

Arab-Israeli Peace Process Signing Ceremony

Secretary Albright

1

*Remarks at Arab-Israeli Peace Process Signing Ceremony
Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt, Septemeber 4, 1999.*

President Mubarak, Prime Minister Barak, and Chairman Arafat; His Majesty King Abdullah and, I must say, King Hussein in spirit; distinguished colleagues, excellencies, special guests: On behalf of President Clinton and the American people, I am honored to be here with you to mark this moment of accomplishment and renewed resolve in the search for an Arab-Israeli peace.

I begin by thanking our hosts President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Moussa. For many years Egypt has merited the world's admiration as an unwavering and courageous champion of peace. This reputation has only been enhanced by Egypt's strong supporting role in the negotiations just completed.

I especially want to congratulate Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat and their respective negotiating teams headed by Gilad Sher and Saeb Erakat. They have toiled long hours under great pressure in a noble cause, and they have succeeded.

In addition, I want to highlight the presence of such leading supporters of peace as the King of Jordan and distinguished representatives of Russia, the European Union, Norway, and Japan. The peace process could not survive without their backing, which will be even more crucial as we strive to build on the current agreement.

The accord Israeli and Palestinian leaders have just signed provides a long-awaited boost both to the substance and to the spirit of the search for Middle East peace. By agreeing on a plan for implementing the Wye River Memorandum and other outstanding commitments, the two sides have begun to rebuild their partnership—a partnership that is central to the Oslo process and vital to the region's future.

For the first time in several years, Israelis and Palestinians are working together and solving problems together. Relationships of trust and shared conviction are being built

through this process. The result is beneficial to both sides. Under today's agreement, further redeployments will be carried out. Security cooperation will deepen, the fight against terror will continue, and prisoners will be reunited with their families. In addition, construction of a port for Gaza will begin, and safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank will be opened. These provisions are important in themselves, but there is an even larger significance to this agreement.

First, the fact that Israelis and Palestinians negotiated this pact directly is a rich source of hope for the future. As one can see here tonight, the peace process has many sponsors and many supporters. But that process cannot succeed unless the parties are engaged with each other gaining mutual confidence and building mutual trust.

When that happens, agreements are not only more likely to be signed, they are more likely to be implemented. And if you ask the average Palestinian or Israeli, he or she will tell you, implementation is what counts.

Second, through this agreement the parties have cleared the way for the beginning of serious permanent status negotiation. Here is where the bold vision encompassed by the Oslo Declaration of Principles will meet its sternest test.

The obstacles that permanent status negotiators will face are daunting. They are tough, laden with emotion, and deeply rooted in the region's troubled past. They involve life and death issues for both sides. But the road to reconciliation has always been strewn with obstacles. Over the years the peace process has been undermined by extremists, assaulted by terrorists, and shocked by assassins. Still the desire for peace has not been quenched, and the need for peace has never lessened.

If a permanent settlement is to be achieved, the friends of peace must be strong. Those who seek peace must be persistent, and the advocates of peace must make the case

over and over again that negotiations are not just one option among many; they are the only way for either Israelis or Palestinians to realize their deepest aspirations.

But permanent status negotiations will prosper only if they are conducted in a spirit of partnership that was born in Oslo. That spirit has been absent in recent years but is present today and marks a new beginning. And it must be maintained. It is the spirit of striving not to create obstacles but rather to overcome them, of seeking not to intimidate but rather to persuade, of searching not to defeat the other party but rather to find the way to a shared victory.

If we are to ask where the negotiators will find the required strength and confidence, I can only think of the

model provided by Anwar Sadat, Menahem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, and King Hussein.

These leaders experienced war and understood therefore the need to prevent war. They believed that people brave enough to fight must also be courageous enough to make peace. And they proved that negotiations will produce gains that alternatives cannot, such as the removal of security threats, the restoration of land, and the opening of new economic possibilities. The legacy of their leadership guides us tonight and must continue to inspire us tomorrow.

That is true with respect to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians; it is true as well in the search for a comprehensive settlement. We must help find the right way for Israel to resume negotiations with Syria and Lebanon, while also restarting the

multilateral track so that what has been a regional conflict can end in a regional peace.

As President Clinton has affirmed, the United States will do all we can to facilitate and enhance this effort and to help negotiations succeed. This reflects the interests we have, the commitments we have made, and the values we cherish. Let there be no doubt that through the remaining months of this century and far into the next, America will stand by and with those who stand for peace.

Once again, I want to thank President Mubarak, Foreign Minister Mussa for Egypt's indispensable role in the peace process, and to extend my warmest congratulations to Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat. A great task has been completed. An even larger one remains. Thank you. ■

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Security Challenges Confronting The Asia-Pacific Region

Secretary Albright

Intervention at Sixth ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore, July 26, 1999.

Fellow ministers and distinguished colleagues: I am honored to represent the United States at this sixth meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum—ARF. It is also a pleasure to renew or make acquaintance with each of you.

I want to begin by thanking Foreign Minister Jayakumar and his government for their hospitality and by congratulating them for their leadership of the forum this past year. Singapore has worked hard to advance the goal of Asia-Pacific security cooperation and shown a real determination to make this conference a success by encouraging frank and substantive discussions. That determination is reflected in the strength of our agenda and provides a firm platform for a productive exchange of views.

I also want to thank Foreign Minister Surin and our Thai colleagues for the superb job they have done as cochairs, with the United States, of the Intersessional Group on Confidence Building Measures—ISG/CBMs. I look forward to working with them even more closely in the year ahead, as Thailand serves as forum chair. I look forward, as well, to cooperating with Japan and Singapore in their capacity as ISG co-chairs.

The United States is a strong supporter of the ASEAN Regional Forum. In this period of advanced

technology and rapid change, it is essential that nations consult and cooperate wherever possible on matters of shared security concern. This forum provides us with an indispensable means for doing just that.

As we scan the horizon in the Asia-Pacific today, we see potential dangers and real opportunities for progress. This poses a test of leadership and vision for us all. Together, we must strive to build on shared interests; increase mutual confidence; resolve differences; and create the basis for lasting stability, prosperity, and peace.

The Security Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis

Last year, when we met in Manila, large parts of the Asia-Pacific were experiencing or threatened by economic and financial crisis. There was real concern that the crisis would spread and produce instability that would undermine security and political relationships in the region.

The crisis has caused very substantial hardships and suffering. And as a matter of economic and social policy, we have much left to do to restore growth and help those most affected get back on their feet.

But in the realm of security, we can be thankful that our fears have not been realized. In fact, one effect of

the crisis has actually been constructive. The changes in government that may be traced, at least in part, to economic disruptions have been generally positive. As a rule, the new governments in our region have shown a deeper understanding and commitment to financial transparency, political openness, and democratic principles than their predecessors. This bodes well for the stability of these governments and for our ability, as a group, to work together effectively on security concerns.

The Strategic Relationship of the Major Powers and its Impact on the Region

In the Asia-Pacific region, as elsewhere, mutual security depends on mutual cooperation and effort. To these ends, the United States continues to play an important and constructive role.

This is reflected in our treaty alliances with five major countries in the region. It is shown by our effort to develop strong and multifaceted bilateral relationships with key nations, including fellow members of the UN Security Council. It is illustrated by our forward-deployed military presence. And it is evidenced by our strong support for regional and subregional dialogues aimed at resolving hard problems and preventing conflicts.

The cornerstone of our support for stability is our alliance with Japan—an alliance our two governments have taken steps to modernize during the past few years.

As we have previously made clear, the new U.S.-Japan Joint Security Guidelines we have developed are situational, not geographical. They are not directed against any particular country, nor were they devised with any particular contingency in mind. Rather, they are needed to update our alliance in a manner that reflects the realities and complexities of the new era. Japan's fundamental defense policy is unchanged.

Together, the United States and Japan have contributed much to regional stability by supporting the Agreed Framework on Korea and other non-proliferation measures, by encouraging democratic development, and by working along with the IMF and World Bank to facilitate economic recovery.

America's relationship with China is also a key to the Asia-Pacific's future. My government is strongly committed to its policy of purposeful and principled engagement with China. This approach serves the interests of both our countries and of the region, as a whole. In recent years, it has yielded important dividends toward controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction and promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula.

During the past few months, several events have complicated Sino-U.S. relations. We believe these matters should be dealt with in accordance with the fundamental logic underlying our strategic dialogue. That logic provides no guarantee of agreement, but it does envision diligent and good faith efforts to avoid misunderstandings and narrow differences where possible.

The United States also seeks to cooperate with Russia, not only on European security, but on matters affecting the Asia-Pacific, as well. For example, we are determined to

intensify our discussions with Moscow on how to jump-start the process of strategic arms reductions and to deal with new missile threats without abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Success in these efforts would make Asia and the entire world more secure.

More generally, we welcome initiatives by nations within the region to strengthen bilateral relationships. Last May's successful visit by Korean President Kim Dae-jung to Moscow has the potential to contribute significantly to security cooperation in the future. The same is true of the important steps that have been taken by national leaders in Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea to promote closer ties and deeper mutual understanding.

The Security Environment and Challenges in Southeast Asia

South China Sea. Along with many other countries, the United States is increasingly concerned about rising tensions in the South China Sea. Several nations have sought recently to bolster their claims in the area by building or upgrading outposts.

Incidents at sea have multiplied. Tensions have risen. And we have all been reminded that unresolved territorial disputes can spark violence that leaves no one better off.

The stakes are too high to permit a cycle to emerge in which each incident leads to another with potentially greater risks and graver consequences. We cannot simply sit on the sidelines and watch. Nor can there be any doubt that this is an appropriate forum for discussion of this issue. All members of the ARF have an interest in peace and stability in the South China Sea.

So we must ask ourselves whether we are doing all we can to find diplomatic approaches, identify confidence-building measures, and take other concrete steps to stabilize the situation and make a peaceful resolution in the area more likely.

Indonesian Democratization.

The United States congratulates the people of Indonesia for the successful and nonviolent conduct of their historic June 7 national elections. All segments of Indonesian society deserve credit for this major stride toward meaningful multiparty democracy.

As Indonesians are the first to recognize, however, additional hurdles must be surmounted before their journey will be complete. Foremost is the need for the People's Consultative Assembly to act with transparency and integrity in selecting the next president.

East Timor. The deployment of the UN Mission in East Timor is a positive development. With others, we encourage both proindependence and prointegration East Timorese to work together to build a future better than the past.

We are deeply concerned, however, by continuing violence that could create an atmosphere of intimidation and preclude a fair referendum. We look to the Indonesian Government to meet its obligation to create a secure and credible environment for the August vote.

Burma. Burma continues to pose a threat to regional stability because of the government's failure to prevent widescale narcotics production and trafficking activities—and because its repressive policies have created strife and caused the outflow of refugees.

The United States urges Burma to shift direction and begin a dialogue with the democratic opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and other representative groups. We support the UN role in encouraging this and are disappointed that Special Envoy DeSoto has not yet been able to return to Burma, despite several requests over the past 6 months. We call upon the Burmese authorities to allow such a visit as soon as possible.

The Security Environment and Challenges in Northeast Asia

The central security challenge in Northeast Asia is to preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula. We urge all participants in this forum to support efforts to that end.

We cite, specifically, President Kim Dae-jung's policy of engagement with the Democratic Republic of North Korea—D.P.R.K., the Four Party Talks, and the policy review led by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry. These initiatives have in common a desire to reduce the isolation of the D.P.R.K., address humanitarian needs, and prevent potentially destabilizing military developments.

Leaders in the D.P.R.K. should be in no doubt about the willingness of the R.O.K., the United States, Japan, and others in the region to respond positively and substantively to constructive actions and concrete indications of restraint on their part. They should also know that such steps would be profoundly in the interests of their people who suffer greatly from North Korea's dismal economic situation.

The United States encourages the D.P.R.K. to take advantage of the opportunity that now exists to improve relations and to begin to participate more fully in the economic and political life of the region. We also encourage all nations to continue to support implementation of the Agreed Framework in recognition of its contribution to regional stability.

The Security Implications of Transnational Issues: Non-proliferation, Terrorism, and Transnational Crime

Non-proliferation. There is no more important global or regional security challenge than strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. To this end, the United States is: working for timely entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; promoting negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and in the

interim seeking a moratorium on fissile material production; striving to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty through the NPT review process; urging support for strengthened IAEA safeguards; and discussing with Russia how best to continue reducing our stockpiles of strategic weapons.

Other advanced weapons technologies concern us as well; thus, we are working to strengthen controls on ballistic missiles and other sensitive technologies, striving to give teeth to the Biological Weapons Convention, and moving to implement the treaty that seeks to banish poison gas worldwide.

The dangers posed by these categories of weapons and technologies are clear. It is in the interests of every country represented here to contribute in every way it can to international non-proliferation efforts.

Last year's nuclear and missile tests have intensified the spotlight on proliferation issues in South Asia. We urge both India and Pakistan to avoid steps that would lead to an arms race and hope that both will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and support negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in Geneva.

Terrorism. Governments participating in this forum are united in their opposition to international terror, which has claimed victims in every part of every continent on earth. The United States urges the ARF to serve as a regional rallying point for effective international action to deter and disrupt terrorist networks and to oppose those who finance, harbor, and support them. By making life more complicated and less secure for terrorists, we will make it better and safer for our citizens.

Transnational Crime. Whether directly or indirectly, transnational crime harms us all. Left unchecked, it can fray the fabric of our societies and threaten the security of our nations. We believe this forum has a distinctive contribution to make in this region's fight against transnational crime. We

support the proposal to convene an experts group to consider how best to deal with such issues as small arms trafficking and piracy and armed robbery at sea.

Track I Activities

The Intersessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures made significant progress this year by implementing or proposing measures that include the U.S.-Brunei-hosted Professional Development Program and Australia's planned seminar on the Law of Armed Conflict. We also urge all ARF members to support and implement the new maritime CBMs.

Our ISG cochair, Thailand, deserves much credit for its work on the "overlap" between CBMs and preventive diplomacy. The four proposals outlined in the Thai working paper would assist parties to a dispute, with their consent, to resolve differences before they affect other ARF members.

We see particular value in a willingness on the part of member states to reduce tensions and build trust by voluntarily briefing other members on issues affecting regional security. We hope this approach can become a regular element of the ARF process.

The United States also supports the idea of establishing a "good offices" role for the ARF chair, so that ARF members to a dispute could call on the chair for assistance. This would be done on a strictly voluntary basis and would be similar to the role played by the ASEAN Troika in Cambodia.

We recognize that this forum's evolution must proceed at a pace with which its members are comfortable. We acknowledge that we are likely to progress in increments, not giant leaps. It is important, however, that we continue to move in the direction of concrete and effective security cooperation. It is in that spirit that we look forward to further examination of preventive diplomacy by the ISG in the year ahead.

The Future Direction of the ARF

Membership. We believe that when North Korea is ready to do so, it should reapply for admission on the same terms as any other qualifying country. Otherwise, the United States supports a period of consolidation. At 22, the ARF's membership already risks becoming unwieldy. And aside from North Korea, no other appropriate applicants exist within the East Asia/Oceania region.

Institutionalization. As this forum matures, it will need to communicate and distribute materials more quickly. We hope the ISG study of an Internet-based, dedicated system will help.

Some form of institutional structure will also likely be needed, which should take into account the interests of all ARF members. No specific decisions are yet necessary, but it may be wise to begin discussing general approaches soon.

Conclusion

I want to again thank Singapore for hosting this conference and for its praiseworthy effort to ensure a focused discussion of the security challenges that confront our region. ■

For more information and related topics, visit the Department's website at: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/index.html>

Supporting ASEAN Initiatives and Making Progress Toward Shared Goals

Secretary Albright

Intervention at Sixth ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, Singapore, July 26, 1999.

Fellow ministers, distinguished colleagues: It is a great pleasure for me to join you as the representative of the United States. And let me add a word of welcome to ASEAN's newest member, Cambodia.

The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference brings together as diverse a group of nations as any regional body anywhere. But there should be no doubt that the nations represented here today form a true community of interest.

We share a fundamental interest in Asia's economic health, in fostering growth that lifts the lives of all the region's people, and in maintaining Asia-Pacific leadership in the drive for a more open, stable, and dynamic global economy.

We have an equally profound interest in the region's security, in ensuring peace among nations, and in preventing the destabilizing spread of weapons of mass destruction. And we have a common interest in regional cooperation—in encouraging nations to pull together to combat challenges none could defeat alone.

In each of these areas, the United States is pleased to work with the states of the region to support ASEAN initiatives and to make progress toward our shared goals.

The Economy: From Crisis To Recovery

In the economic arena, I think we would all agree that the picture is brighter than it was a year ago. The primary credit for that improvement is due to the region's governments, which moved with determination not only to stabilize finances, but also to protect school enrollments and health expenditures—and to families who responded to hard times by seizing new opportunities, such as production of farm products for export or to displace imports.

The United States has done its part by joining forces with the World Bank and the IMF to provide the financing needed to support reform and to address basic humanitarian needs. Perhaps most importantly, we kept our growing markets open to Asian exports, making it easier for the region's industries to get back on their feet.

Now that the worst of the crisis appears past, there is renewed optimism in the region. Investment is returning. Family spending is rising. Production is increasing. New jobs are being created. And in some countries, poverty is again declining.

With many of the region's economies now showing signs of recovery, it would be tempting to return to business

as usual. But the work of reform is not complete. Governments and businesses across the Pacific, including my own, must stay focused on bank reform and corporate restructuring, increasing the quality and transparency of financial regulation, building stronger capital markets, promoting broad-based growth, reducing unemployment and meeting basic human needs, and on supporting countries that have taken tough decisions for reform.

The challenge is to stay the course and make sure the region reaps lasting benefits from the difficult changes it has already endured. This will require persistence not just from the nations directly affected, but also from their partners in Asia and around the world.

It is especially important that growth-oriented policies be pursued by major economies. While we are pleased that the strong U.S. economy continues to aid recovery in the region, we would like to see other engines propelling regional and global prosperity. Japan has an immense role to play, and we support Tokyo's efforts to restore domestic demand-led growth.

In addition, the United States is bringing programs together under the Accelerating Economic Recovery in Asia Initiative—AERA to help Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines

strengthen their banking, legal and regulatory frameworks, and train workers in new skills. We are pleased that American businesses are actively assisting these efforts.

We also want to work with ASEAN and its members to foster public-private partnerships that support agriculture, sustainable forestry, rural development, and poverty eradication.

When APEC Leaders meet this September, we hope that ASEAN nations will take the lead in building momentum for the WTO ministerial in Seattle, endorsing a new trade round, and moving forward on the Accelerated Tariff Liberalization package as well as APEC's own trade agenda. A strong and growing global economy, with increasing possibilities for trade, is the best guarantee of prosperity and stability in Southeast Asia.

On a related matter, the United States will continue to work for the entry of China into the WTO on commercially viable terms.

ASEAN's Hanoi Plan of Action will make an important contribution toward this goal by promoting transparency, open markets, and economic integration. The United States welcomes the plan and looks forward to supporting its implementation.

We also welcome the involvement of ASEAN nations, with others in the international community, in putting forward and refining ideas on strengthening the global financial architecture.

Democracy and the Rule of Law

Of course, not all the keys to a prosperous future are economic in nature. We have learned very clearly in recent years that sustainable economic growth is best built on a foundation of open and accountable democratic institutions and the rule of law.

Accordingly, we have observed with hope and respect the progress Indonesia has made in conducting free and fair elections and broadening political participation. And we have strongly supported Thailand as it

responded to financial difficulties while bolstering its commitment to democratic values.

At the same time, we have been disappointed by the continued failure by authorities in Burma to open a meaningful dialogue with its democratic opposition and other representative groups. Just as democracy fosters prosperity, so repression in Burma has generated economic disaster.

One welcome outgrowth of the financial crisis has been a sharper focus regionally and around the world on the economic, social, and political costs of cronyism and corruption. To one degree or another, these plagues are a problem in every country. Vice-President Al Gore's 1998 Anti-Corruption Conference provided a welcome opportunity for nations around the world, including those in Southeast Asia, to share information and discuss strategies for responding to this challenge. It is vital that we continue to work together to create economic and political structures that reward enterprise and merit, not payoffs and accidents of birth.

The Environment

Our response to transnational threats is an important agenda item for this post-ministerial conference. This is appropriate because our ability to make progress in addressing such problems is a key to the standard of living and quality of life in each of our societies.

ASEAN nations are making commendable headway in forging common responses to these difficult issues. The United States stands ready to support your efforts. We believe we can best contribute, in our capacity as an ASEAN dialogue partner, to two areas of the Hanoi Action Plan—environmental protection and transnational crime.

The haze of pollution which too often blights parts of Southeast Asia reminds us that individual actions can have serious generalized consequences. Yet we have tremendous power, when

we act collectively, to reverse environmental degradation and thereby improve individual lives.

Through our East Asia and Pacific environmental initiative, we are supporting 21 projects this year. They will help manage forest and coastal resources and land use, study coral bleaching, and conserve biodiversity. By introducing less wasteful forest harvesting practices and combating destructive fishing, these projects serve economic as well as environmental ends. By enlarging protected areas, saving endangered species, and promoting scientific research, they help ensure that our natural resources will endure for generations to come.

And as we work on each of these important problems, we must not forget another overriding threat—global climate change. For as the emission of greenhouse gases continues to rise, we invite more extreme weather conditions, with potentially harmful effects on coastal and agricultural economies. The United States and other industrialized nations have a responsibility to lead in combating global climate change and are committed to doing so. But if the major emerging economies do not accept their own responsibility, we will never begin to bring this problem under control.

This year, Japan and the United States will provide two important opportunities for discussing issues related to global climate change. A regional workshop for Southeast Asian nations will be held August 30-31 in Bali, and in December a conference in Manila will focus on effective implementation of national action plans.

Transnational Crime

In the past year, the United States has stepped up its partnership with ASEAN in the fight against transnational crime. We worked with Thailand to open the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, which provides high-quality training while helping to build networks among the region's law enforcement officials.

We are also cooperating with ASEAN countries and the United Nations to curb trafficking in narcotics and other illicit substances. We welcome the Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN and will support the region's efforts to meet that goal. To do so, we should establish concrete counter-narcotics objectives, building on the results of the January 1999 meeting on regional solutions to the narcotics problem cohosted by Japan and the United Nations Drug Control Program.

In addition, with partners in ASEAN and elsewhere, the United States has undertaken a major diplomatic and law enforcement effort against trafficking in women and children. Such trafficking is a global menace and is everyone's problem. An estimated 40,000 to 50,000 people are trafficked annually into my own country, where we are working to shut down traffickers' networks and protect their victims. In Asia, it is believed that 250,000 human beings or more are bought and sold each year. This figure represents a quarter of a million private tragedies, as well as dirty profits for international criminals and a threat to public health.

Our strategy must be broad enough to educate the public, assist the victims, protect the vulnerable, and apprehend the perpetrators. And our goal must be to mobilize people everywhere, so that trafficking in human beings is met by a stop sign visible around the Equator and from pole to pole.

The United States is already working with several ASEAN members to combat trafficking by training law enforcement officials, promoting NGO efforts at prevention, and supporting a project to return and reintegrate victims of trafficking in the Mekong Delta.

Early next year, the United States and the Philippines will cohost a workshop to consider how the region can better combat this nefarious trade.

Infectious Disease

In addition to these areas, the United States would like to do more with ASEAN members to reduce the threat posed by HIV/AIDS and other forms of infectious disease. These plagues continue to devastate communities, strain health care systems, and sap the energy and productivity of emerging economies.

We know that with national leadership, international assistance, and local interventions the tide can be turned. In some countries, aggressive policies have begun to reverse the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. But in others, the tide has not crested—and the central challenge of prevention has not been fully addressed. The United States and Japan have worked together to help governments implement effective HIV/AIDS responses and to explore and promote prevention and treatment regimes. The U.S.-Japan Common Agenda also includes efforts to eradicate polio in the region and worldwide by the end of next year.

Conclusion

We have assembled here in Singapore because we have important common interests in all these areas—and because we believe that together we can, and should, do more to promote those interests. And as we work together, we will strengthen the confidence and partnership among our nations and brighten the prospects for our security, our economies, and our citizens' daily lives. ■

For more information and related topics, visit the Department's website at: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/index.html>

The U.S. and Kosovo: Working Together To Build a Lasting Peace

Secretary Albright

Address to the people of Kosovo, Pristina, Kosovo, July 29, 1999.

Good afternoon Kosovo! As United States Secretary of State, and as a friend, I want to thank you all for this wonderful welcome, along with my colleagues Bernard Kouchner of the United Nations. Let there be no mistake. As long as you choose, Kosovo will remain your home.

You have been through a terrible ordeal this past year and more. Much has been lost that cannot be regained. But an opportunity exists now to answer the question, "What kind of a home will you build?" "What kind of a Kosovo do you want?"

I hope that today we may pledge that, here in Kosovo, never again will people with guns come in the night, never again will houses and villages be burned, and never again will there be massacres and mass graves. Let us pledge that in Kosovo there will a new birth of freedom, based on tolerance, law, and respect for every human life.

The United States and its partners want to help you build the new Kosovo. This is reflected in the work of KFOR and the steady progress being made in establishing the United Nations civilian presence here. It is reflected in the promise of countries throughout Europe and beyond to

provide support for reconstruction and recovery, including America's pledge of up to \$500 million for immediate needs. And it is reflected in our support for the International War Crimes Tribunal, because we believe that justice is a parent to peace, that those indicted for ethnic cleansing and murder should be held legally accountable, and that Slobodan Milosevic should answer for his crimes.

Today, I ask you as a friend to help and cooperate with KFOR and the United Nations and other agencies working here. If problems arise, don't be afraid to speak your mind, but also be patient. Remember they cannot be everywhere and do everything; their job is to aid all Kosovars equally, and their goal is to help your dream of a democratic and peaceful Kosovo come true.

Now, I do not have to tell you that there are those who believe Kosovo will never escape its past. They say that you will act toward the Serbs as the Serb military and police acted toward you; that you will make it impossible for Serbs to live in Kosovo. These critics point to tragedies such as the cowardly murder this past week of 14 Serbs in Gracko, and they say "see, we are right. The Kosovo Albanians are no better than Milosevic."

Today, I want to make a prediction that you will prove those critics wrong. Your leaders understand that when an ethnic Albanian murders a Serb, he commits a crime against his own cause and against the future of Kosovo. Democracy cannot be built on revenge. And you will not have the support of the world if you are intolerant and take the law into your own hands.

I cannot tell you how to feel. No one can who is not in your shoes. But I do ask you to embrace one principle, which is the foundation of all democracy. And that principle is that every person has the right to be judged not by his or her parentage or religious faith but by their actions and character.

If there is to be a true victory in Kosovo, it cannot be a victory of Albanians over Serbs or NATO over Serbs. It must be a victory of those who believe in the rights of the individual over those who do not. Otherwise, it is not victory. It is merely changing one form of repression for another. And I know you want more for Kosovo than that.

The fighting is over. Let us together win the peace. Let us make Kosovo an example for the world to follow. Let us create a democratic

Kosovo, within a stable southeast Europe, within a Europe whole and free.

I have thought about all you for a very long time. I have thought about the suffering that you have gone through. And I have thought about the future that you have ahead of you.

I have waited for a day like today when I could come to Pristina to share a very special time with you—a time of hope and opportunity. Having now seen you in person and having felt the warmth of your greeting, let me once

again pledge my own best efforts on behalf of the United States in rebuilding and renewing your permanent home.

Thank you all very much, and let us now build the peace together. ■

For more information and related topics, visit the Department's website at: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/index.html>

The Balkan Question and the European Answer

Deputy Secretary Talbott

Address at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado, August 24, 1999.

Thank you Elmer [Johnson] for that introduction, and thanks, too, for taking on the presidency of the Aspen Institute, which has done so much over the years to encourage discussion on the world's toughest problems. In that spirit, I'd like to talk to you this evening about the Balkans, about why that corner of Europe has been so troubled, and what's at stake there for Americans as well as Europeans.

Let me start with a set of questions. They go to the heart of what's happening today in Bosnia and Kosovo, but they also resonate through history and around the world. These are questions that have never been answered with total clarity and permanence either in theory or in practice. Moreover, the attempt to answer them has been over the centuries more or less a constant source of war.

The questions are these: What exactly is a nation? What is a state? When does a nation become a state, and what allows it to survive as such? What are the economies of scale, the natural boundaries that make a piece of real estate viable as a sovereign country? What, indeed, is sovereignty, and what are its limits? At issue here is not just geography but also anthropology; that is, the mystery of human behavior. How similar—and in what

ways similar—must the inhabitants of a certain territory be to feel that they have a common identity, a common destiny and, often, a common vulnerability?

There is, of course, an American answer to this cluster of questions, and it goes like this: A state should let its people choose their leaders through elections; it should derive strength and cohesion from the diversity of its population; and it should protect the rights of minorities, especially those of the ultimate minority—the individual citizen. In short, to be successful and strong, to survive and prosper, a state should be a liberal democracy. Of course, we Americans have had plenty of arguments among ourselves about what that phrase—liberal democracy—actually means. Yet the pursuit of that ideal has been at the core not just of our domestic politics but of our foreign policy as well.

The U.S. has promoted and defended democracy in other lands not so much out of missionary zeal as out of self interest. We have conducted our diplomacy, and sometimes our military exertions as well, on the premise that the way foreign leaders behave within their own borders has a direct bearing on the way they will behave toward other countries, including our own.

States that protect the rights of minorities on their own territory are more likely to respect the independence of other nations. Conversely, a regime that relies on force in dealing with its own people is predisposed to commit aggression against its neighbors, and that, in turn, may require the military intervention of the United States.

It has been in response to that sort of threat that we have sent American troops across the Atlantic five times in eight decades: twice in World Wars, once in the Cold War, and twice more since the end of the Cold War—first in Bosnia then in Kosovo. In a sense, it's appropriate that Europe has been the principal testing ground for the proposition that the defense of American strategic interests requires the defense of American political values—and vice versa. Europe, after all, is the birthplace of the Enlightenment and thus a critical source of much of our own political culture. But Europe also has been the scene of a protracted and often harrowing struggle between the forces of liberalism and tyranny.

In much of central and eastern Europe, until very recently, tyranny has had the upper hand in that struggle. That has been especially true in the Balkans. The people of that region began this century in the twilight of

imperialism. The more the empire faltered, the more its rulers resorted to repression, and the more their subjects sought to assert national identity as a prelude to nationhood itself. Nationalism, in other words, was synonymous with liberation.

The Serbs were the prime example. They broke free of Ottoman rule in 1878 and established their own state. In the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, Serbia went to war against the Ottoman empire in its decrepitude. Then, a year later, a Serb nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, struck a blow against the other imperial power in the region, the Habsburgs. What started as the third Balkan war quickly escalated into World War I, which was also the first of the five times that the U.S. dispatched troops to Europe.

Two catch phrases emerged from that manifestation of America's emergence as a world power: one was the vow to "make the world safe for democracy," and the other was the conviction that a stable, democratic peace should be based on "self-determination" for the nations liberated from imperialism. Those mottoes—indelibly and rightly associated with Woodrow Wilson—have generated quite a bit of controversy over the years, both in the U.S. and around the world.

They have recently figured prominently in the debate over America's intervention in the fourth Balkan war of this century—the one that began with the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 and that ended a little over 2 months ago on June 10, when NATO formally suspended its bombing campaign. "Making the world safe for democracy" is simplistic, of course, as all slogans are, but it actually stands up pretty well, as long as we understand what it does—and doesn't—mean. It doesn't mean that Uncle Sam dons a suit of armor, grabs a lance, and sallies forth to slay every anti-democratic dragon in sight; it doesn't mean resorting to force to impose liberal democracy on everyone everywhere.

But here's what it does mean: It means we have, at certain key times and places, been willing and able to oppose, deter and, if necessary, defeat anti-democratic regimes when they have threatened other states that were trying to establish themselves on the principles of liberal democracy. That has been a consistent theme in America's commitment to the security of Europe from World War I right through our current engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo.

“ . . . we have, at certain key times and places, been willing to oppose, deter and, if necessary, defeat anti-democratic regimes when they have threatened other states that were trying to establish themselves on the principles of liberal democracy.”

Now let me turn to that other highly charged watchword of Wilsonianism: "self-determination." How to translate that phrase into practice—and into peace—was one of the challenges at Versailles 80 years ago, just as it was at Rambouillet 6 months ago, and just as it is in Sarajevo and Pristina today. At Versailles, self-determination meant the dismantlement of empire and the formation of a whole cluster of new nation-states.

Nation-states have been a venerable fixture in Europe since the mid-17th century, when the Treaty of Westphalia broke up the Holy Roman Empire and established a country called France for the French and a country called Sweden for the Swedes. In theory at least, a nation-state is as homogenous and harmonious as an empire is heterogeneous and roiling with frustrated national aspirations. However, a pure nation-state doesn't exist in nature, since the ethnographic map never coincides with the political one. That is especially true in the Balkans.

Partly for that reason, the map-makers at Versailles created a single home for three groups of so-called South Slavs: the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. The very inclusiveness of Yugoslavia might, over time, have made it an improvement on the older, Westphalian generation of monoethnic nation-states. However, that was not to be because of what was happening elsewhere on the continent.

During a formative period in Yugoslavia's development, Europe as a whole resembled a musty, sprawling laboratory in the basement of a gothic castle, where mad scientists were experimenting with competing yet similar political monstrosities—two in particular: fascism and communism. Both were dictatorial in their internal order and predatory in their external behavior. Both required the armed intervention of the United States. And both took a heavy toll on Yugoslavia as it defined for itself those problematic words "nation" and "state."

Yugoslavia suffered a double dose of fascism under the Nazi occupation and the Ustashe reign in Croatia. Then, with no time to recover from those horrors, it fell under communism. As a result, Yugoslavia entered the second half of the century without any ideology for binding together its constituent nationalities beyond an authoritarian and artificial one that was imposed, and strictly enforced, by the central government.

When my wife Brooke and I lived in Belgrade in the early 1970s, we often heard it said that Yugoslavia consisted of six republics, five nationalities, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one Tito. When it lost that last, unifying attribute in 1980, things fell apart; the center would not hold. Communism, already desiccated and discredited, gave way to the most malignant species of nationalism; party hacks who were good at mouthing the internationalist slogans about the solidarity of the working class morphed, almost overnight, into hate-mongering jingoists.

Serbia, while by no means the only offender in this regard, was the best armed and, therefore, the most offensive. Its leaders mobilized their kinsmen in neighboring lands on behalf of the dream of Greater Serbia, which, of course, was a nightmare for everyone else in the region. Within its own borders, the Serbian regime repressed and often killed non-Serbs, especially Kosovo Albanians. Irredentism abroad and ethnic cleansing at home were part and parcel of the same policy: the drive to define and expand Serbian statehood in terms of Serb nationality.

Thus an evil—and that's the only word for it—that we thought had been expunged by the middle of the century made a stunning comeback at the end. The international response to that comeback was not as timely as any of us would have wished. But when it came, it was, at least, not too late. This time, thanks to the revolution in global communications, it was much harder to avert our gaze from what Chamberlain and others had dismissed in 1938 as trouble in "faraway countries" of which "we know nothing."

This time we knew a lot about the trouble in question, and we knew that such trouble tends first to fester, then to escalate in ferocity and scope until only forceful intervention will bring it to a halt. Also, unlike in the 1930s, this time the transatlantic community had both the political will and the military means to meet the challenge before it

got completely out of hand. The institutional mechanisms were NATO, the OSCE, the EU, and the UN. These organizations, all of which came into being after—and because of—World War II, have different but overlapping memberships, and they have different but mutually reinforcing missions. In Europe at least, they have been able to make common cause in enforcing a vital principle: National leaderships must not be allowed to define national interests or national identity in a way that leads to crimes against humanity and threats to international peace.

That principle was applied, belatedly but, nonetheless, decisively, in the way that we, and others, stepped in and ended the fourth Balkan war. Now we're deep into the no less difficult task of imposing a Balkan peace. It involves dealing, day in and day out, with die hards and vengeance seekers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. It also involves working to establish in both those places the basis for viable political arrangements—arrangements that take account of the violence and the divisions that have occurred in the recent past, while at the same time guarding against the danger that they will recur.

This means trying to find new answers to those old questions about nationhood, statehood, democracy, and self-determination that have vexed Europe and especially the Balkans for the past 100 years. A few words on what that challenge means in each case. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, our goal is to give all citizens reason to feel that they belong to a single state. That means thwarting those who would like to split Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts—in other words, those recidivists, if I can put it that way, who would like to refight the war of 1991-95 by other means.

Partition in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a multiple disaster: It would play right into the hands of advocates of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia; it would result in a Muslim or Bosniak rump state that would be barely viable

economically and existentially insecure, since it would be at the mercy of its larger and exceedingly unfriendly neighbors. That's why we must continue to bolster Sarajevo's role as the capital of the country.

In Kosovo, our task is different in one obvious respect: We have suspended Belgrade's powers as the administering authority over the province, but that does not mean we support Kosovo's independence. Quite the contrary: We feel that secession would give heart to separatists and irredentists of every stripe elsewhere in the region. Most of all, secession would encourage proponents of Greater Albania—a single state stretching across the Balkan Peninsula from Albania proper to northwestern Macedonia, with its own sizable ethnic Albanian population. Greater Albania would be no less anathema to regional peace and stability than Greater Serbia.

In this regard, Macedonia deserves special care and attention. It's a brave, young, independent state that has made a real and promising effort at establishing multiethnic democracy and thus, so far, escaping the worst pitfalls of the nation-state. If Kosovo were to become a catalyst for Albanian nationalism throughout the region, Macedonia would probably disappear from the map—and violently so.

So there is a common denominator in our two principal ventures in the Balkans. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, we stepped in not only to stop the slaughter of human beings, but also to stop the violent dismemberment of states. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is reason for cautious optimism. The leaders of all the communities there have subscribed to the basic outlines of a single state. They have started to put in place common institutions that embrace both the Serb entity, Republica Srpska, and the Muslim-Croat one, the Federation. Bosnia and Herzegovina now has a flag, a common currency, a common license plate—all steps in the right direction, although with a long way to go.

Kosovo is a much harder case and not just because the war there ended only 75 days ago. The overwhelming majority of the ethnic Albanians want out of Yugoslavia, pure and simple. If they were complete masters of their own fate, they would be independent. As it happens, today Kosovo is a ward of the international community. It goes about the business of rebuilding itself under the day-in, day-out protection and supervision of a consortium of global and regional organizations. The ultimate status of Kosovo is a question for the future.

If the people who live there are ever going to settle for some form of self-governing autonomy short of total independence, it will only be if Serbia itself changes profoundly. It will only be if Serbia frees itself from the tyranny and barbarism personified by Milosevic. It will only be if the people of Serbia foster the conditions in which they and the people of Kosovo can, once again, live with each other—not in the context of the old Yugoslavia but in the context of a new Europe.

That brings me to the good news about European politics in the second half of the 20th century. Since World War II, two trends have reinforced each other. One is that all successful, modern European states—whether unitary ones like Great Britain, federal ones like Germany, or confederal ones like Switzerland—have defined statehood in a way that encourages majorities and minorities to prosper together. That's because in those countries, the norms of society, politics, and economics all conspire to make cooperation across ethnic lines itself a norm. The effect is to soften ethnic competition and make it less relevant to everyday life.

The second trend has been the emergence in Western Europe of a concert of liberal democracies under the aegis of the European Union. The treaties of Westphalia and Versailles are giving way to those of Maastricht and Amsterdam. The old system of nation-states—each sovereign in its exercise

of supreme, absolute, and permanent authority—is giving way to a new system in which nations feel secure enough in their identities and in their neighborhoods to make a virtue out of their dependence on one another.

This means pooling sovereignty in certain areas of governance and in other areas granting greater autonomy to regions. It means simultaneously relinquishing some powers upward and devolving others downward. On those matters where borders have become an obstacle to efficiency and prosperity, such as commercial activity and monetary policy, much of Europe is investing authority in supranational bodies. The euro is only the most dramatic example.

On other matters, where communal identities and sensitivities are at stake—such as language and education—central governments are transferring power to local authorities. For example, there is still a country in Europe today called Spain, but within its borders is an entity that calls itself the state of Catalonia, where Catalan is the official language and Spanish is taught as an elective. The Germanlander—from Bavaria to Schleswig-Holstein—have taken control of affairs that once resided in the national capital. In Britain, the Blair government has sanctioned the establishment of parliaments in Scotland and Wales, thereby, however paradoxical it may seem, actually making the United Kingdom more united, because the institutions of governance are more accommodating of the national communities that make up the state.

In this fashion, Europe is managing and sublimating the forces that might otherwise trigger civil strife and conflict across borders—that is, precisely the forces that have so devastated the Balkans and threatened the peace of Europe as a whole. As the most multiethnic of the Balkan states, Yugoslavia would have especially benefited from those trends that have characterized West European politics

these past several decades—the opening of borders, the opening of societies, the protection of minorities, the empowerment of regions, and the pursuit of transnational cooperation.

But since Yugoslavia was largely cut off from the European mainstream, its multiethnic character became a curse: Deprived of inducements for integration, Yugoslavia fell victim to disintegration. With the end of the fourth Balkan war, now we have an opportunity to bring the fragments of the old Yugoslavia, along with other countries that are emerging from the wreckage of communism, into the orbit of those innovations in national identity and international relations that Western Europe is putting in place. Or, to put the point in Wilsonian terms, we have an opportunity to make the entire continent safe for democracy, thereby creating an environment in which self-determination can flourish without requiring the proliferation of ethnically based microstates.

Taking advantage of that opportunity is first and foremost a challenge for the Europeans in general and for the European Union in particular. But it is also a challenge for us. Five times in this century the United States has had to help Europe save itself from the consequences of political experiments gone catastrophically awry. Each time our intervention has been crucial; each time it has made possible yet another chance for peace.

Now, finally, there is an experiment underway in the laboratory of European politics that is going right—an experiment that carries with it the promise that the 21st century might truly be an improvement on the 20th, an experiment that coincides with our own political and civic values and therefore with our own vital strategic interests. That's why we must do everything we can to help the Europeans succeed—for our sake as well as their own. ■

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TREATY ACTIONS

AUGUST

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol on the Authentic Quadrilingual text of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944. Done at Montreal Sept. 28, 1977.

Acceptance: Jordan, July 19, 1999.

Protocol on the Authentic Six-Language text of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944. Done at Montreal Oct. 1, 1998.

Acceptance: Brazil, July 16, 1999.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force Jan. 13, 1996.

Additional Protocol to the Agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels June 19, 1995. Entered into force June 1, 1996.

Further additional Protocol to the Agreement among the states parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the other states participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the status of their forces. Done at Brussels Dec. 19, 1997. Entered into force Apr. 15, 1999.

Ratification: Denmark, July 8, 1999.¹
Entry into force for Denmark: Aug. 7, 1999.

BILATERAL

Israel

Agreement amending the land lease and purchase agreement for construction of diplomatic facilities of Jan. 18, 1989, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem Mar. 26 and May 11, 1999. Entered into force May 11, 1999; effective January 18, 1999.

Japan

Protocol extending the agreement of June 20, 1988, as extended, on cooperation in research and development in science and technology. Signed at Washington May 19, 1999. Entered into force May 20, 1999.

Mexico

Agreement amending Annex II (TIAS 11269) of the agreement of Aug. 14, 1983 for the protection and improvement of the environment in the border area (TIAS 10827). Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico City June 4, 1999. Entered into force June 4, 1999.

Wildfire protection agreement for the common border. Signed at Mexico City June 4, 1999. Entered into force June 4, 1999.

New Zealand

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 18 and 21, 1999. Entered into force May 21, 1999.

Nicaragua

Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 20, 1998 regarding the consolidation, reduction, and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and its agencies. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua Apr. 9 and May 19, 1999. Entered into force May 19, 1999.

Philippines

Agreement regarding the treatment of United States armed forces visiting the Philippines. Signed at Manila Feb. 10, 1998. Entered into force June 1, 1999.

Agreement regarding the treatment of Republic of Philippines personnel visiting the United States. Signed at Manila Oct. 9, 1998. Entered into force June 1, 1999.

Sierra Leone

Agreement regarding grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the furnishing of defense articles, related training, and other defense services to the Government of Sierra Leone. Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown May 3 and 19, 1999. Entered into force May 19, 1999.

Spain

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annexes and appendices. Signed at Madrid and Patch Barracks (Germany) May 6 and 19, 1999. Entered into force May 19, 1999.

Ukraine

Agreement concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Kiev May 6, 1998. Entered into force May 28, 1999.

Uzbekistan

Agreement regarding grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the furnishing of defense articles, related training, and other defense services to the Government of Uzbekistan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tashkent Mar. 18 and May 4, 1999. Entered into force May 4, 1999.

Agreement concerning cooperation in the area of demilitarization of chemical weapons associated facilities and the prevention of proliferation of chemical weapons technology. Signed at Tashkent May 25, 1999. Entered into force May 25, 1999.

SEPTEMBER

BILATERAL

Azerbaijan

Agreement concerning the acquisition and retention of diplomatic and consular properties in the United States of America and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Signed at Baku Mar. 5 and Apr. 21, 1999. Entered into force June 8, 1999.

Canada

Agreement relating to and amending Annexes I and IV of the treaty concerning Pacific salmon of Jan. 28, 1985, with attachments. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 30, 1999. Entered into force June 30, 1999.

Chile

Agreement extending the basic agreement of May 14, 1992 relating to scientific and technological cooperation, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 5 and June 22, 1999. Entered into force June 22, 1999.

Ecuador

Agreement continuing air transport services in accordance with the terms of the agreement of Sept. 26, 1986, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito May 20 and July 1, 1999. Entered into force July 1, 1999.

Egypt

Investment incentive agreement. Signed at Washington July 1, 1999. Entered into force July 1, 1999.

Implementing arrangement for cooperation in energy technology. Signed at Washington July 1, 1999. Entered into force July 1, 1999.

Estonia

Agreement extending the agreement of June 1, 1992, as extended, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Tallinn Mar. 10 and June 11, 1998. Entered into force June 21, 1999; effective June 30, 1998.

Guatemala

Agreement concerning cooperation in the promotion and development of civil aviation. Signed at Washington and Guatemala May 26 and June 11, 1999. Entered into force June 11, 1999.

Hungary

Agreement extending the annex to the air transport agreement of July 12, 1989, as extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 29 and June 29, 1999. Entered into force June 29, 1999.

Iceland

Basic exchange and cooperative agreement concerning global geospatial information and services cooperation,

with annexes. Signed at Bethesda and Reykjavik June 7 and July 1, 1999. Entered into force July 1, 1999.

Ireland

Agreement on technical cooperation in civil aviation matters. Signed at Dublin June 11, 1999. Entered into force June 11, 1999.

Japan

Agreement concerning a program for the cooperative research of Shallow Water Acoustic Technology (SWAT). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo June 18, 1999. Entered into force June 18, 1999.

Agreement concerning a cash contribution by Japan for administrative and related expenses arising from implementation of the mutual defense agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo June 29, 1999. Entered into force June 29, 1999.

Korea

Agreement relating to scientific and technical cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Washington July 2, 1999. Entered into force July 2, 1999; effective Apr. 29, 1999.

Lithuania

Basic exchange and cooperative agreement concerning global geospatial information and services cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Vilnius June 11, 1999. Entered into force June 11, 1999.

Mongolia

Agreement concerning the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Ulaanbaatar Mar. 24 and Apr. 5, 1999. Entered into force Apr. 5, 1999.

Russia

Agreement extending the agreement of May 31, 1988 on mutual fisheries relations (TIAS 11442), as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of

notes at Moscow July 28 and Nov. 23, 1998. Entered into force June 18, 1999; effective Dec. 31, 1998.

South Africa

Agreement regarding the status of military personnel and civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense who may be present in the Republic of South Africa in connection with mutually agreed exercises and activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Pretoria Apr. 9 and June 10, 1999. Entered into force June 10, 1999.

Sri Lanka

Agreement concerning a full and final settlement of the commercial dispute between Evans International Ltd. Co. and Centrepoint Colombo Ltd., Urban Development Authority of Sri Lanka, and the Government of the Democratic

Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka relating to reconstruction of the Colombo financial district. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 7, 1999. Entered into force June 7, 1999.

Turkey

Agreement extending the agreement of June 14, 1994 relating to scientific and technological cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 28 and June 21, 1999. Entered into force June 21, 1999; effective June 14, 1999.

United Arab Emirates

Agreement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at Abu Dhabi June 6, 1999. Entered into force June 6, 1999.

United Nations

Agreement extending the agreement of Oct. 18, 1994, as amended and extended, for the contribution of personnel to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Effected by exchange of letters at New York June 24 and 25, 1999. Entered into force June 25, 1999.

¹ Not applicable to the Faroe Islands or Greenland. ■

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