

December 6, 2001

Mr. M. Reddemann
Site Vice President
Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-266/01-14; 50-301/01-14

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On November 6, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on November 2, 2001, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, this inspection was a routine review of plant activities by the resident and regional inspectors.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green). The issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a Non-Cited Violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Point Beach facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you provide one, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Roger D. Lanksbury

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-266/01-14; 50-301/01-14

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301
License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No: 50-266/01-14; 50-301/01-14

Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location: 6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

Dates: October 1, 2001, through November 6, 2001

Inspectors: P. Krohn, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Powell, Resident Inspector
S. Orth, Senior Radiation Specialist
R. Schmitt, Radiation Specialist
D. Nelson, Radiation Specialist

Approved by: Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000266-01-14, IR 05000301-01-14, on 10/1-11/6/2001, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2. Adverse Weather Protection.

This report covers a 6-week routine resident inspection and baseline radiation protection and emergency preparedness inspections. The inspections were conducted by resident and regional specialist inspectors. One Green finding was identified in the area of adverse weather protection. The finding involved a Non-Cited Violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector-Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action"), in that the licensee failed to take corrective action prior to the onset of freezing temperatures in the fall of 2001 for previously identified problems with the plant's freeze protection system.

The finding was considered to be more than minor because the freeze protection system helps to protect safety-related components from freezing and the system's failure could have a credible impact on safety. Because there was no actual failure of safety-related components associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone, the finding is considered to be of very low significance (Green). (Section 1R01)

B. Licensee-Identified Findings

None.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained at 100 percent until October 15, 2001, when power was reduced to approximately 70 percent for work associated with the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant switchyard. Unit 1 was returned to 100 percent power on October 17 and remained at or near full power until October 23 when power was reduced to 65 percent per direction of the controller of the utility's electrical distribution grid. Unit 1 was returned to 100 percent power on October 25 and remained at or near full power until October 28 when power was reduced to 90 percent due to offsite power Line 111 unavailability. Unit 1 was returned to 100 percent power later that same day and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of inspection period.

Unit 2 was operated at or near 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Emergency Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's cold weather readiness to verify that cold weather protection features such as heat tracing (the facade freeze protection system) and space heaters were monitored and functional; that plant features and procedures for ice melt operations were appropriate; and that operator actions specified in the licensee's cold weather preparation procedures verified the readiness of essential systems. As part of this effort, the inspectors accompanied a non-licensed operator during the operator's check of the preparedness of plant areas and equipment for cold weather. The inspectors also attempted to verify that the licensee had entered weather related problems, which could affect mitigating systems and support systems, in their corrective action program and that the problems were being properly addressed for resolution.

a. Findings

The inspectors reviewed corrective actions from a December 6, 2000, facade freeze event during which three sensing lines in the facade area were found to be frozen. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 00-4046, "Numerous Problems With Freeze Protection." The inspectors noted that immediate actions were taken to correct the as-found condition and an action was assigned to conduct a root cause evaluation (RCE). Licensee records document that the RCE was completed by the assigned individual and forwarded for management review on January 12, 2001. Although the January 12 date was beyond the original due date of January 7, the extension was approved by the plant manager, as permitted by

licensee procedure. The engineering group head concurred with the evaluation and, pending minor editorial changes, approved it and forwarded it to the issue manager. The next documented action on the RCE was engineering management (issue manager) approval on May 7, followed by approval by the corrective action program manager on September 4, approximately 9 months after the facade freeze event and 8 months after the initial completion of the RCE.

The inspectors observed that as a result of the untimely completion of the RCE, corrective actions were not formally assigned until September 4, 2001, with due dates extending as far as November 30, well after freezing temperatures were expected in Two Rivers, Wisconsin. The inspectors noted that some of the corrective actions were actually accomplished in the January 2001 time frame in accordance with existing work plans and modification packages. For example, final evaluation of thermocouple placement was completed by the vendor in January 2001. Additionally, Operating Instruction 106, "Facade Freeze Protection," was revised in December 2000 to correct an identified procedure inadequacy.

One corrective action involving restoration of piping insulation removed during maintenance and contingency plans for in-progress work which required insulation removal during freezing conditions had not been accomplished. The action was assigned a due date of September 30, 2001. On October 1, the inspectors contacted the assigned individual and were informed that not only had the action not been completed, but the individual was unaware he had been assigned the action.

The inspectors reviewed RCE 00-109, "Numerous Problems Identified With the Freeze Protection System," approved, as discussed above, on September 4, 2001, and noted that the same issue involving maintenance activities in the facade during cold weather was previously identified as being a contributing factor in the January 1999 facade freeze event involving the safety injection (SI) system recirculation line. Ineffective corrective actions from an issue previously identified by RCE 99-003, "Safety Injection Recirc Line Freeze," was identified by the licensee to be a contributing cause to the December 2000 event.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to take prompt action to resolve an identified condition adverse to quality was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action." Criterion XVI required that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected. The inspectors determined that despite identifying on multiple occasions that inadequate control of maintenance activities in the facade during cold weather conditions resulted in frozen pipes, the condition still existed in the fall of 2001 when temperatures again decreased below the freezing point at the Point Beach plant.

The inspectors used NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process, (SDP)," Appendix A, dated February 5, 2001, to evaluate the violation. The finding was considered to be more than minor and have a credible impact on safety due to the uncorrected condition being a contributing cause to previous facade freeze events, yet remaining uncorrected during the onset of cold weather conditions in the fall of 2001. The finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone because it could have credibly affected the operability of a system or train in a mitigating system (SI and

residual heat removal (RHR)). As a result, the inspectors initiated Phase 1 of the SDP. The inspectors determined that the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) based on the SDP Phase 1 Screening Worksheet for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone because no actual loss of safety function occurred.

This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) (NCV 50-266/01-14-01; 50-301/01-14-01) consistent with Section VI.A. of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was in the licensee's corrective action system as CR 01-2728, "Status of Root Cause Evaluations."

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Fire Protection System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial system walk-down of the fire protection system, while the electric fire pump, P-35A, was out-of-service for planned maintenance. The inspectors used licensee checklists and drawings to accomplish the inspection.

The inspectors walked down the diesel-driven fire pump, P-35B, and portions of the distribution headers to verify the correct position of control switches and valves. The inspectors also reviewed the tagout associated with the P-35A work for appropriateness. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unit 2 "A" Component Cooling Water (CCW) Train

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial system walk-down of the Unit 2 "A" train CCW system, while the Unit 2 "B" train CCW system was out-of-service for planned maintenance. The inspectors used licensee checklists and drawings to accomplish the inspection.

The inspectors conducted the walkdown to verify the position of open, shut, locked, and throttled valves; to verify that control power was aligned to select motor-operated valves; and to inspect valve material condition. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated other elements, such as pipe supports, area radiation levels, housekeeping, and component labeling.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down the following areas to assess the overall readiness of fire protection equipment and barriers:

- Fire Zone 225, Battery Room - D106
- Fire Zone 226, 125 Volts Direct Current Electrical Equipment Room - D04
- Fire Zone 227, 125 Volts Direct Current Electrical Equipment Room - D03
- Fire Zone 321, Swing Battery Room - D305
- Fire Zone 323, Charger Room - D301
- Fire Zone 324, NonSafety-Related Battery Room - D205

Emphasis was placed on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition of fire protection equipment, and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or propagation. Area conditions/configurations were evaluated based on information provided in the licensee's "Fire Hazards Analysis Report," dated August 17, 2001.

The inspectors looked at fire hoses, sprinklers, and portable fire extinguishers to verify that they were installed at their designated locations, were in satisfactory physical condition, and were unobstructed. The inspectors also evaluated the physical location and condition of fire detection devices. Additionally, passive features such as fire doors, fire dampers, and mechanical and electrical penetration seals were inspected to verify that they were located per Fire Protection Evaluation Report requirements and were in good physical condition. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements to verify that component and equipment failures were identified, entered, and scoped within the maintenance rule and that select structures, systems and components were properly categorized and classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors reviewed station logs, maintenance work orders (WOs), (a)(1) corrective action plans, selected surveillance test procedures, and a sample of CRs to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the maintenance rule at an appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were

appropriate. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's performance criteria to verify that the criteria adequately monitored equipment performance and to verify that licensee changes to performance criteria were reflected in the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment. Specific components and systems reviewed were:

- 120-Volts Alternating Current (Y System)
- SI System
- RHR System
- Fire Protection

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, configuration control, and performance of maintenance associated with planned and emergent work activities, to verify that scheduled and emergent work activities were adequately managed. In particular, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for conducting maintenance risk safety assessments to verify that the licensee's planning, risk management tools, and the assessment and management of on-line risk were adequate. The inspectors also reviewed licensee actions to address increased on-line risk when equipment was out-of-service for maintenance, such as establishing compensatory actions, minimizing the duration of the activity, obtaining appropriate management approval, and informing appropriate plant staff, to verify that the actions were accomplished when on-line risk was increased due to maintenance on risk-significant structures, systems, and components. The following specific activities were reviewed:

- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning September 30, 2001. This included work involving risk-significant surveillance testing of the SI and RHR systems and planned maintenance on risk significant battery room exhaust Fans 0-W-085 and 0-W-086.
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning October 7, 2001. This included work involving risk-significant surveillance testing of the Unit 1, 'B' Train emergency diesel generator (EDG) while the Unit 2 'B' EDG was out-of-service due to an electrical generator rotor failure, undervoltage relay testing, and preventative maintenance on the electric-driven fire pump. The inspectors also reviewed the additional activities added to the week to verify that emergent work did not adversely affect the risk assessment which had been previously completed for the work week.
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning October 14, 2001. This included work involving risk-significant post-maintenance testing (PMT) of the Unit 2 'B' EDG, G-04, following generator rotor replacement

and the unavailability of auxiliary feedwater bearing and battery room coolers due to cleaning of several service water (SW) strainers potentially fouled by lake grass. The inspectors also reviewed the additional activities added to the week to verify that emergent work did not adversely affect the risk assessment which had been previously completed.

Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 01-3133, "IT [Inservice Test] 14 Not Listed In Safety Monitor as a Safety Significant Procedure," which was initiated as a result of this inspection activity. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

.1 Intrusion of Lake Grass Into SW System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the operability determination associated with CR 01-3131, "Intrusion of Some Sort of Lake Grass," to understand the impact of fine lake grass which passed through the traveling water screens and the main SW Zurn Strainers during the week of October 8, 2001. The inspectors reviewed licensee efforts to monitor safety-related equipment for signs of reduced cooling water flow which included cleaning and monitoring of the auxiliary feedwater pumps, the G-02 EDG, and the primary auxiliary building battery room cooler SW strainers. The inspectors also interviewed the SW system engineer to understand the deposition characteristics of the fine lake grass in the containment fan coil units in primary containment, the normal bearing cooling configurations associated with the auxiliary feedwater pumps, and the remote alarms associated with the primary auxiliary building battery room coolers. Finally, the inspectors reviewed selected individual strainer cleaning records to understand the extent of lake grass intrusion into individual plant components and systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

.1 Unit 2 RHR Pump 2P-10A

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed PMT activities conducted in accordance with OI [Operating Instruction] 163, "SI, RHR, and CS [containment spray] Pump Runs," Revision 1, following an oil change of 2P-10A to verify that the test was adequate for the scope of

the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors selected this activity due to the risk significance of the RHR system. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Instrument Air Compressor Semiannual, Power Supply Breaker, and Interstage Solenoid Maintenance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PMT activities conducted in accordance with WOs 9937529, 9922489, and 9929957 following instrument air compressor K-2A semiannual maintenance, power supply breaker diagnostic testing, and replacement of the interstage vent solenoid valve. The inspectors reviewed the PMT activities to verify that the tests were adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design basis requirements. The inspectors also walked down the tagout series during and following the maintenance to verify that the work and PMT activities had no unintended consequences on other operating equipment and to verify that the compressor was properly returned to service. The inspectors selected this activity due to the contribution of the instrument air compressors to core damage frequency. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 P-35A Electric Fire Pump

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PMT activities conducted on October 12, 2001, in accordance with WOs 9931842 and 9944696, following replacement of FP-00022, pump discharge to test header isolation valve, and bench adjustment of FP-03726, minimum flow control valve. The inspectors reviewed the PMT activities to verify that the tests were adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design basis requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 PMT Associated with EDG G-04 Rotor Replacement

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PMT activities associated with EDG G-04 electrical generator rotor replacement which was conducted in accordance with WO 9945368 and Point Beach Test Procedure 107, "EDG G-04 Test." The inspectors reviewed the PMT activities to verify that the tests were adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design basis requirements. The inspectors also walked down the tagout series during the maintenance to verify that the work and PMT activities had no unintended consequences on other operating equipment. The inspectors selected this activity due to the contribution of the EDG to core damage frequency and the total generator rewinding that had taken place following failure during a previous surveillance test.

The inspectors reviewed and observed portions of each of the PMTs in Point Beach Test Procedure 107 which included manual start tests, fast start tests, endurance and margin test load runs, full load rejection and hot restart tests, reliability tests and single largest load pickup and rejection tests to verify that the rewound rotor had been rigorously tested and remained capable of meeting all design basis requirements. The inspectors considered power factor loading of the generator during overload testing, single largest load characteristics, bearing insulation resistance acceptance criteria, inductive and capacitive characteristics of a temporary load bank used during single largest load pickup and reject testing, and meggar readings of the generator stator and rotor resistance during the PMT sequence. The inspectors also made observations to verify that the electrical generator oil sightglasses had been installed at the correct elevation and in accordance with the original design specifications to ensure adequate electrical generator bearing lubrication capabilities during design basis functions. The inspectors reviewed the completed Point Beach Test Procedure 107 to verify that all acceptance criteria had been met and supervisory reviews had been critically and properly completed. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Unit 2 CCW Pump 2P-11A Oil Change and Pump Bearing Reservoir Site Glass Modification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed PMT activities conducted in accordance with WOs 9941690 and 9930263 following an oil change of 2P-11A and addition of pump inboard and outboard bearing oil reservoir sight glasses to verify that the tests were adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors observed portions of the oil

change and bearing modification activities to verify that foreign material exclusion controls were properly applied, the correct oil was added to the bearing reservoirs, and the equipment was restored to a normal configuration following maintenance activities. The inspectors selected this activity due to the risk significance of the CCW system. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

.1 Unit 2 White Channel Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features Quarterly Surveillance Test

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed reactor protection system (RPS) design basis requirements and observed performance of Instrumentation and Control Surveillance Test 2ICP 2.001WH, "Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features White Channel Analog Quarterly Surveillance Test," Revision 1, to verify operability of the RPS system. The inspectors compared surveillance test acceptance criteria against Technical Specification requirements to verify that the test acceptance criteria were conservative relative to the safe operating limits defined in Technical Specifications Sections 15.2.3, "Limiting Safety System Settings, Protective Instrumentation," and 15.3.5, "Instrumentation System." The inspectors observed instrumentation and control technician calibration techniques, communication interfaces with the duty control room crew, and concurrent and independent verification practices when removing and restoring RPS instruments and bistables from service. Test instruments used during the surveillance test were inspected to verify calibrations were current. The inspectors also reviewed the completed surveillance test procedure to verify that supervisory reviews had been properly completed.

Finally, the inspectors reviewed document feedback form "1 & 2 ICP [Instrumentation and Control Procedure] 02.001 Rd, WH, BL, YL," which was initiated as a result of this inspection activity and reviewed as part of the inspection scope. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 P-35A Electric Fire Pump

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed surveillance testing of the electric fire pump, P-35A, on October 17, 2001, to verify that the pump was capable of performing its intended safety

function. The inspectors reviewed the test to verify that it was adequate to demonstrate operational readiness consistent with the design and licensing basis documents, and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear. Portions of the test were observed to verify that the test was performed as written, that all testing prerequisites were satisfied, and that the test data were complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

.1 Differential Pressure Indicators for North and South SW Zurn Strainers

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modifications 99-040 and 99-041, "Differential Pressure Indicators for SW-02911/02912-BS," which were installed in September 1999, to verify that the modifications were properly installed, provided accurate indications, and continued to meet their intended functions. The inspectors reviewed the calibration frequency, tolerances, and the effects of instrument drift of the differential pressure indicators over the two-year period of installation to verify that SW system transients remained bounded by design basis analyses. The inspectors compared differential pressure indicator calibration records to vendor specifications to verify that the instrument stability requirements were satisfied. The inspectors also questioned licensee temporary modification processes to determine if mechanisms existed to verify the calibration of instruments associated with temporary modifications that had been installed for extended periods of time.

Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 01-3114, "Zurn Strainer Differential Pressure Indicating Transmitters Not Calibrated in 2 Years," which was initiated as a result of this inspection activity.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing (71114.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors discussed with the emergency preparedness (EP) staff the design, maintenance, and periodic testing of the public Alert and Notification System (ANS) for the station's emergency planning zone (EPZ) to verify that the system was tested and maintained in accordance with emergency plan commitments. The inspectors reviewed records of annual preventive maintenance and non-scheduled maintenance activities performed during calendar years 2000 and 2001. During this inspection, the inspectors also observed the licensee's response to problems concerning the acceptance criteria

applied to siren testing and the documentation of annual preventative maintenance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's criteria for determining whether each model of siren installed in the EPZ would perform as expected if activated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing (71114.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors discussed with the EP staff the primary and backup provisions for initiating augmentation of the on-shift emergency response organization (ERO) during normal business and off-hours. The inspectors reviewed a sample of records of unannounced, off-hours staff augmentation drills, which were conducted in calendar years 2000 and 2001 to determine whether the licensee met its off-hours augmentation drill commitments and had initiated acceptable corrective actions for drill performance concerns. In particular, the inspectors discussed with the licensee corrective actions to address repetitive drill failures that the licensee had identified. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of the licensee's ERO training records, including those related to persons who would initiate an off-hours ERO augmentation, to ensure that personnel were qualified to perform their assigned responsibilities. The inspectors reviewed the EP staff's provisions for updating the call-out roster and its current revision to assess the adequacy of the numbers of personnel assigned to each key and support ERO position.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed Revision 19 to Appendix D of the Point Beach Emergency Plan to verify that the revision did not appear to reduce the effectiveness of the licensee's emergency planning, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (71114.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's audits of the EP program to ensure that its year 2000 and 2001 assessments met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). The inspector

also reviewed other assessments of EP program activities (e.g., self-assessments and drill records and critiques) to verify that the licensee was adequately identifying and correcting deficiencies, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspector reviewed a sample of CRs and related records resulting from the aforementioned audits and EP program reviews to determine whether the licensee had taken acceptable corrective actions on self-identified concerns.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the control room simulator and technical support center during an emergency preparedness drill conducted on October 4, 2001. The inspection focused on the ability of the licensee to appropriately classify emergency conditions, complete timely notifications, and implement appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with approved procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

.1 Plant Walkdowns, Radiological Boundary Verifications, and Radiation Work Permit Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the radiologically controlled area (RCA) to verify the adequacy of radiological boundaries and postings. Specifically, the inspectors walked down several radiologically significant work area boundaries (high and locked high radiation areas) in the Unit 2 Containment and in the Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Buildings. Confirmatory radiation measurements were taken to verify that these areas, and other selected radiation areas were properly posted and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, licensee procedures, and Technical Specifications. The inspectors reviewed Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) for routine plant tours, a discharge of Blowdown Evaporator concentrates, and an "At Power" entry into Unit 2 Containment, for Accumulator Tank sampling. The RWPs were evaluated for protective clothing requirements and electronic dosimetry alarm setpoints to verify that work instructions

and controls had been adequately specified and that electronic dosimeter setpoints were in conformity with survey indications.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

.2 Job-In-Progress Reviews, Observations of Radiation Worker Performance, and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the following high exposure or high radiation area work activities performed during the inspection and evaluated the licensee's use of radiological controls:

- Discharge of Evaporator Blowdown Concentrates
- Unit 2 Accumulator Tanks sampling

The inspectors attended pre-job briefings for both of the aforementioned activities. The inspectors evaluated the radiological job requirements for each activity. The inspectors then observed portions of the Evaporator Blowdown evolution and participated in the entry into the Unit 2 Containment (i.e., for sampling Accumulator Tanks) to verify compliance with regulatory requirements. The inspectors evaluated required surveys, including system breach radiation, contamination, and airborne surveys; radiation protection job coverage; and contamination controls, to verify that appropriate radiological controls were utilized. The inspectors also reviewed completed surveys and applicable postings and barricades to verify their accuracy. The inspectors evaluated the radiation protection technician (RPT) and radiation worker job performance at the work sites to verify that the RPTs and workers were aware of the significance of the radiological conditions in their workplace and the RWP controls/limits given the level of radiological hazards present and the level of their training.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Reviews of Licensee's Programmatic Controls for Highly Activated/Contaminated Materials

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedure SOP-FH-001, "Fuel/Insert/Component Movement in the Spent Fuel Pool or New Fuel Vault," to verify that all highly activated/contaminated materials were properly stored and controlled. The inspectors also discussed the licensee's programmatic controls over the highly activated/contaminated materials with the radiation protection (RP) personnel/engineering staff.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated licensee calendar year (CY) 2000-2001CRs, which focused on access control to radiologically significant areas (i.e., problems concerning activities in HRAs, radiation protection technician performance, and radiation worker practices). The inspectors examined Nuclear Procedure (NP) 5.3.1, "Condition Reporting System." The inspectors also reviewed Radiation Protection Self-Assessments "High Radiation Area Controls and RP Station Documentation." The inspectors reviewed these documents to verify the licensee's ability to identify repetitive problems, contributing causes, the extent of conditions, and then implement other corrective actions in order to achieve lasting results.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71121.03)

.1 Source Tests and Calibration of Radiological Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated radiological instrumentation associated with monitoring transient high and/or very high radiation areas, and instruments used for remote emergency assessment to verify that the calibrations were conducted consistent with industry standards and in accordance with station procedures. The inspectors reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and performed walkdowns to confirm that selected area radiation monitors (ARMs) were operable and properly indicated area radiation levels. The inspectors examined the licensee's alarm setpoints for selected ARMs to verify that the setpoints were established consistent with the FSAR, Technical Specifications, and the station's Emergency Plan.

Specifically, the inspectors selectively reviewed calibration procedures and CY 2000-2001 calibration records for the following radiation monitoring instrumentation:

- Unit 1, Containment 66' elevation, 1RM-126 ARM;
- CVCS [Chemical and Volume Control System] Holdup Tank Area, RE-114 ARM;
- Central Auxiliary Building, 8' elevation, RE-112 ARM;
- Unit 2 Seal Table, 46' elevation, 2RE-107 ARM; and
- Spent Fuel Pool Area, RE-105 ARM.

The inspectors discussed surveillance practices with licensee personnel and reviewed CY 2000 - 2001 calibration records and procedures for selected radiation monitors used

for assessment of internal exposure. The inspectors also reviewed calibration records and procedures for those instruments utilized for surveys of personnel and equipment prior to egress from the RCA. The inspectors examined (and observed RP staff complete functional tests of) selected continuous air monitoring instruments, personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, and a small article monitor to verify that these instruments were source checked and calibrated adequately, consistent with station procedures and industry standards. These instruments included:

- AMS-4 Air Monitoring System;
- Gamma 40/60 Portal Monitor;
- Whole Body Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM-1B); and
- Small Articles Monitor (SAM-9/11).

The inspectors examined portable survey instruments maintained in the licensee's instrument calibration facilities and instrument issue area to verify that those instruments designated "ready for use" had current calibrations, were operable, and were in good physical condition. The inspectors observed radiation protection staff source check portable radiation survey instruments to verify that those source checks were adequately completed using appropriate radiation sources and station procedures. The inspectors reviewed the calibration procedures and selected CY 2001 calibration records to verify that the portable radiation survey instruments had been properly calibrated consistent with the licensee's procedures. The inspectors observed the calibrations of the following instruments:

- RM-14, Portable frisker;
- RS0-50 Ion chamber; and
- Temporary Area Monitor, Model #3090-3/3096-3.

Additionally, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the post-accident sampling system and reviewed quality control records to ensure that the system was capable of obtaining representative samples of the reactor coolant system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's respiratory protection program for compliance with the requirements of Subpart H of 10 CFR Part 20, to ensure that SCBAs were properly maintained and stored and to ensure that personnel required to don SCBAs were qualified. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the monthly testing records for CY 2001 for SCBAs located in various areas within the site. The inspectors also performed walkdowns of the SCBA storage locations and inspected a sample of the units to assess the material condition of the equipment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's current training and qualification records to verify that applicable emergency response, fire brigade, and control room personnel were currently trained

and qualified for SCBA use, as required by the Emergency Plan, FSAR, and plant procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed CY 2001 CRs that addressed radiation instrument/SCBA deficiencies to determine if any significant radiological incidents involving radiation instrument deficiencies had occurred since the last assessment. Additionally, the inspectors examined these CRs to verify the licensee's ability to identify repetitive problems, contributing causes, the extent of conditions, and implement corrective actions to achieve lasting results. The inspectors also reviewed Nuclear Oversight, Quarterly Report 1Q2001, "Calibration of Radiological Instruments," to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's self-assessment process to identify, characterize, and prioritize problems and to verify that previous radiological instrumentation/SCBA-related issues were adequately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)

.1 Reactor Coolant System Leakage PI

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the 2000 and 2001 data for the Reactor Coolant System Leakage PI for Units 1 and 2 using the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 1.

The inspectors reviewed operations department data to verify that the maximum monthly value of identified leakage had been reported as required by NEI 99-02. The inspectors also reviewed CR 01-3182, "NRC Performance Indicator Incorrectly Reported," which was initiated as a result of this inspection activity.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 High Pressure Injection System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed reported second quarter 2001 data for the High Pressure Injection System Unavailability PIs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 using the PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02.

The inspectors reviewed station log entries and system engineer data sheets for periods of system unavailability. The inspectors verified that planned and unplanned unavailability hours were characterized correctly in determining PI results. The inspectors also verified PI data through independent calculations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 RHR System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed reported third quarter 2001 data for the RHR System and Unavailability PIs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 using the PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02.

The inspectors reviewed station log entries and system engineer data sheets for periods of system unavailability. The inspectors verified that planned and unplanned unavailability hours were characterized correctly in determining PI results. The inspectors also verified PI data through independent calculations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Emergency Preparedness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's records related to each of the three emergency preparedness PIs to verify that the licensee's program was implemented consistent with NEI 99-02 and licensee procedures. Specifically, licensee's records related to the ANS, ERO Drill Participation, and Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) PIs were reviewed to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data submitted to the NRC for the period October 2000 through September 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)

Temporary Fire Seals Not In Compliance With Qualifying Calculations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Event Notification 38424 made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 on October 24, 2001, regarding the installation of nine temporary fire seals that were not in compliance with the qualifying calculation. The inspectors reviewed the location of the degraded fire seals to understand the effects on train separation required for safe shutdown equipment. The inspectors interviewed selected fire protection personnel, monitored the licensee compensatory actions, and observed repair of selected penetrations to ensure fire barrier operability was restored.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting

The resident inspectors presented the routine inspection results to Mr. M. Reddemann and other members of licensee management on November 2, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

Interim Exit Meetings

Senior Official at Exit Meeting:	M. Reddemann, Site Vice President
Date:	October 26, 2001
Proprietary Information:	No
Subject:	Emergency Preparedness, Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas, and Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Change to Inspection Findings:	No

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

R. Anderson, Training
A. Cayia, Plant Manager
D. Flannagan, Emergency Preparedness
F. Flentje, Senior Regulatory Compliance Specialist
D. Gehrke, Nuclear Oversight Supervisor
W. Hennessey, System Engineering Manager
N. Hoefert, Engineering Programs Manager
V. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager
C. Krause, Regulatory Assurance
J. Lindsay, RP General Supervisor
R. Mende, Director of Engineering
M. Reddemann, Site Vice-President
D. Schoon, Operations Manager
D. Shannon, Radiation Protection Supervisor
S. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Turner, Inservice Inspection Coordinator
T. Webb, Licensing Manager
W. Yarosz, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

NRC

B. Wetzel, Point Beach Project Manager, NRR

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-266/01-14-01 50-301/01-14-01	NCV	Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action Regarding Inadequate Control of Maintenance Activities During Cold Weather Conditions (Section 1R01)
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Closed

50-266/01-14-01 50-301/01-14-01	NCV	Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action Regarding Inadequate Control of Maintenance Activities During Cold Weather Conditions (Section 1R01)
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Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ANS	Alert and Notification System
ARMs	Area Radiation Monitors
CCW	Component Cooling Water
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
CS	Containment Spray
CY	Calendar Year
DEP	Drill and Exercise Performance
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EP	Emergency Preparedness
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
ICP	Instrumentation and Control Procedure
IR	Inspection Report
IT	Inservice Test
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NP	Nuclear Procedure
OI	Operating Instruction
PI	Performance Indicator
PMT	Post-Maintenance Testing
PT	Periodic Test
RCA	Radiologically Controlled Area
RCE	Root Cause Evaluation
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
RP	Radiation Protection
RPS	Reactor Protection System
RPT	Radiation Protection Technician
RWP	Radiation Work Permit
SCBA	Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SI	Safety Injection
SW	Service Water
TS	Technical Specification Test
WO	Work Order

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1R01 Adverse Weather

PC 49 Part 1	Turbine Building Ventilation	Revision 6
PC 49 Part 3	Auxiliary Building Ventilation	Revision 9
PC 49 Part 5	Cold Weather Checklists: Outside Areas and Miscellaneous	Revision 14
CR 00-4046	Numerous Problems With Freeze Protection	December 6, 2000
RCE 00-109	Numerous Problems Identified With the Freeze Protection System	September 4, 2001
RCE 99-003	Safety Injection Recirc Line Freeze	February 12, 1999
Operating Instruction (OI) 106	Facade Freeze Protection	Revision 18
OI 38	Circulating Water System Operation	Revision 26
CR 01-2728	Status of Root Cause Evaluations	August 30, 2001

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Check List (CL) 19	Fire Protection System Valves	Revision 30
Bechtel Drawing 6118, M-208	Fire Water	Revision 41
Tagout Series 0 FP P-35A-M EM	Electric Fire Pump Motor	October 9, 2001
Tagout Series 0 FP P-35A-M MM	Electric Fire Pump	October 9, 2001
2-CL-CC-001	Component Cooling Unit 2	

1R05 Fire Protection

Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 225, Battery Room - D106	August 17, 2001
Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 226, 125VDC Electrical Equipment Room - D04	August 17, 2001
Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 227, 125VDC Electrical Equipment Room - D03	August 17, 2001
Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 321, Swing Battery Room - D305	August 17, 2001

Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 323, Charger Room - D301	August 17, 2001
Fire Hazards Analysis Report	Fire Zone 324, Non-Safety Related Battery Room - D205	August 17, 2001

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

Nuclear Procedure Memoranda (NPM) 2000-0325	1999 Annual Report for the Maintenance Rule	March 30, 2000
NPM 200I-0251	2000 Annual Report for the Maintenance Rule	March 26, 2001
Calculation 98-0169	Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Maintenance Rule Availability Performance Criteria and Reliability Performance Criteria	Revision 1
Inservice Test (IT) 01	High Head Safety Injection Pumps and Valves (Quarterly) Unit 1	Revision 48
IT 03	Low Head Safety Injection Pumps and Valves (Quarterly) Unit 1	Revision 43

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 1	September 30, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 2	September 30, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 1	October 7, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 2	October 7, 2001
1ICP03.016	Independent Overspeed Protection System Analog and Train A and B Logic Monthly Test	Revision 2
2ICP03.016	Independent Overspeed Protection System Analog and Train A and B Logic Monthly Test	Revision 2
Technical Specification Test TS 33	Containment Accident Recirculation Fan-Cooler Units (Monthly)	Revision 21
IT 07	P-32A Service Water Pump (Quarterly)	Revision 8

IT 16	Quarterly Fail-Safe Stroke Test of Air-Operated Valves	Revision 6
WO 9930738	APS [Appelton Station Group] Weekly PBNP [Point Beach Nuclear Plant] Transformer and Switchyard Data Sheets	October 8, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 1	October 14, 2001
	Weekly Core Damage Risk Profile (Safety Monitor) - Unit 2	October 14, 2001
CR 01-3148	Diesel Testing Not Identified in Schedule/Test Plan	October 16, 2001
	Work Week Additions/Deletions	October 18/2001
PC-009.5	Rotational Lubrication of Unit 1 SI Pump Bearings	
OI 163	SI, RHR, and CS Pump Runs	Revision 1
Technical Specification Test (TS) 32	Safety Valve Position Verification-Subcooling Margin Computing System-Containment Purge Valve Position (Monthly)	Revision 0
Periodic Test 0-PT-FP-002	Monthly Diesel Engine-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test	Revision 0
<u>1R15 Operability Evaluations</u>		
CR 01-3131	Intrusion of Some Sort of Lake Grass	October 15, 2001
CR 00-0267	Significant Amount of Silt in Seal and Baseplate Leakage - SW Pumps	January 25, 2000
CP 34 Part 3	Service Water Strainers, Completed October 13 and 14, 2001	Revision 23
<u>1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing</u>		
OI 163	SI, RHR, and CS Pump Runs	Revision 1
WO 9929957	Semiannual Compressor Maintenance	October 4, 2001
WO 9937529	Instrument Air Compressor Motor	October 4, 2001
WO 9922489	K-2A IA [Instrument Air] Compressor Interstage Vent Solenoid	October 4, 2001
FSAR Section 9.7	Instrument Air (IA)/Service Air (SA)	June 2000

Tag Series 0 IA K-2A MM Rev1-1	K-2A Instrument Air Compressor	October 4, 2001
Tag Series 0 IA K-2A EM Rev1-1	K-2A Instrument Air Compressor	October 4, 2001
WO 9931842	P-35A Diesel Fire Pump Discharge to Test Header	September 10, 2001
WO 9944696	P-35A Electric Fire Pump Minimum Flow Control	October 8, 2001
Periodic Test 0-PT-FP-004	Annual Fire Pump Capacity Test	Revision 0
0-PT-FP-003	Monthly Electric Motor-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test	Revision 0
CR 01-3134	Less Than Adequate Return to Service Testing of Fire Pump	October 12, 2001
Point Beach Test Procedure 107	EDG [Emergency Diesel Generator] G-04 Test	Revision 0
WO 9945368	Emergency Diesel Generator	October 11, 2001
Safety Evaluation 2001-0054	PBTP 107 Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Test	October 8, 2001
CR 01-3164	G-04 Restart - Unanticipated Equipment Response	October 17, 2001
FSAR Section 8.8	Diesel Generator (DG) System	June 2001
Tag Series 0 DG G-4	Gen [Generator] Remove/Replace	Revision 0-1
Point Beach Drawing PB-31-M-DGG-128- 001-09	#140 Synchronous Generator 2 Bearing Oil Lubricated Drip Proof Guarded	Revision D
WO 9941690	Component Cooling Water Pump 2P-11A	October 24, 2001
WO 9930263	Change Oil, Flush Bearings and Clean Air Intake Grills	October 24, 2001
<u>1R22 Surveillance Testing</u>		
2ICP02.001WH	Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features White Channel Analog Quarterly Surveillance Test	Revision 1
Document Feedback Form	1& 2 ICP 02.001 Rd [Red], WH [White], BL [Blue], YL [Yellow]	October 24, 2001

0-PT-FP-003	Monthly Electric Motor-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test	Revision 0
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1R23 Temporary Modifications

CR 01-3114	Zurn Strainer Differential Pressure Indicating Transmitters Not Calibrated in 2 Years	October 10, 2001
Rosemount Inc. Vendor Manual	Model 3501 Smart Pressure Transmitter Family, Functional Specifications	
WO 9948315	SW-2911-BS North Zurn Strainer Differential Pressure Indicator	October 11, 2001
WO 9948314	SW-2912-BS South Zurn Strainer Differential Pressure Indicator	October 11, 2001
Temporary Modification (TM) 99-040	Differential Pressure Indicators for SW-0291-BS, DPIS-02911	September 24, 1999
TM 99-041	Differential Pressure Indicators for SW-0291-BS, DPIS-02912	September 24, 1999
Safety Evaluation 99-108	TM 99-040 and TM 99-041: Differential Pressure Indicators for SW-02911/02912-BS	September 24, 1999
NP 7.3.1	Temporary Modifications	Revision 12

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing

CR 01-3307	NRC Questioned the ANS Annual Maintenance	October 24, 2001
CR 01-3308	NRC Questioned the Weekly Growl Test Data	October 24, 2001
EPMP 6.0	Alert and Notification System (ANS)	Revision 0
PMP-44-02	COM Alert and Notification System Annual Preventative Maintenance	Revision B

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing

	Staff Augmentation Drill Guidelines	June 14, 2001
CR 01-0565	Emergency Organization Staffing Failures	February 22, 2001
EPMP	Emergency Response Organization Notification System	Revision 0
ETD 01	Nuclear Power Business Unit, Emergency Telephone Directory	Revision 10
LP3017	Notifications	Revision 1

RCE 01-009	Emergency Response Organization Staff Augmentation Drill Failures	Revision 1
TRPR 34.0	Emergency Response Training Program	Revision 6

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

A-P-00-04	First Quarter 2000 Plant Support Audit	June 8, 2000
A-P-00-04	Organizational Assessment, Audit Plan and Checklist: First Quarter 2000 Plant Support Audit	May 9, 2000
A-P-01-04	Plant Support Audit Master Checklist	April 16, 2001
BCR 01-0802	Relations with State and County Agencies	March 14, 2001
BCR 01-1165	Assembly and Accountability Start Times	April 10, 2001
CR 00-0713	EP Qualification Issue	March 1, 2001
CR 00-0941	Post Accident Sampling System Procedures	March 20, 2001
CR 00-4169	2000 EP Exercise -- Dose/PAR Coordinator Validation Error	December 15, 2000
CR 00-4171	2000 EP Exercise -- TSC Assessment Weakness	December 15, 2000
CR 01-0575	Inadequate Completion of Inventories	February 23, 2001
CR 01-0995	Emergency Plan Drill -- Operations Coordinator Simulator Response Concern	March 28, 2001
CR 01-1168	Emergency Plan Is Not Clear on Design for Habitability of Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs)	April 10, 2001
CR 01-1431	Less than Adequate EP Auto Notification	April 24, 2001
CR 01-3283	NRC Questioned Licensee's Definition of a Release in Progress	October 26, 2001
CR 01-3284	NRC Questioned the Threshold for Generating Condition Reports for EP Issues	October 26, 2001
NP 5.3.1	Condition Reporting System	Revision 18
NPM 2000-0682	Memorandum from R. Hayden to M. Reddemann, et al., "Critique of the August 3, 2000, Emergency Preparedness Drill"	August 16, 2000
NPM 2001-0343	Memorandum from R. Hayden to F. Cayia and M. Reddemann, "Unusual Event -- April 24, 2001"	May 01, 2001

NPM 2001-0356	Memorandum from W. Yarosz to M. Reddemann, et al., "Critique of the March 22, 2001 ERO Drill"	May 10, 2001
NPM 2001-0632	Memorandum from W. Yarosz to M. Reddemann, et.al., "Critique of the August 16, 2001 ERO Drill"	September 19, 2001

EP6 Drill Evaluation

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario	October 4, 2001
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2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas

Condition Reports

CR 01-0611	Laundry Worker Entered High Radiation Area Without Proper Authorization	February 2, 2001
CR 01-2317	Contract RPT Entered High Radiation Area Without Having Electronic Dosimetry Turned on	July 13, 2001

Procedures

CAMP 601	Primary Auxiliary System Sample Points	Revision 7
CAMP 601	Attachment "D," Data from Sampling SI Accumulators	
NP 5.3.1	Condition Reporting System	May 30, 2001
OI 16	Blowdown Evaporator Operation	Revision 23
RWP#01-001	Radiation Protection and Site Waste Surveillance	Revision 0
RWP # 01-008	Routine Plant Tours for NRC Inspectors	Revision 0
RWP # 01-201	Containment Entries, Task #1	Revision 0
2-SOP-CONT-001	Operating Containment Airlocks	Revision 2

Miscellaneous Data

	PBNP FSAR, Paragraph 11.4.2, "Radiation Protection"	June 2001
	Nuclear Management Company, PBNP Unit 1 Cycle27/Unit2 Cycle 25 Schedule	October 16, 2001
	Personnel Calculated Neutron and Skin Dose Log Sheets for Worker Entries into Unit 2, While "At Power"	October 2001
PCE #01-02-020	Personnel Contamination Event Report	April 13, 2001
PCE #01-03-012	Personnel Contamination Event Report	September 14, 2001
	PCE Data, Cumulative Plant Data Through October 23, 2001	
<u>POD</u>	Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Plan of the Day	October 22, 2001
	Spent Fuel Pool Inventory	October 18, 2001
	Technical Specifications, Paragraph 15.6.11, "Control of Access to High Radiation Areas"	March 17, 1998
	Unit 2 Accumulators Chemistry Sample Data Sheets	October 25, 2001
	Work Order # 9930954, Request to Sample Unit 2 Accumulator Tanks	September 10, 2001
<u>Self-Assessments</u>		
NPM 2001-0095	RP Station Documentation Assessment, S-A-RP-01-04	February 1, 2001

NPM 2001-0145	High Radiation Area Controls Assessment, S-A-P-00-01	February 16, 2001
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2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Condition Reports

CR 00-3587	SCBA Regulator Gaskets Deteriorating	November 3, 2000
CR 00-4054	RP Calibration Room Instruments Not Taken out of Service When Required by Procedure	December 6, 2000
CR 01-0560	RP SCBA Checks Missed	February 26, 2001
CR 01-0806	RP Instruments past Calibration Due Date	March 14, 2001

Procedures

HPCAL 1.27	Calibration of the BICRON RSO-50 Ion Chamber	Revision 8
HPCAL 1.27	Calibration of the BICRON RSO-50 Ion Chamber, Completed and Reviewed Package for Unit #7626	October 24, 2001
HPCAL 1.40	Calibration of the DCA Model 3090-3 and 3096-3 Area Monitors	Revision 1
HPCAL 1.40	Calibration of the DCA Model 3090-3 and 3096-3 Area Monitors Chamber, Completed and Reviewed Package for Unit #0056	October 24, 2001
HPCAL 2.15	Small Articles Monitor Type SAM 9/11 Calibration and Efficiency	Revision 9
HPCAL 2.15	Small Articles Monitor Type SAM 9/11 Calibration and Efficiency, Completed and Reviewed Package for Unit #004	May 23, 2001

HPCAL 2.2	Calibration and Efficiency Determination of the Eberline RM-14	Revision 14
	Calibration and Efficiency Determination of the Eberline RM-14, Completed and Reviewed Package for Unit #6786	October 24, 2001
HPCAL 3.11	Containment High Range Detector Response Check	Revision 9
HPCAL 3.11	Containment High Range Detector Response Check Completed and Reviewed Package for Unit 1, RM-126, RM-127, and RM-128	May 5, 2001
HPCAL 3.2	Area Monitor Calibration Procedure DA1-1 and DA1-6 Detector Assemblies	Revision 16
HPCAL 3.2	Area Monitor Calibration Procedure DA1-1 and DA1-6 Detector Assemblies, Completed and Reviewed Packages for Unit RE-105	January 15, 2001
HPCAL 3.3	Area Monitor Calibration Procedure DA1-4 and DA1-5 Detector Assemblies	Revision 18
HPCAL 3.3	Area Monitor Calibration Procedure DA1-4 and DA1-5 Detector Assemblies, Completed and Reviewed Packages for Unit #RE-112	September 17, 2001
HPCAL 3.3	Area Monitor Calibration Procedure DA1-4 and DA1-5 Detector Assemblies, Completed and Reviewed Packages for Unit #RE-114	March 12, 2001
HPCAL 3.3	Area Monitor Calibration Procedure DA1-4 and DA1-5 Detector Assemblies, Completed and Reviewed Packages for Unit #RE-116	September 17, 2001

HPIP 4.5.1.1	Maintenance, Storage and Inspection of Respiratory Equipment	Revision 8
HP4.5.1.4	Scott Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus	Revision 8
HPIP 7.52	Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM-1B) Functional Check	Revision 10
HPIP 7.52	Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM-1B) Functional Check, Completed and Reviewed Packages for Unit #7736	October 24, 2001
NP 4.2.3.1	Portable Survey Instrument and Exposure Monitoring Device Control Program	Revision 2
PC 75 Part 1, NNSR	Monthly and Turnaround Maintenance for the SCOTT 4.5 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus	Revision 12
PC 75 Part 1, NNSR	Monthly and Turnaround Maintenance for the SCOTT 4.5 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus, Completed and Reviewed Packages	July 7, 2001
PC 75 Part 1, NNSR	Monthly and Turnaround Maintenance for the SCOTT 4.5 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus, Completed and Reviewed Packages	August 5, 2001
PC 75 Part 1, NNSR	Monthly and Turnaround Maintenance for the SCOTT 4.5 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus, Completed and Reviewed Packages	October 9, 2001
<u>Miscellaneous Data</u>		
	Area Radiation Monitor Data, Control Room Readouts, 2RE-107 and 2RE-102	October 24, 2001

Area Radiation Monitor data, Technical Support Center, 1RE-114	October 24, 2001
Calibration Data Sheet, Eberline AMS-4, #A016	August 9, 2000
Calibration Data Sheet, Eberline RO-2A, #6921	April 10, 2001
Calibration Data Sheet, Eberline AMS-4, #A027	April 23, 2001
Calibration Data Sheet, DCA 3090-3/3096-3, #6131	June 14, 2001
Calibration Data Sheet, Eberline RO-2, #6305	July 17, 2001
Calibration Data Sheet, BICRON RSO-50, #7625	August 7, 2001
Calibration Data Sheet, Automess Teletector, #9691	August 13, 2001
Functional Testing Worksheets for SCOTT AIR- PAK 2.2/4.5, Fifty-nine Units at PBNP	Throughout past 12 months
Yearly Calibration Schedule for All Station Instruments	
Counting Instrument Performance Statistics, MS-2 #8082	October 15, 2001
PBNP FSAR, Paragraph 11.5-6, "Area Radiation Monitoring System"	June, 2001
PBNP FSAR, Paragraph 11.4-14, Table 11.4-1, "Radiation Protection Program, Storage Location of Equipment"	June, 2001
PBNP FSAR, Paragraph 11.4-14, Table 11.4-2, "Radiation Protection Program, Radiation Protection Equipment"	June, 2001

RMSASRB

Portable Instrument Calibration Worksheet, Ludlum Model 3, # 8714	August 13, 2001
Portable Instrument Calibration Worksheet, Canberra, # 7194	September 6, 2001
Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Set Point and Response Book, for All Installed ARMS	Revision 1
RADOS RAD-51 Dosimeter Calibration, #981164	January 17, 2001
RADOS RAD-51 Dosimeter Calibration, #980023	April 15, 2001
RADOS RAD-51 Dosimeter Calibration, #981691	August 8, 2001
RP Instrument Response Investigation Report, Teletector #50853	July 2, 2001
RP Instrument Response Investigation Report, RO-2 #A006	August 27, 2001
SCBA Inspection and Maintenance Records, Operations Support Center, Control Room, RP Station, and Clean Side Respirator Issue Area	February, 2001 to October, 2001
SCBA Qualified Personnel Listing (Medical, CBT, TPE, and Fit Test Dates)	October 15, 2001
Technical Specifications, Paragraph 15.6.8.4, "Post Accident Sampling"	July 7, 1986
Under Responding Portable Dose Rate Instrument Investigation Worksheet, RO-2	October 13, 2000

Under Responding Portable Dose Rate Instrument Investigation Worksheet, RO-2 November 26, 2000

Under Responding Portable Dose Rate Instrument Investigation Worksheet, RO-2 April 16, 2001

Under Responding Portable Dose Rate Instrument Investigation Worksheet, Ludlum Model 3 May 1, 2001

Self-Assessments

Nuclear Oversight, Quarterly Report #1Q200, "Radiation Protection, Calibration of Radiological Instruments" July 2, 2001

4A01 Performance Indicator Verification

NEI 99-02	Reactor Coolant System Leakage	Revision 1
	Control Room Shift Log, Page 47	June 12, 2001
CR 01-3182	NRC Performance Indicator Incorrectly Reported	October 17, 2001

4A02 Identification and Resolution of Problems

4A03 Event Follow-up

Event Notification 38424	Point Beach Event Notification for Temporary Fire Seals Not In Compliance With Qualifying Calculations	October 24, 2001
CR 01-3256	Temporary Fire Seals Installed May Not Be Configured As Required	October 24, 2001