BLACK CRIME:

a police view

Edited by Herrington J. Bryce

Foreword

Crime is a problem that affects our communities in many, many dreadful ways. The economic costs are staggering. Crime's toll on the quality of life in black neighborhoods is even greater. Statistics show that blacks are as frequently the victims as they are perpetrators of crime. Crime is an insidious enemy.

Our elected and appointed officials must confront the issue of crime, especially black-on-black crime. They must be energetic and unrelenting in their pursuit of solutions. Success requires leadership. This book is the culmination of a project to begin that effort.

It is only right that black police executives should gather to discuss ways in which crime in low-income urban areas can be reduced, since there is a relationship among poverty, cities, blackness, and crime. The nature of the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and criminal activity has not been taken into account by those who make police policy. As a group, black police officials offer a potentially significant impact on America's outlook on crime, and law enforcement generally. As yet an untapped resource, they have begun the task of involving themselves in the policy-making process. We will insist that if we are part of the problem, we must be part of the solution at every stage: in research, policy discussion, policy formulation, and policy implementation.

As important as their impact on police policy is the leadership black police can offer black communities. The fight against crime requires organization: to oppose the criminal effectively and to demand adequate police services effectively. This, I think, is the challenge before us.

The Joint Center for Political Studies plans to play a continuing role in the search for lasting solutions to the problems of crime.

Eddie N. Williams
President
Joint Center for Political Studies

The Police Foundation was pleased to join with the Joint Center for Political Studies and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in sponsoring the symposium on crime reduction in low-income areas.

When the concept of a national symposium of black law enforcement leaders was originally suggested, all of us who were involved were enthusiastic in our belief that these officials represented a valuable resource heretofore untapped. They could offer a unique perspective on such critical issues as the relationship of the police to the minority community, the methods by which the minority community and the police can reduce the amount of criminal victimization in low-income areas, and potential areas for police improvement.

The three-day symposium more than met our expectations. Many of those who attended had dedicated their careers to law enforcement, yet never had been consulted at the national level about their thoughts on the subjects of this symposium. As the proceedings of the conference demonstrate, they seized the opportunity to make known their views to a national audience. They shared common experiences, learned much from each other that could be taken back to their individual police departments, and offered numerous suggestions to the national audience.

Perhaps even more gratifying, however, was their refusal to view the symposium as a one-time event. They immediately began plans to create an organization, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, that would help assure that their voices would continue to be heard in the national debate on crime reduction. I salute the attendees and the organizations who participated in the symposium and hope that we do not again lose sight of the valuable resource we have in our minority law enforcement leaders.

Patrick V. Murphy
President
Police Foundation

According to LEAA's National Crime Panel victimization surveys, blacks are more likely than whites to be victimized by violent crimes —rape, robbery, and assault; households headed by blacks have higher victimization rates for all household crimes than those headed by whites; and, contrary to popular belief, those most frequently victimized are young black men, as opposed to the elderly.

The victimization data and other studies have led LEAA to believe that it is important to encourage mutual responsibility between citizens and the criminal justice system.

Consequently, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was pleased to participate as a co-sponsor with the Police Foundation and the Joint Center for Political Studies in providing a forum for the first such gathering of the nation's highest-ranking black law enforcement officials to explore collectively ways of reducing crime in the black community—specifically, black-on-black crime.

The creation of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) during the symposium has been heralded as a major thrust in recent efforts to make the entire field of criminal justice work more effectively for the black community.

The comprehensive and thought-provoking working papers incorporated in these proceedings, the listing of major recommendations developed by the police officials, and the workshop summary discussions constitute a state-of-the-art understanding of black-on-black crime as viewed by black police executives and is of major concern to all criminal justice agencies and the public at large.

I would like to commend Ms. Peggy Triplett, a member of my staff, for the excellent work she did in conceiving of this project and in maintaining an important relationship over the years with black police officers at every level. We are proud of the fact that Ms. Triplett, a special assistant to the director of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, was cited by the members of NOBLE for her "dedicated service in improving the status of blacks and ethnic minorities in law enforcement and equal justice."

Richard W. Velde
Administrator
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

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INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND

Introduction and Background

Herrington J. Bryce

This book is based on a symposium on reducing crime in urban low-income areas which was co-sponsored by the Joint Center for Political Studies, the Police Foundation and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The symposium, which was held on September 7-9, 1976, was planned in order to assemble the nation's top-ranking black police officials and to permit them the opportunity—for the first time—to exchange opinions about the problem of crime in the black community, community crime-control, police-community relations, and problems of the black police executive. Officials came from 55 cities in 24 states where over 43 percent of the U.S. black population resides. They represent approximately 10 million black Americans (Table 1).

TABLE 1
Black Population in Proportion to
Total Population for Selected Cities, 1970
(in thousands)

City, State	Total Population	Black Population	Percent Black
Albany, NY	115,875	13,881	12.0
Anchorage, AK	48,157	2,724	5.7
Atlanta, GA	497,024	255,051	51.1
Atlantic City, NJ	47,889	21,014	43.9
Baltimore, MD	905,759	420,272	46.4
Benton Harbor, MI	16,481	9,687	58.8
Birmingham, AL	300,687	126,380	42.0
Boston, MA	641,053	104,596	16.3
Buffalo, NY	462,783	94,336	20.4
Champaign, IL	56,621	5,310	9.4
Chicago, IL	3,362,825	1,098,569	32.7
Cincinnati, OH	452,550	124,928	27.6
Cleveland, OH	751,046	287,871	38.3

Herrington J. Bryce *is Director of Research at the Joint Center for Political Studies.*

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City, State	Total Population	Black Population	Percent Black
Columbus, OH	539,377	99,649	18.5
Compton, CA	78,493	56,135	71.5
Dallas, TX	844,189	210,238	24.9
Dayton, OH	243,459	74,177	30.5
Detroit, MI	1,511,336	660,524	43.7
Evanston, IL	79,878	12,861	16.1
Fayette, MS	1,725	1,318	76.4
Gary, IN	175,249	92,795	53.0
Houston, TX	1,232,407	316,591	25.7
Indianapolis, IN	744,570	134,203	18.0
Jacksonville, FL	528,865	118,471	22.4
Kansas City, MO	507,242	111,980	22.1
Las Vegas, NV	125,641	13,983	11.1
Los Angeles, CA	2,816,111	503,517	17.9
Memphis, TN	623,755	242,375	38.9
Miami, FL	335,062	76,260	22.8
Milwaukee, WI	717,124	105,015	14.6
Muskegon Heights, IL	NA	NA	NA
Nashville, TN	448,003	87,856	19.6
Newark, NJ	382,377	207,302	54.2
New Orleans, LA	593,471	267,347	45.0
Newport News, VA	138,177	39,322	28.5
New York, NY	7,894,851	1,665,470	21.1
Oakland, CA	361,613	124,671	34.5
Omaha, NE	347,380	34,499	9.9
Opelousas, LA	20,121	10,184	50.6
Peoria, IL	126,996	14,492	11.4
Philadelphia, PA	1,948,607	653,747	33.5
Phoenix, AZ	581,466	27,868	4.8
Pittsburgh, PA	520,167	105,393	20.3
Portland, OR	381,927	21,506	5.6
Richmond, VA	249,621	104,737	42.0
Riviera Beach, FL	21,449	11,946	55.7
Roanoke, VA	92,115	17,753	19.3
St. Louis, MO	622,236	254,268	40.9
St. Paul, MN	309,940	10,803	3.5
San Francisco, CA	715,674	95,845	13.4
Savannah, GA	118,344	53,674	45.4
Shreveport, LA	182,179	61,150	33.6
Trenton, NJ	104,578	39,193	37.5
Tuskegee, AL	11,028	9,599	87.0
Washington, DC	756,492	537,570	71.1
Total blacks in cities as percent of all blacks		9,850,906	43.7

Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1970.

TABLE 2
Blacks as a Percent of Total Persons Arrested for Violent and Property Crimes by Age, 1971—75

Year	Violent Crime		Property Crime	
	All ages	Under 18	All ages	Under 18
1971	61.1	68.1	35.7	33.2
1972	59.9	67.0	35.1	32.5
1973	56.5	62.0	33.8	31.5
1974	56.1	60.9	34.1	30.9
1975	53.2	57.3	32.9	29.6

Calculation based on data from: *Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States.* Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1971-75.

Statistics bear out the contention that crime, indeed, is of particular concern to the black community. Blacks continue to be disproportionately arrested for all types of crime (Table 2). But there is one element of optimism. Blacks (even black teenagers) are accounting for a declining percentage of those arrested for violent and property crimes. In 1971, blacks accounted for 36 percent of those arrested for property crimes. Today, blacks account for 33 percent of such arrests. In 1971, blacks accounted for 61 percent of all arrests for violent crime. Today, blacks represent 53 percent of all arrests for these crimes. A similar trend is shown for black teenagers. Despite these figures, black over-representation in arrest statistics remains a critical problem.

Poverty is often cited as a major reason for crime. At least 20 percent of all black families in 85 percent of the cities represented at the symposium are poor. In addition, many of these cities are among those with the highest percentage of poor black families in the entire United States (Table 3).

TABLE 3
Percent of all Black Families in Selected Cities with 1969 Income Below the Poverty Level and National, State and City-Size Class Rank*

City, State	Percent	U.S. Rank	State Rank	City-size Rank
Albany, NY	24.3	274	11	47
Anchorage, AK	7.2	531	1	241
Atlanta, GA	25.1	251	12	16
Atlantic City, NJ	21.6	338	10	154

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City, State	Percent	U.S. Rank	State Rank	City-size Rank
Baltimore, MD	23.2	301	4	12
Benton Harbor, MI	27.4	NA	NA	NA
Birmingham, AL	34.3	118	13	3
Boston, MA	25.3	246	5	8
Buffalo, NY	24.4	272	10	18
Champaign, IL	31.9	141	4	31
Chicago, IL	20.7	364	15	6
Cincinnati, OH	26.6	221	5	10
Cleveland, OH	23.3	296	10	11
Columbus, OH	21.4	343	16	13
Compton, CA	18.0	419	30	104
Dallas, TX	25.1	251	28	9
Dayton, OH	18.7	408	20	77
Detroit, MI	18.7	408	13	9
Evanston, IL	8.2	529	28	142
Fayette, MS	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gary, IN	18.8	405	11	75
Houston, TX	25.3	246	26	1
Indianapolis, IN	18.0	419	14	18
Jacksonville, FL	34.8	115	13	3
Kansas City, MO	20.5	368	9	15
Las Vegas, NV	21.1	351	1	65
Los Angeles, CA	21.4	343	21	4
Memphis, TN	35.7	100	7	2
Miami, FL	27.9	195	20	7
Milwaukee, WI	24.9	258	1	10
Muskegon Heights, IL	NA	NA	NA	NA
Nashville, TN	27.8	197	10	8
Newark, NJ	23.6	290	5	21
New Orleans, LA	38.9	69	8	1
Newport News, VA	27.3	208	6	34
New York, NY	20.5	368	18	8
Oakland, CA	21.8	333	20	24
Omaha, NE	26.1	237	1	13
Opelousas, LA	57.2	NA	NA	NA
Peoria, IL	23.5	292	10	50
Philadelphia, PA	21.4	343	15	4
Phoenix, AZ	31.5	147	3	4
Pittsburgh, PA	26.9	213	8	6
Portland, OR	22.6	310	2	23
Richmond, VA	24.7	266	11	45
Riviera Beach, FL	23.1	NA	NA	NA
Roanoke, VA	25.2	250	8	64
St. Louis, MO	25.5	243	6	7
St. Paul, MN	21.0	357	2	27
San Francisco, CA	20.3	374	24	16

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City, State	Percent	U.S. Rank	State Rank	City-size Rank
Savannah, GA	38.4	72	5	7
Shreveport, LA	41.8	45	6	3
Trenton, NJ	22.7	310	8	54
Tuskegee, AL	26.4	NA	NA	NA
Washington, DC	15.5	457	1	20

Calculations derived from: U.S. Census of Population, 1970.

*Rates based on cities 25,000 or more in population, 1970. There were 845 such cities in 1970.

TABLE 4
Number of Crimes Per Thousand Population and Expenditures Per Thousand for Selected Cities

	1975 Crime Rate*	Expenditures Per Capita, FY 1973
All U.S.	52.8	39.19
All U.S. Cities	64.7	39.19
Total 55 Cities	82.4	61.18
Albany, NY	23.4	46.95
Anchorage, AK	86.7	NA
Atlanta, GA	108.4	49.46
Atlantic City, NJ	105.0	NA
Baltimore, MD	80.2	68.79
Benton Harbor, MI	189.8	NA
Birmingham, AL	86.1	32.10
Boston, MA	130.2	76.56
Buffalo, NY	67.4	52.77
Champaign, IL	89.9	NA
Chicago, IL	74.3	72.23
Cincinnati, OH	78.9	53.35
Cleveland, OH	85.2	67.14
Columbus, OH	93.0	39.28
Compton, CA	154.3	NA
Dallas, TX	115.7	43.73
Dayton, OH	128.2	43.09
Detroit, MI	112.3	83.50
Evanston, IL	76.8	NA
Fayette, MS	NA	NA
Gary, IN	72.7	31.88
Houston, TX	70.0	28.37
Indianapolis, IN	57.5	27.75
Jacksonville, FL	85.2	28.04

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	1975 Crime Rate*	Expenditures Per Capita, FY 1973
Kansas City, MO	92.2	50.32
Las Vegas, NV	189.3	NA
Los Angeles, CA	81.3	65.01
Memphis, TN	82.4	33.09
Miami, FL	112.5	45.59
Milwaukee, WI	55.8	52.75
Muskegon Heights, IL	NA	NA
Nashville, TN	76.9	31.14
Newark, NJ	94.0	87.43
New Orleans, LA	69.4	42.52
Newport News, VA	57.8	NA
New York, NY	76.0	69.47
Oakland, CA	124.0	48.92
Omaha, NE	63.0	24.77
Opelousas, LA	14.7	NA
Peoria, IL	102.1	NA
Philadelphia, PA	45.2	74.73
Phoenix, AZ	118.8	49.20
Pittsburgh, PA	66.8	43.32
Portland, OR	112.5	44.44
Richmond, VA	84.9	49.08
Riviera Beach, FL	129.0	NA
Roanoke, VA	95.7	NA
St. Louis, MO	124.4	74.04
St. Paul, MN	78.6	31.91
San Francisco, CA	93.9	64.75
Savannah, GA	93.3	NA
Shreveport, LA	57.7	NA
Trenton, NJ	85.9	NA
Tuskegee, AL	NA	NA
Washington, DC	75.1	126.91

*Number of 1975 crimes per 1000 1973 population.

Calculations based on data from: *Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States.* Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1975.

The current crime rate for the 55 cities as a group is considerably higher than the rate for all U.S. cities. The cities represented at the conference averaged 82.4 crimes per 1000 inhabitants, compared to an average of 64.7 crimes per 1000 for all U.S. cities. The national average, including cities, suburbs, and county sheriff departments, is only 52.8 crimes per 1000 inhabitants (Table 4). At least 21 of the cities saw an increase in the crime rate between 1974 and 1975 which exceeded both the 9.5 percent increase for all U.S. cities and

the national average increase of 10.4 percent. Only 5 of the cities had a decline in crime (Table 5).

Between 1973 and 1975, many departments sought to adjust to the economic crisis by reducing the size of their police departments. Some cities saw a reduction in the total force. But in many cases, only a substitution occurred—sworn personnel were replaced by civilians. Thus, in at least 22 cities represented at the symposium, the number of sworn personnel was reduced. Yet, 14 of these same cities show an increase in civilian personnel (Table 6).

TABLE 5
Percent Increase in Number of Crimes
in Selected Cities: 1974—75

City, State	Percent Change
Albany, NY	-10.0
Anchorage, AK	26.7
Atlanta, GA	0.5
Atlantic City, NJ	4.9
Baltimore, MD	- 7.6
Benton Harbor, MI	0.2
Birmingham, AL	9.3
Boston, MA	22.5
Buffalo, NY	13.5
Champaign, IL	14.3
Chicago, IL	- 3.0
Cincinnati, OH	9.2
Cleveland, OH	11.1
Columbus, OH	27.9
Compton, CA	6.9
Dallas, TX	14.8
Dayton, OH	17.3
Detroit, MI	11.2
Evanston, IL	3.3
Fayette, MS	NA
Gary, IN	13.0
Houston, TX	1.2
Indianapolis, IN	22.5
Jacksonville, FL	8.5
Kansas City, MO	9.7
Las Vegas, NV	16.5
Los Angeles, CA	3.6
Memphis, TN	8.3
Miami, FL	3.9
Milwaukee, WI	14.1
Muskegon Heights, IL	NA
Nashville, TN	22.3

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City, State	Percent Change
Newark, NJ	5.8
New Orleans, LA	2.4
Newport News, VA	2.1
New York, NY	11.8
Oakland, CA	5.9
Omaha, NE	- 1.5
Opelousas, LA	NA
Peoria, IL	20.7
Philadelphia, PA	3.0
Phoenix, AZ	- 2.1
Pittsburgh, PA	9.4
Portland, OR	1.1
Richmond, VA	17.3
Riviera Beach, FL	6.6
Roanoke, VA	21.9
St. Louis, MO	4.5
St. Paul, MN	8.5
San Francisco, CA	15.4
Savannah, GA	19.2
Shreveport, LA	12.8
Trenton, NJ	8.4
Tuskegee, AL	NA
Washington, DC	0.9

Calculations based on data from: *Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States.* Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1971-75.

TABLE 6
Percent Change in Number of Law Enforcement Officials for Selected Cities by Type: 1973—75

City, State	Total	Sworn Officers	Civilians
Albany, NY	5.4	6.1	- 3.1
Anchorage, AK	13.2	13.3	12.8
Atlanta, GA	12.7	3.0	127.6
Atlantic City, NJ	- 2.7	14.9	- 37.5
Baltimore, MD	- 6.1	- 5.5	- 9.3
Benton Harbor, MI	-23.4	NA	NA
Birmingham, AL	3.0	1.1	13.2
Boston, MA	- 0.9	- 5.5	42.1
Buffalo, NY	- 2.8	- 5.3	20.9
Champaign, IL	- 3.2	- 1.2	44.4
Chicago, IL	- 0.3	- 2.8	22.9
Cincinnati, OH	- 6.0	3.9	- 48.7

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City, State	Total	Sworn Officers	Civilians
Cleveland, OH	-12.2	- 9.3	- 47.5
Columbus, OH	4.6	3.5	10.0
Compton, CA	1.9	1.5	2.6
Dallas, TX	0.5	2.0	- 4.4
Dayton, OH	25.1	26.5	20.5
Detroit, MI	- 4.2	- 3.1	- 12.7
Evanston, IL	2.9	2.9	3.0
Fayette, MS	NA	NA	NA
Gary, IN	- 6.5	- 8.9	10.9
Houston, TX	20.9	19.0	33.8
Indianapolis, IN	1.8	- 2.9	28.0
Jacksonville, FL	31.6	21.4	51.4
Kansas City, MO	1.5	- 4.9	24.3
Las Vegas, NV	2.6	0.3	10.3
Los Angeles, CA	9.1	5.6	18.9
Memphis, TN	11.8	12.5	9.2
Miami, FL	14.6	-15.6	130.0
Milwaukee, WI	0.8	0.0	9.5
Muskegon Heights, IL	5.1	NA	NA
Nashville, TN	15.0	11.5	33.8
Newark, NJ	1.3	4.3	- 12.2
New Orleans, LA	7.5	22.6	- 36.9
Newport News, VA	3.5	3.6	2.9
New York, NY	- 2.6	- 3.6	3.9
Oakland, CA	2.1	- 3.5	16.4
Omaha, NE	- 0.6	- 0.7	0.0
Opelousas, LA	- 7.2	NA	NA
Peoria, IL	7.2	2.2	27.8
Philadelphia, PA	0.8	0.7	1.5
Phoenix, AZ	20.9	16.8	41.1
Pittsburgh, PA	- 9.3	- 9.1	- 23.4
Portland, OR	4.0	0.8	- 18.7
Richmond, VA	6.5	1.5	47.1
Riviera Beach, FL	18.5	21.6	7.1
Roanoke, VA	7.5	5.8	33.3
St. Louis, MO	- 3.8	- 2.1	- 9.7
St. Paul, MN	- 1.8	- 0.8	- 6.0
San Francisco, CA	- 3.6	- 8.4	22.2
Savannah, GA	- 1.8	- 2.3	0.0
Shreveport, LA	8.0	0.8	40.5
Trenton, NJ	6.6	- 2.5	58.9
Tuskegee, AL	NA	NA	NA
Washington, DC	- 3.8	- 7.2	21.5

Calculations based on data taken from: *Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States.* Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1971–75.

Profile of Participants

Tables 7 through 10 offer a profile of participants in the symposium. Ninety-five percent of the 43 participants started out as patrolmen (Table 7). Nearly 60.5 percent of respondents have been in their present ranks for less than 5 years. Less than 5 percent have been in their present ranks for ten years or more (Table 8). Over 65.0 percent of the participants have been doing police work for at least 20 years. Only 7.0 percent have been employed in police work for less than 10 years (Table 9). Slightly over half (55.8 percent) of the participants supervise less than 100 persons, although a little less than 10 percent of the participants supervise over 1000 employees (Table 10). The participants brought a long and rich experience to the symposium.

TABLE 7
Level of Entry into Police Work

Entry Level	Number of Participants	Percent
Patrolman	41	95.30
Other	2	4.70
Total	43	100.0

TABLE 8
Tenure in Present Office

Years in Present Rank	Number of Cases	Percent
less than 1 year	7	16.3
1 – 4	19	44.2
5 – 7	10	23.3
8 – 10	5	11.6
10 or more	2	4.7
Total	43	100.1*

*Error due to rounding.

TABLE 9
Number of Years in Police Work

Years in Police Work	Number of Participants	Percent
0 – 4	0	0.0
5 – 9	3	7.0
10 – 14	4	9.3
15 – 19	8	18.6
20 – 24	15	34.9
25 – 29	8	18.6
30 or more	5	11.6
Total	43	100.0

TABLE 10
Number of People Supervised by Participants

Number of People supervised	Number of Participants	Percent
less than 100	24	55.8
100 – 299	4	9.3
300 – 499	5	11.6
500 – 699	2	4.7
over 1000	4	9.3
No Response	1	2.4
Total	43	100.1*

*Error due to rounding.

Employee morale, most participants indicated, is the problem most common to police executives, black or white. Problems of particular concern to black executives are: that they have less power than their responsibility requires, poor relationships with the community, and informal pressure to reaffirm their credibility to whites (Tables 11 and 12).

The need for more black officers and discrimination in promotion are, respectively, the first and second most serious racial problems facing police departments, according to 67.4 percent of the participants. About one-third of the respondents felt that white officers

TABLE 11
The Most Severe Problems Facing Police Executives*

Response Categories	Number of Responses	Percent of Responses
Employee Morale	41	39.9
Inadequate Resources	28	25.2
Community-police relations	22	19.8
Increasing Crime	13	11.7
Organizational Resistance to Change	7	6.4
Total	111	100.0

*Respondents were asked to list at least three problems.

TABLE 12
The Most Severe Problems Facing Black Police Executives*

Response Categories	Number of Mentions	Percent
Power not commensurate with responsibility	17	22.7
Community-police relations	14	18.7
Need to establish credibility with whites	14	18.7
Minority police recruitment, hiring and promotion	10	13.3
White executive's attitudes towards black executives	8	10.7
Black officer's view of black executives	2	2.7
Other	4	5.3
No response	6	8.0
Total	75	100.1**

*Respondents were asked to list at least three problems.
**Error due to rounding.

had a serious problem communicating with poor blacks. Only 14 percent thought that discrimination in wages was a problem (Table

13.) This may be due to the fact that wages are regulated by civil service.

TABLE 13

Evaluation of Selected Problems Within Police Departments

Problems	Very Serious		Rather Serious		Moderately Serious		No Problem		
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Need for black officers	29	67.4	7	16.3	5	11.6	2	4.7	43 (100.0)
Discrimination in assignment	7	16.7	7	16.7	14	33.3	14	33.3	42 (100.0
Discrimination in wages	0	0	2	4.7	4	9.4	37	86.1	43 (100.0)
Discrimination in professional association	9	22.0	4	9.8	9	22	19	46.3	41 (100.0)
Discrimination in promotion	11	25.6	6	14.0	7	17.1	19	44.2	43 (100.0)
Relationship between black officers and low-income citizens	1	2.4	5	12.2	18	43.9	17	41.5	41 (100.0)
Relationship between white officers and low-income citizens	8	19.5	14	34.1	17	41.5	2	4.9	41 (100.0)

Finally, more than one-half of the participants felt that the major causes of high crime rate among blacks are related to socioeconomic conditions such as poverty, education, housing, and unemployment. Specifically, unemployment was the most frequently cited reason.

TABLE 14
Reasons for Crime in the Black Community*

Response Categories	Number of Mentions	Percent
Socioeconomic conditions (housing, education, poverty, etc.)	34	31.8
Unemployment	26	24.3
Black alienation from and frustration with the system	14	13.1
Acceptance/tolerance of crime by black community	13	12.2
Citizen values/expectations	7	6.5
Drugs	5	4.7
Other	7	6.5
No respone	1	.9
Total	107	100.0

*Respondents were asked to list the three most important reasons.

Causes of Crime in the Black Community

The black police executives argued that the major causes of crime are socioeconomic—poverty, inadequate housing, lack of quality education, the disintegration of the black family in the inner cities, alcoholism and drug abuse. In particular, they cited a significant correlation among unemployment, underemployment and crime. One point of view was that criminal activity is a profitable undertaking—often the only profitable alternative available—to some inner city residents.

The executives were unanimous in their belief that there is a great inconsistency in the way the law is enforced in black and white communities. Because of this inconsistency, there is a lack of trust among blacks for the police.

In an effort to alleviate the causes of crime, the officials recommended (among other things) enactment of a comprehensive legislative program of social and economic reform, a nationwide war on drugs and a ban on all handguns.

The executives also recommended that minimum, mandatory sentences and uniform sentences be imposed on all individuals convicted of crime. They also called for a review and examination of the in-

ternal investigation process in all police departments and an assessment of the selective enforcement of the law with respect to minority groups.

Community Crime Control

Distrust of police has often contributed to the failure of police-initiated citizen involvement programs. Officials nonetheless encouraged use of these programs in black communities as effective anticrime measures. Black executives stressed the point that the black community must itself attack the crime problem. But it was recommended that more black policemen be hired so as to encourage the black community to identify with the police and to cooperate with them.

Officials frequently stated that one fundamental problem with crime control in the black community involves identifying the role of the policeman. The major advances in police work have been mostly technological, with little significant effect on how citizens and police relate to each other.

They further maintained that extended and continuing relationships fostered by the foot patrolman in the neighborhood have been replaced by the impersonal deployment of patrol cars. The policeman responds to calls, but his contacts with citizens are sporadic and usually occur under unpleasant circumstances, the officials noted.

The officials observed that the perception of the social service aspect of police work has declined. Participants suggested that every patrolman be required to spend a certain amount of his tour of duty on foot, patrolling and getting to know the neighborhood and its people. Correspondingly, they suggested that decision-making responsibility vis-a-vis deployment of personnel should be decentralized.

Officials were also concerned with the increasing specialization of police work. This situation was viewed as a further contribution to the depersonalization of the police. The policeman is seen as doing purely technical work; i.e., tactical, vice, traffic, etc. This situation was viewed as increasing the frustration of the citizen, who is shunted from officer to officer. Team policing, as a way to reduce a police department to its smallest organically functioning unit, was a strategy officials thought could serve to lessen the one-dimensional character of an over-specialized force.

Police-Community Relations (PCR)

Officials noted that due to lack of commitment on the part of most police departments, police-community relations programs are generally dismal failures.

One officer pointed out that ideally, every policeman should be a PCR man, but since that is not the case, specially trained PCR officers should be attached to each precinct. Citizen complaint boards ought to be established with an appeals process, the officials said.

In an attempt to educate the public about police work and respect for the law, officials suggested starting courses at the junior high school level on "police and the law," providing outreach centers, and establishing hot-line complaint reporting systems and citizen auxiliary patrols. Officials felt that federal funding should be sought for viable local PCR programs.

Officials acknowledged that improved police-community relations depend on responsive and sensitive police departments. They recommended that entry-level psychological testing and continuing psychological/stress counseling be given to eliminate some of the excesses of the police. They also called for department guidelines establishing boundaries on the discretion of patrolmen in such matters as field investigations and stop-and-frisk procedures.

The Black Police Executive

Participants urged all black police executives to take a vocal and visible stand in support of social and economic reform in their respective communities. It was agreed that the black executive must assert himself within the department and in the community at large against discrimination.

Officials agreed that at the heart of the police problem in the black community is the dearth of blacks in law enforcement. The black police executives felt that they could aggressively seek to correct this imbalance by actively supporting affirmative action in their departments, by leadership within the black community, and by serving as role-models on which young blacks could focus.

The black executives noted that they were faced with a number of obstacles, including the denial of assignments to special staff units or "promotional" slots, and the lack of opportunity to attend special seminars or advanced study courses. The officials acknowledged that lack of experience in areas other than patrol have been effective bars to promotion.

The officials urged black executives to encourage young black police officers to prepare for promotional exams. Often, the only way a black can advance in the department is to do an outstanding job on the test. Participants recommended initiating study classes to prepare for the exams. This would give the young officer confidence. Participants discussed how executives could motivate young officers by assuring that review boards have some black representation, and by arranging assignments so that black officers do more than patrol. In addition, participants called for a re-examination of the promotion and assignment practices.

The officials noted that the success of the black police executive has depended in large part on his acceptance of the values of unions and departments which, too often, don't care and too often oppose the interests of the black community. The officials were unanimous in their belief that support from the black community will increase the black police executive's effectiveness in demanding that the black community be provided with the police services it needs.

NOBLE

A major by-product of the symposium was the formation of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE). The officials stated their desire "that this organization be formed for the unification of black law enforcement officers at executive and command levels and that it impact upon the major problems of crime and delinquency in metropolitan areas by (1) conducting proper and adequate research, (2) establishing mutually beneficial linkages and liaisons with organizations of similar concern and purpose, (3) establishing effective means for dealing with racism, and (4) evaluating and recommending legislation at all levels of government."

The formation of NOBLE and its goals clearly reflected the sense of urgency and commitment manifested by the executives at the symposium. NOBLE's Chairman, Hubert Williams, the Newark, New Jersey police director, said that the organization was of vital importance to both blacks and to the nation.

Organization of the Book

By any measure of opinion or fact, crime in the black community is a grim reality. In Part II, Congressman John Conyers and Mayor

Maynard Jackson discuss the underlying political conditions which form America's attitudes about crime and criminals.

There is a high correlation among the variables of poverty, race, and crime. In Part III, Dr. Lee Brown explains their relationship and chronicles the staggering economic and social costs of crime. Some would argue that the police can do very little to control crime. Gwynne Peirson emphasizes the need for a fresh look at police crime-control procedures, reaffirming the necessity for greater police responsiveness to community needs.

Many policing problems in the black community are a result of the fact that blacks do not trust the police. In Part IV, Ben Holman finds two major problems underlying the failure of many police-community relations programs: the lack of commitment on the part of police and lack of community involvement. Irv Joyner discusses the reluctance of blacks to cooperate with the police, and outlines a number of ways by which to encourage community trust.

All of the authors confirm the need for increased minority recruitment in police departments. In Part V, Burtell Jefferson and Lloyd Sealy discuss problems faced by black police executives: in discriminatory assignment and promotion practices and in their personal dealings with fellow officers.

The final portion of the book includes a list of recommendations made by participants, compiled from tapes of the workshops. This is followed by a list of conference participants and participating organizations.

PART II
THE CONCERN OF
ELECTED OFFICIALS

Chapter 1
Crime as a Concern of Congress

John Conyers

It took these great co-sponsoring organizations to bring us together so that we might consider the problem of crime, which has long been a burden. It is about time that the high-ranking black police officials, and other law enforcement agents, come together.

Most of us came out of a ghetto, and most of us appreciate the euphemism used in the title of this symposium, "reducing crime in urban low-income areas." That is the ghetto. And I think that if I refer to the term "ghetto," instead of "urban low-income area," no one will have any misconception of what we are talking about. The problem is: how do we reduce crime in the black ghetto?

As I thought about a few of the things I would say, I recalled the philosophy that I've developed in the course of a lifetime of living as a black man in America. It is an ideology of progressive politics, a viewpoint that was developed long before I came to Congress.

I feel very privileged to come to you as a member of Congress, a member of the Congressional Black Caucus, and perhaps a part of a larger number of more progressive federal legislators who take sharp exception to the way law enforcement ideology and practice, unfortunately, have developed in this country.

First of all, to understand the phenomenon of crime we must cast it against a socioeconomic backdrop. Not to do so is to continue the same kinds of mistaken notions that have characterized our tragic and unsatisfactory course of action, at the federal, state, and local levels—not only in law enforcement, but particularly in government policy-making and among elected officials in the Congress.

For example, one of the most interesting experiences that I've had is taking charge of the gun control bill in the House these past two years. It has had a profound impact upon my understanding about the true nature of the problem, how people are willing to solve that problem and the solutions elected officials are willing to offer. As you all know, the overwhelming majority of citizens in this country want stricter gun-control legislation. Why not? If we consider that 2.5 million handguns, mostly of domestic manufacture, are introduced into the country every year through sales—not to mention many other kinds of longarms—it is clear that we are in an arms race within our country.

This fact was not quite clear to many people inside our black communities when I began hearings on this subject two years ago. There was some ambivalence among blacks about surrendering weapons to a government and a country against which they feel they might need to use those weapons in self-defense. It was very commonly stated: "Why should I give up my gun? I may need it to defend myself against the police or against the government!"

I have witnessed, however, the sharp change in the black community on the question of gun control. As we began to separate fact from fiction and to understand that we were the greatest victims of gun violence, we as a people began to come around. In fact, there are not many black people in the city who do not know someone who has been injured or killed in senseless handgun violence.

But in the House of Representatives and in the Congress there is no mood for handgun control. Senator Mansfield, Senate Majority Leader, announced before we could even dispose of the bill one way or another in the House of Representatives, that the Senate was not inclined to take up gun-control legislation. That was the signal for many in the House to argue that there is no reason for us to pass such futile legislation, since the Senate would not act on it anyway. You'll notice it's a reversal of the old argument which has been that the Senate was willing to pass the legislation, but would not, since it could not expect the House to act upon it. So, the people do not always get what they want from their government.

There is another aspect to gun control. I began to understand that the reason we might not have gun-control legislation moving forward is that in the international arena our policy is to be the most fortified, the most overarmed, the most powerful military nation on earth and in the course of history. We are the super nuclear military power and more than that, we are willing to export this nuclear capability. This being the case, and with a Department of Defense whose budget

this year reflects the largest sum for military expenditures in our peacetime history, how on earth can we then double back inside our borders and say that we should become a people who should disarm? It's inconsistent.

The same attitudes that fuel the powerful Defense Department in a military-industrial-government complex, that take away from the social resources of this country, lead our federal government to reject any serious disarmament program inside the United States. No international disarmament, no domestic disarmament. The implications of both for black people and for freedom-loving people are the same: The possibility of war, violence, and social conflict is increased and this makes your job as police executives much more difficult.

I might add that I have noticed, with some amusement, a change of attitude among police organizations, originally very much opposed to gun control. Now, many more of them are taking reconsidered views. I think this is an important and critical development.

One of the popular axioms I took for granted is that "victimless crimes" ought to be left alone, since we cannot regulate morals. That is a popular liberal position. But then I began to examine the whole question of gambling and how local police agencies are sometimes caught up in gambling syndicates and their political machines. Whole political units of government are sometimes overtaken by organized criminals.

I will say to you that we cannot let gambling run unabated, and allow people foolish enough to spend all their money at a race track or on mutuels and policy slips "to do their own thing." Behind this rather innocent pastime is the ominous presence of organized crime. And with it, my friends, is the first foot in the door of the compromise of individual police officers, and of individual local elected officials—the gradual rotting and corrupting of the entire system. It soon moves beyond the numbers racket. It soon moves beyond an innocent little bet on a horse, because with organized crime comes the loan sharking, the drugs, the organized prostitution, and all of the violence and corruption they breed. In my judgment, laws against gambling ought to be enforced.

Narcotics and controlled substance abuse is another serious problem that our minorities face. Everything we have ever done on drug enforcement in the last 50 years has been almost all wrong. We have done scarcely anything right.

Since about 1912, when we sent our spokesman to The Hague Opium Convention, we have been moving on increasingly shaky ground. We have been misled and misguided about the drug problem,

which was generally ignored until it began to spread out of the ghetto. Now that it is a national problem, our liberal reaction is obvious. We now advocate decriminalization of marijuana, which is probably a good first step. We find, however, that many are hooked on a wide range of legal drugs as well.

It seems to me that we are moving in the wrong direction when mandatory sentences affect only the poor drug seller, who is frequently a junkie doing the only thing he knows how to do when he is not committing a street crime or burglary; namely, selling the product that he is hooked on.

I am reminded of one case in Detroit, concerning a major crime figure. He was almost bored with his long appearance in court, in which he and his lawyers easily outclassed United States attorneys handling the case. The case tied up a court docket for several months at a cost estimated to be several hundred thousand dollars at the minimum. During his trial, he offered jobs to members of the federal courts who impressed him. It was bizarre. What was it about? It was about taxes. Here, we were trying to get a well known, highly placed, clearly wealthy, organized crime figure but only on a tax-violation charge. Clearly, it was a little beside the point. Yet, we have not been able to figure out an effective way to strike at organized crime. Now, what does that mean, in terms of the implications for the inner cities of America, where gambling and drugs and prostitution are more prevalent than in any other place in America? It means that it is impossible for you to do the kind of job that will lead to control of the rest of the criminal activity.

I see the problem of crime in terms of the socioeconomic situation. How on earth can you (as police executives) be asked to keep down the rate of crime in the inner cities of the United States? Many major cities are now turning black, and housing situations are deplorable. How can you ask those people frequently trapped in the ghettoes to have the same rate of crime as their fellow citizens in suburbia when the unemployment rate is doubled, when their youngsters are pushed out of school? Indeed, if they graduate, they graduate with a high school diploma that does not prevent them from being functionally illiterate.

According to the Urban League, 64 percent of the black youngsters cannot find work for the second or third summer in a row. Yet, we think that their crime rate is to be the same as everybody else's, and we want something done about it. I say that if you look at the political economy of the black ghetto, you will find a trapped colony

of Americans who have no way out in this society. You can argue whether it is deliberate and by design, or an accidental by-product of this system. Yes, some always make their way out. They become the example for other people who are supposed to pull themselves up by their boot straps. But in the black ghetto, we find an economic system that makes it impossible for us to expect that the rate of crime will be anything other than different and markedly higher than that for the national community. It is going to stay that way, your good intentions and mine notwithstanding.

Until we begin to take a different approach, until we have the courage to free ourselves of many of the myths we know to be patently false, there will never be any serious alteration of the crime rate or patterns of crime in this country. These myths control the philosophy and policy of law enforcement at all levels and they must be broken. We must challenge these myths.

I would like to speak briefly about socioeconomic patterns. It is clear enough to me that we must go beyond law enforcement policy and acknowledge the fact that we are developing a generation of young blacks who will come to adulthood without ever having had any meaningful work experience. What are they going to be doing? What will they have done in the meantime? It's clear. You know.

It amazes me that there is so little organized juvenile crime in this country. Yes, so little, not so much. The second thing that impresses me is that in the ghetto, the overwhelming majority of black citizens are, in fact, law abiding. They do want better and more effective law enforcement. They still support this legal and political system. It is also clear, however—by any evaluation of the statistics—that many are beginning to lose faith. Look at the voting results. After 31 primaries, not much more than 20 percent of the voters cast a ballot. Voter participation, black and white, in presidential elections has been declining steadily since 1968. The evidence shows more people violating the law. But more important, more people are beginning to turn away, to lose respect for government and those of us involved in law enforcement. This is more dangerous, potentially, than the so-called juvenile crime wave and the increase in the crime rate.

As long as organized crime continues to flourish, as long as the importation and circulation of drugs continue in this country, as long as we have an uncoordinated and non-working federal and local crime control policy, there is no way—even with the few programs that are advocated and supported by the majority of us—that we are ever going to get a handle on crime. We must look at the inequities in the economic system that trap people in the ghetto and which pro-

duce youngsters who take a criminal approach to escape their inadequate economic status. They are said to be different from youngsters who grew up in another generation.

Are we prepared to challenge a society that tells a youngster in every way he can be told, that he is now not needed? That his skills cannot be used in this technological system? That unskilled labor is no longer necessary? He watches his older brothers and sisters who went to school. They are now unemployed. He knows of the phenomenon of Ph.D's driving cabs in every major city of the country. He is prepared to recognize his fate and a social attitude that says, "To stand on the corner nowadays, you ought to have Florsheim shoes and a cashmere sweater to go with them." This emphasis in our society spells out to many youngsters that they will have to do their own thing. It results, frequently, in the kinds of crime problems that are challenging each of you in your own jurisdictions.

Any discussion about how we are going to pull the black community out of this increasing rate of criminal activity will be useless—unless we look beyond the law enforcement system itself. Now this, it seems to me, calls for a reckoning. We need to have an end to the myths that control and dominate the thinking about crime in this country.

One of these myths, spoken of frequently by Judge George Crockett in Detroit criminal court, is that judges have some responsibility for reducing the rate of crime. He points out an elemental fact many of us forget: the judge in the courtroom has the responsibility of making sure that an accused person has a fair trial. If he is guilty, punish him.

But five years or ten years of mandatory sentences will not solve the problem.

Unless we are willing to build more prisons (and most people are unwilling to do so, and most legislators are unwilling to sponsor such a move) we have to approach the problem somewhere else. Many law enforcement officers are beginning to say much the same thing. I think we have a responsibility to analyze it.

If we had more cops out in the street, would we be able to cut back crime? Well, LEAA has studies that show that in some places where police officers went out on strike, the rate of crime went down during the period they were off. There is plenty of evidence to show that the redeployment of law enforcement people would have a lot more to do with effectively reducing the crime rate than merely adding more and more police. "More police, more police," has been a song and dance which has gone on for the last 20 years, at least. But

police officers are beginning to say that they can't stop crime. Police officers try to apprehend criminals. A police officer's function cannot affect the attitude of citizens who are not cooperating.

And so I come upon a central point that I think all of us should be able to agree upon, regardless of what our particular philosophies might be: until we involve citizens and communities and community organizations far more in the anticrime fight, we are not ever going to be able to deal effectively with this situation. We have citizens who have been begging, law enforcement agencies, and especially the police to let them cooperate. I think that we must demystify, not only law enforcement, but the entire legal system; not just the criminal justice system—the entire legal system in which we find ourselves. We must open it up so that the 3,500 police officers trying to regulate effectively a population of 1.3 million will be able to develop friends in the community.

I succeeded this year in getting a provision in the LEAA Re-Authorization Bill, J.R. 13636, which mandates the agency to establish an office which will give special emphasis to getting community organizations involved in many ways. The complexity of the LEAA system of grants and grantsmanship has usually excluded many of the citizens who did not have a lawyer or were not able to get a politician to walk their applications through all the many obstacles. What we want to do, and must do, is simplify that process. Not that every community in America has to have an LEAA grant, but we must begin to show all our citizens that they are partners; show them more than just a policeman's field day, or an open house at the local precinct. We have to make sure that everybody who wants to cooperate with law enforcement at any level has that opportunity. I claim they have not had that opportunity, especially in the black community.

I cannot conclude my statement here without saying to you that we live in a racist society. That "official" finding was made many years ago, but we don't hear it much anymore. We lived in a racist society then, in the 1960's when the statement was made. We do now. Law enforcement is particularly affected by racism in our society. The testimony about racism inherent in law enforcement and the experiences of all of you here could fill many volumes in the Library of Congress.

The clearest and the most aggravating example, of course, is the failure of law enforcement agencies to integrate their forces, even when people, at the same time, are calling for increased cooperation between the black community and its police. There are very few

jurisdictions in which the police are represented in proportion to the ethnic composition of their jurisdictions.

This situation is worsened during a recession when, as occurred in Detroit, we had a police disturbance in the federal court, in the Federal Building, over the question of how we were going to reduce the number of officers and still not exacerbate the already poor racial ratio in the Department. We need to further enforce the mechanisms that will lead to increased recruiting and, of course, to increased promotions.

I have been one of the most severe critics of LEAA. In the eight or nine years of its existence, the agency has spent $4.5 billion on what is largely regarded as a pork-barrel operation. LEAA has had little impact, if any, on the reduction of crime in this country. I say that as the Chairman of the subcommittee that has had oversight responsibility for LEAA—the subcommittee on crime. I am the first to acknowledge that Congress has not "oversighted" LEAA since 1968, when it was created. I think that underscores the nature of the problem confronting us. We need to make many of those LEAA programs more effective. LEAA has a research institute and action grants, and we have states that have never seen a black person in any responsible position dealing with the administration of these programs. We have a system that has never, on its own, suspended any grant for operations accused of discrimination. The only example that comes immediately to mind is the situation in Chicago. The Chicago police grant was interrupted by federal court order and, even there, we have had a lot of problems. Although we are hiring more black officers, we still have not reached the real problem of promoting the middle-grade officers and the upper grade officers who are eligible for promotion. The court order has not addressed itself to that question.

If we dare to talk about the myths that we know are false, if we examine the whole question of community involvement, if we begin to demystify law and law enforcement, if we address the whole question of that economic underclass in America that has been systematically excluded from all the amenities of the economy of this country, it seems to me that we will then be in a position to make that new beginning in reducing crime often talked about, but never undertaken.

It's in that spirit that I join your deliberations and commend each and every one of you for spending these two days here—days that I hope will bring the promise of justice and equality, not only to the poor and to black Americans, but to every person in this country.

Chapter 2
Crime as a Concern of City Hall

Maynard Jackson

I am concerned that as we view the realities of this nation from Afro-America's perspective, the old familiar faces of despair, hunger, unemployment, and high crime rates are still very apparent. It is my belief that if this country were able to bring about a meaningful, effective relationship between its police officers and the members of the black community, the underlying social conditions giving rise to much of the crime in our communities still would not be altered in any substantial way. This is a reality which must be understood by those who are the movers and shakers of government policy and social programs.

A crook is a crook is a crook. Race or color is no exemption. Neither, however, should race raise a presumption of criminality. It is within the context of this reality that I wish to direct the thrust of my presentation. I believe that many of the issues facing the art of policing flow from how we have been conditioned to perceive the isssues of crime and criminality. One of the things I recall from a course in logic that I took as an undergraduate at Morehouse College is that if the premise is wrong, then all that follows from it is wrong. In the context of crime, criminality and law enforcement in this country, this idea has a particularly relevant role. Our premise must be the *truth*, not the myths under which we suffer.

In fashioning America's myth about crime and criminality, we have: 1) selectively chosen from an abundance of evidence and information which highlights black participation in the criminal arena; 2) we have used and continue to use those data as the basis for making

Maynard Jackson *was elected mayor of Atlanta, Georgia, in 1973. He is the youngest man and the first black ever to hold that office. Mayor Jackson received his L.L.B. cum laude from North Carolina Central University Law School in 1964. He began his legal career as General Attorney for the National Labor Relations Board, Region 10. He was founder and former senior partner of Jackson, Patterson, Park and Franklin, Georgia's first black law firm, established in January, 1970.*

an ultimate statement of the truth and reality of crime in this country; 3) we have cultivated an environment through the press and other forms of mass media which promotes aspects of crime that tend to give support to the myth that blackness and criminality are synonymous terms; and because of the above, 4) we have aggravated the crime problem by breeding distrust and disrespect in one sector of the community. And, in another sector of the community, we have protected some criminality through a policy of benign neglect, leniency, and criminal cover-up.

Perhaps another way of stating the above is to say that the drama of black crime and criminality unfolds itself in the context known in the social sciences as the self-fulfilling prophecy. Much of what we think and feel about crime and the black community is interwoven unrelentingly and inextricably with this concept. Perceptions and preconceptions about criminals-as-blacks become reality because those aspects of reality that support the belief are recognized officially and dramatized; and significant institutions in our society respond and react to them in ways that sustain such views.

I contend that as long as the nature of the crime problem is confused with the group of people that has been officially, but erroneously, identified primarily or exclusively with it, we can only expect—at best—a shadowboxing with the symptoms rather than a meaningful attempt to address the root causes of crime.

While I have no intention of minimizing the importance of coming to grips with the ugly octopus of crime (including black-on-black crime, whose tentacles touch all of us in some way) I am also concerned that the nature of the reaction—given America's racial perception of the criminal—not be a worse problem than crime itself. This is a very critical concern that is not without some basis.

Who is "the criminal?" I am quite sure that you have come up with several definitions. But whatever those definitions are, for the most part, they automatically exclude any reference to "the average American" as being a criminal; and I hope that your conclusions are justifiable. I imagine that some of you have concluded that a criminal is somehow a different kind of person than "the average American;" someone who is qualitatively different; someone who can be dismissed as a nonperson and who, therefore, rightfully is deserving of any kind of treatment he or she gets. Certainly, if the criminal is defined as a nonperson, an object, an animal, the kinds of social policies and strategies we put together to deal with him or her will reflect such an attitude. Perhaps this is why many of us have very little concern about the conditions that characterize prison life;

about what happens to those who are released from prison and try to establish or re-establish ties with the conventional world. Indeed, because too many Americans wrongly, automatically have characterized those who inhabit the ghettoes, the barrios and the reservations as amoral, evil and nasty, we also expect them to do evil, amoral and nasty things. "That is just the way they are" becomes a justification for doing nothing about the objective material conditions of their lives, and a justification for not seeing them as a part of the human family. This attitude invariably leads us to treating them as though they are not human beings.

Let us—for the sake of discussion—define a criminal as one who has committed an act that is in violation of a criminal law. An interesting exercise that one of my college professor friends has done on occasions when he teaches a criminology course is to ask each student to write down five or six acts that he or she has committed in violation of the law. Then he collects the pieces of paper and reads back what they have written. It sounds like a lightweight roll call in San Quentin. Like many "average Americans," they either had not been caught, or had parents who knew someone with clout. Perhaps what becomes clear here is that there may be no qualitative difference between the "average American" and many people sitting in state prisons tonight; that nothing and no one is intrinsically criminal; that criminality has a definition applied by individuals with the power to do so.

The entire public dialogue about crime, criminality and law and order is based almost entirely on crime statistics gathered by the FBI and issued annually as the "Uniform Crime Reports." Usually, the contents of the reports provide ammunition for right-wing extremists who scream about the Supreme Court coddling criminals and other "lenient" aspects of our criminal justice system. More important, the content of the reports compels one to understand why criminality and blackness are perceived improperly by some as synonymous terms.

If one is told that an overwhelming proportion of people who are arrested are black and that the population of the jails and prisons is predominantly and increasingly drawn from the black community, one is forced to conclude that the argument suggesting that blackness and criminality can be used interchangeably has apparent—although mistaken—merit. So profound is the connection that it is extremely easy to find someone—black or white—who automatically will conjure up images of a black male when asked to provide the portrait of "a criminal."

There are at least two basic problems with the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). First, the UCR is a gross underestimation of the actual crime rate. A survey taken by the President's Crime Commission shows that, by the most conservative standards, the actual crime rate is at least double or triple the rate reported by the FBI.

Relative to the focus of this presentation, the second problem that the UCR poses is the more important one. The UCR does not take into consideration the phenomena of organized crime and white-collar crime. Organized crime scarcely gets counted in crime statistics, despite the fact that its actual yield in profits is in the billions of dollars.

White-collar crime normally is not counted as crime, even when it is specifically known to officials. White-collar crime is crime committed by corporations, and by business and professional people in the course of their occupation. Such information as is available—though not systematically compiled—indicates that white-collar crime is pervasive in our society and causes enormous economic and social harm. Congressional investigations have turned up indications of widespread unethical and illegal behavior in various industries.

The exclusion of organized criminal activities and white-collar activities from the UCR drastically underestimates the amount of crime taking place. Another effect of this highly selective mode of recording criminality is to paint a false picture of who or what the criminal is. Such recording leads to a distortion of what crime is all about.

The official picture counts those kinds of behavior that just happen to be peculiar to certain groups. One observer speaks to the implications of this selective approach by saying:

"The middle-class executive, for example, is not likely to commit burglary. He doesn't need to. But price fixing is within his realm of possibility. Laws restricting this kind of conduct exist—true. They are, however, loosely formulated and seldom enforced—partly because it is difficult to do so. The frequency of this criminal conduct may actually be much higher than that of burglary or other forms of conduct typical of the powerless classes. But it is rarely noticed or counted. One can wonder why. Indeed, one can only imagine what patterns would appear in crime rates were the powerless able to determine what is to be recorded. But then they would no longer be powerless."

The kinds of crimes committed by members of the social groups being discussed here are compatible with their position in the social structure. By definition, unemployed people cannot commit white-

collar crimes. Middle-class executives and professionals have rare need to commit such crimes as robbery and burglary when they can fix prices or embezzle money.

There is no qualitative difference between the two types of perpetrators. Their relative positions in the social structure dictate the kinds of instruments used to achieve their ends. One is able to use the pen, the other has to use the gun. If the latter thought he could achieve his or her ends without the gun, he or she would. If the former had to use the gun to avoid detection, he or she would.

The real difference lies, of course, in the political arena. One group has the power to make rules and to single out for differential treatment those who are defined as being different, powerless and morally susceptible.

Everyone knows, blacks especially, that 1) upper-class persons who commit crimes frequently are able to escape arrest and conviction because their money and social position make them more powerful politically; and 2) laws that apply exclusively to business and to the professions, and which therefore involve nonpoor people, seldom are dealt with by the criminal courts. Of course, everyone knows that people who commit traditional crimes are dealt with more harshly than those who commit white-collar crimes.

In a case involving the Sherman Antitrust Act, the executives of seven electrical manufacturing corporations were convicted of a price conspiracy involving over one billion dollars. They were each sentenced to thirty days in jail. Meanwhile, seemingly drastic sentences were meted out to poor people convicted of crimes in the streets. A man in Asbury Park, New Jersey, for instance, was convicted of stealing a $2.98 pair of sunglasses and a dollar box of soap. He was sent to jail for four months. Joseph Sills in Dallas, Texas, was sentenced to 1,000 years in prison for stealing $73.10. The list goes on and on. These are just a few illustrations of the uneven severity of the criminal justice system, when applied to poor people.

It is apparent to me that if any meaningful inroads are to be made in controlling the problem of crime in the black community, discriminatory application of the law must be stopped. It is not only blatantly unfair, but it is increasingly difficult for minority communities to accept a criminal justice system that is lenient toward and protective of the criminality of one sector, including the Ford-pardoned Richard M. Nixon, while being severe toward and overdramatizing the criminality of another sector of the community. The implication of a growing disrespect for the law and for law enforcement personnel is all too obvious.

The above situation not only fans the flames of racism, it also aggravates the crime problem by breeding and heightening distrust and disrespect of the law in communities already having more than their share of problems, while indulging and shielding the criminality of some in the upper circles of our society.

I join hands with those who advocate a need for a definition of crime that moves away from the presentation of a social order that is built on inequality; a definition that moves away from protecting those engaged in sustaining conditions of inequality and human misery.

We need a definition that says crime includes, but is not limited to, a violation by anyone of basic human rights—the right to decent food, shelter and human dignity. Under this definition, any individual who is engaged in denying these rights would be a criminal; and *any* situation or condition which causes the abrogation of these rights would be seen as a crime.

The latest attempt to give this view some programmatic substance in my city—Atlanta—includes the waging of a campaign against slumlords who are engaged in generating and sustaining living conditions that are unfit for dogs. It is only by taking such bold strokes, and by making the objective social conditions under which people live the target of social policy, that the most significant intrusions on the problems of crime in the African-American community can be achieved.

The unwillingness to bring the resources of our nation to bear upon the negative social conditions that too frequently characterize African-American communities not only constitutes a form of social entrapment, it also helps to guarantee that new generations of youngsters will find the pathway to becoming part of society's records of criminal statistics. Our collective charge is to enforce the opportunity for equal justice under law for all as a major part of our war against crime.

PART III
CRIME IN THE
BLACK COMMUNITY

Chapter 3
Causes of Crime

Lee P. Brown

Many of our cities are becoming predominantly black. For example, according to the 1960 U.S. Census, there were only three predominantly black communities in the United States, all in the South. In 1970, however, the number of communities with a population over 25,000 having a black majority, had increased to 16, ten of which were outside the South (Tables 1 and 2).

TABLE 1
Gains in Black Population in Urban Centers

| | Percent Black | | |
	1950	1960	1970
New York	9.5	14.0	21.2
Chicago	13.6	22.9	32.7
Detroit	16.2	28.9	43.7
Philadelphia	18.2	26.4	33.6
Washington	35.0	53.9	71.1
Los Angeles	8.7	13.5	17.9
Baltimore	23.7	34.7	46.4
Cleveland	16.2	28.6	38.3
St. Louis	18.0	28.6	40.9
Newark	17.1	34.1	54.2

Source: Louis A. Radelet, *The Police and the Community: Studies* (Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press, 1973), p. 102.

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TABLE 2
16 Communities Where Whites Are Outnumbered

Community	Total Population	Percent Black
Willowbrook, Calif.*	28,705	82.3
Westmont, Calif.*	29,310	80.6
Washington, D.C.	756,510	71.1
Compton, Calif.	78,611	71.0
East St. Louis, Ill.	69,996	69.1
Florence-Graham, Calif.*	42,895	56.0
Highland Park, Mich.	35,444	55.3
Petersburg, Va.	36,103	55.2
Newark, N.J.	382,417	54.2
East Orange, N.J.	75,471	53.1
Gary, Ind.	175,415	52.8
Bessemer, Ala.	33,428	52.2
Greenville, Miss.	39,648	52.0
Atlanta, Ga.	496,973	51.3
Prichard, Ala.	41,578	50.5

*Unincorporated Places

Source: Louis A. Radelet, The Police and the Community: Studies (Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press, 1973), p. 102.

Based on 1970 Census data, we find that over 25 cities have black populations of over 100,000 (Table 3). Although blacks do not constitute a majority in all of these cities, the number of blacks constitutes a significant factor for urban America. It is estimated that by 1980, at least 50 of the nation's large cities will have a majority black population.[1]

The trend shown by the above figures clearly illustrates the fact that blacks are becoming an increasingly urban people. Whereas blacks comprise about 12 percent of the nation's population, approximately 58 percent of the nation's blacks live in urban areas, compared with about 28 percent for whites.

What is the significance of this phenomenon? First—as pointed out previously—crime is a predominantly urban problem. Blacks are basically urban people. Therefore, we can logically conclude that the crime problem is a problem of great significance for the black community.

Second, as blacks form a majority in our large cities, they will be electing black mayors. Already, of the 25 cities with over 100,000 blacks, 6 have black mayors (Detroit, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Newark, Cleveland and Washington, D.C.). When this happens, it is also logical to assume that the black mayors will appoint black chiefs of police.

TABLE 3
25 Cities That Have 100,000 or More Blacks

City	Black Population	Black as a Percent of Total
New York	1,666,636	21.2
Chicago	1,102,620	32.7
Detroit*	660,428	43.7
Philadelphia	653,791	33.6
Washington*	537,712	71.1
Los Angeles*	503,606	17.9
Baltimore	420,210	46.4
Houston	316,551	25.7
Cleveland	287,841	38.3
New Orleans	267,308	45.0
Atlanta*	255,051	51.3
St. Louis	254,191	40.9
Memphis	242,513	38.9
Dallas	210,238	24.9
Newark*	207,458	54.2
Indianapolis	134,320	18.0
Birmingham	126,388	42.0
Cincinnati	125,070	27.6
Oakland, Calif.	124,710	34.5
Jacksonville	118,158	22.3
Kansas City, Mo.	112,005	22.1
Milwaukee	105,088	14.7
Pittsburgh	104,904	20.2
Richmond, Va.	104,766	42.0
Boston	104,707	16.3

*Have black mayors.

Source: Louis A. Radelet, The Police and the Community: Studies (Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press, 1973), p. 102.

Although Atlanta has a black commissioner of public safety and Newark has a black director of police, none of the 25 cities with more than 100,000 blacks has a black chief of police.

Third, the statistics suggest that blacks—particularly black police administrators—must develop new approaches to the age-old problem of crime, and speak specifically to the problem in the black community. If black police administrators are to make a contribution beyond that of their white counterparts, they must address the problems of the black community by advancing proposals that are realistic and that will work, given the realities in both black and white communities.

Finally, because the urban problem, the crime problem, and the race problem are closely related, black police administrators must be afforded the opportunity to influence public policy.

Out of this conference will emerge, I hope, a different and innovative frame of reference for addressing the problem of crime in our cities. To be of benefit, this new frame of reference must transcend the boundaries established by those who traditionally influence public policy on the crime issue. It is important for us to develop new approaches to the crime problem. We must be aggressive in establishing public policy relative to crime and the black community. We can no longer depend solely on a small number of white academicians and practitioners such as James Q. Wilson and Edward Davis to conceptualize for us, because they heretofore have provided only a narrow frame of reference that does not reflect totally the interests of the black community. They have not provided viable solutions. It is time we say to the Wilsons and Davises of the nation that there is a lifestyle in our black communities that cannot be visualized by armchair philosophers.

I am not suggesting that whites cannot or have not made contributions to the problem of crime. I am suggesting that those contributions have been limited and it is now time for blacks, particularly black criminal justice practitioners, to develop our own strategies for addressing the problem of crime. Our refusal or inability to do so represents a drastic disservice to the nation. Who is in a better position to develop new techniques for controlling crime in the black community than black police officials? Black police deal with the problem of crime on a daily basis from the vantage point of the black experience. I submit that there are certain aspects of the issue of crime and the black community that make it difficult, if not impossible, for nonblacks to understand and thereby conceptualize the problem.

I shall return to this point later in my presentation. Let it suffice to say at this time that during the two days we are here, we have the unique opportunity to establish new directions for our concern about the problem of crime, its impact on the black community, and methods of prevention and control.

The Extent of Crime Among Blacks

There are essentially two methods of measuring crime in this country: (1) The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) as published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and (2) Victimization Studies as con-

ducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. For a moment, let's examine what these two sources have to say about the extent of crime in the black community.

As you know, the oldest and most publicized source of crime statistics is the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Information contained in these reports is voluntarily reported to the FBI by local law enforcement agencies. Although many criticisms are leveled at the UCR's, they are influential because the FBI has long been the central repository for crime data in the United States. The UCR's, however, do not provide an exact measure of crime in America. Instead, they provide an annual reflection of those crimes reported to the police, as reported to the FBI by the police. I am sure we are all aware of certain inequities in this system, particularly in the numbers and types of crimes reported. But because of its influence, the UCR cannot be neglected.

In examining crime for the year 1975—as reported by the FBI—we find that in 1975, of those arrested for violent crimes, 47.1 percent were black. In the case of property crimes, 29.6 percent of those arrested were black. In the cities, blacks accounted for 52.1 percent of all arrests for violent crimes, and 32.2 percent of all property crimes.[2]

It is also important to note that in 1975, of those arrested 26 percent were under the age of 18, 42 percent under 21 and 57 percent were under 25. For all serious crimes, 43 percent were under the age of 18.

We must use FBI statistics cautiously. For example, they do not give an accurate picture of the crime problem. Often the figures presented to the FBI are not accurate. The FBI itself admits that it does not screen police reports and cautions against inappropriate comparisons. The UCR's only tell about arrests and do not report on the disposition of the cases.

A more accurate method of assessing the extent of crime in America is obtained through victimization surveys conducted for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration by the U.S. Bureau of Census. Victimization studies provide a more accurate picture of the crime problem because they do not rely on incidents of crime reported to the police—rather, information is obtained by conducting personal interviews with individuals in a representative sample of households and commercial firms about their experiences with selected crimes of violence and theft.

"As these victimization surveys continue, they are expected to supply criminal justice officials with new insights into crime, its victims, and the impact of criminal behavior on society. The surveys also furnish a means for developing profiles of victims and, for certain sectors of society, indicating the relative risk of being victimized. Victimization surveys can distinguish between stranger-to-stranger crime and domestic violence, and between armed and strongarm assaults and robberies. They can tally some of the costs of crime in terms of injury or economic loss sustained and they provide a basis for understanding why certain criminal acts are not reported to law enforcement authorities."[3]

The first victimization survey was conducted for the year 1973. It revealed that "blacks were more likely than whites to have been victims of personal crimes . . ."[4] The victimization rate for black males (85 per 1,000) was higher than that for white males (75 per 1,000).[5]

The survey showed that blacks were more likely than whites to have been the victims of rape, robbery and assault. Similarly, black males were more likely than white males to have been victims of aggravated assault.[6]

Regarding property crimes, black households had a higher burglary rate than white households in all income groups. The same was true for larceny. Also, blacks with incomes over $10,000 had a higher rate of victimization for motor vehicle theft.

The results of this survey clearly pointed out that "the typical crime victim is . . . black. He is a young black male—and a poor, undereducated black male at that."[7]

In comparing the results of the 1973 survey with results of the 1974 survey, it was found that "there was a marginally significant decrease of 14 percent in the victimization rate for blacks in the area of personal crimes of violence."[8] There was, however, no significant change in the victimization rate for blacks for personal crimes of theft and household crimes.[9]

In a 1972 study of crime victims in Chicago, conducted by LEAA, it was found that "four out of every 1,000 black women had been raped, eight out of every 1,000 blacks had been robbed and injured during the crime, and 30 out of every 1,000 blacks had been robbed without injury. According to Chicago Police Department statistics, 803 blacks were killed in that city during 1973, compared to 127 whites."[10]

Another characteristic of crime is "the poorer a person is the more likely he or she has or will become a crime victim. And in 1972, 34 percent of all blacks had incomes below the poverty level, compared to just 10 percent of all whites."[11]

The disproportionate impact of crime on the black community also can be demonstrated by the results of surveys of jails and prisons.

A jail survey was conducted in 1972 and revealed that 42 percent of all inmates were black. This represented a total of 58,000 persons, out of a total of 141,600.

In addition, the survey showed that of the blacks confined in jails throughout the nation, almost 70 percent had not completed high school, 46 percent had been earning less than $2,000 a year when arrested, and another 12 percent had been earning less than $3,000 a year.[12]

An examination of the composition of state prisons reveals a similar pattern. An inmate census of state prisons conducted in 1973 for LEAA showed that about 48 percent of all prisoners were black. Of those, at least 64 percent had not completed high school. Fifty-two percent were under 25 and 75 percent were under 30 years of age.[13]

If we examine individual states, the pattern is clear. For example, in the State of Oregon about 12 percent of the inmate population in the state prison is black. But blacks constitute only about 3 percent of the state's population.

To be even more specific, we can look at the county in which I work. Multnomah County has a 4 percent black population, yet 22 percent of those arrested there are black. In other words, blacks are arrested up to 6 times their proportion in the population. Equally disturbing is the fact that about 18 percent of those committed to the Oregon State Prison from Multnomah County are black.

The conclusion that crime is a major problem in the black community is evident from these statistics. These statistics, however, do not tell us anything about the nature of the problem. What is the economic impact of crime on the black community? What are the social and psychological consequences for the black community? The answers are generally unknown because there is a dearth of information on this subject. But, answers are essential for the development of strategies to control crime and policies to prevent it.

Assessing the impact of crime on the black community is not a simple task. The issue, however, can be addressed from several levels.

"One can distinguish between economic and social, including psychological, consequences. This, in effect, is not a dichotomy but an operational means of facilitating analysis by dealing with two sides of the coin. There are, however, other juxtapositions. One may, for example, speak of direct and indirect side-effects; immediate and long-range or ultimate consequences; visible and hidden costs; macro-effects and micro-effects; public and private costs; material costs and intangibles, such as the psycho-social climate, which may be difficult to quantify.

"Moreover, the question may be asked: consequences for whom or for what? For the individual or for society at large? For the victim or the offender, or both, and including their families? For the economy or lifestyle of the population? For the rate of crime or the operation of the agents of control? The focus will evidently vary according to viewer and perspective, and what may seem harmful to one may seem tolerable or even beneficial to another."[14]

We may begin to assess the economic impact of crime by examining the total cost of crime in the United States. A recent report estimated that in 1974, the cost of crime in America was approximately $88.6 billion. This was an increase over an estimated $51 billion in 1970. In addition, it is estimated that white-collar crimes cost Americans anywhere from $40 billion to $200 billion per year (Table 4).[15]

It is quite clear that the cost of crime is staggering. In fact,

"the economic impact of crime hits everybody, in every class of society and in all parts of the country. In addition to personal losses suffered by the victim, crime adds to the price of almost everything people use, either directly or indirectly. And it hikes tax bills."[16]

It has been estimated that crime costs approximately $420 per person per year in the United States.[17] Just as criminal activity disproportionately affects the black community, so does its cost; a point which most certainly merits examination.

Although it is difficult to measure the economic impact of crime on the black community with precision, a tentative picture can be obtained by examining some work done by Andrew F. Brimmer

TABLE 4

Cost of Crime	Organized Crime	Billions of Dollars
Total take by organized crime from illegal goods and services:	Gambling	30.0
	Narcotics	5.2
	Hijacked Goods	1.5
	Interest from Loan Sharking	0.5
$37.2 billion		
Crimes against property and business:	Embezzlement, Fraud, Forgery	7.0
	Kickbacks Paid by Businesses	5.0
	Unreported Business Thefts	5.0
	Robbery, Burglary, Theft, Shoplifting	3.0
	Vandalism, Arson	1.3
$21.3 billion		
Other Crimes:	Homicides, Assaults (Loss of Earnings, Medical Costs)	3.0
	Drunken Driving (Wage Loss, Medical Costs of Victims, Property Damage)	6.5
$ 9.5 billion		
Criminal Justice System:	Police (Federal, State, Local)	8.6
	Penal System	3.2
	Court System	2.8
$14.6 billion		
Private Crime-Fighting		
$ 6.0 billion		
	Total Crime Cost	88.6

Source: "Economic and Social Consequences of Crime: New Challenges for Research and Planning." (Working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, Switzerland, September 1-12, 1975), p. 4.

while he was a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Table 5).

Dr. Brimmer's estimates were based on information prepared for the 1967 Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. He estimated that in 1965 (the year the data were gathered for the Crime Commission's report) for the six categories of crimes listed in Table 5, the cost to blacks was about $2.3 billion. That figure represented 11 percent of the Commission's estimate of the $21 billion cost to the nation as a whole. The figures were based on the estimate that blacks constituted about 10 percent of the nation's population.

TABLE 5
Estimated Costs of Crime to the Black Community, 1965
(Millions of Dollars)

Type of Crime	Estimated Cost to Nation as a Whole	Estimated Share of the Black Community	
		Percent of Total	Amount
Crimes against persons (loss of income, etc.)	815	15	122
Crimes against property (transfers and losses)	3,932	15	590
Other crimes (driving under influence of alcohol, tax fraud, abortion)	2,036	10	204
Illegal goods and services	8,075	11	915
Gambling	7,000	10	700
Others (narcotics, loan-sharking, etc.)	1,075	20	215
Public law enforcement and criminal justice	4,212	7	295
Private costs related to crime (prevention devices, etc.)	1,910	8	153
TOTAL	20,980	11	2,279

Source: Andrew F. Brimmer, "An Economic Agenda for Black Americans," (a. speech delivered at the Charter Day Convocation Celebrating the One Hundred and Fifth Anniversary of Atlanta University, Atlanta, Georgia, October, 1970).

Converting his figures to 1969 rates, Brimmer estimated that in 1969—because of inflation—crime cost the black community about $3 billion of the $25 billion it cost the nation as a whole. That represented 10 percent of the aggregate family income for blacks in 1969, as compared with less than 5 percent of the aggregate family income for the nation as a whole.

In 1974, the cost of crime in the black community was still higher. For example, it was estimated that blacks comprised about 12 percent of the nation's population in 1974. Using a very conservative estimate, blacks bear about 15 percent of the nation's crime costs. As stated previously, crime cost the nation approximately $88.6 billion in 1974. Thus, crime would have cost the black community approxi-

mately $13.29 billion in 1974. Considering the rate of inflation between 1974 and 1976, crime today is even more costly to the black community.

Brimmer concludes:

"In presenting these estimates of the costs of crime, I am attempting to sketch a broad overview; the impact of crime on individuals and families cannot be captured in statistics. Nevertheless, I think it is important to emphasize that a significant share of the hard-earned income and a sizable proportion of the wealth that the black community has struggled to accumulate are being dissipated through the wastage of criminal offenses. Moreover, the cost of crime is by no means evenly distributed in the nation at large. Instead, the poorest members are far more likely to be victims—especially in cases of personal violence. Thus, the segments of the black population which can least bear the costs of crime are most often forced to carry a disproportionate share of what amounts to a criminally imposed levy."[18]

Brimmer also addressed the impact of crime on black businesses. He concluded that:

"The situation of the average black businessman is equally distressing. Typically, he is a small-scale operator engaged in the provision of personal services or in low-margin retailing in the ghetto. The direct losses suffered by many of these merchants are extremely heavy. This is especially true of the retail field, in which many black businessmen are concentrated. For example, the President's Commission estimated that losses in the retail field associated with crimes (such as shoplifting, employee theft, etc.) may amount to as much as 2 percent of the value of all retail sales. Since after-tax profit margins tend to be thin in these lines (frequently in the range of 4 to 6 percent), this means that the crime toll may be eroding more than one-third of the net earnings of many black businessmen. Moreover, these figures do not include losses due to robbery—which are known to inflict a staggering tariff on ghetto businessmen. With blacks taking over from whites more and more ghetto establishments, they are bearing an increasing share of the costs of crime. In fact, a significant proportion of failures—particularly among recently launched black businesses—can be traced to some extent to the adverse impact of crimes against them."[19]

In April of 1973, *Black Enterprise* devoted an entire issue to "Crime and Black Business." Pat Patterson, editor of the publication, succinctly placed the problem in focus:

"No one yet has been able accurately to measure its costs. There is the dwindling market that results because of location and the lower sales occasioned by shorter store hours. There are the rising costs of increased security and the ever-present dread of that moment when a robbery could cost one his business or even his life. If the cost of crime can be approximated, no one yet has been able to measure the cost of fear."[20]

Tom Bradley, Mayor of Los Angeles, addressed the practical implications of crime for the economy of a city. He made the following statement before the 1976 National Urban League Conference:

"Let me describe some situations in far too many neighborhoods and communities in my own city. As I do, remember that the conditions are often far worse in many other cities in the country.

"The flight to the suburbs of some businesses and industries has left blocks of abandoned buildings with broken windows and gutted interiors.

"As these firms left, they took thousands of jobs—often too far away for the black employees to follow.

"The abandoned buildings become attractive nuisances, and encourage more vandalism and destruction. This added to a process of blight and deterioration that had an effect upon the businesses which remained.

"The physical and psychological impact on those who remained was devastating.

"The nearby residential neighborhoods began to see boarded-up, abandoned houses. Those who cared about their property got out, if they could.

"The blight swept through entire neighborhoods like a destructive cyclone.

"Store after store, shop after shop, business after business—large and small—closed or moved.

"Sears closed what had been one of its busiest stores after five years of steadily rising losses. These losses were the result of theft and vandalism at their store and a steady erosion of the nearby commercial and residential neighborhoods.

"That closing had a domino effect upon adjacent smaller stores which both fed traffic to Sears as well as survived off customers who came to the area to shop at Sears.

"The economic loss, direct and indirect, was devastating. The physical impact destructive and the psychological effect indescribable.

"The losses through vandalism and fear of crime at night caused most of the theaters and other places of entertainment to close.

"Businesses and homes must install iron bars and gates on their windows to be sure their belongings will not be ripped off during the night.

"Many large supermarkets have closed or moved out because of staggering losses from shoplifting, bad checks or employee thefts.

"Walls and buildings are covered by ugly graffiti.

"Schools suffer the typical vandalism and break-ins experienced nationwide. I heard last week that the loss from vandalism alone was enough to buy all the books required in all the school systems in the country for a full year. What a waste!

"Some schools have become worse than jungles, unsafe for teachers or students, unfit for human habitation and unhealthy for a learning environment.

"Gang fights are daily—gang killings number almost a hundred in one city alone.

"Such neighborhoods thus become like wartime 'no man' lands. A place of terror and fear for old and young alike. A community already suffering from blight and high unemployment loses jobs, services and hope.

"The process is like a cycle from which there seems to be no escape."[21]

Detroit is another good example of a city that is suffering economically from the crime problem. Just recently, a number of conventions, which would have brought millions of dollars to the city, cancelled out due to the widespread publicity of teenage violence. Many other examples could be cited, but the point is clear—crime is having a devastating economic impact on our cities.

The negative effects of crime are not limited to economic considerations. While the economic cost is high, the social cost might very well be higher. "Freedom from want may become all but mean-

ingless if not accompanied by freedom from fear, and crime breeds fear."[22]

A national study conducted in 1972 showed that almost half (49 percent) of nonwhite respondents were afraid to walk alone at night.[23]

I was in Fresno, California, two weeks ago, and was appalled to see entire neighborhoods resembling fortresses of old. Not only were there bars on windows, but many homes had bars that covered entire doors. People were afraid to leave their homes and locked themselves in each night when they went to bed. Although such a procedure may increase security, it also increases fear. The absence of trust creates social isolation and prevents that interaction and solidarity necessary for the development of a sense of social well-being.

It is important for those of us involved in the administration of justice to recognize the psychological implications and consequences of fear. For example, studies have shown that in a one-year period, "accidents in homes throughout the world caused close to 24 million injuries, 4 million of which resulted in either temporary or permanent disabilities, as compared with some 100,000 from robberies,"[24] and the risk of death at the hand of strangers in the United States is less than one-third that of death by falling, and about one-eleventh that of death from automobile accidents.[25] Yet, the fear of injuries from home or traffic accidents in no way approaches the fear of crime.

The fact that crime is higher in black communities and "people find the idea of being injured in a violent encounter more frightening than being hurt in a traffic accident,"[26] has grave social and psychological consequences for the lifestyle of black people. The ever-present possibility of being victimized and the unpredictability of such victimization can succinctly be summed up as follows:

"Continuous uncertainty leads to chronic anxiety, tension and stress. Protracted reactions of stress are damaging to physical and mental health; socially chronic stress tends to produce increased aggressiveness and/or withdrawal (in different forms, including drug use) and the breakdown of interpersonal communication and subsequent alienation."[27]

The fact that there is a general lack of confidence in the ability of the criminal justice system to control successfully the crime problem further increases feelings of anxiety, helplessness and fear. The realities of the situation strongly suggest that this concern is not without

merit. Dr. A. C. Germann, a leading criminal justice educator, discussed the issue:

> "Some 10.1 million serious crimes (index offenses) were reported in 1974 in the Uniform Crime Reports, with a 21 percent clearance rate (identified and charged). On May 24, 1976, the Census Bureau, in a survey done for LEAA, said that there actually had been 39.6 million serious crimes in 1974. This means that a more accurate clearance rate for 1974 would have been 5.2 percent, and that of some 40 million serious crimes, only some 2 million were cleared. In other words, about 38 million of 40 million serious crimes are unaffected by the work of criminal justice institutions."[28]

Brief mention should also be made of the fact that the disproportionate distribution of crime is used for political purposes evidenced in "law and order" campaigns designed to obtain support and passage of repressive legislation having a negative effect on the poor and blacks. It increases insurance rates. It changes socialization patterns. It also creates a negative image of blacks as a group, in the majority of communities.

In sum, the poor, the powerless, the undereducated, the old and, especially, blacks, are more frequently the targets for all forms of crime—be it white-collar or street crime. Exploitation of the black community is a problem that black administrators must address.

Causes of Crime

To date, few, if any, of the theories relating to the etiology of crime are practical. Equally distressing is the fact that black scholars have neglected the problem of crime as a legitimate area of academic inquiry. Consequently, what we do know about crime in the black community comes primarily from white social scientists. Without attempting to present a definitive survey of the literature on causes of crime in the black community, let me briefly explore some of the more significant comments on the subject.

Professors Marvin Wolfgang and Bernard Cohen, authors of what is probably the most frequently cited study of race and crime,[29] quote Mozell Hill:

> "Negroes who live in blighted areas suffer deeply from discrimination, rejection and lack of integration into the society.

Juvenile delinquency among them is generated by this lack of integration rather than by a process of social disorganization. An increase in juvenile delinquency is likely to occur most frequently when and where aspirations of youth persist under conditions of limited and prescribed opportunities. Under such circumstances, access to success goals by legitimate means is seldom available to Negro youth in cities. They do not have opportunities for internalization of acceptable and respectable norms of conduct."[30]

Wolfgang and Curtis, in their study of criminal violence, addressed the disproportionate involvement of blacks in homicide, assault, rape and robbery. They concluded by proposing three strategies they thought could best serve to control those acts: (1) enrichment programs aimed at eliminating black unemployment and underemployment, (2) dispersal of the black populace out of the highly urbanized environment, and (3) desegregation (racial mixing).[31]

Thorsten Sellin wrote in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science:*

"Nothing ... points to a conclusion that the Negro's real criminality is lower or as low as the white's. The American Negro lacks education and earthly goods. He has had very little political experience and industrial training. His contact with city life has been unfortunate, for it has forced him into the most dilapidated and vicious areas of our great cities. Like a shadow over his whole existence lies the oppressive race prejudice of his white neighbor, restricting his activities and thwarting his ambitions. It would be extraordinary, indeed, if his group were to prove more law-abiding than the white, which enjoys more fully the advantages of a civilization the Negro has helped to create."[32]

Guy Johnson linked black crime with historical factors associated with the black experience in America. He felt that the degradation of slavery prevented the development of three conditions essential for normal group life, (1) stable family relations, (2) stable economic conditions, and (3) stable community life. Although there is some dispute over the significance of the correlation between economic conditions and crime, Johnson argued that economic considerations are important causative factors. He thought that discrimination within the criminal justice system also contributed to crime among blacks.[33]

Morris Forslund compared black and white crime rates. His explanation for black crime includes the following observations: (1) blacks are overrepresented in the high crime risk, lower socioeconomic strata, (2) blacks are overrepresented in high crime risk, younger age categories, (3) blacks lack opportunities to achieve their goals through legitimate means and (4) blacks are overrepresented in deteriorated, high crime sections of our cities, producing greater opportunities to learn criminal behavior patterns.[34]

Earl Moses, in a study of black and white crime rates, began with the assumption that most comparisons of black and white crime rates do not take into account differences in the socioeconomic status of the two groups. He argued that because of socioeconomic and racial prescriptions, blacks do not have the freedom of wholesome expression as compared with similarly situated white groups. Johnson concluded that greater criminality among blacks is derived from these differences.[35]

Robert Staples examined black crime based on the colonial model. He states that the essential features of colonialism are manifested in American society, resulting in the economic exploitation of blacks. Blacks are controlled politically and lack the ability to express their cultural values without incurring serious consequences. Black crime, according to Staples, is directly related to the fact that, "the racist fabric of white America denies blacks a basic humanity which permits the violations of their right to equal justice under the law. In America, the right to justice is an inalienable right; for blacks, it is still a privilege to be granted at the caprice and goodwill of whites who control the machinery of the legal system and the agents of social control."[36]

Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the United States—in a discussion of the nature and causes of crime—concluded that "probably four in five of all serious crimes flow from places of extreme poverty and most are inflicted on the people who live there."[37] More specifically, he attributed crime to the problems of poor education, unemployment, bad health, and inadequate housing.[38]

"If we are to control crime, we must undertake a massive effort to rebuild our cities and ourselves, to improve the human condition, to educate, employ, house and make healthy. And with the vastness of our growth and the immensity of change, we must move urgently."[39]

Patrick Murphy, president of the Police Foundation, made the

following statement before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress:

"From what I have observed during my years in policing, social and economic problems are interrelated. And the manifestations of chronic unemployment and these other problems are despair, violence, frustration and high crime rates."[40]

Not all police administrators are naive about the crime problem. Not all police administrators are afraid to speak up on the realities of crime. Robert DiGrazia (former) Boston Police Commissioner, said at the Police Foundation's Executive Forum on upgrading the police:

"There is one other thing few police chiefs are doing—leveling with the public about crime. Most of us are not telling the public that there is relatively little the police can do about crime. We are not letting the public in on our era's dirty little secret: that those who commit the crime which worries citizens most—violent, street crime—are, for the most part, the products of poverty, unemployment, broken homes, rotten education, drug addiction and alcoholism, and other social and economic ills about which the police can do little, if anything.

"Rather than speaking up, most of us stand silent and let politicians get away with law and order rhetoric that reinforces the mistaken notion that the police—in ever greater numbers and with ever more gadgetry—can alone control crimes (the politicians, of course, end up perpetuating a system by which the rich get richer, the poor get poorer and crime continues)."[41]

The President's Crime Commission made a similar finding when it reported:

"The findings have been remarkably consistent. Burglary, robbery and serious assaults occur in areas characterized by low income ... low levels of education and vocational skills, high unemployment ... and high population density."[42]

One of the nation's leading public policy authorities on the crime issue is Professor James Q. Wilson, a Harvard political scientist turned criminologist. In his most recent publication, *Thinking About Crime,* Wilson postulates the notion that a policy analysis, instead of a

causal approach, should underwrite a discussion of crime. Wilson writes:

> "Crime and drug addiction can only be dealt with by attacking their root causes. I am sometimes inclined, when in a testy mood, to rejoin: 'Stupidity can only be dealt with by attacking its root causes.' I have yet to see a 'root cause' or to encounter a governmental program that has successfully attacked it, at least with respect to those social problems that arise out of human volition rather than technological malfunction."[43]

In his book, Wilson acknowledges the fact that blacks are disproportionately represented in criminal statistics. He acknowledges the fact that blacks suffer from socioeconomic conditions more so than whites. But in his "thinking about crime," he fails to see a correlation between the relative deprivation of blacks and their disproportionate representation in criminal statistics.

If public policy makers were to take seriously Wilson's advice as to the proper approach to the crime problem, and many do, they would neglect the conditions that many believe to be the causes of crime and increase the institutionalization of offenders. Consequently, the blackness of our jails and prisons would increase greatly and there would be no programs designed to deal with the real problems.

Unfortunately, Wilson did not deem it important to address the issue of white-collar crime. He avoided the issue of gun control. He omitted a discussion of police corruption. Instead, his entire thesis dealt with what he called "predatory crime," e.g., robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft.

Wilson's book offers an important reason why we as blacks must address the problems of the black community. It is important in the field of law enforcement to recognize the influence of ideologies and social environment on policy decisions. This problem has long been recognized by researchers. John Huizinga placed the issue in its proper prospective when he wrote:

> "Scholarship is not realized in the individual in synthesis alone, but also in analysis. No true historical analysis is possible without the constant interpretation of meaning. In order to begin an analysis, there must already be a synthesis present in the mind. A conception of ordered coherence is an indispensable precondition even to the preliminary labor of digging and hewing."[44]

Could it be that Wilson has been preconditioned by his personal environment? I raise this question because his study of Boston home-owners showed that

"the issue which concerned more respondents than any other was variously stated—crime, violence, rebellious youth, racial tension, public immorality, delinquency. However stated, the common theme seemed to be a concern for proper behavior in public places."[45]

Wilson's advice to blacks, implicitly stated, is that if they are to be accepted, they must prove that they are not deviant. This message, though stated politely, is clear. Wilson says ". . . the suspicion of heterogeneity will only be overcome when a person proves by his actions that his distinctive characteristic [blackness] is not a sign of any disposition to violate the community's norms."[46]

Apparently he found his conclusion disturbing since he found it necessary to "take up explicitly the dark thoughts forming in the minds of some readers that this analysis is little more than an elabor-ate justification for prejudice . . ."[47] Then he naively reaches the conclusion that "much of what passes for 'race prejudice' today may be little more than class prejudice, with race used as a rough indica-tor of approximate social class."[48] He adds insult to injury by saying that "during the 1960s we were becoming two societies—one affluent and worried, the other pathological and predatory."[49] What does this mean? First, pathological means sick. Second, predatory means "disposed or showing a disposition to injure or exploit others for one's own gain."[50] One gives the Kerner Report's assessment of the Sixties, that we were moving toward two societies—one black and one white—Wilson's message becomes quite clear. Enough about Pro-fessor Wilson.

Policy Issues

Most of the studies summarized above concur in the opinion that crime in the black community is due in large part to the relative deprivation of blacks as a group.

Many blacks must cope with living conditions which are "crim-inal." It is my position that to deal effectively with crime in the black community, we must first address the "crimes" society visits on the black community. Unemployment, underemployment, sub-standard housing, infant mortality, disease, poverty, inadequate edu-

cation, racism, discrimination, inadequate health care, physical deterioration, overcrowding, drugs, and other social and economic ills are at the heart of the crime problem.

Crime control planners must be ever mindful of the fact that no one program is the answer to all the ills of society that contribute to crime in the black community. In addition, the solutions will not be simple ones. We need a problem-solving process that will include all segments of our society. Americans can ill afford to accept crime as a way of life. By the same token, America can ill afford to ignore the factors that contribute to crime.

The process for attacking crime in the black community must be multifaceted. It must begin with governmental policies that address the socioeconomic problems of the black community. It is important that this country reject a policy of benign neglect. Instead, public policy makers at all levels must develop a sense of commitment to the development and implementation of lasting solutions to those socioeconomic problems that are conducive to criminal behavior.

With this in mind, I have outlined a few policies upon which we, as a group, should insist. With one voice, we must call upon our public-policy makers to address the socioeconomic problems that breed crime.

The Congress of the United States should immediately pass the full employment bill. H.R. 50, commonly referred to as the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, would mandate a job for every willing and able American. It would encourage employment in the private sector by stimulating business. It would guarantee employment by establishing the federal government, through the creation of the job guarantee office, as the employer of last resort. National Urban League studies showed the black unemployment rate to be 26 percent in 1974-75, representing over 3 million unemployed blacks, 683,000 of whom were not eligible for unemployment benefits. Furthermore, it means that about 2.5 million black children are living in homes where the head of household is out of work.

I hope we will come out of this conference with a unified message to the Secretary of State that he should take diplomatic action against those nations that enable drugs to flow into this country. Whether Turkey or Mexico, the message from the State Department should be loud and clear—stop! Heroin use is on the rise again in this country. It is estimated that there are some 400,000 heroin addicts in the U.S. A large proportion of crime, particularly property crimes, are committed by those who must steal to support their habit. Since an addict receives only about one-fifth of the value of the merchan-

dise stolen, an addict with a small $30 per day habit would have to steal about $150 of property per day. It was estimated that in 1970, thefts by addicts living in or operating in Central Harlem alone amounted to $2.3 billion.

The President must also address the problem of drug addiction. Currently the nation's treatment programs do not meet the demand. As a matter of policy, the administration should include in its executive budget adequate funds to meet the treatment needs of drug addicts, giving special attention to the area with the greatest need, the black community.

In the development of the Administration's economic policies, the President must consider the plight of the blacks and others who are victimized by decisions that make the rich richer, and the poor poorer. Under recent economic policies, we find the income disparity between blacks and whites increasing.

Blacks received about $62.9 billion in 1974, representing only 6 to 8 percent of the nation's income although they represent about 12 percent of the nation's population.[51] Over 50 percent of the black children in the nation live in families that earn less than the $9,198 that our government has stated is needed for even the lowest decent standard of living.

The Congress should pass, and the President should sign, legislation to provide adequate health care for all Americans. The nation's black elected officials have outlined the essential elements of such legislation: (1) it must set forth a positive health concept, which includes preventative services, health maintenance and community education for personal and community health, (2) health care must be recognized as a right, not merely as a privilege, (3) health coverage must be comprehensive and include a full range of health care—preventive and rehabilitation—regardless of one's ability to pay, (4) there must be progressive trust fund financing so that a permanent health care program is begun, (5) community residents must be encouraged to participate in health care program operations, and (6) the health care program must be reinforced with adequate financing for research, planning and administration.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development should stop building huge complexes that force blacks into government-supported ghettos. Instead, HUD's policy should encourage home ownership.

In St. Louis, a multimillion dollar housing complex occupied by blacks had to be blown down. This is evidence of the lack of wisdom in current policy. Our national policy should seek safe, decent and

sanitary housing for all Americans living in both rural and urban areas.

The Department of Justice should make funds for crime control available to community groups. To date, billions of dollars have been spent, mostly by criminal justice agencies, as a result of the 1968 Safe Streets Act. Yet clearly, criminal justice agencies alone cannot control crime.

Congress should pass legislation that bans the manufacture, sale, importation and possession of handguns. This nation should not tolerate the 10,000 deaths each year caused by illegal handguns. There are over 25 million handguns in this country. In 1971 alone, some 17,630 Americans were killed, over half of them from wounds inflicted by handguns. No longer should the Congress be persuaded by powerful lobbying groups, for they are not the ones being killed.

Congress should pass legislation curtailing television violence. Evidence shows that television violence does have an effect on children. In the December 1975 issue of the *Journal of the American Medical Association,* Dr. Michael Rothenberg, a psychiatrist, reviewed 50 studies which revealed "that violence viewing produces increased aggressive behavior in the young." He concluded: "it would seem to me that the time is long past due for a major organized cry of protest from the medical profession in relation to what, in political terms, is a national scandal." I think we as black police administrators should make that protest.

Congress should pass and the President should sign legislation revitalizing our large cities. After World War II, this country saw fit to spend over 15 billion dollars (The Marshall Plan) to rebuild war-torn Western Europe. With a gross national product of over a trillion dollars, we should also be able to energize our own cities. Such a program should include an economic development plan and aid to minority businesses, many of whom are being liquidated because of their inability to repay federal loans.

Congress should enact tax reform legislation. Currently tax shelters and loopholes allow wealthy persons and corporations to avoid paying any taxes, or to pay at a rate well below that of the average American.

Federal officials should enforce the laws directed at current inequities. Full enforcement of the 1957, 1960, 1964, and 1968 Civil Rights Acts are called for.

White-collar crime and governmental corruption must also be stopped. White-collar crime places a heavy burden on the public, but receives only fleeting attention. Whereas the FBI reports, victimiza-

tion studies and the news media focus their attention on what is popularly called "street crime," white-collar criminality goes virtually unnoticed. Ralph Nader, testifying before the Congress, put this issue in its proper perspective when he said, ". . . newspapers and television highlight bank robberies as major events, yet white-collar criminals inside the bank, through fraud and embezzlement, took six times more money in fiscal year 1973 than did the hold-up man." Nader pointed out that $135.6 million was lost by virtue of embezzlements and bank frauds while $22 million was lost by robberies. Similarly, whereas bank robberies have increased by 12 percent between 1969 and 1973, frauds and embezzlements have increased 313 percent. Similarly, corruption involving governmental officials, including the police, is a crime that deserves much greater attention. This fact was acknowledged by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals when it reported:

"(1) the corruption of public officials at all levels of government—federal, state and local—is perceived as widespread by the American public. (2) such corruption results in a staggering cost to the American taxpayer; and (3) the existence of corruption breeds further crime by providing for the citizen a model of official lawlessness that undermines any acceptable rule of law."[52]

As stated by Judge Brandeis, "our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for laws; it invites every man to become a law unto himself . . ."[53] Crime is indeed multifaceted. It includes not only violent and property offenses, but also white-collar criminality, organized crime, and the lawlessness of governmental officials. Any attack on crime must focus on crime in its entirety.

The states and our school boards should provide our children with decent and meaningful education. Too many of our children leave school ill prepared, undereducated, unskilled.

"The United States, no matter how productive and affluent it is, cannot afford to have almost one million youths drop out each year only to become unwanted and unemployed. The accumulation of the millions of excluded and alienated youths and young adults, unceremoniously relegated to the ever-increasing slag heap, cannot and will not remain without causing

serious dislocations in our society. If we cannot reconstruct our educational system to provide meaningful, successful experiences for all of our children so that they will become an integral part of our society, then the possibilities for growth and stability in America may be lost."[54]

Chief executives at both the state and local levels must hire black chief police executives. A black has never directed a state law enforcement agency. With the few notable exceptions at this conference, blacks have been systematically overlooked by mayors and city managers when appointing chiefs of police.

We must insist that more black police officers be hired in our communities. It is indeed ironic that although blacks comprise about 12 percent of the nation's population, less than 5 percent of the nation's sworn officers are black. A study which I conducted on the "Attitudes and Perceptions of Black Police Officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department"[55] tends to dispel the myth that blacks do not want to be police officers. In fact, most of those surveyed indicated that they considered police work as a career at a very young age. The black officers of the MPD were well qualified by education. The most important single reason they entered police work was a desire to make the community a better place to live. Over 80 percent felt that blacks were discriminated against by the MPD in hiring, assignment of duties, enforcement of rules and regulations and suitability ratings. Some 84 percent of the black officers were satisfied with police work when compared to jobs held before, and 72 percent indicated that they found their job rewarding; yet only 25 percent thought their chances for promotion were better than average.

I hope we will issue a message to the entire police world that if the police are to be respected by blacks, they must respect blacks. The problem of police and community relations in the black community, though not as explosive now as was the case in the 1960's, is still a major problem. To a large degree, those problems stem from the attitudes of white officers toward blacks. Substantial programs, not gimmicks under the title of police-community relations, must be developed.

We must initiate in our departments firearm use policies that would reduce the number of blacks killed or injured by the police. Statistics from the Public Health Service show that between the years 1952-1968, more than 49 percent of those killed by the police were nonwhite, mainly black. Dr. Kenneth Clark's study of police killing

in New York City over a several year period revealed that 72 percent of those killed by the NYCP were either black or Hispanic, mostly black. We must send out a message to the police world that the use of a firearm must not only be legally justified, but also socially and morally warranted and in keeping with the concept of social control in a democracy.

The black community itself can do more to address the problem of crime.

We should send a message to the heads of all black organizations: civil rights, fraternal, sororal, civil, business, religious, professional, etc., calling for a summit meeting for the expressed purpose of addressing the problem of crime in the black community. Indeed there is much the black community itself can do about the crime problem.

Blacks have hundreds of organizations composed of thousands of people. Such organizational structures could be used in a variety of ways to address the crime problem. The NAACP, Urban League, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, National Black Lawyers Association, National Association of Black Police Officers, National Association of Blacks in Criminal Justice, National Black Social Workers Association, as well as the many black women's groups, church organizations, Masons, Elks, to name a few, by developing a strategy that taps each organization's capabilities could initiate a comprehensive approach to the problem.

We should send a message back to the black community telling those who are systematically undermining that community to stop. The black rapist must be told in no uncertain terms that we will no longer tolerate his abuse of our black sisters. The black robber must be told in no uncertain terms we will no longer tolerate his robbing our black businesses. The black burglar must be told in no uncertain terms we will no longer tolerate him breaking into our homes. The black dope pusher must be told to get out of our community. And our black citizens must be told to stop buying stolen goods.

Finally, we should form a national association of black police administrators. We all share the same problems. We share the same concerns. We can support each other. It can, indeed, be lonely being such a small minority in a predominantly white profession, particularly at the administrative level.

The creation of a formal organization affords us the opportunity systematically to address our common concerns.

In this paper I have made the point that crime is a natural consequence of the social, economic and political system in which we live.

Thus, as long as there is unequal opportunity to achieve, there will always be crime. Although this conference addresses crime among blacks, we must not forget that crime itself is not racially motivated. Rather the high incidence of crime in the black community must be viewed in context of the relative deprivation of blacks in America. That deprivation, however, is related to race. Resolution of the crime problem, therefore, must focus on the systemic issues identified, which if not causative, are at least contributing factors.

I have attempted to outline an agenda for addressing the problem of crime in the black community. The agenda, admittedly, is incomplete. During the course of this conference, however, I hope we can reflect collectively on the problem that brought us together and leave with a collectively developed agenda that we can all support.

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Chapter 4
The Role of Police in Reducing Crime

Gwynne Peirson

This paper is intended to assess the state-of-the-art in selected areas of police crime control and crime suppression. The four areas examined include organization, deployment, tactics and techniques, and policies and priorities. A thorough examination of the problems and alternatives within these categories would be, of course, too detailed and extensive to be addressed properly within this format. I will, however, offer a discussion of a few of the more innovative and controversial issues within these categories.

Police Organization

Team Policing

The team policing concept has been one of the more recent and innovative organizational approaches to crime suppression and investigation. In 1973, The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in its publication of *A National Strategy to Reduce Crime,* strongly urged all police agencies to examine and test the team policing concept with the aim of determining its value in the reduction of crime and improving the quality of police–community cooperation.

Although it was felt that each municipality should develop its own team-policing model, it was recommended that this be done within the following parameters:

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1. The teams should be composed of from 20 to 40 officers.
2. The team operations should be confined to specific areas, either comprising a neighborhood or an area defined by strategically defined boundaries.
3. Each team should, under the direction of a team commander, be given the necessary authority and responsibility for providing the necessary services such as patrol duties, crime investigation, planning, evaluation, resource allocation, and training within the area of their assignment.
4. The team commander should have the rank and the authority which will clearly spell out his ability to have direct access to the chief of police.
5. Rational and standardized decision-making processes will be predetermined within each team, in which objectives will be identified, plans developed and implemented, and overall team activities evaluated.
6. The promotion of positive interaction between the team and the residents of the geographical area they serve will be given primary importance.
7. A maximum degree of interaction should be promoted among team members.

Individual administrators will have to decide whether or not some form of team policing would be beneficial to their particular community. Conditions unique to each jurisdiction may include union or police association opposition, whether there is a valid data base to evaluate such a program, and the department's history of cooperation or resistance to internal changes.

One of the unique aspects of the team-policing concept is that the characteristics which typify it and offer the greatest possibilities for improvement in police services are the same characteristics which are contrary to the traditional concepts ingrained in the standard operational policies of police departments.

Traditionally, the authoritarian form of supervision has characterized police departments. In team policing, supervision is participatory. In the traditional police structure the responsibility for criminal activity changes with each shift. In team policing this responsibility remains with the team.

Dramatic differences are evident in the delivery of services and in degree of specialization. For many years medium and large police departments have had various types of units, i.e., traffic, juvenile, vice, patrol, etc., working in the same area, each unit manned by

officers who are considered specialists in their particular assignment. In many instances, this structure of enforcement has had the effect of encouraging the specialized units to ignore problems that they feel belong to patrol or traffic units.

By comparison, team policing embodies the concept of the team performing most all called-for and on-view services in their area. Rather than being specialists who concentrate only on specific types of activities, team members have limited specialization, and are more identifiable as a team of generalists.[1]

Another aspect which may strongly affect the decision to accept team policing involves accountability of personnel. For many years, one of the more perplexing problems in police work has been the question of how effectively and objectively to evaluate the performance of individual officers. It is generally recognized that evaluations based on the number of reports, arrests, traffic citations, etc., that an officer makes during a fixed period of time, fall far short of a valid analysis of an officer's contribution or his potential. In team policing, accountability is narrowly focused and offers the opportunity for objective evaluation throughout a series of investigations, or the focus may involve some particular element within a series of investigations. A question naturally arises when discussing the advisability of team policing: how can a patrol officer assume investigative responsibilities in addition to his patrol function? Available studies indicate that patrol officers spend only a limited amount of time in actual preventive patrol. These studies, in addition to indicating that preventive patrol has little appreciable effect on the incidence of crime, suggest that the time spent on so-called "preventive patrol" could be much better utilized.[2]

Although information now available on the effectiveness of team policing is far from complete and not scientifically satisfactory, some important preliminary findings have been made available. In some cities—New York, Albany, Cincinnati—citizen groups have demanded that team policing be implemented in their neighborhoods. New York has already expanded its original program, and some other cities have begun to consider expansion. Of all departments known to have tried the program to date, only Detroit discontinued efforts in this direction. Even in Detroit, however, the program was eliminated, not because of its failure, but because a new commissioner disliked the concept.[3]

It would be naive to believe that team policing offers a cure for all the problems facing today's police departments. However, it does offer new insights into ways that crime problems might be dealt with

more effectively. On the other hand, without careful planning, team-policing can generate major frictions within a department. If a department is corrupt, the team policing concept offers the opportunity for more informal contacts between citizens and police that may lead to escalation of the corruption.

It still cannot be said, however, that police law enforcement is so sophisticated and has reached such a level of competence and professionalism that it need not seek out more effective means of dealing with crime. It may be that the opposite is true. Police effectiveness and credibility are so severely threatened that alternative methods of dealing with both external and internal problems should be seriously examined.

If and when a department decides to implement a team policing program, it should not do so with the goal of reducing crime rates. It is more likely that effective team policing will increase reported crime rates because of the increased trust and cooperation such a program is likely to generate among citizens in the community being served. An effective and well administered program is likely to decrease the gap between actual and reported crime.

It has become evident that the chain of command and the decision-making process within the team policing framework tend to be more practical and manageable than is the case within a department as a whole. A primary advantage of the team policing command structure and decision-making guidelines is that units command and supervisory officers are far more likely to have the ability to make decisions based upon accurate, up-to-date information. Additionally, team command officers have a much closer working relationship with the problems upon which they are called to make decisions.

Team policing, where it has been tried, has been more successful than most police-community relations programs in generating positive interactions between the police and the community—another potential advantage. In addition, the team policing structure lends itself much more readily to concepts of both responsibility and accountability of specific individuals for the control of crime in the geographic areas assigned. It allows the police to adopt particular strategies and to give increased emphasis to specialized tactics for controlling crime. When compared to the traditional organizational structure of police departments, where all problems are routed through channels, the team concept has shown itself to give less importance to command authority, while giving more importance to the individual expertise of each member of the team.

Any discussion of the merits of team policing should acknowledge

one of the more comprehensive studies conducted in this area. The Police Foundation's study, which examined team policing in seven cities, found varying degrees of success. In their view, the concept involved striking a balance between the police goal of centralized efficiency, and the community needs for police decentralization, in order to increase responsiveness to the problems of citizens. A major goal of the Foundation's study was to pinpoint why the program worked better in some cities than in others.[4]

Tactics and Techniques

Investigative Techniques

There is little doubt that among the great majority of police officers, the use of highly specialized units is extremely popular. Basic to the question of whether such units, i.e., tactical squads, SWAT, specially trained riot control teams, highly trained marksmen (sometimes, but not always assigned to tactical squads), etc., are a functional and necessary part of police operations, is the police self-concept of their role.

The form that any specialized unit takes is not nearly as important as whether or not such units represent a proper function of today's police agencies. The question is not an easy one, since the problem of defining the operational and organizational authority structure of police departments, in terms of their statutory obligation of service to the total community, is extremely complex. What is, or should be, a policeman's self-concept? Should an applicant for police service look forward to a career as a specialist, an expert in a particular area of law enforcement, or should he envision his role as that of a generalist, trained to deal proficiently with a multitude of situations and problems?

The Director of the National Center on Police and Community Relations at Michigan State University identifies the role of the police in today's society as "one of the central, most perplexing, fundamental questions affecting police-community relations."[5] Even earlier, however, this problem had been specifically stressed in the 1968 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The Kerner Commission), which stated that:

"The policeman in the ghetto is a symbol of increasingly bitter social debate over law enforcement. One side, disturbed

and perplexed by sharp rises in crime and urban violence, exerts extreme pressure on police for tougher law enforcement. Another group, inflamed against police as agents of repression, tends toward defiance of what it regards as order maintained at the expense of justice."[6]

To a great degree, the police role should be based upon what the police expect from the community and what the community expects from the police. Whatever overall plan and role police define for themselves are articulated to the community in the form of tactics and techniques.

Historically, the basic mission of the police has been to prevent crime and disorder. As our societies become more complex, so does the mission of the police. The result is confusion and inconsistency among police officers as to what their role is, or should be. Possibly, because of a lack of vision or originality, many departments have chosen to copy existing operational structures in determining their role and in selecting their priorities. Consequently, it has become standard operational procedure to promote specialization within a department to such an extent that in some instances, as many as four different units can be working the same geographical area at the same time, none of them knowing what the others are doing.

For example, in some departments it is a common practice, if a traffic or other nonpatrol unit is contacted by a citizen who wants to report a crime, for the officer to summon a patrol officer to initiate the report. If the report concerns vice activities, the patrol unit may have to defer to a vice unit even for the initial report and preliminary investigation. This operational philosophy often results in the thorough confusion of the reporting citizen. He wonders why he cannot make his report to any officer, particularly since he is well aware that if he is a culprit, any police officer, rather than a specialist, can put him behind bars.

One of the classic examples of stereotyped police operations involves the time-worn method by which many departments assign officers to investigative duties. Upon promotion, officers assigned to investigations, i.e., robbery, homicide, burglary, car theft, etc., have attained a position of status within their departments. One of the rewards corresponding to this status is that most detectives only work day shifts.

A critical analysis of investigative techniques and the role of detectives has emerged. The Rand Corporation's 1975 report on investigative processes and results found no difference in effectiveness among

different organizational models of criminal investigation units. More importantly, the study found that the percentage of reported crimes solved by detectives was extremely low.[7]

The study identified the primary objectives of the criminal investigation function as (1) deterring and preventing crime (2) uncovering the occurrence of crime (3) identifying and apprehending criminal offenders (4) recovering stolen property, and (5) maintaining public confidence in the police. In focusing on these roles of the criminal investigator, the study determined that an investigator's time is preponderantly consumed by reviewing reports, documenting files, and attempting to locate and interview victims in "cases that experience shows will not be solved."[8]

The study further claims that in cases that are solved—suspect identified—an investigator spends more time in post-clearance processing than he does in identifying the perpetrator. A point that is likely to evoke considerable controversy was the finding that "investigators do not spend much time on activities that lead to clearances, and most of their work in this connection could be performed by clerical personnel."[9]

The Rand study claims further that while detectives tend to be proud of their caseloads involving in some instances fifty or more "active" cases, these cases are "active" only in the sense that they are assigned to the investigator and are unsolved. They are not "active" in the sense that any work is being done on them, and could more accurately be described as suspended.

One of the more critical findings was that well under half of all reported crimes receive any serious attention by an investigator. It was concluded that the single most important determinant of whether or not a case will be solved is the information the victim supplies to the immediately responding patrol officer. "If such information is not presented at the time the crime is reported, the perpetrator, by and large, will not be subsequently identified."[10]

The Rand study has evoked controversy and criticism. The fact remains, however, that it is valid to question whether or not it is more productive to have one officer follow an investigation through from its inception to its conclusion. This approach is, admittedly, more applicable within the team-policing concept. This is not intended to infer that team policing is the total answer, however. It is more likely that there is more than one answer, just as there is likely more than one "best" method of crime investigation.

These types of questions are probably best answered by enlarging on an earlier statement: the police role (and the most efficient

method of implementing that role) should be based on what the police expect from the community, and what the community expects from the police. Is it not reasonable for a citizen who calls for a police officer to report that he has witnessed, or has been a victim of a crime, to expect the officer to whom he reports the crime to investigate the matter? Experience has shown that citizens are reassured and far more appreciative of police services when they are able to deal with the same officer(s) throughout an investigation. On the other hand, when a citizen makes a report to a beat officer, and then comes in contact with the same officer a few days later, only to discover that the officer has no idea (and in some instances, no interest) in the progress of the investigation, the resulting disillusionment (and loss of confidence in the police) is understandable. The greater long-term damage, however, is the citizen's suspicion of department competency and willingness to meet his needs.

The Urban Institute in Washington, D.C. conducted its own study of the problem of improving the rate of success in police criminal investigations. While several of their findings were generally similar to those of the Rand Corporation study, they did find that skilled detectives are often essential, but that there are a number of means by which the rate of investigation successes could be improved. Areas in which they noted particular need for improvement included interacting with the public, *especially victims and witnesses* [my emphasis], improving relationships between investigators and patrol officers, decentralizing detective assignments, and conducting investigative activities not related to specific cases.

This study emphasized the fact that the recommendations, for the most part, were applicable within the existing resources of most departments, a factor that carries considerable weight when department administrators attempt to equate efficiency with budgetary restrictions.[11]

Field Interrogation

It has been pointed out that discretion exists "whenever an officer is free to choose from two or more task-relevant, alternative interpretations of the events reported, inferred, or observed in a police civilian encounter." Often, the police-citizen encounter evolves into a role playing and role interpretation problem. The police officer, based on his suspicions, experience, or information, defines what constitutes acceptable behavior for the citizen in a given situation. For his part, the citizen's response is often triggered by his evaluation

of the officer's attitude and demeanor toward him.

There is little dissent from the opinion that discretion is a widespread and necessary tool of the police officer. It is also true that discretion is a major cause of friction between police and citizens, and that this friction is manifested often in the form of charges of police racism.

Several years ago I had occasion to question the actions of a white officer who worked a patrol beat adjacent to mine. I had noticed on at least a half dozen occasions, when a description had been broadcast describing a white suspect, this officer would inform the dispatcher that he had stopped "a light-skinned male Negro" who, he claimed, fit the description of the wanted person. When I asked him why he repeatedly stopped blacks when the wanted person was described as white, he explained that he had more experience than did most whites in dealing with Negroes, and he was, therefore, aware that less experienced white officers were sometimes unable to differentiate between a white person and a light-skinned Negro.

Was this an example of legitimate discretion based on experience, or was it a practice motivated by racial prejudice? The officer's self-proclaimed experience did not lead him to stop whites when the broadcast described a light-skinned black, however he was not known to have claimed more experience in dealing with whites.

Studies have shown that a major factor influencing discretion in arrest-option situations is the respect evidenced by the citizen in his interaction with the officer. When such respect is lacking—by the officer's definition—arrest percentages increase dramatically. One proposal [which I personally find extremely difficult to take seriously] for an alternative method of dealing with certain specifically described acts of disrespect, i.e., gratuitous insults, gutter language, insulting labels, etc., is to give officers the authority to issue citations to the offending citizen.[1][2]

One of the more formalized applications of police discretion involves the practice of field interrogation. By definition, field interrogation involves a contact initiated by a police officer who stops, questions, and, in some instances, searches a citizen in a situation in which the officer believes he has grounds for reasonable suspicion. "Reasonable suspicion" refers to more than a mere hunch or speculation, but falls short of the probable/reasonable cause which would be the basis for an arrest.[1][3]

As a result of widespread interest and widespread controversy surrounding field investigations, the Police Foundation conducted a study of these practices. The San Diego F.I. structure studied by the

Police Foundation is similar to that used in many other cities. When an officer's F.I. contact does not result in an arrest, but still does not remove his suspicions regarding the subject, he initiates a field interrogation report. The San Diego study showed that patrol officers "have traditionally been given extensive training in recognizing valid F.I. situations and in conducting the interrogations."[14]

The study concluded that some F.I. activity, as opposed to none, does provide a deterrent effect on "suppressible crimes in localized areas."[15] The study also concluded that more than 98 percent of field interrogation reports did not result in arrests. This factor might lead one to question the quality of the "extensive training" it was stated the officers were given in recognizing valid F.I. situations.

An earlier study of the field interrogation program indicated that a great majority of F.I. reports in San Diego were submitted on subjects who were black—in a city with a population approximately 10 percent black.[16] This finding appears to bear out the results of a study intended to measure the extent of racial prejudice on the part of white police officers. Included in the studies' findings was the indication that while only 5 percent of the sample interviewed indicated a "dislike for Negroes," 50 percent felt Negroes were pushing too hard for their rights, and 33 percent felt that blacks do require stricter enforcement procedures than do whites.[17]

Are these attitudes typical of most white officers? Are they typical of San Diego officers? The Police Foundation study did not address these questions. Yet the study concluded that use of field interrogations did not have a "major" influence on the attitudes and opinions of San Diego citizens about police activities, including the stopping and questioning of "suspicious" persons.[18]

Based on the evidence available from these and other studies, it would appear likely that the use of field interrogation as a standard police operation opens the door to a significant amount of police "discretion" that, in all likelihood, could be defined more accurately as racial prejudice.

Deployment

Preventive Patrol

Clarence Kelley, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, began his tenure as Chief of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department in 1961. Under his leadership, the department progressed rapidly, and in ten years was generally considered to be one of the more

progressive and professional departments in the United States.[19] Because the Kansas City Department was among the first to adopt technological advances in police work, it began to focus attention on other ways of improving the police function.

In 1971, with funding from the Police Foundation, three divisions of the Department: Central Patrol, Northeast Patrol, and South Patrol, formed planning task forces. These task forces included representatives from all ranks whose responsibilities were to identify problem areas and design programs for them.[20] In January of 1972, the Police Foundation provided funds to the Kansas City Department to allow them to continue their experiments in planning and consultant services. With the available funding, the "Proactive-Reactive Patrol Experiment," subsequently called the "Preventive Patrol Experiment," was undertaken by the Kansas City Police Department.

The preventive patrol experiment came about as a result of the Southern Patrol Division's Task Force discussions of assumptions underlying routine preventive patrol. During the discussions, the following questions were raised:

1. How effective is routine preventive patrol in deterring crime?
2. What do police officers actually do during their patrol time?
3. How does police visibility affect citizens' feelings of security?[21]

The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment was one of the first attempts to challenge the assumption that the presence of police will deter criminal activity. Throughout the history of policing in this country, "patrol by uniformed personnel on a continuous basis has been the primary method of police service delivery and is often termed the backbone of policing."[22] Basically, the experiment found that variations in the levels of routine preventive patrol appear not to affect crime, service delivery, and citizens' feelings of security in ways the public and the police often assume they do.[23]

The findings in the Kansas City experiment received much attention in the law enforcement community because they challenged basic beliefs about the patrol function in police work. But an evaluation of Kansas City is necessary before the findings can be applied to other jurisdictions.

As the summary report of the Kansas City experiment states, the experiment involved variations in the level of routing preventive patrols within 15 Kansas City police beats. The beats were randomly divided into three equal groups, reactive groups, proactive groups, and a control group.[24] In the reactive beats, officers responded only

to calls for service. Preventive patrol was supposedly eliminated in this group. In the proactive beats, routine patrol was increased by assigning additional patrol cars, along with the frequent presence of cars from the reactive beats. In the control beats, routine preventive patrol remained at the usual level.

Information was collected from citizens (residential as well as commercial constituents of the communities), and police officers,[25] through victimization surveys, encounter surveys, noncommitted time surveys, response time surveys, interviews, questionnaires and various departmental data (arrest data, reported crime, traffic data, personnel records, etc.). Analysis of the data was based on the following hypotheses:

1. Crime, as reflected by victimization surveys and reported crime data, would not vary by type of patrol.
2. Citizen perception of police service would not vary by type of patrol.
3. Traffic accidents would increase in the reactive beats.
4. Police response time and citizen satisfaction with response time would vary by experimental area.

The findings of the experiment are listed on pages xvi-xvii of the *Technical Report*. The experiment showed that experimental conditions (in the reactive, proactive and control groups) had no significant effect on burglaries, auto theft, citizen attitudes toward police services, degree of citizen fear of crime, or citizen satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the police. Additionally, it was found that police response time had no effect on criminal activity, and that about 60 percent of a police officer's time is noncommitted.[26]

It is important to remember that the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment was just that, an experiment. Because the authors anticipated the criticisms their finding would generate, they warned readers in the introduction to the report that the intention of the experiment was to provide research in the area of preventive patrol. The authors did not attempt to discredit the patrol function, but rather, thought their work should be viewed as beginning the process of developing, testing, and evaluating new approaches to patrol and policing.[27]

If, in fact, patrol does not reduce or prevent crime, what function does it serve? Because of the shift from foot patrolmen to mobile units, the deterrent effect of patrol undoubtedly has decreased because officers are relatively unfamiliar with the areas they patrol.

There is a probability that this is a factor in most cities. In fact, the findings in Kansas City probably apply to other jurisdictions, but precautions must be taken before such applications are made. The International Association of Chiefs of Police, in their position paper on the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (appearing in the September, 1975 issue of *Police Chief*), called for a replication of the experiment which would either confirm or disprove the results. One study cannot and should not be considered the only authority on any issue, including patrol work.

Criticisms of Kansas City

Several attempts have been made to discredit the Kansas City Patrol experiment since its publication. Although the criticisms may be a bit severe, some of the points raised merit consideration. Edward M. Davis and Lyle Knowles, who have led the critics of Kansas City, identify four questions which must be answered before the findings and recommendations can be accepted and applied:

1. Was the study valid or accurate?
2. Were the research procedures reliable or consistent?
3. Were the researchers objective in reporting their findings?
4. Can and should the findings be applied to other areas and situations?

Davis and Knowles seriously question the validity of the experiment and recommend that officials review the experiment to compare their own jurisdictions with Kansas City before accepting the results and attempting to apply them to their own jurisdictions.[28]

The IACP position paper discussed above, addressed two basic questions in evaluating Kansas City:

1. What do the results mean?
2. What information and conclusions for decision making can practitioners infer from the experiment?[29]

The position paper pointed out four difficulties experienced during the study which may have had an effect on experimental conclusions:

1. Despite the design, a considerable amount of unintended police activity existed in the reactive areas.

2. There was no conflict between department personnel and the research team. The report itself acknowledges these problems on

pages 32, 60, and 63, but the effect of the conflict on the actual outcome of the study cannot be overestimated. One of the police officers who participated in the study discusses the numerous problems that arose because of the conflicts between departmental personnel and the researchers in an article entitled, "Evaluative Research in Policing—The Kansas City Experience" in the June, 1975 issue of *Police Chief.*

3. There was a lack of data on officers. Little information is presented concerning the personal characteristics of the officers involved in the experiment. Differences in characteristics of the officers would seem highly relevant to behavior in the experiments.

4. The size of the group of officers and citizens participating in the experiment has been questioned by outsiders. The actual experiment was discontinued at one point because there were not enough participants to make the findings reliable.

Data collection techniques used in the experiment were suspicious, in the opinion of some. They questioned the reliability of victimization surveys and various departmental data. Victimization surveys have been used more in recent criminal justice research efforts because of the doubtful reliability of the Uniform Crime Reports. But, victimization surveys also have their shortcomings. The surveys are based on the respondent's ability to recall the incident. They also rely on respondents who were not necessarily victimized, but who were in some way related to the person victimized (household surveys). Memories often become vague, and in instances where the respondent is not the victim, the report is, in essence, hearsay. The accuracy of such respondents, therefore, is questionable.

The reliability of the departmental data is also questionable. We all know the pitfalls and problems of the collection of data relating to reported crimes and arrests, i.e., bias, prejudice, self defense, reports for insurance purposes, crime reports intended to lead to civil action, etc.

"Player-observations" were also suspect. In order to determine whether or not "certain elements" of the community knew the experiment was being conducted, and to determine if they were modifying their behavior as a result, the experimenters hired two informants from another city to spend two weeks in Kansas City. These informants moved through "designated" areas to determine exactly what the "criminal subculture" knew of the experiment. Listed in the Data Sources as "Player-Observations," these informants were only placed in the black community. This action would appear to indicate that a "finding" had already been made: that a criminal

subculture existed in designated areas, and that these areas were confined to the black community. These types of unfounded assumptions on the part of those involved in the criminal justice process can be viewed as additional evidence of the institutional racism which exists within the criminal justice system.

The authors themselves admitted that generalizations concerning community perceptions could not be drawn from "Player-Observations." One can question seriously, therefore, the actual need for informants in only one segment of the whole Kansas City community—the black community. Inadvertently, the experimenters verified selective enforcement by utilizing "players" only in the black community.[30]

The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment focuses upon the police department, enforcement problems and needs for only one city. Generalizations should not be made and one should not assume the findings to be true for all jurisdictions, because the findings do not provide sufficient justification for concluding that patrol is not an important function in contemporary law enforcement. What the study does say is that, if officers have a large degree of non-committed time (which other studies have shown), perhaps alternatives to patrol should be examined.

It is time for the controversy over the experiment to subside and time for the law enforcement community to face the issues about police patrol emerging from the experiment. If police officers do have a considerable amount of free time on patrol, the members of the community deserve, at the very least, that law enforcement officials attempt to find ways of better utilizing the patrolman's time. The authors in the Technical Report state that:

> ". . . the police, as an institutionalized mechanism of social control, are seriously limited in their ability either to prevent crime or to apprehend offenders once crimes have been committed. The reasons for these limits are many and complex, but they include the very nature of the crime problem itself, the limits a democratic society places upon the police, the limited amount of resources available for crime prevention and the complexities of the criminal justice system."[31]

In view of these limitations on police work and the reluctance of the law enforcement community to acknowledge the social, economic and political determinants of crime in our country, one should not be surprised that an experiment questioning the patrol function, indeed, discrediting it, should receive so much criticism.

In spite of the shortcomings of the experiment [and all experiments have their shortcomings] let us not discredit its real worth. It is an attempt to bring about research in the area of patrol and to generate innovative alternatives to improve the police function.

Policies and Priorities

In 1973, The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in its report on the *Police,* recommended that:

> "Every police chief executive should develop written policy based on policies of the governing body that provides formal authority for the police function, and should set forth the objectives and priorities that will guide the agency's delivery of police services. Agency policy should articulate the role of the agency in the protection of constitutional guarantees, the enforcement of the law and the provision of services necessary to reduce crime, to maintain public order and to respond to the needs of the community."[32]

Police chief executives who establish goals and responsibilities for their organizations, usually set forth in the operational procedures, have no way of assuring themselves, or the citizens, that these goals and responsibilities are carried out at all levels of the police organization. This is due, in part, to the amount of discretion involved in police work. Few police activities in police-citizen encounters are regulated by law.[33] For example, a policeman may observe an individual driving under the influence of alcohol. He may issue a ticket, arrest the individual, simply advise the individual that he should go home, or, as is a common practice in some middle and upper class white communities, call for a taxi to take the person home.

The law states that driving under the influence of alcohol is punishable in all instances. There is no way of regulating by law the activities of the police as police have so much discretionary power. The extent of discretion in the criminal justice system as a whole, and law enforcement in particular, prohibits executives from establishing enforcement policy. In fact, to a great degree, enforcement policy is made at the patrol level and not by the chief executives, since it is the patrolman who usually encounters violations of the law and decides how the situation will be handled.

Ideally, full enforcement of the criminal laws is one goal of police organizations and is supposedly achieved by arresting all who violate

the laws. In fact, it has been noted that "Criminal statutes are so stated as to imply that the duty of the police is faithfully to enforce all the laws, against everyone, in all circumstances, at all times."[3][4]

Full enforcement, however, in daily police procedure is not a reality. For several reasons, the police never fully enforce all of the laws. Thus, selective enforcement better describes law enforcement policy in this country."[3][5]

Selective Enforcement

Despite that, in reality, selective enforcement and non-enforcement have displaced the official goal of full enforcement in police organizations, the issue of selective enforcement has not been sufficiently explained. Practitioners and some educational institutions refuse to acknowledge that laws are selectively enforced. Indeed, some advocate official selective enforcement policies.

"Selective enforcement" is a broad term used to describe any enforcement of the law which is less than full enforcement. Three types of selective enforcement are:

1. Enforcement of the laws against members of society who are in the lower economic classes, as well as minorities. Statistical evidence in the Uniform Crime Reports, prison statistics and judicial statistics show that laws are unequally enforced against these groups as compared to enforcement of laws against the more powerful members of society.

2. Laws relating to "victimless crimes" are enforced more often than laws against other types of crime—white-collar crimes, tax evasion, corporate crimes—which are not even considered crimes by many executives in law enforcement.

3. Some of the laws are not enforced because they are obsolete, ignored, or considered unenforceable.

Selective Enforcement by Social Class and Race

Herbert L. Packer, who coined the terms "due process model" and "crime control model" to describe law enforcement activities, applied the descriptions to law enforcement in general. In recent years the terms have been used to describe the actual manner in which police handle persons who violate the laws.

Several authors have documented the fact that for a number of reasons, police activities vary in different parts of communities. Generally, they found the more powerful members of society are

often treated under the due-process model, while less powerful members of society, those of lower socioeconomic classes, are handled by police along the lines of the crime-control model. Law enforcement executives tend to minimize or ignore the social, economic, and political determinants of crime in their enforcement policies. Although law enforcement activities have improved over the past ten years (due in large part to the general concern about crime and the subsequent high visibility of the police), most confrontations between police and citizens which result in arrests still take place in lower-class neighborhoods. In those neighborhoods discretion on the part of the police officer leads to selective enforcement against those without power.

This situation will not change until law enforcement officials begin to redistribute discretionary power so that it decreases rather than increases as one moves down the police hierarchy. Policies must be designed to structure and impose sanctions which will be enforced. This is not to argue, however, that all discretion at the patrol level should be eliminated. Jerome Skolnick points out that discretion will always be present in police work, but police executives must begin to establish policies which will limit that discretion of power which results in selective enforcement of the law against any particular group in our society.[36]

Victimless Crimes

The controversies surrounding victimless crimes in the law enforcement community demand a change in policy pertaining to these types of crimes. Edwin M. Schur, co-author of a book entitled *Victimless Crimes,* states that such crimes are created when we attempt to ban through legislation the exchange of strongly desired goods between willing participants. The controversy surrounding victimless crimes focuses on the attempt of the criminal law to enforce morals. The purpose of that law should be to protect individuals from harm. If individuals willingly decide to participate in certain activities which are not perceived as harmful to them, an increasingly large percentage of our society seriously questions the responsibility of the law to label these activities and the participants as criminal. If participation in an activity has no effect on the rest of society or causes no harm to the rest of society, should the participant be labelled a criminal? Who decides what activities should be regulated by criminal sanction?

The arbitrary nature of laws aimed at behavior which cannot be

said to harm others was exemplified by a law passed—and later rescinded—in Ocean City, Maryland. It was made a criminal offense for any person over the age of five years to be seen in public bare from the waist up, unless that person was on the beach. It was claimed that the law was imposed because the older residents of Ocean Beach were "offended" by the exhibitions of "nudity" by young adults. However, the law was discriminatory in that it was implemented at the behest of a particular group, and was intended to be invoked only in certain public instances. The law's strict interpretation, however, prohibited small children from going about bare chested, and also made it a "crime" for persons playing basketball on a public playground to strip to the waist.

Selective enforcement of the laws against prostitutes, homosexuals, gamblers and addicts may cause society more harm than it realizes. First, enforcement of the laws has not eliminated these types of offenses. Second, officers' time spent enforcing these laws could be better spent enforcing laws against more serious—and controllable—offenses. Third, because perpetrators of these crimes often are able to make informal arrangements with law enforcement officials regarding their activities, police attention to these activities too often contributes to bribery and police corruption.

Instead of seeking to restructure the laws relating to victimless crimes, law enforcement officials in many jurisdictions tend to operate as if the enforcement of the "vice laws" was actually beneficial. The actions of the courts, recidivism rates for prostitutes, addicts and gamblers give strong evidence, however, that the laws are not taken seriously either by the violators or the criminal justice system as a whole.

Law enforcement administrators need not endorse the activities labelled as victimless crimes, but they should examine the policy issues of victimless crimes and begin to consider alternatives to selective enforcement of victimless crime laws. For example, it has been proposed that drug addiction be considered an illness and treated as such. While there is little dissent that drug addiction is harmful to the individual, the primary reason he is labeled "criminal" rather than "ill" is that the drugs he needs to support his addiction are illegal. If the use of alcoholic beverages were still illegal, the number of persons labeled "criminal" because they are alcoholics would be staggering.

The method by which most jurisdictions interpret and enforce the laws dealing with prostitution may be questioned. The usual charge is solicitation, thereby giving the arresting officer the discretion to arrest only the female participant, rather than both parties. Is such

discretion (discrimination) justifiable?

We live in a rapidly changing society. The methods of social control of society must necessarily change in order to serve better society's needs. The criminal justice system is responsible for social control, and therefore must continue to monitor and evaluate its own activities and priorities.

This paper has been primarily an evaluation of alternative, formal methods of police operations. A large part of police philosophy is based on traditional, but unproven, beliefs. Additionally, self evaluation of police effectiveness is based on a method of crime clearance, based on self-serving statistics.

When the police talk of their crime-clearance rates they are implying inaccurately that crime-clearance is synonymous with crime-solving. When they talk of selective enforcement they inaccurately imply that it is an alternative to full enforcement. It has been pointed out that some of the major deficiencies in police operations stem directly from a system which pretends that full enforcement is either a practice or a goal.[3][7]

The fact that this paper was devoted primarily to the formal methods of police operations and the state-of-the-art, does not imply that the informal methods of social control—as practiced by the police—are of less importance or less deserving of evaluation. It is simply that there is a need to identify the rationale behind formal methods of operation, and to measure their effectiveness, before one can accurately and effectively focus on areas of police discretion that are too often based on political, social, racial, or economic discrimination. When the late William Parker, Chief of Police of Los Angeles, in a discussion of selective enforcement, stated that if mechanics committed a disproportionate amount of crime, his department would concentrate on arresting mechanics, was he defining a legitimate method of police operations, or was he exhibiting his own prejudice and imposing it on his department's method of operation? Do we know which group, i.e., occupation, age, sex, race, etc., commits most crimes, or do we know only which group is most often arrested?

Overall, evaluations and studies of police methods—and results—should have three aims, (1) to assess, and change, if necessary, the kinds of police officers we have, and the methods by which we recruit and train them, (2) to evaluate the effectiveness of the way police departments are organized and run, in policy and practice, and (3) to assess the effectiveness of external control and evaluation of the police.

The areas of police crime control and crime suppression discussed here comprise only a few of the many areas which can and should be evaluated. Ongoing external evaluations of police methods are imperative if police effectiveness is to be uniformly upgraded.

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PART IV
POLICE-COMMUNITY
RELATIONS

Chapter 5
Community Relations Units in Police Departments

Ben Holman

The picture presented by police-community relations in black and other minority communities today is a dismal one. This assessment comes, in fact, at a critical stage for such programs—a time when the emphasis on police-community relations is dying nationwide.

This is unfortunate since the problems which led to the creation of police-community relations (PCR) units are unresolved and still pose a serious threat to the welfare of our society.

The 1968 report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, the Kerner Report, warned that "our nation is moving towards two societies, one white, one black—separate and unequal."[1]

That warning has rung true. Moreover, America has witnessed the emergence of many separate and unequal societies—Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, the Indians and others, as well as blacks.

Over the years, the assimilation of these racial and ethnic minority groups into the mainstream of American life has precipitated conflict and racial tension in our nation's communities. Even a cursory examination of racial conflicts since 1968 clearly demonstrates that this country is not a "melting pot."

And the very survival of our democratic society will be determined, at least in part, by the ability of all racial and white ethnic groups to coexist peacefully as equals.

Problems of quality education, school desegregation, drug abuse and crime, decent housing, adequate medical and health facilities, and meaningful employment become more than just issues for discussion at community boards and council meetings. For the minori-

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ties, they literally become issues of survival. And these are the serious issues always found at the soul of every racial conflict.

In many instances over the years, interracial tension arising from minority community needs have found their expression in violence and outright hostility toward the community's law enforcement authorities.

Seen through the eyes of minorities, and especially minority youth, the policeman represents everything socially and institutionally denied them. He is the immediate and most visible agent of a society responsible for their deplorable condition.

On the other hand, police have traditionally been defenders of the status quo and have increasingly viewed their roles as punitive agents and enforcers of the law, rather than as monitors of the democratic process. While the majority community views the policeman as "society's guard"—daily encountering situations that are too painful or too frightening for the rest of society to confront—the minority community for the most part views him only as the "majority's protector."

 The tensions and conflict resulting from such a situation are predictable. In James Baldwin's *Nobody Knows My Name*, the tense relationship between the black community and the police is graphically described:

> "The only way to police a ghetto is to be oppressive. None of the Police Commissioner's men, even with the best will in the world, have any way of understanding the lives led by the people; they swagger about in twos and threes patrolling. Their very presence is an insult, and it would be, even if they spent their entire day feeding gumdrops to children. They represent the force of the white world, and that world's real intentions are, simply, for that world's criminal profit and ease, to keep the black man corralled up here, in this place. The badge, the gun in the holster, and the swinging club, make vivid what will happen should this rebellion become overt . . . It is hard, on the other hand, to blame the policeman, blank, good-natured, thoughtless, and insuperably innocent, for being such a perfect representative of the people he serves. He, too, believes in good intentions and is astounded and offended when they are not taken for the deed. He has never, himself, done anything for which to be hated—which of us has? And yet he is facing, daily and nightly, the people who would gladly see him dead, and he knows it; there is no way for him not to know it. There are few

things under heaven more unnerving than the silent, accumulating contempt and hatred of a people. He moves through Harlem, therefore, like an occupying soldier in a bitterly hostile country; which is precisely what, and where, he is, and is the reason he walks in twos and threes."[2]

Other minority communities likewise agree that today's police function is designed to patrol rather than protect the barrios, ghettos and other enclaves where this nation's racial minorities live.

A 1970 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights study revealed that

"Mexican-American citizens are subject to unduly harsh treatment by our law enforcement officers, that they are often arrested on insufficient grounds, receive physical and verbal abuse, and penalties which are disproportionately severe." The study also pointed out that Mexican-Americans have been deprived, on many occasions, of the proper use of bail and fair representation by counsel, and have been "excluded from full participation in law enforcement agencies, especially in supervisory positions."[3]

The highly volatile confrontation at Wounded Knee in 1973 provides just one example of applying varying law enforcement standards in minority communities.

The failure to create operational police-community relations programs that improve the department itself through active citizen participation at all levels will inevitably result in the policeman's inability to perform successfully what should be his real mission— protecting all citizens.

Indeed, the individual policeman, as an "on-the-street ambassador," holds the keys to the future harmonization of the department and the community.

Some social scientists and alert police and community officials recognized this as far back as World War II. Then, with the support of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, human relations training programs for the police began to develop.

Dr. Lee P. Brown, noted criminologist, states in his study, *The Death of Police-Community Relations*, that one of the earliest PCR units was organized in 1957 from conferences with the National Institute of Police-Community Relations at Michigan State University and local St. Louis citizen committees.[4] However, the St. Louis unit's central theme, like other early units, was providing human relations training for officers.

The 1960's brought about a change in emphasis for PCR programs. The confrontations of the '60's and the advent of the civil rights movement polarized the white and black communities. At that time, PCR programs began to promote primary attention to the serious problems of the black community.

Nationwide concern over the troubled cities, and recommendations of the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, brought about increased funding and political support for active PCR programs.

But that concern and support was in response to the "explosive 60's," and many units were established only "to put out the fires." In many cases, the units were hastily formed and programs given little—if any—direction. For the most part, the substantive issues which formed the basis for conflict were never really given proper consideration.

A few programs which showed some success and promise for the future in reaching substantive issues were dropped because interdepartmental hostility developed over the actual "police role" in crisis situations.

As a result, police departments across the country reacted to violence-ridden cities with a strong show of force.

The violent '60's ended, but the underlying problems which provided the spark still exist. And those problems, perhaps more than ever before, demand solutions.

The warning signals still come—on the Indian reservations, in the Hispanic barrios, in the black ghettos, and in all the enclaves where minorities are forced to eke out their existence.

Serious confrontations between the police and the minorities have not ended either. In fact, the Community Relations Service (CRS) indicates that administration of justice cases account for its largest area of activity. In 1975 and 1976 alone, CRS has responded to 180 administration of justice cases. Of these, 56 concerned fatal shootings, 36 involving blacks and 20 involving Spanish-speaking minorities. An additional 14 cases involved non-fatal shootings. And 72 cases involved the alleged excessive use of force.[5] The police must begin to recognize these warning signals and work to develop effective PCR programs to deal with them.

Indeed, the police are at the cutting edge of a society demanding change. In the past, their PCR programs failed because the needs of the entire community were not met. The absence of interpretation, direction, and input from the minority community in the formula-

tion of PCR programs and policies has also contributed to their failure, especially in the 1960's.

In order to develop programs to deal effectively with the problems of the 1970's, key minority police administrators and social leaders must take the lead in offering guidance and assistance to the police structure. Without that involvement, now-crippled PCR programs will surely die, and our "separate and unequal societies" will grow even further apart.

Evaluation of Police-Community Relations Units'

In evaluating PCR units nationwide, a number of criteria may be used as measures of effectiveness.

CRS, in 12 years of dealing with police-community relations and the problems which arise in its application, has relied on two basic criteria to determine an individual program's success:

— To what extent has the individual PCR unit improved relations with those groups where the most hostility exists? Blacks? Indians? Chicanos? Other minorities?
— To what extent has the individual unit influenced the police department itself?

Applying these criteria, a set of common problem areas has been identified. They are:

— Disagreement over the police role;
— The absence of community assessments and surveys;
— Lack of commitment by top police managers;
— The absence of defined objectives;
— Failure to impact on the department itself;
— Lack of citizen participation;
— Inadequate resources;
— Lack of an effective evaluation procedure.

Disagreement Over The Police Role

Valiant efforts by police science theorists, public officials, and police associations alike have failed fully to define a police role that is both acceptable to the police and operationally successful in the community. In fact, as long as policemen have existed, so has this controversy over their role in society.

Historically, it seems the public has viewed the police officer as "society's guard." As a result, the police officer has traditionally

looked upon his mission as protecting the life and property of the people. Emphasis on formal authority and the use of force to achieve this objective has been more or less personally accepted by the uniformed patrolman.

But on closer examination, the police officer's role—even historically—must be extended far beyond that "guarding function."

For example, in 1835 the Boston police escorted 506 drunken citizens to their residences. Five hundred thirty-nine home "disturbances" and family quarrels were mediated, 32 stray horses were provided shelter, seven lost children were found, and 29 physicians were called to medical emergencies.[6] With the possible exception of sheltering stray horses, these functions are much the same as many performed by the modern police officer.

Simply because the police department is an official government service agency which remains open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, it has always been the citizen's primary contact for a myriad of "emergencies" in society.

A 1975 study by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) indicates that approximately 80 percent of the law enforcement officer's time is spent in the area of social services. The study cites New York City as just one example of this point. In 1973, only two out of every 10 of the 7 million calls for New York City police assistance involved actual or threatened crime or violence.[7]

Obviously, the police role must be redefined to include this ever-growing public service function. And the effectiveness of the police must be measured by more than just their ability to apprehend criminals. The department should also be judged by its levels of cooperation with the total community it is designed to serve.

A few concerned communities have attempted to redefine the police department's role in this way. One of the clearest definitions of the police role was provided as part of a Police Consolidation Study Project in Portland, Oregon. Among the study's recommendations and suggested guidelines were the following:[8]

— The most important responsibility of the police is the preservation of human life.
— The police responsibility for the maintenance of social order is conditioned by a responsibility for protecting individual rights and ensuring social justice.
— Police departments should support other government agencies in passing on information about citizen problems and needs.
— Law enforcement is an important function of the police; how-

ever, physical arrest is only one strategy used to enforce the laws. Police officers can legitimately exercise discretion if it results in the enforcement of laws.
— Police must work with and for the citizens as much as they serve the government. As such, they must be more concerned about obtaining voluntary, rather than forced, compliance with the laws.

When this definition of the police is compared to the actual day-to-day operations of police departments, the seriousness of not having an operational protective and social role for the police is *immediately recognized.*

The Portland study group's recommendations may appear to the enforcement-conscious officer a bit too unrealistic. Nevertheless, to gain the necessary community support for police actions, an attempt must be made to apply those recommendations.

For minority communities—beset with problems of high unemployment, poor housing, and high rates of crime—the adoption of such operational police service functions is most important.

The lack of these specific goals and objectives inflates the already powerful aspects of an officer's use of discretion. More often than not, the officer reacts differently to a disturbance in the minority community than he would do that same disturbance in a majority setting.

When examining police use of discretion in their social role, it must be remembered that police departments—just like the societies they serve—are made up of individuals with varying attitudes. Just as the social consciousness of minority groups in society has brought tensions to the communities over the years, so has the social consciousness of minority police officers brought tensions to the police departments. An officer's social role may certainly be affected by his personal attitudes, and the observant PCR unit may work to resolve these tensions in the department.

Only when police administrators recognize that the police should be concerned with their social-service role, and with resolving prejudiced attitudes both within and outside the department, will closer ties between the police and the community begin to develop.

The Absence of Community Assessments and Surveys

In order to establish an effective PCR program, certain fundamental questions must be answered. Certain data and facts about the physical makeup and population of a community must be collected.

Details concerning demographic characteristics, cultural traditions, languages, and community histories must be found.

The police department, too, must be analyzed. A thorough analysis of "who determines what, when, how, and why" should be conducted.

Too often, these factors have been glossed over or completely ignored.

Even if such surveys were carried out in the past, most were conducted to pinpoint where "sore spots" existed for more effective control of the community. Rarely were the assessments conducted to gain actual knowledge of the entire community.

Lack of Commitment By Top Police Managers

One of the major drawbacks to effective PCR programs has been the failure consistently to assign quality personnel to active units. Traditionally, line officers have considered their jobs of keeping order, enforcing laws, and arresting felons as more important, and in many cases more difficult, than the PCR function.

In their study, *New Directions in Police/Community Relations*, Arthur Niederhoffer and Alexander Smith outline the collision course between the department and the PCR unit:[9]

"The police department prefers the status quo; the police-community relations officer must work for change. The police department believes in secrecy; the police-community relations officer works to establish open lines of communication. The police department seeks autonomy; the police-community relations officer seeks to involve community groups in the operation of the unit. The police department views the ghetto with hostility; the police-community relations officer works toward establishing friendship. The police department's policy is to 'go by the book'; the police-community relations officer bypasses rules and operates on an informal level. The police department spurns contact with dissident groups; the police-community relations officer must maintain a continuing dialogue. The police department is extremely defensive about criticism; the police-community relations officer must learn to accept it and try to work with the critics. The police department must follow a definite policy in confrontation with demonstrators; the police-community relations officer must use personal 'behind the scenes' diplomacy to fulfill his role."

Following the line officers in their beliefs, many police chiefs have often assigned their weaker and less capable officers to the police-community relations unit. In this way, the chief found a convenient place to transfer those whom he believed could not perform "real" police work.

The lack of commitment to PCR programs by the top police administrators proved the downfall of many units. Chief Inspector Harry Fox, Philadelphia Police Department, states:[10]

"A police chief can devise plans, procedures, tests, demonstrations, and models of perfect police-community relations achievements, but if he isn't unequivocally convinced that the primary police responsibility of law enforcement can be made easier by an active police-community relations program, all orders, plans, and goals are useless."

Even now, the PCR unit assignment is not a job sought after or aspired to by police recruits. Emphasis by the top police managers could change the direction of such thought.

The Absence of Defined Objectives

Many of the PCR programs developed with fervor as a result of public and political pressure in the 1960's are now deteriorating with the cooling of that pressure. Some programs have become so-called "special service units" or crime prevention units. Others have undergone a shift in emphasis to serve only as police-to-public education efforts, making police-community relations a one-way "image-building" street for the department.

The departure from formalized PCR programs and full-time units is justified by many police administrators with the rationale that "every police officer is a community relations officer." The theory behind this statement is certainly valid. And if it could be applied, police departments would surely gain the complete respect of their serviced communities.

The simple fact, however, is that every police officer is not equipped or properly trained to act as a PCR officer. CRS assessments and case actions alone have proved that point. In short, there is a wide gap between this often casually-offered goal and police departments' collective ability to reach it.

Actually, the public expects the individual policeman to be able to take action and respond to a multitude of situations. But the average

police officer could not be expected to be an expert vice officer, traffic officer, juvenile delinquency officer, or in this case—a PCR officer.

The most obvious reason for the demise of PCR programs and units is, without a doubt, the shaky foundation on which they were originally constructed. They were destined to fail from the beginning.

The programs were ill-defined and, in some cases, were established only to gain the favor of the political establishment. During the 1960's, PCR units were deployed as "cool-it" units. They were often sent out after actual confrontation had occurred—when the damage had been done—and were expected to regain the public's trust and respect through their minority contacts and credibility.

Although some of the early PCR programs showed a measure of success in reaching the total community, overall they have generally missed the mark in overcoming the negative attitudes of the minority communities. In these communities, the programs could be more correctly labeled public relations programs. Gimmicks and Madison Avenue techniques have been used on many occasions—especially in the '60's and early '70's—strictly to improve the police image. Great expenditures were authorized for programs involving sewing American flags on uniforms, posting billboards reading "Wave At A Cop—He's Human Too," and organizing "officer do-goody" saturation campaigns.

In the right context, public relations programs serve a useful purpose. For example, public relations is certainly an important vehicle in gaining the support of local civic and business groups.

But public relations and police-community relations have different objectives, require different operational procedures, and demand a different type of involvement. Stated simply, while public relations does a necessary selling job as to what the police are supposed to be doing, an effective, department-supported PCR program would assure that the job is done.

An effective PCR program would have written, clearly-defined objectives. It would allow the PCR unit to work within the department to analyze complaints by minorities about slow response time, insufficient patrolling, and the unnecessary use of deadly force.

For future PCR programs to be successful in reaching the entire community, efforts to define these objectives, goals, policies, and principles must be made.

Failure To Impact On The Department Itself

Because of the strife between line officers and PCR personnel, and the constant disagreement over what is "real" police work, many PCR programs in the past became completely isolated from the rest of the department. Individual chiefs added to this isolation by assigning low-ranking personnel to PCR functions. Insufficient authority to cope with the inevitable resistance, even among high-ranking managers, was a critical deterrent to effective operation.

Contributing to the isolation of PCR units was the tendency for chiefs to assign personnel without regard to the community's make-up and needs. Often, the racial or ethnic composition of the PCR unit did not mirror the community's composition.

In fact, the racial composition of police departments even today usually does not reflect the communities they serve. In 1974, the International Association of the Chiefs of Police and the Police Foundation published the results of a survey on the subject that covered 493 state, county, and municipal police forces. The exact figures were not released, but the report stated that "an accurate proportion of minority-group males who are sworn police officers is approximately four percent."[11] The proportion of the nonwhite U.S. population, in comparison, is 12.5 percent.[12]

The problem of minority recruitment is also growing. And if present trends continue, at least 50 of the nation's large cities will have a majority black population by 1980.

In *The Death of Police-Community Relations*, Dr. Lee P. Brown states the seriousness of the problem this way:[13]

> "It should be clear that the problem of black recruitment transcends a mere moral consideration, although that is important. It transcends a merely legal concern—although the courts have been increasingly addressing themselves to the problem. The problem is based on very basic and practical needs of the police. They are not going to be successful in maintaining the peace and security of the community unless this problem is corrected."

Since the PCR units, then, were structurally divorced from the rest of the department, they often could not directly relate minority concerns for change in any of the department's policies or procedures. One clear example of this inability concerns the department's use of deadly force in minority communities.

The Bureau of Vital Statistics reports that between 1952 and 1963, 2,806 persons were killed by the police "in the line of duty." Of

these, 49.3 percent or 1,382, were identified as nonwhite—and these figures do not include Mexican-Americans or other Hispanic citizens.[14]

Obviously, an urgent concern among minorities was—how many of those deaths were actually justifiable homicide? That same concern exists today. The need for a strong PCR program not only to feel the pulse of the community on such issues but also effect change in the department's firearms policies is readily apparent.

The units of the '60's were not equipped to handle such duties. But with adequate training and concern from top police administrators, PCR units of the '70's could shift the emphasis from use of deadly force to the wide range of other options at the policeman's discretion.

Lack Of Citizen Participation

A major fault in the original organization and planning of PCR programs was the failure of police administrators to involve the community's residents—especially minority residents—in actual program development. Citizen group leaders, club presidents, organization members (such as NAACP members), and minority student leaders should have been included in planning sessions.

If this had been done in the '60's, minorities would have at least felt their needs were being considered, rather than ignored. The purpose of police-community relations would also have been somewhat more accepted if such planning had taken place.

Inadequate Resources

Past PCR programs proved in many cases to be only a piecemeal effort among the department's least qualified and, at times, least interested personnel. Some storefront operations, designed as "in-community" police stations, rarely operated as intended. Rather than becoming "neighborhood community-police centers," many of the storefronts of the 1960's were viewed by minorities with the same hatred and fear as the downtown headquarters. Rather than operating to prevent arrest and recognize alternatives to arrest, the storefronts in some minority communities served only as stopover points before the final trip downtown.

Early PCR programs also did not take advantage of other community resources. Local universities, government agencies, medical clinics, state agencies, and other concerned groups could have pro-

vided PCR personnel with a complete referral file to handle community emergencies humanely and quickly.

The failure to take these steps resulted in the loss of public respect and trust for the PCR unit. And when the respect and trust of the citizen were lost, the programs became ineffectual and useless.

Lack Of An Effective Evaluation Procedure

Early PCR programs suffered from the lack of an effective mechanism for evaluating results. In fact, an evaluation procedure for measuring the effectiveness of the police function overall had short-circuited police administrators' ability to alter, upgrade, or abolish programs they felt were meaningless. Without criteria to measure a program's value, the decision to continue or to abolish a program was often a personal judgment of the administrator.

The traditional units in the department were not usually affected by such decisions since objective arrest and conviction data were always maintained. The results of the PCR unit, however, could not be tabulated in any objective fashion. Thus, the administrator could merely abolish the unit on a personal whim, without needing significant data to back up his decision.

The problem of inadequate evaluation procedures was also compounded by the fact that the average police chief maintains his position for about two or two-and-one-half years. In the past, this has meant that PCR programs could never uniformly carry over from year-to-year. As a result, the programs lacked both objective evaluation measures and a "tradition" to follow as an example.

The Effective Police-Community Relations Unit

The problems of crime, social unrest, civil protest, and racial friction will no doubt still be part of the American scene in the rest of the 1970's and 1980's. The police can and should develop approaches to serve as monitors of this development, taking the necessary steps in humanizing the response to the inevitable conflict rather than increasing it through mere strict enforcement of the laws.

Utilizing certain skills, knowledge, and proven PCR procedures, police working along with citizens rather than against them can succeed in safeguarding life, protecting property and reducing crime.

Although police-community relations today is held in very low esteem, a vigorous effort could redefine appropriate authority and program objectives and change the quality of community policing significantly.

When selective enforcement reflects the needs of the minority community—when calls for police service are responded to promptly in all sections of the community—when minorities are assigned in all units in the department in a fair and democratic fashion—and when the individual officer engages in his service function and treats all citizens politely and fairly, then a true PCR program will have succeeded. And the final measure of success is seen only in the changes which the community will readily recognize.

Under the authority of a specialized unit, the coordination, supervision, and direction of a PCR program may begin. Such a unit pinpoints responsibility and establishes a formal means of carrying out programmatic efforts.

A well-directed effort can perhaps be the means of aiding the patrol officer in his use of discretion, identifying for him means and options other than arrest and apprehension. Improving the quality of police functions will undoubtedly improve relations between the department and minorities.

Based on years of CRS experience, and the testimony of many recognized experts in the field of police-community relations, the following recommendations are offered as a guide to developing effective units. It should be noted that these guidelines are intended to serve only as a foundation on which communities may develop programs tailored to their needs.

Recommendations:

1. Assessment

A careful study must be made of the complete demographic and population characteristics, rate of employment, housing conditions, and crime rate. A police-community study group should also probe the history of protests, issues, and tensions in the community. The group should utilize universities, colleges, federal agencies (CRS, LEAA), human relations commissions, churches, minority organizations, and other civic and private groups as data-gatherers and program developers.

2. Goals and Objectives

There are some 40,000 police agencies with some 400,000 police officers in the United States. Therefore, goals, objectives, and programs should be imaginative and innovative, and specifically designed

to match the make-up of the serviced community. In other words, what works in Harrisburg will not necessarily work in Harlem.

Ongoing PCR programs should be of an integral design so that they may impact on other units such as the juvenile bureau, vice division, homicide section, traffic division, tactical force, intelligence squad, and detective section. Police-community relations efforts should relate to all the members of these units and assist them in developing sensitivity and skills so that all branches can offer maximum service to the community. Goals for the specific units should be drawn on the consensus of the department and an accurate assessment of the community's needs.

3. Commitment Of Top Administrator

CRS assessments over the years have repeatedly shown that a PCR program will fail if high-level management does not support it. If the program incorporates an award system sanctioned by the chief executive, the police will quickly respond to the program's goals.

The PCR unit should be housed in a readily accessible location rather than some obscure and dingy corner of the building. The symbols of status and proximity to the center of authority are of utmost importance.

4. Staffing

The units should be placed at the highest level and commanded by officers who are one rank—no more than two—below the chief. Regardless of chain of command, the PCR officer should report directly to the chief. In smaller departments, the chief himself, or a close, high-ranking assistant, should assume the responsibility. Staffing should also reflect the minority composition of the serviced community.

5. Impact On Department

Through incentive programs, training and direction of community leaders, reform can begin. A PCR program will not succeed by attempting to change the views of citizens. Minority groups—if not all citizens—are certain to react to the unwillingness of the department to face up to its faults.

For example, polarization between minority and majority officers in the department can be redirected by a strong, actively supported PCR program. And the net effect would elicit lasting support from the community's leaders. The recent trend toward team policing is

another segment of police-community relations that can—with appropriate direction—significantly bring favor on the police mission and win active minority community support.

6. Citizen Participation

Decentralization of program planning incorporates citizen councils, civilian staff, and minority leaders to advise the department on problem solutions. Such participation will certainly enhance relations with hostile sectors and initiate community acceptance of the department's mission.

7. Resources

To maintain a well-structured, citizen-supported response system, an adequate referral file must be kept and updated as necessary during the year. The file should have a number of local community resources stated, such as universities, colleges, civil rights groups, consultants, church groups, medical and dental health clinics, and federal, state, and local agencies.

8. Evaluation

Appropriate evaluation methods will provide the testing of valued services of the PCR program. The point to keep in mind here is to have, among other criteria, an evaluation procedure which determines the measure of improved response of the police to the community, and the improved response of the community to the police.

Such methods should examine every point mentioned in this recommendation section. The evaluation should also include the planning of regular police-community review committees to examine the changing nature of the community from year to year.

The ultimate evaluation of a PCR program—its moment of truth—will come in the community's examination of police work. Those citizens who are ever-watchful will recognize the change that occurs. And they will be as grateful if it does as they are hostile if it does not.

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Chapter 6
People and Police

Irv Joyner

Throughout history black people have dealt with their crime problems in the best way possible. The best way possible has depended upon the environment and other burdens afflicting that community.

The crime problem is merely one of the many problems that black people must contend with. Black people perceive what the problems are, rank them into priorities and deal with them in that manner. The major shortcoming is that these attacks have been unorganized. It is traditional, for example, that individuals and families attempt to handle most of their own problems. This reaction is necessary because there are few institutions that blacks can rely upon to intercede in their behalf.

Lee Brown, Director of Criminal Justice Services in Multnomah County, Oregon, correctly asserts that:

"The residents of the black community are concerned with the everyday chore of survival in a community in which the infant mortality rate is over two times the rate for the city as a whole. They are concerned about conditions that contribute to their community having a death rate 25 percent above the city's average. Black people have to deal with food poisoning and venereal diseases that are often 100 percent higher than in the white community. They are daily confronted with the end results of a racist society—alcoholism and drug addiction. Their community has an illiteracy rate above 15 percent because the

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schools are the poorest and the equipment and books are too old and mutilated to be used in white schools. Consequently, a higher percentage are unemployed. The community has to survive on an average per capita income which is only 60 percent of the average for the city as a whole. In their community there is overcrowding, dirty streets, poor transportation and an extremely high crime rate."[1]

Speaking in stronger terms, playwright Amiri Baraka, keynoting the first national conference on Crime and the Minority Community, echoed Brown's assessment. Baraka states that:

"The fact that these [black] communities exist the way they do is the most outrageous crime there is, and beside that fact everything else takes second place ... Burglary, robbery, and serious assaults occur in areas characterized by low income, physical deterioration, dependency, racial and ethnic concentrations, broken homes, working mothers, low levels of education and vocational skills, high unemployment, higher proportion of single males, overcrowded and substandard housing, high rate of tuberculosis and infant mortality, low rates of home ownership or single-family dwellings, mixed land use, and high population density ... The majority of that weight comes fullest down on black youth, who between the ages of 16 to 21—over 50 percent—are neither enrolled in school, finished high school nor employed, nor in the labor force."[2]

Various commentators on the crime problem and black communities share these views and suggest that the elimination of these problems will go a long way in minimizing the crime problem. Similar views are expressed by residents of black communities based on their perceptions of what is happening. In a study of the Western Police District in Baltimore, John and Homa Snibbe report that 11 percent of blacks studied felt that environmental problems cause crime. Fifteen percent thought that unemployment caused crime, while a majority felt that the lack of strong family training contributed to the problem. Fifty percent of the respondents felt that the proper rearing of children would solve the crime problem, while 75 percent agreed that employment and rehabilitation programs would help to solve the problem.[3]

"There can be no doubt that poverty, unemployment, racism, powerlessness and economic exploitation are among the

causes of crime . . . Lack of respect for criminal justice institutions is another cause of crime. The prison system is a miserable failure, because instead of decreasing crime or rehabilitating prisoners, it helps produce criminal offenders. Eighty percent of all serious offenses are committed by former prisoners—men and women who have been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by the state while they learn new crime techniques."[4]

Blacks perceive that the problems that plague the black community are the same problems that cause crime in those communities. Unorganized and without the assistance of institutional support, residents of these communities attack the problems on a piecemeal basis in the hope that they can lift enough of their own burdens to allow themselves to continue to function. Crime becomes a problem that is attacked as it happens by the individual or family members.

It is commonplace for a black who gets mugged in the park or on his way from church or school to round up his brothers, sisters or friends to go and retrieve the stolen property or to get even. This is successful if the victim knows the attacker or can track the attacker down. Since the attacker usually lives in the vicinity, this is not an impossible task. This crime problem is thus taken care of when it becomes pressing.

Another common example is the mugging of a school child by another going to or coming from school. The incident is reported to the mother, father or older brothers and sisters and a visit to the attacker's home is arranged to solve the dispute, retrieve the stolen property, or to get even.

No police officers are needed or desired. If the problem is one that cannot be handled individually, the police may be called. No real results are expected unless the individual feels that the problem cannot be handled in the street.

Because of this personal type approach to problem-solving in black communities, many residents perceive crime as occurring very often. The Baltimore study conducted by Wallach and Jackson revealed that 96 percent of its respondents had some experience with crime.[5] A similar study conducted in Bedford-Stuyvesant by Scott reported that only 46.9 percent of the respondents had some experience with crime.[6]

Despite the variance on the crime-experience percentages, both studies concluded that considerable interpersonal violence (e.g., murder, forcible rapes, robberies and assaults between non-strangers) occurs. Both studies suggest that residents were concerned about

crime and that many persons took individual precautions against it, e.g., locking doors, avoiding groups of teenagers, installing extra door locks, looking out for each other, participating in civilian patrols, being careful. A large segment of both communities reportedly do absolutely nothing to prevent crime.

The police are perceived as problems in both studies. In Bedford-Stuyvesant, only 15.5 percent of the respondents felt that the police were doing a good job of preventing crime. Despite this, 69 percent of the respondents reported a need for more police in their community. The Baltimore study reported that 50 percent of the respondents viewed police behavior as being unacceptable, while 11 percent saw the police as being good. While most of the respondents viewed the police as not being effective in crime prevention, a majority expressed the desire for more foot patrolmen.[7]

Conflict with the police is a major problem. This conflict is prevalent in the perception of blacks and is one reason why interaction between the two is poor and often hostile.

"Attitudes of black citizens toward the police during the last decade have been moving from 'resentment to confrontation.' The resentment has been based on many charges—policy brutality, police corruption, lack of police protection in the ghetto and the lack of effective mechanisms for protest and remedy ... Police brutality as a salient local issue was related to the existence of more abusive police practices, less responsiveness on the part of a local police chief to black grievances, less knowledge by the police of local black residents and more personal experience by blacks of police abuses."

Many studies lend credence to the findings articulated here by Ostrom and Whittaker. Because of the antagonism, the black community is reluctant to cooperate with the police, despite their perception that more police are needed.[8]

"The conditions [that exist in black communities] are viewed as the results of oppression by a white power structure. White racism is seen as the source of [black] frustration and the white police officer who comes into the community is seen as a representative of that oppression. Couple that with abusive police practices and it is easy to see why hostility directed toward police is not unlike that directed toward a foreign army of occupation."[9]

Brown contends that the hostility presently existing between the police and the black community is also present within the various police departments:

"Just as there is a social revolution occurring in the wider society (e.g., black-white relationships), a similar revolution is occurring within the police establishment (e.g., white policemen vs. black policemen) . . . This is evident by the growing polarization between blacks and police officers, which can be seen in the establishment of black officers' organizations."[10]

A recent Howard University study reported that two out of three black policemen in the District of Columbia did not trust their white counterparts.[11] Given this, there is little hope that trust can or will be restored in the near future.

What we have, then, is a black community beset by some serious problems. These are problems that are not experienced by whites, for the most part. While crime is a problem, it is only one of many, and when the pain of crime hits, the residents respond, but generally as individuals or families.

The agency charged with the responsibility of protecting blacks is a part of the problem rather than a solution to it. In many cases blacks fear the policeman as much as they fear the criminal. Blacks feel that the police are brutal toward them and have no interest in protecting them. This fear and resentment renders it improbable that an alliance between the police and the black community can be forged to prevent crime.

The problems described here represent causes of much of the crime that plagues the inner cities. Until these are dealt with in a meaningful manner, crime will continue to plague black communities.

Crime Prevention vs. Crime Control

It is important for us to note here that crime prevention is different from crime control. Many people are confused on these points, especially the police.

Crime control deals with the containment of crime where it already exists and/or the apprehension of persons alleged to have committed crimes. Police officers are quite familiar with crime control since this represents what they want to do and perceive as being

needed. The white community supports and encourages crime control because it generally means keeping "blacks in their place" and out of white communities.

The police support this effort because they live, for the most part, in the relatively crime-free white communities. In fact, many police officers left the urban centers because blacks and crime were moving in.

On the other hand, police officers are trained primarily to catch criminals. It matters little that the police do a poor job of this. The point is that the training academies glorify this function as they stress to the police officers the need to "crush crime." Consequently, the officer—in his need to satisfy his superiors—makes as many arrests as he can. He not only does this, but he actively seeks out those whom he suspects of criminal behavior in the hope of discovering a violation sufficient to justify an arrest.[12]

The "apprehension need" is based primarily on the fact that 80-90 percent of the policeman's training is focused on investigation and apprehension. In practice, 10 to 15 percent of a police officer's time is spent in these pursuits. While the need to apprehend criminals is fostered in the academy, the desire to apprehend people is fostered in practice. Lee Brown notes that "it often happens that making arrests becomes the patrolman's goal. This is closely related to the fact that patrolmen are rewarded for the arrests they make. They are not rewarded for the absence of crime on their beats."[13]

In a study compiled by Robert Wintersmith, the assertions by Lee Brown are supported. Wintersmith observed that "apprehension and conviction of the felon is, for the policeman, the essence of police work—it is the source of prestige both within and outside police circles."[14]

Indeed, as Richard Hendrix reports, ". . . if he [the police officer] were to prevent all crime, he would be out of a job; there would be nothing for him to do . . . and to the modern policeman, crushing crime is synonymous with arresting offenders."[15]

Most law enforcement officials view apprehension or crime control as the goal of policing. They believe that "Police publicly must demonstrate an ability to solve crimes if they want to prevent crimes."[16]

This attitude about crime control was ingrained in the "law and order" cry of Richard Nixon, Spiro Agnew and John Mitchell. As soon as the slogan and philosophy were raised, blacks were reviled.

"For black Americans this slogan connotes oppression, police

occupation of black communities, inequitable and selective police treatment, disregard for human and constitutional rights of black citizens and continued denial of equal opportunity."[17]

It is clear even to the casual observer that crime control will not impact positively upon the crime problem in black communities. This is particularly true as long as black people perceive the police department as being a massive occupation army bent on keeping blacks in check while protecting whites.

Despite this, police departments are continuing to utilize the taxpayer's dollars to institute crime control programs under the banner of crime prevention. An example is a recent program instituted in Hartford, Connecticut, with much fanfare last year, entitled "Fight Crime Now." The program lists as its objectives:

1. the development of case files on repeat offenders for special attention and speedy forwarding to prosecutors,
2. development of counselling to juvenile offenders,
3. development of team policing,
4. development of police auxiliary (42 recruits to be hired to free police for field duty),
5. development of a better crime-reporting mechanism.

Crime prevention, on the other hand, deals with reducing the opportunity for crime to occur and the removal of social, economic and political factors that cause crime to happen in the first instant. The Hartford police note that "Citizens can prevent crime by focusing their attention on the social factors that lead to crime, e.g., unemployment, poor education and lack of recreational opportunities."

It is in this area that the black community must take the lead. It must take the lead because the police are not adequately trained or inspired to deal with crime prevention. It must take the lead because the social, economic and political factors fostering crime impact upon it more heavily than on anyone else. The black community must take the lead because the suffering and pain is resident there. Finally, blacks are in the unique position of knowing whether crime prevention efforts are successful or not—relief of the pain and suffering—and thereby are a "built in" measuring rod to determine the scope of the crime problem in that community.

Taking the lead does not mean going it alone. In pursuing strategies to minimize the opportunity for crime to occur (medium-short range goal), the community needs the financial and technical support of the local, state and federal governments as well as of foundations and public support. Such a campaign would also need the active support of the local police department. The difference would be that residents of the community would be responsible for developing, controlling and implementing the program design.

There are several reasons for this approach. One reason is that over the past seven years the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has virtually wasted $4.5 billion that was designed to reduce crime and to improve the operation of the criminal justice process. During that time virtually no attention was paid to the suffering in the black community. There is no reason to expect this attitude to change drastically in the immediate future.

Another reason stems from the apparent racial nature of the crime-prevention programs that do exist at present. In spite of the fact that Justice Department statistics show that the burden of crime impacts heaviest upon the black community, few community-based prevention programs reside there. An example is New York City, which developed an anticrime unit with the support of LEAA. Guidelines set up by the Department requiring a local block association to aid the financing of crime-prevention programs prohibited most black block associations from joining this campaign. Consequently, white communities that could afford a crime-prevention campaign were active in this effort while the poverty-stricken black communities were left out again. In many cities around the country crime-prevention programs are operated for white communities or they allow some black participation in a white-controlled operation.

The police departments either do not understand or are unwilling to admit that they have no expertise in crime prevention in black communities. Some police officers view black people with disdain and as deserving less protection than white people. Blacks are viewed by whites and the police as sinful.

"Moreover, where citizens groups, private industry and even private citizens have attacked the problem of crime prevention, rehabilitation, and basic social conditions leading to deviant behavior, the results of their efforts have been, almost without exception, startlingly better than those of the formal criminal justice system."[18]

Finally, the very process of crime prevention in black communities must seek to organize the community and rekindle in it a new sense of "community." This new sense of community could forge together the many individual responses to crime into a well-oiled machine. At the same time, the organizing effort could address many of the other problems that beset that community, e.g., inferior housing, unemployment, health care, recreation, education, better street lighting, high prices, garbage collection, and street cleaning.

"Exclusive reliance on a self-or-family oriented approach to crime prevention causes individuals and family units to become isolated from one another. The result is that the crime prevention effectiveness of the community as a whole becomes considerably less than that of the sum of its parts . . . Without a sense of community, the crime prevention potential of mutual aid and mutual responsibility is unfulfilled."[19]

Different Approaches To Crime Prevention

Because of the deteriorated relationship between the black community and the police, the advanced decay of these communities, widespread unemployment, extraordinary high crime rates and other pressing concerns that do not touch most white communities, crime-prevention efforts in black communities out of necessity must take on a different character.

Block watchers in white communities assume that any black person coming into those communities needs to be watched. Whites in black communities, for the most part, are not objects of such close scrutiny. Operation identification, house inventories, target hardening, civilian patrols and other crime-prevention endeavors possess a different character than do similar efforts in black communities. Not only do the watched and watcher change, but the nature of what is to be protected changes.

Improved locks on doors in a white person's home may adequately insure it against break-ins. Many blacks, on the other hand, may not be able to afford these same locks or the locks may be more valuable than the door on their apartments. In some cases a good lock on a weakened door in the ghetto may make it easier for a burglar to enter since the strong lock may hold, while a weak door frame may not.

"Officer Friendly" with white children may offer the type of image necessary to instil respect and pride in the law enforcement

process for whites. In black communities this same program obscures the reality of police brutality, abuse and racism that black youths will encounter if they survive into adulthood.

For these and other reasons, Citizen's Action for Safer Harlems (CASH) was organized in New York City. Its primary function is to motivate and mobilize blacks to participate in crime-prevention efforts.

Organizers of CASH recognize that their crime-prevention efforts were no more than bandages since they were only dealing with symptoms. These efforts were necessary, however, to allow blacks enough time to deal with the larger problems that they felt were the causes of crime in the Harlems of the country.

CASH began its active operation in February, 1976, with seed money provided by the New York Urban Coalition. CASH is independent and has no ties to the police department. This was viewed as a necessity because of the widespread mistrust between the police and blacks in Central Harlem. At present there are six staff people. Three are former police officers who are widely known and respected in central Harlem. The other three are resident community activists provided to CASH by the New York Urban Coalition.

CASH began in response to a speech given by Roosevelt Dunning, Commissioner of Community Relations of the New York Police Department, to a local congregation. The speech graphically detailed the devastating impact of black-on-black crime.

In an attempt to ensure maximum community participation, input and control, the *Amsterdam News* convened an advisory board composed of community religious and organizational leaders to develop a strategy for this "war on crime." The board then met with officials of the criminal justice system in New York to refine the direction in which the war on crime should go. The board next met with over 200 Harlem clergy and with representatives of various community organizations. Out of these meetings, the direction was developed, refined and put into operation.

A key factor in the organization and support of CASH was the Grand Council of Guardians (a joint organization of the city, housing, transit and retired black police officers in New York City).

The Guardians have been involved in efforts to arouse blacks to the crime problem existing in their communities and to expose the widespread racial discrimination within the New York Police Department.

CASH serves as an energizer to the black community. They meet with block clubs, community and civic groups, churches and indi-

viduals to provide technical aid in implementing crime-prevention programs. In addition, CASH seeks to coordinate and publicize the work that the community is doing to rid its streets of crime.

Marches and demonstrations have been organized throughout Harlem to underscore the crime crisis and to draw attention to CASH's program and existence. Presently CASH affiliates work in each of the five Harlem precincts. Each affiliate operates a crime information center, and a crime reporting center. Crimes are reported to CASH by citizens. After an investigation CASH relays these reports to the police and then presses the police for follow-up. CASH also operates educational programs.

Presently, CASH is in the process of organizing a civilian patrol corps to patrol the neighborhood. This is particularly important, contends a CASH official, because racism by the police department has deterred blacks from involvement in police-inspired crime prevention efforts, e.g., block watchers, auxiliary police, and block patrols.

To date, CASH has made extensive use of the news media to publicize its work. This is necessary, according to a CASH official, to show blacks that something can and is being done. As the people see successes, more of them will join in crime-prevention activities.

One of CASH's efforts was directed at narcotics pushers and addicts on 126 Street and St. Nicholas Avenue. This block had become a hangout or "sugar corner" for drug addicts to purchase and shoot up drugs. Residents of this block were afraid to come out on the street, and when they were out of their homes, they were forced to walk in the street along with vehicular traffic. In conjunction with the local police, black police officers and residents, addicts were harassed until they left the neighborhood.

As a result of this effort, residents of the neighborhood can now walk their streets with less fear than they had before. A block association re-emerged on the block, and plans are now being laid by the residents to launch neighborhood social programs. This effort allowed the residents to regain their sense of community and togetherness.

In another effort, CASH provided technical aid and support to efforts by a local tenant patrol in a housing project to expand and improve its effectiveness. Tenants were angered that their pleas for police protection were going unanswered by the housing and city police. Senior citizens and welfare recipients were constantly being robbed and assaulted. CASH was able to intervene and cause the improvement of police protection, and in turn help the tenant patrol to expand its operations and membership.

CASH is a classical example of black citizens taking the lead. A crime problem existed. The police were not dealing with or attempting to deal with the problem. The community became energized, developed its own strategies and programs, and forced the police to become more responsive.

Although there are problems with the CASH model, it is nevertheless an effective model that can be duplicated in other cities. It places the crime-prevention burden on the shoulders of the black community without relieving the police of their obligation to provide long-overdue police services. CASH's effectiveness and credibility are dependent upon its ability to maintain its independence and to secure the funding necessary for its survival and institutionalization—a most difficult task.

Another example of how crime-prevention programs can work in black communities is in Atlanta. Without going into the sad background of Atlanta's police-black community conflict, suffice it to say that an understanding and caring black police administrator can turn around one of the most racist police departments in the country to the point that joint crime prevention efforts in black communities are possible and successful.

Prior to designation of Reginald Eaves as Public Safety Commissioner, Atlanta had one of the highest crime rates, particularly for homicides, in the country. In addition, the police department was responsible for the death of 19 persons (16 were blacks) under questionable circumstances in one year. As a result of these killings, tensions were high. A coalition of black groups was organized to demand the firing of the police chief. This led to further conflict, culminating in an attack upon demonstrators by the police.

In a presentation at the first national conference on "Crime and the Minority Community," Eaves outlined the goals and objectives of Atlanta's anticrime thrust to:

1. reduce crime,
2. reduce fear,
3. increase community confidence in police,
4. increase citizen cooperation and aid to police,
5. isolate/deglorify black criminals.[20]

Eaves correctly perceived that:

"Citizens will not help the police unless they believe the police understand them and their problems. They will not help

promote a program unless they have some influence in the design, implementation and effects of that program on them. It is, therefore, through input that the best information, the best design, the best cooperation and the best results can be achieved. Citizens can and so insure the success—or the failure—of any program."[21]

According to Alex Poinsett, reporting on the Atlanta anticrime crusade for *Ebony* Magazine, Atlanta is winning the fight against black-on-black crime.

"Last year [1975] violent personal crime dropped 9.9 percent. Murders [normally 75-80 percent of Atlanta's murders were black-on-black] decreased from 248 to 185, burglaries dropped from 16,802 to 14,501 and armed robberies fell from 4,357 to 3,887."[22]

In Atlanta's Model Cities area (85 percent black), Eaves developed a special anticrime police team. The Model Cities area is characterized as having one of the highest crime rates in the city, as well as a high unemployment rate.

This special unit, under the command of a black officer, established a neighborhood center where they got to know the people and gained the citizen's respect. Instead of arresting drunks, this unit would help them get home. Crime-prevention tips were given out along with technical support. Poinsett reports that as a result of the effectiveness of this special unit,

"burglaries in the Model Cities area are down 42 percent from [1974], robberies are off 24 percent, aggravated assaults down eight percent. [This special unit] responded to more than 65 percent of its calls in less than three minutes and had a crime 'clear up' rate of 99 percent."[23]

Eaves decentralized the department, making himself and his precinct commanders available to the citizens. Poinsett reports that the black community has gained respect for the Atlanta Police Department. "Eaves believes the man at the top has to be sensitive to the black community before he can cure its crime."[24]

Since his appointment, Eaves has constantly been under fire from whites because of his lack of police credentials and his avowed determination to minimize crime in the black community. Another source

of irritation is based on Eaves' determination to remedy past employment and service discrimination against blacks. Eaves is quoted as saying "we must do what we can to make this system fair and equitable for everyone from this point on, but we have to make some adjustments for what has happened in the past."[25]

There are few cities like Atlanta that can redirect the focus of a predominately white police force into a partnership in crime prevention efforts with the black community. There are fewer Reginald Eaves' who can attain the position and have enough guts to push publicly the interests of black people. It is doubtful that white police administrators will develop a real partnership with blacks or allow competent blacks to have control of police forces across the country. Because of this, it is improbable—hopeful maybe—that the Atlanta model can be replicated in other cities. Broad policy changes that benefit blacks will be extremely difficult to implement in any other city and this includes cities with black mayors, e.g., Newark, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C.

An Alternate Proposal

The New York and Atlanta programs are distinct from the traditional anticrime projects under way in white communities. Those traditional projects are proper for white communities, but for reasons already discussed they are inappropriate for black communities.

The black communities need a program that will organize people and minimize criminality. Without this double-barreled approach, also designed to remedy some of the long-term problems, the black community will flounder. If these efforts flounder, they will have a devastating impact on the hopes of many people in local black communities.

Officials of CASH and the Atlanta program recognize this. They realize the need for real, lasting success rather than public relations gimmicks, such as defensible space and "Officer Friendly" projects. No other program would be successful. This was learned from previous administrations.

There is no time for architects, for example, to redesign our housing as Oscar Newman suggests in his work on defensible space.[26] Black people realize that houses do not rob people. Houses may be insecure or they may be overcrowded, but that is not a determination made by the house, but a determination based on a need because there are no funds to afford better or more housing. The housing may be inadequate but is usually the best that blacks can obtain or afford.

While Atlanta has an "Officer Friendly Project," for example, the character of that project is vastly different from the program in other cities. In Atlanta the project speaks to some real needs rather than smiles and handshakes.

The point is that gimmicks will not do. Black communities need community-based, community-controlled anticrime programs designed to stabilize these communities and to restore the sense of community. The police cannot be relied upon to do this except as they are compelled to respond.

In the hope of provoking thought and discussion about a community based-community controlled crime-prevention program, the following program sketch is presented.

Objectives Of Proposal

This proposal is designed to ensure maximum cooperation among black police officers, the black community and the black political leadership of the community in the area of crime prevention. Secondarily it seeks to develop a working relationship with agencies charged with crime-prevention responsibilities and to make these agencies accountable. Specifically, the objectives of this proposal would be to:

1. combat the escalating black-on-black crime rate,
2. increase the participation of minorities within various police departments,
3. restore the criminal justice process to a level of respect so that the black community can have faith in it,
4. increase the participation of blacks in the battle to reduce the opportunities for crime to occur,
5. develop and implement strategies to eliminate the root causes of crime,
6. serve as a functional model to be adopted by other cities throughout the country.

The objectives of this proposal would be satisfied through five functional program areas. Each program area speaks to providing crucial services to and within black communities. These areas are:

1. recreational programs for juveniles,
2. crime prevention program,
3. minority recruitment and education,
4. legal education, advice and referrals,
5. crisis intervention and community redress.

A basic assumption of this program is that the staff would be able to recruit 150-200 individual volunteers from the black community to augment and supplement the staff in program implementation. It has been demonstrated time and again that extensive and coordinated citizens participation can dramatically and effectively reduce crime. Volunteers would be drawn from the church, college, professional and lay communities. Each volunteer would undergo an intensive training program in human relations and skill utilization to increase the volunteer's usefulness.

Program Description

1. Recreational Program

The recreational program would be a year-round operation focusing on pre-teens, teenagers and young adults. Staff and volunteers would be responsible for the operation of softball, basketball and football leagues. Utilizing this format, a city-wide recreational program can be coordinated which would provide alternative activities for youth that would be both beneficial and creative.

Sports clinics and seminars would be conducted utilizing athletes and other knowledgable persons from the colleges, professional teams and the community at large. Mobile, sidewalk and backyard recreational programs would be set up on a regular basis to increase the number of youths involved in this aspect of the overall program. Staff would attempt to cooperate and coordinate all of its activities with existing city agencies and departments already functioning in this area.

An additional component of this program would provide career and educational counseling to youth. This would be done in conjunction with existing community institutions—schools, employment agencies, youth bureaus.

2. Crime Prevention Program

This program area would be responsible for organizing block clubs, housing projects, tenants and other citizens to combat crime. Seminars and conferences on crime prevention would be conducted. Programs to mark furniture and other valuables for identification purposes would be undertaken, as well as programs to improve street lighting, security of homes and businesses, citizen patrols, crime reporting and anticar theft projects. Block patrols and citizen's communication centers would be organized, and volunteers would be trained and supervised to implement this program.

3. Minority Recruitment and Education Program

The basic goal of the minority recruitment and education program would be to increase the number of minorities employed within police departments and other criminal justice agencies. Recruitment would be directed by minority police officers in conjunction with staff volunteers. Staff would use posters, flyers, community meetings, seminars, conferences, street meetings, one-to-one contacts and other methods to recruit minorities and to spur interest in developing a black presence in the various justice agencies.

As individuals were recruited, staff would conduct weekly educational programs to aid recruits to "overcome" educational deficiencies. The study curriculum would be created by staff based on actual test materials covered on various qualification tests, hopefully in conjunction with the affected agencies.

A study curriculum would also be devised to aid minority personnel after gaining employment to pass promotional tests as may be administered by the various agencies.

4. Crisis Intervention Program and Community Redress Centers

The major goal of the crisis intervention program would be to defuse crisis situations that may result in confrontation between angry citizens and members of the police department.

The crisis intervention program would be operated on a 24-hour basis and would respond to calls to aid in the solving of family disputes, barroom arguments, gang disputes, traffic accidents and other disputes requiring intervention by staff members.

The community redress center would be open to aid citizens with their complaints against the criminal justice system. Staff and volunteers would aid individuals in filing their grievances with the appropriate city agencies. Complaints would be catalogued and tracked in an attempt to assure that city agencies adequately deal with them. Complaints would be actively solicited and training sessions would be conducted to acquaint community leaders with the complaint process.

Staff in this program would not carry guns or other lethal weapons. A key ingredient of this program would be the ability of the staff and volunteers to gain and maintain credibility within the communities that they serve and their ability to remain level-headed at all times.

Records would be maintained in the handling of each complaint, but all records would be confidential. Attempts would be made to

cooperate with other social service programs in a given location in pursuing the objectives of this program area.

5. Legal Education, Advice and Referrals

The major goal of the legal education, advice and referral program would be to provide the black and poor communities with free legal advice and referral service. In many cases, proper legal advice serves as another method of reducing crime and avoiding some crisis situations.

Volunteer law students would be recruited in an attempt to utilize the skills that they have acquired in law school. Directed by staff and augmented by volunteers, legal advisors would be available to answer the day-to-day questions of individual citizens. In cases where legal services are necessary, the citizen would be referred to a legal aid or a cooperating attorney.

A valuable component of this program would be the conducting of seminars, discussion sessions, conferences and other activities to explain various segments of the law to the center's clientele and the community at large. It is anticipated that booklets, pamphlets, research papers and analyses of recent legal and administrative rulings would be made available to the center's clientele on a regular basis.

Volunteers involved in this segment of the program would undergo intensive paralegal training and instructions which, hopefully, will encourage them to pursue career opportunities within the criminal justice system.

Structure

A broad-based, 15-member board of directors should be formed to plan policies, raise funds for operation and to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs described herein.

A staff of nine persons, under the direction of an executive director, would be hired to implement the policies and programs as determined by the board of directors, to recruit and train volunteers and, in general, to handle the day-to-day operation of the community service center. The staff would be composed of police officers on assignment from the police departments (if this could be arranged), professionals (social workers, educators, psychologists) and community workers with the necessary academic and/or practical experience needed to implement the programs successfully.

Volunteers would be recruited from law schools, colleges and universities, professional athletic teams, churches, professional organizations and the community at large.

This proposal is offered in the hope that a final model can be constructed and implemented. Conceptually, this is a new approach that black communities can utilize to halt an escalating crime rate.

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PART V
THE BLACK POLICE
EXECUTIVE

Chapter 7
Policies for Increasing the Number of Black Police Executives

Burtell Jefferson

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author alone. These thoughts deal only with his experience as a member of the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. There is no literature dealing with the problems of black police administrators and managers. This paper is not meant to cover all of the problems faced by these officers, or all of the conditions found in police departments across the country. Hopefully, the thoughts expressed here will serve as a basis for action.

The modern police department places increasing emphasis on professionalism and efficiency. These goals can be reached only through advanced technical training of a select group of officers with the best managerial aptitudes and leadership abilities.

Service in specialized units or special training has a significant effect on an officer's "suitability for promotion" and his place on the promotion roster. The opportunity for assignment and training for favored staff functions has been systematically denied blacks. Lack of knowledge and experience in these critical functional areas have been effective bars to promotion. Discriminatory assignment and promotion practices largely account for the dearth of black executives in staff level and command positions.

Discriminatory practices serving to exclude blacks from elite units are varied and are often covert. "Tailor-made job descriptions" and special qualifications requirements have been used effectively. The selection of aspirants may be covertly controlled by delegating authority to commanding officers of staff units to hand pick members. Special interest groups inside and outside the department can apply pressure for the selection of specific individuals often less qualified for the job.

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When blacks do penetrate specialized units, they are often denied opportunities to attend seminars, workshops, or advanced study courses. Dubious reasons are often cited; for example, budgetary limtiations, availability of slots, or the irrelevance of the program to one's present assignment.

As a result of these long-standing practices, black executives have been denied the opportunity for advanced training and exposure. Consequently, black executives too often shy away from applying for staff positions, often do not remain long in these positions, and too often, upon being promoted to the executive level, have to perform strictly from an "on-the-job-training" concept. There is little formal preparation.

This problem will continue unless our chief executives make an honest and determined effort to develop effective affirmative action and career-development programs. Such programs—if closely monitored—would be the only way to convince black executives to start requesting assignments in divisions other than patrol.

It is essential to include a comprehensive management intern program in the long-term plan of our departments. When necessary, federal assistance grants may be requested to aid such programs. Conducted under the auspices of LEAA or the Police Foundation, a management intern program would provide officers with experience in all staff functions in the department.

If our police departments hope to keep up with the many technological and professional advances now occurring, they should overcome their reluctance to employ civilians in certain staff functions. Departments should also give primary consideration to black executives in such a program, to ensure they are considered for these positions and assigned to them on a continuing basis.

Promotion

It is common knowledge that individuals assigned to the various staff units invariably receive the highest "suitability for promotion" ratings when promotional exams are given. The higher ratings are given, ostensibly, because of the technical nature of the work performed and the relatively small size of the units involved. The black executive, usually in line units, must compete against a larger number of officers for the top ratings. In most cases executive-level ratios of whites to blacks range from 6 to 1 to 10 to 1.

The "suitability for promotion" rating may count for as much as 50 percent of the total evaluation of an officer. This aspect of the

promotion process has been a major concern to the black executive. It fosters the opportunity for commanders to return subjective and discriminatory evaluations—and assures certain "fair-haired" boys a high standing on the promotion roster.

This practice, without a doubt, has had a very adverse effect on the black executive. He knows that only a few will obtain top suitability. As he achieves higher rank, the number of available positions declines. Without a top suitability or close to it, he is not competitive. Only a perfect exam will overcome this disadvantage. The situation often becomes psychologically insurmountable. The executive subconsciously carries this burden into the examination room, and it is often reflected in his test scores.

Fortunately, we may overcome this handicap. To do this blacks must assume the attitude that "you might beat me on the rating, but I'll beat you in the books." We must look at the situation realistically. Until we have a different, more equitable promotional system, we must accept this approach.

In the not-too-distant past, the black community raised a hue and cry over the lack of black executives. A response common to police administrators was "we would promote blacks to these positions, but they can't pass the examinations, or they don't pass high enough to be reached on the promotional register. If they pass the exams, they will be promoted."

This response directly affected the current black assistant chiefs of the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C. (Assistant Chief Burtell M. Jefferson, Field Operations Officer and No. 2 man in the department, and Assistant Chief Tilmon B. O'Bryant, Administrative Services Officer and No. 3 man in the department).

These men formed a study class in 1959. Nine officers met in Chief Jefferson's basement, to prepare for the promotional exam. As a result, all nine were promoted. For the next exam, 16 persons found their way to the study class and 14 of them were promoted. By that time, word of the classes had spread, not only throughout the department, but to the community at-large. By the next exam, the class had to be split since so many officers wanted to attend. Significantly, several white officers who were members of the class also received promotions. When the two officers who initiated the group took the exam for captain (the highest rating achieved through competitive exam), each came out first on the promotion register.

Heretofore, many blacks had assumed the attitude, "Why should I study? They are not going to promote us anyway." The results of the study classes destroyed two assumptions, (1) that blacks could not

pass the promotional exams; and (2) even if they did, they wouldn't be promoted.

Participants confronted many obstacles. Days off and tours of duty were changed to prevent attendance at the study sessions. Study material for general distribution throughout the department was withheld from known participants in the program.

Given the shortcomings of the present promotional system, black executives continue these study groups even when they are competing with each other for the same rank. They are determined to assure that one of them is successful.

Assignment

As black officers gradually reached the executive level, administrators were faced with the dilemma of assignment.

Traditionally, the majority of blacks have been assigned to patrol. At the same time the black community raised constant demands for executive-level promotions for blacks. As a result, administrators were provided with a ready-made solution for an otherwise touchy problem. They assigned black executives to the Patrol Division, where they had spent all their previous time. Administrators justified this practice by noting that they were acceding to the wishes of the black community. Due to the limited number of black executives, they contended, assignment to the patrol division offered the black executives the closest contact and greatest impact on the problems of the black community. Moreover, the lack of knowledge and experience in various staff functions and field units, led administrators to argue that black executives would operate more effectively in the patrol division. Administrators could provide for the high visibility of blacks while at the same time preserving the status quo in staff and the more prestigious operating units. Since many of these units had never had black executives, their traditional all-white status was preserved at the executive level. This practice should be closely scrutinized.

Fortunately, in the Metropolitan Police Department, this practice was short-lived. As more blacks reached the executive level, demands for equal opportunity and career development became more acute. Administrators found they had to reassess their previous course of action and deal head-on with a problem they had managed to evade for years.

Underlying the change in attitude was the feeling that the black executive, determined to succeed in an assignment previously denied

him, could prove to be a more effective and efficient official. Unfortunately, this change of attitude in the administration did not produce the desired effect in the distribution of assignments of black executives. Instead of taking advantage of several opportunities for different assignments, black executives have been reluctant to leave the patrol unit. There seem to be two dominant reasons for this: (a) executives are reluctant to leave a high visibility assignment in the patrol division for fear of being buried in a staff position which draws little attention or prestige, and few favors within the department; and (b) the relatively small number of black executives in the patrol division virtually compels commanders to give high evaluations, to avoid charges of discrimination.

I found evidence of this attitude in the course of my search for a black executive to fill the position of Administrative Lieutenant in the Detective Division, a position of great responsibility. Each black executive was asked whether he would accept this position, and in each instance the response was negative. When asked why they would pass up such an opportunity, they cited the above reasons most often. It was only by virtue of a close, personal relationship, that I was able to convince one black executive to accept the post and he has done an outstanding job there.

The question of assignment is critical for police departments as well as black executives. Assignment practices are the major vehicles for promoting greater black involvement in the entire police organization. By changing assignment practices, many doors, previously closed to us, whether by choice or design, will be opened. By changing assignment practices, black executives will be able to reach their full potential as qualified managers and administrators. Without the opportunity to serve and command in these areas we cannot achieve the knowledge and expertise so necessary for the effective and efficient operation of the various units of the department.

No longer must the black executive be content to accept the traditional assignments in patrol, community relations, and the detective division. If the past gains are to have any significant impact on the police organization, there must be a willingness to accept the opportunity for assignment in previously closed areas. Lack of prior experience should not cause black executives to shun these areas. The reasons for refusing such assignments (noted above) can only be looked upon as selfish and self-defeating—and the results will be to the detriment of efforts being made to correct these past practices.

There is also a definite need for a certain amount of self-sacrifice on the part of black executives: to enroll voluntarily in courses

offered through the LEEP and other federally assisted programs, and to enroll in courses offered by various colleges, universities, and private organizations. These programs can provide the basic knowledge and prerequisites necessary to function at an acceptable level in any command assignment. There should, certainly, be a restructuring of the technical assistance programs and workshops now being offered. These programs are geared only to the top-level command posts. Including the mid-level executives in such activities would be of inestimable value in preparing them for future command posts. We cannot place enough emphasis on this, since the future assignments of black executives depends on an immediate effort to expand opportunities in mid-level positions.

Tokenism

In order to arrive at a fair and impartial assessment of the degree of tokenism experienced by the black executive, one must approach the problem in both an objective and subjective manner.

Objectively, we must be willing to accept the fact that what appears to be tokenism on the surface may be an honest attempt to institute a long-needed affirmative action program. These attempts however, are bound to fall short of the desired results, primarily because of the small number of black executives available to fill positions formerly denied them. Truthfully speaking, there are just not enough black executives to go around. Therefore, there has to be a certain amount of selectivity employed in the process of assignment and promotion.

This situation can change only when the number of black executives increases and when there is an open willingness of the present executives to demand assignments they have previously avoided— indeed, a willingness to accept them. Subjectively, as long as community and political pressures are exerted on chief administrators, a pattern of *de facto* tokenism will exist. By *de facto* tokenism I mean that when a black executive is promoted and his assignment is changed, he is invariably replaced by another black. In certain neighborhoods and communities, the citizens have let it be known in no uncertain terms that they only want a "black district commander" or a "black community relations official," and so forth. This type of pressure puts an undue burden on the chief administrator, since he must invariably bow to these pressures even though he may be making a determined effort to implement an affirmative action program. This has done irreparable harm to the morale of many black

executives for they have now begun to feel that their only chance for advancement or change in assignment depends upon being selected to replace another black executive in his present assignment. This *de facto* tokenism has also led certain unit commanders who have the authority to hand pick or request replacements in their units, to assume that certain assignments or posts are to be filled only by black executives.

The perpetuation of this situation does a disservice to the black executives who have been chosen strictly on the basis of ability and competence (not race), to assume previously denied posts; and who, in every instance, have performed effectively and competently. This is not to say that tokenism has not been practiced in the past; no doubt a certain degree will continue—but when one takes a look at assignments now being made and their far-reaching effects on the total organization, the "tokenism-as-a-policy" argument is clearly refuted. In my department, black executives have been assigned as departmental disciplinary review officers. Evidence shows continually that a disproportionate number of blacks have been subjected to the disciplinary system. There is a black departmental equal employment officer, who is charged with assuring the fair, impartial treatment of all officers and who administers the affirmative action program. The night supervisors, charged with supervision of the entire department between 4 p.m. and 8 a.m., are black. In most instances, any tokenism usually takes place below the executive level.

Self Image

The average black executive takes pride in the fact that he has been able to overcome great odds and many obstacles to reach his present position. He is confident of his ability to discharge his duties and responsibilities in a highly effective and competent manner. He looks upon the wearing of the "white shirt" as testimony to his ability to meet a challenge and to succeed. This attitude has done much towards establishing camaraderie at a level heretofore nonexistent because of the age old caste system based on the rank structure of departments. There is an excellent line of communication now; in the past it was almost nonexistent. This was brought about through a mutual desire to succeed, a sense of mutual cooperation, and a mutual understanding of the many difficult tasks confronting black executives.

In order to assure effectiveness in present and future assignments, and hopefully, to have some impact on change in certain areas of the

department, we established an informal organization of black executives in the Metropolitan Police Department. We meet periodically to exchange information and discuss methods for accomplishing our goals. This has been done with the complete knowledge and understanding of the Chief of Police.

Credibility

In the Department

As the number of black executives increases, their credibility continues to remain at a very high level throughout this department. This is more than likely the result of their rise through the promotional examination system now in effect, which is geared to the selection of the top individuals. In order for the black executive to be promoted, he must be ranked invariably at, or very near the top of the promotional register. This is an assurance that the best men are being promoted. This fact is common knowledge throughout the department; and, coupled with the highly effective and competent manner in which they have discharged their duties and responsibilities, assures their continued credibility.

Further evidence of credibility is the confidence placed in the black executives in command-level positions, who are constantly sought out for advice and guidance. Black members of the department, irrespective of rank, have subconsciously viewed the Field Operations Officer as a combination "Father Confessor," "Black Moses," and "a Solomon" all rolled into one, because of the confidence they place in him. He commands their unqualified loyalty and respect.

In the Community

The competence and effectiveness of the black executive has won the confidence and respect of the community. This is evidenced by the constant demands from the community for promotion of more black executives and for the assignment of more black executives to the field where they are in direct contact with the community.

The pride in their accomplishments in the department, and their determination to do the best job possible, have endeared these executives to every segment of the community with which they have worked, and they receive the utmost in support and cooperation in all their endeavors. Favorable community response will undoubtedly continue. When a black executive replaces a black executive, he is

aware of the reputation and results obtained by his predecessor. This knowledge more than assures that every effort will be made not only to equal this performance, but to surpass it.

Black Executives and Black Officers

Black executives take great pride in their accomplishments, and their ability to perform the duties and responsibilities assigned them. Confident in the belief that they should not be looked upon differently than any other executive of the department, their actions are taken without fear or favor. They are determined to adhere strictly to this ideal. In some instances, this has caused disappointment among black officers. In certain situations involving an encounter with a black executive, they felt some concessions or special considerations should have been forthcoming. When these did not materialize, they felt they had been short-changed. These attitudes usually are short-lived, as officers realize black executives are making an effort to be fair and impartial in all their dealings both inside and outside the department, and that all efforts to compromise them will be rebuffed.

Chapter 8
The Dilemma of the Black Police Executives

Lloyd Sealy

In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice stated that "It should be a high-priority objective of all departments in communities with a substantial minority population to recruit minority-group police officers, and to deploy and promote them fairly."[1]

The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders[2] suggested that the lack of black police officers contributed to the lack of confidence in police agencies and engendered hostility in the black community toward the police. It recommended increased recruitment of minority group officers.

In 1972, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals urged that "Every police agency should engage in positive efforts to employ ethnic minority group members. When a substantial ethnic minority population resides within jurisdiction, the police agency should take affirmative action to achieve a ratio of minority group employees in approximate proportion to the makeup of the population."[3] It also recommended that police administrators insure non-discrimination in the hiring, assignment, and promotion of minority-group members. The report noted that minority applicants will not increase much if discrimination continues in the assignment and promotion of agency personnel. When minorities are impeded from advancing to management and administration, they will not respond to recruitment.

Entwined in these recommendations were two themes: 1) the acknowledged poor relationships between police agencies and black communities will not improve substantially until more members of

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those communities are represented in the agencies; and 2) the personnel makeup of police in a democratic society should be representative of the communities the police serve. The second theme, articulated less forthrightly than the first, reflects the principle of exercising social control with the consent of the governed rather than by externally imposed force.

The role to be played by the black police executive was not considered by any of these commissions. The number of blacks holding positions of lieutenant and above in law enforcement agencies is small. A 1973 survey of 493 police agencies revealed a total minority complement of sworn officers of 12,447, an average of 26 minority officers per agency. Less than half (N = 243, 49 percent) of the agencies employed sworn minority (i.e., black, Spanish-surnamed, Oriental, Indian, etc.) police personnel in supervisory or command ranks. Of the 1,986 minority officers characterized as in supervisory positions, only 387 (19 percent) held ranks of lieutenant or above.[4] Unpublished data which I have been able to obtain show that of a total of 21,329 police officers of the rank of lieutenant or above, 423 (2 percent) were black.

The problems which this minority of police executives faces are the subject of this paper. Almost no research has been done on the characteristics, frustrations and peculiar responsibilities and conflicts of the black police officer holding the rank of lieutenant (or its equivalent) and above. Consequently, this paper relies heavily on both personal experiences and the shared insights of black police executives for much of its examination of problems and matters of concern. This paper does not pretend to be an exhaustive account. Rather, it is intended to prompt and facilitate the exchange of experiences and insights among fellow black police executives in order that all members of the police community may better understand the nature and extent of problems that we confront.

The Problems

With few and extremely rare exceptions, the black police executive does not begin his police service as an executive. By the time he achieves the rank of lieutenant or above, he has already survived—and has often been shaped by—a process of selection and promotion that begins much earlier in his career.

The Selection Process

Promotion in police agencies—especially to middle-management executive ranks (e.g., lieutenant, captain)—generally is achieved

through civil service written examination. In addition to these examinations, the candidate's final rating for promotion may include a weighted number of points for seniority, record, on-job performance, veteran status, and college education. An oral interview and/or psychological test may be involved. After promotion, there is generally a probationary period in the new rank.

Some chiefs have the flexibility to promote personnel to certain management and command ranks which are exempt positions. This option affords the chief the opportunity to designate a black if he so desires. Many departments, however, have a civil service examination structure throughout the entire organization. In those that do have exempt positions, the number of these positions is generally small.

While promotion through combinations of civil service examination and weighted background characteristics (seniority, veteran's status, and the like) emerged from progressive reforms of the 1920's and 1930's as an attempt to ensure promotion of the best qualified, the system tends—for a number of reasons—to be particularly disadvantageous to black and other minority officers. Credit for seniority on promotional examinations tends to work to the disadvantage of blacks, particularly in those departments which only recently began hiring blacks in any substantial number.

Performance ratings have to be closely scrutinized because they often harbor a history of discriminatory practices against blacks. This becomes especially important where such ratings are a substantial factor in the final ratings for promotions. Rating disparities against blacks may be found even where there is no intent to discriminate. The subjective assessment of traits through a rating scale is difficult to judge independently and its use as a factor in promotion can create serious barriers for blacks. The point spread between the successful and unsuccessful applicant is sometimes very small, but often very consequential. College education as a criterion for promotion may work to the disadvantage of blacks who may not have had the opportunity to attend college nor the financial ability. The oral interview and use of the psychological test as part of the promotion selection process may itself harbor hidden and often subtle biases, intentional or otherwise.

These traditional promotion devices have in a number of places been challenged in recent years as either arbitrarily discriminating or unrelated to desired performance.

Court Challenges

The suitability of prevailing examining practices for entry posi-

tions as well as promotion had not been questioned until recent times. As minorities became more interested in positions in police work and as reliance on court challenge gained momentum, the written examination was more closely scrutinized. It was found in almost all challenged cases that the type of civil service examinations used had an adverse impact on black applicants, that these tests were not job related, and that they were in some instances culturally biased.

The leading case in the challenge of discriminatory examinations concerned the private sector: Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Two examinations, one testing general intelligence and the other testing mechanical comprehension, had to be passed to secure transfer to another department. The labor department—where all blacks worked at the Duke Power Company—paid the lowest salaries of the firm's departments. To qualify for a position outside of the labor department the two examinations had to be passed. The court held that an employment requirement which appears neutral on its face but which has a markedly disproportionate impact on a given class of applicants establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, and the employer must show that the requirement is job related.

The definition of job relatedness in the Griggs case formed the basis for the suit challenging the city of Chicago Police Department and resulted in findings of discrimination in the Chicago civil service examination for patrolmen and sergeants and with quota-hiring practices established by the court. The patrolmen's examination given by the Chicago Police Department in 1971 disqualified only one-third of the white applicants but disqualified two-thirds of the black and Hispanic applicants. In addition, blacks receiving passing scores tended to score lower than whites. When this score was coupled with the physical and medical requirements and the background investigation, the result of the 1971 examination was appointment of 88.5 percent white, 10 percent black and 1.5 percent Hispanic officers as compared to the original applicants who were 66 percent white, over 29 percent black and over 4 percent Hispanic. The racial composition of the Chicago Police Department, which was 83 percent white, 16 percent black and 1 percent Hispanic, did not reflect the city's population of 60 percent white, 33 percent black and 1 percent Hispanic.

The examinations for sergeants, lieutenants and captains served to reinforce the imbalance. Although blacks and Hispanics constituted 17 percent of the uniformed personnel in the Chicago Police Depart-

ment, they represented only 9 percent of all persons above the rank of patrolman.

The 1973 sergeants' examination was administered to 6,555 otli-cers in Chicago, of whom 80 percent were white and 20 percent were black and Hispanic. The success rate of whites was twice that of blacks. Of the 400 persons who could expect to be promoted from that list 21, or 53 percent, were black and 8 or 1.9 percent were Hispanic. Thus, the success rate of whites was over three times that of blacks among those who were likely to be promoted.

The plaintiffs in the Chicago challenge United States v. City of Chicago,[5] structured their case around the court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and were able to demonstrate that the requirements for promotion had a racially disproportionate impact. The written examination consisted of 100 multiple choice questions which appeared on its face to be based on police training and experience and in calling for responses to hypothetical situations which might confront a sergeant. It could not, however, be shown that the examination was job related.

In November 1974 the court enjoined the city of Chicago from any act or practice which had the purpose or effect of discrimination.

No use could be made of the patrolmen's or sergeants' list without court authorization. In its final decree of February 2, 1976, the court directed a hiring quota of 16 percent females, 42 percent blacks and Spanish surnames and 42 percent other males until further court order. The hiring quota for sergeants was set at 40 percent black, and Spanish surnames, 60 percent other males. Revenue-sharing funds were frozen until the city complied with the court's decision.

The Chicago case has been the most dramatic breakthrough for changes in the selection process for promotion. It is therefore of major importance for our consideration of possible legal remedies to overcome discriminatory practices.

Can court-mandated promotions be viewed as a panacea to increase the number of black police executives? The answer is positively no. Many departments are striving vigorously to construct examinations that meet the criteria for job relatedness. The courts have made it very clear that their decisions are based on examinations lacking job relatedness. Mere cultural and educational deprivation would not cause a test to be declared invalid. We must continue to address the problems of black preparedness, motivation and a willingness to sacrifice to achieve the executive level in police administration.

Assignments

The number of black executives is relatively small in any law enforcement agency. Therefore, the matter of their duty assignment is of paramount importance. In many instances the black is given a community relations unit. It is reasoned that in this role he can best assist in improving the relationship between the department and the black community. His staff is likely to consist of a small number of officers, some of whom will be black. The unit is often given subordinate status and prestige within the organization. In this type of assignment, the black executive is not expected to assume a meaningful role in policy formation or implementation. He is perceived as being in basically a public relations role.

The next likely assignment for the black commander is a juvenile unit. Here again, the role expectation is that of handling a facet of police work which tends to have low status in the organization with little interaction with the major units of the organization. Little opportunity for input into high-level decisions is afforded from such an assignment. It is infrequent that a black is considered for command responsibility of an investigation, vice, narcotic or traffic unit. These are regarded as prestigious assignments. Command of auxiliary units such as communications, records, maintenance or technical services as well as staff positions in planning, budgeting, training and inspections do not go to blacks.

In view of the fact that there are so few black executives, the number one priority assignment should be patrol. For it is in the patrol function that the most interaction between blacks and police occurs; it is here that department practices are implemented by the line unit; it is here that the most frequent and potentially controversial interaction between citizen and officer occurs; it is here that police attitudes, practices and actions contribute most importantly to good or bad community relations; it is in patrol that most police abuses will occur; and it is here that the black has the greatest opportunity for visibility, communication with the community and the opportunity to influence and make policy, to direct, supervise and control officers' behavior and take needed disciplinary actions.

There is no aspect of police work where a commander exercises greater influence than in the patrol function. The black executive and a knowledgeable black community should insist that blacks be more frequently placed in command responsibility in patrol. Caution must be exercised to be certain that the assignment of the black to patrol command carries with it meaningful command authority and

not the subordinate role of administrative aide or assistant to a white patrol commander who has the real command power. The black community must be educated to understand that rank and title do not always denote power and authority. With this discernment, they can support efforts to give black executives genuine authority in police organizations. Because there are so few blacks, the executive is less likely to have an opportunity for diversified assignment and experience in all aspects of police operations, thereby limiting his opportunity for growth and development on the job. The patrol assignment must still be the number one objective.

The Chief

For those blacks who have become the top administrators of their departments, the problem of how to establish their control of the organization is paramount. Middle management runs most agencies. How the black chief asserts his authority and maintains control requires serious deliberation. Similar issues are posed for the black who is the top line commander in his department. Command authority does not confer power. It is only the instrument through which power may be exercised. Failure to do so results in loss of power, regardless of rank.

Police Organization

In considering the problems of the black police executive, it is necessary to also look at the structure of police organizations. Law enforcement agencies traditionally have been developed along quasi-military lines with a corresponding command structure. The establishment of policy at the top, the transmittal of orders down through the chain of command to the operating units, with relatively little input into the decision-making process from the lower ranks, has been the traditional model.

James Q. Wilson, in his *Varieties of Police Behavior*,[6] pointed out that police departments exhibit three basic policing styles; the legalistic, the watchman and the service style. In most instances there is a combination of styles, but emphasis on one style tends to distinguish one department from another. When we look at the legalistic style which emphasizes the enforcement role and the concepts of professionalism to achieve a well-run efficient organization, we must examine it to determine if there is anything inherent in such a structure which could contribute to the problems of black executives.

It is suggested that where a police organization identifies its role as primarily that of law enforcement, with the emphasis on arrests and summonses which this orientation fosters, there will be community problems for the black. Aggressive patrol tactics which accompany a legalistic style inevitably create friction between the police and minorities.

A department in which the watchman style prevails can be seen by blacks as overly concerned with business and property interests of the community to the disadvantage of the black community in terms of its police needs. Personnel deployment may be perceived as serving special interest groups.

Where the service concept is seen as the primary responsibility of the agency, this style supports the black executive, provided the black community feels that its needs are adequately served.

Regardless of organization style, the police have areas of broad discriminatory power. If an organization does not develop guidelines for its personnel in the exercise of police discretion and the black community perception is one of police abuse of discretionary authority, the organizational deficiency aggravates the problems of the black executive. Appropriate guidelines need to be developed relating to aggressive patrol, stop and frisk, selective enforcement, use of arrest, use of firearms, handling of disputes, intoxicated persons and juveniles to eliminate discriminatory enforcement of the law.

The police agency mechanisms for dealing with citizen complaints of abuse of authority, brutality and corruption are important organizational factors which impact on the relationship between black executives and the community. The failure of a department to implement procedures aggressively and impartially to deal with these critical police-citizen issues places the black executive in a very difficult position.

Again, we must look at the police organization to determine how supportive it is of the concept of equal opportunity for all its personnel and the extent to which it supports the black executive in his command role.

A highly centralized police department in which policymaking and program implementation are rigidly controlled may discourage some blacks from seeking to address themselves to the needs of their command area. Within the framework of department policy the black must find ways to respond to needs or priorities which he regards as essential to serve the needs of the community. Traditionally structured police agencies may lack the capacity to be responsive to black community needs for police service.

Programs and training policies which foster executive development are important to blacks. The criteria for selection must be sufficiently broad to provide blacks the opportunity for full participation. The practice of involving only persons currently assigned in related fields to attend outside training programs works against blacks.

The Black Executive

When the black officer reaches the executive level, he has achieved a career milestone sought by many in the organization.

In the discussion of assignments of executives, it was emphasized that the organization may seek to avoid giving line command responsibility to blacks. Perhaps this is a good time to raise the issue of options for the black executive. Should he seek an assignment of his own choice? Can he decline patrol if given the opportunity? Is he a "Tom" if he does not identify with priorities set by other blacks? Must black executives assume black leadership roles within the police agency? How do blacks within the agency deal with the black executive who does not relate? How will this relationship affect communication among blacks? These are some of the problems that may surface as the black achieves command rank.

In his new command role he must relate to those of higher rank, to his peer group including any other black executives, and to his subordinates both black and white. The perceptions which the black executive has of himself and the organization are important factors in determining how he functions in his role. Let us consider first the self-made man who after years of hard work and study finally makes it. He may have the attitude that he made it on his own and is not indebted to anyone for his current position. His police experience gives him confidence that he can do his job. He has been a member of his department for years and to some extent has been socialized in its tradition.

Undoubtedly he is known to the chief and the top echelon and has some knowledge of their attitudes toward blacks and believes he knows what they expect of him. The lines of communication which are available to him in dealing with his superiors are extremely important.

Does he have access to the chief? If he does, how is this interpreted by the command hierarchy? Good relations with his immediate commander are important. But what if his boss seeks to sabotage his efforts to do his job? To discredit him in the eyes of the chief?

This is less likely to happen to a seasoned veteran than to one perceived as a "90 day wonder." A person who achieves executive rank quite naturally aspires to higher positions. The performance evaluation by his commander is an important factor on which his chances for future promotion will depend. This is especially true if his is an exempt-rank classification.

Should he conform to his commander's expectations of his role where they are at variance with his own? How much compromising does he engage in to accomplish his goals? Should he chart an independent course? Is this feasible? These are some problems that our executive confronts. If he feels that he is being undercut, should he go to the chief to register a complaint? If not, how should he deal with the situation? These are questions for consideration.

The black executive who has been promoted preferentially because of affirmative action compliance directives or community pressures faces some additional problems. He is likely to be bitterly resented because someone was bumped to make room for him and protests of reverse discrimination are likely to be heard. This hostility spills over into his relationships in the department and concerted efforts may be made to withhold cooperation from such a person. The fact that social discrimination may have impeded previous efforts at promotion by blacks may be completely overlooked in the emotional heat generated by the current promotions. This is a tough way to achieve a command position and tends to reinforce the stereotypes of blacks not being qualified to compete. This ultimately will be overcome by the demonstrated competence of the black in his new role. This places a responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the chief to select the most competent blacks for promotion in situations of this kind. To do otherwise is to contribute to organizational divisiveness and to foster racial bigotry.

Where a black is projected into an executive role with gaps in his training and experience he has to learn fast, seek out sources of information yet assume full responsibility for decision making.

The executive, when he assumes command, must understand that, in addition to any other problems, he must deal with racial prejudices. They may be subtle and indirect or open and blatant but they are often there. There is no need to be paranoid about them but they must be recognized. Whites have a problem accepting blacks in the executive role. Therefore, many will seek to avoid and evade giving the recognition and respect for his authority and try to undercut and discredit his efforts. Particularly destructive to the black is the practice of bypassing him and dealing directly with subordinate per-

sonnel. This frequently is done by the top ranks. The black must be alert and prepared to deal decisively any time attempts are made to go around him up or down and to subvert his authority. Rank carries authority and responsibility which may or may not be clearly delineated. No black can permit erosion of his authority, and must curtail any effort in that direction. He constantly must remain aware that he will be tested.

As a black commander implements policy which may affect black communities, problems can arise which require communicating black community priorities to white police personnel. This may appear to put the black in opposition to his men and the department. How should this be handled? How does one change attitudes and behavior which clearly evince racial bias?

Anyone anticipating promotion thinks about his new responsibilities. The next rank provides an opportunity for prouder exposure to the top echelon and the possibility for further advancement. Many subordinates seek to placate their superiors by not taking initiative or being innovative in responding to command problems. Instead they simply follow procedures and policies perceived to be satisfactory to the chief. Should the black executive play this game? It may be necessary for the commander to chart new ground. Leadership is required to assess the police needs of a community and to devise police responses which are effective. The black executive, in dealing with superiors and peers, performs a function of focusing attention on police problems and the need for greater efforts to deal with them. In this matter, the involvement of the black community is necessary.

The opportunity for informal discussion of problems arises in social settings among police as in all organizations. Here problems are aired, policies thought over, decisions arrived at—in a relaxed atmosphere. The executive should participate in such social affairs to utilize the advantages of these social contacts. To not participate because he or she or their spouse feels uncomfortable or unwelcome is a mistake. Similarly, the executive should involve himself in professional police organizations to make himself and his points of view known and to contribute to agenda items and organization programming which consider the concerns of minorities.

It goes without saying that where there are several black executives in a department they should be mutually supportive of each other. Personalities and ambitions must not create situations in which blacks neutralize their effectiveness because of divisiveness, self-generated or externally fostered. The opportunity for black

executives within a department to meet and discuss problems within their department and to ventilate their frustrations and disappointments must be created. The blacks must structure this themselves.

The relationship between the black executive and other blacks in the organization is very important. Rank difference may become a barrier to open communication and the executive should initiate ways of facilitating dialogue. In any organization, the black officer will have grievances which he believes should be pursued by the black commander. If they are not, an impasse may develop.

Like the black community, the black subordinate is usually proud and enthusiastic about one of his own who has made it. The great expectations that organizational inequities will now be remedied may be blunted by bureaucratic resistance to change. Thus, when the black executive has had little impact for change, the black subordinate becomes critical and may attribute lack of concern to the black executive. To the black subordinate the black executive should be a dedicated black man fighting to improve and change conditions for black subordinates and the black community. He should be bold, aggressive, fearless.

The lack of black command persons creates an obligation from which those who achieve such positions cannot escape. The black executive should assume a leadership role among blacks in the organization for the benefit of the individual as well as of the organization. Open communication among blacks is essential and problems of mutual concern must be mutually shared. The black executive must come to grips with organization policies and practices as well as those of operating personnel which violate the tenets of professionalism in its broader sense. He cannot play games and pretend that all is well within the department while the citizen or lower-ranked blacks are having a hard time getting fair treatment.

There are situations in which confrontations between black and white officers may occur and the black commander seeks to smooth things over for the "good" of the agency. How does this affect relationships? In exercising his duty responsibility, the executive may be very sensitive to any charge of partiality toward blacks. Should he give preference to black officers in any circumstances?

Black police organizations exist in many departments and have programs related to issues of concern to black communities which call for action to change discriminatory practices. The police officer may be in the vanguard of this movement. What role should the executive have?

The executive must seek to help and encourage others to aspire to and to achieve rank status. He should be able to identify young officers who have potential and do everything within the organization to develop such individuals, including seeking out job assignments which afford opportunities for broadening job experience and time to study.

The black community is proud of the accomplishments of the executive and identifies with him. This is true even where there is a negative police image. One of their own has made it. There are expectations for changes for the better. The expectations may be unrealistic but they are there. Dialogue between the community and the executive should be established to provide a flow of information about community and police problems and the level and quality of police service. The executive performs an educational role not only in regard to his department, but also in how to deal with organized government. It is important that the executive sensitize the agency and its personnel to community needs and perceptions of the police and to the reasons for doing so. The department may expect him to be a buffer between the department and the community. Should he be placed in this position?

An aspect of the community role of the executive is that of an image for youth. The potential and positive impact that can be made by sharing with and moving among the youth and children of the community should not be underestimated.

The black police executive must be a catalyst for change in law enforcement. Police agencies are bureaucracies and as such perform their functions in a manner and at a level to keep public criticism to a minimum.

The problems of urban crime and violence strike hardest at the black community. Present police methods of dealing with crime are woefully inadequate. Yet we continue to do the same things in more sophisticated ways. It is going to be from the concern, the knowledge and the ingenuity of the black executive that leadership emerges within police organizations, with a dedication to deal with problems of crime in urban areas and with a commitment to reverse the trends and involve the community in achieving safe streets.

Executive Development

The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended that police agencies implement formal programs of personnel development designed to further professional growth. Internships, paid leaves of absence to allow achievement of

academic objectives, job rotation and programs encouraging self development are some of the ways to achieve this.

Data should be collected on the academic backgrounds of black executives, including police programs attended. This would assist in determining the needs for further development. We need to look at the kinds of training blacks are pursuing in police agencies and the educational criteria for managerial and administrative positions in law enforcement.

Black executives, present and prospective, must have equal access to these opportunities for growth and development. LEAA and the Police Foundation should sponsor more programs specifically geared to the recruitment and development of black police executives.

Conferences sponsored by LEAA and the Police Foundation which bring black executives together for professional and educational purposes should be instituted on a permanent basis for the continued improvement of law enforcement.

All of the problems of the executive that have been outlined in this presentation have stressed the quality of the black executive. No matter how many problems there may be which have racial connotations, the executive is just that: an executive. He must function as a professional who seeks to render the best service to all within his jurisdiction.

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PART VI
RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE CONFERENCE

A list of recommendations was made at each of the workshop sessions. The following is an itemization of these recommendations:

To Alleviate Causes of Crime:

1. Officials recommend enactment of a comprehensive legislative program of social and economic reform; i.e., taxes, welfare, health care, housing, education.
2. Officials propose a nationwide war on drugs, with sanctions against Turkey, Mexico, etc., for failure to prosecute offenders.
3. Officials recommend that handguns be outlawed.
4. Officials would require minimum mandatory sentencing and uniform sentencing of those convicted of crimes. Judges should articulate a reason for the sentence imposed.
5. Officials recommend applying pressure to school boards to improve education. They advocate withdrawal of federal subsidies from school systems that fail to educate.
6. Officials recommend examination of internal investigation processes to ensure that laws are not selectively enforced against blacks.
7. Officials recommend police participation in urban planning. Crime can be prevented through architectural design, and installation of adequate security measures.

To Control Crime:

1. Officials would seek federal funding for citizen crime prevention projects.
2. Officials support the work of the National Minority Advisory Council on Criminal Justice.
3. Officials recommend a redefinition of the police role; to emphasize service rather than control.
4. Officials should assist in formulating and advocating citizen proposals for crime reduction.
5. Officials recommend that every patrolman be required to spend a certain amount of his tour of duty on foot.
6. Officials recommend decentralization of patrol decisions. Depart-

ments should experiment with team policing and sector planning.

7. Officials recommend that police departments set quantifiable, time-phased crime reduction goals.

8. Officials recommend that more black policemen be hired to reflect accurately the racial composition of specific jurisdictions.

To Improve Police-Community Relations:

1. Officials recommend passage of Rep. Conyer's bill, HR 13636, which would end federal funding in police departments which do not have affirmative action.

2. Officials recommend the development of an evaluation process to assess discriminatory practices and policies of police.

3. Officials recommend entry-level psychological testing and periodic counseling for police officers in departments currently lacking such services.

4. Officials recommend that PCR units be redefined and strengthened.

5. Officials recommend development of criminal justice curricula at all levels of education. They suggest implementation of school liaison programs at all levels.

6. Officials recommend development of police units to teach students to pass police entrance exams.

7. Officials propose the establishment of department guidelines for field investigation, stop-and-frisk procedures, and eye-witness identification, to reduce harrassment.

8. Officials recommend that police personnel be required to reside in the city where they work.

9. Officials recommend that the police make an effort to involve the community in crime prevention programs.

The Role of the Black Police Executive:

1. Officials recommend that black police executives actively promote the above recommendations.

2. Officials recommend that the black executive write and publish policy papers.

3. Officials recommend that the black executive advocate a reexamination of assignment practices and promotion procedures to insure equal opportunity for advancement.

4. Officials recommend black executives advocate the lateral appointment of qualified individuals to assist police departments, e.g., Ph.D's in criminology.

5. Officials recommend that black executives advocate solicitation of LEEP-LEAA grants and foundation support for the legal education of blacks, which would incur a two-year commitment to service as police counsels, prosecutors, and public defenders.

6. Officials recommend that black executives seek to establish executive career development programs to assure the upward mobility of black officers.

7. Officials recommend that black executives encourage black officers to prepare for promotional exams, e.g., by initiating study classes.

8. Officials recommend that black executives be accountable to the black community.

9. Officials urge the black executive to speak for the black community in the department and in the community at large.

The above recommendations were made by individuals and do not necessarily represent a concensus view, either of the conference participants, their departments, or the sponsors.

PART VII
CONFERENCE
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The Center for Minority Group Mental Health Programs
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Institute for the Study of Contemporary Social Problems

National Urban League

Community Relations Service
U.S. Department of Justice

National Urban Coalition

United Planning Organization

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Related Publications from the Joint Center for Political Studies

The Federal A-95 Review Process: Making it Work for Minority Groups
By Milton D. Morris

The A-95 review process is a system for reviewing and evaluating applications for many types of federal grants. It requires that applications be submitted to metropolitan, rural, or statewide clearinghouses, such as councils of governments in many metropolitan regions. One purpose is to make sure that federal money is not spent on programs that would have a discriminatory effect on minorities. Yet that purpose has often been neglected. This volume explains how the process originated and how its goals expanded to include civil rights concerns; how the process works; how it is supposed to protect minority interests and how it has failed in most cases. The book also reports the success of some regions in making the process work well, and offers suggestions on how to use it effectively.

Municipal Budgeting: A Primer for Elected Officials
By Jesse Burkhead and Paul Bringewatt

Describes the process of preparing a budget; suggests criteria by which to evaluate a budget; evaluates alternative ways of raising money and categorizing expenditures; suggests ways to make the budget-making process more responsive to citizens' views of their needs.

National Roster of Black Elected Officials, 1976 Edition
Prepared by Office of Research, JCPS

A unique reference source on the expansion of black political strength in America, providing the only accurate and up-to-date listing of black elected officials in the nation. The National Roster analyzes the growth in numbers and influence of black elected officials; pinpoints who they are, where they are, what offices they hold; compares elected officials to offices available and voting power. The 1976 edition (Volume VI) includes: historical review of blacks in elective office; analysis of blacks in the elected judiciary; analysis of black women in elective office; analysis of growth of black mayors; a new section on blacks in regional government.

New Federalism and Community Development: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.
By Milton D. Morris

Reviews the major provisions of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 and assesses its potential impact on low and moderate-income persons, especially minorities. Identifies channels for citizen participation in designing local plans for housing and community development.

Urban Governance and Minorities
Edited By Herrington J. Bryce

Based on the 1975 Conference on Urban Governance, sponsored by the Joint Center for Political Studies, Washington, D.C. Published in cooperation with Praeger Press. In five parts, discusses: problems of one large and one small city governed by black mayors; inner-city problems related to unionism, minority employment and fiscal performance in cities with large populations; forms, costs, and benefits of citizen participation in local government; neighborhood councils, the D.C. regional councils, reform of government organizations; causes and trends of crime, professionalization of police, and judicial reform.

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