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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

December 27, 2011

ACTION MEMO FOR UNDER SECRETARY KENNEDY - M

FROM: NEA – Jeffrey Feltman *JF*

SUBJECT: Future of Operations in Benghazi, Libya

Recommendation 1:

That you approve a continued U.S. presence in Benghazi through the end of calendar year 2012; and that you approve a combined footprint of 35 U.S. government personnel in Benghazi, including eight State Department and USAID and two TDY beds.

Approve *JF* Disapprove _____

Recommendation 2:

That you approve the release of the existing State Department lease in Benghazi on Villa A; and that you approve the retention of Villas B and C for office and residential space for the State Department presence.

Approve *JF* Disapprove _____

Background

The Transitional National Council (TNC) recently declared Libya liberated and moved the center of TNC operations from Benghazi to Tripoli. Chris Stevens, the Department's original Special Envoy to the TNC, has been replaced by Bureau of Political Military Affairs officer Mike Miller, who previously served at Embassy Tripoli. Entry level officer Nathan Tek transitioned to Tripoli in mid-December and USAID has shifted its permanent presence to Tripoli. Because of budget constraints and the reduced footprint, Diplomatic Security's current presence consists of two Special Agents, with an additional three slots currently unfilled.

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With Information Management Officer (IMO)/Management Officer Dana Pierce, the permanent presence in Benghazi is five, down from an approved footprint of 17. The current leases are paid through February 4, 2012, and extendable at our discretion through 2015.

Although our presence in Benghazi has shrunk considerably since the reopening of the Embassy in Tripoli, I would like to maintain a small State-run presence in Benghazi through the end of calendar year 2012, to include the critical summer elections period. Headed by an FS-02 or GS-14 officer, this office would work in close coordination with Tripoli on political and economic reporting, public diplomacy and commercial work in the eastern part of Libya and serve as "host" for the activities of USAID, PM, and any other U.S. government TDY personnel in Benghazi. Because this would be a smaller operation, Benghazi would continue to be supported by one IRM TDYer for communications and management issues and one NEA TDY reporting officer in addition to the TDY head of operations. NEA also would support the continuation of an LES PSA position to provide translation, policy, and administrative support. With the full complement of five Special Agents, our permanent presence would include eight U.S. direct hire employees, two slots for TDY PM and USAID officers, and one LES program assistant.

A continued presence in Benghazi will emphasize U.S. interest in the eastern part of Libya. Many Libyans have said the U.S. presence in Benghazi has a salutary, calming effect on easterners who are fearful that the new focus on Tripoli could once again lead to their neglect and exclusion from reconstruction and wealth distribution and strongly favor a permanent U.S. presence in the form of a full consulate. They feel the United States will help ensure they are dealt with fairly. TNC officials have said some government agencies may shift their headquarters to Benghazi (such as the National Oil Company). Other government agencies and corporations already have their headquarters in Benghazi and will likely remain there for the foreseeable future. The team will be able to monitor political trends (Islamists, tribes, political parties, militias) and public sentiment regarding the "new Libya," as well as report on the critical period leading up to and through Libya's first post-Qadhafi elections. Programmatic benefits to a continued U.S. presence in Benghazi include building on USAID/OTI's programs to strengthen civil society groups, media training, and capacity building in municipal councils. We should continue to engage with the populace, particularly with the large population of Libyan youth, an important and receptive audience with high expectations for the post-revolution period.

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Italy, Tunisia, Morocco, Malta, Finland, Turkey, Egypt, Sweden, Sudan, and the Palestinian Authority all have consulates in Benghazi. In informal conversations, representatives of the United Kingdom and French have said their governments would be unlikely to maintain offices there for budgetary reasons. The European Union and the United Nations have not announced whether they will maintain long-term presences in Benghazi.

Facilities

The current Benghazi State platform (Villas A, B, and C) is a 13-acre walled compound with 3.5 villas, office space, and a dining hall. Although all groups have come to the conclusion that co-location is the best and most economical option for continued presence, the State presence cannot be accommodated at the annex, and the current State facility is not large enough to permit co-location. Tripoli Facility Manager George Ibarra recently traveled to Benghazi to study a proposed villa compound (Villa D – see Tab) adjacent to the annex property and determined that the electrical, plumbing and physical security work needed to bring the facility up to an acceptable standard would negate any cost savings of the move.

The current Villa Compound is much larger than we need for the duration of our presence in Benghazi. We currently pay \$70,000/month for the three properties (A - \$28,000/month, B - \$14,000/month, and C - \$28,000/month). NEA proposes to release the Villa A property and use Villa C for residential and Villa B for offices, dining facility, and TDY housing. If you agree with this course of action, NEA will work with DS to rapidly implement a series of corrective security measures as part of the consolidation of the State footprint. We have one-year leases renewable for up to three additional one-year periods on these villas, with an option to terminate without financial penalty after the first six months, with sixty days notice. In order to avoid any additional rent payments on Villa A, NEA proposes to give immediate notice of termination, but would like to retain the leases on Villas B and C through the end of calendar year 2012 or until such time as an appropriate alternate property can be found that would allow for co-location of all U.S. government personnel in Benghazi.

Attachment:

Tab – Benghazi proposal

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Approved: NEA/FO: Jeffrey D. Feltman

JDF for

Drafted: NEA-SCA/EX – Karen Keshap,



Cleared:

- NEA/FO: RMaxwell
- NEA-SCA/EX: L Lohman
- NEA/MAG: E Sidereas ok
- NEA-SCA/EX: K Hanson ok
- NEA-SCA/EX/PMO: G K Hill ok
- NEA-SCA/EX/Budget: V Lawrence ok
- M: E Dar ok
- OBO/FO: J Hochuli, Acting ok
- DS: G Smith, Acting ok
- RM: K Eisenhardt ok
- A: J Flynn ok
- D(N): S Carl-Yoder ok
- D(B): J Sawyer (info)
- P: C Grantham (info)
- Benghazi: M Miller ok

with edits suggested by Am

From: Nordstrom, Eric A
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2012 9:00 PM
To: Bacigalupo, James P
Cc: Papanu, Brian
Subject: RE: DS coverage for Benghazi

See attached, the last time we had only 2 agents at post, suspending outside movements for approximately 10 days.

SBU This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Nordstrom, Eric A
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2012 8:58 PM
To: Bacigalupo, James P
Cc: Papanu, Brian
Subject: RE: DS coverage for Benghazi

Sure, For historical continuity and clarity we have had multiple times previously had no movements in Benghazi because we had only 2 DS agents on the ground. Having no movements for upwards of 10 days severely limits operations in Benghazi. I've been placed in a very difficult spot when the Ambassador tells me that I need to support Benghazi but can't direct MSD there and been advised that DS isn't going to provide more than 3 DS agents over the long term.

Eric A. Nordstrom

Regional Security Officer
U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Libya
[REDACTED]

<http://libya.usembassy.gov/>
SBU This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Bacigalupo, James P
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2012 8:53 PM
To: Nordstrom, Eric A
Cc: Papanu, Brian
Subject: Fw: DS coverage for Benghazi Eric,

Call me, I am surprised at your statement that "DS is hesitant to devote resources and as I (you) have indicated previously that has severely limited operations in Benghazi".

Jim

From: Lamb, Charlene R.
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2012 10:35 AM
To: Nordstrom, Eric A
Cc: Bacigalupo, James P
Subject: Fw: DS coverage for Benghazi
Hi Eric,

If you have time today or tomorrow would you please give me a call. Lee Lohman is going to call me tomorrow. I just want to make sure I have the latest from you so I can support you accordingly.

Thanks,
Charlene

From: Lohman, Lee
Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2012 09:23 AM
To: Lamb, Charlene R.
Subject: FW: DS coverage for Benghazi

Charlene, I suspect that the NEA Front Office will react if the reporting stops. Do you have some time to discuss this tomorrow? Lee

From: Keshap, Karen
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2012 3:10 PM
To: Lohman, Lee; Libya Management Issues
Subject: Fw: DS coverage for Benghazi

Karen Keshap
Post Management Officer - Libya
NEA-SCA/EX

From: Nordstrom, Eric A
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2012 01:13 PM
To: Crowley, Shawn P; Tillou, Patrick A; Polaschik, Joan A; Easter, Keith A; Sidereas, Evyenia
Cc: Keshap, Karen; Cretz, Gene A; Papanu, Brian
Subject: RE: DS coverage for Benghazi

Shawn, In discussions with DS/IP/NEA, they plan to make the 2nd ARSO position in Tripoli at least temporarily assigned to Benghazi to assist in continuity. That being said, it will be a long time until that happens. I'll speak with our SST personnel to see if they can free up 1 or 2 bodies for Benghazi. They had expressed a willingness to support while MSD is tied down with training. They are constrained to moving with another DS agent as part of their conditions, however, that may allow for at least one movement team and 2 persons at the compound.

While the status of Benghazi remains undefined, DS is hesitant to devot resources and as I indicated previously, this has severely hampered operations in Benghazi. That often means that DS agents are there guarding a compound with 2

other DOS personnel present. That often also means that outreach and reporting is non-existent. In terms of visiting prisons and detention facilities, these sites are already a politically sensitive area. A refugee camp was recently attacked outside Tripoli. With all of our DS/MSD assets and SST assets, we have taken CODELs to Abu Salim prison in Tripoli, and it has been less than ideal. It is my understanding from my UK colleagues that they have a 5 person team assigned to just their head of mission, so they have made a commitment to maintain a larger presence in Benghazi than the USG. The UN has made a decision requiring less movement security in otherwise stable areas, hoping that the UN name will keep them safe. If the senior DS agent on the ground has concerns about visiting a detention facility, I will support their assessment.

Eric A. Nordstrom
Regional Security Officer
U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Libya
[REDACTED] <http://libya.usembassy.gov/>
SBU This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Crowley, Shawn P
Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2012 5:29 PM
To: Tillou, Patrick A; Polaschik, Joan A; Nordstrom, Eric A; Easter, Keith A; Sidereas, Evyenia
Cc: Keshap, Karen; Cretz, Gene A
Subject: DS coverage for Benghazi

Apologies for being a broken record, but beginning tomorrow Benghazi will be down to two agents. The third, scheduled to arrive Tuesday, is delayed TBD due to visa issues. Since one agent needs to remain on compound to protect the other USG employees, this leaves just one DS agent to travel off compound. RSO procedure at present calls for two agents to do so. We have no drivers and new local guard contract employees have no experience driving armored vehicles. What this means is that we will be all but restricted to compound for the vital February 12-18 timeframe. This will effectively leave us unable to do any outreach to Libyan nationals during the week and we will be extremely limited in the ability to obtain any useful information for reporting. The new RSO at post has disapproved a visit to the local facility housing detained African migrants planned for tomorrow (2/12).

After inspecting the facility, he is uneasy with the lack of security at the location and the number of Somalis being held there. Other western diplomats and UN officials (including AmCits working for the UN) visit the facility routinely. Similar concerns are likely to occur for most off compound movement this week, due to expected demonstrations surrounding the February 17 anniversary. We are all here to serve as needed, but having two non-security employees restricted to compound does not appear to be the best use of USG resources. I know we have exhausted almost all recourse at this point, but anything that could be done to either: 1) obtain additional DS resources; or 2) alter the requirement for protected movements in Benghazi, would be greatly appreciated. Regards, Shawn

--Forwarded Message Attachment--

From: Hill, G. Kathleen
Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2011 4:59 PM
To: Nordstrom, Eric A; Polaschik, Joan A
Cc: Scruggs, Bryan; Papanu, Brian
Subject: RE: Benghazi Plan

Eric,

This came up in conversations with Chris Stevens as well. Chris noted there were 7(?) FAVS in Benghazi. He thought we could at least move 3 to Tripoli. The plan for Benghazi staffing calls for 3 State (PO, IM/Mgmt, reporting officer) plus DS (3-5?) plus 1-2 TDYs at any given time. With that how many cars does Benghazi need? Based on the proposed staffing you can work with DS to ~~move~~ move any excess vehicles to Tripoli, which would help your movement situation. You might want to keep enough in Benghazi to have two movements. If you get VIPs, however, you might need to supplement from Tripoli which could be challenging given the distance and security environment between.


Kathleen

From: Nordstrom, Eric A
Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2011 8:38 AM
To: Hill, G. Kathleen; Polaschik, Joan A
Cc: Scruggs, Bryan
Subject: Benghazi Plan

DS/IP/NEA has recently advised that they currently don't have a replacement for Peter Velazquez, the RSO in Benghazi, when he is scheduled to depart on 12/19. As such, the DS footprint will appear to drop to 2 DS agents providing protection for a PO and an IMO.

Is there a plan for a closure of operations in Benghazi or will we be at this level for some time?

If we have such a small footprint, we could really utilize the armored vehicles that are there.

Eric A. Nordstrom
Regional Security Officer
U.S.Embassy
Tripoli,Libya

<http://libya.usembassy.gov/>



Progress Elusive in Libya

Product of the Research & Information Support Center (RISC)

The following report is based on open source reporting.

March 1, 2011

Instability Continues

More than a year has passed since the uprising against General Muammar Qaddafi began, and nearly five months have lapsed since the long-time Libyan leader met his end. While the pitched battles that characterized Libya's civil war are a thing of the past, instability and violence on a smaller scale continue. Tripoli and Benghazi remain in an uneasy, but largely peaceful, state with periodic protests against the Transitional National Council (TNC). Clashes between the Tabou and Zwaya tribes erupted in southeastern Libya on February 12 and killed more than 100, according to the United Nations. Damage from the war has only begun to be repaired. Sirte, Qaddafi's final stronghold, lies in ruins; its residents complain that the TNC has abandoned them. Some in Libya appreciate that rebuilding a new Libya from the ashes of its civil war will take time, while others grow increasingly frustrated at the lack of discernable progress. Myriad issues confront the new Libya, but several stand out as sore points that remain to be addressed.

A Confederation of Militias

Though the TNC is making slow progress in fostering national reconciliation and building a central government, autonomous military councils control Libya's cities, and individual militias control specific districts within each city. Checkpoints, which help to keep the few remaining Qaddafi loyalists out of Libya's major cities, also serve to stifle trade and provide a chance for unscrupulous militiamen to extort those who pass through. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have both alleged militias are responsible for widespread human rights violations, and that the TNC is powerless to stop them. On January 26, Doctors Without Borders suspended its operation in Misrata, claiming detainees held by the Misrata militia were being tortured and denied medical care. Libyan and UN authorities do not know the location of all detention centers or how many alleged Qaddafi loyalists are being held.

TNC efforts to centralize authority and incorporate militias under its control generally have failed thus far, highlighting the continued dominance of local militias and the fragmented nature of the national security profile. Until a legitimate political process is put in place, most militias will retain their positions, and their arms, out of hopes of eventually securing greater prominence at the national level. If successful, nationwide elections slated for June 2012 may succeed in generating a legitimate central government that can enjoy greater success in bringing coherence to the Libyan security structure.

Radical Islamists

In late December 2011, reports indicated that al-Qa'ida leadership in Pakistan had sent "experienced jihadists" to Libya to build a new base of operations in the country. Between May and December 2011, one of these jihadists had recruited 200 fighters in the eastern part of the country. Documents seized in Iraq indicate that many foreign fighters who participated in the Iraqi insurgency hailed from eastern Libya. This small batch of fighters would have been dealt with quickly by a central authority, were it in place.

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Until a stronger national army or guard force is developed, rural Libya will remain fertile territory for terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb.

Implications for the Private Sector

The lack of an effective national government will continue to present a challenge for businesses operating in Libya. Transportation will require in-depth knowledge of the local human and geographical terrain. Moving internally within Libya may require passing through multiple checkpoints monitored by militias with varying requirements for passage. Until state institutions are developed, rules and regulations governing private business in Libya may remain unclear.

While it may take years to establish an effective system of governance, Libya has much going in its favor. As the process of building a new Libya continues, the private sector will have to share the burden of its growing pains. If Libya is able to hold inclusive elections that give a voice to the communities that have felt excluded in the post-Qaddafi era, it will be a milestone on the path to a more stable environment.

For Further Information

Please direct any questions regarding this report or the general security situation in the region to OSAC's Regional Analyst for the Middle East and North Africa.

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MEMORANDUM

DATE: February 1, 2012
TO: DS/DSS/TIA/OSAC
From: RSO Tripoli, Eric Nordstrom
SUBJECT: OSAC Crime and Safety Report

Overall Crime and Safety Situation

Crime

Libya witnessed a popular uprising against the regime of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi that lasted from February to October 2011 and included fighting throughout the country. Libya is currently governed by the Transitional National Council and is passing through a post-conflict transition to a new government. Many basic state institutions, including emergency services and tourist facilities, are not yet fully operational. Although active fighting in Libya's civil war concluded in October 2011, various factions and militias continue to vie for power in the absence of a stable political and security environment, often resulting in violence.

While official statistics are often inaccurate and difficult to access, crime levels in Tripoli have significantly increased with the fall of the Qadhafi regime as local militias are demobilized and there remains an absence of effective security and police structures. Carjackings, robberies, burglaries, and thefts have noticeably increased in Tripoli. The majority of the 16,000 criminals released by Qadhafi during the revolution have yet to be re-apprehended. Police and judicial authorities are still in a state of transition, with significant portions of the security infrastructure damaged or destroyed. The Government of Libya, through the Ministries of Interior and Defense, has embarked on a robust plan to integrate the various militia organizations under the two ministries. However, reconstitution of police and security remains slow as the Government of Libya tackles a wide range of policy issues in addition to demobilizing and retraining, and re-equipping former militia fighters.

While the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is in the process of absorbing a large percentage of the demobilized militia, many of its records and infrastructure were destroyed during the revolution. The MoI estimates that only 60% of police have returned to their pre-revolution posts. During the revolution, it is estimated that approximately 16,000 criminals were released from prison by former regime officials. Widespread small arms distribution coupled with lack of

employment for former regime supporters, and demobilized or current militia members, has added to the increased crime rate.

Tripoli police do not maintain comprehensive crime statistics for individual neighborhoods and it is difficult to obtain an accurate assessment of the general crime level in Tripoli. Residential burglary and theft is the most common crime reported by expatriates in Libya. Burglaries that were reported occurred both during the day and at night. Rising burglary rates have caused many foreign individuals and companies to invest in residential security measures such as metal grillwork, alarm systems, and anti-climb devices. Burglars often carry edged weapons both as tools for entry and as a deterrent against uncooperative victims, although an increasing number of criminal assailants have access to small arms looted during the revolution.

Carjacking was a concern in pre-revolution Libya, with a rising incidence of such crimes since October 2011. A favorite tactic of carjackers is to stop vehicles and victims under the guise of a militia or security checkpoint. The victims are then separated from their vehicles, often at gunpoint. Several foreigners and international companies in Tripoli have reported carjackings in this manner. Unfortunately, even 'legitimate' checkpoints are not centrally controlled by the Ministry of Interior, adding to the overall confused security environment, and thus the effectiveness of this criminal tactic.

Road Safety

Traffic accidents constitute the most common safety threat for visitors to Libya. In addition to traffic accidents, there has been an increase in the number of reports of armed highway robberies in both urban and rural areas. Police do not routinely enforce traffic laws and Libyan drivers are often reckless and inattentive. It is not uncommon for Libyan drivers to drive through red lights at full speed and swerve across multiple lanes of traffic in order to make turns. Traffic accidents are the leading cause of accidental death in Libya.

Due to the recklessness of Libyan drivers, short-term visitors are discouraged from driving themselves and are advised to use a reputable limousine service instead. Many vehicle services have re-opened in Libya while others have begun operating in Libya. Visitors and residents alike should always wear seatbelts, and are strongly encouraged to bring an approved car seat for infants and young children. Libyans do not generally use seatbelts or infant/child seats.

If driving in Libya is necessary, drive extremely defensively. Ensure sufficient braking distance and beware of Libyan pedestrians, who often step out in front of oncoming traffic. Pedestrians may often "challenge" traffic by stepping out into busy streets without warning. Libyan traffic law stipulates mandatory jail time for any driver who hits a pedestrian; this was perhaps the only Libyan traffic law that was routinely enforced under the prior regime. As the judicial and

law enforcement authorities rebuild and reassert their control, it is likely that non-political prior Qadhafi era laws and regulations such as traffic laws will remain unchanged in the short term. All visitors are advised to keep windows and doors locked at all times. Beggars are common at some intersections and they approach stopped vehicles and knock on windows in search of money.

Traffic accidents often attract large crowds of onlookers that can become violent or angry. Individuals involved in traffic accidents who fear for their safety at the hands of a flash mob are advised to seek the nearest police officer or, if none are present, to leave the scene and travel directly to a safe location.

Individuals who travel outside of major cities are advised to limit their travel to daylight hours and to travel in convoys, if possible. Many rural roads are unpaved and the majority of roads outside urban areas lack sufficient lighting for nighttime driving. Major urban highways merge into single-lane roadways outside of city limits and are more dangerous at night and in bad weather. Motor vehicles share the roads with horse-drawn trailers, farm vehicles, and other slow-moving traffic. Traffic signals and checkpoints appear frequently and traffic often stops abruptly before them.

Roadside assistance is extremely limited and offered only in Arabic. Police, fire, and ambulance services operate in and around major cities, although they are poorly equipped and have slow response times. This response time has lengthened during the post-conflict transition to a new government. There have been reports of armed highway robberies and carjacking, in both urban and rural areas. The border areas along the Tunisian / Libyan border are subject to frequent and unannounced closures. RSO receives numerous reports of widespread smuggling, particularly involving weapons, and clashes between militias and alleged former regime supports along the borders with Algeria, Niger, and Chad. Unexploded ordinance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) remain a significant concern in urban and rural areas, particularly in areas which saw heavy fighting such as Sirte, Bani Walid, and Misrata. The former Qadhafi regime deployed significant amounts of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines during the revolution, the whereabouts of which were not well recorded by former regime forces.

The Ministry of the Interior has recently affirmed a Qadhafi era motor vehicle law prohibiting tinted windows in vehicles. Law enforcement officials have been advised to strictly enforce the ban. The Ministry of the Interior has reviewed the law amid the growing number of street crimes and car jackings occurring in Tripoli.

Political Violence

Historical perspective

Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi ruled The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) from 1969 to 2011, in a "state of the masses" that ostensibly governed through direct representation via People's Committees and Congresses. In 2011, Qadhafi's autocratic government was brought to an end by an eight-month uprising and ensuing civil war. The country is currently governed by the Transitional National Council (TNC) that emerged from the rebellion and has pledged to turn Libya into a pluralist, democratic state. The TNC and its interim government now face the formidable challenge of imposing order, disbanding the former rebel forces, rebuilding the economy, creating functioning institutions and managing the pledged transition to democracy and the rule of law. The TNC advised that general elections will take place in June 2012.

Libya is a secular but culturally Islamic state with a legal system based on both Islamic law and Italian colonial law.

Regional Terrorism and Organized Crime

Libya was removed from the State Department's list of sponsors of terrorism in 2006. However, extremist groups and persons affiliated with extremist groups participated in fighting against the Ghaddafi regime. Al-Qaida affiliated groups, including Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and other violent extremist groups are likely to take advantage of the ongoing political turmoil in Libya. The U.S. government remains concerned that such individuals and groups remain in Libya, engaged in fund-raising, recruitment, procurement of arms, and may use Libya as a platform from which to conduct attacks in the region.

The Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) has historically been active in Libya and was banned worldwide by the UN's 1267 committee. Although designated by the U.S. government as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, the group denies ever being affiliated with al-Qaeda, stating that it refused to join the global Islamic front when Osama bin Laden declared against the west in 1998. In March 2011, members of the LIFG declared that the group supported the revolution against Ghaddafi's rule, and placed themselves under the leadership of the National Transitional Council. LIFG members claimed that the group changed its name to the Libyan Islamic Movement (al-Harakat al-Islamiya al-Libiya), had approximately 500–600 militants released from jail in recent years, and denied any past or present affiliation with Al-Qaeda. Abdelhakim Belhadj, a senior member of the LIFG, became the commander of the Tripoli Military Council after the rebels took over Tripoli during the 2011 Battle of Tripoli.

Any American citizen who decides to travel to Libya should maintain a high level of awareness, keep a low and inconspicuous profile, vary travel times and routes, and avoid crowds and demonstrations.

Civil Unrest

Following a change of regime and government, the political situation in Libya remains fragile. Many basic state institutions, including emergency services and tourist facilities, are not yet fully operational. Although the security situation appears to have improved, it remains difficult to assess and can change rapidly. Militia members operate checkpoints within and between major cities. Libyan militia members are poorly trained and loosely affiliated with the interim government. In some instances, militias have made arrests on scant evidence and held detainees in substandard conditions.

Violent clashes between armed groups are possible across the country, particularly at night, and even in those places that have previously avoided conflict. These often include the use of heavy weapons.

Public demonstrations occur frequently in Libya in the central squares of cities, such as Martyrs' Square in Tripoli and Freedom Square in Benghazi. U.S. citizens are advised to avoid these demonstrations and to take cover if they hear celebratory gun fire.

As in other regions of the world, the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli advises American travelers to the region to be vigilant in their personal security and to be aware of local events.

Post-Specific Concerns

Environmental Hazards

Natural disasters are not a major problem in Libya, although there are occasional floods in winter. The Tripoli coastline is situated above an inactive fault line and most buildings are not designed to western building codes or specifications.

Doing Business in Libya

Sexual harassment of women, property crime, and petty street crime are the most common problems faced by international companies in Libya. Several other factors make getting along in Libya more difficult than in other North Africa countries: language laws keep English signage to a minimum; there is no street address system; very few Libyans speak English; medical care may be limited and inadequate; the economy is cash-based and ATMs are very rare; and

women who adhere to western dress codes may experience harassment unless they opt for more conservative dress.

Libya is in a post-conflict transition period and business procedures and laws may no longer be valid or uniformly enforced throughout Libya. Local military and city / regional councils exert significantly more influence in the absence of a strong, centralized government. Regional differences and decentralized authorities often results in confusion and fluctuation in the interpretation, application, and enforcement of both criminal and civil laws.

Cash-Only Economy

Libya's economy operates under a cash-only policy for most transactions. Some ATMs are available in major hotels, shopping centers and restaurants, although many are not working due to lack of maintenance during the revolution. Much of the banking and commercial infrastructure in Libya is recovering from U.N. sanctions during the civil war and the majority of businesses utilize cash. Travelers should consult their credit card company prior to travel to ensure that transactions in Libya are allowed. The business workweek is Sunday through Thursday.

Visas

Currently, the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli does not issue any visas while it works to reestablish operations in Libya. Embassy operations were resumed in Tripoli, Libya on September 22, 2011. However, services available to U.S. citizens in Libya are limited to emergency services. Individuals requiring routine consular services or assistance in obtaining immigrant or non-immigrant visas to the United States should apply at the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate outside of Libya.

Passports and visas are required for all U.S. citizens traveling to Libya. Currently, Libyan embassies abroad are operating under varying conditions; travelers are encouraged to reach out to the Libyan embassy in the country in which they reside to obtain the latest information on visa procedures. Libyan immigration officials sometimes require endorsement letters from the Transitional National Council as well.

The Government of Libya does not allow persons with passports bearing an Israeli visa or entry/exit stamps from Israel to enter Libya.

Additional information regarding Libya can be found on the Department of State's Country Specific Information (CSI) sheet:

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_951.html.

Private Security Firms

This issue of private security firms operating in Libya is a particularly sensitive one for the TNC given Ghadafi's use of foreign mercenaries during the revolution. Historically, only three security firms existed in Libya, two of which were associated with the prior regime. A third company, Atlas Security, remains in business and provides unarmed security at a few sites in Tripoli. The Ministry of Interior and its predecessor, the Supreme Security Council, has yet to clearly address the licensing of private security organizations, particularly firearms laws.

The U.S. Embassy cannot recommend specific medical facilities and assumes no responsibility for the professional ability or integrity of the persons or firms whose names appear on the Embassy's list. The order in which the names appear has no significance.

A number of companies claim to have obtained "no objection certificates" from the TNC, which they claim allows the companies to operate.

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/12/09/Security-firms-hustle-in-lawless-Libya/UPI-75871323450621/

AKE

Atlas Security

Blue Mountain Group

Control Risks Group

Gallice Security

Garda World

Ollve Group

There are no known private security or legal firms offering private investigative services in Libya. The U.S. Embassy suggests that OSAC constituents contact the Regional Security Office for further information as this information may change quickly given the local legal and political situation in Libya.

Police Response

After the February 2011 uprising, various militias have supplanted the police in maintaining internal security. Militia members operate checkpoints within and between major cities. Libyan

militia members are poorly trained and loosely affiliated with the interim government. In some instances, militias have made arrests on scant evidence and held detainees in substandard conditions. The Ministry of Interior estimates that only 60% of uniformed police have returned to duty. Historically, most police officers in Libya speak limited English, are ill equipped and poorly trained, and have long response times.

Celebratory Gunfire

Since the revolution, celebratory gunfire represents a significant safety risk to travelers. Hundreds of injuries and a number of fatalities have resulted from rounds falling from the sky. While the NTC has made efforts, including public education campaigns, to reduce celebratory gunfire it continues to be a significant public safety issue. During the celebration of the Prophet Mohammed's birthday in Tripoli from 02-04 February, hospitals reported more than 90 injuries from celebratory gunfire.

In the event of celebratory gunfire, we advise persons to stay indoors wherever possible.

Landmines, unexploded ordinance (UXO) and explosive remnants of warfare (ERW)

Although demining operations and efforts to remove unexploded ordinance (UXO) and explosive remnants of warfare (ERW) continue throughout Libya, a significant amount of unmarked landmines, UXO, and ERW remain. The risk of encountering unexploded ordinance and indiscriminately laid landmines is high in all areas where fighting occurred. Travelers are advised to exercise caution in these areas.

Medical Emergencies

Nationwide Emergency Numbers

Supreme Security Committee 1515

Police 1515

Fire 1515 Tripoli (021 444 8111)

Ambulance 1515

Contact Information for Local Hospitals and Clinics

Public and private medical care in Libya may not meet Western standards and, in some cases, may be poor or nonexistent. Many physicians have been trained in the U.S. or Europe but modern medical equipment and medicine are not always available. Nursing care, diagnostic

equipment, and laboratory facilities are especially lacking. These shortages have become more acute after eight months of civil war although the medical sector is making efforts to return to pre-revolution levels. The vast majority of Libyans seek non-routine medical care outside of Libya. A list of healthcare providers is available at:

[http://libya.usembassy.gov/medical Information.html](http://libya.usembassy.gov/medical%20Information.html).

Doctors and hospitals expect cash payment upon rendering services. While some over-the-counter medications are available, travelers should bring a full supply of necessary medications with them. The medical professionals listed in the link above can be contacted for emergency prescriptions.

Information on vaccinations and other health precautions, such as safe food and water precautions and insect bite protection, can be obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's hotline for international travelers at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747) or via the CDC's web site at or via the CDC's internet site at <http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/default.aspx>. For information about outbreaks of infectious diseases abroad consult the World Health Organization's (WHO) web site at <http://www.who.int/en>.

The U.S. Embassy cannot recommend specific medical facilities and assumes no responsibility for the professional ability or integrity of the persons or firms whose names appear on the Embassy's list. The order in which the names appear has no significance. The following list of local doctors and dentists in Tripoli has been made on the basis of positive experiences in the expatriate community. It is provided for convenience only and constitutes neither an endorsement nor a recommendation by the U.S. Embassy:

Al Afia Hospital

021-563-3051/52/53/54

021-563-3900/01/02/03/04

Fax: 021-563-3055

Email: info@alafiaclinic.com

Libya British Diagnostic Center

Jraba Street

Ben Ashour Area

Tripoli

Tel: (+218) 91 320-5816

Fax: (+218) 21 361-9692

MEDILINK INTERNATIONAL

Tripoli Clinic

Shara Hasl Messaoud

Suq El Gbub, Ghirgharesh

Tripoli LIBYA.
Tel: +218 4830501

Fax: +218 4830491
Email: clinic@medlinkint.com

Brothers Clinic

Nufleen Area, 1st right after Bengaber Mosque/near ICRC

Tel: 091-218-2411

Fax: (+218) 021-340-1671

<http://www.brothersclinic.com/>

Saint James Hospital

Wesayat El Belderi

Ben Ashour Area

Tripoli

Tel: (+218) 21 7190843

Fax: (+218) 21 113092

Email: [REDACTED] www.stjhlbya.com

Tripoli Medical Center

Tel# 021-462-3701 to 3714

Cel# +218 (91) 2114966

Tel# +218 (21) 46307-4

Al Khadra Hospital

021/4900754

Fax: 021/4906030

Abuslim Trauma Hospital

Management Office: +218 21 4901951

Emergency + 218 21 4900606 Ext 253

Burn Center

Tel# +218 21 360 5541/43/44

Tel# +218 21 360 4637/38

Refaq Medical Services

Seyahey- Hay Al-Wahda Al-Arala- Tripoli- Libya

Tel# + 218 21 4842989

Email info@refaqh.com

Alsalaam Medical Center

Janzour Circular Road – Tripoli Libya


Tel# 091 320 58 16

Land line# 021 489 80 25/6

Fax# 021 489 14 90

E-mail info@amc.ly [REDACTED]

Dentist



Eye Clinic



Tips on How to Avoid Becoming a Victim

As in other countries, travelers to Libya should exercise common sense and good personal security practices, including being aware of one's surroundings, keeping an inconspicuous appearance, and avoiding unsolicited offers of assistance. In general, one should approach Libyan cities with the same security posture as one would approach major U.S. cities. Travelers should refrain from taking photographs of military and police installations and personnel, industrial facilities, government buildings, and critical infrastructure (dams, roads, airports, bridges, etc). Such sites often lack clear markings. Individual Libyans may object to having their picture taken. Travel guides, police, and other government officials can advise if a particular site may be photographed. Photographing prohibited sites usually result in the confiscation of camera and film and could lead to being detained by police.

Libyans are generally friendly towards foreigners and are curious about Westerners following decades of isolation. However, Libya also has a large population of migrant workers from neighboring states and sub-Saharan Africa. Many Libyans believe that these migrants are responsible for increased crime.

Tripoli has a handful of safe, moderately-priced hotels, and a growing number of western chain hotels, although most hotels are owned at least in part by the government. When staying in a Libyan hotel, be sure to immediately report suspicious activity to the front desk, always use the

door viewer and deadbolt lock, know all fire escape routes, and refrain from bringing strangers into your room.

Further Information

U.S. Embassy Tripoli
Walee al-Ahad Street
Airport Road District

Telephone: +218 (0) 91 220 3203

(When calling from outside Libya, dial +218 and omit the "0." When calling from within Libya, dial "0" followed by the number.)

US Embassy Tripoli Webpage: <http://libya.usembassy.gov>

American Citizen Services: +218 (0)91-379 4560, tripoliconsular@state.gov

Regional Security Office: +218 (0)91-220-3094 (OSAC inquires), DSRSOTRIPOLI@state.gov

OSAC Country Council

OSAC has an active Country Council program in Tripoli that meets regularly and discusses a range of issues that are of interest to the U.S. private sector. The Tripoli Country Council is open to all U.S. private sector constituents. For additional information on the Tripoli Country Council, please visit the Tripoli page via <http://www.osac.gov>. For information on how to join or become involved in the Country Council please contact that Regional Security Office in Tripoli or OSAC headquarters.

**ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012**

Reporting Post: Tripoli
RSO Region: NEA
Report Date: 20 Feb 2012

Residential Crime Section:

Residential Crime Section - Questions 1 - 10

1. Crime Mobility:**1a. Justification**

D. Criminal elements roam freely at night, and are active in diplomatic/expatriate/affluent neighborhoods where Post official residences are located. (083)

Libya witnessed a popular uprising against the regime of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi that lasted from February to October 2011 and included fighting throughout the country. Libya is currently governed by the Transitional National Council and is passing through a post-conflict transition to a new government. Many basic state institutions, including emergency services, police, and security, are not yet fully operational. Although active fighting in Libya's civil war concluded in October 2011, various factions and militias continue to vie for power in the absence of a stable political and security environment, often resulting in violence.

While official statistics are often inaccurate and difficult to access, crime levels in Tripoli have significantly increased with the fall of the Qadhafi regime as local militias are demobilized and there remains an absence of effective security and police structures. Carjackings, robberies, burglaries, and thefts have noticeably increased in Tripoli. The majority of the 16,000 criminals released by Qadhafi during the revolution have yet to be re-apprehended. Police and judicial authorities are still in a state of transition, with significant portions of the security infrastructure damaged or destroyed.

Criminal groups, often indistinguishable from 'militia' members, can operate with impunity within the areas their militia controls. Many now possess automatic weapons or even military grade weapons, such as RPGs and vehicle mounted, crew-served machine guns or AA weapons (23mm). The Ministry of Interior reported more than 50 'attacks' on police stations within Tripoli since the TNC declared a cessation of active fighting in October 2011. These attacks are largely militia groups, organized gangs of criminals, and former regime elements who attack police stations in response to a member being detained or arrested.

**ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012****2. Crime Incidents****2a. Justification**

D. Multiple reports of property crimes and at least 1 confrontational crime in proximity, about 1 mile, to Post residences involving victims who were diplomats, expatriates, or affluent host country nationals. (083)

HOTEL TARGETED BY SMALL ARMS FIRE: According to German Embassy officials, the RIXOS hotel received sustained gunfire from an adjacent park during the evenings on 09/28, 09/29, and 09/30 culminating in gunfire which penetrated one of the windows for the German Embassy's security team. The German Embassy officials stated that Hotel Security at the RIXOS advised the gunfire was initiated by pro-Qadhafi forces probing the perimeter security. The German mission left the RIXOS hotel shortly after the incident.

03 OCTOBER 2011 -- GUNFIGHT NEAR MISSION PROPERTY: At approximately 2030 hrs, several vehicles and their passengers were engaged in a moving gunfight which passed in front of a temporary U.S. Embassy residential site. One of the chase vehicle struck an Embassy vehicle parked on an adjacent street, although no injuries of US government personnel was reported as a result of the gunfire. Local council officials provided varied accounts of what had caused the gunfire, the most plausible explanation was that local militia members were chasing a former regime supporter who had recently returned from Tunisia.

14 OCTOBER 2011 -- ARMED ROBBERY OF ORE STAFF: On the morning of 14 October 2011, a member of the Mission's local official residence (ORE) staff, a citizen of Pakistan, was robbed by three males at knife point of his cellular telephone and approximately 200 LYD while walking to a taxi stand. The incident occurred in daylight hours in the Burg al Fateh area of Tripoli. The victim went immediately to a nearby police station to report the incident and was told by the police that they could do nothing since Libya was "without a government or laws".

28 OCTOBER 2011 -- DIPLOMATIC VEHICLE STOLEN: Italian Embassy Security Representatives reported the theft of an unarmored, official Embassy vehicle from outside of the temporary Italian Embassy property. The vehicle bore local Libyan license plates and was parked in front of the Italian Embassy property. The Italian Embassy Security Representatives reported that the vehicle was taken during night-time hours.

30 OCTOBER 2011 -- ATTEMPTED ROBBERY OF WAREHOUSE: On 30 October 2011, at approximately 0315 hrs, at the Embassy's warehouse located on the eastern side of Tripoli, at least 2 unidentified gunmen in an unidentified vehicle began firing their weapons into the air outside the warehouse gate as part of an apparent robbery attempt. The individuals shouted to the local guards on post to open the gate and the guards refused, asking for the identity of the persons in response. At least one of the unidentified gunmen climbed the front vehicle gate and attempted to view the inside of the warehouse compound. Local guards on post contacted the local guard force commander and the landlord for the warehouse, who resides at a house next to the warehouse. The landlord responded to the warehouse via a secondary gate, and fired two rounds from his personal AK47 into the air, causing the unidentified gunmen to flee the area. No injuries or damage to USG property were reported.

01 NOVEMBER 2011 -- MILITIA FIREFIGHT AT HOSPITAL: A group of Zintan militia affiliated fighters

**ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012**

stormed a hospital in Tripoli and demanded the hand-over of a fighter who was wounded earlier in the day. The wounded militiaman had been injured in an earlier clash that also left another militiaman dead. The doctors refused and a Tripoli militia, in charge of hospital security, forced the Zintan affiliated militia out of the hospital. During the altercation, the Zintan affiliated militia reportedly fired rounds at the hospital which escalated the situation. Reinforcements responded to both militias and the fighting escalated to include the use of heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft guns. The gunfight lasted approximately three hours. There were no direct fatalities from the fighting, but three patients at the hospital died due to stress-related causes linked to the clashes. Three Tripoli fighters were wounded. The fighting reportedly ended after calls from a local imam and senior commanders from both groups talked by phone with their men.

03 NOVEMBER 2011-- ATTEMPTED CAR-JACKING OF LES: On 03 November 2011 at 1200 hrs, a US EMBASSY local employed staff member (LES) was targeted for a robbery or car-jacking incident while in the Gargaresh section of Tripoli. According to the LES staff member, he was visiting a local bank on behalf of the Embassy. When the LES pulled into a street near the bank, he noted a vehicle approaching him at a high-rate of speed. The LES staff member reported that the vehicle stopped in front of his car and blocked his path. Two young males then exited the vehicle, told the LES staff member to wait, and then appeared to reach into their vehicle to retrieve automatic weapons. The LES staff member put his car in reverse and began backing out of the area as he continued to observe the two males in front of him. As he was focused on the persons in front of him, the LES staff member did not check his mirrors and hit a vehicle parked behind him. The two individuals got back in their vehicle and sped away. The owner of the vehicle hit by the LES staff member also observed the incident and was understanding given the circumstances.

15 NOVEMBER 2011 -- OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL NGO STRAFFED BY SMALL ARMS FIRE: US Embassy security personnel met with the head of the U.S. based NGO regarding an incident wherein at least two unidentified individuals fired AK-47 rounds at the front of the NGO's office and residential property located in the Gargaresh section of northwest Tripoli. The incident occurred at approximately 0330 on Tuesday, 15 November. Embassy security personnel observed approximately 8-10 impact points on the front of the building, including the front entrance door and an exterior light.

21 NOVEMBER 2011 -- INTERMILITIA FIGHTING AT PALM CITY COMPLEX: U.S. Embassy security officials received confirmed reports from several sources within the local press, business, and diplomatic community that an inter-militia firefight erupted at the front gate area to the Palm City residential area. The Palm City residential area houses the European Union Mission, UN offices, Canadian Ambassador's Residence, German Mission, and several residences of multinational companies. Initial reports indicate that 1-2 militia members, possibly from the Misrata Militia, were killed and 2 more wounded. Reports vary as to the cause of the firefight and whether the Misrata Militia engaged the Zintan Militia, Tripoli Brigade/Tripoli Military Council, or private security at the Palm City complex.

27 NOVEMBER 2011 -- VANDALISM OF VEHICLE AT US EMBASSY: On 27 November at approximately 1700 hours, a U.S. Embassy employee discovered that his vehicle had been vandalized in the employee parking area behind the interim Embassy compound. The driver's side window of the vehicle was smashed but nothing was missing from the vehicle.

**ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012**

28 NOVEMBER 2011 -- VANDALISM OF VEHICLE AT US EMBASSY: On 28 November at approximately 1430 hours, a U.S. Embassy employee discovered that his vehicle had been vandalized in the employee parking area behind the Interim Embassy compound. The passenger side window of the vehicle was smashed but nothing was missing from the vehicle.

29 NOVEMBER 2011 -- RAID OF FARM HOUSE; RECOVERY OF 180 ASSAULT RIFLES NEAR MISSION COMPOUND: On 29 November 2011, fifteen members of the Zintan militia converged on and raided a farm house located within 800 meters of the Interim Embassy and Residential Compounds. The Zintan militia, supported by three trucks with vehicle mounted heavy weapons recovered 100 FN-FAL and 80 AK series rifles and a computer with weapons information. The home reportedly belonged to a Libyan diplomat who had previously worked at the Libyan embassy in South Korea. Elements of the Zintan militia conducted the raid after reportedly detaining an individual with an unregistered assault rifle, who provided information regarding the weapons cache. The homeowner was not present at the time of the raid, however, the militia remained onsite in an effort to apprehend anyone coming to the property.

02 DECEMBER 2011 -- EU STAFF MEMBER CARJACKED: On 02 December, European Union (EU) security reported that a white Hyundai SantaFe was stolen from a local EU staff member during a mid-day carjacking in downtown Tripoli. EU security reported that the vehicle and driver were stopped by what the staff member believed to be militia members at a security checkpoint near Martyrs Square in downtown Tripoli. The militia members reportedly told the EU staff member there was a problem with his vehicle registration and that he needed to follow the militia members to a local police station. The EU staff member was instead led away from downtown Tripoli into a more isolated area, where the militia members forcibly took the Hyundai at gunpoint.

04 DECEMBER 2011 -- MILITIA FIREFIGHT: Sustained inter-militia firefights were reported by NGO and diplomatic contacts in the Jam'a Essaga, Al-hani, Zawia Street, Salah eddine and Shara' Edhill, BenAshur, and Noufleen neighborhoods of Tripoli. The gunfight lasted more than 30 minutes with opposing militias utilizing AK series small arms, DSHK 12.7mm and 23mm automatic cannon fire. At least two persons were reported killed in the clash. Sources in the Bashir Sa'dawi's Brigade stated that an intoxicated armed male was arrested in the Ben Ashour neighborhood and held by Al'Asiam Martyrs' brigade in the former Mutassim Qadhafi residence. Individuals from an unknown militia apparently responded to the area and attempted to forcibly release the detained individual. Elements of security dispatched from the Supreme Security Committee in Tripoli responded to the area and restored calm to the quarter. The former U.S. Embassy compound is located in the neighborhood where the clashes took place. Continued skirmishes in the area also resulted in the closure of Alzawah and Algmehoria streets in Tripoli.

13 DECEMBER 2011 -- GUNFIGHT AT AMAN BANK: The son of Libyan Gen Khalifa Hiftar was injured in a confrontation with members of the Zintan militia at a Tripoli bank. Hiftar's son, Saddam, reportedly triggered the clash by trying to enter the Aman bank armed with a gun and a hand grenade. The Aman bank is guarded by elements of the Zintan militia. A GoL spokesman stated that Saddam was injured in the leg and was taken to a local hospital. Saddam's brother, Belgassim, accused the rebels of abducting Saddam. The Aman Bank is used by many expatriates, including the US Embassy, for banking services.

**ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012**

18 DECEMBER 2011 -- BREAK-IN AND THEFT FROM LES VEHICLE AT US EMBASSY: At approximately 1645 hours, a U.S. Embassy locally employed staff member reported that unknown individuals broke the driver's side rear window of his vehicle, which was parked in the rear parking lot of the Interim Embassy compound. The employee stated that a sound system (portable radio) belonging to the Public Affairs Office was stolen from the rear cargo area of the vehicle. The thief's partial shoe print was noticeable on the rear seat. The employee went to lunch with a 2nd PD section LES at approximately 1200, returning around 1220. This is the third incident since 11/27 involving vandalism and/or theft of a Mission employee's vehicle at the interim Embassy compound.

SIMAS EVENT # 294645

21 DEC 2011 - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT: At approximately 00:50 hours, at a U.S. Embassy annex compound, local guards found a wooden pallet leaning against the interior side of the perimeter wall. Above the wall where the pallet was located, a leather belt was draped over the barbed wire. Security personnel conducted a security sweep of the compound to determine whether an intruder entered the facility or if anything was stolen. No one was found and there were no signs of theft or vandalism.

29 DEC 2011 -- BURGLARY AT NGO OFFICE: On 29 December, the office of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), a DoS institutional contractor, was burglarized. NDI attempted to deposit operating funds into their Tripoli bank account on the 28th of December, however, the bank refused to make the deposit without documentation showing how the funds were brought into the country. At the time of the burglary, the offices were empty so no injuries occurred. The perpetrators entered through a ground floor metal office door, gained access to the finance office area, and carried away a 100kg safe. Libyan police investigated the incident and initially detained a guard and driver working on short-term contracts with NDI; they have since been released by the police and their contracts suspended. Police now claim they don't have sufficient evidence or leads to proceed with the investigation.

03 JANUARY 2012 -- CLASHES IN TRIPOLI: Clashes between militia elements from Misurata and Tripoli closed down a major area of downtown Tripoli for several hours in the early afternoon on 03 January. The fighting, which lasted for roughly 30 minutes, occurred in an area between the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Interior and reportedly involved heavy weapons fire including RPG's. Embassy security officers present in the area witnessed the deployment of several technicals (commercial vehicles with crew served weapons) and at least 20 troops. The media has reported between one and five casualties but Post was unable to confirm this information

07 JANUARY 2012 - FRENCH BUSINESSMAN MURDERED: A French businessman, identified as Hugues de Samie, age 60, a former French serviceman, was killed at his residence in the Zawiet al-Dahmani neighborhood of Tripoli. Sources indicate that Samie may have been targeted by a group of 2-3 individuals, possibly for his former business dealings with the Qadhafi regime. Witnesses stated that nothing of value was taken from the residence, north African domestic workers at the residence were unharmed by the assailants, and Samie was shot at close range with a handgun. Samie, a former member of the French military with a long military career, worked in Libya since 2008 for Construction Mecanique de Normandie (CMN), a French shipyard. He had reportedly been involved in attempts to sell naval patrol



ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012

boats to Muammar Qadhafi's regime and to win contracts to modernize Libyan frigates bought in the 1970s. Libyan authorities arrested one suspect in the killing, identified as Mohammed al-Kurdi, 28, "The [arrested] criminal is a drug addict and his motive was theft. There are no political motives.

10 JANUARY 2012 -- EMBASSY LES VEHICLE BREAK-IN; THEFT: At approximately 15:30 hours, on 10 January 2012, U.S. Embassy local guard force members reported hearing the sound of glass breaking in the rear parking lot of the interim Embassy compound. Inspection of the parking lot by LGF and LE Staff approximately 5-10 minutes later showed that the front passenger side window of a GSO LES employee's car was smashed. The window had been completely broken and there were traces of blood on some of the glass. Items from the glove box, console and side pockets of Ajaj's car were strewn about the interior of the car.

The LES employee stated that 1,000 Libyan Dinars were missing from the center console storage compartment; he said he had gone to the bank at approximately 08:00 hours. No other items appeared to be missing. The car was parked approximately 15 meters from the wall of the Embassy compound but next to an olive tree blocking any direct view from the back gate. SIMAS Event # 294644.

16 JANUARY 2012- GRENADE FIGHTS: According to diplomatic security contacts, several people were injured, one seriously, when an individual threw a hand grenade in Martyrs Square. The incident took place between the hours of 2130-2200 hrs. Hospital contacts confirmed that the seriously injured had lost a leg. Tripoli police reportedly sought the support of a police-led militia unit to restore order in the square.

RSO received additional reports of grenades thrown in Souq al Juma at approximately 0200 hrs.

23 JANUARY 2012 -- MILITIA FIREFIGHT: On Monday 23 January, at approximately 0115 hrs, local police and security contacts confirmed that a firefight occurred between two militias in the Fashlum area of Tripoli. The fight occurred between a group led by 4 brothers from the Kabuka family and a group from the nearby Abu Salim neighborhood. The firefight lasted 60-90 minutes and involved small arms fire and at least 3 RPG explosions. Two fatalities were confirmed in the fighting (1 Kabuka/1 Abu Salim Brigade), a third individual was listed as deceased (unconfirmed/Kabuka), and at least one seriously wounded, possibly fatally (Kabuka). A subsequent raid of the Kabuka family residence uncovered various small arms, RPGs, an undisclosed amount of funds, and an unknown amount of Ecstasy tablets.

MILITIA FIREFIGHT: A second firefight was reported between midnight and 0300 hrs on Monday, 23 January, in the area near the Al Waddan Hotel, along the cornice area of Tripoli. The gunfight started at a check-point a few meters from Al Waddan hotel. The militia in charge in that area insisted on controlling and checking the identification of members of other militias who passed the checkpoint. An argument ensued when the militia in charge of the checkpoint challenged IDs of another militia who were passing the checkpoint. There was sustained gunfire and explosions during the fire fight, although reportedly no wounded or killed in the incident.

However, a source at a local hospital confirmed that a total of 9 individuals died in fighting in Tripoli during the evening and early morning of 22 / 23 January.



ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012

MILITIA FIREFIGHT: A third firefight was reported at approximately 1640 hours and continued for approximately 45 minutes in the eastern portion of the city, adjacent to the 2nd ring road, in the vicinity of where we maintain a GSO warehouse (MGRS Coordinates: 33SUS31705 39814). There is a former ESO office/operations center in the area and the two militias apparently have been fighting over the control of the site. Roadblocks were placed on several of the primary roads but were removed at the conclusion of fighting. RSO received unconfirmed reports that two persons were killed.

TRAFFIC POLICE OFFICER KIDNAPPED; KILLED: On 23 January 2012, a Tripoli Police traffic officer was kidnapped and later killed by unknown assailants while walking home from his duty post south of Grey 4 on the airport road. The officer was wearing his traffic police uniform. The incident occurred at approximately 1400 hrs, and the officer's body was found later along the airport road with hands tied behind his back, and numerous bullet wounds in his back. Ministry of Interior contacts advised that this was the third Tripoli based police officer to be killed since November 2011 in similar circumstances. In at least two of the cases, the officer's vehicle was taken, and the Ministry of Interior is trying to determine the motive for the crimes.

ATTEMPTED CARJACKING OF OIL COMPANY VEHICLE: On 27 January 2011, at 1300 hrs, a vehicle belonging to a Western oil company was enroute to Tripoli International Airport when it was forced to slow down by a group of youths. The vehicle contained one driver and two passengers. The occupants felt that they were being targeted for a robbery or carjacking as the youths attempted to intimidate the occupants and one of the assailants attempted to open one of the vehicle doors. As the vehicle slowly tried to move forward, another youth was 'bumped', but not injured. The group of youth converged on the vehicle and smashed the rear window. The driver took evasive action and departed the scene. The vehicle occupants did not report any injuries. No report of firearms being displayed or used.

INTER-MILITIA GUNFIGHT: At approximately, 1500 hrs, a gunfight erupted between elements of the Zintan and Misrata militias when elements of the Zintan brigade used force, including AK47s, heavy weapons and 1-2 RPG's to gain entry to a compound behind the Marriot Hotel, on the seafront. This compound is thought to be occupied by fighters from Misratah. (The compound was once owned and used by Saad Gaddafi)

The Zintan group then freed a fighter that had been arrested by fighters from Misratah prior to the engagement. The main initial engagement lasted 20 – 25 minutes and was limited to the area close to that of the compound. Fighting was also reported at Saif al-Islam Qadhafi's beach house that had been occupied by the Zintan militia.

3. Crime Environment

C. Within walking distance or easy public transit access, about one mile, of high-crime areas, which are perceived as unsafe because street and residential crimes are common day and night. (016)

**ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012****3a. Justification**

The primary cause for an increasing crime rate is the political instability and lack of police and security officials after 8-months of civil war. Only 60% of the police have returned to duty and must rely on the various heavily armed militias for support in carrying out their duties. The militias control the neighborhoods and streets during the day time, but particularly at night, when most police are hesitant to come out of the stations to confront more heavily armed militias or criminal gangs.

Criminal groups, often indistinguishable from 'militia' members, can operate with impunity within their areas of control. Many now possess automatic weapons or even military grade weapons, such as RPGs and vehicle mounted, crew-served machine guns or AA weapons (23mm). The Ministry of Interior reported more than 50 'attacks' on police stations within Tripoli since the TNC declared a cessation of active fighting in October 2011. These attacks are largely militia groups, organized gangs of criminals, and former regime elements who attack police stations in response to a member being detained or arrested.

The Ministry of Interior is increasingly concerned that semi-organized groups of criminals made up of 16,000 inmates released during the revolution, former regime elements, and disaffected militia members, are involved in the surge in violent crimes.

3b. Crime Environment Addendum

Currently, all COM personnel are required to reside in a residential compound in close proximity to the high-speed airport road.

The primary cause for an increasing crime rate is the political instability and lack of police and security officials after 8-months of civil war. Only 60% of the police have returned to duty and must rely on the various heavily armed militias for support in carrying out their duties. The militias control the neighborhoods and streets during the day time, but particularly at night, when most police are hesitant to come out of the stations to confront more heavily armed militias or criminal gangs.

Criminal groups, often indistinguishable from 'militia' members, can operate with impunity within their areas of control. Many now possess automatic weapons or even military grade weapons, such as RPGs and vehicle mounted, crew-served machine guns or AA weapons (23mm). The Ministry of Interior reported more than 50 'attacks' on police stations within Tripoli since the TNC declared a cessation of active fighting in October 2011. These attacks are largely militia groups, organized gangs of criminals, and former regime elements who attack police stations in response to a member being detained or arrested.

4. Aggressiveness of Criminals

D. Do not avoid, and may seek, violent confrontation during burglaries or street crimes, and are not deterred by police or private security response to alarm or emergency calls. (200)



ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012

4a. Justification

Criminal groups, often indistinguishable from 'militia' members, operate with impunity within their areas of control. Many now possess automatic weapons or even military grade weapons, such as RPGs and vehicle mounted, crew-served machine guns or AA weapons (23mm). Criminals have little concern with confrontations with police or ministry of interior officials. The Ministry of Interior reported more than 50 'attacks' on police stations within Tripoli since the TNC declared a cessation of active fighting in October 2011. These attacks are largely militia groups, organized gangs of criminals, and former regime elements who attack police stations in response to a member being detained or arrested.

5. Armed Criminals

D. Carrying firearms, handguns or shoulder weapons. (083)

5a. Justification

Many now possess automatic weapons or even military grade weapons, such as RPGs and vehicle mounted, crew-served machine guns or AA weapons (23mm). Criminals have little concern with confrontations with police or ministry of interior officials.

6. Aggregation of Criminals

C. Operate in groups of two to four individuals, are disposed occasionally to be confrontational and gratuitously violent. (016)

6a. Justification

The Ministry of Interior is particularly concerned about the uptick in crimes committed by groups made up of persons who were released from jail during the revolution (estimated at 16,000), former regime supporters, and disaffected former militia members. The Ministry of Interior also believes that senior former regime officials and members of the Qadhafi family are funding such semi-organized groups as a method to undermine the current government.

7. Police Effectiveness: Residential Crime

B. Police or neighborhood assn. are partially effective at deterring major residential property crime, and responses to alarms or emergency calls are sufficiently prompt and effective to disrupt/neutralize burglaries. (004)

7a. Justification

Currently, the most effective deterrent to residential and non-residential violent crime has been ad-hoc neighborhood militias, many armed with AK-47s, heavy weapons, and vehicle mounted weapons. Professionalism and training standards of these various militias, often made up of volunteers, varies considerably. Militia members operate checkpoints within and between major cities. Libyan militia members are poorly trained and loosely affiliated with the interim government. In some instances, militias have made arrests on scant evidence and held detainees in substandard conditions.



ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012

8. Police Effectiveness: Violent Residential Crime

B. Police or neighbor assn. are partially effective at deterring violent crime and responses to alarms or emergency calls are prompt and effective to disrupt crimes in progress. Case closure and conviction rates are mod/high for violent crimes. (016)

8a. Justification

Currently, the most effective deterrent to residential and non-residential violent crime has been ad-hoc neighborhood militias, many armed with AK-47s, heavy weapons, and vehicle mounted weapons. Professionalism and training standards of these various militias, often made up of volunteers, varies considerably. Militia members operate checkpoints within and between major cities. Libyan militia members are poorly trained and loosely affiliated with the interim government. In some instances, militias have made arrests on scant evidence and held detainees in substandard conditions.

9. Police Mobility

B. Police have partially reliable access to transport and/or fixed posts in neighborhoods where diplomats, expatriates and affluent host country nationals live. (004)

9a. Justification

Police are rebuilding their infrastructure and resources, to include vehicle resources. Gasoline is inexpensive although the budget and support infrastructure within the police and Ministry of Interior are still recovering from the Libyan revolution.

10. Professionalism of Police

E. Are unprofessional, ill-trained, generally inept, susceptible to bribery if initiated by others, and unresponsive to alarms and investigation of incidents in Post official neighborhoods. (040) 10a.

Justification

The Libyan civil war has left the Ministry of Interior and urban police forces under strength, outgunned, and unmotivated to respond to even the most basic crimes. While the Ministry of Interior has received donations of uniforms, equipment, and vehicles from Arab League and EU countries, these items are not standardized causing issues of interoperability. Training resources are overwhelmed trying to meet the need of disarmament and integration of militia fighters into the Ministry of Interior. Officers within the mid-level and senior-levels of the police and Ministry of Interior are frequently shifted around to various postings and directorates as the government is in transition. Salaries have been delayed as Libya recovers from UN sanctions and rebuilds its financial and budgetary infrastructure.

Non-Residential Crime Section

Non-Residential Crime Section Questions 1 – 9

**ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012****1. Homicides/Murders**

B. Occur with some frequency, but normally under avoidable circumstances and in specific geographic areas. Diplomats & expatriates need take only the most basic precautions to avoid being in the "wrong place at the wrong time." (005)

1b. Justification

Post has received reports of local police being murdered in Tripoli, possibly for ties to the former regime or a form of revenge against former regime officials. In some instances, militias have made arrests on scant evidence and held detainees in substandard conditions, which have included torture and death while in custody.

2. Sexual Violence

B. Sexual Violence occurs with some frequency, but normally under avoidable circumstances and in specific areas. Personnel need take only the most basic precautions to avoid being targeted or being in the "wrong place at the wrong time." (005)

2b. Justification

Sexual harassment of women, property crime, and petty street crime are the most common problems faced by international companies in Libya prior to the revolution. Neither the police nor the Ministry of Interior keep reliable records on sexual violence, although Post believes that such crimes have increased along with all other forms of violent and non-violent crime.

3. Other Violent Crime

C. Occur with some frequency, including in areas where diplomats and expats congregate. Diplomats & expats can adjust their routines (ex. Group travel, off-limit areas) to minimize the chance of being targeted or in the "wrong place/wrong time." (035)

3b. Justification

Most violent crime takes place after dark, when existing police and Ministry of Interior officers retreat into police stations and abdicate control of neighborhoods to various militia units.

4. Non-Residential Burglary

B. Does occur with some frequency, but generally in hotels, office buildings, and other establishments not owned, managed and/or frequented by the diplomatic and expatriate community. (005)

4b. Justification

Warehouses have been targeted by criminal groups and looters during and after the Libyan revolution. Occasionally, militia groups have 'seized' sites purportedly for being pro-Qadhafi.

**ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012****5. Non-Confrontational Theft**

B. Occasionally occurs, but generally can be mitigated via the most basic awareness measures. In cases where diplomats & expatriates report theft, poor security practices on the victim's part are often a factor in the event. (005)

5b. Justification**6. Vehicle Theft**

D. Vehicles are regularly stolen even with security devices. Vehicle theft is as likely to take place in expat/diplomat/affluent areas as compared to the wider metropolitan area. Stolen vehicles are unlikely to be recovered. (080)

6b. Justification

Post and the Ministry of Interior report a rising number of vehicle thefts since the Libyan revolution. All forms of crime have increased as police, security, and enforcement agencies lack the resources, personnel, and ability to investigate these crimes or prosecute suspects. High-end SUV and luxury sedans are more likely to be stolen and many are transported across the Egyptian, Nigerian, or Chadian borders where the Government of Libya no longer has any effective border security units in place.

Looting of vehicles was widespread during the fighting of the Libyan civil war, to include all of the U.S. Embassy official and personnel vehicles. Approximately 20% of the USG vehicles, damaged beyond repair, were found at the former External Security Office (ESO) compound in eastern Tripoli.

7. Carjacking

C. Occur with some frequency, including in areas where diplomats and expats commonly drive. Diplomats & expats can adjust their routes (ex. off-limit areas) to minimize the chance of being targeted or in the "wrong place/wrong time." (035)

7b. Justification

An increasing tactic of carjackers and short-term kidnapers is to stop vehicles and victims under the guise of a militia or security checkpoint. The victims are then separated from their vehicles, often at gunpoint. Several foreigners and international companies in Tripoli have reported carjackings in this manner. Unfortunately, even 'legitimate' checkpoints are not centrally controlled by the Ministry of Interior, adding to the overall confused security environment, and thus the effectiveness of this criminal tactic.

8. Kidnapping

B. Occurs with some frequency, but normally under avoidable circumstances and in specific geographic areas. Diplomats and expatriates need take only the most basic precautions to avoid being in the "wrong place at the wrong time." (035)

**ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ACEQ) 2012****8b. Justification**

Post has received an increasing number of reports of kidnappings within Libya, and particularly Tripoli, these crimes have not specifically targeted diplomats or U.S. citizens. Diplomats can adjust their routines to minimize the risk of kidnapping. Many kidnappings are politically motivated and often have an element of revenge as a motivation against those perceived as enemies under the former regime.

Elements of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other violent extremists fought in the Libyan civil war against the Qadhafi regime. Such groups have used kidnapping as a means of financing in the past.

9. Fraud/Economic Crime

B. Occurs but almost exclusively affects the local community. (005)

9b. Justification

As Libya is largely a cash economy, ATM, ID theft, and bank fraud are not as common as in countries with highly developed electronic financial systems. A black market in currency does exist. Unfortunately, with the removal of the former autocratic government and its enforcement and intelligence systems, would-be criminals need only create their own documents, letter head, ID cards, and credentials to show membership in a militia, local council, or to create a business. The Libyan state, as it recovers from 8 months of civil war, lacks the enforcement mechanisms to investigate or prosecute even the simplest of economic crimes.

From: draper, hannah a
Sent: 8/8/2012 5:55:58 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: The Guns of August: security in eastern Libya

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MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 952
Date/DTG: Aug 08, 2012 / 080856Z AUG 12
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE/ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, LY
Captions: SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
Subject: The Guns of August: security in eastern Libya

1. (SBU) Summary: Since the eve of the elections, Benghazi has moved from trepidation to euphoria and back as a series of violent incidents has dominated the political landscape during the Ramadan holiday. These incidents have varied widely in motivation and severity. There have been abductions and assassinations, but there have also been false alarms and outright fabrications. The individual incidents have been organized, but this is not an organized campaign. What we are going through – and what people here are resolved to get through – is a confluence rather than a conspiracy. The Supreme Security Council (SSC), designed to be an interim security measure, has not coalesced into a stabilizing force, and provides little deterrence. Across the political spectrum, people concede the necessity of a security apparatus that is strong enough to keep peace, but many inherently fear abuse by the same authorities. This debate, playing out daily in Benghazi, has created the security vacuum that a diverse group of independent actors are exploiting for their own purposes. End Summary.
2. (SBU) In response to the widely reported security incidents of the past week, security forces have increased their profile and are now a more visible, though still understaffed, presence on Benghazi streets. Most prominent is Benghazi's SSC, assembled from former members of various militias as an interim security measure. However, even in the assessment of its own commander, Fawzi Younis, SSC Benghazi has not coalesced into an effective, stable security force.
3. (SBU) The absence of significant deterrence, has contributed to a security vacuum that is being exploited by independent actors: Ordinary criminals are able to engage in crimes that are more about profit than politics with relative impunity; car jackings and smuggling are particular concerns. Former regime elements are active because they believe that attacking the Revolution in its cradle will have maximum impact on public opinion. Islamist extremists are able to attack the Red Cross with relative impunity, and UN officials tell us human trafficking is on the rise. Violence at hospitals has become a particular concern, with security guards reportedly walking out after demands for treatment have escalated into shootings. Police in the eastern city of Marj have also staged sit-ins to protest lack of government follow-through on promises made to them as well.
4. (SBU) Though most acknowledge the need, others fear the government's potential strength. But a centralized and professional security force is the future, and contacts across the political spectrum concede that the government needs to

be strong enough to keep the peace (though strongly committed to doing so within checks and balances). This is a long-term prospect the militias regard with suspicion at best. As Benghazi navigates the move from a Transitional Council no one respects to a National Congress no one yet knows, they are clearly jockeying for position in a game that involves public relations and private intimidation. (Comment: A surprising number of contacts here dismiss many of the recent incidents – particularly the bombs that were reportedly discovered and disarmed – as having been engineered by the various security forces to discredit their rivals, to improve their own standing, and to seize prime real estate. End Comment).

5. (SBU) Comment: The SSC has increased its presence in the wake of the most recent string of security incidents in Benghazi. This approach is all authorities can do at present. But it is not clear whether it will prove to be effective. What we have seen are not random crimes of opportunity, but rather targeted and discriminate attacks. Attackers are unlikely to be deterred until authorities are at least as capable. End comment.

Signature: STEVENS

Drafted By: Benghazi:Gaudiosi, Eric V (Benghazi)

Cleared By: POL-ECON:McFarland, David C

Hicks, Gregory N

Approved By: EXEC:Stevens, John C

Released By: TRIPOLI:draper, hannah a

Info: DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC RUEHRCROUTINE;
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DCROUTINE;
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE; DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
ROUTINE; DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE;
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE; CIA WASHINGTON DC
ROUTINE; CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GEROUTINE; FBI WASHINGTON DCROUTINE;
AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVEROUTINE; ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVEROUTINE

Action Post:

Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

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From: draper, hannah a
Sent: 9/4/2012 5:24:45 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Benghazi Weekly Report - September 4, 2012

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MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 1078
Date/DTG: Sep 04, 2012 / 040925Z SEP 12
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE/ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KISL, LY
Captions: SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
Subject: Benghazi Weekly Report - September 4, 2012

1. (SBU) Summary. This is Benghazi's weekly round-up of political, economic, and social issues not included in previous reporting.
2. (SBU) **September 1 "Maximum Alert"**: Public comments from senior Interior Ministry officials August 29 regarding the immediate and indefinite introduction of a "state of maximum alert" in Benghazi took many here by surprise. The morning rush hour passed without event, but security forces have maintained a visible presence in the city throughout the week, including staffing checkpoints that had long been idle. They have been out in force at the airport since August 30, and the police have established a 24/7 police presence at the Mission in response to our long-standing request. Since the alert, authorities here are tracking numerous security incidents, including a car bombing in downtown Benghazi allegedly targeting former Interior Ministry officers and a thwarted attack on the Benghazi branch of the Central Bank.
3. (SBU) Coordination is still an open question. An hour-long gun battle broke out between local police and militia forces August 28 following the arrest of a militia member for allegedly stealing weapons, demonstrating the very delicate dynamic among the city's official and unofficial security forces. The rationale for the alert, given as the threat from former regime elements, also strikes many Benghazi natives as odd. Qadhafi loyalists have been targets more than threats here of late, and have kept a very low profile in the face of strong Revolutionary and Islamist sentiment. Although some point to the anniversary of Qadhafi's revolution September 1 as a potential rallying point for former regime elements, to the more conspiratorially-minded of Benghazi's citizens, the Ministry's announcement appears to be an effort to distract attention from Tripoli's own highly-publicized difficulties keeping the peace in the West.
4. (SBU) **Port Manager Outlines Expansion Project**: Benghazi Port Manager Mustafa al-Abbar told PO August 28 that the port is functioning at pre-Revolutionary levels but could expand capacity dramatically through an ambitious two-year construction project. The plan calls for dredging down to a depth of 18 meters to accommodate up to 10 container ships simultaneously, and converting the original piers to a port for tourist vessels and other pleasure craft. Al-Abbar says that current capacity allows the port to handle 3 container ships simultaneously, causing a 7-10 day wait as ships queue up in the Mediterranean or even transfer their cargos to smaller vessels in Malta for delivery here. He commented confidently that "the money is there" for the port expansion, but was less definitive regarding his chain of command, commenting

only that the port reported to "the government." He went out of his way to predict that more goods from the U.S. would begin to enter the port "now that you have finally started issuing visas."

5. (SBU) UK Presence: A planned visit by the UK Embassy's DCM was postponed due to transportation problems, and has been rescheduled to September 5. The UK's local office will remain closed but we understand that plans are underway to assess reopening on or about the beginning of October.

Signature: HICKS

Drafted By: BENGHAZI:Gaudiosi, Eric V

Cleared By: U.S. Embassy Tripoli:draper, hannah a
POL-ECON:McFarland, David C

Approved By: Hicks, Gregory N

Released By: TRIPOLI:draper, hannah a

Info: DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC RUEHRCROUTINE ;
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
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Action Post:

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From: Plickens, Amber R
Sent: 9/11/2012 5:01:30 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: TRIPOLI WEEKLY REPORT- SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

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MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 1096
Date/DTG: Sep 11, 2012 / 110912Z SEP 12
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EINT, KDEM, KJUS, LY
Captions: SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
Subject: TRIPOLI WEEKLY REPORT- SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

1. (SBU) This is Embassy Tripoli's weekly round-up of political, economic, and social issues not included in previous reporting.
2. (SBU) **GNC to Choose PM:** The General National Congress (GNC) has set itself a deadline of September 12 to select Libya's next Prime Minister. Of the eight announced candidates, the front-runners are Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, leader of the liberal National Front Alliance; Dr. Mustafa AbuShagur, the current Deputy Prime Minister; and Dr. Awad al-Barasi, the current Electricity Minister and announced candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party. The process, according to several GNC members with whom Post has spoken, will begin on September 10, when each candidate will participate in a 90 minute presentation and question and answer session before the full Congress. The proceedings will be televised.
3. (SBU) **Update on UNSMIL's Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Efforts:** Poloff learned on September 3 that UNSMIL's Transitional Justice and Rule of Law team is rethinking how it works with the international community and the GOL to coordinate donor assistance. One change that will likely be made is that UNSMIL will host regular meetings between key GOL and embassy stakeholders to review assistance offers to ensure they meet the GOL's needs and that accepted proposals are complementary and build on current programs. (Comment: To date, the Justice team has hosted meetings for the international community without the presence of GOL officials. These meetings have tended to be fairly unproductive as the UNSMIL staff typically briefed a large group on the status of assistance and then relied upon the attendees to update a matrix of assistance offers. End Comment.) The UNSMIL Justice team also told Poloff that the UNDP has repackaged its \$8.6 million assistance proposal that the MOJ rejected in the spring. UNDP intends to resubmit the proposal to the MOJ in the coming weeks and is confident that the revised proposal will be accepted this time around. Once accepted, the Danish Charge reported his government will contribute funds to the project.
4. (SBU) **Transitional Justice Community Prepares for Constitution:** USAID representatives attended a Transitional Justice Informal Information Exchange hosted by No Peace without Justice on Sep 5. The transitional justice community is focused on preparing lawyers and civilian society for the upcoming constitution-drafting process along with capacity building within the sector. For example, Lawyers for Justice in Libya, a group comprised of Libyan Diaspora attorneys, is

organizing a bus tour of local Libyan lawyers who will travel around Libya in early October to explain the constitutional process and gather feedback at the grassroots level. In addition, the Tripoli Bar Association is working with several NGOs to build individual capacity of attorneys and institutional capacity of the bar, focusing on constitutional and election processes and transitional justice remedies for addressing transgressions of the former regime.

5. (SBU) **Possible Danish Contribution to Missing Persons Project:** On August 30, Danish Charge Anders Tang Friberg told Poloff that he will consider matching the USG's \$700,000 contribution to the \$3 million International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) project that aims to improve the forensics capability within the Ministry of Martyrs and Families of the Missing (MMM). Poloff provided a copy of the ICMP proposal submitted to the GOL early this spring to Friberg and discussed the USG's plan to support some of ICMP's work outlined in the proposal. Poloff also provided background on ICMP's ongoing work with the current government and its failed efforts to date to secure a contribution from the GOL for its proposal. Poloff stressed that ICMP is fairly confident that with donations from the USG and a few other key donors, the Libyans will be more likely to contribute to the work. Friberg told Poloff he will discuss the proposal with Copenhagen and meet with MMM officials. He also noted his colleague in Washington had a similar conversation with Ambassador Bill Taylor on the subject in mid-August.

6. (SBU) **Firm Pursuing Financial Sector Reform:** On September 3, econoff met with a representative from Financial Services Volunteer Corps (FSVC), which had been providing financial sector technical assistance to the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Stock Market since 2008. FSVC does not have any current work underway with the GOL, and the representative from Tunis was exploring new opportunities during his trip to Libya. He identified several opportunities, including working with Libyan banks to develop risk management practices. He noted that Libyan banks have traditionally lent only to state-owned enterprises that cannot default, and he sees an opportunity to help foster entrepreneurship by working with banks to develop risk portfolios. FSVC is interested in working with the GOL on its SME initiative, and highlighted the lack of venture capitalists and angel investors as an impediment to SME growth. He further cited an abundance of bureaucratic procedures hindering new business start-ups and spoke of the need for a diversified economy.

7. (SBU) **Forming a Local NAPEO Chapter:** During a September 4 meeting with econoff, Tamim Baiou, who is the Libyan U.S. - North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity (NAPEO) representative, shared his plans for forming a local NAPEO chapter. To ensure he had the right group of dedicated professionals, Baiou said he wanted to start holding events with groups of 50 or more businesspersons and civil society members, to include men and women from geographically diverse parts of the country, and shop the concept to these participants. Once they are familiar with NAPEO's goals of job creation, employment, education and entrepreneurship through public-private partnerships with the U.S., Baiou said he envisioned reducing the group to around seven individuals who would make up the board. He anticipated the larger event would happen when Aspen Institute representatives come to Libya at the end of September. He added that it was important to address the reasons for U.S. interest in partnering with Libya, noting that he is frequently asked this question. Baiou expressed his hope that the 2014 NAPEO conference be held in Tripoli. Wearing his other hat working for alRakiza, he said he was working on getting the TOEFL exam offered in Libya; sending Libyans to the Colorado School of Mines; developing training programs for aspiring entrepreneurs; and bringing an education delegation to Libya in conjunction with IIE.

8. (SBU) **e-Libya Update:** Khaled elMufti, from the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications (ICT), updated econoff on September 5 with the latest developments regarding the e-Libya initiative. He said that the ICT ministry just awarded a contract to PwC (though this has not yet been publicized), which will work on the e-Libya strategy and publish the RFPs for implementation. He anticipated there would be over 200 projects coming out of PwC's work, the most prominent of which would be building a data center in Benghazi to host e-government applications. While the ICT ministry and all of the telecommunication companies are based in Tripoli, elMufti said that e-Libya would be primarily based in Benghazi. Eventually the ministry plans to build a second data center in Tripoli. He was confident that the e-Libya initiative would continue, believing that Minister Anwar Fituri would remain in his position. elMufti expressed an interest in setting up a study tour to the U.S. to see how various e-service initiatives are run. He specifically mentioned visiting Silicon Valley and seeing Stanford University's e-learning program. While there, he would like to meet with U.S. companies to explore collaboration opportunities. He requested assistance by the State Department in setting up such a visit.

9. (SBU) Indicator Mapping Exercise Completed for Tripoli: USAID/OTI has developed a first draft indicator map of Tripoli neighborhoods to better enable the program to target communities for political transition processes support. Program staff and local partners gathered specific information on indicators such as high crime rates, low socio-economic status, anti-revolution sentiments, perception of government, and population density (see attached Tripoli survey map). The USAID/OTI program will further build upon this mapping and is currently undergoing similar mapping exercises in priority program regions and towns around the country, including the Nafusa mountains, Sabha, Kufra and Derna.

Signature: STEVENS

Drafted By: ECON:Servello, Alyssa N

Cleared By: POL-ECON:McFarland, David C
EXEC:Hicks, Gregory N

Approved By: EXEC:Stevens, John C

Released By: TRIPOLI:Pickens, Amber R

Info: DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; FBI WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
CIA WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GEROUTINE ;
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
ROUTINE ; DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC RUEHRCROUTINE ;
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Attachments: OTI_Tripoli_Indicator_Survey_9-2012.jpg

Action Post:

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UNCLASSIFIED
SBU

From: Pickens, Amber R
Sent: 6/25/2012 3:11:32 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: LIBYA S FRAGILE SECURITY DETERIORATES AS TRIBAL RIVALRIES, POWER PLAYS AND EXTREMISM INTENSIFY
Attachments: Metadata.dat

UNCLASSIFIED
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MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 622
Date/DTG: Jun 25, 2012 / 250712Z JUN 12
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ASEC, KCRM, KJUS, KISL, LY
Captions: SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
Reference: 12 TRIPOLI 582
Subject: LIBYA'S FRAGILE SECURITY DETERIORATES AS TRIBAL RIVALRIES, POWER PLAYS AND EXTREMISM INTENSIFY

1. (SBU) Summary: The recent increase in violent incidents throughout Libya has taken two distinct tracks: 1) clashes between Libyan groups; and, to a lesser degree 2) attacks against western interests. The proliferation of militias and the absence of effective security and intelligence services have limited the GOL's ability to decisively respond. Fighting among Libyans is most prominent on the western and southern borders. Targeted attacks against western interests had been primarily limited to the East but have recently occurred in the west and south. While clashes have been largely localized, they share common threads: intensified tribal rivalries; criminality; and, struggles for regional and political power. The motivation for specific attacks against western interests is less apparent, but likely includes a combination of religious extremism, xenophobia, and power-posturing. This cable examines key factors underlying the recent uptick in violence, assessing its causes and implications for progress in the post-revolutionary transition. **End Summary.**

INTRA- LIBYAN VIOLENCE ON THE RISE

2. (SBU) Libya has experienced an increase in localized fighting during the first half of 2012. Along Libya's western border, fighting between tribes in Zuwara and Ghadames has led to frequent border closures and the disruption of travel and trade with Tunisia. Along Libya's northwest coast, militias from Zintan have engaged the Mashasha and the Shigiga tribes, battling for control of strategic trade and smuggling routes through the Nafusa Mountains. Militias from Misrata regularly raid Tewargha camps in Tripoli and conduct frequent sorties into Sirte and surrounding areas to suppress alleged pro-Qadhafi loyalists. In southern Libya, frequent battles between Tebou and Arab tribes in Kufra and Sebha have resulted in hundreds killed. The southern Arab tribes claim that most of the Tebou are pro-Qadhafi supporters from Niger and Chad, while the Tebou respond that they largely supported the revolution and accuse the Arab tribes of a racially motivated campaign to force the Tebou out of Sebha and Kufra.

3. (SBU) The intra-Libyan conflicts have been largely contained within each region and have not involved large-scale, nationwide fighting – nor do they appear to involve any attempts to undermine the state of Libya or seize national power by force. The GOL has had some success in dispatching its nascent national army and high-level mediators, such Prime

Minister ElKeib, Defense Minister Juwaili and TNC Chairman Mustafa Abd al-Jalil, to quell the worst of the violence and prevent it from escalating further. These efforts have mostly focused on negotiating limited ceasefires, rather than addressing underlying causes of the conflicts – which continued to simmer until specific events renew outbreaks of violence. While the specifics of each conflict vary by tribe and region, they are largely driven by the same central dynamics, including intensified personality- and tribal-based rivalries, competition over smuggling routes, and projection of regional power – all of which are aggravated by the lack of effective institutions or reliable security forces. Until the GOL is able to effectively deal with these key issues, the violence is likely to continue and worsen.

TRIBAL DIVISIONS PERSIST

4. (SBU) In some ways, the recent upsurge in fighting between Libyans is a product of long-standing tribal rivalries that were exacerbated by Qadhafi-era manipulation and fighting during the revolution. Qadhafi strategically exploited tribal rivalries, favoring “loyal” tribes with arms, government positions and income from contracts and smuggling, while marginalizing any who were seen as a threat to regime stability. For example, Qadhafi strongly opposed the Amazigh people in Zuwara and the Nafusa Mountains, banning their language and schools and periodically employing brute squads from nearby Arab communities to punish any perceived signs of “Amazigh nationalism.” Similarly, the regime backed the Meshasha tribe over Zintan, the Tewragha against Misrata families and certain Tebou and Tuareg groups against Arab tribes in southern Libya. During the revolution, these divides largely dictated the sides taken by the tribes. Qadhafi’s favored tribes naturally supported the regime and marginalized groups joined the revolution. Fighting between these rival groups was often intense and bloody – especially the sieges of Misrata and Zintan – and remains fresh in the memory of both sides. Many militias turned to vigilantism in the absence of national efforts to address perceived crimes stemming from before and during the revolution, resulting in arbitrary detentions and occasional revenge attacks. Since January, Misratan militias have regularly raided Tewargha camps seeking “wanted fugitives,” while the capture and abuse of militia commanders in Zuwara and Sebha were the catalysts for periodic rounds of violence there. The close proximity of rival tribes, combined with an overabundance of readily-available weapons and lingering distrust create an environment where even small disputes can quickly escalate into armed violence.

COMPETITION FOR SMUGGLING ROUTES FUELS CONFLICT

5. (SBU) Another key factor driving the conflicts along Libya’s borders is the struggle between different groups to assert control over Libya’s lucrative smuggling trade. In Zuwara and Ghadames, for example, the flow of subsidized gasoline and food into Tunisia and Algeria has long fueled the economies of the communities on both sides of the border. With the collapse of Qadhafi’s system of patronage, the tribes that traditionally controlled this trade no longer enjoy a monopoly and fierce competition for these routes has led to clashes and violence. The transitional GOL’s inability to control the border and reliance on militias for security has only exacerbated the problem, with the deputized militias reportedly using their assumed authority to extract profit from smugglers and traders. Similar problems exist in southern Libya, where the Tebou and Tuareg have historically facilitated the movement of arms, contraband and migrants into Libya but now face challenges from other Arab tribes that oppose smuggling or want to take control of the routes themselves.

PROJECTING REGIONAL AND POLITICAL POWER BEFORE ELECTIONS

6. (SBU) Local tribes and leaders looking to consolidate their power in the run-up to elections have also fueled regional conflicts. After 42 years of Qadhafi, most Libyans have limited experience with democracy and elections, and many are openly skeptical that they will be fair or reflect the “true revolution.” Some have expressed concerns that the distribution of congressional seats does not fairly represent regions such as the east or the south, while others fear that Qadhafi supporters will somehow find a way to “steal” the elections and reinstall members of the old regime. In response, some tribes and cities are reluctant to disarm their militias (or integrate them into the MOI or MOD) and are actively seeking to project their power and limit those of local rivals. In June, for example, attempts by Zintani militias to extend their control over most of the Nafusa Mountains led to pitched fighting with their historical rivals, the Mashasha. Similarly, Misrata militias have periodically raided Sirte to put down reported “pro-Qadhafi” uprisings, while fighters from Bani Walid and Tarhouna seized the Tripoli International Airport in June to force negotiations with the GOL over a detained militia commander.

7. (SBU) This dynamic may be most apparent in southwestern Libya, where contacts note that TNC member Abdulmajid Saif al-Nasr has been methodically building coalitions among local Arab tribes, such as the Awlad Suleiman, Megraha and Hasowna, to bolster his political influence and control in the south. Tebou contacts have added that a key part of Nasr’s strategy is to harness existing resentment and racism against the Tebou, combined with allegations that they supported Qadhafi, as a unifying point for the non-Tebou residents of Sebha. The result of the campaign, a Tebou leader claimed,

was attacks against Tebou neighborhoods, aimed at driving them from the city and preventing them from returning – or voting – in Sebha. Separately, the head of an international organization operating in Tripoli corroborated Nasr’s strong influence over southern militias, claiming that Nasr had ordered the detention of four IOM personnel in Sebha in January, because they had not first cleared their trip with him. (Note: IOM had coordinated this mission through UNSMIL and the GOL, and had reportedly also obtained the permission of the Sebha local council for its travel. End note.)

FOREIGNERS ALSO INCREASINGLY TARGETED

8. (SBU) From April to June, Libya also witnessed an increase in attacks targeting international organizations and foreign interests. The first incident occurred in April when unknown attackers rolled a grenade under UN SRSG Ian Martin’s vehicle during a visit to Benghazi. In May, International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) buildings in both Benghazi and Misrata were attacked with rockets and a grenade was thrown at a UK embassy vehicle in Sebha. Finally, during June there were three attacks in Benghazi, including an IED at the US Mission, an RPG fired at the UK Ambassador’s car and an attack on the Tunisian consulate. An Islamic extremist group, “the Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman Brigade,” claimed responsibility for the attacks on both ICRC buildings and the U.S. compound. The statements issued by the group accused the ICRC of proselytizing Christianity to Libyans and described the attack against the United States as ““target[ing] the Christians supervising the management of the consulate.”

9. (SBU) Libyan security officials purport to have launched investigations into these attacks, but thus far they have reached no formal conclusions. A GOL national security official shared his private opinion that the attacks were the work of extremists who are opposed to western influence in Libya. A number of local contacts agreed, noting that Islamic extremism appears to be on the rise in eastern Libya and that the Al-Qaeda flag has been spotted several times flying over government buildings and training facilities in Derna. Other contacts disagree, however, suggesting that the attacks could be the work of pro-Qadhafi loyalists or individuals who have been politically and financially marginalized by the TNC.

10. (SBU) Comment: The ElKeib government is keenly aware of the need to quell the intra-Libyan clashes, lest they further destabilize the country and mar upcoming elections. ElKeib laid out his two-pronged approach to the problem during a June 24 meeting with the Ambassador. First, the government would continue to strengthen the security services. Second, it would explore ways to address the social and economic causes of the violence. Both initiatives are worthwhile but are long-term efforts. Meanwhile, the government remains reluctant to confront extremists, preferring to try to co-opt them instead (reftel). Looking past the elections, it is possible that individuals and communities that feel they are not adequately represented in the new congress and government could form yet another source of friction and instability. End comment.

Signature: STEVENS

Drafted By: TRIPOLI:Tillou, Patrick A
Cleared By: POL-ECON:McFarland, David C
Approved By: EXEC:Stevens, John C
Released By: TRIPOLI:Pickens, Amber R
Info: DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; FBI WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
CIA WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GEROUTINE ;
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
ROUTINE ; DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC RUEHRCROUTINE ;
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVEROUTINE

Action Post:
Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 3/28/2012 3:12:26 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: REQUEST FOR DS TDY AND FTE SUPPORT
Attachments: Metadata.txt

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU



MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 130
Date/DTG: Mar 26, 2012 / 230648Z MAR 12
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, LY
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: [12 TRIPOLI 64](#)
Pass Line: STATE FOR DS/DP/NEA AND NEA/EX
Correction Reason: CORRECTED COPY. Retel added.
Subject: REQUEST FOR DS TDY AND FTE SUPPORT

1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: As Tripoli seeks to transition from emergency to normalized security operations, post and the RSO face a considerable workload in a constantly evolving environment. Accomplishment of RSO's core objectives -- essential support for movement security, including continuing high volume of senior-level visits; rebuilding and expanding post's PSA Local Guard Force (LGF); managing major physical security projects; creating a locally engaged bodyguard force; and establishing traditional RSO programs -- requires continued TDY support from the Department, as well as an increase in the number of our permanently assigned RSO staff. In order to transition successfully from the current MSD and SST-based security model to one that incorporates more locally based and non-emergency assets, post requests: 12 TDY DS agents for 45-60 day rotations in Tripoli (to replace our two departing MSD teams); 5 TDY DS agents for 45-60 day rotations in Benghazi; continued deployment of one MSD team through completion of training of our second LES bodyguard team (o/a July 1); one TDY ARSO from April 1 til July 1; and one WAE TDY'er to assist with LGF program development and emergency planning. In addition, post requests an increase in full-time staffing for RSO Tripoli to include: one RSO, one Deputy RSO, and four ARSOs. Post is extremely grateful for the extraordinary support provided by DS as we transition to normalized security operations. End summary and action request.

2. (SBU) As noted in our EAC reports and regular DS spot reports, the security environment in Tripoli remains uncertain and unstable. Although there has been a marked decrease in the number of militia checkpoints around Tripoli, the Transitional National Council (TNC) has not yet succeeded in demobilizing the multiple militias or bringing them into a centralized command and control structure. This uncertain environment is likely to continue through the entire transition cycle, which as outlined in the TNC's constitutional charter, is

expected to last at least one year beyond the June 2012 election for the constitutional assembly. In REF A, Post provided a detailed description of the evolving security environment at Post, VIP visit demands, physical security projects underway, and an update of LGF and LES close protection recruitment, staffing, and training efforts.

3. (SBU) As recommended by the Department, post is developing plans to transition our security staffing from an MSD and SST-based model to one that incorporates more locally based and non-emergency assets. Post requests the following support:

-TDY DS AGENTS: Post requests twelve (12) TDY DS agents, with a preference for high-threat trained personnel, for 45-60 day rotations, to provide movement and static security in lieu of two MSD teams. Since Tripoli reopened in September 2011, post has relied on three teams of MSD agents (18 DS agents) to provide emergency support in support of our operations. One of the three MSD teams departed post in March and was not replaced. While post has reduced its movement security profile in light of a general improvement in the security environment, Post requires a DS escort for movement of personnel who have not received FACT, SNOE, or similar post provided training. Currently, MSD and SST personnel man two Quick Reaction Force (QRF) elements, deployed as a response force, for all day time movements in Tripoli. Movements after 1800 hrs generally require QRF support and a DS escort in the vehicle. MSD and SST personnel also provide personnel to support COM and DCM movement teams. Post also is required to deploy MSD and SST personnel to support VIP visits, which occur at rate of 3-5 per month. Finally, MSD and SST assets provide static armed security at the temporary Chancery and interim Residential compounds. As Post's LES close protection assets and program expands, we would expect the number of TDY DS agents to contract accordingly, with a planned complete reduction of TDY DS agents in Tripoli within the next 3-5 months. However, complete elimination of our USDH TDY security presence is contingent upon post receiving host government permission to arm our LES bodyguard force.

-DS AGENT SUPPORT IN BENGHAZI: Post requests continued support for 5 TDY DS agents in Benghazi on 45-60 day rotations. This number is required to ensure that we have an appropriate USDH presence to protect our COMSEC; support the two long-term USDH TDY'ers; and support an increasing number of program/assistance TDY's from both Tripoli and Washington. The number of TDY'ers in Benghazi is expected to increase in the run-up to the June elections. Embassy Tripoli is in the process of recruiting four LES drivers and an RSO LES SPSS, which will support operations in Benghazi. Post also plans to deploy a TDY RSO from Tripoli once expanded permanent staffing is established and stabilized. Once these positions are filled, Post anticipates requiring fewer TDY DS agents to support Benghazi. Although an LGF contractor has begun operations in Benghazi, initial discussions regarding contractor-provided armed close protection / movement support does not appear viable based on complications regarding GOL firearms permits. Currently, the LGF contractor is able to obtain only short-term (48-72 hr) firearms permits for specific VIP visits.

-MSD TEAMS: Post requests the continued deployment of one MSD team of six agents to provide training team assistance for a surge of newly hired LGF and LES movement security. We would expect the first group of 12 LES movement security team members to complete an 8-week MSD led training course on April 19 and a second group of 12 team members to complete the same training on June 14. Approximately 50 newly hired LGF will complete MSD assisted two-week basic training courses by mid-April. Post anticipates the departure of the MSD training team upon completion of the second LES movement security team training course and deployment, on/about July 1, 2012. Post requests that the second MSD team currently deployed until mid-May be replaced with the aforementioned TDY non-MSD DS agents.

-ARSO SUPPORT: Post expects its two permanent ARSOs to arrive in mid-April and mid-June respectively. Post

requests one TDY DS AGENT with prior ARSO experience to act in a TDY ARSO capacity for periods of 45-60 days beginning on April 1 until July 1.

-ADDITIONAL SUPPORT: Post requests one WAE TDYer to assist with LGF program development and assist with emergency planning, to include development of Post's Emergency Action Plan (EAP).

4. (SBU) FULL TIME STAFFING: Given the vast increase in the number of programs and personnel that RSO is required to manage as well as the fluid security environment in which those programs must be built, Post supports the proposed full time staffing for RSO Tripoli of 1 RSO, 1 Deputy RSO, and 4 Assistant RSOs. As Post expects continued operations in Benghazi through CY 2012 and Tripoli's tours of duty to remain at one year, the proposed permanent staffing would provide sufficient support during periods of RR/RRBs while also stabilizing support for operations in Benghazi.

5. (U) Embassy Tripoli is extremely grateful for the extraordinary support provided by DS as we transition to normalized security operations. Point of contact for this request is Eric A. Nordstrom, RSO Tripoli, [REDACTED] 24hr VOIP/TOC – [REDACTED].

Signature: CRETZ

Drafted By: TRIPOLI.Nordstrom, Eric A. (RSO)
Cleared By: Larson, Jennifer A
Approved By: Polaschik, Joan A
Released By: TRIPOLI.Johnson, Carol R
Info:

Action Post:
Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: [REDACTED]
To: evcSMARTETSPOB
Subject: TRIPOLI -- Request for extension of TDY security personnel
Attachments: Metadata.txt

CLASSIFIED
SBU



MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 690
Date/DTG: Jul 09, 2012 / 0813:5Z JUL 12
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, MARR, LY
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: A) 12 TRIPOLI 582 - INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSSES BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND SECURITY CONCERNS
B) 12 TRIPOLI 622 ? LIBYA'S FRAGILE SECURITY DETERIORATES
C) 12 TRIPOLI 586 ? TRIPOLI - EAC - 06/20/2012
D) 12 TRIPOLI 37 ? TRIPOLI EAC
E) 12 TRIPOLI 512 ? TRIPOLI EAC
F) 12 TRIPOLI 39 ? TRIPOLI EAC
G) 12 TRIPOLI 504 - MISSION LIBYA- UPDATED TRIPWIRES
Subject: TRIPOLI -- Request for extension of TDY security personnel

1. (SBU) Summary and Action Request: Embassy Tripoli requests continued TDY security support for an additional 60-days, through mid-September 2012. Post assesses a minimum of 13 TDY U.S. security personnel, either DS MSD, domestically assigned HT trained DS agents, DS SPS, or DOD/SST personnel or a combination of these personnel, are required to maintain current transportation security and incident response capability while we transition to a locally based security support structure. Post also requests continued TDY support of 2 DS agents until the RSO reaches a planned full-time staffing level of five (5) agents. These TDY security needs do not include MSD security personnel involved exclusively in training the local guard force (LGF) and LES close protection team/bodyguards. Post understands and appreciates ongoing efforts by DS to identify and deploy TDY resources to meet our security needs during the next 60-90 days. End summary and action request.

2. (SBU) Conditions in Libya have not met prior benchmarks established by Post, the Department, and AFRICOM, for a complete drawdown of TDY security personnel. Overall security conditions continue to be unpredictable, with large numbers of armed groups and individuals not under control of the central government, and frequent clashes in Tripoli and other major population centers. National parliamentary elections have been delayed from 6/19 to 7/7, with post expecting an increased likelihood of election related political violence during and after the election period.

3. (SBU) While post has made a number of procedural security enhancement and physical security upgrades, our

efforts to normalize security operations have been hindered by the lack of host nation security support, either static or response, an increase in violence against foreign targets, and GoL delays in issuing firearms permits for our LES close protection/bodyguard unit. Despite field expedient physical security upgrades to improve both the temporary Embassy and Villas compound, neither compound meets OSFB standards. Recognizing the growing challenges to Libya's fragile security environment, the Department increased Post's danger pay allowance from 25 percent to 30 percent on July 1st.

4. (SBU) Under current arrangements, Post's thirty-four (34) U.S. security personnel (16 SST, 11 MSD, 1 WAE TDY, 1 RSO, 2 ARSOs, and 3 TDY ARSOs) will draw down to twenty-seven (27) security personnel on 7/13. On 08/05, post will reduce U.S. security personnel to 4 MSD trainers, 1 RSO, 2 ARSOs, and 3 TDY ARSOs, with a further reduction to seven U.S. security personnel on 08/13, which includes four (4) MSD trainers not generally supporting transportation security, VIP visits, or RSO programs.

5. (SBU) As the Regional Security Office seeks to transition from emergency to normalized security operations, the continued presence of TDY security personnel is essential to support our daily movement and the continuing high volume of senior-level visits, provide static security in the absence of an appropriate host nation security presence, and assist our Mobile Security Detachment (MSD) colleagues in the training of our newly hired LGF members and locally engaged bodyguard force. SST's deployment has been critical to our ability to navigate the transition to a more locally-based security team while continuing to support a high-volume of VIP visits and expand our U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) staff (reflets A-G). Post anticipates supporting operations in Benghazi with at least one permanently assigned RSO employee from Tripoli, however, would request continued TDY support to fill a minimum of 3 security positions in Benghazi.

6. (SBU) With the receipt of firearms permits for 11-members of Post's LES close protection team, RSO anticipates limited deployment of team members to support Ambassador, DCM, and QRF details. However, this deployment will continue to require U.S. security personnel support and leadership until the close protection team (CPT) is fully staffed with 24 members. A second group of 5 members of LES CPT members complete MSD led initial training on 7/18 and could be fully deployed once firearms permits have been received from the Ministry of Interior. Permits for the first 11 LES close protection team members took more than 2 months and required Ambassadorial intervention with the Minister of Interior. While post anticipates a quicker response with this next round of permits, recruitment efforts of qualified applicants for the remaining CPT positions remains slow. As of 7/5, Post has identified only 2 of the remaining 8 candidates for the 3rd and final MSD led training course for new LES CPT.

7. (SBU) RSO and Post continue to engage host nation and is in the process of constructing and refurbishing climate controlled guard booths at the temporary Embassy and Residential Villas compound as part of a plan to entice Ministry of Interior security support. Additionally, RSO has had initial discussions with Ministry of Interior police leadership, who expressed interest in signing a MOU for stipends to support a sustained presence of MoI officers at the aforementioned properties. However, despite assurances of support from throughout the MoI, to include from the Minister directly, the reality is that the GoL remains extremely limited in its ability to sustain a security support presence at USG compounds (REFTEL B).

8. (SBU) RSO and Post will continue to examine ways to augment the internal defense and static security profile at USG compounds in Libya, to include consideration of a partial arming of supervisory personnel in the LGF. Post anticipates that full implementation of armed supervisor LGF members could take up to 60 days for selection, training, equipping, policy approvals and deployment. Given the GoL's traditional sensitivities regarding armed security personnel, Post does not recommend deployment of either an armed LGF or CPT element without notification to and licensing from the GoL.

8. (SBU) Post addresses Department's support and guidance as we work to build up local capacity to address security requirements.

Signature: STEVENS

Drafted By: TRIPOLI.Norstrom, Eric A.
Cleared By: POL-EGON.McFarland, David C.
Approved By: EXEC Stevens, John C.
Released By: TRIPOLI.Norstrom, Eric A.

Info: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC#ROUTINE; CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE#ROUTINE;
[REDACTED] ROUTINE; [REDACTED] ROUTINE

Action Post:
Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: [REDACTED]
To: svsSMARTETSPOPT
Subject: REQUEST TO ADD LES AMBASSADOR PROTECTIVE DETAIL BODYGUARD POSITIONS IN US EMBASSY TRIPOLI

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU



MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 844
Date/DTG: Aug 02, 2012 / 021250Z AUG 12
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
Action: SECSTATE WASHDC ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, AFIN
Captions: SENSITIVE
Reference: 12 TRIPOLI 844
Pass Line: DS/IP/NEA, NEA/SCA, AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI, MGT, FMO
Correction Reason: CORRECTED COPY 2: SUBJECT LINE CORRECTED
Subject: REQUEST TO ADD LES AMBASSADOR PROTECTIVE DETAIL BODYGUARD POSITIONS IN US EMBASSY TRIPOLI

(SBU) Summary and Action Request: Embassy Tripoli requests 11 LES bodyguard positions be added to the current roster of 24 APD members. The augmented roster will fill the vacuum of security personnel currently at Post on TDY status who will be leaving within the next month and will not be replaced. These TDY officers include members of DS MSD, SST, and DS TDY special agents. Due to the level of threat in regards to Crime, Political Violence, and Terrorism, Post feels this is an appropriate number of LES security personnel needed to further Embassy diplomatic outreach missions performed by Foreign Service (FSO) and other USG officers. Post appreciates ongoing efforts by DS to meet and fulfill our security standards. End summary and action request.

(SBU) The security condition in Libya remains unpredictable, volatile, and violent. Though certain goals have been successfully met, such as the national election for a representative Parliament who will draft the new Libyan Constitution, violent security incidents continue to take place due to the lack of a coherent national Libyan security force and the strength of local militias and large numbers of armed groups.

(SBU) Post has made several procedural security and physical upgrades to the interim US Embassy compounds. However, host nation security support is lacking and cannot be depended on to provide a safe and secure environment for the diplomatic mission of outreach performed by FSO and other USG personnel on the ground.

(SBU) There are currently twenty-eight (28) U.S. security personnel (16 SST, 5 MSD, 1 FSO, 3 ARSO's, 4 TDY ARSO's, assigned to the Embassy. This number will be reduced on 08/03 when the SST's security support mission comes to an end. On 08/30 the security personnel will be further reduced with the departure of the MSD team, which as of today, will not be replaced.

(SBU) Post considers a roster thirty-five (35) armed LES APD officers, will help maintain the Protective Ring of Security necessary to provide physical security to the Embassy staff to include the Ambassador, and other USG personnel under COM authority. This number of LES APD members will also be utilized for the continued deployment of the Embassy's Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to respond to emergencies throughout the city and monitoring of the Tactical Operation Center (TOC).

(SBU) Post estimates the yearly cost to hire ten (10) bodyguards at an FS 5 level (US \$30,042.72) and one supervisor at an FS 7 level (US \$34,618.16) will be US \$335,045.36. Salaries include misc. allowances, yearly bonus, social security, medical benefits, and projected overtime pay.

(SBU) Post appreciates the Department's continued support and guidance as we strive to build up local capacity to help address the security concerns in Tripoli.

Signature: STEVENS

Drafted By: TRIPOLI: Saravia, Jairo
Cleared By: EXEC: Stevens, John C
Approved By: RSO: Martinec, John B
Released By: TRIPOLI: Saravia, Jairo
Info:

Action Post:
Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Benghazi Weekly Report. Special Eid al-Fitr Edition - August 20, 2012

UNCLASSIFIED
SBU



MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 1020
Date/DTG: Aug 20, 2012 / 201321Z AUG 12
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE
E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KISL, LY
Captions: SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
Subject: Benghazi Weekly Report, Special Eid al-Fitr Edition - August 20, 2012

1. (SBU) This is Benghazi's weekly round-up of political, economic, and social issues not included in previous reporting.
2. (SBU) **Municipal Council Chair Resigns:** Benghazi Municipal Council Chair Shahat Awami announced his resignation August 16, amid rumors of death threats from employees and widespread complaints regarding the GOL's failure to provide the council with promised budgetary support. Awami, who met with visiting NSS Libya Country Director Ben Fishman last month, ultimately found his unclear authorities no match for Benghazi's obvious problems. Although other council members tell us a replacement will be selected shortly after Eid, Awami's departure after only a few months in office begs the fundamental question of "who is actually in charge?" With only a fraction of its promised budgetary allotment on hand and no consensus on the municipality's right to raise revenues directly, municipal workers are not being paid, and municipal services are not being delivered. The city's Department of Social Affairs has been a particular black hole, announcing August 18 that it will be unable to disburse payments promised to poor families for Eid. Trash removal remains the most visible symbol of the city's straits; the much-heralded arrival of five new trash trucks this week will double the city's fleet. Comment: The municipality's stumbles reinforce partisan loyalties, undermine confidence in government institutions, and open the door to political parties interested in increasing their profile by providing social services. End comment.
3. (SBU) **Barasi Bandwagon:** Minister of Electricity Awad Barasi, a Benghazi native, is reportedly recovering from exhaustion after a week spent trying to address the country's rolling blackouts. Before public disclosure that he had gone to a local hospital for treatment, Barasi was trying to keep a low profile despite media speculation that he is on the short list of potential candidates for Prime Minister. Local contacts across the political spectrum speak highly of Barasi, praising his technical competence, his personal modesty, and his strong commitment to maintaining his ties to Benghazi. Human rights activist Hana el-Ghallal described Barasi as "the only candidate who is new and not simply recycled." Although supporters acknowledge that his selection would put easterners in the two most senior positions in government (given Magariaf's origins in Ajdabiya), many here are still hopeful that Barasi will emerge from the field, suggesting that only leaders from the East will have the credibility to cement a deal on decentralization. Still, one contact remarked with regret that this "might only make sense to easterners."

4. (SBU) Security Dialogue: Women's rights activist Wafa Bugaighis is leading efforts to begin a public campaign against the recent spate of violent incidents. After being briefly detained along with other local and international attendees at a seminar in Benghazi last week, Bugaighis told us that "for the first time since the revolution, I am scared." Nonetheless, she has met with the leadership of the militia responsible for the incident, trying to establish an inclusive dialogue about security and human rights as "everyone's responsibility." She asked in exasperation, "How can we be the commercial capital if we can't keep our streets safe?" Bugaighis is particularly concerned by the lack of public remorse over the killings of former regime officials, which she sees as a reflection of concern that the government is too weak to bring them to justice.

5. (SBU) Security Incidents:

- Protesting the recent series of incidents at local hospitals, staff at Benghazi's Hawari Hospital have been on strike since August 15.
- The border with Egypt was briefly closed following a reported exchange of gunfire between Egyptian forces and smugglers late in the week.
- Rumors of a strike of security personnel at Benghazi Airport – reportedly prompted by prolonged non-payment of salaries – ran rampant during the week.
- UN officials believe the Supreme Security Council is "fading away," unwilling to take on "anyone with powerful patrons or from powerful tribes."
- Incidents continue in this security vacuum, including a grenade attack on Army Colonel Abdullah el-Shaafi on August 14 and the reported storming of the al-Bilad newspaper by unidentified armed men on August 16.
- On a positive note, the local police did respond informally to acknowledge receipt of our request for a permanent presence in Benghazi; we will follow up with them in the days ahead. Also of note, the war veterans who had been occupying the Tibesti hotel lobby have departed and the hotel is said to be preparing to reopen on August 22.

Signature: HICKS

Drafted By: Benghazi:Gaudiosi, Eric V
Cleared By: U.S. Embassy Tripoli:draper, hannah a
Approved By: Hicks, Gregory N
Released By: TRIPOLI:draper, hannah a
Info: DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC RUEHRCROUTINE ;
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY-WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
ROUTINE ; DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
ROUTINE ; FBI WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; CIA WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVEROUTINE ; AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVEROUTINE

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From: [REDACTED]
Sent: [REDACTED]
To: svcSMARTBTSP03
Subject: BENGHAZI WEEKLY REPORT- SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

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MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 1093
Date/DTG: Sep 11, 2012 / 111351Z SEP 12
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
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E.O.: 13526
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, SENV, ENRG, KDEM, KISL, LY
Captions: SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
Subject: BENGHAZI WEEKLY REPORT- SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

1. (SBU) Summary: This is Benghazi's weekly round-up of political, economic, and social issues not included in previous reporting.
2. (SBU) Benghazi Local Council Welcomes the Ambassador: Members of Benghazi's Local Council told the Ambassador about their frustrations with the slow pace of reforms instituted by the Transitional National Council (TNC) and its successor, the General National Congress (GNC). Members said they welcomed USG assistance across a broad range of political and economic issues, including specific programs and training from USAID and MEPI to improve the effectiveness of the Council, its communications with constituents, and its administrative processes. They pleaded for a regional balance to other USG programs to ensure participants from the east and west were equally represented in programming, noting the long-standing feeling in the east that the TNC and GNC had focused development efforts on Tripoli to the detriment of the rest of the country. Despite the challenges, members asserted that the security situation was improving and told the Ambassador that the USG should "pressure" American companies to invest in Benghazi. Twenty of the 41 council members, including President Jumaa al-Sahli, participated. The Benghazi Local Council oversees the work of approximately 600 employees.
3. (SBU) Benghazi SSC Commander discusses security situation, dissolution of the SSC, extra-judicial killings of former regime security officers, political aspirations of militia leaders, reintegration of revolutionaries, and welfare of Iranian Red Crescent detainees: In a September 2 meeting with Acting Principal Officer Benghazi, Supreme Security Council (SSC) commander Fawzi Younis told us that senior Interior Ministry authorities had unceremoniously ended the "state of maximum alert" announced in Benghazi on August 29. The alert came amid fears of potential strikes by ex-regime supporters to mark the September 1, 1969, revolution and Qadhafi's rise to power, Younis said. He continued that reintegrating revolutionaries remained a priority (much hope but no serious plans to help his 18,000 SSC personnel), and he expects that the SSC and militias would gradually dissolve (but not until a legitimate alternative for maintaining security emerged). Younis expressed growing frustration with police and security forces (who were too weak to keep the country secure) and commented that the Iranian Red Crescent detainees are still held by "unknown" kidnappers but in good accommodations). He speculated about possible motivations for the ongoing extra-judicial killings of interior ministry officials (personal vendettas, criminality, tribal conflicts, purge of pro-Qadhafi officials), and he noted indications that a

few key brigade commanders, who have been seeking government positions in security ministries, may be developing higher political and economic aspirations. (More data is secret.)

4. (SBU) Militia commanders discuss the Muslim Brotherhood, Jibril, their political aspirations, the economy, and security: In a September 9 meeting, local area militia commanders Wissam bin Ahmed (Commander, Libya Shield 1) and Muhammad al-Gharabi (Commander, Rafai' al-Santi Brigade and Libya Shield 2) discussed the very fluid relationships and blurry lines they say define membership in Benghazi-based brigades under the February 17, Libya Shield, and SSC umbrellas. They themselves were members of multiple brigades, they said. They debated – hotly and without resolution – about which brigades supported or opposed specific causes. They claimed to exercise “control” over Libyan Armed Forces Chief of Staff Yousef Mangoush, who “depends” on them to secure eastern Libya. In times of crisis, Mangoush has no other choice than to turn to their brigades for help, they said, as he did recently with unrest in Kufra. As part of this arrangement, Mangoush often provides the brigades direct stocks of weapons and ammunition, they said. Al-Gharabi and bin-Ahmed support the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party backed candidate Minister of Electricity Awad Al Barasi for Prime Minister and said that, if elected, al-Barasi would appoint Fawzi Bukatif, Commander of the February 17 Brigade, as Minister of Defense. Bukatif’s appointment would open the MOD and other security ministries and offices to plum appointments for his most favored brigade commanders – giving February 17 and Libya Shield tacit control of the armed forces. They criticized the USG for “supporting” National Forces Alliance (NFA) leader and Prime Minister candidate Mahmoud Jibril. If Jibril won, they said, they would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a critical function they asserted they were currently providing. Growing problems with security would discourage foreign investment and led to persistent economic stagnation in eastern Libya, but the USG could play a role by “pressuring” American businesses to invest in Benghazi.

5. (SBU) Salafists reported killed in clashes with locals defending Sufi shrines: The Ministry of Interior confirmed press reports that a September 8 gun battle about 35 kilometers outside Benghazi resulted in three killed and seven injured during an attempt to destroy a Sufi shrine in Rajma. Press reports credit local residents and the late-responding Libya Shield brigade with defending the Sidi Al-Lafi mausoleum. Some contacts here, however, assert that Salafists within the Libya Shield were actually fighting against the local residents in support of efforts to destroy the shrine.

6. (SBU) Expanding Islamist influence in Derna: A growing number of anecdotal reports from residents, NGOs, and USG contractors link the Abu Salim Brigade with a troubling increase in violence and Islamist influence in Derna. Complaints against the Abu Salim Brigade range from their efforts to close radio and other media outlets, enforce strict rules against co-mingling of men and women at the local university, and increased criminality, including carjacking, thefts, and murders. One e-mail to the Ambassador asserts Abu Salim Brigade members have undercut police presence by accusing the police of being loyal to the former regime. The e-mail ends by pleading to the U.S. Embassy to “Please send someone to see the truth for yourselves.”

7. (SBU) Car Bomb Kills One, Injures Another: A September 1 car bomb on Benghazi’s largest and busiest street, Gamal-Abdel-Nasser, killed Abdul Baset Hufaiha and injured Col. Jumaa Kadeki, both former Interior Ministry security officers under the Qadhafi regime. The bombing occurred during the “state of maximum alert” announced by Interior Ministry officials on August 29, and fueled rampant speculation in the press and among our contacts that unknown actors continue to work down a list of former Qadhafi regime officials who had been targeted for extra-judicial killings. Security contacts at United Nations Benghazi who were on the scene within minutes and questioned eye-witnesses, tell us that it is just as likely that the driver of the car, Abdul Baset Hufaiha, may have been in possession of the explosive device and detonated it accidentally.

8. (SBU) Great Manmade River Authority (GMRA): Press reported a September 9 explosion that targeted power lines in the Wadi Mansour area between Tarhouna and Bani Walid and cut the major source of electrical power to parts of the Great Manmade River. On September 10, GMRA Acting Chairman Nasser Bubteina told us that auxiliary power lines had kept the GMMR running, but confirmed press reports that “huge 400 kilowatt” lines and towers, including their foundations, had been completely destroyed by the explosion. Bubteina told us that repairs would take a minimum of two weeks, but quite possibly longer because he first had to secure permission from local militias and mobilize security forces to insert workers from the Ministry of Energy and the General Electric Company into the area. With about USD 10 billion invested since its inception in the 1980s, the Great Manmade River (GMMR) Project links wholesale water supplies

from underground aquifers in southern and eastern Libya to municipal, agricultural, and industrial end users in Benghazi and points west toward Tripoli. The GMMRA Authority manages the system, a structure of about 3500 miles of pipes, about one hundred operational wells, multiple reservoirs, and multiple supply, pump, and delivery stations that supply water to more than two-thirds of Libya's population. Details to follow septel.

9. (SBU) Ambassador to Open American Space Benghazi: The Ambassador will launch American Space Benghazi, a public platform for cultural and educational outreach by U.S. Mission Libya. The American Space will contain a small library, computer lab, and open space for programming. Embassy Tripoli will support the center with regular programs and speakers. We have already used the space to engage in dialogue with 15 young adults about U.S. foreign policy in the country and Libya's political transition.

10. (SBU) MEPI Projects: In our ongoing effort to assist and monitor USG implementers, we visited with some of the two dozen civil society organizations that operate in Benghazi with MEPI assistance, including: the *Libyan Society for Industrial Engineering*, which has created eastern Libya's first mobile public library; *My Environment Society*, which conducts environmental education campaigns with school-age children; *Rayhan Elshohadaa Association*, which works to empower disadvantaged youth with employable skills, including computer literacy and English education; and *the Cure Foundation*, which has conducted education campaigns about cancer and hemophilia to patients and their families. Additionally, the Embassy-supported ACCESS program in Benghazi, offers evening English-language instruction to disadvantaged teenagers.

11. (SBU) UK Presence: British Charge d'Affairs Gill Frasier visited U.S. Mission Benghazi during a September 5 trip to determine whether conditions were appropriate for the re-opening of the British Consulate. According to Frasier, London will make its decision about reopening the consulate sometime in October. The British withdrew their presence from Benghazi after the widely reported June 11 RPG attack on the British Ambassador's motorcade.

Signature: STEVENS

Drafted By: POL-ECON:McFarland, David C
Cleared By: EXEC:Hicks, Gregory N
Approved By: EXEC:Stevens, John C
Released By: TRIPOLI:Pickens, Amber R
Info: DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ; FBI WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;
CIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ; CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE ROUTINE ;
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ; DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
ROUTINE ; DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC RUEHRC ROUTINE ;
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12 FAM 300 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

12 FAM 310 PHYSICAL SECURITY OF FACILITIES ABROAD

*(CT:DS-161; 03-01-2011)
(Office of Origin: DS/C/PSP)*

12 FAM 311 SCOPE AND AUTHORITY

12 FAM 311.1 Policy

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

This section implements the security responsibilities of the Secretary under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 ("SECCA") and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.

12 FAM 311.2 Applicability

(CT:DS-161; 03-01-2011)

- a. All new embassy compounds (NECs), new office buildings (NOBs), and newly acquired buildings (NABs), or commercial office space, intended for the conduct of diplomacy, whether acquired by purchase or lease, must conform to the collocation and setback requirements set forth in the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 ("SECCA") (22 U.S.C. 4865) with an effective date of November 29, 1999.
- b. All NECs, NOBs, NABs, and existing office buildings (EOBs), including commercial office space, are also subject to the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) security standards and policies promulgated in 12 FAH-6. For EOBs only, the physical security standards apply to the maximum extent feasible or practicable as defined in 12 FAH-5 H-121.1.
- c. These statutory requirements and standards apply to all official diplomatic facilities and U.S. Government personnel abroad that are under the

authority of the Chief of Mission (COM). U.S. Government personnel include U.S. citizens and Locally Employed Staff (*LE staff*) who are employed via direct-hire appointments, Personal Services Contractors (PSCs), or Personal Services Agreements (PSAs) (2 FAH-2 H-114).

12 FAM 311.3 Authorities

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

- a. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-399;) (22 U.S.C. 4801, et seq.).
- b. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-113; 22 U.S.C. 4865) and Conference Report 106-479.
- c. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228), Section 505 (22 U.S.C. 3927, as amended) (Exemption of Voice of America Correspondents on Official Assignment from Responsibilities of the Secretary and Chief of Mission).
- d. Section 691 (Public Law 107-228) (Sense of Congress Regarding the Location of Peace Corps Offices Abroad).

12 FAM 312 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

- a. As set forth in the President's Letter to each COM at the beginning of an administration or when appointed, each COM is directly responsible for the security of his or her mission (1 FAM 013; 2 FAH-2 H-112.3).
- b. The Office of Physical Security Programs, Physical Security Division (DS/PSP/PSD), is responsible for ensuring that all new construction and major renovation design plans for buildings occupied by U.S. Government personnel under the authority of a COM comply with SECCA requirements and OSPB physical security standards and policies.
- c. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) is responsible for implementing SECCA requirements and OSPB security standards and policies into building projects (1 FAM 281).

12 FAM 313 SECURE EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACT (SECCA)

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

- a. SECCA establishes statutory security requirements for U.S. diplomatic facilities involving collocation and setback.
 - (1) **Site Selection (Collocation):** The State Department, in selecting a site for any new U.S. diplomatic facility abroad, must collocate all U.S. Government personnel at the post (except those under the command of an area military commander) on the site.
 - (2) **Perimeter Distance (Setback):** Each newly acquired U.S. diplomatic facility must be sited not less than 100 feet (30.48 m) from the perimeter of the property on which the facility is situated.
- b. U.S. diplomatic facilities are defined for purposes of the SECCA to include any chancery, consulate, or other office notified to the host government as diplomatic or consular premises in accordance with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. It also includes offices subject to a publicly available bilateral agreement with the host government that recognizes the official status of the U.S. Government personnel present in the facility.
- c. Normally, under the parameters of this definition, certain types of activities are excluded, including:
 - (1) Offices occupied by U.S. Government personnel at facilities owned and operated by the host-country government in order to accomplish their mission, e.g., U.S. military training, anti-terrorism assistance training; sales support and liaison offices collocated with host-country ministries or military units; protective service missions for foreign government heads of state; and U.S. Treasury personnel working in a host nation Ministry of Finance;
 - (2) Commercial office space or hotel rooms rented for temporarily assigned U.S. Government personnel supporting a short-term international conference or meeting;
 - (3) Nonoffice sites or facilities where technical operations may be conducted, e.g., U.S. Customs pre-clearance centers and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) facilities;
 - (4) Facilities occupied by Peace Corps volunteers but not country directors and staff;
 - (5) Residential facilities or spaces;

- (6) Warehouses (storage only), garages, guard booths, and other nonoffice facilities;
- (7) Consular agencies and Center for Disease Control (CDC) research laboratory facilities operating from non-U.S. Government-leased spaces;
- (8) Non-U.S. Governmental organizations leasing U.S. Government facilities;
- (9) Voice of America (VOA) relay stations (collocation only); and
- (10) VOA Correspondents on official assignment.

12 FAM 314 OSPB SECURITY STANDARDS

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

- a. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Physical Security Programs (DS/C/PSP), in concert with OSPB working groups, has developed and is responsible for a number of security standards, as approved by the OSPB, for three of six threat categories – political violence, technical, and crime. Those involving the technical threat are a shared responsibility with the Office of Security Technology. These standards cover Armored Vehicles; Classified Facility Lock and Leave; Construction Security; Construction Materials and Transit Security; Design and Construction of Controlled Access Areas; Physical Security of Unclassified Warehouses; Post Communications Centers; Physical Security; Secure Procurement for Controlled Access Areas; and Special Protective Equipment. OSPB security standards for Local Guards, Residential, and Emergency Plans and Exercises are the responsibility of the Office of International Programs. OSPB security standards for human intelligence and other technical threats involving technical countermeasures are the responsibility of the Office of Security Technology. All of the above standards are covered in 12 FAH-6.
- b. The Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis semi-annually publishes the Security Environment Threat List (SETL) reflecting the level of threat in each of the six threat categories (12 FAH-6). Other threat categories not addressed above are Transnational Terrorism and Indigenous Terrorism. Security standards against the terrorism threat categories are part of the Physical Security Standards that also serve as countermeasures against the political violence threat. The standards identified as countermeasures against terrorism are identical across the board at all threat levels.

12 FAM 315 WAIVERS AND EXCEPTIONS

12 FAM 315.1 SECCA – Waiver Authority

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

- a. The Secretary of State may waive the statutory collocation requirement only if the Secretary, together with the head of each agency employing personnel that would not be located at the site, determines that security considerations permit and it is in the national interest of the United States.
- b. The perimeter distance requirement may be waived "if the Secretary determines that security considerations permit and it is in the national interest of the United States."
- c. The Secretary may not delegate the waiver authority with respect to the collocation and setback requirements for a chancery or consulate building. For this purpose, a chancery or consulate building is a building solely or substantially occupied by the U.S. Government that is newly constructed or otherwise acquired where the main business of the U.S. Government is performed in that city.
- d. The Secretary has delegated the waiver authority with respect to the collocation and setback requirements for all other offices, including annexes and chancery/consulate facilities that do not substantially occupy a building, to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security in consultation with the Director/Chief Operating Officer of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO). This flexibility was provided by Congress with the expectation that waivers used by the Secretary would be infrequent, and therefore, considered more seriously in the instances such a waiver is exercised (Delegation of Authority No. 274).
- e. Application for waivers to collocation and setback requirements should be directed to the Physical Security Division, Office of Physical Security Programs, for processing and evaluation prior to being forwarded to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security for approval or recommendation to the Secretary. Waiver requests must contain all of the information stipulated in 12 FAH-5 H-300.

12 FAM 315.2 OSPB Security Standards – Exception Authority

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

- a. All OSPB security standards will be met in new facilities whether

constructed or acquired by purchase or lease. Every attempt will be made to acquire sites or new facilities that meet the physical security standards, particularly floor loading capacity, and that are noncontiguous with adjacent buildings. In the event that compliance with one or more standards of those identified in 12 FAM 314 a may not be possible for a specific building, application for an exception to the standard(s) may be made by the post, agency, or Department organization. Applications for exceptions should be directed to the Physical Security Division, Office of Physical Security Programs, for processing and evaluation prior to being forwarded to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. Exception requests must contain all of the information stipulated in 12 FAH-5 H-200.

- b. Regional Security Officers (RSOs) will ensure that the physical security standards are met in existing office buildings to the maximum extent practicable or feasible. Feasibility is determined by physical limitations, legal constraints, and practicality as defined in 12 FAH-5 H-121.1. This includes agency-specific applications of those standards as defined by agreements approved by the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security. Although exception requests are not required, when physical security standards cannot be met due to physical limitations, legal constraints, or practicality, documentation pertaining to the inability to institute a particular standard must be obtained by the RSO with copies furnished to the Office of International Programs and the Physical Security Division.
- c. At least once every 3 years or upon the acquisition of a new facility, RSOs must conduct physical security surveys of their post facilities to determine if such facilities within their regions meet the standards as required and to identify deficiencies requiring correction.

12 FAM 315.3 Application of Statutory Requirements and OSPB Security Standards

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

- a. New U.S. chancery/consulate buildings, solely or substantially occupied by the U.S. Government, must meet collocation and 100-foot (30.48 m) setback statutory requirements; otherwise, waivers to the statutory requirements must be granted by the Secretary. These new U.S. diplomatic facilities must also meet OSPB security standards identified in 12 FAH-6; otherwise, exception(s) to those standards listed in 12 FAM 314 a must be granted by the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.
- b. New U.S. diplomatic facilities, other than the chancery and consulate buildings, must meet collocation and 100-foot (30.48 m) setback statutory requirements and other OSPB security standards identified in 12 FAH-6; otherwise, waiver(s) to the statutory requirements and

exception(s) to those standards listed in 12 FAM 314 a must be granted by the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.

- c. New U.S. diplomatic facilities, determined by DS to be chancery and consulate offices not constituting substantial occupancy in terms of space or people within commercial and other facilities, must meet collocation and 100-foot (30.48 m) setback statutory requirements and OSPB security standards for a "chancery or consulate" in accordance with 12 FAH-6; otherwise, waiver(s) to the statutory requirements and exception(s) to those standards listed in 12 FAM 314 a must be granted by the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.
- d. American Presence Posts, although regarded as "consulates," do not perform the same tasks as the usual chancery or U.S. consulate and are intended to operate with one or two cleared U.S. citizen employees. These facilities are best suited for location in a commercial building as a "Tenant of Commercial Office Space" for OSPB physical security standards purposes. The statutory requirement of 100-foot (30.48 m) setback also applies.

12 FAM 315.4 Chief of Mission/Principal Officer Approval

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

The Chief of Mission or the principal officer, ultimately responsible for the physical security of personnel at post, must approve the waiver or exception request.

12 FAM 315.5 Congressional Notification and Report Requirements

(CT:DS-121; 09-21-2006)

- a. The Secretary must notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of any waiver with respect to a chancery or consulate building and the reasons for the determination, not less than 15 days prior to implementing a statutory collocation or setback waiver.
- b. By 15 March, the annual report of all collocation and setback waivers, granted by the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security under SECCA, must be submitted to Congress. Since the Secretary has delegated the responsibility for preparing the annual report of waivers to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, the Office of Physical Security Programs is responsible for preparing this report. The Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security will submit this report, including transmittal letters to Congress, to the Under Secretary for

Political Affairs who has been delegated the function of approving submission of reports to the Congress by the Secretary (Delegation of Authority No. 280).

12 FAM 316 THROUGH 319 UNASSIGNED

**SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011****ON 1 JUNE 2011 – BENGHAZI**

CAR BOMB EXPLODES OUTSIDE HOTEL: A car bomb exploded outside the Tibesti Hotel in Benghazi. Following this explosion, other devices were discovered and made safe by the local authorities. TNC officials blamed former regime officials for the incident.

10 SEPTEMBER 2011 -- LIBYA / TUNISIA / ALGERIAN BORDER

UK CITIZEN KIDNAPPED: According to the UK High Commission, a British national was kidnapped in the Libya/Tunisia/Algeria border area on 10 September 2011 and was subsequently released on 12 September 2011.

23 SEPTEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

PIPE BOMB THROWN AT NTC FORCES: At approximately 0042, U.S. Embassy local guard force (LGF) personnel received a report that two crude pipe bombs were thrown at NTC forces manning a nearby checkpoint. The checkpoint was located approximately 500 meters west of the temporary U.S. Embassy residential buildings. According to the NTC personnel at the checkpoint, individuals approached the check point in a 4Dr white, Chevrolet Opra sedan and threw two (2) pipe bombs at the NTC forces. The suspect(s) vehicle was identified as a white Chevrolet Opra (4-door sedan). NTC Forces initiated a search for the suspect(s), and no injuries were reported. U.S. Embassy security officials viewed the site during day time hours and confirmed that a crude device had detonated.

26 SEPTEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

ALLEGED THREAT FROM PRO-GHADDAFI ELEMENTS AGAINST VARIOUS TARGETS: A letter in Arabic was disseminated to Libyan citizens warning of impending attacks against unspecified targets on/about 27 September. The attacks would allegedly be carried out using explosives and small arms in the Abu Salim and Ghar bin Gashir areas of Tripoli, to include neighborhoods near Tripoli International Airport. The letter called on individuals to support the Ghaddafi regime and warned of potential violence in the streets.

27 SEPTEMBER 2011 – BENGHAZI

Militia Commanders Protest Outside TNC Headquarters – Fifteen commanders from the Protective Security Brigade, a Ministry of Interior-affiliated militia that protects key infrastructure within the city of Benghazi, protested in front of the headquarters of the TNC. They claimed that Minister of Interior Ahmed Darat was not providing them with equipment and they condemned his ministry's attempts to dissolve their militia. They also complained that members of the old regime, especially in the external and internal intelligence/security organs, were still holding their jobs and should be fired.

Protests in Downtown Benghazi Over Holdovers from Old Regime – Hundreds protested in Benghazi's central Freedom Square calling for the removal of "climbers," i.e. those allegedly connected to the regime, from schools and universities, hospitals, the police, Libya's embassies, and private companies. Protesters' chants included "Come on, Benghazi, the revolution still lives!"



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

28-30 SEPTEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

HOTEL TARGETED BY SMALL ARMS FIRE:

According to German Embassy officials, the RIXOS hotel received sustained gunfire from an adjacent park during the evenings on 09/28, 09/29, and 09/30 culminating in gunfire which penetrated one of the windows for the German Embassy's security team. The German Embassy officials stated that Hotel Security at the RIXOS advised the gunfire was initiated by pro-Ghaddafi forces probing the perimeter security. The German mission left the RIXOS hotel shortly after the incident.

03 OCTOBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

GUNFIGHT NEAR MISSION PROPERTY:

At approximately 2030 hrs, several vehicles and their passengers were engaged in a moving gunfight which passed in front of a temporary U.S. Embassy residential site. One of the chase vehicle struck an Embassy vehicle parked on an adjacent street, although no injuries of US government personnel was reported as a result of the gunfire. Local council officials provided varied accounts of what had caused the gunfire, the most plausible explanation was that local militia members were chasing a former regime supporter who had recently returned from Tunisia.

08 OCTOBER 2011 - TRIPOLI

CELEBRATORY GUNFIRE HITS U.S. MISSION COMPOUND; USG VEHICLE DAMAGED: On October 8, 2011, at 1715 local time, at least three rounds of celebratory small arms fire (CSAF) impacted on the Embassy residential site in Tripoli. Heavy small arms celebratory occurred in the area surrounding the two Embassy residential sites after the Libyan national soccer team

defeated the Zambian national team. MSD and RSO initiated duck and cover procedures, donning of PPE, and directed all personnel to remain indoors for the duration of the celebratory fire. An MSD agent and POLOFF were returning to one of the residential sites as directed when at least three rounds of fire impacted the three story apartment building. No injuries to Mission personnel resulted from the fire. The all clear was given at approximately 1745 hours and RSO personnel responded to the scene to assess the number of impacted rounds.

On October 9, 2011, at 0845 local time, RSO conducted a subsequent inventory and inspection of Mission vehicles parked in an adjacent lot to the residential site. RSO observed that at least two additional rounds impacted an Embassy soft-skinned vehicle, causing damage to the windshield, and a wall directly in front of the residential compound.

12 OCTOBER 2011 - TRIPOLI

CELEBRATORY GUNFIRE HITS MISSION COMPOUND:

On October 12, 2011, at approximately 2200 local time, heavy celebratory gunfire, including some heavy weapons fire and substantial amounts of tracer fire, erupted throughout Tripoli, Libya to include from properties and personnel adjacent to the Embassy Residential Compound. Local media advised that the gunfire was in response to the reported capture of one of Ghaddafi's sons in fighting in Sirte, Libya. No injuries or significant property damage reported, however, several Mission personnel reported or observed what appeared to be rounds impacting on the residential property. Subsequent review of the residential compound confirmed that two rounds



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

of celebratory small arms fire impacted the Mission Residential Compound.

14 OCTOBER 2011 - TRIPOLI

ARMED ROBBERY OF ORE STAFF: On the morning of 14 October 2011, a member of the Mission's local official residence (ORE) staff, a citizen of Pakistan, was robbed by three males at knife point of his cellular telephone and approximately 200 LYD while walking to a taxi stand. The incident occurred in daylight hours in the Burg al Fateh area of Tripoli. The victim went immediately to a nearby police station to report the incident and was told by the police that they could do nothing since Libya was "without a government or laws".

Heavy fighting erupts in Tripoli between TNC militias and alleged pro-Ghaddafi forces: On October 14, 2011, at approximately 1600 hrs local time, heavy fighting erupted between TNC militias and alleged pro-Ghaddafi forces in the downtown area of Tripoli in the vicinity of the Rixos Hotel. Initial reports claimed units numbering up to 50 individuals were engaged on both sides of the fighting.

U.S. security personnel in downtown Tripoli reported the presence of heavy militia checkpoints in the downtown area, extensive security in the Martyr's Square neighborhood, the deployment of TNC militia heavy weapons 'technical's', and intensive vehicle searches in roads around the Rixos Hotel and Abu Salim neighborhoods; traditional pro-Ghaddafi strongholds.

U.K security personnel advised that an unidentified truck strafed the Radisson Blu hotel with heavy weapons fire and fled the area east bound at approximately 1700 hrs. TNC militia

pursued the vehicle, believed to be affiliated with pro-Ghaddafi forces. The Radisson Blu Hotel is the location for the temporary UK Embassy.

At 1840 hours, U.S. Embassy officials received unconfirmed reports that two hand grenades were thrown at the Al Mahir Hotel, located near the Radisson Blu Hotel.

QADHAFI SPOKESPERSON DR. MOUSSA IBRAHIM REPORTEDLY CALLS FOR SUPPORTERS TO RISE UP AND ATTACK THE US, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES IN TRIPOLI. On October 14, 2011, at approximately 2300 hrs local time, U.S. Embassy security officials received information that Dr. Moussa Ibrahim, Qadhafi's spokesperson, reportedly called upon Qadhafi's "Eagles {supporters}" to rise up and attack the US, French, and Italian Embassies in Libya. The statement reportedly appeared on Allibiya TV (<http://www.facebook.com/AllibiyaTV>), a pro-Qadhafi news outlet.

The alleged statement is consistent with open source and social media reporting of Qadhafi's calls for a loyalist uprising against the TNC and NATO to start on October 14, 2011. Post received unconfirmed reports that a Facebook campaign, possibly via the AllibiyaTV facebook page, also called on Qadhafi loyalists to target the Radisson hotel which was hit by gunfire earlier in the evening of the 14th.

23 OCTOBER 2011 - TRIPOLI

LGF HIT BY ROCK: An unidentified individual threw a rock at a member of the U.S. Embassy's local guard force while on patrol near the southern wall of the Embassy's residential compound. The rock appeared to come from a



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

multi-story apartment building adjacent to the compound.

28 OCTOBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

DIPLOMATIC VEHICLE STOLEN: Italian Embassy Security Representatives reported the theft of an unarmored, official Embassy vehicle from outside of the temporary Italian Embassy property. The vehicle bore local Libyan license plates and was parked in front of the Italian Embassy property. The Italian Embassy Security Representatives reported that the vehicle was taken during night-time hours.

26 OCTOBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

HAND GRENADE RECOVERED FROM MISSION PROPERTY LAWN - DISARMED AND DISPOSED WITHOUT INJURY: On 26 October 2011, at approximately 0900 hours, an unused hand-grenade was found on the lawn of a U.S. Embassy annex property located near the airport road. The hand-grenade had not been activated and was uncovered during landscaping in preparation for the visit of a VIP. Embassy security officials responded to the compound and coordinated with the Zintan Military Brigade, who removed and disarmed the grenade. The grenade was a Soviet-era fragmentation grenade, model RDG-5.

The hand grenade had not been activated. Based on its location, Post's assessment is that the grenade was dropped by the prior residents of the compound and uncovered during landscaping and compound rehabilitation activities. A number of TNC militias and local citizens had utilized the property during the Libyan civil war. The property was formally leased to a U.S. company, which evacuated Tripoli at the start of the revolution. No injuries or damage to U.S. personnel or property.

One of the major concerns for post is the uncontrolled and unaccounted for amounts of

small arms, explosives, RPGs, and weaponry in circulation within Libya as a result of the civil war. Although the compound had been searched for the presence of UXO prior to occupancy, the lack of landscaping and upkeep of most residential compounds has significantly complicated EOD/UXO recovery and removal efforts.

30 OCTOBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

ATTEMPTED ROBBERY OF WAREHOUSE: On 30 October 2011, at approximately 0315 hrs, at the Embassy's warehouse located on the eastern side of Tripoli, at least 2 unidentified gunmen in an unidentified vehicle began firing their weapons into the air outside the warehouse gate as part of an apparent robbery attempt. The individuals shouted to the local guards on post to open the gate and the guards refused, asking for the identity of the persons in response. At least one of the unidentified gunmen climbed the front vehicle gate and attempted to view the inside of the warehouse compound. Local guards on post contacted the local guard force commander and the landlord for the warehouse, who resides at a house next to the warehouse. The landlord responded to the warehouse via a secondary gate, and fired two rounds from his personal

AK47 into the air, causing the unidentified gunmen to flee the area. No injuries or damage to USG property were reported.

31 OCTOBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

WAR-WOUNDED PROTESTS: A group of 25-30 unarmed men apparently protesting the treatment of war-wounded breached the front gate of the TNC Cabinet headquarters today before they were turned away by armed guards



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

at the door after several minutes of heated argument.

01 NOVEMBER – TRIPOLI

MILITIA FIREFIGHT AT HOSPITAL: A group of Zintan militia affiliated fighters stormed a hospital in Tripoli and demanded the hand-over of a fighter who was wounded earlier in the day. The wounded militiaman had been injured in an earlier clash that also left another militiaman dead. The doctors refused and a Tripoli militia, in charge of hospital security, forced the Zintan affiliated militia out of the hospital. During the altercation, the Zintan affiliated militia reportedly fired rounds at the hospital which escalated the situation. Reinforcements responded to both militias and the fighting escalated to include the use of heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft guns. The gunfight lasted approximately three hours. There were no direct fatalities from the fighting, but three patients at the hospital died due to stress-related causes linked to the clashes. Three Tripoli fighters were wounded. The fighting reportedly ended after calls from a local imam and senior commanders from both groups talked by phone with their men.

03 NOVEMBER 2011 - TRIPOLI

ATTEMPTED CAR-JACKING OF LES: On 03 November 2011 at 1200 hrs, a US EMBASSY local employed staff member (LES) was targeted for a robbery or car-jacking incident while in the Gargaresh section of Tripoli. According to the LES staff member, he was visiting a local bank on behalf of the Embassy. When the LES pulled into a street near the bank, he noted a vehicle approaching him at a high-rate of speed. The LES staff member reported that the vehicle stopped in front of his car and blocked his path. Two

young males then exited the vehicle, told the LES staff member to wait, and then appeared to reach into their vehicle to retrieve automatic weapons. The LES staff member put his car in reverse and began backing out of the area as he continued to observe the two males in front of him. As he was focused on the persons in front of him, the LES staff member did not check his mirrors and hit a vehicle parked behind him. The two individuals got back in their vehicle and sped away. The owner of the vehicle hit by the LES staff member also observed the incident and was understanding given the circumstances.

HAND GRENADE RECOVERED FROM MISSION PROPERTY - DISARMED AND DISPOSED

WITHOUT INJURY: On 03 NOVEMBER 2011, at approximately 0900 hours, an unused hand-grenade was found on the lawn of a U.S. Embassy annex property located near the airport road. The hand-grenade had not been activated and was uncovered during landscaping in preparation for the visit of a VIP. Embassy security officials responded to the compound and coordinated with the Zintan Military Brigade, who removed and disarmed the grenade. The grenade was a Soviet-era fragmentation grenade, model RDG-5. The hand grenade had not been activated. Based on its location, Post's assessment is that the grenade was dropped by the prior residents of the compound and uncovered during landscaping and compound rehabilitation activities. A number of TNC militias and local citizens had utilized the property during the Libyan civil war. The property was formally leased to a U.S. company, which evacuated Tripoli at the start of the revolution. No injuries or damage to U.S. personnel or property.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

One of the major concerns for post is the uncontrolled and unaccounted for amounts of small arms, explosives, RPGs, and weaponry in circulation within Libya as a result of the civil war. Although the compound had been searched for the presence of UXO prior to occupancy, the lack of landscaping and upkeep of most residential compounds has significantly complicated EOD/UXO recovery and removal efforts.

14 NOVEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

DEMONSTRATION AT RADISSON HOTEL: 200-300 members of the Warshafanna tribe demonstrated at the Radisson Hotel on November 14, protesting TNC Minister of Communications Shammam's statement characterizing the tribe as Qadhafi loyalists. Separately, a senior TNC military official told an Embassy that the clashes were centered on a dispute over control of the former 32nd brigade compound and did not involve any pro-Qadhafi loyalists.

08 – NOVEMBER 2011 - NIGER / LIBYAN BORDER

BORDER GUNFIGHT: An allegedly pro-Gaddafi armed convoy attempted crossing the Libyan border into Niger, where they were stopped by elements of the Nigerien army. In the ensuing gun battle, one Nigerian and thirteen (13) Libyan militia members were killed.

08 – 13 NOVEMBER 2011 – ZAWIYA / OUTSKIRTS OF TRIPOLI

MILITIA / TRIBAL CLASHES: Large-scale fighting erupted in the outskirts of Tripoli, between Zawiyah and Tripoli, involving a Zawiyah-based militia and a group from the Warshafanna tribe. The Zawiyah group accused the members of the

Warshafanna tribe of belonging to Gaddafi loyalist remnants. The Zawiyah group claimed seeing tanks and vehicles with the Gaddafi-era green flag and markings that said "Brigade of the Martyr Muammar Gaddafi". The Warshafanna denied the Zawiyah account, adding that the Zawiyah militia had been misled by a rumor that pro-Gaddafi fighters were in the area. The fighting was centered around the Imaya military base, with both sides attempting to control the compound. Heavy weapons, to include vehicle mounted weapons and GRAD rocket launchers were used during the clashes. Casualty reports vary, although the Tripoli Medical Center confirmed 27 dead and 25 wounded.

14 NOVEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

ZAWIYA PROTESTS: 200-300 members of the Warshafanna tribe demonstrated at the Radisson Hotel on November 14, protesting TNC Minister of Communications Shammam's statement characterizing the tribe as Qadhafi loyalists. Separately, a senior TNC military official told Embassy officials that the clashes were centered on a dispute over control of the former 32nd brigade compound and did not involve any pro-Qadhafi loyalists.

15 NOVEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL NGO STRAFFED BY SMALL ARMS FIRE: US Embassy security personnel met with the head of the U.S. based NGO regarding an incident wherein at least two unidentified individuals fired AK-47 rounds at the front of the NGO's office and residential property located in the Gargaresh section of northwest Tripoli. The incident occurred at approximately 0330 on Tuesday, 15 November. Embassy security personnel observed approximately 8-10



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

impact points on the front of the building, including the front entrance door and an exterior light. The NGO country director added that the round that struck and damaged the exterior light also caused an electrical short and loss of power at the property. He added that the guard on duty reported that two individuals initially parked their vehicle at the adjacent property, which is under construction, at approximately 0300 hours. The unknown individuals then exited their vehicle and fired an entire magazine from an AK-47 into the air, and departed the area. According to the guards, the persons returned to the area after 30 minutes, fired additional rounds, to include several rounds apparently directed at the NGO occupied building.

The NGO country director added that the guards observed an armed robbery occur several days earlier in the vicinity of the Embassy of Oman, located 6-8 residences to the west of the NGO offices. According to the country director, the guard observed 3 individuals armed with AK-47s stealing property, including a television, from the nearby property. NGO staff added that the area near the Embassy of Oman is a source of significant nighttime celebratory gunfire. After speaking with the guards, neighbors, and landlord, the NGO director did not feel that the incident was directed at the NGO but the likely by product of nearby criminal activity. In light of the incident and some physical security deficiencies at the office property, the NGO decided to move from the building.

21 NOVEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

INTERMILITIA FIGHTING AT PALM CITY

COMPLEX: U.S. Embassy security officials received confirmed reports from several sources within the local press, business, and diplomatic

community that an inter-militia firefight erupted at the front gate area to the Palm City residential area. The Palm City residential area houses the European Union Mission, UN offices, Canadian Ambassador's Residence, German Mission, and several residences of multinational companies. Initial reports indicate that 1-2 militia members, possibly from the Misrata Militia, were killed and 2 more wounded. Reports vary as to the cause of the firefight and whether the Misrata Militia engaged the Zintan Militia, Tripoli Brigade/Tripoli Military Council, or private security at the Palm City complex.

23 NOVEMBER 2011 – BANI WALID

INTER-MILITIA SKIRMISH: Accounts vary as to the exact cause of the fighting, with one report claiming that fighting began after a militia high-speed chase with a vehicle containing a Ghaddafi loyalist. The loyalist was reportedly killed and the militia attempting to arrest the loyalist was ambushed in an area where residents had blocked roads to create a chokepoint. During the ambush, fifteen (15) militia members were reportedly killed and survivors reported being engaged from adjacent buildings with grenades, RPGs, and small arms fire. One civilian was reported killed during the fighting.

26 NOVEMBER 2011 - TRIPOLI

BELHAJ DETAINED: Tripoli Military Council leader Abdul Hakim BelHaj was detained for approximately one hour on November 24 while attempting to enter Tripoli following a trip to Qatar. He reportedly was carrying a false passport and a suitcase of cash.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

27 NOVEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

CAA CLOSES MITIGA TRAFFIC: The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Director-General halted commercial passenger flights out of Mitiga Airport after a November 26 security breach. The Director-General was reluctant to discuss details, but said an armed group of young men breached airport security and disrupted operations, delaying a Tunis Air flight by six hours. He said no shots were fired and no casualties reported, but that the CAA limited flights out of Mitiga until the security situation is brought under control. Local contacts report the armed group was from a Souq al-Juma' brigade, angered over the inequitable treatment of war-wounded in Tunisian hospitals.

SKIRMISH IN ZUARA: A locally employed staff member (LES) of the U.S. Embassy reported a firefight between Zuara forces and a unit out of Ajaali, a nearby town that allegedly was home to pro-Qadhafi fighters during the revolution. According to staff, the sides skirmished over rights to protect a section of the Greenstream project, the Italian natural gas submarine pipeline. No casualties were reported.

BERBER DISCONTENT: An Amazigh groups conducted small demonstrations in downtown Tripoli over the weekend to protest the lack of Berber representation in the new TNC cabinet. Amazigh activists advised they want official recognition of their own language and religion and seek ministerial positions in the Ministries of Education, Culture and/or Religious Endowments.

VANDALISM OF VEHICLE AT US EMBASSY: On 27 November at approximately 1700 hours, a U.S. Embassy employee discovered that his vehicle had been vandalized in the employee parking

area behind the interim Embassy compound. The driver's side window of the vehicle was smashed but nothing was missing from the vehicle.

24-27 NOVEMBER 2011 – BENGHAZI

STUDENT PROTESTS HINDER RESUMPTION OF CLASSES AT THE BENGHAZI UNIVERSITY –

Students at the Benghazi University (formerly known as Gar Yunus University) colleges of engineering, law, and sciences have been holding protests for the past three days that have delayed the resumption of classes. Many students are demanding fairer grading practices, claiming many professors are failing students without cause. Students are also complaining about professors mistreating students and expelling them from classes without cause, and as a result students are demanding changes to the university's rules that offer more protections of students' rights. University professors claim that in fact the students are protesting attempts by faculty to raise academic standards – during the Qadhafi era, universities suffered from grade inflation, as professors and deans would pass students for political reasons.

28 NOVEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

VANDALISM OF VEHICLE AT US EMBASSY: On 28 November at approximately 1430 hours, a U.S. Embassy employee discovered that his vehicle had been vandalized in the employee parking area behind the interim Embassy compound. The passenger side window of the vehicle was smashed but nothing was missing from the vehicle.

AMCIT REPORTS VEHICLE THEFT: An AMCIT visited the interim U.S. Embassy and reported to U.S. Embassy security personnel that he was the victim of a carjacking on 31 October 2011 in



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

Tripoli. The AMCIT, who is also a Libyan citizen, was abducted by persons known to him who accused him of being a supporter of Ghaddafi. The AMCIT claimed his life was threatened and he was taken to a lawyer, where he was forced to sign over ownership of his vehicle. The AMCIT reported that he was dropped off on a highway by the assailants. The following day, the AMCIT saw his vehicle and the assailants and he notified a local militia. The militia attempted to stop the vehicle and opened fire on the fleeing assailants but was unable to recover the vehicle. The AMCIT added that he had filed a police report but police had not recovered his vehicle.

29 NOVEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

RAID OF FARM HOUSE; RECOVERY OF 180 ASSAULT RIFLES NEAR MISSION COMPOUND: On 29 November 2011, fifteen members of the Zintan militia converged on and raided a farm house located within 800 meters of the interim Embassy and Residential Compounds. The Zintani militia, supported by three trucks with vehicle mounted heavy weapons recovered 100 FN-FAL and 80 AK series rifles and a computer with weapons information. The home reportedly belonged to a Libyan diplomat who had previously worked at the Libyan embassy in South Korea. Elements of the Zintan militia conducted the raid after reportedly detaining an individual with an unregistered assault rifle, who provided information regarding the weapons cache. The homeowner was not present at the time of the raid, however, the militia remained onsite in an effort to apprehend anyone coming to the property.

28 NOVEMBER 2011 – RAS AJDIR, TUNISIAN/LIBYAN BORDER

BORDER VIOLENCE: Tunisian customs officers stopped three cars at the Ras Ajdir border crossing, two of which carried contraband. Relatives of the smuggler retaliated by burning tires in front of the Ben Gardane town hall, requiring national and regional level officials to intervene.

28 NOVEMBER 2011 – RAS AJDIR, TUNISIAN/LIBYAN BORDER

BORDER VIOLENCE: On 30 November, a group of Libyans on the Tunisian side of the border crossing assisted several vehicles loaded with contraband cross into Libya. A Tunisian policeman failed an attempt to stop the vehicles and was attacked and threatened with a firearm, an eyewitness reported. Border police went on strike in protest of the lack of security and the Tunisian Armed Forces decided to close the border crossing indefinitely.

01 DECEMBER – BENGHAZI

FOUR INJURED IN TEBU-ARAB CLASHES IN KUFRA – Tebu contacts told U.S. Embassy officials that a Tebu border protection militia clashed violently with an Arab militia from the Zuay tribe at the outskirts of Kufra in southeastern Libya. Four Tebu militia fighters were injured and hospitalized. The clashes were the result of a dispute over which militia had jurisdiction – the Tebu and Arab militias set up competing checkpoints, with each side claiming that it had been authorized by the TNC to inspect travelers.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

DETENTION OF U.S. CITIZEN NGO

REPRESENTATIVE: On December 1, the U.S. citizen chief of party of a U.S. based NGO operating in Libya was detained by members of the Zintan Martyrs Brigade. On Thursday, December 1, 2011 the chief of party was attending an engagement party for a local CDGP colleague at a farm outside of Benghazi. During the event, 50-60 members of the Zintan Martyrs Brigade (a private militia) raided the house, which had been mistaken for another farm, believing the occupants to be "Fifth Column" (pro-Qadhafi) elements. The militia stated they acted under orders from the Prosecutor General's office. Failing to find evidence of "Fifth Column" suspects, the leader of the Zintan Martyrs Brigade ordered his men to round up and detain all 22 men in attendance for listening to loud music and on suspicion of drinking alcohol. There were no women in attendance as this was a traditional Libyan bachelor's dinner.

All 22 men, including the U.S. citizen chief of party, spent the next day and a half in the custody of the Zintan Martyrs Brigade. In the middle of the second day, the Brigade took them to the office of the Prosecutor General of Benghazi, who refused to acknowledge their authority to arrest and investigate possible cases of law breaking. He informed them they should hand the group over to the police, who alone had the authority to arrest and investigate those suspected of breaking Libyan law, or release them.

Later that evening, the men were taken to the local police station, which undertook its own investigation and promptly dismissed the case against all 22 men for lack of evidence. According to the NGO, at no time were the men mistreated, and the Brigade provided a steady supply of

water and basic food. The chief of party confirmed that they suffered only material discomfort and general anxiety. They did not face abuse or violence.

01 DECEMBER 2011 – JANZOUR (outskirts of Tripoli)

GUNFIGHT AT MILITIA CHECKPOINT; 1 DEAD –

Accounts of the incident differ, however, Ashraf Abdelsalam Al-Marni Swayha, deputy head of the Janzour military council, was killed at a checkpoint manned by the Zintan militia. According to Janzour militia officials, SWAYHA and his driver stopped at the checkpoint and reportedly informed the Zintan militia of SWAYHA's rank. Allegedly, the Zintan militia told SWAYHA that they didn't care about the Janzour military council and SWAYHA told his driver to depart the checkpoint, at which point the Zintan militia opened fire. SWAYHA was killed and his driver was injured.

02 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

EU STAFF MEMBER CARJACKED: On 02 December, European Union (EU) security reported that a white Hyundai SantaFe was stolen from a local EU staff member during a mid-day carjacking in downtown Tripoli. EU security reported that the vehicle and driver were stopped by what the staff member believed to be militia members at a security checkpoint near Martyrs Square in downtown Tripoli. The militia members reportedly told the EU staff member there was a problem with his vehicle registration and that he needed to follow the militia members to a local police station. The EU staff member was instead led away from downtown Tripoli into a more isolated area, where the militia members forcibly took the Hyundai at gunpoint.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

03 DECEMBER 2011 - TUNISIA/LIBYAN BORDER

TUNISIA/LIBYAN BORDER CLOSED: Tunisian authorities closed the border due to continued militia firefights in the vicinity of the Ras Ajdir border post. Specifically, the Tunisians pointed to a series of incidents wherein Libyan militias chased alleged smugglers into Tunisian territory. Libyan militia personnel were asked to withdraw one mile back from the border.

04 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

MILITIA FIREFIGHT: Sustained inter-militia firefights were reported by NGO and diplomatic contacts in the Jam'a Essaga, Al-hani, Zawia Street, Salah eddine and Shara' Edhill, BenAshur, and Noufleen neighborhoods of Tripoli. The gunfight lasted more than 30 minutes with opposing militias utilizing AK series small arms, DSHK 12.7mm and 23mm automatic cannon fire. At least two persons were reported killed in the clash. Sources in the Bashir Sa'dawi's Brigade stated that an intoxicated armed male was arrested in the Ben Ashour neighborhood and held by Al'Asiam Martyrs' brigade in the former Mutassim Ghaddafi residence. Individuals from an unknown militia apparently responded to the area and attempted to forcibly release the detained individual. Elements of security dispatched from the Supreme Security Committee in Tripoli responded to the area and restored calm to the quarter. The former U.S. Embassy compound is located in the neighborhood where the clashes took place. Continued skirmishes in the area also resulted in the closure of Alzawah and Algmehoria streets in Tripoli.

05 DECEMBER 2011 – AL-HANI PORTION OF TRIPOLI

SUFI VERSUS SALAFI CLASHES RESULT IN 4 DEAD:

During a meeting between the Minister of Interior, RSO, and Ambassador, the Minister of Interior confirmed that recent fighting in the Al-Hani area of Tripoli between Salafi and Sufi groups resulted in the death of 4 Salafists. The Minister added that Ministry officials believe that Saadi Ghaddafi, a surviving son of former regime leader Mohammed Ghaddafi, is responsible for inciting violence between the two sects of Islam in an effort to undermine the new government.

05 DECEMBER 2011 – UBARI CITY

CLASHES IN UBARI CITY: RSO received unconfirmed reports that clashes occurred in Ubari City. No further details available.

05-07 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

CITIZEN DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST MILITIAS:

Local citizens staged peaceful protests in downtown Tripoli, near Nasser and Omar Muktar streets and the new Ministry of Interior building. The protestors called for the departure of militias from the streets of Tripoli. No violence was reported as a result of the demonstrations although the Ministry of Interior and Supreme Security Council established a number of preventative security checkpoints on major roads which affected traffic.

10 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

MILITIA FIREFIGHT; CLOSURE OF TRIPOLI

INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT: The TNC closed the airspace at Tripoli International Airport on 10 December due to fighting between two militias on the airport road near the Sidi Saleem fuel



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

depot. The fighting lasted approximately 2.5 hours and occurred within 2 KM of the Embassy Residential Villas (N 32' 47.373' / E 013' 08.747'). U.S. Embassy security personnel activated internal defense and safe haven procedures for all staff as a significant amount of gunfire, to include anti-aircraft rounds, traveled in the direction of the residential villas. None of the U.S. Embassy buildings suffered any damage nor appear to have been directly targeted during the fighting. According to local media reports, two militia members were injured in the fighting. Sources at the UN stated that 4 persons were killed in the clashes, 1 from the Zintan Brigade and 3 from Tripoli based brigades. The firefight involved significant fire from AK series weapons, 14.5 mm machine guns, 23 mm cannons, and RPG fire. Tanks were previously deployed to the area on 08 December and may have been involved in the fighting. A specific clash was reported by local Mission employees at an overpass near the Brega gas terminals, identified by post as waypoint GREY98 ((N 32' 47.373' / E 013' 08.747'). Zintan militia reportedly attacked a national army checkpoint that had been established at the site earlier on 10 Dec. Libyan army spokesman claimed that two gunmen opened fire on a convoy accompanying army chief Maj-Gen Khalifa Haftar earlier in the day.

12 DECEMBER 2011 – BENGHAZI

PROTESTS AND COUNTER-PROTESTS IN THE EAST: An estimated crowd of about 3,000 mostly youth protesters converged on Benghazi's Shajarah ("Tree") square on the night of December 12 to protest against a range of issues, primarily corruption, the state of the economy, a lack of government transparency and the continued presence of Qadhafi-era figures in government. There were reports of similar,

smaller youth-driven protests in Bayda and Tobruk that same night.

These protests continued during the night of December 13 in Shajarah Square, and were joined by a pro-TNC, pro-Jalil demonstration led by the local "Committee of Wise Men" in Benghazi's Freedom Square. The two protests were estimated to be in the 2,000-3,000 size range each on the night of the 13th. There have been no reports of violence or militia involvement, and the two sites are a considerable distance apart from one another.

13 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

LIBYA'S AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS STAGE STRIKE: Libyan air traffic controllers staged a brief strike on Tuesday that affected flights in the capital and other cities, forcing one passenger plane to be diverted shortly before landing. The air traffic controllers were reportedly unhappy with their pay as well as the appointment of new management. The strike affected airports in the capital Tripoli, the eastern city of Benghazi, and Sabha in the south. Mukhtar Al-Akhdar, commander of the militia unit that controls Tripoli International Airport, said flights resumed after 4:00 p.m. (1400 GMT), and that no civilian aircraft had been allowed to land or depart before then.

According to Abdelrezaq Zaatout, head of Libya's civil aviation authority, the controllers failed to give airlines the required 72 hour notice regarding the strike, which aggravated its impact. After negotiations with management, the workers agreed to go back to work.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

15 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

GUNFIGHT AT AMAN BANK: The son of Libyan Gen Khalifa Hiftar was injured in a confrontation with members of the Zintan militia at a Tripoli bank. Hiftar's son, Saddam, reportedly triggered the clash by trying to enter the Aman bank armed with a gun and a hand grenade. The Aman bank is guarded by elements of the Zintan militia. A GoL spokesman stated that Saddam was injured in the leg and was taken to a local hospital. Saddam's brother, Belgassim, accused the rebels of abducting Saddam.

REPORT OF MILITIA GUNFIGHT: RSO received an unconfirmed report from an NGO security representative of an inter-militia firefight in Tripoli at MGRS: 33SUS1643833426.

16-17 DECEMBER 2011 – BENGHAZI

YOUTH PROTESTS CONTINUE: Youth-led protests in Benghazi and other eastern towns continued on December 16-17, and protesters in Benghazi remained in Shajara square. Protest organizers were not encouraging additional large-scale protests at this time, and local staff in Benghazi confirmed that the numbers of protesters in Benghazi had dropped from crowds in the thousands to perhaps 100 by December 18. According to a protest organizer, this change was implemented because the protests went too far in making their demands – particularly the verbal attacks against NTC Chairman Jalil and calls for the entire NTC to step-down.

18 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

BREAK-IN AND THEFT FROM LES VEHICLE AT US EMBASSY: At approximately 1645 hours, a U.S. Embassy locally employed staff member reported that unknown individuals broke the driver's side

rear window of his vehicle, which was parked in the rear parking lot of the interim Embassy compound. The employee stated that a sound system (portable radio) belonging to the Public Affairs Office was stolen from the rear cargo area of the vehicle. The thief's partial shoe print was noticeable on the rear seat. The employee went to lunch with a 2nd PD section LES at approximately 1200, returning around 1220.

This is the third incident since 11/27 involving vandalism and/or theft of a Mission employee's vehicle at the interim Embassy compound.

20 DECEMBER – BENGHAZI – TRIPOLI

PROTECTIVE SECURITY FORCES FOIL AN ATTEMPT DUBBED (PAPA NOEL) OR SANTA CLAUS TARGETING EMBASSIES AND OIL FIELDS IN LIBYA DURING CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR

EVE HOLIDAYS: Libyan protective security authorities claimed that they foiled plans to attack embassies, consulates and oil fields operating in Libya. According to the GoL, these attacks were allegedly planned for the Christmas and New Years Eve holidays. According to GoL security official Abdessalam Borghathi, a network of Gaddafi loyalists were behind the plot and the GoL arrested the members and dismantled the group. The GoL reported seizure of 150 RPG launchers, and various light weapons and ammunition and undisclosed sums of money. The arrested members of this network reportedly exchanged SMS messages confirming their intent in carrying out this operation as an explosive "Christmas gift" to the Libyan people.

20 DECEMBER 2011 – 27 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

ONGOING PROTESTS IN ALGERIA SQUARE: Approximately 100-200 protesters participated in



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

ongoing protests in Tripoli's central Algeria Square, where they erected a tent and occupied the square. Like protesters in other cities, the Algeria Square protesters' demands included the removal of the symbols of the Qadhafi regime from the government, the suspension of Tripoli's representatives on the TNC, elections for Tripoli local council members, the publication of the minutes of TNC meetings, the sacking of ministers with dual citizenship, and the publication of TNC members' financial holdings and resumes. Social media sites posted videos allegedly showing mistreatment of the protesters: one video shows a person reported to be a bodyguard of Tripoli Local Council president Abd al-Razzag Buhajar threatening protesters with his rifle.

21 DECEMBER 2011- TRIPOLI

POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT: At approximately 00:50 hours, at a U.S. Embassy annex compound, local guards found a wooden pallet leaning against the interior side of the perimeter wall. Above the wall where the pallet was located, a leather belt was draped over the barbed wire. Security personnel conducted a security sweep of the compound to determine whether an intruder entered the facility or if anything was stolen. No one was found and there were no signs of theft or vandalism.

26 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION: The Security Attaché for the Embassy of the Netherlands reported a small demonstration, approximately 30 persons, outside of the Prime Minister's office.

DEMONSTRATION: The UK Defense Attaché's office reported a planned demonstration at the Radisson Hotel and Martyrs Square by the FIGHTERS UNION regarding lack of pay.

27 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

DEMONSTRATION AT TRIPOLI UNIVERSITY:

Students at Tripoli University reportedly protested over the resignation of University president Dr. Faisal Krekshi, who resigned to pursue political aspirations. Krekshi was to be replaced by Dr. Madani Dakhel, formerly the head of the National Committee for Cooperation between Libyan and American Universities. Reportedly, when Dr. Madani attempted to enter the university office, he was attacked by students and kicked out, and the university security personnel were only able to escort him safely out of the university compound. The students then blocked the university entrances and demanded Dr. Krekshi's return.

29 DECEMBER 2011 – TRIPOLI

BURGLARY AT NGO OFFICE: On 29 December, the office of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), a DoS institutional contractor, was burglarized. NDI attempted to deposit operating funds into their Tripoli bank account on the 28th of December, however, the bank refused to make the deposit without documentation showing how the funds were brought into the country. At the time of the burglary, the offices were empty so no injuries occurred. The perpetrators entered through a ground floor metal office door, gained access to the finance office area, and carried away a 100kg safe. Libyan police investigated the incident and initially detained a guard and driver working on short-term contracts with NDI; they have since been released by the police and their contracts suspended. Police now claim they don't have sufficient evidence or leads to proceed with the investigation.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

In January 2012 – BENGHAZI

SUFI CEMETARY DESTRUCTION BY SALAFISTS:

Salafists destroyed the Sufi cemetery of Sidi Ubaid in Benghazi and removed 31 bodies of Sufi saints interred at the site.

03 JANUARY – TRIPOLI

CLASHES IN TRIPOLI: Clashes between militia elements from Misurata and Tripoli closed down a major area of downtown Tripoli for several hours in the early afternoon on 03 January. The fighting, which lasted for roughly 30 minutes, occurred in an area between the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Interior and reportedly involved heavy weapons fire including RPG's. Embassy security officers present in the area witnessed the deployment of several technicals (commercial vehicles with crew served weapons) and at least 20 troops. The media has reported between one and seven casualties but Post was unable to confirm this information. The reasons behind the fighting remain unclear; some reports attributed it to a real estate dispute while others claim that Misurata militia members attempted to free a colleague who had been detained by members of the Tripoli Military Council. According to a GoL official, Misurata militia members attacked Tripoli's Sidi Khalifa militia (part of the Tripoli Military Council). Libyan social media sites focused heavily on these clashes, criticizing the lack of information regarding the events on any of the new Libyan TV channels.

01-04 JANUARY 2011 – TRIPOLI

PORTS STRIKE: An official from the Ports and Maritime Transport Authority stated on January 4 that a "small" group of port workers have been striking for increased wages. According to press reports, 300 of the 1800 workers have been

striking since January 1 demanding better working conditions and government investment to repair war damage and decades of negligence.

PROTEST AT PM OFFICE: Voices of Libyan Women (VLW), staged a peaceful protest of approximately 50 women in front of the Prime Minister's office on January to protest a 10% quota for women in office under the newly-released elections law. After several hours, PM Al-Keab came out and met with the protestors, agreeing to a separate meeting with the leaders on January 5.

07 JANUARY 2011 – TRIPOLI

FRENCH BUSINESSMAN MURDERED: A French businessman, identified as Hugues de Samie, age 60, a former French serviceman, was killed at his residence in the Zawiet al-Dahmani neighborhood of Tripoli. Sources indicate that Samie may have been targeted by a group of 2-3 individuals, possibly for his former business dealings with the Gaddafi regime. Witnesses stated that nothing of value was taken from the residence, north African domestic workers at the residence were unharmed by the assailants, and Samie was shot at close range with a handgun. Samie, a former member of the French military with a long military career, worked in Libya since 2008 for Construction Mecanique de Normandie (CMN), a French shipyard. He had reportedly been involved in attempts to sell naval patrol boats to Muammar Gaddafi's regime and to win contracts to modernize Libyan frigates bought in the 1970s. Libyan authorities arrested one suspect in the killing, identified as Mohammed al-Kurdi, 28, "The [arrested] criminal is a drug addict and his motive was theft. There are no political motives.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

08 JANUARY – TRIPOLI

BANK MANAGER KIDNAPPED: According to unconfirmed reports from commercial and media contacts, the manager of the Arab Commercial Bank, Mr. Dhawo el Hamdi, was kidnapped today from Tripoli. However, the Libya government had not officially confirmed the incident.

09 JANUARY 2011 – TRIPOLI

HOTEL EMPLOYEE ARRESTED: According to unconfirmed reports from a commercial contact, a man was arrested yesterday at the Rixos Hotel. He was apparently an employee there and attempted to park his car next to the hotel. The car was searched and a device, described possibly as a grenade, was reportedly found in the car.

12 JANUARY 2011 – TRIPOLI

PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION: RSO noted a small demonstration, approximately 12-15 persons, primarily women, outside of the Prime Minister's office.

10 JANUARY 2012 - TRIPOLI

EMBASSY LES VEHICLE BREAK-IN; THEFT: At approximately 15:30 hours, on 10 January 2012, U.S. Embassy local guard force members reported hearing the sound of glass breaking in the rear parking lot of the interim Embassy compound. Inspection of the parking lot by LGF and LE Staff approximately 5-10 minutes later showed that the front passenger side window of a GSO LES employee's car was smashed. The window had been completely broken and there were traces of blood on some of the glass. Items from the glove box, console and side pockets of Ajaj's car were strewn about the interior of the car.

The LES employee stated that 1,000 Libyan Dinars were missing from the center console storage compartment; he said he had gone to the bank at approximately 08:00 hours. No other items appeared to be missing. The car was parked approximately 15 meters from the wall of the Embassy compound but next to an olive tree blocking any direct view from the back gate.

12 JANUARY 2011 – BENGHAZI

FEMALE POLITICAL ACTIVIST BEATEN IN BENGHAZI: Political activist Azza Ali Orfi was assaulted and beaten by two unknown assailants as she left Al-Fadhel Hotel in Benghazi where she was on business. Azza was present at Maydan Al Shajara in Benghazi on Wednesday where she criticized the TNC for ignoring the demands of "Correcting the Revolution Movement" held in Freedom Square to protest against the current situation.

13 JANUARY 2012 – SABHA

4 MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL NGO DETAINED: Four international staff members (Jordanian, Lebanese, US, and German/Somali) of the International Organization of Migration (IOM) were detained at 0030 hrs by several individuals purportedly responsible for security at the Sabha airport. IOM operates a transit assistance center in Sabha and the team planned to travel to the area to discuss future operations with local officials. The IOM staff members were taken from the airport arrivals area by 3 armed individuals and driven to a compound 10-15 minutes from the airport. The armed individuals appeared to be militia members involved in security at the airport and claimed they needed to inspect the IOM vehicle and baggage. Once at the compound, the person in charge, identified as



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

Mukhtar Al Heishi, threatened all four staff members, fired his handgun at the feet of the staff members, and struck three of the team members with his hand or handgun. Al HEISHI was identified as the Head of Security at Sabha Airport and the Rebel Commander in charge of Sabha Airport, and a member of the Martyrs of Abdel Jaleel Saif Al-Nasr Regiment. The IOM team was placed into a room that was used as a detention facility and their telephones were confiscated. Also in the room was a Libyan Toureg and a Tunisian citizen, who had also arrived on the same flight into Sabha as the IOM team. According to the IOM team, the Libyan Toureg was taken from the room on at least two occasions and several beaten by Mukhtar and his guards. After approximately 4 hours, militia members from the Saif Al-Nasser brigade came to the compound and transported the IOM team and the Tunisian to a 2nd site, where they were provided water, food, access to a restroom, and usage of their cellphones, although the team was not free to leave. The IOM team and the Tunisian citizen were allowed to depart at approximately 1600 hrs.

13 - 15 JANUARY 2012 – GHARYAN

RIVAL MILITIAS CLASH; 3 DEAD, 42 WOUNDED: Clashes between rival Libyan militia have killed three persons and wounded at least 42, the latest in a series of incidents involving armed groups refusing to hand in their weapons. The clashes began late on Friday and continued on Saturday and Sunday. Friday's violence pitted fighters from the town of Gharyan, 50 miles (80 kilometers) south of Tripoli, against a militia from al-Asabia, about 10 miles (16 kilometers) to the southwest. Media reported artillery and rockets were used during the clashes. Ahmed al-Sharif of the Gharyan militia said his fighters had gone to

arrest people suspected of having ties to the former Gadhafi regime. Al-Asabia fighters refused to hand the suspects over, triggering a shootout.

15 JANUARY 2012 – GHADAMES

BUS ATTACKED; 1 KIDNAPPED: Members of a Tuareg militia, allegedly aligned with former regime elements, allegedly attacked a public bus on its way to Ghadames from Tripoli. The armed attackers stopped the bus and reportedly fired small arms at it, then kidnapped one of its passengers.

15 JANUARY 2012 – DERNA

MILITARY COUNCIL ATTACKED: An armed group attacked the Military council in Derna, which was defended by the Naser Almadhkour Militia. No reported deaths from the fighting.

15 JANUARY 2012 - DERNA

INTERMILITIA CLASHES: In the eastern city of Derna, local militias were engaged in a brief firefight with a group of fighters from outside the city.

16 JANUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

GRENADE FIGHTS: According to diplomatic security contacts, several people were injured, one seriously, when an individual threw a hand grenade in Martyrs Square. The incident took place between the hours of 2130-2200 hrs. Hospital contacts confirmed that the seriously injured had lost a leg. Tripoli police reportedly sought the support of a police-led militia unit to restore order in the square.

RSO received additional reports of grenades thrown in Souq al Juma at approximately 0200 hrs. No details regarding injuries.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

16 - 17 JANUARY 2012 - ALGERIAN/LIBYAN BORDER

ALGERIAN OFFICIAL KIDNAPPED; FREED IN LIBYA: Libyan authorities freed Mohamed Laid Khelfi, governor of the southern Algerian province of Illizi, after he was kidnapped by three gunmen and transported across the Algerian/Libyan border. According to the victim, he was kidnapped after returning from official duties in the town of Debdeb when his car was intercepted at 1630 hrs on 16 January by three persons in a Toyota pickup truck. KHELFI stated he was kidnapped in the area of Timeroualine, approximately 80 kilometres from Debdeb. The assailants were described as between 25-30 and carrying AK-47s. The Algerian Interior Ministry added that the kidnappers had been fully identified. Governor Khelfi travelled to the province in response to protests earlier in the week following court judgement against some of the area's residents and family members of an AQIM leader. The governor was released after a Libyan official travelled to Zintan and negotiated with the kidnappers. The Algerian Interior Minister advised that the kidnappers were Algerian and were in Libya, declining to talk about their fate. He also rejected the possibility of submitting an extradition request to Libya.

19 JANUARY 2012 – BENGHAZI

PROTESTORS ROUGH UP NTC VICE PRESIDENT: A crowd of protesters on 19 January surrounded Transitional National Council (TNC) Vice Chairman Abdul-Hafiz Ghoga and assaulted him before his security guards managed to pull him away. The incident occurred at Gharyounis University in Benghazi, where Ghoga was due to attend a memorial ceremony for those who had been killed during the 2011 uprising and civil war.

During the scuffle, Ghoga's bodyguards reportedly stabbed a student who was demonstrating at the university, though this has yet to be confirmed. The TNC denounced the protest against Ghoga, and claimed that it was an attempt to damage the organisation's reputation. On 22 January, Ghoga resigned from the NTC, saying he did not want the "atmosphere of hatred" to affect the council and its performance.

19 JANUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

HEAVY GUNFIRE/POSSIBLE FIREFIGHT:

Unconfirmed reports from various commercial contacts regarding a heavy gunfire / possible militia gunfight near the Al Waddan hotel in Tripoli. The gunfire reportedly lasted for approximately 2 hours, beginning at 2100 hrs.

20 JANUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, SABHA

MULTI CITY PROTESTS: Hundreds of Libyan Islamists demonstrated on Friday, 20 January 2012, to demand that Muslim sharia law form the basis for Libyan legislation. The organizers called the protests a response to the emergence of secular political parties after the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Groups assembled by Islamist political and religious groups demonstrated in squares in Tripoli, Benghazi and in Sabha in the southern desert. In Tripoli's Algeria Square, Islamists burned copies of the "Green Book," Gaddafi's eccentric handbook on politics, economics and everyday life, to underline that the Koran should be the country's main source of legislation.

21 JANUARY 2012 – BENGHAZI

PROTESTS STORM TNC HQ IN BENGHAZI:

Approximately 200 Libyan protesters stormed the TNC's headquarters in Benghazi and demanded a meeting with the country's interim leaders.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

23 JANUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

MILITIA FIREFIGHT: On Monday 23 January, at approximately 0115 hrs, local police and security contacts confirmed that a firefight occurred between two militias in the Fashlum area of Tripoli. The fight occurred between a group led by 4 brothers from the Kabuka family and a group from the nearby Abu Salim neighborhood. The firefight lasted 60-90 minutes and involved small arms fire and at least 3 RPG explosions. Two fatalities were confirmed in the fighting (1 Kabuka/1 Abu Salim Brigade), a third individual was listed as deceased (unconfirmed/Kabuka), and at least one seriously wounded, possibly fatally (Kabuka). A subsequent raid of the Kabuka family residence uncovered various small arms, RPGs, an undisclosed amount of funds, and an unknown amount of Ecstasy tablets.

MILITIA FIREFIGHT: A second firefight was reported between midnight and 0300 hrs on Monday, 23 January, in the area near the Al Waddan Hotel, along the cornice area of Tripoli. The gunfight started at a check-point a few meters from Al Waddan hotel. The militia in charge in that area insisted on controlling and checking the identification of members of other militias who passed the checkpoint. An argument ensued when the militia in charge of the checkpoint challenged IDs of another militia who were passing the checkpoint. There was sustained gunfire and explosions during the fire fight, although reportedly no wounded or killed in the incident.

However, a source at a local hospital confirmed that a total of 9 individuals died in fighting in Tripoli during the evening and early morning of 22 / 23 January.

MILITIA FIREFIGHT: A third firefight was reported at approximately 1640 hours and continued for approximately 45 minutes in the eastern portion of the city, adjacent to the 2nd ring road, in the vicinity of where we maintain a GSO warehouse (MGRS Coordinates: 33SUS31705 39814). There is a former ESO office/operations center in the area and the two militias apparently have been fighting over the control of the site. Roadblocks were placed on several of the primary roads but were removed at the conclusion of fighting. RSO received unconfirmed reports that two persons were killed.

23 JANUARY 2012 -- BANI WALID

CLASHES IN BANI WALID: Multiple Embassy contacts confirmed press reports of renewed fighting in Bani Walid. A TNC official characterized the clashes as between pro-Qadhafi and pro-TNC tribes, and told Embassy officials that the Ministry of Defense dispatched brigades from Misrata to quell the violence. Embassy officials witnessed Zintan brigade members gearing up and heading south. According to the head of Bani Walid's 23 October Brigade (a militia that is reputed to have fought for Qadhafi), the 28 May Brigade (another Bani Walid militia and the hated rival of the 23 October Brigade) started the fighting when it kidnapped a member of the powerful Werfelli tribe. The 23 October brigade leader said that he and various Werfelli tribal leaders are gathering fighters to "deal with the problem" and that everything was "under control" in Bani Walid. He strenuously denied reports that the clashes are between pro- and anti-Qadhafi forces, characterizing the fighting as entirely tribal in nature. Bani Walid has seen several rounds of fighting since Qadhafi's death. The previous incidents included elements of tribal rivalries and



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

some anti-TNC sentiment. The October 23 militia leader, for example, stated that he is not pleased by the way that the TNC has treated Bani Walid like an occupied territory.

According to a USG funded mine and ordinance abatement team in Bani Walid at the time of the clashes, a group of armed men, wearing masks and carrying AK-47s and RPGs, set up a barricade around the military council. The members of the military council said that these men were not under the military council and accused them of being "pro-Qadhafi." As the team left the area, the men at the barricade stopped them, but seeing that they were foreigners, let them pass. A member of the same team also reported that the coastal road heading east from Tripoli has been closed off with armed checkpoints. He said that one of their team (a Libyan translator) was heading east to visit his family and was turned around.

23 JANUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

TRAFFIC POLICE OFFICER KIDNAPPED; KILLED: A Tripoli Police traffic officer was kidnapped and later killed by unknown assailants while walking home from his duty post south of Grey 4 on the airport road. The officer was wearing his traffic police uniform. The incident occurred at approximately 1400 hrs, and the officer's body was found later along the airport road with hands tied behind his back, and numerous bullet wounds in his back. Ministry of Interior contacts advised that this was the third Tripoli based police officer to be killed since November 2011 in similar circumstances. In at least two of the cases, the officer's vehicle was taken, and the Ministry of Interior is trying to determine the motive for the crimes.

27 JANUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

ATTEMPTED CARJACKING OF OIL COMPANY

VEHICLE: On 27 January 2011, at 1300 hrs, a vehicle belonging to a Western oil company was enroute to Tripoli International Airport when it was forced to slow down by a group of youths. The vehicle contained one driver and two passengers. The occupants felt that they were being targeted for a robbery or carjacking as the youths attempted to intimidate the occupants and one of the assailants attempted to open one of the vehicle doors. As the vehicle slowly tried to move forward, another youth was 'bumped', but not injured. The group of youth converged on the vehicle and smashed the rear window. The driver took evasive action and departed the scene. The vehicle occupants did not report any injuries. No report of firearms being displayed or used

28 JANUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

MILITIAS EXCHANGE GUNFIRE: According to a diplomatic official from a NATO Embassy, there was a sustained gunfight at approximately 1730 hours in the Gargaresh area of Tripoli (N 32° 52.073' E 013°06.383'). The exchange of gunfire occurred at a location previously established as a vehicle checkpoint by one of the militias exercising control over the area.

FRENCH DIPLOMAT STOPPED AT CHECKPOINT:

In the Gurgi area of Tripoli, a French Diplomat, traveling in a vehicle bearing diplomatic plates, was stopped by militia members manning a checkpoint. Despite the diplomatic plates, the militia members insisted on searching the vehicle. Reports of such incidents have become increasingly common, with untrained and marginally controlled militias failing to abide by



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

or understand international laws governing the protection of diplomats.

PROTEST AT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE: U.S.

Embassy security officials observed a group of approximately 75 males, described as between the ages of 18-35, wearing a mix of civilian and military attire, who were protesting and blocking the main gate entrance into the Ministry of Defense. The Embassy's movement security team entered the compound via a secondary entrance. At the conclusion of the 90 minute meeting, Embassy security officials noted the crowd had roughly doubled in size and were interacting with traffic on both the north and west side of the complex. Protesters waved flags, placards and banners allowing vehicles to pass but intermingled in traffic creating disruption. No threatening or malicious action was observed. A rough translation of the protestors placards, criticized acting Minister of Defense Juwali's recent remarks seen as critical of revolutionaries. Juwali reportedly referred to the revolutionaries ('thumar') as "thieves and pirates".

01 FEBRUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

INTER-MILITIA GUNFIGHT: At approximately, 1500 hrs, a gunfight erupted between elements of the Zintan and Misrata militias when elements of the Zintan brigade used force, including AK47s, heavy weapons and 1-2 RPG's to gain entry to a compound behind the Marriot Hotel, on the seafront. This compound is thought to be occupied by fighters from Misratah (the compound was once owned and used by Saadi Gaddafi). The Zintan group then freed a fighter that had been arrested by Misratan fighters prior to the gunfight. The main initial engagement lasted 20 – 25 minutes and was limited to the area close to Misratah compound. Fighting was

also reported at Saif al-Islam Gaddafi's beach house that had been occupied by the Zintan militia.

05 FEB 2012 - TRIPOLI

PROTESTORS STORM RUSSIAN EMBASSY: From 1400 to 1700 hrs, a demonstration was held outside the Russian Embassy in Tripoli a day after Russia and China blocked a UN resolution on the Syrian crisis. During the demonstration, dozens of pro-Syrian protesters stormed the Russian Embassy, climbed onto the roof of the building, damaged surveillance cameras and hauled down the Russian flag. No injuries resulted from the incident, however, Russian officials complained to the Government of Libya over the lack of response from host nation security officials. The Libyan authorities apologized over the incident and pledged to probe into the circumstances and to ensure security of the Russian diplomatic mission in Tripoli.

06 FEBRUARY 2012 – JANZOUR / SUBURB OF TRIPOLI

INTER-MILITIA CLASH: A clash between a Misrata affiliated militia and an unidentified armed group resulted five persons killed and two wounded.

06 FEBRUARY 2012 – JANZOUR / SUBURB OF TRIPOLI

REFUGEE CAMP ATTACKED BY MILITIA: On 6 February, seven male black Libyan civilians from Tawergha were killed by militias who raided their makeshift refugee camp at a former naval academy in Janzour, a suburb of Tripoli. The survivors said that they appeared to be from Misrata because of their license plates, though the Misrata militia denied this. The militia



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

members who raided the refugee camp claimed to be searching for suspects from an earlier militia clash in Janzour.

06 FEBRUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

PROTESTORS HURLED ROCKS, EGGS AND TOMATOES AT THE CHINESE EMBASSY: Syrian and Libyan demonstrators hurled rocks, eggs and tomatoes at the Chinese embassy in Tripoli on Monday, after Russia and China vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution backing an Arab plan urging Syria's President Bashar al-Assad to give up power.

Armed men, who said they were from the Libyan government's Supreme Security Committee, guarded the embassy from about 50 protesters who waved Syrian opposition flags and had managed to break windows and spray graffiti on the walls. One demonstrator tried to force his way past the guards but was stopped.

Just as protesters had done the day before at the Russian embassy, demonstrators said they wanted to take down the Chinese flag and replace it with the Syrian opposition's flag and the red, black and green flag of Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC).

One of the men guarding the embassy said his colleagues had shot into the air to disperse the crowd when they hurled rocks and tried to push their way through. The crowd later hurled eggs before lining up to pray at prayer hour.

10 FEBRUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

ALLEGED TERROR CELL ARRESTED IN AIRPORT AREA: According to the Zintan Military Council, members of a Zintan militia arrested a criminal gang that was operating out of an apartment in Qasr Bin Ghasher area in Tripoli as a base to sell

alcohol, drugs, and weapons. The Zintan Military Council stated that the arrestees carried fake revolutionary ID cards issued by the Ministry of Interior, spoke an Egyptian dialect of Arabic and came from the Eastern Desert (Libyan-Egyptian borders). Zintan officials added that one of the arrestees confessed to planning sabotage and terror attacks in Tripoli to guarantee the instability of the city.

12 FEBRUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

INDIVIDUAL DETAINED TRYING TO ENTER UN VEHICLE WHILE STOPPED IN TRAFFIC: A pedestrian attempted to enter a marked UN UNMAS vehicle while it was stopped in traffic on Gurji road, in northwest Tripoli. A militia group driving past the UN vehicle observed the incident. One of our drivers witnessed a minor incident on the Gurji road yesterday involving UN vehicle UNMAS 004. Apparently a pedestrian tried to enter the vehicle which was stopped in traffic. A uniformed military group driving by saw the incident, detained the individual, and placed him in the militia vehicle. No further information is available as to what happened to the individual or what he was trying to do.

12 FEBRUARY 2012 – AL-KUFRA

TRIBAL CLASHES: At least five people were killed in clashes between rival tribes over control of territory in the far southeast of Libya. Violence erupted in the remote south-eastern province of al-Kufra and continued on 13 February. Zwai tribesmen fought with fighters from the Tibu ethnic group. The Zwai claim that the Tibu are bringing in people from Chad and basing them at a nearby oasis, at a camp in the town of Jalu. Both groups were initially utilized light weapons when the fighting initially erupted, but the



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

violence escalated, with the two sides firing rocket-propelled grenades and anti-aircraft guns. A TNC spokesperson confirmed the clashes, adding that 20 persons were wounded in the fighting in addition to the five dead.

14 FEBRUARY 2012 – TRIPOLI

EMBASSY SECURITY TEAM MEMBER GRAZED BY CELEBRATORY SMALL ARMS FIRE: On Tuesday, 14 February at approximately 2345 hours, a member of the U.S. Embassy's security support team (SST) assigned to provide static security support at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, was grazed by one round of celebratory small arms fire (CSAF) while taking out his trash on the Residential Villas Compound. The bullet, believed to be a 7.62mm/AK-47 type round, grazed the SST member's left forearm, leaving an abrasion and 2nd degree burn. The round struck the SST member during its downward trajectory. The SST member was treated by Embassy medical personnel on site at approximately 0015 hours and the injury was treated with a topical anesthetic, burn cream, and placed in a loose dressing.

19 FEBRUARY 2012 – BENGHAZI

US MISSION PERSONNEL DETAINED: U.S. Mission personnel were detained by militia personnel after they drove through a previously unknown and hastily created checkpoint in Benghazi. The Mission vehicle and personnel were returning from Benghazi's Benina airport at approximately 0100 hours. The Mission vehicle was pursued and stopped by a militia vehicle and additional militia personnel arrived at the site after the Mission vehicle was stopped. The two female Employees in the vehicle identified themselves as U.S. diplomats by referring to their

vehicle license plate, diplomatic placard, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs ID card but they were still prevented from leaving. The one English speaking militia member at the checkpoint demanded to see their passports and demanded to inspect their cargo. Mission personnel refused access to the vehicle and its cargo. The detained employees contacted Mission security personnel and 17 Feb Martyrs Brigade QRF members, who responded to the checkpoint and were able to resolve the situation with the checkpoint commander.

The Mission employees noted that there were 12 checkpoints on the route from the airport. They described the checkpoints as aggressive, with armed personnel who attempted to open the doors of their vehicles.

02 MARCH 2012 – DERNA

DERNA SECURITY COMMITTEE HEAD ASSASSINATED: The head of the security committee in Derna, Colonel Mohammed Al-Hassi, was shot and killed outside a gas station in Derna. Col. Al-Hassi survived two earlier assassination attempts and was also the head of Derna's anti-drugs unit. He reportedly targeted enforcement efforts directed at local drug smugglers during and before the civil war.

03 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI

LOCAL DRIVER THREATENS EMBASSY SECURITY OFFICERS AFTER VEHICLES SCRAPE IN TRAFFIC: The side mirror of a passing vehicle scraped the side of a U.S. Embassy mobile patrol/quick reaction vehicle while it was operating in downtown Tripoli. The local driver exited his vehicle and made threatening hand gestures toward the Embassy vehicle and its occupants. The local driver pursued the Embassy vehicle



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

multiple times and stopped in front of the Embassy vehicle, causing a block in traffic. The passenger of the car also threatened the Embassy vehicle with a large rock.

06 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI / BENGHAZI

SEMI-AUTONOMY DEMONSTRATIONS: On 6 March, tribal and militia leaders in Benghazi declared semi-autonomy for the eastern region of Cyrenaica. This was met with anger from the NTC government in Tripoli and anti-autonomy demonstrations erupted in Tripoli and Benghazi.

08 MARCH 2012 – BENGHAZI

EXPLOSIONS NEAR US MISSION COMPOUND: At approximately 2330hrs, several loud explosions occurred near the perimeter of the U.S. Mission compound in Benghazi. Mission security personnel and local 17 Feb Martyrs Brigade personnel secured the compound and investigated the source of the explosions. Additional personnel from the 17 Feb Martyrs Brigade responded to the compound. Security personnel determined that the explosions occurred on a nearby street, within 400 meters of the compound. No injuries or damage were reported from the explosions, believed to be dynamite, 'fish bombs', or 'gelateenas' used in Benghazi for fishing and frequently thrown as part of wedding celebrations.

09 MARCH 2012 – ZLITEN

SALAFISTS ATTEMPT TO DESTROY SUFI SHRINES: On March 9, over 100 carloads of armed Salafists arrived in Zliten intent on destroying the tomb of one of the most revered Sufis in Libyan history, Sidi Abdul-Salam Al-Asmar al-Fituri. The Salafists, from Benghazi, Tripoli, Misrata, Khoms and other towns and led by Sheikh Salah Al-Kikli from Jebel

Nafusa, were confronted by angry Zliten residents and gun-waving militiamen determined to protect the shrine. These pro-Sufi groups were joined by other militiamen from Misrata. Libya's Grand Mufti, Sadeq Al-Ghariani, subsequently issued a fatwa prohibiting attacks on shrines.

08 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI

MILITIA CLASHES: There were clashes involving militiamen in Tripoli on Thursday night over pay. The clashes occurred in Omar Mukhtar Street, Shara Al-Sarim near Shara Ennasser and in the suburb of Gurgi. The fighting started after militiamen went to area military council offices to collect money promised to them by the government. When many militia members did not find their names on the payroll lists. Making matters worse, they claimed that some names on the lists had not played a part in the revolution.

The disgruntled militiamen then started shooting at the local military council offices. The most serious clashes were in Gurgi where heavy weaponry was used.

12 MARCH 2012 – KUFRA

TWO JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN KUFRA: Two journalists, one U.S. citizen and one Ukrainian citizen, were detained by the Kufra military council for several hours. The journalists had an entry permit for Libya but had been denied permission to travel within Kufra. They were handed over to the local branch of the intelligence service, and then released after several hours, unharmed.

16 MARCH 2012 – BENGHAZI

PRO-AUTONOMY DEMONSTRATORS CLASH: Pro-federalism demonstrators in Benghazi rallied in support of the establishment of two separate



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

capital cities in Tripoli and Benghazi. The protesters also called for an equal division of seats between the east, west and south in Libya's new constituent assembly, the elections for which are scheduled to take place in June. The demonstrators gathered after Friday prayers and went to Freedom Square, where Ahmed Zubeir Senussi, who was appointed on 6 March as head of the Cyrenaica Transitional Council, made a speech in support of federalism. Pro- and anti-federalism demonstrators clashed in the surrounding streets, using firearms and other improvised weapons. At least one person was killed and five others injured.

17 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI

TRASH PROTESTS: A protest group led by CLEANING UP TRIPOLI, held a demonstration in front of the PM's office in downtown Tripoli to protest the city's escalating waste management crisis, which has resulted in refuse accumulation in many areas of the city.

18 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI

MILITIA GUNFIGHT: On 18 March, a clash erupted between the Zintan militia and residents of Tripoli's Abu Salim district, previously loyal to Gaddafi. One militiaman was killed before a cease-fire was brokered by the district's militia commander. The Zintan militia took control of a school in the neighborhood in August 2011, when Tripoli was overrun by the TNC. The school was turned into a military-style base.

18 MARCH 2012 – BENGHAZI

ARMED ROBBERY OF BRITISH SCHOOL

PERSONNEL: Six unidentified individuals wearing ski masks, dressed in military fatigues, and armed with hand-guns carried out an armed robbery of

teachers and staff of the British School in Benghazi. The assailants threatened the staff and stole handbags, wallets, watches, and vehicles. The incident took place at 0640 hours at the teachers departed a residential compound in route to the school.

21 MARCH 2012 - DERNA

HAND GRENADE ATTACK ON VEHICLE: Unknown assailants threw a grenade at a car filled with ammunition in Derna, the resulting explosion destroyed the vehicle. No information on fatalities or injuries.

22 MARCH 2012 - BENGHAZI

MILITIA MEMBERS SEARCHING FOR A SUSPECT FIRE WEAPONS NEAR AND ATTEMPT TO ENTER U.S. MISSION COMPOUND: At 0227 hours seven militia members armed with AK series small arms and traveling in two Toyota Hilux vehicles stopped at the rear gate of the U.S. Mission compound, began kicking the entry gate, and demanded access to the compound. The local guard on duty fled the gate area when the individuals began firing their weapons in the air. As the local guard fled the gate, he activated an internal defense alarm, which caused the Mission security personnel and 17 February Martyrs Brigade personnel to respond to the area. Mission security officers and the 17 February Martyrs Brigade determined that the unidentified individuals were part of the Libyan Ministry of Defense, El Awfea Brigade, who were patrolling the area after a recent fire and noted an unauthorized fire on the US Mission compound. The El Awfea Brigade members apologized to US Mission personnel for their reaction and left the area soon thereafter.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

22 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI

CHAIRMAN OF ANTIQUITIES DEPT KIDNAPPED; RELEASED AFTER RANSOM PAID: Salah Agab, Chairman of the Department of Antiquities, was kidnapped by unidentified militiamen, only to be freed the following day after payment of an undisclosed amount of money.

22 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI

PROTESTORS THREATEN PM'S OFFICE: A group of protestors from Kala'a went to the GoL cabinet offices to demand medical treatment. An official received the group yesterday provided information on the criteria to qualify for GOL-funded care. Apparently dissatisfied by that response, the group came back to the cabinet offices and brandished weapons while making their demands. No one was hurt.

23 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI

MILITIA MEMBERS KIDNAP AND BEAT TURKISH HOTEL MANAGER OVER UNPAID BILL: Armed members the Zintan Militia burst into the Rixos luxury hotel in Tripoli and opened fire after one of their members was told to pay a 6-month lodging bill or vacate. The militia member left returned with dozens of armed men, who smashed through the front door and shot weapons into the air. The Rixos Hotel's general manager, Sukru Kocak, was taken to the militia office in the Fallah area of Tripoli where he said he was beaten, suffering injuries to his knees and a burst ear drum, causing him to lose hearing in his right ear. It's unclear if the damage to his hearing is permanent. Kocak, who is Turkish, said he was released only after the Turkish Embassy and other officials contacted the Libyan government on his behalf. The luxury Rixos is owned by a Turkish company. Before the news of

Kocak's release, Mohammed Madani, a commander of one of the Zintan militias in Tripoli, said the manager was not detained but was taken for questioning and the issue "has been resolved."

23 MARCH 2012 – SIRTE

MILITIA MEMBERS FIRE ON MIN OF INTERIOR VEHICLE; 1 INJURED: Ministry of Interior vehicles were shot at and threatened by the Al-Jalet Brigade in Jaref, Sirte after they escorted TNC Chairman Abduljalil and PM Al-Keeb's convoy. The attack resulted in the injury of a security officer employed by the Ministry of Interior. Suspects were turned over to the Mol on 27 March 2012.

23 MARCH 2012 – LIBYAN / EGYPTIAN BORDER

ARMED EX-REBELS CLOSE LIBYAN-EGYPTIAN BORDERS: An ex-rebel group in the border town of Imsa'ed closed the border crossing with Egypt "until further notice". According to sources in Imsa'ed, residents are demanding that the ministries of Interior and Defense take control over the busy border crossing. The ex-rebels say that personnel affiliated with the Ministry of Interior are involved in smuggling operations, and that is why they intervened and closed the borders with Egypt. The border was re-opened on 25 March 2012.

23 MARCH 2012 – BENGHAZI

PROTEST BY POLICEMEN AND SOLDIERS: Soldiers and policemen held a protest and march in Benghazi, which ended in Benghazi's Tahir Square. The protestors called for the full reactivation of the army and state security services as the only forces responsible for the country's security.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

23 MARCH 2012 – BENGHAZI

ARMED MILITIA BLOCKS COASTAL ROAD IN BENGHAZI DEMANDING PAY: Militia members from the Sidi Khribish area in Benghazi blocked the coastal road at the roundabout near the Mohammed Al-Mgarief School and demanded that the government pay them their promised militia salaries.

24 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI

ITALIAN EMBASSY GUARD STRUCK BY CSAF: An Italian security guard was struck and injured by celebratory small arms fire (CSAF) which landed inside the Italian Embassy compound.

26 MARCH 2012 - TRIPOLI

MILITIA GUNFIGHT NEAR DUTCH EMBASSY: Two militias engaged in a mid-day (approximately 1200 hrs) gunfight 300 meters west of the Dutch Embassy in downtown Tripoli. Dutch security officers reported extensive small arms and heavy weapons fire but were unable to confirm any injured, dead, or the motive for the fighting.

GUNFIGHT NEAR POLISH EMBASSY: At approximately 2100 hours, members of the Polish Embassy security team reported a gunfight lasting approximately 10 minutes within 100 meters of the Embassy. The security officers stated the fight involved unknown individuals, although Libyan Military Police appear to be involved. No information on injured, dead, or a motive for the gunfight.

28 MARCH 2012 - DERNA

HAND GRENADE ATTACK: An unknown person(s) threw a hand grenade into the courtyard of the Women's Higher Vocational Centre in Derna, in

eastern Libya. No details regarding fatalities or injuries.

25 - 31 MARCH 2012 – SEBHA

CLASHES IN SEBHA: Clashes in Sebha, 660 km south of Tripoli, resulted in more than 160 dead and at least 360 injured. TNC officials stated that the clashes started after a group from the Tebu tribe killed an employee of the General Electricity Co. and stole his vehicle on Sunday; which sparked the clashes between the militias, city residents, and the Tebu tribe. The Libyan Ministry of Transportation confirmed that a Libyan Arab Airlines plane at the Sebha airport was damaged by gunfire and a RPG during the fighting. No passengers were on the plane at the time of the damage. Area hospitals reportedly run out of food and blood and are low on medicine.

FIGHTING IN UBARI: Additional fighting was reported between elements of Tuareg tribes and Zintan militia members in the town of Ubari, to the west of Sebha. The area of fighting is located approximately 30 km east of an oil field where a number of operations are ongoing with a significant number of expats. Both Zintan and Misrata militias were reported massing and heading south into the area.

29 MARCH 2012 – TRIPOLI

GUNMEN FIRE ON GHANA AMBASSADOR RESIDENCE: According to the Embassy of the Republic of Ghana, an unknown number of assailants, operating in three vehicles, fired small arms indiscriminately at the Ambassador's Residence. The incident took place at midnight, and gunfire hit the main gate, front of the residence, and five bullets were fired into the residence bedroom. The Ambassador's spouse



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

was injured by window glass shards resulting from the gunfire. The Ambassador was uninjured.

01-02 APRIL – GHAT

INTER-MILITIA CLASHES: Media reported approximately twelve persons killed near Ghat, located in southwestern Libya, in fighting between Tuaregs and the Zintan tribe

02 APRIL 2012 – BENGHAZI

UK DIPLOMATIC ARMORED VEHICLE ATTACKED BY PROTESTORS: At approximately 1815 hours a U.K Diplomatic Mission armored vehicle was attacked by a mob of demonstrators. The vehicle was damaged but the occupants escaped injury. The demonstrators who numbered between one hundred (100) and two hundred (200) were members of the Traffic Police Force known as "Murur". The Murur Policemen were involved in a clash with local militiamen that escalated into a shooting. The Internal Ministry deployed a third security force the "Al-Nayda" or "Al-Shorta" Police to quell the fighting. A two car UK motorcade, unaware of the protest and related violence, drove near the demonstration site and was attacked by protestors. UK Security officials believe the demonstrators mistook the UK vehicles as local militia units.

01 - 05 – APRIL – 2012 – Zuwara, Al-Jumil, and Ragdalin:

INTER-MILITIA FIGHTING/CLASHES: Ongoing clashes between the residents of Zwara, Al-Jumil, and Ragdalin resulted in the death of 26 people and wounded 142 others. Reports on the cause of the fighting vary. Zuwara militiamen claim that they were detained by members of a neighboring town, while Ragdalein fighters stated that they


captured the Zuwara militiamen after months of abuses by Zuwara brigades, including looting of property. The Ministry of Interior added that a Zuwara hunting party shot and killed a person from Al Jumail by mistake and the members of the party were arrested. A TNC spokesperson stated that VP of the TNC and a number of TNC members headed to western Libya to calm the tensions between the clashing neighbors. The TNC spokesperson added forces from the National Army have also been sent there to stabilize the situation. Heavy weapons, including tanks, mortars, anti-aircraft weapons and artillery were used during the fighting.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

06 APRIL 2012 – BENGHAZI

CRUDE IED THROWN OVER WALL OF US MISSION; 2 CONTRACT GUARDS ARRESTED AS SUSPECTS: At approximately 2300 hours, one former and one current U.S. Mission contract guards threw a crude IED, referred to as a 'fish bomb' or 'gelateena' over the wall of the U.S. Mission compound in Benghazi. The two suspects were arrested by members of the 17 Feb Martyrs Brigade which provides armed security for the Mission compound. No employees were injured in the incident and limited damage was reported to the interior of the wall. The former guard was dismissed several days earlier for gross misconduct, specifically putting graffiti on USG property.



Typical home made 'fish bomb' or 'Gelateena'

07-08 APRIL 2012 – RAS JEDIR; LIBYAN-TUNISIA BORDER

TUNISIAN SMUGGLERS DETAINED BY MILITIA: On Saturday, 7 April 2012, five Tunisian smugglers were detained near the Ras Jedir border crossing in the Libyan region of Al-Aqil, 50 km from Ras Jedir. The detained smugglers were freed on Sunday, 8 April 2012, after negotiations between the Libyan Military Council of Al-Zawiyah and the Tunisian National Guard, a

security source told TAP news agency. The detainees, who had engaged in illegal trading in fuel, were released and were able to retrieve their vehicles, which were full of fuel. Residents from the Tunisian town of Ben Geurdane, where the smugglers originated, blocked the road leading to the border checkpoint to protest against the repeated abduction and detention of Tunisians. The border crossing at Ras Jedir, on primary road leading from Tunisia to Tripoli, has been closed several times over the past year due to clashes or unrest in the border area.

10 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI

DEMONSTRATIONS AT MOI: Several protests occurred outside the Ministry of Interior (MOI) building in downtown Tripoli. Residents from Zuwara (West of Tripoli) demonstrated about an ongoing conflict between residents of Zuwara and residents of Jmail, and specifically the slow reaction from the MOI to resolve the situation. A number of protestors were demonstrating against the appointment of Salem Al Hassi as the new Intelligence chief. Al Hassi was based in the US and many complain that he is a puppet for the US and should not hold such a critical role. Finally, members of the police, fire brigade and ambulance services demonstrated against the appointment of many of the former regime members into senior positions in the MOI.

10 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI

DEMONSTRATORS STORM PM OFFICE; 3 EMBASSY EMPLOYEES EVACUATED FROM SITE:

Approximately 125 protestors from a militia based in the Ben Ashour area of Tripoli protested in front of the Prime Minister's office. The protest, which began peacefully around 1100 in the morning, escalated when the protestors



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

broke through the outer perimeter fence and stormed the Prime Minister's Office building at approximately 1225 hours. The protestors were able to break through the limited security on-site and entered the first floor of the building. The U.S. Embassy had three employees on-site attending bi-lateral coordination meetings. U.S. Embassy security officers operating in a mobile Quick Reaction Force (QRF) responded to the site and evacuated the employees and a local driver before the demonstration escalated further. Shortly after the U.S. Embassy employees were evacuated, demonstrators beginning firing their weapons at the site.

10 APRIL 2012 – BENGHAZI

CRUDE IED THROWN AT UN CONVOY AND SUPREME SECURITY COUNCIL BUILDING. At approximately 1430 hours a crude IED, subsequently identified as a 'fish bomb' or 'gelateena' was thrown at a four (4) vehicle convoy carrying the United Nations Special Envoy to Libya. The attack took place in the city of Benghazi just as the motorcade had arrived at the office building of Fawzi Wanis Ghaddafi, the head of the Supreme Security Council (SSC). The device exploded approximately 12' from the UN envoy's vehicle. No one was hurt in the explosion, no one has been arrested and no one has taken responsibility for the attack.

11 APRIL – 12 APRIL 2012 – BENGHAZI

MOI FACILITY ATTACKED BY UNKNOWN GUNMEN: An unknown number of gunmen attempted to steal new vehicles purchased by the former regime and stored at the Moi HQs in Benghazi. The Al Nayda/Al-Shorta Police, subsequently reinforced by elements of the 17 February Martyrs Brigade and Libyan Army

Special Forces from a nearby camp, engaged the assailants in a firefight which lasted from 1800 hrs on 11 April until approximately 0700 hours on 12 April. The MOI Benghazi HQ's is located approximately 4 KM from the US Mission compound in Benghazi. Use of small-arms, anti-aircraft weapons, and RPGs was reported.

12 APRIL 2012 – BENGHAZI

INTER-MILITIA CLASHES: Unconfirmed reports of armed clashes taking place in the Vinicha area of Benghazi, when one militia allegedly attacked a second militia over 'links to the former regime'. Local militia groups frequently accuse other groups, military, or local leaders of supporting the Ghaddafi and the former regime, often as an attempt to discredit competitors.

12 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI:

UK CITIZEN DETAINED BY MILITIA WHILE VISITING FORMER REGIME COMPOUND: On Thursday, 12 April, a UK expatriate working for an engineering firm and his Libyan driver stopped at the former regime Camp 77 compound, opposite Ghaddafi's former Bab Azzizia compound, in downtown Tripoli. The two entered the compound via a hole in the wall, were immediately stopped by militia personnel, and arrested at approximately 1645 hrs. The two were taken to a military compound near Mitiga Air Base, where they were questioned and allowed to call the engineering firm, who in turn notified the UK Embassy. Questioning and searches of the two, including their personnel effects, laptop computers, and telephones, continued until the UK Embassy arranged for their release around 2100 hrs.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

13 APRIL – 14 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI

EXPATRIATE HOTEL EMPLOYEES DETAINED AT PARTY:

On Friday, 13 April and Saturday, 14 April 2012, a group of expatriates working for a western hotel chain in Tripoli were ejected from their villa by a Janzour Militia. The group was having a party, with loud music and alcoholic beverages. The Militia came to the villa at approximately 0200 hrs on Saturday, 14 April, shut down the party, and gave the party-goers 15 minutes to depart. At least one individual, possibly the villa owner, was arrested. The 'ejected' expatriates departed and obtained rooms at the western hotel chain where they worked.

20 APRIL 2012 – KUFRA

INTER-MILITIA CLASHES: A ceasefire in the desert town of Kubra ended on April 20 when Arab militias and the Libya Shield brigade began fighting with Tebu militias. The Libya shield brigade is an eastern Libyan militia dispatched by the Ministry of Defense to intervene in earlier tribal conflicts in the area. The head of one of the militias involved in the fighting, the Shield Libya brigade, stated that fighting erupted after Zwai tribesman killed a Tebu man. The leader of the Tebu militias in Kufra reported that six houses in two Tebu residential neighborhoods were destroyed by heavy shelling. According to Tebu militia leaders, sixteen Tebu, both fighters and civilians, were injured and five civilians killed in the fighting.

On April 21, the commander of the Libya Shield brigade signed a ceasefire agreement with Tebu leaders and fighting calmed significantly. Tebu leaders claimed that southern Libya's Arabs are waging a campaign of ethnic cleansing against

them with the tacit support of the Libyan government.

23 – APRIL to 09 MAY 2012 - BENGHAZI

PROTESTS AT OIL COMPANY: Approximately 50 protesters gathered outside the offices of Libya's largest oil company, Arabian Gulf Oil Company (AGOCO). The protestors demanded more transparency over how the country's new rulers are spending its money, more jobs for youth, and wanted Ghaddafi-era officials removed from government. The protestors blocked the entrances to the company and prevented employees from entering the building. AGOCO has stated that it will have to close the oil operations at midnight on 03 May due to the protests. The oil company complained about the lack of intervention from Libyan security forces to remove the blockade from the facility. The company has cut production by 30,000 barrels per day (bpd) as a result of the ongoing protests.

24 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI

GUNFIGHT: At approximately 1600 hrs, a group of up to a dozen men physically attacked a stationery car on Gorji road in northeast Tripoli. The vehicle began to emit smoke from the damage caused by the assailants. The assailants fled the area when an unknown individual(s) opened fire with small arms and then heavy weapons. A number of persons in civilian clothes were reportedly setting up barriers in the area to stop traffic as a result of the incident. A UK Mission vehicle with security personnel was in the vicinity at the time of the incident. Apparently it was due to an extortion attempt that had gone wrong.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

24 APRIL 2012 – KUFRA

KUFRA RESIDENTS ATTEMPT TO HIT MOD AIRCRAFT WITH GUNFIRE: Unconfirmed media reports claimed that during his visit to the Kufra area to oversee a recent ceasefire, the Minister of Defense's motorcade and aircraft were fired on in separate incidents. The military council commander in Kufra claimed that local residents fired on the Defense minister's aircraft, possibly with unidentified rocket systems, as it took off. Separate reports claimed that gunfire, including heavy weapons fire, was directed toward the Minister's motorcade during his 5-hour visit to Kufra.

17-25 APRIL – ZLITEN and MISRATA

DEATHS CAUSED BY UXO: During the past week, two persons were killed in separate incidents related to unexploded ordnance (UXO). In the Zliten incident, the three victims were working on a construction site when they uncovered UXO. The UXO exploded, killing one of the workers and injuring the other two. In Misrata, one man was injured and a second killed when they entered a destroyed ammunition storage area inside the Air Force Academy in search of scrap metal.

25 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI

US EMBASSY LOCAL SECURITY OFFICER DETAINED; RADIO SEIZED. A U.S. Embassy local national security officer was detained at a militia check-point for 2 hours while traveling home after his night-shift. While at the check-point, the security officer was interviewed regarding his employment and a U.S. Embassy radio was seized by the militia. The militia members were unable to explain what type of permission, license, or permit was required for a Libyan national to possess a hand-held radio nor were the militia

members able to explain what Libyan law they were enforcing by seizing the radio. The Embassy local security officer was released without further incident. U.S. Embassy security officer is following up with the militia to retrieve the radio.

26 APRIL 2012 - BENGHAZI

FIGHT AT INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL UNIVERSITY; US DIPLOMAT EVACUATED FROM SITE: A fist-fight escalated to gunfire between the security guards of a Tripoli based trade delegation and militia providing security at the International Medical University. The university is in close proximity to the U.S. Mission in Benghazi and the Principal Officer (PO) from the U.S. Mission was attending the same trade event. As the fight escalated at the front entrance to the university, U.S. Mission security personnel and the 17 Feb Martyrs Brigade QRF personnel supporting the U.S. Mission evacuated the PO while still safe to do so.

26 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI

EXPATRIOT NGO EMPLOYEE DETAINED FOR 4 HRS: At approximately 2100 hrs, an expatriate employee and a contract driver of a U.S. based and funded NGO was stopped by four militia members while traveling north from Tripoli International Airport. The four militia members traveling in two unmarked sedans approached the NGO vehicle from behind at high-speed and directed the vehicle to pull over to the side of the road. Two unidentified individuals, believed to be members of a militia based on statements they made to the driver, asked for the documents of the NGO employees. The expat NGO employee, a Palestinian citizen, was directed into one of the militia vehicles and the NGO driver was directed to follow the two militia vehicles into the city.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

The Palestinian employee of the NGO was placed in the back of the vehicle with two of the militia members in the front seat. The militia members would not allow the Palestinian NGO employee to take his cell phone but he was able to retrieve his backpack and laptop from the NGO vehicle. While in the militia vehicle, the Palestinian NGO employed noted he was left alone in the back of the vehicle, with access to a militia members’ AK-47 on the rear seat beside him. He was not searched. Once in downtown Tripoli, the militia members met with another individual, identified as a ‘sheik’, who also questioned the NGO’s Libyan driver and Palestinian officer. The NGO’s Libyan driver was advised he was free to go after the militia reviewed his documents, although the NGO’s Palestinian employee was transported to a ‘military police’ compound in southeastern Tripoli, where he underwent additional questioning by three additional militia members and military police. The military police advised that the facility was used to process, investigate, screen persons believed to be illegally present in Libya. Upon verification of the NGO’s Palestinian’s work and travel documents, he was transported back to the NGO’s downtown office at approximately 0100 hrs and released.

26 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI

PROTEST AT NTC HQ: A number of lawyers protested in front of the NTC headquarters in Tripoli over plans to integrate them into the justice ministry. The lawyers are from the Public Defense Lawyers Group (“Muhama Shaabia”), from which lawyers are appointed by the state to defend Libyans in court at government expense.

27 APRIL 2012 – BENGHAZI

FAILED PRISON BREAK: In the early morning hours a Benghazi prison was the site of an attempted prison break in which prisoners and prison guards exchanged gunfire. Officials claimed that the fighting killed three prisoners and three guards.

27 APRIL 2012 – BENGHAZI

COURTHOUSE BOMBED: At approximately 0500 hours, the Benghazi courthouse was targeted by three crude IEDs, believed to have been contained within packages at the site. Initial reports claimed that four security guards were injured and both the courthouse and an adjacent building were damaged . A Benghazi security official later claimed that the explosives were thrown out of a passing car. No group or motive claimed credit for the attack.



27 APRIL 2012 – BENGHAZI

EXPATRIOT DEMINING/ WEAPONS ABATEMENT STAFF DETAINED, QUESTIONED, and RELEASED: Two South African nationals, in Libya as part of a U.S. funded weapons abatement, UXO removal, and demining project, were detained at gunpoint while walking in an residential area. At approximately 0630 hrs, a Ford sedan passed the two men while they were walking, turned around



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

and returned to where the men were, and a soldier with an AK series assault rifle exited the vehicle. The soldier directed them to get in the vehicle. The soldier took one of the South African's company ID, read the Arabic version on the back of the ID card, and examined the passport and visa. The two South Africans were driven to a house at high speed, where the soldier crashed the gate open with his vehicle. A second militia member wearing a hood and armed with an AK47, entered the vehicle, and questioned the two expatriates regarding their nationality, employer, and purpose for being in Libya. The vehicle departed the residential building at high-speed but stopped in order for the militia members to blindfold the two South Africans. The South Africans were then driven to a second property where a third, unidentified person joined the first two militia members. The militia members reviewed the passports, employer ID cards, and appeared to be discussing next steps. The militia members returned the South Africans' documents and cards and then drove them back to the initial point where they were directed into the vehicle. The South Africans' remained blindfolded until they were brought to the initial pick-up point. The militia members told the South Africans' that they were detained for "their own safety", shook hands with the South Africans' and allowed them to return to their residence. The incident lasted for approximately 2 hours.

27 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI

GUNFIGHT: At about 2030 hours, an argument between 2 youths in the Alheshan area (Souk Al Juma) escalated to gunfire, killing one bystander and injuring two others. The motive behind the fight was suspected to be part of an ongoing drug

war. Reason behind it not clear but suspected to be part of an ongoing drug war.

28 APRIL 2012 – TRIPOLI

DRIVE-BY REVENGE KILLING: Two individuals were shot and killed late on Saturday night in what appears to be a drive-by revenge attack for a shooting incident which took place on 27 April in Alheshan/Souk Al Juma area of Tripoli. Gunfire went on until the early hours. The police emergency number (1515) was called and the answer reportedly given was: "We're aware of the problem but there's nothing we can do."

28 APRIL 2012 – BENGHAZI

AIRPORT CLOSED DUE TO PROTESTS: Multiple sources confirmed that Benghazi's Benina airport was closed yesterday due to a protest by the 'Qatar' Battalion of the Barqa Militia. The Barqa Militia has not been paid their salaries in some time. The intent of the Barqa Militia in halting the flights was to prevent PM Al-Keib from flying to Tripoli. Al-Keib and other government ministers were in Benghazi to inaugurate the new government headquarters in the city. The Prime Minister met with representatives of the protestors at the airport; however, the meeting was unable to resolve the protestors' demands. As a result of the closure, the Prime Minister flew back to Tripoli from Abraq airport.

01 MAY 2012 – KUFRA

THREAT OF MORE VIOLENCE AFTER INDIVIDUAL KILLED: Media sources reported that an unidentified member of the Al-Majabra tribe was shot and killed around 8pm in the town's Ashoura district while walking home from a market. The Ashoura district is considered to be a largely Tebu



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

area and the killing could re-ignite new clashes in the area.

01 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

PROTESTS AT TNC OFFICES IN TRIPOLI: Several hundred armed revolutionaries from the Union of Revolutionary Battalions surrounded the TNC's offices in Tripoli as part of protests over benefits for former fighters. Between 300 - 400 fully armed ex-rebels surrounded the NTC's offices with gun-mounted trucks. The NTC's offices are located opposite the luxury Rixos Hotel. The demonstrators claimed to represent 200 militia brigades and met with NTC Chairman Jalil. The protestors presented a list of demands to the NTC, including having a direct voice in governing the country, seats assigned to them in the new National Assembly, and amnesty for any crimes committed during the revolution. The protestors also demanded an extension to the voter registration period from 2 weeks to 30 days and for candidates from 7 to 25 days. The group also demanded proper care for all injured ex-rebels and proper distribution of monetary grants being paid to the ex-rebels.

01 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

CLASHES IN TRIPOLI: On May 1, militias from the Souq al-Jumaa and Tajoura neighborhoods joined with the Tripoli branch of the Supreme Security Council to successfully oust what they characterized as "criminal gangs" that had occupied the former headquarters of the Libyan External Security Organization and the Jedayda prison. The gangs had allegedly used the ESO building and the prison as bases to conduct rent-seeking activities such as operating illegal checkpoints and stealing residents' cars. One Tajoura militia member was killed in the clashes

and at least three others were injured. In a public statement issued in reaction to the fighting, the SSC called on militias to comply with orders issued by the GOL to hand over occupied government facilities.

The clashes continued on into the evening, with an increase in militia patrols throughout Tripoli as well as the closure of portions of the Tripoli Ring Road in the eastern side of the city.

Supreme Security Committee (SSC) contacts stated that a group of criminals posing as militia members had indiscriminately fired at residential buildings and the Ministry of Interior building at the intersection of December 24th Street and Al-Naser Street in downtown Tripoli. Two individuals were arrested with no confirmed casualties.

In Suq Al-Jouma, SSC sources reported members of a militia brigade attacked a building belonging to the Foreign Ministry. A number had been arrested with no further details as to casualties or the motive behind the attack.

In the Hadba Al-Khadra neighborhood, the SSC confirmed clashes between members of the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade and the Shara Ajdabiya Revolutionary Brigade over a government building. Forces from the SSC were directed to the area to resolve the fighting. No further details as to casualties or the motive behind the attack.

01 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

DEPUTY LGF COMMANDER DETAINED, ASSAULTED, AND US EMBASSY LGF VEHICLE STOLEN BY ARMED INDIVIDUALS AT AN IMPROMPTU CHECK-POINT NEAR POST'S GSO WAREHOUSE. On 05/01/2012, at approximately



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

1040 hours, the U.S. Embassy's Deputy LGF Commander was detained, assaulted, and the US Embassy LGF vehicle he was operating stolen by armed individuals at an impromptu check-point near Post's GSO Warehouse. The armed youth detained the LGF deputy along with several other Libyan citizens at a former Ghaddafi regime compound in Tripoli, Libya for more than 3 hours. The LGF deputy, assisted by a Libyan National Transitional Government (NTC) guard in the group of detainees, scaled a wall, escaped the compound, and fled to the U.S. Embassy's GSO warehouse. RSO coordinated recovery of the vehicle with NTC security officials, who directed two militia (Tajoura & Souk Al-Juma) brigades and national army units to the area. On the evening of 5/1/2012, NTC officials recovered the Embassy vehicle although heavy fighting in the area where the incident occurred, to include clashes with the armed group responsible for the vehicle theft, prevented RSO and Embassy officials from retrieving the vehicle until the following day. Libyan security forces, including national army units and militia falling under the control of the Supreme Security Council, recovered 4 vehicles, including two vehicles stolen from other militias, a UN vehicle, and the US Embassy vehicle, and released thirty detainees. During the fighting, security elements killed 2 members of the group, arrested approximately 12 individuals, gained control of the former ESO compound, and continue to search for 5 additional suspects.

02 MAY – 10 MAY 2012 – BENGHAZI

WORKERS STRIKE AT LIBYAN CEMENT

COMPANY: Approximately 65 workers of the Libyan Cement Company, a joint venture between the Economic and Social Development Fund/Ministry of Industry and an Austrian company, ASAMERR, have been on strike since 02

May outside the Benghazi plant. While the production facility remains open despite the striking workers, the managing director of the company has evacuated 33 expatriate employees of the company as a preventative measure in the event of further unrest and violence.

03 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES CLASH WITH

ARMED DRUG GANG: At approximately 1630hrs, police and security forces engaged an armed drug gang in the Qadasiya area of Tripoli. Police attempted to arrest the members of the gang when the drug dealers opened fire with automatic weapons. The gunfight was sustained for approximately 15 minutes, with witnesses describing persons firing in several directions. Casualties were unknown.

06 MAY 2012 – BENGHAZI TO TOBRUK

THREE KILLED AND TWO INJURED IN AN ARMED ROBBERY OF BANK VEHICLE; 2 MILLION LYD TAKEN; THIEVES PART OF BRIGADE HIRED TO PROTECT LIBYAN CENTRAL BANK IN BENGHAZI:

According to the Tobruk based Ali Hassan Al-Jaber Brigade, an unidentified group of 3 armed individuals carjacked a bank truck carrying 2 million Libyan Dinars while it was in route to a bank in the eastern Libyan city of Tobruk. The Brigade's commander stated that three of the guards accompanying the bank truck were killed and one injured by the armed assailants and the driver of the truck is still missing. The bodies of the guards were left by the roadside when the attackers fled with the vehicle and cash. Two of the murdered guards were shot and the third had his throat slit. Investigators believe that the assailants wanted the attack to be carried out by Islamist extremists. The vehicle attack took place



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

while the guards were transporting money from the Central Bank of Libya in Benghazi to the Bank of North Africa in Tobruk.

Hospital officials in Al-Marj confirmed that three bodies were transported to Al-Marj's main hospital along with the injured guard. Brigade members claimed they arrested the assailants and recovered the stolen money. Subsequent investigation revealed that the assailants were from the brigade hired to protect the Benghazi premises of the Libyan Central Bank. Investigators determined that the gang planned to murder all the guards to avoid being recognized as security from the Central Bank. The wounded guard was able to identify the attackers to investigators.

05 MAY 2012 – SEBHA

RENEWED FIGHTING: Clashes broke out in the Al-Jadid area in Sebha between Libyan "Special Forces" and purported Qadhafi loyalists. Officials within the Libyan special forces claimed that heavy weapons were used during the fighting, with two Libyan special forces members wounded and two 'loyalists' injured and arrested.

08 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

PROTEST AT PM'S OFFICE: Individuals who were prisoners under the Qadhafi regime protested at the PM office in Tripoli. This protest was unrelated to a subsequent protest by militia members from Yefren and Kikla, which escalated into a violent confrontation between the militia members and the MOI/SSC.

08 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

CLASHES AT PM OFFICE; 4 INJURED AND 1 KILLED: Approximately 200 militia members from the western Nafusa Mountains (Yefren and Kikla)

clashed with Ministry of Interior and Supreme Security Council members outside of the Prime Minister's Office in downtown Tripoli. A security officer from the MOI/SSC assigned to the PM's office was killed and three others wounded. One of the militia members was injured. SSC officials claimed to have seized sixteen militia vehicles and arrested fourteen militia members. The incident began with militia members protesting at the PM's office for wages when it escalated into exchanges of gunfire, to include use of heavy weapons.

08 MAY 2012 – ZAWYIA

ATTACK ON OIL REFINERY: Senior GOL officials reported an attack on an oil refinery in Zawya, although the officials could not provide additional details as to who had carried out the attack or what the motive was. No information on damage, injuries, or fatalities.

11 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

TRIPOLI RESIDENTS PROTEST AND CALL FOR REMOVAL OF WEAPONS AND MILITIAS:

Thousands of Tripoli residents demonstrated in Martyrs' Square demanding the removal of arms and the departure of unofficial and unsanctioned militias. Protestors also called for the establishment of a National Army and the absorption of the militia groups under its control.

The demonstrators called for the activation of the legal system, the National Army and the collection of arms in order to achieve safety, security and stability.

12 - 13 MAY 2012 – BANI WALID

CLASHES IN BANI WALID: Clashes broke out this evening on the outskirts of Bani Walid between



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

government troops and local fighters opposed to the TNC and the revolution.

Ministry of Interior officials confirmed the deployment of additional government forces, including militia under the Libya Shield Brigades, were deployed to the southern area of Tripoli, near Tarhuna, and also to Bani Walid. Reinforcements from Misrata were reportedly blocked from entering Bani Walid by sympathizers in Tarhouna.

9-14 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

PROTESTS AT TRIPOLI INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT: For the past several days, a small number of airport employees have been striking at Tripoli International Airport, demanding higher wages, among other requests. On May 13, U.S. Embassy observed that the employees have positioned themselves at the entry point for outbound passengers to pass through customs, significantly slowing down customs' ability to process passengers. As a result of the disruption, recent flights to Rome, Frankfurt, and Vienna on international carriers have reportedly taken off from three to five hours late. Air Malta and AlItalia each cancelled at least one flight to Tripoli because of the strike. Airport officials reported that while all flights are eventually taking off, the protesters have slowed down the process to allow just one flight per hour. According to airport officials, the issue was resolved on 14 May 2012.

13 MAY 2012 – LIBYAN/EGYPTIAN BORDER

TWO DIE IN MINE BLAST CROSSING FROM

EGYPT TO LIBYA: Two men were killed and 29 other people were injured after their convoy that was illegally crossing from Egypt into Libya entered a minefield. Mahmoud Zahran, a Health

Ministry official in the northern Egyptian city of Marsa Matrouh, confirmed that an Egyptian and a Sudanese man died when their vehicle, which was travelling in a convoy with two others, hit landmines inside Libya. The Injured were transported to a hospital in Salloum, an Egyptian town near the border. The north coast of Egypt and Libya is littered with landmines laid during World War II. It is unknown if the landmine dated from the 1940s or was more recently planted.

14 MAY 2012 - MURZUQ

CANDIDATE ASSASSINATED IN SOUTHERN

LIBYA: A local candidate from Murzuk, located in southwestern Libya, was assassinated shortly after registering to stand in the June elections as a candidate for the National Congress.

Khaled Bukhatwa Abu Salah, a prominent political activist and physician from the oasis town of Murzuq, was attacked and killed by an armed gang some 30 kilometers from Awbari. Supreme Security Council (SSC) officials stated that an armed gang traveling in five cars followed him after he registered with the electoral commission. They surrounded his vehicle and killed him. Two colleagues travelling with Abu Salah managed to escape the attack.

Bukhatwa Abu Salah was a member of the Fazazna, an ethnic group of dark-skinned former African slaves who identify culturally and politically with Libya's Arabs. One prevailing theory among Murzuq residents is that Bukhatwa was killed by a Tebu militia for his frequent statements in the Libyan media criticizing human rights violations committed by the Tebu, such as torturing prisoners. A Supreme Security Council spokesman told Al Jazeera that the killing remains



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

under investigation and its perpetrators and motivation are not yet clear.

14 MAY 2012 - MURZUQ

CLASHES IN GHADAMES; TUAREQ LEADER AND 9 OTHERS KILLED: A Tuareg leader and eight others were killed in clashes that lasted for more than seven hours. One man from the Ghadames brigade was also killed and more than 20 people injured. Local officials added that Tuareg militia had also attacked a National Army checkpoint located at 50 km outside the city on 11 May. Ghadames brigade members reportedly called on the National Army, Army Chief of Staff, and Special Forces from Benghazi, but no reinforcements arrived. The clashes lasted for more than seven hours and included mortar fire and 106mm anti-tank rockets. A hospital, the airport, and several residential houses were reportedly damaged during the fighting. The Libyan Army Chief of Staff subsequently attributed responsibility for the attacks on a irregular militia called the “Western Region Military Junta”.

14 MAY 2012 – RAS JEDIR; LIBYAN-TUNISIA BORDER

BORDER CLASHES BETWEEN SMUGGLERS AND AUTHORITIES: Thirty trucks loaded with bananas, apples, and a variety of electrical and household equipment were stopped at the border crossing in the southeastern town of Ben Guerdane, triggering clashes between authorities and locals.

During the confrontation, an angry crowd of locals from Ben Guerdane joined the fight, clashing with police and army officials. As tensions rose, protests spread into downtown Ben Guerdane, forcing roads and shops to close

throughout the city. Tunisian armed forces succeeded in restoring order until the following morning. The director of Ben Guerdane Hospital confirmed to Tunisia Live that the hospital admitted two men following the clashes, one of whom was badly burnt.

15 MAY 2012 - SORMAN

TWO KILLED IN CLASHES IN BEACH RESORT AREA: At least two persons were killed and a third wounded in clashes in the northwestern resort town of Sorman. The clash occurred at the Electricity Institute, which is located in the resort area of the town, which is located approximately 45 km west of Tripoli on the road to Sabratha. The clashes reportedly occurred following a dispute between a man from Sorman and another from the Mutrud area. After the fight, a weapons store in Sorman was destroyed by Mutrud residents as retribution for the attack.

15 May 2012 - BENGHAZI

MILITARY POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN BENGHAZI TARGET OF GRENADE ATTACK : An unknown attacker threw a hand grenade at the Military Police (MP) headquarters in Benghazi. Currently, the MP headquarters is being used as a makeshift prison where a number of Qadhafi loyalists are detained. No injuries were reported and no inmates were able to escape.

15 MAY 2012 - BENGHAZI

DIRECTOR OF BENGHAZI'S MEDICAL CENTER INJURED IN SHOOTING : Director of Benghazi's Medical Center Dr. Fathi Al-Jhani was wounded in the chest after he was shot on Wednesday afternoon when leaving work. Dr. Al-Jhani was taken to a Benghazi hospital for treatment and doctors there said he is in a stable situation.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

Armed men followed Dr. Al-Jhani as he headed to his vehicle in the center's parking lot and fired at him, injuring him in the chest. Security officials reportedly captured the assailants as they attempted to flee the scene. Subsequent reports indicated that the shooting was related to

16 MAY - NATIONWIDE

BANK EMPLOYEES STAGED DEMONSTRATIONS FOLLOWING MURDER OF COLLEAGUES IN ARMED ROBBERY:

Employees of the Bank of North Africa staged a nationwide protest following the murder of four of their colleagues in an armed robbery. The robbery took place on a convoy transporting LD 2 million from the Central Bank of Libya in Benghazi to the Bank of North Africa in Tobruk on 6 May. Demonstrations were witnessed at Bank of North Africa branches in several Libyan cities, with the demonstrators demanding swift action to bring the perpetrators to justice. The money has subsequently been recovered and the robbers arrested.

16 MAY 2012 - SIRTE

VEHICLE BOMB ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT:

Embassy commercial contacts provided details on a 16 May assassination attempt against a Libyan national in Sirte. The Libyan national was the target of a bomb placed underneath his vehicle while it was parked at his residence in Sirte. The bomb detonated, destroyed the car but missed the intended target as he was opening his residential vehicle gate at the time of the explosion. The commercial contact traveled to the scene and spoke with EOD personnel who described the attempt as 'professional' and likely triggered by a timer. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. No further specifics

as to the background of the individual or who might have targeted him were available.

17 MAY 2012 – BENGHAZI

TNC MEMBERS ATTACKED AT BENGHAZI

AIRPORT: An armed group allegedly attempted to shoot NTC members, Khaled Saleh and Fathi Al Baaja at Benghazi Airport on the evening of 17 May 2012. According to Saleh, he had been trying to speak to the group regarding militia payments when the group became agitated and began shooting at the TNC officials. The group reportedly was linked the Cyrenaica military council.

18 MAY 2012 – BENGHAZI

PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION AT UNHCR:

A peaceful demonstration was held at the UNHCR office located in the Hawary area of Benghazi. Approximately, 200 pro-federalists gathered in front of the UN building to express their dissatisfaction with the current distribution of parliamentary seats for the Barqa area. The protestors arrived in approximately 60 vehicles and were accompanied by press from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. The participants delivered a petition to the UN and remained on site for approximately 2.5 hours.

21 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

FIGHTING IN JANZOUR AREA: Libyan National Army units reportedly gave notice to the militia currently occupying the Regatta area to leave the site. The Army units reportedly returned in the afternoon to evict them by force. Additionally, diplomatic contacts reported a 2nd, possibly related incident, approximately 500 meters south of Palm City near the 'Little Janzour' roundabout. Diplomatic vehicles were in the vicinity when a



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

gunfight took place at the roundabout, followed by the dispatch of heavy militia, police, and SSC/MOI response. SSC officials confirmed that two SSC officers died during the clashes in Janzour.

21 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

CZECH DIPLOMATIC VEHICLE

STOPPED/SEARCHED BY MILITIA: A Czech Embassy vehicle, bearing red diplomatic license plates, was stopped and searched by approximately 20 members of the Suq Al Juma militia. Reportedly, the diplomatic passengers were told to exit the vehicle and taken to a nearby location by the militia while the search was being conducted. Czech Embassy officials were able to arrange for intervention by SSC officials via a dual-national (Czech/Libyan) contact within the SSC.

22 MAY 2012 – BENGHAZI

ICRC BUILDING AND BANK STRUCK BY RPGs:

The International Committee for the Red Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC) building was hit by two RPG rounds, one at approximately 0330 hours and a second at 0530. The first RPG struck the front of the building, damaging a shipping container. The second was an 'airburst' with no damage. No casualties were reported given the time of the incident. There were also reports of a third RPG explosion approx 1 km away at 0540 hours, which struck the Sahara Bank's Fuwaihat branch. The ICRC compound is located near the al-Nasser Athletic Sports Club on Shari Al-Andalus near the intersection of Third Ring Road, approximately 1km from Benghazi Mission. The Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman Brigades claimed responsibility on 27 May for the attack of the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC). The brigade accused the ICRC of attempting to convert internally displaced members of the Tawergha ethnic minority to Christianity. It called for the NGO to close its offices, and declared Libya to be an Islamic state.

22 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

ANGRY VISA APPLICANT FIRES WEAPON AT

GERMANY EMBASSY: At approximately 1200 hrs, a Libyan militia veteran applied for a Schengen visa at the German Embassy. The Libyan militia veteran, identified as Hassam BELHAJ, DOB: 15-Sept-1987, was planning to travel to German for follow-up treatment but his visa application was rejected as being incomplete. Enraged, he began firing his AK-47 into the air, causing further confusion on the street outside the German Embassy. During the shooting, German Embassy officials were instructed to remain in the building, away from the windows. German personnel off-site were directed to remain off-site.

23 MAY 2012 – LIBYAN/TUNISIA BORDER

RAS JEDIR BORDER CROSSING CLOSED BY

LIBYAN GOVT: Media sources reported that the Libyan side of the Ras Jedir border crossing was closed, possibly in protest over news that Tunisia would not extradite former Libyan PM Baghdadi. The border was re-opened later on the 23rd.

23 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

SHOOTING AT TRIPOLI AIRPORT AFTER ARREST OF LIBYAN DEFENSE MINISTER'S RELATIVE:

Members of the Al-Zintan Brigade at Tripoli International Airport arrested a relative of Libyan Defense Minister Usamah al-Juwayli. According to sources at the airport, after the arrest, members of the Al-Zintan Brigade started shooting near one of the African Airways planes.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

Reportedly, the minister's relative was arrested after "verbal exchanges" between the minister's relative and security officials the airport. Security officials reportedly asked the relative for a license for the car he was driving, which he was unable to produce. After the relative's arrest by security officials, members of the Al-Zintan Brigade attempted to intervene in the situation.

23 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

DETENTION AND SEARCH OF DIPLOMATIC CARGO BY LOCAL MILITIA: Shipments of diplomatic supplies, including a 20' container of security equipment, cameras, and electrical supplies, were seized and searched by members of the SSC outside of Tripoli port. The cargo, including goods destined for the German Embassy, were diverted to a TNC Customs side near the WICS/MOD site, and then to Mitiga Airport. Although clearly marked and manifested as diplomatic cargo, the SSC failed to acknowledge TNC customs guidance that the shipments were exempt from search and seizure. The U.S. Embassy goods were released after approximately 6 hours due to intervention by Embassy officials. However, a number of items were removed from the shipment during the searches.

23 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

KIDNAPPING/DETENTION OF MITIGA CUSTOMS CHIEF BY ARMED GROUP: The head of the customs department at Mitiga airport, Col Ibrahim Umar Qasudah, was kidnapped by an armed group on Wednesday, 23 May, while on his way to his office at the airport. It is unknown if his detention was related to the seizure of diplomatic cargo on the same day.

24 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

TRIPOLI CUSTOMS STAFF PROTEST CHIEF'S KIDNAP, LIBYAN BRIGADE DENIES INVOLVEMENT:

On 24 May, customs officers staged a protest outside the Council of Ministers in Tripoli to demand the transitional government's intervention to free Col Ibrahim Umar Qasudah, the head of customs at Mitiga airport in Tripoli who was kidnapped/detained by armed men on 23 May. The protestors demanded the GoL provide protection to all customs staff at all border crossings and the swift punishment of kidnappers and criminal groups targeting customs staff and offices. The protestors threatened to stop work at all Libyan land, sea and air customs ports. The commander of the Badr Misratah Brigade denied that his forces "are linked in absolutely any way" with the kidnap of a customs officer at Tripoli's Mitiga International Airport.

25 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

DRUG RAIDS BY SSC: Supreme Security Committee (SSC) forces, brigades under Interior Ministry control and members of the NTC-affiliated Abu Salim Military Council conducted a series of night time raids of drug dens in the Abu Salim and Al-Huadba districts of Tripoli. According to NTC spokesman Mohammed Harizi, the raids began at 02:00hrs and continued for several hours. Sustained exchanges of fire took place, with unconfirmed reports of six fatalities, including two SSC officers, and approximately fifteen persons wounded. The wounded men have been taken to Abu Salim hospital for treatment. Large quantities of drugs and alcohol were reportedly seized during the raids, which were subsequently disposed of at the Abu Salim Military Council HQ.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

26 MAY 2012 – TRIPOLI

SENEGALESE AMBASSADOR CARJACKED: On 5/26/2012, the Senegalese Ambassador had his vehicle carjacked while waiting to enter his residential compound. A militia vehicle with a crew served weapon followed the Ambassador's vehicle to his residence where the Ambassador was forced out of his vehicle and his vehicle taken by the individuals in the militia vehicle. The Ambassador was driving in a diplomatic plated vehicle although did not have a security escort or team. The Ambassador believed that the vehicle was providing his diplomatic vehicle with an armed escort.

26 MAY 2012

FAILED ATTACK ON HEAD OF WESTERN MILITARY COUNCIL: According to various media reports, the head of the military council for the western region, Mukhtar Fernana, was the target of an attack by gunmen. Fernana's vehicle was reportedly attacked by assailants traveling in five vehicles. No further details regarding the identity of the assailants nor was any information available on casualties.

26 MAY 2012 – WADI AL-AHMAR

OIL WORKER PROTESTS: Protesters in Wadi Al-Ahmar threatened to suspend oil production on 28 May 2012, unless the government agrees to federalist demands for eastern Libya, particularly Barqa. The protests also sought more equitable sharing of oil revenue between the three historical regions of Libya.

28 MAY 2012 – SIRTE

EXPLOSION KILLS 7, INCLUDING MOI CONTROLLED MILITIA MEMBERS: An explosion took place inside the base of the Sirte Revolutionary Brigade last night, killing seven people. An unknown number of people were also injured. According to the MoI, three members of the brigade, who are under Interior Ministry control, were killed, along with two men from the Al-Fergan tribe and two from Derna. Conflicting reports identified the source of the explosion as a fire in a weapons/ammunition storeroom or an RPG attack, possibly by former regime elements (FRE).

28 MAY 2012 – ZLINTEN

BODY OF ZLINTEN MAN TORTURED TO DEATH DUMPED IN LOCAL HOSPITAL: The body of a man has been found dumped at Zliten hospital. Investigations have revealed that the dead man, named as Hussein Omar Attir and in his forties, was tortured to death. His body was covered in bruises and his hands had been tied. According to the Libyan Human Rights Observatory, it has sent a report to the Attorney General which is to said to claim that Attir was tortured and murdered by five named members of a local brigade after being held for six days during at one of the brigade's command centers in the town.

04 JUNE 2012-TRIPOLI

AL-AWFEA BRIGADE SEIZES AIRPORT: On June 4, 2012, A gun battle took place at Tripoli International Airport between members of a Tarhouna based militia and government forces, after the Tarhouna militia men stormed the airport demanding the release of a rebel leader. Libyan authorities allegedly deployed 5,000 security forces to the airport, regained control of the facility, and arrested 30 militia members. The



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

attack on the airport was carried out by members of the al-Awfeia brigade, a volunteer militia from the town of Tarhouna about 80 km (50 miles) south-east of Tripoli. Flights were diverted to Mitiga airport while black smoke could be seen rising from fires set in the runway area. Sporadic gunfire could be heard for several hours.

06 JUNE 2012-BENGHAZI

US MISSION TARGET OF IED: On June 6th 2012, at approximately 0325 hrs the U.S. Mission in Benghazi was the target of an IED attack. The Mission's local guard force reported a suspicious male individual wearing "Islamic" dress exit a passing vehicle and approach the front gate of the Mission. The guards observed stated they saw the subject place a device at what appeared to be the ledge of the perimeter wall, approximately 3 feet from the ground. The local guard force initiated the Mission's emergency, imminent danger alarm. Approximately 6 minutes after the IDNS alarm was initiated, an IED exploded next to the front gate. No one was injured and all personnel are accounted for. Video camera footage shows a 4-door white pick-up truck departing the area in front of the main gate. The guards confirmed that the subject was driving the vehicle. The local guards then stated that they smelled and saw smoke coming from the area of the wall where the subject had approached. Approximately 6 minutes after initiating the IDNS, the device exploded, creating a large hole in the perimeter wall. US Mission Benghazi QRF, and their support unit from Local Militia (17th February Martyrs Brigade) responded quickly to the incident. The Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman Brigades reportedly claimed credit for the attack.

08 JUNE 2012-SABHA

GRENADE ATTACK ON UK VEHICLES: At approximately 2345 hours, two hand grenades were used by unknown persons to target marked UK diplomatic vehicle while they were parked outside of a Sabha hotel. One grenade detonated, causing damage to three tires and an oil pump. The second grenade failed to detonate and was removed by local security forces. No injuries resulted from the incident.

10 JUNE 2012 – KUFRA

CLASHES IN KUFRA: On 10 June, fighting flared up again in Kufra. Tobu tribesmen were engaged in clashes with former rebels who had become members of the new Libyan National Army. A Kufra official said the Tobu had launched an attack on the city with tanks and other heavy weapons. A Tobu representative said it was the tribe that had come under attack. The Tobu rep stated that the fighting started after the former militiamen, known as the Libya Shield Battalion, shelled the tribe's district. A third official claimed that an attack on a security checkpoint in the town triggered the violence. The fighting continued into the 14th of June with at least 38 people were killed and as many as 150 wounded.

10 JUNE 2012 – TRIPOLI

ATTEMPTED BREAK IN / ARMED ROBBERY OF SUV OF EXPAT: At approximately 2250 hours, ten (10) unidentified men carrying AK-47s and traveling in 3 vehicles, attempted to scale the wall of the expat's villa after the security guard at the villa refused to grant them entry. Military police providing security to a nearby refugee camp, alerted by the efforts of the thieves, responded to the villa and the armed gang fled before any gunfire was exchanged. The vehicles used by the armed gang were described as two



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

unmarked Toyota Land Cruisers with tinted windows, and one Chevrolet (or similar) sedan car. There were no insignia or number plates evident.

10 JUNE 2012 – TRIPOLI

ZINTAN MILITIAMEN SEIZE GOVERNMENT CARS IN TRIPOLI:

A group from one of the Zintan militias, Brigade 14, which was assigned to protect the Algerian-Libyan borders, seized a number of government vehicles in Tripoli on Monday. The vehicles seized by the militia included cars belonging to the protocol department as well as police vehicles. Brigade 14 militia members stated that they seized the government vehicles due to the government's failure to provide financial "entitlements" to the brigade. The Ministry of Interior confirmed that at least 33 government vehicles were taken by the brigade, adding that negotiations between the government and the brigade were ongoing. The vehicle in which the Maltese Central Bank Governor Josef Bonnici was traveling was among those seized. Bonnici, in town for official meetings with the Central Bank of Libya, was told to exit the protocol vehicle he was traveling in when the motorcade was stopped at a Zintan checkpoint. Protocol and police vehicles, including those in Bonnici's motorcade, were taken to the brigades' Tripoli headquarters, near the airport road.

11 JUNE 2012 – BENGHAZI

RPG ATTACK ON UK AMBASSADOR'S CONVOY; 2 SECURITY OFFICERS INJURED:

At approximately 1530 hours, a 3-car motorcade carrying the UK Ambassador was targeted by an RPG attack. The security personnel in the motorcade indicated that they were initially engaged by an RPG and

then possible AK-47 fire within 500 meters of the rear entrance of their compound. The attack occurred as the convoy was en route to the British office compound, which is located approximately two kilometers from U.S. Mission Benghazi. One RPG round struck the rear of the lead armored vehicle, injuring two of the security personnel in the vehicle. The motorcade was not flying the British flags. Security and medical personnel from the U.S. Mission in Benghazi responded and provided initial trauma medical care until the Supreme Security Council (SSC) could respond. No suspects have been identified and no group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Both injured security officers were medevaced out of Libya for further treatment.

12 JUNE 2012 – MISRATA

IED/EXPLOSION AT THE ICRC COMPOUND IN MISRATA; 1 PERSON INJURED.

The ICRC confirmed that an explosion occurred in our Misrata office at 3.50am on 12 June. A crude, time-delayed IED was the cause of the explosion, which wounded one person. informed and were on site early at five in the morning."

13 JUNE 2012 – SEBHA

CLASHES IN SEBHA: Two persons were killed and eleven wounded in fighting between the National Army and 'wanted individuals' in Sebha. According to the Supreme Security Committee in Sebha, the two men killed were part of the SSC and described the wounded as soldiers and SSC members. According to the Sebha SSC, the 'wanted individuals' were from Ghaddafi's tribe.

13 JUNE 2012 – BENGHAZI

INDIVIDUAL KILLED IN CAR BOMB

ASSASSINATION: One individual was killed at the Zamzam market area of Benghazi when a bomb



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

placed inside his vehicle detonated. The victim was identified as Ibrahim al-'Arabi by the Benghazi Security Directorate's spokesman Majdi al-'Arfi. The bomb went off as the man was leaving the market in route to his residence. The victim was reportedly the aid to a former internal security service officer.



21 JUNE 2012 – BENGHAZI

BENGHAZI JUDGE LINKED TO YOUNIS'S DEATH ASSASSINATED: On the evening of June 21, the former military prosecutor who reportedly ordered the arrest of General Abdul Fatah Younis was shot and killed in Benghazi. Judge Jumah Hasan al Jawzi had survived two earlier attempts on his life in January and March. The judge was blamed for Younis's death, when Younis was killed after being summoned by the TNC last July for questioning. No one has yet to be charged with killing Younis. It is unclear who was behind al Jawzi's assassination.

23 JUNE 2012 – BENGHAZI

ARMED ROBBERY OF UK CITIZEN BY LOCAL TAXI DRIVER: On 23 June, a UK citizen was robbed at gunpoint by the driver of a local taxi. Shortly after the UK citizen entered the local taxi, a black and white Hyundai sedan with no local license plates, the driver pulled a 9mm pistol on the passenger and demanded money. The passenger

gave the taxi driver a small amount of funds and was able to exit the vehicle. No injuries reported.

24 JUNE – 02 JULY 2012 – KUFRA

RENEWED FIGHTING: Clashes in Al-Kufra between Tebu, Zwai, and elements of the Libya Shield Brigade, which falls under the Libyan ministry of Defense, left numerous dead and wounded. Sources in the Supreme Security Council and the Ministry Defense confirmed that both sides utilized armored vehicles, including tanks, during the fighting and that residential neighborhoods and the local hospital were struck during the fighting. During the three weeks' of fighting, Tebu spokesmen claimed that at least 56 of their people have been killed, most recently two on Saturday, 6/30 during shelling of the town's Tebu districts of Qaderfi and Qarah Tebu.

24 JUNE 2012 – TRIPOLI

POLICE RAIDS AGAINST ARMED GANG: According to the Tripoli police and Supreme Security Committee (SSC), the two organizations carried out a raid against an armed gang involved in drug smuggling and kidnappings. The raid took place on Sunday on a property formally owned by the Ghaddafi regime located on the outskirts of Tripoli. No further details were provided on the number of persons arrested or the exact location of the raid. No casualties were reported. The raid is part of a series of recent raids in May and June 2012 carried out by authorities in Tripoli to improve law and order in the city.

24 JUNE 2012 – TRIPOLI

HEAD OF ROADS AND BRIDGES AUTHORITY KIDNAPPED: According to officials at the Roads and Bridges Authority, the Director of office, Dr. Naas Mohamed was kidnapped by eight. The



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

Director was reportedly taken by the armed group from his office in Got Alshaal area on Sunday morning. Authorities were informed of the incident and continue to investigate.

26 JUNE 2012 – TRIPOLI

TUNISIAN CONSULATE TARGETED BY CRUDE IED:

According to the Tunisian Embassy, shortly after 1500 hrs, two to four men in a Mitsubishi Lander drove up to the front of the Tunisian Embassy located in the Nouflein area of Tripoli. The individuals threw a small explosive device at the outside of the building. There were no reported injuries as a result of the explosion, however, the consulate's rear gate was charred, two nearby cars were damaged, and a large hole was created in the ground. Many believe the incident is connected with the extradition of Al-Mahmoudi from Tunisia to Libya, which occurred on 24 June.

01 JULY 2012 – BENGHAZI

HNEC OFFICES STORMED; ELECTION MATERIALS

AND BALLOTS BURNED: Between 100-200 demonstrators ransacked the office of the High National Electoral Commission (HNEC) in Benghazi, burning election materials and chanting pro-federalist slogans.

01 JULY 2012 – TOBRUK

HNEC OFFICES STORMED; DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

BEATEN: The HNEC office in Tobruk was stormed by protestors, who also assaulted its deputy chairman, Mufta Othman.

02 JULY 2012 – MAREJ

POLITICAL PARTY OFFICE FIREBOMBED:

According to unconfirmed media reports, the campaign office of the Justice and Construction Party in Marej was the target of a firebombing.

The office was reportedly destroyed. No suspects were identified. A Molotov bomb was thrown at an electoral office that belongs to Justice and Construction Party in Marej city and burned it down.

03 JULY 2012 – MUSAID (LIBYAN-EGYPTIAN BORDER)

SECURITY FORCES ABANDON POST IN PROTEST

OVER DANGEROUS CONDITIONS: Security forces on the Libyan-Egyptian border crossing at Musaid abandoned their posts in protest at what they said are the dangerous conditions they have been exposed to, which included being regularly shot at by smugglers involved in human trafficking.

04 JULY 2012 – BENGHAZI

BORDER SECURITY OFFICER ASSASSINATED IN

BENGHAZI : A border control department officer, identified as Colonel Sulaiman Hasan Bortima, was assassinated on Wednesday. Colonel Bortima, who was assigned to the Gharyonis district, was struck by three bullets fired by a group of unidentified assailants driving in a Mitsubishi Lancer. Neither a motive nor the assailants have been identified.

03 JULY 2012 – KUFRA

ZWAY TRIBESMAN STOP OIL PRODUCTION AT THREE SITES TO PROTEST VIOLENCE AND GOVT

RESPONSE IN KUFRA: Zway tribesmen surrounded and stopped production at three oil fields in the Kufra region after their prior warning four days prior went unheeded by the government. The Zway leaders in Kufra demanded that the NTC take decisive action to put an end to the violence in the town within 72 hours or they would stop oil flowing. The three fields include Wintershall's Nafura C96



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concession at Jakhira and the nearby concession in the Amal field held by Harouge (formerly Veba) Oil. Oil production at the two locations was estimated to be approximately 75,000 barrels per day. The Zway are the primary security guards at the Nafura fields, which aided their ability to cause a work stoppage. The Zway are also threatening to stop water following in the Man-made River in their attempts to force the government to take decisive action in Kufra.

05 JULY 2012 - AJDABIYA

ARSON SUSPECTED IN LIBYAN POLL OFFICE FIRE:

The main storage center for election materials in Ajdabiya caught fire in a suspected arson attack. The fire destroyed ballot papers and other election equipment. Security sources confirmed that the fire was being investigated as a possible arson attack. National election commission officials planned to replace the materials before the elections on Saturday. The storage center is located on the outskirts of Ajdabiya, but the main election commission headquarters in the center of town were not affected, according to witnesses.



06 JULY 2012 – BENGHAZI

LIBYAN AIRFORCE HELICOPTER STRUCK BY GUNFIRE; ONE HNEC EMPLOYEE KILLED: A Libyan

air force helicopter transporting polling material was struck by gunfire, suspected of being from a 14.5 millimeter anti-aircraft weapon, and was forced to land at Benghazi's Benina Airport. The aircraft was flying to Al Abyar Benghazi Sub Constituency. One HNEC staff member was killed during the attack and another was wounded.

07 JULY 12 – QAMINIS / OUTSKIRTS OF BENGHAZI

ARMED INDIVIDUALS STORM THREE POLLING STATIONS:

A group of Pro-Federalist gunmen reportedly stormed three polling stations in the Qaminis area, located approximately 47 km west of Benghazi city. The group took ballots, voting material, and burned the material in the street. No reports of casualties.

07 JULY 2012 – AJDABIYAH

POLLING STATIONS CLOSED DUE TO THEFTS OF ELECTION MATERIAL:

According to election officials and media sources, voting was suspended in some polling stations in Ajdabiyah following the theft of election material. The election material was reportedly stolen just before dawn on Saturday, 7 July.

07 JULY 2012 – AJDABIYAH

GUNMAN OPENS FIRE NEAR POLLING STATION:

One person was killed and another was wounded when unknown gunmen opened fire near a polling station in the city of Ajdabiya.

08 JULY 2012 – SABHA

CONTINUED CLASHES: Additional clashes were reported in the Al-Jadid district between members of the national army and the Maqariyah tribe. No casualties were reported



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from the clashes, which lasted approximately 30 minutes. The incident reportedly occurred after the national army surrounded a district which houses members of the Maqariyah tribes.

09 JULY 2012 – DERNA

MOSQUE TARGETED BY IED: The Sahaba Mosque in Derna was targeted by an IED at approximately 7 am on Monday morning. The blast damaged the tomb of Zuhayr Ibn Qais Al-Balawi at the Sahaba Mosque in Derna causing what could be irreparable damage to the monument to the seventh century commander who helped bring Islam to the region. No casualties have been reported. The bomb destroyed the building over Balawi's grave but the actual grave is reported not to have been damaged. No group claimed responsibility for the explosion, but local residents blame a small group of Salafists active in the area. Reportedly, the Salafist group refused to pray in the mosque because of Zuhayr Ibn Qais Al-Balawi tomb. Conservative Salafist Muslims have been blamed for the attack, which follows similar incidents at other shrines around the country in recent months.

08 -15 JUL 2012 – BANI WALID / MISRATA

LIBYAN JOURNALISTS DETAINED/KIDNAPPED: Gunmen kidnapped two journalists, Youssef Badi and Abdelqader Fessouk, who work for Misratah-based Tobacts TV station. The journalists were abducted near the town of Bani Walid while on their way back from Mizdah where they were covering the elections. The Misratan journalists were released on 15 July 2012, reportedly in exchange for an unspecified number of detainees from Bani Walid being held in Misrata. The release of the journalists came after a week of heightened tensions between Misrata and Bani

Walid, which included a second abduction incident in Bani Walid.

12 JULY 2012 – BANI WALID / MISRATA

JOURNALIST AND SECURITY MEMBER ATTACKED AND ABDUCTED IN BANI WALID:

Three more Misratans were abducted in Bani Walid after a shooting incident. The three individuals, two members of the Libya Shield brigade and an independent journalist, came under attack after passing through the Bir Dufan checkpoint 20 kilometres northeast of the town. The two shield members, Omran Shaban and Mohammed Al-Ouyb, were taken to a hospital in Bani Walid where they are now receiving treatment. Shaban was reportedly wounded in the neck by a bullet. The journalist identified as Abdul Aziz Harous is not believed to have been wounded and is being held separately. The release of all three is said to be still under negotiation.

15 – 22 JULY 2012 – TRIPOLI

LIBYA'S OLYMPIC CHIEF KIDNAPPED IN TRIPOLI:

Libya's Olympic committee president was taken from his car by gunmen in Tripoli on Sunday and his whereabouts are unknown. Nabil Elalem was in his car with a colleague when two vehicles carrying men in military-style clothing blocked them in. The gunmen, estimated to be approximately eight in number, reportedly claimed to be from the national army and asked for Elalem to come with them. Elalem was not allowed to take a phone or laptop with him. The other passenger in Elalem's vehicle was not harmed or abducted. Elalem was released unharmed on 21 July 2012. It is believed that Elalem was held by a criminal group, although the exact circumstances of his abduction remain unclear.

**SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011****17 JUL 2012 – DERNA****UN VEHICLES TARGETED BY SMALL ARMS FIRE**

NEAR DERNA: UN officials confirmed that three of their vehicles were fired upon while passing under an overpass in Derna while returning to Benghazi from Tobruk on July 17. The UN staff had been observing local elections in Tobruk. Bullets struck one of the vehicles but the incident resulted in no casualties.

17 JULY 2012 – TRIPOLI

ARMED CLASHES: Following an accidental killing between two friends, four brothers of the deceased decided to seek revenge on the family of the boy who killed their family member. At approximately 1745hrs a small group of four men attacked a house and shop in the Gargarsh area close to the police station belonging to the family of a brother involved in the incident earlier in the day, which led to the fatality at the beach. The group fired 2 RPG rounds and threw petrol bombs at the house followed by small arms fire. During this period a further 3 RPG rounds were fired at the house and further small arms fire. The group then attacked the shop and vehicle belonging to the family with petrol bombs resulting in the shop and the vehicle being destroyed. The incident lasted for approximately two hours after which the local security committee intervened and put an end to street confrontations between the two families. No further incidents were reported.

19 JUL 2012 – BENGHAZI**BENGHAZI PLANNING OFFICE CLOSED BY**

PROTESTORS OVER SALARY DISPUTE: The Planning Office in Benghazi was stormed. Protesters reportedly stormed the Planning Officer in Benghazi, causing a work stoppage

when they blockaded the offices over unpaid salaries and living expenses. The protesters are reportedly owed past salary payments totaling 15 million LYD, which has been paid by the city of Benghazi on behalf of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA). Despite promises from the MSA that this loan would be refunded, nothing had yet been received.

19 JULY 2012 - TRIPOLI

ARMED ROBBERY OF RESTAURANT: At approximately 1800 hours, unidentified gunmen robbed all of the patrons of a Chinese Restaurant located on Gargaresh Road in western Tripoli. No casualties were reported.

CLASHES NEAR AIRPORT: Heavy weapon fire was reported northeast of the Tripoli International Airport at approximately 15h00. Air traffic was not disrupted in any way. Reports indicate that two rival militia groups were clashing in the vicinity of Kaser Ben Gasher (Qaser Bin Gasher) area located near the Airport facilities. No further reports.

21 JULY 2012 - TRIPOLI

INTER-MILITIA CLASHES: At approximately 2130 hours, inter-militia clashes involving small arms and hand-grenades reported in the vicinity of the Tripoli Towers near Alrasheed and Omar Mukhtar Streets.



SECURITY INCIDENTS SINCE JUNE 2011

GENERAL ASSESSMENT ON THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:


Crime levels in Tripoli have significantly increased with the fall of the Ghaddafi regime as local militias are demobilized in the absence of a reconstituted security/police infrastructure. Tripoli residents reported being subjected to looting and robbery by gunmen. Carjackings, robberies, burglaries, and thefts have noticeably increased in Tripoli, particularly given that the majority of the 16,000 criminals released by Ghaddafi during the revolution have yet to be re-apprehended. While the Ministry of Interior is in the process of absorbing a large percentage of the demobilized militia, many of its records and infrastructure was destroyed during the revolution. The Mol estimates that only 60% of police have returned to their pre-revolution posts. Widespread small arms distribution coupled with lack of employment for former regime supporters, and demobilized or current militia members, has added to the increased crime rate. The government estimates that between 200,000 and 250,000 people in Libya are armed. It has attempted a number of schemes, including offering people jobs in exchange for handing over their weapons or offering to buy their weapons, in order to disarm the militias. So far the offers have shown few results.

RSO has received regular reporting about clashes between rival militias, and some reports of vigilante revenge killings. The government struggles to establish its legitimacy with weapons freely available and various armed brigades having unclear lines of command and control. While authorities had so far successfully contained any outbreaks of violence, they could escalate and widen in scope, he warned.

The lack of oversight by the central government over militias creates an environment conducive to torture and ill treatment of those suspects arrested or detained by the various militias, often on limited evidence. Diplomatic personnel and expatriates are increasingly being detained by poorly trained militia groups, often for arbitrary or unclear reasons. The government has acknowledged the problem of the Militias in torture and detentions, but it admits that the police and Justice Ministry are not up to the task of stopping them. On Tuesday, it sent out a text message on cell phones, pleading for the militias to stop.

The risk of U.S. Mission personnel, private U.S. citizens, and businesspersons encountering an isolating event as a result of militia or political violence is HIGH. The Government of Libya does not yet have the ability to effectively respond to and manage the rising criminal and militia related violence, which could result in an isolating event.

Officials have described the Ghaddafi legacy on the ability of the interim government to govern as "weak, at times absent, state institutions, coupled with the long absence of political parties and civil society organizations, which render the country's transition more difficult". Local officials remain concerned with the chaos and radicalization that could result from protracted civil conflict in Libya. Neighboring countries fear extremist groups who could take advantage of the political violence and chaos should Libya become a failed state.



- See Translation
June 6 at 2:01pm · Like
- استلام النجاة التي انقذت من الموت في الجنة
See Translation
June 6 at 2:06pm · Like
- سجل يا شيخ ليلاني ... فت الفقه فالفقه
من بقرات الفقه من المعر
See Translation
June 6 at 2:17pm · Like
- مكتداس العزة لاجل انك بالظن جادو ليرين
1994 من الكرامة والموهبة كل شي راجع كرامة بالاسما
See Translation
June 6 at 2:29pm · Like
- مكتداس العزة ليرين من الفقه غير الفقه علي
قولك العزلة
See Translation
June 6 at 2:30pm · Like
- Haumar Knight المصنوع السياسي الامريكى
يبدو وهو يرتاح على الامتياز الذي راجع بالذم
من فوكتين وانما الراد من المعر يا جواد الفقه
June 6 at 2:53pm · Like
- امنية علم كانه فيه رحمة جوار طالعك ما يروح الا
بوجه الله علي يمانلي
See Translation
June 6 at 2:56pm · Like
- Manx Liby هو رالي معاه يومنا في
See Translation
June 6 at 2:56pm · Like
- مزي يوم بلادي خدمهم اشياء الرمال هو بجدول
وهو يساوه
See Translation
June 6 at 3:01pm · Like
- الحق جزائي القسم برزق العيش في الجنة
للجنة من رزقهم في الجنة الذي يساوه
من الساعة 8:15 من اجل العيش في الجنة
التي هي في الجنة من رزقهم في الجنة الذي يساوه
الذي هو في الجنة من رزقهم في الجنة الذي يساوه
See Translation
June 6 at 3:17pm · Like

Write a comment...

First Annual Conference of supporters of Sharia in Benghazi, starting from June 7, 2012

This is a discussion on First Annual Conference of supporters of Sharia in Benghazi, starting from June 7, 2012 within the Politics, Jihad and Current Affairs forums, part of the Main Topics category; Assalamu alaykum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuhu, First annual conference of diverse brigades and groups supporting Islamic Sharia in Libya has ...

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8th June 2012

#1

Bearer of the Sword
Junior Member
Khat'ab



KHAT'TAB

Join Date: Aug 2009
Age: 23
Posts: 184
Thanks: 9

Thanked 329 Times in 99 Posts

First Annual Conference of supporters of Sharia in Benghazi, starting from June 7, 2012

Assalamu alaykum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuhu,

First annual conference of diverse brigades and groups supporting Islamic Sharia in Libya has been organized in Benghazi, starting from June 7, 2012. It's a big, huge event, as the photo albums would make it clear to you:

<https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?...7766481&type=1>

Somebody plz translate this description of above photo album, has names of different groups and brigades participating, very important data

الملتقى الأول البصرة الشريعة الإسلامية في بنغازي 7/6/2012.....وصول كتابته البركات والفريق من مصراتة والفتة بكتبة انصار الصرية وكتبة انصار الشريعة وكتبة ابي عبيدة بن الجراح وكتبة شعواء الفوارسة وكتبة الشهيد محمد الحامير وكتبة الجبل وكتبة النور وكتبة شهداء بوسليم وسرايا والاه السنخات وكتبة شهداء بنغازي الامن الرئاسي أمن المواطن الوحدة الامنية العليا الفؤاد السليبي بنغازي وكتبة صالحي النصر والعديد من الكتائب من بنغازي وبرقة والنوالمية واجاديبه وسنبراه ومن جندور ايضا الان في جرد اشوية وترحب حائل من ثوار بنغازي وبرقة بنوار محمراته في بنغازي

<https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?...7766481&type=1>

Original banner promoting the conference:

<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?...2926723&type=1>

Katalb Ansar al Sharia(unrelated to the Tunisian group of some name) is participating.

Things are becoming clearer day by day in Libya. groups and brigades are polarizing along Islamist-jihadist-secularist lines.

US drones are not only hovering all the time over eastern Libya, they also bombed a training camp run by Abdulbasit Azuz, a commander from Derna.

Yes, you heard that right, US drones are bombing Libya already.

Derna, Benghazi, other parts of eastern Libya are teeming with mujahideen. InshaAllah high levels of popular support, specially from the youth, even in western cities like Misrata and Tripoli. Lots of help to the Syrian mujahideen is coming from Misrata.

Stay tuned.

From Allaah we come and to Him we shall Return




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Bearer of the Sword
Junior Member



KHAT'TAB
Join Date: Aug 2009
Age: 23
Posts: 184
Thanks: 9

Thanked 329 Times in 89 Posts

Re: First Annual Conference of supporters of Sharia in Benghazi, starting from June 7, 2012

All the videos are must watch:



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Ph.D. explains why most people fail at learning a new language. Even major universities make this simple mistake. The secret to learning a language in only 10 days is revealed.

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Pinetour Approach

