Already in 2011 the EU asked for Chinese support for the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), created by the Euro area member-states to prop up the single currency. This year, NATO Allies that use the Euro may need to go to China, Russia, Brazil and India again to ask for funds. What these rising states will require, in non-financial terms, for their support is unclear.
But the novelty of the situation cannot be underestimated: a range of NATO Allies may depend economically – and, by extension, for their defence budgets – on non-NATO states. And with this dependence, comes risks. If these EU states get Chinese support, what room for manoeuvre will NATO Allies have for example if there were a conflict between the United States and China in the South China Sea?
The rise of the “Rest” does not, however, mean a handover from the West to China, or even to the BRICs, as there was a de facto transition from Europe to the United States after World War II. True, international systems designed to maintain the post-World War II balance of power may have little attraction to the rising powers of the “Rest”. But the power structures that would be more attractive to China and the other BRICs is not clear.
The BRIC nations are torn internally between accepting the status quo, for example in the UN Security Council, only if their power in the institution is increased; or trying to fashion a new system altogether. China is becoming increasingly involved in global police work, such as in the Mekong Delta, but is reluctant to take the full step towards superpower responsibility.
In addition, the “Rest” are increasingly divided amongst themselves on a range of issues. For example, while European leaders rallied around French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde to be the new IMF chief, the BRICs dithered and disagreed on who they would like to see in the top international job.