Homeland Security Watch

The September issue of the Emerging Infectious Diseases includes a policy review that assesses variability in state plans to contain pandemic influenza. The report reviewed 49 of 50 states’ pandemic influenza plans (Lousiana was the only state without one on the web), and focused on three key areas: vaccination, surveillance & detection, and containment measures. Although the report describes variability in the first two areas, containment strategies–such as legal and practical plans for quarantine–showed the most marked heterogeneity:

…confusion and lack of specificity exist in these posted state plans in proposing practical containment measures in the community.

The authors, all from the Research Triangle Institute International (RTII), make helpful recommendations to fill this gap:

Several practical nonpharmaceutical containment steps need to be considered. For example, only approximately one third of the state plans are explicitly considering recommending self-isolation of adults with influenzalike symptoms and keeping children with such symptoms home from school and daycare. Even in this increasingly computer-based economy, in which a considerable percentage of persons can work from home most of the time, this simple stratagem is not addressed in most state plans. Other simple recommendations for use in the community, such as avoiding mass gatherings; shopping on off hours; and household and workplace strategies such as frequent hand washing, avoiding handshaking, and keeping towels separate, are often neglected in state plans.

We should remember that health officials who fought against the spread of SARS in 2003 used extensive exposure control measures, including restrictions on mass gatherings and voluntary home quarantines. Many officials credited such measures as important to slowing disease spread, including CDC director Julie Gerberding. And a Harvard survey of Toronto citizens impacted by SARS demonstrates that the public is not as allergic to the idea as many think. Creative solutions, such as Singapore attention to workforce issues and Hong Kong’s guidance for business and special needs groups, should be thoughtfully considered.

The RTII researchers suggest lack of federal guidance and gaps in epidemiological knowledge as primary reasons for variable state plans, and recommend a revision of the national pandemic influenza plan. Such a revised plan should pay close attention to exposure controls like isolation, quarantine, community restrictions, and other practical containment measures.

A quick post from the road. Be sure to check out this story from Chuck McCutcheon at Newhouse News headlined “Crumbling Infrastructure Worries Homeland Security Experts,” which quotes from a post that I wrote a few weeks ago. The story covers what I think is an interesting issue, and one to which Congress is paying increased attention as of late.

The George Washington University’s National Security Archive posted earlier this monththe full transcripts of the 9-11 air traffic control recordings, as well as detailed flight paths for three of the four hijacked airplanes. The documents, released by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on a FOIA request, were previously summarized in the 9/11 Commission Report. However, there are some minor differences–and certainly additional detail–to be found in the text:

For example, the NTSB transcript differs slightly from the Commission’s text of the warning that United Airlines Flight 93 received only minutes before the hijackers attacked. At 9:23am, the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) shows a text message to Flight 93 reading: “BEWARE OF ANY COCKPIT INTROUSION [sic]. TWO AIRCRAFT IN NY, HIT TRADE CNTER BUILDS [sic].” Five minutes later at 9:28am Flight 93 was sending the message “***(mayday)*** (hey get out of here) ***” as it was being hijacked.

The Flight Path Studies reconstruct the routes of American Airlines Flight 11, American Airlines Flight 77 and United Airlines Flight 175. Complied from recorded radar data and information from the Flight Data Recorders, the studies’ illustrations of radar ground tracks, maps and altitude profiles provide graphic guides to each hijacking and were used by the NTSB to determine the takeover points where the hijackers gained control of the planes.

For a reference point, you can access the first chapter of the 9/11 Commission Report here.

Looks like I’ll be holding down the fort from the US. I also am glad to be on board – thanks to Christian for including me.

Building on Dan’s commentary in the previous post, it’s noteworthy that UK Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly unveiled today a new Commission on Integration and Cohesion to start work in September. As described by the BBC, the commission is designed to “establish common values across society” and will tour the UK to better understand the economic and social gaps that exist between different ethnic groups. According to BBC:

…its work will include examining the fight against extremist ideas amid concerns from some Muslim leaders that they are not receiving enough help in combating the growth of radicalisation.

Muslim communities have been divided since the London bombings over how best to address radical movements associated with extremism, with some saying there is a small but serious problem and others denying terrorism is linked to Islamist thinking.

The commission is designed to carry on some of the research that followed riots in northern towns in 2001. Following that violence, experts warned the government some communities were leading “parallel lives” with little or no contact with each other.

In the wake of this month’s aviation plot, the commission will undoubtedly be pressed to provide recommendations to address the phenomenon of European extremism, which terrorism experts like Peter Bergen believe to be one of the “most pressing threats to America from al Qaeda.”

Like Christian, I’m headed to Europe for several weeks. Unfortunately, it’s conferences and meetings for me, and not vacation.

Harboring some worries about my scheduled return flight from Europe on the five year anniversary of 9/11, my first guest post is on the UK airline bomb plot and addressing Islamic radicalization in Europe.

I hope to post more from abroad. Glad to be on board.

Had the recent bomb plot against U.S.-bound flights from the U.K succeeded, it would have been the most spectacular terrorist attack since 9/11. It also would have been a brazen taunt to U.S. authorities: No matter what you do to protect airplanes, they are still not safe. Thwarting this latest attack was a huge law enforcement and intelligence success. But five years after 9/11, the plot also confirms that we have moved into a new stage in the war on terrorism, one that will require more tools than the military, law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security solutions that have dominated our efforts to-date.

Islamic extremists’ fascination with airplanes has not abated, despite the nearly $20 billion we’ve spent since 9/11 to make them harder targets. Airplanes are ready-made for human casualties. They fit the bill for spectacular theater. And, Al Qaeda also places a premium on inflicting significant economic damage.

The often overlooked aspect of terrorists’ aviation fascination is that intercontinental air travel is a shining symbol of globalization. While many view the forces or modernization, mobility, and interdependence as forces of positive change, reaction against those forces feeds Bin Laden’s radicalism as well as the growing disaffection of segments of Europe’s indigenous Muslim youth, the young men behind the London transit bombings and this latest plot. In the reactionary worldview, globalization is an engine of western imperialism and injustice.

Arguably though, Bin Laden himself is a product of the globalizing trend, the son of a wealthy Saudi businessman and educated in engineering and business. Similarly, many of the 9/11 bombers were western-educated with technical and law degrees. As with the London transit bombings, many of these most-recent plotters were second-generation Pakistanis born and raised in UK. The westernized children are more radical than their first-generation immigrant parents. No irony is lost on the fact that the intended bombing paraphernalia included i-Pods and Gatorade bottles – two other icons of global capitalism.

The susceptibility of indigenous Muslim communities in Europe to terrorist radicalization is a vexing problem that will last for more than a generation. How do you prevent the alienation of young men from societies into which they were born? How do you counter or defuse the deep antipathy toward the U.S. that results from our foreign policy in the Arabic and Muslim world? How do you increase intelligence and law enforcement scrutiny of Muslims in Europe without fueling radicalism or alienating the overwhelming majority of law-abiding Muslim citizens?

Solutions will require patience and perseverance from societies that want security now. They will also require a greater engagement by “white” Europe of a “brown” Europe that it has traditionally tolerated but which it has never integrated. Policies must obviously include improving education, increasing economic opportunities, and bettering relations with police. At the same time, Muslims themselves must do more to turn their own against extremism. This is harder said than done, though: European Muslims who have cooperated with their governments have often lost credibility in their communities.

America’s war on terrorism has resorted to military solutions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Away from the hot wars, the counter-terrorism fight is banking on law enforcement, intelligence, and technology for its success: detect and prevent plots before they happen. As terrorist cells increasingly reflect autonomous and home-grown risks, however, it is unrealistic to think that detection and prevention will always succeed.

As we approach the fifth anniversary of 9/11, the United States and its allies must develop a strategy to defuse the threat of a “Eurabian” fifth column, extremists within European immigrant communities bent on attacking their own countrymen.

The military, intelligence, technology, and aggressive police work are the right tools against the symptoms of terrorism, but do little to address terrorism’s root causes. While tough-on-terror politicians scoff at “softer” tools, education, outreach, and better economic opportunities are the right counterweight to radicalizing influences. If we are serious about waging and winning the long war on terrorism we must bring every possible tool to bear. Our political leaders need to realize that while hammers are essential, all problems are not nails.

Daniel B. Prieto is Senior Fellow and Director of the Homeland Security Center at the Reform Institute. Previously, he was Research Director of the Homeland Security Partnership Initiative at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

I’ve posted nearly 1,000 times on this site in the last nine months, so I’m ready for a vacation, and am leaving town later today. I’m going to be out-of-pocket for the next two weeks, returning to DC on September 10th. I’m going to do my best to stay away from the blog during that time, although I might sneak in a post or two from an internet cafe. The previous post this morning contains the homeland security events list through the period of time that I’m away.

While I’m out, I’m turning over the site to two guest contributors, who will be posting as much or as little as they want under their own bylines.

The first is Kate Phillips, a former colleague of mine in the Homeland Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Kate studied molecular biology at Princeton and will be finishing her master’s degree next spring (attention potential employers!) at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. She’s expert on a range of homeland security issues – bioterrorism, risk assessment, aviation security, etc. – and I predict that she will become Secretary of Homeland Security sometime in the mid-2020′s. You can reach her at this address if you would like to provide suggestions or feedback on any posts.

The second is Dan Prieto, a Senior Fellow at the Reform Institute, a centrist think tank here in the DC area. Dan worked previously on homeland security issues at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and as a professional staff member on the House Homeland Security Committee. He’s been a Council on Foreign Relations fellow and was an associate member of the Markle Task Force on National Security, among other prior affiliations. You can read his full bio here.

Both of them will have an open invitation to continue to post after I return. Although by no means do I expect to slow down my posting at the time – I should return tanned, relaxed and ready to bang out the next thousand posts.

Below is a list of homeland security policy events in the DC area over the next two weeks (as well as the occasional listing outside of DC), extended in this one instance through the period of time that I’m on vacation. You can always find current and previous postings under the “Events” category tab at right. And please note that many events require prior invitations and/or RSVPs.

In addition to the events mentioned below, the Families of September 11 website has a comprehensive list of commemorative activities and memorials around the country related to the fifth anniversary of 9/11.

8/29: Mississippi College Law Review symposium on Hurricane Katrina and its impact. Jackson, MS.
8/30: Avisian Identity in Government event on “Securing our First Response: FIPS-201 Products aid in disaster recovery.” National Press club, 7:30am.
9/6-9/7: Fifth North American Cargo Security Forum. Washington Hilton.
9/6-9/8: Pace University ‘Aftershock’ conference on “Rethinking the Future Since September 11, 2001.” New York City.
9/6-9/8: ICAO Symposium on Machine Readable Travel Documents. Montreal, Canada.
9/6-9/8: Technologies for Critical Incident Preparedness conference. Atlanta, GA.
9/7: Manhattan Institute event on “First Preventers: The Role of Law Enforcement in the War on Terror.” Roosevelt Hotel, NYC, 8:30am.
9/7: Wilson Center event with Bruce Hoffman on “Five Years After 9/11: Terrorism Trends and Implications.” 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, 4pm.
9/7: RAND Policy Forum with Brian Michael Jenkins on his new book “Unconquerable Nation.” 1200 South Hayes St., Arlington, 6pm.
9/8: AEI event on “Five Years Later: A Progress Report on U.S. Security Post-9/11.” 1150 17th St NW, 9am.
9/8: Cato Institute event on “The War on Terrorism Five Years after 9/11.” 1000 Massachusetts Ave NW, 9:30am.
9/10-9/12: 2006 Water Security Congress. Omni Shoreham Hotel, DC.
9/10: Discovery Channel special with Ted Koppel on “The Price of Security”, 8pm.
9/11: Radford University Homeland Security Conference. Radford, VA.
9/11: RAND Congressional Luncheon with Brian Michael Jenkins on his new book “Unconquerable Nation.” Location TBA, 12 noon.

(Please e-mail me if you have suggestions about additions to this list for this week, or future weeks).

Last Friday the Congressional Budget Office released their cost estimate for the Senate’s immigration and border security bill, S. 2611. The CBO estimates that the bill would increase direct spending on discretionary programs (assuming that authorized funding is appropriated) by $33 billion from 2007-2011, and $78 billion from 2012-2016, largely for border security activities. They also estimate that it would increase direct spending (i.e. for health, social services, Social Security) by $16 billion from 2007-2011, and $48 billion from 2012-2016. These latter costs assumed in the Senate bill derive from expected increases in outlays of benefits to people who are now illegally in the country (and are already paying many types of taxes) but cannot today receive certain federal benefits.

By contrast, CBO estimated that the House bill, H.R. 4437, would cost only $1.9 billion over the 2006-2010 period, although that estimate is somewhat deceiving. This estimate is for the manager’s amendment, not the final bill that passed the House after dozens of amendments were added to it. The estimate is for the authorization of certain border security and enforcement programs, and does not include any authorized funding for additional Border Patrol and construction along the border.

A Northwest Airlines flight from Schiphol airport in Amsterdam to Mumbai returned to Schiphol shortly after takeoff today, as the result of suspicious behavior by twelve people on the flight, who were using cell phones onboard, passing them among themselves, and disobey flight attendants during an early stage of the flight. The flight returned with F-16 escort and the 12 individuals are currently detained in accordance with Dutch law. No word yet on the identities of the 12 individuals and whether this is connected at all to terrorism (I’ve checked Dutch language sources in addition to English ones), and this could be nothing, but given the circumstances, it sounds like the authorities in the Netherlands acted appropriately.

Update (8/24): No link to terrorism.

The Department of Homeland Security issued a press release today detailing the results of border security activities over the past few months. The document is an improvement upon earlier press releases on this topic, in that it provides statistical context for some of its statements, for example, regarding ‘catch and release’:

– 99% Apprehended Now Being Detained For Return. In the week of August 7-13, 2006, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehended 1055 non-Mexican illegal aliens at the Southern border, and released only 7 non-Mexican illegal aliens.

– Last Year Only 34% Detained. This year’s detention numbers are a dramatic improvement. For comparison, in January of this year, the number of apprehensions was significantly higher, and DHS was only able to detain half of the non-Mexican illegal aliens arrested. At this time last year, the detention rate was 34% of all non-Mexican illegal aliens apprehended.

This press statement is closely timed with Sec. Chertoff’s trip to Texas later this week, during which he will tour the border and speak at the Border Governors Conference in Austin on Thursday. It also comes as Congress prepares to return to DC to try to salvage the border bill, perhaps via a compromise such as the Pence-Hutchison plan. But given the political dynamics of the 2006 races (which discourage compromise in both parties), the persistent gap between the Senate and House on the issues, and the incendiary tone of the House’s theatric field hearings this month, the chances of passing a bill have significantly diminished in the last few weeks.

The Congressional Research Service issued a new report that looks at the definition, scope, and characteristics of homeland security intelligence (HSINT). It’s available for the first time on the Internet here at Homeland Security Watch:

RL33616: Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches, August 18, 2006

The report attempts to address a question that hasn’t been fully answered yet: what do we really mean by “homeland security intelligence”? Is it a new intelligence discipline? Is it instead simply a constituency within the intelligence community? Or is it instead something new, that doesn’t easily conform to earlier intelligence paradigms, and requires new means of interaction and control?

The author of the report, Todd Masse, offers three potential ways to frame thinking about homeland security intelligence: (1) a geographic approach, i.e. focusing on where collection takes place; (2) a structural/statutory approach, focusing on who is doing the collecting; and (3) a holistic approach, that does not have formally delineated borders. About this final approach, Masse writes:

The approach recognizes no borders and is neither “top down” nor “bottom up.” It involves and values equally information collected by the U.S. private sector owners of national critical infrastructure, intelligence related to national security collected by federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers, as well as the traditional “Ints” collected by statutory members of the IC. It involves strategic and tactical intelligence designed to prevent attacks on the U.S. homeland, as well as highly tactical and event-driven information coordination that must take place in response to a terrorist attack or national disaster. Yet such an approach also implies a level of information sharing between federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector information collection entities that does not appear to exist currently.

….Under the holistic approach, the HSINT community might include the 16 statutory members of the IC (as each collects national intelligence, or intelligence related to national security which could have a profound impact on homeland security); the National Counterterrorism, National Counterintelligence, National Counter Proliferation, and Open Source Intelligence Centers; the 14 existing private sector Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, scores of state and local law enforcement entities charged with gathering criminal intelligence, numerous state and regional “intelligence fusion” centers, and federal entities with law enforcement responsibilities which may collect intelligence related to national security. This holistic approach implies an interdependency between the diverse players of the statutory IC and the broader HSINT Community.

Building these interdependencies needs to be one of the most important objectives for our national security today. Unfortunately progress has been halting over the last five years, although I think the intelligence community has started to turn the corner within the last year. Organizations like the NCTC, the ISE office, and the many state/local fusion centers are gradually leading to a more interdependent HSINT community. But these efforts will be insufficient without a deep commitment to cultural change (tied to pay and promotion) in the intelligence community, one that eschews classification except when absolutely necessary (to allow rapid sharing with non-federal sources), promotes collaboration, and encourages information-sharing rather than information-hoarding.

Overall, a very thoughtful piece from CRS. And as always, the full Homeland Security Watch collection of CRS reports is available here.

Wired Magazine has a story today on a $12,000 nuclear detector built by a group of volunteer researchers in San Francisco:

Here on the San Francisco Bay, a group of do-it-yourself volunteer researchers are not waiting for the mushroom cloud. They say they are close to perfecting a portable device that could do much the same thing right now, for total out-of-pocket costs of about $12,000.

The group, led by physicist and Sandia Lab weapons subcontractor Stanley Glaros, says it has already built a boat-mounted scanner with off-the-shelf parts that might reliably spot radiation spikes in containerships at sea from a kilometer away. The team’s detector has been up and running for eight months, and the group plans to publish its test findings in the Review of Scientific Instruments.

“Can we detect hazardous material at a distance?” said Glaros. “Yes, easily.”

….the team is now testing a homemade detector based on a 4-inch by 4-inch by 16-inch sodium iodide crystal, custom grown by Saint Gobain, a subsidiary of Compagnie de Saint-Gobain headquartered in Paris, France. It is the same technology used in many monitors currently deployed at ports around the country. It will also be used in most of the new Advanced Spectroscopic Portals being purchased by DHS.

“The crystal is like Frodo’s sword,” explained a Glaros collaborator. “It starts to glow when the bad stuff’s around, kind of a blue fluorescence.”

Faced with a large-crystal scanner, terrorists would find it extremely difficult to hide 10 kilograms of Uranium 235, the amount needed to construct a first-generation Chinese- or Pakistani-designed weapon. To shield it, a terrorist “would have to get a shit load of lead bricks and put the source inside,” said Glaros. Theoretically, the device could also detect a Soviet era plutonium fueled suitcase bomb.

The article provides additional details on how this system works, and discusses the challenges about how to respond to a positive indication from a detector. If this system can do what it claims, then it’s something that DHS should consider for deployment on other vessels, essentially as a small “side bet” as part of its broader portfolio of intended nuclear detection capabilities.

As a response to the UK terror plot, the Science & Technology directorate of DHS posted this request for information on FedBizOpps.gov today:

In support of the ongoing effort by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DoD), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the DOE National Laboratories and the commercial sector, it is DHS’s goal to investigate any and all potential detection technologies that may assist in the identification of explosive and flammable liquids.

In order to exhaust the list of technologies that are already being investigated and to enhance the opportunities for non-traditional vendors, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of DHS is seeking potential sources of Bottle Screening Devices capable of detecting and distinguishing explosive and flammable liquids from benign liquids (drinks, lotions, hygiene products, contact lens solutions, etc.).

The anticipated application of these devices is screening bottles or other containers at passenger checkpoints, which will require the devices to have a 200 bottle per hour minimum throughput and must meet a minimum technology readiness level (TRL) of 5 or greater. This means that the basic technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so it can be tested in a simulated environment….

The deadline for the RFI is September 12th.

The New York Times has an important story today on the issue of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) and the role that it can play as a data input into the aviation screening system, in the wake of the foiled UK terror plot. The proposals discussed in the story seem to go beyond the currently-planned uses of PNR data, envisioning a broader system of data analysis using the PNR information, perhaps with a direct hook into the major Computerized Reservation Systems (e.g. Sabre, Galileo, Amadeus) that are the core information nodes of the global travel system:

A proposal by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff would allow the United States government not only to look for known terrorists on watch lists, but also to search broadly through the passenger itinerary data to identify people who may be linked to terrorists, he said in a recent interview.

Similarly, European leaders are considering seeking access to this same database, which contains not only names and addresses of travelers, but often their credit card information, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers and related hotel or car reservations.

….“Ideally, I would like to know, did Mohamed Atta get his ticket paid on the same credit card,” Mr. Chertoff said, citing the lead hijacker of the 2001 plots. “That would be a huge thing. And I really would like to know that in advance, because that would allow us to identify an unknown terrorist.”

Would there be direct security benefits from this type of analysis? Absolutely. Will the privacy loss from this outweigh its benefit? That depends, based upon different individual and national privacy values (and some people would object to the concept of even quantifying this). Are there ways to do this that are less invasive in terms of individual privacy? Definitely, including data anonymization and a system where individual countries and the reservation systems conduct data analysis themselves and share only the ‘hits’ against common watch list and indicators databases, without having to share the full stream of unwashed PNR data.

Update (8/23): More on this issue from Ryan Singel at 27BStroke6.

From the Guardian this afternoon:

Eleven of the 24 people arrrested in connection with the alleged aircraft bomb plot are to face charges, the Crown Prosecution Service announced today.

At a joint press conference, the head of the Metropolitan police’s anti-terrorist branch, revealed that investigations had found bomb making equipment, the chemical hydrogen peroxide and a number of “martyrdom” videos.

Deputy assistant commissioner Peter Clarke said police also had “highly significant” surveillance that would be used in evidence against the suspects.

Eight of the eleven have been charged with two offences of conspiracy to murder and a new offence of preparing acts of terrorism contrary to section five of the Terrorism Act 2006.

The other three have been charged with other offences under the Terrorism Act 2000.

The CPS said 11 others are still in custody and a woman has been released.

Here’s the link to the official release from the Crown Prosecution Service on the charges.