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*National Evaluation of the
Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program:
Final Report*

**Volume I
Cross-Site Findings**

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December 30, 2004

Prepared for:

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WESTAT
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RESEARCH CORPORATION

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Executive Summary

Many studies suggest that child abuse and neglect are risk factors for the development of juvenile delinquency and other problem behaviors. The Safe Kids/Safe Streets (SK/SS) program is designed to break the cycle by funding community collaboratives to undertake comprehensive, community-wide efforts to reduce child abuse and neglect. SK/SS is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs (OJP). Three offices within OJP—the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the Executive Office for Weed & Seed (EOWS), and Office on Violence Against Women (OVW)—funded the participating sites and jointly monitored them, with OJJDP providing overall coordination.¹

OJP selected five localities to implement the SK/SS program, which began in 1997. Three grantees were in mid-sized cities (Huntsville, Alabama; Kansas City, Missouri; and Toledo, Ohio), one in a rural area (Burlington, Vermont), and one in a Tribal area (Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan). Initial awards for the first 18 months ranged from \$425,000 for the rural and Tribal sites to \$800,000 for Huntsville and \$923,645 for Kansas City. Unlike the other sites, Toledo received \$125,000 in “seed money” to encourage promising activities already underway in the community. After the first 18 months, sites were expected to receive four more awards, each covering a year, for a total project period of 5½ years. OJP did not hold projects to a strict timetable, however. In 2003, OJP decided to provide an additional \$125,000 per site to cover a final year of transition to non-Federal funding. All sites were still receiving SK/SS funds as of June 2004.

This four-volume report describes the results of Westat's national evaluation of SK/SS, which examined planning and implementation at the SK/SS sites from their initial awards in 1997 through June 2003 (before any site had received transitional funding). Volume I summarizes Westat's cross-site findings from multiple sources, including twice-yearly site visits, review of project documentation, three stakeholder surveys, a survey of agency personnel, and two structured surveys of “key informants.” It also discusses the lessons learned from the initiative. Volume II provides detailed case studies of the planning, implementation, and outcomes for each site. Volume III describes the methodology and findings of the final

¹ Recently, the Office on Violence Against Women was reorganized and is no longer a part of OJP, though it continues to work closely with different components of that office. For almost all of the SK/SS Initiative, OVW was under OJP, so that is the structure referred to throughout this document.

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Stakeholder Survey (N=277 respondents), conducted in 2003. Volume IV describes the methodology and findings of the 2002 Survey of Agency Personnel (N=353).

Federal Goals, Expectations, and Structure

OJP expected the SK/SS sites to:

- Restructure and strengthen their criminal and juvenile justice systems to be more comprehensive and proactive in helping children, adolescents, and families who have been involved in abuse and neglect or are at risk;
- Better coordinate the management of abuse and neglect cases by improving policy and practice in the criminal justice, juvenile justice, child welfare, family service, and related systems; and
- Develop comprehensive community-wide, cross-agency strategies to reduce child and adolescent abuse and neglect and resulting child fatalities.

Project plans had to incorporate four key elements:

- **System reform and accountability.** Sites were to reform policies, practices, and procedures across multiple systems and agencies to better identify and respond to child abuse and neglect and to hold offenders accountable. Improving cross-agency training and communication was an important part of this element.
- **A continuum of services to protect children and support families.** Sites were to provide a full range of services and supports for children and families, from prevention to treatment. In doing so, they were to explore ways to make more effective use of existing services and resources, including public and private funding and informal support systems.
- **Data collection and evaluation.** Sites were to improve information sharing across systems and agencies and make data collection about child abuse and neglect cases more uniform, so that decisions in individual cases and case management would be more informed. Sites also had to participate in the national evaluation and conduct a local evaluation to measure how well community-wide objectives and outcomes were met.
- **Prevention education.** Using multiple media, sites were to educate the community about child abuse and neglect and how to report it, the community services available for children and families, and good parenting practices.

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Sites were required to develop broad-based local collaboratives to carry out these plans. Members were to include representatives from criminal justice, child welfare, family service, education, health, and mental health agencies, along with “nontraditional” partners such as faith-based organizations, community groups, the media, and victims and their families. The SK/SS framework was flexible, to accommodate each community’s unique circumstances, and did not dictate how sites should allocate their effort among the four program elements. In OJP’s view, however, the overarching purpose of the SK/SS initiative was system reform.

A national core team, consisting of OJP program managers, Westat, and a technical assistance (TA) team, supported the initiative. The TA team was added in the second year to promote a stronger system reform focus and help sites access a wider range of TA. The TA included direct on-site assistance and subsidies for training or consultation from other sources. OJP also convened biennial “cluster conferences” for national team members and the sites.

The Grantees and Their Communities

OJP purposely selected communities with a solid infrastructure for SK/SS. All five grantees had a long history of work on child abuse and neglect, some experience with multidisciplinary and collaborative approaches, and community environments that were receptive to improving child protection. Beyond that, there were many differences in the characteristics of the lead agencies, community demographics, and local experience with cross-agency structures to coordinate approaches to child abuse and neglect.

The lead agencies in Huntsville, Kansas City, and Sault Ste. Marie had multimillion dollar budgets prior to SK/SS, compared with \$29,000 in Burlington and \$700,000 in Toledo. Sault Ste. Marie was the only project led by a government agency—Anishnabek Community & Family Services, the provider of social, mental health, and substance abuse services for the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians. It was also the only project to target a Tribal population and a multicounty area. The other four grantees were nonprofit organizations. Two of them—Burlington’s Community Network for Children, Youth and Families and Kansas City’s Heart of America United Way—had been convening stakeholders with an interest in a child abuse and neglect system for many years, but were not direct service providers. In contrast, the lead agencies in Huntsville and in Toledo had pivotal roles in the formal child protection system. Huntsville’s National Children’s Advocacy Center (NCAC)

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had pioneered the Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) approach, which combines multidisciplinary handling of child abuse cases with a child-friendly setting and resources for families. Toledo’s Family and Child Abuse Prevention Center (FCAPC) was coordinating several multidisciplinary teams (MDTs), supervising a home visiting program, and managing the area’s new CAC. (Kansas City was the only other site to have a CAC, operated by a local hospital.) The projects led by nonprofits all targeted a single county, although Kansas City focused direct services mostly on three high-need ZIP Code areas.

Program Implementation

Timetable

The first 18-month grant period was intended to cover both planning and early implementation, but was devoted mostly to planning. The fully funded sites were required to prepare formal Implementation Plans, which were submitted from 5 months (Huntsville) to a year (Burlington) after the initial awards. In every case, OJP required significant revisions or additions to the plan before giving final approval, although all sites were allowed to begin partial implementation by mid-1998. Two sites, Huntsville and Sault Ste. Marie, reopened and substantially revised their planning process as a result of OJP’s feedback.

Everywhere, the second grant period marked the transition to full implementation. Burlington and Toledo were the first to access their second award—in January 1999, 21 months after the initial awards. Sault Ste. Marie was the last to do so, in January 2000. Each continuation award was for the same amount as the initial award, except in Kansas City, where the funding level was cut to \$500,000 as of the third grant period. By June 2003, when Westat ended data collection for this report, Burlington, Huntsville, and Toledo had nearly spent their last full award and were preparing to access the \$125,000 in transitional funding. Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie had not yet tapped their last full award.

Allocation of Effort

Throughout planning and implementation, the lead agencies took primary responsibility for staffing the collaborative effort, but often used subgrants to support direct services and other discrete initiatives. Reflecting differences in the size of their awards, Kansas City and Huntsville consistently had the largest staff and Toledo the smallest. By mid-2003, all

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sites were spending from one-fifth to one-third of their SK/SS awards on core staffing and administration.

Project agendas spanned all four required program elements—system reform and accountability, continuum of services, data collection and evaluation, and prevention education and public information. However, sites made different choices initially about how to allocate their SK/SS resources, and their priorities shifted over time, based on local judgments about need and input from OJP and the TA team. During early implementation, Kansas City was the only site to allocate the largest share of its budget to system reform activities. In contrast, in Burlington, Toledo, and Sault Ste. Marie, allocations for services far outstripped allocations for system reform. Huntsville also allocated more to services than system reform initially, but the difference was not as great.

OJP and the TA team consistently urged sites to focus more on system reform and less on services. In Burlington, OJP negotiated extensively to shift the balance before awarding the fourth grant. By mid-2003, resource allocations had changed substantially across all sites. All were spending more on system reform, and Huntsville and Toledo had joined Kansas City in making it their largest investment. The turnaround in Toledo was truly dramatic, with services dropping to 27 percent of the budget (from 68% under Grant 2) and system reform rising to 47 percent (from 13%). Burlington also reduced its services budget (from 49% to 31%), redirecting funds to system reform and core staffing.

Allocations for data collection/evaluation and prevention education/public information started small and remained that way, relative to other program elements. Even so, in mid-2003, Sault Ste. Marie and Kansas City were budgeting about twice as much of the SK/SS funding for these activities as their counterparts—8 to 9 percent for data collection/evaluation and 12 to 14 percent for prevention education. Budgets for data collection ranged from nothing in Toledo to 4 and 6 percent in Huntsville and Burlington, while prevention education was budgeted at 5 to 6 percent in all three locations.

Each site carried out a unique mix of activities under each program element. There were some commonalities, however. Under system reform, for example, all sites worked to make more effective use of MDTs and CACs, enhancing them if they already existed and starting new ones if they did not. They also worked to improve training for mandated reporters. In the service area, several sites worked to expand or improve home visitation services,

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neighborhood- or community-based services, and parent education. Initiatives to help children affected by domestic violence were also common. In the data collection and evaluation area, all sites (with strong encouragement from OJP) undertook a Multisystem Case Analysis (MSCA)—tracking samples of child abuse and neglect cases across agencies in the formal child protection system. Under prevention education and public education, all sites developed a variety of resource materials (some of them web-based), appeared at community events, and made some use of mass media to carry their message. An extensive description of site-specific activities is found in Volume II.

Collaboration

Each site established a governing council to plan and implement SK/SS, building upon previous relationships and existing collaboratives. Only Toledo expanded an existing collaborative to serve as its governing body. Compared with the other sites, Sault Ste. Marie was at relative disadvantage in not having an existing collaborative to draw upon. Governing councils went through some changes, often related to turnover in member agencies' personnel, but few groups dropped out. Huntsville and Sault Ste. Marie made the most significant changes over time, replacing their original governing councils with new governance structures intended to strengthen member participation and sustainability. Sault Ste. Marie was still making the transition to its latest structure as of mid-2003, delayed by recent upheavals in Tribal leadership.

By the time the sites moved to full implementation, all the governing councils had representation from the required core agencies. Beyond that, they included a diverse array of nonprofit service providers and community groups. Typically, the agencies were represented by directors or other high level staff. The governing councils were supplemented by committees and workgroups, which also played an important role in designing and carrying out the SK/SS agenda. These groups included a broader range of participants, including mid-level and line staff from various agencies, and in some locations, community residents and clients. Most collaboratives also used broad-based community meetings to obtain community input on the project agenda and recruit more active participation.

A series of Stakeholder Surveys supplemented other sources of data on the make-up and roles of the more active stakeholders (those who served on councils or committees or received SK/SS subgrants). These surveys, conducted in 1998, 2001, and 2003, had 141, 264, and 277 respondents, respectively. On the 2003 survey, most respondents from agencies or

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other organizations said they had considerable authority to make decisions on behalf of their organizations. About 25 percent of respondents overall represented the formal child protection system (law enforcement, child protective services, prosecutors, courts), 32 percent represented other public agencies, and 26 percent private agencies. The remaining 17 percent represented “nontraditional” groups such as professional or civic organizations, community or neighborhood groups, parents, youth, and business. However, this distribution varied markedly across sites. In Toledo, for example, the largest group of respondents was from the formal child protection system (55%), and in Burlington, the largest group was private service providers (51%). Huntsville and Kansas City had the most nontraditional respondents—about 30 percent each, compared to 10 percent in Burlington and 2 or 3 percent in Toledo and Sault Ste. Marie. The typical respondent spent about 2 hours per month on SK/SS and attended 5 meetings per year, but each site had a core group of much more active stakeholders. Although there was a modest correlation between receiving funding from SK/SS and participation, among respondents whose organizations had never received SK/SS funding, many were involved several hours a month, and 38 percent said their organizations had contributed staff to SK/SS efforts.

Survey data and other interviews highlighted some challenges to developing effective collaboratives. As of 2003, limited resources and maintaining the momentum appeared to be the most pressing concerns. The least frequently reported challenge was ineffective leadership. Other challenges, such as leadership turnover, lack of participation by key agencies, and “turf issues” were of much greater concern in some locations than others. Turf issues, while still a concern in some sites, appeared to be less important than in earlier years. When turf issues did occur, they most often surfaced around CACs, MDTs, and other specific activities that required cross-agency agreement on protocols and roles—and not around the broader mission or role of SK/SS itself.

Another challenge involved getting nontraditional partners involved in the collaborative and its governing council, particularly partners who did not represent any organized group, such as parents, clients, and community residents. Respondents to the 2003 survey recognized shortcomings in this area, especially in the same sites where “nontraditional” respondents were few. Fifty-eight percent of respondents in Burlington and 41 percent in Toledo were dissatisfied with the cultural and ethnic diversity of the SK/SS effort; 58 percent in Sault Ste. Marie and 44 percent in Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie said there had not been enough community involvement.

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On balance, the collaboratives developed for SK/SS were reasonably faithful to OJP expectations. They grew and diversified over time, retained the commitment of their members, and took on issues beyond the scope of the Federal grant. They became more than a forum for information-sharing or a rubber stamp for staff, sharing responsibility and accountability for decisions, although to varying degrees. They also shared resources—primarily personnel time rather than money. In the process, the sites used many strategies typical of other successful collaboratives, including involving key players early, establishing a shared vision and defining outcomes, setting readily attainable objectives, devising creative and realistic strategies, emphasizing what partners agreed on and respecting differences, avoiding “red herrings” that would derail collaboration-building, and publicizing success and acknowledging contributions from partners. The sites were less successful at including participants at every level (especially community members and consumers, but also mid-level and line agency staff) and finding ways to empower community residents and clients to participate more effectively. Most sites were making new efforts in these areas, however.

OJP did not necessarily expect the SK/SS collaborative structure to continue beyond the term of Federal funding, but all except the Kansas City collaborative were hoping to do so. They were at different stages of planning for it as of mid-2003. Kansas City had decided to transfer the functions of its collaborative to the Jackson County Quality Assurance Committee, which oversees the exit plan for the local child protective services (CPS) agency’s Consent Decree.

Accomplishments of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Sites

National evaluators did not observe any changes in reported child maltreatment during the term of the study and did not expect to. However, they reported significant accomplishments that are expected to help reduce maltreatment, delinquency, and other problem behaviors in the long run.

Increased Organizational Capacity To Respond to Child Abuse and Neglect

SK/SS played a key role in creating new agency structures for case handling, improving existing structures, and changing policies and procedures to improve case processing and outcomes. For example:

- Two sites (Burlington and Huntsville) implemented new prosecution units.
- Four sites started Drug Courts (Huntsville, Kansas City, Sault Ste. Marie, and Toledo).
- Three sites (Huntsville, Kansas City, and Toledo) started or expanded law enforcement units to handle child maltreatment and domestic violence.
- The two sites without CACs at the outset (Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie) started them.
- The three sites with existing CACs made a variety of improvements in their training, procedures, and MDT arrangements.
- One site (Burlington) upgraded and expanded MDTs for at-risk or “gray area” families. It also improved resources and facilities for forensic examinations of sexual assault victims.
- Aside from these changes, two sites (Kansas City and Toledo) were especially active in developing other new protocols, procedures, and guidelines, among them protocols for filing court cases on drug-exposed infants, structured decisionmaking tools for CPS, permanency planning protocols for Juvenile Court, and pediatric sexual assault guidelines.

Most of these changes do not depend on SK/SS funds for their continuation. The exceptions are the new CACs in Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie, which had yet to establish a secure funding base as of June 2003.

Increased Personal and Professional Capacity To Respond to Child Abuse and Neglect

SK/SS stakeholders benefited personally from participation in the project, according to survey respondents. In the 2003 survey, 72 percent said they had made new contacts in the child abuse and neglect field, and more than half made new contacts in the juvenile justice field, received new training as a result of SK/SS, and/or increased their ability to

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do their jobs effectively. All sites had an active training agenda and attempted to improve mandated reporting and cross-agency understanding of roles and responsibilities in the child protection system. While some popular training efforts will need funding to continue after SK/SS, many efforts were designed to survive through development of products and/or adoption by another agency. These include, for example:

- A self-administered tutorial for mandated reporters, now required for all new Tribal employees (Sault Ste. Marie).
- A training curriculum on Medical Aspects of Child Abuse and Neglect, now mandated for CPS workers and conducted by the local children's hospital (Kansas City).
- A mandated reported video and toolkit, to be distributed statewide (Burlington).
- *Resources 101*, a monthly orientation to community resources, required for new agency staff at CPS and Healthy Families (Huntsville).

New or Expanded Services for Children and Families

In the short term, the projects succeeded in filling some gaps in the continuum of prevention, intervention, and treatment services, primarily through subgrants to service providers and community agencies. Several of the services were designed to reach out to families in their homes and neighborhoods. In most sites, it was too soon to judge whether the services will survive the loss of SK/SS support, but the evaluators found some promising signs:

- In Burlington, the project had already discontinued its many subgrants, yet most services were continuing, albeit at slightly reduced levels. Continuing services ran the gamut from intensive home visitation and grandparent support to group therapy for child witnesses of violence and treatment for juvenile sex offenders.
- When Kansas City cut back its Neighborhood Services Grants (a result of reductions in its SK/SS award), it successfully leveraged other local resources to take up the slack.
- Toledo revamped its home visitation model, the project's major service priority, to make it more affordable and secured additional support for it through state and Federal funding.

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- Alternate funding was supporting several programs developed in Huntsville, including First Responders (to domestic violence scenes), Parents as Teachers, supervised visitation, and a parenting program for noncustodial fathers.
- Three sites (Burlington, Huntsville, and Kansas City) had sponsored training to increase the ability of service providers and grassroots organizations to raise funds on their own.

Greater Interagency Communication, Cooperation, and Collaboration

Many of the new programs and protocols, by their very nature, required greater interagency communication and collaboration. It was too early to tell whether these specific relationships would endure. However, many key informants reported that collaboration had become the normal, expected way of doing business—i.e., the community culture had changed—and they credited SK/SS with playing a key role in that change. Closer collaboration between the domestic violence and child protection communities was particularly noteworthy in several sites.

In other areas, accomplishments were more modest or uneven across sites. It was also too early to judge their ultimate payoff, although there were signs of short-term successes. Many of these activities will require alternate sources of support to continue beyond SK/SS.

Increasing Cultural Competence

All sites took some steps to promote cultural competency through training or grant programs. Sault Ste. Marie had the most comprehensive approach, undertaking an ambitious multi-year training program called the Community Healing Process, which was designed to infuse cultural values and practices throughout Tribal programs. The Tribe's Cultural Division was expected to become a permanent home for continuing these efforts. Huntsville inaugurated the popular Diversity Schoolhouse, which has been copied by four other communities and will be continued by the lead agency.

Increased Capacity for Collecting and Using Data

This was a challenging area for SK/SS, but there was evidence of some capacity-building. First, Westat detected greater recognition of the need for data-based decisionmaking

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and an increased appetite for information about how well individual agencies and the community are addressing child maltreatment. One concrete improvement: frustrated by its difficulty finding local evaluation expertise for SK/SS, the lead agency in Huntsville created a new research division. Second, several sites modestly improved their capabilities for electronic case tracking and information sharing, by upgrading technology for e-mail and interagency access to data. Several sites contributed to development of new databases for certain types of cases or clients (serious sexual and physical abuse cases in Burlington, substance abuse clients in Sault Ste. Marie, emergency room cases and home visitation clients in Toledo).

Increased Prevention Education and Public Awareness

In this area, it was easier to gauge efforts than results. Huntsville and Sault Ste. Marie developed comprehensive public information campaigns around child abuse and neglect and also tried to make community resource information broadly available by instituting web-based resource information systems. Burlington developed a resource directory that got wide distribution, and Huntsville's "Purple Pages" team succeeded in adding a resource section to the phone book. Burlington and Kansas City also used subgrants to support prevention education. Kansas City's grant program was explicitly intended to build community capacity for continued prevention education.

Changes in Legislation, State Policy, and Resource Distribution

Many of the accomplishments referenced above required participating agencies to shift resources. However, SK/SS efforts to effect macro-level changes in legislation, state policy, or resources were in their infancy. With TA support, Huntsville had begun working on developing a local Children's Budget. The Kansas City and Burlington collaboratives had voiced their concerns on budget cuts at the state level. But mostly the sites were still in reactive mode. Burlington had started to be more proactive, cosponsoring regular legislative breakfasts and joining the state's leading child advocacy group, where staff successfully persuaded the group to add a separate section on maltreatment to its agenda.

Local Perspectives on Accomplishments

Westat systematically solicited local perspectives on accomplishments through the 2003 Stakeholder Survey and a 2002 Survey of Agency Personnel. (Details of these surveys are

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presented in Volumes III and IV, respectively.) On average, stakeholders responded that SK/SS had affected their community in 9 areas, out of a list of 19 choices. Across sites, the most frequently reported effects were:

- Improvements in communication and cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect (74%),
- Improvements in multiagency responses to children affected by domestic violence (67%),
- Improved community education on child abuse and neglect (61%),
- Expanded prevention programs (60%), and
- Improved information sharing and case tracking across agencies (60%).

When asked to select the *most* important effects out of the 19, the top choice was improving communication and cooperation in Burlington, Huntsville, and Kansas City. In Toledo, respondents ranked improving information sharing and case-tracking number one and in Sault Ste. Marie, the most popular choice was educating community residents about child abuse and neglect.

The majority of stakeholders felt that SK/SS had significantly affected their own agencies in one or more ways (73%), had a major effect on the children and families they served (55%), and were quite satisfied with the SK/SS accomplishments (66%). Satisfaction levels were highest in Huntsville (79%) and Burlington (70%) and lowest in Sault Ste. Marie (49%) and Toledo (59%), with Kansas City in between (65%).

On the 2002 Survey of Agency Personnel, most respondents (77%) reported making more frequent interagency contacts. They usually attributed these changes to improved knowledge of whom to contact and a closer working relationship with staff of other agencies. Some respondents reported other improvements. About 57 percent saw some improvement in the child protection system in the past 2 years, at least in some areas. Just over one-third (34%) of all workers attributed some of the improvement to SK/SS, but many respondents were not familiar with the SK/SS project.

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Factors That Influenced the Outcomes of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Projects

The OJP Framework for Safe Kids/Safe Streets

Several features of the OJP framework help account for the solid performance of SK/SS. They include an adaptable program design, a generous timeframe, a strong commitment to the primacy of system reform and comprehensive collaboration, the availability of TA and other supports, and the emphasis on treating SK/SS as a “learning community.” Some features of the framework presented challenges, however, including the broad parameters of the initiative; the limited body of knowledge about collaborative approaches; OJP’s interoffice management structure; turnover among OJP managers, TA, and evaluation personnel; lack of clarity about requirements vs. suggestions or options, and the continued elaboration of expectations. Some of these challenges were unavoidable or represent the downside of otherwise desirable features, but careful planning might minimize them in future initiatives.

Site-Level Factors

Across sites, several factors set the stage for successful project efforts, including: the selection of a credible lead agency, a history of collaboration, a favorable community climate, initial commitments from key decisionmakers, and the existence of complementary initiatives. Four other factors helped the sites make good on the opportunity offered by SK/SS—skilled project leadership and staff, leadership stability, development of a process and structure that supported collaboration, and sustained commitment from key partners.

While the positives outweighed the negatives, there were obstacles to be overcome. They included a preoccupation with service strategies as the solution to local problems; limitations in local data collection systems and evaluation capabilities; turnover in leadership positions at key agencies; absent or intermittent partners; limited involvement by neighborhood representatives, parents, consumers, and other nontraditional partners; belated attention to sustainability planning; turf issues; and a declining economy. Two factors—highly publicized child fatalities (in Burlington and Kansas City) and resource differentials across projects—had mixed or uncertain effects on project outcomes.

Lessons Learned From the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Experience

Overall, the original design and OJP’s approach to implementation were assets to the SK/SS initiative. The evaluators concluded that the SK/SS approach can succeed in a wide range of communities. However, some community conditions make success more likely. These include the conditions favored by OJP in its selection criteria, such as existing capacity and infrastructure, including a capable, credible lead agency and prior experience with collaboration. Also, flexibility in program oversight and design can help programs overcome barriers, weather false starts, and adapt to new challenges and opportunities.

In summing up, the evaluators highlight many “good ideas” that emerged from the experience of the SK/SS demonstration sites. These include developing effective strategies for building and maintaining collaboratives, increasing the personal and professional capacities of stakeholders, institutionalizing cross-agency training, and building cultural competence. They encourage other jurisdictions to look to the SK/SS sites for examples of new or enhanced structures that may combat child abuse—such as Drug Courts, special police or prosecution units, CACs, and MDTs—and examples of useful policy/procedural changes. They also point to the range of services implemented. In the data collection and evaluation arena, the evaluators encourage other jurisdictions to seek TA early on results-based accountability approaches and data integration, so that they can inform planning and resource allocation. In the prevention education sphere, evaluators urge sites to explicitly link these efforts to their overall system reform agenda.

The national evaluators also offer recommendations for sponsors of future comprehensive, community-wide, collaborative initiatives. These recommendations cover:

- Addressing timing issues through a longer planning period (9 to 12 months), a longer demonstration period overall (8 to 10 years), a transitional period of stepped-down funding (1 to 2 years), and more detailed project timelines.
- Achieving balance by providing more initial guidance about the interrelationships among program elements, the appropriate balance of investments, the relationship between service efforts and system reform, and the participation of nontraditional partners.
- Providing TA during planning, implementation, and the transition from Federal or other outside funding.

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- Developing a learning community by providing clear and consistent messages from all team members, defining roles for all team members, providing TA to collaborative partners (including project staff and key stakeholders), documenting key decisions or understandings reached with sites, and expanding communication beyond project staff to stakeholders.
- Evaluating comprehensive initiatives, at the local level, by focusing evaluation on “results-based accountability,” involving local evaluators in planning, and using evaluation committees or similar structures to engage stakeholders, and, at the national level, by defining the evaluator’s role early, aligning evaluation products with the needs of the learning community, and bringing local and national evaluators together more often to exchange information/expertise and plan joint efforts.

List of Acronyms

ACFS	Anishnabek Community and Family Services
BHF	Building Healthy Families
BSNAF	Building Strong Native American Families
CAC	Children’s Advocacy Center
CASA	Court Appointed Special Advocate
CATF	Lucas County Child Abuse Task Force
CWLA	Child Welfare League of America
CPC	Child Protection Center
CPS	Child Protective Services
CPT	Child Protection Team
CUSI	Chittenden Unit for Special Investigations
DFS	Division of Family Services
DHR	Department of Human Resources
EOWS	Executive Office for Weed and Seed
FCAPC	Family and Child Abuse Prevention Center
GAL	guardian ad litem
HAUW	Heart of America United Way
HFA	Healthy Families America
HFLC	Healthy Families Lucas County
HSCB	Human Services Collaborative Body
IEL	Institute for Educational Leadership
KCPD	Kansas City Police Department
LCCS	Lucas County Children’s Services
LINC	Local Investment Commission
MC3	Madison County Coordinating Council for Families and Children
MDT	multidisciplinary team
MIS	management information system
MSCA	multisystem case analysis
NCAC	National Children’s Advocacy Center
NCL	National Civic League
OJJDP	Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
OJP	Office of Justice Programs
OVW	Office on Violence Against Women

List of Acronyms

PSA	public service announcement
PSP	Public Sector Partners
SAMHSA	Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
SAO	State's Attorney's Office
SITTAP	Systems Improvement Training and Technical Assistance Project
SK/SS	Safe Kids/Safe Streets
SRS	Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services
TA	technical assistance
VNA	Visiting Nurses Association

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1. Introduction

Many studies suggest that child abuse and neglect are risk factors for the development of juvenile delinquency and other problem behaviors. The Safe Kids/Safe Streets (SK/SS) program, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs (OJP), was designed to break the cycle, by reducing child abuse and neglect through comprehensive, multifaceted strategies involving a wide array of community partners.

Five demonstration sites were selected to implement SK/SS, which began in 1997. Three offices within OJP—the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the Executive Office for Weed & Seed (EOWS), and the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW)—funded the sites and jointly monitored them, with OJJDP providing overall coordination.²

Federal Goals and Expectations for Safe Kids/Safe Streets

The goals for SK/SS, as stated in the original Program Announcement, were ambitious. Participating communities were expected to:

- Restructure and strengthen their criminal and juvenile justice systems to be more comprehensive and proactive in helping children, adolescents, and families who have been involved in abuse and neglect or are at risk;
- Better coordinate the management of abuse and neglect cases by improving policy and practice in the criminal justice, juvenile justice, child welfare, family service, and related systems; and
- Develop comprehensive community-wide, cross-agency strategies to reduce child and adolescent abuse and neglect and resulting child fatalities.³

To pursue these goals, sites were expected to develop broad-based local collaboratives, building on relationships and collaborations already in place. The SK/SS collaboratives were supposed to include agencies from the justice, child welfare, family service, education, health, and mental

² Recently, the Office on Violence Against Women was reorganized and is no longer a part of OJP, though it continues to work closely with different components of that office. For almost all of the SK/SS Initiative, OVW was under OJP, so that is the structure referred to throughout this document.

³ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *Safe Kids/Safe Streets-Community Approaches to Reducing Abuse and Neglect and Preventing Delinquency*, FY 1996 Discretionary Competitive Program Announcements and Application Kit, Washington, DC: Author, July 1996: 34.

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health systems. Besides the “system” representatives, they also were to include nontraditional partners such as faith-based organizations, community groups, the media, and victims and their families.

The SK/SS collaboratives were required to develop and carry out plans that incorporated four key elements:

- **System reform and accountability.** Sites were to reform policies, practices, and procedures across multiple systems and agencies to better identify and respond to child abuse and neglect and to hold offenders accountable. Improving cross-agency training and communication was an important part of this element.
- **A continuum of services to protect children and support families.** Sites were to provide a full range of services and supports for children and families, from prevention to treatment. In doing so, they were to explore ways to make more effective use of existing services and resources, including public and private funding and informal support systems.
- **Data collection and evaluation.** Sites were to improve information sharing across systems and agencies and make data collection about child abuse and neglect cases more uniform, so that decisions in individual cases and case management would be more informed. Sites also had to participate in the national evaluation and conduct a local evaluation of their efforts to measure how well communitywide objectives and outcomes were met.
- **Prevention education.** Using multiple media, sites were to educate the community about child abuse and neglect and how to report it, the community services available for children and families, and good parenting practices.

The Program Announcement did not fully spell out the interconnections among these four program elements or how sites should allocate their efforts among them. It provided a flexible framework, intended to accommodate each community’s unique circumstances. In OJP’s view, however, the overarching purpose of the SK/SS initiative was system reform. Over time, OJP program officers provided greater clarification about their expectations and the primacy of system reform, with support from technical assistance (TA) providers.

The Safe Kids/Safe Streets Sites

The five SK/SS sites, selected from a field of 178 applicants, received their initial awards in March 1997. The sites were diverse, ranging from moderate and mid-sized cities

(Huntsville, Alabama; Kansas City, Missouri; and Toledo, Ohio) to rural (Burlington, Vermont) and Tribal (Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan) communities. Initial awards ranged from \$425,000 for the rural and Tribal sites to \$800,000 for Huntsville and \$923,645 for Kansas City. (Lower funding for rural and Tribal sites was prescribed in the Program Announcement.) Unlike the other sites, Toledo received only “seed money”—\$125,000—intended to encourage promising activities underway in the community.⁴

The initial awards were to cover 18 months, including 6 to 9 months of planning. According to the Program Announcement, the sites would receive four more awards of one year each, bringing the total period of Federal support to 5½ years. OJP recognized that projects might need more time, however, and did not hold them to a strict timetable. Planning, in particular, took considerably longer than expected. The fully funded sites needed from 17 to 25 months to win OJP’s final approval of their Implementation Plans.⁵ However, OJP allowed partial implementation to get underway everywhere by mid-1998. In 2003, OJP decided to augment the original program design by covering a year of transition to non-Federal funding for all sites. As a result, each site was slated to receive a sixth award of \$125,000.

As of June 2004, more than 7 years after the initial awards, all projects still had SK/SS funds left. Burlington, Huntsville, and Toledo were nearing the end of their sixth and final awards, while Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie were still spending their fifth awards. Table 1-1 identifies the lead agency at each site and summarizes its funding history.

Four of the grantees are nonprofit organizations. The exception occurs in Sault Ste. Marie, where the lead agency is a Tribal government agency and provider of social, mental health, and substance abuse services to the Sault Sainte Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians.

This Report

OJP selected Westat to conduct the national evaluation of SK/SS in 1997, before the sites began work. Since then, evaluation staff have observed and documented the planning

⁴ Toledo was seen as not quite ready to implement the SK/SS model or vision. Although the community had a burgeoning collaborative to support children and families involved in child abuse and neglect, it lacked depth in prevention programs.

⁵ Because it received only seed funding, Toledo was not required to do the planning demanded of other sites.

Table 1-1. Characteristics of the Lead Agencies for the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Projects

	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	Toledo, OH
Project Name	KidSafe	One by One	KIDSAFE	Building Strong Native American Families (BSNAF)	Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program
Lead agency	Community Network for Children, Youth, & Families (The Community Network) ^a	National Children’s Advocacy Center (NCAC)	Heart of America United Way (HAUW)	Anishnabek Community and Family Services (ACFS)	Family and Child Abuse Prevention Center (FCAPC)
Type of agency	Private, nonprofit organization; a partnership of agencies, community groups, and individuals working together to improve the community’s response to child abuse and neglect	Private, nonprofit organization to coordinate agency responses to child abuse and neglect, to reduce trauma to victims, and improve results for prosecution	A nonprofit agency serving 6 counties in the bi-state metropolitan Kansas City area and administering funds for nonprofit health and human service agencies	A Tribal government agency and provider of social services, mental health services, and substance abuse services to the Sault Sainte Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians	A nonprofit, community-based education, public awareness, and direct services agency
Mission	To strengthen the community’s ability to ensure safety and nurturance for children and their families at risk of abuse and neglect and reduce their exposure to violence	To model and promote excellence in child abuse response and prevention	To increase the organized capacity of all people to care for one another	To develop an integrated, seamless, and multi-disciplinary service delivery system that provides for appropriate, culturally sensitive services. It shall be designed for the prevention and early identification of child abuse and neglect. Services shall be client oriented, easily accessible, and focused toward measured positive client outcomes	To provide high quality, innovative services through coordinated, community-based education, public awareness, and direct intervention programs to prevent violence to children and families
Number of years in existence	25	18	85	25	30
^a In 2003, the agency began doing business as the KidSafe Collaborative of Chittenden County.					

Table 1-1. Characteristics of the Lead Agencies for the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Projects (continued)

	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	Toledo, OH
Total annual budget ^b					
1996	\$ 29,120	\$2,426,225	\$3,580,370	\$3,860,695	\$397,216 (6 months)
1997	111,880	2,135,247	3,937,550	4,727,840	701,362
1998	442,900	2,331,715	4,225,059	5,796,940	809,789
1999	511,978	3,694,472	3,694,472	5,584,232	894,077
2000	471,406	3,981,479	N/A	7,092,451	970,001
2001	497,382	4,091,585 ^c	N/A	7,412,218	974,657
2002	\$469,300	\$6,137,209 ^d	N/A	\$7,538,744	\$977,707
OJP Funding Source (Type of Award)	OVW (Rural)	OJJDP	EOWS	OVW (Tribal)	OJJDP (Seed)
SK/SS Awards (Time Period)					
Grant 1 ^e	\$ 424,494 (3.97-12.98)	\$ 800,000 (3.97-4.99)	\$923,645 (3.97-9.99)	\$425,000 (3.97-12.99)	\$125,000 (3.97-12.98)
Grant 2	424,494 (1.99-12.99)	800,000 (5.99-3.00)	923,645 (10.99-6.01)	425,000 (1.00-6.01)	125,000 (1.99-12.99)
Grant 3	424,494 (1.00-3.01)	800,000 (4.00-3.01)	500,000 (7.01-6.02) ^g	425,000 (7.01-6.02)	125,000 (1.00-5.01)
Grant 4	424,494 (4.01-3.02)	800,000 (4.01-3.02)	500,000 (7/02-6/03)	425,000 (7.02-7.03)	125,000 (6.01-3.02)
Grant 5	427,024 (4.02-6.03)	800,000 (4.02-12.03)	500,000 (7/03-9.04)	425,000 (8.03-8.04)	125,000 (4.02-12.03)
Grant 6	<u>125,000^f</u>	<u>125,000^f</u>	<u>125,000^f</u>	<u>125,000^f</u>	<u>125,000^f</u>
Total	\$2,250,000	\$4,125,000	\$3,472,290	\$2,250,000	\$750,000
Target area	Chittenden County, VT	Madison County	ZIP Codes 64124, 64127 and 64128	Mackinac, Chippewa, and Schoolcraft counties	Lucas County

^b Beginning in 1997, the budget includes SK/SS awards. Burlington budgets are for fiscal years running from 4/1 to 3/31.

^c Includes \$760,405 of capital revenue.

^d Includes \$2,045,150 of capital revenue.

^e Funding for the grant period was expected to cover 18 months. Subsequent awards were for 1 year, but projects were allowed to carry over unexpended funds.

^f Each site was expected to receive an additional \$125,000 transitional grant for continued sustainability efforts. Burlington, Huntsville, and Toledo applied for these funds in June 2003. Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie were not expected to apply for these funds until spring or summer 2004.

^g Kansas City's award was reduced to \$500,000 in later years due to budget constraints within EOWS.

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and implementation experiences of the sites, striving to determine the effectiveness of the SK/SS approach and derive lessons for other jurisdictions grappling with similar problems. Most of our work has focused on “process” rather than “impact” evaluation. Resource constraints dictated this approach, along with the recognition that it could take many years to detect the impacts of SK/SS on community levels of child abuse and neglect.

This report represents the culmination of all Westat’s evaluation work to date and the final stage of the SK/SS process evaluation.⁶ The report contains four volumes:

- Volume I, the current volume, which provides a cross-site examination of the SK/SS initiative.
- Volume II, which contains detailed case studies for all five sites.
- Volume III, which reports the results from the third in a series of surveys of SK/SS stakeholders, conducted early in 2003.
- Volume 4, which reports on a 2002 Survey of Agency Personnel at four SK/SS sites (all but Toledo).

This Volume

The current volume, Volume I, documents SK/SS experiences from the initial awards through June 2003, drawing upon the materials in the other three volumes and information contained in five previous reports.⁷ It focuses on SK/SS implementation across sites and the overall results of the initiative as of mid-2003.

Chapter 2 provides background on the rationale for the SK/SS initiative, its objectives, and the organizations that participated at the national and local levels. It also

⁶ One more report is planned, which will summarize evaluation activities undertaken with supplemental funds. These activities focus primarily on the effects of SK/SS on case processing and communitywide outcomes.

⁷ The previous reports include one on the initial planning and early implementation period of SK/SS—Gragg, F., Cronin, R., Myers, T., Schultz, D., & Sedlak, A., *An Examination of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Planning Process: Year 1 Final Report for the National Evaluation of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program*, Rockville, MD: Westat, 1999. Three subsequent reports covered approximately a year each—Gragg, F., Cronin, R., Schultz, D., & Myers, T., *From Planning to Implementation: A Year 2 Status Report on the National Evaluation of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program*, Rockville, MD: Westat, 2000; Gragg, F., Cronin, R., Schultz, D., & Eisen, K., *Year 3 Status Report on the Implementation of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program*, Rockville, MD: Westat, 2001; and Gragg, F., Cronin, R., Schultz, D., & Eisen, K., *Year 4 Status Report on the Implementation of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program*, Rockville, MD: Westat, 2002. There was also a separate report on a survey of stakeholders conducted in 2001—Cronin, R., & Gragg, F., *Implementation of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program: Report on the Stakeholder Survey, Year 3*, Rockville, MD: Westat, 2002.

describes the national evaluation in more detail. Chapter 3 introduces the local grantees and their communities. Chapter 4 contains abbreviated case studies of the planning and implementation activities at each site and their status as of mid-2003. In Chapter 5, we review how the sites approached collaboration, the challenges they encountered, and the prospects for sustaining the collaboratives after SK/SS. Chapter 6 summarizes the key accomplishments of the sites under the four required program elements and considers the likelihood of their being sustained. Chapter 7 highlights the factors that most helped or hindered the achievements of SK/SS across sites. Finally, Chapter 8 characterizes the overall results of the SK/SS initiative and considers the lessons learned about program development, collaboration, and system reform.

The three appendices provide supporting materials to the study. Appendix A presents a logic model for the overall SK/SS Initiative. Appendix B provides information on child abuse definitions, reporting requirements, and mandatory reporters for each state hosting a SK/SS program. Lastly, Appendix A provides contact information for each of the sites.

Introduction

2. Structure of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative

The SK/SS initiative applies comprehensive, communitywide strategies to the reduction of child abuse and neglect. In this chapter, we discuss some of the research and program experience that underlie the initiative. We then describe the development of the Program Announcement, the selection of sites, and the structure developed for monitoring and evaluating the projects.

Foundations of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative

During the first half of the 1990s, public concern about juvenile delinquency was growing, fueled by indications of disproportionate increases in crime by juveniles, especially violent crime.⁸ OJJDP and the Department of Justice (DOJ) responded to this challenge with a variety of initiatives, grounded in a comprehensive framework based on research into the causes and correlates of juvenile delinquency as well as effective prevention and intervention techniques.⁹

This approach recognized that there are many pathways to delinquency and that multiple factors—communal, familial, educational, and individual/peer—place children at risk. According to this framework, communities can prevent delinquency and other problem behaviors by focusing on reducing these risks and enhancing factors that protect against them. Because the risk factors are so diverse and often are interrelated, many different service systems in the community, including justice, human services, education, and health, have a role to play in responding to them. In fact, the most effective responses are collaborative, engaging all the relevant systems as well as community members in planning and implementation.¹⁰

⁸ Snyder, H.N., Sickmund, M., & Poe-Yamagata, E., *Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1996 Update on Violence*, Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, February 1996.

⁹ Howell, J.C. (Ed.), *Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders*, Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, June 1995.

¹⁰ Howell, J.C., *Delinquency Prevention Works: Program Summary*, Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1995.

Structure of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative

In the years preceding SK/SS, this framework had shaped many OJJDP initiatives, including the Title V Delinquency Prevention Program, the Comprehensive Strategies Program, and the Safe Futures initiative to reduce youth violence and delinquency.¹¹

SK/SS built on these experiences and took the framework a step further, targeting the particular constellation of risks and problems related to child abuse and neglect. It acknowledged emerging evidence that children do not just suffer immediately from child abuse and neglect, but the experiences increase their likelihood of subsequent delinquency, substance abuse, and possibly abuse and neglect of their own children. In recent years, the evidence for this cycle has continued to accumulate. Researchers have reported that:

- Children who experienced maltreatment—sexual abuse, physical abuse, or neglect—were more likely to be arrested later in life (26.0% of abused people were arrested as juveniles versus 16.8% of those who were not abused; 28.6% of abused people were arrested as adults versus 21.0% of those who were not).¹²
- Children who experienced any type of abuse were more likely to commit a sex crime as an adult than nonabused children. (The odds of committing such a crime were 4.7 times higher for children who were sexually abused, 4.1 times higher for physical abuse victims, and 2.2 times higher for neglected children.)¹³
- Child abuse victims were significantly more likely than nonvictims to have an official record (45% vs. 32%) or to self-report serious (42% vs. 33%) or violent (70% vs. 56%) delinquency.¹⁴
- There were high rates of substantiated child abuse among female (39%) and male (66%) delinquent offenders in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin.¹⁵
- Among adult offenders in state prisons, 16 percent of males and 57 percent of females experienced child maltreatment compared to 5 to 8 percent of males and 12 to 17 percent of females in the general population.¹⁶

¹¹ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *1995 Report to Congress: Title V Incentive Grants for Local Delinquency Prevention Programs*, Washington, DC: Author, March 1996; Howell, 1995, op. cit.; Kracke, K., *Safe Futures: Partnerships to Reduce Youth Violence and Delinquency*, Fact Sheet #38, Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, June 1996.

¹² Widom, C.S., *Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse—Later Criminal Consequences*, Research in Brief, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1995: 5-6.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Kelley, B.T., Thornberry, T.P., & Smith, C.A., *In the Wake of Child Maltreatment*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1997.

¹⁵ Wiebush, R., Freitag, R., & Baird, C., *Preventing Delinquency Through Improved Child Protection Services*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 2001: 2.

Structure of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative

- Childhood abuse and neglect are related to problems other than later delinquency and criminal behavior.¹⁷ Such problems include poor grades, drug use, adolescent pregnancies, violent behavior, and other psychological disorders.

The research also pointed to a number of successful strategies for reducing child abuse and neglect. For example, adding prevention programs—home visitation, early parenting intervention programs, and multifaceted prevention interventions—appeared to divert families from the system.¹⁸ Research also suggested that the efficacy of the formal child protection system could be increased by emphasizing community involvement and ownership, creating new partnerships, bridging agency boundaries, and broadening community accountability for protecting children.¹⁹

Development of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative

When it came time to develop the solicitation, OJJDP turned for help to two working groups—one comprised staff within OJP and the second comprised practitioners and researchers from a range of disciplines—law enforcement, prosecution, medicine, children’s advocacy, and psychology. OJP garnered additional input from interviews and questionnaires administered to over 50 other professionals, parents, and victims. The working groups addressed the complex questions of (1) how to break the cycle between childhood victimization and later juvenile or adult crime, and (2) how OJP could best help communities to achieve that end.

The advisers concurred that the solutions had to be developed locally, albeit with Federal support, and needed to use comprehensive, community-based, interdisciplinary approaches. In particular, they argued that:

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 2.

¹⁷ Kelley, Thornberry, & Smith, 1997, op. cit.; Lemmon, J.H., “How Child Maltreatment Affects Dimensions of Juvenile Delinquency in a Cohort of Low-income Urban Youths,” *Justice Quarterly*, 16(2), 1999: 357-76; National Institute of Justice, *Childhood Victimization and Risk for Alcohol and Drug Arrests*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1995; National Institute of Justice, *The Cycle of Violence Revisited*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1996; Weeks, R., & Widom, C.S., *Early Childhood Victimization Among Incarcerated Adult Male Felons*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1998; Widom, 1995, op. cit.; Wiebush, Freitag, & Baird, 2001, op. cit.

¹⁸ CSR, Inc., *Lessons Learned: The Experience of Nine Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Programs*, Washington, DC: Author, 1996: 6-8.

¹⁹ Farrow, F., *Building Community Partnerships for Child Protection*, Paper prepared for the Executive Session on Child Protection, Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy, Kennedy School of Government, 1997: 1, 6-7.

Structure of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative

- System reform is essential in many areas—including case handling, interagency coordination, family involvement, professional capabilities, and culturally sensitive practice. The system also needs to deal better with co-occurring problems, such as child abuse and partner abuse. “Tinkering” will not be sufficient to address these issues.
- Communities need a broad spectrum of quality services and community supports to prevent child abuse and neglect and meet the needs of families where children are already at risk.
- Communities needed to gather, analyze, and share more information on abuse, both to help evaluate their efforts and make better decisions in individual cases.
- Communities need to use mass media and other strategies to raise public awareness of abuse and neglect and reach adults with information about parenting and resources.²⁰

These themes underpin the four program elements that later became part of the final Program Announcement.

Based upon experiences from ongoing OJJDP programs (e.g., Safe Futures, Title V, and Comprehensive Strategies) and advice from the work groups, OJP also decided to seek out sites where cooperation or collaboration around child abuse and neglect already existed. However, sites would have to anchor the SK/SS collaborative in six key systems—justice, child welfare, family services, medical, mental health, and education—and supplement it with a range of local agencies; neighborhood, religious, and charitable groups; nonprofit organizations; and other groups that have the potential to affect child maltreatment.

OJJDP also decided to fund the proposed program collaboratively. OJJDP approached offices within OJP, as well as agencies outside of DOJ. Two offices within OJP—OVW and EOWS—agreed to commit significant funding for the program. Subsequently, the three agencies agreed to joint management through a formal interagency project management team, with OJJDP having final administrative responsibility for the project. Other agencies such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), and the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) agreed to support the effort through TA.

²⁰ See Appendix A of the Program Solicitation, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1996.

Structure of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative

The resulting Program Announcement outlined a broad program to be implemented at the local level. This breadth is best exemplified by reviewing some of its key themes:

- Addressing problems and creating solutions collaboratively with mutual reinforcement of complementary missions and goals across projects and agencies;
- Promoting healthy child development through prevention and early intervention strategies;
- Building a *unified* child protection system rather than coordinating multiple systems;
- Building system capacity through training, better deployment of resources, improved policies and procedures, enhanced or new intervention strategies, and community involvement; and
- Responding to the links between domestic violence and child abuse and neglect.
- Increasing family involvement and culturally sensitive practices.

The Program Announcement did not clearly convey the experimental and developmental nature of the proposed effort. OJP funded the projects through cooperative agreements. This vehicle—less prescriptive than a contract but more constraining than a grant—was intended to allow the flexibility needed to support the program and allow it to evolve over time. For example, OJP expected to introduce new strategies and insights as they emerged from Title V, Comprehensive Strategies, Safe Futures, and efforts funded by other Federal agencies and private foundations, as well as lessons learned at each of the SK/SS sites during implementation. Indeed, as the project developed, OJP introduced or emphasized certain themes such as results-based accountability, family and neighborhood involvement, cultural competence, unified fiscal planning/flexible funding/finance reform, and sustainability planning.

While the solicitation identified four critical program elements—system reform, filling gaps in the continuum of services, data collection and evaluation, and prevention education/public awareness—it was not very precise about how those elements would effect change. Also, OJP did not provide guidelines for how sites should balance or budget efforts in these four areas achieve the best results. Later, during implementation, all sites did receive some limited instructions to set aside dollars for purposes such as training and TA. In general,

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however, most decisions about resource allocation were addressed individually—first, when sites submitted their Implementation Plans and later, when they applied for their continuation awards.

The Selection Process

The solicitation generated 178 proposals. Of these, 89 met minimum program requirements and were forwarded for peer review. At this point, proposals were divided based on which office would provide funding:

- Proposals from areas with an existing Weed & Seed program (approximately one-quarter) were earmarked for EOWS;
- Proposals from rural and Tribal areas (approximately one-quarter) were allotted to OVW; and
- The remaining proposals were designated for OJJDP.

Four outside review panels identified the top two or three proposals in each group. The OJP management team made the final selections, fully funding four sites at the levels specified in the program solicitation. OVW funded the rural and Tribal programs, based in Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie, respectively. EOWS funded Kansas City's proposal, and OJJDP funded the Huntsville, Alabama, program. In addition, OJJDP provided seed funding for a fifth program, in Lucas County (Toledo), Ohio. Because of its limited funding, Toledo was exempted from requirements for developing a formal Implementation Plan and conducting an evaluation. OJP notified the five sites of their awards in March 1997.

Administering and Evaluating Safe Kids/Safe Streets

Several agencies and organizations formed a core team to support the sites in implementing the SK/SS demonstration program. This team included the program officers within OJP, TA providers, and national evaluators. Each is discussed below.

Office of Justice Programs

The management structure of the SK/SS project at the Federal level was unusual, involving collaboration among several OJP offices. While OJJDP had experience working with

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other agencies inside and outside DOJ, this was the first time that multiple agencies had joined in monitoring a program. This structure lasted for the first 4 years of the program, after which OVW ceded its monitoring role to OJJDP staff. EOWS maintained responsibility for monitoring the Kansas City site for the life of the program.

These three offices helped define the themes of the solicitation and brought distinctive expertise to support the sites. For example, OJJDP had experience with previous demonstrations involving collaborative approaches and had funded key research on the cycle of violence. OVW brought experience with domestic violence issues and promoted connections with local domestic violence programs, funded from Federal and other sources, which were operating in several of the communities. EOWS had expertise in building grassroots programs and integrating treatment and prevention efforts with more enforcement-oriented approaches.

The Technical Assistance Team

When SK/SS began, OJP already had contractual relationships with a diverse array of TA providers. OJP intended to link SK/SS sites to these providers as the sites' TA needs were identified. About a year into the program—after reviewing the sites' Implementation Plans and reflecting on the experiences of Safe Futures—OJP reassessed this approach, concluding that SK/SS needed a dedicated TA provider to promote stronger system reform efforts and link the sites to other TA sources.

OJP developed a bifurcated structure to support TA encompassing (1) overall TA coordination and (2) the Systems Improvement, Training, and Technical Assistance Project (SITTAP). During the first year of SK/SS, Patricia Donahue and Associates led the TA coordination effort. In subsequent years, the National Civic League (NCL) took on this responsibility. NCL was already familiar with SK/SS through its involvement as a subcontractor for the other TA component, SITTAP. As TA coordinator, NCL was charged with the overall coordination of the TA team, identifying site TA needs, locating additional providers to meet these needs, and searching out information pertinent to other project activities. NCL also helped OJP coordinate regular conference calls and cross-site “cluster conferences” twice yearly.

The other branch of the TA structure was SITTAP, operated by the Institute for Educational Leadership (IEL). IEL assigned each site a SITTAP coordinator, who visited

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periodically, consulted by phone, and participated in planning sessions with OJP program officers and the national evaluator. The SITTAP coordinators worked with sites in various ways, reviewing local TA plans and, on occasion, facilitating meetings, giving workshops, and helping prepare plans or other documents. They provided substantive expertise in several areas, including:

- Unified fiscal planning,
- Developing a “children’s budget,”
- Developing a community advisory board for child protective services (CPS) agencies,
- Drafting collaborative bylaws,
- Improving public buy-in on targeted outcomes for children and families at risk of family violence,
- Cultural competency,
- Integrated information-sharing, and
- Formalizing partnerships for sustainability.

Additionally, SITTAP developed toolkits to help sites make and sustain system reforms, including *Building Sustainability*, *Family Centered Culturally Competent Partnerships*, *Building Community Partnerships*, and *Using Data Effectively*. SITTAP held annual retreats to discuss and develop system reform-oriented TA plans for the following year. SITTAP also maintained a web site (<http://www.SITTAP.org>) targeted to SK/SS, Safe Futures, and Safe Start, a program initiated after SK/SS. The web site provides information on each of the sites, resource materials and publications, information on cross-site meetings, and a calendar of events.

OJP required sites to set aside a small portion of their budgets for activities related to TA. In addition, NCL administered a pool of funds that could be used to subsidize other TA, typically the purchase of consultant services or trips to training conferences for staff or collaborative partners. Conferences subsidized by TA covered topics such as court improvement (Burlington), Drug Courts (Huntsville), child abuse (Kansas City), and forensic interviewing (Toledo). Some TA showcased at cluster meetings—on Multisystem Case Analysis (MSCA), community mapping, cultural competency, the Green Book domestic violence initiative, and

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information and data management systems—was also presented on site to those projects interested in following up on the approaches. The sites also used these TA funds to support special projects, such as the introduction of structured decisionmaking in Kansas City’s CPS agency and intensive sustainability training for the Burlington grantee and several of its partners.

The National Evaluation Team

Westat served as the national evaluator for the program. We were fortunate to be funded at the same time as the sites, enabling us to get to know the projects and participate in the national team from the outset. Evaluation staff were assigned as site coordinators to each local program. At three sites, the site coordinator has maintained the same responsibility toward the site since 1997. In two sites—Sault Ste. Marie and Toledo—the same site coordinator has worked with the sites since 2000. The initial grant to Westat was for a process evaluation, with a possibility of future funding for an impact evaluation, if the program’s development warranted it. An impact evaluation component was added to the national evaluation in 2000 and expanded through a supplemental award in 2003.

The primary goals for the national evaluation were:

- To assess the process of SK/SS implementation;
- To identify factors that contributed to or impeded successful implementation;
- To determine the effectiveness of the overall SK/SS program and of selected program components and its impact in the participating communities;
- To help develop the capacity of SK/SS sites to use local data systems and evaluate what works in their communities; and
- To identify lessons and make recommendations to policymakers and practitioners who might want to adopt SK/SS approaches elsewhere.

To meet these goals, Westat played a dual role as evaluator and TA provider, although the TA role was secondary. In the latter capacity, Westat met with local evaluators periodically, kept in touch via telephone and e-mail to discuss their problems and findings, and commented on evaluation plans from time to time. In March 2002, Westat also conducted a 2-day meeting with local evaluators, project directors, TA providers, and program officers. This meeting

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provided an opportunity to share interim findings from the national and local evaluations and included presentations on conducting the MSCA and useful strategies for program evaluation.

A third role emerged for the evaluation team as the program developed, resulting from the evolutionary nature of the program, Westat’s early involvement in the demonstration, and its dual role of evaluator and TA provider. This third role was one of advisor on program development, changing the character of the evaluation from a traditional model to a more interactive model. As implementation progressed, national evaluation staff were increasingly involved in meetings and conference calls designed to identify TA needs and gaps in program implementation at the sites and positioned to provide a sounding board for new ideas. This role often proved difficult for evaluation staff, who attempted to balance the demands for program participation with the requirements of maintaining objectivity. Westat evaluators also attended all cross-site cluster meetings, helped plan some of the later ones, and produced and circulated the minutes.

In carrying out its primary evaluation role, Westat relied on logic models as a framework and upon case study methods, supplemented by several surveys and the collection of communitywide indicator data. The logic model (which is often referred to as the “theory of change”) was used to lay out the expected sequence of steps from program inputs (resources, staff, TA) to activities that lead to immediate, intermediate, and finally long-term impacts on child safety and well-being. Both an overarching logic model (Figure A-1) and models for each site were developed and revised as projects reprioritized and elaborated their efforts over time.²¹ These models helped shape decisions about what aspects of the program to document and measure in both the process and the impact evaluations.

Our overall logic model for the SK/SS initiative shows how different aspects of the community context, such as readiness to undertake system reform, capacity for communitywide collaboration, and friendly legislation and policies shape the entire program, starting with program inputs—selection of the lead agency, hiring of staff, and development of the Implementation Plan. The specific activities covering the four program elements then flow from each project’s unique set of inputs. In the short term, the program activities are expected to lead to immediate outcomes at the individual and agency level, such as improvements in communication and cooperation among agency staff and new tools or protocols to streamline

²¹ Logic models for each of the sites can be found in Volume II, *Case Studies of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Sites*. A final logic model of the overall initiative is presented Appendix A of this volume.

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case processing. Once individuals and agencies internalize the changes, the child protection system realizes intermediate outcomes like collaborative decisionmaking across agencies and more efficient and effective use of existing resources. Eventually, these intermediate outcomes are expected to lead to the long-term outcomes of reducing the incidence of child abuse and neglect and juvenile delinquency, thereby interrupting the subsequent cycle of violence and dysfunction.

For the process evaluation, we conducted regular interviews with project staff, key stakeholders, and agency personnel. We visited the projects twice a year, beginning in fall 1997, kept in contact by phone and e-mail, and reviewed semi-annual progress reports, applications for funding, activity reports on selected activities, minutes of meetings, and other project documentation. As a result, we were able to track the experiences of each site in considerable detail and discern something of the distinctive “culture” of each location. In addition, evaluation staff kept abreast of OJP’s priorities and concerns for the projects through participation in the various conference calls and meetings and review of key correspondence. Evaluators also formally interviewed SK/SS program officers twice during the life of the evaluation.

The impact evaluation comprised four separate surveys—three Stakeholder Surveys and one Survey of Agency Personnel—and two sets of interviews with key informants at each of the sites:

- **Stakeholder Surveys.** Westat conducted three Stakeholder Surveys during the life of the project (in 1998, 2001, and 2003). For this purpose, stakeholders were defined as all collaborative members who had served on project task forces, councils, or committees or had received program subgrants. Stakeholders changed throughout the life of the project; therefore the three surveys do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the same persons over time. Survey lists were updated each time, and in 2002 and 2003, recipients were asked to respond only if they had been involved in the project over the previous 2 years. However, many stakeholders were included in all three surveys. Overall response rates for each survey were 44 percent (n=141 respondents), 70 percent (n=264), and 71 (n=277) percent, respectively. The first survey queried stakeholders about the planning process and their opinions of the program goals and objectives. The second survey focused on satisfaction with the implementation process, the general direction of the project, and interim results. The third covered many of the same domains as the first two surveys, but included an assessment of overall accomplishments and expectations for the future of the SK/SS collaborative. Detailed results

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from the last survey are reported in Volume III, *Findings from the Stakeholder Survey*.²²

- **Survey of Agency Personnel.** Although the impact evaluation design called for conducting this survey twice during the life of the program, OJP provided funding for only one survey. Its purpose was to determine the nature and extent of the changes occurring throughout the agencies targeted by SK/SS. Conducted in fall 2002, the survey targeted supervisors and frontline staff in CPS, schools, police, and prosecutor's offices. It also included court-appointed special advocates (CASAs), guardians ad litem, and some victim-witness personnel. The survey was limited to the four fully funded sites (that is, all but Toledo). The survey asked: how frontline and supervisory staff defined their role in the child protection system, whom they worked with outside their agency and how, whether and why this had changed in the last few years, what improvements were needed in the child protection system, and how SK/SS had affected the system. The survey achieved a 60 percent response rate overall (n=353), though rates varied considerably by site and type of respondent. Results are presented in Volume IV, *Survey of Agency Personnel*.
- **Key Informant Surveys.** Westat twice conducted systematic, structured interviews with individuals identified as key informants (across all five sites). Key informants were broadly defined as individuals in the community who play key roles in the child abuse and neglect system, or who are in a position to routinely observe the system's operations and any changes. In contrast to the routine process interviews conducted during every site visit, these surveys were designed to enhance cross-site comparability by asking an identical set of questions at every site to consistent categories of informants. The first survey was done in fall 2000, with 107 individuals from the five sites.²³ To provide a reliability check on the site coordinator's perception of local developments, we heavily involved interviewers other than the site coordinator at each location. In 2002, a modified key informant survey was conducted to identify results and accomplishments from the SK/SS programs. In the latter survey, site coordinators conducted all 85 interviews. Findings from this last survey are included in this volume and in Volume II, *Case Studies of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Sites*.

Additionally, in 2003 funding was added to the impact evaluation to track the experiences of families involved with CPS and other involved agencies (law enforcement, criminal court, dependency court) to determine whether outcomes for individual children and their families

²² Findings from earlier surveys were reported in 1999 and 2002. See Gragg, Cronin, Myers, Schultz, & Sedlak, 1999, op. cit.; Gragg, & Cronin, 2002, op. cit.

²³ Findings from the 2000 Key Informant Survey are found in Gragg, Cronin, Schultz, & Eisen, 2001, op. cit.

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have improved as a result of system interventions and changes pursued by SK/SS. This study is currently underway and findings from that study are expected to be available in 2005.²⁴

Collaboration Among the Core Team: OJP, TA Providers, and Westat

In response to the lessons learned in earlier initiatives, OJP worked to foster a SK/SS “learning community,” where Federal program officers, TA providers, Westat evaluation staff, and the sites could share their experiences and insights. OJP initiated monthly meetings for the national core team, attended by project officers, TA coordinators, and Westat’s project director, and scheduled quarterly conference calls for the core team and the sites. In later years, conference calls had focal topics, such as prevention education, to guide the discussion and encourage group problem solving. In 2001, the sites themselves began having conference calls, allowing project directors to openly discuss local problems and solutions among themselves.

By 1999, OJP placed more emphasis on the biennial cluster conferences as a means of creating a shared vision for SK/SS, as well as introducing best practices from other jurisdictions. OJP began requesting that sites bring collaborative members, not just staff, to the meetings. Core team and site representatives also took a larger role in conference planning. Table 2-1 shows the dates and topics for the cluster conferences.

The remainder of this document and the volumes that follow highlight the findings from the SK/SS evaluation and program experience.

²⁴ Note that early in the evaluation effort, Westat had considered another approach to examining effects of SK/SS on individual children and families. This approach would have entailed developing an MIS system to track services received by “clients” of SK/SS projects and their outcomes. In fact, the projects did not develop a distinctive pool of SK/SS clients, although they supported many different activities and services with clients. The supported services varied greatly within and across sites and targeted many different types of children and families. Thus the strategy of developing a project MIS to track individual service recipients did not seem appropriate.

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Table 2-1. Schedule of Safe Kids/Safe Streets Cluster Meetings			
Date	Main Agenda	Location	Facilitator
May 1997	Project orientation	Washington, DC	OJP
September 1997	Technology Conference <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Information technology and how to use technology to fight crimes ▪ Presentations from model counties that have implemented such programs 	San Diego, CA	OJP
March 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Team-building and visioning ▪ Site accomplishments and challenges 	Huntsville, AL	OJP
November 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Federal expectations and review processes ▪ MIS reform in Kansas City ▪ Systems change ▪ Site accomplishments and barriers ▪ Accessing TA 	Cincinnati, OH	OJP/TTA Coordination (Donahue and Associates)
April 1999	Resources, practices and planning for system change	Washington, DC	TTA Coordination (Donahue and Associates)
November 1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Intervention in domestic violence and child maltreatment ▪ Building cultural, consumer, and community competencies 	Kansas City, MO	TTA Coordination (Donahue and Associates)
May 16 - 17, 2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Results-based accountability (outcome-based measurement) ▪ Facilitative leadership 	Burlington, VT	TTA Coordination (Donahue and Associates)
November 2000	Sustainability—Definitions, dimensions, processes and resources	Washington, DC	TTA Coordination (NCL)
April 2001	Cultural competence—assessment and development, linkages to sustainability	Albuquerque, NM	TTA Coordination (NCL)
October 2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Team-building ▪ Building and sustaining collaboratives ▪ Leadership approaches 	Washington, DC	TTA Coordination (NCL)
May 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Data-based decisionmaking ▪ Information sharing ▪ Integration of information systems ▪ Youth asset mapping 	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	TTA Coordination (NCL)
March 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Achievements and lessons learned ▪ Cross-site synthesis ▪ Sustainability and replication 	Washington, DC	TTA Coordination (NCL)

3. The Grantees and Their Communities

In selecting communities to implement SK/SS, OJP looked for those with the infrastructure to support the project. Ideally, the community would provide an environment favorable to community-based planning and reform around child abuse and neglect, including some history of cooperation or collaboration on the issues as well as the management and organizational capacity to develop and sustain a community-wide collaborative. In the following sections, we describe the infrastructure for SK/SS in each of the sites.

Grantees

All of the lead agencies for the SK/SS projects have been involved in child abuse and neglect since their inception. Two of the lead agencies are nonprofits with pivotal roles in the formal child protection system, including providing direct services. The National Children's Advocacy Center (NCAC) led the One by One project in Huntsville, Alabama. The NCAC was created in the mid-1980's to help restructure the county's child protection system. The core partners of the NCAC included the District Attorney's office, law enforcement, the Department of Human Resources (DHR), and the Health Department. The NCAC has become nationally known for its pioneering work with the Children's Advocacy Center (CAC) approach, which combines multidisciplinary handling of cases of child maltreatment with a child-friendly environment and resource center for victims and families. The NCAC has a large staff to carry out its mission, which also includes providing extensive training and information for professionals. Prior to SK/SS, NCAC's multimillion dollar budget derived mainly from grants from the Federal agencies, state agencies, DHR, and local nonprofits and foundations.

The lead agency for the SK/SS project in Toledo is a nonprofit, community-based education and public awareness agency that also provides direct services. The Family and Child Abuse Prevention Center (FCAPC) offers a range of programs that focus on domestic violence prevention and advocacy, child and sexual abuse prevention, early intervention, professional training, and community education. The FCAPC has coordinated a number of multidisciplinary teams, including the Child Abuse Task Force (CATF), which assumed primary responsibility for overseeing SK/SS. FCPAC also provides supervision for the Building Healthy Families (BHF) program and manages the CAC, which began operations the month that SK/SS was awarded. The FCAPC is a United Way agency and receives the majority

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of its funding through United Way allocations. Other funding comes from local, state, and Federal grants. Program service fees contribute a small amount annually.

Building Strong Native American Families (BSNAF) in Sault Ste. Marie is distinctive for being the only project led by a governmental agency. Anishnabek Community and Family Services (ACFS) is a Tribal government agency and provider of social, mental health and substance abuse services to the Sault Sainte Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians. ACFS works with the Tribal Court in child welfare matters involving Sault children who live on trust/reservation land. It conducts child abuse and neglect investigations, provides services to children and their families when a case of abuse has been alleged and/or substantiated, and supervises out-of-home placements for Sault Tribe children, including those removed because of substantiated child abuse and/or neglect. In addition, ACFS works with the state child welfare system in providing foster care services to Sault Tribe children who reside off trust/reservation land. Funding for ACFS comes from the Tribal government, Federal and state grants, fees paid by ACFS clients, and other sources.

The last two lead agencies for SK/SS, both nonprofit organizations, provide leadership and advocacy for child maltreatment issues in the community, but no direct services. In Burlington, KidSafe is a project of the Community Network for Children, Youth and Families (“The Community Network”), a not-for-profit organization whose mission is to promote the right of children to grow up in safe and nurturing environments that support their physical, social, and emotional well-being. At the time of the SK/SS grant application, the members of the Community Network included the state Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS), the Visiting Nurse Association, the community mental health center, the local hospital, several private providers of services to children and families, the Family Court, and the state Departments of Health, Social Welfare, and Corrections. The Community Network serves as coordinator, advocate, and educator around issues of child abuse and neglect. It also convenes child protection teams to improve service coordination in certain types of cases, a responsibility that pre-dated SK/SS but has expanded since.

The Kansas City KIDSAFE project resides within the Heart of America United Way (HAUW). HAUW has served the metropolitan Kansas City region for more than 85 years. Each year it funds numerous nonprofit health and human services agencies and is a leader in administering and implementing communitywide initiatives. HAUW has a long history of involvement in child maltreatment issues. Prior to KIDSAFE, its primary child abuse initiative

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was the Metropolitan Child Abuse Network. This group facilitated regular contact among all of the major stakeholders in child abuse and neglect issues. The KIDSAFE project took over the Network's role as the central planning, coordinating, networking, and advocacy body on child abuse issues for the community. For many years, HAUW also has served as the facilitator and mediator for the Consent Decree under which the Jackson County Division of Family Services operates.

The size of the lead agencies varies considerably. At the time of the SK/SS application, Burlington's Community Network included 22 member agencies with an annual budget of just \$29,000, derived primarily from member dues and two small grants. Toledo's FCACP had an annual budget of \$700,000 when the SK/SS initiative began. In contrast, the lead agencies in Huntsville, Kansas City, and Sault Ste. Marie were all large organizations with many full-time staff and multimillion dollar annual budgets.

Community Characteristics

The communities served by the SK/SS projects vary considerably in terms of population, racial/ethnic diversity, and economic well-being. Table 3-1 shows some of the demographic characteristics of the counties in which the projects operate. The Kansas City and Toledo projects both work in counties with large urban populations. The Kansas City site was unique in designating a target area within the larger county for many of its service and prevention programs. However, the project's system reform efforts extended beyond this target area to encompass the entire county. The Huntsville project covers a county with an urban center but a much smaller total population than either Kansas City or Toledo. As mentioned earlier, the Burlington project operates within a small rural county, although it is the largest in Vermont and contains the state's largest city. Sault Ste. Marie's project includes all Tribal members living in a seven-county area of rural Michigan. Table 3-1 shows the demographic characteristics of the two largest counties (including both Tribal and non-Tribal members). Everywhere except Lucas County, Ohio, the total population grew over the project period. Across the counties, the proportion of children in the population ranged from 21 to 26 percent.

The counties also varied in the degree of racial/ethnic diversity. While Chittenden County, VT, is largely White, Madison County, AL (23%), Jackson County, MO (23%), and Lucas County, OH (17%) all have large Black populations. The American Indian population in Michigan's Mackinac and Chippewa Counties represents 14 and 13 percent of the total,

Table 3-1. Demographic Characteristics of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Communities

Characteristic	Burlington	Huntsville	Kansas City	Sault Ste. Marie		Toledo
	Chittenden County	Madison County	Jackson County	Mackinac County	Chippewa County	Lucas County
Population (2000) ^a (Tribal population ^b)	146,571	276,700	654,880	11,943 (2,678)	38,543 (5,565)	455,054
Percentage of population 17 or younger (2000) ^a	24%	26%	26%	22%	21%	26%
Racial/ethnic breakdown (2000) ^a						
White	95%	72%	70%	80%	76%	78%
Black	1%	23%	23%	<1%	6%	17%
Hispanic	1%	2%	5%	1%	2%	5%
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut	<1%	1%	1%	14%	13%	<1%
Asian	2%	2%	1%	<1%	1%	1%
Other race	<1%	1%	3%	<1%	<1%	2%
Percentage of children in single parent families ^c						
1990	18%	18%	26%	19%	20%	26%
2000	20%	23%	31%	22%	28%	32%
Median income ^a						
1990	\$36,877	\$33,048	\$27,853	\$19,397	\$21,449	\$28,245
2000	\$46,747	\$43,239	\$37,732	\$28,367	\$30,477	\$37,064
Percentage of children below poverty level ^c						
1990	9%	15%	19%	22%	21%	22%
2000	8%	14%	17%	14%	16%	20%
Percentage of high school dropouts ^c						
1990	5%	10%	13%	9%	9%	9%
2000	5%	11%	13%	12%	8%	10%

^a U.S. Census Bureau: *State and County QuickFacts*, 2000 Census of Population and Housing.

^b *Building Strong Native American Families Implementation Plan*, February 1999.

^c *KIDS Count*, 2000 Online Census Data.

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respectively. All of the counties saw some increase in the proportion of minority population from 1990 to 2000.

The counties also look different on some indicators of family and economic well-being. In 2000, around one-fifth of the children in Chittenden, Madison, and Mackinac Counties lived in single-parent households. Closer to one-third of the children in Jackson, Chippewa, and Lucas Counties resided with only one parent. For all of the counties, the percentage of children living in single-parent households increased from 1990 to 2000. In 2000, the median household income was lowest in the two Michigan counties, at \$28,000 and \$30,500. Jackson and Lucas counties had similar income levels, with the median household income around \$37,000. Chittenden County had the highest income level at around \$47,000, followed closely by Madison County at just over \$43,000. Child poverty levels in the SK/SS communities ranged from a low of 8 percent in Chittenden County to a high of 20 percent in Lucas County. While child poverty was down in all counties in 2000, it declined most dramatically in the two Michigan counties. The high school dropout rate also varied across the counties. In 2000, Chittenden County had the lowest high school dropout rate (5%) while Jackson County had the highest (13%). Three of the counties (Madison, Mackinac, and Lucas) experienced increases in high school dropouts from 1990 to 2000, while the remainder had the same or fewer high school dropouts in 2000.

Table 3-2 provides limited data on some additional indicators of child welfare prior to the SK/SS initiative. The patterns are quite varied across SK/SS sites. Differences in reported maltreatment, substantiations, and child placement may reflect differences in the community's propensity to report and the system's response style, as well as different levels of actual child maltreatment. Reports of child abuse and neglect fluctuated in all sites during this time, with only Lucas County showing a fairly steady decline in the previous 5 years. Chittenden, Chippewa, and Lucas Counties showed decreases in the rate of substantiated child abuse, while Mackinac showed an increase and Jackson County fluctuated for the 3 prior years. Out-of-home placements appeared to be increasing in Chittenden, Jackson, and Lucas Counties, but decreasing in both Michigan counties. These numbers do not provide a clear picture of what was happening, in terms of problems or possible solutions. They do provide a gross baseline and suggest that longer trend lines are needed to fully understand patterns of child abuse and neglect and community responses to it. The table also suggests the variation in data sources, calculations, and comparability that faced the sites.

Table 3-2. Child Welfare Indicators of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Grantees

Characteristics	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI		Toledo, OH
	Chittenden County	Madison County	Jackson County	Mackinac County	Chippewa County	Lucas County
Reports of child abuse and neglect (per 1,000 children) ^a						
1992	18.1 ^b	24.8	15.5	48.0	68.0	35.8 ^c
1993	19.9 ^b	23.0	16.6	66.7	76.6	36.2 ^c
1994	15.5 ^b	19.3	*	62.6	77.4	34.9 ^c
1995	18.3 ^b	18.5	*	60.4	68.3	33.9 ^c
1996	18.1 ^b	24.7	*	64.8	56.1	30.4 ^c
Substantiated victims (per 1,000 children) ^a						
1992	9.7 ^b	*	*	5.1	13.6	22.7 ^c
1993	7.8 ^b	*	*	18.8	11.5	23.2 ^c
1994	6.8 ^b	*	18.4	11.7	14.0	21.1 ^c
1995	7.4 ^b	*	21.0	9.7	10.5	18.8 ^c
1996	7.2 ^b	*	19.6	13.2	10.1	18.6 ^c
Out-of-home placements (per 1,000 children)						
1992	8.1 ^b	*	4.7 ^d	7.6 ^e	8.5 ^e	(567) ^{c**}
1993	8.7 ^b	*	4.6 ^d	8.9 ^e	8.9 ^e	(595) ^{c**}
1994	8.4 ^b	*	5.5 ^d	8.5 ^e	8.6 ^e	(673) ^{c**}
1995	8.8 ^b	*	4.5 ^d	5.7 ^e	6.0 ^e	(804) ^{c**}
1996	11.8 ^b	*	5.3 ^d	7.2 ^e	5.4 ^e	(778) ^{c**}
Teen pregnancy rate per 1,000 females 15-19 ^a						
1994	30.4 ^f	9.5% ^g	73.1	*	29.8 ^h	*
1995	22.5 ^f	9.2% ^g	72.7	*	*	*
1996	32.5 ^f	9.6% ^g	69.9	26.8 ^h	23.8 ^h	36
Infant (Less than 1 year old) death rate per 1,000						
1994	6.1 ^f	9.4 ⁱ	10.3	***	*	8.2
1995	5.7 ^f	6.0 ⁱ	9.0	***	*	8.7
1996	*	6.8 ⁱ	9.6	*	5	7.5

^aData from *KidsCount*, County-City-Community-Level Information on Kids, unless otherwise noted.

*Data not available.

**Numbers in parenthesis are actual number of reports/placements, not rates.

^bData from Vermont Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Vermont Department of Health.

^cData from Lucas County Children's Services.

^dData from Missouri DFS, *Child Abuse and Neglect Report 1998-2002*.

^eData from *KidsCount*, Michigan League for Human Services.

^fData from Vermont Department of Health, Vital Stats Data System.

^gData from the Center for Health Statistics, Statistical Analysis Division, are based on females ages 10 to 19.

^hMichigan data are based on unmarried females ages 15 to 17.

ⁱData from Center for Health Statistics, Statistical Analysis Division.

***Rates were too small to calculate (less than 6 per 1,000).

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Approaches to Child Abuse and Neglect

The child abuse and neglect definitions in the states with SK/SS projects all specify a general category for abuse that encompasses physical, sexual, and emotional acts and a category for neglect that includes failure to provide basic necessities, medical treatment, or supervision (see Appendix B for information on definitions of child abuse and neglect, mandatory reporters, and reporting requirements in each of the states). In addition, Alabama, Ohio, and Vermont provide separate definitions for sexual abuse and/or sexual exploitation. Vermont also defines emotional maltreatment separately from the overarching abuse and neglect category.

All states also identify those persons considered perpetrators of abuse or neglect. Typically, the child protection agency's jurisdiction covers child abuse and neglect committed by a parent or another caretaker, such as a guardian, foster parent, or staff member of a school or day care setting. Alabama's definition extends to any person responsible for the care or custody of the child. Missouri's child abuse statute provides a general description of perpetrators as those responsible for the child's care, custody, and control. In Vermont, child abuse also includes sexual abuse of a child by anyone, not just a caretaker.

The state administers child protective service agencies in Alabama, Missouri, and Vermont. Even though the overall authority resides at the state level, in both Missouri and Vermont, day-to-day operations are carried out by district offices that cover the county where the project is based. In Ohio, the state supervises the county agencies that have primary responsibility for administering CPS.

The Sault Ste. Marie site is unique in being governed by a Tribal Code that defines abuse as “the infliction of physical or mental injury including the failure to maintain reasonable care and treatment to such an extent that the child’s health, morals, or emotional well-being is endangered.”²⁵ The Sault Ste. Marie Tribal Code does not specifically define who may be considered a perpetrator of maltreatment. The provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act dictate the jurisdiction and case flow for child abuse and neglect cases involving Sault Tribal members. Cases that involve a child who lives on reservation/trust land are investigated through Sault Tribal systems and governed by the Tribal Child Welfare Code. For children who

²⁵ Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians Tribal Code 30.304. 1981, revised 2003.

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live off of reservation/trust land, there may be joint jurisdiction with the state in cases of out-of-home placement. Prior to SK/SS all sexual abuse cases, regardless of the child's domicile, were prosecuted by the Federal court system, even though the Tribal Court also had jurisdiction.

The CPS agencies serving the SK/SS communities all take reports from mandated reporters—health personnel, teachers and others legally required to report suspected maltreatment—and the general public. From there, the agencies use different methods to determine whether and how to investigate the specific reports. Missouri is unique among SK/SS sites in having a “dual-track system” for child abuse and neglect reports, established shortly after the KIDSAFE award through a legislative initiative. This system requires the DFS to fully investigate reports of abuse or neglect that may involve criminal conduct but allows for a family assessment, voluntary for the family, in reports that would not be considered a criminal violation even if true. The new system then tailors the DFS response depending on the assigned track. DFS pilot tested the new dual track system in the area office that serves the KIDSAFE target area starting in May 1998. The system went statewide later that year. None of the other CPS agencies serving the SK/SS sites have a voluntary family assessment option. Statutes require them to investigate all child abuse and neglect reports that meet screening standards.

The sites also differed in the resources available within the child protection system at the time the initiative began. Three of the sites had a Children's Advocacy Center (CAC) or similar entity at the time of the SK/SS grant award. CACs provide a multidisciplinary response to child abuse, based on agreements among the different agencies responsible for responding and intervening in child abuse and neglect. As noted above, in two sites—Huntsville and Toledo—the CAC was managed by the lead agency for SK/SS. In Toledo, the CAC was just taking its first clients in March 1997 and was still working on interagency protocols. In Huntsville, the NCAC had supported both the CAC and the multidisciplinary team (MDT) for years. In addition to providing a child-friendly environment for interviewing victims and conducting forensic examinations, the NCAC supports a wide range of programs, including prevention, community outreach, treatment services, and training programs for CAC and MDT professionals. In Kansas City, the Child Protection Center (CPC) serves as a CAC, providing a central place for interviewing children. After receiving a referral, a team that consists of a DFS investigator, a police detective, and the CPC social worker conducts a joint interview of the child and then works together to coordinate the investigation and prosecution of the case. The CPC offers fewer services than some other CACs, however.

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In Huntsville and Toledo, at the time of the initial awards the lead agencies were also already facilitating MDTs that focused on maltreatment cases under investigation. Huntsville's MDT is composed of prosecutors, supervisors from the three largest law enforcement agencies, caseworkers from the Department for Human Resources (DHR), NCAC staff, Health Department doctors, and other treatment providers as needed. The team meets weekly at the NCAC to review existing cases and new referrals for child abuse and neglect, to examine prosecution issues, and to discuss intervention services for victims, other children, and nonoffending parents. Toledo's MDT was originally created by the CATF to review cases of serious child physical abuse and sexual abuse. The team is now cofacilitated by the CAC and Lucas County Children's Services. This multidisciplinary approach to investigation also includes representatives from law enforcement; medical, mental health, criminal and juvenile justice and advocacy programs; and other service providers who can contribute information on specific cases. The group meets weekly to review existing cases and new referrals and coordinate interventions. The team decides which cases should be prosecuted and provides input into the mental health and other social service needs of the child and family. The MDT also makes decisions on the need for forensic evaluation or other investigation.

At several sites, formal agreements among the agencies involved in the formal child protection system existed at the time of the SK/SS awards. For example, in Huntsville a county-level Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) describes how DHR shares investigation of child abuse and neglect with law enforcement. In Toledo, a county-level MOU outlines the responsibilities of various agencies in reporting and investigating child abuse and neglect. The directors of all the agencies involved with the formal child protection system signed the MOU, including the presiding judge of the Court of Common Pleas, the presiding judge of the Juvenile Court, the Lucas County sheriff, chief municipal police officers, township police officers, the prosecuting attorney, the Toledo law director, the director of law for each city within the county, village solicitors, and the executive director of the Lucas County Children's Services agency. In Sault Ste. Marie, a formal protocol for the Sault Tribal MDT was signed by multiple Tribal agencies and the U.S. Attorney in 1995. Under this protocol, the Tribal prosecutor facilitates the MDT for all serious cases of maltreatment on trust/reservation land. ACFS is a member, along with Tribal law enforcement, health, mental health, and court agencies, and the U.S. Attorney and the FBI agent serving the Upper Peninsula. Additionally, Sault Ste. Marie convenes a Child Protection Team composed of direct service providers. Burlington had a special law enforcement unit, Chittenden Unit for Special Investigation (CUSI), which co-investigated sexual abuse and other serious child maltreatment with Social and Rehabilitative

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Services (SRS). In two sites, there were also multidisciplinary groups—the Quality Assurance Committee in Huntsville and the Problem Solving Forum in Kansas City—developed in response to Consent Decrees in the states. In contrast to the previously mentioned groups, they focused on identifying system problems and improving practice within child protective services and included community residents.

Local Expectations for the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative

In their original applications for SK/SS funding, the five sites pointed to both the problems that the SK/SS initiative could address and the community strengths the local programs could build on. Typically they referred to indicators of concern, such as those reported in Table 3-2: high child abuse and neglect referral rates, high teen pregnancy rates, and high infant death rates. Other common problems mentioned included:

- Fragmented services or gaps in service delivery (Burlington, Huntsville, Sault Ste. Marie);
- Inappropriate, nonindividualized service plans (Sault Ste. Marie, Toledo);
- Inefficient use of resources/lack of information on the gamut of community services available (Huntsville, Kansas City, Toledo);
- Lack of public information on problems, effects, reporting, and prevention for child maltreatment (Huntsville, Kansas City, Toledo);
- Duplicative collection of client information among service providers (Sault Ste. Marie, Toledo);
- Limited use or lack of access for voluntary or community services (Burlington, Sault Ste. Marie, Toledo);
- Limited use, understanding, or availability of community data (Huntsville, Toledo);
- Poor communication among agencies dealing with child abuse (Burlington, Huntsville, Kansas City); and
- Lack of attention to cultural values in addressing child abuse and neglect (Sault Ste. Marie).

Each site also identified barriers to preventing and responding comprehensively to child abuse and neglect. Burlington pointed to problems with strict client confidentiality and redundant and inconsistent data collection, which made sharing client-level information

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difficult. Huntsville expressed concerns about developing a coordinated response among MDT members who were scattered geographically, with heavy workloads, and different organizational perspectives. Kansas City noted that the agencies and organizations working with families exist in different worlds: health, mental health, youth and social services, and job training occupy one sphere while police, prosecutors, CPS, and Family Court occupy another, with no communication between the two. Sault Ste. Marie cited highly fragmented service systems and agencies. Toledo identified traditional turf issues—politics, self-interest, and eroding funding—as barriers to interagency collaboration.

On the positive side, each site could build on previous collaborative efforts around child abuse, many of which are discussed above. Several sites involved prospective partners in developing the original proposals. Others were able to get commitments from key stakeholders for the proposed effort. Some sites also could point to a broader climate of concern about child welfare and child abuse and neglect. The Huntsville and Kansas City areas were already trying to make changes in CPS, in response to court-imposed Consent Decrees. In Alabama the state supported local MDTs with funding. In Vermont, state legislators and other policymakers had shown considerable support for prevention efforts.

Summary

Thus, there were important commonalities among the agencies and communities that instituted SK/SS programs. As OJP had intended, all provided some infrastructure upon which SK/SS could build, including:

- A lead agency with a long history of work on child abuse and neglect;
- Some experience (though varied) in approaching child abuse and neglect from a multidisciplinary perspective and using collaborative approaches; and
- Community environments receptive to improving child protection systems.

The differences among the communities were considerably more extensive and underscore the variation in laboratories in which the SK/SS “experiment” took place. There were differences in:

- Size and structure of the lead agency;
- Community size and other demographic characteristics;

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- Experience with developing and working with cross-agency structures such as MDTs and CACs; and
- Levels of state support for changing local systems.

In the next chapter, we discuss how each of these sites planned and implemented local SK/SS projects.

4. Implementation of the Program

This chapter walks the reader through the highlights of planning and implementation at each of the five sites. As noted in Chapter 1, the rate of program implementation (and expenditure) for the SK/SS Initiative varied across sites. The original schedule called for five grant awards, covering 5½ years. The first grant period had been expected to cover both planning and early implementation. For most sites, however, it was predominantly a planning period, and for all, it lasted longer than the 18 months originally planned. Burlington and Toledo were the first sites to access their second grant—in January 1999, 21 months after the initial awards. Sault Ste. Marie was the last to do so, in January 2000.

Whenever it began, the second grant period for SK/SS marked the transition from planning to full implementation. Huntsville and Kansas City had had local evaluators on board since the beginning, while the remaining sites added local evaluators under the second grant, although their responsibilities differed considerably in scope across sites. By the third grant period, all sites were in full implementation and had at least begun activities under all four program elements. Overall, the sites strengthened their focus on system reform during the third grant period, while continuing to directly support service delivery to varying degrees. At this point, for most of the sites, public education continued to be the program element that lacked a coherent vision.

All sites continued implementation during the fourth grant period. While some new activities were initiated, sites emphasized the strategies introduced in earlier years. At most sites, stakeholders became more directly involved in program decisionmaking around issues such as system change plans, sustainability, funding for neighborhood grants, training priorities, and efforts to increase family involvement. Most sites also broadened their prevention education and public information efforts.

In June 2003, Sault Ste. Marie was still using its fourth grant, and Kansas City was just completing its fourth grant. Both expected to use fifth grant funds well into 2004. The other three sites—Burlington, Huntsville, and Toledo—were far into their fifth grant and expecting to receive an extra award of \$125,000 to help with a year of transition to non-Federal support. (These sites had been spending at approximately the same pace since early 2000, when they received their third awards, while Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie did not tap their third awards until July 2001.) Regardless of where they were in their spending, all projects were

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focusing more intensely on sustainability planning. For each site, the sustainability challenge encompassed two dimensions: continuation of the SK/SS collaborative itself (or at least, its crucial functions) and continuation of the individual services and reforms implemented under its wing.

Throughout planning and implementation, the lead agencies had primary responsibility for staffing the collaborative effort, although not necessarily the direct services it supported. Staffing levels varied across sites, reflecting differences in both award size and project strategy. With one of the smaller budgets and many subgrantees, Burlington operated with a small project staff since inception. This became an issue during the fourth grant period, when OJP required the project to create an assistant project director position and part-time cultural diversity and training positions, thereby increasing the core staff time available for the system reform work. The Sault Ste. Marie grants also supported one of the smaller core staffs. Toledo's grant supported a half-time project manager, reserving its other staff funding for positions related to direct services.

Reflecting their larger awards, Kansas City and Huntsville have consistently supported bigger project teams. From the beginning, Kansas City used liaisons in several of the public agencies to advance a system reform and change agenda. Huntsville also had a large staff, including a community information coordinator, a resource coordinator, a training coordinator, and a faith and family resource coordinator, all supported by the grant.

In the following sections, we describe the way that each site approached the SK/SS initiative and what it had accomplished through June 2003. We conclude with a summary discussion of how SK/SS resources were budgeted to support those efforts. More detailed documentation is found in *Volume II, Case Studies of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Sites*. Appendices to that volume also contain logic models outlining the theory of change for each site and extensive tables documenting the individual activities under each of the four required program elements—system reform and accountability, continuum of services, data collection and evaluation, and prevention education and public information.

KidSafe, Burlington, VT

Planning

Planning for the SK/SS initiative took approximately 10 months, from May 1997 to submission of the Implementation Plan in March 1998. The first major step was a widely publicized kick-off meeting in June 1997, which introduced KidSafe to the Chittenden County community. Besides the Network's own 22 member agencies, this meeting attracted 30 or 40 other participants who were interested in planning for KidSafe. They volunteered for four teams, whose focus corresponded roughly to the four required SK/SS program elements. In August, the Network hired a part-time consultant to facilitate the planning process, with assistance from the Network coordinator.

Planning teams met regularly for months, reporting their progress at a second public meeting in October 1997. At this meeting, the attendees agreed on a plan for a Management Council, which would serve as KidSafe's governing body. The Council was to include two representatives of the Community Network Board and at least four members from each of the following sectors: (1) the justice and CPS systems; (2) school, child care, and medical providers; (3) prevention, intervention, and treatment providers; and (4) parents and other community members. When the Council began meeting monthly in November 1997, the State's attorney, the district director of SRS, and senior managers from many local organizations were at the table. As one of its first acts, the Council authorized staff to solicit proposals for "service improvement subgrants" from community agencies. KidSafe's approved budget had included a lump sum for these subgrants. However, the planning teams and the Council decided the strategy areas (which included identification/assessment, prevention/early intervention, abuse intervention/treatment, and systems change), the funding allocations, and the specific priorities in each area (such as supervised visitation in the abuse intervention area).

Over the next 2 months, the project staff sent out a Request for Proposals (RFP), received 27 responses, and coordinated reviews by small teams of Council members. In the end, the Management Council accepted 15 proposals from 13 providers, ranging in budget from \$3,000 to \$50,000, for a total of \$263,747. The Community Network itself was awarded two grants totaling \$20,000, one to facilitate development of a CAC and the other to support professional training and public education. Most other subgrants focused on direct services.

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The draft Implementation Plan refined the goals and objectives from the original proposal and identified two primary target populations within the county for the project— (1) children whose abuse and neglect had gone unrecognized or insufficiently treated and (2) families with multiple risk factors, especially those related to domestic violence. KidSafe proposed to retain the management structure from the planning phase, consisting of the Management Council and several committees, but it would hire a permanent project director. The subgrants—later known as the Partner Projects—were expected to be the primary vehicle for achieving most of the objectives. Partner Projects would meet regularly as an Operations Team to promote information sharing and coordination across programs.

Although KidSafe staff had consulted frequently with OJP and shared an early draft of the Implementation Plan, they were unprepared for much of OJP’s feedback on the final version. In particular, OJP wanted more detailed training/education, evaluation, and MIS plans. (At this point, KidSafe had no local evaluator and only limited input from an MIS expert.) Meanwhile, the Partner Projects were eager to get underway, and some had even started work at their own risk. The Community Network had also hired a KidSafe project director and begun convening the new Operations Team and a CAC Task Force. The Management Council directed staff to respond immediately to OJP and request permission to proceed with implementation while they were developing more detailed plans in some areas. After some negotiation, OJP agreed—releasing partial implementation funds in May 1998.²⁶ KidSafe earned final approval of an amended Implementation Plan in August 1998.

KidSafe submitted continuation applications every year thereafter, updating the approved plan. In 1999, there were new planning efforts, including a System Reform Vision Summit for KidSafe and several meetings about reorganizing the Community Network itself. This reorganization got underway in 2000. In the process, the Management Council was renamed the KidSafe Collaborative Council and took on a more important role in the Network, becoming the organization’s policymaking and “visioning” body. The reorganization also replaced the old Network Board, made up of the Network’s 20-plus member agencies, with individuals recruited to handle agency oversight, personnel, financing, and fund-raising. The new Community Network was no longer an organization of member agencies.

²⁶ OJP did this reluctantly. Earlier, it had counseled KidSafe staff to delay the decisions on subgrant awards until after plan approval and felt that if KidSafe followed this advice, there would have been no need to move so quickly.

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KidSafe returned to strategic planning in 2001, when for the second time, there were lengthy negotiations with OJP over KidSafe's Implementation Plan. Reacting to KidSafe's fourth grant application, OJP staff decided that it was time for the project to cut spending on the Partner Projects—which were primarily service expansion efforts, in OJP's view—and spend more on staffing broader system change initiatives. OJP had raised these concerns previously and believed that the fourth grant application had not gone far enough to address them. Negotiations lasted several months and included an on-site strategic planning session in May 2001, attended by OJP and convened at its insistence. By all accounts, this was a tense, difficult meeting, but it was a turning point. The group began outlining more expansive system change plans at this meeting, and most of these plans were being implemented by late in the year. To meet OJP requirements and to staff these new initiatives, KidSafe added personnel and reduced funding for Partner Project grants to \$150,000 in the fifth grant period.

Implementation

Implementation of KidSafe effectively began in May 1998, with OJP's partial release of implementation funds. By June 2003, KidSafe had nearly spent the last of the five awards originally planned for SK/SS. However, OJP had invited an application for a \$125,000 supplement to assist the transition to non-Federal support. This will carry the project into 2004.

Staffing and Governance

Despite turnover at lower levels, KidSafe enjoyed stable senior leadership. The same project director, working about 80 percent time, has been at the helm since implementation began in 1998. In the early years, she had part-time assistance from the Network coordinator and a secretary. When the Network coordinator resigned in 2001, 4 years into the project, the KidSafe project director assumed dual responsibilities for the Community Network and the project. To compensate for this change, support the heightened focus on system reform, and meet OJP requirements, KidSafe hired a longtime participant in the project and former co-chair of the KidSafe Council to serve as assistant project director. By early 2002, KidSafe reached its biggest staff ever—about 2.5 full-time equivalents—by adding a half-time multicultural coordinator and a quarter-time training, education, and outreach coordinator. Besides this core project team, the project has had a local evaluation consultant since the summer of 1999.

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The KidSafe governance structure has remained much the same as when the Council first met in November 1997, although the Council is somewhat larger and its membership rules more flexible. Other KidSafe committees and task forces have engaged many Council and non-Council members, although specific committees have come and gone according to the priorities of the moment. Throughout the project's history, staff have kept collaborative members informed about project activities and opportunities to collaborate by convening community meetings, cosponsoring events with other groups, and regularly distributing agendas, minutes, and other materials.

Implementation of the Four Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program Elements

The list of KidSafe activities is long and varied. Many activities were funded by subgrants to Partner Projects, most of which began in 1998 and were refunded each year. Meanwhile, KidSafe staff supported the KidSafe Council and the various committees. They also devoted considerable time to working collaboratively with other groups. Over time, the burdens of the subgrant process declined, as the RFP process was routinized and the Partner Projects became more familiar with KidSafe expectations and reporting requirements. In later years, staff spent much less time managing the subgrants and more on system reform efforts, including several new initiatives that grew out of the 2001 negotiations with OJP. Highlights of project activities are described below.

System Reform and Accountability

KidSafe subgrants helped get two major initiatives off the ground—establishment of a Juvenile Unit in the State's Attorney's Office (SAO) and development of a CAC. Using KidSafe backing as leverage, the SAO won legislative support for added staff, enabling the Juvenile Unit to start operations in January 2001. These changes not only made more time available for staff training and for preparing court cases, but allowed the SAO to take a stronger leadership role in many areas related to child abuse, neglect, and delinquency. CAC development took longer. There were struggles over the appropriate governance structure and operational model, and at least one shift in direction—from targeting “gray area” families²⁷ to focusing on “deep end” cases (those under investigation by CPS and law enforcement),

²⁷The expression “gray area families” became widely understood and used in the KidSafe community to describe families whose problems placed their children at risk, but were not sufficiently recognized or severe enough to trigger SRS intervention. In other words, these were families who were “falling through the cracks.”

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following the practice at most other CACs. Interim steps included institution of an MDT to discuss cases under investigation, co-location of a CPS worker at CUSI (the countywide law enforcement agency responsible for investigation of serious child abuse), and establishment of dedicated facilities for sexual assault examinations at the area hospital. By June 2003, the CAC had been certified by the National Children's Alliance, was operating side by side with CUSI, and was offering on-site therapy.

KidSafe staff also led a year-long effort to revitalize the Community Network's Child Protection Team (CPT), which had originated years before to bring multiagency attention to children who were "falling through the cracks." Referrals to the team from schools and other agencies had dwindled. A new, more family-friendly, and geographically accessible CPT was put in place in 2001—earning praise from many local observers. By 2003, the CPT was partially supported by a contract with SRS and averaged just over one case per month. In 2003, the Health Department announced that it would contract with KidSafe to facilitate a similar team for families with a substance-abusing parent.

KidSafe put increasing emphasis on professional training in recent years. One of the newer efforts involved development of a video and toolkit for mandated reporters, which was scheduled for statewide distribution late in 2003. The idea grew out of the KidSafe policy forums, which focused on improving community policies and protocols for reporting and intervening in child abuse and neglect. In 2002, staff also started a popular series of Building Bridges workshops, which featured visits to and presentations by a different agency each month. The Partner Projects subsidized several other training opportunities for local professionals. One project developed a college course for child care providers, focused on working with children of parents with mental illness.

In 2002 and 2003, KidSafe began reaching out to legislators, partnering with the Domestic Violence Task Force to sponsor a forum for candidates and, later, monthly breakfasts where legislators and community members could exchange views on family and child welfare issues. KidSafe staff also joined the policy board of the Vermont Children's Forum, the state's leading child advocacy group, and successfully advocated for adding a separate section on child maltreatment to the Forum's policy agenda. KidSafe staff regularly collaborated with several other groups, most notably the Family Court's Permanency Planning Project and the Winooski Pilot Project. Local observers say the close working relationships between KidSafe and Family Court fostered several innovations—including placement of mental health personnel at the

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Court and greater involvement by the Visiting Nurses Association (VNA) in the court process. More generally, the partnership created a climate in which Family Court, SRS, and local providers work together on child protection. In Winooski, the Winooski Family Center got KidSafe funds to nurture community involvement in an SRS pilot effort to create a community child protection partnership.

KidSafe stakeholders evidenced a high level of concern about cultural competency, reflecting the fact that the Federal government has resettled many foreign refugees in Chittenden County over the past decade. Nonetheless, the project's cultural competency efforts had their ups and downs. Initially, KidSafe had hoped to fund a Partner Project in this area, but could not find the right partner. Later, staff worked directly with the Vermont Refugee Resettlement Program (VRRP), helping staff a 24-Hour Interpreter Access Committee. Unfortunately, constant turnover at VRRP made it difficult to build on those efforts, and a pilot project developed by the committee was put on indefinite hold. In 2003, KidSafe shifted funding to pay for translation of information materials at three local agencies. KidSafe also funded three cultural competency training sessions for diverse audiences, delivered by outside experts, and eventually hired its own multicultural coordinator. She began recruiting "multicultural liaisons"—informal representatives of minority and ethnic cultures—to serve as a resource pool for KidSafe and other groups. Gradually, however, the multicultural coordinator shifted her efforts to networking in support of a local movement to develop a community multicultural center. Meanwhile, KidSafe continued to support a Partner Project in multicultural North Burlington, where the VNA instituted popular Community Culture Nights, planned with parents. KidSafe encouraged all the Partner Projects to improve their cultural competency, increase family involvement, and coordinate services and resources with other agencies. Several partnerships between grantees emerged, resulting in numerous instances of cross-training, delivery of services at partner locations, and mutual referrals.

Continuum of Services

Since the Community Network is not a direct service agency, the Partner Projects were the primary vehicles for expanding prevention, intervention, and treatment services. The largest single subgrant (\$50,000 initially) supported two programs through the VNA—intensive home visiting for up to 10 families without other payment sources and parent education and support at the VNA's Family Center in North Burlington. KidSafe funds also helped establish the now-thriving Winooski Family Center, which provides multiple services, including

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preschool programs, parent education, a summer lunch program, and case management. At the Milton Family Community Center, KidSafe helped start the only grandparent support group in the county. Over the years, the grandparents in this group became more active in defining their own agenda, recently expanding it to advocacy.

Several Partner Projects focused on families in conflict. One developed the county's first supervised visitation program and another provided therapeutic playgroups for child witnesses of domestic violence. A third partner added parent education to its batterer education program and developed new group programs for men and teens with abuse/control issues. Other prevention and early intervention services supported by KidSafe included Nurturing Parent groups for single mothers and for incarcerated fathers, case management for homeless families, and clinical support for a YMCA day camp serving SRS-referred children. On the treatment side, there were subgrants to the local community mental health center to support the STEP program for sexually reactive victims of child abuse, ages 6 to 12, and group, individual, and family therapy for adolescent sex offenders.

Despite an unfavorable economic climate, most services continued after their KidSafe funding ended in spring 2003, sometimes at slightly reduced levels. The supervised visitation program was facing the most significant funding challenges, particularly because of its costly security. The program shut down temporarily in June 2003, while awaiting action on a pending application that would support security services.

Data Collection and Evaluation

Data collection and evaluation got off to a slow start at KidSafe and never became a strong emphasis. Although a local evaluator came on board in 1999, her budget was modest—never more than \$10,000 a year. Nonetheless, the local evaluator helped refine the progress reporting system for the Partner Projects, collected extant data on changes in community indicators, and conducted two rounds of interviews with key agency personnel to assess changes in practice. In 2001, she also began helping KidSafe with its biggest data collection and evaluation effort, the Multisystem Case Analysis (MSCA) initiative, undertaken in collaboration with the Family Court Permanency Planning Project. Adapting a methodology developed by the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA), KidSafe tracked samples of cases entering the Family Court in 1998 and 2000 across agencies, including SRS, law enforcement, and the SAO. The task was arduous, complicated by the fact that each agency had distinctive data systems,

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and there were no linkages among them. Law enforcement and prosecutor data could be located on only a few cases. Study results were still pending as of June 2003.

The fact that all the key public databases are maintained and administered at the state level was a particular barrier to improving local MIS capabilities. Over the years, however, KidSafe made small investments in improving data access at CUSI/CAC, and contributed to several discussions about data systems at the state level. In addition, according to local observers, KidSafe sensitized the local SRS office to some limitations of its existing system and created a climate in which SRS freely shared much more information about performance than previously. Several Partner Projects also reported that evaluation training sponsored by KidSafe, coupled with the KidSafe reporting requirements, made them more outcome-oriented in their internal data collection and assessment methods.

Prevention Education and Public Information

Prevention education and public awareness, like data collection and evaluation, received much less emphasis than system reform and service efforts in Burlington. However, two KidSafe subgrants focused exclusively on this area. Kids on the Block-Vermont provided prevention-oriented puppet shows for hundreds of elementary school children each year, along with information materials for parents and teachers. Stop It Now! VT encouraged reporting of child abuse by reaching out to victims, perpetrators, and their family members through workshops, a 24-hour hotline, and the media. In addition, several of the prevention and early intervention subgrants mentioned above included prevention education for parents or children.

Meanwhile, KidSafe staff also carried out a variety of public awareness activities. In 1999, staff convened a public meeting that helped focus community concerns on constructive responses to a recent child fatality. KidSafe also participated routinely in community fairs and other local events where project materials were distributed. In 2000, KidSafe developed a comprehensive *Family Services Directory*, which was widely disseminated and updated. In 2002-2003, KidSafe began working on a more comprehensive public awareness strategy, designed in part to make the program more widely known. As part of the effort, staff developed an annual report, a Fact Sheet on child abuse and neglect, and a KidSafe web site.

Sustainability

KidSafe had always made clear to the Partner Projects that they would need to support themselves once Federal funding ended and had considered each one's potential for sustainability when reviewing applications each year. Beyond that, sustainability did not receive much attention until early 2001, when the KidSafe Council reached a strong consensus that the KidSafe collaborative itself should be sustained. Shortly afterward, KidSafe affiliated with the Champlain Initiative, a state-designated "community partnership" working on community health and well-being. KidSafe became the Initiative's only team focused on child abuse and neglect.

KidSafe formed a small Sustainability Committee in fall 2001, and early in 2002, the Community Network Board itself established a Fund Development Committee. The latter developed a target budget of \$60,000 to \$100,000 to continue the collaborative's core activities when Federal funding was expected to expire in mid-2003. As 2003 began, KidSafe had commitments from private foundations, SRS, and the United Way to cover some KidSafe activities and was expecting a small contract from the Health Department. The SRS contract, for \$15,000, would engage KidSafe to develop a new Community Advisory Board for SRS, besides supporting the CPT. Recognizing that KidSafe had become the Community Network's primary identity, the Network also filed for permission to do business as the "KidSafe Collaborative."

Several other activities were undertaken to strengthen the capacity of KidSafe and its partners to sustain them. KidSafe convened a Funders Forum, where private foundations and state agencies discussed their priorities, and surveyed local agencies about their funding and expenditures for prevention, intervention, and treatment. The survey work was contracted to the University of Vermont's Rural Studies Department and mailed in mid-2003. It is expected to inform discussions about resource allocations, locally and at the state level, where a major reorganization of the Agency for Human Services is being planned. Through the Vermont Community Foundation and with help from SK/SS TA funds, KidSafe also obtained low-cost training and TA on sustainability for itself and eight other nonprofits (including four of the Partner Project agencies). This assistance showed Board and Council members that KidSafe needed to more clearly articulate the value of its work to potential funders. Around the same time, a team of graduate students recommended that KidSafe develop a 5-year strategic plan and promote public awareness of its activities more vigorously.

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In April 2003, KidSafe staff were delighted to learn that the project could obtain a final transitional grant of \$125,000 from OJP. KidSafe planned to use these funds to support a fall retreat for Council and Board members, develop a 5-year strategic plan, and build on several initiatives already underway.

Results

So far, KidSafe has amassed a strong record of accomplishments. Through involvement in KidSafe, the Community Network reinvented its structure—establishing a vibrant, working collaborative that represents diverse sectors of the community. Collaborative members developed a common vision and shared important decisions about resources and priorities, in an atmosphere that was open to different points of view. In 2001, KidSafe bounced back from what many local stakeholders considered a confrontation with OJP to tackle more difficult system change issues, including sustainability.

KidSafe has made impressive progress on system reform and helped bring about many changes that are likely to endure. Perhaps the most dramatic change is that collaboration has become the normal way of doing business in the community. There have been other forces at work, but local opinion is close to unanimous that KidSafe deserves a large share of the credit. KidSafe played a substantial role in many other system changes, among them:

- Establishment of a Juvenile Unit within the SAO,
- Establishment of a CAC,
- Implementation of an MDT for serious abuse cases under investigation,
- Revitalization of a family-friendly MDT for children “falling through the cracks,” and
- Closer integration of Family Court with the child protection community.

Through the subgrant process, KidSafe established new or expanded services for children and families, including home visiting, a grandparent program, case management for homeless families, therapeutic programs for child witnesses, treatment for sexually reactive children, and neighborhood-based family supports. Subgrants also expanded programs for offenders, including treatment for adolescent sex offenders and counseling/education for violent males. It is too soon to judge some other initiatives—such as the MSCA, the new outreach to

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legislators, the funding survey, and the mandated reporter video and toolkit—but they have system-changing potential.

While local informants report great improvements in interagency communication and information-sharing, the community’s MIS capabilities remain largely as they were when KidSafe began, with little integration across agencies. KidSafe promoted changes where it could, but it seems clear that major changes were beyond the scope of the project, or would have required a radically different approach and resource allocation. In other areas—promoting public awareness, prevention education, cultural competency, and family-centered practice—KidSafe did valuable work, but there are few structures in place to continue it if KidSafe itself does not find the resources. The collaborative also has struggled, with limited success, to attract more involvement from nontraditional sectors, including business, the faith community, grassroots organizations, and consumers. When surveyed, KidSafe stakeholders have consistently reported that community participation and cultural diversity of participation in the collaborative have been inadequate, although fewer stakeholders felt that way in 2003 than in earlier years. KidSafe’s new responsibility—for developing the SRS District’s Community Advisory Board—may open up new avenues for engaging more nontraditional members in the collaborative.

By and large, however, KidSafe participants appear very satisfied with both the collaborative process and its results so far. They feel that the Community Network was the right choice to lead the KidSafe project and provided outstanding leadership. Stakeholders, many of them long-term participants, seem determined to continue the KidSafe legacy. Given the steps toward sustainability taken so far, we find reason for cautious optimism about KidSafe’s future, despite the significant challenge of Vermont’s current economic climate.

One by One, Huntsville, AL

Planning

Planning for the SK/SS initiative occurred in two distinct phases. The first occurred between April and August of 1997, culminating in the original Implementation Plan. The second phase occurred between November 1997 and September 1998, when a revised Implementation Plan was submitted for OJP approval.

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The first Implementation Plan closely followed Huntsville’s original proposal. The Stakeholders Council designated the Quality Assurance Committee (QAC), which had been established for the RC Consent Decree, as an advisory panel for the project.²⁸ The QAC took an active role in developing the plan and setting priorities to decide how activities would be carried out and which populations to target. Approximately 20 activities were proposed in the first Implementation Plan. Many activities were designed to fill gaps in treatment and prevention programs—a substance abuse program for caregivers, supervised visitation programs, a Juvenile Sex Offender Program, a minority fathers program, and a program linking domestic violence volunteers with the police (called First Responders). Under the initial Implementation Plan, enhancements to the MDT (part of the system reform program element) and public information activities would begin immediately (in some cases they had already begun). Other activities would be implemented gradually.

In early October, OJP notified the NCAC by telephone that the plan required substantial changes. OJP required the Huntsville team to: (1) develop a communitywide initiative, rather than expand the NCAC; (2) specify both problems to be addressed and goals of the project in more detail (i.e., identify the target population and number of people to be targeted, how it would be implemented, how progress would be measured, how problems and goals were linked); and (3) include a local evaluation plan. OJP also required the project to address operational issues, securing active participation of the courts in the collaborative; examining the role of different agencies (e.g., law enforcement) and professions (e.g., the medical profession) within the child protection system; expanding the project to address issues of neglect, unreported maltreatment, and at-risk children; expanding the MIS plan to address information sharing and confidentiality issues across agencies; and reexamining the linkages between cultural issues and child abuse and neglect intervention practices.

The process for revising the Implementation Plan was fundamentally different from that used for the first plan. First, the project established a Steering Committee, composed of members of the Stakeholders Council (or their designees) and representatives of additional groups such as Court-Appointed Juvenile Advocates, Juvenile Probation, the Municipal Court, the Huntsville Housing Authority, DHR clients, and the business and faith communities. With

²⁸ The settlement for the RC Consent Decree involved agreement to a set of principles for reforming child welfare in the state, but allowed a county-by-county implementation strategy. One of the primary principles required developing community partnerships. In Madison County, this resulted in the development of the QAC.

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the OJP program officer's encouragement, the presiding judge of the Juvenile Court agreed to chair this committee.

Second, the project initiated a five-step process to revise the plan that included:

1. Pulling together community concerns and ideas from as many sources as possible, primarily through focus groups within agencies and Madison County communities;
2. Conducting a telephone survey of county residents about child abuse and neglect and measuring knowledge of agencies active on this issue;
3. Publicizing issues culled from the focus groups and the survey, conducting a survey of resource capabilities, and estimating future needs;
4. Conducting an all-day Vision Summit in May 1998 to review and recommend activities to comprehensively address child abuse and neglect, as well as risk factors for abuse; and
5. Revising the Implementation Plan and including Summit participants in developing those revisions.

The revised Implementation Plan differed from the original plan in several significant ways. First, the governing structure became three-tiered with a Stakeholders Council, Steering Committee, and the QAC. Second, the revised plan included a great deal more detail than the original. It included a four-pronged local evaluation plan, calling for incremental implementation of (1) community mapping and offense monitoring, (2) neighborhood research to examine neighborhood-level impact of SK/SS; (3) intra-organizational monitoring and data-driven decisionmaking; and (4) tracking clients (and outcomes) through agencies. Third, and most important, the plan was informed by the community, through an iterative process of data collection—involving focus groups, a public opinion survey, and the Summit meeting. As a result, the revised plan took a more expansive view of child abuse and neglect, rethinking activities in terms of community needs rather than how to improve current NCAC efforts, and added a focus on risk factors associated with child abuse and neglect. The new plan also outlined some new initiatives that later became hallmarks of One by One, such as The Circle Project.

One by One submitted the revised plan in September 1998, and then responded to OJP's comments on the revisions in December 1998. One by One received additional comments in April 1999, which were addressed at that time. During this extended planning and

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comment process, OJP released part of the implementation funds so that co-location of MDT members, training, and the Juvenile Sex Offender Program could proceed. The remaining funds from the first grant were released in January 1999, following submission of a revised budget.

Implementation

Implementation began in March 1998 with the early release of funds reported above. Full implementation of the One by One program occurred in 1999. By June 2003, One by One had spent most of the five awards planned for SK/SS. However, OJP had invited sites to apply for a transitional grant of \$125,000 to support efforts to sustain project efforts beyond Federal funding. Under this continuation grant, the project was expected to continue until September 2004.

Staffing and Governance

Of the five SK/SS sites, Huntsville had the most project staff. One by One established seven positions and hired two consultants to implement the project. While the positions were redefined somewhat through the life of the project, there was remarkably little turnover in the staff filling them, which allowed the incumbents to become recognized resources in the community. The project director, an employee of NCAC and involved in the original proposal, took over grant responsibilities when the grant was awarded in March 1997. The local evaluation consultant, also involved in the proposal, came on board at the same time. Three other positions—community information coordinator, program assistant, and resource coordinator were in place in 1998. The project added training and faith and family resource coordinators in 1999. This cadre of employees allowed the project to shift focus and take on staff-intensive system reform efforts as the program evolved. An MIS consultant supported efforts to connect MDT staff with each other and their agency headquarters. The project received support from other NCAC staff but at significantly lower percentages of time: finance director (25%), executive director (20%), marketing director (5%), and grants administrator (25%).

The project was also supported by a series of subcontracts. While there were subcontracts under all four of the required program elements, the majority (11 of them) involved the continuum of services component and had been envisioned in the original proposal. These contracts began between May 1998 and November 1999. Subcontracts in the

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area of system reform and accountability were initiated through the life of the project. Two of them—LEADERSHIP *Social Services* and The Circle Project—were expected to continue with the transitional funding through December 2004.

Even with an evaluation consultant designated early in the project,²⁹ One by One had difficulty locating sufficient local expertise to support the local evaluation and data collection. Consequently, it pieced together additional support from Auburn University - Montgomery, the University of Alabama-Birmingham, the University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa, and a local research assistant.

The collaborative grew as the project developed. There were four important stages in developing the collaborative:

- **Ensuring active participation of District Court judges.** OJP stepped in early in the process to ensure the active involvement of judges in the project. As a result, all judges in the District Court became active, taking on leadership in the Stakeholders Council, the Steering Committee, and in Summits on substance abuse and supervised visitation. All judges also participated in project-sponsored trainings. Their participation provided additional visibility to the project and helped bring new groups to the collaborative.
- **Mobilizing nontraditional groups.** Huntsville recognized the need to involve religious leaders, business representatives, higher education institutions, civic associations, and neighborhood organizations early in the first Vision Summit. Representation of a broad spectrum of agencies and neighborhoods in the collaborative grew throughout the project.
- **Engaging community residents and consumers of services.** One by One developed workgroups, special training programs in conjunction with the Vision Summit, a mentor program, and a Client Board Bank to engage community members and clients in activities beyond participation in the Vision Summit. While those were important steps, ongoing participation had had only limited success by mid-2003.
- **Developing an overarching collaborative council.** The Madison County Coordinating Council (MC3) emerged in response to the recognition that community leaders had more and more community programs—often with overlapping aims—competing for their time. MC3 addressed issues beyond SK/SS, while including SK/SS goals in its mission. It required a broad membership, including local agency heads, business and community representatives, and allowed for rotating leadership. One limitation of MC3

²⁹ The evaluation consultant was headquartered at the University of New Mexico.

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was the initial refusal of members to put budget issues on the table. However, OJP planned to provide TA to help the collaborative examine approaches to unified fiscal planning in fall 2003.

After the establishment of MC3, the Steering Committee continued to support project-specific functions for One by One, such as budget approvals and refunding applications. The committee also took on two additional tasks—sustainability planning and program coordination. For sustainability planning, the Committee was responsible for prioritizing efforts, identifying resources and methods for sustaining and advancing program initiatives, as well as directing Federal monies to newer efforts such as *LEADERSHIP Social Services* and continued support of MC3.

Implementation of the Four Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program Elements

The activities undertaken in each of the four program elements—system reform and accountability, continuum of services, data collection and evaluation, and prevention education and public information—were varied and extensive. We highlight just a few below.

System Reform and Accountability

In addition to developing the collaboration, One by One conducted a range of system reform activities, increasing its focus on this component as the project developed. Four efforts were cornerstones of the project: (1) MDT enhancements, (2) professional training, (3) cultural competency initiatives, and (4) coordinated neighborhood service delivery.

At first, system reform centered on enhancements to the MDT—co-locating team members, hiring team assistants, connecting team members to home computers, linking members by e-mail, and establishing video linkages between the team offices and the CAC. In 1999, the collaborative efforts supported by SK/SS led to the inclusion of domestic violence investigators and other professionals in the MDT. The district attorney established a Family Violence Unit in 1999, which united attorneys for child abuse and neglect and domestic violence in a single unit. The domestic violence staff then co-located with the MDT.

One by One's professional training programs targeted a wide range of participants and topics. Trainees included clergy, private sanitation workers, school counselors, day care workers, Healthy Families workers, DHR caseworkers, substance abuse professionals, private

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service providers, summer camp counselors, Huntsville utility workers, law enforcement officers, guardians ad litem, staff from the Alabama Bureau of Investigation, and emergency room, pediatric, and family practice nurses. Training topics were also wide-ranging, including what constitutes child abuse and neglect, how and where reports should be made; how reports are investigated and handled by DHR, law enforcement, and the legal system; resources; program evaluation; collaboration; family violence; and working with social service clients. One by One used creative approaches to training topics, implementation, and targets. For example, *LEADERSHIP Social Services*, modeled after a leadership program conducted by the Chamber of Commerce, was designed to ensure that collaboration permeated social service agencies by training their directors, mid-level supervisors, and board members on how different agencies operate and how collaboration can enhance those operations. One by One also supported training for District Court judges, including training that supported development of a Drug Court in 2002.

The project's cultural diversity efforts began as a multiday training co-sponsored by the Alabama Cooperative Extension System and the Youth Services Council. While the project repeated this training several times, other efforts grew from it. Diversity Schoolhouse was one of the biggest project successes. It began as a relatively simple concept—monthly brown bag lunches to discuss differences in a wide range of families (Jewish, Chinese, Islamic, Hispanic, African American, Native American, Indian, Korean, and Middle Eastern)—targeted to agency professionals. Healthy Families, DHR, and NCAC staff regularly attended these sessions, which averaged 28 participants per session. Other cultural competency activities included child abuse and neglect training in Spanish (1999), Spanish classes for social service providers (2002-03), formal assessment of the cultural competence of the NCAC (2001), and development of a Volunteer Language Bank (2002).

One by One's fourth major system reform effort involved coordinated neighborhood service delivery. During the first Vision Summit, the participants identified the need for neighborhood-level services. As early as 1998, One by One began identifying ways to encourage neighborhood development through activities such as block parties and a school-based health clinic. Staff also tried to partner with one of the few neighborhood organizations to house a neighborhood-based Healthy Families worker. These efforts met with limited success. One by One then turned to community-based Family Resource Centers as a way to support neighborhoods and move services out into the community. When these efforts failed too, One by One visited cities where neighborhood-based services had succeeded and began

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again. This time the program focused on developing The Circle Project, which had pilot programs running in all three school districts in Madison County by mid-2003. Although it took some time, One by One worked through the process of (1) identifying a community need (with community input), (2) researching best practices for addressing the need, and (3) finding the right fit for the community.

Continuum of Services

At the beginning of the One by One project, stakeholders and project staff were primarily concerned with getting the services identified in the original proposal up and running. These included a Juvenile Sex Offender Program, expanded clinical services within the NCAC, additional support for a school program, a Parents as Teachers Program, the First Responder Program, a supervised visitation program, a substance abuse program for families involved with DHR, and a program targeting minority, noncustodial fathers. Implementation for the first five of these programs began in 1998 during the second planning period. The ability of One by One to implement these efforts in the “swirl” of planning and replanning lent credibility to the Federal initiative and kept partners at the table by fulfilling some of the promises in the proposal.

Three prevention/early intervention programs speak to the diversity of approaches used.

- The First Responder Program, in which volunteers accompany police officers on domestic violence calls, allows domestic violence professionals to (1) intervene in domestic violence problems as early as possible, (2) identify children at risk and who witness violence, and (3) provide support and information to the victim(s) while the police address the perpetrator and the crime investigation. The program, initiated shortly after submission of the SK/SS proposal, operated on limited shifts, targeted a specific section of Huntsville, and focused on calls involving injuries. By 1999, the program was operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and was headquartered within the Huntsville Police Department. Also in 1999, the First Responder program was officially added to the MDT, with the coordinator and the investigators co-located with the MDT.
- The project’s Parents as Teachers Program expanded on the Healthy Families Program by working with families past their Healthy Families involvement and emphasizing child development and school readiness. The project also developed resource guides that identified programs and other resources available for children and parents. The family strengthening coordinator

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staffed an active workgroup to support efforts and connected with the faith community to identify community resources.

- Friends 'N Faith Clubs emerged from the recognition that One by One needed to connect to the faith community other than at collaborative meetings. In June 1999, One by One hired a part-time faith coordinator and established a workgroup. The group worked on the lack of summer programs for Madison County youth, first through expanding vacation bible schools to youth outside the congregations. From 2001 to 2003, the faith community took programs directly to neighborhoods where the youth resided.

Three treatment programs also show the range of issues the project addressed.

- The Juvenile Sex Offender Program, a 2-year program targeting youth 11 to 15 years old, required that the youth not abuse drugs and alcohol and attend all meetings. Initially, participants were referred by the District Court; however, beginning in 1999, the program accepted referrals from agencies working with youth.
- The New Horizons Program was designed to address the problem of substance abuse among caretakers of children involved with DHR. DHR referred caretakers to New Horizons for evaluation for an intensive counseling program. The program provided both a therapist and caseworker to the client to ensure more comprehensive support. Aside from the individual successes, this program improved communication between New Horizons and DHR.
- One by One, in conjunction with a community-based organization, COARMM, designed a program to support noncustodial fathers. The program targeted noncustodial fathers of families enrolled in Healthy Families and provided in-home visits and counseling to teach fathers how to stay involved in their children's lives.

Data Collection and Evaluation

One by One approached this element of the project through subcontracts with experts in evaluation, outcome measurement, and data collection and through ad hoc projects taken on by project staff. The original, four-part evaluation design was ambitious and difficult to implement. Problems included failure to find trained local staff to complete the work and an unrealistic budget. The first component of the evaluation, community mapping and offense monitoring, was conducted under a subcontract with the University of Alabama and involved collecting varied community indicators, ranging from child abuse and neglect reports, teen pregnancy rates, and infant mortality, to economic and crime data. The project dropped the mapping element of this component due to cost. The second evaluation component was

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initiated by the University of Alabama and completed by the evaluation consultant and research staff at NCAC. It included interviews with residents and caseworkers in three neighborhoods to examine the impact of SK/SS. The third component was the collection of ongoing program data—target population and program outcomes—from service subcontractors. The final evaluation component was the MSCA. This component, conducted by the local evaluator and a research assistant, tracked 1997 MDT cases and identified actions and outcomes for each case in different agencies—DHR, law enforcement, District Court, CAJA, Crisis Services, and Circuit Court. Findings for this study were not yet available by June 2003.

As a result of its status as a SK/SS site, One by One also received two grants (\$20,000 each) from BJS to implement formal evaluations of the neighborhood-based Healthy Families worker and the First Responder Program. These evaluations were conducted in 2002 and 2003, respectively, but findings were not available as of June 2003.

As part of the local evaluation, project staff also undertook less scientifically rigorous data collection to guide project activities. This data collection included conducting focus groups of agency personnel and community residents during the proposal, planning, and sustainability stages; surveys of training participants and funding sources for agencies involved with child abuse and neglect, domestic violence, and substance abuse; exit interviews with clients; and needs assessments for Family Resource Centers. One by One used the findings to inform priorities in program development, improve training programs, develop workshops, target programs for the Family Resource Centers, and identify funding sources and gaps.

The project also tried to develop a management information system (MIS), in response to expectations articulated by OJP. Eventually, One by One settled on (1) linking MDT members electronically to their home agency computers and to each other via e-mail, (2) developing a database for the MDT with data from each of the participating agencies, and (3) identifying barriers to information sharing across agencies. This latter effort served to begin the discussions for a cross-agency database.

One of the successes under this program element occurred through the initiative of the MC3 and a subcommittee tasked with developing a Community Report Card. The purposes of the Report Card were to: (1) provide a benchmark for measuring progress, (2) help all members of the collaborative better understand their roles, (3) increase public awareness of the status of children, and (4) help establish priorities. The subcommittee selected community

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indicators and searched for appropriate data. The first Report Card (released in January 2002) awarded Madison County a C overall. Specific indicators helped MC3 identify the four issues that needed their attention most: teen pregnancy, runaways, the divorce rate, and domestic violence.

Prevention Education and Public Information

In Huntsville, the prevention education/public information element began as a stand alone effort, with most activities unconnected to other program elements. Early efforts focused on simple, direct public messages about child abuse and neglect, supporting school art and essay contests during Child Abuse and Neglect Month, billboards, sponsoring story-time at the public library, and publicizing SK/SS trainings and meetings.

In keeping with the problems identified in the original proposal, the project focused on publicizing and publishing resource information. This started relatively simply with publication of *Pocket Youth Yellow Pages* (targeted both for agencies and youth) and a *Family Strengthening Resource Guide*. These efforts blossomed; the HELPnet database of community resources was expanded and made Internet-compatible and interactive through a network of 27 information kiosks located throughout the community. This latter effort was the result of a collaborative proposal initiated by One by One for a grant from the Technology Opportunities Program, funded by the Department of Commerce. Crisis Services of North Alabama serves as the lead agency. Other public awareness efforts included the development of resources pages for the phone book, the *Streetwise* newsletter, cookies for information swaps, a monthly orientation for new agency staff, and Family Friendly Business Awards.

In 2002, the project implemented a unified prevention education campaign (BUILDING CommUNITY), cosponsored by Crisis Services, MC3, and One by One. This campaign included public service announcements, billboards, newspaper articles, and television news segments. The campaign covered the Community Report Card, both Child Abuse and Sexual Assault Prevention Months, the Women's Expo, Victim's Rights Week, Take Back the Night, community resources, and the HELPnet information kiosks.

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Sustainability

One by One assigned responsibility for prioritizing and working on project sustainability to the Steering Committee. In some cases, partners have committed to continuing efforts—the MDT enhancements, the First Responder Program, ongoing communication among substance abuse programs, the NCAC Research Division, Diversity Schoolhouse, and cross-agency training. Several groups spawned by One by One that reinforce collaborative program and proposal development, such as the Stretching Dollars Network, are also being sustained.

One by One planned to continue working on several of its biggest efforts—MC3, LEADERSHIP *Social Services*, and The Circle Project—using the transitional funding. Each of these three efforts evolved from earlier efforts and required restructuring to get workable programs for the Huntsville community. For MC3, One by One is working with TA providers to help resolve the conflict and duplication of effort between MC3 and a state-mandated council, the Children’s Policy Council. The project is completing the development of a full curriculum for LEADERSHIP *Social Services* and exploring ways to finance the program through fees or other sources. Huntsville hopes to use the final transitional award to support The Circle Project operating in schools in each of the three school systems. Continuation of these programs would go a long way in sustaining the goals and efforts undertaken under SK/SS.

Results

Over the course of SK/SS, the One by One project moved beyond its initial “comfort zone” and widened the collaborative circle. The child protection system did the same, including more organizations like schools, which typically felt uninformed about the process, as active partners in child protection. The Family Friendly Business Awards also raised awareness of how business can play a role by providing more supports to families, which in turn benefits business through improved worker productivity and loyalty.

Stakeholders, key informants, and frontline agency personnel each reported that collaboration is now a normal way for agencies to do business. The ramifications are huge, as Madison County has developed a collaborative, community response to child abuse and neglect. Changes include improvements in how stakeholders do their jobs, greater knowledge of resources and whom to contact by frontline workers and stakeholders, and a more

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comprehensive, multiagency approach to problem solving. Many stakeholders and frontline workers credited One by One with improving and increasing communication with other organizations, improving training/professional development, increasing the amount/quality of information available for making decisions, and improving communication with clients.

The project can also take credit for supporting several system changes that appear likely to endure, including:

- The establishment of a Family Violence Unit in the DA’s Office,
- Establishment of a Drug Court,
- Expanding and enhancing the MDT, and
- Mechanisms to support collaboration—Stretching Dollars, the Client Board Bank, a newsletter, and a community calendar.

Other accomplishments include the continuation of extensive cross-agency training programs, which address resources, reporting, and first contact with clients, and diversity. The NCAC has addressed the research deficit in the community by building research expertise in-house through its new Research Department.

The community is currently trying to determine how to accomplish the mission and goals of the MC3 without overlapping other boards or commissions, such as the Children’s Policy Council. Regardless of the group’s name, we anticipate the emergence of such a group, since most collaborative members point to the individual and community benefits of a board that gives voice to all sections of the community. Further, we expect to see collaborative efforts continue in part because new linkages and relationships have been forged throughout the community, and the community has become accustomed to this way of doing things. Additionally, many of the enhancements brought to Madison County through the SK/SS initiative have created their own demand. We suspect the community will find a way to meet that demand.

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Kansas City, Missouri

Planning

Formal planning for KIDSAFE began in late spring 1997, shortly after Kansas City received notice of its selection. To plan the project, Heart of America United Way (HAUW) reconvened the collaborators who had worked to prepare the proposal, reactivated three of the proposal development committees—covering systems reform, MIS, and professional development/public awareness—and added a fourth planning committee on evaluation. The core group consisted of the Public Sector Partner (PSP) agencies—Division of Family Services (DFS), Family Court, Kansas City Police Department (KCPD), and the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (PAO). A representative from each PSP agency sat on each committee, with the System Reform Committee acting as the de facto steering committee to which other committees reported. Although the planning committees did not involve agency heads, many participants held relatively senior positions—heading up offices or divisions within their agencies. Through most of the planning period, the committees met about once a month. During the planning phase, KIDSAFE also conducted focus groups, met with representatives of nonprofit and grassroots organizations, developed a resource directory, and prepared a training directory for KIDSAFE collaborators. In developing the Implementation Plan, the planning committees also drew on information compiled or collected by the local evaluator.

The planning committees worked to develop and refine the specific activities that would address the four SK/SS program elements. According to the draft Implementation Plan, the overall project governance would be placed in the hands of a 25-member KIDSAFE Council. The plan listed the categories of stakeholders to be represented, a diverse group that included public and private agencies, foundations, businesses, the faith community, neighborhoods, and youth. A representative of the Weed & Seed project would serve on the Council to maintain a close relationship between the two projects. KIDSAFE planned to convene the Council quarterly.

The draft Implementation Plan focused heavily on activities that would change how the formal system handled child maltreatment. Some of the planned activities included conducting multidisciplinary case reviews, developing new policies and procedures for handling certain cases, supporting professional development efforts, and improving communication and information sharing across agencies. Complementing these system reform activities, KIDSAFE

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planned a major effort to involve three target ZIP Codes in planning for their own needs and creating better bridges to the formal system. The project outlined a Neighborhood Services Initiative (NSI) that would award grants for community-based services in the target area. The Implementation Plan also included plans for prevention and public awareness activities and the local evaluation.

Because the Kansas City site was funded by EOWS, it faced unique challenges related to the EOWS requirement that the KIDSAFE project coordinate with the local Weed & Seed effort. During the planning process, the Federal project officer and a Weed & Seed consultant made visits to Kansas City to reconcile the Weed & Seed and KIDSAFE target areas and integrate the Weed & Seed strategy into KIDSAFE. When the Implementation Plan was submitted, KIDSAFE believed that it had arrived at a plan acceptable to EOWS. Rather than change the target ZIP Codes defined in the original KIDSAFE proposal, the existing Weed & Seed program would expand into KCPD's East Patrol Division to include these areas. For its part, KIDSAFE would stick with its chosen target area in the East Patrol area, where reports of child abuse and neglect were high. However, the planned KIDSAFE Council would include representatives from both areas, and the systemwide reform activities would address the needs of both.

Staff had originally envisioned an 8-month planning process, culminating in submission of an Implementation Plan on February 1, 1998. Although KIDSAFE submitted the plan on schedule, the Federal review process took months longer than expected, largely because EOWS was not satisfied with the plans for integrating local Weed & Seed efforts. While negotiations continued that summer, OJP released a small portion of the implementation funds, allowing the project to begin recruiting staff. KIDSAFE received final approval for its Implementation Plan on September 30, 1998, after extensive discussions and correspondence between the program and project staff. At the time, OJP was still reviewing the training and MIS plans and withheld approval to expend \$100,000 until these had been approved. EOWS concerns about KIDSAFE's relationship with Weed & Seed extended into implementation. Yet the project managed to move forward with fewer obstacles once the Implementation Plan was approved.

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Implementation

As of July 2003, KIDSAFE was entering its fifth grant period. KIDSAFE's first round of implementation funding in the amount of \$923,645 carried the project through September 1999. For the project's second grant, spanning the period from October 1999 to June 2001, KIDSAFE received another \$923,645 in continuation funds. Starting with the third grant in July 2001, the KIDSAFE award was reduced to \$500,000 per year with two additional awards in that amount coming in July 2002 (Grant 4) and July 2003 (Grant 5). The budget cut implemented by EOWS in 2001 proved to be major development for KIDSAFE, forcing the project to reevaluate its plans and priorities.

Staffing and Governance

KIDSAFE's staff remained fairly stable over time although there were some shifts in responsibility. The KIDSAFE project manager, the Vice President of Community Initiatives for Heart of America United Way, had been involved since the inception of the grant, providing leadership for grant development and planning, supervising the KIDSAFE project director, and staying active in all system reform activities. The current project director has been involved with the project since 1998, when she was hired as the project's community coordinator. KIDSAFE staff also included formal KIDSAFE liaisons for DFS, KCPD, and PAO. The liaisons—based in their respective agencies—provided a point of contact for other PSP agencies and collaborative members, took responsibility for communication and coordination of services, participated in cross-agency meetings, served on KIDSAFE committees, and assisted with multidisciplinary training. As implementation progressed, the PAO liaison focused her work on the system reform component of the project, directing KIDSAFE's involvement in several initiatives and facilitating dialogue between the other PSP agencies. The DFS and KCPD liaisons moved into more neighborhood-based community-building work, increasing their involvement in the NSI and supervision of grantees conducting prevention and public education activities.

Planning and strategizing for KIDSAFE occurred through monthly Management Team meetings attended by KIDSAFE staff and liaisons as well as key staff from the KCPD, the PAO, Family Court, and DFS. The meetings allowed those involved in the project to share information, present problems, and maintain their focus. The Management Team set up strategies and timelines for project activities. To help with strategic planning, KIDSAFE held

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periodic retreats to allow the Management Team to identify issues related to accomplishing the goals and objectives of the four SK/SS program elements.

KIDSAFE's formal governing body convened for the first time in August 1998 with representatives from all key stakeholder groups. The membership of the KIDSAFE Council included high-level decisionmakers from public and private agencies, foundations, and community groups. Despite some turnover in the individual representatives, there were no major changes in the agencies and organizations with seats on the Council during implementation. The Council met quarterly with KIDSAFE staff, with the Council co-chairs setting the agenda. Council meetings were largely seen as broad strategy sessions focusing on the project's goals and objectives. KIDSAFE staff used the Council as a vehicle for sustaining connections between key agencies and groups, exchanging information, and advising the project staff. KIDSAFE staff engaged the Council in decisionmaking through working committees.

Implementation of the Four Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program Elements

Throughout implementation, KIDSAFE worked on all four program elements. However, the emphasis shifted somewhat over time. The project began with a strong focus on system reform activities. While they remained prominent as implementation continued, KIDSAFE expanded the services component through the NSI and strengthened the public awareness component through a community grant program. From the beginning, KIDSAFE undertook a comprehensive local evaluation. While reductions in KIDSAFE's budget from mid-July 2001 onward necessitated cuts in each area, KIDSAFE made substantial progress across all the program elements.

System Reform and Accountability

One of KIDSAFE's major system reform efforts was the formation of an MDT to review serious child maltreatment cases from the target area. KIDSAFE began by organizing and directly convening a Case Review Team. When problems with this case review process forced KIDSAFE to suspend the team, KIDSAFE used the experience to help plan a new MDT formed as part of the community's response to a series of child fatalities in Jackson County in 1999. By mid 2001, the team (later named the Investigative Collaborative) met regularly, with representatives from DFS, Family Court, KCPD, and PAO, to share information and decide how to proceed with specific cases. KIDSAFE played a facilitation role, helping the

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Investigative Collaborative develop new policies and procedures for bringing cases to the group and for following up on information requests. Over time, the case conferences evolved into a forum for the involved parties to get information and support from each other and better coordinate their investigations.

As part of its system reform efforts, KIDSAFE maintained a strong focus on professional development and training. The professional development agenda centered on four key priorities—PSP roles and responsibilities, medical aspects of child abuse and neglect, investigation and prosecution of child abuse and neglect, and relationship-building with the domestic violence community. Annual reviews and updates to the project’s training plan show that KIDSAFE remained committed to these areas throughout implementation. For the first priority area, KIDSAFE developed brief video presentations on the roles and responsibilities of each PSP agency. KIDSAFE made the completed videos available to the PSP agencies and other interested organizations for cross-training of new and existing staff. The second priority involved training DFS staff on the medical aspects of child abuse and neglect. Working with Children’s Mercy Hospital, KIDSAFE facilitated the development of a curriculum that includes 24 hours of training provided over a 2-year period to DFS workers and selected staff from other agencies. For the third portion of its training agenda, KIDSAFE planned and conducted training sessions for the KCPD and the PAO on the investigation and prosecution of child maltreatment. For its fourth priority area, KIDSAFE worked to establish links with the domestic violence community. In fall of 2001, KIDSAFE convened a workshop to provide cross-disciplinary training on domestic violence and to encourage relationships between agencies. During the workshop, participants identified several action steps and established work groups to continue the effort. One work group focused on the Green Book recommendations, a national model to create a coordinated and consistent response to co-occurrence of child abuse and domestic violence, promoted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The efforts of this work group have emerged as a major activity for both KIDSAFE and the larger community.

Another big part of KIDSAFE’s efforts in the area of system reforms involved working on policy and procedural changes within specific agencies. Two of the larger activities involved DFS. KIDSAFE provided financial support to a structured decisionmaking project for the Jackson County DFS. This project resulted in new procedures and policies related to two critical points in the system: handling hotline calls and screening reports on child maltreatment. KIDSAFE also financially supported the state’s ongoing effort to receive child welfare accreditation. The goal of the accreditation process is to implement high-quality, best practice

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standards for child welfare agencies. KIDSAFE also worked to develop multidisciplinary responses to certain types of cases through the development of protocols or practice guidelines. For example, KIDSAFE helped draft protocols for filing court cases on drug-exposed infants and for co-investigating child sexual abuse.

Continuum of Services

Most of KIDSAFE's efforts in this area came under the project's Neighborhood Services Initiative (NSI). KIDSAFE designed this initiative to provide services for at-risk families in the target area. After issuing a request for proposals, KIDSAFE involved the community in the selection process by recruiting representatives from community-based agencies and neighborhood residents to serve on grant review teams. In September 1999, KIDSAFE made awards to 14 NSI projects. The grantees provided a wide range of services, including grandparent support programs, counseling and support groups for children and parents, academic tutoring, parenting classes, and youth activities. All of the services were offered in the KIDSAFE target area. Grants ranged from \$20,000 to \$50,000 and extended through June 2001. Starting in July 2001, KIDSAFE refunded 8 of the 14 original grantees. KIDSAFE also added two ZIP Codes to the target area covered by the NSI to incorporate the entire Weed & Seed area. The following year, the project's overall budget cut forced KIDSAFE to delay and scale back a second RFP. In July 2002, KIDSAFE funded nine grantees with 1-year awards. The grants included three new projects and six refunded projects. KIDSAFE's final grant budget included 6 months of funding for eight of these projects to cover the period from July to December of 2003.

Another part of KIDSAFE's community service strategy involved neighborhood hubs in the target area. When implementation started, KIDSAFE already had two hubs selected. Early in implementation, these hubs received a modest amount of funding to provide neighborhood residents with an opportunity for involvement, decisionmaking, and support. Once the NSI started, the hubs played a much less prominent role in KIDSAFE's services strategy, and the project eventually stopped funding them. Instead, KIDSAFE began coordinating with the Weed & Seed Safe Havens. Starting in 2001, Weed & Seed provided \$20,000 for two Safe Havens that were located within organizations in the target area. With their designation as Weed & Seed Safe Havens, these organizations hired staff, continued existing programming, and developed new programs for family support and youth development.

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Data Collection and Evaluation

KIDSAFE's partnership with a local evaluator when submitting the original proposal helped make the data collection and evaluation component of the KIDSAFE project strong from the beginning. Conforming to the formal evaluation plan submitted with the Implementation Plan, the local evaluation gathered information on each major component of the project. In the area of system reform, the local evaluation monitored changes in agency policies and procedures on an ongoing basis, surveyed participants from different systems to look at relationships between agencies, and conducted brief surveys of training participants to get feedback on the quality and usefulness of each training session. KIDSAFE began planning a MSCA in 1999. The data collection involved 40 sexual abuse cases from the target area for a baseline period (1998) and another 40 cases for a comparison period (2000). Data collection progressed extremely slowly due to problems locating files, finding enough cases in the timeframe, and determining how to handle the unexpectedly high number of unsubstantiated cases in the sample. However, as of June 2003, the local evaluator had prepared and circulated a draft report.

KIDSAFE's comprehensive local evaluation also covered other components of the project. For the NSI, the local evaluator produced periodic reports showing the number and types of services provided and the demographic characteristics of the individuals served. For the prevention grants, she documented the number of attendees, described the activities, and discussed their perceived impact in the target area. She also conducted a Community Impact Survey that gathered resource information on the agencies providing services in the target area and the types of services available.

KIDSAFE's MIS efforts originally focused on inter-agency access to databases and e-mail. Early on, these efforts progressed under the leadership of the Family Court director and a Family Court judge who worked to overcome several obstacles to integration in different databases. By the end of 2000, the electronic databases of DFS, Family Court, and the PAO were accessible to each other's staff. KIDSAFE also helped organize training for PSP agency staff on using the databases and prepared protocols for accessing the databases. While these efforts removed some of the barriers to information sharing, KIDSAFE's agency partners later reported that staff did not really use the cross-agency access to databases, for reasons that are not clear. At this point, the KIDSAFE Council expressed renewed interest in a broader MIS.

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KIDSAFE received some additional funding from the SK/SS's national TA coordinator to develop an integrated MIS for the PSP agencies. This effort was ongoing as of June 2003.

Prevention Education and Public Information

KIDSAFE's prevention education and public awareness efforts started on a small scale with the project's participation in community and neighborhood events. A turning point came when KIDSAFE devised its Community Grant Program, which had two components. The Prevention Grant Program gave small awards to numerous community organizations to conduct a prevention or public education event. The Grassroots Capacity Grants provided funds for small grassroots agencies to develop prevention programming in the target area.

KIDSAFE also found ways to offer training and TA to community agencies and grassroots groups. In 2001, KIDSAFE partnered with the local Council on Philanthropy to develop a series of Primer's Training sessions for grassroots groups. All of the recipients of Grassroots Capacity Grants were required to attend the Primer's Training series, which covered topics such as collaboration, fund-raising, grant-writing, and outcome evaluation. KIDSAFE also invited all of the NSI grantees to participate in the training sessions.

Sustainability

KIDSAFE started planning for the future during the project's third grant period (July 2001-June 2002). Over the following 2 years, the KIDSAFE Council considered several alternative structures to sustain the collaborative's vision and goals. While community stakeholders showed little interest in creating a new structure to continue the effort, there was consensus that some type of organizational body was needed. However, rather than maintain the KIDSAFE Council, KIDSAFE plans to sustain project activities by institutionalizing them within existing community organizations. This involves several organizations KIDSAFE has partnered with over the past seven years of planning and implementation, including the Child Protection Center (CPC), the Community Quality Assurance Committee (CQAC), and HAUW. Under this proposal, following the end of federal funding in September 2005, KIDSAFE would no longer exist as a separate entity. The project's efforts would be folded into the work of these organizations that already share a common vision, members, and goals for professional development and information sharing.

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The CPC is expected to be the primary vehicle for carrying out the project's vision for system reform. KIDSAFE is providing funding for contract staff support at the CPC with a focus on strategic planning, development of outcome measures, fiscal sustainability plans, and revising mission and roles, and protocols and procedures at the child and family, systems, and community levels of the child protection system. The public sector partners will continue to coordinate, communicate, and conduct joint planning through the CPC to ensure efficient co-investigation of referred cases. The CPC will also efficiently move referred families and their children through the process of advocacy and referrals to treatment in a culturally competent manner. At the same time, KIDSAFE is providing staff support to the CQAC to further advance the project's system reform efforts. The CQAC is navigating the Children's Division's exit from the Consent Decree and will help ensure independent community advice, advocacy, and accountability for the broader child protection system utilizing the same outcome measures as the federal Child and Family Services Reviews.

Like other localities, the Kansas City community began to feel the strain arising from the nation's economic downturn and related budget concerns as implementation progressed. Individual agencies and the funding community experienced budget cutbacks that made sustainability planning more difficult. KIDSAFE has a good track record in this area, having persevered when EOWS cut the project budget by nearly half. At that time, KIDSAFE leveraged some local resources to maintain the NSI and the Community Grant Program. KIDSAFE plans to rely on HAUW and the Council on Philanthropy to sustain the prevention and intervention services. In addition, KIDSAFE's efforts to improve the skills of grassroots organizations through training and TA were intended to help them develop and run programs as well as pursue other resources. While the KIDSAFE dollars will surely be missed, such efforts to build capacity in the community make it more likely that some of the services and prevention programs will continue.

Results

The KIDSAFE collaborative, anchored by the PSP agencies, brought together a broad spectrum of agencies and organizations that come into contact with maltreated children. The KIDSAFE Council, the formal governing body that guided the project, proved to be a neutral, approachable, and welcoming entity that played a mediating role in addressing child protection issues and served as a forum for the agencies to get to know each other and work together. The Council brought organizations to the table and helped build a sense of shared

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responsibility for issues related to child abuse and neglect. Locally, KIDSAFE is credited with providing a forum for dialogue among the PSP agencies and serving as a catalyst for changes in the system.

KIDSAFE's focus on system reform activities resulted in a number of positive and permanent changes in the child protection system. Starting during KIDSAFE's planning phase, a number of agencies in the formal child protection system undertook reorganizations or made structural changes to improve their handling of child abuse and neglect cases. KIDSAFE also worked on policy and procedural weaknesses identified by partners, resulting in development of formal protocols and guidelines as well as more informal procedures for multiagency responses to specific types of cases. KIDSAFE also played an important role in developing and then supporting the countywide Investigative Collaborative. The MDT provided a forum for discussing and planning responses to individual cases and allowed team members to flag policy or procedural problems. The KIDSAFE collaborative improved informal working relationships across agencies, encouraging staff involved with child abuse and neglect to share information with their counterparts and discuss problems or plans as needed.

Throughout implementation, KIDSAFE's professional training agenda remained a strong piece of the project's system reform agenda. KIDSAFE greatly expanded the training opportunities for professionals in the formal child protection system, including frontline workers and managers. Overall, the professional development activities reached a broad spectrum of public sector agencies and community groups and service providers. To promote sustainability, KIDSAFE was successful in getting other agencies or groups to take ownership of the different training activities.

Local stakeholders believed KIDSAFE's greatest successes came with the project's unique efforts to connect with the community through services, prevention programs, and public awareness activities. The NSI added services, fostered collaboration and networking between service agencies, helped service agencies understand the roles and responsibilities of the PSP agencies, and involved community and agency staff in funding decisions. For the grantees, the project also provided training and TA to improve staff skills in grant writing, recordkeeping, outcome measurement, and evaluation. As for KIDSAFE's Prevention and Grassroots Capacity Grants, and the accompanying Primer's Training sessions, these efforts resonated with the community. The strategy of providing small grants to organizations in the target area proved to be empowering and confidence building for the participants.

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Throughout, the project's local evaluation systematically generated data on all project activities. This helped KIDSAFE staff understand what things worked, guide program development, make funding decisions, and identify needs in the community. KIDSAFE also used information from the local evaluation to guide the collaborative in devising a response to the child fatalities and to inform administrators and policymakers about community issues related to child protection.

Overall, KIDSAFE benefited from having a lead agency that enjoyed recognition and credibility in the community as a facilitator of collaboration on children's issues and had the neutrality to navigate some of the political and territorial issues that arose. With support from the lead agency, KIDSAFE built a strong collaborative that acknowledged the significant problems in the child abuse and neglect system. Perhaps more importantly, from the outset the KIDSAFE collaborators agreed that the solutions to child abuse and neglect problems would have to involve changes in structure, policy, and procedures and better deployment of existing resources. The PSP agencies sent representatives to all of the committee meetings and in some cases, supported staff that spent substantial amounts of time on KIDSAFE activities. Finally, the collaborative's commitment extended beyond the agencies within the formal child protection system to many individuals, agencies, and organizations within KIDSAFE's target area. The project's community initiatives produced a high level of participation and commitment to tackling child abuse and neglect issues.

Building Safe Native American Families, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan

Planning

Planning for the program was led by a Stakeholders Advisory Group, which included a wide range of Tribal and non-Tribal agencies and representatives. The Stakeholders Advisory Group took responsibility for setting program policies and prioritizing program activities. In addition, BSNAF developed topical subcommittees to plan project activities. Unlike most of the other SK/SS sites, partners outside ACFS had not been involved in developing the proposal and first got involved in planning after the program award. These groups began work in September 1997 and submitted a draft Implementation Plan by December 1997. The project submitted a revised Implementation Plan, addressing OJP comments, in

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November 1998. In part due to the long time between the submission and approval of the Implementation Plan, the planning and implementation phases overlapped somewhat.

The program envisioned by BSNAF initially was broad in scope, encompassing both Tribal and non-Tribal agencies. Although the original proposal described a collaborative built around a small group of Tribal agencies, project staff decided to pursue a more expansive approach. They believed that OJP expected the project to involve non-Tribal agencies, since early discussions at the first cross-site cluster meeting had emphasized the need to make collaboratives comprehensive. As a result, the BSNAF planning collaborative was significantly larger than anything outlined in the original proposal. Its members represented the largest and most diverse body of community members that had ever assembled in the Eastern Upper Peninsula to address child welfare issues, with representatives from Tribal governmental departments, state governmental departments, local governmental agencies, Federal agencies, and private, nonprofit agencies.

The Implementation Plan drafted by this group was consistent with the goals and objectives outlined in the original proposal. The major change between the two was the inclusion of more agencies. Instead of limiting the collaborative to Tribal agencies with a direct role in service provision for child abuse and neglect cases, the Implementation Plan included 11 Tribal and 22 non-Tribal agencies and organizations.

OJP staff who reviewed the Implementation Plan were surprised by what they perceived as a major shift in the orientation of the project. Also, they felt the plan did not adequately address the court's role in the child protection system and saw this as a major gap. As a result, OJP required that an Ad Hoc Legal Issues Subcommittee, scheduled to convene in the implementation phase, be activated immediately to respond to some of the comments. The justice and law enforcement staff, who were slated to participate in the subcommittee, represented required collaborative members according to the original Program Announcement. OJP wanted them to have a say in the planning.

To further explore issues raised by the draft Implementation Plan, OJP arranged a TA site visit by the American Indian Development Associates (AIDA) in May 1998. OJP asked AIDA to assess and identify ways of increasing both the participation and visibility of the Tribal Court and Tribal Law Enforcement in addressing BSNAF goals. AIDA staff were also asked to assess the level of participation by Tribal members in BSNAF. Their report, submitted to

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OJJDP in July 1998, provided a general set of recommendations for improving BSNAF and specific recommendations for improving the role and function of the Tribal Court, Tribal Probation, the Victim-Witness Advocate, Tribal Prosecution, and Tribal Law-Enforcement. AIDA suggested ways in which the Tribal Court and Law Enforcement systems could work more collaboratively with BSNAF, but also recommended system improvements that went beyond the issues of child abuse and neglect or the specific goals of SK/SS. The AIDA report also suggested that few Tribal members had participated in planning. It asserted that Tribal agencies were represented on the planning committees but the active members were mostly non-Tribal members who worked for the Tribe.

The project was not altogether pleased with the AIDA report. They viewed the TA visit as a nonvoluntary experience and expressed surprise that the TA agenda included an assessment of the broader Tribal justice system. In essence, the project staff and AIDA staff had very different perceptions about the type of collaborative and planning process necessary to realize OJP's vision. The project staff viewed the level of involvement from agencies during the planning process as consistent with OJP's expectations. Non-Tribal justice agencies were represented, and Tribal agency representatives had attended stakeholders meetings and voted on the Implementation Plan.

OJP program officers conducted a follow-up visit to Sault Ste. Marie in July 1998 and arranged a second TA visit in October 1998, from a new provider, to assist with strategic planning. The new TA provider facilitated a "Visioning Experience" with representatives from all aspects of Tribal government, BSNAF staff, and OJP officials. The Visioning Experience focused on clarifying the Tribe's vision of its future and the role that BSNAF could play in achieving that vision. Members were also asked to brainstorm ideas that would help the SK/SS project achieve its goals. The Visioning Experience had the effect, at least in part, of getting BSNAF staff and Tribal agencies and officials more focused on changing the child welfare system to benefit Sault Tribe children and families. During the Visioning Experience, four components of an overall strategic direction were identified—strategic planning to ensure a tribal future, working together to build a strong community, revitalizing traditional and spiritual values, and strengthening Anishnabe families.

BSNAF submitted its revised Implementation Plan to OJP in November. The project incorporated the feedback received from OJP and the results from the Visioning Experience. While much of the revised plan was consistent with the original proposal, there

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were some significant changes. First, the plan added a number of new Tribal agencies to the collaborative—including the Tribal Court and Tribal Law Enforcement. Second, at OJP’s insistence, it reconfigured the broad collaborative to one focused on Tribal agencies, representatives, and Tribal members. So instead of a two-county program that involved leaders in Tribal, state, county, and city government and private services agencies, BSNAF would be a reservation/trust-focused program that involved leaders in Tribal agencies only. Specifically, this meant that the target population would include families who were members of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians and living in the seven counties in the Eastern Upper Peninsula of Michigan. Of approximately 27,700 tribal members, it is estimated that less than half live permanently in the seven-county area. Project activities would initially focus on Chippewa and Mackinac Counties where there was a higher concentration of Tribal members. Later, as planned, the project expanded to Schoolcraft County, located in what is commonly referred to as the Western service end. Finally, the revised plan included a local evaluation description. OJP approved this Implementation Plan in May 1999.

Implementation

Implementation of project activities did not begin in earnest until late in 1999. Prior to that, project staff spent time developing a plan and organizational structure for the program. However, a few prevention activities, such as Family Fun Nights, began as early as 1998. As of June 2003, the BSNAF project was nearing the end of its fourth grant award of \$425,000. It expected the fifth grant to carry the project for at least another year.

Staffing and Governance

A full-time project facilitator and an administrative assistant have consistently staffed the BSNAF project. In addition, SK/SS funds supported a half-time project director in the first 4 years of the project; in the last 2 years, his contribution to the project was provided “in kind” by the lead agency. The project also employed a special project assistant and two case managers, responsible for coordinating services for families in Chippewa and Mackinac County and for the Western service end. It also employed, on a part-time basis, an accounting assistant, a utilization facilitator, a juvenile law enforcement officer, and evaluation support staff. There has not been significant staff turnover.

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The project also utilized subcontracts and consultants to staff several activities. The largest subcontract was with two consultants from Sovereignty Associates and the Southwest Healing Lodge, who facilitated the Community Healing Process over several years. Smaller subcontracts with Tribal agencies facilitated web site development (e.g., YooperAid), MIS efforts, and the public awareness and media campaign. A 1-year contract with Great Lakes Behavioral Health provided an evaluator to collect case tracking data. When this agency folded, the evaluator joined ACFS as the clinical supervisor for the Western Service end, working primarily on the Children's Mental Health project, but providing some input to BSNAF.

Collaborative Structure

Throughout the project, the official governing body for all Tribal activities, including those of the SK/SS project, was the 13-member Tribal Board of Directors. The Board is elected by the Tribe's general membership and must approve all policy statements, budgets, and strategic plans. The project has been managed by ACFS throughout, but was moved from the Behavioral Health Division to the ACFS executive director's office in 2000, although the project director remained the head of Behavioral Health. ACFS made this change to increase both the visibility and influence of the project as well as to reinforce its focus on system reform.

While the Tribal Board represented the first tier of governance for the BSNAF project, the identity and membership composition of the second tier changed significantly over time. During the planning phase, the Stakeholders Advisory Group held this position. It was replaced by the Tribal Human Services Collaborative Body (HSCB) in 1999, during early implementation. A third group, the Tribal Leadership and Management team, took over in 2001.

The Tribal HSCB emerged out of the revised Implementation Plan and the Visioning Experience of 1998 to embody the new Tribal focus of the SK/SS project.³⁰ Created by authority of the Tribal Chairman and Board of Directors, the Tribal HSCB replaced the larger Stakeholders Advisory Group and took over primary responsibility for approving program activities and setting program policy. The Tribal HSCB met for the first time in May 1999. As the role of the Tribal HSCB increased, that of the larger Stakeholders Advisory Group

³⁰ In 1995, a state report, *Systems Reform for Children and Their Families*, recommended that each community have or develop a multipurpose collaborative body as a decisionmaking body to coordinate human services within the community. As a result, a multipurpose collaborative body (MPCB) was developed in Chippewa County and a human services collaborative body (HSCB) was developed in Mackinaw County. The Tribal HSCB was modeled in part on this approach.

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decreased, and ultimately, stakeholders from non-Tribal agencies stopped participating. The group disbanded by the end of 1999.

The HSCB was intended to serve as a Tribal coordinating and policymaking body for all child and family services. As originally envisioned, it was to have representatives from all the major Tribal agencies. In practice, it had difficulty attracting their commitment and participation. Few, if any, agency or division directors came to meetings. For the most part, those who attended did not have any authority or power to make major decisions. Key Tribal agencies such as Tribal Courts, Tribal Law Enforcement, Family Support Services, Children's Placement Services, and Tribal Administration did not participate. Despite its limitations, the Tribal HSCB did help BSNAF with its early strategic planning and with activities such as training and public education and it increased involvement and buy-in from some Tribal agencies and members.

By the middle of 2001, ACFS and the Tribal Chairman decided to reorganize and put the collaborative under the joint leadership of the administrative director of ACFS and the deputy executive director of the Tribe. The reorganized structure was ultimately renamed Tribal Leadership and Management (TLM). While designed to serve as a mechanism for implementing the strategic plans of various agencies involved with children, youth, and families, the TLM also planned to monitor and provide ongoing strategic planning to BSNAF. The TLM reexamined the membership issues and attempted to require attendance. The TLM also elevated the membership of the collaborative to division directors. With the new structure, the TLM reinvited several Tribal agencies/divisions that had stopped attending HSCB meetings and asked some new agencies to participate, including the Tribal Cultural Division, Tribal Education, and Tribal Elder Care.

These changes immediately elevated the importance and power base of the TLM within the Tribal community. The new group revisited the vision, mission, goals, and procedures adopted by the HSCB to ensure that they were current and meaningful. The group developed a new vision and mission statement. The TLM was to be an inclusive planning body of key Tribal team members, combining resources to develop and implement Tribal plans and programming for the benefit of the membership and community. The TLM had responsibilities beyond monitoring progress on the SK/SS action plan, including:

- Identifying potential service duplication and encumbrances;

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- Formulating the most appropriate response for service delivery and operational efficiency; and
- Identifying, monitoring, and coordinating all elements of Tribal divisions that pertained to the prevention or treatment of child abuse, neglect, or delinquency.

While the TLM got off to a good start, it hit rough water as a result of political strife within the tribe. One TLM co-chair left his senior management position in the Tribe (and the TLM) in 2003. Other political uncertainty within the Tribe's Board of Directors significantly stalled TLM efforts and constrained its decisionmaking abilities. Plans after June 2003 include reconvening the group under the new executive director of the Tribe and meeting bimonthly. There will be no formal leadership from BSNAF, although the project will provide administrative support. The political situation makes the future of the TLM uncertain. Key changes introduced with the TLM—particularly the involvement by the Tribal Board of Directors and the requirements for high-level agency participation—were expected to help the collaborative survive beyond the Federal SK/SS funding. While plans called for making the TLM a permanent committee of the Tribal Board of Directors, so far that has not happened.

Implementation of the Four Safe Kids/Safe Streets Program Elements

BSNAF conducted activities under each of the four program elements required for the SK/SS initiative. Many of the activities—training programs, for example—cut across these elements. This occurred more as the project evolved, with greater recognition of the interaction of the four SK/SS elements.

System Reform and Accountability

The Community Healing Process mentioned earlier represented a major systems change effort for the project. Based on a vision of “building a real community, a spiritual place where people care and protect each other,” the primary objective was “to train a core group of community members with information and skills ... to assist others to heal and grow in the knowledge, culture and traditions and spirituality of Bahwating Anishnabe people.”³¹ The Community Healing initiative was also expected to foster sharing of cultural resources across ACFS and other programs, thereby sustaining a “cultural foundation” for each program and

³¹ The Community Healing Process vision and mission, as presented in a seven part brochure series developed to educate others about specific concepts.

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Tribe-wide and, ultimately, incorporating cultural practices throughout the service delivery and treatment system. The project completed three training modules for Community Healing, involving a total of 42 training days, over 2 years: *What Was Never Told*, which established a common understanding of the community and its history; *Ethnostress*, which addressed internalized oppression and its impact on the cultural, social, and behavioral environment; and *Community Building*. The project expected to complete the fourth and last module, *Indigenous Ways of Helping/Healing* (36 training days), by December 2003. Complementing this work, the cultural specialist at ACFS coordinated regular cultural trainings for staff and worked to integrate traditional and spiritual values into ACFS programs.

The project's major goals for professional development included standardizing the training curriculum for mandated child abuse and neglect reporters and incorporating the cultural values, norms, and practices of Native Americans into all training curricula. As part of these efforts, the project polled the provider community, identified specific risk factors and indicators of abuse and neglect, and published a brochure entitled *At Risk Factors and Reasonable Cause to Suspect Indicators*. In 2002, the project coordinated two interdisciplinary training sessions on the "Continuum of Community Responses to Child Abuse and Neglect" that drew large audiences, including both Tribal and non-Tribal service providers. The project ultimately developed a self-administered tutorial for mandated reporters available on a CD-ROM. All new Tribal employees now receive mandated reporter training in coordination with Tribal Human Resources.

The development of a Tribal CAC represents another key system reform effort. BSNAF received a \$15,000 planning grant from the National Children's Alliance to support this effort. Several law enforcement, CPS, and medical staff received training at the National CAC Training Center on child abuse and basic and advanced forensic interviewing. After opening in 2002 at the ACFS office in Kincheloe, CAC staff began developing interagency agreements and protocols and started to provide forensic interviewing, therapy, family visitation, and intake and referral on site. The Tribe's existing MDT, which coordinates and plans investigations of child maltreatment, also started to meet at the CAC in 2002. On-site training conducted by Fox Valley Technical College helped the MDT to initiate strategic planning, encompassing vision, mission, goals, and objectives.

In other system reform efforts, BSNAF spearheaded collaborations with several other agencies, including Tribal Head Start and Youth Education and Activities. Project staff

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also participated in the Mackinac County HSCB, the Chippewa County MPCB, and the MPCB's development team for the *Pre-Birth to Age 5 Strategic Plan*. BSNAF's participation in these groups helped increase communication with service providers in the non-Tribal communities. BSNAF also initiated efforts to develop a cross-Tribal planning body to enhance services in the Western Service end and worked with ACFS service providers in the Manistique (Schoolcraft County) office to select priorities and identify leadership.

Continuum of Services

BSNAF's primary service activities involved the design and implementation of the Family Service Team/Wraparound Program, staffed by SK/SS-supported caseworkers and a juvenile police officer in the Tribal school (also partially supported by SK/SS funds). BSNAF hired two caseworkers, one for Chippewa County and one for Manistique in Schoolcraft County. The caseworkers worked out of ACFS' Behavioral Health Division, in tandem with the Children's Mental Health Initiative funded by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). The second position enhanced collaboration and expanded services in the underserved, rural Western service area. As part of this activity, ACFS trained staff internally on service coordination and also used a national expert to train staff in the wraparound model. Implemented in 2002, the "treatment team model" included teams of clients, individuals the client identified as supportive, and service providers. The family service teams had worked with over 30 families as of June 2003, including families with substantiated child abuse and neglect and those at risk. This new mode of operating also helped to include non-Tribal agencies (such as the state CPS, courts, and schools) in treatment planning for Tribal members. This is an important element, because it is estimated that nearly half of the child abuse and neglect cases served by the Tribe are initially identified by the state CPS system.

Data Collection and Evaluation

The project struggled to develop a coordinated data collection and evaluation system from the time of its initial grant application. BSNAF had hoped to examine the effectiveness of the Family Service/Wraparound model by piggybacking on the evaluation of the Children's Mental Health Initiative, but ultimately this did not work out. The project did complete some independent data collection, including a Capacity Inventory and some focus groups with youth. The project also began a case tracking analysis patterned after the CWLA's MSCA model. The effort was designed to examine performance of the formal child protection

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system by tracking child abuse and neglect cases across agencies. The project collected baseline data on 1998 cases from Child Placement and Protective Services, and it planned to collect data from other agencies such as law enforcement, mental health, and the courts.

Prevention Education and Public Information

BSNAF successfully carried out a number of different prevention education and public awareness efforts.

- In response to the need for more public education on child maltreatment identified in the Capacity Inventory, BSNAF launched a culturally appropriate, comprehensive, and coordinated multimedia campaign, with four seasonal themes based on the Native American Medicine Wheel. The campaign developed over 20 culturally specific public service announcements (PSAs) that were carried on television and radio. The project competed with over 100 other entries and received four Excellence in Community Communications and Outreach (ECCO) awards for its prevention education and public education efforts in 2002. The awards were sponsored by the Comprehensive Mental Health Services for Children and Their Families Program of the Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS), SAMHSA.
- In 2002, the project implemented “YOOPERAID,” a user-friendly, on-line services directory that allows easy access to resource information, sources for assistance, event calendars, and maps of the seven-county service area.³² SK/SS special project assistants developed a membership services directory, also available on the Internet through YOOPERAID.

Sustainability

Sustainability planning for BSNAF was subsumed under the strategic planning efforts of both ACFS and the Tribe. A variety of stakeholders credited BSNAF with laying the groundwork for the Tribe’s strategic planning process and for sustaining its momentum in the community. The SK/SS project facilitator served as the ACFS representative to the Tribal Strategic Planning Committee, which developed the Tribe’s mission, vision, and values statement. ACFS developed its own strategic plan, “Foresight Anishnabek 2005” that included feedback from a client satisfaction survey and a staff analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities of ACFS and its programs.

³² Yooper is a local reference to residents of Michigan’s Upper Peninsula.

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Despite these strategic planning efforts, the project, and ACFS overall, have relied on successful grant applications to continue many of their efforts. ACFS and other Tribal agencies obtained several Federal grants that will benefit SK/SS's target population, including a collaborative grant among ACFS, the Tribal Courts, and Youth Education and Activities. Additionally, the project is working to make some of the services provided by family service caseworkers reimbursable by public insurance. However, this will require that ACFS complete an accreditation process.

Results

In assessing the BSNAF project's success, it is important to note that it only moved into full implementation in 2000, and as of June 2003 still had full funding to carry it through most of 2004 (with transitional funding expected for the year after that). In addition, political strife within the Tribe had stalled progress on system reform efforts. On balance, however, the evidence suggests that it had made considerable progress.

The original Stakeholders Advisory Group developed a committee structure and established a working collaborative with members from diverse sectors of the community. After the project switched to an exclusively Tribal focus, the TLM developed a common vision and strategic plans. Since 2001, it has been able to actively engage representatives from key Tribal agencies such as the courts, health, and cultural divisions. The collaborative also made sustainability plans. Plans to have the TLM facilitated by the executive director of the Tribe should solidify its sustainability and influence on policy decisions.

The long-term survival of the TLM as a governing body remains in doubt. However, the TLM has already expanded collaborative decisionmaking beyond a single Federal grant, attempted to institutionalize broad representation, and prioritized issues for action. If sustained, it may well take on even greater challenges—especially those related to Tribal agency resources, budgets, and strategic plans.

So far, OJP's vision for community participation has not been fully realized. Certainly, BSNAF did engage community members in the Community Healing process. But community members had little or no direct role in project governance, except insofar as the agency professionals involved were themselves members of the Tribe. The collaborative also failed to recruit sustained participation from law enforcement.

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The SK/SS project made progress on system reform and helped bring about many significant changes in other areas. Many stakeholders and other key informants felt that BSNAF deserved a large share of the credit for the fact that collaboration has become the normal way of doing business among many Tribal agencies. In the same vein, the Community Healing Process infused new perspectives and approaches into many aspects of Tribal life and practice. Both these movements have changed the community climate in ways that would be difficult to reverse.

In addition, BSNAF played a substantial role in:

- Coordinating services and encouraging family and client participation through the Interdisciplinary Family Service Treatment teams, which promise to endure—especially with insurance reimbursement for many of the services on the horizon;
- Enhancing coordinated responses for child victims of sexual abuse and severe physical abuse through an interdisciplinary communitywide training curriculum and monthly child abuse and neglect training in collaboration with human resources, which is open to all Tribal employees;
- Educating the community and service providers about child abuse and neglect; and
- Developing a Tribal CAC, which was in its early stages of implementation.

As of June 2003, BSNAF still needed to complete several activities, including further analysis and distribution of the results of the MSCA so that the information can be used to influence programming. The project also was actively working to enhance the Tribal CAC and strengthen buy-in from Tribal law enforcement and the Tribal prosecutor. Lastly, the TLM and its new leadership faced the challenge of keeping its member agencies involved and developing mechanisms to communicate its progress back to program-level and line staff, as well as to the community at large, to ensure continued support.

Safe Kids/Safe Streets, Toledo, OH

Planning

The SK/SS project in Lucas County was designed originally as a service delivery program to fill gaps by providing “individualized intensive child abuse prevention services to

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stressed families needing support to stop the escalation of behaviors leading to abuse.” In addition, the SK/SS project targeted at-risk teenage mothers.

Unlike the other four SK/SS sites, the Toledo project received only “seed” funding. OJP felt that the community was not far enough along to warrant full funding, due to the initial proposal’s narrow focus on child sexual abuse and the lack of community-based, consumer, and nontraditional involvement in the existing collaborative. Because of the limited funding, OJP did not require the project to submit an Implementation Plan, conduct a separate planning phase, or include a local evaluation. However, the project did elect to conduct a local evaluation.

Implementation

OJP awarded the project in March 1997. After FCAPC submitted additional details required by OJP, the revised proposal was accepted and approved on June 4, 1997. At that time, the project received its first award of \$125,000. By June 2003, SK/SS had just a few months of funding left under the last of the five awards originally planned for SK/SS. However, OJP had invited an application for a \$125,000 supplement to assist the transition to non-Federal support. The project expected this grant to carry activities for another year.

Staffing and Governance

SK/SS had a small management staff, which experienced several changes in leadership over the years. Despite these changes, SK/SS activities were not seriously affected. Many former SK/SS staff (both management and direct service) remained involved with SK/SS efforts, working from their new positions outside of FCAPC.

FCAPC initially provided the project’s management staff in-kind. However, beginning in 1999 (Grant 2), project funds supported a project director. Three individuals have served as SK/SS project directors. The first project director left in June 1999, and was replaced by the director of the CAC. The second resigned in 2001, although she continued to remain active in the SK/SS project. The project hired a new SK/SS project director in 2002. Additionally, FCAPC’s chief executive officer (CEO), an active participant in the SK/SS project, retired in 2001. A new CEO was hired the same year.

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The project also funded several assessment and support workers and a supervisor for Building Healthy Families (BHF).³³ SK/SS funding also supported a victim advocate, as well as a program supervisor, crisis counselor, and case manager at the CAC. Many of these staff stayed the same throughout the project. SK/SS approach to funding BHF staff changed significantly over the life of the project, however. During 2000, SK/SS shifted from funding direct services to funding supervisory, training, and coordination positions that would support all BHF programs throughout the county. The project found other state and Federal monies to support the assessment workers. SK/SS then redirected project funds to a supervisor for the Help Me Grow Contract Providers Committee, a new collaboration of BHF and Early Start agencies. SK/SS also helped fund an assessment trainer and contracted for a mental health consultant to also train direct service workers.

The pre-existing Lucas County Child Abuse Task Force (CATF) served as the collaborative for the SK/SS project with FCAPC providing management oversight. CATF had already played a key leadership role in Toledo—developing the Interagency Lucas County Plan of Cooperation and Protocols, a plan that defined the roles in the child abuse and neglect service continuum back in 1987 and, more recently, worked to establish the CAC.

The CATF and SK/SS governance structure evolved through the life of the project. In 2000, the CATF reorganized, developed a new SK/SS steering committee, and reconfigured the Advocacy, Prevention, and Research Committee as the Evaluation Committee for SK/SS. The Service Coordination Committee also took the lead on the SK/SS project newsletter. At the same time, the CATF decided that to facilitate “ownership” of the collaborative, a different agency would provide leadership each year.

In 1999, with help from SK/SS consultants, the project also affiliated with the Comprehensive Strategies initiative in Toledo, another OJJDP-funded initiative. This initiative, which predated SK/SS, involves Juvenile Court, social services, and community-based agencies collaborating to improve the juvenile justice system, provide first-time offenders with structured programs and services, and offer appropriate prevention methods to children, families, and communities. The linkage between the two initiatives brought more court involvement to SK/SS and provided the project and its lead agency a seat at the policymaking table along with Lucas County Children’s Services (LCCS), law enforcement, and the courts. FCAPC also became an

³³ Originally called Healthy Families Lucas County (HFLC), this was a home visitation program for new mothers.

Implementation of the Program

active participant in the Lucas County Family Council, a state-mandated council that administers state and Federal funds for early intervention services. CATF was evaluating whether to incorporate as a formal subcommittee of the Family Council at the end of June 2003.

Implementation of the Four Safe Kids/Safe Streets Elements

Highlights of project activities are described below.

System Reform and Accountability

The CAC has been one of the focal points of system reform activities for the Lucas County SK/SS project. The major goals of the SK/SS project included updating the CAC protocol, developing strategies to increase awareness and utilization of the CAC, and ultimately creating a “one stop shopping” center where child abuse victims and their families can receive sensitive, coordinated, and culturally competent services and advocacy. Over time, the SK/SS project’s financial support for staffing allowed services to expand to include help for children who witness violence, parenting classes for men and women at an adult correctional center, and services for children experiencing various types of trauma—the latter in coordination with a SAMHSA-funded Children’s Trauma Practice Center. Additionally, the project established a support network for professionals who work with victims of abuse at the CAC.

Improving the MDT remained a shared goal of the SK/SS project and its partner agencies. Key informant interviews conducted in the fall of 2000 revealed significant conflict surrounding the MDT decisionmaking process and its actual outcomes. The biggest frustration with the MDT was that not all case decisions were made at formal MDT meetings as planned. Many MDT members were also frustrated at the lag time between the initial CPS investigation to the presentation of the case at MDT, creating a serious barrier to consensual decisionmaking.³⁴ In response, the SK/SS project sponsored several training sessions. In 2003, the American Prosecutors Research Institute’s National Center for the Prosecution of Child Abuse conducted a 2-day forensic interview training. That same year, the Midwest Regional CAC conducted development training and identified critical issues for the Lucas County CAC and MDT. Several MDT members also attended a training put on by the Ohio Network of CACs (ONCAC). These events reenergized MDT members and spurred monthly strategic

³⁴ A full discussion of key informant interview results is found in Gragg, Cronin, Schultz, & Eisen, 2001, op. cit.

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planning sessions. Through these sessions, the MDT clarified its mission, goals, case presentation criteria, and operating procedures. The project scheduled additional forensic interview training on the Childhood Trust model (the model adopted by ONCAC) for the Toledo Police Department. In addition, as of June 2003 the MDT was considering implementing a small team of dedicated forensic interviewers at the CAC. A new supervisor at LCCS now co-facilitates the MDT which has also provided positive leadership for the group.

The project's system reform activities also included efforts directed toward children who witness violence. The SK/SS project, along with the Ohio Attorney General, Toledo Children's Hospital, LCCS, the YWCA, the Lucas County Sheriff's Office, and the Toledo Police Department planned and initiated the Children Who Witness Violence Project (CWWV), in 2000. CWWV is an outreach crisis service for children who witness violence, based at the CAC. Along with a community Family Resource Center, the project also sponsored Project Omega, a school-based outreach program that provides free counseling to children who witness violence. For this project, SK/SS secured startup funds in 2003 to add in-home crisis counseling services for children in homes where there is domestic violence.

SK/SS was an important catalyst for another significant system reform activity, court reform and permanency planning efforts. To kick off court reform efforts, the SK/SS project coordinator, a Magistrate from the Juvenile Court Dependency Division, and an LCCS attorney attended a symposium at the National Center for State Courts. SK/SS funded their participation. This group subsequently visited two model court systems. In 2001, the local court-appointed special advocate (CASA) sponsored a series of related workshops entitled *Permanency for the Abused and Neglected Child* to increase community support for permanency planning and to provide training and education to judges and social service and court professionals. In 2003, the Court implemented a new permanency planning protocol outlining reforms in the court process. For example, the Court now makes attorneys available for qualified parties appearing for emergency shelter care (removal) hearings in child protection cases. Also in 2003, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges designated the Lucas County Juvenile Court as a model court.

Due to its strong connection to the Toledo Hospital system, SK/SS and the FCAPC facilitated the development of pediatric sexual abuse guidelines for medical personnel. The guidelines were finalized and distributed to six emergency medical centers in 2000, and extensive training was conducted.

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Continuum of Services

Originally, Healthy Families Lucas County (HFLC) represented Toledo’s primary prevention and early intervention activity. This program provided long-term services for at-risk families through home visitation and parental role modeling. The SK/SS project reevaluated the model and curriculum in 1999. From the reevaluation, the project concluded that the Healthy Families Lucas County (HFLC) model was too expensive, particularly because of strict criteria related to the number of home visits, maximum caseload for workers, and enrollment immediately after birth. The project ultimately adopted the BHF program, a less intensive and less expensive model than HFLC. The project established the Help Me Grow Contract Providers Committee (originally called the Building Healthy Families Collaborative) to transition from the HFLC model to the less intensive BHF home visitation program. These changes dove-tailed with the SK/SS decision to shift funding from direct services to supervision, training, and coordination functions, described earlier. Ultimately, funding from TANF, the Ohio Department of Health, and the Early Start Program supplemented BHF, allowing the program to double in size and capacity to reach families. The project views these funding sources as long-term financial support for BHF.³⁵

SK/SS prevention and early intervention efforts also included planning and implementing Lucas County’s response to Ohio legislation that mandated the availability of a “Safe Haven for Newborns” by April 2001. The initiative, led by the Prosecutor’s Office, aims to prevent the loss of life of abandoned babies and targets adolescents and young adult women. The Safe Haven provides a place for parents to drop off unharmed newborn babies within 72 hours of delivery without facing criminal charges. After the infant is medically cleared, LCCS gains custody and places the child in an adoptive home. The CAC provides crisis phone coverage with the courts, hospital systems, and law enforcement. SK/SS staff also worked on the community awareness campaign.

³⁵ The early intervention programs in Lucas County have had several different names. “Early Start” now refers to several early intervention programs—Right from the Start, Welcome Home, Early Start, Help Me Grow and BHF—in Lucas County that provide prevention, home visitation, and early intervention services. The FCAPC still calls its individual program, BHF.

Data Collection and Evaluation

The SK/SS project conducted a limited local evaluation, implemented the MSCA, and collaborated on MIS efforts. For its local evaluation, the project initially focused on exploring the potential utility of a planned community education/media campaign. The project secured funding from DOJ's Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to conduct a baseline assessment of adult perceptions of child abuse and neglect in Lucas County. The survey assessed community knowledge about child abuse and neglect, including how to report suspected abuse. The survey found significant deficits in the knowledge of child abuse and neglect among respondents.³⁶

During 2001, SK/SS renewed evaluation efforts by subcontracting with a local evaluator. The project hoped to build the internal capacity of the SK/SS project for ongoing evaluation and to develop a structure that would create stakeholder ownership of evaluation efforts. In the shorter term, the project established a multiagency evaluation committee and focused on research related to the CAC, BHF, and system-level issues. The project's long-range plan was to phase out the external evaluators, leaving an internal evaluation team in place for ongoing efforts.

The evaluation team made considerable progress in designing and implementing strategies to centralize data collection, storage, processing, and analysis at the CAC. LCCS now forwards disposition statistics to the CAC, which enables the CAC to report outcome statistics for clients. The evaluators also revised and implemented a new client satisfaction survey and developed a survey for professionals who refer clients to the CAC.

The SK/SS project, the CATF, and other key agencies involved in Comprehensive Strategies (including LCCS, the Juvenile Court, and the Family Council) began exploring the MSCA in 2001. The Family Council and a key Juvenile Court judge agreed to lead the effort. Originally, the Family Council thought the MSCA could also help evaluate the countywide service coordination plan, although ultimately that was not feasible.³⁷ For the MSCA, the

³⁶ Price, J.H., Islam, R., Gruhler, J., Dove, L., Knowles, J., & Stults, G., "Public Perceptions of Child abuse and Neglect in a Midwestern Urban Community," *Journal of Community Health*, 26(4), 2001: 271-284.

³⁷ Each Family and Children First Council in Ohio was required to develop a countywide service coordination plan to address service planning and delivery for abused, neglected, dependent, unruly, and delinquent youth and families who voluntarily wish to receive services.

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project sampled cases from 2001, since that was the first year that automated systems were thought to exist for all participating agencies. After completing data collection in 2003, the project produced a draft report. The SK/SS project hopes that MSCA efforts will ultimately be integrated into the Family Council's countywide data and evaluation network.

While SK/SS in Toledo did not pursue an expansive MIS, it was involved with MIS efforts at partner agencies. The project participated in the development of a database on child abuse and neglect for emergency medical centers. Utilizing funds from the Ohio Department of Health and Toledo Hospital, this effort developed a comprehensive database for emergency medical centers, law enforcement, the courts, and social service providers. SK/SS plans to use OJP transitional funds to install a computer network server to facilitate data transfer. The project's data coordination efforts also focused on the BHF program. BHF now tracks all families receiving services, as part of the implementation of a common assessment tool among early intervention service providers.

Prevention Education and Public Information

Early on, the Toledo SK/SS project envisioned a public education media campaign that built on results from the citizen survey on child abuse attitudes. The SHOCK (Silence Hurts Our Community and Kids) Campaign was developed by members of the Ad Club of Greater Toledo as a pro bono project in 1997-98. The campaign included public service announcements for radio and television, brochures, and billboards. Unfortunately, the project did not have funding for the campaign in either of its first two budgets and never secured other funding for it. The project did produce and distribute a SK/SS brochure.

After setting aside the broader plans for a public education media campaign, the project developed a SK/SS newsletter and web site. The newsletter, done in collaboration with the CATF service coordination committee and Toledo Hospital, was distributed approximately three times a year to over 500 individuals and agencies. The newsletter highlighted a different community coalition in every issue and provided updates on SK/SS project activities and other CATF activities. The Toledo hospital agreed to continue cover printing costs for the newsletter after SK/SS funds are gone. The project also developed a web site for FCAPC that includes a section on SK/SS and links to partner agencies. FCAPC plans to support this web site after SK/SS funding ends and hopes to include cross-agency training schedules and a list of best practices and training curricula.

Sustainability

Lucas County SK/SS participants seemed fairly optimistic about the future. Key informants generally felt that the collaborative itself would be sustained. Throughout its 20-year history in Toledo, CATF has achieved many goals, including developing a strategic plan, developing a countywide plan of cooperation for child abuse and neglect, and implementing the CAC. Once the SK/SS project helped CATF meet these primary goals, it became necessary to revisit goals and objectives in order to maintain participation and a meaningful focus. Thus, in 2003, with the aid of SK/SS TA funds, the CATF brought in an outside facilitator and held a retreat focused on strengthening the collaborative and conceptualizing the future direction and sustainability of the SK/SS initiative. At that time, CATF decided to utilize the SK/SS steering committee as the steering committee for the CATF.

As of June 2003, the lead agency and key long-term stakeholders appeared determined to continue SK/SS. Although some stakeholders expressed concern about losing momentum, the CATF, led by the SK/SS steering committee, has engaged in strategic planning at several points during the SK/SS initiative to revitalize its mission. During 2004, CATF plans to explore formalizing its governance structure by putting it under the umbrella of the Family Council.³⁸ Affiliating with the Family Council should institutionalize CATF's role as well as increase its influence across the spectrum of prevention, intervention, and treatment of child abuse and neglect. The Family Council's broader membership includes executive directors and leaders of the major public agencies, who have the authority to act directly on system and policy changes and recommendations developed by CATF. At the same time, the Family Council has a history of active grassroots, parent, and consumer leadership. Joining the Council would provide the Task Force much more direct access to agency executive directors and leaders, as well as voting rights on the Council and a small budget for community awareness events.

The project also made significant strides in securing long-term funding for services such as BHF. It also found funding for services such as the CWWV project, the Children's Trauma Center, and CAC therapists, although as yet these programs are not secured through long-term or blended funding. We are optimistic that plans to use OJP transitional funds to conduct a CAC co-location feasibility study and develop a business plan for ongoing funding, including pooled or blended funding, will lead to sustained support for the CAC.

³⁸ Toledo Children's Hospital and Family Child Abuse Prevention Center, *OJP Application for Sustainability Funding*, June 2003.

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Results

Judging from our various surveys, SK/SS participants in Toledo are satisfied with both the collaborative process and its accomplishments. Despite its limited funding, the Lucas County SK/SS project appears to have done a good job realizing OJP's vision. Through SK/SS, CATF reengineered its committee structure, establishing a working collaborative with members from diverse sectors of the community. Collaborative members developed a common vision and strategic plans and engaged representatives from nontraditional sectors, including faith-based organizations and grassroots community organizations as well as citizens. The collaborative also confronted sustainability issues and was considering formal changes in its affiliation in order to solidify its position.

It was too early to judge the results of some SK/SS activities when we completed data collection. However, the Lucas County SK/SS project could already point to many achievements in the area of system reform, and prospects for their continuation looked promising. Most important, perhaps, is that collaboration has become routine for many agencies involved in preventing or responding to child abuse and neglect. Many stakeholders and other key informants said that the SK/SS project deserves considerable credit for this shift toward collaboration, although programs like Comprehensive Strategies no doubt played a role. It seems unlikely that the Lucas County community would revert to the level of collaboration that existed before the Comprehensive Strategies initiative and SK/SS.

A second significant and enduring system change is the Permanency Planning Protocol. The protocol is based on best practices, including reforms to front-load coordinated services and other policy and practice changes at the court to achieve timely permanence for children under court jurisdiction. The approach also includes data collection strategies to evaluate progress.

Lastly, in close collaboration with the Family Council, the project was successful in accessing blended funding (local, state, and Federal funds) to support early intervention services, standardized assessment, and statewide data collection through the Help Me Grow system. This represents a major achievement in Lucas County, affecting the resources available for the prevention and early intervention of child abuse and neglect long-term.

Implementation of the Program

There were other significant system changes in which the project played a substantial role including:

- Enhancement of early intervention services by creating a BHF coordinator position, a central intake site, and coordinating training for all BHF workers;
- Strengthening the fledging CAC and interagency protocols;
- Enhancement of medical center responses to child victims of sexual abuse through the development and distribution of the Pediatric Sexual Abuse Guidelines;
- Enhancement of coordinated responses for child victims of sexual abuse and severe physical abuse by improving the MDT through multidisciplinary training, forensic interviewing training, and a memorandum of agreement for the joint investigation process;
- Enhancement of treatment for child victims and witnesses of abuse through the establishment of the Children’s Trauma Center and CWWV project;
- Greater integration of responses to domestic violence, including children who witness violence, between LCCS, the police and the provider community; and
- Establishment of an emergency medical center database and information sharing system for domestic violence and child abuse and neglect cases.

Allocation of Resources

From the forgoing descriptions, it should be evident that sites made different choices initially about how to allocate their SK/SS resources and shifted their priorities over time—responding to local judgments about need as well as input from OJP and the TA team. Figures 4-1 through 4-5 compare how each site allocated their SK/SS budgets for two grant periods, Grant 2 (early implementation) and Grant 5 (late implementation). For Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie, the Grant 5 budgets represent projections for the grant period that was about to start.

For this comparison, we distributed budgeted expenditures across five categories, including the four program elements (system reform, continuum of services, data collection/evaluation, and prevention education/public information) and a core staffing/administration category. The latter category included the project director, other staff or consultants who primarily engaged in management or administrative support, and items like rent, staff development, and office expenses. Subgrants and staff or consultant positions that related

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primarily to one program element were assigned to that category. For instance, a subgrant for supervised visitation was assigned to the service category, a subgrant for public awareness activities went under public information, and local evaluators were assigned to data collection. Professional development and training activities were assigned to system reform.

Our approach has some limitations—budgeted expenditures did not always match actual expenditures, and projects often leveraged additional dollars from other sources—but we believe it does provide a reasonable approximation of the big picture. On average, we note that most sites budgeted somewhere from one-fifth to one-third of their SK/SS awards for core staff and administration during Grant 2, and all were doing so by Grant 5. In the earlier period, Sault Ste. Marie allocated substantially more than any other site (46%) and Toledo substantially less (14%) but both moved to the more typical pattern by Grant 5 (34% and 21%, respectively).

Figure 4-1. Burlington




Figure 4-2. Huntsville




Figure 4-3. Kansas City




Figure 4-4. Sault Ste. Marie





Figure 4-5. Toledo



Implementation of the Program

Kansas City and Burlington both increased their staffing and administration budget over time, while Huntsville decreased it somewhat. As noted earlier, OJP required Burlington to add staff and the effects can be seen here—by Grant 5, it was budgeting the largest percentage of any site (35%) for this purpose.

Some other broad patterns are noteworthy. With a couple of exceptions, investments in the data collection/evaluation and prevention education/public information elements remained small—representing 6 percent or less of the SK/SS budget in both time periods—although in some cases the sites leveraged other support for these efforts. Sault Ste. Marie and Kansas City both budgeted larger percentages for evaluation—14 and 10 percent, respectively, in Grant 2, 9 and 8 percent in Grant 5—although Kansas City’s dollar investment was much greater because of its higher funding level, especially in Grant 2. Kansas City also invested a larger share of its budget—13 to 14 percent—in prevention education. Sault Ste. Marie was projecting a 12 percent investment in prevention education in Grant 5.

The other significant pattern relates to the balance between funding for system reform and enhancing the continuum of services. During Grant 2, Kansas City was the only site to allocate the largest share of its budget (33%) to system reform. In contrast, Burlington and Toledo gave services the lion’s share of the budget, far outstripping allocations for system reform (48% for services vs. 14% for system reform in Burlington, 68% vs. 13% in Toledo). In Sault Ste. Marie, the services budget also far outweighed that for system reform (26% vs. 9%). The difference in Huntsville (34% vs. 24%) was not as great.

By Grant 5, this picture had changed substantially. All sites were devoting larger shares of their funding to system reform activities, although the change in Sault Ste. Marie was small (from 9% to 13%). And Huntsville and Toledo had joined Kansas City in making this their number one category of investment. The turnaround in Toledo was truly dramatic, with services dropping to 27 percent of the budget (from 68% before) and system reform rising to 47 percent (from 13 %). We believe the shift toward system reform would be even larger at most sites, if we could precisely determine how core project staff spent their time and allocate it across program elements. As it is, we can only say that from our observations and other documentation, it appears that core staff were spending more of their time on system reform during late phases of implementation than during the initial phases.

5. Collaboratives Developed for Safe Kids/Safe Streets

OJP designed the SK/SS initiative with collaborative development as a critical element. OJP expected a broad-based local collaborative to design and carry out the agenda in each community. Further, the original program solicitation specified that “Programs are to be firmly centered within larger community-based initiatives.”³⁹ That is, communities should not propose an entirely new enterprise, but should build on efforts already in place. As discussed in Chapter 3, OJP took particular care to select sites that had a record of cooperation or collaboration around issues of child protection and family well-being; however, this was done with varying success

In this chapter, we begin by reviewing the definitions and attributes of successful collaboratives. We then discuss how the SK/SS collaboratives developed and were maintained, the challenges they faced during development, their successes, and their prospects for sustainability. This chapter draws frequently on the findings of the Stakeholder Surveys, especially the most recent one, conducted in 2003. These mail surveys targeted active collaboration members—those with a history of service on SK/SS councils or committees and recipients of subgrants—and asked them about many aspects of their experience with the SK/SS collaboratives.

Key Aspects of Collaboration

The literature contains a plethora of definitions of collaboratives and interdependent systems. OJP provided a good synthesis of those definitions in the SK/SS solicitation:

“...collaboratives differ from coordinated or cooperating groups in that members of a collaborative share responsibility, accountability, and resources. In this instance a communitywide collaborative will extend and institutionalize multidisciplinary practices across all the systems that prevent, intervene in, or treat child abuse and neglect (or have the potential to do so).⁴⁰

³⁹ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, July 1996, op. cit.: 35.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 40.

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Several aspects of this definition should be emphasized. First, requiring that the collaboratives share responsibility *plus* accountability *plus* resources meant moving beyond information-sharing or sign-off on project plans. OJP was not looking for project staff to implement a program that was rubber-stamped by an advisory board. The work to be undertaken by the projects was to be developed and implemented jointly by project staff and the collaborative. Second, the parenthetical expression “or have the potential to do so” directed sites to move well beyond the agencies typically associated with the child protection system. The project must involve a core team of traditional agencies—incorporating the medical, mental health, and educational systems, as well as the more familiar child protective services, law enforcement, justice, and family services agencies. Further, sites were to include nontraditional groups—such as churches, religious organizations, recreation programs, Boys and Girls Clubs, YMCAs, neighborhood-based groups, the Junior League, 4-H Clubs, the media, and survivors of abuse (and the system). This meant casting a wide net and going beyond the collaborative arrangements already in place. The specific choice of whom to include (beyond the core agencies) was left open, so that sites could select the most appropriate groups from their own community. In addition, OJP expected the collaboratives to include representatives from all levels of the relevant agencies—”policymakers, decisionmakers, and frontline workers.”⁴¹

Over the past decade, collaboratives developed to support Federal, state, and foundation initiatives have become a familiar feature of the landscape. Experiences from these programs suggest a number of strategies useful (or some may say required) for developing and maintaining successful collaborations:⁴²

- *Involving key players early in the process* to build ownership of the project as it develops;
- *Establishing a shared vision and defining outcomes* that reflect an understanding of the perspectives and priorities of the partners and the ultimate goals (“how will we know when we get there?”);
- *Setting readily attainable objectives*, especially at first, to create a sense of accomplishment and maintain momentum toward longer term objectives;

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 34.

⁴² Melaville, A.I., & Blank, M.J., *What It Takes: Structuring Interagency Partnerships to Connect Children and Families with Comprehensive Services*, Washington, DC: Education and Human Services Consortium, 1991; CSR, 1996, op. cit.; Farrow, F., 1997, op. cit.; Mizrahi, T., & Rosenthal, B.B., “Complexities of Coalition Building: Leaders, Successes, Strategies, and Solutions,” *Social Work*, 46(1), 2001: 63-78; Mizrahi, T., “Strategies for Effective Collaboration in Human Services,” *Social Policy*, 29(4), 1999: 5-20.

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- *Devising creative and realistic strategies* that recognize and build on community strengths, share resources across members, and use information strategically;
- *Emphasizing what partners agree on and respecting differences*, to avoid being overwhelmed by the frustrations and disappointments that are part of the process of learning to work together;
- *Avoiding “red herrings,”* by not getting diverted by secondary issues or technical obstacles that could give some partners an excuse to drop out, before the partners have developed a shared vision and had a chance to assess how to change or accommodate certain impediments to collaboration;
- *Including participants at every level*, such as those with the power to make changes as well as those who will be affected by them (i.e., agency administrators as well as frontline staff, parents, and children);
- *Addressing how partners work together*, not just the outcomes they have come together to achieve;
- *Publicizing success and acknowledging contributions from partners* so that they can attract the funding necessary to maintain and expand their efforts; and
- *Institutionalizing change* by incorporating partnership objectives into each agency’s budget, ensuring a permanent flow of resources to keep the efforts going, and rotating collaborative leadership.

While these strategies are important, merely listing them does not tap the complexity of interactions involved in developing and maintaining a cohesive group and sustaining members’ commitment amidst competing and overlapping interests. Robert Chaskin emphasized the problem in stating:

“Collaboration has different meanings for different participants, and collaborative members have different approaches to problem solving, different bases of experience, different goals, orientations, and different perspectives on the nature of the problem, the importance and meaning of representation, and the appropriate role of the collaborative in fostering...change.”⁴³

Add to this the turnover in individual members, the addition of new groups, and an uncertain economy (at least, in recent years), and the challenges faced by the SK/SS sites appear legion.

⁴³ Chaskin, R.J., *Lessons Learned From the Implementation of the Neighborhood and Family Initiative: A Summary of Findings*, Chicago, IL: Chapin Hall Center for Children, 2000: 9.

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Below we discuss how they went about meeting the requirements established by OJP, confronting these challenges, and achieving viable collaboratives.

The Safe Kids/Safe Streets Collaboratives

Chapter 4 makes clear that the sites used a range of structures and processes to build a communitywide collaborative and promote a collaborative spirit for working with children and families. Table 5-1 shows the primary mechanisms used—governing councils; teams, committees, and workgroups; and broad-based community meetings. Below, we discuss the development of each mechanism.

Governing Councils

Each collaborative established a governing council to oversee planning and implementation of SK/SS. The governing councils were multiagency bodies with, at least initially, responsibilities for overall approval of actions plans and budgets. Oversight of project activities and resource allocations, such as staffing, was the province of the lead agency, ACFS in Sault Ste. Marie and FCAPC in Toledo. In Burlington, the lead agency's board delegated most of this responsibility to the SK/SS governing body. Elsewhere the main responsibility went to a council subcommittee, such as the Steering Committee in Huntsville or the Management Team in Kansas City.

As noted earlier (see Chapter 3), at the time of the SK/SS awards, each of the five sites could point to some collaborative efforts in the community around child protection. Typically, the lead agencies for SK/SS were themselves a focal point for interagency collaboration and had involved many of the required participants in their efforts. In Burlington, the board of the lead agency (the Community Network) was itself a multiagency collaborative that had focused on child maltreatment issues for years. In two other sites, the lead agency was convening long-established groups that brought together major stakeholders—the CATF in Toledo and the Metropolitan Child Abuse Network in Kansas City. In Huntsville, the lead agency's board represented many public and private organizations. Sault Ste. Marie was unique in that, prior to SK/SS, collaboration around child maltreatment had occurred mainly at the

Table 5-1. Governance and Collaboration Mechanisms

Site	Policymaking/Governing Structure ^a	Teams, Committees, Workgroups ^a	Community Meetings
Burlington, VT	KidSafe Collaborative Council (<i>formerly the Management Council</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Grants Oversight Committee (joint with Network Board) ▪ Multisystem Case Analysis Work Group (joint with Permanency Planning Project) ▪ Policy Committee ▪ Sustainability Committee ▪ Child Protection Team ▪ Operations Team (disbanded 3/03) ▪ <i>Systems Change Team</i> ▪ <i>Child Abuse/Neglect & Parents with Mental Illness Work Group</i> ▪ <i>Training, Education, & Outreach Team</i> ▪ <i>Child Protection Team Steering Committee</i> ▪ <i>Evaluation Team</i> ▪ <i>Legislative Advocacy Committee (joint with Network Board)</i> ▪ <i>Children’s Advocacy Center Task Force</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Kickoff Stakeholder Meeting (1997) ▪ Follow-up Stakeholder Meetings (1997, 1998) ▪ Vision Summits (1999, 2000) ▪ Community Forums on Child Protection Teams (2 in 2000) ▪ Forum on Heroin & Young Women (2001) ▪ Policy Forums (3 in 2002) ▪ Funders Forum (2002) ▪ Legislative Candidates Forum (2002) ▪ Public Policy Forum (2002)
Huntsville, AL	<p><i>Stakeholders Council</i></p> <p>Madison County Coordinating Council for Families and Children (MC3)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Steering Committee ▪ Sustainability Subcommittee ▪ Family Strengthening Education Workgroup ▪ Faith ‘N Neighborhood Workgroup ▪ Purple Pages Workgroup ▪ Public Awareness and Education Workgroup ▪ MC3 Executive Committee ▪ The Circle Project Task Force ▪ Substance Abuse Solutions Network ▪ <i>MC3 Report Card Committee</i> ▪ <i>Family Resource Center Workgroup</i> ▪ <i>Language Bank Committee</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Project Kickoff at Chamber of Commerce Breakfast Meeting (1997) ▪ Vision Summits (1998,1999, 2000, 2001) ▪ Substance Abuse Summit (2001) ▪ Supervised Visitation Summit (2002)
Kansas City, MO	KIDSAFE Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Management Team ▪ Funding Oversight Committee ▪ Professional Development Committee ▪ MIS Committee 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Community forums on sustainability (2 in 2001)

Table 5-1. Governance and Collaboration Mechanisms (continued)

Site	Policymaking/Governing Structure	Teams, Committees, Workgroups	Community Meetings
Sault Ste. Marie, MI	<i>Tribal Human Services Collaborative Body</i> Tribal Board of Directors Tribal Leadership and Management (TLM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Public Awareness Committee ▪ Community Healing Committee ▪ <i>Information Systems Committee</i> ▪ <i>Kids Involvement Committee</i> ▪ <i>Paradigm Issues Committee</i> ▪ <i>Service Coordination Committee</i> ▪ <i>Strategy Committee</i> ▪ <i>Training and Education Committee</i> ▪ <i>Ad-Hoc Legal Issues Committee</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Kickoff event (1997) ▪ Visioning Experience (1998) ▪ Strategic Planning Workshop (1999)
Toledo, OH	Lucas County Child Abuse Task Force (CATF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Safe Kids/Safe Streets Steering Committee ▪ Service Coordination Subcommittee ▪ Support and Treatment Subcommittee ▪ Evaluation Committee ▪ Education and Training Committee 	
<p>^a Bold type indicates entities or positions that were new or significantly changed in 2002-3. Regular type indicates entities or positions that carried over from 2001. <i>Italics</i> indicate entities that were dropped by 2002.</p>			

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operational level. ACFS, an umbrella organization of several Tribal service providers, served as the lead agency for the Sault Ste. Marie site, but it had not routinely convened a broad array of stakeholders around child protection issues.

Where collaboratives existed, the SK/SS governing councils drew initially upon them for members. By the time they had completed their initial Implementation Plans, all collaboratives had attempted to meet the core requirements of the solicitation. After reviewing these plans, however, OJP pressed them for additional adjustments. In Burlington, OJP encouraged the governing council to broaden its nontraditional representation. In Huntsville, OJP required more active involvement of the District Court judges. While the three District Court judges sat on the Stakeholders Council, they had been largely passive during the initial planning. OJP provided TA support for these judges to attend model court workshops, to help the judges identify ways to work on such councils without compromising their judicial objectivity. In Sault Ste. Marie, the project had planned to involve the Tribal Court during implementation, but activated the Ad hoc Legal Issues Subcommittee several months earlier in response to urging from OJP.

Toledo was the only site to use an existing collaborative—the CATF—as the governing body for SK/SS. Though not required to develop an Implementation Plan, the group spent the early period determining how to maximize the impact of the grant. Late in 1999, it began partnering with another OJJDP effort, Comprehensive Strategies, whose stakeholders mirrored many of the stakeholders at other sites—especially judges, prosecuting attorney, law enforcement, and court personnel—and complemented the existing CATF membership.

OJP intervened more broadly in the collaboration building for both Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie. In Kansas City, which was funded by EOWS, the KIDSAFE collaborative was required to coordinate with the existing Weed & Seed program. This posed a problem because the neighborhoods that KIDSAFE proposed to target in its funding application (those with the highest incidence of child abuse and neglect reports) were not part of the Weed & Seed target area. Negotiations to integrate Weed & Seed and KIDSAFE continued through the first 2 program years. In Sault Ste. Marie, the issues revolved around the site's proposed expansion of the Stakeholders Council to include Tribal and non-Tribal agencies. To move the site back to a Tribal focus, OJP and a TA provider worked with project staff and the Tribal Board of Directors. The resulting collaboration was an amalgam of Tribal agencies. Sault Ste. Marie also decided upon a two-tiered governing body, which gave the elected Tribal Board of

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Directors approval over all policy statements, budgets, and strategic plans of the Stakeholder Council.

Table 5-2 displays the breadth of the groups participating in the collaboratives in 2002 and 2003, as well as groups involved in previous periods (in italics). On average, the governing councils had representation from 27 different groups, often with multiple representatives from categories like the school system, the medical community, and nonprofit service providers. These numbers suggest the potential complexity of the interactions among members, the variation in points of view, and level of project effort required to manage and support the collaboratives.

By the time SK/SS moved to full implementation, all of the governing councils included representation from the required core agencies. For their education representatives, sites drew from a variety of representatives, including school district administrators, school counselors, Head Start and Early Head Start directors, and university personnel. Some sites also included elected officials (city, county, state, and national) in the council. Four of the five sites had representatives from domestic violence organizations. Beyond that, the governing councils included a diverse array of nonprofit service providers and community-based groups—not surprisingly, some were unique to the individual sites. Four sites involved United Way agencies on the governing council; two involved Junior Leagues. Kansas City involved Boys and Girls Clubs representatives, while the CASA director served on Toledo’s governing council. Huntsville and Toledo were alone in having the faith community represented on the governing council. Sault Ste. Marie had no representation comparable to the other sites in several categories, in part because of the Tribal focus adopted in response to OJP directives. Several of the Tribal agencies do work similar to neighborhood-based groups or nonprofit service providers, for which there were no private counterparts.

Governing councils were not static during the implementation of SK/SS. All experienced some turnover, often connected to personnel changes in participating organizations, but few groups dropped out. Four sites (all but Kansas City) did some restructuring to broaden the scope of the council, enhance ownership by participants, and/or foster sustainability. In Burlington, the basic structure of the KidSafe Council remained constant, although it added members and changed its name. However, the Council took on a more important position in the

Table 5-2. Membership in the Site Governing Councils

Represented Groups	Burlington, VT (KidSafe Management/ Collaborative Council)	Huntsville, AL (Stakeholders Council, MC3)	Kansas City, MO (KIDSAFE Council)	Sault Ste. Marie, MI (Tribal HSCB, TLM)^a	Toledo, OH (CATF)
Court systems	Chittenden County Family Court	Presiding Judges of District (dependency), Circuit (criminal), and <i>Municipal</i> (misdemeanor) Courts	Jackson County Family Court, 16 th Judicial Circuit Court of Kansas City, Missouri Court of Appeals	Tribal Court	Lucas County Juvenile Court, Lucas County Victim Witness Assistance, Lucas County Domestic Relations Court
Law enforcement	Chittenden Unit for Special Investigation	Huntsville and Madison City Police Departments, Madison County Sheriff's Office	Kansas City Police Department (Special Victims Unit, East Patrol and Central Patrol Divisions)	Tribal Law Enforcement	Lucas County Sheriff's Office, Toledo Police Department (Sex Crimes Unit)
Child protective services ^b	Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services	Department of Human Resources Children Services	Division of Family Services	Represented by Anishnabek Community and Family Services Director	Lucas County Children Services
Prosecuting attorney	State's Attorney's Office	District Attorney's Office	Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office	Tribal Legal	Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
Education	Burlington, Chittenden East, Winooski, and Essex school districts	Huntsville, Madison City, and Madison County school systems, universities	Kansas City school district, KCMC Child Development Corp. (Head Start program)	<i>Bahweting School Tribal Head Start, Tribal Early Head Start, Tribal Education</i>	Toledo Public Schools, University of Toledo
Medical system	VT Dept. of Health, Visiting Nurses Association, pediatrician (private practice)	Madison County Health Department, <i>Pediatrician (private practice)</i>	Children's Mercy Hospital	Tribal Health, Tribal Community Health	<i>Lucas County Health Department, Toledo Children's Hospital, Mercy Children's Hospital, Toledo Healthy Tomorrows, Promedica Health System</i>
Mental health system	Baird Center for Children & Families	Mental Health Center of Madison County	Jackson County Department of Mental Health	ACFS Behavioral Health	Lucas County MR/DD

Table 5-2. Membership in the Site Governing Councils (continued)

Represented Groups	Burlington, VT (KidSafe Management/ Collaborative Council)	Huntsville, AL (Stakeholders Council, MC3)	Kansas City, MO (KIDSAFE Council)	Sault Ste. Marie, MI (Tribal HSCB, TLM)^a	Toledo, OH (CATF)
Other government/ Tribal agencies	Staff of U.S. Senators, ^c Dept. of Corrections- Community Correctional Services	Huntsville and Madison City Councils, Madison County Commission, Huntsville Housing Authority, Redstone Arsenal, state representatives ^c	Kansas City Parks and Recreation Department, Kansas City Mayor’s Office, Kansas City Council, Staff from U.S. Senator’s and Representative’s offices	Tribal Human Resources, Tribal Youth Education and Activities, Tribal Recreation (Chi Mukwa), Tribal Administration, Tribal Planning, Tribal Cultural Division, Tribal Elder Care, Tribal Home Improvement, Tribal MIS	<i>Toledo Housing Authority, Juvenile Probation Department, Lucas County Family Council</i>
Domestic violence organizations	Women Helping Battered Women, Spectrum-Domestic Abuse Education Program, <i>Domestic Violence Task Force</i>	Crisis Services of North Alabama	Newhouse		YWCA Battered Women’s Shelter
Nonprofit service providers	Child Care Resource, Committee on Temporary Shelter (COTS), Spectrum Youth & Family Services, VT Children’s Aid, Lund Family Center, Family Connection Center, <i>King Street Youth Center, Children’s Legal Services, VT Refugee Resettlement Program</i>	United Way, New Futures, Family Services Center	Child Protection Center, Heart of America United Way Family Services, MOCSA, Gillis, Swope Community Enterprises		Family Child Abuse Prevention Center, United Way, Children’s Advocacy Center, Cullen Center, Harbor Behavioral Healthcare, Unison Behavioral Health, YWCA Rape Crisis Center

Table 5-2. Membership in the Site Governing Councils (continued)

Represented Groups	Burlington, VT (KidSafe Management/ Collaborative Council)	Huntsville, AL (Stakeholders Council, MC3)	Kansas City, MO (KIDSAFE Council)	Sault Ste. Marie, MI (Tribal HSCB, TLM)^a	Toledo, Oh (CATF)
Community-based organizations	Women of Color Alliance	Civic associations, Community Watch associations	East 23 rd Street PAC, Santa Fe Neighborhood Association, KC Building Blocks		<i>Nathan Hale Family Center, Open Door, New Connection Point</i>
Community/client/consumers	A parent and a grandparent (consumers), <i>other community members</i>	Drawn from PTAs, foster parents, other interested individuals	Neighborhood resident, community volunteer		Adult survivor of child abuse
Other organizations or participants	United Way, Prevent Child Abuse VT!	Junior League, Interfaith Mission Service, individual churches, business representatives	Local Investment Commission, Boys & Girls Club of Greater Kansas City, Partnership for Children, Hall Family Foundation, Full Employment Council, Bank of America, LISC, Stop Violence Coalition		CASA, Junior League, Peace Mountain, Family Service of N.W. Ohio; <i>Collaborative Network of Lucas County; Y. W. Child Care Connections</i>
Number of different agencies/groups as of 2002-3	26	30	33	18	29
<p>Notes: Regular type indicates entities included in the councils in 2002 or 2003. <i>Italics</i> indicate entities that were involved prior to 2002 but not after.</p> <p>^a The original Stakeholders Council, which did the first Implementation Plan, was replaced by the Tribal HSCB upon the recommendation of OJP, and non-Tribal members were dropped. Members of that original planning group are not included in this table, unless they became active in subsequent governing councils.</p> <p>^b In the original solicitation, OJP separately specified child welfare and family services agencies as required collaboration members. In practice, this representation was achieved through the child protective services agency and, in some cases, through private providers of family services.</p> <p>^c Invited nonvoting members.</p>					

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community when the lead agency reorganized in 2000. The old Community Network had been a membership organization of 24 agencies, most of them service providers and all of them seated on the Board. The new Network adopted a more typical nonprofit structure, with a small board to handle agency oversight, personnel, management, and financing. The KidSafe Council became responsible for carrying out the mission of the agency, as its permanent forum for “visioning” and policy setting about child abuse and neglect. The Community Network also recently began doing business as the KidSafe Collaborative, recognizing that KidSafe had become the organization’s primary identity in the community.

In Huntsville, the demanding schedule of the Stakeholders Council (five times a year plus subcommittee meetings) combined with the time demands and overlapping missions of other community collaboratives motivated the Executive Committee of the Council to rethink the original structure. In 2000, it began meeting and drafting bylaws for a new organization, the Madison County Coordinating Council for Children and Families (MC3). The new collaborative built on three other collaborations, expanded the membership, and broadened the goals. While retaining all participants in the original Stakeholders Council, MC3 added the Huntsville Housing Authority, the United Way, and the commanding general of Redstone Arsenal (a military installation). It also included representatives of six different “communities,” including business, nonprofit service providers, higher education, faith groups, civic groups, and consumers. Previously, these groups had participated primarily through SK/SS’s work groups or community meetings. MC3’s broader mission encompassed more of the issues that were brought up during community meetings—such as improved public transportation, runaway shelters, and residential drug treatment programs—that had previously seemed outside the purview of the SK/SS project.

As mentioned above, the governing council for Sault Ste. Marie underwent significant changes as a result of OJP responses to the original planning efforts. A second reorganization occurred in 2001, when ACFS and the Tribal chairman broadened the council’s mission, placed it under the joint leadership of the administrative director of ACFS and the deputy director of the Tribe, and made it the locus of strategic planning for Tribal agencies involved with children, youth, and families. The project elevated membership to division directors. To remedy flagging attendance, the assistant deputy director of the Tribe strongly recommended attendance at meetings. The new structure, the TLM, added new agencies, including Tribal Cultural Division, Tribal Education, and Tribal Elder Care. As in Burlington and Huntsville, the new council’s responsibilities expanded beyond monitoring a single Federal

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grant. In 2003, due to political conflicts within the Tribe, the TLM began reporting to the executive director of the Tribe rather than the deputy executive director.

In Toledo, in 2000 the CATF established a SK/SS Steering Committee to provide additional support and strategic planning for the project. To facilitate ownership and shared leadership, the CATF also moved from having a single agency (the SK/SS grantee) direct the task force to rotating leadership on annual basis. During 2001-02, LCCS and the Child Assessment Team of Mercy Hospital took the first rotation of leadership. The project made further changes in response to concerns about including community residents and agency clients in the collaborative. In 2003, the CATF voted to include citizens and succeeded in recruiting an adult survivor of childhood abuse to serve on the Steering Committee.

For the most part, agency directors and other high level staff participated in the SK/SS governing councils. The primary exceptions were the CATF in Toledo, which included program directors and frontline staff, and the KidSafe Council in Burlington, which included school counselors and at least one Health Department nurse assigned to SRS. The Tribal HSCB in Sault Ste. Marie included a mix of directors and frontline staff, but the subsequent TLM was composed mainly of senior directors.

Governing councils met with varying frequency across sites. In Burlington, Toledo, and Sault Ste. Marie, meetings usually occurred monthly (although in Sault Ste. Marie, the schedule was interrupted during periods of reorganization). In Kansas City, the group met quarterly for most of the project, dropping to semiannually in 2003. Huntsville had the most variation over time. Its original Stakeholders Council met almost monthly; with the advent of MC3, meetings dropped to quarterly and then semiannually. After some stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with the latest schedule, the project created more committees to help maintain the momentum between meetings.

Teams, Committees, and Workgroups

Teams, committees, and other workgroups played an important role at all sites in carrying out the agenda of the governing council and the project. The reliance on committees began early, with all sites forming committees (or workgroups) to help in planning the SK/SS agenda. At most sites, the configuration of committees changed over time as priorities evolved and some tasks were completed. Participants typically included a mix of council members,

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midlevel and line staff, project subgrantees, and others drawn to the issues involved. These committees provided an important avenue for broadening community and stakeholder involvement in project activities beyond the governing council. For some participants, the teams provided a recruitment and training ground for the governing council.

The committee structure developed in different ways. The project formally organized some committees to support the governing councils and intended them to be permanent parts of the collaborative. For example, this was true of the Steering Committees in Huntsville and Toledo, and the Management Team in Kansas City. Other committees emerged from public meetings or trainings. Some workgroups provided opportunities to engage community residents and clients in targeted efforts for limited periods of time. Still others were identified as the project identified new priorities, such as sustainability planning. Several of the committees contributed heavily to key SK/SS accomplishments. For example,

- In Burlington, a community forum on Child Protection Teams (CPT) spawned a workgroup that spent a year developing plans and procedures to revitalize the CPT approach. A new CPT began operating in 2001, using these plans and procedures, and has been highly praised by stakeholders.
- In Huntsville, a workgroup grew out of a training for NCAC clients. A primary problem identified in the training was the difficulty of finding information about agencies and their services. Participants felt that the phone book should be a source for this information. Subsequently, the clients got together as the “Purple Pages Workgroup” to devise a way to format the data and market the concept. The resultant pages were included in the 2002 BellSouth phone book.
- In Kansas City, the project convened a Funding Oversight Committee to review and select grantees for the project’s NSI. The project also recruited representatives from community-based agencies and neighborhood residents—many of them new to the task—to serve on the grant review teams.
- In Sault Ste. Marie, participants in the Community Healing Process formed a committee to examine ways to evaluate that process and develop educational brochures and mini-curricula on native culture.
- Toledo’s Treatment and Support Committee explored gaps in mental health services for child abuse victims, their families, and offenders. They submitted a report to the Mental Health Board that included professional recommendations on mental health service needs.

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Community Meetings

Several sites used broad-based community meetings to address a range of issues and obtain community input for initial project agendas and ongoing decisions. Burlington, Huntsville, and Sault Ste. Marie each held kickoff meetings in 1997 to introduce the project to the community. In Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie, the projects opened the meetings to the public and used the occasion to recruit stakeholders to participate in planning. Huntsville chose a different approach, introducing the program first to the business community through the Chamber of Commerce. This introduction was designed to attract media attention to SK/SS as well as draw in nontraditional players. Kansas City elected not to hold such a meeting until Implementation Plans were approved, out of concern for creating false expectations in the target neighborhoods.

Burlington continued to use community meetings throughout the life of the project to tap community concerns and conduct more targeted discussions of key issues. Huntsville used annual Vision Summits (from 1998 through 2001) to garner community input and provide feedback on project efforts. Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie made much more limited use of community meetings, while Toledo did not host any. Sometimes the community meetings also turned occasional participants into active partners, involving them in committees, and, on a few occasions, the governing councils.

Staff Support of the Collaboratives

SK/SS project staff spent considerable time supporting these collaborative mechanisms. Such efforts included making the logistical arrangements—scheduling, arranging for a location, publicizing, circulating agendas, providing support materials, and arranging for speakers when needed. Staff also took responsibility for recording and circulating meeting minutes, researching topics and issues identified during the meetings, and keeping members up to date. In addition, they helped identify new or replacement participants and encouraged participation among nonattendees. Most of the sites developed newsletters to keep both collaborative members and the community informed of project efforts and related issues brought up through community meetings.

As the collaboratives evolved, project staff sometimes worked with TA providers and key stakeholders to strengthen or revise governance structures. In Huntsville, staff and

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SITTAP consultants worked closely with the Stakeholders Council to develop bylaws and meet with members of overlapping collaborations to develop the MC3. In Burlington, Sault Ste. Marie, and Toledo, staff worked with the governing councils in making key transformations to ensure the sustainability of the collaboratives.

Connections with Other Collaboratives

In addition to their direct work on SK/SS, project staff at each site sit on other councils and boards that target interrelated problems in the community and coordinate activities across councils and projects. Kansas City KIDSAFE staff sit on the Weed & Seed Steering Committee. In Huntsville, SK/SS staff participate on two Weed & Seed Steering Committees and sit on the boards of the Youth Services Council, the Volunteer Center, the Partnership for a Drug Free Community, the Alabama Cooperative Extension System, the Better Business Bureau, and others. Burlington staff routinely participate in the Family Court Permanency Planning Project, the Domestic Violence Task Force, and the Community Placements Management Team. They also helped staff the now dormant Vermont Refugee Resettlement Program's Interpreter Access Task Force. Toledo project staff sit on two collaboratives—Comprehensive Strategies and the Family Council—and coordinate with them to address questions involving the child protection system. In Sault Ste. Marie, project staff enhanced communication and service linkages to non-Tribal communities through participation in the Mackinac County HSCB and its counterpart in Chippewa County. Staff also facilitate the Tribal Children and Youth Network in Chippewa County, made up of supervisory and frontline staff who work with youth.

The Collaborators

Given the important role of the collaboratives in SK/SS, it is worth examining more closely the individuals who participated. The 2003 Stakeholder Survey (n=277) provides a recent glimpse of who these collaborators were, how and to what extent they participated, and their perspectives on project implementation.

As in previous administrations, the Stakeholder Survey targeted participants in governing councils, task forces, committees, and subgrants. Not everyone responded, of course, but Table 5-3 suggests that those who did respond were fairly similar to the total pool of survey recipients on several variables. These include whether the respondents had been sent a survey

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in 2001 and thus were longer term participants),⁴⁴ whether they represented public agencies, and whether they had ever served on the SK/SS governing council. Overall, those who completed the survey were similar to all survey recipients on the first two variables, but slightly more likely to have served on the SK/SS governing council (41% versus 34%). We were not surprised by this difference, since we thought that members of the governing body would probably be more interested in the survey and more motivated to share their views. However, these differences varied by site, with variations being quite small in both Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie. Also, internal comparisons of respondents indicated that stakeholders involved in governance councils did not hold opinions about SK/SS that were consistently different from those of their fellow stakeholders.⁴⁵ Thus, we believe that our respondents were reasonably reflective of stakeholders who have taken on active roles in the projects.

Characteristics	All Recipients (N=486)	All Respondents ^a (N=277)
Percentage from 2001 mailing list	62%	60%
Percentage from public agencies	50%	49%
Percentage with service on SK/SS Governing Council	34%	41%
^a Actually, 343 recipients returned questionnaires (71%), but we asked those who had not been involved in the project for 2 years or more to return blank surveys. We use “respondents” here to refer to those who actually completed surveys.		

Figure 5-1 shows the breakdown of stakeholders according to their affiliation with the formal child protection system (including child protective services, law enforcement, prosecution, and Dependency Court), other public agencies, and private groups (private service providers; community or neighborhood organizations; professional, civic, or religious organizations; parents; and others). Overall, 57 percent of responding stakeholders represented public agencies—25% from formal child protection agencies and 32% from other public agencies. However, as shown in the figure, the proportion of public agency respondents varied significantly across sites, ranging from a low of 39 percent in Burlington to a high in Sault Ste.


⁴⁴ The 2003 list updated the 2001 list by adding new stakeholders who fit our criteria and removing people who had moved out of the area, were known to have dropped out in the last 2 years, or who had asked to be removed from the mailing list in 2001.

⁴⁵ For an in depth discussion of response rates and variations by site, see *Findings from the Stakeholder Survey, Volume III, Appendix A*.

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Marie of 96 percent. Toledo was the only place where respondents from the formal child protection system made up the majority (55%).

Figure 5-1. Percentage of 2003 Stakeholders by Agency Type



The “private” respondents in Figure 5-1 are subdivided into persons affiliated with private agencies and members of “nontraditional” groups such as professional or civic organizations, community or neighborhood organizations, parents, youth, and business. Figure 5-1 suggests that Huntsville and Kansas City had many more nontraditional representatives than the other sites. Nontraditional stakeholders accounted for about 30 percent of all respondents in these two sites, compared to 10 percent in Burlington and 2 or 3 percent in Toledo and Sault Ste. Marie. This picture is consistent with our on-site interviews and observations.

Stakeholder survey data confirm another observation from our site visit, that the agency representatives who were most active in the collaborations were often high-level staff. . . Most respondents who represented organizations reported having considerable authority to

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make decisions on behalf of those organizations at SK/SS meetings. On a 5-point scale ranging from 1, “no authority,” to 5, “authority to commit agency resources/staff,” 42 percent placed themselves at “5” and 22 percent at “4.” The majority at every site chose ratings of 4 or 5, suggesting that all the collaboratives attracted a solid core of stakeholders with power and influence. However, there were statistically significant differences across sites, with the average ratings ranging from 3.3 in Sault Ste. Marie to 4.0 in Huntsville and Kansas City in 2003. Note that in Toledo, the situation appears to have changed considerably in recent years; in 2001, a minority of respondents (41%) reported authority levels of 4 or 5, while in 2003, 60 percent of the stakeholders did so.

The stakeholders also reported significant commitments to SK/SS. The typical respondent reported spending about 2 hours a month on SK/SS and attending five meetings a year.⁴⁶ However, each site had a core of much more active stakeholders. Overall, about one in five respondents spent 6 or more hours per month on SK/SS, and one in four attended at least one meeting a month. Earlier surveys reported comparable time commitments. There was also some variation across sites in levels of stakeholder activity, with Burlington and Toledo respondents reporting more meetings than their counterparts elsewhere. Other indications of stakeholder commitment include:

- In the past year, over half the respondents (52%) reported attending community meetings convened by the project. About one-third had helped implement project-funded activities.
- Smaller proportions of respondents had helped with project trainings (17%), writing project plans or other documents (13%), and deciding which groups should receive funding (7%). Toledo respondents were about three times as likely as other respondents to have been involved in writing plans or other documents.
- Although there was a modest correlation between receiving funding from SK/SS and levels of participation in the collaborative, many of the respondents whose organizations had never received SK/SS funding were involved several hours a month, and 38 percent reported that their organizations had contributed staff to SK/SS efforts.

⁴⁶ The figures reported are medians, rather than the means, which were 5.1 hours and 8.5 meetings respectively. The median is the midpoint of all responses, when they are put in order from lowest to highest. It more accurately reflects the typical or average response in situations where the mean (the arithmetical average) is skewed by a few respondents who report very low or very high numbers

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We also infer from responses to the Stakeholder Survey that many stakeholders felt a sense of obligation to participate in SK/SS. When asked whether they personally had contributed sufficient time to SK/SS in the past year, 34 percent reported that they themselves had not contributed enough time and 20 percent said that their organization had not contributed enough time. Only 9 percent of stakeholders said that they had contributed more than enough time.

Challenges to Collaboration Development

Each site experienced challenges in developing a collaborative that met the OJP requirements and community expectations while still carrying out the SK/SS operational agenda. In the 2003 Stakeholder Survey, we asked respondents to comment on eight challenges that frequently characterize collaborative development and operations. We drew this list of challenges from the literature and from open-ended responses to the 2001 Stakeholder Survey. They included: limited resources, keeping up momentum, turf issues, understanding/meeting funder expectations, lack of participation from key agencies or groups, defining a realistic agenda, leadership/turnover in key agencies, and ineffective leadership. Respondents were asked whether each challenge was: (1) never significant, (2) significant earlier, but not now, or (3) significant now or always. The percentage of stakeholders considering each challenge significant now or always is charted by site on Figure 5-2.⁴⁷


Two challenges were seen by a majority of respondents in all sites as significant now or always:

- Limited resources (reported by 85% overall), and
- Keeping up the momentum (66% overall).

No doubt, the recognition that Federal funding would end soon fueled the concern about resources. However, three out of four respondents who considered resources a challenge said that this had *always* been significant challenge, not just now (data not shown).

⁴⁷ Additional information on responses to these challenges is provided in Volume III, *Findings From the Stakeholder Survey*.

Figure 5-2. Challenges Considered Significant Now or Always by SK/SS Stakeholders in 2003



In 2002, the key informants echoed stakeholder concerns about keeping up momentum. Early on, delays in approval of the Implementation Plans at the four fully funded sites had frustrated stakeholders eager to start putting their ideas into practice. At that stage, the damage was somewhat mitigated by OJP’s agreement to release partial implementation funding while plans were reworked or expanded. More recent concerns about may be tied to a number of issues. First, at the time of the 2003 survey, the SK/SS projects had already been underway for 6 years, which is a relatively long time for a single initiative. The initial excitement following the infusion of Federal dollars was long past. Second, project staff and other key informants were now worrying about how stakeholders would respond when there was no longer significant Federal funding available. Third, sites were dealing with maintenance issues: Toledo had begun considering the option of joining the Family Council, Sault Ste. Marie was again restructuring the TLM, and Kansas City was looking for another group to continue the work of the KIDSAFE Council. Fourth, key informants in all five sites were recognizing and acknowledging some frustration with how long it takes to change systems and alter agencies

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and practices. One Burlington key informant summed it up by commenting that “collaboration is just hard work.”

While stakeholders everywhere saw loss of momentum and resources as current challenges, certain sites found other significant challenges. In Kansas City, a majority of stakeholders identified lack of participation from key agencies or groups (54%) and leadership/staff turnover in key agencies (54%) as challenging. Our key informants gave us some insights into these responses. Some groups did not come to the table, though invited, until two child deaths in the community resulted in state-mandated meetings with all interested parties in the child protection system. Kansas City also saw a lot of turnover in key positions—the director of the Jackson County DFS and the Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney changed at least three times. New agency heads had differing levels of interest in the KIDSAFE collaborative; but even when they were enthusiastic, the addition of a new person often changed the group dynamics and required a new round of introductions to the project and collaborative.

Many stakeholders in both Sault Ste. Marie (53%) and Huntsville (55%) expressed concern with understanding and meeting the expectations of the funders as of 2003. A majority of Sault Ste. Marie stakeholders (59%) also found the lack of participation from key agencies a significant challenge. Tribal key informants mirrored these concerns, citing difficulties getting buy-in from agencies and making SK/SS a priority for all of them. Key informants also suggested the need for “mini-successes” and for greater clarity on project goals and priorities.

A majority of stakeholders in Toledo (56%) and Kansas City (53%) identified “turf issues,” as currently significant. However, across all sites, about a third of respondents said that turf issues had been an issue earlier, but were no longer significant. Our observations and interviews for the process evaluation suggest that turf issues most often surfaced around the establishment or modification of CACs, multidisciplinary teams, and other initiatives that required staff of different agencies to agree on protocols, make case-level decisions, or deliver services on common ground. While these issues slowed progress, they were eventually resolved well enough to permit work to proceed. Because the issues were activity-specific, they generally did not hinder the rest of the project agenda.

Broader turf issues—where the grantee or the collaborative found itself at odds over its broad mission or role in the community—were rare. One exception occurred in Kansas City, when the Governor appointed another agency—which had not been active in SK/SS—to

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develop a response to recent child abuse deaths in the community. After some conflict and confusion, KIDSAFE agreed to tackle the formal system issues while the other agency focused on community involvement. Following a change in leadership at the CPS agency, the other agency eventually withdrew, but the conflict initially stalled progress on some activities for several months. External events also resulted in a macro-level conflict in Huntsville, where the state legislature created a Children's Policy Council whose mission and membership substantially overlapped that of MC3, the SK/SS collaborative. By June 2003, the situation has contributed mostly to uncertainty over the future of MC3, rather than any conflict between the members of the two entities.

In general, most stakeholders thought that all the challenges on our list were significant at *some* time in the project history, if not now. The least frequently reported challenge—currently or ever—was ineffective leadership. The majority of stakeholders overall (53%) said that ineffective leadership had never been a significant challenge; 21 percent said it had been significant earlier (not now); and only 26 percent thought it was a challenge now. Interestingly, in Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie, almost equal proportions felt that leadership was never a significant challenge (45% in Kansas City and 43% in Sault Ste. Marie) and that it was significant now/always (41% in Kansas City and 46% in Sault Ste. Marie). Burlington was also unusual, in that just 6 percent of stakeholders said that leadership was a current challenge.

Another challenge, documented in our process interviews and observations, involved getting nontraditional partners involved in the collaborative, particularly at the level of the governing councils. The term “nontraditional” covers a wide territory, from neighborhood residents, parents, consumers or clients, and community activists to representatives of groups such as business, the faith community, civic organizations, youth groups, and recreational organizations. Sites were more successful in bringing in nontraditional partners that represented a formal group (even if loosely organized), such as neighborhood organizations, community watch groups, Boys and Girls Clubs, youth centers, churches, and interdenominational councils. Participation from survivors of child abuse, nonoffending parents, parents of disabled children, foster parents, Healthy Families mothers and fathers, and community volunteers was more difficult. For the most part, it was easier to involve community members in one-time activities such as communitywide meetings and trainings, or in committees with a limited mission. Often these committees had fewer agency directors and more line staff, and included other community members.

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OJP remained attentive to this aspect of implementation and frequently reminded sites of its importance. In 1999 and 2001, presentations at the cluster meetings focused on involving consumers of CPS in the decisionmaking. This may help account for the fact that many stakeholders recognized shortcomings in this area—particularly at the three sites with low nontraditional representation in our Stakeholder Survey. In 2003, significant proportions of respondents in Toledo (58%) and Burlington (44%) reported that there had not been enough community involvement. There was also significant dissatisfaction with cultural and ethnic diversity in Burlington (58%) and Toledo (41%). Many respondents to the Stakeholder Survey in Sault Ste. Marie (44%) also were concerned about community involvement.

In Sault Ste. Marie, there appeared to be a discrepancy between the views of the survey respondents and those of their leadership. Process interviews with project staff and key informants suggested that little effort was targeted to improving community representation there. These informants typically felt that community members were adequately represented by agency staff who were Tribal members and through the overall project oversight provided by their elected Tribal Board of Directors.

Elsewhere, however, sites worked to secure more community involvement. Burlington and Kansas had community slots on their governing bodies from the outset, while Huntsville and Toledo revamped their membership requirements to include them later. Typically, staff recruited community members personally, based on recommendations from other collaboration members or contacts made at community meetings for SK/SS and other programs. Both Burlington and Toledo tried to ease the burdens of participation by subsidizing transportation and babysitting. Gradually, sites have moved to broader strategies for improving community involvement:

- Burlington has taken on responsibility for developing a Community Advisory Board for SRS.
- After training and mentoring some community members and agency directors around working together, Huntsville is now developing a Client Board Bank to provide ongoing training in community participation.
- Toledo is working on orientation and training materials for members. SK/SS has also joined the Family Council's Parent Advocate and Leadership Training Committee, recently formed to develop a training curriculum for citizens and parents and to train professionals on the value of citizen involvement.

Success in Promoting Collaboration

The findings of the SK/SS evaluation to date confirm that it is possible to implement a broad-based community collaboration, the central element of the SK/SS model, with reasonable fidelity to OJP expectations. The collaboratives grew and diversified over time and retained the commitment of their members. These collaboratives took on issues beyond the scope of the Federal grant. All started with an agenda limited to oversight and approval of the SK/SS grant, but their horizons expanded with input from OJP, TA providers, project staff, stakeholders, and the communities themselves.

To some extent, the sites' success at promoting collaboration can be attributed to their use of the strategies listed at the beginning of this chapter. Generally, the sites proved quite successful in applying most of the strategies, including:

- **Involving key players early in the process.** All sites began with commitments from a broad spectrum of agencies, most of which joined the planning process early. Where key agencies were missing, OJP program officers provided TA to bring them on board and continued to encourage more nontraditional representation. It is noteworthy that many of the early participants remained involved throughout the life of the project. The vast majority of stakeholders (80%) responding to the 2003 survey had been involved in the project for at least the last 2 years. A substantial minority, 44 percent, had been involved since 1997 or 1998 during the project's planning phase.
- **Establishing a shared vision and defining outcomes.** A shared vision grew slowly, as a byproduct of the regular interactions between collaborative members, as well as formal meetings and retreats. Besides the sheer number of stakeholders involved and the diverse groups they represented, there were some distinctive challenges. In Burlington, by Grant 4, OJP felt that the vision of the collaboration had diverged too much from that of OJP and held meetings and provided TA to bring the two into alignment. In Huntsville and Sault Ste. Marie, the collaboratives had to restructure and add new members during the planning phase, in response to OJP directives. In both sites, there was additional restructuring and "re-visioning" necessary after they further revised their governance. In Huntsville, stakeholders and staff also had to figure out how major community issues that had been identified through the first Vision Summit—public transportation, housing, employment, shelters—fit into the SK/SS mission. By the time we conducted key informant interviews in 2003, however, we found high levels of agreement about the program's mission and objectives at most sites. The sites also got better at defining their desired outcomes, although for the most part their capacity to measure them was still lacking.

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- **Setting readily attainable objectives.** Sometimes the initial Implementation Plans set very broad objectives—to train all child protection staff, for example—that were overly optimistic if taken at face value. Through input from program officers, TA providers, and evaluators, and their own experience, sites did become more skilled at breaking efforts into smaller steps, and identifying shorter term goals. However, more often than not, we believe the original problem was a lack of skill in writing objectives (or the need to articulate an objective before the detailed planning was done), rather than a failure to recognize what was possible. If anything, over time, OJP had to pressure sites to be more ambitious in their objectives.
- **Devising creative and realistic strategies.** Sites proved to be adept at building on community and agency strengths as well as using information strategically. In Huntsville, the needs assessments conducted during the planning process provided a rich source of ideas for project strategies. At times, community meetings served much the same purpose in Burlington. Project staff at all sites were also good at recognizing the opportunities for joining forces with other initiatives in the community and maximizing the SK/SS resources.
- **Emphasizing what partners agree on and respecting differences.** Again, collaborations were good at this, recognizing the mandates of different partners and respecting those positions. Stakeholder Survey respondents reported that SK/SS was quite open to different points of view. Average ratings were high everywhere and did not differ significantly across sites. Sixty-five percent of respondents rated their influence on overall goals and objectives fairly high, awarding SK/SS a 4 or 5 on a scale ranging from 1, “no influence at all,” to 5, “a great deal of influence.” Fifty-seven percent felt they had fairly high influence over program operations, and 48 percent felt their influence extended to funding decisions. There were significant cross-site differences on these three items, with Sault Ste. Marie stakeholders reporting the lowest levels of influence on all items.
- **Avoiding “red herrings.”** The sites seem to have been remarkably successful at avoiding the kind of “technical difficulties”⁴⁸ that can derail a budding collaborative. For the most part, they did not get hung up on debates over how decisions should be made, who should get a vote and sit at the governance table, or who should lead. In Huntsville, when it became clear that MC3 could not go forward if agency members had to put their budgets on the table, this issue was set aside for future consideration (underway as of mid-2003).
- **Publicizing success and acknowledging contributions from partners.** Project staff were skilled at identifying, celebrating, and publicizing mini-successes and were meticulous in crediting partners with their success. Progress reports from sites included numerous newspaper and newsletter articles about events and supporting efforts of partners. For example, Huntsville got press coverage for such new efforts as recruiting mentors for

⁴⁸ Melaville, & Blank, 1991, op. cit.

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Big Brothers and Big Sisters. In 2003, Burlington held a luncheon to honor local professionals and other community members who contributed to children's welfare. Toledo's SK/SS newsletter featured different partners in each edition. (Privately, we also found that in our process interviews, project staff were concerned that we not overstate their contributions to joint efforts in the community and, occasionally, in our view, downplayed their real role.)

Sites were somewhat less successful with two other strategies and are still working on each to enhance their collaborations.

- **Including participants at every level.** Community members and consumers are still underrepresented in the SK/SS collaboratives and do not have equal status with the agency members on the governing councils. Their votes count the same as any other member, but they are few in number and in most sites represent only themselves, not any organized constituency. As for agency representation, the governing councils are dominated by high level staff, although every site can point to some success in getting individuals at varying levels of agency responsibility to take ownership of some SK/SS efforts, often through committee work. In general, however, SK/SS is not widely known among mid-level and supervisory staff, judging from our 2002 Survey of Agency Personnel. Overall, about 58 percent of the workers surveyed had not heard of the SK/SS project or had heard of it but were not familiar with any specific programs or activities. The degree of familiarity with the SK/SS projects varied for workers from the different agencies and by site. More workers from schools (62%), GAL and CASA programs (78%), and law enforcement (83%) were unfamiliar with SK/SS than CPS workers (22%) and workers from "other" agencies, mainly prosecutors and victim/witness workers (14%). Sault Ste. Marie was the only site where the majority of all workers surveyed (66 percent) knew something about SK/SS, contrasted with about one-third of the workers in Burlington and Kansas City and 46 percent in Huntsville.⁴⁹
- **Addressing how partners work together.** Sites have not focused on this much to date, except when issues have arisen around specific activities, such as MDTs, which seem particularly vulnerable to differing agency perspectives and values. At the level of the overall collaborative, it appears that participants from various agencies have learned to work together simply as a result of increased interaction during council and committee meetings, trainings, and such. However, these activities have not done as much to empower community residents and clients for participation in the governing councils and other efforts. As mentioned above, several sites have begun to recognize that a more direct approach is needed and are working on new strategies—namely, more systematic training approaches in Huntsville and Toledo, and development of a Community Advisory Board in Burlington.

⁴⁹ Toledo was not included in the survey. See Volume IV, *Survey of Agency Personnel* for a detailed report on all survey findings.

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The remaining item on our list of strategies for successful collaboration—*institutionalizing change*—speaks more to outcomes than process. For that reason, we reserve most of that discussion for the upcoming chapter. At the end of this chapter, we briefly review prospects for sustaining the collaboratives themselves.

From the perspective of process, however, how well did the collaboratives live up to OJP’s vision of them as entities where members would share responsibility, accountability, and resources? The SK/SS collaboratives clearly departed from the familiar “advisory board” structure, where project staff do most of the work and make most of the real decisions. The collaboratives became not just a valued forum for information-sharing, but also shared responsibility and accountability for decisions, although more so at some sites than others. At Sault Ste. Marie in particular, the evidence is not all in, because recent upheavals in Tribal leadership have stalled an attempt to revitalize the collaborative structure. However, at all sites we can find instances in which committees or the governing councils took on significant ownership for key activities—from developing the MC3 in Huntsville to figuring out how to evaluate the Community Healing Process in Sault Ste. Marie. In Burlington and Kansas City, collaborative members took responsibility for difficult and potentially unpopular decisions about how to distribute subgrant funding. In Toledo, agencies agreed to rotate responsibility for supporting collaborative meetings. In Burlington, the governing council rallied and came up with a substantially expanded system reform agenda, after OJP critiqued its Grant 4 plans.

When it comes to sharing resources, at the level of the collaborative itself, the primary resource shared so far has been time. In 2003, as noted earlier, most of the respondents to our Stakeholder Survey had personally spent time on SK/SS activities (above and beyond time spent implementing subgrants). Half told us that their organizations had contributed staff. Few respondents reported that their organizations had contributed financial support to SK/SS, although the percentage had risen from just 6 percent in 2001 to 14 percent in 2003. Most reports of financial support emanated from Burlington and Toledo.

Apparently, the majority of respondents expect to continue contributing time to SK/SS, at least in the short term. Fifty-five percent said that they were likely to be involved in SK/SS during the upcoming year. Only 16 percent expected to be less involved than in the past year. Overall, the majority (56%) also think it is likely that the SK/SS collaborative will continue beyond the period of Federal funding in some form. Kansas City was the only site where a minority of respondents (43%) expected the collaborative to continue, possibly

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reflecting the different path that Kansas City is taking to sustain collaborative functions. These plans are discussed in the next section.

Sustainability of the Collaboratives

OJP did not necessarily expect the projects to sustain the collaborative structures developed for SK/SS beyond the term of Federal funding, recognizing that communities could develop alternate ways to carry on and expand the accomplishments of the program. However, four of the sites—all except Kansas City—were hoping to sustain the SK/SS collaborative itself. They were at somewhat different stages of the process as of June 2003.

- Sault Ste. Marie had taken an important first step toward sustaining collaborative capacity, by planning to make the TLM a permanent committee of the Tribal Board of Directors. However, the political situation—involving the resignation of the official who had co-chaired the TLM from both his Tribal and administrative posts—makes it difficult to predict how the TLM will function in the future and what resources will support it.
- Burlington needs to sustain both the lead agency and the collaborative, since the two have increasingly become intertwined, and SK/SS has been the primary source of funding. As 2003 began, the Board and KidSafe Council were partway toward their budget goal of \$60,000 to \$100,000—which would support the collaborative structure, essential staff, and key functions such as training and operation of the CPT.
- In Huntsville, despite significant restructuring to ensure the sustainability of MC3, progress had stalled pending resolution of the overlap between the missions of MC3 and the state-mandated Children’s Policy Council. Meanwhile, SK/SS was seeking funding for MC3 staff and, with TA support, opening a discussion around unified fiscal planning.
- Toledo’s CATF is considering whether to move out from the aegis of the United Way and become a formal subcommittee of the Lucas County Family Council. Incorporating into the Council would provide the Task Force with direct access to key agency decisionmakers as well as grassroots and consumer perspectives, voting rights on the Council, and a small budget for community awareness events.

Kansas City was the only site that had decided to transfer the functions of its collaborative council to another organization. After lengthy debate over several options, the KIDSAFE Council helped form a Governance Group for the CPC to continue the close collaboration among the Public Sector Partners and to serve as the vehicle for carrying out the project’s vision for system reform. In addition, KIDSAFE expects the Jackson County

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Community Quality Assurance Committee to become the locus for independent, community-wide advice and advocacy on behalf of children and families. This committee oversees the exit plan for the Jackson County DFS Consent Decree, focusing on the same outcomes as the Child and Family Services Reviews, including safety, permanency, and child and family well-being. If the project proceeds with this arrangement, then it seems likely that the scope of efforts will narrow to focus on DFS and its coordination with partners.

In the next chapter, we highlight accomplishments of the sites in improving child protection, both in the formal system and the broader community, and the prospects for institutionalizing and sustaining these changes.

6. Accomplishments of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Sites

Collaboratives, buttressed by resources, represent the organizing mechanism for SK/SS, but they were not an end in themselves. Neither were the activities carried out in connection with the four program elements—system reform and accountability, continuum of services, data collection and evaluation, and prevention education/public information. Instead, according to the logic of SK/SS (see Figure A-1), these strategies were expected to create a community and a child protection system with greater capacity to recognize and respond effectively to child abuse and neglect. Over the long term, this then was expected to reduce child maltreatment and thereby interrupt the cycle leading from maltreatment to delinquency and other problem behaviors.

During the period we observed the SK/SS initiative, we did not anticipate significant reductions in reported child maltreatment or other community-level indicators of well-being.⁵⁰ Thus, trends in community indicators will be covered only briefly here. This chapter focuses primarily on the shorter term accomplishments. Did the SK/SS communities develop a greater capacity to recognize and respond to child abuse and neglect? To what extent has this capacity been institutionalized? In answering these questions, we rely on multiple sources of evidence, including observations, document review, and interviews conducted during 6 years of process evaluation, plus the findings from key informant interviews, the three Stakeholder Surveys (n=141, 264, and 277), and the Survey of Agency Personnel (n=353).

We caution the reader that any attempt to summarize SK/SS outcomes runs the risk of oversimplifying a complex and wide-ranging initiative. Here we attempt to highlight key accomplishments and convey something of the range of outcomes across sites, their commonalities, and differences. It is also important to note that the SK/SS sites cannot lay sole claim to all the accomplishments discussed below, nor would they try to. The SK/SS communities had many efforts underway, and one of the strengths of SK/SS was that it partnered with others in carrying out its work. In our judgment, however, SK/SS made a significant contribution to all of the accomplishments we mention. *Volume II-Case Studies of the SK/SS Sites*, describes the nature of the contributions in more detail.

⁵⁰ In fact, it seemed likely that SK/SS would actually increase reporting of child abuse and neglect—particularly if the projects raised awareness of child abuse, educated people about how to report, and increased confidence in CPS. Such increases in reporting could easily mask the effects of any reductions in abuse brought about by other project efforts.

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Increased Organizational Capacity

The SK/SS sites attacked the problem of system capacity on several fronts. Some of the most striking accomplishments might be categorized as improvements in the organizational capacity to respond to reported child abuse and neglect. These improvements include the creation of new agency structures or the improvement of existing ones and the adoption of policy and procedural changes designed to apply agency resources more effectively.

New Agency Structures or Organization

All sites promoted or supported changes in the structure or organization of agencies in the child protection system in order to improve the processing of cases entering the system. The changes included:

- New prosecution units in two sites—a Juvenile Justice Unit in Burlington and a Family Violence Unit in Huntsville;
- New Drug Courts in Huntsville, Kansas City, Sault Ste. Marie, and Toledo;
- New or expanded law enforcement units to deal with child abuse and neglect and domestic violence in Huntsville, Kansas City, and Toledo.

These changes are currently supported by the agencies themselves and do not depend on SK/SS for their continuation.

New or Enhanced Children's Advocacy Centers

All sites promoted CACs as a vehicle for providing a multidisciplinary response to child abuse and linking victims and their families to services. The CACs host or help coordinate MDTs to discuss serious cases under investigation by law enforcement and CPS and have adopted protocols and procedures to support a consistent, coordinated response. In some cases, the meetings also identify policy and procedures that needed further attention. By June 2003:

- Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie had both established CACs, after a development effort spanning several years. Burlington had begun to offer some therapeutic services on site and had just received formal certification from the National Children's Alliance.

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- Huntsville and Toledo had refined their existing CACs through professional development, improved protocols, and interagency agreements.
- Huntsville had co-located team members at the NCAC offices, added team assistants and domestic violence investigators, linked members via e-mail, and instituted video interviews at the CAC (Little House).
- Kansas City had established an Investigative Collaborative to regularly review cases at the Child Protection Center, supported by formal procedures and a memorandum of agreement.

In most sites, the CACs and MDTs are not dependent on SK/SS funds, although SK/SS supported their development or the procedural improvements associated with them. The new CACs in Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie have yet to establish a secure funding base for the long term, however. In part, CACs manage by redeploying existing resources, but they do require some funding for core staff and administration. Judging from the experience of the more established CACs in the other sites, we think it likely that the Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie programs will survive.

Other Multidisciplinary Teams

Independent of its CAC efforts, Burlington revitalized its existing CPT, which focuses on service coordination for at-risk or “gray area” families rather than on cases under investigation. The new family-friendly procedures and greater geographic accessibility for families and referring agencies were so well-received that the Health Department asked SK/SS to facilitate a similar MDT for substance-abusing parents. The SK/SS grantee now relies primarily on non-SK/SS support in managing both MDTs. The local CPS office and private sources fund the former and the Health Department funds the latter.

Other Changes in Agency Policies, Procedures, or Practices

Aside from changes adopted in connection with CACs and MDTs, SK/SS also helped modify other policies, practices, and procedures of the child protection system. The sites undertook these efforts to standardize how agencies respond to certain types of cases and to streamline case processing, support better decisions, and ultimately, yield better outcomes for children and families. The Kansas City and Toledo projects adopted numerous new protocols, procedures, or guidelines that span different agencies and processes. For example, Kansas City:

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- Developed a protocol for child abuse investigations that involve allegations against school staff;
- Adopted standard procedures for filing cases on drug-exposed infants and for transferring juvenile offenders from the police department to the Family Court;
- Developed guidelines for the evaluation of suspected child abuse and neglect by pediatric condition falsification (often referred to as Munchausen's syndrome by proxy); and
- Helped the CPS agency implement structured decisionmaking tools for handling hotline calls and for screening reports of child maltreatment.

In Toledo:

- The Juvenile Court implemented a new permanency planning protocol that outlined reforms in the process for relevant agencies. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges formally designated the Juvenile Court as a model court in 2003.
- All home visitation programs adopted a standard assessment tool and training curriculum.
- The project developed and widely distributed pediatric sexual assault guidelines, then supported their use with extensive training. The State Attorney General's Office also announced a plan to start paying for medical exams in cases of suspected sexual assault.

Additionally, in Burlington, the area hospital set up dedicated facilities for forensic examination of sexual assault victims and began paying sexual assault nurse examiners (SANE) to be on call.

In all cases, these changes in policies and procedures have been implemented by the participating agencies, although we could not directly assess the quality of their implementation. These changes are not expected to require continuing support from SK/SS.

Increased Personal and Professional Capacity

Benefits Reported by Stakeholders

In addition to changing the structures, policies, and procedures of organizations, SK/SS also operated to increase the skills and competencies of staff in the formal child protection system and other agencies, as well as other individuals active in the SK/SS effort. As

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shown in Table 6-1, most respondents to our 2003 Stakeholder Survey reported benefiting personally from their participation in SK/SS.

- Nearly three-fourths (72%) said they had made new contacts in the child abuse and neglect field, with smaller percentages saying they made new contacts in the juvenile justice (55%) and other fields (35%).
- About half (52%) said that participation in SK/SS had increased their ability to do their jobs effectively.
- Over half (54%) reported that they had received some new training because of their involvement.

Sites differed in the extent to which stakeholders reported some of these benefits. Respondents in Sault Ste. Marie were less likely than their counterparts elsewhere to report making new contacts in the child abuse and neglect field or to credit SK/SS with improving their ability to do their jobs. Kansas City respondents were less likely to report receiving training connected to SK/SS, although the proportion reporting this benefit had almost doubled between the 2001 and 2003 surveys. In fact, the proportion of stakeholders reporting that they had received training increased substantially overall (up from 37% in 2001), and there were increases at all sites.

Expanded Professional Development and Cross-Agency Training Opportunities

No doubt the personal benefits reported by stakeholders stem from several aspects of SK/SS, including the opportunities for informal interaction and the experience of serving on governing councils and other workgroups. However, all sites had an active training agenda by the time they reached full implementation. While their training efforts varied considerably in scope and content, all sites sought to improve the recognition, reporting, and response to child abuse and neglect. Several sites developed training that addressed the roles and responsibilities of agencies in the child protection system. These efforts made cross-agency training the standard at all sites and improved cross-agency communication.

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Table 6-1. Personal Effects of Participating in SK/SS: 2003 Stakeholder Survey¹

	Burlington (N=70)	Huntsville (N=62)	Kansas City (N=56)	Sault Ste. Marie (N=55)	Toledo (N=29)	All Sites (N=272)
Made new contacts in:						
- the child abuse and neglect field	84%	73%	75%	49%	83%	72%^a
- the juvenile justice field	61	53	59	40	66	55
- other fields	31	45	32	24	45	35
Increased ability to do job effectively	66	56	45	36	52	52^b
Received new training	59	63	34	53	62	54^b

¹Responses do not add to 100 percent because respondents could choose multiple answers.

Significance levels of χ^2 :

^a = $p \leq .01$.

^b = $p \leq .001$.

The sites designed several training efforts around videos, toolkits, or curricula that could survive the loss of SK/SS funding. The sites also had some success in getting other agencies to take ownership of training efforts. For example:

- Kansas City created a video series explaining the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved with child abuse and neglect cases. Each agency received a set of videotapes for ongoing training of new or existing staff.
- Toledo developed a cross-agency training plan for social service professionals and home visitation staff and encouraged collaborating agencies to share training and library resources.
- Burlington developed a mandated reporter video and toolkit for statewide distribution, relying mostly on non-Federal funding.
- Kansas City developed a training curriculum on the Medical Aspects of Child Abuse and Neglect. DFS later mandated this training for all new workers, and the local children's hospital agreed to continue conducting the sessions.
- Sault Ste. Marie's large interdisciplinary trainings on community responses to child abuse and neglect became the basis for a self-administered tutorial for mandated reporters. All new Tribal employees now are required to complete this tutorial.
- Huntsville's *Resources 101*, a monthly orientation for new agency staff on resources within the community for children and families, is now required training for employees of CPS and Healthy Families.

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Some of the projects' other training efforts proved especially popular; local informants view them as valuable additions to the community's training opportunities.

Examples include:

- Burlington's Building Bridges Workshops, which allow professionals to visit and hear a presentation from a different agency each month.
- Huntsville's LEADERSHIP *Social Services* program, which trained agency directors, mid-level managers, and board members on how different agencies operate and how collaboration enhances those operations.
- Huntsville's training series for mandated reporters on the basic elements of child abuse, how to report, and what happens after you report.

Training efforts like these are largely dependent on SK/SS funding at present. Their continued availability will depend on the lead agency's ability to find resources to continue them, either in-house or under the auspices of another agency.

Improved Cultural Competence

Improvements in cultural competence encompassed improvements in personal and professional capacity as well as increases in organizational capacity. Throughout implementation, OJP stressed that agencies and their staff needed to be culturally competent in order to respond effectively to the diversity of children and families entering or at risk of entering the child protection system. Of all the sites, Sault Ste. Marie took the most comprehensive approach by weaving cultural sensitivity and competence into all the project activities, and into overall planning for the SK/SS initiative and the entire Tribe. The primary vehicle for this was the Community Healing Process, an ambitious effort to revitalize traditional cultural values and practices and incorporate them in all Tribal programs. Besides training many professionals and community members, the effort has led to educational presentations for various community groups, development of culturally specific information materials, and an innovative public information strategy (see below). We can only guess at the longer term effects of the Community Healing effort, but it has sown the seeds of change across a wide range of agencies. The Tribe's Cultural Division is expected to become the administrative "home" for continuing efforts to revitalize spiritual values and traditions in the community and enhance collaboration in these areas.

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Huntsville is the only other site that had a substantial agenda around cultural competence, albeit less global than that of Sault Ste. Marie. The Diversity Schoolhouse program, initiated as a luncheon series back in 1999, has attracted almost 900 attendees over the years and been copied by at least four other communities. The NCAC, Healthy Families, and DHR encourage their staff to attend. Recognizing the widespread interest in this training, the NCAC decided to support its continued implementation. Other activities in Huntsville, including multidisciplinary trainings in cultural competence, Spanish classes for social service providers, and the Volunteer Language Bank, currently depend on SK/SS for support. The extent to which they can continue to serve the community is therefore uncertain.

The other sites invested less time in efforts related to cultural competency, making their accomplishments more difficult to gauge. Kansas City did not have a cultural competency agenda per se, relying mainly on its NSI, Grassroots Capacity, and Prevention grants to bring more diversity to their work. However, KIDSAFE's work on the co-occurrence of child abuse and domestic violence has cultural competency as a primary focus. Burlington and Toledo both sponsored some training and assessment efforts. Burlington also briefly supported a Multicultural Coordinator to work with agencies and community groups and paid for translation of information materials at several local agencies. Based on the concerns about cultural competence expressed in the 2003 Stakeholder Survey (see Chapter 5), it seems likely that these efforts heightened awareness of the challenges, if nothing else.

New or Expanded Services for Children and Families

While we lack individual-level data on the outcomes for children and families, SK/SS did demonstrate an ability to increase the range of services available to them. At least in the short term, the projects succeeded in filling gaps in the continuum of prevention, intervention, and treatment services, primarily through grants to service providers and community agencies.

- Burlington spent about half of its implementation budget on direct services, funding 11 subgrants lasting from 2 to 5 years. Burlington's grants ran the gamut from home visiting, neighborhood-based family supports, and parenting programs to services for families in conflict and therapy for sex offenders and sexually reactive victims.
- Kansas City funded 17 services grants, some for as long as 3 years. The grants subsidized a wide range of services, including a grandparent support

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program, counseling and support groups for children and parents, academic tutoring, parenting classes, and youth activities. At various times, Kansas City also subsidized programs at two sites designated as “Safe Havens” by the Weed & Seed program.

- Huntsville helped support about a dozen services, most of them through subcontracts. They included First Responders, a crisis service for families involved in domestic violence; parenting programs; supervised visitation; treatment programs for juvenile sex offenders, substance abusers, and sexual assault victims; and support for noncustodial fathers.
- Sault Ste. Marie supported a half-time law enforcement officer to provide prevention programming at the Tribal elementary school and hired caseworkers for a new Family Services Team, designed to provide coordinated, wraparound services for families with multiple needs.
- Toledo supported the BHF home visitation program, funded a victim advocate in the prosecutor’s office, and helped increase services for children who witness violence.

Some of the service efforts were deliberately designed to reach out to families and children in their home communities. For instance, Burlington subsidized one family center in the city and two in outlying communities. Kansas City’s NSI subgrants went almost entirely to programs based in high-need ZIP Codes. Huntsville’s persistent efforts to develop neighborhood service hubs finally culminated in piloting The Circle Project, based on a full-service school model, in each school district in the county. Sault Ste. Marie stationed one of its family service workers in a satellite office. For the most part, these services have been well-utilized.

Regardless of the immediate benefits associated with these services, the projects face the pressing question of whether they can sustain them when Federal support for SK/SS ends. Overall, the prospects look promising. Burlington had always made sustainability part of its grant review criteria and encouraged providers to develop additional sources of funding. At this point, SK/SS no longer funds any of the services, but most are continuing, albeit at slightly reduced levels in some instances. Kansas City has consistently leveraged additional local resources to supplement its NSI, through local foundations, HAUW, the Children’s Trust Fund, and Jackson County’s anti-drug tax. The project expects these resources to remain available even when the Federal SK/SS grant ends.

Elsewhere, there have also been some successes. Toledo revamped its home visitation model to be more affordable and has acquired additional funding for BHF workers

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through TANF and the Ohio Department of Health. In Huntsville, alternate funding now supports several programs, including First Responders, Parents as Teachers, supervised visitation, therapy for victims, and a parenting program for noncustodial fathers. The fate of the remaining programs will depend on developing new funding sources or finding partners able to take on the work. Project staff consider The Circle Project the greatest funding challenge, given the state's economic climate and school budget deficits.

Building Local Capacity To Develop and Continue Programs

There is some evidence that SK/SS built the capacity of local agencies to develop their own programs and sustain them long-term. At least they tried, particularly in Burlington, Huntsville, and Kansas City.

- Burlington supported intensive sustainability training for several grantees and other organizations. The project also pushed grantees to work on these issues, by building sustainability into the criteria for annual refunding.
- Huntsville initiated a training series on grant writing, management, and resource development called Stretching Dollars Network.
- Kansas City developed a Primer's Training series for grassroots groups, covering collaboration, fund-raising, and grant-writing, along with a separate session on outcome evaluation. Grassroots Capacity grantees were required to attend, while all of the NSI grantees were invited to participate.

The sustainability training in Burlington was too recent for us to determine its effects. In Huntsville, the Stretching Dollars program, which is partially supported by local sources, has proven so popular that SK/SS staff think it likely to be sustained by United Way and the public library when Federal funding expires. In Kansas City, the Council on Philanthropy reconfigured the Primer Series curriculum into a certification program for emerging programs, building on an assessment of the initial offering by SK/SS's local evaluator.

Greater Interagency Communication, Cooperation, and Collaboration

Many of accomplishments described above are inextricably entwined with improvements in cross-agency communication, cooperation, and collaboration, and it is difficult to disentangle cause and effect. New protocols often required that agencies work together more

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closely, but the process of developing protocols depended on initial cooperation. Training supported by SK/SS directly promoted interagency communication and collaboration, but also developed informal relationships that facilitated the same result. New services provided opportunities for agencies to work together in new ways, but relationships built in other SK/SS settings helped it to happen.

Certain programs—for example, the CACs and the MDTs, the Family Service Teams in Sault Ste. Marie, and The Circle Project in Huntsville—are inherently collaborative. In other cases, sites took specific steps to bring about closer coordination of service and program development efforts. For example,

- Burlington and Kansas City formally convened their subgrantees to facilitate information-sharing and networking—through a monthly Operations Team and quarterly NSI meetings, respectively. Burlington’s grant criteria also explicitly encouraged collaboration. As a result, several partnerships between grantees emerged, resulting in numerous instances of cross-training, delivery of services at partner locations, and mutual referrals.
- Kansas City was unique in placing project staff within other agencies. The KIDSAFE liaisons at CPS, the Kansas City Police Department, and the Prosecutor’s Office worked to forge communication links, share resources, and provide training on agency operations and the SK/SS project.
- Toledo reordered its priorities and support for BHF to focus on cross-agency training, supervision, and coordination.

Despite these accomplishments, it is too soon to tell whether the specific relationships and networks established will survive the inevitable turnover of agency staff and the eventual cessation of SK/SS support. However, in Burlington, where support for the subgrants has already ended, Operations Team members were invited to join the SK/SS Council (if not already members), and several have done so. On a broader scale, many key informants in the SK/SS communities told us that collaboration has become the normal, expected way of doing business.

One particular area of accomplishment in the sphere of cross-agency communication and collaboration deserves special mention—*improved collaboration with the domestic violence community*. At several sites, the projects stimulated closer collaborations between the child protection system and the domestic violence community.

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- In Kansas City, this was a key professional development priority, supported by a cross-disciplinary training workshop and follow-up work groups. One work group began vigorously pursuing a coordinated and consistent response to co-occurrence of child abuse and domestic violence using the “Green Book” national model as a tool to begin their work.⁵¹
- In Huntsville, the SK/SS lead agency and Crisis Services of North Alabama forged closer bonds and worked in tandem on a number of grants, including one to support community information kiosks (described below) as well as the development of the First Responder Program.
- In Burlington, working relationships improved markedly between SRS, Women Helping Battered Women (WHBW), and Domestic Abuse Education Program (DAEP), the provider of educational and counseling programs for batterers. As of June 2003, DAEP was working with SRS on protocols for referring domestic violence offenders who are also implicated in child abuse and neglect to DAEP and planned to schedule on-site intake at SRS. DAEP was also working with WHBW to develop partner contact protocols.
- Sault Ste. Marie collaborated on a grant to provide mental health services to victims of domestic violence and to provide training on how to respond to children who witness violence.

There seems good reason to be optimistic about all of these efforts. As in other areas, the growing community culture around collaboration is evident. In Kansas City, the co-occurrence initiative has considerable momentum, with widespread commitment from agencies, organizations, and providers and a structure to facilitate continued progress. Toledo is the only site where connections between the domestic violence and child maltreatment communities have lagged. There were promising signs this was about to change, however, as a result of the community’s new Children’s Trauma Initiative and the presence of new leaders with significant expertise in domestic violence at SK/SS and its lead agency.

Increased Capacity for Collecting and Using Data

OJP had expected SK/SS sites to improve their capabilities for data collection and information-sharing across systems and agencies, both to inform decisions in individual cases and to enable the community to judge its needs and its progress in reducing child maltreatment. OJP’s vision really encompassed two different challenges—one involving development of the technical capabilities for getting, sharing, and interpreting data, and the other, involving

⁵¹ The label comes from the green cover of the document that describes model recommendations.

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decisions about what information was needed. Overall, the SK/SS projects only partially realized OJP's vision. However, there was evidence of capacity-building on both dimensions.

Increased Recognition of the Need for Data

Kansas City came to SK/SS with a local evaluator on board, plans for both MIS improvements and a comprehensive evaluation, and a clear appreciation of the value of these elements. Kansas City was also the first site to undertake Multisystem Case Analysis (MSCA), and on its own initiative. Huntsville's evaluation consultant was active in both proposal Implementation Plan development. In contrast, the other sites began with limited local capacity for data collection and evaluation, and it is fair to say their interest in local evaluation did not extend much beyond giving OJP what it wanted—while investing the bare minimum necessary. Over time, however, we observed that these sites built an appreciation for the value of data within their communities and increased the demand for data to inform policy decisions.

We can point to several indicators of this shift:

- Burlington established a temporary Evaluation Committee, made of partner agencies, to help design the monitoring system for the subgrants and define other local evaluation priorities. Several subgrantees reported that these monitoring requirements, together with results-based accountability training arranged by the project, significantly changed the way they measured their achievements.
- Toledo, although exempted from local evaluation requirements, hired a local evaluation consultant and established an ongoing Evaluation Committee anyway. The Committee played a major role in improving the CAC's data collection systems (see below) and working closely with a twin Evaluation Policy Committee of representatives from key agencies. The Policy Committee focuses on interpreting results of data collection efforts and determining their policy implications.
- In Huntsville, the Community Report Card effort educated stakeholders about the availability, reliability, and comparability of community data and started conversations about what the data really meant. There is some evidence now that local stakeholders want and expect data on indicators of child welfare to be routinely available.
- All sites eventually committed to conduct an MSCA (although most might not have done so without pressure from OJP). In Burlington, a joint SK/SS-Family Court Task Force has overseen the effort and worked on interpretation and presentation of findings.

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These efforts have involved a certain amount of struggle and, in some cases, revision of priorities. Sault Ste. Marie never succeeded in defining a role for local evaluation beyond the MSCA, despite having set aside funds for such work. However, in the first few years of the project, Sault Ste. Marie conducted a Capacity Inventory, a needs assessment survey (of Tribal members visiting a SK/SS booth), and youth focus groups to inform program priorities. The MSCA effort itself, while it generated a fair amount of initial enthusiasm at least in Kansas City, Burlington, and Toledo, was still incomplete everywhere as of June 2003, although it been underway nearly 2 years in Burlington and as long as 4 years elsewhere. It remains to be seen whether the projects will find the results useful. We believe that the process itself has been instructive, however—serving to highlight the limitations of the current data systems for conducting policy analysis.

Overall, we detect an increasing appetite for information about how well the community and individual agencies are addressing child maltreatment. In addition,

- Key informants in all sites said that they now view SK/SS as the community's primary resource for information about child maltreatment.
- Huntsville's lead agency, frustrated by a shortage of local expertise in research, created its own research division to support the agency, new grants, and the larger community.

On the other hand, we believe the SK/SS collaboratives made relatively little progress in defining a longer term agenda for measuring the performance of the community's child protection system or finding the resources to pay for it, although the NCAC's new research division perhaps represents a start. Even in the short term, only Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie invested more than 4 to 5 percent of their SK/SS budgets in data collection, evaluation, or enhancement of local MIS capabilities. (Some other efforts were subsidized from SK/SS TA funds or other DOJ sources.) We recognize the challenges, however—investments in research capabilities are a tough sell in most communities and even tougher when the economy is dictating service cutbacks.

Improvements in Electronic Data Sharing

There was some improvement in the technological capabilities of most sites, although not on the scale OJP might have hoped. All sites found the prospect of integrating MIS across agencies quite daunting, although Kansas City, Burlington, and Sault Ste. Marie

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initially explored the possibilities. However, most sites did modestly improve their capabilities for electronic case tracking and information sharing:

- In Burlington, the project supported CUSI's efforts to develop an electronic database for cases under investigation and to make it accessible to prosecutors and the CPS worker stationed on site.
- Huntsville linked MDT members electronically to their home agency computers and to each other via e-mail to facilitate the exchange of case-level information.
- Kansas City established interagency access to databases and e-mail for CPS, Family Court, and the Prosecutor's Office.
- Toledo helped develop a comprehensive database for emergency medical centers, law enforcement, the courts, and social service providers, which tracks the experiences of victims of domestic violence and child maltreatment from the initial emergency room contact through their contacts with other agencies.
- Toledo also helped Building Healthy Families implement a database to link with a communitywide database of early intervention service providers that is now under development.
- Sault Ste. Marie developed a multidivision and multiagency MIS that allows shared access to the clinical records of substance abuse clients.

None of these changes require continued support from SK/SS. Toledo's efforts were the most ambitious, involving development of new interagency systems. The utility of the systems is still to be demonstrated. On a smaller scale, Kansas City's experience provides a cautionary tale. While cross-agency access to data was achieved, and the project supported it with training and new protocols, agency staff have not been using the new capabilities. As a result, project partners are taking another look at developing an integrated public sector database, with support from SK/SS TA funds.

Increasing Prevention Education and Public Awareness

OJP expected the sites to develop multimedia campaigns to educate the community about child abuse and neglect and how to report it, good parenting practices, and the community services available for children and families. These efforts were expected to identify children and families already involved in maltreatment or at risk and expose community members to

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good prevention practices and supportive resources. As a longer term goal, the projects worked to create a constituency for continuing efforts to protect children.

At this juncture, we can only characterize the efforts, not their results. For the most part the efforts have been modest, claiming 5 or 6 percent of the SK/SS budget in Burlington, Huntsville, and Toledo, and 12 to 14 percent elsewhere. Initially, the sites' public information activities were limited mainly to distributing resource and prevention materials at community and neighborhood events. Some of the materials—brochures and fact sheets, for example—were developed specifically for SK/SS, and others came from local partners or national sources. Burlington and Toledo eventually developed a new agency web site, while the other sites included project information on the web sites of their lead agencies. In general, the projects have shifted to more coordinated, systematic efforts and are integrating them better with overall SK/SS aims.

Three sites worked to make community resource information available on a more enduring basis:

- Huntsville helped win grant funding to set up 23 resource information kiosks and 27 dedicated computer workstations with on-line access to the database. Eight kiosks were up and running by June 2003.
- Huntsville, along with Burlington, also pursued low-tech approaches. For example, Huntsville supported the development of Youth Yellow Pages and a family resource section for the phone book (the "Purple Pages" mentioned in Chapter 5). Burlington developed, updated, and widely disseminated a comprehensive *Family Services Directory* to community and professional audiences.
- Sault Ste. Marie implemented "YOOPERAID," a user-friendly, on-line services directory for the seven-county area. Competing with over 100 other entries, this was one of four Sault Tribe activities to win Excellence in Community Communications and Outreach (ECCO) awards in 2002 from the Comprehensive Mental Health Services for Children and Their Families Program at SAMHSA.

Huntsville and Sault Ste. Marie also developed more comprehensive public information campaigns around child abuse and neglect:

- Huntsville's mass market campaign included public service announcements, billboards, newspaper articles, and television news segments. Huntsville also initiated Family Friendly Business Awards that earned wide media attention.

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- Sault Ste. Marie launched a comprehensive multimedia campaign, coordinated across agencies, that was built around culturally specific prevention themes. ECCO recognized the Tribe's planning of this public awareness campaign and public service announcements with a gold medal.

Burlington, meanwhile, provided 5 years of subgrant support to Stop It Now! VT, which regularly sponsored panels and workshops for a wide audience; appeared on TV, radio, and in print; and developed widely aired public service announcements. Burlington and Kansas City also used other subgrants to support prevention activities. Burlington funded prevention-oriented puppet shows for hundreds of school children and subsidized some community education under other subgrants. Kansas City was unique in supporting public awareness and prevention education through its community Prevention Grants and Grassroots Capacity Grants. These grants were explicitly intended to build community capacity to carry on prevention efforts independent of SK/SS.

While many of these efforts brought prevention education to the broader community and promoted public awareness of child abuse and neglect issues, they are generally not self-sustaining. The projects have had some success in developing outside sources of funding—for instance, the *Family Services Directory* in Burlington received some local support, and the information kiosk effort in Huntsville is funded by another Federal grant. Burlington's subgrantees are no longer receiving SK/SS support, but are attempting to continue their public information activities at some level. Nonetheless, by mid-2003, the sites did not have structures in place to continue most of their prevention education and public awareness activities beyond SK/SS.

Changes in Legislation, State Policy, and Resource Distribution

The most ambitious part of the SK/SS vision involved the hope that the projects could bring about macro-level changes in the overarching policies governing the welfare and safety of children and, particularly, in the broader allocation of resources to these concerns. This might require educating state-level policymakers in the executive and legislative branches about needs and priorities (at least in the non-Tribal sites), as well as convincing state or local decisionmakers to adopt different approaches to deciding how resources for children and families should be invested.

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These efforts were in their infancy at all of the sites. On the resource side, many of the discrete project accomplishments already discussed necessitated changes in resource allocations, either to get project activities started or to sustain them. And many initiatives relied on multiple sources of funding. However, only Burlington and Huntsville had tried to systematically scrutinize the overall deployment of community resources—in both cases using surveys of community agencies. Huntsville had conducted two such surveys, but used them primarily to help set priorities for SK/SS. With TA assistance through SK/SS, Huntsville was also working on developing a Children’s Budget. Burlington’s resource survey was still underway. None of the sites had yet attempted to place global resource allocations on the table or change the rules governing them at the community level.

None of the non-Tribal sites had developed a comprehensive agenda around state policy, nor did they have routine mechanisms in place to reach policymakers at that level. Typically, for example, the SK/SS governing councils discussed impending legislative, policy, or funding changes at the state level, but left individual stakeholders to make their own judgments about taking action. There were some exceptions:

- In Kansas City and Burlington, the collaboratives voiced their collective concerns about budget cutbacks affecting children’s services, although it is difficult to say whether this changed anything
- In Burlington, collaborative leaders were invited to serve on two state advisory committees—a Health Department committee providing input on violence prevention and a SRS committee looking at policies for cases where domestic violence and child abuse co-occur. (The former was close to completing a draft of a new SRS policy as of June 2003.)

For the most part, however, the SK/SS projects were still in reactive mode. Only Burlington had recently become more proactive—affiliating with the Champlain Initiative to raise the prominence of the project’s agenda at the state level and cooperating with the Domestic Violence Task Force (DVTF) on a legislative candidates’ forum and monthly breakfasts for legislators. Local informants believe the latter efforts contributed to passage of legislation designating clergy as mandated reporters and requiring improved protocols and training for mandated reporters and their co-workers. SK/SS staff also joined the Policy Board of the Vermont Children’s Forum (VCF), the state’s leading child advocacy group, and persuaded VCF to add a separate section on child maltreatment to its policy agenda. In Kansas City, KIDSAFE sponsored workshops on legislative advocacy and the public policy process for community agencies.

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Assessment of Progress Toward Long-Term Outcomes

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, we did not anticipate that long-term outcomes for SK/SS would be apparent during the evaluation's life span. Additionally, even if observed, hard to attribute to SK/SS. Nonetheless, we tracked progress on some commonly used indicators of child welfare, using administrative data from relevant agencies. Table 6-2 provides limited data on risk factors associated with child maltreatment. Overall, the birth rate to teen mothers declined in those counties with data for the 1997 to 2001 period. In Burlington, fatality rates for children ages 1 to 4 declined from 1997 to 2000, but comparable data for infants and older teens were not available. While infant mortality increased in Huntsville and Toledo from 1997 to 2001, comparable data on older children were not available. Kansas City's infant, child, and teen death rates remained flat from 1997 to 1999 with more recent data unavailable. Finally, in the two Michigan counties, the data on infant, child, and teen deaths are too limited to characterize the trends.

Table 6-3 provides some direct indicators of child maltreatment for the SK/SS communities. In Burlington, the number of child abuse and neglect reports grew dramatically from 1997 to 2002, while substantiations and placements climbed less sharply. In Huntsville, these reports increased in 2000 before falling in 2002, while the number of substantiated cases consistently fell during this period. Kansas City experienced a decrease in the substantiation rate, but saw little change in the report and placement rates. In Michigan's Mackinac County, the number of reports increased from 1997 to 2002 with a corresponding increase in the number of substantiated victims per 1,000 children. While the report rate remained flat in Chippewa County, the substantiation rate increased from 1997 to 2002. Toledo is the only site where reports of child abuse and neglect declined from 1997 to 2002, as did the substantiation rates. Placement rates were up in 2002, after dipping in 1999.

None of these patterns can be clearly linked to SK/SS. They are undoubtedly affected by factors (e.g., economic conditions, local health care systems) other than the implementation of SK/SS. Also, we expect that SK/SS efforts to train professionals and educate the public on maltreatment increase reporting in the near term, possibly offsetting the preventive effects of other activities (better services, MDTs, etc.). System reform is a slow process. Given the magnitude of the task, it may take many years to significantly reduce child abuse and more years for it to translate into reductions in juvenile delinquency and other problems.

Table 6-2. Child Welfare Indicators in the SK/SS Communities

Characteristic	Burlington ^a	Huntsville ^b	Kansas City ^c	Sault Ste. Marie ^c		Toledo ^c
	Chittenden County	Madison County	Jackson County	Mackinac County	Chippewa County	Lucas County
Births to teens, ages 15-17 (per 1,000) ^d						
1997	25.6	NA	68.5	26.8	29	36
2000	22.0	27.4	64.6	NA	20	28
2001	NA	23.6	61.5	NA	NA	NA
Infant death rate (per 1,000 live births)						
1997	NA	5.4	8.7	NA	(6)*	6.2
2000	NA	5.6	NA	NA	(5)*	7.3
2001	NA	10.2	NA	NA	NA	8.1
Child death rate, ages 1-14 (per 100,000)						
1997	15	31	32.2	NA	35	NA
1999	17	NA	26.8	NA	NA	NA
2000	7	29	25.5	NA	32	NA
Violent deaths, ages 15-19 (per 100,000)						
1997	NA	55	87.9	279	100	NA
1999	NA	54	94.5	NA	NA	NA
2000	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<p>^a Data from Vermont Department of Health, Vital Stats Data System.</p> <p>^b Data from Center for Health Statistics, Statistical Analysis Division and the Institute for Social Science Research, University of Alabama report titled “Studies in Support of the Evaluation of One by One: A Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative” (2001).</p> <p>^c Data from <i>KidsCount</i> County-City-Community Level Information on Kids.</p> <p>^d Teen pregnancy rate for 15- to 19-year-olds in Jackson County.</p> <p>* The numbers in parenthesis are the actual number of deaths. Rates were not calculated because the event numbers were too small.</p>						

Table 6-3. Child Maltreatment Data for the SK/SS Communities

Characteristic	Burlington ^a	Huntsville ^b	Kansas City ^c	Sault Ste. Marie ^d		Toledo ^e
	Chittenden County	Madison County	Jackson County	Mackinac County	Chippewa County	Lucas County
Reports of child abuse and neglect (per 1,000 children)						
1997	(649)*	(1,178)*	NA	69.5	101.0	33.4
1998	(690)*	(1,196)*	67.4	87.9	101.4	32.8
1999	(761)*	(1,272)*	60.4	82.1	101.9	34.4
2000	(902)*	(1,379)*	67.2	88.8	102.5	28.2
2001	(904)*	(1,248)*	68.3	93.9	106.2	25.0
2002	(972)*	(1,025)*	66.0	83.1	107.2	25.2
Substantiated victims of child abuse and neglect (per 1,000 children)						
1997	(279)*	(644)*	NA	6.6	9.9	55.5
1998	(331)*	(426)*	13.2	11.2	10.9	56.0
1999	(301)*	(401)*	7.6	8.6	12.0	52.2
2000	(329)*	(337)*	7.9	11.7	9.3	46.6
2001	(285)*	(342)*	7.6	10.2	10.2	45.1
2002	(364)*	(282)*	7.0	10.6	13.9	42.5
Out-of-home placements (per 1,000 children)						
1997	(281)*	NA	5.1	NA	NA	(720)*
1998	(317)*	NA	5.6	NA	NA	(803)*
1999	(318)*	NA	5.3	NA	NA	(691)*
2000	(297)*	NA	6.2	NA	NA	(650)*
2001	(316)*	NA	5.2	NA	NA	(763)*
2002	(337)*	NA	NA	NA	NA	(782)*

^a Data from Vermont Agency for Human Services, Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, February 2004.

^b Data from Institute for Social Science Research, University of Alabama report titled "Studies in Support of the Evaluation of One by One: A Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative" (2001).

^c Data from Missouri Division of Family Services, Missouri Child Abuse and Neglect Report 1998-2002.

^d Data from *KidsCount* in Michigan, Michigan League for Human Services.

^e Data from Lucas County Children's Services.

* The numbers in parenthesis are the actual number of reports, not rates.

Accomplishments of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Sites

Local Perspectives on Accomplishments

The preceding sections have summarized the accomplishments identified by the national evaluation, based on a variety of sources of information. We also used the 2003 Stakeholder Survey (n=277) and the 2002 Survey of Agency Personnel (n=353) to systematically collect local perspectives on accomplishments and changes associated with SK/SS.⁵² Findings from these surveys are presented in greater detail in Volumes III and IV. In general, changes in communication are the most frequently reported effects on these surveys, whether the respondents are project stakeholders or agency personnel. Also, stakeholders who have been actively involved in SK/SS report many other types of changes and attribute them to SK/SS. Mid-level and frontline staff were less likely to report changes or attribute them to SK/SS, but many were less familiar with the project and may not have recognized any connections that did exist. Also, the Survey of Agency Personnel focused more narrowly on operations of the formal child protection system than the Stakeholder Survey.

Highlights of both surveys are provided below.

The 2003 Stakeholder Survey (n=277)

Stakeholders in all five sites were asked what effects of SK/SS they had observed on their community. Table 6-4 summarizes their responses. Across sites, the top-rated effects were improvements in communication and cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect, reported by 74 percent of stakeholders, followed by improvements in multiagency responses to children affected by domestic violence, reported by 67 percent. A majority of stakeholders also reported that SK/SS had improved community education on child abuse and neglect (61%), expanded prevention programs (60%), and improved information sharing and case tracking across agencies (60%). With one exception, these effects were reported by at least half the stakeholders at every site, with up to two-thirds reporting some of the effects in Burlington, Huntsville, Kansas City, and Toledo.

Items in the middle section of the table were reported by 50 to 59 percent of all stakeholders, but the patterns were more variable across sites. For example, large majorities of

⁵² Because of the smaller program implemented in Toledo, Toledo was not included in the Survey of Agency Personnel.

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**Table 6-4. Stakeholder Opinions About Effects of SK/SS on the Community:
Proportion Reporting Strong Effects^a**

	Burlington (N=39-67)	Huntsville (N=33-59)	Kansas City (N=37-52)	Sault Ste. Marie (N=39-49)	Toledo (N=22-29)	All Sites ^b (N=178-254)
The Federal SK/SS program has many goals and objectives related to child abuse and neglect. Not all sites are placing the same emphasis on each one. So far in your community, do you believe SK/SS has had any effect on:						
Most Frequently Report Effects						
Improving communication/cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect	83%	83%	68%	61%	75%	74% ^x
Improving multiagency responses to children affected by domestic violence	68	79	58	61	64	67 ^x
Educating community residents, including parents, about child abuse and neglect	60	74	57	51	64	61
Expanding prevention programs	63	65	60	50	62	60
Improving information sharing and case tracking across agencies	66	69	53	40	75	60 ^y
Effects Reported Sometimes						
Making professionals/services more sensitive to the ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the children and families they serve	46	85	45	62	51	59 ^z
Improving needs assessment for children/families	57	75	48	51	64	59 ^x
Improving case management and follow-up for families	56	70	40	51	67	56 ^x
Improving services for children/families who might “fall through the cracks”	57	70	50	49	50	56
Expanding treatment services for victimized children	55	78	38	39	72	55 ^z
Decreasing community tolerance for child abuse and neglect	52	73	49	44	48	54 ^x
Expanding early intervention programs	56	58	55	38	60	53 ^w
Evaluating local practices and outcomes	53	70	52	26	50	51 ^x
Leveraging resources across public/private agencies to support children/families	47	68	54	35	38	50 ^x
Least Reported Effects						
Involving grassroots organizations, religious organizations, and informal networks such as extended families in supporting children/families	34	64	52	32	25	43 ^z
Holding offenders more accountable	40	57	29	21	40	37 ^z
Standardizing data collection across agencies	25	50	33	18	61	35 ^y
Expanding treatment services for juvenile sex offenders	37	46	30	23	37	34 ^w
Reaching underserved rural areas	31	45	19	51	14	34 ^z

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Table 6-4. Stakeholder Opinions About Effects of SK/SS on the Community: Proportion Reporting Strong Effects^a

	Burlington (N=39-67)	Huntsville (N=33-59)	Kansas City (N=37-52)	Sault Ste. Marie (N=39-49)	Toledo (N=22-29)	All Sites^b (N=178-254)
Number of strong effects identified^c	(N=67)	(N=59)	(N=52)	(N=50)	(N=30)	(N=258)
Mean number of strong effects	8.3	10.7	8.0	7.2	8.7	8.6^x

^a Respondents ranked effects on a 5-point scale, where “1” stands for “No effect at all” and “5” stands for “A major effect.” Many respondents skipped these items or indicated that they had “no opinion.” Nonresponse rates exceeded 20 percent on most items. They ranged from a low of 8 percent (“Improving communication and cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect”) to 36 percent (“Reaching underserved rural areas”).

^b Significance tests examined average ratings across sites.

^c This average is based on the number of items rated “4” or “5” on the 5-point scale of effects. The maximum value is 19 for respondents who report strong effects on all 19 items.

Significance levels of F:

^w = $p \leq .05$.

^y = $p \leq .001$.

^x = $p \leq .01$.

^z = $p \leq .0001$.

respondents in Huntsville (78%) and Toledo (72%) reported that SK/SS had expanded treatment services for victimized children, compared with less than 40 percent of respondents in Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie. The bottom section of Table 6-4 shows the least-reported effects overall, which included improvements in involving grassroots organizations and other nontraditional groups (43%), holding offenders more accountable (37%), standardizing data collection across agencies (35%), expanding treatment for juvenile sex offenders (34%), and reaching underserved rural areas (34%). Once again, some sites depart from the overall pattern. At least half the respondents in Huntsville and Kansas City reported that SK/SS had increased the involvement of nontraditional groups—paralleling findings reported in Chapter 5 that these sites had greater representation from such groups in their collaboratives.

Overall, respondents reported an average of nine strong effects from the list of 19 choices presented. Huntsville respondents reported 11 effects on average, while respondents in the remaining sites reported 7 to 9 different strong effects.

We also asked respondents to select the two *most* important effects out of the entire list of 19 (see Table 6-5). Improving communication and cooperation shows up among every site’s top three, ranking number one in Burlington, Huntsville, and Kansas City. In Toledo, improving information and case-tracking across agencies ranked number one. In Sault Ste.

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Table 6-5. Stakeholder Opinions of Most Important SK/SS Accomplishments: Top Three Choices^a	
Burlington (N=65)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improving communication/cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect [63%] 2. Improving services for children/families who might “fall through the cracks” [23%] 3. Improving case management and follow-up for families [18%] 3. Improving information sharing and case tracking across agencies [18%]
Huntsville (N=53)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improving communication/cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect [42%] 2. Making professionals/services more sensitive to the ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the children and families they serve [25%] 3. Improving multiagency responses to children affected by domestic violence [19%]
Kansas City (N=45)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improving communication/cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect [53%] 2. Involving grassroots organizations, religious organizations, and informal networks such as extended families in supporting children/families [27%] 3. Expanding prevention programs [22%]
Sault Ste. Marie (N=41)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Educating community residents, including parents, about child abuse and neglect [41%] 2. Making professionals/services more sensitive to the ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the children and families they serve [32%] 3. Improving communication/cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect [29%]
Toledo (N=23)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improving information sharing and case tracking across agencies [48%] 2. Improving communication/cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect [39%] 3. Standardizing data collection across agencies [30%]
All Sites (N=227)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Improving communication/cooperation among those who deal with child abuse and neglect [48%] 2. Expanding prevention programs [16%] 3. Making professionals/services more sensitive to the ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the children and families they serve [14%] 3. Improving multiagency responses to children affected by domestic violence [14%] 3. Improving information sharing and case tracking across agencies [14%]
<p>^a Stakeholders were asked to choose from among the 19 effects shown in Table 6-4. This table shows the three most frequently selected accomplishments for each site, and overall. In case of ties, all tied items are shown. Percentages selecting each accomplishment are shown in brackets.</p>	

Marie, educating community residents about child abuse and neglect ranked first, and it was the only site where this item made the top three.

Huntsville and Sault Ste. Marie respondents were the only ones to accord high average rankings to an ethnic/cultural sensitivity effect—it received the second highest number

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of votes in both sites. Burlington and Kansas City respondents were unique, in each having a second-place effect that showed up on no other site's list. In Kansas City, respondents ranked involving grassroots organizations, religious organizations, and informal networks second. Burlington respondents ranked improving services for children/families that might fall through the cracks second. Toledo respondents named standardizing data collection across agencies as one of the most important effects.

Other highlights of the Stakeholder Survey findings include:

- When asked how SK/SS had affected their own organization (if applicable), 73 percent of stakeholders reported at least one significant effect and 38 percent reported five or more. The most commonly reported effects were in the areas of interagency communication (56%), communication with community members (51%), training and professional development (45%), expansion of the scope of services/activities (43%), and the quality or amount of information available for decisionmaking (40%). One out of three stakeholders said that SK/SS had significantly affected *overall* operations within their own organization.
- Fifty-three percent of stakeholders reported that SK/SS had a major impact on the children and families served by their organization.
- Most stakeholders were quite satisfied with the SK/SS accomplishments. About two-thirds (66%) overall awarded satisfaction ratings in the 4 to 5 range on a 5-point scale. Satisfaction was lowest in Sault Ste. Marie (49%) and Toledo (59%) and highest in Huntsville (79%). Burlington (70%) and Kansas City (65%) fell in between. In 2003, satisfaction had increased noticeably in Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie over levels reported in 2001.

The 2002 Survey of Agency Personnel (n=353)

It was reassuring to find that many of the outcomes reported by stakeholders (who tended to be supervisors or agency directors) were confirmed by mid-level and frontline staff.

- Over three-quarters of mid-level and frontline workers (77%) reported more frequent contact with outside agencies around child protection issues in the last 2 years. For some workers, the change was pervasive. A majority (57%) of the workers said they had increased contact with four or more outside agencies.
- When asked why interagency contact was more frequent, the workers cited an improved knowledge of whom to contact and a closer relationship with staff of other agencies as the main reasons.

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- Staff of the local CPS agency and police were the most likely to report improvements in interagency communication and information-sharing about individual cases of child abuse and neglect. About one-quarter of the workers said that communication and sharing with CPS (29%) and the police (25%) had improved. Again, the workers cited knowing who to talk to in other agencies as the primary reason for agency-level improvements in communication and information sharing on specific cases.
- When asked about changes in specific procedures and activities within the community's child protection system, agency personnel most often reported improvements in overall knowledge of child abuse resources (39%), recognition of abuse by professionals (31%), and cross-agency coordination (31%). Just over one-third (34%) of the workers attributed improvements in the child protection system to SK/SS. (Note that many respondents were not familiar with the SK/SS project, and therefore were not able to assess its contribution to changes they had observed.)
- Overall, agency staff saw some positive changes in the community's child protection system. More than one-fourth (27%) of the respondents said that the child protection system had improved in the last 2 years. Another 30 percent reported a mixed picture—certain aspects of the system had improved, while other areas had actually gotten worse. Just one-third of these workers felt that the system remained the same, and only a small minority (4%) said that it had gotten worse.

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7. Factors That Influenced the Outcomes of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Projects

In the preceding chapters, we described the implementation of the five SK/SS collaboratives and their agendas for system reform and accountability, enhancing the continuum of services, data collection and evaluation, and prevention education/public information. We also discussed their accomplishments in each area, focusing particularly on those that appeared most likely to be sustained after Federal support for SK/SS ends.

In this chapter, we highlight the factors that, in our view, are most significant in accounting for the way the SK/SS projects developed and their achievements so far. We begin with the OJP framework for SK/SS and then turn to other factors, including project environment, history, leadership, and other circumstances that facilitated or hampered project efforts.

The OJP Framework for Safe Kids/Safe Streets

The OJP framework for SK/SS had several features that help account for the solid performance of the SK/SS initiative to date. These strengths include:

- **An adaptable program design.** In developing the original framework for SK/SS, OJP built on other collaborative efforts that pointed to the importance of systemic reform buttressed by services and other supports. The program solicitation established the goals and some broad parameters, but did not impose a particular model. Thus sites had considerable freedom to choose targets, structures, and strategies that would suit their unique circumstances and appeal to local stakeholders. It seems clear that no other approach could have worked with sites as diverse as the rural, Tribal community of Sault Ste. Marie and the urban jurisdiction of Kansas City.
- **A generous timeframe.** Learning from previous collaboratives, OJP also recognized that sites would need years to realize their objectives. The original solicitation allowed 5½ years—generous by Federal standards—but OJP managers permitted the sites to extend the timeframe and even planned to make one additional award to support “sustainability.”⁵³ There is no question that the sites needed this time. Three or four years into the initiative, the sites’ achievements would have appeared far more modest. At that point,

⁵³ By 2003, OJP had funds available to make sustainability awards to Burlington, Huntsville, and Toledo. Sustainability funding for Kansas City and Sault Ste. Marie, which spent their original funds more slowly, will depend on OJP’s future budget circumstances.

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some key efforts were stalled or struggling—including, for example, the development of the CAC in Burlington, the neighborhood-based initiatives in Huntsville, and the MDT process in Kansas City. Other noteworthy activities were not even on the radar yet. And overall, the collaboratives were still building the credibility and support necessary to sustain their gains.

- **A strong commitment to the primacy of system reform and comprehensive collaboration.** While OJP gave the sites considerable latitude in their agendas and timetables, program managers were willing to intervene if a site appeared to be straying too far from the original vision for the initiative. In Huntsville, OJP intervened during the planning phase, asking the project to bring a broader spectrum of the community into the process. In Burlington, OJP intervened much later, to redress what it saw as a continuing imbalance between service-oriented and system reform strategies. Both projects emerged with a stronger system reform agenda, and Huntsville, with broader participation in governance. In each case, the process generated some new and popular initiatives. Intervention certainly slowed project momentum temporarily and alienated some stakeholders. But Huntsville and Burlington rebounded quickly.

In Sault Ste. Marie, the results were more mixed. As in Huntsville, the project had to rethink the structure of its collaborative and plan again. In many respects, this intervention succeeded. The project did engage more Tribal stakeholders, including leaders with the power to sustain a long-term commitment to system reform. However, the extended planning process delayed implementation by at least a year, frustrating many stakeholders and dissipating some of the original enthusiasm.⁵⁴

- **Technical assistance and other supports.** OJP reinforced its commitment to system reform and broad-based collaboration by providing TA and other supports, especially the cross-site cluster conferences. Although TA was limited during the first year, in later years TA consultants helped sites strengthen governance and expand their system reform agendas. For instance, they assisted Sault Ste. Marie with its “re-visioning” process and helped Toledo integrate its efforts with OJP’s Comprehensive Strategies Program. In Burlington, they helped facilitate strategic planning meetings and, later, shape the system reform plan for Grant 4.

The cluster conferences often led projects to incorporate new activities or strategies into their agendas. For example, Huntsville and Toledo both stepped up their parent/consumer involvement initiatives and undertook cultural competence studies because of conference presentations. Sault Ste. Marie adapted techniques for surveying its collaborative about goals and priorities. And in some areas, if sites did not take the initiative, OJP and TA consultants pushed them. This was particularly true for the MSCA efforts (except in Kansas City, where the site took the initiative). Also, OJP

⁵⁴ In addition, non-Tribal agencies were entirely dropped from the collaborative structure. It is hard to say what type of project would have resulted had they remained involved. In any case, BSNAF was able to work with non-Tribal agencies on selected activities in later years.

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promoted greater investment in funding analysis and “blended funding” strategies, in hopes that they would help projects sustain their efforts. Some of these efforts have yet to prove their worth (sites were still working on them when we ended data collection), but the rationale for incorporating them into SK/SS appears sound.

- **SK/SS as a learning community.** OJP wanted SK/SS to be a “learning community,” in which all involved—sites, OJP staff, TA providers, and evaluators—could share experiences and learn from each other. A fully realized learning community may have been impossible, given the power differentials between funders and recipients, and evaluators and the subjects of evaluation. Nonetheless, there was considerable sharing of information about disappointments as well as accomplishments, often during the cluster conferences. Sites did in fact borrow ideas and tactics from one another—such as funding surveys, community report cards, and parent involvement strategies. OJP contributed to this spirit by accepting that project activities would involve trial and error and that not all efforts would work out as planned. They gave the projects the space to change direction or abandon unpromising ventures. Huntsville, for example, completely revamped its neighborhood-based initiatives, moving from a strategy centered on Family Resource Centers to one focused on schools. Toledo made major adjustments in its home visitation program over the course of SK/SS.

There were also challenges inherent in the design and the management approach OJP adopted to implement the initiative. In making the SK/SS awards “cooperative agreements,” OJP intended to become “partners” to the sites—participating in a give and take about the best strategies, contributing new ideas to help bring the sites closer to their goals, and if necessary, pulling sites’ back to OJP’s original vision. In practice, however, it was difficult for OJP to find the middle ground between too much direction and too little. Even after the planning phase, the sites often expressed uncertainty about what was expected of them and what they could expect in the way of feedback. We believe several factors played a role.

- **The broad parameters of the SK/SS initiative.** The program solicitation was both a blessing and curse, in that it left so *many* choices to the sites and to the program managers. In addition, the solicitation did not fully spell out OJP’s vision, particularly the way in which system reform efforts were to interact with the other program elements.
- **The limited body of knowledge about collaborative approaches.** While OJP managers were open to the lessons of previous collaborations, the information available did not provide definitive guidance about how much direction funders should provide to sites or when they should provide it.
- **OJP’s interoffice management structure.** Combining managers from different offices within OJP brought SK/SS more diverse expertise and a wider internal audience for the lessons learned. However, it complicated the

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task of providing consistent direction to the sites. The three offices involved had different grant management styles, and their managers had different workloads. In addition, the managers probably differed somewhat in their personal interpretations of the SK/SS requirements.

- **Turnover among the OJP managers, TA, and evaluation personnel responsible for working with the sites.** The OJJDP program manager who coordinated the Federal management team was the only OJP manager involved with the project throughout. Kansas City's current program officer was involved with SK/SS early on, but, initially, she was responsible for coordinating efforts across the three OJP offices. Every site had at least two changes in its Federal program manager; Burlington had four. As for TA providers, only Burlington retained the same lead consultant for system reform from the inception of the SITTAP contract in 1998 until June 2003. Kansas City had a single SITTAP consultant who started in 2002; the site had chosen to do without a lead consultant until then. Sault Ste. Marie, Toledo, and Huntsville, however, each had several program officers and SITTAP consultants over the course of the program. For Sault Ste. Marie, in particular, the changes in TA providers delayed progress in several areas. Sault Ste. Marie and Toledo also experienced turnover in their site coordinator from the Westat evaluation team; the current coordinator, the third, came on board in 2000. The other sites retained the same evaluation coordinators throughout.
- **Lack of clarity about requirements versus suggestions or options.** The sites were also challenged when what OJP intended as a directive was not always labeled as such. This issue arose because much of the communication between OJP managers and the sites was oral, or if written, informal (by e-mail). Also, many ideas about best practices were communicated through presentations and discussions at cluster meetings, a setting that blurred the distinction between requirements, strong recommendations, and helpful suggestions.
- **The continued elaboration of expectations.** While the program solicitation had set the goals and the basic framework for SK/SS, OJP saw the initiative as dynamic. Over the years, therefore, OJP tried to draw upon the interim lessons learned by the sites and information emerging about best practices elsewhere. That, after all, was part of being a learning community and demonstration program. From the standpoint of the sites, however, the bar kept getting higher, and the focus kept shifting.

Some of these things could not be helped, and some represent the downside of otherwise desirable features. Some might be minimized by future initiatives, through careful planning. We discuss the lessons for future initiatives in our final chapter. The important point here is that though these factors caused some tension between OJP and its sites, none of them was serious enough to derail the initiative.

Factors That Influenced the Outcomes of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Projects

Site-Level Factors That Affected Project Efforts

While the OJP framework played a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of SK/SS, many characteristics of the SK/SS communities themselves, the projects, and their approach were equally important. Below we begin by discussing the factors that we believe were mostly positive and help account for the high level of accomplishments observed. We then discuss factors that were mostly negative, creating significant obstacles or challenges. Lastly, we discuss two factors that we had expected to be significant, but whose effects were mixed or uncertain. The discussion focuses on those factors that appeared to be most significant across sites.⁵⁵

Factors That Facilitated Project Efforts

In selecting sites, OJP had been attentive to environmental factors, attempting to select communities that would provide fertile ground for the SK/SS initiative. In fact, several aspects of the community setting appear to have had a positive influence on project outcomes. These include:

- **A credible lead agency.** All five of the agencies awarded SK/SS funds had a track record of working on child abuse and neglect in some capacity and were generally viewed as appropriate to lead the new initiative by local decisionmakers. All had sufficient organizational capacity to carry out the project, although Burlington's Community Network was at a relative disadvantage because of its very small staff and budget. It had previously managed larger projects, however, and had nonprofit legal status, a Board, and policies in place to accommodate expansion. The Community Network in Burlington and the United Way in Kansas City had the added advantage of being perceived as neutral parties, because they were neither members of the formal child protection system nor providers of direct services. According to local informants, Toledo's Family and Child Abuse Prevention Center was also seen as relatively neutral, although it was a service provider. Huntsville's NCAC was viewed as a community leader and the only agency that could have managed such a broad undertaking, but its very dominance threatened some potential partners initially. Similarly, in Sault Ste. Marie, the fact that the lead agency was responsible for child protective services constituted negative baggage in some circles, although it too was probably the only viable candidate to run such a project.

⁵⁵ The case studies in Volume II provide detailed information about the unique circumstances that influenced each project.

Factors That Influenced the Outcomes of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Projects

- **A history of collaboration.** All the lead agencies had some history of collaboration around child and family welfare issues. The existing collaborations were not as broad as OJP required, but they came fairly close—mainly because their agencies already provided community forums for discussion of child abuse and neglect. Sault Ste. Marie had the most work to do, because previous collaborations there were mainly ad hoc and short term. But every grantee had some relationships on which to build. In addition, in two sites—Kansas City and Toledo—informants told us that collaboration among community agencies was fairly common in spheres other than children’s issues.
- **A favorable community climate.** There was no active opposition to the SK/SS mission in any of the sites and there were no organizations that saw the project as encroaching on their turf. Other background conditions were helpful at some sites. In Huntsville and Kansas City, for example, the imposition of Consent Decrees governing the CPS agency had already elevated community concerns about child abuse and neglect. In Vermont, state policymakers had a strong record of supporting prevention and early intervention for families, including home visiting, parent education, and initiatives to reduce domestic violence.
- **Initial commitments from key decisionmakers.** All projects were required to include commitments to participate from key agencies in their original application. As is typical in these situations, some supporters knew more about the plans than others. Overall, Kansas City and Huntsville participants were probably the best informed; both sites spent considerable time engaging other organizations in planning their proposals. Some of these organizations pledged financial or staff support for the project. There was limited consultation in Burlington and Toledo, and in Sault Ste. Marie, none at all outside the lead agency. Nonetheless, for the most part, those who signed commitments followed through.
- **The existence of complementary initiatives in the target area.** All the communities that hosted SK/SS had other large initiatives underway that overlapped the interests of SK/SS. For the most part, these did not conflict, but rather created opportunities for synergy. Prominent examples of major contemporaneous efforts include the Family Court Permanency Planning Project in Burlington, the SAMHSA-funded Children’s Mental Health Initiative in Sault Ste. Marie, and the OJJDP-funded Comprehensive Strategies Program in Toledo.

Favorable environments set the stage for successful planning and implementation, but at least four other factors were essential to carry it off and were important for all sites. They include:

- **Skilled project leadership and staff.** Some SK/SS staff were known quantities in their communities, while others were relative newcomers. Either way, they earned the respect of collaboration members for their abilities. They proved themselves adept at attracting key players to their collaboration and expanding its membership. They established good lines of

Factors That Influenced the Outcomes of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Projects

communication with collaboration members. They also were flexible and adaptable, remaining open to new opportunities, such as those offered by the presence of complementary initiatives.

- **Leadership stability.** Considering the duration of the SK/SS initiative, project leadership was remarkably stable. Burlington and Huntsville retained the same project directors throughout implementation. Kansas City had just one change of project director, with a transition period during which the old and new project directors split the management responsibilities. Sault Ste. Marie also had one change of director, which occurred while planning was still underway, but kept the same project facilitator throughout. Toledo is the only site that underwent several leadership changes.
- **Development of a process and structures that supported collaboration.** The collaboratives, buttressed by skilled leadership, evolved several features that made them viable over the long haul.
 - The collaboratives fostered an atmosphere of mutual respect, trust, and openness to different points of view.
 - They took seriously the requirement to build a diverse membership.
 - They fostered a common vision and sense of unique purpose.
 - Their governance and committee structures fostered good communication among members, as did the informal relationships that developed out of specific implementation activities.
 - The collaboratives provided opportunities for involvement in multiple ways and by multiple levels of staff, although line staff were not involved on a broad scale at most sites.
 - The collaboratives fostered shared leadership and ownership of project activities.
- **Sustained commitment from key partners.** Initial commitments to participate were important in getting SK/SS off the ground, but the sites successfully sustained commitments over time. Many individuals have participated in SK/SS for years, providing a stable core of institutional memory. Most of the organizations that participated originally are still involved, although their individual representatives have changed over the years and have been joined by new collaboration members. In fact, it has been fairly unusual for agencies to drop out, although levels of participation sometimes waxed and waned—often for reasons largely unrelated to the SK/SS project.

Factors That Influenced the Outcomes of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Projects

Factors That Presented Obstacles

While the positives greatly outweighed the negatives, the projects faced some significant obstacles or challenges. They included:

- **A preoccupation with service strategies as the solution to local problems.** Except in Kansas City, which heavily emphasized policy and procedural reform from the outset, the SK/SS sites focused much of their initial attention on filling gaps in services. In response, OJP directed much of its TA and support toward achieving a better balance between service-oriented strategies and strategies centering on reforms to policy, procedures, and practices and resource reallocation.
- **Limitations in local data systems and evaluation capabilities.** Only two of the sites – Kansas City and Huntsville – had evaluation expertise available when the project began. Most of the grantees lacked experience with data-driven decisionmaking and did not have evaluation expertise available when they began. And to some extent, all sites were hampered by local data systems ill-equipped to help assess the community’s problems and needs, determine the effects of project activities, or facilitate shared decisions in cases where specific children’s welfare was at stake.
- **Turnover in leadership positions at key agencies.** All the projects dealt with turnover at leadership levels of the partner agencies. Often, the long-run consequences were positive, but turnover presented challenges in the short run—especially when it involved agencies from the formal child protection system (especially CPS) or, in Sault Ste. Marie, changes in the Tribe’s senior management. At the very least, such turnover slowed implementation of specific activities that depended on the new leader’s support. Over time, project staff became fairly adept at orienting new leaders and shifting attention to other priorities until they had settled in.
- **Absent or intermittent partners.** Although SK/SS enjoyed a high level of commitment overall, most sites had some trouble getting and keeping one or more of the agency partners at the table. For example, in Kansas City, it took years to get stable participation from the school system and even then the involvement was limited to attending some Council meetings. In Sault Ste. Marie, law enforcement never really became engaged. In Burlington, organizations that represented people of color and refugees, respectively, were only intermittent participants in the governing council. It is hard to generalize about the reasons for this. Sometimes, agencies were in turmoil or were simply stretched too thin.

Factors That Influenced the Outcomes of the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Projects

- **Limited involvement by neighborhood representatives, parents, consumers, and other nontraditional partners.** While most sites appeared to genuinely want more nontraditional participation in their collaborations⁵⁶ and tried to nurture it, none invested heavily in the effort. Kansas City had an advantage because it focused on an urban target area with several established neighborhood organizations. Staff found it relatively easy to recruit Council members from these groups. But in general, the sites made some gains in this area but never fully realized OJP’s vision. Admittedly, involving nontraditional groups is not easy. Parents and other nontraditional partners must be sold on the idea that it is in their interest to participate and be given support (e.g., through training, financial assistance, if needed, and accessible meeting times and places). Traditional partners need convincing, too, not just about the benefits of bringing nontraditional partners to the table, but also about the fact that considerable resources may be needed to get them there and develop effective working relationships. Sites had not yet made the level of investments necessary to achieve the full integration of nontraditional partners.
- **Belated attention to sustainability planning.** Despite persistent encouragement from OJP and TA consultants to begin sustainability planning long before Federal funding ended, for the most part, the sites did not get serious about it until 2001 or later.
- **“Turf issues.”** Turf issues are a natural byproduct of collaborative enterprises, and arguably can even be healthy, if overcome. For SK/SS, as noted earlier, turf issues rarely rose to the level of “turf battles,” but they did slow progress on some specific activities. A majority of stakeholders in both Kansas City and Toledo identified turf issues as significant challenges as late as 2003. In general, **though**, turf issues tended to occur during the earlier stages of program development. Interestingly, they did not **involve** the control of project dollars (or at least not in any obvious way).⁵⁷
- **The economy.** By 2003, the sites were facing a very different economy from the one in which the project began. Public and private agencies and foundations were all feeling the pinch. The Kansas City project was the first to feel the brunt, because the economic downturn produced local cutbacks in public sector staff just as EOWS unexpectedly reduced the project’s SK/SS award. The Huntsville and Burlington sites also confronted state cutbacks in social service programs. At all sites, the situation certainly complicated sustainability planning. To some degree, it also took time from other activities, as collaboratives or their staff framed responses to and advocated against state decisions.

⁵⁶ Insofar as parents and consumers are concerned, Sault Ste. Marie was an exception. Many project partners believed community members were adequately represented by agency staff who were themselves Tribal members and users of Tribal services. Also, community members could voice their concerns directly to elected Tribal representatives at open Tribal Board of Directors meetings.

⁵⁷ None of the collaboratives directly advocated changes in the way the community allocated resources for children and families during the time that we studied them; we suspect that would have provoked greater conflict.

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Other Factors

There were a couple of factors that we had expected to be influential, but were mixed or uncertain in their effects on SK/SS. These include:

- **Child fatalities.** In 1999, there were highly publicized child abuse fatalities in Burlington and Kansas City. These events brought increased community attention to the problems of child abuse and neglect and a greater sense of urgency. But in both sites, the events also produced turmoil in the CPS agencies, which delayed some SK/SS activities while leadership transitions took place. In Kansas City, the events had the further effect of precipitating troublesome turf conflicts between SK/SS and another local agency (described earlier).
- **Resource factors.** Although the SK/SS awards and the resources of the grantee agencies differed significantly, neither factor seemed to play a definitive role in the outcomes achieved. At least, we cannot see any evidence that the low level of funding in Toledo or the small agency budget in Burlington made them less able to realize the SK/SS vision. It appears that all the projects had enough resources to do the job—to staff the collaborative, bring people to the table, and implement or enhance some programs that were highly valued by stakeholders. In Toledo, one could argue that the limited award of seed money caused the project to develop a stronger system reform agenda than called for in its original proposal (which focused on services) and to attend to sustainability somewhat earlier than other sites. In Kansas City, the project had a major budget cut midway through implementation, yet continued to make progress by rearranging priorities and leveraging additional local resources. Many project activities—efforts to change agency policies, improve information sharing, etc.—needed staff and stakeholder time more than dollars. Certainly, more money can buy a bigger staff, more services, and a more ambitious evaluation. However, it is important to note that the original funding formula for SK/SS—large awards to the “urban” sites and smaller ones to rural and Tribal ones—probably assumed a greater correlation between population size and need than actually exists. Many SK/SS efforts, especially in the areas of system reform and public awareness, take about the same amount of time in a small community as a large one. About the same number of agencies must come to the table wherever the table is situated.

8. Conclusions, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

Summarizing 6 years of a demonstration program as multifaceted as SK/SS is a daunting task. In previous chapters, we described the goals and structure of the program, its achievements, and its challenges. We also summarized the factors that affected program development and outcomes across sites. In this chapter, we reflect on the successes of the SK/SS initiative overall and derive lessons for other jurisdictions and for sponsors who are contemplating similar efforts.

The Achievements of Safe Kids/Safe Streets

Each of the sites successfully developed comprehensive community collaboratives to promote a system reform agenda. Their efforts moved them beyond the goals of the lead agency or any partner agency and broadened the community's concept of the child protection system to encompass partners well beyond traditional boundaries. The projects accomplished this while integrating activities across the four SK/SS program elements—system reform, continuum of services, data collection and evaluation, and prevention education. This work took time (which varied considerably across sites), energy, and tenacity—from the lead agencies and stakeholders involved, and from OJP, which labored to hold sites to the conceptual bases of the initiative.

The projects and stakeholders deserve credit for maintaining and expanding the commitment of collaborative members throughout a long planning process, some difficult misunderstandings between OJP and individual projects, and a lengthy implementation period. Further, the projects' accomplishments were realized in a constantly changing environment—characterized by OJP's periodic introduction of new emphases or strategies, turnover in site personnel and elected officials, new grants to the communities, a shifting economy, and the tragedy of child fatalities. In short, the SK/SS experiment required considerable adaptability, and the projects responded skillfully.

While collaborative approaches have been successfully used in other arenas, the SK/SS initiative represents the most comprehensive application in the child maltreatment field. It succeeded in building broad-based collaboratives around child abuse and neglect issues in five very different communities. The five collaboratives enabled their communities to forge

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stronger relationships between agencies and focus on system reform issues. They also engaged a broad spectrum of stakeholders, exceeding the core membership requirements of OJP, although falling short of fully integrating nontraditional partners, especially residents and clients. Further, these collaboratives shared responsibility, accountability, and to a lesser extent resources. Efforts to share resources continued to build at the close of our data collection, as sites faced the challenge of sustainability.

Lessons Learned

OJP designed SK/SS as a demonstration, intending that other communities and sponsors would learn from the SK/SS experience. Many of the lessons learned were positive, testifying to the strength of the original design and the approach to implementation.

First, the SK/SS approach can succeed in a wide range of communities. The SK/SS sites ranged from rural and Tribal areas to mid-size cities. It adapted to environments with differing demographics and resource levels, was implemented by a variety of agency types, and made progress at annual funding levels from \$125,000 to over \$800,000.

However, some community conditions will make success more likely. OJP favored communities with existing capacity and infrastructure, “friendly” legislation and policies, and a readiness to undertake system reform—with good results. In particular, we would highlight the importance of a lead agency with leadership experience, content expertise, and credibility in the community. Ideally, the agency will also have an existing collaborative on which to build and be seen as a neutral party. Where the latter elements are absent, the community can expect to spend more time collaboration-building and agenda-setting. Sault Ste. Marie’s lead agency, for example, suffered on both counts; it had no standing collaborative, and it was responsible for child protective services. Huntsville’s NCAC had a collaboration in place, but as a leading service provider and one of the largest agencies in the community, it was not perceived as “neutral.”

Flexibility in program oversight and design can help programs overcome barriers, weather false starts, and adapt to new challenges and opportunities. OJP established a broad vision and held to some key principles, but allowed sites considerable latitude to find the right mix of activities for their own communities. We do not believe any other approach could have accommodated the wide range of community circumstances and

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stakeholder priorities. Sometimes plans just don't work out, despite good faith efforts. For example, Huntsville tried several models for bringing services to neighborhoods before settling on The Circle Project, using a full-service school model. Kansas City's initial MDT was abandoned and replaced by a different model, linked to the existing CAC. Burlington stopped its CAC services and restarted with different targeting criteria.

Also, sites need the freedom to be opportunistic. These days, many communities have multiple collaboratives, with new ones emerging all the time. The SK/SS sites profited from aligning themselves with other collaboratives, even though initially the payoff may have been uncertain. For example, Toledo's involvement with the Comprehensive Strategies Program brought stronger alliances between the child welfare and law enforcement/court arenas. In Burlington, the relationship between SK/SS and the Family Court Permanency Planning Project resulted in both service enhancements and joint data collection efforts.

“Good Ideas”

Aside from these lessons, **the SK/SS project yielded a wealth of good ideas about strategies, tactics, and activities that should help other communities** build collaborations and increase the organizational capacity of agencies within the child protection system. SK/SS demonstrated that in building collaborations:

- Governance structures will probably need fine-tuning over time. Major restructuring (as occurred in Huntsville and Sault Ste. Marie) may even be desirable to bring in new partners, accommodate new political realities, and/or make the most effective use of resources.
- Community meetings can be an excellent way to broaden participation in setting an agenda and recruit people to more active roles in the collaborative. Workgroups and committees can play a similar role, ensuring that both the work of the collaborative and the credit for its accomplishments are widely shared.
- Redistributing project funds through grants can bring key stakeholders to the table and enhance legitimacy in the community, especially if stakeholders decide how to allocate the funds. Additional benefits may come from a competitive funding process that heavily involves stakeholders in proposal reviews. Burlington and Kansas City found that this helped build capacity both to write proposals and to think critically about how specific projects/approaches could contribute to broader goals for system reform.

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- Communities need not be overly concerned about turf issues derailing an entire initiative. Certainly, turf conflict may slow some specific efforts. Given a broad agenda, however, the initiative can still progress in other areas and give stakeholders who are at odds on some parts of the agenda time to find common ground elsewhere. SK/SS also demonstrates that some turf issues can be tackled directly and moderated through team-building training (as happened for CACs in several sites).
- Rather than rush the initial planning process, sites should consider implementing a few efforts about which there is strong stakeholder consensus while planning is still underway. In every SK/SS site, this helped ease frustration and sustain stakeholder commitment. Even efforts as small as Family Fun Nights conducted in Sault Ste. Marie can build support for planning and bring visibility to the project.
- It pays to periodically revisit initial plans and resource allocations with a critical eye. As noted above, early plans sometimes founder and community circumstances change. A return to strategic planning can re-energize stakeholders by bringing forth new ideas and initiatives. Burlington's development of statewide mandatory reporter training was one such idea. Toledo's decision to shift funding from direct services to training and coordination for Building Healthy Families was another idea.

In the system reform area, the SK/SS sites demonstrated the potential for increasing the personal and professional capacities of those involved with the child protection system. The majority of stakeholders reported that participating in SK/SS resulted in personal benefits such as making new contacts, receiving training, or improving their ability to do their job. Most stakeholders also credited SK/SS with affecting their own organization's work environment by improving both interagency and community communication and the information available to make decisions. In the 2002 Survey of Agency Personnel, over three-fourths of the frontline workers and mid-level agency staff also reported increased contact with other agencies. These agency staff reported improvements in interagency communication, knowledge of child abuse resources, and the child protection system itself. Several different strategies and tactics contributed to this result at the SK/SS sites, which included using:

- A tiered approach to governance that provided myriad opportunities for people to work together on governing councils, committees, and other work groups in all sites. In most sites, community meetings also allowed less active collaboration members to enlarge their range of contacts.
- Service grants to promote stronger relationships among agencies. Sometimes, agency personnel were placed in new locations—for example, Huntsville's Community Liaison from DHR was located in the community and made monthly trips on the bus route servicing DHR. Often, new services strengthened referral relationships or created new ones. In Sault Ste. Marie,

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the Family Service Team/Wraparound Program expanded such referrals, particularly in the underserved rural Western service area. Burlington and Kansas City held regular meetings for their grantees to help promote working relationships among them. The Contract Providers Committee for Toledo's Help Me Grow served a similar function.

- Cross-agency training opportunities at all sites. Cross-agency training is an excellent way to make sure the same information is provided consistently to staff across the community's child protection system and helps participants get to know one another better. But some of the training was explicitly designed to promote closer working relationships. For example, Kansas City brought CPS staff, domestic violence providers, and law enforcement together for cross-disciplinary training. Burlington started the Building Bridges Workshops, held at a different agency each month.

Closer collaboration between the domestic violence and child protection communities was a particularly noteworthy result of such efforts in several sites. Two-thirds of all stakeholders said that SK/SS had improved multiagency responses to children affected by domestic violence—the second most frequently reported effect (after improving communication among those who deal with child abuse and neglect).

In addition to greatly expanding cross-agency training opportunities, SK/SS endeavored to sustain them through products such as training curricula, toolkits, and videos. For example,

- Sault Ste. Marie turned its training for mandated reporters into a self-administered tutorial and required it for all new Tribal employees.
- Kansas City's training curriculum on Medical Aspects of Child Abuse and Neglect was mandated for CPS workers and conducted by the local children's hospital.
- Huntsville's *Resources 101*, the monthly orientation on community resources, was required for new staff at CPS and Healthy Families.

Other communities would do well to look for similar opportunities to conduct cross-agency training and to embed training into local systems.

The sites also sponsored some training for community members at large, often in partnership with collaborating agencies. The Community Healing Process in Sault Ste. Marie was especially ambitious, consisting of a multiyear training open to the entire Tribe and designed to infuse cultural values and practices throughout Tribal programs. Admittedly, the

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environment was somewhat unique, involving a small, well-defined community of Tribal members, and the content was tailored to a Tribal audience. However, it suggests that other small communities (or perhaps a small target area within a larger city) could attempt a broad-based training.

The Community Healing Process in Sault Ste. Marie was the most comprehensive effort to promote cultural competence. However, other sites used tactics that would be adaptable to a wide variety of communities:

- Several sites offered training to make practitioners more culturally sensitive. For example, Huntsville inaugurated a popular brown bag luncheon series called Diversity Schoolhouse, which four other communities emulated.
- Burlington required prospective grantees to demonstrate how they were addressing cultural competence issues in their grant applications.
- Kansas City took a distinctive route. Its small Capacity Building and Prevention Grants, designed to build community capacity for prevention programming, were also intended to engage more diverse service providers, including neighborhood-based and grassroots organizations.

Perhaps the most impressive system reform efforts at the SK/SS sites involved creating new agency structures for case handling, improving existing structures, and changing policies and procedures to improve case processing and outcomes. Other sites might look to these examples for inspiration. For example:

- Two sites (Burlington and Huntsville) implemented new prosecution units.
- Four sites started Drug Courts (Huntsville, Kansas City, Sault Ste. Marie, and Toledo).
- Three sites (Huntsville, Kansas City, and Toledo) started or expanded law enforcement units to handle child maltreatment and domestic violence.
- The two sites that lacked Children’s Advocacy Centers (CACs) at the outset (Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie) started them.
- The other three sites made a variety of improvements in the training, procedures, and MDT arrangements for their existing CACs.
- Burlington upgraded and expanded MDTs for at-risk or “gray area” families. It also improved resources and facilities for forensic examinations of sexual assault victims.

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- Kansas City and Toledo were especially active in developing new protocols, procedures, and guidelines. For example, Kansas City established protocols for filing court cases on drug-exposed infants and adopted new structured decisionmaking tools for CPS, while Toledo developed permanency planning protocols for Juvenile Court and new pediatric sexual assault guidelines.

Most of these changes do not depend on SK/SS funds for their continuation. The exceptions are the new CACs in Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie, which had not yet established a secure funding base.

Most sites also successfully filled service gaps and facilitated greater access to services. Except for Kansas City, sites made gaps in the continuum of services their highest priority during the early phases of implementation. The services funded ran the gamut from prevention to treatment. Throughout implementation, the SK/SS projects also emphasized coordinated and wraparound services. Additionally, SK/SS projects used technical assistance, training, and other strategies to build the capacity of service providers to continue valued services in the post-SK/SS era. Several programs had already transitioned to other sources of funding—among them, the majority of the service programs in Burlington, Toledo’s home visitation program, and Huntsville’s First Responders and Parents as Teachers programs. These programs and others are described in more detail in Volume II.

In most sites, we were just beginning to see significant progress in data collection and local evaluation as of June 2003. The comparatively modest efforts in this arena reflect the fact that most sites made it a relatively low priority. Nonetheless, across sites, we observed:

- Increased local capacity to collect and use data; and
- Greater recognition of the need for and utility of data to inform decisions and priorities and track program progress.

In part, these initiatives were emphasized because of efforts to get additional funding to sustain programs; new sponsors wanted to see the evidence that improvements had been achieved.

Although no site implemented a comprehensive interagency MIS, Toledo was in the early stages of two such efforts—one to track victims seen in the emergency room and the other for home visitation clients—and Kansas City was taking a second look at the possibilities. All sites did make some cross-agency improvements in electronic data sharing and information-sharing. For example, Kansas City and Huntsville improved the technology for interagency e-

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mail and cross-agency access to data. Burlington backed development of a new database for serious sexual and physical abuse cases in Burlington, which was accessible to law enforcement and SRS investigators as well as prosecutors at the CAC location. Sault Ste. Marie was working on a plan to share selected information across agencies serving substance abuse clients.

Because the accomplishments were so modest in the data collection and MIS areas, the primary lessons of SK/SS relate mostly to process and resources. We believe that other jurisdictions would do well to seek expert advice and on-site TA early, in two areas:

- The use of results-based accountability approaches, which focus on data-driven decisionmaking and identification of clear, measurable outcomes.
- Integration of data systems. Such TA could help jurisdictions understand the full range of MIS options, from simple low-tech to cutting edge, the latest approaches to coping with confidentiality concerns, and how system changes could be phased in.

In fact, SK/SS sites received such TA, but too late to strongly affect their agendas in the time period we observed. Early TA would help a jurisdiction do a better job of planning its overall agenda and allocating sufficient resources to data collection and data integration efforts.

At most sites, initially modest prevention education efforts matured into more comprehensive strategies as the programs developed, though funding allocations typically remained modest.

- The sites developed a wide array of resource materials, from sophisticated on-line information systems in Sault Ste. Marie and Huntsville to service directories, brochures, newsletters, community calendars, and other printed materials at all sites.
- All sites participated in many neighborhood and community events.
- All sites produced or supported multimedia—radio, television, print, billboards—campaigns about child abuse and family violence. The campaign in Sault Ste. Marie earned national recognition.
- Kansas City provided grants to community-based organizations to build grassroots capacity and develop targeted awareness efforts.

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Many of these activities may be appealing to other communities and are described in more detail in Volume II. The overarching lesson for other communities, we believe, is to link prevention education efforts to the overall objectives of the initiative.

Recommendations for Sponsors

While local jurisdictions can undertake comprehensive, collaborative efforts on their own, it is likely that outside sponsors will continue to play a significant role in promoting such initiatives. We believe that the SK/SS experience overwhelmingly demonstrates that they are worthwhile investments. Capitalizing on the benefits of 20-20 hindsight, below we make recommendations in five areas where we see potential for improving comprehensive, communitywide, and collaborative system reform efforts. Each of these recommendations is based on our observations of sites over time and is not related to discrete incidents at a particular site.⁵⁸

Timing

Building true collaborations, even where the community has the infrastructure, takes a long time. It takes even longer to bring about system reform. As OJP eventually did, sponsors of new initiatives or communities initiating their own system reform agenda should be attentive to the timing issues at all stages of the program—planning, implementation, and achieving outcomes. We recommend the following:

- **Allow 9 to 12 months for project planning and initial collaboration building.** Sponsors should also be prepared to release small amounts of implementation funds during planning for activities about which there is consensus. This will maintain stakeholder interest, provide an opportunity for some early successes, and diminish stakeholder frustration with long planning efforts.
- **Plan for an extended demonstration period (8 to 10 years), including a transitional period of stepped-down funding.** The length of the demonstration will depend on a number of local factors—readiness to take on system reform, the status of collaboration, strategies selected, barriers encountered, and targeted outcomes. For national initiatives, assume variation in the pace of development across sites.

⁵⁸ Many of the lessons learned outlined in this chapter were informed not just by our own work, but by the March 2003 cluster conference, in which site personnel and stakeholders, TA providers, OJP program officers, and national evaluators reflected on the program experience and shared recommendations.

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- **Develop detailed timelines for accomplishing key activities and achieving the specified outcomes at the project level.** The project timeline should reflect a consensus from collaborative stakeholders about what is possible when and include recognizable milestones. The purpose is not to provide a straitjacket for project activity, or prevent it from responding to unexpected opportunities, but rather to help sites make realistic plans, judge their progress, and make necessary adjustments.

SK/SS was sufficiently flexible to permit a planning period longer than the expected 6 months and an implementation period greater than 5 years. OJP also released implementation funds incrementally during planning to address pressing community concerns and make the lengthy planning more tolerable. By adopting a longer time horizon from the outset, communities and sponsors undertaking similar projects can develop better plans, built upon more realistic projections about funding support, and reduce frustration among participants.

Achieving Balance

Comprehensive initiatives require a delicate balancing act on a number of fronts. First, system reform and direct services are often in a tug of war for attention and resources.⁵⁹ In SK/SS, service funding played an important role in bringing collaborators to the table and creating the relationships that made other accomplishments possible. But at times, it threatened to overwhelm the rest of the agenda, and OJP had to be vigilant in defending the system reform side. To ease the tension around this issue, we recommend that sponsors of similar initiatives do the following:

- **Provide guidelines on expenditures.** At the application and planning stages, make recommendations about the appropriate balance between investments in system reform activities and expenditures for new or expanded services and suggest how those investments should change over time. Require applicants to document and justify any requests for waivers to guidelines.
- **Require projects to explicitly address the role of services in the overall effort,** by answering questions like the following:
 1. How will investments in specific services help improve community or systemic policies and practices?

⁵⁹ Annie E. Casey Foundation, *The Path of Most Resistance: Reflections on Lessons Learned From New Futures*, 1995, Baltimore, MD: Author, 1999.

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2. What will it take to sustain such services when grant funds are no longer available?
3. If a particular service initiative is unlikely to have systemic impact, what other objectives will it serve (e.g., strengthening community capacity, bringing missing voices to the table, addressing community concerns)?
4. How can direct service initiatives help promote best practices, such as cultural competence, family-centered practice, and service coordination/integration?

Second, collaboration building requires bringing a wide variety of agencies, communities, groups, and individuals to the table. It further demands that representatives at different levels (directors, midlevel, and frontline) participate. Some of these participants are easier to bring on board than others, but the collaborative cannot afford to be dominated only by those who sign on readily. SK/SS taught us that collaboratives find it particularly challenging to include nontraditional partners, including representatives of organized groups and individuals with different ethnicity, culture, and experience from agency professionals. Future funders should:

- Help projects identify nontraditional partners during the early planning stages and strategize about how to secure their involvement.
- Assist with the initial costs of involving nontraditional groups (identification and recruitment, training, and facilitation).
- Require sites to budget for the continuing costs of involving nontraditional partners, including ongoing training/orientation and measures to defray the costs of participation for these individuals (transportation, babysitting, etc.).

Finally, in addition to guidelines for balancing expenditures between system reform and services, we suggest that sponsors consider broad funding guidelines for other aspects of implementation—particularly local evaluation, public education, and working with nontraditional groups. In SK/SS, these areas were underfunded at most sites, and we suspect the same pattern would be likely to occur with other comprehensive programs. Such guidelines should:

- Reflect the importance of the various program elements to the underlying rationale of the program.
- Recognize that resource needs are only loosely correlated with the size of the jurisdiction involved. Activities such as collaboration building and evaluation design may cost about the same whether a community is large or

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small. Smaller or more remote jurisdictions (like Burlington and Sault Ste. Marie) may face disproportionate training costs because fewer resources are available locally, and airfares to off-site training are higher than for larger urban jurisdictions.

Recommendations for Technical Assistance

TA is critical to the success of such programs. It is needed during planning, implementation, and transition to non-Federal/sponsored funding.

Planning

While OJP recognized the importance of TA for SK/SS, it underestimated the level of guidance that sites would need to transform their proposals (which OJP viewed more as statements of capability than blueprints for action) into acceptable Implementation Plans. OJP recognized and remedied this mistake fairly early, but not before sites had wasted valuable resources going in the wrong direction. Indeed, TA support proved to be essential throughout the project history, although the emphasis of the assistance changed. Based on this experience, we recommend involving an experienced TA team from the outset to assist sites directly and coordinate access to additional support. As OJP did, sponsors might require sites to set aside a portion of their funding exclusively for purchasing TA and training. TA during planning should:

- **Encompass both the content of Implementation Plans and the process for eliciting collaborative, community, and sponsor input.**
- **Build a common understanding of “system reform” for local agencies and community members.** The SK/SS experience suggests that this understanding cannot be taken for granted. TA providers may also need to help sites translate the concept of system reform into concrete programs and strategies and identify best practices in various program areas.
- **Provide guidance on data-driven decisionmaking and results-based accountability.**
- **Assist collaboratives in identifying missing partners and strategizing to bring them on board if necessary.**
- **Schedule at least one meeting that focuses mostly on expectations for the planning process and the content of the Implementation Plans.** This meeting should include all members of the national team (sponsors, TA providers, and evaluators). OJP’s introductory cluster meeting covered a

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wide range of issues—the history of the initiative, administrative issues related to cooperative agreements and budgets, evaluation, and the TA available through other OJP offices. Rather than overwhelm new grantees at the first meeting, convene a second meeting (or hold local meetings at each site with staff and stakeholders) to more directly address the planning process, outline sponsor expectations and requirements, and help both sponsor and site reach agreement about what variations in approach are consistent with the sponsor’s overarching vision.

Such TA and meetings should help to avoid misinterpretations of project requirements and flag issues needing further negotiation before plans are fully drafted.

We commend the development of Implementation Plans for the SK/SS initiative; however, we also have some specific recommendations for these plans:

- **Shorter is not necessarily better.** While we recognize the desire to avoid burdening sites unnecessarily, SK/SS’s requirement of 30-page plans was probably a mistake. Most sites found themselves responding to numerous questions and developing additional documentation before they were cleared to proceed.
- **Include logic models.** For SK/SS, the national evaluators developed a logic model for each site based on its draft Implementation Plan. We believe that sites would benefit from developing their own logic models, with support from TA providers or evaluation staff. These models or some variation thereof are a cornerstone of results-based accountability approaches. They ensure that collaboratives are explicit about what they hope to accomplish and about the linkages between the activities they have chosen and the outcomes they expect in the short, intermediate, and longer term. The logic models would also lay the groundwork for the discussion of how to measure these outcomes.
- **Require projects to estimate the number of person-days of staff effort needed for each major activity or strategy.** This should help projects identify areas where their objectives and timetables are unrealistic or will require substantial support from others.
- **Include plans for sustaining efforts and accomplishments.** These plans should go beyond general statements about the intention to carry on after Federal funding is gone. They should identify aspects of the project for which sustainability is a goal, levels of resources that might be required, sources, and steps that will be taken to access those resources over the long term. If some decisions about what to sustain will be deferred, the rationale for this and the criteria for later decisions should be stated. In other words,

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sites should begin elaborating a “theory of sustainability”⁶⁰ to accompany the theory of change embodied in their logic model. Also, by including such considerations in the planning documents, sponsors can address the supports needed to achieve sustainability well before sponsored funding expires.

Most sites would probably need TA to make best use of logic models and design sustainability plans, and some might need hands-on help with budgeting staff time realistically. However, including these additional elements in planning documents would yield more robust blueprints for action and support sustainability efforts.

Implementation

The SK/SS experience clearly demonstrates that TA is useful well beyond the planning stages. We recommend a couple of changes in TA tactics overall:

- **Conduct on-site conferences.** Overall, the cluster meetings proved to be a valuable method for delivering TA, and we commend OJP for rotating the meetings among sites and requesting that sites bring stakeholders to the meetings, not just project staff. However, travel costs precluded broad stakeholder attendance, and the individuals who did attend varied from conference to conference and brought very different levels of understanding and experience. While it would be costly, sponsors should consider making more use of local, site-specific meetings at key points in program development. For example, local meetings on planning, mid-project assessment, and sustainability might be especially useful, with presentations tailored somewhat to the particular site. Sponsors would reach a much larger audience with key program messages and demonstrate a commitment to collaboration with local stakeholders, not just project staff.
- **Revisit requirements and expectations.** We learned that repeating the message is needed for several reasons, which are likely to have parallels in other complex, long-term initiatives: (1) the SK/SS program was so broad that it was difficult to understand the implications of the different program elements at first (or even second) glance; (2) the program changed as new information became available on best practices or failures experienced elsewhere; (3) sites continued to bring new people and groups into their collaborations throughout the life of the program; and (4) new people joined the initiative on every level (project staff, Federal program officers, TA providers, and evaluators).
- **Adjust for the developmental needs of the projects.** In SK/SS, projects progressed at very different rates, and even projects at comparable stages of

⁶⁰ Cornerstone Consulting Group, *End Games: The Challenge of Sustainability*, Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2002: 18.

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development overall were often focusing on different priorities. Such variations may mean that sites do not always grasp the applicability of tools and concepts when they are first presented at cross-site meetings. TA should be tailored to the sites' stage of development and repeat or supplement what is delivered at cross-site sessions if necessary.

- **Explore the use of web-based tools to communicate the menu of TA resources available.** A web site could also provide examples of how these resources have been used successfully in the past, the approximate costs, and how to complete requests for sponsor-supported TA.

Transition From Federal/Sponsored Funding

The SK/SS TA team was just beginning to focus intensively on providing transitional assistance as we ended our data collection, although sustainability issues had been addressed at several earlier cluster conferences. However, it was clear that sites were looking for more assistance—around sustainability of the collaboratives themselves, their service reforms, and their service enhancements. TA providers are expecting to help collaboratives identify products and functions that might be supportable through non-Federal means and are stepping up TA on blended funding strategies. One site had also tapped TA funds to obtain sustainability consultation locally. We believe that future programs can be expected to have the same needs.

Recommendations for Developing a Learning Community

As mentioned in Chapter 2, OJP worked to foster a learning community in which lessons learned and other information could be shared on an ongoing basis. This involved monthly meetings with TA providers, program officers, and evaluators; quarterly conference calls with sites; conference calls on TA; and the cluster conferences themselves. The sites expanded on the concept, holding calls among themselves to discuss problems and experiences.

Clearly, communication is key to building a learning community. Future initiatives should particularly work to:

- **Clarify the message.** TA providers and program officers should work together at the beginning of the initiative to ensure that they are providing consistent messages about program requirements and clearly distinguishing them from suggestions or options that sites may choose to disregard. New requirements, based on new information from other projects and site experiences, should also be specifically discussed among all core staff. The

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more individuals involved and the broader the initiative, the more critical and time consuming these discussions will be.

- **Define the roles of all team members.** National team members (program officers, national evaluators, and TA providers) should meet early—prior to any cluster meetings, for example—to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities in the project.
- **Document key decisions.** OJP often used meetings or phone calls to clarify implementation issues or problems. After these encounters, the sites and program officers sometimes left the table believing that they had reached a consensus when in fact, they had not. Since the “consensus” went undocumented, the misunderstandings only became evident later. We recommend that sponsors circulate written minutes to participants after all substantive phone calls or meetings—if only in the form of a brief list of discussion points and decisions reached.
- **Include stakeholders in the loop.** Following the usual practice for grants, OJP program officers and TA providers communicated primarily with project staff. They tended to meet with stakeholders only when something was wrong. To some extent, communication practices have not caught up to the important role that stakeholders play in collaborative efforts. When a collaborative is successful, stakeholders do not just advise staff, they direct them. Sponsors might consider a variety of mechanisms to treat stakeholders as the full partners they are intended to be—such as copying governing council officers on all communication and holding on-site meetings at key points in program development, as recommended above. Another method would be to include representatives from the project’s governing council on quarterly conference calls with the other sites, program officers, TA providers, and evaluators to ensure that collaborative members are fully informed.

Recommendations for Evaluating Comprehensive Initiatives

Last, we address issues associated with evaluating comprehensive initiatives. Our recommendations apply to both local and national efforts. First for local evaluations, sponsors should:

- **Shift the emphasis of local evaluation from “impact evaluation” to building capacity for “results-based accountability.”** The difference is more than semantic, although many of the activities may be the same. By focusing on results-based accountability, evaluators would more likely stimulate improvements in local data systems and encourage more lasting commitment to data-based decisionmaking.

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- **Bring local evaluators on board to assist in planning.** If such assistance is not available locally (the ideal), sponsors may need to help sites find appropriate help elsewhere or fund the national evaluator to fill in.
- **Require local evaluators to connect with the collaborative (ideally through subcommittees).** SK/SS sites that formed committees to help develop their evaluation or other research efforts built both demand for data and the capacity for understanding and using it in decisionmaking.

For national evaluations, we suggest four areas of improvement. The sponsor and national evaluators should jointly:

- **Clarify roles and expectations early**, in two areas that were problematic under SK/SS, although they became less so over time. One area involves the national evaluator's role in the core team—especially, the extent to which evaluators should participate in core team decisions about project implementation and TA needs and reinforce messages from other members of the team. The other area involves the relationships between national and local evaluators—namely, how much the national evaluator should direct, oversee, assist in, or comment on the local work. We believe that a number of different scenarios could work, but the important point is to agree upon them up front.
- **Consider joint efforts between local and national evaluators earlier in the initiative.** Such efforts could include developing an initial logic model during the planning project, conducting joint surveys, and providing training on measuring progress and documenting results.
- **Sponsor early meetings/workshops between local and national evaluators.** Such meetings would be another form of the cluster conference but more narrowly targeted to the local evaluators, members of the collaboratives' local evaluation committees, and project directors. Topics could include measuring progress, documenting results, and examining ways to collect comparable data across sites. Following the development of the local evaluation plans, such a meeting could be used to discuss strengths and weaknesses of the plans and develop an overarching evaluation plan that interweaves local and national efforts. Such activities would foster working relationships with the national and local evaluators while meeting the requirements of both levels of evaluation.
- **More closely align the products of the national evaluation with the needs of the learning community.** Westat developed end-of-year reports that documented what had been learned through myriad sources that year. The reports took months to produce and review and were fairly academic in style. In retrospect, we believe reports to document planning efforts, mid-project review, and a final report would have sufficed. The resources saved could have been used for shorter interim reports primarily for the learning community, perhaps on special topics that would also provide information for the evaluation.

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Conclusion

We feel positive about the results of SK/SS and the changes that were and still may be achieved. We also recognize that such programs require a substantial investment. Following our recommendations would not reduce those costs. Developing a learning community (rather than funding a project) and partnering with communities (rather than monitoring programs) require more time and more money than traditional Federal programs. Further, all participants in the initiative must take on new partner roles, often working outside their own “comfort zones”:

- Program officers must balance the monitor and partner roles, allowing projects to develop as needed but keeping them on track with the original vision.
- Stakeholders must also become partners, leaving behind the role of “advisors” to work shoulder-to-shoulder with both project staff and volunteers.
- Project staff must step back to allow both the stakeholders and the program officers’ entry into decisionmaking on planning, implementing, and sustaining programs.
- TA providers must be prepared to address a wide range of topics and issues, as well as balance sponsor and stakeholder needs and demands.
- Evaluators must move from a traditional observer role to that of instructor and partner with the initiative.

More experience is needed from programs in operation now and those funded in the future to further define these new roles and approaches. In the meantime, OJP has made great strides in working with communities in a new way to realize system reform.

APPENDIX A

The Safe Kids/Safe Streets Logic Model




Figure A-1. Logic Model for the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Initiative

APPENDIX B

State Definitions, Reporting Requirements, and Mandatory Reporters

Table B-1. State Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect¹

Types of Abuse	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	Toledo, OH
Abuse	Abused or neglected child: A child whose physical health, psychological growth and development, or welfare is harmed or is at substantial risk of harm by the acts or omissions of his or her parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare; also a child who is sexually abused by any person; or who is at substantial risk of sexual abuse by any person. Harm can occur by nonaccidental physical injury or emotional maltreatment; failure to supply adequate food, clothing, shelter, or health care; or abandonment.	Harm or threatened harm to the health or welfare of a child through nonaccidental physical injury; non-accidental mental injury; sexual abuse or attempted sexual abuse; or sexual exploitation or attempted sexual exploitation.	Physical injury, sexual abuse, or emotional abuse inflicted on a child by nonaccidental means by those responsible for the child's care, custody, and control.	<p><u>State of Michigan</u></p> <p>Harm or threatened harm to the health or welfare of a child by a parent, legal guardian, or any other person responsible for the child's health or welfare or a teacher or teacher's aide; that occurs through nonaccidental physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or maltreatment.</p> <p><u>Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians</u> (Tribal Code 30.304, 1981, revised 2003)</p> <p>Abuse is the infliction of physical or mental injury including the failure to maintain reasonable care and treatment to such an extent that the child's health, morals, or emotional well being is endangered.</p>	<p>An abused child includes any child who:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Is the victim of sexual activity ▪ Is endangered as defined in the statute concerning endangering children ▪ Exhibits evidence of any physical or mental injury or death, inflicted by other than accidental means, or an injury or death which is at variance with the history given of it ▪ Because of the acts of his parents, guardian or custodian, suffers physical or mental injury that harms or threatens to harm the child's health or welfare ▪ Is subjected to out-of-home care child abuse.

¹ Excerpted from National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau (2002). *Child Abuse and Neglect State Statues Series/Compendium of Laws/Reporting Laws: Definition of Child Abuse and Neglect*. Unless otherwise noted, provisions for Sault Ste. Marie, MI are from Michigan state statutes.

Table B-1-. State Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect (continued)

Types of Abuse	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	Toledo, OH
Neglect ²	Combined with the definition of abuse above.	Negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child, including the failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter; medical treatment; or supervision.	Failure to provide, by those responsible for the care, custody, and control of the child the proper or necessary support; education as required by law; nutrition; medical or surgical care; or any other care necessary for the child's well-being.	<u>State of Michigan</u> ³ Harm or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare by a parent, legal guardian, or any other person responsible for the child's health or welfare that occurs through either of the following: negligent treatment, including the failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care; placing a child at unreasonable risk to the child's health or welfare by failure to intervene to eliminate that risk when that person is able to do so, and has, or should have, knowledge of the risk.	Defined as an act of omission or a pattern of care which fails to meet the minimum level of a child's basic physical needs when such failure harms a child or places a child at risk of harm.
² All five states exempt from the definition of neglect withholding specific medical treatment for a child because of legitimately practicing religious beliefs.					
³ There was no separate definition of neglect in the Tribal Code					

Table B-1. State Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect (continued)

Types of Abuse	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	Toledo, OH
Sexual Abuse	Any act(s) by any person involving sexual molestation or exploitation of a child, including incest, prostitution, rape, sodomy, or any lewd and lascivious conduct involving a child; or the aiding, abetting, counseling, hiring, or procuring of a child to perform or participate in any photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show, representation, or other presentation which, in whole or part, depicts sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse involving a child.	<p>Sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of any child to engage in, or having a child assist any other person to engage in any sexually explicit conduct or any simulation of the conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of the conduct; or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other forms of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.</p> <p>Sexual exploitation includes allowing, permitting, or encouraging a child to engage in prostitution; and allowing permitting, encouraging, or engaging in the obscene or pornographic photographing, filming, or depicting of a child for commercial purposes.</p>	No further breakdown other than that provided in the definition of abuse.	<p>Engaging in sexual contact (the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts; or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification) or sexual penetration (sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse; or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object in the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required) with a child.</p> <p>Sexual exploitation: allowing, permitting, or encouraging a child to engage in prostitution; or allowing permitting, encouraging, or engaging in the photographing, filming, or depicting of a child engaged in a listed sexual act.</p>	Defined as any acts of a sexual nature upon or with a child. The act may be for gratification of the perpetrator or of a third party or is the victim of “sexual activity” as defined under Chapter 2907. of the Ohio Revised Code, where such activity would constitute an offense under that chapter, except that the court need not find that any person has been convicted of the offense in order to find that the child is an abused child (from the Ohio Revised Code: 2151.031).

Table B-2. Mandatory Reporters, Circumstances for Reporting and Privileged Communication¹

Type of Reporter	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	Toledo, OH ²
Medical Personnel	Physicians, surgeons, osteopaths, chiropractors, or physicians' assistants who are licensed, certified, or registered; resident physicians; interns; hospital administrators in any hospital in the State; registered nurses; licensed practical nurses; medical examiners; dentists; other health care providers	Hospitals, clinics, doctors, physicians, surgeons, medical examiners, coroners, dentists, optometrists, osteopaths, chiropractors, podiatrists, nurses, pharmacists	Physicians, medical examiners, coroners, dentists, chiropractors, optometrists, podiatrists, residents, interns, nurses, hospital and clinic personnel (that are engaged in the examination, care, treatment, or research of persons), other health care practitioners	Physicians, coroners, dentists, registered dental hygienists, medical examiners, nurses, persons licensed to provide emergency medical care, audiologists	Physicians, hospital interns or resident, dentist, podiatrist, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, visiting nurse, coroner or other health care professional
School Personnel	School teachers, school superintendents, school librarians, day-care workers, school principals, school guidance counselors	School teachers and officials, day-care workers or employees	Day-care center workers or other child care workers, teachers, principals, other school officials	School administrators, school counselors, school teachers, regulated child care providers	School teacher; school employee, or school authority
Other Health Personnel	Psychologists, mental health professionals, social workers	Mental health professionals, social workers, sanitariums	Psychologists, mental health practitioners, social workers, Christian Science practitioners	Psychologists, marriage and family therapists, licensed professional counselors, certified social workers, social workers, social work technicians	Licensed psychologist, speech pathologist or audiologist, social worker, licensed professional counselor
Law Enforcement Personnel	Probation officers, police officers	Peace officers, law enforcement officials	Juvenile officers, probation officers, parole officers, peace officers, law enforcement officials	Law enforcement officers	Municipal and county peace officers, attorneys
Photographers	No mention	No mention	Commercial film and photographic print processors	No mention	No mention

¹ Excerpted from National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau (2002). *Child Abuse and Neglect State Statutes Series/Compendium of Laws/Reporting Laws: Definition of Child Abuse and Neglect*. Unless otherwise noted, provisions for Sault Ste. Marie, MI are from Michigan state statutes.

² Excerpted from *Child Abuse and Neglect: A Reference for the Community*. Second Addition. The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Office for Children and Families. February 2004.

Table B-2. Mandatory Reporters, Circumstances for Reporting and Privileged Communication (continued)

Type of Reporter	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	Toledo, OH
Other	Camp owners, camp administrators, camp counselors, clergy	Members of the clergy or any other persons called upon to render aid or medical assistance to any child, when the child is known or suspected to be a victim of child abuse or neglect ³	Clergy, internet service providers, other persons with responsibility for the care of children	Clergy	Administrator or employee of a certified child care agency, or other public or private children services agency; person rendering spiritual treatment through prayer in accordance with the tenets of a well-recognized religion
Circumstances	When they have reasonable cause to believe that any child has been abused or neglected.	When the child they are aiding is known or suspected to be a victim of child abuse or neglect.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. When they have reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been or may be subjected to abuse or neglect. 2. When they observe a child being subjected to conditions or circumstances which would reasonably result in abuse or neglect. 3. When they have reasonable cause to suspect that a child who is or may be under the age of 18, who is eligible to receive a certificate of live birth, has died. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. When they have reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect. 2. The pregnancy of a child less than 12 years of age or the presence of a venereal disease in a child who is over 1 month of age but less than 12 years of age shall be reasonable cause to suspect child abuse and neglect have occurred. 	When they have reason to believe that any child under 18, or any physically or mentally handicapped child under 21 has suffered any wound, injury, disability, or condition of such a nature as to indicate abuse or neglect

³ Alabama State Law 2003-272, March 2003.

Table B-2. Mandatory Reporters, Circumstances for Reporting and Privileged Communication (continued)

Type of Reporter	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	Toledo, OH
Circumstances (continued)			4. Commercial film and photographic print processors must report when they have knowledge of or observe within the scope of their professional capacity or employment, any film, photograph, videotape, negative, or slide depicting a child under the age of 17 years engaged in an act of sexual conduct.		
Privileged Communication	No mention	A member of the clergy shall not be required to report information gained solely in a confidential communication privileged pursuant to Rule 505 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence.	Any legally recognized privileged communication, except that between attorney and client, shall not apply to situations involving known or suspected child abuse or neglect and shall not constitute ground for failure to report as required or permitted.	Any legally recognized privileged communication except that between attorney and client is abrogated and shall neither constitute ground for excusing a report otherwise required to be made nor for excluding evidence in a civil child protective proceeding resulting from a report.	An attorney or physician is not mandated to report suspected child abuse or neglect if his suspicions are a result of a communication made to him in the attorney-client or physician-patient relationship unless: 1) the client/patient is under 18 or a physically or mentally handicapped child under 21; 2) the attorney or physician knows or suspects as a result of the communication or observation that the client/patient has been abused or neglected; and 3) the relationship does not arise out of the client/patient's attempt to have an abortion without notification of her parents.

Table B-3. Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Requirements for Mandatory Reporters¹

Reporting Requirements	Burlington, VT	Huntsville, AL	Kansas City, MO	Sault Ste. Marie, MI	Toledo, OH ²
Oral Report	Within 24 hours	Immediately	Immediately	Immediately	Immediately
Written Report	Must follow an oral report. Timeframe not specified.	Must follow oral report. Timeframe not specified.	No mention	Within 72 hours	May be required
Contents of Report	Name and address of the reporter; names and addresses of the child and the parents or other persons responsible for the child's care, if known; the age of the child; the nature and extent of the child's injuries; any evidence of previous abuse and neglect of the child or the child's sibling; any other information that the reporter believes might be helpful in establishing the cause of the injuries, establishing the reasons for the neglect, protecting the child, and assisting the family.	Child's name; child's whereabouts; names and addresses of child's parents, guardian, or caretaker; character and extent of the child's injuries; any evidence of previous injuries to the child; and any other pertinent information which might establish the cause of the child's injuries or the identity of the person(s) responsible for the child's injuries.	Names and addresses of the child and his parents or other persons responsible for his care, if known; the child's age, sex, and race; the nature and extent of the child's injuries, abuse, or neglect, including any evidence of previous injuries, abuse, or neglect to the child or his siblings; the name, age, and address of the person responsible for the injuries, abuse, or neglect, if known; family composition; the source of the report; the name and address of the reporter, his occupation, and where he can be reached; the actions taken by the reporting source, including the taking of color photographs, the making of radiologic examinations, the removal or keeping of the child, the notification of the coroner or medical examiner; and any other information that the reporter believes may be helpful.	Child's name; a description of the abuse or neglect; the names and addresses of the child's parents, the child's guardian, and the persons with whom the child resides; the child's age; and other information available to the reporter which might establish the cause of the abuse or neglect, and the manner in which it occurred.	Name, address, age of child; name and address of caretaker; name of person you suspect is abusing or neglecting child; reason you suspect abuse or neglect. Any other information reporter believes may be helpful. Reporter's name if he wants to give it.

¹ Excerpted from National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau (2002). *Child Abuse and Neglect State Statutes Series/Compendium of Laws/Reporting Laws: Definition of Child Abuse and Neglect*. Unless otherwise noted, provisions for Sault Ste. Marie, MI are from Michigan state statutes.

² Excerpted from *Child Abuse and Neglect: A Reference for the Community*. Second Addition. The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Office for Children and Families. February 2004.

APPENDIX C

Contacts for the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Sites

Contacts for the Safe Kids/Safe Streets Sites

Burlington, VT

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