

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of Inspector General

**The Transportation Security Administration's
National Deployment Force**





**Homeland
Security**

April 30, 2008

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department.

This review addresses when, where, and why the Transportation Security Administration's National Deployment Force has been deployed and the expenses incurred related to the maintenance and deployment of the program. In addition, we evaluated TSA oversight activities, the adequacy of standard operating procedures, and whether the overall intent of the National Deployment Force program is being met. The review is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, quantitative analysis, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Richard L. Skinner".

Richard L. Skinner
Inspector General

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Abbreviations

ATSA	Aviation and Transportation Security Act
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
FSD	Federal Security Director
MSF	Mobile Screening Force
NSF	National Screening Force
NDF	National Deployment Force
NDO	National Deployment Office
OHC	Office of Human Capital
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OSO	Office of Security Operations
TEEP	Training Exercise Execution Plan
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TSO	Transportation Security Officer

OIG

*Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General*

Executive Summary

The Transportation Security Administration's National Deployment Force deploys Transportation Security Officers to support airport screening operations during emergencies, seasonal demands, or other circumstances requiring more staffing resources than are regularly available. Our review of National Deployment Force Program costs responds to concerns raised by Congressman John Mica regarding the Transportation Security Administration's possible reliance on this program in ways not originally intended. In his letter of June 30, 2006, Congressman Mica requested information on when, where, and why the National Deployment Force had been deployed since the inception of the program, along with a breakdown of deployment expenses to include travel, per diem, hotel, and overtime costs for Fiscal Years 2004, 2005, and 2006.

The Transportation Security Administration implemented their deployment program without developing a process to determine the criteria and priority for deployment decisions, or ensuring the appropriateness of resource allocations. From the establishment of a deployment program in November 2003 until January 2007, they did not have financial systems to track and document program-related costs; adequate documentation to support deployment decisionmaking; or internal controls and standard operating procedures over key deployment functions. In addition, they were overly reliant on the deployment force to fill chronic staffing shortages at specific airports in lieu of more cost effective strategies and solutions to handle screening demands.

We recommended that the Transportation Security Administration establish systems to collect, track, and report deployment costs; develop decisionmaking procedures for deployment requests and document results; and develop and disseminate standard operating procedures for key program functions to increase program efficiency and effectiveness. TSA officials generally agreed with our findings, and have initiated corrective actions to address recommendations in this report.

Background

Congress enacted the *Aviation and Transportation Security Act*¹ (ATSA) following the attacks of September 2001. The Act created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation to protect the Nation's transportation systems. On March 1, 2003, TSA was integrated into the Department of Homeland Security. As part of its mission, TSA has responsibility for passenger and checked baggage screening operations at more than 400 commercial airports. Federal Security Directors (FSD) and their staff manage passenger and baggage screening operations, including management of the screener workforce, at one or more airports under their jurisdiction.

ATSA tasked TSA with building a federal agency and meeting a 1-year mandate to federalize aviation security for passenger screening by November 19, 2002. To meet this requirement, TSA recruited, hired, trained, and deployed approximately 55,000 federal full-time Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to more than 400 airports by the mandated timeframe. In August 2002, following congressional concern over the size of the federalized TSO workforce, Congress imposed a cap prohibiting TSA from exceeding 45,000 TSO positions.

In November 2002, TSA's Office of Aviations Operations established a regionally based Mobile Screening Force (MSF) to support the initial deployment of federal screeners to each commercial airport and respond to other short-term operational needs. The MSF was composed of screening staff who were detailed from their permanent duty station and assigned temporarily to airports as part of the transition from private to federalized screening operations.

To determine the initial airport TSO staffing requirements, TSA used the same number of screeners that were in place before the airports were federalized. However, within the first year of operation, TSA identified imbalances in TSO resources, airport overstaffing, and hiring and retention issues that resulted in continued use of MSF staff by airports. TSA also needed the MSF at airports to support planned growth, assist while equipment is upgraded, and for other special operations such as enhanced airport employee screening.

In October 2003, as required by TSA Directive AVO 5200-1, the MSF was transitioned into a centrally managed National Screening Force (NSF) as a permanent mobile screening entity. The NSF was responsible for providing support to all airports during emergencies, to cope with seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances that require labor assets not regularly

¹ Public Law No 107-71, 115 Stat.597 (2001).

available to the FSDs. Examples of these circumstances include severe weather conditions, heightened security requirements, natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, and increased passenger activity due to special occasions. The creation of the NSF was in response to TSA's legal requirement to screen 100% of baggage and passengers at all commercial airports at a time when TSO resources were below required levels.

The NSF functioned as an independent operation where staff reported directly to the NSF Operations Center at TSA headquarters. When not deployed, members of the NSF were assigned to duty at their airport of record. NSF deployment costs were charged to the NSF operating budget. TSO salary and benefits costs were charged to a central account, with pay computations based on the location of their home airport.

TSA officials described its centralized management process under the NSF as inefficient and costly because airports were not fiscally responsible. In November 2006, the NSF Operations Center transitioned into the National Deployment Office (NDO), located within the Office of Security Operations (OSO). TSOs serving in the program were renamed the National Deployment Force (NDF). TSA officials said that this transition focused primarily on the decentralization of TSO administrative responsibilities. The aim was to move the non-operational NDF functions back to the employees' airport of record, with the intention of redistributing responsibility and costs.

In April 2007, TSA transferred TSO administrative support functions such as processing payroll, training certifications, and performance appraisals for NDF personnel to the airport of record or deployment. The NDO retained responsibility for overall program management, processing and approval of requests for deployment, and support functions related to travel and lodging.

As of December 2007, there were 480 TSOs assigned to the National Deployment Force. Since its inception in 2003, the program has had an annual operating budget of \$35 million. For FY 2007, \$32 million was earmarked for NDF deployment-related costs for travel, lodging, and per diem; and \$3 million was budgeted for contractors who provide administrative support and travel-related services. The NDF budget is not inclusive of compensation and benefits costs for headquarters staff, or for the NDF staff assigned to the program. NDF salary and benefits costs are supported by the TSO's airport of record.

Results of Review

Internal Controls Over National Deployment Force Operations

According to OMB Circular A-123, "Management Responsibility for Internal Control," management is responsible for developing and maintaining effective internal controls to ensure that programs operate and resources are used consistent with agency missions. This should be accomplished with minimal potential for waste, fraud, and mismanagement. In addition, internal controls must be established that reasonably ensure that funds and other assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation.

Since November 2003, TSA has maintained a deployment force program to support the temporary deployment of federal screeners to commercial airports that require screening resources not routinely available. However, neither procedures to ensure the integrity and accountability over deployment resources, nor a decisionmaking process that defines the criteria and priority for handling requests for screener assistance had been established. Program managers responsible for overall NDF operations said that during the inception of the deployment program, there was no way to track employees who had been deployed, and screeners could slip through the cracks and even overstay their deployment. In the absence of internal controls to track and document the use of NDF resources, we were unable to determine deployment cost and the rationale for deployment decisions for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006.

Deployment Costs

We requested financial data on all deployments from November 2003 to March 2007, including a breakdown of salaries, per diem, transportation, and other travel-related expenses. Also, due to concerns regarding events surrounding specific deployments to Washington-Dulles International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, and Joe Foss Field in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, we requested additional information for these deployments.

After several requests for deployment cost data, NDO program managers said that they could not provide such information for each airport that received NDF support in FYs 2004, 2005, and 2006. In addition, they were unable to provide deployment cost data for Washington-Dulles International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, and Joe Foss Field in Sioux Falls. NDO officials said that deployments to Los Angeles International Airport for approximately 90 to 120 days during 2006 were required due to local hiring shortfalls. Also, Dulles International Airport experienced local hiring shortfalls throughout FYs 2005 and 2006, which resulted in continuous NDF support. NDF deployments to Sioux Falls, SD, were in response to a 12-week

seasonal surge in passengers from October to December 2005 and extended until February 2006 when a private contractor assumed responsibility for screening operations.

TSA officials said that airport deployment costs were not tracked during FYs 2004 through 2006. Because the objective of the NSF was to provide assistance to the FSDs who did not have sufficient TSO resources, project managers were provided funds to support airport screening operations as needed. They also said that the budget process consisted of taking the \$33 million allocated annually for per diem, rental cars, airfare, and hotels, along with the \$2 million allocated for contractor support costs, and dividing it to spend among four quarters. OSO Budget and Finance officials said that they reviewed the NDO status of funds simply to ensure that they were not deficient, but were not responsible for producing financial reports of NDF deployment costs.

We obtained documentation that showed FY 2004 to FY 2006 NDF program costs for TSO airfare, per diem, and lodging that totaled \$24.7 million, \$26.3 million, and \$27.9 million, respectively. We also received information that showed the average number of TSOs deployed per week by calendar year for 2005 and 2006, which totaled 412 and 408, respectively. Due to the limited information provided, we are unable to determine actual deployment costs, inclusive of TSO salary and benefits. TSA officials said that salary and benefit costs, while part of the cost of deployment, are not additive costs to an NDO deployment because TSO salary and benefits are paid regardless of location.

Information obtained from the Office of Human Capital showed that the average annual salary and benefit costs for a locally hired TSO is \$56,900, or \$219 per day. NDO program managers said that the daily cost for one deployed TSO including salary, benefits, travel, lodging, per diem, over-time, and related expenses totals \$511 per day. Based on information provided by NDO officials for calendar year 2005 and 2006 weekly deployments, and the average daily expense to deploy one TSO, we estimate total deployment costs of \$76.7 million for 2005, and \$76 million for 2006. Costs for all NDO deployments in 2007 totaled \$65.8 million, which included \$33.5 million for operational expenses and \$32.3 million for pay, compensation, and benefit expenses (see Appendix D).

NDF officials said that their financial analyst was responsible for tracking deployment costs. A financial analyst was temporarily detailed to NDO from mid-November 2006 to mid-February 2007. The financial analyst said that responsibilities included conducting comprehensive examinations of all deployment expenditures. This examination included a review of operational costs and nonpayroll data, ensuring the accuracy of contracts, and a review of financial records to measure burn rates and other data. However, tracking

deployment costs was not an assigned duty, and NDF continued to manage their own budget. NDO officials said that the NDO financial analyst position was permanently filled in December 2007, and includes responsibility for monitoring and tracking deployment costs.

Deployment Decisions

We were unable to determine the rationale for TSO deployment decisions made during FYs 2004, 2005, and 2006. NDO officials said from 2003 to 2007 there was no formal process to manage deployment decisions. They referred to this time period as “the wild west” since there were no operational directives for the NDF, and deployment decisions were largely based on individual relationships between NDF staff and the requesting FSD. NDF staff said that requests for screener assistance were rarely denied since it was assumed that FSDs would not exaggerate their need for screener assistance, and NSF staff did not possess the experience to make denial decisions. In addition, there were no methods to validate the need for additional assistance, and no means to determine what airport management was doing to remedy staffing issues. NDO officials also said that FSDs were able to use the NDF program as a cost-saving tool since the additional temporary staff did not affect the receiving airport’s operating budget.

In the absence of a deployment decisionmaking process during this period, TSOs at airports we visited also expressed opinions about a process that resulted in favored TSOs being given assignments to the more desirable deployment locations. TSOs believed that favoritism was a result of friendships between NDF staff and TSOs. Many TSOs said this favoritism had a negative effect on their morale.

NDO officials confirmed this perception of favoritism in deployment decisions and believed that it occurred because the assignment process was not transparent. Also, there was a comfort factor where FSDs requested TSOs who had previously been deployed to their location and were already familiar with the operations.

Beginning in FY 2007, information regarding the rationale for each deployment was documented on a form developed for FSDs requesting NDF assistance. This information included total deployments by pay period and the reason for deployment. For FY 2007, there were a total of 9,197 deployments, as shown in Appendix D.

To address deficiencies in the NDF deployment decisionmaking process, TSA created the Training Exercise Execution Plan (TEEP) committee. The TEEP was created in January 2007, and is responsible for assessing NDF deployments. Previously, deployment requests were approved with limited consultation with other offices. In January 2007, the deployment assessment

and approval process was expanded to include participation from the Office of Human Capital (OHC), Workforce Utilization Office, and Field Operations Offices. According to NDO officials, guidance from these offices has enhanced the TEEP assessment process by including current airport performance, overtime utilization, new hire status, and TSOs who are already being recruited or trained.

NDO program managers said that for FY 2007, the number of TSOs requested for deployment continued to be inflated. To support the deployment analysis and approval process, NDO staff developed a database with information on each airport's deployment requests, the deployment duration, the number of TSOs required, and all projected costs. Following an analysis of all available information, TEEP determines whether the deployment request is supportable or whether other strategies or solutions would be more appropriate.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, TSA:

Recommendation 1: Implement a financial management system capable of tracking and reporting on all costs related to National Deployment Force operations. At a minimum, the financial management system should include the number of TSOs requested, salary and benefit costs, travel and per diem costs for each TSO, and the deployment duration.

Recommendation 2: Establish procedures to ensure that (1) all guidance provided by Office of Human Capital, the Workforce Utilization Office, Office of Security Operations, and other offices is validated and incorporated into the deployment analysis process; (2) a cost-benefit analysis is conducted and documented for all requests for deployment; and (3) the final disposition of the request is documented and communicated to appropriate staff.

Recommendation 3: To improve transparency in the process for making deployment assignments, develop and communicate the selection criteria to TSOs and other staff as appropriate.

Reliance on NDF to Offset Local Hiring

According to TSA Directive AVO 5200-1, the NSF provides support to all airports during emergencies, seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances that require more TSOs than would be regularly available to the FSDs. However, TSA officials confirmed that airports with chronic problems

hiring or retaining TSOs became overly reliant on the NDF to make up for their staffing shortfalls.

TSA officials said that for FY 2007, the primary reason NDF TSOs were deployed to airports was staffing shortfalls caused by local hiring problems. For FY 2007 deployments, NDO documented TSO deployments and related deployment costs by pay period. Based on information obtained from NDO, we determined that for FY 2007, local hiring difficulties accounted for 4,401 of 9,197, or about 48% of deployments, at a cost of \$31.5 million (see Appendices D and E).

In a March 20, 2007, memorandum to FSDs, the Assistant Administrator, Office of Security Operations, expressed concern regarding the continued high percentage of all NDF deployments being made in response to local hiring shortfalls. He said that this was not what the program was designed to do. According to the memorandum, FSDs were instructed to seek ways to reduce requests made due to local hiring problems, and that future approvals to deploy NDF resources would occur only for unique situations beyond the ability of the airport to support.

Program managers estimated that for FY 2007, approximately 30 airports continued to experience local hiring problems. We reviewed FY 2005 through FY 2007 deployment data for six of these airports, and learned that:

- All six airports received NDF TSOs continuously for periods of up to 1 year.
- Two of the airports had received screener support continuously since November 2002.
- The largest airport in this group, with an authorization of more than 600 TSOs, received NDF support for 21 consecutive months from FY 2005 to FY 2006. This airport averaged 99 NDF TSOs per week, or 16% of its authorized TSO workforce.

From the establishment of a deployment force until July 2007, FSDs had an incentive to prolong deployments at their airport because the receiving airport incurred no costs from its own budget for the NDF deployment. The costs associated with the deployment—overtime, per diem, and travel—were absorbed within the NSF operations budget. The costs for TSO salaries and benefits were centrally budgeted.

According to the June 28, 2007, NDO NetHub Message Archive: 400.3, titled “NDF Support for Local Hiring, as of July 22, 2007,” airports that are authorized NDF deployments due to local hiring shortfalls are directly charged the TSO salary and related benefits costs for the period of deployment (see Appendix F). However, the NDO budget continues to fund all other

deployment costs for TSOs deployed due to local hiring shortfalls, including per diem, lodging, and travel, and all deployment costs for reasons other than local hiring shortfalls.

We recognize that TSA must support airports that do not have sufficient personnel to satisfy passenger and baggage screening requirements. However, long-term NDF deployments to airports with local hiring problems created a sense of permanency in NDF support. Additionally, long-term NDF deployment creates the appearance that the program is a costly band-aid in lieu of applying more cost effective solutions to local hiring problems.

TSA officials said that the TEEP Committee is addressing this issue by taking into account an airport's authorized TSO level, and closely tracking local hiring initiatives at airports experiencing chronic hiring problems. In October 2006, 292 TSOs were deployed in support of local hiring shortfalls. By September 2007, 76 TSOs were deployed due to local hiring shortfalls.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, TSA:

Recommendation 4: Develop, implement, and document a decisionmaking process for local hiring deployment requests that includes, at a minimum, an assessment of actions taken by the FSD to resolve staffing shortfalls, estimated NDF costs for the deployment, and an assessment of alternative solutions.

Standard Operating Procedures

From FY 2003 to FY 2006, standard operating procedures for key aspects of the NDF program had either not been established or effectively communicated to staff. For areas where procedures were developed, management communicated the information verbally or through management directives that provided no assurance that all staff received the information. For example, scheduling officers who were unaware of TSO leave policies approved leave for TSOs serving in their first 60 days of deployment, even though the policy does not authorize such leave. As a result, there were inconsistencies in carrying out duties and responsibilities related to NDF program operations.

In 2007, TSA officials initiated efforts to develop standard operating procedures for key functions of the program and improve communications between headquarters and field staff personnel. An NDO website was

established in March 2007 to transmit information regarding the program through bulletins, guidelines, and standard operating procedures. A National Deployment Office Handbook was developed in July 2007 to provide information on program operations. In addition, an interactive website was created to post questions, concerns, and documents to support and facilitate the transition of TSO administrative duties to the airports.

While the handbook and NDO website represent improvements, field staff said that the availability of these additional resources or how to gain access had not been communicated to them.

Procedures for the following key NDO operations still had either not been established or were not included in the NDO Handbook:

- The deployment assignment process;
- The Performance Accountability and Standards System process to fully document TSO performance during multiple deployments in the performance period;
- TSO training procedures to ensure that requirements for recertification can be achieved while on deployment; and
- Availability and selection of TSOs to participate in the Drug-Free Workplace Program to ensure that TSOs have an equal chance of selection for periodic random drug and alcohol testing.

To provide consistency in the performance of NDO operations, NDO management officials need to ensure that the NDO Handbook represents a comprehensive source for current policies, procedures, and guidelines for NDO operations. In addition, a process needs to be developed to ensure that all NDO and airport staff are informed of available resources to assist in effectively accomplishing their duties and responsibilities.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, TSA:

Recommendation 5: Provide all FSDs with standard operating procedures, NDO Handbooks, and all available Internet resources.

Recommendation 6: Establish a process to ensure that the NDO Handbook includes current policies, procedures, and guidelines for all NDO operations.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis

We evaluated TSA's written comments to our report. Below is a summary of TSA's written response to the report's recommendations and our analysis of the response. A copy of TSA's response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix B.

In its written comments, TSA said that OIG's draft report, for the most part, accurately assesses many of the NDF Program challenges experienced prior to January 2007. However, management officials expressed concerns that the report did not adequately reflect significant improvements made to the NDF program since January 2007.

To address issues identified by Congressman Mica, our review focused on NDF activities from its inception in October 2003 through Fiscal Year 2006. The report does recognize efforts taken by management officials during 2007 to address deficiencies in the deployment process. However, we did not assess the effectiveness of these actions since some programmatic changes have not yet been finalized and incorporated into NDO Operations Directives, as confirmed in TSA's written response.

Recommendation 1: Implement a financial management system capable of tracking and reporting on all costs related to National Deployment Force operations. At a minimum, the financial management system should include the number of TSOs requested, salary and benefit costs, travel and per diem costs for each TSO, and the deployment duration.

TSA Response: TSA concurred with our recommendation. In its response, TSA noted that the NDO has developed, and is now using, a financial management tracking and reporting system that captures all costs, including salary and benefits, travel, per diem, and deployment duration, associated with TSOs requested for each deployment.

OIG Analysis: Based on our review of documentation generated from TSA's financial management tracking and reporting system, we consider the recommendation resolved and closed.

Recommendation 2: Establish procedures to ensure that (1) all guidance provided by Office of Human Capital, the Workforce Utilization Office, Office of Security Operations, and other offices is validated and incorporated into the deployment analysis process; (2) a cost-benefit analysis is conducted and documented for all requests for deployment; and (3) the final disposition of the request is documented and communicated to appropriate staff.

TSA Response: TSA concurred with our recommendation. In its response, TSA describes a deployment analysis process initiated during 2007 that: (1) engages stakeholders; (2) incorporates cost considerations and relevant guidance from other offices; and, (3) documents and communicates final deployment decisions. The deployment analysis process requires that all NDF requests be evaluated by the Office of Human Capital and Office of Security Operation's Workforce Utilization team. Procedures have been communicated to FSDs, and are documented in TSA NDO's draft Operations Directive, expected to become final in late April 2008.

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA's comments responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This recommendation will remain resolved and open until TSA provides documentation that these procedures have been incorporated into the final NDO Operations Directive.

Recommendation 3: To improve transparency in the process for making deployment assignments, develop and communicate the selection criteria to TSOs and other staff as appropriate.

TSA Response: TSA agreed with our recommendation, and said it has communicated assignment selection criteria to NDF TSOs, FSDs, and other staff. The NDF Handbook published in July 2007 describes the criteria used to determine assignments of NDF Officers to deployments. Also, they plan to (1) include the assignment selection criteria in the NDO Operations Directive, expected to become final in April 2008, and (2) post the selection criteria to the NDF SharePoint site, and announce the posting to NDF TSOs.

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA's comments responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This recommendation will remain resolved and open until TSA provides documentation that selection criteria has been included in the NDO Operations Directive and posted to the NDF SharePoint site.

Recommendation 4: Develop, implement, and document a decision-making process for local hiring deployment requests that includes, at a minimum, an assessment of actions taken by the FSD to resolve staffing shortfalls, estimated NDF costs for the deployment, and an assessment of alternative solutions.

TSA Response: TSA concurred with our recommendation, and has implemented a comprehensive deployment analysis and decision-making process that engages stakeholders, considers actions already taken by the FSD, estimates deployment costs, and assesses alternative solutions. TSA distributed the deployment analysis and decision-making procedure to FSDs via the NetHub broadcast system in January 2007, and will also include the

procedure in the NDO Operations Directive, expected to become final in late April 2008.

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA's comment responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This recommendation will remain resolved and open until TSA provides documentation that this decision-making process for local hiring requests has been included in the NDO Operations Directive.

Recommendation 5: Provide all FSDs with standard operating procedures, NDO Handbooks, and all available Internet resources.

TSA Response: TSA concurred with our recommendation, and described steps taken to provide FSDs, NDF TSOs, and other stakeholders with access to the NDF Handbook, TSO assignment selection guidelines, and NDF decision-making criteria. TSA plans to finalize and distribute the NDO Operations Directive to all FSDs and stakeholders in April 2008, and will emphasize the availability of NDO/NDF information at the NDF SharePoint site.

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA's comment responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This recommendation will remain resolved and open pending our receipt of documentation that the NDO Operations Directive has been finalized and provided to all FSDs and stakeholders.

Recommendation 6: Establish a process to ensure that the NDO Handbook includes current policies, procedures, and guidelines for all NDO operations.

TSA Response: TSA concurred with the recommendation, and said it will document in the upcoming NDO Operations Directive their process for reviewing the NDF Handbook to ensure it contains current and relevant guidance.

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA's comment responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This recommendation will remain resolved and open pending our receipt of documentation that the NDO Operations Directive has been finalized and includes the process for ensuring that the NDF Handbook contains current and relevant guidance for all NDO operations.

Appendix A

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to determine when, where, and why the Transportation Security Administration National Deployment Force had been deployed since its inception in October 2003, including expenses for related maintenance and deployment. In addition, we examined TSA oversight activities, and whether the overall intent of the NDF was being met. We also reviewed future plans for the program.

We examined data and documents related to the NDF program from November 2003 to December 2007. Through interviews and document reviews, we evaluated the process established by TSA to request, approve, and track NDF deployments and resources. We reviewed management directives, standard operating procedures, program status reports, recruitment documents, and TSO handbooks. We interviewed staff and contractors at the NDF headquarters office, the Office of Security Operations, the Workforce Utilization Office, and Office of Human Capital. We conducted telephone interviews with FSDs and their staffs from 12 airports that we selected based on their participation in the NDF program. We also conducted field visits to three airports where NDF program TSOs had been deployed to observe passenger and screening operations.

We conducted our review between January and September 2007 under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and according to the *Quality Standards for Inspections* issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

**Appendix B
Management Response to Draft**

MAR 20 2008

INFORMATION



Office of the Assistant Secretary

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 22202-4220

**Transportation
Security
Administration**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard L. Skinner
Inspector General
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

FROM: Kip Hawley *Kip Hawley*
Assistant Secretary *(for)*

SUBJECT: Transportation Security Administration's Response to
DHS's Office of Inspector General Draft Report,
TSA's National Deployment Force, February 2008

Purpose

This memorandum constitutes the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) response to DHS' Office of Inspector General's (OIG) Draft Report, *TSA's National Deployment Force*. TSA appreciates OIG's effort on this inspection and will use the findings and recommendations to continue to improve the National Deployment Force (NDF) Program.

Background

In a letter dated June 30, 2006, to DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner, Representative John Mica expressed concerns that TSA had relied on the NDF in ways not originally intended. Representative Mica asked OIG to provide information on NDF deployments since the program's inception, along with a breakdown of deployment expenses to include travel, per diem, hotel, and overtime cost for Fiscal Years 2004, 2005, and 2006.

OIG conducted its review between January-December 2007. The inspection objective was to determine when, where, and why the NDF had been deployed since its inception in October, 2003, including expenses for related maintenance and deployment. OIG also examined TSA NDF oversight activities and whether the overall intent of the NDF was being met.

OIG collected and reviewed documentation relating to the NDF Program from November 2003 to December 2007. The inspection team also interviewed staff and contractors at the NDF headquarters office, the Office of Security Operations (OSO), and the Office of Human Capital (OHC). OIG conducted phone interviews with NDF Transportation Security Officers

Appendix B Management Response to Draft

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(TSOs) and local airport Federal Security Director (FSD) staff at the following airports¹: ASE, CVG, DAL, GCC, IAH, JFK, KOA, LAS, PDX, SEA and SLC. Finally, OIG visited three airports during NDF deployments: ANC, EYW, and JAX.

OIG found that TSA implemented the deployment program without either developing a process to determine the criteria and priority for deployment decisions or ensuring the appropriateness of resource allocations. OIG states that, from the establishment of the program until January, 2007, TSA did not have a financial system to track and document program-related costs; adequate documentation to support deployment decision-making; or internal controls and standard operating procedures over key deployment functions. Additionally, OIG indicates that TSA was overly reliant on the deployment force to fill chronic staffing shortages at specific airports in lieu of more cost effective strategies and solutions to handle screening demands.

Discussion

OIG's draft report for the most part, accurately assesses many of the NDF Program challenges experienced prior to January 2007. However, the report does not adequately reflect the significant improvements made since then. For example:

- TSA implemented a comprehensive deployment analysis and decision-making process that engages stakeholders, considers actions already taken by the FSD, estimates deployment costs, and assesses alternative solutions.
- TSA developed a financial management tracking and reporting system called Post Deployment Summaries (PDSs). PDSs capture all costs, such as salary and benefits, travel, per diem, and deployment duration, associated with the number of TSOs requested through the NDF Program.
- Through its SharePoint site and NetHub broadcast messages, TSA provided FSDs, NDF TSOs, and other stakeholders with access to standard operating procedures, the NDF Handbook, NDF TSO assignment selection guidelines, and NDF support decision-making criteria.

These improvements have produced dramatic results. For example:

- NDF TSO Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) have declined from 678 in FY06 to a Screening Allocation Model authorization of 400 in FY08, a reduction of 278 FTEs.
- NDF deployments due to local hiring shortfalls have significantly declined from 292 NDF TSOs in October 2006 to 76 NDF TSOs in December 2007. This decline has continued into FY08; as of March, 2008, only 24 NDF TSOs were deployed because of local hiring shortfalls.

¹ ASE: Aspen Pitkin County Sardy Field (CO); CVG: Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky International (KY); DAL: Dallas Love Field (TX); GCC: Gillette-Campbell County (WY); IAH: George Bush Intercontinental Airport - Houston (TX); JFK: John F. Kennedy International (NY); KOA: Kona International (HI); LAS: McCarran International (NV); PDX: Portland International (OR); SEA: Seattle-Tacoma International (WA); SLC: Salt Lake City International (UT); ANC: Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport (AK); EYW: Key West International Airport (FL); JAX: Jacksonville International (FL)

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- Reducing the need to deploy NDF TSOs as a temporary solution for local hiring shortfalls, along with other improvements, has allowed the National Deployment Office (NDO) to achieve an FY07 budget savings of \$6 million (expending \$29 million against a budget of \$35 million). Correspondingly, the NDO FY08 budget was reduced to \$29 million, a 17 percent savings. In FY09, this savings from improvements in local hiring rates will be reinvested to fund NDO deployment operations for Transportation Security Advance Teams, Transportation Security Forward Teams, and Visual Intermodal Protection Response Teams (VIPR).

The overall decrease in NDF TSO FTEs, as well as the decrease in the number of NDF TSOs deployed in support of local hiring shortfalls, clearly demonstrates that TSA is not overly reliant on NDF support for local hiring shortfalls. Although evident in Appendix D, OIG does not include a full discussion of this dramatic improvement in the narrative of its draft report.

It must be noted that TSA disagrees with “the wild west” characterization attributed to NDO program officials on page six, paragraph one. During OIG interviews, NDO program officials used this term as an extreme point of comparison only to illustrate the significant recent improvements made to the program’s structure and processes. By not referencing these improvements, this term is used out of context and does not fully reflect program officials’ opinions.

TSA also disagrees with the implication that accountability and decision-making procedures have not yet been established. On page four, paragraph two of its draft report, OIG indicates that “...neither procedures to ensure integrity and accountability over deployment resources, nor a decision making process that defines the criteria and priority for handling requests for screener assistance had been established.” OIG’s finding does not fully reflect that in January 2007, NDO implemented a comprehensive deployment analysis process that engages stakeholders and incorporates cost considerations; airport FTE and overtime burn rates; paid-not-worked percentages; local hiring plans (if the requests are due to hiring shortfalls); and other pertinent operational and risk considerations. This decision-making process requires all NDF requests to be evaluated by OHC and OSO’s Workforce Utilization team. Their input and recommendations are provided to the Area Director for consideration and evaluation prior to the Area Director’s decision to approve, disapprove, or modify a request for NDF support. Moreover, NDO has also developed PDSs as a financial management tracking and reporting system. PDSs capture all costs, such as, salary and benefits, travel, per diem, and deployment duration, associated with the number of TSOs requested through the NDF Program. By implementing the above-mentioned deployment analysis process and PDS system, TSA has certainly added accountability and discipline to its NDF deployment decisions.

OIG, in its draft report, also overlooks the progress NDO officials made by developing a better informed NDF TSO assignment selection process. To better match NDF TSOs’ abilities to the needs of requesting airports, as well as reduce unnecessary deployment costs, NDO officials are collecting, organizing, and using individual TSO skill set/capabilities data. Some of the skill sets NDO program officials are now tracking include specific equipment certifications, procedural capabilities, special job classifications, and law enforcement and military experience. This skill set data is then interfaced with other data, such as days since last deployment, rank (e.g., Lead or Supervisory TSO), and willingness to deploy overseas to identify ideal candidates on a case-by-case basis.

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Finally, OIG states that procedures for key NDO operations, such as, (1) the Performance Accountability and Standards System (PASS) process to fully document TSO performance during multiple deployments and (2) training procedures to ensure that requirements for recertification can be achieved while on deployment, had either not been established or were not included in the NDO Handbook. In fact, the PASS process to fully document TSO performance during multiple deployments and TSO training procedures for recertification had already been established and published. On March 30, 2006 the National Screening Force (NSF) General Reference Material (GRM) was made available in the On-Line Learning Center (OLC) and was also assigned to all NSF OLC Learning Plans. The NSF GRM contains information that NDF TSOs can access on the following topics:

- PASS – Describes (1) the steps each TSO should take to ensure they are included in all PASS requirements while deployed; and (2) the documentation for the Competencies and Skills Observations that must be sent to the Airport of Record (AOR).
- The Current NDO Handbook.
- Various forms the NDF Officer may need to complete while deployed (e.g., Office of Personnel Management Form 71, PASS Collateral Duty Form, and the Dual Function Screener Sustainment Form). This material was updated in November 2007 within the OLC and is available to all NDF TSOs via an OLC Catalog search.

Additionally, the TSA PASS SharePoint site contains the NDF Guidelines, to be followed by the AOR and the Airport of Deployment. Chapter 8 of the NDF Handbook provides guidance on training, and Chapter 9 provides guidance on PASS.

TSA's response to OIG's recommendations is attached.

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Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Response

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report:
TSA's National Deployment Force (NDF), February 2008

Recommendation 1: Implement a financial management system capable of tracking and reporting on all costs related to National Deployment Force operations. At a minimum, the financial management system should include the number of Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) requested, salary and benefit costs, travel and per diem costs for each TSO, and the deployment duration.

TSA Concur. TSA's Office of Security Operations (OSO) National Deployment Office (NDO) has developed, and is now using, a financial management tracking and reporting system, called Post Deployment Summaries (PDSs), that addresses OIG's recommendation. PDSs capture all costs, such as, salary and benefits, travel, per diem, and deployment duration, associated with the number of TSOs requested through the NDF Program. OSO NDO will continue to seek out improved methods for capturing, tracking, and using deployment cost information in ways that allow for added efficiency and effectiveness.

Recommendation 2: Establish procedures to ensure that (1) all guidance provided by Office of Human Capital (OHC), the Screening Optimization Office, Office of Security Operations, and other offices is validated and incorporated into the deployment analysis process; (2) a cost-benefit analysis is conducted and documented for all requests for deployment; and (3) the final disposition of the request is documented and communicated to appropriate staff.

TSA Concur. OSO NDO has implemented a comprehensive deployment analysis process that engages stakeholders, incorporates cost considerations, includes relevant guidance from other offices, and documents and communicates final deployment decisions. This process was initially communicated to all Federal Security Directors (FSDs) on January 24, 2007. The current NDO deployment analysis process requires all NDF requests be evaluated by OHC and OSO's Workforce Utilization team. Their input and recommendations are provided to the Area Director for consideration and evaluation prior to the Area Director's decision to approve, disapprove, or modify a request for NDF support. The status of requests for NDF support is then appropriately documented and communicated to the requesting FSD. Additionally, FSDs who request NDF support may, at any time during the decision-making process, access their request via the NDO SharePoint site and view all comments made by the above-mentioned stakeholders and Area Director staff. Although these procedures have already been widely communicated, they are also documented in TSA NDO's draft Operations Directive, expected to become final in late April 2008.

Recommendation 3: To improve transparency in the process for making deployment assignments, develop and communicate the selection criteria to TSOs and other staff as appropriate.

TSA Concur. On February 22, 2007, OSO NDO communicated the assignment selection criteria to NDF TSOs, FSDs, and other staff via the NetHub broadcast messaging system. Additionally, Section 601.1 of the NDF Handbook, published July, 2007, states:

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“The NDO Program Office uses the following criteria to determine assignments of Officers to deployments:

- The nature of the request (i.e., seasonal demands, local hiring, and special security events, etc.) is the primary consideration that drives selection of Officers;
- The situation and mission also dictate specific deployment needs such as the number of:
 - Supervisory Transportation Security Officers (STSOs), Lead Transportation Security Officers (LTSOs), Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), as well as the number of male / female officers;
 - Training and/or skills necessary to complete the mission;
 - Deployable Officers who are available at the time of deployment;
- To the extent possible, consistent with mission requirements, deployment opportunities will be fairly and equitably assigned so that Officers have an equal opportunity to deploy.

Consistent with the above criteria, Officers will normally be rotated among those with the longest deployment duration at one location.”

OSO NDO plans to include the NDF TSO assignment selection criteria in the NDO Operations Directive, expected to become final in late April 2008. Finally, NDO will also post the selection criteria to the NDF SharePoint site and announce the posting to NDF TSOs.

Recommendation 4: Develop, implement, and document a decision-making process for local hiring deployment requests that includes, at a minimum, an assessment of actions taken by the FSD to resolve staffing shortfalls, estimated NDF costs for the deployment, and an assessment of alternative solutions.

TSA Concur. OSO NDO has implemented a comprehensive deployment analysis and decision-making process that engages stakeholders, considers actions already taken by the FSD, estimates deployment costs, and assesses alternative solutions. This process is consistently applied to all major NDF TSO requests, including those intended to resolve staffing shortfalls. This procedure requesting NDF support will be included in the NDO Operations Directive, expected to become final in late April 2008. This procedure was distributed to FSDs via the NetHub broadcast system on January 24, 2007:

“The NDO, working closely with Area Directors and other TSA Offices, will carefully evaluate requests for National Deployment Force (NDF) support, to ensure that the optimal solution, from both an operations/risk management perspective and a cost perspective, is selected. Factors that will be considered in evaluating an FSD’s request for NDF support will include actual airport FTE and overtime burn rates, paid-not-worked percentages, local hiring plan (if the request is due to hiring shortfalls), and other pertinent operational and risk considerations. Ultimately, the decisions to approve, modify, or deny a request will be made by the Area Directors. All submitted requests will be reviewed with Area Directors, to ensure the most efficient and effective use of the NDF.”

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The effectiveness of this decision-making process is evident in Appendix D of the OIG's draft report. The number of NDF TSOs deployed due to local hiring shortfalls declined dramatically in FY07, from a high of 292 on Oct 1, 2006 to 76 on September 30, 2007. This trend has continued into FY08. As of March, 2008, only 24 NDF TSOs are deployed because of local hiring shortfalls.

Recommendation 5: Provide all FSDs with standard operating procedures, NDO Handbooks, and all available Internet resources.

TSA Concurs. Through its SharePoint site and NetHub broadcast messages, TSA NDO has provided FSDs, NDF TSOs, and other stakeholders with access to the NDF Handbook, NDF TSO assignment selection guidelines, and NDF support decision-making criteria. Moving forward, OSO will finalize and distribute the NDO Operations Directive to all FSDs and stakeholders when it becomes final in April 2008. Along with the Operations Directive, NDF plans to include the NDF Handbook and other standard procedures. This communication will be used to emphasize the availability of NDO/NDF information at the NDF SharePoint site, which currently provides stakeholders with access to the handbook, TSO location list, and the Support Request Form.

Recommendation 6: Establish a process to ensure that the NDO Handbook includes current policies, procedures, and guidelines for all NDO operations.

TSA Concurs. NDO, along with other stakeholders, review the NDF Handbook annually in May/June to ensure it contains current and relevant guidance. This review process will be documented in the upcoming NDO Operations Directive expected to become final in April 2008.



U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Washington, DC 20515

Don Young
Chairman

James L. Oberstar
Ranking Democratic Member

June 30, 2006

Lloyd A. Jones, Chief of Staff
Elizabeth Megginson, Chief Counsel

David Heimsfeld, Democratic Chief of Staff

The Honorable Richard Skinner
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
7th and D Streets, SW, Room 3636
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Skinner:

According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in October 2003 the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) established the National Screening Force to provide screening support to all airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances that require a greater number of screeners than regularly available to Federal Security Directors (FSDs) (GAO Report No. GAO-04-440T). The National Screening Force was intended to compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational flexibility to respond to changes in risk and threat. The National Screening Force consists of hundreds of full-time passenger and baggage screeners, a percentage of which are screening supervisors. According to the GAO, members of the National Screening Force volunteer to participate on the force for a 1-year period and while these screeners have a home airport to which they are assigned, they travel to airports in need of screening staff a majority of the year.

The GAO cited TSA officials as stating that they determine where to deploy members of the National Screening Force based on four priorities:

- The highest priority is given to those airports that need additional screeners in order to be able to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD.
- The second priority is given to small airports that have never met their authorized screener staffing levels and have no permanent screeners.
- The third priority is given to airports that are so understaffed that significant screening delays would occur without additional staff.
- The fourth priority is given to those airports with peak seasonal needs, airports that have a shortage of female passenger screeners; and airports offering new commercial service.

Additionally, TSA reportedly redeploys the National Screening Force to airports determined to be at a higher risk based on intelligence data.

Appendix C
Congressional Letter

The Honorable Richard Skinner
June 30, 2006
Page 2


Yet, it has recently been brought to my attention that the TSA is and has been heavily reliant upon its National Screening Force; perhaps reliant in ways not intended and at great expense to the Federal Treasury. I am also concerned about TSA oversight of the National Screening Force. For instance, I understand that the TSA has never been able to fully staff Dulles International Airport and has almost permanently assigned a National Screening Force team at that airport since 9-11. Additionally, I am told that there are occasions when screeners from the National Screening Force work overtime, not because they are necessarily needed, but because they have nothing else to do. The TSA assigned an eight-person National Screening Force team to Sioux Falls last year to cover a 6 ½ week hunting season. The team stayed in Sioux Falls for five months and ran at 8% overtime. Finally, due to the extraordinary level of screener attrition at Los Angeles International Airport, the TSA has recently deployed a National Screening Force team of as many as 80 screeners.

I request that your office conduct an investigation and audit of the TSA National Screening Force. In particular, I am interested in the following:

- When, where and why the National Screening Force has been deployed by the TSA in the last three years.
- A breakdown of all expenses related to the maintenance and deployment of the National Screening Force for the last three years, including hotel, travel and per diem.
- A breakdown of all overtime pay attributed to the National Screening Force for the last three years.
- A status update and analysis of the TSA's standard operating procedures for the National Screening Force.

I believe that the TSA's over reliance on and use of the National Screening Force has lead to much waste and abuse. Therefore, I am making this request for an investigation and would ask for a complete briefing by you and your staff at the appropriate time. I am most interested in your findings and recommendations. Thank you in advance for your kind consideration of my requests.

Sincerely,



John L. Mica
Chairman
Subcommittee on Aviation

Appendix D

FY 2007 NDO Deployment Summary of Personnel by Pay Period and NDF Deployment Costs

Pay Period		Local Hiring	Seasonal Support	Screening Partnership Program Support	Risk Mitigation	Equipment Support	Other Personnel Shortfalls	Total Deployed
1-Oct	14-Oct	292	8	0	0	0	104	404
15-Oct	28-Oct	243	0	0	0	0	124	367
29-Oct	11-Nov	242	11	0	0	0	130	383
12-Nov	25-Nov	255	34	0	0	58	25	372
26-Nov	9-Dec	253	36	0	0	49	28	366
10-Dec	23-Dec	228	148	0	0	62	18	456
24-Dec	6-Jan	177	191	0	0	53	18	439
7-Jan	20-Jan	229	200	0	0	25	21	475
21-Jan	3-Feb	235	214	0	0	43	16	508
4-Feb	17-Feb	205	226	0	0	29	12	472
18-Feb	2-Mar	191	223	0	0	18	9	441
3-Mar	16-Mar	142	204	0	0	9	67	422
17-Mar	30-Mar	136	200	0	0	11	8	355
31-Mar	13-Apr	116	126	0	49	29	10	330
14-Apr	27-Apr	116	88	0	0	3	7	214
28-Apr	11-May	106	14	0	0	4	6	130
12-May	25-May	110	82	0	0	20	0	212
26-May	8-Jun	131	143	0	0	32	0	306
9-Jun	22-Jun	177	172	0	0	26	0	375
23-Jun	6-Jul	166	160	12	0	0	1	339
7-Jul	20-Jul	134	157	26	11	33	1	362
21-Jul	3-Aug	114	153	26	33	26	1	353
4-Aug	17-Aug	116	146	21	11	32	1	327
18-Aug	31-Aug	116	140	16	10	30	1	313
1-Sep	14-Sep	100	116	6	20	48	1	291
15-Sep	28-Sep	76	68	7	0	51	0	202
Total		4,401	3,257	113	133	686	609	9,214

NDF Deployment Costs

Deployment Justification	Total Cost
Local Hiring	\$31,493,498
Seasonal Support	\$23,306,119
Screening Partnership Program Transition	\$808,718
Risk Mitigation	\$948,276
Equipment Support	\$4,909,564
Other Personnel Shortfalls	\$4,354,912
Total Deployment Costs	\$65,821,087

Appendix E
Estimated FY 2007 Deployment Costs for Local Hiring by Pay Period

Pay Period	Operational	Pay, Compensation and Benefits	Total Local Hiring Deployment Costs
1-Oct 14-Oct	\$1,062,880	\$1,026,906	\$2,089,786
15-Oct 28-Oct	\$884,520	\$854,582	\$1,739,102
29-Oct 11-Nov	\$880,880	\$851,066	\$1,731,946
12-Nov 25-Nov	\$928,200	\$896,784	\$1,824,984
26-Nov 9-Dec	\$920,920	\$889,750	\$1,810,670
10-Dec 23-Dec	\$828,100	\$800,072	\$1,628,172
24-Dec 6-Jan	\$644,280	\$622,474	\$1,266,754
7-Jan 20-Jan	\$833,560	\$805,347	\$1,638,907
21-Jan 3-Feb	\$853,580	\$824,690	\$1,678,270
4-Feb 17-Feb	\$746,200	\$720,944	\$1,467,144
18-Feb 2-Mar	\$693,420	\$669,950	\$1,363,370
3-Mar 16-Mar	\$515,060	\$497,627	\$1,012,687
17-Mar 30-Mar	\$493,220	\$476,526	\$969,746
31-Mar 13-Apr	\$420,420	\$406,190	\$826,610
14-Apr 27-Apr	\$422,240	\$407,949	\$830,189
28-Apr 11-May	\$384,020	\$371,022	\$755,042
12-May 25-May	\$400,400	\$386,848	\$787,248
26-May 8-Jun	\$475,020	\$458,942	\$933,962
9-Jun 22-Jun	\$644,280	\$622,474	\$1,266,754
23-Jun 6-Jul	\$604,240	\$583,789	\$1,188,029
7-Jul 20-Jul	\$485,940	\$469,493	\$955,433
21-Jul 3-Aug	\$413,140	\$399,157	\$812,297
4-Aug 17-Aug	\$422,240	\$407,949	\$830,189
18-Aug 31-Aug	\$420,420	\$406,190	\$826,610
1-Sep 14-Sep	\$364,000	\$351,680	\$715,680
15-Sep 28-Sep	\$276,640	\$267,277	\$543,917
Total Cost	\$16,017,820	\$15,475,678	\$31,493,498

Appendix F

NDO – NetHub Message Archive: 400.3- Routine – NDF Support for Local Hiring

National Deployment Office NDO - NetHub Message Archive: 400.3 – ROUTINE – NDF Support for Local Hiring

 [New Item](#) |  [Edit Item](#) |  [Delete Item](#) | [Alert Me](#) | [Go Back to List](#)

Title: 400.3 – ROUTINE – NDF Support for Local Hiring
Body: From: NETHUB
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2007 10:21 AM
To: TSA FSD
Cc: NETHUB; NetHub Info Group
Subject: 400.3 – ROUTINE – NDF Support for Local Hiring Shortfalls

Date: June 28, 2007

To: Federal Security Directors

From: Mo McGowan, Assistant Administrator, Office of Security Operations

Primary POC: Frank Quindlen, 571-227-2218, Frank.Quindlen@dhs.gov

Secondary POC: JR Hall, 571-227-1545, JR.Hall@dhs.gov

Reference(s): None

Subject: 400.3 – ROUTINE – NDF Support for Local Hiring Shortfalls

Attachment(s): None

Effective on Pay Period 15, July 22, 2007, the National Deployment Force (NDF) FTE burn for NDF TSO and Transportation Screening Officer Volunteers (TSOV) deployed in response to local hiring shortfalls will be charged to the airport that requested NDF/TSOV support. Area Directors, as part of their evaluation of a request for NDF/TSOV support, will determine if the request is based on local hiring shortfalls. When the Area Director authorizes NDF/TSOV deployment because of a local hiring shortfall, the National Deployment Office (NDO) will assign the deploying NDF/TSOV a project code for use in Time and Attendance Reporting that will charge the NDF/TSOV PC&B costs to the airport that is requesting the NDF/TSOV support.

The NDF/TSOV FTE burn for all other types of NDF/TSOV deployments will continue to be funded from the OSO NDO account.

Office of Security Operations, NetHub 1-866-700-0015

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Appendix G

Major Contributors to this Report

Deborah Outten-Mills, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspections

Jim O'Keefe, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspections

Lawrence Anderson, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspections

McKay Smith, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspections

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