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Developing a Strategy for a Multiagency Response to Clandestine Drug Laboratories

Monograph

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Executive Summary

Methamphetamine abuse, trafficking, and production is a fast-growing national problem that has been likened to the crack cocaine epidemic of the early 1990s. In the past few years, methamphetamine abuse and production has spread from the West to the Southwest and Midwestern regions of the country, and is moving eastward into such states as Arkansas, Georgia, and even Florida.

Methamphetamine is relatively simple to manufacture from commonly available ingredients, including ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, red phosphorus, hydrochloric acid, hydriodic acid, iodine, ether, alcohol, white gasoline, lye, and anhydrous ammonia. These chemicals and the waste products produced during the manufacturing process are dangerous to human health and the environment.

Clandestine laboratories used to manufacture methamphetamine often house substantial quantities of highly toxic, corrosive, and explosive chemicals. They may be operated on an intermittent and transient basis in such locations as hotel/motel rooms, barns, trailers, apartments, and rural sites.

Laboratory operators display little regard for the environment, and as a result, clandestine laboratory sites have been the scene of explosions, fires, toxic fumes, environmental damage, and numerous injuries and deaths. For every pound of finished product, five to six pounds of hazardous chemical waste is produced.

Seizing or "taking down" a lab requires a strategically precise enforcement action, often involving Federal, State, and local law enforcement. Once seized, the lab remains a potential hazardous waste site, often with large quantities of potentially toxic chemicals, as well as an array of unknown corrosives, carcinogens, and combustibles. Clandestine laboratory enforcement efforts, unlike other narcotics cases, are complicated by the presence of these hazardous materials. It is this complication that demands expansion of the traditional narcotics task force investigation and prosecution to encompass health, occupational safety, and environmental agencies' approaches.

In addition to the planning and organizational problems faced by traditional narcotics task forces, clandestine laboratory enforcement programs (CLEPs) must also address the following health, safety, and environmental issues:

- ❑ Selecting appropriate safety equipment, including respirators, and ensuring their use by officers involved in clandestine laboratory enforcement.
- ❑ Establishing and maintaining a medical screening and surveillance program for these officers.

- Determining how cleanup costs will be shared among the agencies involved.

In 1987, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funded demonstrations by five agencies—the Washington State Patrol, the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, the Portland (Oregon) Bureau of Police, the New Jersey State Police, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Office of the Attorney General—to develop and implement CLEPs. The experience of these demonstration sites in implementing their CLEPs indicates that a multidisciplinary approach to clandestine laboratory enforcement includes the following components:

- A strategic planning team.
- Interagency agreements.
- Personnel and training.
- Specialized safety equipment.
- Medical screening and surveillance.
- Precursor chemical monitoring.
- Clandestine laboratory cleanup.
- Community education and awareness.

This monograph presents sample language from policies and procedures developed by the demonstration sites to assist policymakers in formulating their own program components.

This monograph is designed to help State and local law enforcement officials plan, organize, and manage a comprehensive CLEP that includes these components. The purpose of this monograph is to complement existing training and operational manuals by addressing the strategic planning process that allows the operational tasks to take place.

The strategic planning approach to developing and implementing an effective CLEP consists of five stages:

Stage 1: Mission formulation.

Stage 2: Organizational assessment.

Stage 3: Developing objectives.

Stage 4: Developing action plans.

Stage 5: Implementation.

Worksheets are included to assist policymakers with the process of strategic planning. Upon completion of the worksheets, program planners will have a strategy for developing and implementing a comprehensive CLEP, including:

- ❑ An analysis of existing laws, policies, and procedures that may impact program developments.
- ❑ A training plan and communication strategy.
- ❑ A plan for identifying program resources.
- ❑ An approach for garnering and maintaining program support both within the department and with other agencies.

This monograph was developed to address the concerns of State and local officials seeking to implement CLEPs. However, the principles and processes of strategic planning, which form the foundation of a successful CLEP, are equally applicable to any enforcement operation that requires the cooperation and commitment of a number of agencies having differing priorities and mandates.

Foreword

In 1987, the BJA Discretionary Grant Program funded a program to implement a comprehensive cooperative effort to assist State and local law enforcement agencies to develop strategies to discover, investigate, and close clandestine laboratories. Five competitively selected sites and a technical assistance grant were funded to develop a model strategy for eventual replication nationwide.

The demonstration sites consisted of the following agencies: the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement; the Portland, Oregon Bureau of Police; the Washington State Patrol; the New Jersey State Police; and the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General. The technical assistance grantee was Circle Solutions, Inc. In each of the demonstration sites, project staff interviewed key agency staff; observed enforcement and prosecution activities; reviewed policies, procedures, and training materials; and collected a wide range of other data.

This monograph, which was first published in 1991 and revised in 1993 and 1998 reflects the best practices learned from the five demonstration sites. It has been updated to include changes in policies and practices that have occurred over the past several years. The monograph also includes numerous appendixes that will provide models of forms and procedures for State and local agencies to use in developing comprehensive clandestine laboratory enforcement programs. The list of reference material, which is found at the back of the monograph, has been expanded to include information on methamphetamine trafficking, use, and production. Also, the table of subject matter experts has been updated to include personnel from additional agencies that have recently joined the fight against the Nation's growing clandestine drug laboratory problem.

Introduction and Purpose

Methamphetamine abuse, trafficking, and production is a fast-growing national problem that President Clinton has likened to the crack cocaine epidemic of the early 1990s.[1] Methamphetamine, a highly addictive and violence-causing synthetic stimulant, is also known by its street names as "crystal," "crank," "ice," and "speed." The drug may be injected, smoked, snorted, or taken orally.

Until the late 1980s, methamphetamine trafficking was primarily associated with outlaw motorcycle gangs in California who supplied users in various parts of the United States.[2] However, in the past few years, available data shows that methamphetamine abuse and production has risen significantly in the West and Southwest regions of the country. The Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) statistics released by NIJ in June 1997 show that methamphetamine use is highest in western locations.[3] (Curiously, DUF data contained in this same report shows a marked decrease in the presence of methamphetamine among arrestees in eight cities that, in 1995, reported the highest amounts of the drugs. These cities are Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, Omaha, Phoenix, Portland, San Diego, and San Jose.[4]) According to the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), between 1989 and 1995, the estimated number of nationwide emergency room drug abuse episodes doubled, and between 1991 and 1995 the number of methamphetamine-related deaths almost tripled.[5]

Other examples of the seriousness of the methamphetamine problem include:

- During a recent investigation by DEA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Idaho Bureau of Narcotics, approximately 40 pounds of methamphetamine were seized and 17 traffickers arrested.
- In Iowa's Polk County, which includes Des Moines, the number of drug arrests, with methamphetamine accounting for 65 percent of the total, now surpass drunk driving arrests.
- Law enforcement officials in Phoenix report that methamphetamine is largely responsible for the 40-percent increase in the city's homicide rate in 1994.
- A drug treatment official in Atlanta reports that methamphetamine tends to be used by white, middle-class teenagers and young adults who have no links to the crack scene.[6]

The methamphetamine problem is spreading from the West into the Midwest and is moving eastward into such states as Arkansas, Georgia, and Florida. The Midwest region of the country (Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, and Nebraska) saw a 300-percent increase in clandestine laboratory (labs that manufacture methamphetamine) seizures between 1992 and 1996, and the DEA seized 236 laboratories in Missouri alone.[7] Nationally, the DEA seized 879 methamphetamine production laboratories in 1996, nearly a 170-percent increase over 1995.[8] DEA statistics do not present a true picture of the problem because this data only accounts for clandestine laboratory seizures in which DEA participated. For example, the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement seized 835 clandestine laboratories in 1996.[9] The true extent of the problem is unknown because there is no centralized data collection agency for reporting clandestine laboratories.

The increase in clandestine laboratories and trafficking is primarily due to the emergence of organized Mexican drug trafficking organizations and their involvement in methamphetamine production and distribution. Sophisticated Mexican polydrug organizations with links to Columbian traffickers have replaced outlaw motorcycle gangs as the primary methamphetamine producers, traffickers, and distributors in California. These traffickers establish large-scale clandestine laboratories capable of producing 20 to 100 pounds of product.[10] The scope of Mexican involvement with methamphetamine production is supported by numerous data. According to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the amount of methamphetamine seized along the Southwest border increased from 6.5 kilograms in 1992 to 653 kilograms in 1995—a hundredfold increase, while the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement reported that methamphetamine seizures increased from 636 kilograms in 1991 to 8,182 kilograms in 1995.[11]

Although Mexican criminal organizations control a significant amount of the production and distribution of methamphetamine, other organizations also contribute to the problem. These include Asian gangs in Northern California, Washington State, and British Columbia, in addition to continuing involvement by outlaw motorcycle gangs.[12] A recent trend in Midwestern and other States is the increase in small "mom and pop" stove-top clandestine laboratories. These are operated by individuals or small groups who do not appear to be affiliated with criminal organizations. They manufacture methamphetamine for their own use and sell excess products to their friends and family. These "mom and pop" laboratories are responsible for the huge increase in methamphetamine production in Missouri, Oklahoma, and other States.[13]

Clandestine laboratories often house substantial quantities of highly toxic, corrosive, and explosive chemicals, posing serious human health and environmental risks. They may be operated on an intermittent and transient basis. After operators "cook" a batch of methamphetamine, the laboratory is often moved or stored and then is set up in another location.

Hazards to Law Enforcement Officers and the Community

Methamphetamine is relatively simple to make from commonly available ingredients. Chemicals frequently used in methamphetamine manufacture include ephedrine or pseudoephedrine (commonly used in asthma or cold medicines), red phosphorus, hydrochloric acid, hydriodic acid, iodine, ether, alcohol, white gasoline, lye, and anhydrous ammonia. These chemicals and the waste products produced during the manufacturing process are dangerous to human health and the environment.

Laboratory operators typically have little formal chemistry training or education—relying instead on apprenticeship with other "cooks" and working from handwritten recipes. They are often well armed, and their laboratories are occasionally booby-trapped. Weapons ranging from handguns to high-powered automatic firearms and explosives are commonly found at laboratory sites.

Laboratory operators display little regard for the environment. As a result, clandestine laboratory sites have been the scene of explosions, fires, toxic fumes, environmental damage, and numerous injuries and deaths. For every pound of finished product, 5 to 6 pounds of hazardous chemical waste is produced.[14] This hazardous chemical waste is typically dumped into nearby streams or onto the ground, or poured into local sewage systems. The amount of waste material from a clandestine laboratory may vary from a few pounds to several tons depending on the size of the laboratory and its manufacturing capabilities.

Once the laboratory is seized, hazardous waste and contaminated materials, such as chemicals (solvents, reagents, precursor, by-products, and the drugs themselves), glassware, and equipment must be disposed of in accordance with numerous Federal, State, and local laws and regulations. As a result, special training in health, safety, and environmental protection measures are necessary for anyone who plans to raid or otherwise work at the site of a clandestine laboratory.[15] In addition, cleanup costs often exceed $5,000 per laboratory site and can reach over $100,000 for larger sites. In 1995 alone, the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement spent $2.4 million and the DEA spent approximately $8 million on cleanup.[16]

A serious problem related to the environmental hazard issue is that of children whose parents are operators of clandestine laboratories. The California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement is encountering a growing number of children under the age of 13 in "mom and pop" clandestine laboratories. Approximately 40 percent of these children are found to have elevated toxic chemical levels in their blood.[17]

Most State and local law enforcement officers and agencies lack adequate training in clandestine laboratory enforcement, safety procedures and regulations, hazards, and other related health and safety issues. This represents a serious threat to first responders, investigators, and the community in general.

The chemical reactions that occur during the manufacturing process may produce toxic vapors that are absorbed by wall and floor surfaces of buildings housing clandestine laboratories. In addition, laboratory operators may vent these vapors into the outside environment. Problems also occur when the chemicals are stored at public locations such as self-storage facilities. The lack of proper ventilation and temperature controls of these sites add to the potential of fires, explosions, chemical leaks, and human exposure. Even more frightening is the fact that laboratory operators often set up shop in locations such as hotel rooms, exposing numerous innocent people to the possible toxic effects of chemical reactions.

Methamphetamine laboratories may contaminate water sources and/or soil. Surface and ground water drinking supplies can be contaminated by dumping waste products and chemicals into bathtubs, sinks, toilets, or creeks. Perhaps the greatest risk of long-term exposure is assumed by unsuspecting inhabitants who may use or live in buildings formerly used as clandestine laboratory sites. Residual contamination may exist for years at these locations.

Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Issues

Investigations of clandestine laboratories usually require traditional narcotics investigative techniques (such as surveillance and the use of informants or wiretaps). Seizing or "taking down" a laboratory, however, requires a strategically precise enforcement action, often involving Federal, State, and local law enforcement. Once seized, the laboratory remains a potential hazardous waste site, often with large quantities of potentially toxic chemicals, as well as an array of unknown corrosives, carcinogens, and combustibles. The presence of these hazardous materials complicates clandestine laboratory enforcement efforts, making them unlike other narcotics cases. This complication mandates expanding the traditional narcotics task force investigation and prosecution to encompass the approaches of health, occupational safety, and environmental agencies.

Therefore, the term "clandestine laboratory enforcement program" or "CLEP" refers to a comprehensive program that encompasses all phases of planning, investigation, seizure, dismantling, waste removal, and remediation of contaminated property.

Thus, the issues surrounding health, occupational safety, and the environment become inherent in the investigation and prosecution of clandestine laboratory operators. The expertise required for the various aspects of

laboratory seizures and prosecutions makes the coordination of resources and programs among a multidisciplinary team of Federal, State, and local agencies of utmost importance.

Like any number of specialized narcotics task force operations, CLEPs face a myriad of planning and organizational issues. Among these are the following:

- ❑ Developing and maintaining cooperation among the law enforcement, environmental, health, and safety agencies that have a role in clandestine laboratory enforcement.
- ❑ Recruiting and selecting appropriate personnel.
- ❑ Developing and implementing necessary personnel training.
- ❑ Funding in times of competing priorities.
- ❑ Addressing the legal obligations and liabilities of the agencies involved.
- ❑ Coordinating investigations with traditional narcotics task forces.

Unlike traditional narcotics task force operations, CLEPs must also address the following health, safety, and environmental issues:

- ❑ Selecting appropriate safety equipment, including respirators, and making sure officers involved in clandestine laboratory enforcement use it.
- ❑ Establishing and maintaining a medical screening and surveillance program for these officers.
- ❑ Determining how cleanup costs will be shared among the agencies involved.

Lessons Learned From the Demonstration Sites

In 1987, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funded five demonstrations to develop and implement CLEPs at five agencies: the Washington State Patrol; the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement; the Portland (Oregon) Bureau of Police; the New Jersey State Police; and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Office of the Attorney General. Each of these sites developed its program with an understanding that clandestine laboratory enforcement necessitated a multidisciplinary approach, requiring expertise among narcotics enforcement and prosecution officials as well as among fire and hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams and health and environmental officials.

To establish and implement these CLEPs, Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials in each site needed to identify common goals, delineate their respective roles and responsibilities, devise interagency agreements among themselves and other agencies, formulate enforcement strategies that would ensure the personal health and safety of officers involved, and recognize their responsibilities in safely and effectively disposing of the hazardous waste remaining after the laboratory was seized.

Thus, a multidisciplinary approach to clandestine laboratory enforcement includes the following components:

- ❑ A strategic planning team.
- ❑ Interagency agreements.
- ❑ Personnel and training.
- ❑ Specialized safety equipment.
- ❑ Medical screening and surveillance.
- ❑ Precursor chemical monitoring.
- ❑ Clandestine laboratory cleanup.
- ❑ Community education and awareness.

Since their programs' inception, these officials have learned a great deal about the changing nature and scope of clandestine drug laboratory operations and how to develop and implement effective multidisciplinary responses. The collective experience of these sites provides the foundation on which other jurisdictions can design successful clandestine laboratory enforcement efforts.

The Purpose of the Monograph

This monograph is designed to help State and local law enforcement officials plan, organize, and manage a comprehensive CLEP. Much has already been written about how to conduct clandestine laboratory investigations, seizures, and prosecutions. This monograph is intended to complement existing training and operational manuals by addressing the 1strategic planning process that allows the operational tasks to take place.

The monograph is based on a number of fundamental principles:

- ❑ A CLEP requires the commitment of a number of agencies (Federal, State, and local law enforcement; health and environment; and fire/HAZMAT teams) that have different, and sometimes conflicting mandates. Thus, the issues and concerns a CLEP raises invariably require extensive discussion and negotiation.

- ❑ Developing a CLEP requires implementing strategic planning principles.
- ❑ Managing the CLEP involves effective communication, inside and outside the law enforcement agency.

This monograph includes worksheets to help policymakers plan and implement the CLEP process. Upon their completion, program planners will have a strategy including:

- ❑ An analysis of existing laws, policies, and procedures that may have an essential impact on program development.
- ❑ A training plan and communication strategy.
- ❑ A plan for identifying program resources.
- ❑ An approach for gathering and maintaining program support both within the department and with other agencies.

The principles and processes of strategic planning, which form the foundation of a successful CLEP, are equally applicable to any enforcement operation that requires the cooperation and commitment of a number of agencies that have differing priorities and mandates.

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13. Personal communication with the Kansas City (Missouri) Police Department's Drug Unit Commander (May 1997) and the Chief Agent, Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics (May 1997).

14. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, *Proceedings of the National Consensus Meeting on the Use, Abuse and Sequelae of Abuse of Methamphetamine with Implications for Prevention, Treatment and Research*, 1997.

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16. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.

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Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement: The Framework for Program Development

Unlike other narcotics enforcement actions, clandestine laboratory enforcement actions are complicated by the presence of hazardous chemicals that may have an immediate impact on an officer's safety and cause acute and chronic health problems.[1] Consequently, policymakers need a basic understanding of the chemicals that officers will encounter in clandestine laboratories, their known and probable effects, and the measures that can be taken to prevent exposure. Policymakers also need to have a working knowledge of the legal and liability issues they may face both with respect to their employees and the community in which the laboratory is located. These health and legal/liability issues form the rationale for the CLEP components detailed in chapter 3.

The present chapter addresses two critical areas for policymakers. The first, basic toxicology, includes a discussion of chemicals that are known to be harmful to humans, their negative health effects, and their methods of invading the body. A myriad of unknown chemicals may also be present in clandestine laboratories, with even more harmful effects than the known substances.[2] The second area addressed concerns basic Federal and State regulations that govern the CLEP operation: directives from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

The chapter is not meant to be a comprehensive discussion of medical and legal principles; rather, it is an introduction to issues that will help policymakers formulate their CLEPs. Program planners should regularly consult with State and local health officials, toxicologists, and legal counsel for detailed descriptions of these health, safety, and legal issues.

Corrosives, Combustibles, and Carcinogens: A Look at Basic Toxicology

Little is known at present about the potential long-term health or reproductive risks resulting from exposure to the known, as well as unknown, narcotics and precursor chemicals present in clandestine laboratories. Certain chemical reagents, illicit drugs, and drug precursors have been implicated in lasting disabilities among law enforcement officers.[3] Inasmuch as there have been no epidemiological studies of enforcement officers or clandestine laboratory operators exposed to clandestine laboratory toxins, scientists can only make educated guesses about potential acute and chronic health effects.

However, recognizing this potential and understanding the factors that determine whether a particular chemical will have short- or long-term effects can be very beneficial in formulating policies addressing protective equipment, medical screening and surveillance, and safety procedures.

Recognizing the Complexity and Diversity of Hazards

Recognizing the vast complexity and diversity of hazards associated with clandestine laboratory enforcement is a first, critical step for the policymaker who is responsible for setting protective guidelines for employees and for ensuring the fitness of the site for reoccupancy. (Appendix A contains a list of chemical compounds that may be found in clandestine laboratories, including each compound's physical state, exposure symptoms, and health effects.) It is important to remember that, added to the already complex nature of clandestine laboratory enforcement, some combinations of chemicals produce different effects than those each produces separately; that is, some combinations increase the toxic effect of the separate chemicals, while others decrease the toxicity, as will be discussed below.[4]

Inasmuch as efforts to control one hazard may create or impede control of other hazards, it is critical for policymakers to be able to identify the levels as well as types of protection needed for specific, varying situations. For example, some chemicals used in methamphetamine production present a danger of injury from fire or explosion.[5] Risk of injury or toxicity from chemical exposure depends on the toxic properties of the particular chemicals, as well as their quantity, form, concentration, and duration and route of exposure.

Toxic Materials: How They Invade and Threaten the Body

A toxic material is capable of producing local or systemic detrimental effects in the human body. The effects associated with toxic material may be temporary or permanent, immediate or delayed, mild or severe.[6] Toxic materials injure the lungs or the skin or do damage to the liver and the kidneys or the nervous system. Some may induce cancers. Other toxins such as teratogens cause malformation of the embryo or result in genetic damage, cancer, or reproductive failure.

Toxic materials encountered in clandestine laboratories enter the body through the following methods, in order of importance: inhalation, absorption, and ingestion. Some materials may enter the body by more than one of these routes of exposure.[7]

Inhalation. Inhalation is the most common exposure route for toxic materials in clandestine drug laboratories. Once absorbed by the respiratory tract, toxins may reach other organs via the bloodstream or the lymphatic system.

The respiratory tract is the only organ system with vital functioning elements that is in constant, direct contact with the environment. The lungs have the largest exposed surface area of any organ other than the skin; many toxic materials can produce acute or chronic diseases of the respiratory tract when they are inhaled.[8] (For types of inhaled toxicants and their effects, see appendix A1.)

Inhalation may result in injury from corrosive substances, with symptoms ranging from shortness of breath to cough to chest pain. Many solvents are absorbed into the body through the lungs and, in sufficient dose, may cause symptoms of intoxication, dizziness, lack of coordination, nausea, and disorientation.[9]

Many chemicals will also produce hypoxia (oxygen deficiency) as a result of the body's defense mechanisms. When an irritant enters the body it causes swelling and leakiness of the tissues, which results in the accumulation of fluid and prevents oxygen absorption.[10]

Absorption. Of the three major avenues of contamination, absorption through the skin is another important route. Toxic materials, including dangerous, invisible vapors, may be absorbed through the skin, sweat glands, sebaceous (oil) glands, and hair follicles, causing both local and systemic effects. Absorption through skin exposure to corrosive substances may result in skin burns, as well as the symptoms that occur with inhalation of these substances; e.g., shortness of breath, cough, and chest pain.

Absorption rate depends on a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the condition of the skin and properties of the chemical involved. Some factors that enhance absorption rate are nonintact skin, increased skin hydration, increased skin temperature (which causes sweat glands to open, secrete sweat, and dissolve solids, as well as to increase blood flow to the skin), increased concentrations of the chemical substance, altering of the skin's normal pH of 5,[11] and adding of surface-active agents or organic chemicals.[12]

Many toxic materials produce systemic effects. To produce a systemic effect, the toxic material must be absorbed and distributed inside the body to an organ distant from the entry point. The organ targeted most often by systemic toxicity is the central nervous system, followed by the liver and kidneys. Additional organs affected may be the heart, spleen, and the reproductive system.[13]

Ingestion. Toxic materials on hands, cigarettes, and in food or drink may be ingested by mouth. Materials ingested pass through the stomach and may be absorbed into the bloodstream, after which they may move directly to the liver or other organs or tissues.[14] Damage to the mouth, esophagus, stomach, and intestines can result from ingesting strong acids or bases or other corrosives such as mercuric chloride.

Acute vs. Chronic Exposure

Exposure to a toxic material may be acute or chronic. The term "acute exposure" refers to exposure that occurs in a short time. In the context of clandestine laboratories, acute exposures often happen with high concentrations of toxic materials. Thus, the idea of severity is frequently incorporated into the term. The body can display an immediate or delayed reaction to the toxic exposure.[15]

In the context of clandestine laboratories, "chronic exposure" usually refers to exposure to a low concentration of toxic material that occurs over time. A latency period usually occurs prior to the body's response to the toxic exposure. Chronic exposure effects on the body may be reversible or irreversible.[16]

Effects of Toxic Exposure

The effects on the body of toxic exposure depend primarily on the chemical's type, concentration or dosage, and the duration of exposure. Toxic effects vary from one chemical to another. Many toxic chemicals are nonselective in their actions on the body; others act on specific areas of the body. (Refer to appendix A for examples.) Local exposure affects the nose, eyes, mouth, throat, skin, and the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts; absorption does not have to occur. With systemic exposure, absorption does occur, and the site of damage may be remote from the contact site. In many cases, both local and systemic damage occurs.[17]

Concentration, or dosage, is the most important factor in determining whether a particular chemical will produce toxic effects. Essentially, the dose makes the poison. A low chemical concentration may have no effect on the body; high concentrations may adversely affect the body, depending on the chemical's properties.[18]

Measurement of Toxicity

A toxic material that is normally thought of as harmless may induce a toxic response if added to the human body in sufficient amount. Toxic potency, therefore, is defined by the amount of the toxic material and the response that is produced in the human body.[19] Comparison of an organism's response to a given material at specific varying doses (amounts of exposure) is known as "dose-response." For factors influencing toxicity, see appendix A2.

Exposure Risk Issues

Potentially, five groups of individuals may be vulnerable to toxic chemicals in clandestine laboratories: (1) laboratory operators involved in the "cooking" process; (2) first responders, such as law enforcement officers and fire/HAZMAT teams; (3) cleanup contractors; (4) neighbors of active laboratories; and (5) residents of buildings formerly used as laboratories. Risks of exposure vary according to a number of factors, including whether a laboratory is an active or inactive (former) site.[20]

Risks of Active and Inactive, or Former, Laboratories. An active laboratory should be considered unsafe for entry except by trained personnel using appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). The greatest risks are fire and explosion due to the relatively large amounts of solvents normally found at the sites. A chemical spill can result in air concentrations strong enough to produce adverse effects from inhalation of solvents, corrosives, or cyanide. The levels of airborne chemicals and the corresponding risk for exposure vary depending on the cooking method, quantity and form of the chemicals present, room size, and ventilation.[21]

Another potential risk of toxic exposure in an active laboratory may occur as a result of "booby traps." A trip wire can be set to drop a chemical into another chemical, resulting in the release of a highly toxic gas.[22]

In an inactive, or former, laboratory where equipment and chemicals have been removed, residual amounts of some substances may persist on building surfaces and furnishings prior to cleanup. Most substances present in the active laboratory, such as gases or volatile solvents, should dissipate rapidly with ventilation. (Ventilation of some types of chemicals from labs in populated areas, such as those making the synthetic opiate fentanyl, should occur only under controlled circumstances.) Airborne contaminants and chemical spills may pose a health risk to first responders especially, because they may be repeatedly exposed to unknown toxic substances.[23]

Cleanup and Reoccupancy Risks. In addition to first responders and other agency officials performing initial site assessments, disposal contractors and persons reoccupying the premises before cleanup occurs are at risk for adverse health effects from toxic materials. These persons may be exposed to high concentrations of toxic chemicals for short periods of time and should be aware of the symptoms of acute exposure from solvents, cyanides, corrosives, irritants, and metals and their salts. When such symptoms occur, the exposed person should leave the premises or remove the source itself. Reentry should not occur unless proper ventilation has reduced the airborne toxins or unless a self-contained breathing apparatus is used.[24]

A basic understanding of the health effects of toxic chemicals commonly found in clandestine laboratories aids in comprehending the various Federal and State occupational safety, health, and environmental regulations that govern the response to clandestine laboratories.

Occupational Safety, Health, and Environmental Regulations: A Policymaker's Primer

Numerous Federal, State, and local laws govern the activities of law enforcement and other agencies dealing with clandestine laboratories. Although active laboratories pose a greater risk than former sites from chemicals, explosion, and fire, both environments should be considered dangerous. This section discusses certain Federal laws with which law enforcement and other agencies must comply when they become involved with a clandestine laboratory. Local agencies should become familiar with applicable State and local laws, as they may be more stringent than Federal regulations outlined in this chapter.

Employee Health and Safety Regulations

Agencies involved with clandestine laboratory operations fall under OSHA regulations (29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1910) that require the following actions by employers, including State and local government agencies:

- Communicating clear, unambiguous warnings to employees, as well as providing educational programs on the hazards of chemical substances. These warnings and educational programs apply not only to investigators and others who come in contact with chemicals in the field, but also to personnel who analyze the seized chemicals.
- Training all employees who may be exposed to hazardous substances in how to recognize and handle safety and health hazards at laboratory sites, in the use of protective equipment, and in safe work practices. Requirements include an initial 40 hours of safety training, followed by 3 days of field experience and 8 hours of annual refresher training. All specialized training must meet OSHA standards.
- Providing specialized protective equipment to employees who will be exposed to hazardous chemicals. The equipment must meet National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) standards. Examples of specialized equipment include chemical-resistant suits, self-contained breathing apparatus, boots, gloves, and goggles.
- Examining and monitoring the health of employees exposed to hazardous substances; this should include a thorough medical screening prior to training or working in clandestine laboratories. In addition, a continuous medical surveillance program is required to identify any signs of possible exposure to hazardous substances. All cases of employee exposure must be documented carefully for future medical reference.

- ❑ Providing information to employees regarding any hazardous conditions in their work environments. It is important to note that any time employees may be exposed to hazardous substances, they have the right to know their specific risks. Law enforcement agencies, for example, should provide training on the known dangers in clandestine laboratories and should also make officers aware of the fact that a broad range of unknown dangers also exist at these sites. In addition, since the evidence room may contain hazardous substances, specific information regarding the exact substances known to be present should be posted in that room.

Specific information should be provided to female employees involved in CLEPs regarding such issues as their increased vulnerability to toxic chemicals due to gender-specific ratios of body fat and the increased risks to their reproductive systems associated with exposure to hazardous materials. After being informed of their risks through proper procedures, female employees should be allowed to make their own decisions regarding assignment to CLEPs.

Where agencies fail to adhere to these requirements, supervisors can be held strictly and personally liable for situations involving employee exposure to hazardous substances and the resulting adverse health effects.

Hazardous Waste Regulations

Law enforcement agencies that seize clandestine laboratories may find they have become generators of hazardous waste as defined by Federal laws and regulations. EPA regulations that implement the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) define a generator of hazardous waste as "any person, by site, whose act or process produces hazardous waste...or whose act first causes a hazardous waste to become subject to regulation" (40 CFR 260.10). The following Acts and their regulations apply to agencies discovering hazardous waste materials in excess of certain minimum quantities:

1. The RCRA, as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Act (40 CFR 260B263), governs transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.

2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), governs emergency responses for release of hazardous substances into the environment and cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites (40 CFR 300).

3. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act regulates packaging, marking, labeling, and transporting hazardous wastes (49 CFR, 170, 171, 172).

4. The Occupational Safety and Health Act regulates safety conditions in the workplace (29 CFR 1910.120); these provisions cover site incidents, and supervisors are held strictly and personally liable for violations of this section.

5. The Occupational Safety and Health Act establishes employee right-to-know provisions (29 CFR 1200).

6. State and local regulations (these may be more stringent than Federal regulations).

To avoid confusion, State and local agencies are advised to follow the DEA policy of treating all waste at clandestine laboratories as potential RCRA hazardous waste, no matter how small the amount found. This will reduce agency liability and remove guesswork from site personnel decisions regarding seizure of equipment and chemicals. By taking this action, agencies fall under certain EPA and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations regarding transporting, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.[25]

Active Sites May Be Subject to CERCLA. In addition to the regulations listed above, active laboratory sites may be subject to CERCLA, as amended by SARA. This regulation established a "Superfund" to finance the cleanup of the worst hazardous waste sites and set criteria for emergency notification of releases of hazardous substances.

In certain cases, clandestine laboratories may pose imminent, substantial health hazards that require an immediate response or a more long-term cleanup. A responding agency that suspects that a chemical released at a clandestine lab is a hazardous substance as defined by CERCLA should contact the National Response Center, which is staffed by several agencies, including EPA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to initiate the response process (see Sources for Further Information). On a national scale, clandestine drug laboratories rarely meet the criteria defined by CERCLA.

Compliance Officer's Role. Agencies that deal with clandestine laboratory enforcement or cleanup should consider appointing someone to act as a compliance officer to ensure the agency meets all applicable regulations. The compliance officer should keep abreast of all changes in existing laws and any new laws that may affect agency activities.

Unlike other narcotics law enforcement efforts, clandestine laboratory investigations and seizures require a policymaker's clear understanding of the potential health and safety risks to involved personnel, including law enforcement, other first responders, and cleanup contractors, and the agency's legal responsibilities regarding occupational health and safety, as well as environmental protection. It is important to note that supervisors are held strictly and severely liable for failure to adhere to OSHA employee health and safety regulations, including the providing of information to employees regarding any hazardous conditions in their work environments.

Notes

1. Drug Enforcement Administration, Health Services Unit, *Potential Health Hazards at Clandestine Laboratory Units*, October 1985.
2. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and U.S. Coast Guard, *Guidelines for the Cleanup of Clandestine Drug Laboratories*, March 1990.
3. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Drug Production and the Environment*, April 11, 1991.
4. Amdur, Mary, John Doull, and Curtis D. Claussen, *Casarett and Doull's Toxicology: The Basic Science of Poisons*, 4th edition, New York: Pergamon Press, 1991.
5. Skinner, Harry F., "Methamphetamine Synthesis via Hydriodic Acid/Red Phosphorus Reduction of Ephedrine," *Forensic Science International* 48(123–124), 1990; Cantrell, T.S., John Boban, Leroy Johnson, and A.C. Allen, "A Study of Impurities Found in Methamphetamine Synthesized From Ephedrine," *Forensic Science International* 39(39–53), 1988.
6. Kittle, Lew J., *Interim Guidelines for Contamination Reduction and Sampling at Illegal Drug Manufacturing Sites*, Washington (State) Department of Health, Office of Toxic Substances, 1992.
7. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.
8. Kittle.
9. Kittle.
10. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.
11. A pH of 5 is moderately acidic. The letters pH stand for "hydrogen ion" and the numbers represent negative logarithms, from an acid extreme of 0 to an alkaline extreme of 14, with 7 representing neutrality.
12. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.
13. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.
14. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.
15. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.
16. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.
17. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.
18. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.
19. Amdur, Doull, and Claussen.

Notes *(continued)*

20. Kittle.

21. DEA, EPA, and U.S. Coast Guard.

22. DEA, EPA, and U.S. Coast Guard.

23. DEA, EPA, and U.S. Coast Guard.

24. Kittle.

25. EPA regulations (40 CFR Parts 261, 262, and 263); DOT regulations (49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, 178, and 179).

Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Program Components

A comprehensive CLEP requires a number of components to ensure that coordinated enforcement efforts are safely and effectively implemented. This chapter discusses eight specific components that make up such a program. Each of these components is based on an understanding of the health and safety risks inherent in clandestine laboratories, the legal responsibilities of organizations to minimize occupational hazards, and the ultimate goals of seizing the laboratory and successfully prosecuting the operator(s). Policymakers are encouraged to consider carefully the rationale presented for each component and to remain aware of State statutes and regulations that may impact components of their specific programs.

Throughout this chapter, sample language from the policies and procedures developed by the BJA demonstration sites is presented to help policymakers formulate their own program components. However, these samples should be considered only as blueprints; they will require modifications to meet the needs of individual jurisdictions.

Component 1: The Multidisciplinary Strategic Planning Team

Creating a multidisciplinary strategic planning team to develop the strategic plan discussed in chapter 4 and to coordinate the roles and responsibilities of the participating agencies can be a key factor in the successful CLEP operation. This body can be effective in identifying concerns about the program operation and garnering support from their respective agencies, examining existing policies and procedures and identifying linkages to the CLEP, and planning the communication strategy and providing recommendations for training.

The strategic planning team's overall goals should:

- **Advocate safe entry, seizure, and cleanup of clandestine laboratories.** The chemical and physical hazards in laboratories pose serious, acute, and chronic health threats for law enforcement officers and other first responders. In addition, in cases of fire or explosion, other individuals and property can be in danger. The strategic planning team has a vital role in informing local law enforcement, fire, and other agencies of the potential risks and the methods of protecting both individuals and property from hazards.

- **Coordinate a uniform investigative and cleanup response.** The team can be instrumental in developing response guidelines, protocols, and standard operating procedures for law enforcement agencies, hazardous materials teams, environmental response agencies, and State and local health departments. The team can also develop written interagency agreements that describe how two or more agencies will work together.

The planning team may be formed as a state- or countywide body. For example, the Washington State Controlled Substances Act (Revised Code of Washington 69.50) and amendments to the Act have set forth the principles of a coordinated, cooperative response effort.[1] Thus, the Washington State Clandestine Laboratory Steering Committee was the planning team formed with representatives from State agencies, but with the provision that "local health departments may want to establish an interagency, county-wide steering committee on illegal drug labs if none exists."[2] Washington State's Clandestine Laboratory Steering Committee includes representatives from the following agencies:

- Washington State Patrol, local law enforcement agencies, narcotics task forces (including county prosecutors), and DEA.
- Fire departments' HAZMAT divisions and local HAZMAT teams.
- State Department of Ecology.
- State and local departments of health.
- State Board of Pharmacy.
- Attorney General's Office.
- State Real Estate Board.

Additional, or "ad hoc," members may be invited to attend specific meetings of the committee. These members may include representatives from the medical community, child protective services, and other State and local professional associations with an interest in clandestine laboratory enforcement issues.

The planning team should select a chairperson to coordinate its activities; the chairmanship may be rotated on a regular basis to allow all the members equal participation.

Component 2: Interagency Agreements

The development of interagency agreements or memorandums of understanding (MOUs) should be one of the strategic planning team's primary tasks. MOUs should be in place before any multidisciplinary, coordinated enforcement effort is conducted. They should outline the roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in the enforcement effort and should, at a minimum, address the following:

- **Purpose, goals, objectives, and scope of authority.** The MOU should define the mission of the CLEP, articulate the participating agencies' mutual goals, and state clearly the program's scope of authority (statewide, regional, countywide, or other).

- **Funding.** The MOU should describe how the CLEP is to be funded and the amount of financial support to be provided by each participating agency. Support may come from a number of sources, including each agency's operational funds, grants and contracts, seized assets, or special tax levies.

- **Pay and benefits.** Agencies have considerably different pay rates, overtime policies, liability and insurance coverage, and worker compensation benefits. A comprehensive MOU should take these differences into account. Some programs elect to allow participating personnel to operate under pay and insurance plans funded by their specific agencies. While this can result in occasional inequities, it is a very workable solution if agreed upon in the MOU.

- **Personnel.** The MOU should set formal personnel selection criteria and clear rotation policies, address the length of time for program assignment, and stress the need for participants' adherence to parent agency regulations. Since interagency agreements are seldom all-inclusive, it is necessary for personnel to understand that parent agencies retain authority and control over their employees assigned to the program.

The MOU should set specific criteria for selection and tenure of top program leaders. Formal procedures addressing these issues in advance will help to ensure consistency in the type of top leadership; thus, personnel changes at this level will not pose a threat to the strategic planning team's continued effective operation.

- **Media relations.** The MOU should specify who will be responsible for handling media relations and issuing press releases. Ideally, this responsibility should be vested in a single person, who may be the CLEP coordinator or a designated representative.

- **Sharing forfeited assets.** The MOU should specify how any forfeited assets will be distributed and used. For example, some CLEPs may wish to distribute the funds to participating agencies using a formula based on the number of agencies; or the decision may be made to use the assets to augment the program's operating budget.

In Pennsylvania, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) have developed the following interagency agreement that specifically details the goals and objectives of the clandestine laboratory program:

The clandestine laboratory program is intended to be an interagency cooperative effort between PSP and the OAG. Each agency shall participate as fully as possible in program goals and objectives: (1) equipping and training of the clandestine laboratory investigative unit; (2) expansion of precursor and glassware monitoring program; (3) intelligence and operational interface between State, local, and Federal authorities; (4) public awareness and publicity to aid investigations; (5) location of laboratories, arrest and detention of operators at all levels; (6) full legal support and prosecution at all levels; (7) agreements with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Environmental Resources, the Environmental Protection Agency, and private waste disposal hauler contractors for disposal of harmful substances; and (8) training for State and local officers.

Office of the Attorney General and the
Pennsylvania State Police
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

When Washington State expanded its existing clandestine laboratory enforcement program to include a cleanup component, the following MOU was developed among the Washington State Department of Health, Department of Ecology, and State Patrol to delineate each agency's roles and responsibilities.

It is agreed the Department of Ecology, Washington State Patrol, and the Department of Health shall participate in the (cleanup program) as technical advisors, proposal reviewers, panel members for contract selection, and report reviewers. Specifically, their responsibilities during this project will be as follows:

1. **Washington Department of Health** will serve as the lead agency for this project under the Revised Code of Washington 69.50, RCW 43.27 and RCW 70.54: Public Health and Safety Act. They will provide project management, project coordination, hire contractors, and write the final report submitted to the Drug Enforcement Administration.

2. **Washington State Patrol** will serve as law enforcement experts and follow the Federal and State Guidelines as they relate to preraid planning, initial entry, risk assessment, and processing phase. They will operate under the provisions of RCW 69.50: Controlled Substances Act.

3. **Washington Department of Ecology** will serve as environmental protection experts and follow their mandated role of removing, transporting, and disposing of hazardous materials under the provisions of RCW 69.50. Also, Ecology will conduct an environmental risk assessment outside of the building as mandated by RCW 70.105D: Model Toxins Act.

Component 3: Personnel and Training

Selection and training of personnel are critical to the CLEP's effectiveness. This section should discuss the various personnel needed for an effective program and the type of training they should receive. This section should also emphasize the importance of all appropriate team members meeting prior to each enforcement action to delineate their respective roles and responsibilities.

Personnel

The CLEP should include the following personnel:

- **Program coordinator.** He or she should be responsible for overall CLEP administration and clandestine laboratory investigations. The coordinator may also be responsible for developing and informing employees of procedures regarding safety, industrial hygiene, and training requirements; coordinating hazardous waste contracts (this may also be the Department of Environment's responsibility); providing technical advice and training in laboratory investigations and safety; reviewing and approving the selection of health and safety equipment; coordinating the medical surveillance program; and serving on a regional, State, and/or countywide clandestine laboratory strategic planning team.

- **Law enforcement personnel.** These should include an onsite supervisor or incident commander, an entry team, a site safety officer, a site safety appraisal team, a forensic chemist, criminal investigators, latent print analysts, and a photographer.

The roles and responsibilities of the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, California Department of Justice, personnel are presented as a sample in appendix B. It is important to note that departments differ with regard to specific responsibilities. For example, while California's procedures require two scientific personnel to respond for all active or cooking laboratories, the Washington State Patrol's policy allows detectives who have a good knowledge of chemicals to take samples when there are only three or four substances involved. This allows the detectives to process these substances onsite without having to send for a chemist. The detectives understand that, where they may have doubts, they are to call a chemist. The California procedures also require the presence of an experienced criminalist when latent print analysts process a laboratory scene. The Washington State Patrol, however, stresses the importance of a detective's presence during latent print processing, since the detective has a working knowledge of the case and can intercede on the analyst's behalf if other law enforcement personnel should ask the analyst to perform an unsafe activity.

- **Financial investigator.** He or she may be an employee of the law enforcement agency or the prosecutor's office, and should be responsible for all aspects of the financial investigation (when appropriate) of clandestine laboratory operators.

- **Prosecutor.** The prosecutor plays a critical role in the program's overall effectiveness, providing essential oversight of all aspects of the investigative process, ensuring that the criminal and civil (when appropriate) cases are properly developed and prepared and that financial investigations are properly conducted, assisting with search warrant and case preparation, preparing affidavits for destruction of all hazardous material, providing ongoing training on legal matters to other CLEP members, and serving as a member of the strategic planning team.

It is important for the prosecutor to be aware of the broad range of laws and strategies that are available for litigating cases related to clandestine laboratory enforcement. Knowledge and application of civil, health/safety, environmental, and child neglect/endangerment codes can, in some cases, result in enhanced sentences and facilitate recovery of cleanup costs. For example, a Los Angeles County prosecutor used the California Health and Safety Code 11470.2(b) to bill the laboratory operators for recovery of the costs of "seizing, eradicating, destroying or taking remedial action with respect to the manufacture or cultivation of a controlled substance." Since prosecutors on both State and local levels can marshal all the necessary legal and law enforcement resources to conduct comprehensive investigations, they may, in some jurisdictions, serve as the CLEP's general coordinator. Regardless of the role played in the CLEP, it is important that the prosecutor be cross-designated as a special U.S. Attorney for cases that may warrant Federal prosecution.

- **Fire department/HAZMAT teams.** These teams provide onsite support services to the law enforcement, health, and environmental personnel. They also may be valuable resources for ongoing training and technical assistance to all CLEP members.

- **Health department personnel.** These officials are responsible for assisting law enforcement and fire department/HAZMAT teams onsite in accordance with their departments' guidelines and procedures. Health department officials may be principally responsible for posting contaminated properties, notifying residents of health and safety risks, and developing and implementing guidelines for the cleanup of residual contaminants. They may also provide technical advice to law enforcement agencies regarding compliance with OSHA and other State safety and health regulations, the selection and maintenance of safety equipment, and the development of employee medical monitoring/surveillance programs.

- **Department of environment/ecology personnel.** These officials may be responsible for acquiring the disposal contractor, monitoring the removal of hazardous chemicals and contaminated equipment, and monitoring the cleanup of the laboratory's exterior environment.

Training

Since CLEP training requirements may be subject to Federal and State regulations, policymakers should be familiar with standards set by DEA, OSHA, and their respective State criminal justice and occupational safety and health agencies.

All personnel who may be exposed to hazardous materials should be required to complete specialized clandestine laboratory training. Training curriculums should comply with Federal and State OSHA requirements and should also meet all standards for clandestine laboratory training established by the State criminal justice / law enforcement training agency. If possible, every law enforcement officer should receive supervised on-the-job training in critical areas (safety, raid techniques, handling hazardous material, using proper safety equipment, etc.). Training should also address the specific risks to both male and female officers who may be exposed to hazardous materials. The following are examples of the training requirements from the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement and the Washington State Patrol:

Personnel shall have successfully completed all applicable training requirements as specified by the training matrix before responding to a clandestine laboratory scene. Training requirements will meet those specified in 29 CFR 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response.

Law enforcement officers, onsite, and scientific support personnel shall complete the following training: (1) a minimum of 40 hours of (California) DOJ-approved offsite training; (2) a minimum of 3 days of actual field experience under the direct supervision of a trained, experienced onsite supervisor; (3) 8 hours of (California) DOJ-approved annual refresher training; (4) a minimum of 8 hours of additional training specific to their responsibilities and the Department's health and safety program.

California Department of Justice
Division of Law Enforcement
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement
Sacramento, California

All clandestine drug laboratory team members shall complete training mandated by WAC 296–62–3040.

Required training shall include: (1) A 40-hour Basic Clandestine Laboratory Safety School, (2) 24 hours of field experience under the direct supervision of a qualified clandestine laboratory team member, and (3) 8 hours of refresher training annually.

In addition to the above training, supervisors shall have 3 days of supervised onsite field experience and at least 8 hours of training covering such topics as the employers' health and safety program, personal protective equipment (PPE), spill contamination, and health hazard monitoring.

Sampling and training shall consist of at least 4 hours of classroom and practical instruction by a forensic scientist who is a member of the clandestine laboratory team.

Washington State Patrol
Olympia, Washington

In addition to the special, investigative training required for law enforcement officers, it is beneficial for the prosecutor to acquire an understanding of the broad range of issues involved in the CLEP, including the roles and responsibilities of other program participants, laboratory investigation and safety procedures, the chemicals and processes by which illegal drugs are manufactured, and the various violations related to laboratory operations.

Component 4: Equipment

Perhaps the most important (and sometimes controversial) decision that CLEP policymakers must make involves the selection of and requirement for staff use of personal protective equipment (PPE). The diversity of known and potential health hazards at the clandestine laboratory scene requires that all responding personnel be protected to the fullest extent possible. Federal agencies, including EPA, OSHA, and DEA, have issued guidelines addressing the protection of employees from hazardous materials. Policymakers should review these, as well as State statutes and regulations addressing hazardous materials response and occupational health and safety, prior to designing this component of the CLEP.

Three principal elements go into the CLEP's equipment component: (1) PPE, (2) respiratory protection, and (3) air monitoring equipment.

Personal Protective Equipment

The type and degree of protection required for clandestine laboratory response is dependent on the type and degree of hazards to be encountered, type and duration of work to be performed, and clothing and equipment use limitations. The PPE component should delineate specific levels of protective equipment to be worn for the varying hazardous chemical and physical environments associated with clandestine laboratory responses. For example, the Washington State Patrol policy mandates the use of self-contained breathing equipment when dealing with certain hazardous labs, such as an LSD or fentanyl site. (Several Federal agencies have recommended minimum levels of PPE for varying hazardous environmental levels.[3]) This component should also identify the specific equipment to be worn by each clandestine laboratory team, as illustrated by the following excerpt from the Washington State Patrol policy:

Entry Team

1. Two-piece Nomex™ utility suit with hood and gloves.
2. Full-face respirator.
3. Level IV ballistic vest.
4. Nylon gun belt, holster, and cuff case.
5. Leather boots.
6. Goggles (for use if respirator not required).
7. Latex over-boots.

Site Safety Appraisal Team

1. Saranex™ suit with hood.
2. Two-piece Nomex™utility suit with hood and gloves.
3. Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
4. Steel-toed PVC boot.
5. Vinyl glove liners.
6. Nitrile-latex gloves.
7. Latex over-boots (for use if PVC boots not used).

Processing Team

1. Saranex™ suit with hood.
2. Two-piece Nomex™ utility suit with hood and gloves.
3. Full-face respirator.
4. Goggles (for use if respirator not required).
5. Vinyl glove liners.
6. Nitrile-latex gloves.
7. Latex over-boots (for use if PVC boots not used).

Washington State Patrol
Olympia, Washington

To select the appropriate level of PPE, policymakers should assess working conditions, including airborne concentrations of contaminants and other environmental factors. Selection criteria for PPE fall into three general areas: (1) hazard assessment, (2) performance requirements, and (3) chemical resistance.

Hazard Assessment. Examples of hazard information that should be assessed include:

- ❑ Chemical hazards (each chemical's physical and toxicological properties).
- ❑ Physical hazards (hot temperatures).
- ❑ Degree of hazard (grade, strength, quantity of chemicals present).
- ❑ Work function, duration, and probability of exposure.

Performance Requirements. Protective clothing and equipment should be selected with specific use requirements in mind. Products may be manufactured from a variety of materials that provide varying levels of protection and performance. The following are several factors to consider in assessing PPE performance requirements:

- ❑ Strength (degree to which it withstands tears, abrasions, and punctures).
- ❑ Flexibility (degree to which it allows freedom of movement).
- ❑ Temperature resistance (degree of protection in extreme temperatures).
- ❑ Cleanability (whether it can be washed and decontaminated routinely).
- ❑ Durability (degree to which it resists aging and maintains protective capacity over time).

Chemical Resistance. The PPE's chemical resistance (the degree of protection against specific chemical hazards) requires special consideration since no single material will provide proper protection against all chemical hazards. All materials used in protective clothing and equipment are susceptible to attack by various chemicals; therefore, it is important to know which material will protect against which chemicals.

Of the wide variety of natural and synthetic materials used to manufacture PPE, some of the most effective are known as elastomers. Elastomers are materials that return to their original shape after being stretched; they provide the best protection against chemical attack (solid, liquid, or gas). Used in boots, gloves, coveralls, and fully encapsulating suits, elastomers are sometimes combined with other materials to enhance durability and protection.

Since vendors may advertise a broad array of products as meeting the needs of the clandestine laboratory enforcement team, program coordinators should develop product specifications carefully and precisely to ensure the purchase of equipment that will, in fact, provide the most effective protection available. A sample from the Washington State Patrol "Product Specifications" (PPE specifications) appears in appendix C.

Respiratory Protection

A specific, written policy addressing the selection, use, and maintenance of respirators is an essential element of the equipment component and should apply to all field and laboratory personnel. This policy should clearly delineate the employer's responsibility to select and provide appropriate respirators and to develop and provide training on their use. The policy should also describe proper respirator use, fit testing and maintenance, medical limitations for respirator wearers (such as restrictions on persons with respiratory problems such as asthma, emphysema, or allergies), and program evaluation. Appendix D contains an example of the respiratory protection program developed by the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement.

Air Monitoring Equipment

Specialized air monitoring equipment is needed to evaluate chemical hazards by testing for explosive atmosphere and oxygen deficient atmosphere at clandestine laboratory sites prior to collecting evidence and dismantling the laboratory. This section of the equipment component should describe the types, uses, advantages, and limitations of various air monitoring equipment. For example, the following is an excerpt from the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement policy addressing combustible gas indicators:

> Combustible gas indicators are used to measure the concentration of flammable vapors or gases in the air. The results are expressed in percentage of the lower explosive limit (LEL) of the vapor or gas.
>
> The advantage of using this type of instrument are: (1) immediate reading; (2) simple to operate; (3) portable; and (4) built-in audible alarms.
>
> The limitations of using tis type of instrument are: (1) combustible gas indicators are intended for use only in normal oxygen atmospheres; (2) oxygen deficient or enriched atmospheres can produce false readings; and (3) certain substances (i.e., leaded gas vapors) can affect the meter's ability to respond correctly.
>
> **California Department of Justice**
> **Division of Law Enforcement**
> **Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement**
> **Sacramento, California**

Additional Equipment. This section of the component should describe other equipment and procedures necessary to ensure that the clandestine laboratory site is processed in a safe, thorough, and timely manner. Thus, this section may address such issues as evidence collection and inventory, chemical sampling, prisoner handling, decontamination of site personnel, and the use of a clandestine laboratory response van.

Component 5: Personnel Medical Screening and Surveillance, and Data Collection

Although the long-term health effects of exposure to all the chemicals typically found in clandestine laboratories have yet to be studied, many acute and chronic effects have been documented. Most common of these include upper respiratory ailments, kidney and liver dysfunction, and in some instances, reproductive dysfunction. There is also evidence that PCP and its precursors have caused chemical and neurological disorders in children born to women who were exposed to or used PCP before the children were conceived, as well as cases involving high levels of mercury and lead in children who were living in houses where laboratories were operating.

The purpose of this component is to delineate procedures for monitoring the health status of employees involved in clandestine laboratory enforcement activities. Regular medical monitoring ensures that: (1) work-related illnesses are detected early, making medical intervention more successful; (2) illnesses that may be aggravated by exposure to toxins are identified; (3) injuries resulting from exposure to toxins are immediately treated; and (4) baseline and followup medical data are available to monitor changes in the health status of employees who are exposed to hazardous substances.

Personnel assigned to clandestine laboratory teams should receive a baseline medical screening, including an occupational/medical history, a complete physical examination, a blood chemistry screen, pulmonary function and spirometry testing, and a stress-treadmill test prior to assignment. Medical screening should also evaluate a person's ability to wear required PPE under specific conditions—high temperatures, for example—that may be expected at a clandestine laboratory site. Only medically approved employees should be assigned to the CLEP.

As illustrated by the excerpts that follow from the medical screening and surveillance protocols of the Washington State Patrol and the Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, medical examinations should be repeated at 12-month intervals, after injury or exposure to hazardous chemicals, and at the termination of the assignment. Annual examinations may also be provided for employees who have left the CLEP but were exposed to chemicals during their assignments.

All members of the clandestine laboratory team shall participate in a medical surveillance program. The medical surveillance program shall comply with WAC 296–62–3050 and include the following: (1) a baseline physical examination shall be obtained prior to assignment to the clandestine laboratory team; (2) an annual physical exam obtained by each active member of the clandestine laboratory team; (3) an examination obtained by any team member who is injured or develops any signs or symptoms indicating possible overexposure; (4) a physical examination at the termination of the employee's assignment to the clandestine laboratory team.

The employer shall bear all costs associated with the medical surveillance program.

Medical examinations shall include a medical and work history (or updated history) with special emphasis on symptoms related to the handling of hazardous substances and health hazards associated with clandestine laboratories and to fitness for duty, including the ability to wear required PPE under conditions which may be expected in clandestine laboratories.

All medical examinations shall be performed by, or under the supervision of, a licensed physician.

Washington State Patrol
Olympia, Washington

A. Medical surveillance shall be provided by the employer and all team members according to the following guidelines:

1. Prior to assignment to the laboratory team.

2. At least once each 12 months after initial assessment.

3. At termination of employment or removal from the laboratory team if the team member has not had an examination within the last 6 months.

4. As soon as possible upon notification by a team member that the team member has developed signs or symptoms indicating possible overexposure to hazardous substances or health hazards, or that the employee has been exposed above the established exposure levels in an emergency situation.

5. At more frequent times, if examining physician determines that an increased frequency of examination is medically necessary.

B. Medical examinations shall include a medical and work history (or updated history if one is in the team member's file), with special emphasis on symptoms related to the handling of hazardous substances and health hazards associated with clandestine laboratories and to fitness for duty, including the ability to wear required PPE under conditions (e.g., temperature extremes) that may be expected in laboratories.

C. All medical examinations shall be performed by, or under the supervision of, a licensed physician; and shall be provided at no cost to the team member.

D. The employer shall provide the following to the physician:

1. Copy of laboratory policy.

2. Description of team member's duties.

3. Team member's anticipated exposure levels.

4. Description of PPE used or to be used.

5. Information from previous medical examinations.

Office of the Attorney General
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Two data collection instruments are currently used to monitor personnel whose work includes exposure to or handling of hazardous chemicals: (1) the Hazardous Assessment and Recognition Plan (HARP) and (2) the Clandestine Laboratory Exposure Report (CLER).

The HARP (illustrated in appendix E) provides a chronological record of hazardous and chemical information as it is developed during the course of an enforcement action. It is completed onsite by the site safety officer and includes information on potential hazards (chemical, flammable, explosive, and radioactive) at the site. It also documents each employee's onsite work duties and includes the specific types of chemicals present, as well as types of protective equipment used by personnel.

The HARP, developed by the California Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, includes Drager tubes on its list of recommended equipment; however, the Washington State Patrol has not found toxicity assessment of the laboratory environment to be of value, and personnel cautioned that the use of these tubes at a complex laboratory site could add several hours to the processing time and provide only minimal benefit.

A CLER (illustrated in appendix F) should be completed for each person at the clandestine laboratory scene. The report should include such information as (1) laboratory type, (2) length of exposure by type of activity, (3) any physical reaction/symptom, (4) any medical diagnosis, (5) special equipment and decontamination activities, and (6) other personnel present.

Component 6: Precursor Chemical Monitoring

Developing and implementing a system to monitor the sale and distribution of precursor chemicals is an essential element to a comprehensive approach to clandestine laboratory enforcement. The principal Federal statute to control the diversion of precursor and essential chemicals is the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988.

In addition to Federal legislation, States have enacted precursor chemical/glassware monitoring statutes. For example, in the States of Washington, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma, precursor chemical statutes have been effective in reducing the number of "mom and pop" laboratories and have placed serious burdens on even large, organized operators/profiteers.

State statutes vary with regard to the types and quantities of chemicals they control, licensing and reporting requirements, and sanctions, as well as the State agency charged with monitoring the movement of these chemicals. In some States, the monitoring agency is a law enforcement agency (department of public safety, bureau of narcotics and drugs, the office of the attorney general, or department of justice); while in other States, the responsibility falls on any one of a number of agencies (the board of pharmacy, the department of health, or the department of commerce).

Wide variations in State laws have made monitoring the sale and distribution of these chemicals across State lines very difficult for State and local law enforcement officials. Consequently, these officials have recommended that the Federal Government encourage uniformity among the States and take the initiative to develop a model State chemical control statute. This effort is currently being undertaken by the American Prosecutors' Research Institute of the National District Attorneys Association (APRI/NDAA).

In a draft report, Highlights of the Model State Chemical Control Act, APRI has recommended provisions that should be contained in State chemical control acts (see appendix G).

Component 7: Clandestine Laboratory Cleanup

Clandestine laboratories present significant environmental and public health challenges; therefore, a comprehensive program invariably includes policies and procedures for the safe disposal of the hazardous materials found, as well as for site cleanup.

Perhaps no component of a CLEP requires more interagency cooperation and coordination than that of cleanup. While active labs pose a greater risk of chemical exposure than do sites where drugs were formerly produced, both environments should be considered hazardous waste sites and should be treated as such by law enforcement, environmental, and health agencies. Clearly, the cleanup component is not merely the responsibility of one agency but is shared by all agencies represented in the program. Ultimately, the benefits of an effective cleanup strategy are shared by all of the participating agencies.

Chapter 2 noted that when a law enforcement agency seizes a clandestine laboratory, the agency may become a hazardous waste generator as defined by Federal law—the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act—and may need to comply with applicable regulations.

As policymakers design their clandestine laboratory enforcement programs, they should be thoroughly familiar with the rules, regulations, and issues involved in disposal of gross contaminants. Health and environmental agencies, as well as forensic chemists who are members of the CLEP strategic planning team, can be instrumental in clarifying applicable Federal and State statutes and regulations and in assisting law enforcement agencies in developing specific policies and procedures addressing clandestine laboratory cleanup and disposal.

Disposal of Contaminated Materials

Once all necessary evidence samples are collected at the clandestine laboratory site, remaining chemicals, laboratory glassware, and equipment should be considered contaminated and disposed of properly. States vary in how hazardous chemicals may be destroyed. For example, the California Health and Safety Code allows, with specific requirements, for the destruction of chemicals used in the manufacture of controlled substances. The State of Washington allows a "destruct order" (see appendix H) to be issued in conjunction with the search warrant for the laboratory site, enabling law enforcement officers to "destroy or arrange for the destruction of any item suspected of being dangerous or hazardous, such as chemicals, residue, contaminated lab equipment, containers for such items, or other suspected hazardous substance."

Although law enforcement personnel should be present to provide security for the disposal operation, the actual procedures should be performed by a qualified disposal contractor. The contractor should remove, transport, store, and dispose of all chemicals and associated glassware, equipment, and contaminated materials from the site, and prepare manifests. In so doing, the contractor should be familiar with and comply with applicable DOT, EPA, and State regulations:

- ❑ EPA and required State identification numbers.
- ❑ Controlled substances registration (if State mandated).
- ❑ Appropriate vehicles, material, and personnel available.
- ❑ Reasonable response time.
- ❑ Use of an RCRA-permitted treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facility.
- ❑ Knowledge and experience necessary to manage and dispose of hazardous materials properly.

Selection of the disposal contractor may be a joint effort of the CLEP strategic planning team, as health and environmental officials can assist law enforcement officials in reviewing contractor qualifications in light of State and local needs. Jurisdictions vary in how they select and use disposal contractors. For example, in California, both the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement and DEA have disposal contractors; decisions about which contractor to call are most often predicated on which is the "lead" investigative agency. In Washington State and New Jersey, the disposal contractor is hired by the State department of ecology or environmental protection, as illustrated by the following policy excerpts:

> The incident commander shall notify the appropriate Department of Ecology Spill Response Region of the possibility of a clandestine laboratory operation.
>
> The Department of Ecology is responsible for acquiring a contractor to dispose of chemicals and contaminated equipment found at the lab site.
>
> **Washington State Patrol**
> **Olympia, Washington**

> All activities undertaken will comply with procedures adopted in concert with the State Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding the safe disposal of toxic or hazardous substances seized in clandestine lab interdictions.
>
> The DEP will, as required by law, provide assistance as necessary for the neutralization, removal, and destruction of any toxic or hazardous materials that are found at and seized from any clandestine lab sites.
>
> **New Jersey State Police**
> **Operation ALERT Policies and Procedures**

Securing of the Site

Once the disposal contractor has finished, law enforcement personnel should secure the site and the appropriate State or local agency, usually the health department, should post the site. (Law enforcement personnel should not leave the site until it is posted; in some instances, law enforcement agencies take responsibility for the posting.) The posting should indicate that a clandestine laboratory was seized at that location on a specific date. Additionally, all appropriate State and local health and environmental agencies should be notified of an enforcement action involving the transfer, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste.

If the laboratory site is on private property, the property owner should be notified; if the site is on public land, the appropriate State or local agency should be notified. (Samples of notification letters are presented in appendix I.) In formulating procedures addressing notification, policymakers need to consult their State and local statutes and regulations addressing hazardous waste sites and the applicability of these laws to the specific waste generated at the site.

Cleanup of Residual Contamination

Cleanup of residual contamination—the final step in the cleanup process—is usually the property owner's responsibility. Clandestine laboratory sites will require cleanup if the site is to be used again as residential or commercial property. The cleanup process consists of three steps: (1) site evaluation, (2) residual cleanup and decontamination activities, and (3) post-cleanup sampling.

Component 8: Community Education and Awareness

As with other criminal problems, law enforcement agencies need help from the public in preventing and detecting clandestine laboratories. Community education and awareness should be an important part of any overall CLEP strategy. Education and awareness programs should be designed to acquaint the general public with warning signs of clandestine laboratory operations, such as the smell of chemicals not normally associated with residential housing; the presence of chemical drums, equipment, and glassware; or high levels of water and electricity usage. In addition, public awareness programs should stress the possibly toxic, flammable, and explosive nature of chemicals found at laboratory sites.

Special segments of the business community should be targeted for education and awareness programs, with particular emphasis on providing training to residential landlords and property managers. This training should include such topics as:

- ❑ Applicant screening.
- ❑ Rental agreements.
- ❑ Property inspections.
- ❑ Warning signs of drug activity.
- ❑ Actions to take upon discovering a clandestine laboratory.
- ❑ Eviction.
- ❑ Role of law enforcement and other agencies.
- ❑ Appropriate Federal and State laws and local ordinances.

The Portland (Oregon) Police and Fire Bureaus and the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program, Office of Neighborhood Associations, have developed The Landlord Training Program: Keeping Illegal Activity Out of Rental Property: A Practical Guide for Landlords and Property Managers (see Sources for Further Information, Training Programs), as part of their community policing initiative. More than 4,000 city landlords and property managers have attended this program to date. In addition, the booklet *Clandestine Drug Labs—What Every Hotel and Motel Operator Should Know* (see Sources for Further Information, Training Programs) also was developed, describing clandestine laboratory operations and procedures for hotel and motel managers reporting suspicious activities.

Notes

1. RCW 69.50.500 **Powers of enforcement personnel.** (a) It is hereby made the duty of the State Board of Pharmacy, the department, and their officers, agents, inspectors and representatives, and all law enforcement officers within the state, and of all prosecuting attorneys, to enforce all provisions of this chapter, except those specifically delegated, and to cooperate with all agencies charged with the enforcement of the laws of the United States, of this state, and all other states, relating to controlled substances as defined in this chapter. (b) Employees of the department of health, who are so designated by the board as enforcement officers, are declared vested to be peace officers and shall be vested with police powers to enforce the drug laws of this state.

2. Washington State Interagency Steering Committee on Illegal Methamphetamine Drug Labs, *Model Local Health Department Response to Illegal Methamphetamine Drug Labs*, Olympia, Washington: Department of Social and Health Services, Toxic Substances Section, March 1989.

3. These Federal agencies and their respective codes are OSHA—29 CFR 1910.120 (Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response); EPA—40 CFR 260 et seq. (Hazardous Waste Regulations); Department of Transportation—40 CFR 172, 173, 178, and 179 (Transportation requirements for hazardous materials).

The Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Program: Planning a Strategy

In recent years, many organizations have begun to heed the words "He who fails to plan, plans to fail." As a result, organizations have become involved in some type of long-range or strategic planning. Although opinions differ as to how strategic planning should be defined and interpreted or designed and executed, a general consensus exists that there is a need for some kind of strategic planning in organizations of all sizes and cultures.[1]

This chapter highlights the importance of strategic planning and describes the principles of the strategic planning process as they apply to CLEPs. These principles are translated into practical steps for program implementation in chapter 5.

Strategic Planning Defined

Strategic planning, broad-based and conceptual in nature, deals with the future in terms of long-term objectives and integrated programs for accomplishing these objectives.[2] The strategic plan also addresses the critical issues facing the organization in the future and is often seen as planning in the face of obstacles or competition.[3] Strategic planning requires the setting of clear goals and objectives and reaching these objectives within a specified timeframe.[4]

For CLEPs, the strategic planning process is designed to enhance the ability of a planning team to identify and achieve specific, designed results by integrating information about the program's external environment, its internal capabilities, and its overall purpose and direction. The emphasis of this planning approach is on the process itself, which is characterized by self-examination, setting direction and priorities, making difficult choices, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating.

Need for Strategic Planning

The need for a strategic planning approach is particularly important for CLEPs because of the program's multidisciplinary nature. A CLEP's strategy recognizes that agencies working together can often be more effective and productive than the same agencies working separately, and the strategic plan is the vehicle that ensures interagency cooperation, coordination, and communication.

Strategic planning can help law enforcement, prosecution, and health and environment personnel, as well as emergency responders, establish a common mission and common priorities and minimize parochial perspectives in favor of broader goals. This approach can also help highlight the need for, and ways to obtain, funding; educate oversight bodies; deal with leadership changes; establish policies and procedures; and make timely responses to legal and political mandates.

Gaining Commitment for Strategic Planning

The first and most critical aspect in instituting a strategic planning approach for a CLEP is commitment from the heads of the agencies involved, and this commitment must be communicated to program participants early and clearly. It is vital to the program's success that all participating principal organizations are identified and their commitment to the program and the strategic planning process obtained.

Top Management Responsibility in Strategic Planning

The primary responsibility for development and implementation of the plan rests with the involved agency heads. These top managers should see the planning process as crucial to the program's overall success and be willing to invest time and effort in a way that is visible to all participants. The creation of a CLEP—deciding its purpose and its future course—is the task of the various agencies' top management and should not be delegated.[5]

Identification of the Strategic Planning Team. Once commitment from participating agency heads is obtained, the strategic planning team members should be identified. This team should represent all participating agencies, including Federal, State, and local law enforcement; prosecutors; fire, health, environmental, and occupational health and safety officials; and forensic chemists. The multidisciplinary strategic planning team is a critical CLEP component, facilitating involvement and open dialog among all principal participants, which, in turn, will engender program "ownership" by all the agencies, rather than just the lead agency. It is important to remember that the strategic planning team is not the same as the operational task force. The planning team *develops* the plan, while the operational task force *implements* it.

Each agency head should identify and appoint individuals who can represent that organization's various functional aspects on the planning team. The team should be directly accountable to the agency heads who are creating the CLEP and should be required to submit periodic progress reports to the agency heads throughout the planning process, keeping them involved on a continuous basis for making key choices and decisions, and providing direction. Only in this way can the agency heads guide the planning process so as to ensure the creation of a CLEP that meets their needs.

Environmental Analysis

Prior to and throughout the entire planning process, the team should be alert to any changes and developments that may affect the CLEP. For example, a combination of factors, including passage of the "kingpin" statute in New Jersey and a precursor chemical statute in Pennsylvania, resulted in clandestine laboratory operators buying their chemicals in New Jersey, but making and distributing their products in Pennsylvania. These "environmental" factors created the need to develop an interstate approach to clandestine laboratory enforcement efforts.

The goal of environmental analysis is to identify trends that are most significant for the organization and describe their likely implications. Through ongoing data gathering and analysis of relevant trends, the team should examine a broad range of issues: economic trends; social, technological, and political factors; demographics; statutes and regulations; research and development; citizen complaints; and the individual and collective strengths and weaknesses of the participating organizations. It is important to note that environmental analysis is not in itself a stage or phase of the strategic planning process; rather, it is a continuous function of the planning team that provides critical information during all strategic planning stages.[6]

The Strategic Planning Approach

The strategic planning approach consists of the following five elements or stages:

- Stage 1: Mission formulation.
- Stage 2: Organizational assessment.
- Stage 3: Developing objectives.
- Stage 4: Developing action plans.
- Stage 5: Implementation.

Each of these stages is essential to the CLEP's successful development and implementation.

Stage 1: Mission Formulation

The program mission statement is the starting point for the plan. The mission statement forms the foundation from which all the other strategic elements emanate.[7] The mission statement should describe the values or beliefs that will shape the program and the program's purpose. While developing the mission statement may be a difficult and time-consuming task, it is critical since it will chart the CLEP's future direction and establish a basis for decisionmaking.[8]

Values: Beliefs That Shape the CLEP. Values are the beliefs that shape the program and the behavior of the individuals involved.[9] Typically, an organization's values are organized and codified into a philosophy of operations, which explains how the organization approaches its work, how it is managed internally, and how it relates to its external environment. Organizational values determine what both individuals and organizations consider to be appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Thus, values play an important role by influencing administrative decisions as well as employee actions.

The Washington State Patrol has articulated its values as follows:

> The Washington State Patrol has been entrusted with duties and responsibilities to assist, preserve, protect, and defend people and their property and to maintain social order. This public trust mandates that all members exemplify the highest standard of conduct while on and off duty.
>
> Departmental members shall adhere to and uphold all laws and serve the public in an ethical, courteous, impartial, and professional manner while respecting the rights and dignity of all persons.
>
> **Washington State Patrol**
> **Olympia, Washington**

Strategic planning team members should define and articulate those values that they want to guide the CLEP. The multidisciplinary nature of a CLEP necessitates clarification of the program's values: what is appropriate behavior, how participating agencies approach their work, how they manage internally, and how they relate to the community. In addition to examining their own values, strategic planning team members should assess the values of their respective organizations and their stakeholders (funding agencies, employees, members of the community, etc.), as these will often influence what the team identifies as the CLEP's values.

Purpose of the CLEP. A clear mission statement:

- ❑ Defines the purpose and intent of the CLEP.
- ❑ Allows all the participating agencies to see themselves as part of a worthwhile enterprise.
- ❑ Enables participants to see how they can improve the community through their participation in the program.

Defining the purpose of the CLEP in the mission statement is a crucial aspect of the strategic planning process. For example, the Washington State Patrol's Mission Statement reads:

> The Washington State Patrol shall serve the public by providing assistance, coordination, and the delivery of law enforcement and support services for the safety and protection of people and property.
>
> **Washington State Patrol**
> **Olympia, Washington**

This mission may be readily transferable to a CLEP, as exemplified by the mission statement developed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General:

> The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General conducts aggressive, comprehensive, and coordinated law enforcement activities to detect, identify, assess, and counter or neutralize clandestine drug manufacturing laboratories operating within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In doing so, departmental personnel shall ensure the safest possible environment by avoiding or reducing chemical exposure.
>
> **Commonwealth of Pennsylvania**
> **Office of the Attorney General**

The New Jersey State Police's Operation ALERT (Active Laboratory Emergency Response Team) program defines its purpose as follows:

> To establish and make operational a team of chemists, investigators, and attorneys who have the expertise necessary to investigate and prosecute clandestine laboratory operators and to train and equip personnel toward this end.
>
> **New Jersey State Police**
> **West Trenton, New Jersey**

The success of the CLEP will to a large extent depend on the clarity of the program's purpose and whether it has incorporated all the reasons for its existence, including not only the reduction or elimination of clandestine laboratory activity but also the purposes related to prosecution, health, and the environment.

Stage 2: Organizational Assessment

An important question facing the strategic planning team is whether the CLEP has the ability to accomplish its mission effectively. Therefore, in the organizational assessment stage of the strategic planning approach, special attention should be paid to collecting the following data that will influence the program's capabilities:

Critical Issues. The organizational assessment should include information about critical issues inside and outside the program that might impact the strategic plan. A critical issue is defined as a difficulty that has significant influence on the way an organization functions or on its ability to achieve a desired future for which there is no agreed-upon response.[10] A critical issue can be almost anything—funding, current Federal/State statutes and regulations, participating agencies' policies and procedures, new technologies, politics, or community acceptance. The strategic planning team needs to develop an issue agenda and prioritize the issues that they believe will have the most impact on the program in the next 3 to 5 years.

Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. The planning team should identify and rank the program's strengths and weaknesses, as well as its future opportunities and threats. The purpose of examining strengths and weaknesses is to identify strengths that can be utilized in accomplishing the program's mission and weaknesses that need to be managed or avoided as the strategic plan is formulated. Future opportunities and threats should be examined since policymakers probably will find that much of the program's future may be dictated by forces outside its own structure. Therefore, no plans should be developed without studying these external forces.

Stage 3: Developing Objectives

At this stage, the strategic planning team should ask the questions, What do we want the CLEP to accomplish, and how do we measure our success or failure?

When developing objectives, the planning team should examine what is expected from the program by all the participating agencies. Since the CLEP is a multidisciplinary program, there probably will be many different expectations; however, it is essential that all participants share a common vision for the program.

In the context of the CLEP, objectives may focus on such issues as the elimination of clandestine laboratories, increased numbers of prosecutions resulting in convictions, decreased levels of exposure-related injuries or illnesses in law enforcement and other personnel, and improved environmental factors related to the cleanup of contaminated property.

The planning team should then compare its objectives with the information gathered about the critical issues and the program's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The team should attempt to develop concrete actions to manage the critical issues by building upon strengths, overcoming weaknesses, exploiting opportunities, and blocking or blunting threats.[11]

If there is a substantial discrepancy between the program's objectives and the capacity to achieve them, the planning team should reevaluate its objectives and rework the plan, until the gap between the objectives and the capacity to achieve them is minimized. For example, a strategic plan that includes the elimination of all clandestine laboratories and the prosecution of all operators in a given region within a 6-month period would generally be unreasonable and impossible to achieve. This strategic plan should be reworked to include examining the program's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats and setting a more realistic objective of reducing the number of clandestine laboratories by a certain percentage within a given timeframe.

Stage 4: Developing Action Plans

After the objectives have been established, the planning team should identify the proposed ways in which each objective might be met. This effort should include analyzing the cost/benefit of each and selecting the particular strategies that are most likely to achieve the objective.

The action planning phase should be delegated to the various participating agencies, each of which should be expected to develop detailed action plans with a budget and a timetable for completion. All participating agencies should submit action plans to achieve the program's objectives.

Each agency's plan should then be checked against the program mission statement to determine whether the proposed actions and directions are consistent with the CLEP's mission. Each agency's plan should be agreed upon by each of the other agencies and should become a part of an interagency agreement.

The team should then identify any gaps in the combined plans, determine how they can be closed, and determine what impact, if any, the gaps might have on the plan's implementation.

Stage 5: Implementation

In this phase, the plan is handed to the various agency heads to implement to achieve the required results. The true test of the action plan's implementation and effectiveness is whether the organizational managers use it in everyday decisionmaking.

By this time, the planning team has worked closely with the various agency heads in the strategic plan development. It is important now that the agency heads become involved in the implementation phase in a highly visible manner, publicly voicing their commitment to the program and its strategic plan, and demonstrating this commitment by dedicating the resources necessary to make it successful.

During implementation, the planning team should make periodic reports to the agency heads and staff about the program's progress. The implementation phase also requires the team to conduct evaluations of the strategic plans and make any changes necessary to ensure the objectives are being met and the program's mission accomplished.

Strategic planning is the process by which the guiding members of an organization envision the organization's future and develop the necessary procedures and operations to achieve the vision. The multidisciplinary nature of a CLEP compounds the need for a strategic planning approach.

Strategic planning is a continuous process, and it is important to realize that the plan and the guidance it provides are required throughout the life of the CLEP. Often, participants in the strategic planning process become bogged down with the complexities of the plan and lose sight of its real purpose. Keeping the planning model simple, with reasonable expectations, will help to ensure its success. Special emphasis should be placed on reminding all participants in the planning process that the real purpose of the strategic plan is to serve as a framework for action in creating the future direction of the CLEP.

Notes

1. Hines, Gary, "Strategic Planning Made Easy," *Training and Development*, April 1991.

2. Below, Patrick J., George L. Morrissey, and Betty L. Acomb, *The Executive Guide to Strategic Planning*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987.

3. Kaufman, Roger, *Strategic Planning Plus: An Organizational Guide*, Glenview, Illinois: Scott Foresman, 1992.

4. Goodstein, Leonard D., Timothy M. Nolan, and J. William Pfeiffer, *Applied Strategic Planning—A Comprehensive Guide*, San Diego, California: Pfeiffer and Co., 1992.

5. Goodstein, Nolan, and Pfeiffer.

6. Pfeiffer, J. William, Leonard D. Goodstein, and Timothy M. Nolan, *Understanding Applied Strategic Planning: A Manager's Guide*, San Diego, California: University Associates, Inc., 1985; Witham, Donald C., "Strategic Planning for Law Enforcement," *The Police Chief*, January 1990.

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7. Below, Morrissey, and Acomb.

8. Goodstein, Nolan, and Pfeiffer.

9. Wassermann, Robert, and Mark H. Moore, *Values in Policing* (Perspectives on Policing No.8), Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1988.

10. Nutt, Paul C., and Robert W. Backoff, *Strategic Management of Public and Third Sector Organizations*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992.

11. Nutt and Backoff.

Establishing the Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Program: Practical Steps to Implementation

The process of building a comprehensive clandestine laboratory enforcement program requires an organization's long-term commitment and should include the principles of strategic planning. This chapter describes specific steps to establishing a CLEP based on the experiences of the demonstration sites, as well as on the principles of strategic planning discussed in the previous chapter. Worksheets are provided as an aid to the strategic planning team in designing the programs.

Practical Steps to Implementation

Practical steps to implementing a CLEP include the following:

Step 1: Develop the Program Mission Statement

As discussed in chapter 4, the strategic planning approach to establishing an effective CLEP begins with formulating the program's mission statement. A precise, carefully developed mission statement, describing the program's purpose and values or beliefs, will facilitate efficient, productive decisionmaking during program implementation.

Worksheet 5.1 provides a sample format for developing the CLEP's values and mission statement.

Step 2: Select a Program Coordinator or Manager

The CLEP needs an advocate and leader. The program coordinator or manager should be an experienced administrator with expertise in all aspects of clandestine laboratory enforcement and with the authority to influence and implement agencywide policies and procedures. To be successful in this role, the coordinator should be:

- An individual in a position of authority who commands the respect of both staff and managers and who can make the necessary operational changes to ensure the program's success.
- An individual who can identify and evaluate existing and emerging resources that may be of value to the program.
- A risk taker who is willing to take a leadership role in addressing controversial issues.

- A problem solver who can identify barriers to the program and the means to overcome them.
- A coalition builder who can work and negotiate effectively among participating agencies' conflicting interests, bringing them together toward a common goal.
- A strong communicator who can articulate orally and in writing the program's incentives, goals, objectives, and mission and who can deliver briefings to all principal program participants, other policymakers and legislators, and the community.

Each agency participating in the CLEP may identify a program coordinator who will be responsible for carrying out the responsibilities of his or her respective agency.

Step 3: Develop the Strategic Plan

As chapter 4 suggested, development of a strategic plan for the program is crucial to its success. This process should delineate the following:

- Environmental developments and trends that will impact the program over the next 3 to 5 years, including economic, social, legal, technological, and political issues.
- Critical issues inside and outside the organization that may have an impact on the program's success.
- Organizational weaknesses that need to be managed or avoided and organizational strengths that can be utilized in accomplishing the program's objectives.
- Program results that may indicate success or failure of the program.
- Positive expectations of the principal participants who will support the CLEP and negative expectations of those who will not support it.
- Action plans for each program objective.

Use Worksheets 5.2 through 5.7 to begin the process of developing the CLEP strategic plan.

Step 4: Identify Funding Sources and Options

Identifying sources of funding is a critical step in establishing the CLEP. Throughout the strategic planning process, agency heads and other policymakers should attempt to identify potential long-term funding options and resources beyond any initial developmental funds that may be available. Agency heads should be alert to the possibility of any State or Federal grants that may be available. However, the life of the program

should not be dependent on such funds; these sources should be considered only as potential pieces of the total funding. For example, it may be possible to obtain grants to fund specific segments of the operation, such as training, equipment, etc.

In other types of drug investigations, asset forfeiture funds are often seen as a logical source of revenue. This is not the case in most clandestine laboratory investigations for the following reasons. First, the laboratory site may be so contaminated that it may be virtually unusable and, therefore, worthless. Second, the cleanup cost of the site may exceed the value of the property. Third, even if the site is cleaned and remediated, the seizing agency may incur civil liability due to the possibility of long-term health risks. Thus, most clandestine laboratory sites are not seized for asset forfeiture purposes but are returned to the property owner after the evidence and gross contaminants have been removed.

Some policymakers have suggested that CLEPs should be allocated a share of the forfeitures from all drug cases. For example, the New Jersey State Police's Operation ALERT policy states:

> The seizure and/or forfeiture of currency and real or personal property will be equitably shared among the agencies participating in the case based on manhours and resources devoted by the agencies.
>
> **New Jersey State Police**
> **West Trenton, New Jersey**

Additional options for identifying potential funding resources beyond the initial developmental ones include, but are not limited to the following:

- **A cost-sharing consortium model.** This model is based on the concept that several jurisdictions within a State, or several agencies within a jurisdiction, can use the services of the CLEP and, therefore, should contribute to its funding. In this model, which may be applied to the entire program or to any part of the program (such as disposal of hazardous materials, cleanup), participating jurisdictions or agencies develop a "formula" for payment into a central fund for program use. An example of this model is the San Diego County Hazardous Materials Incident Response Team (HIRT) program, which funds a 24-hour, emergency response capability to any hazardous materials site, including clandestine laboratories. (See appendix J for a description of the HIRT program and its funding formula.)

- **Agency operational funds model.** In this model the CLEP components are financed by the participating agencies' operating budgets. For example, the prosecutors' salaries are incorporated into the county prosecutor's or attorney general's budget, the costs associated with investigation are borne by the law enforcement agency, and the costs for disposal and cleanup are the department of environment's responsibility.
- **Recovery legislation.** State legislation may be enacted that would empower State officials to serve an individual owner or operator of a clandestine laboratory with a petition for the recovery of all expenses incurred in "seizing, eradicating, destroying or taking remedial action with respect to the manufacture or cultivation of a controlled substance."
- **Other options.** Policymakers have suggested other funding otions, including tax levies on chemical companies that manufacture precursor and essential chemicals, fines on chemical companies found to be illegally selling precursor chemicals, and Federal and State contracts/grants. Identifying viable, long-term funding is essential prior to the development and implementation of the CLEP.

Use Worksheet 5.8, "Identifying Funding Resources and Options," to begin the process of identifying CLEP funding sources.

Step 5: Establish Components and Write Policies and Procedures

The program components are the foundation of the CLEP. Policies and procedures should be written for each of the program components. The CLEP can then be introduced through an internal and external communication strategy (see step 7).

Use Worksheet 5.9, "Component Policies and Procedures," to write policies and procedures for each component.

Step 6: Select Staff and Develop Roles and Responsibilities

Each of the agencies participating in the CLEP should identify the appropriate staff and delineate their respective roles and responsibilities in the program. Refer to chapter 3 and appendix B for a discussion of personnel and their roles and responsibilities.

Step 7: Implement an Internal and External Communication Strategy

A well-designed and executed communication strategy, targeted at both the participating agencies and, sometimes, the community at large, can help ensure the program's success. Communication should be viewed as a

proactive part of the program, rather than as a series of reactive responses. As with all aspects of the CLEP, the communication strategy must have the principal participants' support. Further, it should:

- ❑ Involve representatives from all agencies represented in the program.
- ❑ Identify the target audiences (among them legislators, judges, law enforcement officials, the community at large, and the media) and priorities for each.
- ❑ Develop a plan, including messages, content, and timing, for implementing the communication strategy.
- ❑ Identify appropriate individuals to implement the communication strategy.

Use Worksheet 5.10, "Communication Strategy," to devise the nature of the communication, the message(s) to be disseminated, the intended audience(s), and the methods.

Step 8: Prepare a Training Plan

The training plan is a part of the internal communication strategy and should include a series of training sessions for all personnel involved in the investigation, prosecution, and cleanup of clandestine laboratories, as discussed under component 3. The training plan should describe the audience, goals, content, method of delivery, and resources that will be needed.

Use Worksheet 5.11, "Training Plan," to prepare a training plan for the CLEP.

Step 9: Develop a Health and Safety Plan

A health and safety plan should be developed to include procedures for medical screening of employees prior to their participation in clandestine laboratory investigations and seizures, and ongoing health monitoring of employees who are involved in such operations. As discussed in chapter 2, screening and monitoring of employees by agencies involved with clandestine laboratory operations is mandated by OSHA regulations.

Step 10: Develop an Evaluation Plan

The decision to establish a CLEP involves substantial commitment and resources. Program planners have a right to know how well the program is working and a need to know how to improve it. Therefore, the evaluation step should not be overlooked by program planners. An outside evaluation by professionals is preferable as it provides an objective, third-party, expert opinion. If the cost of an outside evaluator is prohibitive, much can be gained from self-evaluation by officials within the program.

Even a very simple evaluation strategy can help to ensure that the program continues to meet the agencies' and community's needs and that it is responsive to changes in the types of clandestine laboratory cases encountered. The evaluation strategy involves systematically examining the CLEP to document its impact, and identifying and solving impediments to its overall functioning. Evaluation should be ongoing throughout the implementation of the program, since results can serve as valuable guidance for modifying the CLEP as necessary.

The evaluation strategy should include five major components:

- **Defining the program's goals and objectives.** This process consists of examining written program documentation and discussing program goals and objectives with the principal participants.
- **Detailing the program's history.** This information, which reveals the program's scope and limitations, can often be obtained from those strategic planning team members who were principally responsible for the program's design. Issues to address include origins of the program, changes in the program since its inception, and recommendations for the program's future.
- **Defining the program's content.** The evaluation should determine whether each of the essential program components has been used and, if not, document the reasons for omission.
- **Describing program processes and outcomes.** This step involves delineating the components of the implementation processes and the results or outcomes. For example, the organizational, political, legislative, and management strategies are the processes used to implement a program. Outcomes of a program may include an increase in the number of clandestine laboratories seized, an increase in the number of hazardous sites remediated, and a change in the knowledge and attitudes of the principal participants about respective roles and responsibilities.
- **Summarizing the program and providing recommendations for change.** A report should be written describing the evaluation activities and findings. Abbreviated versions of the report may be prepared for different audiences inside and outside the organization, including heads of participating agencies, the news media, the public, and funding sources, where applicable. If the evaluation developed recommendations to improve the CLEP, these recommendations should be included in this report.

Successful implementation of a comprehensive CLEP requires the commitment of the heads of all participating agencies, the development of a strategic plan, and the execution of that plan in a systematic manner. The program implementation process begins with the establishment of a strategic planning team and ends with a program evaluation. The final step, evaluation, will serve to identify successful program approaches, as well as approaches that may need to be modified to ensure that all objectives are met.

Worksheet 5.1
Develop the Mission Statement

The mission statement should include the values and beliefs that guide the CLEP as well as the program's purpose.

Values	Mission Statement/Purpose
(Example) The Washington State Patrol has been entrusted with duties and responsibilities to assist, preserve, protect, and defend people and their property to maintain social order. This public trust mandates that all members exemplify the highest standards of conduct while on and off duty. Department members shall adhere to and uphold all laws and serve the public in an ethical, courteous, impartial, and professional manner while respecting the rights and dignity of all persons.	(Example) The Washington State Patrol shall serve the public by providing assistance, coordination, and the delivery of law enforcement and support services for the safety and protection of people and property.

Worksheet 5.2
Environmental Analysis

List the specific environmental developments and trends that you believe will have an impact on the CLEP's functioning over the next 3–5 years. Consider a broad range of factors that may have a strategic impact (e.g., economic, social, technological, political, demographic factors, and/or government regulations).

1.	(Examples) Environmental and public health concerns.	6.	
2.	Impact of increased arrests on local correctional facilities.	7.	
3.		8.	
4.		9.	
5.		10.	

Worksheet 5.3
Organizational Assessment—Critical Issues

Critical issues are anticipated or actual conditions or difficulties that will have a significant impact on the CLEP. List the critical issues that the CLEP must manage to be successful in the future.

1.	(Examples) Legislative issues.	6.	
2.	Political issues: clandestine laboratories are not seen as a priority among drug problems.	7.	
3.		8.	
4.		9.	
5.		10.	

Worksheet 5.4
Organizational Assessment—Strengths and Weaknesses

List the strengths (skills, talents, advantages, resources, etc.) that the CLEP can use to accomplish its objectives, and weaknesses (lack of one or more skills, talents, advantages, resources, etc.) that the CLEP needs to manage or avoid.

Organizational Assessment				
Agency	**Strengths**	**Weaknesses**	**Opportunities**	**Threats**
(Example) Department of public safety.	(Example) Has hazardous materials certification and forensic chemists.	(Example) Not fully funded by legislature.	(Example) Can provide training to other agencies.	(Example) Political priorities related to drug enforcement may shift away from clandestine laboratories.

Worksheet 5.5
Program Results

Program results are areas in which you must be successful in order to accomplish your mission. List the results that will indicate success for the CLEP.

1.	(Examples) Development of multidisciplinary strategic planning team.	6.	
2.	Reduction in injuries/illnesses in first responders and the public.	7.	
3.		8.	
4.		9.	
5.		10.	

Worksheet 5.5 (continued)
Program Results

Now list the results that would indicate failure for the CLEP.

1.		6.	
2.		7.	
3.		8.	
4.		9.	
5.		10.	

Worksheet 5.6
Principal Participants' Expectations

Principal participants are individuals, groups, and organizations that share an interest in the CLEP strategies (i.e., all parties, internal or external, that will be affected by or will affect these strategies). List in order of priority the participants who are most likely to be supportive of the CLEP strategies. Now list in priority order the stakeholders who are most likely to oppose the CLEP strategies. Now list each participant's expectations of the CLEP.

Principal Participants' Expectations	
Who Will Support the CLEP?	**Their Expectations**
(Example) Attorney General.	(Example) A coordinated investigation and prosecution response to encompass health, occupational safety, and environmental concerns.

Worksheet 5.6 (continued)
Principal Participants' Expectations

Principal Participants' Expectations	
Who Will Oppose the CLEP?	**Their Expectations**
(Example) The chemical industry.	(Example) A coordinated program would threaten the chemical industry's profits; this industry will oppose surcharges or taxes on chemicals.

Worksheet 5.7
Action Plans

Objective 1: Define the roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in the CLEP.	
Activities (List in order of priority those most likely to achieve the objective.)	**Cost Benefit of Each Activity**
Determine what expertise exists in each agency.	Reduces the replication of services and staff time.
Develop memorandum of understanding (MOU) among agencies.	Clearly defines each agency's role and responsibilities, both during initial response and during cleanup.

Worksheet 5.7 (continued)
Action Plans

Objective 2:	
Activities (List in order of priority those most likely to achieve the objective.)	**Cost Benefit of Each Activity**

Worksheet 5.7 (continued)
Action Plans

Objective 3:	
Activities (List in order of priority those most likely to achieve the objective.)	**Cost Benefit of Each Activity**

Worksheet 5.7 (continued)
Action Plans

Objective 4:	
Activities (List in order of priority those most likely to achieve the objective.)	**Cost Benefit of Each Activity**

Worksheet 5.8
Identifying Funding Resources and Options

Component of Program	How Currently Funded	Funding Gap	Resources/Options	Contact
Equipment.	Not funded.	Total.	Legislative authority.	Legislative liaison. Chairman of Appropriations Committee.

Worksheet 5.9
Component Policies and Procedures

This sample worksheet is designed to assist you to (1) identify the existing statutes, policies, and procedures which may affect each component of the CLEP and (2) identify new policies and procedures which need to be developed for the specific purposes of the program.

Existing/New Policies and Procedures		
Component	**Existing Statutes, Policies/Procedures**	**New Statutes, Policies/Procedures**
(Example) Component 2: Interagency agreements.	(Example) The law enforcement agency is considered the generator of hazardous wastes.	(Example) The department of ecology will be considered the generator of hazardous wastes.
Rationale for New Policy The department of ecology has the resources and expertise to perform hazardous waste cleanup.		
Implementation Strategy for New Policy Develop a written agreement between the law enforcement agency and the department of ecology designating the department of ecology as the hazardous waste generator upon notification of a clandestine laboratory enforcement operation.		

Worksheet 5.10
Communication Strategy

Audiences	Communication Message	Delivery Mechanism	Timing
Legislature and lobbyists.	Need for support and funding of program.	Hold meeting with legislative staff; invite staff and officials to training sessions.	Begin immediately and continue targeted campaign through legislative session.

Worksheet 5.11
Training Plan

A training plan should be designed for each audience targeted (law enforcement, health department, prosecutors, judges, etc.). If interdisciplinary training is planned (i.e., each of the principal agencies participates in a single training event), the training plan should encompass the goals of the interdisciplinary training.

Audience	Content	Timing	Costs	Resources Needed
Department of health.	Roles and responsibilities at laboratory sites.	Within the next 3 months.	Staff time.	A trainer from law enforcement agency and the department of health.

Worksheet 5.11 (continued)
Training Plan

Audience	Content	Timing	Costs	Resources Needed

Glossary

Absorption	The movement of material through the skin.
Acute	Lasting through a single event or for a short period of time.
Air purifying respirator (APR)	A device designed to protect the wearer from the inhalation of harmful atmospheres by removing the contaminants through a filtering media.
Carcinogen	A substance that induces cancer from either acute or chronic exposure.
Caustic	Capable of strongly irritating, corroding, burning, or destroying living tissue.
Chronic	Over a long period of time.
Clandestine laboratory	An illicit operation consisting of a sufficient combination of apparatus and chemicals that either have been or could be used in the manufacture of controlled substances.
Combustible gas indicator	An instrument used to detect and measure flammable/explosive atmospheres.
Decontamination	The process of removing or neutralizing contaminants from individuals and equipment.
Exposure	Any situation arising from work operations where any employee may ingest, inhale, absorb through the skin or eyes, or otherwise come into contact with a hazardous substance.
Exposure limit	A limit set to minimize employee exposure to a hazardous material.
Hazardous	Capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health and safety.
Hazardous waste	A waste or combination of waste that has been identified by Federal or State regulation as posing a risk to public health or the environment.

Incompatible	A term used to describe materials that will or can cause dangerous reactions from direct contact with one another.
Irritant	A material that will cause an inflammatory response or reaction of the eyes, skin, or respiratory system.
Laboratory safety certified	This term describes an employee who has current certification meeting the medical surveillance and training matrix requirements.
Permissible exposure limit (PEL)	A maximum allowable exposure level under OSHA regulations.
Precursor	A raw material that is essential to the production of a controlled substance and that becomes a part of the finished product.
Route of exposure	The manner in which a chemical contaminant enters the body (i.e., ingestion, inhalation, or absorption).
Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)	A respirator designed to protect the wearer from the inhalation of harmful atmospheres by providing a clean air source carried by the wearer.
Site safety plan	Written, site-specific safety criteria that establish requirements for protecting the health and safety of respondents during all activities.
Solvent	A substance, usually a liquid, into which another substance is dissolved.
Synthesis	The formation of a complex compound by the combining of two or more chemicals.
Toxicity	The capacity of a material to produce adverse health effects resulting from exposure to that material.

Tables of Chemical Toxicity and Routes of Exposure

Washington State Department of Health

Table A1. Chemical Toxicity and Routes of Exposure (Skin and Respiratory) for Solvents.

Solvent	Form	Exposure
Acetone	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Benzene	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Benzylchloride	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Chloroform	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Ethanol	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Ethyl Ether	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Freon	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Hexane	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Isopropanol	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Methanol	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Petroleum Ether	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin
Pyridine	Liquid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation

Health Effects:

Inhalation of vapors at low concentration may result in mild eye, nose, and throat irritation. Symptoms of intoxication (drowsiness and lack of coordination) or loss of consciousness may occur at high doses.

Freon spilled onto the skin may result in freezing injury to the skin.

Source: Amdur, Mary, John Doull, and Curtis D. Claussen. *Casarett and Doull's Toxicology: The Basic Science of Poisons*. 4th Edition. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. 1991.

Table A2. Chemical Toxicity and Routes of Exposure (Skin and Respiratory) for Cyanide.

Substance	Form	Exposure
Sodium Cyanide	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Potassium Cyanide	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Benzyl Cyanide	Liquid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation
Hydrogen Cyanide	Gas	Inhalation

Health Effects:

Cyanides are highly toxic substances. If solid salt forms are mixed with acid, hydrogen cyanide gas will be released. Inhalation of hydrogen cyanide may result in rapid progression of symptoms to coma, respiratory failure, and death.

Table A3. Chemical Toxicity and Routes of Exposure (Skin and Respiratory) for Corrosives and Irritants.

Substance	Form	Exposure
Acetic Acid	Liquid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation
Acetic Anhydride	Liquid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation
Benzylchloride	Liquid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation
Hydroiodic Acid	Liquid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation
Mercuric Chloride	Powder, Solid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation
Methylamine	Gas, Liquid, Solid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation
Perchloric Acid	Liquid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation
Phosphine	Gas	Eyes, Inhalation
Sodium Metal	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Sodium Hydroxide	Liquid, Solid	Skin, Eyes
Thionyl Chloride	Liquid	Skin, Eyes, Inhalation

Health Effects:

Vapors of volatile corrosives may cause eye irritation, heavy tearing, conjunctivitis, and corneal injury. Inhalation may cause irritation of mucous membranes of the nose and throat, and lung irritation resulting in cough, chest pain, and shortness of breath. Pulmonary edema and hemoptysis may occur in severe cases. High concentrations of vapor may cause skin irritation. Additional symptoms of vapor inhalation may include headache, nausea, dizziness, and anxiety.

Direct contact with corrosives may result in severe eye or skin burns.

Source: Amdur, Mary, John Doull, and Curtis D. Claussen. *Casarett and Doull's Toxicology: The Basic Science of Poisons.* 4th Edition. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. 1991.

Table A4. Chemical Toxicity and Routes of Exposure (Skin and Respiratory) for Metal/Salts.

Substance	Form	Exposure
Aluminum	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Magnesium	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Red Phosphorous	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Iodine	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Mercuric Chloride	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Mercury Vapor	Liquid, Vapor	Inhalation
Lead Acetate	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Lithium Aluminum Hydride	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Sodium Acetate	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Sodium Hydroxide	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Sodium Metal	Solid in Kerosine	Skin, Eyes
Potassium Metal	Solid in Kerosine	Skin, Eyes
Thorium	Solid	Skin, Eyes

Health Effects:

Most metals and salts are stable solids with minimal potential for exposure unless ingested or the metal is present in the air as a dust or fumes, when heated. Sodium and potassium metal and sodium hydroxide are extremely corrosive in the presence of moisture (water). Lithium aluminum hydride is extremely reactive. Thorium is an alpha particle emitting radioactive material. Mercury vapor is of utmost concern because of its neurotoxic effects.

Table A5. Chemical Toxicity and Routes of Exposure (Skin and Respiratory) for Precursors.

Substance	Form	Exposure
Phenylacetic Acid	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Phenyl-2-Propanone	Solid	Skin, Eyes
Methylamine	Gas, Liquid, Solid	Skin, Eyes

Health Effects:

Phenylacetic acid may produce irritation upon direct contact. Specific toxicity on Phenyl-2-Propanone is lacking. Similar compounds are used in fragrances and pharmaceuticals. Methylamine is an irritant and a corrosive.

Source: Amdur, Mary, John Doull, and Curtis D. Claussen. *Casarett and Doull's Toxicology: The Basic Science of Poisons.* 4th Edition. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. 1991.

Table A6. Chemical Toxicity and Routes of Exposure (Skin and Respiratory) for Chemicals Associated With the Manufacture of LSD, MDA, and MDMA.

Name	Form	Route	Health Effects
Acetonitrile	Liquid / Vapor	Inhalation, Ingestion	Headaches–Convulsions, Possible Cyanide Poisoning
Alumina	Solid	Inhalation	Irritation
Ammonium Acetate	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Skin, Inhalation	Mucous Membrane, Skin Irritation
Ammonium Formate	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Skin, Inhalation	Mucous Membrane, Skin Irritation
Cuprous Oxide	Solid / Dust	Eyes, Inhalation	Mucous Membrane Irritation
Diethylamine	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Skin, Inhalation	Corrosive
Dimethylformamide Doses	Liquid / Vapor	Inhalation, Skin	Irritation, at Higher Central Nervous System Effects
Ergot Alkaloid	Solid / Powder	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin, Ingestion	Severe Arterial Spasm / Gangrene Small Doses Lethal
Ergotamine Tartarte	Solid / Powder	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin, Ingestion	Severe Arterial Spasm / Gangrene Small Doses Lethal
Ethylene Dichloride	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin	Irritation, Central Nervous System Effects
Formamide	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin	Irritation
Formic Acid	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin	Irritation
Isosafrole	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin	Carcinogenic
Hydrazine	Liquid	N / A	Explosive
Hydrobromic Acid	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin	Irritation
Hydrogen Peroxide	Liquid	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin	Irritation
Hydroxyamine	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin	Irritation
Lithium Aluminum Hydride	Solid / Powder	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin	Corrosive, Potentially Explosive
Lithium Hydroxide	Solid / Powder	Inhalation	Central Nervous System Effects
Lysergic Acid	Solid / Powder	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin, Ingestion	Severe Central Nervous System Effects
N, Methylformamide	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin, Ingestion	Irritation

Table A6. (continued) Chemical Toxicity and Routes of Exposure (Skin and Respiratory) for Chemicals Associated With the Manufacture of LSD, MDA, and MDMA.

Name	Form	Route	Health Effects
Methylene Chloride Nervous	Liquid / Vapor	Inhalation, Skin	Irritation, Central System Effects, Carcinogen
Piperonal	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin, Ingestion	Irritation
Potassium Hydroxide	Liquid / Vapor	Inhalation, Skin	Irritation
Raney Nickel	Solid / Powder	Inhalation	Irritation / Allergen
Safrole	Liquid / Oil	Ingestion	Carcinogen
Sodium Dichromate	Solid / Powder	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin, Ingestion	Severe Irritation / Corrosive
Sodium Borohydride	Solid / Powder	N / A	Flammable / Explosive
Sodium Nitrate	Solid / Powder	N / A	Flammable / Explosive
Sodium Sulfate	Solid / Powder	N / A	Little Effect
Sulfur Trioxide	Gas	Eyes, Inhalation	Mucous Membrane Irritation, Corrosive
Tartaric Acid	Solid / Powder	Eyes, Inhalation, Skin, Ingestion	Corrosive Irritation to Mucous Membranes and G.I. tract
Toluene	Liquid / Vapor	Eyes, Inhalation	Mucous Membrane Irritant, Centra Nervous System Effects

Source: Amdur, Mary, John Doull, and Curtis D. Claussen. *Casarett and Doull's Toxicology: The Basic Science of Poisons.* 4th Edition. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. 1991.

Types of Inhaled Toxicants and Their Effects

- Asphyxiants—gases, such as nitrogen, that deprive the body tissues of oxygen.
- Irritants—chemicals, such as hydrogen gas and ammonia compounds, that irritate the air passages, causing constriction of the airways and possibly edema, or liquid in the lungs, and infection.
- Necroses—chemicals, such as nitrogen dioxide, that result in cell death and edema.
- Fibroses—chemicals, such as silicates, that produce fibrotic tissue, which may block airways and decrease lung capacity.
- Allergens—chemicals, such as isocyanates, that induce an allergic response characterized by bronchial constriction and pulmonary disease.
- Carcinogens—chemicals, such as arsenic, that are associated with lung cancer.

Source: Lazarus, Bruce, Gus Ballis, Gerri Silva, and Ken Beutler. *Field Hazards and Protection Training Guide.* U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Clandestine Laboratory Certification Program. June 1987.

Factors Influencing Toxicity

A number of factors influence the normal dose response. These include the following:

- **Route of exposure**—the route by which a toxic material enters the body determines how much is absorbed and which organs are exposed to the highest concentration; e.g., the amount of chemical that is toxic orally may not be as toxic when in contact with the skin.
- **General health**—some materials may be more toxic to one person than to another, based on each person's nutrition, immunologic status, hormonal status, and co-existing diseases.
- **Gender**—some materials are more toxic to one gender than another, because of differences in body fat, metabolism, and reproductive systems. For example, women have a larger percentage of body fat than men; this body fat tends to retain the effects of toxic chemicals. Further, toxic chemicals cause reproductive risks for women of childbearing years.
- **Synergism, Antagonism, and Potentiation**—some combinations of chemicals produce effects different from those attributed to each individually. Synergists are chemicals that, when combined, cause a greater than additive effect; antagonists are chemicals that, when combined, lessen the predicted effect. Potentiation is a type of synergism in which the potentiator is not usually toxic in and of itself, but has the ability to increase the toxicity of other chemicals.
- **Age**—children and the elderly are more susceptible to the effects of certain chemicals than are average adults. Children have higher respiration rates and different metabolism rates, excretory patterns, and susceptibilities than adults; for example, children are less sensitive to central nervous system stimulants but are more sensitive to depressants than average adults. Infants are especially vulnerable to toxic substances since their immature livers lack the detoxification mechanisms found in adults. The elderly are more susceptible to the effects of certain chemicals because aging has affected their blood and hepatic systems, musculature, metabolism, and excretory patterns.
- **Genetics**—genetic differences can affect susceptibility; some people lack genes which produce enzymes that can alter the toxicity of some chemicals.
- **Environmental factors**—increased and decreased environmental temperature, increased or decreased barometric pressure, or radiation may influence a toxic response.

Each of these factors needs to be considered in order to accurately determine the relative risks of any clandestine laboratory.

Source: Lazarus, Bruce, Gus Ballis, Gerri Silva, and Ken Beutler. *Field Hazards and Protection Training Guide*. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Clandestine Laboratory Certification Program. June 1987.

Sample Roles and Responsibilities of CLEP Law Enforcement Personnel

California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement

Roles and Responsibilities

The roles and responsibilities section has been divided into two categories. The first category consists of law enforcement personnel, including an onsite supervisor, case agent, site safety officer, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE) narcotic task force commanders, and the clandestine laboratory coordinator. The second category consists of scientific support personnel, including criminalists, laboratory technicians, latent print analysts, and members of the Hazard Response and Evaluation (HRE) Program. Finally, safety guidelines have been included for all personnel responding to the clandestine laboratory site.

Law Enforcement Personnel

Onsite Supervisor

- ❑ Shall be a laboratory safety certified law enforcement officer who has also completed the 8-hour Health and Safety Supervisor training course.
- ❑ Ensures that the provisions of this manual are adhered to by all personnel.
- ❑ Has ultimate authority at the scene.
- ❑ Is responsible for reporting unusual occurrences to their immediate supervisor and the clandestine laboratory coordinator.
- ❑ Ensures the completion of all appropriate reports/forms in a timely manner.
- ❑ Directs all phases if case agent is not laboratory safety certified.
- ❑ Should consult with the scientific support personnel on safety-related issues.

Case Agent

- ❑ Directs all phases (if laboratory safety certified).
- ❑ Assigns and directs site safety officer during all phases of the investigation.
- ❑ Ensures procedures as outlined in this manual are followed by all personnel.
- ❑ Works with the criminalists and latent print analysts in determining what items of evidence are sampled.
- ❑ Completes all appropriate reports in a timely manner.

- ❑ Ensures that the evidence will be transported from the analyzing laboratory to the storage location.
- ❑ Ensures proper notification of the county health department and the property owner as required by Health and Safety Code, Division 10, Section 11642(c)(2).
- ❑ Ensures that all personnel are briefed on safety issues related to the investigation.
- ❑ Is responsible for notifying hazardous waste hauler.

Site Safety Officer (SSO)

- ❑ The case agent shall appoint one laboratory safety certified law enforcement officer to act as the site safety officer.
- ❑ Is responsible for health and safety at the site.
- ❑ Ensures that the HARP form is completed and submitted to the DOJ clandestine laboratory coordinator within 10 days of the incident.
- ❑ Ensures that one laboratory safety certified individual is designated to be available in the immediate area to enter with an SCBA and/or any other necessary equipment in case of an emergency.
- ❑ Ensures that emergency first-aid equipment is available for immediate use at the site (i.e., first-aid kit, eye wash, shower).
- ❑ Ensures the proper selection and use of personal protective equipment and that replacement equipment is available.
- ❑ Notifies personnel of onsite changes that could affect safety (i.e., weather).
- ❑ Ensures that all contaminated disposable equipment is removed by the waste hauler.
- ❑ Ensures that nondisposable equipment is decontaminated or packaged for transfer to another site for decontamination.
- ❑ Establishes work zones and ensures that they are respected based upon information obtained through a combination of direct reading instruments and his/her observation.
- ❑ Ensures that there is adequate lighting to perform all required tasks safely.
- ❑ Ensures chemical spill material is available.

BNE Narcotic Task Force Commanders

- ❑ Task force commanders should request a clandestine laboratory team for assistance at the initiation of a clandestine laboratory investigation to ensure the availability of a laboratory team for seizure and dismantling. Notification should be made prior to any briefing so that laboratory team members can attend.
- ❑ Task force commanders shall ensure that officers under their command are briefed on and understand the policies and procedures in this manual.

Clandestine Laboratory Coordinator

The coordinator supervises and directs BNE's statewide clandestine laboratory enforcement efforts. The responsibilities of this office include:

- ❑ Developing and informing employees of procedures regarding safety, industrial hygiene, and training requirements.
- ❑ Coordinating statewide hazardous waste contracts.
- ❑ Providing technical advice and training in lab investigation and safety.
- ❑ Reviewing and approving the selection of health and safety equipment.
- ❑ Coordinating medical monitoring of employees.
- ❑ Managing the county reimbursement program.
- ❑ Chairing the Department of Justice's statewide Clandestine Laboratory Safety Committee.
- ❑ Preparing legislation and bill analyses.

Scientific Support Personnel

Criminalists

- ❑ Two scientific support personnel, one of whom is a criminalist versed in chemical procedures used in illicit drug manufacturing, should respond to a clandestine laboratory location. However, for all active or cooking laboratories, two scientific personnel shall respond.
- ❑ Criminalists shall work with the case agent to determine what items of evidence shall be sampled.
- ❑ Criminalists should collect l ounce of sample per inner container (40 CFR 173.4).
- ❑ Criminalists are responsible for ensuring that all sampling materials are brought to the scene.

- ❑ Only criminalists shall sample evidence unless otherwise authorized by their bureau chief.
- ❑ Upon arrival at the scene, the criminalists shall provide consultation to the site safety officer to determine the level of personal protective equipment to be used during the processing and assessment phase.
- ❑ The criminalists shall package and transport the samples to the laboratory in accordance with procedures outlined in this manual.

Laboratory Technicians

- ❑ Laboratory technicians responding to a clandestine laboratory scene shall meet all of the requirements for laboratory safety certification.
- ❑ Will assist the criminalist in the sampling, packaging, and transporting of the evidence.

Latent Print Analysts

- ❑ Laboratory safety certified latent print analysts shall be responsible for the processing of the clandestine laboratory scene for latent prints.
- ❑ Latent print analysts shall not process a clandestine laboratory scene unless a clandestine laboratory experienced criminalist is present.
- ❑ Latent print lift cards shall be photographed along with the processed item.
- ❑ Latent print lift cards shall be sealed in an evidence pouch and transported by the latent print analyst.

Hazard Response and Evaluation Program (HRE Program)

The Hazard Response and Evaluation Program was established to develop a series of safety programs to meet the needs of the Department of Justice's Division of Law Enforcement. The responsibilities of the HRE Program include:

- ❑ Compliance with State and Federal safety laws.
- ❑ Technical support to the Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Program.
- ❑ Development and implementation of a chemical hygiene plan for all Bureau of Forensic Science (BFS) laboratory facilities.
- ❑ Compliance with hazardous waste laws.
- ❑ Assistance to other law enforcement agencies in development of their safety plans.
- ❑ Consultation to BNE for safety-related matters at the request of the chief of narcotic enforcement.

- ❑ Development and implementation of a hazardous communication plan for the Division of Law Enforcement.
- ❑ Provision of safety-related training to clandestine laboratory personnel.

Safety Guidelines—All Personnel

- ❑ All personnel working at a clandestine laboratory site shall use the level of protection established by the site safety officer.
- ❑ Prior to eating, drinking, or smoking, all personnel shall follow decontamination procedures established in this manual.
- ❑ All personnel shall report any observed safety hazards immediately to the site safety officer.
- ❑ All personnel shall follow decontamination procedures prior to leaving the scene.
- ❑ All clandestine laboratory personnel shall participate in a medical surveillance program provided by their employer.
- ❑ All personnel shall complete the minimum required training as outlined in this manual prior to participating in clandestine laboratory preassessment, assessment, or processing phases of the investigation.
- ❑ All personnel using personal protective equipment are required to ensure their equipment is in safe working condition.

Sample Product Specifications Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Washington State Patrol

Product Specifications

Product: Pressure demand self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) with composite cylinder (30-minute service life) and NIOSH-approved, intrinsically safe, in-mask, noise-canceling microphone.

SCBA (with case):	7 units
Composite cylinders:	10 units
Spectacle kit:	3 units
Nose cup (large):	16 units
Microphones:	7 units

I. Purpose

To establish the minimum safety standards for personal protective equipment.

II. Type

A. The SCBA type covered by this specification shall use compressed air and shall be approved jointly by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) under Subpart H, 30 CFR, Part 11, for a 30-minute service life.

III. Component Parts

A. The SCBA shall consist of the following parts:

1. Single-lens facepiece.
2. Breathing tube and coupling nut assembly.
3. Pressure-demand regulator complete with pressure gauge, mainline valve, and integral bypass valve.
4. High-pressure hose connecting the pressure demand regulator and the audible warning device.
5. Audible warning device.
6. Cylinder of compressed air complete with valve containing guarded pressure gauge and with handwheel at right angle to center line of cylinder.
7. Frame with clamp and draw bolt to retain cylinder.
8. Fire- and heat-resistant harness with stainless steel reinforcement to support frame on wearer.

9. Speaking diaphragm with NIOSH-approved, pass-through, inmask noise-canceling microphone.

10. Instructions for use and maintenance.

11. Carrying case.

IV. Facepiece

A. The facepiece shall be constructed as follows:

1. The number of facepieces shall be six medium and one large.

2. The single lens shall be shatterproof, available in polycarbonate or glass, and located to provide a satisfactory field of vision for persons of widely varying facial shapes and sizes.

3. Air shall enter the facepiece in a manner that will reduce the possibility of accumulation of moisture on the lenses. An air deflection baffle molded in the facepiece shall divert exhalation away from the lens.

4. Adjustable five-band rubber headband assembly shall be held in place by roller buckles.

5. An exhalation valve opening at a pressure of approximately 1.5 inches of water.

6. A speaking diaphragm suitably protected.

7. A couple nut at inlet.

8. All parts shall be replaceable in the field without special tools.

9. Nose cup shall be provided as an option for each unit.

V. Breathing Tube Assembly

A. The breathing tube assembly shall consist of the following parts:

1. A corrugated breathing tube.

2. A male insert to match coupling nut on facepiece.

3. A couple nut assembly consisting of a coupling nut threaded to attach to the regulator, an insert to the coupling nut to guide the coupling nut in connection to the regulator, and a gasket.

4. Items 2 and 3 shall be fastened securely to the breathing tube with a suitable clamp.

VI. Pressure-Demand Waist-Mounted Regulator

A. The pressure-demand regulator shall deliver a flow of air when the wearer exhales and shall terminate when the wearer inhales. The static outlet pressure shall be approximately 1.0 inches of water when tested by means of a flowmeter to indicate the flow. The regulator shall have the following characteristics (either air- or water-pumped nitrogen shall be acceptable for testing and the gas pressure used for the testing shall be between 1,000 and 2,000 pounds per square inch.)

1. A flow of at least 200 liters per minute shall be delivered before there is a negative pressure in the facepiece.

B. The pressure-demand regulator shall contain the following parts:

1. A pressure gauge to indicate the pressure in the cylinder.

2. A shutoff valve to stop airflow into the regulator from the cylinder.

3. A bypass valve to permit airflow, at controlled pressure from the cylinder, through the regulator, independent of the shut-off valve, should malfunctioning of the automatic elements of the regulator require such a flow. The entire flow passage shall be integral to the regulator, with no externally mounted tube to deliver the air from the bypass value to the regulator.

4. A pressure-reducing value to reduce the high pressure from the cylinder to a range suitable to meet the performance requirements specified above. Such a value shall have a centered metal filter on the inlet to retain particles 25 microns or greater, shall be in open position against the high-pressure air inlet, and shall seat in the direction of this airflow. It shall be adjustable by means of a screw on the regulator's exterior.

5. An admission value to deliver the airflow to the user from the reducing air chamber during exhalation. This value shall be open in a chamber separate from that housing the diaphragm.

6. A diaphragm responsive to respiration and used to open the admission value by actuating twin levers for flow during inhalation. This diaphragm shall be constructed of a material resistant to the permeation of petroleum vapors and shall be replaceable as a unit without any retention components.

7. A spring to produce a pressure of approximately 1.0 inches of water at the outlet of the regulator.

8. A pressure-relief valve to release pressures in excess of the normal operating pressures of the reducing valve. The pressure at which the valve releases shall be at least 10 pounds per square inch above the normal operating pressure of the reducing valve and not more than 30 pounds above such pressure. It shall be mounted external to the regulator and shall vent to the air.

9. A pressure-relief valve to release any excessive pressure that may develop on the low-pressure side of the regulator because of blockage of the regulator outlet. This relief valve shall vent at a nominal 35 psi pressure and shall be mounted externally with the inlet in the diaphragm chamber. (Note: Face-mounted regulator is unacceptable due to downward vision impairment when working in a confined hazardous materials environment.)

VII. High-Pressure Hose

A. A high-pressure hose connecting the demand regulator and the audible warning device shall be provided. It shall have a minimum working pressure of 2,500 psi and a minimum burst of 8,800 psi.

VIII. Audible Alarm

A. The audible alarm shall be an air-actuated, self-cocking, continuously ringing, audible warning device, automatically operating when air pressure in supply cylinder reaches approximately 560 psi.

IX. Cylinder

A. The cylinder shall be a nominal 514 cubic inch volume which, when filled to 2,216 psi pressure, shall contain approximately 45 cubic feet of free gas, and shall bear DOT exemption 7277.

B. The cylinder shall contain a closing valve, which shall incorporate a pressure gauge to indicate the pressure in the cylinder at all times. The handwheel shall be at a 90-degree angle from the longitudinal plane of the cylinder.

C. The cylinder shall be constructed of aluminum and fiberglass composite material (fully wound).

X. Harness

A. The harness assembly shall consist of harness straps and a metal plate fitted with a clamp to hold the cylinder. The cylinder clamping device shall be adjustable for various sized cylinders, hinged at one end, and equipped with a quick opening device at the other end. The harness straps shall be attached to the frame by replaceable nuts and bolts with leather wear pads. The harness material shall be heat, wear, and chemical resistant, and be padded at the

shoulders for maximum comfort. The frame should contain stainless steel reinforcement to protect against chemical or flame degradation. The entire suspension shall be readily adjustable for various physical sizes.

XI. Carrying Case

A. A carrying case shall be provided to retain the complete apparatus and the instruction card or booklet for each unit.

XII. Communication

A. Speaking diaphragm shall contain a NIOSH-approved, intrinsically safe in-mask, noise-canceling microphone. Microphone cable shall be capable of being connected to a Y-cable for interface with an amplifier and a two-way radio.

XIII. Instruction Card or Booklet

A. An instruction card or booklet shall be provided with each apparatus. Such instructions shall contain complete operating instructions and maintenance procedures.

XIV. Spectacle Kits

XV. Training

A. The vendor shall provide training to the user at no charge to the agency.

Sample Respiratory Protection Program
California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement

Clandestine Laboratory Safety Written Respiratory Protection Program Manual May 1991

Written Respiratory Protection Program

Respiratory Protection Program—Standard Operating Procedure

1. Introduction

1.1 Scope—This standard sets forth accepted practices for respirator users, and provides information and guidance on proper selection, use, and maintenance of respirators.

1.2 Purpose—The purpose of this standard is to ensure that the California Department of Justice's respiratory protection program provides guidance to all employees using respiratory protection. This program applies to all job-related respiratory hazards encountered both in the field or in the laboratory.

1.3 Permissible Practice—In the control of those occupational diseases caused by breathing air contaminated with harmful dusts, fumes, sprays, mists, fogs, smokes, vapors, or gases, the primary objective shall be to prevent atmospheric contamination. This shall be accomplished as far as feasible by accepted engineering control measures (e.g., enclosure or confinement of the operation, general and local ventilation, and substitution of less toxic materials) and/or administrative control measures (e.g., limiting exposure by adjusting work schedule). When effective engineering and administrative controls are not feasible or while they are being instituted or evaluated, appropriate respirators shall be used.

1.4 Employer Responsibility

1.4.1 Approved respirators shall be provided by the employer when such equipment is necessary to control harmful exposures.

1.4.2 The employer shall properly select the correct respirator for the job application.

1.4.3 The employer shall be responsible for the establishment and maintenance of a respiratory protection program.

1.4.4 The employer shall educate and train employees on proper respirator use.

1.5 Employee Responsibility

1.5.1 The employee shall use the provided respiratory protection in accordance with the instruction and training received.

1.5.2 The employee shall properly maintain the respirator.

1.5.3 The employee shall report any malfunction of the respirator to the appropriate manager or supervisor.

1.6 Program Administration—Responsibility and authority for administration of this program shall be with the HRE Program.

1.7 Safety Officer—Individual designated by the special agent supervisor or laboratory manager who is responsible for maintenance, monthly inspection, cartridge and accessor supply stock, etc. of respirators.

1.8 Site Safety Officer—Responsible for implementing the site safety plan, information gathering, evaluation, and coordinated communications.

2. Definitions

Aerosol A system consisting of particles, solid or liquid, suspended in air.

Approved Respirators that have been tested and listed as satisfactory, meeting standards set by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), or jointly by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) and NIOSH.

Breathing Tube A tube through which air or oxygen flows to the facepiece.

Cartridge A small canister containing a filter solvent, or catalyst, or any combination thereof, which removes specific contaminants from the air drawn through it.

Confined Space An enclosure—such as a storage tank, process vessel, boiler, silo, tank car, pipeline, tube, duct, sewer, underground utility vault, tunnel, or pit—having limited means of egress and poor natural ventilation and that may contain hazardous contaminants or be oxygen deficient.

Contaminant A harmful, irritating, or nuisance material that is foreign to the natural atmosphere.

Dust A solid, mechanically produced particle with size varying from submicroscopic to visible.

Emergency Respirator Use Wearing a respirator when a hazardous atmosphere suddenly occurs that requires the immediate use of a respirator either for escape from or entry into the hazardous atmosphere.

Facepiece That portion of the respirator that covers the wearer's nose and mouth (quarter mask and half mask) or that covers the nose, mouth, and eyes (full facepiece). It is designed to make a gas-tight or particle-tight fit with the face and includes the headbands, exhalation valve(s), and connectors for an air-purifying device or repairable gas source, or both.

Filter A media component used in respirators to remove solid or liquid particles from the inspired air.

Fume A solid condensation particle of extremely small size, generally less than 1 micrometer in diameter.

Gas An aeriform fluid that is in the gaseous state at ordinary temperature and pressure.

High-Efficiency Filter (HEPA) A filter that removes from air 99.97 percent or more of monodisperse dioctyl phthalate (DOP) particles having a mean particle diameter of 0.3 micrometer.

Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) Any atmosphere that poses an immediate hazard to life and produces immediate irreversible debilitating effects on health.

Inhalation Valve A device that allows respirable air to enter a respirator and prevent exhaled air from leaving the respirator through the valve.

Maximum Use Limit The maximum concentration of a contaminant for which an air-purifying filter, cartridge, or canister is approved for use.

Mist A liquid condensation particle with sizes ranging from submicroscopic to visible.

MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.

Negative Pressure Respirator A respirator in which the air pressure inside the respiratory-inlet covering is positive during exhalation and negative during inhalation in relation to the air pressure of the outside atmosphere.

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Not Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health Any hazardous atmosphere that may produce physical discomfort immediately, chronic poisoning after repeated exposure, or acute adverse physiological symptoms after prolonged exposure.

Odor Threshold Limit The lowest concentration of a contaminant in air that can be detected by the olfactory sense.

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.

Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) The legally established time-weighted average (TWA) concentration or ceiling concentration of a contaminant that shall not be exceeded.

Positive-Pressure Respirator A respirator in which the air pressure inside the respiratory-inlet covering is positive in relation to the air pressure of the outside atmosphere during exhalation and inhalation.

Protection Factor The ratio or ambient concentration of an airborne substance to the concentration of the substance inside the respirator at the breathing zone of the wearer. The protection factor is a measure of the degree of protection provided by a respirator to the wearer.

Respirator A device designed to protect the wearer from the inhalation of harmful atmospheres.

Sanitization The removal of dirt and the inhibiting of the action of agents that cause infection or disease.

Service Life The period of time that a respirator provides adequate protection to the wearer.

Smoke The products of combustion, pyrolysis, or chemical reaction of substances in the form of visible and invisible solid and liquid particles and gaseous products in the air.

Spray A liquid, mechanically produced particle with sizes varying from submicroscopic to visible.

Vapor The gaseous state of a substance that is solid or liquid at ordinary temperature and pressure.

3. Classification, Description, and Limitations of Respirators

3.1 Atmosphere-Supplying Respirators

3.1.1 Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) are respirators in which the wearer carries his/her own breathing atmosphere. Chief limitations of SCBAs are their weight and/or bulk, limited service life, and the training required for maintenance and safe use. Only SCBAs providing 30 minutes of breathing air at 2215 psi and operated in the positive pressure mode will be used to enter atmospheres requiring the use of an SCBA.

3.1.2 Emergency escape respirators used in a hazardous atmosphere for immediate escape. This respirator is to be used only for escape. The respirator provides 5 minutes of breathing air.

3.1.3 Air line respirators are those in which the breathing atmosphere is supplied from a source away from the wearer.

3.2 Air Purifying—Air-purifying respirators are those employing a filter, cartridge, or canister device to remove contaminants from the atmosphere. These respirators do not protect against IDLH, oxygen-deficient atmospheres, atmospheres with poor warning properties, or atmospheres not removed by air-purifying cartridges and are limited by the type, efficiency, and capacity of the filter, cartridge, or canister employed.

4. Selection of Respirators

4.1 Approved Respirators—Only MSHA/NIOSH-approved respirators shall be selected. Surgical masks or unapproved dust filters shall not be substituted for approved respirators.

4.2 General Considerations—The selection of a respirator for any given situation shall require consideration of the following factors:

4.2.1 The nature of the hazard.

4.2.2 The characteristics of the hazardous operation or process.

4.2.3 The location of the hazardous area with respect to a safe area having respirable air.

4.2.4 The period of time for which respiratory protection may be provided.

4.2.5 The activity of the workers in the hazardous area.

4.2.6 The physical characteristics, functional capabilities, and limitations of various types of respirators.

4.2.7 The respirator-protection factors and respirator fit.

4.3 Selection Criteria

4.3.1 Respiratory protective equipment shall be selected based on hazard assessment findings and type of work being performed.

4.3.2 Selection of appropriate respirators shall be obtained with the guidance of Respirator Selection Criteria (see page 111)

5. Use of Respirators

5.1 Training—The supervisor and the respirator wearer shall be given adequate training by a qualified person(s) to ensure proper use of respirators. Written records shall be maintained by the clandestine laboratory coordinator for BNE personnel and the HRE manager for BFS personnel of those persons trained and the dates the training occurred.

5.1.1 Training of Supervisors—Supervisors who supervise respirator wearers shall be given adequate training to ensure proper use of respirators. This training shall include the following elements:

- ❑ The basic respiratory protection practices.
- ❑ The nature and extent of respiratory hazards to which persons under his/her supervision may be exposed.
- ❑ The principles and criteria of selecting respirators.
- ❑ The training of respirator wearers.
- ❑ The issuance of respirators.
- ❑ The inspection of respirators.
- ❑ The use of respirators, including monitoring of use.
- ❑ The maintenance and storage of respirators.
- ❑ The regulations concerning respirator use.

Respirator Selection Criteria



5.1.2 Training of Respirator Wearers—To ensure the proper and safe use of a respirator, the training of each respiratory wearer shall include the following elements:

- ❑ The reasons for respiratory protection.
- ❑ The nature, extent, and effects of respiratory hazards to which a person may be exposed.
- ❑ An explanation of why engineering controls are not being applied or are not adequate and of what effort is being made to reduce or eliminate the need for respirators.
- ❑ An explanation of why a particular type of respirator has been selected for a specific respiratory hazard.
- ❑ An explanation of the operation, and the capabilities and limitations, of a respirator selected.
- ❑ Instruction in selecting, donning, checking the fit, and wearing the respirator.
- ❑ An opportunity for each respirator wearer to handle the respirator, learn how to don and wear it properly, check its seals, wear it in a safe atmosphere, and wear it in a test atmosphere.
- ❑ An explanation of how maintenance and storage of the respirator is carried out.
- ❑ Instruction in how to recognize and cope with emergency situations.
- ❑ Instruction for special respirator use.
- ❑ Regulations concerning respirator use.

5.1.3 Retraining—Each respirator wearer shall be retrained annually.

5.2 Respirator Fit Tests

5.2.1 A qualitative respirator fit test shall be used to determine the ability of each individual respirator wearer to obtain a satisfactory fit with a negative pressure respirator.

5.2.2 A person shall be allowed to use only the specific make(s) and model(s) for which the person obtained a satisfactory fit. Under no circumstances shall a person be allowed to use any respirator if the results of the qualitative respirator fit test indicates that the person is unable to obtain a satisfactory fit.

5.2.3 A respirator fit test shall be carried out for each wearer of a negative pressure respirator prior to initial respirator use and at least annually.

5.2.4 In qualitative fit tests, a respirator wearer is exposed to an irritant smoke, an odorous vapor, or other suitable test agent. An air-purifying respirator must be equipped with an air-purifying element(s) that effectively removes the test agent from the inspired air. If the respirator wearer is unable to detect penetration of the test agent into the respirator, the respirator wearer has achieved a satisfactory fit with the respirator.

5.2.5 Respirator fit tests shall not be required for positive pressure respirators.

5.3 Respirator Fit Test Records—Records of respirator fit tests shall be kept. These records shall include the following information:

5.3.1 A person who has hair (stubble, mustache, sideburns, beard, low hairline, bangs) that passes between the face and the sealing surface of the facepiece of the respirator shall not be permitted to wear such a respirator.

5.3.2 A person who has hair (mustache, beard) that interferes with the function of a respirator valve(s) shall not be permitted to wear the respirator.

5.3.3 Spectacles that have temple bars or straps that pass between the sealing surface of the respirator facepiece and the wearer's face shall not be used.

5.3.4 A head covering that passes between the sealing surface of the respirator facepiece and the wearer's face shall not be used.

5.3.5 The wearing of spectacles, goggles, a face shield, helmet, or other eye and face protective device that interferes with the seal of a respirator to the wearer shall not be allowed.

5.3.6 If scars, hollow temples, excessively protruding cheekbones, deep creases in facial skin, the absence of teeth or dentures, or unusual facial configurations prevent the seal of a respirator facepiece to a wearer's face, the person shall not be permitted to wear the respirator.

5.4 Respirator Inspection Prior to Use—Each person issued a respirator for routine, nonroutine, emergency, or rescue use shall inspect the respirator prior to its use to ensure that it is in good operating condition.

5.4.1 Air-purifying respirator inspection shall include facepiece, face shield, straps, buckles, valves, cartridges/canisters, and sealing caskets.

5.4.2 SCBA inspection shall include facepiece, face shield, straps, buckles, valves, breathing tubes, fittings, compressed air cylinder, air hoses, regulator, and low-pressure warning device.

5.5 Leaving a Hazardous Area—A respirator wearer shall be permitted to leave the hazardous area for any respirator-related cause. Reasons that require a respirator wearer to leave a hazardous area include but are not limited to the following:

- ❑ Failure of the respirator to provide adequate protection.
- ❑ Malfunction of the respirator.
- ❑ Detection of leakage of an air contaminant into the respirator.
- ❑ Increase in resistance of respirator to breathing.
- ❑ Severe discomfort in wearing the respirator.
- ❑ Illness of respirator wearer.

6. Maintenance of Respirators

6.1 Cleaning and Sanitizing—Each respirator shall be cleaned and sanitized to ensure that the respirator wearer is provided with a clean and sanitized respirator at all times. Respirators shall be cleaned and sanitized after each use following the manufacturer's recommendations.

6.2 Inspection

6.2.1 Each respirator shall be inspected before and after use. A respirator shall be inspected by the user immediately prior to each use to ensure that it is in proper working condition.

6.2.2 Respirators used/maintained for emergency shall be inspected at least monthly by a designated individual.

6.2.3 A record of inspection dates, findings, remedial actions, and the name of the individual performing the inspection shall be kept with each respirator.

6.3 Part Replacement and Repair

6.3.1 Replacement of parts or repairs shall be done only by persons trained in proper respirator assembly and correction of possible respirator malfunctions or defects.

6.3.2 Replacement parts shall be only those designed for the specific respirator being repaired.

6.4 Storage—Respirators shall be stored in a manner that will protect them against dust, sunlight, heat, extreme cold, excessive moisture, or damaging chemicals. Respirators shall be stored to prevent distortion of rubber or other elastomeric parts.

7. Special Problems

7.1 Vision

7.1.1 Employees who wear corrective lenses shall be provided spectacle kits designed to hold corrective lenses inside the respirator mask

7.1.2 The wearing of contact lenses is prohibited in any atmosphere where a respirator is required.

7.2 Use of Respirators for Entry Into Atmosphere Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health—When respirators are required for entry into IDLH atmospheres, at least one standby person shall have the proper equipment available to assist the respirator wearers in case of emergency. Communications (visual, voice, or other suitable means) shall be maintained between the standby person and the respirator wearers.

7.3 Respirator Use in Confined Spaces—All confined spaces shall be considered to be immediately dangerous to life or health unless proven otherwise. Before a person is allowed to enter a confined space, tests shall be carried out to determine the concentration of any known or expected flammable or toxic contaminant present and to determine the concentration of oxygen. A person shall not be permitted to enter a confined space without wearing the proper type of respirator.

8. Evaluation of Program Effectiveness

8.1 Wearer Acceptance—Respirator wearers shall be consulted periodically about their acceptance of respirators. Factors affecting the wearer acceptance of respirators include comfort, resistance to breathing, fatigue, interference with vision, interference with communication, restriction of movement, and confidence in the effectiveness of the respirator to provide adequate protection.

8.2 Appraisal of Protection Afforded—Medical surveillance of respirator wearers shall be conducted annually to determine if respirator wearers are being provided with adequate respiratory protection.

8.3 Industrial hygiene evaluation of workplace conditions requiring use of respirators shall be periodically conducted.

9. Medical Limitations for Respirator Wearers

9.1 No employee shall be assigned work requiring the use of a respirator, including standby mode, unless it has been determined by a physician that the person is physically able to perform the work while using a respirator.

9.2 The physician's determination that an employee is certified to wear/use a respirator shall be based on medically indicated tests and findings, including:

- ❑ Medical history.
- ❑ Pulmonary function tests (spirometry).
- ❑ Treadmill test (when indicated).
- ❑ Chest x-ray (when indicated).

9.3 The physician's determination shall be made at the time of preemployment medical examination and updated annually.

9.4 The physician's determination shall be documented on the "Physician's Certification of Employee Respirator Use" letter or similar document, signed by the examining physician and placed into the employee's confidential medical record.

Sample Hazardous Assessment and Recognition Plan (HARP) Instrument

California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement

CLANDESTINE LABORATORY INVESTIGATION
HAZARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOGNITION PLAN

BNE CASE NO.

BNE CASE NO. (s)

SECTION A - CASE INFORMATION

FIELD OFFICE	AGENCY ASSISTED	DATE SEIZED	

SECTION B - SITE SAFETY OFFICER

SAFETY OFFICER (Name)	AFFILIATION (if other than BNE. Enter agency name.)

SECTION C - SITE DESCRIPTION

CLAN LAB ADDRESS

SITE LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION

STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION ☐ Residence ☐ Mobile Home ☐ Storage Locker ☐ Motel / Hotel ☐ Apartment

☐ Other (Describe)

WEATHER CONDITIONS ☐ Calm ☐ Breezy ☐ Windy Temp Range: ________ ☐ Clear ☐ Fog ☐ Snow ☐ Rain ☐ Other: ________

SECTION D - OTHER AGENCY FIELD SUPPORT

FIELD SUPPORT	OFFICIAL CONTACTED (Name/Title)	CONTACT NUMBER	AGENCY NAME	NOTIFIED Date / Time
CA DEPT of TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL (DTSC)				
FIRE DEPARTMENT				
HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM				
DISPOSAL COMPANY				
HEALTH DEPARTMENT				
MEDIVAC HELICOPTER/ AMBULANCE				
OTHER				

SECTION E - FIELD TEAM: Activities/Level of Protection

NAME	UNIT / AGENCY	ENTRY					ASSESSMENT					PROCESSING				
			B	C	D	TIME SPENT HR / MIN		B	C	D	TIME SPENT HR / MIN		B	C	D	TIME SPENT HR / MIN
		YES NO					YES NO					YES NO				
		YES NO					YES NO					YES NO				
		YES NO					YES NO					YES NO				
		YES NO					YES NO					YES NO				
		YES NO					YES NO					YES NO				
		YES NO					YES NO					YES NO				
		YES NO					YES NO					YES NO				
		YES NO					YES NO					YES NO				
		YES NO					YES NO					YES NO				

BNE 017 (rev.12/96)

SECTION F - CLANDESTINE LABORATORY CATAGORY

☐ OPERATIONAL/COOKING ☐ OPERATIONAL /NON-COOKING ☐ BOXED/DISMANTLED

SECTION G - CLANDESTINE LABORATORY TYPE

☐ METHAMPHETAMINE ☐ FENTANYL ☐ MDA/MDMA

☐ AMPHETAMINE ☐ LSD ☐ PRECURSOR LAB (Specify) _____

☐ PCP ☐ P2P ☐ OTHER (Specify) _____

SECTION H - CHEMICAL HAZARDS

☐ CARCINOGENS ☐ EXPLOSIVES ☐ FLAMMABLES ☐ OTHER CHEMICAL HAZARDS: _____

☐ CORROSIVES ☐ OXIDIZERS ☐ WATER REACTIVES _____

SECTION I - OTHER HAZARDS

☐ COMPRESSED GAS CYLINDER(S) ☐ SLIP/TRIP/FALL HAZARD ☐ DAMAGED STRUCTURE ☐ ENTRY/EXIT

☐ HEAT STRESS ☐ ELECTRICAL ☐ EXCAVATION ☐ LEAKING CONTAINERS

☐ CONFINED SPACE ☐ BURN HAZARD ☐ OTHER: _____

SECTION J - DECONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL & MONITORING EQUIPMENT

Method Used ☐ FULL ☐ MODIFIED

Briefly Describe Method

SECTION K - HAZARD ASSISSMENT FINDINGS

☐ NO ASSESSMENT PERFORMED (Explain in Comments Section)

READINGS OBTAINED			COMBUSTIBLE GAS INDICATOR/OXYGEN METER **SPECIFY BRAND/MODEL METER USED:** _____
LEL (Lower Explosive Level)	% OXYGEN	PPM (Parts Per Million)	LOCATIONS IN CLAN LAB WHERE READING OBTAINED

	DRAGER TUBES (Check all used)	RESULTS (Circle)	COLOR CHANGED TO	CONCENTRATION (PPM) (Highest level noted - i.e. longest length of color stain)
☐	Acetone 100/b	+ -		
☐	Carbon Disulfide .04	+ -		
☐	Ethers	+ -		
☐	Ethyl Acetate 200/a	+ -		
☐	Hydriodic Acid	+ -		
☐	Hydrochionc Acid	+ -		
☐	Hydrocyanic 5/a	+ -		
☐	O-Toluidine 1/a	+ -		

	DRAGER TUBES (Check all used)	RESULTS (Circle)	COLOR CHANGED TO	CONCENTRATION (PPM) (Highest level noted - i.e. longest length of color stain)
☐	Petroleum Hydrocarbons	+ -		
☐	Phosphine	+ -		
☐	Trichloroethane 50/d	+ -		
☐	Triethylamine 5/a	+ -		
☐	Other:	+ -		
☐	Other:	+ -		
☐	Other:	+ -		
☐	Other:	+ -		

SECTION L - COMMENTS:

SITE SAFETY OFFICER (Sign & Date) _____

CASE AGENT (Sign & Date) _____

SPECIAL AGENT SUPERVISOR (Sign & Date) _____

Sample Clandestine Laboratory Exposure Report (CLER) Instrument

California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement

CLANDESTINE LABORATORY EXPOSURE REPORT

BNE, BFS, and Task Force personnel who have received or intend to receive medical evaluations shall complete and submit this document as per CLMIP (Clandestine Laboratory Manual of Instruction and Procedure) within 24 hours to: the Clandestine Laboratory Coordinator, BNE HQ (Law Enforcement Personnel), or the Hazard Response & Evaluation Manager, BFS HQ (Scientific Support Personnel).

EMPLOYEE INFORMATION	NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)		DATE OF BIRTH
	FIELD OFFICE OR CRIMINALISTICS LABORATORY		TITLE (SA, SAS , CRIM, etc.)
INCIDENT DATA	DATE OF LABORATORY RAID		CASE NO./OTHER AGENCY NO.
	TYPE OF DRUG LABORATORY (Methamphetamine, LSD, PCP, Cocaine conversion, etc.)		
LAB SITE	RESULTS OF DRAEGER TUBES (If available)		RESULTS OF GASTECH 1314 ____% oxygen ____% combustible gas
	PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT USED FOR EACH ACTIVITY LISTED (Nomex suit, gloves, boots, etc.) A. Entry		B. Pre-assessment
	C. Assessment		D. Processing
	E. Disposal		F. Other
MEDICAL TREATMENT	PROVIDER	MEDICAL CONDITION	TYPE OF TREATMENT
	DATE FIRST AID TREATMENT RECEIVED		NAME OF DOCTOR AND PHONE NO.

NOTE: Refer to Clandestine Lab Manual for SCIF 3301 Form Submission

INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT OF 1977

AUTHORITY:	Civil Code Section 1798, et. seq.
PURPOSE:	To provide safety and health support for IEB employees exposed to hazardous chemicals.
ROUTINE USES:	Records are maintained for internal IEB use. The only disclosure of information outside the agency would be when authorized by the subject.
EFFECT:	Failure to provide information will result in inadequate health and safety recommendations.

Employee's Signature Date Supervisor's Typed Name and Signature Date

BNE 015 (Rev. 10/91) Continue on Reverse

CHEMICAL EXPOSURE

Name ALL chemicals to which you were exposed

LABORATORY RAID ACTIVITIES (Check all that apply)

ACTIVITY	Duration of Activity in Clandestine Laboratory					Symptoms as a result of laboratory activities													Special conditions in laboratory		
	Less than 1 hr.	1 hr.	1 - 4 hours	4 - 8 hours	8 + hrs. (specify)	Eyes Burn	Nose irriation	Nose Bleed	Cough	Sore Throat	Breathing Difficulty	Nausea/Queasiness	Headache	Light-Headed/Dizzy	Skin Irriatation/Rash	Chemical burns	Collapse	Fire	Explosion	Uncontrolled Reactions	Leaks/Spills
A. Entry																					
B. Pre-assessment																					
C. Assessment																					
D. Processing																					
E. Disposal																					
F. Other																					

Other Symptoms (describe)

Other Conditions of Unusual Circumstances (describe)

PLEASE TYPE ALL INFORMATION, IF POSSIBLE

State of California EMPLOYER'S REPORT OF OCCUPATIONAL INJURY OR ILLNESS	**Please complete in triplicate. Retain last copy for your files and mail the original and one copy to** **STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND** *Refer to STATE ADMINISTRATIVE MANUAL, SECTIONS 2581.2 — 2581.5 for instructions on completion and routing.* ***BOTH SIDES OF THIS FORM MUST BE COMPLETED***	OSHA Case or File No.

PICA XXX ELITE XXX ← TYPEWRITER ALIGNMENT GUIDE → PICA XXX ELITE XXX

California law requires an employer to report **within five days** every industrial injury or occupational disease which: (a) results in lost time beyond the day of injury, or (b) requires medical treatment other than first aid. **PLEASE NOTE:** In addition, if death results or if the injury or illness: (a) requires inpatient hospitalization of more than 24 hours for other than medical observation; or (b) results in loss of any member of the body; or (c) produces any serious degree of permanent disfigurement, then the nearest district office of the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health also must be notified **immediately** by telephone or telegraph. This notification is not required, however, if the injury or death results from an accident on a public street or highway.

EMPLOYER

1. DEPARTMENT — DIVISION — 1A. P.A.C. OR SCIF POLICY NUMBER
2. MAILING ADDRESS (Number and Street, City, ZIP) — 2A. PHONE NUMBER
3. LOCATION, IF DIFFERENT FROM MAIL ADDRESS (Number and Street, City, ZIP) — 3A. LOCATION CODE
4A. NATURE OF BUSINESS e.g. painting contractor, wholesale grocer, sawmill, hotel, etc. — 5. STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACCT. NO.
4B. TYPE OF EMPLOYER: PRIVATE STATE CITY COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT OTHER GOVERNMENT - SPECIFY

EMPLOYEE

6. EMPLOYEE NAME — 7. DATE OF BIRTH (MM-DD-YY)
8. HOME ADDRESS (Number and Street, City, ZIP) — 8A. PHONE NUMBER
9. SEX Male Female — 10. OCCUPATION (Regular job title, not specific activity at time of injury) — 11. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
12. DEPARTMENT IN WHICH REGULARLY EMPLOYED — 12A. DATE OF HIRE (MM-DD-YY)
13. HOURS USUALLY WORKED: HOURS PER DAY — 13A. DAYS PER WEEK — 13B. TOTAL WEEKLY HOURS — 13C. Under what class code of you policy were wages assigned?
14. GROSS WAGES/SALARY: PER: HOUR DAY WEEK TWO WEEKS MONTH OTHER - SPECIFY

INJURY OR ILLNESS

15. WHERE DID ACCIDENT OR EXPOSURE OCCUR? (Number and Street, City) — 15A. COUNTY — 15B. ON EMPLOYER'S PREMISES? YES NO
16. WHAT WAS EMPLOYEE DOING WHEN INJURED? (Please be specific. Identify tools, equipment or material the employee was using)
17. HOW DID THE ACCIDENT OR EXPOSURE OCCUR? (Please describe fully the events that resulted in injury or occupational disease. Tell what happened and how it happened. Please use separate sheet if necessary.)
18. OBJECT OR SUBSTANCE THAT DIRECTLY INJURED EMPLOYEE e.g., the machine employee struck against or which struck him; the vapor or poison inhaled or swallowed; the chemical that irritated his skin; in cases of strains, the thing he was lifting, pulling, etc.
19A. DESCRIBE THE INJURY OF ILLNESS e.g., cut, strain, fracture, skin rash, etc. — 19B. PART OF BODY AFFECTED e.g.., back, left wrist, right eye, etc.
20. NAME AND ADDRESS OF PHYSICIAN (Number and Street, City, ZIP)
20. IF HOSPITALIZED, NAME AND ADDRESS OF HOSPITAL (Number and Street, City, ZIP)
22. DATE OF INJURY OR ILLNESS (MM-DD-YY) — 23. TIME OF DAY a.m. p.m. — 24. Did employee lose at least one full day's work after the injury? (MM-DD-YY) NO YES - Date Last Worked:
25. HAS EMPLOYEE RETURNED TO WORK? (MM-DD-YY) No, still off work Yes, date returned: — 26. DID EMPLOYEE DIE? (MM-DD-YY) NO YES - Date of Death:
27. WAS ANOTHER PERSON RESPONSIBLE? NO YES — 28. PERS/STRS MEMBER NO YES — 29. ARE LEAVE CREDITS AVAILABLE TO BE USED IN SUPPLEMENTING TEMPORARY DISABILITY BENEFITS? NO YES

Completed by (type or print)	Signature	Title	Date

PLEASE DO NOT USE THIS COLUMN
CASE NO.
OWNERSHIP
INDUSTRY
OCCUPATION
SEX
AGE
DAILY HOURS
DAYS PER WEEK
WEEKLY HOURS
WEEKLY WAGE
COUNTY
NATURE OF INJURY
PART OF BODY
SOURCE
ACCIDENT TYPE
A.O.S.
EXTENT OF INJURY
CODED BY

SCIF 3067 STATE (REV 8-88) FILING OF THIS REPORT IS NOT AN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY. NOTICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS MUST BE GIVEN TO INJURED WORKER WITHIN 5 DAYS OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THIS INJURY. FORM 5020 (REV.5) April 1987

If the Supervisor and Manager Review portions of this form cannot be completed within five days of the injury DO NOT DELAY SUBMISSION OF THE REVERSE SIDE TO STATE FUND. Submit the form completed in its entirety to the Departmental Safety Coordinator within ten days of the injury.

EMPLOYEE'S NAME	UNIT	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SUPERVISOR'S REVIEW

Facts available lead me to believe this work injury was caused by and happened during State work.	☐	From the facts I need my superior's or a physician's advice. The alleged claim of injury is not clearly identified with State employment.	☐	The facts do not indicate this claim of injury was work connected.	☐

GIVE THE FACTS THAT JUSTIFY THE ITEMS CHECKED:

WHAT CORRECTIVE ACTION IS BEING TAKEN TO PREVENT SIMILAR ACCIDENTS? HAVE YOU TAKEN THESE STEPS? ☐ YES ☐ NO If no, explain.

I DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION BUT RECOMMEND:

IF INJURED EMPLOYEE IS UNABLE TO PERFROM FULL DUTY:

A. THE POSSIBILITY OF MODIFIED WORK WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE ATTENDING DOCTOR: ☐ YES ☐ NO

B. MODIFIED WORK DECISION: ☐ Condition precludes M.W. ☐ Appropriate M.W. not available ☐ M.W. arranged _____ days

Signature	Classification	Date

MANAGER'S REVIEW

DO YOU CONCUR WITH 1ST LINE SUPERVISOR'S REVIEW? ☐ YES ☐ NO If no, explain.

Signature and Date

CONTINUATION AND MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS:

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND ADJUSTING OFFICES

P.O. BOX 9729
BAKERSFIELD, CA 93389-9729

P.O.BOX 4973
EUREKA, CA 95502-4973

P.O. BOX 40000
FRESNO, CA 93755-4000

P.O. BOX 2037
MONTEREY PARK, CA 91754-8937

P.O. BOX 12971
OAKLAND, CA 94604-2971

P.O. BOX 496049
REDDING, CA, 96049-6049

P.O. BOX 254700
SACRAMENTO, CA 95865-4700

P.O. BOX 1316
SAN BERNARDINO, CA 92402-1316

P.O. BOX 85488
SAN DIEGO, CA 92138-5488

P.O. BOX 807
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94101-0807

P.O. BOX 759
SAN JOSE, CA 95106-0759

P.O. BOX 2407
SANTA ROSA, CA 95405-0407

P.O. BOX 8000
STOCKTON, CA 95208-0016

P.O. BOX 25280
VENTURA, CA 93002-5280

Department of Industrial Relations
DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

EMPLOYEE'S CLAIM FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS

If you are injured or become ill because of your job, you are entitled to workers' compensation benefits.

Complete the "Employee" section and give the form to your employer. Keep the copy marked "Employee's Temporary Receipt" until you receive the dated copy from your employer. You may contact the State's Office of Benefit Assistance and Enforcement at **1-800-736-7401** if you need help in filling out this form or obtaining your benefits. An explanation of workers' compensation benefits is included on the reverse of this form.

You should also have received a pamphlet from your employer describing workers' compensation benefits and the procedures to obtain them.

EMPLOYEE:

1. Name _____ Today's Date _____
2. Home Address _____
3. City _____ State _____ Zip _____
4. Date of Injury _____ Time of Injury _____ a.m. _____ p.m.
5. Address/Place where injury happened _____
6. Describe injury and part of body affected _____
7. Signature of employee _____

EMPLOYER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION AND GIVE THE EMPLOYEE A COPY IMMEDIATELY AS A RECEIPT

8. Name and address of employer _____
9. Policy # _____ 10. Employee's Soc. Sec. # ___/___/___
11. Date employer first knew of injury _____
12. Was employee paid full wages for date of injury ☐ Yes ☐ No
13. Date claim form was provided to employee _____ 14. Date employer received claim form _____
15. Name and address of insurance carrier or adjusting agency STATE INSURANCE FUNDS
16. Signature of Employer Representative _____ Date _____
17. Title _____ 18. Telephone _____

EMPLOYER: You are required to date this form and provide copies to your insurer and to the employee, dependent or representative who filed the claim **within one working day** of receipt of completed form from employee. Please return original along with your Employer's First Report of Injury to your local State Fund office.

DWC Form 1 (1-1-90)
SCIF 3301 (Rev. 6-90)

SIGNING THIS FORM IS NOT AN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY

STATE FUND COPY

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND

Highlights of the Model State Chemical Control Act

American Prosecutors Research Institute
National District Attorneys Association

Highlights of the Model State Chemical Control Act

Preventing Illegal Diversion

- ❑ Regulates transactions involving chemicals frequently used in the illicit production of controlled substances.
- ❑ Authorizes emergency regulation of chemicals on a temporary basis to avoid imminent hazards to public safety.

Controlling Access to Chemicals

- ❑ Requires annual registration of persons who manufacture, provide, sell, furnish, transfer, or deliver regulated chemicals.
- ❑ Terminates registration upon registrant's death, cessation of legal existence, discontinuation of business or professional practice, or change in ownership.
- ❑ Precludes assignment or transfer of registration without written consent from an appropriate State official.
- ❑ Requires a permit for each time a person seeks to possess a regulated chemical.
- ❑ Requires a permit applicant to submit detailed identification information, including notarized fingerprint cards (except in specified circumstances) and criminal history. Business applicants must provide information for each owner, manager, agent, or representative.

Protecting Lawful Use and Facilitating Implementation

- ❑ Excludes from regulation agents, common carriers, law enforcement officers, medical practitioners, and pharmacists who handle regulated chemicals in the lawful course of practice, business, or employment.
- ❑ Allows, upon application by a drug manufacturer, the exemption of a specific drug product from regulation (e.g. Bronkaid, Tedral, Primatine).
- ❑ Exempts owners, partners, and corporate officers of publicly held corporations of 35 shareholders or more from permit application requirements to submit criminal history, fingerprint cards, and other identification information.
- ❑ Allows submission of retrospective monthly reports in lieu of a permit if the possessor is eligible to apply for a permit and either maintains a regular supply and purchase relationship with a distributor or has a record of lawful use.

- ❑ Provides permit applicants the right to appeal if official fails to act on an application within 21 days after receipt of a completed application.
- ❑ Provides a show cause hearing for denial, suspension, or revocation of a registration or permit, or suspension or revocation of a monthly report, with right to appeal.
- ❑ Allows distributors and possessors to submit copies of reports submitted under Federal law for transactions involving threshold amounts.
- ❑ Allows appropriate State officials to charge nonrefundable application fees to cover processing and other administrative costs.

Tracking the Flow of Chemicals

- ❑ Requires regulated distributor to obtain identification of purchaser and any vehicle used in the transaction.
- ❑ Requires regulated distributor and possessor to prepare annual physical inventory and maintain readily accessible records for 4 years after the date of the transaction.
- ❑ Requires regulated distributor and possessor to report theft or loss of chemicals, breakage of containers, and suspicious transactions (e.g., method of payment or delivery not in the usual course of business, potential violations of Act or EPA laws).

Deterring Unauthorized Action and Protecting the Environment

- ❑ Imposes civil fines on corporations in addition to criminal penalties.
- ❑ Establishes civil assessments for cleanup of hazardous illegal laboratory sites and enforcement of the Act.
- ❑ Authorizes forfeiture of chemicals and property pursuant to controlled substances acts.

Determining Compliance With the Act

- ❑ Provides State official investigatory powers to subpoena witnesses, compel testimony, and require production of documents.
- ❑ Requires confidentiality of information obtained through administrative investigation.
- ❑ Authorizes administrative inspection of premises where chemicals and records are required to be or in fact kept.

Source: American Prosecutors Research Institute, National District Attorneys Association. Alexandria, VA. 1992. (Produced under grants from the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Institute of Justice.)

Sample Destruct Order
Washington State Patrol

9.28.113 Destruct Order

SUPERIOR COURT FOR (NAME OF COUNTY) COUNTY

In Re Search Warrant	)	No.
	)	
	)	HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
	)	DESTRUCTION ORDER
	)	
	)	

This matter coming before the Court on the application of the State, and the Court having reviewed the Affidavit/Complaint for Search Warrant, made a finding of probable cause, and issued said search warrant for the following (premises/vehicle):

It is ORDERED that the officers charged with service of said warrant are hereby authorized to destroy or arrange for the destruction of any item suspected of being dangerous or hazardous such as chemicals, residue, contaminated lab equipment, containers for such items, or other suspected hazardous substances in accordance with the laws and regulations of the State of Washington found during the service of said warrant after said items have been fingerprinted, photographed and subsampled to preserve their evidentiary value for subsequent proceedings.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this _____ day of

_____, 199__.

_____ JUDGE

Presented by:

_____

_____

ORDER FOR DESTRUCTION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

Page 1 of 1

Sample Notification of Hazardous/Toxic Chemical Contamination Letters

California Office of the Attorney General and Washoe County, Nevada District Health Department

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attorney General

State of California
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

P.O. BOX 161089
SACRAMENTO, CA 95816-1089
(916) 739-5445

NOTIFCATION OF HAZARDOUS/TOXIC CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION TO OWNER OF RECORD OF PRIVATE PROPERTY

Dear _____:
(property owner of record)

This letter is being written to advise you, as property owner of record, that on _____, the property known as _____, was legally searched as a result of an illegal drug laboratory investigation. Observations made during the search warrant indicate that hazardous/toxic chemical substances were either transferred, stored or disposed of on the property.

Governmental seizure and removal of "bulk" chemicals and other hazardous materials has occurred. Because there may still be significant chemical contamination at the property, copies of this notification are being sent to local authorities concerned with environmental toxic contamination pursuant to Division 10, Section 11642 (c) (2) of the Health and Safety Code.

Inquiries regarding this matter should be made to the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement's _____ Regional Office at (_____) _____. Please refer to investigation case no. _____ when making such inquiries.

Sincerely,

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attorney General

Special Agent in Charge
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement

cc: Local County Health Department
Local Board of Supervisors

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attorney General

State of California
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

P.O. BOX 161089
SACRAMENTO, CA 95816-1089
(916) 739-5445

Department of Toxic Substances Control
P.O.Box 942732
Sacramento, California 94234-7320

RE: Notification of Hazardous/Toxic Waste Disposal on Public Land

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter is being written to advise the Department of Health Services that on _____, at the public property known as _____, was legally searched as a result of an illegal drug laboratory investigation. Observations made during the search indicate that hazardous/toxic chemical substances were either transferred, stored or disposed of on the property.

Governmental seizure and removal of "bulk" chemicals and other hazardous materials has occurred. Due to the fact that there may still be significant chemical contamination at the property, this notification is being provided to the Department of Toxic Substances Control.

Under Division 10, Section 11642(c) (2) of the Health and Safety Code, the requirement of notification lies with the city, county, or state agency which is owner, lessor, or lessee of the publicly owned property. However, the Department of Justice is providing this notification out of courtesy.

Inquiries regarding this matter should be made to the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement's _____ Regional Office at (_____) _____ . Please refer to investigation case no. _____ when making such inquiries.

Sincerely,

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attorney General

Special Agent in Charge
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement

SUBJECT: CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB

Dear _____;

As you have been made aware, a rental property of yours was recently found to contain a suspected clandestine drug lab, in which methamphetamines were being produced by the tenants residing in the basement. The property is identified as _____ located at _____, in _____. Hazardous chemicals were confiscated and removed after basic identification. The manufacture of methamphetamines involves various processes which can contaminate the structure and furnishings of the dwelling.

The Washoe County District Health Department (WCDHD), in accordance with Chapter 439 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, is responsible for protecting public health throughout the jurisdiction. WCDHD considers occupancy of homes used as clandestine drug labs as a threat to the health of residents, and under the authority of the Health Officer, this office forbids the occupancy of the basement portion of the residence until appropriate decontamination as outlined below is accomplished.

1. All acoustic ceiling tile in the kitchen will be removed and disposed of.

2. All flooring, walls and ceilings will be washed with a disinfecting solution.

3. All carpeting will be steam cleaned. Any evident staining of carpeting suspected to be from chemicals will be removed and disposed of.

4. Any other flooring contaminated and/or stained from suspected use of chemicals will be removed and disposed of. Underlying surface which is also stained will be removed or sealed with an epoxy or other similar coating to prevent migration of chemical residues.

It is also recommended that similar actions be taken to the residence on the ground floor. They have indicated that they had noticed chemical odors coming from the basement, and may have residual contamination.

Once above listed measures have been completed, please contact this office so that an inspection may be performed to ensure compliance.

I have attached sheets which may assist you in cleaning.

Sincerely,

Paul E. Donald, Hazardous Materials Specialist
Environmental Health Services Division

Sample Hazardous Materials Incident Response Team (HIRT) Program Executive Summary

San Diego County, California

HIRT
The Hazardous Materials Incident Response Team

Section I
Executive Summary

On October 1, 1986, a regional hazardous materials emergency response program was implemented in San Diego County. The program was designated the Hazardous Materials Incident Response Team or HIRT. The program was developed by, and is a program of, the San Diego County Unified Disaster Council. The Disaster Council is the governing body of the Unified San Diego County Emergency Services Organization. This Emergency Services Organization was established under an Agreement of Joint Powers signed by the County of San Diego and all incorporated cities within the county.

The program calls for hazardous materials emergency response to be provided countywide through the joint efforts of the San Diego Fire Department (SDFD) HAZMAT Response Team and the San Diego County Department of Health Services' Hazardous Materials Management Division (HMMD). Both of these agencies have highly trained teams with many years of experience in responding to hazardous materials emergencies. The cities and the county are the primary funding source for HIRT.

Under this program, a combined response is provided. The SDFD HAZMAT Response Team is responsible for isolating and containing the incident, stopping the release, effecting rescues, and other related tasks. The HMMD, on the other hand, is responsible for assessing the risk to public health and safety and the environment, taking the necessary steps to mitigate these hazards, ensuring adequate cleanup of the area, and conducting necessary enforcement activities. The combined team is referred to as the Hazardous Materials Incident Response Team, or HIRT.

HIRT will respond to the request of first responders at a hazardous materials incident. HIRT provides advice and technical support to the first responder but does not assume scene management responsibility. The first responder, or appropriate agency designated by law, maintains full control and authority over the incident and retains responsibility for any release of public information concerning the incident.

HIRT is normally activated through the City of San Diego's Fire Department Communication Center. HIRT can also be contacted directly by telephone or established radio channels. Communication and consultation between local agencies and HIRT can be maintained while in route through the use of mobile telephones.

This program has a number of benefits, some of which include the following:

1. Makes available, throughout San Diego County, a team of highly trained hazardous materials response professionals.
2. Reduces potential liability to individual jurisdictions by having a specialized response capability available.
3. Makes available to member jurisdictions an expert resource for a wide variety of hazardous materials questions, problems, and issues.
4. Eliminates unnecessary duplication of effort by having one program providing a coordinated and standardized response making the best use of available resources.
5. Provides a formal process for cost recovery that takes advantage of the most recent enabling legislation.
6. Makes grant monies and equipment more accessible by consolidating into a single request the needs and requirements of the entire area (4,255 square miles) and total population (exceeding 2,500,000) of San Diego County.
7. Allows for user control of a regional program by using, as the administrative authority, an existing regional organization of which the user jurisdictions are members.

The HIRT program is considered to be a successful, effective, and desirable program. User jurisdictions have expressed a high level of satisfaction. While the number of incidents has increased, the team's experience and efficiency have improved and kept pace.

The HIRT program, with its regional approvals, control, and response, is unique in the country. Interest from other areas is high. Inquiries have been received from throughout California and from other states, such as Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Oklahoma. The program is viewed nationally as a successful model program.

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Sources for Further Information

Expert Sources

Expertise	Contact(s)	Agency	Phone Number
Community Outreach/Education	John Campbell	Campbell-DeLong Resources, Inc.	503–221–2005
Community Outreach/Education	Dave Tholman	Portland, Oregon, Police Bureau	503–823–0283
Environmental Regulations	Rolf Hill	U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration	202–307–8833
Equipment and Safety	Bill Henle	Portland, Oregon, Fire Bureau	503–823–3946
Equipment and Safety	Nick Vent	San Diego, California, Department of Health	619–338–2217
Forensic Chemistry	Roger Ely	U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration	415–744–7051
Law Enforcement Program Planning	Edward J. Machado	California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement	916–227–3985
Law Enforcement Program Planning	John Duncan	Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics	405–521–2885
Law Enforcement Program Planning	Paul Beckley Dennis Bonneville	Washington State Patrol	360–753–3287
Prosecution	Francine Joy Lane	Kern County, California, District Attorney's Office	805–868–2768
Prosecution	Dale Kitching	Sacramento, California, District Attorney's Office	916–874–5756
Prosecution	Scott Reed	Utah Attorney General's Office	801–366–0250
Site Assessment/ Health Issues	Dr. David Chandler	Oregon Health Sciences University	503–494–2197
Site Assessment/ Health Issues	Lew Kittle	Washington State Health Department	360–236–3381
Site Assessment/ Emergency Response	Mike Handman	San Diego, California, Department of Health	619–338–2216
Statewide Investigative Coordination	Greg Sharpe	Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office	717–783–2600

Federal Agencies

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Division Offices

Atlanta Field Division
Richard B. Russell Federal Building
75 Spring Street SW., Room 740
Atlanta, GA 30303
404–331–7347

Boston Field Division
15 New Sudsbury Street, Room E400
Boston, MA 02203
617–557–2100

Chicago Field Division
230 S. Dearborn Street, Suite 1200
Chicago, IL 60604
312–353–7875

Dallas Field Division
1880 Regal Row
Dallas, TX 75235
214–640–0801

Detroit Field Division
431 Howard Street
Detroit, MI 48226
313–234–4000

Houston Field Division
1433 West Loop South
Houston, TX 77024
713–693–3000

Los Angeles Field Division
255 East Temple Street, 20th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90012
213–894–2650

Miami Field Division
8400 Northwest 53d Street
Miami, FL 33166
305–590–4870

Newark Field Division
Federal Office Building, Suite 806
970 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
201–645–6060

New Orleans Field Division
3838 North Causeway Boulevard,
Suite 1800
3 Lakeway Center
Metairie, LA 70002
504–840–1100

New York Field Division
99 10th Avenue
New York, NY 10011
212–337–3900

Philadelphia Field Division
600 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
215–597–9530

Phoenix Field Division
Suite 301
3010 North 2d Street
Phoenix, AZ 85012
602–664–5600

Rocky Mountain Field Division
115 Inverness Drive East
Englewood, CO 80112
303–705–7311

San Diego Field Division
4560 Viewridge Avenue
San Diego, CA 91950
619–616–4100

San Francisco Field Division
450 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102
415–436–7900

Seattle Field Division
Suite 104
220 West Mercer
Seattle, WA 98119
206–553–5443

St. Louis Field Division
Suite 500
7911 Forsythe Boulevard
St. Louis, MO 63105
314–425–3241

Washington Field Division
Room 2558
400 Sixth Street SW.
Washington, DC 20024
202–401–7834

National Response Center
1–800–424–8802

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Regional Offices

(24-hour response telephone numbers)

EPA Region 1
Emergency Planning and Response Branch
John F. Kennedy Building
Boston, MA 02203
617–223–7265

EPA Region 2
Response and Prevention Branch
2890 Woodbridge Avenue
Edison, NJ 08837
732–548–8730

EPA Region 3
Superfund Removal Branch
841 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
215–566–3255

EPA Region 4
Emergency Response and Removal Branch
345 Courtland Street NE., 1st floor
Atlanta, GA 30365
404–562–8700

EPA Region 5
Emergency Response Branch
77 West Jackson, 5th Floor HSE–5J
Chicago, IL 60604
312–353–2318

EPA Region 6
Emergency Response Branch
1445 Ross Avenue, 9th Floor
Dallas, TX 75202–2733
214–665–2222

EPA Region 7
Emergency Planning and Response Branch
25 Funston Road, 2d Floor
Kansas City, KS 66115
913–281–0991

EPA Region 8
Emergency Response Branch
999 18th Street, Suite 500
Denver, CO 80202–2405
303–293–1788
1–800–227–8914

EPA Region 9
Field Operations Branch
75 Hawthorne Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
415–744–2000

EPA Region 10
Emergency Response
1200 Sixth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98101
206–553–1263

Publications

Note: The publications listed below are available from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161, 703–605–6000.

An Overview of the Emergency Response Program. Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Washington, D.C. April 1992.

Chemical Handler's Manual: An Informational Outline of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Washington, D.C. 1990.

Guidelines for the Cleanup of Clandestine Drug Laboratories. Joint Federal Task Force of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and U.S. Coast Guard. Washington, D.C. March 1990.

Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response: General Information and Comparison. Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Washington, D.C. April 1991.

Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response: Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites and RCRA Corrective Actions. Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Washington, D.C. April 1991.

HAZMAT Team Planning Guidance. Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Washington, D.C. February 1990.

Protecting Health and Safety at Hazardous Waste Sites: An Overview. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Washington, D.C. September 1985.

Reimbursement to Local Governments for Emergency Response to Hazardous Substance Releases. Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Washington, D.C. November 1989.

Note: The publications listed below are available from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, U.S. Department of Justice, Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850, 800–851–3420.

Controlling Chemicals Used to Make Illegal Drugs: The Chemical Action Task Force and the Domestic Chemical Action Group. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. Washington, D.C. January 1993.

Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement Strategies: Reducing Supply and Demand. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. December 1990.

Precursors and Essential Chemicals in Illicit Drug Production: Approaches to Enforcement. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. Washington, D.C. October 1993.

Note: The following publications are available from the National Drug Intelligence Center, Johnstown, PA, 814–532–4601.

Effects of D-Methamphetamine, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice, Johnstown, PA. December 1996.

Ephedra: A Potential Precursor for D-Methamphetamine Production, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice. Johnstown, PA. May 1997.

Hazards of D-Methamphetamine Production, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice. Johnstown, PA. June 1995.

Note: The following publications are available from a number of sources, including government agencies, libraries, and bookstores. They contain significant information on clandestine drug laboratory chemical processes, emergency response, scene management, and cleanup and removal operations:

Allen, A.C. *A Review of the Synthesis and Analysis of Fentanyl and Its Analogs.* Clandestine Laboratory Investigative Chemists Association. 1996.

Hugel, J., and A. Holmes *An Analyst's Guide to the Investigation of Clandestine Laboratories.* Clandestine Laboratory Chemists Association. 1995.

Kalchick, M.F. *A Review of the Synthesis and Analysis of Phencyclidine and Its Analogs.* Clandestine Laboratory Chemists Association. 1995.

Kalchick, M., and R. Ely. *A Review of the Synthesis and Analysis of Phenyl-2-Propanone, Amphetamine, and Methamphetamine, Volumes 1 and 2.* Clandestine Laboratory Investigative Chemists Association. 1993.

Chemical Threats to Police Officers from Clandestine Drug Labs. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. March 1996 (ISBN 0–662–24268–8).

Clandestine Drug Lab Contaminant Reduction Program. City of Portland, Oregon. April 1993.

Clandestine Drug Laboratories Cleanup Demonstration Program. California Environmental Protection Agency, Division of Toxic Substances Control. July 1993.

Clandestine Laboratory Manual of Instruction and Procedure. California Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement. March 1992.

Clandestine Laboratory Policy Manual for Law Enforcement Agencies. Washington State Patrol April 1989.

Health, Heat, and Water Hazards Associated with Illegal Drug Manufacturing (Amphetamine, Methaqualone, Phencyclidine, and Methamphetamine). California Health and Welfare Agency, Emergency Services Authority. March 1991.

Guidelines for Contamination Reduction and Sampling at Illegal Drug Manufacturing Sites. Washington State Department of Health, Office of Toxic Substances. June 1996.

Model Local Health Department/District Response to Illegal Drug Labs. Washington State Department of Health, Office of Toxic Substances. July 1996.

Model Local Fire Department and Hazardous Materials Team Response to Illegal Methamphetamine Drug Labs. Washington State Department of Health. January 1990.

Training Programs

1. The following training programs were developed with funding support from the Bureau of Justice Assistance and are available from Circle Solutions, Inc., 2070 Chain Bridge Road, Suite 450, Vienna, VA 22182. For more information, contact Michael McCampbell, Clandestine Laboratory Model Enforcement Program, 703–902–1225.

   - ❑ **Introduction to Comprehensive Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement.** This 1-day training program prepares State and local law enforcement agencies to address specialized problems associated with clandestine drug laboratory enforcement. Through a series of lectures and case studies, course participants will learn to recognize the signs of a clandestine laboratory and apply investigative techniques to successfully apprehend lab operators. Participants will also learn to plan for the unique hazards of a clandestine laboratory when executing a raid. Most importantly, participants will be provided with critical information that may prevent them from being injured at a clandestine laboratory.

   - ❑ **Managing a Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Program.** This 1-day program prepares supervisors and managers in State and local law enforcement agencies to address the specialized problems associated with clandestine laboratory enforcement. Course participants will learn about the dangers of clandestine laboratories and associated risks to investigative personnel. From an understanding of these risks, course participants will become aware of the importance of a coordinated, multiagency approach to enforcement. In addition, participants will learn the components necessary for a comprehensive enforcement program.

- ❑ **Clandestine Laboratory and Methamphetamine Trafficking Investigations.** This 5-day workshop prepares investigators in State and local law enforcement agencies to apply the specialized techniques required to conduct an effective clandestine laboratory investigation. Through a series of lectures and case studies, course participants will learn how to recognize and react to hazards, develop cases, conduct a comprehensive investigation, and develop a complete raid plan.

- ❑ **Strategic Planning for Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement.** This 2-day course is designed primarily for upper level management and policymaking personnel from State and local public safety, health, and environmental agencies. It will assist these personnel to develop a strategic plan for a multiagency approach for organizing, coordinating, and managing their clandestine laboratory response programs. In addition, participants will be provided with detailed information on the components of an effective enforcement program, including implementation steps and long-term cleanup requirements.

2. The following training programs are available from the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), which is a component of the Governor's Office of Emergency Services. For more information, contact the Registrar, CSTI, P.O. Box 8123, San Luis Obispo, CA 93403, 805–549–3344.

   - ❑ **Clandestine Drug Laboratory Waste Operations (CLANWOPER).** This 5-day course was developed jointly by CSTI and the California Department of Toxic Substances Control. It provides practical, hands-on health and safety training for emergency response to, or managing the cleanup of, clandestine drug laboratory sites and hazardous waste.

   - ❑ **Clandestine Drug Laboratory Chemical Identification.** This 4-day course was developed jointly by CSTI and the California Department of Toxic Substances Control. It focuses on the field identification of hazardous material associated with, and hazardous waste generated in, clandestine drug synthesis. The course is specifically for those persons responding to, or managing the cleanup of, clandestine drug laboratories and their hazardous wastes.

3. For more information on the Portland, Oregon Police Bureau's Land lord Training Program and the booklet, *Clandestine Drug Labs—What Every Hotel and Motel Owner Should Know*, contact John Campbell, Campbell-Delong Resources, Inc., Portland, Oregon, 503–221–2005.

BJA Contact

The Bureau of Justice Assistance provides grant support and program planning assistance in support of State clandestine laboratory enforcement programs. For additional information, contact the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Law Enforcement Branch, 810 Seventh Street NW., Washington, DC 20531, 202–616–3211.

Bureau of Justice Assistance Information

General Information

Callers may contact the U.S. Department of Justice Response Center for general information or specific needs, such as assistance in submitting grants applications and information on training. To contact the Response Center, call 1–800–421–6770 or write to 1100 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20005.

Indepth Information

For more indepth information about BJA, its programs, and its funding opportunities, requesters can call the BJA Clearinghouse. The BJA Clearinghouse, a component of the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), shares BJA program information with state and local agencies and community groups across the country. Information specialists are available to provide reference and referral services, publication distribution, participation and support for conferences, and other networking and outreach activities. The Clearinghouse can be reached by:

- **Mail**
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  Rockville, MD 20849–6000
- **Visit**
  2277 Research Boulevard
  Rockville, MD 20850
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