

# NATO

*review*

AUTUMN 2001

## NATO's evolving partnerships



Interview  
with  
Martti Ahtisaari  
*pages 24-25*



Military reform  
in Central and  
Eastern Europe  
*pages 30-33*

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


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# foreword

During the production of this issue of *NATO Review*, the United States suffered a devastating terrorist attack, the effects of which have been felt around the world. The reaction of America's Allies to the barbaric attacks of 11 September was immediate: total solidarity with the United States in its time of need. As a profound symbol of that solidarity, on 12 September, NATO's members agreed that, if it were determined that this attack had been directed from abroad against the United States, it should be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an attack against one or more Allies shall be considered an attack against them all. On 2 October, the US government confirmed that the attacks had indeed been launched from abroad, by terrorists from Osama Bin Laden's *al-Qaida* organisation.

NATO's essential foundation – its bedrock – has always been Article 5, the commitment to collective defence. Of course, this commitment was first entered into in 1949, in very different circumstances. But it remains equally valid and essential today, in the face of this new threat. With the decision to invoke Article 5, NATO's members demonstrated, once again, that the Alliance is no simple talking shop. It is a community of nations, united by its values, and utterly determined to act together to defend them.

On 12 September, it was also demonstrated that the Euro-Atlantic community today is much broader than the 19 NATO members. Within hours of NATO's historic decision, the 46 member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – from North America, Europe and Central Asia – issued a statement in which they agreed that these acts were an attack not only on the United States, but on our common values. In the EAPC statement, the 46 countries also pledged to undertake all efforts needed to combat the scourge of terrorism.

It is too early to say what role NATO and its members, or the EAPC, will play in the coming international struggle against the scourge of terrorism. That struggle will be long and sometimes difficult. It will require all the tools at our disposal, political, economic, diplomatic as well as military. And it will need the active engagement of the widest possible coalition of countries, all working towards common goals. The solidarity and determination displayed in Brussels on 12 September, by the North Atlantic Council and the EAPC, are a vital first step. They show the practical importance of NATO's partnerships and underline the timeliness of this issue of *NATO Review*.

*Lord Robertson*

# FOCUS ON NATO

NATO Secretary General **Lord Robertson** visited **Berlin**, Germany, on 20 and 21 September to attend the NATO Review conference, an annual event to discuss the future of the Alliance, and meet Chancellor **Gerhard Schröder**, Foreign Minister **Joschka Fischer** and other political leaders.

## Armitage briefs



US Deputy Secretary of State **Richard Armitage** visited **NATO** on 20 September to brief **Lord Robertson** and the **North Atlantic Council** on the state of investigations into the terrorist attacks of 11 September.

## Follow-on force

On 19 September, President **Boris Trajkovski** of the former **Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*** asked **NATO** to deploy a reduced, follow-on force in his country after the end of **Operation Essential Harvest** on 26 September.

Between 17 and 22 September, four NATO members and five Partners participated in **Cooperative Engagement 2001**, the first maritime NATO/Partnership-for-Peace exercise to take place in Slovenia, at **Ankaran** near **Koper**.

Seven NATO members and three Partners participated in **Cooperative Poseidon**, the second phase of a submarine safety exercise, which took place in **Bremerhaven**, Germany, between 17 and 21 September. The exercise was also attended by observers from seven **Mediterranean Dialogue** countries.

Military personnel from nine NATO and 13 Partner countries took part in **Cooperative Key 2001**, an exercise in

peace-support operations, which took place in **Plovdiv**, Bulgaria, between 11 and 21 September. Representatives of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and several non-governmental organisations also participated.

Between 10 and 21 September, participants from seven NATO members and 13 Partner countries took part in **Cooperative Best Effort 2001** at **Zeltweg Airbase**, Austria, an exercise designed to train participants in peace-support skills.

German General **Dieter Stöckmann** succeeded UK General **Sir Rupert Smith** as **Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe** at a ceremony at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (**SHAPE**) in **Mons**, Belgium, on 17 September.

**Lord Robertson** visited **Skopje**, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\* on 14 September to consult with President **Boris Trajkovski** and his government and review progress of **Operation Essential Harvest**.

## Three minutes silence

On 13 September, **NATO staff** joined millions of people across Europe in observing three minutes silence for the victims of the 11 September terrorist outrage and their families.



**NATO and Russia** expressed their deepest sympathy with the victims of the 11 September terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC and their families and pledged to intensify cooperation to defeat terrorism at a meeting of the **NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council** on 13 September. Similar sentiments were expressed at extraordinary meetings of the **NATO-Ukraine Commission** and the **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council**.

## New UK ambassador

Ambassador **Emyr Jones Parry** succeeded Ambassador **David Manning** as the **permanent representative of the United Kingdom** to NATO on 13 September. Ambassador Parry, 53, is a career diplomat and was political director of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from July 1998 until August 2001.

## Article 5

On 12 September, **NATO ambassadors** agreed that if the 11 September terrorist attack was directed from abroad, it would be considered as an attack on all NATO Allies, thus invoking **Article 5 of the Washington Treaty**, NATO's founding charter, for the first time in the Alliance's history.

On 11 September, **Lord Robertson** and the **North Atlantic Council** condemned terrorist attacks on innocent civilians in the United States and expressed their deepest sympathy and solidarity with the American people.

On 7 September, **Lord Robertson** attended the last day of a three-day symposium in **Oslo**, Norway, which focused on technological, industrial and scientific aspects of adapting to today's transformed security environment. The event was hosted jointly by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (**SACLANT**), the **Norwegian Defence Command** and the **US Joint Forces Command**.

## New US ambassador



Ambassador **Nicholas Burns** succeeded Ambassador **Alexander Vershbow** as **permanent representative of the United States** to NATO on 4 September. Ambassador Burns, 45, was formerly US ambassador to Greece from 1997 until July 2001.

Between 1995 and 1997, he was spokesman of the US State Department.

A live-flying exercise to train air forces in tactical air operations, including the suppression of enemy air defences and electronic warfare, took place between 3 and 14 September from Main Air Station in **Ørland**, Norway. **Air Meet 2001** involved air forces from 13 NATO member countries and was conducted by the headquarters of **Allied Air Forces North**, based at **Ramstein**, Germany.

**Lord Robertson** met President **Boris Trajkovski**, Prime Minister **Ljubco Georgievski**, Interior Minister **Ljube Boshkovski**, Foreign Minister **Ilianka Mitreva** and Defence Minister **Vlado Bukovski** during a visit to the former **Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*** on 29 August to assess progress made by NATO troops in collecting weapons from ethnic Albanian rebels.

## Disarming rebels



**Operation Essential Harvest** was launched on 22 August, two months after the government of the former **Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*** requested NATO assistance to restore peace and stability in its country. The 30-day mission, which effectively started on 27 August, was to disarm ethnic Albanian rebels and involved some 3,500 troops, with logistical support.

The situation in the former **Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*** dominated the regular joint meeting of the **North Atlantic Council** and the **European Union's Political and Security Committee**, held in **Brussels**, Belgium, on 22 August.

# FOCUS ON NATO

Indicted war criminal **Dragan Jokic**, a Bosnian Serb implicated in the 1995 Srebrenica massacre and attacks on UN observation posts, surrendered to SFOR troops on 15 August.

The headquarters of **Task Force Harvest** deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\* on 15 August — two days after the signing of a political framework agreement to provide for internal reforms and allow NATO-led troops into the country to disarm ethnic Albanian rebels — to assess the situation and prepare the launch of **Operation Essential Harvest**.

**Vidoje Blagojevic**, a former Bosnian Serb commander indicted for war crimes, was detained on 10 August and transferred to the **International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague**.

## Flood preparations

Work on a pilot project to improve flood preparedness and response in the Tisza river area in Ukraine began in September. The project is being developed in the context of the NATO-Ukraine work programme for 2000.

**Lord Robertson** joined EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy **Javier Solana** and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Romanian Foreign Minister **Mircea Geoana**, in **Skopje**, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\* on 26 July for talks with government leaders and political parties to rein-vigorate talks aimed at ending five months of violence.

Lithuanian Prime Minister **Algirdas Brazauskas** met **Lord Robertson** at NATO on 24 July.

On 19 July, the **Military Committee**, NATO's highest military authority, and



its chairman, Admiral **Guido Venturoni**, visited the regional southern command, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), which is responsible for all NATO-led operations in the Balkans.

Serbian Deputy Prime Minister **Nebosja Covic** and Yugoslav Foreign Minister **Goran Svilanovic** met **Lord Robertson** and addressed the **North Atlantic Council** on 18 July. Discussions focused on developments in southern Serbia and Kosovo.

## New NATO Deputy Secretary General



Ambassador **Alessandro Minuto Rizzo** succeeded Ambassador **Sergio Balanzino** as NATO Deputy Secretary General on 16 July. Ambassador Rizzo is an Italian career diplomat and was previously his country's permanent representative to the European Union's Political and Security Committee.

**Lord Robertson** and the 19 NATO ambassadors visited **Albania** and **Bosnia and Herzegovina** on 12 and 13 July for wide-ranging discussions with government leaders.

Current Euro-Atlantic security issues were discussed at a five-day meeting organised by the **NATO Parliamentary Assembly** for young and newly-elected parliamentarians from NATO and Partner countries, held in **Brussels**, Belgium, between 9 and 13 July.

Romanian President **Ion Iliescu** and Foreign Minister **Mircea Geoana** met **Lord Robertson** on 9 July at NATO to discuss the situation in the Balkans and Romania's cooperation with NATO.

On 6 July, the day after a cease-fire between the government and ethnic Albanian rebels in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\* was signed, Foreign Minister **Ilinka Mitreva** came to NATO to meet **Lord Robertson**.

**Lord Robertson** visited **Kyiv**, Ukraine, on 4 and 5 July, where he met President **Leonid Kuchma**, Prime Minister **Anatolyi Kinakh**, Foreign Minister **Anatolyi Zlenko** and Defence Minister **Olexandr Kuzmuk**, as well as other key figures. He also addressed a Partnership for Peace symposium organised by **SACLANT**.

A ceremony to mark the inauguration of a project aimed at destroying Albania's stockpile of 1.6 million anti-personnel mines — as required under the Ottawa Convention prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines — took place at **Mjekës**, south of the capital **Tirana**, on 29 June. This is the first demilitarisation project to be implemented under a **Partnership for Peace Trust Fund** set up for this purpose in 2000.

## Essential Harvest

On 29 June, the **North Atlantic Council** approved **Essential Harvest**, an operation plan drawn up by SHAPE, for the possible deployment of NATO troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\* at the request of the government, to help disarm ethnic Albanian groups. The plan would be implemented on condition that the parties pursue political dialogue and end hostilities.

Moldovan President **Vladimir Voran** visited NATO on 28 June, where he met **Lord Robertson** and signed an agreement, which will enable NATO experts to provide material assistance and training to ensure the implementation of a **Partnership for Peace Trust Fund** project aimed at the safe destruction of highly corrosive rocket fuel, as well as anti-per-



sonnel landmines and surplus munitions.

UN Special Representative to Kosovo **Hans Haækkerup** briefed NATO ambassadors on the situation in the province and preparations for upcoming elections there at NATO on 26 June.

Polish President **Aleksander Kwasniewski** visited SHAPE in **Mons**, Belgium, on 21 June, where he met the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US General **Joseph W. Ralston**.

## US visit

During a trip to the **United States** from 19 to 22 June, **Lord Robertson** gave a speech to the Chicago Council for Foreign Relations, before travelling to Washington to meet National Security Advisor **Condoleezza Rice**, Secretary of State **Colin Powell** and Secretary of Defense **Donald Rumsfeld**. He then attended the annual seminar organised by **SACLANT** in **Norfolk**, Virginia, which this year focused on NATO's military capabilities.

Between 18 and 29 June, 15 NATO countries took part in **Clean Hunter 2001**, a live-flying exercise over northern Europe and northern France. This annual event involves the headquarters of Allied Air Forces North and its subordinate combined air operations centres in exercises aimed at maintaining effectiveness in planning and conducting coordinated live air operations.

 For more information, see NATO Update at: [www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm)

# Building security through partnership

*Robert Weaver analyses the evolution of NATO's partnerships ten years after the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.*



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Historic event: the Soviet Union dissolved during the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991

When the 46 ambassadors of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) meet, they take it for granted that they will be able to debate and discuss the most pressing security issues of the day in an open and constructive environment. But just a little over ten years ago, diplomats from countries that belonged to the Warsaw Pact – which represent close to half of today's EAPC members – were unable even to enter NATO headquarters. If they wished to deliver a message, they were obliged to leave it at the front gate. This contrast illustrates the evolution of Euro-Atlantic security in the past decade and, above all, the way in which an Alliance strategy built around partnerships has altered the strategic environment in the Euro-Atlantic area.

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*Robert Weaver works on NATO enlargement and EAPC matters in NATO's Political Affairs Division.*

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In addition to hosting the EAPC, a dynamic, multilateral forum for the discussion and promotion of security issues, NATO is the focal point of a web of interlocking security partnerships and programmes. The Alliance is working via the Partnership for Peace to help reform militaries and assist the democratic transition in much of former Communist Europe. Moreover, special bilateral relations have been forged with both Russia and Ukraine, the two largest countries to emerge out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. And a security dialogue is ongoing with an ever increasing number of countries in the Mediterranean region (see box on page 9).

Today, 27 Partners use this institution to consult regularly with the 19 Allies on issues encompassing all aspects of security and all regions of the Euro-Atlantic area. In addition, Allied and Partner militaries exercise and interact together on a regular basis. And some 9,000 sol-

diers from Partner countries, including about 4,000 Russians, serve alongside their Alliance counterparts in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

Anyone predicting in 1991 the kind of evolution of Euro-Atlantic security that has taken place over the past decade would likely have faced ridicule. At the time, with the end of the Cold War, it was more fashionable for analysts to predict the imminent demise of NATO or, in the wake of the Moscow coup of August 1991, a return to the confrontational stances, which had characterised European politics for the best part of half a century. Moreover, looking back, things could have gone horribly wrong. That they did not is in large part because the Allies offered a “hand of friendship” to their former adversaries and is a tribute to the partnership-building strategy, which NATO has pursued over the past decade.

At the end of the Cold War, NATO's primary task was to try to overcome lingering misconceptions about what the Alliance stood for and how it operated. Explaining that NATO was a defensive Alliance was critical. In London, in July 1990, NATO leaders decided to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance's military strategy to that of “weapons of last resort”. This move signalled NATO's benign intentions and was meant to deny the anti-reform forces in Moscow the pretext of an alleged “NATO threat” to crack down on the liberalisation process in central and eastern Europe. Beyond this, NATO needed to consider how best to establish a genuine security relationship with these countries, which would allow the Alliance actively to shape security developments. At NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991, the Alliance proposed the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for a structured dialogue with former Warsaw Pact countries.

The NACC met for the first time in December 1991 with 16 Alliance and nine Partner countries in attendance. Such was the pace of change in Europe at the time that the meeting itself witnessed a historic diplomatic event. As the final communiqué was being agreed, the Soviet ambassador asked that all references to the Soviet Union be struck from the text. The Soviet Union had dissolved during the meeting with the result that, in future, he could only represent the Russian Federation. In March 1992, a further ten newly independent states from the former Soviet Union joined the NACC. Albania and Georgia became members in June of that year.

In the immediate post-Cold War period, NACC consultations focused on residual Cold War security concerns, such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. Meanwhile, political cooperation centred on security and defence-related issues, including defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, civil-military relations, air-traffic management and the conversion of defence industries, as well as NATO's so-called “Third Dimension”,

that is the Alliance's scientific and environmental programmes.

The NACC broke new ground in many ways. However, it focused on multilateral, political dialogue and lacked the possibility of each Partner developing individual cooperative relations with NATO. The Partnership for Peace, launched in January 1994, was designed to meet this need, offering tailored programmes of cooperation with NATO and a strengthened political relationship. This included the right of any Partner to consult with the Alliance, if it perceived a threat to its political independence, security or territorial integrity. The focus of the Partnership was on the development of forces that would be interoperable with those of the Alliance – primarily military forces – and issues such as civil-emergency planning. The Partnership for Peace allowed Partners to develop their own bilateral relationship with NATO at their own pace.

As the political relationship between Allies and Partners deepened, the Partnership for Peace also provided the mechanisms by which Partners could take part in NATO-led operations if they wished to do so. In practice, this has meant participation in NATO actions in the Balkans, where, even before deployment of the first peacekeeping mission, Partners have played a critical role.

During the Bosnian War, several Partner countries helped the Alliance enforce an arms embargo against the whole of the former Yugoslavia, economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and a flight ban over Bosnia. Albania, for example, allowed NATO ships to use its territorial waters to enforce the arms embargo and economic sanctions, and Hungary, then a Partner, allowed NATO Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to use Hungarian airspace to monitor the Bosnian no-fly zone. Moreover, troops from 14 Partner countries served alongside their Alliance counterparts in the Implementation Force (IFOR), the first NATO-led peacekeeping operation, bringing in extra force capabilities and added legitimacy for the mission.

As Partners placed their soldiers in the field and their forces operated under NATO command in a high-risk environment, they naturally sought greater opportunities to take part in the decision-making process, which determined the objectives and operating procedures of the mission. In the build-up to IFOR, this had largely been carried out on an *ad hoc* basis, as the mission was a first for the Alliance. With Partners willing to show such commitment to helping solve security problems beyond their own borders, a new approach to partnership was needed.

In the wake of a visionary speech by then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in September 1996, which proposed the creation of a new security forum, NATO undertook a major examination of its partnership strategy. One of the prime aims of this process was to ensure greater decision-making opportunities for Partners across the

entire scope of the Partnership. The other was to seize the opportunity to focus the Partnership ever more closely on operational issues. The outcome was the creation of the EAPC and an Enhanced and More Operational Partnership.

On the political-consultation front, it now made sense to move beyond the NACC and to build a security forum to match the increasing sophistication of the relationships being established through the Partnership for Peace. Rather than define its membership by who used to be NATO's adversaries, a new cooperative body needed to encompass all Euro-Atlantic countries wishing to build a relationship with NATO. This new body could include traditionally neutral countries, which had proved to be valuable members of the Partnership for Peace, such as Austria, Finland and Sweden, who were not full members of the NACC.

In moving beyond the NACC, the EAPC represented a commitment on the part of NATO to involve Partners ever more closely in Alliance decision-making processes. It would also provide a framework for involving Partners more closely in consultations for the planning, execution and political oversight of what are now known as NATO-led PfP Operations. As the multilateral body pulling the threads of the Partnership together, the EAPC retained the NACC's focus on practical political and security-related consultations. But it expanded the scope of these consultations to include crisis management, regional issues, arms-control issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, as well as defence issues, such as defence planning and budgets, including defence policy and strategy. Civil-emergency and disaster preparedness, armaments cooperation and defence-related environmental operations made up an impressive list.

In addition to traditional consultations, the EAPC has carved out a role for itself in helping address major issues of concern to both NATO members and Partners. It has achieved this by making the most of the flexibility provided by a minimum of institutional rules to adopt innovative approaches to security issues. Use has, for example, been made of open-ended working groups, enabling those countries most concerned to take initiatives and prepare work for the full forum. Consultations on the Caucasus and southeastern Europe have, for example, benefited from this approach. The EAPC has also encouraged its members to look at issues from new angles, rather than seeking to resolve long-standing sticking points, an approach that has proved fruitful where other organisations have the recognised lead responsibility.

As for the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership, its new direction built upon experience gained during the early years of the Partnership for Peace, and on lessons learned in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Among steps taken to reinforce and improve the Partnership to make it more operational, three initiatives

stand out. These are the Planning and Review Process (PARP); the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC); and the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations.

The PARP lays out interoperability and capability requirements for participants to attain and includes an extensive review process to measure progress. By providing the standards to aim for, it helps Partners develop the capabilities that will form the backbone of the more operational aspects of Partnership. Over the years, the requirements have become more complex, demanding and linked to the capability improvements that Allies have set themselves in the Defence Capabilities Initiative. Indeed, increasingly, the PARP has come to resemble the Alliance's own defence-planning process, with ministerial guidance for defence-planning objectives; Partnership Goals similar to NATO Force Goals; and the PARP Assessment mirroring NATO's Annual Defence Review.

When considering an actual operation and the use of these Partner forces, NATO commanders need to know what forces are available and how capable they are. The OCC was developed to address these critical issues and aims to provide NATO commanders with reliable information about potential Partner contributions to allow for the rapid deployment of a tailored force. This complements the assessment made under the PARP and should help improve the military effectiveness of those forces assessed. For NATO commanders, more militarily effective Partner contributions improve the Alliance's capability to sustain long-term operations.

Putting into place mechanisms to help increase Partner contributions is, of course, only part of the story. In the first instance, Partners have to decide whether they want their forces to be involved in a particular operation. This is the critical interface between the practical and the political – brought together by the EAPC.

Through the EAPC, all Partners are involved in consultations on developing crises, which might require the deployment of troops. In order to encourage Partners to commit forces to complicated and potentially dangerous operations, NATO has developed a mechanism to ensure that consultations are no longer conducted on an *ad hoc* basis, but are institutionalised according to procedures that recognise the importance of Partner contributions. This initiative, the third major element of the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership, is known as the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations.

When an escalating crisis is under discussion, all EAPC members are involved. If NATO believes that troops may need to be deployed, the North Atlantic Council, NATO's highest decision-making body, can recognise Partners who declare an intention to contribute to the force. These Partners are then able to exchange views with Allies and



associate themselves with the first stage of planning for an operation. They will also be consulted on the plan for the operation and be involved in the force-generation process, when the commander draws up the composition of the force. It is at this stage that the OCC should save time and effort through the increased predictability about the capability of Partner forces that are available.

Once Partner contributions are accepted, discussions on the operation can take place between NATO and those contributing Partners. Meanwhile, the full EAPC is still involved in general discussions on the particular operation and the political circumstances surrounding it. While troop-contributing Partners are consulted to the maximum degree possible, final decisions still need to be taken by the Alliance, upon whose assets such operations depend. This consultation process continues for the duration of an oper-

ation, ensuring that Partner voices are heard when important decisions are taken.

The contribution of Partners to the peacekeeping operations cannot be overestimated. Indeed, it could be argued that NATO's involvement in bringing peace to Kosovo would not have been possible without Partner participation. Not only have Partners provided valuable political support, but also mission-essential assets for NATO's use, including the use of airspace during the air campaign and vital logistics bases to sustain lines of communication for KFOR. As the relationship between Allies and Partners grows, it is increasingly possible to speak of a shared community of values underlying these practical undertakings. In the ten years since the inception of the NACC, Partnership has evolved to become a fundamental feature of Euro-Atlantic security. ■

## Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO launched its Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994 in recognition of the fact that European security and stability is closely linked to that in the Mediterranean, writes *Alberto Bin*.

This programme, which includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, aims to contribute to regional security and stability, to improve mutual understanding, and to correct misperceptions about NATO among Mediterranean countries.

The Dialogue is based primarily on bilateral relations between each participating country and the Alliance. However, it also allows for multilateral meetings on a case-by-case basis. It offers all Dialogue countries the same basis for discussion and joint activities and complements other related but distinct international initiatives, such as those undertaken by the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Dialogue provides for political dialogue and practical cooperation with participating countries. The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral political discussions, as well as multilateral conferences at ambassadorial level. These provide an opportunity to exchange views on a range of issues relevant to security

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*Alberto Bin works on the Mediterranean Dialogue in NATO's Political Affairs Division.*

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in the Mediterranean, as well as on the future development of the Dialogue.

Practical cooperation is organised through an annual Work Programme and takes various forms, including invitations to officials from Dialogue countries to participate in courses at NATO schools. Other activities include seminars designed specifically for Dialogue countries, particularly in the field of civil-emergency planning, as well as visits of opinion leaders, academics, journalists, and parliamentarians from Dialogue countries to NATO.

The Alliance awards institutional fellowships to scholars from the region. In addition, the Dialogue promotes scientific cooperation through the NATO Science Programme. In 2000, for instance, 108 Dialogue-country scientists participated in NATO-sponsored scientific activities.

The Work Programme also has a military dimension that includes invitations to Dialogue countries to observe exercises, attend seminars and workshops, and visit NATO military bodies. In 2000, 104 military officers from the seven Dialogue countries participated in such activities. In addition, NATO's Standing Naval Forces in the Mediterranean visit ports in Dialogue countries. Otherwise, three Dialogue countries – Egypt, Jordan and Morocco – have contributed peacekeepers to NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And Jordan and Morocco currently have soldiers in the Kosovo Force.

# Getting Cinderella to the ball

*Robert E. Hunter examines the potential of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and proposes that it play a greater role in Euro-Atlantic security.*



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Ministerial meeting: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council has the potential to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security in a way that no other institution can match

When created in May 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was NATO's poor stepchild. It lacked, then and now, the decision-making power of the North Atlantic Council, which is limited to the 19 NATO Allies. Initially, it had no role in managing the practical work of the Partnership for Peace, with which it shares almost the same membership. Even its semi-annual ministerial meetings and occasional summits have tended to be long on speeches and short on substance. But this Cinderella of an institution has the potential to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security in a way that no other can match.

The EAPC was born almost by accident. It was preceded by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), created in 1991 to bring within the broader NATO family – in

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“an institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues” – those states that had emerged from the wreckage of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Later in the decade, however, the NACC seemed a bit of an anachronism: defined more by what its non-Allied members had been than about aspirations for the future. And the NACC did not formally include most of the states that emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia or Europe's neutral and non-aligned countries.

It made sense to recast the NACC to make a fresh start and enable countries that were neither “ex-communist” nor “ex-Warsaw Pact” to become full members. The initiative came in a speech by then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher at Stuttgart, Germany, on 6 September 1996. This date marked the 50th anniversary of an historic address by one of his predecessors, James Byrnes, which was called the “speech of hope” because of its vision for post-war Europe and US engagement. Secretary Christopher chose to speak of a New Atlantic Community and wanted a headline-grabbing idea, which the State

Department hastily provided: namely, to convert the NACC into something new and to call it the Atlantic Partnership Council. Details were left for later.

As the new institution began to take shape, the prefix “Euro-” was added to the proposed name. Both existing NACC members and other European countries that belonged to the Partnership for Peace were invited to join. And views were canvassed within the Alliance about what the new EAPC should be and do. The results were agreed at the EAPC’s formal founding – the NACC’s final meeting – at Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May 1997. The EAPC would focus on issues like crisis management, arms control, international terrorism, defence planning, civil-emergency and disaster preparedness, armaments cooperation and peace-support operations. And NATO pledged that the EAPC would “provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate”. Unclear, then and now, is the meaning of “to the maximum extent possible”.

These were ambitious goals and the newly created EAPC agreed to institutionalise a wide range of meetings to see them implemented. These included monthly meetings of ambassadors; twice-yearly meetings of foreign and defence ministers; occasional meetings of heads of state and government; as well as so-called “16 (now 19)-plus-one” meetings of the Allies and individual Partners. Since then, the EAPC has sought to make its mark in a variety of areas, ranging from identifying ways in which it might contribute to the challenge of small arms and light weapons to organising exercises in civil-emergency planning with the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

The EAPC could, of course, do much more. However, it still lacks decision-making authority. This power is jealously guarded by the North Atlantic Council, in large measure because the Allies have special obligations and responsibilities under the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding charter, and bear the brunt of organising and funding EAPC activities. Yet, in 1999, the Allies began to engage EAPC members in helping to shape the way in which Partner countries would take part in so-called “non-Article 5 operations”, that is operations not related to collective defence. The aim was to engage Partner countries, within limits, in political consultations and decision-making, in operational planning and in command arrangements for future NATO-led operations in which they participate.

Because of the growing importance of the Partnership for Peace, this was a natural step. Further developments included issues affecting Partner countries under NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative and the creation of an Expanded and Adapted Planning and Review Process – in part to improve the interoperability of forces and capabilities – and consultations on crises and other political and security-related issues. The EAPC’s Action Plan for 2000-

2002 also covers consultations and cooperation on regional matters, including Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus, as well as issues relating to the Stability Pact, the EU-led initiative to develop a comprehensive, international framework to help build long-term stability in southeastern Europe.

Despite these efforts, the EAPC has yet to reach its potential. There are two reasons for helping it do so. First, however many countries are invited to join the Alliance at next year’s Prague Summit, some aspirants will be left out. It is critical that the EAPC give these countries a firm sense that they belong within the broader NATO family. Second, some EAPC countries, notably in the Caucasus and Central Asia, are unlikely ever to join NATO. Nevertheless, the EAPC could help them, as well, gain in security and confidence.

Giving the EAPC true decision-making powers, beyond the capacity to help shape decisions of the North Atlantic Council, is not currently on the Alliance agenda. However, as Partners demonstrate their capacity to take on additional responsibilities, this should be reviewed. Certainly, further integration of the activities of Partners with Allies should be the next immediate goal. Several possibilities stand out:

**Crisis management:** At present, most crisis consultations at NATO centre on the North Atlantic Council. Even here the Alliance is handicapped because it lacks the competence of a sovereign government. NATO’s role in helping to manage crises – like that in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\* – is largely limited to specific tasks that member states assign to the Secretary General. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Kosovo, for instance, NATO found itself called upon to act militarily, without having been directly engaged in the preceding diplomacy. The EAPC cannot be expected to develop a competence that even the North Atlantic Council does not have, but it is striking that EAPC members include countries with a good deal of experience in, as well as proximity to, areas most challenging to NATO, especially in the Balkans. The EAPC should therefore be developed into a primary forum for devising viable crisis outcomes, not just a place to brief on the results of North Atlantic Council deliberations.

**The Balkans:** The EAPC is already active in Southeastern Europe, and in particular much of the former Yugoslavia, which is a special challenge for the international community. At the Alliance’s 1999 Washington Summit, NATO launched its South East Europe Initiative, one pillar of which is an *Ad hoc* Working Group, under the auspices of the EAPC, which promotes regional cooperation. At an EAPC ambassadorial meeting in July 2000, Bulgaria announced the establishment of the South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEE-GROUP), a forum in which all countries of the region are able to meet to exchange information and views on projects and initiatives designed to stimulate and support practical

cooperation between members. Since the change of government in Zagreb in early 2000, Croatia began to build bridges with the Alliance. As a first step, the country joined both the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace in May of that year and is now an active participant in SEEGROUP. As the new, democratic government in Belgrade opens up to NATO, the EAPC should play a leading role in assisting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's transition and reintegration into the international community.

**“Out-of-Area” dispute and conflict management:**

Many other areas of concern to NATO members either include or border EAPC member states. So far, the EAPC has had little experience in trying to mediate, ameliorate or resolve tensions and conflict between its members in the Caucasus and Central Asia. But the Alliance – and specifically the EAPC – should not shy away from this possibility, nor accept that, of necessity, *ad hoc* arrangements or some other body (like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) should take precedence. Leadership will be important. So, too, will be the development of a sense among its members that the EAPC can add value as a basic European security institution, born of NATO, to which regional disputes and crises can properly and productively be brought. This will only emerge through experience, after the EAPC selects one or more such situations and sets a positive precedent for its potential role.

**Engaging Russia:** In some cases, the development of such a dispute and conflict-management role for the EAPC, among its own members, will be more possible and productive – for example, as a support to or even replacement for the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh, a region contested between Armenia and Azerbaijan – if Russia can be convinced to play a greater role. In the run-up to the Prague Summit, with the prospect of invitations to join NATO being extended to Central European states, the Alliance will, in any case, have to reach out to Moscow to demonstrate that NATO is neither challenging Russia, strategically or politically, nor seeking to isolate it. Russia has so far chosen to play a relatively passive role in the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace, and it has been reluctant to test the limits of the Permanent Joint Council, the forum for NATO-Russia consultation and cooperation. NATO already has an interest in convincing Russia that it has a valid place within a broader concept of European security and that its basic interests in Europe are compatible with NATO's. Indeed, if Russian President Vladimir Putin's musings about Russia's one-day joining NATO can be nurtured, not so much for the specific idea but for wider possibilities, then the EAPC could become a useful vehicle for Moscow to work with NATO. This could supplement the Permanent Joint Council, while providing

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As NATO continues to take in new members, both the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace will naturally change in character and purpose

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Moscow with more legitimacy than it now has for engaging other EAPC countries, without generating fears that Moscow would gain undue influence over their strategic and political choices. The EAPC could therefore become a mechanism for helping to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion to include as members countries close to its borders.

**EAPC, ESDP and EU-NATO Relations:** NATO has been building a relationship with the European Union as that institution develops a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This process is far from complete and, in my view, far from harmonious. One way of trying to reconcile differences is via the alignment of their respective bodies, especially through joint meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the European Union's new Political and Security Committee (PSC) at ambassadorial and ministerial levels. Given that both the European Union and NATO are taking in new members from Central Europe and are otherwise deeply involved there, that both are engaged in the Balkans, that both have developed special relationships with Russia and Ukraine, and that both have interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, these joint meetings should be extended to include parallel EAPC-PSC consultations. This could also stimulate the European Union's companion Common Foreign and Security Policy to be more outward-looking. In any event, the European Union and NATO do share a broad agenda, even if they approach most non-defence issues from different perspectives. In the effort to eliminate the artificial barriers that have for so long existed between these two institutions, the EAPC could prove a useful instrument.

Finally, it is important to remember that, as NATO continues to take in new members, both the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace will naturally change in character, and in some regards in purpose. With further NATO enlargement, the relative balance between Partners and Allies in the EAPC will progressively shift towards the latter. The non-Allied membership of the EAPC will increasingly be dominated by countries east of Turkey. This is a strong argument for the EAPC to emphasise dispute and conflict resolution, as well as coordination with the European Union and other institutions, to help countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia develop their politics and economies, as well as reform their militaries.

Looking to the future, the vision of a “Europe whole and free” can only be realised if “security” is understood in the broadest sense. The EAPC has much to offer towards that goal and could develop into an effective political and security instrument with a remit that goes far beyond its original purposes. ■

# Promoting regional security

*James Appathurai examines how NATO promotes regional security cooperation in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Baltics.*

In the field of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation, certain big-ticket arrangements get almost all the press: NATO and its Partnership for Peace, the European Union's developing defence dimension, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE). But alongside these large and well-established structures, smaller fledgling regional arrangements are making important contributions to building security in sensitive areas throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. These lower-level efforts at cooperation are an important pillar in the overall security architecture and the Alliance is eager to assist their development.

The logic of regional security cooperation is clear. By pooling resources in the right way, like-minded countries can enhance their own security more effectively. Economically, cooperation allows for economies of scale and the acquisition of equipment that would otherwise be unaffordable for individual, especially smaller countries. Militarily, cooperation multiplies the potential of any individual country's armed forces. Politically, cooperation in the security field is the ultimate confidence and security-building measure because it requires transparency, coordination and mutual trust.

NATO stands as vivid testimony to the success of this approach. What began, in 1949, as a group of nations divided by very recent history – and, not least, by an ocean – has become the most cohesive and effective political/military Alliance ever. And the NATO experience demonstrates that regional cooperation is not a substitute for other endeavours, but a complement to them. Any country can have multiple security affiliations, without any individual affiliation suffering as a result. Hence, for example, the North American Aerospace Defence cooperation between Canada and the United States, or the European Union's security and defence identity.

It is precisely because the potential of regional and sub-regional cooperation is so clear that the Alliance has lent increasing support to these efforts, even among countries that do not aspire to NATO membership. No single, approved document sets out the rationale behind regional cooperation and the modalities by which the Alliance will support it. Instead, that approach is set out through a vari-

ety of documents and policies, each of which applies to a specific area or issue – but which, when taken together, form an intellectually coherent whole. The Alliance works to promote regional security cooperation primarily in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Baltics, as part of NATO's overall efforts to promote peace and security across the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO takes an individual, targeted approach to each region, because each faces its own security challenges in a unique geopolitical context, and because each is of unique security interest to the Alliance.

## The Balkans



Southeastern Europe is of enormous geopolitical importance to NATO. Kosovo, for example, sits in a vital strategic area for the Alliance: just above two NATO members, below new NATO members in Central Europe, and organically linked to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia). Instability, conflict and widespread human rights abuses in this region have posed direct challenges to NATO's interests over the past decade and the Alliance has been obliged to work to ensure that crises do not destabilise neighbouring countries. The highest-profile tools through which NATO has promoted peace and security in the Balkans are the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. But the Alliance has also engaged in a number of other military and political efforts to promote stability across southeastern Europe, from preventive diplomacy to the active promotion of regional cooperation.

Perhaps the most prominent example of such efforts is NATO's South East Europe Initiative. Launched at the Alliance's 1999 Washington Summit to promote regional cooperation and long-term security and stability in the region, it built on already extensive cooperative relation-

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ships with Partners through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace. It also extended to include countries that did not belong to these institutions and programmes, Bosnia and (at the time) Croatia, and foresaw the extension to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. An *Ad hoc* Working Group on Regional Cooperation, set up under EAPC auspices, promotes regional cooperation to stimulate and support practical cooperation among countries of Southeastern Europe. The countries of the region, for example, established the South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEE-GROUP) in September 2000, the chair of which rotates among members, to support the various cooperative processes now at work. Activities include demining, efforts to control small arms and light weapons, crisis-management simulation and air-traffic management.

Together with other international organisations, the Alliance is working to build regional stability in the framework of the EU-sponsored Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. In this way, NATO has helped set up programmes to assist discharged officers make the transition from military to civilian life (see article on page 23) and others to close military bases and convert them to civilian uses. Other activities require regional leadership. A good example is the South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP). This was a NATO idea, taken forward by countries of the region, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The SEECAP sets out common perceptions of security challenges among signatory nations and should be a vital first step in building peaceful relations in the Balkans. It also sets out opportunities for participating countries to cooperate in addressing these challenges.

### The Caucasus

The scenario is different in the Caucasus, where NATO is also promoting regional cooperation. Although there are equally intractable problems in this region, the only Alliance member directly to feel the effects is Turkey. Moreover, there is certainly a perception that NATO as an organisation has limited influence in the region and that NATO members can more usefully contribute to peace and security there through bilateral measures, or by working through other organisations such as the OSCE or the United Nations.

For all these reasons, NATO takes a more low-key approach in the Caucasus. Even at this lower level, however, the Alliance still actively supports security cooperation in the region as a way to promote transparency and confidence-building. The central vehicle for these NATO efforts is the EAPC *Ad hoc* Working Group on Prospects for Regional Cooperation in the Caucasus. Priority areas identified by the Working Group for practical regional cooperation are defence-economics issues, civil-emergency planning, science and environmental cooperation, and information activities.

Under the auspices of the EAPC, a regional cooperation seminar on energy security in the Caucasus took place in Azerbaijan in 2000, which covered the environmental, economic and civil-emergency aspects of energy security. Seminars have also been held elsewhere in the region on defence economics, civil-emergency planning, civil-military cooperation, small arms and light weapons, and scientific cooperation. The possibility of further conferences is now being discussed on international terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as on crisis management and mine action. These are all valuable endeavours because the focus is on issues of immediate security interest to the countries of the region.

It must be stressed that when it comes to promoting cooperation in the Caucasus, other regional groupings, such as the OSCE and the GUUAM, an organisation



including Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, take the lead. But NATO continues to play a role, encouraging the development of common solutions among countries facing common challenges.


### The Baltics

The third major region in which NATO takes an active interest in promoting cooperation is the area of the Baltic Sea. Unlike the Balkans, where the challenges are severe and NATO's interest immediate, or the Caucasus, where the challenges are equally intractable but affect the entire Alliance less directly, the Baltics are a region of direct geopolitical importance to the Alliance, but one in which regional cooperation is already progressing nicely and does not require the same level of support from NATO.

This indigenous success should come as no surprise, as this is an area in which regional cooperation has a long history. Certainly, once Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became states in the beginning of the 20th century, they naturally looked to closer forms of cooperation, for clear

geographic, political, economic and military reasons. Today, that cooperation is stronger still – and the reasons are obvious. From a geographical standpoint, these three countries still form a natural region. They are all small states, with small populations and small economies. Furthermore, their socio-economic evolution since the 1920s has been similar and, at present, they have no real disagreements among themselves.

Perhaps as a result, it is safe to say that nowhere in Europe has subregional cooperation been as profound in the post-Cold War era as in the Baltic Sea area. The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which was initiated in 1992 by the then Danish and German foreign ministers, is an excellent example of a successful regional grouping, bringing together 12 countries to deepen cooperation on a variety of issues. While traditional security was not initially



on the agenda, the CBSS now promotes subregional cooperation against organised crime and search and rescue at sea, even including the use of military units.

The CBSS has served as an example for similar endeavours in other parts of Europe, in particular the Balkans. Furthermore, the cooperative activities at the state level are underpinned by a well-developed network of specialised organisations, as well as a web of cooperation between provinces, cities and municipalities across the Baltics. This is especially the case in the security sector, where all three states share a desire to consolidate their independence and rebuff any instability from the East. Regular trilateral cooperation on protection of airspace, for example, has led to the recent establishment of the regional airspace surveillance system (BALNET) for all three countries.

The three countries also realise that with their limited defence resources, it makes sense to work on their development together. The Baltic Security Assistance Group is an effective body for international coordination of security assis-

tance to the defence forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltic Defence College, a military academy primarily for officers from the Baltics that operates in English, is also a good example of cooperation in defence education.

The three Baltic countries also want to demonstrate that they are good European partners, willing to contribute to security. The joint peacekeeping battalion, BALTBAT, and the Baltic squadron (BALTRON) are obvious examples of concrete cooperation in action. The BALTBAT has already been active in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

NATO's support for Baltic participation in its peacekeeping operations is one way in which the Alliance and its members are encouraging cooperation among the three Baltic countries. These operations have demonstrated that, by working together, the Baltics can punch above their weight and have an influence on Euro-Atlantic events disproportionate to their individual size.

NATO is also facilitating such cooperation through the Membership Action Plan and the Partnership for Peace. Both projects aim to improve the military capabilities of participating countries and both focus, in particular, on improving interoperability for combined operations. These are essential standards for increased regional cooperation, which the three Baltic countries are working to meet.

Alliance members are also supporting Baltic regional cooperation on a national basis. Denmark, for example, has played a leading role, providing assistance to the Baltic Defence College and accommodating Baltic peacekeepers in Danish formations in the Balkans. The United States has also provided crucial political support. This has manifested itself, in particular, through the 1998 US Baltic Charter, an agreement that, according to then US President Bill Clinton, is designed to encourage close cooperation among the Baltic states and their neighbours and to demonstrate "America's commitment to help Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to deepen their integration, and prepare for membership in the European Union and NATO."

President Clinton's linking of regional cooperation and membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions is important because it is in the Baltic region, in particular, that concerns are sometimes raised about how successful regional cooperation might undermine aspirations to join NATO. Far from being a constraint against Alliance membership, successful regional cooperation is a powerful selling point for aspiring members. NATO is an organisation within which member states work together, pool resources and develop policy through consensus. Successful regional cooperation not only prepares aspirants for membership, it also demonstrates to existing members that these countries are willing and able to accept the conditions and working methods of the Alliance – while of course building security for all participants. ■

# Partnership in practice: Georgia's experience

*Irakli Menagarishvili describes Georgia's relationship with the Alliance and how it is evolving to the benefit of both Georgia and NATO.*

Georgia's overriding foreign policy aim is to integrate itself into Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security structures to join the European community of nations and fulfill an historical aspiration of the Georgian people. Ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, my country has attempted to build a modern, democratic society and forge closer and deeper relations with countries and institutions throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. At the same time, Georgia and the wider Caucasus have experienced much instability and turbulence. Developing a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship with the Alliance has therefore been a national priority for the past decade, one which is evolving to the benefit of both Georgia and NATO.

As NATO opened its arms to former members of the Warsaw Pact and successor states of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Georgia was quick to join all new security institutions and programmes. It became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992; signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document in 1994; and became a founding member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. Georgia has progressively

increased its involvement in the Partnership for Peace, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, and now participates in more than 100 activities every year.

This summer, Georgia achieved a milestone when it hosted the first, full-scale Partnership for Peace exercise in the Southern Caucasus, Cooperative Partner 2001. The exercise, which took place in and around the Black Sea port of Poti and included some 4,000 servicemen from nine NATO and six Partner countries, aimed to develop combined naval and amphibious interoperability between Alliance and Partner participants in peace-support operations and the provision of humanitarian assistance. This was the largest-scale activity in which Georgia has been involved with NATO. It has helped promote military-to-military cooperation between the Georgian armed forces and those of Alliance members. And it reflects an ever-deepening relationship between Georgia and NATO.

Georgia has also consistently supported NATO's efforts to end the violence and build stability in the Balkans. Indeed, we have sent an infantry platoon to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) to demonstrate our commitment to the peace process in that part of Europe. Moreover, we firmly believe that, since no country can insulate itself from instability elsewhere, threats to security in one part of the Euro-Atlantic area are threats to the entire Euro-Atlantic area. In order to build genuine security in Europe, therefore, every country should contribute, according to its own means, to eradicating all hotbeds of instability. Georgia has therefore consistently been eager to participate in activities designed to improve security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and aspires eventually to integration in NATO.

Both Georgia and the wider Caucasus have great potential. Georgia is, for example, at the centre of efforts to build the Eurasian Transport Corridor – a key east-west trade artery between Asia and Europe. It is also a natural transport hub for this revitalised "Silk Road" which has three main components: the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, a Trans-Caucasian Strategic Energy Corridor (to transport Caspian energy resources to Western markets) and a Trans-Caucasian Telecommunications Network. However, for these projects – which are being assisted by the European Union and other interested countries – to see fruition, it will be necessary to stabilise the entire region and create tangible guarantees for peace and sustainable development.



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Georgia's position towards the wider Caucasus is based on principles presented by President Eduard Shevardnadze in his *Initiative on a Peaceful Caucasus* of 1996 and jointly signed by the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This initiative, which excludes the use of force in resolving disputes, proposes a political formula that aims at transforming the existing confrontation and crises in the region into cooperation and general welfare. Implementation of these principles will only be possible with the concerted efforts of countries of the region, neighbours and other leading actors on the world stage interested in a peaceful and stable Caucasus. In this context, other initiatives – including the proposed Stability Pact for the Caucasus – deserve serious consideration.

In addition to cultivating closer relations with NATO, Georgia has sought to build bridges with and join other international organisations. It is a member of the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the World Trade Organisation, and it signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 1996. Georgia is also a member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organisation, which seeks to promote mutual understanding, an improved political climate, and economic development in the Black Sea area. And it is part of the GUUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova – a regional organisation aiming to build common approaches to political, economic, humanitarian and ecological problems.

The most pressing security issues within Georgia are the internal disputes with separatists in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (formerly known as South Ossetia). Satisfactory resolution of these disputes is an essential precondition for the establishment of stable political, social and economic conditions, and for the return of some 300,000 Georgians who were forced to flee ethnic violence in the early 1990s. We aim to consolidate our independence by making it clear to our neighbours that an independent, prosperous, stable and unified Georgia is in their best interests. This applies especially to the Russian Federation, which currently has some 6,000 troops stationed on Georgian soil. Georgia seeks the phased withdrawal of all Russian troops from Georgian territory and the closure of their military bases. At the OSCE's Istanbul Summit in 1999, Russia signed an agreement to this effect, including a withdrawal timetable for two of the four bases, only one of which was fully met.

Georgia views the EAPC as a particularly important institution, capable of reviewing and helping solve numerous security problems in the Euro-Atlantic area. Since Partners are able to propose the topics of discussions and consultations in the EAPC, Georgia has used this forum to table a series of issues of special concern. These include issues related to regional security, conflict resolution and prevention and conventional arms control. Georgia has also made the most of the mechanism within the EAPC of

calling meetings between the 19 Allies and individual Partner countries, so-called 19+1 meetings, to consult with NATO on questions of interest for both Georgia and the Alliance. The first political consultations between Georgia and NATO took place at NATO in spring 2001 at the level of assistant secretary general for political affairs and deputy foreign minister. The usefulness of these meetings demonstrates the potential of the relationship between the Alliance and a Partner, given a genuine will to foster cooperation and understanding.

In recent years, Georgia has given special importance to implementation of its Individual Partnership Programme with NATO and participation in the Planning and Review Process, which we joined in 1999. To date, Georgia has accepted and is working towards fulfilling 29 Partnership Goals. We have also hosted a significant number of EAPC activities. This includes a regional course on civil-emergency planning and civil-military cooperation in May 1997; the first ever EAPC seminar on practical regional security cooperation in October 1998; the meeting of Land Armaments Group 9 of NATO and Partner countries in October 1998; another EAPC workshop on Economic Aspects of Defence Budgeting in Transition Economies in June 2000; a NATO Science Programme Advisory Panel on Life Science and Technology in May 2001; and a NATO Science Committee meeting in October 2001.

Regional security cooperation in the Caucasus is an area of EAPC activity which Georgia has consistently sponsored and is eager to take forward so that both Georgia and the wider region realise their potential. Since the EAPC Basic Document sets out the possibility of creating special regional groups, Georgia proposed the formation of a specialised working group on the Caucasus. The initiative was supported by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as other members of the EAPC and led to the creation of the EAPC *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Prospects for Regional Cooperation in the Caucasus. This Working Group met formally in Autumn 1999 to explore possibilities of practical cooperation in the region, building on work already undertaken in informal discussions in 1997. It recommended a number of activities falling under the following identified priority areas: defence economics, civil-emergency planning, security-related science and environmental cooperation, information and public relations. The Working Group met again in 2000 to take stock of work undertaken in these areas and to consider other possibilities for further cooperation.

In the course of the past ten years, both Georgia and NATO have travelled a long way. Through involvement in the EAPC and by expanding bilateral relations with key NATO members, Georgia has been able to move politically closer to the Alliance and join the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. Clearly, Georgia's relationship with NATO has already borne much fruit. Yet there is potential for an even more fruitful partnership. ■

# Imagining NATO 2011

*Michael Rühle gazes into his crystal ball and imagines how the Alliance and the Euro-Atlantic security environment might look in ten years.*

In 1984, a famed Norwegian peace researcher came up with a list of what he considered to be Europe's most secure states. His choice of Switzerland as the number one was hardly surprising. By contrast, his choice of second and third seemed peculiar even at the time: Albania and Yugoslavia. His reasoning was as straightforward as it was worrying. Since NATO and the Warsaw Pact were undoubtedly going to war with one another, those countries furthest removed from the "military blocs" would have the rosiest future.

It may be tempting to belittle this unfortunate analysis as a typical "period piece" from the early 1980s. Yet, dire predictions about NATO's future have hardly fared better than predictions about the Balkans. Although NATO's current primacy in Euro-Atlantic security may suggest otherwise, only a decade ago the Alliance's future seemed bleak. Indeed, in the early 1990s, even staunch Atlanticists harboured doubts about the future of an organisation that seemed to have accomplished its mission. Had it been predicted then that, in 1999, NATO would admit three former Warsaw Pact members and conduct a protracted air operation in the Balkans, the likely reaction would have been disbelief or even derision.

Speculating about the future remains a hazardous undertaking, but one which is nonetheless useful. Even if not every prediction will come true, the very exercise of forecasting helps to concentrate the mind on the key issues. It forces thinking about a "preferred future", the means necessary to achieve this outcome, and the variables that could interfere.

This approach appears particularly appropriate in a security environment as conducive to shaping as today's post-Cold War Europe. In this fluid setting, institutions such as NATO are playing a major role in influencing the direction of Euro-Atlantic security. Put differently, institutions have become agenda-setters. Not only do they enable collective action in a crisis, they also foster new security relationships and thereby address questions of Europe's wider stability and even long-term political order.

This exercise in exploring NATO's potential to shape the Euro-Atlantic security environment of the next decade will proceed in three steps. It will outline a benevolent scenario for 2011; identify some major conditions and variables affecting that scenario; and make some suggestions as to what NATO must do now to help achieve the benevolent scenario.

## **A benevolent scenario 2011**

Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of "NATO 2011" is that it will be larger. After several waves of enlargement, the Alliance will have grown to 25 or more members. It will therefore still have more members than an enlarging European Union. Even so, the overlap in memberships will remain close enough to enable both organisations to continue their institutional rapprochement. Fears that NATO's decision-making process will be unduly compromised by the growth of

Alliance membership will have been put to rest. The unique political and military role of the United States in Euro-Atlantic security will remain and will continue to help ensure a pre-disposition among Allies to seek common solutions.



The European Union's ambition to develop a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) will have manifested itself in an even stronger European military role in the Balkans, as well

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as in more coherent foreign-policy initiatives regarding the Caucasus, the Middle East and Northern Africa. Mainly as a result of streamlining procurement practices and pooling European military assets, EU countries will have made some progress towards improving their defence capabilities. However, continuing shortfalls in capabilities critical for high-intensity conflict will remain,

making it necessary to maintain close links between the European Union and NATO.



The EU-NATO relationship will have significantly broadened beyond ESDP to include regular consultations on southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean, Russia, terrorism and particularly crisis prevention. Regular back-to-back EU-NATO ministerial meetings will be held,

underlining the will of Europe and North America to maintain coherence in institutions and policies.

NATO will still have troops deployed in the Balkans, but the scale of the Alliance's military presence will have been greatly reduced, as a result of political and economic progress in the region. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia will have long ago joined the Partnership for Peace and will both be formal aspirants for NATO membership.

With proliferation risks having ever-deepening significance, NATO Allies will have established a coordinated policy on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction through diplomatic and economic means. The United States will have deployed a rudimentary defence against strategic missiles. Several European Allies will have fielded tactical missile defences within their armed forces. This new relationship between deterrence and defence will also be reflected in NATO's military strategy, which will feature counter-proliferation elements and an increased emphasis on active defence and counter-terrorism.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will have developed formal links to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and will have become a steering organ for pan-European disaster relief. Exchanges on terrorism will have intensified. It will also have acquired a role as a facilitator of regional cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where it will serve as a framework for addressing issues such as border control and energy security.

The Partnership for Peace will have developed further as the hub of pan-

European military cooperation and, together with the EAPC, serve as a means to keep Partners, particularly the remaining non-NATO EU members, closely associated with NATO. The Partnership will cover the full range of military cooperation between NATO and Partner nations, including defence planning and defence reform. It will feature a stronger focus on regional cooperation and on crisis prevention, for example, through targeted security cooperation programmes, confidence-building measures, preventive deployments and consultation mechanisms.

While repeated Russian overtures to join the Alliance will not yet have borne fruit, the NATO-Russia relationship will have significantly improved and will resemble a quasi-associate status. In the context of the Baltic states' accession to NATO, a satisfactory solution will have been found to Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave between Lithuania and Poland. The dialogue will have expanded to cover the full range of issues specified in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, such as non-proliferation, defence reform and civil-emergency planning. The relationship will also include serious military cooperation beyond the Balkans, *inter alia* in the framework of an experimental joint NATO-Russian peacekeeping brigade. It will also include armaments cooperation, for example, on tactical missile defence.

NATO's relations with the United Nations will have been consolidated both formally and conceptually. Formally, a permanent liaison office at UN Headquarters will underline NATO's role as an institution central to European crisis management. Conceptually, NATO's experience in the Balkans will form an important part of the United Nations' reform of its own approach to peacekeeping.

The rising strategic importance of the southern Mediterranean region will have elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue out of its role as the

stepchild of NATO's outreach activities. It will have evolved along similar lines to the Partnership for Peace, with serious military cooperation, notably in the field of crisis management, and a strong focus on non-proliferation. Reflecting the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region, the bi-annual Japan-NATO conferences will have been superseded by a broader Asia-NATO Dialogue, modelled after the Mediterranean Dialogue.

This undoubtedly represents a benign scenario, with NATO playing a major, though far from singular, role in managing change. The major difference between 2011 and 2001 will be the fact that the *ad hoc* relationships between major institutions that developed out of necessity in the Balkans will have led to strong formal relationships, facilitating a comprehensive approach to crisis management and, hopefully, prevention. NATO's internal post-Cold War readjustment, which was largely completed by the late 1990s, will have been augmented by some additional mechanisms, in line with new challenges that will have emerged after 2000.

### Essential conditions

It would be analytically questionable at best and outright useless at worst to sketch a benevolent scenario of the future without discussing at least the most important conditions for its realisation. Indeed, the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for the benevolent scenario to materialise say as much about the way ahead as the scenario itself.

Clearly, *Russia's positive evolution* will be a decisive condition for a benevolent scenario. Should Russia's democratic experiment fail, or should Russia's very statehood be jeopardised by political and economic fragmentation, the attainment of the preferred future sketched above would seem impossible. To be sure, a Russia in decline need not necessarily precipitate a new Cold War. Yet, a crisis-ridden Russia would severely

compromise the development of all Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Another condition is *coherence in the enlargement processes* of the European Union and NATO, Europe's key institutional actors. If the enlargement of one or both institutions were to stall and differences in memberships were to widen, the chances for developing coherent and effective policies – the potential of which has been recently demonstrated in the Balkans – would again diminish.

The sound development of a *European Security and Defence Policy* is another major variable. If ESDP remains within its current Atlanticist philosophy, it could address at least some of the burden-sharing demands put forward by the United States. By contrast, should ESDP become an exercise in EU self-assertion or even in "counterbalancing" a unilateralist United States, it would become a liability rather than an asset for transatlantic relations.

*Continued US interest in Europe* will also be crucial. If US interest in European security remains high, possible adjustments within the transatlantic relationship, such as a stronger EU security role or a greater US focus on Asia, could be effected without tearing the transatlantic fabric. However, should US interest in Europe diminish – because of deteriorating transatlantic relations or other pressing global interests for the United States – NATO would be bereft of the leadership it requires to function as a meaningful agent of change.

*Coping with the evolution of military technology* will be another condition for a benign scenario. Missile defence, for example, could go a long way to offer protection against the challenge of proliferation – and should therefore be an organic part of "NATO 2011". However, if mishandled politically, it could also move Europe and the United States out of

step with each other. A widening transatlantic technology gap would diminish the importance of European Allies for the United States and fuel the burden-sharing debate. It could also reinforce unilateralist tendencies in the United States, which, in turn, would lead to increasing resentment in Europe.

*Sufficient resources* are another condition for an optimistic scenario for 2011. Devoting insufficient funds to defence would restrain the potential security roles of the European Union and NATO and hamper the benevolent scenario. In the context of a more heated burden-sharing debate, failure to fund adequately programmes such as the European Union's Headline Goal or NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative could have political ramifications far beyond these programmes' immediate military value. In a similar vein, European defence industry consolidation and/or restrictive US policies on defence industry cooperation could lead to a "Fortress Europe" and a "Fortress America", which would seriously damage transatlantic relations.

Finally, there is the evolution of *risks and threats* in and around Europe. This is, of course, the greatest variable with potentially the furthest-reaching consequences, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September. Assuming that the security evolution in and around Europe remains essentially benign, some US isolationists as well as some "Europhiles" might feel tempted to declare the end of a need for US military engagement in Europe. Yet, one should not conclude from this that NATO can only thrive in a volatile environment, nor that it would necessarily do so. Disagreements among Allies on how to address another war in the Balkans, for example, could even provoke strategic realignments among Allies and weaken NATO. Shaping European security by peaceful means clearly remains NATO's preferred option.

### What NATO must do now for the benevolent scenario to come true

**Stay in business:** The current European security architecture is far from perfect, but it features a strong cooperative momentum that offers many built-in disincentives against rogue action or the reckless pursuit of national interests. By contrast, if NATO were to disappear, some countries would fear being marginalised. This could lead to a heightened sense of insecurity throughout Europe and may lead to policies that would reverse the positive evolution the continent has witnessed over the past decade. While the NATO framework has clear limitations, there is no viable institutional alternative to it for the foreseeable future.

**Stay the course:** Whether the issue is NATO enlargement, engaging Russia, ESDP or the Balkans, there is currently no need for any radical policy change. Indeed, as the NATO-minded reader will have already guessed, if the Alliance's current agenda were implemented to the full, it could essentially lead to the benevolent scenario sketched above, give or take a new initiative or two. By contrast, a sudden U-turn on any of these issues would simply re-open battles that were fought in the mid-1990s. NATO will continue to develop new mechanisms to address a changing security landscape, not least intensifying its coordination efforts to deal with international terrorism, but the basic parameters are already set.

**Get the basics right:** The hysterical overtones in the current transatlantic debate may sometimes suggest otherwise, but a transatlantic divorce due to "irreconcilable differences" over greenhouse gases and genetically modified food is not in the offing. A look at the fundamentals of transatlantic security puts things in perspective. These demonstrate, for example, that the United States will not deny Europeans a distinct security policy, just as Europe will not impose a policy of strategic vulnerability on the United States by oppos-

ing the development of a missile defence. They also indicate that NATO has made the case of the Balkans irreversibly its own – and that succumbing to the temptation of disengagement would only re-invite the transatlantic discord experienced in the first half of the 1990s. Finally, they show that Europe and North America share many other strategic interests, such as preventing proliferation, combating terrorism and maintaining open markets. Pursuing these interests will require continued transatlantic cooperation. As the Alliance's decision to invoke its collective defence commitment in response to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington confirmed, NATO is too valuable strategically to allow it to be damaged by squabbles over tactical issues.

The implicit theme of this essay is that NATO is changing. Compared to the Alliance of today, "NATO 2011" will be bigger, somewhat more "European" and perhaps somewhat more "southern" in its strategic focus. In addition, the Alliance's evolution will be increasingly dependent on external developments in the Balkans, the European Union, the Mediterranean and Russia. None of these changes, however, would deprive "NATO 2011" of the fundamental characteristics that have made it both valuable and durable, particularly its strong transatlantic dimension and unique military competence. Marlene Dietrich once observed that: "Most women set out to change a man, and when they have changed him, they do not like him any more." By contrast, despite many changes, "NATO 2011" should remain an Alliance that Allies and Partners will still like, and very much approve of.

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This essay is based on a popular lecture Michael Rühle gives regularly at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. It is a personal view, but he wishes to thank Rad van den Akker, James Appathurai and Nick Williams for comments and suggestions. ■

## Partnership conference



NATO is hosting an international conference to mark the tenth anniversary of the formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and celebrate a decade of ever-closer relations between Alliance members and Partners.

The conference, entitled *Ten Years of Partnership and Cooperation*, takes place on Friday 26 October at NATO headquarters and will be attended by participants from all 46 members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

In addition to reviewing key events in the formation of NATO's Partnership strategy and assessing achievements to date, the conference will examine the future evolution of relations between Alliance members and Partners and consider ways in which the EAPC might develop in the years to come.

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson will use the event to make his major speech of the year on partnership and cooperation. That speech and those of other keynote speakers will be broadcast live on the NATO web site.

NATO's Office of Information and Press is also publishing a special, 20-page brochure to coincide with the conference. Entitled *Partnership in Action*, it looks back on the birth and development of the Partnership idea and examines how Partnership works in practice.



Further information on the conference, the webcast and the *Partnership in Action* brochure can be found, closer to the event, on NATO's web site at: [www.NATO.int](http://www.NATO.int)

# MONITORING CONTAMINATION IN KAZAKHSTAN

Between 1949 and 1989, a total of 456 nuclear tests were carried out at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, the former Soviet Union's premier test site, before its closure by presidential edict in 1991. For the rest of the decade, despite fears about the level of radioactivity and the potential impact on the local population, flora and fauna, the site was left largely unmonitored. Now, however, scientists have begun systematically measuring and studying contamination at the site, as part of a NATO-sponsored project.

The Semipalatinsk project, which is a joint venture between scientists from Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom, aims to examine contamination levels across some 600 square kilometres of the 22,000 square kilometre site, an area about the size of Wales. It brings together scientists from Middlesex University in London with their peers at the Al-Farabi Kazakh State National University in Almaty, the Institute of Radiation Safety and Ecology in Kurchatov and the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty. Expert help is also being provided by University College, Dublin, in Ireland.

NATO's involvement in the project follows a series of tests carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1997, which confirmed that the site represented a "serious risk to the health of some individuals and population groups". The IAEA recommended further monitoring and a UN resolution of December 1997 urged collective international action to "fund a viable solution for

the ecological problems at the Semipalatinsk test site". Following a donors' conference in Tokyo in 1998, NATO decided to fund a three-year study, which began in 1999, to the tune of 20.5 million Belgian francs (some \$500,000).

Nicholas Priest, professor of environmental toxicology at Middlesex University, and Mukhambetkali Burkitbayev, head of inorganic chemistry at the Al-Farabi Kazakh State National University, are joint directors of the project. They chose the 600 square kilometre area for study because it has fresh water, an electricity supply, was formerly used for grazing and hay production, and borders the village of Sarzhal, which has



Monitoring radioactivity

a population of about 2,000. "Before NATO funded our research, monitoring of radioactivity and contamination levels took place on a limited and *ad hoc* basis," Professor Priest said.

The area of study is especially significant because it was in the plume of a 1953 ground-level, hydrogen-

bomb explosion. It lies close to the Degelen mountains, where 239 underground nuclear tests were carried out, and was the site of two experiments, exploring the possibilities of creating canals and diverting rivers by using nuclear explosives. It is also close to another test area called Balapan, where more than 100 nuclear explosions were carried out in vertical shafts underground.

The Semipalatinsk project seeks to measure contamination levels throughout the 600 square kilometre area, identifying land that is immediately fit for human settlement, land which could be settled with minimal clean-up work, and land which should permanently be placed off limits to humans. In addition, the consequences of the two experiments aimed at creating canals and diverting rivers are being studied. Three Kazakh doctoral students are also examining respectively plutonium levels in people living near the site, plutonium levels in water, and the potential for contamination of surrounding areas via airborne plutonium. Results of the various studies are immediately fed into a second project on land utilisation funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development.

The Semipalatinsk project is one of the largest of 97 projects currently supported by NATO's Science for Peace programme. This programme, which was established in 1997 and currently has an annual budget of more than \$5 million, is based on the principle that science and technology are critical to the security of nations. All NATO-funded scientific research projects require cooperation between scientists from Alliance member and Partner countries. A call for proposals in 2000 generated some 850 applications, of which an additional 45 to 50 projects will eventually be supported. ■

# EASING THE TRANSITION TO CIVVY STREET

An innovative, NATO-sponsored programme is helping recently and soon-to-be discharged officers in Bulgaria and Romania find work and make new lives for themselves outside the military and will soon be extended to Croatia and possibly Albania.

The programme, which was drawn up within the framework of the EU-sponsored Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, brings together institutions and organisations that have not traditionally worked together, such as NATO and the World Bank, to help tackle deep social problems and contribute to building long-term stability in Southeastern Europe. In total, some 60,000 officers — 20,000 each in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia — will be beneficiaries and thousands more could benefit if the programme is extended to other countries in the region.

“Both NATO and the World Bank are doing what each organisation does best,” says Chuck Parker, coordinator of NATO’s South East Europe Initiative. “NATO is helping Partner countries downsize their armed forces and the World Bank is lending some of the money to finance the reforms and help turn soldiers into civilians.”

Parker, a former US Army colonel, helped devise and develop the programme together with colleagues at the World Bank, Stability Pact and the relevant Bulgarian and Romanian ministries. “NATO and the World Bank are not natural bedfellows, but were able to come together because of the framework provided by the Stability Pact and the resulting synergy is now generating results that can be understood by the man in the street,” he says.

After initial discussions in the months following the creation of the Stability Pact in July 1999, NATO despatched teams, including Dutch, German, French and US experts, to Bulgaria and Romania in February and March 2000 to help design the respective programmes. This assistance, combined with NATO’s follow-up monitoring, helped persuade the World Bank to provide the necessary loan financing.

Romania borrowed \$500,000 from the World Bank to get its programme off the ground in March of this year and is currently negotiating a further \$3 million loan. The Romanian programme, which was drawn up on similar lines to an existing assistance

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Looking for new careers

scheme aimed at unemployed miners, is administered by the defence ministry. It brings together several government departments and agencies and operates on a peripatetic basis, visiting military bases, counselling soon-to-be discharged officers to help them get over the shock of redundancy and advising them on their options in civilian life. By September, some 2,000 former mili-

tary personnel had made use of the programme.

Bulgaria decided not to take the World Bank loan on offer and appealed, instead, for donor-financing. In response, the United Kingdom donated computers and the Netherlands, Norway and the Open Society Institute, the charitable foundation of billionaire philanthropist George Soros, contributed close to \$500,000 to get the programme off the ground. It has funding until the end of 2001, the Netherlands has agreed to fund one of four regional centres through 2002, and the programme is looking for additional donations for next year.

The Bulgarian programme differs somewhat from the Romanian. It is administered by a non-governmental organisation, the NGO Resource Centre, which is run by a retired Bulgarian colonel and has established four regional centres. By July of this year, some 2,500 out of about 3,000 discharged officers had visited one of the centres. Some received initial support and set out on their own to find jobs. About 1,000 formally registered or requested that the programme find employment for them. Of these, 200 have found jobs and between 400 and 600 are following leads or preparing for interviews arranged by the programme.

As the Bulgarian and Romanian programmes began to yield results, both Albania and Croatia expressed an interest in launching similar initiatives. Croatian envoys visited Romania to examine how the programme was operating there and get an idea of the preparatory work involved. In March 2001, a NATO team was despatched to Croatia to advise on the next steps.

The Bulgarian and Romanian programmes form part of NATO’s South East Europe Initiative, an initiative launched in 1999 in the wake of the Kosovo air campaign to contribute to building stability in Southeastern Europe. ■

# Martti Ahtisaari: international mediator

In June 1999, when President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari persuaded then Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to accept NATO's terms for ending the Kosovo air campaign. Since leaving office in 2000, he has chaired various conflict-prevention organisations, has been an independent inspector of the IRA's arms dumps in Northern Ireland, and has founded an association to facilitate his international work.

**NATO Review:** In the past decade, the Euro-Atlantic security environment has changed almost beyond recognition. What are the greatest threats to security today?

**Martti Ahtisaari:** In the wake of the tragic attacks in New York and Washington DC, the threat of terrorism and the fight against it is clearly high on everybody's agenda. Indeed, this is a good example of how new security threats can seriously challenge what is still a largely state-centred security system. Many of today's most serious threats are global in scale. In addition to terrorism, they include corruption, organised crime, drug trafficking and the spread of small arms. On the other hand, most of today's armed conflicts are not between states but within states, involving systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Typical features include collapsed state structures and political mobilisation of populations based on ethnic and religious identity. Traditional means of managing international disputes do not work in these circumstances.

**NR:** What more could be done to enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area?

**MA:** Taken together, these new threats are such that it is extremely difficult for governments to come up with effective responses. Clearly, these problems cannot be solved without effective international cooperation. It is therefore critical, above all, to improve the ways in which we cooperate and exchange information.



**NR:** The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council has become an important forum for dialogue on security matters. How do you see this institution evolving in the coming years?

**MA:** The EAPC provides a very useful forum for high-level political consultation and dialogue between Partners and Allies. In the wake of the terrorist attack in the United States, I see even greater possibilities for cooperation in the EAPC. This depends very much on how the situation is handled, but I see great possibilities for transatlantic cooperation between the United States, Europe and Russia in the EAPC.

**NR:** Both NATO and the European Union are considering expansion at present. What potential problems do you foresee?

**MA:** The enlargement of NATO, from an organisational point of view, is an easier exercise. When it comes to the European Union, it is clear that we have to examine both the decision-making processes and the institutions themselves. I have advocated the enlargement of the European Union for many years and therefore see more possibilities than problems. I am also sympathetic to those countries wishing to join NATO. Above all, they want to secure a peaceful atmosphere within which to develop democratic traditions, respect for human rights and the rule of law. The challenge is for existing members and applicant countries alike to utilise the coming years to make sure that the enlargement process is successful.



**NR:** You have deep insight into Slobodan Milosevic's role in the wars of Yugoslav dissolution. How does a mediator negotiate with someone of his ilk?

**MA:** I first met Mr Milosevic when I was chairman of the Bosnia and Herzegovina working group at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in Geneva from August 1992 until October 1993. But if you look at my CV, you realise that almost all my interlocutors have been rather difficult personalities. In South Africa before democratisation took place, for example, we had to negotiate with individuals who were not especially forthcoming. This was a good experience for dealing with Mr Milosevic. But it is important to remember that Viktor Chernomyrdin and I were not negotiating with Mr Milosevic. We were simply presenting an offer that would facilitate an end to the bombing, provided that he committed the Yugoslav government to certain principles.

**NR:** How important will Slobodan Milosevic's trial be?

**MA:** Mr Milosevic knew before we went to Belgrade that he had been indicted. At the time, however, I believe that he never thought he would be going to The Hague. Indeed, this matter was not raised during our discussions. I think in general it is important that all political leaders are made aware that they cannot escape justice, if they misbehave to the extent that is the case here. Perhaps that is the best form of preventive diplomacy.

**NR:** Are the various Balkan peace processes on track, or should the international community change tack?

**MA:** I always look at the Balkans in the light of what we have learned elsewhere in Europe. Take, for example, the unification process in Germany. At the time of unification, my German friends said that the process would take one generation. However, I recently met people working on these issues there, who said that we should expect the process to take as much as two generations. It is not only a question of administrative solutions, but also a mental and psychological process. If it takes one to two generations in Germany, it will definitely take longer in the Balkans. As long as the international community is prepared to commit to staying there for 10 to 20 years, we will be able to set short-term implementation targets and take the process forward. The challenge is, however, enormous. Recent opinion polls have shown that some 62 per cent of Bosnians between the ages of 14 and 30 wanted to leave the country. Clearly, a lot of work remains to be done. That said, we have both achieved and learned a lot as well. We are beginning to establish functioning institutions. Elections take place on a regular basis. People are learning to respect democratic processes. And local people are beginning to run key institutions. That is much better than having the international community running the process and the locals criticising what we are doing.

**NR:** The international community has invested many billions of dollars in the former Yugoslavia in the past decade. Are there more effective and timely ways of managing, or heading off conflict, that you would advocate?

**MA:** One lesson of the international community's experience in the Balkans is the importance of creating a conceptual framework in which to operate and analysing all actions and policies. In the absence of an intellectual framework, we risk simply wasting our money. It is therefore extremely important to finance some of the think tanks working on these issues in Europe. In the past year and a half, I've read some very interesting studies carried out by the European Stability Initiative, with whom as chairman of the East-West Institute, I collaborated on a project evaluating Stability Pact programmes. It is important to make such studies available to a much wider audience.

**NR:** Since leaving political office, you have been working on a number of initiatives to improve international responses to crises. What are these and how might they contribute?

**MA:** I have initiated three activities via my association, the Crisis Management Initiative. Firstly, I am working to improve the use of information technology in crisis management. Having run a complex international mission myself in Namibia from 1989 to 1990, I am aware how useful it would have been had I been able to tie the whole operation together with the kind of technology, which was not available at the time. Indeed, when head of administration at the United Nations, I reformed the way in which information technology was used. Technology makes it possible to bring people together easily, to share information, and to save time and money. Secondly, I am working to improve civilian responses to crises. If we compare the preparedness of the military with that of civilians for crisis-management tasks, the difference is enormous. The military has well-established training patterns and no one is sent on a peacekeeping mission without prior training. The same cannot be said for civilians. In the European Union we need to create a group of civilians who have undergone specialised training for crisis-management operations. There should be common teaching for everybody and more tailored programmes for the different professions. If such a programme can be set up, we will be better prepared to deal with crises. Thirdly, I have been promoting the idea of a crisis-management portal on the internet to bring together analysts, decision-makers, journalists and other parties interested in crisis management to provide them with the tools to generate, disseminate and accumulate related knowledge. I hope such a portal could also be used as an active discussion forum. ■

# The new Macedonian question

*Christopher Bennett reviews recent literature on the latest part of the former Yugoslavia to succumb to ethnic violence.*

As the Yugoslav federation was breaking up in 1991, two of the country's republican leaders fought a rear-guard action to keep it together – Alija Izetbegovic and Kiro Gligorov, presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia respectively. Both men feared that the consequences of Yugoslavia's disintegration would be greatest in their republics. On 3 June 1991, therefore, they presented the rest of the federation with their own compromise model for inter-republican relations. Sadly, nothing came of this bold, eleventh-hour initiative and in less than a month war broke out. Ten months later, Bosnia was engulfed by a conflict, which confirmed Izetbegovic's greatest fears. By contrast, despite countless predictions of doom, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\* managed to avoid similar bloodshed and violence for the best part of a decade.

That the new country should prove so durable surprised many analysts. At the time of Yugoslavia's disintegration, it was poor, ethnically divided, militarily weak, landlocked and surrounded by historically, aggressive neighbours. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Macedonian question had haunted Europe's Great Powers, whose diplomatic efforts failed to head off bloody conflict. In the course of the ensuing Balkan Wars, whose scale and savagery appalled contemporary observers, geographic Macedonia – an area bounded to the north by the Skopska Crna Gora and the Shar Planina mountains; to the east by the Rila and Rhodope mountains; to the south by the Aegean coast around Thessalonika, Mount Olympus and the Pindus mountains; and to the west by the lakes of Ohrid and Presp – was wrested from Ottoman rule and divided three ways, between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. Moreover, in the inter-war period, Macedonian terrorists were active way beyond the Balkans. Indeed, even at the end of the 20th century, much about the new state, from its borders, to its language, history, flag and even its name, remained controversial. If ever a country was ripe for disintegration, surely this was it.

Perhaps it is inevitable that prophecies of doom have dominated and continue to dominate media analysis of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\* After all, predictions of a country's peaceful survival are hardly newsworthy. But for most of the 1990s, the new state defied the odds. It negotiated the peaceful departure of the Yugoslav People's

Army from its territory. It survived a limited economic embargo, the fall-out of international sanctions against Montenegro and Serbia and the loss of its markets elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. And it joined a host of international organisations and programmes, including NATO's Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan, to maximise its security. As a result, unlike other parts of the former Yugoslavia, whose agony during the past decade has generated a massive literature, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\* has largely escaped such scrutiny. Indeed, only three books have appeared on it in recent years in English.

The pick of the bunch is without doubt *Who are the Macedonians?* (Hurst & Co, 2000) by Hugh Poulton. This is a comprehensive yet concise history of Macedonia and its peoples in the broadest sense, which should be required reading for anyone interested in or attempting to resolve the current crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\* Poulton is a prolific writer on Balkan and minority questions who has worked on these issues as a researcher for Amnesty International, Article 19 and the Minority Rights Group. Moreover, in addition to publishing several, original books in recent years, he has fronted a rock band called the *Walking Wounded*, many of whose songs have been inspired by the past decade of conflict in the Balkans.

*Who are the Macedonians?* traces the histories of the many peoples who inhabit or have inhabited geographic Macedonia from antiquity to the present. In the process, it analyses the formation of modern national identities and, in particular, the so-called *millet* system, the system by which Ottoman subjects were governed within their religious community, or *millet*. This is significant because it was the *millet* system that enabled the Ottoman lands to become so ethnically mixed and accounts for the link between religion and ethnicity today.

Poulton considers the competing territorial claims of the various peoples living in geographic Macedonia when it still formed part of the Ottoman Empire and the actions of each whenever they were in a position to make good those claims. In a short yet insightful analysis, he illustrates how the nation states that emerged from the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire were largely created by ethnic cleansing, persecution and repression. He also examines the notorious Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation or VMRO, whose terrorist activities in the inter-war period reflected national frustration at the absence of a Macedonian Slav

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*Christopher Bennett is editor of NATO Review and author of Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York University Press).*

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national state and extended way beyond the Balkans. In later chapters, Poulton analyses the evolution of a Macedonian Slav national identity in Tito's Yugoslavia, the creation of an independent state in the wake of the break-up of Yugoslavia and relations between Macedonian Slavs and ethnic Albanians. He points out that, unlike Bosnia, there was minimal mixing between ethnic groups. Indeed, he cites an opinion poll from 1974, showing that 95 per cent of both Macedonian Slav and ethnic Albanian and 84 per cent of ethnic Turkish heads of households would not let their sons marry a girl of different nationality, while for daughters the percentages were even higher.

Mutual suspicion and animosity between Macedonian Slavs and ethnic Albanians pre-date the creation of an independent state. Indeed, Poulton describes "neo-Malthusian" measures taken in the 1980s aimed at restraining the ethnic Albanian birth rate. This included obliging families to pay for medical services for any children above the ideal number of two and the withdrawal of child allowance for additional children. In 1989, the constitution was amended in such a way that the republic was defined as a "nation-state of Macedonian people" instead of the previous formulation which defined it as "a state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities". This change reflected the growing unease of the Macedonian Slav authorities in the face of Albanian nationalism and the possible break-up of Yugoslavia. Inevitably, however, a more assertive Macedonian Slav nationalism generated in turn a similar ethnic Albanian response. Ethnic Albanians boycotted the republic's independence referendum in 1991 and held their own autonomy poll in 1992. Since then, issues of national symbols and minority rights have remained close to the surface of political life and came to the fore again in the wake of NATO's Kosovo campaign.

Poulton is also a contributor to *The New MACEDONIAN QUESTION* (Palgrave, 2001), a collection of essays edited by James Pettifer. His chapter, *Non-Albanian Muslim Minorities in Macedonia*, is as informative as his book and covers Muslim Slav Macedonians, variously referred to as Torbesi, Pomaks, Gorans and Poturs, Turks, Roma and, remarkably, "Egyptians", since many Roma have chosen to declare themselves as Egyptians in recent censuses, because of the perceived stigma attached to the name Roma.

*The New MACEDONIAN QUESTION* contains a huge breadth of contributions, including works by Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Macedonian Slav, Russian and Serbian authors as well as Western European analysts of the Balkans. This is both its strength and weakness, since, despite several excellent chapters, the book is extremely uneven. Moreover,

a deliberate decision to allow each writer to use his or her own terminology and style leaves the reader confused. In addition to Poulton's chapter, Pettifer's two contributions – chapters entitled *The new Macedonian Question* and *The Albanians in western Macedonia after FYROM* – are certainly worth reading. So, too, is the first chapter by the late Elisabeth Barker and originally published in 1949, which, according to Pettifer "sets out the traditional pro-Greek view of the British Foreign Office". Otherwise, Evangelos Kofos' chapter, *Greek policy considerations over FYROM independence and recognition*, is particularly insightful. Overall, however, *The New MACEDONIAN QUESTION* is disappointing because it fails to live up to its title and dwells largely on what most people would consider to be an older Macedonian question.

By contrast, Alice Ackermann's *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia* (Syracuse University Press, 2000) focuses on the very recent past. That said, an uncharitable reviewer could dismiss it. The second chapter on preventive diplomacy reads like a literature review prepared for a doctoral thesis. An analysis of the "successes" and "failures" of preventive diplomacy, which contrasts international responses to disputes between Hungary and Slovakia, and Estonia and Russia, with international responses to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, seems to be comparing apples and oranges. And the analysis of

Yugoslavia's disintegration, which borrows excessively from the controversial writings of Susan Woodward and contains several (minor) factual errors, is weak. Despite this, anybody wishing to understand the current conflict should read this book.

The strength of Ackermann's well-intentioned book is the original research she carried out into international attempts to head off conflict. This includes analyses of the work of the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its high commissioner on national minorities, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, and the activities of certain non-governmental organisations, including Search for Common Ground and the Ethnic Conflict Resolution Project. What becomes abundantly clear is that the painstaking and unsung work of several organisations and individuals, dealing with essentially identical issues to those which dominate today's agenda, did contribute to the young country's survival in the early years. Macedonians of all ethnic origins must be hoping that today's international mediators have as much patience, tact and success as their predecessors. ■



Timely publications

# Educating a new elite

*Colonel Ralph D. Thiele marks the 50th anniversary of the NATO Defense College by describing how the institution has expanded its courses and activities to include citizens of Partner countries.*

**F**ifty years after NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, founded the NATO Defense College, the rationale behind its creation, namely the need to develop individuals capable of adapting to a new security environment, remains as valid as ever. With the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of new, multi-faceted and unpredictable security threats, NATO has succeeded in making itself the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. But the need for individuals able to innovate, think laterally and come up with creative solutions has never been so great.

As countries that were enemies for more than 40 years became NATO Partners, the Defense College has moved with the times and evolved to cater for the needs of their military establishments as much as those of Alliance members. Increasingly, the Defense College has opened its doors to senior representatives of Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, inviting them to participate in the full range of educational activities, together with their NATO counterparts. Indeed, for several years now the Defense College has been running practically all its courses – the Integrated PfP/OSCE, NATO General and Flag Officers', NATO Reserve Officers' and Senior Courses – within the Partnership for Peace framework. This is also the case for its activities, including the Conference of Commandants, co-sponsorship of International

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*Colonel Ralph D. Thiele is Chef de Cabinet at the NATO Defense College.*

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Purpose-built: the NATO Defense College moved into new premises in autumn 1999

© NATO  
Research Seminars and the Fellowship Programme. Every year, four fellows – two from Partnership for Peace and two from Mediterranean Dialogue countries – are sponsored to carry out their own security-related research at the Defense College.

The focus of courses at the Defense College is not tactics or operational techniques, but international politico-military issues at the strategic level. In addition, all courses provide a forum for exchanging information, building consensus and improving understanding and cooperation between

Alliance and Partner countries. With course members coming from some 50 nations and a multinational staff and faculty, the Defense College is a truly multinational institution, which promotes an Alliance – as opposed to a national – viewpoint. The objective is not to teach but to provide a learning environment for expanding students' horizons, so that course members see for themselves that consensus and bonding is possible even among people with the most varied backgrounds. The Defense College provides an exceptional learning opportunity, but it is up to course members to make the most of it.

Courses tend to generate their own team spirit, which in turn develops into a useful network of contacts between course members from NATO and Partner countries. This *esprit de corps* helps to overcome barriers that may have existed before, as well as strengthening trust between the respective nations. The spirit of consensus runs like a thread through the course members' daily life. Moreover, since all discussions take place on a non-attributable basis, participants are able to speak their mind.

Course members of different ranks and from all services and diplomatic and governmental departments learn to understand each other. The time and effort they invest in establishing trust and friendship with their peers is repaid in kind. They develop and improve a sense of solidarity, cooperation and understanding with fellow course members. They also find that it is possible to have an open exchange of ideas and to reach group consensus, without sacrificing individual or national identity. Beyond the academic programme, deep bonds develop between course members and their families as a result of the extensive social and cultural side to life in Rome.


In autumn 1999, the Defense College moved into new, purpose-built premises so that it can properly serve the needs of future generations. Organisational structures and processes have been streamlined and adapted. On the academic side, over the past few years the Defense College has focused on four areas. These are adapting the curriculum to the fundamental security tasks contained in NATO's new Strategic Concept; using the new facilities to educate more people from NATO, Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, as well as to take on more activities; engaging the best speakers; and developing the newly established capacity for research-related activities. Like NATO itself, the Defense College now has the capacity to respond to the fundamentally changed security environment and to take on new tasks appropriate to its new missions and Partners.


Since April 2000, the Defense College has supported the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Study Institutes, a group that helps forge new partnerships between defence academies and practitioners,

scholars and experts in Partner and NATO countries. In this way, the Defense College is serving as a focal point within NATO for the Consortium. It is also participating as a full member in the guiding secretariat working group, harmonising the activities of the Conference of Commandants with the Consortium, and participating in selected Consortium working groups, particularly where strategic-level education is discussed.

Early this year, the Defense College sponsored an international week at the Ukrainian National Defence Academy. In this way, it was able to offer Ukrainian students a unique and qualitatively different academic introduction to Euro-Atlantic security. Judging by their reactions, particularly in the small group discussions, it seems that the initiative was greatly appreciated. This event was not just important in its own right, but also as part of a broader process of helping transform Ukraine's military education and may serve as a precedent for similar activities elsewhere.

As the Defense College celebrates its 50th anniversary this autumn, it remains committed to playing the educational role envisaged by its founding father. As in the past, it will continue to supply Alliance and Partner countries with men and women who have the courage to grasp the security challenges of the 21st century and whose minds are equipped to deal with them effectively. ■

 More information on the NATO Defense College and its courses can be found at: [www.ndc.int](http://www.ndc.int)

 More information on the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes can be found at: [www.pfpconsortium.org](http://www.pfpconsortium.org)

## NATO School (SHAPE)

Like the Defense College, the NATO School (SHAPE) at Oberammergau, Germany, has adapted its intake and curriculum in the past decade to cater for increasing numbers of students from Partner countries. In 2000, 5,818 students from 47 countries attended courses and conferences at the school, of whom only 4,722 came from Alliance member states.

Students from countries active in the Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue gain insight into how NATO works and participate in courses, including subjects as diverse as crisis management, resource management, civil-emergency planning and civil-military cooperation. Organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees also regularly send students and speakers.

As NATO has become increasingly involved in peacekeeping, the School has supported ongoing military operations and developed courses to assist the peace processes. In this way, commanders and staff with field experience are able to pass on lessons learned to course participants. In addition, a security cooperation course has been organised specifically for civilian and military personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, aimed at building confidence and instilling a spirit of openness and cooperation among participants.

Oberammergau also hosts a number NATO symposiums and conferences. The most significant is the annual Defence Planning Symposium to which Partner representatives have been invited since 1999.

# Reform realities

*Chris Donnelly examines why military reform has proved so difficult in Central and Eastern Europe and prospects for future restructuring.*



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About turn: military reform has followed a remarkably similar pattern throughout Central and Eastern Europe

Over the past ten years, the armed forces of every country in Central and Eastern Europe have undergone drastic transformation and downsizing. Brought about by the end of the Cold War and the changing nature of the threats to national security, this is an ongoing process. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe differ in terms of size, economic capability, geostrategic situation and the nature of their relationships with the European Union and NATO. However, notwithstanding the corresponding differences in size and composition of their armed forces, the path of military reform has followed a remarkably similar pattern everywhere.

The first stage was characterised by a loss of rationale and ideology, and by massive force reductions brought on by the change in geostrategic, economic and political circumstances. This was attended by a loss of Communist

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*Chris Donnelly is NATO's special adviser for Central and Eastern European affairs.*

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Party and governmental control mechanisms that were not replaced by any corresponding mechanisms for democratic control. New governments everywhere lacked military expertise and had no adequate civilian mechanisms either to make military policy or to direct the course of military affairs and the development of their armed forces. Where mechanisms existed, they were crude and amounted to little more than establishing ever-lower financial ceilings for defence expenditure. In many countries, internal power struggles resulted in authority over the armed forces either being split between many ministries and agencies, including some which would not normally have expected to have responsibility over troops, or being moved from one branch of the executive to another, such as from the government to the president, or vice versa. In some countries, politicians sought to use the military directly in power struggles. This further reduced the degree of real political control over the armed forces.

The second stage in the process saw the armed forces' leaderships rally to protect and preserve their military sys-

tems, striving to retain as much of the old force structure and infrastructure as possible. This was influenced by a combination of motives in which vested interests undoubtedly played a part. But sincere conviction, based on patriotism and a strong belief in the validity of the former system, reinforced by the lack of competence and expertise of new civilian governments, was the driving factor. This was exacerbated by the militaries' lack of exposure to alternative professional views and by the naturally cohesive qualities found in all effective military systems.

The effects were quickly felt. Trying to maintain a massive but obsolete structure at a time of rapid social change and economic decline proved disastrous. As Central and Eastern European countries moved painfully towards a real cash economy, resources for the military began to dry up. In most countries, this was not immediately obvious because the military establishment had traditionally been able to draw on resources in kind rather than in cash and had its own means of generating income and consumable resources. Exploiting these assets allowed the core of the military to survive, despite the lack of government funding.

After more than four, and in some cases seven, decades of a command economy, all Central and Eastern European countries lacked appropriately trained accountants and effective accounting procedures. Moreover, neither police nor judiciary were equipped to monitor and control financial irregularities. This was particularly the case in defence establishments, where the need for military secrecy further impeded transparency. As a result, the defence sector in Central and Eastern Europe was slow to set up proper budgetary systems and, as a result, corruption became endemic in some instances. The uncontrollable sale or distribution of military material, the lack of guidelines on officers using their positions and forces under their command for personal purposes, the hiring out of soldiers by officers, straightforward theft and other corrupt practices – all highly destructive of military discipline – proliferated. This led to a rapid decline in training standards and then in living standards, both for conscripts and for those officers and senior non-commissioned officers who lacked the rank or position to control marketable resources, or – the majority – who were simply honest.

In the third stage, the procurement system broke down. Defence industries, deprived of a tied domestic market, generally tried to avoid restructuring and reorientation, taking refuge in the fiction that arms sales abroad would save them. In the event, as a result of corruption, an unwillingness to reform and a lack of expertise in market-economic realities, Central and Eastern European defence industries missed what might have been a window of opportunity in the early 1990s to seize a share of the world market. With this export opening lost and with domestic demand collapsed, defence industries looked to governments to bail them out. Defence factories soaked up massive state subsidies but used the money to keep large numbers of idle

workers on subsistence pay, rather than to restructure the industry. In the long term, no country can maintain the quality and cost benefits that make for attractive exports without the security of a good home market. The ability to draw on vast reserves of fundamental, scientific research as well as existing military research and development has enabled the industries to survive in their obsolete form and avoid painful reform. But these reserves are now running out and defence industries in Central and Eastern Europe that have not yet restructured face near-total collapse. Reform today will be far more difficult and painful than had it been undertaken ten years ago.

The impact of this myriad of problems was in almost all countries first felt among conscripts, whose training and living standards disintegrated. The failure of the military establishment in some countries to change with society meant that the young were no longer willing to serve and the breakdown of the established system meant that they could no longer be compelled to do so. The system of universal conscription decayed rapidly and, with it, any pre-service military training in schools and universities. Henceforth, only a fraction of the eligible age groups would serve in the military. Legal exemption, the ineffectiveness of the draft and bribery would ensure that the better-off and better-educated would never have to serve in the ranks.

With the disintegration of national service, the concept of a “socialist nation-in-arms” died. Moreover, it could not be restored because the social basis it sprang from and depended on had gone forever. In retrospect, this seems obvious. But, at the time, in the early to mid 1990s, it was not appreciated by decision-makers brought up in a very different system, so the decline continued. The fall in the number and quality of conscripts, the endemic problem of physical abuse of conscripts by senior soldiers and officers, the catastrophic decline in training and the consequent collapse of the armed forces' prestige next took its toll on the ranks of young officers, many of whom resigned. Meanwhile, standards of entry to officer training colleges dropped. Moreover, many cadets, having received a good technical education, decided not to enter the army and left on or just before graduation. This completed the self-destruction of the old system.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, working to a common Soviet model, had relied on young officers to conduct all the junior command and training tasks at unit level that in most Western armies are carried out in depots or by regular professional long-service non-commissioned officers. The lack of young officers meant that the steady downward spiral of training accelerated. A vicious circle had become established. Training standards fell. Equipment broke down and was not replaced. Poor treatment of soldiers increased. The gap between the command and the soldier grew. Recruitment of young officers became more difficult. Morale fell and, with it, public

respect. The result was declining competence, accompanied by a steady command and administrative drain, as officers left their posts at all levels and the force structure crumbled. When this process was also accompanied by military action, such as affected the Russian Army in the first Chechen War, the results of the decay were instantly visible.

As armies shrank, their officer corps became grossly top-heavy and this itself created an obstacle to reform. But attempts to reduce drastically the officer ranks were also harmful. The sight of the government discharging unwanted senior officers without thanks, without proper pensions or social security and with little chance of taking up a new career led those who were not qualified for other employment to do all in their power to stay in the armed forces. It also demoralised younger officers and put many young men off the idea of a military career.

The deterioration of the armed forces did not take place at the same speed everywhere and the pace differed even within the armed forces of the same country. In general, problems have been worse in Russia and some new countries of the former Soviet Union than in most of Central Europe. But many experiences are common to most countries. Successive ministers and chiefs of defence attempted to rationalise their shrinking armies and succeeded to differing degrees. In units and formations with exceptional commanders, competence and combat capabilities were retained. By concentrating efforts and resources on a small number of units – regiments, squadrons or ships – some of these have been maintained at a reasonable standard of military readiness.

But, in the main, the decline was not halted. As a result, during the 1990s, none of the armed forces of countries in the former Soviet Union or its former Central and Eastern European allies managed to reconstruct an effective and sustainable military system on modern lines. Indeed, a point was reached in most Central and Eastern European countries where the situation got so dire that the armed forces became desperate. Their plight was obvious and the only way they could see to pursue reform was to seek more money from the state.

A thorough military reform programme is expensive. However, experience in Central and Eastern Europe has shown that, when money was made available to defence establishments in advance of reforms, it tended to be spent not on reform but on keeping the old system on life support. Cosmetic improvements were made, but the essential, fundamental reform was actually put off and the situation got worse. Indeed, reform became more difficult because the money stiffened resistance.

The “NATO factor” has played a role in the process in many Central and Eastern European countries. In some countries keen to get into NATO, the military command has on occasion proposed the procurement of unnecessary and often unaffordable equipment arguing that: “It will be needed to get us into NATO.” At a time when the political leadership and their civilian staffs, as well as parliamentarians and journalists, did not know enough about military issues, this argument could sound persuasive. Moreover, Western arms manufacturers often peddled the same line. In other countries, governments sometimes used NATO “demands” as the excuse for pushing for defence reform because they lacked the self-confidence to tackle this issue on their own authority. Both approaches have damaged civil-military relationships and eroded public confidence.

In Russia, the “NATO factor” has been used differently. The maintenance of a perception of a military threat from NATO has been used to justify the preservation of much of the old military infrastructure. This has in turn distracted attention and siphoned off money from real defence reform.

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Reforms are being spurred by the realisation that, were they to be postponed, the process would be even more difficult in the future

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The final element in the “NATO factor” has been the readiness of Central and Eastern European governments and militaries alike to look to the West for models of military organisation and reform. All NATO members have different military systems, while Central and Eastern European countries have widely differing requirements for defence reform or for building forces anew. Central and Eastern European countries have therefore found it exceptionally difficult to evaluate successful models, to work out which elements are relevant for their own development and to find reliable, unbiased advice. Governments and armies have gone from the one extreme of rejecting any Western influence to the other of rushing to embrace Western ideas, such as professionalisation, without any real understanding of what it involves – or costs.

Many efforts to reform from below failed. At one stage, advocates of reform hoped that young officers would be able to rejuvenate the system and bring in new ideas from the bottom up. Indeed, this approach did have some temporary successes. However, in the end, there were too few energetic, young officers to create sufficient momentum for reform. They failed, either because they could not overcome the inertia of the mid-level structures or because they were undermined by superiors who viewed them as a threat.

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The story is similar with officers sent for training and education abroad, most frequently to Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. These individuals were expected to return home and infuse their military sys-



tems with new ideas. In practice, however, this proved a false hope as, all too often, the military establishment closed ranks to protect itself. In some Central European countries, even as late as 2000, every single officer who had been sent abroad on training courses was on return, either dismissed, demoted or sent to serve in a dead-end post in some military backwater. In another country, although all senior officers had received training abroad, their lead was ignored by the mass of colonels beneath them, who obstructed the implementation of the orders from on high. "Democratic control of the armed forces" is usually taken to mean that the generals will obey the politicians. But democratic control can also fail if colonels do not obey the generals.

A further common failing has been the inability of defence ministries in Central and Eastern Europe to implement an effective budgetary and planning system. This is extremely difficult because it requires converting the mentality of the military collective. Militaries have traditionally wished to retain the existing system, while modernising weapons and improving conditions for soldiers. As a result, they have pushed for the resources for such a vision, refusing to accept that economic realities make excessive defence spending unjustifiable and that social and economic changes necessitate reform. Western armies, by contrast, approach the issue of defence planning from the budget, working out what that pot of money will buy and prioritising on the basis of current threat assessments.

Linked to this common failing is the almost total absence of an honest and open system for evaluating the abilities and qualifications of officers. In the absence of such a system, it is almost impossible to develop a proper promotion and posting process. Without this, defence ministers will never be able to institutionalise reform because they will not be able to identify officers with the qualities needed to create a new kind of army, or put them into positions where they can transform words into action.

Much attention has been given in all Central and Eastern European countries to the issue of democratic control of

armed forces. But a frequently neglected aspect of democratic control is the issue of whether the government is actually competent to decide on and implement a defence policy and direct the course of military reform. This is a common failing, with frequently disastrous results. The fact is that Central and Eastern European countries have not yet been able to develop the body of civilian expertise in defence issues, which is needed to ensure balance and to provide dispassionate advice. The rapid turnover of governments in Central and Eastern Europe compounded this lack of expertise. When governments are reliant on the military for advice on defence issues, it is the armed forces, and not the government, which effectively decide policy. This state of affairs still persists in some Central and Eastern European countries, despite the existence on paper – and in law – of what would otherwise be adequate mechanisms for democratic control.

In recent years, the situation in some Central and Eastern European countries has, nevertheless, begun to change. The decline has been halted and prospects for rebuilding a new kind of armed forces appear good. Countries that have faced up to the fundamental nature of their problems are now poised to take the plunge, do away with the remaining elements of the old system and rebuild anew. But, this is not true everywhere. In some countries, such as Russia, the fundamental problems are yet to be faced.

In those Central and Eastern European countries where reform has taken root and is now capable of flourishing, it has been a process led by a few senior officers of vision, courage, determination and technical knowledge. They have been able to inspire subordinates to follow them and to draw on external experts to help them. Moreover, they have also been fortunate to have strong political backing to protect and encourage them, and to organise public information campaigns so as to ensure popular support. The reform processes now underway in several Central and Eastern European countries will take a long time to see through. But they are being spurred on by the growing realisation that, were they to be postponed even further, reform would be even more difficult in the future. ■



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"Bringing scientists together for progress and peace"




The NATO Science Programme supports collaborative projects between scientists from Allied and Partner countries.

The programme – which is not defence-related – aims to stimulate cooperation between scientists from different backgrounds, to create enduring links between researchers, and to help sustain scientific communities in Partner countries.

Full details can be found on the NATO web site: <http://www.nato.int/science>

# Defence expenditure and size of armed forces of NATO and Partner countries



The above statistics are from *The Military Balance 1995/96* and *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, published by the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies.


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


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