Guy Roberts,
the new Strategic Concept of NATO:
how will nuclear issues
be involved in that
and what impact will it
have on these issues?
There is
in the new Strategic Concept...
There will be a section on the nuclear
deterrent posture of the alliance.
Of course in the 1999
Strategic Concept and the 1991 one
it was very prominent.
The difference will be is that,
due to the current
security environment,
the nuclear deterrent part of our
overall deterrent is not as significant,
because the threats
to which they apply are very remote.
And, as a result, I anticipate
that there will be a much smaller
reference to, but that it
certainly will be and will remain in,
the new Strategic Concept
our nuclear deterrence posture.
What that will be,
to anticipate the question,
I think that the fundamental pillars
of our current deterrence posture
will remain, and that is a belief
in the continuing need for deterrence.
We as an alliance believe
deterrence is important,
that it is an integral part
of our security situation.
Secondly, that, as the Madeline
Albright Group of Experts report
just recently reaffirmed,
that there will remain
some American
nuclear presence in Europe,
because of the importance
of the transatlantic link,
that commitment to,
on the one hand,
the security of Europe
and European allies,
and, on the other,
a great desire for the third pillar,
which is
burden-sharing and consultation.
The nations believe it is important
to share the risk of that deterrent.
Some countries mention
that they would like to see
NATO nuclear weapons
taken off of their territory.
What’s NATO’s response?
Well, that idea has been proposed
by a number of not only nations,
but also think tanks as well, and
that has certainly been something
that we as an alliance should look at
and re-examine
our nuclear deterrence posture.
It is one in which we believe
it deters potential adversaries,
it prevents coercion,
it is designed so that
we will never have to go to war,
but it needs to be examined
in the new environment.
Of course, we have already looked
at the security environment
and reduced these numbers
down to a very low number.
We only have a few hundred nuclear
weapons, the B61 gravity bomb,
US nuclear weapons in Europe today.
These proposals have been made,
most prominently by Germany,
but what has been key to all of this
is that all of the nations,
including Germany,
have said, very emphatically,
that any decisions about removing
nuclear weapons from any country,
any decisions about changing
the configuration, the composition,
the location of these weapons
will be done as an alliance,
and will be done
on the basis of consensus.
The element of missile defence
has been discussed,
particularly in the context
of the new concept.
Who will it be defending against?
Well missile defence is a part
of our overall deterrence posture.
I describe that as holistic deterrence.
Once we put in place
a robust missile defence system,
that will certainly put doubt
in the minds of any adversary
that a missile attack
won't get through.
That then hopefully will
detour them from thinking
they can gain politically
by attacking us.
It's very relevant. It complements
our nuclear deterrence,
our conventional
and all other capabilities.
There are over 30 nations
that are developing ballistic missiles.
There are many nations that are
developing ballistic missile defences.
I like to say that Europe already
has a missile defence system
and its the... I believe,
80 interceptors around Moscow.
Our Russian colleagues
believe in missile defence.
We're hoping to collaborate with them
and help develop
a collaborative system.
Some people say,
including Secretary of State Clinton
that one of the dangers
is not actually other countries
gaining nuclear
materials or weapons,
it's actually non-state actors
getting hold of one of those two.
What's your reaction and how
does NATO prepare against that?
NATO is certainly looking
at how we can develop
the capabilities to respond,
first of all to, in fact,
to structure
our deterrence posture in a way
that would hopefully put
in the minds of a potential adversary
that this is not
a good course of action.
One of the ways we can do that
is by working with our allies,
with the nations within the alliance,
with other organisations,
like the IAEA,
to develop the capability
to attribute any nuclear explosion
or improvised nuclear device,
or any radiological device,
to a particular country or location.
So we can track these things back
and hold accountable
any nation that might provide
those materials to a terrorist group.
We have some very robust
non-proliferation activities
to try to ensure
that materials cannot be transferred,
cannot be smuggled or stolen
and provided to terrorist groups that,
where they can themselves
fashion radiological weapons
or some other kind
of improvised explosive device.
NATO assembles many countries
with differing nuclear postures.
We've mentioned Germany
and its recent statements
and the US has an evolving
position on nuclear issues.
How does NATO gather those together
and come up with a single policy?
I believe that the differences
are one of degree.
On the one hand
several countries within the alliance
are committed and believe that,
of the importance of disarmament,
arms control and non-proliferation.
All countries believe
in the importance of those,
but it’s a question of a degree.
Some put more emphasis on that.
Others put emphasis on maintaining
a credible nuclear deterrent.
All of our nations support the idea
of maintaining a credible deterrent.
In fact, I think President Obama
in his speech in Prague last year,
when he talked about
a world free of nuclear weapons,
also pointed out
that until that day arrives
we'll continue to maintain
our nuclear deterrent.
And so countries that have argued for,
or espoused the idea,
of removing
nuclear weapons from Europe,
have done so in the context
of an arms control process.
A process, for example, of working
with Russia to get an agreement
to remove all tactical
nuclear weapons out of Europe.
That should be done
as part of an arms control process
and in that way we can enhance our
security, but unilateral reductions,
most nations see
as putting our security at jeopardy.
And so, one of the criteria
for bringing everything together
is back to this issue of security.
That's what this is about.
Security, security, security.
And if you can make a proposal
or any nation makes a proposal
that can be demonstrated
that it in fact enhances our security,
then you're going
to get acceptability by all the nations.
So, that being the standard by
which we will judge these proposals,
I think that
there is large room for agreement,
and what we're going to do with
the Strategic Concept, is just that.
We're going to work through
all these questions and proposals.
Do you think 2010 will be
a key year for nuclear issues
with the START-agreement,
the Nuclear Security Summit
and also, quite apart from the events,
it seems to be a year
when a lot of the countries
who are looking at the nuclear issue
for the first time,
Brazil, South Africa etc.,
when they come to make a decision
about whether
they support the existing order
or try to make changes
in the haves and have-nots.
Do you think this year those issues
are all coming to a head?
I believe they are,
I mean, this year with the impetus
of the new US administration,
the commitment by President Obama
to re-energising
the agenda for seeking in a world
in which nuclear weapons
continue to be diminished
to the point
where we can create the conditions
where we can have a world
free of nuclear weapons.
That has excited a lot of countries,
and that's given many of us hope
that we can achieve that
through hard work,
but it’s going to be a long process,
in which we have to create
the conditions
in which we have high confidence
that when we say the world has no
nuclear weapons it doesn't have any,
and create the conditions
where those that try to acquire them
will pay a price for doing that.
However, one of the questions
that you have to ask yourself is,
and this is why
it’s going to take a long time,
how do we create the conditions
where we don't end up
having another great power war,
like we had in 1945?
What kind of world are we going
to create without nuclear weapons?
Is it a world of 1914?
Is it a world of 1939?
We don't want that kind of world.
Get rid of nuclear weapons
and then find ourselves
in a situation where millions
are losing their lives.
We have to do this
in a step-by-step approach.
Final question,
it’ll probably be a personal opinion,
but I’d like to ask you
about the path to global zero
which President Obama, when
he talked about a global nuclear zero,
did say that it may
not happen in his lifetime.
When do you feel it’ll be realisable?
Is it completely realisable?
And what are the main obstacles
to a global nuclear zero?
That is a personal question.
I think it's possible,
but it's going to take
an awful lot of hard work.
There's an article written back
in 1961 by Fred Iklé,
it was for Foreign Affairs, and I think
it was After non-compliance what?
This was before any of the arms
control regimes were in place.
There was no NPT, no chemical
or biological weapons convention,
none of these things in place.
And what he said was:
Number one,
was the question of verification.
What kind of verification mechanisms
can we put in place
to give us all high confidence
that people aren't cheating?
Because in a world without nuclear
weapons the first to acquire them,
will gain a very big advantage.
This is something that we have
to ensure doesn't happen.
And that relates to the second aspect,
or the second condition:
What are
the compliance mechanisms?
How do we ensure that anyone
that cheats is going to pay
such a high cost that it just
won't be worth it to them?
Unfortunately our record
on compliance is very poor.
And this gives us all a lot of concern.
The obvious case is North Korea.
They've withdrawn from the NPT,
they've conducted two tests,
they've gained the advantage
of being an NPT member
without any of the costs to be paid,
and now they are one
of our biggest non-proliferation,
or proliferation problems.
Secondly, there is Iran,
with numerous
Security Council resolutions
and yet no progress
in resolving and ensuring
that they're not on a path
to acquiring nuclear weapons.
So, we have to build confidence
that we can put in place
the mechanisms to stop countries
from acquiring nuclear weapons,
to be able to eliminate them
and ensure
that they will never come back
and be a problem
for our security again.
And I would like
to think that that could happen,
but again, it's probably not going
to happen in my lifetime.
Guy Roberts, thanks very much.
- Thank you very much. My pleasure.