[House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House]
[Chapter 7. Budget Process]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]
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CHAPTER 7 - BUDGET PROCESS
HOUSE PRACTICE
Sec. 1. In General; Legislative Background
Sec. 2. Committee Jurisdiction; Reports and Estimates
Sec. 3. The Budget Timetable
Sec. 4. Budget Resolutions; Consideration and Debate
Sec. 5. -- Amendments to Resolutions
Sec. 6. -- Debate on Conference Reports
Sec. 7. -- Budget Resolution to Precede Consideration of Related
Legislation
Sec. 8. Reconciliation Procedures
Sec. 9. Adherence to Budget Resolution Spending and Revenue Levels
Sec. 10. Other Spending Controls
Sec. 11. -- Sequestration
Sec. 12. -- New Contract Authority; New Borrowing Authority
(Sec. 401(a))
Sec. 13. -- New Entitlement Authority (Sec. 401(b))
Sec. 14. Social Security Funds
Sec. 15. The Budget Process and the Public Debt Limit
Sec. 16. Impoundments Generally
Sec. 17. -- Rescissions; Line Item Veto
Sec. 18. -- Deferrals
Sec. 19. Unfunded Mandates
Research References
Deschler Ch 13 Sec. 21
Manual Sec. Sec. 169, 720, 748, 853, 990, 1127-1130
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(Gramm-Rudman)
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation
Act of 1987
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
Budget Enforcement Act of 1997
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Manual on the Federal Budget Process, Congressional Research
Service, Aug. 28, 1998
Sec. 1 . In General; Legislative Background
Generally
There are three stages in the complex process by which the
Congress allocates the fiscal resources of the Federal government.
First, there is an authorization process, under which Federal programs
are created in response to national needs. Second, there is an
appropriations process under which funding is provided for those
programs. See Appropriations. Finally, there is a congressional budget
process that annually establishes an overall fiscal policy of spending
and revenues and that institutes a complex web of procedures to
enforce those budgetary decisions. The overall fiscal policy is
established by the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the
budget. The congressional budget process includes the development and
consideration of reconciliation legislation to implement its most
significant budget policies. These three stages are not necessarily
considered or completed in chronological order.
The enforcement of budgetary decisions encompasses both
congressional and executive actions. Such enforcement is rooted
principally in two statutes--the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (the
Budget Act) and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman). The Budget Act permits enforcement through
parliamentary points of order against legislation violating its
requirements and procedures. However, the enforcement mechanisms are
not automatically applied; and timely points of order from the floor
are required to bring them into play. Gramm-Rudman provides automatic
procedures (called sequestration) to enforce spending. Procedures
enforcing discretionary spending limits and deficit targets (sections
251 and 253 of Gramm-Rudman) expired on September 30, 2002. Procedures
to enforce direct spending and receipts (section 252 of Gramm-Rudman),
although textually still in law, have no effect. Sec. 11, infra.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
Budget reform began with the passage of the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921. That Act established a new budget system that permitted
all items relating to a department to be brought together in the same
bill; required the President to submit an annual national budget to
Congress in place of the previous uncoordinated agency submissions;
created the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to assist him in
this respect; and estab
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lished the General Accounting Office and made it the principal
auditing arm of the Federal government. 31 USC Sec. 1101.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974
Until 1974 the Congress lacked a comprehensive uniform mechanism
for establishing priorities among its budgetary goals and for
determining national economic policy regarding the Federal budget.
Responsibility for the Budget remained fragmented throughout the
Congress. The size of the budget, and the size of the surplus or
deficit, were not subject to effective controls. To address these
problems, both Houses enacted over President Nixon's veto the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Deschler Ch
13 Sec. 21. The Act (2 USC Sec. 601) consisted of 10 titles that
established:
New committees on the budget in both the House and the Senate,
and a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) designed to improve
Congress' informational and analytical resources with respect
to the budgetary process.
A timetable and controls for various phases of the
congressional budget process centered on a concurrent
resolution on the budget to be adopted before legislative
consideration of revenue or spending bills.
Various enforcement procedures and provided for program review
and evaluation.
Standardized budget terminology.
Procedures for congressional review of Presidential
impoundment actions.
Titles I through IX constitute the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 and title X constitutes the Impoundment Control Act. The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 added a new part B to title IV of the
Budget Act.
The central purpose of the process established by the Budget Act
is to coordinate the various revenue and spending decisions that are
made in separate tax, appropriations, and legislative measures.
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(Gramm-Rudman) made further significant changes in the budget process,
and in the Budget Act procedures. 2 USC Sec. 900. Conceived as a
statutory response to the burgeoning Federal deficit, Gramm-Rudman
instituted a single binding budget resolution, binding committee
allocations, reconciliation, and enforcement of spending through
sequestration. Gramm-Rudman included provisions amending the Budget
Act to permit a new point of order against legislation exceeding the
appropriate committee allocation (Sec. 302(f) of the Budget Act),
exempting the title II Social Security program from rec
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onciliation (Sec. 310(g) of the Budget Act), and precluding the
breaching of budget authority or outlay ceilings or revenue floors,
with certain exceptions (Sec. 311 of the Budget Act). Pursuant to
section 275 of Gramm-Rudman, several provisions of Gramm-Rudman
expired on September 30, 2002, including two provisions providing for
sequestration to enforce discretionary spending (section 251) and
deficit targets (section 253).
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990; Revisions and Extensions
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA of 1990) revised the
Gramm-Rudman deficit targets, made deficit targets adjustable, and
extended the sequestration process. It set limitations on distinct
categories of discretionary spending and created paygo to require that
increases in direct spending or decreases in revenues due to
legislative action be offset, so that there would be no net increase
in the deficit. Sec. Sec. 10-13, infra.
Budget Enforcement Act of 1997
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 (BEA of 1997) extended the
discretionary spending limits and paygo process through fiscal year
2002 and changed the congressional budget process.
Sec. 2 . Committee Jurisdiction; Reports and Estimates
Committee on the Budget Jurisdiction
To implement the congressional budget process, the Budget Act
created the Senate and House Budget Committees and CBO. 2 USC
Sec. 601. The Budget Committees were authorized to draft the
concurrent resolution on the budget. Unlike the authorizing and
appropriating committees, which focus on individual Federal programs,
the Budget Committees focus on the Federal budget as a whole and on
how it affects the national economy.
Rule X clause 1(e) gives the House Budget Committee jurisdiction
over matters relating to the congressional budget, including
concurrent resolutions on the budget and measures on budget process
and on the enforcement of budget controls. Manual Sec. 720. Section
310 of the Budget Act provides conditions for the reporting by the
Budget Committees of reconciliation measures.
Section 306 of the Budget Act prohibits the consideration in
either House of a bill or resolution dealing with a matter within the
jurisdiction
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of its Committee on the Budget if not reported from that committee or
discharged therefrom. The following were held to violate this section:
An amendment directing that certain lease-purchase agreements
be scored on an annual basis for budget purposes. 106-1, July
19, 1999, p ____.
An amendment designating an appropriation as ``emergency
spending'' within the meaning of the budget-enforcement laws.
106-1, Sept. 8, 1999, p ____.
The 107th and 108th Congresses adopted an order of the House to
confine the point of order under section 306 to bills and joint
resolutions only. 107-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2001, p ____; 108-1, H.
Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p ____.
Committee on Rules Jurisdiction
The Committee on Rules has the special oversight function of
review of the budget process. Rule X clause 3(i). Under section 301(c)
of the Budget Act, the Speaker must refer a concurrent resolution on
the budget reported from the Committee on the Budget sequentially to
the Committee on Rules for not more than five legislative days if it
includes any procedure or matter having the effect of changing a rule
of the House. After such a referral, an additional one-day layover
follows the report of the Committee on Rules. Sec. 305(a)(1) of the
Budget Act. In modern practice, this sequential referral is obviated
in favor of the perusal by the Committee on Rules when reporting a
special order of business governing consideration of the budget
resolution. This process allows the Committee on Rules to review
suggested rules changes. In the 108th Congress, composition of the
Committee on the Budget was changed to include one member of the
Committee on Rules. Rule X clause 5(a)(2).
Committee Reports; Cost Estimates and Scorekeeping
CBO provides economic and programmatic analyses and cost
information on most reported public bills and resolutions. Under the
Budget Act, five-year cost estimates are prepared and published in the
reports accompanying these bills. Sec. Sec. 308(a)(1)(B), 402 of the
Budget Act. A committee cost estimate identifying certain spending
authority as recurring annually and indefinitely was held necessarily
to address the five-year period required by this section. Manual
Sec. 844.
Committee reports on legislation providing new budget authority or
a change in revenues or tax expenditures are required to contain the
estimates and other detailed information mandated by section 308(a) of
the Budget Act. The information mandated by section 308(a) also is
required under House rule XIII clause 3(c), except that the estimates
with respect to new
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budget authority must include, when practicable, a comparison of the
total estimated funding level for the relevant program (or programs)
to the appropriate levels under current law. Manual Sec. 840.
If a bill providing new budget authority is reported without an
estimate of its cost, a point of order under rule XIII clauses 3(c)(2)
and 3(c)(3) (requiring that an estimate under sections 308 and 402 of
the Budget Act be included in the report) may be made against
consideration of the bill. However, a special order for the
consideration of a bill that ``self-executes'' the adoption of an
amendment providing new budget authority into a bill to be
subsequently considered does not, itself, provide new budget authority
within the meaning of section 308 of the Budget Act (so as to require
a report by the Committee on Rules to include such a cost estimate).
Manual Sec. 1127.
The Director of CBO is required to issue to the committees of the
House and the Senate monthly reports detailing and tabulating the
progress of congressional action on specified bills and resolutions.
Sec. 308(b)(1) of the Budget Act. The Budget Committees of each House
are required to prepare budget ``scorekeeping'' reports and to make
them available frequently enough to provide Members of each House with
an accurate representation of the current status of congressional
consideration of the budget. Sec. 308(b)(2) of the Budget Act.
For a discussion of committee allocations, see Sec. 9, infra.
Sec. 3 . The Budget Timetable
Section 300 of the Budget Act includes a nonmandatory timetable
for various stages of the congressional budget process:
On or before first Monday in February--President submits his
budget to Congress
Note: Additional time for submission of the President's budget can
be provided by law. Shortly after its submission, the two Budget
Committees begin hearings on the budget, the economic assumptions upon
which it is based, the economy in general, and national budget
priorities.
On or before February 15--CBO submits annual report to the
Budget Committees
Note: This report deals primarily with overall economic and fiscal
policy and alternative budget levels and national budget priorities.
Not later than six weeks after President submits his budget--
committees submit views and estimates to Budget Committees
Note: These reports provide the Budget Committees with an early
and comprehensive indication of committee leg
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islative planning. These reports include estimates of new budget
authority and outlays.
On or before April 1--Senate Budget Committee reports
concurrent resolution
On or before April 15--Congress completes action on concurrent
resolution on the budget
Note: Congress may revise its budget resolution before the end of
the appropriate fiscal year (section 304 of the Budget Act); although
this may be done at any point, the Congress in some years has followed
the practice of revising the budget plan for the current fiscal year
as part of the budget resolution for the ensuing fiscal year.
May 15--Annual appropriation bills may be considered in the
House
Note: General appropriation bills, and amendments thereto, may be
considered in the House after May 15 even if a budget resolution for
the ensuing fiscal year has yet to be agreed to. Sec. 303(b)(2) of the
Budget Act.
On or before June 10--House Committee on Appropriations
reports last annual appropriation bill
June 15--Congress completes action on reconciliation
legislation
Note: The mandatory June 15 deadline was repealed by the BEA of
1990. However, the Congress may not adjourn for more than three
calendar days during the month of July until the House has completed
action on the reconciliation legislation (Sec. 310(f) of the Budget
Act) and the 13 general appropriation bills (Sec. 309 of the Budget
Act).
On or before June 30--House completes action on annual
appropriation bills
October 1--Fiscal year begins
Note: The fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September
30. If action on appropriation bills has not been completed by October
1, Congress may pass a ``continuing resolution'' to provide
appropriations on a temporary basis until the regular appropriation
bills are enacted.
Deadlines for other stages in the budget process, such as
notification of adjustment in maximum deficit amounts, the President's
mid-session budget review, and various CBO and OMB sequestration
reports, were provided for in section 254(a) of Gramm-Rudman. Other
than October 1 (beginning of new fiscal year), the dates established
in section 300 are targets to be met each year. Failure to meet the
targets does not inhibit consideration of measures beyond those dates.
Under rule X clause 2(d), each standing committee must submit its
oversight plans for the Congress to the Committees on Government
Reform and House Administration by February 15 of the first session.
These plans
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must be reported to the House by the Committee on Government Reform by
March 31 of the session. Rule X clause 2(d).
Sec. 4 . Budget Resolutions; Consideration and Debate
Generally
The budget resolution is a concurrent resolution; as such it is
not a law. It serves as an internal framework for Congress in its
action on separate revenue, spending, and other budget-related
measures. The content of budget resolutions and accompanying reports
is governed by section 301 of the Budget Act. Budget resolutions set
forth budgetary levels for the upcoming fiscal year and for at least
the four succeeding fiscal years, including amounts for total spending
and total revenues. The budget resolution gives the Congress a
mechanism for establishing Federal spending priorities. The budget
resolution accomplishes this by dividing up Federal spending among
various ``major functional categories,'' such as national defense,
agriculture, and health. Manual Sec. 1127.
Section 301(b)(4) of the Budget Act permits a concurrent
resolution on the budget to ``set forth such other matters, and
require such other procedures, relating to the budget, as may be
appropriate to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.'' This provision
is sometimes referred to as the ``elastic clause.'' Textually, the
``other matters'' and ``procedures'' admitted by this section must:
(1) relate to the budget; and (2) be appropriate to carry out the
purposes of the Budget Act.
Note: Matter included under the ``elastic clause'' must not
include matter that would destroy the privilege of the concurrent
resolution on the budget, such as by effecting a special order of
business. The only matter in the nature of a special order of business
that may be included in a privileged concurrent resolution on the
budget is a reconciliation directive. Reconciliation, see Sec. 8,
infra.
Consideration of Budget Resolutions
A concurrent resolution on the budget that has been reported as
privileged pursuant to rule XIII clause 5(a) is privileged for
consideration under procedures set forth in section 305 of the Budget
Act, but those procedures do not apply to unreported budget
resolutions. 98-2, Apr. 5, 1984, pp 7992, 7993. The House may vary the
parameters of consideration by unanimous consent, by suspension of the
rules, or by adoption of a special rule, because the statutory
provisions concerned were enacted as exercises of the rulemaking
powers of the House and the Senate, respectively, under the
Constitution. Sec. 904(a) of the Budget Act. It is customary for the
House to vary
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the parameters for consideration of a budget resolution by adopting a
special rule recommended by the Committee on Rules. In recent
Congresses such rules have permitted only designated amendments in the
nature of substitutes, and perfecting amendments have been precluded.
See, e.g., 103-2, H. Res. 384, Mar. 10, 1994, p 4346; 107-1, H. Res.
100, Mar. 28, 2001, p ____.
In addition to the Budget Act, concurrent resolutions on the
budget for fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001 included a point of
order against consideration in the House or Senate of a concurrent
resolution on the budget for the following fiscal year, or any
amendment thereto or conference report thereon, that set forth a
deficit for any fiscal year (as determined by the Budget Committee).
106-1, sec. 201, H. Con. Res. 68; 106-2, sec. 201, H. Con. Res. 290.
Section 305(a)(1) of the Budget Act requires a three-day layover
period that starts when the report on the resolution first becomes
available to the Members. Rule XIII clause 4(a). Section 305(a) of the
Budget Act also provides for consideration in the Committee of the
Whole; limits general debate to not more than ten hours, with up to an
additional four hours permitted on economic goals and policies; and
provides for consideration of amendments under the five-minute rule.
Sec. 5, infra. After the Committee of the Whole rises and reports the
resolution back to the House, the previous question is considered as
ordered on the resolution and any amendments thereto to final passage
without intervening motion. Neither a motion to recommit the
resolution nor a motion to reconsider is in order. Sec. 305(a)(2)-(5)
of the Budget Act. The question having been put on final adoption of
the resolution, the yeas and nays are considered as ordered. Rule XX
clause 10.
A budget resolution being considered in Committee of the Whole has
been held subject to a motion to rise and report the resolution back
to the House with the recommendation that the resolving clause be
stricken. 103-1, Mar. 18, 1993, p 5658. However, the motion to
recommit pending House concurrence under rule XVIII clause 9 would not
be in order under section 305(a) of the Budget Act.
A budget resolution may under some circumstances be divided so as
to permit a separate vote on particular sections therein. Manual
Sec. 921. The question of adoption of a budget resolution containing
one section revising the congressional budget for the fiscal year,
preceded by sections setting forth budget targets for ensuing fiscal
years as well as reconciliation instructions, and followed by a final
section on reporting of certain fiscal information, was divided on the
demand of a Member for two separate votes (1) on the first and final
portions of the resolution and then (2) on the separable section in
between. 96-2, May 7, 1980, pp 10185-87. The rule providing
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for the consideration of a budget resolution normally precludes a
demand for a division. See, e.g., 107-1, H. Res. 100, Mar. 28, 2001, p
____.
Sec. 5 . -- Amendments to Resolutions
Generally
Under section 305(a)(5) of the Budget Act, amendments to budget
resolutions are considered in the Committee of the Whole under the
five-minute rule in accordance with rule XVIII. Under rule XVIII
clause 10, the resolution is open to amendment at any point, so that
the Committee of the Whole may amend the functional categories section
before consideration of the total budget allocations. Manual
Sec. 1127.
Amendments to Achieve Mathematical Consistency
Rule XVIII clause 10 requires, with certain exceptions, that
amendments to concurrent resolutions on the budget be mathematically
consistent. Under this rule, amendments making changes in budget
authority and outlay aggregate totals must be accompanied by
comparable changes in functional categories. A point of order will lie
against an amendment to the resolution increasing the aggregates and a
functional category for budget authority and outlays but not changing
the amount of the deficit. However, an amendment that only transfers
an amount of budget authority from one functional category to
another--that is, reduces one category by a certain amount and adds
the same amount to another category--need make no changes in the
aggregates to achieve mathematical consistency. 96-1, May 8, 1979, p
10271.
An amendment to achieve mathematical consistency throughout the
resolution may either change the functional categories to conform with
the aggregates, or vice versa, and if such an amendment is offered and
rejected, another amendment in different form to achieve mathematical
consistency may be offered. 96-1, May 14, 1979, pp 10967-75. Under
section 305(a)(5) of the Budget Act, an amendment or amendments to
achieve mathematic consistency can be offered at any time up to final
passage. These consistency requirements should be read in light of
provisions contained in budget resolutions of the 106th Congress. See,
e.g., 106-1, Sec. 201, H. Con. Res. 68, Apr. 14, 1999, p ____. Those
provisions established points of order against a budget resolution, or
amendment thereto, setting forth a deficit for any fiscal year.
A change in the public debt limit from that figure reported by the
Committee on the Budget is not in order, except as part of an
amendment offered
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at the direction of the Committee on the Budget to achieve
mathematical consistency. Rule XVIII clause 10. Public debt limit, see
Sec. 15, infra.
Germaneness
Unless protected by special rule, an amendment to a concurrent
resolution on the budget must be germane to the text of the
resolution. An amendment expressing the sense of Congress that the
Impoundment Control Act be repealed for a fiscal year and calling for
a review of the Budget Act and the budget process has been conceded to
be not germane. 96-2, Nov. 18, 1980, p 30026.
Sec. 6 . -- Debate on Conference Reports
Unless limited by a special rule, there can be up to five hours of
debate in the House on a conference report on a concurrent resolution
on the budget under section 305(a)(6) of the Budget Act, to be equally
divided between the majority and minority parties. Where the conferees
report in total disagreement, debate on the motion to dispose of the
amendment in disagreement is not governed by the statute and is
instead considered under the general ``hour'' rule in the House. See,
e.g., 95-2, May 17, 1978, p 14117.
Sec. 7 . -- Budget Resolution to Precede Consideration of Related
Legislation
Section 303 of the Budget Act precludes consideration of certain
budget-related legislation for a fiscal year until the budget
resolution for that year has been adopted by both Houses. The essence
of this section is timing. It reflects a judgment that legislative
decisions on expenditures and revenues for the coming fiscal year
should await the adoption of the budget resolution for that year. 101-
2, July 25, 1990, p 19161. Legislation ruled out under section 303 has
included:
A conference report containing new spending authority in the
form of entitlements to become effective in fiscal years 1978
through 1980, where the concurrent resolution on the budget for
those fiscal years had not yet been adopted. Manual Sec. 1127.
An amendment providing new entitlement authority to become
effective in a fiscal year before adoption of the budget
resolution for that year. Manual Sec. 1127.
An amendment providing new budget authority for a fiscal year,
before adoption of a budget resolution for that year. Manual
Sec. 1127.
A motion to recommit proposing an amendment providing an
increase in revenues for a fiscal year before adoption of a
budget resolution for that year. 105-2, July 24, 1998, p ____.
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A section 303 point of order lies only against a bill or joint
resolution that has been reported. Sec. 303(b)(3) of the Budget Act.
However, a section 303 point of order may lie against an amendment to
an unreported measure. 105-2, July 24, 1998, p ____. In that instance
an amendment striking a revenue provision in a pending unreported bill
and proposing to insert an alternative revenue provision was held to
violate section 303.
Waivers of section 303 of the Budget Act have been provided
pursuant to a special rule from the Committee on Rules. See Sec. 4,
supra. Section 303 does not apply after April 15 if the measure would
not increase the deficit or lower revenues below the aggregate level
of Federal revenues set forth in the concurrent resolution on the
budget. Sec. 302(g) of the Budget Act.
Sec. 8 . Reconciliation Procedures
Section 301(b)(2) of the Budget Act provides for the inclusion of
reconciliation instructions in a budget resolution and for the
reporting and consideration of reconciliation legislation.
Reconciliation instructions direct committees to recommend changes in
existing law to achieve the goals in spending or revenues contemplated
by the budget resolution. If reconciliation instructs more than one
committee in each House, then all committees instructed are to submit
their recommendations to their respective Budget Committees. The
Budget Committees then assemble, without substantive revision, all the
recommendations into one bill for action by the House or Senate.
Sec. 310 of the Budget Act. Reconciliation instructions may
contemplate several reconciliation bills, including a bill that
reduces revenues. See, e.g., 104-2, May 21, 1996, p 11939-41 (decision
of Chair sustained on appeal in the Senate); 106-1, H. Con. Res. 68,
Mar. 25, 1999, p ____ (House adoption of budget resolution). Section
310 provides expedited consideration in both Houses of reconciliation
legislation, provided the reconciliation bill has been reported as
privileged pursuant to rule XIII clause 5(a). However, it is customary
for the House to vary the parameters for consideration of a
reconciliation bill by adopting a special order of business resolution
recommended by the Committee on Rules. See, e.g., 107-1, H. Res. 142,
May 16, 2001, p ____.
Section 310(c)(1)(A) of the Budget Act permits committees, in
meeting their reconciliation targets, to alternatively substitute
revenue and spending changes by up to 20 percent of the sum of the
absolute value of reconciled changes as long as the result does not
increase the deficit relative to the reconciliation instructions.
Section 310(d) of the Budget Act requires that amendments offered to
reconciliation legislation in either the House or the Senate must not
increase the level of deficit (if any) in the resolution. In
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order to meet this requirement, an amendment reducing revenues or
increasing spending must offset deficit increases by equivalent
revenue increases or spending cuts. Manual on the Federal Budget
Process, CRS, Aug. 28, 1998, p 79. Section 313 of the Budget Act
addresses the subject of ``extraneous'' material in a reconciliation
bill--the so-called ``Byrd Rule.'' The enforcement of this section
applies only in the Senate but can be directed against matter
originating in the House.
Sec. 9 . Adherence to Budget Resolution Spending and Revenue Levels
The various parliamentary enforcement mechanisms established in
the Budget Act--those sections establishing points of order against
consideration of certain propositions--constitute rules of the House
and, as such, are liable to waiver by unanimous consent, by suspension
of the rules, or by adoption of a special rule. It is not unusual for
the House to waive such a point of order by adopting a special order
of business resolution recommended by the Committee on Rules.
Adherence to Total Spending and Revenue Levels (Sec. 311(a) of the
Budget Act)
With certain exceptions, section 311(a) of the Budget Act
precludes specified measures--including amendments and conference
reports--that would cause total budget authority or total outlays to
exceed, or total revenues to be below, the level set forth in the
budget resolution. The provision is enforced by points of order
against the consideration of reported measures that would breach the
``appropriate levels'' of total new budget authority or total outlays
or total revenues in the budget resolution. A section 311(a) point of
order does not lie against consideration of an unreported measure.
104-1, Mar. 21, 1995, p 8491.
The House has adopted resolutions to ``deem'' budget resolutions
to be in place for temporary enforcement. These ``deemers'' have been
in either a special rule reported from the Committee on Rules or as a
separate order in an opening-day resolution adopting the standing
rules for a Congress. See, e.g., 105-2, H. Res. 477, June 19, 1998, p
____; 106-1, sec. 2(a)(1), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p ____; 107-2, H.
Res. 428, May 22, 2002, p ____; 108-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p
____.
In the 108th Congress, the House adopted a special rule permitting
the former chairman of the Committee on the Budget to place in the
Congressional Record section 302(a) allocations under the budget
resolution that were ``deemed'' in place. Before his election as
chairman in the 108th Congress, the Member who served as chairman of
the Committee on the Budget
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in the 107th Congress was given such permission because the Budget
Committee was not constituted before the House considered measures
subject to enforcement under the Budget Act. 108-1, H. Res. 14, Jan.
8, 2003, p ____.
The Chair has sustained points of order under section 311(a) of
the Budget Act in the following instances:
An amendment striking a rescission of existing budget
authority where its effect would be to increase the net new
budget authority in the bill in breach of the applicable total.
97-1, May 12, 1981, p 9314.
An amendment reducing revenues for the fiscal year below the
total level of revenues contained in the concurrent resolution
on the budget for that year. See 94-2, Oct. 1, 1976, pp 34554-
57.
A motion to amend a Senate amendment providing new budget
authority for official mail costs to be available immediately
where the applicable total of new budget authority contained in
the budget resolution had already been exceeded and where the
Committee on Appropriations had exceeded its section 302(a)
allocation (thereby rendering the section 311(b) exception
inapplicable). 101-1, Sept. 28, 1989, p 22267.
Committee Allocations (Sec. 302 of the Budget Act)
Section 302(a) of the Budget Act provides for an allocation to
each committee of ``appropriate levels'' of new budget authority and
outlays, which are published in the joint statement of managers
accompanying a conference report on the budget resolution.
Each committee is allocated an overall level for discretionary
spending that is consistent with the congressional budget plan. Under
section 302(b) of the Budget Act, the Committee on Appropriations of
each House then subdivides its allocations among its subcommittees.
Section 302(c) of the Budget Act precludes consideration of an
appropriation measure until that committee has made its suballocation
under section 302(b). Points of order under section 302(c) apply
separately to the consideration of bills and amendments. Thus, a
waiver of points of order against consideration of an unreported
appropriation bill before filing of a report from the Committee on
Appropriations allocating new budget authority among its subcommittees
does not extend to an amendment providing new budget authority in
addition to the amounts contained in the bill. 100-1, July 13, 1987, p
19514; 108-1, Jan. 8, 2003, p ____.
Any Member may raise a point of order under section 302(f) of the
Budget Act against a reported bill, amendment, or conference report
that would exceed the relevant committee allocation. An amendment that
provides no new budget authority or outlays but instead results in
outlay savings is not subject to a point of order under these
provisions. 100-1, June
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30, 1987, p 18308. The Chair has sustained points of order under
section 302(f) of the Budget Act in the following instances:
An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to
strike a provision scored as negative budget authority and thus
providing new budget authority in excess of the relevant
allocation under section 302(b) of the Budget Act. 106-2, June
13, 2000, p ____.
An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to
strike a provision stating that a specified increment of new
discretionary budget authority provided by the bill would
``become available for obligation only upon the enactment of
future appropriations legislation,'' thus causing the bill to
provide additional new discretionary budget authority in that
incremental amount in excess of the relevant 302(b) allocation.
104-2, June 26, 1996, p 15563.
A motion to recommit a bill with instructions proposing to
provide new budget authority in excess of the relevant 302(a)
allocation. 106-2, June 28, 2000, p ____.
In the 108th Congress, the House adopted a special rule permitting
the former chairman of the Committee on the Budget to place in the
Congressional Record section 302(a) allocations under a budget
resolution that were ``deemed'' adopted by the House. Before his
election as chairman in the 108th Congress, the Member who served as
chairman of the Committee on the Budget in the 107th Congress was
given such permission because the Budget Committee was not constituted
before the House considered measures subject to enforcement under
section 302(a) of the Budget Act. 108-1, H. Res. 14, Jan. 8, 2003, p
____; see Sec. 9, supra.
The Section 311(b) Exception
As noted above, section 311(a) of the Budget Act precludes
Congress from considering legislation that would cause total revenues
to fall below, or total new budget authority or total outlays to
exceed, the appropriate level set forth in the budget resolution.
However, section 311(a) does not apply in the House to spending
legislation if the committee reporting the measure has stayed within
its allocation of new budget authority. See Sec. 311(c) of the Budget
Act. Accordingly, the House may take up any spending measure that is
within the appropriate committee allocations, even if (solely due to
excessive spending within another committee's jurisdiction) it would
cause total spending to be exceeded.
Emergency Spending
Before the expiration of section 251 of Gramm-Rudman, section 314
of the Budget Act provided automatic adjustments to budget aggregates
and discretionary spending limits set forth in the concurrent
resolution on the budget and to the relevant committee allocations
under section 302(a) of the
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Budget Act for appropriations designated as an emergency pursuant to
section 251(b)(2)(A). Such designation permitted emergency spending
notwithstanding the enforcement mechanisms contained in sections
311(a) and 302(f) of the Budget Act, although the designation did not
automatically cause a corresponding adjustment to a section 302(b)
allocation of a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. An
emergency designation of direct spending or receipts pursuant to
section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act is still possible and may cause adjustments under section 314 of
the Budget Act as described herein. However, because the sequestration
procedures outlined in section 252(e) are no longer viable, such
emergency designation is unlikely. Sequestration to enforce
discretionary spending limits also has expired with the expiration of
section 251, although that feature of the law could be reinvigorated
in the 108th Congress.
Chair Guided by Committee on the Budget Estimates
When the Chair decides questions of order under titles III and IV
of the Budget Act, section 312(a) of the Budget Act requires him to
rely on estimates provided by the Committee on the Budget in
determining levels of new budget authority, outlays, direct sending,
new entitlement authority, and revenues for a fiscal year. See, e.g.,
106-2, June 8, 2000, p ____.
Sec. 10 . Other Spending Controls
Generally
For a detailed explanation of deficit targets, discretionary
spending limits, and the paygo process, see the Manual on the Federal
Budget Process, CRS, Aug. 28, 1998.
Sec. 11 . -- Sequestration
Sequestration (an automatic spending reduction process) involves
the issuance of a Presidential order that permanently cancels
budgetary authority (except for special funds and trust funds) for the
purpose of achieving a required amount of outlay savings.
Sequestration orders are automatically triggered by OMB reports
mandated under Gramm-Rudman. Gramm-Rudman provided multiple
sequestration procedures. However, two of those procedures (section
251, to enforce the discretionary spending limits, and section 253, to
enforce deficit targets) expired on September 30, 2002. Sec. 275 of
Gramm-Rudman. The sequestration procedures under section 252 of Gramm-
Rudman, although textually still in law, have no effect. Sections 251-
253 of Gramm-Rudman could be reinvigorated in the 108th Congress.
[[Page 203]]
Modification or Suspension of Sequestration
OMB having issued a final sequestration report for a fiscal year,
the Majority Leader of either House may under Sec. 258A(a) of Gramm-
Rudman introduce a timely joint resolution directing the President to
modify his most recent sequestration order or to provide an
alternative to reduce the deficit for such fiscal year. The issuance
of a ``low growth'' report by CBO may also trigger a joint resolution
suspending the relevant enforcement provisions of titles III and IV of
the Budget Act. Sec. 258(a) of Gramm-Rudman. For an example of such a
resolution, see 102-1, S.J. Res. 44, Jan. 23, 1991, p 2128.
A sequestration ordered by the President for fiscal year 1990 was
rescinded by the Congress when it adopted a deficit-reducing
reconciliation bill for that year. In this instance, initial
sequestration reports for fiscal year 1990 were issued by the
Directors of both CBO and OMB. Accordingly, the President issued an
initial sequestration order directing that the reductions specified in
the OMB report be made on a provisional basis. A final sequestration
order was then issued by the President. The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989 included provisions to rescind the orders
and restore the sequestered funds. It also reduced the deficit by
achieving certain other savings.
Discretionary Spending
The currently expired section 251 of Gramm-Rudman imposed limits
on discretionary spending. The limits applied to new budget authority
and outlays provided in annual appropriations Acts (except for certain
mandatory programs funded in those Acts). A breach in either type of
limit would cause a sequester under section 251. Section 251(b)(1) of
Gramm-Rudman set forth a detailed procedure for the periodic,
automatic adjustment of the discretionary spending limits. Adjustments
were made for various factors, including changes in accounting
concepts and inflation. The 108th Congress could reinvigorate section
251.
Direct Spending
A conventional authorization establishes or continues a government
agency or program. Although it may limit the amount of budget
authority that may be appropriated for that purpose, the authorized
funds are available only to the extent provided for in appropriation
Acts originated by the Committee on Appropriations. Deschler Ch 25
Sec. 2.13; see Appropriations. Spending legislation that circumvents
the appropriations process is called ``direct spending'' (sometimes
referred to as ``mandatory spending''). Under section 250(c)(8) of
Gramm-Rudman, direct spending includes the fol
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lowing: (1) budget authority provided by law other than appropriation
Acts; (2) entitlement authority; and (3) the food stamp program.
Direct spending is not capped but operates under Gramm-Rudman's
so-called paygo process (section 252 of Gramm-Rudman), which requires
that direct spending and revenue legislation enacted be deficit
neutral. However, section 252, although textually still in law, has no
effect, although it could be reinvigorated in the 108th Congress.
Sec. 12 . -- New Contract Authority; New Borrowing Authority
(Sec. 401(a))
New budget authority provided by law other than appropriation Acts
may take the form of new contract authority or new authority to incur
indebtedness (often referred to as ``borrowing authority'').
With certain exceptions, section 401(a) of the Budget Act requires
new contract authority and new authority to incur indebtedness to be
effective only as provided in appropriation Acts. The various
authorities referred to in section 401(a) of the Budget Act do not
apply to bills that provide legislative authorizations that are
subject to the appropriations process. A conference report authorizing
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to borrow funds by
issuing government notes as a public debt transaction, not subject to
amounts specified in advance in appropriation Acts, was conceded to
violate section 401(a) of the Budget Act and was ruled out on a point
of order. 94-2, Sept. 27, 1976, p 32655. Whether or not an amendment
to a pending measure violates section 401(a) of the Budget Act is
determined by its marginal effect on the pending measure (rather than
current law). See 102-2, Mar. 26, 1992, p 7183.
Sec. 13 . -- Entitlement Authority (Sec. 401(b))
Section 401(b) of the Budget Act precludes ``new entitlement
authority'' that becomes effective during the current fiscal year.
Entitlement authority is the authority to make payments to a person or
government under a provision of law that obligates the United States
to make such payments to those who meet the requirements established
by that law, including the food stamp program. Sec. 3(9) of the Budget
Act; Manual Sec. 1127. The Chair contemplates immediate enactment to
determine when an entitlement takes effect. Manual Sec. 1127.
[[Page 205]]
The following examples have been held to provide new entitlement
authority within the meaning of the Budget Act:
A conference report requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to
pay a cost of transporting agricultural commodities to major
disaster areas.
A Senate amendment requiring the Secretary of Labor to certify
a new group of workers as eligible for adjustment assistance
under the Trade Act of 1974.
An amendment enlarging the class of persons eligible for a
government subsidy.
Manual Sec. 1127.
The following examples have been held not to provide new
entitlement authority within the meaning of the Budget Act:
A provision requiring payments to individuals meeting certain
qualifications but also requiring such payments to be ratably
reduced to the amounts of appropriations actually made if sums
appropriated pursuant thereto are insufficient.
An amendment establishing a new executive position at a
specified compensation level but subjecting its salary to the
appropriation process.
Manual Sec. 1127.
In recent Congresses, the House has adopted a an order of the
House excluding Federal compensation from the definition of
entitlement authority. See, e.g., H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p ____.
Points of Order under Section 401 of the Budget Act
A point of order under section 401 lies against a reported bill or
joint resolution and not against an unreported measure. Manual
Sec. 1127. The spending authorities subject to constraints under
section 401, as forms of direct spending, are also subject to the
spending constraints on new budget authority under sections 302(f),
303, and 311(a) of the Budget Act. The paygo provisions of section 252
of Gramm-Rudman have constrained legislation providing direct spending
and receipts. However, section 252, although textually still in law,
has no effect. It could be reinvigorated in the 108th Congress. Manual
Sec. 1127.
Sec. 14 . Social Security Funds
Receipts and disbursements of the Social Security trust funds are
not to be counted as new budget authority, outlays, receipts, or as
deficit or surplus. Under section 13301 of the BEA of 1990, the off-
budget status of these programs applies for purposes of the
President's budget, the congressional budget, and under Gramm-Rudman.
Manual Sec. 1129. Section 13302 of the BEA of 1990 creates a ``fire
wall'' point of order in the House to pro
[[Page 206]]
hibit the consideration of legislation that would change certain
balances of the Social Security trust funds over specified periods.
Manual Sec. 1129.
Section 310(g) of the Budget Act prohibits the consideration of
reconciliation legislation that contains recommendations with respect
to the title II program under the Social Security Act (OASDI).
Sec. 15 . The Budget Process and the Public Debt Limit
A limit on the public debt is fixed by law. 31 USC Sec. 3101. The
public debt limit may be changed by enactment of a bill or joint
resolution. See, e.g., 101-2, H.R. 5350, Aug. 4, 1990; the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Such a joint resolution may be
generated automatically under rule XXVII upon adoption by Congress of
a concurrent resolution on the budget that sets forth a level of the
public debt that is different from the statutory limit. Rule XXVII was
first adopted in the 96th Congress. It was rendered inoperative on
occasion. See, e.g., 104-1, H. Res. 149, May 17, 1995, pp 13275,
13276; 105-1, H. Res. 152, May 20, 1997, p ____. It was repealed in
the 107th Congress and reinstated in the 108th Congress. Manual
Sec. 1104.
Section 301(a)(5) of the Budget Act requires the budget resolution
to set forth the appropriate level for the public debt. Under rule
XVIII clause 10(c)(1), it is not in order to consider an amendment to
the budget resolution that proposes to change the appropriate level
for the public debt. Reconciliation directives relative to changes in
the public debt may be included in the concurrent resolution on the
budget under section 310(a)(3) of the Budget Act.
Sec. 16 . Impoundments Generally
Executive Branch Authority; Types of Impoundments
The executive branch has no inherent power to impound appropriated
funds. In the absence of express congressional authorization to
withhold funds appropriated for implementation of a legislative
program, the executive branch must spend all the funds. Kennedy v.
Mathews, 413 F. Supp. 1240 (D.D.C. 1976); see also Train v. City of
New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975). Accordingly, if the controlling statute
gives the officials in question no discretion to withhold the funds, a
court may grant injunctive relief directing that they be made
available. Kennedy, 413 F. Supp. 1245.
The impoundment of appropriated funds may be proposed by the
President pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Manual
Sec. 1130(6A). Two types of impoundments are referred to by this
statute: (1) rescissions, which are the permanent cancellation of
spending, and (2) deferrals, which
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impose a temporary delay in spending. Sec. Sec. 1012, 1013 of the
Impoundment Control Act; 2 USC Sec. 681.
The Impoundment Control Act was enacted by Congress in an effort
to control the budgetary impoundment powers asserted by the President.
As the court noted in City of New Haven, Conn. v. United States, 634
F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986), in the early 1970's the President began
to use impoundments as a means of shaping domestic policy, withholding
funds from various programs he did not favor. The legality of these
impoundments was repeatedly litigated, and by 1974, impoundments had
been vitiated in many cases. See, e.g., National Council of Community
Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C.
1973) (public health funds).
Sec. 17 . -- Rescissions; Line Item Veto
Under Impoundment Control Act
Under the Impoundment Control Act, the President may propose to
rescind all or part of the budget authority Congress has appropriated
for a particular program. To propose a rescission, the President must
send a special message to Congress detailing the amount of the
proposed rescission, the reasons for it, and a summary of the effects
the rescission would have on the programs involved. Sec. 1012(a) of
the Impoundment Control Act. Under the Act, Congress then has 45 days
within which to approve the proposed rescission by a ``rescission
bill'' that must be passed by both Houses. Sec. 1012(b) of the
Impoundment Control Act. If the rescission bill is not approved, the
President must allow the full amount appropriated to be spent. City of
New Haven, Conn. v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449, 1452 (D.D.C.
1986).
The 45-day period prescribed by the Act applies only to the
initial consideration of the bill; the consideration of a conference
report on such a bill is subject only to the general rules of the
House relating to conference reports and is not prevented by the
expiration of the 45-day period following the initial consideration of
the bill. Manual Sec. 1130(6A).
The Impoundment Control Act sets forth detailed procedures
expediting and governing the consideration of a rescission bill
introduced under its provisions. Sec. 1017(a)-(c) of the Impoundment
Control Act. These procedures are rarely invoked in the modern
practice, and the ``rescission bill'' referred to in the Act is not
the only means by which the House may take action on such a matter.
The House may address the question through other legislation without
following the procedures set forth in section 1017 of the Impoundment
Control Act. 94-1, Mar. 25, 1975, p 8484.
[[Page 208]]
Rescissions of prior appropriations are often reported in general
appropriation bills, and the inclusion of rescission language by the
Committee on Appropriations is excepted from the prohibition against
provisions ``changing existing law'' under rule XXI clause 2(b). See
Manual Sec. Sec. 1038, 1043, 1052. However, this exception does not
extend to amendments or to the rescission of contract authority
provided by a law other than an appropriations Act. Manual Sec. 1052.
Under Line Item Veto Act
Enhanced rescission authority was given to the President on April
9, 1996, with the enactment of the Line Item Veto Act. This new
authority first became effective in the 105th Congress. It added a new
part C to title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974. 2 USC Sec. 631.
In Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), the Supreme
Court held that the cancellation procedures of the Line Item Veto Act
violated the presentment clause of article I, section 7 of the
Constitution. During the period between January 1, 1997 (the effective
date of the Act), and the Court decision, the President exercised his
authority under the Act to cancel dollar amounts of discretionary
budget authority (see e.g., H. Doc. 105-147), new direct spending (H.
Doc. 105-115), and limited tax benefits (H. Doc. 105-116).
Cancellations were effective unless disapproved by law.
Although the congressional review procedures remain in the law,
the Court decision makes it unlikely that they will be invoked. The
procedures may be summarized as follows: The cancellations were
transmitted to the Congress by Presidential message within five
calendar days after the enactment of the law to which the cancellation
applied. The Act provided for a congressional review period of 30
calendar days of session with expedited House consideration of bills
disapproving the cancellations, including: (1) prescribing the text;
(2) referral to committee with directions to report within seven
calendar days subject to a motion to discharge; (3) consideration of a
disapproval bill in the Committee of the Whole with no amendment in
order (except that a Member, supported by 49 other Members, could
offer an amendment striking cancellations from the bill), and
consideration of the bill for amendment limited to one hour; and (4)
one-calendar-day availability for a conference report.
Sec. Sec. 1025(d), 1025(f), 1026(6) of the Impoundment Control Act.
The Act also provided for expedited procedures in the Senate.
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Sec. 18 . -- Deferrals
Under section 1013(a) of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the
President must notify Congress of the proposed deferral of any budget
authority, the reasons for the deferral, the impact the deferral will
have on the programs involved, and ``any legal authority invoked to
justify the proposed deferral.'' 2 USC Sec. 684(a).
Until 1986 the Act was used frequently as the basis for
Presidential deferral proposals and for their consideration by the
Congress. Section 1013 of the Impoundment Control Act allows a
deferral to be overridden by a resolution of disapproval passed by
either House. Congress could reject the proposal by one-House veto or
in subsequent legislation. Today, the Congress may disapprove a
deferral only through the enactment of a law (often an appropriation
Act). It may not do so through a resolution of disapproval only by one
House under court rulings. Manual Sec. 1130 (Congressional Disapproval
Provisions Contained in Public Laws).
In 1986 a suit was brought to contest the validity of certain
deferrals proposed by the President under section 1013 of the
Impoundment Control Act. In November 1985, the President had signed
the fiscal year 1986 appropriations bill for the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, which appropriated funds for certain community
development programs. In February 1986, the President sent impoundment
notices to Congress pursuant to the Act announcing his deferrals of
the expenditure of funds for the programs at issue. The plaintiffs in
the suit included various cities, community groups, and Members of
Congress. The plaintiffs challenged as unconstitutional the provision
allowing a so-called one-House legislative veto of impoundments
proposed by the President, such vetoes having been declared
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court decision in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 (1983). The
plaintiffs argued that the unconstitutional legislative veto provision
contained in section 1013 rendered the entire section invalid, leaving
the President without statutory authority on which to base the
deferrals in question. After analyzing the intent of Congress in
enacting section 1013, the District Court for the District of Columbia
held that the section's unconstitutional legislative veto provision
was inseverable from the remainder of the section. City of New Haven,
Conn. v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986). Accordingly,
the court declared section 1013 void in its entirety and ordered the
defendants to make the deferred funds available for obligation. City
of New Haven, 634 F. Supp. 1460. The judgment of the District Court in
striking down section 1013 in its entirety was affirmed by the U.S.
Court of Ap
[[Page 210]]
peals. City of New Haven, Conn. v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
In 1987, after section 1013 of the Impoundment Control Act was
declared unconstitutional, the Act was amended to exclude the one-
House legislative veto procedure, and limitations were placed on the
purposes for which deferrals could be made. Section 1013 of the
Impoundment Control Act now permits deferrals only in three specified
situations: ``to provide for contingencies,'' ``to achieve savings
made possible by or through changes in requirements or greater
efficiency of operations,'' or ``as specifically provided by law.''
The same language is used in the Anti-Deficiency Act. 31 USC
Sec. 1512(c)(1). The purpose of such language was to preclude the
President from invoking section 1013 as authority for implementing
``policy'' impoundments, while preserving the President's authority to
implement routine ``programmatic'' impoundments. City of New Haven,
Conn. v. United States, 809 F.2d 906 (note).
Unreported Deferrals
Section 1015(a) of the Impoundment Control Act (2 USC Sec. 686(a))
requires the Comptroller General to report to the Congress whenever he
finds that any officer or employee of the United States has ordered,
permitted, or approved a reserve or deferral of budget authority, and
the President has not transmitted a special impoundment message with
respect to such reserve or deferral.
Sec. 19 . Unfunded Mandates
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 added a new part B to
title IV of the Budget Act that imposes several requirements on
committees with respect to ``Federal mandates,'' establishes points of
order to enforce those requirements, and precludes the consideration
of a rule or order waiving such points of order in the House. 2 USC
Sec. Sec. 658-658g. Section 425 of the Budget Act establishes a point
of order against consideration of a bill, joint resolution, amendment,
motion, or conference report containing unfunded intergovernmental
mandates. Section 426(a) of the Budget Act establishes a point of
order against consideration of any rule or order that waives the
application of section 425. Points of order under sections 425 and
426(a) of the Budget Act are disposed of by the House voting on the
question of consideration. Manual Sec. 1127.
Section 426(b) of the Budget Act requires a Member raising a point
of order under section 425 to specify the precise language upon which
the point of order is based. Debate on the point of order is on the
question of consideration of the underlying text that is the subject
of the point of order.
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The Members controlling debate on the point of order may reserve
their time, and a manager of a measure who controls time for debate
against the point of order has the right to close debate. A point of
order under section 426 against consideration of a resolution
providing a special order of business that waives section 425 or self-
executes the adoption of an amendment must be made when the special
order is called up and comes too late after the resolution has been
adopted. A point of order under section 425 against consideration of a
bill is properly raised pending the Speaker's declaration that the
House resolve into the Committee of the Whole for such consideration.
Manual Sec. 1127.
Under rule XVIII clause 11, an amendment proposing only to strike
an unfunded Federal intergovernmental mandate from a bill in the
Committee of the Whole may be precluded only by specific terms of a
special order of the House. Manual Sec. 991.