A. Introduction
Moldova is neither a major drug trafficking nor drug producing country, but Moldova is a regular transit point for drugs destined for Western Europe. Moldova’s proximity to the European Union, limited law enforcement capacity, and its lack of control of the Transnistria territory (on the east bank of the Dniester River adjoining the Ukrainian border) where Moldovan law and by extension, national drug policy, are not applicable, have complicated drug control efforts. This has resulted in an increased importation of synthetic drugs and psychotropic substances into Moldova, both for local use and external distribution. Moldova is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
On July 4, 2011, the Government of Moldova (GOM) established a National Anti-Drug Commission, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister with representation from all governmental institutions involved in drug policy. The Commission strives to bring Moldova into conformity with all requirements set forth by UN drug conventions, coordinates interagency cooperation among governmental institutions, and liaises with non-governmental institutions and civil society on all matters relating to drug policy. The Moldovan Ministry of Health Permanent Committee on Drug Control continued to manage governmental policies on drug control and addiction matters, and proposed several amendments to the 1999 law on narcotics, psychotropic substances and precursors.
Police, customs and border officials cooperated in counter-narcotics activities, but with limited effectiveness. The Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) has a specialized sixteen-person police unit responsible for the prevention and combating of drug-related crime nationwide. In addition to these full-time specialized counter-narcotics officers, there are 65 other regional police officers responsible for minor drug crimes. Anti-drug activities overall are hampered by the lack of a sufficient number of specialized police officers, along with a lack of funding and adequate technical equipment, including vehicles and analytical resources. Internal, administrative personnel issues in the police force itself, such as the lack of objective promotion criteria, also undermine narcotics enforcement effectiveness.
The GOM is a party to the the UN Convention against Corruption. There is no bilateral extradition or mutual legal assistance treaty between the GOM and the United States. The Moldovan constitution does not permit extradition of its nationals. The Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) of Moldova is responsible for handling requests for international legal assistance in the pre-trial phase, whereas the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) handles the in-trial and correctional phases.
The GOM has concluded many bilateral and multilateral treaties in the field of combating crime, largely deriving from its participation or membership in such organizations as the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) initiative, and others. In September and October, 2011, Moldova's law enforcement agencies, in cooperation with their counterparts from GUAM, participated in joint operation "NARCOSTOP-2011," which focused on combating drug trafficking among GUAM member states. On March 24, 2011, the GOM and Romania signed a cooperative agreement on combating crime, enhancing bilateral cooperation in combating the illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, and chemical precursors.
2. Supply Reduction
Moldovan authorities registered 1,243 drug-related cases in the first nine months of 2011 with 59% proceeding to prosecution. During that time, authorities dismantled two drug trafficking networks.
Drug seizures in the first nine months of 2011 netted increases in the following substances: Ecstasy (MDMA) – 873 tablets (65 tablets in 2010); opium – 6,832 ml. (1,078 ml. in 2010); hashish oil – 108 ml. (26 ml. in 2010). There was a decrease in seized heroin – 1,467 grams (2,679 grams in 2010); liquid heroin – 52 ml. (189 ml. in 2010); and amphetamine – 192 grams (1,711 grams in 2010). There were no cocaine seizures, compared to 4 grams in 2010.
There are three major drug trafficking routes through Moldova:
• The "Balkan" route (Turkey- Bulgaria-Romania-Moldova-Ukraine-Russia) for heroin.
• The "Black Sea Northeastern" route (Tajikistan-Uzbekistan-Georgia-Ukraine-Moldova – Western Europe) for heroin.
• The "West European" route (Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium – Moldova – Ukraine, Russia, other CIS countries) for synthetic drugs.
Moldovan authorities have also reported cases of trafficking domestically cultivated marijuana and poppy plants into Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
On May 30, 2011, Moldovan and Romanian authorities jointly dismantled a criminal network of drug dealers that had been trafficking Indian-made methamphetamine into Romania through Moldova. The culprits had been using DHL to smuggle the drugs from Mumbai to Chisinau, transiting DHL facilities in Germany, Great Britain, and Russia. The case was transferred to Romania for further investigation and prosecution. In September 2011, Moldovan police dismantled a criminal group involved in illicit trafficking of psychotropic substances. Police confiscated 7,549 tablets of a new substance named "Taren," containing a controlled substance aprophen.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
Through October 2011, the Moldovan Ministry of Health registered 8,960 drug users/addicts, an increase of 296 over 2010. According to the National Drug Dependency Clinic, the official figure is an underestimate by as much as a factor of 10 because data is only collected on those who contact relevant public institutions.
Through October 2011, the MoIA has conducted 1,148 drug abuse awareness lectures and meetings at high schools and universities, organized 2,182 meetings with vulnerable groups and citizens, and published 36 articles in the media aimed at educating the population regarding drugs.
Rehabilitation programs continue to suffer from lack of financial resources and older, inadequate facilities, which burden the GOM's efforts to treat drug addiction.
4. Corruption
Moldovan national legislation does not distinguish between drug corruption and corruption related to other types of crime. As a matter of governmental policy, Moldova does not encourage or facilitate the production, shipment, or distribution of illicit drugs or the laundering of illegal drug proceeds. There is no credible evidence available indicating that any current senior Moldovan government official is engaged in illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. However, corruption is seen as a serious problem within both the Moldovan government and society and legal cases have been prosecuted where heads of ministries have been seemingly complicit with drug trafficking.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
The GOM and the USG cooperate on law enforcement and counter-narcotics issues under the terms of the Letter of Agreement on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement signed on August 28, 2001. Amendments to this agreement provide funding to support activities designed to create sustainable improvement in the rule of law and in the operational capability of Moldova's law enforcement agencies.
In January 2011, the USG, at the request of the Moldovan MoIA, funded a comprehensive assessment of Moldova’s counternarcotics institutions conducted by a UNODC expert. The assessment evaluated Moldova's progress in developing its legislation and institutions to more efficiently combat and prevent drug trafficking, and concluded that although its laws are in closer conformity to UN conventions, the GOM still needs to implement further reforms.
USG-provided training and equipment help improve the ability of the Moldovan police to investigate and dismantle organized crime and narcotics enterprises. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s office in Vienna is responsible for case-work cooperation with members of Moldova's specialized anti-drug unit within the MoIA and enjoys support from Moldovan counterparts in several ongoing investigations.
D. Conclusion
The USG and the GOM have worked together successfully to improve the ability of Moldovan law enforcement to operate effectively while respecting the rule of law. The GOM has also had a positive and cooperative relationship with the EU, which has placed senior level advisors at the MoIA and the MOJ to assist in the reform efforts of these organizations and to help coordinate the contributions of international donors. The GOM should increase its own efforts to better train and equip its justice sector entities, including those engaged in combating illicit narcotics trafficking. Additionally, the GOM should look to develop and foster a more comprehensive and active relationship with regional authorities to address border control concerns, especially in the southern and eastern portions of the country.
Montenegro is an important transit country for illegal drugs moving to Central and Western Europe along the “Balkan Route.” Skunk, a selection of selectively bred marijuana, from Albania and heroin from Afghanistan are the most prevalent drugs trafficked. Cocaine is smuggled by sea and air from South America to Montenegro with the increased involvement of Montenegrin citizens, either as organizers or couriers. While a small portion of the smuggled cocaine is used for domestic consumption, the majority is shipped to Western and Central Europe. Synthetic drugs are not commonly used, but the summer influx of tourists along Montenegro’s coast leads to an increase in use.
Even though Montenegro is a major route for drug smuggling, the amount of seized drugs remained low. In the 2011 reporting period, 563.6 kg of marijuana, 3.1 kg of heroin, 0.355 kg of cocaine, 0.139 kg of synthetic drugs, 0.109 kg of hashish and 0.105 kg of psilocybin and psilocin were seized. The majority of drugs were seized at land crossings, but there were also seizures at ports and airports.
Montenegro is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Montenegro is also a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols on trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling and to the UN Convention against Corruption. The Law on Precursors and Narcotics has been in force since December 2009. To complete the national anti-narcotics legislation framework, Montenegro adopted the Law on Prevention and Misuse of Drugs in 2011. Montenegrin law enforcement officials are becoming more proactive in combating the operations of illegal drug distribution networks. Border police and customs officers perform narcotics control operations on a daily basis. Within the police system, there are departments specialized in narcotics-related crimes. The Border police also have 10 drug-sniffing dogs working at border crossings, as well as equipment for drug testing.
Drug related crimes continued to constitute a significant percentage of the overall crimes committed in the country. During the first ten months of 2011, police filed charges against 189 persons in 123 cases involving the production and distribution of narcotics. Several important counternarcotics police operations were also launched. According to the police, there were no reported cases of synthetic drug lab operations or synthetic drug production.
Drug use began to spread more widely in Montenegro in the mid-1990s and has become a significant public health issue. Reliable statistics on drug use from the Ministry of Health are still lacking. Authorities estimate that Montenegro has between 2,500-3,000 drug addicts, but the actual number may be higher. According to the most recent EU survey of high school-age respondents on the use of alcohol and other drugs, the most frequently-used illicit drugs were marijuana and inhalants, followed by tranquilizers and sedatives. The Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and Criminal Code (CC) call for mandatory treatment of drug addicts. They also permit temporary and permanent seizure of assets derived from illicit drug trafficking, and authorize the use of secret surveillance measures in the pre-trial and investigation process. Permanent confiscation of assets can also be applied if the offender was sentenced by a final decision for a crime involving the unauthorized manufacture, possession, or distribution of narcotic drugs. The penalty for producing and selling drugs ranges from two to 15 years in prison.
In accordance with the “National Response to Drugs 2008-2012” initiative, the GoM through its Office on Drug Prevention is implementing activities in four key areas: prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, reduction of harm, and police and customs interventions. In March 2010, the National Council for the Prevention of Drug Abuse, with the President at the helm, was established to treat, rehabilitate, re-socialize, and reduce the number of drug addicts. However, the civil sector has criticized this Council for being unmotivated and ineffective.
During the last year, the Ministry of Health established a network of 21 municipal drug prevention offices across the country. The offices are the major tool for implementing preventive and educational activities covering all primary and secondary schools nationwide. Schools, health centers, police stations, social centers and NGOs all supplement the activities of the municipal drug prevention offices. Preventative medical treatment is free of charge within the public health system. Although the Spuz Prison hospital contains a department for treating drug addicts, prisoners, along with mentally ill prisoners, were often treated in the Kotor psychiatric hospital, which lacks facilities and personnel to house drug addicts and mentally ill patients.
Montenegro views the U.S. as a strategic partner and generally supports U.S. goals in the Balkans, including drug control initiatives. The Montenegro Special Prosecutor’s Office cooperates with the DEA regional office in Rome on matters of mutual concern. The DEA maintains an active liaison with the National Police Directorate’s Narcotics Division. At the International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) organized by the DEA in April in Mexico, Montenegro was admitted as a full-fledged member of the IDEC. Montenegro recognizes the 1902 U.S. – Kingdom of Serbia extradition treaty as valid. As a matter of government policy, Montenegro does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.
A. Introduction
Morocco is one of two countries – along with Afghanistan – identified by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as a leading source for cannabis cultivation and production. The country is also consistently cited as a primary origin for cannabis seizures made in Europe, and several seizures of multi-ton loads of cannabis in Morocco during 2011 underscore its continued role in cannabis production and trafficking.
However, Morocco has made impressive inroads in reducing overall cannabis cultivation, a traditional and lucrative, albeit illegal, cash crop. According to the Government of Morocco (GOM), the amount of land devoted to cannabis cultivation has fallen by 65 percent from 2003 to 2010. No additional land was targeted for crop substitution during 2011, with the GOM citing several reasons for this policy, including the effectiveness of ongoing surveillance of illicit crops.
Morocco’s centuries-old trade routes serve as a crossroads of two continents, and have been exploited by narcotics traffickers for the movement of cannabis, cocaine and other drug trafficking from Africa to Europe.
Illicit drug use has generally not been a major concern for the GOM in previous years, as narcotics consumption was viewed primarily as a European problem. However, following a pattern in other transit countries the GOM has reported an increase in the domestic use of cocaine and ecstasy, and is taking more proactive measures in drug treatment and demand reduction.
Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
Morocco has made significant efforts to combat the production and trafficking of narcotics. The GOM employs a multi-faceted strategy that couples law enforcement, crop eradication/replacement, and demand reduction/treatment efforts with economic development measures to erode the cannabis growing culture that has historically existed in northern Morocco.
In 2009, the GOM established an integrated alternative development program in the cannabis growing regions of the country, devoting more than $70 million U.S. dollars and targeting 74 rural communities. While the GOM has had success encouraging the cultivation of alternative crops, some farmers have resisted this policy.
Most large shipments of illicit cannabis bound for Europe are transported via speedboats and other small non-commercial vessels. Smugglers continue to ship cannabis through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and the Moroccan port of Tangier, crossing the Strait of Gibraltar by ferry. The Royal Moroccan Navy and the Royal Gendarmerie maintain an aggressive maritime interdiction effort against smuggling activity, with multiple accounts of seizures reported in the Moroccan media.
When fully completed in 2015, the commercial port at Tangier Med will be the largest maritime container facility on the African continent. The potential for narcotics smuggling by commercial conveyance is significant, and the GOM has worked closely with the U.S. Government to acquire equipment and training needed to increase detection and interdiction of illegal shipments.
Cocaine traffickers are increasingly attempting to smuggle cocaine to Europe through Morocco. Cocaine is shipped from South America to sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel region and then on to Morocco. Morocco’s law enforcement agencies do not completely stem the flow of cocaine moving through the country, given Morocco’s porous borders and proximity to Europe.
Morocco is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, but has not signed any of its protocols. Morocco is also a party to the UN Convention Against Corruption. Morocco and the U.S. cooperate in law enforcement under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.
2. Supply Reduction
The GOM reports that land dedicated to cannabis cultivation has decreased from 134,000 hectares in 2003 to 47,500 hectares in 2010. However, according to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), a cannabis cultivation survey to confirm this reduction that was to be conducted by the GOM in cooperation with the UNODC in 2010 had to be postponed.
More than 118 tons of cannabis resin were seized in 2010, the most recent period reported by the GOM, and over 400 foreigners were arrested and charged with drug trafficking offenses. Multi-ton seizures of cannabis continue to occur in Morocco on a regular basis, including a 5.5 metric ton seizure made in October.
The GOM collaborates with European counterparts, in particular French and Spanish authorities, to combat drug trafficking. Since 2008, Morocco and Spain have participated in a joint commission to fight drug trafficking and illegal migration. Spain’s 1999 deployment of SIVE (the Integrated System of External Vigilance), a network of fixed and modular radar, infrared, and video sensors around the Strait of Gibraltar, continues to force smugglers to utilize longer, more exposed and vulnerable routes.
Moroccan law provides a maximum allowable prison sentence for drug offenses of 30 years, as well as fines for illegal drug violations ranging from $20,000 to $80,000 U.S. dollars. Eight to ten years imprisonment remains the typical sentence for major drug traffickers convicted in Morocco.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
The GOM launched a methadone substitution therapy program in 2010 as part of a comprehensive package of services for the treatment of heroin dependence. According to the INCB, Morocco is the first country in North Africa (and in the Arab world) to adopt legislation allowing the use of methadone in the treatment of drug dependence.
The GOM does not have a program to measure the extent of domestic drug abuse. There is also no effective, standardized system to monitor and evaluate drug-related crime; however, the GOM reports that approximately 29 percent of the 2010 prison population has been convicted of drug-related offenses ranging from personal consumption to trafficking.
In order to discourage drug abuse among Moroccan youth, the GOM Ministry of Health developed a counternarcotics awareness campaign targeting school children and created drug-free school zones, patrolled by police and the Auxiliary Forces. Moroccan civil society and some schools are active in promoting counternarcotics education.
4. Corruption
As a matter of government policy, the GOM neither encourages nor facilitates the production or trafficking of narcotics or controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. However, corruption and tacit non-enforcement remain serious issues in Morocco. Narcotics-related corruption among governmental, judicial, military and law enforcement officials has been an issue in the past, and the GOM has taken steps to hold officials complicit in drug trafficking accountable for their actions. In 2010, for example, the GOM sentenced 92 people – 55 of whom were members of the security services – to a maximum of ten years in prison for participating in a drug trafficking ring that reportedly shipped 30 tons of cannabis resin to Europe over several years.
In late 2008, the GOM formed the Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption (ICPC), charged with anti-corruption advocacy and prevention. In 2010, the GOM established a two-year program intended to reinforce public administration integrity and transparency, strengthen internal administrative control, and reform anti-corruption legislation. In 2011, Morocco adopted a new constitution with a number of significant changes, including providing for an increased role of the ICPC in combating corruption in the country by making it an independent agency with enhanced investigative authority.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
GOM officials seek to build upon their already strong existing relationships with international organizations such as the UNODC, the INCB, and INTERPOL. This cooperation has been strong on the law enforcement side, but less robust in terms of demand reduction efforts.
The GOM works closely with USG agencies on law enforcement issues and related training, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense, and the Department of Treasury. In addition, the Department of State, via both the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, maintain a very close and productive working relationship with a wide array of GOM counterparts.
The USG is working to enhance Morocco’s counternarcotics capabilities through training in law enforcement and border control techniques. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard provided training in 2011 on maritime law enforcement boarding operations, and DHS trained Moroccan police units on border patrol search, trauma and rescue techniques. Moreover, the U.S. Treasury’s ongoing efforts to strengthen the GOM’s vigilance on the financial sector by solidifying its measures against money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes may also contribute to the GOM’s ability to track and stop the flow of drug trafficking money.
D. Conclusion
Although cannabis cultivation persists in Morocco, and the country may be increasingly used as a transit zone for cocaine shipments, the GOM consistently demonstrates a strong commitment to addressing narcotics trafficking issues. Cannabis eradication programs have had significant success, Morocco’s capability to interdict narcotics shipments is improving, and demand reduction and treatment programs are increasing. The GOM has also effectively sought out and cultivated counternarcotics partnerships with countries in Europe and Africa, and continues to work closely with the USG on ways to improve Moroccan law enforcement capabilities.
Mozambique is not a significant producer of illegal drugs or chemical precursors. It is, however, a transit point for drugs moving to consumer markets in South Africa and Europe. Domestic drug consumption is limited primarily to cannabis and is difficult to reduce because it is engrained in rural, cultural practices. Designer drug abuse is not prevalent in Mozambique and is not a major concern of Government of the Republic of Mozambique (GRM) officials.
Mozambique is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols and the UN Convention Against Corruption.
Long porous borders, an extensive coastline, weak security infrastructure, and inadequately trained and equipped law enforcement personnel hamper Mozambique’s enforcement and interdiction efforts.
Mozambique’s coastline (1,550 miles) and international borders (2,800 miles, five countries) are extremely porous and poorly patrolled by the GRM making drug trafficking easier. Drug production in Mozambique is limited and mainly involves small scale production of marijuana and hashish. Mozambique lacks the technical and industrial expertise necessary for the large-scale production of synthetic drugs. There are media reports of small scale mandrax production.
The Office to Combat and Prevent Drug Use (GCPCD) reported for all of 2010, the seizure of 10 kilos of hashish, 3,252 kilos of marijuana (up 24 percent from 2009), 3.8 kilos of cocaine, and 5 kilos of heroin.
Arrests at airports rose significantly in 2010 and continue to rise; the exact number of arrests is unknown due to poor GRM recordkeeping. Media regularly report on drug arrests at Maputo airport; most traffickers arrive on Ethiopian Airlines flights. As examples, on October 17, 2011, a South African with 13 kilos of cocaine, arriving on an Ethiopian Airlines flight to Maputo, was arrested, and on December 25, two South Africans and one Zimbabwean arriving on Ethiopian Airlines flights were arrested with cocaine.
Despite the increase in seizures, corruption is a concern at the country’s ports. On October 24, 2011 eight policemen and customs officials at Maputo International Airport were immediately suspended for facilitating the entry of illegal drugs into the country in exchange for bribes.
The GRM’s unified counternarcotics plan is weakly enforced and its institutional human and financial resources are weak. However, the GCPCD does annually report and analyze trends and enforcement/treatment efforts of the GRM and civil society. GCPCD domestic drug abuse statistics underestimate the actual number of drug addicts; only about half as many addicts as exist in the capital area are actually registered.
The GCPCD relies on civil society support to convey its anti-drug message. In 2010, 35,523 anti-drug activists were trained. There were 3,721 anti-drug lectures given, mainly to school-age youth, reaching an audience of 755,312. Mozambique lacks dedicated drug treatment facilities; most drug addicts are treated at home by the family. Given the correlation between HIV and drug use, some HIV clinics offer drug dependency programs too, but lack sufficient resources.
Twelve Mozambican National Police attended drug interdiction-training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Botswana in 2011. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement will be providing a comprehensive border security training program for immigration, police investigators, customs officers, and prosecutors during 2012 and 2013. Additional training programs are planed for customs, police and border guards in FY2012. Further assistance to the Attorney General’s Office is also under consideration. Coordination with other narcotics assistance donors occurs during “Mini-Dublin” group meetings of appropriate embassy officers. The Department of Defense (DoD) has supplied 17 rigid hull inflatable boats to the Mozambican Navy since 2006 and will continue this engagement with operation and maintenance instruction. DoD’s program to provide maritime radar and Automatic Marine Identification Systems is ongoing and will improve maritime domain awareness.
The Mozambican government does not as a matter of policy encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics and in public statements takes a strong anti-drug and anti-corruption stance. Despite having strong laws in place, corruption remains widespread and some government officials are widely suspected of facilitating or condoning drug trafficking. The GRM is finalizing a new multi-year anti-drug strategy, in a process led by the GCPCD, and overseen by the Office of the Prime Minister.
In September 2011, the GRM completed its investigation of prominent businessman, Mohamed Bachir Suleman, who was placed on the Department of Treasury’s Drug Kingpin list in 2010. While the GRM found insufficient evidence of drug trafficking to prosecute on that charge, it found extensive tax, customs and foreign exchange violations, and commenced administrative action against him for payment of back taxes and fines.
Because of weak border controls, Mozambique remains a transit point for drugs passing to more lucrative consumer markets. The GRM’s counternarcotics fight is hampered by weak political will, high levels of corruption and few resources. The U.S. government will continue to work with those elements of the GRM committed to combating illegal narcotics.
Although Nepal is neither a significant producer of, nor a major transit route for narcotic drugs, some hashish, heroin, and domestically produced cannabis and opium are trafficked to and through Nepal every year. Nepal’s Narcotics Drug Control Law Enforcement Unit (NDCLEU) reports that more Nepalis are investing and taking a larger role in managing trafficking operations. Customs and border controls in Nepal remain weak, but international cooperation has resulted in increased narcotics-related apprehensions in Nepal and abroad. Officials claim law enforcement efforts have improved in 2011 over previous years, but limited resources still hinder the development of a robust counternarcotics program. Narcotics-related legislation has been pending for several years.
Police confirm the cultivation of cannabis is on the rise in the southern areas of Nepal, most destined for the Indian market. Abuse of locally grown and wild cannabis and locally produced hashish, which are marketed in freelance operations, remains widespread. Heroin from Southwest and Southeast Asia is smuggled into Nepal across the porous border with India and through Kathmandu’s international airport. Legal, medicinal drugs continue to be diverted and abused. Nepal is not a producer of chemical precursors, but serves as a transit route for precursor traffic between India and China. The GON has committed to enhance overall law enforcement; however, the GON has given little attention to narcotics-specific initiatives.
Nepal’s basic drug law is the Narcotic Drugs Control Act, 2033 (1976, last amended in 1993), making the cultivation, production, preparation, manufacture, export, import, purchase, possession, sale, and consumption of most commonly abused drugs illegal. The government plans to amend the Act to incorporate provisions for psychotropic substances, demand reduction, treatment and rehabilitation. In 2006, the GON updated its Narcotics Control National Policy. The policy consists of five strategies to control drug production, abuse and trafficking: (1) supply control, (2) demand reduction through treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention, (3) risk reduction, (4) research and development, and (5) collaboration and resource mobilization.
To coordinate narcotics control activities, the 2006 policy called for the creation of a Narcotics Control Bureau, but the GON has not decided when or how to implement this planned new bureau. The policy also called for restructuring a high-level Narcotics Control National Guidance and Coordination Committee and a Narcotics Control Executive Committee to oversee all narcotics control programs, law enforcement activities, and legal reforms. However, the committees appear to exist more on paper than in fact.
NDCLEU has the lead in law enforcement efforts and is focused on supply control. It improved its capacity in recent years, and made quality arrests and seizures, particularly through stationing more personnel at the Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA). NDCLEU also regularly conducts drug investigation training programs for various law enforcement groups – sometimes in collaboration with the UN Office for Drugs and Crime. However, it is still handicapped by technology and resource shortages.
In 2011, the overall number of police arrests decreased, while drug seizures overall rose. From January to September 2011, police arrested 112 individuals (83 Nepalis and 29 foreigners) on the basis of drug trafficking charges. The non-Nepalis arrested were primarily Indian nationals. The seizure of hashish in 2011 was at an all-time high with 1,923.4 kilograms (150 percent increase from 2010). The government seized 5.8 grams of heroin (down 27 percent from 2010), and 32,859 vials of diverted pharmaceutical drugs (an increase of 31 percent over 2010). Trafficking of hashish via TIA decreased due to the deterrent affect of frequent seizures and arrests. No seizures of chemical precursors have been recorded by police in 2011. There have been no reports of the illicit use of licensed, imported, dual-use precursor chemicals, but Nepal is used as a transit route to move precursor chemicals between India and China.
According to NDCLEU, evidence from narcotics seizures suggests that narcotics transit Nepal from India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to China, Iran, Europe, the United States, Australia, Canada, and other countries in Asia. Drugs are typically routed through Thailand, China, Indonesia, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden. Media reports claim that most narcotics are bound for India and most seizures occur at the porous India/Nepal border, where customs and border controls are weak. Recent case investigations conducted by the DEA New Delhi County Office established that a small percentage of narcotics, especially hashish is sent to the United States by individuals involved in trafficking through the use of the international express parcel services.
U.S. policy is to strengthen Nepal’s law enforcement capacity to combat narcotics trafficking and related crimes, to maintain positive bilateral cooperation, and to encourage Nepal to enact and implement appropriate laws and regulations to meet all objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The United States is committed to working with the Nepali government to provide expertise and training in law enforcement, particularly to border and customs services. The United States continues to provide support to various parts of the justice sector to combat corruption and improve the rule of law. The United States also encourages Nepal to enact drug legislation. Nepal does not have any extradition or mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States. The Government of Nepal does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances, nor does it encourage or facilitate the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. The USG is not aware of any senior officials engaged in drug trafficking.
A. Introduction
The Netherlands is a significant transit country for narcotics and has traditionally been a producer of synthetic drugs, such as MDMA (ecstasy). The Dutch Opium Act prohibits the possession, commercial distribution, production, import and export of all illicit drugs. The Dutch government places a high priority on combating the illegal drug trade, and it has seen considerable success. The Netherlands is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Production. The government has made the fight against organized cannabis cultivation a top priority. In addition to the National Taskforce on Organized Hemp Cultivation established in July 2008, the Justice and Security Minister in December 2010 set up a special taskforce to combat drug-related organized crime, particularly illegal cannabis cultivation, in Brabant province, where the country’s cannabis plantations are concentrated.
The country has traditionally been a major producer of ecstasy, although a sizeable amount of production appears to have shifted to other countries. During 2010 Dutch Police (KLPD) reporting indicated an increase in ecstasy production in the Netherlands. Although there were no reports of ecstasy laboratory seizures in 2010, there have been numerous indications of lab activity. These include significant seizures of “pre-precursor chemicals,” which can be converted easily into the traditional precursors needed for production. In January 2011 the Trimbos Institute reported that more and better quality ecstasy had emerged on the Dutch market. There is also production of amphetamines and other synthetic drugs. The Netherlands has a large (legal) chemical sector, making it a convenient location for criminals to obtain or produce precursor chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs.
Trafficking/Transit. With its extensive transportation infrastructure and the busiest maritime port in Europe, the Netherlands continues to be a major distribution point for illicit drugs to and from Europe. A sizeable percentage of the cocaine consumed in Europe enters through the Netherlands. Cocaine trafficking is combated through the 100-percent checks on inbound flights from the Netherlands Antilles, Suriname, and West African countries. Trafficking in “hard” drugs is prosecuted vigorously, and dealers are subject to a prison sentence of up to 12 years. When trafficking takes place on an organized scale, the sentence is increased by one-third (up to 16 years).
Illegal Drug Use. The Dutch Opium Act distinguishes between “hard” drugs that have “unacceptable” risks (e.g., heroin, cocaine, ecstasy), and “soft” drugs (cannabis products). Sales of small amounts of cannabis products (under five grams) are “tolerated” (i.e., not prosecuted, even though technically illegal) in “coffeeshops” operating under regulated conditions (no minors on premises, no alcohol sales, no hard drug sales, no advertising, and no creating a public nuisance).
The Health Ministry coordinates drug policy, while the Ministry of Security and Justice is responsible for law enforcement, including the police. Matters relating to local government are the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. At the municipal level, policy is coordinated in tripartite consultations among the mayor, the chief public prosecutor, and the police.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
In May 2011, the Dutch Cabinet agreed to measures to reduce drug-related nuisance and drug tourism as proposed by the previous government. Under the plans, coffeeshops are to become private clubs for the local markets, only accessible to Dutch citizens upon display of valid proof of identity. Coffeeshops must be at least 350 meters away from schools or face closure. According to a study by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), this would lead to closure of 58 of the 650 coffeeshops in the Netherlands.
The measure to turn coffeeshops into private clubs has been criticized by a number of local governments and drug experts fearing the plan will lead to more illegal street dealing and more public nuisance. Moreover, a study by the Amsterdam city council showed that 70 percent of cannabis users in Amsterdam do not want to be registered as club members. Meanwhile, coffeeshops in Maastricht started banning all foreign customers, except for Germans and Belgians, in September. The action is a strategic initiative by coffeeshop operators who want to see whether the measure will lead to more public nuisance, illegal street sales, and crime.
In June 2011, the Cabinet submitted a bill to parliament penalizing all preparations by persons and companies that facilitate illegal cannabis cultivation, even if they do not grow the plants themselves. The bill not only targets legal “grow shops,” which sell seeds, lamps, fertilizers, and other supplies, but transport and distribution companies and landlords and electricians who help with illegal cannabis production. The offense will carry a maximum prison term of three years.
In August the Cabinet presented a bill to ban driving under the influence of cannabis.
In September, the Health Ministry announced that the GHB party drug will be placed on Schedule I of the Dutch Opium Act, which means that it will become a “hard” drug like cocaine and heroin. A recent assessment by the Coordination Center on the Assessment and Monitoring of New Drugs (CAM) determined that GHB may pose serious health risks, particularly when used in combination with alcohol or other drugs.
In October, the Cabinet agreed to categorize cannabis with a THC content of 15 percent or more as a “hard” drug and to place it on Schedule I of the Dutch Opium Act. Penalties on trade, import and export of high-THC cannabis will also be raised. If Parliament accepts the plan, a large part of “Nederwiet” (Dutch-grown cannabis) will be banned. The Trimbos Institute for Mental Health and Addiction recently concluded that 74 percent of Dutch cannabis contains more than 15 percent THC. In 2010 the average THC content in “Nederwiet” was 17.8 percent. The Cabinet also decided to keep the current drug classification system (Schedule I “hard” drugs such as cocaine, ecstasy and heroin, and Schedule II “soft” drugs) in place.
The Netherlands is party to all of the UN Drug Conventions, and the 1972 Protocol. It is party to the UN Convention against Corruption and to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols on trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. The U.S. and the Netherlands have fully operational extradition and mutual legal assistance (MLAT) agreements, including the 2004 U.S.-Netherlands Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Agreements, which entered into force in 2010.
Operational cooperation between U.S. and Dutch law enforcement agencies is excellent, despite some differences in approach and tactics. In August 2010 the Kingdom of the Netherlands acceded to the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement, a treaty that enhances cooperation in combating drug trafficking in the region. They are also a member of the Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre-Narcotics (MAOC-N), which is an intelligence exchange and coordination platform for maritime operations among European countries.
2. Supply Reduction
The Netherlands is a major producer of cannabis. The 2008 National Threat Assessment (NDB) estimates there are between 30,000 and 40,000 hemp plantations in the Netherlands. More than 80 percent of Dutch-grown cannabis is exported, with illegal revenues of between 2.5 billion to 5 billion Euros. In December 2010 the Security and Justice Minister set up a special taskforce to combat organized crime in Brabant province. Between December 2010 and October 2011, the taskforce arrested more than 1,200 suspects, dismantled 800 cannabis plantations and seized more than four million Euros in criminal assets.
According to the 2010 report by the ESDP, the amount of amphetamine (powder, paste and oil) seized in the Netherlands in 2010 dropped 67 percent from 2009 to 544 kilos. A total of 1,734 kilos of Dutch amphetamine was seized abroad, which was 10 percent up from 2009. Most Dutch amphetamine is exported to the UK, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, and Germany. MDMA seizures in the Netherlands rose significantly in 2010, but the number of Dutch MDMA tablets seized abroad dropped slightly. According to the ESDP, no reports of MDMA tablet seizures in the U.S. linked to the Netherlands were received in 2010. Most Dutch MDMA tablets were seized in France. The number of dismantled synthetic drug production sites dropped to 19 in 2010 from 24 in 2009. Of these 19 sites, 9 were involved in amphetamine production. Mephedrone, or “Miaow Miaow,” and GHB are becoming increasingly popular in the Dutch party scene.
|
Drug Seizures in the Netherlands |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
|
Heroin (kg) |
803 |
596 |
- |
|
Cocaine (kg) |
6,757 |
4,934 |
- |
|
Ecstasy (tablets) |
249,761 |
172,845 |
555,401 |
|
Ecstasy (powder)(kg) |
84 |
3.4 |
66 |
|
Synthetic drug labs |
21 |
24 |
19 |
|
Amphetamine powder (kg) |
1,106 |
1,946 |
66 |
|
Amphetamine paste (kg) |
121 |
466 |
546 |
|
Methamphetamine (kg) |
0.02 |
0 |
44.6 |
|
LSD (trips) |
17,825 |
0 |
6,430 |
|
Methadone (tablets) |
4,562 |
113 |
- |
|
Cannabis resin (kg) |
24,443 |
4,633 |
- |
|
Marijuana/”Nederwiet” (kg) |
42,359 |
5,942 |
- |
|
Hemp plants |
1,053,368 |
863,343 |
- |
|
Dismantled hemp plantations |
4,731 |
4,727 |
- |
|
MCPP (tablets) |
7,764 |
361,600 |
5,200 |
|
2-PEA (tablets) |
0 |
0 |
4,000 |
|
Ketamine (kg) |
0 |
0 |
5 |
|
BMK (liter) |
231 |
258 |
334 |
|
PMK (liter) |
0 |
40 |
0 |
|
PMK-glycidate (kg) |
0 |
0 |
1,200.5 |
|
Safrol (kg) |
0 |
20 |
85 |
|
Ephedrine/pseudo-ephedrine (kg) |
317 |
587 |
508 |
|
Chemical waste dumps |
36 |
34 |
35 |
(Source: KLPD National Police Services Force)
The number of drug crime suspects registered by the police in 2009 (latest available statistics) was more than 16,000. In 2009 more than 17,000 drug-related offenses were registered with the public prosecutor’s office. Drug-related offenses constituted 7.6 percent of the total number of criminal cases handled by Dutch courts in 2009. The average unconditional prison sentence for a drug offense in 2009 was 305 days.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport continues to be the agency responsible for coordinating Dutch drug policy and implementation. Demand reduction and treatment policies aim to reduce the risks to drug users, their immediate surroundings, and society. In meeting these goals, the Netherlands has been reasonably successful. Despite a reputation for tolerance, the share of the population abusing drugs in the country is on a par with the rest of Europe. The rate of drug-related deaths is the lowest in Europe: 2.4 per million inhabitants.
Drug prevention programs are organized through a network of local, regional and national institutions. Programs target schools in order to discourage drug use among students, and use national mass media campaigns to reach the broader public. The Netherlands requires school instruction on the dangers of alcohol and drugs as part of the health education curriculum. The Trimbos Institute each year carries out drug information campaigns, and its 24-hour national Drug Info Line has become very popular.
Below are the 2009 (latest available) statistics on percent among the general population ages 15-64 reporting lifetime (ever) use and last-month (current) use. (Note that, because of differences in research methods, statistics about drug use in 2005 and 2009 are no longer comparable.)
| Lifetime use | Last-month use | |
| 2009 | 2009 | |
| Cannabis | 7.0 | 4.2 |
| Cocaine | 1.2 | 0.5 |
| Heroin | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Ecstasy | 1.4 | 0.4 |
| Amphetamine | 0.4 | 0.2 |
(Source: National Drug Monitor (NDM) 2010, Trimbos Institute)
The Health Ministry administers a wide variety of demand and harm-reduction programs, reaching about 75 percent of the country's addicts. According to the 2010 NDM, in 2009 outpatient treatment centers registered 8,863 clients seeking treatment for their (primary) cannabis addiction; 9,993 for cocaine; 12,466 for opiates; 154 for ecstasy; and 1,504 for amphetamines. The number of hard-core opiate addicts has declined dramatically over the past 10 years to about 18,000; their average age has risen to 48; and the number of overdose deaths related to opiates has stabilized at between 30 and 50 a year.
Needle supply and exchange programs have kept the incidence of HIV infection among intravenous drug users relatively low. Of the addicts known to the addiction care organizations, 75 percent regularly use methadone. There are 17 clinics where heroin is distributed to approximately 700 hard-core addicts, for whom all other forms of assistance have failed. As apparent results of this program, both the crime rate among addicts has dropped and their health has improved.
4. Corruption
The Dutch Government does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. No senior official of the Dutch Government has been found to engage in, encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Press reports of low-level law enforcement corruption appear from time to time, but the problem is not believed to be widespread or systemic.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation and U.S. Policy Initiatives
U.S. and Dutch law enforcement agencies maintained excellent operational cooperation, with principal attention given to South American cocaine trafficking organizations and the production of synthetic drugs. Dutch regulations continue to restrict the use of criminal informants in drug trafficking investigations. In addition, the Dutch do not use their asset forfeiture laws in conjunction with drug related investigations to the same extent as the U.S. DEA The Hague has noted improved and expedited handling of drug-related extradition requests. The U.S. is also working with the Netherlands to assist the Caribbean part of the Kingdom in countering narcotics trafficking.
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Netherlands in 2011 that formalizes a previous exchange of letters from 1994 allowing USCG law enforcement detachments (LEDET) to deploy onboard Netherland Naval vessels. The MOU is a more comprehensive agreement that allows the USCG to leverage Netherland Naval vessels as a force multiplier to enhance presence and expand maritime drug trafficking interdiction opportunities in the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone.
Both DEA and the National Crime Squad (NR) recognize the importance of money laundering investigations and joint initiatives concerning drug related "bulk" money smuggling operations.
In December 2006 the Royal military police (KMar) was instructed by the Justice Ministry to stop sharing the Schiphol “black list” of couriers intercepted at the airport with DEA The Hague for privacy reasons. The Ministry indicated that, since Dutch policy requires the names to be removed from the list after three years, entering the names into a U.S. government database without a sunset provision would be contrary to Dutch law. This issue has not yet been resolved, and the suspension continues. DEA The Hague continues to supply the KMar at Schiphol airport with international trend information on routes being utilized by drug couriers.
All foreign law enforcement assistance requests continue to be sent to the International Network Service (IPOL), a division of the KLPD. IPOL has assigned two liaison officers to assist DEA and other U.S. law enforcement agencies. In coordination with IPOL, DEA and other liaison officers may contact the Regional Police and NR offices for requests and intelligence sharing. This policy has continued to permit better coordination during ongoing enforcement actions. Under Dutch law enforcement policy, prosecutors control most aspects of an investigation. Dutch police officers must get prosecutor concurrence to share information directly with foreign liaison officers even on a police-to-police basis. Dutch regulations regarding police-to-police information sharing are nebulous and often subject to interpretation, which can hamper the quick sharing of information; however, the pace is improving as a result of the increased access for DEA agents with NR units. Additionally, DEA has worked with Dutch counterparts at the KLPD and the National Prosecutor’s Office, resulting in a reduction of the amount of time it takes to obtain approval for money pickup operations via MLAT requests. This reduction in approval time has resulted in multiple successful operations.
The use of confidential sources is heavily restricted under Dutch law. Since many DEA investigations outside of the Netherlands utilize cooperating source information, this poses a unique challenge when attempting to initiate or coordinate cases with Dutch counterparts. All matters concerning confidential sources are closely coordinated with KLPD’s Criminal Intelligence Division and the National Prosecutors Office.
D. Conclusion
Despite the reality of toleration of soft drug use, the Dutch government takes the fight against drug trafficking very seriously. In particular, the fight against organized cannabis cultivation has been made a priority issue. Although the Netherlands is hampered to some degree by domestic legal restrictions on the extent to which it can cooperate bilaterally, close bilateral cooperation with the U.S. on counter-narcotics efforts has been fruitful in the past and will continue.
A. Introduction
Nicaragua continued to be a major drug transshipment point for South American cocaine flowing to the United States in 2011. Nicaragua’s limited law enforcement capabilities and sparsely populated regions provide an enabling environment for drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to move drugs, weapons and cash, and establish clandestine labs and warehouse facilities. DTOs were increasingly reliant on local populations for logistical support, including refueling and security, and used women and children as “mules” to transport contraband. Nicaragua is a producer of crack cocaine, methamphetamines and marijuana. There was no reliable data on the size of the export market for these illicit drugs or on the quantities consumed domestically. Indications existed, however, that domestic use of these drugs was rising, particularly on the Caribbean coast. Over the past year the police targeted smaller gangs and DTOs operating in and around the capital of Managua.
Despite difficult conditions and limited resources, in 2011 Nicaragua’s civilian and military law enforcement units disrupted 18 DTO operations throughout the country, including operations in the strategically important autonomous regions of the Caribbean coast. Security forces dismantled DTO logistical structures; seized drugs, currency and small arms; destroyed clandestine airstrips; and confiscated vehicles, aircraft, vessels and livestock. Nicaragua protected its territory as best it could with limited resources and while able to deter some DTOs from Nicaraguan littoral waters, many continue to use these maritime routes.
The Government of Nicaragua routinely announced its commitment to fight illicit drug trafficking and organized crime, including efforts to coordinate with other Central American countries to combat the drug trade. In April 2011, a delegation from Costa Rica and Nicaragua met on their common border to coordinate efforts to counter DTOs operating in the porous border area. The Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) enhanced their efforts by participating in regional law enforcement forums; the Nicaragua National Police (NNP) Chief represented the government at several Central American Integration System (SICA) meetings. Nicaragua is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
In 2011 Nicaraguan authorities started to enforce Law 735, approved by the Nicaraguan National Assembly in November 2010, which regulates the prevention, investigation and prosecution of organized crime, as well as the administration of seized, forfeited and abandoned assets. In April 2011, Nicaragua enacted an administrative regulation restricting production, importation and distribution of the chemical phenyl acetic acid (PAA), a methamphetamine precursor, in its raw form or any products derived from the chemical, and banned all uses of PAA – commercial and domestic. A violation of the administrative regulation will result in a fine and/or prison time. In November 2010, the National Assembly approved a national budget increase to strengthen the counternarcotics capacity of the military and national police.
In March 2011, the Nicaraguan National Assembly ratified the Central American Simplified Extradition Treaty to facilitate the prosecution of third-country nationals for organized crime and similar offenses. The ratification of this treaty will allow Nicaragua to streamline arrests and the extradition of prisoners from Central American nations. The United States – Nicaragua extradition treaty dating from 1907does not apply to Nicaraguan citizens, as the Nicaraguan Constitution bars their extradition from national territory.
The government built new NNP facilities in municipalities around the country and five sub-stations in Managua. The NNP added 1,300 new officers to its rolls, setting a new record for a single-year increase in new officers. Additionally, the NNP added to its vehicle fleet, bringing the quantity of new or seized assets added since 2007 to approximately 600 motorcycles and 120 motor vehicles. The NNP seized, modified and equipped six large transport trucks to serve as mobile command centers for the Mobile Inspection Unit’s (MIU) periodic roadblock operations along the Pan America Highway.
In March 2011, the NNP and the European Union signed a cooperation agreement for 5.9 million euro to fund a central criminal forensic laboratory for the police to receive and process physical evidence collected at crime scenes. Once fully opened in early 2012, the laboratory will conduct genetic studies, fingerprinting, and ballistic and voice analysis.
The United States and Nicaragua signed a Maritime Counterdrug Bilateral agreement in November 2001. Nicaragua is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols, and is a member of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States (OAS). Nicaragua is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Nicaragua also ratified the Inter-American Mutual Legal Assistance Convention in 2002, an agreement that facilitates sharing of legal information between countries and improves cooperation with U.S. requests for evidence sharing or transfer. In 2002 Nicaragua ratified the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, and signed but not ratified the Caribbean Regional Maritime Counternarcotics Agreement in 2003. In 2004, the United States and Nicaragua signed the Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System (CNIES), which allows greater law enforcement information sharing among nations. Nicaragua is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Nicaragua participated in the U.S. Coast Guard sponsored Multilateral Maritime Counterdrug Summit, which included participants from Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico and most Central American countries.
2. Supply Reduction
DTO transshipment methods include numerous land, sea and air routes. Maritime smuggling via go-fast boats on the littoral waters of the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, the San Juan River, and Lake Nicaragua remained prevalent, though routes changed routinely. According to the government, DTOs appeared to increase use of self-propelled fully-submersible submarines to transport cocaine in the Pacific region. Traffickers constructed and used clandestine airstrips in the Caribbean coastal areas, the Northern Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and the Southern Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS). Nicaragua’s limited capacity for tactical communications between surface and air assets impeded interdiction coordination.
In 2011, Nicaraguan authorities reported a decrease in the previous year’s cocaine seizures and an increase in cash and property seizures, including 50 vehicles, six airplanes, 15 boats, 79 illegal firearms and 19 farming operations (fronts for illicit trade) with over $900,000 worth of livestock. Nicaragua seized over $5 million in bulk cash currency in addition to assets worth approximately $11 million. Drug seizures included 8.80 (MT) of cocaine, 31 liters of liquid cocaine, 86 kilograms (kg) of heroin and 342 (kg) of marijuana. Nicaragua also arrested 168 individuals for drug-related crimes. Nicaragua did not report the dismantlement of any high-level drug trafficking organizations.
Border security remained a concern. Border police officials blamed a decrease in seizures on the lack of personnel, poor working conditions and low morale at the border. Corruption also likely contributed to the underreporting of seizures. The marshy region along the southern shore of Lake Nicaragua, which comprises much of the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border, is difficult to monitor. DTOs used the Pan-American Highway as a route for northbound cocaine, heroin and marijuana and a southbound route for weapons and currency. The port of entry at Peñas Blancas, on the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border, was the most successful and aggressive Nicaraguan border checkpoint in 2011. It remains the last overland chokepoint for northbound contraband and southbound currency entering or leaving the Central America customs area. However, the seizures for 2011 dropped dramatically at Penas Blancas.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
Drug consumption in Nicaragua rose in 2011, particularly on the Atlantic coast where the transshipment of drugs is highest. Nicaraguan community leaders and law enforcement officials reported rising domestic use of crack cocaine, methamphetamines and marijuana, particularly among 16 to 35 year olds. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that 0.7 percent of the population aged 12-65 abused cocaine. The limited education and law enforcement resources dedicated to addressing domestic drug use were largely focused on the Hispanic Pacific Coast regions of Nicaragua, rather than the Creole and Indigenous Atlantic Coast.
The NNP’s Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program celebrated its 10 year anniversary as Nicaragua’s premier youth demand reduction program in all regions of the country. Since 2001, more than 70,000 students in 800 schools participated in the DARE programs in English, Spanish or Miskito. In 2011, 41 NNP officers received training on demand reduction strategies, violence prevention and gang resistance education. The DARE program expanded into 148 new public schools, reaching nearly 18,000 new students, a 35 percent increase from 2010.
The NNP’s Second Step (Segundo Paso) drug awareness and prevention program for teachers and police officers dealing with preschool level children, continued in Managua, the RAAS, and the RAAN. Twenty-seven preschool teachers and three NNP officers received Second Step Monitoring and Project Evaluation training. In addition, the NNP Juvenile Affairs Division’s anti-drug message reached 280 students in 15 schools in the Pacific and Atlantic Coast regions.
In 2011, the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program, initiated in 2010 with the support from the NNP, expanded to all regions of the country. The program graduated more than 3,000 students from 20 public elementary and high schools in Nicaragua, including more than 10 percent of students in the capital of the RAAS.
In July 2011, the NNP inaugurated a new youth development center designed to give former gang members and their families vocational skills and alternatives to gang membership. The center focused on the reintegration of youth and families who show a willingness to be key players in the development of their communities. According to the NNP, the youth received personalized attention to promote confidence and self-esteem, as well as vocational training and job placement assistance.
There were no private sector initiatives to promote national drug abuse awareness or prevent drug addiction in 2011, although various international non-governmental organizations (NGO) provided treatment and services to drug users. The New Self Foundation opened a rehabilitation center for individuals addicted to narcotics with the intent to provide treatment to 1,500 addicts. The Foundation received training support from the National Council to Combat Drugs, Institute of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, the NNP and the Nicaraguan military.
4. Corruption
As a matter of policy, the GON neither encouraged nor facilitated illegal activity associated with drug trafficking and no senior government officials were accused of being engaged in such activity. Nevertheless, corruption remained a serious problem in Nicaragua. Many factors made corruption difficult to combat, including low salaries for police and judges and a poor law enforcement infrastructure. Cash-rich criminals acquired a cloak of impunity through bribery and extortion of judicial and law enforcement officials. Detained drug suspects were regularly freed after short periods of detention.
The politicization of the Nicaraguan judiciary, particularly the Nicaraguan Supreme Court presented another impediment to serious law enforcement efforts in the country. In 2011, for the first time, NNP officials received assets and vehicles seized from the Supreme Court in accordance with Law 735. Money and other assets seized from drug trafficking activities were largely unaccounted for. Reports of judges retaining expensive vehicles and luxury items were common.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
Despite budget reductions in 2011, the Nicaraguan Navy’s cooperation and interoperability with its regional partners and the United States made it the most productive counternarcotics force in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan Navy and U.S. agencies enjoyed a cooperative operational relationship, but the law enforcement bureaus of Nicaragua remained dependent upon U.S. assistance.
U.S. assistance in Nicaragua is focused on enhancing the abilities of government law enforcement agencies to detect and intercept shipments, detain traffickers, stop the laundering of illegal profits from the drug industry, and support preventative programs to protect youth from drugs and recruitment into gangs.
With U.S. assistance, the Nicaraguan Navy upgraded its 65-foot patrol boat fleet and extended its maritime operations into the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea. The Navy refitted and returned to service 20 confiscated go-fast type vessels. The United States provided training in maritime law enforcement, small boat operations, maintenance, logistics, engineering and leadership. The United States and the Nicaraguan Navy developed a long-range patrol strategy centered on three 65-foot patrol boats.
The United States provided support for civilian border security units, military border patrol units and the NNP’s Mobile Inspection Unit (MIU), which established random checkpoints at strategic points on the national highway system and accounted for the bulk of all police seizures. In July 2011, the United States coordinated an interagency assessment of Nicaragua’s port security in Corinto, San Juan del Sur, El Rama and the international airport in Managua.
D. Conclusion
The Government of Nicaragua took steps to stem the flow of drugs, weapons, money and exploited persons through it borders and the region as a whole. Nicaragua and the United States share common national security interests and in 2011 the NNP began to exhibit a greater willingness to cooperate with the United States on law enforcement issues. The Nicaraguan Navy’s success with interdictions continued and demonstrated the willingness of Nicaragua to confront DTOs. The government should expand its efforts to include interdiction as a component of a cohesive strategy to identify, disrupt, dismantle, and seize assets of high-value drug trafficking organizations to avoid an overt-focus on low-level traffickers. Nicaraguan achievements will increase if the government places greater emphasis on combating corruption and money laundering; professionalizing and removing political influences on the judiciary and the Prosecutor General’s office; ensuring security activities are implemented through internationally-recognized norms; and continuing development of law enforcement institutions. Further, Nicaragua can expand its successes and facilitate regional security by opening its institutions to and sharing best practices with other Central American nations.
Drug production and use are not high-priority problems in Niger, though trafficking and use appear to be increasing. According to the head of the Drug Enforcement Coordination Center (CCLAD), population growth and increasing poverty continue to have dire social consequences that often result in drug abuse. Low prices for narcotics, especially cannabis and prescription medications, are also contributing to a gradual increase in consumption and to narcotics-related health problems.
Drug-trafficking routes run from Mauritania through Mali and cross northern Niger along the Algerian and Libyan borders, continuing toward North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. The drugs originate mainly from South America. Instability and wider availability of arms resulting from the Libyan conflict may have expanded traffickers’ capacity to move drugs through these routes. Only a very small amount of cannabis is grown in Niger, and to date there is no evidence of synthetic drug production facilities.
Niger is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and to the UN Convention against Corruption. As a matter of government policy, the Government of Niger does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances, nor does it encourage or facilitate the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.
Cannabis and diverted prescription medications are readily and cheaply available in Niger. They are generally trafficked into Niger from Nigeria and Benin on heavy transport trucks, in the baggage of people traveling north into Niger, and on camels using traditional trade routes. Enough marijuana to make a cigarette or two is available for as little as 100 to 200 CFA (20-40 cents) and can be purchased on the periphery of many markets throughout Niger, but especially in Niamey and other urban areas. Diazepam, a depressant commonly marketed as Valium, is the prescription medication of choice for abuse and can be purchased on the street for as little as 25 to 50 CFA (five-10 cents) per pill. Drug use can be recreational or work-related, for work involving intense effort or extended drudgery. Dealers and users are generally 15 to 40 years old, and include members of affluent families. The CCLAD has visited schools in and outside Niamey to raise drug abuse awareness among students.
The CCLAD operates nationwide and is headed by a National Police Commissioner appointed in October 2010. The CCLAD is the focal point for government and private organizations that combat drugs and is tasked with compiling statistics, developing intelligence, and pursuing drug users and distributers. The CCLAD receives support from the French government and uses the French national public health laboratory to analyze recovered drugs. Within the Ministry of Justice, the Director of Criminal Affairs and Pardons heads the National Coordinating Commission for the Fight against Drugs, which organizes outreach and educational programs. The CCLAD headquarters office in Niamey includes 30 police officers, with plans for the addition of six National Guardsmen. The CCLAD has branches in Agadez (covering Agadez and Tahoua regions) and in Zinder (covering Diffa, Maradi, and Zinder regions). The center in Niamey also covers the regions of Dosso and Tillabery. The CCLAD is under-equipped and understaffed, and can offer no incentives to attract other security agents to join its ranks. Since its creation in 1992, the CCLAD has not been able to establish a detoxification or rehabilitation center for drug patients. The CCLAD intends to strengthen its branches in Agadez and Zinder by the end of 2012. It also intends to provide drug enforcement training for all security forces. The CCLAD plans to draft proposals for their upcoming activities and request assistance from partner countries.
During the first six months of 2011, the CCLAD-Niamey and other security forces arrested 242 people (including 97 sentenced to prison terms) and seized 655.4 kilograms of cannabis and 182,020 Diazepam (D5) pills. On June 7, drug enforcement officers at the Port of Cotonou, Benin, seized a container in transit to Niger in which they found 405 kilograms of cocaine shipped from Brazil. On June 10, the Togolese drug enforcement agency seized 97 kilograms of cocaine in a container registered as carrying soybean oil en route to Niger. On September 3, near Dirkou, in Agadez region, the CCLAD with support from other security forces apprehended traffickers aboard three vehicles carrying a total of at least 3,200 kilograms of cannabis resin with an illicit market value of 13 billion CFA ($27.5 million). The CCLAD escorted the vehicles and their contents to headquarters in Niamey. On November 3, near Madama, in Agadez region, security forces clashed with suspected drug traffickers aboard four vehicles. The suspects managed to escape, leaving one government soldier injured. The CCLAD reports that it is investigating several cases involving politicians.
A. Introduction
Nigeria remains a transit country for heroin and cocaine destined for Europe, and to a lesser degree, for the United States. The Nigerian Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) frequently arrests drug couriers at Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA) in Lagos, but drug traffickers have begun using other ports of entry, such as seaports and land borders, to avoid the tighter controls at Lagos’ airport. The Embassy's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Office donated digital body scanners for Nigeria’s four international airports in 2008, which continue to play a key role in NDLEA’s detection of drug couriers. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) also donated drug detection kits for use at all points of entry, including land borders, to enhance the NDLEA’s drug detection capacity on site.
Still, Nigerian organized criminal networks remain a major factor in moving cocaine and heroin worldwide, recently adding methamphetamine to and around Southeast Asia. In addition to drug trafficking, some of these organizations also engage in advance-fee fraud, and other forms of fraud targeting U.S. citizens and businesses. Widespread corruption in Nigeria facilitates criminal activity. These factors and Nigeria’s central location along major trafficking routes provide incentives and mechanisms for criminal groups to flourish and for Nigeria to serve as an important trafficking hub.
The only drug cultivated in significant amounts domestically is cannabis sativa (marijuana). Nigerian-grown marijuana is the most commonly abused drug in the country. It is also exported to neighboring countries through Nigeria’s vast, porous borders and then shipped on to Europe. However, marijuana is not shipped in significant quantities to the United States. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
The NDLEA enforces laws against drug trafficking and abuse and plays the lead role in demand reduction and drug control policy development. Inter-agency cooperation remains weak, partially explaining the dearth of apprehensions of major traffickers or the absence of consistent interdiction of major shipments of contraband. For instance, although all law enforcement elements have representatives at Nigeria’s international ports of entry, joint operations between them are rare. No single law enforcement agency in Nigeria has adequate resources to combat sophisticated international criminal networks.
Nigeria’s counternarcotics policy derives from a 1998 National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP). Many of the plan's goals, however, remain unfulfilled. The NDLEA’s budget is not adequate. The Government of Nigeria (GON) increased the NDLEA budget to 7.81 billion naira (about USD 49 million) from 4.62 billion naira in 2009, an increase of 69 percent. Of this, seven percent, or 547 million naira (about USD 3.5 million) is allocated for NDLEA staff training. About 90 percent of the NDLEA budget goes to personnel costs, while two percent supports capital expenditures.
Besides being a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, Nigeria is also a party to the UN Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols. The 1931 U.S.-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty, made applicable to Nigeria in 1935, remains the legal basis for U.S. extradition requests. There are often challenges made during extradition proceedings to the continued validity of the Extradition Treaty. Processing extraditions remains a tedious, slow process, yielding few results, in part because of Nigerian court procedures that tolerate defendant counsel’s delaying tactics.
In the past year, NDLEA cooperated with international drug enforcement efforts, including numerous operations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Most notable among these joint operations were the two Tin Can Port seizures in Nigeria in January, totaling 275 kilograms of cocaine originating in Bolivia; and, the seizure by NDLEA of West Africa’s first methamphetamine laboratory in Lagos in June. DEA’s Special Testing and Research Laboratory sent chemists to Lagos to help with the hazardous materials clean-up at the site of the seized lab. The seizure of the methamphetamine laboratory marked the beginning of a dangerous trend in Nigeria, namely apparent domestic production of methamphetamine. NDLEA and DEA have jointly initiated two additional investigations this year targeting clandestine methamphetamine laboratory operators either based in Nigeria or selling the labs’ illicit production in Nigeria. These operators are actively seeking organized criminal group assistance in legally importing and then diverting large-scale quantities of precursor chemicals into Nigeria to increase their methamphetamine-production capacity.
2. Supply Reduction
The U.S. Embassy's INL Office donated digital body scanners and drug/explosives-detecting “itemizers” for Nigeria’s four international airports (Abuja, Kano, Lagos, and Port Harcourt) in 2008. INL has also sent many NDLEA airport commanders to training at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone, Botswana. NDLEA has made good use of this technology and training. Most of NDLEA’s hard drug seizures (e.g., cocaine and heroin) occur at the airports, with the vast majority occurring at MMIA in Lagos. Still, NDLEA faces challenges arresting major drug traffickers and financiers who organize the regular traffic of low level drug “mules.”
Until recently, authorities have not systematically used asset seizures from traffickers and money launderers as enforcement tools. NDLEA reported no money laundering convictions in 2011. Asset forfeiture remains challenging in Nigeria, which lacks non-conviction-based forfeiture or plea bargaining laws. Without an appropriate plea bargaining mechanism, NDLEA encounters difficulty winning cooperation from low-level couriers to build cases against criminal gang bosses. At other times, the problem lies with Nigeria’s courts, which remain subject to intimidation and corruption.
Cannabis sativa (marijuana or “Indian hemp”) is the only illicit drug produced in significant quantity in Nigeria, although, as noted above, NDLEA has discovered a methamphetamine lab in Nigeria in the last year. All 36 of Nigeria’s states grow marijuana, which remains the main drug abused domestically. Traffickers sell marijuana in Nigeria and export this drug through West Africa and into Europe. There is no evidence of significant marijuana exports to the United States. The NDLEA continues to pursue an aggressive and successful eradication campaign, which destroyed 690.6 hectares of marijuana cultivation between January and September 2011, almost 1.75 times the 395.3 hectares eradicated in 2010.
Nigeria is a major transshipment point for smuggling Asian heroin to Europe and to a lesser extent to the U.S. and for South American cocaine to Europe. Introducing vigorous, anti-drug enforcement regimes at Nigeria’s five major seaports and its porous land borders would yield significant drug seizures. As traffickers become more aware of the presence of scanners at the airports, they are seeking other routes to smuggle drugs.
As drug couriers try to find new routes to avoid Nigeria’s international airports, where detection is high, drug seizures at the MMIA have decreased slightly from last year. Between January and October 2011, the NDLEA Command at MMIA seized 57.82 kilograms of cannabis, 79.7 kilograms of cocaine, 11.71 kilograms of heroin, 39.22 kilograms of methamphetamine and 5.5 kilograms of ephedrine.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
In addition to the traditional use of marijuana in Nigeria, the abuse of harder drugs (e.g., cocaine and heroin) has risen. Traffickers have followed a well-known pattern of pushing drugs into the transit country’s domestic market. The NDLEA’s Demand Reduction Directorate has reinvigorated its school-oriented programs and other programs targeting youth, professional truck/bus drivers, sex workers, community leaders, and transport workers. In the past year, NDLEA counseled and rehabilitated 1,708 drug dependent persons, more than 95 percent of involved marijuana users.
4. Corruption
Corruption plays a major role in drug trafficking in Nigeria. However, the GON does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Nigeria has anti-corruption laws, but authorities can point to only a few notable convictions, including that of a former NDLEA Chief. These cases, however, remain the exception to the rule. Frequent media reports of high-level corruption that goes unpunished send the message that, by deft use of corruption, criminals can operate with impunity in Nigeria.
To address some weaknesses in Nigeria’s criminal code, NDLEA has sought amendments to Nigeria’s basic narcotics law during the past ten years to provide stricter mandatory sentences for major traffickers, but the National Assembly has failed to act.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
Despite recent budget increases for NDLEA, GON funding for Nigerian law enforcement agencies remains insufficient. Unless the GON remedies this situation, little progress will occur over the medium to long term. The INL and DEA Country Offices in Nigeria work closely with the NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies to strengthen capacity. The Embassy INL Office also promotes greater cooperation between the Nigeria Customs Service and the NDLEA to improve interdiction at the vulnerable seaports and porous land borders. In FY2012, INL will fund a counternarcotics advisor and DEA plans assistance to stand up an elite unit, both of which will help to improve NDLEA’s ability to address complex cases.
D. Conclusion
The U.S. government will continue to engage the GON on the issues of drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, and other crimes. The underlying institutional and societal factors that contribute to these criminal activities in Nigeria remain deep-seated and require a comprehensive and collaborative effort at all levels of law enforcement and government. Progress can only occur through sustained GON efforts and political will with continued support from the international community.
A. Introduction
Pakistan remained a major transit country for opiates and hashish originating in Afghanistan in 2011. Pakistan also continues to be a producer of opiates from illicit poppy grown mostly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Drug trafficking and addiction were associated with instability and lack of government control on Pakistan’s 1,500-mile (2,430km) border with Afghanistan. The rugged, remote, border separating the FATA and Baluchistan province from Afghanistan is ideally suited for drug traffickers, who smuggle tons of heroin and opium across the border annually. Heavy traffic at the three official border crossing points contributes to the difficulty of surveillance and detection efforts. The border has dozens of unsupervised crossing points and is crisscrossed by unmapped and uncontrolled trails. The sheer volume of drugs transiting this country of approximately 185 million people, along with its deep-seated economic and social problems, fuels a domestic drug addiction problem. The country’s law enforcement and judicial structures are under-financed and often fail to cooperate among themselves. Corruption in Pakistan is widespread.
The Pakistani Taliban and allied militant groups remained an active and determined insurgent force in the tribal areas in the northwestern area of the country that borders Afghanistan. The ongoing violence and military necessities relegated counternarcotics to a secondary effort in these regions. Pakistan’s federal Anti Narcotics Force (ANF), the government’s lead anti-drug agency, rarely extended its reach into the tribal areas. The ANF, along with the Frontier Corps, was present in Baluchistan, which borders Afghanistan’s major drug producing provinces, Helmand and Kandahar. Given the enormous amount of sparsely policed territory and the nature of the terrain, law enforcement and other barriers to trafficking were spread thin.
Pakistani authorities actively endeavored to intercept the flow of narcotics and continued to make seizures, some fairly significant in size and scope. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) recognizes that the flow of drugs through the country is not just the problem of destination countries, but fuels a growing addiction problem within Pakistan itself. Pakistan continued its cooperation with the U.S. government and other governments on bilateral counternarcotics initiatives. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has a presence in Pakistan, and worked closely with the GOP and USG on counternarcotics efforts over the past year. Pakistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
The GOP continued to implement aspects of the National Drug Control Master Plan 2010-14, working towards three objectives: drug supply reduction, drug demand reduction, and international cooperation. The GOP has made advances in each area, most notably through the establishment of an Inter-Agency Task Force on Narcotics Control and the design and implementation of Drug Free Lahore, an innovative public effort to counter drug abuse at many levels. Despite these developments, inter-agency cooperation in these areas was inconsistent.
The inauguration of the new ANF Academy in Islamabad in May 2011 was a significant step toward the long term goal of increased professionalization of counternarcotics law enforcement officials in Pakistan as well as a symbol of greater interagency and international cooperation. As of October, the Academy had trained nearly 1,000 ANF and other law enforcement officials, whereas in the previous decade, the Academy was able to train an average of fewer than 330 officials annually. The academy has taught a range of narcotics, legal, financial, crime scene analysis, drug rehabilitation, and intelligence courses to officials from many other Pakistani law enforcement agencies, including the Pakistan Rangers, Frontier Corps, Airport Security Force, Levies Force, Intelligence Bureau, Maritime Security, provincial Police and provincial Excise and Taxation. The academy also opened courses to participants from other countries, notably Afghanistan, UAE and Saudi Arabia, with the aim of becoming a regional training hub. Another sign of international cooperation is that the academy seeks funding and technical support from various international partners, most notably the United States, but also the UK, Australia and UNODC, while the GOP determines how to ensure a consistent level of support to the academy’s program.
2. Supply Reduction
The ANF is not part of the armed forces, but its Director General is traditionally a senior Pakistan army officer. The ANF is authorized 3,000 personnel. Other law enforcement agencies have counternarcotics mandates, including the Frontier Corps Baluchistan (FCB) and Frontier Scouts (FSKP), the Pakistan Coast Guards, the Maritime Security Agency, the Frontier Constabulary (FCONS), the Rangers, Customs Preventive Force, the provincial police forces, and the Airport Security Force (ASF). The Pakistan Coast Guards uses counternarcotics cells and checkpoints along the Makran Coast to better coordinate and execute counternarcotics operations. The primacy of ANF, however, limits other agencies’ investigative authorities. In addition, weak interagency cooperation continued to slow the GOP’s ability to pursue drug traffickers and seize their contraband.
In 2011, GOP law enforcement and security forces reported seizing 3.8 metric tons of heroin, 2.59 metric tons of morphine, 22.80 metric tons of opium, 3.3kg cocaine and 173.75 metric tons of hashish. In 2011, the ANF reported having destroyed over 1,000 hectares of the approximately 1,700 hectares that the UNODC reported were cultivated in Pakistan in 2010. These reports have not been verified because much of the area where poppy is cultivated is in the restive FATA. Law enforcement agencies reported 85,471 arrests in narcotics cases nationwide and authorities registered 83,902 cases. Many of these arrests were of small-time traffickers and drug users, accounting for the large numbers arrested. During the same period, there were 7,183 convictions in narcotics cases.
Since many seemingly strong narcotics cases are reversed on appeal, the ANF supplemented its in-house prosecutors by hiring private lawyers to argue appealed convictions. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) continues to advise ANF on the use of conspiracy laws to prosecute major traffickers.
The GOP collaborated with law enforcement agencies from multiple countries to carry out controlled deliveries and joint operations around the world. Pakistani law enforcement agencies participated in controlled deliveries to Malaysia, Benin, Spain and the United Kingdom resulting in nine arrests and seizure of 608 kg of heroin. The GOP either conducted or was executing thirteen joint operations with American, British, Dutch, Australian, Belgian and South African authorities resulting in the seizure of more than 160 kg of heroin.
The GOP has an established chemical control program to closely monitor the importation of controlled chemicals used to manufacture illicit narcotics. Nevertheless, significant quantities of precursor chemicals shipped to Pakistan, and transiting Pakistan for Afghanistan, are diverted for illegal use. Some progress has been made in determining the routes and methods used to smuggle chemicals through Pakistan into Afghanistan. Major routes run to the Afghanistan provinces of Nangarhar, Helmand, Kandahar, and Nimroz. DEA routinely provides Pakistani law enforcement information regarding chemical seizures that may have links with Pakistani smuggling groups and/or chemical companies, to facilitate further investigation within Pakistan.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
In early 2011, the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) commissioned the UNODC to conduct a nationwide drug use survey, the results of which are due in mid-2012. The survey, which is being conducted in conjunction with Pakistani Federal Bureau of Statistics, is designed to produce data on the level of drug use in the country to help establish a basis for targeting future demand reduction efforts. The GOP’s programs for drug awareness, demand reduction, and treatment are inadequate. They are inadequate to accommodate all who need help, and some of the methods applied do not demonstrate high levels of success. The GOP instituted its “Drug Free” campaign in coordination with educators, religious leaders, labor unions, the media, and political parties. The GOP’s national plan also envisions development of an effective and accessible treatment and rehabilitation system. Although Pakistan has three Model Addict Treatment Centers in Quetta, Karachi and Islamabad, a number of private organizations are taking the lead in treatment and rehabilitation, including USG-supported DOST (“Friend”) Welfare Foundation in Peshawar, New Horizons Care Center in Karachi and Mian Afzal Trust in Gujranwala. The GOP could increase its reach and effectiveness in treatment and rehabilitation by offering greater support for privately funded centers.
4. Corruption
Corruption is widespread in Pakistan. Government officials as well as the political opposition, press, and the judiciary have acknowledged that it is a major challenge to law enforcement and the business climate. An independent judicial system and a sizeable press investigate and expose corrupt practices, but often with limited consequences for those involved. While parliamentary oversight committees and executive branch agencies also work against corruption, their overall effectiveness is mixed. Pakistan’s corruption challenge also increases its vulnerability to drug trafficking, principally through bribes to officials to allow the unchecked movement of people and goods. Narcotics traffickers are not thought to have major influence on senior-level government policy or law enforcement. As a matter of government policy, the GOP does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
Much of 2011 was a period of heightened tension and uncertainty in the overall U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relationship. In spite of this, U.S.-Pakistani cooperation in counternarcotics remained steady and in some areas thrived.
The U.S. Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) manages an extensive multi-faceted effort in Pakistan, with an FY’11 budget of $114 million. NAS leads an interagency counternarcotics working group at the Embassy including representatives from DEA, and other USG agencies, Embassy Political section, and Regional Affairs designed to more effectively coordinate Mission counternarcotics efforts. The NAS counternarcotics program includes road construction and alternative development projects in inaccessible areas, assistance for GOP counternarcotics units including the ANF’s Special Investigative Cell (SIC), support for the ANF Academy and demand reduction programs. NAS also manages border security law enforcement reform and capacity building programs. The USG provides aviation support and training to enhance the GOP’s surveillance and interdiction capabilities; makes available commodity support, training and outpost construction for Pakistani security forces to improve their capability to interdict militants, narcotics traffickers and other criminals; and has built hundreds of kilometers of roads to allow Pakistani authorities access to remote areas where narcotics cultivation and militant activity often occur. The NAS Air Wing., was established to assist GOP counternarcotics efforts and advance U.S. border security objectives. NAS also provides support for eight local demand reduction programs carried out by non-government organizations in four provinces and the capital area.
DEA’s Islamabad Country Office has a close working relationship with the ANF Special Investigation Cell (SIC). During FY11 joint operations by DEA and ANF SIC led to the seizures of approximately 226 kilograms of cocaine (an unusual narcotic to this region that is being used increasingly by the local population), 62,803 kilograms of hashish, 707 kilograms of heroin, 851 kilograms of morphine, 6,606 kilograms of opium, and $4,038,351 in assets. This tandem effort also initiated three international controlled deliveries of approximately 370 kilograms of heroin to Benin, Malaysia, and Spain. The respective international controlled deliveries led to separate investigations, seizures, and arrests by the local DEA offices and their host counterparts. Seizures have also been made in the FATA, a formerly unchartered area for Pakistani law enforcement. DEA and ANF SIC have initiated a Hawala (informal money transfer shops) investigation, which has revealed an international network spanning from North America to Europe to Asia. Finally, DEA has set up a 39-man Vetted Unit (VU) that received a training program on basic narcotic investigations. Great strides have been made toward strengthening the working relationship between DEA and ANF SIC.
After assuming a counternarcotics mission in 2004, the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan (ODRP) Security Assistance Office has provided over $190 million in equipment, construction, and training to the Navy, Maritime Security Agency, Coast Guards, Customs Preventive (MCC), ANF and Special Services Group-Navy (SSG-N). ODRP engagement with Pakistani security forces is currently focused on increasing maritime interdiction capability. To accomplish this goal, ODRP has funded the creation of a Fast Response Boat program, construction of a tactical training center, and expanded the training curriculum to include Small Boat Unit tactical training and advanced boat maintenance. Interaction between ODRP and Pakistani civilian counternarcotics components grew beyond providing narcotics/explosive detection equipment maintenance and operator training into a larger role that includes providing equipment and constructing facilities.
The U.S. government continues to work with the GOP to improve Pakistani cooperation in the extradition of narcotics fugitives and the enactment of comprehensive money laundering legislation. The USG also encourages streamlining Pakistani drug enforcement legislation, making it easier for the ANF and other law enforcement agencies to prosecute narcotics cases.
Pakistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the UN Convention against Corruption, and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
The United States provides counternarcotics and law enforcement assistance to Pakistan under a Letter of Agreement (LOA). The LOA provides the terms of funding for cooperation in border security, crop control and area development efforts, narcotics law enforcement, and drug demand reduction efforts. There is no mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) between the U.S. and Pakistan, nor does Pakistan have a mutual legal assistance law. The 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, which was applicable to all of British India, was adopted by Pakistan when it gained independence in 1947. Both the Extradition Treaty and Pakistan’s Extradition Act are outmoded. Lack of action by Pakistani authorities and courts on pending extradition requests continues to be of concern to the United States. The last extradition was in 2006.
D. Conclusion
Pakistan is likely to continue to serve as a major narcotics transit country, as long as the production of narcotics in Afghanistan continues at current levels and Pakistan’s border region with Afghanistan remains porous. The influx of narcotics into Pakistan has already fueled and will almost certainly continue to fuel an increase in drug use among Pakistanis, adding to social and economic ills in a country already burdened by security challenges and poverty. Unemployment and underemployment are high and the economy struggles to create employment for Pakistan’s constantly growing population.
Pakistani authorities recognize the growth of narcotics trafficking and drug use and the corresponding damage being inflicted. The capacity of the GOP to act effectively against the narcotics trade is limited. Combating the threat to the country from terrorist groups and insurgents takes priority, and that effort absorbs most resources available for security and law enforcement. The militancy along the border with Afghanistan contributes to the difficulty of blocking or interdicting the drug trade.
The GOP is making strides toward greater international cooperation. However, it can make its counternarcotics efforts more effective. Most importantly, government agencies can work in a more coordinated fashion against traffickers. Better utilization of GOP agencies’ limited resources requires basic improvements such as information sharing to avoid duplicative or contradictory efforts. Continued and increased cooperation with other governments and international organizations is another way for the GOP to further reduce the supply of drugs, while increased support for private organizations focused on drug education, anti-drug campaigns and drug treatment programs would also increase effectiveness in demand reduction.
A. Introduction
In 2011, Panama remained a focal point for illicit activity, including the trafficking of illegal drugs and goods. By virtue of its geographic location and the presence of the canal, Panama was and remains a crossroad for illicit trafficking. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) – mostly from Mexico and Colombia – and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) used Panama’s remote spaces such as the Darién region, its coastline and littoral zones, and its transportation infrastructure to move illegal drugs and other contraband. This infrastructure included four major containerized seaports, the Pan-American Highway, and Tocumen International Airport, which boasts the most passenger traffic of any airport in Central America. President Ricardo Martinelli’s administration continued Panama’s historic cooperation with the United States on counternarcotics operations, investigations, and capacity building. The United States worked closely with the leadership of all Panamanian security services to build stronger security and justice sector institutions. Panama is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Developments
Throughout 2011, Panama built on past efforts to strengthen and improve its three security institutions and took concrete steps to improve interdiction capacity and citizen security. Panama increased the Ministry of Public Security’s (MSP) fiscal year 2012 budget by 7.8 percent over fiscal year 2011 funding levels, marking the third straight year of increased funding levels for security-related issues. The government continued to invest in infrastructure and equipment, including funding the creation of an Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) program to link Panama’s passenger manifest control system to the United States’ APIS. This system will provide Panama with the ability to target incoming and outgoing passengers and flights. The Panamanian National Police (PNP) also increased spending on infrastructure and equipment, including procurement of more than 950 vehicles and 450 motorcycles to improve officers’ ability to respond to emergency calls. Leadership changes undertaken in late 2010 within the National Air-Naval Service (SENAN) enabled the organization to launch tangible reform efforts. The Panamanian National Border Service’s (SENAFRONT) increased presence and efforts in the Darién region improved government control over the remote region, and disrupted narcotics trafficking in the area. SENAFRONT continued capacity building activities in close partnership with the United States and Colombia.
The PNP implemented elements of a modern Computer Statistics (COMPSTAT) system that – when completed – will enable the police to fully utilize an array of community-based policing techniques. Through U.S. assistance and technical advisors, Panama incorporated modern police philosophies into PNP training programs. In 2011, the Attorney General initiated changes in the Public Ministry, but justice sector institutions remained weak and susceptible to corruption. Panama had difficulty in prosecuting complex organized crime cases, resulting in inhibited efforts to disrupt sophisticated trafficking organizations.
In September 2011, Panama commenced implementation of the switch to an accusatory judicial system. The new judicial system will be implemented in phases and, by end of 2011, was functioning in the Coclé and Veraguas provinces. The systemic change is expected to reduce pretrial detention and Panama’s notorious judicial backlog.
Panama is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. A mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty are in force between the United States and Panama, although the Constitution does not permit extradition of Panamanian nationals. In 2002, the United States and Panama concluded a comprehensive maritime interdiction agreement, named Salas-Becker, which continued to be one of the most effective agreements in the region in 2011. Panama has bilateral agreements on counternarcotics with the United Kingdom, Colombia, Mexico, Cuba, and Peru. Panama is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols and to the UN Convention against Corruption. Panama is also a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and is a party to the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the Inter-American Convention on Extradition, the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, and the Inter-American Convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms. Panama is a member of the Central American Integration System (SICA). In 2011, Panama participated in both sessions of the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counterdrug Summit, which includes Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and all other Central American countries.
2. Supply Reduction
In 2011, Panama reported seizing 34 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, largely in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement. This includes cocaine captured by Panamanian authorities, but does not include 2.2 MT of cocaine seized by U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) assets in Panamanian waters, or cocaine jettisoned by traffickers during pursuit. Panama experienced a marked decrease in cocaine seizures from prior years having seized 49.5 MT of cocaine in 2010. The United States estimates the drop in cocaine seizures can in part be attributed to the disruption of established trafficking organizations and a shift in trafficking trends away from multi-ton shipments. The government’s increased forward deployment of assets also contributed to changing trafficking routes.
SENAN continued to facilitate USCG requests for ship registry data and provided liaison officers to serve aboard U.S. maritime vessels to increase the effectiveness of interdiction operations. SENAN provided support for joint counternarcotics operations including interdiction, patrolling, photographing suspect areas, and identifying suspect aircraft. In addition, the organization continued to allow U.S. maritime vessels to operate in Panamanian territorial waters under the Salas-Becker bilateral agreement. A full year of dedicated, focused and stabilized senior leadership in SENAN allowed for a number of positive reforms, including clearing unprofessional officers from its ranks, and improving its ability to maintain maritime vessels. Other institutional challenges will require considerable time, effort, and resources to resolve. In the interim, institutional weakness will continue to hinder Panama’s ability to effectively deter drug trafficking within its territorial waters.
Panama did not produce cocaine, heroin or precursor chemicals. Panama cultivated a limited amount of cannabis, principally for domestic consumption. Drug-related seizures in 2011 include 4.9 MT of cannabis, 295 kilograms (kg) of crack cocaine, and 194 kg of heroin. Additionally, Panamanian authorities seized $11,250,000 USD in drug-related bulk cash, up from $8,100,000 in 2010.
In 2011, maritime trafficking along Panama’s north coast stabilized at 2010 levels, but Panama experienced an increase in documented movements on the Pacific in regions west of Panama City towards the Costa Rican border. These two trafficking routes support narcotics flows moving north toward Central America and into the United States. Panama continued efforts to widen the canal to support licit commerce activities; the United States expects trafficking via shipping container through Panama – the default transit point for the Western Hemisphere – will grow along with licit container traffic. Based on seizures from containers in Panama and destination countries, the United States assessed that the bulk of container-based drug trafficking continued to flow to Europe in 2011.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
Drug demand data continued to be difficult to assess for trends, as the last drug demand study, conducted in 2008, remained under review and unpublished. Although no reliable national data exists, the Mental Health Institute reported a slight increase of people seeking assistance for addiction-related issues across all categories. According to reports from 2006, Panama treated 992 persons for addiction-related issues. Panama did not update its written strategy on drug demand reduction from 2007, but reportedly will release a new plan covering 2012 through 2016 in early 2012. In 2011, the government again lacked an official budget for drug reduction programs, although funding became available through seized assets, donations from civil society groups and international cooperation. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Education provided drug prevention programs in schools, and the Ministry of Health supported a drug-counseling program known as the Mental Health Institute. The Ministry of the Presidency acted as the coordinating entity for some 45 youth programs spread among 20 Panamanian government agencies. The United States partnered with the PNP and other local actors to implement such programs as Drug Awareness and Resistance Education (DARE) and Youth Crime Watch.
4. Corruption
The Panamanian government did not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution. The government of Panama was not involved in laundering proceeds of illicit drug sales. Despite Panama’s public stance against corruption, the government adjudicated few cases of corruption in 2011, in part due to weak investigative capacity and judicial system. Corruption remains a serious concern throughout the security services and the justice sector. There are indications that members of the security services were involved in trafficking and that DTOs penetrated the government’s security services. However, the MSP and the PNP supported a major reform of the internal affairs process governing all security services. Formal implementation of this reform was delayed pending necessary legal reforms, but the PNP already adopted many of the policies and procedures of the new system, including increased civilian oversight of internal affairs investigations and standard disciplinary guidelines. In 2011, the PNP Internal Affairs unit received and processed 670 citizen complaints, and 83 police officers of various ranks were removed from service for cause. In 2011, the Panamanian government and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) signed an agreement establishing a Regional Anti-Corruption Academy in Panama. UNODC staff worked with members of Panama’s National Council for Transparency against Corruption to establish the Academy. Although in the early stages, the Academy seeks to improve transparency in Panama and throughout Central America.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
Programs supported by the United States focused on improving Panama’s ability to intercept, investigate, and prosecute illegal drug trafficking and other transnational crimes; strengthening Panama’s judicial system including its prisons; improving Panama’s border security; and promoting better enforcement of existing laws.
In 2011, the United States provided resources for modernization and upkeep of SENAN, SENAFRONT, and PNP vessels and facilities in support of interdiction efforts. Throughout 2011, the United States also provided training, operational equipment, and logistics support to members of Panama’s security services to improve their professionalism and effectiveness. The United States conducted two mobile training team (MTT) sessions for small boat operations and performed an assessment of SENAN’s logistical, engineering, force management and operations.
The United States supported and encouraged a growing training relationship between Panama and Colombia through which Colombian police experts provided training to members of Panama’s security services. The United States continued support for a major law enforcement modernization project within the PNP to develop its leadership and implement modern police philosophies. The program aims to improve community policing tactics, expand existing crime analysis technology and promote managerial change to allow greater autonomy and accountability. In 2011, the program expanded to include the creation of a modern COMPSTAT system to improve how the PNP receives, processes, responds to, and records all types of citizen reports. The information generated from the new system will not only improve Panama’s ability to record statistical information relating to criminal activity, but also provide all levels of police leadership with the information needed to effectively apply modern policing strategies and improve response time. In 2011, half of the PNP’s 16,000 members received initial training in the new system, and the system deployed to five geographic police zones throughout the country. The combination of establishing community-based policing tenets within the PNP’s core values and reforming its internal affairs process is expected to have far-reaching, positive effects on the law enforcement institution.
In 2011, the government collaborated in joint counternarcotics efforts with U.S. entities, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Homeland Security and USCG, among others, and worked collaboratively with the United States to strengthen national law enforcement institutions.
The United States provided equipment and support to vetted Panamanian law enforcement units in 2011, who in turn investigated high-profile cases, often involving crimes with a nexus to the United States. These law enforcement units conducted sensitive investigations and operations related to counternarcotics, money laundering, human smuggling, and other transnational crimes. U.S. law enforcement continues to work with host nation counterparts to disrupt DTO operations. After several years of investigation, Panama dismantled a major DTO operating on its Caribbean coast, further disrupting drug trafficking in the area.
In 2011, the MSP continued an ambitious plan to forward deploy maritime assets belonging to all three of its security services to better control narcotics transit zones. In 2009, most MSP maritime assets were based near the capital and the city of Colón. The security services maintained 16 observation points or installations with varying degrees of capacity to respond to trafficking threats. By the end of 2011, the security services maintained 23 posts on Panama’s coasts and the government stationed resources across Panama, resulting in improved capabilities to respond to trafficking treats. In 2011, the United States provided infrastructure support to complement Panamanian efforts, including support for the construction of three new observation posts to be completed in 2012.
D. Conclusion
Panama made strides toward institutional reform and increased transparency within the MSP and the security forces under its leadership. Panama should complete – and institutionalize – the reforms to ensure that the PNP, SENAFRONT, and SENAN are professional forces capable of withstanding the corrosive effects of transnational crime. The United States will continue to work closely with Panama, and encourages the government to devote more resources to the modernization of its security and justice institutions. The United States will also support Panama’s efforts designed to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute financial crimes and money laundering. Panama will be strengthened by a renewed focus on law enforcement modernization; anti-corruption; strategic planning; judicial and prosecutorial reform; and decentralization of decision making, in addition to a stronger focus on community-oriented policing philosophies.
A. Introduction
Paraguay faces significant challenges to successfully fighting narcotics trafficking and production: its location and the institutional challenges facing its law enforcement agencies and courts continue to impede counternarcotics efforts.
Paraguay produces one of the largest marijuana crops in the hemisphere, largely for export to Brazil and Argentina. It is also a transit country for Andean cocaine, most of which is destined for Paraguay’s neighbors or to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Significantly smaller quantities are transported to the United States. Although domestic demand for illegal drugs remains low, as elsewhere in the region, consumption of crack is on the rise.
This landlocked nation’s porous borders, extensive internal waterways, and weak law enforcement institutions are easily exploited by drug traffickers. Arms trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting, and other illegal activities linked to drug trafficking are also prevalent. Moreover, these activities increasingly involve international criminal organizations, such as the Brazilian-based Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), operating in towns along the Paraguay-Brazil border. All in all, it is a challenge for the National Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD), Paraguay’s primary counternarcotics agency, which has just over 360 members.
Despite these challenges, in 2011 the Government of Paraguay continued to disrupt the activities of drug traffickers through interdiction, eradication, and demand reduction efforts led by SENAD and aided by the Paraguayan National Police (PNP) and the Customs Administration. Those agencies, along with the Attorney General’s Office, the Anti-Money Laundering Secretariat, and the Supreme Court all welcome cooperation with the United States in combating narcotics trafficking.
Paraguay is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
The Paraguayan Congress continues to study two laws introduced in 2010 that, once passed, would enhance counternarcotics efforts, particularly for SENAD. The first proposal would strengthen Paraguay’s asset forfeiture regime, providing more funds for counternarcotics efforts. The second would grant official law enforcement powers to SENAD special agents. In 2011, SENAD served as the country coordinator for a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) multi-agency and multi-national program: Strengthening the Rule of Law, Security and Justice in Paraguay. Through this program, the United States provided financial support for the completion of a national base-line drug survey, the first such survey in Paraguay since 2006. SENAD received modest budget increases each of the previous three calendar years and its 2011 budget totaled $3.9 million.
Paraguay is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Paraguay is also a party to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols; the United Nations Convention Against Corruption; the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption; and the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. Paraguay is a signatory to the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) Hemispheric Drug Strategy, and is also a signatory to the 1992 Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
U.S. and Paraguayan law enforcement authorities cooperate in extradition matters pursuant to a 2001 bilateral extradition treaty. The 1987 bilateral Letter of Agreement under which the United States provides counternarcotics assistance to Paraguay was extended in 2004 and has been amended annually through 2011.
2. Supply Reduction
SENAD’s 2011 cocaine seizure statistics are on par with 2010’s record seizure numbers. It seized 1,389 kilograms of cocaine but had no chemical precursor seizures. SENAD’s canine unit made 48 cocaine seizures totaling 131 kilograms with 16 related arrests. In total, SENAD made 341 narcotics related arrests. It also seized 369 metric tons of marijuana; 4,663 kilograms of marijuana seeds and wax; eradicated 825 hectares of marijuana crops; destroyed 253 production camps; confiscated 130 vehicles (including motorcycles), 8 airplanes, 62 firearms.
The PNP increased its seizure numbers in 2011 due largely to improved collaboration with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the creation of a Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU). In 2011, the PNP seized 1,294 kilograms of cocaine; 6,100 kilograms of precursor chemicals; 171 metric tons of marijuana; 4,870 kilograms of seeds and wax; eradicated 1,664 hectares of marijuana; confiscated 108 vehicles and 36 firearms; and made 470 narcotics-related arrests.
The UNODC reports that Paraguay is one of the largest marijuana producers in the hemisphere, accounting for over half of South America’s production. Marijuana cultivation takes place primarily in the northeastern departments near the Brazilian border. SENAD often cites UNODC estimates of five to six thousand hectares of cultivated marijuana, although a thorough, scientific assessment has not taken place in five years.
A variety of methods are used to smuggle narcotics through Paraguay on to regional and international destinations, including cargo trucks, passenger buses, small airplanes, containerized cargo, and human mules. Towns along the Brazilian border such as Pedro Juan Caballero, Salto del Guaira, and Ciudad del Este are notorious transit centers for narcotics, arms, and other contraband. Vehicular and foot traffic routinely cross the border unchecked by authorities on either side. Additionally, due to the sparse presence of law enforcement and a lack of radar coverage, large farms in the northwestern Chaco region along the Bolivian border are used as bases of operation for aerial cocaine shipments originating in Bolivia.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
Domestic demand for illegal drugs in Paraguay appears low in comparison to neighboring countries. However, Paraguay’s last official drug use assessment was in 2006 and only captured statistics from 12 to 18 year-olds. Still, SENAD is active and, in 2011, sponsored 242 workshops reaching 16,439 students, parents, and teachers in 97 different educational institutions. It distributed 5,940 informational pamphlets and 100 DVDs to students, teachers and counselors, and conducted 50 drug abuse awareness radio broadcasts.
The Ministry of Health’s National Addiction Control Center is the only public drug treatment facility in Paraguay. It offers in-patient, out-patient, and walk-in assistance. No gender or age distinctions are made and assistance is provided to all who seek treatment. Meanwhile, there is only one private rehabilitation center in Paraguay.
4. Corruption
The government of Paraguay neither encourages nor facilitates illegal activity associated with narcotics trafficking and no senior government officials have been implicated in such activity. Nevertheless, corruption remains a principal challenge to reducing the production and distribution of illegal drugs. Corruption in the judicial system and law enforcement is substantial and is a major barrier to effective prosecution and elimination of narcotics traffickers and producers. In a move that may combat this, the Paraguayan Congress approved a 40% pay increase for the national police in October 2011.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
The Lugo administration continues to assign a high priority to counternarcotics efforts by supporting SENAD and the Interior Ministers. Congress also provided increased funding to aid the various entities in executing their counternarcotics mandates. The United States works closely with the Paraguayan government to disrupt narcotics trafficking organizations and to strengthen legal and regulatory frameworks in a joint effort to combat narcotics trafficking and the myriad associated crimes such as money laundering and arms trafficking. Over the past three years in particular, U.S. operational support from INL and DEA has sustained joint SENAD/DEA and PNP/DEA investigations, resulting in an increased numbers of drug seizures, arrests, and cases presented for prosecution.
D. Conclusion
The Government of Paraguay continues to advance its counternarcotics abilities as evidenced by its increased seizure numbers and SENAD’s collaboration with the Brazilian Federal Police on select narcotics cases. Unfortunately, Paraguayan inter-agency collaboration remains underdeveloped. Finding ways to leverage the counternarcotics expertise of SENAD with the broader law enforcement community, and in particular with the PNP, could pay dividends for future counternarcotics efforts.
We encourage Paraguay to continue to institute measures to address corruption across all levels of government and for Congress to pass the pending legislation related to SENAD authorities and asset forfeiture. Finally, we encourage the Government of Paraguay to work diligently to provide sustained funding in support of the recently enacted legislation increasing police salaries.
A. Introduction
According to U.S. Government (USG) statistics, Peru has the world’s highest potential production of pure cocaine and the second highest potential production of export quality cocaine. Peru is the world’s second largest cultivator of coca, with an estimated 53,000 hectares (ha) of coca under cultivation in 2010. Cocaine is transported to Europe, East Asia, Mexico, the Caribbean, and the United States via land and maritime conveyances, and commercial air flights. Peru is also a major importer of precursor chemicals used for cocaine production.
Domestic consumption of illicit drugs is a growing problem and the number of treatment and rehabilitation centers falls short of what is needed to treat the estimated 150,000 addicts nationwide. There is also growing concern about the impact of drug trafficking and drug abuse on the nation’s youth, as well as the damage illicit drug production causes to the environment.
Peru has a national counternarcotics strategy but does not devote sufficient resources towards its implementation, in part because cultivation and drug production occur far from densely populated urban centers. Eradication remains controversial in coca-growing areas, and some growers resort to violence to resist it. In mid-September, for example, coca growers temporarily blocked the main highway of the Ucayali Region. The administration of newly inaugurated (July 2011) President Ollanta Humala’s briefly suspended eradication in mid-August, citing security concerns, but resumed eradication operations within three days. Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path) factions in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) and in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE) rely on cocaine production and trafficking for funding, and have attacked and killed police and military personnel engaged in counternarcotics operations.
Peru is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
The Humala Administration’s new counternarcotics strategy, previewed in November 2011, focuses on better controlling organized crime, narcotics and precursor chemicals, money laundering and financial crimes, narcotics, and on improving or increasing drug-use prevention, rehabilitation, eradication, and alternative development. The Government of Peru (GOP) continued to rely heavily on USG counternarcotics assistance to maintain police academies and bases, fund eradication efforts, provide aviation support, and fund operations and equipment for counternarcotics police.
In October 2011, then Minister of the Interior Valdés conducted a major reorganization of the Peruvian National Police (PNP), eliminating over two dozen senior positions. U.S.-supported police academies in Santa Lucia, Mazamari, and Ayacucho graduated 511 officers. Meanwhile, 600 students graduated from programs that prepared them to attend the academies. As a result of this intensive training, 2,082 members of the PNP’s specialized counternarcotics unit, Dirección Antidrogas (DIRANDRO), operated in coca source zones east of the Andes in 2011.
The Office of the Attorney General (Public Ministry) continued its efforts to strengthen prosecutorial capacity by increasing staff and providing training on the New Criminal Procedure Code (NCPC), which transitions the Peruvian legal system from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system. By the end of 2011, the NCPC was implemented in 17 of the 30 judicial districts in Peru. Nationwide implementation is expected by the end of 2013, with Lima anticipated to be the final judicial district to implement the code. The NCPC has been applied to corruption cases nationwide since September 2010.
Peru is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances; the 1988 UN Drug Convention; the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption; the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols; and the UN Convention Against Corruption. The United States and Peru are parties to an extradition treaty that entered into force in 2003. Peruvian law requires individuals to serve sentences and any probationary period in Peru before being eligible for extradition. Among the seven pending U.S. extradition and provisional arrests, three are related to narcotics trafficking and one each is related to homicide, money laundering, fraud, and child molestation. Six subjects of extradition requests remain at large. Three Peruvians were extradited to the U.S. in 2011. Two were extradited on child molestation charges and one was extradited on fraud charges.
In November 2009, Peru signed separate bilateral agreements with the Governments of Mexico and Brazil to increase intelligence sharing and cooperation on counternarcotics. In March 2010, the U.S. Coast Guard and Peruvian Maritime Authority signed Operational Procedures for boarding and inspecting vessels suspected of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. In 2011, the Peruvian Navy participated for the first time in the Multilateral Maritime Counterdrug Summit.
2. Supply Reduction
The 2010 USG estimate indicated that 53,000 ha of coca were under cultivation in Peru, a 33 percent increase from the 2009 level of 40,000 ha. The United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC), using a different methodology, estimated 61,200 ha of cultivation in 2010, a 2 percent increase from the 2009 level of 59,900 ha. USG estimates for potential production increased to 325 MT of pure cocaine (a 44 percent increase from 2009), or 365 MT of export-quality cocaine (a 49 percent increase from 2009). According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), density of coca cultivation per hectare has remained stable, as has the 72.4percent efficiency of alkaloid extraction from coca leaf.
In 2011, Peruvian authorities focused eradication efforts on central Peru’s San Martin, Huanuco, and Ucayali regions. Despite coca growers’ unsuccessful pressure on the GOP to halt or limit eradication, Peru eradicated 10,290 ha of illicit coca, exceeding their 10,000 ha goal, and destroyed 147 maceration pits.
Traffickers regularly used large production laboratories and storage areas to prepare and store cocaine, and then transported the cocaine from coca source zones (primarily in the UHV and VRAE) to Peru’s coastal and border areas for further processing and distribution. The GOP increased DIRANDRO personnel in coca source zones for the seventh consecutive year in 2011, contributing to more effective and sustained eradication and interdiction operations. PNP seizures of cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) destined for Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador highlighted the regular cross border trafficking.
Maritime smuggling is the primary method for transporting large cocaine shipments. Peruvian, Colombian and, increasingly, Mexican traffickers maintain sophisticated transit networks in Peru to ship cocaine to Europe, East Asia, Mexico, the Caribbean, the United States, and other Latin American countries.
In joint investigations with U.S. law enforcement during 2011, DIRANDRO identified and disrupted major international cocaine trafficking organizations responsible for maritime and air shipment of several metric tons of cocaine for export. The PNP continued to make headway against Peru-based organizations, but sustained progress will require resources beyond the DIRANDRO CY11 budget of approximately $7.3 million.
The GOP reported that in CY11 they seized approximately 24.5 MT of cocaine -- 13.8 MT of cocaine paste, and 10.7 MT of HCl. The GOP also reported the seizure of 3 MT of marijuana and the destruction of 157 MT of marijuana plants. In addition, DIRANDRO destroyed 1,517 cocaine laboratories, including 19 HCl and 1,498 base laboratories in the UHV and the VRAE.
As of October 2011, DICAPI seized 668 kg of cocaine, and the PNP and SUNAT seized 293 kg of cocaine in maritime counterdrug enforcement operations. Of an estimated 1.3 million containers that passed through Peruvian ports, SUNAT personnel inspected approximately 5,080 containers, up from 4,500 containers in 2010. The PNP-SUNAT Maritime Task Force continued to conduct profile exams from analysis of export cargo at the Callao seaport and was responsible for the seizure of 300 kilos of cocaine at main ports and cargo warehouses. As a direct result of intelligence provided by the Task Force, international counternarcotics officials seized an additional 300 kilos of cocaine in foreign ports.
PNP and SUNAT also interdicted 1.0 MT of cocaine and arrested 205 individuals at Lima’s Jorge Chavez International Airport, including 53 internal drug carriers. Nearly 7,560 passengers were submitted to inbound and outbound body scan x-ray searches to detect illicit narcotics and currency. PNP and SUNAT authorities discovered narcotics concealed in 284 international air cargo shipments and seized 174 kg of cocaine at Peruvian post office locations.
In 2011, the PNP arrested various high-ranking SL members from the Huallaga Valley, and killed several SL members during counterterrorist operations, including Cresillo Veramendi-Meza (aka “Camarada Tigre”). Police also arrested the alleged principal money launderers for SL-VRAE, Jorge Hinostroza-Quispe and Alex Gutierrez-Mantari, and seized approximately US$8 million in assets. Both suspects have been charged with financing terrorism.
Peru produces precursor chemicals, such as sulfuric acid, required for the processing of coca to cocaine base. Peru is also a major importer of other essential chemicals for cocaine production. In 2011, the PNP Chemical Investigations Unit (DEPCIQ) continued its successful chemical enforcement and regulatory operations, leading to the seizure of significant quantities of precursor chemicals, including 20 MT of acetone, 117 MT of hydrochloric acid/muriatic acid, and 23 MT of sulfuric acid.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
The Comision Nacional Para El Desarrollo y Vida Sin Drogas (DEVIDA) is responsible for media campaigns to inform the public about the risks of drug use. They collaborate with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide anti-drug research, statistics and awareness campaigns to the public. Most public primary and secondary schools in large cities offer drug awareness education, but rural schools often lack these programs. Abuse of marijuana, cocaine, to a lesser degree, amphetamines, and synthetic drugs, most notably ecstasy or MDMA, has been increasing in Peru in recent years. According to the Information and Education Center for Prevention of Drug Abuse (CEDRO), approximately one million Peruvians use illicit drugs. CEDRO estimates that between 12-15 percent of these users become addicts. Public treatment facilities remain insufficient; only 6,000 addicts receiving care in 2010. The GOP Ministry of Health is developing regulations to standardize treatment and rehabilitation centers. A few major prisons have also established treatment and rehabilitation programs.
There is also a growing number of private treatment and rehabilitation centers in main cities, but many suffer from a shortage of trained staff. Peru has 200 to 250 “therapeutic community centers” (a participative, group-based approach to drug-addiction treatment) countrywide. Out of these private centers, only 10 or 15 percent are formal and professionalized. The rest are informal centers, often lead by “former” addicts and usually located in low-income communities or shanty towns. There are no therapeutic communities, rehabilitation centers, or clinics specifically for women and teenagers. Only three government-run drug addiction units exist under the Ministry of Health.
4. Corruption
As a matter of policy, the GOP does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics, or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. According to a 2011 national survey, 46 percent of Peruvians believe corruption is one of the biggest problems in the country and 96 percent perceive the judiciary and the police corrupt. Of those surveyed who had contact with a police officer within the previous 12 months, more than half (57 percent) indicated they were asked to pay a bribe.
In 2011, newly effective legislation provided the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) broad sanction authority over public officials, authorizing the OCG to sanction public officials who commit infractions while carrying out their official duties. In March, an OCG report on the fight against corruption stated that more than 76,000 civil servants have received formal corruption complaints.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
The USG assists the GOP in eradication, interdiction, and control of precursor chemicals; maritime enforcement, port and airport security, and chemical field testing. To reduce dependence on illicit coca cultivation, the USG also assists with alternative development and good governance. Additionally, the USG supported counter-terrorism activities (which include counternarcotics operations in the major drug source zones of the UHV and VRAE); the refurbishment of police bases and enhanced police training that increased police presence and improved police operational capabilities. In the VRAE, the USG supported the Peruvian military with training, equipment, technical advice, and intelligence to enhance their capacity to combat SL, which is now responsible for much of the narcotics trade in the VRAE, and to increase state presence in this remote area. Law enforcement officials from other Andean countries also participated in some of these activities, strengthening regional counternarcotics cooperation.
The Alternative Development (AD) element continued to consolidate gains in coca-growing regions in 2011. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) continued working in San Martin with the private sector and transferred AD activities to regional and local governments, farmer associations, and other agents. This allowed the redeployment of resources to newly eradicated areas in Ucayali and Huanuco Regions under the post-eradication strategy. In 2011, alternative development activities began in areas of high-coca production in Huanuco Region. A total of 17,535 farmers received technical assistance to maintain 35,682 ha of licit crops, including 3,356 ha of new crops in 2011. Total sales of these crops were $30.8 million in the first six months of 2011. Licit incomes of participant families continued to increase, rising 24 percent from 2009 to 2010.
As Peru’s counternarcotics programs mature and economic growth forecasts remain strong, the USG expects the GOP to increasingly take the lead in counternarcotics efforts. Recently, Peru’s Aviation Police (DIRAVPOL) assumed responsibility for purchasing and transporting jet fuel; the USG expects this trend to continue in 2012.
D. Conclusion
The USG supports the Humala Administration’s efforts to carry out a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy that maintains core commitments to eradication, interdiction and alternative development, and also addresses important associated issues like combating organized crime, controlling precursor chemicals, enhancing investigations of money laundering and financial crimes, and focusing on the administration of justice.
Importantly, Peruvian Customs (SUNAT), Coast Guard (DICAPI), National Port Authority (APN), Peruvian National Police (PNP), Peruvian military, and the Public Ministry do not consistently coordinate counternarcotics activity effectively. Additional GOP resources would allow them to more aggressively interdict maritime, land, and airport narcotics shipments.
A. Introduction
Domestic consumption of methamphetamine and marijuana continued to be the main drug threats in the Philippines. The 2011 United Nations World Drug Report identified the Philippines as having the highest methamphetamine abuse rate in East Asia at 2.1 % of the adult population ages 16 to 64.
In 2011, the issue of Philippine citizens being used as drug couriers by transnational drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) gained nationalattention when two Philippine citizens were executed in China for drug trafficking. Philippine citizens have also been arrested in other countries while attempting to smuggle cocaine from South America to Asia as well as methamphetamine within Southeast Asia.
Philippine authorities made several large methamphetamine seizures in metro Manila during the year. In addition, prior efforts to eliminate large-scale labs seemed to have been effective as no major new labs were identified by law enforcement. The scale of the trafficking abuse problem in the Philippines continues to pose a major to challenge in prosecution: the Supreme Court Office of the Court Administrator reported that in the National Capital Region, as of December 2010 almost 30% of pending regional trial court cases were drug-related.
The Aquino administration made a special effort to increase cooperation among Philippine agencies involved in drug enforcement. This cooperation resulted in a 45% increase in counter-drug operations. Funding for drug law enforcement agencies, however, remained limited. The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the lead anti-drug law enforcement agency, had to request support from other law enforcement and military drug units to carry out missions. Many of those units, such as the Philippine National Police (PNP’s) Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF), were task forces and therefore lacked dedicated budgets or permanent status.
The Philippines also continued to face the daunting task of tackling transnational drug trafficking organizations without strong legal tools such as provision for judicially authorized interception of criminal communications, plea bargaining, and an efficient drug asset forfeiture process. Without these important tools, enforcement’s ability to gather evidence against high-level drug traffickers remained limited.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Developments
In 2011, the Philippine Congress initiated a review of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 to improve its effectiveness. Changes were approved by the House of Representatives to the procedure for gathering evidence to reduce the number of cases dismissed on technicalities; Senate approval of these changes is pending. The PNP encouraged Congress to approve an amendment to the Juvenile Justice Law to permit prosecution and punishment of youthful offenders between 15 to 18 years old to act as a deterrent to drug traffickers who recruit minors. Under current law, 15 to 18 year olds are protected from being prosecuted and incarcerated. A draft amendment is under consideration. The Philippine Congress also continued to work on amending the Witness Protection Law to provide rights and protections to witnesses.
The Philippine Congress continued to deliberate on an act establishing the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Dangerous Drugs (OSPDD). The OSPDD, if created, would be an independent and autonomous agency attached to the Office of the President focused on prosecuting major drug traffickers as well as any public servant or senior government, elected, senior police, or military official linked to the drug trade.
The Philippine Department of Justice (PDOJ) reconstituted its Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Task Force to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecutions of drug cases at its main office in Manila to ensure local politics do not influence the prosecution of drug cases.
The Philippines is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, as well as to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention. The Philippines is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols, and the UN Convention against Corruption. A bilateral extradition treaty and mutual legal assistance treaty is in force with the U.S.
2. Supply Reduction
From January to October 2011, the government conducted 9,850 anti-illegal drug operations resulting in the arrest of 8,491 suspects and 9,995 cases being filed, according to PDEA. Authorities seized 250 kilograms of methamphetamine, valued at $68 million; 4,789,146 marijuana plants and seedlings and 818 kilograms of marijuana, with total value of $17.4 million; 17,222 grams of cocaine, valued at $2 million; and 960 tablets of ecstasy, valued at $26,790.
Ethnic Chinese organized crime groups continued to be the primary organizers and financers of methamphetamine trafficking in the Philippines. Law enforcement agencies noted the new trend of African-produced methamphetamine being smuggled into the Philippines through the airport for onward distribution throughout Southeast Asia. PDEA and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted investigations that led to the identification and arrests of several African DTO members in Malaysia.
Law enforcement agencies also made large seizures of bulk, high-grade methamphetamine that appeared to have been produced outside the Philippines and smuggled in via cargo shipments. This supports law enforcement’s findings of the continuing decline in industrial-size methamphetamine laboratories in the Philippines itself due to improved detection and enforcement efforts. PDEA did seize six smaller, “kitchen type” clandestine methamphetamine laboratories.
Marijuana cultivation in the Philippines occurs in remote, mountainous regions of Luzon and Mindanao. The government conducted 97 manual eradication missions to suppress this cultivation throughout the year.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
The Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) continued to lead Philippine government preventive education programs aimed at explaining the repercussions of drug dependency. The “Peer Group Against Drugs” program expanded its membership to 97 chapters encompassing 36,000 members throughout the Philippines. DDB conducted seminars and workshops for parents to help them protect their children from illegal drug use. PDEA worked with non-governmental organizations, including the Rotary Club, to develop seminars for teachers on how to mentor their students to pursue a drug-free lifestyle. Most schools have integrated drug education programs in the general education curriculum and conduct random drug testing for secondary and tertiary students.
In 2011, there were 38 accredited drug rehabilitation centers with a total bed capacity of 3,876. The Philippine Congress approved funds for an additional seven rehabilitation centers. Enrollment in rehabilitation centers has been declining, however, due to increased fees. Congress considered a proposal to allow the Philippine health insurance system to cover rehabilitation enrollment costs.
4. Corruption
Corruption remained widespread and a problem for government administration, including drug law enforcement. As a matter of government policy, the Philippines does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking, and no senior Philippine government official is known to engage in such activity.
Media and law enforcement officials alleged some local politicians received support from drug traffickers, but no cases were filed. One member of the Philippine Congress was convicted for possession of cocaine in Hong Kong. The independent Office of the Ombudsman examined charges of public abuse and impropriety including against the top ranks of the former administration. The lack of investigative and judicial tools noted above (i.e., wire tap authority and plea bargaining) continued to impede case development.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
State Department and Department of Defense funding supported training, mentoring, and provision of some equipment for the PNP as part of its reform effort; creation of model police precincts; and development of a PNP Special Boat Unit for patrols and interdictions were among the completed projects. State Department funds also supported a Resident Legal Advisor. The International Law Enforcement Academy and Joint Interagency Task Force-West continued to provide drug-related training for law enforcement personnel and military personnel.
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, and JIATF-West planned to assist a newly formed Airport Drug Task Force to combat the increased use of Manila airports by DTOs and improve coordination with the Philippine government’s Interagency Counternarcotics Operation Network.
D. Conclusion
In 2011, Philippine law enforcement agencies enhanced intelligence and operational cooperation despite limited resources. PDEA and the law enforcement and military task forces that support PDEA should be formalized and adequately funded and staffed. The Philippines should develop additional investigative and judicial tools such as judicially authorized interception of criminal communications, plea bargaining, improved police-prosecutor coordination, and an efficient drug asset forfeiture process. This would strengthen investigations and prosecutions and allow the government to combat the transnational drug trafficking organizations present in the Philippines as well as assist in combating corruption.
Although not a center of drug production, Portugal continues to be a gateway for drugs entering Europe, particularly from South America and western Africa. Drug use remains stable, despite decriminalization of personal drug use in 2001. Portugal, which is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, focuses much of its efforts on treatment and prevention. Portugal is also a member country of the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics (MAOC-N), headquartered in Lisbon. Few illegal drugs originate in Portugal. The vast majority of drugs used in Portugal and passing through the country originate in South America, Africa, and southwest Asia.
Drug smugglers have used Portugal as a primary gateway to Europe in recent years, a task that has been made easier by open borders among the Schengen Agreement countries and by Portugal's long coastline. From 2007-2010, Portuguese law enforcement entities reported a decline in cocaine seizures. In 2011, however, Portuguese authorities seized 1,800 kilograms of cocaine off the southern coast of Portugal, the largest single cocaine seizure in Portugal in four years. Traffickers are increasingly using west African nations, such as former Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde – which are ideally suited as a transshipment, refueling, and storage location points for cocaine-laden vessels from South America en route to Europe through the Iberian Peninsula. The lack of effective law enforcement/ interdiction resources in Guinea Bissau and other African countries, and their linguistic and cultural ties to Portugal, make this region ideal operating bases for drug trafficking organizations. Additionally, drug trafficking organizations continue to use "mules" to enter Europe in smaller, harder to detect packages and are continuing to use shipping containers in which secreted drugs are harder for law enforcement officials to identify. Drug trafficking organizations use various types of smaller vessels, including high-speed boats and fishing boats in attempts to smuggle drugs into the country, and some use the Azores islands as a transshipment point. For hashish, the primary source country is Morocco, transshipped through the Southern Iberian peninsula. The Netherlands, Spain, and Belgium are the primary sources of ecstasy in Portugal. The U.S. has not been identified as a significant destination for drugs transiting through Portugal.
Portugal decriminalized drug use for personal consumption in 2001. The law makes the "consumption, acquisition, and possession of drugs for personal use" a simple administrative offense. Although overall drug use in Portugal remains roughly stable and below the EU average, "problem" drug use and HIV rates among drug users are above the EU norm. Under the decriminalization law, drug users identified by law enforcement agencies are referred to the Drug Addiction Dissuasion Commission, consisting of multi-disciplinary teams that assess users and decide the most appropriate sanction and referral to educational or treatment programs. The Portuguese Ministry of Health’s Institute on Drugs and Drug Addiction (IDT) operates 66 drug treatment centers nationwide. The IDT also has several initiatives to combat drug use and addiction. Prevention programs include training sessions, awareness-raising activities, and dissemination of information through printed material. Universal drug prevention is part of the Portuguese school curriculum. In addition, in the “Safe Schools” program, law enforcement agents patrol the areas surrounding schools to prevent and protect students from criminal activities such as drug trafficking in the surrounding area. Law enforcement also actively participates in awareness and training activities.
Portugal is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Portugal is also party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (“TOC”) and its protocols against trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. In September 2007, Portugal ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (“CAC”). A Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) has been in force between Portugal and the U.S. since 1994. In February 2010, the US-Portugal protocol implementing the 2003 U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements entered into force. The extradition protocol expands the list of extraditable offenses that were not available under the 1908 US-Portugal Extradition Treaty.
On September 30, 2007, Portugal – along with Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom – agreed to work together as part of the Lisbon-based MAOC-N regional intelligence fusion cum maritime response initiative. As a member country, Portugal is collaborating to combat the increasing cocaine flow from South America to Europe and Africa. As a matter of government policy, Portugal does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.
A. Introduction
Romania is not a major source of illicit narcotics, but continues to be a significant transit country for narcotics and lies along the well-established Northern Balkan Route for opium, morphine base, heroin, and chemical precursors moving to and from Afghanistan, Central and Western Europe. The largest cocaine seizure in all of Europe in 2009 (over 2 metric tons) took place in Constanta, its largest port city. Romania and other Black Sea Eastern European countries are becoming increasingly popular among international cocaine traffickers looking for alternative entry points into Western Europe’s lucrative cocaine markets. Romania’s long Black Sea coastline and its large deep-water port of Constanta likely are being used as secondary cocaine entry points into Europe. The global economic crisis continued to impact on all Romanian government agencies, and resources for counternarcotics units were more scarce than usual. Despite these challenges, Romanian authorities continue to work closely with U.S. and regional counterparts on successful and effective international seizure operations. Drug use in Romania has increased in recent years, due in part to an increased poverty level, with a noted increase in the use of synthetic narcotics and heroin.
Romania is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Romania and the U.S. are also parties to a bilateral extradition treaty and a mutual legal assistance treaty, which was amended by a Protocol in 1999. Both the Extradition Treaty and the Protocol fulfill the requirements for bilateral instruments that are contained in the Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements between the United States and the EU. The U.S. and Romania also have a customs mutual assistance agreement in force. Romania is party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols, and the UN Convention Against Corruption.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
The Romanian Ministry of the Interior manages all law enforcement agencies. The two units involved in drug-related crime enforcement are the Organized Crime and Anti-Drug Unit (RNP) and the Romanian Border Police (RBP). The RNP is responsible for investigating major drug trafficking offenses, including manufacturing, distribution and organizations trafficking drugs into Romania. As of May 1, 2009, the RBP is only involved with narcotic investigations and drug seizures which occur at border crossings. Romanian law requires that both agencies work closely with the Romanian National Prosecutors Office. The RNP and the RBP regularly work jointly when known or suspected drug traffickers are entering or exiting Romania. Law enforcement cooperation continued to expand and become more sophisticated with the assistance of foreign training programs such as those offered by the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center (transformed in October 2011 into the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center - SELEC) based in Bucharest, and specialized training sessions offered by the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest Hungary. Even with this advanced training, the global economic crisis continued to have a significant negative impact on narcotics units already strained for resources. Romanian police had to stretch their resources and operations and suffered occasional setbacks due to the lack of resources. Romanian police forces were able to secure some technical equipment, but lacked force protection equipment. Threats of pay cuts and forced unpaid leave due to the economic crisis were having a negative impact on morale government wide. Despite these hurdles, the Romanian counternarcotics authorities have continued to engage with regional and U.S. partners for joint operations and projects.
2. Supply Reduction
The RNP in Bucharest, Romania seized the following drugs during the period of January to June 2011: 7.18 kilograms of heroin; 159.6 kilograms of cocaine; 40.1 kilograms of cannabis; 9.2 kilograms of hashish, 2925 Ecstasy tablets, 130 ml of ketamine, 7290 amphetamine tablets, 4.5 kilograms of “Spice”-synthetic marijuana, in addition to, 2.6 kilograms and 1282 tablets of other designer drugs. Romanian law enforcement’s commitment to coordination means they are frequently involved in joint operations. In one instance, one hundred and fifty-nine (159) kilograms of cocaine were seized by the RNP and two individuals arrested after a container declared as wood from Bolivia turned out to contain cocaine. In another case, the RNP were focused on a Nigerian drug trafficking organization (DTO) based out of Bucharest, Romania. In April, the RNP developed information which, when passed to the Greek National Police, led to the arrest of one individual and the seizure of 735 grams of heroin. In the last year, information pertaining to this DTO has led to cocaine seizures in Brazil, Japan, Seoul and England. In February 2010, the Romanian Government listed 36 additional substances and plants, the majority of which were hallucinogenic in nature, in their schedule of controlled substances. Armed with the new listings, Romanian authorities were able to seize two fully functional JWH-018 labs, making them the first ever synthetic labs of this type seized in Romania. The chemicals used to make the synthetic drugs were imported from China, and the intended markets were Romania, England and Ukraine.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
Drug education and prevention programs are conducted in cooperation with local authorities, NGOs, religious organizations and private companies. Detoxification programs are offered through some hospitals, but treatment options are limited. Many drug education programs have had to be down-sized or closed due to a lack of resources and poorly trained staff. The first drug treatment center in Romania only opened in 1996. Since then, Romania has continued to build an integrated system of prevention and treatment services that now total 47 Anti-Drug Prevention and Counseling Centers throughout the country. Under Romanian law, the drug user is viewed as a patient, needing medical care; not a criminal. However, each case is closely evaluated, since it must be proven that the drug user was not involved in drug distribution. Drug use in Romania has been comparatively low historically, but has grown over the past few years. The number of drug users has doubled in the last five years while the average user age has decreased. The National Anti Drug Agency (ANA) found that less than 20 percent of Romanians believe that drug users should be treated as ill, and not punished
4. Corruption
As a matter of government policy, Romania does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. There is no evidence that senior Romanian officials engage in, encourage, or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of dangerous drugs or substances, or launder proceeds from illegal narcotics transactions. Corruption and judicial inefficiency remain serious problems for the Romanian government. Convictions for many crimes, including drug-related crimes, were difficult to obtain, and as many as fifty percent of those convicted do not serve their full sentences. In addition, 49 Romanian border police and customs officers were brought to court in May 2011to face charges of bribery. These officers are accused of receiving up to 2,700 Euros (apx. $3600, per shift, from October 2010 to January 2011 from cigarette smugglers using the Serbia/Romania checkpoint. It is possible that members of the Border Police and Customs were also bribed by drug smugglers, but these officers were not prosecuted. In total, 234 police and customs officers have been indicted on corruption charges since February 2011.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
In May 2011, the Romanian Ministry of Justice Organized Crime Division and the Turkish Ministry of Justice signed an agreement to reinforce their cooperation against drug trafficking and terrorism in the Balkans. This agreement will allow the Romanian and Turkish police and prosecutors to set up joint investigation teams and permit exchanges of information. In 2011 Romania continued to benefit from U.S. financial assistance to the SECI Center for Combating Trans-border Crime (now SELEC). DEA personnel assigned to SELEC augment DEA Athens, which has responsibility for Romania. DEA personnel from Athens and SELEC coordinate narcotics information sharing, maintain liaison with participating law enforcement agencies, and coordinate with Romanian police on case-related issues.
D. Conclusion
The DEA continued to be heavily engaged in Romania during 2011. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation and partnership continue to grow and result in joint successes in international drug trafficking investigations. The United States stands ready to assist Romania in meeting the continuing challenge of drug trafficking. Concerns persist that the lack of funding due to the economic crisis will continue to negatively impact on the ability of the Romanian police to fight narcotics trafficking.
A. Introduction
Russia is a major destination country for heroin from Afghanistan. It is also a significant market for opium, hashish, marijuana, synthetics, and other dangerous illegal substances. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports (July 2011) that Russia is the largest single market for Afghan-origin heroin, consuming approximately 70,000 kilograms (70 MT) per year, and is the largest per capita consumer of heroin in the world. UNODC estimates that there are approximately 1.7 million opiate users in Russia (1.64 percent of the population), among whom HIV infection rates are up to 61 percent in some regions, according to recent epidemiological surveillance.
Approximately 25 percent of Afghanistan’s annual heroin production traverses neighboring Central Asian states along the so-called “northern route” to Russia. Russia’s 6846-kilometer border with Kazakhstan is roughly twice the length of the U.S.-Mexican border and accounts for the overwhelming majority of smuggling activity. Opiate trafficking along this route could become even more prevalent as Kazakhstan has entered into a customs union with the Russian Federation and a customs union is under consideration in Kyrgyzstan as well, which may weaken future interdiction efforts as Russia relies on those countries’ customs inspections at the union’s external borders. Further, most Central Asian citizens are granted visa-free entry into the Russian Federation. Contraband is typically carried in vehicles (often bundled with loads of agricultural produce) along the region's highway system that connects populated areas of Southwestern Russia and Western Siberia. Couriers sometimes use the region's passenger trains and incidents involving internal body carriers or "swallowers" are also common. Russia has called on the international community to recognize the production of heroin in Afghanistan as a threat to international peace and security.
Although not as significant as the use of heroin, opium and hashish, Russian counternarcotics officials have expressed concern about increased use of synthetics and other pharmacological narcotics that are inexpensive and increasingly available in Russia. One such synthetic is desomorphine, which first appeared on the Russian market in 2003, and is as addictive as, and more toxic than, heroin. Desomorphine is easily produced at home by mixing codeine-based medications, widely available in Russia without a prescription, and household chemicals. Cocaine is also used in Russia, and the supply appears to be keeping pace with a growing pool of would-be users whose affluence makes higher priced cocaine more feasible as a recreational drug. It appears that the preferred smuggling route for cocaine continues to be by sea from South America. As the demand for stimulants increases in Russia, there are additional indications that synthetic stimulants, such as amphetamine, are increasingly being used.
Approximately two and a half million Russians (1.8 percent of its population) use illicit drugs on a regular basis. Russian officials estimate that there are 80,000 new drug users each year, more than 30,000 people die annually of drug overdoses and another 70,000 deaths per year are drug-related. This translates to economic losses of up to three percent of gross national product per year, according to the FSKN, the Federal Narcotics Control Agency.
Cannabis grows wild throughout Russia (FSKN estimates 1,000,000 hectares of “wild hemp”). Wild stands of the plant and large-scale outdoor cultivation are concentrated in the Caucasus, in the Republic of Tuva, and the Amur River Basin in the Russian Far East. Russia is also a producer of acetic anhydride (AA), which has many licit uses, but is also an essential precursor chemical for processing heroin. Currently Russia has one factory located in Dzerhinsk that is licensed to produce AA for internal use and for export.
The Russian government has begun to take steps to address the public health issues associated with drug use. Health education programs in schools and outreach programs for youth and other vulnerable populations incorporate messages concerning the harmful effects of drug use and the links between injecting drugs and HIV/AIDS. However, current government-supported drug addiction treatment programs are ineffective and not widely available.
The United States has a bilateral Treaty for Mutual Legal Assistance with Russia, signed on June 17, 1999. Russia is a party to all of the UN Drug Conventions and the 1972 Protocol. Russia is also a party to the UN Convention Against Corruption and the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
Four federal agencies in Russia conduct investigations of drug trafficking: FSKN, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Federal Customs Service (FTS). The FSKN is the primary drug enforcement agency and has an authorized staffing level of 40,000 employees, with branch offices in every region of Russia.
The government issued its “State Counternarcotics Strategy until 2020” by Presidential decree in June 2010. The strategy enlists all levels of government and all agencies in the fight against illicit drugs. It stipulates the roles of different government agencies in counternarcotics activities, calls for improvements in efforts to reduce the supply of illegal drugs, outlines new legislation aimed at deterring drug trafficking and discusses the requirements for reducing the demand for illegal narcotics and preventing drug use. The strategy also calls for the development of a surveillance system to track trends in illegal drug trafficking and use, better state control over legal narcotics and their precursors, more attention to the medical and social services needed in order to rehabilitate drug users and more state funding in a number of these areas.
The Russian government has stepped up counternarcotics efforts in the past year, particularly in the area of international cooperation to combat drug trafficking in the region in light of the challenges posed by the “northern route” for trafficking of Afghan heroin. The FSKN regularly hosts and attends regional working group meetings aimed at stemming the flow of opiates into Russia from Central Asia. The FSKN maintains drug liaison officers in many countries of the region, and is planning on posting liaison officers at the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC), which it has recently officially joined as a member nation. Russia leads a four nation “Quartet,” composed of Russia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, which meets regularly to jointly target opiate trafficking from Afghanistan. Additionally, Russia has taken up the issue of regional drug trafficking in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russia maintains bi-lateral counternarcotics cooperation agreements with over 35 nations.
As part of the NATO-Russia Council’s counternarcotics project, Russian trainers conduct training courses for Afghan, Pakistani and Central Asian counterparts at the Domodedovo training center of the MVD outside Moscow and the Counternarcotics Training Center in St. Petersburg. These training courses assist South and Central Asian police forces in combating drug trafficking within and from Afghanistan. Russia also partners with the United States in implementing an OSCE project to improve drug interdiction capacity building for border guards in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and with UNODC to support the State Drug Control Service in Kyrgyzstan.
The FSKN has continued its efforts to implement effective monitoring of the chemical industry. Production, transportation, distribution, and import/export of controlled substances now require licensing from FSKN. Russia is a producer of several precursor chemicals including the amphetamine precursor benzyl methyl ketone (aka Phenyl-2-Propanone or P2P), the heroin precursor Acetic Anhydride, and the precursor Gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), a precursor in the production of Gamma-hydroxybutyric acid (GHB). In Russia, the production and distribution of GBL is licensed to attempt to avoid diversion for illicit drug production. Russia’s increased control over precursor chemicals has yielded definite results. Seizures of acetic anhydride declined dramatically from their highs in the mid-2000s as opportunities for diversion have been limited. One recent investigative success highlights how increased Russian precursor chemical regulation and monitoring has drastically reduced successful diversion. In April 2011, the FSKN seized 800 kilograms of acetic anhydride as a drug trafficking organization attempted to divert them directly from the factory.
2. Supply Reduction
The total amount of narcotics seized from illegal circulation by all law enforcement agencies in 2010 was 41 (metric) tons, 245.8 kilograms (an 8.8 percent decrease in comparison to the previous year). Total seizures of illegal narcotics in the first nine months of 2011 by type of substance were as follows: heroin, 1 ton, 637.3 kilograms; cannabis, 19 tons, 659.5 kilograms; hashish, 1 ton, 922.5 kilograms; cocaine, 188.1 kilograms; and synthetic narcotic substances, 533.6 kilograms.
FSKN officials continue to be concerned about increased drug trafficking as a result of the withdrawal of Russian border guards from the Afghan/Tajik border in 2005. Russian forces had been stationed in Tajikistan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but departed after the expiration of the agreement governing their presence.
To disrupt this trafficking, each year since 2003, law enforcement agencies of the member states of the CSTO (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) have participated in “Operation Kanal (Channel).” However, seizure statistics from this operation include narcotics and weapons seized in parts of the world not applicable to the identification of smuggling trends in Russia and the Central Asian countries, and are therefore not included in this report.
Russia has a legislative and financial monitoring structure that facilitates the tracking, seizure, and forfeiture of all criminal proceeds. Russian legislation provides for investigative techniques such as wiretapping, search, seizure and the compulsory production of documents. Legislation passed in 2004, entitled: "On Protection of Victims, Witnesses and Other Participants in Criminal Proceedings" extends legal protection to all parties involved in a criminal trial. Prosecutors or investigators may recommend that a judge implement witness protection measures if they learn of a threat to the life or property of a participant in a trial.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
The Russian government has begun to take steps to address the public health issues associated with drug use. Demand reduction and drug abuse prevention are addressed at length in the National Counternarcotics Strategy, issued in June 2010. The strategy outlined ongoing deficiencies in the demand reduction system, including insufficient medical treatment and social rehabilitation services, a shortage of specialized workers (doctors and social workers) and a shortage of centers serving drug abusers. The few government-supported drug addiction treatment programs that do exist are generally ineffective with high rates of recidivism. The National Counternarcotics Strategy calls for addressing these deficiencies through augmentation and reorganization of state resources and new programs for treatment and rehabilitation of drug users. Health education programs in schools and outreach programs for youth and other vulnerable populations do incorporate messages concerning the harmful effects of drug use and the fact that drug injection is fueling HIV/AIDS cases. The government sponsors a range of public health publicity campaigns that include drug use prevention messages including posters in metros, billboards and other outreach efforts.
Most drug replacement therapies, such as methadone, are illegal in Russia, although a few new models of cognitive therapy which expand the breadth of substance abuse programs and rehabilitation are being implemented in treatment centers in St. Petersburg and Orenburg. A new medication-assisted therapy study, supported by USAID and the Russian government, is expected soon concerning the use of Naltrexone. In addition, the Russian Orthodox Church has established approximately 40 faith-based rehabilitation centers.
Local NGOs are also active in drug prevention activities. The Health and Development Foundation (formerly Healthy Russia Foundation), for example, has established, with assistance from the U.S. Government and others, a peer-to-peer outreach program that targets youth in high drug use target areas through vocational schools, youth clubs, activities, summer camps and other special programs set up by regional governments to reach teenagers at greatest risk. The peer-to-peer program encourages youth to discuss the impact of substance abuse and introduces life skills to discourage drug use. HDF has also developed a Ministry of Education-sanctioned health education curriculum for high school students and training materials for teachers that incorporate demand reduction messages.
4. Corruption
Corruption among law enforcement officials in Russia continues to present major challenges. No senior Russian officials were known to engage in, encourage, or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. However, several long-running cases of arrests of counternarcotics law enforcement officials on corruption or organized crime charges have occurred in the past two years.
On a related note, a sweeping restructuring at the MVD has pre-occupied the Ministry for much of 2011, and has greatly diminished its operations during this transition period. This has undoubtedly applied much greater pressure on FSKN to increase counter-narcotics efforts.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
In March 2011, Russia became a full member of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC), creating increased opportunities for cooperation with DEA personnel assigned to CARICC. U.S.-Russia counternarcotics cooperation increased in 2011, particularly between DEA and FSKN, by frequent productive meetings of the Counternarcotics Working Group of the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission led by the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Director Gil Kerlikowske and FSKN Director Viktor Ivanov. Joint participation in DEA-FSKN training programs continued with training conducted on tactical operations, chemical analysis, investigative techniques, and financial investigations. Joint investigative work continued to develop on both heroin trafficking derived from Afghanistan and cocaine trafficking emanating from South and Central America. Meetings of the Northern Route Working Group (NRWG) also continued throughout 2011. In addition to operational law enforcement cooperation, the United States has, since 2002, conducted a range of programs to promote counternarcotics and law enforcement cooperation with the Russian Government.
In response to increased levels of concern about heroin trafficking emanating from Afghanistan and transiting through Central Asia for ultimate use in Russia, the U.S. Department of State has proposed a $4.2 million Central Asian Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI), which will provide support for Central Asian counter-narcotics efforts, particularly the disruption of trafficking networks, jointly with the UNODC and DEA. Meanwhile, the FSKN has proposed its own initiative called Rainbow-2, which calls for the re-instatement of Afghan crop eradication efforts and increased law enforcement targeting.
D. Conclusion
Russia continues to treat counternarcotics efforts as a top national priority, as reflected by its National Counternarcotics Strategy issued in June 2010. Russia has increased its counternarcotics cooperation with the United States and other countries. Russia continues to move toward establishing and assuring the required interagency coordination, legal framework and commitment of resources that are necessary to make progress in the fight against drugs. Russia’s active participation in international, regional, and bilateral counternarcotics activities and the productive work in the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission’s Counternarcotics Working Group reflect this emphasis on cooperation as do the numerous recent operational successes involving both U.S. and Russian law enforcement. The regular high-level contacts between the Working Group’s Chairpersons continue to build on this partnership. Russia’s cooperation is essential to combating the scourge of international narcotics trafficking, and the United States is committed to continuing to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not a significant transit country for drugs, nor is there notable drug production reported in the country. Drug trafficking is illegal and is punishable by death. The Saudi Arabian government (SAG) has implemented several policy initiatives aimed at curbing the trafficking and abuse of narcotics to include sponsoring drug education curricula, drug treatment facilities, and coordination with neighboring countries on combating cross border trafficking. However, regular seizures of fenethylline (a synthetic stimulant also known as Captagon) indicate a continued trend of smuggling and use of some illegal narcotic substances.
Combating narcotics trafficking and addiction is a priority for the SAG. As a matter of government policy, the SAG does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, nor does it encourage or facilitate the laundering of proceeds from illegal transactions. According to the Ministry of Interior (MOI), security services arrested 475 people, just under half of whom were Saudi citizens, between June and September 2011 involved in trafficking, receiving, or selling drugs with an estimated black market value of more than $450 million. Between December 2010 and May 2011, Saudi security forces arrested 981 people, half of whom were Saudi citizens, for similar drug-related crimes.
The MOI leads SAG counternarcotics efforts, and the MOI’s General Directorate of Narcotics Control (GDNC) cooperates with the National Commission for Narcotics Control (NCNC) and other SAG ministries and agencies to combat the smuggling and use of narcotics. The GDNC maintains overseas drug enforcement liaison offices with responsibility for counternarcotics efforts. Saudi Arabia hosts the Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, which focuses on crime prevention and drug control, and the Kingdom maintains narcotics-related bilateral agreements with a number of regional countries. Saudi Arabia is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Saudi Arabia is also a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols.
Saudi Arabia has adopted both the 1986 “Common Arab Unified Law” and the 1999 “Arab Anti-drug Strategy” issued by the Council of Arab Ministers of Interior. Saudi Arabia signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2004, but has not yet ratified it. The government conducts public awareness campaigns aimed at educating the public on the harmful effects of drugs, and the country’s influential religious establishment actively preaches against the use of narcotics. Due to the negative social perception of drug use, data on drug use in Saudi Arabia is scarce, and many cases of addiction likely go unreported. SAG efforts to treat drug abuse are aimed solely at Saudi nationals, while expatriate substance abusers are usually jailed and summarily deported. There are four government-run facilities throughout the country (located in Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam, and Qassim) specializing in treating addiction and psychological rehabilitation.
Senegal serves as a transit country for drug traffickers due to its location, infrastructure and porous borders. The country's location on the west coast of Africa, along with a well-serviced international airport and an active seaport, make it an enticing transit point for drug traffickers. Narcotics are trafficked through Senegal by vehicle and boat from countries to the south of Senegal, including Guinea-Bissau and Guinea. The U.S. is not a destination point for these drugs.
Cannabis, a traditionally popular drug in Senegal, is cultivated in the southern Casamance region. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Senegal may become the leading producer of cannabis among the Francophone countries of West Africa and the third largest producer in West Africa after Nigeria and Ghana. Cocaine abuse in Senegal is also on the rise. UNODC estimates that about 40 tons of cocaine from Latin America reaches Europe via West Africa each year. However, Senegal and its neighbors are unprepared to deal with increasing levels of drug trafficking. Law enforcement officials lack the means and infrastructure to track smugglers, and poorly equipped local authorities face an uneven battle against the cash-wealthy traffickers.
Senegal’s Drug Law of 1997 is the country’s basic law on drugs; it covers the entire breadth of policy from apprehending and punishing offenders to rehabilitating abusers and was amended in 2006 to include stiffened penalties for drug traffickers. In 2011, at least 65 Senegalese and foreign individuals were prosecuted and convicted for drug trafficking. Senegal has a national plan of action, originally created in 1998, to combat drug abuse and the trafficking of drugs. Multidisciplinary in its approach, Senegal's national plan includes objectives to control the cultivation, production and traffic of drugs; to inform the population of the dangers of drug use; and to reintroduce former drug addicts into society. However, the government lacks the financial means to effectively counter the threats, and therefore frequently falls short of achieving plan objectives.
Senegal works with its partners in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to combat cocaine trafficking. Senegal also has several bilateral agreements with neighboring countries to combat narcotics trafficking and has signed mutual legal assistance agreements with the United Kingdom and France to facilitate exchange of enforcement information on narcotics trafficking and other transnational crimes. In April 2011, the U.S. and Senegal signed a maritime bilateral agreement that, among other objectives, will strengthen Senegal’s maritime capacity to counter drug trafficking. Senegal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Corruption, and the UN Convention against Transnational Crime and its three protocols.
The Senegalese government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. No senior government officials are known to engage in, encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Though corruption is a problem for narcotics law enforcement all over Africa, narcotics-related corruption does not appear to be a problem within senior levels of the Senegalese government.
In July, 2011, the U.S. Coast Guard conducted a 15 day African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership mission involving joint training, surveillance, and law enforcement operations in support to suppress illicit transnational maritime activity in and around Senegal waters.
The Senegalese government has demonstrated political will to fight drug trafficking, though its efforts are hampered due to lack of infrastructure and funding. Its national plan to counter narcotics trafficking and its cooperation with regional neighbors are both positive and necessary steps to help Senegal in this fight. However, Senegal, like its neighbors, continues its struggle to track and prevent traffickers who have greater resources. Senegal’s geographical location creates a tempting point for drug traffickers seeking to move narcotics from South America to Europe, and its proximity to Guinea-Bissau, a country plagued by a severe narco-trafficking problem, presents an ongoing challenge as Senegal tries to maintain its borders and also handle illicit marijuana cultivation in the Casamance region.
A. Introduction
The Republic of Serbia is an important transit country for narcotics and other drugs along the traditional Balkan smuggling corridor leading from Afghanistan, Central Asia and Turkey to Central and Western Europe. Heroin grown and processed in Afghanistan and marijuana, moving from Albania through Montenegro, are the main illicit drugs transiting Serbia. Small quantities of cocaine also enter Serbia. Smugglers appear to be shifting attention to Serbia's southern and eastern neighbors, especially European Union (EU) members. The government of Serbia continues to prioritize international law enforcement cooperation, particularly with neighboring states, recognizing that regional cooperation is critical in the fight against drug trafficking and organized trans-national crime.
Serbia’s Ministry of Interior believes that Serbian organized crime groups primarily smuggle cocaine directly from South America to Western Europe. Trafficking of synthetic drugs and precursors also remains a concern. Serbia is not a major producer of organic or synthetic drugs or precursors. Serbian authorities take the threat of domestic production of synthetic drugs very seriously and occasionally seize drug labs in Serbia. The Serbian government estimates that relatively small amounts of internationally trafficked narcotics, mostly heroin or marijuana, remain in the country for domestic consumption. Marijuana and synthetic drugs are the most frequently abused.
Serbia’s drug abuse and treatment capacity is limited. Estimates of the addict population range from 30,000-100,000. The only dedicated government-run drug and alcohol rehabilitation clinic treats about 1100 patients per year. The government conducts some public outreach on prevention. The Republic of Serbia is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, as a successor state to the former Yugoslavia.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
The Ministry of Interior, Border Police, and Customs Administration are responsible for combating drug-related crimes in Serbia. These agencies report generally good internal cooperation, but there is no government-wide coordinating body that has a clear lead in counter-narcotics law enforcement efforts, analogous to the U.S. DEA. Interior Ministry officials advocate a more centralized and robust organizational response to narcotics trafficking, but note serious resource constraints. The Interior Ministry conducts joint investigations with neighboring countries and provides intelligence, contributing to international seizures and arrests throughout Europe. Serbia is also working with South American countries with U.S. assistance. The Commission for the Fight against Drugs is composed of the Ministries of Health, Education and Sport, Interior, Social Welfare, and Justice and implements the National Strategy for the Fight against Drugs. The Ministry of Health has the lead, in prevention and treatment efforts. The government has made limited progress in implementing the National Action Plan and five-year National Strategy for the Fight against Drugs, both adopted in 2009. Serbia concluded agreements on law enforcement and counternarcotics cooperation with Turkey in April and with Russia in August 2011, among others.
Serbia participated in the Southeastern Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime activities, as well as the associated Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group (SEEPAG), and ratified the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC) Convention in October 2011.
Cooperation with Kosovo remains a significant exception. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an independent country and will not cooperate directly with Kosovo government representatives, permit them to attend conferences that Serbia hosts, or participate in multilateral events with them. The Interior Ministry signed a law enforcement cooperation agreement with the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in 2009, and the Customs Service cooperates informally with EULEX. Direct interaction needs to increase significantly, however, in light of the practical challenges. This has been made more difficult for the short-term by increasing tensions on Serbia’s border with northern Kosovo since late July 2011.
A new law on psychotropic drugs was adopted in December 2010. A revised Criminal Procedure Code was adopted in September 2011. A new Customs Service Law, which would bring Serbia into compliance with EU standards, remains under review. Serbia became a legal successor state to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on June 3, 2006. All international treaties and agreements continue in force, including the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
2. Supply Reduction
The Ministry of Interior continues the nationwide “Operation Morava” launched in October 2009 to pressure street-level drug dealers throughout the country and disrupt supply to local markets. Serbian law enforcement agencies report that most drug seizures are the result of international intelligence sharing, good interagency cooperation, and careful investigative work.
Serbia’s Customs Administration and all Interior Ministry agencies made a total of 3,897 seizures from January to September 20112010 saw a steep increase in overall seizures and a single, spectacular heroin seizure. Heroin seizures in 2011 thus were down significantly, a “base-effect” from last year (+66%), cocaine down slightly from a low and declining baseline (11%), and marijuana essentially steady (6% decline). The Customs Administration will have deployed ten new mobile x-ray systems [by end 2011] and invested in other equipment, training, and increased cross-border information-sharing.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
The Serbian government conducts drug abuse prevention campaigns, including a voluntary addiction prevention program in primary and secondary schools. Serbia’s only dedicated government-run drug and alcohol rehabilitation clinic provides emergency services and inpatient and outpatient detoxification using opiate receptor blockers or methadone, psychotherapy, and reintegration skills workshops to treat patients. Public hospitals, including prison hospitals, run outpatient and inpatient drug rehabilitation programs.
4. Corruption
As a matter of policy the Serbian government does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics or launder proceeds from illegal drug transactions. There is no evidence that any senior government official engages in, encourages, or facilitates the illicit production or distribution of drugs. Corruption in Serbia remains a serious social and governmental concern, however, due to low pay, inadequate working conditions and a culture of tolerance of petty corruption in certain fields of public administration, including law enforcement and healthcare. The Republic of Serbia is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
The Serbian Government works closely with the United States, the OSCE, and EU countries to reform and improve its law enforcement and judicial capacity. The United States has provided extensive technical assistance and equipment donations to the police, customs services, border police, and judiciary. Several USG agencies have programs that directly or indirectly support counter-narcotics activities in Serbia, including the Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and the Department of the Treasury. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funded programs are implemented by the Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) and have been instrumental in providing support to the Organized Crime Police and Organized Crime Court in Serbia.
USG assistance programs are aimed at professionalizing the police and customs services, building skills for prosecution and investigation techniques providing guidance in the drafting of new legislation, improving the ability of Serbia to prosecute corruption and organized crime, including money laundering and illicit trafficking, and increasing the ability of the judiciary to effectively address serious crime.
Negotiations are underway to update the 1902 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Kingdom of Serbia, which remains in force between the United States and Serbia.
D. Conclusion
Serbia in 2011 bolstered counternarcotics cooperation on a bilateral basis with its Balkan neighbors and in multilateral fora. Serbia’s cooperation with international partners since at least 2009 has helped lead to multiple drug seizures, several indictments, asset seizures, and new court proceedings against powerful Serbian cocaine traffickers like Darko Saric, although more effective cooperation with Kosovo and EULEX is needed. Improved communication and strategic coordination among law enforcement and judicial bodies within Serbia is also needed to enhance the comprehensive counternarcotics efforts. The United States will continue to support the efforts of Serbian law enforcement to combat narcotics smuggling in the country and the region through training, capacity-building, and donations of critical equipment.
Production of narcotics in Seychelles is limited to the growing of cannabis. Plants are grown outdoors and seizures are regularly made at locations throughout the larger islands. Over the last twelve months, significant progress has been made in suppressing drug activity on the street level and the importation/trafficking level. Between 15 to 20 persons are arrested each week for minor drug offences such as possession, obstruction, etc.
In 2011, more than 1,000 mature marijuana plants were seized. This figure is substantially higher than the figure in 2009/2010 when some 191 plants were seized. All of the compressed cannabis and herbal material is imported into the Seychelles. Seychelles is not a major producer or exporter of illegal drugs, or a transit route for drug trafficking. Other illicit drugs, primarily heroin and to a lesser extent cannabis products, are brought into Seychelles for consumption with some small share going for transshipment to other markets.
Seychelles National Drug Enforcement Agency (NDEA) of the Seychelles Police Force works closely with other law enforcement and health agencies on drug control and education/treatment programs throughout the country, and cooperates with U.S. government agencies. The NDEA continues to look for ways to improve its resources and to build its capacity. Seychelles is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Seychelles is a party to the UN Convention Against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
The NDEA appears on track, based on data as of October 2011, to record an increase in seizures and cases filed involving illegal drugs. Seychelles customs has recorded record levels of seizures over the last three years. The NDEA and Customs credit the increase in illicit drug seizures and arrests in recent years to their ongoing operations with other units of the police force and cooperation with immigration and profiling. The Government of Seychelles (GOS) collaborates with the Drug Enforcement Administration, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the International Narcotics Control Board.
Based on narcotic seizures, arrests, and rehabilitation program participation, marijuana has become the most commonly consumed drug in Seychelles closely followed by heroin. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) believe that there are approximately 3000 abusers of which 1000 to 1500 are injecting. The NDEA states that there are 5000 substance abusers including alcohol abuse. The Ministry of Health provides treatment for drug addicts at a number of outlets in Seychelles. A disturbing increase in Hepatitis C cases has prompted the government to consider the use of a methadone substitute to maintain addicts during treatment and to introduce a needle exchange program. NGOs provide counseling and prevention advice to supplement government efforts.
Seychelles’ legislation controlling the illegal use of drugs dates from 1991. The GOS has clearly indicated that it will deal harshly with drug traffickers and has now adopted a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to any drug related activity. This has resulted in significant reduction in the availability of drugs and in the ability of the traffickers to conduct business. Retired Irish police officers, contracted to advise the Seychelles Police, have made a positive impact on the capacity of Seychelles Police to enforce the law. The government of the Seychelles does not encourage or facilitate drug trafficking as a matter of government policy, and senior officials of the government are not believed to be involved in such activity.
The U.S. government provides training assistance to Seychelles law enforcement agencies, including the NDEA, through the International Law Enforcement Academies in Gaborone, Botswana and Roswell, New Mexico, and through Africa Command, the FBI, and NCIS.
With its porous borders, poorly patrolled coastline, weak infrastructure, and deep poverty, Sierra Leone presents a potentially attractive transshipment point for illegal drugs. The government’s efforts to combat the drug flow in 2011 continued to be hampered by resource constraints and limited operational sophistication. Sierra Leone’s limited enforcement capacity, inadequate drug treatment and rehabilitation programs, and corruption often impede its counternarcotics efforts.
Cocaine is the main drug transiting Sierra Leone. It moves through the country’s unguarded and unprotected borders, both land and sea, from South America to Europe via intermediary points such as Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Small amounts of Southeast Asian heroin are also suspected of being shipped through Sierra Leone on direct commercial flights from East Africa. Sierra Leone’s endemic corruption certainly facilitates trafficking, as government officials and police and intelligence officers accept bribes, to turn a blind eye on trafficking, or even engage in trafficking drugs themselves. As a matter of policy, however, the government of Sierra Leone does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics or launder proceeds from illegal drug transactions. There is no evidence that any senior government official engages in, encourages, or facilitates the illicit production or distribution of drugs. The only drug produced in Sierra Leone is marijuana. It is widely cultivated and consumed locally, and is also transported to surrounding countries and to Europe. Increased cannabis cultivation has given rise to food security concerns as farmers substitute it for subsistence farming. Diversion of precursor chemicals is not a problem in Sierra Leone.
The National Drug Control Act of 2008 brought Sierra Leone’s laws into conformity with international conventions and norms. It defined stricter penalties for all drug-related charges, contained mutual legal assistance provisions, and authorized a budget appropriation to support prevention and control activities. Efforts to strengthen the law began in 2010, but as of 2011 a revised law had not yet been passed. Sierra Leone is a party to all of the UN Drug Conventions and the 1972 Protocol. The 1935 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Great Britain remains in force between the United States and Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption. Though Sierra Leone signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in 2001, it has yet to ratify it. The 2009 Maritime Counter Drug Bilateral Agreement promotes cooperation between the U.S. and Sierra Leone for the purpose of suppressing illicit transnational maritime activity, including narcotics trafficking.
The 2008 Drug Control Act also established a National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) to serve as the focal point on policy issues and investigations. However, with limited staff and virtually no budget, it is a hollow organization with no real capacity and no demonstrated successes. The vast majority of drug interdiction activity is carried out by the Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TOCU), an elite inter-agency unit supported by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other international donors. Donor agencies have helped TOCU increase its capacity significantly since TOCU’s establishment. However, TOCU still needs continued training as well as improved forensic capabilities, including a dedicated forensic laboratory. Sierra Leone’s plans to create a special court dedicated to organized crime and narcotics issues with specially trained judges and prosecutors, supported by UNODC, has not yet been implemented.
During the period October 2009 to June 2011, TOCU conducted 172 investigations, which led to 114 court cases; the remaining cases were closed without any prosecutions. In the first half of 2011, TOCU conducted 45 investigations which led to 32 court cases. The vast majority of these cases were for cultivating, selling, and trafficking in marijuana. There were also several charges for possession and sale of cocaine. TOCU also investigated cases of suspected human trafficking and 419 financial scams.
U.S.-supported interdiction efforts were focused on the Joint Maritime Committee a kind of coast guard which conducts patrols with three small cutters, donated by the U.S. Coast Guard and a larger Shanghai-class patrol boat donated by the Chinese government. In 2011, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) funded significant infrastructure improvements at TOCU, including an automated ship identification system, two radars, and improved Internet access. In addition, in 2011, the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership, a program of the Africa Partnership Station administered byAFRICOM, conducted joint Sierra Leone/U.S. Coast Guard training, surveillance, and law enforcement operations. These operations included the Coast Guard Cutter “FORWARD” embarking a law enforcement team from Sierra Leone to locate and board vessels suspected of illegally trafficking narcotics.
The Government of Singapore (GOS) enforces stringent counter-narcotics policies through strict laws -- including the death penalty and corporal punishment -- vigorous law enforcement, and active prevention programs. Singapore is not a producer of narcotics, but as a major regional financial and transportation center, it is an attractive target for money launderers and drug transshipment. Singapore is ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in the world. Corruption cases involving Singapore's counter-narcotics and law enforcement agencies are extremely rare. Singapore officers regularly attend U.S.-sponsored training programs as well as regional forums on drug control. In recent years, Singapore has begun training ASEAN narcotics officers in partnership with French and Australian counterparts. In May 2011, Singapore Central Narcotics Bureau officials partnered with UN Colombo Plan officials to deliver a one-week narcotics course to officers from South and East Asian nations including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Timor-Leste, and others.
According to GOS figures, during 2010, 1772 drug offenders were arrested compared to 1882 arrested in 2009. Heroin and methamphetamine remain the top two drugs of choice in Singapore accounting for 88 percent of the drug abusers arrested, up from 84 percent in 2009. In 2010 Singapore saw an increase in seizures of almost all drug types. In 2010, Singapore seized 48.45 kg of Heroin #3, a 68 percent increase from 29.14 kg in 2009; 8.51 kg of Cannabis, compared to 5.3 kg in 2009; 5.53 kg of methamphetamine compared to 3.9 kg in 2009; 12.14 kg of ketamine compared to 9.3 kg in 2009; 43,320 tablets of Nimetazepan-AKA Erimin-5 as compared to 24,124 tablets in 2009. Also seized were 8,085 tablets of MDMA (ecstasy), 332 tablets of methamphetamine (Yaba), and 292 tablets of Buprenorphine (Subutex).
In 2010, there was no known production of illicit narcotics in Singapore. Singapore has been used as a transit point for narcotics moving to destinations such as Indonesia, China, and Hong Kong via parcels, maritime containers and air cargo. Air and maritime ferry passengers have also frequently transited Singapore in possession of narcotics for delivery to other countries such as Indonesia. Points of origin have included Malaysia, India, Thailand, and Pakistan. Singapore is a one of the world’s largest licit producers of ephedrine and pseudo-ephedrine (precursor chemicals for the production of methamphetamine) and also acetic anhydride (precursor chemical for the production of heroin). Precursor chemicals, including acetic anhydride, have also transited Singapore from South Korea and China en route to destinations such as Pakistan, destined for heroin conversion laboratories in Afghanistan. Singapore is one of the busiest transshipment ports in the world. With few exceptions, Singapore does not screen containerized shipments unless they enter its customs territory. Neither Singapore Customs nor the Immigration and Checkpoint Authority (ICA) keep data on in-transit or transshipped cargo unless there is a Singapore consignee involved in the shipment. In 2010, Singapore’s Free Trade Zone (FTZ) was exploited on numerous occasions by Pakistani nationals and others to transship narcotics and precursor chemicals to, among other countries, Mexico, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
As a matter of government policy, the GOS neither encourages nor facilitates illicit production or distribution of narcotics, psychotropic drugs, or other controlled substances, nor the laundering of related proceeds. Singapore continues to pursue a strategy of demand and supply reduction for drugs. The GOS worked closely with numerous international groups dedicated to drug education, including the Partnership for a Drug-Free America. In addition to arresting drug traffickers, Singapore focuses on arresting and detaining drug abusers for treatment and rehabilitation, providing drug detoxification and rehabilitation, and offering vigorous drug education in its schools. Singaporeans and permanent residents are subject to random drug tests. The Misuse of Drugs Act gives the Singapore Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) the authority to remand all drug abusers to rehabilitation centers for mandatory treatment and rehabilitation. Since 1999, individuals testing positive for consumption of narcotics have been held accountable for narcotics consumed abroad as well as in Singapore.
Singapore is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Singapore and the United States continue to cooperate in extradition matters under the 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty. Singapore and the United States signed a Drug Designation Agreement (DDA) in November 2000, and a mutual assistance agreement limited to drug cases. Singapore has signed mutual legal assistance agreements with Hong Kong and ASEAN. The United States and Singapore have held discussions on a possible bilateral MLAT, most recently in December 2005, although there have been no formal negotiations since 2004. Singapore is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Corruption Convention. In April 2006, Singapore amended domestic legislation to allow for mutual legal assistance cooperation with countries for which Singapore does not have a bilateral treaty.
