The Heritage Foundation has announced a new position for the controversial Bush Administration lawyer David Addington:

Effective Feb. 1, David Addington will become senior vice president for legal and judicial policy, heading the Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies. In this new capacity, Addington will be responsible for the Legal Center’s research and education programs. Addington currently serves as Heritage’s senior vice president and deputy chief operating officer.

According to the WSJ Law Blog, Addington will focus on combating excessive claims of federal government power and overreaching claims of the Executive branch:

As head of the Meese Center, Mr. Addington said he hoped to focus on what he called “overregulation” by the federal government, and he said the Obama administration had taken some “questionable” steps, such as recess appointments of executive branch officials opposed by Senate Republicans.

Categories: Uncategorized     Comments


    Turns out that hackers can use Cisco phones to monitor our communications, says Sal Stolfo of Columbia University, and Cisco evidently has taken its own sweet time to fix the problem.

    And the FAA’s fancy new NextGen traffic control system will allow hackers with $1000 worth of equipment to send fake GPS signals to commercial planes, says Paul Rosenzweig of Red Branch Consulting. That would apparently be enough to get the planes to land in unexpected places. Like the Capitol.

    Categories: Uncategorized     Comments

      Auto-Pen Signatures of Bills

      I blogged about this in 2011, citing to an Office of Legal Counsel opinion that concluded:

      [We find that, pursuant to] the legal understanding of the word “sign” at the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified and during the early years of the Republic ..., a person may sign a document by directing that his signature be affixed to it by another. We then review opinions of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice and find the same understanding reflected in opinions addressing statutory signing requirements in a variety of contexts. Reading the constitutional text in light of this established legal understanding, we conclude that the President need not personally perform the physical act of affixing his signature to a bill to sign it within the meaning of Article I, Section 7.

      I haven’t followed this issue since, but I thought I’d point to a contrary view from Prof. Terry Turnipseed, which is in the news again because of the auto-pen signature of the fiscal cliff blill:

      The state of the law surrounding proxy signatures has remained amazingly constant through both English and American history. The proxy and the principal must be present together when a proxy signature is utilized for a high-value transaction. This was the rock-solid law when the constitution was written.

      No one seems focused on the presence requirement: not the President, nor the Republican House members who complained to the President, nor the numerous legal commentators and scholars that we have heard from since the auto-pen signing occurred. The use of the auto-pen, itself unproblematic, seems to have eclipsed the more important issue of whether the president was present when it was used.... In sum, the President’s use of the auto-pen (or even a human being) to sign a bill outside of the President’s presence is unconstitutional.

      Note that, even if the auto-pen signature were to be found invalid, this would not mean the bill is vetoed (unless it comes to the President near the end of a legislative session); but it would mean the bill goes into effect ten days (not counting Sundays) later, according to article I, § 7 of the Constitution:

      If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

      Categories: Uncategorized     Comments

        Public Citizen has details on the case, including the court documents. Here’s Public Citizen’s summary (paragraph break added):

        A contractor sued a woman who posted an unfavorable review of his services on Yelp and Angie’s List, alleging defamation in a number of respects, and sought a preliminary injunction. The trial judge held a preliminary injunction hearing and took testimony from the plaintiff and the defendant; he denied the preliminary injunctions in all respects save two, but ordered the defendant to revise one of the statements in her post using words crafted by the judge, and to refrain from addressing a specific subject in any published review on the subject.

        We drafted a motion for reconsideration for defendant’s trial counsel to file, reminding the court of the rule against prior restraints and of the fact that this rule flatly forbids any preliminary injunctions against repetition of allegedly libelous statements, then filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Virginia. Without waiting for a response from the winning plaintiff, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed with a terse unpublished ruling, finding that the preliminary injunction was not justified and that, in any event, the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law.

        For analysis of the decision — which doesn’t cite the First Amendment, but which reaches what I think is the correct result under the First Amendment — see Steve Emmert’s Virginia Appellate News & Analysis blog. For my thoughts on why preliminary injunctions against alleged libel are generally unconstitutional even though permanent injunctions (following a full hearing on the merits) are often constitutional, see here.

        Categories: Defamation, Freedom of Speech     Comments

          People v. Morales (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2013) says no, following the general view of American courts (see, e.g., Suliveres v. Commonwealth (Mass. 2007)). The one exception that courts have historically recognized is having sex with a person while pretending to be the person’s spouse, which is indeed treated as rape. The facts:

          [D]efendant Julio Morales entered the dark bedroom of victim Jane Doe after her boyfriend departed and, without disclosing his identity, had sexual intercourse with her. He was charged with rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(4). The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1003, which, as given, stated in part that “[a] woman is unconscious of the nature of the act if she is unconscious or asleep or not aware that the act is occurring or not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator tricked, lied to, or concealed information from her.” (Italics added.) The prosecutor argued both correct and incorrect theories under which Jane was unconscious: that she was asleep (correct), and that she was not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because defendant deceived her into believing he was her boyfriend (as we explain below, incorrect). Defendant was convicted of violating section 261, subdivision (a)(4), and the trial court sentenced him to the low term of three years in state prison, from which judgment defendant appeals. Because we cannot discern from this record whether the jury convicted defendant on the correct or incorrect theory, we must reverse. [Footnote: In doing so, we urge the Legislature to reexamine section 261, subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(5), and correct the incongruity that exists when a man may commit rape by having intercourse with a woman when impersonating a husband, but not when impersonating a boyfriend.] ...

          Prosecution’s Evidence

          On February 20, 2009, 18–year–old “Jane Doe” went to a party with her boyfriend, Victor, and another friend. Jane’s brother, Filiberto, and several of his friends, including defendant, also attended the party. Jane drank three to five beers at the party. [Jane, her boyfriend Victor, defendant, and some others returned to Jane's house to eat; most of the people then left, and Jane went to sleep.] ...

          According to Jane, she woke up to the sensation of having sex.... She was confused because she and Victor had agreed not to have sex that night. When light coming through a crack in the bedroom door illuminated the face of the person having sex with her, i.e., defendant, she realized it was not Victor and tried to push him away. Defendant grabbed her thighs and pushed his penis back into her vagina. She pushed him away again and began to cry and yell. Defendant left her room; Jane locked her door and called Victor, asking him to come back to her house....

          [When defendant was caught by the police, h]e admitted that he had gone into Jane’s room while she was asleep. He said that he had kissed her and that she kissed him back, but he thought she might still be asleep. He pulled down her pajama bottoms, got on top of her, and started to have sex. He said she probably thought he was her boyfriend, and when she realized he was not, she started screaming. During a second interview with Deputy Leyn, defendant once again described what happened, including that Jane was asleep when he put his penis into her vagina, and wrote out a statement admitting that he kissed Jane and touched her vagina while she was asleep.

          Defense Evidence

          Defendant testified that sometime after Victor had left Jane’s bedroom, Filiberto’s friend Tony and he went into Jane’s room, at Tony’s suggestion. They nudged Jane to try to awaken her so she could come out and drink with them. Defendant then realized that Tony was no longer in the room, and the door was closed. He tried to leave, but the door would not open.

          He tried to wake Jane up by nudging her again, but she did not move. He thought she was attractive, so he kissed her on the cheek. She turned toward him, and they kissed some more. He thought she was not asleep because she responded to his kisses, but he also thought she believed he was her boyfriend. [Footnote: Defendant gave conflicting testimony about whether he attempted to identify himself. At first he testified that he did not identify himself and believed Jane did not know who he was, but he later testified that he told Jane he was not her boyfriend.] They kissed for several minutes, ... [and then] began to have sex. He stopped because he felt he was betraying his girlfriend; he did not recall Jane pushing him away, and he did not try to reinsert his penis after he pulled out of her.

          The court reversed, because it concluded that sex under pretense of identity is not a crime (again, except when the defendant is pretending to be the victim’s spouse). But the court remanded for retrial, because if the prosecution could prove that Morales had indeed had sex with Jane Doe while she was asleep, he would indeed be guilty of rape. (Restarting the sex after Jane pushed him away could qualify as rape as well, but apparently that wasn’t the prosecution’s theory at trial.)

          I’m not a fan of allowing general “rape by fraud” prosecutions (see here for some interesting examples from Israel), largely because it would open the door to criminalizing a wide range of lies, whether about fidelity, past sexual partners, wealth, love, and so on, used to get sex. I explain some of my thinking on that here, though I acknowledge that the problem is not an easy one: In particular, I don’t have an entirely satisfying answer to the question, “why is getting money by lying a crime [fraud], but getting sex by lying not?”

          But it seems to me that having sex with someone while pretending to be a particular person known to the victim — whether a spouse, a lover, a friend, or what have you — should indeed be criminally punishable. It is, thankfully, apparently a rare sort of lie; it is very far outside the normal level of dishonesty that people expect might happen in their relationships; it is one for which there is no plausible justification or mitigation; and criminalizing it is unlikely to sweep in the garden variety lies that, unfortunately, often appear in people’s sexual and romantic lives.

          Categories: Criminal Law     Comments

            BLT reports: “Senate Republicans announced today that newly elected Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas), a lawyer who was backed by the Tea Party movement, will serve as a member of the committee during this session.” Cruz takes the place of Senator Coburn. Jeff Flake also joins the committee, taking the place of Senator Kyl. On the Democratic side, Mazie Hirono replaces Senator Kohl.

            Categories: Uncategorized     Comments

              This Breitbart.com column says so:

              According to the FBI annual crime statistics, the number of murders committed annually with hammers and clubs far outnumbers the number of murders committed with a rifle.... [For instance, i]n 2005, the number of murders committed with a rifle was 445, while the number of murders committed with hammers and clubs was 605....

              I’m not sure this is right, for a simple reason: The FBI statistics also include “Firearms, type not stated,” which suggests that not all rifle homicides are labeled as such in the FBI data:

              Weapons 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
              Total 14,965 15,087 14,916 14,224 13,636
              Total firearms: 10,158 10,225 10,129 9,528 9,146
                 Handguns 7,565 7,836 7,398 6,800 6,452
                 Rifles 445 438 453 380 348
                 Shotguns 522 490 457 442 418
                 Other guns 138 107 116 81 94
                 Firearms, type not stated 1,488 1,354 1,705 1,825 1,834
              Knives or cutting instruments 1,920 1,830 1,817 1,888 1,825
              Blunt objects (clubs, hammers, etc.) 608 618 647 603 611
              Personal weapons (hands, fists, feet, etc.) 905 841 869 875 801
              Poison 9 12 10 9 6
              Explosives 2 1 1 11 2
              Fire 125 117 131 85 99
              Narcotics 46 48 52 34 45
              Drowning 20 12 12 16 8
              Strangulation 118 137 134 89 121
              Asphyxiation 96 106 109 87 77
              Other weapons or weapons not stated 958 1,140 1,005 999 895

              It thus seems that local law enforcement reports about 13-20% of all gun homicides to the FBI without indicating what the gun type is — likely because this isn’t clear to the coroner (e.g., the wound was made by a bullet that could have been fired either from a rifle or a handgun) and the crime hasn’t been solved, or perhaps just because the police department doesn’t bother to provide the gun type data even if it knows it. We don’t know what fraction of these homicides involved rifles, but it seems unlikely that the fraction is 0%. If we assume that 5% of the homicides involved rifles (following the breakdown between known handgun homicides and known rifle homicides), then blunt object homicides would still exceed rifle homicides. If it’s 20%, for instance if handgun homicides are more likely to be provably identified as such, but rifle homicides are more likely to seem ambiguous, then rifle homicides would exceed blunt object homicides.

              The Breitbart.com article briefly acknowledges the uncategorized guns problem, without noting its magnitude: “While the FBI makes is clear that some of the ‘murder by rifle’ numbers could be adjusted up slightly, when you take into account murders with non-categorized types of guns, it does not change the fact that their annual reports consistently show more lives are taken each year with these blunt objects than are taken with Feinstein’s dreaded rifle.” But the FBI’s reports don’t show this, because they don’t actually give a count of rifle murders — they give a lower bound for such murders (the cell labeled rifles) and an upper bound (the cell labeled rifles, added to the cell labeled “Firearms, type not stated”), and we don’t know exactly where the actual rifle murder count falls.

              In any event, I don’t think one can say with any confidence that rifle murders are less common than blunt object murders. I’m generally skeptical of gun control proposals, whether aimed at handguns or rifles, because I think most such proposals will either have little effect on anyone, or would tend to interfere with self-defense much more than they would interfere with crime. But until we have a better sense of what the “firearms, type not stated” category means, I wouldn’t assume much about rifle murder counts.

              Categories: Guns     Comments

                Now THAT Is A Signing Statement!

                Today the President issued a signing statement regarding H.R. 4310, the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.”

                I haven’t written much on President Obama’s constitutional signing statements recently (those suffering from insomnia, see here here,  here, here, here, and here for examples from 2009-2011), but today’s installment is such a classic of the genre that  I thought it warranted brief comment.

                The signing statement is noteworthy in a few respects.  It runs 1,173 words, and by my count mentions 21 provisions, which is a goodly number.  That is pretty long as far as signing statements go, but it probably reflects in part the length of the bill he was signing.  Things with names like “National Defense Authorization Act” tend to be long, and this was no exception–the bill ran 680 pages.

                The signing statement also explained in unusual detail why he signed a bill he obviously considers flawed:

                Our Constitution does not afford the President the opportunity to approve or reject statutory sections one by one. I am empowered either to sign the bill, or reject it, as a whole. In this case, though I continue to oppose certain sections of the Act, the need to renew critical defense authorities and funding was too great to ignore.

                He then goes category by category explaining his constitutional (and practical) concerns with various provisions.

                The thing I found most noteworthy is that the statement makes what would be classified as a “unitary executive” objection–basically, the legislation interferes with the President’s ability to direct the exercise of discretion by officials within the Executive Branch.  But perhaps prudently, it avoids using that phrase, which tends to provoke a strong visceral reaction among some people:

                Certain provisions in the Act threaten to interfere with my constitutional duty to supervise the executive branch. Specifically, sections 827, 828, and 3164 could be interpreted in a manner that would interfere with my authority to manage and direct executive branch officials. As my Administration previously informed the Congress, I will interpret those sections consistent with my authority to direct the heads of executive departments to supervise, control, and correct employees’ communications with the Congress in cases where such communications would be unlawful or would reveal information that is properly privileged or otherwise confidential. Additionally, section 1034 would require a subordinate to submit materials directly to the Congress without change, and thereby obstructs the traditional chain of command. I will implement this provision in a manner consistent with my authority as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the head of the executive branch.

                This is more developed than his last “unitary executive” objection (“The President has well-established authority to supervise and oversee the executive branch, and to obtain advice in furtherance of this supervisory authority.”), which can be found here.

                The entire signing statement can be found here.  For a fuller (and, I think, generally sensible) discussion of the use of presidential signing statements, see here.

                Categories: Executive Branch     Comments

                  “Surely”

                  Observation: When a judge describes his own conclusion of law as “surely” correct, but then offers no legal authority to back it up, the validity of the judge’s conclusion is almost always very much in doubt.

                  Categories: Uncategorized     Comments

                    Ellen Nakashima of the Washington Post has another ground-breaking article on novel approaches to network defense. I’ve blogged before about honey tokens, deceptive files that leave hackers with false data while flagging the intrusion to defenders.  Nakashima’s article suggests that their use is growing, as other defensive techniques prove ineffective:

                    Brown Printing Co.,...began planting fake data in Web servers to lure hackers into “rabbit holes” in the hopes of frustrating them into giving up. The bait was varied — including bogus user log-ins and passwords and phony system configuration files. Anyone who took it was being watched by Brown, their computer locations tagged and their tactics recorded.

                    “We’re taking the hackers’ strengths and we’re making it their weaknesses,” said Nathan Hosper, a senior information technology officer at Brown. “They get caught up in this cycle of fake information.”

                    So far, so good.  What’s sad is the FBI’s reaction, which will be familiar to those who know how big city police departments view homeowners who use guns to defend themselves:

                    U.S. officials and many security experts caution companies against taking certain steps, such as reaching into a person’s computer to delete stolen data or shutting down third-party servers.

                    Those actions probably would violate federal law, FBI officials said. The bureau also warns that the use of deceptive tactics could backfire — hackers who identify data as bogus may be all the more determined to target the company trying to con them.

                    Actually, I’m being too kind to the FBI.  If you call 911 to report a home invasion, at least the police will send someone to your house who is armed and ready to take on the intruder. (Whether they’ll arrive in time is a different question, leading to the familiar saying, “When seconds count, the police are just minutes away.”)  

                    If you call the FBI to report a network intrusion, though, you’ll get a stifled yawn and a request to meet with your CEO for relationship building purposes. Given the government’s feeble capabilities against cyberespionage, discouraging corporate self-help is particularly irresponsible.

                    Not everything the bureau said was wrong. Shutting down third party servers probably is illegal under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. In contrast, I doubt that companies are acting unlawfully when they delete their own files from a hackers’ computer, though I recognize that Orin Kerr has a different view, and the Justice Department may be closer to Orin than to me on this. 

                    But I don’t know anyone who thinks that it violates federal law to deploy honeytokens on your own network.  So when FBI officials caution that using deceptive files that way could make you more of a target, they aren’t giving legal advice.  They’re giving “leave it to the FBI” advice, in a field where leaving it to the FBI is a recipe for failure. 

                    Also, I suspect they’re talking through their, uh, hats. In what way will deploying fake files “backfire”?  OK, fake files may not work forever; the hackers may come back and look harder for the real stuff, but is that really a reason not to deploy them? 

                    Let’s perform a thought experiment: In option A, you don’t use fake files, so bad guys who break into your network steal your data.  In option B, you do deploy fake files, so the bad guys steal bad data, and you find out that you’re a target whose current security isn’t sufficient. After that, either the bad guys are fooled by the bad data and they waste time and money acting on it, or they figure out that it’s bad data and they have to go back and find the real data on a system that you’ve had time to harden. And the FBI thinks that option B is the one that might “backfire”?

                    (I recognize that it’s also possible that the hackers will get mad about being fooled and will destroy files or take other retaliatory actions that they wouldn’t take if they got the good stuff right away.  But I’m skeptical. First, that’s a big escalation in tactics that we haven’t seen yet from cyberspies, probably for good reason. Second, that would be astonishing advice from a law enforcement ageny, the equivalent of:  ”Better let these criminals steal you blind; otherwise they might burn down the store” or  “Cooperate with hijackers so they don’t have to kill any hostages” or “Resisting a rapist will only get you beaten, stabbed or shot.” If that’s the FBI’s official position on cybercrime, it means they’ve oficially given up.)

                    Categories: Uncategorized     Comments

                      The General Assembly’s recognition of Palestine as a state (which I’ve discussed previously) is widely regard as having the central upshot of facilitating a case against Israeli officials in the International Criminal Court. Indeed, Prime Minister Abbas has already threatened such action in regard to Israeli settlements – which are said to constitute an unlawful “deportation or transfer” of Israeli civilians into occupied territory.

                      Yet the GA’s recognition of Palestine’s statehood does not establish that the Israeli civilian population centers are “on its territory,” a basic requirement for ICC jurisdiction, as I explain today in a post an the European Journal of International Law’s blog. Here is part of it:

                      The mere fact of Israeli occupation does not make the territory part of Palestinian sovereign borders... the dominant interpretation of the Geneva Conventions is that an “occupation” can arise even in an area that is not the territory of any state. Yet even if Israel is an occupying power throughout the West Bank for the purposes of substantive humanitarian law, this does not establish that settlement activity occurs “on the territory” of the Palestinian state.

                      To put it differently, even if violating the Geneva-based norm of transfer need not take place in the territory of a state, it still must be “on the territory” of a state for the ICC to have jurisdiction, as the ICC exercises delegated territorial jurisdiction. This is consistent with the respective roles of the Geneva Conventions and the ICC. The Conventions, which have near universal adherence, are interpreted broadly because of a desire to not have gaps in coverage. With the ICC, which has a limited and particular jurisdiction, gaps in jurisdictional coverage are inherent.

                      I am working on a longer article on the jurisdictional issues that would be raised by a Palestinian referall of the settlements issues, which will discuss the question of gravity, and the implications of such case for other potential ICC situations, like Cyprus/Turkey, or Georgia/Russia.

                      Tags: , , ,

                      “Congress, apparently, couldn’t end the year without showering billions on a handful of interest groups, some of which you probably didn’t even know existed,” the Washington Post editorializes. the final bill incorporated a Senate measure that extended various corporate tax breaks and a farm bill extension. More from Brad Plumer and Matt Stoller have more and Tim Carney details how this happened.

                      Categories: Public Choice     Comments

                        Drone Memos Can Remain Secret

                        The federal government does not need to disclose the legal opinions and other documents justifying the use of drone to target suspected terrorists overseas, a federal judge ruled this week. As Josh Gerstein reports, the ACLU and New York Times had sought their release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). While Judge Colleen McMahon noted there were “legitimate reasons” to question the legality of the use of drone strikes for targeted killings overseas, and thought disclosure of the legal rationale relied upon by the administration would further public debate on the use of drones, she concluded the relevant documents were lawfully withheld under FOIA. While I, like many others, would like to see the relevant memos, Judge McMahon’s opinion is likely correct.

                        Rafaella Wakeman and Robert Chesney comment at the Lawfare blog.

                        Governing Online Spaces:  Virtual Representation

                        David R. Johnson, David G. Post, & Marc Rotenberg

                          ”The introduction of this new principle of representative democracy has rendered useless almost everything written before on the structure of government . . .”

                        Thomas Jefferson, August 1816

                        Facebook recently terminated its commitment to hold a vote on all policy changes that received comments from thirty percent or more of users. In defense of the move, it explained that the system encouraged quantity rather than quality of comments; some defenders of the move also have pointed out that reaching the requisite minimum number, on a platform with almost a billion users, was impossible to achieve in any event.

                        We believe that this presents an opportunity to rethink the ways that meaningful participation by users in the development of policies that will govern large (and arguably essential) online social spaces can be achieved.  In the online world, website policies, incorporated into their Terms of Service (TOS), “regulate” the activities of large numbers of people during increasingly substantial portions of their lives.  In effect, TOS represent a new kind of law – an amalgam of principles borrowed from property law (and a service provider’s right to impose conditions on access to its servers), contract law (although TOS terms are not the result of negotiations or meaningful acceptance by users, and, indeed, most service providers reserve the right to change the terms that users supposedly accept at any time), tort law (although TOS-law doesn’t generally provide for compensation for any injuries), and criminal law (although TOS-law doesn’t provide for due process or impose external sanctions). Terms of Service govern not merely the relationship between individual users and the online service provider, but the relationships among users.  They matter, and they will matter more and more as more and more of our time is spent in online spaces.  The question is: who will make this new kind of law?

                        We believe in the principle of self-governance and self-determination:  that all users have a right to participate in the processes through which the rules by which they will be bound are made.  This principle is today widely accepted throughout the civilized world when applied to formal law-making processes, and we believe it applies with equal force to the new forms of TOS-based rule-making now emerging on the Net.  Facebook’s privacy policies, its data-retention policies, its intellectual property policies, its rules regarding permissible content – all will have a far more substantial impact on the lives of many users than most of the more formal Law to which those users are subject. It is reasonable for users to demand that those policy-making procedures comport with this fundamental principle, and it is in the interests of service provides to find some reasonable mechanism to implement it.

                        Some will argue that users need not and should not be given any voice in the development of website policies because they can simply express their preferences through their ability to choose among competing sites. We certainly agree that the market can and does serve as a significant and largely effective check on the ability of website operators to impose arbitrary or unreasonable conditions on user activity. But markets are never perfect; in some contexts – Facebook being a prime, though not the only, example – switching is extremely costly for users, many of whom have invested substantial amounts of time and effort in organizing their own experience at the site and are understandably reluctant to have to repeat that investment elsewhere. Users are not exactly “trapped” on Facebook’s platform, but their ability to switch is severely constrained [see Google+], and to that extent the market is both an ineffective check on Facebook and an imperfect reflection of user preferences and values. Moreover, the positive network effects associated with social sites distorts the market for such sites even further, by making user exit to sites with smaller numbers of participants an even less viable alternative (and an even less effective check on the policies of the incumbent sites).

                        We propose that Facebook implement a system of virtual representation, whereby every Facebook user would be given the ability to grant a proxy to anyone who has volunteered to act on his/her behalf in policy discussions with Facebook management. These proxy grants could be made, revoked, or changed at any time, at the convenience of the user. Those seeking proxies would presumably announce their general views, proposals, platforms, and positions. Anyone receiving some minimum number of proxies would be entitled to participate in discussions with management — and their views would presumably carry more or less weight depending upon the number of users they could claim to represent.

                        This scheme serves the interests both of Facebook and of Facebook users, giving the former a far more reliable guide to user preferences and user values than it has under the current scheme, and giving the latter the opportunity to have their voices heard – indirectly, to be sure, but with appropriate weight, and potentially with great effect – in the development of Facebook policies that affect their experience at the site and their interactions with other users.

                        Virtual Representation Would be Good for Users

                        It is, we recognize, entirely unrealistic to expect large numbers of users, with busy lives and many other competing priorities, to delve deeply into arcane questions regarding the Terms of Service of increasingly complex social networking sites.  It is equally absurd to imagine a sensible and truly deliberative discourse emerging out of the hundred million or so people who might actually care about any particular Facebook policy alternative placed before them.

                        But these are problems that we have confronted and solved before, through the 18th century invention of representation and representative democracy. As Alexander Hamilton and James Madison (writing as “Publius”) noted in The Federalist over 200 years ago, “representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election” was one of the principles that was “now well understood” (i.e., in the late 1700s) but “either not known at all, or imperfectly known, to the ancients.” A method of designating individual representatives for large numbers of citizens was the only way, Publius (and others) realized, that democratic governance could scale over large territories and large populations like the newly-independent United States.  It was, in Publius’ words again, a “powerful means by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.”

                        Our proposal updates the principle of representation for the global network, and we believe that it constitutes an important step towards development of a mechanism for scaling up democratic principles and democratic institutions on a truly global basis.  There is no longer any need for Facebook to make the difficult determination, UN-style, of how many representatives any particular interest group or geographic region “deserves”; let the users decide.  Giving users the freedom to allocate, or re-allocate, their proxies at any time obviates the need to schedule synchronous “election days” when everyone has to find his/her way to a polling place.  Unlike specially timed elections among competing candidates, a rolling proxy designation mechanism would allow non-activist users to be involved in (indirectly) shaping TOS policy at their own convenience. This would allow more moderate voices to be more fully reflected in the discussion. Extremists, who currently participate in Facebook policy forums on equal footing with all other users, will be (appropriately) marginalized if their views are unable to gain the support of large numbers of users. Ambitious would-be representatives would have an incentive to crystallize the issues, and to promote themselves as standing for particular points of view. Advocacy groups might find it in their interest to promote individual candidates for such a representative role, because showing up with a binder full of proxies would make it more likely that the company would listen to their suggestions.  The need for those seeking proxy designations to reach out to the broadest possible audience would help to assure that all interests were represented and the extreme positions could be put into perspective. This mechanism would also allow representation of user viewpoints on a global basis; users could make their views known from any location, and designation of representatives could proceed from discussions in any language. Users around the globe could take some comfort in the realization that their diverse values would, to some appropriate extent, be taken into account.

                        Virtual Representation Would be Good for Facebook

                        Facebook, like most benevolent dictators, might have doubts about the wisdom of giving users the power to govern (even in part) their own affairs; it might fear that any mechanism for user involvement would give disproportionate power to extremists and activists pursuing their own parochial agendas; and it might fear that it would become somehow obligated to take actions that disserve its shareholders or even the bulk of users themselves. Facebook might argue that it already has adequate incentives to make its product as valuable as possible, and that its users are always free to migrate elsewhere.

                        But Facebook is both a product and a polity. While it has an ordinary producer-consumer relationship, mediated and constrained by its TOS, with each of its users, its power and its success derive from its ability to empower users to form relationships among themselves, relationships that are also mediated and constrained by those TOS rules.  Making good policies for complex social networks requires thoughtful tradeoffs among many competing values; the only way to get a sense for how most of the affected users would make those tradeoffs is to ask them, or to ask some small group of active users who can be counted upon to reflect the perspectives of the larger group.

                        An online polity that is experiencing some success in governing its own affairs would be less likely to desert en masse for another platform.  Really dumb mistakes, like sudden actions that defeat user expectations of privacy, would be less likely to occur and more quickly remediable when they do occur.  Users, possessing a degree of participation in policy-formation procedures, couldn’t blame any rule they object to entirely on The Man.

                        Facebook’s compliance with the clearly expressed will of the online polity would also surely help to keep real-space regulators at bay .Facebook now confronts a need to comply with a complex array of local regulations, reflecting a diverse set of values articulated by local governments around the globe. Those won’t entirely go away. But the pressures to pass local regulations would diminish if Facebook itself could credibly claim to have a mechanism that produces TOS policies that reflect the views of its entire global polity. Many governments are happy to defer to self-regulation if their is some evidence that the regulated are satisfied with the results and are mostly making rules that govern themselves rather than pushing negative externalities and costs onto others. The TOS rules that guide user interactions primarily affect the way that users interact with one another. If users can be shown to be satisfied with the rules, and have a chance to influence them, it will be easier to persuade local governments to step back from aggressive efforts to shape and constrain Facebook products and services.

                        We are not (yet) suggesting that Facebook change its TOS to provide that it must adopt whatever policy a majority of representatives favor.  Such a provision would, we recognize, pose a difficult conflict with the fiduciary obligation of the corporate directors to act in the interest of the company’s shareholders. But providing a mechanism to distill and discern the strong and concentrated views of large numbers of users, even by indirect means, is perfectly consistent with corporate self-interest, and does not pose any such conflict.

                        Adopting an innovative mechanism for virtual representation would place Facebook at the forefront of public spirited innovation in Internet governance. By affirming that its users constitute a true polity entitled to some measure of self-government, Facebook would gain the “high ground” in the governance debates, avoiding the need to constantly defend itself against the negative reactions engendered by its seemingly arbitrary changes in policy. Other important online sites might follow suit, perhaps even using mechanisms for proxy-identification and proxy-allocation provided by Facebook itself. Over time, Facebook might be viewed as a founding parent of global online democracy — quite an improvement over its current image as an unaccountable, all-too-powerful, not-so-loved, 18th century monarch.

                        Conclusion

                        Representative democracy is not perfect. But we believe it is the best available alternative. It would be relatively cheap to implement – indeed, it would likely be a relatively simple task for Facebook itself to make an app available to all users for the purpose of facilitating the designation of representatives and the allocation of proxies.  The personal investment of time and effort by a small number of people who have incentives to become able to claim (accurately, for a change) that they “represent” the views of large numbers of users, would lead to more constructive discussions and better decisions on what the TOS ought to say and how it should be implemented.

                        Lots could go wrong, there are many unanswered questions, and implementation will undoubtedly prove to be more complicated than it might appear at the outset.  But that has always been true when facing the challenge of creating new governance structures for new situations.  The time for thinking more creatively about how to set the rules that regulate important online communities has arrived.

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                          Annals of Crime

                          The estimable Gene Weingarten of the Washington Post has written a wonderful article about the Jeffrey MacDonald murder case (the subject, originally, of Joe McGinniss’ “Fatal Vision,” and, more recently Errol Morris’ “A Wilderness of Error.”  It’s an extraordinary case — The McGinniss book, which I read when it first came out some 30 years ago, is simply one of the greatest true crime books every written, right up there with Capote’s In Cold Blood and Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song.  Morris thinks that MacDonald was railroaded and wrongly convicted — Weingarten explains very, very persuasively why that’s a lot of bunk.  Highly recommended.

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