Chris Dixon

Samsung’s predicament

In the past year, Samsung went from being a moderately successful electronics manufacturer to the leading non-iOS mobile device maker. Together, Apple and Samsung earn 98% of the profits in the smartphone market. MG Siegler echoed a common sentiment when he wrote that Samsung is now the “fifth horseman” of tech, alongside Apple, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.

The mobile device industry is still in its infancy. Samsung’s fate depends largely on how the industry evolves. If the computer-in-your-pocket (smartphone/tablet) business ends up being like the computer-on-your-desk (personal computer) business, Samsung is on track to be the modern Dell. Dell had a good run as the low-cost provider in a highly commoditized business, but the vast majority of the industry profits went to Microsoft.

So the big questions for Samsung are:

1. Will the smartphone/tablet industry stratify the way the PC business did? 

The dominant view is that technology markets inevitably stratify. Clay Christensen is the most sophisticated proponent of this view. In his theory (more here and here), every tech market eventually “overshoots” the needs of its customers, at which point the benefits of horizontal specialization outweigh the benefits of vertical integration.

A minority view, held mostly by Apple faithful, is that Christensen et al are guilty of over-theorizing. Apple lost the PC business simply because, when Steve Jobs was fired, they stopped innovating. When Jobs returned, Apple started gaining PC market share again. In this view, the future mobile industry structure mostly depends on whether Apple management is innovative enough to keep making superior vertically-integrated products.

2. If the industry stratifies, will the lion’s share of the profits go to the OS and application layers as it did for PCs?

Generally, technology businesses that are defensible have network effects, and network effects usually arise from products with significant software components. Samsung’s competitors like HTC are just one hit product line away from stealing Samsung’s position. Eventually, handset designs will converge and, as happened in the PC market, consumers will stop paying premiums for performance improvements (arguably, this has already started happening). The OS and apps layer, on the other hand, are very hard to replicate. If you invest enough money you can usually build or acquire decent software, but it takes more than just capital to build a vibrant developer ecosystem (just look at Microsoft).

Samsung’s predicament is: their current strategy succeeds only in the scenario where both (a) the industry stratifies, and (b) significant profits flow to hardware. Samsung seems to understand the improbability of (b), which is why they’ve been hinting at throwing serious support behind a new OS. Getting traction with a new OS will be difficult, to put it mildly. Google and Apple have vastly more experience making software and a huge head start with developers. Moreover, Google’s strategic position is even stronger today than Microsoft’s was in their heyday. Google makes so much money from web services (mostly search, for now) that they can afford to lose money on handsets and OSs indefinitely – a very scary fact for Samsung and everyone else in the mobile hardware business.

Plans are nothing, but planning is indispensable

It is widely believed that writing a business plan is a waste of time, because: 1) very few people will read it, and 2) you’ll end up changing it along the way. This is all mostly true.

However, before you commit yourself to working on a project for 5+ years, it’s prudent to think hard about what you are trying to build and some of the things that might go wrong. For many people, writing out a detailed business plan is the best way to enforce intellectual rigor.

My cofounders and I wrote a fairly long business plan for our first company, SiteAdvisor. We wrote it iteratively while getting lots of candid feedback from entrepreneurs, VCs, and industry executives (one of many reason you shouldn’t keep your idea secret).

I thought it might be useful to share our plan so I’ve embedded it below (at the time, we were temporarily calling the company InfiniTrust).

In retrospect, some things in the plan look prescient, some look naive, and some look downright goofy. But writing it was an extremely useful exercise. It made us think through issues we would have otherwise glossed over, and helped us stay focused when shiny new things could have led us astray.

As Eisenhower famously said: “plans are nothing, but planning is indispensable.”

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InfiniTrust

January, 2005 

InfiniTrust intends to create a new type of desktop security product that we call a “web reputation service.”  The product will benefit users who value both unrestricted web access and security — primarily consumers and small and medium businesses.  At the core of the product will be a database that classifies URLs, IP addresses, program downloads, ActiveX objects, and other “web entities” according to their degree of trustworthiness.  There will also be a downloadable application that protects the desktop according to the security classifications in the core database.  In addition, the company will provide plug-ins to firewalls, routers and web proxies (allowing for, among other things, the possibility of a fully managed outsourced web filtering service).

We see InfiniTrust as having a large addressable market.  We believe the product will offer significant value to a large portion of the approximately 600M PCs in use today.  Pricing for comparable products ranges from $2-$20 per PC per year depending on the product and channel.  Since the marginal cost per customer will be extremely low (the main expense will be maintaining the database), we see the business as potentially having high gross margins.

Desktop security has become one of the top issues for individuals and organizations in the last few years and the problem has been only getting worse.  We believe InfiniTrust represents a fundamentally new and important category of desktop security software, and if executed properly could become a leader in this emerging category much the same way Symantec and McAfee did in anti-virus or Brightmail and Postini did in anti-spam.

Problem

The data security industry has consistently ignored a large class of desktop security threats that they have considered to be “social engineering” or “user education issues” and therefore not addressable through their usual defense methods.  Some examples are:

A user is confronted with an ActiveX prompt that asks him whether he trusts a company he has never heard of called Claria.  The user knows that last time he saw a similar prompt on the ofoto.com website he said “No” the website failed to work properly, so this time he says “Yes,” enabling Claria’s Gator spyware software to take full control of his PC.

Typical industry response:  The user should educate himself as to when to answer “Yes” or “No” to such prompts or should disable ActiveX altogether thereby rendering many popular websites dysfunctional.

A user receives a phishing email purporting to be from Citibank that is actually from a criminal in Uzbekistan trying to steal his credit card information.  Citibank detects that the phishing attack has occurred but has no effective way to propagate defensive information to customers.

Typical industry response:  The user should learn never to click on URLs in emails.

A user spends time browsing a music sharing website that exploits an unpatched hole in Internet Explorer to insert spyware on the user’s machine.

Typical industry response:  The user should learn not to browse untrusted websites without modifying his browser security settings to restrict functionality like Javascript and ActiveX that enable most browser exploits.

A user downloads Grokster, a popular P2P file-sharing application.  The user clicks “Agree” to Grokster’s 32-page End User License Agreement (EULA) without reading it carefully and therefore doesn’t realize that along with Grokster he is also downloading over a dozen different bundled spyware applications that will render his computer virtually unusable.

Typical industry response:  The user should read all EULA’s before downloading software.

The data security industry has gotten very good at dealing with traditional security threats such as worms and viruses. These threats are characterized as 1) being unambiguously malicious and 2) having attack vectors that are primarily technical in nature.   With more and more non-technical users having direct access to remote counterparties via email and the web, a new class of threats has emerged that are characterized as 1) having attack vectors that are primarily “social” in nature,  and 2) not being clearly good or bad but instead involving tradeoffs on the part of the user.

Related to this trend toward “social” and “grey-area” threats has been the rise of economically motivated hacking.  For example, spyware and phishing have quickly become big businesses.  Claria (maker of Gator) generated about $90M in ‘03, primarily due to their distribution relationship with Kazaa.  WhenU generated about $45M in revenue in ‘04, and there are literally dozens of other companies (e.g. 180Solutions, Direct Revenue) that are generating double digit millions in revenues.   Estimates of losses due to phishing vary, but the numbers seem to be conservatively in the hundred of millions.  In summary, there are literally billions of dollars generated every year by companies and criminals whose main “marketing” technique is exploiting the credulity and confusion of users.

Background on Spyware and Phishing

Spyware is an increasingly serious threat to desktop computer users.  According to a recent study by Dell, 90% of computers are afflicted with spyware.  Spyware help calls are the #1 issue handled by Dell customer support, accounting for 20% of all calls.  Only 24% of computer users said they were knowledgeable about how to handle spyware.

Somewhat more conservatively, IDC estimates that 67% of computers have some form of spyware and that the market for anti-spyware software will grow from $47M in 2004 to $305M in 2008 (we think these estimates are very low—we know of specific anti-spyware companies that combined generated far more than $47M in revenues in 2004).

Phishing came almost out of nowhere in 2004 to become a major security threat.  According to Gartner Group, 57M Americans have or think they have received phishing emails.   Of those, 11% clicked on phishing links and 3% actually gave away sensitive information to attackers.  The growth rates of phishing attacks have consistently been in the double and even triple digits month-over-month.

InfiniTrust Solution

The main features of the InfiniTrust product are as follows:

Site Protection:  Adjusts the browser functionality dynamically according to the security rating of the website currently being browsed.  For example, scripting calls to vulnerable ActiveX objects are disabled on untrusted websites but enabled on trusted sites.  The point of this is to drastically reduce browser exploits that insert spyware and viruses, as well as eliminating “annoying” scripts such as pop ups, without reducing functionality of trusted sites.

Download Protection:  Uses a whitelist approach to program downloads to warn or block the user before downloading an untrustworthy program (in an enterprise version,policy settings could be created to automatically block untrusted downloads without prompting).

Fraud Detection and Protection:  Redirects the user to a warning page if he visits a fraudulent website such as a phishing landing page.

ActiveX Protection:  Allows only whitelisted ActiveX objects to download or execute.  Non-whitelisted objects are simply blocked, eliminating the need for user prompts.

Exploit Protection:  Filters out browser scripting code associated with known exploits.

Ecommerce Protection:  Warns the user about a poor security rating of a website before he enters his credit card information.  In v2.0 will notify the user of summarized business-practice information about the site (using information from sources such as BizRate).

Privacy Protection (v2.0 only):  Warns the user about the trustworthiness of a website before he submits personal information such as an email address.  Also blocks cookies and other outbound transmissions of personal information to untrusted sites or ad networks.

In light of the recent high profile adoption of the Firefox browser (albeit mostly by the technical “elite” so far) it is interesting to note which of the Infinitrust features are “IE” specific and which provide a more general web security. Features #1, #4 and #5 are primarily for IE users.  The other four features apply to users of all platforms and browsers.

In the case where InfiniTrust is being used as software installed on the desktop (as opposed to the firewall or web proxy API), it will either take automatic action or prompt the user with an easy-to-understand prompt depending on what’s most appropriate in case at hand.  For example, when the user is browsing untrusted sites InfiniTrust will automatically restrict the browser’s functionality but when the user actively clicks on a downloadable program he will see a simple prompt explaining what, if any, malicious features the software contains.

In the case of the enterprise version the need for prompting will be obviated through policy settings created by the system administrator.  Increasingly, many organizations are blocking all downloads and ActiveX controls altogether out of fear of getting spyware on the network.  InfiniTrust will give them an alternative by providing them with 100% spyware prevention through its whitelist approach to ActiveX and downloads (in addition to browser exploit blocking).

Technology Plan

There are three main components to the InfiniTrust technology:

1) Data collection/analysis.  InfiniTrust will collect and analyze large amounts of disparate data sets to generate an “InfiniTrust Score” for every “web entity” (including downloadable programs, ActiveX objects, and website URLs/IPs).  Input data sources will include:

Static analysis of web-crawled HTML and JavaScript.

Analyzed results of automated installations of downloadable software.

Data gathered from third party deals (e.g. IP intelligence services, phishing blacklist feeds, website and program popularity data)

Active and passive user feedback from users who opt-in to InfiniTrust’s product improvement program.

Information mined from publicly available sources (e.g., whois data, public blacklists)

Web site link analysis.  As companies like Google has shown, if site X links to site Y, that is in some sense an endorsement by site X of site Y.  Google uses this insight to rank the relevancy of sites, but it can also be applied to rank the trustworthiness of sites.  If site X links to known untrusted site Y, then site X is more likely to be untrusted itself.  Another way to put this idea is that the “dark alleys” of the web tend to be highly clustered in terms of link structure.

All of this will be processed to determine the degree of trust that someone should have when going to a particular website, downloading a particular piece of software, or engaging in some sort of commercial relationship with an online entity.  Much of the true intellectual property of InfiniTrust will reside in the processes and tools for collecting and analyzing these input data sources.

2)  Data servers.  In order to balance load and decrease communication distances, the database will be replicated to a set of distributed data servers.  Desktop clients will connect to these data servers in order to query for the security ratings of particular entities, or to periodically download software updates.  The client software will include a caching mechanism to ensure that performance drag is negligible.  Data servers will also receive back-channel information from users who opt-in to the product improvement program.

3) Client agent.  The client side agent takes action on behalf of the user or provides the user with easy-to-understand, relevant information.  A client side agent consists of a core-agent that communicates with a data server, as well as an application-specific GUI agent that provides user-visible functionality.  Most of these GUI agents will be web browser extensions, but they could also be built in to web proxies, or the underlying OS to protect non-traditional applications (e.g. software update tools) that make use of HTTP.

InfiniTrust plans to publish APIs and release an open source Linux/Firefox version of the client-side agents to facilitate partnerships with other software and equipment vendors.  Access to the data feeds will be controlled with encrypted certificates.

In version 1.0, almost all of InfiniTrust’s data will be generated from public sources.  As the user base and revenues grow, InfiniTrust plans to seek out additional data licensing deals.  Examples could include phishing blacklists from anti-spam vendors and ecommerce data from companies like Bizrate.  With a sizable user base, InfiniTrust could also become an important enforcement mechanism for “self-regulating” (and therefore mostly ineffective) programs and protocols like Trust-e and P3P.  Down the road, we can also envision incorporating offshore manual labor into the data collection and analysis process.

Competition

Overview:  We expect that in 2005-6 a lot of attention will be paid to problems like spyware and phishing.  This is both good and bad for InfiniTrust.  The risk is that other companies, especially large incumbents, either mitigate these threats significantly (less likely) or else create enough noise in the market to make the need for InfiniTrust less obvious (more likely).  The good news is that InfiniTrust is specifically designed to complement existing security bundles.  As pressure to differentiate security bundles increases, InfiniTrust could become an attractive add-on product or acquisition target.  The historical pattern is that most of the innovation in consumer security has come from startups.  For example, the software-based firewall was pioneered by ZoneLabs and anti-spyware was pioneered by companies like PestPatrol, Lavasoft and WebRoot.

Summary of existing anti-spyware technologies:  Almost all of the anti-spyware products that currently exist are for removing spyware, not preventing it.  It is widely believed that even the best anti-spyware removers achieve highly unsatisfactory success rates.  For this reason, most experts recommend that users run multiple spyware removers (in addition, users are repeatedly instructed to be very careful where they browse, what they download, etc).  This poor success rate is due mostly to the fact that once spyware takes control of a user’s PC and starts performing tricks like copying itself, changing the HOSTS file, disguising its signature etc, the technological problem of removing it becomes extremely difficult.

There are a few existing anti-spyware programs that claim to have spyware prevention features (e.g. SpywareBlaster, Microsoft’s AntiSpyware) but in fact just use highly inaccurate behavior-based techniques (similar to Intrusion Prevention Systems).  In the near future, we expect security companies to develop blacklist-based preventative approaches to spyware.  Blacklist approaches have a number of problems:  1) it is extremely difficult to keep spyware blacklists up-to-date and even a single mistake can render a PC unusable, 2) they don’t properly address the many sources of spyware that are “grey area” downloads.   The problem of spyware is not nearly as black-and-white as problems like viruses and worms as most spyware comes through bundled adware where reasonable people can disagree about its maliciousness.  InfiniTrust believes the best way for users to be both protected and have a satisfying browsing experience is to 1) whitelist trusted programs, 2) blacklist purely malicious programs, and 3) inform users about the trade offs (and alternatives) in the grey area cases in a very easy-to-understand way.

Summary of existing anti-phishing technologies:  There are three primary methods for stopping phishing attacks today.

The first is simply for existing anti-spam companies to better filter phishing emails.  Anti-spam technologies have achieved 95+% accuracy but are not perfect.  Moreover, phishing emails can be particularly hard to detect as they often use zombie PC’s for delivery (thereby making IP-based blocking difficult) and contain content that looks very similar to legitimate content.

The second approach is to try to shut down the email delivery or landing page machines in the midst of an attack.  A number of security companies do this on behalf of their customers who tend to be large financial institutions.  We believe these methods are limited as they succeed only after the critical first few (~6) hours of phishing attacks.  Moreover, from the desktop user’s perspective, even if these companies stop phishing attacks for, say, the top banks there are many other types of phishing attacks that these companies are not even trying to stop, such as the Tsunami-relief phishing attacks that were recently seen in large volumes.

Client-side solutions:  These have the advantages of providing zero-hour defense and the ability to defend against fraud from all sources.   There have been a handful of client-side solutions released recently from companies like Earthlink, Netcraft, WebRoot, and GeoTrust.  InfiniTrust is a client-side solution that has distinct advantages over these client-side competitors.  For one, because InfiniTrust will be collecting a nearly comprehensive database of existing websites, it can take a (partial) whitelist approach to phishing detection.  The fact that a site clicked through to from an email doesn’t appear in InfiniTrust’s list of millions of legitimate websites is a strong indicator that the site is potentially fraudulent.  It also goes beyond these other solutions insofar as it prevents non-email based attacks (such as keyloggers inserted through browser exploits) and also more “grey-area” fraud such as dubious but not outright fake ecommerce sites.

Notes on primary competitors:

Symantec:  Generated $1.87B in revenue in 2004, 47% of which came from consumer products.  Symantec has not yet released a spyware removal tool but is expected to in Q105.  They have no client side phishing product today but will likely release one sometime this year.

McAfee:  McAfee is the #2 consumer security software bundle.  They currently have spyware detection but not removal.  It is likely they will release spyware removal sometime this year.

ZoneLabs:  ZoneLabs was acquired by Checkpoint in 2004 for approximately $250M.  Their primary product is ZoneAlarm, a software-based firewall that had, as of 2004, at least 30M (free) users.  They also sell a complete security bundle that has at least 1M paying subscribers.  ZoneLabs built their business almost exclusively through a free downloadable version that became popular in the press and among technology enthusiasts.

Computer Associates:  CA sells a traditional security bundle and recently added spyware removal tools through their acquisition of PestPatrol.

Trend Micro:  Trend Micro has recently added spyware removal and has features they describe as anti-phishing (actually just an outgoing firewall that looks for personal info being sent from the PC).

Microsoft:  Recently acquired an anti-spyware company (Giant) and an anti-virus company and is expected to release versions of each in Q105.  There have been conflicting reports about whether they plan to charge for these services.  Microsoft appears to see web-based security threats as a major headache.  Firefox has supposedly gotten 10% of the browser market in just the past 6 months due in large part to users’ frustration with Internet Explorer security issues.

WebRoot:  WebRoot is widely considered to have a very good spyware removal tool.  Their rate of innovation has generally been very impressive.  WebRoot generated $16M in revenues in Q404 alone, evidence that point solution security products can thrive in the consumer market. We had thought Webroot was likely to be acquired but last week announced a $108mm financing event.

Freeware:  Lavasoft’s Ad Aware and Spybot S&D have been extremely popular free spyware removal tools.  For example, Ad Aware consistently gets more than 2M downloads per week on download.com alone (there is also a paid version of Ad Aware that is rumored to have generated significant revenues for the company).

Websense:  Websense is a $1B market cap company that is considered to be the leader in so-called web filtering technology.  The primary focus of web filtering technology is to restrict corporate users from going to “bad topics” such as adult and gambling websites.  They have recently added an optional, add-on security module that basically works by altogether blocking access to large blocks of websites associated with insecure activity (e.g. Kazaa.com).  Websense severely restricts web access and is therefore only useful to (typically large) corporations that find such restrictions acceptable.

Would any of these competitors be likely to offer a product similar to InfiniTrust’s?

Today, InfiniTrust’s closest competitor in terms of the product itself is probably Websense.  Websense has a database that in many ways is similar to InfiniTrust’s although much more focused on topics rather than security ratings.  Websense has built a high growth business ($100M revs, $36M EBITDA, $1.2B market cap) focusing almost solely on larger enterprises.  We see their entry into the consumer market as being unlikely but if they did enter it that could be a serious threat to InfiniTrust.

Anti-spyware vendors could also conceivably take an approach like InfiniTrust’s, although it would mean a fundamental change in how they go about building their technology and database.  Right now their approaches are very similar to those of anti-virus technologies: they have databases of signatures they use to scan PC’s for existing infections (“parasites”), as opposed to InfiniTrust which has a database of all the “hosts” (websites, program downloads, ActiveX objects) that might carry those parasites.  Determining the trustworthiness of hosts is simply a different technology problem than detecting and removing the parasites.

We see InfiniTrust as being fundamentally about providing secure, “unannoying” yet unrestricted web access, just as anti-spam companies try to provide secure, “unannoying” yet unrestricted email access.  Spyware and phishing happen to be two important and growing security threats that have mostly web-based attack vectors. They are therefore important to InfiniTrust’s value proposition but that does not mean that InfiniTrust is just another anti-spyware or anti-phishing company.

Marketing Plan 

The target market will be individuals and organizations that care about both security and unrestricted web browsing.  InfiniTrust sees this as encompassing a large percentage of consumers and, to a somewhat lesser extent, small and medium businesses.  Larger businesses tend to be satisfied with much “blunter” security instruments such as Websense that significantly restrict user web access.

InfiniTrust plans to offer a limited-functionality free version that can be downloaded directly from infinitrust.com and will also be distributed through channels.   The current plan calls for the free version to offer the user basic defensive features but not have access to the full database. The free version will remind the user of its value by displaying periodic reminders of the specific dangers it has blocked or warned about.  The paid version will likely start at $30 per year for consumers (discounted strategically for different target populations) and something in the range of $5-20 per seat per year for enterprises with an upfront licensing fee for the admin console.

Distribution Partnerships:  ISPs, security software vendors, search engines, toolbar vendors and PC OEMs are natural distribution partners.

ISPs (especially dialup providers where consumer choice is greater) are increasingly trying to differentiate their services through security software they give to their customers.  For example, security is the primary focus of recent television campaigns by AOL and Earthlink.  Additionally, these companies incur significant costs handling customer support calls resulting from phishing and spyware. For example, Earthlink says that customer support costs them $120K per phishing attack.  Deals with ISPs could either be pay per user (AOL pays McAfee $2 per user for anti-virus functionality alone which is generally considered a commodity) or unpaid distribution of the free product.

Large consumer security software vendors try to provide a single package that includes every existing category of security software.  If InfiniTrust succeeds in convincing them that its product is complementary and useful, it could be seen as a critical addition to their bundles.

Toolbar vendors such as Google, Yahoo, Earthlink, MSN and Ebay have recently been incorporating security features for anti-phishing and anti-spyware.  For example, Yahoo distributes PestPatrol and Earthlink distributes WebRoot.   Earthlink built its own anti-phishing functionality.  InfiniTrust’s data feed can make these toolbars significantly more powerful.

PC OEMs receive numerous calls from customers about browser security issues. As mentioned earlier, 20% of Dell’s customer service calls are about spyware.  These companies are interested in not only reducing these costs but also differentiating their products.  Many of these companies have shown a willingness to work with startups (e.g. Dell distributes Sunbelt’s anti-spyware solution, generating a significant portion of Sunbelt’s $30M in revenue).

A recent internal survey by InterActive Corp. of web search users showed that the safety of the sites they find was users’ #1 concern (cited by 77% of respondents as a “major concern”).  As search engines are increasingly the “gatekeepers of the web,” it is natural for them to provide filtering and ranking based on security.  At the simplest level, a partnership with a search engine could provide an InfiniTrust score next to search results in exchange for showing the InfiniTrust logo.

Financial institutions affected by phishing have expressed interest in distributing client-side anti-phishing solutions such as InfiniTrust’s as a way to offer protection their customers.   For example, one recently developed anti-phishing toolbar, FraudEliminator, received business development cold calls from 3 major banks, Mastercard and Experian in just the past week despite having spent $0 on marketing.

PR:   Desktop security was by far the #1 topic of discussion in the technology-related press in 2004.  The fact that InfiniTrust solves growing, high-visibility problems like phishing and spyware as well as older problems such as browser exploits in a new way provides a great opportunity to leverage this attention.  Initially, the technology press will be targeted, but the benefits of the product are widespread enough to attract mainstream media coverage.

Word of mouth:  Most “unsophisticated” users choose their security software based on the recommendations of 1) the media, 2) their PC manufacturer or ISP, and 3) technologically sophisticated friends and family.  Strategies for addressing 1) and 2) were discussed above.   The strategy for addressing 3) is, among other things, to make the product and message amenable to technology enthusiasts.  InfiniTrust’s client software will be mostly or completely open source, thereby showing goodwill toward the technology-enthusiast community and assuaging concerns that the client software might be in some way malicious (importantly, open sourcing the client will not jeopardize the business as the value lies primarily in the centralized database which will not be open).  In addition, the company will build Firefox, Linux and Mac versions relatively early on and expose popular portions of the database to the public via search engines.

Paid marketing:  In the past few years, online advertising channels such as search engines and banner ad networks have transformed the marketing possibilities for consumer software downloads and services.  In particular, it is now possible to target customers by demographic and context far more efficiently than in the past.  Moreover, startups are able to compete on a level playing field in keyword and banner auctions instead of having to, say, fight for shelf space in retail stores or suffer huge payouts to powerful distributors.  Some consumer software products and services that have built interesting businesses primarily through web-based advertising and had recent successful exits include Gotomypc (acquired by Citrix for $237M), ZoneLabs (acquired by Checkpoint for $250M), Classmates.com (acquired by United Online for $100M), TripAdvisor (acquired by IAC for $250M), and Shopping.com ($750M market cap).

Risks.

Market risks:

Competitive offerings: Companies such as Symantec, McAfee and Microsoft could improve their products enough to substantially solve the same problems that InfiniTrust is trying to solve. These companies have superior brand recognition and distribution so even if they merely solve the same problems, say, 75% as well as InfiniTrust does, they will likely succeed in the marketplace.

Insufficient or inaccurate data:  InfiniTrust may launch with a data set that is simply not sufficient to show real benefits to early adopters. It may be that deeper or broader data is required in order to cover an acceptable percentage of actual user browsing.  Initial diligence, however, suggests this outcome to be unlikely because web browsing tends to be fairly highly concentrated.  It has been shown, for example, that 50% of page views on the web are for the top 5000 websites, and the top 2000 downloads account for over 95% of total downloads.

Unwillingness to pay: While the InfiniTrust product may provide incremental value to users, there may not be a willingness to pay for it.

Lack of awareness: Despite attempts to build distribution partnerships and generate PR, customers may simply not hear about InfiniTrust. The cost of running a concerted advertising or paid inclusion program may simply be too high for a start up to muster.

Problems decrease for other reasons: Legal changes, software quality improvements or other external factors may lead to a reduction in the type of security problems that InfiniTrust solves, thereby reducing the need for the product.

Technical risks:

Data collection:  The data required to make InfiniTrust work can be difficult to collect.  Programs must be automatically installed, phishing attacks must be recognized, and web exploits must be discovered and analyzed. The company believes it has a solid plan for tackling these problems, but if it is wrong the product quality could suffer.

“Arms race”: Once attackers realize how InfiniTrust operates they may put more effort into hiding their spyware, phishing attacks, web exploits etc.  This may result in a reduced data quality.  Since most of the “hackers” InfiniTrust is targeting are economically motivated, the company believes this will only happen when the company is quite successful distributing its product.  At that point the company expects to have the resources to fight back.

Budget

The company is raising $2.7M, which would allow for a 12 month product development plan plus an additional 12 months of marketing, business development, and product refinement.  After the v1.0 product is built, the company would hire an additional team member to help with marketing and business development, and would also engage a PR firm and do online advertising to build market traction.  A summary of the budget plan is below.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The product lens

There has been a lot of discussion lately about the markets for startup financing. Many of the discussions use words like “valuations” “bubble” “crunch” etc. Words like that generally mean the writer is discussing the world through the lens of finance. This is a useful lens, but I’d like to suggest there is another lens that is also useful: the product lens. First, some background.

Two markets

Startups sit in the middle of two markets: one between VCs and startups, and one between startups and customers. These markets are correlated but only partially. When the financing supply is low but customer demand is high, entrepreneurs that are able to finagle funding generally do well. When financing and startup supply is high, customers do well, some startups do well, and VCs generally don’t. And so on.

When VCs get too excited, people talk about a bubble. When VCs get too fearful, people talk about a crash. Historically, downturns were great times for startups that were able to raise money because competition was low but customer demand for new technology remained fairly steady. Downturns also tended to coincide with big platform shifts, which usually meant opportunities for entrepreneurs.

These markets shift independently between different stages and sectors, although there are connections. The amount of financing available is relatively constant, because of the longevity of VC funds and the way most VCs are compensated (management fees). Less financing in one sector or stage usually leads to more financing in others.

The stages are related because the early stages depend on the later stages for exits and financings. The result is a bullwhip effect where changes in later stages (the latest stage being public markets) lead to magnified changes in early stages.

Smart VCs understand these dynamics and adjust their strategies accordingly. Smart entrepreneurs don’t need to think about these things very often. Fundraising is necessary (at least for companies that choose to go the VC route – many shouldn’t), but just one of the many things an entrepreneur needs to do. The best advice is simply to raise money when you can, and try to weather the vicissitudes of the financial markets.

The product lens

Good entrepreneurs spend most of their time focusing on the other market: the one between their company and their customers. This means looking at the world through the lens of products and not financing. This lens is particularly important when you are initially developing your idea or when you are thinking about product expansions.

The product lens suggests you should ask questions like: have the products in area X caught up to the best practices of the industry? Are they reaching their potential? Are they exciting? Are there big cultural/technological/economic changes happening that allow dramatically better products to be created? Sometimes the product lens guides you to the same conclusion as the finance lens and sometimes it doesn’t.

For example, there has been a lot of hand wringing about a financing crunch for consumer internet startups. One theme is that investors are pivoting from consumer to enterprise. The finance lens says: for the last five years or so, consumer was overfunded and enterprise was underfunded – let’s correct this. It also helps that enterprise IPOs have performed much better than consumer IPOs in the last year or so.

The product lens is tricky. My sense is that, at least for the non-mobile consumer internet, the product lens and financing lens agree. Anyone who has had the misfortune to use enterprise technology lately will tell you that the hardware and software they use at home (iPhone, Gmail, etc) is far and away more sophisticated and elegant than the software they use at work. It feels like the enterprise tech is way behind in the product upgrade cycle.

Mobile seems like a case where the lenses disagree. The finance lens says: billions of dollars have been invested in mobile apps. It has become hit driven and there have been very few “venture-scale” startups created.

The product lens says: the modern smartphone platform began about four years ago when the iOS app store launched. This is clearly a major new platform. Platforms and apps interact in a push-pull relationship that takes decades to play out. Innovative new apps, designs and technologies are created all the time. It would be surprising – and contrary to all the historical patterns – if the mobile product evolution were already played out.

That is not to dismiss the finance lens. It could be painful along the way:  financing markets might dry up, and profits might accrue to the platforms over the apps. But clearly mobile is just getting started.

Some of the biggest mistakes I’ve made as an angel investor stemmed from being beholden to the finance lens. The finance lens feels more scientific and therefore appeals to analytical types. It might sound unsophisticated to say “the products for X are crappy, and I have an idea for how to make them great.” But in many cases, it’s actually that simple.

Some problems are so hard they need to be solved piece by piece

Andrew Parker had a great post a few years ago where he sketched out all the startups going after pieces of Craigslist:

Startups that have tried to go head-to-head against the entirety of Craigslist (the “horizontal approach”) have struggled. Startups that have tried to go up against pieces of Craigslist (the “vertical approach”) have been much more successful (e.g. StubHub, AirBnB).

Recruiting looks like it’s going through a similar evolution. Last-generation products like LinkedIn are broad but not deep. Everyone I know who recruits uses LinkedIn, but none of them think it has solved their recruiting problems. Now we are seeing the rise of vertical solutions that are significantly better, e.g. Stack Overflow for developers and Behance for designers (at least that’s what I believe – I’m an angel investor in both).

The benefits of focusing are: 1) you can create a dramatically better user experience when it’s tailored to a specific use, 2) you can do unscalable hacks when starting out (e.g. AirBnb paying photographers to take pictures of apartments), 3) you need far fewer users to get to minimum viable liquidity, and 4) brand building is easier when you solve a straightforward, narrow problem (e.g. “I need a place to stay this weekend”).

This pattern – horizontal first, vertical second – is common. But you need to be careful. Back in 2003-2004, there was a lot of speculation that vertical search engines would eventually take down Google. A few categories worked (e.g. travel), but Google adapted in other categories (e.g. video, news) and lots of startups suffered.


a16z

VCs are experts at analyzing industries and identifying new opportunities, which is why it’s odd that the VC industry itself has so stubbornly resisted change.

Two years ago I wrote a post where I argued that innovative new VC firms are finally starting to change this:

Top tier entrepreneurs are frequently selecting their investors, not vice versa. The VCs most sought after are mostly new firms: big firms like Andreessen Horowitz, Union Square Ventures, and First Round, and micro-VCs like Floodgate (fka Maples), Betaworks, and Ron Conway.

Since then, the trend has become even more pronounced. VC is only partly about investing. It is primarily a service business whose purpose is to help entrepreneurs.

When Andreessen Horowitz (“a16z”) started out three years ago, like a lot of people I thought “OK, really interesting entrepreneurial founders, but how will they be as investors?” Then I started hearing chatter among entrepreneurs that they really wanted to raise money from them. “We’re talking to X, Y, & Z — but Andreessen is the firm we really want” became an increasingly common refrain.

Earlier this year I got to meet the a16z team and observe the operation directly. There are over 60 people at the firm. Only six people do traditional VC activities: investing, joining boards, and helping out. The rest are exclusively focused on helping entrepreneurs.

The “startup idea” behind a16z is: instead of spending the bulk of the fund fees on partner salaries, spend it on operations to help entrepreneurs. There is a marketing team (=helps you get noticed), a talent team (=helps you recruit), a market development team (=helps you get customers), and a research team (=helps you figure stuff out).

Spending time there, I had the same feeling I have whenever I meet a great startup: “This is obviously the future, why didn’t someone do it before?”

So I’m super excited to say that I’m joining a16z as their seventh General Partner. I’ll specialize in consumer internet investments but will be open to anything ambitious that involves technology. I’ll be based in California, but plan to do a lot of investing in NYC.

I’ll miss seeing my Hunch colleagues on a daily basis. Many of us have been working together for eight years, through two startups. I’d also like to thank everyone at eBay for being so welcoming and supportive.

Agency problems

Agency problems” are what economists call situations where a person’s interests diverge from his or her firm’s interests.

Large companies are in a constant state of agency crisis. A primary role of senior management is to counter agency problems through organizational structures and incentive systems. For example, most big companies divide themselves into de facto smaller companies by creating business units with their own P&L or similar metric upon which they are judged. (Apple is a striking counterexample: I once pitched Apple on a technology that could increase the number of iTunes downloads. I was told “nobody optimizes that. The only number we optimize here is P&L in the CFO’s office”).

If you are selling technology to large companies, you need to understand the incentives of the decision makers. As you go higher in the organization, the incentives are more aligned with the firm’s incentives. But knowledge and authority over operations often reside at lower levels. Deciding what level to target involves nuanced trade offs. Good sales people understand how to navigate these trade offs and shepherd a sale. The complexity and counter-intuitiveness of this task is why it’s so difficult for inexperienced entrepreneurs to sell to large companies.

Agency problems also exist in startups, although they tend to be far less dramatic than at big companies. Simply having fewer people means everyone is, as they say in programming, “closer to the metal”. The emphasis on equity compensation also helps. But there are still issues. Some CEOs are more interested in saying they are CEOs at parties than in the day-to-day grind of building a successful company. Some designers are focused on building their portfolio. Some developers are only interested in intellectually stimulating projects. Every job has its own siren song.

One of the reasons The Wire is such a great TV show is that it shows in realistic and persuasive detail how agency problems in large organizations consistently thwart well intentioned individual efforts. The depressing conclusion is that our major civic institutions are doomed to fail. Those of us who are technology optimists counter that the internet allows new networks to be created that eliminate the need for large organizations and their accompanying agency problems. Ideally, those networks recreate the power of large organizations but operate in concert like startups.

The economic logic behind tech and talent acquisitions

There’s been a lot of speculation lately about why big companies spend millions of dollars acquiring startups for their technology or talent. The answer lies in the economic logic that big companies use to make major project decisions.

Here is a really simplified example. Suppose you are a large company generating $1B in revenue, and you have a market cap of $5B. You want to build an important new product that your CTO estimates will increase your revenue 10%. At a 5-1 price-to-revenue ratio, a 10% boost in revenue means a $500M boost in market cap. So you are willing to spend something less than $500M to have that product.

You have two options: build or buy. Build means 1) recruiting a team and 2) building the product. There is a risk you’ll have significant delays or outright failure at either stage. You therefore need to estimate the cost of delay (delaying the 10% increase in revenue) and failure. Acquiring a relevant team takes away the recruiting risk. Acquiring a startup with the product (and team) takes away both stages of risk. Generally, if you assume 0% chance of failure or delay, building internally will be cheaper. But in real life the likelihood of delay or failure is much higher.

Suppose you could build the product for $50M with a 50% chance of significant delays or failure. Then the upper bound of what you’d rationally pay to acquire would be $100M. That doesn’t mean you have to pay $100M. If there are multiple startups with sufficient product/talent you might be able to get a bargain. It all comes down to supply (number of relevant startups) and demand (number of interested acquirers).

Every big company does calculations like these (albeit much more sophisticated ones). This is a part of what M&A/Corp Dev groups do. If you want to sell your company – or simply understand acquisitions you read about in the press – it is important to understand how they think about these calculations.

Regulatory hacks

A common way to think of business regulations is by analogy to sports: the rules are specified up front, and the players follow the rules. But real regulations don’t work that way. Regulations follow business as much as business follows regulations.

Sometimes the businesses that change regulations are startups. Startups don’t have the resources to change regulations through lobbying. Instead, they need to start with regulatory hacks: “back door” experiments that demonstrate the benefits of their ideas. With luck, regulators are forced to follow.

Nextel was one of the all-time great regulatory hacks. In the late 80s and early 90s, the FCC’s rules banned more than two cellular operators per city. As Nextel’s cofounder said, “the FCC thought a wireless duopoly was the perfect market structure”. Nextel (called Fleet Call at the time) circumvented these rules by acquiring local (e.g. taxi, pizza truck) dispatch radio companies, which they then connected to create a nationwide (non-dispatch) cell phone service.

Predictably, the cellular incumbents tried to regulate Nextel out of existence. From a 1991 New York Times article:

In a move that could threaten cellular telephone companies, the Federal Communications Commission may decide on Wednesday to grant a small radio company’s request to provide a new form of mobile telephone service in six major cities, including New York. If the request is approved, the action could inject new competition into the industry. At the moment, Federal rules permit only two cellular systems to operate in any city. But the new proposal could open up a regulatory back door, allowing companies that provide private radio service for taxi fleets and delivery services to offer mobile telephone services to individuals…. The proposal has alarmed the industry, which has heatedly opposed it and enlisted support in Congress late last year to delay the F.C.C.’s decision.

The incumbents argued that Nextel’s service would interfere with public safety frequencies and therefore endanger the public. They also argued that Nextel’s service would be too expensive:

Some analysts contend that the radio handsets for Fleet Call and its imitators will be more expensive than cellular units. The technical features of cellular equipment are now standardized nationwide, making it possible to bring down costs through higher selling volumes. Specialized mobile services are currently different in each city.

And their call quality would be inferior:

Some analysts contend that Fleet Call’s local service is likely to be inferior as well. “It is highly unlikely to be as good as cellular service,” said Denise Jevne, telecommunications analyst with T. Rowe Price Associates in Baltimore.

The FCC eventually decided not to block Nextel. Nextel grew to become a top five US cellular operators before it was acquired by Sprint in 2004 for $35B. Their service turned out to be cost-competitive, high quality, and safe. The only thing endangered were the incumbents’ profits.

What Nextel faced in 1991 is very similar to what many startups face today. Uber is being threatened by the taxi industry, Aereo by the TV broadcasting industry, and Airbnb by the hotel industry. Some industries, like finance, are so heavily regulated that almost any new idea runs into regulatory objections.

Of course regulations that truly protect the public interest are necessary. But many regulations are created by incumbents to protect their market position. To try new things, entrepreneurs need to find a back door. And when they succeed, it will all look obvious in retrospect. Today’s regulatory hack is tomorrow’s mainstream industry.

 

The rise of enterprise marketing

Building an enterprise software company used to be largely about sales, because enterprise software was sourced and purchased by high-level business people. Those business people needed to be charmed and convinced, an activity that was distasteful to many technologists.

Internet-based delivery (“SaaS”, “cloud”) dramatically lowered installation costs, letting individuals or small groups buy software on discretionary budgets or use basic versions for free. As adoption spread throughout the organization, the value of the software eventually percolated up to high-level business people who could write large checks to get features big companies need, such as administration, security, integration, compliance, and support. This ”bottom-up” approach was pioneered by Salesforce and open source companies like MySql. Recent enterprise success stories also follow this model, e.g. New Relic, Yammer, Twilio, and Github. Many of these companies have processes that would have seemed crazy ten years ago – e.g. sales people only handle inbound inquiries or only call customers who already use their product.

Thus enterprise software went from being about sales (one-to-one) to being about marketing (one-to-many). Marketing requires crafting a compelling message, figuring out the right channels and then optimizing. But the most effective marketing is a compelling product that can be easily tried. As a result, as Benchmark’s Peter Fenton said recently: ”We’re seeing a fundamental shift from sales-driven companies to product-driven companies. The companies that are leading the way there let this consumer and product focus permeate the culture of their companies.”

One of the most visible manifestations of this shift is the refreshingly accessible language on modern enterprise websites. Sales-driven enterprise software companies speak the arcane language of CIOs. Marketing-driven companies talk directly to business users (e.g. Yammer) or developers (e.g. Github).

This is good news all around. Enterprises are more likely to get software that incorporates the advances made over the last decade in consumer software. Startups get a shot at creating this software, and get to do so on a fairly level playing field. The product and marketing focus should also attract a lot more technologists who were turned off by sales. The only losers are incumbents who continue to pursue the old model.

Facebook’s embedded option

The best way to think of Facebook’s stock is as the sum of two businesses: the existing display ad businesses, and a probability-weighted option on a new line of business. This is how Wall Street views it. For example, here is a section of a recent Goldman Sachs analyst report on Facebook:

Optionality not in the model: further potential upside

While not in our model, as [Facebook] has not publicly expressed pursuit of these areas, we believe there are three obvious opportunities that the company could leverage its platform to capitalize on:

- Developing an external ad network

- Monetizing paid search

- Entering China

Of the three options, search is clearly the most interesting. An external ad network is inevitable. Google proved this model with Adsense. With an already huge base of advertisers bidding on CPCs, it is impossible for most other ad networks to compete on publisher payouts. But Facebook’s traffic is so great now that an external ad network might increase their revenues by 2x or so. The same goes for entering China. They might get another half a billion users who monetize at lower ad rates than US users. Neither move would put them in Google’s revenue range. They need a better business model for that. The only (known) models that deliver RPMs high enough to compete with Google are search, payments, and e-commerce.

At TechCrunch Disrupt last week, Mark Zuckerberg talked about possibly entering the search business. Investors had been concerned that maybe Zuckerberg really meant what he said in his IPO letter – that he just didn’t care that much about making money. By expressing an interest in search, Zuckerberg signaled that he understood Facebook’s immensely valuable embedded option and was thinking about ways to exercise it.