

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE N° 16  
COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
25th June, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL  
DOCUMENT  
CF-D/1

To: Permanent Representatives

From: Secretary General

Committee of Three

The Committee of Three desire you to submit the attached Questionnaire to your Governments with the request that they should send their replies to me by the 20th August at latest.

2. It is the intention of the Committee to use these replies as a basis of discussion with member countries when they reassemble in Paris early in September.

3. Within a few days there will be a memorandum circulated by the Committee containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to some of the questions.

(Signed) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

COMMITTEE OF THREE

QUESTIONNAIRE

The Committee of Three, consisting of Mr. Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway, Dr. Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, and Mr. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, were appointed by decision of the North Atlantic Council of 6th May "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community".

A study of some of these problems had already been made by the Committee on the Atlantic Community in 1951 - 1952 under the chairmanship of Mr. Pearson. This Committee did not propose rigid rules for "automatic" formulae for consultation, but stressed the need for the development of a "habit of consultation" between member governments. As criteria for matters which ought to be subject to consultation, the Committee indicated the degree of common interest, or the likelihood of a need for co-ordinated action. Furthermore, the Committee made a general distinction between exchange of information, on the one hand, and actual consultation on the other, the former covering a wider range of topics than the latter. Some progress has since been made towards co-ordination of the foreign policies of the NATO countries. The Council has begun to serve as a forum for exchange of information on matters of common concern, and active and effective consultation has in some cases taken place. However, there are also examples of lack of co-ordination and of unilateral action by member governments in matters directly concerning the Alliance, which have had detrimental effects on the unity of NATO and thereby weakened the organization. It therefore seems necessary to find new ways and means of promoting the habit of using the Council as an active instrument of consultation in order to reach closer co-operation in the non-military fields.

The questions which follow are intended to elicit in as concise form as possible, the views of your Government on the problems raised by the task set the Committee by the Council. This list is not to be regarded as exhaustive, and should your Government wish to supplement their answers with any additional statements or suggestions, these will be welcome.

I. POLITICAL QUESTIONS

1. It might be useful to consider the desirability of laying down certain basic principles as guidance for the political consultation on matters of common concern, such as the following:

- (a) The Council should be kept fully informed of any political development in any area which may affect significantly member countries or the Alliance as a whole.
- (b) The duty of informing the Council at an early stage of such developments should be accepted.
- (c) The Council should normally not be requested to take decisions or adopt resolutions of political importance without having had the opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all available information.
- (d) Member governments should endeavour not to make political declarations significantly affecting the Alliance or its member nations without prior consultation through the Council.

It would be of interest to know the view of member governments on this proposal, with a statement indicating to what extent the above-mentioned principles are acceptable.

2. To what extent and under what circumstances is your Government prepared to participate in the following types of consultation within NATO ?

- (i) Informal exchanges of information;
- (ii) Preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments;
- (iii) Consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies;
- (iv) Consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action.

3. What should be the basis for determining the matters of common concern which might be the subject of consultation under the four headings listed above, and what should be regarded as the factors limiting such consultation, such as respect for liberty of action of each member government and the non-universal character of NATO ?

4. To what extent can NATO assist in the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes and differences ? In view of the provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty, should procedures of conciliation and peaceful settlement of disputes, similar to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and other international agreements be adopted by NATO ?

5. Should NATO give more formal recognition to parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference and what should be the relationship between the Council and these parliamentary groupings ?

II. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

1. Does your Government consider that closer co-operation between member countries of NATO within the specialised organizations to which they belong and the establishment of closer relations with such organizations, would represent the most suitable means for promoting greater unity in the economic field between member countries ?

2. In this connection, as regards the OEEC, does your Government consider the participation of the United States and Canada as merely "associated members", to be adequate ?

3. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Does your Government think that the activities of other organizations, in particular the OEEC, is sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of NATO countries in this respect ? To what extent does your Government consider that NATO could assist in the conciliation of economic conflicts arising between member countries ?

4. Does your Government feel that NATO may have some interest in developing public works for civilian use, as has been done in the military field ?

5. Does your Government consider that NATO should take an active part in the economic development of underdeveloped regions within the NATO area or would it be preferable that NATO should limit itself to the appraisal of the political importance for the Alliance of development programmes to this end.

6.(a) Does your Government consider that NATO has a vital interest in promoting the economic development of underdeveloped countries outside the NATO area? If so, bearing in mind the non-universal character of NATO, what action in assisting underdeveloped countries does your Government consider can appropriately be carried on by NATO countries to achieve the necessary objectives and what co-ordination can be furnished within NATO ?

(b) Does your Government consider that the Statutes of existing and planned international financial agencies give them sufficient flexibility to enable them to operate suitably under present political conditions and to meet the requirements of the situation with which NATO is now confronted ?

7.(a) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to counter and neutralise Soviet commercial practices which do not conform to the principles by which Western countries carry on their normal trade and financial relations with one another ?

(b) Does your Government feel that NATO should consider measures to meet the competition of the Soviet Bloc in the field of contracts for public works in politically sensitive areas ?

8. What suggestions can be derived from the experience in the economic field of other regional organizations with a view to the possible application of this experience to other geographical areas ?

9. Does your Government consider that it would be in the interests of the Alliance for the NATO countries to consult together when certain important questions are coming up for discussion in international economic bodies in which the Soviet bloc is represented ?

10. Are there any other specific economic subjects or classes of subjects of general concern to NATO which are not now being adequately considered in other agencies and which might be discussed usefully in NATO ?

### III. CULTURAL QUESTIONS

Increased co-operation in the cultural field might serve to strengthen relations between NATO countries, provide a larger measure of public support for NATO and encourage the feeling of belonging to an Atlantic Community.

1. Does your Government consider that these aims will be served by setting up:

- (a) a common research institute for Atlantic Community studies ?
- (b) a civilian version of the NATO Defence College in which short courses on political, economic, social and cultural problems of the Atlantic Community would be given to those in the position to influence public opinion, such as teachers, journalists, etc ?

2. Does your Government consider that NATO should encourage co-operation between youth movements in NATO countries, bearing in mind the co-ordination of youth activities in communist countries ? Should the Council discuss youth co-operation problems ?

3. Does your Government consider that NATO should undertake the co-ordination of measures to increase the recruitment and training on a long-term basis of scientists, technicians and specialists, bearing in mind the developments in these fields in communist countries ?

4. What educational activities, if any, should be undertaken by NATO to strengthen the ties of the Atlantic Community, which are not already carried out by existing International Organizations such as UNESCO ?

5. Would your Government favour the exchange of service personnel individually or in groups for the purpose of familiarising themselves with conditions in other member countries and for the promotion of goodwill ?

6. Which of the possible programmes under questions 1, 2, 3, 4 should, in the judgment of your Government, be financed:

- (a) under a commonly financed programme;
- (b) on a joint user basis;
- (c) singly by member governments ?

IV. INFORMATION QUESTIONS

Increased co-operation in the information field, particularly under the conditions of competitive co-existence and the new Soviet policies, might serve to increase support for NATO of a well-informed public opinion and thus increase the unity of the Alliance.

1. Does your Government consider that the Information Service should concentrate on purely factual information about NATO ?

2. Does your Government consider the necessity of a better co-ordination of efforts in the information field to deal with the Soviet initiatives in the propaganda field ?

3. Does your Government consider that reciprocal visits of professional groups such as teachers, journalists, etc. should be extended ?

4. Does your Government consider that co-operation between the NATO Information Service and national information agencies, governmental as well as private, should be improved ?

5. Considering the importance of the impact on public opinion of extending political consultation in NATO, has your Government any suggestion on how far to go in keeping the public informed of activities in this field ?

V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

1. What specific changes in procedure or organizational arrangements would your Government recommend to ensure closer and more effective consultation in the Council to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community ?

2. To what extent does your Government consider that experts could be used more either on a permanent or ad hoc basis to assist the Council in the process of political consultation ?

3. To what extent should the Secretary General play an active rôle in the field of political consultation, and to what particular types of problems should such a rôle extend ?

4. In view of the economic responsibilities of NATO, and those in prospect, what organizational changes, if any, does your Government consider are required to discharge them ?

5. Does your Government consider that greater use could be made of NATO machinery for the circulation on a NATO-wide basis of "basic position material" by individual governments (e.g. texts of agreements, basic statements of position, etc.) ?

6. The suggestion has been made that a closer relationship might be established between NATO and the United Nations, possibly establishing the position of NATO as a regional organization in the terms of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. What are the views of your Government on this question ?

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD 4  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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EXEMPLAIRE N° 103  
COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
28th June, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/1(Revised)

To: Permanent Representatives  
From: Secretary General

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
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A.S.G. Political Div

ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

32

PALAIS DE CHAILLOT  
PARIS-XVI  
Tél. : KLEber 50-20

ORIGINAL: ANGLAIS  
28 juin 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIEL  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/1(Révisé)

Aux : Représentants Permanents  
Du : Secrétaire Général

COMITE DES TROIS

Le Comité des Trois vous demande de bien vouloir soumettre le questionnaire ci-joint à votre Gouvernement en le priant de m'adresser sa réponse avant le 20 août au plus tard.

2. Ces réponses ne seront utilisées que par le Comité, qui les prendra pour base de discussion dans les entretiens qu'il tiendra individuellement avec chaque gouvernement membre lorsqu'il se réunira à nouveau à Paris au début de septembre.

3. Les délégations recevront dans quelques jours un mémorandum du Comité contenant des notes explicatives et des directives destinées à aider les pays à préparer leur réponse à certaines des questions ci-après.

(Signé) ISMAY

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Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIIe.

NATO CONFIDENTIEL

COMITE DES TROIS

QUESTIONNAIRE

Le Comité des Trois, composé de M. Lange, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Norvège, du Dr. Martino, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Italie, et de M. Pearson, Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Extérieures du Canada, a été chargé le 6 mai par le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord " de présenter au Conseil des recommandations quant aux mesures à prendre pour améliorer et développer la coopération entre pays de l'OTAN dans des domaines non militaires et pour accroître l'unité au sein de la Communauté Atlantique".

Certains de ces problèmes ont déjà été "étudiés en 1951-1952 par le Comité de la Communauté Atlantique", présidé par M. Pearson. Ce Comité n'a proposé ni règles rigides ni formules "automatiques" de consultation, mais il a souligné la nécessité de développer "l'habitude des consultations" entre gouvernements membres. Comme critères des questions qui devraient faire l'objet de consultations, ce Comité a mentionné la mesure dans laquelle elles présentent un intérêt commun ou sont de nature à appeler une action coordonnée. En outre, il a établi une distinction générale entre les échanges de renseignements d'une part, et les consultations proprement dites de l'autre, en précisant que les premiers devraient porter sur des sujets plus nombreux que les seconds. Depuis lors, certains progrès ont été réalisés dans le sens de la coordination des politiques étrangères des pays de l'OTAN. Le Conseil a commencé à servir à l'échange de renseignements sur des questions d'intérêt commun, et des consultations actives et efficaces ont eu lieu dans certains cas. Toutefois, il existe également des exemples de manque de coordination et de mesures unilatérales prises par des gouvernements membres au sujet de questions intéressant directement l'Alliance; ce manque de coordination et ces mesures ont nui à l'unité de l'OTAN et affaibli de ce fait l'organisation. Il semble donc nécessaire de trouver de nouveaux moyens propres à encourager les pays à faire du Conseil un outil efficace de consultation, afin d'aboutir à une coopération plus étroite dans les domaines non militaires.

Les questions suivantes ont pour objet de permettre à votre gouvernement de faire connaître sous une forme aussi concise que possible ses vues sur les problèmes que pose la mission confiée au Comité par le Conseil. Cette liste ne doit pas être considérée comme limitative, et toute déclaration ou proposition complémentaire que votre gouvernement désirerait ajouter à sa réponse sera la bienvenue.

I. QUESTIONS POLITIQUES

Il pourrait être intéressant d'examiner s'il est souhaitable de poser, à titre de directives pour les consultations politiques sur des questions d'intérêt commun, certains principes fondamentaux tels que les suivants :

- (a) Le Conseil doit être tenu pleinement au courant de toute évolution de la situation politique dans une région quelconque, de nature à avoir des répercussions sensibles sur les pays membres ou l'ensemble de l'Alliance;

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- (b) les pays doivent accepter l'obligation d'informer sans tarder le Conseil de toute évolution de cet ordre;
- (c) en principe, le Conseil ne doit pas être invité à prendre de décisions ou à adopter de résolutions importantes du point de vue politique sans avoir pu disposer de tous les renseignements disponibles;
- (d) les gouvernements membres devront s'efforcer de ne pas faire de déclarations politiques affectant sensiblement l'Alliance ou les pays membres sans s'être consultés au préalable par l'intermédiaire du Conseil.

Il serait intéressant que les gouvernements membres fassent connaître leurs vues sur cette proposition et précisent dans quelle mesure ils jugent ces principes acceptables.

2. Dans quelle mesure et dans quelles circonstances votre gouvernement est-il disposé à participer aux types suivants de consultations au sein de l'OTAN ?

- (i) Echanges officieux de renseignements;
- (ii) Etablissement de jugements communs en fonction de l'évolution de la situation;
- (iii) Consultations visant à parvenir à un accord général sur lequel chaque gouvernement se fonderait, ou dont il s'inspirerait pour élaborer sa politique;
- (iv) Consultations visant à parvenir à un accord sur une politique ou une ligne de conduite sur des questions déterminées.

3. Sur quelles bases doivent être déterminées les questions d'intérêt commun pouvant donner lieu à consultations sous les quatre rubriques ci-dessus, et quels éléments doivent être considérés comme limitant ces consultations, tels que le respect de la liberté d'action de chaque gouvernement membre et le caractère non universel de l'OTAN ?

4. Dans quelle mesure l'OTAN peut-elle contribuer au règlement pacifique des différends et divergences de vues entre pays membres ? Compte tenu des dispositions de l'Article 1 du Traité, l'OTAN doit-elle adopter des procédures de conciliation et de règlement pacifique des différends analogues aux dispositions correspondantes de la Charte des Nations Unies et de certains autres accords internationaux ?

5. L'OTAN doit-elle accorder une valeur plus officielle aux associations de parlementaires et à la Conférence des parlementaires et quelles doivent-être les relations entre le Conseil et ces groupements ?

## II. QUESTIONS ECONOMIQUES

1. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que le renforcement de la coopération entre pays membres de l'OTAN au sein des organisations spécialisées dont ils font partie et l'établissement de relations plus étroites avec ces organisations, constitueraient le

meilleur moyen de renforcer l'unité entre les pays membres dans le domaine économique.

2. A ce sujet, et en ce qui concerne l'OECE, votre Gouvernement considère-t-il comme suffisante la participation actuelle des Etats-Unis et du Canada aux travaux de cet organisme à titre de simples "membres associés" ?

3. L'Article 2 du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord stipule que les parties s'efforceront d'éliminer toute opposition dans leurs politiques économiques internationales. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que les activités d'autres organisations, notamment l'OECE, sont suffisantes pour permettre aux pays OTAN de s'acquitter de leurs responsabilités dans ce domaine ? Dans quelle mesure votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que l'OTAN pourrait aider à régler les conflits économiques entre pays membres ?

4. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l'OTAN aurait intérêt à lancer des travaux publics dans le secteur civil, comme elle l'a fait dans le domaine militaire ?

5. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l'Organisation Atlantique doit prendre une part active au développement économique des pays sous-développés de la zone OTAN, ou juge-t-il préférable qu'elle se borne à évaluer l'importance politique que présentent pour l'Alliance des programmes de développement élaborés à cette fin ?

6. (a) Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il qu'il est d'un intérêt capital pour l'Organisation Atlantique de favoriser le développement économique des pays sous-développés situés en dehors de la zone OTAN ? Dans l'affirmative, étant donné le caractère non universel de l'Organisation, quelles mesures d'aide aux pays sous-développés votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que les pays de l'OTAN pourraient prendre pour atteindre les objectifs recherchés et quelle coordination peut être instituée dans le cadre de l'Alliance ?

(b) Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que les statuts des organismes financiers internationaux existants ou prévus leur donnent une souplesse suffisante pour leur permettre de fonctionner convenablement dans les conditions politiques actuelles et de faire face à la situation devant laquelle l'OTAN se trouve actuellement placée ?

7. (a) Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l'OTAN doit envisager l'adoption de mesures visant à contrecarrer et à neutraliser les pratiques commerciales soviétiques qui ne sont pas conformes aux principes sur lesquels les pays occidentaux fondent normalement leurs relations financières et commerciales mutuelles ?

(b) Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l'OTAN doit envisager l'adoption de mesures lui permettant de lutter contre la concurrence du bloc soviétique en ce qui concerne les contrats de travaux publics dans les régions qui constituent des points névralgiques du point de vue politique ?

8. Quelles suggestions peut-on formuler en fonction de l'expérience acquise dans le domaine économique par d'autres organisations régionales, en vue de leur application éventuelle à d'autres régions ?

9. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que l'Alliance aurait intérêt à ce que les pays OTAN se consultent lorsque certaines questions importantes viennent en discussion dans des organismes économiques internationaux où le bloc soviétique est représenté ?

10. Existe-t-il d'autres questions ou catégories de questions économiques déterminées d'intérêt commun pour l'OTAN, qui ne font pas actuellement l'objet d'études suffisantes dans d'autres organismes et qui pourraient être examinées utilement par l'OTAN ?

### III. QUESTIONS CULTURELLES

Le développement de la coopération dans le domaine culturel pourrait servir à renforcer les relations entre les pays de l'Alliance, à assurer à l'Organisation un appui accru de l'opinion publique et à développer le sentiment d'appartenance à une Communauté Atlantique.

1. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que ces objectifs seront mieux atteints par la création :

- (a) d'un institut commun de recherche sur la Communauté Atlantique ?
- (b) d'un collège civil analogue au Collège de Défense OTAN, où des cours de brève durée sur les problèmes politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels de la Communauté Atlantique seraient donnés aux personnes qui sont en mesure d'agir sur l'opinion, telles que professeurs, journalistes, etc.. ?

2. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que l'OTAN doit encourager la coopération entre les mouvements de jeunesse des pays de l'Alliance eu égard à la coordination des activités de jeunesse dans les pays communistes ? Le Conseil doit-il examiner les problèmes relatifs à la coopération des mouvements de jeunesse ?

3. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il que l'OTAN doit entreprendre la coordination de mesures de longue haleine destinées à développer le recrutement et la formation de savants, de techniciens et de spécialistes, eu égard aux progrès accomplis dans ces domaines par les pays communistes ?

4. Afin de renforcer les liens de la Communauté Atlantique, quelles seraient éventuellement, dans le domaine de l'éducation, les tâches que l'OTAN pourrait entreprendre et dont des organisations internationales existantes telles que l'UNESCO ne se sont pas déjà chargées ?

5. Votre Gouvernement serait-il favorable à des échanges de personnel militaire, soit individuellement, soit en groupes, grâce auxquels ce personnel pourrait se familiariser avec la situation dans d'autres pays membres et la compréhension internationale serait facilitée ?

6. Quels sont parmi les programmes éventuels entrant dans le cadre des questions 1, 2, 3 et 4, ceux qui devraient, de l'avis de votre gouvernement, être financés ?

- (a) dans le cadre d'un programme financé en commun;
- (b) en commun par les pays intéressés;
- (c) par les gouvernements membres individuellement ?

IV. QUESTIONS RELATIVES A L'INFORMATION

Le développement de la coopération dans le domaine de l'information, particulièrement dans le cadre de la coexistence compétitive et compte tenu de la nouvelle politique soviétique, pourrait servir à renforcer l'appui accordé à l'OTAN par une opinion publique bien informée et resserrer ainsi l'unité de l'Alliance.

1. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que le service de l'information ne doit chercher qu'à donner des renseignements d'ordre purement documentaire sur l'OTAN ?
2. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il nécessaire de mieux coordonner les efforts dans le domaine de l'information pour faire échec aux initiatives de la propagande soviétique ?
3. Votre Gouvernement considère-t-il qu'il convient de développer les visites réciproques de groupements professionnels, tels que professeurs, journalistes, etc.. ?
4. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il qu'il convient d'améliorer la coopération entre le service d'information de l'OTAN et les organismes d'information nationaux, tant publics que privés ?
5. Etant donné l'importance des répercussions sur l'opinion publique du développement des consultations politiques au sein de l'OTAN, votre gouvernement a-t-il des suggestions à formuler sur la mesure dans laquelle le public doit être tenu au courant des activités déployées dans ce domaine ?

V. QUESTIONS D'ORDRE ORGANIQUE ET FONCTIONNEL

1. Quels changements précis dans la procédure ou les dispositions relatives à l'organisation votre Gouvernement recommande-t-il en vue d'améliorer et de resserrer les consultations au sein du Conseil, de renforcer et d'étendre la coopération des pays OTAN dans les domaines non militaires et d'accroître l'unité de la Communauté Atlantique ?
2. Dans quelle mesure votre Gouvernement estimerait-il utile pour l'Organisation de faire davantage appel au concours d'experts, sur une base soit permanente, soit ad hoc, au cours des consultations politiques du Conseil ?
3. Dans quelle mesure le Secrétaire Général doit-il jouer un rôle actif en matière de consultations politiques, et sur quels types particuliers de problèmes doit porter son action ?
4. Etant donné les responsabilités économiques assumées actuellement par l'OTAN et celles qu'elle envisage d'assumer, quelles sont éventuellement les modifications d'ordre organique que votre Gouvernement considère comme nécessaires pour permettre à l'OTAN de s'acquitter de ces responsabilités ?

5. Votre Gouvernement estime-t-il que le mécanisme de l'OTAN pourrait être davantage utilisé pour la diffusion par chaque gouvernement à l'échelle de l'OTAN de "documents fondamentaux" (tels que textes d'accords, déclarations de principe, etc..) ?

6. Il a été mentionné que des relations plus étroites pourraient être établies entre l'OTAN et les Nations Unies, peut-être en établissant la position de l'OTAN en tant qu'organisation régionale, conformément au sens du Chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations Unies. Quelles sont les vues de votre Gouvernement sur ce point ?

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

7

*A-S.G.  
Political*

EXEMPLAIRE N° 46  
COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
3rd July, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/2  
+ add. 12-7-56

To: Permanent Representatives

From: Secretary General

Committee of Three

Attached is a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire of the Committee of Three, which was circulated a few days ago.

(Signed) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIIe.

NISCA FILE N.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

FINAL DRAFT

COMMITTEE OF THREE QUESTIONNAIRE

EXPLANATORY NOTES

The questions put to Member Governments by the Committee are intended, as far as possible, to be self-explanatory. In cases where the question may require clarification, explanatory comment is offered in this paper to help bring out the information desired by the Committee. In the event that any further clarification is desired either on the points listed below, or any other points contained in the questionnaire, this should be sought through Permanent Representatives on the North Atlantic Council.

In preparing their answers or any supplementary statements, Governments may wish to refer to the following material produced in previous studies:

- (1) "NATO, the First Five Years" by Lord Ismay, in particular Chapter XIV.
- (2) The first Report of the Committee on the Atlantic Community submitted in Rome in November 1951 (C8-D/6). ✓
- (3) Final Report of the Committee on the Atlantic Community, submitted at Lisbon in February 1952 (C9-D/8). ✓
- (4) The Report of Dr. H. J. Reinink on Strengthening Cultural Co-operation among NATO Countries (AC/52-D/53).
- (5) Survey of Article 2 Activities (C-M(56)45).

I. POLITICAL QUESTIONS

*Question 3 - see Addendum 1) 12/7/56*  
Questions 4 and 5. The Committee did not have in mind such structural changes as would involve renegotiation of the Treaty. See also General Note on Section V.

II. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

Question 1. The Committee wishes to make it clear that there is no intention that NATO should assume responsibilities now discharged by OEEC or other international economic agencies.

Question 3. The intention of the Committee is to find out the opinions of Member Governments on whether, in view of the political importance for NATO of eliminating economic conflicts between Member Governments, the activities of existing international economic organizations, especially the OEEC, are adequate to take care of the common interests of the Alliance, or whether additional tasks might be envisaged for those organizations. The views of Member Governments are also desired on what might be done in NATO which is not already being done in existing international economic organizations, especially the OEEC, to bring conflicting interests of member countries into harmony. With regard to the last sentence of Question 3, the Committee has in mind those economic conflicts, which if allowed to remain unresolved, might have serious political repercussions on NATO.

Question 6(a). In answering this question, Governments might also give their views on the possibility of associating private enterprise with programmes for the development of economically underdeveloped countries, and on the incentives which might be required for this purpose.

Question 6(b). The reference: "the status of existing and planned international financial agencies" is in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation and the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).

Question 7(a). The Committee has in mind particularly Soviet commercial and financial practices undertaken for political purposes, such as purchases above market prices, sales below market prices, the granting of special terms on loans, etc.

Question 8. The reference particularly is to the Colombo Plan and the Economic Committee of the Bagdad Pact. This question is therefore especially directed to those countries who are members of these organizations.

### III. CULTURAL QUESTIONS

Question 1(a). It has been suggested that member countries consider the establishment of a centre of Atlantic Community Studies whose main task would be to promote basic long-term research and thinking about the common values of the Atlantic Community. This research centre would have the status of a university and might be financed from common funds.

Question 1(b). It has been suggested that in addition there should be short (say 6 months) courses to discuss common problems of non-military co-operation specially for those who have professional opportunities for influencing public opinion such as teachers, journalists, etc. The Wilton Park College in the United Kingdom has been suggested as an example of the kind of institution envisaged.

Question 3. The Soviet leaders have invested substantial resources in a rapid development of their educational system to ensure the recruitment on a long-term basis of scientists, technicians and specialists. This problem has been the subject of studies such as the report published in the Annals of the American Academy (January 1956) entitled "Soviet Science in the Post Stalin Era". The situation as regards "Shortages and Surpluses of Highly Qualified Scientists and Engineers" in the Western World has been the subject of a report by the Manpower Committee of OEEC (document C(55)160 dated 20th June 1955). These studies point to certain problems of common concern and it might be useful to consider if and how NATO might assist in finding ways and means to deal with it.

Question 5. The intention is to find out if Governments would be in favour of programmes of a multilateral or bilateral character for exchanges of visits of service personnel in member countries, either by encouraging and facilitating individual travelling or by organizing travelling groups for personnel on leave.



IV. INFORMATION QUESTIONS

Question 5. What is intended here is an indication of how far Member Governments believe information should be given out about political consultations in NATO either through communiques or press conferences in order that the public should be made aware of the more important issues involved in such consultations. The desirability of keeping the public informed has to be weighed against considerations of security, particularly with respect to the exchange of confidential views and information upon which the development of the habit of political consultation so much depends.

V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL QUESTIONS

General Note on Section V

The Committee realises the difficulty of trying to renegotiate the Treaty at this time and therefore has in mind particularly organizational and functional proposals which could be implemented without renegotiation of the Treaty.

Question 2. One suggestion that has been made is that senior experts most familiar with the thinking of their Governments in any given field might be made available on an ad hoc basis to assist their Governments' Permanent Representatives in the Council as well as to consult with their counterparts from other member countries. In this connection, Governments will wish to bear in mind the decision of the Council taken at Lisbon on the organization of the Council in Permanent Session (Final Communique, 25th February 1952).

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD &  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

ASB. Political

EXEMPLAIRE N° 58  
COPY

ORIGINAL: FRENCH  
12th July, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL  
ADDENDUM to  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/2

COMMITTEE OF THREE

EXPLANATORY NOTES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

ADDENDUM

to

CT-D/2  
(dated 3rd July, 1956) ✓

I. POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Question 3. The Committee had in mind the possibility of determining certain categories of questions with respect to which member countries would agree that they should be submitted to a consultation procedure.

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.

NISCA FILE No.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE N° 39  
COPY

ORIGINAL: ANGLAIS

27 juin 1956

*3<sup>e</sup> juillet ?*

NATO CONFIDENTIEL

DOCUMENT

CT-D/2

*+ add. 10-7-56*

Aux: Représentants Permanents

Du : Secrétaire Général

Comité des Trois

Veillez trouver ci-joint un mémorandum contenant des notes explicatives et des directives destinées à aider les pays à préparer leurs réponses au Questionnaire du Comité des Trois distribué il y a quelques jours.

(Signé) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVI<sup>e</sup>.

NISCA FILE No.

NATO CONFIDENTIEL

PROJET DEFINITIF

QUESTIONNAIRE DU COMITE DES TROIS

NOTES EXPLICATIVES

Les questions posées aux gouvernements membres par le Comité sont destinées à se passer autant que possible de toutes explications. Pour les questions qui appellent certains éclaircissements, le présent document apporte un commentaire explicatif destiné à bien faire ressortir ce que désire savoir le Comité. Au cas où une délégation désirerait avoir des précisions supplémentaires sur l'un des points énumérés ci-dessous ou sur tout autre point du questionnaire, elle est invitée à les demander par l'intermédiaire de son Représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord.

En préparant leurs réponses ou toute autre déclaration supplémentaire, les gouvernements pourront se reporter aux documents suivants publiés précédemment:

- (1) "OTAN, les Cinq Premières Années" par Lord Ismay, particulièrement le Chapitre XIV.
- (2) Le premier rapport du Comité sur la Communauté Atlantique soumis à Rome en novembre 1951 (C8-D/6).
- (3) Le rapport définitif du Comité sur la Communauté Atlantique soumis à Lisbonne au mois de février 1952 (C9-D/8).
- (4) Le rapport du Dr. H.J. Reinink sur le Renforcement de la coopération culturelle entre les pays de l'OTAN (AC/52-D/53).
- (5) L'Etude sur les activités relatives à l'Article 2 (C-M(56)45).

I. QUESTIONS POLITIQUES

Questions 4 et 5. Le Comité n'a pas envisagé de changements organiques qui impliqueraient une nouvelle négociation du traité. Voir également la note générale sur la partie V.

II. QUESTIONS ECONOMIQUES

Question 1. Le Comité tient à préciser qu'il n'est pas question que l'OTAN assume des responsabilités qui incombent à l'heure actuelle à l'OECE ou à d'autres organismes économiques internationaux.

Question 3. Le Comité veut savoir si les gouvernements membres estiment qu'en raison de l'importance politique que revêt pour l'OTAN le règlement des conflits économiques entre les gouvernements membres, les activités des organisations internationales existantes et en particulier de l'OECE suffisent à sauvegarder les intérêts communs de l'Alliance, ou s'il faut envisager la possibilité de confier des attributions nouvelles à ces organisations.

Le Comité aimerait également connaître les vues des gouvernements membres quant à ce qui pourrait être fait par l'OTAN dans les domaines dont ne s'occupent pas les organisations économiques internationales actuelles, notamment l'OECE, afin d'aplanir les conflits d'intérêt entre pays membres. En ce qui concerne la dernière phrase de la Question 3, le Comité songe aux conflits économiques qui, s'ils restent sans solution, risquent d'avoir de sérieuses répercussions politiques pour l'OTAN.

Question 6(a). En répondant à cette question, les gouvernements pourraient également dire ce qu'ils pensent de la possibilité d'associer des entreprises privées au développement économique des pays sous-développés, ainsi que des stimulants requis à cette fin.

Question 6(b). Les mots "les statuts des organismes financiers internationaux existants ou prévus" visent en particulier la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le développement, la Corporation financière internationale et le Fonds spécial des Nations Unies pour le développement économique (SUNFED).

Question 7(a). Le Comité pense en particulier aux pratiques commerciales et financières soviétiques, adoptées à des fins politiques, tels que les achats à des prix supérieurs aux cours, les ventes à des prix inférieurs aux cours, l'octroi de prêts à des conditions spéciales, etc...

Question 8. Le Comité pense surtout au Plan de Colombo et au Comité économique du Pacte de Bagdad. Cette question est donc spécialement destinée aux pays membres de ces organisations.

### III. QUESTIONS CULTURELLES

Question 1(a). Il a été suggéré que les pays membres envisagent la création d'un centre d'études sur la Communauté Atlantique qui aurait pour but principal d'encourager des recherches et études de longue haleine sur les valeurs communes de la Communauté Atlantique. Ce centre de recherche aurait rang d'université et pourrait être financé sur les fonds communs.

Question 1(b). On a suggéré d'établir, en outre, de brefs cours (de 6 mois par exemple), consacrés aux problèmes communs de coopération non militaire, et spécialement destinés aux professeurs, journalistes, etc... qui, en raison de leur profession, peuvent influencer l'opinion publique. Le Wilton Park College au Royaume-Uni a été mentionné comme exemple du genre d'institution envisagé.

Question 3. Les dirigeants soviétiques ont investi des sommes importantes dans le développement rapide de l'enseignement afin d'assurer à long terme la formation de savants, de techniciens et de spécialistes. Ce problème a fait l'objet d'études telles que le rapport publié dans les Annales de l'Académie Américaine (janvier 1956) sous le titre de "Soviet Science in the Post Staline Era" (La Science Soviétique après Staline). La situation en ce qui concerne les pénuries et excédents de savants et ingénieurs qualifiés dans le monde occidental a fait l'objet d'un rapport du Comité de la Main-d'oeuvre de l'OECE (document C(55)160 en date du 20 juin 1955). Ces études insistent sur certaines questions d'intérêt commun, et il serait peut-être utile de voir dans quelle mesure et de quelle façon l'OTAN peut coopérer à la solution de ce problème.

Question 5. Cette question a pour but de voir si les gouvernements sont partisans de programmes d'ordre multilatéral ou bilatéral pour les échanges de visites de personnel militaire entre pays membres, soit en encourageant et en facilitant les voyages individuels, soit en organisant des voyages collectifs pour le personnel en permission.

IV. QUESTIONS RELATIVES A L'INFORMATION

Question 5. Le Comité voudrait savoir dans quelle mesure les gouvernements membres estiment qu'il convient de diffuser des informations sur les consultations politiques au sein de l'OTAN au moyen de communiqués ou de conférences de presse, afin de tenir le public au courant des problèmes les plus importants traités au cours de ces échanges de vues. D'une part il est souhaitable que le public soit informé de ces échanges de vues, mais d'autre part il convient de tenir compte de considérations de sécurité, spécialement en ce qui concerne l'échange d'opinions et de renseignements confidentiels dont dépend, dans une si grande mesure, le développement de l'habitude de ces consultations politiques.

V. QUESTIONS D'ORDRE ORGANIQUE ET FONCTIONNEL

Note générale sur la Section V

Le Comité sait combien il serait difficile de négocier à nouveau le traité à l'heure actuelle, et il songe par conséquent spécialement aux propositions d'ordre organique et fonctionnel qui seraient applicables sans nouvelle négociation du traité. ||

Question 2. Il a été suggéré de faire appel, sur une base ad hoc, à des experts réputés, qui connaissent bien les vues de leurs gouvernements dans un domaine donné, qui aideraient les représentants permanents de leurs gouvernements auprès du Conseil, et procéderaient à des échanges de vues avec leurs collègues des autres pays membres. A cet égard, les gouvernements n'oublieront certainement pas la décision du Conseil adoptée à Lisbonne sur l'organisation du Conseil en session permanente (Communiqué final, 25 février 1952).

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD /  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Index

EXEMPLAIRE N° 37  
COPY

ORIGINAL: FRANCAIS  
12 juillet 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIEL  
ADDITIF au  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/2

COMITE DES TROIS

NOTES EXPLICATIVES POUR LE QUESTIONNAIRE

ADDITIF

au

Document CT-D/2  
(en date du 27 juin 1956)

I. QUESTIONS POLITIQUES

Question 3. Le Comité avait à l'esprit la possibilité d'identifier certaines catégories de questions au sujet desquelles les pays membres seraient d'accord de recourir à une procédure de consultation.

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIIe.

NISCA FILE N°

NATO CONFIDENTIEL

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD " " " "  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE N° 71  
COPY



*3rd Registry*  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
12th July, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/3

To: Permanent Representatives  
From: Secretary General

Committee of Three

As was indicated in the cover note to their Questionnaire (1), the Committee of Three intend to hold discussions with member governments individually on the basis of the replies to be received.

2. The Committee propose to arrange these discussions according to the attached timetable. It will be seen that it is intended to meet each day with the representatives of two governments, one in the morning and one in the afternoon.

3. Would you kindly let me know at the next meeting of the Council, on Wednesday, 18th July, if possible, whether your government can accept these arrangements.

(Signed) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.

(1) CT-D/1(Revised) ✓

NISCA FILE No

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE



Proposed Programme for the Committee of Three

September 10th to 22nd, 1956

Preparatory Meetings

September 10th and 11th

Consultations with other NATO Governments

September 12th	a.m. p.m.	Iceland Turkey
September 13th	a.m. p.m.	Netherlands Greece
September 14th	a.m. p.m.	Belgium Germany
September 17th	a.m. p.m.	Luxembourg United States
September 18th	a.m. p.m.	Portugal United Kingdom
September 19th	a.m. p.m.	Denmark France

Concluding Meetings

September 20th to 22nd

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

3<sup>rd</sup> Registry

EXEMPLAIRE N° 43  
COPY

ORIGINAL: ANGLAIS  
12 juillet 1956



NATO CONFIDENTIEL  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/3

DU : Secrétaire Général  
AUX : Représentants permanents

Comité des Trois

Comme l'indiquait la note de couverture de son Questionnaire (1), le Comité des Trois se propose d'avoir, avec chacun des gouvernements membres individuellement, des entretiens auxquels les réponses à ce questionnaire serviront de base.

2. Le Comité propose, pour l'organisation de ces entretiens, le calendrier ci-joint. Comme on le verra, il compte se réunir chaque jour avec les représentants de deux gouvernements, les uns dans la matinée, les autres dans l'après-midi.

3. Je vous prie de bien vouloir me faire savoir, si possible au cours de la prochaine réunion du Conseil, le mercredi 18 juillet, si votre gouvernement est en mesure d'accepter ces dispositions.

(Signé) ISMAY

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIIe.

(1) CT-D/1(Révisé) ✓

NISCA FILE N°

NATO CONFIDENTIEL

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

Programme proposé pour le Comité des Trois

Du 10 Au 22 septembre 1956

Réunions préparatoires

10 et 11 septembre

Entretiens avec les autres gouvernements de l'OTAN

12	septembre	matinée	Islande
		après-midi	Turquie
13	"	matinée	Pays-Bas
		après-midi	Grèce
14	"	matinée	Belgique
		après-midi	Allemagne
17	"	matinée	Luxembourg
		après-midi	Etats-Unis
18	"	matinée	Portugal
		après-midi	Royaume-Uni
19	"	matinée	Danemark
		après-midi	France

Réunions finales

20 au 22 septembre

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

18

3rd Registry



EXEMPLAIRE N° 32  
COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
10th August, 1956

NATO RESTRICTED  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/4

TO: Members of the Committee of Three  
FROM: Acting Secretary General

The attached study of the possible implications for NATO if it were to become a regional organization in the terms of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, has been prepared by the International Staff in response to the Committee's request.\*

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe

\* CT-R/1, paragraph 9 ✓

NISCA FILE No

NATO RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO IF IT WERE  
TO BECOME A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION\* IN THE TERMS OF  
CHAPTER VIII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

NATO cannot be considered, in its present form, as a "regional arrangement or agency" within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. There is no definition or general ruling as to the requisites necessary for an organization to be considered a "regional arrangement or agency". Article 52 of the Charter itself implicitly calls for the existence of a machinery adequate to meet the requirement that the members of such organizations should "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council". No such machinery is envisaged in the North Atlantic Treaty. The fact is that NATO was not intended by its authors to be a regional organization, that the member governments have repeatedly emphasised this fact, and that a simple declaration that they henceforth consider it "a regional arrangement or agency" would not be in itself sufficient to turn it into such.

2. It follows that some appropriate adjustment or amplification of the Treaty would be necessary to confer on NATO the character of a "regional arrangement or agency" in the terms of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. There is no ruling as to what particular machinery or action should formally be adopted in order to attain this object. It is, however, felt that no such machinery or action, given its far-reaching character, could be adopted formally, without involving constitutional processes of member governments, either for a renegotiation of the Treaty or for other action (e.g. an additional protocol).

3. Apart from the juridical and constitutional problems involved by a renegotiation of the Treaty or by any other action as might be necessary in order to transform NATO into a regional organization, the implication of such a change should be weighed very seriously against the background of the general political situation and of the very carefully balanced considerations which were kept in mind in the original drafting of the Treaty.

4. It was the consistent intent of the authors of the Treaty to write it strictly within the framework of the United Nations Charter. It was also their purpose to provide, at the same time, an insurance against any situation which the Security Council itself might be unable to control.

The legal background was provided for by Article 51, Chapter VII, of the Charter which stipulates:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures

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\* The term regional organization is used throughout the context as corresponding to "regional arrangements and agencies" in the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain and restore international peace and security".

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has, therefore, a twofold purpose:

(a) To make clear to any would-be aggressor that his attacks would be met by the continued resistance of all the member states. The first part of Article 5 reads accordingly as follows:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area".

(b) To confirm the full respect of the provisions set forth in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The second part of Article 5 goes on in fact to state:

"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

It may also be usefully recalled here that full adherence to the Charter is further confirmed by Article 7 of the Treaty which recites:

"This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security".

It can thus be seen that the wording of Articles 5 and 7 of the Treaty offers a clear-cut and, at the same time, absolutely adequate way to establish the formal obligation of the members of the Alliance automatically to take action under certain circumstances, and to stress the full consistency of such actions with the provisions of the Charter.

5. A fundamental consideration to be borne in mind is that the careful drafting of the Treaty with its specific and exclusive reference to Article 51 of the Charter, which embodies the principle of "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence", implies a reminder that such action does not require any prior authority from the Security Council and, therefore, can in no way be subject to the paralysing veto of one of the five permanent members.

In this connection, it is helpful to contrast this with the relevant part of Article 53 of the United Nations Charter which reads as follows:

"The Security Council shall, where appropriate utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council....."

The stand repeatedly taken in the past by adversaries of NATO is that, while normally recognising the "right of individual or collective self-defence" to member nations, the Charter rules out instead any action if it is to be taken under regional arrangements, except when ordered by the Security Council. By upholding the theory that NATO is in fact a regional organization, such adversaries have challenged the legitimacy of the obligation of its members, under Article 5 of the Treaty, to "take forthwith ..... such action .... including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area".

The point at issue has been sufficiently cleared by authoritative jurists to the effect that a definite distinction must be drawn between "measures of self-defence, individual or collective", as authorised by Article 51 of the Charter (and contemplated by the Treaty), and, on the other hand, "measures of enforcement", which do require instead prior authority from the Security Council and imply action decided for the purpose of the restoration of peace. The language of the Charter does not confuse the distinction between these terms and the whole sense of the Charter requires them to be completely distinguished.

The fact remains, however, that Article 53 of the United Nations Charter offers a margin of doubt for discussion and that any debate on its practical implications in the case of NATO becoming a regional organization, would tend to blur the issue. This also is one of the reasons why, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding or hesitancy, the authors of the Treaty preferred to avoid any reference to regional agreements. This consideration still appears valid today.

6. A similar set of considerations applies to the impact of Article 54 of the United Nations Charter, should NATO become a regional agreement.

Article 54 says that the "Security Council is to be kept informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security". It is generally recognised that this wording is obscure and susceptible of causing misunderstanding. The generally accepted explanation tends to limit the purport of Article 54 to action already taken

or which it is contemplated to take under prior authorisation of the Security Council.

However, there has so far been no official ruling as to the exact interpretation of Article 54. Again, here, we are faced with the problem of a wording which is sufficiently confused to allow for the possibility, indeed probability, were NATO a regional organization, of far-reaching questioning, not only at large but also in the United Nations themselves, in relation to the actual purport of the right of the Security Council to be kept informed of the activities of NATO, including possibly even its military planning and defence arrangements.

7. As against the negative aspects of a formal transformation of NATO into a regional organization, there would in fact be no need to proceed to such juridical changes in order to allow the member governments, if they so wish, to undertake any or all of the activities at present conducted by existing regional organizations - such as the OAS - for the purpose of settlement of disputes among their respective partners. In the first place, NATO members, where normal diplomatic channels prove insufficient, can always have recourse to an exchange of views within the North Atlantic Council. This was, in fact, the normal procedure envisaged by the authors of the Treaty. It is also open to NATO members, in existing circumstances, to put into practical effect any of the measures for the pacific settlement of disputes as are set forth in Article 33 and other Articles of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. A resolution by the North Atlantic Council to that effect, whether designed to establish a general ruling or referring to specific cases, would be sufficient.

8. If the considerations made in the preceding paragraph are pertinent and well-founded, a further aspect to be kept in mind, apart from the immediate one of the relations between NATO members, concerns the psychological projection of NATO on public opinion at large. Not only must the authority and respect which NATO commands remain unimpaired, but no doubt must be allowed to grow that the adoption by NATO of the practices or machinery of regional organizations reflects a change in the fundamental aims of the Alliance. Whatever advantage may be gained in the field of relations between members by adopting new activities and machinery, it would be essential always to make it clear that this in no way implies:

- (a) a weakening or change in the original juridical basis (Article 51 of the United Nations Charter) and application of the North Atlantic Treaty provisions (Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Treaty);  
or
- (b) an abandonment of the achievements and machinery functions already developed within NATO.

Otherwise, vis-à-vis world opinion, the implications would be extremely harmful to the original aims of NATO without having corresponding advantages from such a change of emphasis.



CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

3<sup>rd</sup> Register

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EXEMPLAIRE N° 22  
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ORIGINAL: ANGLAIS  
10 août 1956

NATO DIFFUSION RESTREINTE  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/4

Aux: Membres du Comité des Trois  
Du : Secrétaire Général par intérim

L'étude ci-jointe des incidences que pourrait avoir pour l'OTAN sa transformation en organisation régionale aux termes du Chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations Unies a été établie par le Secrétariat International à la demande du Comité\*.

(Signé) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.

\* CT-R/1, paragraphe 9 ✓

MISCA 113 E No

NATO DIFFUSION RESTREINTE

INCIDENCES QUE POURRAIT AVOIR POUR L'OTAN SA TRANSFORMATION EN  
ORGANISATION REGIONALE\* AUX TERMES DU CHAPITRE VIII DE LA  
CHARTRE DES NATIONS-UNIES

1. Sous sa forme actuelle, l'OTAN ne peut être considérée comme un "Accord ou organisme régional" au sens du Chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations-Unies. Il n'existe aucune définition ou règle générale précisant les conditions nécessaires pour qu'une organisation soit considérée comme un "Accord ou organisme régional". L'Article 52 de la Charte elle-même exige implicitement l'existence d'un mécanisme propre à permettre aux membres de ces organisations de "faire tous leurs efforts pour régler d'une manière pacifique, par le moyen desdits accords ou organismes, les différends d'ordre local, avant de les soumettre au Conseil de Sécurité". Aucun mécanisme de cet ordre n'est envisagé par le Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Le fait est que les créateurs de l'OTAN n'ont pas entendu en faire une organisation régionale, que les gouvernements membres ont souligné ce fait à maintes reprises et qu'il ne leur suffirait pas de déclarer qu'ils considèrent désormais l'OTAN comme un "Accord ou organisme régional" pour que cette transformation soit un fait acquis.

2. Il en résulte que pour conférer à l'OTAN le caractère d'un "Accord ou organisme régional" aux termes du Chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations-Unies, le Traité devrait être modifié ou sa portée élargie de manière appropriée. Aucune règle ne précise la procédure officielle à suivre à cette fin. Il semble toutefois qu'aucune mesure de cet ordre, étant donné ses profondes répercussions, ne puisse être adoptée officiellement sans que des procédures constitutionnelles soient mises en oeuvre par les gouvernements membres, soit aux fins d'une nouvelle négociation du Traité, soit à d'autres fins (par exemple, en vue de la conclusion d'un Protocole additionnel).

3. En dehors des problèmes juridiques et constitutionnels que poserait une nouvelle négociation du Traité ou toute autre mesure nécessaire pour faire de l'OTAN une organisation régionale, les incidences d'une telle transformation doivent être examinées très soigneusement dans le contexte de la situation politique générale et des considérations mûrement réfléchies qui ont présidé à l'origine à la rédaction du Traité.

4. Les auteurs du Traité se sont constamment efforcés de rester strictement dans le cadre de la Charte des Nations-Unies. En même temps, ils ont aussi cherché à se prémunir contre toute situation qui échapperait au contrôle du Conseil de Sécurité. La base juridique du Traité est fournie par l'Article 51, Chapitre VII de la Charte, qui est ainsi conçu:

"Aucune disposition de la présente Charte ne porte atteinte au droit naturel de légitime défense, individuelle ou collective, dans le cas où un Membre des Nations-Unies est l'objet d'une agression armée, jusqu'à ce que le Conseil

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\* Dans tout ce contexte, le terme "Organisation régionale" est synonyme d' "Accords ou organismes régionaux" au sens du Chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations-Unies.

de Sécurité ait pris les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales. Les mesures prises par les des Membres dans l'exercice de ce droit de légitime défense sont immédiatement portées à la connaissance du Conseil de Sécurité et n'affectent en rien le pouvoir et le devoir qu'a le Conseil, en vertu de la présente Charte, d'agir à tout moment de la manière qu'il juge nécessaire pour maintenir ou rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationales."

L'Article 5 du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord a donc un double but:

(a) Avertir clairement tout agresseur éventuel qu'il se heurterait à la résistance soutenue de tous les États membres. C'est pourquoi la première partie de l'Article 5 est ainsi conçue:

"Les Parties conviennent qu'une attaque armée contre l'une ou plusieurs d'entre elles survenant en Europe ou en Amérique du Nord sera considérée comme une attaque dirigée contre toutes les Parties, et en conséquence, conviennent que, si une telle attaque se produit, chacune d'elles, dans l'exercice du droit de légitime défense, individuelle ou collective, reconnue par l'Article 51 de la Charte des Nations-Unies, assistera la Partie ou les Parties ainsi attaquées en prenant aussitôt, individuellement et d'accord avec les autres Parties, telle action qu'elle jugera nécessaire, y compris l'emploi de la force armée, pour rétablir et assurer la sécurité dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord".

(b) Confirmer le respect intégral des dispositions de l'Article 51 de la Charte des Nations-Unies. La deuxième partie de l'Article 5 stipule donc expressément que:

"toute attaque armée de cette nature et toute mesure prise en conséquence seront immédiatement portées à la connaissance du Conseil de Sécurité. Ces mesures prendront fin quand le Conseil de Sécurité aura pris les mesures nécessaires pour rétablir et maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales".

Il n'est peut-être pas inutile de rappeler à ce sujet que le respect intégral de la Charte est encore confirmé par l'Article 7 du Traité, aux termes duquel:

"Le présent Traité n'affecte pas et ne sera pas interprété comme affectant en aucune façon les droits et obligations découlant de la Charte pour les Parties qui sont membres des Nations-Unies ou la responsabilité primordiale du Conseil de Sécurité dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales".

Il apparaît donc que le texte des Articles 5 et 7 du Traité permet d'établir clairement et d'une manière entièrement adéquate l'obligation formelle pour les membres de l'Alliance d'intervenir automatiquement dans certaines circonstances, tout en soulignant l'entière compatibilité des mesures de cet ordre avec les dispositions de la Charte.

5. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue la considération fondamentale suivante: le texte soigneusement rédigé du Traité, qui se réfère spécifiquement et exclusivement à l'Article 51 de la Charte, lequel fait état du "droit naturel de légitime défense individuelle ou collective" rappelle implicitement qu'aucune mesure de cet ordre n'exige l'autorisation préalable du Conseil de Sécurité et ne peut donc être paralysée par le veto de l'un des cinq membres permanents.

A cet égard, il convient de rappeler par contre le passage pertinent de l'Article 53 de la Charte des Nations-Unies, qui est ainsi conçu :

"Le Conseil de Sécurité utilise, s'il y a lieu, les accords ou organismes régionaux pour l'application des mesures coercitives prises sous son autorité. Toutefois, aucune action coercitive ne sera entreprise en vertu d'accords régionaux ou par des organismes régionaux sans l'autorisation du Conseil de Sécurité; ..."

La position prise à maintes reprises dans le passé par les adversaires de l'OTAN est que la Charte, tout en reconnaissant en principe aux pays membres le "droit de légitime défense individuelle ou collective", exclut en revanche toute mesure prise en vertu d'accords régionaux, sauf sur l'ordre du Conseil de Sécurité. En soutenant que l'OTAN est en fait une organisation régionale, les tenants de cette thèse ont contesté la légitimité de l'obligation qui incombe à ses membres, aux termes de l'Article 5 du Traité de prendre "aussitôt, ... telle action... y compris l'emploi de la force armée, pour rétablir et assurer la sécurité dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord".

La question en cause a été suffisamment clarifiée par des juristes autorisés dans le sens suivant: une nette distinction doit être établie entre les "mesures de légitime défense individuelle ou collective" autorisées par l'Article 51 de la Charte (et envisagées par le Traité), d'une part, et d'autre part les "mesures coercitives" qui, elles, exigent au contraire l'autorisation préalable du Conseil de Sécurité et présupposent des dispositions prises pour le rétablissement de la paix. Le texte de la Charte maintient clairement la distinction entre ces expressions, et tout l'esprit de la Charte exige que cette distinction soit maintenue.

Il n'en reste pas moins qu'à cet égard l'Article 53 de la Charte peut donner dans une certaine mesure matière à discussion, et que tout débat relatif aux conséquences pratiques de cet article, au cas où l'OTAN deviendrait une organisation régionale, tendrait à obscurcir le problème. C'est également l'une des raisons pour lesquelles, afin d'éviter tout risque de malentendu ou d'hésitation, les auteurs du Traité ont préféré s'abstenir de faire mention des accords régionaux. Il apparaît que cette considération conserve aujourd'hui toute sa valeur.

6. Les conséquences de l'Article 54 de la Charte des Nations-Unies, au cas où l'OTAN deviendrait une organisation régionale, appellent des considérations analogues.

Aux termes de l'Article 54, "le Conseil de Sécurité doit, en tout temps, être tenu pleinement au courant de toute action entreprise ou envisagée en vertu d'accords régionaux ou par des organismes régionaux, pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales". Il est généralement admis que ce texte est obscur et peut

prêter à malentendu. L'interprétation généralement admise tend à limiter la portée de l'Article 54 aux mesures déjà prises ou envisagées en vertu d'une autorisation préalable du Conseil de Sécurité.

Toutefois, aucune décision officielle n'est intervenue jusqu'à présent au sujet de l'interprétation exacte de l'Article 54. Là encore, nous sommes en présence d'un texte assez confus pour rendre possible, voire probable, au cas où l'OTAN deviendrait une organisation régionale, que se posent des questions d'une grande portée, non seulement dans le public, mais aussi aux Nations-Unies elles-mêmes, au sujet du sens exact du droit pour le Conseil de Sécurité d'être tenu au courant de l'activité de l'OTAN, y compris, éventuellement, ses plans militaires et ses dispositions de défense.

7. Tels sont les aspects négatifs d'une transformation officielle de l'OTAN en organisation régionale; en revanche, aucune modification juridique de cette nature ne serait nécessaire pour permettre aux gouvernements membres, s'ils le désirent, d'entreprendre l'exécution de l'une quelconque ou de toutes les tâches actuellement accomplies par les organisations régionales existantes, telles que l'Organisation des Etats américains, aux fins de règlement des différends entre leurs membres. En premier lieu, lorsque les voies diplomatiques normales se révèlent insuffisantes, les membres de l'OTAN peuvent toujours procéder à un échange de vues au sein du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord. Telle est en fait la procédure normale envisagée par les auteurs du Traité. Les membres de l'OTAN ont également la faculté, dans les conditions actuelles, d'appliquer n'importe quelle mesure de règlement pacifique des différends envisagée par l'Article 33 et d'autres articles du Chapitre VI de la Charte des Nations-Unies. Il suffirait à cet effet d'une résolution du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, qu'elle soit destinée à établir une règle générale ou qu'elle concerne des cas particuliers.

8. Si les considérations formulées dans le paragraphe précédents sont pertinentes et bien fondées, il ne faut pas non plus oublier, en dehors du problème immédiat des relations entre pays OTAN, la question de l'impact psychologique de l'OTAN sur l'opinion. Non seulement l'autorité de l'OTAN et le respect qu'elle commande doivent rester intacts, mais il ne faut laisser croire à personne que l'adoption par l'OTAN des usages et procédures des organisations régionales traduit une modification des buts fondamentaux de l'Alliance. Quelque avantage que puissent présenter, dans le domaine des relations entre Etats membres, l'adoption de nouvelles activités et la création de nouveaux mécanismes, il serait toujours indispensable de préciser que ces mesures n'impliquent à aucun degré

- (a) l'affaiblissement ou la transformation de son fondement juridique initial (l'Article 51 de la Charte des Nations-Unies) ou de l'application des dispositions du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (Articles 3, 4, 5 et 6 du Traité);
- (b) l'abandon des résultats et de l'organisation déjà acquis au sein de l'OTAN.

Faute de quoi, l'effet sur l'opinion publique des mesures prises serait extrêmement nuisible aux objectifs initiaux de l'OTAN, sans que la nouvelle orientation présente des avantages correspondants.

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD <sup>10</sup>  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

3rd Registr<sup>m</sup>

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
13th August, 1956



EXEMPLAIRE N° 73  
COPY

NATO CONFIDENTIAL  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/5

To: Permanent Representatives  
From: Acting Secretary General

COMMITTEE OF THREE

The attached Memorandum by the Danish and Norwegian Governments on a "Centre of Atlantic Community Studies" is circulated at the request of the Committee of Three.

The Committee considers that this Memorandum will be useful to other governments in the preparation of their answers to the questions set out in Section III, sub-sections 1(a) and (b) of the Committee of Three's questionnaire.(1)

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIIe.

(1) CT-D/1(Revised) ✓

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRE OF ATLANTIC COMMUNITY STUDIES

Memorandum by the Danish and Norwegian Governments

With reference to the question of setting up a "Centre of Atlantic Community Studies", the Governments of Denmark and Norway wish to make the following comments.

1. Discussions in NATO on the further development of the Atlantic Community in the spirit of Article 2 have stressed the need for:

- (a) A more profound cognisance of the political, economic, social and cultural ideas on which the Community is based;
- (b) Collective efforts within NATO to promote and extend the understanding of the Atlantic Community, thus making it a lasting reality.

2. For more than four years NATO Defence College, under the direction of the Standing Group, has carried out valuable work by imparting to a limited number of military and civilian officials from member countries, through 6 months' courses, a better understanding of the defence problems of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

3. Recognition of the demands, arising from developments, for an intensification of NATO co-operation in the non-military fields, naturally leads to the idea of setting up a "Centre of Atlantic Community Studies", which, as a civilian version of NATO Defence College, would be able to foster a more profound appreciation of the solidarity within the Atlantic Community and to disseminate this knowledge to wider circles.

4. The following preliminary thoughts are presented regarding the activities of the Centre:

The Centre should undertake teaching and should principally be open to persons who are in a position to influence public opinion, such as teachers, journalists, leaders of youth activities, etc., as well as civil servants, in order to enable these persons to promote in their home countries a better understanding of the political, economic, social and cultural life of the Atlantic Community.

In addition to an advanced education of qualified persons for the above purpose, the task of the Centre should be to bring about, on a broader basis and preferably through short elementary courses, a better knowledge and appreciation of the common ideals and historical heritage of the NATO countries. In this respect the educational activities of the Nordic Folk High Schools are kept in mind.

Finally, the activities of the Centre should form the basis for research on matters of common concern to the member countries and on issues bearing upon the developments of the Atlantic Community.

5. In relation to NATO the Centre should have the same independent status as a university in a democratic country. This would entail, amongst other things, that representatives of non-NATO countries may have the opportunity to participate in the activities of the Centre.

For purposes of organization the Centre should be placed directly under the North Atlantic Council. It is suggested that a number of Council members and distinguished representatives of cultural life in the member countries be elected to serve as the Steering Board of the Centre. A director (principal) nominated by the Council for a term of say three years, should be in charge of the management of the Centre.

The Centre should be seated in Paris. In order to avoid duplication of work the Centre should keep in close contact with NATO Defence College. The functions of the Centre should be laid down in a Charter prepared by a Committee of Experts, and adopted by the North Atlantic Council.

6. The centre should be financed by common NATO funds.



CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE

N°

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COPY

NATO CONFIDENTIEL  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/5

ORIGINAL: ANGLAIS  
13 août 1956



Aux : Représentants Permanents

Du : Secrétaire Général par intérim

COMITE DES TROIS

Le mémorandum ci-joint des gouvernements danois et norvégien sur un "Centre d'études atlantiques" est distribué à la demande du Comité des Trois.

Le Comité estime que les autres gouvernements pourront utilement consulter ce mémorandum lorsqu'ils établiront leur réponse aux questions de la Section III, sous-sections 1 (a) et (b) du questionnaire du Comité des Trois. (1)

(Signé) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIIe.

(1) CT-D/1 (Révisé) ✓

NATO CONFIDENTIEL

CENTRE D'ETUDES SUR LA COMMUNAUTE ATLANTIQUE

Mémorandum des gouvernements du Danemark  
et de la Norvège

Les gouvernements du Danemark et de la Norvège désirent formuler les observations ci-après au sujet de la création d'un "Centre d'études sur la Communauté atlantique".

1. Les échanges de vues qui ont été consacrés au sein de l'OTAN à un nouveau développement de la Communauté atlantique dans l'esprit de l'article 2 ont fait ressortir la nécessité:
  - (a) d'une connaissance plus approfondie des principes politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels sur lesquels repose cette Communauté;
  - (b) d'efforts collectifs au sein de l'OTAN afin de promouvoir et de développer la connaissance de la Communauté atlantique et d'en faire une réalité durable.
2. Depuis plus de quatre ans, le Collège de Défense de l'OTAN, sous la direction du Groupe permanent, accomplit une tâche précieuse en apprenant à un petit nombre d'officiers et de fonctionnaires des pays membres au moyen de cours d'une durée de six mois à mieux comprendre les problèmes de défense de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord.
3. En reconnaissant la nécessité, née de l'évolution de la situation, d'intensifier la coopération OTAN dans les domaines non militaires, on en vient tout naturellement à l'idée de la création d'un "Centre d'études sur la Communauté atlantique". Ce centre, version civile du Collège de Défense de l'OTAN, serait en mesure de faire naître une conscience plus profonde de la solidarité des membres de la Communauté atlantique, et de diffuser cette conscience dans des milieux plus larges.
4. On trouvera ci-après des notions préliminaires relatives aux activités du Centre:

Ce Centre devrait se consacrer à l'enseignement et s'adresser principalement aux personnes qui sont en mesure d'influencer l'opinion publique, telles que professeurs, journalistes, dirigeants de mouvements de jeunesse, etc... ainsi qu'aux fonctionnaires, afin de permettre à ces personnes de contribuer à mieux faire connaître dans leur pays la vie politique, économique, sociale et culturelle de la Communauté atlantique.

Toutefois, le Centre ne se contenterait pas de dispenser à des personnes qualifiées un enseignement poussé aux fins décrites ci-dessus; il s'efforcerait également de développer, sur une base plus large et de préférence au moyen de cours élémentaires de

courte durée, une meilleure connaissance et une plus grande appréciation des idéaux et de l'héritage historique communs aux pays de l'OTAN. A cet égard, il convient de rappeler l'activité éducatrice des écoles secondaires populaires des pays nordiques.

Enfin, c'est sur l'activité du Centre que devraient se fonder les recherches entreprises sur des questions qui intéressent également les pays membres ou qui ont une influence sur l'évolution de la Communauté atlantique.

5. Vis-à-vis de l'OTAN, le Centre devrait avoir la même indépendance qu'une université dans un pays démocratique, ce qui aurait notamment pour conséquence de permettre aux représentants des pays non OTAN de participer à l'activité du Centre.

L'organisation du Centre devrait dépendre directement du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord. Il est suggéré qu'un certain nombre de membres du Conseil et d'éminents représentants des activités culturelles des pays membres soient élus au Comité de direction du Centre. La direction du Centre devrait incomber à un Principal désigné par le Conseil pour une période de trois ans par exemple.

Le Centre aurait son siège à Paris. En vue d'éviter tout double emploi, il devrait se tenir en contact étroit avec le Collège de Défense de l'OTAN. Les fonctions du Centre devraient être définies dans une Charte établie par un Comité d'experts et adoptée par le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord.

6. Les dépenses du Centre seraient imputées sur les fonds communs de l'OTAN.

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17th August, 1956

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RECEIVED

TO: Members of the Committee of Three

FROM: Acting Secretary General

The attached note on procedures for the pacific settle-  
ment of disputes within various international organizations, has  
been prepared by the International Staff in response to the  
Committee's request.\*

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.

\* CT-R/1, paragraph 8. ✓

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NOTE ON PROCEDURES FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF  
DISPUTES WITHIN VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The procedures followed for the pacific settlement of international disputes are, as is well known, of three kinds: pre-judicial, semi-judicial and judicial; they include diplomatic negotiation, enquiry, good offices, conciliation, arbitration and recourse to the International Court of Justice. The question is whether they could be applied by an organization such as NATO. Other international organizations - the Organization of American States, the United Nations, the Western European Union - have adopted them.

A. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

2. The Organization of American States prescribes the following:

Pre-judicial procedures

In the first instance, it provides for pre-judicial procedures (American Treaty on Pacific Settlement - Pact of Bogota, 30th April, 1948).

1) In the event of failure of diplomatic negotiation, recourse is had to good offices. The good offices are not necessarily those of States but may also be supplied by eminent citizens, whose function is that of mediators, not judges. The mediators set a period of from 3 to 6 months for the Parties to reach a peaceful settlement of their differences; if they fail to do so, conciliation procedures are resorted to.

2) Conciliation procedures can assume various forms. The Commission of Investigation, consisting of five American members, is convened by the Council of the OAS and must submit a report within six months. The OAS Council may itself act as a conciliation panel (under the terms of the 1947 Treaty of Rio). It can act in this capacity in cases of violation of the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or independence of member States by one of themselves or by a non-member State.

The Inter-American Peace Committee is a little outside the orbit of the OAS (possibly through an oversight on the part of the drafters of the 1948 Pact of Bogota). Composed of five members, unlike the Council of the Organization itself it is vested with judicial powers.

It should be noted that certain American States consider that the Council, with its ability to act in the dual capacity of conciliator and organ of political consultation is in danger of becoming too powerful, while others consider that, with its membership of five, the Inter-American Peace Committee is not unlike an oligarchy.

Semi-judicial procedures

3. Provision also exists for a semi-judicial procedure:  
ARBITRATION.

This procedure has often been adopted by the American States. The arbiter has sometimes been the head of a State, sometimes the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague. The present arbitration procedure is that laid down in the Pact of Bogota (Chapter 5, Articles 38 et seq.).

Recourse to arbitration is optional but becomes compulsory when a dispute having been brought before the International Court of Justice of The Hague, the latter has declared itself to be without jurisdiction to hear the controversy (see paragraph 4 hereunder).

The Pact of Bogota specifies how the Arbitral Tribunal is to be established, how the special arbitration agreement is to be drawn up, the role of the Council in the event of failure to appoint the arbiter, the form in which the award is to be drafted, etc.

Judicial procedures

4. One of the aims of the American States is to reach the stage of inter-American justice. To take account of this desire for compulsory jurisdiction, the Pact of Bogota, in Chapter 4, Article 31, makes the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice of The Hague compulsory. The Pact refers specifically to Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and recognises as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court in all disputes of a juridical nature (e.g. the interpretation of a treaty; any question of international law; the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute the breach of an international obligation; the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation).

The Pact also provides that either of the parties to a dispute may have recourse to the Court when conciliation procedure has failed or arbitration has not been accepted.

Furthermore, the Court alone is competent to determine the merits of a plea by one of the parties that it is without jurisdiction to hear the controversy. If the Court declares itself without jurisdiction on the grounds that the controversy is national in character, that it has already been settled or that all internal means of recourse have not been exhausted, such controversy shall be declared ended. If the Court declares itself to be without jurisdiction for any other reason, this decision is tantamount to referring the dispute to arbitration which, as stated above (paragraph 3), becomes compulsory in certain cases. This procedure provides means of settling political differences by arbitration.

System of Collective Security

5. The American States have organized in the American continent a system of internal collective security (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Rio de Janeiro, 2nd September, 1947).

They regard the interference of any State in the affairs of another State as tantamount to aggression. They have signed various pacts which reject war as an instrument of policy and

mutually reject their right to territorial conquest; they do not recognise gains obtained by the use of force. During the War, a so-called emergency committee was set up for political defence; it held a watching brief over all the American States to forestall any infiltration or any political aggression detrimental to the continent and was, in reality, directed against the Axis Powers. In its role of an investigating and co-ordinating body, it was able to make recommendations to the Council of the Union.

6. The system of collective security set forth in the Act of Chapultepec (1945) is defined by the Treaty of Rio (1947).

The Treaty prescribes preventive measures and sanctions covering all conflicts, and stresses the need for close co-operation between the American Governments for the maintenance of peace.

- (a) It specifies that an attack by any State against the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or political independence of any other State shall be considered as an attack against all the other American States;
- (b) it imposes conciliation on the American States as a duty. As a provisional measure, the Council can assume this duty by convening the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned. (No time limit is set, and it can happen, as it already has, that the Council, after convening the Foreign Ministers without specifying the date of their meeting, itself acts as the organ of conciliation);
- (c) the Council also acts as the organ of political consultation. In this capacity, it is vested with powers of determination, and this makes its prescriptions, which are collective in character, binding on States parties to the Treaty.

These prescriptions may comprise recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic, consular and finally postal relations; interruption of commercial, economic and financial relations; the use of armed force.

They are optional in the case of a mere threat or of an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, compulsory in the case of armed aggression or an aggression which, though not an armed attack, affects the sovereignty, the independence or the territorial integrity of one of the member States.

The rejection of pacifying action by an American State will stamp that State as an aggressor. However, no American State is required to make use of armed force.

#### B. THE UNITED NATIONS

7. The American States, like the Atlantic States, have at their disposal an alternative system for the peaceful settlement of international controversies, i.e. the one written into the United Nations Charter.

The Charter provides for situations of two kinds; the existence of disputes the continuance of which may constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, and the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

8. For the first case, the Charter (Article 33,1) lays down that the parties shall first of all seek a solution of the dispute by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, or by recourse to regional agencies or arrangements (Article 36,1). This clause not only prescribes the traditional methods, but also, it is worth noting, recognises the priority and value of regional arrangements for the settlement of international disputes. The procedures of an agency such as the Organization of American States, are fully warranted under this head.

Should the parties omit to have recourse to peaceful means, the Security Council, if it deems it necessary, urges them to settle their dispute by such means. If this advice is followed, the Council may nevertheless recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment; the legislation of all the States leaves them freedom to adopt these recommendations. The Council is, of course, expected to take into consideration any procedures already initiated and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in legal matters. Should the parties "fail to settle the dispute", either of them may refer it to the Council. The latter recognises or denies the existence of a dispute and, in the affirmative, decides whether it concerns a reserved field, i.e. one outside the purview of any international authority, ascertains whether the procedures for pacific settlement referred to above (negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other Council recommendation) have been followed, and determines whether the continuance of the dispute is, in fact, likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace. It may then, if it deems it desirable, recommend the adoption of further means of pacific settlement, the employment of methods of appeasement, or even suitable terms of settlement. The field of action of the Council is, therefore, extremely wide.

9. The second situation comprises threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression (Article 39). When the Council has determined the existence of such circumstances, it makes recommendations or decides what measures shall be taken. These may be provisional measures which it imposes on the parties concerned (Article 40); on the other hand, it may call on all members of the Organization, or only some of them, to apply other sets of measures. The latter may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal and other means of communication (Article 41). If it considers these to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

10. The attention of the Security Council may be drawn to these disputes by the parties concerned, including States which are not Members (Article 35, paragraph 2), by member States which are not parties to the dispute, by the Secretary-General (Article 99) and by members of the Council themselves (Article 39).

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11. It is a moot point whether the General Assembly may itself bring a dispute to the notice of the Council but it would seem so (Articles 10 and 12,4). The General Assembly is, in any case, empowered to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 11) such as: supervision of the execution of the provisions of the Peace Treaties, attempts at finding peaceful means of smoothing out differences or of dealing with situations endangering peace (Article 14). The General Assembly has itself recognised that whenever there are threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression in respect of which the Security Council has been unable to fulfil its basic function, it may be convened for recommendations on the collective measures which should be taken (Resolution of 3rd November, 1950). However, this declaration of competence leaves unimpaired the primacy of the Security Council.

12. In brief, the United Nations Charter, although it refers legal disputes insofar as is feasible, to the International Court of Justice, provides that political disputes shall be handled entirely by a political agency, first and foremost the Security Council. However, the Charter omits certain definitions which, given a combination of procedures for the settlement of disputes, would appear to be essential, for instance, the definition of a dispute (presumably a deadlock between two parties regarding the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of certain obligations) or that of aggression. Consequently, the peaceful settlement of disputes by the Council rests on very fragile foundations. Last, but not least, in respect of questions of substance as opposed to procedure, the veto rule can operate.

This probably explains the interest evinced by the Charter itself in efficient regional agencies, to which Chapter VIII is devoted.

C. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

13. It will not be out of place to examine the relations of the United Nations with agencies such as the Organization of American States for the pacific settlement of disputes.

The character of the OAS is two-fold. It is an international organization designed to permit of the exercise of the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence; its basis is Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Article 3 of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, 1947). The American, like the Atlantic States can resort to force after they have been the victims of armed aggression. It is the Organ of Consultation of the OAS which determines the character of aggression.

Unlike NATO, the OAS must also be regarded as a regional agency set up within the framework of the United Nations (Article I of the OAS Charter, Bogota, 30th April 1948). According to the United Nations Charter, the purpose of regional agencies is primarily to deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. This is certainly the aim of the procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes between member States adopted by the OAS. They are thus consistent with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

Consequently, in implementation of the combined stipulations of the Charter and of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, in the event of a dispute, the American States must first try to settle it themselves by the methods they have accepted as members of a regional agency. However, they may not use coercive measures without the authority of the Security Council. They notify the latter of the existence of a dispute and keep it informed of the activities undertaken or in contemplation for its settlement. Any member government can draw the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly to the existence of the conflict (see paragraph 9 above). As has already been noted (see paragraph 7 above), the United Nations must refer the dispute back again if all means of settlement under the proscribed regional procedures have not been exhausted. The Security Council retains the right to ensure that the action taken is consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Article 52 of the Charter).

D. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

14. The members of the Western European Union have also stressed, in Article 8 of the Brussels Treaty (17th March 1948), their determination to settle disputes between themselves only by peaceful means. While the present Treaty remains in force, they agree to recognise the competence of the International Court of Justice as regards disputes of a legal character and to submit all other disputes, by which are meant political disputes, to arbitration procedure. However, so far, this procedure does not appear to have been defined.

CONCLUSIONS

15. The position of NATO States with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes still remains to be examined.

- (a) As regards legal disputes, the position is reasonably clear. All its members, with the exception of the German Federal Republic, are members of the United Nations and as such they have acknowledged not only the optional jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice but, under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, its compulsory jurisdiction subject to the reservations made by certain countries. As for the German Federal Republic, its position is on a par with that of its six WEU partners, by virtue of Article 8 of the Brussels Treaty.
- (b) As regards disputes of a political character, member States are bound only by the provisions of Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty and, with the exception of the German Federal Republic, by the United Nations Charter. These provisions are very obscure and, in a certain measure, problematical. If the prescribed procedures were followed, any difference between two NATO States would be submitted to the Security Council. There is no need to dwell on the benefit the enemies of the Alliance would derive from a public dispute between two parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, quite apart from the fact that the situation could only deteriorate as a result of such action.

(c) Under the terms of the relevant agreements, in the final analysis it normally falls to the North Atlantic Council to attempt itself to settle differences between member countries. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent the parties to a dispute if they are members of NATO, from submitting voluntarily to a procedure for its pacific settlement along the lines of those adopted by the American States, or from accepting a procedure recommended to them by the North Atlantic Council.

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
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Aux : Membres du Comité des Trois  
Du : Secrétaire Général par intérim

La note ci-jointe sur les procédures de règlement pacifique des différends dans différentes organisations internationales a été établie par le Secrétariat International à la demande du Comité (+).

(Signé) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIIe.



+ CT-R/1, paragraphe 8

N.A.T.O. DIFFUSION RESTREINTE

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NOTE SUR LES PROCEDURES DE REGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES DIFFERENDS  
DANS DIFFERENTES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Les procédés employés pour la solution pacifique des différends internationaux sont bien connus : préjuridictionnels, parajuridictionnels, juridictionnels; ce sont les négociations diplomatiques, les enquêtes, les bons offices, la médiation, la conciliation, l'arbitrage, le recours devant la Cour Internationale de Justice. Une institution comme l'OTAN pourrait-elle les employer ? D'autres organisations internationales les ont instaurés : Organisation des Etats Américains, Nations Unies, Union de l'Europe Occidentale. Nous allons les examiner.

A - L'ORGANISATION DES ETATS AMERICAINS

2. L'Organisation des Etats Américains use des procédures suivantes :

Procédures préjuridictionnelles

En premier lieu sont prévues des procédures préjuridictionnelles: (Traité américain de règlement pacifique : Pacte de Bogota 30 avril 1948).

1<sup>o</sup>) En cas d'échec des négociations diplomatiques on a recours à la procédure des bons offices. Les bons offices ne sont pas rendus nécessairement par des Etats, mais par des citoyens éminents; ceux-ci agissent en qualité de médiateurs et non de juges. Les médiateurs doivent fixer un délai de 3 à 6 mois pour que les Parties aboutissent à un règlement pacifique de leurs différends; en cas d'insuccès, il est recouru aux procédures de conciliation.

2<sup>o</sup>) Les procédures de conciliation peuvent se présenter sous diverses formes. La Commission d'Enquête consiste en une commission de cinq membres américains qui est convoquée par le Conseil de l'O.E.A. et qui doit présenter un rapport dans un délai de six mois. Le Conseil de l'O.E.A. peut agir également comme un organisme de conciliation (cela résulte a contrario du Traité de Rio 1947). Il peut agir en cette qualité en cas de violation de l'intégrité, de la souveraineté ou de l'indépendance des Etats membres, du fait de l'un d'eux comme de celui d'un Etat non membre.

La Commission interaméricaine de la Paix se situe un peu en marge de l'organisation de l'O.E.A. (peut-être par suite d'une négligence des rédacteurs du Pacte de Bogota 1948). Composée de cinq membres, elle dispose, à la différence du Conseil de l'Organisation lui-même, de pouvoirs juridiques propres.

Il faut noter que certains Etats américains estiment que le Conseil, par le cumul du rôle de conciliateur et de celui d'organe de consultation politique, risque de devenir trop puissant; d'autres, par contre, estiment que composée de cinq membres, la Commission interaméricaine de la Paix offre des allures oligarchiques.

Procédures parajuridictionnelles

3. Il existe aussi une procédure parajuridictionnelle : l'ARBITRAGE.

Il a été souvent employé par les Etats Américains. L'arbitre a été parfois un chef d'Etat, parfois la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage de La Haye. A l'heure actuelle, le Pacte de Bogota (chapitre 5, articles 38 et suivants), organise une procédure de l'arbitrage.

Le recours à l'arbitrage est facultatif; il devient obligatoire au cas où une affaire ayant été portée à la Cour Internationale de Justice de La Haye, celle-ci s'est déclarée incompétente pour en connaître (cf. ci-dessous par. 4).

Le Pacte de Bogota précise le mode de désignation du tribunal arbitral, les conditions de rédaction du compromis, le rôle du Conseil en cas de carence de l'arbitre, la rédaction de la sentence arbitrale, etc.

#### Procédures juridictionnelles

4. Les Etats Américains ont essayé d'atteindre le stade de la justice interaméricaine. Tenant compte de cette aspiration à la juridiction obligatoire, le Pacte de Bogota, chapitre 4, article 31 a proclamé la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour de La Haye. Le Pacte se réfère en effet à l'article 36, paragraphe 2 du Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice, et déclare obligatoire la compétence de la Cour à l'égard de différends d'ordre juridique (par exemple : interprétation du traité; tout point de droit international; l'existence de tout fait qui, s'il était établi, constituerait la violation d'un engagement international; la nature et l'étendue de la réparation due pour la rupture d'un engagement international).

Le Pacte prévoit en second lieu qu'une partie peut citer l'autre devant la Cour si dans un différend la conciliation a échoué ou si l'arbitrage n'a pas été accepté.

En outre, la Cour jouit d'une compétence exclusive pour décider du bien-fondé de l'exception du domaine réservé qui serait alléguée par une partie. Si elle se déclare incompétente, pour le motif que le litige est de compétence nationale, ou bien qu'il est déjà réglé ou bien que les voies internes de recours n'ont pas été épuisées, le différend doit être considéré comme terminé. Si sa décision d'incompétence est fondée sur d'autres motifs, elle constitue renvoi à une procédure d'arbitrage qui, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut (par. 3), revêt un caractère obligatoire. Cette procédure permet que des différends d'ordre politique puissent être résolus par l'arbitrage.

#### Système de Sécurité Collective

5. Les Etats Américains ont organisé sur le continent américain un système interne de sécurité collective (Traité interaméricain d'assistance mutuelle, Rio de Janeiro 2 septembre 1947).

Ils considèrent l'intervention d'un Etat dans les affaires d'un autre Etat comme une véritable agression. Par différents pactes ils ont proclamé la suppression de la compétence de guerre et du droit de conquête territoriale les uns envers les autres : ils ne reconnaissent pas les acquisitions dues à la force. Pendant la guerre a été créé un comité dit d'urgence pour la défense politique : il exerçait un droit de regard sur tous les Etats américains afin de

prévenir toute infiltration, toute agression politique susceptible d'atteindre le continent, il était en fait dirigé contre l'Axe; ayant un rôle d'étude et de coordination il pouvait faire des recommandations au Conseil de l'Union.

6. Le système de sécurité collective, organisé par l'Acte de Chapultepec (1945) est défini par le Traité de Rio (1947).

Ce texte organise la prévention et la sanction de tout conflit, insiste sur la nécessité de la solidarité étroite des gouvernements américains pour maintenir la paix.

a) Il pose le principe que toute atteinte d'un Etat à l'intégrité territoriale, à la souveraineté ou à l'indépendance politique d'un autre Etat est regardée comme un acte d'agression contre tous les autres membres de l'O.E.A.

b) il donne à l'O.E.A. le devoir de conciliation. Le Conseil peut l'exercer à titre provisoire à charge pour lui de convoquer les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères qui en sont responsables (aucune limite de durée n'est fixée pour cette convocation; il peut arriver, et il est arrivé, que le Conseil convoquant les ministres des Affaires Etrangères, sans fixer la date de leur réunion, agisse seul en qualité d'organisme conciliateur).

c) Le Conseil agit enfin en qualité d'organe de consultation politique. A ce titre il jouit d'un pouvoir déterminateur, c'est-à-dire que ses prescriptions sont obligatoires pour les Etats Parties au Traité et ont un caractère collectif.

Ces prescriptions peuvent être: le rappel des Chefs de Mission Diplomatique; la rupture des relations diplomatiques, puis consulaires, puis postales; l'interruption des relations commerciales, économiques, financières, l'usage de la force armée.

Elles sont facultatives en cas de simple menace ou conflits extra ou intra continentaux; elles sont obligatoires en cas d'agression armée; elles le sont également en cas d'agression non armée, mais attentatoire à la souveraineté, à l'indépendance, à l'intégrité territoriale d'un des Etats membres.

Le refus d'un Etat américain de s'associer à des mesures pacifiques le fait considérer comme un agresseur. Au contraire aucun Etat américain n'est tenu de faire usage de la force armée.

#### B - LES NATIONS UNIES

7. Les Etats américains, comme les Etats atlantiques disposent parallèlement d'un autre système de règlement pacifique des conflits, celui inscrit dans la Charte des Nations Unies.

Deux cas sont à considérer d'après la Charte, celui des différends dont la prolongation est susceptible de menacer le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationale, et celui des menaces contre la paix, des ruptures de paix, des actes de guerre.

8. Dans la première série d'hypothèses, la Charte (article 33, 1) prévoit que les parties doivent d'abord rechercher la solution du différend par voie de négociation, d'enquête, de médiation, de conciliation, d'arbitrage, de règlement judiciaire ou par recours aux organismes ou accords régionaux (art. 36, 1<sup>o</sup>). Cette disposition constitue d'une part un renvoi aux procédures traditionnelles

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et d'autre part, cela vaut d'être souligné, une reconnaissance de la priorité et de la valeur du régionalisme comme cadre pour la solution des différends internationaux. Les procédures d'une organisation comme l'O.E.A. ont, de ce chef, leur pleine utilité.

Si les parties négligent de recourir aux moyens pacifiques, le Conseil de Sécurité, s'il le juge nécessaire, les incite à régler le différend par de tels moyens (art. 37). Si elles utilisent ces moyens, le Conseil peut, cependant, recommander des procédures ou des méthodes d'ajustement appropriées; les Etats restent libres in jure de suivre cette recommandation. Il est bien entendu que le Conseil doit avoir égard aux procédures déjà engagées et à la compétence d'ordre juridique de la Cour Internationale. Si les parties n'ont pas réussi à "régler le différend" chacune d'elles peut porter celui-ci devant le Conseil. Celui-ci dira s'il existe réellement ou non un différend, statuera pour savoir si celui-ci est du domaine réservé c'est-à-dire échappe à la compétence de toute instance internationale, vérifiera si les procédures de règlement pacifique visées plus haut (négociation, enquête, médiation, conciliation, arbitrage, règlement judiciaire ou toute autre recommandée par le Conseil) ont été suivies, vérifiera si la prolongation du différend menace véritablement la paix du monde. Puis il pourra, s'il le juge utile, recommander soit que de nouvelles procédures de règlement pacifique soient observées, soit que des méthodes d'apaisement soient employées, soit même un règlement approprié du conflit. Le champ d'action du Conseil est donc infiniment varié.

9. La seconde série d'hypothèses comprend des menaces contre la paix, la rupture de la paix, les actes de guerre (art. 39); lorsque le Conseil a constaté que de telles circonstances existent, il fait des recommandations ou décide quelles mesures seront prises. Ce peuvent être des mesures provisoires qu'il impose aux parties intéressées (art. 40); à défaut il peut demander à tous les membres de l'Organisation ou à partie d'entre eux d'appliquer d'autres séries de mesures. Ces dernières peuvent être: l'interruption partielle ou complète des relations économiques, ou celle des communications ferroviaires, maritimes, aériennes, postales, etc..., la rupture des relations diplomatiques (art. 41). Si ces dernières lui paraissent inadéquates, il pourrait entreprendre au moyen de forces aériennes, navales ou terrestres, toute action jugée nécessaire au maintien ou au rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.

10. De tous ces différends le Conseil de Sécurité peut être saisi par les Parties intéressées, y compris des Etats non membres (art. 35, par. 2), par les Etats membres non parties au différend, par le Secrétaire Général (art. 99) par le Conseil lui-même (art. 39).

11. L'Assemblée Générale peut-elle le saisir également ? il le semble (art. 10 et 12, 4<sup>e</sup>). Celle-ci d'ailleurs a une compétence générale pour discuter toute question se rattachant au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales (art. 11); par exemple la surveillance de l'exécution des Traités de paix, la recherche de solutions destinées à apaiser les différends ou les situations menaçantes pour la paix (art. 14). Aussi bien a-t-elle admis elle-même que dans tous les cas de menace à la paix, de rupture de la paix, d'acte d'agression, où le Conseil de Sécurité n'aurait pas été en mesure de s'acquitter de sa fonction essentielle, elle pourrait être réunie pour faire des recommandations sur les mesures



collectives à prendre (Résolution du 3 Novembre 1950). Toutefois cette réclamation de compétence laisse intacte la prééminence du Conseil de Sécurité.

12. En somme, la Charte des Nations Unies, si elle renvoie les différends d'ordre juridique dans la mesure du possible à la Cour Internationale de Justice, laisse les différends d'ordre politique à l'exclusive compétence d'une institution politique au premier chef, le Conseil de Sécurité. Bien plus, la Charte ne donne point certaines définitions qui, dans un ensemble de procédures de solution de conflits, seraient bien nécessaires: par exemple celle des différends (on peut admettre que c'est la nette opposition entre 2 parties quant à l'exécution de la non exécution de certaines obligations), celle de l'agression. C'est dire que la solution pacifique des différends par le Conseil repose sur des bases fragiles. Enfin et surtout, pour ces questions, qui sont de substance et non de procédure, la règle du veto peut jouer (cf. art. 27).

On comprend dès lors l'intérêt attaché par la Charte elle-même au bon fonctionnement des Organisations régionales au sens de son chapitre VIII.

#### C - RAPPORTS DES NATIONS UNIES AVEC L'O.E.A.

13. Quels sont les rapports des Nations Unies et d'une organisation comme l'O.E.A. du point de vue du règlement pacifique des différends ?

L'O.E.A. a un double caractère: c'est une organisation internationale destinée à permettre la mise en oeuvre de la légitime défense, individuelle et collective; elle est fondée sur l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies (art. 3 du Traité de Rio de Janeiro 1947). Les Etats américains, comme les Etats atlantiques, peuvent recourir à la force s'ils sont d'abord l'objet d'une agression armée. L'appréciation du caractère de l'agression appartient à l'Organe de Consultation de l'O.E.A.

A la différence de l'O.T.A.N., l'O.E.A. doit en outre être regardée, en même temps, comme une organisation régionale, dans le cadre des Nations Unies (article 1 de la Charte de l'O.E.A. Bogota 30 avril 1948). D'après la Charte des Nations Unies (art. 52), l'objet des organismes régionaux est essentiellement de régler les affaires qui, touchant au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, se prêtent à une action de caractère régional. Tel est bien le but des procédures de règlement pacifique de différend entre Etats membres, prévues au sein de l'O.E.A. Aussi bien relèvent-elles du Chapitre VIII de la Charte des Nations Unies.

Dès lors, en application des dispositions combinées de la Charte et du Traité de Rio de Janeiro, en cas de différend, les Etats américains sont tenus d'abord d'essayer de le régler eux-mêmes suivant les méthodes auxquelles ils ont souscrit en tant que membre d'une organisation régionale. Toutefois ils ne peuvent user de mesures coercitives sans l'autorisation du Conseil de Sécurité. Ils doivent faire rapport à celui-ci sur l'existence du conflit et les méthodes employées ou projetées en vue de le résoudre. Tout gouvernement membre a le droit de soumettre le conflit à l'attention du Conseil de Sécurité ou de l'Assemblée Générale (par. 9 ci-dessus). Mais comme nous l'avons vu (par. 7 ci-dessus) les Nations Unies doivent renvoyer le différend si les procédures régionales ne sont pas épuisées.

Le Conseil de Sécurité conserve le droit de vérifier à tous moments la compatibilité de l'action entreprise avec les buts et principes des Nations Unies (art. 52 de la Charte).

D - UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE

14. Les membres de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale ont également souligné, à l'article 8 du Traité de Bruxelles (17 mars 1948) leur détermination de ne régler leurs différends que par des voies pacifiques: pendant la durée de l'application du Traité, ils s'engagent à respecter la compétence de la Cour Internationale de Justice concernant les différends d'ordre juridique, et à soumettre à une procédure de conciliation tous les autres différends, c'est-à-dire les différends d'ordre politique; toutefois, il ne semble pas que cette procédure ait été définie jusqu'à ce jour.

CONCLUSION

15. Quelle est la situation des États de l'OTAN au regard du règlement pacifique des différends.

a) en ce qui concerne les différends d'ordre juridique la situation est assez claire. Tous, sauf la République Fédérale, sont membres des Nations Unies; en cette qualité ils ont reconnu non seulement la compétence facultative de la Cour Internationale de Justice, mais encore en application de l'art. 36 du Statut de la Cour, sa juridiction obligatoire sous certaines réserves formulées par certains pays. Pour la République Fédérale elle est dans une situation analogue à l'égard de ses six partenaires de l'U.E.O. en application de l'art. 8 du Traité de Bruxelles.

b) en ce qui concerne les différends d'ordre politique, ils ne sont liés que par les formules de l'article I du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, et sauf pour la République Fédérale par celles de la Charte des Nations Unies. Celles-ci sont bien vagues et dans une certaine mesure aléatoires: en effet, s'il fallait suivre les procédures prévues, un conflit entre deux États atlantiques serait soumis au Conseil de Sécurité: le profit que tireraient les adversaires de l'Alliance d'une discussion politique entre deux signataires du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, il n'est pas nécessaire de le souligner, sans compter que la situation elle-même ne pourrait que s'envenimer.

c) Dans l'état actuel des textes, c'est en définitive normalement au Conseil Atlantique lui-même de s'employer à régler les différends entre ses membres. Rien ne s'oppose d'autre part, à ce que les parties en cause à un différend, et membres de l'O.T.A.N., se soumettent, de leur gré, à une procédure de solution pacifique du type de celles adoptées par les États américains, ou acceptent d'en suivre une qui leur serait recommandée par le Conseil Atlantique.

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

12

ASC Political air.

EXEMPLAIRE N° 20  
COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
28th August, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/7

To: Members of the Committee of Three  
From: Acting Secretary General

The attached outline of what NATO has done so far in the non-military fields has been prepared by the International Staff in response to the Committee's request.\*

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.

\* CT-R/1, para.6 ✓

NISCA FILE No.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

OUTLINE OF WHAT NATO HAS DONE SO FAR IN THE NON-MILITARY FIELDS

The achievements of the NATO countries during the past ten years in the field of non-military co-operation have been considerable. This is demonstrated in the Survey of Article 2 activities prepared recently at the request of the Council.<sup>(1)</sup> But the practical achievements of NATO itself in this field have been severely limited, largely because most members of NATO are also members of a wide range of other agencies which deal with various aspects of non-military co-operation. Most of these agencies have a wider membership than NATO and provide essential political and economic links between the Atlantic countries and the rest of the world. The policy of NATO has therefore been to avoid a duplication of effort which would not only be wasteful but might weaken other agencies and harm these valuable links.

2. This policy is implicit in the Ottawa Declaration of 20th September 1951 in which the Council announced that it had set up a five-power Ministerial Committee on the North Atlantic Community to consider ways and means of implementing Article 2 of the Treaty "without duplicating the work of other international organizations which promote the same objectives" as NATO. The final report of this Committee,<sup>(2)</sup> adopted by the Council in February 1952, recommended that the tasks of the Committee be transferred to the Council in permanent session and made various suggestions for developing co-operation on the following subjects:-

- co-ordination and consultation on foreign policy;
- economic co-operation;
- the movement of labour;
- cultural co-operation;
- information activities.

The subject of social co-operation was also considered but the Committee felt that there was little that NATO could do which was not already being done, unless there was an opportunity in the future of developing trans-Atlantic collaboration. It recommended that the subject be kept under review. The following is a brief summary of what has been done so far in the non-military fields.

Co-ordination and consultation on foreign policy

3. Political discussions by the Council have increased steadily in scope and importance during the past few years. Certain subjects are debated regularly in Permanent and in Ministerial Sessions of the Council: the political implications of the military situation, taking account of the relative military strength of the Communist Bloc and of the West; relations in the Communist Bloc and trends in Soviet policy. On this latter subject a Working Group has been set up to advise the Council. Other questions

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(1) C-M(56)45(Revised)  
(2) C/9-D/8

have been brought before the Council by member governments which were of concern to other member governments or to the Organization as a whole. Special mention should be made of the consultations on the German problem, European security, and disarmament; and on the decisions taken at major international conferences. It is a sign of the growing use of the Council as a forum for political consultation that the earlier international conferences were discussed only after they had been held whereas before the Geneva conference in 1955 there were preliminary consultations on the line which would be followed.

4. Nevertheless, political consultations have by no means reached the point of using the Alliance to the fullest advantage. The NATO countries are rightly reluctant to behave as though they were members of a tightly closed bloc, but many problems of common interest to member countries have as yet barely been touched upon.

#### Economic co-operation

5. The work of this Organization in this field has fallen into two parts. First, economic studies of member countries are made in the course of the Annual Review (using to a great extent the results of the economic survey conducted by the OEEC). Although the purpose of these studies stems from the need to ensure that the defence effort rests on a secure economic base, they may fairly be regarded as having non-military implications. Following the precedent set by the Temporary Council Committee in 1951, the Council in debating the results of the Annual Review, has from time to time made recommendations on economic policy, while leaving the practical consequences of these recommendations to be worked out elsewhere.

6. Secondly, the Council has set up a committee to advise it on economic developments and policies in the Soviet countries, with particular reference to trends in the comparative economic strengths of the NATO and Soviet countries. Recently, this committee was requested to prepare periodic surveys of Soviet economic moves vis-à-vis the outside world, especially the underdeveloped areas. In addition, a committee of technical experts has been established which at present is studying the Pineau Plan for aid to underdeveloped countries.

7. It will be noted that the growing interest of the Organization in economic matters arises from the changing tactics of the Soviet bloc rather than from the intention of member countries to use NATO as an instrument for general economic collaboration in the sense that this is implied in Article 2 of the Treaty.

#### Social co-operation - the movement of labour

8. The only social question considered by NATO is that of the movement of labour. A working group has been set up to study trends in employment, labour mobility and migration and to advise the Council on means of freeing the movement of labour and assisting migration. This working group produces annual reports containing general conclusions but no precise recommendations for action.

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Cultural and information activities

9. A Council committee has been established to give policy guidance on matters of information and cultural relations. Various studies have been made to find the most fruitful ways of developing cultural co-operation within NATO. In 1954, a temporary consultant was appointed who produced a report for the Council. In July 1956, a meeting was held of senior officers concerned with government sponsored cultural activities in member countries; their report is currently under consideration.

10. The results of five years of debate and study are not very impressive. So far the following action has been taken by NATO:

- (a) a NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme was established in 1955. It distributed its first sixteen grants in April 1956;
- (b) a summer course for representatives of Universities and Youth Organizations from NATO countries was held in Paris in July 1955. A further meeting of representatives of Youth Organizations was held this year;
- (c) NATO contributed to a Summer Seminar on International Organizations held in Oxford in July 1956.

11. The main information activities undertaken by the organization are: NATO sponsored journalists' tours, conferences of heads of national information services, conferences and courses on troop information, briefing of visitors to NATO Headquarters, the publication of the NATO letter, of handbooks and other documentation, the organization of mobile exhibits and the production and distribution of films.

12. [Despite an annual increase in the financial support for cultural and information activities, the total amount now made available seems small compared with the resources of member countries. At the same time, governments have failed to provide the alternative to increased support for NATO-wide activities - sustained and adequately programmed activities on a national basis.]

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

ASC Political an

EXEMPLAIRE N° 8  
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ORIGINAL: ANGLAIS  
28 août 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIEL  
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
Le Secrétaire Général par intérim

Aux: Membres du Comité des Trois

Le document ci-joint, qui expose dans ses grandes lignes l'oeuvre accomplie jusqu'ici par l'OTAN dans les domaines non militaires, a été établi par le Secrétariat International à la demande du Comité.\*

(Signé) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIe.



\* CT-R/1, paragraphe 6

NATO CONFIDENTIEL

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GRANDES LIGNES DE L'OEUVRE ACCOMPLIE JUSQU'ICI PAR L'OTAN  
DANS LES DOMAINES NON MILITAIRES

L'oeuvre accomplie par les pays de l'OTAN au cours des dix dernières années dans le domaine de la coopération non militaire est considérable, comme le prouve l'"Etude sur les Activités relatives à l'Article 2", récemment rédigée à la demande du Conseil(1). Sur le plan pratique cependant, les réalisations de l'OTAN proprement dites en ce domaine ont été fortement limitées, du fait surtout que la plupart de ses membres font également partie de nombreux autres organismes dont l'activité s'exerce dans divers domaines de la coopération non militaire. Ces organismes, qui, pour la plupart, regroupent un nombre de pays plus important que l'OTAN, permettent d'établir les liens politiques et économiques essentiels entre les pays atlantiques et le reste du monde. La politique de l'OTAN a donc consisté à éviter un chevauchement des efforts qui ne serait pas seulement inutile mais risquerait aussi d'affaiblir les autres organismes et de porter atteinte à ces liens d'une très grande valeur.

2. Cette politique est implicitement contenue dans la Déclaration d'Ottawa du 20 septembre 1951, par laquelle le Conseil annonçait qu'il avait créé une Commission ministérielle de cinq puissances sur la Communauté de l'Atlantique Nord avec mission d'étudier les voies et moyens permettant d'appliquer les dispositions de l'Article 2 du Traité "sans que son travail fasse double emploi avec celui d'autres organisations internationales qui visent au même but". Dans son rapport final(2) adopté par le Conseil en février 1952, la Commission recommanda que les tâches qui lui avaient été confiées fussent transférées au Conseil Permanent et présenta diverses suggestions en vue de développer la coopération dans les domaines suivants:

- coordination et consultations en matière de politique étrangère;
- coopération économique;
- mouvement de la main-d'oeuvre;
- coopération culturelle;
- activités relatives à l'information.

La question de la coopération sociale avait été examinée elle aussi, mais la Commission estima qu'il restait à l'OTAN bien peu à faire qui ne fût déjà fait dans ce domaine, à moins que la possibilité ne se présente par la suite de développer la collaboration entre les pays situés de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique. Elle recommanda que la question ne fût pas perdue de vue. On trouvera ci-après un résumé des résultats obtenus jusqu'à présent dans les domaines non militaires.

Coordination et consultations en matière de politique étrangère

3. Au cours des dernières années, les consultations politiques se sont développées régulièrement au sein du Conseil aussi bien en étendue qu'en importance. Certains sujets font

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(1) C-M(56)45(Révisé)

(2) C/9-D/8



l'objet de délibérations régulières au sein du Conseil permanent et au cours des sessions ministérielles: ce sont, par exemple, les incidences politiques de la situation militaire, compte tenu de la force militaire relative du bloc communiste et de l'Ouest; les relations avec le bloc communiste et les tendances de la politique soviétique. Pour cette dernière étude, un Groupe de travail a été créé avec mission de formuler des avis au Conseil. Les Gouvernements membres ont également saisi le Conseil d'autres questions qui intéressent soit d'autres pays de l'Alliance, soit l'Organisation dans son ensemble. Il convient de mentionner en particulier les consultations sur le problème allemand, sur la sécurité européenne, sur le désarmement et sur les décisions prises au cours des grandes conférences internationales. Alors que, dans le passé, le déroulement des conférences internationales n'était généralement étudié qu'après coup, les consultations politiques qui ont précédé la conférence de Genève de 1955 montrent le rôle de plus en plus grand que joue le Conseil en tant que centre de consultations politiques.

4. Cependant, le développement des consultations politiques est loin d'avoir atteint le point où celles-ci permettraient de conférer à l'Alliance toute sa valeur. Les pays de l'OTAN répugnent à juste titre à se conduire comme s'ils étaient les éléments d'un bloc monolithique mais jusqu'à présent un grand nombre de problèmes d'un intérêt commun pour les membres de l'Organisation n'ont guère été effleurés.

#### Coopération économique

5. Les travaux de l'Organisation en ce domaine se présentent sous deux aspects. Tout d'abord, les études économiques auxquelles procèdent les pays membres à l'occasion de l'Examen annuel (en utilisant largement les résultats de l'examen économique effectué par l'OECE). Bien que l'utilité de ces études tienne à la nécessité d'assurer à l'effort de défense une base économique saine, elles peuvent raisonnablement être considérées comme ayant des incidences non militaires. Suivant en cela l'exemple donné par le Comité Temporaire du Conseil en 1951, le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, lorsqu'il examine les résultats de l'Examen annuel, formule parfois des recommandations sur la politique économique tout en laissant à d'autres la mise en oeuvre pratique de ces recommandations.

6. En second lieu, le Conseil a créé un autre comité avec mission de formuler des avis sur l'évolution et la politique économique des pays soviétiques, en considérant particulièrement les tendances de la puissance économique relative de l'OTAN et du bloc soviétique. Ce comité a été récemment chargé de procéder à la revue périodique des initiatives économiques des Soviets à l'égard du monde extérieur et notamment des régions insuffisamment développées. En outre, un Comité de techniciens créé depuis peu étudie actuellement le plan Pineau d'aide aux pays sous-développés.

7. Il convient de noter que l'intérêt croissant de l'OTAN pour les questions économiques est dû davantage à la nouvelle tactique soviétique qu'à la volonté de ses membres d'utiliser l'Organisation comme un instrument de collaboration économique générale au sens donné à ce terme dans l'Article 2 du Traité.

Coopération sociale - Mouvements de main-d'oeuvre

8. La seule question sociale prise en considération par l'OTAN est celle des mouvements de main-d'oeuvre. Un Groupe de travail a été constitué pour étudier les tendances de l'emploi, la mobilité de la main-d'oeuvre et les migrations et pour renseigner le Conseil sur les moyens de libérer les mouvements de main-d'oeuvre et de favoriser les migrations. Ce Groupe de travail rédige des rapports annuels aboutissant à des conclusions générales mais qui ne contiennent aucune recommandation précise sur les mesures à prendre.

Activités culturelles et Information

9. Un Comité établi par le Conseil a pour mission de donner des directives générales sur les questions d'information et les relations culturelles. Ce Comité a procédé à diverses études sur les moyens les plus efficaces pour développer la coopération culturelle au sein de l'OTAN. Un Conseiller temporaire, nommé en 1954, a rédigé un rapport à l'intention du Conseil. En juillet 1956, une réunion de hauts fonctionnaires a étudié les activités culturelles patronnées par le gouvernement dans les divers pays membres ; ce rapport est actuellement à l'étude.

10. Le résultat de cinq années de délibérations et d'études n'est pas très impressionnant. Jusqu'à présent, les réalisations de l'OTAN ont été les suivantes :

- (a) Un programme de bourses d'études et de recherches créé en 1955. Les seize premières bourses ont été décernées en avril 1956.
- (b) Un cours d'été pour des représentants d'Universités et d'organisations de jeunesse appartenant aux pays de l'OTAN qui a eu lieu à Paris en juillet 1955. Une nouvelle réunion des Représentants des organisations de jeunesse, tenue en 1956.
- (c) L'OTAN a participé à un cours d'été consacré aux organisations internationales qui a eu lieu à Oxford en juillet 1956.

11. Les principales activités d'information entreprises par l'Organisation sont: les voyages de journalistes, patronnés par l'OTAN, les conférences des Directeurs des services d'Information nationaux, les conférences et les cours pour l'information des forces armées, les "briefings" aux personnes qui viennent visiter le siège de l'OTAN, la publication des "Nouvelles de l'OTAN" de manuels et d'autres documents, l'organisation d'expositions itinérantes et la production et la distribution de films.

12. En dépit de l'augmentation annuelle des moyens financiers accordés aux activités culturelles et à l'Information, le total des sommes actuellement disponibles semble faible eu égard des ressources des pays membres. Par ailleurs, les gouvernements n'ont pas fourni l'alternative à un appui accru aux activités OTAN, à savoir un programme d'activités culturelles et d'information régulier et convenablement conçu à l'échelon national.

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CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

(24)

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EXEMPLAIRE  
COPY N° 24  
NISCA 670  
NATO SECRET  
DOCUMENT  
CT-D/8

ENGLISH ONLY  
28th August, 1956

To: Members of the Committee of Three  
From: Acting Secretary General

Attached are lists of political and economic questions which have been put before the Council in the past. These lists have been prepared in accordance with an instruction from the Committee (1).

2. As will be seen, the list on political subjects and the list on economic subjects have been sub-divided into questions submitted for information only and questions which have been discussed and acted upon by the Council. Attached to each sub-division is an index of the subjects which have been dealt with.

(Signed) A. BENTINCK

Palais de Chaillot,  
Paris, XVIIe.

NISCA FILE N.

(1) CT-R/1 paragraph 7

NATO SECRET  
 CT-D/8

POLITICAL SUBJECTS CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL

1952

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
C-R(52)3	Export of arms to Egypt from NATO countries	13. 5. 52.	Statement of UK Representative on export of arms to Egypt from NATO countries
C-R(52)18	United Kingdom and Egypt	20. 8. 52.	United Kingdom statement on relations with Egypt
	Swiss Merchant Marine	28. 8. 52.	The US Representative explained the position of his Government on this matter
	Iran	4. 9. 52.	The UK Representative informed the Council that the latest US - UK proposals with regard to the settlement of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been rejected
C-R(52)25	EDC	15.10.52.	Progress report on the work of the EDC interim Commission
C-R(52)26		22.10.52.	French statement on ratification of EDC agreement
	Denmark and the Soviet Union	30.10.52.	Danish statement on an exchange of notes between Denmark and the Soviet Union
	Relations between the Soviet Union and East Germany and the Soviet Union and Communist China	30.10.52.	UK statement on integration of East Germany into the Soviet orbit and Soviet-Chinese negotiations
	Arms supply to Egypt	17.11.52.	UK statement on supply of aircraft to Egypt
C-R(52)29	NATO and Norway	19.11.52.	Negotiations between Norway and NATO military authorities for the defence of Norwegian coastal waters

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
C-R(53)1	EDC	14. 1.53.	The question of the ratification of the EDC agreements
C-R(53)2	Germany and the Annual Review	21. 1.53.	Participation of Germany in the Annual Review exercise
C-R(53)4	Germany and NATO	3. 2.53.	US statement on German defence contribution
C-R(53)4	Nazis in Germany	3. 2.53.	UK statement on arrest of Nazis in Germany
C-R(53)4	EDC	3. 2.53.	UK statement on liaison between the United Kingdom and EDC
C-R(53)4	Clarification	3. 2.53.	UK statement clarifying Sir Winston Churchill's views on the recession of the danger of war
	Italy and Greece	12. 2.53.	M. De Gasperi's visit to Greece
	Italy and Egypt	18. 2.53.	The Italian Minister of War's visit to Egypt
C-R(53)8	EDC	4. 3.53.	French statement on the interpretative protocols regarding EDC agreements
C-R(53)8	Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia	4. 3.53.	Reception by the Secretariat of the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia
C-R(53)9	EDC	13. 3.53.	French statement on the work of the EDC Interim Commission and UK statement on the association of UK forces with EDC
	Air incidents between East and West	18. 3.53.	UK statement on destruction by Czechoslovak aircraft of a British bomber
C-R(53)11	EDC	25. 3.53.	Interpretative protocols on EDC agreements
C-R(53)11	Greek armed forces	25. 3.53.	Greek statement on Greek armed forces
C-R(53)17	Germany and the US	15. 4.53.	US statement on Dr. Adenauer's trip to Washington
C-R(53)20	President Eisenhower	23. 4.53.	Message of President Eisenhower
C-R(53)22	Egypt and UK	24. 4.53.	UK statement on developments in Egypt and Sudan
C-R(53)24	Germany and Western Defence	25. 4.53.	Financial contribution of Germany to Western Defence

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
C-R(53)25	Indo-China	6. 5.53.	French statement on Indo-China
	Middle East	27. 5.53.	UK statement on the Middle East Defence Pact
	Egypt	27. 5.53.	UK statement on problems in connection with evacuation of the Canal Zone in Egypt
	Big Three	27. 5.53.	Statements by Big Three on the proposed Bermuda Conference
	Indo-China	27. 5.53.	French statement on the military and political situation Indo-China
C-R(53)29	US, the Middle and Far East	10. 6.53.	US statement on Mr. Dulles' tour of Middle East countries India and Pakistan
	The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia	10. 6.53.	The death of Stalin and Soviet Yugoslav relations
	Middle East	10. 6.53.	Middle East Defence Pact
	Korea	18. 6.53.	US statement on situation in Korea
	Bermuda Conference	18. 6.53.	UK statement on the proposed Bermuda Conference and the agenda
	Big Three and Yugoslavia	18. 6.53.	Military negotiations between the Big Three and Yugoslavia
	EDC	24. 6.53.	Italian statement on EDC meeting in Paris under the chairmanship of President De Gasperi
	East Berlin	24. 6.53.	UK and French statement on situation in East Berlin
	Egypt	24. 6.53.	UK statement on situation in Egypt after the proclamation of the Republic
	Italy	24. 6.53.	Italian statement on elections in Italy
	Bermuda Conference	24. 6.53.	US statement on the proposed Bermuda Conference
C-R(53)32	Greece and Bulgaria	30. 6.53.	Greek statement on Greek-Bulgarian Joint Frontier Commission
C-R(53)32	East Berlin	30. 6.53.	US statement on events in East Berlin
C-R(53)32	Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia	30. 6.53.	Turkish statement on tripartite communiqué on Balkan Pact

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
C-R(53)34	Big Three meetings	8. 7.53.	US statement on meeting of Big Three Foreign Ministers in Washington to consider a number of international issues
C-R(53)34	Hungary	8. 7.53.	UK statement on events in Hungary
	Big Three and Yugoslavia	15. 7.53.	Statement by the French Representative on Military negotiations between the Big Three and Yugoslavia
C-R(53)35	Denmark	15. 7.53.	Danish statement on military service in Denmark
C-R(53)37	EDC	29. 7.53.	Netherlands and Belgian statement on the question of the ratification of EDC agreements
	Albania	26. 8.53.	US statement on Albania
	Anzus	17. 9.53.	Result of the Anzus meeting in Washington
	US and Spain	30. 9.53.	US statement on US - Spanish bilateral agreements
	Soviet Union	15.10.53.	Information about draft reply to the Soviet note
	Denmark	15.10.53.	Danish statement on military service in Denmark
	EDC	15.10.53.	Belgian statement on Rome meeting which had disclosed certain divergencies on the subject of the political authority. Netherlands statement on Dutch ratification of EDC agreements.
	EDC	4.11.53.	Luxembourg statement on Rome meeting
C-R(53)47	Sir Vinson Churchill	4.11.53.	Sir Winston Churchill's utterances on lessened danger of war
C-R(53)48		18.11.53.	Greek statement on USSR protest over US bases in Greece

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C-R(54)8	Portugal and Spain	3. 2. 54.	Portuguese statement on Portuguese-Spanish military talks
C-R(54)11	Turkey and Pakistan	17. 2. 54.	Turkish statement on advantages of the Turkey-Pakistan Security Pact
C-R(54)15	EDC	17. 3. 54.	Belgian ratification of EDC agreements
C-R(54)19	The Netherlands and Soviet Union	1. 4. 54.	Dutch statement regarding a Soviet note to the Netherlands in respect of the stationing of US aircraft in the Netherlands
C-R(54)22	North America	20. 4. 54.	US and Canada announcement on Air Defence of North America
C-R(54)29	Caracas Conference	28. 4. 54.	US statement on Caracas Conference
C-R(54)34	Dakar Conference	19. 5. 54.	French statement regarding Dakar Conference on defence facilities in Africa
C-R(54)35	US and Turkey	16. 7. 54.	Turkey - US bases agreement with regard to the use of certain Turkish bases
C-R(54)36	Geneva Conference	21. 7. 54.	French statement on results of Geneva Conference
C-R(54)39	Soviet diplomats in the United Kingdom	29. 7. 54.	UK statement on relaxation of travel restrictions of Soviet diplomats in the UK
C-R(54)39	Denmark and Soviet Union	29. 7. 54.	Danish statement on Denmark-Soviet Union trade
C-R(54)39	Netherlands and New Guinea	16. 9. 54.	Netherlands statement regarding an Indonesian request to the United Nations for consideration of the New Guinea question
C-R(54)39	SEATO	22. 9. 54.	US statement on SEATO
C-R(54)39	Trieste	5. 10. 54.	Italian statement on Italo-Yugoslav agreement on Trieste
C-R(54)39	Soviet bloc diplomats in the US	5. 10. 54.	US statement on travel restrictions governing Soviet bloc personnel in the US
C-R(54)39	Trieste	22. 10. 54.	Italian statement on Italo-Yugoslav statement on Trieste
C-R(54)39	Portuguese settlements in India	22. 10. 54.	Portuguese statement on Goa
C-R(54)39	Italy and US	27. 10. 54.	Italian statement on certain military facilities to be granted to US forces on Italian Territory

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
C-R(54)41	Big Three and Soviet Union	3.11.54.	French, UK and US statements on Soviet note of 23rd October
C-R(54)41	French North Africa	3.11.54.	French statement on redeployment of French Forces earmarked for SHAPE in Algeria
C-R(54)42	Air defence of NATO Europe	12.11.54.	US statement on problems involving the air defence of NATO Europe
C-R(54)42	US deployment plans in Europe	12.11.54.	US statement on changes in US deployment plans in Europe
C-R(54)43	French North Africa	17.11.54.	French statement on redeployment of French forces earmarked for SHAPE in Algeria
C-R(54)44	Swiss air space	24.11.54.	US statement on Swiss protests for violation of air space
C-R(54)45	UK forces	1.12.54.	UK statement on changes to UK forces not earmarked for NATO
C-R(54)51	Portuguese settlements in India	17.12.54.	Portuguese statement on situation of Portuguese settlements in India

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
C-R(54)3	US and Formosa	26. 1.55.	US statement on Eisenhower statement on Formosa
	UK defence	14. 2.55.	UK statement on White Paper on defence
	Turkey and Iraq	23. 2.55.	Turkish statement on Turkish-Iraqi agreement
C-R(55)8	UK prisoners in Korea	2. 3.55.	UK statement regarding treatment of UK prisoners in Korea
	US and the Far East	30. 3.55.	US statement on situation in the Far East
	Austria and the Big Four	4. 5.55.	Note by the Big Three on the Austrian Treaty and Four-Power negotiations
C-R(55)19	Austria	9. 5.55.	French statement on Austrian State Treaty
C-R(55)21	Geneva "summit" Conference	10. 5.55.	US statement on Geneva "summit" Conference
C-R(55)27	Communists and the atom	22. 6.55.	UK and US statement regarding a conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in Moscow
C-R(55)30	South Africa	6. 7.55.	UK statement on defence base in South Africa
C-R(55)30	Cyprus	6. 7.55.	UK statement on tripartite talks over Cyprus in London
C-R(55)38	UK forces	21. 9.55.	UK statement on temporary redeployment of units earmarked for assignment to NATO in the Far East
C-R(55)38	UK and the Soviet Union	21. 9.55.	UK statement on courtesy visit of British fleet to Leningrad and similar visit of the Soviet fleet to Portsmouth
C-R(55)38	Extension of UK sovereignty	21. 9.55.	UK statement on sovereignty over the uninhabited island of Rockall, off the Outer Hebrides
C-R(55)38	Garmisch informal conference	21. 9.55.	Secretary General and US statement on Garmisch informal conference over current problems
	Middle East	5.10.55.	Big Three statements on supply of arms to the Middle East
C-R(55)48	Baghdad Pact	25.10.55.	Turkish statement on Pakistan's accession to Baghdad Pact

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
	Norway and the Soviet Union	16.11.55.	Norwegian statement on Norwegian ministerial visit to Moscow
C-R(55)53	Norway and the Soviet Union	23.11.55.	Norwegian statement on Norwegian - Soviet talks
C-R(55)53	Denmark and the Soviet Union	23.11.55.	Danish statement on exchange of naval visits between Denmark and the USSR
C-R(55)54	Movements of French forces	30.11.55.	Statement on movements of French forces
C-R(55)54	The Netherlands and the Soviet Union	30.11.55.	Netherlands statement on naval visits to and from Soviet Russia

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
	Field-Marshal Montgomery	21. 1. 56.	UK statement on proposed visit of Field-Marshal Montgomery to Spain
C-R(56)5	Norway and the Soviet Union	8. 2. 56.	Norwegian statement on Soviet violation of Norwegian territorial waters
C-R(56)6	Austria	15. 2. 56.	US statement on expulsion by Austria of World Federation of Trade-Unions
C-R(56)6	UK armed forces	15. 2. 56	UK announcement of White Paper on armed forces
C-R(56)6	Greece and the Soviet Union	15. 2. 56.	Greek statement on request of Soviet Government for passage of Soviet aircraft over Greek territory
C-R(56)9	Norway and the Soviet Union	1. 3. 56.	Norwegian statement on visits of Soviet naval units in Oslo
C-R(56)9	Canada and the Soviet Union	1. 3. 56.	Canadian statement on expansion of Soviet Embassy staff in Ottawa
C-R(56)9	Air communications between Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union	1. 3. 56.	Danish statement on civil air communications between Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union
C-R(56)9	Humanitarian agreements	1. 3. 56.	Danish statement on agreement on saving human life in the Baltic
C-R(56)10	Italy and Yugoslavia	7. 3. 56.	Italian statement on two Italo-Yugoslav agreements concerning fishing in the Adriatic and industrial equipment
	Scandinavian and Soviet air communications	11. 4. 56.	Danish statement on Scandinavian-Soviet airline agreement
	US and Spain	25. 5. 56.	US statement on US military mission to Spain
	Soviet Union	30. 5. 56.	US statement on Moscow air display
C-R(56)30	US forces in Europe	13. 6. 56.	US statement on movements of US forces in Europe
C-R(56)31	Greece and the Soviet Union	15. 6. 56.	Greek statement on visit of Soviet Foreign Minister to Athens

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
C-R(56)31	Greek children	15. 6.56	Greek statement on Greek children deported by the Communists
C-R(56)32	UK and Soviet Union	19. 6.56	UK statement on invitation of UK officials to Soviet Air Display
	Atomic radiation	22. 6.56	US expert report on the effects of atomic radiation
C-R(56)35	Belgium and the Soviet Union	27. 6.56	Belgian statement on invitation to Moscow

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Atome	22. 6.55	22. 6.56			
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Baghdad Pact	10. 6.53	4. 3.53	17. 2.54	23. 2.55	25.10.55
Balkan Pact	4. 3.53	18. 6.53	30. 6.53		
Bermuda Conference	27. 5.53	18. 6.53	26. 6.53	15. 7.53	
Caracas conference	28. 4.54				
Dakar conference	19. 5.54				
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	Greece	15. 2.56	15. 6.56	18.11.53
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	Netherlands	1. 4.54	30.11.55	
	Norway	16.11.55	23.11.55	8. 2.56 1. 3.56
	UK	29. 7.54	21. 9.55	19. 6.56
	US	5.10.54		
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	Scandinavian air communications	1. 3.56	11. 4.56	30. 5.56
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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(52)1	Appointment of new Supreme Allied Commander Europe	28.4.52	Appointment by Council of General Ridgeway as Supreme Allied Commander Europe	Appointment
C-R(52)1	EDC	28.4.52.	European Defence Conference. The EDC treaty and procedure for signing and NATO protocol.	The Council agreed to reconstitute a Legal Working Group to examine texts of common interest to EDC and NATO and, at a later stage, to check that the terms of the treaty were in conformity with the principles approved in Lisbon.
C-R(52)2	"	6.5.52		The Council agreed on a number of points concerning EDC.
C-R(52)3	"	13.5.52		
C-R(52)4		21.5.52		
C-R(52)6		28.5.52		
	Recognition of King of Egypt as King of Sudan	3.7.52	The UK Representative said that his Government had hoped no friendly Government would accredit an Ambassador to King Farouk as King of the Sudan	
C-R(52)15	Political consultation	9.7.52	In connection with the circulation among member-countries of the final text of the answer of the Three Occupying Powers to a note on Germany, the need of fuller political consultation within NATO was pressed.	The Council agreed that Representatives should bring to the attention of their Governments the views expressed during the course of the discussion; that political issues should be discussed; that a general discussion on Germany should be held.

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(52)16	EDC	16.7.52	German defence effort and NATO-EDC liaison	The Council agreed on a number of points
C-R(52)17	Common action to counter Soviet propaganda	12.6.52 19.6.52 24.7.52	The possibility was discussed of common action to counter Soviet propaganda	The Council instructed the Information Policy Working Group to make recommendations.
C-R(52)17	EDC	24.7.52	Progress report on the work of the EDC Interim Committee	
C-R(52)18	Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia	20.8.52	Co-ordination of defence plans between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia	
	Germany	28.8.52 4.9.52	Statement of the policies of the occupying Powers toward Germany by the French, UK and US Representatives	It was agreed that the occupying Powers had primary responsibility for the reply to the recent Soviet note, but that the principles underlying it were of great concern to all of the NATO powers.
C-R(52)19	Meteorology and the Neutrals	3.9.52	Exchange of meteorological information with neutral countries in time of war	The Council agreed that this was a matter for individual countries and not NATO as an organization.
C-R(52)18 C-R(52)19	Germany and the Annual Review	20.8.52	German participation in the Annual Review exercise	The Council agreed on a number of points.
C-R(52)19	Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia	3.9.52 4.9.52	Greek and Turkish relations with Yugoslavia	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(52)20	Swiss Merchant Marine	10.9.52	NATO and Swiss shipping in time of war	The Council agreed that the Italian Government inform the Swiss Government informally of views on the possibility of Swiss ships refuelling in NATO harbours in time of war.
C-R(52)22	Germany and NATO	24.9.52	Statement to the press by NATO on discussions concerning the reply of the Three Occupying Powers to a Soviet note;	The Council agreed that no statement should be made to the press.
C-R(52)22	Communist Party Congress in Moscow	24.9.52	Agreement for the discussion at a subsequent meeting of the Communist Party Congress to be held in Moscow on 5.10.52 and NATO's counter-propaganda policy	
C-R(52)23	Swiss Merchant Marine	1.10.52	Aide-Mémoire for use by the Italian Government in respect of the question of the Swiss Merchant Marine	The Council agreed that the Italian Government use the aide-mémoire in replying to the Swiss Government
C-R(52)25	Turkey and Yugoslavia		The Turkish Representative reported a visit by a Yugoslav military mission to Ankara but stressed out that no formal engagements had been entered with Yugoslavia	
C-R(52)27	Global strategy	28.10.52	Global strategy in the light of a Standing Group presentation	
C-R(52)27	NATO and Yugoslavia	28.10.52	NATO strategy and Yugoslavia	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
	The military interest of France the United Kingdom and the United States in Yugoslavia	17.11.52	Proposed mission of a US general army officer to Yugoslavia	
C-R(52)29	Military Manoeuvres	19.11.52	Political implications of military manoeuvres	The Council approved the Military Representatives' Committee proposals
C-R(52)38	Soviet policy	16.12.52	Trends of Soviet policy	
C-R(52)38 C-R(52)39	Indo-China	16.12.52 17.12.52	French effort in Indo-China	The Council adopted a resolution on Indo-China to be released to the press
C-R(52)39	Italy and Yugoslavia	17.12.52	Relations between Italy and Yugoslavia	
C-R(52)39	Germany and the Three Occupying Powers	17.12.52	UK statement on the Policies of the Three Occupying Powers towards Germany	
C-R(52)39	EDC	17.12.52	The question of the ratification of the EDC agreements	The Council approved a resolution on EDC to be released to the press
C-R(52)39	Soviet bloc	17.12.52	Estimate of the strength and capabilities of the Soviet bloc	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(53)4	EDC	18.2.53	Interpretative protocols on EDC agreements	
	Denmark and Germany	18.2.53	Stationing of Danish troops in Germany	
	Turkey and Yugoslavia	18.2.53	Discussion between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia	
C-R(53)9	Turkey and NATO	13.3.53	"Dynamic" policy favoured by Turkish Foreign Minister for NATO	
	Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia	18.3.53	Treaty of friendship and collaboration between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia	
	Soviet Union	18.3.53	Statement by the French, UK, US Representatives on development in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin	
C-R(53)10	NATO and the POWs	18.3.53	Development of a NATO policy concerning POWs.	The Council agreed to have the matter examined
C-R(53)16	Soviet Union	10.4.53	-Discussion of recent developments in Russian foreign policy and,	The Council agreed to have two documents prepared for the Ministerial session
C-R(53)17		15.4.53	-procedure for Ministerial discussion of Soviet peace moves	
C-R(53)21		25.4.53	-Soviet policy including review of recent developments	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(53)22	EDC	24.4.53	EDC review	
C-R(53)22	Indo-China	24.4.53	French effort in Indo-China	
C-R(53)29	Council versus military authorities	10.6.53	SACEUR's report	The Council agreed that Supreme Commanders should submit reports of a political nature to the Council prior to their release.
	EDC	10.6.53	UK statement on its association with EDC	
C-R(53)31	NATO concerted action in connection with NATO diplomats in the Soviet Union	26.6.53	-Concerted action by NATO countries on movements of NATO diplomats and journalists in the Soviet Union	The Council agreed to take action of this nature
C-R(53)33		1.7.53	-Restrictions imposed on movements of NATO diplomats and journalists in the Soviet Union	The Council agreed on a number of points and decided to consider further the matter
C-R(53)34	Soviet representatives in NATO countries	8.7.53	Travel restrictions on Soviet and Satellite representatives	The Council agreed to consider the matter further.
C-R(53)34	Big Three meetings	15.7.53	Meeting of Big Three Foreign Ministers in Washington to consider a number of international issues (Germany - EDC - NATO)	
C-R(53)35	Soviet representatives in NATO countries	15.7.53	Travel restrictions on Soviet and Satellite representatives	The Council agreed on interim measures and further consideration of the matter.
C-R(53)38		5.8.53		The Council agreed that some relaxation was desirable in the travel restrictions on Soviet Representatives
C-R(53)39		21.8.53		

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(53)37	NATO and Red Cross Societies	29.7.53	League of Red Cross Societies request for NATO assistance	It was agreed to relax travel restrictions on Hungarian satellite diplomats but that no effort would be made to achieve concerted NATO action.
	Big Three and the Soviet Union	21.8.53	Big Three reply to Soviet note on Germany and proposed meeting with the Soviet Union to discuss the German question	The Council agreed that the League should be requested to approach individual Governments
	NATO and Parliaments	21.8.53	Association of members of Parliament with the work of NATO - Conference of NATO parliamentarians proposed by Norway	
	Soviet Union	26.8.53	Three Powers reply on Soviet note on Germany	
	Big Three and the Soviet Union	1.9.53	The Big Three circulated the text of the reply which they intended to deliver to Soviet Government regarding Germany	The Council considered the matter and agreed to further examination
	Soviet Union	17.9.53	Soviet courses of action up to mid-1953 by US Representative	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(53)46	US forces in Europe	28.10.53	Denial of US intention to withdraw from Europe forces assigned to NATO	
	Soviet Union	4.11.53	Soviet reply to Big Three note	
	Big Three and Soviet Union	12.11.53	Big Three reply to Soviet note	
	Bermuda Conference	18.11.53 24.11.53	Invitation to the Secretary General of NATO to attend the Bermuda Conference	
	Big Three and Soviet Union	21.11.53	Big Three reply to Soviet note on Austrian State Treaty	
C-R(53)49 C-R(53)50	Schleswig-Holstein	25.11.53 2.12.53	Barracks in Schleswig-Holstein	The Council agreed that no NATO action was possible
C-R(53)50	Council of Europe	2.12.53	The question of a NATO report to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe	The Council agreed that the attention of Governments of member-countries should be called on this matter
	Soviet Union	3.12.53	Statement by the US Representative on the Soviet note of 26.11.53	
C-R(53)50	International situation	14.12.53	Consideration in ministerial session of international situation.	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(54)2	Communist front organizations	26.1.54	Conferences of Communist front organizations in NATO countries	The Council agreed to recommend to governments of member countries action making it impossible to hold such conferences.
	Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia	26.1.54	The Military conferences between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia are not in conflict with NATO planning	
	Four-Power Conference in Berlin	3.2.54 10.2.54 17.2.54 27.2.54	French, UK, US statements on developments in the Four-Power discussions taking place in Berlin	The Council welcomed M. Bidault's suggestion to meet with the Council in order to give them an account of the Berlin Conference.
	Four-Power Conference in Berlin	27.2.54	Survey of results of four-power conference in Berlin	
C-R(54)8	Soviet Union	17.3.54	Trends of Soviet policy	The Council agreed that a paper should be submitted to the Ministerial Session
C-R(54)8	EDC	31.3.54	NATO - EDC relations	The study of this matter is postponed
C-R(54)11	Soviet Union	1.4.54	Soviet membership of NATO	
C-R(54)10	EDC	31.3.54	Marshal Juin's statement on EDC	The Council agreed to express regret and to the release of a statement
C-R(54)12		5.4.54		
C-R(54)13		6-7.4.54		

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(54)14 C-R(54)16	Soviet Union	7.4.54 22.4.54	Soviet membership of NATO	The Council agreed that comments made by Permanent Representatives should be conveyed to the drafters of the Big Three reply to a Soviet note
	Indo-China	23.4.54		Personal telegram of Lord Ismay to the defenders of Dien-Bien-Phu
C-R(54)18	International situation	23.4.54	Consideration of international situation in ministerial session	
C-R(54)18	Political consultation	23.4.54	Political consultation in NATO	The Council agreed to favour extension of political consultation in NATO
C-R(54)18	German Democratic Republic	23.4.54	The grant by the Soviet Union of "sovereignty" to the German Democratic Republic	The Council agreed not to recognize the German Democratic Republic as an independent government
C-R(54)18	NATO duration	23.4.54	US and UK statements on the question of the unlimited duration of NATO	The Council agreed to call on all member countries to consider the matter
	United States	23.4.54	Statement by Mr. Dulles on US Security policy with regard to the use of atomic weapons	
C-R(54)21	Belgium	12.5.54	Duration of military service in Belgium	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(54)22	Swedish fishing boats	19.5.54	Damage by NATO craft to Swedish fishing boats	The Council agreed on way to handle matter
C-R(54)22	Red Cross meeting	19.5.54	Communist propaganda at the meeting of the Board of Directors of the International Red Cross Society in Oslo	The Council agreed that member governments should beware
C-R(54)23	German Democratic Republic	26.5.54	The grant by the Soviet Union of "sovereignty" to the German Democratic Republic	The Council agreed on the terms of a resolution
C-R(54)25	Indo-China Netherlands	26.5.54 16.6.54	The Geneva Conference on Indo-China Duration of military service in the Netherlands	
C-R(54)26	German Democratic Republic Indo-China	23.6.54 30.6.54	The grant by the Soviet Union of "Sovereignty" to the German Democratic Republic The Geneva Conference on Indo-China	The Council finalised the resolution considered on 26.5.54
	Norway and East Germany	30.6.54	Norway and the Soviet recognition of "full sovereignty" to Eastern Germany	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action Taken
C-R(54)26	Washington conversations	30.6.54	Washington talks between the President of the US and the Prime Minister of the UK on EDC, etc.	
	Balkan Pact	30.6.54	Several Representatives stressed out the political consequences of the proposed Balkan Pact	
	Central Europe	16.7.54	Calamities in Central Europe	The Council agreed that NATO action should be limited within the NATO area
	Balkan Pact	21.7.54		The Greek and Turkish Representatives will provide the Council with a written statement of the main points of the proposed Treaty
	Portugal	26.7.54	Portuguese settlements in India	
	Balkan Pact	26.7.54	What would be the position if Yugoslavia was attacked and Greece and Turkey went to her aid ?	
	Soviet Union	26.7.54		The Representatives of France, UK and US will circulate copies of the Soviet notes of 25th July 1954

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(54)26	Balkan Pact	29.7.54	Final discussion on the proposed Balkan Pact	The Balkan Pact is welcomed
	Soviet Union	2.8.54	Suggestions of the Council to answer the Soviet note of 25th July	
	Balkan Pact	2.8.54		It was agreed that any press query as to whether the Council had discussed the Balkan Pact will be met with the reply of "no comment"
	West Germany	2.8.54	Security measures in West Germany	
	Soviet Union	1.9.54 3.9.54 7.9.54	Draft reply of the Big Three to the Soviet note of 25th July and suggestions of the Council	
C-R(54)34	W.E.U.	16.9.54		Sir Anthony Eden's tour of European capitals on a substitute to EDC
C-R(54)35	W.E.U.	22.9.54	Preparatory London Conference	
C-R(54)36		5.10.54	on W.E.U.	
C-R(54)37		6.10.54		

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(54)37	German Democratic Republic	6.10.54	Soviet declaration on German Democratic Republic	
C-R(54)40 C-R(54)41	WEU	27.10.54 3.11.54	Interim measures pending ratification of WEU agreements	The Council agreed to associate in a certain measure Germany with the work of NATO, pending German accession to NATO
	WEU	17.11.54		The Council expressed concern that any proposal had been made to establish a special Western Union military organization
	Soviet Union	17.11.54 22.11.54 24.11.54 26.11.54 27.11.54	-Discussion on draft replies made by the Three to Soviet notes of 23rd October and 13th November 1954 -Nine nations reply to Soviet note	The Council agreed that every effort should be made to achieve identical replies from the 12 (or at least 9) NATO nations to whom the Soviet note had been addressed. The delivery of the Nine-Power Note would be made on the same day
C-R(54)45	French North Africa	1.12.54	Redeployment of French forces earmarked for SHAPE in Algeria	
C-R(54)46	Atomic information	3.12.54	Agreement for co-operation regarding atomic information	The Council had the agreement signed on 22.6.55.

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(54)50	Political versus military authority	17.12.54	Military Committee's report	The Council agreed that it was the responsibility of Governments of member countries for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities
C-R(54)50	Soviet Union	17.12.54	Trends of Soviet policy	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(55)1	W.E.U. and the Soviet Union	12. 1.55	Soviet note to a number of NATO countries regarding the ratification of the Paris agreements and W.E.U. countries reply to the Soviet Union	The Council agreed on a common attitude
		19. 1.55		
		26. 1.55		
		2. 2.55		
	Soviet Union	9. 2.55	Developments in the Soviet Union	
C-R(55)6	NATO and Parliaments	14. 2.55	Parliamentarian meeting at NATO Headquarters, Paris	The Council agreed to the holding of the meeting
	Soviet Union	23. 2.55	Developments in the Soviet Union	
		2. 3.55		
	Baghdad Pact	2. 3.55	Statement by the Turkish Representative on a Turkish - Iraqi Pact	
		9. 3.55		
		16. 3.55		
C-R(55)8	Atomic information	2. 3.55	Procedure for signing agreement for co-operation on atomic information	The Council agreed on the procedure to be followed
	Soviet Union	9. 3.55	UK statement on the continuity of Soviet Foreign Policy	
	Austria	16. 3.55	US statement on Soviet comments on the possibility of an Austrian Treaty	
	Communists and the atom	23. 3.55	Communist attitude to atomic weapons	
	Baghdad Pact	30. 3.55	UK joins the Turkish - Iraqi alliance	
	Bandung	30. 3.55	Bandung Conference	
	Communists and the atom	6. 5.55	Statement by the Big Three on a Communist-sponsored Congress on effects of atomic explosions	
C-R(55)18	Germany in NATO	9. 5.55	German accession to NATO	
C-R(55)18	Soviet Union	9. 5.55	Trends of Soviet Policy	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	action taken
C-R(55)19	Geneva "summit" conference	9. 5.55	Agenda of Geneva "summit" conference	
C-R(55)20	Disarmament	10. 5.55	Disarmament negotiations	
C-R(55)20	Middle East	10. 5.55	Consideration of Middle East situation	
C-R(55)20	Far East	10. 5.55	Consideration of Far East situation, including Formosa and the Bandung Conference	
C-R(55)23	SACEUR Austria	26. 5.55	Revised terms of reference of SACEUR	The Council agreed on the revised terms
	Yugoslavia and Soviet Union	1. 6.55	Military implications for NATO of Austria's neutrality	
	Geneva "summit" meeting	1. 6.55	Relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union	
	Yugoslavia and Soviet Union	8. 6.55	Arrangements for the Geneva "summit" meeting	
	Geneva "summit" meeting	15. 6.55	Relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union	
	Geneva "summit" meeting	20. 6.55	The question of a Ministerial Session prior to the "summit" meeting and the Three-Power talks in New York	
	Big Three and Yugoslavia	22. 6.55	Belgrade military meeting of Big Three and Yugoslavia	
	Geneva "summit" meeting	22. 6.55	"Summit" Conference and preliminary Western powers talks	
	Geneva "summit" meeting	27. 6.55	Report of status of San Francisco talks with Mr. Molotov concerning the forthcoming "summit" meeting.	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
	Communists and the atom	27. 6. 55	Action by member countries in respect of Russian invitation to Atomic Conference	
	Big Three and Yugoslavia	29. 6. 55	Belgrade military meeting of Big Three and Yugoslavia	
C-R(55)31	Redeployment of US forces in Europe	13. 7. 55	Redeployment from Austria to Italy of US forces	The Council agreed to the redeployment
C-R(55)31	French North Africa	13. 7. 55	Movement of French forces from Europe to Algeria	The Council agreed that France should restore as soon as possible her forces in Europe
C-R(55)34	Geneva "summit" conference	27. 7. 55	Briefing and discussion following "summit" Conference	
C-R(55)37	Military manoeuvres	14. 9. 55	Public relations policy on Exercise "Fox-Paw"	The Council agreed on this policy
C-R(55)37	Greece and military manoeuvres	14. 9. 55	Views of Council on Greek decision of non-participation in military manoeuvres	The Council requested the Greek Representative to convey these views to Athens
	West Germany and the Soviet Union	19. 9. 55	Statement on Chancellor Adenauer's discussions in Moscow	
	Soviet policy	21. 9. 55	Education of NATO public opinion on Soviet policy	
	October Big-Four Geneva Conference	26. 9. 55 30. 9. 55 5. 10. 55	Progress report of Working Group on October Big-Four Geneva Conference	
	Iceland and Algeria	5. 10. 55	The question of Algeria at the United Nations and Iceland	
C-R(55)40	NATO public opinion and the Soviet Union	5. 10. 55	The question of policy vis-à-vis the Soviet and the education of NATO public opinion	The Council agreed to consider the question

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(55)40	October Big-Four Geneva Conference	5.10.55	Ministerial session prior to the Geneva Conference	
C-R(55)40	National defence establishments	5.10.55	Changes in national defence efforts	The Council approved a resolution to this effect
C-R(55)45	NATO information activities	6.10.55	Development of NATO information activities	The Council agreed to develop, if possible, such activities
	Military affairs	12.10.55	Defence Ministers Conference	
	October Big-Four Geneva Conference	13.10.55	National comments on the report of the Working Group on October Big-Four Geneva Conference	
C-R(55)46	NATO public opinion and the Soviet Union	19.10.55	The question of policy vis-à-vis the Soviet and the education of NATO public opinion	The Council agreed to consider the question once a month
C-R(55)47	October Big-Four Geneva Conference	25.10.55	Exchange of views prior to the Geneva Conference	
C-R(55)49	The Secretary-General and Greek-Turkish relations	2.11.55	Personal action by Secretary-General for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations	
	The Soviet Union and the Middle East	9.11.55	US statement on Soviet activities in the Middle East	
	October Big-Four Geneva Conference	16.11.55 21.11.55	German and French report on the Conference by the Big-Three	
C-R(55)55	Belgium and the Austrian State Treaty	7.12.55	Belgian protest at late reception of Austrian State Treaty in advance of publication	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
	Disputes among NATO countries	7.12.55		The Council agreed that the Secretary-General could discuss controversial issues informally with his colleagues and eventually make a personal appeal to governments
	German reunification	7.12.55	Comments on a Canadian statement on the reunification of Germany	
C-R(55)58	International situation	15.12.55	Consideration of international situation in Ministerial Session	
C-R(55)59	NATO defence planning	15.12.55	Military Committee's report on NATO defence planning	Approval by Council
C-R(55)59	Air defence Command in NATO Europe	15.12.55	Military Committee's recommendations on the Air Defence Command and Control in NATO Europe	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
	Turkey and the Soviet Union	25. 1. 56	Soviet attitude vis-à-vis Turkey	
C-R(56)1		11. 1. 56		
C-R(56)3	Atomic information	25. 1. 56	Agreement for co-operation regarding atomic information	
C-R(56)4	Iron curtain diplomats in Italy	1. 2. 56	Treatment of Iron curtain diplomats and nationals in Italy	
C-R(56)5	Soviet Union	8. 2. 56	Report on trends in Soviet policy	
C-R(56)6		15. 2. 56		
C-R(56)9	W. E. U.		W. E. U. and internal defence and police forces	The Council agreed on the reply to the W. E. U. Secretary General
C-R(56)9	NATO and Parliaments	1. 3. 56	Meeting of Parliamentarians of NATO countries, at Headquarters, Paris	The Council approved the meeting
	Disarmament and German reunification	7. 3. 56	Pineau statement on disarmament and German reunification	
	Disarmament	7. 3. 56	Letter of President Eisenhower to Bulganin on disarmament	
	Congresses	7. 3. 56	Communiqué of Congrès de l'Internationale Socialiste	
	Cyprus	14. 3. 56	Statement by the Greek Representative on the deportation of Mgr Makarios	
	Soviet Union	21. 3. 56	Trends in Soviet policy	
C-R(56)13	French North Africa	27. 3. 56	Movement of French forces from Europe to Algeria	The Council agreed on the terms of a communiqué
C-R(56)13	Soviet Union	27. 3. 56	Trends in Soviet policy	
	Disarmament	27. 3. 56	UN disarmament discussions and the London discussions	

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1956

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(56)14	Atomic information	11. 4. 56	Agreement for co-operation regarding atomic information entered into force on 29th March, 1956	
	Iceland bases	11. 4. 56	Comments by the Icelandic Representative on the resolution of his Parliament regarding the withdrawal of NATO forces	
	Disarmament	11. 4. 56	Importance for NATO to be informed of the negotiations taking place in the UN on disarmament	
	Soviet Union	16. 4. 56	Trends in Soviet policy	
	Dulles speech	18. 4. 56	Proposed speech by Mr. Dulles before the Annual Convention of the Associated Press in New York	
	Soviet Union	18. 4. 56	Soviet policy towards Soviet nationals abroad	
	Cyprus	25. 4. 56	Statement on the question by the Greek Representative	
	Field Marshal Montgomery	2. 5. 56	Invitation to Field Marshal Montgomery by the Iraq Government	
C-R(56)20	International situation	4. 5. 56	Consideration of international situation in ministerial session	
C-R(56)23	Middle East	9. 5. 56	Arms supply to the Middle East	
	French North Africa	9. 5. 56	Shipment of arms to French North Africa	
	Soviet Union	9. 5. 56	Soviet policy towards Soviet nationals abroad	

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(56)24	Disarmament	9. 5.56	Disarmament	The Council agreed to consider further the matter
C-R(56)24	Greece and the Soviet Union	9. 5.56	Refuelling in Greece of Soviet aircraft	The Council agreed to discuss the substance later
C-R(56)24	Soviet Union	9. 5.56	Soviet economic penetration	The Council agreed on periodic studies
C-R(56)27	France and the Soviet Union	26. 5.56	Visit of French Ministers to Moscow	
C-R(56)27	Disarmament	30. 5.56	Review of the question of disarmament	
C-R(56)29	Communication projects	6. 6.56	US offer to finance two initial links in the proposed forward scatter communication project	The Council agreed to accept the offer
C-R(56)32	US and Iceland	18. 6.56	The Icelandic Representative asked for the views of the Council as to the military necessity for the facilities in Iceland	
C-R(56)32	Soviet Union	19. 6.56	Periodic surveys of Soviet economic moves vis-à-vis the outside world	
C-R(56)32	Attacks on NATO in non-NATO countries	19. 6.56	The Chairman called attention on the need to counter attacks on NATO in non-NATO countries	An informal Working Group of the seven countries which had received letters from Bulganin would be established to prepare a list of general principles on which replies could be based
	Middle East	22. 6.56	Arms supply to the Middle East	
	Disarmament	22. 6.56 25. 6.56	Bulganin letters on disarmament	

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Italy	17.12.52			
Middle East - Far East	3. 7.52			
	2. 5.56	9. 5.56	22. 6.56	
Netherlands	16. 6.54			
North Africa	1.12.54			
	5.10.55	10. 5.55	13. 7.55	
	27. 3.56	9. 5.56		
Norway	30. 6.54			
October Big Four Geneva Conference	26. 9.55	30. 9.55	5.10.55	13.10.55
	19.10.55	25.10.55	16.11.55	21.11.55
Political consultation	9.12.52	15. 7.53	14.12.53	
	23. 4.54			
	15.12.55			
	4. 5.56	5. 5.56		
Portugal	26. 7.54			
SACEUR	26. 5.55			
Turkey	13. 3.53			
USSR Membership of NATO	1. 4.54	7. 4.54	22. 4.54	
Soviet notes	21. 8.53	26. 8.53	1. 9.53	4.11.53
	12.11.53	21.11.53	3.12.53	
	26. 7.54	2. 8.54	1. 9.54	3. 9.54
	7. 9.54	17.11.54	22.11.54	24.11.54
	26.11.54	27.11.54		
Soviet diplomats	26. 6.53	1. 7.53	8. 7.53	15. 7.53
	5. 8.53	21. 8.53		
Soviet policy	16.12.52	17.12.52		
	17. 9.53			
	17. 3.54	17.12.54		
	9. 2.55	23. 2.55	2. 3.55	9. 3.55
	9. 5.55			
	1. 2.56	8. 2.56	15. 2.56	21. 3.56
	27. 3.56	16. 4.56	18. 4.56	9. 5.56
	19. 6.56			
Soviet propaganda	12. 6.52	19. 6.52	24. 7.52	24. 9.52
	18. 3.53	10. 4.53	15. 4.53	25. 4.53
	19. 5.54			
NATO public opinion	21. 9.55	5.10.55	19.10.55	
Middle East	9.11.55			
	25. 1.56			
Communist front organizations	26. 1.54			
Atom	27. 6.55			



Us	13. 7.55			
	18. 4.56	6. 6.56		
(Iceland)	11. 4.56	18. 6.56		
WEU	16. 9.54	29. 9.54	5.10.54	6.10.54
	27.10.54	3.11.54	17.11.54	
	12. 1.55	19. 1.55	26. 1.55	2. 2.55
	1. 3.56			
NATO Information activities	6.10.55			
Red Cross Societies	29. 7.53			
	19. 5.54			
Parliaments	21. 8.53			
	1. 3.56			
POWs	18. 3.53			
	23. 4.54			
	7.12.55			
	19. 6.56			

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ECONOMIC SUBJECTS CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL  
1952

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
Informal meeting	Article 2 activities	28.8.52	Secretary General stressed importance of Article 2 ideas and requested all representatives to give this matter their most urgent and serious attention.
C-R(52)25 Item XII	Working Group on Movement of Labour	15.10.52	Statement by Greece reminding Council of decision to set up a working group. Requested working group should be treated with importance which nature of its work justified.

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1953

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
C-R(53)2(44) Item VI	Article 2 of NAT.	21.1.53	Chairman's statement on monthly reports from committees and working groups on Article 2. Reports at monthly intervals would begin after February, 1953.
C-R(53)5 Item I	Flood disaster in Holland, United Kingdom and Belgium	11.2.53	Statement by Netherlands Delegation on economic effects of recent disasters.
Informal meeting Para. 15	East-West Trade	18.2.53	Turkish Representative stated his Government had received invitation to conference in Switzerland dealing with East West trade on multilateral basis.
C-R(53)7(56) Item X	Economic Conference in Peking	25.2.53	Statement by H.M. Delegation on undesirability of attending Peking Conference.
C-R(53)38 Item IV	U. S. Immigration Quota	5.8.53	U. S. Delegate stated that an additional 214,000 immigrants would be admitted in next 3 years, principally from NATO countries. U.S. Administrative support for this measure had been greatly stimulated by work of NATO Working Group on Labour Mobility.
C-R(53)49 Item VIII	Greek Earthquake Disaster	25.11.53	Statement by French Delegation on adoption of 2 Greek townships.

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1954

Information

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
Informal Meeting Para. 30	Danish Trade with Russia	29.7.54	Danish Representative informed Council of breakdown of trade negotiations and recall of Danish trade delegation from Moscow.
Informal meeting Item III	McCarran Act	2.8.54	U.S. Representative stated he had brought to attention of his government views on Section 212 of McCarran Act and discussions on this section had now been reopened.

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1955

Information

Date of meeting

Subject

Reference

The Canadian Representative put forward a memorandum suggesting that time be given at future Ministerial meetings to discuss economic problems of interest to all member countries. Supported by the Italian Representative.

7.12.55

Memorandum by Canadian Delegation on economic discussions at NATO Council Meetings

Informal meeting  
Item 1

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Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Information
Informal meeting	Report by René Massigli on visit of MM. Mollet and Pineau to Moscow	26.5.56	US asked if Pineau Plan had been substantively discussed. Mr. Massigli said "no", but Russians had expressed interest.
C-R(56)33 Item I	Oral Report by Committee of Three Ministers	22.6.56	The Ministers reported that they had considered main lines of their report, inter alia: a chapter on economic consultation referring particularly to role of NATO in the economic field; with an analysis of what NATO could do and what it should not attempt to do.

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INDEX OF ECONOMIC SUBJECTS RAISED IN THE COUNCIL  
FOR INFORMATION

(Further reference to most of these subjects will be found in the index to subjects considered by the Council for discussion or action)

<u>Subject</u>		<u>Dates</u>
Article 2 Activities	- General	28.8.52 21.1.53
	- Committee of Three Ministers	22.6.56
	- Economic discussions at Ministerial Meetings	7.12.55
East-West Trade	- Geneva Conference	18.2.53
	- Peking Conference	25.2.53
	- Danish Trade with Russia	29.7.54
Flood Disaster in Holland United Kingdom and Belgium		11.2.53
Greek Earthquake Disaster		25.11.53
Labour Mobility		15.10.52 5.8.53
McCarran Act		2.8.54
Pineau Plan		26.5.56

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1952

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
Informal meeting Item IV	NATO Relationships with Trade Union Movements	4.9.52	Secretary General informed Council of approach made by ICFU and thought it important not to rebuff such overtures.	The Council expressed agreement with the views of the Secretary General and invited him to circulate a paper on this subject.
C-R(52)21(18) Item I	Implementation of Article 2.	22.9.52		The Council:- (1) agreed that a working group on the move- ment of labour should be set up (2) that the Chairman should be the Permanent Representative of Greece (3) that Italy and US should be represented by their Permanent Representatives (4) that a working group on social and cultural co-operation should be set up (5) that the Chairman should be the Permanent Representative of Canada (6) that Belgium and Denmark should be represented by their Permanent Representatives. (7) that reports from the above groups and from the Information Policy Working Group should be considered by the Council at the same meeting at monthly intervals.

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1952

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(52)21 Item II	Labour Mobility	22.9.52		<p>The Council:- agreed that a small section of the International Staff/Secretariat should be charged with specific responsibility of dealing with the manpower problem, working in close touch with national experts in this field, the results of its work being submitted to the Working Group on the Movement of Labour.</p>
C-R(52)21 Item III	Relations with Trade Unions	22.9.52		<p>The Council:- approved proposals made by the Secretary General in C-M(52)76 for closer association with trade unions</p>
C-R(52)31 Item IV	Labour Mobility	3.12.52	C-M(52)111 (see C-R(52)21 above)	<p>The Council:- (1) approved recommendation in para.6 of C-M(52)111</p> <p>(2) agreed that Secretary General should address communication to Permanent Representatives</p> <p>(3) agreed that the question of the chairmanship of the Working Group on Labour Mobility be considered later.</p>
C-R(52)37 Item IV (Ministerial Session)	Implementation of Article 2	15.12.52	Exchange of views between Ministers on emphasis to be given to non-military aspects of NATO	<p>The Council instructed the Secretariat to prepare a draft resolution for consideration by the Council, taking into account proposals made by the Representative of Turkey and views expressed in course of discussion.</p>

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1952

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(52)38 Item III (Ministerial Session)	Trends of Soviet Policy	16.12.52	C-M(52)116	The Council:- (1) requested Permanent Representatives to consider ideas put forward by Turkey and France  (2) agreed to include in final communiqué UK reference to intention of USSR to divide the free world.  The Council:- (1) approved draft resolution as amended (2) agreed that reference to resolution would be made in final communiqué.
1 C-R(52)39 Item II (Ministerial Session)	Draft Resolution on Implementation of Article 2	17.12.52		

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1953

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(53)4	Flood Disaster in Holland, United Kingdom and Belgium	3.2.53	French Delegate considered that flood disasters in NATO countries called for joint assistance	The Council agreed with the French proposal.
C-R(53)6(35) Item VII	-do-	18.2.53		The Council agreed that account of contribution made by NATO countries to flood victims should be given to the press
C-R(53)8(33) Item III	Meeting of Commercial Experts organised by ECE in Geneva	4.3.53	Turkish memorandum on East-West trade. C-M(53)14.	<p>The Council:-</p> <p>(1) agreed that governments should maintain close contact to work out common line of policy in Geneva.</p> <p>(2) that Information Policy Working Group should study question of Geneva Conference from propaganda angle</p> <p>(3) invited Secretariat, in connection with long-term problem of East-West trade, to make an initial study and to report to the Council when that study was completed.</p>

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1953

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(53)39 Item I	Earthquake disaster in Ionian Islands	19.8.53		The Council:- (1) adopted resolution expressing sympathy with Greece (2) invited Chairman of Joint Working Group on Information Policy and Cultural Co-operation to consider which action in future should be taken by NATO.
C-R(53)40 Item I	East-West trade	2.9.53		The Council referred C-M(53)86 on long-term problem of East-West trade to Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy.
Informal Meeting Item VII	Aid to Greece after Earthquake disasters	17.9.53	Secretary General proposed to aid Greece on a NATO basis. In course of discussion, pointed out that whatever action was taken should be linked to article 2.	The Council agreed that the Secretary General should draft a resolution urging governments and peoples of North Atlantic Alliance to contribute to best of their ability.
C-R(53)42 Item V	Assistance to Greece after Earthquake disasters	23.9.53		The Council:- (1) adopted a resolution on aid to Greece after earthquake (2) approved a press conference on this subject
C-R(53)44 Item II	NATO co-operation for Disaster Relief	14.10.53	C-M(53)125. Ref. C-R(53)39. Canadian report on co-operation of emergency disaster relief	The Council approved procedure proposed by Committee on Information and Cultural Relations set out in para. 3 of C-M(53)125.
C-R(53)49 Item VI	Report by Working Group on Labour Mobility	25.11.53	C-M(53)155. Some discussion on para.39(c) of document, which dealt with capital investment in overseas schemes.	The Council:- (1) agreed to defer decision on para.39(c). (2) approved remainder of recommendation in para. 39

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1954

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(54)1 Item II	Recommendations by Working Group on Labour Mobility	13.1.54	(see C-R(53)49 above)	The Council approved redraft prepared by Secretariat and set out in para. 2 of C-M(53)175.
C-R(54)8 Item IV	Paper on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy	19.3.54		The Council agreed that a paper should be submitted to the Ministerial Meeting on trends and implications of Soviet policy, prepared by the Secretariat and reviewed by the Working Group on Soviet Policy.
Informal meeting Para. 4-15	McCarran Act	30.6.54	Discussion of problems created for seamen by certain articles of the McCarran Act. Considered contrary to spirit of Article 2.	
C-R(54)44 Item I	Economic Comparison between NATO countries and Soviet bloc	26.11.54		The Council agreed:- (1) that study in C-M(54)99 was of great value and work should be continued (2) to consider C-M(54)99 further at the next meeting (3) that a decision would be taken whether or not to bring document to the attention of the Ministers.

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1954

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(54)45 Item III	Economic comparison between NATO countries and Soviet bloc	1.12.54		<p>The Council agreed:-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) study by Secretariat should be continued</li> <li>(2) a working group should be set up to work in co-operation with the Secretariat</li> <li>(3) the Secretary General would appoint a member of the staff as Chairman of the working group</li> <li>(4) the Secretary General would include paragraph in his progress report on comparative economic potential of NATO countries and the Soviet bloc</li> </ol>
C-R(54)50 Item IV (Ministerial Session)	Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy (April to December 1954)	17.12.54		<p>The Council approved the report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy, C-4(54)116</p>

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1955

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(55)7 Item I	Review of trends in employment, labour mobility and migration and action taken by member governments and international organizations	23.2.55	Discussion in which Italian, Greek, French, Danish and Canadian Representatives participated	<p>The Council:-</p> <p>(1) approved the recommendations contained in para.3 of cover note of C-M(55)12</p> <p>(2) agreed that the question of publicity should be dealt with by the Secretary General at the next press conference.</p>
C-R(55)55 Item VI	Comparison of economic trends in NATO and Soviet countries	7.12.55		<p>The Council:-</p> <p>(1) agreed to forward C-M(55)119 for discussion at the Ministerial Meeting</p> <p>(2) invited the Working Group to continue its studies on this question and report to the Council</p> <p>(3) invited the International Staff to consider downgrading the paper from NATO SECRET to permit wider circulation</p>

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1955

Action taken

Reference

Subject

Date of meeting

Discussion

C-R(55)58  
Item IV  
(Ministerial  
Session)

Review of international  
situation

15.12.55

The Ministers discussed at length  
various problems of Soviet policy  
raised by the documents under review:

- (1) Intelligence Survey by Standing  
Group (MCM-4-55)
- (2) Report on Trends and Implications  
of Soviet Policy (C-M(55)121)
- (3) Report on Comparison of Economic  
Trends in NATO and Soviet  
Countries (C-M(55)119)

and proceeded to consider possible  
NATO action for the implementation  
of Article 2 (see C-R(56)3 below).

C-R(55)60  
Item I  
(Ministerial  
Session)

Implementation of  
Article 2

16.12.55

The Council of Ministers adopted the  
following resolution:-

- (1) recognising recent developments in  
international situation make it  
necessary to have closer co-operation  
between members of Alliance as  
envisaged in Article 2 of Treaty
- (2) taking note of statements made to  
this effect at present meeting
- (3) decide to instruct the Permanent  
Council to examine and implement all  
measures conducive to this end

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CT-D/8

1956

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(56)3 Item II	Implementation of Article 2	25.1.56		<p>The Council agreed to consider various points made in the course of discussion at the meeting on 8th February, in particular:-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) the desirability of the survey of Article 2 activities proposed by the UK in C-M(56)3, and               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) under whose auspices should the paper go out</li> <li>(b) what would be the scope of the paper</li> <li>(c) who would prepare the paper</li> </ol> </li> <li>(2) whether an analysis should be prepared of soviet political and economic action outside the Iron Curtain; the Council subsequently to decide on possible counter measures</li> <li>(3) the relations of NATO with other international organizations dealing, in particular, with economic questions.</li> </ol> <p>The Council agreed to discuss the UK proposal for Article 2 survey on 8th February but to postpone remainder of discussion until 15th February 1956</p> <p>The Council instructed the International Staff to submit draft terms of reference as basis for preparing a factual study setting out work done in the Atlantic area within and outside NATO on co-operative basis which had had effect of accomplishing the objectives of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.</p>
C-R(56)4 Item V	-do-	1.2.56		
C-R(56)5 Item I	-do-	8.2.56		

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1956

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
Informal meeting	Private discussions	15.2.56	Herr Blakenhorn urged the importance of private consultation with the Council on both diplomatic and economic aspects of Soviet policy.	
C-R(56)6 Item III	Implementation of Article 2	15.2.56	Discussion of draft outline by the International Staff (C-M(56)11) on factual study of work done within and outside NATO on a co-operative basis having effect of accomplishing objectives of Article 2.	The Council:- (1) agreed that the survey of Article 2 activities should follow the lines proposed in C-M(56)11 (2) took note of suggestions made in the course of discussion.
C-R(56)8 Item I	NATO co-operation for Disaster Relief	24.2.56	Discussion on immediate and longer-term effects of abnormally severe winter conditions in Europe.	The Council:- (1) agreed to urge member governments to authorise their forces assigned to NATO to prepare urgently to deal with the expected disasters from floods (2) recommended member governments give consideration to action required to deal with shortage of food resulting from agricultural damage.
C-R(56)12 Item VII	Survey of article 2 activities	21.3.56		The Council:- (1) invited the International Staff to complete survey of Article 2 activities on lines of C-M(56)11 by third week in April (2) agreed as soon as survey was available to consider whether short paper for publication could be prepared for consideration at Ministerial Meeting in May (3) invited delegations to submit proposals in writing as to future action on Article 2.

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1956

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
Informal Meeting Item I	Analysis of trends of Soviet policy	21.3.56	Discussion at some length on NATO's role in economic co-operation with particular reference to aid to underdeveloped countries and East-West competition. General agreement that NATO was a valuable forum for consultation and political directives but not necessarily as agency for implementing economic projects. French and Italian Delegates stated they would shortly present papers on this subject to the Council.	
C-R(56)13 Item VI	-do-	28.3.56	UK urged clear distinction between general question of trends of Soviet policy and particular problem of Soviet economic penetration in the Middle East.	The Council agreed that economic aspects should be discussed after Easter.
C-R(56)14 Item VIII	Article 2 activities	11.4.56	Italian Representative stated he would submit a paper on Article 2 activities for discussion in private session.	The Council:- (1) agreed to discuss Italian paper at private meeting on 18th April (2) agreed that Council at next meeting should examine the factual Article 2 survey and that Secretariat would prepare draft outline of paper for publication.

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1956

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
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Informal Meeting  
Item II

Action under Article 2	18.4.56	Italian Delegate expounded proposals circulated by his Delegation:- (1) to examine the nature of Soviet economic offensive with a view to deciding on possible counter-measures. (2) to set up a Group of Senior Counsellors to advise Council on these problems and suggest how they can be resolved	
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Discussion of when and how Italian proposals should be raised at forth-coming Ministerial Meeting. Germany supported Italian proposal. UK did not favour too ambitious an approach to consideration of economic problems in NATO. Not useful to establish Committee of Economic Experts.

C-R(56)16  
Item IV

Survey of Article 2  
activities

18.4.56

Discussion of Staff paper on Survey of Article 2 activities (C-M(56)45).

The Council:-

- (1) agreed to set up a working group under UK chairmanship to prepare
  - (a) draft Introductory Statement to be submitted together with C-M(56)45 to Ministers
  - (b) draft of a passage to be included in final communique of Ministerial Meeting dealing with Article 2 activities
- (2) agreed that revision of C-M(56)45 would be undertaken after Minister Meeting and would incorporate both suggestions by delegations and cor. made by Ministers in the course of discussion. NATO SECRET

1956

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(56)17 Item V	Introductory statement on survey of Article 2 activities	28.4.56		The Council:- (1) invited the International Staff to amend C-WP(56)1 in the light of the discussion (final text C-M(56)55) (2) agreed that the document as amended should be submitted to Ministers as a report by the Working Party.
C-R(56)20 C-R(56)21 Item IIA (Ministerial Session)	Trends and implications of Soviet policy	4.5.56	Discussion between Ministers on various aspects of Soviet policy, including economic plans C-M(56)49 C-M(56)52 C-M(56)50 (Soviet Sixth 5 Year Plan)	
C-R(56)21 Item IIB (Ministerial Session)	Political and economic questions arising from current Soviet tactics	4.5.56	Speeches by Mr. von Brentano (Germany). Presentation of Pineau Plan by Mr. Pineau (France). Speech by Mr. Martino (Italy), etc.	
C-R(56)23 Item I (Ministerial Session)	-do-	5.5.56	Turkey considered that NATO countries should adopt common line in other international organizations on article 2 activities.	The Council agreed to appoint a Committee of Three Ministers to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community. The Council also agreed:- (1) to undertake periodical examinations of the political aspects of economic problems.

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1956

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(56)23 (contd.)				<p>(2) to strengthen economic co-operation between member countries, to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to promote conditions of stability and wellbeing.</p> <p>(3) to instruct the Permanent Representatives of the Council to examine economic problems in the light of the ideas set out above and of the plan put forward by Mr. Pineau, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, calling upon the services of a committee of technical advisers working under their authority.</p>
C-R(56)24 Item III	Outcome of Ministerial Meeting: B. Committee of Three	14.5.56		<p>It was decided that the International Staff should service the Committee of Three Ministers.</p>
	E. Pineau Plan for aid to Underdeveloped Countries		<p>Preliminary discussion on methods of examining economic and political problems of Pineau Plan, i.e. setting up committee of technical advisers.</p>	
	I. Article 2 Survey		<p>Secretary General pointed out that no decision had been taken as to whether C-M(56)45 should be edited and published.</p>	<p>The Council agreed to set up a Working Group to start editing and revising the article 2 Survey (C-M(56)45):</p>
	J. Proposal by German Foreign Minister regarding periodic surveys of Soviet economic penetration in underdeveloped countries			<p>The Council agreed that periodic studies of Soviet economic penetration should be made at quarterly intervals by International Staff on basis of information supplied by delegations.</p>

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 CT-D/8

1956

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(56)25 Item VII	Quarterly surveys of Soviet economic penetration	17.5.56	US wished International Staff to prepare terms of reference for studies in question	The Council requested the Secretary General to prepare terms of reference for quarterly surveys of Soviet economic penetration for submission to the Council as soon as possible.
Informal Meeting Item IV	Pineau Plan and para.5 of final communiqué of Ministerial Meeting	25.5.56	Discussion on distinction between Pineau Plan and para.5 of communiqué dealing with political aspects of economic problems. Italy urged creation of Committee of Economic Experts. Supported by France, UK and others thought definition of directives essential before appointment of experts.	The Council agreed to consider Pineau Plan and para.5 of final communiqué at meeting on 6th June (see C-R(56)26).
C-R(56)26 Item IV	Committee of Three Ministers	25.5.56	Secretary General stated that Three Ministers were arriving in Paris in July. Was any preparatory work necessary? Canadian Representative suggested Staff should prepare reference papers listing suggestions for strengthening Atlantic Community	The Council invited the Secretary General to prepare a paper on lines suggested by the Canadian Representative.
Informal Meeting Item I	Organization and functions of NATO	30.5.56	US referred to possible enlargement of scope of NATO, including role of technical advisers for economic matters having political implications for NATO. Portuguese Delegate raised possibility of NATO becoming unpopular if "supervisor" of work of other organizations. Greek and Norwegian Delegates thought report on Six Power Conference in Venice would be useful. Belgian Delegate agreed to provide this.	

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1956

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CI-D/8

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
Informal Meeting	Egyptian tenders for dock construction at Alexandria	18.6.56	The Italian Delegate drew attention to a concrete case of possible Soviet politico-economic penetration in an uncommitted country. In March 1956 Egyptian government requested tenders from a number of firms both in Soviet and in Western countries for dock construction in Alexandria. After construction, management of the dock would be entrusted to representatives of Egypt and of the constructing company. There was a risk that the USSR or a satellite would enter a low bid in order to obtain the contract. Hence Soviet penetration in the eastern Mediterranean with subsidised dock servicing Soviet shipping. Was there any scope for joint NATO action in this matter? Discussion followed of the many implications of the problem raised.	The Council:- (1) invited Representatives to report to their governments on Italian statement and to find out if any private firms proposed to submit tenders.  (2) decided to discuss the matter in restricted session on 27th June.
C-R(56)32 Item I	Periodic surveys of Soviet economic penetration	21.6.56	C-M(56)78	The Council approved the draft decision on periodic surveys of Soviet economic moves set out in C-M(56)78.
C-R(56)35 Item VIII	Egyptian tenders for dock construction at Alexandria	27.6.56		The Council agreed to refer question of Egyptian tenders for dock construction at Alexandria raised by Italian Delegation to the Working Group on Soviet Economic Policy for a factual study and report.

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1956

Reference	Subject	Date of meeting	Discussion	Action taken
C-R(56)38 C-R(56)40	Pineau Plan	11.7.56 18.7.56		The Council established a Committee of Technical Advisers to report on the Pineau Plan by 1st November 1956
C-R(56)42	Egyptian tenders for dock construction at Alexandria	25.7.56	The UK, France and Canada considered that it would be unwise for NATO to become involved in this problem but agreed with Italy that the position should be kept under review.	The Council agreed that the report submitted by the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy (C-M(56)100) should be referred to member governments and that the question should be kept under review by the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy.

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INDEX OF ECONOMIC SUBJECTS CONSIDERED BY  
THE COUNCIL FOR DISCUSSION OR ACTION

<u>Subject</u>		<u>Dates</u>
Alexandria Dockyard construction		18.6.56 27.6.56 25.7.56
Article 2 Activities	- General	22.9.52 15.12.52 17.12.52 16.12.55 11.4.56 18.4.56
	- Survey of Article 2 Activities	25.1.56 1.2.56 8.2.56 15.2.56 21.3.56 18.4.56 28.4.56 14.5.56
East-West Trade	- Geneva Conference	4.3.53
	- Study on long term Problem of East-West Trade	2.7.53
Economic implications of Soviet Policy	- General discussion	16.12.52 19.3.54 17.12.54
	- Economic comparison between NATO countries and Soviet bloc	1.12.54 7.12.55 15.12.55
	- Report on Soviet 6th 5 year Plan	4.5.56
	- Surveys on Soviet Economic penetration	4.5.56 14.5.56 17.5.56 21.6.56
Labour mobility	- General	22.9.52 3.12.52
	- Chairmanship of Working Group on Labour Mobility	
	- Report on Labour Mobility	25.11.53 13.1.54

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Dates</u>
McCarran Act	30.6.54
NATO co-operation for Disaster relief	
- General Procedure	14.10.53
- Flood Disaster in Holland, United Kingdom and Belgium	3.2.53 18.2.53
- Greek Earthquake Disaster	19.8.53 17.9.53 23.9.53
- Severe Winter in Europe 1956	24.2.56
NATO relationships with Trade Unions	4.9.52 22.9.52
Pineau Plan for Assistance to Under- developed Countries	4.5.56 14.5.56 25.5.56 26.5.56 11.7.56 18.7.56
Role of NATO in Economic Co-operation	21.3.56 18.4.56 5.5.56 30.5.56

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD 15  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Ref. *Information*

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EXEMPLAIRE N° 44  
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DOCUMENT  
CT-D/9

COMMITTEE OF THREE

LIST OF DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE

1. Questionnaire (CT-D/1(Revised)) with explanatory notes (CT-D/2). ✓
2. Replies from all countries except Denmark, France, Iceland and Turkey, and Draft Analysis of these replies, prepared by International Staff (CT-D/8). ✓
3. Summary Record (CT-R/1) containing decisions reached during June meetings of the Committee. ✓
4. Timetable of consultations with governmental representatives (CT-D/3). ✓ Note: this timetable has been agreed to by all governments. The following two items should, however, be added to it:  

12th September, 10 - 12 a.m. - meeting with the Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Association

15th September, 10 - 12 a.m. - meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association
5. Papers prepared by the International Staff:
  - (i) possible implications for NATO if it were to become a regional organization in the terms of chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter (CT-D/4); ✓
  - (ii) notes on procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes within various international organizations (CT-D/6); ✓
  - (iii) outline of what NATO has done so far in the non-military fields (CT-D/7); ✓
  - (iv) list of political and economic subjects considered by the Council (CT-D/8). ✓

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6. Proposals and contributions:

- (i) memorandum by the Danish and Norwegian Governments on a "Centre of Atlantic Community studies" (CT-D/5); ✓
- (ii) memorandum by Prof. L.B. Sohn of Harvard University, dated 8th June, 1956, on the strengthening of NATO, particularly with respect to the settlement of legal and political disputes and the setting up of an inter-parliamentary assembly; ✓
- (iii) letter from Mr. M. Koster (of London) to Mr. Lange, dated 19th June, 1956, containing a proposal for the exchange of civil servants between NATO member countries; ✓
- (iv) letter from Dr. Kurt Hahn to Lord Ismay dated 11th July, 1956 containing a proposal for the setting up of NATO colleges. ✓

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Paris, XVIe.

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1st October, 1956

NATO CONFIDENTIAL  
CT-D/10

COMMITTEE OF THREE

Draft Formal Record of Proceedings  
(to be Annexed to the Report)

The Committee of Three, consisting of Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway), Mr. Gaetano Martino (Italy) and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada) was established by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session on 5th May, 1956, with the following terms of reference:

" . . . to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."


2. The Committee held its first meetings from 20th to 22nd June, 1956, at NATO Headquarters in Paris. During these discussions, the procedure to be followed by the Committee was established, and it was decided to send a Questionnaire to each NATO Member Government in order to obtain its views on the problems raised by the task set the Committee by the Council. This Questionnaire, which was circulated on 28th June, contained a number of specific questions with respect to co-operation in the political, economic, cultural and information fields and regarding the organization and functions of NATO. In addition, the Committee issued a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire. Governments were requested to submit their replies by 20th August.

3. The Committee reassembled in Paris on 10th September, 1956, and held a series of meetings lasting until the 22nd of that month. After having examined and analysed the replies to the Questionnaire, the Committee held consultations with each member country individually. The purpose of these consultations was to clarify, where necessary, the position taken by governments in their replies, and to obtain their views on a number of specific proposals selected from the different replies, and summarised in a preliminary working paper which was circulated to serve as a basis for these discussions.

4. The consultations took place in the following order:

Wednesday, 12th September a.m. Iceland (represented by Mr. H.G. Anderson, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the North Atlantic Council)

p.m. Turkey (represented by Mr. N. Birgi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)



Thursday, 13th September a.m. The Netherlands (represented by Mr. J.W. Boyen, Foreign Minister)

p.m. Greece (represented by Mr. Averoff, Foreign Minister)

Friday, 14th September a.m. Belgium (represented by Mr. P.H. Spaak, Foreign Minister)

p.m. Germany (represented by Professor Hallstein, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Monday, 17th September a.m. Luxembourg (represented by Mr. M.J. Bech, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister)

a.m. France (represented by Mr. C. Pineau, Foreign Minister)

p.m. United States (represented by Senator George, special representative of the President)

p.m. Portugal (represented by Mr. P. Cunha, Foreign Minister)

Tuesday, 18th September a.m. Denmark (represented by Mr. Erling Christiansen, Deputy Foreign Minister)

p.m. United Kingdom (represented by Mr. Anthony Nutting, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

5. In addition the Committee met with the following groups:

(a) On Wednesday, 12th September, meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO Countries, consisting of the following persons:

Belgium	M. Frans Van Cauwelaert M.A. de Meeler
Canada	Senator, The Hon. Wishart McL. Robertson, P.C.
France	M. Maurice Schumann
Germany	Herr F. Berendsen Dr. Richard Jaeger

Netherlands Mr. J.J. Fens  
Mr. J.L. Kranenburg  
Mr. E.A. Vermeer

Turkey Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek

United Kingdom Colonel Walter Elliot, C.H.,  
M.C., M.P.

United States Congressman Wayne L. Hays, M.C.

(b) On Saturday, 15th September, meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association, represented by:

Count Morra, Chairman  
Dr. Nord, Vice-Chairman  
Dr. Flynt, Vice Chairman, and  
Mr. John Eppstein, Secretary General

and a number of delegates from national member organizations.

(c) On Tuesday, 18th September, meeting with General Billotte and Mr. Barton, representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.

6. As a result of these consultations a draft report to the Council was prepared.

7. (Paragraph about the meeting in November and its results).



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2nd November, 1956

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CT-D/10(Revised)

COMMITTEE OF THREE

DRAFT FORMAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS  
(to be Annexed to the Report)

The Committee of Three, consisting of Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway) and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada) was established by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session on 5th May, 1956, with the following terms of reference:

"... to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."

2. The Committee held its first meetings from 20th to 22nd June, 1956, at NATO Headquarters in Paris. During these discussions, the procedure to be followed by the Committee was established, and it was decided to send a Questionnaire to each NATO member government in order to obtain its views on a number of specific problems with respect to co-operation in the political, economic, cultural and information fields and regarding the organization and functions of NATO. In addition, the Committee issued a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire. The Questionnaire was circulated on 28th June, 1956, and governments were requested to submit their replies by 20th August.

3. The Committee reassembled in Paris on 10th September, 1956, and held a series of meetings lasting until the 22nd of that month. After having examined and analysed the replies to the Questionnaire, the Committee held consultations with each member country individually. The purpose of these consultations was to clarify, where necessary, the position taken by governments in their replies, and to discuss with the representatives of other governments in a preliminary way certain views of the Committee.

4. The consultations took place in the following order:

Wednesday, 12th September a.m. Iceland (represented by Mr. H.G. Andersen, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the North Atlantic Council)

p.m. Turkey (represented by Mr. N. Birgi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

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Thursday, 13th September a.m. The Netherlands (represented by Mr. J.W. Beyen, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

p.m. Greece (represented by Mr. Averoff, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

Friday, 14th September a.m. Belgium (represented by Mr. P.H. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

p.m. Germany (represented by Professor Hallstein, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Monday, 17th September a.m. Luxembourg (represented by Mr. M.J. Bech, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs)

a.m. France (represented by Mr. C. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

p.m. United States (represented by Senator George, special representative of President Eisenhower)

p.m. Portugal (represented by Mr. P. Cunha, Minister for Foreign Affairs)

Tuesday, 18th September a.m. Denmark (represented by Mr. Ernst Christiansen, Deputy Foreign Minister)

p.m. United Kingdom (represented by Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs)

5. In addition the Committee met with the following groups:

(a) On Wednesday, 12th September, meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO Countries, consisting of the following persons:

Belgium	Mr. Frans Van Cauwelaert Mr. A. de Meeler
Canada	Senator, The Hon. Wishart McL. Robertson, P.C.
France	Mr. Maurice Schumann
Germany	Herr F. Berendsen Dr. Richard Jaeger

