

Green	McDermott	Sabo
Gutierrez	McHale	Sanders
Hall (OH)	McKinney	Sawyer
Hall (TX)	Meehan	Scarborough
Hamilton	Meek	Schroeder
Harman	Menendez	Schumer
Hastings (FL)	Mfume	Scott
Hefner	Miller (CA)	Serrano
Hilliard	Mineta	Sisisky
Hinchee	Minge	Skaggs
Holden	Mink	Skelton
Hoyer	Moakley	Slaughter
Jackson-Lee	Mollohan	Souder
Jefferson	Moran	Spratt
Johnson (SD)	Murtha	Stark
Johnson, E. B.	Nadler	Stokes
Johnston	Neal	Studds
Kanjorski	Oberstar	Stupak
Kaptur	Obey	Tanner
Kennedy (MA)	Olver	Tejeda
Kennedy (RI)	Ortiz	Thompson
Kennelly	Orton	Thornton
Kildee	Owens	Thurman
Klink	Pallone	Torres
LaFalce	Pastor	Torricelli
Lantos	Payne (VA)	Towns
LaTourette	Pelosi	Traficant
Levin	Peterson (MN)	Velazquez
Lewis (GA)	Pickett	Vento
Lincoln	Pomeroy	Volkmer
Lipinski	Poshard	Ward
Lofgren	Rahall	Waters
Lowe	Rangel	Watt (NC)
Luther	Reed	Waxman
Maloney	Reynolds	Williams
Manton	Richardson	Wilson
Markey	Rivers	Wise
Martinez	Roemer	Woolsey
Mascara	Rose	Wyden
Matsui	Roybal-Allard	Wynn
McCarthy	Rush	Yates

NOT VOTING—11

Berman	McNulty	Stenholm
Jacobs	Payne (NJ)	Tucker
King	Peterson (FL)	Weldon (FL)
Kleckza	Quillen	

So the conference report was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider the vote whereby said conference report was agreed to was, by unanimous consent, laid on the table.

Ordered, That the Clerk notify the Senate thereof.

169.24 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—
NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT
TO NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. WALKER, laid before the House a message from the President, which was read as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery ("weapons of mass destruction"), I issued Executive Order No. 12938 and declared a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*).

As I described in the report transmitting Executive Order No. 12938, the new Executive order consolidated the functions of and revoked Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, which declared a national emergency with respect to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, which declared a national emergency with respect to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and their means of delivery. The new Executive order also expanded certain existing authorities

in order to strengthen the U.S. ability to respond to proliferation problems.

The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the annual report on the proliferation of missiles and essential components of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the "Nonproliferation Report," and the annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182).

The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) are fully in force and continue to be used to control the export of items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.

In the 6 months since I issued Executive Order No. 12938, the number of countries that have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has reached 27 (out of 159 signatory countries). I am urging the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification as soon as possible. The CWC is a critical element of U.S. nonproliferation policy that will significantly enhance our security and that of our friends and allies. I believe that U.S. ratification will help to encourage the ratification process in other countries and, ultimately, the CWC's entry into force.

The United States actively participates in the CWC Preparatory Commission in The Hague, the deliberative body drafting administrative and implementing procedures for the CWC. Last month, this body accepted the U.S. offer of an information management system for the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that will implement the CWC. The United States also is playing a leading role in developing a training program for international inspectors.

The United States strongly supports international efforts to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). In January 1995, the Ad Hoc Group mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference to draft a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BWC held its first meeting. The Group agreed on a program of work and schedule of substantive meetings, the first of which will occur in July 1995. The United States is pressing for completion of the Ad Hoc Group's work and consideration of the legally binding instrument by the next BWC Review Conference in 1996.

The United States maintained its active participation in the 29-member Australia Group (AG), which now includes the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania. The AG reaffirmed in December the members' collective belief that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC provides the only means to achieve a permanent global ban on CBW, and that all states adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities support these goals.

The AG also reiterated its conviction that harmonized AG export licensing measures are consistent with, and indeed actively support, the requirement under Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the manufacture of chemical weapons. These measures also are consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials and related information for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, as they focus solely on preventing assistance to activities banned under the CWC. Similarly, such efforts also support existing nonproliferation obligations under the BWC.

The United States Government determined that three foreign nationals (Luciano Moscatelli, Manfred Felber, and Gerhard Merz) had engaged in chemical weapons proliferation activities that required the imposition of sanctions against them, effective on November 19, 1994. Similar determinations were made against three foreign companies (Asian Ways Limited, Mainway International, and Worldco) effective on February 18, 1995, and imposed sanctions against them. Additional information on these determinations is contained in a classified report to the Congress, provided pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. The United States Government continues to monitor closely activities that may be subject to CBW sanctions provisions.

The United States continued to control vigilantly U.S. exports that could make a contribution to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, exercising restraint in considering all such transfers consistent with the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR Partners shared information not only with each other but with other possible supplier, consumer, and transshipment states about proliferation problems and also stressed the importance of implementing effective export control systems.

The United States initiated unilateral efforts and coordinated with MTCR Partners in multilateral efforts, aimed at combatting missile proliferation by nonmembers and at encouraging nonmembers to adopt responsible export behavior and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. On October 4, 1994, the United States and China signed a Joint Statement on Missile Nonproliferation in which China reiterated

its 1992 commitment to the MTCR Guidelines and agreed to ban the export of ground-to-ground MTCR-class missiles. In 1995, the United States met bilaterally with Ukraine in January, and with Russia in April, to discuss missile nonproliferation and the implementation of the MTCR Guidelines. In May 1995, the United States will participate with other MTCR Partners in a regime approach to Ukraine to discuss missile nonproliferation and to share information about the MTCR.

The United States actively encouraged its MTCR Partners and fellow AG participants to adopt "catch-all" provisions, similar to that of the United States and EPCI, for items not subject to specific export controls. Austria, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom actually have such provisions in place. The European Union (EU) issued a directive in 1994 calling on member countries to adopt "catch-all" controls. These controls will be implemented July 1, 1995. In line with this harmonization move, several countries, including European States that are not actually members of the EU, have adopted or are considering putting similar provisions in place.

The United States has continued to pursue this Administration's nuclear nonproliferation goals. More than 170 nations joined in the indefinite, unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on May 11, 1995. This historic decision strengthens the security of all countries, nuclear weapons states and nonweapons states alike.

South Africa joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), increasing NSG membership to 31 countries. The NSG held a plenary in Helsinki, April 5-7, 1995, which focused on membership issues and the NSG's relationship to the NPT Conference. A separate, dual-use consultation meeting agreed upon 32 changes to the dual-use list.

Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, I report that there were no expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order No. 12938 during the period from November 14, 1994, through May 14, 1995.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 18, 1995.

By unanimous consent, the message was referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed (H. Doc. 104-76).

¶69.25 ADJOURNMENT OVER

On motion of Mr. ARMEY, by unanimous consent,

Ordered, That when the House adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at 12 o'clock noon on Monday, May 22, 1995.

¶69.26 HOUR OF MEETING

On motion of Mr. ARMEY, by unanimous consent,

Ordered, That when the House adjourns on Monday, May 22, 1995, it adjourn to meet at 10:30 a.m. for "morn-

ing hour debates" on Tuesday, May 23, 1995.

¶69.27 CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS DISPENSED WITH

On motion of Mr. ARMEY, by unanimous consent,

Ordered, That business in order for consideration on Wednesday, May 24, 1995, under clause 7, rule XXIV, the Calendar Wednesday rule, be dispensed with.

¶69.28 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT— NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. WALKER, laid before the House a message from the President, which was read as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

I hereby report to the Congress on developments since the last Presidential report on November 18, 1994, concerning the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979, and matters relating to Executive Order No. 12613 of October 29, 1987. This report is submitted pursuant to section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), and section 505(c) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9(c). This report covers events through April 18, 1995. It discusses only matters concerning the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in Executive Order No. 12170 and matters relating to Executive Order No. 12613. Matters relating to the March 15, 1995, Executive Order regarding a ban on investment in the petroleum sector, and the May 6, 1995, Executive Order regarding new trade sanctions, will be covered in separate reports. My last report, dated November 18, 1994, covered events through October 18, 1994.

1. There have been no amendments to the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560, or to the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 535, since the last report.

2. The Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") of the Department of the Treasury continues to process applications for import licenses under the Iranian Transactions Regulations. However, a substantial majority of such applications are determined to be ineligible for licensing and, consequently, are denied.

During the reporting period, the U.S. Customs Service has continued to effect numerous seizures of Iranian-origin merchandise, primarily carpets, for violation of the import prohibitions of the Iranian Transactions Regulations. OFAC and Customs Service investigations of these violations have resulted in forfeiture actions and the imposition of civil monetary penalties. Additional forfeiture and civil penalty actions are under review.

3. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the "Tribunal"), established at

The Hague pursuant to the Algiers Accords, continues to make progress in arbitrating the claims before it. However, since my last report, the Tribunal has not rendered any awards although payments were received by claimants in late November for awards rendered during the prior reporting period. Thus, the total number of awards remains at 557. Of this total, 373 have been awards in favor of American claimants. Two hundred twenty-five (225) of these were awards on agreed terms, authorizing and approving payment of settlements negotiated by the parties, and 150 were decisions adjudicated on the merits. The Tribunal has issued 38 decisions dismissing claims on the merits and 85 decisions dismissing claims for jurisdictional reasons. Of the 59 remaining awards, three approved the withdrawal of cases and 56 were in favor of Iranian claimants. As of April 18, 1995, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reported that the value of awards to successful American claimants for the Security Account held by the NV Settlement Bank stood at \$2,365,160,410.39.

Iran has not replenished the Security Account since October 8, 1992, and the Account has remained continuously below the balance of \$500 million required by the Algiers Accords since November 5, 1992. As of April 10, 1995, the total amount in the Security Account was \$191,219,759.23, and the total amount in the Interest Account was \$24,959,218.79.

The United States continues to pursue Case A/28, filed in September 1993, to require Iran to meet its obligations under the Algiers Accords to replenish the Security Account. Iran has yet to file its Statement of Defense in that case.

4. The Department of State continues to present United States Government claims against Iran, in coordination with concerned government agencies, and to respond to claims brought against the United States by Iran.

On April 18, 1995, the United States filed the first of two parts of its consolidated submission on the merits in Case B/61. Case B/61 involves a claim by Iran for compensation with respect to primarily military equipment that Iran alleges it did not receive. The equipment was purchased pursuant to commercial contracts with more than 50 private American companies. Iran alleges that it suffered direct losses and consequential damages in excess of \$2 billion in total because of the U.S. Government's refusal to allow the export of the equipment after January 19, 1981, in alleged contravention of the Algiers Accords. As directed by the Tribunal, the United States' submission addresses Iran's claims regarding both liability and compensation and damages.

5. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ("FSCS") on February 24, 1995, successfully completed its case-by-case review of the more than 3,000 so-called "small claims" against Iran arising out of the 1979 Islamic revolution. These "small claims" (of \$250,000