



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

October 22, 2001

Randal K. Edington, Vice President - Operations
River Bend Station
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

**SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION-CORRECTION TO NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 50-458/01-02**

Dear Mr. Edington:

On June 23, 2001, the NRC completed inspections at your River Bend Station facility. NRC Inspection Report 50-458/01-02 was issued on July 13, 2001. The purpose of this letter is to correct an error in that inspection report.

Section 1R21 was erroneously included in Inspection Report 50-458/01-02 in place of the intended Section 1R17. Please disregard Section 1R21, Safety System Design and Performance Capability, of NRC Inspection Report 50-458/01-02. Enclosed please find Section 1R17, Permanent Plant Modifications. In addition, a revised inspection report attachment, Supplementary Information, is attached. This revised attachment corrects the listings of persons contacted and documents reviewed for NRC Inspection Report 50-458/01-02. No findings of significance were identified during our review of permanent plant modifications.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

July 13, 2001

EA-01-105

Randal K. Edington, Vice President - Operations
River Bend Station
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION--NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 50-458/01-02

Dear Mr. Edington:

On June 23, 2001, the NRC completed inspections at your River Bend Station facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report presents the results of these inspections which were discussed with you and other members of your staff on June 21, 2001.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors identified three findings of very low safety significance (Green). One of these findings was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a noncited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this noncited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the River Bend Station facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William D. Johnson, Chief
Project Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47

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NRC Inspection Report
50-458/01-02

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WMMcNeil	CSMarschall	ABEarnest	GMGood	GFSanborn
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C:DRP/B				
WDJohnson				
/RA/				
07/13/01				

ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47
Report No: 50-458/01-02
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: River Bend Station
Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61
St. Francisville, Louisiana
Dates: April 1, 2001, to June 23, 2001
Inspectors: M. S. Peck, Senior Resident Inspector
S. M. Schneider, Resident Inspector
W. M. McNeil, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. F. Runyan, Senior Reactor Inspector
W. A. Maier, Senior Emergency Planning Inspector
A. B. Earnest, Senior Physical Security Specialist
Approved By: W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B
ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

River Bend Station NRC Inspection Report 50-458/01-02

IR 05000458-01-02; on 04/01/2001 - 06/23/2001; Entergy Operations, Inc; River Bend Station. Integrated Resident & Regional Report. Occupational Radiation Safety: One Green NCV. Physical Protection: Two Green findings.

The inspections were conducted by resident and regional inspectors. The inspections identified three Green findings, one of which was a noncited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

- Green. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 19.12(a) for failure to keep radiation workers informed of radiological conditions. Specifically, personnel did not receive a radiological hazards briefing prior to a high radiation area entry as required by NRC regulations.

This finding was greater than minor and had a credible impact on safety because of the potential for unintended and unplanned dose resulting from actual radiological conditions. The inspectors determined that this failure to brief radiation workers prior to entry into a high radiation area was of very low safety significance by the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process since it was not an as low as reasonably achievable issue, the ability to assess dose was not compromised, and there was no actual or substantial potential exposure in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 dose limits. The safety significance of the condition was further mitigated by the conservative setpoints on the alarming dosimetry worn by the personnel during the entry (Section 2OS1).

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

- Green. During an Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation conducted on June 19-23, 2000, a vulnerability in the licensee's protective strategy was identified that resulted in the simulated loss of part of a target set (EA-01-105). Further details (safeguards information) are available in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/2000-12. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2000-1302.

The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process because it was not repeatable or

predictable. The issue was more than minor because the potential loss of a target set represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the Physical Protection Cornerstone (Section 4OA5).

- Green. During an Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation conducted on June 19-23, 2000, a vulnerability in the licensee's protective strategy was identified that resulted in the simulated loss of a target set (EA-01-105). Further details (safeguards information) are available in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/2000-12. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2000-1302.

The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process because it was not repeatable or predictable. The issue was more than minor because the potential loss of a target set represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the Physical Protection Cornerstone (Section 4OA5).

B. Licensee Identified Findings

None

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status:

At the beginning of the inspection cycle, the licensee was operating the plant at full power. On April 7, 2001, Entergy personnel reduced reactor power to approximately 67 percent following a reactor recirculation (RR) pump failure. The RR pump failed due to a motor electrical fault. The licensee continued single RR loop plant operation until an April 18, 2001, shut down to investigate and repair the RR pump motor. Entergy completed RR pump motor repairs and restarted the reactor on April 20, 2001.

The reactor automatically scrammed due to high reactor pressure during turbine control valve testing on April 21, 2001. The high reactor pressure condition resulted following a turbine control system failure and turbine control valve closure. The licensee restarted the reactor on April 23, 2001, and achieved full power on April 26, 2001.

Entergy continued full power operations until a May 31, 2001, reactor feedwater pump seal failure. The licensee reduced reactor power to about 80 percent and completed repairs on two feedwater pumps. Entergy returned the unit to full power on June 3, 2001. The licensee operated the reactor at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Alignment Check of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System

a. Inspection Scope

On May 25, 2001, the inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the HPCS system. The inspectors verified the system was capable of performing required safety functions and that the licensee had properly performed mechanical and electrical system alignment. The inspectors reviewed the HPCS operating procedure, SOP-0030, "HPCS Valve Lineup," Revision 19; "Engineering P&I Diagrams, System 203, HPCS System (PID-27-04A)," Revision 24; and the HPCS system health report dated May 11, 2001. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports and outstanding maintenance work requests initiated during the past 12 months and assessed the effect of deficiencies on the ability of the system to perform its safety function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Alignment Check of the Division I Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed a partial walkdown of the Division I EDG on April 14, 2001. The inspectors verified that the EDG was properly configured and performed a review to identify any discrepancies which might impact the system function and thereby potentially increase risk. The inspectors performed the walkdown while the Division II EDG was out of service. The inspectors also reviewed Procedure SOP-0053, "Standby Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries," during the assessment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Alignment Check of the Division III EDG

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed a partial walkdown of the Division III EDG on June 6, 2001. The inspectors verified that the EDG was properly configured and performed a review to identify any discrepancies which might impact the system function and thereby potentially increase risk. The inspectors performed the walkdown while the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system was out of service. The inspectors also reviewed Procedure SOP-0052, "HPCS Diesel Generator," during the assessment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Alignment Check of Standby Gas Treatment System Train B

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed a partial walkdown of the Train B standby gas treatment (SBGT) system on June 15, 2001. The inspectors verified that the SBGT train was properly configured and performed a review to identify any discrepancies which might impact the system function and thereby potentially increase risk. The inspectors performed the walkdown while the redundant SBGT train was out of service for corrective maintenance. The inspectors also reviewed Procedure SOP-0043, "Standby Gas Treatment," Sys 257, Revision 9, and PID 27-15A, Revision 14, during the assessment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the licensee implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, and maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition. The inspectors completed walkdown inspections of the following plant areas and verified operational status and material condition of fire detection systems, mitigation systems, passive fire barriers, and the status of portable fire suppression equipment.

- Auxiliary building 70' crescent area
- Reactor building 186', 162', 141', and 114' levels
- Turbine building 67' level
- Fire pump building
- Fuel building 148' and 113' levels
- Control building 136', 116' and 98' levels
- Diesel generator building 98' level

The inspectors reviewed the following procedures during the fire protection assessment:

- Fire strategies for the associated areas
- Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) fire hazards analysis
- River Bend postfire safe shutdown analysis

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a periodic and seasonal flooding assessment to verify that the licensee's flooding mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with design requirements and risk analysis assumptions. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the RCIC room on May 10, 2001, and of the control building 70' level cable chase on June 12, 2001. The inspectors conducted the seasonal external flooding review following heavy rains which occurred during the week of June 4, 2001. The inspectors reviewed the following documents during the assessment:

- RBS individual plant examination of external events
- Calculation G13.18.8.0*004, Revision O, "Impact of the Construction of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation in the Unit 2 Excavation Area on the Design Basis Flood Levels for RBS Structures"

- RBS ER 00-0391, "Site Soil Preparations Required for Dry Cask Storage Pad"
- G13.18.12.3*15, "Internal Flooding Screening Analysis"
- G13.2.3 PN-317, "Max Flood Elevations for Moderate Energy Line Cracks in Cat I Structures"
- 12210-PN-319, "Maximum Flood Calculations for Long Term Post LOCA Passive Failures"
- PID-32-09 J&K, "Engineering P&I Diagram System 609, Drains - Floor and Equipment"
- USAR
- PID-31-01 A, D & H, "Engineering P&I Diagram, System 603, Radwaste Liquid"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the method and results of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger A (PEP-0239, "Performance Monitoring Program for the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers E12-EB001A and E12-EB001C," Division I) testing performed on April 14, 2001. The inspectors verified:

- The selected test methodology was consistent with Electric Power Research Institute NP 7552, "Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines," December 1991
- Test conditions were consistent with the selected methodology and procedural requirements
- Test acceptance criteria and results were consistent with the design-basis values
- Test results considered test instrument inaccuracies and differences

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on April 12, 2001, conducted to support single RR pump operation and plant shutdown. The inspectors verified the licensee implemented lessons learned and industry experiences supporting single RR pump operation, positive moderator coefficients, and period based detection system operation. The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of clarity and formality of communication, the ability to take timely action in the safe direction, prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms, correct use and implementation of procedures and timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions. The inspectors also compared simulator board configurations with actual control room board configurations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors independently verified the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule (MR) for selected risk-significant plant equipment with performance problems. The inspectors reviewed licensee MR scoping and characterization against the 10 CFR 50.65 criteria. The inspectors also reviewed licensee documentation of safety significance classifications, performance criteria, goals, and corrective actions for components classified as (a)(1). The inspectors selected the following performance problems and evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions and MR determinations:

- CR 2000-1664, "Inoperable CST Low Level Instrumentation"
- CR 2000-1384, "HPCS Diesel Speed Governor Test Failure"
- CR 2000-1257, "RCIC exceeds maintenance rule performance criteria"
- CR 2001-0403, "Service Water Cooling Pump 1B failure"
- CR 2001-0450, "B21-MOV085 steam leak"
- CR 2001-0479, "Recirculation Pump A trip"
- CR 2001-0518, "Feedwater Pump 1A minimum flow valve failure"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of risk assessments performed by the licensee for the work weeks beginning June 4 and 11, 2001, and for emergent work performed on the service water cooling, reactor feedwater, and RR systems. The following procedures were reviewed during the assessment:

- Maintenance planning guideline
- On-line maintenance guidelines
- Weekly maintenance schedules
- Equipment out-of-service computer program

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions and Events (71111.14)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and observed personnel performance following the unplanned RR pump trip on April 7, 2001, and unplanned reactor scram on April 21, 2001. The inspectors also observed operator performance in coping with nonroutine single RR pump reactor operation and shutdown on April 17, 2001. The inspectors observed portions of two reactor startups on April 20 and 23, 2001. The inspectors also reviewed GOP 4, "Single Loop Operation" Revision 15, AOP-007, "Loss of Feedwater Heating," Revision 19, and AOP-001, "Reactor Scram," Revision 17.

The inspectors evaluated the initiating causes of the RR pump trip and reactor scram (CR-2001-0479, trip of RR Pump A and CR-2001-0523, reactor scram and turbine trip). The inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and strip charts to determine what occurred; and that operators responded in accordance with plant procedures and training.

The inspectors also reviewed software input change Package #10/001 incorporating reduced fuel thermal limits curves in the plant process computer for single pressure regulator operations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of selected system operability evaluations and verified that the licensee considered other existing degraded conditions as compensating measures. The inspectors referred to the USAR and plant Technical Specifications during the review. The inspectors evaluated the operability of the HPCS system after observing high water level trip (level 8) was sealed in during shutdown operations. The inspectors also reviewed the following documents to ensure that operability was properly justified, the components remained available, and there was not a significant increase in risk:

- CR 2001-0391, "Division I Emergency Diesel Generator Unscheduled Unavailability and Operability"
- CR 2001-0523, "Reactor Scram on April 21, 2001 and Evaluation of Safety Relief Valve Response"
- CR-2001-0548, "Hydrogen Igniter Strings, Failure to Meet Surveillance Test Criteria"
- CR-2001-0450, "B21-MOV085, Main Steam Line Leakage Control System Boundary Valve Operability Determination"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the postmaintenance testing requirements specified for the maintenance action items (MAIs) listed below to ensure that testing activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability:

- MAI 327432, "Refurbishment and Signature test of inboard MSIV Positive Leakage Control Valve E33-MOVF005"
- MAI 343964, "Service Water Cooling Pump 1B Repairs and Refurbishment"
- MAI 340287, "HVK-CHL1D Control Building Chilled Water Chiller D, Replacement of Refrigerant"
- MIA 340024, "HVAC Chilled Water Purge Unit, HVK-CHL1D"
- MAI 335946, "Troubleshooting of Low chiller D Evaporator Pressure"

- MAI 342569, "ER# ER-RB-2001-0308-000, Loop Calibration Report, Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train A, Inlet Temperature Loop," Revision 0
- MAI 339667, "Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train A Electric Heater Thermocouple Switch Bi-Stable Calibration Record"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's forced outage plan prior to the April 18, 2001, shutdown to assess the licensee's outage risk control plan. The inspectors monitored shutdown activities and observed portions of the cooldown process to verify that Technical Specification cooldown restrictions were followed. The inspectors reviewed RR pump motor inspections and cable replacement activities.

The inspectors monitored plant heatup and startup activities on April 20 and 23, 2001. The inspectors verified, on a sampling basis, that Technical Specifications, license conditions and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant configurations.

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the drywell 114' level prior to reactor startup on April 20, 2001, and verified absence of debris which could adversely affect performance of the containment sumps.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (71111.21)

.1 System Requirements

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the heat removal needs for the residual heat removal system (including the low pressure safety injection, shutdown cooling, and suppression pool cooling modes), 480 Vac and 125 Vdc systems (including the associated inverter, battery chargers and batteries) were met. In this regard, the calculations, specification and testing of the cooling loads for the rooms in which the equipment was located were reviewed by the team.

The inspectors verified that required inputs to components, such as flow, pressure, and

temperature parameters, were consistent with design-basis analyses for the residual heat removal (including the low pressure safety injection, shutdown cooling, and suppression pool cooling modes), 480 Vac and 125 Vdc systems (including the associated invertors, battery chargers and batteries) and their support systems. In this regard the USAR and system-design criteria were reviewed and compared to calculations, and engineering requests, as well as, the equipment found in the field.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 System Condition and Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed equipment protection efforts regarding fire, flood, missile, and high energy line break. This included inspection of such things as hose stations, flood doors, building structure, and pipe whip restraints that were identified in design documents to be installed on the residual heat removal (including the low pressure safety injection, shutdown cooling, and suppression pool cooling modes), 480 Vac and 125 Vdc systems (including the associated invertor, battery chargers, and batteries).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the residual heat removal (including the low pressure safety injection, shutdown cooling, and suppression pool cooling modes), 480 Vac and 125 Vdc systems (including the associated invertors, battery chargers, and batteries). The walkdowns focused on the installation and configuration of piping, components, and instruments; the placement of protective barriers and systems; the susceptibility to flooding, fire, or other environmental concerns; the physical separation; the provisions for seismic concerns; and accessibility for operator action.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified, by witnessing and/or reviewing test data, that selected risk-significant systems and component surveillance tests met the Technical Specification, USAR, and procedure requirements. The inspectors ensured that surveillance tests demonstrated that the systems were capable of performing their intended safety functions and provided operational readiness. The inspectors specifically evaluated surveillance tests for preconditioning, clear acceptance criteria, range, accuracy and current calibration of test equipment and verified that equipment was properly restored at the completion of the testing. The inspectors reviewed and or observed the following surveillance tests and documents:

- STP-251-3202, Revision 10 & MAI # 340184, "Diesel Fire Pump Operational Test, Monthly Fire Pump Testing"
- STP-204-6302, Revision 18, "Div I LPCI (RHR) Quarterly Pump and Valve Operability Test"
- STP-204-6604, Revision 3, "Div I RHR Eighteen Month Position Indicators Verification Test"
- STP-254-1401, Revision 3, "Division 1 Hydrogen Igniter Train Current and Voltage Check"
- STP-254-1402, Revision 12, "Division 2 Hydrogen Igniter Train Current and Voltage Check"
- STP-204-6303, Revision 15, "Div I RHR Quarterly Valve Operability Test"
- PEP-0026, Revision 7, "Diesel Generator Operating Logs"
- STP-309-0201, Revision 21, "Division 1 Diesel Generator Operating Test"
- STP-505-5203, "Division 1 Flow Control Trip Reference (FCTR) Switch Verification"
- STP-505-5204, "Division 2 Flow Control Trip Reference (FCTR) Switch Verification"
- STP-309-6308, Revision 3, "Division II EDG Surveillance Test Procedure, Rear Bank Air Start System Quarterly Valve Operability Test (IST)"
- STP-309-0202, Revision 23, "Division II Diesel Generator Operability Test"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

On May 10-11, 2001, the inspectors reviewed Temporary Modifications 96-006, 99-014-00, 99-016-00, 00-008-00, 00-009-00, 00-012-00, 00-013-00, 00-014-00, 01-0001, 01-0002, and 01-0003 and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening evaluations against the USAR and Technical Specifications. The inspectors verified that the modifications did not adversely affect system operability or availability. None of the temporary modifications installed at the time of the inspection were risk significant.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing (71114.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the following actions to evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's offsite siren system for alerting the public in the event of a nuclear emergency:

- Reviewed licensee commitments for the siren system contained in the system design report, the emergency plan, and station procedures
- Reviewed changes to the system and their effect on commitments
- Evaluated the adequacy of siren test and maintenance procedures
- Reviewed a sampling of siren test records from November 2000 through March 2001
- Interviewed licensee personnel responsible for siren maintenance and testing
- Observed a monthly siren test performed by offsite governmental authorities

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing (71114.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the following actions to evaluate the licensee's system for notification of emergency response organization members and activation of onsite emergency response facilities:

- Reviewed emergency response organization notification and facility activation goals and commitments in the emergency plan and station procedures
- Reviewed the adequacy of design, operation, and testing of the primary and backup notification systems
- Observed simulated operation of the primary and backup notification systems
- Reviewed augmentation drill results, condition reports documenting augmentation system problems, and the adequacy of corrective actions
- Reviewed the qualification status for a sample of 25 emergency response organization members
- Interviewed two shift communicators and one shift manager responsible for performing emergency response organization augmentation notifications to evaluate the adequacy of training for this task

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Revisions 22 and 23 to the River Bend Station Emergency Plan and Revision 11 to Procedure EIP-2-001, "Classification of Emergencies," to determine if these revisions decreased the effectiveness of the plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (71114.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the following actions to evaluate emergency preparedness related efforts to correct weaknesses and deficiencies:

- Reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions taken for emergency preparedness problems identified in the year 2000 biennial exercise
- Reviewed quality assurance audit and surveillance reports for calendar years 1999 and 2000
- Interviewed the lead auditor for the quality assurance audit performed in April 2001
- Reviewed emergency preparedness condition reports and action items for the adequacy and timeliness of corrective actions
- Reviewed emergency planning department self-assessments for calendar year 1999 and 2000 to determine the quality of self-initiated corrective actions

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the licensee's June 5, 2001, emergency preparedness drill in order to evaluate the adequacy of the drill and critique. The following procedures and documents were reviewed during the assessment:

- EIP-2-001, "Classifications of Emergencies"
- EIP-2-002, "Classification Actions"
- EIP-2-006, "Notifications"
- EP-01-0605, "Drill Scenario No. 13 Site Drill"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstones: Occupational Radiation Safety and Public Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

a. Inspection Scope

On April 4, 2001, the inspectors observed workers entering a high radiation area to support an inclined fuel transfer system simulation. The inspectors also reviewed Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 2001-1005, "Inspections and Tours", Tasks 1 and 2.

b. Findings

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 19, Section 12(a), after plant workers made a high radiation area entry without being informed of the radiological conditions in the area. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).

On April 4, 2001, the inspectors observed outage personnel prepare to enter the controlled access area to perform an inclined fuel transfer system valve manipulation demonstration. The inspectors identified that outage personnel selected the incorrect RWP task during the prejob radiological briefing. The workers selected the "radiation area" task rather than the "high radiation area" task. The licensee took immediate corrective actions to ensure workers used the correct RWP task for the inclined fuel transfer system demonstration and entered the condition into the corrective action program (CR 2001-0463).

On April 5, 2001, during the investigation of the above condition report, the licensee identified that outage personnel had previously entered the inclined fuel transfer system high radiation area on the incorrect RWP task on March 30, 2001. The licensee determined that the workers were not informed of the radiological conditions in the area prior to the March 30, 2001, entry. The highest area dose rates were 180 mrem/hour at 30 centimeters. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program (CR 2001-0474).

The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the workers of the radiological conditions prior to a worker entering an area had a credible impact on safety. The event involved the potential for unplanned and unintended dose based on actual radiological conditions. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (SDP), the inspectors characterized the issue as very low safety significance (Green), since this was not an as low as reasonably achievable finding, the ability to assess dose was not compromised, and there was no actual exposure in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 dose limits. Also, the condition did not present a substantial potential for overexposure based on the alarming dosimetry setpoints of 20 mrem dose and 80 mrem/hour dose rates.

10 CFR Part 19, Section 12(a) states, in part, that all individuals who in the course of employment are likely to receive in a year an occupational dose in excess of 100 mrem shall be kept informed of the storage, transfer, or use of radiation and/or radioactive material. The failure to keep radiation workers informed of the radiological conditions was a violation of 10 CFR Part 19, Section 12(a) (NVC 50-458/0102-01). This violation is associated with an inspection finding that is characterized by the SDP as having very low safety significance (Green) and is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC enforcement policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001-0463 and CR 2001-0474.

4. **OTHER ACTIVITIES**

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 EDG and HPCS Performance Indicators

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors used NRC Inspection Manual Procedure 71151, performance indicator verification, to verify the accuracy and completeness of data associated with the safety system unavailability performance indicators. Systems reviewed during the assessment included EDG and HPCS. The following procedures and documents were reviewed during the verification:

- Performance indicator data summary report for the second quarter of 2000
- Performance indicator data summary report for the third quarter of 2000
- Performance indicator data summary report for the fourth quarter of 2000
- Performance indicator data summary report for the first quarter of 2001
- EDG system health report dated May 15, 2001
- HPCS system health report dated May 11, 2001
- NEI 99-02, Revision I, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines"
- Performance indicator technique sheets for emergency diesel ac power
- Performance indicator technique sheets for HPCS

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Safety System Functional Failures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors used NRC Inspection Manual Procedure 71151, performance indicator verification, to verify the accuracy and completeness of data associated with the safety system unavailability performance indicators. The following procedures and documents were reviewed during the verification:

- Performance indicator data summary report for the second quarter of 2000

- Performance indicator data summary report for the third quarter of 2000
- Performance indicator data summary report for the fourth quarter of 2000
- Performance indicator data summary report for the first quarter of 2001
- Entergy Correspondence RBF-01-0018 dated April 5, 2001, "Reportability of Unplanned Outages of the RCIC System"
- NEI 99-02, Revision I, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines"
- NUREG-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73"
- Performance indicator technique sheets for safety system functional failures

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Drill and Exercise Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed classification, notification, and protective action recommendation results from the year 2000 biennial exercise and selected emergency preparedness drills and simulator scenarios from the second quarter of calendar year 2000 through the first quarter of 2001 to verify the accuracy of the reported performance indicator data for that period. The inspector also observed an evaluated simulator training scenario, the results of which were included in performance indicator totals for the current quarter.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed drill participation data from the second quarter of calendar year 2000 through the first quarter of 2001 for a sample of 45 key emergency response organization members to verify the accuracy of data reported for this performance indicator for that period.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Alert and Notification System Reliability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of siren test results from the second quarter of calendar year 2000 through the first quarter of 2001 to verify the accuracy of data reported for this performance indicator for that period.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 458/0012-01: failure to prevent a simulated adversary from gaining access to a vital area. During an Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation conducted on June 19-23, 2000, a vulnerability in the licensee's protective strategy was identified that resulted in the simulated loss of a target set. Further details (safeguards information) are available in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/2000-12. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2000-1302. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process because it was not repeatable or predictable. The issue was more than minor because the potential loss of a target set represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the physical protection cornerstone. Prior to the end of the inspection, an identical scenario was exercised in which immediate corrective action for the issues identified in the first exercise prevented simulated destruction of the same target set.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 458/0012-02: failure to prevent a simulated adversary from gaining access to a vital area. During an Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation conducted on June 19-23, 2000, a vulnerability in the licensee's protective strategy was identified that resulted in the simulated loss of a target set. Further details (safeguards information) are available in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/2000-12. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2000-1302. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low by the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process because it was not repeatable or predictable. The issue was more than minor because the potential loss of a target set represents a credible impact on safety and impacts a key performance attribute of the Physical Protection Cornerstone. Prior to the end of the inspection, an identical scenario was exercised in which immediate corrective action for the issues identified in the first exercise prevented simulated destruction of the same target set.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Edington, Vice President - Operations, River Bend Station, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of various parts of the inspection on May 3 and 4, June 21, and during a telephonic exit meeting on May 9, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

M. Bakarich, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
R. Biggs, Coordinator, Licensing
W. Brian, Director, Engineering
E. Bush, Superintendent, Operations
R. Edington, Vice President-Operations
J. Fowler, Manager, Quality Assurance
R. Frayer, Supervisor, System Engineering
H. Goodman, Superintendent, Reactor Engineering
D. Heath, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
T. Hildebrandt, Manager, Maintenance
J. Holmes, Manager, Technical Support
R. Kerar, Fire Protection Engineer
R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
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F. Lenox, Technical Specialist IV, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
D. Lorfing, Coordinator, Licensing
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M. Walton, Licensing
D. Wells, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
D. Williamson, Licensing Specialist
M. Wyatt, Manager, Planning and Scheduling/Outage

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

50-458/0102-01	NCV	Failure to keep radiation workers informed of radiological conditions (Section 2SO1).
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ITEMS CLOSED

50-458/0012-01	URI	Failure to prevent a simulated adversary from gaining access to a vital area (Section 4OA5).
50-458/0012-02	URI	Failure to prevent a simulated adversary from gaining access to a vital area (Section 4OA5).

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:

Condition Reports

1997-1393	1999-0605	1999-0860	2000-0704	2000-1659
1998-0591	1999-0665	1999-0863	2000-0856	2000-1739
1998-0794	1999-0784	1999-0966	2000-1652	2000-1761
1999-0602	1999-0842	2000-0107	2000-1656	

Calculations

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
ES-146	Pool Temperature Response to Stuck Open Relief Valve Isolation, and ADS Events	0
G13.18.2.1*061	Auxiliary Building Design Basis Heat Loads and Unit Cooler Sizing Verification	0
G13.18.2.1*62	Auxiliary Building LOCA w/LOOP Temperature Transient Analysis/Zone Temperature w/Loss of HVAC	1
G13.18.4.6-3	RHR Heat Loads under Various Operating Modes	0
G13.18.12.2*10	Safe at Removal System Temperature Sensing Unit Transmitter 1RHS*RTD47D	0

Control Drawings

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
1-RHS-002-CD-A	1-RHS-020-002-2	3
1-RHS-003-CD-A	1-RHS-020-003-2 & 016-023-2	11
1-RHS-017-CD-A	1-RHS-010-017-2	5
1-RHS-032-CD-A	1-RHS-014-032-2	5

Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
PID-27-07A	System 204 Residual Heat Removal-LPCI	33

Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
PID-27-07B	System 204 Residual Heat Removal-LPCI	35
PID-27-07C	System 204 Residual Heat Removal-LPCI	24

One Line Diagrams

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
EE-001CE	480V One Line Diagram 1NHS-MCC102A & 102B Auxiliary Building	10
EE-001TB	480V One Line Diagram EHS*MCC2C8 Auxiliary Building	9
EE-001TC	480V One Line Diagram 1EHS*MCC2E Auxiliary Building	9
EE-001TD	480V One Line Diagram 1EHS*MCC2G & 2H Auxiliary Building	10
EE-001TE	480V One Line Diagram 1EHS*MCC2J & 2K Auxiliary Building	14
EE-001TF	480V One Line Diagram 1EHS*MCC2B Auxiliary Building	9
EE-001TG	480V One Line Diagram 1EHS*MCC2F Auxiliary Building	13
EE-001XA	480V One Line Diagram EHS-MCC15A, 15B, & NHS-MCC15A	8
EE-001YB	480V One Line Diagram 1EHS*MCC8B Standby Switchgear	9
EE-001ZC	One Line Diagram Stby Bus A & B Low Voltage Distribution System	11
EE-001ZG	125V One Line Diagram Standby Bus A 1ENB*SWG01A, 1ENB*PNL02A, 03A	15
EE-001ZH	125V One Line Diagram Standby Bus B 1ENB*SWG01B, 1ENB*PNL02B, 03B	16
EE-001ZJ	125V One Line Diagram Normal & Standby Backup Charger Sys	17
EE-1L	4160V One Line Diagram Standby Bus 1ENS*SWG1B	14

EE-1WA	480V One Line Diagram 1EHS*MCC14A &14 B Standby SWGR Room 1A	6
EE-42OL	Seismic Conduit Installation Plan El. 115'-0", 116'-0" Control Bldg	7

Engineering Requests

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
97-0718	RHR Heat Exchanger Cleaning	00
99-0347	Tube Sheet Pull from RHR D Heat Exchanger	0
99-0349	Alternate Means of Minimum Flow for RHR Pumps During Shutdown Cooling	00
99-0464	Insulation of Piping in the Auxiliary Building for Margin Recovery of Unit Coolers HVR-UC3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, & 10	0
99-0665	Insulation of Piping in the Auxiliary Building for Margin Recovery of Unit Coolers HVR-UC 7, & 10,	0
00-0700	Correct One Line Load Description	0

Procedures

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
ADM-0037	Equipment Identification and Labeling	0
ENG-3-037	Engineering Request Process	5A
LI-102	Corrective Action Process	0

Specification

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
248.000	Electrical Installation	10

Test Result

NUMBER	TITLE
PEP-0227	Performance Monitoring Program of Safety Related Auxiliary Building Unit Cooler 1HVR*UC5 (DIV I)

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
EDG	emergency diesel generator
HPCS	high pressure core spray
MAI	maintenance action item
MR	maintenance rule
NCV	noncited violation
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
RCIC	reactor core isolation cooling
RR	reactor recirculation
RWP	radiation work permit
SBGT	standby gas treatment
SDP	significance determination process
URI	unresolved item
USAR	Updated Safety Analysis Report

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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We regret any inconvenience that this error may have caused. Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William D. Johnson, Chief
Project Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47

Enclosure:
Section 1R17 and revised
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10/19/01	10/22/01	10/22/01		

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ENCLOSURE

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedures governing plant modifications to evaluate the effectiveness of the program for implementing modifications to risk-significant systems, structures, and components, such that these changes did not adversely affect the design and licensing basis of the facility. The inspectors also reviewed 10 permanent plant modification packages to verify that they were performed in accordance with plant procedures. Procedures and permanent plant modifications reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.

The inspectors conducted field walkdowns of two permanent plant modifications. The inspectors interviewed the cognizant design and system engineers for the identified modifications as to their understanding of the modification packages.

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action process to identify and correct problems concerning the performance of permanent plant modifications. In this effort, the inspectors reviewed River Bend Station condition reports and the subsequent corrective actions pertaining to licensee-identified problems and errors in the performance of permanent plant modifications. River Bend Station condition reports reviewed are listed in Attachment 1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

ATTACHMENT

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ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

50-458/0102-01	NCV	Failure to keep radiation workers informed of radiological conditions (Section 2SO1)
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ITEMS CLOSED

50-458/0012-01	URI	Failure to prevent a simulated adversary from gaining access to a vital area (Section 4OA5)
50-458/0012-02	URI	Failure to prevent a simulated adversary from gaining access to a vital area (Section 4OA5)

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the inspection and to support any findings:

Procedures

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
RBNP-010	Configuration Management	10
DC-115	ER Response Development	0 with TCN R2
DC-116	ER Response Installation	0
DC-117	Post Modification Testing and Special Testing Instructions	0
DC-118	ER Response Closure	0

Modification Requests (MRs)

M95-0506	Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling System Injection Valves Manual Overriding
M96-0069	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling reroute to Feedwater
M96-0070	Replace E12-RVF055A/B with Thermal Relief Valves
M96-0079	Specify New Standby Diesel Generator Intake Expansion Joint

Engineering Requests (ERs)

- ER97-0142 Alternate Gaskets for High Pressure Cooling System Diesel Generator
- ER97-0293 Modify Control Circuit of E22-S004-ACB001 Spring Charging Motor
- ER98-0097 Engineering Request Parts Interchangeability Evaluation and Commercial Grade Item Evaluation for 1009SW Ashcroft Pressure Gage
- ER98-0426 Provide Class 1E Power to Division I & II Diesel Generator Air System
- ER99-0450 Install Time Delay Drop Out Relay to Prevent Sudden Motor Reversal and Subsequent Breaker Trip
- ER99-0730 Modify Actuator to Increase the Torque Output Capability as a result of Limitorque® Technical Update 98-01

Condition Reports (CRs)

- 2000-0015
- 2000-0827
- 2000-1196
- 2000-1422
- 2000-1615
- 2001-0438

LIST OF ACRONYMS

- CFR Code of Federal Regulations
- EDG emergency diesel generator
- HPCS high pressure core spray
- MAI maintenance action item
- MR maintenance rule
- NCV noncited violation
- NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- RCIC reactor core isolation cooling
- RR reactor recirculation
- RWP radiation work permit
- SBGT standby gas treatment
- SDP significance determination process
- URI unresolved item
- USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report