Each of the three countries that joined NATO in 1999 had its own reasons for seeking Alliance membership but the basic ingredients were the same. All of Central and Eastern Europe shared a feeling of historical injustice, a sense that through no fault of their own, two post-Second World War generations had been robbed of basic freedoms and opportunities. NATO membership could never return what had been taken away. It would, however, symbolically restore half the continent to its rightful place among free and democratic countries.
NATO was also seen as a buffer from internal strife. In 1999, a relatively short ten years separated the then-candidate countries from communism. The first years of freedom were also turbulent, and stability in the mid-1990s came only slowly. To Budapest, Prague and Warsaw, the fate of Slovakia served as a warning that communism may not necessarily be replaced with democracy. Slovakia's first post-independence government turned out to be corrupt and bent on persecuting its political opponents. While these are not issues that NATO deals with per se, membership in the Alliance did help curb potential and real anti-democratic excesses. The NATO accession process set the political framework within which the aspiring members were to operate. To the then-candidate countries, the threat of being dropped from NATO's membership list served as a powerful incentive to remain within bounds.
And lastly, there was Russia. None of the Central and Eastern European countries had an easy transition from communism, but Russia seemed to have a more difficult time than others. And while none of the former communist states was entirely secure from the possibility of a relapse to totalitarianism, Russia's political difficulties made it, in the eyes of the NATO candidate countries, a potentially dangerous neighbour. These fears were not in the least quelled by Moscow's inability or unwillingness to resolve outstanding border issues with the Baltic states. This is where NATO's original mission came into the enlargement debate. Once in NATO, the candidate countries concluded, Article 5 would deter any potential difficulties from the Russian side.
This, in a nutshell, was the thought process leading up to the 12 March accession ceremony. To the new member states, the Alliance stood as a crowning symbol of new-found freedom, as a calming influence against domestic strife, and as a friendly yet sufficiently high wall against instability in the east. Membership came several years later than originally expected. However, after much waiting and preparation, the accession papers were duly signed and the three new flags were moved from the anteroom to fly alongside those of the 16 existing members.
Needless to say, the prospect of intervention in the Balkans was far removed from the candidate countries' original analysis of what NATO membership involved. While there was a logical link between enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and enforcing and keeping peace in the Balkans - both were meant, in the long run, to produce a stable and peaceful Europe - the demands of the Kosovo campaign and NATO's focus on Southeastern Europe were harder to appreciate in countries that only recently escaped communism and saw in the Alliance peace of mind for themselves. There was, in the contrast between the events of 12 March and 24 March, the irony of a marathon runner crossing the finish line only to discover that he must help the organisers move their heavy equipment to another race.
If the candidate countries were disappointed by the turn of events, they managed to conceal their emotions. NATO's "one for all, all for one" approach to security was one from which candidate countries stood to benefit more than others, and as such, they went along with the campaign. But there was also definite tension. Public support for the Kosovo War was at its lowest among the new members. The governments of the three new Allies found themselves on the defensive, explaining to their respective publics why an alliance that was meant to bring peace to them was now bombing Belgrade in their name - a devilishly difficult concept to defend even if the logic of bringing peace to Europe's periphery made long-term sense to most in Central and Eastern Europe.