Interview: Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Store

Jonas Gahr Støre is Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

He has been one of the most passionate advocates for increased focus on developments in the High North.

Minister, the level of knowledge about what's happening in the Arctic and the High North is changing all the time.

Does that make it very difficult to formulate policy?

No, I think to the contrary. When knowledge increases I think the ability to formulate policy goes up.

Of course, there is a degree of complexity, because as knowledge increase you see the complex nature of

challenges and opportunities in the North, ranging from climate change to sailing routes, energy exploration, legal issues.

But I think in general, for all policy making, we should welcome increased levels of knowledge, conferences

such as these is bringing the collective body of knowledge up and we have perspectives from military and civilian sides.

So this is all to be welcomed and we see it in important policy formulations in Russia,

European Union, Norway of course—we've been on this for quite some years—inn the U.S.,

with Arctic strategies, and I think all of that is high time and it's happening now and that's generally to be welcomed.

There is a rapid pace of change in many areas here in the region, such as physical with the ice caps melting,

economic with the changing price of oil and ecological with changing migratory habits of fish.

Are you confident that we're able to keep up with that rapid pace of change?

That is a big, big question. I think, you know, generally if you add sailing routes,

resources, people and resource scarcity generally you have combinations for conflict.

But you also have ingredients for progress. So I think the big challenge for us is to preserve

what is now the status of the High North, namely low tension.

To keep the tension low, because of all of the things you would like to achieve.

And that goes the same for Norway and Russia and the U.S. and Canada and others,

is that we have a sphere of cooperation which is productive, non-confrontational and I think we have the legal

the body of international law, the Convention of the Law of the Sea,

rights and obligation of coastal states, as the foundation for dealing also with differences.

So I think what we need to get out of this is a major focus on dealing with differences in a non-confrontational way.

And that may succeed, and I think we all stand to lose if it doesn't.

It's been mentioned here today there can be healthy competition and unhealthy competition.

What do we do to ensure that the competition remains healthy?

Well, I think as for all kind of... when there's quest for progress from states,

companies, private sector, you need rules and regulations.

And I think what we've seen in the international economy recently,

if you let that loose, and let that slip, you're in for something which is quite dramatic.

So I think it should be a priority for governments to have as a point of departure the Convention of the Law of the Sea,

which gives us a lot of guidelines on how to deal with differences,

how to deal with rules and regulation formulation.

And then we have to move to those bodies that do adopt sea lanes, do adopt Search and Rescue procedures,

do adopt management procedures for fish in international waters and so on.

And that we are doing that ahead of time, and not, you know, chasing developments.

So, I think, you know, for politicians, for governments, we do have the tools.

We do have the opportunities, and it's really now about building collective momentum for action.

And for seizing those opportunities.

Do you feel that the High North is a global issue?

Good point. I mean, the Arctic Council has the Arctic coastal states, plus Finland, Sweden and Iceland.

The issues at stake, however, in the Arctic are global, as you said. That's the fascinating part of it.

You know, here in NATO we talk about indivisibility of security.

That is largely a geographical notion, that we are all linked in the same security pot together.

But I think we are now seeing indivisibility of security also from a thematic perspective.

Global warming is all about interdependence, no matter where you are on the globe.

So what we need to do, I think, is to identify those bodies, where the appropriate rules are adopted,

where there's policy formulation, decision shaping, decision making. And they vary.

We have to accept there is not one global body for Arctic issues where we all come together and adopt the rules.

We have to go to the IMO to do a lot of the transport things, for example, or the UN bodies.

The Arctic Council, however, I think is a very important council for those most affected states,

to agree on these procedures. And then we have to take the concrete work onto those bodies.

The fact that the European Union is now adopting its Arctic strategy is good and positive,

because a large part of what the EU is deciding has reference... relevance for the Arctic.

The same goes with U.S., Canada, Russia, of course.

Is there a danger that some of the problems may purely be about misperception of the issues in the High North

in that four of the Arctic countries are NATO allies, and the other one is Russia.

Well, I think there's image and reality at the same time. What I try to stress in my interventions

is that we have the old Cold War thinking where part of the Arctic was really centre of the conflict's eye,

where the East met West. At our border with Russia basically.

What we have to do now is to acknowledge that we live in different times,

where most of these risks we have to manage are not owned by one state alone, not owned by the military alone.

They are civil military pluristate challenges, and from a Norwegian perspective,

Russia is part of the solution to most of them rather than part of the problem.

At the same time, have no illusion. We are neighbours to Russia with a large military capability,

with increased military activity in the region, for all the more reason why we need NATO.

But I think, you know, we have to go through that mental map transformation and acknowledge

that there are really new times in this region and we have to do that,

I think, in expanding cooperative procedures with Russia.

That's why Norway has been very sceptical to the idea that when we have a difference with Russia

we kind of punish by limiting dialogue and contact.

NATO-Russia Council is a resource for managing differences and where we have common positions

and we only hurt ourself if we close down on those channels.

So this is a challenge for us, and indeed, it’s a challenge for Russia.

We have to welcome and expect that Russia also behaves as a constructive modern partner.

The Arctic is really about testing, and I think at this the seminar, there was one expression here that

it is testing our ability to apply modern policies, which are tailored to today's challenges.

How would you quality the level of cooperation with Russia?

From a Norwegian perspective we have had correct bilateral relations with Russia always.

Norway has been in peace with Russia for a thousand years. We should not forget.

Different neighbours of Russia in NATO have very different stories of that relationship.

And I have to bring to the table in NATO my experience, my country's experience, which is one experience of peace.

We went through very difficult years during the Cold War, but at the same time

we managed correctly neighbourhood relations.

We managed the fish in the Barents Sea together,

the cod, which we own kind of 50/50, with quotas and resource management.

And today we manage the border. In 1990 there were 3,000 people crossing that border.

Last year there were a 105,000.

So there is integration going on and I think an important contribution of

Norway to NATO's relations with Russia is to bring that experience to the table.

Then, you know, we need to see more channels between NATO,

the EU, the West and with Russia.

So I think that that is the way we should pursue integration,

but not integration without mutual expectation of behaviour and emphasis on policies.

And I think we've come far, but there's still a lot more we can do.

We created... Norway initiated in 1993 the Barents Sea Corporation,

which has the Barents Sea states together, cooperating as governments,

but also with the local communities of our northernmost part of our countries.

For the first time they have been brought into international cooperation.

A very innovative and productive way of working and engaging Russia.

Do you think that science should have a special place in this cooperation?

Absolutely. And you know, Norway, as a coastal state, doing multifaceted

resource management, science is key.

So I think both in the way we determine energy exploration, do we have the knowledge,

do we have the knowledge of security to engage in new waters?

You know, Norway has gradually gone north from the southern part

of the Northern Sea up to the Barents Sea.

So I think we are into a region where there is a lot we don't know.

If you ask people who are experts on oceans and climate change,

I think they give very credible answers when they say there is a lot we don't know.

We have to invest in that knowledge.

And what we see, from a Norwegian perspective, is that, for example,

Svalbard, which used to be a mining community, is now a little bit of mining,

a lot more of tourism, and a substantial degree of research.

It is evolving into a European and global research station,

uniquely placed with its infrastructure to observe climate change,

all kinds of climatic and other kind of observations.

So this is very challenging, very, very exciting actually.

We are now been through the International Polar Year, of polar research,

and we have to take with us a large body of new knowledge and a large body of

new challenges to hand over to our scientists to continue working on.

Are you confident there's sufficient equipment and training to deal with the issues of the High North?

Well, as I said, you know, none of these challenges are only military.

They are civil/military. So we have to look at our capabilities,

both from the civilian side and the military side.

For example, in terms of surveillance, which is needed to manage these large ocean areas

which are now opening up, we cannot only count on military surveillance,

we also have to include civilian surveillance, meteorological surveillance, for example, bring that together.

We run a project now on the kind of testing level called the Barents Watch, which is about

how can we put these observation resources together to get the complete

picture of activities in this ocean, in this large area.

If there's an accident where is the closest Search and Rescue facility?

Where are the currents going, and so on and so forth?

Military-wise, I would say that, you know, again let me just stress

that there are no military answers to the challenges and risks we are facing.

They are political and we need to tailor our answers to the character of those challenges.

But in line with increased presence, increased activity, increased traffic in the areas,

I would approach that from a Norwegian perspective to

see we have to be present militarily accordingly.

So our new main capability, five brand new frigates, which are able to operate in large sea areas,

increase stability in this region, not because they are military with a military mandate,

but because they have capabilities of being present.

And I think what we need to discuss inside NATO is how do we pool our resources,

our perspectives, and our capabilities simply to be able to be there, and manage,

keep stability and keep what is always NATO's task, deterrence.

That we are able to deter what we don't want to see.

Is there a danger that more military hardware in the region may be misconstrued by

other nations and therefore leads to a response to that increase?

Well, let us start with that other nation, which is Russia.

They have a large capability in the North.

They always had a strategic capability. They are now modernizing their fleet,

modernizing their planes, resuming their activity.

We don't see this primarily as something directed towards a single group of countries or a single country.

But it is a way for Russia to bring back their presence.

We have to follow that very carefully and we have to respond I think accordingly.

But not by kind of spiralling up potential for military confrontation

because there are no military solutions to the challenges we are facing,

and I profoundly believe that most of what Russia wishes to achieve

in its part of the Arctic will largely profit from cooperation and low tension.

But as you said, you know, in order in all these settings to avoid misunderstandings

you need to expand communication. And have no illusion, but you know,

if you expand communication you get a better foundation for your own analysis,

for your own knowledge of how the other side may think.

In terms of that dialogue, the agreement in Ilulissat last year clearly seems like a first step,

but do you think that's enough for a sustainable understanding?

Well, you know, that was a one-off where the five coastal states which don't have

a particular institution for themselves, they came together because they are coastal states.

It has significance that five Foreign Ministers of coastal states

expressed themselves in concert on such an issue.

But they don't come together in an institution or in a body.

We came together in a one-off as coastal states.

Then we are bringing the Ilulissat Statement with us to our parliamentarians,

to our national political settings and also to the Arctic Council, to anchor.

And you know, I have been very focused on saying that we're not going to have

an exclusive forum of the coastal states only.

We would like to preserve the role of the Arctic Council.

So you will see Ilulissat emerge there. Ilulissat is basically about reiterating the importance

of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, and also stipulating

that we will develop rules and regulations and policies on that basis.

It was said by the Finnish Nobel Peace Prize winner, Martti Ahtisaari,

that the further north you go the less problems you have.

Now that the High North has been found to have many rich resources,

do you think that that still holds true?

I think that's an optimistic statement that I would like to share.

I'm always cautious because I think we have to be pragmatic and realistic about it.

No illusions about what human competition can lead to.

But I think what Martti Ahtisaari is pointing at is an experience.

And I've always experienced that working in the Barents Sea Council,

in the Arctic Council, in these regional settings in the North, we are making a lot of progress.

We are, you know, somehow able to operate pragmatically on cross-border issues,

enhancing economic, scientific, environmental cooperation and not drawing

that onto some kind of large-scale geopolitical disputes.

And maybe that is, you know, linked to the fact that up in the North things are serious, they are cold.

You have to act with a certain kind of dedication to get things done.

We all make that shared experience. And I always have a

great respect for Russia, for its Arctic history.

Russia is the biggest Arctic nation in terms of its coastline,

with a long and proud Arctic explorer history.

So, let us approach Russia on Arctic issues from that perspective.

But again, with no illusions about them safeguarding their interests.

But the challenge, coming back to all of this is that, as I said, .

it is high time we discussed the High North with low tensions

And the potential of seeking cooperation, agreement,

and moving forward together, should satisfy the interests of all, actually.

And that is not something you say to be rosy about things,

but I think it is a correct observation of how things stand.

Minister, thank you very much.

Thank you.