The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
For more than 30 years, the term “hollow army” has represented President Carter’s alleged willingness to allow American military capability to deteriorate in the face of growing Soviet capability. The true story is more complicated than the metaphor suggests.
Drawing on the literature on military innovation and reform, the author examines an important case of military change: the transformation of the U.S. Army in the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The findings of this study have significant implications for how the U.S. Army should think about implementing changes needed today to meet new strategic, economic, and technological challenges.
In this study of the organizational culture of the U.S. Army, Dr. Pierce has reviewed a previously assumed but unverified connection between organizational culture and professional development. The study has uncovered a lack of congruence between the dominant type of organizational culture of the U.S. Army and the professional managerial/leadership skills of its senior level leaders. This observed lack of congruence may be inhibiting performance and unconsciously perpetuating a cycle of caution and an overreliance on stability and control. The data indicate that the U.S. Army is illustrative of an organization that emphasizes stability and control, and one that attempts to comprehend the ambiguity of the future through an unconscious reliance upon the successful solutions employed in the past.
Historically, the U.S. Army has employed its officers to good effect, but is there need for improvement? Does its current assignments paradigm lead to optimal career satisfaction and productivity? Does it allow officers to develop the depth and breadth of talent the Army needs? Perhaps most importantly, does the Army really know enough about the officer talent it possesses, as well as the requirements for that talent?
The U.S. Army is almost universally acknowledged as an organization that powerfully develops talent in areas such as leadership, teamwork behavior, work ethics, adaptability, fitness, and many others. Employers know that the Army invests substantially in its people, and that this investment translates directly into enhanced productivity. Despite this well-earned reputation, however, are the Army’s current officer development programs equal to tomorrow’s challenges? Does it suffer from a growing imbalance in talent supply versus demand? Perhaps most importantly, is there an effective relationship between its developmental and employment strategies?
Organizations often focus their recruiting efforts on high-payoff markets--how does the Army identify the right market in which to focus its officer accessions efforts? What role does education play in officer accessions? How does the Army identify and go about meeting its officer diversity requirements? Why is establishing the proper ratio between commissioning sources so important?
Do you think the Army officer corps needs a clear statement of its professional ethic? Colonel Matthew Moten does, and he has written it in one page. Join the debate.
What is the difference between competent and talented? What is talent, and which people have it? What talents should the United States Army seek in its officers? Most importantly, what are the consequences of failing to create an officer talent management system?
The author evaluates the extent to which America’s principal military ally, the United Kingdom, has been able to transition to effects-based operations and the implications this has for the United States.
The topic of Women in Combat has been one of great emotion, but uncertain factual content until recently. The rules created to deal with the fact that women want to serve in the armed forces have ranged from silly to serious, but the factual bases have changed and the plea of all the contributors is to review the entire issue with objectivity and attention to the facts as they exist.
The author concludes that, in an effort to operationalize Clausewitz's signature concept, the U.S. military probably limited its utility. The Center of Gravity is best applied as an abstract, rather than as a practical, concept.
This Letort Paper addresses how the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1990 to 2005 used a strategic planning system to respond to their global challenges.
The situation in post-war Iraq is producing combat veterans accustomed to a perspective of combat that differs greatly from past wars. The authors explore the facets of fighting from the FOB.
Each year, the Army After Next Seminar students are asked to orient their Strategy Research Papers on topics appropriate to the programs 30-years in the future focus. Thirty years ago, the United States Army was deeply involved in Vietnam and in the Cold War.
The author starts from the traditional American notion that technology might offer a way to decrease the horror and suffering of warfare. He points out that historically this assumption is flawed in that past technological advances have only made warfare more—not less—bloody.
Only after the future roles of the U.S. military have been determined can the Department of Defense turn to the other important issues posed by Congress. Dr. William T. Johnsen concludes that the U.S. military will continue to perform its traditional roles: deterrence, reassurance, compellence, and support to the nation. The method and manner of carrying out those roles, however, will change.
Dr. Robert S. Ross argues that Japan's relationship with China is a key element in the evolving East Asian security structure. From Beijing's perspective, China's Japan policy rivals its relationship with the United States in relative strategic importance. Today Japanese and Chinese interests compete in many areas, requiring tolerance, patience and diplomatic sophistication.
Ms. Pascale Combelles-Siegel examines the difficult road traveled by the press and the military since Operation URGENT FURY in 1983. She focuses on the development of the 1992 Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs as a practical tool for reducing tension and providing press access to the battle. Her analysis reflects the duality of the relationship and the efforts of both communities to find a modus vivendi.
Given the volatile, unstable, and ambiguous environment in which armed forces can find themselves, the actions of field forces have a greater chance than ever before of affecting subsequent strategic decisions made at higher levels. The pressure on field commanders to "get it right the first time" is demonstrably greater than ever.