Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to U.S. National Security Interests

Why It's High Risk

The U.S. government has a number of programs to identify and protect critical technologies consistent with U.S. interests. These include:

• the export control systems to approve the commercial sale of arms and dual-use items,
• the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, and
• reviews of foreign investments in U.S. companies.

The Department of Defense annually spends billions of dollars to develop and produce advanced weaponry. At the same time, the U.S. government approves the sale of these weapons and defense-related technologies overseas for foreign policy, security, and economic reasons. These weapons and technologies are often targets for theft, espionage, reverse engineering, and illegal export. As a result, in 2007 GAO designated ensuring the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. national security interests as a high-risk area.

^ Back to topWhat We Found

Over the last decade, GAO has identified a number of weaknesses in government programs designed to regulate and protect critical defense-related technologies and has made multiple recommendations to correct these weaknesses. Individual agencies have been responsive to prior GAO report findings on the existing export control system, as well as in other related programs, and have taken the following actions in specific areas since the 2009 High-Risk update.

• In 2009, the National Security Council issued guidelines to ensure timely adjudication of commodity jurisdiction cases. As of July 2010, State officials reported that the median processing time for such cases decreased to 36 days, down from 118 days in 2002.
• Commerce has reached agreement with China to conduct on-site reviews of validated end-users receiving U.S. dual-use goods.
• Defense improved its system of identifying military-critical technologies and has coordinated with Commerce and State to establish guidance for developing and maintaining this system.
• Defense began offering training on anti-tamper guidelines to program managers in 2009 to help protect weapons systems and military-critical technologies from unauthorized or improper use.

In addition, in April 2010, the administration announced a reform initiative to strengthen and streamline the government’s export control system by creating a single licensing agency, control list, enforcement coordination agency, and electronic licensing system. However, programs essential to the protection of critical technologies extend beyond export control and must work collectively to be effective.

^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done

Action is needed at three levels to help protect technologies critical to U.S. national security interests.

• First, individual federal agencies need to continue to take action to fully address identified weaknesses in their respective programs.
• Second, to build on the constructive efforts currently under way, the executive branch will need to identify measures to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of its government-wide export control reform efforts. It will also need to work with Congress to implement a number of regulatory and legal aspects of the reform.
• Finally, the executive branch and Congress should consider re-evaluating the wider portfolio of critical technology-related programs, such as FMS and government monitoring of foreign investment in U.S. companies, to ensure that these programs work together as a system to meet the demands of the new security environment and help the U.S. military retain its technological superiority.

^ Back to topKey Reports

Export Controls

Persian Gulf

Defense Exports

Export Controls

International Security

Iran Sanctions

Defense Exports

Military and Dual-Use Technology

Export Controls

More Reports