The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
The author describes strategic trends in cultural change and identity formation in the 21st century and suggests that the beliefs and values of foreign societies may increasingly, and more directly, impact our own national security in a future dominated by information technology.
This book answers several essential questions: What is cyberpower; how do we deal with emerging threats in cyberspace; what are the lessons that have already been learned; and where are the current cyberspace vulnerabilities?
The author explores the centrality of Human Intelligence in meeting the needs of the U.S. Army, as well as the Department of Defense, and the whole of government, for relevant information and tailored intelligence essential to creating a national security strategy; for defining whole of government policies that work in harmony; for acquisition of the right capabilities at the right price in time to be useful; and for operations, both local and global.
This year’s USAWC’s Strategic Studies Institute 20th Annual Strategy Conference was held on April 14-16, 2009, at Carlisle Barracks. It focused on “Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies,” and was intended to look beyond the noted importance of advances in the field of cyber and information technologies to raise awareness of other technology areas which thus far have received less visibility. The conference explored biogenetics, biometrics, nanotechnologies, robotics, artificial intelligence, alternative energies, electromagnetic weaponry, nuclear power, and global warming.
Throughout U.S. history the American military services have had an unfortunate penchant for not being ready be the next war. American military institutions have been surprisingly optimistic in weighting their preparedness as they embarked on the nation's wars. Military institutions have always had considerable problems in adapting and innovating during inter-war periods.
The author starts from the traditional American notion that technology might offer a way to decrease the horror and suffering of warfare. He points out that historically this assumption is flawed in that past technological advances have only made warfare more—not less—bloody.
Nonlethal technology, concepts and doctrine may provide the Army a way to retain its political utility and military effectiveness in a security environment characterized by ambiguity and the glare of world public opinion. To explore this, the Army is undertaking programs and initiatives which may make it the driving force in nonlethality.
Indirectly, any military institute operates within its technology context. The Army of today is, for instance, in a period of technological transition from an Industrial Age army to an Information Age army. A tremendous faith in technology is an abiding American characteristic.
They provide insights into three critical areas: the operational environment; the emergence of simultaneity as a unifying concept in Information Age warfare; and, changes that must take place in the planning environment. The authors suggest that the challenge today is to determine what array of capabilities may be needed to perform a broader range of requirements.
The Gulf War demonstrated that theater missile defense (TMD) will be an important mission for the U.S. Army and its Patriot defense system in the years ahead. The author suggests that Army planners should view TMD not just as a simple tactical problem, but as an exercise that has important political and strategic ramifications that cut to the core of U.S. efforts to create and maintain international coalitions.
In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Dr. Bruce Hoffman presented this paper as part of a panel examining "New Technologies and New Threats." Terrorism, of course, is not new. Hoffman warns, however, of the changing nature of terrorism. In the past, terrorists have been motivated by limited political and ideological objectives.
The authors discuss the ways in which the Army has changed its strategic systems over the past several years so that the Army operational and tactical forces will be able to "see" a situation, decide, adapt, and act faster and more precisely than their opponent. These changes will give strategic planners, and operational and tactical commanders, a new set of information age tools to use in theater