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Evaluation of the Mesa Gang Intervention Program (MGIP)

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Acknowledgments (Mesa)

Many thanks to all who helped with the National Evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program in Mesa, Arizona. The Evaluation could not have been completed without the extensive efforts and cooperation of the Mesa Police Department, the lead agency, the City Manager's Office, the City Council, the United Way, Mesa Public Schools, and the Juvenile and Adult divisions of the Maricopa County Probation Department.

The burden of collaborating with the National Evaluation team was added to the challenge of developing a comprehensive program to address the youth gang problem. Project-related agency staff, Mesa public and non-profit agencies, grassroots organizations and city government leaders went to extra lengths, not only to support the Project, but to make possible the elaboration of existing agency data systems useful to the Evaluation.

Project and related agency staff directly contributed to the success of the Evaluation. The local evaluator went to great lengths to develop and collect data from a comparison youth sample, as well as from program youth. Based on their collective work, we now know better what needs to be done to reduce the youth gang problem, and have documented how it was done.

We must extend special thanks to the commitment and talents of the Project leaders: Dan Zorich, Project Case Management Coordinator and Supervisor, Adult Probation Department, Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County; Captain Lin Adams, Project Director, Commander, Mesa Police Department; as well as the very able Project Team of outreach youth workers, probation, police and other workers; T. Farrel Jensen, Vice-Mayor of Mesa; Lieutenant Steve Toland, Commander of Gang Crimes and Project Director (succeeding Captain Lin Adams), Cheryl K. Townsend, Chief Juvenile Probation Officer, Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County; Dr. Ray Rafford, Assistant Superintendent, and Dr. Lou Ann Dickson, Research and Evaluation, Mesa Public Schools; Jan Strauss, Chief of the Mesa Police Department; Dr. Guy Spiesman, Senior Vice-President, Mesa United Way; and last, but certainly not least, our highly resourceful local Evaluators, Professor Charles M. Katz and Vincent J. Webb of the College of Human Services, Administration of Justice Program, Arizona State University, who provided much valuable insight into the Mesa gang problem.

These people were an extraordinary crew, highly committed to the success of the Project and the National Evaluation.

Irving A. Spergel and Staff, National Evaluation

Abstract

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project, based on the OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Model was successful in reducing the youth gang problem at the individual and Project-area levels. The Mesa Police Department – the lead agency – collaborated in the development of the program with the Maricopa Juvenile and Adult Probation Departments, the Mesa School District and United Way social agencies, and received strong support from the Mesa City Council. In the course of the five-year Project, the MGIP utilized a case-management approach involving a team of gang police, probation officers, case managers and outreach youth workers.

The program emphasized the provision of social-intervention services, as well as controls, for 258 youth, mainly male Latinos between the ages of 12 and 20. Most were gang members on probation, but were not violent offenders. In a multivariate, statistically-controlled comparison of these youth with 96 comparison youth (who received no program services) from three comparison gang-problem areas, the program youth reduced their level of arrests 18% more than did the comparison youth, over a four-year program period compared to an equivalent four-year pre-program period. The program area also experienced a 10.4% greater reduction in selected youth-typical crime incidents relative to an average of such crime incidents over the three comparison areas. The factors of gang identification – gang membership, gang association, or no gang connection – were not significant in accounting for changes in arrest patterns. Category of prior total arrests, program effects and community/institutional collaboration were the most significant factors accounting for the considerable measure of success.

Executive Summary

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project was generally successful in reducing the delinquency-related gang problem at both individual and area levels. Its success in adapting the OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Model was based largely on the collaboration of the lead agency – the Mesa Police Department – with the Maricopa County Juvenile and Adult Probation Departments, the Mesa School District, United Way social agencies, and the City Council. The Project utilized a case management team approach, involving the Project Director, a Case Management Coordinator, gang detectives, probation officers, outreach youth workers, and a Youth Intervention Specialist – all housed together in a central location in the program area.

OJJDP funded the Project for five years, with additional funding from local agency sources, especially from the police and probation departments. The gang problem in its delinquent character was just emerging in Mesa, although gangs were known to have existed there for generations. Gangs as a criminal-justice problem were identified only in the early 1990s. The key program objective was to provide social-intervention services, as well as control activities, to gang-involved and at-risk youth, most of whom were on probation but were not serious offenders (at least not for violence offenses).

Two-hundred-and-fifty-eight (258) program youth were provided with a wide variety of social-intervention and control services, including individual and family counseling, group discussions, referrals to a variety of community agencies, and surveillance, supervision, monitoring and arrest. Some neighborhood-development services were provided to residents of

the program area. A sample of 96 comparison youth was matched with program youth on age, gender and program-exposure time. The comparison youth were from an area similar to the program area but did not receive Project services. Older-youth probationers with arrest records predominated in the program during its first two years of operations; somewhat younger, less-serious offenders and non-offenders predominated in the second two years. Approximately 82% of youth in the program were males; 85% were Latino (mainly of Mexican or Mexican-American origin); at program entry, ages ranged from 12 to 20 years, with 15 to 17-year-olds comprising the major age group.

The majority of youth at program entry (or its equivalent for comparison youth) were either self-declared gang members, or were so identified by Project workers. An additional 17% were gang associates, but more than 20% were non-gang youth. Based on arrest records, gang-identified youth were more often delinquent than gang associates and non-gang youth; more than a third of program youth had no arrest history prior to program entry. For both program and comparison youth, between two-thirds and three-quarters of pre-program and program-period arrests were for property offenses and minor offenses (such as driving without a license, disorderly conduct, possession of alcohol, and curfew violations). Serious violence comprised 3.8% of all arrests; total violence (including felony and misdemeanor violence) comprised 14.5%; and drug arrests about 8.0% of all arrests.

A total of 10,933 services, 11,893 direct worker contacts and 3140 coordinated worker contacts were provided by Project workers to program youth. Program data analysis was based on 1650 worker tracking forms completed every three months by Project workers. Youth who entered the program during its first two years were provided with an average of 27.8 months of

services and worker contacts; youth who entered the program in the last two years were provided with an average of 9.4 months of services and worker contacts. Despite the differences in length of program-exposure time, youth who came into the program in the last two years were provided with more services (69.6%), more direct contacts (50.0%) and more coordinated contacts (57.1%) on a monthly basis than were youth who came into the program in the first two years.

The Evaluators were able to obtain interviews and self-reports only for program youth who entered the program in the first two years, and for comparison youth. Complete police arrest histories, however, were obtained for all youth in the program, whether interviewed or not, and for the comparison youth (all of whom were interviewed). The effectiveness of the program was determined at the individual and area levels, using arrest data. A series of multivariate procedures (General Linear and Logistic Regression models) were constructed to examine program effects, controlling for youth demographics, gang membership, program-exposure time, and prior arrest histories. The key dependent, or outcome, variables were differences in annualized total arrests between the matched program and pre-program periods.

We also compared differences in self-reported offenses among the interviewed program youth (n = 106) and the interviewed comparison youth (n = 96) over the generally shorter (1 to 1¼-year period between the first and second interviews. Results of the analyses using arrest and self-report data were similar.

In general, program and comparison youth reduced their average levels of arrests (and self-reported offenses). Program youth, under controlled statistical conditions, had an 18% greater reduction in total arrests than comparison youth. The oldest age group (18 years and over) and the youngest age group (12 to 14 years) reduced their levels of total arrests more than

did the 15 to 17-year-olds. Program females did significantly better than males.

Factors that did not seem to make a difference were: whether the youth was a gang member, a gang associate, or a non-gang youth; length of time (years) in the program; and probation status. The most significant factor (or main effect) in the models was prior arrest category (or self-reported offenses) × program effects.

Social-intervention services (including individual or family counseling and group discussion) – whether provided by probation officers, case managers, or outreach youth workers – were the significant program variables predictive of lower outcome effects for total arrests, including arrests for violence, drugs, property and “other” (minor) offenses. Suppression activities were generally less effective. General levels of contacts by the various types of Project workers (coordinated suppression or non-suppression services) and total services were also less important. Specific level of social-intervention service was not significant, except that the highest level of social-intervention services was significant in lowering arrests for youth with the highest category of prior arrests.

Program youth (i.e., those for whom interview data were available) provided with high levels of social-intervention services increased their levels of educational achievement compared to program youth who were provided with low levels of social-intervention services (controlling for age and pre-program arrests). Further, there was evidence that those program youth who stayed in school or achieved a higher grade level significantly decreased their total arrests.

Project success was also evident at the area level. Total incidents of crime typically committed by youth (including violence, property, drug crime and status offenses) declined 10.4% more in the program area than in the average of the three comparison areas. Furthermore,

the program was more effective with program gang youth who hung out in the program area, compared to program gang youth who hung out with gangs in the comparison areas. The fact that Project workers were particularly active in the program area probably accounted for these differences.

Finally, we observe that the MGIP did not incorporate all of the elements of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model in program development, particularly the use of outreach youth workers in the neighborhood, and collaboration with grassroots organizations. Also, more seriously-delinquent gang youth should have been included in the program.

In sum, major factors contributing to Project success were cohesive and capable community and staff leadership committed to a balanced social-intervention and control approach, particularly to the provision of social-intervention services to moderately delinquent, non-violent, and at-risk youth.

Evaluation of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP)

Gang Research, Evaluation and Technical Assistance (GRETA) Projects

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Evaluation of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP)

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Chapter 1

Program and Evaluation Background

Introduction

In 1994, in accordance with Sections 281 and 282 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act of 1974, as amended, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, utilized a collaborative process to respond to America's gang problem (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994). Its purpose was to implement a comprehensive approach for gang prevention, intervention, and suppression through local programs around the country. Five cities – Bloomington-Normal (McLean County), Illinois; San Antonio, Texas; Mesa, Arizona; Tucson, Arizona; and Riverside, California – were selected and awarded funds for periods of four or five years to develop and conduct a series of coordinated efforts to assess the nature and extent of the local gang problem, and to plan and implement comprehensive, community-wide programs.

The comprehensive initiative also provided funding for technical assistance, and for an evaluation of the development and impact of these programs. This report of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) is the second of a series of evaluations of each of the five programs.

Background. Youth gangs were in existence and had been troublesome for many decades in large cities, among them Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit, San Antonio, and Cleveland (Miller, 2001). Youth gang violence, gang-related drug activities, and other forms of gang crime became increasingly prevalent in cities and towns of

varying sizes, and in rural areas as well. Violence was increasingly lethal in the late 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s. Drive-by shootings claimed the lives of rival gang members as well as those of innocent bystanders. Entrepreneurial gang members also became active in the distribution of illegal drugs. A range of other types of organized group crimes committed by youth was also prevalent (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994).

A disturbing trend since the 1980s and 1990s has been the emergence, or re-emergence, of the gang problem in a range of large-, mid-, and small-sized cities, suburban areas, small towns, rural areas and Indian reservations in almost all 50 states, Puerto Rico and the territories. However, the specific scope, nature and severity of the gang problem in those jurisdictions has not been clearly defined. The best approach(es) for addressing the problem has (have) not been identified.

In an early national survey of law enforcement agencies, officials in 91% of the 79 largest U.S. cities reported the presence of youth gang problems (Curry, 1992). It conservatively estimated that during 1991, there were 4,881 gangs with nearly 250,000 gang members. An estimated 780,200 gang members were active in 28,700 youth gangs in 1998. This was a decrease from 1997's figures of 816,000 gang members and 30,500 gangs (National Youth Gang Center, November, 2000). In 1996, 1997, and 1998, Curry, Maxson, and Howell examined gang homicide trends in 1216 cities with populations greater than 25,000. A total of 237 cities reported both a gang problem and at least one gang-related homicide for each of these years. However, relatively few of the cities, outside of Los Angeles and Chicago, reported large numbers of gang homicides (Curry, Maxson, Howell, 2001 #3).

The characteristics of the gang problem, including such terms as gang, gang member, and

gang incident, have not been clearly or consensually defined. A street gang or youth gang, for program and policy-development purposes, is usually differentiated from adult crime gangs, prison gangs, motorcycle gangs, drug gangs, tagger groups, racist groups, or even delinquent groups. Nevertheless, these categories of gangs, crime groups, or delinquent groups can overlap. What generally distinguishes the youth gang are a commitment to violence, group symbolism, turf, drug use and drug selling, variable degrees of group cohesion, and sustainability.

Most active youth-gang members are between the ages of 12 and 20, sometimes younger or older. While gangs comprise mainly males, females are increasingly identified as gang members and commit a range of property crimes, although they tend to be less violent, less chronically delinquent, and less committed to the gang than males. Youth identified as gang members usually have different statuses in, and degrees of attachment to, the gangs, which vary over time. They generally come from low-income, minority, problem families in certain often-segregated neighborhoods. The definition of the gang problem, based on the definition of a gang incident, varies somewhat from city to city or state to state. The definition of a gang incident or a gang offense depends on: 1) gang-membership criteria (i.e., the youth has been identified as a member of a criminal gang or associates with gang members and is on a police gang-membership [or gang-associate] list); or 2) gang-motivated criteria (i.e., the youth has been involved in an incident involving certain distinctive gang characteristics, such as drive-by shooting, intimidation, retaliation, use of symbols, signs, or graffiti) (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995). The definitions are usually incorporated in state law and have become a basis for increased law-enforcement activity and justice-system processing. The gang-membership definition generally results in identification of larger numbers of gang youth than the gang-motivational definition

(Maxson and Klein, 1990).

While progress has been made in defining and explaining the gang problem, limited progress has been made in learning or demonstrating how to deal with the problem successfully. In recent decades, law enforcement has been the dominant agency attempting to control or resolve the problem, which nevertheless continues to develop and spread in sometimes cyclical, seemingly unpredictable ways. Increasingly, policy makers, program operators, and researchers have concluded that the youth-gang problem is highly complex, and that a better-informed and coordinated effort is required from key community and public agency elements to correctly target problem gangs and gang youth, and develop an interrelated approach to successfully addressing the problem.

Preliminary Efforts. In 1987, OJJDP funded The Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Program, a preliminary research and development initiative to investigate and describe conditions that perpetuate the youth-gang problem, and to develop a model for local community effort to reduce it. Literature reviews, national surveys, site visits, conferences, reports, intervention and technical assistance models were produced. The report of that program (1987-1991) concluded that the gang problem varied somewhat from community to community, but that it was a result of a combination of interactive factors: poverty, rapid population movement, racism, segregation and social isolation of minority groups, weak family structure, adolescent youth in crisis, the development of youth-gang subcultures, and, in particular, community disorganization, or fragmentation of levels and types of community efforts to address the problem (Spiegel, 1995).

A model approach was developed based on the notion that local institutions had to

coordinate their efforts and target particular community sectors and unsatisfactory organizational arrangements, as well as particular gangs, gang members and youth highly at risk of gang involvement (Spergel, 1995). In 1994, OJJDP solicited applications for, and subsequently launched, the five-site demonstration of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program (the “Comprehensive Gang Program”). Comprehensive evaluation, training and technical assistance efforts, and the creation of a national advisory board were to be closely associated with and related to the set of demonstration programs (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994).

Theory

The Program Model derives from Community Social Disorganization theory and, to some extent, from theories such as Differential Association, Opportunity, Anomie, and Social Control. The community-based program model builds on the ideas and research of Battin-Pearson et al (1998), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Cohen (1980), Curry and Spergel (1988), Haynie (2001), Hirschi (1969), Klein (1971, 1995), Kobrin, (1951), Kornhauser (1978), Markowitz, Bellair, Liska and Liu (2001), Merton (1957), Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush (2001), Sampson (1991), Sampson and Groves (1989), Sampson and Laub (1993), Shaw and McKay (1972), Spergel (1995), Sullivan and Miller (1999), Sutherland and Cressey (1978), Suttles (1968), Thrasher (1927), Veysey and Messner (1999), and Zatz (1987).

Gang-problem communities (or segments of communities) are viewed as comprising two overlapping types – chronic and emerging. The first is characterized by an established, marginalized population and a long-term, serious gang problem. The second is characterized by

a recently-arrived, less-marginalized population and a less serious, more recently-developed gang problem. Scope, duration, and severity of both adult and juvenile crime, including gang crime, tend to be greater in the chronic than in the emerging gang-crime communities or their segments. Turf-based gang violence and drug-crime markets, although not always closely related, seem to be more prevalent in chronic gang-problem communities; a range of minor offenses, less violence and increasing drug crime activities seem to be more prevalent in emerging gang-problem communities. The nature of the gang problem and the response to it are also based on the community's – especially the city's – perception of the problem, its level of concern, and political interests in addressing the problem.

Organized crime and youth-gang crime are often better developed and interrelated in chronic than in emerging gang-problem communities. Conventional or legitimate institutions are relatively stronger in the emerging local gang-crime community or community segment, and are also better integrated with conventional institutions of the city or larger community. Moral panic often characterizes the response of formerly-stable but now changing populations, and of established community leaders in emerging gang-crime communities (Cohen, 1980; Zatz, 1987). Levels of victimization due to violence are lower in emerging gang-crime communities, but higher in chronic gang-crime communities.

Socialization of youth in the chronic gang-problem community is more likely to occur because of the presence of a variety of criminal, weak social-agency or conventional-neighborhood and street-based group pressures (Venkatesh, 1999) than in the emerging gang-problem community. Youth access to illegitimate opportunities and to gang status may not be as well-developed in the emerging gang-problem community, where legitimate opportunities may

be relatively more available, and pressures for conventional behavior may be greater (see also Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).

Social-intervention and suppression strategies are poorly integrated in chronic gang-problem communities. The police may pay more attention to serious gang crime, while social agencies and grassroots organizations provide limited social support for youth, especially those at risk. Suppression and intervention strategies are carried out in a manner unrelated to each other. In emerging gang-problem communities, social intervention and suppression strategies are reasonably well-integrated, at least at the established-agency level of the community, and efforts are usually targeted to youth committing less-serious gang offenses. Community, justice system, and social service agencies seem to overreact to the presence of low-income minority youths, who are increasingly identified, or defined, as gang-at-risk or actual gang members.

Efforts to counter community social disorganization require mobilization of agency and citizen interest, social intervention, and provision of social opportunities as well as suppression, but in different combinations in the chronic and emerging gang-problem communities. In the chronic gang-problem community, relatively greater responsibility may be necessary at the city or county level for mobilizing local and area-wide institutions, coordinating strategies and efforts, and developing and extending resources to prevent and control serious gang problems. In the emerging gang-problem community, relatively greater responsibility may be necessary at the local neighborhood or community level for mobilizing and integrating local institutions, coordinating prevention and social-intervention strategies, and for directing existing local resources to less serious gang problems, and particularly to youth at risk for gang involvement. However, chronic and emerging gang-problem sectors of a community or region may interact and

even coalesce, and therefore variable attention may need to be paid and resources allocated to the different types of youth-gang problems at the individual and community-sector levels over time.

The Program Model

The OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program Model consists of three sets of interrelated components: key program elements, strategies, and implementation principles, all directed to the nature and scope of the gang problem and related demographic, socio-economic, organizational and local community factors (Chart 1.1). Coordinated policy, program, and worker efforts have to take place at individual-youth, organization, and community levels. Ideally, all components of the Model have to be present, and developed for maximum positive effects, for the reduction of the gang problem to occur.

Program Elements

A series of program structures and processes is necessary to activate the Model, which comprise a steering committee, lead-agency management, an interagency street team (including youth outreach workers), grassroots involvement, social services, criminal justice participation, school participation, and employment and training.

The Steering Committee has to engage the leadership of the community, including the mayor's office, public and non-profit agencies, local schools, grassroots and county organizations in a comprehensive effort of gang-problem analysis, policy planning, strategy development, acquisition of resources, and program implementation and refinement. The direction of the Gang

Program Model requires criminal justice system policy and administrative support, and the front-line collaborative involvement of law enforcement, probation, community-based youth agencies, schools and employment sources, as well as the involvement of local grassroots groups (particularly churches and neighborhood groups) and even of former gang members. The steering committee is to bring the knowledge and influence of key community leaders together in a cohesive structure to guide the development of the Gang Program and an approach that will both protect the community and target gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth for integration into the legitimate life of the community.

Lead-Agency Management. A lead agency has to be selected to develop, manage and coordinate the various elements of the Comprehensive Gang Program. Such an organization must have a background of work with gang-involved or highly at-risk gang youth, and a broad understanding of their needs and problems. It should have the capacity to mobilize its own agency resources as well as those of other agencies, to enlist grassroots support, and develop additional resources to sustain the Program. A police department, youth agency, public school, community mental health agency, probation department, or a special youth authority may be well positioned to undertake leadership and responsibility for program development. Much depends on the agency's leadership commitment to an outreaching, well-balanced, social-service as well as community-control and community-participation approach, targeted to delinquent, highly at-risk and gang youth.

A special requirement is that the lead agency not only have sufficient management, capable staff, and interest and experience in dealing with the gang problem, but also genuine commitment to the comprehensive community-wide gang approach. The normal bureaucratic

impulse to acquire and use resources to meet traditional or particular organizational interests and the routine provision of services must be restrained. It is inappropriate for the lead agency or a consortium of agencies to “buy into the approach,” and simply to “split the pie,” so that each agency can continue to do what it usually does, only now with more resources. The lead agency must be truly committed to a new, institutional and community-participatory approach, which ensures that policy and practices are developed to implement the Model.

The Interagency Street Team should be a formal outreach team of direct-service personnel (police, probation, outreach youth workers, school officials and community organizers) who continually interact with each other in regard to differential planning, programming and contacting gang-involved and/or highly-at-risk youth, as well as particular gangs and families. The team must also address neighborhood contexts and organizational situations that influence the behavior of targeted gang youth. The outreach or street team is the key youth direct-service component of the Gang Program, whose members are also in communication with local groups and neighborhood residents. It operates during day-time as well as evening and late night hours, on weekends, and during crisis times.

The outreach youth worker has an especially important role to play. Ideally he should be a former influential gang member from the neighborhood, now fully identified with the norms and values of legitimate society, yet sensitive to the needs and problems of the local youth-gang society or culture. Minimally, he should be someone who is “streetwise” and able to relate comfortably to the targeted youth. He contributes to the assessment of the nature of youth-gang problem situations, and facilitates the outreach efforts of the rest of staff. Qualified and trained outreach youth workers can provide ready access to youth gangs, help define the gang problem,

and serve as mediators between the gang and established local community and institutional sectors. While the use of outreach youth workers has inherent risks, the benefits to program outcome outweigh the risks.

Grassroots Involvement. The local community is complex, with many different individuals, groups, and organizations concerned about the gang problem, working with and against gang-involved and gang at-risk youth. Two key parts of the community that must be involved in the comprehensive gang program approach are: 1) established agencies such as police, schools, key governmental organizations, and youth agencies, who are all primarily concerned with the interests and concerns of the larger community; and 2) the grassroots community, comprising family, neighborhood groups, block clubs, political associations, citizen groups, churches, and other organizations whose members live and interact with gang youth in the area. Established agencies often set key program policies (affecting the lives of the residents) which are primarily based on the values and interests of the middle-class community or the city at large, and thus, ultimately, the legitimate developmental and career interests of youth. The grassroots organizations often focus on social support, crisis intervention and socialization issues more directly related to the expressed needs of the local (usually lower class) minority population. Communication and interaction between these two parts of the community in respect to the gang problem are often characterized by ambivalence or antagonism. A gang-problem community is usually characterized by a lack of sufficient interdependence and cooperation among and between established agencies and grassroots organizations. Grassroots elements as well as established agencies must participate in determining the direction of the project, as well as the day-to-day operation of the project street team.

Social Services. A variety of social service programs should be provided to gang-involved program youth and their families, including younger siblings who may be at risk of gang membership and delinquent behavior. Targeted program youth often require crisis intervention and referral, and/or direct help with school, employment, and drug use problems, as well as with gang-related and personal-development issues. Social services should also be provided to families of targeted youth who may need assistance with housing, public aid, health care, family conflict resolution, employment, immigration, racism, and other problems which either directly affect gang youth, or are conducive to their gang behavior.

The street team provides front-line and initial services to gang-at-risk and gang-involved youth. The outreach youth worker and other team members – police, probation, the neighborhood organizer – as well as lead agency staff are collectively responsible for a variable combination of support and control services. Each member of the team must share some responsibility for a complementary, and at times common, approach to the youth's and community's gang problem.

Criminal Justice Participation. Police (including gang detectives) juvenile and adult probation, and juvenile and adult parole must be knowledgeable about the scope and nature of gang-crime in the target area and the community's response to it. They must also be closely identified with the Comprehensive Gang Program. Police and probation are directly concerned with social control and suppression of the targeted youth, particularly those who are delinquent and gang-involved, but also must be careful not to label as gang members those youth who are not at high risk for gang involvement. Judicial authority, prosecution, detention and other justice system elements must support the street team through graduated sanctions in such a way as to

facilitate the youth's social development and to protect the community.

Criminal justice administrators must encourage, if not require, law enforcement officials to collaborate with each other, as well as with other members of the street team, including outreach youth workers, educators and job-development personnel, in an integrated social-development and social-control approach. The police have a special responsibility to accurately assess the gang problem, and address it in as balanced and rational a way as possible, especially recognizing the close connection between the gang problem, race/ethnic issues, and political pressures and conflicting community interests.

School Participation. Principals, teachers, and disciplinarians of regular public, parochial, and alternative schools are key components of the comprehensive approach to the gang problem. Schools, already overwhelmed with a range of educational and social problems, are generally reluctant to deal directly with the gang problem. The steering committee and lead agency administration have to persuade and assist school personnel to modify school "zero-tolerance" practices, and often their practice of almost exclusive suspension and expulsion of gang members and at-risk youth. The street team should participate in the life of the school and assist school staff in addressing gang-related issues, thereby facilitating better development and use of educational opportunities by gang youth, preferably in the regular school program. Targeted youth need to be mainstreamed within the context of regular school to the extent possible, where it is hoped that they will receive an appropriate education which prepares them for legitimate career development.

The use of alternative schools may or may not be the best way to address the educational and behavioral problems of gang youth. Special collaborative arrangements with social agencies

and therapeutic programs may assist gang youth to remain in regular school and to make productive use of educational opportunities. If the youth is referred to an alternative school, a high-quality educational program in a therapeutic context must be provided, with a firm commitment to returning the youth to a mainstream school as soon as possible. Outreach youth workers have a special responsibility not only to help program youth make the best use of available learning resources, but to assist school staff in better understanding the nature of gang pressures on program youth which arise from situations and crises both inside and outside the school.

Employment and Training. Obtaining a job is critical to the transition of youth from the gang to legitimate and personally satisfying adult roles. Getting and holding a full-time job is a significant step for the youth, so that he no longer needs the gang or has the time and motivation to associate with gang members or participate in gang life. Job and work-skills training provide a legitimate and satisfying basis for leaving the gang.

The youth worker and the job developer, closely related to the Gang Program, are the key personnel responsible for motivating youth to obtain jobs, and for helping sustain them on the job once employed. A major task of the job developer is contacting employers and training institutions to facilitate access to job and training opportunities for gang youth. Special arrangements may be required to open up jobs for youth who may at first be marginal workers. Special incentives may be necessary to enable employers to hire gang youth. Neighborhood residents, former gang members, and the youth's family are sources of information about hiring opportunities and referrals for jobs, and need to be accessed by the street team. Steady girlfriends or wives also play an important part in sustaining youth on the job.

Steps in the Approach

The steps in the application of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model (Chart 1.2) are as follows:¹

- The community leadership, including those in established agencies and grassroots groups, the mayor's office and political leaders, as well as business leaders and the media must acknowledge that a youth-gang problem exists.
- The steering committee, including criminal justice and youth agencies, schools, and other major public, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations, together with grassroots groups, must: conduct an assessment of the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem in the identified target community where gang crime (particularly violence and often drug selling) is most evident; develop and use appropriate definitions or descriptions of what is a delinquent/criminal gang, a gang member, or a youth who is at risk of gang membership; identify who particular gangs are; and identify the organizations available to address the gang problem in its various interrelated aspects.
- Once the steering committee is established, a set of goals and objectives is determined, with the assistance and involvement of the lead agency and community leaders at influential and grassroots levels. The goals and objectives must address the identified gang problem and causal factors, based on the results of the assessment, and may be refined over time as a better understanding of the gang problem emerges.
- The key goals must be the reduction of youth-gang crime, as well as the social-development of gang youth or those youth at high risk for gang involvement. This is to

¹ Adapted from OJJDP Gang-Free Schools and Communities Initiatives 2000.

be accomplished by improving the capacity of the community grassroots groups and agencies to address the problem through the application of interrelated strategies of community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and organizational change and development targeted to the particular gang problem.

- The steering committee, the lead agency and community leaders must interact with each other to produce and make available relevant programming, i.e., strategies, services, tactics and procedures consistent with the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, particularly its five “core strategies” (see below).
- The steering committee and community leaders must then assess the operation of the program, its outcome and impact, preferably through systematic evaluation procedures. If the results are positive, i.e., gang crime is absolutely or relatively reduced, then sufficient resources must be provided to sustain project activity and program development.
- The process of intervention and attempting to cope with the youth-gang problem also contributes to ongoing assessment and understanding of the nature and changing scope of the problem, as well as to a determination of whether the Model has been appropriately applied. This is a process that continues during the course of the life of the project and beyond.

Strategies

The Model is multi-faceted and multi-layered, involving individual youth, family members, peers, agencies and the community. It is based on theory, research, and practice which assume that the gang problem is systemic, and is a response to rapid social change, local

community disorganization, poverty, fragmentation of approaches to the problem across multiple organizations, and institutional racism. The five core Model strategies and their associated cultural elements are as follows:

Community Mobilization

- Key established organizations, including police, probation, social agencies, schools, manpower agencies, community organizations (especially local community grassroots groups), churches, block clubs, and political groups, along with local residents and even former gang members, are involved in or advise on various assessments, problem analyses, policies, and program measures to be undertaken. These efforts are coordinated by the steering committee and the lead agency and, to the extent possible, integrated into a program and community-development process focused on the gang problem.
- A steering committee of key established agencies and community organizations (including grassroots groups and faith-based organizations), as well as political and governmental leaders, is closely involved in the development of policy and practices, within and across agencies and community groups, and in the creation of a multi-disciplinary street team. Key agencies will generally have to modify policies and practices to achieve the objectives of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang Program Model. The lead agency is challenged to take responsibility for crossing agency-mission and community-group boundaries, and getting the steering committee to take collective ownership of the comprehensive-program initiative.
- The lead agency along with the steering committee initiates, develops, and maintains

interagency communication and relationships across agencies and community groups. A special challenge is modifying established law-enforcement, school, and governmental policy to include the participation of faith-based and grassroots groups, as well as former youth-gang members, in the steering committee process. The multi-disciplinary street team must participate in steering committee activities and assist in community and neighborhood gang-program-focused development efforts within the framework of the lead agency. Awareness of the issues of population change, and sensitivity to the neighborhood and its culture, its varied organizational interests, the needs of gang youth, and the complaints of local residents are essential for the operation of the steering committee, the street team, and the lead agency.

Social Intervention

- The street team, especially the youth outreach-worker staff, must collaborate with social service agencies, youth agencies, grassroots groups, schools, faith-based and other organizations, in directly providing gang and at-risk-for-gang-involvement youth with appropriate combinations of prevention, intervention, and socialized control services, depending on their social-service and social-control needs. Differential diagnoses and treatment/intervention planning must occur. Not all youth should be provided with the same pattern or dosages of control and social services, or even with highly-coordinated services or contacts.
- Street outreach services focus simultaneously on protecting community citizens (including gang youth) from gang crime, enforcing the law, serving the interests and

needs of targeted youth and their families, and on assuring the linkage of youth to social services and the case-coordination of these services.

- Group activities are carefully developed so as not to cohere delinquent or gang youth to each other. Primary attention is on individualized youth interests, and needs of gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth which, if met, contribute to their better transition and attachment to mainstream institutions of school, training and employment, and to association with non-gang peers.
- Sensitivity to the influence of gang norms and values, and street-team skill in the use of group, community and situational structures and processes are important, particularly at times of crisis when violent and serious criminal behavior is likely to occur and has to be prevented and controlled.
- A clear, mutually-understood and accepting relationship between the street team (including the youth outreach worker), the individual youth and the gang must be established so that the youth and the gang clearly understand the purpose of the program, the nature and scope of the team's operation and the interdependent roles of team members.
- Social intervention and social control should not be restricted to a 9 AM to 5 PM agency-based workday routine of making contact and assisting youth with social-development needs and meeting justice-system reporting requirements. Outreach, including social intervention, focuses on contacts with youth in the neighborhood, at home, and in hangouts during evenings, on weekends, and in crisis times, and assisting youth to assume legitimate obligations to the neighborhood and the larger society.

Provision of Social Opportunities

- Access to opportunities, especially for further education, training, and jobs must be provided to gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement. Such access has to be structured, nurtured, and supported through the collective policy and administrative efforts of the steering committee, the lead agency, community agencies, and the implementation activities of the street-level team.
- The members of the steering committee should be in a position to provide special and/or additional and sustained access to opportunity systems in their own agencies and across organizations, in order to better mainstream program youth into legitimate society. Appropriate arrangements have to be made to avoid segregating gang youth from mainstream society in the course of providing opportunities to them.
- The street team (especially the outreach youth workers and case managers) serves to mediate relationships and modify exclusionary policies and practices of agencies, so that targeted youth have access to and are carefully prepared to make use of educational and training programs and jobs. In this process, agency, school, and employment personnel must be willing and prepared to modify their practices, and to assist these vulnerable youth who have special needs and social limitations. Social control and social intervention tactics have to be carefully integrated in this process.
- The street team collaborates with local residents and families, as well as with grassroots groups, businesses, schools, and social-agency personnel in the provision of, and access to, opportunities for gang-involved and highly at-risk youth.
- The opportunity-needs of program youth siblings, parents and peer group associates are

also addressed, to the extent possible, particularly as the fulfillment of those needs may assist in facilitating the transition of program youth to non-delinquent and non-gang roles.

- Of special importance is encouragement of the contributions of businesses, industry, government, and legislators in providing improved access to school, job, and training opportunities for lower-income and minority (including gang) youth, in part through not excluding those youth who may already have criminal records. In this process, in order for youth to make the best use of opportunities provided, appropriate social-control and social-support measures may also be necessary.

Suppression/Social Control

- The development by staff of formal and informal procedures of social control in order to hold youth accountable for their behavior is integral to a comprehensive approach to gang youth. Highly-targeted sweeps and interdiction of gang youth about to engage in (or who have actually engaged in) criminal acts are appropriate. However, labeling as gang members those youth who are not gang members, and targeting minority youth for a whole range of minor and questionable offenses, are inappropriate. Social control must be based on positive communication, respect for youth, some level of youth accountability in return, law enforcement discretion in use of suppression tactics, and focus on youth who are involved, or prove to be involved, in serious delinquent behavior.
- Controls are broadly conceived, and range from arrest and warnings to behavior modeling, advice, counseling, crisis intervention and positive attention paid to youth interests and needs by members of the street team. Carefully structured situations may be

required in which activities such as recreation, athletic events, holiday and family celebrations, cultural and ethnic events, group meetings, or conflict mediation sessions are arranged, which may involve police, probation, youth workers, and gang youth in sharing mutual or communal obligations and benefits. At the same time, information-sharing among all team members about serious, criminal acts by gang members is essential so that offenders are accurately identified, arrested and prosecuted.

- Suppression involves the street team organizing neighbors to patrol neighborhoods, encouraging them to report criminal acts to the police, making sure that gang youth show up for probation or parole interviews and court appearances, as well as getting gang youth not to hang on street corners, and to help clean up litter and remove graffiti.
- Social control also requires the defense of gang youth from false accusations and prosecution, illegal harassment and/or brutal treatment by police officers, and defending or vouching for youth in court when they are brought in for violations of local laws (which themselves may prove to be illegal and/or unconstitutional). The street team, administrators of the Gang Program, steering committee members and community leaders must not only directly and indirectly contribute to the suppression of unlawful (especially serious) criminal behavior, but to the modification of criminal justice system policies and practices that unjustly criminalize and/or punish youth.
- Valid definitions of the nature and scope of gang crime, especially gang incidents, must be developed, and appropriate data collected, managed, and used. Such accurate and meaningful gang information should be routinely collected and shared among members of the street team and the steering committee – with due regard to issues of confidentiality –

as a basis for ongoing diagnosis and assessment of the gang problem and the development of effective policies and programs.

- Special commitments from police administrators to accept the Model, and special training sessions for gang specialists or team police to implement the Model correctly, may be required to assure that police and criminal-justice personnel participate in the Gang Program in accordance with the Model. The purpose of the Program is not simply to assist police or probation to acquire intelligence in order to make better arrests, but also to train the police to refer troublemakers and troubled gang youth to social and mental health agencies when appropriate.
- Suppression, along with social intervention, opportunities-provision, and relevant organizational change, should be viewed as part of an interrelated and interdependent community-building process focused on reducing gang crime. The lead agency, the members of the street team and the steering committee share responsibility for carrying out the suppression or social-control functions critical for building a “good” community, one of benefit to gang-involved youth as well as to other citizens of the local and larger communities. Gang members are not all likely to be or to become delinquents and/or serious offenders. Most gang youth in gang-crime communities grow out of their delinquent or criminal gang involvement in due course.

Organizational Change and Development

- Organizational change and development underlie the strategies of the Comprehensive Gang Program. Local institutions must change, and local agency and community group

procedures must be developed both to reduce gang crime and to meet the social needs of gang youth. Enhanced law enforcement alone, and enhanced preventive and treatment services alone, may be ineffective and may even exacerbate the gang problem.

- Positive change in individual youth-gang-member behavior may occur naturally, but it can be facilitated in interrelated, interdisciplinary and collaborative fashion by the team of workers within a context of respective agency and community-group support for the Model. The activities of street-team personnel, in community groups and across agencies, may have to be modified to achieve a more generalist mission, e.g., the police take some responsibility for social intervention, the outreach workers assist with suppression of serious crime and violence, and the community organizers encourage alienated neighborhood residents to communicate with the police about gang-crime incidents, and advise them of better ways to address the problem.
- Organizational policies, practices, and worker responsibilities have to become more community-oriented, even communal, and take into consideration the particular interests, needs, and cultural backgrounds of local residents, including the targeted gang youth themselves. A panicked, alienating, punitive community response to the gang problem, together with an elitist, bureaucratic, non-community-oriented agency approach to gang youth are counter-productive.
- Administrative arrangements, special training, and close supervision of staff must be established, particularly for youth-outreach and law-enforcement workers in order for them to develop collaborative roles in a mutually respectful and effective fashion.
- Staff development and training of the intervention team has to be both collaborative and

coordinated, as appropriate, on a separate subunit professional basis. The orientation of team members may not completely mesh and accommodations have to be made.

Appropriate mechanisms must evolve for data sharing, interactive social intervention, suppression planning, and other carefully-managed implementation activities. Not all types of data about youth gang-member activities have to be shared; only those that significantly impact the achievement of program objectives and goals.

- Case-management and associated data systems are established so that contacts and services provided by all members of the street intervention team can be documented and monitored for effective targeting and assessment of youth, for program planning and implementation, and for measuring program quality and effects. These and other data then become the basis for evaluating outcomes at individual, gang, program, agency, interagency, and community levels.

Program Implementation Principles

A special set of principles guides the various organizations, community groups, and staffs in the implementation of the Model strategies. They are the basis for developing, carrying out, and testing the Program Model, with focus on the core strategies.

Targeting

It is critically important that the steering committee and lead agency select the right neighborhoods, gangs and youth in the community that account for the gang problem, and identify the organizations addressing (and which should be addressing) the problem. This

includes identifying the most significant aspects of the gang problem, based on careful initial and ongoing assessments of gang situations, the specific youth involved, and the locations and contexts of gang activities. There are many cultural and organizational myths which create obstacles to appropriate identification and assessment of the gang problem. Police may claim that the gang problem is pervasive throughout the whole city, when in fact gang incidents, gang hangouts, and where gang youth live tend to be concentrated only in certain parts of a community. The majority of youth in the most gang- and crime-ridden communities are not gang members. Youth agencies may claim they are serving at-risk or gang-involved youth, when they are not. Schools committed to “zero tolerance” and strong suspension policies may in the long term contribute to an increased level of crime in the community. If the majority of youth in the program are under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system, and are required to participate in the program based on court, probation or parole orders, the program may then be viewed as primarily an extension of law enforcement and potentially punitive. At the same time, certain organizations (e.g., particular schools, churches, youth agencies, special police units, neighborhood organizations, aldermen and government units) in gang-ridden and emerging gang communities may, on a case-by-case basis, be substantially and constructively involved in addressing the gang problem, but these efforts may not be effectively aggregated.

A careful assessment of the gang problem from a street-based as well as an agency-based perspective is necessary to determine which gangs and gang members are most involved in serious crime (including drug selling and violence), where and when the gang offenses are being committed, and what community situations and changed organizational policies and practices are critical to understanding and addressing the specifics of the problem. It is important not only to

regard the gang problem as systemic, but to address the most serious aspects of the problem first. Hardcore youth, including key gang leaders and influentials, are the critical focus of initial attention, as much to develop access to other gang members as to address their own particular, ongoing and crisis-related gang problems.

Unfocused violence-prevention, generalized public health approaches, non-targeted suppression, and reactive citizen demonstrations (such as neighborhood marches or poorly planned meetings) may be useful for particular agency- or community-cathartic purposes, but may be of little value for problem-solving and positive community development. Diffuse strategies by interagency coalitions may also become devices to avoid dealing with the gang problem. Especially to be avoided are responses to the problem based strictly on political interests, narrow agency missions and opportunism, professional turf considerations, ignorance of the details of the problem, and impulsive collective action.

Balance

Once the specific problem(s), target area(s), target gang-youth, institutions or agencies to be involved and their required policies are identified, a set of balanced strategies must be considered and operationalized. Dominance of particular strategies in regard to program development may be inappropriate. One type of program service and/or control will not be suitable for all youth. Gang youth have varying commitments to the gang life and varying degrees of troublesome personal problems during the course of their gang careers. Targeting only hardcore gang youth for suppression, younger gang youth or wannabees for prevention services, and “creaming” only selected youth for jobs are not consistent with the Model. A

differential mix and dosage of multiple strategies is required for specific categories of program youth at different times.

An imbalanced strategy may result in a dominant suppression approach, which contributes to excessive imprisonment of youth who can be readily served in the community with a combination of treatment, opportunities-provision and graduated sanctions. An imbalanced strategy may serve to label at-risk youth as gang members and make them more subject to arrest for minor offenses (or even non-offenses). An approach which focuses only on recreation and group activities may increase gang cohesion, delinquent activity, and the solidification of delinquent norms, and may not meet the longer-term socialization and community-integration needs of alienated gang youth.

An appropriate mix of agency and grassroots participation is extremely important. A basic goal of the approach – to improve community capacity to address youth-gang crime – cannot be achieved unless critically important organizational and community-based components are involved in the program’s development, and participate in its activities. The Model is not served if only established social or youth agencies or law enforcement organizations participate. On the other hand, if the program is primarily based on grassroots participation, adequate resources may not be available to implement, sustain, or institutionalize the approach, even if the program shows promise. The basic functions of community-building and social integration across different community sectors relevant to the gang problem have to be integrated.

Intensity

Dosage refers to the duration, frequency and continuity of particular worker contacts,

services and strategies carried out for different categories of youth. An appropriate dosage is necessary for a positive outcome. However, a balance of strategies, types of workers, coordination of worker contacts, and the nature of specific services and controls may be more important than the amount of services or contacts provided. The nature of the coordination among team workers in relation to particular types of youth may be more important than the specific range or intensity of services or strategies provided by each of them.

The length and frequency of contact the youth has in the program may be inversely related to positive outcome. Once the youth begins to make progress, it may be beneficial for him to disassociate himself from the program. The purpose, combination and intensity of relationships by particular workers with different types of youth may be critically important in predicting outcome for different categories of youth in the program.

Continuity

The same worker or combination of workers providing services and contacts for a substantial period of time may have more influence in determining positive outcome than different workers contacting particular youth for only short periods of time. Continuity of contact is important, particularly for gang or delinquent youth who have special needs for social support and control, and for building trusting relationships with adults. Gang youth are often distrustful of adults and are often exploitive of relationships with them. Workers may be viewed as undependable, rejecting, hostile, or as easily manipulated. It takes a good deal of time for the worker(s) to develop a positive working (controlling and helping) relationship with certain gang youth. Service interruption and lack of continuity of contact may result in further alienation of

the youth, and interfere with the program's plan for the his or her rehabilitation. A return to, or intensification of, gang behaviors may result from the absence of (or undependable contacts with) a worker during periods of crisis that the youth may not be able to manage on his own. An accessible and responsive worker whom the youth trusts and needs at such junctures may be critically important.

Commitment

The Program Model challenges existing agency policies and procedures and existing professional specialization norms, requires the development of new knowledge and skills, and creates extra work and distress for all. Commitment to the promise and the validity of the approach does not come quickly or easily. Appropriate steering-committee, lead-agency-management and extra supervisory support and commitment have to be developed. Steering-committee members and program administrators must persevere in their program-support efforts, and they must periodically renew their commitment to the Comprehensive Gang Program approach. Project lead-agency administrators and supervisors and steering-committee members may not be fully aware of the difficulties and challenges faced by direct-service, street-team workers, or of special staff needs for support (and sometimes controls) for their outreach activities, particularly the problems and frustrations of outreach workers on the streets.

Work with gang youth and gang problems is complex, difficult and frustrating. Gang youth are often undependable, elusive, and hostile in their relationships with adults and peers, and require a high level of sensitivity, firmness and concentrated attention by workers.

Traditional agency, school, and other institutional staff may not be interested in, prepared for, or

have sufficient resources to work with troublesome gang youth. The team workers on the street have to develop multidimensional skills. Street-team, lead-agency, and steering-committee efforts together must be reinforcing, and combine to introduce an integrated world of real opportunity, social support, and constraints to gang youth.

Chart 1.1
 Comprehensive Gang Program: Implementation Model
 Goal 1: Improve Community Capacity to Address Youth Gang Crime
 Goal 2: Reduce Gang Crime

Community Context
Social Disorganization Factors:

- Demographic
- Socio-economic
- Family Characteristics
- Ecological
- Cultural





Chart 1.2
 Comprehensive Gang Program: Process Model
 Steps in the Application of the Approach



OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program
 (Candice Kane)

Chapter 2

Evaluation Issues and Problems

We do not attempt to review the literature on gang (or gang violence) prevention, intervention, or suppression programs. A growing list of such reviews exists (Curry, 1995; Klein, 1995; Howell, 2000; Mihalec, Irwin, Elliott, Fagan and Hansen, 2001; Sivilli, Yim and Nugent 1995; Spergel, 1995). Gang programs in earlier decades emphasized single-strategy approaches to gang prevention, social intervention, crisis intervention, community organization, street work, interagency coordination, and community organization. Evaluations of these programs suggest negative, indeterminate, or in a very few cases limited positive results (Howell, 2000). Community-based gang programs have failed for a range of reasons: poor conceptualization, vague or conflicting objectives, weak implementation, organizational-goal displacement (particularly by police and youth agencies), interagency conflict, politicization, lack of sustained effort, insufficient resources, etc.

The evidence that a particular approach does or does not work, however, may be due not only to program design or implementation, but also to the failures of public policy and the limitations of evaluation research methodologies (Curry, 1995). Gang program approaches assessed as successful by community leaders, politicians, and policy makers may not necessarily be sustained, and those assessed as failures but which are consistent with community myth and traditional agency missions may continue to flourish. Evaluation research, particularly outcome research, has generally had little or no impact on policy or gang-program development. It has not contributed to the creation of alternate or modified approaches to the gang problem. This may be

2.1

due in large measure to the complexity of community-based gang programs, and to the difficulties of designing and implementing complex evaluations of such programs in the community.

Below, we discuss briefly those elements of gang research methodology which we believe are essential for the evaluation of gang-programs implemented within a comprehensive-community or interagency-coordination framework. We address some of the issues or obstacles relevant to gang-program evaluations. Ideal program-evaluation models require experimental and quasi-experimental designs and rigorous procedures which usually cannot be applied in the real world of gang-program development and operations. Evaluation research is expected to be objective and independent, and not clearly identified with program operations. However, the critical (often politicized) nature of community-based gang programs requires an interdependent and sustained relationship between evaluation and program personnel from program start to finish. This characterizes the best of classic community-based gang program research, limited as it was by the then-present-day research, methodological, and statistical standards (Gold and Mattick, 1974; Klein, 1968, 1971; Miller, 1962).

Nevertheless, there are issues which may not have been adequately resolved in past or current evaluations of comprehensive and/or community-based gang programs and which we have had to contend with in our present evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program.

Cooperation with Program Operators and Data Managers. Program directors and operators are prone to distrust gang researchers who are not sufficiently knowledgeable of their own program's

pressures, interests and constraints. Gang program directors are under great and conflicting pressure to accommodate program development to the interests and needs of funders, community residents, steering committees or advisory boards, partner agencies (including criminal-justice and social-service agencies), as well as the media, government or political officials, and the program youth themselves. Program operators generally regard evaluators as a necessary evil, since they may affect the flow of funding for the program, and are costly in terms of program time and effort which that they believe should be directed instead to specific, ongoing program or agency operations. Evaluators interfere with the flow of agency program operations and information systems, to the extent that they exist. Program operators can be skilled at avoiding, or partially complying with, evaluators' requests for data, and even when pressured or compelled to comply tend to provide incomplete or inadequate data for evaluation purposes. The gang program executive's interest and desire to comply with the evaluation-research design and need for data is tempered by the his need to survive in a resource-limited environment.

Gang-program operators are also over-stressed by the complexity, frustrations and unpredictability of community-based, gang-program operations, and may be subject to a pervasive sense of impending program failure. The program operator tends not to know much about gangs or gang youth, or how or whether he can conduct a community-wide or street-based program that will provide clearly positive results. The evaluator enters the chaotic, community gang-problem arena without sufficient understanding of the complex, community context or the diverse interests of the various program-related actors in cooperating with the program. These actors usually control various kinds of program-process or outcome data essential to the evaluator for achieving research objectives.

2.3

The evaluator therefore must be prepared to make time for a considerable effort to understand local community and program contextual factors in order to establish a basis for a positive relationship with program operators and those who control data sources. The mechanisms of access to evaluation data have to be negotiated and renegotiated if the evaluation process and its substantive outcome are to be objective and meaningful to the key community constituents, funders, program operators, and the research community. The gang-program evaluators have to engage key program-related personnel as soon as possible, and regard them as creators, providers, and partners in the development of a successful evaluation.

Research Design. Good program evaluation ideally should be designed to assess program process, individual outcome, and gang the program's impact on the gang and the community, based on an explicit (hopefully well-developed) program model which is conceptually clear, logical and operationally practicable. The program evaluator's primary purpose is not to test theory, but to test a program model which usually contains elements of several theories and interests. Gang programs in the real world cannot be encompassed by one set of theories or interests. Most criminologists are often more interested in testing theoretical propositions than the specific nature and effects of a program model. Funders are interested in testing general policy which may not be clear, consistent, or formulated in detail. Program managers, on the other hand, are mainly concerned with program development and its contribution to their agency's value – economic, political and organizational. A consensus must be reached in the funder+program operator+evaluator relationship as to the mutually-acceptable goals and specific objectives of the program to be tested. This process may drag on a long time.

The objectives and activities that reduce gang-delinquent behavior need to be specified and agreed upon by the program operator and the evaluator: what key services or worker contacts are to be provided, for which types of youth, for what purposes (i.e., what project activities are to produce what intended results), and how. Research variables, i.e., independent, mediating, outcome, and controlling factors (e.g., youth demographics, gang status and delinquency characteristics) must be articulated and related to the program model, as well as to the reality of program structure and operation. Ultimately, the main job of the evaluator is to know what the program components are, what they are intended to do, and what they in fact do. This process occurs through ongoing dialogue and mutual accommodation between the project operator and evaluator. This evaluation-relationship process determines and explains what and how evaluation-design procedures for data collection and analysis are related to the program model. Obviously, some flexibility has to be built into the implementation of both the program and evaluation models. The researcher and program operator have to negotiate continually to accommodate the needs of both program and evaluation implementation.

Community-based gang research is not medical or experimental research, in which almost all elements are (ideally) rigidly controlled. At best, community-based gang research is quasi-experimental, with room for limited manipulation by the program operator and the evaluator.

Technical Assistance. An intermediary may be required to assure that informed and focused relationships are initiated and sustained which meet the needs of program implementation as well as the interests of the funder and the evaluator. Ideally, the technical assistance teams, with the aid of the sponsor or funder, initiates and sustains these relationships. While technical assistance

is provided mainly to assist and supplement the efforts of the program operator, involvement of the evaluator is required to insure that he, the program operator, the technical assistance team, and the funding agency are on board together as to the nature of the program model and how it is to be implemented.

The program and evaluation models have to be effectively articulated and sustained, and changes that occur must be explicit. Gaps and failures in the implementation of the program and evaluation model have to be addressed consensually as early as possible. The gaps, deficiencies and changes over time have to be anticipated, recognized, accounted for, and explained. Deficiencies in the efforts of the technical assistance team, the evaluator, and the funder have to be identified and corrected, with limited politicization. In any case, the evaluator has a special responsibility for controlling the integrity of the program model for research purposes. This complexity of relationships, which can support or handicap common understanding and effective implementation of the program model, is avoided when the program operator and the evaluator are the same person, when the evaluator is a partner with the program operator in the development of the program model, and/or when the funder or sponsor of the program is strongly identified with the evaluator's conception of the program model and its implementation.

Start-Up Problems

Program Youth Selection. A key problem of the community-based gang program arises when youth selected are not representative of the expected program sample, i.e., they are not gang members or youth clearly at risk for gang involvement. The problem may be compounded because the program operator and the evaluator often do not know what the characteristics of

youth truly are until a sufficient number of youth have actually entered the program. Procedures for who is admitted to the gang program are often weak because definitions of who is eligible for the program are not clearly communicated to program staff and/or referring agencies. Certain gang or at-risk youth may not easily be recruited, or allowed into the program. Conflicting views may arise early as to who appropriately should be eligible for the program.

A key problem is that sources of reliable information about target-youth characteristics (e.g., gang membership) may not be available at the start of the program. Police, probation, schools, or in-house agency workers may not know specifically the identity and location of gangs, the specific character of their activities, and which youth are at what level of risk. The concept of risk may not be clearly defined or understood. Gang-related information about youth referred to the program should be obtained from multiple sources: official and established youth agencies, neighbors, local community groups, sometimes family members, and especially former and present gang members themselves.

Who selected youth are in terms of age, race/ethnicity, gender, justice-system background, gang-membership status, why they are referred to the program, by whom and from where, must be known to the evaluator as soon as possible. We know from previous research that gender, age, race/ethnicity, and prior arrests of youth may be critical factors in determining eligibility for the program, and predict expected outcomes. Females are less likely than males to be serious or chronic delinquents, or gang members. Younger gang youth, 12 to 14 or 15 years of age, are more likely to show increasing levels of gang delinquency than older gang youth.

The research or theoretical interests of the evaluator may deter him from a close examination of who these youth are, and why they got into the program. He may be less

interested in the types of youth who should be in the program, than in the specific characteristics of youth or gangs which may be useful to his own ongoing research or theory development. He may focus too much on hardcore or at-risk youth, females rather than males, the psychological or structural characteristics of gangs, and insufficiently on the selection of youth consistent with the program model. The acquisition of simple, basic data (on age, gender, race/ethnicity, and – as soon as possible – gang status and prior-offense or arrest record) for youth who enter the program is essential for program-development and evaluation purposes. These data become the basis for comparison-sample selection and evaluation multivariate analysis.

Gang Status and Prior Delinquency. Extensive research indicates there is a very close relationship between gang membership and the nature and level of the youth's delinquent behavior, especially during the youth's active or self-declared gang membership phase. Obviously, the evaluator's task is to determine to what extent the youth is a gang member and a delinquent in relation to criteria for selection into the program. Each of these two factors must be considered as a variable, yet they may not be known to program staff, and not necessarily clearly revealed even by gang youth themselves. A key proposition not recognized or accepted by many policy and program personnel, or even by researchers, is that not all gang youth are or will become delinquent, and not all delinquents are or will become gang members. Non-gang delinquent youth may respond worse to the program than gang youth who may be less delinquent and less committed to the gang life. Most gang programs deal with a varied sample of gang and non-gang, delinquent and non-delinquent youth.

A variety of sources of data on gang and delinquent behavior in different contexts over

time may have to be accessed. Earlier field observations, self-reports, police records, and program-worker information separately may be insufficient for determining eligibility of youth for the program, and to predict outcome. Consistency of findings about the nature and level of gang identification and delinquency also provides validity as to how the youth is to be classified. Delinquency and gang-involvement scales have to be developed. Different types of delinquency and patterns of association must be identified and addressed over the course of the youth's involvement in the program. As they age, gang youth may also change their patterns of offending (increasingly from turf or interpersonal violence to relatively more criminal-gain behavior, including drug selling), or may follow conventional routes and build legitimate careers.

Sampling. Typologies of gangs and gang youth abound (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995; Fagan, 1989). What gang or pre-gang universe from which to select the sample depends on the nature and purpose of the program and, ideally, on some assessment of the community's actual gang problem. Characteristics of the universe of gangs in a particular community may be based on police, other criminal-justice, school, youth-agency, and media information, and occasionally on community surveys. The youth referred to a gang program may or may not be representative of gang youth known to the police from a particular neighborhood or set of gang neighborhoods in a city, or across cities.

In earlier decades, community-based youth-gang programs focused on field or street observations of, and work with, particular gangs and their membership. Specific gangs were the primary targets of service, and the basis for research and evaluation. More recently, youth appear to be selected for gang programs and research based on an institutional cross-section of youth-

agency, probation, school, and correctional caseloads. This may reflect increased community concern about the problem of youth gangs, the prevalence and dispersion of the youth-gang problem, fragmentation of gang structures into smaller units (still as part of a larger gang conglomeration), or a lack of familiarity with the gang problem in particular community or agency contexts by established agency personnel and researchers.

Another primary task of the evaluator is to select a comparison-group sample, i.e., non-served youth with characteristics similar or equivalent to program youth. However, as suggested earlier, both the program operator and evaluator may not know *a priori*, up front, or even during the program period what the gang or delinquency characteristics of program youth are. A time lag usually exists between selecting and interviewing program and comparison youth. Finding and interviewing appropriate comparison youth may not be easy. Police, probation, and youth agencies may have insufficient information about characteristics of gang youth, let alone where appropriate comparison gang youth are to be located and how they are to be contacted.

Comparison-gang youth often tend to be less delinquent or problematic than program youth.

When a community-wide consortium establishes a gang program, it usually tries to address the most problematic gangs, and sometimes gang members in the most gang-problematic neighborhood.

Probably the best solution to the problem of obtaining or developing similar, let alone equivalent, samples in the open community is to use several types of comparison groups, if funding permits. Co-arrestee gang members from the same gangs are often similar; youth from the same-named gangs in an equivalent gang area in the same city may be somewhat similar.

Individual program youth may be used as their own control, matched for an earlier and equivalent

age period when they were not served, i.e., using a growth-curve model for analysis purposes. This option assumes that community contexts, gang patterns, and police practices have been comparable during the pre-program and program periods, which may not be the case in part because of program operations. Nevertheless, there may be sufficient and similar program and comparison youth available in the program and comparison samples to conduct a matching process. A community-based program model also may require selection of a comparison group from a comparable city. This creates even more problems of complexity in data collection and analysis.

No community-based gang program research has as yet been able to resolve satisfactorily the matching or control-group problem. Appropriate measurement and multivariate analytic techniques can, within limits, compensate for the lack of the availability of an adequately-selected comparison sample.

Sources of Data and Data Collection Instruments

Multiple units of analysis as well as multiple sources of data may be essential in community gang-program research. Gang-as-a-unit and community-level gang incident or arrest data, as well as ethnographic or field observations may be important for interpreting and explaining individual-level findings. However, researcher field observation and interviewing, the data collection method which has been the basis for classic gang studies, may not be sufficient for program evaluation, or even for understanding gang structure and process. Youth-gang activities occur at different times of the day or night, or in early morning hours. The field observer cannot be present 24 hours a day to observe changes in gang or delinquent behavior of

youth. Estimates of changes in gang structure (e.g., cohesion, leadership, recruitment, violation of gang codes, inter-gang conflict) cannot be accurately or reliably measured by a single data-gathering procedure. Interviews, field observations and police and agency-worker records together are required to clarify and verify gang process and program-effect patterns. The classic use of field observations as a primary basis for theorizing about program effects is not adequate for evaluation research (Klein, 1971; Short and Strodbeck, 1965).

Program Process Data. Special worker-service, or program-tracking or recording devices have to be created to describe the key program activities or worker contacts provided to, and received by, program youth. Existing agency records (whether police, probation, or social-agency) may be insufficient for purposes of testing the program model. The problem of collecting data from workers or agency records is compounded when information derived from multiple sources across multiple agencies has to be integrated. Evaluation of comprehensive gang programs must develop commonly understood terms across different agencies, community groups and staffs, which also take unique organizational and worker missions into consideration.

Commonly accepted definitions of program measures must be established, since services or contacts may have different definitions and purposes for different agencies and worker disciplines. The nature of collaboration among workers and agencies in the provision of services has to be viewed as an important variable. The identity and function of the particular service provider gives special meaning to the service or contact, and therefore has to be duly recognized and its significance understood. The variety of measures developed to obtain data on meaningful program effects has to include types of services provided, and types and dosage of worker

contacts made. Most important, the type and purpose of the service must be incorporated into the development and analyses of community-based, program-process data.

Measurement. The need to integrate data (even at the same level of analysis) derived from different data sets, the reduction of differences between program and comparison youth characteristics and their different selection and interview periods, the integration of multiple variables (especially when sample sizes are relatively small), as well as missing data – all create formidable measurement problems in community-based, gang-program research. Meaningful connections across variables as well as the reduction of the number of variables have to be engineered. Use of factor-analytic procedures may not be sufficient. Critically important are key program-model concepts and propositions as a basis for selection of variables and interpretation of findings. Appropriate scales may be required to reduce ratio or interval data to ordinal or nominal-level scales, especially when program and comparison-youth characteristics are highly disparate and sample size is small. Special measures or indices have to be created to test propositions of the program model. For example, a gang-involvement scale may have to be conceptualized and specific items introduced to measure change over time, not only in terms of the youth's original gang- or non-gang-member status, but in terms of a cluster of items such as rank in the gang, level of gang participation, time spent with gang friends, gang victimization, gang status of parents or siblings, etc.

Analysis. Differences in the findings relating to key characteristics of program and comparison youth have to be related to the specific effects of the program. Whether the program or parts of

the program are successful or unsuccessful in predicting or accounting for differences with the non-served sample may best be determined through the use of multivariate analytic procedures, particularly the use of General Linear Modeling and Logistical Regression. Such analyses may still be unconvincing unless other sources of data using both the same and different units of analysis (such as related gang, agency, program-structure, and community characteristics and changes) are available to throw light on the reasons for the individual-level findings. In other words, the analysis of program effects based on individual-level quantitative findings from a single data source as a means for determining individual youth change may still not be sufficient to determine what the program accomplished or failed to accomplish.

The congruence of findings in the relationship of the same or similar variables using different sources of data (e.g., individual youth self-reports, police arrest data, field observations and agency progress reports) and different units of analysis (group, and community-level), and their relationship to predicted program outcomes at the individual level are the best bases for making judgements about the value of the program. Researcher and program-operator qualitative observations, as well as theory and prior research findings, provide reference points against which to measure not only the reliability and validity of the findings, but their interpretation. The degrees of rigor of the different but associated analyses have to be duly recognized. The relationships of findings at the different levels of analysis may not be easily made.

The Evaluation Model

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) Evaluation examined the nature of program implementation, and the services and contacts provided to individual youth, based on the requirements of the program Model, described above. It examined individual-youth outcome in particular, the nature of services and contacts provided by different workers, and to some extent the impact of the program on gang and community crime. It required a great deal of qualitative and quantitative data and examined the relationship of concepts and variables at different levels of analysis.

The Evaluation Model was based on the relationship of sets of recursive factors. It sought to describe and test the influence of elements of the Program Model, using concepts derived from social-disorganization and social-opportunity theories. The Evaluation Model was built upon factors which interact with and influence each other, beginning with contextual (mainly community social disorganization) factors and ending, for evaluation purposes, with changes-in-crime factors at the individual-youth, gang, and community levels. A variety of intermediate factors, such as organizational relationships, program structure, services and worker contacts provided, changes in youth life course/space behaviors and law enforcement policies and practices, were also identified, and the direction and strength of their influence analyzed (Chart 2.1).

I. Community Social Disorganization

Certain ecological, economic, social, and cultural conditions were expected to create the community circumstances favorable to the development of the gang problem. These

circumstances included: the rapid movement, expansion, and/or shift of population (particularly of low-income minority groups) into the program area, and the outflux of a stable, often middle-class, non-minority population from the program area; the presence of a large adolescent population (especially males) weakly integrated into educational, socialization, or employment systems in the community; and the existence of criminal structures and alternate opportunity agencies.

II. Organizational/Interorganizational Factors

Key institutions were unable to adequately accommodate the interests and needs of a changing population that required better access to services and social and economic opportunities, as well as appropriate controls on deviant subcultures and quasi-organized groups adapting to community disorganization. Key organizations coalesced to cope with problems of community disorganization and the gang problem through the development of a coalition of agency programs and the development of a comprehensive approach to the gang problem.

III. Program Implementation Structure

The additional federal resources introduced into the community were utilized to develop a comprehensive, community-wide approach that emphasized varying levels of control, opportunities provision, social services, and policy and program changes that would affect the youth-gang population and meet the interest and needs of the leadership structure in the larger community.

IV. Services and Worker Contacts

Program Model elements, strategies, and implementation principles emphasized varying degrees of control and social services. How the Model was operationalized depended mainly on the interests of police and probation in targeting certain elements of the youth population for the program.

V. Changes in Youth Characteristics

The key objective of the Steering Committee, program leadership and the operational street team was to change the behavior of targeted youth while protecting established community interests, especially by reducing gang involvement, constraining youth to conform to school rules and responsibilities, and providing access to, and sustaining them on, jobs.

VI. Individual-Youth Outcome

Changes in the life space and life course of program youth through provision of social opportunities, access to treatment services, more sensitive and pervasive controls, and enhanced coordination among workers was expected to reduce or prevent delinquency among program youth, especially among gang-involved members and those at serious risk of gang involvement.

VII. Law Enforcement Policy/Practice

The success of individual-youth outcome also depended on the nature and scope of crime or deviancy attributed to youth at the time of program entry, relative to the interests of law enforcement in suppressing or controlling the behavior of program youth.

VIII. Gang-as-a-Unit

Program effects at the individual program-youth level were expected to be translated into gang effects, depending on the degree to which program youth were representative of active gangs, the scope and structure of the established gangs, the extent to which program workers reached out to gangs and gang youth in the neighborhood, and police policy and practice.

IX. Target-Area Outcome (Crime Change)

Changes in crime, especially gang-related incidents and gang-related crime, were contingent on changes in (and/or control of) program youth behavior, and especially gang-as-a-unit behavior. In general, the program was expected more directly and powerfully to influence program youth, and indirectly and less powerfully to contribute to change in gang-as-a-unit behavior. The scope of these effects was expected to influence changes in area (gang) crime rates.

Implementing the Evaluation

The evaluations of the Program Model across the five sites – Mesa, Tucson, Riverside, San Antonio, and Bloomington-Normal – were simultaneous and complex, requiring extensive collaboration among local project personnel, local evaluators and technical-assistance and national-evaluation teams, within the general guidelines set by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and aided by the suggestions of the National Advisory Board. Major problems of research design, program modification and implementation, data collection, sample development, and analysis had to be addressed at all stages of the evaluations. The National

Evaluator, the University of Chicago, was responsible for overall research design, instrument development, coordination of data management within and across sites, and the interim and final analyses. The National Evaluator had no responsibility for program implementation, and only partial responsibility for the selection of the program- and comparison-youth samples and implementation of data collection procedures. The local evaluator at each site was appointed and funded by the local program director, under guidelines formulated by the National Evaluator and OJJDP.

Early problems of a lack of understanding of the Program Model and how to implement it, as well as slow acceptance of data-collection procedures and requirements at the local sites, had to be addressed. Not all components of the Model were adequately implemented by the local site operators; not all procedures for local data collection were followed. The difficulties of program-youth (and especially comparison-youth) sample selection and interview data collection were not fully anticipated, either at local or national levels. Distinctive, individual-site program and evaluation problems occurred and were continually addressed; some were never fully overcome.

The problems of insufficient understanding and acceptance of the Program Model by the local sites were largely handled by OJJDP management and technical-assistance staff, but they also involved the National Evaluator. Much of the early problem of Program Model implementation and local evaluation data collection surfaced around the issue of who was to be selected for the program. The local program directors generally presumed that the primary, long-term purpose of the program was prevention and early intervention, i.e. targeting at-risk, usually younger youth not yet gang members or even having police arrest records. At some of the sites,

key organizations such as police and youth agencies assumed that the funds they received were to help them keep doing what each organization separately had been doing all along.

The problems of sample selection and implementation of the Model were further complicated when the local projects were required to focus on bringing both gang delinquents and youth at high risk for gang involvement into the program. Also, none of the lead agencies had experience developing a program combining social-service and suppression activities. The initial applications to OJJDP did not clearly articulate the criteria for the selection of youth into the program. The lead agencies (except possibly in San Antonio) did not have the experience or know-how to reach gang delinquents directly from the streets. No grassroots organizations, neighborhood groups or former gang members with access to gangs or gang youth were involved in program planning, or even later in program implementation. The programs were based mainly on referrals of youth from probation sources (mainly juvenile probation) and to a limited extent from schools – youth who might be suspended or expelled and who were regarded as troublesome, but not necessarily gang-involved or at serious risk for gang involvement. The probation departments, especially juvenile probation, came to be heavily invested in the programs.

The selection of both the program-youth sample, and the comparison-youth sample would require special evaluation efforts, particularly by the local evaluators. A comparable gang-problem community, where the program was not established, had to be selected. It was not clear which areas and which kinds of youth would be selected for the comparison samples. At four of the five sites, another part of the same city was selected. At the fifth site, another city (or set of twin cities) was selected.

Each local site evaluator had his or her own research interest, which sometimes could become complementary to the evaluation mission of the National Evaluator, sometimes not. At four of the five sites, the local evaluator had no research experience with gang youth. Some of the local evaluators were not particularly interested in testing the Program Model, and delegated major sections of the local evaluation responsibility to students. There were changes of local evaluators at two of the sites. There were also long delays in initiating the data-collection process.

Collection of data was a great burden for local program personnel, as well as for the national and local evaluators, at all the sites. A variety of continuing obstacles, and resistance by local program personnel and local evaluators had to be overcome. The plan for data collection included: individual youth surveys to be administered to each of 100 program and 100 comparison youth at annual interview periods; summary program-service records of contacts by workers with each youth every three months, to be gathered by the different program workers at each site; and complete police arrest and confinement histories to be collected for all program and comparison youth. The effort to obtain official school records and misconduct histories for each program and comparison youth had to be aborted because of the unavailability of such records for youth, and the lack of complete attendance or grade records. Gang-as-a-unit data for all gangs and community gang-crime statistics had to be obtained from gang-crime police and crime analysts in the program and comparison areas. Organization surveys were to be collected from 20-25 administrators in key agencies and organizations addressing the gang problem in each of the program and comparison areas.


The data collected also included: on-site observations of program operations by local and

national evaluators; interviews of program staff; minutes of steering committee meetings; minutes of cluster (multi-site program staff) meetings; minutes of monthly telephone conferences with key program staff from each site; reviews of yearly funding applications, progress reports and special communications by each site with OJJDP; and, lastly, program-performance measures based on interviews with key local agency and steering committee personnel at the end of the 4 to 5-year program periods.

The evaluations were complex undertakings at all five project sites. Site visits by the national evaluators were made two or three times per year. Visits to the national evaluation office in Chicago were also made periodically by some site project directors and local evaluators to provide information and resolve evaluation issues. In many respects, data collection represented the most difficult and time-consuming part of the evaluation process, extending well into the data-organization, cleaning, and data-analysis phases. This happened in large measure because multiple sources and years of data had to be collected from different agency providers, and especially because problems of data reliability were not discovered until the analysis stage of the evaluation, when the different data sets were integrated. The various agency providers at the sites, including the lead agencies, were not always sure which youth were in the program and which youth were not. Missing and incorrect data were discovered. These issues were resolved only at the final stage of the integration of data sets.

Chart 2.1

Evaluation Model: Program and Comparison Areas, Gangs, Youth
 (Comparison Area Components = I, II, V [partial], VI, VIII, IX)



Chapter 3

The Program and Comparison Areas

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) is located in the Powell Junior High School attendance area. (It is also identified by the Mesa United Way as “Building a Healthier Mesa Area 3.”) The program or target area, located in south central Mesa, comprises a rapidly-changing, low-income, increasingly Hispanic population of Mexican origin.

Mesa, Arizona has been one of the fastest growing cities in the United States. Based on the 2000 U.S. Census its population was 396,375, an increase of 37.6% since the 1990 Census. Mesa is located in Maricopa County which also contains Phoenix, the sixth largest city in the United States with a population of 1,321,045 (2000 Census). Mesa is 12 miles east of Phoenix and is substantially affected by that city’s economy and social problems, including a growing gang problem.

Mesa has a distinctive and rich cultural history. Founded by the Mormons in 1828 but with deep roots in its Mexican settlements, the city, which originally occupied 15 square miles, now encloses 122-plus square miles. It has a diverse and changing population and a diversified economic structure. Among the city’s largest employers are the McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company, Boeing Corporation, Motorola, TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, General Motors, the Lutheran Health Care Network, the Maricopa County Community College and the Mesa Police Department, which employs one thousand people. In recent years, employment growth has shifted from the high-paying manufacturing to the low-paying services and retail-trade sectors. There has been a swing from full-time to part-time jobs. Mesa adjoins the Maricopa Indian Salt

River Indian Reservation, which has few resources and whose increasing social problems are part of those of the city itself (Tribune Newspapers, June 7, 1992, “The Changing Face of Mesa”).

Many youth from the Reservation attend schools in Mesa.

Community leaders say that Mesa has traditionally viewed itself as a wholesome, self-sufficient, family-oriented community which takes pride in solving its problems from within rather than depending on assistance from outside. It is a conservative community with the second largest settlement of Mormons in the country. It is currently experiencing the negative consequences of its rapid growth, and the acceleration of a variety of social, economic, and educational problems. “Among the most alarming is the visible rise in youth ‘gang-related’ criminal activity” (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, September 18, 1996).

Many local citizens perceive Mesa to be a small town where people care for one another. This is particularly so in its central area, which includes the Project target area. “Hispanic families have lived in the area for several generations, with gang life often multi-generational. However, even on the worse streets, neighborhoods in Mesa are still generally safe...” For many years youth gangs have been viewed as only small neighborhood groups of youth committing minor crimes (Third-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September 12, 1997).

Mesa has become an increasingly diverse city with growing migration, education, poverty and health problems. Central Mesa and East Mesa, with an increasing Hispanic and decreasing non-Hispanic white population, have the greatest need for health and human services (Tribune Newspapers, June 7, 1992). The population in the target area comprises not only settled Mexican-American families who have become assimilated into American culture, but “Mexican nationals – more recent arrivals with strong connections to Mexico, who often lack English skills

and are less familiar with local ways, including land ordinances and zoning requirements” (Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). An underlying tension is said to exist between “established” neighborhood groups and recent immigrants, which may be accounted for by the increase in gangs and conflict between Mexican immigrants and established Mexican-American youth gangs (Memo to I. Spergel from C. Kane, October 28, 1996).

The Mexican-American population is highly visible in the Powell Junior High School area and the three comparison areas (see below). According to Project leadership, the Mexican-American community is not well-represented politically. The increasing number of alternative high schools and junior high schools in Mesa contain an increasing proportion of Mexican-American youth. Many old-time white and Mexican-American residents have moved out as immigrants have moved into the target area. All of this may have added to the isolation of the Mexican immigrant population from Mesa’s established social and cultural life.

At the start of the Project, a 1996 study conducted by the Mesa Unified School District found that the Powell Junior High School neighborhood had undergone increases in immigrant residents and single-parent homes, and decreases in family incomes which left the community with a weakened capacity to deal with the increasing crime rate and gang problem (Katz, Webb, Schaefer, December 1999, “An Assessment of Mesa, Arizona’s Gang Problem”).

Nevertheless, city officials and community leaders continue to emphasize the distinctive and relatively mild character of crime (both gang and non-gang) in Mesa. Police data indicate that the problem is not characterized by serious violence. However, drug use (and particularly drug dealing) have become increasingly common, especially in low-income areas. Non-gang as well as gang youth, some parents and family members regularly drive to Mexico to pick up

quantities of marijuana or “meth,” not only for personal use but to sell and “make a living.” Dealing drugs has become a more lucrative occupation than legitimate employment, since access to good-paying jobs is not really available to unskilled and poorly-educated newcomers (Zorich Visit to Chicago, May 28, 1998).

The areas of Mesa with the highest levels of human and social problems, which are on Mesa’s south and southeast sides, appear to be Mesa Junior High School (Area 5), Powell Junior High School (Area 3), Carson Junior High School (Area 4), and Kino Junior High School (Area 6). The area served by Powell Junior High School is the Project target area, and we determined to use the other three areas as comparison areas for purposes of program evaluation. A large majority of the city’s documented gang members were said to be located in the Project and comparison areas (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, 1996).

In a recent telephone survey of citizens – 400 from the Project target area and 400 from the rest of the city (including but not focused on the specific comparison areas) by Katz, Webb, and Choate (2001) – target-area respondents reported significantly more social disorder in their areas than respondents from the rest of the city. According to target-area respondents, the quality of life had significantly declined; there was significantly more concern expressed about racial/ethnic relations, and target-area residents viewed neighbors as significantly less cohesive than did residents in the rest of the city.

Population Characteristics of the City: Program and Comparison Areas

Based on U.S. Census data (Table 3.1), Mesa experienced a major (37.6%) growth in population size between 1990 and 2000, although the increase was not so great as that between

1980 and 1990 (87.3%). Of greater significance to the rise of the youth-gang problem since the 1980s was the relatively greater growth and concentration of the Mexican and Mexican-American population in the program and comparison areas, compared to the rest of the city. In these areas, the number of non-Hispanic whites grew by 45,603 (18.6%), but the Hispanic-origin population grew by 46,924 (149.6%). The increase in the proportion of Hispanic population was: from 16.5% to 33.8% in the Powell Junior High School program area; from 13.1% to 30.3% in the Carson Junior High School area; and from 12.8% to 25.5% in the Kino Junior High School area. The greatest relative increase in Hispanic population was in the Mesa Junior High School area – from 21.8% to 49.9% (Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5).

It was possible to speculate that the increase in the gang problem, particularly the growth in numbers of gang members in the 1990s, was closely related to two socio-demographic phenomena: 1) the growth of the Hispanic population in the program and comparison areas; and 2) the size of the decline of the non-Hispanic white population relative to the increase in the size of the Hispanic population in these areas, i.e., the increasing segregation and isolation of the low-income, relatively younger Hispanic population from the rest of the city, especially from its non-Hispanic white population.

Table 3.1
Selected Population Characteristics
1990 and 2000 Census
Mesa, Arizona

Year	Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %)								
	Total Population	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic African-American	Hispanic Origin/Latino (any race)		Asian /or Pacific Islander	American Indian	Other	Two or More Races
				TOTAL	<i>Mexican</i>				
1990	288,091 (100.0)	244,577 (84.9)	5,146 (1.8)	31,357 (10.9)	26,506 (84.5)	4,140 (1.4)	2,621 (0.9)	250 (0.1)	NA
2000	396,375	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
difference (%)	37.6	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2000¹ (low estimate)	390,323 (100.0)	290,180 (74.3)	9,377 (2.4)	78,281 (20.1)	63,519 (81.1)	6,629 (1.7)	5,454 (1.4)	402 (0.1)	(6,052)
difference (%)	---	-10.6	+0.6	+9.2	-3.4	+0.3	+0.5	0	---
2000² (high estimate)	402,911 (100.0)	295,371 (73.3)	11,103 (2.8)	78,281 (19.4)	63,519 (81.1)	8,924 (2.2)	7,336 (1.8)	1,896 (0.5)	---
difference (%)	---	-11.6	+1.0	+8.6	-3.4	+0.8	+0.9	+0.4	---

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error.

¹ Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a the figure of 390,323, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 396,375: the sum of the one-race responses – 390,323 – and the two-or-more-race responses – 6,052. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000.

² In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person indicating “White **and** Black or African-American **and** Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 402,911, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories.

Table 3.2
Selected Population Characteristics
1990 and 2000 Census
Powell Jr. High School Attendance Area

Year	Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %)								
	Total Population	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic African-American	Hispanic Origin/Latino (any race)		Asian /or Pacific Islander	American Indian	Other	Two or More Races
				TOTAL	<i>Mexican</i>				
1990	42,375 (100.1)	32,502 (76.7)	1,230 (2.9)	6,999 (16.5)	6,042 (86.3)	828 (2.0)	752 (1.8)	64 (0.2)	---
2000	49,789	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
difference (%)	17.5	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2000¹ (low estimate)	48,682 (100.0)	26,614 (54.7)	2,234 (4.6)	16,476 (33.8)	---	1,309 (2.7)	1,970 (4.0)	79 (0.2)	(1,107)
difference (%)	---	-22.0	+1.7	+17.3	---	+0.7	+2.2	0	---
2000² (high estimate)	50,736 (100.0)	27,504 (54.2)	2,479 (4.9)	16,476 (32.5)	---	1,632 (3.2)	2,251 (4.4)	394 (0.8)	---
difference (%)	---	-21.5	+2.0	+16.0	---	+1.2	+2.6	+0.6	---

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error.

¹Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a the figure of 48,682, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 49,789: the sum of the one-race responses – 48,682–and the two-or-more-race responses – 1,107. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000.

²In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person indicating “White **and** Black or African-American **and** Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 50,736, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories.

Table 3.3
Selected Population Characteristics
1990 and 2000 Census
Carson Jr. High School Attendance Area

Year	Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %)								
	Total Population	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic African-American	Hispanic Origin/Latino (any race)		Asian /or Pacific Islander	American Indian	Other	Two or More Races
				TOTAL	<i>Mexican</i>				
1990	32,348 (100.1)	26,680 (82.5)	592 (1.8)	4,223 (13.1)	3,656 (86.6)	394 (1.2)	437 (1.4)	22 (0.1)	---
2000	36,960	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
difference (%)	14.3	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2000¹ (low estimate)	36,262 (100.1)	22,612 (62.4)	1,201 (3.3)	10,988 (30.3)	---	573 (1.6)	830 (2.3)	58 (0.2)	(698)
difference (%)	---	-20.1	1.5	17.2	---	0.4	0.9	0.1	---
2000² (high estimate)	37,697 (99.9)	23,215 (61.6)	1,442 (3.8)	10,988 (29.1)	---	717 (1.9)	1,092 (2.9)	243 (0.6)	---
difference (%)	---	-20.9	2.0	16.0	---	0.7	1.5	0.5	---

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error.

¹Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a the figure of 36,262, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 36,960: the sum of the one-race responses – 32,262 – and the two-or-more-race responses – 698. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000.

²In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person indicating “White and Black or African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 37,697, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories.

Table 3.4
Selected Population Characteristics
1990 and 2000 Census
Kino Jr. High School Attendance Area

Year	Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %)								
	Total Population	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic African-American	Hispanic Origin/Latino (any race)		Asian /or Pacific Islander	American Indian	Other	Two or More Races
				TOTAL	<i>Mexican</i>				
1990	26,111 (100.0)	21,751 (83.3)	541 (2.1)	3,343 (12.8)	2,890 (86.4)	194 (0.7)	257 (1.0)	25 (0.1)	---
2000	29,680	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
difference (%)	13.7	---	---	---	--	---	---	---	---
2000¹ (low estimate)	29,297 (100.0)	20,119 (68.7)	886 (3.0)	7,484 (25.5)	---	282 (1.0)	502 (1.7)	24 (0.1)	(383)
difference (%)	---	-14.6	0.9	12.7	---	0.3	0.7	0	---
2000² (high estimate)	30,071 (100.0)	20,458 (68.0)	1,010 (3.4)	7,484 (24.9)	----	366 (1.2)	652 (2.2)	101 (0.3)	---
difference (%)	---	-15.3	1.4	12.1	---	0.5	1.2	0.2	---

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error.

¹Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a the figure of 29,297, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 29,680: the sum of the one-race responses – 29,297 – and the two-or-more-race responses – 383. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000.

²In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person indicating “White **and** Black or African-American **and** Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 30,071, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories.

Table 3.5
Selected Population Characteristics
1990 and 2000 Census
Mesa Jr. High School Attendance Area

Year	Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %)								
	Total Population	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic African-American	Hispanic Origin/Latino (any race)		Asian /or Pacific Islander	American Indian	Other	Two or More Races
				TOTAL	<i>Mexican</i>				
1990	28,094 (99.9)	20,651 (73.5)	584 (2.1)	6,136 (21.8)	5,464 (89.0)	367 (1.3)	321 (1.1)	35 (0.1)	---
2000	34,074	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
difference (%)	+21.2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
2000¹ (low estimate)	33,628 (100.0)	15,248 (45.3)	707 (2.1)	16,775 (49.9)	---	480 (1.4)	390 (1.2)	28 (0.1)	(446)
difference (%)	---	-28.2	0	+28.1	---	+0.1	+0.1	0	---
2000² (high estimate)	34,626 (100.0)	15,696 (45.3)	847 (2.4)	16,775 (48.4)	---	608 (1.8)	539 (1.6)	161 (0.5)	---
difference (%)	---	-28.2	+0.3	+26.6	---	+0.5	+0.5	0	---

Totals do not always sum due to rounding errors.

¹ Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a the figure of 33,628, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 34,074: the sum of the one-race responses—33,628—and the two-or-more-race responses—446. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000.

² In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person indicating “White **and** Black or African-American **and** Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they reported gives a total population of 34,626, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high estimates for each of the social/ethnic categories.

Chapter 4

The Gang Problem in Mesa

It is difficult to estimate the actual scope and nature of the gang problem in Mesa. This may in part be due to the fact that Mesa does not have a chronic and serious gang problem. What the gang problem has been, and how it is changing in terms of numbers of gangs, numbers of gang members, and the character of gang incidents cannot be clearly or accurately determined based on existing data sources. The Mesa Police Department began assessing the gang problem using quantitative data in 1998, and is still in the process of developing and perfecting its gang-data system. Initially, the assessment of the scope of the problem was largely based on anecdotal or case description. Recent reports of the gang problem are also available from occasional surveys conducted by the Mesa School District and Arizona State University, as well as from estimates of the Maricopa Juvenile Probation Department and Gang Prevention Steering Committee, and from the media.

The general perception is that the Mesa gang problem is mild compared to medium-sized and larger cities, and is characterized by relatively less violence but growing drug dealing and drug use. Nevertheless, recent data indicate that the gang problem is increasing, and that this is due both to the arrival of an immigrant and mobile low-income population (especially of Mexican and Mexican-American origin) and the growth of African-American and Skinhead groups. The gang problem has grown statewide, particularly in and around the Phoenix area. Gangs are increasingly mobile, and distinctions between gang problems in Phoenix, Tempe, Chandler, Glendale, Mesa and other nearby cities and communities seem to be eroding.

4.1

Various Mesa institutions appear to view the gang problem – and the necessary response to it – somewhat differently. The Mesa Police Department sees the problem as mainly one of young adult males who are to be watched or arrested and incarcerated, as the situation requires. The Maricopa County Juvenile Court and Probation Department see the gang problem as comprising juvenile males (and some juvenile females) who have been involved in less-seriously violent, minor criminal or status offenses; youth who are to be closely supervised, and (usually) provided with community-based services as well as (sometimes) “intensive” supervision. Prosecution focuses on the more serious gang offenders involved in drive-bys or violent crimes, who are to be prosecuted and sent to correctional institutions. The Mesa Unified School District pays attention to a broad range of disruptive youth, including gang members, gang associates and non-gang youth who may not always be delinquents, but who may be removed from the regular school system and referred to alternative junior high and high schools. Youth agencies see the gang problem as comprising a younger, juvenile at-risk population who mainly require recreational activities, mentoring, and substance-abuse counseling.

Definitions

Arizona state law has defined a criminal gang, a gang member or gang associate, and a gang incident. Identification procedures have not yet been fully developed, implemented or systematically operationalized. Arizona State Legislative Senate Bill 1921, passed in the Spring of 1993, defined the gang problem as requiring a suppression-oriented approach. Parts of the California State Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (S.T.E.P.) Act have been incorporated into Arizona law. Mesa community leaders joined the Arizona Attorney General and others to

support enactment of this legislation, with funding provided for special intelligence units under the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS), whose responsibility would be centralizing the gathering, analysis, and dispersal of gang statistics (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994).

The Mesa Police Department (MPD) utilized the definition of a gang included in the Arizona Revised Statute 13-105: a “criminal street gang means an ongoing formal or informal association of persons whose members or associates individually or collectively engage in the commission, attempted commission, facilitation or solicitation of any felony act and who has at least one individual who is a criminal street-gang member” (Katz, Webb, Schafer, December, 1999).

The MPD Gang Unit uses seven criteria to assess whether or not an individual should be classified as a gang member:

- Self-proclamation
- Witness testimony or official statement
- Written or electronic correspondence
- Paraphernalia or photographs
- Tattoos
- Clothing or colors
- Any other indicia of street-gang membership.

Any individual meeting one of the above criteria can be classified by the Gang Unit as a gang associate. Any individual meeting two or more of the above criteria can be classified as a gang member (Katz, Webb, Schaefer, December 1999).

Furthermore, a gang member convicted of a felony offense “with the intent to promote, further, or assist any criminal conduct by a criminal street gang may have his or her sentence increased by three years” (Arizona Revised Statutes 13-604).

Applying the gang-membership criteria can be subjective. Much depends on police, probation, or school identification of the youth as a gang member, regardless of whether he commits a crime or not. It is possible that adolescents in certain neighborhoods and of certain ethnic backgrounds are more likely to be identified as gang members or gang associates than is the case for adolescents in other neighborhoods of other ethnic backgrounds. Hispanic youth are probably more likely to be placed on special police gang-membership lists than are members of other racial or ethnic groups. Neo-Nazi, militia, and satanic groups (or gangs) are apparently classified separately, and are usually not identified as part of the street-gang problem.

Most gang members on police lists are young adults. According to Katz, Webb, and Schaefer (1999), based on the MPD’s Gang Unit data (collected over a period 1995-1999) only 16.2% of documented gang members are juveniles, i.e., under the age of 18 years. The major age-category of gang members, 18 to 25 years, comprises 67.9% of those on the documented-gang-member list. The remaining age-category, over 25 years, comprises 15.9% of the documented gang members. The age distribution of gang members may represent youth who are placed on these lists and not appropriately removed over time.

Names of youth on gang-membership lists are supposed to be expunged if the youth has

not been arrested during a five-year period, but we do not know how frequently or systematically the police update their files. The list of gang members in the MPD files continues to grow. The distinctions between gang members and gang associates or non-gang youth may also not be clear. Gang members are arrested more often than gang associates or non-gang youth (Katz, Webb, Schaefer, December 1999). It is not known whether the classification of a youth as a gang member is compellingly associated with particular patterns of offenses (such as gang violence) which may be distinctively gang-related.

Number of Gangs

The number of gangs increased in Mesa, particularly in certain areas. Elements of the same gang, or gangs with similar names, were present in the Project and comparison areas as well as citywide, but the largest segments of the most troublesome gangs appeared to be located in the Project and comparison areas. The First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1994) under the Comprehensive Gang Program claimed that few of the “homegrown” gangs existed five years ago, and that the number of gangs (as well as their violent activity) had grown exponentially due to the influence of gang youth moving to Mesa from Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Chicago. The “rapid infiltration of gangs” signified an “accelerating problem.” There were five gangs in Mesa in 1990, ten gangs in 1991 and fifteen gangs in 1994. Furthermore, in the same First-Year OJJDP Funding Application there was reference to “30 different gangs [that] had developed in Mesa.”

The Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application (1996), however, claimed there were 19 gangs in Mesa: five gangs that had only an Hispanic membership; seven gangs that had primarily

Hispanic membership but also included whites; one mixed gang (Hispanic, African-American, and white); three African-American-only gangs; two African-American gangs that included whites; and one white-only gang. Of the 19 documented gangs, six were known to have female members; 8 of the 19 gangs were viewed as having a “high propensity for violence ... such as drive-bys, aggravated assault robberies ...”

In the Spring of 1997, during a National Evaluation staff visit to the Mesa Project, program administrators still claimed there were 19 gangs in Mesa, but there was no specific data on the number of gangs in the Project target area. The MGIP Director claimed that such information would not be available from the MPD data system until July 1997. In February 1998, the MPD documented 17 Mesa gangs. In the course of a telephone conference between National Evaluation and Mesa staff (Conference Call with National Evaluators and MGIP Staff, August 19, 1998), the Case Management Coordinator indicated that the Project was working with members of 4 gangs mainly in the Project area (Southside Mesa, Wetback Power, Westside Mesa, and Los Varrio Locos). He claimed that the gang problem was as strong as ever, but “they had seen a reduction of violence in the youth they work with.”

In 1999, Katz, Webb, and Schaefer reported that Mesa had 25 documented gangs, the five largest of which were Wetback Power, Westside Mesa, Southside Mesa, La Victoria Locos, and West Side City Crips (an African-American gang). However, these five gangs contained only 39.7% of total gang members in the city. Apparently, the smaller-size gangs collectively contained the majority of gang members in Mesa.¹ The claim continued to be made that gangs

¹ However, based on four annual interviews with Mesa Gang Unit detectives, the largest numbers of gang members in the program and comparison areas were claimed to be from these five gangs. Also, members of the program and comparison youth samples were largely from these same gangs.

and gang members were dispersed citywide, except perhaps for Wetback Power, which was located mainly in the Mesa Junior High area (the comparison area just east of the Project target area). Members of most gangs were said to be dispersed “randomly” throughout the city, although the gang problem – at least based on school-survey and police gang-specialist estimates – was concentrated in the four central-city areas, including the Project area and three comparison areas. There was also occasional reference to the Skinhead, White Supremacist, Indian Reservation and motorcycle gangs or groups in Mesa, but presumably they were not generally present in the target area.

In their Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application (1998), the Mesa Project leadership claimed that “Mesa does, in fact, have a gang problem, although it is still an ‘emerging gang problem.’ This problem is growing incrementally ... Mesa has 25 gangs operating in the city ... a 500 percent increase over the five documented gangs in 1990.” As in the First-Year Funding Application, there was reference to the increase in the “degree of violence” due to the influence of Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Chicago gangs. And there was reference to “a rapid infiltration of gangs [in the Mesa Vista alternative school student population] over the same [8 to 10 year] period.”

In June and July of 2000, the MPD Gang Unit lieutenant observed that 26 gangs were now documented by the MPD, although only five or six “were really active” (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, July 2000). However, the same lieutenant, who later became the Gang Unit Commander and Project Director of MGIP, mentioned that gang arrests were up – “involving 39 different gangs” – presumably from Mesa (Steering Committee Minutes, November 14, 2000). This latest claim was made around the time of termination of OJJDP

funding of the Project in December, 2000. The number of gangs was apparently growing, but the exact numbers remained elusive. In the course of the final site visit by the National Evaluation team (June 22-23, 2000), the departing MPD Gang Unit Commander noted that the growing gang problem was predominantly Hispanic. The incoming Gang Unit Commander and Project Director also raised the issue of “how one could view the Project as a success when the number of gang members continued to increase” (I. Spergel, Field Notes, June 24, 2000).

Number of Gang Members

It was also difficult to determine how many gang members and gang associates were present in the target area and in the city as a whole, and what changes in these numbers were occurring over time. Based on data sources from the MPD and Maricopa County Probation Departments (Juvenile and Adult), estimates were imprecise in part because distinctions between juvenile and adult gang members were not always made. Estimates also often referred to at-risk youth, who may or may not have met the criteria of gang associate. Further, we are not sure if the estimates of numbers of gang youth referred to the membership of key gangs operating in the program or comparison areas only, or citywide. Nevertheless, the number of gang members did not seem to have grown as much as the number of gangs.

A Tribune newspaper feature article, The Changing Face of Mesa (June 7, 1992), stated that “the Mesa Police Department’s Gang Suppression Action plan (1993) estimates ... only 550 known gang members being tracked in Mesa by the local police.” In Mesa’s First-Year Funding Application (and Abstract, 1994), these figures jumped dramatically to 1500 gang members, and included a large number of “at risk” youth who would be classified as “wannabes.”

Katz, Webb, and Schaefer (1999) stated that “in 1995, when the police department began to document gang members, there were 1,333, [but] by June 1999, 1506 gang members had been documented in Mesa, Arizona [a rise of 12%].” The Mesa Fifth-Year Funding Application (1999) specified these figures as 1035 documented gang members and 471 gang associates. In the same Application, target-area gang members from the four large gangs – West Side Mesa, Southside Mesa, East Side Locos, and Wetback Power – were said to number 240, or 40%, of the 601 total Mesa documented gang members in the target area. A year later, the Arizona Republican reported there were 700 to 800 gang members in the target area (Christina Leonard, “Feds, City Offering Opportunities to Gangs,” June 7, 2000). In 2000, the MGIP Director said there were 1600 documented gang members and gang associates in all of Mesa (Steering Committee Minutes, July 11, 2000).

Probably our best estimate of the number of gang members and gang associates, and changes in these numbers over time, is from figures cited in the Fifth-Year MGIP Funding Application (1999).

Number of Gang Members in Mesa					
Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Number of Gang Members	1335	1464	1206	1423	1506

A MPD Gang Unit detective, presumably knowledgeable about gangs and gang members, estimated the total citywide gang membership in January 2001 to be 1135, and the total number of gang members in the target area to be 1010. Whether these numbers included both gang members and gang associates is not clear. In any case, the proportion of target-area gang

members appears to have risen, although overall gang-member numbers may have declined.

The difference between the increases in estimated numbers of gangs and gang members is a puzzle. The number of gangs appears to have grown about 500%, but the number of gang members only 15% to 20%. We would have expected the number of gang members to have grown more than the number of gangs. We address these changing patterns in the numbers of gangs and gang members, comparing the program and comparison areas, and using police gang-specialist estimates, in a later chapter: Gang and Community-Level Crime Changes (Chapter 14).

Finally, Katz, Webb, and Schaefer (1999) report that of the 481 juvenile gang members in their citywide sample (derived from MPD Gang Unit lists, which include gang associates), 22.5% (n = 108) had no arrest records. Furthermore, of the 146 (mainly juvenile) youth in the Project at the time, 42.5% (n = 62) had not ever been arrested. In other words, a substantial proportion of youth documented as gang members or gang associates in the city at large, including the target area, probably had no arrest records. If we use MPD 1999 estimates of the age distribution of juvenile gang members or gang associates in Mesa, only 16.2% were listed as juveniles (under 18 years of age). This computes to only 244 juvenile gang members or gang associates in all of Mesa.

The Nature of the Gang Crime Problem

In this chapter we report mainly agency and field-observation findings of the nature of juvenile gang-offender arrests, and of changes in these arrests over time. In a later chapter, based on more systematically-collected and analyzed self-report and police-arrest data for program and

comparison youth, we present findings on the specific scope and nature of crime and gang offenses of program and comparison youth (Chapter 9).

Various observations of Project administrative staff and other sources of data suggested that Mesa was an emerging gang-problem city, that the gang-crime problem was not serious, and that crimes such as homicides and aggravated assaults were not dominant features of the gang problem. Maricopa County Juvenile Probation records indicated that among the 481 gang juveniles known to them in the three-year period between 1995 and 1998, charges were brought for only 4 homicides, no forcible rapes, 16 robberies, no drivebys, but for 53 aggravated assaults. Between 1995 and 1998, homicides decreased by 100%, robberies by 77.% and aggravated assault by 79.4%. The crimes most often committed by these juvenile probationers in the three year period were larceny, theft, and motor vehicle theft (21.7%), misdemeanor assaults (15.6%), drug violations (8.5%), and curfew violations (13.4%). All crimes by these probationers decreased 33.1% in this period (Katz, Webb, Schaefer, December, 1999). Nevertheless, the Mesa Police Department website (2002) and their more detailed area-level crime data suggested that the program and comparison areas accounted for more than half the city's crime, but contained only a little more than a third of the city's population. The majority of almost all types of crime incidents were occurring in the program and three comparison areas together during the program and pre-program periods.

At the time of the Katz, Webb, Schaefer (1999) survey, 59% of program participants had a record of arrests. Only 14 (9.7%) of these were chronic offenders (arrested 6 or more times), and 42 (28.0%) were moderate offenders (arrested 2 to 5 times). While the majority of program youth were on probation, only 6 were classified as hardcore offenders involved in criminal

activities such as drivebys (Amy Silverman, New Times – Phoenix, December 16, 1999).

Project police and probation officers also estimated that youth-gang incidents had generally declined in the Project area during the program period, but had increased in the neighboring area to the east – the Mesa Junior High School comparison area– which was experiencing a greater increase in Hispanic population than were the program and other two comparison areas. Project police officers claimed that, since the Project was established, crime in the target area – particularly crime committed by gang youth – had gone down (I. Spergel and F. Perez, Field Notes of June 22-23, 2000 visit to Mesa).

This was not to deny that there were occasional serious gang-crime incidents involving juveniles and adults, as reported by Gang Unit detectives at Gang Prevention Steering Committee meetings: five driveby shooting incidents in 1996, with no injuries and no arrests made; Gang Unit intervention in a conflict between gangs at an alternative high school in 1999; several gang members arrested for armed robbery in 2000; and phone harassment and aggravated assault incidents by Skinhead groups. At one of the Steering Committee meetings, a program youth was identified as the victim of a gang assault at a local junior high school; there was no injury inflicted and the suspect was charged with an aggravated assault because he used a club (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, January 15, 1998).

The Case Management Coordinator reported that there was “so much violence in the [target] community,” but when pressed to be more specific, responded “well the violence related to the people using drugs and alcohol... lots of bar fights... violence against their [gang youth] moms” (Transcript of conversation with Mesa Case Management Coordinator in Chicago, December 23, 1999).

Drugs. The larger gang problem was identified as use of alcohol and marijuana, and selling drugs such as marijuana and cocaine (and increasingly methamphetamines) by gang youth – more and more by undocumented gang youth. There was some disagreement among police and probation as to whether gang youth were selling large quantities of drugs, and whether their drug dealing was well-organized. There was evidence that a good deal of drug dealing involved non-gang youth and young adults, as well as gang members.

One Project detective reported that “our Narcotics Unit conducted an investigation in an area where we have the most Project participants living. The investigation centered around a group of individuals who were selling large amounts of marijuana (anywhere from 25 pounds and up) and methamphetamines (anywhere from one ounce and up). These individuals were distributing the drugs in the neighborhood to be sold at street level amounts. Some of the sellers were gang members and others were illegal citizens from Mexico... One of the subjects targeted during the investigation was a Project participant” (Memo from the Project Gang Unit detective to the Project Director and Commander, January 3, 1998).

Another MPD detective, not directly connected with the Project, reported that “two West Side Mesa Gang members (probably not program participants) were arrested for selling 50 pounds of marijuana.” He noted that “gangs are getting more involved in drug trafficking...” (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, January 15, 1998). It was not yet evident that gang youth were becoming hardcore drug users or drug sellers. There was little evidence that gangs hung out in crack houses or in areas where heavy drug distribution took place. Gang hangouts and drug distribution centers were still not associated (F. Perez Field Notes, June 22-23, 2000).

Female Gang Members. Also noted was that young adolescent females were becoming more involved with gangs, and that “female gang members [were] becoming more violent and more directly involved in criminal activity.” “Females are playing a more prominent role in gang activity. They are being jumped into gangs more frequently, becoming full-fledged members... they are becoming much more violent than in the past... motives for two recent gang-related shootings have centered around disputes over females” (Third- and Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Applications, 1997 and 1998). The Project Gang Unit detective expressed the view that “... females were not that ... involved in the gang problem ... [but] it would eventually be coming ... it would only be a matter of time before this site too would be affected” (F. Perez, Field Notes from June 22-23, 2000 Visit to Mesa).

Timing of Gang-Related Offenses. Despite the claims of Steering Committee members and the views of school authorities that gang offenses occurred mainly in the afternoons or after school hours during the week, this was not entirely the case. Based on police data, Katz, Webb, and Schaefer revealed that gang-related offenses were most likely to take place at the end of each week. Approximately 25% of such offenses took place on Thursday, 14% on Friday, 12% on Saturday, and 14% on Sunday. Furthermore, gang-related offenses took place mainly between 6:00 and 11:59 PM (40.8%) and between midnight and 3:00 AM (12.7%). Only 15.9% of gang incidents occurred between 3:00 PM and 6:00 PM, in the hours after school. It is possible that the Gang Prevention Steering Committee focused more on juveniles, and the police focused on, and arrested, more adults for gang offenses.

Reasons for the Gang Problem

The general-community and Steering Committee view was that youth joined gangs “to meet social and economic needs not satisfied through family, religion, school, or employment. The lack of stable families and neighbors combined with racism will continue to create an environment in Mesa where gangs may thrive” (Tribune Newspapers, June 7, 1992, “The Changing Face of Mesa”). Project staff increasingly noted the family dysfunction of youth served by the MGIP. Youth are frequently being raised by single parents (mostly by mothers) with generally low economic status and little education. Many families move frequently, and the instability of uprooting residence is a risk factor for gang involvement. There is violence in the home of a lot of youth; family role models are often inappropriate for the youth. Some families are so dysfunctional it appeared evident that mental-health services would be necessary at some point... (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997).

The perception of some local residents about gangs, at least based on the views of a small sample of residents at a community meeting, did not entirely jibe with official police or agency views. “Several of the people [parents] present said that gang members protected the neighborhood. However, after some discussion they admitted that local gang youth attracted opposing gangs...and drivebys. There had recently been several shootings. Luckily no one had been hurt, yet...” (Summary of Community Meeting, I. Spergel Field Notes, December 13-15, 1999) (See Jankowski, 1991; Sullivan, 1989; Suttles, 1968; and Whyte, 1943).

The Katz, Welsh, Choate Citizen Assessment of Gangs and Gang Control in Mesa, Arizona (2001) also indicated that 39% of residents in the target area believed that gang crime was “the most serious or one of the most serious problems facing law enforcement, whereas

about 45% of residents from the comparison area [the rest of the city] believed that gang crime was the most serious or one of the most serious problems facing law enforcement.” Target-area residents were less concerned with gang problems than were residents of the rest of the city, including the Project comparison areas.

There was the general Mesa-community and agency sense that the gang problem was growing worse, but it was not out of control; it was not the chief problem in either the city or the target community, and there was no clear or consistent assessment of the scope and nature of the problem. Adequate data management systems to assess the problem, and changes in the problem over time, were still to be established.

Chapter 5

Mesa's Response to the Gang Problem

Before the OJJDP grant for the Comprehensive Gang Program was awarded, Mesa agencies, schools, and government already comprised a well-developed leadership structure which was concerned with and active in addressing youth-development problems, particularly problems of youth at risk of gang involvement. However, the gang problem had not been clearly assessed, and focus was on youth city-wide, particularly on younger youth in the context of schools and youth agencies. The criminal justice system was just beginning to address the gang problem, which seemed to be growing. OJJDP funding for the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) was viewed initially as a primary opportunity to target at-risk and moderately-involved delinquent gang youth, particularly on an individual-youth and family basis. Control and suppression of gang-involved youth represented a separate approach, and seemed to be of lesser long-term importance than prevention of the gang problem itself.

While a broad, comprehensive prevention and early-intervention program was the priority for Mesa leadership, they also realized the importance of the Project's targeting moderately-delinquent gang-involved youth (including those already on probation). The MGIP could also be a project that would further meet the long-term interests and needs of the community. In this chapter, we describe Mesa's efforts at community and agency mobilization and its plan of community action in regard to gang prevention; the adaptation of the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Model to the youth selected for the program; and the institutionalization of the program. The specific nature of the implementation of the OJJDP Model in Mesa is

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described in Chapter 6.

Early Response to the Gang Problem

A major social-development program called “New Turf” was started in Mesa in 1991 (funded by the U.S. Office of Substance Abuse Prevention), which became the basis for the United Way’s “Building a Healthy Mesa” (BHM) plan. This plan called for the community to work toward world-class levels of health and fitness, educational excellence, emotional wellness and economic health. One of the main recommendations of the BHM plan was the creation of 11 different area or neighborhood councils; each neighborhood was to be associated with and designated by a junior high school catchment area.

At the same time, concern was expressed about an emerging gang problem. The Gang Prevention Steering Committee was formed in May 1992 (prior to the OJJDP initiative) and comprised representatives of the United Way, the Mesa Public Schools, city government, the Mesa Police Department and other community agencies. Its mission was “to develop and implement a community action plan that would prevent, intervene [in], and suppress youth gang activity and mobilize coordinated community efforts to sustain positive results against gangs” (Appendix, Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999).

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee (GPSC) of Mesa was chaired originally by a City Council member and later by the Superintendent of Schools. Although the GPSC was not a Mesa City Council committee, it made recommendations to the City Council as well as to the Mesa Public School District and Mesa United Way. The GPSC was comprised of policy-level representatives from a range of government, criminal-justice, and community-based agencies, as

well as from faith-based and business organizations. It subsequently became the policy-making body of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project. The MGIP became a major project of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee, but its scope was broader than the OJJDP initiative in Mesa (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996).

The original mission of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee was “to develop and implement a community action plan that would mobilize coordinated community efforts to sustain positive results against gangs.” The GPSC’s Community Action Plan of December, 1993, included a list of 19 priorities which emphasized expansion of resources, and programs of prevention and early intervention such as operating junior and senior high school gymnasias for teen recreation on Friday and Saturday, developing neighborhood after-school programs, and doubling the number of elementary schools offering summer recreation programs for youth.

Only five of the nineteen priorities referred explicitly to gangs, and three of them emphasized suppression or control: “provide additional uniformed or civilian personnel for Mesa Police Department Gang Suppression;” “develop ... ‘prevention alternatives to gangs’ through [an] earn and learn program ...;” “meet with area legislators to discuss legislation to suppress gang activity; support legislation banning possession of handguns by minors;” and “develop positive alternatives to gangs program for up to 100 adolescents” (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994).

The emphasis of the Community Action Plan was to “provide opportunities to help direct a large number of youth toward positive activities and on suppression efforts to hold youth accountable for their criminal activities.” The Mesa Gang Intervention Project was to be a further component of the GPSC’s plan to “provide a comprehensive, collaborative effort to

intervene in the lives of violent gang members and associates” (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). However, it was not clear that Mesa in fact had a “violent gang” problem, and no specific plan for addressing a violent gang problem evolved. Instead, a coordinated, team approach was expected to develop which would offer program participants opportunities to address “educational, psychological, family and employment needs through school, social services, neighborhoods, churches and the business community working together” (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996).

At the very first OJJDP cross-site orientation and technical assistance session, held in Kansas City in June 1995, Mesa community leaders expressed their key long term “purpose and direction to touch all the kids where they may be at risk ... the target area is the city as a whole ... We’ve been targeting programs for the at-risk [youth] ... We know that with heavy-duty gang members... we have to treat them very differently...” (Transcript of discussion with Mesa Community leaders, Kansas City, June 7, 1995).

In the first application for funding from OJJDP, the MGIP appeared to have two major “themes for action.” The first was to “provide positive alternatives for children and youth so that they will not become associated with gangs or resort to violence as an answer to problems.” This was to be achieved through: expansion of positive alternatives to gang membership and violence; opening up neighborhood and agency facilities; promotion of positive values and informing youth about services; and development of a training and leadership program for youth (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). The GSPC agencies were to take responsibility for implementing this theme.

The second and somewhat separate “theme for action” was to adopt a community-wide

“zero-tolerance” attitude against criminal gang activity, to be achieved through: “increase of law enforcement suppression of criminal gang activities;” “encourage reform in the Department [of Corrections] to specifically address length of incarceration and rehabilitation;” and “encourage and support legislative action to stiffen penalties for repeat juvenile offenders and gang-related violence” (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994).

Gang Prevention Steering Committee leadership and the MGIP administration perceived that OJJDP was concerned with social intervention and outreach, as well as suppression, for hardcore, gang-involved, and at-risk youth. However, the long-term interest of community leaders and the GPSC was prevention and early intervention (Executive Committee, Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, April 18, 1996). Based on “Building a Healthy Mesa,” the frame of reference for the GPSC and (initially, but to a lesser extent) for the MGIP, was meeting the “human service needs of participants and neighborhood families, mentorship, and intensifying efforts to provide services which benefit at-risk youth in general in the area” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

In order to obtain OJJDP funding, the Mesa community and Project leadership agreed that MGIP would concern itself with “the reduction of violent crime by current hard-core gang members” through social intervention. Mesa would need to show that “we are going to do intensive intervention involving MPD and Probation and utilizing some type of outreach component” (Mesa Gang Prevention Steering Committee, Executive Committee Minutes, April 18, 1996). Again, there was little evidence of a violent gang problem in Mesa. Also, the hardcore offenders, whether gang members or not, were generally sent directly to correctional institutions and bypassed the Project.

Project Development Issues

A good deal of communication and coordination already existed among established criminal justice, education, and social welfare organizations in respect to various aspects of the delinquency problem. A key initial problem for community leaders and the Project administrators was how to sustain the commitment to “building a healthier Mesa,” in particular facilitating a broad youth-development and prevention approach while incorporating the OJJDP youth-gang-focused Model. The Project Director – the Mesa Police Department Captain who later became Commander of the Gang Unit – early recognized the difficulties of integrating the two approaches. The Captain and the Project Case-Management Coordinator were also already raising questions about the feasibility and value of the youth-worker outreach approach, which required contact with youth gangs and their more delinquent members on the streets (Summary Notes, I. Spergel Visit to Mesa, December 13-15, 1995).

The MGIP, as it developed, appeared to emphasize certain components of the Model, particularly community mobilization and the involvement of police (especially the Gang Unit), juvenile and adult probation, and selected established social agencies. It seemed to avoid contact with grassroots or faith-based organizations, interagency coordination arrangements, and the training of its outreach youth workers to focus on contacting gang-youth on the streets. A team of workers evolved in a central neighborhood, but it was not clear that criminal justice authorities, police and probation were together systematically directing their attention to the same youth that outreach youth workers or case managers were. The OJJDP Model was understood but not entirely adopted.

Furthermore, the MGIP administrators and Steering Committee did not follow through on

their claim as to how they would proceed, program-wise. This could have resulted because the MGIP and the Steering Committee had overlapping but slightly different agendas. The MGIP third-year application for continued OJJDP funding stated that the Project's goal was to "implement and test a comprehensive, community-based model program for gang prevention, intervention, and suppression focusing upon violent offenders and the reduction of violent gang activity." At the same time, the third-year application for funding cited the MGIP's and the Steering Committee's key objectives, which emphasized youth social development:

- "Expand current parenting program and provide bilingual parenting program in the community, i.e., churches, Mesa Alternative Schools.
- Provide afterschool programs at Carson/Emerson/Salk, Kino/Edison, Powell/Redbird, Mesa Junior/Lowell, McKellips Learning Center, Power Learning Center and Mesa Vista Alternative Schools. Emphasis should be providing activities after school between the hours of 3 and 7 PM and should include youth training, sibling care, etc.
- Develop and implement a mentoring program within the neighborhood, whereby 25 adult mentors/role models would be identified and connected with 25 at-risk youth in each of fourteen (14) Building Healthier Mesa areas." (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). It is not clear that more than one or two MGIP youth were ever involved in this program, although the MGIP Case-Management Coordinator was responsible for the mentoring program.

In their Fifth-Year Application for OJJDP Funding (1999) the MGIP Administrators persisted in a statement-of-focus on the reduction of gang-violent activity. In a telephone

conference call between the National Evaluators, OJJDP Local Evaluators, and the MGIP administrative staff, the National Evaluation Co-principal Investigator asked “whether there was any evidence of violence between [program] youth.” The MGIP Case Management Coordinator responded that he didn’t consider there was any serious violence among program youth. “One youth kicked another. That’s about the most violence they had in the last year” (Mesa Conference Call Minutes, August 19, 1998).

Further, while the MGIP Fifth-Year Application abstract states that the Project “provides intervention strategies to 119 gang members, gang associates, youth at-risk for gangs and their families,” it adds that the Project’s objective or strategy is “community mobilization to fight gangs in the target area of Central Mesa.” However, the Funding Application does not indicate how this was to be done, and how fighting gangs was related to a youth social-development strategy. The MGIP appeared to have difficulty developing an approach that emphasized and integrated both control and social intervention for its program youth. Because of the greater number of police and probation staff relative to social-intervention staff on the team, the control function appeared to dominate, especially in regard to the relatively large number of probationers who were referred to the program in its early development.

The Local Evaluators stated that many of the youth had to participate in the program as a condition of probation, but the Project had a problem maintaining contact with those youth once the probation condition was terminated, at least in the earlier years of the program. Youth who were no longer on probation seemed not to be interested in Project services (Conference call with National Evaluators and Local Evaluators, June 25, 1998). One of the outreach youth workers also raised questions about the nature and degree of participation of youth in the Project. There

wasn't as much direct contact with youth as he had expected (Memo from D. Coleman to L. Adams, January 5, 1998). Not all probationers in the Project had contact with outreach youth workers.

Tensions initially existed between the Gang Unit Police who were not involved in the Project and a key alternative high school regarding the approach(es) of the Project. At first, the police Gang Unit perceived the MGIP as being soft on crime. The tensions were largely eliminated with the incorporation of the Project into the Gang Unit. On the other hand, Mesa Vista Alternative High School, where many of the program youth were located, believed the Project was too closely associated with the police. The MGIP administrative staff felt that "the school was not observing the district's policy regarding no gang signs, colors, etc. in school ..." (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, October 26, 1999). It wasn't until close to the end of the fifth and final year of the OJJDP grant period that an adequate relationship of communication exchange and coordinated programming began to take place between these two groups.

During the early phase of program operations, the OJJDP Program Manager raised a range of questions about the nature of the program that the MGIP was developing. He wondered about the type of youth reached by the community outreach workers and whether gang youth were receiving an appropriate range of services, including contacts by outreach workers on the street. He asked whether the community-development worker's efforts were sufficiently directed to the gang problem (Letter from J. Burch to L. Adams, October 2, 1998).

Two different client groups seemed to evolve in the course of program development: a group comprising males referred mainly from juvenile probation, and an at-risk group comprising younger youth from the target area junior high school. It was not clear to what extent

the admissions criteria developed for probationers referred to the program were implemented, and whether appropriate criteria for the at-risk group existed.

The following general criteria were established for referrals of probationers to the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996):

- documented gang member or associate using Gang Member Identification Criteria (GMIC), age 16-21 years
- currently on juvenile or adult probation
- history of involvement in, or propensity for, violent crime
- lives in the target area.

We have already raised questions about some of these criteria (Chapter 4). The definition of a gang member and especially a gang associate was exceedingly broad. Gang probationers in the program were generally not violent or serious offenders. Many youth were not exclusively recruited from the neighborhood, and some had no criminal-justice record. The Case Management Coordinator said he could not politically resist court, social agency, and other community organization pressures to include youth from other parts of the city in the program. He also noted that the Project worked with approximately 25% more youth than were listed on MGIP rosters and for whom no program tracking records existed (Mesa Conference Call Minutes, October 29, 1998).

The Fourth-Year Mesa Funding Application (1998) indicated that the Project worked with at-risk youth primarily through its Youth Intervention Specialist, whose purpose was to deter youth, ages 12 to 15, from gang involvement. Delinquent, disruptive, or deviant school behavior often preceded gang involvement. The Youth Intervention Specialist stated that she

worked with youth exhibiting signs of the following:

- incorrigibility
- excessive school truancy
- school suspension
- inability to control anger
- noticeably negative attitudes
- lack of respect for authority figures
- association with known gang members
- gang graffiti on books
- clothing resembling gang attire
- substance-abuse issues
- family dysfunction.

The school counselor generally referred school youth to the MGIP Youth Intervention Specialist for anger management, substance-use discussion, and other forms of (mainly group) counseling and home visits (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). There were girls in the school at-risk group, but many initially referred to the program had behavior problems, were not delinquent, and may not have been gang associates. The Case Management Coordinator later noted that the Youth Intervention Specialist is “now doing a better job of targeting the gang at-risk youth,” especially those already hanging out with gang members. Some of the girls were “seriously involved with older guys – at 15 they’re already pregnant [but these] girls weren’t viewed as active in gangs...” (Mesa Conference Call Minutes, October 29, 1998 and February 16, 1999).

Institutionalizing the Program

Despite questions about the extent to which the MGIP implemented some of the significant components of the OJJDP Model, other key components of the Model were well developed. The institutionalization of the program was assured for several years from the start of the program, based on the strength and capacity of community leadership and the availability of local resources. No other Comprehensive Gang Program site had prepared as well for the development of the program and provided the extensive local resources in support of the comprehensive community-wide approach. The commitment of key agency directors – particularly police, probation, the United Way, the school system and city government – to the support of the program was continuously evident. Community and agency leaders on the Steering Committee were highly active in support of the Project.

At the time of the initial funding application, the Gang Prevention Steering Committee and the Mesa Police Department promised that “Mesa will encourage 11 mandatory agencies discussed in the RFP to take ownership of the Program and shift funding priorities... Community leaders would continue to be involved at policy and program levels. The Gang Prevention Steering Committee would continue to monitor and evaluate program implementation and would market successful programs to local organizations for funding consideration. With this oversight process, achievement of future funding in our community to continue programs after the demonstration grant’s termination is a realistic expectation” (Letter from L. Adams to J. Burch, January 19, 1995).

From the start, it was clear that the single strongest agency that could facilitate not only the development but the institutionalization of the program was the Mesa Police Department.

The Captain of the MPD (the initial Director of the Project), was highly identified with the purpose of the Project; she was extremely resourceful, and politically savvy about what would have to be done to sustain the Project and its approach within the MPD. The Mesa City Council was also integrally involved in considerations of funding the Project when OJJDP funding terminated. The support of the City Council was critical regarding whether and how the MPD would modify its traditional approach, and integrate the Project into its structure. “If monetary support were withdrawn by the City Council [and the Project terminated], it would be possible that a narrow, punitive suppression approach to the gang problem would characterize the policy and practices of the Mesa Police Department” (Summary notes of visit by National Evaluation staff to the MGIP, December 13-15, 1995).

The support and guidance of the national technical assistance team, OJJDP program management, and top-level administrative staff were important in structuring and assuring continuation of the program. The OJJDP Program Manager paid a special visit to the MGIP and indicated the likelihood of fifth-year funding for the Project. He praised Mesa’s substantial contribution of in-kind resources and the linkage among organizations in the city that supported the Project (Steering Committee Meeting Notes, January 8, 1998).

In early June 1998, the OJJDP Program Manager and the national Technical Assistance Advisor spent “nearly four hours” with the Project Director “discussing how to manage a team [of police, probation, United Way, and social service agency staff].” The problem was how to encourage and integrate staff into Project operations when agencies had different vacation, sick-time, compensatory-time, supervisory and other distinctive agency policies. The OJJDP Manager and national Technical Assistance Advisor also made recommendations about the

future “placement” of the Project in the police department. Placing it in the MPD Gang Unit seemed most feasible, particularly after the current Project Director’s expected retirement from the Department in the near future. (Memo from C. Kane to I. Spergel, June 5, 1998).

In a meeting in Washington, D.C. with U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and the Chiefs of Police from the five OJJDP project sites, Chief Strauss spoke of the progress of the Mesa Police Department – particularly its Gang Unit – in accepting the OJJDP Model. The Gang Unit had been “very suppression/confinement oriented.” But officers of the Gang Unit and others associated with the Project now “better understood issues concerning family dysfunction [of gang members],” and how the police could better “work with those families by providing them with [access or referral to] services. The police had become more knowledgeable due to the Project information-sharing process. The department was exploring whether the Gang Unit and the Project should merge in the near future in order to increase the ‘buy-in’ that will be necessary [for the Mesa Police Department] to sustain the program once the [OJJDP] grant ends” (Minutes of the Police Chiefs’ Round Table with the Attorney General, Washington, D.C., December 14, 1998).

In 1998, the Mesa Gang Prevention Steering Committee formed a special task force to begin the planning process to insure the Project’s institutionalization. The task force comprised representatives from the Mesa Police Department, PreHab of Arizona (a comprehensive social service agency that had supplied much of the outreach youth-work and specialized-counseling services for the Project), Mesa Public Schools, and the Maricopa County Juvenile Probation Department. The Chief Juvenile Probation Officer was the chair of the task force (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). The task force called on Steering Committee

agencies with staff collaborating with the Project to examine their next year's budget cycles in order to integrate these Project positions more fully into their own agency budgets.

The Mesa Police Department stated that it would continue to be a strong supporter of the program. It was already contributing a Commander and two detectives and their salaries to the work of the Project. The MPD Chief believed that police involvement was critical to the development of the Project, and that in turn the Project enhanced the department's "overall philosophy of community policing." Nevertheless, the Chief cautioned that in order for the Department to continue its support, "there would need to be a direct correlation between continuation of the Project's activities and a reduction in crime (specifically gang-related) or other measurable positive outcomes" (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

The Chief Juvenile Probation Officer was highly supportive of the Project, which she claimed had significantly and positively affected the agency's work. She stated that in the first year of the project, juvenile referrals from the Mesa (ZIP code) target area to the court dropped 8% (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, April 13, 1999). The United Way representative, who had been integrally involved in writing the various Project funding applications, also declared that the United Way continued to have a primary interest in the development of city-wide services to at-risk youth. Such a program could still be centered in the police department (Gang Prevention Steering Committee, September 14, 1999).

Finally, the OJJDP Program Manager praised the Project's involvement of community agencies, particularly the participation of the YMCA, PreHab of Arizona, and the Boys and Girls Club. He noted the importance of corporate involvement (e.g., the presence of the Boeing Corporation) at the Gang Prevention Steering Committee executive meetings. He directed

special praise to the MPD's successful integration of the Project into its Gang Unit (Executive Committee Minutes, Gang Prevention Steering Committee, April 13, 1999).

Chapter 6

Program Implementation: Strengths and Weaknesses

Despite highly effective community-wide agency mobilization, committed leadership of public and nonprofit agencies and major corporations, and sustained Project structure (even after OJJDP funding ceased), the OJJDP Model was not entirely adopted in Mesa. The full range of gang-involved youth present in the community was probably not addressed. Emphasis in the program was on recruiting and working with youth on probation who were gang members or gang associates, disruptive, mildly delinquent, and who were not violent offenders (it could have been there were relatively few violent gang youth in the community). A more effective approach was probably developed for at-risk and less-delinquent rather than more-delinquent gang-involved youth. Community-mobilization efforts did not include grassroots and faith-based organizations. The strategy of social intervention did not make use of neighborhood workers in contacts with gang youth on the streets. Provision of social opportunities, particularly in relation to jobs and job development, also received insufficient attention.

The Project Philosophy

A structure and process of community leadership, decision making and commitment to a particular philosophy was in place prior to the Mesa Police Department's OJJDP Funding Application and the development of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP). The guiding philosophy of the Mesa Gang Prevention Steering Committee (GPSC) was social development of youth in the community. The MGIP was relatively more focused on delinquent youth. Social

development of youth emphasized prevention and early intervention by case managers, particularly through group and individual counseling programs. Suppression was to be carried out almost exclusively by criminal-justice personnel. The MGIP was developed within a framework of dual philosophies. The police, probation, and outreach youth workers (or case managers) were committed to the MGIP program in separate fashion. They were housed together and communicated frequently about particular youth, but each had a separate mission, which changed somewhat over time. During the early years of the program, the dominant interest of the Project was more effective control of the large majority of its youth who were probationers. During the later years, greater interest seemed to be on relatively more social-development services for at-risk youth.

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee was integrally responsible for planning the Mesa Gang Intervention Project. “The Committee is deeply concerned with addressing Mesa’s emerging needs in regard to the gang problem. It sees gang members as primarily not hardcore. Most are salvageable and worth trying to save from further criminal involvement” (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). In its original plan in 1993, the focus of the Committee’s plan to address the emerging community gang problem was on family and neighborhood-intervention issues. Gangs were hardly mentioned (Mesa’s Community Plan to Address Gang Issues, January 1, 1994-June 30, 1995). In the course of the Project, the Steering Committee developed a stronger interest in social intervention and suppression for gang youth.

In 1997, the Technical Advisory Committee of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee finalized its recommendation of the “Community Action Plan.” Its focus – rather than directly on gang intervention – was still on prevention: “expand prevention programming... provide

afterschool programs... emphases should be on providing activities between the hours of 3 and 7 PM... developing and implement a mentoring program [for] ... at-risk kids” (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, March 27, 1987; Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999).

Community Mobilization

The dominant strategy of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee was the mobilization of established community agencies, the organizational context for the development of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project. “In 1992 ... the community was just realizing it had a gang problem. Its reaction was to call together a large group (not yet named the Gang Prevention Steering Committee) of policy makers, representing many governmental and human service groups, with resources to make changes in the community and discuss what should be done.” The Steering Committee claimed to operate “independently without political constraints, yet it had representatives and sanctions from all the community organizations necessary to make an impact on the problem of gangs” (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999, “Program Strategy”).

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee was a broad-based partnership of at times as many as forty agencies (MGIP Progress Report, October 30, 1995). Its key members, i.e., those with special policy influence on city institutions as well as on operations of the MGIP, were the Mesa City Council, United Way, the Mesa Public School Superintendent’s Office, the Maricopa County Juvenile Probation Department and the Mesa Police Department (the direct operator of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project). Other agencies also involved in the Steering Committee,

but perhaps with less direct involvement in Project operations, were the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department, Mesa City Court, East Valley Institute of Technology (EVIT), Mesa Chamber of Commerce, Boys and Girls Club of East Valley, Empact, YMCA, Mesa Family/Welfare Services, Boeing Corporation, Motorola Corporation and other organizations or associations of organizations. By the time of its Fifth-Year Application, 30 organizations were still listed as members of the Steering Committee which included the 11 mandatory agency components in planning activities addressed to “gang involved and at-risk youth.” The Steering Committee met on a bi-monthly basis “with consistently high attendance” (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996).

The Steering Committee also comprised an Executive Committee as well as the Technical Advisory Committee. The Executive Committee met on October 26, 1995 and recommended certain structural arrangements to provide better coordination of Project objectives and activities with those of the Steering Committee (Progress Report, October 30, 1995):

- “All component agencies represented in the grant project be member agencies of the Steering Committee;
- All of the grant project policymakers be added to the Steering Committee’s Executive Committee; thus the Executive Committee and the grant project policymakers be the same group of individuals;
- A Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) comprised of staff-level personnel from the various component agencies be established and report to the Executive Committee. The TAC be responsible for working on specific areas of the Project’s goals and objectives.”

In June, 1996, a Memorandum of Understanding developed by the Steering Committee was signed by thirteen organizations – Mesa Police Department, Mesa City Probation, Maricopa County Juvenile Probation, Maricopa County Adult Probation, Maricopa County Attorney, Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, Mesa Ecumenical Council, PreHab of Arizona, Boys and Girls Club of East Valley, Mesa YMCA, Mesa United Way, Mesa Public Schools, and the Mesa Chamber of Commerce. The purpose of the Memorandum of Understanding was to commit the agencies to “the development and operation of a smaller networking process at the operational-level management program involving documented gang members.”

It was “the intent of the agreement to facilitate replication of cooperation and dialogue among those agencies at the operational level which is already shared at the policy-making level. These persons [representing the agencies] would facilitate the communication and coordination of services at the community level... interagency procedures would be developed to address specific concerns...” The Steering Committee was interested not only in the development and support of the Community Action Plan, which favored the creation and extension of programs and services that contribute to the prevention of the gang problem and early intervention with youth at risk or peripherally-involved gang youth, but also in the sharing of possibly confidential information about youth across agencies, and in utilizing the Arizona State Gang Member Identification Criteria (GMIC) as a standard means of identifying gang members and gang associates (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996).

The MGIP utilized a “case-management team approach” involving a case-management coordinator, gang detectives, probation officers, outreach youth workers, a youth intervention specialist, and a neighborhood development specialist. The program objective was to develop

alternative opportunities for gang-involved and other at-risk youth. Program participants were to be provided with prevention and intervention services as well as suppression activities and intensive supervision. It was expected that “frequent interaction and information-sharing among police and probation [would] also facilitate a greater knowledge of participants’ criminal activities” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Proposal, Updated Abstract, September 12, 1997).

Missing from the structure were local neighborhood groups, local churches and faith-based groups, ethnic associations, and even former gang youth and community residents, all of whom could be involved at policy, program-operational or client levels. The Steering Committee, its subcommittees, and the MGIP included representatives of the major formal public and volunteer agencies. The GPSC and the MGIP developed highly professional, top-down, and well-organized efforts to address the gang problem. The Steering Committee viewed itself as a community forum at the broad, community level addressing gang problems, and creating programs to address both the at-risk and gang-involved youth. It focused on facilitating interagency collaboration.

A key component of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model was grassroots involvement of local residents, neighborhood groups, churches, ethnic organizations, local businesses, and those closest to the daily activities, interests, and needs of youth and their families, as viable local-community and program decision makers, or advisors, in the development of the MGIP. This occurred in a limited and indirect way through the work of the Neighborhood Development Specialist, who was also associated with United Way local community citizen-development efforts. The Project did establish close ties with the schools, which were concerned with control of the gang problem, and particularly with disruptive youth.

Contacts were made with administrators, teachers, and probation officers located in at least 14 schools, mainly in the target area. MGIP workers also made contacts with 57 or more organizations and their representatives for services to or controls of program youth. In this process, apparently not a single church or neighborhood group was contacted. However, four local business were contacted for purposes of providing program youth with jobs.

Project leadership came to recognize that a gap existed in its local, community-based approach to the gang problem, and indicated several times in the course of the five-year Project period that it “planned” to address the gap. In the original First-Year Funding Application, under the category of planned “organizational change and development,” the MGIP leaders stated that “what is needed is further development of membership by one or a partnership among several community-based organizations to fund, organize and supervise a community-wide neighborhood development committee to ... provide technical assistance and resources to achieve and maintain neighborhood improvement and protection from gangs and other destructive forces.”

In the first National Evaluation visit to the Mesa site, a group of five target-area citizens were assembled by MGIP staff to discuss the gang problem. They seemed more concerned with issues of noise, garbage collection and the restrictive rules of the Boys and Girls Club, which kept gang youth in their neighborhood out of the Club program. Several of the local residents said that gang members “protected the neighborhood.” After some discussion, however, they admitted that local gang youth attracted opposing gangs and there had been several shootings, but no one had been hurt (I. Spergel, Field Notes of December 14, 1995 Visit to Mesa).

In the Second-Year Application for OJJDP Funding (1996), the MGIP noted that

“community mobilization will be intertwined throughout the Project strategies, encouraging residents to become organized and responsible for improving their personal quality of life and that in their neighborhood, including gang prevention/reduction.” However, at a planned community meeting to which the National Evaluation staff were invited, five or six MGIP staff and only three local residents attended. The meeting was used by the Project Administrators to announce future planned activities of the Project. There was no discussion by the local residents about local gang problems, except that the Project police officer on the MGIP staff wanted local residents to cooperate in testifying against gang members in open court. The citizens present were not cooperative. To do so would be a threat to their person or property (I. Spergel Field Notes of March 26, 1999 Visit to Mesa).

In a discussion of community mobilization at one of the cross-site meetings in Orlando, Florida, the MGIP Administrators noted that they were trying to find ways to build grassroots involvement into their program “because currently the community where the majority come from do not trust the program or the police connected with it” (R. Scott, Field Notes, October 2, 1997).

In the course of a conference telephone call made late in 1998, the National Evaluator noted that MGIP administration had at one time mentioned their interest in developing a local advisory board. The MGIP Director replied that the Gang Prevention Steering and Executive Committees were to function as a local advisory board, so another layer may not be necessary. The National Evaluator wondered whether the Neighborhood Development Specialist had identified individual residents from the target area who could become part of the Steering Committee. The Project Director said that such persons had not been identified. The Steering Committee had been formed, but “things could change in the future” (Mesa Conference Call

Minutes, October 29, 1998).

In the Fourth-Year Application for OJJDP Funding, the idea of a local advisory committee, comprising members of the target community (residents, teachers, business owners, etc.) who would provide feedback to the Project regarding Project strategies, was no longer mentioned. Such feedback was now to be provided by the Neighborhood Development Specialist based on her informal contacts with neighborhood groups (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

In their Fifth (and final)-Year Funding Application (1999), the MGIP noted that “the Project has not involved the target [area] business community ... [but] the Project [plans to] organize a business advisory group to meet regularly with Project staff [so the advisory group could] be updated on gang issues ... When formed, such a group could provide assistance to program participants, their families, and the neighborhood at large.” The Neighborhood Development Specialist and outreach workers, however, would continue to work with individual residents and neighborhood groups to help them in their organized efforts to fight criminal gang activities. This would involve collaboration with the police.

Also in their Fifth-Year Funding Application, the MGIP observed that the two major faith-based organizations, the Mesa Ecumenical Clergy Association and the East Valley Association of Evangelicals, were on the Steering Committee, but as they represented primarily Protestant churches, they had not been utilized because the Hispanic population in the target area (including most Project participants and their families) were Catholic. They tried to keep the Youth Ministries Director of the Catholic parish serving the Project updated about the Project.

In a tape-recorded conversation with the Project Case Management Coordinator, one of

the National Evaluation team members asked:

Evaluator: “Grassroots involvement, how is that coming along?”

Coord: “That is one of the most difficult things. One of the things we are fighting is that the neighborhood is primarily made up of a lot of illegals ... So that makes them very anxious or fearful of working with any agency, not just police, people from United Way [including the Neighborhood Development Specialist] ... the language barriers also makes it difficult ... what you see in Mesa is the backfilling of the older city ... most of them are just trying to survive” [Edited transcript with D. Zorich in Chicago, December 23, 1999).

Neighborhood Development Specialist. The Neighborhood Development Specialist, funded partially by the United Way, contributed to the work of the MGIP. She was to “serve as a resource to help mobilize residents in the target area to meet the needs of that particular neighborhood,” and as a liaison with the Neighborhood and Community Assistance Office and the MPD Community Action Team” (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). Instead, she principally provided residents with access to individual and family services, and encouraged participation in Neighborhood Watch groups to “fight gangs.”

The Neighborhood Development Specialist was the principal team member working at the grassroots level. She helped the MGIP staff access and interact with local residents, particularly assisting Project police to fight gang crime. She helped neighbors “conduct surveillance on [drug trafficking], get license plate numbers, and prepare documentation for the police. These efforts ... contributed to ... [a] ‘crack house’ being closed.” She was also a “link”

to the East Valley Food Bank “to provide food boxes throughout the year and on major holidays and organized drives to provide Christmas gifts for youth” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

Despite the accomplishments of the Neighborhood Development Specialist, the OJJDP Program Manager raised questions about the extent to which she mobilized “...organizations, groups, and agencies ... to deal with or respond to the gang problem. To what extent has neighborhood cooperation been developed to deal with this problem?” (Letter from OJJDP Program Manager to MGIP Director, October 2, 1998).

It appears that the Neighborhood Development Specialist emphasized linking neighborhood residents with services and assisting Project staff to relate to neighborhood residents in the further development of their particular agency-service mission, over gang control and social development of gang-involved youth. Her focus was consistent with the mission of the United Way’s “Building a Healthier Mesa.”

Nevertheless, the community-mobilization strategy of the MGIP was highly effective in several respects. It mobilized established community organizations to address the gang problem at the youth at-risk level, particularly involving schools and youth agencies (which we shall elaborate further, below). It facilitated coordination of police and probation in targeting gang problems. However, it did not adequately facilitate the collaboration of grassroots groups and organizations with criminal-justice and social agencies to address the social-development and control problems of gang-involved youth. The youth gang problem was not viewed or addressed in its full continuum of formal and informal, established-agency and grassroots-organization connections.

Coordination. In the Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Application for Funding (1996), the MGIP claimed it would

“apply a team approach involving government and social service agencies, schools, businesses, churches, neighborhoods and families ... the team will work together, share information, and utilize an ‘Intervention Case Management System.’ They will work together to assist each other’s efforts with Project participants ... it is anticipated that the team will share some type of office space ... in close proximity to the target area...”

The Case Management Coordinator was to be responsible for making caseload assignments and conducting team activities. Weekly meetings among Project staff were planned, and monthly meetings were to be conducted among team members and representatives of the Technical Advisory Committee to facilitate planning and collaboration of program agencies and workers.

Some of these stated objectives were achieved, some were not. Coordination was achieved in a way that generally met traditional agency-mission objectives. The integration or coordination of criminal-justice and social-development staff was not fully achieved in a way that simultaneously and interactively met the needs of the community for protection and the needs of gang-involved youth for social control and social development. These respective needs were variably achieved, mainly within particular agency domains and not substantially across them. Justice-system personnel were now better able to utilize information and contacts provided by outreach youth workers, youth intervention specialists, and school personnel who

were still not sufficiently able to get criminal-justice personnel to refer youth sufficiently for services.

As Project operations got under way, Project detectives were now more quickly able to find and apprehend youth with outstanding court warrants, because they had information from outreach youth workers, case managers, and especially from probation officers. The Project police were better able to maintain “updated data bases with current photos, names of associates, vehicles, etc., that they can incorporate with gang intelligence files.” Information-sharing about program participants greatly assisted criminal investigations by Project detectives. The Project Case Management Coordinator’s observation was that “this close monitoring was somewhat of a deterrent to the participants, as it frequently seems that the detectives are now [continually] watching them; [or at least] the participants think they are, and are less likely to get involved in criminal activity” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997).

The Case Management Coordinator also thought that the Project police were “doing a really good job ... to identify youth who *don’t want to get involved in the Project*. The Project detectives are making arrests when necessary of these youth who aren’t going to change and who will be problems in the community ...” (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, January 15, 1998).

By the end of the second year of the program, clear relationships were established, particularly between the outreach youth workers and Neighborhood Development Specialist (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). There was greater clarity in the roles of outreach worker and youth intervention specialist, and greater collaboration in respect to referring at-risk youth to the program and working with them. The Youth Intervention Specialist

was making referrals of at-risk program youth to the Boys and Girls Club, which reciprocally was referring Boys and Girls Club youth to the Project. An example of the impact of the Project was “instances where youth have been suspended from school and/or activities, but were allowed to return on condition that they participate in our Project” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

The Project clearly served the interests and needs of probation. Both Juvenile and Adult Probation were very pleased with their involvement with the Project. They had each contributed manpower, above and beyond what was federally funded and/or their original commitments to the Project. The MGIP provided probation not only with enhanced rehabilitation services and better community surveillance of probationers, but also made it possible for probation to increase the pool of probationers available (or potentially available) for enriched services and controls.

“The Project fits very well with Juvenile Probation’s community justice model ... this is the first time that Juvenile Probation has ever placed a probation officer on special assignment to work with gangs and, as a result of this positive collaboration, the agency is now considering the possibility of institutionalizing a specialized gang caseload in other parts of the county. Similar probationers assigned to the Project have received enhanced services previously not as readily available to them (participation in Any Town camps, additional advocacy and support from outreach workers and interns), and increased police contact and surveillance. Juvenile Probation has increased its involvement in the Project by housing a Juvenile Intensive Probation Supervisor (JIPS) team at the Project ... this also enables the Project probation officer to handle a larger caseload of standard probationers and provides the Project with a panel of JIPS participants previously not

identified as gang members or at-risk of gang membership ... It also enhances communication between the Project [regular] probation officers and the JIPS team and provides opportunities for more referrals to/from the Project” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

The Maricopa Adult Probation Department also advocated a

“restorative justice philosophy ... so the Project’s philosophy fits well with the agency’s philosophy. Three additional adult probation officers use the Project as a satellite work area. Their caseload includes some older former gang participants. Information shared will enable the Project staff to become more knowledgeable about this kind of offender in the community and possibly become more aware of prospective participants who have not been identified as gang members” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

The greatest benefit of collaboration resulted in the exchange of information and the coordinated efforts of Project police and probation working together, which had implications beyond the immediate officers involved.

“A very positive outcome of having all Project staff working in the same office is the familiarity and trust that has been developed between the gang detectives and probation officers ... As a result of their intense patrolling of the target area they (Project detectives) have also been able to assist the MPD Gang Unit in identifying suspects the Gang Unit detectives had not been able to previously identify. [Project] probation

officers [also] ... frequently participate in ride-alongs with gang detectives to share information about [program] participants and their friends they observe during the ride-along” (Fourth Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

Nevertheless, despite the positive results derived from coordination between Project probation and Project gang detectives, there was a problem of “lack of understanding and appreciation” of the role of the Project detectives, who were supposed to operate in a motivational context of intervention or prevention as well as suppression. At first, [separately from the Project detectives] the MPD Gang Unit still preferred to operate in heavy enforcement mode. At the end of the third year of MGIP operations the general feeling of most Project staff was that the “Gang Unit does not support the Project’s efforts and thinks the Project coddles gang members too much” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

By the end of the fourth year of the Project, the MPD police chief had reorganized the department, which brought the Gang Unit and the Project closer together. A new MPD Gang Unit Lieutenant had been assigned to direct the Project. He immediately brought the entire Gang Unit to Project staff meetings, and personally encouraged a two-way free exchange of information which was of benefit to both. Gang detectives not directly connected with the MGIP began more frequently to visit the Project, and even participated in particular client staffings. Also, because of the new Lieutenant’s support of the Project’s concept, there were now not only referrals to the Project from the Gang Unit, but from the patrol division as well (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999).

The police and probation were increasingly willing to accept assignment to or association

with the Project (I. Spergel Field Notes of January 22-24, 2000 Visit to Mesa). At the same time, outreach youth workers came to play a more specialized or limited role. Outreach youth workers interacted with probation officers only “if asked to provide a particular service; they do not otherwise make a priority of building relationships with these youth, though they do know many from descriptions [of them] in the office [meetings] ...” (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, April 16, 1999).

The role of the schools in the MGIP was less dominant than the role of other agency personnel. Schools were associated with the Project, but the association often came through the efforts of probation officers already located in the schools in conjunction with youth already on probation (although not necessarily only because they were adjudicated delinquents; they were often status offenders). As indicated above, a small group of these at-risk youth was recommended by the Project’s Youth Intervention Specialist.

Finally, we note that the MGIP developed an association with the Mayfield Alternative Youth Center, where one of the Project outreach youth workers conducted group counseling sessions. The center was a detention facility providing services and other agency contacts of an “early intervention” nature to status offenders and their families. The offenders were referred to the Center by juvenile court for such offenses as runaway, curfew violation, truancy, possession of alcohol and incorrigibility (Mesa Progress Report, January 1-June 30, 1997).

Social Intervention

The First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1994) emphasized “proactive alternatives for children and youth so that they will not become associated with gangs or resort to

violence as an answer to problem.” This was to be done through the following means:

- “expand positive alternatives to gang membership;
- open neighborhood facilities;
- promote positive values/inform youth about services;
- training and leadership program for youth.”

The Application stated that “early intervention, referral, and creative counseling programs must be established with interagency participation to produce a streamlined, cost-effective utilization of staff resources” and in such a way as to “empower all family members [so] that they are the primary means of developing a healthy family identity.”

The Technical Advisory Committee – “trained in the Hawkins/Catalano ‘Risk and Protective Factors’ or [Assets] model” – recommended that agencies:

“expand current parenting programming and provide bilingual parenting programs in the community ... provide afterschool programs ... emphasis should be on providing activities between the hours of 3 and 7 PM and should include youth training sibling care, etc. ... develop and implement a mentoring program ... in each of (14) Building a Healthier Mesa areas” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997).

The Superintendent of Schools in Mesa, who was the Chairman of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee, supported this approach and commented that “the afterschool piece fits in very well with what we’re learning from OJJDP and from the discussions the Executive Committee have had about the critical times for youth (from 3-7 PM)” (Gang Prevention Steering Committee, Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, February 27, 1997). The notion of

social intervention was interpreted as consistent with, and encompassed by, the idea of social development and prevention.

On entering the new MGIP Project office (which housed all staff – Project police, probation, outreach youth workers, youth-intervention and neighborhood-specialist staff) in the middle of a major shopping mall in the center of the program target area, visitors were

“immediately confronted by well-appointed framed statements [hanging on the wall] of the missions of the various organizations participating. Each of the mission statements emphasized prevention and the provision of community services to youth and others.

Partnerships with community groups was emphasized, [but] no mention of the word gang or delinquency . . .” (I. Spergel Field Notes of March 25-27, 1997 Visit to Mesa).

The Director of the Project, the MPD Captain, said they were not entirely happy with the Technical Advisory Committee’s recommendations, which were too broadly focused. She added that since January [1997], apparently most of the youth were referred “from juvenile court, a few from adult probation, and some from the city court. The program was viewed as a level 2 intermediate probation service, between general probation and intensive probation” (I. Spergel Field Notes of March 25-27, 1997 Visit to Mesa).

At the same time, in the Fourth-Year Funding Application (1998), it was stated: “Future plans are to continue to involve Building a Healthier Mesa, Area 3, in Project activities, including meetings on the human-service needs of participants and neighborhood families, mentorship, and intensifying efforts to provide services which benefit at-risk youth in general in the area.” In its Fifth-Year Funding Application (1999), under Community Action Plan, in the

section on prevention and intervention activities, it was stated that the theme for action is to “provide alternatives for children and youth so that they will not become associated with gangs or resort to violence as an answer to problems.” Emphasis was, again, to “empower all family members so that they are the primary means of developing a healthy family identity” (and in particular to “assist all families in gang prevention and intervention activities”).

Outreach Youth Workers. The role of the outreach youth worker (key to a social-intervention approach as developed in the OJJDP Model), although understood, was not adequately operationalized, despite the fact it would have contributed to better contact with gang youth, greater grassroots involvement, and better understanding and potential control of the gang problem. According to a job description in the Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1996), the primary function of the outreach youth worker was “to develop and maintain close relationships with Project participants, serving as a role model, mentor, and advocate, counseling and advising participants in order to prevent, control, and eliminate violent behavior.” The outreach youth worker was responsible for directing youth to “more productive activities; [he] conducts mediation and crisis intervention activities as needed; assists in preparing and referring youth to educational, training, job placement; [advises on] personal and family issues; establishes liaison with police, probation, schools, community agencies, businesses, neighborhood residents, and others as appropriate; assists in prevention and control of violent gang activities; assists in individualized plan development and modification.”

When it became apparent that the scope of these functions was too broad for the outreach youth worker, the functions were divided and carried out by a Youth Intervention Specialist,

Neighborhood Development Specialist, and an outreach youth worker. The outreach youth-worker role in general excluded contacting gang youth or youth at risk in their natural habitats or hangouts, or establishing helping, referral, and monitoring relationships with them. The job-referral or placement function was not a primary function of any of these workers.

Initially, part-time student interns from the Arizona State University School of Social Work were hired as outreach youth workers. They were called outreach workers, although it was stressed that they “would be mainly caseworker types ... much of the work of the interns would be counseling, home visits, and follow-up; little would be with gang groups.” These youth workers would be available from about 3:00 PM to 7:00 PM each work day, and would explicitly not be available to contact gang members in the neighborhood (Site Visit to Mesa, March 25-27, 1997). During most of the Project period, the outreach youth workers were used either to liaise with the schools and the Boys and Girls Club, or to conduct group discussion sessions with male or female youth at the Project office. They involved youth in recreational activities at camp or at the Boys and Girls Club, delivered turkeys or food baskets to families in the Project area, and occasionally accompanied police and probation officers on visits to program youths’ homes.

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee, the Mesa Police Department, Mesa social agencies, and the MGIP Administration did not make a significant investment in the recruitment, hiring, or development of outreach youth workers for a range of reasons. There may have been some lack of understanding of what the outreach youth-worker role should encompass. However, there was extensive orientation and advice provided by the Technical Assistance Advisor, the National Evaluator, and the OJJDP Program Manager about the tasks of the worker and qualifications for the position. The outreach youth worker preferably should be from the

gang neighborhood, possess understanding of gang youth and gang culture, and be required to work at night and on weekends to make contact with gangs and gang youth in their natural hangouts or habitat.

The reasons given by the Project Administration for not accepting or addressing the development of the outreach-worker role was that Mesa agencies had no experience with outreach youth workers. It was too dangerous for youth workers to be out on the streets at night. Their role was too complicated and qualified candidates were not available. Probably the key reasons for the lack of full development and use of outreach youth workers on the Project was the objection by the police to hiring former gang members who might have had criminal records, and the general social distance of the established, majority community from its minority, low-income, Latino adolescents.

When the Project's female outreach youth-worker interns finished their school assignments with the Project, two male, African-American ASU interns were assigned the part-time youth work job, but their interests were primarily athletic activities and work with youth in an agency gym. They apparently did not obtain adequate supervision from the lead outreach youth worker, whose background was that of a case manager and counselor with little knowledge of gangs. The lead outreach youth workers resigned his position and returned to his original agency.

A series of applicants then applied for the part-time positions, but were not hired because of their questionable backgrounds (one applicant had been convicted of an armed robbery). The issue of full-time versus part-time outreach youth workers also had to be resolved. Finally, an African-American male, formerly a member of a Los Angeles gang, was hired. He lived in the

target area and began to work at nights, but did not know the local gangs. One night the youth worker was pushed by a gang member; he resigned his position shortly afterwards.

Project Administration received persistent criticism from OJJDP, the National Evaluation staff, the Technical Assistance Advisor and even the Local Evaluators about the inadequacy of MGIP's approach to outreach youth work. The two Mesa Local Evaluators reported:

“The Project had been unable to hire the right people and keep them. They also believed that the Mesa Police Department or city was imposing unnecessary restrictions on who could become an outreach worker, limiting recruitment only to college interns who work part-time and do not live [in] or know the target community. They did not attempt to recruit young adults from the community who were ex-cons or had previous records, but who had turned their lives around; and who were willing to actively engage neighborhood gang youth. The current outreach youth workers saw Project youth and their families mainly in the Project office. They rarely made home visits” (Minutes of Telephone Conference Call with C. Katz and V. Webb, August 20, 1998).

The initial reaction of the Project Case Management Coordinator to the persistent criticisms was recognition of the weaknesses of MGIP's outreach-youth-worker approach. He thought the problem could be addressed with additional funding for the gang-prevention component of the Project. The youth worker could then reach out to the Boys and Girls Club and work with a younger group of 10 to 12-year-olds at risk (Minutes of D. Zorich's Visit to Chicago, August 28, 1998). Finally, in late 1999, the City Council, the Mesa Police Department, and the Gang Prevention Steering Committee agreed to modify qualifications for the outreach youth worker position. The Case Management Coordinator was able to recruit a former local “hardcore gang

member.” He was first employed part time, and later full time. He worked well with probation and began to do a “phenomenal” job as a “good role model” to gang youth in the community (Gang Prevention Steering Executive Committee Meeting, December 7, 1999).

In a meeting with National Evaluation staff in Chicago, the Case Management Coordinator announced:

“I hired an ex-gang member. His major job is to make contact with kids out in the community. I have him go to the Boys and Girls Club two or three times a week. He put together a fitness program to get some of the older guys to come in. When I say older guys, I mean that they are sixteen, seventeen years old ... His hours are flexible ... He works about three nights a week and part of that work is going to the Boys and Girls Club. He’s trying to get the guys off the street ... Each time the guys show up they bring somebody else with them” (Edited Transcript of D. Zorich’s Discussion with National Evaluation Staff, December 23, 1999).

The second MPD Commander to serve as Director of the Project indicated that he was pleased with the Project’s progress, particularly the addition of a former gang member from the community to the staff. He believed this added a needed dimension to the Project (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, Mesa Site Visit, October 28, 1999). An additional outreach worker, an African-American female, was also hired. They operated as a team and were able to contact gang youth in the streets in the early evening, then switched their hours to later at night. They were making significant contacts with gang youth, and were happy with this arrangement (Memo to C. Kane from F. Perez, Report on Outreach Training Session, June 23, 2000).

In the Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (Abstract, 1999), the MGIP stated that an important goal was strengthening the Project's outreach component utilizing former gang members as outreach workers. Later, the Case Management Coordinator's report to the Gang Prevention Steering Committee stated that "because the collaboration of outreach [workers] with police and probation had not been done before," he believes "this has now been achieved and the community is being served in the best interests of the collaborating agencies" (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, January 11, 2000).

Nevertheless, the Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1999) also took a significant step backward. It redefined "outreach contact and social services to gang youth" as "[to] those at high risk of gang involvement, and their families, with the collaboration of local citizens and other agencies including criminal justice, schools, and manpower, especially in respect to prevention and intervention." Project emphasis had changed or reverted to a focus on younger, at-risk youth, and a social-development approach.

At a meeting at the National Evaluation office in Chicago in October 2001 (after OJJDP funding for the project had terminated), the former Case Management Coordinator said he was "upset that the one decent, former-gang-member, outreach youth worker they had was terminated from the Project. He was caught driving on a suspended driver's license. [He] said if he were still the case manager and coordinator that he would not have let this happen. The police made a wrong decision ... The lack of use of outreach youth workers ... was still a major weakness of the Project" (Minutes of Meeting in Chicago October 15, 2001, between D. Zorich and I. Spergel).

Agency Contacts and Activities. Project workers, especially case managers, youth intervention

workers, and outreach youth workers referred program youth to a great variety of agencies in the community. Personnel of community agencies, the schools, and probation reciprocally referred other youth (who may or may not have been gang members or at risk) to the Project for a variety of services. A substantial portion of these other gang, school, or probation youth – perhaps as many as 25% of the youth in some way connected to the Project – were not documented at all in the MGIP’s records, and we do not know exactly what services were provided.

The school or community-agency programs from which youth referrals came included:

- Positive Alternatives to Gangs (PAG) at Mesa Vista Alternative High School, the Power Learning Center, and McKellips Learning Center
- SUNS Nite HOOPS, a basketball-skills development program associated with the Phoenix Suns professional baseball team
- Boys and Girls Club
- Anytown Camping Program
- Arts and Crafts activity at the Mesa Service Center
- Concerned Offenders for Northern Arizona (COYA) (an activity in which Project youth were brought to Arizona State Prison for interaction with prisoners)
- Mesa Tattoo Removal Program
- East Valley Family Resource Center (counseling for MGIP youth as well as their parents)
- Arizona Museum trips
- Arizona Theatre Corporation
- Sun Valley High School Tutorial Program
- Gene Lewis Boxing Club
- Mayfield Youth Alternative Center, a county detention center for minor offenders and status offenders

There was a range of other programs which were developed or used primarily by MGIP, and from which MGIP did not receive referrals in turn:

- Pre Hab Youth and Family Counseling Program
- Gang Resources, Education and Training (GREAT)
- Mesa Mentoring Program
- Parent Intervention Groups at Kino Junior High School

In addition, MGIP staff participated in the following (mainly Project-area) activities:

- Informational meetings about the program, held at local junior high schools
- Block watch group
- Home visits from Project outreach staff to Project and non-project youth, mainly in the Project area.
- City-wide basketball tournaments
- Distribution of food baskets, mainly to target-community residents

The variety of additional service-activities provided mainly for Project youth (but also for non-Project youth) at the MGIP office included:

- Counseling, discussion groups, tutorial (GED) groups, parent discussion groups, young fathers discussion group, female support group, co-ed therapy group
- Cognitive restructuring class, anger management group sessions, substance abuse

discussion groups, one-on-one counseling, family counseling, drug treatment groups, individual probation counseling sessions for the MGIP or non-MGIP youth on probation (staffed mainly by probation officers)

- Arts and crafts classes with a strong Mexican cultural content
- English as a Second Language (ESL) classes.

Since records were not kept of the number of youth who were involved in these various activities, the full range of activities provided for Project or non-Project youth through the MGIP is not known. MGIP records and reports were not adequate to describe the nature and scope of activities provided. The closest we can come is through National Evaluation worker-tracking or program-process records completed by the MGIP staff. These records were completed mainly for MGIP program probationers and school-youth referred to the program. Many of the youth for whom no adequate program records exist were probably youth from the target area and to some extent from other areas who were at risk for gang involvement and who were referred for services later in the program.

Provision of Social Opportunities

The MGIP paid less attention to the provision of access to social opportunities than to the provision of social intervention services. A computer lab was established at the MGIP offices to enhance the academic skills of program participants. Only limited, belated attention was given to improved (or better) utilization of educational programs, and to access to direct job-placement or training.

Educational Opportunities. The First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1994)

emphasized the importance of keeping marginal, at-risk youth in regular school with the aid of community-based services, or of mainstreaming youth back from alternative schools. According to a local newspaper report, “not-so-perfect youth” had to be better prepared for the changing job market. The problem of a disassociated educational system had to be addressed for low-income Hispanic youth. “Schools, colleges, and social agencies must become full partners raising the skill levels of graduates across a complex of newer and technical skills and providing the needed training and education for citizens to become gainfully employed” (Tribune Newspapers (Special Supplement) “The Changing Face of Mesa,” June 7, 1992).

The Mesa educational problem was apparently not adequately addressed. During the course of the MGIP program there was an increase in alternative and charter schools for youth who did not meet public school academic standards or conform to school-district behavioral standards. A special problem was the presence of undocumented youth not acculturated to the standard school system. Students at the alternative schools were increasingly subjected to random searches, since a considerable number of students seemed to have “lots of money and drugs on them” (I. Spergel December 13-15, 1995 Field Notes of Visit to Mesa). The “student population of Mesa Vista Alternative School [continued to exhibit] a rapid infiltration of gangs” (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999). Youth were unable to get or hold jobs and consequently became increasingly involved in the drug trade, but still congregated around schools. (I. Spergel, June 24, 2000 Field Notes of Visit to Mesa). Public schools were under more and more pressure to get rid of gang youth. As a consequence, police and probation became more and more integrated into the educational process.

The schools used suppression and zero tolerance to address the youth-gang problem (I. Spergel March 25-27, 1997 Field Notes of Visit to Mesa). During the early years of the Program, the Project Director and Case Management Coordinator were particularly concerned with the lack of cooperation from public schools (including some alternative schools) in sharing information with the Project about problem youth, and the schools' reluctance to use remedial community-based services. In due course, the MGIP – particularly its youth outreach workers and youth intervention specialists – established productive relationships with a regular junior high school in the program area, and with charter schools that served some program youth. A good deal of information-sharing between Powell Junior High School staff and the MGIP Youth Intervention Specialist enabled teachers to refer students to the Project for family-crisis, self-esteem, literacy, cognitive-restructuring, and arts and recreational services. These services provided school personnel with needed resources, mainly for at-risk youth.

Much of the relationship between the Project and schools in the program area focused on the assistance Project workers could provide in regard to behavioral problems of students, and how the Project could be helpful in getting youth to conform to school norms. Participation in the Project was required if youth who had behavioral problems were to return to school. At first, many of the youth with behavioral problems referred to the Project were not gang members or at risk for gang membership, but Project staff were increasingly responsible for referral decisions, and made those decisions based on clear gang-at-risk criteria. While the role of Project workers was being built into the school disciplinary system, it was not clear how or to what extent the Project staff facilitated improved educational opportunities for gang or gang-at-risk youth in the schools. Toward the end of the Project, the new Case Management Coordinator spoke of

developing a plan that would enable Project youth to be bused to the Sun Valley High School, a charter school, for a five hour program that would tailor class activities to particular-youth learning levels and interests. The same Case Management Coordinator was also working on a plan at the Powell Junior High School to cut down on expulsion or suspension of Project youth. Nevertheless, significant educational opportunities were provided to some Project gang-youth through the Project's GED learning laboratory. Between twenty-five and thirty school dropouts, mainly gang-involved youth, (though not all formally regarded as Project youth) were provided with educational learning opportunities. The Project's GED learning laboratory also became a resource for charter or regular high schools. Established educational organizations were using the MGIP's GED learning laboratory to provide educational opportunities that they themselves should have provided. It is not clear, however, how many youth actually kept up attendance and graduated from the Project's GED program.

Job Opportunities. MGIP leadership apparently did not invest resources in a program of job preparation or job placement for gang-involved or at-risk youth, and the specialized staff to run it. The Case Management Coordinator believed that employment opportunities were not an issue in Mesa; that Mesa (he said) had the lowest unemployment rate in the country at that time. The problem was that Project youth did not know how to access job opportunities, and could not hold a job. The Project made little effort to address this problem.

A part-time Job Development Specialist was hired early in the Project to help program participants develop employment skills, counsel them in job/career decisions, establish liaison with local employers, refer participants to jobs, monitor job progress and assist with

individualized job-development planning, as well as utilize state-level employment services (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). However, the person hired for the job-development position apparently did not work out, presumably because “the majority of Project participants were juveniles who had no job experience.” The Job Development Specialist also regarded the youth as undisciplined; he could not accept or deal with their behavioral problems (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). Referrals were then made by Project Case Management Coordinators to a range of employment-training and placement programs, such as Phoenix Job Corps, Maricopa County Work Development, JTPA Summer Program, East Valley Institute of Technology, Mesa Public Schools Vocational High School and a JTPA summer program.

The Project eliminated the position of Job Development Specialist and used the PreHab’s World of Work (WOW) program to develop jobs for Project youth (Gang Prevention Steering Committee, Executive Committee Meeting, February 22, 1997). It is unclear if this plan ever materialized. The general view of Project personnel was that their job-development efforts were not successful, and considerably more Project resources had to be put into training and job-development programming (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, “Planning for Sixth Year and Beyond,” 1999).

In sum, the Project made only limited progress in the provision of social opportunities. Some effort was made to assist Project youth with educational opportunities available in regular and alternative or charter schools. The Project did assist the schools in constraining disruptive youth behavior and possibly in limiting the number of youth suspended and expelled. But it is not clear that established school-system educational opportunities were expanded, or better

tailored to meet the needs of Project youth. Alternative charter school programs expanded, but it is also not clear that these programs were effective in educating gang-involved or gang-at-risk youth. The nature, scope, and effects of the MGIP workers' job-referral or placement efforts were not documented, and their efforts at job preparation or job development for program youth essentially did not get off the ground.

Suppression/Social Control

The Mesa Police Department (MPD), which operated the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP), modified its structures and strategies to accommodate the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program. Over time, it made the Project an integral component of the MPD Gang Unit. The MPD developed a strategy which directed attention to the service needs of gang-involved youth, sensitivity to the interests of neighborhood residents and social agencies and developing closer relationships with them, while still emphasizing law enforcement and control of the gang problem. According to the MPD Chief, the Department modeled its approach to gangs based on the notion of community-oriented policing.

However, the MGIP was initiated primarily within a framework of "zero tolerance" against criminal activity. The goals of the MPD, as stated in the MGIP's 1994 First-Year Funding Application, were to:

- increase suppression of criminal gang activities
- engage and support legislation, judicial and law-enforcement reform to ensure that the criminal justice system works as an effective deterrent to control gang activity
- encourage and support legislation to stiffen penalties for repeat offenders and gang-

related violence.

In 1993, the Arizona State Legislature passed Senate Bill 1291 which translated parts of the California State Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (S.T.E.P.) Act into Arizona law. The issues or concerns of Mesa leadership in 1994 were that gangs ... were “growing in number. Violence by gang members is increasing although only 5% of the gang members are involved in violent crime.” “In particular, ‘gang’ and illegal gang activity were defined for the first time. Mesa community leaders, including the chairman of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee, ... joined with the Arizona Attorney General and others to enact this legislation” (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994).

Gang-membership identification criteria (GMIC) were established. The courts could now treat convicted gang offenders more harshly than defendants who were not gang members. “A person convicted of committing any following offense with the intent to promote, further or assist any criminal conduct by a criminal street gang shall not be eligible for suspension of sentence, probation, or release from confinement ... the presumptive, minimal and maximum sentence for the offense shall be increased by three years ...” (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). Later, the Gang Prevention Steering Committee also recommended that standardized GMIC criteria be utilized by community agencies (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998) and that information on what a gang is, who a gang member is, and what a gang incident is be included in a common “valid database” (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999).

Implicit in the building of a gang database was increased contacts between police and

community agencies. In this process, suppression would come to include a social component. Holding a youth accountable for his crimes and misbehavior would now be “in accordance with law, social policy, and the interests of the community” (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999). Improved communication and some modification of attitudes among the various units of the MPD about the activities of the MGIP were expected to facilitate the purpose of the Project and the mission of the Mesa Police Department. The Gang Unit and patrol officers now began to refer youth to the Project for services.

Structure of the MGIP in the MPD

The Mesa Police Department Chief was a strong supporter of the MGIP and its underlying concepts. A full-time police Commander and the Gang Unit detectives had been assigned to the Project. MPD support appeared to grow stronger over time. The Gang Unit, at first independent of the MGIP, was now expected to fully support Project efforts, and “by doing so, would be enhancing the Department’s overall philosophy of community policing ...” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). In the early years of the Project it was unclear what the relationship between the Project and the Gang Unit was, and might be. It was uncertain how the role of detectives on the Project would differ from those in the Gang Unit (J. Burch letter to L. Adams, October 2, 1998). A further complication was that the reporting structure was different for each of the first two MGIP detectives, who came from different sections of the Mesa Police Department. The most obvious problem, however, was “the apparent lack of understanding and appreciation on the part of the Gang Unit of the Project’s strategies of utilizing prevention, intervention, and suppression, coupled with opportunities provision and

community mobilization ... the general feeling of most [MGIP] staff is that the Gang Unit does not support the Project's efforts" (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

The Local Evaluators observed during the first year or two of the Project that there was "no consistent, established relationship between MGIP and the Gang Unit ..." There were no referrals and very little communication about youth in the program known to both the Project and the Gang Unit detectives. The Local Evaluators concluded there was "no direct incentive [for the Gang Unit] to cooperate and so they rarely were willing to help" (R. Scott memo to I. Spergel, August 20, 1998). During this period there was extensive concern and discussion by the Project Director and the Case Management Coordinator about placing the Project within the Police Department. Working relationships between the Gang Unit and the MGIP were proceeding too slowly. The MPD Commander, who was also the first Director of MGIP, was expected to retire from the Department at the end of the third Project year. While she was dedicated to the concept of the Project, the Department's "ownership" of the Project was unclear. As indicated above, with strong urging from the National Technical Advisor and the OJJDP Program Manager, and the subsequent support and commitment of the MPD Chief, the Project was placed in the Gang Unit in 1999 (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, June 5, 1998).

The Shifting Suppression Strategy. The First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1994) already indicated that the commitment of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee and the MPD was not only to "zero tolerance for senseless crimes," but also to "finding ways to educate and provide alternatives for individuals and families to make positive changes to avoid violence and involvement with gangs." By the second application for funding, the MGIP leaders emphasized

that “although suppression/enforcement tasks ... [are] primarily ... provided by the gang detectives and probation officers ... the primary goal will not be to incarcerate, but to monitor, supervise, and enforce to such a degree that the [Project] participants will find it more conducive to become involved in alternative Project-defined opportunities ... (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). By the third funding application, the lessons learned from year two about police participation in the MGIP Street Team was that “building trust is very time-consuming. Distrust needed to be overcome not only between team members and participants, but also among team members themselves ...” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). Finally, by the end of the fourth year of program operations, the “gang suppression activities of the Mesa Police Department [began to] focus on crime committed by gangs, not necessarily on [simply] disbanding gangs.” Again, there was growing recognition that only a small percent (5%) of gang members were involved in violent crime. The majority of crimes committed by gang youth, at least in junior high school, were minor or status offenses (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999).

The fact that Project staff – gang detectives, probation officers, outreach youth workers and case managers – were located in the same set of offices and were in frequent communication provided the Project detectives with increased understanding of the personal and family nature of the gang problem in the program area. Information about Project youth was more widely disseminated among Project staff and the Mesa Police Department. Project detectives assigned to Project areas were now “able to spend more time patrolling the area and interacting with gang members. This enhances their ability to identify more gang members, put faces with names, and in general assist in the intelligence gathering process.” Project detectives had greater ability to

determine whether program youth were involved in criminal activities, which contributed to their ability to investigate crimes (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997).

Project detectives' attitudes were changing. One of the detectives noted that "having contact only on a negative basis (arrests, citations) will only develop animosity from the families" (R. Monares Memo to Commander Adams, January 6, 1997). The same detective earlier thought the way to strengthen the Project was to "use 'the hook and book' mentality ... [but] the officers have to ease up on arresting people for minor offenses and concentrate on more serious offenses, if they hope ultimately to reduce them" (F. Perez Field Notes, June 22-23, 2000 Visit to Mesa). These new evolving relationships with youth also meant more positive relationships with parents. One of the Project detectives commented, "on occasion, I have been able to locate their missing children because I knew they were just hanging out at a friend's house and didn't want to come home. I have gone and picked them up and taken them home" (R. Van Gelder Memo to Commander Adams, January 3, 1998). Relationships with Project participants and parents also facilitated investigations about serious crime, especially drug dealing.

Coordinating Suppression-Staff Relationships. The MGIP created better coordination among Project detectives, probation, other justice-system agencies, schools, neighborhood residents and businesses. A wide variety of organizations and groups now directly and indirectly aided the law-enforcement mission of the MPD. A Project detective observed that their new, close relationship with probation made getting information about participants "faster than normal. As police, we have also benefitted from knowing who is on probation and what the stipulations of

probation are ... Our participants have been held more accountable ...” (R. VanGelder, Memo to Commander Adams, January 3, 1998). Project police were able to incorporate information about program youth known to probation. For example, if the Project detective had an outstanding warrant, he was able to more quickly apprehend the youth because the probation officer knew where the youth was (Third Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997).

As gangs have increasingly crossed city and state borders, the Mesa Gang Unit was able to increase contact with justice-system agencies in other parts of the state. Closer communication has occurred between the Mesa Gang Unit and the Arizona Department of Public Safety Gang Intelligence unit “to improve the quality and quantity of gang-related statistical information.” The Gang Unit has also worked “with the Tempe Police Department’s surveillance efforts of several Gangster Disciples who lived in Mesa, and who were responsible for several drivebys in Tempe and Chandler, nearby gang problem cities” (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, January 16, 1997).

Nevertheless, the Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1999) indicated that the MPD was still highly focused on suppression, but in more sophisticated ways. A school/police liaison officer would now be stationed at schools and work with the school intervention coordinator to “intervene” early with at-risk and gang-involved students based on the teachers’ use of GMIC. Information obtained by the teacher and school officials would be shared with the MPD. In this process, the school staff would contact parents and guardians of students “suspected of gang activity or at-risk for gang activity” and obtain permission for Project staff to talk with them. Whether this procedure increased the labeling of youth as gang members and potential delinquents, and induced a higher level of police and probation contacts and,

consequently, a higher level of arrests of such youth is explored in Chapter 12.

The Associate Superintendent of Schools observed that use of the new GMIC procedure has been effective in maintaining confidentiality in the schools where it has been used. The procedure also has enabled teachers to refer students for Project services such as crisis intervention, self-esteem building, literacy, cognitive restructuring, etc. “These opportunities provide school personnel with additional needed resources for students at-risk for gangs ...” (Letter of Support for Fifth-Year Funding from D. Duvall, Associate Superintendent, Mesa Public Schools, June 27, 1999).

Close working relationships between the Project detectives, the Neighborhood Development Specialist, local residents, and neighborhood groups also facilitated law enforcement’s neighborhood efforts in “fighting criminal gang activity.” The Neighborhood Development Specialist worked with Project detectives to organize a neighborhood group which suspected that a “crack house” was operating in their area. As indicated above, she worked with neighbors to conduct surveillance on traffic, get license plate numbers, and prepare documentation for the police. These efforts not only “empowered” the citizens, but contributed to an ongoing police investigation which resulted in the “crack house” being closed (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

Project Gang Unit detectives were less effective in addressing a problem of youth hanging out after school at a local delicatessen, which was a recruiting ground for the Wetback Power gang. Parents had called police on numerous occasions, but little was done to control or alleviate this situation. The Commander of the Gang Unit noted the “area continues to be a problem because of a lack of cooperation from the owner of the deli. The owner needs the business of the

students who hang out there, and therefore does not want the police to chase them away” (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, January 11 and March 14, 2000). Perhaps pressures from a better-organized neighborhood group, greater involvement by Project youth workers, or the influence of a neighborhood business advisory group (which did not exist) would have helped in this suppression process.

Limitations of the Police Suppression Approach. At the start of the program, Mesa was viewed as an emerging gang-problem city. The scope and severity of the gang problem was not fully or accurately identified while the program was getting underway. Youth targeted for the program were almost exclusively Latino, but based on city-wide and program and comparison-area arrest and incident data, there also appeared to be African-American and white (or white supremacist) youth-gang problems as well. These aspects of the gang problem were not targeted, in part because gangs present in the target area were mainly Latino. However, the MGIP did not entirely confine its services, or the police their suppression efforts, to youth in the program area.

Furthermore, insufficient attention may have been directed to the group, or systemic, factor of gang activities and gang crime. Gangs or gang segments were not targeted. Individual youth who were less-serious gang offenders were selected to participate in the program. Gang leaders and more-serious offenders were generally incarcerated and did not participate in the program. Many of these somewhat older youth should have been referred to the program. Based on age alone, they would normally have been more likely to reduce their gangbanging patterns, and (probably) positively affect the younger gang members selected for the program, who were more likely to increase their gang activities.

Police in Mesa, including the Project detectives, were still largely law-enforcement-oriented and only beginning to understand the nature of gang structure and gang activities in a community context. It was unclear to what extent the Project police substantially understood the complexity of gang phenomena. Positive communication with gang youth was essential to obtain information for intelligence and law-enforcement purposes, but this could not adequately be accomplished unless some level of respect for and ability to communicate effectively with gang youth was established. Based on National Evaluation staff observations, there apparently was little in the way of “relationship building” between the Project police officers and any of the groups of gang members on the streets (F. Perez Field Notes on June 22-23, 2000 Visit to Mesa). The Project Director and Case Management Coordinator frequently expressed concern that patrol officers and the Project detectives often harassed gang youth or associates by taking away their driver’s licenses for minor infractions. Based on Mesa justice-system policy, it was extremely difficult to recover licenses unless a \$500 fine was paid. The court issued additional arrest warrants when fines were not paid.

The Case Management Coordinator said “the police were very hard-nosed and reflected general community or white attitudes toward Latinos” (Notes from D. Zorich’s Visit to Chicago, August 28, 1999). The Coordinator said that he and the Project Director planned to approach the city prosecutor and the city court about the driving-without-a-license problem and “propose that as an alternative to owing thousands of dollars, the youth should be given the option of participating in the Project. But the only way this is going to happen is if the police department, and particularly the Gang Unit, sees some worth in this. They have been talking about this for years” (Mesa Conference Call Minutes, August 19, 1998).

A limitation in the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model was the inability of the MPD, the criminal-justice system, and city leadership to come to terms with employing neighborhood residents, including former gang members, as outreach youth workers. Although the MGIP's notion of youth-outreach encompassed agency and community-based (including some citizen group) contacts with gang youth, it did not encompass people from the Project-area neighborhood who were already in contact with these gang youth.

Probation

The Maricopa County Juvenile and Adult Probation departments played key roles in supporting the Project, particularly in elaborating the Project's suppression and deterrence strategy so that it included the provision of access to community-based services. Juvenile probation was responsible for the great majority of youth formally referred to the MGIP. The Project probation officer was the person most frequently seen by the program participants. Active probationers were required by the court to participate in various aspects of the MGIP program, at least while they were on probation. Both juvenile and adult probation were committed to a "restorative justice philosophy," and provided extensive manpower resources directly or indirectly in support of the Project, including intensive-probation, regular-probation, school-probation and surveillance officers.

As discussed above, a close relationship developed between Project probation officers and Project detectives. They frequently rode together on their tours of duty in the target area. Probation officers kept the Project police *au courant* on whether program youth had outstanding warrants, where they could be located, and what the probationer's family situation, work, and

school status were. Probation maintained an updated data base which greatly assisted police in the investigation of crime in which program youth might be involved.

Probation made a significant contribution to the work of the Project, which also enhanced the administrative efficiency of the Maricopa County Juvenile Probation Department. “Juvenile probation has increased its involvement in the Project by housing a juvenile intensive probation supervision (JIPS) team at the Project. This provides a greater level of juvenile supervision of youth in the Project. The team’s presence at the Project provides the opportunity for them to utilize Project resources and increase the number of participants ... this also enables the Project juvenile probation officer to handle a larger caseload of standard probationers and provides the Project with a pool of JIPS participants previously not identified as gang members or at risk of gang membership [some of the youth on the probation caseload did not necessarily have arrest records, but often may have been known to the Juvenile Court for truancy or misbehavior]” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998).

Both juvenile and adult probation used the MGIP as a satellite probation office to fulfill probation’s supervisory as well as service functions. The Project provided access to services for their probationers. Juvenile probation provided resources for a computer lab based at the Project office. A teen drug-treatment probation group began to meet once per week at the Project office (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999). Juvenile and adult probation were highly pleased with the existence and operation of the MGIP. The officers believed that the Project enabled probation officers to reduce recidivism. “ ... the more closely the team works with the participant to address his need, the better the participant does. Project probation officers feel the violation rate for the group of offenders is lower than what normally would be expected with a

similar group ... and they believe it is attributable to the increased contacts and depth of the relationships established with participants by the Project team” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997).

In sum, the dominant workers in the Project were probation officers and police, and the dominant strategy of the Project was suppression, surveillance, and deterrence, with access to services for program youth referred to the program by probation. Probation and police, in relation to each other, provided a high level of coordinated contact to program youth. A service approach was built into the program for a range of justice-system-connected gang offenders who generally had committed less-serious rather than more-serious crimes or offenses. A limitation of probation’s suppression and deterrence-oriented approach was retaining youth in the program. Both Local Evaluators observed early in the Project that “the youth attend the program as a condition of their probation, but once they are off probation, they lose interest in sticking around ...” (Conference Call with the Local Site Evaluators, June 25, 1998). This apparently changed over time. Program youth and neighborhood residents pressured the city to continue the Project when a city funding crisis developed.

Organizational Change and Development

The MGIP was a richly-developed program, characterized by significant institutional change during the course of its five years of operation. There were important organizational changes and commitments to the Comprehensive Model by the Mesa Police Department. Probation expanded its services. There was coordination among agency workers, particularly police and probation, and, to a lesser extent, school personnel. There was a broadening of agency

involvement on behalf of program youth across a great variety of agencies.

Established community-agency mobilization and program development took place, but not inclusionary community effort directed to the full and complex nature of the gang problem. Grassroots groups and faith-based organizations were hardly contacted; local area advisory groups were never developed. It is not clear to what extent local residents in the target area participated and made a contribution to the program's development. The Project's commitment to hiring and using local neighborhood residents as outreach youth workers remained a weak aspect of the Project. The inclusion of representatives of the grassroots Latino community was not achieved.

Community-agency and Project leadership preferred to address the gang problem in established agency and in-house service terms. Community outreach was interpreted more as communication among workers across established agencies. Little street-gang-level information was developed by the MGIP staff, other than by police. The outreach youth worker was not available to gang youth on the street or at times of crisis in the community.

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee and to some extent the MGIP were fundamentally committed to a general community-development effort, particularly in regard to increasingly addressing the social service needs of at-risk youth. The MGIP was significantly involved in social control of youth in the program referred by probation. The Gang Prevention Steering Committee early on was committed to "making punishment fit the crime" and to graduated sanctions, but it also identified itself as a catalyst for change in the community, especially in regard to legislation that could lead "to more effective rehabilitation means and ends" (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). It was not clear to what extent

these two commitments applied to seriously delinquent, gang-involved youth. The Steering Committee's interests were broader than the MGIP's, and its primary community-development goals were specified by a set of objectives that were not as focused on the gang problem or gang youth.

The initial Funding Application (1994) noted that "two very separate systems exist to rehabilitate troubled youth: a community-based system and a criminal-justice system. The systems needed to be integrated into one service-delivery system through joint planning and coordinated participation. Interagency contact must become much more common to provide the underlying authority necessary to effect a continuum of integrated services. Management information systems concerning gang membership and illegal activities must be created" (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). Such systems were not created.

The same 1994 Funding Application recommended that a program should be established "with representation from the community as well as state and criminal justice systems. Recreation, intervention, and job-training programs must gain access to criminal-justice [systems] to better serve as resources to establish a 'continuum of service' for gang and 'at-risk' youth." This program approach has not yet been fully developed. Progress was made during the course of the Project, before local funding was terminated.

Chapter 7

Organization Perceptions and Program Performance

As part of the National Evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program, executives and administrators from a range of local agencies and organizations were surveyed twice in the early years of the Project to determine whether changes occurred in their perceptions of the gang problem and their organizations' strategic responses to it. A brief questionnaire was also administered at the end of the OJJDP Project period to executives of agencies closely connected to the development of the Project, as well as to the National Evaluators, to determine whether they felt the objectives of the Program Model had been achieved.

Organization Survey Analysis (Rolando V. Sosa)

The National Evaluation conducted community-agency leadership surveys at each of the five Project sites, including Mesa, Arizona. At the start of the program, each local Project Director provided lists of organizations and relevant contact persons for the National Evaluators to interview. These lists consisted of organizations expected to be members of the local steering committees, service providers expected to be part of the Project intervention programs, and other community organizations in the program areas concerned about or involved with the youth-gang problem. The individuals interviewed were in key policy-making, administrative, or high-level program-implementation positions, and familiar with the youth-gang problem and their organization's response to it.

Organization surveys were administered at two time periods, to ascertain whether changes had occurred at the sites between 1996 and 1998 – the early years of the program. In the first survey (Time I), representatives of 132 organizations across all five Project sites were interviewed; in the second survey (Time II), representatives of 104 organizations were interviewed.¹ Before the Time II survey, the lists of respondents were updated, and representatives of the new organizations were also interviewed. The following tables and analyses include only organizations in the program areas who completed both a Time I and a Time II survey questionnaire, i.e., 104 (or 79%) of the 132 organizations interviewed at Time I. Not all of the organization respondents answered all questions at each survey period.

Representatives of twenty Mesa organizations completed interviews, both at Time I and Time II, about the average response rate for the five sites (n = 20.8). Also, Mesa had a very high proportion of same-organization respondents at both time periods – 80% – compared to the five-site average percentage – 69.2% (a low for one site = 43%).

Mesa organizations/agencies responding to the Time I and Time II Organization Survey included:

- Mesa Police Department
- Mesa City Prosecutors Office
- Maricopa County Juvenile Court Services
- Maricopa Country Adult Probation
- Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections
- Mesa Youth Placement
- Prehab of Arizona
- Empact Suicide Prevention Center
- YMCA Urban Services

¹ We were only able to collect Time I organization-level data from the comparison sites. The original Mesa comparison areas (Carson and Kino Junior High Schools) together contained a similar number of organizations at Time I (n = 26), and were representative of the same kinds of organizations as in the program area.

Mesa Boys and Girls Club
Mesa United Way Neighborhood Development
City of Mesa Parks and Recreation
Mesa School Board
Mesa Public Schools, Student Services
Power Learning Center
Mesa Alternative High School
Mesa Gang Intervention Project
Queen of Peace Catholic Church
Westwood Junior High School
Powell Junior School

Mesa organizations/agencies responding only to the Time I Organization Survey included:

Maricopa County Deputy Attorney
Maricopa County Juvenile Court Services
Salt River/Pima Indian Reservation
Mesa City Council
Neighborhood Development Center

Mesa organizations/agencies added at Time II who completed a modified (brief) Time I

Organization Survey included:

Maricopa County Juvenile Court
First Assembly of God
MECA, c/o Red Mountain United Methodist Church
El Sendero de la Cruz/The Pathway of the Cross
Building A Healthier Mesa, Area 3
Neighbors as Partners
Lincoln Elementary School

Respondents in all five Project sites generally were males, in their middle 40s, with masters degrees, who lived in the Project cities, although not necessarily in the program areas.

The Mesa Time I-Time II respondents were similar to those at the other Project sites. At both Time I and Time II, few Mesa respondents – less than 10% – lived in the program area; most

Mesa respondents – more than 80% – were white, compared to the average of about 67% for all five Project sites.

The gang problem in Mesa was regarded by city-wide leaders and outside observers as just emerging, and minor in scope. They viewed the problem as less serious than did community leaders at the other Project sites. Mesa organization representatives rated the gang-crime problem in the area at a modest level on a five-point (1 - 5) scale, both at Time I (3.66) and at Time II (3.09), compared to higher average levels across the five sites (Time I = 3.74; Time II = 3.36). Mesa respondents rated gang crime at a significantly lower level at Time II than at Time I; they also rated gang and non-gang crime at the lowest levels of all the sites, both at Time I and Time II.²

Respondents at all the sites, including Mesa, reported that levels of serious violence and less-serious violence declined at Time II. Only Mesa organizations reported significant drops in both serious and less-serious violence between the two interview periods. Mesa organization respondents also perceived a decline in gang-related property and drug crime. However, the perception of a decrease in gang-related drug crime was not consistent with the view of Mesa gang police specialists, who estimated there had been a growth in gang membership and drug crimes during the Project period.

Non-gang crime was rated at lower levels than gang crime at other Project sites, while levels of non-gang crime (particularly less-serious violence and property crime) were rated as

² The comparison areas' ratings of gang crime (3.57) and non-gang crime (2.23) were at slightly lower levels, but not significantly lower. These patterns were similar across different types of crime during the early years of the program, i.e., they were slightly lower in the comparison areas for violence, drug, and property crimes, both gang, and non-gang.

significantly lower at Time II in Mesa. Levels of both gang and non-gang problems – for specific types of crime – were rated significantly lower at Time II in Mesa than in any of the other sites (Table 7.1).

When Mesa respondents were asked the question: “would you say the gang problem experienced by specific programs of your organization has become worse, stayed the same, or become better?” (“over the last three years” at Time I, and “over the last year” at Time II), all sites reported an increase over the three years prior to the Time I interview. However, Mesa organizations generally perceived a slightly lower level of the gang-crime problem at both Time I and Time II (Table 7.2).

Mesa organization respondents regarded their community’s general gang-problem strategies as fairly good, but a little worse than did the average of respondents from organizations at the other sites, especially in respect to coordination, although slightly better in respect to provision of social opportunities and social intervention, and about average in regard to suppression and a little better in regard to community mobilization (Table 7.3). The response in respect to coordination was surprising. The evidence was clear that Mesa produced a higher level of community mobilization or coordination – at least among established organizations – than did the other sites, both before and during the program period. Only Mesa was able to house representatives of various agencies within their site’s office.

Organization respondents in Mesa believed that their community had a small problem in respect to most types of crime. They believed, with a great deal of consensus, that while their strategies for addressing the gang problem were adequate, they needed an even more comprehensive and coordinated planning and programming focus on prevention and early

intervention. Coordinated policies and agency efforts were highly emphasized and operationalized in Mesa, based on National Evaluation field observations.³

Representatives of Mesa's organizations also indicated that they did not feel threatened by the growth of the gang problem. These community leaders and the Project staff believed that the gang problem should be addressed through a series of somewhat-separate, but well-coordinated prevention and suppression efforts. The administrators of the Mesa Project also clearly and explicitly recognized the distinction between the OJJDP Model and their own local model. Their model emphasized prevention and early intervention, in contrast to the OJJDP Model's more balanced and interrelated prevention, intervention, and suppression approach, which included work with delinquent and gang-involved youth, as well as with at-risk youth.

Program Performance Indicators (Lorita A. Purnell)

In the final months of the Project, the National Evaluators asked key program agency administrators, Steering Committee members and (sometimes) the Local Evaluators to systematically assess the manner in which the local Projects were implemented, based on a series of performance-rating scales. Six Mesa program-related personnel completed the ratings, including the MPD Commander (who was the first Project Director), both Project Case Management Coordinators, the Project detective, the vice-principal of Powell Junior High School, and a representative of the "Hispanic Associates," a citywide community organization.

³ Mesa comparison organizations at Time I rated their community strategies for addressing the gang problem at almost the same (sometimes identical) levels as the Mesa program organizations. Most of the organizations that responded to the survey questions, particularly at Time I, were the same citywide or countywide organizations; however, the respondents may have been different and had to focus on different areas in their responses.

The performance-rating scales were also completed by two members of the National Evaluation team. The ratings were completed by respondents independent of each other. The rating scales covered the major and specific Model categories: the *program elements* – team approach, steering committee, grassroots involvement, youth outreach, criminal justice, school participation, employment/training, lead-agency management; the *program strategies* – community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provision, suppression/social control, organizational change and development; and the *program implementation principles* – targeting, balance, intensity, continuity, commitment. (There were multiple subcategories for each of the categories – targeting, team approach, or community mobilization, etc.). The scale for each item was: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good. The largest number of responses was for four subcategories: lead-agency management, suppression/social control, criminal justice, and schools. There were very few missing responses.

The item scores per category were summed first, and then the items for all categories were summed. The combined mean scores for all subcategories (not weighted) were in the “good” or “very good” range. The combined mean score was 3.43 for the local Project staff respondents and 3.28 for the National Evaluators. These combined mean scores were remarkably similar for each subcategory. The combined, unweighted mean score of all eight respondents, for all items, was 3.36 (Table 7.4). The mean scores for the items and categories in Mesa were generally higher than for any other site. (See Table 7.5 for Program Performance Score Distribution).

The categories which received the highest ratings by local program-related personnel in Mesa were suppression/social control, followed by lead-agency management and intensity. The

categories which received the highest ratings by the National Evaluation staff were continuity, followed by intensity and commitment.

There was better overlap in estimates of subcategories which received the lowest scores in both surveys, albeit the subcategories were rated at a slightly higher level by program-related personnel than by National Evaluation personnel. The subcategories with the lowest ratings, in rank order by the program-related respondents, were school participation, grassroots involvement and team approach. The categories with the lowest ratings by the National Evaluators were targeting, grassroots involvement (closely behind), and school participation.

If we combine the unweighted mean scores across local-program and National Evaluation respondents, the highest-ranked scores were continuity, intensity and lead-agency management. The lowest combined mean scores were school participation, grassroots involvement and targeting. These combined mean scores would appear to be consistent with field observations of the National and Local Evaluation staffs, except for school participation, which probably would have received a higher rating in the fourth and fifth years of the program.

Conclusion

In light of the qualitative findings reported in earlier chapters and the descriptive quantitative findings in the present chapter thus far, we believe the Comprehensive Gang Program Model was reasonably well developed in Mesa. It was distinguished by a highly cohesive community and a set of approaches that were well integrated, except for grassroots involvement, the use of the outreach youth workers and the limited targeting of a range of gang-involved and hardcore gang youth. There was a strong tendency for the Project to target less-

delinquent gang-involved and at-risk youth.

Table 7.1
Organization Survey Mean Ratings¹ of Gang and Non-Gang Crime Categories in Program Area
By Site and By Time Period

Type of Crime ²	San Antonio (n=12)		Tucson (n=18)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington-Normal (n=24)		Riverside (n=15)		Total ³ (N=86)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Gang Total	4.27	3.61*	4.27	3.97	3.66	3.09*	3.07	3.11	4.00	3.29	3.74	3.36***
Serious Violence	4.32	3.45	4.40	3.92	3.55	3.08*	3.25	3.10	3.66	3.39	3.76	3.35***
Other Violence	4.27	3.50*	4.21	4.07	3.62	2.85*	3.07	2.93	3.88	3.46	3.72	3.30***
Drugs	4.33	4.04	4.50	4.38	3.94	3.62	3.85	4.04	4.13	4.15	4.11	4.04
Property	4.27	3.76*	4.00	3.64	3.47	3.06	2.41	2.53	3.70	3.35	3.41	3.16*
Non-gang Total	2.93	2.95	3.15	3.37	2.87	2.31	2.39	2.40	3.06	2.45	2.81	2.64
Serious Violence	2.89	2.60	2.63	3.09*	2.54	2.11	2.31	2.15	2.68	2.35	2.55	2.41
Other Violence	2.55	2.80	3.14	3.43	2.82	2.03*	2.18	2.11	2.88	2.35*	2.67	2.47
Drugs	3.09	3.36	3.72	3.91	3.47	2.88	3.21	3.31	3.67	3.53	3.43	3.39
Property	3.11	3.41	3.21	3.19	3.16	2.43*	2.29	2.33	3.10	2.70	2.89	2.71

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"
 School of Social Service Administration
 The University of Chicago
 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

¹ Respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of gang and non-gang crime on the following scale: 1=No Problem; 2=Small Problem; 3=Moderate Problem; 4=Serious Problem; 5=Very Serious Problem.

² The question asks: "For each crime, please rate how serious a crime problem you think exists in [specific program area for each site] in the last 6 months." Specific crimes were categorized as: 1) serious violence – robbery, battery without a weapon, battery with a weapon, and drive-by shootings; 2) other violence – threats/intimidation, possession of a knife, and possession of a gun; 3) drugs – both selling drugs and using drugs; and 4) property – vandalism/graffiti, breaking and entering, and car theft.

³ The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response.

Table 7.2
Gang Problem Experienced by Organization
By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating

Survey Item	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=15)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=23)		Riverside (n=15)		Total (N=83) ¹	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Gang Problem Experienced by Your Organization... ²	1.92	2.23	1.33	2.13**	1.59	2.12**	1.74	2.35**	1.87	2.67	1.69	2.30***

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys
 Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program”
 School of Social Service Administration
 The University of Chicago
 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

¹ The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response.

² Respondents were asked to rate the gang problem experienced by their organization on the following scale: 1=Become Worse; 2=Stayed About the Same; 3=Became Better. In the Time I Organization Survey, the question was: “**Over the last 3 years**, would you say the youth gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?” In the Time II Organization Survey, the question differs only in reference to the time period, “**Over the last year**, would you say the gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?”

Table 7.3
Organizations' Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem
By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating

Strategy ¹	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total ² (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Coordination: Organizations Defining the Problem	3.81	3.62	3.53	3.78	3.53	3.56	3.70	4.07	3.20	3.53	3.55	3.74
Agreement On What a Gang Is	4.23	3.95	3.84	3.95	3.76	3.76	3.80	4.28	3.53	3.92	3.82	3.99
Agreement On Which Individuals Are Gang Members	3.77	3.69	3.68	4.00	3.59	3.71	3.64	4.00*	3.00	3.44	3.53	3.78
Agreement On What A Gang Incident Is	3.46	3.69	3.63	3.89	3.76	3.47	3.88	4.12	3.16	3.58	3.61	3.79
Agreement On What Should Be Done About The Youth-Gang Problem	3.77	3.23	2.90	3.35	3.00	3.29	3.48	3.88	3.16	3.18	3.25	3.41
Coordination: Organization Information Sharing	3.38	3.25	3.08	3.44	3.06	3.53	3.33	4.27*	2.69	3.36	3.11	3.64***
Sharing Information About Criminal Actions Of Specific Gang Youth	3.77	3.38	3.30	3.60	3.24	3.65	3.38	4.38*	2.81	2.42	3.27	3.73
Sharing Information About Service Needs Of Specific Gang Youth	3.08	3.17	2.89	3.42	2.88	3.41	3.20	4.16*	2.66	3.26	2.95	3.55
Social Opportunities	2.31	2.38	2.39	2.47	2.47	2.79	2.35	2.85	2.32	2.81	2.37	2.69*
Employment Opportunities For Gang Members	2.23	2.08	1.95	2.15	2.06	2.35	1.83	2.46	1.62	2.38	1.93	2.28*
Access To Education Programs For Gang Members	2.38	2.69	2.80	2.85	2.88	3.24	2.88	3.25	3.14	3.22	2.84	3.07

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001.

¹ Respondents were asked to rate these items on the following scale: 1=Poor; 2=Fair; 3=Average; 4=Good; 5=Excellent.

² The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response.

Table 7.3 (continued)
Organizations' Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning The Gang Problem
By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating

Strategy	San Antonio (n=13)		Tucson (n=21)		Mesa (n=17)		Bloomington- Normal (n=25)		Riverside (n=19)		Total (N=95)	
	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II	Time I	Time II
Social Intervention Local Service-Agency Programming To Deal With The Gang Problem	2.62	2.85	3.00	3.15	3.06	3.29	3.60	3.64	2.42	3.84	2.99	3.28*
	2.62	2.85	3.00	3.15	3.06	3.29	3.60	3.64	2.42	3.84	2.99	3.28*
Suppression Law Enforcement Efforts Regarding Gangs	3.83	3.58	3.95	3.95	3.82	4.00	4.40	4.48	3.37	3.84	3.92	4.01
	3.83	3.58	3.95	3.95	3.82	4.00	4.40	4.48	3.37	3.84	3.92	4.01
Community Mobilization Citizen Action Regarding Gangs	2.88	2.31	2.79	2.84	3.03	3.00	3.68	3.72	2.72	2.61	3.08	2.98
	3.23	2.23	2.67	2.81	3.00	2.82	3.52	3.32	2.45	2.42	2.99	2.78
Community Planning Regarding Gangs	2.54	2.38	2.90	2.86	3.06	3.18	3.84	4.12	3.00	2.79	3.16	3.15

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001.

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"
 School of Social Service Administration
 The University of Chicago
 Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa

Table 7.4
Program Performance Indicators: Mean Scores¹

Model Indicators	Respondents		Combined Mean
	Mesa Program-Related Personnel (N = 6)	National Evaluation Staff (N = 2)	
Program Elements			
Team Approach	3.29	3.30	3.30
Steering Committee	3.54	3.41	3.48
Grassroots Involvement	3.09	2.71	2.90
Youth Outreach	3.54	3.21	3.38
Criminal Justice	3.50	3.43	3.47
School Participation	2.83	2.93	2.88
Employment/Training	3.37	3.06	3.22
Lead-Agency Management	3.67	3.33	3.50
Program Strategies			
Community Mobilization	3.38	3.20	3.29
Social Intervention	3.42	3.41	3.42
Opportunities Provision	3.56	3.35	3.46
Suppression/Social Control	3.71	3.27	3.49
Organizational Change and Development	3.50	3.41	3.46
Program Implementation Principles			
Targeting	3.46	2.63	3.05
Balance	3.50	3.25	3.38
Intensity	3.59	3.75	3.67
Continuity	3.50	3.88	3.69
Commitment	3.33	3.51	3.42
Totals	3.43	3.28	3.36

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey
Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to
Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program”
School of Social Service Administration
The University of Chicago
Lorita A. Purnell

¹ Based on a rating scale of: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good.

Table 7.5
 Program Performance Score Distribution
 (All Respondents)

Model Indicators	Ratings					Missing Response	Total ¹ Responses	Combined Mean
	0 no good	1 poor	2 fair	3 good	4 very good			
Program Elements								
Team Approach	0	0	10	42	36	0	88	3.30
Steering Committee	0	1	12	25	50	0	88	3.48
Grassroots Involvement	0	2	25	37	8	0	72	2.90
Youth Outreach	0	6	12	53	49	0	120	3.38
Criminal Justice	0	0	4	55	93	0	152	3.47
School Participation	0	7	36	60	40	1	144	2.88
Employment/Training	0	3	6	16	14	1	40	3.22
Lead-Agency Management	0	0	15	85	107	1	208	3.50
Program Strategies								
Community Mobilization	0	1	13	54	36	0	104	3.29
Social Intervention	1	0	2	49	44	0	96	3.42
Opportunities Provision	0	0	5	41	32	2	80	3.46
Suppression/Social Control	1	1	15	80	63	0	160	3.49
Organizational Change and Development	0	0	8	26	37	1	72	3.46
Program Implementation Principles								
Targeting	0	0	4	16	12	0	32	3.05
Balance	0	0	1	7	8	0	16	3.38
Intensity	0	0	1	10	21	0	32	3.67
Continuity	0	0	1	11	20	0	32	3.69
Commitment	0	0	3	10	19	0	32	3.42

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey
 Evaluation of "The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to
 Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program"
 School of Social Service Administration
 The University of Chicago
 Lorita A. Purnell

¹ Each of the Elements, Strategies and Implementation Principles contain varying numbers of items.

Chapter 8

Research Method: Data Collection, Measurement, and Analysis

The Evaluation attempted to answer several general and interrelated questions: 1) how and to what extent was the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model implemented?; 2) did the Mesa program contribute to a relative reduction in youth gang crime, particularly at the individual-youth level?; and 3) to what extent did the program contribute to a change in (gang) crime at the community level? We addressed the first question in the previous chapters of this report, in terms of the Project's origin and structure, the development of its response to the gang problem, and the extent to which the community organizational response was consistent with the OJJDP Model.

We now move to a discussion of the more specific nature of program services, worker contacts, and outcome for individual youth, particularly in respect to delinquent behavior. Later we examine the possible effects of the program which may have led to a reduction in crime at the community level. Our general hypothesis is that certain patterns of program services and worker contacts contribute to a reduction in delinquency or crime, and/or to a change in key life-course or life-space characteristics of program youth, which more directly contribute to a change (reduction) in their gang involvement and delinquency. Before we proceed with the analysis, we describe in more detail our research design, the instruments employed to gather data, and the resolutions of problems we encountered in data collection. We pay special attention to data-collection and sampling limitations, and then to measurement and analysis procedures used to overcome these limitations. We describe the procedures used to match our program samples.

8.1

At the start of the program, we anticipated and planned for a sample of at least 100 program and 100 comparison youth¹ at each site who would be identified gang members (or youth at high risk of gang involvement), and whom we would be able to interview at least twice. The youth were expected to be mainly between the ages of 12 and 20 years, predominantly male (but with a substantial number of females), mainly African-American and/or Latino, and (to a lesser extent) non-Hispanic white, Asian, and Native American. We expected the samples to reflect the full nature of the gang problem at each of the sites. Gang-problem program and comparison areas, and program and comparison youth were to be selected by Project-site program and local evaluation personnel, based on criteria consistent with the Model. Some of these expectations were met, others were not. A variety of data sources and data-collection procedures were used. Many of the burdens of sampling and data collection and subsequent obstacles to measurement and analysis were not anticipated.

Data Collection

Our main individual-level data-collection instruments were the individual gang-member survey, the worker tracking form for program youth, and official police arrest histories for both program youth (interviewed and not interviewed) and comparison youth (all of whom we interviewed). Somewhat simpler and shorter forms were used to collect data on program exposure, i.e., dates of entry to and exit from the program, and risk period, i.e., the duration of

¹In Mesa, we obtained data (particularly program-process or working-tracking information) for 258 youth. However, only 109 of these received at least a Time I interview. The remaining 149 program youth, for whom we had no interviews but did have program-process and police-history data, were also included in our analyses. We obtained interview and police-history data for 96 comparison youth.

time the youth spent in detention or corrections and was not at risk for crime activity or arrest in the community.

The gang member survey was administered by Mesa research interviewers to each program and comparison youth. The hour-long interview requested information about the youth regarding: demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, age); gang activity; school performance; employment; leisure time and friends; crime and fear in the neighborhood; the youth's neighborhood relationships; gang status; gang structure, size, and activities; family composition and relationships; self-reported delinquency; self-reported arrests; criminal-justice experience; and the nature of his response to program activities and worker contacts. Information on self-esteem and alienation was also gathered. The interviews were administered at yearly intervals, approximately one year apart (Time I and Time II). However, only 109 program youth completed a Time I interview: 75 of these completed a Time II interview, and 149 program youth were not interviewed either at Time I or Time II. Ninety-six (96) comparison youth were interviewed at Time I, and 60 at Time II.

A program-youth tracking form was completed by each worker having contact with youth. Basic socio-demographic information about the youth was collected, as well as: Project worker's perceptions of the youth's gang status; dates of the youth's contacts with the worker; average number and duration of contacts with the youth; reasons for youth being in the program and sources of referral; types of services the worker provided; types of referrals made; the worker's perception of his own helpfulness in providing services to youth; and which other workers were involved in servicing program youth. The worker tracking form was completed on a quarterly basis (every three months) for each individual program youth contacted by the

workers – mainly probation officers and outreach youth workers, but also police, teachers, manpower specialists, and family treatment workers.

The local evaluators or police crime analysts completed an entire police history for each youth. The history included information on all arrests, warrants or suspect cases recorded in the youth's police files: dates and locations of arrests; home address of the youth; gang-involvement characteristics; arrest charges; nature of weapons used; brief description of the arrest incident; disposition of the incident; and whether the youth was placed in custody. In Mesa, police histories included all of the youth's contacts with the police, prior to program entry and updated through the end of the program period, December 31, 2000. Of special importance for later analysis of the program's effort was the matching of the youth's program-period arrest history with an equivalent pre-program arrest history (discussed later in this report).

Data-Collection Problems and Resolutions

A great deal of extra research time and effort was involved in resolving data-collection problems. We describe how these problems were resolved under the following headings: *collaboration, data infrastructure development, accessing and transferring data, and sample comparability.*

Collaboration. The implementation of the research design was influenced by the structure of the Evaluation. As indicated above, those directly involved in the Evaluation included a national evaluation team at the University of Chicago, local evaluators at the five sites, program and evaluation management staff of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S.

Department of Justice, and an advisory board. The technical assistance team was closely integrated into this complex program/research evaluation structure. The National Evaluation was directed by the Principal Investigator at the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago. He and his team were responsible for the design of the Evaluation, including sampling frames and data-collection instruments, and management of the Evaluation, both at and across the local sites. Community crime, census, gang-as-a-unit, program performance indicators, organization-survey and qualitative on-site observational and other data were also collected by the National Evaluation team. Program and comparison youth interviews, individual police arrest histories, and program worker tracking forms were completed by local evaluators and program personnel. All individual-level and aggregate-level data were processed, cleaned, and analyzed by the National Evaluation staff.

The OJJDP Special Emphasis and Research and Development Division's program managers, and other OJJDP administrative staff, played significant roles in the development and implementation of the local programs and the research. OJJDP staff worked to assure the proper implementation of the Model. Most importantly, they assisted and pressured the local evaluators and project directors to complete their evaluation-related assignments in conformity with the research as well as with the Program-Model designs. The OJJDP staff mediated conflicts that arose between National Evaluators, local evaluators and/or local program staff. The National Evaluators also participated in resolving differences between local program staff and local site evaluators, who were not always in close communication and collaboration with each other, particularly in respect to the collection of individual gang-member surveys, worker tracking forms, and youth police histories.

To a large extent, collaboration between program-development and evaluation staffs was structured into the funding of the different program and evaluation functions. Local evaluation funding came out of the local-site's program budgets. The Technical Assistance and National Evaluation staffs were also closely integrated; their functions were carried out by some of the same people, funded from different budgets. Since the Model and ways to implement it were developed at the University of Chicago, the Principal Investigator took primary responsibility for the National Evaluation, and the Co-principal Investigator of the Evaluation, also involved in development of the Model, took primary responsibility for technical assistance. Both worked in close collaboration with each other.

The National Advisory Board comprised three national experts in the areas of gang research and gang-program development. The Advisory Board met annually with the National Evaluation and Technical Assistance teams and their staffs to advise on research design, review evaluation materials, participate in selected cross-site program-leadership meetings, assess evaluation progress, and recommend modification of evaluation strategies.

Data Infrastructure Development. Information and data processing systems had to be developed at the local level to provide the National Evaluators with useful individual-youth, program-process, and police-arrest data. None of the sites had or were able to construct data systems useful for adequately determining individual program-youth characteristics. It was not always clear why certain youth were in the program and others were not, what the relevant gang characteristics of youth were, how the youth's problem was diagnosed, what activities or treatments were appropriate, etc. The nature of the general gang problem in the program area

was not clearly known at the start of the program, or even well into program operations. On what basis youth outreach workers were to make contact with gang youth was unclear. Police were often rotated in and out of the areas. Probation officers were still learning to be community-based.

There was a special problem in regard to gathering gang-incident data from police sources. The definition and procedures for collection of gang-incident data at the individual-youth or community levels were not adequately developed. A definition of a gang incident had been poorly established at the beginning of the Project, referring mainly to youth in a situation involving a drive-by shooting or a gang graffiti incident. The police departments at the different sites had to develop specific mechanisms for identifying a gang or non-gang-related incident; whether a gang incident was based on gang function or interest, or whether it was based simply on the youth's identification as a gang member. In Mesa, a gang incident was to be based on the identification and involvement of a subject, offender or victim as a gang member or gang associate. Definitions of a gang or a gang member were just being formulated. Juvenile or youth gangs had to be distinguished from motorcycle, prison, or adult criminal gangs.

Another problem was that even if police arrest forms had a check-off box to indicate whether the incident was gang- or non-gang-related, the officers often did not check off the box. They may not have known if the youth was a gang member or whether the incident was gang-motivated. Some consistency of definitions, for example, *gang-involved*, *youth-at-risk*, and *youth-at-serious-risk*, had to be established by the National Evaluation team for use across the local sites. Existing police data systems had to be redesigned to accommodate new operational definitions and new data-collection and data-organizing procedures for both local and National

Evaluation purposes.

A further problem at some local sites was clarification of whether youth with police histories were classified as suspects, offenders, or as arrested on a warrant. A suspect might not necessarily be arrested, but a “suspect incident” could be regarded as equivalent to an arrest in some sites. A warrant arrest did not necessarily mean that a new crime or incident had occurred. The problems of interpreting police data, and the potential for over-counting arrests/offenses, were present at several sites. The development of criminal histories for youth known to one or more police jurisdictions sometimes required the integration of police-history data from several sources in the same or overlapping jurisdictions.

The collection of aggregate or community-level police data was even more complex and burdensome for the local crime analysts and National Evaluator. It required the realignment of police beats and districts, using selected program and comparison-area boundaries, for criminal-incident or arrest-counting purposes.

Accessing and Transferring Data

Data Sources. Closely related to the problem of developing new data systems at the local sites (or modifying existing ones), which would be useful both to the local and National Evaluators (and to the local programs), was gaining access to data sources. Criminal-justice data was particularly difficult to access and use for the purpose of compiling criminal-history data. Official data systems varied; offense codes differed at each site. The data was often located in different sections or bureaus of the police departments, i.e., juvenile, adult, and drug-crime sections might have to be accessed separately to obtain a complete youth history. Arrest

dispositions might not be located in police records, but only at a corrections or detention center. Criminal case-record data was sometimes available in computerized form, sometimes only in hard copy (or partially on the computer). The police and sheriffs dealing with the same youth might also not customarily share data. Police crime analysts and court clerks were generally reluctant to provide access to case records to outsiders. Special arrangements had to be made through local police chiefs, chief probation officers, and sometimes presiding judges to accommodate local and National Evaluation data-accessing needs.

Computerized data was sometimes provided in a local-police format and submitted on a diskette, which often contained local data-input and classification errors and omissions, and had to be corrected. Errors in data transfer from local police crime analysts to local evaluators and then to the National Evaluators were numerous. Software systems might be different and incompatible across the police-department, local-evaluator, and National-Evaluation sites.

Interviews. Interviewing gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement presented a series of problems for interviewers. Local interviewers were mainly students, and often females from middle-class backgrounds who had little familiarity with gang youth or gang-problem neighborhoods. Many of the interviewers were fearful of contacting youth in the gang neighborhoods, particularly in the evenings or on weekends. Interview locations that assured privacy, safety, and some comfort for youth were difficult to arrange. It was usually inappropriate to interview youth at local Project offices, where police or probation staff might also be present. This was the case particularly in Mesa, where alternative venues, such as the Boys and Girls Club, were found. Skill and sensitivity were also required to explain the research to the program youth and to obtain consents (from the youth himself, and from a parent if the

youth was a juvenile). Also, considerable effort was required to reestablish contact with a youth in the open community in order to obtain second or third interviews. As time went on, the youth might no longer have contact with the Project or with other established organizations. This especially was a problem with comparison youth. Whereas the reinterview rate at the second interview ranged from 65% to 80% for program youth, it was only 50% to 65% for comparison youth.

Worker-Contact Data. Obtaining program-process data (i.e., standardized worker-service or contact-activity records from the different types of workers within and across sites) proved to be another formidable problem. Project-related agencies had their own systems of recordkeeping, and Project-related workers did not welcome an additional bureaucratic burden. It was difficult for police or probation to understand why the recordkeeping they did for their own agencies was not sufficient for Project purposes. Some of the workers did not believe the National Evaluation program tracking form was adequate to document all that they were doing in the Project. At one site, the probation department insisted that all the necessary data for Evaluation of the Comprehensive Gang Program was already available, either in their hard-copy or computer records. However, this was not the case, since a detailed comparison of data necessary for the National Evaluation and data available at the local-program sites revealed very little match.

Cooperation and Training. Youth agencies did not have a tradition of systematic recordkeeping, although outreach youth workers were somewhat less resistant to completion of worker tracking forms than Project workers from criminal-justice agencies. Police were especially reluctant to complete worker tracking forms. Special pressures from OJJDP had to be

brought to bear to assure police cooperation, and since a substantial amount of Project funding was allocated to the police, after a while the police were persuaded to cooperate. Probation officers and youth workers were more interested in completing worker tracking forms. School personnel generally refused to fill out forms for program youth, generally for reasons of confidentiality, work pressure, avoidance of the problem, or lack of interest.

Local site evaluators and their data collectors usually had to be trained in how to use existing local data sources – whether police, court, or school records – and how to interview gang youth. Inherent in the process of obtaining good data was not only the training of local data collectors, but also developing cooperation among local program-site management staffs and effective monitoring procedures among the data collectors. Training sessions were conducted by National Evaluation staff with the different data collectors at each of the local sites. Refresher training sessions took place when new local data collectors were hired.

Pressures from OJJDP were needed (particularly for agencies receiving Project funds) when required data were not collected or provided in timely fashion. In one case, serious deficiencies in local data collection meant that the National Evaluator had to make special arrangements through OJJDP for a non-local evaluator to collect program-youth interview data. In another case, the local police department denied access to aggregate-level arrest and incident data. Such data (particularly pre-program data) was too much trouble for the particular police department to gather or reconstruct. This situation became the basis in part for termination of funding for that local-site program at the end of the fourth program year.

Sample Comparability. The most serious data-selection and data-collection problem – a

limitation of the research design and its implementation – was establishing comparability of gang-involved and highly gang-at-risk youth in the program and comparison areas. We needed to find comparison youth who were similar to program youth, but from a comparable, gang-problem community not “contaminated” by the program. A research assumption was that gang-involved and gang-at-risk youth could be found in a comparable community or communities, and that local evaluators could identify such communities and had sufficient know-how to obtain interviews from these youth. Police usually provided information on comparable gang-problem areas. However, the task of finding comparison youth depended on knowing, beforehand, characteristics of program youth such as age, race/ethnicity, gender, delinquency background, and gang membership. Generally, this information was not clearly known until program youth were actually in the program and receiving services and worker contacts.

Ideally, the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem, and specific information about the youth-gang population, should have been known for the Project and comparison areas before the program was implemented and the Evaluation developed. This was not the case. The details of program youth gang membership, gang structure, gang process, and the delinquency problems of the program youth were just becoming known by program personnel and the local evaluators as the Projects were beginning. There was even less knowledge of the gang problem and the gang population in the comparison communities. The difficulties of selecting comparable youth to interview in the comparison areas was compounded because there was no easy access to them. While it was not clear how representative program youth were of the general youth-gang population in the program area, at least gang youth in the program area ordinarily would become known over time, and would likely be more reachable than gang youth in the comparison areas.

Police, probation and community-agency personnel in the comparison areas were less likely to be interested in the program evaluation, to have information to assist in adequate gang-youth contact, or to assist the local program evaluators in the interviewing process. Information about potential comparison youth and how to contact them had to be obtained with special assistance from police, local agency personnel, neighborhood informants, or ex-convicts, but the process of contacting and “using” these intermediaries took time, and was not always effective. One enterprising and risk-taking local evaluator had her data collectors simply knock on doors in the comparison area to find prospective gang-member interviewees. She developed a gang-member network approach, and was successful up to a point. Finding and matching comparison with program youth was still a difficult, somewhat unpredictable and not completely manageable process for all the local evaluators.

At the end of a period when a substantial number of initial (Time I) program and comparison youth interviews were completed and analyzed, the National Evaluators found there were some program youth who were not interviewed, but for whom we had extensive program-process or worker-tracking data. This was especially the case in Mesa. Police histories, however, were available for these youth, and we included them in the analysis. The National Evaluators also found that comparison youth were sometimes less delinquent than program youth, and sometimes disproportionately female. The National Evaluators tried to make adjustments through special selection, matching and statistical procedures.

Measurement

We had to overcome problems of: 1) mismatched samples; 2) erratic timing of

interviews; 3) missing worker-tracking data from the early days of the program; 4) different police arrest practices for youth in different jurisdictions or cities; and 5) different time periods for collection and integration of certain types of data.

Mismatched Samples. While youth in the program and comparison samples were usually 12 to 20 years of age, both samples sometimes contained a number of youth who were younger than 12 years and older than 20 years. We included these youth in several of the program analyses, but we had to eliminate them from our comparison-youth analysis when they did not match the ages of program youth. We adjusted for specific youth age differences (to facilitate age comparisons between program and comparison samples) by placing youth in three age categories – 14 years and under, 15-16 or 15-17 years, and 17 or 18 years and over, depending on the age distribution at the sites and on state criminal law as to the cut-off age between juvenile and adult. In general, program and comparison youth at each site were predominantly male, and of the same race/ethnicity (mainly of Mexican origin, and African-American).

Erratic Timing of Interviews. Youth who entered the program were not always administered a Time I interview at baseline (i.e., when they came into the program). Time I interviews took place in a few cases before the program officially began, but mainly at any time within the first three to six months of the youth's entry into the program. The interval between the Time I and Time II interviews of program youth was generally a year to a year-and-a-quarter, but a handful of youth were administered Time II interviews slightly before the first-year interval, or after the year-and-a-quarter interval. We tested (or compared) youth interviewed at somewhat different

Time-I and Time-II periods. In most cases, the difference did not significantly affect outcome.

Comparison youth were interviewed at a later time period than were program youth. The ages of comparison youth had not only to be adjusted to match the ages of program youth at their Time I interviews, but to match the age of program youth when they entered the program. This also had to be done in such a way that criminal-history periods of comparison youth matched those of the program youth.

Missing Worker Tracking Forms. A problem was not simply that certain workers were reluctant to complete worker tracking forms, which described the kinds of services they provided and/or the contacts they made with other workers around program youth. Worker tracking did not usually commence until months after the program had been underway. For the period prior to worker-tracking data collection, we usually had no detailed evidence of services or worker contacts provided to specific youth. However, we did have relatively accurate official Project-entry dates, criminal histories, and youth-confinement records for all program youth, and the youth's own record of services received (from the individual gang-member survey).

Different Police Arrest Patterns Across Areas. We learned belatedly that the arrest procedures and practices of police in the program and comparison areas sometimes differed. The police might arrest youth for certain status offenses and not for others, and be more pro-active in one area or city than another in identifying gang youth and arresting them for a different range of offenses or crimes, minor or major. This could explain why frequency of arrests (and sometimes differences in arrests for certain types of offenses) varied among program and comparison youth.

The youth samples from the program and comparison areas might otherwise be similar, using interview and self-report data on key youth characteristics (e.g., school performance, employment, family structure, household income, personal problems, use of or selling drugs), but might differ in arrest patterns. This was mainly a problem when comparison youth came from a different city.

The best we could do to show an adequate comparison existed between the program and comparison youth samples was to use different sources of data in the separate multivariate analyses, and hope that somewhat similar, or explainable, change patterns would emerge. We could also examine trends and compare similarities and differences at the individual-youth level with those at the gang-as-a-unit and general-community gang-offense levels in the program and comparison areas. A design limitation in the collection of police arrest data was that we did not usually have access to police data for youth who might have been arrested in adjoining cities or jurisdictions. Furthermore, police data might not always reflect further justice-system processing, particularly for status offenses. In Mesa, youth could be on probation (due to referral from family and school) for certain status offenses and not have a police record.

Different Time Periods for Data Collection. Ideally, all of the data at the individual-youth level (gang member survey, worker tracking, police, program exposure, and confinement period) should have been integrated into one comprehensive data set. But this assumed that the time frames for the data collected for each youth would match, i.e., that interviews, services provided, worker contacts, police arrests, and program exposure covered the same periods for each youth. They did not.

Official police data covered the longest periods – 4 to 5 years before and 4 to 5 years during the program period. The police criminal-history period could be adjusted to match the program-exposure and interview periods. The program worker-tracking period averaged about 2½ years; the interval between the Time I and Time II interviews was 1 to 1¼ years. We could not readily make projections of findings based on matching shorter time periods to longer time periods, or vice versa. Our basic time period became police arrest history matched to program-exposure time. The interview time period was usually shorter, and generally only part of the total program and criminal-history period. Time periods for the varieties of data collected were matched to the extent possible. However, weight was given to findings resulting from matching of data over longer rather than shorter time periods. It was still possible to match findings based on police and self-report data. Usually, the outcome findings were in the same direction.

Analysis Strategy

We wanted to maximize the length of time during which the program could reasonably have had some effect – utilizing detailed program-service, self-report and police information together – in order to predict possible youth changes and comprise a basis for determining the Project’s success or failure in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of delinquency and the gang problem, particularly at the individual-youth level.

We were not sure we could integrate key elements of all the data sets satisfactorily to achieve a grand analysis strategy, because of differences in sample sizes and characteristics, different time periods, and the reliability of some of the data. We decided to analyze the data sets in stages, moving from simpler but extensive to more complex and richer analyses using smaller

youth samples. The major steps in our approach were:

1. Compare the effects of the program using official police data and program exposure over the full program period, based on program-entry and exit data. We determined what the effects were on youth during their full program-exposure period, compared to an identical period for matched comparison youth. While the advantage of this approach was the utilization of the longest period of possible program effect for all youth (using systematically collected police arrest data), it did not include detailed data from worker tracking, or most of the interview data on characteristics of program youth. All we could do was control for age, gender, race/ethnicity, for whether the youth said he had been a gang member prior to program entry, and for prior arrests and probation status. We determined the effects of the program on youth using the police outcome variables of *total arrests*, *violence arrests*, *property arrests*, *drug arrests*, and *other arrests* (usually for minor offenses) in a series of multivariate analyses.

2. Next, compare the effects of the program on youth using the official police arrest data and also specific worker-tracking services and contact data over a shorter time period (about the 2½-year period during which detailed worker-service and worker-contact data were collected). These program service/contact variables were indicators of the five Model strategies. A limitation was that we did not have a genuine baseline for when program effects could have started for many of the youth. In other words, we did not observe, but did measure or estimate, the program effects on those youth who had been in the program before worker tracking forms had begun, or at times when worker tracking forms were not completed. However, we did have accurate program-entry and exit data, but not always complete worker-tracking data. We used the same control variables as we did in the analysis described above, and compared arrest

changes of youth during the average 2½-year program period compared to the matched 2½-year pre-program period.

3. As in (1) above, compare the effects of the program using self-report data instead of police arrest data, and the general (but non-detailed) program-exposure effects during the 1 to 1¼-year period between the Time I and Time II interviews. If there were differences in outcome for program and comparison youth, we could determine what the effects of the program were on program youth, compared to matched comparison youth. The advantage of this approach was using the youth's self-reported offense (including specific gang-related) behaviors over the six-month-prior-to-Time-I and six-month-prior-to-Time-II interview periods, 1 to 1¼ years apart. Again, controlling for age, gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership, and prior self-reported offenses, we looked for differences in total offenses, serious violence, total violence, and property and drug-selling offenses over time.

4. Compare the effects of the program on the same youth who were interviewed both at Time I and Time II, using detailed program services and contacts provided by the workers in the interval between the Time I and Time II interviews. We introduced mediating variables derived from the interview findings, such as changes in youth space or life course characteristics (school participation, employment, and gang involvement). The key outcome variables were *differences in self-reported offenses and police arrests between Time I and Time II, and (when possible) between the pre-program and program period* (using arrest data). Similar control and outcome variables (indicated above) using self-report offense or police arrest data were employed. We were interested in the effects of the program-service and worker-contact variables on the outcome variables (primarily for direct program effects), then in the effects of the program

variables on the mediating variables, and finally in the effects of the mediating variables on the outcome variables. Both direct and possibly indirect program effects would be determined.

Matching Program and Comparison Youth (Kwai Ming Wa)

Our analysis strategies depended on establishing equivalency in the program and comparison youth samples, particularly the Time-I-interviewed youth samples. We had to make sure our comparison youth were adequately matched to our program youth on key demographics, especially age and gender, program-entry date and program-exposure time. Special assessment and matching procedures were required.

In Mesa, we established a one-to-one, comparison-to-program-youth matching procedure to avoid biasing program effects. Our purpose was to maximize equivalent arrest periods for youth in the two Time-I-interview samples (program youth = 109 and comparison youth = 96). The youth were matched individually as closely as possible on gender, age, and program-exposure, and an equivalent period for comparison youth. (The program-exposure period was the period between the program youth's dates of entry into, and exit from, the program.) Due to a smaller number of youth in the comparison sample, not all youth were subjected to this matching procedures. Nevertheless, all youth were used in the multivariate analyses.

The steps in the matching procedure were:

Step 1: Select only those interviewed youth with arrest histories: program youth = 98, comparison youth = 72.

Step 2: Match the youth in separate gender categories by age groupings. The age of the youth is computed backward from the standard reference point of January 1, 2001, the date

OJJDP funding ceased for the Mesa Gang Intervention Project. Nine age groupings are established based on this reference point: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 years and older (Table 8.1).

In this process, 26 male program youth are removed from the age groupings to provide a better balance of comparison to program youth in each age grouping. The criteria selected for removal of these 26 program youth (who were added back later) is program participation of less than 1½ years and age distribution. It is important to examine youth with the maximum program-exposure time possible in order better to measure variations in police arrests that may have occurred in respect to similarity of age and gender.

The gender and age groupings for the matched 98 program and comparison youth are presented in Table 8.1.

Step 3: Assign a comparison youth to a particular program youth based on gender and closest age. This means that some program youth are matched with somewhat younger or older comparison youth, and vice versa.

Since there are more females in the comparison than in the program sample, three comparison females, 20 and 21 years of age, have to be assigned to 3 non-matched program males with arrests, 21 years and older, to establish the closest possible age grouping for determining program-equivalent exposure period.

The gender and age groupings for the matched 72 program and 72 comparison youth are established, with 27 program males remaining (Table 8.2).

Step 4: With each comparison youth assigned to one (and only one) program youth, that program youth's program entry and exit dates are also assigned to his matched comparison youth.

The period between program entry and exit also becomes the arrest period, in which number and types of arrests for both program and comparison youth during the program and pre-program periods were determined. These arrest periods are further controlled for days in detention or incarceration, when the youth was not available or at risk for arrest in the community.

Step 5: The 24 remaining male program youth removed earlier – who had arrest records but less than 1½ years of program exposure – are added back to the 11 program youth without arrest histories.

Step 6: Twenty-four (24) comparison youth without arrest histories are matched on the basis of gender and closest age to the 35 program youth in Step 5. More than one comparison youth may have to be matched to the program youth with arrest histories (on the basis of gender and closest age) for the purpose of determining program exposure and program and pre-program arrest periods.

Step 7: A second, non-interviewed program sample (consisting of 149 youth who entered the program later) was matched on the demographics and program-exposure time of the Time-I-interviewed program sample.

Those program and comparison youth without arrest records were excluded from the multivariate analysis, using General Linear Modeling to avoid statistical bias, but were included in the Logistical Regression analysis.

Summary

A variety of procedures were used to overcome data-collection problems in the course of collaboration between program and evaluation personnel: developing appropriate local data

systems; accessing local data sources and transferring data from local to national sites; and establishing comparable program and comparison youth samples. Equivalency was established between the Time-I-interviewed program youth sample and the Time-I interviewed comparison (non-served) youth sample, based on age, gender, program-entry date and program-exposure time, as explained above. A series of multivariate analyses using police arrest and self-reported offense variables, in separate but similar equations, were carried out to determine program effects for both the interviewed and non-interviewed program groups in relation to the comparison sample.

Table 8.1
Age of Program and Comparison Youth
(Reference Date: January 1, 2001)

Sample:	≤15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	≥23	Total
Program Males	4	8	10	16	8	9	9	7	15	86
Comparison Males	2	5	4	10	6	12	4	4	12	59
Program Females	4	2	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	12
Comparison Females	1	3	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	13

Table 8.2
Age of Matched and Unmatched Youth with Arrests
(Reference Date: January 1, 2001)

Sample:	≤15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	≥23	Total
Comparison Males matched to Program males	2	5	4	10	8	9	5	4	12	59
Program Males Remaining	2	3	6	6	0	0	4	3	3	27
Comparison Females matched to Program Females	2	2	2	1	3	2*	1*	0	0	13
Program Females Remaining	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

*The three comparison older females are matched to three program older male youth.

Chapter 9

Characteristics of the Program and Comparison Youth Samples

(Kwai Ming Wa, Rolando V. Sosa)

In this chapter, we present a picture of youth in three samples, based mainly on single-dimensional characteristics of age, gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership, probation status, self-reported offenses, gang location in the program and comparison communities, and arrest patterns. These characteristics are not interrelated and their relationship to program effects are not described in this chapter. The multivariate analyses as to program effects are discussed in the chapters that follow. We look at these characteristics of the youth in the samples at the time of program entry and how they appear similar or dissimilar, but not in any statistically controlled fashion. A picture of changes in arrest patterns of the aggregate youth samples between the pre-program and program periods (without statistical controls) is also presented, to indicate the general nature of crimes for which youth are arrested.

We describe the youth characteristics of: 1) an interviewed program youth sample (n = 109); 2) an interviewed comparison youth sample (n = 96), and; 3) a non-interviewed program youth sample (n = 149)¹. We have criminal history data for all three samples, and interview data for only one of the program samples and for the matched comparison sample. Characteristics of youth from the three samples are drawn from three sources of data: youth interviews, police arrest histories, and worker tracking records. Data for the non-interviewed program sample is

¹ The non-interviewed program sample consisted of youth who entered the program mainly in its last two years.

derived solely from worker tracking records and police arrest histories. The attrition rate for the Time-I-interviewed youth is fairly high at Time II: 31.2% for the program youth and 37.5% for the comparison youth. Since the second program sample was not interviewed, the issue of attrition is not raised for them.

The characteristics of the interviewed program and comparison youth are displayed in two ways. Comparisons are made between the samples of: 1) total program and comparison youth interviewed at Time I; 2) youth interviewed at Time I only; and 3) youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II (the smaller sample, since sizable numbers of youth interviewed at Time I were not interviewed at Time II). The major discrepancy between Time-I-interviewed youth and Time-I/Time-II-interviewed youth is that the former group appears to have contained more serious offenders.

Demographic Characteristics

Gender

Males are predominant in all of the samples. At Time I, in the three samples together 81.6% of all youth are male and 18.4% are female (Table 9.1A). The highest proportion of males is in the interviewed program sample (85.3%), and the lowest proportion of males is in the comparison sample (77.1%). The highest proportion of females is in the comparison sample (22.9%), and the lowest proportion of females is in the interviewed program sample (14.7%). The proportions of males and females in the non-interviewed program sample are between those of the other two samples. At Time II, the proportion of males and females in the interviewed program and comparison samples remains approximately the same as at Time I, with a slightly

greater loss of females than males from both samples (Table 9.1B).

Race/Ethnicity

Latinos predominate in all of the samples at Time I and Time II. In the three samples together, 77.4% of youth are Latino, i.e., mainly of Mexican or Mexican-American origin; 13.3% are non-Latino/white; and 9.3% are of other racial/ethnic backgrounds (African-American, American Indian, and Asian-American) (Table 9.2A).

The largest proportions of youth in the interviewed program sample (86.2%) and non-interviewed program sample (84.3%) are Latino. A smaller majority of youth in the comparison sample are Latino (58.3%). The largest proportion of non-Latino/white youth is in the comparison sample (31.3%). There are relatively few non-Latino/whites in the program samples (interviewed sample = 5.5%; non-interviewed sample = 6.3%). The proportion of youth with other race/ethnic backgrounds ranges from 10.4% in the comparison sample to 8.3% in the interviewed program sample and 9.5% in the non-interviewed program sample (Table 9.2A).

At Time II, the proportion of interviewed program youth from the different race/ethnic groups remains about the same as at Time I. However, in the comparison sample, the proportion of non-Latino/whites drops from 31.3% to 26.7% and the proportion of Latinos and other race/ethnic groups rises slightly (Table 9.2B).

Age

At Time I, youth in the three samples were categorized into three age groups: 14 years and under (32.1%), 15 to 17 years (44.1%), and 18 years and over (23.8%). According to

Arizona law, youth under 18 years are juveniles, and youth 18 years and over are adults. The largest age group across each of the three samples is the 15-to-17-year-olds; the smallest is the 18-years-and-over group. In general, the non-interviewed program sample contains younger youth (i.e., those 14-and-under and 15-17), than either of the two interviewed samples (Table 9.3A).

The largest percent of youth 18 years and over is in the interviewed program sample (30.3%); the smallest percent of youth 18 years and over is in the non-interviewed program sample (18.1%). The largest percent of youth 14 years and under is in the non-interviewed program sample (36.1%); the smallest percent of youth 14 and under is in the comparison sample (26.0%).

At Time II, the distribution of age groups in the samples varies little from Time I (Table 9.3B). The percentage of comparison youth 15-17 years old is higher at Time I, and the percentage of both 14-and-under and 18-and-over youth is slightly smaller. The percentage of program youth 15-17 years old is also higher than at Time I, as is the percentage of 14-and-under youth, but the percentage of 18-and-over youth is much smaller. The largest age group in all three samples remains the 15 to 17 year olds (40.7%).

Gang Membership

It is difficult to compare the proportions of youth who are gang members, gang associates and non-gang-member youth across the three samples. Data for the classification of gang membership status is derived from different sources. At Time I, gang membership status for the interviewed program and comparison youth is based on self-reports, and gang membership status

for the non-interviewed program youth is based on worker-tracking records. Project workers did not know the gang membership status of 23.5% of the non-interviewed youth, who came into the program mainly during the last two years.

We have some question about the reliability of the estimates for non-interviewed program youth in Table 9.4A. Since these youth are somewhat younger, and fewer of them are delinquent (based on police arrest data) than youth in the other two samples, we feel that many of them with unknown gang membership status are probably non-gang youth.

In any case, most of the youth in each sample and across the samples appear to have been gang members (57.6%). The next largest group are gang associates, i.e., those youth only peripherally involved with gangs (18.6%). A high proportion of non-gang youth is present in each of the interviewed samples (program = 19.3%; comparison = 20.8%), as well as in the non-interviewed program sample if we combine unknown and non-gang youth (28.8%).

What is clear is that there are more self-reported gang members in the interviewed program sample (66.1%) at the Time I interview compared to the two other samples. The interviewed program sample also contains a smaller proportion of gang associates (14.7%).

The gang membership status of the interviewed youth at Time II reveals interesting differences from Time I, particularly in the comparison sample. There is a substantial drop in gang members from 53.1% to 45.0%, and an increase in non-gang youth from 20.8% to 26.7% in the comparison sample. The percent of gang associates decreased somewhat for the interviewed program sample at Time II (Table 4B).

Gang Membership and Delinquency

If we consider delinquency rates of youth by their gang membership status based on arrest data in the three samples at Time I/program entry, gang members are more often delinquent and chronic delinquents than gang associates or non-delinquents. More delinquent gang members are in the interviewed program sample (77.5%) than in the comparison sample (58.8%) or the non-interviewed program sample (51.6%). The smallest proportion of non-gang youth (those without arrest records at program entry) is in the interviewed program sample (23.8%), but a surprisingly high proportion of non-gang youth without arrest records is in the comparison sample (80.0%). There is an even slightly higher proportion of non-interviewed program non-gang youth (87.5%) with no arrest records at program entry. In sum, a high proportion of youth in the three samples, whether gang members (41.2%), gang associates (68.0%) or non-gang youth (80.0%) have no delinquency records (Tables 9.5A, 9.5B, 9.5C).

The highest proportions of chronic gang-member delinquents (i.e., medium and high rates) is in the interviewed program sample (46.4%), followed by the non-interviewed program sample (37.0%) and the comparison sample (31.4%). The next-highest chronic delinquency rates are for gang associates in the interviewed program sample (33.7%), although there are only small numbers of gang associates in their sample. Furthermore, the largest proportion of chronic-delinquent non-gang youth is in the interviewed program sample (38.1%) (Tables 9.5A, 9.5B, 9.5C).

The most-delinquent youth – gang members, gang associates, or non-gang youth – are in the interviewed program sample. Delinquency patterns are milder in the comparison and non-interviewed program samples. However, gang members, gang associates, and non-gang youth

are somewhat more delinquent in the comparison sample than the non-interviewed program sample. These two samples appear to be relatively more alike in terms of gang membership and delinquency status compared to the interviewed program sample.

Probably most noteworthy is that there are varying but substantial proportions of gang youth in gang programs and community-based research samples who are not delinquent. While gang members are more delinquent than associate or peripheral gang members, there are significant numbers of gang members in the three samples who have no arrest records, and may not be delinquent. It is, therefore, a major policy, program, and research error to regard all gang members as delinquent, and those gang members who are delinquent as delinquent to the same degree.

Gang Membership by Program/Comparison Areas

It is important to determine not only the effect of the program on individual youth, but also whether the program was more effective with youth affiliated with gangs in the program area than with gangs in the comparison areas. We know that most program youth, particularly interviewed youth, were affiliated with the dominant South Side Mesa gang in the program area, but other program youth were affiliated with the South Side Mesa gang located in the Kino/Carson and Mesa Junior High School comparison areas. The Project workers were particularly active in the program, area both on an individual-program-youth and a community-surveillance and resident-involvement basis. It is possible that program effects occurred interactively at individual-youth and area levels, and could have been particularly cumulative in the program area.

We know from an examination of Time I interview responses that program youth were affiliated with the dominant South Side Mesa gang in the program area (40.4%), and comparison youth were affiliated with the dominant Westside Mesa gang in the Kino/Carson Junior High comparison area and the dominant Doble/Wetback Power gang in the Mesa Junior High comparison area (40.6%).

A question testing the success of the Project at interrelated program-youth and community levels might be: did youth affiliated with the dominant South Side Mesa gang and other gangs in the program area do better than those affiliated with gangs outside of their areas? We attempt to answer this question in a later chapter where we assess changes in gang size and severity of gang problems on an area basis, and the effects of the Project on program youth affiliated with gangs in the program area and program youth affiliated with gangs in the comparison areas (see Chapter 14). Table 9.6 shows interviewed program and comparison-youth affiliation with gangs located in the program or comparison areas and elsewhere. As indicated, the largest proportion of program youth (40.4%) was affiliated with gangs in the program area, but a minority of program youth (15.6%) were affiliated with gangs in the comparison areas. A substantial proportion of youth had no gang affiliation: program youth (19.3%) and comparison youth (20.8%). The data also suggest that program youth could better identify specific gang locations of their gangs than could comparison youth. Relatively more program (26.6%) than comparison (16.6%) youth appeared to be affiliated with gangs outside of their particular areas.

Delinquency, Offense and Arrest Patterns

Introduction

It was important to obtain a clear picture of the nature as well as the scope of the gang delinquency problem among program and comparison youth. It was evident that substantial numbers of youth in the program, including gang members, were not delinquent, and many were not chronic offenders. We needed to know how serious the nature of their offenses were and what the distribution of the various types of offenses, serious and less serious, might be. The relative distribution of offenses or arrests among youth was not clear. The individual gang member survey did not include all offenses, but focused on the more serious violence and property offenses. Police arrest data covered a full array of offenses.

The following discussions are based on a simple analysis of the types of offenses and arrests, and the relative distribution of those offenses and arrests among the three samples during the pre-program and the program periods. No controls or demographic characteristics (such as gender, race/ethnicity, or age groupings) are provided at this time. Our purpose is to provide an overall picture of the kinds of crime and the severity of offenses committed by program and comparison youth, both before and during their time in the program (or equivalent).

The character of these offenses, as indicated by arrests, hardly changed across the three samples, although their scope did change – generally diminishing for the youth in all three samples. Between 2/3 and 3/4 of arrests made during the program or pre-program periods were for property offenses, and other relatively minor offenses such as driving without a license, possession of alcohol, disorderly conduct and curfew violation. Serious violence offenses comprised between 3% and 6% of all arrests, total violence offenses (including felony and

misdemeanor violence) between 10% and 15% , and drug offenses between 6%and 14%.

It is important to remember that, in all the samples, arrests of gang members or non-gang youth generally did not represent serious offenses. The gang problem in Mesa, as represented by youth in the program, was an emerging one, and may not have differed much from non-gang delinquency problems in either Mesa or comparable cities, at least at the time that the Mesa Gang Intervention Project was in operation.

Pre-Program Self-Reported Offense Patterns

Data on offense patterns were derived from responses to self-report items on the individual gang member survey administered to program and comparison youth at Time I and Time II (approximately 1 to 1-¼ years apart). The following discussion and related tables do not include the non-interviewed program youth, for whom we do not have self-report information. At the Time I and Time II interview, each youth was asked to indicate whether he or she had committed any of 26 offenses in the previous six months. Additional survey items asked whether the youth had used or sold drugs (and what kind of drugs), had used alcohol, and whether the youth had access to a handgun.

The self-reported offense patterns were identified for six categories of youth (with no demographic, gang-status, or other controls): all program youth interviewed at Time I; program youth interviewed only at Time I; program youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II; all comparison youth interviewed at Time I; comparison youth interviewed at Time-I-only; and comparison youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II. This discussion focuses on the Time I characteristics of each category of program and comparison youth, and indicates how the

Time-I-only and Time I/Time II groups differed. Generally, the Time-I-only (or the dropout) youth tended to be more serious offenders. In the next section of this chapter we provide police arrest data for all sample youth, whether they were interviewed or not.

Self-reported offenses are categorized as follows: total offenses (and total self-reported arrests), total violence offenses (serious and less serious), total property offenses, drug selling offenses (by type of drug sold and by type of drug used) and alcohol-use offenses. Self-reported offenses are listed in Appendix B. Youth access to a handgun is also identified. The self-reported offenses and their classifications into categories are as similar as possible to those of official police arrest charges described in the next section. The self-reported offense categories differ from the police arrest categories in that they focus on the often-more-serious offenses typically committed by gang youth; the police arrest data also cover a larger inventory of major and minor, gang and non-gang-related offenses, as well as status offenses.

Total Offenses

Not all interviewed youth reported having committed offenses in the six-month period prior to the first interview. More program youth (74.3%) than comparison youth (53.1%) indicated they had committed prior offenses. A higher proportion of youth interviewed at Time I only had committed prior offenses than had youth who were interviewed at both Time I and Time II. Both program and comparison youth interviewed at Time I and Time II had fewer pre-program offenses (based on mean and median estimates) than had those interviewed at Time I only. Youth who were interviewed at Time I only tended more often to be chronic offenders (Table 9.7).

Total Arrests

Less than half of the youth in each of the samples self-reported arrests. The median number of arrests per youth is small and does not vary much across the samples. Youth had been arrested on average about twice during the six-month period prior to the Time I interview, but the mean number of arrests seemed to vary, with more comparison youth reporting arrests than program youth. The self-reported arrest patterns of the program and comparison samples are at some variance with their respective self-reported offending patterns, described above. Youth were engaged in many more offenses than they were arrested for (Table 9.7 and 9.8).

Total Violence Offenses

About half of all program youth (51.4%) and somewhat less than half of comparison youth (42.7%) reported they had committed a violent act in the six months prior to the Time I interview. In general, more youth in the program sample said they had committed more violence offenses than comparison youth. The exception was that more comparison Time-I-only interviewed youth self reported more violence offenses than did program Time-I-only interviewed youth. Nevertheless, program youth appeared to have committed more violence offenses than comparison youth across each of the samples, based on a mean measure of offenses (Table 9.9).

Total Property Offenses

A somewhat higher percentage of program (68.8%) than comparison (47.9%) youth reported they committed property offenses rather than violence offenses. Program youth

committed a higher mean level, but not always a higher median level, of property offenses than comparison youth. Of interest again is that program and comparison youth interviewed at Time I only had the highest median levels of self-reported property offenses. In general, all youth committed a higher frequency of property offenses than violence offenses (Table 9.10).

Drug Selling

Relatively more program (25.7%) than comparison youth (18.8%) reported selling drugs in the period six months prior to the Time I interview. Drug-selling per month was more frequent for program youth than for comparison youth across the various samples, using a median measure. Again, more youth interviewed at Time I only were involved in drug selling (Table 9.11A).

Youth in the various samples were engaged in selling a wide range of drugs. More program (22.9%) than comparison (18.8%) youth were involved in selling marijuana than other types of drugs. More program (15.6%) than comparison (6.3%) youth were selling cocaine; and more program (13.8%) than comparison (8.3%) youth were selling methamphetamines. Fewer youth were involved in selling other drugs, such as crack, heroin, PCP, and LSD. Higher percentages of youth interviewed at Time I only, particularly program youth, were selling drugs, especially marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamines, although the numbers of youth selling drugs was very small (Table 9.11B).

Drug Use

There was less distinction overall between program and comparison samples in both the

number of youth using drugs and the frequency of drug use. About half or more of all youth in each sample reported using drugs. The mean or median frequency of drug use was consistently higher among comparison youth than program youth, with the greatest proportion and highest usage reported among the comparison youth interviewed at Time I only (Table 9.12A).

Marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamines were the drugs of choice for program and comparison youth. Relatively more comparison (57.3%) than program (50.5%) youth used marijuana; but more program youth used cocaine (29.4%) and methamphetamines (20.2%) than did comparison youth (14.6% and 11.5% respectively). Relatively more program and comparison youth interviewed at Time I only used these drugs than did youth from the samples of both program and comparison youth interviewed at Time I and Time II. The highest proportion of youth using marijuana was in the comparison (77.8%) and program (63.9%) samples interviewed at Time I only (Table 9.12B).

Alcohol Use

Relatively more program (69.7%) and comparison (72.9%) youth said they consumed alcohol compared to those youth who said they used drugs. Generally, program and comparison youth interviewed at Time I only reported they consumed about as much alcohol as they used drugs. However, comparison youth seemed more generally involved in the consumption of alcohol than were program youth (Table 9.13).

Access to a Handgun

More program youth (60.6%) had access to handguns than did comparison youth (46.9%).

This pattern was similar across the youth samples. Again, more of the youth interviewed at Time I only had access to handguns than did youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II (Table 9.14).

Summary

Relatively more program than comparison youth were engaged in a wide range of self-reported delinquent activities, typical of gang youth. Also, the more delinquent youth, program and comparison, seemed to be those interviewed at Time I only. The difference in self-reported delinquency patterns between youth interviewed at Time I only and youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II was greater in the comparison than in the program youth samples.

Arrest Patterns

In this section, we focus on patterns of arrests of all youth in the three samples: all program youth interviewed at Time I (n = 109), all comparison youth interviewed at Time I (n = 96), and all non-interviewed program youth (n = 149). Dates of entry into and exit from the program (and an equivalent period for comparison youth) were used to determine arrest risk periods for the youth. Mesa Police Department and probation records were searched for arrest and confinement records for all three samples. The only youth excluded from the analyses were those program youth (mainly non-interviewed) who received less than one month of service. We tried to be as inclusive as possible of youth for our analyses.

Arrest patterns are based on a comparison of program and pre-program periods. For program youth, program periods covered the time of the youth's entry into the program until his

exit from the program, or until the Project terminated (December 31, 2000). The pre-program arrest period and the program-service period are equivalent in length for each youth. Equivalent pre-program and program-service periods for comparison youth were calculated with reference to the Time-I-interviewed program youth, as explained in Chapter 8. Data in this section are derived mainly from Mesa Police Department records, and also from worker-tracking records.

Pre-Program-Period Arrest Histories

More program youth (76.1%) than comparison youth (43.8%) had pre-program arrest records (Table 9.15). Fewer non-interviewed program youth (32.2%) had pre-program arrest records, but this was partially due to the fact that this sample contained many youth who had been in the program for a short period of time and therefore had a short pre-program risk period. The non-interviewed program youth sample also contained a larger proportion of younger youth than the other two samples (Table 9.3A). If the full prior (to pre-program) arrest period for 18 non-interviewed youth who were in the program for a short period of time are included, the percentage of youth with pre-program arrests would jump to 45.0%, similar to the proportion of comparison youth with pre-program arrests.

Youth on Probation

Since the majority of program youth (whether interviewed or not interviewed) were referred through court services, especially probation, we were able to ascertain the probation status of youth in both of the program samples. The sources of information on probation status were the worker tracking form (for program youth) and the individual gang member survey (for

program and comparison youth). The period of time covered in probation-status records could include both the pre-program and program arrest periods.

Table 9.16 shows that a considerable proportion of both interviewed and non-interviewed program youth were on probation at some point during the program and pre-program periods (and even prior to program-entry), but that comparison youth were probably less likely to have had probation experiences, even though the comparison youth may have been somewhat similar to program youth (particularly to non-interviewed youth) in their pre-program arrest histories. We will control for prior arrests and program-exposure periods in our later multivariate analyses.

Pre-Program Arrest Patterns

The majority of arrest charges among youth in all three samples in the pre-program period was for property offenses and other relatively minor offenses, including driving without a license (motor vehicle act), curfew violations and status offenses. There were relatively fewer youth arrested for (and a lower frequency of arrests made for) serious and less-serious violence offenses and drug offenses. There were few variations in these patterns across the three samples. The Time-I-interviewed program youth seemed to be slightly more involved in various types of minor offenses, although relatively more comparison youth had motor vehicle charges. Relatively more non-interviewed program youth were arrested on drug charges than were youth from the other two samples (Tables 9.17A-D and 9.18A-D).

Changes in Arrest Patterns

There were minor pattern changes in arrests across the three samples between the pre-

program and program periods. At the aggregate level – uncontrolled for demographic, gang-status, or prior-arrest categories and other factors – the Time-I-interviewed program sample was associated with a reduced number of youth arrested: from 83 to 68, a reduction of 18.1%. The number of arrests for these youth fell from 253 in the pre-program period to 193 in the program period, a reduction of 23.7%. The non-interviewed program sample was associated with a reduced number of youth arrested: from 49 to 47, a reduction of 4.1%. The number of arrests for these youth fell from 104 to 84, a reduction of 19.2%. The comparison youth sample was associated with an increase in the number of youth arrested: from 42 to 51, an increase of 21.4%. Their number of arrests increased from 137 to 166 – 21.2%. There was also evidence of a relatively greater decrease in more serious offenses for the two program samples than for the comparison sample (Tables 9.17A-D and 9.18A-D).

These differences in arrest patterns among the three samples are systematically tested for program effects under controlled statistical conditions in later multivariate analyses. What is noteworthy is that the youth in the three samples were more often arrested for less-serious than more-serious offenses, and that more-serious-offense arrests appear to decline, while less-serious-offense arrests increased during the program period. We briefly compare changes in self-reported offense patterns and arrest patterns for the interviewed program and comparison youth samples in Chapter 13.

Table 9.1A
Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I[◇] (or Program Entry[⊠])
Gender

Samples	Male		Female		Total	
	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	N
Interviewed Comparison Youth [◇]	77.08	74	22.92	22	27.12	96
Interviewed Program Youth [◇]	85.32	93	14.68	16	30.79	109
Non-Interviewed Program Youth [⊠]	81.88	122	18.12	27	42.09	149
Total	81.64	289	18.36	65	100.0	354

Table 9.1B
Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II¹
Gender

Samples	Male		Female		Total	
	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	N
Comparison Youth	78.83	47	21.67	13	44.44	60
Program Youth	86.67	65	13.33	10	55.56	75
Total	82.96	112	16.54	23	100.0	135

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys; Worker Tracking Forms

¹ Characteristics of youth interviewed at Time I and Time II.

Table 9.2A
Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I[◇] (or Program Entry[△])
Race/Ethnicity

Samples	White		Latino		Other ¹		Total	
	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	N
Interviewed Comparison Youth [◇]	31.25	30	58.33	56	10.42	10	28.92	96
Interviewed Program Youth [◇]	5.50	6	86.24	94	8.26	9	32.83	109
Non-Interviewed Program Youth [△]	6.30	8	84.25	107	9.45	12	38.25	127 ²
Total	13.25	44	77.41	257	9.34	31	100.0	332

Table 9.2B
Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II³
Race/Ethnicity

Samples	White		Latino		Other		Total	
	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	N
Comparison Youth	26.67	16	61.67	37	11.67	7	44.44	60
Program Youth	5.33	4	85.33	64	9.34	7	55.56	75
Total	14.81	20	74.81	101	10.38	14	100.0	135

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys; and Worker Tracking Forms

¹ Mainly African-American, American Indian and some Asian-American youth.

² Frequency missing = 22 (from the non-interviewed program sample).

³ Characteristics of youth interviewed both at Time I and Time II.

Table 9.3A
Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I[◊] (or at Program Entry[⊕])
Age

Samples	14 and Under		15 to 17		18 and Over		Total	
	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	N
Interviewed Comparison Youth [◊]	26.04	25	48.96	47	25.00	24	27.51	96
Interviewed Program Youth [◊]	32.11	35	37.61	41	30.28	33	31.23	109
Non-Interviewed Program Youth [⊕]	36.11	52	45.83	66	18.06	26	41.26	144 ¹
Total	32.09	112	44.13	154	23.78	83	100.0	349

Table 9.3B
Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II²
Age

Samples	14 and Under		15 to 17		18 and Over		Total	
	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	n	Percent	N
Comparison Youth	26.67	16	46.67	28	26.67	16	44.44	60
Program Youth	33.33	25	36.00	27	30.67	23	55.56	75
Total	30.37	41	40.74	55	28.89	39	100.0	135

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys; Worker Tracking Forms

¹ Frequency missing = 5 (from non-interviewed program sample).

² Characteristics of youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II.

Table 9.4A
Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I¹ (or Program Entry²)
Gang Membership

Samples	Unknown		Non-Gang		Gang		Gang Associate		Total	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	N
Interviewed Comparison Youth ¹	0.00	0	20.83	20	53.13	51	26.04	25	27.12	96
Interviewed Program Youth ¹	0.00	0	19.27	21	66.06	72	14.68	16	30.79	109
Non-Interviewed Program Youth ²	23.49	35	5.37	8	54.36	81	16.78	25	42.09	149
Total	9.89	35	13.84	49	57.63	204	18.64	66	100.0	354

Table 9.4B
Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II¹
Gang Membership

Samples	Non-Gang		Gang		Gang Associate		Total	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	N
Comparison Youth	26.67	16	45.00	27	28.33	17	44.44	60
Program Youth	21.33	16	68.00	51	10.67	8	55.56	75
Total	23.70	32	57.78	78	18.52	25	100.0	135

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys: Worker Tracking Forms

¹ Characteristics of youth interviewed both at Time I and Time II.

Table 9.5A
Interviewed Program Youth Gang/Delinquency Status: Pre-Program Period

Gang Status	Delinquency Rank ¹								Total	
	None		Low		Medium		High			
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	N
Gang Member	22.53	16	3.94	23	25.00	18	21.43	15	66.05	72
Gang Associate	31.25	5	25.00	4	18.75	3	25.0	4	14.68	16
Non-Gang Youth	23.81	5	38.10	8	23.81	5	14.28	3	19.27	21
Total	23.85	26	32.11	35	23.85	26	20.18	22	100.0	109

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

¹ Based on Mesa Police Department pre-program-period total arrest history, annualized: none = no arrest; low = 0.01 to 0.98; medium = 1.0 to 1.99; high ≥ 2.00

Table 9.5B
Non-Interviewed Program Youth Gang/Delinquency Status: Pre-Program Period

Gang Status	Delinquency Rank ¹								Total	
	None		Low		Medium		High			
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	N
Gang Member	49.38	40	13.58	11	13.58	11	23.46	19	54.36	81
Gang Associate	88.00	22	4.00	1	4.00	1	4.00	1	16.78	25
Non-Gang Youth	87.50	7	0	0	12.50	1	0	0	5.37	8
Unknown	91.43	32	8.57	3	0	0	0	0	23.49	35
Total	67.79	101	10.07	15	8.72	13	13.42	20	100.0	149

Source: Worker Tracking Records

¹ Based on Mesa Police Department pre-program-period total arrest history, annualized: none = no arrest; low = 0.01 to 0.98; medium = 1.0 to 1.99; high ≥ 2.00

Table 9.5C
Comparison Youth Gang/Delinquency Status: Pre-Program Period

Gang Status	Delinquency Rank ¹								Total	
	None		Low		Medium		High			
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	N
Gang Member	41.2	21	27.5	14	19.6	10	11.8	6	53.13	51
Gang Associate	68.0	17	20.0	5	8.0	2	4.0	1	26.04	25
Non-Gang Youth	80.0	16	20.0	4	0	0	0	0	20.83	20
Total	56.25	54	23.96	23	12.50	12	7.29	7	100.0	96

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

¹ Delinquency rank is based on Mesa Police Department pre-program arrest history annualized period:
 none = no arrest; low = 0.01 to 0.98; medium = 1.0 to 1.99; high ≥ 2.00

**Table 9.6
Gang Membership by Location**

Sample	No Gang Affiliation		Gang Location								Total	
			Program (Powell Junior High)		Comparison (Kino/Carson, Mesa Jr. High)		Outside Mesa		Gang (don't know) without Specific Locations			
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	N
Program Youth	21	19.27	40.37	44	15.60	17	11.01	12	13.76	15	53.19	109
Comparison Youth	20	20.83	7.29	7	40.63	39	8.33	8	22.92	22	48.63	96
Total	41	20.00	24.88	51	27.32	56	9.76	20	18.05	37	100.00	205

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

Table 9.7
Self-Reported Total Offenses¹ at Time I

Samples	N	Youth Reporting Offenses		Number of Offenses Reported	
		Percent	n	Mean	Median
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	74.3%	81	49.3	13.0
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	53.1%	51	41.4	12.0
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	66.7%	54	38.0	10.5
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	51.0%	26	26.7	9.5
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	33.3%	27	71.9	22.0
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	49.1%	25	56.6	19.0

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

¹ See Appendix B for complete list of self-reported offenses.

Table 9.8
Self-Reported Total Arrests¹ at Time I

Samples	N	Youth Reporting Arrests		Number of Arrests Reported	
		Percent	n	Mean	Median
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	35.8	39	2.3	2
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	17.7	17	6.9	2
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	34.2	25	2.7	2
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	11.7	7	5.9	2
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	38.9	14	1.6	1
Comparison Youth Interviewed Only	36	27.8	10	7.7	2

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

¹ See Appendix A for a complete list of self-reported arrest charges.

Table 9.9
Self-Reported Total Violence Offenses¹ at Time I

Samples	N	Youth Reporting Violence Offenses		Number of Violence Offenses	
		Percent	n	Mean	Median
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	51.4%	56	18.5	6.0
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	42.7%	41	23.4	4.0
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	67.9%	38	15.3	5.0
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	48.8%	20	9.3	3.5
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	32.7%	18	23.7	11.0
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	51.2%	21	36.9	7.0

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

¹ Includes serious and less serious offenses: threatened to attack a person *with* or *without* using a gun, knife, or other dangerous weapon; robbed someone by force or by threat of force *with* or *without* using a weapon; beaten up or battered someone *with* or *without* using a gun, knife, or other dangerous weapon; rape; driveby shooting; homicide (see Appendix B for a complete list of self-reported offenses).

Table 9.10
Self-Reported Total Property Offenses¹ at Time I

Samples	N	Youth Reporting Property Offenses		Numbers of Property Offenses	
		Percent	n	Mean	Median
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	68.8	75	38.3	11.0
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	47.9	46	22.6	12.0
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	65.8	48	29.4	8.5
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	38.3	23	18.3	5.0
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I-only	36	75.0	27	54.1	12.0
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I-only	36	63.9	23	26.8	14.0

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

¹ Includes: writing gang (or non-gang) graffiti on school property, neighborhood houses, stores, etc.; throwing rocks or bottles at persons, vehicles, or property; destroying property worth both less and more than \$300; arson; theft of a bicycle or bike parts; theft of parts or property from a vehicle (hubcaps, stereo, etc.); theft of a motor vehicle; fencing or possessing stolen goods (other than weapons); shoplifting; breaking and entering a house, store, or building, to commit a theft; fencing or theft of weapons or firearms. (See Appendix B for complete list of self-reported offenses.)

Table 9.11A
Self-Reported Drug Selling at Time I

Samples	N	Youth Reporting Drug Selling		Number of Times Per Month ¹	
		Percent	n	Mean	Median
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	25.7	28	25.1	22
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	18.8	18	25.9	8.5
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	21.9	16	21.6	14.0
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	15.0	9	26.0	8
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	33.3	12	32.0	27.5
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	25.0	9	25.6	10.0

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

¹ The mean and median figures are computed based on the number of times per month the youth sold drugs.

Table 9.11B
Self-Reported Drug Selling at Time I – continued

Samples	N	Type of Drugs Sold n and (%)							
		Marijuana n (%)	Cocaine n (%)	Crack n (%)	Heroin n (%)	Methamphetamine n (%)	PCP n (%)	LSD n (%)	Other n (%)
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	25 (22.9)	17 (15.6)	6 (5.5)	1 (0.9)	15 (13.8)	3 (2.8)	8 (7.3)	0 (0)
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	18 (18.8)	6 (6.3)	7 (7.3)	2 (2.1)	8 (8.3)	0 (0.9)	5 (5.2)	1 (1.0)
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	15 (20.5)	11 (15.1)	2 (2.7)	0 (0)	9 (12.0)	3 (4.0)	6 (8.2)	0 (0)
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	9 (15.0)	4 (6.7)	5 (8.3)	2 (3.3)	5 (8.3)	0 (0)	2 (5.9)	0 (0)
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	10 (27.8)	6 (16.7)	4 (11.1)	1 (2.8)	6 (16.7)	0 (0)	2 (5.6)	0 (0)
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	10 (27.8)	2 (5.6)	2 (5.6)	0 (0)	3 (8.3)	0 (0)	2 (5.6)	1 (2.8)

Table 9.12A
Self-Reported Drug Use at Time I

Samples	N	Youth Reporting Drug Use		Number of Times Per Month ¹	
		Percent	n	Mean	Median
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	54.1	59	17.4	11.0
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	57.3	55	21.5	16.0
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	46.6	34	14.6	9.5
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	45.0	27	18.3	11.0
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	69.4	25	21.1	12.0
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	77.8	28	24.7	16.5

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

¹ The mean and median figures are computed based on the number of times per month the youth used drugs.

Table 9.12B
Self-Reported Drug Use at Time I – continued

Samples	N	Type of Drugs Used n and (%)									
		Marijuana n (%)	Cocaine n (%)	Crack n (%)	Heroin n (%)	Meth- amphetamine n (%)	PCP n (%)	LSD n (%)	Glue n (%)	Gas n (%)	Other n (%)
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	55 (50.5)	32 (29.4)	4 (3.7)	1 (0.92)	22 (20.2)	8 (7.3)	24 (11.7)	3 (2.8)	0 (0)	3 (2.8)
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	55 (57.3)	14 (14.6)	7 (7.3)	2 (2.1)	11 (11.5)	2 (2.1)	14 (14.6)	5 (5.2)	1 (1.0)	3 (3.1)
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	32 (43.8)	18 (24.7)	2 (2.7)	0 (0)	12 (16.4)	6 (8.2)	15 (20.5)	1 (1.4)	0 (0)	2 (2.7)
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	27 (45.0)	8 (13.3)	3 (5.0)	2 (3.3)	5 (8.3)	1 (1.7)	5 (8.3)	3 (5.0)	1 (1.7)	1 (1.7)
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	23 (63.9)	14 (38.9)	2 (5.6)	1 (2.8)	10 (27.8)	2 (5.6)	9 (25.0)	2 (5.6)	0 (0)	1 (2.8)
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	28 (77.8)	6 (16.7)	4 (11.1)	0 (0)	6 (16.7)	1 (2.8)	9 (25.0)	2 (5.6)	0 (0)	2 (5.62)

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

Table 9.13
Self-Reported Alcohol Use at Time I

Samples	N	Youth Reporting Using Alcohol		Number of Times Per Month ¹	
		Percent	n	Mean	Median
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	69.7	76	9.4	4.5
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	72.9	70	12.2	7.0
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	67.1	49	7.2	4.0
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	66.7	40	9.8	6.0
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	72.2	26	13.4	8.0
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	75.0	27	15.5	10.0

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

¹ The mean and median figures are computed based on the number of times per month the youth consumed alcohol.

Table 9.14
Access to a Handgun at Time I

Samples	N	Percent	n
Total Program Sample at Time I	109	60.6	66
Total Comparison Sample at Time I	96	46.9	45
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	73	58.9	43
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I and Time II	60	38.3	23
Program Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	63.9	23
Comparison Youth Interviewed at Time I Only	36	63.9	23

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys

Table 9.15
Arrest Histories: Pre-Program Period¹

Sample	N	Youth with Arrests ²	
		Percent	n
Time-I-Interviewed Program Youth	109	76.1	83
Non-Interviewed Program Youth	149	32.2	48
Comparison Youth	96	43.8	42

Source: Mesa Police Department Arrest Data

¹ The pre-program period is matched in length to the period of program service (or equivalent, for comparison youth).

² Of the youth with zero arrests or no arrest history in the pre-program period, 4 Time-I-interviewed program youth, 18 non-interviewed program youth, and 0 comparison youth nevertheless had arrests prior to the pre-program period.

**Table 9.16
Youth on Probation**

Sample	N	Source			
		Individual Gang Member Surveys ¹		Worker Tracking Forms ²	
		Percent	n	Percent	n
Time-I-Interviewed Program Youth	109	80.77	88	91.7	100
Non-Interviewed Program Youth	149	–	–	63.8	95
Comparison Youth	96	30.2	29	–	–

¹ The individual gang member survey asked the youth if he was “ever” on probation.

² Worker tracking records indicate whether Project workers reported that the youth was on probation at the time of program entry, or during the program period.

Table 9.17A
Type of Arrest Charge: All Program Youth
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Type of Arrest Charge ¹	Period		Totals % and (N)
	Pre-Program % and (n)	Program % and (n)	
Serious Violence	3.6 (13)	4.7 (13)	4.1 (26)
Violence	14.6 (52)	13.7 (38)	14.2 (90)
Drugs	8.7 (31)	7.6 (21)	8.2 (52)
Property	29.7 (106)	20.9 (58)	25.9 (164)
Other	43.4 (155)	53.0 (147)	47.6 (302)
Total Arrest Charges	100.0 (357)	99.9 (277)	100.0 (634)
Number of Youth Arrested ²	131	115	159

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

¹ There were five types of charges for which youth were typically arrested. If an arrest involved more than one charge, the most serious charge for that particular arrest is used. The five types of charges are categorized as: **serious violence**, comprising aggravated assault, sexual assault/abuse and armed robbery; **violence**, including robbery, attempted robbery, assault, domestic assault, arson, domestic battery, sex crime, child abuse, street fighting, intimidation, telephone harassment and violation of a protection order; **drugs**, including possession of a controlled substance, possession of cannabis/marijuana, and possession of a non-narcotic controlled substance; **property**, including theft, attempted theft, shoplifting, burglary, trespass, possession/receipt/sale of stolen motor vehicle, criminal damage to motor vehicle, possession of stolen property, graffiti, and receipt of stolen property; **other**, including motor vehicle act, curfew violation, minor drinking, intoxication of a minor, possession of alcohol/minor driving under influence of alcohol/drugs, status offense, unlawful use of weapons, unlawful possession of weapons, unlawful possession of firearms, contributing to delinquency of minor, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, reckless conduct, loitering, gang loitering, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide, disorderly conduct, and “other” (see Appendix A for a complete list of individual police arrest charges).

² The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods.

Table 9.17B
Type of Arrest Charge: Time-I Interviewed Program Youth
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Type of Arrest Charge ¹	Period		Totals % and (N)
	Pre-Program % and (n)	Program % and (n)	
Serious Violence	2.4 (6)	4.1 (8)	3.1 (14)
Violence	14.6 (37)	15.5 (30)	15.0 (67)
Drugs	6.7 (17)	5.2 (10)	6.1 (27)
Property	30.0 (76)	20.7 (40)	26.0 (116)
Other	46.2 (117)	54.4 (105)	49.8 (222)
Total Arrest Charges	99.9 (253)	99.9 (193)	100.0 (446)
Number of Youth Arrested ²	83	68	91

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

¹ See Footnote 1, Table 917A.

² The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods.

Table 9.17C
Type of Arrest Charge: Non-Interviewed Program Youth
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Type of Arrest Charge ¹	Period		Totals % and (N)
	Pre-Program % and (n)	Program % and (n)	
Serious Violence	6.7 (7)	6.0 (5)	6.4 (12)
Violence	14.4 (15)	9.5 (8)	12.2 (23)
Drugs	13.5 (14)	13.1 (11)	13.3 (25)
Property	28.8 (14)	21.4 (18)	25.5 (48)
Other	36.5 (38)	50.0 (42)	42.6 (80)
Total Arrest Charges	99.9 (104)	100.0 (84)	100.0 (188)
Number of Youth Arrested ²	49	47	68

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

¹ See Footnote 1, Table 9.17A.

² The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods.

Table 9.17D
Type of Arrest Charge: Comparison Youth
By Pre-Program and Program Period

Type of Arrest Charge ¹	Period		Totals % and (N)
	Pre-Program % and (n)	Program % and (n)	
Serious Violence	3.6 (5)	3.0 (5)	3.3 (10)
Violence	15.3 (21)	7.8 (13)	11.2 (34)
Drugs	7.3 (10)	13.9 (23)	10.9 (33)
Property	33.6 (46)	20.5 (34)	26.4 (80)
Other	40.1 (55)	54.8 (91)	48.2 (146)
Total Arrest Charges	99.9 (137)	100.0 (166)	100.0 (303)
Number of Youth Arrested ²	42	51	66

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

¹ See Footnote 1, Table 9.17A.

² The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods.

Table 9.18A
Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: All Program Youth
By Pre-Program and Program Period

“Other” Arrest Charge	Period		Totals % and (N)
	Pre-Program % and (n)	Program % and (n)	
Motor Vehicle Act	23.2 (36)	29.9 (44)	26.5 (80)
Curfew Violation and Status Offense	25.2 (39)	19.0 (28)	22.2 (67)
Alcohol ¹	18.7 (29)	22.4 (33)	20.5 (62)
Public Disturbance ²	15.5 (24)	15.6 (23)	15.6 (47)
Other ³	11.6 (18)	5.4 (8)	8.6 (26)
Weapon ⁴	5.8 (9)	7.5 (11)	6.6 (20)
Total “Other” Arrest Charges	100.0 (155)	99.8 (147)	100.0 (302)
Number of Youth Arrested ⁵	83	74	113

¹ Minor drinking or intoxication of minor, driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs and possession of alcohol/minor.

² Disorderly conduct, loitering/gang loitering and resisting/obstructing a peace officer.

³ Contributing to delinquency of minor, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide and other miscellaneous offenses.

⁴ Unlawful possession of weapons or firearms and unlawful use of weapons.

⁵ The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods.

Table 9.18B
Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: Time-I-Interviewed Program Youth
By Pre-Program and Program Period

“Other” Arrest Charge	Period		Totals % and (N)
	Pre-Program % and (n)	Program % and (n)	
Motor Vehicle Act	22.2 (26)	34.3 (36)	27.9 (62)
Curfew Violation and Status Offense	24.8 (29)	19.0 (20)	22.1 (49)
Alcohol ¹	18.8 (22)	20.0 (21)	19.4 (43)
Public Disturbance ²	17.9 (21)	16.2 (17)	17.1 (38)
Other ³	9.4 (11)	3.8 (4)	6.8 (15)
Weapon ⁴	6.8 (8)	6.7 (7)	6.8 (15)
Total “Other” Arrest Charges	99.9 (117)	100.0 (105)	100.1 (222)
Number of Youth Arrested ⁵	45	55	68

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

¹ Minor drinking or intoxication of minor, driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs and possession of alcohol/minor.

² Disorderly conduct, loitering/gang loitering and resisting/obstructing a peace officer.

³ Contributing to delinquency of minor, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide and other miscellaneous offenses.

⁴ Unlawful possession of weapons or firearms and unlawful use of weapons.

⁵ The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods.

Table 9.18C
Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: Non-Interviewed Program Youth
By Pre-Program and Program Period

“Other” Arrest Charge	Period		Totals % and (N)
	Pre-Program % and (n)	Program % and (n)	
Motor Vehicle Act	26.3 (10)	19.0 (8)	22.5 (18)
Curfew Violation and Status Offense	26.3 (10)	19.0 (8)	22.5 (18)
Alcohol ¹	18.4 (7)	28.6 (12)	23.8 (19)
Public Disturbance ²	7.9 (3)	14.3 (6)	11.3 (9)
Other ³	18.4 (7)	9.5 (4)	13.8 (11)
Weapon ⁴	2.6 (1)	9.5 (4)	6.3 (5)
Total “Other” Arrest Charges	99.9 (38)	99.9 (42)	100.2 (80)
Number of Youth Arrested ⁵	28	29	45

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors.

¹ Minor drinking or intoxication of minor, driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs and possession of alcohol/minor.

² Disorderly conduct, loitering/gang loitering and resisting/obstructing a peace officer.

³ Contributing to delinquency of minor, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide and other miscellaneous offenses.

⁴ Unlawful possession of weapons or firearms and unlawful use of weapons.

⁵ The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods.

Table 9.18D
Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: Comparison Youth
By Pre-Program and Program Period

“Other” Arrest Charge	Period		Totals % and (N)
	Pre-Program % and (n)	Program % and (n)	
Motor Vehicle Act	51.0 (28)	36.3 (33)	41.8 (61)
Curfew Violation and Status Offense	16.4 (9)	17.6 (16)	17.1 (25)
Alcohol ¹	16.4 (9)	11.0 (10)	13.0 (19)
Public Disturbance ²	9.1 (5)	12.1 (11)	11.0 (16)
Other ³	5.5 (3)	19.8 (18)	14.4 (21)
Weapon ⁴	1.8 (1)	3.3 (3)	2.7 (4)
Total “Other” Arrest Charges	100.2 (55)	100.1 (91)	100.0 (146)
Number of Youth Arrested ⁵	26	41	52

¹ Minor drinking or intoxication of minor, driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs and possession of alcohol/minor.

² Disorderly conduct, loitering/gang loitering and resisting/obstructing a peace officer.

³ Contributing to delinquency of minor, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide and other miscellaneous offenses.

⁴ Unlawful possession of weapons or firearms and unlawful use of weapons.

⁵ The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during either one or both of the time periods.

Chapter 10

Program Structure and Process: Services, Worker Contacts, and Strategies

(Rolando V. Sosa)

Introduction

The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program was based on the assumption that not only the individual, but the community and its organizations and programs participate both in the creation and the reduction of the youth gang problem. The Comprehensive Gang Program Model assumed that key organizations in the community were not adequately coordinated in the development of an appropriate program approach of worker contacts and services, and that sufficient resources might not have been available for them to target gang-involved or highly gang-at-risk youth. The Model required that agencies and grassroots groups address the gang problem by developing and rearranging their programs to better control and support targeted youth, particularly through school, jobs, and conventional age-appropriate socialization activities. A truly comprehensive approach was necessary, one which included different types of agencies and local groups concerned with and/or closely related to gang youth, to their families, and to those at highest risk of gang delinquency.

The Projects at the five sites were not only expected to mobilize both agency and grassroots elements, but to establish outreach contacts with targeted youth who were partially or poorly served, and not socially controlled. From a structural and process perspective, the Model required not only a steering committee of community leaders and representatives of key

organizations, but also an outreach team consisting of street-level workers from the key organizations and community groups concerned with the youth-gang problem. The community direct-service or contact team had to include police officers, probation officers, outreach youth workers and case managers, as well as teachers, manpower workers and specialized treatment workers. The team had to identify not only with the mission and interests of their respective agencies and community groups, but also with the concerns of targeted youth and the community's needs for both youth social-development and community protection.

A critical component of the kind of relationships to be established with program youth and their families was worker sensitivity to local and larger-community norms and values. In particular, probation and police officers had to be sufficiently interested in social support as well as suppression measures to effectively control targeted youth. Ideally, outreach youth workers would come from the same gang neighborhoods, have backgrounds similar to the targeted youth, and be able to facilitate the youth's transition to the legitimate society.

The Model generally required that worker services and contacts be provided through a team of agency and community-oriented workers who were to implement the five program strategies in accordance with the principles of the Model. The workers were to target selected youth from selected gangs and gang segments. They were to implement program strategies – particularly social services, provision of social opportunities, and suppression – in an interrelated and balanced manner. The targeted youth were expected to be both gang members who were chronic delinquents, and youth at high risk for both gang membership and delinquency. Services and worker contacts were to extend over a period of months or years, as necessary, with especially-frequent contacts with chronic or hardcore gang-delinquent youth, in order to

contribute to their social development. Because of the inherent difficulty in modifying existing agency policies and professional roles, and in developing interagency and interdisciplinary team practice, the workers were expected to be highly skilled, flexible, and committed to implementing this complex Model.

Many Model elements were well-developed in the Mesa program, but others were not. Police and probation officers participated substantially in the implementation of the social-development aspects of the Model. Probation officers were the key source of contacts for the majority of youth recruited into the Project, and also, along with the police, probably embodied the dominant authoritative character of the program. There were significant outreach contacts with schools and other community agencies by case managers, youth workers, and neighborhood organizers, but there was little involvement of neighborhood representatives or grassroots organizations in the work or direction of the Project.

A key question was whether the Project and its component agencies were more concerned with gang-involved (especially hardcore-delinquent) gang youth, or with those youth at gang-risk or peripherally involved with gangs, who committed minor offenses and mainly needed early social intervention. Outreach youth workers were not to reach out to gang youth in the neighborhood; they were not generally of the same race/ethnicity as program youth, and not local to the community. They were not required or permitted to perform as neighborhood-oriented outreach workers, based on Model criteria.

However, communication and coordination among Project workers did occur. Youth in the program were provided with an interrelated pattern of services and contacts by the different workers. Attention was paid to a differential mix of social-intervention and suppression

strategies for youth with different backgrounds. Major focus of the Project was on youth who were gang members and gang associates, most of whom were not chronic delinquents, and were younger in age as the program progressed. The few females in the program were provided with more services than were males. Less-delinquent youth, who came into the program later and remained for a shorter period of time, were provided with more services than the delinquent youth, who came into the program earlier and stayed longer.

The discussion in this section, developed from data from the worker tracking forms, describes the problems associated with completion of the tracking forms by Project staff, the sources of referral of youth to the program, the types of services provided, and the scope and nature of worker contacts, including differential patterns of the workers' coordination with each other. Program strategy was the framework for classifying services and worker contacts. The social-intervention strategy included group discussion, individual counseling, family counseling, and advice or crisis-intervention, provided mainly by probation officers, case managers and outreach youth workers and treatment personnel, and to some extent by teachers and even police. A limited amount of social opportunities, including educational services (e.g., mediation between youth and the schools, crisis-intervention around school behavior problems, as well as tutoring and development of a GED program) and vocational services (e.g., training, job referral and placement) was provided mainly by outreach youth workers, case managers, and school staff. Suppression – including arrest, surveillance, monitoring, detention, and warnings – was provided by police and probation officers, and, to a lesser extent, by teachers and outreach youth workers (See Appendix C for a Glossary of Services and Worker Contacts).

The Worker Tracking Form

The major instrument for obtaining data on services to and contacts with program youth by different workers was the 12-page worker tracking form, containing mainly closed-ended check-off items and a few open-ended questions. Each Project-related worker was expected to summarize the nature and scope of his/her direct contacts with program youth and services provided (including referral services) during each three-month calendar quarter. Local Project Administrators were at first concerned about the extra time and effort that completion of the form would impose, beyond the workers' regular assignments. However, the National Evaluator estimated that it would take the worker approximately 10 or 15 minutes to fill out a form for each program youth. Such limited effort could still provide sufficient information for Evaluation purposes.

The form requested the following types of information: identification of the worker and his organization; identification of the youth; the youth's demographics and gang affiliation (and estimated rank in the gang); the dates of worker contact with the youth (first program contact, initial contact in the reporting period, date of last contact in the period); the number and types of contacts with the youth; types of services provided; referrals made on behalf of the youth; a rating of the youth's progress by the worker; identification of services or referrals most helpful to the youth; and observations and ratings by the worker regarding the youth's degree of involvement in various gang and non-gang delinquent activities during the reporting period. Also very important was an accounting of which other workers were contacted, within the Project or in other agencies, in regard to the youth, indicating the nature and level of coordination of program strategies.

The eight major service/activity categories were: case planning, group-oriented services, individual counseling, family counseling, school-related services, job-related services, suppression, and material support. These categories were particularized into fifty-five services for analytic purposes. As indicated, the types of workers expected to supply services to or have contacts with youth were: probation officers, case managers, outreach youth workers, police officers, school personnel, and various other Project-related workers and workers from outside agencies (e.g., treatment, manpower, and detention-agency workers).

Program strategies were implicit or explicit in the categories of services and contacts, for example: *social intervention* – individual counseling, group discussion and family counseling (including crisis intervention); *social opportunities provision* – vocational or job-related and education-related services; *suppression* – arrest, probation, parole, confinement, detention, monitoring surveillance, etc. Also, the strategy of *community mobilization* was specified at the direct-service or worker-contact level as *coordination*, i.e., the number and types of social-development services provided or control-related contacts made by any worker in coordination with other workers in relation to a particular youth. Special attention was paid to the types of coordination-contacts made by workers with other workers about a particular youth, e.g., youth outreach-worker contacts with police and/or probation officers (i.e., communication and coordinated suppression). Also, the strategy of *organizational change and development* was indicated by the fact that the program focused on older, more-delinquent youth in the first two years of the program and on younger, less-delinquent youth in the last two years of the program.

Forms Completed. One-thousand, six-hundred and fifty (1650) worker tracking forms were completed in Mesa for 234 program youth. These 234 youth included 106 who were

interviewed in an initial individual gang member survey at program entry (Time I), and 128 who were never interviewed during the four-year program period, January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2000 – an average of 7.1 forms per youth. In addition, there were 3 Time-I-interviewed program youth and 21 non-interviewed program youth for whom we did not have worker-tracking data. These 24 youth were excluded from this worker-tracking analyses but are included in other analyses in this report using program-entry and exit data, and police criminal-history and individual-gang-member-survey data.

The number and percent of worker tracking forms completed by the different workers were: outreach youth workers, youth intervention workers, and case managers (these roles were often interchangeable) = 808 (49.0%); probation officers = 619 (37.5%); school personnel = 6 (0.47%); police officers = 199 (12.1%); the Neighborhood Development Specialist = 18 (1.1%). The completion of worker tracking forms was a regular and continual exercise for all the workers during the four-year program period. The number of forms completed increased over time: 1997 – 16.5%; 1998 – 23.8%, 1999 – 28.4%; 2000 – 31.4%. This pattern was evidence of an increasing commitment by the Project workers to the program and the Evaluation research.

Problems of Worker-Tracking

The data derived from worker-tracking was expected to be substantial, and representative of services and worker contacts provided to program youth. However, the data collected might not completely reflect the full scope of services or contacts provided in the Mesa program. School and police personnel were somewhat reluctant to complete forms; youth workers and probation officers completed forms the most frequently and regularly. Staff turnover sometimes

hindered the timely completion of forms. This was especially a problem for outreach youth workers, who tended to stay on the job in the program for shorter periods of time than did other types of workers, although replacement outreach youth workers were hired fairly quickly.

We are somewhat concerned about the quality of the data on services and contacts supplied by workers. There was some question as to whether certain categories of services were clearly understood by the different types of workers, although the aggregation of specific service/activity elements into summary categories substantially mitigated the possible misinterpretation of specific service-subcategory items. It was also possible that identification of the kinds of workers providing services might be more meaningful in explaining program effect than the specific categories of services provided. For example, an outreach youth worker is not a policeman or probation officer, and a policeman is not a teacher or a drug-treatment counselor, although certain services might be provided and certain activities might be commonly performed by these different types of workers.

The number of tracking forms completed by a worker might not indicate the precise number of contacts he made or services he supplied, per youth, in the reporting period. However, the services data provided a gross estimate of categories or numbers of services provided. A worker tracking form was not necessarily completed each time a worker had contact with a youth, although this did occur at some of the Project sites. A worker who completed a form for a particular youth might note one or two contacts with the youth for a certain period; another worker who completed a form for the same youth might note ten contacts with the same youth over the same period. Both reports could be accurate. Also, some types of workers (such as probation officers) could draw information from computerized records of contacts with program

youth required for their agency purposes. These then were used to provide the relevant information for purposes of the worker tracking form.

Sources of Referral of Youth to the Program

It is important to observe that the large majority of the interviewed youth (94.3%, n = 103) – for whom we have both worker-tracking data and police histories – were referred to the program during the Project’s first two years. The majority of the non-interviewed youth (80.5%, n = 120) – for whom we also have both worker tracking data and police histories – were referred to the program during the second two years of the Project. The character of the program may have changed somewhat based on the different delinquency characteristics of these two program-youth samples and the services provided to them (Tables 10.1A and 10.1B).

The total youth referred to the program for whom we have worker-tracking data consisted of 197 males (84.2%) and 37 females (15.8%). The largest sources of referral of youth to the program were from court services (mainly from juvenile probation): interviewed youth – 88.6%; non-interviewed youth – 73.9%. Smaller proportions of youth were referred from the schools: interviewed youth – 8.5%; non-interviewed youth – 28.1%. Relatively more females in the interviewed-youth sample (76.9%) were referred from the court than those in the non-interviewed youth sample (37.5%). Relatively more females in the non-interviewed youth sample (37.5%) than in the interviewed-youth sample (15.4%) were referred from the schools. Relatively more Latino youth in the interviewed sample (89.0%) than in the non-interviewed sample (58.3%) were referred from the courts. Relatively more Latino youth in the non-interviewed sample (29.6%) than in the interviewed sample (7.7%) were referred from the

schools (Tables 10.2A and 10.2B).

An important factor to consider in appraising the nature and impact of the program was that the majority of youth referred through court services (mainly through juvenile probation) were, nevertheless, generally less-serious offenders. Youth in the program may not have represented the full range of delinquent youth-gang members in Mesa; some unknown number of more serious offenders may have been sentenced directly to incarceration. The fact that most of the youth were probationers, and that some had few or no prior arrests (particularly youth from the non-interviewed sample), may have influenced the pattern of services and worker contacts provided. Alternative and more substantial grassroots-organization and youth-worker street-based referrals of gang-involved youth to the program might have contributed to the development of a more varied sample of delinquent gang-involved and highly at-risk youth, and possibly a more differentiated pattern of services and worker contacts than was actually developed.

Dosages of Worker Services/Contacts

Since the sheer scope and intensity (as well as the types) of services and contacts provided by workers to program youth may have been important in the determination of program outcome for youth, we first describe the amount of services/contacts provided to the different categories of youth by different types of workers. The interviewed and the non-interviewed program youth were provided with different ranges and intensities of services and contacts. A total of 10,933 services, 11,893 individual worker contacts and 3140 coordinated contacts were

provided to the two samples of program youth.¹ The Time-I-interviewed youth entered the program earlier and stayed longer than the non-interviewed youth. They were provided with services and contacts over a longer period of time. The mean amount of time the interviewed youth were in the program (27.8 months) was almost three times as long as for the non-interviewed youth (9.4 months). While the interviewed program youth were provided with services and contacts over a longer period of time, the dosage of services and contacts on a per capita, monthly basis was higher for the non-interviewed youth sample. Services and contacts were more intense over a shorter period of time for this non-interviewed sample, which was provided with 69.6% more services, 50.0% more direct contacts, and 57.1% more coordinated contacts (Table 10.3).

Types of Services

There was some variation in the pattern of services provided to the interviewed and non-interviewed program youth, and these variations could be significant in later multivariate analyses. They could explain differences in the reduction of levels of arrests as well as ratios of success/failure of youth in the different program samples. The non-interviewed youth were provided with more social-intervention services (group activities, individual counseling, family counseling) – 55.8% of total services, compared to the interviewed youth – 46.0% of total services. The interviewed program youth sample, comparing older and more delinquent youth,

¹ The fact that more contacts than services were listed by the Project workers is an artifact of the way the worker-tracking-form questions were constructed. The worker was asked to indicate the types of services provided and the number of contacts made with youth in the three-month reporting period. There was no attempt to list the number of types of services per contact. The result is an undercurrent of specific types of services provided. In reality, far more services were provided than contacts made.

was provided with relatively more social-opportunities services (job assistance, school services) – 15.0% of total services, compared to the non-interviewed youth – 10.4% of total services. Suppression services (arrest, detention, probation violation, etc.), as a percent of total services, were more often directed to the interviewed youth sample (23.7%) than to the non-interviewed youth sample (19.9%).

We calculated that the non-interviewed youth were provided with 19.37 services per youth compared to the interviewed youth, who were provided with 16.98 services per youth during the program-exposure period. Non-interviewed youth were provided with 14.1% more services overall than interviewed youth (Table 10.4). Youth from the non-interviewed sample were provided with more group services, individual counseling, family counseling, and suppression and other services than were youth from the interviewed sample. The exception was school and employment services.

Different Services for Different Youth

Although females made up only 18.4% of the total youth in the program for whom we have worker-tracking data, they were provided with more total services per youth than males. This was particularly the case with the non-interviewed females (n = 14), who were provided with 67.6 services per youth compared to the males (n = 104), who received 32.3 services per youth. The disparity was not so great for the females (n = 14) in the interviewed sample, who were provided with 71.4 services per youth compared to the males (n = 92), who received 61.3 services per youth. In both program samples, the youngest category of youth (12 to 14-year-olds) was provided with the most total services per youth. In the interviewed-youth sample: 12 to 14-

year-olds = 67.7 services per youth; 15 to 17-year-olds = 59.8 services per youth; and 18 to 23-year-olds = 61.4 services per youth. The pattern was similar, but the youngest age group was provided with relatively more services compared to the two older age groups: 12 to 14-year-olds = 43.6 services per youth; 15 to 17-year-olds = 29.1 services per youth; 18 to 23-year-olds = 29.1 services per youth. Of special concern was that the most delinquent group (15 to 17-year-olds) was provided with the lowest proportion of services (and did not do as well in the program as the other age groups).

Youth who were moderately delinquent (i.e., youth with records of less than 1, or 1 to 2 prior arrests) were provided with more services than youth who had no prior arrests or youth who were the most delinquent (i.e., with 2 or more prior arrests). In the interviewed sample, youth with less than 1 prior (66.3) and 1 to 2 priors (68.6) were provided with more services-per-youth than were youth with no priors (56.7) and 2 or more priors (56.6%). In the non-interviewed sample, youth with less than 1 prior (55.6) and 1 to 2 priors (54.5) were provided with more services-per-youth than were youth with no priors (27.4) and 2 or more priors (36.1).

The pattern of provision of total services to gang-members, gang-associates, and non-gang youth was different. Gang members in each sample were provided with the most total services per youth. For interviewed youth: gang members = 67.7 services; gang associates = 47.0; and non-gang youth = 57.2 services per youth. For non-interviewed youth: gang members = 41.8 services; gang associates = 23.5 services; and non-gang youth = 9.7 services per youth. Gang members, compared to gang associates and non-gang youth, were also provided with the most suppression services – in the interviewed sample, 24.7% of total services, and in the non-interviewed sample, 23.2% of total services. In both samples, gang members were provided a

smaller percentage of opportunity services (job and school) than were non-gang youth. In the interviewed sample: gang members = 14.7%; non-gang youth = 18.8%; in the non-interviewed sample: gang members = 10.1%; non-gang youth = 22.7%. (For a breakdown of services by worker type, see Tables 10.5A and 10.5B).

Types of Contacts

The pattern of the distribution of Project-worker contacts made with program youth was somewhat different from the pattern of the distribution of services provided to program youth. Probation officers played a dominant youth-contact role, particularly with the interviewed youth. Almost two-thirds (64.4%) of all worker contacts (n = 11,893) were with the interviewed program youth. Approximately one-half of all probation-worker contacts (49.6%) were with the interviewed youth, and this was more than the 44.0% of probation contacts with the non-interviewed youth. On the other hand, there were relatively more direct police contacts with non-interviewed youth (7.5%) than with interviewed youth (4.6%). Relatively more contacts by social-development personnel, case managers and outreach youth workers, were with the non-interviewed youth (47.4%) than with the interviewed youth (37.9%). There were more contacts by the Neighborhood Development Specialist (who dealt more with neighborhood organizations and development issues than with program-youth issues) that involved interviewed youth (8.0%), than non-interviewed youth (1.2%). (For a breakdown of contacts by worker type, see Tables 10.6A and 10.6B.)

When we assessed the number of direct worker contacts with youth on a monthly basis, the contrast in the relative proportions of contacts by the different types of workers is sharper in

the interviewed sample than in the non-interviewed sample. Probation officers played a relatively more important contact role with the interviewed youth, and outreach youth workers, especially case managers, played a less-important role. Outreach youth workers and case managers played a relatively more important role in contacting the non-interviewed youth. Relatively more social-development services and contacts were provided in the last two years of the program than in the first two years. This might have been due to the different nature of youth referred to the program in these two periods. It might have also been associated with a shift in Project strategy to working with more at-risk and less-seriously-delinquent youth, whether they were gang-involved or not.

The same types of Project workers contacted and provided services to both interviewed and non-interviewed program youth. Different types of workers were often in communication with each other, but there was a greater tendency for suppression-oriented workers to coordinate or communicate with other suppression workers, than for suppression and non-suppression-oriented workers to communicate with each other. There were relatively more suppression-type workers than non-suppression-type workers contacting and servicing youth in the interviewed program sample than in the non-interviewed program sample (Tables 10.7 and 10.8).

Different Worker Contacts with Different Youth

There were somewhat similar proportions of contacts by workers with male and female youth in the two program samples. During the program period there were 72.3 contacts per male and 71.4 contacts per female in the interviewed program sample, and 32.2 contacts per male and 37.3 contacts per female in the non-interviewed program sample. In the interviewed sample, the

highest proportion of contacts was with the 18 to 23-year-olds; in the non-interviewed sample, the highest proportion of contacts was with the 12 to 14-year-olds.

Again, we observe that Project workers had the most contact with the less-delinquent youth (rather than with the least- or most-delinquent youth) in both program samples. In the interviewed-youth sample, Project workers had slightly more contacts – 62.4 contacts per youth – with non-delinquent youth (i.e., those with no prior arrests) than with the most-delinquent youth (i.e., those with two or more prior arrests) – 60.4 contacts per youth. The pattern of contacts was better for non-delinquent youth in the non-interviewed sample (26.1 contacts per youth) compared to the most-delinquent youth (39.8 contacts per youth). For both samples, youth with less than 1 and 1-2 prior arrests were provided with considerably more contacts.

In general, more worker contacts were provided to gang members than to gang associates or non-gang youth in both program samples, i.e., about half of all probation contacts were provided to gang members. We are surprised, however, that in respect to the Time-I-interviewed youth sample, the relative proportion of police contacts with non-gang youth (4.0%) was almost as high as with gang members (4.7%), and that the proportion of probation contacts with non-gang youth (50.1%) was about as high as with gang members (51.7%). This would appear to suggest a misdirection of Project-worker suppression contacts. The percentage of police contacts with non-gang youth seemed to have been more appropriate in the non-interviewed youth sample – there were none (Tables 10.6A and 10.6B).

Coordinated Contacts

An indicator of the Model strategy of *community mobilization* at the program level was

the scope and nature of coordination among the Project workers. A key purpose of the Project was to interrelate services for youth, based on the nature of the youth's problems, with different types of Project workers, i.e., provide a set of interrelated control and social-support or social-development functions depending on the kind of gang problem the youth represented to himself and to the community.

Data from the worker tracking form permitted us to compute the number of contacts each type of worker had with the other types of workers, both in the Project and outside the Project. Furthermore, we were able to assess the scope and nature of coordinated contacts provided to youth as the program shifted its focus from relatively older and more seriously delinquent youth in the first two years of the program to younger and less-delinquent youth in the last two years of the program.

In general, there was a high level of coordination (i.e., sharing of information, joint planning of services, and joint or complementary action) by Project workers with each other and with other workers both in the same agencies and in other agencies. Probation officers, case managers, and outreach youth workers were the most active initiators of coordinated contacts (Table 10.7 and 10.8).

Generally, school personnel, the Neighborhood Development Specialists and staff both within the same Project-related agencies or from non-Project-related agencies did not often complete worker tracking forms, but were in many cases recipients of contacts from Project workers.

What is most significant, and consistent with other services findings of this report, is that probation officers initiated relatively more coordinated contacts (41.9%) around interviewed

program youth in the first two years of the program, but fewer (31.5%) in the last two years of the program. On the other hand, case managers (35.5%) and outreach youth workers (7.4%) initiated fewer coordinated contacts in the first two years of the program, but relatively more coordinated contacts (case managers = 45.5% and outreach youth workers = 11.0%) in the last two years of the program.

A relatively higher level of suppression coordinated contacts was initiated in the first two years of the program, and a relatively higher level of non-suppression or social-development coordinated contacts was initiated in the last two years of the program. However, the nature of suppression and non-suppression (or social-development) coordination was necessarily interrelated, since probation officers in particular were often the initiators of both types of these functions.

Probation officers probably provided the greater range of services to program youth, followed by case managers. The smallest range of types and amounts of services was provided by outreach youth workers, police and the Neighborhood Development Specialist. The patterned roles of the different types of workers did not change much over the course of the program, whether for interviewed or non-interviewed youth (Table 10.9).

Under ideal Model conditions, the roles of the different types of workers should have been modified over time: with suppression workers providing relatively fewer suppression and more social-development services, and social-development workers providing relatively fewer social-development services and more suppression or social-control services, consistent with the notion of community rather than highly specialized, bureaucratic function.

Summary

The description of the services and worker contacts provided to Mesa program youth is based on data derived from 1650 worker tracking forms (the 12-page report completed by Project outreach youth workers, case managers, probation and police officers, school personnel and others), documenting contacts with and provision of services to 234 program youth during the program period January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2000. The forms were completed every three months for each youth, for an average of 7.1 forms per youth. Project staff were committed to the completion of the forms on a regular basis.

A total of 10,933 services, 11,893 direct worker contacts and 3140 coordinated worker contacts were provided to all program youth – interviewed and non-interviewed. The largest source of referral of youth (197 males and 37 females) was the courts: Time-I-interviewed youth = 88.6%; non-interviewed youth = 73.9%. The next largest source of referrals was the schools: Time-I-interviewed youth = 8.5%; non-interviewed youth = 19.2%. The Time-I-interviewed youth (more delinquent and older) entered the program mainly during its first two years; the non-interviewed youth mainly during the second two years.

The Time-I-interviewed youth were in the program on average three times longer than the non-interviewed youth; however, non-interviewed youth were provided with 69.6% more total services, 50.0% more direct contacts and 57.1% more coordinated contacts. Non-interviewed youth were provided with relatively more social-intervention services (group activities, individual counseling, and family counseling) – 55.8% of total services – than the interviewed youth – 46.0% of total services. On the other hand, suppression services (arrest, detention, probation violation, etc.) as a percent of total services were more often provided to the

interviewed youth – 23.7% – than to the non-interviewed youth – 19.9%.

Females made up only 18.4% of total youth, and were provided with more total services-per-youth than were males, although the disparity was not so great in the interviewed sample. In both samples, the youngest category of youth, the 12 to 14-year-olds, was provided with the most services. Youth who were moderately delinquent (i.e., youth with records of less than one, or 1-2 prior arrests) were provided with more services than youth who had no prior arrests or youth who were the most delinquent (i.e., with 2 or more prior arrests).

In the interviewed sample, gang members were provided with more services than were gang associates or non-gang youth, and non-gang youth were provided with more services than gang associates. In the non-interviewed sample, gang members were provided with more services than were gang associates, who in turn were provided with more services than non-gang youth.

The pattern of the distribution of worker contacts was somewhat different from the pattern of the distribution of services. Almost two-thirds of all worker contacts with all youth were provided by probation officers. Probation officers played a relatively greater role than outreach youth workers and case managers in contacting interviewed youth. The overall balance of contacts by probation officers and outreach youth workers/case managers with non-interviewed youth was relatively more equivalent.

We were surprised to find, in respect to the interviewed youth sample, that the relative proportion of police contacts with non-gang youth (4.0%) was almost as high as for gang members (4.7%), and that the proportion of probation-officer contacts with non-gang youth (50.1%) was about as high as for gang members (51.7%). This would appear to suggest a

misdirection of Project-worker suppression contacts. The distribution of police and probation contacts with non-gang youth, gang associates, and gang members was more appropriate for the non-interviewed program sample. The program seemed to be more appropriately developed in terms of services and contacts for the non-interviewed than for the interviewed program youth. This could have been because of the different nature of youth in the program between the first two years and second two years of program operation, which was due to targeting different youth, and probably to better program development.

Despite the high level of coordination of suppression and social-development workers in the Project, and the greater role that social-development workers played with the non-interviewed youth in the last two years of the program, the activities and functions of the probation officers, case managers, and outreach youth workers in respect to provision of their traditional services did not change.

Table 10.1A
Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the Mesa Gang Intervention Project
By Year and 6-Month Period

Source of Referral	Year and 6-Month Period percent and (n)								Total % (N)
	1997		1998		1999		2000		
	1/1 to 6/30	7/1 to 12/31	1/1 to 6/30	7/1 to 12/31	1/1 to 6/30	7/1 to 12/31	1/1 to 6/30	7/1 to 12/31	
Court Services ¹	100.0 (31)	71.4 (15)	93.3 (28)	88.9 (16)	60.0 (3)	0	100.0 (1)	0	88.6 (94)
School	0	28.6 (6)	6.7 (2)	0	20.0 (1)	0	0	0	8.5 (9)
Parent/ Family Member	0	0	0	5.6 (1)	0	0	0	0	0.9 (1)
Police	0	0	0	5.6 (1)	20.0 (1)	0	0	0	1.9 (2)
Self	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Project	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Friend	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don't Know/ Past Participant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total ²	100.0 (31)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (30)	100.1 (18)	100.0 (5)	0	100.0 (1)	0	99.9 (106)

¹ Juvenile and adult probation and parole.

² Percentages do not sum to 100.0 due to rounding errors.

Table 10.1B
Non-Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the Mesa Gang Intervention Project
By Year and 6-Month Period

Source of Referral	Year and 6-Month Period percent and (n)								Total % (N)
	1997		1998		1999		2000		
	1/1 to 6/30	7/1 to 12/31	1/1 to 6/30	7/1 to 12/31	1/1 to 6/30	7/1 to 12/31	1/1 to 6/30	7/1 to 12/31	
Court Services ¹	50.0 (1)	20.0 (1)	66.7 (6)	77.8 (7)	92.3 (12)	63.9 (23)	65.5 (19)	40.0 (10)	62.3 (79)
School	50.0 (1)	80.0 (4)	33.3 (3)	11.1 (1)	0	27.8 (10)	31.0 (9)	32.0 (8)	27.7 (36)
Parent/ Family Member	0	0	0	11.1 (1)	0	8.3 (3)	0	4.0 (1)	3.8 (5)
Police	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Self	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.0 (2)	1.5 (2)
Project	0	0	0	0	7.7 (1)	0	3.4 (1)	0	1.5 (2)
Friend	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4.0 (1)	0.8 (1)
Don't Know/ Past Participant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12.0 (3)	2.3 (3)
Total ²	100.0 (2)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (9)	100.0 (9)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (36)	99.9 (29)	100.0 (25)	99.9 (128)

¹ Juvenile and adult probation and parole.

² Percentages do not sum to 100.0 due to rounding errors.

Table 10.2A
Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the Mesa Gang Intervention Project
By Selected Demographic Characteristics

Selected Demographic Characteristics	Source of Referral percent and (N)								Total
	Court Services	School	Parent/ Family Member	Police	Self	Project	Friend	Don't Know/Past Participant	
Male	90.3 (84)	7.5 (7)	0	2.2 (2)	0	0	0	0	100.0 (93)
Female	76.9 (10)	15.4 (2)	7.7 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (13)
Latino ¹	89.0 (81)	7.7 (7)	1.1 (1)	2.2 (2)	0	0	0	0	100.0 (91)
African-American	100.0 (4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (4)
Non-Latino White	85.7 (6)	14.3 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (7)
American Indian	100.0 (2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (2)
Asian/Pacific Islander	50.0 (1)	50.0 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (2)
12 to 14 years old ²	67.7 (21)	25.8 (8)	3.2 (1)	3.2 (1)	0	0	0	0	99.9 (31)
15 to 17 years old	97.6 (40)	2.4 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (41)
18 to 23 years old	97.1 (33)	0	2.9 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (34)
Total³	88.6 (94)	8.5 (9)	0.9 (1)	1.9 (2)	0	0	0	0	99.9 (106)

¹ Primarily youth of Mexican ancestry.

² Youth's age at time of program entry.

³ Percentages do not sum to 100.0 due to rounding errors.

Table 10.2B
Non-Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the Mesa Gang Intervention Project
By Selected Demographic Characteristics

Selected Demographic Characteristics	Source of Referral percent and (n)								Total
	Court Services	School	Parent/Family Member	Police	Self	Project	Friend	Don't Know/ Past Participant	
Male	67.3 (70)	26.0 (27)	0	0	1.9 (2)	0.9 (1)	0.9 (1)	2.9 (3)	99.9 (104)
Female	37.5 (9)	37.5 (9)	20.8 (5)	0	0	4.2 (1)	0	0	100.0 (24)
Latino ¹	58.3 (63)	29.6 (32)	4.6 (5)	0	1.9 (2)	1.9 (2)	0.9 (1)	2.8 (3)	100.0 (108)
African-American	100.0 (5)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (5)
Non-Latino White	66.7 (6)	33.3 (3)	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (9)
American Indian	100.0 (5)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (5)
Asian/ Pacific Islander	100.0 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (1)
12 to 14 years old ²	43.5 (20)	50.0 (23)	6.5 (3)	0	0	0	0	0	100.0 (46)
15 to 17 years old	70.0 (42)	16.7 (10)	3.3 (2)	0	1.7 (1)	3.3 (2)	1.7 (1)	3.3 (2)	100.0 (60)
18 to 23 years old	94.4 (17)	0	0	0	5.6 (1)	0	0	0	100.0 (18)
Total³	61.7 (79)	28.1 (36)	3.9 (5)	0	1.6 (2)	1.6 (2)	0.8 (1)	2.3 (3)	100.0 (128)

¹ Primarily youth of Mexican ancestry.

² Youth's age at time of program entry.

³ Percentages do not sum to 100.0 due to rounding errors.

Table 10.3
Dosages of Services and Contacts
Interviewed and Non-Interviewed Program Youth

Program Youth Sample	Months in Program		Total Services ¹	Services per Youth per Month	Total Direct Contacts ²	Direct Contacts per Youth per Month	Total Coordinated Contacts ³	Coordinated Contacts per Youth per Month
	Mean	Median						
Interviewed (N = 106) ⁴	27.8	27.4	6643	2.3	7648	2.6	1948	0.7
Non-Interviewed (N = 128) ⁵	9.38	8.53	4290	3.9	4245	3.9	1192	1.1

¹ Includes 55 different types of services provided to program youth.

² By individual Project worker with particular program youth at particular times.

³ By workers in coordination with other workers servicing/contacting particular program youth.

⁴ Three of the 109 Time-I-interviewed youth had no worker-tracking records.

⁵ Eighteen of the 128 non-interviewed youth were in the program for less than one month.

Table 10.4
Interviewed and Non-Interviewed Youth
Types of Services¹

Program Sample	Type of Service								Total	
	Case Planning	Material Support	Group Services	Individual Counseling	Family Counseling	Job Assistance	School Services	Suppression	Total Services	Services Per Youth
Time-I-interviewed Youth (N = 106)	10.7	4.7	27.8	14.8	3.4	4.8	10.2	23.7	6643	16.98
Non-Interviewed Youth (N = 128)	7.5	6.4	33.9	16.6	5.3	2.0	8.4	19.9	4301	19.37

¹ Based on total counts of services provided during the four-year program period.

Table 10.5A
Types of Services¹
Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Level of Prior Arrests											
<u>Level of Prior Arrests</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvs per Youth</u>
No Priors	145	105	456	232	61	48	130	240	1417	25	56.68
Less than 1 Prior	230	107	643	363	117	132	246	483	2321	35	66.31
1 to <2 Priors	199	59	451	225	24	88	198	472	1716	25	68.64
2 or More Priors	134	39	295	162	27	48	104	380	1189	21	56.62
Totals	708	310	1845	982	229	316	678	1575	6643	106	62.67

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Level of Prior Arrests										
<u>Level of Prior Arrests</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	
No Priors	10.2%	7.4%	32.2%	16.4%	4.3%	3.4%	9.2%	16.9%	100.0%	
Less than 1 Prior	9.9%	4.6%	27.7%	15.6%	5.0%	5.7%	10.6%	20.8%	100.0%	
1 to <2 Priors	11.6%	3.4%	26.3%	13.1%	1.4%	5.1%	11.5%	27.5%	100.0%	
2 or More Priors	11.3%	3.3%	24.8%	13.6%	2.3%	4.0%	8.7%	32.0%	100.0%	
Totals	10.7%	4.7%	27.8%	14.8%	3.4%	4.8%	10.2%	23.7%	100.0%	

¹ Based on total counts of services provided during the four-year program period.

Table 10.5A-continued
Types of Services
Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Self-Reported Gang Membership Status

<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvs per Youth</u>
Non-gang Youth	139	30	327	152	45	92	134	283	1202	21	57.24
Gang Associate	69	41	244	124	28	13	62	124	705	15	47.00
Gang Member	500	239	1274	706	156	211	482	1168	4736	70	67.66
Totals	708	310	1845	982	229	316	678	1575	6643	106	62.67

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Self-Reported Gang Membership Status

<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
Non-gang Youth	11.6%	2.5%	27.2%	12.6%	3.7%	7.7%	11.1%	23.5%	100.0%
Gang Associate	9.8%	5.8%	34.6%	17.6%	4.0%	1.8%	8.8%	17.6%	100.0%
Gang Member	10.6%	5.0%	26.9%	14.9%	3.3%	4.5%	10.2%	24.7%	100.0%
Totals	10.7%	4.7%	27.8%	14.8%	3.4%	4.8%	10.2%	23.7%	100.0%

Table 10.5A-continued
Types of Services
Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Gender

<u>Gender</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvs per Youth</u>
Male	629	211	1532	779	177	289	579	1447	5643	92	61.34
Female	79	99	313	203	52	27	99	128	1000	14	71.43
Totals	708	310	1845	982	229	316	678		6643	106	62.67

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Gender

<u>Gender</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
Male	11.1%	3.7%	27.1%	13.8%	3.1%	5.1%	10.3%	25.6%	100.0%
Female	7.9%	9.9%	31.3%	20.3%	5.2%	2.7%	9.9%	12.8%	100.0%
Totals	10.7%	4.7%	27.8%	14.8%	3.4%	4.8%	10.2%	23.7%	100.0%

Table 10.5A-continued
Types of Services
Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Age Group at Program Entry

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvs per Youth</u>
12 to 14 years old	189	128	645	431	126	54	213	381	2167	32	67.72
15 to 17 years old	227	127	634	361	58	151	285	547	2390	40	59.75
18 to 23 years old	292	55	566	190	45	111	180	647	2086	34	61.35
Totals	708	310	1845	982	229	316	678	1575	6643	106	62.67

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Age Group at Program Entry

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
12 to 14 years old	8.7%	5.9%	29.8%	19.9%	5.8%	2.5%	9.8%	17.6%	100.0%
15 to 17 years old	9.5%	5.3%	26.5%	15.1%	2.4%	6.3%	11.9%	22.9%	100.0%
18 to 23 years old	14.0%	2.6%	27.1%	9.1%	2.2%	5.3%	8.6%	31.0%	100.0%
Totals	10.7%	4.7%	27.8%	14.8%	3.4%	4.8%	10.2%	23.7%	100.0%

Table 10.5A-continued
Types of Services
Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Race/Ethnicity

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvs per Youth</u>
Latino	608	281	1598	862	208	262	581	1379	5779	91	63.5
Non-Latino	100	29	247	120	21	54	97	196	864	15	57.6
Totals	708	310	1845	982	229	316	678	1575	6643	106	62.7

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Race/Ethnicity

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
Latino	10.5%	4.9%	27.7%	14.9%	3.6%	4.5%	10.1%	23.9%	100.0%
Non-Latino	11.6%	3.4%	28.6%	13.9%	2.4%	6.3%	11.2%	22.7%	100.0%
Totals	10.7%	4.7%	27.8%	14.8%	3.4%	4.8%	10.2%	23.7%	100.0%

Table 10.5B
Types of Services¹
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Level of Prior Arrests (N=124)

<u>Level of Prior Arrests</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsupp1</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvs per Youth</u>
No Priors	119	158	756	401	161	42	197	303	2137	78	27.40
Less than 1 Prior	67	40	253	113	25	9	61	155	723	13	55.62
1 to <2 Priors	68	42	236	108	23	16	55	161	709	13	54.54
2 or More Priors	69	36	209	92	19	19	46	231	721	20	36.05
Totals	323	276	1454	714	228	86	359	850	4290	124	34.60

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Level of Prior Arrests (N=124)

<u>Level of Prior Arrests</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsupp1</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
No Priors	5.6%	7.4%	35.4%	18.8%	7.5%	2.0%	9.2%	14.2%	100.0%
Less than 1 Prior	9.3%	5.5%	35.0%	15.6%	3.5%	1.2%	8.4%	21.4%	100.0%
1 to <2 Priors	9.6%	5.9%	33.3%	15.2%	3.2%	2.3%	7.8%	22.7%	100.0%
2 or More Priors	9.6%	5.0%	29.0%	12.8%	2.6%	2.6%	6.4%	32.0%	100.0%
Totals	7.5%	6.4%	33.9%	16.6%	5.3%	2.0%	8.4%	19.8%	100.0%

☞ Four participants were excluded because they were in the program for less than one month.

¹ Based on the total counts of services provided during the four-year program period.

Table 10.5B-continued
Types of Services
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Worker-Reported Gang Membership Status (N=122)◇

<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsupp1</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvs per Youth</u>
Non-gang Youth	11	9	28	20	7	9	13	0	97	10	9.70
Gang Associate	19	57	279	128	77	7	54	38	659	28	23.54
Gang Member	292	206	1139	565	144	65	287	813	3511	84	41.80
Totals	322	272	1446	713	228	81	354	851	4267	122	34.98

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Worker-Reported Gang Membership Status (N=122)◇

<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsupp1</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
Non-gang Youth	11.3%	9.3%	28.9%	20.6%	7.2%	9.3%	13.4%	0.0%	100.0%
Gang Associate	2.9%	8.6%	42.3%	19.4%	11.7%	1.1%	8.2%	5.8%	100.0%
Gang Member	8.3%	5.9%	32.4%	16.1%	4.1%	1.9%	8.2%	23.2%	100.0%
Totals	7.5%	6.4%	33.9%	16.7%	5.3%	1.9%	8.3%	19.9%	100.0%

◇ Six youth had no worker-reported gang membership status.

Table 10.5B-continued
Types of Services
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Gender (N = 128)

<u>Gender</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvc per Youth</u>
Male	282	196	1081	548	160	76	277	735	3355	104	32.26
Female	41	81	375	167	68	10	83	121	946	14	67.57
Totals	323	277	1456	715	228	86	360	856	4301	118	36.45

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Gender (N = 128)

<u>Gender</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
Male	8.4%	5.8%	32.2%	16.3%	4.8%	2.3%	8.3%	21.9%	100.0%
Female	4.3%	8.6%	39.6%	17.7%	7.2%	1.1%	8.8%	12.8%	100.0%
Totals	7.5%	6.4%	33.9%	16.6%	5.3%	2.0%	8.4%	19.9%	100.0%

Table 10.5B-continued
Types of Services
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Age Group at Program Entry (N = 124)✧

<u>Age Group at Entry</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvc per Youth</u>
12 to 14 years old	92	144	756	410	166	8	164	266	2006	46	43.61
15 to 17 years old	144	116	546	255	60	56	169	399	1745	60	29.08
18 to 23 years old	87	10	145	47	0	20	24	191	524	18	29.11
Totals	323	270	1447	712	226	84	357	856	4275	124	34.48

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Age Group at Program Entry (N = 124)✧

<u>Age Group at Entry</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
12 to 14 years old	4.6%	7.2%	37.7%	20.4%	8.3%	0.4%	8.2%	13.3%	100.0%
15 to 17 years old	8.3%	6.6%	31.3%	14.6%	3.4%	3.2%	9.7%	22.9%	100.0%
18 to 23 years old	16.6%	1.9%	27.7%	9.0%	0.0%	3.8%	4.6%	36.5%	100.0%
Totals	7.6%	6.3%	33.8%	16.7%	5.3%	2.0%	8.4%	20.0%	100.0%

✧ Date of birth missing for four youth; age at program entry cannot be calculated.

Table 10.5B-continued
Types of Services
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Services by Type of Service and Race/Ethnicity (N=128)

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Srvs per Youth</u>
Latino	249	226	1212	599	195	71	312	697	3561	108	33.0
Non-Latino	74	51	244	116	33	15	48	159	740	20	37.0
Totals	323	277	1456	715	228	86	360	856	4301	128	33.6

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Race/Ethnicity (N=128)

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
Latino	7.0%	6.3%	34.0%	16.8%	5.5%	2.0%	8.8%	19.6%	100.0%
Non-Latino	10.0%	6.9%	33.0%	15.7%	4.5%	2.0%	6.5%	21.5%	100.0%
Totals	7.5%	6.4%	33.9%	16.6%	5.3%	2.0%	8.4%	19.9%	100.0%

Table 10.6A
Types of Direct Contacts¹
Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Level of Prior Arrests

<u>Level of Priors</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
No Priors	161	606	101	41	652	1561	25	62.4
Less than 1 Prior	309	947	265	120	1119	2760	35	78.9
1 to <2 Priors	253	374	116	94	1222	2059	25	82.4
2 or More Priors	18	226	128	93	803	1268	21	60.4
Totals	741	2153	610	348	3796	7648	106	72.2

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Level of Prior Arrests

<u>Level of Priors</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
No Priors	10.3%	38.8%	6.5%	2.6%	41.8%	100.0%
Less than 1 Prior	11.2%	34.3%	9.6%	4.3%	40.5%	100.0%
1 to <2 Priors	12.3%	18.2%	5.6%	4.6%	59.3%	100.0%
2 or More Priors	1.4%	17.8%	10.1%	7.3%	63.3%	100.0%
Totals	9.7%	28.2%	8.0%	4.6%	49.6%	100.0%

¹ Based on total counts of contacts made during the four-year program period.

Table 10.6A-continued
Types of Direct Contacts
Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Self-Reported Gang Membership Status								
<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
Non-gang Youth	48	442	182	59	735	1466	21	69.8
Gang Associate	169	343	19	39	335	905	15	60.3
Gang Member	524	1368	409	250	2726	5277	70	75.4
Totals	741	2153	610	348	3796	7648	106	72.2

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Self-Reported Gang Membership Status						
<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
Non-gang Youth	3.3%	30.2%	12.4%	4.0%	50.1%	100.0%
Gang Associate	18.7%	37.9%	2.1%	4.3%	37.0%	100.0%
Gang Member	9.9%	25.9%	7.8%	4.7%	51.7%	100.0%
Totals	9.7%	28.2%	8.0%	4.6%	49.6%	100.0%

Table 10.6A-continued
Types of Direct Contacts
Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Gender								
<u>Gender</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
Male	621	1659	576	294	3499	6649	92	72.3
Female	120	494	34	54	297	999	14	71.4
Totals	741	2153	610	348	3796	7648	106	72.2

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Gender						
<u>Gender</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
Male	9.3%	25.0%	8.7%	4.4%	52.6%	100.0%
Female	12.0%	49.4%	3.4%	5.4%	29.7%	100.0%
Totals	9.7%	28.2%	8.0%	4.6%	49.6%	100.0%

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Age Group at Program Entry								
<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
12 to 14 years old	214	1077	113	130	803	2337	32	73.0
15 to 17 years old	396	625	154	87	1214	2476	40	61.9
18 to 23 years old	131	451	343	131	1779	2835	34	83.4
Totals	741	2153	610	348	3796	7648	106	72.2

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Age Group at Program Entry						
<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
12 to 14 years old	9.2%	46.1%	4.8%	5.6%	34.4%	100.0%
15 to 17 years old	16.0%	25.2%	6.2%	3.5%	49.0%	100.0%
18 to 23 years old	4.6%	15.9%	12.1%	4.6%	62.8%	100.0%
Totals	9.7%	28.2%	8.0%	4.6%	49.6%	100.0%

Table 10.6A-continued
Types of Direct Contacts
Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Race/Ethnicity								
<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
Latino	663	1812	533	315	3245	6568	91	72.2
Non-Latino	78	341	77	33	551	1080	15	72.0
Totals	741	2153	610	348	3796	7648	106	72.2

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Race/Ethnicity						
<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
Latino	10.1%	27.6%	8.1%	4.8%	49.4%	100.0%
Non-Latino	7.2%	31.6%	7.1%	3.1%	51.0%	100.0%
Totals	9.7%	28.2%	8.0%	4.6%	49.6%	100.0%

Table 10.6B
Types of Direct Contacts¹
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Level of Prior Arrests (N=124)								
<u>Level of Priors</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
No Priors	91	1046	32	154	710	2033	78	26.1
Less than 1 Prior	190	158	0	43	291	682	13	52.5
1 to <2 Priors	120	156	8	79	372	735	13	56.5
2 or More Priors	175	73	12	42	493	795	20	39.8
Totals	576	1433	52	318	1866	4245	124	34.2

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Level of Prior Arrests (N=124)						
<u>Level of Priors</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
No Priors	4.5%	51.5%	1.6%	7.6%	34.9%	100.0%
Less than 1 Prior	27.9%	23.2%	0.0%	6.3%	42.7%	100.0%
1 to <2 Priors	16.3%	21.2%	1.1%	10.7%	50.6%	100.0%
2 or More Priors	22.0%	9.2%	1.5%	5.3%	62.0%	100.0%
Totals	13.6%	33.8%	1.2%	7.5%	44.0%	100.0%

☞ Four participants were excluded because they were in the program for more than one month.

¹ Based on total counts of contacts made during the four-year program period.

Table 10.6 B-continued
Types of Direct Contacts
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Worker-Reported Gang Membership Status (N=122)◇								
<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
Non-gang Youth	0	81	0	0	0	81	10	8.1
Gang Associate	2	499	24	7	85	617	28	22.0
Gang Member	574	824	28	313	1775	3514	84	41.8
Totals	576	1404	52	320	1860	4212	122	34.5

*Six youth had no worker-reported gang status.

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Worker-Reported Gang Membership Status (N=122)◇						
<u>Gang Membership Status</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
Non-gang Youth	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Gang Associate	0.3%	80.9%	3.9%	1.1%	13.8%	100.0%
Gang Member	16.3%	23.4%	0.8%	8.9%	50.5%	100.0%
Totals	13.7%	33.3%	1.2%	7.6%	44.2%	100.0%

◇ Six youth had no worker-reported gang membership status.

Table 10.6B continued
Types of Direct Contacts
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Gender (N=128)

<u>Gender</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
Male	541	938	40	290	1544	3353	104	32.2
Female	35	496	12	31	322	896	24	37.3
Totals	576	1434	52	321	1866	4249	128	33.2

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Gender (N=128)

<u>Gender</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
Male	16.1%	28.0%	1.2%	8.6%	46.0%	100.0%
Female	3.9%	55.4%	1.3%	3.5%	35.9%	100.0%
Totals	13.6%	33.7%	1.2%	7.6%	43.9%	100.0%

Table 10.6B-continued
Types of Direct Contacts
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Age Group at Program Entry (N=124) ✧

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
12 to 14 years old	234	897	20	141	819	2111	46	45.9
15 to 17 years old	259	477	32	152	755	1675	60	27.9
18 to 23 years old	83	38	0	28	292	441	18	24.5
Totals	576	1412	52	321	1866	4227	124	34.1

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Age Group at Program Entry (N=124) ✧

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
12 to 14 years old	11.1%	42.5%	0.9%	6.7%	38.8%	100.0%
15 to 17 years old	15.5%	28.5%	1.9%	9.1%	45.1%	100.0%
18 to 23 years old	18.8%	8.6%	0.0%	6.3%	66.2%	100.0%
Totals	13.6%	33.4%	1.2%	7.6%	44.1%	100.0%

✧ Date of birth is missing for four youth; age at program entry cannot be calculated.

Table 10.6B continued
Types of Direct Contacts
Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns)

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Race/Ethnicity (N=128)

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>	<u># of Youth</u>	<u>Contacts per Youth</u>
Latino	449	1240	40	285	1454	3468	108	32.1
Non-Latino	127	194	12	36	412	781	20	39.1
Totals	576	1434	52	321	1866	4249	128	33.2

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Race/Ethnicity (N=128)

<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>	<u>Outreach</u>	<u>Case Manager</u>	<u>Neigh Dev</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Total Contacts</u>
Latino	12.9%	35.8%	1.2%	8.2%	41.9%	100.0%
Non-Latino	16.3%	24.8%	1.5%	4.6%	52.8%	100.0%
Totals	13.6%	33.7%	1.2%	7.6%	43.9%	100.0%

Table 10.7
Coordinated Contacts: Interviewed Program Youth
By Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted

Type of Worker Initiating Contact	Type of Worker Contacted percent and (n)						Total ¹ (N)
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Project Case Manager/ Youth Worker	Other Agencies	Within Worker Organization	
Outreach	11.8 (17)	35.4 (51)	20.1 (29)	0	0.7 (1)	31.9 (46)	7.4% (144)
Case Manager	11.0 (76)	32.3 (223)	14.5 (100)	0	8.1 (56)	34.2 (236)	35.5% (691)
Police	0	70.5 (93)	0	24.2 (32)	0	5.3 (7)	6.8% (132)
Probation	25.6 (209)	0	13.0 (106)	37.1 (303)	15.2 (124)	9.1 (74)	41.9% (816)
Neighborhood Dev. Specialist	3.0 (5)	59.4 (98)	6.7 (11)	0	1.2 (2)	29.7 (49)	8.5% (165)
Total ² (N)	15.8 (307)	23.9 (465)	12.6 (246)	17.3 (337)	9.4 (183)	21.0 (410)	100.0 (1,948)

¹Percentages do not always sum to 100.0 due to rounding.

²Percentages are based on the total number of contacts (1,948) from 1,091 worker tracking forms for 106 interviewed program youth.

Table 10.8
Coordinated Contacts: Non-Interviewed Youth
By Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted

Type of Worker Initiating Contact	Type of Worker Contacted percent and (n)						Total ¹ (N)
	Police	Probation/ Parole	School	Project Case Manager/ Youth Worker	Other Agencies	Within Worker Organization	
Outreach	22.9 (30)	33.6 (44)	13.0 (17)	0	0.8 (1)	29.8 (39)	11.0 (131)
Case Manager	19.7 (107)	21.0 (114)	19.6 (106)	0	5.7 (31)	33.9 (184)	45.5 (542)
Police	0	50.4 (66)	2.3 (3)	26.0 (34)	4.6 (6)	16.8 (22)	11.0 (131)
Probation	27.4 (103)	0	13.3 (50)	33.8 (127)	14.4 (54)	11.1 (42)	31.5 (376)
Neighborhood Dev. Specialist	16.7 (2)	33.3 (4)	0	0	16.7 (2)	33.3 (4)	1.0 (12)
Total ² (N)	20.3 (242)	19.2 (228)	14.8 (176)	13.7 (163)	7.9 (94)	24.2 (289)	100.1 (1,192)

¹ Percentages do not always sum to 100.0 due to rounding.

² Percentages are based on the total number of contacts (1,192) from 562 worker tracking forms for 128 non-interviewed program participants.

Table 10.9
Types of Services¹ by Types of Workers

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)									
Number of Services by Type of Worker Providing Service									
<u>Worker Type</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsupp1</u>	<u>group1</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
Outreach	0	23	174	26	1	22	26	5	277
Case Manager	161	144	677	483	146	117	255	20	2003
Police	0	1	79	13	1	0	1	233	328
Probation	544	120	755	447	45	134	362	1315	3722
Neigh Dev. Specialist	0	19	166	13	36	43	34	2	313
Total	705	307	1851	982	229	316	678	1575	6643

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106)										
Percentage of Types of Services by Type of Worker										
<u>Worker Type</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsupp1</u>	<u>group1</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Percent of Total Services By Different Types of Workers</u>
Outreach	0.0%	8.3%	62.8%	9.4%	0.4%	7.9%	9.4%	1.8%	100.0%	4.2%
Case Manager	8.0%	7.2%	33.8%	24.1%	7.3%	5.8%	12.7%	1.0%	100.0%	30.2%
Police	0.0%	0.3%	24.1%	4.0%	0.3%	0.0%	0.3%	71.0%	100.0%	4.9%
Probation	14.6%	3.2%	20.3%	12.0%	1.2%	3.6%	9.7%	35.3%	100.0%	56.0%
Neigh Dev. Specialist	0.0%	6.1%	53.0%	4.2%	11.5%	13.7%	10.9%	0.6%	100.0%	4.7%
Total	10.6%	4.6%	27.9%	14.8%	3.4%	4.8%	10.2%	23.7%	100.0%	100.0%

¹ Based on total counts of services provided during the four-year period.

Table 10.9-continued
Types of Services by Types of Workers

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (N=128)
Number of Services by Type of Worker Providing Service

<u>Worker Type</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>
Outreach	0	23	144	4	2	9	15	1	198
Case Manager	69	164	720	438	195	47	194	33	1860
Police	0	0	58	19	0	0	0	177	254
Probation	252	87	530	247	31	30	150	645	1972
Neigh Dev. Specialist	0	1	8	7	0	0	1	0	17
Total	321	275	1460	715	228	86	360	856	4301

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (N=128)
Percentage of Types of Services by Type of Worker

<u>Worker Type</u>	<u>caseplan</u>	<u>matsuppl</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>indcoun</u>	<u>familycoun</u>	<u>job</u>	<u>school</u>	<u>supres</u>	<u>Total Services</u>	<u>Percent of Total Services By Different Types of Workers[⊗]</u>
Outreach	0.0%	11.6%	72.7%	2.0%	1.0%	4.5%	7.6%	0.5%	100.0%	4.6%
Case Manager	3.7%	8.8%	38.7%	23.5%	10.5%	2.5%	10.4%	1.8%	100.0%	43.2%
Police	0.0%	0.0%	22.8%	7.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	69.7%	100.0%	5.9%
Probation	12.8%	4.4%	26.9%	12.5%	1.6%	1.5%	7.6%	32.7%	100.0%	45.8%
Neigh Dev. Specialist	0.0%	5.9%	47.1%	41.2%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	100.0%	0.4%
Total	7.5%	6.4%	33.9%	16.6%	5.3%	2.0%	8.4%	19.9%	100.0%	99.9%

⊗ Column does not sum due to rounding error.

Chapter 11

Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Arrest Variables

(Kwai Ming Wa)

Introduction

In this chapter, we examine the general effects of the program on youth using arrest variables. We are interested in the effectiveness of the program in reducing arrests for youth who come mostly from the program area (Powell Junior High School area), compared to youth who come mostly from the comparison areas (Kino, Carson, and Mesa Junior High School areas) who were not provided with services and worker contacts. We use statistical models to control for differences between program-youth and comparison-youth characteristics, and to tell us whether youth characteristics rather than program effects account for changes in arrests patterns during the program period compared to the pre-program period. We are also interested in whether youth in the program do better, worse, or about the same as comparison youth, without reference to specific program services or worker contacts provided (which we address in the next chapter).

In the first set of analyses – the General Linear (GLM) and Logistic Regression models – we use the five outcome or dependent variables: *total arrest changes*, which includes arrests for all offenses; *total violence arrest changes*, which combines serious violence and general violence arrests; *total property arrest changes*; *total drug arrest changes*; and *total “other” arrest changes*.¹ The GLM models estimate differences in the change in the mean number of arrests for all program and all comparison youth between the program and the pre-program periods,

¹Refer to Appendix A for a description of charge categories for the different types of arrests.

controlling for several demographic characteristics of the youth.² The GLM models provide us with information to answer the question: Did the mean level of change in arrests decrease, increase or stay the same – not only for the program and comparison youth samples, but for subsamples based on gender, race/ethnicity, age, gang membership, and prior arrest histories? The Logistic Regression equations address a different question: What factors are associated with program youth being a success (having a decrease in arrests or staying arrest free), or being a failure (increasing or staying at the same level of arrests) in relation to comparison youth with similar characteristics? The Logistic Regression models predict how many youth succeeded and how many failed, comparing one sample of youth to another.

For each of the five outcome variables in the GLM models, the number of arrests was annualized, in order to control for varying numbers of arrests during varying lengths of program periods, which were matched with pre-program periods. The outcome variables measure the mean yearly difference in the number of arrests for youth between pre-program and program periods.³

The same six independent variables were generally included in the GLM equations to explain variance in the five dependent variables. The independent variables are: *project* – Time-I-interviewed comparison youth, Time-I-interviewed program youth, or non-interviewed program youth (i.e., inclusively, all program and comparison youth, except as otherwise noted); *priors* –

²Even after matching comparison youth with program youth, other differences remained, e.g., number of prior arrests (see Chapter 9).

³First, the yearly mean number of arrests was calculated using the total number of arrests for each youth during the program and pre-program periods, divided by the length in years for each period. Second, the mean yearly change was calculated by subtracting the mean number of yearly arrests in the program period from the mean number of yearly arrests for the pre-program period.

level or category of arrests⁴ during the pre-program period; *age group* – age at program entry (14 years and under, 15 to 17 years, 18 years and over); *gang membership* – whether interviewed comparison youth and interviewed program youth self-reported being a gang member, a gang associate, or not being a gang member at their Time I interview (or the Project worker reported the non-interviewed program youth as being a gang member, a gang associate, or not a gang member, or unknown); *gender*; *race/ethnicity* (Latino, White, Other). Interaction terms were sometimes added to the models. Youth who had zero prior and zero subsequent arrests (“zero-zero”) for the particular arrest categories were excluded from the GLM models, but generally were included in the Logistic Regression models. The following sections present the findings of “best” GLM and Logistic Regression models.

Models

Total Arrests

GLM Models

In the first basic GLM model for total arrests – consisting of 66 comparison youth, 91 interviewed program youth, and 68 non-interviewed program youth who had arrests (N = 225)⁵ – we included six program and control variables – *project*, *gender*, *race/ethnicity*, *gang membership*, *age group* and *prior total arrests category*. The model explained 50.1% of the variance in the dependent variable, and was significant (p. < 0.001). The *prior total arrest*

⁴The level or category of total yearly prior arrests was ranked as follows: 1) none=no arrest; 2) low=0.01 to 0.99; 3) medium=1.0 to 1.99; and 4) high ≥ 2.00.

⁵ Forty-two youth (6 comparison youth, 7 interviewed program youth, 29 non-interviewed program youth) with police arrest histories had no arrests in either the pre-program or program periods.

category ($p. < 0.001$) and *age group* ($p. < 0.022$) were significant; *project* was marginally significant ($p. = 0.057$), particularly due to the reduction of arrests for the non-interviewed program group; *gender* ($p. = 0.107$) and *race/ethnicity* ($p. = 0.059$) were marginally significant; *gang membership* was not statistically significant ($p. = 0.206$).

In our final, or “best,” model, we included five additional variables: *length of time in the program* (or comparison-sample equivalent); whether *probation status* made a difference; and three interaction terms – *project* × *gender*, *project* × *probation*, and *project* × *priors*). This final model explains more variance (R-square = 56.9%) and clarifies the influence of relevant variables.

While the *project* variable alone was not significant ($p. < 0.480$) in the “best” model, it was highly significant as an interaction term with *priors* ($p. < 0.001$). *Age group* remained significant ($p. < 0.03$). The *gender* and *race/ethnicity* variables were no longer marginally significant ($p. = 0.121$ and $p. = 0.125$, respectively). *Priors* remained the most significant variable explaining outcome. In general, youth with fewer priors increased their arrests in the program period, and youth with more priors decreased their arrests in the program period.

However, there were important differences between the two program groups (the interviewed and the non-interviewed groups) and the comparison group. The two program groups showed less of an increase in arrests during the program period among youth with no or few priors, and more of a decrease in arrests during the program period among youth with more priors. This was particularly the case for the interviewed program youth in the no, low, and medium prior-arrest categories and the non-interviewed program youth in the low, medium, and high prior-arrest categories. Both the interviewed and non-interviewed program youth did better than comparison

youth in three out of the four prior-arrest categories. These differences were not necessarily significant.

Older youth, 18 years and over, reduced their arrests significantly more than the 15 to 17-year-olds ($p = 0.008$), and did marginally better than the 14-years-and-under youth ($p = 0.081$). Program females, whether in the interviewed or non-interviewed group, did non-significantly better (i.e., had fewer subsequent arrests) than comparison females, and had higher levels of reduced arrests than any of the male groups, whether comparison, interviewed-program or non-interviewed-program.

In essence – based on a comparison of program and pre-program arrests and controlling for an array of factors – the non-interviewed program sample showed a non-significantly lower rate of total arrests than the interviewed program or comparison samples, and the comparison sample showed a decrease in total arrests similar to the interviewed program sample. The Mesa Project had a significant, positive effect in reducing levels of total arrests, particularly in interaction with priors. Factors that did not seem to make any significant difference under controlled statistical conditions were gang membership, years in the program, or probation status (Table 11.1).

Logistic Regression Models

In the next set of models, we focused on the effects of the Project on youth who reduced their level of arrests or remained arrest free, including those youth who had no prior arrests in both the program and pre-program periods: these two subgroups represent program successes. We also focused on the effects of the Project on youth who did not remain arrest free, including

those youth who increased their level of arrests or those who did not change their level of arrests, in the program period compared to the pre-program period: these two subgroups represent program failures. In some of the models we included youth who had no arrest histories in either the pre-program or program periods; in other models we excluded them. Our purpose was to identify models where the samples containing both youth with arrests and youth without arrests, and the samples containing only youth with arrests, may be significantly different due to program effects.

In the present model, we included all youth – comparison, interviewed program, and non-interviewed program – with or without arrests (N = 267). We were interested in 1) the effects of the program on the 98 interviewed program youth relative to the 72 comparison youth, and 2) the effects of the program on the 97 non-interviewed program youth relative to the same 72 comparison youth, using separate logistic equations.

Interviewed Program Youth and Comparison Youth. In this Logistic Regression model (Chi Square = 43.81, 6 Df, p. <0.001), 36 interviewed program youth (36.7%) were classified as failures and 62 (63.3%) were classified as successes, while 40 comparison youth (55.6%) were classified as failures and 32 (44.4%) were classified as successes. Entering the *project* variable and controlling for *prior arrests*, *gender*, *race/ethnicity*, *age group*, and *gang membership*, the equation was significant (p. < 0.001). The interviewed program youth did 44% better than the comparison youth (p = 0.361, not significant; odds ratio 1.44). The most significant predictors of outcome were *prior total arrests* (p. < 0.001; odds 2.37); *age group* (the 18-and-over group did 4.6 times better than the 15 to 17-year-olds, and did 18% better than the 14-and-under group; *gender* (females did better than males: p. < 0.01; odds 4.27); and *race/ethnicity* (Latinos did

better than other groups: $p = 0.92$; odds 2.27) (Table 11.2).

We found again that *prior total arrests* was the strongest predictor of success or failure in the program period for interviewed program and comparison youth. The oldest age group, the females and the Latinos reduced their levels of arrests across the two samples. Whether a youth was a gang member, a gang associate or a not a gang member appeared to have little differential influence on changing his arrest patterns. Most important for program-evaluation purposes, youth in the interviewed program sample were more likely than youth in the comparison sample to reduce their level of arrests during the program period compared to the pre-program period, although this difference is not statistically significant.

Non-Interviewed Program Youth and Comparison Youth. The results of the Logistic Regression analysis comparing success and failure of non-interviewed program youth with comparison youth were highly similar to those of the interviewed program youth/comparison youth analysis in respect to change in total arrest patterns between the pre-program and program periods. Again, in this second Logistic Regression model (Chi square = 32.57, 6 Df, $p < 0.001$), 38 non-interviewed program youth (39.2%) were classified as failures and 59 non-interviewed program youth (60.8%) were classified as successes, while 40 comparison youth (55.6%) were classified as failures and 32 comparison youth (44.4%) were classified as successes.

Controlling for the same variables indicated in the above Logistic Regression model, non-interviewed program youth were 42% more successful than comparison youth ($p < 0.083$) in maintaining their pre-program zero-arrest histories or reducing their pre-program arrest patterns during the program period. *Prior arrests*, as a regression factor, remained the strongest predictor of subsequent success or failure. Those youth with records of higher prior arrests were more

likely to be successes, and those youth with records of lower prior arrests were more likely to be failures. Again, the oldest youth group, the Latinos and the females were more likely to be successes (Table 11.3).

Total Violence Arrests

A relatively small number of program and comparison youth were arrested for violence in both the pre-program and program periods. Only 14.7% (n= 33) of all youth were arrested for serious (felony) violence, and 26.77% (n = 60) of youth were arrested for less-serious (misdemeanor) violence – for a total of 41.3% (n = 93) of all youth from all three samples combined (N = 225). On the other hand, there was little variability across the three samples in certain characteristics of youth arrested for any kind of violence: 91.4% (n = 85) of all such youth were males, 84.9% (n = 79) were gang members or gang associates and 80.7% (n = 75) were on probation. We eliminated these three variables – gender, gang membership and probation status – from the analyses of program effects on violence arrests. Also, since only 23.7% (n = 22) of non-Latino youth (African-American, Asian, and White/Non-Latino) combined were arrested for violence, we classified the race/ethnicity variables as Latino/Non-Latino. Further, since there were so few youth arrested for more than one violent act in the pre-program period, we employed only three prior-arrest categories: none = 0, low = 0.01 to 0.49, and medium/high = 0.5 to 1.0 and more.

GLM Models

Our “best” GLM model for total violence included 93 youth – 25 comparison youth, 45

interviewed program youth, and 23 non-interviewed program youth – and five variables: *project*, *race/ethnicity*, *age group*, *length of time in the program* (or an equivalent period for comparison youth), and *prior total violence arrests category*. The model explained 67% of variance in the dependent variable. *Project* was not significant ($p = 0.763$). Comparison, interviewed program youth, and non-interviewed program youth all reduced their level of violence arrests about equally during the program period. Again, our *prior violence arrests* variable was highly significant ($p < 0.001$). The youth with “none” and “low” categories of prior violence arrests increased their levels of violence arrests slightly during the program period, and the youth with “medium/high” categories of violence arrests reduced their levels of violence arrests. *Age group* was a significant predictor ($p = 0.01$). All age groups reduced their levels of violence arrests, but the younger group (14-and-under) had a significantly greater decrease than the 15 to 17-year-olds ($p = 0.002$), and a greater decrease than the 18-and-over group ($p = 0.067$). However, there was little difference in decrease between the two older age groups.

Length of time in the program (or its equivalent for the comparison group) made a difference. The longer the length of time, the greater the decline in violence arrests ($p = 0.018$). We believe we were mainly picking up differences between the interviewed program youth, who were in the program more than two years, and the non-interviewed program youth, most of whom were in the program less than two years. *Race/ethnicity* was not a significant predictor of reduced total violence arrests ($p = 0.591$) (Table 11.4).

In sum, the program had little or no effect on the reduction of violence arrests. Youth who were in the “low” or “medium/high” categories had a slight reduction, overall. Younger youth (14-and-under) were able to reduce their patterns of violence arrests more than older youth.

This is a surprising finding. A younger age was better than an older age (15 to 17, or 18-years-and-over) as an abatement factor for the reduction of total violence arrests. Ordinarily, we would have expected the oldest rather than the youngest age groups to show a greater reduction in violence arrests over time. The finding could be related to the fact that most non-interviewed program youth were younger than most program-interviewed and comparison youth and were in the program for less than two years.

Logistic Regression Models

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and interviewed program youth, 58 comparison youth (80.6%) and 78 interviewed program youth (79.6%) were estimated to be successes, mainly because so many had no violence arrests (“zero-zero”) in both the pre-program and program periods. In the final model, with the variables, *project*, *gender*, *race/ethnicity*, *age group*, *gang membership*, and *prior violent arrests category*, the model ($p = 0.55$) and none of the variables were statistically significant. Even *priors*, while important (odds 1.20), was not significant. Interviewed program youth did 10% worse than comparison youth⁶ (odds 0.890), but the estimate was not statistically significant (Chi-square = 0.076, $p = 0.783$) (Table 11.5).

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and non-interviewed program youth, 58 comparison youth (80.6%) and 86 non-interviewed program youth (88.7%) were estimated to be successes (i.e., remained violence-arrest free), or reduced their level of violence arrests in the program period (again mainly because so few were arrested for violence in either the program or

⁶ A difference of 10% is due to the fact that 47 comparison youth (65.3%) and 53 program youth (54.1%) had no violence arrests.

pre-program period). In the final model, including the same variables as above, the entire model ($p = 0.615$) and none of the variables were statistically significant. The *project* variable was almost marginally significant (Chi-square = 2.616, $p = 0.106$; odds = 1.50). The non-interviewed program youth had a better record of success (50% better) than the comparison youth, but the difference was marginally statistically significant (Table 11.6).

Because so few of the youth in all the samples were arrested for violence in either the program or pre-program period, and because the non-interviewed-program youth generally had fewer violence arrests than the comparison youth (who had fewer violence arrests in the pre-program period than the interviewed program youth), we excluded all youth with no violence arrests from further analyses, to test whether or not the program had an effect on only those youth with violence arrests.

In this Logistic Regression model for total violence arrests, we included only comparison and interviewed program youth with violence arrests; 25 interviewed program youth (55.6%) and 11 comparison youth (44.0%) were estimated to be successes during the program period. Similar to the Logistic Regression model above (comparison and non-interviewed program youth), and including the same variables, the entire model was significant ($p < 0.001$). The *prior violence arrests* variable was significant ($p = 0.002$), and the *age group* variable was almost significant (Chi-square = 2.954; $p = 0.086$; odds = 2.08). Although the *project* variable was not significant, the interviewed program sample had a 48.4% higher ratio probability of success in the reduction of total violence arrests than the comparison sample (Table 11.7).

Further, in the Logistic Regression model for total violence arrests, in which we included only comparison youth and non-interviewed program youth with violence arrests, 12 non-

interviewed program youth (52.2%) and 11 comparison youth (44.0%) were estimated to be successes during the program period. Again, the entire model was significant ($p. > 0.001$), but no variable – not even prior total violence arrests – was significant. There was no difference in the reduction of total violence arrests between the comparison and non-interviewed program samples (Table 11.8). The MGIP may have been more successful with the interviewed program youth than with the non-interviewed program youth in reducing violence arrests.

Total Property Arrests

GLM Models

In these models, a majority of arrested youth in each of the samples had pre-program arrests for a range of property crimes: 39 comparison youth (61.5%); 59 interviewed program youth (86.4%); and 33 non-interviewed program youth (69.7%). Property-crime offenses included theft, attempted theft, shoplifting, burglary, possession/receipt/sale of stolen motor vehicle, criminal damage to motor vehicle, criminal damage to property, possession of stolen property, trespass, criminal trespass to land, criminal trespass to property.

The “best” model, excluding “zero-zero” property offenses, included 131 youth and had six variables: *project*, *race/ethnicity*, *gang membership*, *age group*, *length of time in the program*, and *prior property arrests category*. We excluded the *gender* variable, since only 17 females had property arrests in the program and pre-program periods, and the *probation* variable, since only 3 program (interviewed or non-interviewed) and 21 comparison youth with property-arrest records in the program and pre-program periods were not on probation. This “best” model was statistically significant ($R\text{-square} = 0.644$, $p. < 0.001$). The *prior property arrests* variable

was highly significant ($p. < 0.001$), the *project* variable was significant ($p. < 0.041$), and the *age group* variable was almost statistically significant ($p. = 0.056$). The single variable which explained the most variance was, again, *prior property arrest* ($p. < 0.001$), i.e., the “regression” effect. *Race/ethnicity*, *gang membership*, and *length of time in the program* were not significant in explaining variance in the dependent variable *total property arrests change* (i.e., the difference between total property arrests in the program period and total property arrests in the pre-program period).

There was a decline in property arrests for each of the samples. The largest decline (mean = -0.533) – for the comparison youth – was greater than the decline for the interviewed program youth (mean = -0.143, $p. = 0.026$), but not significantly greater than the decline for the non-interviewed program youth (-0.516; $p. = 0.774$). The decline for the oldest age group (18-and-over) was significantly greater than for the 15 to 17-year-old group (mean = -0.169, $p. = 0.033$), but not significantly greater than the decline for the youngest group (14-and-under) (mean = -0.459) (Table 11.9).

Overall, the comparison youth showed a somewhat greater decline in property-crime arrests than the program youth, particularly the interviewed program youth. The older youth generally showed a greater decline in property-crime arrests than did the younger youth, especially compared to the 15 to 17-year-olds. Again (surprisingly) the youngest age group, like their older counterparts, showed a decline in property arrests during the program period. The only increase was for those who had no prior arrests. This could have been because the non-interviewed program youth, to begin with, were generally less delinquent or were arrested less for property crime than youth in the other two samples.

Logistic Regression Models

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and interviewed program youth, 79 interviewed program youth (80.6%) and 55 comparison youth (76.4%) were estimated to be successful in lowering or remaining at a zero-property-arrests rate during the program period compared to the pre-program period. In the “best” model, with the variables *project*, *gender*, *race/ethnicity*, *age group*, *gang membership* and *prior property arrests category*, the model was statistically significant (Chi-square = 13.460, 6 Df, p. = 0.036). There was no difference in the pattern of success or failure for interviewed program youth or comparison youth. However, females were four times more likely to be successes than males (Chi-square = 3.723, p. = 0.054; odds = 3.85), and Latino youth were three times more likely to be successes than non-Latino youth (Chi-square = 5.609, p. = 0.018; odds = 2.91). The older age group was also 62% (but not quite significantly) more likely than the younger age group to lower (or remain without) arrests for property crime in the program period (Chi-square = 3.055, p. = 0.08; odds = 1.62). Gang membership and prior property arrests were not significant (Table 11.10).

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and non-interviewed program youth, 55 comparison youth (76.4%) and 84 non-interviewed program youth (86.6%) were estimated to be successful in reducing (or remaining without) property arrests in the program period. Again, the model was statistically significant (Chi-square = 15.381, 6 Df, p. = 0.018). Non-interviewed program youth were 19% more successful than comparison youth, but the difference was not statistically significant (Chi-square = 0.470, p. = 0.493; odds = 1.19). Latino youth did 3.2 times better than non-Latino youth (Chi-square 6.194, p. = 0.013; odds = 3.20). Gender, age group, gang membership, and prior property arrests were not statistically significant (Table 11.11).

In sum, all the youth samples lowered their arrest rates for property crime. The program was somewhat more successful in lowering property arrest levels (or keeping youth arrest-free) for non-interviewed program youth than for interviewed program youth, but, overall, comparison youth did as well as program youth. The oldest youth were generally more successful in reducing their property-crime arrests than were younger youth.

Total Drug Crime Arrests

GLM Model

A small but substantial percentage of youth in the three samples were arrested for drug offenses in the program and pre-program periods, mainly for possession of drugs: 21 comparison youth (29.2%), 23 interviewed program youth (23.5%), and 18 non-interviewed program youth (18.8%). The “best” model includes 62 youth. Only 5 females in the three samples had arrests for drugs, so the *gender* variable is excluded from the analysis. Since only 8 whites, 3 youth from the “other” ethnic groups, and 1 youth of unknown race/ethnicity were arrested for drugs in the program or pre-program periods, those race/ethnicity categories were combined. The large majority of youth arrested for drugs were Latinos (n = 50). Also, since there were only 7 non-gang youth and 1 youth with unknown gang membership arrested for drugs, those gang membership categories were combined, as were gang members (n = 44) and gang associates (n = 10). The *probation* variable was excluded from the analysis since of the 62 youth in the analysis only 1 arrested youth from the two program samples and all arrested youth from the comparison sample were not on probation.

Six variables were entered into the “best” model (n = 62): *project*, *race/ethnicity*, *gang*

membership, age group, length of time in the program (less than two years or two or more years, or their equivalent for comparison youth) and *prior drug arrests category*. The model was statistically significant (R-square = 0.487, $p < 0.001$). The *project* variable was not statistically significant ($p = 0.871$). However, there was a slightly greater increase in drug arrests for comparison youth (+0.237) than for interviewed program youth (+0.147), but a very slight decrease for non-interviewed program youth (-0.009). Latino youth significantly decreased their level of drug arrests in the program period ($p = 0.018$). All youth, across all three samples, significantly decreased their arrests for drug crime over a two-or-more-year program period.

The most significant variable in the equation was *prior arrests for drug crime*. Youth with no or low numbers of prior drug arrests increased their level of drug arrests, while youth with medium or high numbers of prior drug arrests decreased their drug arrests. Gang membership was not significant, although gang members increased their level of arrests (+0.344) more than gang associates (+0.059). Non-gang youth showed a slight (non-significant) decrease (-0.028) in arrests for drugs. All age groups slightly (though non-significantly) increased their level of drug arrests, particularly the 15 to 17-year-olds. The smallest non-significant increase was in the 14-and-under group (Table 11.12). The implication of the GLM finding is that the drug problem was increasing, at least based on arrests, and that the Project had little effect.

Logistic Regression Models

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and interviewed program youth (including youth with no history of drug arrests), 58 comparison youth (80.6%) and 89 interviewed program youth (90.8%) were estimated to be successful in lowering (or remaining at

zero) drug-arrest rates during the program period. The “best” model included six variables: *project, gender, race/ethnicity, age group, gang membership, and prior drug arrests category*. The model was not significant ($p = 0.622$). Only the *project* variable is marginally significant (Chi-square = 3.160, $p = 0.076$; odds = 2.37). The interviewed program youth had a 2.4 times better success rate than the comparison youth. None of the other variables come close to being significant (Table 11.13).

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and non-interviewed program youth (including youth with no history of drug arrests), 58 comparison youth (80.6%) and 86 non-interviewed program youth (88.7%) were successful in lowering (or remaining at zero) drug arrests during the program period compared to the pre-program period. In this “best” model, the same six variables were used. The model Chi-square was again not significant ($p = 0.159$). No variable was statically significant, although race/ethnicity was marginally significant ($p = 0.095$; odds 2.32). Latino youth did 2.3 times better than non-Latino youth in reducing their drug arrests. Non-interviewed program youth appear to do 23% better ($p = 0.393$; odds 1.230) than the comparison youth (Table 11.14). Both the interviewed and non-interviewed program youth appeared to be slightly but non-significantly more successful in reducing drug arrests than the comparison youth.

As with our Logistic Regression analysis using the dependent variable *total violence arrests*, we also examined program effects on youth with only drug arrests. In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and interviewed program youth, 7 comparison youth (33.3%) and 14 interviewed program youth (60.9%) were estimated to be successful in lowering drug arrests during the program period. The “best” model included the same gender variables

described above. The model was significant ($p. < 0.05$). No variable was significant, however the interviewed program sample did 3.9 times better than the comparison sample in their success rate (Table 11.15).

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and non-interviewed program youth, 7 comparison youth (33.3%) and 7 non-interviewed program youth (38.9%) were estimated to be successful in lowering drug arrests during the program period. The “best” model included the same gender variables. The model was significant ($p. < 0.01$), but still no variables were significant, and the comparison sample did 41.0% better than the non-interviewed program sample (Table 11.16).

The pattern for the interviewed program sample suggests that the program may have had a positive effect in reducing drug crime only for the interviewed program sample.

All “Other” Arrests

GLM Models

In these models, more interviewed program youth, 81.9% ($n = 55$) than non-interviewed program youth, 62.2% ($n = 28$) or comparison youth, 50% ($n = 37$), had arrests for “other” offenses, either in the pre-program or program periods. “Other” arrests usually included minor arrest charges: violation of the motor vehicle act, obstruction of justice, minor drinking, intoxication of a minor, possession of alcohol by a minor, driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs, drinking, curfew violation, status offense, unlawful possession of weapons, unlawful possession of firearms, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, etc. More program and comparison youth were arrested for these “other” offenses than for any of

the more serious offenses such as violence, property crime and drug possession. Youth in each of the samples who had prior arrests for “other” offenses reduced their “other” arrest patterns.

The “best” model, which excluded youth with no history of (or zero-zero) arrests for “other” offenses, included 165 youth and seven variables: *project*, *gender*, *race/ethnicity*, *gang membership*, *age group*, *length of time in the program*, and *prior “other” arrests category*.

Again, we excluded the *probation* variable, since only 5 program youth (interviewed and non-interviewed) and 32 comparison youth were not on probation. The “best” model was statistically significant (R-square = 0.484, $p < 0.001$). However, the only variable that was significant was *prior “other” arrests* ($p < 0.001$). No other variable came close to significance.

In terms of arrests for minor offenses – whether the variable was interviewed-program, non-interviewed program, or comparison youth; whether the youth was male or female, Latino or non-Latino, a gang member, gang associate, or non-gang youth, younger or older, in the program for a long or short period – they all had a reduction in “minor” offense arrests over time. Most important, there was no program effect on “other” arrests. The dominant change effect was for youth who had no pre-program “other” arrests, but had more program-period “other” arrests. Youth who had some pre-program “other” arrests had fewer program-period “other” arrests (Table 11.17).

Logistic Regression Models

More of the interviewed program youth than comparison youth appeared to have been successful in reducing their “other” offense arrests in the program period (i.e., youth who reduced their arrests or remained at “zero-zero”): 66 interviewed program youth (67.3%) and 35

comparison youth ((48.6%) were successes.

In the “best” Logistic Regression model, the following six variables were used: *project*, *gender*, *race/ethnicity*, *age group*, *gang membership*, and *prior “other” arrests category*. The equation was significant (Chi-square = 13.845, 6 DF, $p < 0.05$). The two variables that were significant were *project* ($p = 0.033$; odds = 2.123) and *gender* ($p = 0.016$; odds = 3.712).

Interviewed program youth were more than two times better than comparison youth at reducing their arrests for “other” offenses (Table 11.18).

In the Logistic Regression equation that includes non-interviewed program youth and comparison youth, 71 non-interviewed program youth (73.2%) and, again, 35 comparison youth (48.6%) were estimated to be successes in reducing their arrests for “other” offenses.

In the “best” Logistic Regression model, the same six variables were used. The model was slightly more statistically significant than the model for interviewed program youth and comparison youth (Chi-square = 16.950, 6 DF, $p < 0.01$). The *project* variable was highly significant ($p = 0.003$; odds = 1.81). The non-interviewed program youth did 81% better than the comparison youth. No other variable in the equation was significant, except that *race/ethnicity* was marginally significant ($p = 0.070$; odds = 2.06). The Latino youth success rate was two times better than the non-Latino youth success rate. Females also did two times better than males ($p = 0.150$; odds = 2.21) (Table 11.19).

In sum, while each of the three samples reduced their levels of “minor” offense arrests during the program period, more of the program youth – interviewed and non-interviewed – successfully reduced their levels (or maintained a “zero-zero” level) of “minor” offense arrests than did comparison youth. More non-interviewed program youth than interviewed program

youth were successful, as were females and Latino youth.

Summary

Program youth, both interviewed and non-interviewed, did better than comparison youth in reducing their levels of total arrests during the program period. About 42% more program youth than comparison youth were successful in the reduction of total arrests, or remained without arrests during the program period.

All of the samples reduced their levels of total violence arrests (serious and less serious). Few youth had records of serious or less-serious violence. However, about 48% more interviewed program youth than comparison youth were successful in the reduction of violence arrests in the program period.

All of the samples of youth reduced their levels of property arrests, but comparison youth had a significantly greater reduction than did interviewed program youth during the program period. However, there was little difference between the comparison sample and the two program samples in the proportions of youth who were successes or failures in reducing their levels of property arrests (or of those who remained without property arrests).

There was an increase in drug arrests in all of the samples, with no difference in levels of increase in drug arrests during the program period. However, the number of youth arrested for drug crimes was small in each of the samples. In general, more program youth (interviewed youth more than non-interviewed youth) reduced their probability of drug arrests relative to comparison youth. This was particularly evident for the interviewed program youth, who were almost four times more successful than comparison youth.

Generally, each of the three samples reduced their levels of “other” (minor) arrests. Minor arrests comprised the majority of arrests for youth in all three samples in the program and pre-program periods. There was no significant difference in the level of reduction of “other” arrests for the samples during the program period. However, program youth (interviewed and non-interviewed) were about twice as successful in the reduction of “other” offense arrests relative to comparison youth.

In sum, program youth had lower levels of arrests, and were more successful than comparison youth in the reduction of arrests – particularly total arrests, violence arrests, drug arrests, and “other” arrests.

Table 11.1
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests
(Controlling for Total Arrests in the Pre-program Period)

11.1(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.569)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program-Interviewed, Program-Non-interviewed	2	1.362	0.74	0.480
Gender: Male/Female	1	4.469	2.42	0.121
Race/Ethnicity: White, Latino, Others, Unknown	3	3.571	1.93	0.125
Gang Membership: Non-gang, Gang, Associate, Unknown	3	0.730	0.40	0.767
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over	2	6.741	3.65*	0.028
Program Length (or Equivalent): <2 Yrs/ >=2 Yrs	1	0.590	0.32	0.572
Probation Status: Yes/No	1	3.467	1.88	0.172
Prior Total Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	90.498	49.01***	0.000
Project XGender	2	1.282	0.69	0.501
Project XProbation Status	2	0.193	0.10	0.901
Project XPrior Total Arrests	6	9.336	5.06***	0.000
Within error	198	1.847	—	—
Total	224	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.1(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Arrests Covariate

Prior Total Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	52	1.160	0.305	1	—	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	73	-0.133	0.287	2		—	0.001***	0.000***
Medium	51	-1.085	0.323	3			—	0.000***
High	49	-2.729	0.337	4				—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.1(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Group Main Effect

Age	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
14 & Under	63	-0.579	0.287	1	—	0.544	0.081
15 to 17	104	-0.433	0.277	2		—	0.008*
18 & Over	58	-1.078	0.316	3			—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.1(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project×Prior Total Arrests Interaction

Project [¶]	Prior Total Arrests	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)													
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
C	None	1.014	0.385	24	1	—		*	‡		*	‡	‡		*	‡	‡	
C	Low	0.028	0.414	23	2		—		‡			†	†	*		†	‡	
C	Med	-0.359	0.494	12	3			—	‡					†			‡	
C	High	-2.867	0.568	7	4				—	‡	‡	*	*	‡	‡			
Pi	None	0.820	0.589	8	5					—	*	‡	‡				‡	
Pi	Low	-0.308	0.438	35	6						—	*	†	‡		†	‡	
Pi	Med	-1.225	0.443	26	7							—		‡		*	‡	
Pi	High	-1.481	0.469	22	8								—	‡			‡	
Pn	None	1.648	0.434	20	9										—	‡	‡	‡
Pn	Low	-0.298	0.486	15	10											—	*	‡
Pn	Med	-1.671	0.550	13	11												—	‡
Pn	High	-3.839	0.528	20	12													—

For differences between groups: * *p* < .05; † *p* < .01; and ‡ *p* < .001 .
[¶]C=Comparison; Pi=Interviewed-Program; Pn=Non-interviewed Program Youth.

Table 11.2
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Total Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.2(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	32	40	72
Program Interviewed	62	36	98

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170).

11.2(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=43.813 * with 6 df)**

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-5.828	1.416	0.000***	—
Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program-Interviewed)	1	0.362	0.396	0.361	1.436
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	1.451	0.564	0.010*	4.267
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	0.761	0.452	0.092	2.139
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.818	0.264	0.002**	2.266
Gang Membership (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	0.092	0.231	0.690	1.097
Prior Total Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High)	1	0.864	0.207	0.000***	2.373

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Table 11.3
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Total Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.3(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	32	40	72
Program Non-Interviewed	59	38	97

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169).

11.3(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=32.566 * with 6 df)**

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-3.591	1.339	0.007***	—
Project : (0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed)	1	0.352	0.203	0.083	1.422
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	0.467	0.548	0.374	1.627
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	0.84	0.430	0.051	2.317
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.585	0.288	0.042*	1.795
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	-0.389	0.293	0.183	0.677
Prior Total Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High)	1	0.787	0.193	0.000***	2.197

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Table 11.4
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests
(Controlling for Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-program Period)

11.4(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.670)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison, Program-Interviewed, Program Non-interviewed	2	0.126	0.27	0.763
Race/Ethnicity: Latino/Non-Latino	1	0.135	0.29	0.591
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over	2	2.269	4.90**	0.010
Program Length (or Equivalent): <2 Yrs />=2 Yrs	1	2.725	5.88*	0.018
Prior Total Violence Arrests: None; Low; Medium; High	3	23.379	50.45***	0.000
Within error	83	0.463	—	—
Total	92	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.4(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and
Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Group Main Effect

Age	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				<i>i/j</i>	1	2	3
14 & Under	26	-0.676	0.152	1	—	0.002**	0.067
15 to 17	41	-0.124	0.118	2		—	0.501
18 & Over	26	-0.253	0.163	3			—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 11.4 continued

11.4(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Program Length Main Effect

Program Length	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2				
<2 Yrs	34	-0.095	0.148	0.018*				
>=2 Yrs	59	-0.607	0.127					

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.4(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Violence Arrests Covariate

Prior Total Violence Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	34	0.870	0.140	1	—	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	23	0.093	0.172	2		—	0.010***	0.000***
Medium	20	-0.488	0.167	3			—	0.000***
High	16	-0.879	0.188	4				—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 11.5
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Total Violence Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.5(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	58	14	72
Program-Interviewed	78	20	98

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170).

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=47, Program=53) are coded as "success."

11.5(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=4.945 with 6 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	0.143	1.299	0.912	—
Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program-Interviewed)	1	-0.117	0.423	0.783	0.890
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	0.280	0.579	0.629	1.323
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	0.305	0.470	0.517	1.356
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.425	0.277	0.125	1.530
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	-0.293	0.271	0.280	0.746
Prior Total Violence Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High)	1	0.184	0.276	0.504	1.203

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 11.6
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Total Violence Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.6(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	58	14	72
Program Non-Interviewed	86	11	97

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169).

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=47, Program=74) are coded "success."

11.6(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=4.458 with 6 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	1.004	1.541	0.515	—
Project : (0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed)	1	0.402	0.249	0.106	1.495
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	0.529	0.699	0.449	1.697
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	-0.442	0.545	0.418	0.643
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.481	0.345	0.164	1.617
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	-0.299	0.367	0.416	0.742
Prior Total Violence Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High)	1	-0.020	0.270	0.940	0.980

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 11.7
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Total Violence Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth
(Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”)

11.7(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	11	14	25
Program-Interviewed	25	20	45

† Total number of youth who have violent arrests for violent crime (N=70).

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=47, Program=53) are removed from this analysis.

11.7(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=22.342* with 6 df)**

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-3.180	2.862	0.267	—
Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program-Interviewed)	1	0.395	0.662	0.551	1.484
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	-2.150	2.025	0.288	0.116
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	0.650	0.791	0.411	1.915
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.730	0.425	0.086	2.076
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	-0.104	0.404	0.796	0.901
Prior Total Violence Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High)	1	2.059	0.663	0.002***	7.834

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Table 11.8
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Total Violence Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth
(Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”)

11.8(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect † ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	11	14	25
Program Non-Interviewed	12	11	23

† Total number of youth who have violent arrests for violent crime (N=48).

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=47, Program=74) are removed from this analysis.

11.8(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=28.594* with 6 df)**

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-13.651	66.822	0.838	—
Project : (0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed)	1	-9.243	46.630	0.843	0.000
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	-7.785	65.282	0.905	0.000
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	-0.448	1.269	0.724	0.639
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.893	0.854	0.296	2.443
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	0.456	1.060	0.667	1.578
Prior Total Violence Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High)	1	18.551	93.225	0.842	999.000

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Table 11.9
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests
(Controlling for Property Arrests in the Pre-program Period)

11.9(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.644)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison; Program-Interviewed; Program Non-interviewed	2	1.759	3.28*	0.041
Race/Ethnicity: Latino/Non-Latino	1	1.020	1.91	0.170
Gang Membership: Non-gang, Gang, Associate; Unknown	2	0.088	0.17	0.848
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 14 & under; 15 to 17; and 18 & over	2	1.578	2.95	0.056
Program Length (or Equivalent): <2 Yrs />=2 Yrs	1	0.726	1.36	0.247
Prior Property Arrests: None; Low; Medium; High	3	32.670	61.02***	0.000
Within error	119	0.535	—	—
Total	130	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.9(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Project Main Effect

Project	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
C	39	-0.533	0.149	1	—	0.026*	0.774
Pi	59	-0.143	0.119	2		—	0.093
Pn	33	-0.468	0.169	3			—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

[†] C=Comparison; Pi=Interviewed-Program; Pn=Non-interviewed Program Youth.

11.9(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age Group Main Effect

Age	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
14 & Under	38	-0.459	0.141	1	—	0.071	0.754
15 to 17	59	-0.169	0.115	2		—	0.033*
18 & Over	34	-0.516	0.143	3			—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.9(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Property Arrests Covariate

Prior Property Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	33	0.998	0.137	1	—	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	31	-0.174	0.180	2		—	0.072	0.000***
Medium	44	-0.532	0.136	3			—	0.000***
High	23	-1.817	0.173	4				—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 11.10
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Property Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.10(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	55	17	72
Program-Interviewed	79	19	98

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170).

‡ Youth without property arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=33, Program=39) are coded "success."

11.10(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=13.460* with 6 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-3.329	1.433	0.020*	—
Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program Interviewed)	1	-0.022	0.431	0.960	0.978
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	1.349	0.699	0.054	3.854
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	1.068	0.451	0.018*	2.910
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.482	0.276	0.081	1.619
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	-0.029	0.255	0.907	0.971
Prior Property Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High)	1	0.305	0.413	0.460	1.356

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Table 11.11
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Property Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.11(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	55	17	72
Program Non-Interviewed	84	13	97

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169).

‡ Youth without property arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=33, Program=64) are coded "success."

11.11(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=15.381* with 6 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-2.380	1.439	0.098	—
Project: (0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed)	1	0.170	0.248	0.493	1.185
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	-0.075	0.590	0.899	0.928
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	1.164	0.468	0.013*	3.204
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.382	0.337	0.257	1.465
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	0.183	0.318	0.565	1.201
Prior Property Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High)	1	0.697	0.562	0.215	2.007

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Table 11.12
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drugs Arrests
(Controlling for Drug Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

11.12(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.487)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison; Program-Interviewed; Program Non-interviewed	2	0.118	0.14	0.871
Race/Ethnicity: Latino/Non-Latino	1	5.157	6.04*	0.018
Gang Membership: Non-gang; Gang; Associate, Unknown	2	0.626	0.73	0.486
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over	2	0.565	0.66	0.520
Program Length: <2 Yrs/ >=2 Yrs	1	3.715	4.35*	0.042
Prior Drug Arrests: None; Low; Medium/High	2	12.245	14.33***	0.000
Within error	51	0.855	—	—
Total	61	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.12(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Race/Ethnicity Main Effect

Race/ Ethnicity	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2
Latino	50	-0.277	0.192	0.018*
Non-Latino	12	0.527	0.305	

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.12(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Program Length Main Effect

Program Length	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2		
<2 Yrs	23	0.633	0.340	0.042*		
>=2 Yrs	39	-0.383	0.281			

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.12(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Drug Arrests Main Effect

Prior Drug Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	27	0.884	0.229	1	—	0.357	0.000***
Low	20	0.537	0.352	2		—	0.002**
Medium /High	15	-1.046	0.324	3			—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 11.13
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Drug Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.13(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	58	14	72
Program-Interviewed	89	9	98

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170).

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=51, Program=75) are coded "success."

11.13(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=4.407 with 6 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	1.352	1.567	0.388	—
Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program Interviewed)	1	0.861	0.485	0.076	2.366
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	0.221	0.703	0.754	1.247
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	0.137	0.544	0.801	1.147
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	-0.077	0.330	0.816	0.926
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	0.098	0.286	0.732	1.103
Prior Drug Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High)	1	-0.343	0.641	0.592	0.709

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 11.14
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Drug Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.14(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	58	14	72
Program Non-Interviewed	86	11	97

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169).

‡ Youth without drugs arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=51, Program=79) are coded "success."

11.14(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=9.276 with 6 *df*)

Variable	<i>df</i>	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	0.437	1.827	0.811	—
Project: (0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed)	1	0.207	0.242	0.393	1.230
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	1.551	1.081	0.151	4.714
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	0.841	0.503	0.095	2.318
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	-0.304	0.330	0.357	0.738
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	-0.587	0.408	0.150	0.556
Prior Drug Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High)	1	-0.469	0.665	0.480	0.626

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 11.15
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Drug Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth
(Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”)

11.15(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	7	14	21
Program-Interviewed	14	9	23

† Total number of youth who have been arrested for drug crime (N=44).

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=51, Program=75) are removed from this analysis.

11.15(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=16.323* with 6 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-40.892	599.1	0.946	—
Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program Interviewed)	1	1.356	0.875	0.121	3.879
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	-0.281	1.528	0.854	0.755
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	12.599	267.9	0.963	999.000
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.634	0.601	0.291	1.885
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	0.214	0.529	0.686	1.238
Prior Drug Arrests: (0=None/Low; 1=Medium/High)	1	13.355	268.0	0.960	999.000

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Table 11.16
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Drug Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth
(Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”)

11.16(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	7	14	21
Program Non-Interviewed	7	11	18

† Total number of youth who have been arrested for drugs crime (N=39).

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=51, Program=79) are removed from this analysis.

11.16(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=19.242** with 6 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-35.795	607.6	0.953	—
Project: (0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed)	1	-0.347	0.665	0.602	0.707
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	1.751	495.4	0.997	5.758
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	13.055	124.3	0.916	999.000
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	1.799	1.154	0.119	6.045
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	-1.309	0.930	0.159	0.270
Prior Drug Arrests: (0=None/Low; 1=Medium; 2=High)	1	4.603	1.830	0.120	99.800

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Table 11.17
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests
(Controlling for “Other” Arrests in the Pre-Program Period)

11.17(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.484)***

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison; Program-Interviewed; Program Non-interviewed	2	0.749	0.50	0.607
Gender: Male/Female	1	0.046	0.03	0.862
Race/Ethnicity: Latino /Non-Latino	1	3.055	2.04	0.155
Gang Membership: Non-gang, Gang, Associate, Unknown	2	1.157	0.77	0.463
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 14 & under; 15 to 17; and 18 & over	2	0.539	0.36	0.698
Program Length (or Equivalent): <2 Yrs/>=2 Yrs	1	1.793	1.20	0.275
Prior “Other” Arrests: None; Low; Medium; High	3	58.515	39.16***	0.000
Within error	152	1.494	—	—
Total	164	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

11.17(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior “Other” Arrests Covariate

Prior “Other” Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	56	1.065	0.219	1	—	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	66	-0.144	0.244	2		—	0.042*	0.000***
Medium	25	-0.760	0.303	3			—	0.000***
High	18	-2.803	0.348	4				—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 11.18
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on “Other” Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.18(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	35	37	72
Program-Interviewed	66	32	98

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170).

‡ Youth without other arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=20, Program=30) are coded as “success.”

11.18(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=13.845* with 6 df)

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-2.995	1.201	0.013	—
Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program Interviewed)	1	0.753	0.352	0.033*	2.123
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	1.312	0.545	0.016*	3.712
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	0.474	0.402	0.238	1.607
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.269	0.239	0.260	1.309
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	-0.072	0.216	0.740	0.931
Prior “Other” Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High)	1	0.136	0.365	0.709	1.146

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Table 11.19
Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on “Other” Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

11.19(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡

Project	Success	Failure	Total †
Comparison	35	37	72
Program Non-Interviewed	71	26	97

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169).

‡ Youth without other arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=20, Program=52) are coded “success.”

11.19(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=16.950 with 6 df)**

Variable	df	Parameter Estimate	Std. Error	Pr > χ^2	Odds Ratio
Intercept	1	-2.614	1.265	0.039	—
Project: (0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed)	1	0.591	0.196	0.003**	1.805
Gender (0=Male; 1=Female)	1	0.791	0.549	0.150	2.207
Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino)	1	0.720	0.398	0.070	2.055
Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): (0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over)	1	0.262	0.277	0.345	1.299
Gang Membership: (0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang Member)	1	-0.101	0.278	0.717	0.904
Prior “Other” Arrests: (0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High)	1	0.055	0.410	0.893	1.056

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

Chapter 12

Program Youth Outcomes: Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Variables

(Rolando Villarreal Sosa)

Introduction

In this chapter, we are interested not only in whether services or worker contacts contribute to changes in arrest patterns for program youth,¹ but also whether different types and “dosages” of services provided by different Project workers contribute to increases or decreases in levels of arrests, and to probabilities of success and failure for the two program samples – interviewed and non-interviewed.

First we considered how much the different total yearly arrest rates changed between the pre-program and program periods due to the effects of different services and worker contacts, using GLM model procedures. Second we considered whether the different services and worker contacts produced different ratios of program-youth successes versus failures, using Logistic Regression procedures. In all models we controlled for the variable *prior arrest category*, *gender*, *age group*, *gang membership* and *interview status* (interviewed versus non-interviewed). In the “best” models, we did not control for *gender* or *gang membership* (which produced only small cell sizes and insignificant differences). We controlled for *race/ethnicity* only in the property-arrest models. In some models, we did not use interaction terms – particularly in regard to social intervention or suppression – because they were not significant.

¹ Comparison youth are excluded from this analysis since our focus is on the different effects of specific types of program services and worker contacts on different samples and characteristics of program youth.

Our dependent, or outcome, variables are the same as in Chapter 11: *total arrest changes*, which includes arrests for all offenses; *total violence arrest changes*, which combines serious violence and general violence arrests; *total drug arrest changes*; *total property arrest changes*; and *total “other” (minor) arrest changes*. In the GLM models, we used changes in total yearly arrests, violence arrests, property arrests, and “other,” (minor) arrests. In the Logistic Regression models, we employed these same dependent variables in determining the ratio of youth success to failure in “reducing” arrests. The outcome variables in the Logistic Regression models were coded: *failure* – if the youth had an increase in arrests or remained at the same level of arrests between the pre-program and program periods; *success* – if the youth had a decrease in arrests or remained arrest-free during the pre-program and program periods.

We tested the effects of the strategies of social-intervention services, suppression activities, opportunity-provision services, and different types of mobilization or coordination (non-suppression and suppression) contacts at the community level, as well as effects of total services or total contacts on arrest patterns. In order to construct “dosage” variables, we summed the service items and contacts according to the particular program strategies, they divided by the number of months program services or contacts were provided by workers, i.e., the time between the youth’s first and last date of program exposure. These “dosage” variables were used as predictors in the GLM and Logistic Regression models. The program variables with the greatest effect on the dependent variables proved to be: 1) social-intervention services² and suppression

²Social-intervention activities included principally group discussion, individual counseling or advice, family counseling, and crisis intervention, provided mainly by case managers and probation officers, but also by outreach workers, school counselors, and even police.

activities³; and 2) who provided the service – case managers/outreach youth workers (including youth intervention specialists) and probation/police. It was possible to statistically test the effects of the different strategies – social intervention and suppression – provided by the different types of workers, particularly social intervention provided by the probation officers (suppression was provided almost exclusively by probation and police).

Our focus in the analysis was not only on those strategies which contributed to the best results (i.e., reduction of arrests for sample youth and higher ratios of successes to failures in lowering arrest levels or remaining arrest-free), but also on whether the interviewed youth (the relatively more serious offenders) or the non-interviewed youth (the relatively less serious [or non] offenders) did better under similar conditions of program strategies and types of worker contacts.

Total Arrests

In the first basic GLM model, excluding any program-effect variables, focus was on change in total arrests for all program youth with arrests in either or both the program or pre-program period (n = 148).⁴ The control factors included *category of prior total yearly arrests*⁵,

³Suppression activities included supervision/surveillance, probation, parole, monitoring, arrest, home confinement, violation of probation, detention, and other formal social-control services provided almost exclusively by probation and police officers, but also by other program workers (case managers, outreach workers, and the youth intervention specialists).

⁴ The sample size included 88 interviewed and 60 non-interviewed program youth who were provided with one month or more of program services, and had at least one arrest during either or both the pre-program or program period. The total does not include 5 program youth (2 who were not officially in the program for more than one month and/or did not receive more than one month of program services, and 3 who were interviewed but did not have any worker-tracking data).

⁵ Level of prior total yearly arrests was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.25 to 0.99 prior arrests; 3) medium = 1.00 to 1.99 prior arrests; and 4) high = 2.00 to 11.07 prior arrests.

age group at program entry, gang membership, gender, race/ethnicity, and interview status. The model explained approximately 45% of the variance in the dependent variable and was significant ($p. < 0.001$). *Prior total yearly arrests category* ($p. < 0.001$) and *interview status* ($p. < 0.05$) were significant: *gender* approached significance ($p. < 0.080$).⁶ Females had larger reductions in arrests than males, and non-interviewed youth decreased their yearly arrest means more than the interviewed youth. As the level of prior arrests increased, there were larger reductions in the number of yearly arrests in the program period, with the greatest decrease among program youth with the highest priors. The pattern represented a strong “regression effect” which occurred in most of the subsequent GLM and Logistic Regression models (Table 12.1).

Next, a series of models were constructed to determine which program variable(s) was more significant in predicting arrest changes. In the “best” GLM model, the dependent variable was the *mean change in total yearly arrests* between the pre-program and program periods for the two program samples (interviewed and non-interviewed), and the key independent variables were *social intervention* and the interaction term *category of prior total yearly arrests × social intervention*. The model included *prior total yearly arrests category* as a covariate; the control variables were *age group at program entry* and *interview status*. The model explained 43.9% of the variance in the dependent variable and was significant ($p. < 0.001$) (Table 12.2).

Both *prior total yearly arrests* and *age group at program entry* were significant ($p. < 0.001$). Youth with higher priors (“medium” and “high” categories) had larger reductions, while

⁶ Because only 16 of the 148 youth (10.8%) were female, and the lack of significance of the *gender* control variable in the model, *gender* was not included in any of the other GLM models in this analysis.

youth in the “low” or “none” categories had increases. Across all age groups, program youth had reduced arrest means. The 18 to 23-year-olds had the largest decrease in total arrests (adjusted mean = -1.393) followed by the 12 to 14-year-olds (adjusted mean = -0.780), and the 15 to 17-year-olds (adjusted mean = -0.377). The difference between the 15 to 17 and 18 to-23-year-old groups was statistically significant ($p = 0.004$).

Social intervention, especially as in interaction term with level of prior arrests, contributed to a statistically significant reduction in the change in total yearly arrests during the program period. Youth with the highest category of prior arrests generally had the highest level of reductions in total yearly arrests. There were some anomalies, however. Youth provided with the highest levels of social intervention did not necessarily have relatively greater reductions in total yearly arrests (Table 12.2e). Controlling for *priors*, youth with “none” and “low” categories of prior arrests who were provided with low levels of social intervention seemed to do better than youth with medium levels of social intervention while, overall, youth with “medium” and “high” categories of prior arrests generally did better with higher levels of social intervention.

In the Logistic Regression model for *total arrests* ($N = 169$),⁷ with the key program variable *social intervention*, the model was statistically significant (Chi Square = 30.483, $df = 6$, $p < 0.001$). The actual percentage of program-youth successes was 67.5%, while the percentage of failures was 32.5%. The *prior total yearly arrests* variable was statistically significant. From the “none” to “low”-level priors to the “high”-level priors, youth improved their odds of being a success by 77%. The control variable *age group at program entry* showed a non-linear pattern.

⁷ The Logistic Regression equations included 21 more youth (14 non-interviewed and 7 interviewed) than the GLM model ($n = 148$). These 21 youth may have had arrest records, but the arrests were before the pre-program and program periods.

Youth aged 15 to 17 years had a non-significant decrease in their odds of success compared to 12 to 14-year-olds, while the 18 to 23-year-olds were 3.6 times more likely to succeed than the 12 to 14-year-olds (Table 12.3). In general, the 15 to 17-year-old group did not do as well as the other age groups in reducing their level of arrests and had lower success-to-failure ratios across all of the models, regardless of arrest-category variables.

Although the variable *interview status* was not statistically significant ($p = 0.650$), youth who were interviewed (more of whom had arrest records) had approximately a 20% greater increase in their odds of success (odds ratio = 1.20) compared to non-interviewed youth. This finding appeared not to be consistent with the results from the GLM model in which non-interviewed youth had a larger reduction in their yearly arrest mean than interviewed youth. But the different results were explained by the fact that the two modeling procedures (GLM and Logistic Regression) were measuring two distinct types of outcomes during the program period: change in arrest means, and the ratio of youth who succeeded (reduced their arrest rates or remained at zero-zero arrests) compared to those who failed (increased or did not reduce their arrest rates). In the Logistic Regression models, more interviewed youth had smaller reductions in their arrest rates or remained arrest free (odds ratio = 2.39) than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 1.74). In the GLM models, even though there were few non-interviewed youth who succeeded, their overall reduction of total yearly arrests was more than that of the interviewed youth; and there were more non-interviewed youth who failed, but their overall increase in total yearly arrests was less than that of the interviewed youth.

The *social intervention* variable was not significant and had a non-linear association with the bivariate dependent variable *change in total yearly arrests* (i.e., success or failure). Program

youth who were provided with medium levels of social intervention were two times less likely to be successful compared to those who were provided with low levels of social intervention. However, the likelihood of success for youth who were provided with the highest level of social intervention was similar to those who received the lowest level.

Type of Worker Contact and Social Intervention

To understand the complex relationship between the variable *social intervention* and the dependent variable *change in total yearly arrests*, we constructed further Logistic Regression models to estimate which types of Project workers provided social intervention to which types of youth, and with what result. Social intervention provided by probation and police officers was distinguished from social intervention provided by case managers and outreach youth workers (including the youth intervention specialists). We were also interested in how youth with different levels of prior arrests responded to social intervention provided by different types of Project personnel, i.e., rates of increase (or no change) in arrests *versus* decrease in (or remaining without) arrests. We needed especially to analyze the relationship between the two Project-worker providers of social intervention and youth with different prior-arrest backgrounds, as predictors of the ratio between success and failure.

Social Intervention by Probation/Police. In the first series of Logistic Regression models, *social intervention provided by probation and police officers* was the primary independent variable. The models included the control variables *category of prior total yearly arrests*, *age group at program entry*, and *interview status*. Several models, with probation and police officers as

primary independent variables, were constructed with varying numbers of program youth, based on whether they had prior arrests or not.

The first Logistic Regression model, including all 169 youth (with and without priors) and all the control variables, was statistically significant (Chi Square = 27.651, df = 6, p. = 0.001). The findings were similar to the Logistic Regression model above, which did not distinguish between who provided the social intervention. Again, *category of prior total yearly arrests* and *age group at program entry* were statistically significant. Youth with higher prior arrests were 2.4 times more likely to be successful compared to youth with lower priors. Youth in both the 15 to 17 and 18 to 23 age categories were more likely to succeed; however, this time the 18 to 23-year-olds were statistically more likely to succeed than the 12 to 14-year-olds (p. < 0.01). Interviewed youth did better than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 1.24). The variable *social intervention provided by probation and police officers* was not significant, but higher levels of provision of social intervention by them decreased the odds of a youth being a success, i.e., increased the odds of failure, from between 22% to approximately 25%, at least when all types of youth who were provided with social intervention by probation and police officers were considered (Table 12.4).

In the next Logistic Regression model, including only youth with no priors in the pre-program period who were provided with social-intervention services by probation and police officers (n = 42), youth who had no pre-program arrest histories had even lower odds of succeeding as social intervention increased. The model was not significant and none of the variables was significant, in part due to the small sample size. The model did indicate a particular tendency for youth in the non-interviewed sample who had no pre-program arrest

background to do worse than youth with no pre-program arrest background in the interviewed sample, when provided with social intervention by probation and police (Table 12.5).

In a further Logistic Regression model, which included only program youth with some level of priors (N = 127), the equation was significant (Chi-square = 16.894, Df = 6, p. < 0.01), but the only statistically significant variable was *prior total yearly arrests* (p. < 0.01). However, interviewed youth did 50% better than non-interviewed youth. The higher levels of social intervention provided by probation and police officers, especially to youth with pre-program arrest records, increased the odds of a youth succeeding by 15% (medium level of social intervention) to 42% (high level of social intervention), i.e., decreased their arrest rates (Table 12.6). In other words, increased levels of social intervention by probation and police tended to be more effective for youth with prior arrests than for youth without arrest histories. The last two Logistic Regression models showed contrasting results of social intervention when applied to both delinquent and non-delinquent youth. (From a policy perspective, the value of social intervention or suppression – at any level – provided by probation and police to youth who had no arrest records ought to be questioned.)

Social Intervention by Case Managers and Outreach Youth Workers

A somewhat more favorable pattern for program youth was observed in the series of Logistic Regression models using the key program variable *social intervention provided by case managers and outreach youth workers (including the youth intervention specialists)*. The same set of control variables – *category of prior total yearly arrests, age group at program entry, and interview status* – was used, with focus on the relationship between levels of provision of social

intervention by this set of Project workers, and categories of prior arrests of program youth.

The first Logistic Regression model with *social intervention provided by case managers and outreach youth workers* included all youth, with and without priors (N = 169). The equation was statistically significant (Chi square = 29.535, df = 6, p. < 0.001). The control variables *category of prior total yearly arrests* and *age group at program entry* were statistically significant, and had about the same relationships to social intervention provided by probation and police officers. Youth with a higher level of prior arrests were 2.35 times more likely to succeed than youth with a lower level of priors. Eighteen (18) to 23-year-olds were 4.74 times more likely to be successful compared to youth aged 12 to 14 years.

Although social intervention provided by case managers and outreach youth workers was not statistically significant, youth who received a medium level of social intervention were more likely to succeed than those who had low levels of social intervention. However, youth who were provided with the highest level of social intervention had lower odds of succeeding compared to youth with the lowest level of social intervention (Table 12.7).⁸ The majority of program youth were arrested for “other,” or minor, misdemeanor offenses. (Whether these youth should have been targeted for entry into the program is a legitimate question.)

The next Logistic Regression model included only youth with no (or a low level of) priors (n = 90), and social intervention provided by case managers and outreach youth workers. Neither the overall model nor any of the variables was statistically significant. However, the highest level of social intervention compared to the lowest level had a large and negative impact on a youth’s odds of being successful. Once again, youth with a medium level of social intervention

⁸These were youth with either low levels of prior arrests (and)/or 12 to 14 years old.

did a little better than youth with a low level, and considerably better than youth with a high level of social intervention. These differences in *level of social intervention provided* were not statistically significant. Again, it is possible that high social intervention was provided to youth who had increases in arrests during the program period. Nevertheless, interviewed youth did better than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 1.329) (Table 12.8).

The final Logistic Regression model in this series included youth with medium and high level of priors (n = 79). The overall equation was not significant, and the only significant variable was *age group at program entry*. Eighteen (18) to 23-year-olds were 13 times more likely to be successful than the 12 to 14-year-olds. More important, youth provided with medium and high levels of social intervention were more than twice as likely to be successful than youth provided with a low level of social intervention. Of special interest was that interviewed youth were likely to do worse than non-interviewed youth. The odds ratio of success to failure was 1.38 when case managers and outreach youth workers provided social-intervention services to non-interviewed youth compared to interviewed youth, regardless of levels of prior arrests (Table 12.9).

In general, higher levels of social intervention appeared to be more effective for youth with prior arrests when provided by probation and police, as well as by case managers and outreach youth workers. The positive effects of probation and police were mainly for the interviewed program youth, more of whom were likely to be more frequent and serious offenders. The positive effects of case managers and outreach youth workers were mainly for the non-interviewed program youth, fewer of whom were more frequent or serious offenders. There was a clear tendency for a negative effect when medium and high levels of social intervention

were provided by probation and police officers to non-interviewed youth and to younger (probably less-serious) offenders, particularly those without prior arrests. The effect of the provision of social intervention to less-delinquent youth was mixed. High levels of social intervention could be associated with an increase in the ratio of success to failure, most particularly for the 15 to 17-year-olds.

Violence Arrests

In the GLM model with the dependent variable *mean change in yearly violence arrests*, (n = 65), the program strategies of *level of suppression*⁹ and *level of social intervention*¹⁰ and the program variables *category of prior yearly violence arrests*¹¹, *age group at program entry*, and *interview status* were entered in two separate equations to determine whether either program strategy (under statistically-controlled conditions) had an effect. None of the two program-strategy variables was significant as a main effect in the separate equations, despite the fact that each GLM model was significant. The model with the largest R-square (0.710) included *level of suppression*, and the interaction term *category of prior yearly violence arrests* × *level of suppression* was significant (p. < 0.001) (Table 12.10).

All youth with prior arrests decreased their violence arrests, regardless of level of suppression provided. The most significant variable in the model was *category of prior yearly*

⁹*Level of suppression* contacts per month was categorized as: 1) lower = 0 to 1; 2) higher = 1.01 to 7.61.

¹⁰*Level of social intervention* contacts per month was categorized as: 1) lower = 0 to 1.98; 2) higher = 2.79 to 13.79.

¹¹Level of prior yearly violence arrests was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.27 to 0.48 prior arrests; 3) medium = 0.50 to 0.98 prior arrests; 4) high = 1.02 to 5.10 prior arrests.

violence arrests ($p. < 0.001$). However, the interaction term *prior yearly violence arrests* \times *level of suppression* was also significant ($p. = 0.019$). A higher level of suppression generally contributed to lower violence arrests for each category of prior violence arrests, except for youth who had no history of violence arrests. Table 12.10b clearly shows that youth with a low level of prior violence arrests had a slight decrease. We note that all frequencies in the subtable illustrating the effect of the interaction term were very small, except for the category of high frequencies of prior violence arrests (Table 12.10d).

In the GLM model using *level of social intervention* ($p. = 0.542$) and the interaction term *category of prior yearly violence arrests* \times *level of social intervention* as the key program variables, the only significant variable other than the *category of prior yearly violence arrests* was *age group at program entry*. Neither *level of social intervention* nor the interaction term *category of prior yearly violence arrests* \times *level of social intervention* was significant as a main effect. However, there was a significant ($p. = 0.008$) reduction in violence arrests for youth 12 to 14 years old, compared to the slight reduction for youth 15 to 17 years old (Table 12.11).

The Logistic Regression model for *total violence arrests* ($n = 65$) was significant, whether we used *level of suppression* (0 = lower; 1 = higher) or *level of social intervention* (0 = lower; 1 = higher) as key program variables in separate equations. In the slightly stronger model, with *level of suppression* as the key program variable, *prior yearly violence arrests* ($p. < 0.001$) and *age group at program entry*, comparing 18 to 23-year-olds to 12 to 14-year-olds ($p. < 0.05$), were significant. All of the odds ratios were positive. There were more successes than failures for both interviewed and non-interviewed youth. The odds ratio of success to failure for older youth (18 to 23 years) was 7.65 times greater than that for youth 12 to 14 years. The odds ratio

of success to failure for interviewed youth was 2.44. The odds ratio was about the same, whether high or low levels of suppression were used. There was about an equal chance of success at either level (Table 12.12). However, in the Logistic Regression model with *social intervention* as the program variable, lower levels of social intervention were more effective than higher levels (odds ratio = 1.72); again the difference is not statistically significant (Table 12.13).

Drug Arrests

There were only 39 youth with drug arrests in the entire program sample (N = 169), including both interviewed youth (n = 22) and non-interviewed youth (n = 17). Our better GLM model (R-square = 0.449, p. < 0.01) used *level of social intervention* (0 = higher; 1 = lower) as the key program variable in the equation. *Category of prior yearly drug arrests* (none, lower, higher) was significant (p. < 0.001). *Level of social intervention* was almost significant (p. = 0.064). Lower levels of social intervention contributed to a reduction in drug arrests (n = 21), while higher levels or “doses” of social intervention contributed to an increase in drug arrests (n = 18). This was an anomalous finding, and is explained to some extent in the discussion below where we used a Logistic Regression procedure (Table 12.14).

The GLM model with *suppression* as the dependent variable was also significant (R-square = 0.417, p. < 0.01). None of the variables in the equation other than *category of prior yearly drug arrests* (none, lower, higher)¹² (p. = 0.001) was significant (Table 12.15).

In the Logistic Regression model using *level of social intervention* as the key program

¹²Level of prior yearly drug arrests was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) lower = 0.26 to 0.49 prior arrests; 3) higher = 0.51 to 2.69 prior arrests.

variable, the equation was significant (Chi-square = 24.48, df = 5, p. < 0.001). Interviewed youth (the majority of whom were on probation) were far more likely to be successful in reducing drug arrests than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 48.21, p. < 0.006). The success rate for interviewed youth was 72.7%, but only 41.2% for non-interviewed youth. However, lower levels of social intervention were more likely to have higher odds of success than higher levels (odds ratio = 2.23; p. = 0.486); the difference was not statistically significant. Youth in the oldest age group (18 to 23) were most likely to succeed in reducing their level of drug arrests (odds ratio = 15.521, p. = 0.07) when compared to the 12 to 14-year-olds (Table 12.16).

What seemed to be occurring was that more social intervention was directed to non-interviewed youth than to interviewed youth. More of the interviewed youth arrested for drugs were probably on probation, and were provided with suppression services (e.g., probation supervision). Social intervention, without controlling for close supervision, may not have been a useful predictor of success.

When we used *suppression* instead of *social intervention* as our key program variable in a Logistic Regression model (but with the same control variables as in the previous model), we obtained results that were somewhat similar. However, the effect of suppression together with social intervention explained the seemingly anomalous findings in the above GLM model (Table 12.14). The Logistic Regression equation with *suppression* as the key program variable was again significant (Chi-square = 24.408, df = 5, p. < 0.001), with an identical pattern of success outcomes for non-interviewed and interviewed youth. The most significant variable in the equation was *category of prior yearly drug arrests* (p. < 0.006). Youth in the oldest age group (18 to 23) were most likely to be successes in reducing their level of drug arrests (odds ratio =

21.856, $p = 0.025$) when compared to the 12 to 14-year-olds. Again, interviewed youth were more likely to be successes than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 55.361, $p = 0.007$). In this model, higher levels of suppression were more effective than lower levels of suppression in the ratio of successes to failures in reducing drug arrest rates (odds ratio = 1.942, $p = 0.525$) (Table 12.17).

The GLM and two Logistic Regression models indicate that social intervention tended to be more effective than suppression in reducing levels of drug arrests; however, the success rate was higher for interviewed youth, most of whom were older and had probation or prior-arrest records. Social intervention of a limited “dosage” was more effective than at a higher “dosage,” for both interviewed and non-interviewed youth. The higher “dosage” of suppression was more effective than lower “dosages.”

Our sample sizes were small, and the analysis must be regarded at this stage as exploratory and tentative. What was suggested, however, was that both social intervention and suppression, in different combinations and at different levels, might be effective in reducing levels of arrests for drugs when targeted to appropriate youth. Suppression was probably required for those youth with higher levels of prior arrests for drugs, yet a certain level of social intervention was also important for all youth.

Property Arrests

In the GLM model with the dependent variable *mean change in yearly property arrests*

(n = 90), the variables entered into the equation were *category of prior yearly property arrests*¹³, *age group at program entry* (12 to 14 years; 15 to 17 years; 18 to 23 years), *interview status* (non-interviewed versus interviewed), *race/ethnicity* (Latino versus non-Latino), *level of suppression* (“none;” “some”), and the interaction term *category of prior yearly property arrests* × *suppression*. The equation was significant (R-square = 0.665, p. < 0.001). Several variables were either significant or marginally significant.

Category of prior yearly property arrests was highly significant (p. < 0.001). *Interview status* was significant (p. = 0.015), as was the program variable *level of suppression* (p. = 0.035). A lower level of suppression was more effective than a higher level of suppression in reducing arrests for property crime. The youth who received suppression services, as indicated above, did significantly worse (p. = 0.035) than those who did not receive suppression services. The interaction term *prior yearly property arrests* × *level of suppression* was not significant, which indicated that the effect of *suppression* was similar for all or most of the categories of *prior yearly property arrests*. Non-interviewed youth had a significantly greater reduction in property arrests (adjusted mean = -0.496) than interviewed youth (adjusted mean = -0.00346).¹⁴ Latino youth had greater reductions in property arrests than non-Latino youth (p. = 0.022). The oldest age group (18 to 23 years) experienced a significantly greater decrease in property arrests than the 15 to 17-year-olds (p. = 0.020) (Table 12.18).

In a somewhat similar model, we used *level of social intervention* in place of *level of*

¹³Level of prior yearly property arrests was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.25 to 0.49 prior arrests; 3) medium = 0.51 to 0.94 prior arrests; 4) high = 1.13 to 5.29 prior arrests.

¹⁴This was opposite to findings in the previous drug-arrest model, where increased suppression was more effective with interviewed youth and less effective with non-interviewed youth.

suppression as the key program variable. The equation was statistically significant (R-square = 0.660, p. = 0.001). The program variable *level of social intervention* was close to significance (p. = 0.065) in reducing property arrests for both interviewed and non-interviewed youth. Non-interviewed youth reduced property arrests significantly (p. = 0.014) more than interviewed youth. Higher levels of social intervention were less effective for all youth in lowering property arrests. A low level of social intervention appeared to be especially useful for non-interviewed youth in reducing levels of property arrests. It was clear that lower levels of social intervention or suppression were better than higher levels in reducing property arrests for program youth generally (Table 12.19).

The Logistic Regression model with *suppression* as the key program variable was significant (Chi-square = 26.865, df = 6, p. < 0.001). *Category of prior yearly property arrests* (0 = none to low; 2 = medium; 3 = high) was the strongest predictor-variable in the equation (p. < 0.001). Again, the oldest age group (18 to 23 years) had the highest ratio of youth who were successes in the reduction of arrests for property crime. More interviewed youth (72.9%) were classified as successes in reducing their property arrests compared to non-interviewed youth (67.7%). Twice as many interviewed youth compared to non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 2.045, p. = 0.266) were likely to be successes, controlling for other variables in the equation. More Latinos than non-Latinos were likely to be successes, although the difference was not statistically significant (odds ratio = 2.340, p. = 0.215).

Again, we observe that a lower level of suppression was better than a higher level in contributing to the success-to-failure ratio in lowering property arrest rates, but the difference was not significant (odds ratio = 0.679, p. = 0.517) (Table 12.20).

In a similar Logistic Regression model with *social intervention* as the dependent variable, the equation was highly significant (Chi-square = 42.756, df = 6, p. < 0.001). *Category of prior yearly property arrests* (0 = none; 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high) was significant (p. < 0.001), but no other variable in the equation was significant, except again that youth in the oldest age group (18 to 23 years) were most likely to be successes, i.e., reduce their levels of property arrests or remain at zero property arrests (odds ratio = 3.813, p. = 0.143). And once again, we find that youth with lower levels of social intervention were more likely to be successes than youth with higher levels of social intervention (odds ratio = 2.09, p. = 0.295). Also, interviewed youth had higher success-to-failure ratios than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 1.46, p. = 0.609) (Table 12.21).

Overall, a regression effect was most evident in determining property-arrest outcomes for program youth, regardless of whether suppression or social intervention was provided. High levels of suppression or social intervention had almost no (or a very limited) effect on rates of property arrests for youth in the program. Lower levels of suppression or social-intervention services, particularly for interviewed youth (who were more delinquent) had some positive effect.

“Other” (Minor) Arrests

In the final set of models, analyzing the effects of service variables, our “best” GLM model explaining variance in the dependent variable “*other,*” or *minor, arrests* (including disorderly conduct, obstruction of justice, driving without a license and status offenses) was significant (R-square = 0.524, p. < 0.001). The variables entered into the equation were *category*

of prior yearly “other” arrests¹⁵, age group at program entry, interview status, level of social intervention (lower, higher), and the interaction term *category of prior “other” yearly arrest* × *social intervention*. The program sample size (n = 105) was larger than in the other models, except for the *total arrests* model (n = 148). Most program youth in the model had been arrested for an “other,” or minor, offense in either or both the pre-program or program periods

The most significant variable in the model was *category of prior yearly “other” arrests* (p. < 0.001), followed by the interaction term *category of prior yearly “other” arrests* × *level of social intervention* (p. = 0.004). The variable *level of social intervention* was marginally significant (p. = 0.086). Neither the *age group at program entry* nor *interview status* variables was statistically significant (Table 12.22).

While *category of prior yearly “other” arrests* was the strongest predictor of “other”-arrests change in the program period, the interaction of *prior yearly “other” arrests* and *level of social intervention* showed noteworthy change patterns. Higher levels of social intervention accounted for decreases for youth with higher levels of prior yearly “other” arrests, while lower levels of social intervention also accounted for decreases for youth with lower prior yearly “other” arrest levels, except for youth with no priors. Evidence was particularly strong for the greater effect of higher rather than lower levels of social intervention for youth who had the highest levels of prior yearly “other” arrests; however, sample cell sizes were small. The tendency for more social intervention to contribute to a greater decrease in arrests was strong for those youth who had been arrested for minor crimes at least twice during the pre-program period.

¹⁵Level of prior yearly “other” arrests offenses was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.28 to 0.98 prior arrests; 3) medium = 1.00 to 1.97 prior arrests; 4) high = 2.00 to 11.07 prior arrests.

The effect was present for youth in the different age groups. Social intervention had a consistent and almost significant effect across control categories in contributing to the reduction of “other” arrests.

The Logistic Regression model with the same variables was significant (Chi-square = 28.648, df = 5, p. < 0.001). Only the *category of prior yearly “other” arrests* (p. = 0.026), and *level of social intervention* – particularly at the lowest level (p. 0.025) of provision of social intervention (odds ratio = 2.724, p. = 0.089) – were statistically significant. Interviewed youth did better, i.e., more of them were successes than failures (odds ratio = 1.217, p. < 0.622) (Table 12.23). Low and high levels of social intervention contributed to the success of youth in reducing arrests for “other” offenses. Compared to a low or high level, a medium level of social intervention appeared to be less effective in accounting for success rates, but this difference was not significant (p. = 0.230). Interviewed youth were more likely to be successes than failures compared to non-interviewed youth, particularly when high levels of social intervention were provided.

Finally, we cannot explain at this time the general lack of social intervention at medium levels being effective in the reduction of “other” arrests. This may be a result of the way services provided to different youth were recorded. We knew that our program “dosage” (i.e., amount of specific service or activity provided by the worker) needed to be further refined, but this would have required more frequent completion of worker tracking forms (an extra burden objected to by local-Project personnel). Project workers only estimated the number of times they gave certain services to a youth over a three-month period, rather than the amount of a particular service or activity provided at the particular time when specific contact was made.

Summary

The GLM models for *total arrests* indicated that social intervention provided to the more-delinquent program youth (or to those with higher levels of prior arrests) contributed to a greater decrease in mean arrest rates; and the Logistic Regression models for *total arrests* indicated that social intervention contributed to an increase in the odds of youth being successes (remaining arrest-free or decreasing their rate of arrests). However, there seemed to be a distinction in effect among the types of workers providing social-intervention services. The detailed analysis in the Logistic Regression models for *total arrests* showed that the provision of social intervention by probation and police officers to non-delinquent program youth increased the youth's odds of failure. The provision of social intervention by probation/police and case managers/outreach workers (including the youth intervention specialists) to youth with prior arrests had positive results, and increased the youth's likelihood of success. The provision of social intervention by case managers, outreach workers and the youth intervention specialists was more likely to increase the odds of a youth's success, whether or not the youth entered the program with an arrests background.

In the GLM and Logistic Regression models for *violence arrests*, the provision of suppression services by probation and police officers rather than case managers and outreach workers played a stronger role in a positive outcome for program youth. Those who had higher prior arrests, and who were provided with a higher level of suppression, either decreased their violence arrest rate or increased their odds of being a success. On the other hand, youth who had prior arrests and who were provided with a lower level of social intervention also either decreased their violence arrest rate, or increased their odds of being a success.

In the models for *change in drug arrests*, social intervention tended to be more effective than suppression in reducing arrest rates; however, the success-to-failure ratio was higher for interviewed youth, most of whom were older youth with prior arrests who were on probation. Low levels of social intervention were more effective than high levels for youth both with and without prior arrests. Higher levels of suppression were also more effective than lower levels in reducing drug-arrest rates.

A regression effect was most significant in determining *property arrest* outcomes for program youth, regardless of whether suppression or social-intervention was provided. Higher levels of suppression or social intervention had almost no (or a very limited) effect on rates of property arrests. Lower levels of provision of suppression or social-intervention services, particularly for interviewed youth (more of whom were delinquent) had some positive effect.

For youth included in the models for “other,” or minor, offenses, social intervention either contributed to a decrease in the youth’s mean arrest rate in the GLM model, or increased the odds of a youth being a success (especially for youth with a high level of priors) in the Logistic Regression model. Higher levels of social intervention tended to be more effective than lower levels in reducing arrest rates for “other” (minor) offenses.

We also note that it was difficult to make distinctions about who best provided (or should have provided) social-intervention services, particularly to youth with prior arrest records, since a team of different types of workers in collaboration (or at least in communication) with each other provided various types of services during the course of the Project. While some level of social-intervention services was better than no social-intervention services (or other types of worker activities), it was not clear that higher levels of services (i.e., higher levels of social

intervention) were better than lower levels of services for youth generally.

Social-intervention services had a positive and significant effect on the outcomes of program youth, especially in respect to their overall arrest rates. Still, it was difficult to disentangle the effect of social intervention from an overall regression effect. Also, while suppression had a somewhat positive impact on the outcomes for youth with prior violence arrests, it had negative effects on the outcomes for youth with prior drug and property arrests.

Table 12.1
Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Covariates (N=148)†
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Yearly Arrests
 for Program Youth with Control Variables

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.446 ; Adjusted R-square=0.405)***

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
Prior Total Yearly Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	77.593	30.682***	0.000
Age Group at Program Entry: 12-14, 15-17, 18-23	2	5.049	1.996	0.140
Gang Membership: Non-gang Youth, Gang Associate, Gang Member	2	2.209	0.873	0.420
Gender: Male vs. Female	1	7.869	3.112	0.080
Race/Ethnicity: Latino vs. Non-Latino	1	4.526	1.790	0.183
Interview Status: Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed	1	11.817	4.673*	0.032
Within error	137	2.529	---	---
Corrected Total	147	---	---	---

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Total Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	21	1.605	0.405	1	---	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	48	-0.288	0.347	2		---	0.005**	0.000***
Medium	38	-1.298	0.357	3			---	0.001***
High	41	-2.556	0.364	4				---

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

† Twenty-one program participants had no arrests during the pre-program and program periods; they are not included in the GLM cell means analysis.

Table 12.1-continued

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Gender Main Effect

Gender	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Male	132	-0.219	0.232	1	---	0.080
Female	16	-1.050	0.448	2		---

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Interview-Status Main Effect

Interview Status	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Non-Interviewed	60	-0.949	0.321	1	---	0.032*
Interviewed	88	-0.319	0.289	2		---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.2
Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention (N=148)+
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Yearly Arrests
 for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.439; Adjusted R-square=0.393)***

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
Prior Total Yearly Arrests: None/Low, Medium, High	2	87.485	34.151***	0.000
Age Group at Program Entry: 12-14, 15-17, 18-23	2	11.176	4.363***	0.000
Interview Status: Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed	1	2.764	1.079	0.301
Level of Social Intervention: Low, Medium, High	2	7.804	3.046	0.051
Interaction: Prior Total Yearly Arrests x Level of Social Intervention	4	8.450	3.299*	0.013
Within error	136	2.562	---	---
Total	147	---	---	---

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate

Prior Total Yearly Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None/Low	69	0.528	0.214	1	---	0.000***	0.000***
Medium	38	-0.864	0.281	2	0.000***	---	0.000***
High	41	-2.214	0.259	3	0.000***	0.000***	---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

† Twenty-one program participants had no arrests during the preprogram and program periods; they are not included in the GLM cell means analysis.

Table 12.2-continued

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age-Group-at-Program Entry Main Effect

Age Group at Program Entry	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
12-14	43	-0.780	0.271	1	---		
15-17	66	-0.377	0.205	2		---	0.004**
18-23	39	-1.393	0.285	3		0.004**	---

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Level-of-Social-Intervention Main Effect

Level of Social Intervention	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean (i) = Adjusted Mean (j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Low	56	-1.020	0.233	1	---	0.041*	
Medium	55	-0.331	0.265	2	0.041*	---	0.035*
High	37	-1.198	0.293	3		0.035**	---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.2-continued

(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Prior Total Yearly Arrests x Level of Social Intervention

Prior Total Yearly Arrests	Level of Social Intervention	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i) = Adjusted Mean(j)									
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
None/Low	Low	-0.357	0.365 (21)	1	---	**	**						
None/Low	Medium	0.822	0.288 (33)	2		---							
None/Low	High	1.120	0.446 (15)	3			---						
Medium	Low	-0.589	0.405 (18)	4				---					
Medium	Medium	-0.456	0.583 (8)	5					---				
Medium	High	-1.546	0.479 (12)	6						---			
High	Low	-2.115	0.395 (17)	7							---		
High	Medium	-1.358	0.431 (14)	8								---	**
High	High	-3.170	0.513 (10)	9									---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.3
Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention for
Total Sample (N=169)

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	47	27	74
TI Interviewed	67	28	95

†Total program youth with and without arrest histories, but with service data and more than one month of program exposure and services (N=169).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=30.483 with $df=6$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	0.133	0.358	0.138	0.710	1.142
Prior Total Yearly Arrests: (1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	0.572	0.175	10.679	0.001	1.772
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			7.398	0.025	
15-17		-0.247	0.406	0.372	0.542	0.781
18-23		1.280	0.608	4.436	0.035	3.598
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed; 1=Interviewed)	1	0.181	0.399	0.206	0.650	1.199
Level of Social Intervention:						
Low	2			4.333	0.115	
Medium		-0.773	0.438	3.107	0.078	0.462
High		0.024	0.529	0.002	0.962	1.024

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12.4
Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention
Provided by Probation and Police Officers (N=169)
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	47	27	74
TI Interviewed	67	28	95

†Total program youth with and without arrest histories, but with service data and more than one month of program exposure and services (N=169).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=27.651 with $df=6$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-0.519	0.474	1.201	0.273	0.595
Prior Total Yearly Arrests: (1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	0.876	0.251	12.155** *	0.000	2.400
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			7.813	0.020	
15-17		0.254	0.396	0.411	0.521	1.289
18-23		1.542	0.552	7.798**	0.005	4.674
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed; 1=Interviewed)	1	0.211	0.387	0.297	0.586	1.235
Level of Social Intervention:						
Low	2			0.316	0.854	
Medium		-0.242	0.524	0.214	0.644	0.785
High		-0.284	0.520	0.298	0.585	0.753

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12.5
Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention
Provided by Probation and Police Officers (N=42)†
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	14	14	28
Interviewed	7	7	14

†Total program youth with no prior arrests, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=42).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=2.224 with $df=4$)

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	0.363	0.527	0.476	0.490	1.438
Age Group at Program Entry: (0=15 to 17, 1=14 & Under and 18 & Over,)	1	0.443	0.650	0.464	0.496	1.558
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed; 1=Interviewed)	1	-0.169	0.782	0.047	0.829	0.845
Level of Social Intervention:						
Low	2			1.328	0.515	
Medium		-0.207	0.983	0.044	0.833	0.813
High		-0.849	0.794	1.143	0.285	0.428

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

† This subsample includes 21 program participants who had no priors and 21 who remained arrest free during the pre-program and program periods.

Table 12.6
Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention
Provided by Probation and Police Officers (N=127)†
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	33	13	46
Interviewed	60	21	81

†Total program youth with at least one prior arrest , service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=127).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=16.894 with $df=6$)**

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-0.638	0.664	0.922	0.337	0.528
Prior Total Yearly Arrests: (1=Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	0.822	0.289	8.069**	0.005	2.275
Age Group at Program Entry:						
14 & Under	2			4.489	0.106	
15 to 17		-0.312	0.504	0.382	0.537	0.732
18 & Over		0.916	0.636	2.074	0.150	2.500
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed; 1=Interviewed)	1	0.404	0.475	0.724	0.395	1.498
Level of Social Intervention:						
Low	2			0.289	0.866	
Medium		0.137	0.624	0.048	0.826	1.147
High		0.351	0.691	0.258	0.612	1.420

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

† This subsample comprises 127 program participants who had at least one prior arrest.

Table 12.7
Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention
Provided by Case Managers and Outreach Workers (N=169)
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	47	27	74
Interviewed	67	28	95

†Total program youth with and without arrest histories, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=169).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=29.535 with $df=6$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-0.461	0.479	0.928	0.335	0.631
Prior Total Yearly Arrests: (1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	0.854	0.252	11.530***	0.001	2.349
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			7.570*	0.023	
15-17		0.379	0.426	0.793	0.373	1.461
18-23		1.556	0.571	7.420**	0.006	4.738
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed; 1=Interviewed)	1	0.051	0.379	0.018	0.893	1.052
Level of Social Intervention:						
Low	2			2.155	0.340	
Medium		0.463	0.453	1.046	0.306	1.589
High		-0.202	0.523	0.149	0.700	0.817

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12.8
Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention
Provided by Case Managers and Outreach Workers (N=90)†
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	19	22	41
Interviewed	28	21	49

†Total program youth with no arrests or a low level, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=90).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=8.949 with $df=6$)

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	0.095	0.364	0.067	0.795	1.099
Prior Total Yearly Arrests: (0=None, 1=Low)	1	-0.418	0.524	0.638	0.424	0.658
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			4.356	0.113	
15-17		-0.833	0.540	2.385	0.123	0.435
18-23		0.356	0.791	0.203	0.652	1.428
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed, 1=Interviewed)	1	0.284	0.490	0.336	0.562	1.329
Level of Social Intervention:						
Low	2			3.651	0.161	
Medium		0.211	0.566	0.139	0.709	1.235
High		-0.983	0.689	2.038	0.153	0.374

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

† This subsample includes program participants with no priors or a low level of priors.

Table 12.9
Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention
Provided by Case Managers and Outreach Workers (N=79)†
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	28	5	33
Interviewed	39	7	46

†Total program youth with medium or high level of arrests, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=79).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=6.930 with $df=6$)

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	2.239	0.600	13.935***	0.000	9.388
Prior Total Yearly Arrests: (0=Medium, 1=High)	1	-0.096	0.690	0.019	0.890	0.909
Age Group at Program Entry:						
14 & Under	2			4.401	0.111	
15 to 17		0.438	0.767	0.326	0.568	1.549
18 & Over		2.599	1.268	4.203*	0.040	13.450
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed; 1=Interviewed)	1	-0.325	0.717	0.205	0.651	0.723
Level of Social Intervention:						
Low	2			0.984	0.612	
Medium		0.720	0.779	0.855	0.355	2.055
High		0.718	1.035	0.481	0.488	2.049

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

† This subsample includes program participants with a medium or high level of priors.

Table 12.10
Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Suppression (N=65)
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Violence Arrests
 for Program Youth with Level of Suppression

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.710; Adjusted R-square=0.656)***

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
Prior Yearly Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	19.053	33.702***	0.000
Age Group at Program Entry: 12-14, 15-17, 18-23	2	0.864	1.528	0.226
Interview Status: Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed	1	0.513	0.907	0.345
Level of Suppression: Lower, Higher	1	0.01016	0.018	0.894
Interaction: Prior Total Yearly Violence Arrests x Level of Suppression	3	2.028	3.587*	0.019
Within error	54	0.565	---	---
Corrected Total	64	---	---	---

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Yearly Violence Arrests Covariate

Prior Yearly Violence Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	23	1.065	0.178	1	---	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	14	-0.07793	0.228	2		---		0.000***
Medium	15	-0.380	0.237	3			---	0.000***
High	13	-1.782	0.225	4				---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.10-continued

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Suppression Main Effect

Level of Suppression	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Lower	37	-0.280	0.151	1	---	
Higher	28	-0.308	0.152	2		---

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Prior Total Yearly Violence Arrests x Level of Social Intervention

Prior Yearly Violence Arrests	Level of Suppression	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean (i) = Adjusted Mean (j)								
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
None	Lower	0.666	0.225 (14)	1	---	*						
None	Higher	1.464	0.257 (9)	2		---						
Low	Lower	-0.123	0.309 (7)	3			---					
Low	Higher	-0.03279	0.307 (7)	4				---				
Medium	Lower	-0.397	0.242 (11)	5					---			
Medium	Higher	-0.364	0.389 (4)	6						---		
High	Lower	-1.266	0.350 (5)	7							---	*
High	Higher	-2.298	0.290 (8)	8								---

For differences between groups: * *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001.

Table 12.11
Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Social Intervention (N=65)
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Violence Arrests
 for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.687; Adjusted R-square=0.629)***

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
Prior Yearly Violence Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	18.801	30.780***	0.000
Age Group at Program Entry: 12-14, 15-17, 18-23	2	2.424	3.968*	0.025
Interview Status: Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed	1	0.386	0.631	0.430
Level of Social Intervention: Lower, Higher	1	0.230	0.377	0.542
Interaction: Prior Yearly Violence Arrests x Level of Social Intervention	3	1.253	2.051	0.118
Within error	54	0.611	---	---
Corrected Total	64	---	---	---

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Yearly Violence Arrests Covariate

Prior Yearly Violence Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	23	0.949	0.185	1	---	0.001***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	14	-0.09596	0.258	2		---		0.000***
Medium	15	-0.582	0.267	3			---	0.001***
High	13	-1.863	0.231	4				---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.11-continued

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age-Group-At-Program-Entry Main Effect

Age Group at Program Entry	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
12-14	22	-0.733	0.206	1	---	0.008**	
15-17	28	-0.06026	0.156	2		---	
18-23	15	-0.401	0.226	3			---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.12
Logistic Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Suppression (N=65)
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Yearly Violence Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Suppression

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	13	8	21
Interviewed	25	19	44

†Total program youth with an arrest for violence, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=65).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=33.041 with $df=5$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-3.602	1.431	6.335*	0.012	0.027
Prior Yearly Violence Arrests: (1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	2.440	0.672	13.189***	0.000	11.472
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			4.754	0.093	
15-17		0.067	0.763	0.008	0.930	1.069
18-23		2.035	1.016	4.009*	0.045	7.654
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed; 1=Interviewed)	1	0.892	0.913	0.955	0.328	2.440
Level of Suppression: (0=Lower and 1=Higher)	1	0.027	0.715	0.001	0.970	1.027

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12.13
Logistic Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Social Intervention (N = 65)
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Yearly Violence Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	13	8	21
Interviewed	25	19	44

†Total program youth with an arrest for violence, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=65).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=33.582 with $df=5$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-3.521	1.341	6.896**	0.009	0.030
Prior Yearly Violence Arrests: (1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	2.400	0.661	13.177***	0.000	11.027
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			3.939	0.140	
15-17		-0.060	0.784	0.006	0.939	0.942
18-23		1.805	1.043	2.996	0.083	6.080
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed; 1=Interviewed)	1	0.794	0.909	0.764	0.382	2.213
Level of Social Intervention: (0=Lower) and 1=Higher)	1	-0.538	0.729	0.543	0.461	0.584

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12.14
Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Social Intervention (N=39)
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests
 for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.449 ; Adjusted R-square=0.346)**

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
Prior Yearly Drug Arrests: None, Lower, Higher	2	14.330	10.712***	0.001
Age Group at Program Entry: 12-14, 15-17, 18-23	2	0.850	0.636	0.536
Interview Status: Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed	1	2.169	1.622	0.212
Level of Social Intervention: 0=Lower, 1=Higher	1	4.915	3.674	0.064
Within error	32	1.338	---	---
Corrected Total	38	---	---	---

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Yearly Drug Arrests Covariate

Prior Yearly Drug Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	14	1.174	0.322	1	---	0.034*	0.001***
Low er	15	0.07470	0.367	2		---	0.031*
Higher	10	-1.266	0.409	3			---

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table 12.14-continued

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Level of Social Intervention Covariate

Level of Social Intervention	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Lower	21	-0.435	0.297	1	---	0.064
Higher	18	0.424	0.294	2		---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.15
Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Suppression (N=39)
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests
 for Program Youth with Level of Suppression

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.417; Adjusted R-square=0.308)**

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
Prior Yearly Drug Arrests: None, Lower, Higher	2	12.288	8.678***	0.001
Age Group at Program Entry: 12-14, 15-17, 18-23	2	0.276	0.195	0.824
Interview Status: Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed	1	0.688	0.486	0.491
Level of Suppression: 0=Lower, 1=Higher	1	2.410	1.702	0.201
Within error	32	1.416	---	---
Corrected Total	38	---	---	---

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Yearly Drug Arrests Covariate

Prior Yearly Drug Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
None	14	1.117	0.330	1	---	0.025*	0.000***
Lower	15	-0.06964	0.364	2		---	
Higher	10	-1.017	0.395	3			---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.16
Logistic Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Social Intervention (N=39)
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	7	10	17
Interviewed	16	6	22

†Total program youth with a drug arrest, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=39).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=24.480 with $df=5$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-2.811	1.186	5.614*	0.018	0.060
Prior Yearly Drug Arrests: (1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	5.216	1.880	7.700**	0.006	184.192
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			3.578	0.167	
15-17		1.408	1.138	1.530	0.216	4.088
18-23		2.742	1.491	3.382	0.066	15.521
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed, 1=Interviewed)	1	3.875	1.403	7.632**	0.006	48.205
Level of Social Intervention: (0=Lower and 1=Higher)	1	-0.803	1.152	0.485	0.486	0.448

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12.17
Logistic Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Suppression (N=39)
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Suppression

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	7	10	17
Interviewed	16	6	22

†Total program youth with a drug arrest, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=39).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=24.408 with $df=5$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-2.792	1.200	5.415*	0.020	0.061
Prior Yearly Drug Arrests: (1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	4.945	1.804	7.512**	0.006	140.427
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			5.218	0.074	
15-17		1.578	1.135	1.935	0.164	4.847
18-23		3.084	1.378	5.009*	0.025	21.856
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed, 1=Interviewed)	1	4.014	1.480	7.354**	0.007	55.361
Level of Suppression: (0=Lower and 1=Higher)	1	0.664	1.045	0.403	0.525	1.942

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12.18
Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Suppression (N=90)
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests
 for Program Youth with Level of Suppression

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.665; Adjusted R-square=0.618)***

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
Prior Yearly Property Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	25.398	41.515***	0.000
Age Group at Program Entry: 12-14, 15-17, 18-23	2	1.786	2.920	0.060
Interview Status: Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed	1	3.819	6.242*	0.015
Race/Ethnicity: Latino vs. Non-Latino	1	3.324	5.434*	0.022
Level of Suppression: Lower, Higher	1	2.816	4.603*	0.035
Interaction: Prior Yearly Property Arrests x Level of Suppression	3	0.771	1.260	0.294
Within error	78	0.612	---	---
Corrected Total	89	---	---	---

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Yearly Property Arrests Covariate

Prior Yearly Property Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	16	1.410	0.209	1	---	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	21	-0.234	0.215	2		---		0.000***
Medium	34	-0.428	0.177	3			---	0.000***
High	19	-1.746	-1.746	4				---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.18-continued

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Age-Group-at-Program-Entry Main Effect

Age Group at Program Entry	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
12 -14	27	-0.273	0.183	1	---	0.020*
15 -17	37	0.005764	0.155	2	---	
18 -23	26	-0.481	0.166	3		---

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Interview-Status Main Effect

Interview Status	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Non-Interviewed	31	-0.496	0.162	1	---	0.015*
Interviewed	59	-0.00346	0.134	2		---

(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Race/Ethnicity Main Effect

Race/Ethnicity	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Latino	70	-0.492	0.105	1	---	0.022*
Non-Latino	20	-0.00687	0.188	2		---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.18-continued

(f) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Level-of-Suppression Main Effect

Level of Suppression	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Lower	55	-0.455	0.151	1	---	0.035*
Higher	35	-0.04406	0.143	2		---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.19
Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Social Intervention (N=90)
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests
 for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.660; Adjusted R-square=0.612)***

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
Prior Yearly Property Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	25.399	40.867***	0.000
Age Group at Program Entry: 12-14, 15-17, 18-23	2	1.366	2.198	0.118
Interview Status: Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed	1	3.926	6.317*	0.014
Race/Ethnicity: Latino vs. Non-Latino	1	4.318	6.948**	0.010
Level of Social Intervention: Lower, Higher	1	2.181	3.509	0.065
Interaction: Prior Yearly Property Arrests x Level of Social Intervention	3	0.559	0.900	0.445
Within error	78	0.622	---	---
Corrected Total	89	---	---	---

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Yearly Property Arrests Covariate

Prior Yearly Property Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	16	1.410	0.211	1	---	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	21	-0.271	0.248	2		---		0.000***
Medium	34	-0.390	0.172	3			---	0.000***
High	19	-1.636	0.190	4				---

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table 12.19-continued

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Interview-Status Main Effect

Interview Status	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Non-Interviewed	31	-0.474	0.166	1	---	0.014*
Interviewed	59	-0.03039	0.135	2		---

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Race/Ethnicity Main Effect

Race/Ethnicity	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Latino	70	-0.496	0.107	1	---	0.010*
Non-Latino	20	0.05177	0.189	2		---

(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Level-of-Social-Intervention Main Effect

Level of Social Intervention	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)		
				i/j	1	2
Lower	55	-0.409	0.140	1	---	0.065
Higher	35	-0.03521	0.161	2		---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.20
Logistic Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Suppression (N=90)
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Yearly Property Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Suppression

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	21	10	31
Interviewed	43	16	59

†Total program youth with property arrests, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=90).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=26.865 with $df=6$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	1.369	0.431	10.096***	0.001	3.932
Prior Yearly Property Arrests: (1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	1.836	0.470	15.280***	0.000	6.270
Age at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			5.409	0.067	
15-17		0.566	0.630	0.806	0.369	1.761
18-23		1.854	0.800	5.364*	0.021	6.383
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed, 1=Interviewed)	1	0.716	0.644	1.236	0.266	2.045
Race/Ethnicity: (Non-Latino=0, Latino=1)	1	0.850	0.685	1.540	0.215	2.340
Level of Suppression: (0=Lower and 1=Higher)	1	-0.387	0.597	0.420	0.517	0.679

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12.21
Logistic Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Social Intervention (N=90)
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Yearly Property Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	21	10	31
Interviewed	43	16	59

†Total program youth with property arrests, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=90).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=42.756 with $df=6$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	-0.586	1.224	0.229	0.632	0.557
Prior Yearly Property Arrests: (0=None, 1=Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	1.910	0.420	20.660***	0.000	6.754
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			3.327	0.189	
15-17		-0.174	0.752	0.054	0.817	0.840
18-23		1.338	0.913	2.148	0.143	3.813
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed, 1= Interviewed)	1	0.376	0.736	0.261	0.609	1.457
Race/Ethnicity: (Non-Latino=0, Latino=1)	1	1.115	0.804	1.923	0.165	0.328
Level of Social Intervention: (0=Lower and 1=Higher)	1	-0.738	0.704	1.097	0.295	0.478

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 12.22
Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests and Social Intervention (N=105)
 An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests
 for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.524; Adjusted R-square=0.473)***

Source	Adjusted df	Adjusted MS	F	Pr>F
Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests: None, Low, Medium, High	3	55.793	31.898***	0.000
Age Group at Program Entry: 12-14, 15-17, 18-23	2	1.637	0.936	0.396
Interview Status: Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed	1	0.809	0.463	0.498
Level of Social Intervention: Lower, Higher	1	5.265	3.010	0.086
Interaction: Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests x Level of Social Intervention	3	8.165	4.668**	0.004
Within error	94	1.749	---	---
Corrected Total	104	---	---	---

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests Covariate

Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)				
				i/j	1	2	3	4
None	23	1.333	0.289	1	---	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
Low	47	-0.08825	0.236	2		---		0.000***
Medium	20	-0.652	0.298	3			---	0.000***
High	15	-3.114	0.373	4				---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.22-continued

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests x Level of Social Intervention

Prior Yearly “Other” Arrest	Level of Social Intervention	Adjusted Mean	Std Err (N)	Pr> T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)								
				i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
None	Lower	1.018	0.373 (13)	1	---							
None	Higher	1.649	0.432 (10)	2		---						
Low	Lower	-0.161	0.241 (36)	3			---					
Low	Higher	-0.01541	0.401 (11)	4				---				
Medium	Lower	-0.472	0.415 (11)	5					---			
Medium	Higher	-0.832	0.447 (9)	6						---		
High	Lower	-1.784	0.440 (10)	7							---	***
High	Higher	-4.445	0.605 (5)	8								---

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 12.23
Logistic Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests and Social Intervention (N=169)
 Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)
 on Yearly “Other” Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status

Interview Status	Success	Failure	Total†
Non-Interviewed	55	19	74
TI Interviewed	69	26	95

†Total program youth with an arrest history, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=169).

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model χ^2 for covariates=28.648 with $df=5$)***

Source	df	Parameter Estimate (B)	Std. Error	Wald	Pr	Odds Ratio
Constant	1	0.937	0.305	9.451**	0.002	2.552
Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests: (1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High)	1	0.963	0.432	4.971*	0.026	2.619
Age Group at Program Entry:						
12-14	2			3.388	0.184	
15-17		-0.734	0.453	2.620	0.106	0.480
18-23		-0.121	0.546	0.049	0.825	0.886
Interview Status: (0=Non-Interviewed, 1=Interviewed)	1	0.196	0.397	0.244	0.622	1.217
Level of Social Intervention:						
Low	2			7.375*	0.025	
Medium		-0.492	0.410	1.439	0.230	0.611
High		1.002	0.589	2.892	0.089	2.724

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Chapter 13

Mediating Variables

(Kwai Ming Wa)

Introduction

The findings of the GLM and the Logistic Regression models thus far have indicated that the program and comparison samples had a reduction in arrests. A key difference was that the reduction in arrests was greater for the non-interviewed program youth than for the interviewed program youth or comparison youth. The program strategy of social intervention¹ was more successful than the strategy of suppression in contributing to a reduction of arrests, particularly for the non-interviewed program youth.

For both the interviewed and non-interviewed program-youth samples, social-intervention services (group discussion, individual counseling, and family counseling) were particularly effective with moderately delinquent youth, i.e., those who had been arrested less than twice in the pre-program period. Suppression services (arrest, surveillance, warning, detention, etc.) contributed to an increase in arrests for the less-delinquent, non-interviewed program youth, but a decrease in arrests for the more delinquent interviewed program youth. The greatest predictor of a reduction of (or an increase in) arrests was *prior total arrests category* (the control variable).

We were interested not only in outcomes for youth in the three samples and whether

¹ Social-intervention services were successful when provided by probation officers to youth with prior arrests, and when provided by outreach youth workers and case managers to youth without prior arrests. However, when social-intervention services were provided by probation officers and police to youth without prior arrests, the results showed an increase in arrests.

program-strategy variables were associated with any of these outcomes, particularly for the program youth, but also in certain life-course or life-space changes that the program could have distinctly affected. We regarded as mediating variables such factors as changes in school status, job status, the youth's personal legal income, the youth's household legal income, the youth's illegal income, the household's illegal income, personal crises, family crises, drug use and the youth's degree of gang involvement. These life-course or life-space changes in turn were expected to contribute to a change in delinquency patterns. In other words, it was possible that the program acted both directly and indirectly through these mediating variables to reduce the youth's delinquency, as indicated by arrest rates or self-reported offense rates.

The mediating variables were based on data derived from responses to the individual gang-member survey, and from program effects on these life-space or life-course factors, and therefore we could only use the interviewed program-youth sample and the comparison-youth sample in our analysis. Furthermore, the youth interviews were administered during the first half of the program period, and represented the possibility of change over the brief period (an average of 1 to 1-¼ years, S. D. = 0.4) between the Time I and Time II interviews. Nevertheless, we assumed that program effects on the mediating variables might also be evident in changes in arrest patterns over the full program-exposure period. If changes in self-reported offenses over the shorter interview period paralleled changes in arrest patterns over the longer program-exposure period, we preferred to examine program effects based on arrest data. Therefore, our decision was to examine the effect of program strategies on changes in mediating variables and their subsequent effect on changes in arrest rates over the full program-exposure period for interviewed program youth (or its equivalent for comparison youth).

In the analyses below, we first determine whether the findings using self-reported offense data parallel those using arrest data. Second, we examine whether changes in life-course and life-space, or mediating, variables occurred during the Time I/Time II interview period for both the interviewed program and comparison samples. Third, if such changes in favor of the interviewed program sample occurred, we determine whether program-strategy variables account for such changes. Fourth and finally, we test whether such mediating-variable changes – in relation to specific levels of program services (particularly social-intervention and suppression services) – account for differences between interviewed program and comparison youth samples, or at least a subset of these samples that provides evidence for change in arrest patterns. Our analysis is handicapped by small sample or subsample sizes.

Self-Reported Offense Outcomes

In our earlier GLM and Logistic Regression analyses comparing arrest patterns during the program and pre-program periods, we find no statistically significant differences in findings for the matched interviewed program-youth and comparison-youth samples. Similarly, we find no significant differences in GLM models when we use self-reported offense data and similar control variables. Interviewed program and comparison youth reduce their levels of self-reported total offenses, total violence offenses, total property offenses and total drug offenses between the Time I and Time II interviews. Since the self-reports did not include “other” (minor) offenses generally, a comparison of such results using self-reported offenses and Mesa police arrest data could not be made.

The reduction in self-reported offenses is usually greater for comparison than interviewed

program youth, but the differences are not statistically significant. We also find no difference in patterns using the Logistic Regression models. The major differences in arrest patterns is between the non-interviewed program sample and the comparison sample. (Obviously, we cannot analyze the effects of the program on mediating variables for the non-interviewed youth, because they had no interviews.)

Mediating Variables

We compared patterns of change in the mediating variables for interviewed program youth (n = 75) and comparison youth (n = 60). In general there was little change in mediating variables between the Time I and Time II interviews for youth in either the program or comparison sample. However, there were a minority of youth in each sample who did have changes in their life-course or life-space conditions. It is to these youth that we pay special attention. In general, for this subsample, program youth do better (or are more successful) than comparison youth. A variety of factors (such as age, gender, race/ethnicity) are not generally controlled for in this part of the analysis.

School Status. The majority of program youth (61%) and comparison youth (58.8%) who were in school at Time I remained at school at Time II. There was little difference between program and comparison samples in the odds of youth who were in school at Time I remaining in school at Time II. However, of the 25 program-youth dropouts at Time I, 10 had returned to school at Time II (odds = 0.667); of the 15 comparison-youth dropouts at Time I, 4 had returned to school at Time II (odds = 0.444). Program youth did 1.5 times better than comparison youth (Table

13.1).

Jobs. Of the 15 program youth who were not in school and without a job at Time I, 12 had jobs at Time II and 3 did not (odds = 4.0). Of the 8 comparison youth who were not in school and without a job at Time I, 4 had jobs at Time II and 4 did not (odds = 1.0). Program youth did 4 times better than comparison youth. However, the comparison sample did 25% better than the program sample in keeping youth with jobs in school at both Time I and Time II (Table 13.2).

Youth Income Directly from Legal Sources. A substantial number of program and comparison youth were earning money legally at either Time I or Time II. This was monthly income that was earned or came directly from legal or legitimate sources, such as regular employment, legal odd jobs, and public aid. While 41.3% (n = 31) of the program youth increased their level of legal income, 38.7% (n = 29) remained at the same level, and 21.5% (n = 15) decreased their level of legal income. The pattern was not as favorable for the comparison youth: while 43.3% (n = 26) increased their legal income, 30% (n = 18) remained at the same level and 26.7% (n = 16) decreased their level of legal income. If we focus our odds on the relationship between youth with increased legal income (successes) and those with decreased legal income (failures), program youth did 26% better than comparison youth (Table 13.3).

Youth “Legal” Income from Household Members and Friends. Based on youth self-reports of personal “legal” monthly income from parents/family and/or friends (boyfriend/girlfriend), there was an increase in income for 21.3% (n = 16) of program youth, a report of no change for 44.6%

(n = 33), and a decrease for 35.1% (n = 26). The pattern for the comparison-youth income from the same sources was: an increase for 31.7% (n = 19) of the households, no change for 33.3% (n = 20), and a decrease for 35% (n = 21) of the households. The odds of an increase in this source of “legal” or “legitimate” income was 0.577 for the program youth, and 0.907 for the comparison youth. Comparison youth showed a 57% greater improvement in this source of income than did program youth. In both cases, however, such sources of income were still declining, but more so for program-youth than comparison-youth households (Table 13.4).

Youth Illegal Income. Most program youth (73.3%; n = 55) and comparison youth (76.7%; n = 46) reported no illegal monthly income at the Time I and Time II interviews. However, a smaller percentage of program youth (9.3%; n = 7) than comparison youth (10%; n = 6) reported an increase in illegal monthly income, and a higher percentage of program youth (13.3%; n = 10) than comparison youth (11.7%; n = 7) reported a decline in illegal monthly income. Thus, program youth reported a higher percentage of illegitimate-income change. The odds for both program and comparison youth was 1.0 (Table 13.5).

Household Legal Income. Less than half of the program youth (45.0%; n = 49) and comparison youth (38.4%; n = 37) reported household yearly legal income. Among the program youth, 18.4% (n = 9) indicated an increase, 63.3% (n = 31) indicated no change, and 18.4% (n = 9) indicated a decrease. Among the comparison youth, 13.5% (n = 5) indicated an increase, 59.9% (n = 22) indicated no change, and 27.0% (n = 10) indicated a decrease. The odds of an increase in household legal yearly income for program youth relative to an increase for comparison youth

was 1.64, or 64% better (Table 13.6).

Household Illegal Income. An even smaller number of program and comparison youth reported household illegal yearly income. Nine youth in each sample reported no change or an increase in household illegal yearly income (4 youth in each sample did not respond to this item at both interviews). Six program youth, but only 3 comparison youth, reported decreases in household illegal yearly income. Both samples were very small, but the program youth had a higher ratio of decrease to increase (or no change) in household illegal yearly income than did the comparison youth. Program-youth households had a two-times better relative improvement than the comparison-youth households in the reduction of household illegal yearly income (Table 13.7).

Drug Use. A higher percentage of program youth (49.3%; n = 37) than comparison youth (33.3%; n = 20) reported they never used drugs, at Time I and Time II. A slightly greater percentage of comparison youth (42.1%; n = 16) than program youth (40.0%; n = 16) reported decreased drug use, and a higher percentage of program youth (42.7%; n = 17) than comparison youth (32.5%; n = 13) reported no change in drug use. Program youth (n = 5) reported a 13.2% increase in drug use, while comparison youth (n = 11) reported a 27.5% increase. The odds of success versus failure (i.e., decrease versus increase) was 2.2 times greater for the program youth than for the comparison youth (Table 13.8).

Personal Problems/Crises. Both program and comparison youth reported a relative decrease in a range of personal problems or crises between the Time I and Time II interviews (e.g., serious

illness, drug abuse, domestic violence, gang-crime victimization, family relationships, jobs, income, and school problems). There was a greater decrease relative to an increase in these problems for program youth (30 decreases; 10 increases) compared to comparison youth (22 decreases; 13 increases). In terms of odds, program youth did 77% better than comparison youth in the reduction of such personal problems or crises (Table 13.9).

Family Problems/Crises. Both program and comparison youth reported reductions in family problems or crises between the Time I and Time II interviews. Again, there was a greater decrease relative to increase in family problems of program youth (24 decreases; 11 increases), compared to families of comparison youth (20 decreases; 18 increases). In terms of odds, program youth reported a 96% relatively greater success-to-failure rate in the reduction of family problems or crises than did comparison youth (Table 13.10).

Gang Involvement. We developed a comprehensive and perhaps more useful scale to measure changes in gang involvement than the simple determination of whether the youth was a gang member or non-gang youth at Time II compared to Time I (see Appendix D). The scale was based on the calculation of changes (yes/no) in regard to whether relatives were involved in gang activities, whether the youth was afraid to walk the streets due to gang activity, whether the youth or his family was exposed to a gang crisis, whether the youth was an active gang member, spent time with or had friends who were gang members, knew the size of the gang, intended or did not intend to leave the gang, and whether the youth was involved in inter-gang violence. Using a T-test procedure, we found that there was a slightly greater non-significant decline in gang

involvement among program youth compared to comparison youth between Time I and Time II (program = -0.733, comparison = -0.417; p. = 0.42).

Using the odds calculation, the number of program youth who decreased their gang involvement (n = 38) versus those who increased their gang involvement (n = 25; odds = 1.52), was the same as the number of comparison youth who decreased their gang involvement (n = 26) versus those who increased their gang involvement (n = 17; odds = 1.53). Twelve program youth and 17 comparison youth had no change in their gang involvement, reporting “no involvement” or “slightly involved” with gangs (Table 13.11).

Program youth generally did better than comparison youth, i.e., improved social adjustment in a range of life-space or life-course factors which could be associated with a decrease in delinquent activity. This pattern was based on changes in a relatively small number of program and comparison youth, excluding gender, race/ethnicity, age category or other statistical controls. The changes took place over the short 1 to 1-1/4-year period between the two Time I and Time II interviews.

Program Strategies and Changes in Mediating Variables

Separate GLM models were developed for Time-I-interviewed program youth with arrest records (n = 72), using social-intervention services (group discussion, individual counseling, and family counseling, combined) at low (1), medium (2), and high (3) levels to predict apparent and meaningful changes in each selected mediating variable in separate equations: school (increase or decrease in level of education); jobs (lost or got a job); personal legal income (increase or decrease); personal illegal income (increase or decrease); household legal income (increase or

decrease); household illegal income (increase or decrease); gang involvement. Again, youth who reported no change were removed from the models to maximize the possibility of program effect over the 1 to 1-¼-year period between the Time I and Time II interviews.

For each of the mediating or dependent variables in this model, the prediction variable was *level of total social-intervention services*, and the control variables, or covariates, were *prior category of total arrests* (for the pre-program period – to provide for maximum period of effect), *gender*, and *age category*. The results overall were not promising.

The only useful model in which social intervention services predicted a mediation variable was change in education level (increase or decrease). Only 41 program youth had an education-level change. This particular GLM model, with a subsample of program youth, was statistically significant ($p = 0.0135$; R-square = 0.425). The significant variable in the equation was *prior total arrests category* ($p = 0.030$). Generally, youth with higher total prior arrests decreased their level of educational achievement, those with lower priors increased their level of educational achievement, the youngest age category (14 and under) did better than the other two age categories ($p = 0.035$), and total social-intervention services was marginally significant ($p = 0.086$). Those youth who were provided with more social-intervention services increased their level of educational achievement, and those with medium or low levels of social-intervention services decreased their level of educational achievement (Table 13.12).

In our earlier series of GLM models, *social-intervention services* had been significant in predicting reduced total arrests for the Time-I-interviewed and the non-interviewed program sample. No other program variables were significant in these earlier models.

Odds. In a further analysis using an odds calculation that included only Time-I-interviewed program youth who increased or decreased their level of educational achievement between the Time I and Time II interviews, we found that higher levels of social-intervention services were effective in contributing to an increase in educational achievement.

We compared Time-I-interviewed program youth who decreased their level of educational achievement (e.g., dropped out): $n = 27$, and those who increased their level of achievement (e.g., went from dropout to school attendee, or from one grade to a higher grade level): $n = 14$. Again, we eliminated all youth ($n = 34$) for whom there was no change (i.e., stayed in school, $n = 25$; finished school, $n = 9$) between Time I and Time II. We determined whether the youth was provided with a low, medium or high amount of social-intervention services. We compared youth who were provided with a medium/high amount of services to youth who were provided with a low amount of services who were likely to have increased their educational-achievement level.

Of the 14 youth who increased their level of educational achievement, 9 were provided with medium/high levels of social-intervention services, and 5 were provided with low levels of social-intervention services, for an odds of 1.8. Of the 27 youth who did worse in their educational achievement, 11 were provided with medium/high levels of social-intervention services, and 16 were provided with low levels of social-intervention services, for an odds of 0.69. Comparing the two rates (no demographic or other controls were used), those program youth provided with higher levels of social-intervention services were 2.6 time more likely to do better at reaching higher levels of educational achievement than youth who were provided with low levels of social-intervention services (Table 13.13).

Program and Educational Effects on Arrests

With the possibility that the Project could have distinctively affected a change in educational level which might have contributed to a reduction in total arrests, we introduced the *change in education level* mediating variable, as well as two interaction terms – change in level of education × project, and change in level of education × age category – in a GLM model, with *gender* and *prior total arrests category* as control variables. We could not use social-intervention services directly for Time-I-interviewed program youth and non-social-intervention services for comparison youth as variables. Instead we assumed that what distinguished the two samples was that the program youth were provided with some level of program social services, and the comparison youth were not.

We included age category as a control variable, because younger youth (12 to 14 years) were less likely to drop out of school than the 15 to 17-year-olds; and older youth (18 and above) were more likely to remain as dropouts than the 15 to 17-year-olds. We also made the assumption that the Project could have had an effect on change in education level between the Time I and Time II interviews (which occurred early in the program period), and consequently this change could have affected total arrests during the full program period.

Several GLM models were constructed. The “best” model included interviewed program and comparison youth (n = 108) to test whether education-level change for program and comparison youth had different effects on total arrests. (Note that program youth did 1.5 times better than comparison youth in a previous analysis; see Table 13.1). Youth in the odds analyses did not necessarily have prior-arrest records; all youth in the GLM analyses did have prior-arrest

records.

Our “best” model included the following variables: *project*, *prior total arrest category*, *change in education level*, *gender*, *age category*, and two interaction terms: *project* × *change in education level* and *age category* × *change in education level*.

This model was significant ($p. > 0.001$), with two insignificant two-way interaction terms, with an R-square of 0.453. The Project main effect was not significant. Both program and comparison youth decreased their total arrests. Change in education level alone was marginally significant as a main effect in the model ($p. = 0.094$). Youth who either dropped out or remained as dropouts at Time II did worse than those who stayed in school, went back to school, finished a GED or high school, or got higher degrees.

What is of special interest is that while the program and comparison youth do not differ overall in changes in education level, there are differences within the program sample. The Project is associated with a decrease in total arrests for those who stay in school or achieve a higher education level. The program youth who dropped out, or remained as dropouts, at Time II showed less of a decrease in total arrests (Table 13.14). It is possible, therefore, if not likely, that the Project, particularly in its provision of social-intervention services, had a positive effect on raising educational levels for Time-I-interviewed program youth, and both the social-intervention-services and the increased-educational-achievement variables may have been associated with a decrease in arrest rates.

In sum, our analysis of the effects of the mediating variables does not reveal any overall differences in findings. Our sample sizes are too small. Nevertheless, there is some suggestive evidence that the Project, and probably the provision of social-intervention services by Project

workers, had a positive effect not only on lowering arrest rates directly, but also on assisting youth to make a better social adjustment at school and to move ahead. The increase in educational-achievement level was also associated with a decrease in total arrest rates.

Table 13.1
Summary of School Status Change for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.1(a) School Status at Time I and Time II:

Project	Dropout	In School	GED	HS Graduate	Higher Degree	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	25	41	4	4	1	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	27	34	7	5	2	75
Comparison, Time I	15	34	4	7	0	60
Comparison, Time II	20	22	7	10	1	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.1(b) Change in School Status for Time-I Dropout Youth:

Project	Time II Dropout	Time II In School	Time II GED	Time II HS Graduate	Time II Higher Degree	Total‡
Program-Interviewed, Time I Dropout	15	9	0	1	0	25
Comparison, Time I Dropout	11	2	2	0	0	15

‡ Total number of youth who were dropouts at Time I (N=40).

13.1(c) Change in School Status for Time-I In-School Youth:

Project	Time II Dropout	Time II In School	Time II GED	Time II HS Graduate	Time II Higher Degree	Total‡
Program Interviewed, Time-I In School	12	25	3	0	1	41
Comparison, Time-I In School	9	20	2	3	0	34

‡ Total number of youth who were in school at Time I (N=75).

Table 13.2
Summary of Job Status Change for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.2(a) Job Status at Time I and Time II:

Project	In School & Job	Employed	Unemployed	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	45	15	15	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	38	26	11	75
Comparison, Time I	42	10	8	60
Comparison, Time II	28	20	12	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.2(b) Change in Job Status for Time-I Unemployed Youth:

Project	Time II In School & Job	Time II Employed	Time II Unemployed	Total‡
Program-Interviewed, Time-I Unemployed	6	6	3	15
Comparison, Time-I Unemployed	0	4	4	8

‡ Total number of youth who were unemployed at Time I (N=23).

13.2(c) Change in Job Status for Time-I Employed Youth:

Project	Time II In School & Job	Time II Employed	Time II Unemployed	Total‡
Program-Interviewed, Time-I Employed	3	5	2	10
Comparison, Time-I Employed	3	12	0	15

‡ Total number of youth who were employed at Time I (N=25).

Table 13.3
Summary of Change in Youth Legal Monthly Income
for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.3(a) Youth Legal Monthly Income at Time I and Time II:

Project	\$0.	\$1. to \$500.	> \$500.	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	29	23	23	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	28	14	33	75
Comparison, Time I	21	18	24	60
Comparison, Time II	12	22	26	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.3(b) Change in Youth Legal Monthly Income for All Youth[¶] :

Project	Increase	No Change ^{¶¶}	Decrease	Total †
Program-Interviewed	31	29	15	75
Comparison	26	18	16	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

^{¶¶} "No Change" includes 17 program and 4 comparison youth whose Time-I personal legal monthly income from household members was \$0 and remained \$0 at Time II.

Table 13.4
 Summary of Change in Youth “Legal” Monthly Income
 from Household Members and Friends
 for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.4(a) Youth “Legal” Monthly Income from Household Members and Friends at Time I and Time II:

Project	\$0.	\$1. to \$500.	> \$500.	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	31	42	2	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	44	25	7	75
Comparison, Time I	26	32	2	60
Comparison, Time II	32	22	6	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.4(b) Change in Youth “Legal” Monthly Income from Household Members and Friends for All Youth[¶] :

Project	Increase	No Change ¶¶	Decrease	Total †
Program-Interviewed	16	33	26	75
Comparison	19	20	21	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

¶¶ “No Change” includes 22 program and 14 comparison youth whose Time-I personal “legal” monthly income from household members and friends was \$0 and remained \$0 at Time II.

Table 13.5
Summary of Change in Youth Illegal Monthly Income
for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.5(a) Youth Illegal Monthly Income at Time I and Time II:

Project	\$0.	\$1. to \$500.	> \$500.	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	61	11	2	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	65	6	4	75
Comparison, Time I	52	7	1	60
Comparison, Time II	53	6	1	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.5(b) Change in Youth Illegal Monthly Income (Excluding Youth¶ without Illegal Monthly Income at Time I and Time II):

Project	Increase	No Change ¶¶	Decrease	Total ‡
Program-Interviewed	7	3	10	20
Comparison	6	1	7	14

‡ Total number of youth who had illegal income at either Time I or Time II (N=38).

¶¶ "No Change" excludes 55 program and 46 comparison youth whose Time-I illegal monthly income was \$0 and remained \$0 at Time II.

Table 13.6
Summary of Change in Legal Household Yearly Income
for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.6(a) Legal Household Yearly Income at Time I and Time II:

Project	\$1. to \$30K	> \$30K	Missing	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	32	17	26	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	29	20	26	75
Comparison, Time I	20	17	23	60
Comparison, Time II	23	14	23	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.6(b) Change in Legal Household Yearly Income (Excluding Youth¶ with Missing Response at Time I and Time II):

Project	Increase	No Change ¶¶	Decrease	Total ‡
Program-Interviewed	9	31	9	49
Comparison	5	22	10	37

‡ Total number of youth who reported legal household yearly income at Time I and Time II (N=86).

¶¶ "No Change" excludes 26 program and 23 comparison youth whose Time-I and Time-II legal household yearly income was missing.

Table 13.7
Summary of Change in Illegal Household Yearly Income
for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.7(a) Illegal Household Yearly Income at Time I and Time II:

Project	\$0.	\$1. to \$30K	> \$30K	Missing	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	60	9	2	4	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	62	7	2	4	75
Comparison, Time I	48	8	0	4	60
Comparison, Time II	47	9	0	4	60

† Total number of youth who was interviewed twice (N=135).

13.7(b) Change in Illegal Household Yearly Income (Excluding Youth¶ Reporting “Zero” or with Missing Responses at Time I and Time II):

Project	Increase	No Change ¶¶	Decrease	Total ‡
Program-Interviewed	4	5	6	15
Comparison	4	5	3	12

‡ Total number of youth who reported illegal household yearly income at Time I and Time II (N=127).

¶¶ “No Change” excludes 56 program and 44 comparison youth whose Time-I household illegal yearly income was \$0 and remained \$0 at Time II.

Table 13.8

Summary of Change in Drug Use for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.8(a) Drug Use at Time I and Time II:

Project	Never to < 1 day	1 to 2 days	3 to 4 days	> 4 days	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	59	11	3	2	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	57	8	5	5	75
Comparison, Time I	42	7	4	6	60
Comparison, Time II	45	2	5	8	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.8(b) Change in Drug Use (Excluding Youth¶ Reporting “Never” at Time I and Time II):

Project	Decrease	No Change ¶¶	Increase	Total ‡
Program-Interviewed	16	17	5	38
Comparison	16	13	11	40

‡ Total number of youth who reported drug use at Time I and/or Time II (N=78).

¶¶ “No Change” excludes 37 program and 20 comparison youth whose Time-I Drug Use was “Never Used” and remained “Never Used” at Time II.

Table 13.9
Summary of Change in Personal Crises
for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.9(a) Personal Crises at Time I and Time II:

Project	None	Low	Medium	High	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	9	16	21	29	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	12	23	22	18	75
Comparison, Time I	8	25	10	17	60
Comparison, Time II	7	26	17	10	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.9(b) Change in Personal Crises (Excluding Youth[¶] Reporting “None” at Time I and Time II):

Project	Decrease	No Change ¶¶	Increase	Total ‡
Program-Interviewed	30	29	10	69
Comparison	22	25	13	58

‡ Total number of youth who reported some personal crises at Time I and/or Time II (N=147).

¶¶ “No Change” excludes 6 program and 2 comparison youth whose Time-I personal crises were “None” and remained “None” at Time II.

Table 13.10
Summary of Change in Family Crises
for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.10(a) Family Crises at Time I and Time II:

Project	None	Low	Medium	High	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	15	34	15	11	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	22	32	11	10	75
Comparison, Time I	22	22	10	6	60
Comparison, Time II	18	31	7	4	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.10(b) Change in Family Crises (Excluding Youth[¶] Reporting “None” at Time I and Time II):

Project	Decrease	No Change ¶	Increase	Total ‡
Program-Interviewed	24	29	11	64
Comparison	20	15	18	53

‡ Total number of youth who reported some family crises at Time I and/or Time II (N=137).

¶ “No Change” excludes 11 program and 7 comparison youth whose Time-I family crises were “None” and remained “None” at Time II.

Table 13.11
Summary of Change in Gang Involvement
for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth

13.11(a) Gang Involvement at Time I and Time II:

Project	None	Low	Medium	High	Total †
Program-Interviewed, Time I	9	26	23	15	75
Program-Interviewed, Time II	8	37	18	12	75
Comparison, Time I	10	25	23	2	60
Comparison, Time II	15	24	19	2	60

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135).

13.11(b) Change in Gang Involvement (Excluding Youth[¶] Reporting “None” at Time I and Time II):

Project	Decrease	No Change ¶	Increase	Total ‡
Program-Interviewed	38	9	25	72
Comparison	26	11	17	54

‡ Total number of youth who reported some gang involvement at Time I and/or Time II (N=126).

¶ “No Change” excludes 3 program and 6 comparison youth whose Time-I gang involvement was “None” and remained “None” at Time II.

Table 13.12
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Education Level/School Status,
Controlling for Total Arrests in the Pre-Program Period (N=41)[¶]

13.12(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.425)*

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Gender: Male/Female	1	1.590	2.40	0.131
Age at Program Entry: 14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over	2	2.476	3.74*	0.035
Social Intervention: Low; Medium; High	1	1.753	2.65	0.086
Prior Total Arrests: None; Low; Medium; High	3	2.244	3.39*	0.030
Within error	32	0.662	—	—
Total	40	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

[¶] "Change in Education Level/ School Status" includes Remained as High School Dropout (n=15), Dropped Out at Time #1 (12), Gone Back to School (n=10), Earned GED or Higher Degrees (n=4).

13.12(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Education Level/School Status (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for the Social-Intervention Main Effect

Social Intervention	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				<i>i/j</i>	1	2	3
Low	21	-0.728	0.284	1	—	0.882	0.031*
Medium	16	-0.773	0.360	2	—	—	0.039*
High	4	0.443	0.421	3	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; and *** $p < .001$.

Table 13.13
Summary of Change in Education Level/School Status
for Interviewed Program Youth

13.13(a) Education Level/School Status at Time I and Time II:

Education Level/School Status Time I/Time II	High School Dropout	In School	GED / High School Diploma or Higher	Total †
High-School Dropout	15	9	1	75
In School	12	25	4	
GED/High-School Diploma or Higher	0	0	9	

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=75).

13.13(b) Change in Education Level/School Status (Excluding Youth¶ who Remained In School and Graduated from High School at Time I and Time II):

Social Intervention	Increase	No Change ¶¶	Decrease	Total ‡
Low	5	Stayed In School (n=25) and Earned GED/ School Diploma or Higher (n=9)	16	21
Medium	6		10	16
High	3		1	4
Total	14	34	27	75

‡ Total number of youth who reported an increase or decrease in education level/school status (N=41).

¶¶ "No Change" includes those program youth who stayed in school and earned a GED, a high-school diploma or a higher degree at Time I and Time II.

Table 13.14
An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Arrests,
Controlling for Total Arrests in the Pre-program Period,
for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth (N=108)[¶]

13.14(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.453)^{*}**

Source	Adjusted <i>df</i>	Adjusted MS	F	Pr > F
Project: Comparison/Program-Interviewed	1	1.580	1.28	0.260
Gender: Male/Female	1	2.166	1.76	0.188
Age at Program Entry: 14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over	2	1.969	1.60	0.207
Change in Education Level [¶] : Decrease; No Change; Increase	2	2.981	2.42	0.094
Prior Total Arrests: None; Low; Medium; High	3	18.326	14.90 ^{***}	0.000
Project × Change in Education Level	2	0.071	0.06	0.944
Age at Program Entry × Change in Education Level	4	1.395	1.13	0.345
Within error	92	1.230	—	—
Total	107	—	—	—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

13.14(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test for the Change in Education-Level Main Effect

Change in Education Level [¶]	N	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)			
				i/j	1	2	3
Increase	22	-0.723	0.294	1	—	0.951	0.080
No Change	44	-0.703	0.239	2		—	0.047*
Decrease	42	-0.132	0.232	3			—

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .

[¶] "Change in Education Level/School Status" includes: a) Increase (i.e. went back to school); b) No Change (i.e. stayed in school or earned GED/higher degrees); and c) Decrease (i.e., dropped out or remained as dropout at Time II).

Table 13.14-continued

13.14(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise *t* Test for Project × Prior Total Arrests Interaction with Change in Education Level

Project [†]	Change in Education Level [‡]	Adjusted Mean	Std Err	N	Pr > T Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j)						
					i/j	1	2	3	4	5	6
C	Increase	-0.861	0.480	8	1	—					
C	No Change	-0.823	0.316	17	2		—				
C	Decrease	-0.338	0.310	17	3			—	*		
Pi	Increase	-0.584	0.355	14	4				—		
Pi	No Change	-0.583	0.284	27	5					—	
Pi	Decrease	0.074	0.295	25	6						—

For differences between groups: * $p < .05$; † $p < .01$; and ‡ $p < .001$.

[†]“Project” includes: C=Comparison Youth; Pi=Interviewed Program Youth.

[‡]“Change in Education Level/ School Status” includes: a) Increase (i.e., went back to school); b) No Change (i.e., stayed in school or earned GED/higher degrees); and c) Decrease (i.e., dropped out or remained as dropout at Time II).

Chapter 14

Gang and Community-Level Crime Changes

Our Evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program in Mesa focused on the effects of the program at the individual-youth level. We were not sure that changes in the behavior of program youth, individually, would be reflected in changes in gang structure and activities at the gang level, or in the scope and nature of the problem at the community level. Also, we could not easily demonstrate a causal connection between changes in individual program-youth behavior and changes in the gang to which the youth belonged. Focus of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) was on individual youth, with little consideration given to changes that might affect the nature and structure of gangs in the area. There were no outreach youth workers to contact the youth and understand the scope and nature of the gang-as-a-unit (i.e., the particular gang or aggregate of gangs) problem in the neighborhood. Efforts at community outreach and development were largely oriented to providing services to families and neighborhood groups, usually without reference to the general gang problem or specific gangs.

The Evaluation design and the data collected did not permit us to make a clear connection between the effect of the program on youth and changes, if any, that resulted at the gang or community levels. Yet some data were available at the individual-youth level which would permit us to make judgements about whether gang youth were identified less, or more, or the same with their gangs after exposure to the MGIP. Substantial numbers of program youth were located (hung out) outside as well as inside the program area. We could determine whether

program youth did better or worse, if they hung out in the program or non-program areas. More importantly, if they were delinquent gang members, we could determine if they did better or worse in terms of reduction in arrests if they came from the program or comparison area.

Interviewed program and comparison youth also estimated changes in gang size at different time periods. The Mesa Police Department gang specialists provided information about changes in gang size and criminal activity over time. Thus, Mesa Police Department aggregate-level area crime statistics could be used to determine changes in the level of crime incidents on an area basis. It was possible that parallel changes were occurring at individual-youth, gang, and community levels, and that this would permit us to make inferences about program effects (or connections). The direction or cause of change might not be clear, however.

We had access to three sources of data which would give us information about changes in the nature of aggregate gang or general-crime changes in the program and comparison areas: the self-reports of youth in our interview samples about gang membership patterns, the observations and data of police gang specialists about gang characteristics, and official police statistics about crime incidents in the program and comparison areas over various time periods. Distinctions between gang and non-gang incidents could not be readily determined.

In this discussion, we first examine changes in the youth's gang-membership and the youth's perception of changes in gang size, based on self-reports at the Time I and Time II interviews (approximately a 1 to 1¼-year interval); then we determine if the youth's hanging out in the program or the non-program area is related to outcome. Finally, we look at changes in gang size and severity of types of crime by specific gangs, as reported by police gang specialists in four interviews, each occurring about 7 to 9 months apart over a 38-month program period –

the Police Time I-Time IV interviews. We also look at changes in crime patterns over the four-year program and four-year pre-program periods, based on Mesa Police Department statistics.

Self-Reported Gang Membership Changes

An objective of the Comprehensive Gang Program was to get program youth to reduce their attachment to the gang. Based on normal social-developmental factors, we expected that fewer youth would be gang members at Time II, but we also expected that the program would have an additional socializing effect. We also thought that if enough program youth said they were no longer gang members at Time II, this could be a sign that a particular gang's size was reduced, if we also assumed recruitment of other youth was not occurring at the same time. Smaller gang size would or should be associated with a reduction in offenses for particular gangs.

At the Time I interview, each interviewed program and comparison youth was asked three questions related to gang membership: if he or she 1) had ever been in a gang (or associated with a gang); 2) had associated with a gang in the prior six months; or, 3) was currently a gang member. The structuring of the questions permitted youth to avoid saying they were currently gang members, when in fact they were, or had been. The analysis focused on whether youth said they were ever gang members.

If the youth answered "yes" to the question: "Have you ever been in a gang or associated with a gang?," then the next question was: "what is/was the name of your present (or most recent) gang?" We computed the number of youth who said they were gang members associated with the particular gangs, the mean and median change scores per gang, and the mean and

median change scores for the aggregate of gangs in the program and comparison areas between the Time I and Time II interviews.

At Time II, most program youth (n = 61) answered the questions asking whether they were ever a gang member and to what gang they belonged; fewer of the comparison youth answered the question (n = 48). Only three program youth did not provide answers; relatively more of the comparison youth (n = 14) did not answer the question. At Time I, 18 program youth said they were non-gang youth, and only 18 program youth (24.7%) said they were members of the program area's major gang (South Side Mesa). Smaller numbers of program youth said they were members of other well-known gangs in the city – Los Varrrios Locos (n = 6), West Side Mesa (n = 5), and Wetback Power (n = 4). The comparison youth who said they were gang members from the larger gangs at Time I were not concentrated in one particular gang – Wetback Power (n = 5), Los Varrrios Locos (n = 8), South Side Mesa (n = 4), and West Side Mesa (n = 3).

In other words, at Time I a majority of youth from both the program or comparison interview samples declared they were either non-gang youth or were from smaller gangs. At Time II, the pattern changed for both the program and the comparison youth. Slightly more of the program youth said they were gang members at Time II (78.2%) compared to Time I (73.4%). There were slight increases in membership in both the major gang (South Side Mesa) and in the minor or smaller gangs, and a decrease in the number of non-gang youth (from 14 to 10). The changes were different for the comparison sample. Fewer of the comparison youth said they were gang members at Time II (40.3%) compared to Time I (50.0%). There was an increase in the number who said they were members of the smaller gangs (from 17.7% to 25.8%), hardly any

increase or decrease in membership of other gangs, and a relatively large increase in the number who said they were non-gang youth (from 27.4% to 37.1%).

In other words, the program was associated with an increase in gang membership, and not being in the program was associated with a decrease in gang membership during the 1 to 1-¼-year interview period. In both samples, an increasing number of youth at Time II had become identified with smaller rather than major gangs. Still, many program youth remained affiliated with the major program-area gang (South Side Mesa).

The Project was apparently not successful in reducing the identification of program youth with their gangs. At the same time, it was important to recognize that a higher proportion of youth in the program were gang-involved (91.2%) than was the case with the comparison youth (80.0%); program youth also had more extensive arrest backgrounds, particularly at Time I. Similar patterns of change (or non-change) were reflected in gang identification among program youth, regardless of gender. Program youth – males and females – were more likely to be gang members at Time II than at Time I, and comparison youth – males and females – were less likely to be gang members at Time II than at Time I.

Gang Size. We attempted to discover whether the program was associated with a change in the size of the gang the program youth “hung out with.” The expectation was that youth in the program would disaffiliate themselves from the gang, therefore causing a decline in the gang’s membership, and consequently a decline in the number of gang youth who could commit crimes. This did not necessarily occur. The size of the gang that youth “hung out with” (whether males or females) increased somewhat for program youth and declined slightly for comparison youth.

The questions asked of program and comparison youth, both males and females, at Time I

and again at Time II, were: “How many active male gang members are currently in the gang group you hang with?” and “How many active female gang members are currently in the gang group you hang with?” Program-youth responses indicated that male gang size had increased: between Time I (median = 80) and Time II (median = 150); program female gang size had also increased between Time I (median = 15) and Time II (median = 20). Comparison-youth males reported that the size of their gangs had increased slightly between Time I (median = 30) and Time II (median = 32.5); comparison female gangs, however, had decreased in size from Time I (median = 15) to Time II (median = 10).

There was consistency in the pattern of change in gang identification (membership) and gang size for both program and comparison youth. Gang identification (membership) and size seemed to grow among program youth, at least those interviewed at both Time I and Time II. Gang identification (membership) and size seemed to stabilize or decline among comparison youth interviewed at Time I and Time II. Based on police arrest records at Time I, we knew that program youth were somewhat more likely to be gang members and delinquent than were comparison youth. The samples were not exactly equivalent, and, because of small sample sizes, we did not assess changes controlling for age or race/ethnicity variables. Our focus was on aggregate changes in program and comparison-youth gang identification and gang size. Furthermore, it is possible that the interviewed youth may not have been fully representative of the gangs of which they were members (but only of particular segments), and had limited knowledge of the gang as a whole.

Whether such increases or declines in gang membership were associated with changes in the scope of crime committed by the gangs or gang segments to which the interviewed youth

belonged is not clear, at least in the program area. Based on the discussions in Chapters 11 and 12, in which the distinction between gang members, gang associates and non-gang youth in the program and comparison samples is not significant, the pattern of increased gang membership and gang size at the individual level or in the program area may not necessarily be associated with an increase in crime.

Gang-as-a-Unit Changes and Police Gang-Specialist Perceptions – Lorita Purnell-James

We sought the views of the gang specialists in the Mesa Police Department regarding the history of specific gangs, and changes in their size and criminal nature. The interviews with the gang specialists commenced in November 1999 and extended through January 2002, approximately one year after OJJDP funding for the MGIP ceased. The police gang specialists were interviewed four times, at 7 to 9-month intervals over a 38-month period. A member of the National Evaluation team conducted interviews by telephone: the first three with one gang specialist, and the fourth with a different gang specialist. Repeat telephone interviews were necessary to clarify or verify estimates.

The police gang specialists were asked to use gang-membership lists and to refer to actual arrest data in providing estimates; emphasis was on estimates being as reliable as possible. The gang specialists generally estimated the size of specific gangs as larger than did the program and comparison youth. This could have been the result of several factors. The police estimate could have covered a longer period of time than that reported by the interviewed youth. Police estimates also could have included certain youth, or sections of the gang, with whom the interviewed youth were not familiar.

Gang History. Several of the gangs operate in more than one part of the city, but they usually predominate in one particular area. The largest gang operating in the program area is the South Side Mesa gang, which has been visible in Mesa since 1987. The gang recruits in the Broadway-McDonald area of Mesa, and its membership has increased since 1998.

Predominantly Hispanic, the gang has two factions headed by families involved in a power and territorial struggle. One faction (Garibo) wants the gang to maintain a low profile in order to facilitate the sale of more drugs, while the other faction (Velasquez) wants visibility and more aggressive action toward rival gangs.

Of the 28 documented gangs in Mesa in January 2002, the largest gang is the Wetback Power/Doble gang in one of the comparison areas. The gang has operated in Mesa since 1990, and its size has increased due to recruiting efforts by its members. The gang is predominantly male-Hispanic, with 5% female participation. Some of the members are Mexican national citizens and undocumented residents in the United States. The gang-membership numbers decline in the summer when the nationals return to Mexico, and increase in the fall when the school term starts. Wetback Power/Doble has members throughout Mesa, but operates mainly in the Mesa Junior High School area, which has shown the largest increase in gang membership.

The predominant gang in the Kino/Carson comparison areas is the La Victoria Locos/East Side La Victoria Locos (LVL). Originally from Tempe, Arizona, the La Victoria Locos are an older gang and have been present since 1981; the East Side La Victoria Locos are a younger faction of LVL, and have been visible in Mesa since 1993. The LVL factions are multi-generational, predominantly Hispanic, organized, and very sophisticated; both factions recruit. Native American youth who attend school outside of the reservation are also becoming members

of LVL.

The West Side Mesa gang also has its largest contingent in the Kino/Carson comparison areas, but operates as well in the program area. West Side Mesa has been very active during the last ten years, and involved in repeated violent rivalries with South Side Mesa and Wet Back Power. The West Side Mesa gang is predominantly Hispanic, and is known for large-scale drug sales of marijuana and crack cocaine, auto theft, burglaries, and vandalism.

Other, smaller gangs (such as Barrio Pobre, East Side Chandler, East Side Mesa, East Mesa Locos, Mesa Vario Locos, Los Compitas Mesa and others) are growing, and operate mainly in the comparison areas, especially the Mesa Junior High School area (see Table 14.1).

Gang Size. The police-reported changes in gang size were based on the differences in estimates between their first and fourth interviews (Police Interview Times I-IV). Based on police estimates for 14 of Mesa's documented gangs located in the program and comparison areas, the total number of gang members increased by 42.5% in all the areas between November 1998 (Time I) and January 2002 (Time IV). The size of gangs operating in the program area increased 33.0% in the same period (176 members at Time I; 234 members at Time IV). The number of gang members in the combined comparison areas of Kino Junior High School and Carson Junior High School increased 11.6% (250 members at Time I; 279 members at Time IV).

A second comparison area (the Mesa Junior High School area) was added in 2001 to account for 25 additional comparison youth from that area who had been interviewed. From Time I to Time IV, the number of gang members in the Mesa Junior High School comparison area increased 82.3% (237 members at Time I; 432 members at Time IV). When the Mesa Junior High comparison area is combined with the original Kino/Carson comparison area, the

number of gang members increased 46.0% between Time I and Time IV (487 members at Time I; 711 members at Time IV).

In other words, based on estimates of the Mesa Police Department gang specialists, the increase in gang membership was greater in the program area than in the first (combined) two comparison areas, but less than in the third comparison area. Thus, the increase in all of the comparison areas together (46.01%) was greater than the increase of gang members in the program area (33.0%).

The increase in size of membership in the predominant or largest gangs varied in each of the areas. The largest gang in the program area (South Side Mesa) increased 47.7% (from 111 to 164 members). The largest gang in the Kino/Carson Junior High School comparison areas (West Side Mesa) decreased 5.3% (from 170 to 161 members). The largest gang in the Mesa Junior High School comparison area (Wetback Power/Doble) increased 31.3% (from 150 to 197 members). However, the major increases in membership seemed to occur in the smaller gangs in the comparison areas, particularly in the Mesa Junior High School area. The Project seemed to have little effect in limiting the growth of the predominant gang – South Side Mesa – in the program area. Overall, the estimates of the growth in gang size by the police gang specialists seemed to parallel the estimates of growth in gang size by the interviewed youth, particularly the program youth (Table 14.1).

Severity of Gang Crime. Each of the police gang specialists was also asked to rate the severity of three categories of crime (violence, drugs, and property) attributable to each of the major gangs in the area over the 38-month police interview period. The ratings ranged from 0 (no involvement) to 10 (serious and frequent involvement). The ratings for violence, drugs, and

property crime were not very different across the areas, particularly at Time I, although the ratings were slightly lower for the South Side Mesa gang in the program area than for the West Side and Wetback Power gangs in the comparison areas. At Time IV, there was generally an increase in the ratings of severity of the drug problem in all of the areas, and the ratings for property crime decreased in all of the areas.

In the program area, the severity of crime levels for the 4 major gangs increased for drug crimes (+1.5), and decreased for violence crimes (-2.5) and property crimes (-5.5). The severity of the crime levels for the most dominant gang (South Side Mesa) in the program area increased for violence crimes (+2.0) and drug crimes (+3.0), and decreased for property crimes (-6.0).

The severity of the crime levels for the 4 documented gangs operating in the Kino/Carson areas increased for drug crimes (+0.75), and decreased for violence crimes (-2.2) and property crimes (-3.75). The severity of crime levels for the most dominant and largest gang in the area (West Side Mesa) decreased for violence crimes (-6), drug crimes (-1), and property crimes (-4). Overall, there seemed to be little difference in these estimates across areas.

The severity of the crime levels for the 6 major gangs operating in the Mesa Junior High comparison area between Time I and Time IV increased for violence crimes (+0.33) and drug crimes (+1.67), and decreased for property crimes (-1.88). The severity of the crime levels for the largest and most dominant gang in the area (Wetback Power/Doble) decreased for violence crimes (-4.0) and property crimes (-3.0), and increased for drug crimes (+1.0). Changes in the severity of these crimes increased in this area more than in the program area or in the original, combined comparison areas (Kino/Carson).

The patterns of change in severity of crime for the gangs in the different areas, as

estimated by the police gang specialists, did not vary much between the program area and the Kino/Carson Junior High School comparison areas. The program area showed slightly more declines in violence and property crimes, but more of an increase in drug crimes among its documented gangs. Violence was still increasing in the Mesa Junior High School comparison area. A comparison of the dominant gangs in all the areas revealed that the South Side Mesa gang in the program area had more of an increase in violence and drug crimes compared to West Side Mesa and Wetback Power/Doble in the comparison areas. However, the South Side Mesa gang was estimated to show more of a drop in property crimes than the dominant gangs in the two comparison areas (Table 14.2).

Summary

The views of police gang specialists about change in the size of gang membership indicated an increase overall in the program area, although several gangs there showed declines. The increase in the program area was due mainly to active recruiting efforts by South Side Mesa, the dominant program-area gang. The gang-membership-size problem was larger to begin with in all the comparison areas, but over time grew at a faster rate in the Powell Junior High program area (at least compared to the Kino/Carson areas) but not as fast as in the Mesa Junior High comparison area, where the city's largest gang (Wetback Power/Doble) was concentrated. The size of the increase in gang membership was smallest in the Kino/Carson Junior High School combined comparison areas.

The police estimates of the severity of gang crime indicated that drug crimes increased across all the areas. The drug-crime problem seemed to increase slightly more among the gangs

in the program than in the comparison areas. However, the program area registered the most noticeable declines in violence and property crimes, relative to the gangs in the comparison areas.

The Project did not have a significant effect on the reduction of gang membership in the program area, but might have had some dampening effect on the level of violence and property crimes among gangs in the program area. There was consistency in the estimates of the gang specialists and the interviewed youth regarding the growing size of gang membership in the program and comparison areas. However, gang-specialist estimates may or may not be consistent with official police crime-incident statistics. Gang-specialist estimates of changes in gang size and severity of gang incidents reflected changes that took place during the program period only. Also, the Project could still have had a significant effect on the reduction of arrests for program youth located in the program area, but less of an effect for program youth not in the program area.

Gang-Member Location and Project Effect

In Chapter 9, observing characteristics of program and comparison youth samples, we found that 44 program gang youth hung out mainly in the program area, but that 17 program gang youth also hung out in the comparison areas. In addition, there were 21 non-gang youth and 12 gang youth who hung out with gangs outside of Mesa, and 15 youth for whom we have no locational or gang membership information (totaling the 109 program youth interviewed at Time D).

If we compare youth who hung out with gangs in the program area with all other program youth (whether gang or non-gang youth, but all located outside of the program area) in a GLM

model controlling only for prior arrests, we find no program effect on *total arrests* (the dependent variable). The model (n = 90 youth) has R-square of 0.278 (p. > 0.001). Only the prior arrest category is statistically significant (p. > 0.001).

However, if we restrict the youth in the model to only those program youth with arrests who were gang members located in the program area (n = 44), and to program gang members in the comparison areas (n = 17), we find that the model (n = 50) has an R-square of 0.292, and is somewhat less statistically significant (p. > 0.003). *Priors* are slightly less significant (p. = 0.004), but the *project* variable is almost significant as a main effect (p. = 0.063). Both the program gang youth located in the program area and the program gang youth in the comparison areas increase their level of arrests, but the level of increase is almost three times greater for the program gang youth in the comparison areas (adjusted mean = 0.804) compared to the program gang youth in the program area (adjusted mean = 0.027). The difference, again, is almost statistically significant (p. = 0.063).

It is not likely that the difference is due to gender or race/ethnicity variations, although the fact that there are relatively more program youth 18-and-over in the program area than in the comparison areas may have made a difference. Actually, a higher proportion of older program youth in the comparison areas have higher priors than do older program youth in the program area. Because our cell sizes are so small, we cannot identify conclusively a special program effect on program youth located in the program area, although we observe below that the program area experienced a greater reduction in rates of general criminal incidents (including those committed by youth) than was the case in any of the comparison areas. There was both a relative decline in individual-youth arrest rates for program youth in the program area, and an

absolute decrease in program-area crime rates. All of this could be directly correlated with the effects of a large number of probation and police officers operating in a comprehensive, collaborative and intensive way to target the gang and crime problem for both program and non-program youth in the program area, compared to the non-targeted efforts of probation and police that affected program and non-program youth in the comparison areas.

Crime Incident Changes – Rolando V. Sosa

We were unable to obtain aggregate gang-incident or gang-related arrest data on a city-wide or program or comparison-area basis. A system for identification of gang incidents or gang arrests (distinguished from non-gang arrests) had not yet been operationally established by the Mesa Police Department. However, general crime-incident data (gang and non-gang together) was available on an area basis for the four-year pre-program period (January 20, 1993-January 9, 1997) and the four-year program period (January 10, 1997-December 31, 2000).

We classified offenses during these periods into four categories and computed incident rates per 1000 population: 1) *violence offenses* (murder; non-negligent and negligent manslaughter; rape by force and attempted rape; robbery and strong-arm robbery; assault with a firearm; assault with a knife or cutting instrument; assault with hands, fists, etc.; other simple assault; arson of an inhabited or uninhabited single residence; arson of an inhabited community or public building; arson of other type of property); 2) *property offenses* (burglary and forcible burglary of a residence and non-residence; motor vehicle theft of a car, truck, bus, motorcycle or other vehicle; vandalism; buying or possession of stolen property); 3) *drug offenses* (possession/manufacture/sale of marijuana, opium or cocaine derivative, synthetic narcotic or

non-narcotic, other dangerous non-narcotic); 4) *other offenses* (forgery or counterfeiting; fraud; embezzlement; offense against family or child; prostitution or commercial sex; other sex offense; curfew or loitering law violation; runaways or agency runaways; carrying, etc. of a weapon; disorderly conduct).

We also analyzed offenses during the same pre-program and program periods that were most likely to be committed by gang youth (particularly in Mesa), based on the observations of MGIP and MPD personnel as well as on our own research experience. For this analysis, we developed five instead of four categories of selected offenses, separating “status” offenses from “other” offenses, and eliminating offenses less likely to be officially reported or committed by gang youth (e.g., forgery or counterfeiting, and sex offenses). The 5 selected offense categories are: 1) *violence offenses* (murder; non-negligent and negligent manslaughter; assault with a firearm; assault with a knife or cutting instrument; assault with hands, fists, etc.; other simple assault); 2) *property offenses* (motor vehicle theft of a car, truck, bus, motorcycle or other vehicle; vandalism); 3) *drug offenses* (possession/manufacture/sale of marijuana, opium or cocaine derivative, synthetic narcotic or non-narcotic, other dangerous non-narcotic); 4) *other offenses* (inclusive of carrying, possession, etc. of a weapon; disorderly conduct; curfew or loitering law violation; runaways or agency runaways); and 5) *status offenses only* (curfew or loitering law violation; and runaways or agency runaways).

The results of these two separate analyses are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The patterns are similar. Using general offense categories over the program period compared to the pre-program period, the decline is similar but sharper in the program area than in any of the comparison areas. Furthermore, the differences between the areas, using the selected offense

categories likely to be committed by gang youth, are even sharper, with the program area showing mainly a pattern of declining offenses and the comparison areas a pattern of increasing offenses.

Offense Change. The Powell Junior High School program area, with the highest rate of total offenses in the pre-program period, shows the highest decline in total offenses (-11.9%) during the program period. The rate of decline for all categories of offenses in the program area compared to the average for the three comparison areas is 5.0%. The program area shows the highest decline in violence offenses (-22.9%), a high level of decline in property offenses (-12.8%; about equivalent to the 12.9% decline in the Mesa area generally), the lowest level of increase in drug offenses (+7.2%) and a decline in other offenses (-7.1%; not as great a decline as in two comparison areas: Kino/Carson Junior High (-9.0%) and Mesa Junior High (-8.7%). The largest decline in offenses appears to be in respect to violence offenses, and the lowest increase in offenses appears to be in respect to drug offenses. Nevertheless, we need to recognize that the level of all categories of offenses is absolutely higher in the Powell Junior High School program area at all time periods (Table 3).

The pattern is a little different and in some respects sharper when we examine changes in rates of selected categories of offenses (such as disorderly conduct, obstruction of justice, vandalism, motor-vehicle-act violations, as well as selected violence and drug offenses) committed more typically by youth, especially gang youth, in the program and comparison areas during the same program and pre-program periods. There is a greater relative decline in *other offenses* (including *status offenses*) when we focus on those offenses primarily committed by

youth.

The program area again shows the highest rate of change, a decline of 8.9% of total offenses during the program period. The change in the comparison areas ranges from -6.0% to +4.2% and +5.4%. The rate of decline for all selected categories of offenses in the program area compared to the average for the three comparison areas is 10.4%. The program area has the sharpest decline (-21.9%) in respect to violence offenses, which in the comparison areas ranges from -8.0% to -18.5%. While the program area has an increase (+7.0%) in drug offenses, the increase in the comparison areas is greater and ranges from 25.2% to 51.6% (Table 14.4).

It is difficult to attribute these greater absolute declines or lower increases in types of offenses directly to the effects of the Project. But the evidence of a greater decline in arrests at the individual level for program youth relative to comparison youth is matched by declines in offenses at the aggregate-area level. We cannot make a direct connection between these change patterns, since we employed different units of analysis without variables that connect these individual-youth and aggregate-area levels. The connection is suggestive, however, since the pattern of change is greater and more pronounced when using selected offense categories more typically committed by youth (particularly gang youth) than when using general offense categories.

Graphs

We see similar patterns of change when we graph the rates of total offenses, especially between 1993 and 2000 (the police Time I and Time IV interviews). Again, we observe that the level of offenses for the program area is much higher when we use a total-offense-rate analysis

(Figure 1). However, the decline after the beginning of the program period seems sharper using both the total and selected offense-rate analyses comparing the program area to the comparison areas. There appears to be an even sharper decline in offenses if we define the program period as beginning between mid-1995 or 1996, when Project-planning and worker assignments were made. Program services for youth began in January, 1997. The level of offenses seems to have abated more in the program area than in the comparison areas (Figures 14.1 and 14.2). The moderating effect in the levels of offenses in the program area in contrast to the comparison areas may well have been due, directly or indirectly, to Project operations. The Project contributed not only to a concentration of social-intervention services to program youth, but to a greater presence and effort to control crime (particularly gang crime) on a community basis.

Summary

The results of the analysis at the gang and area levels indicate that the program probably had a positive effect in containing the gang problem, particularly in reducing violent crime and, to some extent, other types of crime. The program may have been less successful in reducing the number of youth who became gang members, although the size of gang membership in the program area grew less than in the average of the three comparison areas. In other words, the Project appears to have contributed to a greater reduction in crime by program youth individually, and by youth generally in the program area, than would have occurred otherwise. The greater reduction in crime, however, did not correlate with a decrease in the number of program youth, or other youth in the program area, who were identified with gangs.

Table 14.1
Gang Membership of 14 Gangs¹: Time I-Time IV Police Interviews
Program and Comparison Areas

Gang	Gang Membership							
	Total Gang Membership		Powell Jr. High Program Area		Kino/Carson Junior High Comparison Area		Mesa Junior High Comparison Area	
	Time I	Time IV	Time I	Time IV	Time I	Time IV	Time I	Time IV
South Side Mesa	111	174	111	164	0	0	0	10
La Victoria Locos/ East Side LVL	70	59	20	9	50	50	0	0
Doble/Wet Back Power	150	227	0	30	0	0	150	197
South Side Chandler	5	30	0	0	0	0	5	30
Barrio Pobre	15	26	0	0	0	10	15	16
West Side Mesa	210	184	40	12	170	161	0	11
East Side Mesa	25	53	0	2	0	15	25	36
East Side Chandler	5	30	0	0	0	4	5	26
East Side Mesa Locos	15	37	5	5	0	5	10	27
Mesa Varrío Locos	20	44	0	12	20	32	0	0
Los Compitas Mesa	15	35	0	0	0	0	15	35
West Side City Crips	10	2	0	0	10	2	0	0
Mesa Home Boys	5	25	0	0	0	0	5	25
South Side Mexican Locos	7	19	0	0	0	0	7	19
Totals	663	945	176	234	250	279	237	432

¹ Although Mesa has more than 14 gangs, the gangs used in this analysis represent the dominant gangs in Mesa from 1998-2002, and those for which the Mesa Police Department has gang data.

Table 14.2
Police Perceptions¹ of Gang Crime²: Time I-Time IV Police Interviews
Program and Comparison Areas

Gang	Date Time I (11/1998) Time IV (1/2002)	Powell Jr. High Program Area			Kino/Carson Jr.High Comparison Area			Mesa Jr. High Comparison Area		
		V	D	P	V	D	P	V	D	P
South Side Mesa	Time I	6	6	6						
	Time IV	8	9	0						
	difference	2	3	-6						
La Victoria Locos/ East Side LVL	Time I	5	5	5	5	5	5			
	Time IV	5	9	0	5	9	0			
	difference	0	4	-5	0	4	-5			
West Side Mesa	Time I	8	8	8	8	8	8			
	Time IV	0	7	0	2	7	4			
	difference	-8	-1	-8	-6	-1	-4			
Doble/Wet Back Power	Time I	8	8	8				8	8	8
	Time IV	4	9	5				4	9	5
	difference	-4	1	-3				-4	1	-3
Barrio Pobre	Time I							10	10	10
	Time IV				0	9	0	0	9	0
	difference							-10	-1	-10
East Side Mesa	Time I							1	6	4
	Time IV				1	9	4	1	9	4
	difference							0	3	0
East Side Mesa Locos	Time I				3	3	3	3	3	3
	Time IV				6	9	3	6	9	3
	difference				3	6	0	3	6	0

¹ Based on police gang-specialist estimates.

² Police gang specialists ranked the gangs on the severity of the violence offenses (V), drug offenses (D) and property offenses (P) in which they were involved, on a scale of 0 (no involvement) to 10 (serious involvement).

Table 14.2-continued
 Perceptions of Gang Crime: Time I-Time IV Police Interviews
 Program and Comparison Areas

Gang	Date Time I (11/1998) Time IV (1/2002)	Powell Jr. High Program Area			Kino/Carson Jr. High Comparison Area			Mesa Jr. High Comparison Area		
		V	D	P	V	D	P	V	D	P
East Side Chandler	Time I							0	6	0
	Time IV				0	0	0			
	difference									
Mesa Vario Locos	Time I							0	5	3
	Time IV									
	difference									
Los Compitas Mesa	Time I							0	5	0
	Time IV							6	3	2
	difference							6	-2	2
South Side Mexican Locos	Time I							1	0	0
	Time IV									
	difference									
South Side Chandler	Time I							0	0	0
	Time IV							7	3	0
	difference							7	3	0
West Side City Crips	Time I				6	6	6			
	Time IV				0	0	0			
	difference				-6	-6	-6			
All Gangs: Average Difference		-2.5	+1.75	-5.5	-2.25	+0.75	-3.75	+0.33	+1.67	-1.83

Table 14.3
Offense Rate¹ per 1000 by Type of Offense
By Area and by Pre-Program Period (1/20/93 – 1/9/97) and Program Period (1/10/97 – 12/31/2000)

Offenses	Powell Jr. High School Program Area			Kino Jr. High School Comparison Area			Carson Jr. High School Comparison Area			Mesa Jr. High School Comparison Area		
	Pre- Program Period	Program Period	Percent Change	Pre- Program Period	Program Period	Percent Change	Pre- Program Period	Program Period	Percent Change	Pre- Program Period	Program Period	Percent Change
Violence	121.2	93.4	-22.9	106.7	96.3	-9.7	108.1	98.0	-9.3	98.4	82.5	-16.2
Property	595.6	519.3	-12.8	477.0	432.5	-9.3	405.4	356.7	-12.0	348.6	303.7	-12.9
Drug	40.0	42.8	+7.0	36.9	46.2	+25.2	36.6	53.6	+46.4	31.8	48.2	+51.6
Other	235.6	218.8	-7.1	221.6	219.7	-0.9	223.7	203.5	-9.0	192.8	176.1	-8.7
Total	992.4	874.3	-11.9	842.1	794.7	-5.6	773.7	711.8	-8.0	671.7	610.4	-9.1


¹ Population estimates were calculated for each year between 1990 and 2000 using 1990 and 2000 US Census data. Yearly population estimates during the 4-year pre-program and 4-year program periods were based on continual population growth. The offense rates were calculated by dividing the 4-year aggregated number of arrests for each type of offense by the 4-year averaged population totals.

Table 14.4
Offense Rate¹ per 1000 by Selected Type of Offense
By Area and by Pre-Program Period (1/20/93 – 1/9/97) and Program Period (1/10/97 – 12/31/2000)

Offenses	Powell Jr. High School Program Area			Kino Jr. High School Comparison Area			Carson Jr. High School Comparison Area			Mesa Jr. High School Comparison Area		
	Pre- Program Period	Program Period	Percent Change	Pre- Program Period	Program Period	Percent Change	Pre- Program Period	Program Period	Percent Change	Pre- Program Period	Program Period	Percent Change
Violence	104.0	81.2	-21.9	93.4	84.3	-9.7	93.9	86.4	-8.0	89.0	72.5	-18.5
Property	85.1	99.1	+16.5	82.6	100.4	+21.5	70.0	91.7	+31.0	63.8	74.3	+16.5
Drug	40.0	42.8	+7.0	36.9	46.2	+25.2	36.6	53.6	+46.4	31.8	48.2	+51.6
Other	32.9	23.4	-28.9	27.4	21.9	+20.1	29.3	23.6	-19.5	25.7	18.0	-30.0
Status	26.4	16.0	-39.4	54.3	54.4	0.0	37.1	26.1	-29.6	41.5	23.7	-42.9
Total	288.4	262.6	-8.9	294.6	307.1	+4.2	266.9	281.4	+5.4	251.8	236.7	-6.0


¹ Population estimates were calculated for each year between 1990 and 2000 using 1990 and 2000 US Census data. Yearly population estimates during the 4-year pre-program and 4-year program periods were based on continual population growth. The offense rates were calculated by dividing the 4-year aggregated number of arrests for each type of offense by the 4-year averaged population totals.

Figure 14.1
Total Offense Rates¹
By Year and By Program and Comparison Areas



1. Based on yearly population growth estimates from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses and Mesa Police Department total arrests for each year during the program and pre-program periods.
2. Staff selection, use of a centrally-located office in the program area, and selection of youth for the program began in 1996.
3. Actual youth program-entry dates and participation in a range of Project activities began in January, 1997.

Figure 14.2
 Selected Offense Rates¹
 By Year and By Program and Comparison Areas



1. Based on yearly population growth estimates from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses and Mesa Police Department total arrests for each year during the program and pre-program periods.
2. Staff selection, use of a centrally-located office in the program area, and selection of youth for the program began in 1996.
3. Actual youth program-entry dates and participation in a range of Project activities began in January, 1997.

Chapter 15

Lessons Learned (and to Be Learned)

Evidence indicates that the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) was effective in reducing the delinquency problem (i.e., arrests) for individual youth in the program, and for youth generally in the program area. The effectiveness of the program was due in large measure to the social-intervention services provided by Project workers, to the quality of Project leadership, to staff cohesion and commitment to the Model (as adapted) and to the high level of collaboration of Mesa institutions – City Council, Mesa Police Department, Maricopa County Juvenile Probation Department, United Way Agencies, and the School District – in respect to the emerging gang problem. Community leaders (policy makers and leaders of established agencies) were committed to the social development of gang at-risk and gang-involved youth. A Gang Prevention Steering Committee was formed (prior to the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program grant) to expand community resources and programs to address the youth-gang problem, particularly at the level of prevention and early intervention.

The OJJDP grant made possible the development of the MGIP and the further collaboration of key agencies under the leadership of the Mesa Police Department. Initial focus of the program was on gang youth who were on probation and who had moderate arrest records, usually for non-violent offenses. Later in the program, the MGIP shifted its focus to youth who were even less delinquent (or non-delinquent) and to greater collaboration with schools and youth agencies, although the juvenile court and probation were still the dominant source of referrals of youth to the program.

Project Administrators were highly capable and influential in modifying existing criminal justice system policy, as well as emphasizing a community-agency outreach approach. They developed a coordinated range of social-intervention services as well as suppression activities for youth in the program. A team of workers – police and probation officers, case managers, outreach youth workers, and neighborhood development specialists – housed together in an office located in the program area facilitated the development of the comprehensive approach.

Although the MGIP’s program did not incorporate all of the key elements and principles of the OJJDP Model, and it did not target hardcore, gang-delinquent youth, did not use youth workers to reach out to gang youth in the gang neighborhoods, or involve grassroots organizations (including local churches and business groups) in the development or operation of the program, it nevertheless was effective in developing a substantially comprehensive, community-wide approach that contributed to the containment and reduction of the gang problem.

Characteristics of Youth in the Program

1. Youth in the program were generally from low-income, economically- and socially-marginalized families located in increasingly-segregated, social-problem areas. They were probably representative of the less-delinquent, gang-involved and at-risk youth known to the Mesa Police Department and the Maricopa County Juvenile Court Probation Department. While most youth in the program were gang members and gang associates, 42.8% of the gang-related youth in the program had no prior arrest histories. Nevertheless, those gang-involved youth who were delinquent more often had arrest records and were chronically delinquent than were non-

gang-involved delinquent youth.

The full nature and scope of the gang problem may not have been clearly identified in Mesa. A great deal of inappropriate labeling of youth (particularly minority youth) as gang members (who were therefore expected to be prone to delinquency, particularly serious delinquency) may have occurred. This tendency was balanced by a strong commitment to a social-intervention approach on the part of criminal-justice and social-agency personnel.

In general, 15 to 17-year-olds tended to be more at risk for delinquency than were younger or older youth. Based on arrest and self-report data, youth in the program and comparison samples, regardless of age group, became less delinquent over time, which was probably a function of aging and social maturation. The MGIP had the effect of speeding up this process.

2. In general, females were less delinquent and did better in reducing delinquency patterns than males over the course of the program. It was difficult to determine whether race/ethnicity of youth in the program was an important factor, since the majority of youth in both the program and comparison samples were Latinos. However, Latino youth did better than non-Latino youth in reducing levels of property arrests and “other” (minor) arrests.

3. Gang membership (i.e., whether the youth was a gang member or not) did not predict whether the youth would do better or worse in the program. Prior delinquency record in particular, and age group generally, were the strongest predictors of reduced arrests for various offenses. Youth with high levels of prior arrests were arrested less often, and youth with low levels of prior arrests were arrested more often, during the program period compared to the pre-program period. The youngest age group (14-years-and-under) and the oldest age group (18-

years-and-over) did better than the 15 to 17-year-olds in reducing their arrest patterns.

Services and Contacts

1. Data assessment systems were not adequate for determining which youth, gang or non-gang, were at greatest risk for delinquent behavior. Youth gang membership and its varied relationships to delinquency problems were not sufficiently articulated in criminal-justice and social-agency procedures for purposes of identifying those youth most appropriate for referral to the program. Outreach youth workers and neighborhood informants could have aided in better targeting gang-delinquent youth and those at high risk for gang involvement.

2. The provision of social-intervention services, particularly in the context of a community-based program involving a variety of disciplines (including probation officers and social-development workers together) appeared to have been effective in the reduction of the delinquency problem for youth in the program.

3. Criminal-justice personnel, especially police and probation officers, were focused on addressing the gang problem in its various delinquent and non-delinquent manifestations. Youth agencies and school personnel were somewhat less involved in targeting the problems of gang-involved youth.

4. Probation and police officers appeared to be best prepared to address a range of individual-youth gang-delinquency problems through a combination of rehabilitation, suppression, and referrals. Social-agency youth workers tended to focus on younger, less delinquent and less troubled youth. The MGIP did not encourage outreach-youth-worker contact and work with the more-delinquent gang youth in the open community. School personnel were

knowledgeable about the gang problem, but not substantially engaged in the development of special school programs to enhance the social and educational potential of gang-at-risk and gang-involved youth.

5. The MGIP's community-oriented approach to the youth-gang/delinquency problem was effective, particularly in its emphasis on social-intervention services. A key value of a social-intervention approach appeared to be not only its contribution to the improvement of the youth's level of school achievement, and consequently the greater likelihood of his reduced delinquency behavior (i.e., lower arrest rates), but also its combination with a suppression approach (particularly by probation officers) in controlling the violent- and drug-crime behavior of offenders who had already been arrested for such crimes.

Nevertheless, a high level of social-intervention services for program youth was not necessarily more effective in the reduction of delinquency patterns than a low level of social-intervention services. Much depended on the level of prior arrests of program youth. Those youth with fewer priors were less likely to respond positively to increased levels of social-interaction services than were youth with more prior arrests.

Value of the OJJDP Model

Based on the evaluation of the MGIP's experience over the five-year program period, we found that their adaptation of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model was sufficient to contribute to the reduction of the gang problem in their emerging gang-problem community. A further test of the Model would be to focus on and include more delinquent gang or hardcore youth who are present in Mesa. Rather than being referred to gang programs, such youth

presently go directly to correctional institutions, particularly if convicted of serious and/or violent offenses.

It was also possible to argue that a less-comprehensive, community-oriented, institutional-focused effort (e.g., a probation approach committed to a restorative philosophy) would have been sufficient in an emerging gang-problem context to achieve positive results at less cost, at least with moderately-delinquent youth. However, a probation-approach alone would not be able to address the problem of youth at risk for delinquent gang involvement who are not yet detected or officially identified, or the problem of hardcore gang-delinquent youth in the community who have not yet been arrested. Furthermore, if police or probation become the primary institutions for socializing gang youth who may not be delinquent or arrested, social-justice, civil-rights, and constitutional issues could be raised.

Although the better development of an outreach-youth-worker approach in Mesa would have been useful in reaching hardcore youth and integrating them into established rehabilitation systems, this approach alone would not have been sufficient to protect the community from gang deprivations. A control approach involving some level of collaboration with the criminal justice system was required. A greater commitment by the schools to provide programs that better serve the interests and educational and training needs of gang-at-risk or gang-delinquent youth (particularly in association with supervised work programs) probably would have further served to reduce and control the gang problem. However, an effective school-based approach would still have required some level of involvement with social-service and justice systems, as well as with parents.

A further test of the value of a comprehensive, community-wide approach to the gang

delinquency problem requires comparison with alternative approaches which emphasize (somewhat separately) the efforts of justice-system, social-agency or educational-system personnel in less comprehensive program contexts. Such alternative approaches may or may not create the synergy necessary to address complex community or institutional policies that contribute to gang problems, and may or may not be cost-effective. In any case, a clear understanding of youth-gang-delinquency problems as a function of the interaction of deviant youth with a problematic social environment, especially with inadequate institutional policies and procedures, is required. Modification of both youth and institutional behaviors, in interaction with each other, is necessary.

Of special concern is that the community's institutions, including grassroots organizations (whether separately or in combination) learn to use appropriate and effective combinations of control and social-development services for different kinds of youth, who are often from minority, low-income and socially-handicapped families in "segregated" parts of the community. These larger, contextual social/economic/political problems must also be addressed.

The key lessons learned in the course of the Evaluation of the Mesa Comprehensive Community Gang Project were:

1. Not all gang youth were delinquent or at high risk for gang delinquency.
2. Generally, youth in the program committed few serious offenses either before or during their time in the program. The trend for program and comparison youth was a reduction in total arrests.
3. Nevertheless, the program was effective in reducing the level of total arrests of program youth by 18%, compared to similar youth not in the program; and in reducing the level of

program-area youth offenses, including gang-related offenses, by 10.4% more than in highly comparable areas.

4. The provision of social-intervention services was particularly effective in the Project's efforts to address gang delinquency problems. Suppression activities, per se, were generally not effective.
5. Probation played a key role in the reduction of the delinquency problem, particularly for gang youth with prior arrest records.
6. Special attention needs to be placed on the provision of social-intervention services to gang youth, particularly in relation to the problems they have with school and job achievement, and with social development.
7. An efficient system for identifying youth who are delinquent gang-youth requiring Project services needs to be developed in Mesa, and elsewhere.
8. The most important ingredients in the successful Mesa Comprehensive Gang Program were the cohesion and commitment of community leaders from criminal-justice agencies (particularly police and probation), schools, social agencies, and city government as they developed a relatively well-balanced and interactive social-intervention and community-control approach to the youth-gang problem.
9. A fuller test of the Comprehensive Gang Program requires the greater involvement of schools, grassroots organizations and neighborhood-based outreach youth workers, along with criminal-justice and social-agency personnel, in targeting delinquent gang youth and those at high risk for gang-delinquency involvement.

Chapter 16

General Summary

Background

Before the OJJDP grant for the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program Model (the Comprehensive Gang Program) was awarded in 1995, a well-developed leadership structure already existed in Mesa, comprising representatives of social and criminal-justice agencies, schools, businesses, faith-based organizations and government, all concerned with and actually addressing youth social-development issues, including problems of youth at risk for gang involvement. The gang problem had not been clearly assessed, and focus was on younger youth in the context of schools and youth agencies. The criminal justice system was just beginning to address the city-wide gang problem, which seemed to be growing. OJJDP funding for the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) was viewed initially as an opportunity to further develop and implement plans for at-risk and moderately delinquent gang youth. Control and suppression of gang-involved youth seemed to be of lesser long-term importance than prevention of the gang problem itself.

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee (GPSC) of Mesa became the policy-making body of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project. It was chaired by a City Council member and later by the Superintendent of Schools. Although the GPSC was not a Mesa City Council committee, it made recommendations to the City Council as well as to the Mesa Public School District and Mesa United Way. The scope of GPSC's interests was broader than the OJJDP initiative in Mesa. There was little evidence of a violent gang problem in Mesa, but in order to obtain OJJDP

funding, the Mesa-community and Project leadership stated that MGIP would concern itself with the reduction of violent gang crime by current gang members through social intervention. Mesa would also need to show that they were going to do intensive intervention involving the Mesa Police Department (MPD). The MPD became the lead agency, utilizing a combined social-intervention and suppression approach in close alliance with the Maricopa Juvenile Probation Department, and with the support of the United Way.

Program Development

The MGIP emphasized certain components of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model, especially community mobilization, i.e., the collaboration and involvement of key established agencies, particularly the police Gang Unit, juvenile and adult probation, the schools, United Way administration, and the Boys and Girls Club near the Project site. It tended to avoid contact with grassroots or faith-based organizations, and the use of outreach youth workers focused on contacting gang youth on the streets. The Project team was housed in an office located in the Project area (the Powell Junior High School area). It utilized a case-management-team approach involving a Project Director and a Case Management Coordinator, as well as gang detectives, probation officers, outreach youth workers, a Youth Intervention Specialist, and a Neighborhood Development Specialist. Initial focus was on probationers referred to the program from Juvenile Court. The key program objective was to provide social-intervention services as well as suppression and intensive probation services for gang-involved and other at-risk youth. It was expected that frequent interaction and information-sharing among police and probation would also facilitate a greater knowledge of participants' criminal activities.

A Mesa Police Department Commander was selected as the first Director on the Project. At the start, the staff consisted of a senior adult probation administrative supervisor (who became the Case Management Coordinator), two police officers and two juvenile probation officers, a United Way neighborhood-development specialist and a case manager from a social agency (PreHab) who was to be the lead outreach youth worker (or supervisor), as well as two part-time outreach youth workers (student interns from the Arizona State University School of Social Work). The outreach youth workers were available between 3:00 PM and 7:00 PM, and were used mainly to liaise with the schools and the Boys and Girls Club or to conduct group sessions with youth at the Project office. The outreach youth workers and the neighborhood development specialist workers (especially case managers) referred program youth to a great variety of agencies for services. In due course, community agencies, schools, and especially juvenile probation began to refer youth to the program who may or may not have been gang members or at-risk for serious delinquency and/or gang involvement.

The MGIP paid less attention to the provision of access to social opportunities (such as educational and job-related services) than to social services (e.g., individual counseling, family counseling and group discussion). A computer lab was established at the MGIP offices to enhance the academic skills of program participants. Limited attention was given to improved or better utilization of public-school and charter-school educational programs. Project management did not invest resources in developing staff specializing in job preparation or job placement for gang-involved or at-risk youth.

Originally, the Project operated within a framework of “zero tolerance” against criminal activity. The goals of the MPD, as stated in its first-year application for Project funding (1994),

were to increase suppression of criminal gang activities; to encourage legislative, judicial, and law enforcement reform to ensure that the criminal justice system works as an effective deterrent to, and control of, gang activity; and to encourage and support legislation to stiffen penalties for gang-related violence and repeat offenders. In due course, the police (particularly Project gang officers) modified its “hard nosed” approach. There was recognition that only a small percentage of violent crime (5%) was committed by gang members. The MPD accommodated the OJJDP Community Gang Program approach. It made the Project an integral component of its Gang Unit. The MPD’s strategy was to develop closer relationships with neighborhood residents and social agencies, while still emphasizing law enforcement and control of the gang problem. According to the police chief, it modeled its comprehensive approach to the gang problem on the notion of community-oriented policing.

In the fifth-year OJJDP funding application (1999), the MGIP stated it was holding youth accountable for crime and misbehaviors in accordance with law, social policy, and the interests of community. The Project Director and Case Management Coordinator expressed concern that patrol officers and Project gang detectives often harassed gang members by taking away their driver’s licenses for minor infractions. Youth were also subjected to heavy City fines when they tried to retrieve their licenses. Project Administrators were trying to address these practices.

The Maricopa County Juvenile and Adult Probation Departments played a key role in support of the Project, and emphasized that the Project strategy should include the provision of access to community-based services. Both juvenile and adult probation were committed to a restorative justice philosophy, and they provided extensive manpower resources directly and indirectly in support of the Project. Intensive probation, regular probation, school probation, and

probation surveillance officers came to be directly involved in, or associated with, Project operations.

Participation in the Project enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of the Maricopa County Juvenile Probation Department. The Project office housed a juvenile intensive probation supervision (JIPS) team which, in interaction with Project personnel, provided a greater level of supervision of youth in the program than would have been possible otherwise. This arrangement allowed Project probation officers to handle larger caseloads of standard probationers who could be identified as gang members or as at risk for gang membership. Some of the program youth on probation did not necessarily have arrest records, but were known to the juvenile court for truancy or other misbehaviors.

A close, cooperative relationship developed between Project probation and police officers. They frequently rode together on tours of duty in the Project target area. Project probation officers provided Project police with up-to-date information on outstanding warrants of program youth; in turn, police provided information on where youth could be located. They shared information on the probationer's family situation, work, and school status. Probation made available information from their data base which assisted Project police in the investigation of crime in which program participants were (or might have been) involved.

Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth Samples

The Evaluation of the MGIP program utilized three youth samples: interviewed program youth (n = 109), non-interviewed program youth (n = 149), and comparison (non-program or non-served) youth (n = 96). Information on characteristics of youth from the three samples was

drawn from three sources of data: youth interviews (including self-reported offenses), police arrest records, and worker-tracking records (services provided and contacts made). Self-reported offense charges and selected mediating variables were derived from the interviews of program youth and comparison youth during the first two years of the program. (Non-interviewed program youth mainly entered the program in the last two years of Project operations.) However, the analyses of Project effects were based largely on police arrest records of all youth in the three samples during the complete program and pre-program periods.

The demographic characteristics of youth in the three samples at program entry (or its equivalent for comparison youth) were as follows:

Males comprised 85.3% of the interviewed program sample, 81.9% of the non-interviewed program sample, and 77.1% of the comparison sample. Latinos comprised 86.2% of the interviewed program sample, 84.3% of the non-interviewed program sample, and 58.3% of the comparison sample. The largest proportion of white youth was in the comparison sample (31.3%). Between 5.5% and 9.5% of youth of other races were included in the various samples.

The youth fell into three age groups: two juvenile groups (12 to 14, and 15 to 17 years old), and one young-adult group (18 to 23 years old). The age distribution of the samples was: interviewed program sample: 14-years-and-under = 32.1%; 15 to 17 years = 37.6%; 18-years-and-over = 30.3%; non-interviewed program sample: 14-and-under = 36.1%; 15 to 17 years = 45.8%; 18-and-over = 18.1%; comparison sample: 14-and-under = 27.1%; 15 to 17 years = 46.9%; 18-and-over = 26.0%. There were considerably more juveniles in the non-interviewed program sample than in the other two samples.

Gang Membership. Interviewed program and comparison youth were classified as either

gang members, gang associates, or non-gang youth based at the Time I interview; classification of non-interviewed program youth was based on consensus identification from Project workers. The distribution of the gang-membership classifications in the interviewed program sample was: 66.1% gang members, 14.7% gang associates, and 19.3% non-gang youth. The distribution in the non-interviewed program sample was: 54.4% gang members, 16.8% gang associates, 5.4% non-gang youth, and 23.5% unknown (for purposes of our analyses, we placed the “unknowns” in the non-gang-youth category). In the comparison sample, the distribution was: 53.1% gang members, 26.0% gang associates, and 20.8% non-gang youth. There was no shift in gang membership status in the interviewed program sample, but there was a shift downward in the comparison sample – to 45.0% at the Time II interview. We do not know to what extent the non-interviewed program sample’s gang membership distribution shifted.

Gang Membership and Delinquency. Gang members were more often delinquent and chronic delinquents than gang associates or non-gang youth. More delinquent gang members were in the interviewed program sample (77.5%) than in either the comparison sample (58.8%) or the non-interviewed program sample (50.6%). The highest proportion of non-gang, non-delinquent youth (87.5%) was in the non-interviewed program sample. The smallest proportion of non-gang, non-delinquent youth (23.8%) was in the interviewed program sample. The highest proportions of chronic gang-member delinquents (i.e., medium and high rates of delinquency) were in the interviewed program sample (46.4%), followed by the non-interviewed program sample (37.0%). There were significant proportions in each sample of youth identified as gang members who had no arrest records: interviewed program sample, 22.5%; non-interviewed program sample, 49.4%; comparison sample, 41.2%.

Probation Status. The probation status of youth in the three samples varied: interviewed program youth = 80.8%; non-interviewed program youth = 63.8%; and comparison youth = 30.2%. There were non-interviewed program youth who were on probation who had no arrest records, and comparison youth with arrests who had no probation records. We cannot explain these different patterns (especially between comparison and non-interviewed program youth, since more comparison youth had arrest records), other than that some non-interviewed program youth on probation were probably status offenders, and that some arrested comparison youth had “luckily” avoided probation.

Gang Affiliation and Location. Most program youth, particularly interviewed program youth, were affiliated with the South Side Mesa Gang located primarily in the program (Powell Junior High School) area. Almost all comparison gang youth were affiliated with the Wetback Power, East Side or West Side Mesa gangs, located in the Carson, Kino, or Mesa Junior High School comparison areas. We were interested in whether program youth who were in the same gang but who lived in different areas (program and comparison) had different arrest rates. Of special importance was to determine whether declines in individual program-youth arrests might be associated with declines in area arrest rates, especially rates for gang youth.

Self-Reported Offenses. Since self-report data was not available for non-interviewed youth, these analyses could only include interviewed program and comparison youth. In general, a higher percentages of program youth than comparison youth self-reported having committed higher levels of total offenses, violence offenses, property offenses and drug-selling offenses. Youth who were interviewed at Time I only were more likely to self-report a greater variety of offenses, and were more likely to be chronic offenders than were program and comparison youth

who were interviewed at both Time I and Time II. Slightly more comparison youth (57.3%) than program youth (53.2%) interviewed at Time I reported they used drugs. Drugs of choice for use in both samples were: marijuana (50.5%), cocaine (29.4%) and methamphetamines (20.2%). Slightly more program youth (26.6%) than comparison youth (21.9%) interviewed at Time I said they sold drugs. Drugs of choice for sale in both samples were: marijuana (22.9%), cocaine (15.6%) and methamphetamines (13.8%). More comparison youth (72.9%) than program youth (69.7%) reported using alcohol. More program youth (60.6%) than comparison youth (46.9%) had access to a handgun.

Arrests. The gang problem in its delinquent character was emerging in Mesa and may not have been much different from the non-gang delinquency problem. There was little difference in the character of arrests committed by youth in the three samples in both the pre-program and program periods. Between two thirds and three fourths of arrests were for property offenses, and for minor offenses such as driving without a license, disorderly conduct, possession of alcohol, and curfew violations. Serious violence comprised 3.8% of all arrests, total violence (including felony and misdemeanor violence) comprised 14.5%, and drug offenses comprised 8.0% of all arrests across the three samples, during both the pre-program and program periods.

Program Structure and Process: Strategies, Services, and Worker Contacts

Youth workers, probation officers and police officers, as well as case managers, outreach youth workers and other staff in the MGIP collaborated to provide contacts and services to program youth, whether interviewed or non-interviewed. The Project staff completed 1650 worker tracking forms (each a 12-page report) documenting services to, and worker contacts

with, 224 individual program youth (106 Time-I-interviewed; 128 non-interviewed) during the program period (January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2000). The forms were completed every three months, for an average of 7.1 forms per youth. Project staff completed the forms on a regular basis.

A total of 10,933 services, 11,893 direct worker contacts and 3140 coordinated contacts involving different types of workers were recorded for all program youth. The largest source of referrals of youth to the program (197 males and 37 females) was the court (particularly juvenile court): Time-I-interviewed youth = 88.6% and non-interviewed youth = 73.9%. The next largest source of referrals was the schools: Time-I-interviewed youth = 8.5% and non-interviewed youth = 19.2%. The Time-I-interviewed youth (more delinquent and a little older than the non-interviewed youth) were referred to the program mainly during the first two years; the non-interviewed youth entered mainly during the second two years.

The Time-I-interviewed youth were in the program an average of three times longer (mean = 27.8 months) than the non-interviewed youth (mean = 9.4 months). However, on a monthly basis, non-interviewed youth were provided with 69.6% more total services, 50.0% more direct contacts, and 57.1% more coordinated contacts (i.e., contacts involving communication, planning and possible action with other Project workers). Non-interviewed youth were provided with more social-intervention services (group activities, individual counseling, and family counseling) – 55.8% of their total services – compared to Time-I-interviewed youth, who were provided with less social-intervention services – 46.0% of their total services. On the other hand, Time-I-interviewed youth were provided with more suppression services – 23.7% – than were non-interviewed youth – 19.9%.

Time-I-interviewed females were provided with more services per youth (71.4) than were males (61.3); the youngest age group (14 and under) were provided with more services per youth (67.7) than the 15 to 17-year-olds (59.8), or those 18 years and over (61.4). Youth who came into the program with annualized “moderate” levels of prior arrests were provided with more services per youth (less than 1 prior = 55.6 services; 1-2 priors = 54.5 services) than were both the non-delinquent youth (no priors = 27.4 services) and the most-delinquent youth (2 or more priors = 36.1 services). However, gang members were provided with more services per youth (67.7) than non-gang youth (57.2) or gang associates (47.0). Non-interviewed youth, although they were less delinquent, were provided with more group, individual, and family services than were Time-I-interviewed youth. However, interviewed program youth were provided with more suppression-type services, particularly by probation officers who were the primary providers of services: 49.6% for the Time-I-interviewed youth; 44.0% for the non-interviewed youth. Outreach youth workers provided only 9.7% of total services to Time-I-interviewed youth, and 13.6% of services to non-interviewed youth. Case managers provided 28.2% of total services to Time-I-interviewed youth and 33.8% of total services to non-interviewed youth.

Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Arrest Variables

We were interested in the effectiveness of the MGIP in reducing the level of arrests for program youth relative to comparison youth. We were also interested in the ratio of successes to failures of program youth relative to comparison youth. We used a General Linear Modeling (GLM) procedure to determine differences in levels of arrests and a Logistic Regression procedure to establish success/failure ratios.

Total Arrests. In our “best” GLM model (R-square = 56.9%), the *project* variable was not statistically significant, but was highly significant as an interaction term with *prior category of arrests* ($p. < 0.001$) in the main equation. Prior arrests remained the most significant variable explaining arrests in the program period compared to the pre-program period. The two program samples (interviewed and non-interviewed) each had less of an increase in arrests among youth with “no” or “low” prior arrests, and more of a decrease among youth with more prior arrests during the program period compared to the pre-program period, than did the comparison sample (controlling for gender, race/ethnicity, age group, and gang membership status). We estimated that program youth (interviewed and non-interviewed, together) with prior arrests had an 18% greater reduction in arrests, on average, than similar comparison youth during the program period.

Older youth (18 years and older) reduced their arrests significantly more than the 15 to 17-year-olds ($p. = 0.008$), and did marginally better than the 14-years-and-younger group. Program females, whether in the interviewed or non-interviewed sample, on average did somewhat but not significantly better (i.e., had fewer subsequent arrests) than comparison females; program females also had a greater reduction in level of arrests than program males, whether in the interviewed or non-interviewed samples. Factors that did not seem to make a difference in outcome – under controlled statistical conditions – were: whether the youth was a gang member, gang associate, or non-gang youth; years in the program; or probation status.

In the Logistic Regression models, we tested whether the program samples were likely to have a higher ratio of successes to failures than the comparison sample, in respect to the reduction of total arrests. Again, controlling for category of prior arrests, gender, race/ethnicity,

age group, and gang membership status, the model was significant ($p. < 0.001$). Interviewed program youth did 44% better than comparison youth, although the difference was not statistically significant ($p. = 0.361$). The most significant predictor of outcome was prior arrests ($p. < 0.001$). Females, again, did better than males ($p. < 0.01$).

In the Logistic Regression analysis comparing non-interviewed program youth with comparison youth, the same variables were entered and the results were almost the same. Non-interviewed program youth did 42% better than comparison youth, and the difference was almost statistically significant ($p. < 0.083$). Prior arrests remained the most powerful predictor of the ratio of success to failure. Again, the oldest age group and the females were more likely to be successful in avoiding or reducing arrests than were the younger youth and the males.

Total Violence Arrests. In all three samples, only 14.7% of youth were arrested for felony violence, and 26.8% were arrested for misdemeanor violence, during both the program and pre-program periods. There was little variability among youth arrested for violence: 91.4% were males, 73.1% were gang members, and 80.7% were on probation (these variables were eliminated from the model). Also, very few youth had committed more than one prior violent act. In our “best” GLM model ($R\text{-square} = 0.670$), the *project* variable was not significant ($p. = 0.763$); *prior arrests category* was the most significant variable ($p. < 0.001$). *Age group* was a significant predictor ($p. = 0.01$). All age categories reduced their levels of violence, but younger youth (14 and under) had a significantly greater decrease than the 15 to 17-year-olds ($p. = 0.002$), and a greater decrease than the 18-and-over group ($p. = 0.06$).

In the Logistic Regression model for interviewed program and comparison youth

(including youth with any arrests), 80.6% of comparison youth and 79.6% of interviewed program youth were estimated to be successes. However, none of the variables was significant, although the non-interviewed sample did 50% better than the comparison sample. Because so few youth were in the sample, it is questionable whether an adequate test of the Project's effect on violence arrests was achieved.

In a Logistic Regression model for interviewed program and comparison youth which included only those youth with pre-program violence arrests, 30.6% of comparison youth, but 69.4 % of interviewed program youth, were estimated to be successes. The final model was significant ($p. < 0.001$), with the following variables in the equation: *project*, *gender*, *race/ethnicity*, *age group*, *gang membership*, and *prior violence arrests category*. While *prior violence arrests* was significant ($p. = 0.002$), *age group* was marginally significant ($p. = 0.09$), and the other variables were not statistically significant; the odds ratio of Project success to failure in respect to violence arrests for program youth was 48% higher than for comparison youth. The Project, therefore, did have some degree of success in reducing violence arrests for interviewed program youth with prior violence arrests.

Total Property Arrests. In these models, a majority of arrested youth in each of the three samples had prior arrests for property crime (comparison youth = 61.5%, interviewed program youth = 86.4%, and non-interviewed program youth = 69.7%). In the "best" model ($R\text{-square} = 0.644$), the *project* variable is significant ($p. = 0.041$) as a main effect; *age group* is almost statistically significant ($p. = 0.056$), but the *prior property arrest category* variable explains the most variance ($p. = < 0.001$). There is a decline in property arrests in each of the samples, with the

largest decline in the comparison sample (-0.533) – greater than in the interviewed program sample (-0.143). The difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.026$). The decline in the non-interviewed program sample (-0.516) is not significantly different from the decline in the comparison sample. The oldest age group shows the greatest decline in property crime arrests, compared to the 15 to 17-year-olds ($p = 0.033$).

In the Logistic Regression model, there was no difference between interviewed program or comparison youth in the ratio of successes to failures regarding reduction of property arrests. Females were four times more likely to be successes than males ($p = 0.054$), and Latino youth were three times more likely to be successes than non-Latino youth ($p = 0.018$). The oldest age group (18 years and over) was 62% more likely to be successful than the two younger groups, but the difference was marginally significant ($p = 0.08$). Gang membership status was not significant in this model.

In the Logistic Regression model comparing non-interviewed program youth and comparison youth, the non-interviewed program youth were 18% more successful than the comparison youth, but the difference was not statistically significant ($p = 0.493$). Gender, age group, gang membership status, and prior property arrests category were not significant. In sum, all of the samples lowered their arrest rates for property crime. The comparison sample did somewhat better than the interviewed program sample in lowering their levels of arrests for property crime, but the non-interviewed program sample had slightly more youth who were successes than did the comparison sample.

Drug-Crime Arrests. A small but substantial percentage of youth in the three samples were arrested for drug offenses – mainly for drug possession – during both the program and pre-program periods: comparison youth = 29.2%; interviewed program youth = 23.5%; and non-interviewed program youth = 18.8%. Few females (n = 5) in the three samples had arrests for drugs. The gender factor was not considered in the analysis. The “best” GLM model was significant (R-square = 0.487). The *project* variable was not significant (p. = 0.871). There was a slightly greater increase in drug arrests for comparison youth (+0.230) than for interviewed program youth (+0.147), and a slight decline for non-interviewed program youth (-0.009). Latino youth significantly decreased their level of drug arrests (p. = 0.018). Gang membership, again, was not significant. Generally, youth who were in the program two or more years decreased their arrests for drug crime, while youth who were in the program less than two years increased their arrests for drugs.

Nevertheless, the most significant variable in the model was *prior drug arrests category* – the regression variable (p. < 0.001). The main effect was that all groups, regardless of age, showed a slight increase in drug arrests over the program period. The implication of the GLM finding was that drug arrests were increasing in Mesa, and that the Project had a limited effect on the problem.

The Logistic Regression model which included all interviewed program youth and comparison youth (with and without drug arrests) was not statistically significant, although the *project* variable was marginally significant (p. = 0.076). The interviewed program sample did 2.4 times better than the comparison sample in the success-to-failure ratio. None of the other variables in the equation, including prior drug arrests, was statistically significant. The Logistic

Regression model which included non-interviewed program youth and comparison youth (with and without prior drug arrests) was also not statistically significant. No variable came close to being significant, although non-interviewed program youth did 23% better in their success-to-failure ratio than comparison youth. The program appeared to have a slightly positive effect, mainly in preventing youth from getting arrested for drugs.

Furthermore, in the Logistic Regression model for drug arrests which included only interviewed program youth and comparison youth with drug arrests, the model was significant ($p = 0.003$), and the odds ratio indicated that interviewed program youth were 3.8 times more successful than comparison youth in reducing their likelihood of drug arrests. No variable was significant in this model.

In the Logistic Regression model for drug arrests, the Project was not effective with non-interviewed youth who had prior arrests for drugs. When only non-interviewed program youth and comparison youth (both with drug arrests) were included, the model was also significant ($p = 0.003$), but non-interviewed program youth did 14% worse (odds ratio = 0.707) than comparison youth. No variable was significant in the equation, except for prior arrests for drugs ($p = 0.0119$).

All “Other” Arrests. More interviewed program youth (81.9%) than non-interviewed program youth (62.2%) or comparison youth (50%) had arrests for “other,” usually minor, offenses in the program and pre-program periods. Youth from each of the samples reduced their “other” arrests over the program period. The “best” model is statistically significant ($R\text{-square} = 0.484$), but no variable was significant except their *prior “other” arrests category*. The MGIP was not

associated with any specific effect on “other” or minor arrests. In the Logistic Regression models, the success to failure rate of interviewed program youth and non-interviewed program youth was significantly greater than for comparison youth. No variable other than *project* was significant in the equations, not even prior arrests for “other” offenses. The failure rate for comparison youth was greater than the success rate. Both program samples were each twice as successful as comparison sample in the proportion of youth who reduced their “other” offenses.

In sum, the Project was effective in the reduction of arrests for a range of offenses. Generally, the Project had little distinctive effect on gang members versus gang associates or non-gang youth. Females, younger youth (14 and under) and Latino youth showed relatively greater reductions in levels of crime, and were more likely to have a higher ratio of success to failure in reducing arrests compared to males, non-Latinos and older youth (especially the 15 to 17-year-olds).

Program Service Effects

Social-intervention services (individual or family counseling and group discussion) – whether provided by probation officers, case managers or outreach youth workers – accounted for the most positive program effects, i.e., lower levels of arrests and higher ratios of successes to failures in reducing arrests among program youth. Suppression activities by Project probation or police – whether arrests, surveillance, supervision or probation violations – were generally less effective. Overall, contacts by the various types of Project workers – coordinated suppression or non-suppression services and total services – were also less important.

A series of GLM and Logistic Regression models were developed to determine which type and level of program service or worker contact was effective for interviewed and non-interviewed program youth, under statistically controlled conditions (i.e., controlling for prior category of arrests, age group at program entry, gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership and whether the youth was in the interviewed or non-interviewed sample).

We were interested in the effects of specific program components on changing rates of total arrests, total violence arrests, total property arrests, drug arrests, and “other” arrests. The variables in the models and the procedures used were similar to those reported above, with the addition of the service/activity – *social-intervention* or *suppression* – variables. *Prior category of arrests* continued usually to be the most predictive variable determining outcome, regardless of services/activity provided.

Nevertheless, a high level of social-intervention services, particularly for youth with high categories of prior arrests, produced the greatest reduction in total arrests. A low level of social-intervention services was most effective with youth with no (or a low level of) prior arrests. Also, non-interviewed program youth with prior arrests did significantly better through the delivery of social-intervention services than did interviewed program youth ($p = 0.032$). The oldest age group (18 and over) significantly reduced its level of total arrests; females had a marginally significantly greater reduction in total arrests than males.

Social-intervention services provided by probation and police officers tended to be more effective in increasing the odds of success to failure in lowering total arrest rates for youth with prior arrest histories (odds ratio = 1.50), particularly for the interviewed youth, who were more often delinquent than the non-interviewed youth. Higher (in contrast to lower) levels of social

intervention provided by probation and police officers did not contribute to an increased odds ratio of success to failure for youth with no pre-program arrests, particularly the non-interviewed youth. On the other hand, higher (in contrast to lower) levels of social intervention provided by case managers and outreach youth workers did contribute to an increased odds ratio of success to failure in total arrests for those youth with medium or high levels of pre-program arrests (odds ratio = 1.30).

Different levels of social intervention or suppression did not contribute significantly to a lowering of violence arrests among program youth. However, higher levels of suppression did predict greater decreased levels of violence for youth with higher rather than lower levels of prior arrests for violence – an interaction effect between levels of suppression and levels of prior arrests. Few youth had pre-program or program-period violence arrests to begin with.

As with violence, the program was less effective in reducing drug arrests for program youth (compared to total arrests and “other” arrests) . Neither different levels of social intervention nor of suppression were significant in the GLM models. Still, the program contributed to a significantly higher success-to-failure ratio in respect to drug arrests for interviewed program youth compared to non-interviewed program youth. This was particularly the case for older interviewed youth (18 and older) who had prior drug arrests, and who were on probation. The findings of the Logistic Regression model also indicated that a higher level of suppression activities was better than a lower level of suppression activities in increasing success rates in lowering drug arrests.

Lower levels of suppression and social intervention were associated with a lower level of arrests for property offenses. Again, the most significant variable in the equation was *category of*

prior property arrests. Youth with higher levels of prior arrests for property offenses reduced their levels of arrests during the program period. Those youth with no (or low levels of) prior property arrests increased their arrests for property offenses. Non-interviewed youth and Latino youth had significantly lower property arrests than did interviewed youth and non-Latino youth during the program period.

Finally, higher levels of social-intervention services were effective in lowering levels of “other” (minor) arrests (the most typical offenses committed by program youth), particularly for youth with medium or high levels of prior arrests for “other” offenses. Higher levels of social-intervention services also resulted in a marginally higher probability of success for program youth.

Regression effects largely accounted for changing levels of all types of offenses and higher probabilities of success to failure for program youth during the program period. However, the statistical notion of regression to the mean is insufficient to explain the differential overall positive effect of the program relative to comparison youth in respect to total arrests. Social intervention had an important and generally consistent effect in accounting for positive changes in program youth’s reduction in arrests, and in their success rates.

Although the program seemed to be more effective with non-interviewed youth (particularly in lowering their levels of arrests), it was associated with a higher probability of success (odds ratio) for the interviewed sample than for the non-interviewed sample. This pattern was accounted for by the fact that, although fewer non-interviewed youth had arrests and were included in the GLM models, they had more prior arrests than the average for the interviewed program youth. Again, suppression activities, total services or worker contacts and

various types of worker coordination were generally less effective (or not effective) with program youth. Social-intervention services were more effective when provided by probation officers than when provided by case managers or outreach youth workers, particularly for youth with prior arrest histories.

Mediating Variables

We were interested in whether the program was effective in changing certain life-course factors of youth which would in turn result in a reduction of arrests. We examined a range of mediating variables applicable only to interviewed program youth which might have been significantly affected by the level of social-intervention services provided. In a subsample of 40 youth who were program dropouts after the Time-I interview, youth provided with high levels of social-intervention services increased their educational achievement more than those youth provided with medium/low levels of social-intervention services (controlling for age and pre-program arrests). The equation was significant ($p = 0.014$; $R\text{-square} = 0.425$).

Furthermore, we knew from an earlier analysis that the Project was associated with a decrease in total arrests for program youth who stayed in school or achieved a higher grade level. Therefore it was possible that the Project, particularly through its provision of social-intervention services, had a positive effect on raising educational levels, particularly among the interviewed program youth; and that the Project, by raising levels of education for program youth, to some extent contributed to a reduction in levels of total arrests.

Gang and Community-Level Crime Changes

Data were available which permitted us to make judgements about the effects of the MGIP at individual-youth, gang, and area levels, and to some extent about their interrelationship. The Project was not particularly effective in reducing the identification of program youth with their gangs. More program youth remained identified with gangs than did comparison youth. More program youth than comparison youth also perceived that their gangs had grown in size between the Time I and Time II interviews.

Mesa Police Department gang specialists also perceived that gang membership had increased in the program area (33.0%), but not so much as in the combined comparison areas (46.0%), during a 38-month police-evaluation program period. The gang specialists also estimated that gangs in the program showed a greater relative decline in property and violent crime, but an increase in drug crime, relative to gangs in the comparison areas.

There was evidence of a special program effect on youth who “hung out” in the program area compared to program youth who “hung out” in the comparison areas. This subsample of program youth (n = 17) from the comparison areas had a three-times-greater increase in total arrests compared to the subsample of program youth (n = 44) who “hung out” in the program area.

The Project was associated with a greater reduction of reported criminal incidents in the program area compared to the comparison areas between the four-year pre-program and four-year program periods. The program area had the highest rate of decline in total offenses (-11.9%) relative to any of the three comparison areas, where rates of decline ranged between -5.6% and -9.1%. The program area had the highest rate of decline for violence offenses (-22.9%) relative to

declines in the comparison areas, which ranged from a decrease of -9.3% to an increase of +16.2%. The greatest contrast was in regard to drug offenses. The program area increased (+7.0%) relative to the comparison areas, where the increases ranged from +25.2% to +51.6%.

Similarly, the program appeared to have had an effect on the change in area rates of offenses typically committed by youth, including gang youth (e.g., incidents such as disorderly conduct, obstruction of justice, vandalism and motor vehicle act violations, as well as selected violence and drug offenses). The program area, again, showed the highest rate of decline for these youth-typical offenses during the program period (-8.9%). The change in the comparison areas ranged from a decrease of -6.0% to increases of +4.2% and +5.4%. The program area had the sharpest decline in respect to these selected violence offenses (-21.9%), which declined in the comparison areas from -8.0% to -18.5%. While the program area had an increase in drug offenses (+7.0%), the increase in the comparison areas ranged from 25.2% to 51.6%.

When we graphed changes in rates of general and selected youth-typical offenses for the pre-program and program periods, we saw similar patterns of greater decline in the program area compared to the comparison areas. The positive effect of the program seemed to be particularly strong at the time of program startup and during the following three years of operation.

In sum, this aggregate-level analysis indicated that the Project probably had a positive effect in containing the gang problem, particularly in the reduction of violent crime (though there was a relatively small increase in drug crime) and with some reduction in other types of crime usually committed by juveniles. The Project was less effective in reducing the number of program youth who were committed to gang membership, although the size of the aggregate gang-membership increase was generally lower in the program area than in the average of the

three combined comparison areas. In other words, the Project appeared to have contributed to a greater reduction of crime among program youth individually, and among youth generally (including gang youth) in the program area than would have occurred otherwise. Gang membership status was apparently not a significant factor in changes in the crime level in the program area.

Lessons Learned (and To Be Learned)

Evidence indicates that the Mesa Gang Intervention Program was effective in reducing the youth delinquency problem for individual youth in the program, and for youth generally in the program area (including gang youth). The effectiveness of the program was due in large measure to the range of social-intervention services provided by Project staff, the high quality of Project leadership, commitment to the Model, and to the high level of collaboration among Mesa institutions – City Council, Mesa Police Department, Maricopa County Juvenile Probation Department, United Way agencies and the District school system – in respect to the emerging gang problem.

Youth in the program were representative of less-delinquent, gang-involved and at-risk youth. The majority of program youth had no prior arrest records, although many were gang members. Many youth should not have been referred to the program. Inappropriate labeling of these youth as delinquent or potentially delinquent gang members may have occurred. This tendency was mitigated by a strong commitment to a social-intervention approach on the part of Project staff and criminal-justice and social-agency personnel in Mesa.

Probation (and to some extent police) seemed relatively better prepared than other social institutions to address a range of individual and community-area youth-gang problems,

particularly problems of those gang youth moderately involved in delinquency. Greater youth outreach work with neighborhood gangs, and more effective involvement of social agencies, schools, and grassroots organizations and groups would have been required to better identify high-risk and delinquent gang-involved youth, and to involve them in the Project.

Conclusion

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project has to be regarded as successful due to the high commitment to, and support of, the Project by established agency and local governmental leadership, and to effective Project-team involvement of criminal-justice and social/educational personnel in addressing the problems of moderately-delinquent and at-risk youth (who were mainly gang members), particularly through the provision of social-intervention services.

Key lessons learned were that:

1. Not all gang youth are delinquent, and a better assessment system needs to be developed for identifying highly at-risk and gang-involved delinquent youth in comprehensive, community-wide gang programs.
2. A fully-effective approach utilizing social intervention and controls by local grassroots organizations, in combination with established youth-serving and criminal-justice agencies, should be developed to address the range of problems of different kinds of gang youth.
3. Special emphasis needs to be placed on the provision of social-intervention services for those gang youth with special needs related to school and job success and social development.

Appendix A

Police Arrest Charges

Crime	Charges	
Serious Violence	Murder (M) Attempted Murder (AttM) Manslaughter (MNS) Aggravated Battery (AB) Aggravated Assault (AA)	Armed Robbery (AR) Armed Violence (AV) Drive-By Shooting (DBS) Criminal Sexual Assault/Abuse (CSA)
Violence	Battery (B) Robbery (R) Kidnapping (KDN) Arson (AN) Assault (A) Home Invasion (HI) Attempted Aggravated Battery (AttAB) Attempted Robbery (AttR) Hijacking/Motor Vehicle (HJK/MV) Domestic Assault (DA) Domestic Battery (DB) Sex Crime (SXC)	Child Abuse (CA) Street Fighting (SF) Mob Action (MA) Educational Intimidation (EI) Hate Crime (HTC) Stalking (STK) Telephone Harassment (TH) Intimidation (INT) Ethnic Intimidation (ETHI) Racial Incident (RI) Unlawful Restraint (UR) Protection Order (PO)
Property	Burglary (BG) Auto Theft (AT) Theft (T) Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Sale of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Theft of Lost Property (TLP) Attempted Burglary (AttBG) Attempted Theft (AttT) Shoplifting (SHP) Possession of Stolen Property (PSP) Receipt of Stolen Property (RSP)	Possession of Mislaid Property (PMP) Criminal Damage to Property (CDTP) Criminal Damage to Land (CDTL) Criminal Damage to (Motor) Vehicle (CDTV) Graffiti (GR) Vandalism (VDL) Trespass (TR) Criminal Trespass to Residence (CTTR) Criminal Trespass to Land (CTTL) Criminal Trespass to Property (CTTP) Criminal Trespass to (Motor) Vehicle Possession of Burglary Tools (PBT)

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Crime	Charges	
Drugs	Manufacture/Distribution/Delivery of Controlled Substance (M/D/D-CS) Possession of Controlled Substance (PCS) Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana (PC) Possession of Non-Narcotic Controlled Substance (PNCS)	Under the Influence of Cocaine (UICO) Under the Influence of Meth (UIM) Under the Influence of Cannabis/Marijuana (UIC) Driving under the Influence of Drugs (DUID)
Weapon	Unlawful Use of Weapons (UUW) Aggravated Discharge of Firearm (ADF) Unlawful Sale of Weapons (USW) Unlawful Possession of Firearms (UPF)	Unlawful Possession of Weapons (UPW) Possession of Firearm and Ammo (PF/A) Unregistered Gun Carriage (UGC) No FOID (UGC)
Public Disturbance	Resisting/Obstructing a Peace Officer (R/O-PO) Disorderly Conduct (D/C) Reckless Conduct (RC) Curfew Violation (CV) Loitering (L)	Gang Loitering (GL) Gang Assembly (GA) Unlawful Assembly (UA) Contempt of Court (C/C) Obstruction of Justice (OJ)
Alcohol	Driving under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs (DUI) Sale of Alcohol/Minor (SAM) Minor Drinking (MDR) Intoxication of Minor (IOM)	Possession of Alcohol/Minor (PAM) Possession of Alcoholic Beverage (PAB) Drinking (DR) Transportation of Open Alcohol (TOA)
Other	Other (OTH) Status Offense (SO) Attempted Suicide (AttSU) Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) Fraudulent/Unlawful ID (FID) Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (CDM) Exhibitionism (EX) Public Indecency (PI) Maintaining a Public Nuisance (MPN)	Child Neglect (CN) Child Care Referral (CCR) Forgery (FO) Bank Fraud (BF)

Appendix B

Self-Report Offenses

Appendix B
Self-Reported Offense Categories: Total Offenses and Drug Selling

Total Offenses includes 26 offenses divided into *four* sub-categories of offenses: Total Violence (including Serious Violence) Property, Sex and Other Offenses.

I. Total /Serious Violence Offenses includes 9 items:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>1. Threatened to attack a person <i>without</i> using a gun, knife or other dangerous weapon</p> <p>2. Threatened to attack a person using a gun, knife or other dangerous weapon</p> <p>3. Robbed someone by force or by threat of force <i>without</i> using a weapon</p> <p>4. Robbed someone by force or by threat of force using a weapon</p> <p>5. Beaten up or battered someone <i>without</i> using a gun, knife or other dangerous weapon</p> | <p>6. Beaten up or battered someone using a gun, knife or other dangerous weapon</p> <p>7. Forced someone to have sex with you (rape)</p> <p>8. Participated in a driveby shooting</p> <p>9. Participated in a homicide</p> |
|---|---|

Note that Serious Violence Offenses excludes 3 of the 9 items above (i.e. items 1, 3, and 5).

II. Property Offenses includes 13 items:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>1. Written gang graffiti on school property, neighborhood houses, stores, etc</p> <p>2. Written non-gang graffiti on school property, neighborhood houses, stores, etc</p> <p>3. Thrown rocks or bottles at persons, vehicles or property</p> <p>4. Destroyed property worth less than \$300</p> <p>5. Destroyed property worth \$300 or more</p> <p>6. Set fire to building or property (arson)</p> | <p>7. Stolen a bicycle or bike parts</p> <p>8. Stolen parts or property from a vehicle (e.g., hubcaps or stereo)</p> <p>9. Stolen a motor vehicle</p> <p>10. Fenced or sold stolen goods (other than weapons)</p> <p>11. Shoplifted</p> <p>12. Entered a house, store, or building to commit a theft</p> |
|---|--|

Note that Item 13 (i.e. Broke into a house, store or building to commit a theft) is removed from Time II survey.

III. Sex Offenses includes 2 items:

- | | |
|-----------------------|--|
| 1. Made money pimping | 2. Had sex for money or drugs (prostitution) |
|-----------------------|--|

IV. Other Offenses includes 2 items:

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Fenced or sold weapons or firearms | 2. Participated in other offenses |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|

Drug Selling Offenses includes selling 8 different types of drugs: Marijuana, Cocaine, Crack, Heroin, Methamphetamine/Speed/Ice, PCP/Wicky Stick, LSD/Acid, and others.

Note that Drugs Selling Offenses is not included in Total Offenses for calculating self-reported total offenses.

Appendix C

Glossary of Services/Worker Contacts

Glossary of Services¹/Worker Contacts

1. Contact/Service Planning

a. **Assessment, Contact/Service Planning** - Includes activities usually done at an initial contact to assess the history, current situation and needs of individuals for services. Specific activities include tasks such as obtaining a psychosocial history of the individual, evaluating the individual's strengths, problems and needs, prioritizing the problems and needs of the individual, formulating goals and determining services to meet client needs.

b. **Monitoring of Contact/Service Planning** - Includes actions taken to monitor a client's compliance and/or progress related to service plans. Activities may include contacts with the client, significant others, and service providers to determine how the client is doing, whether contact was made, services received and so on.

c. **Other** - Other activities, apart from those listed above, related to contact and service planning with individuals receiving services.

2. Group (Gang) Contact/Service

a. **Crisis Intervention** - Crisis intervention activities in a group context include activities which provide information about the availability of services and/or provide services directly to a group of individuals (gang members) who are in an immediate or pending crisis situation. Examples of activities include intervening in inter or intra-gang exchanges that are escalating toward violence, counseling gang members who are tempted to engage in violence or illegal activities, or forestalling arrest for activities such as gang loitering.

b. **Mediation** - Mediation activities include steps taken to move a dispute between two parties or groups to a peaceful and mutually agreed upon resolution. It may include actions typically involved in conflict resolution such as provision of feedback, increasing opportunities for dialogue between disputing parties (gangs and/or other groups of individuals), and other similar activities. It may or may not be used as a crisis intervention technique.

c. **Supervision/Surveillance** - Supervision and surveillance activities reported here should include any actions taken to increase awareness of group activities whether directly through visual observation or through overt or covert intelligence-related activities. These activities may be part of and/or result in social intervention, suppression or community mobilization.

d. **Explaining Service** - Encompasses activities related to clarifying the purpose and function of the project and its various services and components to groups of youth. May include providing definitional information about services as well as giving specific examples.

e. **Rapport Building** - Activities related to building rapport and understanding between staff and youth participating in the program. May involve actions such as "hanging out" on the

¹ Portions of this glossary were taken from the Cooperative Agreements for Research Demonstration Projects on Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Treatment for Homeless Persons, Glossary of Service Activities, NIAAA, Washington, DC., 1992.

street with groups of individuals, attempts to engage youth in casual conversations, meeting parents, teachers, friends and other actions focused on building a working, i.e., purposeful project-related relationship between program youth, staff and others.

f. **Statutory Notice** - Actions performed in order to give notice to individuals related to complying with statutory regulations such as curfew laws or nuisance ordinances pertaining to gang congregating/loitering.

g. **Recreation** - Includes spontaneous or scheduled group recreational or social activities such as trips to the movies, attending sports events, organizing activities like baseball or basketball, camping trips and other group events. This category does not include activities usually done alone like reading or individual exercise unless the latter is done in a group context.

h. **Community Service** - Activities which are conducted with a group of individuals (gang members) that involve acts of service to the community such as graffiti paint outs, neighborhood clean ups, housing repairs, tutoring of community youth by gang members, and so on. Activities which are performed may be voluntary or ordered by the court. The youth engaged in providing services should not be paid for their activities. Further, the services should be aimed at improving the community in some way.

i. **Group Discussion** - Includes activities designed to facilitate and carry out conversations in a group format, whether spontaneous or scheduled, in which specific issues or problems are discussed. Topics may include any issue of interest from gangs to health or personal issues. Discussions can be educational, therapeutic or otherwise as long as there is some attempt to encourage group participation and discussion of the topic presented.

j. **Other** - This category should include any other activities conducted in a group setting which are not delineated above. Please be specific.

3. Counseling (Interpersonal Helping) - Individual

Counseling activities, at the individual level, regardless of focus, are generally process oriented and are intended to change the individual's attitudes, beliefs, affective responses and/or behaviors.

a. **Individual Counseling Related to Gangs** - Includes activities in which an individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as other assistance during one-to-one "therapeutic" interaction with a professional or paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a gang-related problem, including his or her desire to leave the gang; removal of tatoos; friction between individuals in the same gang, etc.

b. **Individual Counseling Related to Family Issues** - Includes activities in which an individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as other assistance during a one-to-one "therapeutic" interaction with a professional or paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a problem related to family issues. This may include issues related to the individual's family of origin as well as his or her family of procreation.

c. **Individual Counseling Related to Other Issues** - Includes activities in which an individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as other assistance during a one-to-one "therapeutic" interaction with a professional or

paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a problem other than gang-related or family issues. Other issues may include problems such as school-related issues or problems pertaining to non-gang friends. Specify the issues discussed most often if more than one problem was addressed.

d. Family Counseling Related to Gang Issues - Therapeutic services that are provided to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with issues that are related to gangs. This may include, but is not limited to issues related to leaving the gang. Family members who participate may be members of an individual's family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present.

e. Family Counseling Related to Family Issues - Therapeutic services that are provided to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with family-related problems. This may include problems with an individual's family of origin as well as his or her family of procreation. Family members who participate may be members of an individual's family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present.

f. Family Counseling Related to Other Issues - Therapeutic services that are provided to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with issues other than gang-related or family problems. This may include, but is not limited to school problems, substance abuse or problems with non-gang friends. Family members who participate may be members of an individual's family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present.

g. Crisis Intervention - At the individual or family level, crisis intervention includes activities which provide information about the availability of services and/or provide services directly to a person who is in a crisis situation. Examples of activities include referring a person for emergency mental health care or an appropriate treatment unit, helping an individual who is being treated for a substance abuse problem to avoid use of alcohol or illegal drugs when he or she is tempted, preventing or forestalling an individual's eviction from housing or his or her committing an act of violence against another individual.

h. Other - Includes other counseling or helping activities to individuals and/or their family members not listed above.

4. Prevocational and Vocational Services --Individual

Note that the activities in this category may all be performed in the course of obtaining employment for an individual and may overlap at times.

a. Job Preparation - Activities conducted with the goal of preparing individuals to look for and secure employment. May include activities such as providing information about dress codes, conducting mock interviews, helping individuals fill out employment applications, assisting with résumé writing and instructing individuals on how to compile a list of job references.

b. Job Training - Activities conducted for the purpose of preparing someone for a specific job or occupation. Includes actions taken to evaluate an individual's current

employability and job skills as well as activities and/or structured programs designed to help individuals acquire or improve job skills.

c. **Job Development** - This includes activities such as searching for jobs or contacting employers in agencies to identify a range of jobs for which program youth might possibly qualify. In addition, job development activities involve the use of explanation as to the purpose and nature of the program and persuasion of potential employers to contact or reach out to gang youth in the program.

d. **Job Placement** - Activities that are performed as part of placing individuals in employment situations. In contrast to job referral, job placement involves actually knowing about a specific job and placing an individual in the position.

e. **Other** - Includes other activities performed in the course of providing job-related or vocational services.

5. Educational Services - Individual

a. **Advocacy (e.g., school transfer/returns)** - Encompasses activities performed to support or promote individuals related to educational matters, including individuals' opportunities to complete elementary, special school or high school programs. Actions may involve working with school administrators or school counselors to facilitate returns to school for individuals who have been suspended or expelled or helping with transfers to alternative educational programs.

b. **School Placement** - Activities related to placing individuals in schools, including alternative school programs.

c. **GED Program** - Activities performed in relation to placing individuals in GED programs. Includes gathering information about programs, helping with applications, and so on.

d. **Continuing Education** - Activities performed, whether formal or informal, which facilitate individual's obtaining continuing education or specialized skills, often on a part-time basis. Actions may include providing information about programs, helping individuals gain admission, or directly providing continuing education programs.

e. **Junior College Placement** - Activities related to placing individuals in junior or community college programs. Actions may involve providing information about programs as well as helping individuals complete applications, obtain financial aid and other activities intended to facilitate placement.

f. **College Placement** - Activities related to placing individuals in four-year college programs. Actions may involve providing information about programs as well as helping individuals complete applications, obtain financial aid and other activities intended to facilitate placement.

g. **Other** - Other activities, not included above, related to education including tutoring or other similar activities.

6. Criminal Justice - Individual

a. **Advocacy/Legal Assistance** - Activities undertaken to support or defend individuals related to legal problems. Includes services provided by a lawyer or trained legal paraprofessional to assist with an individual's legal problems.

b. **Arrest** - Includes arrest by sworn law enforcement officials.

c. **Home Confinement** - Includes actions related to enforcing and carrying out sentences involving home confinements for individuals when they have been mandated.

d. **Monitoring** - Includes activities related to ensuring compliance of individuals with mandated activities, such as home confinement, community service, or other judicial requirements that are part of sentencing decisions. Actions may include contacts with the individual him or herself as well as significant others to determine how the individual is doing.

e. **Probation** - Activities performed as part of court mandated overseeing of an individual's probation. Pertains to sworn probation officers only.

f. **Parole/Aftercare** - Activities conducted as part of overseeing an individual's parole or aftercare plan, i.e., usually when the individual is released from the jurisdiction of a correctional institution. Includes all actions undertaken as part of executing the plan such as counseling, job referral, housing location and so on. (However, you should report such activities in the appropriate sub-categories as well, i.e., also under housing location or counseling, if applicable).

g. **Violation of Probation** - Activities performed in relation to violating a probationer (i.e., revoking probation). Pertains to sworn probation officers only.

h. **Detention** - Actions undertaken related to placement of an individual in detention, whether the detention is in a city, county, state or federal facility. Pertains to sworn law enforcement personnel only.

I. **Prosecution (Assisting With)** - Activities related to prosecuting individuals for alleged criminal activities. Includes investigating, locating and obtaining testimony from victims, trial activities, recommending dispositions and so on.

j. **Witness Protection** - Includes actions taken to protect individuals who have served as witnesses in criminal proceedings. Activities include assisting with relocation as part of the protection effort, helping to secure necessary identification documents as well as actions directed against persons who may or actually do intimidate witnesses.

k. **Other** - Includes other activities related to criminal justice matters not included above.

7. Benefits, Assistance, and Money Management - Individual

a. **Welfare Assistance** - Includes activities undertaken to obtain resources, services or benefits such as Social Security, unemployment or victim's compensation, general assistance programs, food stamps, family assistance programs, or Veteran's Administration benefits for individuals. Involves acts such as helping individuals to apply for benefits; arranging a transfer of records; gathering information about potential welfare programs; completing required referral forms or providing necessary information to qualify an individual for benefits; working with

other organizations or professionals or staff within your own agency/program to plan and/or coordinate services related to welfare benefits on behalf of a specific individual; and interceding or advocating on behalf of an individual to obtain or return necessary benefits.

b. Medical Insurance - Involves actions related to securing medical insurance for individuals including linking individuals to resources, helping them to contact agencies to apply for insurance, arranging for transfers of records, gathering information about potential programs, completing required referrals forms or providing necessary information to qualify an individual for benefits, interceding or advocating on behalf of an individual to obtain or retain necessary insurance and referring individuals to insurance programs.

c. Money Management - This category includes activities related to assisting individuals with money management issues and can involve actions helping an individual to open and manage a personal bank account; working with an individual to budget personal expenses and pay bills; and becoming the officially designated representative payee for an individual directly receiving Social Security and other income on behalf of that individual.

d. Practice Supports (concrete provision) - Includes actions taken to directly provide to individuals concrete and necessary supports such as food, clothing, laundry facilities, bathing facilities, cash or vouchers, access to a telephone or mail service.

e. Other - Includes any other activities performed in the course of helping individuals to obtain benefits and other assistance or to manage their money.

8. Housing Location/Provision - Individual

Actions taken to assist individuals in securing temporary or long-term housing. Specific activities can include locating affordable housing units, talking with landlords and management companies, assisting individuals with rental applications or housing subsidy applications, or directly providing housing, either temporary or long-term. This category does not include referrals to residential treatment programs.

9. Alcohol/Drug Abuse Treatment Services - Individual

Includes activities taken in order to provide alcohol and/or drug abuse treatment services to individuals. May include initial assessment, physical evaluation, initiation and/or provision of recovery activities (i.e., running AA meetings), ongoing treatment, treatment planning and monitoring related to substance abuse problems. Referrals for substance abuse treatment should also be included as should referrals to residential treatment programs (as referrals for service).

10. Medical Services - Individual

Includes diagnostic and treatment services provided by licensed physicians, nurses or other health care professionals or technicians. Also include activities related to prescribing, administering and monitoring of medication as well as the provision of educational information about health care issues such as birth control, HIV/AIDS education and other health matters. Referrals for medical services should be counted as referrals in this category.

11. Other Services Individual

a. **Transportation** - Activities conducted for the purpose of transporting (or accompanying) individuals to a service activity, service agency, job interviews and so on, or providing individuals with cash or bus tokens for them to use on public transportation.

b. **Child Care** - Activities including the supervision, care and execution of age-appropriate activities for children of individuals who are participating in the program.

c. **Other** - All other activities not included in any of the above categories. Specify.

Appendix D

S/W Gang Involvement Scale

S/W Gang Involvement Scale

There is an extensive literature that consistently demonstrates that gang members commit more crime, and more serious crime (especially violence), than either delinquent non-gang youth or non-delinquents. However, many self-report, survey, and cohort studies simply ask the youth respondent whether he or she is or has been a gang member, which then becomes the all-important independent variable predicting highly-frequent and/or serious levels of crime participation. Gang membership in this type of quantitative (although not observational or ethnographic) study is viewed as a categorical variable. The youth is a gang member – an invariable status – at a particular point or set of points in time. However, for purposes of program development, based on the youth’s life-course changes (Sampson and Laub 1993), it is important to emphasize the variability of this status.

The reality is that there are different degrees of gang membership, and different circumstances which influence the youth’s gang status and role over time. The degree of the youth’s commitment to the gang role may determine his gang delinquent behavior. The variability of gang membership and its relationship to delinquency, within and across time periods, has not been adequately factored into gang research, policy, program development and evaluation. It is critically important, therefore, to test the proposition that all gang members are not the same; that they all have not been and will not be subjected to the same influences; that they all are not and will not be involved in gang structures and processes to the same degree over time; and, consequently, that the nature and levels of their delinquent behaviors identified as gang-related can be expected to vary. In other words, while it is important to know whether the youth is a gang member or not, this fact alone is not sufficient to account for or to predict the

level of the youth's subsequent delinquency. It is important also to assess the changing nature and processes of the youth's specific context of gang involvement which, along with other variables such as his changing patterns of educational achievement, employment status, and sources of income, may more substantially account for his level of delinquency.

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale may be useful for determining the youth's level of risk for gang delinquency, and may provide guidance for policy and program planning as to what measures to take in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of the youth's actual or potential gang behavior, after he has been initially identified as a gang member. The nature of gang involvement must be broken down into components that characterize the youth's prior and current gang status, and the prior and current conditions that proximately contribute to it. These temporal and contextual factors continuously interact with each other, and may have an effect on the youth's delinquent behavior.

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale, for research purposes, provides the Evaluators with a way to measure effects of the program in terms of the youth's degree and context of gang involvement, at different points in time, which may result in delinquent behavior. It is important not only to measure the effect of the program on the youth who may or may not have been a gang member when he entered the program, but also to measure to what extent the program was successful in preventing or reducing the youth's gang involvement during the program period. The S/W Scale has not yet been tested or validated, and is used in an exploratory way in the present analysis to measure changes in the youth's gang involvement, which, in turn, may have caused changes in the youth's total offenses during the course of the Mesa program.

The present scale contains 11 items obtained from the Individual Gang Member Survey:

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whether parents, siblings, or anyone else in the current household has ever been a gang member (yes = at least 1, no = not in the household); ratio of close gang friends to non-gang friends (yes = a few and some, no = none or no close friends); time spent with gang friends (yes = some, no = none); areas in neighborhood where the youth was afraid to walk alone because of gang-related concerns (yes, no); whether any close relative of the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); whether the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); whether the youth is currently an active gang member (yes, no); the most recent rank of the youth in the gang (yes = leader, core, regular; no = peripheral, associate, wannabe); the youth's knowledge of current gang size (yes, no); whether the youth has ever received a gang violation (yes, no); if the youth thinks he will ever leave the gang (yes, no).

Scores are established for the Time I and Time II interview responses. A maximum score of 11 is possible at each interview, if all responses are "yes." A difference score between Time II and Time I measures the amount of change in gang involvement that has occurred. We anticipate that the difference score will enable us to predict program effects on gang involvement of the youth, and that changes in gang involvement will help us predict changes in levels of offenses.

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