

 Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate (JLD) - ACRS Additional Recommendations List

Title	Source Document	Description	Valid Issue	us to Fukushima	SL Recommendation	Disposition Date	Staff Response/ Action
ACRS Recommendation 1(a)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Actions related to NTF Recommendation 2.1 should be expanded to include an expedited update of the applicable regulatory guidance, methods, and data for external flooding to ensure that outdated guidance and acceptance criteria are not used in the reevaluations.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (All-Hazards Approach per SC Direction)	11/14/2011	Staff expanded its actions related to NTF Recommendation 2.1 to include "other natural external hazards" in light of Section 402 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2012 (Public Law 112 74) and ACRS Recommendations. This will be a new Tier 2 activity. (Tier 2)
ACRS Recommendation 1(b)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Actions related to NTF Recommendation 2.3 should be expanded to assure that the walkdowns address the integrated effects of severe storms as well as seismic and flooding events.	Yes	Yes	Steering Committee Action Needed	11/14/2011	Staff expanded NTF Recommendation 2.3 to ensure that the walkdowns address the integrated effects of severe storms as well as seismic and flooding events. (Tier 1)
ACRS Recommendation 1(c)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Actions related to NTF Recommendation 4.1 should be expanded to include issuance of an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking and requiring licensees to provide an assessment of capabilities to cope with an extended station blackout (SBO).	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (Verify Inclusion w/ Technical Staff)	11/14/2011	Staff expanded NTF Recommendation 4.1 to include an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) and performance-based criteria for an extended SBO. (Tier 1)
ACRS Recommendation 1(d)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Actions related to NTF Recommendation 5.1 should also be applied to boiling water reactor (BWR) plants with Mark II containments.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (No Additional Action Needed)	11/14/2011	Staff expanded NTF Recommendation 5.1 to include BWR Mark II containments. (Tier 1)
ACRS Recommendation 1(e)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Discussions with stakeholders should be initiated regarding near-term actions for additional hydrogen control and mitigation measures in reactor building for plants with Mark I and Mark II containments.	Yes	Yes	Steering Committee Action Needed	11/14/2011	Staff will include discussion with stakeholders in its actions associated with NTF Recommendation 6. (Tier 3)
ACRS Recommendation 1(f)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Information should be requested from licensees regarding current plant-specific spent fuel pool instrumentation, power supplies, and sources of makeup and cooling water.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (Verify Inclusion w/ Technical Staff)	11/14/2011	Staff enhanced NTF Recommendation 7.1 and the associated SFP instrumentation Order and used information regarding current plant-specific SFT instrumentation to inform the associated Order. (Tier 1) The staff also enhanced NTF Recommendations 7.2-7.5 to inform plant-specific power supplies and sources of make-up and cooling water. (Tier 2)
ACRS Recommendation 1(g)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Actions related to NTF Recommendation 8 should be expanded to include fire response procedures.	Yes	Yes	Steering Committee Action Needed	11/14/2011	Staff evaluated how to appropriately integrate the fire response procedures into a licensee's onsite emergency response capability and determined that the fire response procedures would be best considered in the agency's actions associated with NTF Recommendation 3. (Tier 3)
ACRS Recommendation 2(a)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Performance-based criteria to mitigate and manage an extended SBO should be considered as an alternative to the specific coping times proposed in Recommendation 4.1.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (Verify Inclusion w/ Technical Staff)	11/14/2011	Staff expanded NTF Recommendation 4.1 to include an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) and performance-based criteria for an extended SBO. (Tier 1)
ACRS Recommendation 2(b)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Recommendation 6 should be expanded to include a requirement for BWR plant with Mark I and Mark II containments to implement combustible gas control measures in reactor buildings as a near-term defense-in-depth measure.	Yes	Yes	Steering Committee Action Needed	11/14/2011	Staff will enhance actions associated with NTF Recommendation 6 to include the implementation of combustible gas control measures in reactor buildings. (Tier 3)
ACRS Recommendation 2(c)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Recommendation 6 should be expanded to include an assessment of the vulnerabilities introduced by shared ventilation systems or shared stacks in multi-unit sites.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (Verify Inclusion w/ Technical Staff)	11/14/2011	Staff will enhance actions associated with NTF Recommendation 6 to include vulnerabilities introduced by shared ventilation systems or shared stacks in multiunit sites. (Tier 3)
ACRS Recommendation 2(d)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Integration of onsite emergency response capabilities envisioned by Recommendation 8 should be expanded to include fire response procedures.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (Same as ACRS Recommendation 1(g))	11/14/2011	Staff evaluated how to appropriately integrate the fire response procedures into a licensee's onsite emergency response capability and determined that the fire response procedures would be best considered in the agency's actions associated with NTF Recommendation 3. (Tier 3)
ACRS Recommendation 2(e)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	Selected reactor and containment instrumentation should be enhanced to withstand beyond-design-basis accident conditions.	Yes	Yes	Steering Committee Action Needed	11/14/2011	Staff will develop a new action on "reactor and containment instrumentation withstanding beyond-design-basis conditions." (Tier 3)
ACRS Recommendation 2(f)	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011	The NRC should proactively engage in efforts to define and participate in programs to capture and analyze data from the Fukushima event to enhance understanding of severe accident phenomena, including BWR melt progression, seawater, addition effects, hydrogen transport and combustion, and safety systems operability. Licensing actions requiring the granting of containment accident pressure (CAP) credit should be suspended until the implications of post-Fukushima containment pressure control measures are understood.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (SC Discussion Item- 01/04/12)	11/14/2011	Staff in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) is currently working on capturing and analyzing Fukushima-related data to enhance the agency's understanding of the severe accident phenomena. (Other)
ACRS Recommendation 3	ACRS Letter - 10/13/2011		Yes	No	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (To NRR's Generic Issues Program)	11/14/2011	Staff determined that CAP credit will continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
ACRS Conclusion/ Recommendation 1	ACRS Letter - 11/08/2011	Rulemaking activities related to strengthening of station blackout (SBO) mitigation capability should be expedited.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (No Additional Action Needed)	11/21/2011	Staff accelerated NTF Recommendation 4.1 as a result of the Commission's decision in SRM-SECY-11-0124 dated October 18, 2011. The staff has designated the SBO rulemaking as a high-priority rulemaking with a completion goal of 24-30 months. (Tier 1)
ACRS Conclusion/ Recommendation 2	ACRS Letter - 11/08/2011	Recommendations 1(a) through 1(g), and 2(a) through 2(d) of our October 13, 2011 report.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (No Additional Action Needed)	11/21/2011	Staff expanded NTF Recommendation 2.3 to ensure that the walkdowns address the integrated effects of severe storms as well as seismic and flooding events. (Tier 1)
ACRS Conclusion/ Recommendation 3	ACRS Letter - 11/08/2011	NTTF Recommendation 10.2 regarding evaluation of the command and control structure and qualifications of decision makers should be initiated in parallel with Tier 1 activities related to integration of onsite emergency actions (NTTF Recommendation 8).	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (No Additional Action Needed)	11/21/2011	Staff evaluated how to appropriately initiate the "evaluation of the command and control structure and qualifications of decision makers" and determined that they would be best considered with the agency's actions associated with NTF Recommendation 6. (Tier 3)
ACRS Conclusion/ Recommendation 4	ACRS Letter - 11/08/2011	Tier 2 recommendations should be expanded to include the additional actions recommended in our October 13, 2011 report regarding enhancement of selected reactor and containment instrumentation, and the need to proactively engage in efforts to capture and analyze data from the Fukushima event (Recommendations 2(e) and 2(f) of our October 13, 2011 report).	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (No Additional Action Needed)	11/21/2011	Staff will develop a new action on "reactor and containment instrumentation withstanding beyond-design-basis conditions." (Tier 3)
ACRS Conclusion/ Recommendation 5	ACRS Letter - 11/08/2011	Staff Tier 1 Recommendation 7.1-2, "Develop and issue order to licensees to provide reliable SFP instrumentation," should be reconsidered. Schedules for SFP instrumentation improvements and other modifications to the SFP should be informed by quantification of the contribution made by SFPs to overall plant risk.	Yes	Yes	NO Steering Committee Action Needed (No Additional Action Needed)	11/21/2011	Staff enhanced NTF Recommendation 7.1 and the associated SFP instrumentation Order and used information regarding current plant-specific SFT instrumentation to inform the associated Order. (Tier 1) The staff also enhanced NTF Recommendations 7.2-7.5 to inform plant-specific power supplies and sources of make-up and cooling water. (Tier 2)