



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

January 25, 2001

Mr. Dale E. Young, Vice President
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B)
ATTN: Supervisor, Licensing &
Regulatory Programs
15760 West Power Line Street
Crystal River, FL 34428-6708

SUBJECT: CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-302/00-04

Dear Mr. Young:

On December 30, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Crystal River Unit 3 facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on January 17, 2001, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified by the NRC inspectors.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Leonard D. Wert, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-302
License No. DPR-72

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-302/00-04
w/Attachment: NRC's Revised Oversight Process

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

FPC

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cc w/encl:

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No: 50-302

License No. DPR-72

Report No: 50-302/00-04

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation (FPC)

Facility: Crystal River Unit 3

Location: 15760 West Power Line Road
Crystal River, FL 34428-6708

Dates: October 1 - December 30, 2000

Inspectors: S. Stewart, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Sanchez, Resident Inspector
W. Sartor, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
(Sections 1EP1, 4OA1.3-1.5)
J. Kreh, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
(Sections 1EP1, 4OA1.3-1.5)
M. Scott, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R02)

Approved by: Leonard Wert, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000302-00-04, on 10/01-12/30/2000, Florida Power Corporation, Crystal River Unit 3, Integrated Inspection Report.

This inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, regional emergency preparedness inspectors, and a regional reactor inspector. No significant findings were identified by the inspectors. The significance of findings would have been indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 "Significance Determination Process" (See attachment, NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Process).

A. Inspector Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

One violation of very low significance which was identified by the licensee was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. This violation is listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status:

Unit 3 operated at or near full power during the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity (Reactor-R), and Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report and Operations Instruction (OI)-13, Adverse Weather Conditions, to evaluate the licensee's readiness to protect mitigating systems from cold weather. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of various plant structures and systems to check for maintenance or other apparent deficiencies that could affect system operations during cold weather conditions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R02 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's effectiveness in implementing changes to the plant as described in their Final Safety Analysis Report for conformance with 10 CFR 50.59 and the licensee's implementing procedures. During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed: modifications to the plant, deficiency resolutions, and procedure evaluations that required full 50.59 evaluations, i.e., required an unreviewed safety question determination (USQD). Additionally, the inspectors reviewed changes that did not require a complete 10 CFR 50.59 review (screened out). The inspectors reviewed self assessments and corrective actions to confirm that the licensee was identifying and resolving issues using their corrective action program. Documents reviewed included:

50.59 Safety Assessment (SA) evaluations that did not require the depth of evaluation for completion:

Safety Assessment (SA) 98-0058, Rev 0, Decay Heat System Valve DHV - 40
SA 98-0092, Rev 0, Molded Case Circuit Breaker Trip Setting (procedure)
SA 98-0468, Rev 2, Modification Approval Record (MAR) 98-09-02-01, Remote Shutdown Panel Fire Barrier
SA 98-0519, Rev 1, Vital Bus Regulating Transformer Replacement
SA 99-0114, Rev 0, Shutdown from Outside the Control Room (procedure)
SA 99-0268, Rev 0, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Recovery (procedure)
SA 99-0386, Rev 0, Calculations, M-97-0141, M-97-0074, and I-84-0003

SA 99-0438, Rev 0, Decay Heat Pump-1A Outboard Bearing Oil Leak
 SA 99-0476, Rev 0, Breaker Refurbishment (procedures)
 SA 99-0478, Rev 0, Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFP)-3 Bearing and Right Angle Fan Drive have Elevated Vibration
 SA 00-0079, Rev 0, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Response to Safety Injection Test Signal (Mode 1-3)
 SA 00-0153, Rev 0, Control Complex Chiller (CHHE-1B) Functional Test

Reviewed 50.59 evaluations that required a full Unreviewed Safety Question Determination (USQD):

USQD 98-0041, Rev 3, Resolution of Dynamic Effects of Loss of Coolant Accident
 USQD 98-0369, Rev 0, Automatic Depressurization Valve Steaming Clarification
 USQD 98-0519, Rev 1, Vital Bus Regulating Transformer Replacement
 USQD 98-0565, Rev 0, Cross-tie ES busses to non-ES busses
 USQD 99-0051, Rev 0, Changing Normal Position of DHV-34/35 to Open
 USQD 99-0071, Rev 0, Radiation Monitor (RM)-G26 and RM-G27 Upgrade
 USQD 99-0144, Rev 0, Removal of Purge Valve Opening Limitation
 USQD 99-0382, Rev 0, Building Spray and Decay Heat Net Positive Suction Head
 USQD 00-0289, Rev 0, RCP Trip
 USQD 00-0057, Rev 0, Initial Low Pressure Injection Flow Rate
 USQD 00-0265, Rev 0, DC Power System

Licensee Self Assessments:

Self Assessment for Procedures, May 1999 - May 2000, July 13, 2000
 Self Assessment for Procedures, May 1998 - May 1999, June 29, 1999
 Self Assessment for Modifications, September 1998 - September 1999, July 31, 2000
 Self Assessment for Modifications, September 1997 - September 1998, December 9, 1998

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted partial alignment walkdowns of the safety related systems listed below to evaluate the operability of the redundant trains or backup systems while the other trains were inoperable or out of service. The walkdowns included reviews of appropriate parts of the Final Safety Analysis Report, verification of control room switch positions to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability and reliability of the redundant train during maintenance, and verification of electrical power to critical components.

- 'A' Train of 4160 Volt Switchgear
- Emergency Feedwater Pump 2
- Raw Water Pump 3A / Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Pump 1A

The inspectors conducted a complete walkdown of the decay heat removal system. Documents reviewed included; OP-404, Decay Heat System Operation; PI-305-814, Decay Heat System Hanger Drawing; and FD-302-641, Decay Heat System Flow Drawing. The relevant electrical system lineup was also verified. Precursor Cards PC-00-3220, 00-2478, 00-4084, 00-2919, 00-2828, 00-3209, and 00-3046 were reviewed to verify that issues were being appropriately addressed in the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas considered important to safety listed below to evaluate conditions related to control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; the operational condition of fire protection systems; and the status of the fire barriers used to limit fire damage. Appropriate sections of the FPC Fire Protection Plan, the December 20, 1999, Appendix R Fire Study, and Administrative Instruction AI-2200, Guidelines for Handling, Use, and Control of Transient Combustibles, were reviewed during these inspections. Other documents reviewed included surveillance procedure SP-190D, Functional Test of Fire Detection Systems - Control Complex, to verify testing of various fire detection instruments, and PC 00-3252, concerning minor Mecatiss fire barrier deficiencies that were identified and corrected by the licensee. Additionally, PC 00-2918, concerning two inoperable cable spreading room dampers, was reviewed. The inspectors verified that the issue was properly evaluated, immediate corrective actions were completed, and appropriate longterm corrective actions were developed.

- Control Room/Cable Spreading Room
- 'A' Train of 4160 Volt Switchgear
- 480 Volt Switchgear
- General Auxiliary Building Including Emergency Feedwater Pump 2 Area
- Safety-Related Battery Rooms
- Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control Instrumentation Rooms
- Emergency Feedwater Pump 3 Building

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified by the NRC inspectors. A licensee identified non-cited violation is addressed in Section 4OA7.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the conduct of two simulator examinations during the annual operating examination required by 10 CFR 55.59. One examination scenario included a loss of coolant accident, the second simulated a steam generator tube rupture complicated by a stuck open safety valve. The inspectors observed the crew's ability to perform actions prescribed by emergency procedures, oversight and direction provided by crew supervisors, crew emergency plan classifications and notifications, and the quality of crew interactions and internal communications. The inspectors also observed that the licensee evaluators adequately assessed crew performance and that the simulator facility closely matched the actual control facility.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled portions of the systems listed below due to performance issues and assessed the effectiveness of maintenance efforts on these systems. Reviews focused on maintenance rule scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and characterization of system or component problems. Additionally, the (a)(1) or (a)(2) classifications were reviewed. Procedures reviewed included compliance procedures CP-153A, Maintenance Rule Implementation, and CP-153B, Monitoring the Performance of Structures, Systems, and Components Under the Maintenance Rule. Other documents reviewed included portions of: the Final Safety Analysis Report; Technical Specifications; and the Second and Third Quarter, Year 2000 System Health Reports.

- Reactor Coolant System
- Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control
- Reactor Coolant Valve (RCV-8)
- Instrument Air System
- Nitrogen System
- Control Complex Chiller

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed daily maintenance schedules and observed work controls to evaluate risk assessments before maintenance activities were conducted and to assure that maintenance schedules were followed such that risk was minimized. The inspectors verified that the licensee was managing risk appropriately by assuring that key safety functions were preserved, and that upon identification of an unplanned situation, the resulting emergent work was controlled as described in licensee procedure CP-253, Work Week Risk Assessment. The inspectors also confirmed that emergent work was identified and addressed through the corrective action program. In addition to routine evaluations, the risk controls associated with the emergent maintenance listed below were specifically evaluated:

1. PC-00-2758, B Control Complex Chiller (CCHE-1B) tripped on October 9, 2000
2. PC-00-3042, Instrument Air Compressor (IAP-3C) tripped on November 3, 2000
3. PC-00-3230, B Channel Reactor Protection System tripped on November 24, 2000

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the following operability evaluations to verify that operability was justified following testing failure or other identified problems. The inspectors also monitored licensee activities to verify that operability evaluation issues were being identified at an appropriate threshold and that issues were entered into the corrective actions program. The following licensee documents were reviewed:

- FPC Calculation EEE-00-011, EDG-1A/1B Loading Evaluation
- EEM-00-013, RWV-36 Failure Flow Determination.
- Precursor Card 00-2641, Diesel Fuel Pump (DFP-1B)
- Operability Resolution 00-0005, Raw Water Check Valves (RWV-35 and RWV-38)
- Precursor Card 00-3280, Failure of Nuclear Services Check Valve RWV-36

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testinga. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance test activities for risk significant mitigating systems to assess the following (as applicable): (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy, consistent with the application; (5) tests were performed as written with prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. Documents reviewed included Precursor Card 00-1897 regarding a problem with a reactor trip breaker in July 2000; and Precursor Card 00-3095, 00-3096 regarding minor deficiencies identified and corrected by the licensee during emergency diesel preventive maintenance.

- Surveillance Procedure SP-907A, 4160 Volt Engineered Safeguards Bus Relay Inspection
- SP-348A, Feed Water Pump-7 Testing and MTDG-1 Surveillance Test following Battery Replacement for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Diesel (MTDG-1)
- SP-344A, RWP-2A, SWP-2A, and Valve Surveillance following Repair of Raw Water Valve (RWV-36)
- SP-354B, Monthly Functional Test of EGDG-1B following Preventive Maintenance on Emergency Diesel Generator (EGDG-1B)
- Operating Procedure 409, Work Request 367552, Control Complex Chiller Tripped on Low Refrigerant Pressure

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testinga. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed surveillance testing (SPs) or reviewed test data of risk-significant systems or components listed below, to assess whether they met Technical Specifications, Final Safety Analysis Report, and FPC procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

- SP-344B, RWP-2B, SWP-1B, and Valve Surveillance
- SP-348A, FWP-7 Testing and MTDG-1 Surveillance Test
- SP-457A, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Response to a Safety Injection Test Signal (Mode 1-3)
- SP-354B, Monthly Functional Test of EGDG-1B
- SP-370, Quarterly Cycling of Valves

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP1 Exercise Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the Crystal River Nuclear Plant biennial, full-participation emergency preparedness exercise on October 18, 2000, to determine whether they were designed to suitably test major elements of the licensee's emergency plan.

During the period October 16-19, 2000, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's performance in the exercise, as well as selected activities related to the licensee's conduct and self-assessment of the exercise. The exercise was conducted on October 18, 2000 from 8:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Licensee activities inspected during the exercise included those occurring in the Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The NRC's evaluation focused on the risk-significant activities of event classification, notification of governmental authorities, onsite protective actions, offsite protective action recommendations (PARs), and accident mitigation. The inspectors also evaluated command and control, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, adherence to procedures, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment process, as well as the presentation of critique results to plant management.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verifications

.1 Safety System Functional Failures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed LERs reported in the year 2000 and determined none were included in this performance indicator. This is consistent with what the licensee has reported to the NRC.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Safety System Unavailability - High Pressure Injection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy of the performance indicator (PI) for high pressure injection (HPI) unavailability which was reported to the NRC. The inspectors reviewed data applicable to five quarters of operation beginning with the third quarter of 1999 and ending with the third quarter of 2000. The inspectors compared data contained in the nuclear shift manager logs to the values utilized to generate the PI data to ensure the values reported were consistent. The inspectors also reviewed the FPC corrective action program for relevant issues related to the collection of PI data.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Drill/Exercise Performance PI

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance over the past eight quarters through review of a sample of drill documentation. Classifications and notifications were observed during licensed operator simulator sessions. Detailed records of drills conducted in March and July 2000, as well as a Notification of Unusual Event declared on September 16, 2000, were reviewed to verify the licensee's reported data regarding successes in emergency classifications, notifications, and PARs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation PI

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector assessed the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation during the previous eight quarters by review of the training records for the 75 personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. Drill participation was verified by reviewing training attendance records for approximately 10% of key ERO personnel against the drill/event participation matrix for specific drill dates.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Alert and Notification System Reliability PI

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector assessed the accuracy of the PI for the alert and notification system reliability through review of the licensee's records of the siren tests for the previous 12 months.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

The inspectors reviewed the final report issued by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) for the evaluation that was conducted in March 2000 at the Crystal River Unit 3, Florida Power Corporation. The inspectors did not note any safety issues in the INPO report that warranted further NRC review.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Dale Young and other members of management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 17, 2001. The managers acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and was a violation of regulatory requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG 1600, for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV).

NCV Tracking Number

Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet

NCV 50-302/00-04-01

Crystal River 3 Operating License Requirement 2.C.(9) requires that all provisions of the approved fire protection program be implemented. Table 6.7a of the Fire Protection Plan requires that when a fire barrier penetration is not functional, the licensee shall either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the barrier, or verify the operability of fire detectors on one side of the barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. For various periods of time from February 1999 to October 10, 2000, both exhaust fire barrier dampers (AHFD-47 and 83) for the cable spreading room were not

functional and the fire watch provisions of the Fire Protection Plan were not met. The violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Precursor Card 00-2918.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Florida Power Corporation

M. Annacone, Assistant Plant Director, Operations
 R. Grazio, Acting Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, Florida Progress Corporation
 D. Young, Vice President, Progress Energy Corporation
 J. Cowan, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, Florida Progress Corporation
 R. Davis, Manager Training
 C. Gurganus, Assistant Plant Director, Maintenance
 S. Johnson, Acting Director, Nuclear Quality Programs, Florida Progress Corporation
 R. Warden, Manager Nuclear Assessment, Progress Energy Corporation
 J. Holden, Director Site Operations
 D. Roderick, Plant General Manager
 T. Taylor, Director, Nuclear Engineering & Projects, Florida Progress Corporation
 J. Terry, Manager Engineering, Progress Energy Corporation
 G. Chick, Assistant Plant Director, Outage
 J. Stephenson, Emergency Planning Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation, and other corporate personnel. In December 2000, Progress Energy Corporation replaced Florida Progress Corporation as the owner of Florida Power Company.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

L. Wert, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3
 Melanie Maymi, Inspector-in-Training

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened and Closed

50-302/00-04-01	NCV	Failure to Implement Fire Protection Plan Requirements When Two Cable Spreading Room Fire Dampers Were Not Operable. (Section 40A7)
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NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness

Radiation Safety

- Occupational
- Public

Safeguards

- Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and

increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.