The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
The January 2012 announcement that the United States would reduce the number of Brigade Combat Teams in Europe captured media, popular, and scholarly attention, prompting many to ask: Is the United States turning its back on Europe as it pivots to Asia? Do the Europeans have the wherewithal to defend themselves? Are forward-based U.S. land forces necessary at all? Given the necessity of capable, interoperable coalition partners for the future security threats Washington most expects to encounter, the role of America’s forward military presence in Europe remains as vital as it was at the dawn of the Cold War, but for different reasons. Dr. Deni’s monograph forms a critical datapoint in the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of American Landpower.
Troubled relations between the armed forces and civil society sap the vitality of the republic and undermine the effectiveness of the military. This timely monograph launches a discussion about what kind of civil-military relationship we have and how to improve it.
The purpose of the Key Strategic Issues List is to provide military and civilian researchers a ready reference for issues of special interest to the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense.
What lessons can be learned from the occupation of Germany after World War II and from Iraq after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM? This Carlisle Paper analyzes both the similarities and differences between the occupations of both countries and suggests how lessons learned from both can be applied to the future.
Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO’s irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. This book explores shortfalls in the U.S. Government’s strategic planning processes and the mechanisms for interagency coordination of effort that have contributed to this situation, as well as reforms needed to meet emerging 21st century national security challenges.
This monograph considers both the future of Iraq and the differences and similarities between events in Iraq and the Arab Spring states. Serious and expanding mistakes by new governments are possible in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolutions, and any lessons that can be gleaned from earlier conflicts will be of considerable value to those nations. Moreover, U.S. Army officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) may often have unique opportunities and unique credibility to offer advice on the lessons of Iraq to their counterparts in some of the Arab Spring nations.
The authors assert that attaining unity of effort is the fundamental prerequisite for effective homeland response operations. They conclude that the best way to improve unity of effort is to create a dynamic system for producing, validating, and updating a unifying national homeland response doctrine.
Intended to facilitate dialogue between academic experts, military leaders, policymakers, and civilian practitioners, this edited volume provides a state of the art analysis of current whole of government (WoG) approaches and their effectiveness for coordinating stabilization and peacebuilding efforts. It explores the question: Can “smart power”—using the right tool for each operational context—successfully shift the burden of stability operations to civilian actors and enable the timely scaling-down of military deployments?