

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
and
PUBLIC DISCLOSED

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SUMMARY RECORD
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Summary Record of a meeting of the Council held at
the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIIe., on Saturday,
5th May, 1956, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT

Chairman : H.E. Mr. K. Gudmundsson (Iceland)

Vice-Chairman and
Secretary General : The Lord Ismay

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P.H. Spaak (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke (Permanent Representative)

CANADA

The Hon. L.B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External
Affairs)
H.E. Mr. L.D. Wilgress (Permanent Representative)

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. H.C. Hansen (Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. M.A. Wassard (Permanent Representative)

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. C. Pineau (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. Parodi (Permanent Representative)

GERMANY

H.E. Mr. H. von Brentano (Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs)
H.E. Mr. H. Blankenhorn (Permanent Representative)

GREECE

H.E. Mr. S. Theotoky (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. M. Melas (Permanent Representative)

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. H.G. Andersen (Permanent Representative)

ITALY

H.E. Mr. G. Martino (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. Alessandrini (Permanent Representative)

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LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. J. Bech (Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. N. Hommel (Permanent Representative)

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.W. Beyen (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starckenborgh Stachouwer (Permanent Representative)

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. H. Lange (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. J. Boyesen (Permanent Representative)

PORTUGAL

Prof. Dr. P. Cunha (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Count de Tovar (Permanent Representative)

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Fuat Köprülü (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi (Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)
Sir Christopher Steel (Permanent Representative)

UNITED STATES

H.E. Mr. J. Foster Dulles (Secretary of State)
H.E. Mr. G.W. Perkins (Permanent Representative)

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Baron A. Bentinck (Deputy Secretary General)
Mr. G. Cosmelli (Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs)
Mr. F.D. Gregh (Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance)
Mr. J. Murray Mitchell (Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics)
The Lord Coleridge (Executive Secretary)

ALSO PRESENT

General D.H. Buchanan (Standing Group Liaison Office)

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I. CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE SURVEY OF ARTICLE 2 ACTIVITIES

1. Mr. THEOTOKY (Greece) thought that the Council should concentrate its attention on three distinct fields. First, in the military field, it should be noted that Stalinist principles were still honoured in Russia and that the military threat therefore retained its absolute priority. Hence it was important to maintain the defence effort, even if it were supposed that a real change in Soviet policy was likely.

2. In the political field, the problems were of two types. First there was the problem of Atlantic policy towards the USSR. It was difficult to devise a procedure whereby a common Atlantic policy could be pursued, but it should be possible to concert the activities of NATO as far as Russia was concerned, and Russia should understand that she was dealing, not merely with a transient figure, but with an enduring concert of nations.

3. Then there was the problem of the policies of the members of the Alliance in regard to one another: where real or potential conflicts existed it was important to examine them either when they arose or, even better, in advance, so as to create harmony in the ranks of NATO. For this purpose it might be considerable to set up a co-ordinating body.

4. Finally, there was the problem of extending commitments under Article 2 of the Treaty. No doubt to meet the new trends in Soviet policy it would be desirable to contribute to the economic development of the less prosperous countries. It was also true that even in NATO there were underdeveloped countries which were already called on to make heavy sacrifices in the name of joint defence, and on which it was proposed to make further demands under Article 2.

5. He thought it would be undesirable to set up a new body to implement decisions taken under Article 2 when other international organizations already existed which were competent in matters of economic and technical aid. That said, it was up to NATO to draw up under Article 2 an order of priority whereby aid to the less prosperous NATO countries would take priority over that which should be given to other underdeveloped countries.

6. Mr. von BRENTANO (Germany) said that he could support the draft resolution submitted by the Italian Delegation. He proposed a drafting amendment which was accepted by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

7. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements by the Greek and German Foreign Ministers.

II. DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND DRAFT OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE
PREPARED BY THE WORKING GROUP

Document: FC/2

8. There was discussion of the wording of the paragraph of the above document, dealing with ways of improving political consultation among members of NATO, and of the paragraph of the document dealing with methods of implementing Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

9. The COUNCIL:

invited the Working Group on the Final Communiqué to prepare a third draft in the light of the observations made by Ministers during the course of discussion.

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III. NATO INFORMATION POLICY

Reference document: C-M(56)18

10. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) underlined the importance of information and propaganda within the general field of NATO's activities. The NATO countries had not yet succeeded in informing their public opinion, let alone that of the neutral or uncommitted nations, of the importance of the part played by NATO in preserving freedom. This was not an easy task for the best information could not be fully effective unless the policies and actions to which it related provided a sound foundation for it. He thought that most NATO governments had not yet recognised the part to be played by NATO as an international information agency. This was unfortunate because the efficiency of national information was impaired by lack of co-ordination on the international plane. NATO should therefore consider what further progress could be made with a view to co-ordinating or centralising to a greater degree information on all matters of common interest. Of primary significance in this field was the fact that the danger of military aggression had not yet disappeared. Stress should also be laid upon the interdependence of all NATO nations and that weakness within the smallest of these nations was a weakness in the entire Alliance. Co-ordination of information was also necessary in the case of disputes between NATO nations.

11. In conclusion, NATO's action in the field of information could be greatly improved if it devoted more resources to this end. If the desire to co-ordinate information activities and to encourage them were increased and if closer contact were maintained between the various national information agencies and NATO, much more could be achieved.

12. Mr. LANGE (Norway) suggested that public opinion might be able to familiarise itself better with what NATO did if, occasionally, a meeting of Foreign Ministers were held in a NATO capital other than Paris. In order to limit expenditure, such meetings might be held on a restricted basis as regards the size of delegations.

13. THE COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of document C-M(56)18;
- (2) took note of the statement by the Canadian Representative recorded in paragraphs 10 and 11 above;
- (3) invited the Permanent Council to consider the suggestion put forward by the Norwegian Representative recorded in paragraph 12 above.

IV. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE GROUP OF THREE MINISTERS

14. There was general agreement that certain paragraphs of a draft terms of reference for the "three wise men" could be incorporated in the final communiqué. It was also agreed that the points dealt with in the first two paragraphs of the draft were covered in the draft already submitted by the Working Group on the Final Communiqué.

15. Mr. LANGE (Norway) thought that the Council should reflect very seriously before deciding to appoint a Ministerial committee with such wide terms of reference. He suggested that the Council in Permanent Session should examine the problem and report back to a Ministerial Meeting which might be held in a couple of months' time.

16. A number of Ministers pointed out that there had been a leakage with regard to the provisional proposal to set up a committee of three Ministers, and that the hand of the Council was therefore in effect forced. Terms of reference of the Ministerial committee must be dealt with in the communiqué, since the decision to establish the Working Group was public property.

17. The COUNCIL:

invited the Working Group on the Final Communiqué to work out a procedure for incorporating appropriate references to the Ministerial Working Group in the final communiqué.

V. DISCUSSION OF OTHER MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

A. North Africa

18. Mr. PINEAU (France) said that for three reasons the French Government was glad to see North Africa appearing on the Agenda of the present session. NATO, unlike UNO, was an Alliance within the close ranks of which it was normal for member governments to explain their national problems. Secondly, North Africa was so important for the security of the free nations that it was impossible for NATO to remain indifferent to the problems of security in that area. Lastly, the French Government had required NATO's assistance in view of the fact that it had removed troops stationed in Germany and sent them to North Africa.

19. The defence of the eastern frontiers was less seriously affected than might at first appear. There had been no change in two of the three points which constituted France's principal commitments - interceptor fighters and radar cover of the territory. On the third point, the commitment concerning ground forces in Germany, the reduction was about eight thousand men. It should be noted in this connection that the French Government had made a considerable effort, by calling up certain classes of reservists.

20. In the case of Morocco and Tunisia, the French Government had wished to follow a very liberal policy and had granted independence to these two countries. They had only retained the notion of inter-dependence lest the political power of these countries should prove unable to exercise itself throughout their territories.

21. For various reasons the French Government did not consider it possible to make the same gesture in regard to Algeria.

22. The Algerian political situation had always been different from that of Morocco and of Tunisia. Quite apart from the legal argument of the division of Algeria into French departments, it should be noted that at no time in history had Algeria possessed national sovereignty, a national government or even a national administration. If therefore France were to relinquish its power in Algeria, she would leave an almost complete void.

23. Moreover, for France to be able to conclude a political agreement, there would have to be someone with whom to negotiate. In Morocco, France had negotiated with the Sovereign and the representatives of political parties such as the Istiqlal and the Democratic Independence Party, which were representative of a large proportion of the population. In Tunisia there had always been a legitimate Sovereign, the Bey, and France had also been able to negotiate with the representatives of an important political party, the Neo-Destour.

24. In Algeria on the other hand, the sovereignty belonged to France; there was no party representative of public opinion. The sole activity of the opposition elements which had emerged had been to set ambushes for French troops and to launch attacks against the Moslem and European civilian population. There was therefore no one with whom they could negotiate as they had done in Morocco and in Tunisia.

25. Another important factor was the existence of a large population of European origin (1,200,000) established in Algeria for over a century in some cases. This population, far from being of exclusively French origin, also included Algerians of Spanish, Italian or Maltese origin. Algeria was the homeland of these peoples and if they had to leave they would be unlikely to find in France the homeland, social

conditions and general background they required. These 1,200,000 Algerians of European origin were at present living in a state of extreme unrest; they were prepared to go to all ends and even resort to violent action, in order to avoid being driven out of the country. It was, moreover, in the interest of the French Government, for its part, to avoid the risk of a conflict between the two sections of the population which might degenerate into a desperate civil war.

26. In order to ensure the peaceful co-existence of the two sections of the population, various solutions might be considered. If the solution advocated by the National Army of Liberation were adopted, the result would be to create an independent Algeria based on the domination of the Moslem majority and on a minority of European origin. In order to avoid the inevitable bloodshed this would produce, the only solution (which was moreover already beginning to win some support both in Algeria and in France) would be to divide Algeria into two parts: the one, with the European population in the majority, would include large cities such as Algiers and Oran and the coastal region connecting them; the other, with the Moslem population in the majority, would cover the hinterland areas which were economically much poorer. This solution would produce a system very similar to the one adopted for Israel and would entail for North Africa conflicting factors of the same type as those now prevalent in the Middle East. This explained the French Government's strong objections to a solution which meant cutting the country in two.

27. The French Government was, therefore, in favour of a settlement which would not be dictated by France but which would be discussed with representative elements of the population which could emerge only from free elections. It would be very difficult to organize any such elections in the present state of unrest. It was this situation which had led up to the military action designed to diminish the state of unrest and to create zones in which it would be possible to arrange for elections under a single electoral system. It would then be the French Government's intention to work out a status of co-existence. The French Government would doubtless envisage some kind of federal arrangement by which Algeria could acquire a status similar to that of the German Land or of the American States. Some measure of autonomy would be assured for the Moslem population and relations would be established with France for the benefit of the population of French origin and in order to maintain order.

28. The French Government would let no opportunity pass of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the present problems. It was extremely anxious, both in the interests of France and in those of the rest of the free world, to put an end to this grievous and costly conflict.

29. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statement by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

B. The Middle East

30. Mr. KÖPRÜLÜ (Turkey) said that the political situation in the Middle East continued to be troubled, and dangerous to the stability of the free world. Local factors of discord and the susceptibility of certain countries which had recently acquired their independence, in addition to the fact that the entire area was underdeveloped, created a fertile field for subversive activities. Soviet Russia took full advantage of the situation by attempting to divide the Middle East countries. Moreover, certain countries, and in particular Egypt, pursued a policy which, although aiming at something different, ended by supporting Russian policy. Moscow was quite happy to leave the work to these countries.

31. The Baghdad Pact was at present the only instrument of defence against Russian penetration, and the only source of hope for those countries which desired the welfare and stability of the Middle East. It had therefore come under violent criticism not only by Moscow but also by the Egyptian leaders and those who followed in their steps in the name of neutralism. There could be no doubt, however, that those who opposed the Baghdad Pact by all the means in their power were only trying to create antagonism and to bring to a head conflict in that region. Those who criticised the Baghdad Pact as being responsible for tension in the Middle East should be reminded that it had come into being as a consequence of that tension and not as a cause. The second meeting of the Ministers of the Baghdad Pact, which had recently been held in Teheran, showed the remarkable results already achieved by that organization in the industrial, economic and military field as well as for the defence of that region.

32. He then spoke of the disquieting situation in Afghanistan where the Russians had succeeded in establishing means of penetrating that country through economic and political channels. The strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan constituted a danger to peace which Turkey was doing its best to eliminate. He would shortly accompany the Turkish Prime Minister in a visit to Afghanistan and he hoped that, although they might not be able to do much, they would at least succeed in arresting Russian infiltration in that country.

33. Mr. FOSTER DULLES (United States) explained the policy followed by the United States in respect of the tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The United States was running the risk of being drawn into a "prestige" conflict in support of Israel and against Egypt, backed by the USSR. There were, in fact, certain elements in the United States who wished to give the maximum aid to Israel who was a potential enemy of Egypt - a tool of the Communists. It was clear, however, that such a development would cause extreme danger to world peace and, although it was difficult to hold the scales even in the United States during an electoral year, his Government was most anxious to avoid any action which might involve it in any kind of prestige contest. Although it fully understood that Israel should not be left denuded of adequate strength to repel an invasion, it did not feel it right to provide that strength and to fight the USSR by proxy.

34. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) agreed with Mr. Dulles that the situation in Palestine was extremely dangerous. The United Kingdom Government had done its best to convince the Russian leaders during their visit to Great Britain that every effort should be made to avoid war. At the same time, the Secretary General of the United Nations had done a very good job on the spot, and seemed to have achieved temporary success. This was not enough however and, with the support which the Soviet leaders had promised to give to the United Nations in this respect, the Western countries should consult Mr. Hammarskjold as to what should be the best method of dispelling the threat of war in the Middle East.

35. He then described the policy followed for the past years by the United Kingdom Government regarding the supply of arms to the Middle East countries. This policy consisted in supplying a "trickle" of weapons to both sides with a view to maintaining the balance between their military power and preventing them from becoming sufficiently equipped for war. The considerable supply of weapons by the Communist bloc had disturbed the balance, but the United Kingdom Government believed that its policy was still the best.

36. He then referred to the Baghdad Pact which the United Kingdom considered as a vital part of the screen against Communist infiltration, not only in the military but also in the economic field. The final communiqué of the recent Teheran Meeting mentioned the many achievements reached by the Baghdad Pact since its recent creation. The United Kingdom was determined to make a success of the Baghdad Pact and considered that, in providing a shield against Russian penetration of that area, it found ample justification for its existence.

37. Mr. PINEAU (France) said that his Government's position on the question of the supply of arms to the Middle East was a difficult one. In view of the situation in Algeria France was anxious to avoid further cause of friction with the Arab world. Yet each shipment of French arms to Israel caused violent reaction in Cairo.

38. For some months, France had been alone in supplying Israel with much needed weapons but the point had been reached where, politically speaking, it would be unable to continue these supplies alone. The French Government therefore considered that the time had come for other countries to join in the effort of maintaining Israel's ability to defend itself. The establishment of a common policy on this question was much desired.

39. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) said that his Government was also concerned in this problem since it was under considerable pressure from both sides to supply arms. He felt that a peaceful settlement would not be helped by accepting a flow of armaments to one side and a trickle to the other. He fully

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appreciated the arguments put forward by Mr. Dulles, but warned the Council that Israel was in a state of real fear. A genuine political settlement was the only solution, and he thought that the Secretary General of UNO had given a good lead by what he had accomplished in recent weeks. Through UNO a solution might be imposed on the two antagonists.

40. Mr. THEOTOKY (Greece) referred to an acute problem which had faced his Government in recent months owing to requests for facilities, in Greek territory, for aircraft, presumably transporting arms to one or other of the two parties. Was the Greek Government to refuse facilities to either of the two parties, or was it to grant equal facilities to both? This was a question for which he asked a direct reply from the Council.

41. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) thought that the policy in the Middle East being followed by certain members was dangerous, in that there was a tendency to supply arms to both sides. Now that relations with the USSR seemed to be somewhat better, would it not be possible to try to solve the problem by disarmament, rather than by an armaments race.

42. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) appreciated the point made by the Belgian Foreign Minister. As he saw it, the first essential was to prevent war breaking out in the Middle East: and in this connection, the visit by the Secretary General of UNO had brought about good results. This, however, was only a first stage. The second stage must be a political settlement, which could only be achieved, in his opinion, through UNO.

43. Mr. THEOTOKY (Greece) said that he had had no answer to the concrete question he had put. Unless he received guidance from the Council on this matter, the Greek Government would be obliged to take the action it felt appropriate to meet requests put to it, and would feel no responsibility to NATO for any decisions it might take.

44. The CHAIRMAN suggested that this was a question which the Permanent Council might consider as a matter of urgency.

45. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the statements made in the discussion on problems in the Middle East;
- (2) agreed that the Council in Permanent Session should examine, as a matter of urgency, the problem raised by the Greek Foreign Minister.

C. The Far East

46. Mr. FOSTER DULLES (United States) said that he had visited certain areas which were perhaps not Far Eastern countries properly speaking: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The situation there was disturbing, in that Afghanistan seemed to be in danger of becoming a Communist satellite and Pakistan was

concerned at this development. Pakistan's determination to defend itself against this possibility, in its turn, was alarming to India. The Russian leaders, on their recent visit to the Indian continent, had played on these fears, and had encouraged India by stating that Kashmir was in fact theirs.

47. With regard to the position in Viet-Nam, the Phillipines, Taiwan and Japan, he believed that there was real anxiety as to the possibility of their being overrun by the Communists, and a fear that Western policies might increase the danger by building up, inadvertently, the prestige of Communist China. If these important areas were lost, it would mean a real change in the balance of power in the Far East. The countries he had mentioned were holding on, backed by the hope of support from the West, and above all from the United States. At the same time, he was far from happy with regard to the position in this part of the world. Finally, there was no sign that Chinese Communism was developing a milder tone, along the lines of Russian Communism. They still relied on military strength and on force.

48. Mr. BEYEN (Netherlands) said that he would like to refer briefly to Indonesia in this context. The position there represented at present no threat to peace, but he felt that the NATO Council should be aware of certain facts concerning Indonesia. He did not believe that there were any serious national antipathies in the feeling that had developed in the past ten years in this area, though there might be a general hostility to the white race. The Netherlands Government had given independence to Indonesia, but that had left no legacy of gratitude: on the contrary, the Indonesian people were disappointed, and to some extent resentful. They seemed hardly able to realise that they were independent. Further, they were trying to create the legend that independence had been won by their efforts rather than by the good will of the Netherlands Government. All this created an overall atmosphere of discontent which the Communists were trying to exploit; and he wished his colleagues to understand the real reasons for the malaise in that area.

49. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements by the United States and Netherlands Foreign Ministers.

D. Germany

50. Mr. von BRENTANO (Germany) pointed out that no change in the intentions of the USSR with regard to Germany had become apparent since the last Geneva Conference. As previously, the Government of the Federal Republic was being periodically invited to enter into negotiations with the Pankow Government. Furthermore, the London talks with Bulganin and Krushchev showed that the Soviets were still pursuing the same relentless policy. In this context, Mr. von Brentano thanked the United Kingdom Government for having tried to obtain some easing of the Soviet attitude to the German problem. He also thanked the French and Italian Governments for their recent declarations

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in Paris, attesting their continuing support of the Federal Government. The Federal Government, for its part, had frequently reiterated its unchanging views with regard to matters such as the importance of disassociating the problem of free elections throughout Germany from the question of security and disarmament. It went without saying that all problems concerning the relations of the Federal Republic with the USSR would continue to be examined in close collaboration with the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

51. He went on to say how gratified he was to find that the Soviet Government was now being compelled to take more account of the Russian people's desire for peace. He was not however, by any means convinced that this new policy sprang from any true love of peace. It arose rather from the wish to consolidate and extend the Soviet sphere of influence by more subtle methods. It was essential, in the view of the Federal Government, to keep to the agreed NATO defence programme. In accordance with these plans, the build-up of forces was proceeding and some 95,000 men would have been called up by the end of the year. Finally, the necessary statutory provisions for the introduction of compulsory military service had now reached the stage at which the relevant laws could be voted before the next parliamentary recess.

52. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statement by the
German Foreign Minister.

E. Disarmament

Document: C-M(56)57(Revised)

53. Mr. Lester PEARSON (Canada) regretted that little time was left to discuss the very important subject of disarmament. The Sub-Committee on Disarmament, which had been meeting in London since 19th March, had postponed its work the day before the present meeting and would shortly report to the United Nations. Its work had not met with the success that had been anticipated when the Russians made the proposals which had led to the convening of the Sub-Committee. The Soviet Government had refused to move from their position as put to the Sub-Committee on 27th March. Document C-M(56)57(Revised) explained in detail the reasons for the failure to reach agreement; it also expressed the view of the four NATO nations on the Sub-Committee that the work should not be abandoned and that further efforts should be made to reach agreement. These four nations had emphasised their readiness and determination to do all they could in this field. It was his opinion that the world should know the position of the Western Allies so that they should not be held responsible in the case of final failure to reach agreement.

54. Nevertheless, the London talks had served a useful purpose in that they had given the Allied powers an insight into Russian policy and tactics on a most important matter and at a significant period in the evolution of the Soviet bloc.

55. Mr. LANGE (Norway) believed that the problem of disarmament should remain on NATO's agenda. He therefore proposed that document C-M(56)57(Revised) be referred to the Permanent Council and, if necessary, to the various member governments. He agreed with the Canadian Representative that the psychological aspect of this problem was most important. The problem with which the free world was confronted was to determine the best way of presenting its position so that the world would know on which side lay the responsibility for failure.

56. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) thought that the Soviet propaganda machine would try to make out that the Soviets had accepted the original offer made by the Western Powers but that the latter had subsequently withdrawn from their position, thus rendering agreement impossible. Their argument would be that the United States Government had refused to reduce its forces below the 2½ million mark, whereas the United Kingdom and French Governments had originally proposed a level of 1½ million. The truth was that the United States were proposing a reduction to 2½ million as a first phase in the disarmament process whilst the Soviets were proposing a figure of 1½ million as being the final figure. Above all, the Soviets gave no indication that they would accept anything but an artificial system of control. They made it clear that they would never agree to give control teams real power. They would merely be empowered to report to the Security Council where the USSR had the power of veto. The Soviets also held that the entire process of disarmament should be carried out without previous settlement of outstanding political differences. This was a most unrealistic approach to the problem. They also excluded any consideration of the question of control over automatic weapons.

57. It could therefore be said that the position of the Western Powers was absolutely sound but they would have to think very carefully about the method of presenting it to the world. In this context the proposal made by the Norwegian Representative would certainly prove extremely useful.

58. Mr. FOSTER DULLES (United States) said that his Government believed that the soundest foundation for disarmament should be a combination of the best form of inspection and of a settlement of the acute political problems which still threatened peace. He knew it was unnecessary for him to reiterate the assurance that the United States were anxious to shed part of the burden of their defence effort. At the same time, they did not want to disarm for a third time under conditions that would not promote peace, as would be the case if disarmament were not accompanied by a settlement of political differences.

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59. The United States had world-wide responsibilities which involved maintaining large numbers of troops overseas and an even larger number of supporting forces at home. They could not accept, therefore, to reduce their total forces below the level of 2½ million during the first phase of disarmament.

60. More important than this question of force levels, however, was the question of the system of controls. In this respect, the United States wished to avoid a repetition of the fraudulent tactics which had enabled North Korea to rearm thanks to the lack of power of the control teams. In the absence of political solutions, the United States would insist on having at least an entirely dependable system of control. The United States had made many attempts to solve the disarmament problem and their failure was solely due to the unwillingness of the Soviets to meet the political problems and to accept an efficient system of control. They were therefore compelled to maintain the military strength necessary for their protection and that of their Allies.

61. The COUNCIL:

agreed to refer document C-M(56)57(Revised) to the Permanent Council for further consideration.

[The Council adjourned until 10.30 p.m.]

62. The Council then had before it the text of a draft communiqué, on the basis of which they took certain decisions of substance. These were as follows.

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VI. EXTENSION OF NON-MILITARY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN NATO COUNTRIES

A. Appointment of a Committee of Three Ministers

63. The COUNCIL considered it timely and useful for the members of the Atlantic Community to examine actively further measures which might be taken at this time to advance more effectively their common interests.

64. In order to enable the Council better to perform these tasks, they agreed:

- (1) to appoint a Committee of Three Ministers to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community;
- (2) invited Mr. Lester B. Pearson, Mr. G. Martino and Mr. H. Lange to serve as the three members of this Committee;

- (3) invited the Committee to submit its report as soon as possible this year.

B. Action by the Council

65. In the meantime, the COUNCIL agreed:

- (1) to undertake periodical examinations of the political aspects of economic problems;
- (2) to strengthen economic co-operation between member countries, to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to promote conditions of stability and well-being;
- (3) to instruct the Permanent Representatives of the Council to examine economic problems in the light of the ideas set out above, and of the plan put forward by Mr. Pineau, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, calling upon the services of a committee of technical advisers working under their authority.

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VII. FINAL COMMUNIQUE

66. The COUNCIL agreed on the text of a final communiqué for immediate issue (see Press Release).

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.