

Ratifying the CTBT: Marking a Path For Others To Follow

Secretary Albright

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*Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC,
October 7, 1999.*

Mr. Chairman and Senators: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of a treaty that will make the world safer and America more secure.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT, is not a panacea. It will not guarantee that nuclear weapons spread no further. No pact or policy can ensure that. But the Treaty will make it more difficult and dangerous for countries to develop and modernize nuclear weapons. That is, without question, in the national security interests of the United States.

Under the treaty, America would retain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. But by preventing testing, the treaty will inhibit the development of more advanced weapons by other nuclear weapons states and make it harder for countries that do not now have such weapons to build them.

Our nation has the world's most advanced nuclear capabilities. In the past, we conducted more than 1,000 nuclear explosive tests. Our most experienced and eminent nuclear scientists, and the heads of our testing labs, agree that we do not need to continue these tests in order to maintain an effective deterrent. We can keep our weapons fully safe and reliable under the provisions of the treaty and the special safeguards President Clinton has proposed.

This view is echoed by our senior military leaders, including Gen. Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and four of his predecessors, and has been supported consistently by the chiefs of all our armed services.

America's ability to protect its security without testing is not new. We stopped conducting nuclear explosive tests in 1992. In recent years, such a moratorium has been broadly observed around the world, but—as the exceptions in South Asia last year indicate—restraint depends now almost entirely upon good will.

Since America has no need and does not plan to conduct nuclear explosive tests, the essence of the debate over CTBT should be clear. It is not about preventing America from conducting tests; it is about preventing and dissuading others from doing so. It is about establishing the principle on a global basis that it is not smart, not safe, not right, and not legal to conduct explosive tests in order to develop or modernize nuclear weapons.

By banning such tests, the treaty removes a key tool that a modernizer or a proliferator would need to develop with confidence small, advanced nuclear warheads. These are the weapons that can most readily be concealed and that can be

MESSAGE TO OUR READERS

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delivered by ballistic missiles. They are the most threatening to others and to us. No country could be confident of developing them under the CTBT.

Some say the treaty is too risky because countries might cheat. But by approving the treaty, what exactly would we be risking? With no treaty, other countries can test without cheating—and without limit.

The CTBT would improve our ability to deter and detect clandestine nuclear weapons activity in three ways.

First, every signatory would be required to accept intrusive monitoring.

Second, the treaty establishes a comprehensive international verification regime, with more than 320 data-gathering stations of four different types that can register nuclear explosions anywhere in the world. A great deal of the information collected by these sensor stations would not otherwise be available to our intelligence community.

And **third**, the treaty would give us the right to call for on-site inspections when we have evidence a test has occurred.

Obviously, we will continue to make full use of our own national technical means. But we will have more extensive access in more countries of interest under the treaty than we would ever have without it. And the more countries that support and participate in the treaty, the harder it will be for others to cheat, and the higher the price they will pay if they do.

Mr. Chairman, some have suggested that the treaty is not verifiable because we cannot be absolutely certain of detecting very low-yield tests. Strictly speaking, that is true with or without the treaty. But by improving our capacity to monitor, we are much more likely under the treaty to detect such tests and consequently to deter them. The CTBT prohibits all explosive tests, and we would take any sign of cheating very seriously.

But our citizens should know that low-yield explosions would be of little use in developing new or more ad-

vanced weapons systems. And we are confident that we could detect and deter any tests that could damage U.S. security interests.

Another criticism I have heard of the treaty is that it is premature. We should wait, some say, both until our ability to detect even the smallest tests is 100%, which may never happen, or until every country about which we are concerned has ratified the treaty first. I can only reply that this is a recipe for followership, not leadership.

The purpose of our national security policy should be to help shape events, not simply observe them. We

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want other countries, including Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, to ratify this treaty and undertake a binding commitment to refrain from nuclear explosive tests.

But how can we convince them to do so if we will not? If we wait, why shouldn't they? Waiting is not a strategy; waiting is the absence of a strategy. If we believe nuclear restraint is the right approach, we should ratify this treaty and mark a path for others to follow.

After all, we heard the same arguments during the debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Opponents said we should wait. But once we decided to move ahead, five countries, including China, chose to submit their ratifications on the same day we did. Cuba ratified a week later, and Iran, Pakistan, and Russia followed within 8 months.

Over the past 2 days, I have been asked whether I would prefer to see a vote on this treaty delayed rather than have it voted down. I have only one preference, and that is to see the treaty approved as soon as possible. The reason is not sentiment but sense. This treaty would help America.

And I hope that Senators who now oppose the CTBT or who are undecided will think very carefully about what the consequences would be if the treaty were not approved, because it would be a national security tragedy if the world's greatest deliberative body killed a treaty that our nation has sought for 40 years by failing properly to deliberate on and appreciate its merits.

Under those circumstances, we would have preserved the right to do something we have no need and no intention of doing, while giving a free pass to those who may want to conduct nuclear explosive tests and could one day do us harm:

- We would have ignored the best national security advice of our top military leaders.
- We would have missed a priceless chance to improve our ability to detect and deter nuclear tests.
- We would have denied the vision and betrayed the dream of the two Presidents who first proposed and pursued the comprehensive test ban—Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy.
- And we would have done damage to American interests in every region: in Asia, by throwing away a valuable tool for slowing the modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and by sending a very confusing signal to North Korea;

in South Asia, by cutting the legs out from under our efforts to persuade India and Pakistan to sign and ratify the CTBT, in Russia, by reducing our credibility on nonproliferation issues with a government we have continually urged to take proliferation seriously; in the Gulf, by easing worldwide pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions; and, in Europe, the Americas, and around the globe, by disappointing our allies and friends, many of whom have ratified the treaty and are, without exception, urging us to do the same.

Senators, in recent years, I have traveled to every corner of the world. I have met with senior officials from most nations. In that time, I have not heard a single expression of doubt about the overwhelming power and reliability of our nuclear deterrent or about our ability and resolve to defend America's vital interests.

What I have heard are questions about whether America would continue to lead in reducing the threat that nuclear proliferation poses to citizens in every country. I have heard the concern that we would insist on reserving the right to conduct nuclear explosive

tests and thereby give every country with the potential to develop nuclear weapons a green light to do so.

Let us be clear: It is potential proliferators who need to test; we do not. It is those who might wish to modernize; we set the standard for modernization. By approving the CTBT, we can go far to lock in a technological status quo that protects us without threatening others. At the same time, we would strike a historic blow against the spread of nuclear weapons.

But if we send this treaty down to defeat, we will fuel ambitions and fears that could multiply the number and danger of nuclear weapons even as the new century dawns.

Mr. Chairman, it just so happens that about 3 weeks ago, I was blessed with my fourth grandchild and first granddaughter. Her name is Madeleine. I hope I am not being selfish when I say that I want Madeleine and others her age to grow up like those of us on both sides of this table in one respect could not. I want her to grow up free from the fear of nuclear attack. I believe that the CTBT will give her and

her generation a better chance. I fear that without the treaty, the spread of nuclear dangers could create risks even graver than those we faced.

In recent days, I have heard opponents refer to this treaty to ban nuclear explosive tests as dangerous. Call me illogical, but I believe that, given where the United States now stands in the world, it is unrestrained nuclear explosive tests that are dangerous.

I know this treaty can't eliminate all the risks that we and our families will face. But like President Clinton, Secretary Cohen, American military leaders past and present, and our nation's allies from Ottawa to Paris and London to Tokyo, I am convinced this landmark agreement will reduce those risks.

I urge each Senator to think carefully before voting, to put partisan considerations aside and to cast your vote in support of American leadership on behalf of a safer world and in favor of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Thank you. ■

Women and Foreign Policy: A Call to Action

Secretary Albright

*Remarks at the Women's Conference, Los Angeles, California,
October 5, 1999.*

Thank you Governor, very much, for that introduction. Mrs. Sharon Davis, distinguished sponsors, women and friends of women of California: Good afternoon. This conference is billed as a call to action, and I see before me thousands of people who are ready to answer that call.

California is the place for those who refuse to spend their lives waiting for others to act. This is the State of doers—of Gray Davis, Dianne Feinstein, Barbara Boxer, and no less than 13 women Members of the U.S. House of Representatives.

It is a State that fuels much of the vast network of non-governmental organizations that drives social progress in our nation and world today. And it is the State whose very name has become a synonym for the future, for the cutting edge, as evidenced by the scholarship winners you honor today. Their achievements and promise show again that, with opportunity, there is no field in which women cannot excel and no limit to what women can achieve.

I, myself, am extremely grateful for the chance President Clinton has given me to serve as Secretary of State. It has been, and remains, an extraordinary experience which I recommend highly to anyone who is willing to wait until I am through.

When I first took office, I was asked what it was like to be the first women in the job. I said that, “Well, I have been a woman for 60 years, and Secretary of State for about 6 hours; we’ll just have to wait and see how the two go together.”

In the time since, I have not pleased everyone, but I have made an impression on a few. For example, *Time* magazine named me one of their 25 most intriguing people, along with a cloned sheep. The Serb press referred to me as “elderly, but dangerous.”

And a fourth-grade class in Minnesota elected me to their new wax museum. This is true. A girl in the class wrote me a very charming letter and sent me a copy of her essay which highlighted a dinner I allegedly served to Jordan’s Queen Noor consisting of “Hamburger Helper and Pringles.”

At any rate, my intention today is to discuss women and foreign policy, but before I do, I want to highlight an especially timely question that should be on any woman’s agenda—and any man’s; that is, whether the United States Senate should approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty when it comes to a vote during the next week.

That treaty has a very simple purpose: to ban nuclear explosive tests by anyone, anywhere, anytime—for all time.

The treaty has been a goal of U.S. Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy. If approved and enforced, it would arrest both the development and the spread of new and more dangerous weapons. It has been widely endorsed by our military and scientific leaders. And it would make our nation and our world safer.

The United States today has no plans and no need to conduct nuclear explosive tests. It is in our interests to establish the principle that such tests are not smart, not safe, not right, and not legal—and to make it harder for countries to cheat by creating—as the treaty would—an improved detection and monitoring regime.

Essentially the choice is this. We can approve the treaty and strike a historic blow against the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. Or we can defeat the treaty and fuel the ambitions and fears that could drive more and more countries to say “yes” to the nuclear option.

It just so happens that I have a new grandchild, 2 weeks old, named Madeleine. And I want nothing more than for her to be able to grow up—as I did not—free from the fear of nuclear war.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not ensure that, but it will move us in the right direction. I hope

you agree that, for the sake of all our grandchildren, that is the direction the Senate should choose.

Again, the choice is between a safer world and a more dangerous one. I felt it important that I come to Washington to discuss this choice with you here in California. Now it is important that California's voice be heard in Washington. Ensuring that essential voices be heard is also part of the larger theme that I want to discuss with you today.

I am proud to be the first Secretary of State to address this California Women's Conference, which is another way of saying I am proud to be one of you. Because we are part of a movement to advance the status of women and girls that is one of the great success stories of the 20th century. One hundred years ago, except in a handful of States, we could not vote. We had virtually no voice in government, the professions, and academia. And our clothes were designed by structural engineers.

That is why we look back with such gratitude to the pioneers, such as Lucretia Mott, Susan B. Anthony, and Sojourner Truth, who devoted their lives to making the pledge of liberty and justice for all a reality.

Your theme today is "celebrate the past," which we do and "create the future," which we must—for our movement is still young, still blossoming, still spreading the good news of equality and empowerment. It is far more than an American movement; the cause of women's rights has long since gone global.

In 1995, I had the privilege of seeing this firsthand at the Fourth World Conference on Women. Its Platform for Action is perhaps the most significant affirmation ever made of the global importance of economic, political, and social opportunities for women.

For the past 3 years, I have had the honor of serving as chair of the President's Interagency Council on Women, with a mandate direct from the White House to implement the

Platform for Action in the United States. This has been an extraordinarily exciting part of my job.

Working with women and men throughout our government, and in partnership with organizations in California and other States, we have made enormous progress. If you go down the list—from curbing violence against women to fostering participation in the global economy—the Council has pushed, and America's women and their families have benefited.

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Later this month, in partnership with NGOs, the Council will kick off a series of regional outreach meetings to prepare for the fifth anniversary of the Beijing Conference. I am delighted that the California Women's Action Agenda will be a leader in this effort, and I invite the participation of you all. This process will culminate with a special session of the UN General Assembly next June.

For the United States, helping women to advance is the right thing to do at home—and the smart thing. That is also true around the world.

As we approach the new century, we know that American prosperity, security, and freedom depend on whether others have those blessings as well. There can be no doubt that the contributions of women are needed to achieve these goals.

We are encouraging such contributions through our Vital Voices Global Democracy Initiative, which is bringing women leaders from everywhere

together to compare notes and learn practical skills, such as how to run an office, grow a business, enact laws, and advocate effectively for change.

Our goal is to help ensure that from the smallest village to the largest city, women's voices are heard at the ballot box, in legislatures, and on the airwaves and in classrooms, courtrooms, and boardrooms.

This is critical because, as we scan the horizon today, we see that despite the great strides made in recent decades, women remain an undervalued and underdeveloped human resource. This is not to say that women have trouble finding work.

In many societies, in addition to bearing and nurturing the children, women do most of the non-child related work. But often, women are barred from owning land and permitted little if any say in government, while girls are often excluded from schools and provided less nourishment than boys.

In our diplomacy, we are working with others to change that because we know from experience that when women's voices are heard and choices heeded, societies are better able to break the chains of poverty. Birth rates stabilize. Environmental awareness increases. The spread of AIDS and other sexually transmitted disease slows. And socially constructive values are more likely to be passed on to the young.

We are fortunate that our government is led by someone who does understand. As President Clinton has said, "If women can live and work as equal partners in any society, then families will flourish. And when they do, communities and nations will thrive." Vice President Gore has also been an outstanding leader in advancing the status of women, and I was delighted to learn that Tipper Gore will be addressing your conference this afternoon. As a result of their support, our overseas programs today include many projects designed to help women gain redress, achieve access, and make progress.

For example, we recently gave \$17 million in American wheat to Yemen, which sold it and used the proceeds for rural health and girls' education. In Uruguay, we used interest payments on the government's debt to build a hospital for children with severe health problems.

USAID programs in Peru have helped to integrate women into the free market economy, reduce illiteracy, and promote political participation. In Ethiopia, we are helping to increase the number of female teachers, who then provide positive role models for girls. In Morocco, over the past 5 years, USAID has helped cut infant mortality in half, while doubling the school participation of girls from rural areas.

At our initiative, women were integrated into the peace-building effort in Bosnia earlier this decade. Now, we are making an even stronger effort in Kosovo, where NGOs are helping women and girls to recover from war, resume their educations, and generate income.

These initiatives make sense, and they are making a difference. Economists will tell you that, especially in the developing world, income controlled by the mother is far more likely to be used to promote the health and education of children than income controlled by the father.

We also support international family planning programs, because we believe that women have a right to control their own bodies and because we want to reduce the number of abortions and make it more likely that when children are born, they grow up healthy and strong.

Similarly, we are speaking up on behalf of the women and girls of Afghanistan, who have been victimized by all factions in their country's bitter civil war. The most powerful of those factions, the Taliban, seems determined to drag Afghan women back from the dawn of the 21st century to somewhere closer to the 13th. The only female rights they appear to recognize are the rights to remain silent and uneducated, unheard, and unemployed.

Afghan women and girls have asked for our help. I know because, not long ago, I sat in a tent in the mountains of Central Asia and listened to their stories. I will tell you what I told them.

The United States cannot and will not abandon you. We are increasing our support for education and training. And we have made it clear that if the leaders of the Taliban or any other Afghan faction want international acceptance, they must treat women not as chattel, but as people—and they must respect human rights.

Fifty years ago, a great American First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, was the driving force behind the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Four years ago, at the Women's Conference in Beijing, another great First Lady—Hillary Rodham Clinton—eloquently reaffirmed America's commitment to that declaration and to its application to all people—stating specifically that there can be no distinction drawn between human rights and women's rights, for each includes the other, and both must be observed.

The Universal Declaration embodies values that are central to all cultures, reflecting both the wondrous diversity that defines us and the common humanity that binds us. Unfortunately, today, despite the progress that has been made, in many countries, appalling abuses are still committed against women. These include coerced abortions and sterilizations, children sold into prostitution, ritual mutilations, dowry murders, and domestic violence.

There are those who suggest that all this is cultural, and there's nothing we can do about it. I say it's criminal, and we each have a responsibility to stop it. That is why we will never cease in our effort to gain Senate approval of what has been called the international Bill of Rights for Women. I know there are some in this auditorium, such as Billie Heller, who have devoted countless hours to this cause, and I salute you. I hope we would all agree that, after 18 years, it is long past time for America

to become party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

We are also backing strongly the international war crimes tribunals, because we believe that the authors of ethnic cleansing should be held accountable, and those who see rape as just another tactic of war must pay for their crimes.

In addition, we are supporting the efforts of women in some countries to reform laws governing so-called honor crimes. These are laws that set a double standard, saying in some situations if a woman injures her husband, it's a felony; while if a man injures his wife, it's understandable. I don't know about you, but it seems to me that the job of upholding honor should be a joint responsibility.

Finally, we have launched a major diplomatic and law enforcement initiative to halt trafficking in women and girls. This is one of the fastest-growing criminal enterprises in the world, preying on the economic desperation of a million or more women every year, robbing them of health and hope.

Our strategy is to educate the public, assist the victims, protect the vulnerable, and apprehend the perpetrators. Our approach is to develop and implement specific plans in key countries, including our own. For example, as a result of talks I had in Israel, the government has set up special police units to combat trafficking. We have established a joint working group with Italy and prepared a comprehensive strategy with Ukraine to protect victims and prosecute traffickers.

Two weeks ago, in New York, I had my annual dinner with the world's other women foreign ministers. We are not a large group, but neither are we shy. This year we issued a letter urging people everywhere to mobilize, because at the dawn of the new century, if anything is wrong, trafficking and slavery are wrong.

The women and girls who have been victimized deserve to have their voices heard. And if we apply a standard of zero tolerance to those who

sell illegal drugs, we should be at least as tough in opposing those who buy and sell human beings.

Before closing, I must add that the work America does on behalf of its interest in advancing the status of women and girls costs money. When bureaus within the State Department present their budget proposals to me, they know I will ask "Where are the funds for women in development?" And "what are the projects to aid women's rights?"

Unfortunately, the resources we have available for foreign policy today have not kept pace with our responsibilities. For years, our workload has gone up, while our budget has gone down.

To make matters worse, this year, Congress is proposing a cut of more than \$2 billion in what the President has requested for international affairs. This does not count another \$2 billion in emergency needs that have arisen since our budget was prepared. We are facing a huge shortfall that is potentially very harmful to America and that would make it impossible for me to do my job.

People often don't believe me when I tell them what is true—that only one penny out of every dollar the Federal

Government spends goes for international affairs. But in many situations, diplomacy is our first line of defense, not only in helping women, but more broadly in preventing war, defusing crises, countering terror, safeguarding the environment, and fighting disease.

So I hope we will have your support in giving us the resources we need to lead for women, for men, and for all Americans.

Today's Conference on Women is a call to action. In recent years, I have had the honor of seeing many who, like you, are answering that call: usually not in fancy meeting rooms or the councils of state, but in villages constructed out of mud and tin; in urban health clinics where malnutrition and disease conspire against life; in arid wastelands where nothing grows but the appetites of small children.

It is in these places that I have most often stood in the presence of women who are acting despite great odds; women who have been beaten back, beaten down, and beaten up but never defeated because their pride is too strong, their love too fierce, their spirit unshatterable.

The women's movement has endured and prospered not because it is trendy, but because of the underlying power of its central premise, which is

that every individual counts. This basic idea of valuing each human person fairly is what has united our movement across the boundaries of geography, status, and culture; through the window of time; back to our great-great grandmothers; and forward to embrace the youngest girls here in this auditorium today.

This philosophy is not based on any illusions. Advocates of social progress have seen far too much of hardship and frustration to indulge in sentimentalism. But we live in a nation and a world that has been enriched beyond measure by those who have overcome enormous obstacles to build platforms of knowledge and accomplishment from which others might advance.

It is said that all work that is worth anything is done in faith. So, on this day of celebrating the past and creating the future, let us all pledge to keep the faith—believing that every door opened by our striving, every life enriched by our giving, every soul inspired by our commitment, and every barrier to justice brought down by our determination will ennoble our own lives, inspire others, and explode outward the boundaries of what is achievable in this golden State and on this earth.

Thank you very much. ■

The Importance of Public Diplomacy To American Foreign Policy

Secretary Albright

Remarks at a ceremony commemorating the consolidation of the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency, Washington, DC, October 1, 1999.

Thank you for that great introduction Ambassador-designate Elam. Under Secretary Lieberman, Penn Kemble, men and women of USIA: Good morning. What a beautiful, gorgeous day for this important ceremony.

Ecclesiastes tells us that there is a time to rejoice and a time to mourn. Today, some of you may be more inclined to the latter emotion, but I hope you will find room in your hearts and minds for both.

As earlier speakers have stressed, in 46 years of independence, USIA did so much to advance American security and promote democracy that its accomplishments will always be honored and its name forever revered. USIA employees, past and present, have profound reasons for pride.

But do not doubt: Your mission of explaining America and reaching out to the world is more important now than ever. It is a national security imperative that public diplomacy survive and thrive in its new home. I believe it will, and so will those who practice it.

In joining the Department of State, you change it forever. That is why today we mark the birth of a new State Department, enriched by ACDA and bolstered now by the finest institution of public diplomacy the world has ever known. Together, we are one team,

America's team. And in the face of new challenges, in response to new times, we must join strength to strength in Washington, as we have for so long in our missions abroad.

I know that some of you may be wary about the reception you will receive within State. You may believe that the mission and importance of public diplomacy are not well understood. You may question the ability of your new colleagues to appreciate and use cutting-edge technology. You may fear that, in different surroundings, your voice will not be heard.

The advice I offer is simply this: If we are not listening to you, raise your voice. If we are on the wrong track, help us find the right one. If there is something important we do not see, show us.

Because we have much to learn from you—from your expertise in communications; your depth of cultural understanding; your openness; and your ability to work with NGOs, businesses, universities, and other non-State actors, who are on-line, plugged in and increasingly important.

This morning, as you join and thereby help create the new Department of State, I offer three basic understandings.

The **first** is that, in our era of public diplomacy, it is not simply nice to have it; it must be a core element in our foreign policy—for if American interests and values are to advance, we must make ourselves understood when we act to promote and protect them. We must tell our story, present the facts, provide explanations, clear up distortions, and rebut lies.

Public diplomacy is the instrument we use to share America's perspective, and no one does public diplomacy better than you do. You understand that we must make our case in language our listeners will comprehend, through media to which they will have access, and with a content they will find relevant to their own experience.

You also know that the process of educating others about America is a marathon, not a sprint. If we are to be understood, we must do more than provide a description today of yesterday's policy. The respect of the world is earned over time. With your skill, we will continue to use the technology of the moment for enduring gains.

The **second** understanding everyone in the new Department of State must share is that integration is not subjugation; it is an arrangement among partners.

I will tell you what I have told Under Secretary Lieberman. From this day forward, public diplomacy must and will be an integral part of our major foreign policy initiatives from the day those policies are conceived. Your unique angle of vision will be vital to us as we frame our strategy.

This means that public diplomacy must be treated fairly in the budget process. And public diplomacy professionals must have every opportunity for recognition and advancement within the State system.

Third, we must preserve the integrity and value of our international scholarship, exchange, and visitor programs. I have a deep commitment to these programs because, when I was a professor I was an AMPART. I participated in them. I have seen them work.

In relatively closed societies, they provide a rare chance to establish outside contacts and explore wonderfully dangerous ideas such as freedom. In transitional countries, they provide a means of educating future leaders about the nuts and bolts of democratic institutions. And in every nation they touch, they help open the door of opportunity to minorities and women.

For decades, these programs have made friends for America. And let there be no doubt, they are by law and by right nonpolitical programs. They are not pork; they are pure gold, and we

must manage them. We have to manage them because they are the precious assets for America.

As we have discussed, one reason our public diplomacy succeeds is because we use advanced technology to convey information. But that alone does not explain its strength.

You know and I know that the ability to transmit information with speed and scope is a power that, like all others, can be abused, as well as used. We think of the Hutu broadcasts that contributed to the genocide in Rwanda. We think of the propaganda put out by extremists in the Balkans.

We think of the communist “Big Lie” and of George Orwell’s “Big Brother,” from a futuristic novel, set in a time now 15 years ago.

We look back even further and hear radio described as a weapon “that doesn’t stop at borders and doesn’t turn back before closed doors; that jumps rivers, mountains and seas and that is able to force all people under the spell of one powerful spirit.” So said the chief of Nazi propaganda in 1935. It should be clear to all that American public diplomacy succeeds not because it conveys information but because of the information it conveys.

That is why, for almost half a century, USIA has been the most effective antipropaganda institution on the face of the earth. It pioneered a public diplomacy based not on self-serving fictions but rather on openness and truth—and truth not as narrowly

defined by some dictatorial regime but as broadly defined by the clash of free minds in vigorous debate.

American public diplomacy will remain strong only if we adhere to this proud USIA tradition; only if the story we tell reflects America’s identity as a free society, tolerant of different opinions and confident that it is through the search of free men and women for truth that all human progress occurs.

This morning, I am honored to welcome you as co-architects in building a vigorous and farsighted American foreign policy with public diplomacy at its core—a policy that will lead our nation and the world into a new era, where information will matter greatly and freedom even more.

Let me also say how very much I feel this personally. I am so glad to be the Secretary of State at the time that this has happened. I have personally believed in public diplomacy before I ever believed I could be America’s first diplomat. And to have you become a part of the State Department at a time that I am running it is the deepest honor for me. I pledge to you that when I say you are central to American foreign policy, you will be central to American foreign policy. And Evelyn Lieberman will always be at my side representing the best in American public diplomacy.

So thank you again this morning for this honor. ■

America's Stake in a Democratic Russia

Secretary Albright

*Address at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, DC, September 16, 1999.*

Thank you very much, Jessica. I am very glad to be here with everybody this morning and to be here before such a learned audience, including distinguished members of the diplomatic corps, as the guest of this venerable and unique institution.

The Carnegie Endowment has been a training ground for many of the all-stars in the State Department during the Clinton Administration and throughout this century. Your programs are a rich source of information and ideas, and you help make our international organizations more effective. You publish one of the world's indispensable foreign policy journals. Mort Abramowitz's brainchild, the Carnegie Moscow Center, is a truly unique forum for high-level discourse, which is the State Department's term for no-holds-barred argument, about the full range of U.S.-Russia ties.

This is appropriate because today, while the rest of America talks about the weather, I want to talk about Russia. In recent weeks, reports of alleged money laundering and corruption in that country have raised questions and aroused some rather extraordinary comment on Capitol Hill about the direction in which Russia is headed.

I thought it might be useful to revisit the what, why, and how of American policy toward Russia, in light of the critical future choices both countries must make.

In so doing, I hope we will bear in mind that Russia is not a watch or a set of keys that can be misplaced. It is a nation of almost 150 million people that has, for more than three centuries, been among the world's major powers. The suggestion made by some that Russia is ours to lose is arrogant; the suggestion that Russia is lost is simply wrong.

After all, since the Cold War ended, first President Bush and then President Clinton have pursued two basic goals in our relations with Russia. The first is to increase the safety of the American people by working to reduce Cold War arsenals, stop proliferation, and create a stable and undivided Europe. The second is to support Russia's effort to transform its political, economic, and social institutions at home. Neither of these goals has been fully achieved, but neither has been lost. Each remains a work in progress. We remain determined to work with Russia and our allies to accomplish each.

We are under no illusions that this will happen overnight, nor do we underestimate the grave obstacles that exist. Russia is in the midst of a wrenching transition, made far more difficult by its long history of highly centralized and, in this century, totalitarian rule.

Eight years ago, when I was still a professor, I participated in a survey of attitudes toward democracy and a market system in Russia.

It was around the time the Soviet Union broke up. We found the Russian people eager for change in the abstract, but as Pushkin wrote in a different context, "lost in the snowstorm" about what democracy would mean. They seemed poorly prepared for capitalism.

The idea of rewarding more productive work with higher pay was alien. Dependence on the state was deeply ingrained. People had no experience with competitive markets. They were deeply divided not only by ethnicity but also by age, gender, level of education, and urban from rural.

My conclusion at the time was that transforming Russia into a functioning pluralist society with a market system would be a "herculean task." Today, we hear some say the job is not only herculean, but hopeless. I obviously don't agree.

Russia's future course is uncertain. A flood of forces, many in opposition to each other, have been unleashed. Currents of free enterprise, initiative, and greater freedom compete with those of corruption and crime. Impulses toward integration and openness vie with tendencies toward isolation and alienation. Time will tell which of these prevail. All we can be sure of now is that the result will be distinctively Russian—and that it will depend ultimately far less on decrees handed down in Moscow—or on the advice of outsiders—than on the decisions made

and opinions formed in Russia's classrooms, farms, factories, and livingrooms.

It is grounds for encouragement, then, that the Russian people have, at every opportunity, made clear their rejection both of the Soviet past and a dictatorial future—despite their dissatisfaction with the muddy present. They have yet to see democracy produce, but they have not abandoned democracy's promise.

American policy is based on our own interest in seeing that promise realized. We want Russian democracy to succeed, and we should never forget why.

For some of us, the Cold War is already a fading memory. For many, it is not a memory at all. Today's high school freshmen were 4 years old when the Berlin Wall fell.

But we must remember and learn. The Cold War was not just a useful background for spy fiction. It was a time of relentless and institutionalized tragedy; of proxy wars that destroyed lives on every continent; of barbed wire stretched across Europe's heart; of gulags and forced confessions; and of countless thousands killed while trying to escape.

Above all, it was a time of fear—of showdowns in Korea, Berlin, and Cuba and children taught to hide under their desks. Each night we knew that within minutes, perhaps through a misunderstanding, our world could end and morning never come.

Leaders in Washington and Moscow have no greater responsibility than to ensure that we do not return to that time or any variation of it. That is why, since the Cold War's end, we have been striving to make ever more remote the threat of nuclear war and to halt the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

In those great missions, we have made a good start. Since 1992, our support has helped to deactivate almost 5,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union; eliminate nuclear weapons from three former Soviet Republics; strengthen the security of nuclear weapons and materials at more than 100 sites; and purchase more than 60

tons of highly enriched uranium that could have been used by terrorists or outlaw states to build nuclear weapons. A number of these accomplishments are directly attributable to the work of our binational commission with Russia, chaired on our side by Vice President Gore.

Despite these steps, the job of preventing "loose nukes" is far from complete. That is why the overwhelming majority of our assistance dollars to Russia go to programs that lower the chance that weapons of mass destruction or sensitive missile technology will fall into the wrong hands.

It is why President Clinton announced in January the Expanded

As these discussions and our ongoing high-level talks with North Korea indicate, we are doing all we can diplomatically to defuse regional rivalries and prevent destabilizing developments. And we maintain what is by far the world's most powerful military deterrent.

We are also developing theater missile defense systems to protect our territory, troops, friends, and allies. And we are developing and testing a national missile defense system, with a decision on deployment of a limited system possible as early as next summer.

Already, the President has made some decisions on the changes to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that would

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Threat Reduction Initiative. This includes measures to help Russia tighten export controls, improve security over its arsenals, and provide opportunities for more than 30,000 former Soviet weapons scientists to participate in peaceful commercial and research ventures.

We are also seeking Russia's cooperation in responding to the potential of new dangers posed by long-range missiles. For decades, we viewed this threat primarily through a narrow Cold War lens. But the spread of ballistic missile technology to a number of potentially hostile states has broadened our concerns.

We have pressed Russia to use its new laws and export controls to curtail the flow of missile technologies to countries such as Iran. This was discussed at length in the meeting last Sunday between President Clinton and Prime Minister Putin.

be necessary were we to decide to go forward with deployment. And we have begun discussions with Congress, our allies, and Moscow on these issues.

To the Russians, we have emphasized that these changes would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the treaty, which we value deeply, and which are to maintain stability and enable further reductions in strategic nuclear arms. We have made it clear that we are willing to cooperate with Russia on strategic defense. We have no intention of undermining Russia's nuclear deterrent, and our proposal wouldn't do that. Moreover, we are suggesting substantial further reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. This is a step Moscow welcomes, in part because of the high cost of maintaining nuclear weapons. In short, we seek an agreement that will give us the early protection we need to safeguard our security, without undermining Russia's.

We recognize, of course, that our proposal may be seen by Moscow as asking too much and by some of our domestic critics as demanding too little. Our response to Russian officials is that not only we, but they, are potentially vulnerable to these new threats; that, in any case, they cannot have it both ways. They cannot fail to crack down effectively on the transfer of advanced technologies and then express surprise when we insist on protecting ourselves against threats fueled by those transfers.

Our message to our own citizens is that the best way to protect our security is to provide for our defense, while preserving strategic nuclear cooperation with Moscow. We will not be safer, if in responding to new threats, we revive old ones.

Throughout this decade, we have tried to work with Russia, our allies and partners, to build a Europe that is secure, stable, and free from the divisions that have endangered our own security on numerous occasions during this century.

It remains premature to say what kind of long-term relationship Russia will have with its neighbors, but the progress made during the past decade has been astonishing. If one of the scholars in this room had predicted in 1990 that, by century's end, there would be no Russian forces in the Baltics or central Europe, that Russia would have established a formal partnership with NATO and the EU, and that Russian troops would be serving side-by-side with Americans in Bosnia and Kosovo—I suspect that Carnegie would have politely forwarded the resume of that farsighted scholar to Brookings.

As this audience is well aware, progress with Russia in Europe has not occurred easily or by accident. Russia had differences with us in Bosnia, opposed NATO expansion, and denounced the allied air campaign over Kosovo.

At the same time, we continue to press Russia to join in supporting effective UN Security Council action toward Iraq and to recognize that

Serbia cannot end its isolation as long as Slobodan Milosevic is in power. Such disagreements have led to predictions that the spirit of pragmatic cooperation between Russia and the West will crash and burn. At some point, the pessimists may be proven right. But the relationship has survived headwinds, turbulence, and even a midair turnaround—and is still aloft.

The reason has little to do with sentiment and much to do with common sense. Although many still refuse to admit it, the zero-sum world of the Cold War is truly gone. Future progress will depend not on dominating others, but on forging partnerships aimed at shared security and economic growth.

The greatest opportunities will reside in a healthy global economy fueled by openness and expanded trade. And the most serious threats will be posed by proliferation, regional strife, and—as we have been reminded these past 2 weeks—terror.

In recent days, powerful explosions have claimed the lives of more than 200 civilians, many of them children, in and around Moscow. President Clinton has made clear the shock and anger of the American people at these callous and cowardly acts of murder. Our prayers are with the victims and their loved ones.

We welcome statements by Russian leaders that the explosions do not justify acts of bigotry against any nationality. And we strongly support their efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice by constitutional means. As I told Foreign Minister Ivanov this past week, in the battle against terror, the United States and Russia stand side by side.

The second overriding objective in our policy toward Russia is to encourage its full transition to political democracy, a healthy market economy, and the rule of law. This reinforces our security goals because a stable and democratic Russia is more likely to be a good partner on arms control and questions of international security and peace.

But as we know from our own experience, building democracy is hard. It is especially tough when you are

emerging from a long history of totalitarian rule. The Poles said of the post-Cold War challenge in their own country, “The communists showed us how to turn an aquarium into fish soup. Now, we have to figure out how to turn the soup back into an aquarium.” Unlike Poland, Russia doesn't have the advantage of a democratic model from the past. This has made it harder for the Russian people to recognize and unite around shared goals.

But if anything unites Russians it is the desire to see their country respected. This is wholly legitimate, given Russia's history and past achievements. The question Russians must deal with is how to define their country's greatness anew in the 21st century.

Certainly, success cannot come through a return to some version of the failed systems of the past. It cannot come at the expense of Russia's neighbors or through isolation or hibernation. It can only come through Russia's ability, over a period of years, to build a vibrant democratic society at home and play an honored role in world affairs. Fortunately, democratic habits are among the world's most benign addictions and are starting to spread in Russia.

It is easy to forget that a decade ago, the Communist Party was still the only one allowed by the constitution. Today, there is a whole lot of democracy going on. Russians enjoy greater liberties than at any time in history. The press is outspoken and varied. Civil society is expanding rapidly. And Russians have grown accustomed to voting regularly and speaking their minds freely. In December, critical parliamentary elections are scheduled, and Russia's first-ever democratic transfer of power is anticipated as a result of the presidential election next summer.

America's role will be to support the democratic principles that underlie the elections. USAID will continue its work with NGOs to help provide the infrastructure for elections that are free and fair. We want the will of the

Russian people to be expressed, because nothing could do more damage to Russia, at home or abroad, than a failure to observe the constitutional process. And nothing could do more to cement Russia's place among the world's democracies than the constitutional election and inauguration of Boris Yeltsin's successor.

Unfortunately, the new Russian government will inherit some old problems. The worst fears of a year ago have been avoided, but the Russian people are still suffering great hardships. Many are poor. Wages are low. Pensions are often delayed. Health care is scarce. Democratic institutions are fragile. And there is about as much public faith in the banking system as there is in the legal system—which is to say almost none.

It is true that devaluation of the ruble has raised the price of imports and thereby revived production for the home market in some sectors. But the seeds of long-term growth have hardly taken root. And the deadweight of corruption is holding Russia back.

Although some have suggested that the problem of corruption originated with the post-Cold War democratic reforms, that is not the case. Corruption flourished under the Czars and thrived under the Soviets—but as a state monopoly. The problem now is that Russia has gone from a system with too many bad rules to one with not enough good rules. And without the rule of law firmly in place, foreign investors have hesitated, capital has taken flight, the influential few have distorted markets, and the economy has sagged.

For years, America has tried to help Russia move toward a higher road. In 1993, USAID launched a rule of law project to draft a new civil code, a criminal code, bankruptcy laws, and a legal and regulatory framework that allows Russia's Securities and Exchange Commission to function.

In 1995, President Clinton, in Moscow, called for "a market based on law, not lawlessness." In 1996, Strobe Talbott told the U.S.-Russia Business Council that "President Yeltsin and

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin must bring under control the epidemic of crime and corruption."

In 1997, Vice President Gore took the lead in pressing Russia to enact money laundering and anticrime legislation. The same year, Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers declared "we must recognize that a successful campaign against crime and corruption [in Russia] must begin at the top." And in a speech last year, I stressed that foreign funds "should be used to help the neediest Russians, not enrich foreign bank accounts."

Unfortunately, the response from Russian authorities has not been adequate. President Yeltsin's government needs—at last—to make fighting corruption a priority. The Russian legal system remains no match for well-connected criminals. And the tentacles of Russian organized crime have spread far beyond the nation's borders.

"... Some Russians attribute the furor over corruption to a desire by the West to embarrass Moscow or to electoral politics here in the United States. These are fantasies. The problem is real and must be taken seriously."

Some Russians attribute the furor over corruption to a desire by the West to embarrass Moscow or to electoral politics here in the United States. These are fantasies. The problem is real and must be taken seriously. Our message to Russian leaders has been to get tough on corruption and to cooperate, in full, with investigations into it, including money laundering and the use of IMF funds, no matter where or to whom the evidence leads.

We are encouraged that Prime Minister Putin sent a high-level team to the United States this week to discuss issues involved in the current controversy. We also acknowledge that the problem of corruption is by no means limited to Russia. On the contrary, it is a plague present to one degree or another in every nation, and those trying to move from a closed system to

democracy are especially vulnerable. But that does not reduce the harm it causes to Russia's reputation and economy, nor diminish the need for effective action.

In the days to come, we will need to work even more vigorously with those in Russia who want to create the "good rules" their society needs. This includes enacting anticrime and money laundering legislation. It includes financial sector reforms that stress transparency and accountability. It includes judicial training and advice on fair and efficient tax collection. It includes developing and enforcing standards to prevent conflicts of interest in government. And it includes helping small and medium-sized businesses to escape the shadow of the monopolies and become a driving force in Russia's economy.

But we also need to keep our heads about us. It is right to focus on the

cloud of corruption in Russia, as we have been doing for some time. But it is not the whole picture.

Today, in Russia, unlike the past, allegations of corruption, incompetence, and other shortcomings are lodged against even the highest levels openly and often. The press and public can investigate, criticize, and question. This fall, in the regions of Russia most notorious for corruption, political leaders face challengers who have made clean government their rallying cry.

This seems normal to us, but in Russia, it is revolutionary. And when coupled with the growing emergence of the post-Soviet generation, and Russia's ongoing search for a new and honored national identity, as evidenced by their pride in observing this year the

200th anniversary of Pushkin's birth—it holds the promise of positive change. These are reasons to increase our efforts with Russia, not—as some suggest—to cut our aid and walk away.

Obviously, we shouldn't send good money after bad policy, but neither should we turn our backs on good people doing the right things. And that is precisely who and what our aid programs are designed to support.

Unfortunately, Congress is proposing a 25%-30% cut in the amount President Clinton has requested for programs in Russia and elsewhere in the New Independent States next year. This would require unacceptable and self-defeating tradeoffs. And it ignores the fact that our programs directly serve important American interests and values.

We have made clear that we will not support further multilateral assistance to Russia unless fully adequate safeguards are in place. And we have always kept a close eye on our bilateral aid.

As I noted earlier, most of this bilateral assistance supports nonproliferation. This is critical because each nuclear warhead safely dismantled, each ton of highly enriched uranium that is secured, each nuclear scientist that is put to work on a civilian project makes our world a little less dangerous.

The remainder of our programs are designed primarily to strengthen democracy at the grassroots where Russia's future direction will be determined. Examples include our exchanges that have enabled 35,000 Russian leaders of tomorrow to witness first hand the workings of America's free market democracy.

More than a quarter million Russian entrepreneurs have benefited from our training, consulting or small loans. We have helped develop independent Russian media, which now include more than 300 regional television stations. We have aided independent trade unions in seeking to establish their legal rights. And USAID has worked

directly with more than 15% of the 65,000 NGOs that have begun operating in Russia this decade.

Some might say that our modest programs cannot affect much in a nation as large as Russia. I would say that a small difference has the potential to make all the difference when the cause is just and the time is right. Earlier this year, I had the chance to meet with representatives of the civil society in Moscow. I found among them a fierce commitment to democracy, free press, religious tolerance, and the rights of women. They also expressed deep appreciation for the assistance we have provided. These champions of human rights are not ready to quit on Russia, and we should not quit on them.

I told them that the American people know it is in our interests for Russia to succeed—and that we want to see a Russia with legal structures that ensure due process for everyone, including dedicated activists such as Alexander Nikitin. We want to see a Russia where bigotry is shunned and anti-Semitism everywhere condemned. We want to see a Russia as renowned for its freedom as for its culture, music, literature, and the bravery of its people. I know what the cynics may say, but I believe the ongoing surge in non-governmental organizations in Russia is a big deal. As Sergei Kovalyov, the eminent human rights advocate has said, "the quality of democracy depends on the quality of democrats. We have to wait for a critical mass of people with democratic principles to accumulate." He said, "It's like a nuclear explosion: The critical mass has to accrue."

No one can predict when, or if, that day will come. Certainly, it will not come immediately. Probably, it will not come suddenly, but rather in fits and starts. But it most assuredly will not come at all if we, who championed liberty through five decades of Cold War, desert liberty's cause in Russia now.

I say to you and to my friends on Capitol Hill that we are proud of our efforts to help equip Russians with the

tools they need to build the kind of future that will be best for them—and for us. We will fight for our assistance programs, and we are confident that we will have in the future as we have had in the past, strong bipartisan support.

In recent years, Russia has moved from one critical point to another: the confrontation with parliament; the war in Chechnya; the rise of extreme nationalists; the resurgence of hard-line communists; the financial crisis; the disagreement over Kosovo; and now investigations into money laundering and corruption.

Each time, the chorus has arisen to pronounce the death of the new Russia. And each time, the Russian people have refused to attend the funeral. Tolstoy wrote once that "the strongest of all warriors are these two—time and patience."

These are not qualities Americans have in abundance, but they are needed now in our approach to Russia. It is beyond our prerogative and our power to determine Russia's future. But we can shape our own policy. We can be hostile and dismissive toward Russia and risk recreating our enemy, or we can explore with vision and persistence the full possibilities of this new era.

In choosing the latter course, we will continue to encourage Russia's integration with the West. We will fulfill our joint responsibility with Russia to safeguard the world from nuclear war. We will help Russia find its place in a new Europe without walls, wholly at peace and fully free. And we will extend our hand to the Russian people as they strive—after 1,000 years of history—to consolidate the institutions of freedom in their great land.

That is a work worthy of the spiritual descendants of Andrew Carnegie and this Endowment. And it is a task I hope everyone in this room, and our citizens across the country, will continue to support.

Thank you very much. ■

Three Steps Toward Peace, Democracy, And Renewal in Kosovo

Secretary Albright

*Remarks to Kosovar Albanians at the U.S. Institute of Peace Conference,
Washington, DC, September 14, 1999.*

Thank you very much, Chet. Chet and I were colleagues for a long time at Georgetown University, and it's very nice to be colleagues in this enterprise also.

Good morning to everybody and I'm so very, very pleased to be able to welcome you to the Department of State. As you may know, I have just come back from a rather long trip to the Middle East and to Asia, and I came back especially early because I did not want to miss the chance to meet with all of you and to talk to you—the mothers and fathers of a democratic Kosovo. I thank you all for changing your schedule to make my participation possible.

I also want to thank Dick Solomon and the U.S. Institute of Peace for organizing this conference—and for your dedication to the cause of peace in Kosovo, throughout the Balkans, and around the world. I want to congratulate Vjosa Dobruna, Xheraldina Vula, Muhamet Mustafa, and everyone—every one of you—for the encouraging reports you have just presented. After all that has happened, there is no better feeling than to see the people of Kosovo at peace, hard at work, and planning for the future of what will always be your rightful home.

I think it really is quite appropriate that you should have had your meeting in Virginia—a State which for all

Americans is deeply identified with the creation of an American democracy, and so it's very nice that you met at Lansdowne. I'm only sorry that I wasn't here so that you could meet at my farm so that this could be called the Hillsborough declaration.

You have heard new voices and different views. And with the Lansdowne Declaration you have drafted, you have taken responsibility for building Kosovo's institutions—and with them, a better future.

What is more, I see that you have achieved a new appreciation for the importance of women's full participation in political life. I understand that several wives in Pristina are going to be pleasantly surprised when their newly enlightened husbands return.

You have done an inspiring job at Lansdowne of bridging differences and creating the common ground upon which a democratic Kosovo may be built. Already, you have accomplished much in Kosovo as well: Almost 800,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees have returned to their homes.

UNMIK and KFOR are revising upward their estimates of Serbs and other minorities choosing to remain in Kosovo. We hope many more will be able to return. Great progress has been made toward rebuilding homes and preparing for the winter. The economy

is rapidly reviving, as factories reopen and new businesses appear daily. Schools have opened, and ethnic Albanian children are receiving the public Albanian-language education they were so long denied.

Judges and prosecutors appointed by the UN Mission in Kosovo have begun to hear cases, laying the foundation for a system of justice administered for Kosovars by Kosovars. The Kosovar Police Academy opened last week with its first class of 168 students.

Kosovo's independent media are vigorous and expanding, thanks in no small part to the efforts of many in this room. This remarkable progress is a testament to the determination of the people of Kosovo to build lives better than what they have known before—and to the desire of the international community to support all of you in doing that.

After months of violence, 10 years of Belgrade's repression, and more than 50 years of communist centralization, it would be wrong and foolish to expect one summer to cure all of Kosovo's troubles and problems. I believe that most Kosovars are trying, as fast as you can, to tackle their difficulties honestly. In short, I believe in you.

But after all that the people of Kosovo have suffered and lost, they—and you—should not accept anything

less than true democracy and lasting peace. And neither democracy nor peace is sustainable without respect for human rights. If everyone is not safe in Kosovo, ultimately no one will be safe; and if all are not equal under the law, ultimately no one will be able to count on the law for protection.

And that is why, as your friend, I will say, plainly, that you must combat the temptations of revenge, corruption, and criminality. Evidence of unchecked criminality would lose you the support of the international community and the trust of your people.

And you must do everything you can to prevent the killing, terrorizing, and expulsion of Serbs and other minorities. Acts of terror harm your own interests. They discourage international humanitarian support and investment, and they give aid and comfort to your enemies. They are seen by some to validate Milosevic's claim that Serbs cannot be safe where ethnic Albanians have power. And by teaching Kosovo's children to hate, they prepare not peace, but discord.

Already, some in the international community have concluded that you cannot build a peaceful, multiethnic democracy; they expect you to fail—and, as Senator Dole told you, they are waiting to be proven right. You have heard the stories. You have been described as prisoners of Balkan history, interested only in doing to the Serbs what they have already done to you.

I can't tell you how to feel. No one can. But I hope and believe that you will aim higher and achieve more than the cynics and bigots expect. I pledge that the United States will stand with you in those efforts. Today I can announce three steps the United States is taking to do our part to support peace, democracy and renewal in Kosovo.

First, after consultations with Congress, the United States has officially opened the U.S. office in Pristina, to represent American interests and serve as a platform for all our efforts in Kosovo. The head of the office, Larry Rossin, is a distinguished

Foreign Service Officer, and he is with us today. We are all very grateful to him, and he's a great friend. Larry, thanks for already doing a great job.

Second, we have begun consultations with Congress toward amending our budget request for fiscal year 2000, which begins next month, to provide substantial additional support for Kosovo and southeast Europe. These new resources will promote Kosovo's democratic development, including the holding of elections, the development

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of a free media, and the rule of law. They will help stand up a Kosovo police force, and they will sustain our own commitment to KFOR.

Third, the United States will support the development of a new civil emergency response organization—the Kosovo Corps. The Kosovo Corps will deal with floods, fires, land mines, and unexploded munitions, as well as assisting with Kosovo's reconstruction. We expect that many members of the KLA will join the Kosovo Corps. Others have joined the new Kosovo police.

With other donors, the United States will support programs for vocational training, scholarships, and other

assistance for KLA veterans. Their energy, skills, and resources are needed to build the peace. It is vital that the KLA carry out fully and faithfully its undertaking to demilitarize by next Sunday, September 19.

Your courage sustained you through times of bitter suffering and hardship. Your courage won you the support of NATO and many others around the world. And now, your courage is needed to win the peace.

Over the past 4 days, you have shown not only courage, but also initiative and wisdom. You have taken the initiative to move Kosovo's political process forward by acknowledging problems with the transition and by establishing a forum for political leaders to meet regularly in Pristina. You have identified economic priorities and the need for transparent and reliable economic structures. And you have already built the foundations for a strong civil society—from a vibrant free press to women's groups to the Mother Teresa Society.

As a former professor, I can tell you that there are as many different ways to run a democracy as there are democracies. And as a long-time resident of one, I can tell you that they are always and everywhere a work in progress.

As someone whose family fled central Europe in search of freedom, I can tell you that your institutions must be strong enough to protect the twin foundations of democracy—individual liberties and the rule of law.

And as someone who believes in you, I can tell you that your work will put you on track toward a Kosovo that will be admired for the justice it extends to all its people, not only some; for the peace it maintains by settling differences through laws, not force; and for the freedom it preserves by choosing leaders with ballots, and not guns.

It will be my privilege to stand with you as you work to put the vision you have melded here into practice — and secure the blessings of liberty for the people of Kosovo.

Thank you. ■



TREATY ACTIONS

MULTILATERAL

Fisheries

Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program, with annexes. Done at Washington May 21, 1998. Entered into force February 15, 1999. *Ratification and entry into force:* Venezuela, September 29, 1999; Nicaragua, October 1, 1999

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives, and International Staff. Done at Ottawa September 20, 1951. Entered into force May 18, 1954. TIAS 2992; 5 UST 1087; 200 UNTS 3.

Signature, ratification, and entry into force: Poland, September 21, 1999.

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their forces. Done at London June 19, 1951. Entered into force August 23, 1953. TIAS 2846; 4 UST 1792; 199 UNTS 67.

Protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty. Done at Paris August 28, 1952. Entered into force April 10, 1954. TIAS 2978; 5 UST 870; 200 UNTS 340.

NATO agreement on the communication of technical information for defense purposes. Done at Brussels

October 19, 1970. Entered into force February 7, 1971. TIAS 7064; 22 UST 347; 800 UNTS 5.

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relating to defense and for which applications for patents have been made. Done at Paris September 21, 1960. TIAS 4672; 12 UST 43; 394 UNTS 3.

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the security of information. Done at Brussels March 6, 1997. Entered into force August 16, 1998.

Accession: Poland, September 21, 1999.

Entry into force: October 21, 1999.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement concerning defense communications services, with annexes. Signed at Washington October 14 and 30, 1998. Entered into force July 13, 1999.

China

Memorandum of understanding concerning settlement of claims relating to deaths, injuries or losses suffered by Chinese personnel as a result of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with annex. Signed at Beijing July 30, 1999. Entered into force July 30, 1999.

Ethiopia

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Addis Ababa August 31 and September 2, 1999. Entered into force September 2, 1999.

Georgia

Agreement regarding grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the furnishing of defense articles, related training, and other defense services from the United States of America to the Government of Georgia. Effected by exchange of notes at Tbilisi June 4 and July 15, 1999. Entered into force July 15, 1999.

Greece

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of July 31, 1991, as extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens July 20 and 26, 1999. Entered into force July 26, 1999.

Honduras

Special objective grant agreement for the Hurricane Reconstruction Program (HRP), with annex. Signed at Tegucigalpa June 9, 1999. Entered into force June 9, 1999.

Agreement amending the special objective grant agreement of June 9, 1999 for the Hurricane Reconstruction

Program (HRP). Signed at Tegucigalpa July 30, 1999. Entered into force July 30, 1999.

Agreement regarding the reduction, consolidation, and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Tegucigalpa August 23, 1999. Entered into force September 27, 1999.

Japan

Protocol amending and extending the agreement of June 20, 1988, as extended, on cooperation in research and development in science and technology. Signed at Washington July 16, 1999. Entered into force July 20, 1999.

Latvia

Agreement between the U.S. and Latvia regarding mutual assistance between their customs administrations. Signed at Washington April 17, 1998. Entered into force July 23, 1999.

Mexico

Memorandum of cooperation in epidemiology. Signed at Mexico City June 4, 1999. Entered into force June 4, 1999.

Russia

Agreement amending the agreement of September 2, 1993, as amended and extended, concerning the provision of material, services, and training relating to the construction of a safe, secure, and ecologically sound storage facility for fissile material derived from the destruction of nuclear weapons. Signed at Moscow and Washington May 21 and 26, 1999. Entered into force May 26, 1999.

Turkmenistan

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Ashgabat July 15 and 20, 1999. Entered into force July 20, 1999.

Uganda

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of

notes at Kampala October 8, 1998 and June 18, 1999. Entered into force June 18, 1999.

Ukraine

Agreement extending the agreement of December 18, 1993, as amended, concerning development of state systems of control, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear materials to promote the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation from Ukraine. Signed at Kiev July 7, 1999. Entered into force July 7, 1999; effective December 18, 1998.

Agreement amending the agreement of December 5, 1993, as amended, concerning the provision of material, services, and related training to Ukraine in connection with the elimination of strategic nuclear arms. Signed at Khmelnytsky July 10, 1999. Entered into force July 10, 1999.

Zambia

Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Lusaka June 23, 1999. Entered into force July 2, 1999. ■