POST
Clark Lombardi, Nathan J. Brown
Thursday, December 13, 2012
If a student of constitutional texts sat down to read the
draft Egyptian constitution from beginning to end, he or she would find much of
it familiar -- the language, structure, and institutions would seem to bear
resemblances to constitutions in many other countries, even if the particular
choices made or terms used were products of domestic political debates. He or
she might pause at Article 4, promising that al-Ahzar will be consulted in
matters of Islamic law. But the observer would likely be totally flummoxed upon
arriving at Article 219, defining the principles of the Islamic sharia in
technical terms from the Islamic legal tradition not used outside of scholarly
circles: there has been nothing quite like this language adopted anywhere else.
What does this mysterious clause say? How did it get there? And what impact
would it have? These are three important questions, but each is more difficult
to answer than the previous one. Read More »
POST
Jerome M. Segal
Wednesday, December 12, 2012
The Arab League Ministerial Council that convened in Doha
Sunday to review the Arab Peace Initiative and reevaluate the peace process
concluded without any decisive action. Qatar's Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim
al-Thani maintained that the initiative would "not be on offer for
ever." Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas objected saying, "It is
not permissible to talk about sidelining the Arab Peace Initiative. It should
stay." Abbas went on to warn that withdrawal of the initiative could lead
to regional war. From press reports, there is no sign that the ministers
undertook an in-depth evaluation of the initiative itself to better understand
why it has not been successful, or to consider how to revitalize it.
The initiative, adopted by the League of Arab States in
March 2002, was an historic opening that could have made a major contribution
toward resolving the Israeli- Palestinian as well as the Israeli-Arab
conflicts. When the initiative was put forward, Ariel Sharon was Prime Minister
of Israel, and there was no likelihood that the architect of Israel's
settlement policy would agree to the withdrawal to the 1967 lines called for by
the Arab states. The primary audience for the initiative was not the Israeli
government, but the Israeli people. The message to Israelis essentially was: In
the context of a comprehensive peace, with your neighbors and the Palestinians,
the entire Arab world will "consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended"
and "establish normal relations with Israel." Read More »
POST
Lindsay Benstead, Ellen Lust, Dhafer Malouche
Tuesday, December 11, 2012
Just over
a year since Tunisia's October 23, 2011 Constituent Assembly elections, long
lines of patient citizens who emerged beaming from polls last October have
given way to new demonstrations and general strikes -- this time against the Ennahda-led
troika. In the cradle of the Arab uprising, Tunisians are deeply frustrated
with the economic and political failure of the government. Today, nearly half
of Tunisians feel they are worse off than they were before the revolution, and
only 26 percent believe their situation has improved. Despite this, however, our
original survey of 1,200 Tunisians conducted between October 10 and November 20
finds reason for optimism.
Tunisia's
problems run deep. A December 1 New
York Times article, written in the wake of uprisings in the Tunisian
town of Siliana in November that led to a five-day stand-off with the
government, chronicles the problems: unemployment is up from 13 to 18 percent
since the fall of former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, youth increasingly
flow out of universities to find themselves without work, a constitution is yet
to be written, elections are postponed, and local governments remain appointed.
Tunisians talk about the disconnect between the government and the people --
grumbling that it is no more concerned with daily needs than Ben Ali's before
it. People say that the current government and police are as corrupt as in the
past, and express a general sense of insecurity. Read More »
POST
Ellis Goldberg
Monday, December 10, 2012
President Mohamed Morsi and his advisors cannot have
expected that his November 22 constitutional declaration would throw Egypt into
a renewed state of turmoil. That it has speaks volumes to the immense changes
that have occurred in the country during the past two years. Morsi's support
for President Barack Obama's truce initiative during the fighting in Gaza
clearly reassured the U.S. president that under a Muslim Brotherhood (MB) president
Egypt would keep the peace with Israel. Because this has been the dominant
concern within the U.S. foreign policy elite about the Egyptian revolution,
Morsi had good reason to believe that the United States and the Egyptian Armed
Forces would not object to his domestic decisions.
That Morsi's move has proven, in a deeply divided country,
to have been a serious error of judgment is worth reflection. Early responses,
especially in the United States, have either been self-satisfied sighs of
recognition that the MB have finally revealed their true nature or,
alternatively, sharp criticism of a westernized liberal minority that refused
to accept gracefully the verdict of democracy mandating a stronger role for
Islam, the MB, and Morsi himself. Read More »