SECRETARY GENERAL CLAES: "NATO IS NEEDED MORE THAN EVER
TO UNDERPIN ALLIED SECURITY, TO PROJECT STABILITY IN
THE WIDER EUROPE, AND TO CARRY OUT NEW MISSIONS IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT AND PEACE-KEEPING"
RIMINI - The Secretary General of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Mr. Willy Claes said on
Sunday that the goal of NATO is "to sustain the
unprecedented period of security, peace and prosperity
enjoyed by Western Europe for the past forty years and
more". Addressing the Pio Manzu "Big Millennium"
conference, he added, however, that "today this is not
enough...We need to extend these same blessings to the
new democracies to our east. Building the wider
security community is a primary goal of the
Euro-Atlantic democracies. Achieving it will be the
security milestone of this fin du siecle."
Mr. Claes told his audience that "perhaps the most
visible example of NATO's contribution to a wider Euro-
Atlantic security architecture is the Partnership for
Peace". He pointed out that twenty-three countries had
already joined the Partnership and that individual
partnership programmes would "allow each country to draw
closer to the Alliance at a pace and in areas of its own
choosing". He also said that "it is clear that PfP is a
two-way street, with the Alliance as well as our
Partners deriving benefit". In this regard he stressed
that "Partnership for Peace is not a substitute for NATO
membership...Our next task is to begin to examine
internally the way ahead, so that we can prepare the
Alliance to accept new members in a way which enhances
European security". Mr. Claes underscored that the
"enlargement debate must not be conducted in terms of a
"zero-sum game", where membership for some would
translate into a net loss for others...Expanding our
Alliance must be recognized for what it is: the
enlargement of a community of values, not an exercise in
exclusion or isolation". Mr. Claes said that such a
process "also requires that NATO develop a close and
special partnership with Russia in the interests of
European and global stability".
Turning to NATO's relations with Russia, the
Secretary General said that the Alliance was currently
"working out an Individual Partnership Programme to
foster co-operation in the security field". He added
that NATO was also working to "strengthen our relations
through the development of a far-reaching dialogue and
co-operation between NATO and Russia, outside the PfP
framework, in areas where Russia has unique and
important contributions to make, commensurate with its
weight and responsibility as a major European and
international power".
Mr. Claes defended NATO's role in support of the
United Nations in the Former Yugoslavia. He stressed
that "within the limits of our mandate, we have
accomplished a lot...The embargo has certainly
encouraged Belgrade to accept the Contact Group's peace
plan and isolate the Bosnian Serbs; and the threat - and
occasional use - of our air power has provided virtually
the only protection to the people of the Safe Areas, as
well as help deter attacks against UNPROFOR". He
acknowledged that "co-operation between NATO and the UN
- two very different organisations, with different
structures and bureaucratic 'cultures' - has been a
learning experience". Nonetheless he was confident that
"we are setting the stage for more fruitful co-operation
in the future, as well as for eventual NATO support to
CSCE - sponsored peace-keeping operations".
Another task for the Alliance was to give NATO's
support for the European Security and Defence Identity a
practical dimension. In this regard, Mr. Claes
reaffirmed NATO's readiness "to make collective assets
available for WEU operations in which the United States
and Canada choose not to participate". He said that
"the Combined Joint Task Forces Concept, if properly
implemented, should provide us with this flexibility",
it being clear that "we cannot expect the United States
to take the lead in each and every crisis".
Finally, Mr. Claes highlighted the growing
importance of the Mediterranean region for Alliance
security. He said that this item was now on NATO's
agenda and "will be an area of increasing priority for
the Alliance in the years to come". In order to enhance
security in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, NATO had to
pursue "a common policy on proliferation issues". Mr.
Claes pointed out that "NATO will support, and not
duplicate, work already underway in other international
fora...but we will also consult regularly on
proliferation threats, both 'at 16' and within the
framework of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council".
The Secretary General warned his audience, however, that
"we also must be prepared should our efforts at
prevention fail...For this reason, we will also examine
how our defence capabilities can be improved and how
NATO's defence posture can support or influence
diplomatic efforts to block the spread of weapons of
mass destruction".
--------------------------------
Speech by the Secretary General
at the Pio Manzu "Big Millennium" Conference,
Rimini, Italy
13th November 1994
President Bush, President Gorbachev, Minister Bernini,
Minister Fisichella, other members of the Italian
government, Mr. Pico, distinguished officials, ladies
and gentlemen,
It gives me great pleasure to address the
distinguished Pio Manzu forum, which has contributed so
much to our understanding of global political and
economic issues, and especially to find myself in the
company of men and women who have done so much to make
the waning years of the second millennium so much more
hopeful than the era of world war and totalitarianism
from which we have so recently emerged. This year's Pio
Manzu honorees, Hanan Ashrawi and George Bush, symbolize
the twin pillars of the international order we are
striving to achieve, namely justice and peace. Mrs.
Ashrawi has devoted herself to the pursuit of justice
for her people and respect for the human rights of all
peoples, which is the only foundation upon which to
build a stable and lasting peace in the Middle East.
And President Bush devoted his leadership to achieving a
global structure of peace based upon the freedom of all
states from external domination and aggression.
Together, the record of both honorees transcends the
interests of a single people, a single nation or a
single political system. Rather, they have served the
interests of what President Gorbachev called universal
values, the defence of which is key to our hopes
of a new millennium for humankind.
The year 2000, dividing the old millennium
from the new, is a natural milestone. It provides an
opportunity for taking stock of what has been achieved
and tempts us to speculate on the shape of things to
come in the new century. What I would like to do today
is first to define the security goals we seek by the
year 2000, and then discuss the role I believe NATO can
play in this period of change and transition. Of
course, such crystal ball gazing is risky. It reminds
me of the local newspaper which told its readers that
the horoscope section had to be cancelled "due to
unforeseen circumstances". But I will try nevertheless.
First: What are NATO's goals? The simple
answer is: to sustain the unprecedented period of
security, peace and prosperity enjoyed by Western Europe
for the past forty years and more. But today that is
not enough. We need to extend these same blessings to
the new democracies to our east. Building the wider
security community is a primary goal of the
Euro-Atlantic democracies. Achieving it will be the
security milestone of this fin du siecle.
How to achieve this, however, is the challenge.
If security policy during the Cold War was perceived
mainly as maintaining the status quo, even maintaining a
balance of terror, so security policy in the post-Cold
War era is about the management of change. In short, we
are attempting to stabilise the processes of political
transformation -- processes that resulted in large
measure from the inspired leadership of the two
distinguished former Presidents in attendance here
today, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.
But it would be wrong to assume that helping
to stabilize the process of integrating the wider Europe
is a fundamentally new task for the Alliance. The fact
is that even during its first four decades of existence
NATO served as more than just a shield against an
external threat; it was a shield behind which Western
European nations which had been enemies for the better
part of the past millennium were able to transcend their
history and build the institutions of political and
economic union. Their militaries were no longer arrayed
against each other, but rather integrated in a single
and unified structure. And the US troop presence was a
guarantee to weak nations that they need not fear the
strong, and to strong nations that they need not fear
each other.
In other words, NATO helped to bring an end
not to history itself, of course, but to Western
Europe's history of great power rivalry and balance of
power politics. It is precisely this mission which the
Alliance is now called upon to play in the wider Europe,
reconciling former enemies and underpinning the process
of pan-European integration.
Thankfully, we do not face an enemy as before,
but we are nevertheless confronted with persisting
threats from Europe's darker past -- conflict in the
Balkans; the general fracturing of multi-ethnic
societies along irredentist lines; the re-emergence of
xenophobia, intolerance and extreme forms of
nationalism, and the fragility of newly democratic
societies to our east. We must also confront a
worsening situation along the southern rim of the
Mediterranean, as well as the growing proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. In this context, NATO is
needed more than ever to underpin Allied security, to
project stability in the wider Europe, and to carry out
new missions in crisis management and peacekeeping.
Let me buttress this point by explaining how
the Alliance has changed in the past five years.
- First, NATO has developed a broad, political
approach to security. This has fostered cooperative
relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, through the establishment of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council, and, most recently, the Partnership
for Peace. This evolution will eventually result in the
addition of new members to the Alliance.
- Second, NATO has taken on the new task of crisis
management by offering support to CSCE and United
Nations peacekeeping operations. NATO's involvement in
former Yugoslavia exemplifies this new mission. We have
also created new force structures suited to these new
tasks.
- Third, NATO is giving greater responsibility to the
European Allies for the security and defence of Europe,
both through adaptations within the Alliance and through
a closer relationship with the Western European Union.
These changes, still underway, are fundamental
and irreversible; they have signalled the Alliance's
political response to the new security environment.
Perhaps the most visible example of NATO's
contribution to a wider Euro-Atlantic security
architecture is the Partnership for Peace, which has
gotten off to a very rapid start. Twenty-three
countries, including both neutral states and former
members of the Warsaw Pact, have joined the programme
thus far, and more may sign. We are now developing
individual work programmes with our Partners to allow
each country to draw closer to the Alliance at a pace
and in areas of its own choosing.
Our principal aim with PfP is to build the
familiarity, trust and habits of cooperation which the
Allies have developed among themselves for many decades.
We also hope to promote democratic control over military
establishments, and to develop a force planning system
of the kind that has underpinned NATO's own integrated
military structure. Together, with partners, we will
develop common ideas and approaches for peacekeeping and
humanitarian support operations to which their forces
may be assigned, thereby greatly increasing the pool of
trained and NATO- compatible assets which we may draw
upon in future Bosnia- type contingencies. Thus, it is
clear that PfP is a two-way street, with the Alliance as
well as our Partners deriving benefits.
One point I should make clear. Partnership
for Peace is not a substitute for NATO membership. At
the January Summit, the Allies made clear they expect
and would welcome enlargement. Our next task is to
begin to examine internally the way ahead, so that we
can prepare the Alliance to accept new members in a way
which enhances European security. This implies, first
of all, that the enlargement debate must not be
conducted in terms of a "zero-sum game", where
membership for some would translate into a net loss for
others. Expanding our Alliance must be recognised for
what it is: the enlargement of a community of values,
not an exercise in exclusion or isolation. It also
requires that NATO develop a close and special
partnership with Russia in the interests of European
and global stability.
Indeed, it is a fact that Russia will remain
the strongest military power in Europe. Its active
participation in building a new security architecture in
Europe is thus absolutely vital. We cannot build such a
structure without Russia, much less against her. This
has only been reaffirmed by the developments in Bosnia.
We will treat each other as equal and sovereign
partners, without any veto or droit de regard.
Since Russia joined the Partnership last June,
we have been working out an Individual Partnership
Programme to foster cooperation in the security field.
We will further strengthen our relations through the
development of a far- reaching dialogue and cooperation
between NATO and Russia, outside the PfP framework, in
areas where Russia has unique and important
contributions to make, commensurate with its weight and
responsibility as a major European and international
power.
Partnership for Peace is an example of what
NATO is doing to create cooperative security relations
between countries in Europe. Its effects will be felt
over time in terms of greater trust and fewer
misunderstandings. The Alliance, however, has to be
ready also to deal with crises which happen when trust
breaks down and conflict erupts.
NATO is currently playing, as you know, an
important role in Bosnia. We are imposing a No-fly
Zone, and have basically prevented the use of air power
as an
instrument of war. We are enforcing trade and weapons
embargoes -- and let me make clear that, whatever the
impact of Congressional legislation on US participation,
NATO will continue to enforce fully and totally all the
relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, including both
embargoes. We are also ready to authorise air strikes
in response to attacks against safe areas or against
UNPROFOR. I should add that none of these operations
would be possible without the support and cooperation of
Italy. In fact, Italy has always been one of the
staunchest and most loyal members of the Alliance, and
never more so than in periods of danger and crisis.
One point should be clear about NATO's
involvement in former Yugoslavia, and that is that we
are not acting independently, but rather in support of
the United Nations, in order to underpin the efforts of
the international community to achieve a negotiated
settlement. We do not have the lead in former
Yugoslavia, but we are attempting to impress upon the UN
the need to use NATO air power in credible and effective
ways. I believe that, within the inherent limits of our
mandate, we have accomplished a lot. The embargo has
certainly encouraged Belgrade to accept the Contact
Group's peace plan and isolate the Bosnian Serbs; and
the threat - and occasional use - of our air power has
provided virtually the only protection to the people of
the Safe Areas, as well as help deter attacks against
UNPROFOR. Of course, cooperation between NATO and the
UN -- two very different organisations, with different
structures and bureaucratic "cultures" -- has been a
learning experience.
But I believe we are setting the stage for more fruitful
cooperation in the future, as well as for eventual NATO
support to CSCE - sponsored peacekeeping operations.
Another task ahead is to continue adapting
NATO's structures to deal with the new security
challenges of today and tomorrow. At our Summit last
January NATO's support for the European Security and
Defence Identity was given a practical dimension. The
Alliance stands ready to make collective assets
available for WEU operations in which the United States
and Canada choose not to participate, and it will adapt
further its military structures in order to create
Combined Joint Task Forces.
This practical initiative is an emphatic
demonstration that there is no rivalry between Atlantic
and European approaches to security. They are
complementary, and equally necessary in any case. We
cannot expect the United States to take the lead in each
and every crisis. We need to develop the flexibility to
be able to respond either through the Alliance or
through the Western European Union, according to the
nature of a crisis. The Combined Joint Task Forces
Concept, if properly implemented, should provide us with
this flexibility.
An additional task that lies ahead is to
sharpen our focus on the Mediterranean. The Alliance
includes five Mediterranean members which enjoy a
security guarantee under Article V of the Washington
Treaty. To be sure, the end of the East-West
confrontation has had a positive impact in the
Mediterranean region, as can be seen most clearly in the
Middle East peace process. Nonetheless, this good news
is matched in the headlines by stories about potentially
destabilising developments along the Mediterranean's
southern rim. Thanks to an initiative by the Italian
government, the issue of stability in the Mediterranean
region was placed on the agenda of the Brussels Summit,
and this will be an area of increasing priority for the
Alliance in the years to come.
Yet another challenge that we must pursue in
order to enhance security and stability in the
Mediterranean and elsewhere is a common policy on
proliferation issues. The spread of weapons of mass
destruction could well become a key security challenge
of the coming millennium. This is why at the January
Summit we agreed on a policy framework on
non-proliferation. NATO will support, and not
duplicate, work already underway in other international
fora. But we will also consult regularly on
proliferation threats, both "at 16" and within the
framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.
Of course, we also must be prepared should our
efforts at prevention fail. For this reason, we will
also examine how our defence capabilities can be
improved and how NATO's defence posture can support or
influence diplomatic efforts to block the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
As times changes, so do alliances. They
redefine their missions, they readjust their structures,
they welcome new members. But fundamentals stay the
same. As we approach a new millennium we must remain
aware of what constitutes the essence of our success:
the transatlantic link. NATO remains the ultimate
embodiment of this link since it commits the United
States and Canada to the maintenance of stability in
Europe. The Atlantic Alliance has proven that it is
possible to create a community of values that transcends
the narrow focus of the nation-state. It is this
achievement that gives us the confidence that we can
indeed widen the Atlantic Community for the benefit of
all of Europe as we approach the new millennium.