

The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: Community Policing in Lansing, Michigan, Final Report

Author(s): Donald L. Carter ; Bonnie Bucqueroux ; Andra J. Katz

Document No.: 193804

Date Received: 04/15/2002

Award Number: 93-IJ-CX-K011

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies.

Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

193804

COMMUNITY POLICING IN LANSING, MICHIGAN

Final Report

PROPERTY OF

National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS)

by Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000

David L. Carter
Director
National Center for Community Policing

Bonnie Bucqueroux
Assistant Director
National Center for Community Policing

Andra J. Katz
Research Associate
National Center for Community

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
560 BAKER HALL
EAST LANSING, MI 48824-1118
517.355.9308 / FAX 517.432.1787

Submitted to

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice
Grant Award Number: 93-IJ-CX-KO11

1996

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I: Studying Lansing	1
Introduction	1
The Change in Scope of the Research	3
Research Design and Analysis	6
A Change in the Research Process	8
SECTION II: A Review of Pertinent Literature	9
Community Policing Defined	10
Theoretical Assumptions Underlying Community Policing	11
The History of American Policing	13
Traditional Police Patrol as an Antecedent of Community Policing	14
Empowering the Community	17
The Shift Towards Community Policing	18
The Implementation of Community Policing: Case Studies	21
Conclusion	24
SECTION III: Lessons Learned From and About CPOs	27
Issues of Split Force	28
The Anti-Crime Argument	28
The Pro-CPO Argument	29
Specialist versus Generalist	31
Community Policing in Lansing Phase One—The CPO Approach	32
The Rationale/Theory of the CPO Position	33
Union Rules	34
Early Definitions of Community Policing	35
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE "IDEAL" CPO?	36
Confronting Backlash	39
HOW CPOs IN LANSING SEE THE JOB	41
A Backdrop of Conflict	41
Community Building in Public Housing	44
Problem Solving and Prostitution	47
Community Policing and Youth	50
CPOs and Drugs	54
Advice and Suggestions from CPOs	56
Top Management	56
First-Line Supervision and Middle Management	57
Relationship With the Community	58
Relationship With Patrol	59
Nuts and Bolts	61

CPO Checklist	61
SECTION IV: Lessons Learned From and About Reorganization	63
COMMUNITY POLICING IN LANSING PHASE TWO—DEPARTMENT-WIDE IMPLEMENTATION (REORGANIZATION)	63
Growing Frustration	63
Developing Plans To Reorganize	66
A Disclaimer	67
Committee Rosters	68
Getting Started	68
Setting Up the Timetable	69
Issues and Objectives	72
The Problem-Solving Teams	76
Changes for CPOs	78
An Interrupted Story	78
THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT	80
Sources of Resistance	80
Clarifying the Role of the Community	82
Communicating the Rationale for Change	83
Planning and Pacing	84
Confronting Barriers	85
Fostering a Climate of Goodwill	86
Defining Success and Failure	87
REORGANIZATION CHECKLIST	89
SECTION V: Other Lessons Learned	91
Implications for Training	91
Neighborhood Network Center	93
Community Governance	96
Budget Concerns	97
Activities/Events	98
The Community Policing Detective	98
The Future of Detectives in Reorganization	102
If Only One Lesson . . .	103
APPENDICES	
Appendix A—Budget & Policies	
FY 1996 Budget for the Lansing Police Department	
Lansing Police Department Vision Statement	
Objectives	
Summary of Discussion on Community Policing Officer Role	
LPD Recruiting Document	
LPD Essential Job Functions for Police Officer I Position	

Ideas for Problem Solving on Night Shift—Memo from Capt. Teszlewicz
Personnel & Training Memo on All Specialty Assignments

Appendix B—SCH, Inc. Training Outline
Provided by Gil Skinner

Appendix C—Sample Crime Statistics
Monthly Crime Summaries—June & December 1994

Appendix D—CPO/Union Issues
Community Policing Neighborhood Boundaries - 3-24-94
Grant/Contract Positions
Union Contract—Non-Supervisory

Appendix E—Personnel Issues
Staffing Levels 7-31-94
FY 1995 Staffing Levels
Affirmative Action Quarterly Report - April/June 1994
Uniform Division Assignment Sheets
Diversity Report - August 1994
Wages - FOP Supervisory Unit
Non-Sworn Personnel by Position—1-19-95
Sworn Personnel by Rank - 1-19-95
Platoon Two Roster
Traffic Unit Roster
Community Bureau Assignments

Appendix F—Reorganization & Implementation Committees
Materials & Minutes

Appendix G—NNC Meeting February 22, 1995
Handout for the Public
Questions & Answers About the Reorganization
Community Neighborhood Offices

Appendix H—Pertinent Information on Detectives
Detective Bureau Reorganization—Report b Fox-Cook-Dama
Investigation Division Operation - 7-94
Reorganization Memo from Fox to Boles - 7-1-94
LPD Investigation Manpower - September 1973 - November 1991
Job Description - Community Policing Detective—10-92
Investigations Division—Monthly Report—October '93
Perry-Buse Memo to Patrol on problems with reports—8-94
CPD Statistics—Norris Memo to Fox—2-11-94
Reorganization memo—Norris to Perry-Buse—6-94
Case Priority Breakdown
Case Designations

Appendix I—Dissent
Petition to LPD to delay implementation
Szilagyi Memo to Boles on deterioration of department

Appendix J—Poetry Slam

'Twas the Month Before Implementation Poem - Anonymous
Throw the Bums Out - or - Nothing Rhymes with Luzader—Anonymous
Response

Appendix K—CPO Handouts/Activities

Carwash flyer—Hansen
Non-Sup Newsletter
CPO Kennedy's Handout
Neighborhood Survey
Kingsley Newsletter by Schneggenburger
Transitional Housing—McManus
Neighborhood Watch Newsletter

Appendix L - Model G

Adopted 1-19-95

Appendix M - Structure Before Reorganization

As of May 1993
As of November 1993, with handwritten revisions for Summer 1994

Appendix N - Brinton Butler Reorganization Plan

The only independent submission to the committee

Appendix O—Survey on CPOs conducted by resident Carol Wood

Presented to Implementation Committee

Appendix P—North Precinct—Captain Helen Perry-Buse

Problem Solving Teams

Appendix Q—Lansing State Journal

Articles on Lansing Police Department Issues & Reorganization

Appendix R—Resident/CPO Efforts on Problem Houses

Klaus letter to residents asking for complaints on specific house
Copy of complaint form
Ruth Hallman letter to detective certifying problems
Ruth Hallman letter to prosecutor certifying problems
CPO Howell letter to landlords
Recognition handout for Neighborhood Watch & Neighborhood Assn.
Hallman remarks when she received recognition award for her efforts

SECTION I: Studying the Lansing Police Department

The National Center for Community Policing has long enjoyed a close relationship with the Lansing Police Department, which provided fertile ground for community policing. Indeed, the late Dr. Robert Trojanowicz, a renowned pioneering figure in the community policing movement, often called Lansing a "laboratory" for many of his ideas about how community policing could be improved. Trojanowicz was singularly involved in the launching of the first (and still only) Neighborhood Network Center in the city (three more are planned), conceptualized as an opportunity for police and other full-time and part-time service providers to work together as a community-based team of problem solvers who would be housed in one neighborhood facility.

When this research was proposed, Lansing seemed an ideal site to explore basic issues concerning successful community policing initiatives nationwide, because it mirrored so many other departments with similar histories. Lansing serves as an example of a medium-size Midwestern "rust belt" industrial city attempting to find its way in the information era. As of the 1990 census, Lansing was a city of 127,321 people, with a median age of 29.7. Among the 50,635 households in the city, 42% are married-couple families. Among persons 25 years old or older, 78.3% have at least a high school diploma and 18.3% have at least a bachelor's degree. However, worrisome is that, while 54.8% of Lansing homes are owner occupied, there are 3,284 vacant homes. (See Appendix B).

Lansing is policed by the Lansing Police Department, whose typical current strength hovers somewhat above 240 sworn officers, though the failure to replace the

surge of Baby Boomers retiring quickly often leaves the department significantly below assigned strength. According to records provided by the department, as of July 31, 1994, the department was authorized for 247 sworn officers funded from the General Fund, 13 grant positions, 1 court officer, 2 sworn officers on HUD contracts, and 93 civilians. In reality, however, the department complement included 228 sworn, 12 sworn on grants, 2 officers on HUD, 1 court officers, and 88 civilians. (See Appendix E.) At any given time, the number of patrol officers actually out on the road averages somewhere around 70.

Also mirroring national trends, Lansing has seen an increase in violence since the far more peaceful 1950s and 1960s. As we will see, there is increasing concern in particular about drugs, gang activity, and "trouble" in schools. As Appendix C shows, more than 9,000 total Part I crimes are now reported to police each year.

Lansing launched its initial community policing effort under (now retired) Chief Richard Gleason as an experimental program, with two officers assigned to two small beats, chosen because they were high-crime areas. Both officers were given little direction and training, yet ultimately one officer accomplished some effective strategies (Another officer was forced by circumstances beyond his control to leave his posting within a few months).

Within a year, it was clear that this new Community Policing Officer idea had exceptional merit. The officer was quick to say that working one-on-one with people in the neighborhood had revitalized his enthusiasm for police work. Residents of the community were quick to champion him as their hero. Traditional police measurements suggested also that the officer's efforts had brought newfound stability to the neighborhood, and the community exhibited an unheard sense of pride, symbolized by its new name, *Sparrow Estates* (McLanus, 1991).

With the National Center for Community Policing just three miles away at Michigan State University, Lansing received not only local but national media attention

for its efforts, as a result of the contacts that Trojanowicz had built up with the press over many years. Asked for sites that were doing a good job of community policing, Trojanowicz would routinely identify Lansing as among the top two or three. As a result, the successful officer received significant national attention, from *Time* magazine, ABC's *PrimeTime Live*, PBS specials, and various appearances on nightly network news shows.

In the meantime, the expansion of community policing in Lansing grew once new Chief Jerome Boles, who was promoted from within, assumed the top job. A graduate of the FBI's National Academy in Quantico, Boles was a popular choice within the agency, particularly among patrol officers, because of the widespread perception that he was "one of them" and that he wouldn't forget his roots. A strong advocate of community policing, Boles brought the total number of CPOs to a high of 14, achieved at the time that this research was undertaken. The new Chief made it clear that he wanted to move community policing from being a program done by a special unit to a philosophy that would imbue the entire department.

The Change in Scope of the Research

As the literature review suggests, the issue of what it means to implement community policing as a department-wide philosophy dominates the current debate. Shortly after the research was proposed and approved, the Lansing Police Department embarked on an extremely ambitious effort to reorganize the entire department in service of this ideal (though, as we will see, confusion about the actual goals for the reorganization surfaced over time).

By the early summer of 1994, Chief Boles had announced his intention to explore options for a reorganization plan. Interviewed for this research, Boles said that "we're at the point where we're stuck in the mud—we're only having small victories in winning over the majority (to community policing)." This, too, echoes the problem that many

police departments with similar histories have faced facing, though few have been willing to "put everything on the table" to be re-negotiated.

The approved research proposal did not highlight this unique opportunity to document and analyze a department as its struggles to reorganize itself to implement community policing department wide simply because, at the time, the chief had not yet announced his intentions. While he talked in general terms of the need to include everyone and inculcate the philosophy throughout the sworn, non-sworn, and civilian ranks, there was no hint that he would embark on such a sweeping attempt at structural and philosophical reorganization.

Part of the pressure for change stemmed from the backlash and hostility toward the Community Policing Officers and their efforts, particularly among district patrol officers. Research in Chicago (Skogan and Lurigio, 1994) and public displays by patrol officers in Houston and New York underscore how controversial community policing reform can be within the police agencies. The opportunity for an in-depth look at how a police department with a positive track record in community policing approaches the challenge of operationalizing the philosophy department-wide provides a unique opportunity for research which has the potential to benefit police managers facing similar challenges.

The initial research plan was designed to focus on:

1. Lessons learned about organizational change, including
 - a. officer acceptance;
 - b. community acceptance;
 - c. political considerations; and
 - d. budgetary concerns.
2. Implications for training, ranging from the academy to field training and in-service training.
3. How the Neighborhood Network Center functions.

4. Fostering "community governance," as a means of empowering neighborhoods so that they no longer need the full-time services of a Community Policing Officer.
5. Specific events.
6. Involvement of non-police agencies.

Because of the unique opportunity to study the reorganization process, the issue of lessons learned about managing change has assumed overarching importance. As the findings detailed below will attest, the Lansing experience not only underscores what to do, but what not to do, when attempting such massive change. Instead of reducing internal dissent, the new reorganization plan sparked protests from both the critics and fans of community policing. Moreover, various individuals and groups within the community expressed outrage at the perceived failure of the department to include them in the decision-making process. Heated discussions dominated the public meetings of the Lansing City Council, and the local media (both print and electronic) recently carried a number of stories about the volatile internal and external reaction to the plan.

As the findings will indicate, the policy issues highlighted by the Lansing experience surround the depth, scope, and pace of the change required to implement community policing department wide. Of critical importance is how the shift in paradigm requires practicing the politics of inclusion internally and externally. There is a general understanding that strategic planning in support of community policing requires input from all segments of the department and the community. However, the Lansing experience underscores how well-meaning police managers may not understand the lengths to which they must go to practice the politics of inclusion internally and externally, if the transition is to enhance the likelihood that the reorganization will fulfill its promise. While we talk about the importance of engaging the community and generating ownership and buy-in, the Lansing experience serves as a reminder that once

the community is invited to the table, they will expect to be there when any far-ranging decisions are made.

Research Design and Analysis

This research employed a case-study approach to exploring the five areas of inquiry listed above. In addition to the literature search, the design included a methodology that focuses on: (1) interviews (including repeat interviews) with relevant actors in the department, in local government, and in the community; (2) attendance at internal planning meetings held by various groups within the department; (3) attendance at various community events where the new plan is being introduced/discussed; (4) collection and analysis of relevant internal and public police documents; and (5) gathering of media accounts and informal reports of reaction to the department's plan.

Of particular importance at the outset was a series of interviews with the top command of the department and the Community Policing Officers and their separate supervisory staff. This provided the foundation for understanding how the Lansing Police Department initially perceived community policing and how those views had changed over time. These interviews also provided the context for interviews with those whose assignments were not initially perceived as being part of the community policing assignment, as well as vocal critics of (1) Community Policing Officers, (2) the community policing philosophy, or (3) both.

These interviews were also essential in gaining perspective on the culture of the entire department, and how community policing posed a threat to the established order, particularly as management announced that plans were being made to implement the philosophy department-wide as part of a complete restructuring, which dramatically added to the ranks of those eager to talk about their concerns.

As noted, these interviews were augmented with attendance at various meetings, inside and outside the department. The Lansing Police Department granted

extraordinary access for this research. In addition to attending meetings of the Reorganization Committee and the Implementation Committee, the department allowed observations at small meetings of various groups within the management staff. This opportunity to rove freely within the agency contributed greatly to providing context for the internal and external eruptions that occurred as the planning process unfolded. Without such access, it might also have been impossible to connect written information about the reorganization process with the final decisions and the continuing internal and external uproar that has ensued.

In addition to interviews with individuals and groups within the police department, the research also employed interviews of various individuals and groups within the community. It should be noted, for example, that many of the Neighborhood Watch and Neighborhood Organization meetings are not well attended by minority residents, so there was a concerted attempt to solicit their input concerning the reorganization plan. During the month prior to the launch of the plan, an effort was also made to identify various sources of discontent and secure their perspectives.

As noted, the situation in Lansing required close monitoring as the implementation date approached. For example, one community group, Citizens for a Better Lansing, comprised of 1,400 members, continued to explore last-minute possibilities to delay implementation, including a request for a meeting with Mayor David Hollister. Indeed, keeping up with the activities of various groups and individuals inside and outside the department was challenging.

Perhaps the most problematic issue in the research was confidentiality. To ensure that various individuals inside the department and in the community spoke freely, a guarantee of confidentiality for "off the record" remarks was essential. Part of the challenge in such instances, however, is obscuring the individual's identity when those remarks are used. As a result, there will be instances throughout this report where individuals giving positive statements will also not be identified by name, so that the

reader cannot easily infer that they are the source of contemporaneous remarks that criticize the actions of others. As one would suspect, such massive change brings emotions to the surface, and the goal is to provide promised protection to those who risked speaking with such candor. What was overwhelmingly clear was that the criticism was clearly intended as constructive, and all were quick to insist that their overriding goal was to make the police department more effective.

A Change in the Research Process

The research process changed in late 1994 as a result of the death of Dr. Trojanowicz. David Carter, a colleague and collaborator of Trojanowicz, assumed the position of Director of the National Center for Community Policing. In addition Carter was asked to complete this grant. After discussions with Craig Uchida at the National Institute of Justice, supplementary funding was awarded to complete the 1993 work of Trojanowicz and follow through the change at Lansing.

REFERENCES

Lurigio, Arthur J. & Skogan, Wesley, *Winning the Hearts and Minds of Police Officers: An Assessment of Staff Perceptions of Community Policing in Chicago* in *Crime & Delinquency*. Volume 30. Number 3. San Francisco, CA: Sage Periodicals Press.

SECTION II: A Review of Pertinent Literature

While quantifying what various agencies that claim to do community policing can contribute to identifying boundaries concerning how the term is used, this must be balanced with in-depth analyses of how specific police agencies attempt to transform themselves into community policing departments. In that regard, the Lansing (MI) Police Department has been identified as an agency that is attempting to make the most of this new approach. Lansing Chief Jerome Boles' stated goal is to "take community policing to the next level" as a department-wide commitment.

Because community policing is a philosophy that can be interpreted in a number of ways, a clear, concise definition is simply unavailable (Skogan, 1994; Kelling, 1994; Kenney, 1992). As an abstract concept, community policing is best explained through the use of concrete examples. Understanding what it consists of has been problematic for a number of agencies. In an attempt to jump on the bandwagon of community policing, such agencies simply engage in activities and practices which mimic rather than truly incorporate the essential characteristics that distinguish it from other police practices.

Kelling (1994) has gone so far as to state that the premise underlying community policing cannot be deduced to one definition. Although a number of police departments claim that they are employing "community policing," it is doubtful that they are practicing it in a manner consistent with the actual philosophy (Weisel and Eck, 1994; Kenney, 1992). Consequently, some will argue that it is difficult to assess accurately the utility of such a philosophy on a large scale (Kenney, 1992). On the other hand, we are

beginning to see success, even give the complexity of organizational change toward the community policing philosophy.

In contrast, Bucqueroux (1995) argues that the no-definition argument is a myth and that a cadre of progressive police chiefs and academics settled the matter long ago. The "clear and concise definition in widespread use for more than a decade" is: Community policing is a philosophy based on forging a partnership between the police and the community, so that they can work together on solving problems of crime, fear of crime, and disorder, thereby enhancing the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods."

By definition, community policing is not a style of policing, a specific program, or a strategy, but a philosophy. It is comprised of a variety of different, yet compatible, components. For example, (and contrary to popular opinion) walking the beat, in and of itself, does not necessarily constitute community policing (Cordner, 1994). The proper attitude and initiatives must accompany such an action for it to accurately be defined as a method consistent with the community policing philosophy. Lack of interaction with the public, or poor interpersonal skills, may, in fact, impede rather than promote the establishment of a working police-community relationship. Consequently, it is necessary to understand and employ the principles identified as being consistent with the community policing philosophy.

Community Policing Defined

According to Trojanowicz and Carter (1988), "(a) philosophy and not a specific tactic, community policing is a proactive, decentralized approach, designed to reduce crime, disorder, and by extension, fear of crime, by intensely involving the same officer in the same community on a long term basis, so that residents will develop trust to cooperate with police by providing information and assistance to achieve those crucial goals" (pg. 17).

In effect, the Community Policing Officer (CPO) acts both as an ombudsman for the community and as a liaison between the community and local police department. Trojanowicz and Carter stress that "improved police/community relations is a welcomed by-product of this approach, not its primary goal" (1988: 17). Rather, by empowering the community, in essence, encouraging citizens to take back their neighborhoods, it is hoped that "untended behavior that leads to the breakdown of community controls" and/or disorder which may in fact lead to crime (i.e. Broken Windows Theory), will be curbed or inhibited (see Kelling; Wilson 1988).

Theoretical Assumptions Underlying Community Policing

The major premise behind community policing is that it will lead to enhanced crime control. Theoretically, there are a number of ways in which this is deemed possible utilizing such a strategy. First, the enhanced police presence "both deters potential offenders from committing crimes and affords officers the opportunities to note criminal acts in progress" (Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988: 8). The benefits associated with foot patrol officers are rooted in the fact that "such officers have access to areas unavailable to officers in cars: walkways and areas between houses, for example" (Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988: 9). While quick access to fleeing felons is a rationale for bicycle patrol, Trojanowicz, in his later years, questioned whether preventive patrol on foot or bike could be any more effective than motor patrol, discredited as a preventive strategy in the Kansas City Preventive Patrol study (see later).

The identification and surveillance by police officers of dangerous offenders who reside within the community is another benefit of community policing. While regular patrol officers can engage in such activities to an extent, the ability to control crime

through such strategies is further enhanced when officers work closely with the community (Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988: 9).

Community policing enables officers to gain access to valuable information which citizens might otherwise keep to themselves. Gaining the trust and respect of community members opens the way for the exchange of information and concerns (Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988: 9). In addition, Moore, Trojanowicz, and Kelling point out that "familiarity with the social and physical characteristics of their beat also helps neighborhood police officers to understand linkages between various pieces of information gathered from their own observations and from other disparate sources" (1988: 9). Still another benefit of community policing rests on the notion that "early intervention can prevent the escalation of disorder into crime" (Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988: 10).

Community policing also actively encourages involvement by community members and institutions. Recommendations come in the form of anti-crime consultation and target hardening (Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988: 10). Such encouragement is beneficial for two reasons: it aids the police in curbing criminal activity and makes community members feel useful and productive in the protection of their own neighborhoods.

The revitalization of community institutions such as churches, community centers, families, schools, and the like which provide informal social control is also a responsibility which lies with the community policing officer (Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988: 10). Currie (1985) states that it is the informal rather than formal sanctions associated with crime commission which actually deter. He believes that "the best deterrent to crime is the creation and maintenance of stable communities in which people may reasonably expect that good behavior will lead to esteemed and rewarding social roles" (Currie, 1985: 57-58).

The History of American Policing

In an attempt to understand why community policing is currently at the forefront of many police agendas, it is necessary to understand the history of policing. Exploring the issues that prevailed at given points throughout time will prove most beneficial. As is true with most institutions, the police have been and continue to be heavily influenced by the social climate.

The history of American policing is, at best, a mixed bag. Originally modeled after the British system of policing proposed by Sir Robert Peel, whereby gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the public was crucial to fulfilling the primary objective of prevention, policing in America soon diversified objective. This failure to accurately replicate and maintain such a system is often blamed on a particular characteristics which distinguishes the two forces.

Currently within England and Wales there are forty-three separate police constabularies (plus the London Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police), bound together by the national standards to which each must adhere. However, there is no national police force, and therefore each agency is solely responsible for its pre-assigned jurisdiction. As a result, the British police system is characterized as being independent in nature.

Police agencies throughout the United States, as in Britain, are rooted in local highly decentralized governments. However, in the United States, there are some "national police forces," comprised of number of different agencies (i.e. FBI, DEA). Consequently, the national jurisdiction of such a police force enables federal officers to become involved in local incidents that are viewed as being especially complex in nature or when a federal law has been broken.

Unlike the British police, who were largely removed from direct political influence, American police were not. As a result, politics invaded and disrupted the prescribed agenda set down by those with good intentions. The corruption and

lawlessness that erupted early on would eventually lead to a forced re-examination of the role of the police. It would take a reform effort to change all that had been destroyed by the political force that raged often unchecked in those days (Uchida, 1993).

Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the police were understandably viewed as untrustworthy, corrupt, and out of control (Uchida, 1993). Suspicious of the police, the public became fearful and demanded that something be done to correct the wrongdoing of officers. However, such changes would not come about until the Progressives began a movement which eventually would lead to the creation of a "truly professional police force" (Uchida, 1993, pg. 25).

In conjunction with the development of a "professional" police force, modern technology played a major role in further perpetuating the strain between the police and the public they served. The public, accustomed to officers patrolling on foot, began to feel distanced from officers both physically and socially. The police began to take on anonymity and, subsequently, rarely came into direct contact with individuals for reasons other than making arrests or reacting to a criminal act. The social relationship that the police once had with the community had all but disappeared. Once again, the police were viewed with great skepticism, especially by the lower classes.

The need to re-establish police-community relations became a priority for police agencies, politicians, and those who harbored an interest or concern about the present situation. Coming to the realization that good police-community relations would benefit all seemed to be at least a viable part of the solution.

Traditional Police Patrol as an Antecedent of Community Policing

Community policing is a philosophy that has, in many ways, evolved out of the traditional police role. Therefore, in order to better understand the reasons underlying

its adoption amongst police agencies throughout the country, it is necessary to explore its antecedents.

Carter (1990) provides an exhaustive summary on the results of studies regarding traditional police patrol methods. One such study, the aforementioned Kansas City Preventive Patrol study, essentially revealed that random patrol not only acts as an inhibitor to the establishment of police-community relations, but also precludes utilizing resources to the fullest extent (Carter, 1990). Another consequence of random patrol, whereby the public is unaware of police presence (i.e. hiding in areas not easily seen by passing cars for speed measuring purposes), is that it creates resentment. Hiding out, and, in a sense, tricking the general public, by no means enhances relationships between the police and the public. This instead creates mistrust and suspicion that can further isolate the police from the community, especially in cases where the police are already viewed cynically.

Response time was another area explored in a number of studies. As Carter (1990) notes, a Kansas City study and a number of subsequent ones set out further clarify the Kansas City findings which, to some, appeared to be counterintuitive and therefore difficult to believe. In fact, it was determined, after close examination, that "(t)he amount of time that elapsed was not, in itself, an important determinant" (Carter, 1990, pg. 171). Rather, citizen satisfaction with police response was contingent upon the relationship between anticipated response time (that which was expected) and the true response time.

If police response time either matched or was quicker than expected, citizen satisfaction was good. However, if response time was longer than anticipated, citizens were apt to be dissatisfied with the police (Carter, 1990). It is important to note that the research does not discuss what determines an individual's perception of what is deemed a reasonable response time. Regardless, as Carter (1990) points out, "(s)ince fast response time neither addressed serious crime effectively nor enhanced citizen

satisfaction, this research paved the way for developing alternative police strategies" (pg. 171).

Isolation from the public has also been blamed, to an extent, on technological advancements. For example, prior to the widespread use of motorized vehicles, officers were forced to walk their beats. As a result, officers interacted with the public they were hired to serve and protect. Citizens became familiar with officers, and often turned to them in times of need. In fact, it may be stated, that these officers often became an integral part of the "community" they served. However, as automobiles became a popular addition to society, it was inevitable that their introduction would penetrate into every aspect of society, including policing.

Although the utilization of police vehicles by officers enhanced response time and efficiency, there was a price to pay. Driving around in vehicles created a social and physical distance to the very officers who once patrolled their beats on foot. The familiar faces of officers began to vanish, as anonymous officers driving past began to occupy that niche. An unfortunate consequence of such technology was the distance it placed between the public and the police.

Mass communication, in particular the telephone, also allowed police departments the option of collecting officers in a headquarters downtown, since those in need of police service could place a call asking for help. Prior to the advent of the telephone, some major cities installed call boxes, and others relied on patrolling officers to uncover problems.

For a number of years, the movement towards creating a professional police force overshadowed everything else. In essence, police-community relations which, at one time, were held in high regards was deemed something of the past. Unfortunately, it took violence, and destruction to force government and police officials to seriously reconsider the need to reconstruct and re-establish such relationships.

Empowering the Community

As the name implies, community policing depends a great deal on support from citizens. Without their willingness to participate, such an effort on the part of government and police officials will be in vain. However, as Trojanowicz (1992) points out, the underlying assumption that communities will become involved and respond positively to efforts initiated by police and local government officials is based on a two theories.

The first is Normative Sponsorship Theory, originally developed by Sower, which Trojanowicz paraphrases as stating that "most people are of good will and that they will cooperate with others to facilitate the building of consensus" (1992: 5). The extent to which members in a community are willing to cooperate is based on the number of commonalties and similarities shared by these citizens. In fact, "(t)he more that various groups share common values, norms, and beliefs, the more they will support efforts that are directed at improving their neighborhoods" (Trojanowicz, 1992).

Critical Social Theory, developed by Fay (1984) and reiterated by Trojanowicz (1992) is more of an explanatory theory. It offers an explanation as to "how and why people coalesce to correct and overcome the socioeconomic and political obstacles that prevent them from having their needs met" (Trojanowicz, 1992: 5). Its utility for community policing is obvious. It offers insight into the process of empowering the citizens of a community to such an extent that they become catalysts for change.

Elaborating on Critical Theory, Trojanowicz (1992) identifies the three core components the theory as follows. The first, referred to as Enlightenment, recognizes that "(p)eople must become educated about their circumstances before they can lobby for change" (5). Not realizing or identifying that a problem exists in the first place allows for the perpetuation of the disorder and/or disarray that plagues a given area without the appropriate amount of resistance from the community members. One

cannot be expected to make the necessary changes if he/she is not made aware of their negative circumstances.

The second component is Empowerment (Trojanowicz, 1992). Improving the conditions or circumstances under which one lives is ultimately the responsibility of that given individual (or community). Stated succinctly, "(p)eople must take action to improve their condition" (Trojanowicz, 1992: 5). Failure to do so will undoubtedly undermine any effort put forth by others to help.

Emancipation, the third core component, goes one step further (Trojanowicz, 1992). This concept refers to the idea that "(p)eople can achieve social change through reflection and social action" (5). It provides answers and a renewed hope for individuals or communities that have been down and out to such an extent that the term "learned helplessness" best characterizes them. Overcoming years of a seemingly hopeless situation is a rather challenging proposition for many of these citizens, as well as the officers who patrol these areas.

The Shift Towards Community Policing

The recent emphasis on community policing has been the result of a number of critical turning points in our changing society. The recent shift towards a community policing philosophy is the result of three interrelated factors, the first being the research on police. Such research has shown time and time again that strained community relations with the police have proven counterproductive, and in some cases, even disastrous. The inability to gather vital information due to such a rift has led to countless incidents of crime and victimization being underreported and/or simply unresolved.

The second and third reasons are closely related and will therefore be discussed as one broad issue, that of the changing nature of communities. Communities have and continue to undergo changes. While some changes are subtle, others are quite extreme.

One prime example is that of the formation of gangs. There is a tendency for gangs to form in areas with high degrees of social disorganization and where poverty runs rampant. These variables are further exacerbated by the growth of criminal opportunities, institutionalized racism, the insecurities of the working and middle classes who are "threatened" by newcomers, and the sudden and rapid minority population into a given community.

Newcomers who are often forced to settle in such areas are frequently met with anger and hostility by permanent residents. In an attempt to protect themselves, often from physical attacks, the formation of gangs for defensive purposes enables them to stave off such attacks. However, over time, such gangs, like pre-existing, well established gangs, begin to take on a more offensive role. Such a transformation, although not inevitable, seems to characterize the evolutionary process of newcomer gang formation.

Although youth gangs are generally comprised of ethnic and/or racial minorities, this phenomenon is not restricted to such populations. In fact, the economic hardships, social and/or cultural pressures faced by families in areas defined as blue-collar or, in some instances, middle class, are factors which have led to the formation of gangs. These predominantly white, formerly stable communities have, in recent times, turned out a generation of youth whose own lives are filled with instability and anger. Gang formation often is the result of such outward hostilities, in that it (the gang) acts as an outlet for the alleviation of internal as well as external pressures.

Reasons underlying gang formation and other types of violence that have penetrated into neighborhoods once viewed as stable have contributed as well to the recent shift towards the community policing ideology. It has been shown (Carter, 1990) that policing strategies of days past no longer appear to be effective in terms of dealing with the ever-increasing violence that plagues our society. The traditional police

response, which is reactive in nature, fails to address the underlying problems that have lead to the disintegration of previously secure, stable neighborhoods.

Much of the recent upsurge in violent crime has been blamed on the breakdown of the family unit, which is no longer as influential in guiding and directing members of society toward socially acceptable and desirable goals. The lack of both quality and quantity of time spent with children during their most crucial years has proven to be quite devastating for society in general.

Additionally, the abuse perpetrated against children by their parents or caregivers has been identified as a factor in the increase in violent crime. The violent behavior that an individual witnesses or is victimized by in the household may lead to the belief that violence is an acceptable outlet for one's aggression and/or frustration. While defining such a relationship as absolute, in that violence leads to violence, is simply not acceptable, it has been shown that there is a fairly strong correlation which links the two (.33).

Another contributing factor to the increasing violent crime rate is the lack of economic stability. High unemployment rates, public dismay, and fewer sources of allocation to police agencies, have all played a role in the current state of society, whereby social ills are running rampant.

Violent crime in our society is by no means a recent phenomenon. The contributory factors mentioned above have been developing and becoming progressively worse over the last 20 years. Although crime is no stranger to our society, the more recent explosion of violent (predatory) crimes has aroused much concern amongst intellectuals and lay persons alike.

Wilson (1983), a noted academic in the area of criminal justice, paints an unnerving picture of society's transition to an era riddled with crime and criminals. He states that "predatory crime arouses fear and often causes injuries" (p. 5). Further, it causes the kind of fear that drives people apart from one another and thus impedes or

even prevents the formation of meaningful human communities" (p. 5). From the standpoint of society, predatory crime "violates the social contract" and is "viewed as immoral" (p. 5). Given these conditions, "(t)hat is why, in virtually every known society, past or present, theft, rape, murder, and unprovoked assault are universally condemned" (p. 5).

Clearly, traditional policing which, at one time, proved quite effective and acceptable, is no longer able to deal effectively with the extreme changes society has been subjected to in recent times. The adoption of community policing as an alternative method not necessarily to replace, but rather to enhance the current state of policing appears to be working. Researchers (Carter 1994, Trojanowicz, 1994) and departments where implementation of this relatively new police philosophy has been executed have shown reliable results.

The Implementation of Community Policing: Case Studies

Several examples illustrating the utility of community policing have recently come to the forefront. One such project, referred to as COPS, was conducted in Denton, Texas. This effort was based on the knowledge that getting to know neighborhoods better enables officers to identify, address, and locate citizen problems and complaints. The results of this program have provided further support for practical importance of community policing.

Evaluation of this program was done using traditional police evaluations, which have "legitimized the success of the program" (The Denton Experience). With regards to this program the "stats show a decrease in crime every year since it began" (The Denton Experience). However, "(e)ven more important than the stats are personal testimonies of citizens and police alike" (The Denton Experience).

Another example is Seattle, Washington. Credited with developing a "(m)odel partnership between citizens and police", community policing has been identified as the

one factor responsible for the "dramatic improvements in the quality of life" in the Seattle area (National Institute of Justice: Research in Brief, p. 1).

The research conducted in Seattle may be identified as more than just a mirror image of other programs. It goes beyond the scope and depth of many, for it not only stresses the importance of community involvement, but it provides measures to ensure that such a partnership continues.

The involvement on the part of citizens and citizens groups plays a vital role. Some examples of community involvement in Seattle are as follows: Citizens identify perpetrators for police, paint over graffiti in their neighborhoods with officers working along side them, operate a "hotline" which receives citizens' information on crime, lobby to create and maintain legislation that gives police officers forceful tools to combat chronic neighborhood problems (i.e., drug dealing), and "(p)rovide feedback to police on the success of their efforts by organizing dinners and special events where officers and supervisors where thanked for work well done" (Research in Brief, p. 9).

As a result of community interest and involvement in combating the crime problems that plague their neighborhoods, officers in Seattle say that they are dedicated to improving the quality of life of those they serve. Additionally, the recognition they receive at formal dinners and gatherings furthers their commitment. Hence, the "model partnership between citizens and police" as characterized by the research team appears to be just that.

When evaluating community policing on a larger scale, the results once again provide support for its implementation. In fact, a survey conducted jointly between Trojanowicz and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1994), reveals that this type of policing is beneficial on more than level. On one level, "(r)espondants report that community policing has helped reduce crime, the 'climate of violence', the fear of crime, drug dealing, and physical and social disorder" (p.1).

Satisfaction also resides with the community police officer. There is general consensus regarding the individual community police officer's enthusiasm with such a role. In fact, "community police officers report higher job satisfaction and greater job safety" (p. 1). As suggested by Trojanowicz (1994), such satisfaction may be closely associated with his/her ability to witness firsthand the results of his/her hard work. This is clearly in contrast to traditional policing where officers usually only spend enough time in a particular locale to resolve the crisis. Once resolution occurs, they are often called away to respond to another incident.

The success of community policing as illustrated by a number of case studies has led to its implementation in public housing projects, which are often plagued by chronic crime and violence. Drug dealing, predatory crime, drive-by shootings, among other things can occur on a daily basis.

"Fear of crime," which parallels that the true crime rate, creates a vicious cycle. Law-abiding citizens are afraid to leave their homes due to a fear of being victimized. As a result, individuals engaged in criminal activities roam freely, without interference from other residents. This creates an environment conducive to the perpetuation of crime.

In an attempt to curb criminal activities in housing projects, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development under Jack Kemp provided funding to implement community policing in public housing. Setting up substations, engaging in vertical foot patrols, and actively seeking out community support are just some of the tactics used in an attempt to suppress the criminal element in high-crime areas.

One example whereby community policing appears to have proven somewhat successful in a housing project is discussed by Cordner (1994). The site chosen for the program was the Bluegrass-Aspendale public housing project in Lexington, Kentucky. While the findings are mixed, he notes that "observations and interviews clearly indicate that Bluegrass-Aspendale is no longer an obvious open-air drug market and

that the streets, sidewalks, and common areas are now routinely used by residents, including young children and the elderly" (p. 186).

However, Cordner (1994) cautions against merely looking at these overt results as an index of the effectiveness of community policing. He states that "(t)heir (overtime foot patrols) effects on calls for police service...have apparently been short-lived" (p. 190). In an attempt to make sense of this inconsistency, Cordner (1994) explains that, "(i)n their implementation these overtime foot patrols have more resembled traditional policing and crackdowns than community policing or problem-oriented policing" (p. 190). He makes the important point that it is necessary to exercise caution when defining an activity, concept, or tactic as community policing. Careful evaluation of the program must take place before it is implemented. Disguising programs so that they appear to be compatible with the community policing philosophy when in fact they are not only taints the results and effectiveness of such a philosophy, which benefits no one

Conclusion

Community policing represents different things for different agencies and individuals. While some view it as merely an alternative method of policing, others, in more desperate position, see it as the best and last hope.

There is no disputing the point that our society has changed dramatically over the years. With predatory crime and violent criminal activity at a drastically high level compared to other nations of the world, it is obvious that something needs to be done.

The philosophy of community policing focuses on preventing crime. While it is unrealistic to assume that it will prove to be a cure-all, whereby criminal activity is completely eradicated, it offers a great deal of hope in times of desperation. Fighting crime utilizing traditional police methods is no longer enough. Identifying that as society changes so must entities that both affect and are affected by it is the place to start.

Community policing is a philosophy that takes into account many of the factors which influence and are influenced by criminal activity. It provides insight into problems which, up to this point, were often ignored. Unfortunately, a failure to address many of these problems has proved damaging. It has hampered police-community relations to the point where it requires a massive effort to rebuild trust. Community policing offers important strategies that have been shown to impact and address many of these problems.

Society has learned the hard way that applying a "band-aid" cure will only lead to a "band-aid" solution. Getting at the root of the problems, learning what citizens want and need, addressing their fears and concerns, and creating an environment where trust and respect are commonplace, is what community policing is about.

REFERENCES

- Bucqueroux, Bonnie (1995), Community Policing Is Alive and Well, Community Policing Exchange. (May/June 1995). Community Policing Consortium.
- Carter, David L. (1990). Methods and Measures. In Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux (Eds.), *Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective*. (165-194). Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Company.
- Community Oriented Policing: The Denton Experience*. Denton, Texas.
- Community Policing in Public Housing: Training Workshop*. (1993). U.S. Department of Justice: Bureau of Justice Assistance.
- Community Policing in Seattle: A Model Partnership Between Citizens and Police*. (August 1992). National Institute of Justice: Research in Brief.
- Cordner, Gary W. (1994). Foot Patrol Without Community Policing. In Dennis P. Rosenbaum (Ed.), *The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Currie, Elliot. (1985). *Confronting Crime: An American Challenge*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Kelling, George. (1994). Defining Community Policing. In *Subject to Debate*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Kenney, Dennis J. (1992). Strategic Approaches. In Larry T. Hoover (Ed.), *Police Management: Issues & Perspectives*. Washington D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Moore, Mark H., Trojanowicz, Robert C., and Kelling, George L. (1988, June). *Crime and Policing*. U.S. Department of Justice.
- Pate, Tony, Bowers, Robert A. and Parks, Ron. (1976). *Three Approaches to Criminal Apprehension in Kansas City: An Evaluation Report*. Midwest Research Institute: Police Foundation.
- Redlinger, Lawrence J. (March, 1994). Community Policing and Changes in the Organizational Structure. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*. 10(1): 36-58.
- Skogan, Wesley G. (1994). The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents: A Cross-Site Analysis. In Dennis P. Rosenbaum (Ed), *The Challenge Of Community Policing: Testing the Promises*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
- Trojanowicz, Robert C. and Carter, David L. (1988). *The Philosophy and Role of Community Policing*. Community Policing Series No. 13. The National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center.
- Trojanowicz, Robert C. (1994). *Community Policing: A Survey of Police Departments in the United States*. U.S. Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- Uchida, Craig D. (1993). The Development of the American Police: An Historical Overview. In Roger G. Dunham and Geoffrey P. Alpert (Eds.), *Critical Issues in Policing*, Second Edition. (16-32). Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press.
- Weisel, Deborah Lamm and Eck, John E. (1994). Toward a Practical Approach to Organizational Change: Community Policing Initiatives in Six Cities. In Dennis P. Rosenbaum (Ed.), *The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises*. (53-72). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
- Wilson, James Q. (1983). *Thinking About Crime*. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers.
- Wilson, James Q. and Kelling, George L. (1992). Broken Windows. In Roger G. Dunham and Geoffrey P. Alpert (Eds.), *Critical Issues in Policing* Second Edition. Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc.

SECTION III: Lessons Learned From and About CPOs

As noted previously, prior to the announcement of the plans to reorganize, many inside and outside the Lansing Police Department considered the department's community policing efforts a success. However, it is also true that those successes were almost exclusively achieved by the small cadre of Community Policing Officers (CPOs) within the department. Indeed, there were notable occasions when it seemed that the friction between CPOs and district patrol officers ran so deep that not only did the department risk being split in two, but the actions of one side threatened to undermine the other.

A case in point involved a young man who was constantly being arrested for one minor offense or another until he was "reclaimed" by his area's CPO. It took a year for the CPO to turn this young man around to the point where he was no longer belligerent, and he was instead mowing lawns for his elderly neighbors. The problem with patrol occurred when the young man wanted to hold a birthday party for himself and invite the neighbors. He went to a neighborhood meeting and asked the CPO and his neighbors for permission to play music later than 11 p.m. He assured those at the meeting that he would be responsible, that there would be no underage drinking or drunk driving, and he invited them all to come (which may explain their unanimous "yes" vote).

Trouble arose when a patrol officer passing through the neighborhood on his way to his district heard the loud music. This officer had had run-ins with that young man before, and protestations about permission for an extended party longer fell on deaf ears. The sad result was that the young man ended up being arrested, and he spent the night in jail.

While this case had a happy ending, in the sense that the young man did not let that experience undo all the good work the CPO had achieved, it underscores significant issues. What kind of police service does the community want and need? How can police prevent situations where patrol officers treat one class of citizens different than another? How can the department avoid situations where some of the officers do community policing, while others undermine their gains? Moreover, are there enough resources to begin reclaiming citizens one by one?

Issues of Split Force

The situation above underscores the "split force" problem associated with implementing community policing as a "program," as something done by a special cadre of officers whose mission is different than the rest of the department. In many agencies, this is the critical issue in community policing, and opinions about how to confront the problem vary:

The Anti-CPO Argument: At one end of the spectrum are widely respected chiefs such as Elgin, Illinois' Charles Gruber, the former president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, who contends that the best solution to the split force problem is to avoid it completely by refusing to deploy Community Policing Officers permanently in specified beats (considered the heart of the community policing philosophy by Trojanowicz et al). The argument is that the benefits that may derive from having a handful of CPOs are outweighed by the inevitability that they become such a lightning rod for hostility from traditionalists that their mere existence threatens the possibility of making community policing a department-wide philosophy.

A corollary holds that certainly an officer who is given a tiny sliver of the community can make a positive difference, but that this is a luxury that financially strapped police agencies cannot afford. Using grant money for those officers does not solve the problem either, because when the grant runs out, the danger is that the officers

are so popular that the citizens in that area will pressure the politicians to leave them there—which often leaves the department funding a CPO whose area is far safer than those nearby that receive no special attention. Indeed, it is that fear that, once deployed, these officers can never be removed that resonates with police managers. The mere existence of CPOs also allows patrol an excuse to say, “It’s their job, not mine—they have the time.”

Drew Diamond, the former chief in Tulsa and recent past director of the Community Policing Consortium, proposes that the issue is developing workable strategies to engage the community in neighborhood-based problem solving. While some agencies use CPOs as part of a strategy to achieve those ends, he also envisions circumstances where crime analysis, structured opportunities for the community to work as partners with police, and flexibility in deploying resources can substitute for reliance on the CPO approach, at least someday.

Viewed in practice, this can mean that patrol officers use their free patrol time to engage the community in proactive efforts. It can mean, as it did in Tulsa, that when crime analysis suggested a serial rapist might be operating in the community (on the basis of similarities in two cases), the sergeant responsible for that area was able to negotiate with his superiors, who provided some detectives who could work as part of the patrol team for that area, and together they wrapped up the case quickly before others were hurt.

The Pro-CPO Argument: Trojanowicz (1994) argued that the ultimate goal of community policing should be to eliminate the need for CPOs, but he anticipated that day was at least a decade away and that it would not come until or unless society solved the social ills of unemployment and inequity that plague “hot spot” neighborhoods. It was his contention that everyone in the department should be doing community policing, but that CPOs should serve as a positive example of what people

working together can achieve, and that backlash is merely a problem for police managers to plan for and solve.

Bill Gill, a documentary filmmaker who has visited numerous noted community policing departments nationwide, said that he is quite sympathetic to the problems of split force that the CPO strategy generates, but that CPOs are such a potent tool that he feels the grief they inevitably bring is worth the price. "I find myself nodding in agreement when I sit in among managers and administrators, where they talk about all the reasons that Community Policing Officers are a bad idea. But then I walk around with a CPO like Wayne Barton of Boca Raton, Florida, and I just don't see how anything can substitute for what he does with kids." As another fan of the CPO strategy said, "The underlying question is whether the department is run to keep the 'good old boys' happy or to give the community the service it needs."

Complicating the debate is the reality that most department initially launch community policing as an experiment, with one or more CPOs in beats, just as Lansing did. As is often the case, money makes a difference, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's grants to pay for officers to work in public housing areas as part of a community policing strategy lured many into giving this approach a try. For many, it is only after the resulting backlash has begun to build that police managers find themselves debating how to bring other elements of the department on board with community engagement and problem solving.

The sophistication in strategic planning, training, and managing change required to envision, develop, and implement a department-wide plan involving every element of the department may well presuppose an expertise that most police agencies do not have. Even those that do may well find the daily pressure of work forbids devoting the time required to make the transition as thoughtfully as required. Indeed, training programs, such as the one jointly funded by the HUD and the Bureau of Justice

Assistance, urge departments to take "baby steps" in making the transition to community policing, because of the danger of backlash.

Specialist versus Generalist: The reality as well is that the CPO debate is often "fudged" by ambiguous and conflicting use of the terms *specialist* and *generalist*. The pro-CPO group talks of CPOs as generalists, in the sense that the officer should be able to give a talk to a group of seniors one moment, then help a youngster one on one, and then switch gears and make an arrest. The reality, however, is that giving the officer sufficient time in the community to develop the rapport necessary to accomplish that wide range of goals may well require making the job a "specialty"—and policing has been plagued by the tendency to invent a new specialty for each new problem, if only to comply with union requirements.

Long ago, police departments primarily relied on command, officers, and detectives to maintain public order. Then came specialties such as narcotics, K-9, and D.A.R.E., and now many agencies are investing in gang squads. Typically, they also have crime prevention and police-community relations specialists.

Many credited the failure of well-meaning inventions such as the police-community relations specialist to the problems associated with having one person in the department whose job is to care about those specific issues, while it is business as usual for everyone else. That argument has also been applied to CPOs, that making community policing a specialty assignment merely lets others in the agency off the hook.

The trade-off, however, is that providing some patrol officers a permanent assignment in a manageable-size beat may be the best—and perhaps only—way to build rapport and trust with the community. Doing so may require labeling the assignment a specialty, particularly in departments where union agreements dictate what can and cannot be done without signifying something as a specialty, but the failure of police managers to quell internal friction and dissent should not be used as an excuse to ignore so successful a strategy.

The issues are substantive, not semantic, but championing CPOs as generalists often belies the fact that the CPO is a specialty assignment. Arguing that community-based problem solving should not be a specialty but everyone's job ignores the reality that some "hot spot" neighborhoods, which Drew Diamond calls "under-served," may demand the full-time services of one officer freed from the unrelenting demands of 911.

While an analysis of a patrol officer's free patrol time may well demonstrate that they have blocks of time during the day when they could engage in community-based problem solving, the problem is that (1) those blocks are not predictable, which limits opportunities to schedule much more than random interactions with the community, and (2) the "hot spot" may need even more time and continuity with just one officer to hold accountable than random attentions from patrol officers can provide.

The issue of the CPO assignment remains one of, if not the most, complex and divisive issues in community policing. It also goes to the heart of the lessons learned in Lansing that fall within two general time frames: (1) **Community Policing in Lansing: Phase One—The CPO Approach** and (2) **Community Policing in Lansing: Phase Two—Department Wide Implementation (Reorganization)**. Dividing the lessons learned into these two categories will allow police managers in other agencies the benefit of insights that may help them deal with issues that they face currently, and also that they may face in the future.

Community Policing in Lansing: Phase One—The CPO Approach

To grasp the pressures, problems, and opportunities posed by the reorganization process in Lansing requires understanding the successes and failures of Lansing's previous efforts, which relied heavily on the departments CPOs. Bucqueroux (1995) proposes that community policing blends three kinds of activities into a proactive approach: law enforcement, problem solving, and community building. While many chiefs of police argue that community policing should be department wide, and not the

sole responsibility of the CPOs, most also agree that CPOs continue to do the bulk of any problem solving and community building efforts.

The Rationale/Theory of the CPO Position

When Jerome Boles became chief of the Lansing Police Department, he greatly expanded the number of CPO positions. In part, this was possible because of the department's effective pursuit of grant funds for this purpose. However, the underlying rationale/theory for community policing as expressed by Chief Boles is that:

- Crime and disorder are killing our cities, by driving those who can afford to do so to move to the suburbs, taking their wealth and their example as role models with them.
- The erosion of the tax base leaves cities with fewer and fewer resources to do a bigger and bigger job in dealing with crime, fear of crime, and disorder.
- The police may not be the best candidates for the job of turning the city around, but they have inherited the task by default.
- The communities with the biggest problems tend to be those that are the most transient, with the highest rates of rental properties, and the least community structure (in terms of Neighborhood Associations and Organizations and activities such as Neighborhood Watch).
- The police have an enlightened self interest in helping law-abiding residents stabilize their neighborhoods and build structure, because continued erosion of the local tax base ultimately threatens not only the future of public policing, but the retirement benefits of those who have already completed their service. (As a former CPO Sergeant said, "If we don't do more to save the city, taxpayers may someday be faced with a bankrupt system. If you and I are retired then, what makes us think that they won't cut back on our benefits to pay for the services they need then?")

- According to Chief Boles, the role of CPOs therefore is to balance traditional policing's reliance on law enforcement with problem solving and community building, in the hope that these officers will help to bring such stability to the neighborhood that they can "do themselves out of the job." The theory is that CPOs can and should be the catalyst that allows neighborhoods to build the stability and structure that they will need to be strong enough to function on their own without the full-time services of the CPO.

Union Rules: It is also essential to understand that, in Lansing, the CPO position is a specialty assignment under the union contract. While it does not mean any increase in pay over regular patrol, the CPO job is a maximum three-year assignment. At the end of that tour (or if the individual seeks to get out earlier), the contract requires that the individual must go back into patrol for two years.

There were numerous reasons why this occurred. The Lansing Police Department acquired a non-supervisory police union, part of Capital City FOP Lodge 141, in 1980, after a one-day "blue flu" walkout, and ill will over that incident still resonates in some quarters. By 1982, the union secured "frozen" shifts, which the majority of sworn personnel wanted. The contract now requires that non-supervisory personnel compete for their preferred shifts every three months. These shift-picks are determined on the basis of seniority, and the department has been experimenting with various time options, including 8-, 10-, and 12-hour shifts, as part of an experiment to determine the final options that will be allowed to the morning, afternoon, and evening personnel.

The main reason that the CPO slot in Lansing had to be named a specialty assignment was to guarantee the officers flexible daytime hours. Without the protection of the specialty assignment designation, individual CPOs would have to compete for assignment to the day shift on the basis of seniority—and most would lose. Indeed, the "perk" of better hours was what lured many to volunteer.

To ensure that CPOs could work days and could deviate from even the regular daytime shift hours required naming the job as a specialty. There was "nothing magic" in the three-year specialty designation, according to the union president, who is also the department's public affairs officer. "We just felt that two years was too short and any longer would mean burnout."

Another major difference between the CPO assignment and other patrol positions concerns overtime. The pay scale at the Lansing Police Department starts at \$26,800, for those with a two-year degree (though virtually all recent hires start higher because they have a four-year degree), rising to a top of \$38,500. However, overtime often adds significantly to that total for patrol officers. One of the main differences when switching to the CPO assignment is that there is virtually no overtime paid, but only "comp" (compensatory) time. Indeed, one CPO reported that his income declined \$2,000 compared to the year previous, simply because of the loss of overtime pay.

Early Definitions of Community Policing

While the rationale/theory of community policing in Lansing and how it impacts the role of the CPO seems quite straightforward and clear, less clear is whether this view is clearly understood by the rank and file within the department. Chief Boles deserves credit for repeating this message over and over again in various forums. Indeed, the chief participated in almost all of the two-training sessions held by SCH, Inc. where he reiterated these themes.

Part of the problem, however, is that community policing was launched under the previous chief without any such clear articulation, because it was such a small experiment, and it has proven extremely difficult to change perceptions once people's minds were made up. Also of concern is that top command has not been explicit about how this theory/rationale should be put into practice. This appears to be common in most police departments because (1) there is not wholesale agreement the community

policing is the avenue a department should follow and (2) because of the conceptual nature of community policing, many do not fully understand the concept, thus have difficulty articulating, and perhaps, supporting it.

WHAT CONSTITUTES THE "IDEAL" CPO?

The experience of one officer vividly highlights much of the continuing dissension within the department about community policing, its goals, and its practice. As noted earlier, when the officer volunteered to be among the first CPOs back in 1990, he did so because he felt burned out in patrol.

During the first couple weeks as a CPO, the officer was uncertain, trying to do the same job on foot that he had done in a patrol car. Searching for "a better way" the officer began going door to door, introducing himself to people in the community and asking them about problems in the area. Over a period of time, people began to warm to him and, as if often the case, he discovered that their main concerns were not violent crime as much as issues of disorder.

Among the first of the officer's many successes was a neighborhood cleanup. He had persuaded local garbage haulers to give him free dumpsters, and he and some volunteers papered the community with flyers announcing that people could bring trash from their homes and yards for a free pickup on Saturday. By mid-morning, the officer was worried that his idea was going to be a failure, however, people started coming in and soon the garbage company found itself overwhelmed. By the end of the day, the people in the neighborhood had filled 17 dumpsters.

That was the beginning of a massive effort to turn the decaying neighborhood into the community know today as *Sparrow Estates*. The officer secured a federal grant for bedding plants. He worked with the city to rehabilitate homes and offer them to low-income residents. He organized efforts to pressure landlords to upgrade their

properties. "The goal was affordable housing, not gentrification that would simply force low-income residents to live elsewhere," he said.

His focus on community building also extended to producing family events. Among them was a carnival and an overnight campout (in tents provided by the National Guard) featuring puppet shows and a free weenie roast. The focus on youth also included securing resources to take kids from the neighborhood to various places around the state, from the Potter Park Zoo in Lansing to Cedar Point in Ohio.

At the time community policing remained a limited experiment, so there had been no attempt to define the concept within the department. Filling that vacuum was the perception of his fellow patrol officers that the CPO was not doing "real police work." He was working days and had the option of "flexing" those hours whenever he felt it necessary to accomplish his goals. It was easy to understand jealousies and misinterpret the CPO's actions, particularly when no one had yet even tried to explain the community policing theory and the CPO rationale.

The officer had strong opinions on how CPOs balance the reactive efforts of patrol. "My job is not to worry about closing the dope house today. The department gave me this job so that I have the time to work on making sure that another one doesn't open tomorrow or next week. As a Community Policing Officer, my job is to work with people so that we do what it takes so that drug dealers don't choose our neighborhood when they are looking to open up shop."

It is unclear whether the officer symbolized the "quintessential Lansing CPO" in the minds of other CPOs and LPD management. There are some within the ranks of CPOs who questioned whether this officer has gone too far in favor of community building and problem solving at the expense of law enforcement. Others say the problem was that the officer was perceived as having no respect for the role of patrol. These conflicts reinforce both the uncertainty of a CPO's role/responsibility as well as the difficulty of inculcating the community policing philosophy among other officers.

A second officer was at the other end of the CPO spectrum in the view of many. This officer said he was having a difficult time trying to do much problem solving or community building in his beat. His neighborhood lacked the committed volunteers and organizational structure that allowed the first officer opportunities to generate community building and problem-solving initiatives. As a result, the CPO felt that his best bet was to concentrate more on the direct law enforcement side, by concentrating on arresting drug dealers.

Neither officer took a strong role in the philosophical disagreements within the department, yet time and again, their names would be used as symbols to draw a line in the sand about what did or did not make a good CPO. In that sense, how the CPOs were to deal with drugs became the defining issue. On the one end were those who believed that the first officer may have gone a bit too far in ignoring the contribution that law enforcement activities can make, but that he certainly proved how community building in particular could turn a neighborhood around. On the other side were the champions of the second officer, who pursued an aggressive law enforcement strategy of pressuring drug dealers touting his approach as an example of what a good CPO should not do. Ironically, the officer spoke of how frustrated he was that he had been unable to organize his neighborhood, yet the fact that he spent less time on community building was viewed as a plus by those using him as their symbol of rejection of the other approach. Personalizing the debate about what CPOs should do obviously added to the confusion, and it is also made it more difficult for management to step in and settle the debate.

When asked to assess the first officer's performance, managers who favored community policing made it clear that they thought he had done a wonderful job, but most then went on to say, like it or not, that the officer had become such a lightning rod for controversy that touting him as the symbol of CPOs in Lansing would be counterproductive by inflaming patrol further. Many also suggested that some of the

resentment of the officer stemmed from a certain jealousy about his visibility in local and national media. Management's reluctance to put faces on the debate about what it took to be a good CPO in Lansing may have been less a conscious decision than an uncertainty about identifying people by name in this battle. The problem, however, is that there was no such reluctance on the part of those in the lower ranks willing to use both men in their heated debate.

Confronting Backlash

On that occasion, for the first time, top command clearly directed middle management that it was their responsibility to take action to stop that kind of divisive talk. For the most part, the approach to backlash in Lansing had been to downplay the incidents as much as possible, in the hope that the tensions would ease over time, as community policing had a chance to prove itself.

Surprisingly, both fans of community policing and many of those who were identified as critics (though some were not the critics that they had been painted) were quick to say that the department should not "try to shove this down our throats." Informal criticism among non-CPOs continued: Some talked about how the resources—such as new bikes—were going to community policing and not traditional efforts. Many cited the "perks" that CPOs received in flexible scheduling as an indicator that management caved in to the CPOs.

Adding to those tensions were the problems that resulted as the number of CPOs began to grow. Despite the fact that almost all of the CPO positions have been funded by grants, the fact that candidates come from the ranks of patrol leaves the perception that community policing is robbing patrol of its full strength. Complicating the situation further is the underlying concern of where the CPO's responsibility for calls in his/her area—and adjoining areas—begins and ends. Regardless of what written policies have said at different times, the fact is that CPOs are not full-service patrol officers in the

sense that they can answer every call in their area with the necessary speed. As a result, emergency calls within a CPO beat typically result in a patrol officer being dispatched, with the understanding that the CPO will get there as soon as possible, if he or she is on duty at the time. (Complicating that is the reality that CPOs did not always work predictable hours.)

Two incidents underscore the level of hostility, and both involve cases where the CPO in question had spent months organizing an event or a meeting when an emergency in their beats arose. In one instance, there was an armed robbery at a convenience store. The robbers had fled, investigators were handling the scene, but the patrol sergeant in charge demanded that the CPO appear immediately. The CPO argued that she had spent months organizing a meeting and that she would be happy to stop by later, but her perceived insubordination (and the perceived failure of the department to punish her for it) fueled tensions between CPOs and patrol.

A similar situation ensued when a CPO arrived at the scene of a suicide that occurred within a family in his beat. At one of the department's reorganization meetings, a committee member used the incident to underscore how out of control the CPOs were. This irate individual cast the story in terms of how this arrogant and uncaring officer "blew off" the family and left uniform officers to deal with the family and the paperwork, just so that the officer could go to a meeting.

Much to that individual's surprise, the investigator on the scene also happened to be at the table, and he was quick to say that he had urged the CPO to leave. In his version, the CPO arrived as soon as he heard what happened and paid his condolences. The family was grateful for his concern, but they knew that the CPO had the only set of keys that would open the facility for a community meeting, and that unless he went to the site, many others would be inconvenienced. The investigator and the family both urged him to go, and the investigator made it clear that he had volunteered to handle the

situation and do all reports. Again, this underscores how rumor and perception circulate unchecked.

The point is not that CPOs behaved properly or improperly, but that the department (1) did not clearly spell out what is expected of CPOs in different situations and (2) had no system in place to communicate expectations and deal with misinformation and rumors. Both incidents were widely credited as fueling ill will on both sides. Some CPOs viewed them as examples of how management failed to correct misperceptions, whereas many in patrol saw them as cases where CPOs get away with flouting the rules.

HOW CPOs IN LANSING SEE THE JOB

A Backdrop of Conflict

Split-force tensions had reached a level that many perceived as critical to the future of community policing and to the organization as a whole. One supervisor was surprised at the resentment from CPOs that he inadvertently touched off in the late spring of 1994 with what he perceived as his efforts to add structure and to foster better rapport with patrol. Toward those ends, the Sergeant moved to have CPOs choose regular shifts and attend roll calls with patrol officers. While he agreed that CPOs needed flexibility in scheduling, he also made it clear that he wanted greater accountability and predictability, and that the supervisors were to be the final arbiter of whether any schedule changes were to be granted and that the main criterion would be whether the change was required to meet the needs of the community (i.e., not for the personal benefit of the CPO making the request).

Perhaps part of the resentment toward these changes stemmed from the fact that it is always more difficult to take away "privileges" than to grant them. Indeed, the CPOs said that the "perk" of flexible scheduling on short notice was a benefit that

helped them avoid the emotional burnout of the job. As one CPO said, "All police work is stressful, but when you have people coming at you all the time wanting your help, it's hard to say no." Considering that the job typically caused the officers to suffer an economic penalty (by the loss of some overtime pay), the perk of flexible daytime hours with most weekends off seemed to them a fair trade-off. Indeed, many worried that this would make the job so much less appealing that there would be few if any officers willing to volunteer for the assignment in the future.

Some CPOs also felt that they had gone out of their way to reach out to patrol and that further concessions were merely pandering. Another concern was that these new rules were perceived as actually being designed to stop abuses on the part of one or two CPOs. As one CPO said, "Why should we be penalized because they won't confront the guys causing the problem?"

In fact, tempers ran so hot that some of the CPOs, as a group, had confronted the sergeant arguing that the change in policy seemed a betrayal of trust. As a consequence, it should be kept in mind that many of the interviews with the CPOs were conducted against this backdrop of conflict, which may have colored their impressions of the job.

Community Building in Public Housing

In that sense, the least jaundiced view may have been that a veteran officer who had recently finished his three-year stint as a CPO. The veteran had been the CPO for the LeRoy Froh public housing complex, with 125 units, in a position funded by a HUD grant. (The expiration of the grant also meant that the officer would not be replaced at that site.)

According to the veteran officer, the issue is, "What kind of city do you want? My experience is that some neighborhoods are made for a CPO." The officer said that he and his CPO sergeant developed a three-year plan for his neighborhood. The first

phase involved having the officer go door to door, handing out flyers to introduce himself. The veteran observed,

"I got two or three good volunteers that way, too. When I first start out, lots of my time was spent gathering intelligence on crime and drugs. By the end of the first year, most of that had been displaced or stopped. So the second year was easier and the third year even easier than that."

The officer worked closely with the Resident Initiatives Coordinator and the Resident Council, made up of people who live in the complex. He also had a close working relationship with the head of the Lansing Housing Commission, who secured funds to remodel many of the units.

The officer observed that, "This is more than a job—I became a member of the family." The veteran was one of the few CPOs interviewed who volunteered how the job allowed him to intervene more effectively in domestic violence. "I'm there all the time to keep an eye on things. I know when there's a problem, and people will talk to me because they trust me."

Just as in the case of police departments all across the country, many minor property offenses are simply never pursued because it is not a cost efficient use of police resources (a fact that most police executives realize but are not fond of overtly advertising to the public.) The veteran CPO said that one virtue of his assignment is that he could work with victims and pursue leads that would lead to arrest and conviction. His personal relationship with the community also allowed him to distinguish between those who are hard-core troublemakers and those who deserved a second chance.

One illustrative case involved two boys who were found to have slashed the tires on a number of vehicles at the complex. The officer said that he was saddened to discover that the perpetrators were two young boys who were top students, youngsters

that he considered as having the greatest promise. He supported them when the case went to the prosecutor, and he was also attempting to gain leniency under the ruling that requires the entire family to be evicted if any member of the family is convicted of a serious crime. Because the boys had slashed so many tires, the dollar amount of the crime threatened to put them in jeopardy of this new regulation. As this suggests, CPOs arguably have the opportunity to use discretion based on greater knowledge of the situation at hand as compared to the traditional criminal investigation.

Another benefit of the CPO strategy from this veteran's perspective is that residents told him that they stayed in the complex even after they had jobs that might allow them to leave, because the officer's involvement made them feel safe and the remodeled buildings made the complex an attractive place to live. As former Chicago public housing director Vince Lane argued in public forums attended by author Bucqueroux, part of the reason that public housing has such serious problems is that anyone who gets even one rung up on the economic ladder is quick to flee, leaving only the most desperate of the desperate behind. If the veteran Lansing officer is right and CPO's assist in maintaining a mix of income levels within public housing, this could be a major advantage that has so far not been identified in the literature.

The veteran expressed concern that his neighborhood would backslide the longer that he was gone. While no one was slated to replace him, the officer's patrol district overlaps the CPO areas he covered, so he had some opportunities to maintain contact; the pressures of calls for service, however, make that difficult to sustain.

At a statewide meeting of public housing officials in the summer of 1994, one speaker who lived in the veteran's CPO area confirmed that she had not seen the officer often since his departure, and she, too, was concerned about backsliding. Of note already was the decline in activity—fewer young people were using the gym, for example. Also of concern were the number of unsupervised youngsters running around the complex.

Backing up district officers in the neighboring areas gave the veteran an opportunity to get to know people there. Some of them reported to him that drug dealers were again "hanging around the area," and rumors abound that they intended to move back in. The officer was trying to find more time to visit his old beat but acknowledged it was nearly impossible because of the call level.

The veteran officer's advice about lessons learned from his experience would primarily focus on setting up the CPO beat at the start and evaluating whether the area is able to "go it alone." When setting up a new beat, the veteran said that a key element is to keep the size small, at least until the CPO can stabilize the area—it can be expanded from there. Also critical is that the officers must have the resources that he/she needs—flyers, telephone, handouts, etc.

The officer also said that he would also like to see three criteria used to determine whether a neighborhood is strong enough to make it on its own, without the full-time services of a CPO:

- Has the neighborhood set goals and are they being reached?
- Are the various groups—Neighborhood Association, Resident Council, Neighborhood Watch, etc.—working well together?
- What are the trends for crime and disorder?

He also observed that if the entire department is to be held accountable for becoming a community policing department, the evaluations of patrol officers should at least include attendance at neighborhood meetings. "The department still judges its district officers on the basis of how many tickets and how many arrests," he said. "We will need to change that to bring them on board."

While some might see Lansing's failure to define clearly the expectations for CPOs, others might see this as the freedom required to tailor community policing to the area and the particular talents of the officer involved. In another officer's case, he

believes that success rests on two pillars: (1) the dedication and participation of the community and (2) the restoration of the family.

"I want to teach the community to do more," he said. The officer is keenly aware of what he perceives as the danger that community policing will foster a new kind of dependency, a dependency on the police. "People need to get involved in city government. In this area, about 60% to 70% are registered to vote, but how many actually vote? Participation doesn't always mean that you get what you want, but if you don't participate" The officer said that many residents in public housing have had little experience in the way that "the system" (government) works, and that this can lead to unrealistic expectations.

He talked of a case where HUD had money available for projects, and residents of his complex were angry that they didn't get what they wanted. "It was only when they got involved in the process did they see that one year, this group gets something, then the next year, the money goes somewhere else. Just because you have a need doesn't automatically mean that you will get funded—there are limited resources."

The officer also expressed concern that the ultimate key to restoring order and safety to troubled communities is the family. "I am there for eight hours a day making a difference, but when these kids go home, all that can be washed away," he said. One particular experience he related concerned a 16-year-old boy that the officer was able to link to a job. He saw the young man as a bright, talented, and ambitious individual who needed to channel his energies into work, so that he would not be lured into doing the wrong thing. The problem was, the boy's father did not work. According to the officer, the father was generally on the couch all day watching television, ridiculing his son as a "chump" for getting up to go to work. The boy finally quit his job. "Dad undid everything that I tried to do," said the officer.

A sad success story involved a young girl that he suspected was being abused at home, but he had no proof. It took months before the young girl trusted him enough to tell him the truth, so that he could intervene.

The officer's advice is that community policing must focus more of its energies on community building, defined in his view as strongly including political participation. He is certainly not the only CPO to hold this view, and there has been some consternation about precisely where to draw that line.

Problem Solving and Prostitution

The private training and technical assistance firm of SCH, Inc., was contracted to conduct the community policing/empowerment training for the Lansing Police Department. Mr. Gil Skinner of SCH said that he strongly recommended training in problem-solving techniques as the top future training priority for LPD in the future. As with many departments of similar size, Lansing's limited training budget must be stretched to meet many needs, and very few of the CPOs interviewed were even familiar with concepts such as Professor Herman Goldstein's S.A.R.A. (Scanning-Analysis-Response-Assessment) model of problem-oriented policing, which has been the cornerstone of the Police Executive Research Forum's (PERF) approach to community policing.

Yet what appears to happen in the field is that a number of CPOs intuitively grasp the underlying fundamentals. Consider, for example, the success that one CPO had in his efforts with prostitution. The officer generated \$5,000 in donations to establish and maintain his neighborhood office, located next to a bowling alley. It was the site of a Christmas party, and it also served as the base of operations for the two V.I.S.T.A. (Volunteers in Service to America) volunteers who were working with him, part of the twenty-two paid volunteers working as part of the Summer of Safety program. (Most CPOs were assigned two V.I.S.T.A. volunteers, who helped with

projects such as cleanups and the McGruff Safe House campaign. This initiative continued as part of Americorp.

When recruited as a CPO the officer was told that the main benefit would be he could see firsthand the impact that his efforts would make. All too often, patrol officers respond to the call, but they never see whether their intervention made a real difference in people's lives, but one CPO supervisor would talk to possible CPO candidates about the personal rewards in seeing what you do make people's lives better.

The problem for the new CPO officer was that he soon found himself frustrated at his inability to rid the neighborhood of an endemic problem with prostitution. Literally around the corner from his office, prostitutes would openly ply their trade. There were young women who would work a circuit that began and ended in Flint, and Lansing was one of the stops along the way.

"Anyone who said that prostitution is a victimless crime has not seen what it can do to a neighborhood," the officer observed. He painted a vivid picture of seeing "johns" who had infants or toddlers in car seats in back. "Many of these women are positive for HIV—then these guys go back home ...," the officer said.

The traditional response has always been to focus on the prostitutes. "But that just wasn't working—getting arrested is just part of the job," he said. Solving the problem also requires putting pressure on the male customers. The admitted he reached the point where he would follow the "johns" in their cars and try to warn them not to come back. The community used protest signs to challenge the men.

The officer also approached the City Attorney about passing an ordinance that would allow him to go after the "johns," similar to loitering laws passed for drug-dealing areas. Months went by and nothing happened, and the community became incensed. Once the community got organized and increased the pressure, the ordinance was passed in four weeks.

The ordinance allows an officer to stop everyone and give them a warning that if they are seen there again within seven days, it can only be for the purposes of solicitation, and they can be arrested. "Most of the girls tell me that they are going to other cities now," said the CPO. He credits his efforts on prostitution and drug dealing with 1993 statistics that show an impressive reduction in crime by 24% in the first six months.

A major difference with CPOs is that they often develop relationships with the miscreants as well as the law-abiding people in the neighborhood. The officer has walked with the girls, trying to find out why they do what they do, in the hope he could find an angle to make a difference. "Nine out of ten appear to be on drugs, and many say that they just cannot live on minimum wage, and they don't have the skills to do anything else," he said.

The CPO even embarked on an effort to reclaim a young prostitute named Stephanie, who thought she was getting rich on \$20 a "trick." The officer linked the 19-year-old to training through the Youth Development Corps, and she went on to get a full-time job, thanking the officer for the helping hand. (He heard through the grapevine that she quit a year later, but he doesn't know what has happened to her since.)

This officer's efforts in dealing with the prostitution in his beat fulfill many of the precepts of community-based problem solving. He worked with the neighbors on identifying, prioritizing, and solving problems. Together, they identified a number of root causes—the role of the "johns," the lack of needed ordinances, no mechanism to link the prostitutes to other job options, and the sense that the community did not have the power to repel them. The officer also identified the elements that he alone could do—such as making arrests—and areas where the community had responsibility, such as applying political pressure.

The good news for the CPO officer's beat, however, turned out to be bad news elsewhere. He said that the prostitutes finally dislodged from his beat were reportedly

plying their trade in an area between his beat and that of two other CPOs. Displacement has been used as an argument against community policing, because of the contention that it doesn't solve the problem, but merely moves it around. This officer disagreed, however, because (1) there are a certain number of prostitutes who may well give up and try to build a different way of life, (2) his neighborhood benefited from solving their problem with prostitution, (3) it can pressure other communities to organize, and (4) the lag between closing down shop in one area and opening in another might have at least some impact on slowing down the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.

Community Policing and Youth

Another CPO problem-solving effort was his success in removing four children from an abusive and neglectful home. Neighbors had told him that they were worried about the children, though they had nothing concrete to go on. So the officer attempted to stop by and talk with the parents, but the father immediately became belligerent and warned the officer that he could not come in without a warrant. The father told him outright, "I hate cops."

To gain entrance, the CPO worked through code compliance, since there was enough suspicion to justify an inspection on those grounds, and the officers waited until the parents were gone to make their attempt. "You have never seen anything like it—the entire place was ankle deep in dog feces, and the toddlers had full diapers." The youngsters were removed by Child Protective Services, and the house was tagged and shut down until it could be brought back up to code. The eldest child reported abuse, and the kids were kept in foster care for four months. The officer expressed concern that neighbors again were reporting that the children were being neglected, but he made it clear that he has thanked the neighbors for sticking with him on trying to solve this problem.

Another officer, funded under a Michigan Department of Transportation grant to work the Cherry Hill neighborhood near the bus station, also talked about how CPOs have the chance to intervene with youngsters. She cited a case where a family that lived in her beat area for only a couple months raised such suspicions with her that she spent the next two years documenting the allegations of abuse and neglect. The officer had tried to persuade the children's maternal aunt that the children were at risk, but the aunt found it hard to think of her sister as at fault. Over time, however, she was able to build a case, which allowed her to provide the judge making the final determination a 14-page report on her two-year investigation, and this helped to persuade everyone involved to have the aunt take the youngsters.

Saddest of all perhaps is the case reported by a community resident which illustrates the importance of allowing CPOs the time to build rapport with youngsters. The citizen and her daughter live in a community policing beat. Both mother and daughter are extremely active in anti-crime initiatives, and, in fact, the mother has been honored with an award from the LPD.

It was Ruth who spotted the tricycle of a little girl outside a church near the little girl's home in a CPO beat area. The youngster lived with her mother and her mother's 15-year-old brother, and she would often wander away unsupervised. The citizen assumed the girl had gone into the church to use the bathroom, and she was worried that the little girl might inadvertently get locked in, since it was close to closing time.

The citizen found the girl and urged her to get on her bike, and then she accompanied the girl home. It was only when they reached the girl's house and the girl climbed off the bike that the citizen discovered her backside was covered in blood, an obvious victim of a savage rape. "I couldn't believe that she never even cried from the pain when I told her to climb on her bike and she bicycled home," said the citizen.

The case sent a shock wave through the community, since it seemed that this little girl had been raped by a stranger who must have been lurking in the church, and

parents feared for their children's safety. It was a CPO, however, whose patient work with the child allowed her to tell him that it was her teenage uncle who had harmed her, not a stranger. The little girl went to the church to get away from him.

While no one will argue with the importance of saving such children one by one, CPOs also have the time and continuity to work on initiatives that enhance the educational, recreational, and social activities available for large numbers of young people. These activities can be part of a focused problem-solving initiative, but more often, they solve problems as a by-product of the LPD's commitment to community building.

"Kids are our future," said one officer. In addition to helping to organize Police Athletic League sports for youngsters in his area, the officer cites the Computer Learning Center as an effective tool in ending the cycle of poverty. "Parents can use the center to learn skills, but kids can also use the computers to do their homework and play games. It gives them a chance to compete with kids who have computers at home."

One officer organized a summer kick-off at the area pool. Another held a block party that attracted 100 kids. Yet another officer held a summer block party and a winter event called Winterfest. He reached out to the Michigan State University fraternity and sorority community for assistance. "They're my secret weapon whenever I need a helping hand," he said. One officer also uses his neighborhood newsletter as a vehicle to get out information on how to protect kids from molestation, and he also tells parents how to have their children included in the I.D. program.

"Kids need an alternative to hanging out," said the officer. "Just give me the key to the school and let me get them in there." He also says that he enjoys coming back into the neighborhood for events on weekends in his street clothes. "The kids need to see me out of uniform, with my wife, so that they see that I am a person, too."

Dealing with kids underscores community policing's ability to deal with problems without focusing exclusively on arrest. One officer spoke of the time when

someone had stolen a fire extinguisher from the local church. Kids in the neighborhood told him who they suspected. When he talked with the youngsters, they confessed, and he marched them over to talk with the pastor. "He didn't press charges, but I have the feeling that he will never again have a problem with those kids," the officer said. While some might argue that the officer's "feeling" is not proof that the individual problem is solved, a look at the recidivism rates among juveniles who go through the formal system suggests that that system has few guarantees of success.

There is also clearly a sense of frustration with the way that many children are being raised. One officer, for example, has a resident in his community who has fathered twenty-five illegitimate children, and the man argues that he cannot afford to take a "straight" job because virtually his entire pay would be garnished to pay child support. "Most of the families in my neighborhood are headed by single females, and so many of these kids are in such desperate need of male attention," he said. "They look to me, but I am only one person."

CPOs also handle the full range of problems related to young people, many of which might not otherwise result in a call for service. One officer, who said that he has become a convert after joining the unit, called many of the problems "piddly"—kids running through backyards—but that they are the kinds of things that have an impact on the overall quality of life. He was particularly optimistic about a new initiative in his area, where his new office would be located in the same facility as transitional housing consisting of 16 unites for single parents with a maximum of two kids. Managed by Catholic Social Services, the effort would also provide vocational training.

Of growing concern in dealing with young people was the emergence of gang problems in Lansing. Another CPO in particular expressed serious concern about growing gang influence. He inherited the largest CPO beat (900 households compared to approximately 700 for other beats). He also inherited a beat that encompasses two warring neighborhoods locked into a power struggle. "One group just loved [the

previous CPO], which meant that the others had to hate her—it was a nightmare,” said the new officer.

As various factions feuded, officer attempted to deal with emerging hostility between the Gangster Disciples and the Vice Lords. “This is a low-income neighborhood,” he said. “Every child under five in this neighborhood lives in poverty.” The CPO said that most of his gang problems were concentrated in three houses that serve as gang headquarters. Attempts to work with the landlords on evicting them had so far failed, and eviction takes three months. “The landlords, for the most part, are in it for the buck and don’t care,” he said. He was working to pass an ordinance where they could coerce landlords into working with them, if the department made more than one raid at year at the same address. (The controversial ordinance was eventually passed, but has since faced legal challenges.)

The officer involved both of his V.I.S.T.A. volunteers in anti-drug efforts, and he said that he appeared to be making headway. “The neighbors told me that they used to see a reportable crime every day, but not anymore.” However, his concern is that support for the CPO strategy appeared to be waning, and he cannot see how the department can deal effectively with gangs in any other way. “When I worked nights, I thought everyone on Baker Street was a bad guy,” he said. In the officer’s view, it is only when CPO’s have the opportunity to work with the people who are trying to make their neighborhoods safe that the department can deal with the emerging gang threat.

CPOs and Drugs

SOD (Special Operations Division) included the kind of organization that other departments would call a Narcotics Bureau, operating at various times as a part of other collaborative task forces, depending on how budget and turf battles were settled. As is the case in most departments, the mandate is for this unit to concentrate on

building cases that should ultimately lead to "Mr. Big." At the same time, efforts by CPOs are aimed at maintain pressure on retail-level drug sales.

The Division Commander committed SOD to working closely with CPOs. As one CPO observed, "We are the patrol arm for raiding drugs, and, in return, they work with us on neighborhood drug problems." One CPO used a five-prong approach in dealing with drugs in his neighborhood: (1) conduct raids, (2) put pressure on landlords, (3) use code enforcement, (4) confront "dopers"—knock on their doors, warn them to quit or move, and (5) pressure dealers with "nickel and dime" violations—tickets for loud parties, etc. The long-range strategy is to involve the community to the point where they can make their neighborhoods drug resistant. "It has taken us 20 to 30 years to get into this situation, so we're not going to get out of it overnight," he said.

Yet another CPO said that dealing with drugs is the most frustrating part of the job. "I used to spend my nights getting chewed by mosquitoes hiding in the weed waiting to make busts," she said. Then she attended the community policing training, which included ideas for involving the community, and she began to reach out to the neighborhood for help. Even so, it was slow going. "I never had any real training in community building, problem solving, or conflict resolution," she said. "But I worked with a local minister and we decided to hold a community action meeting, but nobody came—just [the minister] and me."

Over time, officer was able to encourage citizen participation; however, she warned fledgling CPOs not to get so desperate for community support that you start doing too much for them. "You can't start out trying to do too much," she said. "It's a way to set yourself up for burnout."

One CPO had not had a drug house complaint in his area for six months. He said that he simply warns anyone that he suspects might be dealing that they had better stop, or he will find a way to "bust them." "I give them fair warning—I tell them what I'll do and then I do it, with a heavy presence from SOD."

One of the first CPOs in Lansing contended that community policing has to go further than closing the dope house today, toward ensuring that the neighborhood changes enough so that a new one won't open tomorrow. He sees enhanced economic opportunities for adults and activities for young people and families as key to turning neighborhoods around.

While illicit drugs are a serious problem, alcohol abuse is linked to a wide range of problems that come to the attention of police. One of the officer's more spectacular events was the annual alcohol-free New Year's Eve Party held at the Neighborhood Network Center. Residents of the beat spend weeks cleaning the facility and preparing decorations. The party features free food, a band, and a huge room on the same floor with a Hot Wheels bicycle course and games for kids. All the police officers appear in tuxedos, and a limousine company donates its time to pick up and return neighborhood families to the event. "For many of the families in my neighborhood, there are very few inexpensive ways to celebrate," he said. "I also wanted us to set an example that having a good time doesn't mean getting drunk or getting high, and that families can have a good time together on what is normally considered an adult holiday."

Advice and Suggestions from CPOs

As part of their interviews, CPOs were asked open-ended questions about lessons learned. With the benefit of hindsight, what would have made your job easier or more effective? What would you do differently? What should the department have done differently? What should other departments learn from your successes and your failures?

Top Management: Many felt that top management did not spend enough time in the beats to see what CPOs are actually doing, and many wondered whether administrators truly understood the benefits of a CPO strategy. "I see [the Captain] at meetings all the time, but he's the only one there regularly," said one CPO. "I'd also like

to see them walk the beat with us every once in a while, to see what the job is all about—none of them has ever been a CPO.” (Chief Harry Dolan of Lumberton, North Carolina, for example, insists during his training lectures that chiefs need to go out there with a CPO now and then to get a feel for the job.)

Another hot issue was fear of reprisal for openly discussing dissenting opinions; that is, many said that they felt that they could not speak out in support of the CPO strategy without harming their future careers. “It’s like political correctness now—everyone in the department has to toe the same line. It isn’t good enough to be in favor of community policing—you have to agree that somehow CPOs are the problem in getting everyone to do it. If you stand up in favor of the CPOs, you could be putting your career on the line.”

First-Line Supervision and Middle Management: Perhaps the biggest issue at the time was the sense that rule changes were penalizing all CPOs for the problems of two or three. Echoing a common sentiment, one CPO said, “I don’t understand why the sergeants can’t deal with them (the problem officers) one on one—that’s what they get paid for.” Many officers felt that their jobs were stressful enough without having to endure the abuse from patrol at line-up. “You can’t go backwards,” was echoed again and again.

One CPO said that he wanted his supervisors to make the shift from being controllers to facilitators. “I want them to become cheerleaders and coaches,” he said. Another said that he wanted future CPO sergeants to follow the lead of one particularly popular sergeant, “They can’t let themselves get so tied up in paperwork that they never get into the field.” Many cited this sergeant as an accomplished manager who knew how to get the most from his people by combining firmness with flexibility.

Again, the specific rule change was made moot by the reorganization plan, but from a vantage point outside the department, it would seem that flexible hours are an important element of a successful CPO strategy. On the other hand, building in greater

accountability and requiring CPOs to appear at rolls calls also has its benefits, but the key seems to be that this should be demanded up front. Another possibility is to have the CPO attend the first roll call that occurs within the scheduled hours of the day; that is, if the CPO works 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM and that is too late for the morning shift, the CPO could interrupt his or her day to attend the roll call that occurs first within that time frame.

Relationship with the Community: The sense of ownership and identification with the neighborhood runs deep. One CPO said, "I am the victim of crime in my neighborhood"—by which he meant that every crime victimized him personally. Many were also quick to say that their successes stemmed from the dedicated participation and support of the community. But one CPO said that it isn't just CPOs who burn out but also community volunteers. "You have to keep putting pressure on the community to involve new people, so that you can spread the responsibility around," said a CPO whose youth activities volunteer had reached the point of exhaustion.

Others questioned whether some neighborhoods should be expected to go it alone. "The people I can count on for my neighborhood don't even live there, they own property there," said one CPO. "The neighborhood is so transient that I don't see how we can be expected to build in enough structure in three years to guarantee that they can go it alone."

Lansing had developed a set of criteria concerning how to rank areas that would receive the next available CPO. However, there was no plan in place to use those criteria or develop others and monitor what happens when CPOs leave their beats. The department had not yet pulled a CPO exclusively because of the perception that the neighborhood was strong enough to go it alone. During the period of this research, a number of CPOs were just beginning to reach their three-year maximum mark, while others were pulled from their neighborhoods because their grants ran out.

As is common, overcoming apathy is an issue, and CPOs in Lansing often worked through juveniles to reach adults. Yet the fact that CPOs often recruited truly dedicated and outspoken volunteers ironically also worked against them. Some questioned whether CPOs galvanized a small but vocal minority who might not represent the city as a whole and that this minority was attempting to manipulate the department for their own agenda.

Lansing's experience provides no easy answers for other departments already struggling with the same issues, but it does underscore the importance of open decision-making and advance planning. The number of beats grew rapidly as the experimental beats became popular and more grant funding became available. The serendipitous manner which drove the breadth of the community policing initiative—i.e., the funding and popularity among citizens—is a phenomenon many police agencies will likely experience.

Also at issue is who should be involved when such discussions takes place. If this a leadership issue for top command? Is it so critical that the views of the entire department should be included? What role should be the community play in so critical a decision? Can you call it community policing without having neighborhood residents at the table as equal partners? How do you make the process "real" and not just a rubber stamp?

Relationship with Patrol: There was a sense among some CPOs and police managers that the initiative grew and changed so fast that the department may have to take a few steps back, re-group, and then move forward again. Most CPOs said that the department should have anticipated the patrol officers' backlash, and that there should have been a concrete plan to deal with it. While one CPO expressed the belief that the problem was getting worse, others seemed to be optimistic that the tensions were easing. "It seems that management has always held us accountable for the fact that patrol won't buy into the concept," complained one CPO. It appears, however, this

may be the somewhat biased view of officers who have become too immersed in the issue and cannot see the "big picture" of issues facing police managers.

The Lansing experience again provides no easy answers, but again it underscores the issues. Ideally, Lansing did not want to single out CPOs as a special assignment, but it was the expedient way to deal with the union issue of getting patrol officers with lower seniority flexible, daytime hours. With the benefit of hindsight, it might have made better sense to thrash out other ways of achieving this goal without singling the position out as a specialty separate from patrol.

Also at issue is the culture of the department. What works in one department might not work in another, and personalities also play a role. The transition to community policing seems even more difficult against that backdrop. Management had already demonstrated an unwillingness to tackle issues of perception and reality head on, and this allowed the backlash against CPOs to reach crisis proportion before the crisis was acknowledged.

Planning alone might not solve this issue, but the strategic planning efforts that identified a new mission for the department (see Appendix F) failed to generate the buy-in required to inculcate these new goals within the ranks. At issue as well is that the department did not embark on its ambitious training program until after perceptions had hardened.

One administrator spent several months writing the initial CPO plan, with input from one of the first CPOs. The rationale was that they had a couple neighborhoods out of control, so they developed a job description for this new duty, and they established

Part of the problem with implementing and sustaining community policing stems from the turnover at the top, and how that can change the direction of an effort overnight. Indeed, many hesitant and downright hostile elements within middle management and patrol cooly make it clear that they can simply out wait the current chief—a phenomenon experienced in most police departments in this country to varying

degrees.. For the initiative to survive long-term, therefore, demands institutionalizing the changes by reviewing and changing appropriate policies, procedures, and practices.

Nuts and Bolts: Many recommendations from CPOs focused on nuts-and-bolts issues. One CPO said that he would have benefits from more documentation about resources in the community—government agencies, non-profit groups, community organizations, etc. Also of concern is that existing CPOs may not be documenting their contacts, so that they can be handed over to the next person in the beat. This individual felt that CPOs should also do more to network with other groups who might be willing to maintain initiatives if CPOs are pulled. For example, this CPO wanted to involve Cooley Law School students filing civil cases against landlords whose properties were nuisances.

CPO Checklist

Based on Lansing's experience with split force issues, the following are issues that police managers considering the CPO strategy as part of their community policing plans should consider:

- After careful consideration of the benefits and drawbacks of the CPO position, does this make sense as an element of your overall community policing plan? Are there other options to engage the community that can be equally as effective? Do union rules allow the deployment of "generalists" without a specialty designation?
- What criteria will you use to deploy—and withdraw—CPOs? What is the plan to resolve protests from the community when it is time to withdraw the CPO?
- How will the department decide how many CPOs will be deployed in the future? Who will participate in the decision-making process?

- Will CPOs have the option for flexible hours? How permanent will the assignment be? Will CPOs attend roll call? What are the “perks” in the job? Is there a plan to detect and avoid burnout?
- How can others in the department be educated about the CPO’s role before they are deployed? What is the pace of change?
- What kind of training will CPOs receive?
- How will the job description define their responsibilities for and balance of—law enforcement, problem solving, and community building? Who will participate in writing the job description?
- Does the CPO job reflect the values, vision, mission, and goals of the department?
- What is the plan to review pertinent policies, procedures, and practices to assure that they reflect the commitment to department-wide community policing?
- How will individuals be selected for this duty? What are the ideal traits and skills required?
- How will CPOs be evaluated? What is the plan to develop performance evaluations that reflect qualitative as well as quantitative assessments of performance? How can the community play a role in developing standards of performance and providing input on performance?
- Is there a training plan to instruct others, particularly patrol, how they can do problem solving and community building in their jobs? How will their performance evaluations change?
- How can all other elements within the department express the philosophy in their jobs—from civilians to sworn, dispatchers to detectives?

SECTION IV: Lessons Learned From and About the Departmental Reorganization

The unexpected announcement that the Lansing Police Department planned to reorganize in service of making community policing a department-wide commitment certainly provided a unique research opportunity. It was a chance to observe the process closely, to gain insights from which other police managers can benefit.

To understand the findings requires context, so this section will attempt to provide background, discuss the history of the reorganization, and then analyze important lessons learned in the process that should be of use to police managers.

COMMUNITY POLICING IN LANSING: PHASE TWO—DEPARTMENT-WIDE IMPLEMENTATION (REORGANIZATION)

Growing Frustration

Almost from the moment that he took over, Chief Boles talked about the need to make community policing a department-wide philosophy and not just a program in the hands of a few. While that implies that everyone—sworn, non-sworn, and civilian—must find ways to express community policing in their jobs, the most pressing goal was clearly to bring patrol on board. For the most part, doing so demanded achieving two goals: (1) a philosophical buy-in, which would change how patrol thinks about the work (and how it treats CPOs), and (2) a change in behavior, where patrol would use its free patrol time for community building and problem solving.

According to one administrator, top command had long attempted to bring patrol into accord, and part of that effort included modest attempts at call management

and differential response, to provide patrol the time for problem solving. "At first, middle management kept complaining that their district officers did not have the time to work with the community," that their work was call driven, he said. To counteract those pressures, the chief announced that performance would no longer depend just on numbers, such as numbers of tickets issued.

"We thought that they (middle management) had bought into the concept," said the administrator. But the joke around the downtown police offices is that they simply left patrol officers more time to eat doughnuts.

Management frustration continued to build. One member of the top command staff cited two common instances that begged for a community policing response—the eruption of low-level drug dealing in a neighborhood and rumors of coming violence among the young. Neighborhoods in various areas of the city would periodically erupt with low-level drug dealing, in the form of new dope houses. The efforts of SOD notwithstanding, there was a sense of frustration that middle managers resisted accepting responsibility for solving such problems. "Instead of feeling a sense of ownership for the geographic area, their ownership is to the clock." Lieutenants and the sergeants below them tended to view their jobs as clearing the screen of as many calls as possible, not on how to free up time so that a team of officers might meet with the community about problems with the new dope house, the rumors of upcoming gang clashes, or the potential for other kinds of summer violence among the young.

"The traditional system is failing. We have to find a way to give the officers a sense of ownership," said Boles. Lansing periodically explored requiring literal ownership, in the form of residency requirements for its officers, but no ordinance ever passed. It is widely understood that when cities such as Detroit use the "stick" of requiring residency by law, the end result is that a number of officers simply find ways around the ordinance. Nearby Jackson, Michigan, opted instead for the carrot of encouraging residency by offering officers special mortgage incentives or free rent.

The goal in Lansing was to move beyond limited residency strategies, toward a sense of geographic ownership based on giving patrol sectors of the city that they would own, in the sense of being responsible for that particular piece of turf. That had long been part of the goal of LPD district system, and one CPO had gone further, soliciting volunteers from the district officers whose areas bordered his, so that they could meet at the Neighborhood Network Center (NNC) for weekly problem-solving meetings. Many of those sessions also included various service providers housed at the NNC, and the facilities manager and program development coordinator became a regular. This flexibility also allowed, for example, a problem with a youngster to benefit from including the school counselor from Bingham School who maintained an office there. The CPO often relied on the Michigan State University student nurses, who were one of the first to maintain a regular presence at the NNC along with police.

The challenge came in replicating that success, and when Chief Boles talked of the department being unable to move forward toward on these ambitious department-wide goals. The Chief was apparently looking for a more comprehensive strategy. Questions needed to be answered. Was it feasible to build teams around CPOs, since there were only 14 of them? What of the areas of the city where there were no CPOs? How to build a team approach there?

"The ultimate success of community policing means that everyone does problem solving and the CPO position is eliminated, without any backsliding in the community," said Boles. "Maybe we never cut them (CPOs) off totally, but the key group in keeping neighborhoods stable must be the residents."

It was by late spring 1994 that Chief Boles' concern with the status quo had persuaded him to launch a process that he said might—or might not—culminate in a complete reorganization. "There are two models—a top-down leadership model where you implement change from the top and nurture it, and I am criticized for doing it that

way," said Boles. The other way is to lead by setting broad goals and then having people from within the department develop the plans for change.

Boles opted for the latter course, arguing that the department was headed into uncharted territory. "We are on the cutting ahead—ahead of the curve, so there aren't very many other departments that we can look to for guidance," said Boles. Top management visited the Madison (WI) Police Department under Chief David Couper, known for its dedication to Total Quality Management (TQM), and Boles said that they learned from this experience, but the challenge is to take community policing to a higher level. "No one has completely answered these questions, so we're going to have to figure this out for ourselves."

Developing Plans To Reorganize

The Chief elected to split the task into two phases, with two distinct working groups—the Reorganization and Planning Committee (quickly abbreviated in conversation to the Reorganization Committee) followed by the Implementation Committee. While there would be some overlap, in terms of representatives who might serve on both, these would be two distinctly different committees with different tasks.

The Reorganization Committee was challenged to be the thinkers—to start from scratch in exploring how the structure of the department could be harnessed to the expressed goal of implementing community policing department wide. The Reorganization Committee was told clearly that it had the authority to be as radical as it chose to be in terms of developing the new plan, and the word went out through the department that any individuals interested in developing their own plan should submit their ideas to the Reorganization Committee.

The chief and top command also stated repeatedly that there was no inherent obligation or commitment on the part of LPD leadership to accept and implement the Reorganization Committee's plan. The chief also told the committee that he and his top

command would be working on some ideas of their own—all captains (covering uniform, SOD, investigations, technical services, and administrative support) were asked to submit reports on their ideas. It was also stressed that the committee had the right to come to the conclusion that there was no need to do anything, if their analysis showed that the department's structure was already the best to fulfill their goals.

The chief envisioned a two-step process where the first phase would end when the plan generated by the Reorganization Committee would be reviewed by the chief and top command. The goal was that the plan would be shaped into a final product, and then the Implementation Committee would be challenged to work through all the nuts-and-bolts issues about facilities, equipment, personnel, communications, resources, union regulations, etc. The rationale was that it would be a cleaner process if these tasks were handled by a new group, since they would be less tempted or pressured to return to issues already resolved in the Reorganization Plan.

A Disclaimer

It should be made clear at the outset that the goal of this research is to be critical of each element of the process and the final design, as a means of identifying potential lessons learned. Picking apart each aspect of the process and the plan risks leaving the impression that the experience was somehow unsuccessful. The reality is that the chief and top command gave the committees enormous freedom and flexibility. It was up to the committees to determine how much time they wanted to spend, and the department would find a way to make that time available. The Reorganization Committee in particular was given the power to summon top command to answer questions—or tell them to stay away so that they could deliberate in private. Within a tight timetable, with limited resources, and few personnel trained extensively in this kind of sophisticated planning, the committees rose to the occasion and work through significant issues about how the department should change to meet the goals and objectives that

had been agreed upon. It is with the benefit of hindsight that many issues that seemed confusing then seem clearer now

Committee Rosters

The roster of each committee consisted of individuals appointed by management, but, again, in his effort to ensure that the committees were not perceived as rubber stamps for his views, the chief ensure that the line-up included at least some of the individuals perceived as community policing's biggest enemies. "If I can put a few of the most outspoken critics on the committee and they get on board, then they can help bring the rest of the department along," said the chief.

Getting Started

Though they differ in substance and style, two future captains working on the plan appeared committed to and enthusiastic about change, and they helped to shape the committees' output. Little has been written about the role of personality in police management, but each brought a unique set of traits, talents, temperament, and skills to the process. They also served as unofficial liaisons to upper command, which was considered suspect in some quarters.

Since the included some of the most critical members of the department, these individuals scrutinized the process, looking for "the catch." There were occasional humorous references to the possibility of a "secret plan," and while the tone was joking, it was clear that there were some who felt that the basic elements of the plan had already been decided, and that the role of the committee was to co-opt the critics into validating a plan that they did not necessarily agree with.

The truth was, of course, that rising stars such as the two captains had reason to interact with top command, and they also had occasion to talk with them about the process and its goals, before and during the reorganization process. These factors alone

made it likely that there would be significant overlap in the new captains' preferences and those of the chief and top command, and that the future captains would play a major role in shaping the plan. In that sense, there was some justification for the argument that the plan would end up being what the chief wanted. However, there was no evidence of any outright, "collusion" to manipulate the process.

It is true that decentralization and team policing were definitely ideas that were popular within the ranks of management at LPD. Even before the first Reorganization Committee meeting, the chief stressed geographic ownership and team policing as key, and he echoed these themes in his opening remarks to the Reorganization Committee at their first major two-day planning session. On other occasions the captain of the Uniform Division, that includes patrol, also spoke about establishing ownership of a piece of the city, perhaps by dividing the city into four precincts or more. He clearly recognized the importance of creating a structure that would allow lieutenants in particular to feel that their job was to solve problems and that the structure would allow them to deploy their resources creatively to do so.

Setting Up the Timetable

Being naturally cautious at the outset, the Reorganization Committee tackled some minor issues for its first few meetings. The pressure was building, however, since the committee recognized that it was dealing with a short timetable—the chief wanted to launch any new plan the following spring.

The chief recognized that developing and implementing so far-reaching a plan any sooner would be virtually impossible, but that it would be unwise to wait beyond spring and launch in the summer, when increased calls for service would make the transition even more difficult. Many no doubt would have preferred the luxury of time afforded by a target date of Fall 1995, but Boles wanted at least the basic elements of the plan in place earlier.

Because of the timetable, the Reorganization Committee exhibited a keen sense of urgency, and their July meeting resulted in a decision to conduct a two-day marathon session at the Lansing Parks and Recreation's Scott Center, so that they could have solid block of uninterrupted time to begin grappling with the issues. The Reorganization Committee then expressed a desire to involve an outside facilitator, since many were still tentative about what to do, and there was talk of hiring someone with a labor negotiations background. Observer Bonnie Bucqueroux, former Associate Director of the National Center for Community Policing, offered to act as an unpaid volunteer, and they accepted.

Bucqueroux had recently served as a trainer/facilitator for more than 60 jurisdictions who had received training at part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. Department of Justice joint initiative in community policing training for public housing. While she recognized that serving as a facilitator threatened to compromise her role as an observer for this research, she concluded it was a rich opportunity to experience the process from the inside.

It also seemed at the time that there could be few opportunities for conflict. As found in Appendix F, the LPD had completed the process of setting values, vision, mission, and goals, so the committee's job was to develop structures that would facilitate operationalizing the plan, which seemed clear-cut and could be accomplished with relative ease.

Among the issues that the Reorganization Committee had yet to deal with was the question of how it would involve various groups from inside the police department and the community, as a means of improving the plan and generating buy-in. A spirited discussion ensued during which it was clear that the committee felt (1) this discussion was a diversion from the real task of grappling with reorganization elements, (2) there was hostility that no one in the department had yet sought them out to give input, and (3) there was agreement that the committee should produce the plan first, then present it

to the department and the community. Attempts to persuade them that failing to secure "buy-in" could prove disastrous fell on deaf ears, which underscored the difficulty of balancing the observer role with that of facilitator.

Also of concern was the realization that many in the department did not distinguish between various terms: community policing, decentralization, problem solving, team policing, public relations. This requires a bit of explanation. It rapidly became clear, for example, that various members of the committee saw no distinction between community policing and problem-solving policing, which is why they did not exhibit much concern about strategies that failed to include the community. Only a minority saw involving the community as equal partners as critical to the process. Bucqueroux also had a somewhat unbending view that community policing and problem-solving were mutually exclusive philosophies, a view not shared by Carter and Katz.

It also seemed that the committee considered decentralization as synonymous with community policing—that splitting the city into precincts was tantamount to implementing community policing department wide. It was also clear that they viewed decentralization primarily in terms of geographic decentralization, and not as decentralizing decision-making to the grass-roots, community level. Bucqueroux, a Trojanowicz disciple, has no qualms about stating her bias, which is that the key to community policing is structuring opportunities to bring the community to the table as equal partners for all steps of the process, and this clearly made her a less-than-ideal candidate for the task. (A subsequent accident required Bucqueroux bow out as facilitator for the next session, which eased her return to the role of observer—with occasional backsliding when committee members would ask her for information or opinions.)

In fairness, the Reorganization Committee in particular faced a thankless task. Anyone other than the two new captains had to worry that vocal opposition to ideas

that the chief endorsed could be a "career killer," at least during this administration. It was also clear that many committee members were not looking forward to being challenged by their peers if the plan contained things that they did not like. Even if the committee member could report waging a vigorous defense for the idea, those who were not at the table might well not understand. During those meetings, it was clear that various members were alternately caught up in the process and enthusiastic about thinking through changes and fearful that their participation would not be productive.

It is also obvious that police, as a group, are more action-oriented than process-oriented. When called to the scene of a crime in progress, it is their job to think fast on their feet. Indeed, it is that tendency to want to leap into action that often ruffles community residents—all too often, the eager officer's idea of "equal" partnership and collaboration means that he or she listens for a moment before trying to tell people what to do. While that may be a bit of an exaggeration, it proved difficult to focus the committee on carefully thinking through the dynamics and all of the options before coming to conclusion. It was obvious that the committee did not want to ask elements of the department to prepare reports and "testify," and they did not want community members uneducated about the minutiae of police work at the table.

Issues and Objectives

It is interesting to note that when many individuals in different agencies are challenged to state what the mission of their police department is, even those who were an integral part of the process of developing the new mission statement often fail to remember specific elements. In many ways, the same held true for the process that the Reorganization Committee went through. It was the experience of sorting through the issues that was as meaningful as the final result.

For example, the committee approached developing a plan for the future by examining all of the elements of the existing system to see how they met the new mission

and goals. In essence, this was a form of "zero-based budgeting," where each assignment was scrutinized to see how well it contributed to the mission, and how it should change to meet the objectives of decentralization, "de-specialization," and teamwork, which had been identified as elements that the committee wanted to stress in the plan.

Insights from the process will be used to develop lessons learned, but the end result was that the Reorganization Committee worked with the chief and top command to hammer out a final plan, with the first phase scheduled for implementation March 1995. Appendix M is the structure of the LPD as of May 1993, prior to reorganization. Appendix F includes the committee's final report and Appendix L is Model G, the structure finally adopted. (Appendix N is the model submitted by a systems analyst and Reorganization Committee member, the only full reorganization scheme submitted by an individual to the committee.)

While it appeared early on that the final plan might divide the city into four quadrants, with a captain in charge of each, considerations about the expense resulted in a final plan whose major changes were:

- **Dividing the City into Two Separate Precincts with Two Advisory Councils:** In essence, the plan splits the entire department into two smaller departments, with a reduced central headquarters operation. The March 1995 implementation date focused on splitting patrol and other services, and final decisions concerning how to reorganize the Detective Bureau was tabled for implementation in the fall. One newly appointed Captain was given responsibility for the new South Precinct, and a few days before the implementation date, the second new Captain was confirmed for the new North Precinct. As the report of in Appendix F confirms, part of the rationale was that each side of the city had different problems and different

needs, so each captain would be given the freedom to act virtually as a mini-chief.

The former SOD Captain assumed responsibility for headquarters operations; Another experienced Captain became the new Inspectional Officer, envisioned as a sort of roving troubleshooter and administrative resource person; and a third experienced Captain remained in charge of the Detective Bureau, though again, final decisions concerning how it would be changed to reflect the two-precinct system remained a topic of much interest and controversy. (The department secured funding for that fifth captain's position, since it was widely assumed that one Captain would be retiring soon and that the intention to blend detectives into the two precincts in the fall might mean a total of only four captains.)

The idea of having two citizen advisory councils, one for each precinct, was not considered a primary piece of the plan, but it surfaced during the period of time prior to implementation, in response to community concerns, as an important vehicle to guarantee citizen input. Indeed, much discussion with the community surrounded the proposed make-up of these councils, as well as their authority.

- **The Formation of New Problem-Solving Teams:** Though this element also was not discussed in the Reorganization report to the chief of, the team policing element became a critical piece of the new strategy, particularly since it would assure the community that they would have identifiable individuals willing to listen to their problems. Again, during the period of time prior to implementation in March 1995, the format for these teams, and how their organization might differ precinct to precinct, had not been decided, therefore queries from inside and outside the department elicited no firm response on how these teams would actually function.

This brief discussion leaves out much of the detail, and some of that specificity fell to the Implementation Committee to work out. Indeed, instead of having a more straightforward task than the Reorganization Committee, in the sense that members were not to revisit settled issues about the basic plan, the Implementation Committee found itself attempting to make a huge number of critical decisions—ranging from where to house the two new precincts to minutiae concerning where keys would be kept—that had to be determined before the plan launched in March. The committee also found itself engulfed in the internal debate about elements of the plan, as well as concern from various sectors of the community.

Real world factors complicated the Implementation Committee's job. For example, while it is clear that many of the decisions about the precincts required input and involvement of the two new Captains, final decisions took longer than anticipated. Yet the biggest problem for the entire process stemmed from the reality that little time was allocated to explaining the plan internally and informing the community about what it contained, before the Implementation Committee was to start work. The plan was obviously the "hot topic" within the department, particularly among those most directly affected by the changes. Working with the Reorganization Committee, the chief and top command took the plan to the head of the Neighborhood Council, made up of 17 neighborhoods organizations, and department representatives hosted or visited a brief series of meetings around town, during which the plan was explained to the community.

As discussed below, however, hindsight confirms that this approach left many inside and outside the department feeling that their voices had no impact on the process—that they were handed a *fait accompli*, and not a draft plan open to rethinking. Frustrating as well was that many of the critical details were not yet in place—how many teams, what composition, what role for the community? Even those who thought the broad concept had merit recognized that problems are often in the details.

Just prior to launch, for example, one officer came to plead his case for CPOs. His contention was that, with all the talk about "de-specialization", the only unit changed significantly was the Community Policing division of the Community Services Bureau. Even the K-9 and D.A.R.E. officers had survived untouched. Later at the same meeting, newly promoted Lieutenant appeared to give the committee insight on the role of the CPO. The problem was, however, that the mandate for the Implementation Committee was that they were not to revisit settled issues. While the committee discussed endorsing maintaining CPOs beyond January 1 and finding options for flex time, the press of business precluded review of the numerous issues raised.

The Problem-Solving Teams

Even as late as February 22, 1994, when the chief and Mayor David Hollister hosted a meeting for the announced purpose of getting the truth out, many of the questions about how the teams would work were still not answerable. As the meeting handout provided that night included in Appendix G suggests, the Advisory Committee and problem-solving teams are the vehicles designed to carry most of the freight for extending the community policing philosophy department-wide. However, a few days earlier, when the new captains met with their new roster of lieutenants and sergeants, a substantial amount of the discussion by middle managers concerned their fears about allowing the community too great a role.

For a flavor of the resistance to community involvement, a supposedly pro-community policing lieutenant suggested at a planning meeting for precinct command that if they had to let the community come to their problem-solving meetings: (1) The department could tell the community to identify one or no more than two representatives, and it had to be different people each time. (2) The individual(s) would not be allowed to attend the actual problem-solving meeting, but time would be provided at the end for them to give a brief report of the problems in their neighborhood.

Shortly after launch, it was still not clear whether the community would be allowed a role in any or all of the problem-solving teams, and it appeared that the consensus within the department was that the Advisory Committees might be able to carry all of the community concerns. An additional consideration was about the expense of overtime pay ultimately resulted in the decision that the problem-solving teams would meet "at least once a month," since that requires a budget for overtime.

In addition, patrol officers were "encouraged" to go to neighborhood meetings, and overtime pay was allocated for that purpose. However, by the end of the first month, it was clear that some officers were refusing to attend those meetings, even with the overtime pay. No final decision had yet been made concerning what, if any sanctions, might be imposed.

Interesting as well is that it appears likely that the problem-solving teams will look quite different in each precinct. One Captain, because he had a head start in being named before his counterpart captain for the North Precinct, had already begun developing his teams, built around existing districts. (Part of the problem that Lansing faced in being too creative initially with new boundaries stemmed from limitations in the computer system, which limited changing boundaries for dispatch.) At the time of the launch, the newly named Captain was still perfecting the team concept for her precinct, and it was becoming obvious that these two differed in their approach.

For the most part, it would be fair to say that the first Captain envisioned the teams as primarily engaged in law enforcement activities, almost a crime-specific approach, while the second Captain was attempting to find ways to encourage the teams to engage in more creative problem solving activities that included solutions other than law enforcement. While it is true that one of community policing's virtues is that it allows for tailoring the response to local wants and needs, some questioned why one kind of team makes sense for the south and another for the north? Of course, there is no "right" answer, because the response is one of philosophy. What some critics did not

seem to understand was that as long as the Chief was satisfied that the plans were philosophically consistent with his vision, then the plans were "right."

Changes for CPOs

Confusion reigned in the weeks before and after implementation, as a shifting blend of fact, fiction, and rumor filled the information vacuum about the role of the CPO. There was no doubt that the Reorganization Committee had agreed (and the chief had signed off) on the idea of moving CPOs back into patrol and removing their specialty protection in terms of not having to compete for shift picks. On the other hand, it also seemed clear that the plan was to eliminate the position entirely by January 1, 1996. The resulting furor in CPO neighborhoods, particularly the outrage expressed during the regularly scheduled Monday night City Council meeting in early February and the special session at the NNC meeting a week later, included official statements from the chief and the mayor that that had never been their intent.

In addition to causing concern within the ranks of the CPOs, the uncertain future of the CPO became the focal point of dissent within the community. Citizens for a Better Lansing, a 1,200 member organization, fielded a number of speakers from a CPO who took the microphone at the City Council meeting to ask for their continued presence. These meetings were also televised and rebroadcast on local cable. Local media, picked up on the story and made it a two-week media event.

An Interrupted Story

In some ways, the deadline forcing a conclusion of this research resembled walking out of a movie two-thirds of the way through. However, in other ways, the deadline was fortuitous, because it removed the emphasis from whether specifics of the plan would work or not, and how they plan would evolve and change, toward universal lessons learned from the process.

As the chief kept telling groups inside and outside the department, "If the plan doesn't work, we can always go back." While it is far more likely that changes will be made to make it work, the fact remains that many of the experiences so far highlight issues that other police agencies considering the same thing should consider.

Among the promising signs was that the Implementation Committee added two community representatives both of whom had long been active with their CPOs. The committee was maintained to:

- (1) continue conducting a search for appropriate new precinct facilities;
- (2) deal with the myriad of nuts-and-bolts issues. (Particularly troubling was that the reorganization's success in large part depended on communication through computers and voice mail. Technology was the key to communication between the precincts, among members of the problem-solving teams, and with police managers. Yet the LPD had yet to secure a grant for a sufficient number of laptops; many had not received their computer training; and some of the voice mail units suffered problems.)
- (3) prepare for the next round of changes. (As the section with the Community Policing Detective attests, the detectives opposed to being split into two precincts.)
- (4) develop evaluation/assessment tools.

Appendix O includes the results of a survey that a community representative conducted on her own concerning how the changes in the CPO function were being received. She repeatedly assured that committee that she was not trying to criticize, but that she wanted to help them make the plan work. In particular, she wanted to provide community input into establishing evaluation criteria for the reorganization. However, the committee decided to table any such efforts at least until fall, since they would be working on a reduced summer meeting schedule.

THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT

Sources of Resistance

There is the belief that any change that makes everyone unhappy must be on the right track, since compromise is key. Indeed, the chief referred to that concept at the NNC community meeting, since he found himself facing resistance from:

- **Those within the department who favored the status quo.** The reality, of course, is that change is unsettling, so regardless of the merits or drawbacks of specific changes, there are those who do not want the boat shaken. Within these ranks were individuals who would, of course, seize on any mistake or problem as evidence that the plan was doomed to fail. However, while the mayor and the police chief targeted this group as being the largest and most vocal category of resistance within the department, the truth is that there was more widespread acceptance of the need to change, but more specific hostility to elements of the new plan.
- **Those within the department who questioned specific changes.** This was perhaps the largest group of resisters. CPOs seethed at changes that not only substantially altered how they did the job—and made them vulnerable to sergeants they feared did not understand their assignment, but which also, from their perspective, sent message that it was CPOs who were the problem and who had to change. Others questioned why so many other specialties survived. Still others saw betrayal in the fact that management did not trim its ranks significantly, despite talk about flattening the hierarchy. A significant group felt that the problems were managerial and not structural. Many complained that there were significant obstacles to making the plan work that had not been dealt with (see the discussion below).

- **Community residents with CPOs.** Many worried that the position was on its way to being abolished. They were also concerned that current changes would threaten their relationship with the CPO, because they would not be working convenient hours, would not have time for community building and problem solving, and the pressures of the job would soon force them into calling 911. Active residents also questioned whether they would have the same access to information, which in her case relates to mounting campaigns against problem houses in her neighborhood. As a woman at the NNC meeting told the chief, "It took us a long time to train our Community Policing Officer. When this doesn't work, we want you to hear us."
- **Communities waiting for CPOs.** At the NNC meeting, a resident who lived in an area where he hoped they would someday have a CPO was particularly concerned that this might never happen. He challenged the chief to explain criteria that would be used to evaluate these changes, but the chief explained that there were no criteria yet.

Pockets of enthusiastic support inside and outside the department were hard to find. The two new captains and some of their new lieutenants were tremendously enthusiastic and upbeat. The chief personally visited the homes of some of the most vocal critics prior to the NNC meeting, as a show of goodwill and to explain the plan. One who was particularly impressed with that effort gave a brief but rousing mini-speech about how the community stands ready to help the chief make the plan work.

It is important to remind the reader that the Lansing Police Department deserves praise for allowing observers to critique—and even nit-pick—every step of the reorganization process. The chief and top command should be commended for their openness, which extended to everyone within the department. With that in mind, the experience in Lansing, particularly the consternation on the part of the community at

their perception that they were left out of the process, offers critical insights for others. Again, among the lessons learned:

Clarifying the Role of the Community. As the deadline for launch approached and questions from the community intensified, Chief Boles seemed to move away from the rationale that the reorganization would implement community policing department wide. The reality is, however, that words matter, and the point at which the rubber of rhetoric hit the road of substance was at the pre-launch session at the Neighborhood Network Center. It was there that the chief seemed to focus on talk of decentralization and team policing, rather than involving the community as partners.

Time and again, the chief was politely but firmly challenged to explain why the community had not been asked for input until the plan was done. The first time he was asked, the chief assured the audience that he recognized that they should have done more to involve the community, but that the plan was the result of a thoughtful process.

The truth is that how police departments intend to deal with the community is in translating mission into action. A department can change its definition of problem solving overnight without much external consternation, but particularly when the community has had a taste of involvement, any hint of a change can set off an uproar.

When community policing became the hot "buzz word," it seemed easy for departments to promise community involvement, collaboration, and partnership. But what does that mean in practice? Who do the police work for? Who has the final say when the community's priorities for problem solving differ from the police?

Of particular note is an incident in Lansing where a group of citizens living on the south side of town formed a group called GLAD—Greater Lansing Against Drugs. Frustrated by retail-level drug dealing, they had begun to conduct citizen patrols, and they asked the LPD to authorize one or more officers to work with them. The department refused, apparently in large part because of liability concerns raised by the

city attorney. Cross-fertilization with other departments nationwide that have resolved this issue in favor of collaboration would have helped.

One CPO also said that he urged his supervisor to tell the community, "Remember he works for us, not you." He felt that this provided him with an excuse to beg off when residents wanted more than he could give. Yet that sergeant's comment not only angered elements of the community, but a fellow CPO repeated it back as an indicator that the department was hung up on control.

These are tough issues, with many opportunities for misunderstanding and mistrust. Yet clarifying the precise rights and responsibilities of the community at the outset can go a long way toward letting everyone inside and outside the department know where they stand. The worst of all possible worlds is to promise partnership but deliver paternalism.

Communicating the Rationale for Change. Generating internal and external support requires constant repetition of a clear argument about the need for change—and how the changes specifically address the need. There is a straight line leading from transient populations and the lack of home ownership and neighborhood organizations, to problems with crime and disorder, which cause a flight to the suburbs. Even those who agreed with the chief that the city was ailing may have disagreed about both the diagnosis and the cure.

Are there other reasons that Lansing is threatened with decline? What about the need for high-paying manufacturing jobs, the growing number of single-parent families and too-early parenting, and the lure of better schools in the suburbs? Are the police the only candidates for the job of turning the city around? What are the police department's expectations of a role for the community? How can other groups, ranging from the faith community to government agencies, be enticed into working with police and doing their share?

The chief envisions that splitting the city into two precincts and establishing problem-solving teams will give officers a greater sense of ownership. How will that happen? What will it look like? What can the community do to help officers learn to care? Why is a burglary in one side of town different than in another? How can the department ensure that the two precincts do not become two separate departments? How can the problem-solving teams be made more effective?

Part of the problem that police agencies face in generating support for change are the limited opportunities for the leadership to discuss such issues and get their message across. The Chief has thought deeply about the future of Lansing and the police department's role, and he availed himself of every opportunity to attend training sessions and neighborhoods meetings. Even so, there were many who never heard the plan—or only heard what they wanted to. In the world of advertising the "rule of thumb" is that it takes at least three exposures to the product message to wear down the consumer's resistance. The police might learn from this lesson and structure opportunities to educate their own ranks and the community.

Planning and Pacing. In addition to the conceptual changes in the nature of the work, the Lansing reorganization into two precincts required an enormous number of logistical changes in deployment, allocation of equipment, communication systems, etc. While the chief has a good point that any deadline will seem too soon, there is also the sense that defining which elements are critical and which can be tabled until later should be a part of the planning process. Because of the time crunch, the Reorganization Committee may have given inadequate attention to the issue of not only allowing but soliciting input. A plan dependent on Advisory Committees and problem-solving teams was launched before these were fully conceptualized. The Implementation Committee's responsibility to begin work on developing the criteria for evaluation continues to be moved into the future.

Police managers must walk a fine line between dominating decision-making delegated to others and failing to give them guidance about priorities. A failure to allocate the time to address the concerns of critics early on can mean that dissension erupts later at an even more inopportune time. A number of community residents at the city council meeting and the NNC session with the mayor and the chief asked for a delay beyond the March launch to allow greater reflection. Logistical considerations made that unlikely, but this suggests that when it comes to planning, you can never do enough, and when it comes to pacing, you can never take too long.

Confronting Barriers. The broad rationale for the Lansing changes make eminent sense, but problems can lurk in the details. Decentralization translates into stationing a detective who works fraud at the NNC, yet LEMS is not accessible from there, and no one seems to know when that will be resolved. Patrol officers are told to start using E-mail, but there is no plan to train them and few computers available for their use.

These are bugs that any change must deal with, but there are some serious obstacles that show no opportunity for timely resolution:

- **The role of the CPO.** While community residents do not always understand the inner-workings of the system, they grasped very quickly that most of the CPOs would no longer be available at the same times as before. Moving CPOs, who had relatively lower seniority, back into patrol, meant that they were at a competitive disadvantage against their more senior peers when it came to competing for desirable shifts. Indeed, partly as protest and partly inevitably, the first round of shift picks showed all but one CPO ending up on nights—a tough time to do much community building and problem solving.
 - > The department's solution was to allow CPOs to continue flexing at least part of their time for the near future. Based on one Captain's calculations, virtually two-thirds of the CPOs total work time could be spent on the shift of his or her choice. In practice, however, the plan had

flaws. First, it required the CPOs to identify optimal hours a month in advance. Second, it required approval of their superiors, and there were no more "specialty" CPO sergeants, so some found their new supervisors less than understanding. Third, many complained that it was too stressful to bounce from nights to days and back again, so they were reluctant to apply.

- **The stability of problem-solving teams.** New shift picks occur every three months. While everyone at the top agrees that picking shifts once or twice a year would add stability, a survey showed the majority of rank and file like the picks as they are, which makes it unlikely there will be any union rule change soon. Given that the problem-solving teams meet together only once a month, it is conceivable that the team's roster could change by every third meeting. With the department facing 70 more potential retirements within the next four years, that factor alone threatens lots of "jockeying" for better shifts as the seniority patterns change.

The challenge, of course, is to determine which items are simply bugs to be worked out and which are barriers that must be resolved or the entire plan risks failure. This leads us back to the piece about planning and pacing, because troubleshooting the proposed plan is a critical piece that can be scarified in the press to meet the deadline.

Fostering a Climate of Goodwill. One of the major problems that any organization faces is generating sufficient goodwill at the top and the bottom and in the community to ensure a basic atmosphere of trust. What police managers must understand is that they must be willing to grant the same level of respect that they expect in return. For example, there will always be those at line-level who will see an ulterior motive or something sinister in every action that management takes—and they will be quick to grumble to others. Not only must management be alert to the danger of any taint of hypocrisy and manipulation, they must listen to criticism with an open

mind. They must avoid the tendency is to see suggestions as criticism, and not just dismiss dissenters as "troublemakers."

This research included interviews with a number of individuals in various areas of the department who had been identified as being among the biggest critics of community policing. Confidentiality was granted in exchange for candor, and it is true that some of these individuals may reject the philosophy outright or complain no matter what the issue.

However, it was also true that some had legitimate concerns and valuable insights into possible solutions to various problems. One of the supposedly biggest critics of community policing did not, in fact, not reject the importance of problem solving and community building, but he was scathing in his denunciation of how he saw these strategies being trivialized or exploited by the officers as an excuse for fun activities.

It was his contention that activities ranging from flower planting to taking kids to baseball games in Detroit might have their place, provided they were elements of a coherent plan for the neighborhood that had been hammered out to identify and address crime and disorder priorities. Where he faulted management was in failing to focus these activities so that they would have the most impact. Giving CPOs freedom without accountability—or without communicating the purpose and plan to patrol—simply poisoned the waters, in his view. While it could be argued that he was merely "conning" an interviewer perceived as a supporter of community policing, his critique would have benefited managers looking for insights into marketing the concept within the patrol ranks

Defining Success and Failure. It remains difficult to talk about the relative success or failure of the early steps to implement the reorganization in Lansing. There are no criteria for assessment established by the department, and week-to-week variations in calls for service are generally a poor indicator, particularly since it will take

time for citizens and miscreants alike to alter their behavior on the basis of the changes, and any changes may have more to do with the temperature than with anything that the department has done. At issue as well is how to assess the quality-of-life concerns that community policing ostensibly addresses.

It seems unfortunate that no such process is in place, considering the pressure from the community that the department agree to reverse course on issues such as the CPOs, if it turns out the plan isn't "working." The reality is that, without such discussions between the department and the community, there is no way to know whether they even agree on what success or failure would look like.

Chief Boles makes a good point that even with 200 people crowded into the main assembly room of the NNC for the pre-launch confrontation, there is no way whether these individuals reflect the broader will. However, it is arguable that he also has no reason to believe that they do not—and that success requires maintaining the support of the most vocal and dedicated segment of the community that has already demonstrated its commitment by working to make the CPO strategy a success in their neighborhoods.

Not only from a research perspective, but from the city's point of view, it would have been beneficial if the plan had included scheduling periodic surveys and focus groups to assess how citizens perceive the changes. If indeed it turns out that only a small fraction of the population that lives in CPO neighborhoods disapprove, then the department can assess how critical their support and participation are. Similar tactics could be used to assess internal acceptance. However, lacking any structured and objective way to gauge satisfaction inside the department and in the community suggests that changing—or not changing—elements of the plan risks being rightly perceived as arbitrary, which seems unnecessarily dangerous in a climate where goodwill has already been strained.

REORGANIZATION CHECKLIST

Based on Lansing's experience with reorganization, the following are issues that other police managers considering the same thing might want to consider:

- What is the rationale for change? Can you identify what success and failure would look like, so that all plans can be filtered through that prism?
- Has the department already done the strategic planning to identify values, vision, mission, and goals?
- What is the role of the community? If the community is to be a full partner, what does this mean in terms of the planning and evaluation process? How will community representatives be selected to avoid the taint of manipulation?
- Are local political leaders on board? The business community? Other service providers? Community institutions such as neighborhood groups, hospitals, schools, and the faith community? Has the media been informed? What can be done to enlist their respective participation and support?
- Is there sufficient goodwill within the department to ensure that the majority perceive requests for input as sincere? Can people speak openly about their concerns without fear of reprisal?
- What constitutes a balanced roster on any planning committees and groups? Is the goal to have each element represented? What other criteria are important? Who decides?
- What kinds of data and analysis do the planning groups need? How can they structure opportunities to hear from constituencies within the department and the community that might not otherwise be heard?
- What is a sensible timetable? (Should you double it?)

- How many phases will the new plan include?
- Will the planners review all policies, procedures, and practices in terms of changed required by the new plan? Does the plan fulfill the vision, values, mission, and goals of the department? How do specific elements of the plan link with and fulfill those goals?
- Have the planners set aside time to troubleshoot the new plan, by themselves and with the participation of others inside and outside the department? Is there sufficient detail in the plan for this process to occur?
- What logistical obstacles must be addressed—communications, equipment, personnel, etc.? Which are “bugs” and which are “killers” that can halt implementation if not resolved?
- What is the role of the union? Are elements of the plan’s success contingent on changing some rules?
- How can the department generate internal and external support for the plan, not only at launch but before and after?
- How will the changes be evaluated? Will assessment include pre- and post-implementation surveys and focus groups or only traditional police data? Who will make non-emergency adjustments and how often will they be scheduled to do so?

SECTION V: Other Lessons Learned

While the unique opportunity afforded researchers to study the reorganization process somewhat shifted the focus away from the original research design, the case study of Lansing also provided information and insights concerning: training, the Neighborhood Network Center approach (including the involvement of non-police agencies); community governance; budget concerns; and activities/events (including the role of the Community Policing Detective).

Implications for Training

While there was general agreement from top command all the way to the line level that training was essential in implementing community policing department wide, more than one individual also expressed concern that management tried to use training to carry too much of the freight. One CPO said, "You can't substitute training for good management—if they don't get the message in training, you have to be willing to tell people face to face that they are not doing a good job."

- **Training as a tool for acceptance:** Interviews with CPOs elicited numerous suggestions about how training could be harnessed to the goal of generating internal support for community policing. Many CPOs said that the problem was not only the content of training, but the timing. At least some CPOs had been in place for two or three years before significant numbers of patrol officers were exposed to the rationale in structured training sessions, and the feeling was that this had allowed negative attitudes to harden. While content is indeed important, it seemed that many CPOs were less concerned about

what was said than by the need to get at least some explanation to patrol for the community building and problem solving activities before they were marginalized as "flower planters."

- **Specific Training for CPOs:** As might be expected, among the skills that CPOs consistently identified as potential training areas were: conflict resolution, communications (oral and written), problem solving, foreign language (and not just Spanish); computers.
- **Management Training:** The empowerment training added to the roster under Chief Boles is the first time that the department has invested its training resources in providing management skills. However, a young manager moving up the ranks said that police departments in general either ignore this aspect of training or do not have the money to do so, which leaves those who are ambitious and dedicated taking classes or reading on their own. An interesting suggestion was that the training division could assemble a library of noteworthy books and videos to lend and perhaps organize informal discussion groups. Moreover, if it is true that police managers in Lansing reflect widespread reluctance to confront individuals face to face and difficulty in developing strategies to solve personnel issues, then "brown bag" lunches that allow them to get together to brainstorm ideas might help.
- **Academy Training:** The training issues identified by CPOs above constitute a fraction of academy training time, if at all. There was general consensus among management and CPOs that some way must be found to balance the emphasis on developing physical skills and instilling information on the law and First Aid with instruction on how to talk to people and work together on solving problems.
- **Field Training:** No matter what is taught in the academy, the impact of field training may well be of even greater importance. The experience in Lansing

suggests that some problems are solved by the passage of time, since individuals with an excellent grasp on community policing principles are moving into these assignments. When rookies have opportunities to see field training officers engaged in problem solving and community building as a routine part of the job, it may well have more impact than any lecture.

- **In-Service Training:** Police agencies in medium-size cities suffer from big-city problems without big-city training options. The fact that the chief devoted the lion's share of the training budget to the effort that trained everyone in the basic concepts stands as a testament to the depth of his commitment. It should be noted, however, that this also generates hostility among those who want to see the resources spent elsewhere. Just as patrol sees CPOs as robbing them of officers to answer calls, there were those who felt that training in empowerment and community policing took resources away from training in areas such as investigations, which would also have a direct impact on the department's overall effectiveness.

Neighborhood Network Center

Appendix S includes a brief history of the Neighborhood Network Center (NNC) and information on current activities. (For a history of the Lansing NNC, see also Community Policing Series No. 23, *A Neighborhood Network Center: Basic Issues—Planning and Implementation in Lansing, Michigan*, published by the National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State University, 1993.)

The status of the NNC is in flux, because of an ambitious expansion program. The Mayor has articulated his commitment to the concept and has amassed a budget of \$2- 1/2 million to build three more facilities around the city (including funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation). One officer now devotes 20% of this time (at this

writing) to planning for the new NNCs, along other representatives of community groups that have been or may be housed in the new facilities.

Part of the difficulty in discussing how the NNC relates to the police department's community policing strategy stems from the fact that, at the time of the reorganization, there was no plan to house any CPO at the site. While the situation for police participation may well change when the full complement of NNCs is built, there has been a notable shift from strong police participation to a lesser, part-time support role.

Issues of scale are also worth noting. When the NNC opened in the former State of Michigan Library building, it was not considered the optimal facility, because of its immense size, but it had the virtue of being free (except for the cost of the utilities, donated by Trojanowicz). Trojanowicz and one CPO both had envisioned more of a storefront operation, but a local developer was so impressed with the CPO's efforts to reduce crime downtown that he offered them the use of the entire second floor of this large facility.

Initially, free rent was also the lure to bring other service providers into the facility. "To get up and running, we couldn't just limit ourselves to the perfect roster, we had to try to get groups willing to give this idea a try," said the officer. By the spring of 1994, the CPO was encouraged that the concept's success allowed him the freedom to begin developing plans for the future on the basis of who the ideal team would be. The rationale for the approach is that it allows part-time and full-time service providers to work with police at the grass-roots level on community-based problem solving. It might mean assembling a team of a police officer, social worker, and school counselor to deal with issues in a problem family. It could mean inviting public health to participate in organizing parenting classes for the entire community. Ideally as well, it could serve as a drop-in facility, something that could not be done at the existing NNC because of restrictions in the lease.

The NNC officer and his fellow planners face a massive job in identifying the elements where NNCs will look alike and where they will differ. It is also clear by the size of the budget that this goes far beyond the storefront concept originally envisioned. Indeed, one of the questions about the new NNCs is how to make them user-friendly, so that residents do not see them as forbidding offices filled with professionals who would rather communicate with one another. Of note as well is how those who work at the NNC can be enticed into direct contact with the community on the street—or whether that should even be a part of the plan.

Finding ways to maintain that intimate contact and interaction with the community is one of the officer's top priorities. "I'd say that the main lesson that I have learned from my experience here is that you can really accomplish a lot when you bring people from the community together," he said. "They would love to be able to do it all on their own, but as a police officer, there were things I could do that they couldn't."

Concerning the involvement of non-police agencies, code enforcement no doubt ranks at the top of the list. Of particular note in Lansing is the role of the woman who operates out of the NNC on landlord-tenant relations. More than most, Lansing recognizes that the role of affordable, decent housing for low-income people can make in the overall atmosphere within the community. This can require a delicate balancing act, attempting to pressure landlords to evict drug dealers on the one hand, while urging them to repair and maintain property on the other. Needless to say, this requires a close working relationship with code enforcement, and a keen awareness of the danger of gentrification displacing even more people onto the street. The Mayor appears to be particularly proud of an initiative near Sparrow Hospital, where staff and interns are eligible for a \$5,000 housing subsidy on properties within a mile.

Community Governance

One CPO's comments on what the police can do that the community cannot provides the perfect segue into the issue of community governance. Does community policing strengthen communities so that they can learn to take care of themselves? How can the police help to make that happen?

The experience in Lansing has some remarkable success stories. *Sparrow Estates, Cherry Hill, Green Oaks*—these were once neighborhoods with no name for good reason. One CPO talked about how she had worked with Realtors to organize a seminar on low-income home ownership options, and how the department helped organize a *Parade of Homes*-type outreach to attract people back into the city.

Yet the question is why there have also been such notable failures. If the police claim credit for the successes, do they also have to shoulder blame for the failures? Are there specific skills that certain CPOs bring to the job that allow them to succeed where others fail? Or are some neighborhoods in such disarray, with so many lifelong feuds, that there is little that anyone can do until or unless they resolve those issues?

Opinion on these issues is truly all over the map, but at least the issues have been framed. It is true that the neighborhoods that have had the greatest success appear to be those where there was a cadre of committed volunteers waiting to be tapped. At a Citizens for a Better Lansing meeting, an elderly gentleman talked about how he used to call the department for help with drug problems in his neighborhood, "But the officer treated me like I must be one of them." Giving him and his neighbors a CPO allowed them to put their energies to work together.

Yet there are neighborhoods where mistrust of police runs even deeper, complicated by issues of race and class. At the NNC meeting, the young black woman who recently moved to Lansing asked the chief to be careful that his officers do not go too far in doing the bidding of segments of the community. Interviewed later, she expressed concern that the community could pressure the police to cross the line. As an

example, she said that one of the "successes" in her neighborhood was the effort to remove pay phones on the street, so that dealers could not use them. "We still have drug problems, but I just moved in and can't afford a phone yet, and it makes it tough on me."

Among the serious issues yet to be resolved concerning community policing's contribution to community governance are:

- What strategies can police departments use to strengthen the community's ability to govern itself? Do CPOs help or do they risk creating a new form of dependency?
- What skills do CPOs need to assist communities in becoming more self-governing? What is the role of supervision in ensuring that CPOs are not intentionally or inadvertently fostering dependence?

Recognizing the law of unintended consequences, how do we avoid "rewarding" communities that resist self-governance with a more intense level of service (such as a CPO), while those who respond well to the challenge risk seeing their officer(s) transferred elsewhere?

Budget Concerns

In terms of the budgetary lessons learned from Lansing's experience with CPOs, it can be argued that community policing in the form of CPOs was always vulnerable/never a priority as long as it was dependent on unstable grant funds. As noted previously as well, patrol was never persuaded by the argument that their ranks were not being thinned by these assignments.

The reorganization raises an important issue about the economics of public policing. Remodeling or building new facilities to house the two new precincts may well ultimately cost millions, at the same time that the department has no money for laptops that could solve a major communication glitch. It is one of the greater ironies that this is

a relatively common situation, given that long-term capital investments are funded differently than shorter-term needs. There has also been a call and a commitment to add new officers to LPD, though it is less clear whether the funds can be found.

Activities/Events

A quick scan of Section III suggests a variety of educational, recreational, and social activities and events generated by CPOs. Of particular note are the Computer Learning Centers at public housing sites and activities organized with the help of the Neighborhood Youth and Parent Prevention Partnerships. However, while many of these activities are important and effective, one area where Lansing has truly broken new ground is in its experiment with what it calls the *Community Policing Detective*.

The Community Policing Detective

What is the role of the detective when only one-third of crimes committed are reported to police, and less than one in five of those reported leads to an arrest? How do you deal with fear of crime when a random murder of a drug dealer at 3:00 AM is perceived as less threatening than a neighbor's stolen VCR—because people assume, rightly or wrong, that they can avoid the former but not the latter?

Contesting those issues persuaded Chief Boles and his top command that more has to be done to work with the community on investigating the crimes that they care about. Toward that end, the department elected to identify one detective out of its typical roster of 23 as a Community Policing Detective (CPD). So far, two detectives had served in the role and a third was assigned. All were stationed to work out of the NNC, and ultimately the CPD beat expanded to include three CPO beat areas.

To understand the unique role of the CPD requires knowing the basics of how the bureau functions otherwise. With major drug investigations handled by SOD, the Detective Bureau in Lansing is divided into four squads, each supervised directly by a

sergeant: Homicide and Serious Crimes against Persons; UDAA (stolen cars) and Fraud; Juvenile/Sex Crimes; and other Property Crimes.

Average seniority for a detective in LPD is 22.8 years (a consideration when union rules for non-supervisory positions allow retirement after 25 years, with 73.4% of full pay and full health coverage for life for the individual and his or her spouse). Moreover, there are two categories of detectives, and one is viewed primarily as a perk to boost pay before retirement. Detectives with the rank of 2B is "off roster," which means that if they pass the test, they can remain a detective for life, without being subject to the union rule about limited time in specialty assignments. A 2C allows those with a good service record and the greatest seniority a stint as a higher-paid detective, which boosts a person's ultimate retirement pay.

For a detective in one of the squads, the workload is shared by a number of fellow detectives—and many cases are culled out before the detectives even get a chance to deal with them. Each squad sergeant receives a printout each morning detailing the crime reports and arrests made the previous night that do not fall into the URR (Uniform Report Retained) category. The printout also includes solvability factors for each incident, which are supposed to guide decision-making, but no formal computer analysis is actually done. So it is up to the sergeant to decide which cases to assign to the detectives in the squad and which to treat as OPU—Open Unassigned.

It is these OPU cases that constitute the biggest difference—and the biggest confusion—with the CPD's role. In the rest of the Detective Bureau, cases listed as OPU result in a letter being sent to the victim, telling the person that unless they can supply more information or additional information turns up elsewhere, the case will remain open in the file but it is not pursued.

In the case of the CPD, the Detective receives printouts for everything that happens within those three beats, and they are responsible for disposing of all of them in some way. That is, instead of being responsible for certain kinds of cases, the CPD is

responsible for everything in that defined geographic area (except major drug investigations and the likelihood that the CPD will be the second—not first detective on a homicide).

In some ways, the CPD acts as his own supervisor, since he makes the decisions concerning how far to pursue different cases. Those acts alone allow the CPD to “close” (not clear) the case as an NFI—No Further Investigation—if the conversation fails to turn up workable leads. While no one has done an analysis, it is clear that the percentage of cases considered NFI has grown over the years, as the criteria have changed. Now, if there is no suspect, most of those cases are not assigned. In some cases, the department will not pursue an arrest, such as for simple assault, unless the victim goes to the prosecutor’s officer for a warrant.

According to the CPO Detectives, the opportunity to follow up on such cases often resulted in eventual clearing of the case. However, the department mistakenly saw those high closure (again, not clearance) rates as an indicator that the CPD was dramatically more successful in resolving cases than their counterparts, though a high closure rate means no such thing.

Part of the problem, of course, is that the other detectives do not have a chance to intervene before cases are labeled OPU, while the CPD gets a crack at all of them. The issue, however, is whether that follow-up actually leads to a greater clearance rate—and whether that matters.

Even if the CPD clears more cases, the question becomes whether that is an appropriate use of a detective’s time. Perhaps there are cases of even greater overall import to the city that are occurring in places not covered by the CPD—a system to prioritize those cases for additional follow-up might make more sense than allowing only those cases in the CPD area to receive a greater level of special attention from a detective. There is also some question about whether the issue is high clearance rates—some cases simply take longer to solve, so the fact that they remain uncleared may say

less about the detective's efforts and skills than about the circumstances of the case itself.

Even with those disclaimers, however, the perceptions of the CPDs themselves suggest that they believe that they are making a significant contribution by helping neighborhoods in ways that cannot be achieved in the "regular detective" role. Both Detectives were given the freedom to carve out their own niche, and both decided that attending neighborhood meetings was a critical piece. In addition, since interaction with their detective peers was also considered essential, they would stop at the Detective Bureau each morning (detectives in Lansing work 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM, Monday through Friday, except for overtime emergencies). The CPO Detectives also noted that they talked with CPOs frequently, particularly the one who worked out of the same facility.

One Detective noted that he thought the CPD should use that forum as a means of training patrol officers in investigations. It is widely perceived within the ranks of detectives that so many cases go investigated that involving patrol officers might be a valid piece of a problem-solving initiative aimed at property crime.

He cited an example of how he pursued a case that would likely never have come to the attention of police otherwise. Two sisters, 12 and 14, were frequently truant, and it was rumored to be because they were spending time at the apartment of a 25-year-old boyfriend who was romancing them both. Though there was no formal complaint, the Detective investigated the case and succeeded in bringing statutory rape charges. The question becomes, does that case deserve to receive such attention when other complaints made to the department receive no more attention than the NFI letter? Or is this an important symbol in an era when teen pregnancy is deemed such a serious issue? Should it be the CPD's call? In consultation with the community? In consultation with management? How do these efforts fit into an overall plan for the community?

The Future of Detectives in Reorganization

As it stands, the next phase of reorganization would include a basic plan of splitting the Detective Bureau into two groups, with one assigned to the North Precinct and one assigned to the South Precinct, and probably a core group that would remain at headquarters to handle major cases, homicides and perhaps sexual assaults. At that point, each Captain would likely develop a plan to assign his or her detectives to the problem-solving teams and require them to begin attending neighborhood meetings. In the midst of the consternation among detectives about these proposed changes, the possibility of expanding the number of CPDs has so far been lost, though it seems unlikely that the department would be any more inclined toward creating more CPDs, given its awareness of the drawbacks of CPOs.

At the April 12, 1995 meeting of the Implementation Committee, the detectives showed up *en masse* to protest the break-up of the Detective Bureau (until a bomb threat aborted the meeting). Highlights of the often-heated discussion underscored issues and perceptions. One Captain challenged the detectives to explain why so few attend neighborhood meetings, and why so few have even visited the south side mini-station that opened just prior to the reorganization plan. The Captain said that he felt it was worth considering having his detectives work 10-hour afternoon shifts.

One detective responded that the department had already tried having detectives work afternoons. "Given the amount of time it takes to work the cases and go to court, afternoons don't make sense, and victims and witnesses don't want to be bothered late at night," he said. "The issue is not whether we communicate with police officers, but the quality of our investigation."

A Lieutenant spoke about how detectives could be more effective, and he announced that he was finishing up a six-page proposal on reorganizing the Detective Bureau. As might be expected, that set off a furor of recriminations about the lack of

input. Even though he's a fan of the approach, a CPO Detective said that he felt inundated with buzz words like community policing.

If Only One Lesson...

If there is only one lesson to be learned from Lansing's experience, it is the importance of allowing people input in the change process. As we see, despite the recent lesson of the uproar occasioned by failing to allow groups within the department and the community sufficient participation in decision-making, it happened again.

But the confusion lies in failing to understand that it is those directly affected, within the department and within the community, who determine when they have had sufficient time and opportunity for input—not management. Keeping backlash to a minimum requires allowing these groups sufficient time by their yardstick. Like democracy, community policing is slower and sloppier than any other way of doing business. Yet the alternative is to exclude people from the process, which seems infinitely worse.

PROPERTY OF

National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS)
Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000