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

THE U.S. FIGHTING MAN'S CODE



OFFICE OF ARMED FORCES INFORMATION & EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

'RESISTANCE to TYRANTS is OBEDIENCE to GOD.'

Thomas Jefferson

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10631

CODE OF CONDUCT

FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I hereby prescribe the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States which is attached to this order and hereby made a part thereof.

Every member of the Armed Forces of the United States is expected to measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of Conduct while he is in combat or in captivity. To ensure achievement of these standards, each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture shall be provided with specific training and instruction designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during combat or captivity.

The Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard except when it is serving as part of the Navy) shall take such action as is deemed necessary to implement this order and to disseminate and make the said Code known to all members of the Armed Forces of the United States.

THE WHITE HOUSE
August 17, 1955

Dwight D. Eisenhower

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C. - Price 50 cents

I

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

VI

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

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FOREWORD

During and after the Korean war it became apparent that many U.S. fighting men had been inadequately prepared for the ordeal they faced in Korea. Accordingly, a "Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States" was drawn up. Based on traditional ideals and principles, the Code is intended to give guidance to all members of the Armed Forces in any future conflict.

Since the Code was proclaimed in 1955, each of the Services has improved its instruction on how to avoid capture and what to do if taken prisoner of war. Each Service program has been analyzed, and the best points are reflected in this revised pamphlet, "The U.S. Fighting Man's Code." Some of the material in the booklet has been drawn from Army Pamphlet No. 30–101, "Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War"; *The Airman,* official journal of the Air Force; and the *Naval Training Bulletin.* Materials and suggestions have been received also from the U.S. Marine Corps, and these are reflected in this pamphlet.

The assistance of all of the Services is acknowledged with thanks.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is proud of the record of its fighting men. The overwhelming majority of them have met the standards of the Code of Conduct from the beginning of our military history. Every war has produced outstanding examples of their devotion to duty, country, God.

Although the Code of Conduct grew out of studies of behavior in Korea, that conflict also had its heroes, too many to list here. The individual acts of courage and fortitude by Americans in Communist prison camps alone would fill volumes. For their exemplary conduct while prisoners of war, many American fighting men were decorated.

But the fact remains that in Korea, as in every other war, a few Americans did less than their best to avoid capture—and a few of those who were captured cooperated with the enemy. Who is responsible? Certainly, the men concerned. But the military Services, the Department of Defense, and our Nation must assume a share of the responsibility.

An indomitable will to resist is not acquired overnight. Nor can it be supplied by military training alone. For it rests on character traits instilled in our homes, our schools, our churches—traits such as self-confidence, self-reliance, self-discipline, self-respect, moral responsibility, and faith in country and God.

The serviceman equipped with the *will* reinforced by the *skill* to resist is prepared for whatever military service has in store for him. Both the will and the skill to resist a Communist foe are strengthened by knowledge of Communist tactics and techniques.

The serviceman who understands the nature of Communist enslavement will do his utmost to avoid it. Guided by the precepts of the Code of Conduct, and profiting by the experiences of those unfortunate enough to have been captured by the Communists, he will never surrender himself or his men while there is the slightest chance of avoid-

ing it. He will never give up the fight before the situation is truly hopeless.

If capture is inevitable, he will continue the battle in the prisoner-of-war camp. He will make every reasonable effort to escape and help others who attempt to escape. He will resist enemy efforts to make a tool of him. He will strive to maintain the unity of his group. He will assume leadership if necessary, or obey the leader of his group.

In so doing, he will be fulfilling his mission and upholding the tradition of U.S. fighting men of the past.

Chapter 1

THE NEW ROLE OF THE POW

Something baffling happened to the American fighting man who became a prisoner of war in Korea. It baffled his Service, the Department of Defense, and our Nation as well.

The POW expected interrogation and brutal treatment. He knew the Communists would try to squeeze military information from him, and he certainly did not think they would use kid gloves. In this situation, he was to give *only* his name, rank, service number, and date of birth. He would evade answering other questions to the utmost of his ability.

If tortured, he could pray for strength to withstand his ordeal.

If possible, he would try to escape and rejoin U.S. forces.

Otherwise, based on the experience of past wars, the POW could expect to "sit out" the remainder of the conflict in a prison camp.

The POW got what he expected . . . plus much he had *not* expected!

ASSAULT ON THE MIND

The moment a POW fell into Communist hands in Korea, his captors launched an assault upon his mind and his spirit. Taking advantage of his bewilderment, they plotted their every move with a definite end in view.

The Communist aim: *To make prisoners of war serve the cause of international communism.*

Accordingly, American POW's were subjected to a well-planned and well-organized type of warfare with which few were familiar and for which few were prepared. Briefly, this warfare was aimed at undermining their loyalty to their country and their faith in the democratic

way of life—and thereby, conditioning them to accept communism.

How did the enemy wage this new type of war against our fighting men? What strategy and tactics were employed? What kind of weapons were used? A thorough study of hundreds of interviews with repatriated American prisoners provided the answers to those questions.

Where the Communists were most successful in making a prisoner do as they wished, they preyed upon his defects, his lack of knowledge, and his lack of experience. It follows, then, that if U.S. fighting men in Korea had known what to expect and had been prepared, those who became POW's could have spared themselves much agony . . . and could have put up much more effective resistance.

As long as the Communists threaten direct or indirect aggression to free nations anywhere, the danger of war continues. The United States and her allies will seek by every honorable means to avoid a shooting war. In the event of hostilities, however, you—as a U.S. fighting man—could become a prisoner.

The prisoner's life is never an easy one. And life as a prisoner of the Communists is especially grim, since it holds ordeals beyond the usual hardships of captivity. Hence, you will want to avoid it to the best of your ability. In doing so, you will not only be following the honorable course—set forth clearly in Article II of the Code—but you will be serving your own best interests as well. Some alternatives to surrender are indicated in chapter 13. If you fail to explore every alternative when threatened with capture, you will be making a serious mistake—possibly a fatal mistake.

BE PREPARED

The purpose of this booklet is to help you prepare yourself for any eventuality. By reviewing what happened in past wars, especially in Korea, and by examining what the Communists are trying to achieve, you will be better prepared for what may lie ahead.

Specifically, this booklet aims to acquaint you with some of the tactics, techniques, and methods of Communist interrogation, indoctrination, and handling of prisoners of war, and to suggest some defenses against these enemy weapons. It is intended to show you also how the U.S. Fighting Man's Code can serve as your armor, either in combat or in a POW camp.

"Knowledge is power." This holds just as true for the U.S. fighting man facing the Communist aggressor as it does for the scientist in the laboratory. Much of the knowledge and much of the strength you need to sustain you as an effective fighting man will sustain you also if you become a prisoner.

To combat Communists effectively, either in battle or in a prison camp, remember this:

- International communism seeks world domination.
- Communists will use military force when it suits their purpose.



- Military force is simply *one* way of winning control of the world.
- Communists also keep up an unrelenting war of propaganda, subversion, sabotage.

In North Korea, most American POW's learned the hard way that no enemy is a friend in a prisoner-of-war camp; that friendships must be developed among their own people and not with the enemy. In the event of another conflict with a Communist foe, American fighting men can expect similar treatment. All Communists are trained for one purpose—defeat of the capitalist democracies, especially the United States.

If you ever find yourself a prisoner of the Communists and are tempted to think that war has swept on beyond you, just remember: *there is no such thing as "time out"* in the global struggle between communism and the forces of freedom. Your Communist captor will not take "time out" to provide shelter, food, or medical care. Whatever care or help he gives you will *not* be for humanitarian reasons. It will be given *to help advance the Communist cause.*

How could the Communists use you? What would they expect of you?

THEY SEEK INFORMATION

First, as in previous wars, they would be seeking military information. There is nothing new about this. Captors have been seeking this from prisoners since the days of primitive warfare. Next, they will attempt to get all kinds of nonmilitary information—about you, your fellow prisoners, and your country. Your instructions in either case remain the same.

You will give *only* your name, rank, service number, and date of birth. You will evade answering other questions to the utmost of your ability.

If you were defending a vital spot, you would not surrender it simply because enemy fire threatened your life. To do so would be to undermine the safety of your outfit



and your country. By the same token, if you become a POW, you will not give the enemy any information he can use against your fellow POW's, your fighting forces, your country, or your country's allies.

A Communist interrogator may threaten a POW with death, torture, or solitary confinement. If the POW gives him what he wants because of these threats, he is as disloyal as the man who surrenders in combat to save his own hide.

If ever you are taken prisoner of war, a big test will come when you are first interrogated. Refuse to give anything but your name, rank, service number, and date of birth and you improve your chances of survival. If you waver, you are lost! If you allow your Communist captor to drag other information from you—military or otherwise—he will keep making more and more demands. In the end, he will force you into a shameful collaboration.

The Communists will use whatever means they feel is the most effective to get the information they want. Being

only human, they prefer to do this the easy way. If they can get what they want from you with sweet talk, so much the better for them. But if you indicate a willingness to talk, or cooperate, you are a better subject for further questioning than the prisoner who obviously will not cooperate. If you show you are afraid of harsh treatment, you invite it.

What can you expect when you resist? In later chapters, you will read of men who did resist—even when threatened with death or physical torture. Some of them did die, victims of Communist brutality. But many more lived . . . and came home with honor!

The path of honor is never easy for a fighting man. But it is the *only* path for a man who respects himself and loves his country!

THEY WANT TO USE YOU

Apart from information, what will the Communists be seeking from you if you ever become a POW?

They will want to use you in the cause of communism. This does not mean that they want you to become a member of the Communist Party. Even in the Soviet Union, the Communist Party has accepted only 8 million members out of a total population of 200 million. However, the Communists would like to have you become an open champion of their ideas. If they succeed in getting you to cooperate, they will find many uses for you—both as a POW and after you are repatriated. For example, while you're a POW, they would like for you to broadcast propaganda messages to the folks back home. After you are released they would like for you to help pave the way for communism in the USA. They will not be concerned in the least with *your* welfare, *your* rights, or *your* happiness as an individual. They will be concerned with you *only* as a tool of communism.

The Communists will sometimes offer small bribes or rewards to get you to do what they want. If you prove uncooperative, they will not hesitate to use force.

For example, suppose the Communists want you to be an informer—to tattle on your fellow POW's. If any POW values a few cigarettes and some candy more than he does his honor and the welfare of his fellow POW's, he can make a deal. If he can supply information of more than routine usefulness, his reward may be more. Suppose he refuses! He may be subjected to all kinds of penalties, from beatings to solitary confinement. But he still has his honor!

GUISES OF COMMUNISM

Some of what happened in Korea may be outmoded *if* and *when* another war breaks out. If so, and if you become a POW, be alert for new tricks and new ways to cover up old tricks. Communism assumes many disguises. At various times and places, it may present itself as friendly and considerate. On the other hand, depending on the situation, it may be displayed in all its naked brutality. Some American prisoners observed both sides and many guises during their captivity in Korea. Others saw only one side of communism. Most Americans were impressed by the manner in which communism can undergo quick changes from one guise to another. Any man falling into Communist hands in the future should be prepared to



encounter communism in any of the forms it may assume—even the indignant denial that it is communism at all.

No matter how the Communists change their tactics, their motives and broader purposes will not change. Learn these, and you will understand that *whatever they want you to do* will have some calculated end in view, and that end will be to advance the Communist cause.

IN CONCLUSION

The odds are that you will never become a prisoner of the Communists. At the same time, in any realistic appraisal of what lies ahead, it is a possibility that cannot be overlooked.

If such a fate should overtake you, you may be sure that your Government will do everything possible to rescue you. Meantime, until such help comes, you will have to rely on your own resources. This is the hard, cold truth!

In summing up, remember that the Communists have three basic uses for prisoners of war. They may seek to use any prisoner in one or more of these ways:

- As a source of military information.
- As a champion of communism.
- As a stooge to do their dirty work.

All three possibilities are repulsive. Yet your Government would be doing you a disservice if it did not try to make you aware of them. As bad as they are, fear of the unknown is worse. An ugly truth is no less ugly if it remains in hiding.

Face the facts! You'll find them, unadorned, in this pamphlet.

Chapter 2

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

FOR a full understanding of today's prisoner-of-war problem, knowledge of the past is essential. This can help you prepare for the future.

Looking back to prehistoric times, we know that primitive man and his barbarian descendant annihilated or enslaved all captive foemen. In time it occurred to the conqueror to hold a captured leader as hostage. Such a victim was Lot. According to Scripture, he was freed by the forces of Abraham—perhaps the earliest prisoner-rescue on record.

The Romans sported with their war prisoners, often using them for target practice or for gladiatorial shows to amuse the public. Enslaved warriors rowed Caesar's galleys to North Africa and Britain, and were killed when they could no longer pull an oar. "Slay, and slay on!" Germanicus ordered his Rhineland invaders. "Do not take prisoners! We will have no peace until all are destroyed."

Chivalry developed in the Western World with the rise of Christianity, the concept of "Do unto others." The code of knighthood served to curb the warrior's steel. The true knight refused to slay for slaughter's sake. Facing battle, he was pledged to remain true to his king or cause, even if captured. The disclosure of a trust or the deliverance of a friend to the enemy was treacherous and merited swift punishment.

Thus rules for the fighting man in combat or in captivity were linked to knightly concepts of duty, honor, loyalty to friend, and gallantry to a worthy foe.

Some time during the Crusades a prisoner-interrogation rule developed. The captive knight was permitted to divulge his name and rank—admissions necessitated by the game of ransom. However, the medieval foot soldier continued to risk death or enslavement at the hands of a conquering enemy, without hope of escape through ransom.

In Europe, during the 17th century, the idea emerged that prisoners of war were charges of the capturing sovereign or state. No rules for their treatment had been formulated, but they were protected from servitude and personal revenge. Later, during the 18th century, captivity came to be considered a means of preventing the prisoner's return to friendly forces. This was a step forward. Military prisoners were no longer considered guilty of crimes against the state.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

To discourage desertions during the Revolution, the United States established the death penalty for prisoners who, after capture, took up arms in the service of the enemy. Duress or coercion was recognized as mitigating only in the event that immediate death had been threatened. This was the first definition of required prisoner conduct.

Since George III decreed that all Americans who revolted against Crown authority were war criminals subject to hanging, Revolutionary soldiers and sailors went to war under the shadow of the gallows. The noose was relaxed only because it proved impractical and because English liberals deplored such high-handed tyranny. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, prisoner exchanges were begun and paroles arranged.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

During the Civil War, about 3,170 captured Federals joined the Southern forces, and about 5,450 captured Confederates joined the Federal army. War Department General Order No. 207, issued 3 July 1863, apparently was intended to curb widespread surrender and subsequent parole to escape further combatant service. It provided, among other things, that it was the duty of a prisoner of war to escape. Punishment for misconduct was based on three criteria:

- Misconduct where there was no duress or coercion.

- Active participation in combat against Federal forces.
- Failure to return voluntarily.

In cases involving disloyal prisoners of war, the question of duress—or degree of duress—was weighed in the balance. The Union Judge Advocate General recognized coercion as a defense. It was held that "extreme suffering and privation which endangered the prisoner's life" might justify his enlistment with the enemy. However, if the prisoner made no effort to escape when opportunity offered, he was liable to a desertion charge.

Lieber's Code. Civil War prison camps were harsh. In Southern camps, particularly Andersonville and Florence, men suffered greatly from malnutrition and lack of medication. The Union prison on Johnson's Island in Lake Erie was a bleak Alcatraz, and Union stockades at Point Lookout on the Potomac were described as "hell holes."

Humane citizens, North and South, appealed for lenient treatment of captives. In 1863 President Lincoln requested Professor Francis Lieber to prepare a set of prisoner rules. Lieber's *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States* were probably the first comprehensive code of international law pertaining to prisoners of war to be issued by a government. Based on moral precepts that recognized the enemy as a fellow human with lawful rights, Lieber's code contained the following injunctions:

- A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.
- A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed before the captor's army or people, (for crimes) committed before he was captured, and for which he has not been punished by his own authorities.
- A prisoner of war . . . is the prisoner of the government and not of the captor.



Many Civil War prisoners were confined in tents (above) or makeshift structures (below) and lacked the most elementary sanitary facilities.



- Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment such as may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to be subjected to no other intentional suffering or indignity.
- A prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or otherwise killed in flight; but neither death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted upon him simply for his attempt to escape, which the law of order does not consider a crime. Stricter means of security shall be used after an unsuccessful attempt at escape.
- Every captured wounded enemy shall be medically treated according to the ability of the medical staff.

Lieber's code was a step forward. The Confederacy agreed to abide by the code but could not always fulfill the code's intention. For example, the code required that prisoners' rations be similar to those issued their captors. But the South was slowly starving under pressure of blockade, and Southern soldiers as well as their prisoners suffered from the scarcity of food.

Interrogation and Information. In the American Civil War, espionage, military intelligence, and counterintelligence were important features. In previous wars, few trained intelligence operators had served the American forces. Efforts to gather military information had been haphazard and disorganized. The advent of the Pinkerton Service which operated with McClellan, the Federal Secret Service under Colonel Lafayette Baker, and a well-organized Confederate Secret Service put intelligence-gathering (and defensive counterintelligence) on a modernized basis.

Spies were called "scouts." As old as war was the rule that enemy spies, caught in disguise, faced death. They were beyond the pale of prisoner-of-war exemptions. The Civil War featured many heroic spy exploits. It also featured daring raids on enemy lines to take prisoners for interrogation.

The officer or man who gave his captors military information was as dangerous to country and cause as the

deliberate traitor. So soldiers were enjoined "not to talk." Lieber set down the rule:

- Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giving to the enemy information concerning their own army, and the modern law of war permits no longer the use of any violence against prisoners, in order to extort the desired information, or to punish them for having given false information.

The rule was easier to recite than observe. On the one hand, there was the interrogator ordered by his chiefs to acquire vital information—intelligence that might win a battle and save many lives. On the other hand, there was the prisoner, sworn to withhold information that might cost a battle and the lives of his countrymen. Here are the opposing forces for a cruel contest.

Despite Lieber's rules, prisoners were sometimes chained together, placed in brutal irons, or "bagged" (a suffocating canvas sack tied over the head). They were placed in solitary confinement and denied water. These vicious measures were used more often to wring information from a captive than as disciplinary punishments. Such "third degrees" were conducted privately, usually by military police or Secret Service agents.

Backsliding there was on both sides. However, the general trend was toward more humane treatment of POW's. The going was slow, but the steps were in the right direction.

THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

In 1864, the Swiss philanthropist Henri Dunant wrote a book that set the stage for a conference at Geneva and the founding of the International Red Cross. The Red Cross offered relief to all combatants, regardless of the flag they served. All participants agreed that "the sanitary personnel might continue its duty in the presence of the enemy." Through the determined campaigning of Clara Barton, the United States joined the convention in 1882, and the American Red Cross was organized.

Dunant's work inspired the founding of other prisoner-relief societies. In 1874, a conference was held in Brussels at the instigation of the Russian Government. Delegates of all the major European nations attended. A code based on Lieber's was projected. The Brussels code was not ratified, but it strongly influenced the first Hague Conference, which met at the turn of the century.

Czar Nicholas II sponsored the Hague Conference of 1899, which produced a Convention with respect to laws and customs of war on land. Representatives of 26 nations attended the conference. Discussed were disarmament proposals and the possibility of establishing a world court. The delegates negotiated various agreements relating to warfare and war prisoners.

The prisoner-of-war code adopted at The Hague was based on the one proposed at Brussels. It embodied many of Lieber's original stipulations. Prisoners of war were to be considered as lawful and disarmed enemies. They were captives of the hostile government and not in the power of the individual captors or jailors. It was agreed that unruly prisoners could be punished for insubordination, but humane treatment was required.

Twenty-four of the attending powers ratified the Hague Convention. Signers included the United States, Germany, France, England, and Russia. A hopeful generation called the conference the "First Parliament of Man."

Acting on a Russian proposal, the Netherlands called a second Hague Conference in 1907. During this conference, the powers reaffirmed their adherence to the principles previously adopted.

THE FIRST TOTAL WAR

Another conference was in the making when the First World War exploded. German intentions seemed only too clear when the Kaiser's spokesman described a treaty with Belgium as a "scrap of paper."

The concept of total war—mustering an entire nation and its forces for the conflict—was not new. But in the mod-

ern sense, it was first advocated by a Prussian militarist before World War I. If rules and codes abetted the war effort, observe them. If they didn't, they were unrealistic and to be dispensed with. Total war was no gentleman's game. Any expedient that spelled victory was justifiable.

This concept was not entirely accepted by the High Command, but the Prussian school generally endorsed a policy of *Schreklichkeit* (planned terror or "Frightfulness") to subdue defiant enemy peoples. Prussian "Frightfulness" was amateurish, and not very effective. But it did represent a 20th-century development in psychological warfare. Its usefulness was countered when it backfired in another area—propaganda warfare.

The Germans introduced another innovation during World War I. This new element could be called "political warfare." As distinguished from propaganda, it involved the process known today as political indoctrination.

At Limburg and Zossen, the Germans set up what were known as "political camps." To these camps were sent prisoners who seemed likely subjects for subversion. The inmates were quartered in comfortable barracks. Instead of the normal prisoner ration they were fed the best food available. Tobacco and candy were plentiful. During the first eighteen months of the war, Irish prisoners were selected for these segregated camps.

As reported by Major H. C. Fooks in his book *Prisoners of War:* "One commandant talked to his men and stated that the emperor was aware of the downtrodden state of Ireland, and wished that the Irish captives be placed in a separate camp, where they would be better fed and treated better than the English captives."

By and large, the Germans met with little success. Most of the Irish POW's resisted subversion. But the Germans were pioneering. They were setting a pattern for the future.

At war's end approximately 2,200,000 prisoners were in the hands of the Central (Germanic) Powers. The Allies were holding 615,900. The Americans had captured some 49,000 Germans and the Germans, 4,120 Americans. A total

of 147 Americans died in the enemy's prison camps. Few Americans escaped from Germany, but daring attempts were made. On the whole, the American prisoners were well treated.

In reviewing World War I—the first total war—one may note four major developments:

- Scientific intelligence warfare.
- Psychological warfare.
- Propaganda warfare.
- Political warfare.

All dealt with the human mind, and all would be brought to bear on future prisoners of war—in World War II and in Korea.

THE SECOND TOTAL WAR

During World War II a total of 129,701 Americans were captured by the Axis enemy.



At this model German prisoner-of-war camp near Wetzlar, Germany, Allied airmen captured during World War II received excellent care.



These liberated American inmates of a German prison hospital at Fuchsmuehl (World War II) show the effects of a starvation diet.

Perhaps fearing reprisal more than public opinion, the German military were fairly careful in handling American POW's—with some exceptions. Americans captured in Italy were given similarly correct treatment.

In the matter of prisoner interrogation, the German military seem to have behaved well enough—at least toward the

Americans. There was none of the brutalizing that existed in such Japanese camps as Ofuna and Ashio, where American submariners were tortured.

The Americans captured by General Homma's forces on Bataan Peninsula and at Corregidor were fortunate if they reached a prison camp alive. In the Bataan Death March General Wainwright's surrendered troops endured one of the most excruciating ordeals of the war. Britons and Australians caught at Singapore were treated with similar brutality.

Airmen and submariners bore the brunt of interrogation ordeals. Reason: they usually possessed information of more value to the enemy than an infantryman's. They may have flown from a carrier or perhaps sailed from some hidden island base. The name of the flattop, the location of the base—this was vital intelligence. The submariner knew a dozen secrets: his sub's cruising range, its radar and sonar devices, its torpedo gear. One of the best kept secrets of the war, and one of the most important, was the depth at which a U.S. submarine could operate.

So pilots and submarine sailors who were captured "got the works." The Japanese did not employ subtle interrogation methods. Prisoners were flogged and tortured. They were treated to such Oriental punishments as judo experts and hatchet men could devise. The ordeal of one submarine skipper who "took it" hardly bears recital—cigarette burns, bamboo splinters under the fingernails . . . . But the Japanese did not extract from him the diving depth of U.S. submarines.

In the Pacific after the war, Americans found the graves of American destroyermen who had been beheaded and the bodies of other American prisoners who had been drenched with gasoline and burned alive.

These grim deeds, which the present Japanese Government condemns as heartily as we do, may be regarded as the exception. However, even where the treatment was more humane, the realities of war were making themselves felt. The blockaded Japanese were reduced to meager rations.

The Philippines and the Home Islands were undergoing nonstop bombardment. Consequently, food and medical supplies were at barrel-bottom. The POW's received the leftovers.

But beheadings, torture, the Palawan massacre, and the Bataan Death March were on the record. Like the Malmédy massacre in the Belgian Bulge, like Buchenwald and Belsen, they awaited an accounting. The outraged people of the United Nations demanded retributive justice.

The Germans applied other and seemingly more effective interrogation methods. Consider the testimony of Joachim Scharff, an interrogator stationed at Auswerstelle West, Oberursel, Germany. This was the camp where all captured aviators (except Russian) were brought for questioning. From "all but a handful" of the 500 Americans questioned, Scharff obtained the information he was after. Scharff's methods were not so remarkable. It might be said that he killed his victims with kindness.

In the war there were many "Scharffs." Not all of them were on the German side. Adept Allied interrogators pumped information from case-hardened Luftwaffe pilots and U-boat skippers. In the closing days of the war they pumped their rivals—captured Nazi interrogators—among them Joachim Scharff.

THE COMMUNIST SHADOW

That coming events cast their shadows proved true in the Soviet treatment of Axis prisoners taken during World War II. Even then the Soviets demonstrated methods that they and other Communist nations were to use in later years.

The Communist pattern was beginning to unfold in October 1941, when the Red (Soviet) Army sent a directive to all Communist interrogators, which read in part: "From the very moment of capture by the Red Army, and during the entire period of captivity, the enemy enlisted men and officers must be under continuous indoctrination by our political workers and interrogators."

This was followed by a series of directives that explained in detail what type of information would be extracted from

German prisoners first, how the interrogations should be conducted, and the manner and extent of the indoctrination. Analysis of these directives revealed that the Communists were more interested in economic and political information than in purely military information, though they did not overlook military information. Military information was sought, as a rule, soon after the prisoner was captured and while he was being evacuated from the combat zone to the rear.

Physical Pressure. The Communist interrogators used physical pressure against German POW's in an effort to lower their resistance to interrogation and to make the job of the interrogator easier. *Physical pressure, when used, was directed against selected individuals and not against groups of prisoners.* The Communists realized that physical pressure against a prisoner group would strengthen the unity of the group and defeat their purpose of obtaining information. Examples of the types of physical pressure exerted against selected individual prisoners are: Solitary confinement; requiring the prisoner to assume rigid and uncomfortable positions for long periods of time; prolonged interrogation of the prisoner by using relays of fresh interrogators; depriving the prisoner of sufficient sleep or rest; and denying the prisoner the use of the latrine.

When the Soviet interrogators relaxed their pressure, it was not for humane reasons. They were being realistic. After all, the object of interrogation is to obtain information. A badly injured prisoner, or one too exhausted or confused to talk intelligently, is of no use to the interrogator; therefore, there are definite limits on the amount of physical pressure that can be exerted on a man under interrogation. It should be noted that such methods as those mentioned above were reserved for selected prisoners who were known, or thought, to possess important information; they were not applied to the prisoner population as a whole because of the obvious expense in both manpower and time.

The Indoctrination Process. Although some Communist attempts at indoctrination of German prisoners were made near the front lines almost immediately after capture, the

organized, concerted indoctrination program began at permanent POW camps.

The basic technique was to discredit not only Hitler but the whole German concept of government. The Communists attacked all German leaders and all German schools of thought. Every social system except communism was described as being against the common man. Communism was advanced as the salvation of the workers and the guardian of peace.

Propaganda. Communist propaganda was perhaps the most effective part of the Communist indoctrination of German prisoners. The Communists collected a large number of diaries and letters of dead German officers that indicated defeatist attitudes after Hitler's forces began to slow down on all fronts. These documents were disseminated to newly captured prisoners. They were used to discredit and degrade the officer class and served to create doubt and to weaken the enlisted prisoners' faith in their officers and in Germany.

German prisoners were asked to make recordings, supposedly to be broadcast to relatives in Germany. The recordings were broadcast, instead, as propaganda to the opposing troops on the front line, and gave the impression that life with the Soviets was pleasant. These propaganda recordings caused many Germans to surrender to the Red Army.

"Peace" was the basic theme of the Communists. However, this theme was merely a front to hide their true motives. In actuality, it meant peace on Communist terms. Through fraud, deception, and some German collaborators, numerous German prisoners signed "peace petitions," which the Communists published throughout the world. These "petitions" gave German soldiers and civilians the false impression that only the Communists wanted peace. As a matter of fact, *the current Communist "peace crusade"* started in their prisoner-of-war camps in 1945.

Handling of Japanese POW's. Communist methods of handling Japanese prisoners of war were generally the same as

those employed in handling German prisoners. The interrogation procedures were the same, as were the techniques of indoctrination. The illegal and unjustified detaining of Japanese prisoners for years after hostilities had come to an end paralleled the illegal holding of German prisoners, some of whom were released as late as October 1955, *more than ten years after their capture.* Others, so-called "war criminals," may never be released.

IN CONCLUSION

The interrogation and indoctrination methods used by the Soviets against German and Japanese prisoners of war followed the same pattern as those used against the Russian people. They are a Communist trademark, an established procedure peculiar only to communism.

At the close of World War II, these facts had already been written on the pages of history. Unfortunately, much of what was on those pages was still a Communist secret. If we had known all the facts and had taken them to heart, we could have spared ourselves much grief during the Korean war.

Chapter 3

OUTBREAK IN KOREA

Armed with Soviet weapons, North Korean Communist forces invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. Six days later a battalion of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division was rushed to Korea from Japan.

Thus began one of the strangest wars in American history. Our cause was simple and just, but our objectives were frequently confused in the public mind.

The Korean war had three aspects. There was the civil war aspect—North Koreans fighting South Koreans for control of a divided country. There was the collective aspect—the first United Nations' attempt to stop a treaty-breaking aggressor. And there was the cold war aspect—the Western powers blocking the expansion of Communist imperialism.

The causes of the war, United Nations' objectives, and the need for American intervention were not clearly delineated in the public mind. This lack of understanding prevailed among American civilians and fighting men.

The Communists attempted to exploit to the fullest this condition both in international propaganda and in dealing with our prisoners of war.

THE COLD FACTS

The United States began a piecemeal build-up of the fighting forces in Korea. The first units to reach Korea were not well prepared for combat. However, by November 1950, the North Koreans had been completely beaten, their capital was in Allied hands, and their remnant forces were scattered and disorganized. The victory seemed assured until the Chinese Red avalanche crashed over the Yalu.

In late November, the Chinese opened a massive counter-offensive, hurling our forces into retreat. Early in December, American and Allied forces were trapped at the Chang-Jin Reservoir. By fierce fighting they broke the trap and fought their way to Hungnam, where they were evacuated.

There ensued a winter of back-to-wall battling in subzero cold.

It was during this grueling period, which began in July 1950, that most of the American POW's were captured.

"DEATH MARCHES"

The first ordeal the prisoners had to suffer—and often the worst—was the march to the POW camps. The North Koreans frequently tied a prisoner's hands behind his back or bound his arms with wire. Wounded prisoners were jammed into trucks that jolted, dripping blood, along broken roads. Many of the wounded received no medical attention until they reached the camp. Some were not attended to until days thereafter.

The marching prisoners were likely to be beaten or kicked to their feet if they fell. A number of the Communist officers were bullwhip barbarians. They were particularly brutal to

South Korean captives. Many ROK prisoners were forced to dig their own graves before they were shot—an old oriental custom applied to the execution of criminals. Some Americans, with their hands tied behind their backs, were shot by the enemy.

So the journeys to the prison camps were "death marches." On one of these marches, 700 men headed north. Before the camp was reached, 500 had perished.

The camps were what might be expected in a remote corner of Asia. Prisoner rations were scanty—a basic diet of rice occasionally leavened with some foul kind of soup. The average American could not stomach such fare. Sickness broke out in the camps, and many of the men suffered long sieges of dysentery.

The men suffered much from cold in winter and heat in summer. Water was often scarce; bathing became difficult. Barracks were foul and unsanitary.

In the best of the camps, the men behind the barbed wire were sometimes given tobacco, a few morsels of candy, occasional mail. A few Red Cross packages got through. However, the enemy consistently refused to permit the International Red Cross to inspect prisoner-of-war camps. There was good reason!

THE "BAD" CAMPS

In the worst of the camps, the prisoners existed by the skin of their teeth and raw courage. Men in the "bad" camps were known to lose 50 pounds in weight in a matter of weeks.

The "bad" camps included the so-called "Bean Camp" near Suan, a camp known as "Death Valley" near Pukchin, another camp called "The Valley," apparently in the vicinity of Kanggye. Among the worst camps were the "Interrogation Center" near Pukchin and a neighboring disciplinary center called "The Caves." This last was literally composed of caverns in which the men were confined. Here they were forced to sleep without blankets. Their food was thrown at them. There were no latrine facilities. In "The Caves" the

prisoners were reduced to a degree of misery and degradation almost unbelievable. Those sent to "The Caves" were prisoners accused of insubordination, breaking camp rules, attempting to escape, or committing some other so-called crime. The testimony of survivors suggests that the "crime" was seldom fitted by the punishment.

The primary interest of the North Koreans was to impress United Nations captives and Korean civilians with their "superiority" over "Western barbarians." They operated on the theory that "might is right" and demonstrated that "right" by some of the most inhumane types of atrocities and brutalities that Western civilization has seen. To impress the civilian population, the North Korean Communists placed American captives on display in the village squares of Korea. They beat and even murdered exhausted, sick, and wounded Americans who could not defend themselves.

Mistreatment of American prisoners by the North Koreans had no relationship to interrogation and political indoctrination. Actually, the North Koreans were not primarily interested in collecting intelligence information or exploiting the prisoners of war. They did not conduct an organized program of indoctrination.

They did conduct some interrogations of United Nations prisoners. These were limited, crude, and aimless, and did not produce enough tactical or political information to constitute an achievement. One of the stock questions was, "Why did the United States invade North Korea?" Most Americans questioned by the Koreans were asked, "How many automobiles has each American?" The manner in which the Koreans conducted their limited interrogations, using threats and beatings, usually resulted in opposition by the prisoners rather than cooperation.

CAPTURE BY THE CHINESE

The brutal manner in which the North Koreans treated captives became known to thousands of the United Nations forces. As a result, many Americans felt that capture by the Chinese would bring similar treatment. Therefore, when an American captive of the Chinese was not shot or other-

trained and indoctrinated themselves in communism and all of its techniques was demonstrated by their bitter criticism of everything American and by repeated references to the "capitalists."

After the initial contact with the enemy, some Americans seemed to believe that the enemy was sincere and harmless. They relaxed and permitted themselves to fall into a well-disguised trap by a cunning enemy.

The Chinese Communist leaders, military and political, were educated—many, in the United States. Many also spoke English fluently. Most of them possessed a fairly good understanding of Americans and of the other nationalities that composed the United Nations forces. They were shrewd, and they recognized the potential value to the Communist cause of converting prisoner-of-war camps into laboratories in which they could experiment with various methods of group-handling and indoctrination of United Nations prisoners, especially Americans.

THE FIRST BRIEFING

Shortly after capture, American prisoners were escorted to a point some distance behind the front lines. The Chinese used these points for assembling and briefing the prisoners before marching them to permanent prison compounds. When assembled at the collecting point, the prisoners were briefed by an English-speaking Chinese Communist officer.

The officer told the prisoners that the war in Korea was a civil war, like the Civil War in the United States in 1861. The prisoners were told that the United States was the real aggressor in Korea and that the American capitalists forced other nations to send troops to Korea to help fight a war for Wall Street. The prisoners were told that the military aggression by the United States so angered the Chinese people that the "workers" of China decided to "volunteer" for military duty and come to the rescue of the North Korean people. The prisoners were told that the war in Korea was illegal because the Congress of the United States did not declare war against the People's Republic in North Korea.

The Communist officer further told the prisoners that, in view of the fact that the war was not legal, the Chinese and Korean people would not consider the captives prisoners of war but rather as "students." As students they would be reeducated by the Chinese and Korean People's Governments. The reeducation about which the enemy spoke meant indoctrination—Communist indoctrination.

PERMANENT CAMPS

After the prisoners had undergone the briefing at the collecting points and had been identified and tagged, they were evacuated to one of the permanent camps in North Korea. The evacuation under the Chinese was more orderly and less ruthless than under the North Koreans—another instance of the Communist deception technique in operation. The sick and wounded were assisted by Korean civilians who used carts to help them along the marches. The food en route did not meet American standards but was far better than the food given prisoners by the Koreans. Medical care for the marching prisoners was poor, but the Chinese made what they had available to the more serious cases of sick and wounded.

After arriving at permanent camps, the prisoners were immediately organized into units comparable in size to United States Army units. They were grouped into squads, platoons, and companies, each under a unit leader. Originally, the leaders were selected by the Chinese Communists on the basis of leadership qualities, military bearing, and a loud, commanding voice. This manner of selection, however, was discarded almost immediately because the units were run too much like regular military organizations, and this was contrary to the Communists' strategy. The enemy reexamined the original leaders, checked their backgrounds, and determined which ones could be depended upon to lead the units in the way the Communists wanted them led. In many instances, the unit leaders were studied as potential group leaders and monitors for indoctrination classes. Obviously, the objective behind all this was to gain and maintain complete control over the prisoners.

After the Chinese had established a POW organization that would satisfy their purposes, they began a conditioning process designed to render the prisoners more vulnerable to their propaganda assaults and to their political indoctrination program. The enemy's initial objective was to gain the prisoners' neutrality, if not cooperation, by undermining their sense of duty, their friendships, and their democratic ideals. To attain this, the enemy had no set of rules. No trick was too dirty or mean, no weakness too unjust to exploit, no threat too violent or subtle to be used again and again to batter the resistance of the prisoners and to crush their will.

Fear, threats, confusion, tension, isolation, retaliation, informers, and censorship of mail were used effectively by the Chinese Communists. Since these control measures played such an important part, and since they will probably be used again and again in any future situation of this kind, it is important to explain some of them in detail.

SPREADING FEAR

The Chinese Communists first generated fear among the prisoners by warning them that they might be strafed by our own planes in Korea. This was not an unfounded warning, because we had air superiority in Korea at the time, and the Chinese did not report accurately the locations of the various POW inclosures. This warning created a peculiar fear in the minds of the prisoners—fear of harm by friendly forces. Stories of atrocities and brutalities, a few of which were based on fact, were deliberately spread. In this instance, the implication was that in some rare and unusual situation, the enemy might find it necessary to resort to torture, but if he did it would be as a last resort for the sake of discipline. The enemy spread rumors that some prisoners might be shipped to Manchuria or to China and that the trip might be a one-way affair.

Another rumor deliberately planted and spread by the enemy was that if prisoners did not cooperate with the Chinese and Korean People's Governments for peace, some might not be repatriated. This inspired the greatest fear in



the prisoners—of spending an indeterminate period as prisoners of the Communists.

Playing on basic human instinct and emotions, the enemy started a rumor that food might be withheld from those prisoners who did not cooperate with the enemy. This rumor, coupled with another that even the primitive medical care would be withheld in case of illness, intensified the normal fear of sickness and disease. This fear increased further when the prisoners considered the fact that they were living under conditions far below the normal sanitary standards in the United States and other modern countries of the world.

Perhaps the most significant and destructive fear was fear of the unknown. The Chinese played upon it in the hope of reducing the resistance of the prisoners. This caused some prisoners to weaken and a few to accede to Communist demands. An analysis of this aspect of group-handling by the Chinese Communists reveals that the prisoners actually

were more afraid of the unknown than of the things they could see, feel, and hear.

INFORMING

One of the most vicious and despicable tactics employed by the Chinese Communists was to organize nets of informers. The enemy had two types of informers. One was the unwitting informer. He had no specific instructions from the enemy nor, as a matter of fact, did he realize that he was serving as an informer. He was called to the enemy headquarters at various times and engaged in general conversation. The conversation would always lead to prison life and prisoner activities. Through careless talk, the prisoner gave the enemy information about other prisoners and unwittingly informed on them.

The other type was the regular informer, who reported to the enemy at night or at other specific hours designated by the enemy. He gave the enemy information about other prisoners through weakness or to enhance his position in the eyes of the enemy. In certain instances a regular informer deliberately gave the enemy false information about some prisoner or prisoners, which resulted in unwarranted punishment or hardship for the victims. As a result, prisoners were tried and severely punished for offenses about which they knew nothing—the work of the informer.

The position of the informer was so insecure that he had to report any questionable act in case someone else informed on him, thus causing him to lose his position. These "questionable" acts included such indefinable misconduct as "unwholesome" or "hostile" attitude, the recording of "improper notes" at an indoctrination lecture, and expressing "a capitalistic philosophy." The type of prisoner recruited by the enemy for this work was the opportunist, who stopped at nothing to further his own gains. In return for informing, the Chinese enemy permitted him to conduct various activities, such as selling food to hungry prisoners. The informers were feared to some extent by the other prisoners, but their attitude and conduct more frequently were viewed with anger, shame, and disgust.

IN CONCLUSION

Despite the wide publicity given to informers and collaborationists, they did *not* set the pattern for our fighting men in Korea. The large majority of American prisoners resisted the enemy in the highest tradition of the service and of our country. Of those who resisted, some were singled out for brutal treatment. Some of these cases will be discussed in later chapters. In the long run, however, those Americans who resisted fared about as well physically and materially as the few who chose the road of least resistance. And they had this decided advantage—the personal satisfaction of having acted in the highest moral tradition of a nation under God.

Chapter 4

"PROGRESSIVES" AND "REACTIONARIES"

Who were the "progressives" and who were the "reactionaries"?

These words took on special meanings in the prison camps of North Korea. American fighting men who considered themselves liberals were proud to be called "reactionaries" for demonstrating firm resistance in a Communist prison camp. On this point, they saw eye to eye with their more conservative buddies. And both liberal and conservative POW's looked with contempt on the POW who came to be known as a "progressive."

How did a man become a "progressive"?

If he began to show the "proper spirit"—to cooperate with his captors—he was lectured and handed Communist literature. A docile prisoner who read the literature and listened politely to the lectures was graduated to a better class. Finally he might be sent to "Peaceful Valley." In this lenient camp the food was relatively good. Prisoners might even have tobacco. And here they were given all sorts of Marxian propaganda.

The graduates from "Peaceful Valley" and others who accepted Communist schooling were called "progressives." And there were shades of meaning!

THE "PROGRESSIVE" ROLE

A British study described a "progressive" POW as one who *accepted* the political, economic, and social gospel of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin—even if he was not quite sure what this was. In order to be fully accepted as a "progressive," however, the prisoner had to do more than passively accept communism. He had to become a Communist propagandist and assist the Chinese, not only by giving them all the military information he had but also by acting as an



informer, revealing the plans and thoughts of his fellow prisoners, and helping to spread communism among them and among his family and friends at home. Thus he would show that he had become "politically conscious."

The second and more literal application of the "progressive" label became apparent in the systematic exploitation of a prisoner's services once he had given in on just one issue. Often the first bit of cooperation with the enemy seemed minor in nature; and the prisoner could rationalize, with the captor's help, to justify the act. But the first concession paved the way for a second, and so on down the line. With each "progressive" step down collaboration road, the chance of turning back became more remote. Thus some prisoners learned too late that they couldn't be just "a little bit" of a collaborator so long as the Communists wanted their services.

The "progressives" were called upon to deliver lectures, write pamphlets, and make propaganda broadcasts. They

wrote speeches condemning capitalism and "American aggression in Korea." They organized a group known as "Peace Fighters."

On a percentage basis, fewer officers than enlisted men were "progressives." However, the officers' influence, unfortunately, was strong on the enlisted men. "If the Captain can do it, why can't I?" "If the Colonel signs a peace petition and orders the rest of us to do it, we have to follow orders, don't we?" Altogether, the officers and enlisted men who resisted were on a spot. That most of them refused to join the "progressives" (and rejected a promise, sometimes unfulfilled, of better food, minor luxuries, and mail call) says something for the spirit of both officers and enlisted men.

The Communists soon learned that Americans were not readily sold on communism. Even those of lesser education, or perhaps having little appreciation of their own country's principles, were by no means eager to accept this foreign ideology or to submit to it. The early "converts" turned out to be simply opportunists seeking to better their own lot without regard to the consequences for their fellow prisoners.

THE "REACTIONARY" LABEL

How did the "reactionary" fare? He could expect to be separated from those prisoners whom the enemy deemed to be more susceptible. While there was good chance the "reactionary" would experience some solitary confinement, in time the Communists found themselves short of facilities for handling all resisters in that manner. Thus small "reactionary" groups formed, increasing in size as time went by, isolated to prevent their interference with the subjugation program in the "progressive" camps. Brought together by virtue of their demonstrated resistance to the enemy, these were men who could, despite any personal differences among themselves, present a united front against the enemy and help each other survive.

Still, the "reactionary" label was no guarantee that the prisoner was permanently free from enemy efforts to sub-



jugate him. Any American who signed a propaganda leaflet, a peace petition, or a germ-war confession was a big feather in the enemy's hat. Logically, the higher the rank of the prisoner the more useful would be such service to the enemy. Also, the "breaking" of a senior officer, a "notorious reactionary," or anyone who had demonstrated leadership and other strong qualities that had earned the respect and trust of fellow prisoners, was of tremendous benefit in the Communist effort to convince other prisoners (and people back home) that resistance was futile. For that reason, various "reactionaries" were subjected to pressures often loosely referred to as "brainwashing."

Breakdown of leadership was what the enemy wanted. Officers were usually segregated. "Progressives" were placed in leadership positions. And if the enemy's appointees weren't obeyed by the other POW's, punishments were in store for the "insubordinate prisoners."

THAT LONESOME ROAD

What did the "progressive" expect to gain in the long run . . . after the Korean war was over? Was he thinking that far ahead?

It is doubtful that any of the "progressives" became sincere converts to the Communist ideology. Even in the case of the turncoats—21 American prisoners who refused repatriation and remained in Red China—the seemingly logical assumption that they had been converted has proved erroneous. Perhaps this misconception was fostered by frequent references to them during the repatriation process as "those who chose communism." Indications are that this misleading phrase was introduced by Communist publications.

In any event, reports by returned American prisoners on the actions of those men indicated that they remained for quite different reasons. The subsequent return of some of the 21 further refutes the idea that they "chose communism." One of these, interviewed in Hong Kong and asked why he stayed in Red China in the first place, replied, ". . . I'll tell you this much—it wasn't for political reasons."

Why did the 21 refuse repatriation? Perhaps, in some cases, they feared vengeance at the hands of men they had betrayed, or at the hands of friends of men who had died because of their treason.

THE LAST MILE

Having cut himself off from his own country and his own people, what can the collaborator expect from the Communists? The answer became apparent during the Korean war and it is just as true today.

The Communists know that the turncoat will be no more trustworthy for them than he was for his own side. *The enemy cannot expect to gain actual allegiance from a collaborator if for no other reason than that he has none to give. For a change of allegiance, the ultimate possibility of collaboration, would necessitate a willingness to die for the enemy. Obviously, the prisoner who betrays his own people*

out of fear for his life isn't going to be willing to die for anyone else, either.

No matter where collaboration begins, the Communists continue to press a POW for further services until they have no further use for him. At that point they drop him; and no one is anxious to pick him up. Certainly his prison-mates will have little use for him, since his collaboration with the enemy, no matter what it was, will have in some manner inflicted further hardship on them. Perhaps even more important, from the standpoint of his chances for survival, the collaborator will have little respect for himself.

Whatever the Communists may promise in exchange for collaboration, their payoff will be small. Any slight advantage the collaborator might gain as a result of service to the enemy will be of no value over an extended period of imprisonment. In the long run, the resister and the collaborator may fare about the same in the purely physical sense. But psychologically, there will be a big difference. For the man who gives in will have several handicaps: A sense of failure, or remorse; the loss of respect, both self-respect and that of his fellow prisoners, that in time may well destroy his will to live. In any case, "Man does not live by bread alone." In a Communist prison, where bread is likely to be scarce, sustenance of the spirit—hope, faith, and will—may well be the determining factor in survival.

Having kept faith, the "reactionary" is the winner.

Chapter 5

INTERROGATION

A POW should be prepared for brutal treatment if interrogated soon after capture by an enemy seeking military information of immediate value. Tactical interrogation, wherein time is of the essence, is more likely than any other to include severe physical torture. Certainly it will include many threats, probably beginning with the first refusal on the part of the captive to give information.

During the Korean war, practically all Air Force POW's were given special attention. The primary objective of the Chinese Communists was to use them for propaganda purposes, particularly for germ-warfare propaganda. However, they were grilled also for military information.

Not only in fliers but in *all* POW's, the Chinese interrogators tried to create a fear that, by some mysterious process, they would break under questioning. The idea of "brainwashing" was spread by the Communists to create the false impression that their method and manner of conducting interrogations were irresistible.

METHODS ARE KNOWN

Actually, the methods used by the Communists to obtain information are not new, mysterious, or irresistible. They have been used for centuries. These methods are based on the simple idea of progressively weakening an individual's physical and moral strength. They are not based on some weird psychological theory. Numerous persons have faced Communist interrogation and withstood so-called Communist "methods" for weeks, months, and even years, without "breaking" or even demonstrating fear of any kind. Many of those persons have returned without showing any peculiar or unusual ill-effects as a result of their experiences.

Communist interrogation of United Nations prisoners of war in Korea revealed this significant principle—that Communist objectives frequently limit the use of physical

coercion or torture. The interrogator knows that the prisoner cannot answer questions after he is dead. Alive, refusing to yield, the prisoner remains a *potential* source of information to his captors; dead he is worthless. Although the Communists will attempt to make use of a prisoner's natural anxiety and fear, most of the prisoners who are subjected to Communist interrogation will not be physically tortured, even though they refuse to cooperate with the enemy. The reasons for this vary, but a very important one is that the Communists are practical in their approach to interrogation. They learned during their early reign of terror in the Soviet Union that physical violence, more frequently than not, stiffens group resistance, rather than the reverse.

NATURE OF INTERROGATION

Interrogation has some characteristics of both a science and an art. It resembles a science when conducted by a

shrewd and trained interrogator who knows what he wants and proceeds in an orderly, logical, and determined fashion.

Interrogation resembles an art when the interrogator establishes a relationship between himself and the person being interrogated wherein the latter is subtly persuaded to cooperate in giving information beyond the simple answering of questions. The interrogator, by demonstrating patience, tolerance, sympathy, and understanding, is able to obtain cooperation in achieving his desired results.

Some of the Chinese Communist interrogators in Korea were skilled and possessed the drive, tolerance, and patience to obtain the information they were after. Often they knew English and were well-informed about life in the United States. Some had been educated in the United States and were familiar with the economic and political institutions of the United States. In fact, some of the enemy personnel in the interrogation section were better informed on certain aspects of American life than many of the prisoners.

From the first interrogation, the Communists tried to confuse the American POW's into questioning the sincerity of our objectives in Korea. "Divide and conquer" was the insidious keynote. Only a few Americans were casualties in this battle to capture their minds in the POW camps. The Communists, nevertheless, regarded their interrogation and indoctrination program as an effective weapon in exploiting American POW's.

FIRST INTERROGATION

The Communists began their interrogation soon after a POW was captured. With a downed flier, it began almost immediately after he was picked up. With other POW's, it began at the collecting point where they were brought together. However, the first conversation was more like an interview than a real interrogation.

Generally, the enemy asked the prisoners several routine questions and a few questions on the military situation in the United Nations areas. After completing his direct interrogation, the enemy distributed numerous forms and told the prisoners to sign them. Some of these forms carried

American, International Red Cross, or one of many other headings, most of which were invalid. In addition to signing and completing these forms, the prisoners were told to sign just their names on blank pieces of paper, which the enemy collected and subsequently used for propaganda purposes.

Many Americans signed the various forms because they did not know or believe at the time that the enemy would use the contents of the forms for purposes of incrimination. During the initial interrogation, many Americans talked freely with the enemy and answered most of the questions asked. The lack of resistance during the initial interrogation by the enemy resulted from the apparent friendliness the Chinese had displayed when the prisoners were captured.

At the various collecting points were Chinese whose duties were to screen the completed forms and record the results of the initial interrogations. They studied the answers to the questions on the various forms and compiled a personnel file on each prisoner, which included the questionnaires, results of the initial interrogation, and the blank slips of paper on which the prisoners had signed their names. These files were later forwarded to the camps to which the prisoners were assigned, and the results of all subsequent interrogations were added to them.

An analysis of the results of the interrogations enabled the Communists to select or determine the subjects or attitudes that should be emphasized and exploited in the indoctrination program. In this way they could hand-tailor the indoctrination given to the various groups of prisoners.

At the permanent camps, appropriate physical facilities were provided by the prison command. The United States-British Prisoner of War Camp Number 5, located near the city of Pyoktong, North Korea, was the model for all other camps in Korea. The interrogation sections were located in the camp headquarters, usually near the commanding officer or near the security officer. They were equipped with wire recorders, exposed and hidden microphones, two-way mirrors, and a version of a lie detector. The interrogators were Chinese officers, assisted by Chinese women,

whose duties primarily were to record interrogations on paper in Chinese characters and maintain accurate rosters of prisoners who had and who had not been interrogated. The sections operated on a 24-hour basis and conducted some of the most fruitful interrogations at night.

PRETENSE IS FUTILE

Alone and disarmed, what can one man do under such interrogation? If he yields, he knows he is disgracing himself and undermining his country's safety. Yet when he holds out, he knows he may be in for rough treatment. Is there an easier way out?

Just after the Korean war, there was talk about such a solution. One suggestion was that members of our Armed Forces should be instructed, if taken prisoner, to "confess to anything." Not only would this take the pressure off the POW, it was argued, but it would also confuse the enemy since he would not know where truth left off and fiction began.

This strategy was to have included the preliminary announcement to the world that our men would do this if captured, thereby "nullifying" the propaganda value to the enemy of any such things as false confessions and peace petitions. In its original form, the "confess-to-anything" formula made clear that it was to apply only to such things as false confessions and propaganda. In the realm of military information and maintenance of unquestionable faith with fellow captives, there could be no deviation from a rigid standard.

It was a fine theory! However, experience has shown that once a prisoner started answering questions, the skilled interrogator could be certain of gaining some information from him if he had sufficient time. By no means does this mean, as some have contended, that an interrogator can get all that he wants from a prisoner in due time. It does mean, however, that the prisoner who tries to outmaneuver the interrogator is certain to divulge some information.

Baiting a trap for the POW, the Communists will allow him to "get away" with pretense during interrogation—

even encourage it—for the simple reason that they want the prisoner to develop a habit of pretending. One official study of Communist methods in attempting to elicit false "germ warfare" confessions from captive American fliers describes them as something of a training process. The victim was not simply confronted with demands for a false "confession"; he was enticed into *pretense*. First the subject of "germ warfare" was discussed in very general terms, with broad hints that the prisoner knew quite well what it was all about. Suggestions were made that if the prisoner "had something on his conscience," it would be to his own advantage to "unburden himself." This could go on for days or weeks, until the prisoner himself might ask if he was being accused of such activity. To this, the enemy would often respond with something to this effect: "I have accused you of nothing. However, if you have something on your conscience . . .!"

The prisoner was left to figure out for himself exactly what was wanted. If he did figure it out and if he did comply, he soon learned that "tongue-in-cheek" compliance was not enough. He must learn to speak, write, and act as if his false confession—however preposterous—was entirely true. Since he was "confessing" to a "horrible atrocity," he must also pretend feelings of guilt, shame, and even repentance.

Where such pretense supported Communist propaganda, as in the case of a "confession" to germ warfare, the Communists could—and did—go along with it indefinitely. But where they had encouraged the POW to lie as a way of trapping him, they showed no leniency when the conflict in his stories became apparent.

The prisoner whose lies led him into the Communist trap was considered a more grievous offender than the man who refused to answer, for in addition to wasting the interrogator's time he proved that he was "insincere" and "had not learned the truth." An interrogator was more likely to desire personal vengeance against the prisoner who "sold" him on false information than against the prisoner who maintained a position of respectful noncompliance.

SUMMARY

The means employed by the Communists to obtain information from United Nations prisoners of war were not new, unique, mysterious, or irresistible. They were recognized and understandable methods of undermining an individual's physical and moral strength. By deception, and by other tricks, the Communists obtained apparently useless information from prisoners who did not realize that *all* information is important. The success of the enemy's program of interrogation depended, to a large extent, on the prisoners' lack of knowledge of what was happening to them—a factor on which the Communists have always relied.

The American fighting man should remember that the Communist interrogator is not a superman with mystic powers and unique methods by which he can accomplish the impossible. He is not all-knowing, nor is he all-powerful, even when dealing with a seemingly powerless victim, such as a prisoner of war.

It would be foolish, however, to underestimate the skill of the Communist interrogator. Effective resistance to interrogation, as one ex-prisoner has put it, is not so much a matter of *outwitting* the interrogator as of *outlasting* him—by determined, steadfast refusal to cooperate in the face of all manner of treachery, threat, coercion, and even death.

Those who resisted completely the most skilled Communist interrogators deserve the gratitude and admiration of every American, for they are examples of courage, determination, and endurance.

Chapter 6

INDOCTRINATION

When plunged into a Communist indoctrination mill, the average American POW was under a serious handicap. Enemy political officers tried to force him to read Marxian literature, to participate in debates. He was prodded to tell what he knew about American politics and history. Lectures — study groups — discussion groups — a blizzard of propaganda and hurricanes of violent oratory were all a part of the enemy technique.

To many American prisoners this procedure came as a complete surprise and they were unprepared. That some refused to read the literature, participate in the debates, or engage in political discussions with their skilled captors is a tribute to their courage.

But to a frightened, confused, and hungry prisoner, deprived of leadership and guidance, these initial steps by the Communist enemy were effective. Although most prisoners did not realize what was happening to them as the program progressed and while they were being subjected to interrogation, there were no secrets about what the enemy planned to do along the line of "reeducating" the prisoners. It was reiterated numerous times that they were "students," and, as students, they were going to be reeducated along Communist lines. This fact was made clear at the very beginning. It was never altered.

Basically, the indoctrination program had two main objectives. One was to indoctrinate completely a small, select group of prisoners in the actual theory and practice of communism as a world conspiracy. The second objective was to undermine the faith and trust of the other prisoners in their country, their government, and its political leaders —not to make Communists out of all the prisoners.

In attempting to achieve the first objective, the Communists selected the prisoners on whom they felt they could depend, gave them special training, tutoring, and counsel-



ing, and extended them special treatment. This was in keeping with the Communist concept, as advanced by Lenin, that a small, select, disciplined group should lead the masses. As an incentive for the "chosen few" to apply themselves to the task of betraying their country and their fellow prisoners, the Communists told them that they were the "liberators" of the masses, and promised them positions of leadership in the United States—after a Communist-directed revolution had replaced our democratic system with a Communist form of government.

In pursuing their second objective, the Communists consistently smeared the United States. Any imperfections of our political and economic institutions were distorted completely out of proportion. At no time was mention of the true democratic principles of the United States Government permitted in discussions. In addition to attacking American concepts of democracy, the Communists launched attack

after attack against American statesmen by name, claiming that they were the chief perpetrators of war and evil.

The Communists felt that if they could succeed in the second objective—subverting the prisoners' loyalty—these Americans would be less opposed to communism after their repatriation to the United States. The Communists also reasoned that these ex-prisoners would be more likely to be sympathetic to any Communist conspiracy against the United States. Part of their plan called for the thoroughly indoctrinated prisoners, upon their return to the United States, to assume leadership of the subverted ex-prisoners and urge them to support the Communist conspiracy through the instrumentality of the Communist Party.

OTHER OBJECTIVES

In support of these two main but general objectives, there were specific objectives that had a more direct effect on the lives of the prisoners. To facilitate internal control of the prisoner population, the Chinese Communists attempted to organize a net of informers to relay to the camp

authorities information concerning the activities of other prisoners. Through informers, the Chinese Communists were able to thwart many escape attempts. Informers also furnished the Chinese Communists information concerning prisoners who were actively resisting indoctrination.

Another objective was to recruit collaborators to assist the Chinese Communists in implementing the indoctrination program. These collaborators would give propaganda lectures, write articles, and attempt to talk other prisoners into signing "peace petitions," surrender leaflets, and other types of propaganda.

Still another objective, which fortunately had no success, was to recruit potential agents to perform espionage or subversive activities for the Communists after repatriation. The few who agreed to work for the Communists realized soon after their repatriation that they had been duped and notified the American authorities of this Communist plot.

COMMUNIST FRONTS

Every Communist activity in North Korea was geared for one general purpose—to support the overall mission of political indoctrination. Early in the war, for example, there were various Peace Committees, whose job was to smear America as a warmonger and to laud Communists as champions of peace. In addition to operational committees for indoctrination, the Communists established a number of committees for the administration of the prisoners. These were: Sanitation Committee, Daily Life Committee, Athletic Committee, Mess Committee, and a Committee for Prisoner Morale. The membership of these committees, like that of the others, was made up of prisoners. At all levels of committee activities there were Communist political advisers who insured discipline, control, and nondeviation from the established routines of the program.

Most Americans have heard about Communist-front organizations. A Communist front is an organization conceived by Communists, inspired by Communists, controlled by Communists, and directed by Communists, but which has as a "front" some popular or pseudo-patriotic cause. The

various committees in the prison camps in North Korea served as fronts for the Communist enemy. POW's who became members served the Communist enemy in North Korea in the very same manner in which other naive individuals have served the Communist conspiracy outside of prison camps.

PHASES OF INDOCTRINATION

The Communists administered their indoctrination program in two general phases. The first can be called the preparatory phase, the second the implementation phase.

Preparatory Phase. This phase, a "softening-up" or "conditioning" process, was conducted through the medium of a series of lectures on the imperfections of the governments under which the prisoners lived before capture. The United States Government and its economic and political systems constituted the main target for all lectures. During this phase, the United States was accused of instigating the war in Korea.

Implementation Phase. This phase of indoctrination was devoted to selling communism as a way of life to be preferred over the democratic system. The Communists used an old technique during this phase—comparing one with the other, pointing up the favorable aspects of communism and emphasizing the so-called "defects" of democracy. The enemy pictured the Communist state as a state in which every man, woman, and child lives a life of happiness, free of poverty and class discrimination.

METHODS OF CONTROL

The Communists used the carrot-and-stick method of controlling POW's. When the carrot failed, they relied on three sticks: repetition, harassment, and humiliation.

Repetition. This technique was used against all prisoners at one time or another during their captivity. Some prisoners, yielding to pressure, memorized certain material and were questioned and examined on it for days, weeks, and months. They were asked to answer the same questions over and over again. They were required to read and re-

read Communist propaganda over and over again. By repetition the enemy caused some prisoners with relatively poor formal education to memorize heavy works on communism and economics. Some of these prisoners memorized entire sections of books by Stalin and Lenin. As a result of this repetition technique, some prisoners who had not advanced beyond the sixth grade could recite long essays on communism and its economic and political theories.

Harassment. This technique, like repetition, was used against a great number of prisoners during their captivity. Harassment was employed on a precise schedule that did not vary from day to day, week to week, or month to month. Its purpose was to create a state of anxiety in the prisoners —to keep them tense and in a state of constant uncertainty. It was also contrived to make the prisoners believe that harassment would end eventually, and that they could then live as normally as possible in prison. Harassment was usually based on trumped-up charges against prisoners. These charges could be anything from a very minor infraction of the rules to a major offense, such as striking an enemy officer. However, it worked best on, and was designed for, prisoners who committed minor offenses in connection with the indoctrination program.

Humiliation. This technique was designed to be used against prisoners who demonstrated a great deal of personal pride. Its objective was to break down a prisoner's personal pride by making him look ridiculous in the eyes of the other prisoners—to provoke shame and embarrassment in him. To assure its effectiveness, it was almost always used by the enemy in the presence of other prisoners.

GENERAL RESULTS

The results of Communist indoctrination in North Korea by the Chinese must be appraised in the light of the enemy's objectives. As mentioned earlier, the Communists in North Korea did not attempt to convert every United Nations prisoner. They wanted to indoctrinate a few selected prisoners whom they could trust to accept communism as a way of life. These could subsequently develop

into Communist revolutionists. Primarily, the Communists in North Korea desired to destroy, or at least reduce, the hostility felt by the prisoners toward the Communist cause. They attempted to plant seeds of doubt that would grow and produce an attitude less opposed to communism.

In the light of those objectives, it is reasonable to assume that the Communist program of indoctrination in North Korea was successful to some degree. Official findings revealed that a small, select group of United Nations prisoners of war in North Korea was indoctrinated by the enemy in the theory and practice of communism. They also revealed that an undetermined number of other United Nations prisoners of war did not accept communism as such, but adopted an attitude of "seeing both sides" of communism, observing some "good" points here and there. These sources further showed that the indoctrination weakened the old beliefs of some prisoners, confused other prisoners, and frustrated still others. With the exception of the allegedly indoctrinated prisoners, the others who saw merit in some aspects of communism failed to visualize communism as a threat to their democratic governments or the political institutions in their countries.

SUMMARY

The political indoctrination program had two major objectives:

- The first was to indoctrinate a small, select group of prisoners in the theory and practice of communism, not as it appears through Communist propaganda but as it actually exists—an international conspiracy.
- The second objective was to weaken the loyalty of the prisoners to their countries by undermining their political, religious, and moral convictions and thereby so confusing them that when they returned to their native countries they would be less opposed to communism.

Some American POW's did not know what the Communist program was all about. Some were confused by it. Self-

seekers accepted it as an easy out. A few may have believed the business. They signed peace petitions and peddled Communist literature. It was not an inspiring spectacle. It set loyal groups against cooperative groups and broke up camp organization and discipline. It made fools of some men and tools of others. And it provided the enemy with stooges for propaganda shows.

Fortunately, that was *not* the whole story. The overwhelming majority of United Nations prisoners of war rejected communism as a system of government and as a way of life. Generally, the Americans returned to their country wiser in the ways of communism and stronger in their faith in the United States of America.

Chapter 7

PROPAGANDA

Propaganda is the very lifeblood of communism. It keeps the Communist world conspiracy alive. Without propaganda, communism could never have grown and spread as it has. Through propaganda, the Communist leaders sound the keynote of the current "party line" to be followed and parroted by their underlings. The terms "Wall Street warmongers," "Yankee imperialism," and "decadent democracies" are but a few that were conceived by Communist propagandists. The "big-lie" technique, employed in the germ-warfare accusations leveled against the United States, exemplifies typical Communist propaganda in action.

It should have been expected, therefore, that the Communists would try to use U.N. prisoners in Korea for propaganda purposes. In the prisoner-of-war camps, propaganda was the backbone of the enemy's indoctrination program.

The tie-in with the worldwide Communist plot is shown by the fact that several Soviet propaganda experts were attached to the Chinese Communist prison organization and actively supported the Chinese in all phases of prisoner-of-war administration. The presence of these experts from the Soviet Union was one of the reasons that group-handling in North Korea by the Chinese was so similar to Communist group-handling in Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union. One such expert was from the Moscow Academy of Propaganda, where career Communist propagandists are specially trained in the propaganda themes best suited for each of the geographical areas of the world or for each of the various racial groups.

In addition to the Soviets serving on the propaganda staff, an Australian newspaperman and longtime Communist and a British Communist correspondent served as advisers to the Communist propaganda chief. These two Western newspapermen were responsible for giving the propaganda



a "Western slant" and presenting it in a familiar Western format.

PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES

The objective of all Communist propaganda in North Korea was the glorification of communism and the degradation of the United States. It was the common element of communism present in all Communist activities of the prison command.

The basic theme of Communist propaganda in North Korea was peace, and that general theme never changed because the "peace offensive" by Communists throughout the world has never changed. The Communists were talking peace back in 1930 and said then that they would lull the free world into a state of peace and then strike with a clenched fist. In more recent times, the Communists have been trying actively to achieve that objective. In 1947, the Communists held a series of conferences in Moscow and made plans for an international peace offensive. A similar

conference was held in 1949. As a result of these peace conferences, the Stockholm Peace Convention, the Chicago Peace Crusade, and the Helsinki Peace Conference followed. The latter conferences were held to convince the world that communism was a peaceful movement and that the Communists were the real champions of peace. At the same time, the Communists were accusing the Western powers of preparing for World War III. This strategy followed the plans made by the Communists at their various conferences for peace.

In 1950, the Communists accelerated the peace offensive as a result of the war in Korea. Propaganda generated in North Korea by the Chinese Communists was designed for the prisoners, for the Communist and non-Communist worlds, and for the high command of the world Communist conspiracy. The manner in which a typical "peace petition" was used by the Communists in North Korea serves as a good example of the far-reaching effects of this type of propaganda.

Communist propagandists prepared the basic material for peace petitions. The petitions then were forwarded to the prison camps for signatures. After each petition had been signed by several hundred prisoners, the Communist propagandists checked it and made whatever additions would more specifically support the overall Communist objectives. The peace petition was then sent to certain strategic countries, such as the United States, England, India, Japan, and all Communist countries. In those countries, certain Communist agencies received them for further dissemination. For example, in the United States, the *Daily Worker*, the Communist Party, and the National Peace Center received the petitions and distributed them to the "front organizations." In addition to Communist agencies, one other organization received at least five copies of almost every petition signed in North Korea by United Nations prisoners. That agency was the United Nations. The reason for this is obvious.

Few, if any, United Nations prisoners who signed peace petitions thought those documents would find their way into

every Communist channel in the world and eventually reach the United Nations as an "indictment" of the United States. Too late they realized that they had helped the Communists with two propaganda objectives, which were (1) to portray Communists as lovers of peace and (2) to demonstrate to the world that communism had won hundreds of United Nations prisoners over to its cause.

PROPAGANDA TARGETS

Certain special propaganda targets were designated by the Communists. These, as a rule, were the aspects of American life that the Communists believed they could attack on the basis of their imperfection. The Communists attacked these targets by using false "confessions" made by prisoners, in which they leveled charges against the United States and against the American way of life. For example, some prisoners volunteered to write long papers on American banking, relating it to war and profits. Other prisoners wrote on racial discrimination and religious intolerance, making it appear that these practices were usual and not exceptional in the United States. The Communists would take this material, distort it, and fashion it into propaganda against the United States.

The most ambitious and far-reaching propaganda effort was the extraction of utterly false germ-warfare charges, which were coordinated with the "peace offensive." The Communists obtained from some United Nations prisoners "confessions" in which the prisoners allegedly admitted that they personally had engaged in germ warfare against the Korean civilian population. Such "confessions" were not, in themselves, enough to support the Communist charges, so the Communists also used "confessions" from other prisoners who said they *believed* that America used germ-warfare weapons against the Korean people. The prisoners' voices were recorded, and the comments of those who heard and saw them were recorded.

By actual count, the Communists broadcast the germ-warfare charges against the United States throughout Asia at least 415 times during one period of 17 days. They prepared



and distributed the "confessions" in book form, complete with photographs of the "bombs" and the United Nations prisoners who admitted using the "bombs." So determined were the Communists to discredit the United States that the charges were officially presented to the United Nations General Assembly by delegates from the Soviet Union. These charges were so serious that the United States Government found it necessary to issue an official denial.

On a lesser scale, the Communists tried many other tricks. They tried to propagandize the free world into believing that they were providing the United Nations prisoners with facilities comparable to those the prisoners had enjoyed before their capture. The Communists believe that nothing produces better "proof" than a picture. So, in pursuit of their objective, they made numerous photographs of prisoners enjoying basketball, tennis, swimming, and checkers in a modern recreational clubhouse. These photographs were

disseminated to the world under glowing captions, indicating that the prisoners in North Korea were well treated by the Communists.

For months, prisoners did not receive any mail whatsoever because the Communists were withholding it. At the same time, the Communists did not permit the prisoners to write letters to the United States. At the propaganda center, however, the enemy made numerous "prop" photographs of prisoners sitting at tables in the clubhouse writing letters or reading alleged mail from their families in the United States. These "props," like the others, were given wide dissemination in the free world to create the false impression that the Communist enemy in North Korea was permitting a free exchange of communications between the prisoners and their families. Some such "prop" photographs even had captions "urging" the prisoners to write to their families.

"TOWARD TRUTH AND PEACE"

This publication was the official organ of the Communist prison command and was under the supervision of the propaganda section. Although it was staffed by United Nations prisoners, a Communist propagandist served as adviser and insured that the newspaper would not deviate from the accepted policies. The paper appeared to be a purely prisoner activity, with prisoners contributing to it as editorial writers or as reporters of camp news. However, most of the articles were Communist-inspired, supporting the enemy and severely attacking the United States and the United Nations. The prisoners submitted an average of 600 articles for each issue, of which approximately one dozen were published. The ones that were not published in the paper were published in a wall newspaper—a sheet placed on all company and unit bulletin boards at all camps. "Toward Truth and Peace" was published at United States-British Prisoner of War Camp Number 5 and was circulated to all other camps.

A WORD TO THE WISE

Of the various aspects and techniques of communism, propaganda is one vital element that the American fighting

man should know, understand, and be able to evaluate in the light of Communist objectives. The mere recognition of Communist propaganda is a defense against Communist indoctrination, because indoctrination is nothing more than an organized distortion of facts and fabrication of falsehoods disseminated through the medium of propaganda.

It should be reiterated, too, that the American fighting man should view Communist propaganda in the light of Communist objectives—local, national, and worldwide. Communist propaganda never changes its basic line of exalting communism and criticizing capitalism, especially capitalism as it exists in the United States. All local Communist propaganda has a direct or indirect relationship with worldwide Communist propaganda.

A 1942 scene at Death Camp (Camp O'Donnell) on Luzon. After the photographer snapped this picture of American prisoners of war, selected for their healthy appearance, the rice was removed.

Chapter 8

PROBING FOR WEAK SPOTS

From the moment a POW falls into their hands, the Communists begin probing him for weak spots. Sometimes they cajole; sometimes they threaten. In either case, they are trying to find ways to make him do their bidding.

Sometimes by direct threat, sometimes by subtle implication, the prisoner is made to feel that unless he does the enemy's bidding, he will die. In early stages of captivity the threat is more likely to be direct: "Answer the question! — Write a self-criticism! — Sign this peace petition! Or you will die!"

Captain Theodore Harris, an Air Force POW, experienced this in dramatic fashion during the Korean war. One day he was forced to dig his own grave. Then he was told he would be shot unless he signed a confession that he had dropped germ bombs on North Korea. When he refused, he was placed before a firing squad. Triggers were pulled, but the guns were empty.

By his bravery, Captain Harris won this game of Russian roulette. But this did not end his troubles. Throughout his 14 months as a POW, the Communists kept probing—probing—probing.

TACTICS CAN CHANGE

Sometimes a POW will respond to a threat of death with hopeless resignation, rather than with the determination that moved Captain Harris. When this happens, the Communists can do a quick about-face. Dead, the POW is of no value to them. Their job now is to find other ways of making him do what they want him to do.

Next comes a period of "reassurance" to bring the man out of his fatalistic, resigned mood. "We do not kill prisoners," he is told, "we have a lenient policy." Great "sympathy" is shown by the enemy for this unfortunate fellow, much "concern" for the things concerning him the most. But at the

first sigh of relief or flicker of hope in the prisoner's eyes, there follows: "Of course, if you are to qualify for our lenient treatment, you must demonstrate your willingness to cooperate."

In some such manner it begins. Like a cat toying with a mouse, the captor manipulates the prisoner's emotions, alternating between wistful hope for release and abject fear of death. Whether the threats are direct or implied, the skilled interrogator does his best to hold the captive on the fine edge of *indecision*. He relies on the tug of war between the prisoner's hopes and fears to wear down his resistance. For

a prisoner, except for the opportunist, does not decide to collaborate; he submits gradually—"progressively," from the Communist point of view.

DECENCY IS UNKNOWN

In probing for weak spots, the Communists make no concessions to decency. They know that food, medicine, and mail are important items in prisoner-of-war camps, more so than in normal life. In North Korea, they used these things to break down prisoner resistance. Each had a place in the enemy's program of indoctrination, and each was used by the enemy in a variety of ways, for a variety of reasons.

Food. Food was manipulated, not so much by the enemy as by prisoners whom the enemy had selected to distribute it. "Progressives" or collaborators in several camps were given the responsibility of issuing food. They manipulated the food as a reward for cooperating with the enemy. Although this practice was not the general rule, it nevertheless was used to persuade certain prisoners.

Medicine. Medicine and medical treatment for a time were offered to prisoners as special rewards. The fact that the enemy did not allow the captive American medical officers to attend the sick and wounded prisoners indicates that medical treatment was considered a controlled function reserved for the enemy to use as he determined. Many American lives could have been saved if the enemy had acted humanely by dispensing available medicine and by permitting American doctors to care for the sick and wounded prisoners.

Mail. Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and under the established policy of the International Red Cross, the detaining power is required to deliver the mail to the prisoners after it has been censored. Such mail must be conveyed by the most rapid method at the disposal of the detaining power. Instead of following this established procedure, the Communist enemy used the mail as a weapon and released it piecemeal in many instances as a reward for "cooperation."

To break down the resistance of the prisoners, the Communists established a "system" of releasing mail. If they wanted to gain control of an individual prisoner, they would select and release only letters whose contents reflected worry and discontent, or conveyed bad news. Naturally, such letters would have an adverse effect on the prisoner. Knowing what the normal reaction would be, the enemy approached the prisoner and, by hints and insinuations, further added to his worries and loneliness. The Communists tried to convince the prisoner that they were the only friends he had. By withholding favorable letters from the prisoner, they weakened his spiritual bond with his family. In some cases, the enemy practically divorced prisoners from their families and loved ones simply by manipulating the mails. By so doing, the enemy hoped to establish himself as the only prop on which the prisoners could lean for moral support.

At this stage, Communist pressure would be applied gently. The Communist captors would do their best to arouse the POW's self-concern. "You must consider yourself," they would tell him. Then they would add that he owed nothing to the "fat capitalists" who were living in luxury while he suffered in prison. Under the pressures of the moment, the POW frequently forgot that the very enemy who pretended this sympathy was responsible for his suffering.

GIVE-UP-ITIS

Sometimes the Communists defeated their own purpose by pushing a man too far. Thus they learned that *the same factors and circumstances that had aided them in their efforts to subjugate and exploit a prisoner can also destroy the prisoner's will to live!* And in many cases, death intervened to end a POW's troubles.

Unquestionably, the physical hardship of imprisonment accounts for most of the deaths; lack of medical care for the wounded and sick, for example. But time and again when survivors were asked how some particular prisoner of their acquaintance had died, the answer was, "He just gave up."

Investigation of the nature of "give-up-itis" showed certain similarities in all cases. One of the most noticeable was what might be termed the "withdrawal." Each prisoner who died in such a manner had isolated himself from the others. Not only had he avoided conversation or association, but he had actually resisted—in the earlier stages when he had strength to resist—overtures of friendship or assistance from others. In the latter stages, he had lacked the strength to tell anyone to leave him alone, but his unresponsiveness had usually been enough to discourage any would-be Samaritans.

Most often the victim huddled in a corner. He would cover his head with a blanket, if he had one, or some piece of his clothing—anything to shut himself off more completely. He refused to eat, if anyone bothered to offer him food. He soiled himself rather than get up and go to the latrine. Usually, when he died his body would be drawn up into an approximation of the prenatal position. Each "victim" of "give-up-itis" *died utterly alone.* Rarely, if ever, did any of the witnesses sincerely mourn his passing.

WHILE THERE'S LIFE . . .

The Communists do not want to promote "give-up-itis" any more than a lobsterman wants to promote a disease that will kill his lobsters. Most of the men who resisted the more extensive pressures realized somewhere along the line that the enemy did not want them to die; at least not while they were under special duress. Often, in fact, the Communists exerted considerable effort to keep a prisoner alive if he became dangerously ill. And they tried to prevent him from killing himself if he appeared suicidally inclined. This is perhaps explained in part by the simple fact that the Communists want martyrs *for* their "cause," not against it.

This was shown in the case of Captain Theodore Harris, previously mentioned. Once, as a protest against the type of questions being asked him, he went on a hunger strike that lasted 12 or 13 days. His Chinese captors finally got him to end the strike by agreeing not to ask him any more questions about germ warfare. They honored their agreement



for one month—until he had regained some of his strength. Then they began probing again for weak spots.

The Communists have learned through long experience that severe physical mistreatment is *not* the best way to obtain reliable information from a prisoner. Though an interrogator may be able to force a man to talk by using torture, he does not know whether answers so obtained are reliable or false. The answer may have been made up for the simple purpose of stopping the torture. Nor do all men break down and talk under torture. Sometimes unconsciousness or shock relieves them of all pain; in other cases, so intense is the hatred and defiance aroused that they overwhelm all other sensations.

Consider the case of a tough Army Sergeant named Talbert, who was a POW in Korea. Questioned again and again, he stuck to name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. In telling of his experiences, he said the Communists made

him kneel on sharp boards, they put him in a grave, they made him stand outside in the winter cold in his underwear. They shot a pistol behind his head.

"If I got no other satisfaction out of the war," he said, "I do have the satisfaction of knowing that I didn't tell those ---- -- ------- anything and they couldn't make me tell them."

In probing for weak spots, the Communists frequently meet "Sergeant Talberts." They provide food for thought.

Chapter 9

THE POW CAN RESIST

The Communists have learned that if they push a POW too far too soon, their advantage will be lost. A prisoner's acceptance of his fate—death, torture, or whatever—deprives them of their main lever against him: *fear.*

At the moment of his decision to resist the enemy, come what may, the prisoner will have overcome the main psychological obstacles to survival. This *conquest* of fear on his part relieves his mind of frustration. He retains hope, but he is no longer torn between hope and fear. His mind is now alert to problems of survival and escape. No longer is he dreamy and wishful; henceforth, he will avail himself of



At the risk of death, American prisoners of war celebrated the 4th of July, 1942, in a Japanese prison camp on Mindanao, Philippine Islands.

every opportunity to care for himself and help others do the same. He welcomes work details that might offer an opportunity to pilfer from enemy supplies or scavenge for food in fields or woods. Rather than bemoan his circumstance, he makes the best of it; thus he counters the captors' efforts to make him feel dependent on them.

THE POW MUST BE ALERT

Despite his apparent victory, the POW must remain alert. His Communist captors have not given up; they probably are biding their time . . . just as they did with Captain Harris during his hunger strike. When they think the time is ripe, they will renew their efforts.

If ever you become a POW and find yourself at this point in your relations with your Communist captors, remember this: not only must you *get* outside yourself; you must *stay* outside yourself. For the man who is free in spirit, "stone walls do not a prison make, nor iron bars a cage."

Even if you are kept isolated for long periods of time, you can *stay* outside yourself if you think of yourself as a *fighting man*, still fighting for your country. Think of your fellow Americans who are counting on you to help preserve our way of life. Think of your fellow POW's whose welfare will often depend on your success in resisting subjugation. You are not alone!

TOGETHER WE STAND

Although long periods of solitary confinement are a possibility for which you must be prepared if you become a prisoner of war, the chances are much greater that you will spend most of your time in the company of other POW's. If so, you can draw strength from them, and they will draw strength from you. This was proved again and again in Korea.

Especially inspiring was the record of the Turkish prisoners captured while fighting on the side of the U.N. forces. Although almost half of the Turkish POW's had been wounded before being captured, not one died in prison. In an article on prisoners of war that appeared in *The New*



Yorker of 26 October 1957, Brigadier General Willis A. Perry, USA, was quoted as follows:

At Death Valley, one of the temporary prison camps established by the North Korean Communists in the early days of the war, where the sick and wounded poured in for weeks in a ghastly stream, the Turks lost not a single man out of a hundred and ten, while we lost four hundred to eight hundred out of fifteen hundred to eighteen hundred. When a Turk got sick, the rest nursed him back to health. If a sick Turk was ordered to the hospital, two well Turks went along. They ministered to him hand and foot while he was there, and when he was discharged, they carried him back to the compound. The Turks all shared their clothing and their food equally. When the Communists did the cooking for the camp, two Turks were dispatched to bring back food for the group, and it was divided in equal portions down to the last morsel. There was no hogging, no rule of dog eat dog.

While it is true that some Americans fell short of what was expected of them, this was not the general rule. Many servicemen exhibited pride in themselves and their units. This was particularly pronounced in those who had belonged to the same unit for years. They stood by one another like that "band of brothers" inspired by Nelson. If a man was sick, his fellow POW's took care of him. They washed his clothes, bathed him, and pulled him through. They exhibited true fraternal spirit, comradeship, military pride. These men did not let each other down. Nor could the Korean Reds win much cooperation from them.

Wherever resistance was successful, *esprit de corps* and discipline were important factors. This was true of Americans as well as Turks. In their hatred of communism, however, the Turks were even more outspoken than the Americans. Having lived near the Communist world where they could see communism at close range, the Turks loathed everything communistic. They broke camp rules and refused to obey even reasonable requests simply because those requests were made by Communists.

ANTAGONISM DOES NOT HELP

While such behavior showed courage, it is generally true that an unduly antagonistic attitude will not help you if you become a POW. The best course is to maintain a proper and formal military bearing. While no course of action can relieve all hardship, respectful refusal to give information or to comply with other improper demands is less apt to incur further physical maltreatment than are those actions or mannerisms that in themselves might insult or infuriate the captors.

Self-respecting demeanor and formal propriety in the face of all threats and abuses will in some measure hinder the enemy's efforts, perhaps in time thwart them altogether. *Arrogance*, on the other hand, cannot but bring on further abuse. A captor can hardly be expected to accept personally abusive or insulting language from a captive. Nor would he be likely to permit for long an insolent attitude or actions disrespectful to himself. A little common sense—an appraisal

of the situation from the captor's point of view—will show why proper military bearing is the most desirable conduct in the face of whatever the enemy might threaten or do.

SUICIDE IS NO WAY OUT

As a fighting man, you are prepared to give your life for your country. If you fear that under torture you may do or say something that would hurt your country, the thought of suicide may have occurred to you. If so, get rid of that thought NOW.

Neither your country nor your Service will countenance suicide. Nor will your God! Suicide runs counter to the teachings of both Christianity and Judaism.

You are prepared to give your life only when you are so overwhelmed that you can no longer resist. If you choose to die *at the hands of the enemy* rather than to yield in such a way that you compromise your country, you will have died a hero's death. Between death and dishonor, you will have chosen death.

You have no such choice if you contemplate suicide to escape torture. If you resist to the bitter end in a POW camp and if death comes at the hands of the enemy, you will have lived and died as a fighting man. But if you die by your own hand because you are afraid you will not be able to uphold your honor and your country's honor when the test comes, you actually will have surrendered—finally, and for all time.

Suicide is no way out!

THE BREAKING POINT

Resistance by a fighting man can bring on his death, either in combat or as a POW. A wise man understands and accepts this. He knows also that resistance can lead to his survival. What will be his own fate, he cannot say.

It has been said that "every man has his breaking point." If by this we mean that any man can be broken physically, driven to the point where he may collapse because of pain, hunger, or lack of sleep, the statement is true. However, it

is *not* true if we mean that a *man of integrity* can reach a point at which—to escape further suffering—he will consciously and willingly do or say things to dishonor himself and his country.

Viewed thus, anyone who still holds that "every man has his breaking point" is necessarily including himself among the breakable. He also is demonstrating a fairly common human shortcoming: namely, he is trying to justify his own self-recognized shortcomings by telling himself that "everybody is like that." A man may very well not be sure how much physical or mental stress he can withstand until he is put to the test. He can be taken at his word if he announces in advance that he has no values, principles, or convictions for which he is willing to endure more than minor inconvenience.

HE WHO DIES RESISTING

The man who dies resisting is not broken. Nor is one who is driven to mental distraction. Men were driven to distraction by psychological pressures in the Communist prison camps of Korea. But this was a form of mental escape, much as unconsciousness is relief from physical suffering. When the pressures were removed, mental faculties soon were restored. The man who dies for something in which he believes does so willingly, and without regret unless the regret is such as that expressed by Nathan Hale—that he had "but one life to lose."

Our foes in the past have expressed admiration for U.S. fighting men who fought valiantly against them or held fast to their convictions at all costs. The Communists actually fear the man who proves himself willing to die rather than submit to their demands. His resistance creates for them something of a dilemma; even though they are in a position to kill him if they wish, to do so would create a martyr against their "cause." This they wish to avoid. Further than that, such resistance proves that the Communists are not invincible, negating the Marxist premise that communism is the "irresistible wave of the future."

So long as there remains a man who is willing to die for his convictions, it cannot be said that "every man has his breaking point." Those who would claim for themselves the title of U.S. fighting man, and all others who stand resolutely for human dignity and freedom, must be persons of such convictions and faith. So long as men live there will be those who, by one means or another, will strive to *force* their ways upon all mankind. Only so long as other men are willing to die for their principles, will they continue to know—or even deserve to know—the meaning of freedom!

Chapter 10

THE CODE IS YOUR ARMOR

Every war has its disturbing aftermath. There is always another side to the Victory coin. If the victory is not clearly imprinted and the war has ended in what seems a stalemate, the coin becomes suspect. In any event, there is usually a postwar inventory. If losses have been heavy and objectives obscure, the coin may seem debased.

The inventory after the War of 1812 was unpleasant. There were some painful reactions after the Spanish-American War.

In a great war, some battles are inevitably lost. Military leaders study these battles, determined to uncover mistakes, if any were made, so that errors in kind may be avoided in the future.

Correction of possible errors and the need for a unified plan for the future led the Department of Defense to examine closely the prisoner-of-war situation in Korea. Accordingly, the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War was organized early in 1955 to study the problem.

Guidelines for the Committee were given by Honorable Charles E. Wilson, then Secretary of Defense. In a memorandum to Mr. Carter L. Burgess, then Chairman of the Committee, he had this to say:

> I am deeply concerned with the importance to our national security of providing Americans who serve their country in battle with every means we can devise to defeat the enemy's techniques. To assure the success of our Armed Forces it is equally as essential to arm them with the best weapons of the mind and body as it is to provide them with the machines of war.
>
> Our national military needs must be met. This requires that each member of the Armed Forces be thoroughly indoctrinated with a simple, easily understood code to govern his conduct while a prisoner of war. However, this

military need must be met in a manner compatible with the principles and precepts basic to our form of government. Enforcement must be accomplished with justice and understanding.

A SEARCHING STUDY

Going to work immediately, the Committee made a searching study of the POW problems raised by the Korean war. After a review of the treatment of POW's in past centuries, the Committee scrutinized what the Communists had done to U.S. fighting men who became prisoners in Korea. It studied the Communist methods of interrogation, indoctrination, and propaganda described in previous chapters. Delving into statistics, the Committee faced these facts:

A total of 4,428 American fighting men were recovered from enemy prison camps in Korea. The prison exchanges began with "Operation Little Switch" in April 1953. Some 600 Allied prisoners were returned in exchange for ten times

"Operation Little Switch." American soldier in first group of sick and wounded POW's exchanged in Korea reaches Japan, 21 April 1953.



"Operation Big Switch." U.N. prisoners, released by Communist forces for repatriation, arrive at Panmunjom, Korea, 5 August 1953.

that many Communist Chinese and North Koreans. During subsequent "Operation Big Switch" most of the American prisoners were recovered. At this time it was learned that 2,730 Americans had died in Korean prison camps. This was a ghastly death toll—38%, or nearly four out of every ten.

By joint action of the Services, all of the prisoners recovered were screened by military intelligence agencies. Of the 565 whose conduct was questioned, 373 were cleared or the charges against them were dropped after investigation. Of the remaining 192 suspects, the cases of 47 were forwarded to the appropriate field commanders for investigation to determine whether they warranted trial by courts-martial. Only 14 of the 47 cases were tried by courts-martial, and of the 14, three were acquitted and 11 convicted.

Typical Charges. A POW was accused by 180 others of delivering anti-U.S. speeches, informing on fellow prisoners,

hoarding food, teaching classes in communism, and ordering men to sign peace petitions. There was no evidence he suffered duress.

Another case involved a POW accused by many witnesses of "ratting" on his prison-mates, beating a sick prisoner, forcing a fellow prisoner out into the snow and leaving him there to die.

There was a POW who allegedly courted favors of his captors as soon as he reached prison camp. He was charged with confiscating the small tobacco ration dealt to the other men and eating more than his share of the food. Allegedly, he made the heartless remark, "The more men who die here, the more food for the rest of us." He signed peace petitions, made propaganda broadcasts, and evidently "ratted" on other prisoners. There was no evidence that he was coerced.

There was evidence that a POW informed on fellow prisoners planning to escape. He wrote Red literature for his captors. He was put in charge of a spy system that led to the punishment of "reactionaries" in his camp. He asked for the job. No "brainwashing" there.

Turncoats. The Committee studied the cases of the 21 turncoats who decided to stay with the Communists. Their number included men accused of informing—which suggests a good reason for electing to remain in the enemy's country. Evidence indicates that few of these 21 were "sincere" converts to communism. Expediency, opportunism, and fear of reprisal doubtless influenced some of the group.

No Drugs Used. The Committee also learned that POW's in Korea had not been drugged. Other methods, such as denial of food or sleep, had been equally effective and more practical.

POW SHORTCOMINGS

The "brainwashing" question was thoroughly investigated. In *some* cases this time-consuming and coercive technique *was* used to obtain confessions. Most of the prisoners, however, were *not* subjected to brainwashing but were given high-powered indoctrination for propaganda purposes.

Only a handful of the POW's in Korea were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation. Nearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the "absolute" name, rank, number, date of birth restriction.

Reviewing the interrogation matter, the Committee felt that the steps taken up to 1955 by the Armed Forces had been decidedly inadequate.

The Committee heard evidence which revealed that many of the POW's knew too little about the United States and its ideals and traditions. So the Chinese indoctrinators had the advantage.

The uninformed POW's were up against it. They couldn't answer arguments in favor of communism with arguments in favor of Americanism, because they knew very little about their America. The Committee heard a number of ex-POW's state that a knowledge of communism would have enabled them to expose its fallacies to their camp-mates. The Red indoctrinators tried hard to win the support of factory workers. But as one of them put it, "We'd heard all that guff before. Back home. We knew their line." Knowledge was a defense weapon.

While it might be argued that few of the men became sincere converts to communism—indeed, the percentage seems to have been infinitesimal—the inability of many to speak up for democracy distressed loyal POW's. Active collaborators aside, there were certain passive prisoners who "went along." They lacked the weapon of knowledge.

However, such conduct was *not* typical of U.S. prisoners in Korea. On this point, the Committee expressed itself as follows:

> A few statistics may prove reassuring to anyone who thinks the Armed Forces were undermined by Communist propaganda in Korea.
>
> A total of about 1,600,000 Americans served in the Korean war. Of the 4,428 Americans who survived Communist imprisonment, only a maximum of 192 were found chargeable with serious offenses against comrades or the

United States. Or put it another way. Only 1 out of 23 American POW's was suspected of serious misconduct.

When one realizes that the Armed Forces come from a cross-section of the national population, the record seems fine indeed. It seems better than that when one weighs in the balance the tremendous pressures the American POW's were under. Weighed in that balance, they cannot be found wanting.

THE REMEDY

As the Committee grappled with these problems, answers gradually became apparent.

In a war for the minds of men, the enemy's methods can be successfully combated by military training and civilian education. In battle and in captivity the fighting American is no better than his training and character. Military schooling can teach him combat skills. Such know-how is a "must."

But skill must be reinforced by will—by moral character and by basic beliefs instilled in home and classroom long before a lad enters the military service. Pride in country and respect for its principles—a sense of honor—a sense of responsibility—such basics should be established long before "basic training," and further developed after he enters the Armed Forces.

As the Committee saw it, united action was needed. Although all the Services had regulations on conduct, the U.S. Armed Forces had never had a clearly defined code of conduct. There had been piecemeal legal restrictions and regulations but no comprehensive codification. However, despite this lack of a code, American fighting men had demonstrated through all wars that they do not surrender easily. They had never surrendered in large bodies. When overwhelmed and captured, they had—in the main—acquitted themselves with honor. Still, a clear-cut code was desirable.

Accordingly, the Committee undertook to draft a code of conduct that would reflect the basic principles by which U.S. fighting men have lived since the days of the Revolution. But was some change needed to meet new conditions? For

example, should a POW be given any leeway in answering questions beyond name, rank, service number, and date of birth?

There was something to be said by experienced officers who felt that a man could be taught to hold his own in the battle of wits against enemy interrogators. Authorities pointed out that the Geneva Convention did not impose "absolute silence" on the interrogated war prisoner. There were clauses indicating that he might discuss his employment, his finances, his state of health, or "conditions of captivity" if necessity demanded. In short, he did not have to remain mute.

The Committee agreed that the main line of resistance must be drawn as far forward as possible. The name, rank, and service number provision of the Geneva Convention was accepted as this line of resistance.

In the face of experience, it was recognized that the POW might be subjected to an extreme of coercion. Even then he

NAME Jones, James A.

RANK Private, First class

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

is expected to avoid by every means any disloyalty in word or deed to his country, his Service, or his comrades.

THE CODE IS PROCLAIMED

After long study and earnest deliberation, the Committee came to its decision. That decision is embodied in the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States. The Code, duly proclaimed by President Eisenhower, is as follows:

Article I

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

Article II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

Article III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

Article IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

Article V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

Article VI

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

YOUR ARMOR

The Code is your armor. It was hammered out for you by successive generations of fighting men, who loved their country and who demonstrated their love by what they did. In drafting the Code, the Committee merely put down on paper certain basic ideals and rules by which these fighting men had lived. Tried and tested, the Code meets the needs of this new age.

> The conscience and heart of all America are needed in the support of this Code, and the best of training that can be provided in our homes, by our schools and churches and by the Armed Forces will be required for all who undertake to live by this Code.

Thus spoke the Committee in a letter to the Secretary of Defense. Signed by all the members, the letter continued, in part, as follows:

> America no longer can afford to think in terms of a limited number of our fighting men becoming prisoners of war and in the hands of an enemy in some distant land. Modern warfare has brought the challenge to the doorstep of every citizen, and so the Code we propose may well be a Code for all Americans if the problem of survival should ever come to our own main streets.
>
> And then too the United States must constantly be aware of her high position of world leadership, and the Code we propose must consider the standard of the Ten Commandments and of our Constitution, as well as our pledge to the United Nations.
>
> No Code should overlook the watermarks of America's greatness or bow to the easier courses which might entrap more easily our men as alleged war criminals and weaken

their fiber for the many ordeals they may face. We must bear in mind the past and future significance of the reservation made by Soviet Russia and other Communist nations to Article 85 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 on prisoners of war.

How does this reservation affect you? How can you meet the obligations imposed upon you by the Geneva rules and by the Code? How can the Code protect you?

These and other questions will be considered in the remaining chapters.

Chapter 11

THE GENEVA RULES

Any discussion of atrocities, brutalities, and mistreatment of prisoners must logically include some reference to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949. These grew out of the Hague regulations, mentioned in Chapter 2.

Troubled by the terrible death toll of prisoners in World War II, delegates of many countries met at Geneva in 1949 to formulate and define higher standards of treatment for POW's. The articles of the earlier Geneva Convention were clarified and strengthened. It was agreed that the detaining power would be responsible for the health and welfare of any prisoners held. Fifty-seven nations signed the new Geneva treaty.

In general, the rules provide that prisoners of war must be treated humanely. Specifically forbidden are "violence to life and person . . . cruel treatment and torture . . . outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."

Under the articles of the Convention, prisoners must be given decent housing, nourishing food, adequate clothing, and the right to communicate with their families.

They may not be punished for refusing to answer questions of any kind.

They are to be given medical care, and allowed to worship, exercise, and participate in sports and intellectual pastimes.

Machinery was set up to enable protecting powers and the International Red Cross to have access to camps and to investigate conditions in them.

In short, the Convention spells out in detail the treatment to be accorded prisoners of war.

THE COMMUNIST RECORD

The Soviet Union signed the 1949 Convention as did eight other nations in the Communist bloc. The U.S.S.R. and its

satellites held out, however, on certain points. One of their reservations concerned Article 85 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The Article reads:

"Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention."

The Soviet delegate entered the following reservation:

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider itself bound by the obligation, which follows from Article 85, to extend the application of the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it being understood that persons convicted of such crimes must be subjected to the conditions obtaining in the country in question for those who undergo their punishment."

Under this reservation, a prisoner of war convicted of an alleged war crime under the laws of the captors loses the protection afforded a prisoner of war by the Geneva rules. Therefore, a confession or a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used to convict him as a "war criminal" and thus, according to this Communist bloc device, deny to him any protection under the terms of the Geneva Convention, including repatriation until his sentence is served.

This reservation was a disturbing sign of Soviet intention. Moreover, it set the pattern for later action by other Communist countries.

Early in the Korean war, the United States and the Government of South Korea announced that they would act in accordance with the humanitarian principles contained in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. A few days later, North Korea said that the terms of the Convention were being followed. Still later, the Red Chinese stated that they were following the provisions of the Convention "with reservations."

The effect of these reservations became painfully apparent when the Communists deluded prisoners and tricked them into admitting acts that the Communists claimed were "war crimes." Then they used this admission, either verbal or written, to convict prisoners as "war criminals" and to declare that they had lost their status as prisoners of war.

In practice, the articles of the Convention were consistently violated by the Red Chinese and the North Koreans in their treatment of prisoners.

An investigating committee of the U.S. Senate noted that:

- American prisoners of war were placed in solitary confinement for long periods of time.
- They were shackled.
- They were subjected to the curiosity and insults of the local populace.
- They were physically maltreated.
- They were not given adequate medical attention or adequate clothing.
- Officers were forced to work.
- Prisoner-of-war camps and hospitals were not properly marked and identified.

All of these practices were in direct violation of specific articles in the 1949 Geneva Convention.

IMPORTANCE OF THE CONVENTIONS

Because experience has shown that the Communists will observe the Convention only when it suits their purpose, one must inevitably wonder why we should be concerned with it.

There are at least two reasons why you should have some knowledge of the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

1. The United States is a law-abiding Nation. We have ratified the Geneva Convention and we will abide by it—both as a Nation and as individuals. Your conduct as a U.S. fighting man will be judged accordingly.

2. The second reason is equally important from your personal standpoint. If you do not know the provisions of the Convention, you might violate some of them unwittingly. The Communists, although they may not observe all the provisions of the Convention, have demonstrated that they are quick to seize upon alleged violations.

In case you ever become a POW, here are some of the important Geneva rules you should know:

- You must give your name, rank, service number, and date of birth (Article 17).
- You may not renounce any of the rights to which you are entitled under the Geneva Convention (Article 7).
- You are subject to medical inspection at least once a month (Article 31).
- If you are a physician, a surgeon, a dentist, a nurse, or a medical orderly, you may be required to care for POW's who need your services *even if you are not*

attached to the medical service of your branch of the Armed Forces (Article 32).

- You must salute officers of the enemy and show them any other mark of respect required of their own forces. However, officer POW's must salute only officers of higher rank . . . except for the camp commander, who must be saluted regardless of his rank (Article 39).
- Enlisted POW's who are physically fit may be required to work. However, noncommissioned officers who are prisoners of war may only be required to do supervisory work. Unless he volunteers, a POW may not be employed on labor of an unhealthy or dangerous nature. Nor may any POW be assigned to labor deemed humiliating by the detaining power when performed by a member of its forces. Prisoners of war may not be compelled to do, nor may they volunteer for, the following classes of work when these have a military character or purpose: (1) Public works and building operations; (2) transport and handling of stores; (3) public utility services (Articles 49-54; 62).
- If you have cash in excess of a fixed amount when captured, it may be taken from you and held in account for you. However, before repatriation the detaining power must give you a statement showing the credit balance due you. The United States is responsible for settling with you any credit balance due from the detaining power at the end of your captivity (Articles 58, 64, 66).
- You are subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armed forces of the detaining powers. If accused of a violation, you may be brought to trial (Article 82).

RULES FOR ESCAPE

Under the Code of the U.S. Fighting Man, you must make every effort to escape and to help others to escape if you should be captured. The Geneva Convention recognizes

that prisoners will attempt to escape and limits punishment for POW's attempting it to mild disciplinary action.

However, you should know that you can be prosecuted in the enemy's courts for *serious* criminal acts committed while you are trying to escape.

Article 93 of the Geneva Convention states that "offenses committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only."

The disciplinary punishment so authorized (Article 89) consists of the following:

(1) A fine which shall not exceed 50 percent of the advances of pay and working pay which the prisoner of war would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of not more than thirty days.

(2) Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present Convention.

(3) Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.

(4) Confinement.

The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to officers.

In no case shall disciplinary punishments be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.

You may steal the food or clothing—even money in small amounts—that you need to effect your escape and yet retain your status as a prisoner. But if you commit a murder, or steal valuables to enrich yourself, while attempting to escape, there are no limitations on the punishment you may be sentenced to as a result of appropriate judicial proceedings, except that it must be the same as provided for members of the armed forces of the detaining power who have committed the same acts.



POINTS TO REMEMBER

The United States may, as a sovereign nation, prescribe certain rules of conduct, compatible with the Geneva Convention, for its military personnel who become prisoners of war.

Article 105 of the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* is an example of such a rule. This article, concerning the punishment of misconduct by a United States serviceman while a prisoner of war, provides:

> Any person subject to this code who, while in the hands of the enemy in time of war—
>
> (1) for the purpose of securing favorable treatment by his captors acts without proper authority in a manner contrary to law, custom, or regulation, to the detriment of others of whatever nationality held by the enemy as civilian or military prisoners; or

(2) while in a position of authority over such persons maltreats them without justifiable cause; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

Another example of rules of conduct prescribed by the United States is the Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Finally, remember this: If ever you become a POW, you are expected to abide by all of the Geneva rules that affect you personally, even though the enemy is observing only those he chooses to observe. In some instances, captives have been able to induce their captors to comply with the Geneva rules, but this cannot be expected of a Communist captor.

During World War II, Colonel Paul R. Goode, at the risk of his life, demanded that his German captors accord the prisoners of war the rights to which the Geneva Convention entitled them. The Colonel, who commanded a regiment of the 29th Infantry Division, was captured soon after the Allied invasion of Normandy while personally leading an attempt to rescue elements of his division. Stumbling into a German bivouac in the darkness of night, he was overpowered and wounded by the enemy. Colonel Goode assumed the leadership of his fellow prisoners, American and British officers, organizing them along the lines of a regiment and maintaining the highest morale among them until his release in May 1945. He narrowly missed being shot for an attempt to escape but continued to work toward that end and to help others in their attempts. For his superior leadership, character, and soldierly conduct, Colonel Goode was awarded the Legion of Merit.

Whether or not your captor follows the Geneva rules, you should abide by them as a law-abiding fighting man of a law-abiding Nation. You can't force good faith on your Communist captor. But you can demonstrate to him and to the world that we Americans live up to our word—as individuals and as a Nation.



I

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

Chapter 12

YOU GUARD OUR COUNTRY

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

—Article I, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.

These words were quoted with deep conviction.

The speaker was Admiral Arthur Radford, appearing on 25 October 1955 at the Second National Conference on Spiritual Foundations. The Code of Conduct had been proclaimed during the preceding summer, and Admiral Radford—then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—was discussing its meaning.

"I believe," he said, "most of you realize this is written in the form of a creed. Possibly some of you feel that it is written mostly for those of us in uniform. If so, you are not wrong. It is written as a guiding precept to be followed by the men in our Armed Forces.

"I would suggest, however, that this creed could very well be a part of every American's attitude. There is no hidden meaning, nor is there lack of meaning, when you pledge: 'I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life.' These words are the key to the part played by the mind and the spirit in our national security. They signify: Militant Liberty.

". . . Every American should be dedicated to this mission. It is not sufficient for only a relatively few to defend the United States. In our present peril, people everywhere must unite in the fight against militant international communism, or any other threat to our American way of life."

The people of the United States *have* united in this fight. But if the need arises to defend our country on the battlefield or in the prisoner-of-war stockade, the United States relies on you.

You are an American fighting man!

YOU GUARD OUR WAY OF LIFE

What is this American way of life which you—as a member of the Armed Forces—are sworn to defend? Can you define it? Admiral Radford did so in a few simple words.

"My own understanding of the American way of life is many-fold," he said. "First it is Freedom and Liberty.

"Freedom began with a belief in human dignity, and it grew with the history of the world. Often it came in conflict with tyranny and despotism. Often it was knocked down, but always it arose to fight again. It would fight, and lose, and then fight again.

"We learned this in history when Moses stood before Pharaoh and said: 'Let my people go.' We read it again when the barons stood before King John and the Magna Carta was embodied into laws. We lived it still again in the epic of Valley Forge.

"Our Founding Fathers were adept at choosing the right words to explain the meaning of our way of life. Thomas Jefferson called it 'Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.' Patrick Henry summed it up when he said: 'Give me liberty or give me death.'

"All of you know well the other meanings of our four freedoms. They are all part of the American way of life: —freedom of religion, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and many more. We have lived with these freedoms so long, and have enjoyed them so much, that we are prone to take them for granted."

Continuing, Admiral Radford cited faith as a "second primary ingredient in our American way of life."

"Faith," he continued, "is our belief in the equality of man in the sight of God. It is our belief in what Alexander Hamilton referred to as 'the Sacred Rights of Mankind.' Far beyond the point of lip service, we must all believe that each and every human is entitled to 'Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.' These are the 'substance of things hoped for.'

"That cold winter at Valley Forge was truly an ordeal. The suffering from freezing and starvation almost led American troops to abandon their cause. Faith in their God; faith in their great leader, George Washington; and faith in the righteousness of their cause inspired the courage with which these men were victorious in their hour of trial. These are the 'evidence of things not seen,' to return again to the words of the New Testament.

"Without such faith, we could not be ready, as written in the Code of Conduct, 'to give my life in their defense.' But with it, we can meet successfully any future hour of trial."

Admiral Radford called next for "individual acceptance of responsibility" to defend our way of life against any threat. Then he asked how we could meet the Communist threat.

"The answer lies," he said, "in the heart, the mind, and in the spirit of all Americans. We must teach a better

understanding and appreciation of 'the American way of life'; we must rebuild the conviction that our path is the closest to that which God would have us follow, that it is truly worthy of personal sacrifices."

YOU ARE PREPARED TO GIVE YOUR LIFE

Toward the close of his address, Admiral Radford voiced this thought:

"We must spread the word, both at home and abroad. We must call on the good offices and influence of the home, church, school, and Armed Forces, to develop the sound minds and dedicated spirits upon which our national security is fundamentally based. We can take our cue from Nathan Hale, who, when asked by his captors if he had any last words, simply said: 'I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country.'"

Life held great promise for Nathan Hale. A graduate of Yale, he had taught in Connecticut. His parents wanted him to enter the ministry. However, soon after the Lexington alarm in 1775, he wrote his father that "a sense of duty" urged him to "sacrifice everything" for his country. Soon afterwards he entered the Army as a lieutenant, and a few months later he became a captain.

After the retreat of the Army from Long Island in 1776, General Washington asked for a discreet officer to enter the British lines and get information as to British plans. Hale volunteered and was accepted.

Disguised as a Dutch schoolmaster, he visited the British camp where he made full drawings and memoranda of all the desired information. However, on his return, he was captured by the enemy. Taken before General Howe, of the British forces, Hale was ordered executed the next morning.

Denied the comfort of a Bible or a clergyman, Hale stood facing the gallows. Instead of cringing, he spoke those last words that revealed the full measure of his devotion to his country.

In death, Nathan Hale served as an inspiring example to other Revolutionary fighting men struggling to safeguard

our country's new freedom. Ever since that tragic day in 1776, his name has symbolized the selfless devotion that American fighting men of all generations have felt for our country.

From their final resting places, other heroic fighting men speak also—to you, the men who have fallen heir to their task of defending our Nation. They speak in the words of the poet:

Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
*In Flanders fields.**

*John McCrae, "In Flanders Fields."

11

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

Chapter 13

NEVER SAY DIE

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

—Article II, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.

The tradition of "never surrender" was born during the Revolutionary War. On land and at sea, U.S. fighting men proved their mettle.

On 23 September 1779, John Paul Jones, Captain of the *Bonhomme Richard*, challenged two British ships of war, the *Serapis* and the *Countess of Scarborough*. Old and slow, the *Richard* was outclassed. The *Serapis* was beating in one of the *Richard's* sides while blowing out the other. The *Richard* caught fire again and again. Meanwhile, the waters in her hold were rising alarmingly.

"Do you ask for quarter?" called the captain of the *Serapis*.

"I have not yet begun to fight," Jones hurled back.

The outcome is well known. After three and a half hours of fighting, the *Serapis* struck her flag. Then Jones and his crew boarded the *Serapis* and watched with mixed emotions as the *Richard* sank.

The spirit of John Paul Jones has inspired America's fighting men ever since. On many occasions, the will to resist, no matter how unfavorable the odds, has served other fighting men as well as it did Jones.

In modern war, combat units or individual combatants may frequently find themselves isolated from the main body of friendly forces. Without communications, the situation may appear hopeless. Even with radio or other communications, the isolated unit or individual cannot be completely aware of what goes on outside the immediate area.

However, there are innumerable instances in which iso-

lated units have fought their way out or have held fast until joined by other friendly forces.

Sometimes our men have fought their way out; at other times they have slipped through enemy lines. Airmen shot down deep in enemy territory have walked hundreds of miles, living off natural foods from the land and avoiding capture, in order to reach friendly territory. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines—they were fulfilling their missions and their obligations.

. . . OF YOUR OWN FREE WILL

Recognizing the different circumstances—the confusion, uncertainty, apprehension, and other pressures on the man who finds himself isolated in combat—the simple guideline suggests itself—*the fighting man must never surrender of his own free will.*

It should not be necessary to define the meaning of "his own free will," as some have asked. If a man gives up, he will know full well whether his surrender was willful. No

amount of rationalizing will rid him of the stigma of failure to himself if his surrender was voluntary, born of weakness. His sense of failure and the realization of his lack of will are with him for the rest of his life.

As long as a fighting man can inflict casualties on the enemy, he is selling himself short if he does not. For the casualties he inflicts, however few, or the disruption he effects in the enemy's attack may be the determining factor in repelling the enemy and in his rejoining friendly forces. In case he is isolated and can no longer inflict casualties, perhaps because he lacks ammunition, it becomes his duty to evade capture.

Once in Korea, a machine-gunner found himself isolated. Having used all the available ammunition and worn out two gun barrels in the process, he sat helplessly—or so it seemed—in his foxhole as hordes of attacking Chinese Communist soldiers streamed by. But as the last of the enemy passed his position, his own forces moved in from the flanks and cut off the Chinese.

Suppose a man surrenders while he still has the means to fight back or can remain in hiding. What can he expect to gain? Four out of ten American prisoners of the Communists died in Korea. Untold numbers were coldly executed shortly after laying down their arms, and these were not included in the "prisoner" statistics. The odds are in favor of the man who sticks by his guns. And realizing that many of the deaths in a prison camp result from *lack of will,* how much less is the chance of survival for the fellow whose surrender to the enemy is for that very same reason?

IF IN COMMAND . . .

No responsible U.S. commander advocates suicidal resistance when nothing is to be gained by further fighting. The view of the average commander was expressed by Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN (Ret.), in these words: "I am not advising anyone to fight to the death. When your chances of being captured or killed are so strong that further resistance is useless, then it is the duty of the



senior man present to decide what must be done. After all, great generals, in many wars, have surrendered their troops to prevent useless loss of life, but you must always remember that you may be occupying a strategic position which must be held as long as possible in order to keep the enemy from getting behind our own lines. There are a number of alternatives to surrender, such as slipping through the surrounding enemy lines to your own troops or even back of the enemy lines."

One other alternative is simply to *fight* your way out, and this is what the First Division of the U.S. Marine Corps did in Korea in late 1950. Caught in a mountainous area near the Chosin reservoir, the Division was surrounded by Chinese Communists. The aim of the Chinese was plain: They intended to annihilate the Marines. Not only would this be a demoralizing blow to all United Nations forces, but it would eliminate a sizable element of the then available American combat strength. For this task the enemy had tremendous numerical superiority. With no relief possible, unquestionably the problem for the surrounded unit became

one of survival and breakout. As the Marine commander pointed out, when a fighting unit is surrounded by the enemy there is no such thing as retreat.

Three weeks of fighting in subzero cold preceded the 10-day ordeal of the breakout. There were daily instances of smaller units and individuals breaking out of smaller pockets of isolation, fighting their way or infiltrating through Communist forces, sometimes simply to join a larger force that still had to fight its way out. These included British Commandos, U.S. Army men, and men from other forces—fighting men all.

Casualties? Of course there were—heavy casualties. Some due to the constant assault by the enemy, others due to the bitter elements of the North Korean winter. But how many more would there have been if they had surrendered? How many would have died as prisoners of war?

Command Knows No Rank. Often the decision to keep fighting or to surrender will be made not by an officer but by an enlisted man. During a land battle, more of direct command authority will be exercised by squad leaders than by generals, for the simple reason that there are more of them. Not infrequently, when casualties are high, even the senior private in the remnants of a combat unit must assume leadership of his unit. He may not be as well prepared in terms of training or experience as those of higher rank, but he remains in command for the duration of the battle or until properly relieved. That command carries with it certain responsibilities and demands that cannot be set aside. It is his job, in short, to keep his men fighting as a unit as long as they can fight effectively.

IN CONCLUSION

If individuals and commanders were permitted to surrender whenever a situation seems desperate it would be an open invitation to all weak of will or depressed in spirit.

As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may never voluntarily surrender himself. When he is isolated and can no longer inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces.

The responsibility and authority of a commander never extend to the surrender of his command to the enemy while it has power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off, or surrounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved, or able to rejoin friendly forces by breaking out or evading the enemy.

No matter how tough the going, a U.S. fighting man never says die.

III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

Chapter 14

KEEP UP THE FIGHT

If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

—Article III, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.

However determined a fighting man may be to avoid it, there remains a possibility that he will be captured by the enemy. The POW could be any one of these:

- The soldier or marine rendered unconscious or badly wounded in battle.
- The sailor adrift at sea, whose raft is hardly equipped to engage an enemy warship or effect an amphibious assault on an unfriendly beach.
- The airman bailing out over enemy territory and coming down in a populated area or perhaps into the waiting hands of an armed patrol; or caught during his long, evasive trek to freedom.

What can the POW do when he faces his Communist captors? He knows they will try to subjugate him and use him to defeat his own country. Disarmed, he could feel completely helpless—*if* he let himself. But he is not alone! His country and his Service are with him in spirit . . . guiding and sustaining him in this crucial hour. When a POW repeats to himself the words of the Code, he is communing with his fellow Americans. He knows he is fighting their fight . . . as well as his own. He is one with them, and they are one with him . . . even though he may be thousands of miles from home. Living by the Code, the POW *knows* also that he is keeping faith with America's fighting men of past generations. From these sources, he draws strength to resist his Communist captors.

. . . BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE

That the "means available" for resistance after capture are limited is quite obvious. A physical attack on an interrogator, for example, will be used as an excuse for more violent physical abuse of the prisoner. Sometimes the prisoner will have to "take" treatment against which his instincts rebel.

Consider the case of one POW in Korea. When his Chinese guard wiped his feet on the POW's clothes, the POW struck him. For this, the POW was placed in a box about 30 inches square. Kept there for nine hours, the POW became temporarily paralyzed. Afterwards, his arms were handcuffed to his ankles for three or four days; following this, he was handcuffed in a conventional manner for about six weeks.

We can admire the courage of the POW. At the same time, we recognize that this kind of resistance serves no useful purpose. It takes "guts" to stand calmly in the face of insult and abuse, but it will most often be the best thing to do.

For the time being, the POW's best resistance is passive resistance. The means he still possesses are his mental faculties and his moral code—the determination and the will to resist. These must be kept alive in the captive fighting man because they are what will keep him alive. That the Communist enemy is aware of these "means" too, and their importance, is evidenced in his prolonged and continuous efforts to destroy them.

YOU WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ESCAPE AND AID OTHERS TO ESCAPE

The fighting man has one alternative to "taking" whatever treatment his captors apply—for as long as they choose to apply it. That is, of course, escape. *He must concentrate all his resources toward escape—both for himself and others.* This will entail the full application of his remaining means—wits, will, and patience. Furthermore, the Geneva Convention impliedly recognizes the right of

a prisoner of war to try to escape by providing a limitation of punishment for certain offenses—"such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing"—when such offenses are committed with the sole intention of facilitating escape and do not entail any violence against life or limb.

Remember these provisions, and abide by them if you become a POW. Never give your Communist captor any valid reason for labeling you a war criminal.

Above all else, use good judgment in planning to escape. Be alert to opportunities of the moment—the careless guard or a friendly one interested in deserting—or moments of confusion created by an air raid or attack by friendly forces. Such opportunities may be the only ones you will get. They are more likely to occur in the early stages of captivity, before transfer to a prison camp.

By all means make advance plans and preparations if you can, but don't expect that this will be possible in

any Communist prisoner-of-war camp. Once in an established camp, you may be able to organize an underground escape committee. This can increase your chances of making a successful escape.

For reasons previously cited, physical violence against enemy personnel during escape from a POW camp should be avoided except as a last resort, when the situation is desperate. (That is, if a prisoner feels death by the enemy's hand is imminent anyway, and as a fighting man he is determined to take some of the enemy with him in his final battle.) Except in such extremely desperate circumstances, it is advisable for the prisoner to avoid violence during his escape from camp and his trek to freedom until his objective—friendly forces or neutral territory—is actually in view and until such physical action might eliminate the final obstacles to his bid for freedom.

One pilot who escaped his captors in Korea against tremendous odds is Major Ward Millar (then Captain).

As his plane plunged into enemy territory both of his ankles were broken. Dragging himself on his stomach to a creek, he attempted to gain cover, but the Communists soon spotted him. From the moment of his capture, Captain Millar began planning to escape. He eluded his guards before his improperly set ankles had healed and started his slow, painful trek to freedom on foot, using sticks as crutches and hobbling along in ill-fitting galoshes. As hope of a successful escape was dimming, he enlisted the help of a Korean—a sergeant in the North Korean army—who also wanted to escape the Communists. The two succeeded in signalling a U.S. helicopter, which flew them to safety.

YOU WILL ACCEPT NEITHER PAROLE . . .

A captor's devices—especially a Communist captor's—to subdue a prisoner or render him complacent are many and varied. Among the more subtle of these is the offer of "parole"—an agreement whereby, in exchange for certain privileges or freedom of movement, the prisoner gives certain promises to the detaining power, such as the promise that he will not try to escape.

It is sometimes suggested that captured Chaplains and medical personnel should accept parole in order to minister to other prisoners. In accordance with the Geneva Convention, parole is not necessary for such persons in that they are "retained" personnel, rather than prisoners, with minimal restrictions placed upon them in order that they may render their services as needed. However, you should remember that the Communists did not honor that ruling during the Korean war and cannot be expected to in the future.

Recognizing that the captor is in a position to make parole terms advantageous to themselves and disadvantageous to an unwitting captive, the United States *expressly forbids her captive fighting men to enter into such agreement with the enemy.*

. . . NOR SPECIAL FAVORS

Another ruse of captors such as the Communists is to offer special favors. However innocent these offers may seem, you may be sure there are strings attached. The cigarette or bit of candy offered by an interrogator at the beginning of a session, apparently to establish a relaxed atmosphere, may place the prisoner under an obligation. The wisest course is to reject all offers of favors, even in exchange for what may seem to be very minor concessions. Such offers should be reported promptly to the senior in command of the prisoner group.

There are several reasons why favors should not be accepted—even as a "planned" deception, so that the proceeds may be divided among the group. In the first place, such a deception would necessarily involve pretense, which could lead to a trap. For another, there can be no overall benefit to the group for the simple reason that the favors—or the funds to purchase them—will have come from the sources allotted for the prisoners anyway. The prisoner who accepts favors and keeps them for himself is indirectly stealing from his fellows. And even if he accepts them in order to share them with the others later, he is contributing to the downfall of his group by allowing the enemy to increase his control over it. It thus becomes apparent that *the captive fighting man must not accept special favors from the enemy.*

IN CONCLUSION

The fight is everywhere. Even in the prison camp! When the use of physical weapons is denied, the mental and moral "will to resist" must be kept alive in every prisoner.

A POW has no alternatives. Either he resists, to death if necessary, or progressively submits, in time completely, to the dictates of his captors. Nor is death any less likely in submission than in resistance. It may be different in submission—more lingering—but the more to be avoided because of that. Certainly this leaves little choice for the fighting man who cherishes freedom.

He will escape if able to do so and will help others to escape. He will *not* sign or enter into a parole agreement.

In the POW camp as in battle, there is no place for the coward. In either place, the watchword is:

"Keep up the fight."

V

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

Chapter 15

KEEP FAITH

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

—Article IV, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.

One of the worst acts an American can commit is to give aid and comfort to the enemy by informing on, or otherwise harming, fellow prisoners. A POW must avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who may have knowledge of particular value to the enemy, even if this course brings coercive interrogation.

If ever the Communists hold you as a prisoner, they will try in many ways to make you an informer. At the same time, they will try to break down your faith in your fellow POW's and their faith in you. In Korea, they deliberately placed many prisoners under a cloud of suspicion—by requiring their company on walks or by frequently calling them to headquarters for interrogation—in order to create the impression that they were "cooperating." This practice had a two-fold purpose. It made it difficult to detect an actual informer by hiding him within a selected group. It also cast suspicion on every other individual in the group.

YOU WILL GIVE NO INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT BE HARMFUL

Faced by such tactics, *the fighting man who becomes a prisoner of war must keep faith with his fellow prisoners.*

It is natural during a long term of confinement for men to discuss intimately their past lives and their future dreams, as well as matters of immediate concern, such as thoughts or plans of escape. They will talk with each

other of many things they would not wish disclosed to the enemy. The need for mutual confidence is obvious.

In this connection, an inspiring example was set by Derek Godfrey Kinne, captured on 25 April 1951.

In July 1952, the Chinese Communists accused Kinne of being uncooperative. He was brutally interrogated about other prisoners of war who had uncooperative views.

"As a result of his refusal to inform on his comrades, and for striking back at a Chinese officer who assaulted him," his citation for gallantry in captivity stated, "he was twice severely beaten up and tied up for periods of 12 and 24 hours, being made to stand on tip-toe with a running noose around his neck which would throttle him if he attempted to relax in any way."

In conclusion, Kinne's example was cited as "an inspiration to all ranks who came into contact with him."

YOU WILL TAKE PART IN NO ACTION WHICH MIGHT HARM YOUR COMRADES

The Central Peace Committee was one of several organizations used by the Communists to support their political indoctrination program in Korea. Composed of prisoners, the committee helped prepare material to be used in courses given to other POW's. From the setup and activities, it should have been apparent that this committee was being used to undermine POW resistance and to mislead them as to the role of the United States in the Korean war and in world affairs.

Nevertheless, two American prisoners played key roles. One had charge of indoctrination. The other had charge of propaganda. Both took instructions from the Communists. Under this committee was an elaborate workshop staffed by approximately 30 prisoners. The principal duty of the prisoners stationed there was to pose for propaganda pictures. For example, 10 men would be shown playing basketball. Others would be snapped playing tennis, swimming, or engaging in other sports or recreational activities.

Subsequently these pictures would appear in various newspapers. The purpose, obviously, was to convey the impression that UN prisoners in Korea were being well treated by the Communists.

By their actions, the POW's who worked on this committee helped give an erroneous picture of their fellow POW's. At a time when world opinion should have been mobilized against atrocities in Communist POW camps, some of our own men were helping to avert this. For their labors, they received a "mess of pottage."

Here, if you ever become a POW, is an example of what *not* to do. There will be many other things also. The Communists are clever, and they will propose many things that cannot be predicted. Keep alert! Make up your mind *now* that in peace or in war, in combat or in a POW camp, you NEVER will take part in any action that could harm your fellow fighting men.

IF YOU ARE SENIOR, YOU WILL TAKE COMMAND

Strong leadership is essential to discipline. Without discipline, camp organization, resistance, and even survival may be impossible. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care of the sick and wounded are imperative. Officers and enlisted men of the United States will continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority after capture. The senior officer or enlisted man eligible to command within the prisoner-of-war camp or group will assume command according to rank (or precedence) without regard to Service. This responsibility and accountability may not be evaded. If the senior officer or enlisted man is incapacitated or unable to act for any reason, command will be assumed by the next senior.

Such command *can* be exercised, even when conditions make it seem impossible. This was demonstrated in Korea.

For their inspiring conduct while prisoners of war, 56 American soldiers were decorated. Consider the conduct of four, selected at random—Corporal Donald R. Bittner,



Sergeant Gale W. Carter, Lieutenant Colonel John J. Dunn, and Corporal Richard F. Douglass. Their citations speak for themselves.

Corporal Bittner's "leadership and personal example in defying his captors and in discouraging collaborators raised the morale of his fellow prisoners and bolstered their faith in American ideals." The Corporal headed an active prisoner organization to keep collaborators in line. For repeatedly refusing to sign propaganda documents, he incurred such punishments as hard labor for more than a year and confinement in a cold room for two months.

Sergeant Carter, who also led a prisoner resistance group, "was severely punished and mistreated for his activities. However, throughout the periods that he was subjected to solitary confinement, hard labor, and starvation, he remained steadfast in his devotion to duty and country."

Lieutenant Colonel Dunn, then Major, was the senior officer in a group of several hundred American POW's.

He received the Legion of Merit for his "courageous and outstanding leadership, despite the multitude of difficulties confronting him and without regard for the fact that he was sick and wounded at the time he assumed those important responsibilities. He was instrumental in maintaining the morale and welfare of his comrades, assisting many to defy communistic teachings and to maintain hope necessary to remain alive. Throughout the period of captivity he constantly demanded more food, clothing, and better living conditions essential to the preservation of life."

Corporal Douglass, whose "determined stand against Communist teachings gave heart to those with less spirit and fortitude . . . risked severe punishment by liberating from confinement a fellow prisoner suffering from malnutrition and cold."

But superior leadership was not a monopoly of the Army. Lieutenant Colonel William G. Thrash, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator, won a Gold Star in lieu of a second Legion of Merit for his conduct as a senior officer in a Korean prison camp. Although threatened with harsh punishment if he attempted to organize resistance, and under constant surveillance, he went to work tightening discipline and uniting the prisoners—officers from several nations. For his work in counteracting Communist indoctrination, the Colonel endured solitary confinement for eight months, intense mental pressure, and physical maltreatment. These efforts to "break" him succeeded only in strengthening his influence upon the other prisoners.

YOU WILL OBEY LAWFUL ORDERS

The Communists in Korea attempted to prevent group unity by suppressing leadership. Prisoners were ordered to report to the Communist camp officials if any of their seniors in rank attempted to exercise authority. That there may be weaklings and opportunists who will comply must be considered. This happened in several instances.

Against such odds, the establishment of order and discipline by the prisoners themselves is difficult, to say the

least. And even when established, it will need constant reinforcement, as the Communists will do their best to undermine it. But it must be done, and it can be—as was proven in Korea—if men will stand together behind proper leadership. Obviously, the senior officer can effectively fulfill his responsibilities in this regard only when *those of lesser rank obey his lawful orders and back him up in every way.*

Being a POW does not relieve you as a serviceman from your obligation to follow designated leaders. When prisoners reject the authority of their superiors and refuse to obey lawful orders, discipline and organization break down. This is just what the Communists want, for they know how important discipline is to the success of any resistance movement in a prison camp.

There is the possibility, of course, that the prisoner in authority may be an opportunist, a weakling, or one who will collaborate with the enemy. To prevent wholesale betrayal of the group by such a person, it is stipulated that only *lawful* orders must be obeyed. This does not mean that a prisoner can arbitrarily refuse to obey orders. But, obviously, if a senior tells a subordinate to sign a propaganda leaflet or perform some other collaborative service for the enemy, it is not a lawful order and should be refused. By the same token, collaboration by a senior is not justification for similar action by those of lesser rank.

IN CONCLUSION

Sometimes keeping faith calls for strange action. If some strange act contributes to the welfare of the POW group, it should be judged by what it accomplishes.

In Korea, for example, a POW was showing early signs of "give-up-itis." He was soon rejecting food and spurning the attention of his fellow POW's who were trying to "snap him out of it." Nothing his fellow POW's said or did seemed to make much difference. Expressions of sympathy seemed only to increase his self-pity.

One day when chow was being passed out, a Navy Chief



Petty Officer noticed that this POW had failed to claim his portion. When called, the POW replied that he was not hungry.

"Tell that ___ __ _ _____," said the Chief, "to go out and dig his own grave before he gets too weak to do it. Otherwise, some of the rest of us will have to do it for him, and we've got more important things to do."

Soon afterwards the man came over and ate his chow. Then he began to come out of his shell, and soon he overcame his "give-up-itis."

"It was shock treatment," explained the Chief afterwards, "and it worked. He had passed the stage where kind words or sympathy would have helped him."

Apart from "give-up-itis," there will be many cases in any POW camp where individual prisoners dislike one another. But no matter what your feelings as a prisoner may be, all disagreements must be resolved within the POW group.

"Behind-the-barracks" settlement of personal feuds is extremely risky in a prison camp. For one thing, injuries do not heal easily in the absence of decent food and medical facilities. Furthermore, such incidents are difficult to conceal from the ever-watchful eyes of the captors. Communist camp administrators like nothing better than opportunities to remonstrate with prisoners for their "bad attitudes" toward each other and to "counsel" them on their conduct. Such incidents provide the best possible opportunity for the enemy to aggravate discord and sow seeds of distrust.

Remember how essential teamwork was on your high school or college football team? You wouldn't slug your worst enemy if he was on your team. You'd cover up your own personal feelings and guard him while he was carrying the ball for *your* team.

How much more vital it is, then, for you to keep faith with your fellow fighting men!



V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

Chapter 16

BY WORD AND BY DEED

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

—Article V, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.

Every fighting man possesses some military information of potential value to the enemy. By revealing it to the enemy he might bring death to his comrades or disaster to his unit. Indeed, one man may have some small, seemingly unimportant bit of knowledge that could complete a composite intelligence picture for the enemy and enable the enemy to defeat major forces of his own country. The length of time he has been in service; how long and where he was trained; how long in combat—any such information will serve to improve the enemy's appraisal of our fighting strength and potential.

YOU ARE BOUND TO GIVE ONLY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER, DATE OF BIRTH

If you become a prisoner of war, there is an obvious need for some communication with your captors. To fulfill their obligations under the Geneva Convention, your captors need to know who you are. Moreover, they need to identify you so unmistakably that you will not be confused with any other member of our Armed Forces. This is in *your* interest as well as in theirs, since you will want your Service and your loved ones to know what has happened to you.

For this reason, you are bound by the Code and the Geneva rules to give your name, rank, service number, and date of birth if captured. (For those who wonder



why the date of birth is required, it is simply to establish your identity more completely.) If you refuse to give this information, you may be denied privileges you otherwise might enjoy.

By the same token, you are expected to help identify any of your comrades who may be too badly wounded or too ill to identify themselves. In so doing, you will apply the same restrictions that you would if you were being questioned about yourself.

Assume your captors are Communists. You know they will honor their obligations under the Geneva Convention *only* if it serves their ends. Why, then, you may ask yourself, should you give them *any* information? Why should you give them even your name when they probably will try to use it for propaganda purposes?

This is a risk you must take. When you give the Communists personal information they can relay to your Gov-

ernment and your loved ones, you have no guarantee they will not misuse it. However, in spite of this possibility, you could *not* afford to give your Communist captors a bona fide excuse for *not* relaying word of your capture to your Government.

Remember, finally, that we Americans honor *our* obligations. Under the Code and the Geneva rules, you are obligated to give your name, rank, service number, and date of birth. This you can and should do in good conscience.

YOU WILL EVADE ANSWERING FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE UTMOST OF YOUR ABILITY

Ideally, if ever you become a POW, you should give your captors no information other than name, rank, service number, and date of birth. Don't be stampeded into going beyond this.

There are instances on record where Americans, when summoned for interrogation, have been so terrified by their own unrealistic imagining of what would happen to them that it was not even necessary for their captors to question them. These men had frightened themselves so badly that they poured out any information they had. Other prisoners, almost as frightened, held out until the Communists mentioned that "it would be better" for the POW if he talked. In the prisoner's frightened state, he thought this statement was a threat of all kinds of torture and unknown, mysterious outrages—so that this remark was all that it took to make him give in. In this way, by playing on fear and lack of knowledge, the Communists had their work done for them—the prisoners had defeated themselves.

Actually, the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War has never been able to verify even one case in which a POW was killed because he refused to answer questions. Keep this in mind!

Whatever you do, don't try to evade questioning by

making up a story. Sometimes highly trained and skilled persons can deceive a trained interrogator, but then for only a short period of time. Any improvised story, clutched by a desperate, confused, frightened prisoner of war, will probably be more of an aid to the enemy than a hindrance. The interrogator is always at an advantage, because the prisoner does not know exactly what information the interrogator has. The prisoner's answers are carefully screened by enemy intelligence experts, and false information is easily detected. After his story is destroyed, the prisoner is then at the mercy of his captors.

Playing stupid is something else. A POW who knows he cannot fool an interrogator with false information may evade answering further questions by appearing to know so little that the interrogator gives up.

This happened in the case of a Navy fighter-bomber pilot who was shot down behind enemy lines in Korea. After capture, his system was to be very polite, to be sorry that he didn't know this or that. He knew nothing about the new planes. He did not know where the bases were . . . nor did he know how long the runways were. This sort of game continued during most of his six months as a POW.

Just before the pilot was released, an interrogator told him he was a disgrace to his uniform . . . that he was the most ignorant naval officer he (the interrogator) had ever encountered.

Yes, the officer was dumb . . . like a fox!

He had resisted *successfully* to the utmost of his ability.

YOU WILL MAKE NO DISLOYAL STATEMENTS

On first thought, your pledge to make no disloyal statements seems merely an expression of fundamental decency. You find it hard to conceive of a situation in which you would break your pledge. Yet a number of American POW's signed germ-warfare confessions in Korea, and many others signed peace petitions that cast reflections

on United States policy and objectives. These men did not intend to be disloyal. Undoubtedly, they were pressured into signing. Yet the effect of their statements was definitely harmful to our country. What led them to act as they did? How can you steel yourself *now* to withstand such pressures if ever you become a POW?

First, let it be understood that for every American who made a disloyal statement while he was a POW in Korea, there were many, many others who refused to do so. Follow the example of the majority.

Consider the case of an Air Force captain whose plane was struck by Communist antiaircraft fire over North Korea on 8 April 1952. He was ejected, and as he fell into range, a squad of Chinese Communists opened fire.

On the ground, he saw stealthy figures running toward him, still firing. With his service .45, he killed two of more than 200 Communists who converged on him. Overpowered, he was taken prisoner.

The captain was charged with germ warfare and "murdering Chinese Communist volunteers" in his last ditch fight. Despite unrelenting pressure, he steadfastly refused to sign any statements disloyal to his country. After a midnight trial, he was confined in a camp for undesirables. As a member of the camp's escape committee, he tried three times to make it to U.N. lines. All three attempts failed. Finally, on 31 August 1953, he was repatriated in "Operation Big Switch."

Courage and faith sustained the captain through his ordeal. They can sustain you also if ever you are pressured to make a disloyal statement.

IN CONCLUSION

In the face of experience, it is recognized that you, if you should become a POW, may be subjected to an extreme of coercion. Still, you must resist to the limit of your ability. Don't expect to fall back to successive lines of resistance. Once you have gone beyond the first—your name, rank, service number, and date of birth—in almost any respect whatever, you have taken the first step that leads to collaboration. On the first line you must endeavor to stand to the end.



VI

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

Chapter 17

FAITH WILL TRIUMPH

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

—Article VI, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.

An American is responsible and accountable for his actions. Prisoner-of-war status doesn't change this nor does it change the obligation to remain faithful to the United States and to the principles for which it stands. Throughout his captivity, a prisoner should look to his God for strength to endure whatever may befall. He should remember that the United States of America will neither forget nor forsake him, and that it will win the ultimate victory.

The life of a prisoner of war is hard. He must never give up hope. He must resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners of war who stand firm and united against the enemy will aid one another in surviving their ordeal.

NEVER FORGET THAT YOU ARE A FIGHTING MAN

If you become a POW, you will be fighting for your country in a new arena.

Keep this constantly in mind. Never let yourself be lulled into a feeling that you are "out of the war" . . . that your only problem is to survive until you can be repatriated.

When you face a Communist interrogator, you are under fire—just as truly as if bullets and shell fragments were flying around you. In trying to make you do his bidding, the enemy is attacking the United States of America and our way of life. If you succumb, your country is the loser.

Disarmed and unable to put up physical resistance, you will fight with your mind and your spirit. If you yield no military information, you help safeguard your country's fighting strength. If you remain faithful to your fellow POW's, you help keep up a united front in this new arena of war. Resist every attempt at indoctrination, and you beat back a Communist offensive. Turn back every Communist effort to use you for propaganda, and you help protect the good name of your country and maintain your own personal integrity as well.

Remember always that the Communists are waging a relentless war to overthrow our country and our way of life. Your role may change, but you are never out of the conflict as long as you remain alive.

Never forget that you are an American fighting man.

YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR YOUR ACTIONS

The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice continue to apply, whenever appropriate, to members of

the Armed Forces while they are prisoners of war. Keep this in mind if you become a POW. The circumstances of your capture and your conduct during the period of your detention are subject to examination, with due regard for your rights as an individual and consideration for the conditions of your captivity.

Still, you *are* a fighting man, and your Government expects you to act like one.

Any man may face odds that overwhelm him despite his best efforts. If this explains your capture, your Government will be understanding.

While you are a POW, your conduct will be weighed by your fellow prisoners. You will weigh your own conduct. You will know *in your own mind* whether or not you are acting as a responsible fighting man.

If your conduct as a prisoner of war requires official examination, your guilt or innocence will be determined not by sentiment but by the actual facts. In short, your conduct will be judged by what could reasonably be expected of a loyal, dedicated fighting man under the conditions you are called upon to endure.

Acquit yourself with honor, and you will have won the undying gratitude of your fellow countrymen!

For inspiration, look to the records of those heroes who stood up against staggering odds while prisoners of war in Korea. There were weaklings, of course, and *much* has been written about them. More important, there were many heroes—from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps—and *too little* has been written about them!

Major Walter R. Harris, USMCR, for example, won the Legion of Merit for his adamant resistance. As the recognized leader of a prisoner group in North Korea, he welded the prisoners into a disciplined military organization and conducted educational and religious programs. He did his best to help those who attempted to escape and

made certain they knew the probable punishment if recaptured.

When Major Harris' influence among the prisoners came to the attention of his captors, they tried to force him to sign compromising statements. This he refused steadfastly to do, in spite of solitary confinement, loneliness, hunger, and physical torture.

YOU ARE DEDICATED TO PRINCIPLES THAT MADE YOUR COUNTRY FREE

> *We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . .*

The Declaration of Independence contains the essence of our democratic faith. It was meant to give form to the sentiments of the colonists, to provide a common statement of a new Nation's reasons for carrying on the fight for freedom. The principles expressed in the Declaration heartened the soldier in the Revolutionary War, and those same principles serve as a time-tested standard for the American fighting man today.

If you become a POW of the Communists, you will expect intensive indoctrination in atheistic communism, which rejects the idea of individual liberty expressed in the Declaration of Independence. It is your duty as a fighting man to carry on the battle in the prison camp by resisting Communist indoctrination efforts with all your ability. Your best answers to the Communists lie in the basic principles that have made our country great and free. Your best weapon is an appreciation of the true meaning of these principles.

Your steadfast adherence to the principles of freedom and democracy will help both you and your fellow prisoners.

The Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War found that when a few American POW's signed peace petitions and peddled Communist literature it had far-reaching results.

So long as the principles that have made our country free claim our love and respect, so long will our free and representative government endure and be a source of hope to those who seek human freedom and who believe in the dignity and worth of every human being. Such principles are worth fighting for—on the battlefield or in a POW camp.

TRUST IN GOD

Most religions consider valor and patriotism virtues of the highest order. The person with firm religious convictions, whatever his religion, and the courage to defend those convictions at any cost, is able to defend himself and to maintain his integrity as a man and as a fighting man.

If you are a devoutly religious man you do not need to be reminded that your faith is a source of courage and strength in time of peril. Men who recognize the existence of God and believe in the importance of a man's soul recognize also that there are worse things than death; as a result, the idea of death does not appall them. They may not always understand why things are happening as they are, but they believe with firm conviction that God will not forsake the man who trusts Him and lives by His commandments. When death ends this earthly struggle, it opens the door to everlasting life.

The United States, when still a young, hard-pressed Nation, proudly proclaimed its position to the world in its slogan, "In God We Trust." This heritage helps explain why there are few atheists in the Armed Forces. Even those men who do not subscribe to a formal creed of any kind generally recognize a God who rules the world with justice and mercy.

Centuries ago, a soldier wrote the 23rd Psalm. Its message has echoed in the minds and hearts of other soldiers in each succeeding generation:

Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil; for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff, they comfort me.

TRUST IN YOUR COUNTRY

Your country expects you, as a member of the Armed Forces, to support it to the utmost of your ability. In return, you may expect your country to support you.

In times of war, communications sometimes break down. Messages from home may never reach you. Undoubtedly, you will worry about your family.

If you are a prisoner of war, these worries and fears will be aggravated. Meantime, you will be subjected to a steady onslaught of propaganda and lies about the defeat of American forces and the victories of the enemy.

In such circumstances, remember this: The United States of America will win the war, and she will not forget you—no matter what the enemy says.

In signing the Executive Order that put the Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces into effect, the President of the United States declared:

> No American prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States.
>
> Every available means will be employed by our government to establish contact with, to support and obtain the release of all our prisoners of war.
>
> Furthermore, the laws of the United States provide for the support and care of dependents of members of the Armed Forces including those who become prisoners of war. I assure dependents of such prisoners that these laws will continue to provide for their welfare.

IN CONCLUSION

The U.S. Fighting Man's Code sets a high standard for members of the Armed Forces of the United States. But it is a reasonable standard—one based on principles and ideals that have made America free and strong, on moral qualities found in all men of integrity and character. And

it is a standard that every member of the Armed Forces of the United States is expected to meet. Complete and loyal support of the Code is to the best interests of the American fighting man, his comrades, the United States, and the free world.

The written Code of Conduct is a direct outgrowth of the Korean conflict. But the Code's importance extends far beyond the limits of a single war or a single group of Americans.

Every American citizen—whether in or out of uniform—must share the responsibility for preserving our freedom and our way of life. For in modern warfare, the home front is but an extension of the fighting front. There are no distant front lines, remote no-man's lands, far-off rear areas. Courage and loyalty are expected of every American. And every American might well adopt as his own personal code the Code of Conduct for the serviceman.

Scientific advances have resulted in weapons so formidable that they stagger the imagination of mankind. Less tangible but no less formidable are the psychological weapons the Communists have devised. Their method of treating captives is but one of the weapons they use in their unending, worldwide war for the minds and hearts of men.

We cannot take freedom for granted. Threats to American security must be met with appropriate American weapons.

The physical weapons of war are assured by American enterprise, science, and industry.

The mental and moral weapons are supplied by the strength, will, and minds of the American people.

So long as the weapons, whatever they be, are wielded by men of honor and integrity, who believe in—and practice—the principles upon which this Nation was founded, so long will our Nation be free and invincible.



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
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

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