



**THE  
TRANSATLANTIC  
LINK**

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Speeches and articles

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Lord Robertson of Port Ellen  
Secretary General of NATO

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# Introduction

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From 3 to 7 April, I visited the United States. During this time, I travelled to six cities and delivered nine speeches.

My programme was as follows:

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|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>New York</b>    | <b><i>Monday, 3 April</i></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Harvard Business Club and Foreign Policy Association</li><li>• Council on Foreign Relations</li></ul>                 |
| <b>Washington</b>  | <b><i>Tuesday, 4 April</i></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• National Press Club</li><li>• George Washington University/Atlantic Council</li></ul>                                |
| <b>Boston</b>      | <b><i>Wednesday, 5 April</i></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Harvard University</li></ul>                                                                                       |
| <b>Chicago</b>     | <b><i>Wednesday, 5 April</i></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Chicago Council on Foreign Relations</li></ul>                                                                     |
| <b>Los Angeles</b> | <b><i>Thursday, 6 April</i></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Los Angeles World Affairs Council</li><li>• Rand Corporation and Pacific Council for International Policy</li></ul> |
| <b>Omaha</b>       | <b><i>Friday, 7 April</i></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• University of Nebraska at Omaha</li></ul>                                                                             |

In the following pages, you will find a selection of extracts from my speeches, which I hope will be of interest to you. For ease of reference, these extracts have been arranged according to the four principal themes that I sought to highlight during my visit, namely,

- Why we still need NATO;
- NATO and Kosovo;
- NATO and Russia;
- NATO and the European Security and Defence Identity.

I also include two op-ed articles, one on Kosovo which appeared in the Washington Post on Tuesday, 4th April and the other on "Why America Needs NATO", which appeared in the Los Angeles Times on Thursday, 6th April.

If you would like to have any further information, please contact the NATO Office of Information and Press, 1110, Brussels, Belgium.

If you would like to raise specific points, I would be pleased to hear from you personally via the above address.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robertson". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a distinct horizontal stroke at the end.

Lord Robertson of Port Ellen  
*Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*

# Why we still need NATO

As one of my distinguished predecessors, Lord Carrington, NATO's sixth Secretary General, once said: "security is the oxygen of prosperity." Our mission, my mission, is to ensure that this oxygen supply is kept running. And we will.

This conclusion is simple and based on real experience as well as plain common sense: for prosperity you need security. And for security in Europe, you need NATO, because it alone creates the secure environment for economic growth and free institutions.

Five decades ago, on April 3rd, 1948, the United States Congress enacted Secretary of State George Marshall's five billion dollar "European Recovery Program" — the Marshall Plan. The aim of the programme was simple — to provide seed money for the reconstruction of a Europe shattered economically by the Second World War.

But there was a wider political goal as well. As General Marshall put it, during that famous Harvard Speech, the plan's purpose was to revive Europe's economy "so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

One year later, also on April 3rd, on the very eve of the founding of NATO, U.S. President Truman and his Secretaries of State and Defense met with the Foreign Ministers of the ten European nations with whom they would soon sign the Washington Treaty. And in remarkably blunt words, Truman and Acheson told their future Allies how the U.S. saw the purpose of this new Alliance.

It was not just about defence against the Soviet Union. It was also about helping Europe to develop, as Acheson put it "a new sense of unity."

Nowhere else has the link between economics and security been more explicit than in the twin project of the Marshall Plan and NATO. Indeed, as Truman later put it, the Marshall Plan and NATO were "two halves of the same walnut".

And when you look at how far we have come, this twin project has brought spectacular dividends.

Today, the United States and Europe enjoy the strongest economic relationship in the world. Europe is the largest foreign investor in the U.S.

and the total value of U.S. investments in Europe has grown faster than investments in Asia. They now amount to over \$250 billion. Commerce and trade supports over 14 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.

We thus have a huge stake in each others' prosperity - and in creating the right environment for maintaining and reinforcing this prosperity.

This brings us to the other part of the equation: security. The United States and Europe not only enjoy the world's strongest economic relationship; they also enjoy the strongest security relationship on this globe. And this is no coincidence.

NATO — the core of this security relationship — has provided a sense of total security for its member nations for one day short of fifty-one years. Under NATO's protective umbrella, trade and commerce flourish — and so do our common values.

Some may argue that the end of the Cold War has changed the equation - that in today's world, the security part is not as relevant as in the past. They say we should focus on economics alone and spend our defence dollars on other things.

A seductive idea — but a flawed one, because democracy and prosperity depend upon security.

Let us also not forget that in the Cold War the success of our twin project has been confined to Western Europe only. Today, the countries that once were behind the Iron Curtain are back on the political map; but they are facing daunting challenges of political and economic transition.

We must make their transition successful — and irreversible. We must lock in their progress - not just because it is the right thing to do, but because it is in our own strategic interest to do so.

A divide between a secure and economically prosperous West and a less secure, less prosperous East is neither safe nor sustainable. Europe's Western half simply cannot shield itself indefinitely from the negative effects of poverty and political instability in the continent's East. In the small European pond, the ripple effects bring waves to distant markets and doorsteps.

And neither can the United States insulate itself. In the age of globalisation and the internet stock market the Atlantic Ocean is no longer a shield. It would only be a matter of time until political or economic turmoil in Europe would be felt here in the US as well.





*"We need to create economic prosperity and political stability in all of Europe."*

So the challenge ahead is clear: we need to create economic prosperity and political stability in all of Europe. We must re-apply the formula that worked so well in Europe's Western half: building stability through NATO, to help foster economic prosperity.

Is NATO delivering on its part of the bargain? We certainly are.

We have opened NATO's doors to new members. Last year, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland walked through that door. And many more want to follow.

To those nations who join, NATO membership delivers the security and the Atlantic identity they desperately seek. To those who want to join, NATO membership provides a powerful incentive to get their house in order.

This strategy of the "carrot" works. Over the last few years we have seen a major momentum throughout Central and Eastern Europe to undertake the necessary political, economic and military reforms, and to establish often historic good-neighbourly relations.

In a few years time, the European Union will also open its doors and thus deliver its own part of the bargain. Once again, security and economics are two halves of the walnut — and the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are hungry for both halves.

NATO has also engaged Russia, to create the very necessary bridge with that major European power. Since 1997, there has been a NATO-Russia Joint Council, and an agreed work plan of cooperative security activities.

Russia suspended these relations during the Kosovo air campaign, but they are getting back on track. I recently made a visit to Moscow to meet with President Putin, and I was very pleased to hear that he does see

Russia as part of Europe. That is an assessment we share, and an inclination we have to encourage.

Clearly, Russia's economic well-being is just as important as her increased cooperation with the West in security matters. We all have an interest in seeing Russia's economic reforms succeed.

As with the rest of Europe, Russia's economic prosperity, political stability and military security go hand in hand. In terms of natural resources, Russia is potentially the richest country in the world. A vibrant, free, and dynamic Russian economy will be a boon for Europe and North America alike.

Through Partnership for Peace, NATO has also developed bilateral security relationships with 25 non-NATO countries in Europe and Central Asia, including former Soviet Republics, Warsaw Pact members and neutrals. These partnerships are helping us to create a continent-wide pool of trained and interoperable forces for crisis management.

But we also seek to give assistance to those states coping with the challenge of their post-communist transition. For example, we can assist them in their defence reforms — to help them get rid of their oversized and overpriced military establishments and reduce the burdens on their still fragile economies.

NATO's engagement with Central and Eastern Europe has been a phenomenal success. The old divisions of Europe are disappearing.

And even if many nations to our East are still struggling, they have embraced the basic tenets of democracy and market economy. They are determined to make it.

The remarkable project of extending stability and prosperity after the Cold War is well on track. Marshall and Acheson would have to have been starry-eyed optimists to have imagined such success for their efforts. With the other pioneers, we owe them so much.

But we have also witnessed that there can be convulsions. We have seen it in Bosnia-Herzegovina and more recently in Kosovo.

Some people wanted to turn the clock back. First, they drove their economies into the ground. Then, they orchestrated ethnic hatred and crude nationalism just to remain in power.

The results are only too well known - a legacy of bloodshed and the theft of a generation's future.

So the Alliance stepped in. We stepped in because we did not want to see the project of building a stable Europe mocked and subverted by ethnic cleansing and violence on a scale not seen since the Second World War.

We stepped in because what was at stake was the wider stability of a region that sits right along major political, ethnic, and religious fault lines.

In both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, it took NATO to stop the violence. In both cases, NATO is now creating the basis for a self-sustaining peace. And despite the difficulties, these operations will succeed.

They will succeed because again we are applying the same formula that served us so well: security and prosperity going hand in hand.

NATO troops provide the secure environment needed for economic measures by the European Union and others - and not least of all the peoples concerned - to take firm root. Again, prosperity will follow security. And this combination is bringing Southeastern Europe back into the European mainstream.

One of the great services performed by the Chicago Council each year is to report on public attitudes toward important foreign policy issues. I took particular note that in the 1999 survey, only 44 percent of Americans felt that defending America's allies is a very important goal for the United States. Going down the list, only 39 percent felt that defence of human rights is a very important goal, and only 29 percent felt that bringing democracy to other nations is an important goal.

To someone who knows what the U.S. has done over the years to build peace and security in Europe and elsewhere in the world; what it has done to stand up for the world's oppressed; and what it has done to spread the goodness of democracy, I am deeply saddened to see these figures.

NATO is still vital to the United States because it is still the best means available to support the core values of American and European civilisation - freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law. And Europe needs the United States to stay committed to NATO - for exactly the same reason.

What does NATO do in practice to support these values? It makes our countries and our people safe - safe from attack, safe from fear, from instability, from violent nationalism, from refugee flows, from economic dislocation.

And the fact that they are safe means that our people can get on with their lives without want or worry. It means they can create the democratic

and prosperous societies we want for ourselves, our children and our grandchildren.

I have a 5-year old grandson. And it is when I think of him growing up that I see most clearly NATO's role in providing for the safety and security of future generations.

I know what you're thinking. This is all motherhood and apple pie. But what about the real issues. The real things NATO is facing every day - Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, relations with Russia, big gaps in defence capabilities, and dealing with the EU's ambition to stake out a new role for itself in defence issues.

And for that matter, is NATO even the right tool for modern Europe? When he introduced me yesterday at the Harvard Business Club, Walter Cronkite reminded the audience of the famous words of Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General, that NATO's purpose is to keep "the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." If we don't need to keep the Russians out or the Germans down anymore, why should America still be in?

In answer, let me make three points.

- Risks to the safety of our populations and future generations are still there.
- NATO is doing something to address these risks.
- And it is better for both North America and Europe to work together in dealing with these challenges, than for each to go it alone.

Let me take these points in turn.

**Point one.** Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are still serious risks and threats to our societies that NATO must address every day. Safety and security for our people still matter. During the Cold War, we all lived under the daily threat of nuclear annihilation. NATO - including the nuclear umbrella - was the best means we had available to ensure our safety. Today, the risk of such a nuclear confrontation is nearly gone. But with the Cold War over, our security agenda has broadened, in terms of both the nature and the complexity of the issues we need to address.

For example:

- We need to deal with the resurgence of ethnic rivalries and historical grievances that were suppressed for the 40 years of the Cold War. The conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo showed that -

through instability, refugee flows, stagnating economies and ethnic cleansing - these conflicts have an enormous impact on the safety and well-being of Europe as a whole, and in turn, North America.

- We need to help strengthen democracy and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe. These nations, which threw off communism just over ten years ago, are counting on our help in ensuring a secure environment for their future development. A Europe that remains divided between a stable and prosperous west and a poor and unstable east is both dangerous and wrong.
- We need to support Russia's political and economic transformation. If Russia engages with us as a trusting and trustworthy European power, we will all be more secure. If we fail to engage Russia, the consequences will be felt across the entire Continent.
- We need to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, a challenge that respects no geographical boundaries. The safety of future generations depends on getting this right - before it gets worse.

**Point two.** OK - these are the challenges. But is NATO doing something about them? Absolutely.

NATO has drawn the line against ethnic warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. That is morally right, and it's in our strategic interest. Erase that line, and ethnic conflict could tumble into a far wider and

more dangerous zone. Now NATO is leading the peacemaking. We are not done yet, but we will succeed.

NATO is playing a leading role in Central and Eastern Europe. Through its own enlargement, NATO is erasing dividing lines in Europe, and providing a continuing incentive for aspiring members to put their house in order.

And through the Partnership for Peace pro-



*Secretary General Lord Robertson arriving at Tuzla airport. "NATO has drawn the line against ethnic warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo."*

gramme, NATO is developing security relationships with 25 non-NATO countries, including former Warsaw Pact members and neutrals.

Since the Paris NATO Summit in Spring of 1997, NATO and Russia have been sitting down at the same table in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Russia suspended ties with NATO during the Kosovo air campaign, but relations are now getting back on track.

I recently met Russian President Putin in Moscow, who told me he wants Russia to be part of the new Europe. We share this goal, and will work on it together.

NATO is tackling the menace of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons - by sharing information and intelligence, and improving our capability to protect NATO forces from these threats.

**Point three.** These challenges exist and NATO is addressing them. But why does the United States need to stay engaged in NATO? Why not go it alone?

Because, to use a military phrase, NATO is a force-multiplier. Increasingly, Canada and the European Allies bring real resources, real troops, and real commitment to the common security table.

Let me just ask you to guess: Who is the largest troop contributor in Kosovo?

It is Italy.

And would you believe that European nations are providing 80 percent of all the forces for the KFOR peacekeeping force? It is true. Out of a force of some 45,000 troops, the U.S. now provides roughly 6,000 - well under 15 percent.

European nations are, as they promised, picking up the lion's share of reconstruction efforts in the Balkans. The EU has provided some \$16.5 billion to this region since 1991, and has budgeted nearly US \$12 billion for the next 6 years. Although the U.S. is the single largest provider of international police force for Kosovo, at roughly 15 percent the EU countries provide 40 percent.

But this increased "burden-sharing" must go further. Europe is rich enough to do more. It is no longer tenable that 19 Allies agree on an air operation like Kosovo, but the United States does 80 percent of the work. Europe must have the capability to take the lead in handling crises when the

United States chooses not to be engaged. In the 21st century, we cannot be faced with a choice between massive U.S. involvement or no action at all.

So Europe adds extra muscle and extra money. But let me add one further thought: Underlying it all, the reason why NATO, at fifty-one years old, should still matter to the United States is that even in the different world of today, Europe and North America share the same values.

NATO is an unprecedented community of nations that is based on liberty, democracy, the rule of law, honest politics and fundamental human rights. And when Europe and North America act together to defend these values, they secure the future of generations to come.

Shared values may seem an abstract notion. But in the end, it is these values - more than anything else - that brought us together in two World Wars, and enabled us to overcome the many crises of the Cold War and beyond.

So ultimately, this is why we still need NATO. It puts the resources of North America and Europe together to support our shared values and our strategic interests, for the safety of future generations.

Many people have said that with the problems we face today, if we did not have NATO, we would have to create it. Well, I think the public opinion data published by the Chicago Council makes clear that we couldn't create it. Imagine putting to the U.S. Senate a proposal for the United States to make a fresh commitment to defend absolutely - including by using nuclear weapons if necessary - eighteen other countries, a continent away. I don't think you could do it.

And yet NATO is the best foreign policy investment the United States has ever made. That's why we have to work hard to preserve and strengthen NATO, and the U.S. commitment to NATO, in the work we do every day. You do it here at the Chicago Council, and for me, as Secretary General, it is my most vital, personal mission.

*Sources: "Why Markets Need NATO",  
speech held at the Harvard Business Club and The Foreign Policy Association,  
New York, NY, on April 3, 2000;*

*"Why We Still Need NATO - Safety for the Next Generation",  
speech held at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, on April 4, 2000  
and at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on April 5, 2000.*



# NATO and Kosovo

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On the 24th of March, I went again to Kosovo, on the first anniversary of Operation Allied Force, NATO's air campaign to end and reverse the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian community.

I visited a rebuilt school in a Kosovo village called Poklek, "ethnically cleansed" this time last year by the Serbs. When Milosevic's paramilitaries came to Poklek, 53 local residents, including 10 children, were locked in one house and the Serbs threw in hand grenades. They then burned the house and those in it. Virtually every building in the village was destroyed.

The last year of the twentieth century, in the heart of Europe, two hours flight from Paris, a few hours drive to Budapest, houses with satellite TV - and the savagery of the Middle Ages.

NATO drove out the Serb forces, and KFOR re-established security in the province. Families returned to their scorched and bullet-ridden homes. Children again began to study - inside tents. But they did so in their native language for the first time in ten years. And with KFOR's help, a new school for Poklek was built. The children still walk over an hour to and from school each day. There is no bus service, but life has begun again.

The message to me and NATO Generals Clark and Reinhardt was simple: NATO was their saviour. Their joy and gratitude was as humbling and exhilarating as was the deep sorrow of honouring the photos of the ten murdered children.

Without the NATO air strikes and the NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR, this school would still be a pile of rubble; the villagers would still be refugees; and all that would remain is the grief and sorrow of a people destroyed. And Milosevic would by now have turned his attentions to another ethnic group in his shrinking country.

I went to Kosovo not only to commemorate that important event, but also to assess for myself what came after - the international community's campaign to bring lasting peace and security to a small area that has, for too long, enjoyed neither. It is particularly important to do this because we are hearing more and more historical revisionism these days about Kosovo.

- Revisionism that wonders whether the situation was really that bad for the Kosovar Albanians after all.



- Revisionism that suggests that there were no victims in Kosovo, just two sides fighting for their interests.
- Revisionism that wonders whether NATO should have just stayed out of it, and let the conflict run its course.
- Revisionism that questions whether Kosovo really mattered to the interests of NATO's members.

Let me address each point in turn. First and foremost: for the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, **it was that bad.**

Let us not forget the situation in Kosovo as it was, just over a year ago. By March of 1999, Serb oppression had already driven almost 400,000 people from their homes. The United Nations itself had stated clearly, in successive Security Council Resolutions, and in the UN Secretary General's Reports, that there was a clear threat to peace and security.

As early as September 1998 - six months before the air campaign - UN Security Council Resolution 1198 said the Security Council - including Russia - was:

*"Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes."*

*"Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe as described in the report of the Secretary-General, and emphasising the need to prevent this from happening";*

and therefore the Council

*"Demanded" ... "that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia implement immediately the following concrete measures"*

Item (a) of which was to

*"cease all action by the security forces affecting the civil population and order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression."*

The UN High Commission for Refugees stated clearly that a humanitarian emergency was impending, and that some kind of response was required. So let us not now, in retrospect, minimise what was a very serious humanitarian situation.

My second point. The Serb military actions were no accident, nor an unintended by-product of a legitimate operation by Yugoslavia against Albanian terrorists, or a civil war among two, equally culpable national groups.

Let me quote from the OSCE's report on Kosovo before the air campaign:

*"On the part of the Yugoslav and Serbian forces, their intent to apply mass killing as an instrument of terror, coercion or punishment against Kosovo Albanians was already in evidence in 1998, and was shockingly demonstrated by incidents in January 1999 (including the Racak mass killing) and beyond. Arbitrary killing of civilians was both a tactic in the campaign to expel Kosovo Albanians, and an objective in itself..."*

*"Force expulsion carried out by Yugoslav and Serbian forces took place on a massive scale, with evident strategic planning and in clear violation of the laws and customs of war..."*

*"There is chilling evidence of the murderous targeting of children, with the aim of terrorising and punishing adults and communities..."*

*"The scale on which human rights violations recur is staggering. It has been estimated that over 90 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian population - over 1.45 million people - were displaced by the conflict by 9 June 1999..."*

These are the words of the OSCE - an independent observer. They are not NATO's words but they are the reason NATO acted. This was ethnic cleansing — plain and simple. And ethnic cleansing has very real victims — the dead, the terrorised and the exiled.

The third revisionist theory suggests that, despite the oppression of the Kosovo Albanians, we should have just stayed out of it — that by taking action, NATO made things worse.

Milosevic may well have accelerated his actions, but the nature and purpose of his actions were already ominously clear. By March 1999 — before the air campaign - there were already 400,000 refugees and the international community had plenty of evidence that Serb forces were preparing a massive Spring offensive. Not only was the situation bad, but we knew that it was about to get much worse. To have done nothing would have left the full, pre-planned campaign of ethnic cleansing to go unchecked.

Indeed, it is worth taking a moment to contemplate the implications of not taking action against Milosevic and his thugs. First, we would have guaranteed turmoil and undermined the security balance in Southeast Europe for years, if not decades. One million refugees would have been stranded in neighbouring countries; the conflict would have simmered, and likely spread; Milosevic would have turned his attention to other parts of his shrinking country; and the entire region would have dramatically suffered both economically and politically.

The ripple effects from the instability could, like the scattered refugees, have spread to all the Continent. And the same slick commentators would be telling NATO we should have acted.

That is why this conflict did, and indeed still, matters to our interests. Kosovo is a small place, but it sits at a very strategic point — between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and Christianity.

Just south of Kosovo are two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north, new NATO members in Central Europe. And all around Kosovo there are small countries struggling with the transition to democracy and market economy.

But it also had real implications for our values. If we had allowed this ethnic cleansing to go unanswered, we would have fatally undermined the modern Euro-Atlantic community we are trying to build, just as we enter the 21st century. Indeed, we would have undermined the key lesson of the Holocaust: never again.

After all these decades of working towards ethnic tolerance in our own countries, how could we stand aside and allow nearly two million people to be terrorised, brutalised and expelled from their homeland, for no other reason than their ethnic origin?

The requirement and the imperative for action were therefore clear. And for those who care to recall, the press was at the time insistently demanding action by the international community.

So, knowing what we knew then and confirmed by what we know now, I am proud and loud that NATO took action on Kosovo. It was not only the right thing to do - it was the only thing to do.

After diplomacy was tried - and tried and tried, unsuccessfully, the international community took a stand - and showed what we won't stand for, as the new century dawns.



*KFOR troops in Pristina, Kosovo. "It was not only the right thing to do - it was the only thing to do."*

Today, one year after the start of the air campaign and ten months after Kosovo's liberation, the situation is still far from perfect. As I heard during my visit, there is still too much violence. We need more international police officers to maintain law and order, and judges and prosecutors to uphold it. And the international community has to come up with the funding it has committed to help build the solid foundations of lasting peace. These remain very daunting challenges indeed.

As a result of these challenges, I am now hearing another set of critics arguing that Kosovo is a lost cause. These in-for-a-day experts see the ongoing tensions in one or two flash-points in Kosovo and tell the world that we have all made a terrible mistake. For them, the Albanian and Serb communities of Kosovo are simply unable to overcome their "ancient historical hatred". Some analysts even think we should recognise their "irreconcilable differences", and cut our losses.

Once again, I must respond - because as the saying goes, "misconceptions travel around the world while the truth is still tying its shoes". And I believe that the truth is much more positive and telling than the misconceptions would have us believe.

First, let us keep this situation in perspective. It has only been ten months since the international community entered Kosovo. Dr. Kouchner, the head of the UN mission there, has rightly said that Kosovo is emerging from "forty years of communism, ten years of apartheid, and a year of ethnic cleansing". To expect to create a Switzerland there in less than a year is simply unrealistic.

But even so, I can tell you that when I went to Kosovo a few weeks ago, I already saw the beginnings of a brighter future. First and foremost, over one and a half million people have returned to the homes from which they were driven, either to the woods or abroad, and are now living without the spectre of killing, torturing, raping, looting and thuggery which stalked Kosovo just over a year ago. That alone is huge progress.

And despite the pictures you occasionally see on the news, the overall security situation has improved dramatically. For instance, when KFOR arrived in Kosovo in June 1999, there was a weekly murder rate of 50. It is now down to an average of five — which is comparable to any large European city of two million people.

But NATO drove out the Serb forces, and KFOR re-established security in the province. Families returned to their scorched and bullet-ridden homes. Children again began to study - inside tents. But they did so in their native language for the first time in ten years. And with KFOR's help, a new school for Poklek was built.

The children still walk over an hour to and from school each day. There is no bus service, but life has begun once again.

The message to me and NATO Generals Clark and Reinhardt was simple: NATO was their saviour. Their joy and gratitude was as humbling and exhilarating as was the intensity of the sorrow as we honoured the photos of the ten murdered children.

That's what KFOR is doing in Kosovo today, and that's why we need to continue to support the KFOR mission until the local population is better able to take care of itself.

The groundwork for Kosovo's future is now being laid. Local police and judges are being trained. New institutions have been created, to help the Kosovars govern themselves. The economic situation is picking up. And the United Nations is already planning for free elections by the end of the year.

By any measure, today's situation in almost all of Kosovo is a far cry from the anarchy and lawlessness that many critics predicted when KFOR deployed.

So my answer to the critics and defeatists is simple - you have it wrong. And if you want proof - go to Poklek school and see. We are making progress. Things are getting better. And just for the record - NATO doesn't give up. The Alliance will stay as long as it takes to accomplish its mission.

Winston Churchill once said that, “the problems of victory are more agreeable than the problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult”. That, in a nutshell, sums up the situation in Kosovo.

We have challenges to face in Kosovo. I am the first to admit that some of them are very difficult. But let us be clear — these are the challenges of success. A success for our values. A success for the project of building a just and peaceful Euro-Atlantic community. A success for the safety and security of future generations.

One year after NATO planes took to very dangerous skies to stop a profound evil, that success is the true story of Kosovo.

*Sources: “Kosovo: The Real Story”,  
speech held at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on April 6, 2000  
and  
“Why We Still Need NATO - Safety for the Next Generation”,  
speech held at the National Press Club in Washington, DC on April 4, 2000.*

# NATO and Russia

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In the year 1805, the Austrian General Weynotter was planning to link up with Russian Allies for the Austerlitz campaign. He prepared a sound military strategy, but failed to take into account the ten-day difference between the Gregorian calendar, used in the West, and the Julian calendar, still used in Russia. The result: the Russian troops arrived “right on time” - ten days late.

Looking back at NATO-Russia relations over the course of the 1990s I cannot help feeling that we still had not fully synchronised our calendars. Both NATO and Russia had realised early on that there was an enormous security agenda waiting for them to be tackled together.

Yet throughout the 1990s we remained unable to fully exploit our cooperative potential. Just as in the early 19th century, neither our political agendas nor our “mental calendars” would match.

But can we still afford to be out of synch today, at the start of the 21st century? The answer can only be a resounding “no.” NATO and Russia are fundamentally different than the NATO and Soviet Union of ten years ago. And both have vital stakes in dealing with instability and the new security challenges in Europe. We can work together, and strengthen our chances of success; or we can work apart, and increase the likelihood that we will come into conflict with one another over some third party issue.

Clearly, it is in NATO’s interest to help Russia contribute to solving problems, rather than itself be a problem to be solved. And it is in Russia’s interest to be part of the winning team, rather than a spectator cheering for the losing side.

I believe that is why President Putin invited me to Moscow earlier this year. He knows that the previous NATO-Russia freeze was in no one’s interest. And it is also why I accepted. During my visit, President Putin told me quite clearly that he wants his children, who had gone to school in Germany, to live their lives in a Russia that is part of modern Europe. I hope we can help him make this desire a reality.

But getting from here to there will not be as easy as just pushing a button. Deep-rooted attitudes and beliefs will have to change. The fact of the matter is that even ten years after the end of the ideological and military confrontation in Europe, we still cling to old stereotypes. These stereotypes

have a habit of coming to the fore whenever our interests or perceptions diverge.

The downing of the Berlin Wall and the collapsing masonry across Europe which followed it may have led to a bonfire of the certainties - but there is still on both sides a lingering nostalgia for the predictability of the old days.

NATO's enlargement is such a case of talking past each other. For NATO, extending membership was essentially about extending security integration and political identity. For Russia, NATO's enlargement remained a continuation of Western containment policy.

Kosovo was an even more obvious case. NATO acted when diplomacy simply could not, to avert a humanitarian tragedy, and to uphold key values on which we believe a new Europe should be built. Russia, by contrast, viewed NATO's actions as a geopolitical plot to marginalise its influence in the Balkans and to extend its 'footprint' even closer to another Russia.

On Chechnya, too, our views are far apart. We respect the Russian right to fight terrorism and preserve its territorial integrity. But what we see is a disproportionate, indiscriminate application of force against one's own civilian population, and no long term political solution to the unrest.

It is obvious, then, that NATO-Russia relations did not enjoy a prolonged "honeymoon". But neither has there been a divorce. Indeed, it is significant that none of the controversial issues of the past years have been able to disrupt our relationship altogether.

NATO's enlargement went ahead without causing the major upheaval in Russian domestic politics that some analysts had predicted. And in Kosovo, like before in Bosnia, Russia became part of the team, indeed a crucial part of the solution. As a Finnish observer aptly put it, Russia had been in during the negotiations, out during the bombing, and then in again for the settlement.

Today, NATO and Russian troops serve side by side in Bosnia and Kosovo. And it is obvious that Russian participation in SFOR and KFOR serves both Russian and NATO interests.

So while there were crises, there was no complete separation. But a cooperative European security order requires more than grudgingly recognising each other's importance.



We need a broader, more solid relationship — and we can get it, provided that we keep in mind some essentials. Let me offer three.

First: We need to acknowledge that Russia matters. Its development matters to Europe and to the U.S. I believe it was Harvard's Bob Blackwill who once characterised Russia as Europe's greatest security variable. He was right. No other single nation's development can affect European and American security more profoundly than Russia's.

Some have argued that because Russia is weak, it can be ignored. Others have argued that because Russia is difficult, it should be sidelined. That would be a perilous and, in the long term, a counterproductive strategy. The key is engagement, not disengagement.

My second point: We have common strategic interests. Granted, the ups and downs of our relationship may sometimes suggest otherwise. But at closer inspection, there is more commonality than some may believe.

For example, we have a common stake in the success of Russia's political and economic transition. A stable, democratic, prosperous Russia is a good investment in the long-term stability of Europe — and hence a net gain for US security.

We also have a common interest in stability in the Balkans and South East Europe. In the early 20th century a conflict in the Balkans was able to ignite a major war — because the great powers found themselves on different sides. Today such a scenario has become impossible, because the international community, including NATO and Russia, share a commitment to defuse the proverbial "Balkan powderkeg" for good.

And we have a common interest in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons can pose a risk not only to our national territories, but also to our troops which may be involved in peacekeeping missions.

It is no exaggeration to state that proliferation will be one of the greatest security challenges in this new century. NATO and Russia cannot be absent in the search for a solution.

My third point: we should treat each other's concerns seriously. We should acknowledge that some of our disagreements are substantial and cannot simply be attributed to misperceptions. To have different views — especially on something as complex as Kosovo — is to be expected. But even if our disagreements are real, we should refrain from attributing to each other sinister motives. As in other aspects of human life the obvious

explanation is the real explanation. The cockup is infinitely more common than the conspiracy.

Can these benchmarks be translated into policy? Can the NATO-Russia relationship finally escape its zero-sum character? Can perceptions be brought into line with reality? I sincerely believe so.

My meetings in Moscow last February, including the meeting with President Putin, gave clear indications that Russia, too, wants to shift into higher gear again.

And I am pleased to say that this shift into higher gear is happening. After my visit we were able to end the deadlock in the agenda of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). During our first PJC meeting after my visit, we discussed over almost five hours a wide range of substantive issues, and

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*Meeting of the Permanent Joint Council on 15 March 2000.  
"The Permanent Joint Council re-established itself as the venue  
for dialogue and cooperation."*

we did so in a very constructive spirit. The PJC re-established itself as the venue for dialogue and cooperation, just as we had envisaged in the Founding Act. We had a frank exchange over NATO's new Strategic Concept and Russia's new National Security Concept. And we addressed critical arms control issues. In doing so, I feel that we made a significant contribution to what I consider the top item on our agenda: building trust and confidence and dispelling misperceptions.

This willingness to re-engage is not confined to the PJC. It is also reflected in the remarkable recent statements by President Putin about possible NATO membership for Russia.

Now, everybody clearly understands that Russia is not applying for membership in NATO. But President Putin's remarks indicate that he, too, sees the need for new thinking and cooperation and to move the NATO-Russia relationship forward. It is simply in our mutual interest to move it forward and deepen and intensify it.

I have started my remarks with a story from way back when, so let me also end with one. In the early 19th century a messenger rushed into the office of the great Austrian statesman, Count Metternich, to report that the Russian ambassador had died. Metternich looked up and said: "What is his intention?". Quite obviously, mistrust between Russia and the West goes back centuries.

We can't overcome it in just a few years, though it need not take centuries. The reason is that NATO and Russia are beginning to realise that we don't have that much time. We have a large and important common agenda out there waiting for us — and we need to get on with it right now.

*Source: "NATO, Russia and the Future of European Security",  
speech held at Harvard University on April 5, 2000.*

# NATO and the European Security and Defence Identity

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Fifty-one years ago today, the leaders of the United States, Canada, and ten European nations met in Washington and created the most successful military Alliance in history, NATO.

It was not an easy sell in the United States - establishing an "entangling Alliance," against the best advice of George Washington, after whom this institution was named. But ultimately, through the vision and painstaking efforts of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, the advocates of the new North Atlantic Alliance prevailed.

And they prevailed for two simple reasons:

- NATO stood - explicitly in the Treaty itself - for the democratic values that Americans hold dear.
- And NATO meant that, by putting together North America and Europe - even a Europe exhausted by war - there would be a broader community supporting and promoting these values. The United States would not be alone.

Today, fifty-one years on, I have been asked to address the question, "NATO: Why Should Americans Care?" And the answer is the same: Values, and value-added.

Shared values may seem an abstract notion. They are not. In the end, it is these values - more than anything else - that brought us together in two World Wars, and enabled us to overcome the many crises of the Cold War and beyond.

Only last year, in support of these values, NATO successfully put a stop to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. One year ago, this province was sinking into a nightmare, reliving horrors we thought Europe had put behind it a half a century before. Serbian forces were carrying out a deliberate policy of murder, rape and terror. More than a million refugees were on the move. The ruling regime was burning houses, shelling towns, denying the majority population basic rights of education, health and democracy. After diplomacy failed, NATO Allies courageously, in the name of their values, decided to act. And we succeeded in stopping the massacre.

Today almost a million and a half people are back in their homes. Tens of thousands of houses have been rebuilt. Bridges and roads have been repaired. Despite the harshness of the Balkan winter — and here is a minor miracle — there were no reported deaths due to lack of food or shelter.

What NATO began, and KFOR continues, was not only the right thing to do; it was the only thing to do. Through NATO, North America and Europe acted together in support of their shared values, just as they had throughout the long history of the Alliance. That is why American and European Allies still have to stay the course in Kosovo — together.

However, in the Kosovo crisis, though the values were there, the second half of the equation - the value-added by the broader community of nations within NATO - was less than both Europe and the United States wanted. The fact that the United States flew over 70 percent of the missions in the air campaign was evidence that NATO had become unbalanced.

But this imbalance is now being redressed through European efforts to strengthen their defence capabilities, in a process that is unhelpfully reduced to an impenetrable acronym, ESDI - the European Security and Defence Identity.

Since ESDI is one of the issues where the level of transatlantic understanding is weakest, let me address some of the most common concerns that people have about it.

But first, let me say that as NATO's 10th Secretary General in its fifty-one year history, I strongly support a European Security and Defence Identity. It will make for a stronger Europe, a stronger NATO, and a healthier, more balanced transatlantic relationship. And let me tell you this in plain language: If I was not convinced of this, believe me, I would not support it; indeed, I would oppose it. The last thing I will do is to preside over the weakening of my own unique and irreplaceable institution.

Some of these concerns I have heard expressed about European defence are potentially quite serious. I will be frank with you: ESDI is a work in progress, so it is natural that there are still some unresolved issues. And because of the stakes, we must keep a constant watch over the development of these issues to make sure they come out right.

But to be again quite blunt, a lot of the concerns I hear are unfounded, based on outdated assumptions about what is being done in Europe, rather than what a European Security and Defence Identity is really about. So let me start with a few points to set the stage:

- **There is no intention or desire to create a single European Army, and no one is seriously talking about doing so.** European Defence is about improving the capability of European countries to conduct military operations, both within the EU and within NATO.

As far as NATO is concerned, European Defence will be a rebalancing of roles and responsibilities between European and North American Allies. In other words, a better sharing of burdens. And let us be honest, this is something the United States has wanted for years.

- **European defence will rest on the national capabilities of the EU nations** - capabilities that are equally available for NATO missions in the case of Allies that are members of the EU. To avoid duplication in planning staffs, communications, and headquarters, NATO has sensibly agreed that the European Union can draw on NATO assets

and capabilities. So this is not a question of duplication or competition, but value-added.

- **European defence is not a replacement for collective defence through NATO.** What the EU nations are talking about is crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions - the so-called Petersberg tasks. They are not talking about the defence of Europe. Moreover, NATO and the EU have both said that the EU will act in such cases only when NATO as a whole is not engaged.

- **The EU has the clout to force European nations to put their money where their mouths are.** NATO has been pressing for more

European defence spending for years, with little result. It is good to have the EU on our side.

- **The U.S. does not want to get involved in every regional crisis in Europe.** Just look at the steady stream of proposed legislation limiting U.S. involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo. Although it may be paradoxically tough to accept, the U.S. actually does want Europe to do more.



*“A rebalancing of roles and responsibilities between European and North American Allies. In other words, a better sharing of burdens.”*

Now let me tackle some of the concerns that have been raised about a European Security and Defence Identity.

Some people say, "the EU will take the political credit, but the U.S. will still have to provide the bulk of the military capabilities."

Of course the EU nations will want to take some of the credit and prestige. But they want to do it on the basis of their own actions.

What the EU agreed as a military goal in Helsinki - to create a rapidly deployable force of 60,000 troops that can be sustained for at least a year - is commensurate with the political goal that has been set, of dealing with the limited range of Petersberg tasks. Europe will still look to NATO for collective defence. But for lesser tasks, the EU should be able to - but can't yet - rely largely on its own forces.

Some people say, "It's all talk. The EU will never develop the real military capabilities."

There can be no doubt: developing European defence capabilities is essential to creating a meaningful ESDI. Otherwise it would be a hollow shell. But the EU states themselves know this and have put themselves to the test.

Setting the so-called Headline Goal in Helsinki was a big step forward. At the Lisbon Summit on 24 March 2000, EU leaders took the next step by approving a process for implementing the Headline Goal, and deciding to hold a Capabilities Pledging Conference by the end of this year.

Instead of the empty rhetoric we had heard for so long, we now have a programme for concrete action. Just as with the Monetary Union, once the commitment is finally made, the EU is far more likely to follow through than to suffer the political embarrassment and the challenge to its credibility involved in failure.

And let's not forget: even on the defence side, the EU has done better in recent years. In Kosovo, for example, EU nations alone now provide 63% of the troops. Taken as a whole, Europe - including the non-EU states - contributes over 80%. That is why I am confident that the EU is on the right track to deliver on capabilities.

Some people say, "European defence is really about throwing off the yoke of the United States, getting them out of Europe, and having a totally separate European defence structure that replaces the transatlantic link."

This is dangerous talk. There is no denying that some European rhetoric makes this sound as though it is the underlying motive of a European Security and Defence Identity. But I think we need to listen to the sensible majority and not a few too-vocal hotheads.

First, no European leader wants Europe to go it alone. North America and Europe are the strongest possible economic and political partners, and NATO remains the pre-eminent security organisation in the Euro-Atlantic area. No sane European, no matter how Euro-phile, wants to throw that away or endanger it.

Second, for the foreseeable future, Europe's strategic "independence" is simply not feasible. Not many people may say that, but everybody knows it. Only NATO has the assets and capabilities that are necessary for larger-scale operations. That is why ESDI is being developed to complement NATO, not replace it. ESDI is not about less U.S. - it's about more Europe, and therefore a stronger Alliance.

Some people worry that "The EU's Headline Goal will replace NATO's force planning process as the basis for decisions on national defence capabilities."

In other words, the concern is that the EU Allies will plan for small-scale crisis management, at the expense of collective defence. This is something we have to watch. There is nothing a finance minister would like better than a choice between an expensive option and a less expensive option.

But the reality is that NATO and a European Security and Defence Identity do not present an "either/or" choice. European leaders know they need both: crisis management capabilities and collective defence. Moreover, the things nations must do to meet the Headline Goal - improve deployability, sustainability, and so forth - are fully in line with the things they must do to meet NATO's goals. Taken together, the two processes need to reinforce one another, not replace each other.

The concerns I have just mentioned are specific and, if we keep our eyes on the ball, they can be readily addressed. But there are three other challenges ahead that are harder still. These are the areas where I am focusing a great deal of my attention.

The first one concerns the links between NATO and the European Union. Some people believe that the European Union will make it more difficult for NATO to act. Either there will be an EU caucus in NATO, or NATO



will be unable to make a decision because the European Union itself cannot make a decision. This worst case scenario must never happen.

For the time being, because there is a feeling in some quarters that the EU must get its act together before engaging with NATO, EU-NATO relations are limited to informal gatherings between European Union High Representative Dr. Solana and myself.

Clearly, this is insufficient. These contacts have to be expanded soon based on the principles of transparency and cooperation between both organisations. We are currently working hard to get this right. It should not be too long before both organisations can meet openly on a regular basis.

Ultimately, I am optimistic that we will get this sorted out right. Because despite the organisational differences, the EU and NATO stand for the same values. It will be impossible to stop their working together once a concrete issue demands it.

The second challenge is the participation of European NATO nations that are not European Union members in the new European defence efforts. Some people argue that having the EU develop its own defence role will create diverging security perspectives between EU and non-EU Allies, including the United States. Others argue that it will divide the Alliance, because NATO countries not in the European Union are excluded.

This challenge - of ensuring the right kind of participation for non-EU Allies - is indeed a daunting one. We therefore need to solve it in a way acceptable to all Allies. Similar arrangements already exist elsewhere that show a solution can be found.

Let me also say that the European Union nations know full well they need the political and military support of the non-EU NATO nations if they want their efforts to succeed. This is certainly the case when requesting access to NATO assets and capabilities, but it is also true in a broader political sense. European defence simply cannot work in practice if it is not inclusive.

The third challenge deals with the implementation of the Headline Goal. Some people fear that the European Union will create a vast new defence planning structure that will undermine NATO's integrated military structure and weaken collective defence. Let's be honest: Nobody has that kind of money to let this happen.

Besides, implementation of the EU Headline Goal - which is linked only to the limited Petersberg tasks - will not require "vast" planning

structures. I understand that Dr. Solana expects to have 15 - yes, 15 - planners on his staff by year-end. Such a compact team will inevitably have to concentrate in main on strategic goals, not detailed operational plans. It will clearly be no rival to SHAPE - nor does anyone want it to be.

I cannot know exactly how these many challenges will be fully addressed. The only thing I can guarantee is this: as NATO Secretary General, it is my job, and indeed my personal mission, to do what is right for this whole Alliance, and for Euro-Atlantic security.

To sum up, I do fully understand the concerns that people express about European defence. And I, too, can imagine some worst-case scenarios about how it could develop. And that is precisely why I am engaged actively, every day, in making the case for the right outcomes which will make this a success for both sides of the Atlantic.

A European Security and Defence Identity is an opportunity - an opportunity for both Europe and North America to advance their interests and to defend their common values. The key is to work positively and actively for the right outcome.

ESDI will give renewed significance to the word "shared" when we talk about "shared values." It will create a new and better balance between both sides of the Atlantic, in deed as well as in word, just as was envisioned at the founding of NATO fifty-one years ago.

The historic linking of North American to European security interests is no fragile flower for all it has gone through. The only difference is that in the past, NATO was about what the United States could do for Europe. Today, NATO is about what the United States can do with Europe.

Strengthening the European half of the NATO Alliance only further reinforces the point I started with — that Americans should care about NATO because NATO means that, when it comes to supporting our core values, America is not alone.

*Source: "Why should Americans care?", speech held at the George Washington University, Washington, DC, on April 4, 2000.*

# Finishing the job in Kosovo

In the torrent of words since NATO's decisive action in Kosovo last year it has been all too easy to focus on the continuing problems, and forget the fundamentals. During my visit to Kosovo ten days ago, on the anniversary of NATO's first airstrikes, I got a vivid reminder of just why we acted, how much we have already achieved, and why we need to finish the job.

I visited a rebuilt school in a village called Poklek, "ethnically cleansed" this time last year by the Serbs. When Milosevic's paramilitaries came to Poklek, 53 local residents, including 10 children, were locked in one house and the Serbs threw in hand grenades. They then burned the house and those in it. Virtually every building in the village was destroyed.

NATO drove out the Serb forces, and KFOR re-established security in the province. Families returned to their scorched and bullet-ridden homes. Children again began to study - inside tents. But they did so in their native language for the first time in ten years. And with KFOR's help, a new school for Poklek was built. The children still walk over an hour to and from school each day. There is no bus service, but life has begun again.

The message to me and NATO Generals Clark and Reinhardt was simple; NATO was their savior. Their joy and gratitude was as humbling and exhilarating as was the deep sorrow of honouring the photos of the 10 murdered children.

To anyone who doubts the rightness of NATO's actions last year, I say, go to Poklek's new school, look at those

pictures, and tell me NATO did not stop a great tragedy. To those who argue that the international mission is failing, let them too go to Poklek school, speak to those lovely children and tell me NATO has not made the world of difference.

A year ago, Kosovo was sinking into a nightmare, reliving horrors we thought Europe had put behind it a half a century before. Serbian forces were carrying out a deliberate policy of murder, rape and terror. More than a million refugees were on the move. The ruling regime was burning houses, shelling towns, denying the majority population basic rights of education, health and democracy.

Today almost a million and a half people are back in their homes. Tens of thousands of houses have been rebuilt. Bridges and roads have been repaired. Despite the harshness of the Balkan winter, and here is a minor miracle, there were no reported deaths due to lack of food or shelter. What NATO began, and KFOR continues, was not only the right thing to do. It was the only thing to do.

Do not let me suggest that we have an easy road ahead. Though the conflict may be over, the peace is still something to be won day-by-day, and step-by-step. This is a challenge for us all. But it is a challenge we must meet. The international community, which has already done so much, must do even better. We must put in the necessary resources and see the job through.

Three things are key: troops, money, and police. Let me take them in turn and be blunt. KFOR has enough

troops to do the job. At NATO, we keep a close watch on the situation on the ground and we have a reserve force at our disposal. If new forces are required, NATO nations provide them. Italy, France, Poland, and the UK have all recently added forces and capabilities to KFOR. There is no crisis in KFOR troop levels.

Let me also correct one misperception: The European Allies are doing their share. Out of a force of some 45,000, the U.S. is providing roughly 6,000 troops, slightly less than the largest contributor, which is Italy. European nations - EU and non-EU together - are providing 80 percent of the KFOR forces. This is burden-sharing that is working.

The same is true for the money. Although there has been justifiable criticism about the slowness of the EU in providing financial support to Kosovo, that situation has now been largely addressed. The EU has already provided some \$35 million this year to the budget of the UN Mission in Kosovo, and is planning to provide \$360 million for the year.

The bigger picture is even more telling. According to its own statistics, the European Union has provided some \$16.5 billion to the Balkans since 1991, and has budgeted \$12 billion for the next six years. This is a major contribution in line with the EU's desire to play a leading role in rebuilding the region.

On police, however, we still need to do more. Of an authorized strength of some 4,700 international civilian police, roughly 2,700 have been provided. The U.S. accounts for over 400 of these police - the largest single contribution - but that means the other 2300 have come from other countries. Nevertheless, we still need more police, and I know that UN Secretary-General Annan has been using his authority to press nations to contribute.

The international community's efforts are only the beginning, not the end. Ultimate success can only be delivered by the people of Kosovo themselves. Whenever I visit the province I urge them to seize this chance to break with a past that had already brought so much pain, and could still drag them down if they let it. In Pristina, I gave the bluntest possible warning to their leaders. They must promote a new vision of a peaceful, democratic, and law-abiding province - not play on old nightmares.

To some, Kosovo may seem a far away place that does not affect U.S. interests. But history has many examples of small problems becoming big crises just through lack of attention or commitment. The NATO-led operation in Kosovo was not just morally right, but remains crucially important for European security itself, too often jeopardized by conflicts in the Balkans.

In Kosovo, we must all stay the course - U.S. and Europe alike. If anyone has any doubts, just go to Pöckle.

*Washington Post, April 4, 2000*

# NATO isn't just a one-way street for the United States

Why does the United States need NATO? Why not go it alone? The answer is that even a superpower needs allies to be successful in upholding its interests in the wider world.

Without NATO, the United States could not have peacefully overcome its Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the recent Kosovo conflict, U.S. air power was the decisive factor. Yet it would not have been effective without the use of Italian, German, British, Turkish and Hungarian air bases and the airspace made available by NATO allies and partner nations. Nor could U.S. and NATO troops have been ready to deploy in Kosovo without the use of the Greek port at Thessaloniki.

In short, the U.S. can only bring its enormous power to bear because it can depend on a network of allies such as are found within NATO. To use a military phrase, NATO is a "force multiplier." Increasingly, Canada and the European allies bring real resources, real troops and real commitment to the common security table. In Kosovo, European nations are providing 80% of all the forces for the KFOR peacekeeping force, with the largest troop contributor being Italy. Out of an allied force of about 45,000 troops, the U.S. now provides 6,000.

European nations are, as they promised picking up the lion's share of reconstruction efforts in the Balkans. The European Union has provided about \$16.5 billion to this region since 1991 and has budgeted nearly \$12 billion for the next six years. Although the U.S. is the single largest provider of troops for the

international police force in Kosovo, at roughly 15%, the EU countries provide 40%.

Yet this increased "burden sharing" must go further. Europe is rich enough to do more. It is no longer tenable that 19 allies agree on an air operation like Kosovo, but the United States does 80% of the work. Europe must have the capability to take the lead in handling crises when the United States chooses not to be engaged. In the 21st century, we cannot be faced with a choice between massive U.S. involvement or no action at all.

Bluntly, this means the European allies must improve their defense capabilities. We are, however, already seeing action. The EU has set itself the goal of establishing a robust, deployable military capability by 2003. This complements NATO's defense capabilities initiative, agreed to a year ago, which also will lead to significant improvements in capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic.

NATO is ready to provide some of its assets and capabilities to support the EU, because a strong Europe does not mean less from the United States, but rather a stronger alliance. And as Europe pulls more weight, Washington will be more inclined to stay engaged because it has a real partner, in bad times as well as good. As Secretary General of NATO, my job is to get the European NATO nations to put their money behind their rhetoric and deliver on capabilities.

The rejiggering of roles will better reflect the balance between the U.S. and Europe in the economic sphere. The EU is

**A R T I C L E**

the No. 1 trading partner and the No. 1 investor in the U.S. The reverse also is true.

The ultimate reason why 51-year-old NATO should still matter to the U.S., even in the very different world of today, is that Europe and North America share the same values. NATO is an unprecedented community of nations that all believe in liberty, democracy and human rights. And they are willing to take action to defend those beliefs.

Shared values may seem an abstract notion. Yet, in the end, it is these values more than anything else that brought us together in two world wars and that enabled us to overcome the many crises of the Cold War and beyond.

Only last year, in the name of these values, we successfully tackled the

challenge of Kosovo, where a cruel dictator was killing thousands and driving hundreds of thousands from their homes. Today, perhaps more than ever, we understand that economic prosperity and social progress are based on our shared democratic values.

That is why American and European allies have to stay the course together. In the past, NATO was about what the U.S. could do for Europe. Today, NATO is about what the U.S. can do with Europe.

Through the NATO alliance, the U.S. has the strongest possible economic and political partner for meeting the challenges of the new century.

*Los Angeles Times*  
*April 6, 2000*



