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# **COMMUNITY POLICING IN POLAND**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For the concept of Community Oriented Policing (COP) to be effective, it must be based on the local community's support for activities of the police. Practical examples of numerous countries and experience gathered over many years clearly demonstrate that a community will support activities of the police and will consciously, voluntarily and actively cooperate with it, if this community (1) feels threatened by crime on a daily basis; (2) has respect for local and central authorities; (3) is aware that it lives in a state of law which is ruled by just legal norms; and (4) has faith in the police and the system of justice and is positive about their impartiality and effectiveness.

In comparison with the United States and Western Europe, conditions for the implementation of the COP concept are poor in Poland. This results from the Polish history. One hundred and fifty years of slavery and dependence on Russia, Prussia and Austria, five years of Nazi occupation and over 50 years of communist rule have not taught the nation respect for authority, legal order and the police. Furthermore, independent Poland, in the period between World War I and II (1919-1939), did not last long enough to change the negative image of the police on the part of society.

On the other hand, the threat of crime – one of the conditions stimulating cooperation of the society with the police is real in Poland. The increase in the crime rate has been very rapid over the past 10 years, the number of crimes doubling in this period. Moreover, these are crimes especially painful for the society, e.g., thefts, demanding protection money, robberies and other violent street crimes. Drug and juvenile crimes are on the increase. Corruption is present everywhere, even among police officers.

These are the side effects of the 10-year period of transformation of Poland into a democracy, free market economy and closer relations with the West.

Revolutionary changes in the political and economic system of the country have caused extensive stratification of the society. This has resulted in the appearance of the rich, the well-off middle class whose living conditions are much better than before (approximately 15-20 percent of the population) and all the rest, people whose lives have not improved (approximately 1/3 of the population) and, finally, people who experience poverty or even hunger (approximately half of the population).

Conditions of "profitability" for committing crimes have appeared: the increase in the number of valuable possessions, a low number of detected crimes and inefficiency of the police, legal chaos, weakness of social controls and the law enforcement system.

Out of 100 perpetrators of crimes only three end up in jail. A too liberal (in society's opinion) judiciary system is almost in a state of collapse, and is involved in a far-reaching conflict with the Ministry of Justice. Most important legal norms, including the Penal Code was passed only three years ago, require thorough updating.

What is the image of the Polish police in these circumstances? Together with great changes in Poland in the 90s, a far-reaching transformation of the police took place. It consisted of making it apolitical, introducing full replacement of its executive staff, and gaining certain autonomy in relation to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, to which the police is subordinated. There were closer relations with state and local authorities and closer cooperation with Western police and Interpol. The transformation of the police was not smooth and peaceful; to the contrary, this process appeared to be very difficult and had innumerable consequences which still exert a

negative influence on the state of public safety. The authorities rightly intended to rid of the police force from active supporters of the communist regime. Unfortunately, thousands of well-trained and experienced police officers were made redundant in the process. The changes in all executive positions are too frequent – in 10 years, the police have had seven different Main Chiefs (their deputies have also been replaced). Similar changes have taken place in voivodship and district police headquarters. As a result, key posts are filled with individuals having too little experience in managing people on those levels; they are often incompetent.

Since the beginning of the transformation period in Poland, the police have been under-financed. The salaries of police officers, especially the lower rank police officers who face crime on a daily basis, are ridiculously low. Their families live in poverty. The police infrastructure is obsolete, and there is no money for investments. The system of training of commissioned officers is, according to the Parliamentary Commission of Internal Affairs, outdated. It nearly works like a caste system, as access to it for new, educated personnel is limited. Talented youth have better prospects in the computer era: They look for vacancies in banking, computer science, law, media, or even the army and special services.

However, one must admit that considerable positive change has taken place in the Polish police since January 1990. A far-reaching reform has been initiated. The police structure has been adapted to legal changes resulting from the administrative reform of the country. The number of vacancies in National Police HQ has been decreased, financial and personnel entitlements have been decentralized (by introduction of contests for higher posts on higher levels of the police hierarchy). A new centralized service for

combating organized crime (the Central Bureau of Investigation) and a centralized service for combating crime among police officers (the Directorate for Internal Affairs) have been created. A new motivational remuneration system is being implemented. An action has been taken aimed at improving the lives of police officers and their families. Associative negotiations with the Europol have been started. A new recruitment system has been created. A long-term, complex draft of the Domestic Program of Fighting Crime has been drawn up and passed to the Sejm.

Unfortunately, the crime rate and the number of detected crimes, which are the most important indicators of the efficiency of the police, do not prove that the reform has been successful after over 18 months of implementation.

The radical improvement of safety in Poland depends on the improvement of the police and other elements of the legal system. This includes its legal regulations, the public prosecutor's office, and the judiciary and penitentiary systems. These elements, including the police, are like the system of communicating vessels where the exclusion of one element lowers the level of the other ones. Moreover, in a time when the public distrusts the government and a lot of people live in poverty, it would be naive to think that concepts like Community Oriented Policing themselves can noticeably reduce crime. That is why Community Policing **may be** a useful element only within the framework of general and complex improvement of economic and social situation in the country. Another important condition is improvement in operation of the authorities and the legal system of the country.



In a final note, we present a number of steps, a government or a police chief, of any country, state, or city might be advised to follow, **prior, to the implementation of the philosophy of Community Oriented Policing.**

- 
- (1) define** – what **exactly** is expected of the police and of the community – **role concepts and tasks**

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  - (2) explain** – how **exactly** this can be fulfilled and accomplished – identify the **precise competencies, not just concepts**

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  - (3) survey** – **both** - the police and the public about their desire, willingness, and **ability** to a long term commitment

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  - (4) analyze** – **both** – populations – re: their sincere desire, willingness and **ability** to deliver

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  - (5) evaluate - feasibility of implementation** – re: conflict of interests in light of political economic, and social realities

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  - (6) plan** – **adjust the tasks and concepts** for conflict of interests and local customization of the idea

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  - (7) train** – **both** - the police and the public – **prior to implementation**

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  - (8) allocate - resources** – **long lasting, not temporary**

## **Introduction**

For the concept of Community Oriented Policing (COP) to be effective, it must be based on the local community's support for activities of the police and its conscious, voluntary and active cooperation.

Practical examples of numerous countries and experience gathered over many years clearly demonstrate that a community will support activities of the police and will consciously, voluntarily and actively cooperate with it, if this community:

1. Feels threatened by the crime world on daily bases
2. Has due respect for local and central authorities
3. Is aware of the fact that it lives in a state of law which is ruled by just legal norms
4. Has faith in the police, prosecutors and the system of justice and is positive about their impartiality and effectiveness of action.

The above conditions are logical. If, in a given country or region, there is no crime or it is a marginal phenomenon and the citizens' security is not threatened, it is understandable that the citizens do not feel the need to get involved in active cooperation with the police. The fact that there is proper order in a given area means that the police perfectly fulfill their duty on their own and do not need the community's help. Moreover, local communities can get involved in numerous social activities much more attractive than helping the police.

The police are always an embodiment and a symbol of authority - both local and central. Experiments show that in all countries and in all historical periods the respect for authority entails respect for the police. On the other hand, if given authority is not appreciated and accepted, the police force is not appreciated by the citizens, either.

A society's opinion about a state's legal system is strictly connected to this. It is difficult to respect the authorities and bodies responsible for provision of security and public order when the public opinion considers legal norms to be ineffective, unjust and inappropriate for providing a proper level of security in a given country.

Last but not least, a society must unreservedly trust the police force and be convinced that it acts efficiently and effectively.

Moreover, it would be a mistake to consider the chance of realization of this concept taking into account only the police. One must bear in mind the connections within the whole mutually dependent system of the authorities, the legal system and all bodies created to ensure its proper functioning.

Furthermore, relations between the authorities, their bodies and the society are not created overnight but; it sometimes takes many years and generations. The situation is different in countries which enjoy long-lasting stability of legal and social-political order. On the other hand, it is still different in countries where the development of the state system was turbulent, characterized by violence and the relations between the authorities and society were (or have been) antagonistic.

Considering the issue of Community Oriented Policing in Poland and attempting to assess present achievements and prospects for implementation of this concept in this country, one must start from the historical overview. Firstly, we will consider past relations between the police and society (described in Chapter 1). Here, we will answer the question if the history of the above relations, somehow inscribed in the genes of the many generations of Poles, makes it easier or more difficult to achieve the desirable relations between these partners. We go back to 1772, when the first partition of Poland took place, which was the beginning of Poland's losing independence for the next 150 years. This is the departure point for the considerably shortened overview of the history of Poland until 1989, from the standpoint of relations between the authorities and the police on the one hand, and the society, on the other.

Next, we will concentrate on the four above-mentioned conditions on which the success of Community Oriented Policing in Poland (and not only) is dependent. The first required condition – the threat of crime – exists in Poland. The present state of the threat of crime is covered in Chapter 2. The threat became substantially more significant in the

1989-1999 transition period, - the number of certain types of crimes Poland almost doubled. This chapter deals with the reasons for this disturbing phenomenon and provides the explanation why the number of certain types of crime decreased and the number of other types of crime significantly increased. The analysis includes new categories of crime which had not been known in Poland before. Precise official statistics concerning this period of time are given in this chapter. At the same time, the question whether these statistics are a reliable source of information will also be answered since there are grounds for thinking that they are mostly untrue. The statistics connected with more important categories of crime are discussed comparatively with reference to other countries.

Chapter 3 focuses on the present state of relations between the Polish authorities and the society. It includes the last 10 years, the transition period and the regaining of the independence. The following points are discussed in this chapter: the genesis of transformation, political, economic and social changes. We also concentrate on benefits to the authorities and certain parts of the society resulting from these changes. The benefits are not evenly distributed, which is reflected in citizens' morale and well-being and, what follows, in their attitude towards consecutive groups governing the country and, therefore, the law enforcement services.

The problem of Crime and Punishment is discussed in Chapter 4. Section 1 provides statistical data which show that in Poland for every 100 affirmed crimes only two offenders are imprisoned. The following sections are aimed at ascertaining what is wrong – the laws or the judges. Reasons for the fact that the Polish judiciary system is ineffective are put forth. The Polish penitentiary system is also analyzed.

The analysis in Chapter 5 concerns the degree of social trust in the police, prosecutors, judiciary system and prison services. Section 1 of this chapter discusses the condition of Polish police forces at the turn of the century. It concentrates on the transformations in police forces since 1989, their legal bases and resulting new entitlements and tasks of the police. Criticism has been expressed concerning the personnel policy of the police and the system of training, improvement and recruitment. This section provides information on the number of staff, the organization structure, the subordination system, financing and budget, police officers' education and professional

qualifications, and discipline. Moreover, this section discusses municipal, state and private para-police formations. A lot of attention has been given to the financial situation of police officers, their psychophysical state and the assessment of their public esteem. The government draft of the reform of the police is discussed and commented on.

Section 2 deals with the public prosecutor's office, against which the police hold a grudge. And vice versa. It looks though each side is partly right. Section 3 concentrates on criticisms of the Polish judiciary system expressed both by the police and society. Chief accusations concern sluggish acting and the excessive liberalization of verdicts, which results in fierce protests. Public opinion also criticizes the prison service, which is dealt with in section 4 of this chapter.

Chapter 6 concerns the achievements regarding the concept of Community Oriented Policing in Poland. First attempts to introduce this concept in Poland go back to 1995 but the project didn't get a green light not before January 1999, when the administration reform was implemented and local governments were given bigger entitlements and budgets. This chapter deals with the achievements, results of cooperation with the local police departments with four key elements: (1) the community, (2) elected officials, (3) community agencies and (4) the local media. It shows the opinion of the police and the above elements about their positive and negative experiences and prospects for the future. A lot of attention is put to district constables who have broad, direct and everyday contact with the community. Their experiences in implementing the COP concept are especially valuable.

Chapter 7 deals with the recent reform of the Polish police. Section 1 shows the Plans and Goals. Section 2 describes the first results of the reform. Technical modernization of Police units is discussed in section 3, while section 4 discusses new, sometimes controversial, ideas and projects aiming at broadening operating rights of the police connected with access to classified information – personal, banking and insurance. This chapter also contains the drafts of creation of the Domestic (Police) Center for Criminal Information and the Domestic Judiciary Register.

The detailed Program to Combat Crime, prepared by the government and to be debated in the Parliament is described and commented on in Chapter 8. In this chapter the role and place of the Community Policing concept in this program is discussed. It

explains whether and how much it is taken into consideration, how it will be implemented, and what results are expected.

The summary and conclusions of the entire study are gathered in the final chapter 9, which is primarily devoted to the analysis of the two set of questionnaires distributed to Polish police officers and students. The questionnaires attempted to measure their attitudes and opinions about Community Oriented Policing. Chapter 9 also mentions those aspects of this research which could not be fully analyzed and evaluated, and explains the reasons why. It describes areas to be studied in the future and the overall relevance of this research project to the study of COP in other countries, including the United States.

As far as the sources used in this study are concerned: Nowhere in the world has a publication dealing with this matter been published so far. That is why accessible sources regarding subjects touched upon in Chapters 1-5 have been used. These were mostly materials published by the National Police HQ, including information on its website, materials published in Polish periodicals and daily press, and the few other printed matters which have been discussed. Moreover, materials from the Polish-British conference on cooperation of police forces in both countries with local governments and public administration have been used. The conference took place in Legionowo (Poland), March 1999.

However, the main source of information for presenting the achievements concerning implementation of the COP concept in Poland and assessment of its development prospects have been meetings, interviews and the personal communications of the authors with officers of the National Police HQ in Warsaw, the Center of Police Training in Legionowo and with police officers of different ranks in large cities – Gdańsk, Białystok, Krakow, and Łódź. In these cities, the authors also talked with members of the criminal justice community (attorneys, probation/parole officers, correction officers, etc.) and with representatives of local authorities. Moreover, written surveys were an important source of first-hand information. The results appear to have been extremely useful.

## **Chapter 1. The Relationship Between Society and the Police in Poland: Historical Background**

The most fundamental condition to the successful implementation of community policing is cooperation between the police and the public. This cooperation must be predicated upon trust the public feels toward its police force. According to Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines, and B. Bucquerox (1998), community policing is based upon the joint effort of citizens and police toward solving neighborhood problems.

Then authors also stressed that some of the major considerations in community policing are citizen input into defining problems to be solved, citizen involvement in planning and implementing problem solving activities, and citizens determining if their needs have been met.

If one agrees with these tenets, prior to any analysis of successful implementation of community oriented policing (COP) in Poland, we must determine if and how much the polish citizens are willing to engage in such cooperation with their police force.

To find an answer, Polish realities must be analyzed from a historical perspective. It is impossible to understand the transformation within the Polish police system without going back to deeply rooted prejudices and biases toward this armed tool of the government.

### **Section 1. Poland under Foreign Rule, 1772 - 1918**

Since 1772, Poland has been an independent and sovereign country only for 34 years, 1918 till 1939, and since the end of 1989 until today. Hence, for 200 years Poland was occupied by various countries, and enjoyed freedom and independence only for about 30

years.

Historically, these years can be divided into periods.

#### *First Partition*

During the 18th century the Kingdom of Poland, surrounded by three empires was forced, without fighting, to give up parts of its territory. Under the treaties of August 5, 1772, and subsequent delimitations, the Kingdom of Prussia received 36,000 sq. km of territory and 580,000 inhabitants; Austria 83,000 sq. km and 2,650,000 inhabitants; and Russia 92,000 sq. km and 1,300,000 inhabitants.

#### *Second Partition*

The second partition took place at the end of the 18th century (1792 -1793), when Prussia obtained 58,000 sq. km and Russia 250,000 sq. km.

#### *Third Partition*

The third partition of the Kingdom of Poland took place in 1793, when all the rest of its territory and population fell under foreign rule of Prussia, Russia, and Austria (Gieysztor, 1968).

Thus, with small exceptions (during Napoleon's rule 1807 - 1812) the population of Poland was under the foreign rule of the three empires for almost 150 years. Those states by and large ruled through imposing severe economic sanctions and repression of Polish nationalism. It is, therefore, understandable that the police force that represented the occupying states was bitterly hated by the Poles for almost 150 years of its existence. Any type of cooperation with the occupying force was almost always rejected by the majority of the patriotic Poles. On the other hand, any type of subversive behavior



against the occupying forces, including of course the police force, was always received with the great support and admiration of the public.

## **Section 2. Independent Poland, 1918 – 1939**

In November 11, 1918, after almost 150 years of occupation, Poland reappeared on the map as an independent and sovereign country.

The Polish State Police (national police force) was established by the decree of the Polish Parliament on July 24, 1919, but, the creation of this force was not completed until July 1922 (Grabowski, 2000).

The Polish Police was in operation for over 20 years. Just as the first signs of trust between the police and the public began to materialize, in May of 1926 Marshal Jozef Pilsudski took over the democratically elected government in a bloody coup (more than 400 people were killed). The police force, like other uniformed services, was disoriented and divided, taking different sides on a daily basis. This, of course, did not gain much respect from the public. The authoritarian style of government existed in Poland even after the death of Pilsudski, basically until the German invasion of Poland, on September 1st, 1939 (Konopczynski, 1959).

The almost 21 years of Polish independence were not greatest ones for police – community relations. There were a number of reasons for distrust. First, Poland during 1918 - 1939 was a multicultural society, in which about 10 million people (about 27 percent of the entire population) were minorities from Bielorussia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, who claimed oppression and discrimination at the hands of the Polish government. Those claims led, frequently, to strikes and violent demonstrations

that were quashed by the police in a very violent manner. To deal with larger demonstrations the local police, together with some military units, engaged in physical terror against the minorities, or so the latter claimed.

Other ethnic minorities, the Jews (about 3.5 million) and Germans (about 0.6 million), did not show much sympathy toward the local law enforcement, since that both Jews and Germans were, in practical terms, forbidden from joining the police. Even line functions were out of reach, and the same held true for other minorities of non - Polish origin (Chisholm-Sawicki, 1999).

The quasi-democratic governments during 1929 - 1933 were not capable of providing and sustaining a prosperous economy. In many cases, in the territories under the former Russian occupation (central and eastern Poland) the standard of living was even lower than during the occupation. The rate of unemployment was skyrocketing and with it the level of poverty. Conflicts between the government and the public intensified, and what ensued was the conflict between the police and the public. For example, in 1936 the police used firearms against workers demonstrating in the cities of Lwow and Krakow, killing and wounding scores of people. The following year, 1937, highly armed units of the police were deployed against masses demonstrating in what was known as the Large Farmers' Strike. Derogative terms, used to describe police were in abundance; for example, "paid servants" or "boys from Golendzinowo" (Golendzinowo was a place where anti-riot police units were stationed). A bad reputation was also developed by the police in their capacity as correction officers, in charge of one concentration camp in Bereza Kartuzka, where political dissidents were kept imprisoned (WEP-PWN.,1, 1968, p.708.)

Based on all this, it is safe to assume that despite a step forward in police - community relations in Poland, due to the establishment of the Polish Police force, the relationship did not flourish overall, and there was not enough time to change the negative attitude prevalent toward the idea of law enforcement during times of occupation. The road to cooperation with the police was still not paved.

In the eyes of the citizens, the Polish police officer was definitely better than the one representing one of the occupying forces, the officer was still a symbol for an unpopular government. A retired commissioner of the Polish Police responded once to the accusation that the police is not liked by the public by saying "Police are not here to be liked, but to be feared!" (M. Chisholm-Sawicki, personal communication, London, January 5, 1999, op.cit.).

According to researchers, the Polish Police prior to WWII, were nevertheless considered to be a highly professional force and quite an effective tool for preserving peace and order, with a relatively high clearance rate. In the area of crime prevention the force was apparently quite effective as well, and the crime rate per capita was lower than today. The economic and social status of a police officer was much higher during the 1918 - 1939 and his/her authority was relatively high as well, especially when compared with the authority of a Polish police officer nowadays (Chisholm-Sawicki, op.cit).

### **Section 3. Polish Police during WWII**

This five year period from September 1, 1939 till May 8, 1945, included the Nazi occupation, as well as the Soviet occupation during 1939 -1941. The police force was

divided between two territories. Part of Poland was annexed to the Third Reich, and this part was subjected to the operations of the German police. The other part, about one-third of the former Poland, the territories under German occupation, was subjected to the German administrative order. Under this order the police force, called "the dark blue police", essentially comprised of the former Polish police but was under the jurisdiction of the German police, and was in charge of law and order in the occupied territories. For the Poles, who fought very bravely against the occupying forces, it was quite a shock to see, their police force (wearing the same dark blue uniforms, just without the Polish national symbol) protecting and serving the occupying forces.

Not only the police were protecting and serving the occupying forces, they were doing it with high initiative, frequently literally hunting the Polish underground fighters and the Polish Jews and delivering them to the Germans, where they faced certain death. There were, of course, exceptions to the rule, as always, when police officers were cooperating with the underground fighters, but these were few and far between. No wonder, therefore, that this period is marked by an extremely grim picture of the police officer, one that not only did not contribute to a positive relationship between the police and the public but, to the contrary, gained an even more pejorative connotation.

In territories occupied by the Soviets, almost all Polish police officers were imprisoned and sent to the infamous death camp in Katyn, where they were all executed, together with Polish army officers who were taken by the Soviets as prisoners of war.

In the territories which were annexed by the Russians to the Soviet Union (about 45 percent of the total prewar territory of Poland) during 1939 - 1941 the Soviet Militia took charge of law enforcement, supplemented by some local supporters, none of them of

Polish decent. This militia cooperated closely with the NKVD (the Soviet political police) in an attempt to get rid of the Polish underground organizations, and helped send people to the infamous exile in Siberia.

During 1939 - 45, based upon an order from the exiled Polish government, located in London, England, an underground unit called (Safety Corp) Security Corps, was established in the part of Poland occupied by the Nazis. It was supposed to provide some sort of baseline for the Polish police, in case Poland were freed of the occupation. However, Poland were freed by the Red Army, which did not recognize the legitimacy of this unit, and imprisoned all its known members (Korbonski, S., 1990).

#### **Section 4. Police under Communist Rule in Poland**

This period lasted for almost 45 years, from July 1944 till June 1989, was relatively long and defined Poland as a country that was partially sovereign, partially independent and mostly under the control of the Soviet Union. Over the years, the socioeconomic and political environments varied, but the police – community relationship were always antagonistic, regardless of the situation.

During all those years, most of Polish citizens opposed the so called socialist system of government, that was forced on the nation. In reality, it was a communist regime, despite some important differences between communism as practiced in the Soviet Union and in Poland. Since the majority of the population was in some type of (indirect or direct) opposition to the governing system, the police being a tool of the government generated resentment and conflict. This conflict was of a permanent nature. Of course the Polish Police, or rather the Polish Militia, at least in theory was supposed to act in the interests of the community. In its official and formal function this law enforcement organ

did not differ much from its democratic counterparts. It was supposed to provide safety and security by fighting crime and preserving order. In practice, however, for the average citizen the militiaman was just one of the symbols of the hated political system.

On November 13, 1956, a decree was passed in which both organizations the Militia and the Security Bureau, were incorporated into one Ministry. The real culprit in this Ministry was the Security Bureau however, in the mind of the public, there was no real differentiation between the two, and the image of the Militia was tainted by that of the Security Bureau (Grabowski, op.cit).

This sentiment was particularly strong given that the crime level affecting the average citizen during those years (1945-1989) was much lower than the one nowadays, since 1989 (Haberfeld, 2001).

The governing body, being fully aware of antigovernment sentiments, amassed quite an impressive internal security system to fight the "enemy within", and to protect its power. One of the pillars of this system was the political police, also known as the Security Bureau or Service, known by its popular acronym as the SB. At the height of its strength it was composed of over 50,000 officers. For its support the SB had three additional military formations, namely:

- KBW: Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego- Internal Security Corps
- WOP: Wojska Obrony Pogranicza- Border Troops
- JN: Jednostki Nadwislanskie - Vistula Security Troops

Together, those four formations totaled over 100,000 officers (Jaworski,M., 1984).

The second pillar of the people's government was the Citizens Militia (MO) or the criminal police.

Similar to the Security Bureau, the Militia was structured and deployed around the

country and the numbers ranged at around 50,000 at its inception to 100,000 in later years. (For comparison before WWII, Poland with more or less the same population, had about 35,000 police officers, including the political police). All the ranks within the Militia, starting with the commanding officer of a station and above, were part of the communist party apparatus. This system was put in place to secure all the ranking positions within the police for people who were approved by the communist party. The National Chief of the Police was subject to approval of the highest organ within the party, the PolitBureau, or the Political Bureau. In other words, it was communist party heads who decided the nominations and promotions within the Militia. Professional qualifications of ranking Militia officers were of secondary importance, and their careers primarily depended on the degree of their loyalty and submissiveness to the party, as well as the right personal background (Sadykiewicz, 1989).

This widely known fact about the relationship between the police career and the communist party further deterred the community from cooperation with law enforcement. In addition, the MO had at its disposal very modern and well equipped antiriot units that were deployed around the country. Then in 1946, a new organization was established to supplement the Militia. It was called the Voluntary Reserve to the Citizens' Militia (ORMO) and could be compared to some type of a part time police entity. ORMO enlisted almost 300,000 volunteers, all trained and armed. To further strength the internal security system, a number of para-police formations were established. They included the Railroad Guard, Port Guard, Forrest Rangers, Corrections, Industrial Guard and more. All together they numbered almost 100,000 people. All those formations

cooperated very closely among themselves and the police and supported the police in time of need (Kersten, 1985).

Despite the fact that the first line of opposition against the enemy within was reserved for the Security Bureau and internal military units, the Militia was frequently engaged in the role of a support system to the SB, especially during repressive actions against striking workers, for example in Poznan in 1956, and in Gdansk, Szczecin, and Lublin in 1980. After a state of war was declared in December 1981, nine miners were killed during the suppression of a strike. When the martial law was declared in 1981, the efficient and effective operations of the Militia were credited with its successful implementation. This dubious role created another stigma attached to law enforcement organization despite the fact that some historians and researchers claim that the successful implementation of martial law saved Poland from a much grimmer military intervention on the part of the Russians. This negative view of the force was quite prevalent and the fact that almost 300,000 volunteers were part of the Auxiliary Police Unit did not change much, since many of the so-called volunteers were forced to provide their services (Jaworski, 1984).

Since everything, or almost everything, during those times belonged to the government; factories, shops, means of communications, transportations, etc. the government, or rather the communist party, was in charge of all the decision-making processes, starting with establishing the prices for parsley and finishing with distribution of steel. It was considered to be quite patriotic to act against this governing body. One of these patriotic activities included plain theft of government property, from stealing a light bulb to car parts. What encouraged and contributed greatly to this illicit behavior



was a very low standard of living and a permanent shortage of the most basic products. This quite prevalent theft of products in various plants and factories caused tremendous losses to the country economy. To counter the losses, in the 1950s new legislation was introduced, and the penalties for theft of government property reached unprecedented severity. For example, the theft of bicycle from a private person was sanctioned with a fine and a usually suspended prison sentence of up to 6 months; the same crime committed against a government -owned bicycle carried mandatory 5 years of imprisonment (Jaworski, 1984). Given the fact that the first line of defense against theft was the Militia, which arrested the culprits, the popularity of law enforcement deteriorated even further.

To sum up the historical developments in Poland and their impact on police-community relations it can be said that during the last 230 years, over some 10 to 12 generations of Poles, the relationship between the two entities was decisively antagonistic. This legacy, therefore, is certainly not conducive to the successful implementation of Community Oriented Policing in Poland. However, it does not necessarily preclude success in a definite manner, but certainly hampers attempts from their inception. Therefore, while further analyzing the developments of community policing in Poland, one must bear in mind this historic baggage and its brunt.

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## **Chapter 2. Crime in Contemporary Poland**

### **Section 1. Spiraling crime**

The comparison of the level of crime in Poland prior to 1989 with the situation after the transformation to the new, democratic form of government shows a number of significant changes in the patterns of criminal behavior.

To begin with, certain types of behavior were either decriminalized or, to the contrary, labeled deviant. Some categories of illicit behavior decreased in a most significant way, while others almost disappeared. Newly labeled criminal activities, previously practically unknown emerged as a new category, presenting a serious threat to the security of the country.

Recent data shows an almost catastrophic rise in crime. In 1999 1,121,000 of crimes were recorded. This is a rise of almost 105 percent since 1989. The clearance rate is 45 percent.

What will present the biggest danger to the Polish society in the near future?

According to the authors (Rokita, and Siemiakowski, 2000):

- Drug trafficking, especially cocaine coming from South America
- Expansion of organized crime groups, specifically Asian and Russian
- Concentration of organized crime groups in smaller cities and border areas, which will evolve into control over local social and economic life
- Cross-fertilization between traditional criminal activities and white collar crime
- In traditional crime activities, an increase in burglaries, car theft, bank robberies, etc. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 4/ 25/ 2000).

Crimes that are mostly burdensome for the average citizen are on a steady rise.

Those crimes include robbery, burglary, drugs, car theft, are rising in a systematic manner ( see Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, analyzed in Section 4 – Crime Statistics in Poland).

Economic crime is blooming as well. At the onset of the new government system at the beginning of the 1990s, the range of economic crime was not so wide and included, primarily, bank - related fraud, tax evasions, and corruption of government employees. With time, sophistication in this area has become noticeable. Nowadays, the crime catalogue is supplemented by new types and categories which include, among others, fraudulent use of credit cards, computer crime, falsification of documents related primarily to stock and bonds, and more ([www.informedia.com.pl](http://www.informedia.com.pl), April 6, 2000).

## **Section 2. Organized Crime**

The roots of organized criminal activity in Poland can be traced to the beginning of the 1970s; however, the boom in crime can be traced to the early 1990s. The majority of initial activities centered on theft, illegal gun trafficking, and economic crimes. Gradually, areas of involvement expanded to drug manufacturing, forfeiture of currency and other financial crimes, prostitution, and terrorism. Wiktor Kulesza (2000), a Lodz University law professor, estimates that Poland has about 400 organized crime groups, varying in size and areas of influence. Polish Police Headquarters estimates the number to be even higher, at 440 (Gazeta Wyborcza, 1/6/ 2000).

According to Kulesza, those organized crime groups present a real threat to the democratic foundation of the country, and their organizational structure does not differ from those operating in other Western democracies. Their modus operandi is based on their counterparts around the world. Some of the bosses are well respected citizens, who live a quiet and affluent life. Their money is laundered through

legitimate establishments and places of business. The businesses are frequently infiltrated by their confidants, who make sure that the operation runs smoothly. Their involvement in various social causes, especially contributions to nonprofit organizations, gain them support and loyalty of the public. All of the above is, of course, possible only due to the existence of some additional “support system”, in this case the involvement of various facets of the Polish criminal justice system ([www.rzeczpospolita.pl](http://www.rzeczpospolita.pl), 3/17 2000).

One of the most notorious examples of such a support system was discovered in April, 2000, when the police arrested over 100 members of an organized crime group in Lodz. The group called itself the Lodz Octopus, and consisted of known local criminals as well as “law – abiding” citizens such as police officers, judges, prosecutors, medical doctors, customs officers and other government employees ([www.kprm.gov.pl](http://www.kprm.gov.pl), 5/31/2000).

According to General Jan Michna, the chief of police until October 2001, in 1999, 120 organized crime groups were liquidated by the police. With the reorganization of the police force, a Central Criminal Bureau (equivalent to the American FBI) was established to spearhead lead the fight against organized crime activities in Poland ([www.gazeta.pl](http://www.gazeta.pl), 1/6/2000).

The CCB (in Polish CBS) will have its hands full. Some of the most notorious activities in the hands of organized crime groups are money laundering, and drug trafficking. Wojcik (2000), in his book about the status of money laundering in Poland, estimates that about 40 billion Polish zloty or about 10 billion USD are laundered annually by various organized crime groups.

Drug - related crimes present another insurmountable challenge for law enforcement.

During the last few years the consumption of amphetamines, heroin, and hashish has almost doubled. Drug use is prevalent not only in the so - called marginal population; notable and respectable citizens are found among steady users. The biggest problem is juveniles; a younger and younger population is being exposed to the drug culture. According to government sources, Poland has ceased to be a transit country for drug traffickers. Today drug trafficking is an established and stabilized business in the country ([www.dziennik.pap.pl](http://www.dziennik.pap.pl), 2/23/00). Poland has become one of the main producers of synthetic drugs in the world ([www.gazeta.pl](http://www.gazeta.pl), 2/23/00).

### **Section 3. Corruption**

According to the World Bank Report, Poland is one of the most corrupted countries in the world. It is estimated that corruption in its various forms is steadily on the rise in many sectors of government.

In the eyes of the public, corruption is an established phenomenon and an integral part of the daily life. 71 percent of the surveyed population felt that the phenomenon of corruption intensified under the new coalition - based government. Some of the most corrupted areas are licensing units of the government. Those units, responsible for issuing thousands of documents necessary to run businesses and other enterprises, are more criminogenic than any other (Trybuna, 5/11/00).

One of the areas related to police organization are the self - governing bodies. These local governments, in control of almost all the facets of public life, are extremely corrupted, presumed to be even more corrupted than centralized government agencies. Kaleta (2000), a well known economist, views the effectiveness of the police force as one of the major tools in the fight against corruption.

Allegation of corruption are also directed toward law enforcement. Most frequently the traffic police and local police headquarters are cited as the main culprits. Until quite recently, one of the forms of misconduct was almost legal, the popular sponsorship of local police departments. Since the budget situation of the police force is less than adequate, instances of donating equipment, free renovations of police quarters and other "benefits" became the norm rather than the exception. Some of the departments involved included large city departments, like the ones in Poznan, Warsaw, and Gdansk. In some instances, almost the entire police force was dismissed, like the one in Poznan. The public is under the impression that the police are a highly corrupted institution, one of the most corrupted. In a recent survey conducted by the Center for Research of Public Opinion, respondents rated the Polish police as the second most corrupted government institution ([www.rzeczpospolita.pl](http://www.rzeczpospolita.pl) 3/3/00).

#### **Section 4. Crime Statistics, 1991 -1999**

The rise in crime and the clearance rate during the last decade are illustrated in tables 2.1 through 2.3.

Table 2. 1. Recorded Crimes

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Murder	971	989	1106	1160	1134	1134	1093	1072	1048
Rape	1921	1919	1976	2039	2267	1985	2260	2174	2029
Injury	12956	13795	16646	18454	18901	19371	20505	19496	17849
Battery	5553	6060	7285	9223	10600	11575	13005	13034	12756
Property									
Theft	139507	125074	134089	180514	211602	157479	184368	211651	243537
Extortion									
Robbery	17094	17715	121034	23574	26858	26257	30063	34225	38751
Burglary									
	355896	330741	314338	304293	304899	305703	324017	355176	369235
Traffic									
Crimes	35568	30753	29578	32030	35005	34863	40202	34442	N/A
Economic									
Crimes									
	84590	108051	69803	74956	N/A	73911	82296	78496	60393
Others	221039	254979	256652	259914	364809	265473	294563	323276	349418
Total	866095	881076	852507	906157	974941	897751	992353	1073042	1121545

Comments

N/A = statistics not available.

Source: General Headquarters of Polish Police, Warsaw, [www.kgp.gov.pl](http://www.kgp.gov.pl) 3/07/ 2000, 4/11/ 2000, and 5/30/ 2000.



Table 2.2. Detected Crimes (percent)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
All crimes	48.3	53.1	53.5	54.2	54.2	54.4	53.5	50.5	45.0
Murder	86.5	88.0	87.5	86.9	87.6	88.2	86.4	86.3	85.7
Injury	86.6	89.0	90.7	91.5	91.0	91.3	91.1	90.8	89.2
Battery	81.0	82.0	83.4	84.0	82.8	81.6	80.7	78.7	76.3
Rape	77.8	82.6	83.9	87.8	86.3	85.2	87.0	87.0	83.7
Extortion									
Robbery	45.3	50.8	56.0	60.0	62.1	61.4	61.0	59.6	52.6
Burglary	21.7	23.5	25.5	30.4	30.9	31.1	29.7	27.6	23.5
Larceny	40.9	42.4	42.2	39.1	39.5	31.5	28.6	25.7	20.7
Traffic									
Crimes	92.9	93.1	93.0	93.8	93.3	93.2	93.1	92.3	91.5
Economic									
Crimes	73.9	82.8	77.1	75.7	N/A/	N/A	83.5	86.7	96.7

Source: General Headquarters of Polish Police, Warsaw, [www.kgp.gov.pl](http://www.kgp.gov.pl), 3/7/2000, 4/11/2000, and 5/30/2000.

It is important to mention that the lowest clearance rate, as reported in Table 2.2, is in the categories that are most problematic for the average citizen. For 1999 these categories include larceny and burglary, where the clearance rate is only around 20 to 23 percent. With respect to car theft, for example, the clearance rate is only about 10 percent, and in Warsaw, where car theft is virtually an ongoing epidemic, the numbers are even more discouraging; fewer than 2 percent are cleared. Approximately 70,000 cars are stolen annually just in the city of Warsaw (NIE, No. 43/1999).

During the first months of 2000, police recorded a rise of 19.8 percent in the overall crime rate, in comparison with 1999. For the first time in years, the clearance rate went up, and even though crime declined slightly in the capital city of Warsaw, some increase had been recorded in other areas of Poland ([www.kgp.gov.pl](http://www.kgp.gov.pl) ,5/31/2000).

To sum up how much serious crime has risen in Poland in comparison to the period prior to the transformation to a democratic form of government, Table 2.3 data for 1985 -1999.

Table 2.3. Serious Crime in Poland (1985 - 1999)

Year	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Burglary
1985	486	1,926	5,974	138,396
1990	730	1,840	16,217	431,056
1995	1,134	2,267	26,858	304,899
1999	1,048	2,029	38,751	369,235

Source: Statistical Yearbooks 1986 -1999, Central Statistical Office. (Roczniki Statystyczne ,1986 - 1999,;Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Warszawa).

## Section 5. Crime in Poland Compared with Other Countries

Overall, crime rates measured as a ratio of crimes per 100,000 people are higher in most European countries than in Poland (ranging from rates that are four times higher in the Netherlands to rates that are three times higher in Germany, to similar rates in Spain).

Crime risk in individual crime categories differs in the analyzed countries as follows. With respect to the incidence of murder per 100,000 people, crime rates in Poland are approximately 28 percent lower than in Germany, approximately 32 percent lower than in Italy, approximately 22% lower than in France and Hungary. A lower risk of

murder is recorded in Austria. Similar relations are recorded with respect to serious bodily harm.

With respect to the number of crimes against property per 100,000 people committed in Poland, the number is slightly higher in Spain, and markedly higher in the remaining countries (e.g., four times higher in the Netherlands and 2 - 3 times higher in France and Germany).

The quantitative structure of the most serious crimes against property, such as robbery, extortion by robbery and burglary in individual countries is more complex. The incidence of robbery and extortion by robbery is the lowest in Hungary, Switzerland, Austria and Italy. The number of such offenses in these countries is lower than in Poland, but it is higher in Spain (approximately three times higher), France, the Netherlands and Germany.

The greatest number of burglaries is recorded in the Netherlands, approximately 3,000 per 100,000 people. In Poland the number does not exceed 800. In contrast, the lowest incidence of burglary is recorded in Spain (566) and in France (752).

With an average of approximately 170 frauds per 100,000 people, the incidence of this crime in Poland is far behind Germany (913 offenses), France (530 offenses) and in Hungary (498 offenses). The lowest risk of fraud is recorded in the Netherlands (42 offenses) and Spain (68 offenses) ([www.kgp.gov.pl](http://www.kgp.gov.pl), 4/11/00). (All the data quoted for the comparison was relevant for the year 1996.)

The above statistics were quoted by the official site of the General Headquarters of the Polish Police ([www.kgp.gov.pl](http://www.kgp.gov.pl) April 11, 2000), but the data should not be taken at face value. Based on these statistics it might appear that Poland is much safer than the Netherlands, France or Germany. Such an interpretation of the data might be quite misleading. First, there is no uniformly defined system for gathering of the crime statistics in Europe. For example, according to the Polish Penal Code theft of property valued at about 250 zloty (about \$50) is not considered to be a crime, and is dealt with in an administrative procedure and not in court in other countries the criteria might be different. That is why comparing crime statistics among different countries is rather futile considering the disparity in crime definitions and variety of compilation methods.

Second, there is the very crucial issue of credibility. How credible and representative the numbers are is an issue.

## **Section 6. Credibility of Crime Statistics**

Andrzej Siemaszko (2000), director of Delivery of Justice, a research institute, located in Warsaw, claims that the Polish police has no knowledge of three - quarters of crimes that are actually committed, including over 80 percent of pick-pocketing, 60 percent of battery, 50 percent of car thefts and 45 percent of burglaries. Consumer crime is even less represented in Polish crime statistics, when only about 1 percent of the victims complain about the violations; the dark figures of crime in that area approach 100 percent. Similar numbers can be quoted for various forms of attempted bribery and sex crimes.

Siemaszko does not dispute the crimes statistics presented by the police; his claim is related to the source of knowledge that the police have. The primary source is the victim; whatever picture is painted by the police represents just a fraction of the actual crime situation. According to Siemaszko's research the main reason for the low number of complaints is lack of faith in police effectiveness.

One of the authors of the report, while conducting her research in Poland, talked to a number of crime victims who were very adamant about their unwillingness to report crime. They, too, cited lack of police effectiveness as the main reason for their decision not to complain. On the other hand, the conclusions reached by Siemaszko were strongly denied by some ranking police officers, and it was quite obvious that his findings are challenged by the police organization (Haberfeld, 2001).

There is an additional, interesting, phenomenon that contributes to a skeptical approach to official statistics. The phenomenon, called "complaints received but not accepted", is quite pervasive. Sometimes the victim will express the desire to sign a complaint but the police will persuade him/her not to do so. This is especially common in cases where there is no direct knowledge of the suspect and the chances for clearing the case are minimal or nonexistent. Since the effectiveness of a given police station is

measured primarily by the number of crimes committed and cleared, it is rather obvious what motivation lies behind this discouragement.

Cases of falsification of crime statistics are not new or recent trend. One of the more infamous cases took place in the city of Debica, where police officers used to convince the victims not to report crime since chances of finding the perpetrator were minimal. Informal instructions existed, explaining which crimes and in what circumstances should not be accepted as a complaint. Officers who opposed this illicit subculture were ostracized and punished. As a result, between 1992 and 1996 about 1000 crimes were unreported. The police department in Debica appeared to be the best in its district as far as crime clearance was concerned. Finally, this procedure was discovered by some external sources and 10 officers were indicted (Rzeczpospolita, 3/3/2000).

Similar situation can be found in many other police stations. In 1998, the Internal Affairs Bureau of the Polish Police audited 335 police stations across Poland and found that in 65 of the stations under review there was some type of manipulation of crime statistics (Rzeczpospolita, 3/3/2000).

Daszkiewicz (2000), analyzing clearance rates in Poland during 1990 to 1997, claims that the clearance in 1990 was about 40 percent, in 1996 about 54.4 percent, but declined again in 1997 to 53.5 percent. Therefore, about 50% of the crimes were not solved cleared and the perpetrators remained at large.

It is still doubtful that those figures are accurate, given the preoccupation with crime stats manipulation and other ill - defined laws that do not criminalize certain offenses, which would otherwise be included in the annual crime report.

Based on the numbers and facts presented in this chapter, it is obvious that the average Polish citizen is deeply affected by the crime situation. According to research findings presented in a highly respected weekly magazine, *Polityka* (2/19/2000), 74 percent of Polish citizens had talked to their friends and family about the crime situation during the month preceding the survey and only 7 percent leave their apartment without fear.

Ironically, during the 1000 years of the Polish history, including occupations by other countries, the criminal threat against the average citizen had never been that high. Finally, when after years of oppression and lack of independence Poland has embarked

on its way to a true democracy, the crime wave, both real and perceived, threatens the stability of the country.

The first prognosis in the early 1990s, predicted elevated crime rates during the first years of the transformation. However, the “first years” have passed and the avalanche of crime not only has not diminished but, to the contrary, has escalated beyond this forecast. Hence, as a natural development, the public, threatened by the rise in crime and individual victimization, appears to express some desire to turn to the police and cooperate with its protectors. Therefore, despite years of traditional lack of cooperation with and a negative attitude toward law enforcement (as discussed in Chapter 1) some willingness to change these attitudes is already observable. Even though some pockets of motivated citizens attempt to protect themselves from the immediate threat for example, in one of the quarters of Warsaw residents organized themselves to deal (quite violently) with the local drug dealers and other undesirable individuals (Haberfeld, 2000), some openness towards the police appears to be in the best interest of all involved. To counter the following satiric quote by Wrobel (2000) the better common sense might eventually help to pave the way for the implementation of some of the ideas embedded in the philosophy of Community Oriented Policing.

I give you [the public] one piece of advice: don't leave your home during the day, under no circumstances; at night you can leave only for suicidal purposes. If you are attacked at home, let them beat you up and steal your valuables, and don't call the police. Even if they have some vehicle to come to you they will still treat you as somebody who destroys crime statistics. As to the perpetrator, even if caught, the court is going to release him immediately, and he will return to give you a real beating.

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## **Chapter 3. Poland, 1989 to 1999: From Communism to Democracy - Balance of Political, Economic, and Social Changes**

### **Section 1. Political Changes**

June 4, 1989 marked the first time ever, since the Russian Revolution of 1917, that in a European country the communist government gave up its reign in a peaceful manner, and a newly elected, democratic parliament took charge. This date of the newly gained independence and sovereignty marks the beginning of many transformations. Poland, with its territory of 312,700 square kilometers and a population approximating 39 million was only an independent country in theory for 45 years. Despite its membership in the United Nations, Poland was just another satellite of the Soviet Union, and Moscow government dominated, in varying degrees, Polish governmental activities.

How did this transformation come about? How did Poland finally become an independent entity? To present the shortest version of the events (which will be important in the ensuing overview of the developments of Community Oriented Policing in Poland, it must be mentioned that toward the end of the 1980s, two dominant orientations emerged within the governing communist party (known as the Polish United Workers Party - PUWP): 1. as survivalist and 2. reformatory. In the face of a huge economic crisis, and the growing popularity of the Solidarity movement, the governing body of the PUWP was determined to maintain power through use of force, force provided by various internal security departments and organizations including the Security Bureau, the police with its numerous paramilitary, SWAT like units, the voluntary guard, railroad guard, port guard, etc. Additional help was supposed to be provided by the Soviet Union and, if necessary, the other members of the Warsaw Pact (Paczkowski, 1996).



The opposite orientation, the reformatory one headed by General Jaruzelski, was concerned with the problems identified within the governing system. This group hoped to reach some understanding with the democratically oriented opposition in an attempt to share responsibility for the future of the country. The deciding moment in the power struggle occurred during a plenary session of the Central Committee of the PUWP (in January 1989), during which the idea of cooperation between the party and Solidarity movement was highly criticized. As a result, four of the leading proponents of the idea resigned on the spot, including General Jaruzelski. In effect, this was a very effective blackmail, as the four were asked to reconsider and agreed to, on the condition that the idea of cooperation with Solidarity would proceed.

Later, the four requested that the movement be legalized, Solidarity has been an illegal union until then, and additional pluralism be allowed within the governing structure of Poland. In the final vote, Jaruzelski and his supporters received 143 votes (32 were against and 14 abstained) (Rakowski, 1991).

From then on things changed rather rapidly. In June 1989 the first democratic election to the Parliament took place and proved to be a triumph for the Solidarity movement, and a complete disaster for the governing party.

On June 24, the newly elected Parliament named Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the Prime Minister of Poland, and for the first time since 1944 this position was held by somebody who did not represent the communist party. Soon after, General Jaruzelski was elected President. He gave up this position in December of 1990, to enable the election of Lech Walesa. The road to the transformation was paved (Dudek, 1997).

The decade 1989 - 1999 was marked with many far-reaching changes. Poland became

an independent country, with full membership in the NATO, while aggressively applying for membership in the European Union. The church regained its powerful stance and many post-communist, democratically oriented parties emerged. A new constitution, introduced in 1997, validated all the changes that had been instituted after 1989. Among the changes were:

- Country of law - separation of power between the legislative, enforcement and judicial
- Democratic elections to the Parliament and the self-governing bodies
- Political pluralism
- Freedom of speech
- Freedom of political affiliation
- Freedom of unionizing
- Democratization of uniformed services security, police and armed forces (Skrzydlo, 1997).

Because of these changes, the political system and individual freedom in today's

Poland do not differ from any of the established democracies in Western Europe (Kofman & Roszkowski, 1997).

## **Section 2. Economic Changes**

Similar landmark changes occurred in the Polish economy. In 1990, a shock therapy was introduced to the Polish citizens - a free economy market. Today, more than a decade after its introduction, Poland is still a leader in these types of changes in Eastern Europe, achieving the best results and serving as a role model for other formerly communist countries. This opinion is confirmed by the media. According to media coverage, most of the economic bases were privatized industries, commerce, and services. This explosion of privately owned enterprises was unprecedented, including over 2 million small businesses.

Foreign investors showed a lot of interest in the Polish economy, pouring billions of

dollars into many new ventures, contributing to growth and newly discovered prosperity. The tourist industry experienced similar growth and Poland became a major European destination. Finally, higher education gained a lot of impetus by adding some 150 private colleges (<http://www.uczelnie.prv.pl/>, 1/23/2002).

### **Section 3. Social Changes**

All the positive changes, especially the economic ones, cannot, however, hide the cost they exert on the society. This cost is primarily noticeable in the new social stratification: on one end a very dramatic rise in the standard of living; on the other end, though, an increasing decline. Almost one out of two retired people (and there are about 7 million of them in Poland) collect only \$160 a month (*Trybuna*, 6/04/2000). According to Parliament member Janush Dobrosz, close to 21 million Polish citizens live below a minimum social standard, and 2.2 millions of those live below the minimum biological standard (*Trybuna*, 5/04/2000).

Research findings published by the Polish Central Bureau of Statistics show that one out of two people who live below the poverty line is below age 19, and one out of three is below age 14. Therefore almost half of the poorest Poles are teenagers and children, (G.U.S., 1999).

According to Andrzej Szaraj, from Torun University, the discrepancy among social strata reached a pathological dimension. A new social class emerged, or rather a subclass referred to as expendable people, ones who were basically left to deal with their own destiny (*Polityka*, No. 9, 12/26/2000).

It is therefore indisputable that public expectations from the transformation period

were not materialized. Ironically, the same social strata that actively supported the Solidarity movement, specifically the working class of miners, factory workers, teachers, farmers, etc. became the biggest victims of poverty. Severe reductions took place in those employment areas, and no alternatives were prepared or offered. The farmers suffered when the realistic prices were imposed on their products. In the year 2000 2,6 million of Poles were registered as unemployed, which represents 13.9 percent of the working force (Trybuna, 4/27/00).

In many areas of the country the unemployment rate reaches almost 20 percent. The Central Bureau of Statistics presents an even grimmer picture. The number of unemployed registered per one employment vacancy in the Warminsko - Mazury district is 509 and in another region, Podkarpacie, there are 528 people registered for one position (www.stat.gov.pl, 5/05/00).

It is not hard to assume that these numbers can easily be translated into potential criminal statistics. This is especially true because Poland does not have assistance for the unemployed, or any stamp system, and people do not receive any financial or social help. According to the media, three - quarters of the unemployed do not receive any assistance from the government (Trybuna, 5/25/00).

What is even more disturbing, is the fact that there is no immediate governmental policy programs, planned or in place, to amend this situation.

Numerous reforms begun in 1998, in the areas of public health, insurance, education, and administrative division of the country were poorly planned and ineffectively implemented. This contributed even further to chaos and public dissatisfaction. The Solidarity movement did not have a professionally prepared and skilled cadre of workers

ready to assume governmental posts. In addition, the new political elite favors their own people, at the expense of professionalism.

Mr. S. Alot is one example. Alot, a former philology school teacher who had no educational background in economics or business administration, and had never supervised any business whatsoever, was one of the chief activist in the Solidarity movement in a provincial city of Rzeszow. He was appointed, practically overnight, as the chairman and chief executive officer of one of the city's largest financial institutions. The institution, Government Insurance Company (ZUS), has an operating budget of almost \$18 billion, which translates into, roughly, half of the operating budget of the entire country (Gazeta Wyborcza, 7/10/00).

It is not surprising that within a very short period of time, Alot managed to bankrupt his organization, and was replaced by a qualified college professor who specializes in the insurance industry. Nominations of such professionals as the former school teacher are, unfortunately, not an exception but rather the norm.

One of the co-governing parties that left the government in June of 2000 publicly criticized such an approach to governing, that intertwined relations between politics and the economy (Gazeta Wyborcza, 4/09/00).

In addition, numerous instances of corruption, some of them highly profiled by local media, contribute to social instability, even if, just by perception of the Poles.

According to a survey distributed by the Center of Public Opinion Research, the perception of social instability is directly related to the loss of greatly appreciated social services for a vast majority of the population. Among them:

- free health care
- free medications

- cheap and widely available vacation resorts and summer camps for children
- relatively cheap dwellings
- free education including higher education
- relatively cheap public transportation
- a low unemployment rate (practically no unemployment)
- numerous work- related benefits (for industry workers, police and army officers, etc.)
- very low taxes

Added to all this is an overall feeling of personal insecurity, triggered by a rise in street crime, especially robberies, aggravated assaults, and other violent property- related crimes, as discussed in Chapter 2. Szaraj (2000) depicts the Polish democracy as one of a formal-popular nature, where the voters are courted for their loyalty and support only prior to elections. During those times, promises fly freely in the air, and are not kept after the elections are over. Instead of good old democracy, Poland received a medley of demoralizing political behaviors, a combination of privatization, populism, and technocracy. The latter one exhibits itself in realization of pre-established goals, which are defined without any consultation with the public (Szaraj, 2000).

K.Z. Poznanski (2000), a professor from the University of Seattle, Washington, is even more critical of the situation in Poland. According to his view, the transformation of the system happened rapidly, but it deteriorated even more rapidly, first through recession and then through the selling of businesses to foreign investors.

Ownership of major banks and means of production in the hands of foreigners are not a new phenomenon; ownership of almost the entire economy is. This is the case in Poland where, instead of salvaging whatever was left after the communist regime, the “inheritance” was completely wasted. In effect, there was an overall perception of diminished authority on the part of governing bodies and their agendas, which included, among others, deployment and restructuring of the police force.

Since the 1997 to 2001 of disastrous economic moves, discussed in the Chapter 2, resulted in the catastrophic decline of the Polish economy, it is no wonder that the public chose to vote for a different camp during the last elections. The elections, which took place in September 2001, brought to power new actors, two parties, that were previously in the opposition to the ruling government: SLD ( a leftwing union of democratic parties) and the UP (also a leftwing union of workers). Both parties received more than 40 percent of the votes. The former governing parties, the AWS (a spin - off the Solidarity movement) and the UW (Union of Freedom), did not gain enough votes to sit in the Parliament.

The new government, from its inception, supported the United States in its fight against international terrorism and expressed willingness to help in this endeavor. The new leftwing, government inherited a catastrophic financial situation and a disastrous economic policy. The total deficit is closed to \$15 billion. Most government - owned enterprises (like mining, the railroads, and other industries) not only do not bring profit but are losing money in a significant way. For example, the farming industry is on the verge of bankruptcy, and international commerce is not profitable either ([http:// www.Rzeczpospolita, pl. 1/23/2002](http://www.Rzeczpospolita.pl)).

Given this situation, it is rather hard to predict when and how the Polish economy will recover. Politically neutral analysts agree that without a thorough, radical, empirically based and fully implemented new economic plan, there is not much hope for improvement in the near future. As of the writing of this chapter (February of 2002), no such plan has been outlined by the government, or anybody else for that matter. This of course will have some profound bearing on the topic of police-community relations, as

a poor economy usually has a profound impact on crime rates. We shall return to these issues and their impact in the later chapters.

The new stratification of Polish society, Poland's poverty level, and unemployment (especially of youth), combined with a rise in crime and the lack of constructive and realistic plans for the future, do not indicate a bright future for public safety and security.

It is rather naïve to assume that reorientation toward Community Oriented Policing can actually contribute, in any significant way, to the reduction in crime. Therefore, this philosophy can only be effective, in Poland, when the fertile ground will be provided. This fertile ground has to be a major, drastic change and improvement in the economic and social arenas, and farreaching changes of the legal system.

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## **Chapter 4. Poland 2001: Crime and Punishment**

Professor L. Falandysz, (2000) an expert on the Polish legal system, states that the Polish criminal justice system is going through a very rough time. Even more discouraging is the fact that there is no clear way out of the present situation. According to public surveys, in 2000, seventy five percent of the respondents rated the courts' effectiveness as very poor; for those who had type of interaction with one of the branches of the criminal justice system dissatisfaction is as high as 80 percent ([www.wprost.pl](http://www.wprost.pl), 3/08/00).

### **Section 1. Gloomy Statistics**

The criminal justice system in Poland is so ineffective that out of 100 perpetrators, only 3 end up in prison. In reality, even this low number of 3 out of 100 perpetrators being sentenced to prison terms might not entirely depict the gravity of the situation (Checko, 1999).

What might be the reason for this low incarceration rate? There is no clear-cut answer; however, a number of theoretical explanations have been offered. Some see the source of the problem in an inadequate legal system, especially in the frequently criticized Penal Code, introduced in 1998. Others trace it to ineffective practices within the Court system. Also, serious accusations have been flaunted against the Prosecutor's office. Not surprising is the fact that the vast majority of the accusations are directed against the police. Corrections is the last on the five fingered accusatory hand.

In the eyes of the public what characterizes the Polish criminal justice system are the slow pace and lengthy procedures of the prosecutorial process. This phenomenon was addressed by the Committee for Human Rights and the Tribunal for Human Rights in

Strasbourg, France. Due to their reports Poland had to pay some fines for ineffective and dysfunctional processes. The worst situations exists in large cities, especially in Warsaw, where the average waiting time for a case to be processed by the courts is 40 months ([www.zycie.wp.pl](http://www.zycie.wp.pl), 06/16/00).

Nowadays, about 2 million unsettled and unresolved cases await final verdicts ([www.zw.com.pl](http://www.zw.com.pl)., 02/06/00, Darewicz ( 2000).

In March 2000, the World Bank published a special report about instances of corruption in Poland. In this document some references to work in the Polish court system can be found, among them, short hours of work (the judges work often only three days a week for three hours), and the possibility of purchasing an acquittal or other positive outcome. Sometimes, due to the length of the process, the victim gives up the idea all together, and does not seek resolution through the court. In other cases, the defender has enough time to hide or get rid of all his/her material possessions so that by the time a fine is sanctioned there is no money, or other property, from which the fine can be collected. In addition, the problem of documentation is quite an acute one, due to the ineffective and insufficient technology. It takes a very long time to get all the necessary documents, and sometimes even a bribe for the clerk involved in the process ([Rzeczpospolita](http://Rzeczpospolita), 3/22/00).

In 1999, the courts were swamped by almost 6, 5 million of cases. Considering the fact that there are only about eight thousands judges, the number of cases per judge is staggering. No wonder, therefore, that the decline in effectiveness is so extreme ([Przegląd Tygodniowy](http://Przegląd Tygodniowy), 6/10/99).

## Section 2. The Court System: Sources of the Problem

The entire Court system in Poland consists of slightly over 8, 000 judges. Is this a low or a high number in comparison to other countries? Table 4. 1 gives the answer to this question.

**Table 4.1. Number of judges per 100,000 residents**

Germany	27
Hungary	21
Czech Republic	20
Austria	20
Finland	18
Poland *	17
Belgium	12
Norway	10
Russia	9
Netherlands	8
Spain	8
U.S.A.	4
Sweden	4
England	4

Source: ( K. Kangasputa et al, 1998 )

As of 2000, Poland had about 20 judges per 100,000 residents  
([www.wprost.com.pl](http://www.wprost.com.pl), 3/05/00).

As illustrated by table 4.1 in many countries the ratio of judge and resident is much lower than in Poland. However, one must not look at the number only. In those countries, judges have an elaborate support system, both human and technological. In addition, as for example in the United States, some of the judges are elected; the dissatisfied citizen has the option of removing the incompetent judge.

The argument that judges in Poland are ineffective due to the low numbers per capita does not appear to be valid if the sheer numbers are counted. What contributes to their ineptness seems to be more closely related to the lack of a support system, the low

salaries, and a host of external factors related to the legal system, the nature of crime, the political situation, etc. For example, the reform of the judicial system is planned for the next decade, and might not culminate until 2011 (Luczak et al., 2000).

The public is appalled by the less than serious verdicts that are rendered not only in minor, but also in the most serious cases. Too frequently the offender receives a suspended sentence, which is pretty apparent when one looks at the percentage of mandatory prison sentences, which constitute only about 10 percent of all the verdicts rendered (Siemaszko, 2000).

W. Macior (2000), a professor at Krakow University, states that the public has lost its confidence in the criminal justice system which is not surprising. The sources of malfunction can be attributed to two factors; the new penal code and the judges. Despite the fact that liberal tendencies were also noticeable under the old penal code, they have intensified with the introduction of the new one.

Those liberal tendencies of the Polish judicial system are further validated by the Justice Institute. Based on the assessment of the sentences rendered during the second half of the 1990s, the time frame under the old penal code, the statistics clearly show that the majority of the offenders are not incarcerated; almost 90 percent remain at large. Specifically, for aggravated assault, only 10 percent of the offenders in Poland end up doing time in prison, compared to 60 percent in Denmark. Only 10 percent of theft offenders are incarcerated, compared to 60 percent in Greece. Therefore, after the verdict, the majority of the offenders hit the streets and resume their daily routine. Even those sentenced for prison sentence remain free, awaiting their turn in prison, due to prison overcrowding (Polityka, 3/20/00).

One example of this leniency was the sentencing of three 18 year old men from so called "good families", who brutally killed a homeless man. The motive was pure boredom. The three were sentenced to three years in prison. The public was ostensibly shocked (Polityka, 5/08/00).

Minister of Justice, Lech Kaczynski, appointed in June 2000, a professor who also holds the position of Attorney General, was extremely critical of the courts' output. Being a big proponent of the death penalty, the minister promised some far - reaching changes and reform (www.rzeczpospolita.pl, 6/21/00).

Nowadays, with regard to the New Penal code, the public opinion is rather divided. The minority, headed by Mr. Kaczynski, who resigned as Minister of Justice, in July 2001, demands tougher punishment and return of the death penalty for extremely brutal crimes. However, most feel that approaching the problem from the angle of more severe punishments will not suffice. They feel that reinstatement of the death penalty is not a realistic option since it is against the policies of the European Union, which Poland wants to join. They agree that some of the penalties have to be increased, especially for the most severe crimes however, since the previous code, took ten years to be completed and proved to be a big fiasco one year after its introduction (in 1989). They feel that there is a need to create a new penal code from scratch, and not to modify the one that has been in existence for almost 150 years, as the new government proposes (Polityka, 2/05/2000).

Of course one cannot forget about the need to curb the bureaucracy and reevaluate what makes sense and what doesn't. Over many years, nothing has been done to restore and improve all the other elements of the criminal justice system; nothing has been done to

improve the service conditions of the people who serve the various components of the system. Today's chaos and disintegration are countered by proposals of more severe punishments and simpler registration procedures for the crime committed. These steps are insufficient and will not bring the desired results (Ibid.).

In January 2002, after long discussions and deliberations, the Sejm received a proposal for the new penal code. Following are the recommendations with regard to the former Penal Code that was

approved in 1998:

- Increased penalties for recidivists
- Increased penalties for group or extremely brutal rape
- Juvenile delinquents' age of criminal responsibility lowered to the age of 15
- Increased penalties for crimes against the Criminal Justice System (like false statements, tampering with witnesses, etc.)
- Increased penalties for members of organized crime groups

The rights of the victims are also acknowledged in a much wider sense, broadening the ability of a victim to defend himself/herself from a perpetrator. The term "public servant" was defined and clarified, which has an important bearing on future cases of work-related corruption. For example, there was no law that would allow for prosecution of a medical doctor or college professor involved in job-related corruptive behaviors. Finally, the above proposal includes new legislation against acts of terrorism, computer crimes and sport-related corruption (<http://wyborcza.gazeta.pl/info/,1/17/2002>).

Of particular interest appear to be the new proposals dealing with corruption and its various forms. The situation up to date was rather paradoxical: both parties - the corruptor and the corrupted were subject to mandatory punishment. Critics of this approach point the fact that such legislation basically makes it impossible to fight

corruption on any level. Voices promoting abandoning this approach are heard, advocating a different approach, one that would enable whistle blowers to go free when they identify instances of corruption in which they themselves took part. Without a major change in this legislation, corruption within the police force will never be eradicated. Out of all these proposals and ideas one thing appears to be quite clear: the overwhelming majority of the 94 percent of Polish citizens support tougher punishments for severe crimes (Rzeczpospolita, 12/28/2000).

For many years a serious internal conflict between the Ministry of Justice and the country's Courts Committee, a self - governing body of judges which was supposed to oversee the qualification of the latter, contributes to the overall grim situation and lack of effective remedies. As a result of the power struggle between the two entities, all reforms in this area are slowed to the point that it is hard to predict when and if anything will actually change (Luczak, et al. op. cit).

The previously mentioned report of the World Bank further underscores the position judges hold in Polish society. According to the report, the profession of judge is perceived by the public as a safe haven for less than ambitious individuals who are interested only in a part - time employment (Rzeczpospolita, 3/22/00).

In July 2000, the Polish media reported that beginning on July 1, 2000 some far - reaching changes in the Polish judicial system were to be introduced. The changes were targeted specifically at civil procedures, effectively speeding the process. However, according to the press, the judges were only mildly optimistic about those changes. Those innovations, very technical in nature, were supposed to simplify many court procedures that had been extremely time consuming (www.rzeczpospolita.pl, 7/03/00).



From October 2001, according to the new Constitution the courts were vested with a new, very important responsibility. A form of jury referred to as "a body of citizens having jurisdiction over minor offenses", which dealt with a very heavy load of cases (in 2000 over half a million cases) would cease to exist. In its place new special courts were established, with on a regional distribution. Some of those special courts would deal with criminal cases only, some with minor offenses, misdemeanors, and civil cases. These new responsibilities would further increase the very heavy load of the existing court system. Further, according to the law, many of those misdemeanors would meet the statute of limitations after two years, long before anybody would be prosecuted for the offense. This would create a new population of violators who would know for sure, that they would never be prosecuted for their misdeeds (Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/16/2001).

The impact of all this on police - community relations is quite obvious. It is much harder to blame the entire criminal justice system for seeing the perpetrators go free than it is to blame the police, or at least demand more effectiveness from the police, including protection when and if such is needed, after the criminal appears to be free and unrestricted.

### **Section 3. Corrections**

The public expects not just fair and quick sentences but also effective implementation of punishment. This can be translated into a demand for actual physical incarceration of offenders, as well as rather rough conditions behind bars, based primarily on the deterrence theory. Rehabilitation appears to be less of a concern for the average citizen,

plagued by the rise of violent crime. Nevertheless, there appears to be a clear understanding of the importance of the re - socialization of offenders. Unfortunately, the picture of the corrections system in Poland is more one of problems than remedies.

The first problem seems to be related to the previously mentioned liberalism in sentencing that influences the early release concept as well. Many offenders enjoy the early release option, primarily due to good behavior and humanitarian reasoning. Humanitarian reasoning is rewarded by frequent furlough passes, which are available not just to low - risk offenders but also to the most serious ones, who serve time for felony crimes like rape and murder. Corrections officials justify these policies by referring to the philosophy of " the stick and carrot", that assist them with maintaining good discipline within penal facilities (Polityka, 4/26/00).

Second, there is the problem of overcrowding. Chief of Corrections, W. Mankiewicz (2000) while presenting statistics for the year 2000, stated that 61,000 prisoners serve time in various correctional facilities, and every third facility is overcrowded. In April 2001, the numbers became even more staggering. Then, 77,457 inmates occupied cells that were designated for 67, 865 persons, meaning that about 10,000 inmates were serving their sentences under conditions far from any international human rights standards. The projections 2002 were even higher, and include additional an 10,000 inmates. At the same time, over 25,000 convicted felons wait months for a free prison space (Gazeta Wyborcza, 4/182001).

As a result, any attempt at rehabilitation is doomed from the start. The ratio between corrections officer and inmate has increased, the tutors have more students, even the

psychologists are overloaded. Under such circumstances it is impossible to achieve even a semblance of effective rehabilitation.

The public does not accept this account as valid picture. In June 2000 during a strike organized by inmates in a correctional facility in Bialystok, the media reported on the demands presented to the Corrections Department. One demand, was of particular sensitivity: better food quality. The media immediately compared a typical daily menu from a correctional facility with a menu that a patient receives in a hospital. The comparison rendered a rather disturbing fact: resource allocation (money) for the inmate's daily ration is almost twice as high as that allocated to a patient (Radio TOK, FM, 6/15/00). For a poor, hungry, unemployed young man prison appears more like a safe oasis than an effective deterrent. The abundance of food, no need to work (most of the inmates are unemployed), a bed, good sanitary conditions, the opportunity to exercise, topped by other attractions like access to a color television set, books, musical instruments, etc., present more of a temptation than a fear.

Furthermore, inmates with money are allowed to purchase many goods, including bringing in a prostitute, under the guise of a fiancée by receiving a permit for an intimate visit. Some of the benefits of being an inmate include free and available health care. Under the reform of the health care system it is easier to get a visit to a doctor's office while incarcerated than as a free man (G.U.S. Statistics, 1997).

Partly for these reasons, though not exclusively, the following rates of the recidivism rates in Poland appear to be quite daunting. According to statistics, in 1998 recidivists constituted 51 percent of the inmates; 23 percent were incarcerated for the second time, 13 percent for the third, 8 percent for the fourth, 3.8 percent for the fifth, and 1.6 for the

sixth. 471 inmates served for the seventh time or above (G.U.S., 1999).

The most astounding outcome of the above depicted situation can be found in the following research findings of a Polish professor of criminology, Tadeusz Hanousek (2001), who works out of the University of Krakow. According to his research, one out of 14 young Polish men between the ages of 14 to 22 who live in cities with a population of below 100,000 declared their main source of income as proceeds from criminal activities. This, translates to the fact that over half a million young Poles are ready for a criminal career (Wprost, April 29, 2001).

Over a decade after the transition to a democratic form of government, Polish society still does not have much confidence in its criminal justice system. Specifically, the courts' ineffectiveness does not contribute to crime prevention or elimination. In addition, the corrections system does not sufficiently deter potential and current offenders.

The relevance of these conclusions to effective implementation of the Community Oriented Policing is quite apparent. It is safe to say that, neither the court system nor the corrections department are in a position to provide for any type of support for this philosophy. To the contrary, in a way they encourage vigilantism and the delivery of so-called "street justice". The ultimate success of the Community Oriented Policing orientation is inherently related to effective reform of the courts' system and the corrections department.

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## **CHAPTER 5. Polish Police Service at the brink of the 21<sup>st</sup> century**

### **Section 1. The Decade of the Transformation (1989-1999)**

One of the first acts of the newly established democratic government in Poland was the transformation of its Militia to a Police Service. The change was manifested in many forms: first the uniforms, the colours and the insignias, then the ranks that replaced the military ranks in use by the Polish Militia.

The Police Service became completely independent from the infamous Security Bureau. Organizational and personnel changes were far reaching. Some of the units were completely eliminated, for example the Unit of Political Officers, very active during Militia times. All the officers who had served in that force were dismissed from the force. The majority of ranking officers were dismissed as well, starting with the generals. Most of the commanding officers of the regional forces were replaced and later dismissed. All the units of the Communist Party that were active in various police stations were dismantled and the force was declared as clearly apolitical.

The Sejm ratified the Police Act, on April 6, 1990, in which the primary role of the force was defined as fighting crime, traditional crime, not political crime. In addition, international cooperation was forged with many democratic police forces around the world, among them Germany, the United States, France and Holland. Many officers were sent to those countries to attend courses and training events, and to study foreign languages.

All of these changes were intended to create more trust within the public, and to establish the new concept that the new force is to serve the public, to protect its interest and enforce law and order (Haberfeld, 1997).

Professor Misiuk, from the Higher Police Training School in Szczytno, summarized the positive changes that took place as an outcome of the transformation, after 1990. Following are some excerpts from his article:

- removal of the force from under the political influence of the Ministry of Interior

- limitation of the role of the Minister of Interior to being advisory in nature
- cooperation between the police and other local self- governing bodies
- involvement of the self- governing bodies in the public safety arena

([http://republika.pl/biuletynwspol/ibs\\_1i2-99/a3\\_1-2\\_99.html](http://republika.pl/biuletynwspol/ibs_1i2-99/a3_1-2_99.html)), 8/5/00

This process of transformation was far from smooth, affected the overall safety and crime rate in the entire country most negatively.

A number of problems caused the pain of the transformation. Faulty personnel changes were probably the biggest obstacle. While the desire to clean the ranks of the force of former Militia men and women was certainly understandable and a wise move, the manner in which this was implemented left a lot to be desired. Dismissal from the force was too quick, not thought through from the perspective of its impact on the future of the newly created organization. Many experienced high ranking officers, many specialists in their law enforcement fields, were dismissed and replaced by young officers, with much less experience and less competence than their predecessors. This phenomenon was followed by a rollercoaster of promotions, when somebody in charge of a small police unit who commanded about 50 officers, in a small rural environment, overnight became the police chief of a major city like Katowice, with responsibility for commanding 10,000 officers. Between 1990 and 2000, Poland had 7 new Prime Ministers, and at the same time 7 new Chiefs of Police. Each and every Minister of Interior Affairs wanted “his” men to head the police force. The new Police Chiefs replaced their deputies, which of course had an immediate impact on the overall personnel structure: those who were promoted vacated high- ranking positions that were filled by their successors, who were not always ready or competent enough to take over the responsibilities imposed on them (Haberfeld, 1997, 2000).

This, irrational, practice has been continued by the newly appointed Chief of Police, General Antoni Kowalczyk, appointed in December 2001. After the first month and a half of his tenure almost half of regional commanding officers left their posts. He also replaced all the commanding officers in the Central Bureau of Investigations (Marszalek, 2002).



The next error of judgment was limitation of the police budget. On the surface it appeared as if it were increasing year by year but it was never adjusted for high inflation, and actually it decreased significantly each year. Police salaries were influenced negatively by the lack of funds.

This was, of course, followed by problems with recruitment and selection. Other, more attractive jobs had been created, paid better, with better status, and the quality of new recruits deteriorated rapidly. Private security firms, that experienced an economic boom, attracted young people, who wanted both law enforcement jobs and a decent living. There were other law enforcement related opportunities offering a much better salary and conditions of work; for example City Municipal Guards in Warsaw have salaries twice as high as police officers in the same city. It is therefore not surprising that young, ambitious people are not attracted to police work.

Lately, due to the very high unemployment rate, almost 18 percent in the year 2002, more and more candidates have been applying for police jobs ( <http://www.kgp.pl/3/5/2002>). However the quality of the candidates is still not the highest, the best and the brightest are still attracted to other professions. What is, therefore, quite surprising is the manner in which commissioned officers are trained. J.M. Rokita, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Internal Affairs and Administration, notes that instead of making it more appealing and attractive for young men and women who graduated from universities to join the force, the system works in the opposite direction. A person with an advanced degree even a doctoral degree has to undergo four months of training for patrol officers in Szczytno (police school) then for three years serve as a patrol officer, then to be sent for the second time to Szczytno to attend the officers' training course. Of course, this process does not take into consideration the qualifications of a given candidate (*Rzeczpospolita*, 3/28/00).

The status of police officer in Poland is the lowest in the history of this profession. ([www.rzeczpospolita.pl/teksty/wydanie\\_000703/kraj](http://www.rzeczpospolita.pl/teksty/wydanie_000703/kraj)).

April 24, 2000, marked a new, previously unknown phenomenon in the Polish police, for the first time the force went on strike. It was not a strike, in the formal sense since such an action is not allowed in the Polish police but a form of protest, that took place in Warsaw, sort of a class action against low wages, and poor management responsible for

things like lack of equipment and the accountability that is placed on police officers involved in chases after criminals which damage police vehicles. The individual officer is responsible for damages out of own pocket due to lack of insurance, which the force cannot afford (*Trybuna*, 4/25/00).

What makes the situation even worse is the enemy that the police force is facing. Organized crime groups, and individual criminals are much better equipped and technologically savvy than the police force. They have the most advanced weapons, communications systems and vehicles, which, of course, cannot be found within the Polish Police (Siemiaszko, A.1999b).

## **Section 2. Legal Basis and Missions**

The basis for the role and operations of the Polish Police force were outlined in 1990, by the Sejm, which passed the Police Service Act, on April 6, 1990

([www.kgp.gov.pl](http://www.kgp.gov.pl), 4/11/00).

This Police Service Act introduced to the Polish legal system solutions which comply with the provisions of the International Pact of Civic and Political Rights and other norms of international law (*ibid.*). The Sejm dissolves the Citizen's Militia and replaces it with the Police Service. With respect to its principles of operation, to a large extent the Police Service goes back to the tradition of this force, which existed before World War 2. This is expressed both by external means (restoration of the name and titles of ranks and positions) and more important, by the philosophy behind its operation, based on cooperation with the citizens and political neutrality of the force and individual officers (*ibid.*).

Article 1 of this Act establishes that the force is to serve in uniforms and be armed with fire-arms, to serve and protect the public and the public order. Articles 2 and 3 add that the traditional functions of the police, as in any other democratic country, are to

protect life and property, the investigation of crimes, arrest of the people responsible for criminal activities, crime prevention, and cooperation with self-governing bodies and other social organizations, etc.

The Act also addresses the organizational structure of the force, including its ranks, and the responsibilities and rights of police officers. In addition, it outlines benefits for officers, including salaries, accommodations, and other social benefits. The last article deals with disciplinary sanctions and accountability.

In addition, to this Act, there are a number of laws and regulations that address the Police Service, and were passed either by a Committee of all the Ministers, or the Minister of Interior Affairs. These rules and regulations pertain primarily to: the right to use police force during social unrest, the right to use firearms, types of documents and identification used by the police, uniforms, and the manner in which certain investigations and surveillance functions are to be conducted.

### **Section 3. Budget and Financing**

For 2000, the Polish police received a an operating budget of 4,739,263,000 Polish zloty ( approximately 1 billion USD). The budget reflects a nominal increase of 9.1 percent in comparison with the previous fiscal year; however, adjusted for inflation, the real increase is only 3.2 percent. Following is the regional distribution of this money:

- province commands (about 350) received about 59 percent
- county commands (16 plus 1 city) about 28 percent
- the headquarters in Warsaw – 13 percent

( *PAP: Polska Agencja Prasowa*), 2/16/00.

The entire police force has 102,795 lines for sworn officers (but as of 1/2/00, only 97,872 of the lines were filled and almost 5,000 lines were vacant). In addition there were 13,932 civilian employees.

Due to energetic involvement of the Chief of Police, 50 million zloty were allocated for upgrading of police salaries, and another 55 million to purchasing of new equipment, including computers and other communication devices, as well as equipment for identification of latent finger prints.

In addition, the police force received a significant loan from the World Bank in the amount of 6 million U.S. dollars, to equip the force with new motorcycles for the traffic police.

Very significant vehicle, for allocation of funding for the force, are the local self-governing bodies. In the year 1999, the force received donations in the amount of 19.1 million zloty (from the self-governing bodies), out of which 10.5 million was allocated for the purchase of 608 cars ([www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html)).

Beginning, January 1, 1999, in connection with the reform of the state administration, a major change took place in the financing system of the Police Service. Eighty six percent of funds earmarked for the operation were passed to the provincial and county police headquarters through heads of local government administration. The remaining 14 percent was used for the maintenance of National Police Headquarters and police structures reporting directly to the Main Chief of the Polish police (Central Bureau of Investigation, police schools and other units of central subordination). These funds were also used to finance central purchases of equipment ([www.kgp.gov.pl](http://www.kgp.gov.pl) 4/19/00).

In 2001, the police budget increased 0.4 percent adjusted for the cost of inflation. The new budget will address police salaries, which will increase on average by 13.1 percent, however, this increase will come at the expense of other expenditures, for example, the modernization of the force ([www.kgpgov.pl/serwis.html](http://www.kgpgov.pl/serwis.html), 1/31/01).

This will, of course, impact all the advances introduced in the previous year, as technological advances have to be updated on a rather frequent basis. However, given the fact that about 30 percent of police families live under the line of poverty, it is no wonder that their economic situation received higher priority than technological needs.

The projected budget for 2002 allocates about 291 millions of US dollars, about 99.7 percent of the previous year's allocation (<http://www.policja.pl/statys/statys03.htm>, 5/4/2002). It appears that the newly projected budget mirrors the previous year. This is definitely not a budget that reflects any growth of the force, technological or otherwise.

#### **Section 4. Organizational structure**

The Polish Police Service is composed of the following services:

- criminal, 32 percent
- prevention, including the traffic police 57 percent
- logistics or support services, 11 percent ([www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/kadry.htm](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/kadry.htm))

Under criminal services following units are included:

- investigations
- operations
- forensics

In addition, police services encompass court police, police training schools, special prevention units (anti-riot police and anti-terrorist squads) and Research and Development units. There are also specialized police units such as railway and river police units.

Police duties, to a limited extent, are also carried out by the Municipal Guard, (Straz Miejska lub Gminna), which deals with maintenance of public order in urban areas, in coordination with and under the supervision of local police authorities.

This national police force is headed by the Chief of Police, who resides at Central Police Headquarters in Warsaw, the capital city of Poland. The current Chief of Police (appointed in December, 2001), General Antoni Kowalczyk, is in charge of the following bodies:

- Executive Bureau
- Inspectorate of the Main Chief of the Police
- Personnel and Training Bureau
- Legal Department
- Directorate of Internal Control
- Directorate for Protection of Classified Information

The first deputy to the Chief of Police, currently General Ireneusz Wachowski, is directly in charge of two these two units:

- Prevention Police-Coordination Bureau
- Central Operational Board

The second deputy, currently General Jozef Semik, oversees:

- Criminal Intelligence Coordination Bureau

- Central Bureau of Investigation
- Bureau for International Cooperation of the Police
- Central Forensic Laboratory
- Police Information Department (Records)

The third deputy, currently, General Wladyslaw Padlo, oversees:

- Central Logistic Bureau
- Communication and Automatics Bureau
- Budget/ Financing Bureau ([www.kgp.gov.pl/kgp.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/kgp.html)) 4/30/00.

#### **Section 5. Centralne Biuro Sledcze - CBS (Central Bureau of Investigation - CBI)**

The Central Bureau of Investigation, or the CBS, was created on March 30, 2002, and had its predecessors in other organizational structures, like the Bureau of Organized Crime, created in 1994, and Narcotics Division created in 1997. Both those divisions have been under the direct jurisdiction and supervision of Central Police Headquarters since their centralization, in December of 1998.

In 1999, those two divisions or bureaus were responsible for the following accomplishments:

- arrested over 1,300 dangerous criminals
- seized over 500 kilograms of explosives, 300 kilograms of narcotics, and other illicit products at an estimated worth of over 54 million zloty.
- exposed white-collar economic crimes that cost the government over 680 million zloty.

- liquidated 8 laboratories producing synthetic drugs amphetamines and 12 channels of distribution
- broke many organized criminal gangs and other organized groups like the infamous Octopus gangs in the city of Lodz, and three large gangs in the city of Warsaw (Dziad, Karol and Masa) and other smaller organized crime groups.

The decision to combine both divisions, or bureaus, into one unit – the CBS, was based on the following shared characteristics:

- the same modes of operation with regard to surveillance of gang leaders
- same legal premises in dealing with suspects (state witness, buy and bust, controlled package, etc.)
- confidential informants in the most dangerous gangs
- joint operations overseas
- joint intelligence and logistics support

The main focus for the CBS is the largest gangs/organized crime groups that deal in drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, human trafficking, explosives, and economic crimes like money laundering, various bank-related schemes, and illegal trading.

The structure of the CBS (overseen by the first deputy of Police Chief) is based on the following departments/units:

- Criminal/Narcotics (2 units)
- Economic
- Analytical
- Technical/Operational
- Witness Protection



- Special Operations

The structural composition of the Bureau varies based on location. The CBS has representatives in provinces and counties; in 2001, the strength of the unit was estimated at 1,650 lines. The Bureau is headed by Major Andrzej Borek, who has served on the force since 1971 ( "Polityka", 3/01/00.).

This newly created unit will require new adjustments within the overall structure, new criteria of recruitment and selection, and mobility within the force that will allow its officers not to serve too much time in this special structure

([www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html)) 3/01/00.

As much as the creation of such a unit is commendable, A. Siemiaszko, a well known Polish criminologist, expressed some reservations about its establishment. He expressed some concern about the new structure and its potential effectiveness. Without money for computers and intelligence, the effectiveness of the unit is problematic. His fears are also related to the fact that all the resources will be allocated to the new unit, at the expense of fighting the conventional (street) crime ( (Gazeta Wyborcza, 1/03/00).

Nevertheless, the Polish public awaits dramatic results from the newly created unit and the publicity that has accompanied its creation. The effectiveness of this new entity and its impact on the image of the entire force remain to be seen. Recent involvement of some of its members in organized crime gangs, reported by the Polish media during in May, June, and July 2002, certainly did not attract glory, trust or public support to the CBS specifically, or the entire police force in general.

## **Section 6. Staff, Training and Discipline**

### *SYSTEM OF TRAINING*

Since 1990 Polish police have been undergoing an intensive process of staff changes. In 1990-1996, 46 percent of staff were replaced, in fact a change of a generation. There was a need for the effective, fast and methodologically sound training

of the new police staff. At present, professional training of police officers is conducted at the following levels:

\* *Basic training*, for all new police officers, aimed at the introduction to the basic requirements of the job. Training at this level is conducted in 12 police training centers, around the country.

\* *Specialist training*, preparing police officers to carry out specialized functions in various police forces, including:

- Training for non-commissioned officers, aimed at developing professional qualifications and serving as a requirement for promotion to the rank of non-commissioned officer
- Training for aspirants (warrant-officers), ensuring a further development of professional qualifications of outstanding police officers and enabling their future promotion
- Training for commissioned officers, designed for those with an excellent service record, several years of service, and completed training at the lower levels.

Programs of police officer training in Poland are modular in character. Training at a police school or centers interspersed with on-the-job practical training in police units, where trainees can test their knowledge and practice skills learned in the course of training. Among commonly used participation teaching methods are interactive lectures, simulations, and role playing.

Training is conducted in the following institutions:

1. *The Police Training School in Slupsk* trains policemen of

the prevention service at the level of non-commissioned officer and aspirant (warrant-officer) and offers development training for managerial staff up to the level of head of prevention department at County police Headquarters and police chiefs of category III (the smallest) police stations.

2. *The Police Training School in Pila* trains police officers in criminal investigation at the level of non-commissioned officers and aspirants (warrant-officers) and offers development training for managerial staff up to the level of head of criminal investigation department at County headquarters.

3. *The Police Training Center in Legionowo* trains police officers in traffic regulation, criminal techniques, and observation at the level of non-commissioned officers and aspirants. Additionally, it offers basic training for police officers with tertiary education and the following courses:

- for police officers dealing with criminal investigation;
- for police officers dealing with juvenile delinquency;
- for instructors of intervention/prevention
- for river police
- mine disposal and pyrotechnics
- patrolling and intervention/prevention
- criminal prevention
- Informatics training

In July 1998 the International Center of Specialist Police Training was opened in this Center (for more about it see International Cooperation).

5. The Higher Police Training School in Szczytno trains police officers at the commissioned officer level for the purposes of the basic police forces and prepares them for the specialist posts and lower level managerial. Specialist training is conducted by the Institute of Prevention and the Institute of Criminal Investigation. General subjects, such as law, introduction to philosophy, economics, sociology, psychology, professional ethics, police statistics, and foreign languages, are taught by the Institute of Law and Social Sciences and the Institute for the Education of Police Managerial Staff.

Professional development is an important element in the process of police staff training in Poland. It is carried out mainly by participation in specialist courses, which deepen professional expertise and provide an opportunity to learn about latest methods and forms of fighting crime. Professional development is also pursued by organizing national competitions, tournaments, and professional and fitness contests such as Traffic Patrolman of the Year, Patrol Team Tournament, Policeman as a Dog Leader). The best police officers of given speciality in regional events are qualified for the finals ([www.kgp.gov.pl/policja.szkolenie.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/policja.szkolenie.html), 7/24/00).

As of March 2000 the Polish Police Service employs :

- 16,789 commissioned officers ( there are 21,063 designated lines 4,274 are vacant)
- 26,697 police warrant- officers ( 6,635 lines are vacant)
- 37,132 non-commissioned police officers ( 1,736 lines are vacant)
- 17,254 patrol officers (7,834 over the designated lines)

([www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/kadry.htm](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/kadry.htm), 7/17/00).

In addition, 18,675 civilians are employed by the police, women comprise 9.2

percent of all police officers. Poland has an average one police officer per 396 people.

Those wishing to join the Police Service have to meet the following requirements:

- Polish citizenship
- no criminal record
- secondary education or higher
- physically and mentally capable to serve, as confirmed by a medical board.

The structure of the staff by individual groups is as follows:

- commissioned officers : 16,409 ( 16.8 percent)
- aspirants ( an equivalent to warrant-officers in the U.S. army): 26,231 (26.8 percent)
- non-commissioned officers : 39,300 (40.2 percent)
- privates (szeregowi policjanci): 15,641 (16.2%).

The majority of Polish police officers are young, under the age of 35. They account for total of 57 percent of the total staff. Those 46 years old and more account for 10 percent of the staff.

The majority of Polish police officers have a secondary education ( 77.8 percent), with 18 percent having tertiary education and a mere 4.2 percent a vocational education ([www.kgp.gov.pl/policja/kadry.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/policja/kadry.html), 3/2/00).

A significant number of the police staff, about 60 percent of the force, has fewer than 10 years experience on the force. This is, among other reasons, an outcome of a very high attrition, for example in 1997, thousands officers left the police (Przegląd Tygodniowy, No. 7/2000). The primary reasons are money-related. The average starting salary for police officer is about 800 zloty (about 190 USD), which is

increased to 99 zloty after 3 years and to 1,200 zloty after 11 years (less than 300 USD) (ibid.).

However, it is important to note that higher ranking officers have relatively good salaries, when considering a national comparison to other professions. For example, the Chief of a province earns six times as much as an entry level police officer. ([www.kgpgov.pl](http://www.kgpgov.pl) , March 20, 2000). Due to this discrepancy there are some unresolved issues between the union representing the line officers and the national headquarters. These issues are related to planned reform in the structure of compensation for police officers. This reform proposes an increase in police salaries across all ranks, and the union, of course, demands a raise only for the lower ranking officers, a compensation that will have to come from not raising the salaries of the high ranks, or giving them just a symbolic increase ( [www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html) , 4/18/00).

One of the most important elements of the new reform is a proposal to compensate officers for more effective performance. Until now this additional pay was only about 0.8 percent of the officer's salary, and the reform proposes a raise up to 15 percent. In addition, different pay rates are to be allocated to different units, and a pay raise for a higher rank would be eliminated. According to the authors of this reform such a step would eliminate the inflation in ranks that are really not needed from an operational standpoint with officers getting promoted for additional compensation and not for the needs of the organization. Although management would get a raise, newly recruited officers will get a higher raise, about 30 percent which might attract more and better quality candidates ([www.dziennik.pap.pl/Zes/zes-1.html](http://www.dziennik.pap.pl/Zes/zes-1.html), 6/21/00).

The implementation of this reform is planned for 2003; and, 628 million zloty will be needed to accomplish its goals (Trybuna, June 9, 2000).

*DISCIPLINE*

Table 5.1 presents sanctions for police misconduct between 1993 and 1999.

**Table 5. 1 Police disciplinary violations and sanctions between the years 1993-1999**

Year	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Total violations	6,027	5,945	6,397	6,661	7,045	4,828	3,915
Sanctions imposed	4,850	4,753	4,661	4,891	4,757	2,547	2,244
Dismissal	493	408	259	336	288	172	197
Officers discipline	4,734	4,613	4,584	4,667	4,507	2,525	2,206
Size of the force	97,247	98,599	99,405	101,362	99,525	99,405	99,771
percentage of discipline versus the size of the force	4.8	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.5	2.5	2.2
percentage of dismissal versus the size of the force	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.29	0.17	0.20

Source: ([www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/dyscyplina.htm](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/dyscyplina.htm) 6/07/00).

Analysis of the above data shows that during the last two years (1998 and 1999) there is a decrease in the number of disciplinary violations. The percentage of officers disciplined and/or dismissed from the force versus the size of the force does not look alarming. However, there is no data about officers that were charged by external courts for criminal and/or civil violations, and this gap in information adds to the picture created by the focus groups of students, politicians, and media representatives that contradicts the statistical

data. This testimonial evidence, collected by the researchers during 1999-2001 will be discussed further in this report.

Interesting to mention, as they have a very powerful impact on police - community relations, are the statistics about use of fire-arms by police officers. Table 5.2 presents statistics about use of fire-arms, according to the rules and against the rules, and also under the influence of alcohol during the years 1996 to 1999. The statistics were compiled by the police national headquarters.

**Table 5.2 Police use of firearms**

Year	By the rules	Against the rules	Under the influence of alcohol
1996	125	21	10
1997	93	14	6
1998	74	7	1
1999	97	4	1

(Source: [www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/dyscyplina.htm](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/dyscyplina.htm), 2000)

Judging from this data there is a significant progress in this area the question remains whether all use of firearms by police officers is actually documented.

### **Section 7. Economic and social conditions of police officers**

Based on the request of the Chief of Police, in 1999, 5,100 police officers were surveyed at random, to evaluate their socio-economic status. The response rate on the questionnaires was 62 percent and the researchers presented their findings as representative of the situation in the entire force.



The poverty line in Poland is defined at 325 zloty income per month per family member, which is about \$77.38 in USD (2000). However, the purchasing power parity of 1 USD in Poland is approximately \$ 1.50, (Britannica World Data, 1999, Encyclopaedia Britannica, p.788) so the more real relation, in this case, would be approximately \$116.00).

As a threshold for average income, an amount of 957 zloty has been mentioned, and 2,100 zloty a month per person indicates wealth. Police salaries, based on the survey were classified in the following manner (zł= Polish zloty):

4.5 percent up to 200 zł

16.5 percent up to 300 zł

26 percent up to 400 zł

19 percent up to 500 zł

11.5 percent up to 600 zł

8 percent up to 700 zł

5.5 percent up to 800 zł

9 percent above 800 zł.

These numbers are per person in the police officer's family, per month.

Based on this analysis, one in every four police families lives below poverty level, and on the verge of poverty, we find almost half of police families.

The same survey, disclosed that only 25 percent of officers live in their own apartments or houses, and about 5.5 percent live in accommodations below their social status, like agricultural dwellings or other facilities not designated for human occupancy. This situation with regard to both salary and dwellings is 14 percent lower than is average for

the Polish population ([www.kgp.gov.pl/matpol/kondycja.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/matpol/kondycja.html), 4/19/00). In addition, about 70 percent of the police officers experience problems with paying their current utility bills (*Rzeczpospolita*, 3/15/00).

This situation is even worse for police officers who serve in smaller communities, where the unemployment rate is much higher than in big cities and the possibility of a second income for a police officer's spouse is rather minimal. It is no wonder that police officers look for a second income, and here we find two categories income: legal and illegal. The Police Act allows police officers to engage in second employment, after work. However, this is contingent upon their supervisor's permission, and not every supervisor is allowed to grant such permission. In addition, police officers should not accept employment that can compromise their profession, like private security guard, private detective, or salesman. Those who receive a permit to work are usually employed as driving instructors or by insurance companies, others accept any paying position for which they can get a permit one of the officers even accepted a position of dance instructor (*Rzeczpospolita*, 3/15/00).

Meanwhile, in addition to having poor socio-economic status, police work becomes more and more dangerous. Over 5,500 injuries were recorded in 1998, 8 officers were killed in the line of duty, and 25 officers committed suicide. The number of accidents on the job is on the rise, from 2,326 (including 16 fatal) in 1992, to 5,541 (including 8 fatal) in 1998 ([www.gazeta.pl/Iso/Wyborcza/Kraj/025kra.html](http://www.gazeta.pl/Iso/Wyborcza/Kraj/025kra.html)).

Stress also contributes to the grim situation of a police officer in Poland. According to recent research findings in the city of Lodz, the stress level of police officers and their

overall physical condition is much worse than that of the average Pole, including other stressful professions, for example, the fire-fighters (Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/28/99).

### **Section 8. International Cooperation**

The Polish Police Service maintains active ties with police services operating in other countries, with the areas of focus on:

- Official contacts maintained by the management of the Police Service aimed at building the international authority of the Polish Police bilateral cooperation, and Poland's participation in INTERPOL
- Practical implementation of the political decisions of the government of the Republic of Poland following from signed agreements and conventions (border cooperation, participation in focus groups in the framework of the third Pillar of European cooperation, participation in the cooperation of Baltic states BALTCOM System, participation in the Dublin Group band in programs of the working groups South-East and South-West
- Seeking foreign sources of financing for training and technical equipment of the Polish Police Service (PHARE fund, financial and technical aid programs based on bilateral agreements)
- Arrangement and development of cooperation between the Polish Police Service and the militias and police services operating in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe ( training police officers from the neighbouring countries, conferences and focus meetings with foreign partners)

- Laying the groundwork for Poland's integration with the European Union by the implementation of police standards in force in EU countries (training Polish police officers in the European Police Academy FBI, in France, Britain, and Germany; introduction to police school program subjects taught at Western European police academies, such as human rights; and cooperation in the framework of the European network of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, HONDLEA)

- Development of cooperation with foreign partners in the areas of operations and investigation (organization and assurance of a high level of professionalism of the National Interpol Office with the National HQ of the Police, presently called the Office for International Cooperation; cooperation between the Central Bureau of Investigation and its counterparts in other countries; and cooperation between the Central Forensic Laboratory of the National HQ and its counterparts abroad).

( [www.kgp.gov.pl/policja/international.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/policja/international.html), 7/08/00).

The Polish Higher Police Training School in Szczytno conducts training courses for commissioned police officers from other European countries and cooperates with police schools and academies in Germany, France, Lithuania, Great Britain, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic ( [www.pentathlon.com.pl/wspol.html](http://www.pentathlon.com.pl/wspol.html), 3/18/00).

### *INTERPOL*

The Polish presence in international police organizations goes back to 1923, when Interpol was established. For political reasons, in 1952, the Polish government broke off all relations with this organization. The first step toward renewing of membership in Interpol was taken in 1989, with Poland rejoining the organization in 1990 at the General Meeting of Interpol in Ottawa.

In 1998 the Polish National Interpol Office was included with the Office for International Police cooperation within the National Headquarters of the police. This office meets all Interpol standards with respect to the fast exchange of information. The office is equipped with the electronic mail facility enabling it to send and receive information from/to all 177 member states of Interpol and the Interpol General Secretariat, as well as to send images of fingerprint charts and photographs of individuals. The office has access to the computerized database at Interpol's Secretariat (ADSF), listing all vehicles stolen in almost all European member states.

Since 1997, a representative of Polish Interpol has represented Europe in the governing body of Interpol's Executive Committee, the top-decision-making body of the organization.

#### *EUROPOL*

Poland was the first post-communist country to begin talks about the possibility of joining Europol (European Police Organization), whose headquarters are located in Hague, the Netherlands. European Union countries are the members of Europol, and the main goals of this organization are to fight organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, the illegal distribution of weapons of mass destruction, car theft, money counterfeiting, child pornography and more. Juergen Storbeck, the Chief of Europol estimates that Poland will become the first country outside the European Union that will be allowed to join this organization

([www.gazeta.pl/Iso/Wyborcza/Kraj/050kra.html](http://www.gazeta.pl/Iso/Wyborcza/Kraj/050kra.html), 3/31/00).

## *PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS*

Since 1992, 150 Polish police officers have participated in missions under the auspices of the United Nations and other international organizations in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Albania, Croatia and Tadjikistan. The Polish police contingent is currently made of 62 police officers, of which 53 are located in Bosnia-Herzegovina (a UN mission), and the remaining are engaged in Croatia, Albania, and Tadjikistan.

The objectives of the Polish police officers are to:

- monitor the activities of the local police forces
- train local police staff
- identify threats to public order and advise local police forces

Two Polish police officers lost their lives during missions, one in Iraq (in 1995) and one in Bosnia (in 1997) ( [www.kgp.gov.pl/policja/un.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/policja/un.html), 7/24/00).

## **Section 9. Municipal Police and Municipal Guard**

### **Municipal Police**

The Police Act of 1990 established two totally new forms of local law enforcement, the Municipal Police and the Municipal Guard. The idea behind these two new forces was to establish an entity that would serve the local population, especially with regard to various administrative functions. The officers would serve in the local precincts, and be sponsored partially by local self-governing bodies. Their mandate for use of force was limited. The ultimate goal was to provide the best service to the population they served. Unfortunately, the projected benefits of this modality never materialized. Local self-governing bodies did not like this police force with its limited powers, especially given

the fact that it was an additional burden on their budgets. Within the police force itself, there was enough opposition, as district chiefs considered this auxiliary force as an unnecessary luxury.

As a result of the opposition, in 1995, the local police forces were dissolved (Czapska and Wojcikiewicz, 1999).

### **Municipal Guard**

The ideas behind establishment of the Municipal Guard were quite noble, specially given that this new entity was supposed to relieve the national force of providing some secondary services, administrative and order-related, and they were supposed to do this for a cost lower than the national force would require.

The first formation of the Municipal Guard was established around 1991 however, the formal act was passed on August 29, 1997 and became fully enforced in January 1998.

Five years from its inception the noble ideas did not prove to be as effective as initially projected. First the cost of its maintenance did not prove to be lower than that of a regular police force; to the contrary, it became even more expensive to maintain this unit. Second, and even more important for this research, public opinion rated the Municipal Guard and its effectiveness even lower than the rating of the national force. It is perceived to be a "power" fighting with illegally parked vehicles, harassing people with parking tickets and old women who are trying to supplement their income by selling green vegetables on the streets (Zietkiewicz, M, 2000).

A Municipal Guard can be established by the governing body of a given area after its representatives get the opinion of the Chief of a given Province (Krupiarz, W. 1998). The Chief of Police is responsible for the professional conduct of the Municipal Guard, and the two forces are obligated to cooperate with each other during time of need (Czapska and Wojcikiewicz, op. cit., p.47).

Czapska and Wojcikiewicz (1997), analyzing the duties and roles of the Municipal Guard, arrived at the conclusion that this force can be definitely perceived as preventive policing. In 1997, the force initiated 2,176,559 interventions, out of which about 62 percent, were traffic violation tickets, 29 percent recommendations to send a case to

small court violations, and the remaining percentage was composed of other quality of life minor violations (Zahorski, A., 1998, pp.2-4). The largest unit is located in Warsaw, and its almost 10 years of existence is rather negatively portrayed by the local media (Bockowska, A., 2000).

The average salary of a guardsman in the Municipal Guard is about 1,920 zloty per month, in comparison with a police officer serving in the same area, who earns about 1,100 zloty per month ( Rzeczpospolita, 07/22/00). Their uniforms are not much cheaper than the ones worn by police officers, and their equipment is the same as a police officer's with one difference: they do not carry firearms, but tear gas.

The cost of maintaining the force in the city of Warsaw in 1999 was about 60 million zloty (about 13.5 million USD) while it "earned" only about 3 million from traffic tickets, about 20 times less than the cost of its maintenance (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2/19-20/00).

As opposed to regular police officers, their work day is comprised of only 8 hours, and they are paid overtime. On top of regular salaries there are bonuses and other benefits, so on average a guardsman costs the city of Warsaw about 2,113 zloty per months, (there are about 1,200 guardsmen in Warsaw) in comparison to 1,100 zloty – the cost of a regular police officer (ibid.).

Based on a simple calculation, instead of 1,400 guardsmen the Warsaw police force could have hired over 2,000 additional police officers ( Trybuna, 6/09/00). However, since it is quite obvious that the national police is not going to get the money that is spent on the guardsmen, and the latter make life a little bit easier, cooperation overall is rather positive, even though it does not benefit the overall image of the police force in the eyes of the public.

Recently, a new proposal is being considered to turn the Municipal Guard into a Municipal Police force, despite the evident lack of effectiveness of such an idea (Zycie Warszawy, 5/14/00).

## **Section 10. Private Protection Services: the Country's Second Armed Power**

To fully appreciate the importance of this formation, it is essential first to establish its size. There are no official statistics that offer a realistic estimate of the number of people



employed by various private security establishments. The closest and most reliable numbers vacillate between 250,000 to 300,000 (Jachowicz et al, 1997).

For purpose of comparison, the Polish armed forces have about 150,000 soldiers and the police force about 100,000. To this one needs to add the very pertinent information about the background of the employees. Most managerial positions are held by former police and former militia officers, including commissioned officers from the infamous Security Bureau, and army reserve officers. In addition, those firms have at their disposal the most advanced equipment, including the most advanced modes of transportation and communication, and they are far superior in that regard to the national police force.

Those private security companies are a product of the new political system, and were completely unknown under the former communist regime. Their legal status is, therefore, very vaguely defined and their rights are the same as those of other Polish citizens (Czapska & Wojcikiewicz, op. cit., p. 57).

The vagueness of the law makes it very easy to open such a company, and even easier to employ personnel. The economic and parallel, crime developments in Poland during the last decade certainly facilitated the tremendous boom in the private security industry.

At the other end of the spectrum, lack of proper regulations contributed to various legal violations during the performance of their duties. The scope of these violations can be estimated, based on the 1994 data, when out of 60 private security companies that were audited by the Ministry of Interior only one was found without any problems or violation (Hugo-Bader, J., Wiernikowska M., 1994).

In 1998, a new law was passed in an attempt to regulate the private security industry. Among other regulations, the most significant appears to be the need to obtain a license for both the company and the employees. However, the new regulations do not limit the functions in which private security companies can be involved, to the contrary, the rights to use force appear to be much broader than previously assumed. The licenses are issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, after recommendations from the Provincial Chief of Police (Czapski & Wojcikiewicz, op. cit., p. 66).

The industry is part of a growing trend, and as in other democratic countries the United States among them, many government-owned or run entities are secured by the better known and efficient private security companies.

An interesting experiment, again one bearing some importance on police-community relations, took place in July 2000, in one of the Poland's larger cities. As part of the experiment, joint foot patrols were introduced, combining police officers with private security guards. Typically the patrol consists of one police officer and two private security employees, or less frequently, two police officers and one private security guard.

What is the point of this experiment? Well, beyond the obvious there are more law enforcers on the streets, on patrol, and more patrol units there is the issue of cost. The police force does not pay a penny to the private security industry, but the private security industry is trying to improve its image as a fully operational force that can be called upon, in the future. This already translates into a profit. In a way it's a sort of free advertisement of their services.

What is the legal basis for this cooperation? The Police Act allows the police force to call any citizen to assist them in enforcing the law and maintaining order.

What is the negative side? There is a fear that a new bond will be established between the police and the private security employees, a bond that can be later on used in a negative manner, contributing to corruption-related issues, especially selling information to organized crime groups.

Overall, however, this initiative appears to be a very interesting one, and given the nature of the crime and law enforcement situation in Poland, it might ultimately proved to be beneficial for maintaining public law and order.

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## Chapter 6. Toward Community Policing

### Section 1. District Constable: Key Post in Community Policing

The institution of the District Constable in the Polish police goes back to the times when Poland (its eastern part including Warsaw) was ruled by Russian czars (1779 - 1914). At that time, the lowest but the most basic element of the organizational structure of the police force consisting mainly of Russian citizens was the District Constable (Russian *Uchastkovyj Policejskij*). An *Uchastkovyj* was very familiar with the area in which he served for many years. He had his secret informers in the underworld of a district. He knew personally most potential and real criminals, especially recidivists in his area.

The function of the District Constable also existed in the Polish police before the Second World War. At that time, the above-mentioned Russian model was adopted. This model was later used in the Civic Militia for no less than 45 years of existence of the previous political system in Poland. It existed until 1990, when the period of transformation commenced.

It is only after 1 January, 2000, that radical changes in the organization structure of the lowest field level of the police force, which were based on the updated Police Act of 1998, were introduced. The number of police stations was considerably reduced (in some cities, 2/3 of these stations were liquidated). At the same time, a new structural level – **the Area of District Constables** – was introduced. The areas are managed by the **Managers of District Constables**. Each area is further divided into **Police Districts** supervised by **District Constables** (Dziennik Ustaw Nr. 106, 1998r., poz.668).

The Areas of District Constables have been enumerated within each city and are mainly directed by warrant-officers. In some cities the Managers of District Constables are a few junior commissioned officers.

Each Area of District Constables, on the average, consists of 6 to 12 districts. Each district is supervised by one personally appointed to the post policeman 1<sup>st</sup> class

(sometimes even a policeman 2<sup>nd</sup> class) or a warrant-officer. It also happens that a District Constable can be warrant-officer or even a junior commissioned officer. This happens mostly in former voivodship cities (there are over 30 such cities in Poland) where Voivodship Police Headquarters was liquidated and there is a surplus of warrant and commissioned officers.

According to the article 8a of the above-mentioned act, a city commanding officer is granted the right to create Areas. A Manager of District Constables is appointed and dismissed by the same commanding officer after consulting a chief (an administrator); the mayor or the president of a city. The same article of the act enumerates the most important tasks of the Manager of District Constables, to identify possible threats and prevent their causes, to initiate preventive actions of local communities and undertake administrative activities and activities pertaining to the observance of regulations and other urgent activities connected with a notice of an offense and to secure the place where a crime was committed.

The District Council or the Commune Council may put forward a motion to increase the number of District Constables if these bodies, in collaboration with appropriate police authorities, provide financial means to cover the cost of maintenance of these constables for at least 5 years (article 13[4]).

Normalization of the function of the District Constable by means of a regulatory act is a positive thing, even though the act does not specify the relations between a police station commanding officer and the Manager of District Constables. Neither does it precisely formulate the tasks of the latter concerning realization of the concept of community policing. Only a few examples of a manager's and a District Constable's duties create a concern that a noble and well-meaning institution may degenerate through fulfilling tasks not connected with realization of the community policing concept.

However, one must notice that direct, everyday contact with local communities requires long-lasting presence of the same constable in a given area. He has enough time

to learn about the daily life of his district. Only then will a police officer feel responsible for all happenings in his district and will citizens learn to trust him, cooperate with him and feel responsible for the successes and failures of their district. Both sides – a District Constable himself and the citizens – can rely on his constant, to-day presence.

A District Constable, according to the instruction of his operation in the act, is obliged not only to make contacts with people who commit crimes but also to establish contact with other citizens. This includes people who are especially likely to become victims of crimes or people having influence on a given local environment, i.e., local government activists, members of political organizations, of educational institutions, directors and people handling security of certain structures and properties.

In the 1974 regulations, a District Constable was responsible for visiting each estate in his district, at least once a year, which was a part of his reconnaissance activity. The aim of the visits was to talk with citizens about their problems and disturbing matters. The new act does not include this provision. A District Constable should devote at least 60 percent of his time on duty to patrolling his district. In fact, he often did not leave his station, since he was engrossed in bureaucratic activities or made the rounds by means of a police car (if the police station had one). The instruction from 1995 exempted District Constables from commencing preparatory proceedings. In districts where the instruction was obeyed, District Constables had more time for fulfilling their duties. Still, numerous District Constables were responsible for preparatory proceedings and were burdened with other tasks. The number of preparatory proceedings led by district constables was 169,000 in 1995, 113,000 in 1996, 117,000 in 1997 and 114,000 in 1998 (<http://www.kgp.pl>, 7/07/02).

The report provided by the National Police HQ shows that tasks which require leaving a police district constitute approximately 50 percent of a Constable's working time. So far, the excess of paperwork has been one of the main reasons for the fact that District Constables are not effective enough. For example, in such a trivial case as a break-in to a cellar, a District Constable had to fill in 21 different documents – from a report from

receiving a notice of an offense to a decision about discontinuance of investigation (Checko, 2000, p.6).

But still, it is not the best record of bureaucracy of the Polish penal prosecution agencies including the police and the public prosecutor's office. In the case of a notification of a theft of, for instance, one chicken from a coop, till the moment of preparation of investigation proceedings and preparation of an indictment, according to provisions binding for the police and the public persecutor's office, one must draw up 56 different documents (Stelmach J., 2000).

The reform of the police, which is dealt with in the next chapter of this study, radically reduces the number of documents and aims at the reduction of paperwork. The District Constable level will undoubtedly also benefit from this change. What are the chances that the new model of District Constables' activity will appear to be more effective? One of the main reasons for the collapse of the concept of strengthening the position of a District Constable in the 90s and changing his function according to the community policing philosophy is the unwillingness of local government to provide financial support for District Constables despite a generally positive attitude towards this institution. Also, the fact that the function of District Constables has remained unclear for years, therefore, they lack the authority necessary for them to undertake the preventive programs. The lack of in-depth knowledge has discouraged police officers from undertaking these activities and some clumsy attempts have damaged their image, together with the image of police force in the eyes of the society.

There are many factors which will influence the effectiveness of operation of this new police network. At the least, one should mention: a rational, not mechanical, division of a territory into areas of District Constables and police districts (criteria of this division should be defined and scientifically justified), a reduction of paperwork, and proper training for new District Constables, providing them with means of personal transport (at least some bicycles) and mobile phones and properly equipped offices with computers, and continuous interest and help from local government.

The number of citizens living in an area is also relevant. The target number of citizens per one District Constable will be, on average, 2,500 people. (Przemyski, A., Wroblewski W.(2000). In fact, there are twice as many citizens per Constable. For example, Constable Grzegorz Rakowski from the Ursynów district, Warsaw, has not fewer than 4,500 citizens in his area. Sergeant Janusz Wysokiński from the Grochów district, Warsaw, has not less than 7000 citizens. According to the data from the end of 2000, there were 9,500 District Constables in total but there should be twice as many. (Tygodnik "Przeгляд", 11/6/00; Winnicka, E. (1999), Winnicka E., and Pytlakowski P. (1999).

The decisive elements in this case are qualifications, professional experience and authority of District Constables. That is why, one may expect that if the posts were taken by commissioned and warrant officers and senior noncommissioned officers (as in all 36 former voivodship cities), their operation will bear fruit. Of course, this will happen if they are properly managed and controlled by managers of area police districts and higher levels of the police hierarchy.

In general, worse results may be expected (apart from a few exceptions) in those cities, like Warsaw, which still hold the status of cities which are the seat of Voivodship Offices. For example, in Praga-Północ - a district of the highest crime rate in Warsaw - the crime rate is twice as high as in other districts. The number of District Constables is as follows:

Commissioned officers	0
Warrant - officers	3
Noncommissioned officers	14
Policemen, 1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> class	18

So more than half of District Constables in this area with the highest crime rate in Warsaw are low - rank police officers. On the other hand, in Kalisz, which used to be the capital of a voivodship, among District Constables there are two commissioned officers:



one lower superintendent and the other a superintendent. The rest are warrant-officers, senior noncommissioned officers and only three low - rank police officers ([www.gminacentrum.waw.pl/dzielnicowi/praga-pn.htm](http://www.gminacentrum.waw.pl/dzielnicowi/praga-pn.htm), 7/29/00 and [www.kalisz.pl/policja/new\\_01.htm](http://www.kalisz.pl/policja/new_01.htm), 7/29/00).

A similar situation is in Konin and Pila – former capitals of their voivodships:

	<u>Konin</u>	<u>Pila</u>
Warrant - officers	3	10
Noncommissioned officers	15	13
Policemen 1 <sup>st</sup> class	0	3

([www.crime-stoppers.top.pl/info.htm](http://www.crime-stoppers.top.pl/info.htm) , 2/08/000).

A suitable regulation (A decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of 3 February 1999, tables 4 and 8, Official Journal No. 12, item 107) provides that in the register of police posts there is a post of the Manager of District Constables and three other posts of District Constables, Senior District Constable, District Constable and Junior District Constable which are supposed to be filled by warrant officers who have at least four years of job seniority (Senior District Constable), three years ( District Constable) and only a Junior District Constable may be a non-commissioned officer (at least three years of job seniority).

One may see from the above example of Praga - Północ in Warsaw that those requirements are not met since more than half of District Constables are not even noncommissioned officers, but low - rank police officers. A lot of them do not have job seniority required since they are still low rank police officers (constables), which means they have served in the force for fewer than two years. The same situation is in Wola – another district of Warsaw – where out of 37 police districts the posts in only 18 of them are filled by Constables and senior Constables

([www.gminacentrumwaw.pl/dzielnicowi/wolahtm](http://www.gminacentrumwaw.pl/dzielnicowi/wolahtm), 7/29/00).

Such disproportion connected with filling the District Constable posts which is observed in present voivodship capitals as compared with former voivodship capitals (to the disadvantage of the former) shows that the prospect of the future successful operation of those basic police structures remains grim.

By the way, it is interesting to note that there are cases in which District Constables of the warrant officer rank report to managers of areas of District Constables who are non-commissioned officers, e.g. in Włoszczowa ([www.kielce.kwp.gov.pl/rewir.htm](http://www.kielce.kwp.gov.pl/rewir.htm), 7/30/00) or in Kalisz, where District Constables, commissioned officers - lower superintendent Z. Juraszek and superintendent M. Kucharski) report to managers of areas of District Constables who are warrant officers ([www.kalisz](http://www.kalisz), *ibid.*).

The city police commanding officer in Toruń, during an interview for a local newspaper, expressed an interesting and original explanation of the new role of a District Constable:

“One of the most important goals is to relieve a District Constable of his duties connected with conducting investigation so they are not assigned any paperwork in order to have more time to make a round in their district and meet its inhabitants who have expressed a need for it. We want every citizen to treat a District Constable as his/her general practitioner to whom they report any problems caused by hooligans” (Fialek, A., 2000). Time will tell if these intentions are only wishful thinking or whether they become reality.

## **Section. 2 "Safe City": Initiatives of the Local Police**

With regards to Community Policing, the website of the National Police HQ ([www.kgp.waw.pl/policja/prewencja.html](http://www.kgp.waw.pl/policja/prewencja.html) 3/28/00), published the following text in its English version:

“Since 1990, the Polish Police Service has been implementing a concept of fighting

crime referred to as "crime prevention", equivalent to "community policing". The objective of crime prevention is to avert the risk of crime by eliminating causes.

The Polish Police Service has been engaged in the following activities in this area:

- Train police officers in techniques of situational and social prevention of crimes
- Build cooperation between numerous institutions and entities aimed at reducing the risk of crime
- Inspire local self-help measures (for example, in local residential areas)
- Disseminate knowledge on anticrime activities conducted by the Police Service and other agencies
- Involve the mass media in anti-crime activities
- Establish a system of ad hoc assistance and promote principles of situational safety
- Conduct intensive activities aimed at preventing juvenile delinquency
- Develop preventive programs aimed at the high-risk groups, that is children, teenagers, women, elderly and disabled people, representatives of small business, etc."

Police crime-prevention specialists are trained at all the levels of police education and development. The subject has been introduced to teaching programs in police schools. In 1995, the National Police HQ developed a comprehensive crime-prevention program called "Safe City". At present the Polish Police Service, together with local governments, foundations and local state administration is implementing 1,268 preventive programs of this sort, for example, the "police educating programs" for children aged 11-12 entitled "Live Normally", "Safe School" and " My Local Patrolman " (this probably means a District Constable). In 1996, the National Police HQ proposed to the Polish government that it establish the National System of Juvenile Delinquency and Pathology. On the initiative of the Police Service, associations and foundations were set up in 42 municipalities to support preventive activities" ( *ibid.*).

It is 2002 now and it is seven years since the above-mentioned programs started being implemented. So what are the results? Not much information can be found. It may be assumed that most of these initiatives remained on paper only, because, as described in Chapter 2, crime in Poland has been growing in a catastrophic manner since 1995.

This alone allows us to say that all the measures mentioned above aimed at implementing the Community Policing philosophy in Poland have mostly been unsuccessful. Of course, there are some exceptions. In a number of areas there were some positive results.

We will return to them later. Now let us have a look at one of the most popularized prevention programs in Poland entitled "The Safe Swietokrzyskie" ("Bezpieczne Swietokrzyskie"), which was organized by the Voivodship (Province) Police HQ in Kielce.

This voivodship prevention program ([www.kielce.kwp.gov.pl/prewencjakwp/glownabs.htm](http://www.kielce.kwp.gov.pl/prewencjakwp/glownabs.htm) 5/25/00), based on close cooperation with the local community, state and local authorities (there is no date of its publication but the text suggests that it happened in 1999 or after), is presented with an opening statement signed by the local *triumvirate*: the Voivod, the Speaker of the Voivodship Assembly and the Voivodship Police Commanding Officer. The statement addressed to the voivodship society and publicized in mass media shows goals and tasks of the program. It calls for approval of the society and active cooperation with the police in order to realize it.

At the beginning it reads:

"Today nobody has any doubts that the rising crime wave cannot be stopped either by the police itself or any other institution protecting the legal order. Our safety depends on pursuing a common policy of preventing threats to our safety, which requires, among other things, mobilization of the whole potential of local communities and consolidation of numerous activities into one organized action".

Next, the program graphically shows an organization chart of, as it calls it, the prevention strategy including:

- situational prevention aimed at preventing crimes or making them difficult to commit
- situational prevention aimed at reversing negative tendencies

- general and special prevention aimed at effective inflicting of punishment and alternatives to punishment
- penitentiary prevention aimed at rehabilitation

Next, there is a graphic chart of operation of "The Safe Świętokrzyskie" Program Council. The Council (its members are not named) supervises the Team of Experts, which helps it to draw up a plan of action. There is also the Media Council, dealing with promotion of the program. The chart shows that there are teams, in all 12 districts of the voivodship, which implement the program in the form of the Integrated Plan for Crime Prevention, which is a common document worked out by the local Chairman, Chairman of the District Council and the District Police Commanding Officer. Two social organizations cooperate with the Program: the Association for Help of Crime Victims and the "Safe Kielecczyzna" Association.

Another part of the program includes the Threats Analysis. It says that a survey was carried out in 1999, based on a sample of 520 persons who explained the reasons for crime in the following ways (in percent):

- The law is too lenient                      71.5 percent
- Unemployment                              52.3 percent
- Wrong upbringing of children        37.9 percent
- Ineffectiveness of the police        26.7 percent
- Impoverishment of the society       24.4 percent

Next, the document describes undertakings realized by the police in the voivodship within the framework of the program. They are:

- Training of all police officers teaching them how to contact victims of violence, listen actively, etc.
- Training for persons belonging to the so-called high-risk groups (cashiers, mailmen, gas station owners, exchange offices owners, etc.)
- Organization of self-defense courses for women
- Organization of a constant opinion poll among citizens and victims of crimes
- Introduction of so-called "clean" entrances to police stations for victims and "dirty" ones for criminals

The strategic goals of the program are:

- To reduce the danger of victimization
- To limit crime
- To lower the level of fear (probably the fear of criminals)
- To improve the relationships between the police and society
- 

Then the program demonstrates proposed directions of preventive actions. The quote *in extenso* (the parts in bold print are as in the original)

### Domestic violence

Fighting domestic violence is a necessary condition for correct functioning of a family. Victims of violence need diverse types of support - social, material, psychological and medical. The fight against pathology does not only consist in the police intervention. Police officers should be only a part of the support chain and provide victims with contact with other institutions. That is why, constant cooperation between different institutions and organizations providing help for victims of violence is necessary.

### Juvenile delinquency and depravity of youth

Criminological analyses and data show that there will be a growing tendency for juvenile delinquency and depravity of youth in the next years. Numerous factors contribute to this situation. One of the most important is weakening of family ties and the influence of the environment on the development of the youth. Another negative factor is the relativism of values in social life, which is shown by ignorance of moral norms and exemplars. Boredom and lack of alternative ways of spending leisure time contribute to criminal behavior. Vandalism, vulgarity, lack of respect for one's property and youths' reprehensible behavior in such places as streets, staircases, means of transport, and mass events are not objected to by other people. On the contrary, no reaction whatsoever can be observed.

### Alcoholism

Analyses (not specified ones) show that the number of people consuming alcohol increases every year. The most disturbing fact is that the age of people consuming alcohol is getting lower. Young people prefer weak alcohol but they drink it in large amounts. High consumption is facilitated by easy access to alcohol and sellers' desire to boost profits (in shops, bars and disco clubs). Vendors do not respect the ban on selling alcohol to persons under 18. Another factor contributing to this negative situation is the passive behavior of parents, guardians and people witnessing sales of alcohol to the under-aged. It has become a rule that a drinking person becomes an authority in an informal group. One must remember that drinking contributes to committing crimes and offenses.

The problem with drugs consists in **producing** drugs, **distributing** and **taking** them. This threat concerns all social groups regardless of area, age, education and financial status. It has become an important social problem in the whole country including świętokrzyskie voivodship. The most popular drugs are marijuana, amphetamines and hashish. The youngest age groups find it "fashionable" to get intoxicated by glues and solvents. Most often, the first contact with drugs takes place in schools and places where

crime or peer groups meet. The youth tend to think that incidental and short-term drug use does not lead to addiction and has no harmful effects on health.

### Crimes against property, life and health

Common crimes are most distressing for citizens and they substantially influence their sense of safety. Among criminal offences in the świętokrzyskie voivodship the biggest threat is posed by crimes against property, especially **car burglaries, burglaries to commercial buildings and wholesale warehouses, auto thefts, bicycle thefts and pickpocketing**. The dynamics of this criminal activity shows that unless factors stimulating it are minimized, it will show a growing tendency.

Crimes against life and health of citizens have a substantial influence on their sense of security. The victims of those crimes are usually elderly people, juveniles and persons intoxicated by alcohol. Those crimes are most often committed in a brutal way. Recent data show that there is an increase in the number of crimes against life and health. One must also stress the fact that nearly half of reported crimes were committed by juveniles.

### Economic Crimes

These are usually called crimes "without victims" and are directed at gaining large property. They include fraud, not paying taxes, evasion of the VAT tax and the so-called "laundering" of money coming from criminal activities. Taking into account the dynamics of economic crimes and Poland's future accession to the European Union, one may suppose that those crimes will show a growing tendency.

### Youth subcultures and religious sects

The activities of youth subcultures and sects produce numerous negative effects for both society and individuals. One should pay special attention to the addiction to psychomodifiers and persons, production, distribution of psychoactive substances, breaking moral norms, shaping and entering roles which are not socially approved. Being



a part of a subculture or a sect makes it difficult for people to fulfil the roles of children in a family, pupils at schools, peers, citizens, etc.

The current state of affairs requires a better diagnostic effect (accuracy and reliability of diagnoses and establishing them at an early stage of a child's becoming a part of a subculture) and multidimensional prophylactic activities.

### Road traffic safety

This problem should be in the center of attention of the authorities and the entire society. Every year, many more citizens are killed in traffic accidents than as a result of criminal activities. So far, an effective system for dealing with negative consequences of development of motorization has not been created. The most disturbing phenomena are: constant increase in the number of accidents, the vast scale of social and economic losses and human drama connected with them.

The final part of the program describes conditions for its realization and conclusions. The program will be successful if the six following conditions are fulfilled (it is a direct quote):

1. Consultation – especially holding a wide consultation and acceptance of the guidelines of the program (among media and citizens)
2. Coordination of all plans and undertakings in endeavoring mass activities
3. Activation of local communities
4. Mass character and adequacy of preventive activities
5. Improvement of professionalism of police activities
6. Management. The final sentence of the Program is: “One must immediately take certain action ensuring that rights of a victim are respected by given institutions and secondary victimization does not take place”(www.kielce.kwp.gov.pl/prewencja\_kwp/glownabs.htm, 5/25/00).

How can we assess this program? It is obvious that its goal is really ambitious: to unite the largest circles of local communities, state and local government authorities in the

fight against crime. This must be done in an organized, coordinated and effective way. Another important feature of the above document is an accurate diagnosis of causes of crime, its character and the threat it poses to local communities. It is connected with an important conclusion of the program: **More than half of crimes in the voivodship are committed by juveniles.** It shows the main direction of the fight against crime which is announced in the program. Moreover, the program says that juveniles are most susceptible to the influence of drugs and alcohol. Therefore, one may expect decisive actions against the drug business, and making it as difficult as possible for young people to have access to alcohol.

Road safety must also be improved since “many more citizens are killed in traffic accidents than as a result of all other criminal activities.” This is supposed to be one of the main goals of the program. On the other hand, the program is full of empty phrases or trivial statements like “The dynamics of this criminal activity show that unless factors stimulating it are minimized, it will show a growing tendency.” This observation is true but definitely not new, it concerns not only Kielce but Warsaw, Paris or Pernambuco in the Republic of Congo.

In sum, it is difficult to make a clear-cut assessment of the program. The near future will show how it works in practice.

The influence of the “Safe City” Program appeared to be very great in the country. Thirty nine out of fifty former voivodships have been implementing this program. In 137 municipalities, “Safe City” program councils have been appointed. In 107 municipalities commissions and teams dealing with preventive actions have been appointed, and they provide active support for preventive actions organized by the police ( Fiebig, J. 2000). In 179 out of 316 police district headquarters realization of the program was the sole responsibility of the police. There were no “external structures” describing cooperation with other entities. That is why, only the police bore the costs of prophylactic activities. Despite the fact that the police continually took certain actions aiming at improvement of safety, activities of other entities were mostly short-term, occasional and often chaotic.

Dr. Janusz Fiebig (1999), a research worker at Higher Police Training School in Szczytno, summed up present negative results of the program and came to the conclusion that they resulted from:

- Incompetence, lack of good will, or short-term local governments' interest in crime prevention
- Lack of coordination of activities of institutions responsible for protection of public safety and order, social organizations' limited interest in cooperation with the police in order to ensure public safety and order
- Lack of faith in the sense of social activity
- Lack of formal system solutions, "the police vs. institutional - social surroundings"
- Poor condition of the Polish police force, which is the main initiator of activities, caused  
by poorly equipped basic police units, engagement of prevention police officers in other  
tasks (e.g., escorting convoys), relatively low salaries, lack of respect for the police, lack  
of clear criteria for assessment of preventive actions ( *ibid.*, see also: Widacki, J. [1998]).

### **Section 3. Crime Stoppers**

The initiative of introducing the Crime Stoppers idea in Poland was undertaken by police headquarters in Radom in July, 1997. Similar to the idea introduced in the United States (it originated in Albuquerque, New Mexico in 1976), the Crime Stoppers program in Radom and other Polish cities is supposed to solve three basic problems regarding witnesses. These are: (1) apathy, (2) fear of retaliation and (3) unwillingness to get involved. It is accomplished by providing absolute anonymity for a witness and encouraging him/her by a financial reward if information given results in arresting a criminal.

The Crime Stoppers (CS) program is jointly implemented by three institutions:

- Local community and local government, which create the program, fund awards and oversee its realization
- Media, which promote the CS program, publish data concerning the program, remind the public of telephone numbers and e-mail addresses by means of which witnesses are to report information regarding crimes
- The police, who gather information, ascribe numbers to callers, arrest criminals, point to an anonymous recipient of a reward

Shortly after Radom, other cities (Słupsk, Rzeszów, Płock, Gdańsk, Poznań, Katowice) undertook the initiative to organize the CS action in their areas or, at least, they introduced the 24-hour-a-day “helpline” where everyone, maintaining full anonymity, can give information regarding crimes.

The first practical results of the program are quite encouraging, especially in Radom, which was admitted, as the first city in Poland and entire Middle and Eastern Europe, to the international police association promoting the CS ideas. Lower superintendent Tadeusz Kaczmarek - initiator of the Program – was invited to the United States, where he studied local experiences regarding implementation of the Program in Colorado and Wyoming and also shared Polish experiences in this field ([www.crime-stoppers.top.pl/info.htm](http://www.crime-stoppers.top.pl/info.htm), 2/28/00).

The following numbers show the first results of implementing the CS idea in Radom. In 1997 there were 420 CS calls; 120 pieces of information gained were later verified as reliable information about committed crimes:

- 24 calls made it possible to institute preparatory proceedings
- 30 calls made it possible to find a perpetrator and the public prosecutor’s office could charge him/her
- 4 calls made it possible to arrest persons wanted by the police
- 8 calls made it possible to find illegal alcohol sales points
- 8 calls made it possible to retrieve stolen cars
- 2 pieces of information were sent to the Border Guard that enabled them to arrest smugglers

- 54 pieces of information were already known to the police

Another 300 pieces of information included descriptions of the situation in the town and descriptions of dangerous places, which was also very useful for the police. This mainly concerned information regarding addresses of households where women and children were beaten, places where stolen items were hidden, shops where stolen cars were stripped, etc. Since the advent of the CS action in Radom the police have rewarded a considerable number of people (funds were also provided by the town president).

Surprisingly, **95 percent of people refused the money in return for valuable information regarding it as their duty as a citizen.** The second positive thing is that only in four cases did the police deal with spiteful, untrue information.

In 1998 there were 856 calls, which is twice as many as the previous year. About 360 pieces of information enabled the police to find and arrest criminals. In 1999, there were 869 calls ([www.crime-stoppers.top.pl/efekty.htm](http://www.crime-stoppers.top.pl/efekty.htm) , 2/08/00). Detailed data about this information has not been published yet. Nevertheless, if one assumes that information gained from CS in 1998 and 1999 is at least as valuable as it was in 1997, one must admit that the Crime Stoppers idea has very bright prospects in Poland.

#### **Section 4. Media Fighting Crime**

Polish media pay a lot of attention to the problem of crime. Opinion polls show that the sense of insecurity caused by crime is one of the biggest problems of an ordinary Polish citizen. One must mention here two important weeklies: *Polityka* and *Wprost*, and two dailies: *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita* - their publications are often cited in this study. It is interesting to note that, apart from journalists, the above papers publish interviews with and articles of numerous scientists, university professors, and sometimes distinguished specialists on criminal justice and police sciences. We have included their arguments in previous chapters of this study. On the other hand, compared to previous years, there are many fewer, publications on this subject in specialist scientific periodicals.

Polish media find one of the reasons for this is the fact that the number of colleges of higher education has doubled in Poland in the last few years. This is a response to Polish youths increasing demand for higher education. They understand that nowadays only a university degree can help them have a better career. This rapid growth in the number of new colleges did not go hand in hand with the "production" of new academics - teachers. As a result, most of them teach at their university as well as at a couple of other ones. Some of them teach at as many as 10 different universities, earning more money than in the previous era when professors' income was lower than, e.g. the income of plumbers and greengrocers. As a result of lack of time, it is easier for an academic to give an interview to a newspaper or write an article for it than prepare another scientific publication, which is more time-consuming.

As far as the role of the media regarding the subject of this study is concerned, one must stress extremely useful actions carried out consistently, effectively and on a large scale by *Super Express*, a nationwide daily with the second biggest circulation in Poland (approximately, 400,000 copies every day). Two years ago, the daily initiated a fight against drunk driving. Its numerous publications, reports and interviews with leading experts and lawyers stressed the tragic consequences of drunk driving. Not only were the perpetrators stigmatized but certain regulations which were wrong, according to the daily, came under a lot of criticism. The regulations treated drunk driving as a common offense (if there were no casualties) which is punished with a fine and/or with an oral reprimand, but not with confiscation of a driving license.

The threat of drunk driving was pinpointed. No other criminals caused so many deaths, serious injuries and so much material damage as drunk drivers and perpetrators of road accidents. The police and judicial institutions were criticized for liberal treatment of drunk drivers. Legislative bodies were criticized mainly for failing to notice that the punishment for the above crimes was not commensurate with their social harm. The *Super Express* action carried out **every day** for almost two years largely contributed to updating certain articles of the Criminal Code. Now each accident caused under the

influence of alcohol is a crime punishable with imprisonment for up to 10 years and the permanent or temporary confiscation of a driving license. Moreover, causing an accident involving casualties can be punished with a life sentence.

On 11 March 1999, the editorial staff of *Super Express*, encouraged by the success of this action, started another anti-crime action called "Look out for pickpockets."

This was inspired by the plague of pickpocketing in Poland mainly resulting from imperfect legal norms. A pickpocket, even when caught red - handed, can be punished only symbolically, or not at all. According to Article 278 of the Criminal Code, a person can be punished with imprisonment for a period from 3 months to 5 years for stealing a movable thing (pickpocketing is treated this way). But if the value of the stolen item is below 250 PLN, a pickpocket is only threatened with a punishment by the Adjudicative Board. This administrative body punishes criminals with fines. In practice, most of fines imposed by this body are not executed. As seen in the following example, a pickpocket does not risk a great deal since s/he rarely steals sums larger than 250 PLN, most people do not carry such sums. Of course, foreigners are an exception.

Times change. Now pickpockets are not mainly interested in money or watches but documents: passports, IDs, credit cards, checkbooks and driver licenses. For many years, a "good" tradition cultivated by pickpockets was dropping stolen documents into mailboxes. Every day, mailmen found those documents and returned them to their owners. Nowadays, the documents are the most important loot of pickpockets, who are not so much interested in the couple of zloty they can find in somebody's wallet or purse. Since Poland gained independence its citizens have not needed visas to most of Western countries (apart from the United States and Canada). That is why a stolen passport is worth even 1000 PLN on the black market. Interestingly enough, a black market price for IDs is even higher; it enables theft, one may borrow money from a bank, establish a fictitious company, rent a car s/he will never return and so on. The benefits of stealing a credit card are enormous since most banks in Poland do not have a central system for checking validity and the account balance of a given card. And how can a prosecutor prove that a stolen passport or an ID is worth more than 250 PLN?

*Super Express* fights with this legal nonsense. Every day, famous theoreticians and persons who practice law stigmatize the content of the legal norm. It is also criticized by a large group of ordinary persons in the street who fall prey to pickpockets. The newspaper not only criticizes the legislative bodies. *Super Express* took a consistent and large-scale action against pickpocketing. The police estimate that in Warsaw only there are 300 - 350 episodes of pick pocketing every day. Long-standing "professional" pickpocketing experience passed from generation to generation makes it very difficult or even impossible to catch a pickpocket red-handed, especially when s/he works for an organized and professional group. "The loot" is immediately passed to different members of a gang. Usually it takes seconds in a crowded bus or tram, or in the street.

The *Super Express* action works in four ways: (1) raising people's awareness, (2) exposing pickpockets, (3) encouraging the police to intensify their activities against pickpockets and (4) preventive activities.

#### Raising people's awareness

Publishing of **daily** updated:

- maps of high-risk areas
- lists of high-risk bus and tram lines
- methods of pickpockets' operation and their tricks
- advice for people who are being robbed and who have been robbed
- methods for protecting oneself against pickpockets

The map of areas where pickpockets operate is a map of a section of central Warsaw - about 1/10 of the whole area of the city. There are 10 sub-areas precisely characterized and localized on the map. For example, sub-area no. 3, the Central Railway Station. Platforms III and IV are most dangerous. Pickpockets pass through railway cars during a stopover and rob passengers in the crowd. Railway station cashiers' desks and restaurants are also dangerous. The same pickpockets operate at the nearby the Central Bus Station at the end of the week."



The list of "high-risk" bus and tram lines mentions the bus line no. 175, connecting the airport with the city center. Most dangerous stops are listed. Moreover, there are weekdays and hours when pickpockets' operation is intensified.

Pickpockets' methods and tricks are constantly updated. There are two main categories of this criminal activity: group and individual. The former is most frequent since it is most effective. The newspaper precisely describes all known techniques of pickpockets' "operation", which helps people protect themselves against thieves. It also describes typical techniques of individual operation. Here is an example: "A new method "using a suitcase". A thief cuts out the bottom from a large suitcase. S/he takes it to the Central Railway or Bus Station. S/he is standing next to a passenger who has a suitcase. When the passenger does not look at his/her suitcase, the thief puts his/her suitcase with its bottom cut out on the passenger's one. The owner panics, seeing that his/her suitcase has disappeared. The perpetrator is standing calmly next to him/her pretending to read a timetable.

Another trick played near the Washington Roundabout: Everybody who wants to pick up a roll of banknotes lying on the pavement is surrounded by a group of young men who create confusion and steal the person's bag, etc.

The newspaper gives valuable advice on what to do when somebody is being robbed and immediately after the event.

Finally, there are practical tips on how to protect oneself against pickpocketing. Here is one of them: A wallet with documents (money should be kept separately) should be in the left but not right inside pocket, since it is more difficult to reach with the right hand (unless a thief is left-handed) to the right breast pocket.

### Exposing pickpockets

Thanks to readers' cooperation, *Super Express* gathered a great deal of invaluable information making it possible to expose the most dangerous pickpockets. This information is about:

- Pickpockets' personal data, their first names and initials (giving full names is contradictory to regulations regarding protection of privacy)
- Where they come from (mostly from the outskirts of Warsaw)
- Their age, height, the way they dress, hairstyle, glasses
- Their look: photographs – the whole body and face (the press law requires that their eyes be covered with a black stripe; nevertheless, we can recognize them)
- Where they meet, eat, what groups they form, what tricks and methods they use, where one may usually meet them

All this information and photographs are published **every day** in the special illustrated supplement called "Pickpockets".

#### Encouraging the police

The newspaper does it discreetly but firmly – it demands more protection for citizens. It pinpoints the fact that the fight with pickpockets was more effective in the former political system. A special police unit to fight pickpockets was created in Warsaw in 1956. The unit was the apple of the decision-makers' eye. Militia officers could use wigs, artificial moustache and beards, sideburns, glasses with rearview mirrors and the hit of those times – two-sided jackets. Nowadays, the motto of the policemen is "to see and not be seen". They do not use props. All they have are sharp eyesight, quick reflexes and the ability to follow clues.

#### Preventive activities

These are the following undertakings initiated and organized by the newspaper and agreed on with the police and authorities: white and yellow stickers placed in public places, train and bus stations, intercity and city means of transport which warn people against pickpockets; distributing leaflets with the same content; warnings from

loudspeakers at train stations; organizing financial support for the police to help them install cameras in places frequented by pickpockets (recordings are treated as evidence in courts).

The sticker action was also organized in other cities (e.g. Łódź, Wrocław).

Every day, *Super Express* publishes new lists of readers who became victims. They share their emotions and experiences. The newspaper encourages the acts of bravery while fighting with pickpockets by publishing stories such as the one of a 15-year-old girl who overpowered an older and taller assailant who was trying to snatch her bag. With the help of other witnesses she managed to hold the attacker until policemen came (the pickpocket could not know that this tiny, inconspicuous girl was a karate champion in her age group).

What are the practical effects of this action? Maybe they do not exactly achieve set goals, but Warsaw police have noticed a decrease of 1/3 in the number of reported thefts in the central area of Warsaw in comparison with the period before the *Super Express* action was initiated. It is expected that a more radical decrease will take place when the Criminal Code is updated, which is the main postulate of the newspaper (all data presented in this section come from: [www.se.com.pl/Iso/dzisiaj/main.asp](http://www.se.com.pl/Iso/dzisiaj/main.asp) , 5/02-8/03/00).

To make the overview complete, one must mention the crime-fighting role played by two very popular TV series: "997 Police Magazine" and "Whoever Knows Whoever Has Seen".

These series are created with cooperation of the police and they contribute to popularization of the difficult role of police officers fighting the crime wave. They propagate knowledge about criminals' methods of operation, warn citizens against them, and sometimes contribute to arresting criminals in cases they describe.

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## Chapter 7. The Recent Reform of the Police

### Section 1. The scope and character of implemented changes and the goals of the reform

The Spokesman of the Police Head Commanding Officer Higher superintendent Pawel Bedziak presented the current reform of the police in the Central Internet Bulletin in terse but still essential way: ( [www.kgp.gov.pl](http://www.kgp.gov.pl) 06/24/00 )

What has changed?

#### *PERSONNEL AND FINANCIAL DECENTRALIZATION*

The Police before 31 December 1998:

- The District Commanding Officer was appointed by the Head Commanding Officer **after he had sought advice** of a voivod and the regional government.
- The Police Station Commanding Officer was appointed by the Voivodship Commanding Officer **after he had sought advice** of the Commune Council.
- The budget for all units was allocated by the National Police Headquarters.

The Police after 1 January 1999:

- The Voivodship Commanding Officer is appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration as a result of the Head Commanding Officer's proposal **with the agreement** of a voivod
- The District Commanding Officer is appointed by the Voivodship Commanding Officer **in** consultation with a starost (Councilman);
- The Police Station Commanding Officer is appointed by the District Commanding Officer after he had sought advice of the chief (the administrator) (mayor, president)
- The budget of police units on the level of a voivodship is a part of the voivod budget; on the level of a district there is a subsidy allocated by the starost (social control; the budget cannot be reduced)

#### *CLOSE RELATIONS WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES*

- The voivod – a body responsible for security matters (except for operational-reconnaissance matters and investigation matters)
- The Commune Council or the District Council – possibility of increasing the number of police vacancies financed by the local government – one vacancy would cost approx. 31,000 PLN annually (salary, tax, insurance)
- The Chairperson of the Commune or District Board – preventive tasks for the police

*THE ESSENCE OF THE REFORM – A NEW POSITION OF THE POLICE WITH REGARD TO THE SOCIETY*

THE POLICE before 31 December 1998:

- The creator of the security policy
- Specified tasks for themselves
- Realized them themselves
- Accounted for them themselves
- No distinction between the detection function and the prevention function

THE POLICE after 1 January 1999:

- The legislative body distinguishes the detection function and the prevention function
- **THE POLICE IS A TOOL FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES WHICH SERVES TO PREVENT CRIME**
- The detection function is supervised by the public prosecutor's office and courts

**VOIVODSHIP AND DISTRICT POLICE HEADQUARTERS**

- 16 Voivodship Headquarters and 1 Capital City Headquarters directly subordinated to the Head Police Commanding Officer
- 329 District Headquarters subordinated to Voivodship Police Commanding Officers:
  - \* 316 - former Area Headquarters
  - \* 13 - former police stations
- 2072 police stations subordinated to Commanding Officers

**MAINTAINING A UNIFORM ORGANISM OF THE POLICE – THE CHIEF POLICE COMMANDING OFFICER IS THE SUPERVISOR OF ALL POLICE OFFICERS**

*ALLOCATION OF LINES FOR POLICE UNITS:*

Criteria:

- 65 percent of lines – by population
- 2 percent of lines – by area
- 8 percent of lines – by population in towns and cities
- 4 percent of lines – by cities over 300 thousand citizens
- 20 percent of lines – by the number of detected crimes
- 1 percent lines- the capital city

102,755 lines for the whole country - without the lines of the court police, police

schools, prevention units, Departments of Fight with Drugs and Organized Crime (currently the Central Bureau of Investigation and its field departments – author's note), the total number of 89,633 lines to be shared between police units in Poland.

The number of citizens per one police officer in units situated in areas which are most endangered by crime:

- Warsaw 266
- Zachodnio-Pomorskie Voivodship, 394 (Szczecin 362)
- Pomorskie Voivodship, 401, (Gdańsk 384)
- Dolnoslaskie Voivodship, 414, (Wroclaw 345)

The number of citizens per one police officer in units situated in areas which are least endangered by crime:

- Opolskie Voivodship, 468,
- Mazowieckie Voivodship, 475
- Podkarpackie Voivodship, 514

#### *POLICE OFFICERS*

- PENSIONS – all police officers who work presently can retire according to former rules. New rules will apply to officers employed after 1 January 1999.
- SALARIES – police officers from 33 voivodship and 48 area headquarters which are liquidated can maintain their present salaries together with future pay rises. The Parliament transferred the entitlement regarding this matter from the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration to Voivodship Commanding Officers (until 30 June 1999).
- CHANCES – contests for the posts of Voivodship and District Commanding Officers

#### *COSTS OF THE REFORM*

- Basic changes regarding competencies and structures do not imply any costs
- Change of workplaces for approximately 4,000 police officers (expenditure: commuting, compensation for lack of flats) – 13 million PLN
- Adaptation of new headquarters (communication, economic-financial service, redecoration, computers, etc.) – 140 million PLN
- POLICE BUDGET:  
4 billion 300 million PLN (3 billion 722 million PLN in 1998).

### *POLISH POLICE – ONE ORGANISM*

- Decentralized police – close to local communities, especially as far as prevention is concerned
- Fully autonomous police – independent from local governments' administration as far as detection is concerned
- Centralized police – as far as the fight with organized crime is concerned.
- The police are perceived in a much better way by local communities; in December 1997, 51 percent of people perceived the police activities in a positive way, in September 1998 – 61 percent)\*.

Dr. Janusz Fiebig, a scholar of the Higher Police Training School in Szczytno, thinks that, as a result of the reform, the police will become an institution which will be:

- Decentralized, close to local communities especially as far as prevention is concerned,
- Autonomous, independent from local governments administration as far as crime detection is concerned,
- Centralized, as far as the fight with organized crime is concerned.

([http://republika.pl/biuletynwspol/ibs\\_1i2\\_99/a2\\_1-299.html](http://republika.pl/biuletynwspol/ibs_1i2_99/a2_1-299.html) , 7/12/00).

Decentralization, as far as preventive activities are concerned, makes the police an instrument which will serve local communities to fulfill tasks preventing crime. Two main entitlements of local governments are a big chance for local communities. The first is the possibility to delegate their representatives to vacancy contest commissions deciding about the local commanding officers' posts. The second is the right to propose appointments for local police commanding officers and to dismiss them (ibid.). The author whom we quote here thinks that the reform gives real bases for implementing a new philosophy of the police operation, .i.e. Community Policing (ibid.).

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\* If one were to judge the effectiveness of the reform only on the basis of the percent of the surveyed who perceived the police activities in a positive way, this criterion fails to be satisfactory since later surveys (after September 1998) showed a slump in the number of people satisfied with the police work, which was discussed in earlier chapters.

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## **Section 2. The first achievements (an official summary)**

In August 2000 Jan Michna, then Main Chief of Polish Police, was promoted, by the decree of the President of Poland, to the rank of the General Inspector of Police, an equivalent to the rank of a two-star army general.

On that occasion, the Press Service of the National Police HQ published via Internet ([www.kgp.gov.pl/](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/), accessible 9/10/00), the following summary of the achievements of the police since Gen. Michna became its Main Chief:

Jan Michna, the first General Inspector in the history of the Polish police since 1990, was born on 24 November 1947. He graduated the Law and Administration Department of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow and the Higher Police Training School in Szczytno. In June 1990 he was appointed as the Voivodship Police Commanding Officer in Bielsko-Biala. From 1997 he was the Voivodship Police Commanding Officer in Katowice. In January 1998, he became the Main Chief of the Polish police.

### **Since January 1998:**

1. The police have been adapted to changes resulting from administration reform in Poland (the national Police HQ has reduced, personnel and financial entitlements have been decentralized).
2. The Central Bureau of Investigation – a centralized service for fighting organized crime – has been created.
3. The Directorate for Internal Affairs – a centralized service to fight crime among police officers – has been created.
4. A motivating remuneration system, which is presently being implemented, has been prepared.
5. A program of technical modernization, which is presently being implemented, has been prepared. It includes, e.g., computerization, command stations, DNA and dactyloscopy test bases, etc.
6. Associative negotiations with Europol have been initiated.
7. The most important criminal groups have been liquidated (here, the names of 14 gangs in the capital and in the country).
8. In 2000, the percentage of detected crime increased, in comparison with previous years, and again it was over 50 percent.
9. A new recruitment system has been created – compulsory complex psychological tests have been introduced, changes in police training have been drawn up.
10. Scientific research made by independent centers on psychosocial condition of police officers has been initiated.
11. Complex teams of psychologists, negotiators and other specialists have been created in the police.

12. Projects of further complex changes included in the Domestic Program of Crime Prevention (discussed in Chapter 8) have been drawn up. They concern, e.g., a system of registration simplifying bureaucratic activities and closer cooperation with local governments. For the first time after 1990, the program of police reforms is not only a couple of postulates but it has a form of drafts of concrete amendments to legal acts.

### **Section 3. Controversy between the police and local authorities**

First reports from local police stations show that the essence of the two contradictory reforms has been misunderstood in most voivodships and districts. Local police commanding officers often do not know who supervises them, after the administrative reform both, local government representatives and their police supervisors claim the right to do so. This situation has alarmed Polish MPs and the National Police HQ. On 7 June 2000, during the session of the parliamentary Commission of Administration and Internal Affairs, General Ireneusz Wachowski – the deputy of the Main Chief of Police – presented a document prepared by the National Police HQ entitled: “Functioning of the police within new structures” ([www.dziennik.pap.pl/Zes/zes\\_1.html](http://www.dziennik.pap.pl/Zes/zes_1.html), 6/08/00).

“Controversial dualism of supervisors”, “schizophrenia”, “a pathological situation”, “split personality”, “a puppet system” – these are only a few phrases used by MPs, both from the coalition and the parliamentary opposition, to describe the situation where the police force is subordinated both to local authorities and supervising police headquarters.

“Supervision of local governments over the police means having a right to set tasks and political responsibility. Unfortunately, not all local government activists realize this” – this was written in the National Police HQ document. General Wachowski gave an example of a “president of some town” who stated that “the supervision of the Voivodship Police Headquarters and the National Police HQ no longer concerns them”.

According to the general, it happens that starosts (councilmen) allocate financial means,

taking into account "obedience" of district police commanding officers. Sometimes, a starost, contrary to police orders, does not allow to pursue a criminal in a different district because "he is not going to finance it"(ibid.).

Zbigniew Sobotka, MP, from the then opposition Alliance of Democratic Left (SLD) (since 2001, this party has been in power) stressed the fact that subordination of the police to local authorities makes this formation political. He claimed that "voivods can 'direct' the police to areas which are beneficial for them". Jan Maria Rokita, the chairman of the parliamentary commission, was even more pessimistic about the results of the police reform:

"The operation of increasing safety responsibility of civil authorities has been a failure. This results from the fact that neither voivods nor starosts want to take this responsibility. Civil authorities tend to think that the police is something absolutely autonomous."

Bogdan Borusiewicz, deputy Minister of Administration and Internal Affairs, admitted that local governments "do not really know what to do". General Wachowski sees a chance in training for starosts organized by the police (ibid.).

At the same time, MPs came to an agreement that "we must not return to the old model" and isolate the police from local government structures.

Another problem taken into consideration was the question of contests for the vacancies of voivodship police commanding officers. "Unfortunately, objectively speaking, one must admit that we, as the police, have certain doubts regarding the content-related side of the rules governing those contests", said General Wachowski. He repeated that, according to binding regulations, there are two representatives of the police and three representatives of local governments in commissions electing commanding

officers. He added, "that is why very often personal decisions regarding those vacancies are more political than content-related". One of the MPs said that a commanding officer should not be responsible for actions of people whom he did not and would never like to appoint.

Jan Maria Rokita, the above-mentioned MP and the chairman of the parliamentary commission of administration and internal affairs (1999), was asked if the reform improved the police operation and brought it closer to citizens. He answered, "the reform had a structural but not functional character. It means that its goal was to adapt the police to changes in the organization of the state, especially to the new territorial division."\*

The police were given into the hands of voivods and starosts. After a couple of months, it became clear that, except for the śląskie voivodship, most of voivods did not take the responsibility resulting from supervising the police. Nobody taught them what to do and nobody held them accountable. This is a general problem connected with poor supervision by the Prime Minister and the government of starosts. Rokita's impression was that most starosts have a sense of incompetence and do not want to interfere with the police work. Nevertheless, he feels that the readiness of local governments and the police to cooperate will grow. Such are the tendencies of the modern world (ibid.).

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\* Within the confines of this division, the number of voivodships was decreased from 50 to 16. That is why the areas of new voivodships became much bigger and more populated. Moreover, a three-level administrative system was introduced: voivodship-district-commune instead of a two level one: voivodship-commune. In this way, 360 district were created.

New structures, apart from the state administration (voivods, starosts and chiefs), were given broader local governmental entitlements and bigger subsidies from the central budget.

Jerzy Stepień, the deputy Minister of Administration and Internal Affairs, notices other dangers resulting from the new relations between the police and the authorities: “If the criminal society takes control over the District Council, it will influence the appointment for the vacancy of the district police commanding officer” ([www.zw.com.pl](http://www.zw.com.pl), 7/12/00).

Jerzy Dziewulski MP (a former police officer) is even more pessimistic: “It was a serious mistake. The Polish police are not prepared to be governed by local governments. It may have a negative influence on our safety” (ibid.). In his opinion, the police will not be captured by a mob, but will become a victim of some local “pals’ agreement”. The voivodship commanding officer is responsible for safety in his/her area and s/he cannot make decisions about the vacancy of the district commanding officer. “It’s absurd” he adds (ibid.).

This new model of the police organization structure subordinating it (as regards finances and administration but not operation) to local authorities was introduced. Antoni Kowalczyk, the new Main Chief of the Police, comments on this model:

“In practice, the situation is like this – one starost provided extra money for uniforms of field police officers on time, another did it on time but provided only half of the required sum and still another one provided nothing at all because he thinks there are other more urgent expenses. Let’s imagine that the crime rate grows in county A and slumps in county B. A voivodship police commanding officer is responsible for security in the voivodship but cannot allocate funds to county A, where security is lower. It is absurd! I demand that the budget for the police be allocated from the Ministry of Administration

and Internal Affairs and that the police administer this money themselves”, (Jachowicz and Wronski, 2001).

Nevertheless, general Kowalczyk does not reject the necessity of close cooperation between the police and local authorities. He thinks that this cooperation is extremely important but he demands full independence of the police as far as their finances and operation are concerned (ibid.).

The reform, and especially the local police authorities' dependence on voivods and starosts, is nothing new in the history of the Polish police. In fact, the model adopted on 1 January 1999 is quite similar to the model which existed in Poland in 1919-1939. Misiuk (1996) and Majer, a research worker of the Higher Police Training School in Szczytno (1999) write about it. Most of the information used in this chapter is taken from the study written by the latter.

Article 2 of the Act of Parliament from 24 July 1919 stated that: “The state police is an executive body of state and local authorities. Other provisions of this act stated that: “A voivod provides peace and security in his/her voivodship”. A starost was “the one and only master” of the police in a district since his/her authority was precisely defined by the Cabinet regulation from 13 November 1919. Its article 11 stated that: “The district state police bodies are subordinate to the starost as far as security services and executive activities are concerned (...). A starost may make recommendations and proposals which should be complied with by the state police bodies.”

This coexistence of the police and local authorities has not been entirely harmonious. On the contrary; for those 20 years (1919-1939) there were numerous disputes between the police and local authorities concerning the problem of authority. There were three

grounds for this never-ending problem: p (1) personal entitlements, (2) personnel policy and (3) the range of tasks assigned to the police.

The Police Act from 1919 named voivods and starosts as the only supervisors of the police in voivodships. However, they, bearing in mind their personal convenience, tried to delegate the authority to their deputies and assistants. For example, on the voivodship level, they delegated the task to the director of the Safety and Police Department; on the district level they delegated it to deputy starosts, etc. This caused justified protest by the local police commanding officers who commented ironically that "in no time they will be governed by janitors and typists". After the National Police HQ intervention, the Minister of Internal Affairs issued a special decree repeating that voivods and starosts, i.e. persons who really manage certain areas, are the only persons who can issue commands to the police.

Another controversial issue was the problem of unspecified authority regarding the police personnel policy, which gave considerable autonomy to police commanding officers of all levels. The most debatable item was the fact that decisions related to promotions and commanding officers' vacancies were only taken by their superiors in the police. Voivods and starosts did not like it because they demanded having a decisive, or at least a partially decisive, influence on those matters. On 9 July 1923, after four years of further controversies, the Minister of Internal Affairs issued a decree on the basis of some far-fetched interpretation of the Police Act and the Constitution in which he gave voivods and starosts the right to interfere with the personnel matters of the police so that they could make decisions together with police authorities. Such a situation remained till the beginning of the World War II; however, some legal experts claimed that the decree was

contrary to legislation, which caused numerous clashes between the police and local civil authorities.

The most important conflict regarded the range of authority as far as using the police was concerned. It was a many-sided conflict since it not only involved the police and local civil authorities but courts and prosecutors. It resulted from very vague provisions of the Police Act from 9 July 1919, which in article 2 stated that the police are an executive body of state and local authorities. Article 13 stated that, "Prosecutors' offices and judicial authorities have a right to give direct orders to the police according to regulations included in the Criminal Proceedings Act."

Thanks to these imprecise expressions, prosecutors and administrative and judicial authorities were tempted to force the police to get involved in all activities which were within their authority but sometimes far exceeded statutory tasks. The fact that the police force was one of the most efficient branches of the state administration and it guaranteed the success of undertaken actions was even more tempting for the above institutions. This sign of appreciation was very burdensome for the police since police officers were used to:

- Delivering subpoenas, indictment acts and military draft cards;
- Collecting fines, deliver documents to companies summoning them to register their activity;
- Gathering information about financial status of persons applying for the social security benefit;
- Drawing up lists of domestic animals (!)
- Keeping records of marital status of people of non-Christian religion;



- Escort convicts on their way to interrogations and courts. \*

The Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated that the police, in fulfilling these tasks, were involved only 60 percent of their time in activities providing public safety, since 40 percent of their operation was concentrated on tasks not connected with fighting crime.

As we can see, the reform initiated in 1999 caused the same side effects as the one from 1919. The history repeated itself – the same controversies and conflicts took place. That is why one must agree with Dr Majer’s conclusion to his study:

“As we know, history repeats itself. The police, state and local administration experienced the truth of this saying. This is because the provisions binding since 1 January 1999 are very similar to the ones which were valid in Poland in the period between WW I and II. (...) Analyzing history one might forecast the conflicts and try to avoid them somehow. The modern police are lucky enough that there are scientific publications making it possible to carry out this analysis.” (Majer, op.cit.) .

In this context, General Wachowski’s statement regarding the training for starosts (with relation to cooperation with the police) is too late, and too little. It seems that the training itself is not enough, although it is a necessary undertaking. First and foremost, the problem of superiority must be absolutely clear. The police entitlements which regard personnel matters in police headquarters should be regained by the police since, they

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\* This still happens, every day. At least 3,000 police officers are busy escorting convicts.  
(Rokita, J.M., 2000 a)

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cannot be held responsible for actions of people on whose nomination they have no real influence. Next, the power of civil authorities with regard to setting goals for the police should be precisely defined. Not only the present Police Act should be updated, a series of detailed executive decrees of the Ministry of Administration and the National Police HQ is needed.

#### **Section 4. Technical Modernization**

This is one of the elements of the general reform of the police. The National Police HQ has decided that prevention of the development of organized and common crime and effectively fighting with these phenomena are possible only if the police undergo technical modernization ( [www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html), 2/28/00).

To this end, the National Police HQ have drawn up the five-year Police Technical Modernization Plan (2000 - 2004).

The priorities are: further computerization, modernization of communication systems, creation of systems for support of commanding posts and introduction of a modern system enabling the police to detect criminals. The implementation of the program requires additional financial means equal to 1,055,000,000 PLN: 2000 – 155 million PLN, 2001 – 298.5 million PLN, 2002 – 237.5 million PLN, 2003 – 209 million PLN, and 2004 – 155 million PLN.

The modernization priorities involve:

- Computerization of the police
- Computerization of the services engaged in fighting organized crime, crime related to drugs and criminal analysis

- Creation of systems for support of commanding posts (“Command & Control” type) for the biggest Polish urban areas
- Modernization of the police communication network, transmission network and radio-telephonic equipment
- AFIS automatic fingerprint identification system (ibid.).

This list should also include photo-radars for monitoring traffic and stationary video cameras. Taking into account the usefulness of the latter (e.g., in Great Britain), the Polish police, in collaboration with local authorities, try to install as many of them as possible. This is because Polish experience has confirmed the great efficiency of this equipment. Everywhere they were installed, a slump in crime rate was noted, especially violent crimes, in one of the voivodship cities, the rate of violent crime decreased by half after video cameras were installed.

That is why this “new weapon” is so popular. On 3 August 2000, police and city authorities signed an agreement in Warsaw, according to which almost 1,000 (960 pieces) stationary cameras would be installed in the capital. The first 100 cameras were supposed to be installed in the most dangerous areas by the end of 2000. The police would administer this system and specially trained Municipality Guardsmen would help them maintain it. The points where the pictures from the cameras are watched are located in 17 commune police stations. Analog and digital recordings guaranteed that, if necessary, tapes might serve as evidence in courts [www.zw.pl/2000/000408/art5.html](http://www.zw.pl/2000/000408/art5.html), 4/08/00). The cameras make it possible to observe certain areas for 24 hours a day, they can take close-ups up to 400 meters. The cost of one observation set (a camera and monitor) is

approximately 100 thousand PLN (approximately 24,000 USD). The originators of this project expect a decrease of 70% in crime in Warsaw

([www.gazeta.pl/Iso/Regiony/Warszawa/040akt.html](http://www.gazeta.pl/Iso/Regiony/Warszawa/040akt.html), 4/08/00).

The photo-radars are expected to be the second new device helping the police. As in Western Europe (Great Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Italy, etc.) it is suggested that police officers be relieved of their duties connected with monitoring traffic speed. These activities should be taken over by automatic photo-radars. More cases of speeding will be punished and the state budget will benefit from greater income coming from speeding tickets. Implementation of this program will enable police officers to work more dynamically. Police officers who used to be on duty in stationary posts can now take an active part in the traffic. Financial means gained from this program could be allocated to undertakings related to road safety ([www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html), 2/27/00).

First systems for support of commanding posts ("Command and Control" type) are being installed in Warsaw, Szczecin and Łódź. Initially, such systems will be installed in all voivodship cities and later, gradually, in district towns with the highest crime rates. The systems will improve coordination of operation of police preventive units, traffic, and escorting units, enabling police to cooperate with the ambulance service, fire brigades and other public services. It will also make it possible to monitor the most endangered areas and gain fast access to databases ([www.dziennik.pap.pl/Zes/zes\\_9.html](http://www.dziennik.pap.pl/Zes/zes_9.html), 04/29/00).

The program of police modernization does not mention anything about money for police cars and motorcycles insurance. So far, police officers themselves have had to pay for any repairs in the case of an accident.

It is also important that providing funds for criminal analyses is regarded as one of top priorities of the program. Before that, one had to wait for the results of analyses made by police laboratories for up to three years. Because they are overloaded with work and have very little means at their disposal. During that time, investigations must be stopped, since there is no evidence confirmed by a specialist. For example, in the Wrocław police laboratory there are only two specialists in examining documents and phonoscopy, and there are 800 cases to be investigated. This dramatically slows the system of justice, but punishment makes sense only if it is inevitable and rapid. For the time being, numerous criminals may sleep undisturbed. Many experienced specialists leave the police and establish their own private laboratories and provide paid services for the police (Galant, D., 2002). Generally, the police spend much more money for these services but the remedy has not yet been found. Now, there is a chance.

Finally, the simplest matter – police premises. As Ozadowicz (2002) argues, a lot of police stations have not been redecorated for many years. Police officers use old typewriters and sit on chairs they buy with their own money. In many places, they can only dream about computers. The police network is being created. High rent, increasing electricity and heating bills have caused the number of police stations to decrease. Lately, railway authorities have increased rents for the police. That is why the police station at Warszawa-Zachodnia Station has been liquidated. The same is likely to happen in the trouble spot of Warszawa-Wschodnia Station, and there will be only one railway police station left at Warszawa-Centralna Station. The police have similar problems at big junction stations in Poznań and Katowice.

## **Section 5. Fighting Corruption in the Police**

Lately, two important actions have been taken with regard to fighting corruption in the Polish police. First, in January 1998, the Directorate for Internal Affairs was included in the new organization structure of the National Police HQ. This is "police within the police" – the Inspectorate of Internal Control – which is to guard police professional ethics. Its goal is to prevent and fight all manifestations of law breaking in the police including, of course, the fight against corruption which has been one of the most important and frequent cases of law breaking in this institution. So far, the public opinion has not been informed about any successes of this new formation. This may result from the fact that the new unit is still in its operational stage and the results of its operations will be made known soon.

A second important matter connected with the fight against police corruption is the introduction (in 2000) of scales of charges for fines resulting from breaking traffic regulations. (Kraskowski, L., 2000). Until now, militia officers and, since 1990, police officers (traffic wardens) decided about the amount of a fine or could limit themselves to a verbal rebuke, or not impose any fine at all. In cases where they imposed a fine, they collected the money themselves. If a driver refused to pay a fine, a police officer passed the case on to the Adjudicative Board, where the fine was usually doubled or tripled. That is why it was worthwhile to bribe a police officer. This freedom to decide the seriousness of crime was, in the eyes of the public, an entitlement resulting in direct bribery. Traffic

wardens were very often suspected of taking bribes. \*

The scales of charges may be very effective in the fight against bribery. They include precisely described traffic offenses and the amount of money a driver can be fined for committing them (in PLN). The scales have been made public so every driver is able to check whether s/he was fined in accordance to the crime.

Another novelty is getting rid of cash tickets. A police officer will not take cash from offenders; but s/he will only issue credit tickets. Moreover, each traffic warden will have an I.D. tag with a picture, name and surname, and the telephone number of the police headquarters they report to. This idea, borrowed from Australia, is supposed to discourage policemen from taking bribes from drivers.

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Here is a popular Polish joke regarding the problem:

Two police officers are thinking about a birthday present for their colleague:

“Let’s buy him a Mercedes”, says one .

“He’s already got one”, says the other.

“So, let’s buy him a villa at the seaside.”

“He’s got one.”

“So, should we let him go alone for the patrol over the weekend?”

“Come on”, protests the other. “He doesn’t deserve such an expensive present!”

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Of course, the introduction of scales of charges will not eradicate police corruption, but it will significantly limit it. This is a big advantage of this system.\*

## **Section 6. What Next?**

The Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs, which supervises the police, apart from continuing the reforms described above, broadens their scope. On 12 July 2000, the Ministry presented in the Sejm a far-reaching draft of updating the reform of the police from 14 June 2000 (this is the repeatedly updated Reform of the Police passed initially on 6 April 1990).

The draft of the parliament bill is aimed at legal validation of the police gathering data regarding such matters as racial background, views, religion, addictions, genetic code, sexual life and membership in different associations ([www.Gazeta.pl/Iso/Wyborcza/Kraj02/200kra.html](http://www.Gazeta.pl/Iso/Wyborcza/Kraj02/200kra.html)).

The Ministry also wants to abolish a financial limit regarding the so called police provocation. Today, the police may make a controlled purchase when its value is 1,000

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This part of the text was written in November 2002, when the scales of charges were introduced. However, after less than a year (on October 17<sup>th</sup>, 2001) this novelty was nullified without any explanation to the public and the old system was restored (<http://www.pap.pl>, 10/18/2001).



times higher than the lowest police salary. The amendment also provides the police with access to bank and insurance confidential information (ibid.).

Article 20 of the bill aroused the biggest controversy in the Sejm. It says that the police may “collect, gather, examine and process” information regarding racial or ethnic background, religious or philosophical views, party or trade union membership, health condition, genetic code, addictions and sexual life (ibid.).

Who would decide about gathering such information relating to a specific person? Nowadays, there are only a few decision-makers who decide about “taking special operational actions”, e.g., tapping telephone lines, spying on certain people, checking correspondence, etc. They include the Public Prosecutor General and the Minister - Coordinator of Special Services. The amendment includes additional 40 new decision-makers – the Main Chief of the Police, voivodship police commanding officers and district judges.

The amendment assumes that the routine operational control (what these secret operations are called) can last up to three months after the consent of a proper court is obtained. It can be prolonged by another three months but, in special cases, it can be prolonged even more. How long can it be prolonged? The legislator answers enigmatically: “for a given time”. This means that the police can carry out “operation control” of a chosen person for years.

The opposition has fiercely criticized the amendment. The MPs have asserted that the range of collected information is too broad and includes information breaching the law and civil liberties such as the freedom and protection of the confidentiality of communication (Article 49 of the Constitution), private life (Article 47) and inviolability

of the household (Article 50). The sole fact that the number of decision-makers has been increased will facilitate dissemination of police secret operations. The Polish Constitution says “no-one can be obliged by the public authorities to disclose their views, religious beliefs or their religion”. One of the MPs quoted this fragment and added: “The government, which supports this draft, not only created a police state, but also clearly contravenes the Constitution”.

Regardless of the draft of the Police Act, the Ministry created a draft regarding creation of the new central office – the Domestic Center of Criminal Information. The draft was accepted by the Cabinet on 1 August 2000 (Rzeczpospolita, 8/02/00). This new office, operating beyond the police structures, having the 2001 budget of 16 million PLN, gathers and processes information regarding criminal offences and treasury crimes. The services dealing with pursuing crimes, e.g. the police, the State Security Office and treasury services, send information about crimes they deal with to this new office. This information is gathered in a computer database. Officers of all the services can use the database, but only after an investigation is launched.

Piotr Niemczyk, the advisor of the minister of this department, described the Domestic Center of Criminal Information as an address book of crimes. “The book” will include the most important information on current criminal proceedings: reference symbols of documents, the way of contacting persons conducting the case, information about the suspect and objects lost as a result of a crime, weapons, documents and money (*ibid.*).

Regardless of the disadvantages of this new idea, one must admit that recently there have been a lot of legislative initiatives in Poland whose aim is to fight crime. Another initiative of this sort is the creation of the Domestic Judicial Register. The initiators of

this project are positive it will limit the opportunity to commit economic crimes because economic entities and prosecution agencies will have an access to information about entrepreneurs and economic entities including insolvent debtors. The register started functioning on 1 January 2001 ( [www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html](http://www.kgp.gov.pl/serwis.html), 1/03/00).

Another proposal of the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs and the police regarding changes in Polish legislation are:

- The police will be replaced by the Prison Service in their duty of escorting prisoners
- A simplified procedure of registration of petty crimes will be introduced
- The General Inspector of Financial Information will be appointed

On 19 March 2002, the Polish police gained new, extremely important entitlements. The updated Police Act from 27 July 2001, has enabled them, since 19 March 2002, to use information being, until that time, bank confidential information. This is a rich source of information on criminal transactions (Lukaszewicz, 2002).

Another new idea of the Police HQ was passed on to the Sejm in July 2000: The organizers of mass events are supposed to pay the police for providing security (during sporting events, concerts, etc.).

New ideas come into being at the very "top" of the police, but sometimes this happens at lower levels. As Danielewicz . (2000) says, in Białystok, there was an initiative coming from university law students asking the police to include them in police patrols. The idea, which began implementation on 24 May 2000, is that two students, including women, accompany each patrol, and take part in police intervention and road patrols, even at night. The students are thoroughly checked by the police; there cannot be anybody having

problems with the law. The students serve only an observational function but they cannot take part in interventions. They have neither uniforms nor weapon. What are the benefits? Students can witness the everyday hardships of being a police officer, and their problems. The police can use the fresh view of students, which can suggest some new, valuable solutions.

Here is another initiative coming from lower levels. Special alarm posts have been installed in the 10 most dangerous locations of the Bemowo district, Warsaw. They are cable-connected to the police station, so that citizens can immediately inform the police about committed crimes. Eventually, there will be 35 such posts (Gajewski, M., 2000).

Another innovative initiative well under way from the Polish police is research on creating a criminals' genetic code bank to be used for investigation purposes (Ornatowska, 2002).

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## **Chapter 8. The Governmental Program to Combat the Crime**

### **Section 1. Essentials**

In the face of the rapidly growing crime rate in Poland in recent years, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, with the active help of experts from the National Police HQ, prepared in summer 2000 "A report on the state of the danger of crime in Poland". For the first time, this document not only presents the dangers but also some suggestions how to combat them.

The report is over 400 pages long. Here, we only analyze the tip of the iceberg (or even a small part of the tip), since out of 400 pages of the report fewer than four were made public. These include condensed contents and recommendations of the document. We have to limit ourselves to describing the condensed form and presenting some knowledgeable opinions regarding the report. The first one comes from Jan Maria Rokita, then Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Internal Affairs and the MP from the right-wing AWS party, which was in power in Poland at that time. The second opinion comes from Zbigniew Siemiątkowski, the former Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration in the previous, left-wing cabinet who was, at the time of the publication of the report, a member of the above Parliamentary Committee. Both of them have seen the full version of the report, and disclose some details not included in the quoted summary.

We will have a look at the summary written by Jachowicz (2000a), a famous political commentator in "Gazeta Wyborcza", the leading Polish daily. He has specialized in

matters connected with the police, public security and similar cases for many years. The report consists of two parts. The first discusses the development of crime in the last 10 years and analyses the present state of affairs. The results of the analysis are alarming: in 1999 1, 121,000 crimes were committed. This is 104.8 percent (more than two times!) more than in 1989, when Poland started its transition period. Penal prosecution agencies found the perpetrators of only 45 percent of committed crimes. In criminal cases the number of detected crimes was the lowest since 1990 – only 40.3 percent. The forecasts for the near future are included in the report, and were discussed in Chapter 3 of this study. An extensive overview of the second part of the report, containing concrete proposals for organizational and legislative changes to facilitate combating those dangers is presented here.

After long-lasting negotiations between different ministries, the government, on the basis of this report, drew up and implemented a long-term “Domestic Program of Fighting Crime” (<http://www.policja.pl/statys/statys03.htm>, 5/4/2002). This program has never been made public. Below is an analysis of the implementation of postulates included in the report (only those which have been made public). The report proposed: **(Remarks printed in bold are about implementation of that postulate, as of May, 2002).**

- 1) To stop instituting compulsory investigations in cases of petty crimes, e.g., petty theft, in which the value of stolen goods is lower than a combined value of three minimum wage salaries. According to the authors of the report, the duty of instituting an investigation in these cases burdens a lot of police officers with nonsensical paperwork. The procedure is instituted, even though it is obvious that, in most cases,

perpetrators will not be caught. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration estimates that there are at least 200,000 such procedures every year. The report suggests not instituting an investigation, only registering the crime. An investigation would be undertaken only if there were circumstances leading to establishing a perpetrator. This requires amendments in the Code of Penal Proceedings. **Partially fulfilled, but still a lot of improvements in the "paper" procedures must be introduced** ( Kowalczyk, A.,2002).

- 2) To develop the activity of the newly - created (February 2000) Central Bureau of Investigation. **Successfully fulfilled. During first year of its existence this new institution achieved many successes combating organized crime** (<http://www.policja.pl/oswaidcz.htm>, 5/4/2002).
- 3) To reform the police remuneration system. The current system does not motivate police officers to improve performance and acquire new qualifications. Their bonus, which could encourage them to do so, is only 8 percent of their salaries. This year it is supposed to grow to 15 percent, and will be gradually increased over the years. First, the salary structure would be changed for police officers fighting drug trafficking and organized crime, officers from prevention departments who have shown extraordinary results in their work and officers from the criminal police working overtime. Twenty five PLN from the target reserve is to be allocated to these aims. On 1 July 2000, according to the postulates of the report, a new remuneration system was implemented (discussed in Chapter 7 of this study). It is suggested that 60 million PLN be allocated to this system. **Mostly fulfilled. However, salaries for the Polish police are still very low. Presently, the starting salary for a police officer just**



after finishing initial training and starting to work is 1,300 PLN monthly (\$325).

An average monthly salary in the police, including all commissioned officers and generals, is 2,567 PLN (approximately \$640) (<http://www.policja.pl/statys/statys03.htm>) This, compared, with the starting salary of a British police officer (£,1900 monthly; which is about \$2,800), shows that great difference.

- 4) To decrease the enormous rate of traffic accidents by installing photo-radar. Fulfilled partially, but on a very small scale. This is still in the beginning stages. (The new legislation introduced by the Polish parliament, not mentioned in this report was implemented more effectively: According to these regulations, drunk driving is a crime of high penitentiary risk. Until now, it has been treated as an offence punishable (or not) only in an administrative way.)
- 5) To technically modernize the police (details are discussed in Chapter 7). The estimated cost of this undertaking is 1 billion PLN till 2004. Fulfilled in only a very small part, because of lack of funds assigned for this purpose. Unfortunately, most of the technical equipment of the Polish police is still far below the average Western European standards. This concerns police cars, communication systems, and the police computer network. Most police criminal laboratories still lack essential analytical - research equipment. However, especially very recently, the Polish police has been supplied with relative large quantities of modern weapons, including those for anti-terrorist purposes (<http://www.policja.pl/oswiadczy.htm>, 4/15/2002).

- 6) To extend operational entitlements of the police by means of a regulatory act. For example, the police should have guaranteed access to telephone bills and confidential bank, treasury, insurance or trade information. They should have the right to apply the police provocation also in the case of small bribes and the right to force criminals to cooperate by means of extortion (this should be supervised by the public prosecutor's office). **A lot of appropriate acts were passed by the parliament and almost all of these proposals were fulfilled** (Kowalczyk, A., op.cit).
- 7) To introduce a contract service in the police prevention (anti - riot) units. Recruits could do their substitute military service in these units (instead of the obligatory military service). **Fulfilled.**
- 8) To make the Border Guard a professional service and modernize it. The Guard would gain operational rights similar to the rights of the police. It could also build new watchtowers and increase personnel. **Mostly fulfilled, but personnel have not been increased.**
- 9) To create, within the framework of the Ministry of Finance, the office of the General Financial Inspector, who would prevent introducing money coming from illegal or questionable sources to the financial system. **Successfully fulfilled.**
- 10) To authorize or even oblige the Securities Commission to find the sources of capital used to purchase shares of public companies in an amount giving 20-25 percent of votes during the general assembly of shareholders. The commission would have to have access to confidential information about the proposers of the motion. **This is under way.**

11) To create Magistrate Courts and the Domestic Judiciary Register (the latter was discussed in the Chapter 7). **Magistrate Courts were introduced country-wide at the beginning of 2002. The Register is still in the preparation stage.**

So much has been disclosed about the contents of the report.

## **Section 2. Analysis**

First, the opinions about the report, expressed almost two years ago. Now it is easy to assess their value since we know the early results of the implementation of the postulates of the report. According to J.M. Rokita (2000a), there are no new ideas in the report. Its great advantage is that for the first time in 10 years the government has created something other than a collection of complaints like: "It is so bad; it will be even worse because there is no money for improvements". The report presents drafts of a dozen or so realistic undertakings. It shows that they are going to be implemented, estimates their cost and gives estimated completion time. The undertakings will not revolutionize the state of security in Poland overnight. Still, there is an absolutely new view of security. The report suggests that the Border Guard have full operational-investigation entitlements, similar to those of the State Security Office and the police. It is a good postulate. The Border Guard deals with very complex crimes, which result from the operation of border gangs. If we deprive it of operational means, we take away its basic tools. It is obvious that the Border Guard should have operational entitlements. All services combating with violent criminal actions should be given those entitlements, since violent criminals are the basic social problem.

The report concentrates too much on the question of the law and money. It is true that these are two key elements for safety. Still, it only touches upon the problem of governing, authorities and the clearly visible problem of lack of efficiency of the police and the machinery responsible for safety.

Twice as much money will have to be spent on safety in 2001 than in 2000. Goals include modernization of the police, computer systems and command posts in big cities. These things are extremely important. Maybe the Code of Penal Proceedings should be amended so that procedures concerning minor crimes are simplified. Some action must be taken to place 2,000 best police officers in the Central Bureau of Investigation. There are also questions of bad management of the police, outdated internal organization, an inadequate training system, faulty selection of executive staff, inability to reach set goals and inefficiency in dealing with unexpected situations, absurd bureaucracy, and falsified statistics.\*

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\* Rokita probably refers to spring 2000 when police officers killed a veterinarian during a chase that took place on the streets of Warsaw, instead of a tiger which had escaped from the zoo. There have been other similar cases, like the escape of a dangerous criminal from the court, killing passers-by instead of criminals by mistake, etc.

Although Rokita did not mention it here, one cannot forget about scandalous inefficiency of the police in the case of the murder of Marek Papala (former Main Chief of the Polish Police, killed by a shot to the head in front of his house). After three years the case has not been solved. The murderer has not been captured. This is also true in the case of the

murder of the former PM General Jaroszewicz and his wife, and the murder of General Frankowicz, the former director of the Department of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense.

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All these cases can be characterized by one word – inefficiency. These problems cannot be solved simply by spending more money or amending some codes, but by better governing, effective forms of management, and strong authorities. The authorities are the most important factor in guaranteeing the efficiency of the state and its institutions. This can only be done by politicians. The Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration should, by means of a long-term, decisive policy, force such changes in organization, training, recruitment and every-day operation of the police that this institution would inspire terror in criminals and protect ordinary persons in the street.

A police officer should not wonder if s/he operates in his/her area because if s/he enters a different jurisdiction, s/he will be punished; s/he should only wonder if s/he could catch a criminal. S/he should be punished or rewarded only taking into account the way s/he deals with criminals. A police officer who accounts for the quality of written papers and the aesthetics of his copy books because s/he may be punished with a D, as in school – it is pure nonsense. This approach to their duties is the main problem; money alone will not change it.

This governmental report, Rokita goes on, contains everything about the prevention of crime, e.g., recommendations related to building sports halls for youth. He thinks that the most painful failure of government in the past 10 years is the problem of security. The government has been unable to stand up against the growing number of crimes. In 1998,

the number of registered crimes exceeded one million, in 1999, it was 1,220,000. We still do not know the number of crimes which were not detected, but one can be sure that it is growing proportionally. It seems there is no clear idea how to deal with prevention. This problem is difficult; its solution requires non - standard procedures of social cooperation, and engagement of local communities in the fight with criminals. This program does not include any plan for a new state policy dealing with juvenile delinquency, which is especially worrying for the public (...). Nothing is said about probation officers, but everybody knows that the system inherited from the communist era is outdated. Rokita is under the impression that nobody in this country is interested in this matter. The program presented in the report is far from being perfect. However, despite its imperfections, the public must support it. It is the first serious program heading in the right direction. Future governments will have a starting point; they will not have to start from the scratch.

Another, equally knowledgeable, opinion about the report is expressed by Minister Siemiątkowski, the former Minister of Internal Affairs and the former minister-coordinator of security services (Siemiątkowski J. 2000a), who presently is the minister-coordinator of security services.. This is what he says about the program.

According to Siemiątkowski, there is a need for money in order to implement the program. That is why it needs to be discussed with the Economic Committee of the Cabinet. Without money the report is only worth the sum spent on its printing. Unfortunately, most things proposed in it are quite costly. For example, money is needed for the reform of remuneration to the police -- the introduction of a motivational remuneration system, a pay-raise for police officers. Money is needed in order to connect all 350 district police headquarters by a computer network administered from the

command post in the National Police HQ. It will include, e.g., a database with information about criminals, stolen cars, and the central bank of dactyloscopy. There is a right postulate in the report suggesting that the Border Guard should be made professional. Presently, one - third of this force are recruits to the military. All over the world, the Border Guard stops being a military institution. It becomes a sort of border police.

Of course, this also requires money. It is worrying that the Border Guard wants to gain full operational entitlements, i.e., the ability to tap phones, check correspondence, record things secretly, etc. because too many services have those entitlements. This includes the State Security Office, the police, the Military Information Services, the Customs Inspectorate, the treasury police. The Sejm considers the draft of the Bureau of the Government Protection Act also giving those entitlements to this service. The Military Police also wants to gain them. This is a dangerous tendency. When so many services are allowed to apply those methods, it makes it difficult to control work efficiency and check to see if the methods are used in a legal way. This wide range of entitlements may cause their abuse. The services want to gain them because of their weakness and helplessness; they think that if they fail, operational entitlements will help them.

If the program is to be successful, a separate act must be passed ensuring that it is implemented regardless of who the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration and the Main Chief of the Police is. That is why the opposition in the Sejm should be able to include their ideas in the nationwide program of fight against crime. This would provide a guarantee of its stability, since it is a long-term program. It must also have its own system of financing – a special budget only for the program and not connected with the

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration budget. It cannot be financed from this budget concluded Siemiatkowski.

### **Section 3. The Prospects of Community Policing**

It is obvious that the report, or the part which has been disclosed, **makes no mention of the Community Policing concept.** It also ignores other, discussed in this study, pro-social police initiatives, e.g., "Safe City" or "Crime Stoppers" and the contribution of the media, e.g., the action of *Super Express* directed against pickpockets in Warsaw or the pro-police TV series.

Does this mean that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration and the National Police HQ regard the Community Policing concept as unsuitable for Poland? We cannot draw such a harsh conclusion. To the contrary, thanks to these two institutions, the reform of the police discussed in Chapter 7 was planned, programmed and implemented.

One of the most important elements, or even the most important element, of this reform is the decentralization of the police – transferring the real power over police units to local authorities of governmental administration and to local governments. Since the financing of the local police is dependent on local civil authorities, they have real supervisory power over the police in their territories. Objectively speaking, transferring the responsibility for the state of public safety to voivods, starosts or voivodship and district authorities is one of the initial conditions necessary for the Community Policing concept to succeed. Only local authorities, familiar with the realities of their areas, can encourage



the public to cooperate with the police. They can also encourage the police to cooperate closely with local communities in order to achieve safety and public order.

It is natural that the leaders of local government (the mayor, president) elected in a general election want to win the favor of voters and be elected for the next term. That is why they want to meet the demands of as many citizens as possible. Until now, this activity has focused on the jobless and low-income families. But the unemployment rate in Poland is over 18 percent (in some areas it exceeds 25 percent) and 2/3 of families living below a poverty level, discussed in Chapter 3.

Now local authorities face a dilemma: who should get the money? The jobless and poor, who account for 66 percent of the population (of course, in local areas these numbers are different), or the police, so that 100 percent of the population feels safe?

We did not have to wait long for the answer to this question. In 2001, the first year the police were financed by budgets of local governments, the overwhelming majority of local authorities did not include the police in their priority goals for which money should be allocated immediately and in adequate amounts.

This resulted in fierce protests by the National Police HQ, which put forward a motion that the old system of financing the police from the top down should be restored (Kowalczyk, A., 2002). In that system a sum of money is allocated from the state budget, and it is further allocated by the Main Chief of the Police to the needs of the National Police HQ, the central purchase of equipment and weapons, to training schools and other police units which it supervises directly. Next, the money is allocated to 16 Voivodship Police Headquarters. They provide the money for their own needs and for their district police headquarters. The latter allocate money to given police stations.

If the old system is restored, which is very likely, what are the perspectives of Community Policing in Poland? One may think that this situation will substantially limit the chances of success of this concept but will not completely eradicate it. There are numerous examples of countries where this concept is successful, although the police are financed without any influence of local authorities and communities.

#### Section 4. Final results

The main and basic indicator of success or failure of the reforms proposed in the report and implemented as “the Domestic Program of Fighting Crime” is the crime rate. It is important how much the crime rate grew or fell in comparison with the period before introducing the program. The answer to this question is in the “Statistical Report – Crime in Poland in 2001”, recently published by the National Police HQ (<http://www.policja.pl/oswiadczy.htm>, 5/4/2002).

The beginning of the report states that “in 2001, for the first time in many years, the number of criminal offenses decreased”. Next, there are numbers given: “in the 12 months of 2001 the police noted a decrease of 2.3 percent, i.e., 26,000 of such crimes in comparison with the year 2000 (a decrease from 1,333,162 to 1,107,073).”

However, the document shows that, in comparison with 2000, the total number of crimes increased sharply, by not less than 9.7 percent. This growth was caused by 120,113 cases of drunk driving being regarded as crimes (previously such cases had been qualified by the Penal Code as minor offenses). Excluding drunk drivers, the number of crimes committed in 2001 in comparison with 2000 decreased only by 2.3 percent, which is difficult to call a police success. Moreover, this number is close to the statistical error;

the police statistics in Poland are, delicately speaking, not very precise. The number of murders does seem to be a precise indicator, however. It is almost impossible to manipulate the numbers in this category of crime since a murder cannot be concealed for too long. The document states that there were 1,325 murders in Poland in 2001. This is 4.4 percent more than in 2000 (1,269). This number makes us doubt whether the data presented by the National Police HQ showing the decrease in crime in Poland, are reliable.

This shows that “the Domestic Program of Fighting Crime” has not changed the situation for better; probably, it will take more time to see more significant results from its implementation. On the other hand, according to data included in the “Statistical Report – Crime in Poland in 2001”, the police were quite successful in certain areas. There was a significant decrease of 12.6 percent in auto theft, a 6.9 percent decrease in robberies with violence, robberies and mugging, an 8.8 percent decrease in firearms offenses, and a 10.7 percent decrease in burglaries. The police were also successful in combating robberies of TIR lorries (lorries often transporting millions PLN worth of goods on international routes). In 2000 there were 238 such cases; in 2001, only 138.

Most important, the rate of crime detection increased up to 53.8 percent, which is the highest in the last couple of years.

In spite of all the problems, the data show some optimistic prospects for the Polish police and give hope that ambitious goals and tasks formulated in the Domestic Program of Fighting Crime will be achieved. This is important taking into account the fact that, on 25 October 2001, the Polish Prime Minister in his expose while presenting the goals of the new government regarding safety, stressed the need for active cooperation between

the penal prosecution agencies and the community. He said: "We will favor citizens' initiatives for public order. Broad, well-organized social support may be an effective back-up for the police combating crime" (Miller, L., 2001).

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<http://www.kgp.gov.pl>., for years 2000- May 2002; <http://www.policja.pl>.,for years 2001- May 2002

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## **Chapter 9. Police and the Public: Role Concepts, Perceptions, Attitudes and Where Do We Go from Here?**

### **Section 1. Team Work**

In the early 1980s, the notion of community policing emerged in the United States as the dominant direction in thinking about policing. It was designed to reunite the police with the community. It is a philosophy, not a specific tactic: a proactive, decentralized approach, designed to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime by involving the same officer in the same community on a long-term basis. There is no single program to describe community policing. It has been applied in various forms by police agencies in the United States and abroad and differs according to community needs, politics, and resources available. Community policing goes far beyond being a mere police-community relations program and attempts to address crime control through a working partnership with the community (Peak and Glensor, 1999). This new relationship, based on mutual trust, also suggests that the police serve as a catalyst and challenges people to accept their share of the responsibility for solving their individual problems, as well as their share of the responsibility for the overall quality of life in the community (Trojanowicz et. al., 1994; 1998). The new philosophy, however, still lacks some serious, in-depth evaluation. Rosenbaum, Yeh, and Wilkinson (1994) observe that the identification of key factors that affect the creation and implementation of community-policing innovations has eluded systematic study. Literature focusing on community-policing innovations in the United States suggest that two major dimensions of organizational change have been considered by American policing scholars (e.g., Kelling and Moore 1988; Goldstein 1990; Huber et al. 1993; Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994).

These two dimensions are externally focused and internally focused innovations.

External innovations include the reorientation of police operation and crime prevention activities, and the internal innovations primarily involve changes in police management (Zao et al. 1999). Poland, following the growing number of countries that adopted the American philosophy of Community Policing, afforded us with an opportunity to study, in a systematic manner, both of the external and internal innovations, as they are introduced simultaneously, on a national level. The team work's was presumed to be more coherent and uniformed in a country with a National police force.

The Polish version of Community Oriented Policing, at its onset did not have a translation in the Polish language. The English term, Community Policing, has being used commonly, and the operational strategies and suggestions were based mainly on the American literature and research, skewed towards the realities of life in Poland. "Operation Zero" was coined as a new term, associated with the first experimental steps of Community Oriented Policing. A number of clearly defined operational strategies and concepts were introduced internally to guide the actual, practical, implementation of the philosophy. Those clearly defined steps were primarily structural in nature (like redeployment of foot patrol), and lacked conceptual approaches by, for example, ignoring such critically important areas as proper recruitment, selection, training, evaluations, and assessment. Finally, the other external variable seemed to be ignored as well, the desires and needs of the community they were out to police (Haberfeld and Walancik, 1998). Unlike the testimonial and empirical research performed in the United States, prior to the introduction of Community Oriented Policing, no serious, scientific attempt has been made to assess the

needs of the Polish public. Regardless of the validity of the research performed in the United States and the interpretation of the findings, as they related to the need to implement the Community Oriented Policing philosophy, such research projects were, indeed, undertaken. However, the general public in Poland was not exposed to the same treatment. Therefore, the assumptions have been made, the public was informed, and so was the police, but the message was never delivered in a clear and easily understood manner. In essence, American history repeated itself in Poland: the philosophy of Community Oriented Policing was introduced and became many things to many people. However, for Poland and its police force the semblance had a much more profound impact, due to the centralized nature of the national force. The team work or the partnership between the police and the public was introduced to both parts of the team in the most superficial way. One does not need to ponder too long to realize that any successful implementation of any new idea or philosophy needs to be grounded in a clear understanding of the concepts involved. To make the dream work, one needs to comprehend its nature, otherwise it will turn into a nightmare.

## **Section 2. Questionnaires**

### Methodology and Research Subjects

To address the basic themes introduced by the philosophy of the Community Oriented Policing, we decided to conduct the study through a number of phases. First we distributed a set of questionnaires to a representative sample of police officers. Simultaneously, the same questionnaire was distributed to 500 college students who, for the purpose of this study, represented one segment of the research community. This phase was followed by a series of interviews (phase two) with representatives of various

interest groups in Poland, including community members, local politicians, and media representatives. This phase enabled us to gather a lot of valuable information, summarized and analyzed in the previous chapters.

Phase three included distribution of the second set of questionnaires, followed by phase four, another series of in-depth interviews. Phase five was completed in September 2002, and included another set of in-depth interviews with the beat or Community Police officers. This last phase provided us with some food for thought and recommendations for future research regarding what works and what doesn't in the implementation of Community Oriented Policing.

#### **Phase I: first set of questionnaires distributed to police officers and students**

A basic survey instrument was distributed to about 2,000 sworn police officers in four administrative districts. The new administrative division of Poland comprises 16 districts. The sites were selected with the cooperation of the Polish National Police, the Research Unit located at the headquarters in Warsaw. The sites for the project were identified based on the geographic location, the size of the local police departments, and the overall willingness to participate in a research experiment. The questions for the survey were designed and structured around the following topics/themes:

- demographics of the respondent – it is of crucial importance to be able to discern the differences in perceptions based on the following variables:
  - age
  - length of service
  - rank
  - educational level
  - training history (which training center, how long, and when, plus additional on-the-job training)



- the role of the police during the communist regime
- the role of the police in a newly established democracy
- the role of the police in a democratic society. It is pertinent to be able to identify the differences between the role of the police in a state in which the democratic principles are fully established and the role of the police in a newly created democracy, a democracy still has to struggling with baggage from the past, and the sometimes unruly enthusiasm and desire to experience the ultimate freedom.
- Definition and understanding of the term- “Community Oriented Policing”
- Definition and understanding of the term “Community”
- Individual desire to implement the philosophy of C-O-P – on a daily basis
- Perceptions/opinion about the overall desire of the police administration to implement C-O-P

The data from the collected questionnaires was analyzed and, based on the results, discussion questions for the focus groups were designed. Simultaneously, 400 questionnaires were distributed to students (a version of the questionnaire distributed to the sworn officers was modified to customize a different subject/respondent population) at the universities of Warsaw, Krakow, and Bialystok.

### **Phase III: second set of questionnaires distributed to police officers**

A second set of questionnaires was distributed to sworn police officers. The second set was distributed over a year and a half after the first set was collected, and in addition to the same questions as the first one, included a number of practical scenarios based on some of the tenets of Community Oriented Policing. (The responses to the scenarios constituted a basis for designing focus group questions in phases four and five and will be analyzed later in this chapter.)

## Analysis

One of the prerequisites for successful implementation of any theoretical concept is complete understanding of the concept. Ideally, both parties involved in such an experiment (the police and the public) achieve the same level of understanding of any given concept, but this appears to be unrealistic, a close consensus would suffice. We have analyzed 1,619 questionnaires filled in by the police officers and 253 questionnaires filled by the students, that were collected during the first phase of this project, between October 1999 and April 2000, and 404 questionnaires that were collected during the third stage of the project, between of July and August 2001. The number of questionnaires analyzed represents the numbers of questionnaires that were found valid for statistical analysis.

The following analysis of that data compares and contrasts data collected from three sets of questionnaires: the first officer survey, students, and the second officer survey . In our discussion of the results we are concentrating on the findings that point to lack of understanding or/and lack of information regarding the concept of C-O-P, as well as on the incompatibility in understanding of those concepts.

## Summary of the survey results

The following are some things to note relating to the results of the survey data. The reader is advised to refer to both the tables and the actual survey for additional details. To determine if there was a statistically meaningful difference in the results, we use a difference of 0.5 or greater. **(Relevant tables and/or Power Point diagrams are enclosed at the end of the chapter)**

**See tables 9.1. and 9.2 or Power Point Diagram**

*Questions 1 and 2: The role of police force and police officer in a democratic society*

Although officers in both the first and second samples did not differ significantly on the roles of a police force (question 1) and officer (question 2) in a democratic society, there were differences in how important certain roles were within the student sample. In both questions “enforcing the law” and “providing services” showed the greatest differences in responses between officers and students.

**See Table 9.3 or Power Point Diagram**

*Question 3: The role of the police during the Communist regime*

Much as with questions 1 and 2, officers in the first and second samples did not differ significantly on any of the roles. The differences occurred between officers and students in relation to “preventing crime”, “preserving the peace” and “protecting civil rights and liberties”. Officers consistently rated them more important (0.5 or greater) than did students.

**See Table 9.4 or Power Point Diagram**

*Question 4: Police officer's role in a democratic society*

This question was only asked of police officers, and the differences appear in ranking of the role the police officer plays in a democratic society. While preventing crime appeared to be the most significant role one could play in a democratic police nation, officers in the second survey ranked preserving peace as the number one priority.

**See Table 9.5 or Power Point Diagram**

*Question 5: Have you ever heard the term Community Policing?*

A startling 55.6 percent of officers in the first survey have never heard about the term

Community Policing, with an even more surprising 61.1 percent of officers in the second survey providing the same answer. An overwhelming majority of students, 81.9 percent have never heard the term either. In the second survey, 62.6 percent of those who said 'yes' heard the term in the media while only 33 percent heard it during training, specialized training, informally within the department or during a meeting.

**See Table 9.6 or Power Point Diagram**

*Question 7: Definition of the term 'Community Oriented Policing'*

Officers in the second sample felt that the definition "an old philosophy of policing under a new name" was more correct (2.93) than officers in the first (3.43) and student (4.27) samples. The same pattern is evident in the definition "an old tactical approach to policing under a new disguise". Officers in the second sample (2.93) felt it more correct than those in the first (3.50) and student (4.44) samples.

Officers in both samples and students felt that community policing was both a new philosophy and new tactical approach towards policing. Within a particular sample there were significant differences between these definitions (0.5 or greater) and the others (old philosophy and old tactical approach).

**See Table 9.7 or Power Point Diagram**

*Question 8: The accuracy of characteristics that best define the term "Community Oriented Policing".*

There were two areas to note. The first is the "empowerment of the police officers in their initiatives/generalization". Both the first and second officer samples came out the same but the difference to note is that the students did not view this

as strong a characteristic as the officers (2.39 vs. 1.79). The second major difference is with the characteristic of “empowerment of the citizens in their input into police work-scale”. Police officers in the first sample felt this was a more accurate description than students (1.76 vs. 2.26). The second sample of officers fell in between the first and student samples.

Using 3 as the median between either being accurate or not accurate, officers in both samples felt that all the characteristics listed in this question were accurate (less than a mean of 3) except for “customer orientation in service delivery”, which received a mean of 3.26 in the first sample and 3.42 in the second sample. Using the same evaluation method, the students sampled felt that all the characteristics were accurate except the “customer orientation” like their officer counterparts.

**See Table 9.8 or Power Point Diagram**

*Question 13: Connotations for the term “community”.*

There was a significant difference in the responses between the first and second officer samples with respect to the “area you police” (second, -1.77 vs. first, -3.59). The second officer sample thought it most appropriate, with a mean difference of 1.82. There were significant differences with “population”. The student sample felt it most appropriate (1.51), with over a 0.5 difference with the first officer sample (2.86) and second officer sample (3.40). With respect to “religion”, officers in the second officer sample thought it more appropriate (1.40) than those in the first sample (4.04) and students (3.64). Student felt that “citizenry” played a more appropriate role than officers in the first (2.98) and second (3.90) samples noting that the first officer sample placed a higher value than their second sample counterparts. Officers in the second sample felt

“political affiliation” was more appropriate (1.82) than officers in the first sample (3.74) and students (4.40). Finally, officers in the first sample felt that “professional affiliation” played a more appropriate role (3.42) than those in the second sample (4.07) or students (3.79). Officers in the first sample felt that the “citizens of your country” was the most accurate definition, while the second sample of officers felt that “religious affiliation” was most accurate. Students rated “population” as the most appropriate”.

**See Table 9.9 or Power Point Diagram**

*Question 14: The overall desire of the police administration to implement Community Oriented Policing.*

With respect to the overall desire of the police administration to implement Community Oriented Policing, the second sample of officers felt the desire was stronger (2.18) than the first sample (3.25) (a mean difference of 1.07) and students (3.84). Time may be the reason, and change between the first and second officer samples.

**See Table 9.10 or Power Point Diagram**

*Question 15: Personal desire to be part of the implementation of the Community Oriented Policing.*

Unlike Question with 14, there were no significant differences with the first and second officer samples with respect to their own personal desire to implement community oriented policing. However, there was a significant difference between both samples of officers and students. Students (4.29) were the least willing to implement community oriented policing, compared to both samples (3.50 and 3.68).

*Scenarios*

The following short scenarios; Questions 14-19 below are only reflective of the second survey distributed in mid-2001.

14. Residents have complained to their neighborhood police officer that the city has not picked up their garbage on a regular basis. The officer should respond to the complaints by telling citizens:

A. To call the City Guard about the problem	13.5%
B. To write a letter complaining to the Mayor and the press about the problem	86.5%
C. Tell the residents that this is not a matter for police intervention	0%
Mean: 1.87	
SD: 0.34	
Mode: Choice B	

15. There are a number of complaints about a number of automobiles stolen from the premises of a particular housing project, the police should:

A. Ask the local governing body to build a secure parking lot.	49.7%
B. Advise the residents to hire private security.	33.7%
C. Have the robbery squad conduct undercover car theft stings.	7.6%
D. Increase the number of foot patrol in the area.	9.0%
Mean: 1.76	
SD: 0.94	
Mode: Choice A	

16. You have received complaints by residents that a neighbor is suspected of selling drugs from his home. Suspicious cars are continuously pulling up in front of the suspected neighbor's home for short periods of time at all hours of the day of night. You should take which of the following action:

A. Inform the commanding officer or the given area.	7.0%
B. Write a report suggesting that an undercover operation should be conducted.	3.9%
C. Write a report without any suggestion.	38.7%
D. Suggest to the residents to turn to the special investigative unit within the HQ.	50.4%
Mean: 3.32	
SD: 0.85	
Mode: Choice D	

17. A number of officers in your department are up for promotion. Please identify the factor that will most likely contribute to the promotion of a given officer.

A. Number of arrests (on the scene) during the last year.	27.6%
B. Number of meetings with the local residents.	53.7%
C. Number of ideas to improve safety and security introduced by an officer.	13 %
D. Number of documented, individual contacts with the local residents.	5.7%
Mean: 1.97	
SD: 0.80	
Mode: Choice B	

18. Residents have just complained to you about a group of youths on a street corner playing music loudly, you respond by:

A. Ordering the youths to disperse from the corner.	82.4%
B. Arresting the youths on loitering charges.	6.5%
C. Suggest to the residents to write a complaint and based on the complaint write a report suggesting some type of preventive action.	9.5%
D. Do nothing because the youths are not committing any crimes.	1.6%
Mean: 1.30	
SD: 0.71	
Mode: Choice A	

19. The Commanding Officer of your department was asked by the District Command to submit a report about the safety status in your areas. This mission should be accomplished based on which of the following factors:

A. Analysis of the statistical data.	65.5%
B. Survey of the local residents regarding the fear of specific crimes.	6.0%
C. Survey of the residents regarding which crimes should be targeted and in what ways.	25.2%
D. Invitation to residents, local governing bodies and businessmen to cooperate together with the police to improve the safety of the area.	3.3%
Mean: 1.66	
SD: 0.96	
Mode: Choice A	

The overall picture emerging from the responses to the scenarios is rather disturbing. Despite the awareness of what should or should not be the task of a local beat (CPOP) officer, there is definitely a strong desire to delegate responsibility to others, and minimize one's involvement.

The officers are willing to recommend an action that would involve other entities, rather than involve themselves or some other unit. This is especially visible in scenarios number 15 and 16, where there are given the direct opportunity for such an involvement. On the other hand, in scenario number 18, the traditional response dominates over a new, and desired one, based on the concepts of Community Policing.

Responses to scenario number 19 are especially discouraging, where only about 25 percent of the respondents felt that it is important to survey the local residents regarding which crimes should be targeted in their area and in what ways.



What is, however, rather startling, is the fact that in scenario number 17, a majority of almost 54 percent of the responded identified the number of meetings with the local residents as a clear indicator in the promotion considerations.

The answers to these scenarios allowed us to modify our questions for the focus groups in phases four and five. Some of our subjects' answers are summarized in the last section of the report, and provided us with templates for lessons learned.

### **Section 3. Lessons learned**

One of the goals of our research was to identify initial obstacles to the successful implementation of community policing. The departure point was based on an assumption that the Polish police and the community they police are not necessarily ready for this farfetched transformation. After all, this force underwent a profound transformation, during the last decade (Haberfeld, 1997, Kutnjak-Ivkovich and Haberfeld, 2000), one that is yet to be evaluated in terms of its success. To become fully democratic, beyond rhetoric orientation, a police force is in need of very pragmatic means. Without proper and adequate resources, both financial and human, it is almost impossible to achieve the desired goal. Prior to becoming "a tool in the hands of the public", one needs to assess whether the public wants such a tool, and if so, would they know how to use it in a way that won't turn the clock back, and instead of changing will impede the desired transformation.

One idiosyncrasy regarding the results of the survey that needs to be addressed is an answer to a simple question: if you have never heard the term Community Oriented Policing, how can you answer, in a valid manner, the questions related to understanding

of the term? The answer to the question is quite simple and relates to the way the questionnaires were distributed. We have explained and informed respondents that the questionnaire was designed to measure their understanding of the new approach to policing, which has been endorsed by the chief of the Polish police. Therefore, despite the fact that many of our respondents had not heard about the term C-O-P per se, they were aware of changes in orientation, philosophy, and organization of their police force. Unfortunately, this awareness did not necessarily translate into clear understanding, or any type of consensus. While we do not want to overplay the importance of these particular findings, it appears that it is important to introduce the parties involved into a coined term, since the term carries a profound message regarding the reorientation of the mode of policing. Police forces around the world change their names to reflect this orientation<sup>1</sup>; therefore, it appears that there is some validity to the term. Maybe it can, indeed, motivate and inspire the parties involved in this joint venture.

However, what seems to be of real importance and will affect the direction of our research in the future, and should also affect the direction of research in the United States, is the lack of desire to implement the philosophy of C-O-P. This lack of desire is pretty apparent with respect to all the parties involved; police organizations, police officers, and students. While there are differences in the perception of the role of a police officer in a democratic society, definitions, and interpretations of the term related to the philosophy, the most important finding seems to be lack of desire to

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<sup>1</sup> For example Metro Toronto in Canada changed its name to Toronto Police Services a few years ago, the same is happening for the Royal Ulster Constabulary, changing its name in 2001 to Northern Ireland Police Services.

take part in the implementation process.

What is, therefore, the remedy or the first step in an attempt to change this unconstructive attitude? A number of steps come to mind, and they should be followed in this exact order:

- **(1) define** – what **exactly** is expected of the police and of the community – **role concepts and tasks**

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- (2) explain** – how **exactly** this can be fulfilled and accomplished – identify the **precise competencies, not just concepts**

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- (3) survey** – **both** - the police and the public about their desire, willingness, and **ability** to a long term commitment

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- (4) analyze** – **both** – populations – re: their sincere desire, willingness and **ability** to deliver

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- (5) evaluate** - **feasibility of implementation** – re: conflict of interests in light of political economic, and social realities

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- (6) plan** – **adjust the tasks and concepts** for conflict of interests and local customization of the idea

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- (7) train** – **both** - the police and the public – **prior to implementation**

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- (8) allocate** - **resources** – **long lasting**, not temporary

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Leaving fluid definitions open to interpretation, one cannot elicit any serious commitment. Clear understanding is fundamental base to a successful implementation of any plan that, of course, cannot be executed successfully without proper training of the people involved. As Haberfeld (2002) in her book, Critical Issues in Police Training, in a chapter that deals with training for the concepts of Community Oriented Policing, states; “I don’t know what is the key to success, but the key to failure is trying to please everybody”.

As for the future, what we are trying to deduce from the in-depth interviews some helpful answers to the following questions:

- The common or, not so, common desire of the actors involved with regard to police orientation and deployment?
- The major obstacles to an involved commitment?
- How to tackle the obstacles?

- How to mobilize the media?
- How to mobilize the politicians?
- How to know when to quit and try a new and different approach?\*

Similar to the American reality these questions will be asked too late, after the implementation has already taken place. However, future longitudinal studies exploring the aforementioned questions and related dimensions will help to outline the correct path to a successful implementation of the tenets of Community Oriented Policing, in Poland and in other countries struggling with the same or similar concepts and desires. Of course, pending the confirmation that this is what the team's dream is all about.

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\* In January 2003 the Polish National Police decided to revert to its centralized structure and abandon many of the concepts identified in this report, concepts that were originally based on the ideas of Community Oriented Policing (Haberfeld, 2003).

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**Table 9.1.**

**Question 1. Please rate, according to *your* opinion- what is the role of a *police force* in a democratic society?**

**Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important**

	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=1,619</i>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=404</i>	<b>Student Sample</b> <i>n=253</i>
<b>To Enforce the Laws</b>	Mean: 2.25 SD: 1.42	Mean: 2.10 SD: 1.26	Mean: 2.76 SD: 1.29
<b>To Prevent Crimes</b>	Mean: 1.20 SD: 0.69	Mean: 1.26 SD: 0.80	Mean: 1.28 SD: 0.74
<b>To Serve and Protect the Government</b>	Mean: 3.51 SD: 1.43	Mean: 3.22 SD: 1.31	Mean: 3.10 SD: 1.14
<b>To Preserve the Peace</b>	Mean: 1.30 SD: 0.77	Mean: 1.31 SD: 0.80	Mean: 1.28 SD: 0.62
<b>To Provide Services</b>	Mean: 3.96 SD: 1.35	Mean: 3.70 SD: 1.48	Mean: 3.11 SD: 1.30
<b>To Protect Civil Rights and Civil Liberties</b>	Mean: 1.68 SD: 1.06	Mean: 1.83 SD: 1.21	Mean: 1.65 SD: 0.98

**Table 9.2.**

**Question 2. Please rate, according to *your* opinion- what is the role of a *police officer* in a democratic society?**

**Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important**

	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=1,619</i>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=404</i>	<b>Student Sample</b> <i>n=253</i>
<b>To Enforce the Laws</b>	Mean: 2.31 SD: 1.43	Mean: 2.18 SD: 1.33	Mean: 2.96 SD: 1.30
<b>To Prevent Crimes</b>	Mean: 1.22 SD: 0.71	Mean: 1.19 SD: 0.65	Mean: 1.52 SD: 0.89
<b>To Serve and Protect the Government</b>	Mean: 3.65 SD: 1.42	Mean: 3.32 SD: 1.42	Mean: 3.35 SD: 1.16
<b>To Preserve the Peace</b>	Mean: 1.34 SD: 0.81	Mean: 1.36 SD: 0.84	Mean: 1.35 SD: 0.73
<b>To Provide Services</b>	Mean: 3.99 SD: 1.34	Mean: 3.63 SD: 1.45	Mean: 2.97 SD: 1.45
<b>To Protect Civil Rights and Civil Liberties</b>	Mean: 1.68 SD: 1.06	Mean: 1.80 SD: 1.24	Mean: 1.79 SD: 1.03

Table 9.3.

Question 3. Please rate, according to *your* opinion- what is the role of a police officer in a Communist Regime?

Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important

	1 <sup>st</sup> Officer Sample <i>n=1,619</i>	2 <sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample <i>n=404</i>	Student Sample <i>n=253</i>
To Enforce the Laws	Mean: 1.74 SD: 1.17	Mean: 1.75 SD: 1.08	Mean: 1.79 SD: 1.06
To Prevent Crimes	Mean: 1.73 SD: 1.07	Mean: 2.15 SD: 1.21	Mean: 3.05 SD: 1.09
To Serve and Protect the Government	Mean: 1.50 SD: 1.01	Mean: 1.40 SD: 0.85	Mean: 1.27 SD: 0.66
To Preserve the Peace	Mean: 1.68 SD: 1.05	Mean: 1.82 SD: 1.06	Mean: 2.73 SD: 1.30
To Provide Services	Mean: 3.45 SD: 1.50	Mean: 3.26 SD: 1.56	Mean: 3.64 SD: 1.37
To Protect Civil Rights and Civil Liberties	Mean: 3.38 SD: 1.33	Mean: 3.50 SD: 1.39	Mean: 4.43 SD: 0.80



Table 9.4.

Question 4. Please rate, according to *your* opinion- what is *your* role as a police officer in a democratic society?

Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important

	1 <sup>st</sup> Officer Sample <i>n=1,619</i>	2 <sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample <i>n=404</i>
To Enforce the Laws	Mean: 2.33 SD: 1.47 Rank: 4	Mean: 2.28 SD: 1.37 Rank: 4
To Prevent Crimes	<b>Mean: 1.20</b> <b>SD: 0.69</b> <b>Rank: 1</b>	Mean: 1.28 SD: 0.87 Rank: 2
To Serve and Protect the Government	Mean: 3.63 SD: 1.44 Rank: 5	Mean: 3.34 SD: 1.48 Rank: 5
To Preserve the Peace	Mean: 1.32 SD: 0.80 Rank: 2	<b>Mean: 1.28</b> <b>SD: 0.79</b> <b>Rank: 1</b>
To Provide Services	Mean: 3.89 SD: 1.43 Rank: 6	Mean: 3.61 SD: 1.51 Rank: 6
To Protect Civil Rights and Civil Liberties	Mean: 1.58 SD: 1.02 Rank: 3	Mean: 1.73 SD: 1.16 Rank: 3
<b>Bolded= Most Important Within Sample</b>		

Table 9.5.

Question 5. Have you ever heard the term Community Policing?

	1 <sup>st</sup> Officer Sample <i>n=1,619</i>	2 <sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample <i>n=404</i>	Student Sample <i>n=253</i>
Yes	44.4%	38.9%	18.1%
No	55.6%	61.1%	81.9%

**Table 9.6.**

**Question 7. How do you feel about the correctness of the following definitions of the term Community Oriented Policing?**

Correct 1-2-3-4-5 Not Correct

	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=1,619</i>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=404</i>	<b>Student Sample</b> <i>n=253</i>
<b>A New Philosophy of Policing</b>	Mean: 2.13 SD: 1.34	Mean: 2.18 SD: 1.17	Mean: 2.47 SD: 1.54
<b>A New Tactical Approach to Policing</b>	Mean: 2.35 SD: 1.38	Mean: 2.12 SD: 1.25	Mean: 2.66 SD: 1.31
<b>An Old Philosophy of Policing Under a New Name</b>	Mean: 3.43 SD: 1.52	Mean: 2.93 SD: 1.40	Mean: 4.27 SD: 1.09
<b>An Old Tactical Approach to Policing Under a New Disguise</b>	Mean: 3.50 SD: 1.50	Mean: 2.93 SD: 1.41	Mean: 4.44 SD: 0.92

**Table 9.7**

**Question 8. Please rate, according to your opinion- the accuracy of the following characteristics that best define the term of Community Oriented Policing.**

Very Accurate 1-2-3-4-5 Not Accurate

	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=1,619</i>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=404</i>	<b>Student Sample</b> <i>n=253</i>
<b>Problem Solving Approach to Crime</b>	Mean: 1.73 SD: 1.07	Mean: 1.81 SD: 1.07	Mean: 2.07 SD: 1.23
<b>Decentralization of the Command Structure</b>	Mean: 2.86 SD: 1.42	Mean: 2.59 SD: 1.36	Mean: 2.57 SD: 1.13
<b>Cooperation with the Public/Community in Crime Prevention and Solving</b>	Mean: 1.41 SD: 0.84	Mean: 1.46 SD: 0.71	Mean: 1.49 SD: 0.84
<b>Empowerment of the Police Officers in Their Initiatives/Generalization</b>	Mean: 1.79 SD: 1.16	Mean: 1.79 SD: 1.08	Mean: 2.39 SD: 1.26
<b>Empowerment of the Citizens in Their Input into Police Work-Scale</b>	Mean: 1.76 SD: 1.09	Mean: 1.97 SD: 0.99	Mean: 2.26 SD: 1.31
<b>Joint Accountability for Public Safety Between the Police and the Public</b>	Mean: 2.05 SD: 1.25	Mean: 1.87 SD: 1.04	Mean: 1.59 SD: 2.29
<b>Partnership with the Public in Solving Crime Problems</b>	Mean: 1.63 SD: 0.97	Mean: 1.56 SD: 0.82	Mean: 1.87 SD: 0.95
<b>Customer Orientation in Service Delivery (police towards the public)</b>	Mean: 3.26 SD: 1.51	Mean: 3.42 SD: 1.40	Mean: 3.07 SD: 1.40
<b>Reorientation of Foot Patrol</b>	Mean: 2.54 SD: 1.24	Mean: 2.45 SD: 1.31	Mean: 2.40 SD: 1.08
<b>Police are the Public and the Public are the Police</b>	Mean: 1.69 SD: 1.01	Mean: 1.67 SD: 0.87	Mean: 1.80 SD: 0.92
<b>Proactive Policing</b>	Mean: 1.52 SD: 0.93	Mean: 1.53 SD: 0.84	Mean: 1.72 SD: 1.04

**Table 9.8**

**13. The word “Community” connotes various definitions. Following are a number of characteristics that could serve as the appropriate translation of this term. Please rank each of the characteristics according to your understanding of the term community.**

**Most Appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 Least Appropriate**

	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=1,619</i>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=404</i>	<b>Student Sample</b> <i>n=253</i>
<b>Area You Police</b>	Mean: 3.59 SD: 1.57	Mean: 1.77 SD: 1.01	
<b>The Population of a Given City/Township/ etc.</b>	Mean: 2.86 SD: 1.76	Mean: 3.40 SD: 1.54	Mean: 1.51 SD: 0.79
<b>Religious Affiliation</b>	Mean: 4.04 SD: 1.38	Mean: 1.40 SD: 0.64	Mean: 3.64 SD: 1.32
<b>Gender Affiliation</b>	Mean: 3.41 SD: 1.72	Mean: 3.63 SD: 1.65	Mean: 4.56 SD: 0.88
<b>Age</b>	Mean: 4.29 SD: 1.19	Mean: 3.93 SD: 1.45	Mean: 4.27 SD: 1.08
<b>Citizens of Your Country</b>	Mean: 2.98 SD: 1.66	Mean: 3.90 SD: 1.39	Mean: 2.01 SD: 1.24
<b>Political Affiliation</b>	Mean: 3.74 SD: 1.36	Mean: 1.82 SD: 1.13	Mean: 4.40 SD: 0.93
<b>Professional Affiliation</b>	Mean: 3.42 SD: 1.27	Mean: 4.07 SD: 1.33	Mean: 3.79 SD: 1.28

**Table 9.9**

**Question 14- What is your opinion about the overall desire of the police administration to implement Community Oriented Policing in Poland?**

**Very Strong Desire 1-2-3-4-5 Not Strong At All**

	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=1,619</i>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=404</i>	<b>Student Sample</b> <i>n=253</i>
<b>Level of Desire</b>	Mean: 3.25 SD: 1.21	Mean: 2.18 SD: 1.37	Mean: 3.84 SD: 0.98

**Table 9.10**

**Question 15- What is your personal desire to be part in the implementation of Community Oriented Policing?**

**Very Strong Desire 1-2-3-4-5 Not Strong At All**

	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=1,619</i>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Officer Sample</b> <i>n=404</i>	<b>National Sample</b> <i>n=253</i>
<b>Level of Desire</b>	Mean: 3.50 SD: 1.17	Mean: 3.68 SD: 1.11	Mean: 4.29 SD: 1.01

**SURVEY INSTRUMENT**

PLEASE PAY ATTENTION TO THE DIFFERENCES IN QUESTIONS – YOUR OPINIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE POLICE AS AN ORGANIZATION, A POLICE OFFICER AS A ROLE PLAYER IN THE ORGANIZATION, AND FINALLY, YOUR PERCEPTION OF YOURSELF AS A POLICE OFFICER

FIRST PAGE – INTRODUCTION – EXPLANATION

SECOND PAGE- INSTRUCTIONS

THIRD PAGE AND ON – THE QUESTIONS:

1. Please rate, according to *your* opinion - what is the role of a *police force* in a democratic society?
  - A. to enforce the laws            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - B. to prevent crimes            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - C. to serve and protect the government            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5 **least important**
  - D. to preserve the peace            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - E. to provide services            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - F. to protect civil rights and civil liberties            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - G. other – explain (using the same scale)- 1-2-3-4-5  
\_\_\_\_\_ **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  
2. Please rate, according to *your* opinion - what is the role of a *police officer* in a democratic society?
  - A. to enforce the laws            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - B. to prevent crimes            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - C. to serve and protect the government            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5 **least important**
  - D. to preserve the peace            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - E. to provide services            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - F. to protect civil rights and civil liberties            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
  - G. other – explain (using the same scale)- 1-2-3-4-5  
\_\_\_\_\_ **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**

3. Please rate, according to your opinion -what was the role of the police during the Communist regime?

- A. to enforce the laws            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- B. to prevent crimes            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- C. to serve and protect the government            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5 **least important**
- D. to preserve the peace            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- E. to provide services            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- F. to protect civil rights and civil liberties            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- G. other – explain (using the same scale)- 1-2-3-4-5  
\_\_\_\_\_ **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**

4. Please rate, according to your opinion - what is your role as a police officer in a democratic society?

- A. to enforce the laws            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- B. to prevent crimes            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- C. to serve and protect the government            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5 **least important**
- D. to preserve the peace            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- E. to provide services            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- F. to protect civil rights and civil liberties            **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**
- G. other – explain (using the same scale)- 1-2-3-4-5  
\_\_\_\_\_ **most important** 1- 2- 3- 4- 5            **least important**

5. Have you ever heard the term Community Oriented Policing?

- 1. yes
- 2. no

6. If yes – when and where? (If no, proceed to question number 8)

- 1. during the academy training
- 2. during the in-service training
- 3. during a specialized training
- 4. informally – within the police department
- 5. formally – within the police department
- 6. during a meeting
- 7. in the media
- 8. from somebody in the community
- 9. other – explain

7. If yes, how do you feel about the correctness of the following definitions of the term Community Oriented Policing?

- a. a new philosophy of policing – correct 1-2-3-4-5 not correct
- b. a new tactical approach to policing – correct 1-2-3-4-5 not correct
- c. an old philosophy of policing under a new name – correct 1-2-3-4-5 not correct
- d. an old tactical approach to policing under a new disguise – correct 1-2-3-4-5 not correct

8. Please rate, according to your opinion – the accuracy of the following characteristics that best define the term of Community Oriented Policing?

- a. problem solving approach to crime-  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- b. decentralization of the command structure-  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- c. cooperation with the public/community in crime prevention and solving-  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- d. empowerment of the police officers in their initiatives/generalization-  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- e. empowerment of the citizens in their input into police work-scale:  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- f. joint accountability for public safety between the police and the public-  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- g. partnership with the public in solving crime problems-  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- h. customer orientation in service delivery (police towards the public)-  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- i. reorientation of foot patrol  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- j. police are the public and the public are the police  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- k. proactive policing  
very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
- l. other – explain

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very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate



9. Have you ever received any training in Community Oriented Policing?

1. Yes
2. No

10. If yes – where:

- |              |            |              |
|--------------|------------|--------------|
| 1. Legionowo | 5. Pila    | 9. Opole     |
| 2. Szczytno  | 6. Poznan  | 10. Katowice |
| 3. Slupsk    | 7. Lodz    | 11. Krakow   |
| 4. Szczecin  | 8. Wroclaw | 12. Warsaw   |

11. If yes – when (e.g. 03/99)

\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ month/year

12. If yes – how long?

1. \_\_\_\_\_(days)
2. \_\_\_\_\_(weeks)

13. The word “Community” connotes various definitions. Following are a number of characteristics that could serve as the appropriate translation of this term. Please rank each characteristics according to your understanding of the term community.

- a. geographic community that you police- **most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate**
- b. the population of a given city/township/etc.? – **most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate**
- c. religious affiliation? – **most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate**
- d. gender affiliation? – **most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate**
- e. age? – **most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate**
- f. citizens of your country? – **most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate**
- g. political affiliation? – **most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate**
- h. professional affiliation? – **most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate**
- i. other – explain (using the same scale): 1-2-3-4-5

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**most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate**

14. What is your opinion about the overall desire of the police administration to implement Community Oriented Policing in Poland?

**Very strong desire**      1-2-3-4-5      **Not strong at all**

15. What is your personal desire to be part in the implementation of the Community Oriented Policing?

Very strong desire      1-2-3-4-5      Not strong at all

16. Age – between :

1. 20-25
2. 26-30
3. 31-35
4. 36-40
5. 41-45
6. 46-50
7. 51-55
8. 56-60
9. over 60

17. How many years have you been a police officer?

1. Less than 1
2. 1-2
3. 3-5
4. 5-10
5. 11-15
6. 16-20
7. Over 20

18. What is your rank?

- |                         |                      |                      |                  |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| 1. posterunkowy         | 6. mlodzy aspirant   | 11. komisarz         | 16. nadinspektor |
| 2. starszy posterunkowy | 7. aspirant          | 12. nadkomisarz      |                  |
| 3. sierzant             | 8. starszy aspirant  | 13. podinspektor     |                  |
| 4. starszy sierzant     | 9. aspirant sztabowy | 14. mlodzy inspektor |                  |
| 5. sierzant sztabowy    | 10. podkomisarz      | 15. inspektor        |                  |

19. Which of the following best describes your current assignment?

1. prevention
2. criminal investigations
3. logistics

20. Are you a supervisor or non – supervisor?

1. Non –supervisor
2. Supervisor (unit supervisor, group supervisor)

21. What is the level of your education?

1. Less than 12 years
2. High school
3. Higher education
4. Advanced degree

22. Where did you receive your basic police training?

- |              |            |              |
|--------------|------------|--------------|
| 1. Szczytno  | 5. Pila    | 9. Opole     |
| 2. Legionowo | 6. Poznan  | 10. Katowice |
| 3. Slupsk    | 7. Lodz    | 11. Krakow   |
| 4. Szczecin  | 8. Wroclaw | 12. Warsaw   |

23. Do you live in the area of your service?

1. yes
2. no


24. If not, why not? (explain)

25. If you have any comment, after completion of this questionnaire, please share them with us.

*Thank you for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire.*

# Please rate, according to your opinion- the accuracy of the following characteristics that best define the term of Community Oriented Policing


Officer Sample I (n=1,619)     
  Officer Sample II (n=404)     
  Student Sample (n=253)



*Very Accurate 1-2-3-4-5 Not Accurate*

The word "Community" connotes various definitions. The following are a number of characteristics that could serve as the appropriate translation of this term. Please rank each of the characteristics according to your understanding of the term community.

Officer Sample I (n=1,619)
  Officer Sample II (n=404)
  Student Sample (n=253)




*Most Appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 Least Appropriate*

Please rate, according to *your* opinion- what is the role of a *police force* in a democratic society?

□ Officer Sample I (n=1,619)

□ Officer Sample II (n=404)

□ Student Sample (n=253)




*Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important*

Please rate, according to *your* opinion- what is the role of a *police officer* in a democratic society?

□ Officer Sample I (n=1,619)

□ Officer Sample II (n=404)

□ Student Sample (n=253)




Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important

# Please rate, according to *your* opinion- what is the role of a *police force* in a Communist Regime?

□ Officer Sample I (n=1,619)

□ Officer Sample II (n=404)


□ Student Sample (n=253)



*Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important*




**Student- Comparing the roles of *police officers* and a *police force* in both a Democratic Society and under the Communist Regime.**



n=253

*Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important*


## National Sample I- Comparing the roles of *police officers* and a *police force* in both a Democratic Society and under the Communist Regime.



*n=1,619*

*Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important*

## National Sample II- Comparing the roles of *police officers* and a *police force* in both a Democratic Society and under the Communist Regime.



n=404


*Most Important 1-2-3-4-5 Least Important*

# Have you ever heard the term Community Policing?


Officer Sample I




Officer Sample II




Student Sample



## If yes, how do you feel about the correctness of the following definitions of the term Community Oriented Policing?



# Overall Desire to Implement Community Oriented Policing In Poland



*Very Strong Desire 1-2-3-4-5 Not Strong At All*

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