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We develop a search-theoretic model of financial intermediation and use it to study how trading frictions affect the distribution of asset holdings, asset prices, efficiency and standard measures of liquidity. A distinctive feature of our theory is that it allows for unrestricted asset holdings, so market participants can accommodate trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions. We show that these individual responses of asset demands constitute a fundamental feature of illiquid markets: they are a key determinant of bid-ask spreads, trade volume and trading delays - all the dimensions of market liquidity that search-based theories seek to explain.

Key words: bid-ask spreads, execution delays, liquidity, search, trade volume

JEL codes: D83, G1

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1 Introduction

A recent literature pioneered by Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) (DGP hereafter) uses search theory to model the trading frictions characteristic of over-the-counter (OTC) markets.¹ The search-based approach is appealing because it can parsimoniously rationalize standard measures of liquidity such as bid-ask spreads, execution delays and trade volume, and can be used to study how market conditions influence these measures. A virtue of DGP's formulation is that it is analytically tractable, so all these mechanisms can be well understood.

The literature spurred by DGP, however, keeps the framework tractable by imposing a stark restriction on asset holdings, namely, that agents can only hold either 0 or 1 unit of the asset. In effect, the investors' ability to respond to changes in market conditions is limited rather severely by this restriction. In this paper we develop a search-based model of liquidity in asset markets with no restrictions on investors' asset holdings. The model is close in structure and spirit to DGP, but captures the heterogeneous responses of individual investors to changes in market conditions. From the broader perspective of search and matching theory, a striking feature of the model we develop is that it remains analytically tractable despite the large degree of heterogeneity among agents which is propagated endogenously by random matching with unrestricted asset holdings.² We provide a full characterization of the equilibrium—including transitional dynamics and the endogenous distribution of investors' asset positions—and show how it depends on all the details of the market structure.

Our methodological contribution provides new insights into how trading frictions affect outcomes in financial markets. We find that as a result of the restrictions they impose on asset holdings, existing search-based theories neglect a critical feature of illiquid markets, namely the fact that market participants can mitigate trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions to reduce their trading needs.³ The key theoretical observation is that an investor's asset demand

¹The search-theoretic literature on financial markets also includes Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2006), Gârleanu (2006), Miao (2006), Rust and Hall (2003), Spulber (1996) and Weill (2007).

²DGP restricted asset holdings for the same technical reasons why Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) restricted money holdings to $\{0, 1\}$, i.e., to keep the endogenous distribution of asset holdings manageable. Aside from a few exceptions, such as Green and Zhou (2002), the recent monetary literature, e.g., Lagos and Wright (2005), allows for unrestricted portfolios and keeps the analysis tractable by making assumptions that render the equilibrium distribution of money holdings degenerate. By way of comparison, the model we develop here allows for unrestricted asset holdings and remains tractable even though we make no attempt to harness the heterogeneity that is generated by the model dynamics.

³The importance of this mechanism in the context of another class of models—those with exogenous transaction costs—has been stressed by Constantinides (1986) for the case of proportional transaction costs, and by Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004) for the case of fixed transaction costs.

in an OTC market depends not only on his valuation for the asset at the time of the trade, but also on his expected valuation over the holding period until his next opportunity to trade. A reduction in trading delays makes investors less likely to remain locked into an undesirable asset position and therefore induces them to put more weight on their current valuation. As a result, reductions in trading frictions induce an investor to demand a larger asset position if his current valuation is relatively high, and a smaller position if it is relatively low. We find that these responses of individual asset demands are a key determinant of market efficiency and asset prices as well as bid-ask spreads, trade volume and trading delays—precisely the dimensions of market liquidity that search-based theories of financial intermediation are designed to explain.

From an investor’s standpoint, bid-ask spreads constitute the main out-of-pocket transaction cost in an illiquid market. We show that spreads depend not only on the ease with which investors can find alternative trading partners (a mechanism identified in the existing literature), but also on the degree of mismatch between investors’ endogenous asset positions and their current valuations of the asset. Our model predicts a distribution of transaction costs, both across trade sizes—with spreads that increase with the size of the trade—as well as within a given trade-size category—across investors with different valuations.

Trade volume is a manifestation of the ability of the exchange mechanism to reallocate assets across investors. We find that a reduction in trading delays shifts the equilibrium distribution of asset holdings in a way that tends to increase trade volume. Our theory reveals that from an investor’s point of view, an increase in the market power of dealers is isomorphic to an increase in trading delays. Hence, trade volume will tend to be small in markets where dealers enjoy a large degree of market power. These effects are implicitly assumed away if asset holdings are restricted to lie in $\{0, 1\}$.

Finally, we allow for free entry of dealers as a way to endogenize trading delays—a distinguishing feature of the microstructure of an OTC market. We find that when interacted with investors’ unrestricted asset holding decisions, the dealers’ incentives to make markets generate a liquidity externality that can give rise to multiple steady states. This finding suggests that all the symptoms of an illiquid market—large spreads, small trade volume and long trading delays—can simultaneously arise as a self-fulfilling phenomenon in asset markets with an OTC structure.

2 Environment

Time is continuous, starts at $t = 0$ and goes on forever. There are two types of infinitely-lived agents: a unit measure of investors and a unit measure of dealers. There is one asset, one perishable consumption good called *fruit*, and another consumption good defined as *numéraire*. The asset is durable, perfectly divisible and in fixed supply, $A \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Each unit of the asset produces a unit flow of fruit. There is no market for fruit, so holding the asset is necessary to consume this good. The numéraire good is produced and consumed by all agents. The instantaneous utility function of an investor is $u_i(a) + c$, where $a \in \mathbb{R}_+$ represents the fruit consumption (which coincides with the investor's asset holdings), $c \in \mathbb{R}$ is the net consumption of the numéraire good ($c < 0$ if the investor produces more of these goods than he consumes), and $i \in \mathbb{X} = \{1, \dots, I\}$ indexes a preference type. The utility function $u_i(a)$ is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.⁴ Each investor receives a preference shock with Poisson arrival rate δ . This process is independent across investors. Conditional on the preference shock, the probability the investor draws preference type i is $\pi_i > 0$, with $\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i = 1$. These preference shocks capture the notion that investors will value the asset differently over time thereby generating the need to rebalance their asset positions.⁵ Dealers do not hold positions and their instantaneous utility is c , their consumption of the numéraire good.⁶ All agents discount at rate $r > 0$.

Dealers can trade the asset continuously in a competitive interdealer market. Investors periodically contact dealers who can trade in this market on their behalf. Meetings with dealers occur at random according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α .⁷ Once a dealer and an

⁴Just as in DGP, our specification associates a certain utility to the investor as a function of his asset holdings. The utility from holding an asset position could be simply the value from enjoying the asset itself, as would be the case for real assets such as cars or houses. An alternative interpretation that leads to the same formulation would be to assume that there is a single consumption good, that investors are risk-neutral and able to borrow and lend freely at rate r , and regard the asset as physical capital used to produce the consumption good with the production technology u_i . As yet another possibility, one could adopt the preferred interpretation of DGP, namely that u_i is in fact a reduced-form utility function that stands in for the various reasons why investors may want to hold different quantities of the asset, such as differences in liquidity needs, financing or financial-distress costs, correlation of asset returns with endowments (hedging needs), or relative tax disadvantages. By now, several papers that build on the work of DGP have formalized the “hedging needs” interpretation. Examples include Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2006), Gârleanu (2006) and Vayanos and Weill (2008).

⁵In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix B) we allow preference shocks to follow a general continuous-time Markov chain and find that most of the substantive results generalize under appropriate regularity conditions.

⁶The restriction that dealers cannot hold assets is immaterial when analyzing steady-state equilibria. Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2007) study dynamic equilibria where dealers may choose to hold asset positions.

⁷While our description of the trading process is stylized, it captures the salient features of the actual trading arrangements in OTC markets. We refer the interested reader to Schultz (2001) as well as the discussion in

investor have contacted each other they negotiate over the quantity of assets that the dealer will acquire for the investor and the intermediation fee that the dealer charges for his services. After the transaction has been completed, the dealer and the investor part ways.

Asset holdings and preference types lie in the sets \mathbb{R}_+ and \mathbb{X} , respectively, and vary across investors and over time. We describe this heterogeneity with a probability space $(\mathbb{S}, \Sigma, H_t)$, where $\mathbb{S} = \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathbb{X}$, Σ is the σ -field generated by the sets $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I})$, where $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$ and $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathbb{X}$, and H_t is a probability measure on Σ which represents the distribution of investors across asset holdings and preference types at time t .

3 Equilibrium

Let $V_i(a, t)$ denote the maximum expected discounted utility attainable by an investor who has preference type i and is holding a assets at time t . The value function $V_i(a, t)$ satisfies

$$V_i(a, t) = \mathbb{E}_i \left[\int_t^{T_\alpha} e^{-r(s-t)} u_{k(s)}(a) ds + e^{-r(T_\alpha-t)} \{ V_{k(T_\alpha)}[a_{k(T_\alpha)}(T_\alpha), T_\alpha] - p(T_\alpha)[a_{k(T_\alpha)}(T_\alpha) - a] - \phi_{k(T_\alpha)}(a, T_\alpha) \} \right], \quad (1)$$

where T_α denotes the next time the investor contacts a dealer and $k(s) \in \mathbb{X}$ the investor's preference type at time s . The expectations operator, \mathbb{E}_i , is over the random variables T_α and $k(s)$ and is indexed by i to indicate that it is conditional on $k(t) = i$. The first term on the right side of (1) contains the expected discounted utility flows over the time interval $[t, T_\alpha]$, whose length is exponentially distributed with mean $1/\alpha$. The flow utility is indexed by the preference type, $k(s)$, which follows a compound Poisson process. The second term on the right side of (1) is the expected discounted utility from the time when the investor next contacts a dealer, T_α , onwards. At this time T_α , the dealer purchases $a_{k(T_\alpha)}(T_\alpha) - a$ in the market (or sells if this quantity is negative) at price $p(T_\alpha)$ on behalf of the investor; the investor readjusts his asset holdings from a to $a_{k(T_\alpha)}(T_\alpha)$ and pays the dealer an intermediation fee $\phi_{k(T_\alpha)}(a, T_\alpha)$. Both the fee and the asset price are expressed in terms of the numéraire good.⁸

Section 2.1 in Lagos and Rocheteau (2006).

⁸Since the intermediation fee is determined in a bilateral meeting, it may depend on the investor's preference type and asset holdings. Our notation for the investor's new asset position, $a_{k(T_\alpha)}(T_\alpha)$, makes explicit that it may depend on time and on the investor's preference type at the time of the trade. Below (condition (3)), we will find that the investor's new asset position is independent of the asset position he was holding at the time of the trade. To simplify the notation we anticipate this result and do not include a as an argument of his new asset position.

Let $W(t)$ denote the maximum expected discounted utility attainable by a dealer. It satisfies

$$W(t) = \mathbb{E} \left\{ e^{-r(T_\alpha - t)} \left[\int_{\mathcal{S}} \phi_i(a, T_\alpha) dH_{T_\alpha} + W(T_\alpha) \right] \right\},$$

where the expectations operator, \mathbb{E} , is over the next time the dealer meets an investor, T_α . Random matching implies that the investor whom the dealer meets is a random draw from H_{T_α} , the distribution of investors across preference types and asset holdings at time T_α .

We turn to the determination of the terms of trade in a bilateral meeting at time t between a dealer and an investor of type i who is holding a . Let a' denote the investor's post-trade asset holdings and ϕ the intermediation fee. We take (a', ϕ) to be the outcome corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining problem where the dealer has bargaining power $\eta \in [0, 1]$. The utility of the investor is $V_i(a', t) - p(t)(a' - a) - \phi$ if an agreement (a', ϕ) is reached, and $V_i(a, t)$ in case of disagreement. Therefore, the investor's gain from trade is $V_i(a', t) - V_i(a, t) - p(t)(a' - a) - \phi$. Analogously, the utility of the dealer is $W(t) + \phi$ if an agreement (a', ϕ) is reached and $W(t)$ in case of disagreement, so the dealer's gain from trade is the fee, ϕ . The bargaining outcome is

$$[a_i(t), \phi_i(a, t)] = \arg \max_{(a', \phi)} [V_i(a', t) - V_i(a, t) - p(t)(a' - a) - \phi]^{1-\eta} \phi^\eta, \quad (2)$$

where the maximization is subject to $a' \geq 0$.⁹ The solution (2) can be written as

$$a_i(t) = \arg \max_{a' \geq 0} [V_i(a', t) - p(t)a'] \quad (3)$$

$$\phi_i(a, t) = \eta \{V_i[a_i(t), t] - V_i(a, t) - p(t)[a_i(t) - a]\}. \quad (4)$$

We now turn to the investor's problem. Substitute (3) and (4) into (1) to obtain

$$V_i(a, t) = \mathbb{E}_i \left[\int_t^{T_\alpha} e^{-r(s-t)} u_{k(s)}(a) ds + e^{-r(T_\alpha - t)} \left\{ (1 - \eta) \max_{a' \geq 0} [V_{k(T_\alpha)}(a', T_\alpha) - p(T_\alpha)(a' - a)] + \eta V_{k(T_\alpha)}(a, T_\alpha) \right\} \right]. \quad (5)$$

It is apparent from (5) that the investor's payoff is the same he would get in an alternative environment where he meets dealers according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α , but

⁹It would be equivalent to set $\phi = (\hat{p} - p(t))(a' - a)$ in (2) and reformulate the bargaining problem as a choice of $(a' - a, \hat{p})$. If $a' > a$ the investor is a buyer and $\hat{p} > p(t)$ can be interpreted as the *ask price* he is charged by the dealer. Conversely, if $a' < a$ the investor is a seller and $\hat{p} < p(t)$ is the *bid price* he is paid by the dealer. In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix C), we formulate several strategic bargaining games, each with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that coincides with the axiomatic Nash solution we have adopted here.

instead of bargaining, he readjusts his asset position and extracts the whole surplus with probability $1 - \eta$, whereas with probability η he cannot readjust his asset position and enjoys no gain from trade. Therefore, from the standpoint of the investor, keeping the paths of the aggregate variables unchanged, the environment we are analyzing is payoff-equivalent to an alternative one in which he meets dealers according to a Poisson process with arrival rate $\kappa = \alpha(1 - \eta)$ and has all the bargaining power in bilateral negotiations. Based on this observation, the following lemma offers an equivalent formulation of the investor's choice of asset holdings that appears on the right side of (5).

Lemma 1 *An investor with preference type i and asset holdings a who readjusts his asset position at time t solves*

$$\max_{a' \geq 0} [\bar{u}_i(a') - q(t)a'] \quad (6)$$

where

$$\bar{u}_i(a) = \frac{(r + \kappa) u_i(a) + \delta \sum_j \pi_j u_j(a)}{r + \kappa + \delta} \quad (7)$$

$$q(t) = (r + \kappa) \left[p(t) - \kappa \int_0^\infty e^{-(r+\kappa)s} p(t+s) ds \right]. \quad (8)$$

In Lemma 1, $\bar{u}_i(a)/(r + \kappa)$ is the expected discounted utility and $q(t)/(r + \kappa) = p(t) - \mathbb{E}[e^{-r(T_\kappa - t)} p(T_\kappa)]$ the present value of the expected capital loss to the investor from holding a from t until the next (*effective*) time T_κ when he readjusts his holdings, where $T_\kappa - t$ is exponentially distributed with mean $1/\kappa$. A choice of asset holdings, $a_i(t)$, must satisfy

$$\bar{u}'_i[a_i(t)] \leq q(t), \quad \text{"="} \quad \text{if } a_i(t) > 0. \quad (9)$$

Given $q(t)$, the following lemma shows how to recover $p(t)$.¹⁰

Lemma 2 *If $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-rt} p(t) = 0$, the price of the asset is*

$$p(t) = \int_t^\infty e^{-r(s-t)} \left[q(s) - \frac{\dot{q}(s)}{r + \kappa} \right] ds. \quad (10)$$

At this point we can simplify the expression for the intermediation fee. From (4), $\phi_i(a, t) = \eta \{V_i[a_i(t), t] - V_i(a, t) - p(t)[a_i(t) - a]\}$, with $a_i(t)$ characterized by (9). If we substitute the value functions (e.g., (27) from the appendix) we arrive at

$$\phi_i(a, t) = \frac{\eta \{ \bar{u}_i[a_i(t)] - \bar{u}_i(a) - q(t)[a_i(t) - a] \}}{r + \kappa}. \quad (11)$$

¹⁰In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix D) we show that $p(t)$ must satisfy $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-rt} p(t) = 0$ in any equilibrium, so we can appeal to this condition without loss of generality.

Since each investor contacts a dealer with equal probability, the quantity of assets supplied in the interdealer market over a small interval of time dt is $\alpha dt A$.¹¹ Similarly, the measure of type- i investors who contact dealers is $\alpha dt n_i(t)$, where

$$n_i(t) = e^{-\delta t} n_i(0) + (1 - e^{-\delta t}) \pi_i \quad (12)$$

is the measure of investors with preference type i at time t , so the demand for assets in the interdealer market is $\alpha dt \sum_{i=1}^I n_i(t) a_i(t)$. The clearing condition for the asset market is

$$\sum_{i=1}^I n_i(t) a_i(t) = A. \quad (13)$$

At any point in time investors differ in asset holdings and preference types. Consider a set of asset holdings \mathcal{A} and a set of preference types \mathcal{I} , then for all $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) \in \Sigma$, $H_t(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I})$ gives the measure of investors whose asset holdings and preference types lie in \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{I} , respectively. We characterize this probability measure in the following lemma, where $\mathbb{I}_{\{a \in \mathcal{A}\}}$ denotes an indicator function that equals 1 if $a \in \mathcal{A}$.

Lemma 3 *The measure of investors across individual states at time t satisfies*

$$H_t(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j=1}^I \left[n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t) + \int_0^t \mathbb{I}_{\{a_j(t-\tau) \in \mathcal{A}\}} n_{ji}(\tau, t) d\tau \right] \quad (14)$$

for all $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) \in \Sigma$, where

$$n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t) = e^{-\alpha t} \left[\left(1 - e^{-\delta t}\right) \pi_i + e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{I}_{\{i=j\}} \right] H_0(\mathcal{A}, \{j\}) \quad (15)$$

and

$$n_{ji}(\tau, t) = \alpha e^{-\alpha \tau} \left[\left(1 - e^{-\delta \tau}\right) \pi_i + e^{-\delta \tau} \mathbb{I}_{\{i=j\}} \right] n_j(t - \tau). \quad (16)$$

At time 0, the market starts with investors distributed across preference types and asset holdings according to the initial probability measure H_0 . Subsequently there are two types of investors, those who have not contacted a dealer since time 0 and those who have. The time- t measure of those who started at time 0 with preference type j and assets in \mathcal{A} , whose preference type is i at the current time t , and who have never traded (so their asset holdings are still in \mathcal{A}) is $n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t)$ as given in (15). Analogously, $n_{ji}(\tau, t)$ in (16) gives the time- t density of investors

¹¹See Duffie and Sun (2007) for a derivation of the Law of Large Numbers in random-matching environments.

whose last trade was at time $t - \tau$ when their preference type was j and who have preference type i at time t .

We are now ready to define equilibrium.

Definition 1 *An equilibrium is a time-path $\langle \{a_i(t)\}, q(t), p(t), \{\phi_i(a, t)\}, H_t \rangle$ that satisfies (9), (10), (11), (13) and (14), given an initial condition H_0 .*

Proposition 1 *There exists a unique equilibrium.*

To illustrate how a reduction in trading delays affects the equilibrium, consider the limiting case $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$. From (7), $\bar{u}_i(a) \rightarrow u_i(a)$ and from (8) and (9), $u'_i[a_i(t)] \leq q(t) = rp(t) - \dot{p}(t)$ for all i . From (13), $q(t) \rightarrow q^*(t)$, which solves $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_t^+} n_i(t) u'_i[q^*(t)] = A$, where $\mathcal{I}_t^+ = \{i \in \mathbb{X} : a_i(t) > 0\}$. From (11), $\phi_i(a, t) \rightarrow 0$ for all a, i and t . With regards to the distribution of investors, $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$ implies that every investor holds his desired asset position at all times.¹² Thus, as frictions vanish, investors choose $a_i(t)$ continuously by equating their current marginal utility from holding the asset to its effective cost $q^*(t)$, and the equilibrium fees, asset price and distribution of asset holdings are the ones that would prevail in a Walrasian economy.

3.1 Efficiency

Consider a social planner who wishes to maximize the sum of all agents' expected discounted utilities, subject to the same meeting frictions that they face in the decentralized formulation. Specifically, over a small time interval of length dt the planner can only reallocate assets among a measure αdt of investors chosen at random from the population.

Since the utility of consumption and the disutility of production of the numéraire good net out to zero across agents, the planner solves

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{a_i(t)\}_{i=1}^I} & \left\{ K_0 + \int_0^\infty \sum_{i=1}^I e^{-rt} \alpha n_i(t) \hat{U}_i[a_i(t)] dt \right\} \\ \text{s.t.} & \sum_{i=1}^I \alpha n_i(t) a_i(t) \leq \alpha A, \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

¹²To see this, first note that (15) implies the measure of agents who have not contacted a dealer since time 0 vanishes; i.e., $n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t) \rightarrow 0$ for all i and j , all t and all $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$ as $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$. The time- t density of agents who have not contacted a dealer since time $t - \tau > 0$ is $n(\tau, t) = \sum_{i,j=1}^I n_{ji}(\tau, t)$. From (16), $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$ implies $n(\tau, t) \rightarrow 0$ for all $\tau > 0$, i.e., investors can find a dealer instantly when α is arbitrarily large, so the measure of investors who have not met a dealer between $t - \tau$ and t is zero for all $\tau > 0$. As for those investors who have met a dealer this "instant," from (16), $n_{ji}(0, t) = 0$ for $i \neq j$ and $n_{ii}(0, t) = n_i(t)$. Therefore, $H_t(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) \rightarrow \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \mathbb{I}_{\{a_i(t) \in \mathcal{A}\}} n_i(t)$ as $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$, i.e., every investor of type i holds $a_i(t)$ at every t .

(12), and $a_i(t) \geq 0$ for $i \in \mathbb{X}$, where

$$\hat{U}_i[a_i(t)] = \mathbb{E}_i \left[\int_t^{T_\alpha} e^{-r(s-t)} u_k(s) [a_i(t)] ds \right],$$

$K_0 \equiv \int_{\mathbb{S}} \hat{U}_i(a) dH_0$, and H_0 is given. The constant K_0 captures the utility of all investors before they trade for the first time. The second term in the objective states that over a time interval of length dt there is a measure $\alpha n_i(t) dt$ of investors of type i whose asset holdings can be rebalanced.

Proposition 2 *The equilibrium is efficient if and only if $\eta = 0$.*

When an investor conducts a trade, he anticipates that the fee he will be charged to rebalance his asset holdings in his next encounter with a dealer will be increasing in the gains from that future trade. Hence, $\eta > 0$ inefficiently discourages investors from taking positions that tend to lead to large asset reallocations in the future.

3.2 Steady state

Next, we characterize the limit of the equilibrium allocations and prices as $t \rightarrow \infty$.¹³

Proposition 3 *For any H_0 , the equilibrium allocations and prices described in Definition 1, $\langle \{a_i(t)\}, q(t), p(t), \{\phi_i(a, t)\}, H_t \rangle$, converge to the unique steady-state allocations and prices $\langle \{a_i\}, q, p, \{\phi_i(a)\}, H \rangle$, that satisfy $p = q/r$,*

$$\bar{u}'_i(a_i) \leq q \quad \text{"="} \quad \text{if } a_i > 0, \quad (18)$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i a_i = A, \quad (19)$$

$$\phi_i(a) = \frac{\eta [\bar{u}_i(a_i) - \bar{u}_i(a) - q(a_i - a)]}{r + \kappa} \quad (20)$$

$$H(\{a_i\}, \{j\}) = \frac{\delta \pi_i \pi_j + \alpha \pi_i \mathbb{I}_{\{i=j\}}}{\alpha + \delta} \quad (21)$$

and $H(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) = 0$ for all $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) \in \Sigma$ such that $\bigcup_{j=1}^I \{a_j\} \cap \mathcal{A} = \emptyset$.

In what follows, when we analyze the steady state we will denote an individual investor's state $(a_i, j) \in \{a_i\}_{i=1}^I \times \mathbb{X}$ by $(i, j) \in \mathbb{X}^2$ and $H(\{a_i\}, \{j\})$ by n_{ij} . Also, at times we use ϕ_{ji} to denote $\phi_i(a_j)$ for $(i, j) \in \mathbb{X}^2$.

¹³We omit the "t" argument in an endogenous variable when we refer to its steady-state value.

4 Asset holdings, prices and trade volume

In this section we focus on the steady state to study the effects of trading frictions on individual asset holdings, asset prices and trade volume. Hereafter we assume $u'_i(\infty) = 0$ and $u'_i(0) = \infty$ for each i .¹⁴ Condition (18) becomes

$$\bar{u}'_i(a_i) = rp. \quad (22)$$

Let $a_i = g_i(\kappa; p)$ denote the choice of asset holdings characterized by (22). Then

$$\frac{\partial g_i(\kappa; p)}{\partial \kappa} = \frac{\delta \left[u'_i(a_i) - \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i) \right]}{-\bar{u}''_i(a_i) (r + \kappa + \delta)^2} \quad (23)$$

has the sign of $u'_i(a_i) - \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i)$, i.e., an investor whose current marginal valuation exceeds his expected marginal valuation over the expected holding period increases his demand when κ increases. If $u'_i(a_i) > \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i)$, the investor anticipates that his valuation is likely to revert toward $\sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i)$ in the future, and that when this happens, he may be unable to rebalance his asset position for some time. Consequently, from (22), his choice of a_i is lower than $u'^{-1}_i(rp)$, what he would choose in a world with no trading delays. If α increases, the investor is more likely to find a dealer faster; if η decreases, it will be cheaper for the investor to readjust his asset holdings once he finds a dealer. In both cases the investor assigns more weight to current marginal utility from holding the asset relative to the expected value, so his demand increases. Conversely, an investor with a current marginal valuation which is below his expected marginal valuation over the holding period reduces his demand when κ increases.¹⁵ Next, we show how these reallocation effects shape the implications of trading frictions for asset prices and trade volume.

Standard frictionless models emphasize two sets of factors that affect the determination of equilibrium asset prices, i.e., intrinsic properties of the asset and the characteristics of investors

¹⁴These conditions imply that the investor's problem has a solution for all $q > 0$, and that the nonnegativity constraints in (6) are slack at every date for every investor in the unique equilibrium. This will simplify the notation but is otherwise inessential for our results. See Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) for utility specifications that do not satisfy the Inada conditions.

¹⁵In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix B) we show that this insight does not rely on preference shocks being i.i.d. We derive an expression analogous to (23) when preference shocks follow a general Markov process and provide several sufficient conditions that allow us to sign $\partial g_i(\kappa, p)/\partial \kappa$. We show, for instance, that for κ sufficiently large, $\partial g_i(\kappa, p)/\partial \kappa > 0$ if and only if $u'_i(a_i) < \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_{ij} u'_j(a_i)$, where π_{ij} is the probability that an investor with preference type i draws type j conditional on his receiving a preference shock. This condition is equivalent to the condition in part (i) of Proposition 2 in Gârleanu (2006). See Proposition 10 in Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) for details.

who buy it. Search theory identifies a third element: the manner in which the asset is traded, i.e., the details of the micro structure of the asset market, such as the rate at which investors contact dealers and the market power of dealers. The following proposition characterizes the effects of these trading frictions on asset prices.

Proposition 4 *Let $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i u(a)$. If $[u'(a)]^2 / u''(a)$ is strictly decreasing in a , then $dp/d\kappa > 0$. If $[u'(a)]^2 / u''(a)$ is increasing in a , then $dp/d\kappa \leq 0$ (with “=” if $[u'(a)]^2 / u''(a)$ is constant).*

For the class of preferences in Proposition 4, $\bar{u}_i(a) = \bar{\varepsilon}_i u(a)$, where $\bar{\varepsilon}_i = \frac{(r+\kappa)\varepsilon_i + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}}{r+\kappa+\delta}$ and $\bar{\varepsilon} = \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j \varepsilon_j$, and (22) becomes $\bar{\varepsilon}_i u'(a_i) = rp$. For a given p , the demands of investors with relatively low valuations ($\varepsilon_i < \bar{\varepsilon}$) fall, while those of investors with high valuations ($\varepsilon_i > \bar{\varepsilon}$) rise as κ increases. Whether an increase in κ causes the asset price to rise depends on the curvature of the individual demand for the asset as a function of $\bar{\varepsilon}_i$, i.e., on the slope of $\partial a_i / \partial \bar{\varepsilon}_i = -[u'(a_i)]^2 / [u''(a_i)rp]$. If u is not too concave, a_i is a convex function of $\bar{\varepsilon}_i$. For this case, Jensen’s inequality implies that the increases in a_i for relatively large values of ε_i outweigh the decreases in a_i for relatively low values of ε_i and the aggregate demand for the asset increases in response to an increase in κ . In turn, this implies that the equilibrium price of the asset increases with κ . Conversely, the asset price is decreasing in κ if u is sufficiently concave. For example, if $u(a) = a^{1-\sigma} / (1-\sigma)$ with $\sigma > 0$, then $dp/d\kappa < 0$ (> 0) if $\sigma > 1$ (< 1).¹⁶

It is clear from (23) that regardless of the ultimate effect of trading frictions on the asset price, an increase in κ induces high-valuation investors to take larger positions and low-valuation investors to take smaller positions. This seems to suggest that the distribution of asset holdings will spread out if frictions are reduced. However, this intuition is only partial because (23) keeps the equilibrium asset price constant. In the following proposition we characterize the general equilibrium effect of trading frictions on the dispersion of the distribution of asset holdings.

Proposition 5 *(i) Let $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i a^{1-\sigma} / (1-\sigma)$ with $\sigma > 0$. An increase in κ causes the equilibrium distribution of asset holdings to become riskier, in the second-order stochastic sense.*

(ii) For all $i \in \{1, \dots, I\}$, $a_i \rightarrow A$ as $r + \kappa \rightarrow 0$.

¹⁶If $u(a) = \log a$, then a_i is linear in $\bar{\varepsilon}_i$ and $dp/d\kappa = 0$. This particular result is reminiscent of the findings in Constantinides (1986), Gârleanu (2006) and Heaton and Lucas (1996) that the equilibrium asset price is not (much) affected by transaction costs. In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (Appendix B) we show that this finding generalizes to the more general case of Markovian preference shocks.

Part (i) of Proposition 5 confirms that for a particular class of preferences, the distribution of asset holdings spreads out if frictions are reduced. According to part (ii), the dispersion of the distribution of asset holdings approaches zero as trading frictions become very severe, provided that investors are sufficiently patient. This result holds for general preferences and will be useful in our analysis of transaction costs and trade volume.¹⁷

Let \mathcal{V} denote trade volume, defined as

$$\mathcal{V} = \frac{\alpha}{2} \sum_{i,j=1}^I n_{ij} |a_j - a_i|. \quad (24)$$

An increase in κ has three distinct effects on \mathcal{V} . First, the measure of investors in any individual state $(i, j) \in \mathbb{X}^2$ who gain access to the market and are *able to trade* increases, which tends to increase \mathcal{V} . Second, the proportion $1 - \sum_{i=1}^I n_{ii}$ of agents who are mismatched to their asset position—the fraction of agents who *wish to trade*—decreases, which tends to decrease \mathcal{V} . Finally, the distribution of asset holdings spreads out, which tends to increase the quantity of assets traded in many individual trades. With (21) and (24), it is possible to show that the first two effects combined lead to an increase in \mathcal{V} . While it is difficult to sign the third effect in general due to the general equilibrium effects of the price on the distribution of asset holdings, we provide analytical results for three special cases. First, with $I = 2$ it is possible to show that an increase in κ unambiguously leads to an increase in \mathcal{V} . The second special case allows for richer heterogeneity in types, but adopts a specification of preferences for which the equilibrium asset price is independent of trading frictions. The third case considers the limiting economy where trading frictions become very severe and investors are patient.

Proposition 6 (i) *Let $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i a^{1-\sigma}/(1-\sigma)$ with $\sigma > 0$, and assume that $I = 2$. Trade volume increases with κ .*

(ii) *Let $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i \ln a$. Trade volume increases with κ . Moreover, for any pair (κ, κ') such that $\kappa' > \kappa$, the distribution of trade sizes associated with κ' first-order stochastically dominates the one associated with κ .*

¹⁷In Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) (part (iii) of Proposition ??) we show that part (ii) of Proposition 5 also holds for more general preference shock processes. The proof of part (i) of Proposition 5 relies on the assumption of i.i.d. preference shocks and its immediate mean-reverting property. The i.i.d. specification, however, is without loss of generality for the case $I = 2$. (This is the case analyzed by DGP and much of the subsequent literature.) For $I > 2$, an increase in trading frictions need not compress the cross-sectional distribution of asset holdings. As pointed out by Gârleanu (2006), it is possible that for certain ranges of κ , an investor with a high current valuation (relative to the cross-section of current valuations) may increase his asset holdings in response to an increase in trading frictions. The general insight, however, is that investors always react to more severe trading frictions by choosing asset positions that reduce the expected sizes of their future asset reallocations.

(iii) Trade volume approaches zero as $r + \kappa \rightarrow 0$.

5 Transaction costs

Intermediation fees and the implied bid-ask spreads constitute the out-of-pocket transaction costs borne by investors and are commonly used measures of market liquidity.¹⁸ At the same time, these spreads determine the revenue of dealers, and hence are a key determinant of their incentives to make markets and provide liquidity, a theme we explore in Section 6.

Intermediation fees depend on the rate at which investors can contact alternative dealers, on their bargaining power in bilateral negotiations and on the size of the trade. The following result shows that, keeping the characteristics of an investor and a dealer constant, transaction costs—both total and per unit of asset traded—increase with the size of the trade.¹⁹

Lemma 4 *Consider an investor who holds asset position $a \geq 0$ and wishes to trade $|a_i - a| > 0$. Both $\frac{\partial \phi_i(a)}{\partial a}$ and $\frac{\partial}{\partial a} \left[\frac{\phi_i(a)}{|a_i - a|} \right]$ have the same sign as $a - a_i$.*

In the general equilibrium, trading frequencies and bargaining power affect transaction costs through three channels. Consider for example $\phi_i(a_j)$, the fee paid by an investor who currently has preference type i , and whose preference type was j at the time of his last trade. A larger α tends to reduce the fees that dealers can extract for any given trade size (e.g., it increases the denominator of (20)). Intuitively, a larger α implies better search options for the investor—the *competition effect* of reduced trading frictions emphasized in the previous literature. But here an increase in α also changes the investor’s expected utility from holding his current asset position, a_j , relative to the expected utility from holding his desired asset position, a_i (i.e., it changes \bar{u}_i in (20)). This effect may decrease or increase the intermediation fee depending on the specific values of a_j and a_i . Finally, α affects the actual and desired asset positions, a_j and a_i , themselves. A larger α can induce investors to conduct larger asset reallocations (Proposition

¹⁸See footnote 9 for the theoretical link between intermediation fees and bid-ask spreads.

¹⁹The theory generates a distribution of transaction costs, not only across trade-size categories, but also among trades of equal size, which is in accordance with the evidence from the OTC market for municipal bonds (Green, Hollifield and Schurhoff, 2007). The increasing relationship between trade size and transaction cost for given α is consistent with the empirical evidence on foreign exchange markets (Burnside Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski and Rebelo, 2006, Table 12). In contrast, empirical studies on municipal and corporate bond markets document that larger trades tend to be executed at a discount (Harris and Piwowar, 2006). Our model can rationalize this observation if we allow for heterogenous investors, some of which can contact dealers faster than others. See Lagos and Rocheteau (2006).

6) and by Lemma 4 this translates into larger fees for dealers, on average—the *reallocation effect* of reduced trading frictions. These three effects can give rise to nonmonotonicities in the dealers’ incentives to make markets in response to changes in the degree of trading frictions. We prove this result for the case of patient traders, both for intermediation fees for individual trades (Proposition 7) and for market-wide measures of transaction costs (Corollary 1).

Proposition 7 *For each $(i, j) \in \mathbb{X}^2$, there exists $\bar{r} > 0$, such that for all $r < \bar{r}$ and $\eta \in (0, 1)$, ϕ_{ji} is non-monotonic in κ and it is largest for some $\kappa \in (0, \infty)$.*

In very illiquid markets (as $r + \kappa \rightarrow 0$) investors hedge against future preference shocks by choosing asset holdings that reflect their average utility from holding the asset rather than their current utility at the time they trade. Thus, trade sizes and fees are small. In very liquid markets (as $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$) investors trade large quantities but the fees they pay are also small because of favorable search options. For intermediate values of κ , trade sizes are considerable and dealers have a degree of market power that results in larger intermediation fees.

The average fee charged by dealers across the various types of trades is $\Phi = \sum_{i,j=1}^I n_{ji} \phi_{ji}$, or using (20),

$$\Phi = \eta \sum_{i,j=1}^I n_{ji} \frac{\bar{u}_i(a_i) - \bar{u}_i(a_j)}{r + \kappa}. \quad (25)$$

This average fee is the expected revenue of an individual dealer conditional on meeting an investor, and is therefore a key determinant of the dealers’ incentives to make markets. The following corollary of Proposition 7 characterizes how trading frictions affect these incentives, which will play a key role in the following section.

Corollary 1 *There exists $\hat{r} > 0$, such that for all $r < \hat{r}$ and $\eta \in (0, 1)$, Φ is non-monotonic in κ and it is largest for some $\kappa \in (0, \infty)$.*

Corollary 1 says that dealers are better off when they trade in markets which are neither too liquid nor too illiquid. If κ is very large, dealers would find it profitable to shift the trading activity to markets with larger η or smaller α . Conversely if κ is very small, perhaps surprisingly, dealers would benefit from reductions in η or increases in α .

6 Endogenous execution delays

In this section we allow for free entry of dealers in order to endogenize the supply of liquidity services and the length of the trading delays. We formalize the notion that a dealer's profit depends on the competition for order flow that he faces from other dealers.

Suppose that α is a continuously differentiable function of the measure of dealers in the market, v , with $\partial\alpha(v)/\partial v > 0$ and $\partial[\alpha(v)/v]/\partial v < 0$. We also specify $\alpha(0) = 0$, $\lim_{v \rightarrow \infty} \alpha(v) = \infty$ and $\lim_{v \rightarrow \infty} \alpha(v)/v = 0$. Since all matches are bilateral and random, the Poisson rate at which a dealer contacts an investor is $\alpha(v)/v$. For larger v , each investor contacts dealers faster, but the order flow decreases for each individual dealer.

There is a large measure of dealers who can choose to participate in the market. Dealers who choose to operate incur a flow cost $\gamma > 0$ that represents the ongoing costs of running the dealership.²⁰ With (25), the free-entry condition, $\frac{\alpha(v)}{v}\Phi = \gamma$, can be written as

$$\frac{\alpha(v)}{v}\eta \sum_{i,j=1}^I n_{ji} \frac{\bar{u}_i(a_i) - \bar{u}_i(a_j)}{r + \alpha(v)(1 - \eta)} = \gamma. \quad (26)$$

A steady-state equilibrium with free entry is a list $\langle \{a_i\}, q, p, \{\phi_i(a)\}, \{n_{ji}\}, v \rangle$ that satisfies (18)–(21) and (26), with $\alpha = \alpha(v)$. It can be shown (see Lagos and Rocheteau, 2006) that for any $\eta > 0$ there exists a steady-state equilibrium with free entry of dealers, and it has $v > 0$.

The steady-state equilibrium with free entry need not be unique. While the measure of dealers, v , is strictly increasing in Φ , according to Corollary 1 the dealers' expected revenue, Φ , can itself be a non-monotonic function of $\alpha(v)$. On the one hand faster trade means more competition among dealers, which tends to reduce intermediation fees. But an increase in $\alpha(v)$ also induces investors to take on more extreme asset positions which means that on average, dealers will intermediate larger trades and earn higher fees. For the case of patient traders, the following result shows that the model necessarily exhibits multiple steady-state equilibria if $\alpha(v)/v$ is not too elastic (the effect of an additional dealer on existing dealers' order flow is not too large) and γ is in an intermediate range.

Proposition 8 *Assume $\eta \in (0, 1)$ and $\alpha(v) = v^\theta$, with $\theta \in (0, 1)$. There exist $\tilde{r} > 0$, $\tilde{\theta} \in (0, 1)$, $\bar{\gamma} > 0$ and $\underline{\gamma} \in (0, \bar{\gamma})$ such that for all $(r, \theta) \in (0, \tilde{r}) \times (\tilde{\theta}, 1)$, there are multiple steady-state equilibria if $\gamma \in (\underline{\gamma}, \bar{\gamma})$.*

²⁰Our formulation of the free entry of dealers is analogous to the free entry of firms in Pissarides (2000).

In the case of multiple equilibria, the market could be trapped in a low-liquidity equilibrium where few dealers enter and investors engage in relatively small transactions.²¹ Regarding the efficiency properties of equilibrium with entry, investors' asset holdings are efficient only if dealers have no bargaining power, just as in the formulation with a fixed population of dealers. Therefore, since there is no equilibrium with $v > 0$ when $\eta = 0$, an equilibrium with entry is always inefficient.²²

7 Conclusion

We have developed a model of trade in asset markets that contributes to a growing literature that uses search theory to model the trading frictions characteristic of OTC markets. A novel aspect of our theory is that it does not assume restrictions on asset holdings and therefore allows market participants to accommodate trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions so as to reduce their trading needs. We have found that this mechanism has important implications for market efficiency and the way in which trading frictions shape asset prices as well as standard measures of financial liquidity. Although we have emphasized the application to OTC markets for financial securities, the structure and solution techniques we have developed should prove useful for applications of search theory to other contexts where idiosyncratic uncertainty and random matching give rise to nontrivial distributions of asset holdings.

²¹The strategic complementarity that leads to multiple equilibria in this model depends crucially on the endogenous distribution of asset holdings. The multiplicity is not due to increasing returns in the meeting technology, as in Diamond (1982) or Vayanos and Weill (2008), or to the cost of holding the liquid asset, as in Rocheteau and Wright (2005).

²²As $r \rightarrow 0$, it can be shown that an equilibrium with free-entry is efficient if and only if $\eta = 0$ and $v\alpha'(v)/\alpha(v) = \eta$. Entry introduces a negative externality on other dealers' order flow, and this externality is internalized if and only if the elasticity of the contact technology $\alpha(v)$ coincides with dealers' bargaining power—the so-called Hosios (1990) condition.

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A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. We can rewrite (5) as

$$V_i(a, t) = \bar{U}_i(a) + \mathbb{E}_i[e^{-r(T_\kappa-t)}\{p(T_\kappa)a + \max_{a' \geq 0}[V_k(T_\kappa)(a', T_\kappa) - p(T_\kappa)a']\}], \quad (27)$$

where

$$\bar{U}_i(a) = \mathbb{E}_i \left[\int_t^{T_\kappa} e^{-r(s-t)} u_{\kappa(s)}(a) ds \right] = \mathbb{E}_i \left[\int_0^{T_\kappa-t} e^{-rs} u_{\kappa(t+s)}(a) ds \right]. \quad (28)$$

From (27), the problem of an investor with preference shock i who gains access to the market at time t is given by

$$\max_{a' \geq 0} \left[\bar{U}_i(a') - \{p(t) - \mathbb{E}[e^{-r(T_\kappa-t)}p(T_\kappa)]\}a' \right]. \quad (29)$$

We proceed in two steps: (i) calculate $\bar{U}_i(a)$, and (ii) calculate $\mathbb{E}[e^{-rT_\kappa}p(t + T_\kappa)]$.

Step (i). Equation (28) can be written recursively as

$$(r + \kappa) \bar{U}_i(a) = u_i(a) + \delta \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j [\bar{U}_j(a) - \bar{U}_i(a)]. \quad (30)$$

(We provide an alternative, more detailed, derivation in Lagos and Rocheteau (2007).) Multiply (30) through by π_i , sum over i , solve for $\sum_j \pi_j \bar{U}_j(a)$ and substitute this expression back into (30) to obtain $\bar{U}_i(a) = \frac{\bar{u}_i(a)}{r+\kappa}$, where $\bar{u}_i(a)$ is as in (7).

Step (ii). The expected discounted price of the asset at the next time when the investor gets an opportunity to trade is

$$\mathbb{E}[e^{-r(T_\kappa-t)}p(T_\kappa)] = \kappa \int_0^\infty e^{-(r+\kappa)s} p(t+s) ds. \quad (31)$$

Finally, substitute $\bar{U}_i(a) = \frac{\bar{u}_i(a)}{r+\kappa}$ and (31) into (29) and multiply through by $(r + \kappa)$ to obtain the formulation of the investor's problem in the statement of the lemma. ■

Proof of Lemma 2. Rewrite (8) as

$$q(t) = (r + \kappa) \left[p(t) - \kappa \int_t^\infty e^{-(r+\kappa)(s-t)} p(s) ds \right]$$

and differentiate with respect to t to obtain

$$rp(t) - \dot{p}(t) = q(t) - \frac{\dot{q}(t)}{r + \kappa}.$$

Integrate this expression forward and use $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-rt}p(t) = 0$ to arrive at (10). ■

Proof of Lemma 3. We proceed in three steps: (i) derive $n_{ji}(\tau, t)$, (ii) derive $n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t)$ and (iii) obtain $H_t(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I})$ for an arbitrary $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) \in \Sigma$.

Step (i). The density measure of investors who last readjusted their asset holdings at time $t - \tau > 0$ is $\alpha e^{-\alpha\tau}$. The probability that an investor who last contacted a dealer at time $t - \tau$ has a history of preference types involving $k(t - \tau) = j$ and $k(t) = i$ is $(1 - e^{-\delta\tau}) \pi_i + \mathbb{I}_{\{i=j\}} e^{-\delta\tau}$. Since the measure of investors with preference type j at time $t - \tau$ is $n_j(t - \tau)$, and the Poisson process for meeting dealers and the compound Poisson process for preference shocks are independent, the density measure of investors who last traded at time $t - \tau$ and who have a history of preferences involving $k(t - \tau) = j$ and $k(t) = i$, is $n_{ji}(\tau, t) = \alpha e^{-\alpha\tau} [(1 - e^{-\delta\tau}) \pi_i + \mathbb{I}_{\{i=j\}} e^{-\delta\tau}] n_j(t - \tau)$, as given by (16).

Step (ii). The measure of investors who have not contacted a dealer up to time t is $e^{-\alpha t}$. Since the Poisson meeting process is independent of investors' individual states, the time- t measure of investors whose asset holdings and preference types lied in the set $(\mathcal{A}, \{j\})$ at time 0 and who have not yet met a dealer at time t is $e^{-\alpha t} H_0(\mathcal{A}, \{j\})$. The measure of investors who were of preference type j at time 0 and are of type i at time t is $(1 - e^{-\delta t}) \pi_i + e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{I}_{\{j=i\}}$. Thus, the time- t measure of investors who at time 0 had preference type j and assets in \mathcal{A} , whose preference type is i at the current time t , and who have never traded (so their asset holdings are still in \mathcal{A}) is $n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t) = e^{-\alpha t} [(1 - e^{-\delta t}) \pi_i + e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{I}_{\{j=i\}}] H_0(\mathcal{A}, \{j\})$, as given in (15).

Step (iii). $H_t(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I})$ is the measure of investors who have an individual state $(a, i) \in (\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I})$ at time t . The first term in $H_t(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I})$ is $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j=1}^I n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t)$, namely those investors who never contacted dealers but who were holding asset positions in the set \mathcal{A} at time 0 and whose preference types at t lie in \mathcal{I} . The time- t measure of investors of type i who chose an asset position in the set \mathcal{A} the last time they traded, given that their preference type at that time was j , is $\int_0^t \mathbb{I}_{\{a_j(t-\tau) \in \mathcal{A}\}} n_{ji}(\tau, t) d\tau$. Thus, the second term in $H_t(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I})$, namely the measure of investors who the last time they traded chose asset positions that belong to the set \mathcal{A} and whose preference types at time t lie in \mathcal{I} , is $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j=1}^I \int_0^t \mathbb{I}_{\{a_j(t-\tau) \in \mathcal{A}\}} n_{ji}(\tau, t) d\tau$. ■

Proof of Proposition 1. For all $t \geq 0$, the distribution $\{n_i(t)\}_{i=1}^I$ is unique and given by (12). Define $A_t^d(q) \equiv \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^I n_i(t) a_i(q) : a_i(q) \in \arg \max_{a' \geq 0} [\bar{u}_i(a') - qa'] \right\}$ for $q \in (\underline{q}(t), +\infty)$, where $\underline{q}(t) = \max_{i \in \mathbb{X}} \bar{u}_i'(\infty) \mathbb{I}_{\{n_i(t) > 0\}}$. (If $q \leq \underline{q}(t)$ then (9) has no solution for some i such that $n_i(t) > 0$.) Given that u_i (and hence \bar{u}_i) is strictly concave and continuously differentiable, $a_i(q)$ is uniquely determined for all $q \in (\underline{q}(t), +\infty)$ and all i such that $n_i(t) > 0$, and it is continuous. Consequently, $A_t^d(q)$ is singled-valued and continuous for $q \in (\underline{q}(t), +\infty)$. Moreover, (9) implies

that any interior choice $a_i(t)$ is a strictly decreasing function of $q(t)$ for every i . Thus, $A_t^d(q)$ is strictly decreasing for all $q \in (\underline{q}(t), \bar{q}(t))$, where $\bar{q}(t) = \max_{i \in \mathbb{X}} \bar{u}'_i(0) \mathbb{I}_{\{n_i(t) > 0\}}$, and $A_t^d(q) = \{0\}$ for all $q \geq \bar{q}(t)$. As $q \downarrow \underline{q}(t)$, $A_t^d(q) \rightarrow +\infty$, and as $q \uparrow \bar{q}(t)$, $A_t^d(q) \rightarrow 0$. So for each t there is a unique $q(t) \in (\underline{q}(t), \bar{q}(t))$ such that $A_t^d[q(t)] = \{A\}$ or equivalently, such that $\sum_{i=1}^I n_i(t) a_i[q(t)] = A$. Given this $q(t)$, there is a unique $\{a_i(t)\}_{i=1}^I$ that solves (9). Given $q(t)$, (11) gives the fee $\phi_i(a, t)$ for every i and a . Finally, given $\{a_i(t)\}_{i=1}^I$ the distribution H_t is given by (14). ■

Proof of Proposition 2. Calculations similar to those contained in part (i) of the proof of Lemma 1 imply $(r + \alpha)\hat{U}_i(a) = \frac{r + \alpha}{r + \alpha + \delta} u_i(a) + \frac{\delta}{r + \alpha + \delta} \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u_j(a)$. Substitute this expression into the planner's objective functional to get

$$\max_{\{a_i(t)\}} \int_0^\infty \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^I \left[\frac{r + \alpha}{r + \alpha + \delta} u_i[a_i(t)] + \frac{\delta}{r + \alpha + \delta} \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u_j[a_i(t)] \right] n_i(t) \right\} e^{-rt} dt$$

subject to $\sum_{j=1}^I n_j(t) a_j(t) \leq A$ and $a_i(t) \geq 0$ for all i . Let

$$\mathcal{L}(t) = \sum_{i=1}^I \left[\frac{r + \alpha}{r + \alpha + \delta} u_i[a_i(t)] + \frac{\delta}{r + \alpha + \delta} \sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k u_k[a_i(t)] \right] n_i(t) + \lambda(t) \left[A - \sum_{i=1}^I n_i(t) a_i(t) \right],$$

where $\lambda(t)$ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. Since $\mathcal{L}(t)$ is strictly jointly concave in $\{a_i(t)\}_{i=1}^I$, the first-order necessary and sufficient conditions for the problem $\max_{\{a_i(t)\}} \mathcal{L}(t)$ are

$$\frac{(r + \alpha) u'_i[a_i(t)] + \delta \sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k u'_k[a_i(t)]}{r + \alpha + \delta} \leq \lambda(t), \quad \text{"=" if } a_i(t) > 0, \quad (32)$$

for $i = 1, \dots, I$. The resource constraint (17) at equality is

$$\sum_{i=1}^I n_i(t) a_i^*[\lambda(t)] = A \quad (33)$$

where $a_i^*[\lambda(t)]$ is the a_i that satisfies (32). Comparing (33) with (13), (32) with (9), and setting $q(t) = \lambda(t)$, it becomes clear that (9) coincides with (32) if and only if $\eta = 0$. ■

Proof of Proposition 3. From (12), $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} n_i(t) = \pi_i$ for each i . By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Proposition 1, one can establish that there is a unique, time-invariant, q that clears the asset market. Given this q , (9) implies a unique set of time-invariant optimal asset

holdings $\{a_i\}_{i=1}^I$. Thus, $\{a_i\}_{i=1}^I$ and q satisfy (18) and (19). Given the fact that $q(t) = q$ for all t , (10) implies $p = q/r$. Given q and $\{a_i\}_{i=1}^I$, (11) implies (20), which determines the time invariant fees $\{\phi_i(a)\}_{i=1}^I$. To derive (21), start from Lemma 3 and note that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t) = 0$ for all $i, j \in \mathbb{X}$ and all $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$. Also, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} n_{ji}(\tau, t) = \alpha e^{-\alpha\tau} [(1 - e^{-\delta\tau}) \pi_i + e^{-\delta\tau} \mathbb{I}_{\{i=j\}}] \pi_j \equiv n_{ji}(\tau, \infty)$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} a_j(t - \tau) = a_j$, so

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} H_t(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j=1}^I \left[\int_0^\infty \mathbb{I}_{\{a_j \in \mathcal{A}\}} n_{ji}(\tau, \infty) d\tau \right] \equiv H(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I})$$

for all $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) \in \Sigma$. To conclude, observe that $H(\{a_i\}, \{j\}) = \int_0^\infty n_{ij}(\tau, \infty) d\tau$ and carry out the integration to obtain (21). ■

Proof of Proposition 4. Differentiate (19) to obtain

$$\frac{dp}{d\kappa} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i \partial a_i / \partial \kappa}{-\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i \partial a_i / \partial p}.$$

The denominator of this expression is strictly positive (from (22)), so focus on the sign of the numerator. Differentiate (22) to obtain $\partial a_i / \partial \kappa$, multiply by π_i , and add over all i to arrive at

$$\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i \frac{\partial a_i}{\partial \kappa} = \frac{\delta}{(r + \kappa + \delta)^2 r p} \sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i \frac{[u'(a_i)]^2}{-u''(a_i)} (\varepsilon_i - \bar{\varepsilon}).$$

Suppose $-[u'(a)]^2 / u''(a)$ is strictly increasing in a . Let \bar{a} denote the a that solves (22) for $\bar{\varepsilon}_i = \bar{\varepsilon}$. Then, note that $-[u'(a_i)]^2 (\varepsilon_i - \bar{\varepsilon}) / u''(a_i) \geq -[u'(\bar{a})]^2 (\varepsilon_i - \bar{\varepsilon}) / u''(\bar{a})$ for each i , with strict inequality for all i such that $\varepsilon_i \neq \bar{\varepsilon}$. Thus, $\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i \frac{\partial a_i}{\partial \kappa} > 0$ and consequently, $\frac{dp}{d\kappa} > 0$. Similar reasoning implies $\frac{dp}{d\kappa} < 0$ if $-[u'(a)]^2 / u''(a)$ is strictly decreasing and $\frac{dp}{d\kappa} = 0$ if $-[u'(a)]^2 / u''(a)$ is constant in a . ■

Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Let $a_i(\kappa)$ denote the individual demand of an investor with preference type i in a market with effective contact rate κ . With $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i a^{1-\sigma} / (1 - \sigma)$,

$$a_i(\kappa) = \frac{A}{\sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j \left[\frac{(r+\kappa)\varepsilon_j + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}}{(r+\kappa)\varepsilon_i + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}} \right]^{1/\sigma}}. \quad (34)$$

Consider $\kappa' > \kappa$. We have $a_1(\kappa') < a_1(\kappa)$, since $\frac{(r+\kappa')\varepsilon_j + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}}{(r+\kappa')\varepsilon_1 + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}} > \frac{(r+\kappa)\varepsilon_j + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}}{(r+\kappa)\varepsilon_1 + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}}$ for all $j > 1$, and $a_I(\kappa') > a_I(\kappa)$, since $\frac{(r+\kappa')\varepsilon_j + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}}{(r+\kappa')\varepsilon_I + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}} < \frac{(r+\kappa)\varepsilon_j + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}}{(r+\kappa)\varepsilon_I + \delta\bar{\varepsilon}}$ for all $j < I$. The difference $a_i(\kappa') - a_i(\kappa)$ is continuous in ε_i , so there exists $\tilde{\varepsilon} \in (\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_I)$ such that $a_i(\kappa') = a_i(\kappa) \equiv \tilde{a}$. Moreover, from (34),

$$\left. \frac{\partial a_i(\kappa')}{\partial \varepsilon_i} \right|_{\varepsilon_i = \tilde{\varepsilon}} = \frac{(r + \kappa') \tilde{a}}{\sigma [(r + \kappa') \tilde{\varepsilon} + \delta \bar{\varepsilon}]} > \frac{(r + \kappa) \tilde{a}}{\sigma [(r + \kappa) \tilde{\varepsilon} + \delta \bar{\varepsilon}]} = \left. \frac{\partial a_i(\kappa)}{\partial \varepsilon_i} \right|_{\varepsilon_i = \tilde{\varepsilon}},$$

so $a_i(\kappa')$ as a function of ε_i intersects $a_i(\kappa)$ from below. Hence $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ is unique, and $a_i(\kappa') < a_i(\kappa)$ for all $\varepsilon_i < \tilde{\varepsilon}$ and $a_i(\kappa') > a_i(\kappa)$ for all $\varepsilon_i > \tilde{\varepsilon}$. With (21), the cumulative distribution of assets indexed by κ , is $\mathbb{G}_\kappa(a) = \sum_{j=1}^I \mathbb{I}_{\{a_j(\kappa) \leq a\}} \pi_j$. The fact that $a_i(\kappa') < a_i(\kappa)$ for $\varepsilon_i < \tilde{\varepsilon}$ implies $\mathbb{G}_{\kappa'}(a) \geq \mathbb{G}_\kappa(a)$ for all $a < \tilde{a}$. Thus, $\int_0^a \mathbb{G}_{\kappa'}(x) dx \geq \int_0^a \mathbb{G}_\kappa(x) dx$ for all $a < \tilde{a}$. Moreover, $\int_0^{a_I(\kappa')} \mathbb{G}_{\kappa'}(x) dx = \int_0^{a_I(\kappa')} \mathbb{G}_\kappa(x) dx$, so $\int_0^a \mathbb{G}_{\kappa'}(x) dx - \int_0^a \mathbb{G}_\kappa(x) dx = \int_a^\infty \mathbb{G}_\kappa(x) dx - \int_a^\infty \mathbb{G}_{\kappa'}(x) dx$. The right side of this expression is nonnegative for $a \geq \tilde{a}$ because $a_i(\kappa') \geq a_i(\kappa)$ for $\varepsilon_i \geq \tilde{\varepsilon}$. Thus, $\int_0^a \mathbb{G}_{\kappa'}(x) dx \geq \int_0^a \mathbb{G}_\kappa(x) dx$ for all $a \geq \tilde{a}$. We conclude $\int_0^a \mathbb{G}_{\kappa'}(x) dx \geq \int_0^a \mathbb{G}_\kappa(x) dx$ for all $a \geq 0$, i.e., \mathbb{G}_κ second-order stochastically dominates $\mathbb{G}_{\kappa'}$.

(ii) From (7), as $r + \kappa \rightarrow 0$ then $\bar{u}_i(a) \rightarrow \delta \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u_j(a)$ which is independent of i . Together with market clearing, this implies that $a_i \rightarrow A$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, I\}$ as $r + \kappa \rightarrow 0$. ■

Proof of Proposition 6. (i) For $I = 2$, we have $\mathbb{X} = \{1, 2\}$ and

$$\mathcal{V} = \frac{\alpha \delta \pi_1 \pi_2}{\alpha + \delta} [a_2(\kappa) - a_1(\kappa)],$$

where $a_i(\kappa)$ is given by (34). Since $\varepsilon_1 < \varepsilon_2$, we have $a_1(\kappa) < a_2(\kappa)$, and by part (i) of Proposition 5, $\frac{da_1(\kappa)}{d\kappa} < 0 < \frac{da_2(\kappa)}{d\kappa}$. To find $\frac{d\mathcal{V}}{d\kappa}$, we consider two cases. (a) An increase in κ caused by a decrease in η (keeping α constant). For this case, $\frac{d\mathcal{V}}{d\kappa} = \frac{\alpha \delta \pi_1 \pi_2}{\alpha + \delta} \left[\frac{da_2(\kappa)}{d\kappa} - \frac{da_1(\kappa)}{d\kappa} \right] > 0$. (b) An increase in κ caused by an increase in α , which implies $\frac{d\mathcal{V}}{d\kappa} = \left(\frac{\delta}{\alpha + \delta} \right)^2 \pi_1 \pi_2 [a_2(\kappa) - a_1(\kappa)] + \frac{\alpha \delta \pi_1 \pi_2}{\alpha + \delta} \left[\frac{da_2(\kappa)}{d\kappa} - \frac{da_1(\kappa)}{d\kappa} \right] > 0$.

(ii) Since $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i \ln a$, we have $a_i > 0$ for all i , and $a_i \neq a_j$ unless $i = j$. From (21), the proportion of trades that involve buying a_i and selling a_j or vice versa (for $i \neq j$) is $(n_{ij} + n_{ji}) / (1 - \sum_{i=1}^I n_{ii}) = 2\pi_i \pi_j / (1 - \sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i^2)$, which is independent of κ . From Proposition 4, $dp/d\kappa = 0$, so differentiating (22),

$$\frac{d[g_i(\kappa; p) - g_j(\kappa; p)]}{d\kappa} = \frac{\delta(\varepsilon_i - \varepsilon_j)}{rp(r + \kappa + \delta)^2}.$$

Thus, $|a_i - a_j| = |g_i(\kappa; p) - g_j(\kappa; p)|$ increases with κ for all $i \neq j$. The measure of trades of size less than $z \geq 0$ is

$$\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\pi_i \pi_j}{1 - \sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i^2} \mathbb{I}_{\{|a_i - a_j| \leq z\}},$$

which is decreasing in κ . This establishes that the distribution of trade sizes associated with κ' first-order stochastically dominates the one associated with κ if $\kappa' > \kappa$. Since every trade size is larger in the market with a larger κ , we conclude that \mathcal{V} increases with κ .

(iii) This follows immediately from (24) and part (ii) of Proposition 5. ■

Proof of Lemma 4. Differentiate (20) to obtain

$$\frac{\partial \phi_i(a)}{\partial a} = -\frac{\eta}{r + \kappa} [\bar{u}'_i(a) - q].$$

Suppose that the nonnegativity constraint on a_i is slack. Then, since \bar{u}_i is strictly concave and $\bar{u}'_i(a_i) - q = 0$, we know that $\bar{u}'_i(a) - q < 0$ if and only if $a - a_i > 0$, and $\frac{\partial \phi_i(a)}{\partial a}$ has the same sign as $a - a_i$. If $a_i = 0$, then $a > a_i$ and $\bar{u}'_i(a) - q < \bar{u}'_i(a_i) - q \leq 0$, so $\frac{\partial \phi_i(a)}{\partial a} > 0$ which is the same sign as $a - a_i = a > 0$. This establishes the first part. To show the second part, divide (20) by $(a_i - a)$ and differentiate the resulting expression to get

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial a} \left[\frac{\phi_i(a)}{a_i - a} \right] = \frac{\eta}{r + \kappa} \left[\frac{\bar{u}_i(a_i) - \bar{u}_i(a) - \bar{u}'_i(a)(a_i - a)}{(a_i - a)^2} \right],$$

which is strictly negative since \bar{u}_i is strictly concave. ■

Proof of Proposition 7. Let $q(\kappa, r)$, $a_i(\kappa, r)$ and $\phi_{ji}(\kappa, r)$ denote, respectively, the equilibrium q , a_i and ϕ_{ji} that solve (18), (19) and (20) for all $i, j \in \mathbb{X}$. We proceed in three steps: (i) show that $\phi_{ji}(\kappa, r) > 0$ for all $\kappa \in (0, \infty)$ and all $r \in [0, \infty)$ provided $a_i(\kappa, r) \neq a_j(\kappa, r)$ and $\eta > 0$; (ii) establish that $\lim_{\kappa \rightarrow \infty} \phi_{ji}(\kappa, r) = 0$ for any $r \geq 0$ and all $(i, j) \in \mathbb{X}^2$; (iii) show that for each $\kappa \in (0, \infty)$ there is $\bar{r} > 0$ such that $\phi_{ji}(0, r) < \phi_{ji}(\kappa, r)$ for all $r \in (0, \bar{r})$. The nonmonotonicity of $\phi_{ji}(\kappa, r)$ with respect to κ for all $r \in [0, \bar{r})$ will then follow from steps (i) through (iii).

(i) From (20), $\phi_{ij} = \frac{\eta}{r + \kappa} \{ \max_{a'} [\bar{u}_i(a'; \kappa, r) - qa'] - [\bar{u}_i(a_j; \kappa, r) - qa_j] \}$, so $\phi_{ij}(\kappa, r) > 0$ for all $\kappa \in (0, \infty)$ and all $r \in [0, \infty)$ provided $\eta > 0$ and $a_j \neq \arg \max_{a' \geq 0} [\bar{u}_i(a') - qa']$ (i.e., provided the investor trades).

(ii) $\lim_{\kappa \rightarrow \infty} q(\kappa, r) = q^*$ and $\lim_{\kappa \rightarrow \infty} a_i(\kappa, r) = \arg \max_{a' \geq 0} [u_i(a') - q^*a'] \equiv h_i^\infty(q^*)$, where q^* is independent of r and solves $\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i h_i^\infty(q^*) = A$, which in turn implies $q^* \in (0, \infty)$, $h_i^\infty(q^*) < \infty$, and hence $|u_i(a_j) - q^*a_j| < \infty$ for all $(i, j) \in \mathbb{X}^2$. Therefore $\lim_{\kappa \rightarrow \infty} \phi_{ij}(\kappa, r) = 0$ for any $r \geq 0$ and all $(i, j) \in \mathbb{X}^2$.

(iii) Let $\kappa \rightarrow 0$ to obtain $q(0, r) = \tilde{q}(r)$ and $a_i(0, r) = \arg \max_{a' \geq 0} [\tilde{u}_i(a') - \tilde{q}a'] \equiv h_i^0(\tilde{q})$, where $\tilde{u}_i(a; r) = \frac{ru_i(a) + \delta \tilde{u}(a)}{r + \delta}$, $\tilde{u}(a) = \sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k u_k(a)$ and \tilde{q} solves $\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i h_i^0(\tilde{q}) = A$. From (20),

$$\phi_{ji}(0, r) = \eta \frac{\left\{ r [u_i(a_i) - u_i(a_j)] + \delta \sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k [u_k(a_i) - u_k(a_j)] \right\} - (r + \delta) \tilde{q}(r) (a_i - a_j)}{(r + \delta) r}. \quad (35)$$

Observe that $\lim_{r \rightarrow 0} a_i(0, r) = \tilde{u}'^{-1}[\tilde{q}(0)] = A$, for each $i \in \mathbb{X}$. Totally differentiate (18) and (19) with respect to r and evaluate at $\kappa = r = 0$ to find $\frac{\partial a_i(0,0)}{\partial r} = \frac{\tilde{q}(0) + \delta \tilde{q}'(0) - u'_i(A)}{\delta \sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k u''_k(A)}$ and $\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i \frac{\partial a_i(0,0)}{\partial r} = 0$. Combine these conditions to get $\frac{\tilde{q}(0) + \delta \tilde{q}'(0) - \tilde{u}'(A)}{\delta \sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k u''_k(A)} = 0$ which together with the investor's first-order condition, $\tilde{u}'(A) = \tilde{q}(0)$, implies $\tilde{q}'(0) = 0$ and hence $\frac{\partial a_i(0,0)}{\partial r} = \frac{\tilde{q}(0) - u'_i(A)}{\delta \sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k u''_k(A)}$. With this, apply L'Hôpital's rule to (35) to find $\lim_{r \rightarrow 0} \phi_{ji}(0, r) = 0$.

Our assumptions on primitives imply that $q(\kappa, r)$ and $a_i(\kappa, r)$ are continuous functions, so $\phi_{ji}(\kappa, r)$ is continuous. Hence, for each (i, j) with $i \neq j$ and each $\kappa \in (0, \infty)$, there is some $\bar{r} > 0$ such that for all $r \in [0, \bar{r})$, we have $\lim_{\kappa \rightarrow \infty} \phi_{ji}(\kappa, r) = 0 < \phi_{ji}(\kappa, r)$ (by (i) and (ii)) and $\phi_{ji}(0, r) < \phi_{ji}(\kappa, r)$ (by (i) and (iii)), which establishes the nonmonotonicity of ϕ_{ij} with respect to κ . ■

Proof of Corollary 1. Write $\Phi(\alpha, \eta, r) = \sum_{i,j=1}^I n_{ji}(\alpha) \phi_{ji}[\alpha(1-\eta), r]$, where $n_{ji}(\alpha)$ is given by (21). Fix an arbitrary $(\alpha, \eta) \in (0, \infty) \times (0, 1)$. From part (i) of the proof of Proposition 7, $\phi_{Ij}[\alpha(1-\eta), r] > 0$ for $j < I$ and all $r \in [0, \infty)$. Hence $\Phi(\alpha, \eta, r) > 0$ for all $\alpha(1-\eta) \in (0, \infty)$ and all $r \in [0, \infty)$. Following a similar reasoning as in part (iii) of the proof of Proposition 7, for each $(i, j) \in \mathbb{X}^2$, there is $\bar{r}_{ji} > 0$ such that for all $r \in [0, \bar{r}_{ji})$, $\phi_{ji}(0, r) < \Phi(\alpha, \eta, r)$. Then $\Phi(0, \eta, r) < \Phi(\alpha, \eta, r)$ for any $r \in [0, r_0)$, where $r_0 = \min_{(i,j) \in \mathbb{X}^2} \bar{r}_{ji}$. Finally, from part (ii) of the proof of Proposition 7, for any $r \geq 0$ we have $\lim_{\alpha' \rightarrow \infty} \Phi(\alpha', \eta, r) = 0 < \Phi(\alpha, \eta, r)$, which establishes the nonmonotonicity of Φ with respect to α , and therefore with respect to $\kappa = \alpha(1-\eta)$. ■

Proof of Proposition 8. In an equilibrium with entry the measure of dealers satisfies

$$\Phi[\alpha(v), \eta, r] = \gamma v^{1-\theta}. \quad (36)$$

From Corollary 1, there is $\tilde{r} > 0$ such that $\underline{\gamma} \equiv \Phi(0, \eta, r) < \sup_v \Phi[\alpha(v), \eta, r] \equiv \bar{\gamma}$ for all $r \in [0, \tilde{r})$, and $\lim_{v \rightarrow \infty} \Phi[\alpha(v), \eta, r] = 0 < \underline{\gamma}$. Note that as $\theta \rightarrow 1$, $\gamma v^{1-\theta}$ converges uniformly to γ on any closed interval $[v_0, v_1] \subseteq (0, \infty)$. Thus, for any $\gamma \in (\underline{\gamma}, \bar{\gamma})$, there is a $\tilde{\theta}$ such that for all $\theta \in (\tilde{\theta}, 1)$, there are multiple values of $v > 0$ that satisfy (36). ■

B Generalized preference shocks

Continuous-time Markov chain

Consider an homogeneous, ergodic, continuous-time Markov chain with a finite number I of states. The transitions between the states $\{1, \dots, I\}$ are described by an infinitesimal generator matrix $\mathbf{\Delta} = [\delta_{ij}]$. The time that an investor spends in the preference state i is exponentially distributed with parameter $\sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik} > 0$. Conditional on a transition, the probability to move to state j is $\delta_{ij} / \sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik} \in [0, 1]$ where δ_{ij} is referred to as the transition intensity. By convention, $\delta_{ii} = -\sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik}$ so that the rows of the generator matrix sum to 0. The formulation studied in the body of the paper corresponds to $\delta_{ki} = \delta\pi_i$ if $k \neq i$ and $\delta_{ii} = \delta(\pi_i - 1)$.

Denote $\rho_{ij}(t) = \Pr[k(t) = j | k(0) = i]$ where $k(t)$ is the investor's preference type at time t . The matrix of transition probabilities over a time interval of length t is denoted $\mathbf{R}(t) = [\rho_{ij}(t)]$.²³ Then, the dynamics for the transition probabilities satisfy $\mathbf{R}'(t) = \mathbf{R}(t)\mathbf{\Delta}$ with $\mathbf{R}(0) = \mathbf{I}$ (where \mathbf{I} is the identity matrix).²⁴ The solution to this differential equation is

$$\mathbf{R}(t) = e^{t\mathbf{\Delta}} = \mathbf{I} + \sum_{m=1}^{\infty} \frac{(t\mathbf{\Delta})^m}{m!}. \quad (37)$$

Equilibrium

Using a similar method as in the text, an investor with preference type i chooses his asset holdings to solve

$$\max_{a \geq 0} [(r + \kappa)\bar{U}_i(a) - q(t)a], \quad (38)$$

²³For the i.i.d. specification in the paper,

$$\rho_{ij}(t) = (1 - e^{-\delta t})\pi_j + e^{-\delta t}\mathbb{1}_{\{i=j\}}.$$

Suppose $i \neq j$. With probability $1 - e^{-\delta t}$ at least one preference shock occurs over the time interval of length t . Since shocks are i.i.d., $k(t) = j$ with probability π_j . If $i = j$ one must also take into account the probability that no shocks occur over the time interval of length t .

²⁴The dynamics for the transition probabilities are as follows:

$$\rho_{ij}(t + dt) = \left(1 - \sum_{k \neq j} \delta_{jk} dt\right) \rho_{ij}(t) + \sum_{k \neq j} \rho_{ik}(t) \delta_{kj} dt + o(dt).$$

The first term on the right-hand side is the probability to reach state j at time t from state i at time 0 multiplied by the probability that no preference shocks occur on a small interval of time of length dt . The second term of the right-hand side is the sum of the probabilities to reach state $k \neq j$ at time t multiplied by the probabilities to reach state j from state k in a small time interval of length dt . Rearrange, divide both sides by dt , and take the limit as $dt \rightarrow 0$ to get $\rho'_{ij}(t) = \sum_{k=1}^I \rho_{ik}(t) \delta_{kj}$.

with

$$q(t) = (r + \kappa) \left[p(t) - \kappa \int_0^\infty e^{-(r+\kappa)s} p(t+s) ds \right] \quad (39)$$

$$\bar{U}_i(a) = \mathbb{E}_i \left[\int_0^{T_\kappa} e^{-rs} u_{k(s)}(a) ds \right], \quad i \in \{1, \dots, I\} \quad (40)$$

where T_κ , the next effective contact time with a dealer, is exponentially distributed with parameter $\kappa = \alpha(1 - \eta)$. We obtain the following generalization of Lemma 1 in the text.

Lemma 5 *An investor with preference type i and asset holdings a who readjusts his asset position at time t chooses a_i solution to*

$$a_i(t) = \arg \max_{a \geq 0} [\bar{u}_i(a) - q(t)a], \quad (41)$$

where

$$\bar{u}_i(a) = \sum_{k=1}^I z_{ik} u_k(a), \quad (42)$$

and

$$z_{ij} = \int_0^\infty (r + \kappa) \rho_{ij}(s) e^{-(r+\kappa)s} ds. \quad (43)$$

Proof. Reexpress $\bar{U}_i(a)$ given by (40) as

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{U}_i(a) &= \mathbb{E}_i \left[\int_0^{T_\kappa} \sum_{j=1}^I \rho_{ij}(s) e^{-rs} u_j(a) ds \right] \\ &= \int_0^\infty \kappa e^{-\kappa t} \int_0^\infty \mathbb{I}_{\{s \leq t\}} \sum_{j=1}^I \rho_{ij}(s) e^{-rs} u_j(a) ds dt \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^I \left[\int_0^\infty \rho_{ij}(s) e^{-(r+\kappa)s} ds \right] u_j(a). \end{aligned}$$

To obtain the second equality we use that T_κ is exponentially distributed with parameter κ . The third equality is obtained by changing the order of integration. Since $\bar{u}_i(a) = (r + \kappa) \bar{U}_i(a)$, we get (43). The maximization problem (41) is then derived from (38) ■

From (43) it is easy to check that $z_{ij} \geq 0$ and $\sum_{j=1}^I z_{ij} = 1$. So, from (42), the investor maximizes a weighted average of the utility flows in the different states. The weight that an investor of type i assigns to state j , z_{ij} , is a weighted average of the transition probabilities $\rho_{ij}(t)$.

A reduction in trading frictions implies that investors care more about transitions occurring over shorter time intervals.

It will also prove useful to have an alternative representation of the weights $\{z_{ik}\}$ based on the infinitesimal generator matrix Δ . Let \mathbf{Z} denote the $I \times I$ matrix with generic element $z_{ij} \in [0, 1]$, and \mathbf{I} is the identity matrix.

Lemma 6 *The weights of the indirect utility function $\bar{u}_i(a)$ solve*

$$\mathbf{Z} = \left[\mathbf{I} - \frac{\Delta}{r + \kappa} \right]^{-1}. \quad (44)$$

Proof. Integrate (43) by parts and use that $\rho'_{ij}(t) = \sum_{k=1}^I \rho_{ik}(t) \delta_{kj}$ (see footnote 24) to get

$$(r + \kappa) [z_{ij} - \rho_{ij}(0)] = \sum_{k=1}^I z_{ik} \delta_{kj}.$$

Since $\mathbf{R}(0) = \mathbf{I}$ then $(r + \kappa) (\mathbf{Z} - \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{Z}\Delta$, which gives (44).²⁵ ■

The expression for the intermediation fee is similar to the one in the text, i.e.,

$$\phi_i(a, t) = \frac{\eta \{ \bar{u}_i [a_i(t)] - \bar{u}_i(a) - q(t) [a_i(t) - a] \}}{r + \kappa} \quad (45)$$

The measure of investors in preference state i at time t is

$$n_i(t) = \sum_j \rho_{ji}(t) n_j(0). \quad (46)$$

From (46) one can turn to the determination of $q(t)$. From the same argument as in the text market clearing requires

$$\sum_{i=1}^I n_i(t) a_i(t) = A. \quad (47)$$

Finally, the distribution of investors across individual states at any time t satisfies

$$H_t(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j=1}^I \left[n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t) + \int_0^t \mathbb{I}_{\{a_j(t-\tau) \in \mathcal{A}\}} n_{ji}(\tau, t) d\tau \right] \quad \text{for all } (\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) \in \Sigma, \quad (48)$$

²⁵The invertibility of the matrix $(r + \kappa)\mathbf{I} - \Delta$ can be proved as follows. Consider the set of bounded functions $B(\{0, \dots, I\})$ with the sup norm. For some given $\mathbf{u} = [u_i] \in \mathbb{R}^I$, let $T : B(\{0, \dots, I\}) \rightarrow B(\{0, \dots, I\})$ be defined as $(Tf)(i) = \left(u_i + \sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik} f(k) \right) / \left(r + \kappa + \sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik} \right)$. The solution $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^I$ to $(r + \kappa)\mathbf{x} = \Delta\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{u}$ is a fixed point of T . From the Blackwell's sufficient conditions T is a contraction with modulus $\beta = \max_{i \in \{1, \dots, I\}} \sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik} / \left(r + \kappa + \sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik} \right) \in (0, 1)$. From the Contraction Mapping Theorem, T has a unique fixed point. Hence, $((r + \kappa)\mathbf{I} - \Delta)\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{u}$ admits a unique solution for any $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{R}^I$, i.e., $(r + \kappa)\mathbf{I} - \Delta$ is invertible.

where

$$n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t) = e^{-\alpha t} \rho_{ji}(t) H_0(\mathcal{A}, \{j\}) \quad (49)$$

and

$$n_{ji}(\tau, t) = \alpha e^{-\alpha \tau} \rho_{ji}(\tau) n_j(t - \tau). \quad (50)$$

The interpretations for $n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t)$ and $n_{ji}(\tau, t)$ are similar to the ones in the text. For instance, $n_{ji}^0(\mathcal{A}, t)$ is the measure of investors who have not contacted a dealer on $[0, t]$, an event occurring with probability $e^{-\alpha t}$, with initial state in $\mathcal{A} \times \{j\}$, there is a measure $H_0(\mathcal{A}, \{j\})$ of such investors, and with preference type $k(t) = i$, an event occurring with probability $\rho_{ji}(t)$ conditional on the initial state.

An equilibrium is a time-path $\langle \{a_i(t)\}, q(t), \{\phi_i(a, t)\}, H_t \rangle$ that satisfies (41), (45), (47) and (48), given an initial condition H_0 . Despite the generalization of the process for the preference shocks, the model keeps its simple recursive structure. The distribution $\{n_i(t)\}$ solves (46). Given $\{n_i(t)\}$, (41) and (47) yield $q(t)$ and $\{a_i(t)\}$. Given $q(t)$ and $\{a_i(t)\}$ one can determine the intermediation fees from (45). Proposition 1 in the text can be generalized to show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.

Frictionless limit

We consider the limit when the trading frictions become small. From (44), as $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$ then $\mathbf{Z} = \left[\mathbf{I} - \frac{\mathbf{\Delta}}{r+\kappa} \right]^{-1} \rightarrow \mathbf{I}$, $\bar{u}_i(a) \rightarrow u_i(a)$, and (41) becomes $\max_{a \geq 0} [u_i(a) - q(t)a]$. (Alternatively, from (43), $z_{ij} \rightarrow \rho_{ij}(0) = \mathbb{I}_{\{i=j\}}$ as $\kappa \rightarrow +\infty$.) As the trading frictions vanish, the allocations and prices approach their Walrasian limit.

Efficiency

The planner solves

$$\max_{\{a_i(t)\}_{i=1}^I} \left\{ \int_0^\infty \sum_{i=1}^I e^{-rt} \alpha n_i(t) \hat{U}_i[a_i(t)] dt \right\} \text{ s.t. } \sum_{i=1}^I \alpha n_i(t) a_i(t) \leq \alpha A,$$

where

$$\hat{U}_i[a_i(t)] = \mathbb{E}_i \left[\int_t^{T_\alpha} e^{-r(s-t)} u_{k(s)}[a_i(t)] ds \right]. \quad (51)$$

The solution is such that $\hat{U}_i'[a_i(t)] \leq \lambda(t)$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, I\}$, with a strict equality if $a_i(t) > 0$, where $\lambda(t)$ is the multiplier associated with the resource constraint. The comparison of (40)

and (51) reveals the following difference between the investors' problem and the planner's problem: the time horizon of the investors' problem is exponentially distributed with parameter $\kappa = \alpha(1 - \eta)$ while the time horizon of the planner's problem is exponentially distributed with parameter α . The two coincide when $\eta = 0$.

Steady state

As t tends to infinity, $\rho_{ij}(t)$ approaches π_j where $\{\pi_i\}_{i=1}^I$ is the unique ergodic distribution that solves $[\pi_1, \dots, \pi_I]\mathbf{\Delta} = \mathbf{0}$ and $\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i = 1$. From (46), $n_i(t) \rightarrow \pi_i$ and the market-clearing condition (47) becomes $\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i a_i = A$ where, from (41), $a_i = \arg \max_{a \geq 0} [\bar{u}_i(a) - qa]$. Finally, from (48)-(50) $H_t \rightarrow H$ such that

$$H(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j=1}^I \left[\int_0^t \mathbb{I}_{\{a_j \in \mathcal{A}\}} \alpha e^{-\alpha\tau} \rho_{ji}(\tau) \pi_j d\tau \right] \text{ for all } (\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}) \in \Sigma.$$

Asset holdings, prices and volume

We focus on steady states and in order to guarantee the interiority and the existence of a solution to (41) we also assume that $u'_i(0) = \infty$ and $u'_i(\infty) = 0$. From Lemma 5, the choice of asset holdings of an investor with preference type i solves

$$\sum_{k=1}^I z_{ik} u'_k(a_i) = rp. \quad (52)$$

We first investigate the effects of a change in trading frictions (κ) on investors' asset holdings taking the asset price p as given. Let $a_i = g_i(\kappa, p)$ denote the solution to (52).

Lemma 7 $\frac{\partial g_i(\kappa, p)}{\partial \kappa} > 0$ if and only if

$$\sum_{k=1}^I \frac{\partial z_{ik}}{\partial \kappa} u'_k(a_i) > 0 \quad (53)$$

where

$$\frac{\partial z_{ij}}{\partial \kappa} = \int_0^\infty \rho_{ij}(s) e^{-(r+\kappa)s} [1 - s(r + \kappa)] ds. \quad (54)$$

Proof. From (52),

$$\frac{\partial g_i(\kappa, p)}{\partial \kappa} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^I \frac{\partial z_{ik}}{\partial \kappa} u'_k(a_i)}{-\sum_{k=1}^I z_{ik} u''_k(a_i)}. \quad (55)$$

Since the denominator is positive, (55) implies (53). The partial derivatives $\frac{\partial z_{ij}}{\partial \kappa}$ are obtained by differentiating (43). ■

As trading frictions are reduced investors readjust the weights z_{ij} they assign to their marginal utilities from holding the asset in different states and put more weights on transitions occurring over shorter time intervals.

The next Proposition investigates a class of preference shocks that encompasses the i.i.d. shocks studied in the paper.

Proposition 9 *If $\sum_{j=1}^I \rho_{ij}(t)u'_j(a_i)$ is increasing (decreasing) in t then $\frac{\partial g_i(\kappa, p)}{\partial \kappa} > 0$ (< 0).*

Proof. Substituting z_{ik} by its expression given by (43) and using the change of variable $x = (r + \kappa)s$, the first-order condition (52) can be rewritten as

$$\int_0^\infty \sum_{k=1}^I \rho_{ik} \left(\frac{x}{r + \kappa} \right) u'_k(a_i) e^{-x} dx = rp.$$

Then,

$$\frac{\partial g_i(\kappa, p)}{\partial \kappa} = \frac{\int_0^\infty \frac{\partial \sum_{k=1}^I \rho_{ik} \left(\frac{x}{r + \kappa} \right) u'_k(a_i)}{\partial \kappa} e^{-x} dx}{-\int_0^\infty \sum_{k=1}^I \rho_{ik} \left(\frac{x}{r + \kappa} \right) u''_k(a_i) e^{-x} dx}.$$

So if $\sum_{k=1}^I \rho_{ik}(t)u'_k(a_i)$ is increasing (decreasing) in t then $\frac{\partial g_i(\kappa, p)}{\partial \kappa} < 0$ (> 0). ■

Proposition 9 is intuitive. If the expected marginal utility from holding the asset is increasing with the time horizon t (which implies $u'_i(a_i) < \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i)$) then a reduction in the trading frictions will induce agents to reduce their asset holdings. In the case of multiplicative preference shocks, $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i u(a)$, Proposition 9 implies that if $\sum_{j=1}^I \rho_{ij}(t)\varepsilon_j$ is monotone then a_i increases as trading frictions are reduced if $\varepsilon_i > \bar{\varepsilon} = \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j \varepsilon_j$.

Proposition 9 has the following immediate implication for the case of i.i.d. shocks studied in the paper.

Corollary 2 *If preference shocks are i.i.d. then $\frac{\partial g_i(\kappa, p)}{\partial \kappa} > 0$ if and only if $u'_i(a_i) > \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i)$.*

Proof. For the i.i.d. specification studied in the paper, $\rho_{ij}(t) = (1 - e^{-\delta t})\pi_j + e^{-\delta t}\mathbb{I}_{\{i=j\}}$ so that

$$\sum_{j=1}^I \rho_{ij}(t)u'_j(a_i) = \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i) + e^{-\delta t} \left(u'_i(a_i) - \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i) \right).$$

So $\sum_{j=1}^I \rho_{ij}(t)u'_j(a_i)$ is increasing in t if and only if $u'_i(a_i) < \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i)$ and decreasing in t if and only if $u'_i(a_i) > \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j u'_j(a_i)$. ■

The following proposition allows for general preference shocks but it focuses on economies where trading frictions are small. With a small abuse of notation, redefine $a_i = g_i(\frac{1}{r+\kappa}, p)$ as the choice of asset holdings characterized by (52).

Proposition 10 *Consider the frictionless limit as $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$. Then, $\partial g_i(\frac{1}{r+\kappa}, p)/\partial (\frac{1}{r+\kappa}) > 0$ if and only if*

$$\frac{\sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik} u'_k(a_i)}{\sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik}} > u'_i(a_i). \quad (56)$$

Proof. Denote $x = (r + \kappa)^{-1}$. From (44),

$$\sum_{k=1}^I z_{ik} \delta_{kj} = (r + \kappa)(z_{ij} - \mathbb{I}_{\{j=i\}}), \quad j = 1, \dots, I. \quad (57)$$

Totally differentiating (57), we obtain

$$\left. \frac{\partial z_{ij}}{\partial x} \right|_{x=0} = \delta_{ij}. \quad (58)$$

Differentiating the first-order condition associated with (41), taking rp as given, we get

$$\left. \frac{\partial a_i}{\partial x} \right|_{x=0} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^I \delta_{ik} u'_k(a_i)}{-u''_i(a_i)} \quad (59)$$

Then, $\frac{\partial a_i}{\partial x} > 0$ iff $\sum_{k=1}^I \delta_{ik} u'_k(a_i) > 0$, which gives (56). ■

In a liquid market ($\kappa \rightarrow \infty$) investors only care about their current preference type to choose their asset holdings, i.e., $z_{ii} = 1$. As trading frictions increase investors increase the weights they assign to their marginal utilities in future states. The increase of z_{ij} is proportional to the transition intensity δ_{ij} from state i to state j .

For the case studied in the paper ($\delta_{ij} = \delta \pi_j$ for $i \neq j$), (56) becomes $\sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k u'_k(a_i) > u'_i(a_i)$. In the case of multiplicative preference shocks, $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i u(a)$, (56) gives

$$\frac{\sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik} \varepsilon_k}{\sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{ik}} > \varepsilon_i. \quad (60)$$

This condition is identical to the one in Gârleanu (2006, Proposition 2).²⁶ It reveals that an increase in the trading frictions does not necessarily result in asset holdings closer to the per-capital supply. Indeed, an investor with a high valuation for the asset may have an even higher

²⁶In Gârleanu's model, the coefficient ε_i is interpreted as the instantaneous correlation between the asset dividend and the endowment of the investor. So when (60) holds the current correlation is less than the expected future correlation and investors increase their positions as frictions are reduced.

valuation in the near future in which case (60) holds. However, as a consequence of Proposition 10, the support of the distribution of asset holdings shrinks as trading frictions become more severe.

Corollary 3 *Suppose $u'_1(a) < \dots < u'_I(a)$. As $\kappa \rightarrow \infty$ then $\partial g_1(\frac{1}{r+\kappa}, p)/\partial(\frac{1}{r+\kappa}) > 0$ and $\partial g_I(\frac{1}{r+\kappa}, p)/\partial(\frac{1}{r+\kappa}) < 0$.*

Proof. From (56) and $\frac{\sum_{k>1} \delta_{1k} u'_k(a_1)}{\sum_{k>1} \delta_{1k}} > u'_1(a_1)$ and $\frac{\sum_{k<I} \delta_{Ik} u'_k(a_I)}{\sum_{k<I} \delta_{Ik}} < u'_I(a_I)$. ■

In Propositions 9 and 10, we have taken the asset price as given. In the next proposition we show that some specification for the utility function the asset price is unaffected by the trading frictions.

Proposition 11 *Assume $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i \ln a$. Then,*

$$p = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i \varepsilon_i}{rA}. \quad (61)$$

Proof. From (41)-(42), the choice of asset holdings at the steady state is

$$a_i = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^I z_{ik} \varepsilon_k}{rp}.$$

Use (47) to derive the market-clearing price,

$$p = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^I \sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i z_{ik} \varepsilon_k}{rA}, \quad (62)$$

where $\{\pi_i\}$ is the steady state distribution of investors across preference types. From (43),

$$\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i z_{ik} = \int_0^\infty (r + \kappa) \sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i \rho_{ik}(s) e^{-(r+\kappa)s} ds.$$

Since $\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i \rho_{ik}(s) = \pi_k$ (by definition of a steady-state distribution) then $\sum_{i=1}^I \pi_i z_{ik} = \pi_k$ and (62) gives (61). ■

If preferences are logarithmic, the asset price at the steady state is independent of the extent of the frictions. For this specification, the partial equilibrium results for individual portfolios obtained in Propositions 9 and 10 are also general equilibrium results.

From Corollary 3, starting from a liquid market, the support of the distribution of asset holdings shrinks as trading frictions increase. The next proposition focuses on the limit when trading frictions become infinite and investors are patient.

Proposition 12 *If $r + \kappa \rightarrow 0$ then $a_i \rightarrow A$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, I\}$.*

Proof. Take the limit of (57) as $r + \kappa \rightarrow 0$ to get:

$$\sum_{k=1}^I z_{ik} \delta_{kj} = 0, \quad j = 1, \dots, I,$$

or, equivalently, $\mathbf{Z}\mathbf{\Delta} = \mathbf{0}$. By definition of the ergodic distribution $\{\pi_i\}$ is the unique solution to $\sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k = 1$ and $[\pi_1, \dots, \pi_I]\mathbf{\Delta} = \mathbf{0}$. Consequently, $[z_{i1}, \dots, z_{iI}]$ approaches $[\pi_1, \dots, \pi_I]$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, I\}$. Hence, (41) becomes $\max_a \left[\sum_{k=1}^I \pi_k u_k(a) - q(t)a \right]$ and $a_i \rightarrow A$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, I\}$.

■

If investors are patient and trade in an illiquid market then they maximize their average utility where the weight assigned to a state i is the fraction of the time that the investor will spend in this state over his infinite life horizon, π_i . From Proposition 12, the distribution of asset holdings becomes concentrated towards its mean as the trading frictions become very severe. As a consequence, the trade volume goes to 0. For instance, if the dealer's bargaining power approaches 1 then all investors choose an asset position close to the per capital supply of assets.

C Strategic bargaining

In the body of the paper we assumed that when an investor and a dealer trade, the new asset position of the investor, a' , and the fee, ϕ , are the solution to a Nash bargaining problem where the dealer has bargaining power $\eta \in [0, 1]$ and disagreement point $W(t)$, and the investor has disagreement point $V_i(a, t)$. In this appendix we offer four strategic bargaining games, each with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that coincides with the solution of the axiomatic Nash bargaining problem we have adopted.

The four games we consider have the common feature that the relationship between the investor and the dealer is short-lived in that the negotiation takes place in an “instant.” In the first game, a proposer is chosen at random to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The second is a standard bargaining game with alternating offers and a random termination of the negotiation. We take the limit of this game as the expected time horizon for the negotiation goes to zero. The third is the off-the-shelf bargaining game of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) incorporated into a discrete-time version of our model. Here we assume that the negotiation takes place within a period but may involve an infinite number of bargaining rounds. Finally, we consider a payoff-equivalent game that can involve at most two bargaining rounds. The fact that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in each of these four games coincides with the solution of the Nash problem as formulated in Section 3, is an indication that the disagreement points we have adopted in our axiomatic formulation are the appropriate ones when the relationship between dealers and investors is essentially instantaneous, as is the case in our environment.

C.1 Take-it-or-leave-it offer by a randomly chosen proposer

Our theory is meant to model a fast moving market where investors and dealers don't form long-lasting relationships, but rather contact each other at relatively high frequencies and must trade on the spot, instantaneously, before they part ways. With this in mind, consider the following natural and simple strategic bargaining game. Upon contact, with probability η , Nature selects the dealer to make an instantaneous take-it-or-leave-it offer which the investor must either accept or reject on the spot. With complementary probability, Nature selects the investor to make an instantaneous take-it-or-leave-it offer which the dealer must either accept or reject on the spot. The whole process is instantaneous, and the dealer and the investor part

ways regardless of the outcome.²⁷

Let $\langle a_i^1(t), \phi_i^1(a, t) \rangle$ denote the proposal that the dealer makes to an investor of type i who is holding a at time t , and $\langle a_i^2(t), \phi_i^2(a, t) \rangle$ denote the offer that the latter makes to the former. The set of offers that an investor of type i who is holding asset position a finds acceptable at time t is

$$\mathcal{A}_i^2(a, t) = \{(a', \phi) : V_i(a', t) - p(t)(a' - a) - \phi \geq V_i(a, t)\}.$$

Similarly, the set of offers that a dealer finds acceptable at time t is $\mathcal{A}^1 = \{(a', \phi) : \phi \geq 0\}$. If the dealer is selected as the proposer, he will offer

$$\langle a_i^1(t), \phi_i^1(a, t) \rangle = \arg \max_{(a', \phi)} \phi \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{A}_i^2(a, t)}(a', \phi)$$

where the maximization is subject to $a' \geq 0$, and $\mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{A}_i^2(a, t)}(a', \phi)$ is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if $(a', \phi) \in \mathcal{A}_i^2(a, t)$. It is easy to see that $a_i^1(t) = a_i(t)$, where $a_i(t)$ is as in (3), and $\eta\phi_i^1(a, t) = \phi_i(a, t)$, where $\phi_i(a, t)$ is as in (4). If the investor makes the offer, he chooses

$$\langle a_i^2(t), \phi_i^2(a, t) \rangle = \arg \max_{(a', \phi)} \{ [V_i(a', t) - p(t)(a' - a) - \phi] \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{A}^1}(a', \phi) + [1 - \mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{A}^1}(a', \phi)] V_i(a, t) \}$$

where the maximization is subject to $a' \geq 0$, and $\mathbb{I}_{\mathcal{A}^1}(a', \phi)$ is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if $(a', \phi) \in \mathcal{A}^1$. Hence, $a_i^2(t) = a_i(t)$ and $\phi_i^2(a, t) = 0$. Note that regardless of who gets selected to make the offer, the outcome of the negotiation is that the investor exits the meeting with asset position $a_i(t)$. The transaction fee equals $\phi_i(a, t)/\eta$ if the dealer makes the offer and 0 if the investor makes the offer, so the expected fee (before Nature decides who will make the offer) equals $\phi_i(a, t)$. It is easy to check that with these equilibrium outcomes the investors' and dealers' value functions are just as in the body of the paper and all our results go through (subject to the obvious reinterpretation of $\phi_i(a, t)$ as an *expected* intermediation fee, which is inconsequential).

C.2 Alternating offers in continuous time with random termination

Consider a strategic alternating offers bargaining game similar to the one analyzed by Rubinstein (1982), but extended to allow for exogenous breakdown in negotiations as in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). The game we analyze belongs to the class of stochastic sequential bargaining games studied by Merlo and Wilson (1995). Time is continuous and we

²⁷This type of bargaining procedure has been used extensively in search models of money, e.g., Burdett, Trejos and Wright (2001) as well as in search models of the labor market, e.g., Kiyotaki and Lagos (2007).

assume that negotiations between an investor and a dealer who meet at time t take place at $\tau = t, t + \Delta, t + 2\Delta, \dots$, where $\Delta > 0$ is the length of the period of time between two consecutive bargaining rounds. In every bargaining round, Nature selects a player to make an offer (a', ϕ) ; the dealer is selected with probability η (which we will also denote η_1) and the investor with probability $1 - \eta \equiv \eta_2$. If the recipient of the offer accepts it, the trade is consummated instantaneously and the match is dissolved. If the recipient rejects the offer, the pair waits for a period of length Δ until the next bargaining round. During this period of time between bargaining rounds, the dealer-investor match is subject to a Poisson destruction process with arrival rate β . (This process is independent across matches and also independent of the investor's process for preference shocks.) If the match survives until the next bargaining round, Nature again selects the player who will make the next offer, and so on. To keep the analysis simple we describe the negotiations that take place once the market has reached the long-run steady state described in Proposition 3.

Consider an investor with asset holdings a who enters a negotiation round with a dealer. The payoff to the dealer if an agreement (a', ϕ) is reached at time $\tau \geq t$ is $e^{-r(\tau-t)}\mathcal{W}(\phi)$, where $\mathcal{W}(\phi) \equiv \phi + W$ and $rW = \alpha \int \phi_i(a) dH(a, i)$. Similarly, the payoff to the investor from an agreement (a', ϕ) reached at time $\tau \geq t$ when his preference type is i is $e^{-r(\tau-t)}\mathcal{U}_i(a', \phi)$, where $\mathcal{U}_i(a', \phi) \equiv V_i(a') - p(a' - a) - \phi$, with

$$V_i(a) = \frac{\bar{u}_i(a) + \kappa(pa + \Omega_i)}{r + \kappa}, \quad (63)$$

$\Omega_i = \frac{r+\kappa}{r+\delta+\kappa}\Delta_i + \frac{\delta}{r+\delta+\kappa}\sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j \Delta_j$ and $\Delta_i = \max_{a' \geq 0} [\bar{u}_i(a') - rpa']$. If no agreement is reached, the (current value of) the payoff is $\mathcal{W}(0)$ to the dealer and $\mathcal{U}_i(a, 0)$ to the investor. There are gains from trade between an investor with preference type i who holds a and a dealer if

$$\Gamma_i(a) \equiv \max_{a' \geq 0} [V_i(a') - pa'] - [V_i(a) - pa] > 0, \quad (64)$$

i.e., as long as $a \neq a_i \equiv \arg \max_{a' \geq 0} [V_i(a') - pa']$. For the time being we focus on the case where (64) holds; the analysis will be completed toward the end of the section.

A strategy for a player is a contingent plan that indicates which offer to make following every history after which it is the player's turn to make an offer, and which offers to accept or reject after every history where it is the player's turn to respond. The equilibrium concept we adopt is subgame perfect equilibrium and we restrict attention to stationary strategies.²⁸ The

²⁸In our context, a strategy profile is *stationary* if the actions prescribed at any history depend only on the

fact that the investor's preference type follows a stochastic process implies that the gains from trade also follow a stochastic process. In this setting, Merlo and Wilson (1995) have shown that agreement may turn out to be delayed in the subgame perfect equilibrium. We carry out the analysis under the conjecture that an agreement will not be delayed, and later verify that this is indeed the case for the particular parametrization of the game that we deem relevant for our application.

Let (a_i^1, ϕ_i^1) denote the proposal that the dealer makes to an investor of type i who is holding a , and (a_i^2, ϕ_i^2) denote the offer that the latter makes to the former.²⁹ Assuming the offers $\{(a_i^2, \phi_i^2)\}_{i=1}^I$ are accepted by dealers, the set of offers that an investor of type i who is holding asset position a accepts is

$$\mathcal{A}_i^2(a) = \left\{ (a', \phi) : \mathcal{U}_i(a', \phi) \geq \frac{1-\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \left[\delta\Delta \sum_{j=1}^I \sum_{k=1}^2 \pi_j \eta_k \mathcal{U}_j(a_j^k, \phi_j^k) + (1-\delta\Delta) \sum_{k=1}^2 \eta_k \mathcal{U}_i(a_i^k, \phi_i^k) \right] + \frac{\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \left[\delta\Delta \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j \mathcal{U}_j(a, 0) + (1-\delta\Delta) \mathcal{U}_i(a, 0) \right] \right\}.$$

On the left side of the inequality that defines the set $\mathcal{A}_i^2(a)$, is the utility to the investor with preference type i and asset holdings a from immediate agreement to an offer (a', ϕ) . On the right side of the inequality is his discounted expected utility from rejecting such an offer: he may receive a preference shock (with probability approximately equal to $\delta\Delta$), negotiations may break down (with probability approximately equal to $\beta\Delta$), and in the event that negotiations do not break down, he is selected to make an offer with probability η_2 and to respond to the dealer's offer with probability η_1 . Similarly, the acceptance set of a dealer is

$$\mathcal{A}^1 = \left\{ (a', \phi) : \mathcal{W}(\phi) \geq \frac{1-\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \left[\delta\Delta \sum_{j=1}^I \sum_{k=1}^2 \pi_j \eta_k \mathcal{W}(\phi_j^k) + (1-\delta\Delta) \sum_{k=1}^2 \eta_k \mathcal{W}(\phi_i^k) \right] + \frac{\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \mathcal{W}(0) \right\}.$$

current offer and the investor's current asset holdings and preference type. A subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies is often referred to as a *stationary subgame perfect equilibrium*. Since we find a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, the restriction to stationary strategies is innocuous for our purposes because the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game we are considering is unique if and only if the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is unique. See Merlo and Wilson (1995).

²⁹We could write $a_i^k = a_i^k(a)$ and $\phi_i^k = \phi_i^k(a)$ to emphasize the fact that the offers may depend not only on the investor's preference type but also on his asset holdings. However, as we show below, the equilibrium offers a_i^1 , a_i^2 and ϕ_i^2 are independent of a for all i . The fee proposed by the dealer, ϕ_i^1 , will depend on the investor's asset holdings a , so when ϕ_i^1 appears, we really mean $\phi_i^1(a)$.

Under the conjecture that agreement is not delayed in equilibrium, when it is his turn to propose, an investor of type i chooses the offer that maximizes his own payoff from the set of offers that are acceptable to the dealer, i.e.,

$$(a_i^2, \phi_i^2) = \arg \max_{(a', \phi) \in \mathcal{A}^1} \mathcal{U}_i(a', \phi),$$

where the maximization is subject to $a' \geq 0$. It is easy to show that $a_i^2 = a_i$ and ϕ_i^2 satisfies

$$\mathcal{W}(\phi_i^2) = \frac{1-\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \left[\delta\Delta \sum_{j=1}^I \sum_{k=1}^2 \pi_j \eta_k \mathcal{W}(\phi_j^k) + (1-\delta\Delta) \sum_{k=1}^2 \eta_k \mathcal{W}(\phi_i^k) \right] + \frac{\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \mathcal{W}(0)$$

for $i = 1, \dots, I$, which implies

$$\phi_i^2 = \frac{(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_1}{1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)(1-\delta\Delta)\eta_2} \left[(1-\delta\Delta) \phi_i^1 + \frac{(1+r\Delta)\delta\Delta}{1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2} \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j \phi_j^1 \right] - \frac{r\Delta}{1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2} W. \quad (65)$$

Similarly, the optimal acceptable offer made by a dealer to an investor of type i who is holding a solves

$$(a_i^1, \phi_i^1) = \arg \max_{(a', \phi) \in \mathcal{A}_i^2(a)} \mathcal{W}(\phi),$$

where the maximization is subject to $a' \geq 0$. For all i , the solution has $a_i^1 = a_i$ and ϕ_i^1 satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{U}_i(a_i, \phi_i^1) &= \frac{1-\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \left[\delta\Delta \sum_{j=1}^I \sum_{k=1}^2 \pi_j \eta_k \mathcal{U}_j(a_j, \phi_j^k) + (1-\delta\Delta) \sum_{k=1}^2 \eta_k \mathcal{U}_i(a_i, \phi_i^k) \right] \\ &+ \frac{\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \left[\delta\Delta \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j \mathcal{U}_j(a, 0) + (1-\delta\Delta) \mathcal{U}_i(a, 0) \right], \end{aligned}$$

which implies

$$\phi_i^1 = \frac{1-\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \left[\delta\Delta \sum_{k=1}^2 \sum_{j=1}^I \eta_k \pi_j \phi_j^k + (1-\delta\Delta) \sum_{k=1}^2 \eta_k \phi_i^k \right] + G_i(a), \quad (66)$$

where

$$G_i(a) = \frac{1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)(1-\delta\Delta)}{1+r\Delta} \Gamma_i(a) - \frac{(1-\beta\Delta)\delta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \bar{\Gamma}(a) + \frac{(r+\delta)\Delta}{1+r\Delta} V_i(a) - \frac{\delta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \bar{V}(a),$$

with $\bar{\Gamma}(a) = \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j \Gamma_j(a)$ and $\bar{V}(a) = \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j V_j(a)$. Combine (65) and (66) to arrive at

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_i^1 &= \frac{(1+r\Delta)(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_1\delta\Delta}{[1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)(1-\delta\Delta)][1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)]} \left[\sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j G_j(a) - \frac{r\Delta(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2}{(1+r\Delta)[1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2]} W \right] \\ &+ \frac{1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)(1-\delta\Delta)\eta_2}{1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)(1-\delta\Delta)} \left[G_i(a) - \frac{r\Delta(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2}{(1+r\Delta)[1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2]} W \right] \end{aligned} \quad (67)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_i^2 = & \frac{(1+r\Delta)(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_1\delta\Delta}{[1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)(1-\delta\Delta)][1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)]} \left[\sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j G_j(a) - \frac{r\Delta(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2}{(1+r\Delta)[1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2]} W \right] \\ & + \frac{(1-\beta\Delta)(1-\delta\Delta)\eta_1}{1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)(1-\delta\Delta)} \left[G_i(a) - \frac{r\Delta(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2}{(1+r\Delta)[1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2]} W \right] - \frac{r\Delta}{1+r\Delta-(1-\beta\Delta)\eta_2} W. \end{aligned} \quad (68)$$

Next, we follow Binmore (1987) and consider the case where the time between each offer and counteroffer vanishes. This means that, no matter what the expected duration of the match may be (i.e., for any β), the dealer and the investor may in principle engage in an infinite number of bargaining rounds before the negotiation terminates. As we let $\Delta \rightarrow 0$, from (67) and (68) we find $\lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} \phi_i^1 = \lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} \phi_i^2 = \varphi_i(a, \beta)$, where

$$\varphi_i(a, \beta) = \eta \left\{ \Gamma_i(a) + \frac{r}{r+\beta} V_i(a) + \frac{\beta\delta}{(r+\beta)(r+\beta+\delta)} [V_i(a) - \bar{V}(a)] \right\}.$$

Our theory is intended as a model of a fast moving market with fleeting contacts between dealers and investors. To capture this idea, we consider the limit case where the average duration of the meeting between the dealer and the investor vanishes. As $\beta \rightarrow \infty$, we find $\varphi_i(a, \beta) \rightarrow \eta \Gamma_i(a)$. Then, since (64) and (63) imply $\Gamma_i(a) = \frac{\bar{u}_i(a_i) - \bar{u}_i(a) - rp(a_i - a)}{r + \kappa}$, we conclude that $\lim_{\beta \rightarrow \infty} \varphi_i(a, \beta) = \phi_i(a)$, where $\phi_i(a)$ is as in (20).

To conclude, we verify that the sufficient condition in Merlo and Wilson (1998) that ensures that agreement will not be delayed for any investor-dealer pair in the subgame perfect equilibrium is satisfied as $\beta \rightarrow \infty$. The relevant condition is that the stochastic process for the discounted gains from trade is a supermartingale, which in our application reduces to

$$\Gamma_i(a) \geq \frac{1-\beta\Delta}{1+r\Delta} \left[\delta\Delta \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j \Gamma_j(a) + (1-\delta\Delta) \Gamma_i(a) \right] + o(\Delta),$$

where $o(\Delta)$ is a function with the property that $\lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} \frac{o(\Delta)}{\Delta} = 0$. If we rearrange this condition and let Δ go to zero, it becomes

$$\Gamma_i(a) \geq \frac{\delta}{r+\beta+\delta} \bar{\Gamma}(a).$$

Since $\Gamma_i(a) \geq 0$ for all i and a , this condition is satisfied as $\beta \rightarrow \infty$.

C.3 Alternating offers in a discrete-time formulation of the model

Here we consider a discrete-time version of our model in which the terms of trade in a bilateral match between a dealer and an investor correspond to the outcome of an alternating offers

bargaining game with exogenous risk of breakdown. The environment is similar to the one laid out in the body of the paper, except that time is discrete and indexed by $t = 0, 1, \dots$. The sequence of events within a time period is as follows. First, each investor enjoys utility $u_i(a)$ associated with his current preference type, i , and asset position, a . Second, investors receive preference shocks, and new contacts between dealers and investors take place. An investor receives a preference shock with probability δ and contacts a dealer with probability α . We assume that these events are mutually exclusive and that $\alpha + \delta < 1$. Third, the dealer-investor pairs bargain over the terms of the trade. We assume that although the negotiation occurs within the period, it can take place over an infinite number of bargaining rounds indexed by $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$. Lastly, the interdealer market opens and dealers execute trades on behalf of investors. The interdealer market closes when the period ends, and at that point all trades between dealers and investors are settled (assets are delivered and fees are paid) and all dealer-investor matches are dissolved.

Let $V_i(a, t)$ denote the maximum expected discounted utility attainable by an investor who has preference type i and is holding a at the end of period t , after the interdealer market has closed. It satisfies

$$(1+r)V_i(a, t-1) = u_i(a) + \alpha \{V_i[a_i(t), t] - p(t)[a_i(t) - a] - \phi_i(a, t)\} + \delta \sum_{j=1}^I \pi_j V_j(a, t) + (1 - \alpha - \delta)V_i(a, t), \quad (69)$$

where $(1+r)^{-1}$ denotes the discount factor. Similarly, let $W(t)$ denote the maximum expected discounted utility attainable by a dealer at the end of period t , after the interdealer market has closed. It satisfies

$$(1+r)W(t-1) = \alpha \int \phi_i(a, t) dH_t(a, i) + (1 - \alpha)W(t). \quad (70)$$

We now turn to the determination of the terms of trade. We adopt the strategic model with exogenous risk of breakdown proposed by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). Consider a meeting in period t between a dealer and an investor of type i who is holding a . The terms of trade are determined through an alternating offers bargaining game. The game takes place within the period but it is composed of a large number of rounds. The dealer is the first proposer: he makes an offer that is accepted or rejected by the respondent.³⁰ An offer is a pair

³⁰Below we will eliminate the dealer's first-mover advantage by considering the limit of the game where the probabilities of breakdown between two consecutive rounds approach zero.

(a', ϕ) that specifies the new asset position of the investor and the intermediation fee paid to the dealer. If rejected, the game moves to the second round where the investor can make a counteroffer. Between two consecutive rounds of negotiation the communication between the investor and the dealer can break down. The probability of breakdown following an offer by a dealer is $\eta_1\Delta$ while the probability of breakdown following an offer made by an investor is $\eta_2\Delta$. (The risk of breakdown acts as discounting between bargaining rounds and implies that agents strictly prefer not to delay the agreement.) The payoff to an investor with preference type i if an agreement (a', ϕ) is reached at time t is $\mathcal{U}_i(a', \phi, t) \equiv V_i(a', t) - p(t)(a' - a) - \phi$, and the payoff to the dealer is $\mathcal{W}(\phi, t) \equiv \phi + W(t)$. If no agreement is reached, the payoff of the investor is $\mathcal{U}_i(a, 0, t)$ while the payoff of the dealer is $\mathcal{W}(0, t)$. There are gains from trade between an investor with preference type i who holds a and a dealer as long as

$$\Gamma_i(a, t) \equiv \max_{a' \geq 0} [V_i(a', t) - p(t)a'] - [V_i(a, t) - p(t)a] > 0, \quad (71)$$

i.e., as long as $a \neq a_i(t) \equiv \arg \max_{a' \geq 0} [V_i(a', t) - p(t)a']$. In what follows we focus on the case where $a \neq a_i(t)$ and assume that if $a = a_i(t)$, the dealer proposes the no-trade offer $(a, 0)$ which is accepted by the investor.

A bargaining strategy is a contingent plan that indicates which offer to make following every history after which it is the player's turn to make an offer, and which offers to accept or reject after every history where it is the player's turn to respond to an offer. The equilibrium concept we adopt is subgame perfect equilibrium and we restrict attention to stationary strategies.³¹ Whenever it is his turn to make an offer, the dealer proposes (a^1, ϕ^1) while the investor proposes (a^2, ϕ^2) . Assuming the offer (a^2, ϕ^2) is accepted by dealers, the acceptance set at time t of an investor with preference type i and asset holdings a is

$$\mathcal{A}_i^2(a, t) = \{(a', \phi) : \mathcal{U}_i(a', \phi, t) \geq (1 - \eta_1\Delta)\mathcal{U}_i(a^2, \phi^2, t) + \eta_1\Delta\mathcal{U}_i(a, 0, t)\}. \quad (72)$$

A buyer accepts all offers that generate a payoff greater or equal than his expected payoff if he rejects the offer and takes the chance to make a counteroffer. In the latter case, the investor makes the counter offer (a^2, ϕ^2) with probability $1 - \eta_1\Delta$, and with probability $\eta_1\Delta$ the negotiation breaks down. Similarly, the acceptance set of a dealer is

$$\mathcal{A}^1(t) = \{(a', \phi) : \mathcal{W}(\phi, t) \geq (1 - \eta_2\Delta)\mathcal{W}(\phi^1, t) + \eta_2\Delta\mathcal{W}(0, t)\}. \quad (73)$$

³¹This restriction is innocuous since the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game we are considering is unique. See Proposition 3 in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) or Proposition 122.1 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).

When it is his turn to make a proposal, the investor chooses the offer that maximizes his payoff among the set of offers that lie in the dealer's acceptance set, i.e., the investor's offer is

$$\langle a_i^2(t), \phi_i^2(a, t) \rangle = \arg \max_{(a', \phi) \in \mathcal{A}^1(t)} \mathcal{U}_i(a', \phi, t),$$

where the maximization is subject to $a' \geq 0$. It is easy to show that $a_i^2(t) = a_i(t)$ and

$$\phi_i^2(a, t) = (1 - \eta_2 \Delta) \phi_i^1(a, t). \quad (74)$$

Similarly, the dealer's optimal offer when it is his turn to propose is

$$\langle a_i^1(t), \phi_i^1(a, t) \rangle = \arg \max_{(a', \phi) \in \mathcal{A}_i^2(a, t)} \mathcal{W}(\phi, t),$$

where the maximization is subject to $a' \geq 0$. Hence, $a_i^1(t) = a_i(t)$ and $\phi_i^1(a, t)$ satisfies $\mathcal{U}_i[a_i(t), \phi_i^1(a, t), t] = (1 - \eta_1 \Delta) \mathcal{U}_i[a_i(t), \phi^2, t] + \eta_1 \Delta \mathcal{U}_i(a, 0, t)$ or, equivalently,

$$\Gamma_i(a, t) - \phi_i^1(a, t) = (1 - \eta_1 \Delta) [\Gamma_i(a, t) - \phi_i^2(a, t)].$$

Use (74) to substitute $\phi_i^2(a, t)$ into this last expression and rearrange to get

$$\phi_i^1(a, t) = \frac{\eta_1 \Delta}{1 - (1 - \eta_1 \Delta)(1 - \eta_2 \Delta)} \Gamma_i(a, t). \quad (75)$$

One can check that the offers $\langle a_i^k(t), \phi_i^k(a, t) \rangle$ for $k = 1, 2$, satisfy both agents' participation constraints.³²

From (74) and (75), we see that $\lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} \phi_i^2(a, t) = \lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} \phi_i^1(a, t) = \phi_i(a, t)$, where $\phi_i(a, t)$ is as in (4), with $\frac{\eta_1}{\eta_1 + \eta_2} \equiv \eta$. It is possible to work out the rest of the model in discrete time. In particular, one could let the length of a period be given by Δ' , assume that the probabilities α and δ , the rate of time preference, r , and the utility, $u_i(a)$, are all proportional to Δ' , and then let Δ' approach zero to obtain the same expressions we have in the body of the paper.

³²For the dealer, this only requires $\phi_i^k(a, t) \geq 0$ for $k = 1, 2$ and all i . From (75),

$$\Gamma_i(a, t) - \phi_i^1(a, t) = \frac{\eta_2 \Delta (1 - \eta_1 \Delta)}{1 - (1 - \eta_1 \Delta)(1 - \eta_2 \Delta)} \Gamma_i(a, t) \geq 0,$$

where the inequality is strict provided $a \neq a_i(t)$. So $\langle a_i(t), \phi_i^1(a, t) \rangle$ is preferred by the investor to no trade. It can be easily checked that the same is true of $\langle a_i(t), \phi_i^2(a, t) \rangle$.

C.4 A single bargaining round in a discrete-time formulation of the model

In the context of the model analyzed in Section C.3, we could, instead of considering a bargaining game with a potentially infinite number of rounds, adopt a simpler two-stage bargaining game that delivers the same outcome. In the first stage the dealer makes an offer that the investor accepts or rejects. Following the investor's decision to accept or reject, the bargaining ends with probability $\gamma\Delta$. (As in Section C.3, the risk of breakdown acts as discounting between bargaining rounds and implies that agents strictly prefer not to delay the agreement.) With probability $1 - \gamma\Delta$ one of two players can make a counteroffer without delay. Nature chooses either the investor (with probability $1 - \eta$) or the dealer (with probability η) to make the counteroffer. The recipient of the counteroffer chooses whether to accept or reject it, and regardless of his action, the game ends and the two players part ways.

If the investor is the proposer in the second stage, he offers $\langle a_i^2(t), \phi_i^2(a, t) \rangle = \langle a_i(t), 0 \rangle$, where $a_i(t) \equiv \arg \max_{a' \geq 0} [V_i(a', t) - p(t) a']$. If the dealer is the proposer in the second stage, he offers $\langle a_i(t), \Gamma_i(a, t) \rangle$ where $\Gamma_i(a, t)$ is as in (71). Thus, in the first stage the dealer offers

$$\begin{aligned} \langle a_i^1(t), \phi_i^1(a, t) \rangle &= \arg \max_{(a', \phi)} \phi \\ \text{s.t. } V_i(a', t) - p(t)(a' - a) - \phi - V_i(a, t) &\geq (1 - \gamma\Delta)(1 - \eta)\Gamma_i(a, t) \end{aligned}$$

and $a' \geq 0$. It is easy to see that $a_i^1(t) = a_i(t)$ and $\phi_i^1(a, t) = [1 - (1 - \gamma\Delta)(1 - \eta)]\Gamma_i(a, t)$. Therefore, also in this game we find $\lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} \phi_i^1(a, t) = \phi_i(a, t)$, where $\phi_i(a, t)$ is as in (4).

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D Transversality condition

In this appendix we show that an equilibrium, the asset price $p(t)$ necessarily satisfies the condition $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-rt} p(t) = 0$, used in Lemma 1. The proof we offer here is an adapted version of a similar proof in Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2007).

Consider an investor who effectively contacts the market with Poisson intensity κ . Let $\{T_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ denote the sequence of contact times and N_t the number of contacts over the time interval $[0, t)$. We adopt the convention that $T_0 = 0$ (but T_0 is not a contact time). An asset plan, \mathbf{a} , for the investor specifies his asset holdings as a function time, s , and his history of preference shocks and contact times, $\langle k(s), \{T_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty} \rangle$ for $s \geq 0$. Let $\mathbf{a} = a(s)$ denote an asset plan. An asset plan is feasible if $a(s) = a(T_n)$ for all $s \in [T_n, T_{n+1})$ and $a(0) = a_0 > 0$, which is given. Let $V_i^t(\mathbf{a}, 0)$ be the expected discounted utility over the time interval $[0, t)$ of an investor with preference type i at time 0 who follows an asset plan \mathbf{a} . It satisfies

$$V_i^t(\mathbf{a}, 0) = \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \left[\int_{T_n}^{T_{n+1}} e^{-rs} u_{k(s)} [a(T_n)] \mathbb{I}_{\{T_{n+1} \leq t\}} ds + \int_{T_n}^t e^{-rs} u_{k(s)} [a(T_n)] \mathbb{I}_{\{T_n \leq t < T_{n+1}\}} ds \right] \right\} \\ - \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e^{-rT_n} p(T_n) [a(T_n) - a(T_{n-1})] \mathbb{I}_{\{T_n \leq t\}} \right\},$$

where the expectations operator, \mathbb{E}_i , is taken with respect to the random variables $\langle k(s), \{T_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty} \rangle$ for $s \geq 0$ and is indexed by i to indicate that the expectation is conditional on $k(0) = i$. Collect terms to arrive at

$$V_i^t(\mathbf{a}, 0) = \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \mathbb{I}_{\{0 \leq t < T_1\}} \int_0^t e^{-rs} u_{k(s)}(a_0) ds + \mathbb{I}_{\{T_1 \leq t\}} \left[\int_0^{T_1} e^{-rs} u_{k(s)}(a_0) ds + e^{-rT_1} p(T_1) a_0 \right] \right\} \\ + \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \mathbb{I}_{\{T_{n+1} \leq t\}} \int_{T_n}^{T_{n+1}} e^{-rs} u_{k(s)} [a(T_n)] ds \right\} \\ - \mathbb{E} \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \mathbb{I}_{\{T_{n+1} \leq t\}} e^{-rT_n} \left[p(T_n) - e^{-r(T_{n+1}-T_n)} p(T_{n+1}) \right] a(T_n) \right\} \\ + \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \int_{T_{N_t}}^t e^{-rs} u_{k(s)} [a(T_{N_t})] ds \right\} - \mathbb{E} \{ e^{-rT_{N_t}} p(T_{N_t}) a(T_{N_t}) \}, \quad (76)$$

where the expectations operator, \mathbb{E} , is taken with respect to $\{T_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$. It is shown in Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2007, Lemma 2) that $V_i^t(\mathbf{a}, 0)$ converges to a finite limit $V_i^{\infty}(\mathbf{a}, 0)$ as

$t \rightarrow \infty$. After taking this limit we find

$$\begin{aligned} V_i^\infty(\mathbf{a}, 0) &= \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \int_0^{T_1} e^{-rs} u_k(s) [a(0)] ds + e^{-rT_1} p(T_1) a(0) \right\} \\ &+ \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e^{-rT_n} \left\{ \bar{U}_{k(T_n)} [a(T_n)] - q(T_n) a(T_n) \right\} \right\} \\ &- \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \left\{ e^{-rT_{N_t}} p(T_{N_t}) a(T_{N_t}) \right\}. \end{aligned} \quad (77)$$

To arrive at (77), note that $T_n = \sum_{k=1}^n (T_k - T_{k-1})$ is the sum of n independent exponentially-distributed random variables, so $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{I}_{\{T_{n-1} \leq t < T_n\}} = 0$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{I}_{\{T_n \leq t\}} = 1$ almost surely for all finite $n \geq 1$. The former implies that the first term on the right-side of (76) converges to 0 as $t \rightarrow \infty$. The latter implies that the second term of (76) converges to the first term of (77) and that the second and third terms of (76) converge to the second term of (77). To see that the first term on the last line of the right side of (76) goes to 0 as $t \rightarrow \infty$, write it as

$$\mathbb{E}_i \left\{ e^{-rT_{N_t}} \int_0^{t-T_{N_t}} e^{-rs} u_k(s+T_{N_t}) [a(T_{N_t})] ds \right\}. \quad (78)$$

Any asset plan that is consistent with equilibrium must be bounded, hence the integrand of (78) is bounded above. This integrand is also bounded below, since either u is bounded below or else it satisfies the Inada condition which ensures that any optimal plan has $a(s) > 0$ for all s . The fact that $t - T_{N_t} < \infty$ almost surely (because $t - T_{N_t}$ is exponentially distributed) implies that the integral in (78) is bounded. Finally, note that $\Pr(T_{N_t} < \tau) = e^{-\kappa(t-\tau)}$ for any $\tau < t$, so $T_{N_t} \rightarrow \infty$ almost surely as $t \rightarrow \infty$, which means that (78) goes to 0 as $t \rightarrow \infty$.

Now consider an optimal asset plan, \mathbf{a} , and scale it down by $1 - \varepsilon$. Define $\Delta_\varepsilon \equiv V_i^\infty(\mathbf{a}, 0) - V_i^\infty[(1 - \varepsilon)\mathbf{a}, 0]$; then,

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_\varepsilon &= \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e^{-rT_n} \left\{ \bar{U}_{k(T_n)} [a(T_n)] - \bar{U}_{k(T_n)} [(1 - \varepsilon) a(T_n)] - \varepsilon q(T_n) a(T_n) \right\} \right\} \\ &- \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \left\{ \varepsilon e^{-rT_{N_t}} p(T_{N_t}) a(T_{N_t}) \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Divide the previous expression by ε to get

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Delta_\varepsilon}{\varepsilon} &= \mathbb{E}_i \left\{ \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e^{-rT_n} \frac{\bar{U}_{k(T_n)} [a(T_n)] - \bar{U}_{k(T_n)} [a(T_n)(1 - \varepsilon)] - \varepsilon q(T_n) a(T_n)}{\varepsilon} \right\} \\ &- \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \left\{ e^{-rT_{N_t}} p(T_{N_t}) a(T_{N_t}) \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Since the asset plan \mathbf{a} is optimal, we can take the limit as $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$, apply L'Hôpital's Rule and use the first-order condition for the investor's problem (e.g., (29)) to find that it must satisfy

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Delta_\varepsilon}{\varepsilon} = - \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \{ e^{-rT_{N_t}} p(T_{N_t}) a(T_{N_t}) \} \geq 0.$$

Since $e^{-rt} p(t) a(t) \geq 0$ for all t , the previous condition can be rewritten as

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \{ e^{-rT_{N_t}} p(T_{N_t}) a(T_{N_t}) \} = 0 \tag{79}$$

for each investor. We can use the market-clearing condition to write

$$\int_{\Omega} a^\omega(t) d\omega = A, \quad \forall t,$$

where $a^\omega(t)$ is investor ω 's asset demand at time t and Ω denotes the set of investors. Hence,

$$A \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \{ e^{-rT_{N_t}} p(T_{N_t}) \} = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_{\Omega} e^{-rT_{N_t}} p(T_{N_t}) a^\omega(T_{N_t}) d\omega \right\} = 0,$$

since (79) holds for each ω . Then $T_{N_t} \rightarrow \infty$ almost surely as $t \rightarrow \infty$, so $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-rt} p(t) = 0$. ■

E Related literature

In this appendix we draw connections to some related literature.

E.1 Search models of over-the-counter markets

Traders who operate in markets with OTC-style frictions will seek to mitigate these trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions so as to reduce their trading needs. Our analysis has shown that this a critical aspect of investor behavior in illiquid markets. To illustrate this point, in this section we derive the main predictions of a version DGP’s model and contrast them with those of a special case of our formulation. This comparison will underscore the fact that the type of “liquidity hedging” that we have identified—and that only becomes possible with unrestricted asset holdings—generates new insights on how trading frictions shape the various dimensions of market liquidity, alters the empirical predictions of the theory, and leads to a different assessment of their normative implications.

We will contrast the empirical predictions of DGP’s model with those of a special case of our model with $\mathbb{X} = \{1, 2\}$ and $u_i(a) = \varepsilon_i \frac{a^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$ for $i \in \mathbb{X}$ and $\sigma > 0$. We focus on the version of DGP’s model with no inter-investor meetings (e.g., the version that DGP use in their Theorem 4 and part (i) of Theorem 6). DGP restrict $a \in \{0, 1\}$ and let u_{ij} denote the flow utility of an investor with asset position $i \in \{0, 1\}$ and preference type $j \in \{0, 1\}$.³³ DGP assume $u_{00} = u_{01} = 0$, so for comparison purposes, we do the same hereafter. To simplify the notation, in both models we let π denote the steady-state fraction of investors with high valuation.³⁴

Price. Since asset holdings are indivisible in DGP, equilibrium in the interdealer market requires investors who are on the long side of the market to be indifferent between trading and not trading. It is easy to show that in steady state investors who want to sell are on the short side if and only if $A < \pi$. The equilibrium price in the interdealer market is

$$p = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{r} \frac{(r+\kappa)u_{11} + \delta \bar{u}}{r+\kappa+\delta} & \text{if } A < \pi \\ \frac{1}{r} \frac{(r+\kappa)u_{10} + \delta \bar{u}}{r+\kappa+\delta} & \text{if } \pi < A, \end{cases} \quad (80)$$

where $\bar{u} \equiv \pi_1 u_{11} + \pi_0 u_{10}$.³⁵

³³DGP state their restriction on asset holdings as $a \in [0, 1]$ but only study equilibria in which agents hold either 0 or 1 unit of the asset, which is effectively equivalent to imposing the restriction $a \in \{0, 1\}$.

³⁴“High valuation” corresponds to the index “2” in our formulation and “1” in DGP.

³⁵If $A = \pi$, $p \in \left[\frac{(r+\kappa)u_{10} + \delta \bar{u}}{r(r+\kappa+\delta)}, \frac{(r+\kappa)u_{11} + \delta \bar{u}}{r(r+\kappa+\delta)} \right]$ and the equilibrium price in the interdealer market is indeterminate.

The asset holding restrictions in DGP are also the reason why the asset price in their theory is independent of the stock of assets, A , for any $A < \pi$ and for any $A > \pi$, with a discontinuity at $A = \pi$. In contrast, the asset price in our model is smooth and decreasing in A . For example, in the special case of our model that we are considering in this section, $p = \left(\sum_i \pi_i \bar{\varepsilon}_i^{1/\sigma}\right)^\sigma / rA^\sigma$.³⁶ The behavior of the asset price in response to changes in the trading frictions in DGP depends critically on the level of A . From (80), p is increasing in α (decreasing in η) if $A < \pi$ but decreasing in α (increasing in η) if $A > \pi$. In contrast, with unrestricted asset holdings these extensive-margin considerations are irrelevant to assess the impact of trading frictions on the asset price (recall Proposition 4).

Trade volume. Trade volume is $\mathcal{V} = \alpha \frac{\delta\pi(1-\pi)}{\alpha+\delta} \frac{(\bar{\varepsilon}_2)^{1/\sigma} - (\bar{\varepsilon}_1)^{1/\sigma}}{\pi(\bar{\varepsilon}_2)^{1/\sigma} + (1-\pi)(\bar{\varepsilon}_1)^{1/\sigma}} A$ in our model and $\mathcal{V}_{DGP} = \alpha \frac{\delta\pi(1-\pi)}{\alpha+\delta} \min\left\{\frac{A}{\pi}, \frac{1-A}{1-\pi}\right\}$ in DGP. The latter is independent of the dealers' bargaining power, η , and of all preference parameters and holding payoffs (e.g., r, k). In contrast, these parameters are critical determinants of trade volume in our theory, as they influence the investors' choices of asset holdings (the second factor in \mathcal{V}). Our model predicts that markets in which dealers have less market power will tend exhibit larger trade volume.³⁷

Transaction costs. DGP's transaction costs can be expressed in terms of the intermediation fees ϕ_{01} and ϕ_{10} that dealers charge investors who want to buy and sell, respectively. The equilibrium spread is $s = \frac{\eta(u_{11} - u_{10})}{r + \kappa + \delta}$.³⁸ Conditional on having contacted an investor, the expected intermediation fee that accrues to a dealer in DGP is $\Phi_{DGP} = \frac{\delta\pi(1-\pi)}{\alpha+\delta} \min\left\{\frac{A}{\pi}, \frac{1-A}{1-\pi}\right\} s$. This key determinant of dealers' incentives to make markets is decreasing in the investors' contact rate with dealers, α , and increasing in the dealers' bargaining power, η . In contrast, as we have shown analytically in Proposition 1, in our model with no restrictions on asset holdings it is natural for the average fee to be nonmonotonic in α and η . Our theory suggests that these nonmonotonicities can be important. From an applied standpoint, they help explain how OTC

³⁶Notice that we obtain DGP's formulation with $A < \pi$ as a special case of ours when $\sigma \rightarrow 0$.

³⁷Apart from these qualitative differences, the theory with unrestricted portfolios also has different quantitative implications for the relationship between trade volume and trading frictions. For example, DGP's model has a sharp empirical implication: the elasticity of trade volume with respect to trading frictions equals $\frac{\delta}{\alpha+\delta} \in (0, 1)$. In contrast, in the model with unrestricted asset holdings the corresponding elasticity is larger by an amount that equals the elasticity of $(a_2 - a_1)$ with respect to α —which is positive, capturing the notion that each investor wishes to conduct a larger trade when frictions are reduced.

³⁸Since asset holdings in DGP are restricted to lie in $\{0, 1\}$, every trade is of size 1 and hence $\phi_{01} + \phi_{10} = s$. In addition, the indivisibility assumption implies that dealers either charge a fee on asset sales or on asset purchases, but not both. Specifically, if $A < \pi$ then $\phi_{01} = 0$ and investors only pay a fee $\phi_{10} = s$ when they sell. Conversely, if $\pi < A$, $\phi_{10} = 0$ and investors only pay a fee $\phi_{01} = s$ when they buy.

markets have reacted to recent changes in their market structure (see Lagos and Rocheteau, 2006). From a theoretical standpoint, they can generate self-fulfilling liquidity shortages in markets with free entry of dealers (Section 6).³⁹

Another key difference with DGP is the fact that since the equilibrium in the model with unrestricted portfolios implies a nondegenerate distribution of trade sizes, our theory has predictions for the relationship between transaction costs and transaction sizes. As we showed in Lemma 4, transaction costs are increasing in the size of the transaction. Thus, if $a_i - a_j > a_i - a_k > 0$, then the effective price at which the investor buys is $\hat{p}_{ji} > \hat{p}_{ki}$, i.e., he effectively pays higher prices when he conducts larger purchases. Conversely, $\hat{p}_{ji} < \hat{p}_{ki}$ if $a_i - a_j < a_i - a_k < 0$, i.e., he effectively receives lower prices when he conducts larger sales. In other words, the theory with unrestricted asset holdings naturally generates instances of *price concession* which are commonplace in OTC markets.⁴⁰

Execution delays. DGP endogenized trading delays by allowing a single monopolist dealer to choose search intensity once-and-for-all at the beginning of time. Free entry of competing dealers or market-makers is a feature of most OTC markets, however, the implications of this microstructure have not yet been explored in the literature. We find that allowing for free entry of dealers is a natural way to endogenize execution delays and the amount of liquidity supplied by dealers, and that it provides an important channel through which changes in market conditions affect transaction costs and trade volume. In addition, the interaction between free entry and unrestricted asset holdings leads to a natural kind of strategic complementarity that can help rationalize self-fulfilling liquidity shortages in markets with OTC-style frictions (Section 6).

Welfare. The equilibrium allocation is always constrained efficient in the baseline model of DGP—regardless of the value of η —which stands in contrast to the finding we report in Proposition 2. The reason is that in our model investors choose asset holdings, while this intensive margin is absent in DGP. For the same reason, the inefficiency result we find in the context of the model with free entry also has no counterpart in DGP.

³⁹The spread, s , is decreasing in α and increasing in η in this version of DGP with no inter-investor meetings. One can also verify that the average effective spread weighted by the sizes of each trade and expressed as a proportion of the price is also decreasing in α and increasing in η . The behavior of this measure of the marketwide spread, i.e., (38) in Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) is much more complicated in our model, where the investors' expected holding payoffs, their individual asset demands, the asset price, and the whole distribution of asset holdings change in response to a change in α . Our numerical work, some of which we have reported in Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) is in accordance with the predictions of DGP.

⁴⁰See Section 4.3 in Harris (2003).

A paper that is closely related to ours is an independent contribution by Gârleanu (2006), which studies the asset pricing and volume implications of infrequent (Poisson) trading opportunities. Some of our findings are similar: he also finds that under certain conditions (e.g., a mean-reversion property of preference shocks) investors take more extreme positions when trading delays are short. Also, Gârleanu stresses that the asset price is not affected by the trading frictions—which is true in our model for a particular specification of the utility function (Proposition 4). In terms of differences, trades in Gârleanu (2006) are not intermediated by dealers so he could not consider the implications of execution delays for transaction costs and dealers’ incentives to provide liquidity, which are at the center of our analysis. Also, Gârleanu (2006) formalizes the investors’ motive for holding the asset by developing the “hedging needs” motive we mentioned in footnote 4. Despite the differences in the formulations, some of our results on the effects of α on trade volume are remarkably similar.⁴¹

E.2 Search models of money

Here we discuss the relationship between our theory and the search-theoretic literature on monetary exchange. In contrast to the monetary literature our model does not have fiat money as an asset and it does not aim to explain the use or emergence of a medium of exchange. However, it shares a common objective with modern monetary theory, which is to endogenize some relevant dimensions of “liquidity.” We organize the comparison around four types of results.

Endogenous distribution of asset holdings. Because of idiosyncratic (trading) shocks, under incomplete markets, our model generates a nondegenerate distribution of wealth as Green and Zhou (2002) and Molico (2006), but also Aiyagari (1994). The trading mechanism in our model is closer to the one in Molico: the asset is traded in bilateral matches and the transaction price is determined through bargaining. In terms of the methodology, both Aiyagari (1994) and Molico (2006) solve their models numerically. Green and Zhou (2002) is closer to our analysis in that they can characterize the equilibrium and its distribution of money holdings analytically. Moreover, like us, they do not restrict their analysis to stationary equilibria. The pricing mechanism is different (Green and Zhou consider a double auction).

Bargaining and the distribution of prices. A key insight of our model is that the interme-

⁴¹See the discussion around Proposition 10 in Appendix B for details.

diation fee depends on the (endogenous) asset position of the investor. Similarly, in monetary search models with bargaining, the transaction price depends on the traders' money balances. This dependence occurs through (at least) two channels. First, the buyer can be constrained by his money balances. This mechanism is present even in models with a degenerate distribution of money balances, such as Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005). Second, the money holdings of an agent affect his marginal utility of wealth, and hence the terms of trade. These two effects are absent from our model since our investors never face binding borrowing constraints, and the marginal utility of wealth is normalized to one due to the quasi-linear preferences. An investor's asset holdings influence the outcome of the bargaining in our model because this asset position determines the size of the gains from trade that will be generated for readjusting the investor's asset holdings.

Uniqueness of the equilibrium. The equilibrium (not just the steady state) is unique in our model. In contrast, the model of fiat money of Green and Zhou can display multiple equilibria. This indeterminacy is a general feature of models of fiat money. Even in models with a degenerate distribution of money balances, e.g., Lagos and Wright (2005), the equilibrium is typically not unique, unless one restricts attention to steady-state monetary equilibria. Models of monetary exchange consider environments where the asset being traded is fiat money, whose value emerges endogenously when it is valued as a medium of exchange that mitigates a double-coincidence of wants problem. In contrast, in our model and the rest of the literature that deals with the trading process in OTC markets, the asset being traded is not used to facilitate trades; it is valued for its intrinsic characteristics (e.g., dividend flow).

Endogenous trading delays and multiple equilibria. In our model, the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria with dealer entry arises from complementarities between investors' asset demands and dealers' entry decision. If more dealers participate in the market, it is easier for investors to readjust their asset holdings which induces them to take more extreme positions, and this in turn makes it profitable for dealers to enter. Rocheteau and Wright (2005) consider a monetary search model with free entry of sellers and find that the strategic complementarities between the sellers' entry decision and the buyers' demand for real balances generates multiple steady-state equilibria. If buyers accumulate more real balances, the buyer and the seller are able to exploit larger gains from trade, which gives more incentives for sellers to participate in the market. In both models, the multiplicity does not require increasing returns to scale in the

matching function as in Diamond (1982) or as in most recent search models of financial markets, e.g., Vayanos and Weill (2007). A key difference between our model and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) is the opportunity cost from holding real balances in the latter, which has no counterpart in our formulation. If the opportunity cost from holding cash balances to make a purchase is zero (e.g., if the nominal interest rate is zero) then the multiplicity of (active) steady-state equilibria in that model disappears. In contrast, the multiplicity in our model obtains even though investors do not bear any opportunity cost (e.g., forgone interest) while searching for an asset to purchase (since they have access to a technology to produce the numéraire good). Also, notice that the gains from trade in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) depend on the mean of the distribution of real balances (since the distribution of real balances is degenerate as in Lagos and Wright, 2005), which is independent of trading frictions when the nominal interest rate is zero. In our model it is the second moment, which is endogenous and depends on the trading frictions, what gives rise to multiple steady-state equilibria.

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