The IAEA: the key global agency?

Al Qaeda and the international

community have a common interest:

They both want to find out where

loose nuclear materials are located.

We have guesstimates

of how much material there is.

Preventing access depends on the

level of knowledge of where they are.

How good is that knowledge?

It’s not nearly

as good as we would like it to be,

because there is a long tradition

of denial of transparency

by countries who regard this sort

of data as highly security-sensitive

and they're not forthcoming about it,

even to organisations like the IAEA.

The Achilles heel in physical

protection, control and accountancy

has been accountancy.

Many countries have done a poor job.

There is a lot

of material unaccounted for.

I asked the head of the IAEA

what his thoughts were

on the level of knowledge

on the whereabouts.

Do we have enough knowledge

about where the materials are,

what state they are in

and how well protected they are?

We have the database

on illicit trafficking since 1995.

And in recent years we receive,

roughly speaking,

150 informations

coming every year to our database.

From 2002 to 2009

we have 1400 pieces of information.

This information is very useful

to analyse and establish response.

It's not an exaggeration to say

that the work of the IAEA

could form the core of actions

leading to a possible global zero.

Its verifications will be crucial

in providing both knowledge

and convincing arguments.

Verification and enforcement will be

critical for actually getting to zero.

And they will become more and more

important as we hope the stockpile

of weapons comes down.

It's going to be acutely relevant

if we want to persuade

countries to go to zero.

Nobody is going to do that

unless they are confident

that cheats will be found out,

and if so,

that the global international resources

will deal with the problem.

But without teeth all the verification

in the world won't change behaviour.

I think verification is overrated.

Verification is very important,

but you have to ask yourself:

What happens when we verify

that someone is cheating?

The problem is enforcement,

and what the big powers are

prepared

to do to deal with cheats.

The question is, who will be

that enforcer? It seems not the IAEA.

Can you be the law enforcing agency

President Obama was talking about?

We don't have that mandate.

The responsibility lies,

rests with member states

to ensure nuclear security,

and we are helping them.

But regardless of that, the IAEA

is looked upon as under-resourced

for the tasks facing it in helping

move towards global zero.

The role of the IAEA itself,

the advisory role and the support role

that it can play in bringing

the strategies out into the open,

getting people to understand

what countries are doing,

would be extremely important.

It certainly needs more resources,

more inspection

and laboratory resources,

more policy-making resources,

if you like, policy implementation.

It's an obligation

we can't continue to shirk from.

The IAEA is far and away

the most professional, best

and most relevantly equipped outfit

that we have.

They need a new,

better laboratory for analysis

and that's a very important part

of the organisation.

And they need more staff.

They also need to be provided

with intelligence by member states.

And that's sensitive.

The resource problems are

an issue the head of the IAEA

is more than happy to highlight.

We are operating with a regular

budget and voluntary contribution.

The regular budget is

only 3.2 million US dollars.

That is 20% of our budget.

The proportion is not good.

A new protocol provided

new rules for inspections

that made them more widespread,

but obstacles still remain.

Our great handicap under the rules

that were still valid in Iraq in 1990,

was that we could go, in principle,

only to declared installations,

and even in those to strategic points.

That was far too limiting.

I think you can do more.

I remember that they still need visas

for the inspectors of the IAEA,

not for the chemical inspectors.

And I think that's ludicrous.

Remember that allowing inspectors

into one's country

is still not an easy step for some.

But it will probably benefit them.

On-site inspections

in a sovereign country,

it's not such a long time

that it's been existing.

It came with the IAEA largely.

Before that countries would be

in uproar, they would say:

Foreign inspectors?

We are a sovereign country.

So that has moved a lot.

I used to say: You should not regard

this as an intrusion, but as a service.

If inspectors have been here

who got freedom of movement,

and they come out and say

they are okay, they give a credibility

that you cannot get by

saying the same thing yourself.