




# National Evaluation of Weed & Seed

## Case Study



Salt Lake City,  
Utah  
Research  
Report



Executive Office for Weed & Seed



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# **National Evaluation of Weed and Seed**

## **Salt Lake City Case Study**

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# 1.0 Introduction

Unveiled in 1991, Operation Weed and Seed represents an ambitious attempt to improve the quality of life in America's cities. The ultimate goals of Weed and Seed are to control violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime in targeted high-crime neighborhoods and to provide a safe environment, free of crime and drug use, in which law-abiding citizens can live, work, and raise their families. Weed and Seed, administered by the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS), is grounded in the philosophy that targeted areas can best be improved by a two-pronged strategy of "weeding" out violent offenders, drug traffickers, and other criminals by removing them from the targeted area, and "seeding" the area with human services and neighborhood revitalization efforts. Community policing is intended to serve as the "bridge" between weeding and seeding.

Three key objectives emphasize the government-community partnership at the heart of Weed and Seed:

1. To **develop a comprehensive, multiagency strategy** to control and prevent violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime in targeted high-crime neighborhoods;
2. To **coordinate and integrate existing as well as new Federal, State, local, and private sector initiatives, criminal justice efforts, and human services**, concentrating those resources in the project sites to maximize their impact on reducing and preventing violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime; and
3. To **mobilize community residents** in the targeted sites to help law enforcement identify and remove violent offenders and drug traffickers from their neighborhoods and to assist other human service agencies to identify and respond to the service needs of the target area.

Weed and Seed sites thus draw on the resources of a variety of agencies at all levels of government, private and other public organizations, and individual community residents.

Specific strategies and program components designed to achieve these three objectives fall into one of four Weed and Seed program elements:

1. **Law enforcement.** Weed and Seed's law enforcement goals are the identification, arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of narcotics traffickers and violent criminals operating in the target area.
2. **Community policing.** An objective of community policing is to establish mutual trust between law enforcement and the public. This is the bridge between weeding and seeding: law enforcement officials enlist the community to identify patterns of criminal activity and locate perpetrators; simultaneously, police help the community solve problems.



3. **Prevention, intervention, and treatment.** This element of the program is intended to reduce risk factors and to enhance protective factors associated with drug abuse, violence, and crime in the target area. Safe havens in the target areas typically coordinate the prevention, intervention, and treatment activities.
4. **Neighborhood restoration.** The goal of this element is to enable residents in the target area to improve their community morale, their neighborhood’s physical appearance (buildings, parks, streets, lighting, and so forth), and local economic and business conditions.

An important structural feature of Weed and Seed is the local steering committee. EOWS requires each site to have a steering committee, formally chaired by the U.S. Attorney for the district in which the site is located, that is responsible for “establishing Weed and Seed’s goals and objectives, designing and developing programs, providing guidance on implementation, and assessing program achievement.”<sup>1</sup>

Steering committee members include representatives from key local, State, and Federal agencies, as well as other stakeholders in the Weed and Seed target area, such as business leaders, tenant association leaders, and community activists. The requirement to convene a steering committee reflects EOWS’s belief that, for neighborhood revitalization to work, all key stakeholders must participate in decisions that affect the target area.

Funded sites were divided into officially recognized sites and demonstration sites. Officially recognized sites had implemented Weed and Seed strategies in their jurisdiction, had submitted documentation summarizing their strategy to EOWS, but had not yet received full funding. After EOWS officially recognized the site, it was eligible for demonstration status and full Weed and Seed funding.

## 2.0 Case Study Objective and Methodology

This case study is one of eight completed for the National Evaluation of Weed and Seed, under the direction of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). In 1994, NIJ selected the following eight sites for the national evaluation:

- Hartford, Connecticut; Las Vegas, Nevada; Sarasota and Manatee Counties, Florida; and Shreveport, Louisiana, demonstration sites first received funding in FY 1994.
- Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Seattle, Washington, demonstration sites were awarded continuation funding in FY 1994.
- Akron, Ohio, and Salt Lake City, Utah, were officially recognized sites.

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1 Executive Office for Weed and Seed, “Operation Weed and Seed Implementation Manual,” p. 2–1.

Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Sarasota/Manatee, and Shreveport also received funds from the National Performance Review Laboratory (NPRL).<sup>2</sup>

This case study documents the activities implemented under the Weed and Seed program in Salt Lake City and assesses the program's impact at this site. The final evaluation report compares the eight sites and presents overall conclusions on the Weed and Seed program.

The evaluation activities undertaken for this case study include: (1) onsite observation of program activities; (2) inperson interviews with program staff, key law enforcement personnel, community leaders, service providers, and participants; (3) review of program documents; (4) a survey of target area residents; and (5) analysis of computerized crime and arrest records provided by the local police department.

## **3.0 Site History and Description**

### **3.1 City Characteristics**

The capital of Utah, Salt Lake City is not only the largest city in the state, but it is also an important urban resource for southern Idaho, eastern Nevada, and southwestern Wyoming. Located in Salt Lake Valley, the city covers 109 square miles in northern Utah at the southernmost point of the Great Salt Lake and has a population of 165,835. One-fourth of its residents are less than 18 years of age, which, along with an increasing gang presence, contributes to a high juvenile crime rate. The rate of serious crimes in Salt Lake City is also high, at 12,680 per 100,000 residents (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 1991). An influx of criminal groups from California and illegal immigrants from Mexico are reportedly responsible for an increase in drug trafficking within the city.

Salt Lake City has a larger crime problem than its external image might initially suggest. The city is known for its strong Mormon heritage, will host the Winter Olympic Games in 2002, and generally enjoys a reputation as a rather wholesome and family-oriented community. However, it has also experienced increasing crime and violence problems, most often associated with gang activity and illegal narcotics trafficking. Rates of nearly every Part 1 crime (except for burglary) increased dramatically between 1985 and 1995. According to figures reported by the FBI to the Salt Lake City Police Department, the city's average number of Part 1 crimes during the 2 years prior to its official recognition as a Weed and Seed site was nearly double the national average, at approximately 110 crimes per 1,000 people. According to local law enforcement personnel, much of this increase in violence is due to a dramatic increase in gang activity in the city. As reported by the Salt Lake Area Gang Project, gang membership increased by 116 percent between 1992 and 1995, with an estimated 3,104 gang members or affiliates in the greater Salt Lake City area. It was also estimated about half of these gang members actually reside within the city limits.

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2 The National Performance Review Task Force (now renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government) designated a number of governmental organizations or activities as National Performance Review Laboratories (now Reinvention Laboratories) to test "reinventing government" initiatives. These labs develop more efficient ways to deliver government services by creating new partnerships between entities, streamlining bureaucratic processes, and empowering organizations to make substantial changes. The Weed and Seed Reinvention Laboratory is designed to develop more effective mechanisms for combining and delivering Federal, State, and local resources in Weed and Seed sites.

In addition to gang-related problems, the city has also witnessed a decline in community quality of life as evidenced by increases in disorderly behavior, specifically prostitution and graffiti. The city's typical responses to these problems was to initiate some type of crackdown, deploying a large number of police officers to a particular area for a limited period of time. Issues of community quality of life were part of the 1995 mayoral campaign, in which both candidates promised vigorous crackdowns to address street-level disruptive behavior.

While the physical structure of neighborhoods in Salt Lake City can be characterized as low-density residential living, there are considerable pockets of poverty which suffer low rates of home ownership and the attendant problems of transience. These neighborhoods have traditionally been located on the western side of the city, often buffered from the larger city by industrial complexes. It is within these neighborhoods, local police argue, that crime has taken root, primarily in the form of drug sales and distribution.


### **3.2 Target Area Characteristics and Nature of the Crime Problem**

Salt Lake City's target area is comprised of three neighborhoods: Glendale, Poplar Grove, and a large part of Fairpark. (See exhibit 3.1 for a map of the target area.) Glendale and Poplar Grove were the initial areas of focus for the Weed and Seed efforts, with the Fairpark neighborhood being added later. The entire area is approximately 6.4 square miles and has a population of almost 22,000 residents, 13.3 percent of the city's total population. The target area contains 8,711 housing units, but 11 percent of these are vacant or boarded. Approximately 62.4 percent of the homes in the area are owner-occupied. Although unemployment in the target area is 6.4 percent, more than 25 percent of residents live below the poverty level. More than 10 percent of the residents receive public assistance, and more than 29 percent receive Social Security income. Approximately 20 percent fewer students graduated from high school in the target area in 1990 than was the statewide average for Utah.

The Glendale community has considerable home ownership and a large upper working class and lower middle class population and is seen as having more political power than Poplar Grove or Fairpark. Families in the Glendale area were reported as generally "intact," and the area has also seen a rise in single family home construction. In contrast to Glendale, residents of Poplar Grove and Fairpark were described as more transient, poorer, less well organized, with higher levels of gang- and drug-related violence. However, it is interesting to note each of the three areas appear quiet and residential to an outsider driving around the neighborhoods. While there are individual houses in visible need of repair, much of the area looks like a rather quiet residential area. Often the behaviors and problems the areas report belie the environmental cues about safety and order.

The primary crime problems in the area are complex drug processing, storage, and distributing operations, as well as gang-related crime. A significant number of structures in the neighborhood are used for the illegal narcotics industry. A high percentage of the drug traffickers seem to be illegal Mexican immigrants who are repeat offenders returning after deportation. Police found illegal Mexican immigrants were involved in 80 percent of the cases in which search warrants yielded drug arrests. The main drugs in this market are cocaine and heroin.

**Exhibit 3.1**  
**Salt Lake City Weed and Seed Target Area**



Salt Lake City's target area also has a disproportionately high percentage of gang members and dangerous fugitives. The Salt Lake Area Gang Project estimated in 1993 that 20 percent of the city's 2,143 gang members live in the target area. Further, the Violent Crimes Task Force reported one-third of the total number of listed dangerous fugitives were arrested in the target area in less than a 1-year period. In one 6-month period, 62 drive-by shootings occurred, 84 percent of the city's total for the same period.

### **3.3 Other Funding Sources**

Salt Lake City's original Weed and Seed application in 1994 was not funded. However, the city was selected as a National Performance Review Lab site in that same year. The NPRL program provided \$50,000 to five communities across the United States (Salt Lake City being one of them) to enhance neighborhood planning and grantsmanship and to increase support for community-based interventions. The National Performance Review Lab project had as its central goals:

- Identification of obstacles to local acquisition and use of Federal funding.
- Refinement of a Weed and Seed strategy for Salt Lake City.
- Measurement of local impacts.

Essentially, the NPRL effort was aimed at refining local planning to improve the city's future chances for being selected as a Weed and Seed site, as well as to help its communities clearly identify local resources that might be drawn into crime reduction planning and community improvement efforts.

Following its selection as an NPRL site, Salt Lake City was subsequently funded under the Comprehensive Communities Program, which has several of the community-building elements of the Weed and Seed program. Salt Lake's Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) began in 1995. (For complete details on CCP see BOTEK 94.) The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) provided the city with \$2.2 million for neighborhood crime prevention activities and to suppress and intervene in crime situations within its neighborhoods. A central feature of the CCP program in Salt Lake City was the creation of Community Action Teams (CAT), which were charged with neighborhood mobilization and problem solving.

CAT membership included governmental and nonprofit agencies working in targeted neighborhoods to address crime and public order problems. These teams have become a central feature of Salt Lake's community policing intervention. In addition to the CAT interventions, Salt Lake's CCP program also included a range of programs focused on at-risk youths. These programs typically were housed in existing youth-serving agencies such as the Boys and Girls Clubs, local community centers, and the schools. As will become apparent below, much of the Weed and Seed effort has followed the model outlined in CCP.

Two funding streams (NPRL and CCP) allowed Salt Lake City to implement elements of its Weed and Seed strategy in Glendale, Poplar Grove, and Fairpark before it received recognition or funding from the Weed and Seed Executive Office. As mentioned, much of the work in the early stages of the project was concentrated within the Glendale and Poplar Grove areas and was later expanded to include Fairpark.

In addition, Salt Lake City received a \$1 million grant in FY 1997 to be a community policing demonstration site. According to the Weed and Seed coordinator, some of the activities funded with that grant will be directed at the Weed and Seed target area.

In 1995 Salt Lake City was officially recognized as a Weed and Seed site and the city's Weed and Seed efforts merged with those of the NPRL and CCP to build stronger community alliances and improve community cohesion. Even prior to receiving Weed and Seed funding, Salt Lake City engaged neighborhoods in discussions about social and economic development and community safety. Many of these initiatives are visible within the Weed and Seed program in Salt Lake City, making it very difficult to disentangle the programs and strategies associated with CCP from those of Weed and Seed. This is primarily because the nature of these two efforts overlap and target many of the same communities within Salt Lake City.

## **4.0 Program Structure and Chronology**

### **4.1 Formal Organization and Structure**

Formally, the Weed and Seed program in Salt Lake City is attached to the U.S. Attorney's Office and overseen by a steering committee which attempts to meet quarterly to provide the initiative with oversight and policy direction. The committee is composed of representatives from the U.S. Attorney's Office, the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Salt Lake City Police Department (SLCPD), the district attorney and city prosecutor's office, Salt Lake City Capital Planning and Housing office, Salt Lake City Housing Authority, elected officials from the state legislature, city recreation programs (Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Salt Lake, Utah Crime Prevention Council, and so forth), and the community.

In addition to the steering committee, Salt Lake City has a Weed and Seed Management Committee and a number of working committees. The management committee meets regularly and is responsible for the initiative's day-to-day operation. The committee consists of the U.S. Attorney, the mayor of Salt Lake City, the police chief, and community representatives. The city has developed working committees for each of the four Weed and Seed strategy areas (law enforcement; neighborhood restoration; community oriented policing; and prevention, intervention, and treatment). These working committees involve the U.S. Attorney, the SLCPD, and the director of capital planning, as well as representatives from the target neighborhoods and law enforcement personnel from other Federal law enforcement agencies. It was originally intended that a law enforcement coordinator within the U.S. Attorney's Office would oversee and coordinate the Weed and Seed program. However, due to personnel shifts and the absence of a regular person in the U.S. Attorney's Office, much of the program's oversight has centered in the city prosecutor's office.

Functionally, the project is currently overseen by a Weed and Seed coordinator who works with the Salt Lake City prosecutor's office and is supported by staff from the mayor's Office of Community Affairs. The Weed and Seed coordinator appears to have more of a record keeping and general oversight role, while financial oversight for the project has centered in the mayor's office. Tactically, the chief of police oversees the weeding efforts, while the service provider (seeding) groups meet independently to coordinate their activities. The chief of police also oversees the coordination of police with other Federal agencies, most notably the DEA, FBI, and INS. These efforts are also coordinated through both the local prosecutor's office and the U.S. Attorney's Office.

## 4.2 Proposed Goals and Strategies

In Salt Lake City's original application (which was not funded), the stated objectives were to extend technical assistance for community mobilization and to empower the target areas by sponsoring Weed and Seed activities. In the next application, requesting funding for FY 1996, the major goals of the program were broken down by the four major Weed and Seed program elements:

- **Law enforcement**—reduce the level of violent criminal activity in the Weed and Seed areas through joint law enforcement activities.
- **Community policing**—implement more community oriented policing in the targeted Weed and Seed areas to improve and enhance relationships between beat officers, lead community oriented policing officers, the community, and local Community Action Teams.
- **Prevention, intervention, and treatment**—increase coordination and planning associated with community economic development, employment, and housing through the development of neighborhood revitalization plans.
- **Neighborhood restoration**—reduce risk factors while enhancing social programming for youths and families in the targeted Weed and Seed areas through improved case management of children and families, enhanced job training, and increased investments in a wide array of social, artistic, and cultural programs aimed at community youths.

In the most recent application for funding, FY 1997, the city sought to continue efforts to disrupt narcotics trafficking in the target areas. This disruption was aimed at several levels and involves various members of the law enforcement community. This effort strove to achieve the same four major goals detailed in the prior application.

During the first phase of the FY 1997 plan, the SLCPD in conjunction with the FBI, sought to:

- Purchase narcotics from dealers within the target areas.
- Engage in buy-and-bust activities.
- Conduct interviews with arrestees for gathering greater criminal intelligence.

- Selectively target, arrest, and prosecute those most involved in these activities within the targeted communities.

A second phase of this effort will seek to broaden police interventions through the use of electronic monitoring, increased use of informants, and the building of cases aimed at criminal organizations operating within the targeted communities. In a risk assessment of these communities, local and Federal law enforcement agents concluded a prominent form of criminal activity in these areas “is the processing, storage, transportation, and distribution of illegal narcotics in and from locations within the Weed and Seed site.” Further, this risk assessment concluded “the concentration of street gangs and gang members within the Weed and Seed site is disproportionately high compared to other areas in Salt Lake City.”<sup>3</sup>

### **4.3 Budget Information**

Since the sum of money received by Salt Lake City during FY 1995 was so small (\$35,000), it was used primarily to stimulate community involvement and enhance community capacities to pursue more substantive program funding. In fact, an impressive feature of the Salt Lake City Weed and Seed operation has been the extent to which participants at all levels actively pursued Weed and Seed goals despite the relatively low levels of Federal support.

In FY 1996, EOWS awarded the city \$240,000. Approximately \$100,000 of the money was committed to weeding, \$131,000 to seeding, and \$9,000 was reserved for administration (see exhibit 4.1). These distributions illustrate Salt Lake City’s continued commitment to self-funding throughout the Weed and Seed effort. In addition, in FY 1996, \$25,000 of the seeding money was designated to develop a Weed and Seed Family Intervention model which never evolved, and the money was not spent. Salt Lake’s Weed and Seed coordinator has since arranged for the redesignation of those funds to be spread among the three programs that are funded in FY 1997.

In FY 1997 Salt Lake City remained an officially recognized site by EOWS and received \$275,000. Approximately \$100,000 of the funds were designated to weeding, \$126,000 to seeding, \$3,000 to community policing efforts, and \$46,000 to administration.

### **4.4 Information Systems**

The Salt Lake City Police Department has used its information systems to integrate calls for service data, computer mapping, crime analysis, and feedback to area command and tactical personnel. Data management and some analytic functions are provided to the police department through a centralized information and data management department within city government. Local crime analysis is conducted within the department in the Community Support Division. Personnel assigned to crime analysis functions within the division prepare crime maps and disseminate crime and call for service information to field personnel.

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3 Internal report, Salt Lake City Police Department’s Narcotics Task Force.



## Exhibit 4.1 Salt Lake City Weed and Seed Funding Summary

	FY 1995*	FY 1996 (Proposed)	FY 1997
<b>Total Funding</b>	\$35,000	\$240,000	\$325,000
<b>Funding by program element</b>			
Weeding			
Enforcement (overtime)/COP		\$19,200	\$19,200
Enforcement equipment			
Cellular phones		\$1,800	\$3,600
Vehicle rental		\$3,600	\$7,200
Electronic monitoring		\$10,000	\$10,000
Evidence purchase		\$65,400	\$60,000
<i>Total Weeding</i>	N/A	\$100,000	\$100,000
Seeding			
Boys and Girls Club—Inner-City Sports League		\$10,298	
Youth and Family Specialists		\$56,000	\$50,000
Weed & Seed family intervention model	\$25,000**		
Urban Scouting Project		\$12,000	
Jackson Elementary Music Project		\$19,282	
Glendale Middle School Transportation Project		\$4,000	
Guadalupe School—Early Learning Center		\$2,420	
Neighborhood House Literacy Project		\$2,000	
Prevention through the Arts Program			\$22,500
Neighborhood Revitalization Project			\$31,000
Jobs for At-Risk Youths			\$22,500
Conflict resolution model			\$50,000
	N/A	\$131,000	\$176,000
Community oriented policing			
Dedicated phone line			\$480
Video cameras			\$2,505
	N/A	\$0	\$2,985
Other			
Local evaluation			
Other indirect costs			
Travel/conferences		\$1,000	\$10,000
Training/meetings			
Training consultants			
Supplies/equipment			
Computer			
Printer			\$3,000
Postage			\$1,500
Photocopying			
Telephone/long distance service			
Office supplies			\$1,560
Administration/employees			
Fringe benefits			\$19,110
Weed & Seed coordinator			\$5,460
Evaluation assistant		\$4,000	
Financial grant monitor		\$4,000	\$5,385
	N/A	\$9,000	\$46,015

Sources: FY96 Weeding Strategy, Community Partnership Program—NPR Supplement 9/12/94

\* For FY 1995, no spending breakdown was available.

\*\* Will be spent in FY 1997.

The department and the city have experienced some problems in acquiring a usable computer aided dispatch (CAD) system. In early 1997 a new CAD system was purchased, but, during its installation, it became apparent the system did not function properly. The new system was subsequently abandoned, which created several problems for the department. Staff struggled with the old CAD system while a new provider was found to quickly fill the void created by this system failure. The department subsequently sued the company that provided the nonoperational CAD system.

At the same time, rank-and-file officers, concerned about the functionality of the old CAD system, have pressured the department to quickly resolve this problem, arguing officers' safety is affected. The complexities in the acquisition and use of the new CAD system have implications for community-oriented policing in Salt Lake City, as well as for the Weed and Seed program. The CAD system should provide accurate and detailed information to officers on the street about where criminal activity happens on their beats.

Without this information, officers must rely on the support provided by established neighborhood police stations across the city, the department's district-level CATs, and the Mobile Neighborhood Watch (MNW) program to communicate local crime and safety information. Originally funded through the Comprehensive Communities Program, neighborhood police stations and community policing officers provided an opportunity for the police and community to jointly define and analyze local crime problems and to design strategies that address those problems. In the Weed and Seed target area, one of the neighborhood policing stations is located within a local community center. Two community policing programs are based out of this location, and police personnel are permanently assigned to this center as a means of reaching out to the target communities.

## **4.5 Site Monitoring, Reporting, and Local Evaluation**

While the Comprehensive Communities and National Performance Review Lab program included evaluation efforts, Weed and Seed is not budgeted for a local evaluation. Therefore, there does not appear to be any systematic monitoring and/or tracking of the operational components of the Weed and Seed program in Salt Lake City. Moreover, criteria for success are also only beginning to emerge in the Salt Lake City project.

However, many programs included within the Weed and Seed umbrella may be evaluated in some way through the University of Utah. For instance, several efforts associated with the Comprehensive Communities Program have received some evaluation attention, generally through the efforts of a particular University of Utah professor. Assessment results are now being fed back into program development and will likely shape future refinement of Weed and Seed efforts in Salt Lake City.

## 5.0 Key Implementation Issues and Interpretation

### 5.1 Role of Weed and Seed Site Designation

Operation Weed and Seed, with target areas identified as Glendale, Poplar Grove, and Fairpark, was formally launched in Salt Lake City with a public hearing in February 1993. In response to this hearing, the SLCPD worked quickly to create a Community Support Division, which represented the department's first effort to institutionalize community policing in the city.

In the summer of 1993, the U.S. Attorney General visited Salt Lake City. Her visit was interpreted by local officials as U.S. Department of Justice approval and endorsement of local efforts. Following the Attorney General's visit in August, Salt Lake's U.S. Attorney tried to create a Weed and Seed strategy that could lead to Federal support.

The original Weed and Seed application was designed and written largely as an expression of community efforts within the Glendale community. The proposal was designed to include the four necessary Weed and Seed components: law enforcement, community policing, prevention/treatment, and community restoration. This proposal, however, was then reviewed and processed through the U.S. Attorney's Office, and significant changes were made to the proposed structure and content of the city's Weed and Seed program; the proposal was rewritten as a legal, technical document with less balance shown between weeding and seeding. This new proposal focused more on law enforcement efforts and left a number of seeding programs, which had participated in writing the initial grant request, without funding. The revised proposal was submitted as Salt Lake's initial application but was subsequently not funded.

Given the relatively high expectations that developed over the previous year, this rejection was a considerable disappointment for all of the coalitions that emerged to participate in this process. This produced tension between the U.S. Attorney's Office, the mayor, and the police department, as well as community organizations that invested in the proposal and were disappointed by the outcome. Some of this tension continued to affect the city's Weed and Seed program oversight and policy development.

In 1995, Salt Lake City was officially recognized as a Weed and Seed site and allocated \$35,000. These limited funds were generally used for administration and sponsorship of a small group of community-based programs. Salt Lake City has remained an officially recognized site in both FY 1996 and FY 1997 and was awarded \$240,000 and \$275,000, respectively.

Salt Lake City's Weed and Seed site designation has complicated the ways in which the city adopted and changed funding efforts. Because Weed and Seed was not initially funded in Salt Lake City, community officials had to find other funds for the efforts begun in anticipation of receiving Weed and Seed money. Largely through the NPRL and CCP programs, Salt Lake City mounted police and community interventions within the three target communities. These funds and their program requirements, while aligned with Weed and Seed programs, did not always seek the same ends. As a

result, many officials adopted the idea CCP funding was a prelude to Weed and Seed funding and assumed the programs would simply continue through an alternative funding mechanism—Weed and Seed. This is perhaps more true of social programming, as opposed to the efforts of local and Federal police in the Weed and Seed communities. Nonetheless, the confusion and complexity of the funding has led to the writing of many grants with overlapping objectives in the hope some of the funding will actually be awarded. While this perhaps is an effective local strategy, it creates significant complications in disentangling programs and their respective impacts on communities, families, and children.

## **5.2 Role of Grantee Organization**

The grantee organization in Salt Lake City is the mayor's office, which oversees the implementation of the program developed by the working committees and approved by the steering committee. According to the Weed and Seed coordinator, this work is done in cooperation with the U.S. Attorney's Office, which is viewed as a partner in this process.

## **5.3 Management Structure and Control**

Salt Lake City has encountered a number of issues and problems with the management and control of Weed and Seed efforts. The Weed and Seed program is overseen by a steering committee that has representatives from the mayor's office, the police department, and the community and is headed by the U.S. Attorney. Due to difficulty in scheduling, the steering committee has experienced frequent delays in structuring the activities of the grant.

Further, the day-to-day coordination of the grant has changed hands since the inception of the program and has never been coordinated by someone whose time and effort were solely dedicated to running Weed and Seed. Once the CCP was funded (and Weed and Seed was not funded), the original Weed and Seed coordinator's role was shifted toward running the CCP. The second Weed and Seed coordinator is an assistant prosecutor within the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office who continues to carry a prosecutorial caseload.

In 1997, in recognition of the need for more personnel, a staff person from the mayor's Office of Community Affairs was identified as an assistant Weed and Seed coordinator; she had the additional role of coordinating Salt Lake City's Youth City Government program that teaches better citizenship to high school students. As this assistant coordinator has only recently been closely associated with the Weed and Seed program, she has devoted much of her time to learning its history and dynamics.

The cumulative effect of the two coordinators' additional job responsibilities outside of Weed and Seed has led to decentralized and compartmentalized program development and operations in Salt Lake City. Although there is no doubt the current coordinator and assistant coordinator work hard to manage Weed and Seed efforts, it has been difficult to sustain clear oversight and communications between program components.

## 5.4 Local Politics

Local politics has strongly shaped the nature and programming of Weed and Seed efforts within Salt Lake City. Political problems have surfaced between the mayor and the U.S. Attorney over the management and direction of the program. According to the perception of many outside the U.S. Attorney's Office, the issue of collaboration versus control seemed to be one of the problems, with the city's efforts focused on collaboration of local resources, and the efforts of the U.S. Attorney on controlling all aspects of Weed and Seed. Further, according to Weed and Seed officials, there was a distinct difference in the leadership styles of the mayor and the U.S. Attorney. The mayor is quick to make tough decisions and implement them, while the U.S. Attorney believes in going through a more methodical process before making and implementing decisions. These two styles sometimes created differences in opinion over how decisions regarding Weed and Seed should be made.

The mayor also has an ongoing conflict with the city council, which has resulted in several allegations of misconduct on his part. This continuing struggle has prompted those in city agencies to closely watch the outcome because it may affect both interagency collaboration and program support. Although not directly related to Weed and Seed, this ongoing struggle does affect how public policy is defined, as well as the political atmosphere and, therefore, it ultimately affects city programs such as Weed and Seed.

Within the Salt Lake City Police Department there is also considerable turmoil, some of which affects the Weed and Seed program. Since the new chief of police assumed his position, he has struggled continually with the police union. Some of this conflict started when the new chief announced that a union official neither would be housed in police headquarters nor paid out of the police department budget. Further, a series of incidents in 1997 led the chief to fire members of a police unit that allegedly abused a local citizen. This has widened the gap between rank-and-file police officers and the chief.

Finally, the internal administration of the SLCPD was devoted to "traditional" policing. The introduction of community policing has effectively redistributed power within the police department, resulting at times in internal conflicts; field officers are not always on the same page in regard to community policing as is the captain, who is more interested in maintaining the traditional style of policing. The line officers who witness the benefits of community policing are more interested in slowly moving away from the traditional approach. As a result of these differences of opinion, some personnel have been shifted from assignments in the Weed and Seed target areas, which further complicates communications and program development.

## 5.5 Approach to Weeding

As reported in the budgets of the Salt Lake City Weed and Seed program, much of the resources for weeding have been applied to joint narcotics enforcement efforts between the Salt Lake City Police Department and several Federal agencies, including the FBI, DEA, and INS. These efforts are generally associated with surveillance, undercover work, buy-and-bust tactics, and selective prosecution by both local and Federal prosecutors. The funding for "softer" community policing and problem-solving interventions employed in the Weed and Seed communities in Salt Lake City have generally come from other resources—the department itself and the Comprehensive Communities

Program. The tactical and operational connections between these two rather distinct efforts are undefined, and both efforts appear to operate independently in selected Weed and Seed communities.

The Salt Lake City weeding effort encompassed a distinct number of initiatives, all of which were funded by the city prior to the FY 1996 award. Among the most significant of these are the Metro Narcotics Task Force (MNTF), the Drug Abatement Response Teams (DART), and the MNW.

The MNTF focuses primarily on high-level drug dealers and operates on a citywide basis. Its target area activities are incidental to its primary functions, in that the task force is not solely dedicated to the target areas but rather pursues cases and dealers throughout the city. In many instances, however, these investigations lead to the target area with its historical focus on drug distribution activities. Often, drug distributors purchase housing in the target area and then use the residence as a basis for operations. Prior to the MNTF, this strategy allowed distributors a relatively stable environment in which to do business. As the MNTF made more significant inroads into their operations, however, distributors have switched to short-term rentals, which gives dealers more operational mobility. This police department views this disruption of drug distribution activities as a positive development.

Salt Lake's weeding efforts in the area of drug enforcement are displayed in exhibit 5.1, which shows the number of drug-related arrests by month per 1,000 residents from early 1995 to late 1997.<sup>4</sup> In the 5-month period before the start date of Weed and Seed—March through July 1995—the number of drug-related arrests in the target area averaged 2.5. After Weed and Seed's implementation—from 1996 through 1997 in a similar 5-month block—the average number of drug arrests per month increased by approximately 52 percent in the target area, compared to an increase of approximately 16 percent in the rest of the city. As is shown on the graph, the number of drug related arrests has declined in the target area since August 1997 and has actually decreased below the rate of the rest of the city. This suggests drug activity may have been displaced outside of the target area.


The chief of police also established DART, with a more neighborhood-focused approach toward drug enforcement. These teams consist of a sergeant and six officers who focus on neighborhood-based drug activity. DART personnel identify and rapidly respond to neighborhood drug sales and distribution activities. The teams locate their base in the targeted Weed and Seed areas and, either through their own surveillance or increased neighborhood reporting, team officers react directly to local drug-related problems. Once a residence is identified as a drug sales center, a warrant is obtained, a search is conducted, and offenders are arrested (if the evidentiary basis is sufficient to justify immediate onsite arrest). If a warrant cannot be obtained, a "knock and talk" approach may be used, providing a visible response to community surveillance and complaints. In contrast to more lengthy processes associated with typical drug investigations, the entire process by DART may only take 2–3 days, thereby making it difficult for distributors to get settled into neighborhoods. Such activities also bolster community confidence that the police are doing something and that the community's continued surveillance of the area can produce meaningful results.

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<sup>4</sup> Incident-level data prior to March 1995 was not available from SLCPD. The department installed a new records management system in 1997, and data prior to March 1995 was not brought over to the new system.

Exhibit 5.1

Drug Arrests per Capita by Month



The departmental activities have been assisted by the creation of Mobile Neighborhood Watch teams, which were first created prior to the Comprehensive Communities Program but grew substantially under the CCP. Prior to the CCP, it is estimated MNW involved about 450 people. CCP funding helped expand the program to approximately 800 people by January 1997. CCP funding provided money for equipment, secretarial assistance, and a community-oriented police officer to better link the MNW to the SLCPD.

Throughout the Weed and Seed target areas, hundreds of citizens have attended training meetings conducted by the police department for the MNW. These community residents have received instruction on how to get a timely police response to community observations of crime and disorder. Community residents patrol their neighborhoods in their own vehicles and are equipped with cellular phones to communicate with the Salt Lake City police.

Mobile Neighborhood Watch teams are completely voluntary. Community residents typically become aware of the MNW through local community council meetings. Current MNW coordinators (a community volunteer) use community meetings to recruit members. Watch participants wear a vest designating them as a team member. These are not protective vests, but, rather, they are used for identification purposes. A magnetized sign is placed on the side of Watch participants' cars when they are on patrol to increase their visibility in the community. Mobile Neighborhood Watch members are seen as extended eyes and ears of the police and are not allowed to intervene in situations they encounter. They simply use their cellular phones to notify dispatch about prospective


problems and/or situations to which the police then respond. Most recently, surveillance equipment has been provided to the MNW program to assist members in documenting problems and/or situations warranting police attention.

Periodically communities will form a saturation patrol comprised of a MNW team, members of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), and a Watching in Neighborhood Program (WIN) van. The WIN van is an official police vehicle staffed with officers who are designated to work solely with the saturation patrol for the evening. It is equipped with sobriety testing equipment to facilitate immediate tests, results, and, when necessary, arrests. This has been a successful strategy to discourage drunken driving in the selected Weed and Seed communities and is seen as a way to build public safety coalitions within these neighborhoods and across service agencies.

The Salt Lake City Police Department’s increased enforcement activity in the target area is shown in exhibit 5.2, which details the number of arrests involving Part 1 crimes by month per 1,000 residents from early 1995 to late 1997.<sup>5</sup> In the 5-month period before the start of Weed and Seed—March–July 1995—the number of arrests involving Part 1 crimes in the target area was 2.8 (or about 62 arrests per month). In a similar period after Weed and Seed’s implementation—March through July 1997—the average number of arrests in the target area was 3.3 per month. This change denotes an increase of approximately 18 percent in the number of arrests made in the target area, compared to an increase of approximately 5 percent in the rest of the city during those same periods. As with the

**Exhibit 5.2**

**Part 1 Arrests per Capita by Month**



<sup>5</sup> Part 1 crimes include violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, larceny, auto theft).



drug-related arrest rate, the number of arrests involving Part 1 crimes made in the target area appear to decline to a level closer to that of the rest of the city. In fact, the graph denotes a decrease in arrests in the target area and an increase in the rest of the city from September to November 1996. This may suggest some of the crime in the target area has been displaced and the Salt Lake City Police Department are responding accordingly.

## **5.6 Approach to Community Policing**

As previously indicated, the style of policing in Salt Lake City was typically to crack down on particularly visible and troublesome areas with high crime rates, then return to a traditional response-oriented policing operation. This style has yielded to a more community-oriented style of policing over the past several years.

Beginning in about 1992, the incoming mayor began to build closer ties to the community through outreach efforts that included the police. In 1992, the mayor hired a new chief of police who was specifically instructed to expand and elaborate on community oriented policing strategies and practices within the city.

Further, in 1992 all members of the Salt Lake City Police Department received training in “total quality management.” Since that time, the department has implemented Process Improvement Teams (PIT) and Problem Action Teams (PAT), both of which seek to improve the department’s ability to change toward a more community focused style of policing and to cope with the necessary organizational changes attendant to this transition. These efforts have resulted in several internal SLCPD programs to improve organizational and individual officer functioning. The department has also created the Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) to increase tactical use of crime information and thus free up officer time to work on community problems.

As part of a growing community policing strategy, the police department hosted weekly citywide COP meetings in 1993. These meetings were attended by crime prevention specialists, patrol officers, vice, narcotics and youth specialists, as well as a wide range of city agencies, and were mostly centered around the mayor’s Office of Community Affairs. Business owners and local residents from throughout Salt Lake City also attended these meetings. In addition, the Salt Lake City Police Department created COP specialists throughout the department and integrated COP functions into all sworn officers’ duties and activities. The Salt Lake City Police Department’s adoption of neighborhood offices has linked COP personnel directly with local community centers in the target areas. For example, the Sorenson Center, which is a safe haven community center in Glendale, is the home base for both a COP office, as well as crime prevention and community outreach projects. All of these activities are centered on building communications between the police department, other city agencies, and the community at large.

In 1995, CATs were created and implemented in Salt Lake City as part of the Comprehensive Communities Program. While criminal justice agencies are largely represented on the CATs, so too are social service agencies, youth and family case specialists, and representatives from the mayor’s office. As previously indicated, the CATs are designed to bring government, particularly safety services, directly to the community for review, critique, and joint problem solving. CCP resources also provided more than \$1 million to the department to support 14 new officer positions, as well as their cars and necessary equipment. These funds also supported, in large measure, the Neighborhood

Mobile Watch, which was expanded through this effort. Other CCP resources were allocated to the office of the city prosecutor, the Salt Lake Boys and Girls Club, and the Third District Juvenile Court and the school district. These resources set the stage for activities that were largely CCP supported but which had similar strategies to Weed and Seed funded community policing efforts.

## 5.7 Approach to Seeding

While there are considerable efforts afoot within the Salt Lake City target area, it is not at all clear these efforts are directly tied to a systematic seeding strategy within the city as part of the Weed and Seed program. This may be the result of general confusion within Salt Lake City as to the distinctions between the Comprehensive Communities Program and Weed and Seed; the overlapping nature of programs, target areas, and clients; and/or the divergence and complexity of the programs' strategies. Further, as discussed, it is nearly impossible to separate the two programs at the community level, where they are seen as promoting the same goals.

In FY 1996, the first year Salt Lake City received substantial Weed and Seed funding, the city split the money designated for seeding among several social service programs and efforts. Youth and family specialists were employed in a counseling capacity by the Boys and Girls Club to help troubled teens in the target area. These case specialists were seen as quite successful in managing cases diverted from the juvenile justice system and in building effective communications between youth-serving agencies within Weed and Seed and the city's municipal government. The Youth and Family Specialists were hired by the city as a means to stabilize this program and as a way for the city to more directly influence the services offered to diverted youths and their families.

In most instances, the money from Weed and Seed funds was allocated to pay for part of a social service effort. For example, a music project run out of Jackson Elementary School is designed to expose and teach students how to play a number of instruments before they graduate. Weed and Seed money paid for one-quarter of the music teacher's salary, as well as for the purchase and repair of violins used by the students. Another example is the provision of funds to pay for prereading materials for four classrooms at the Guadalupe School, an early learning center in the target area. In addition, funds were used to buy a computer to track library materials for the Neighborhood House Literacy Project in the Weed and Seed area, and money was given to the Urban Scouting project for supplies, equipment, and registration fees for 100 boys who otherwise could not participate. Finally, money was allocated to the Boys and Girls Club Inner City Sports League to pay for equipment, uniforms, transportation, and part of a league coordinator's salary.

In FY 1997, Salt Lake City designated its seeding funds to three special emphasis initiatives. The following is a rationale for these initiatives, which are still in the planning stages (as of this writing in February 1998).

- **Prevention Through the Arts.** Due to cutbacks in education funding, many schools in the target area no longer offer art classes. Part of the rationale behind this initiative, therefore, was to expose youths in the target area to the arts. A request for proposals (RFP) was released early in the funding cycle and the Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center was awarded the money to conduct a pottery class in their afterschool art program.

- **Jobs for At-Risk Youth.** The need to help youths in the target areas find employment was identified as a crucial need by the community. An RFP was released, and as of February 1998, no organization had been selected to run this vocational program. The Weed and Seed coordinator anticipated the Boys and Girls Club would win the award and begin the program shortly.
- **Neighborhood Restoration Committee (NRC).** The money designated for NRC will be used for community improvement projects the committee believes are necessary and are not large enough to attract other outside funding.

In addition to funding specifically designated for seeding programs, there are a number of social service agencies located in the Weed and Seed target area that are aligned with seeding goals. The following is a description of some of these agencies.

### **Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center (safe haven)**

**Success by Six, Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center.** The Success by Six program, funded by the United Way and housed at the Sorenson Center, is a program aimed at improving the life chances of children in their formative years (prenatal care for mothers and programs for children up to 6 years of age). The Success by Six program identifies families with small children and/or expectant mothers in the targeted communities. The program staff generally work with clients for 1 year. They complete a number of home visits, identify individual and family needs, and network with other agencies to address those needs. Sorenson Center staff are trained by the program for about 4 weeks and then receive regular training updates regarding early intervention strategies.

The Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center is a recreational and community center within the Weed and Seed area that offers swimming and other athletic activities (e.g., midnight basketball), as well as structured afterschool programs, summer programs, parenting classes, and computer activities. The center has primarily had a recreational mission, but its new director aims to broaden the center's role into a full service community center, expanding its educational and community programs and linking the center more directly to the community. The director sees the Sorenson Center as modeling interventions in the local area and then expanding them to other centers citywide. By offering an expressive arts program, counseling and family services, the center aims to fill a gap left by schools that have cut back on extracurricular activities. The expansion to a full-service community center is just underway, and it is unclear if the effort will provide an array of services to a large area.

### **Community Peace Services, Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office**

The Community Peace Center was created through the Comprehensive Communities Program and is conducted through the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's office to provide prevention, early intervention, and mediation in the Weed and Seed target area.

The Peace Center collaborates with the juvenile court, police, the mayor's office, and local community-based organizations by coordinating referrals and distributing funding in support of the services provided.

The Peace Center aims to identify behavior problems in the schools through prevention, intervention, and mediation programs. Prevention programs include a teen tobacco reduction program and the HARMONY program, designed to increase communications and coping skills in children and their parents, for the purpose of reducing violence. Intervention programs conducted through the Peace Center include a YMCA Choices program that identifies and corrects negative or harmful behaviors among young males and a citizenship skills program that teaches participants to negotiate and control interpersonal conflict. These programs are linked to two mediation programs, one aimed at youths using a peer court and the other toward adult conflict mediation.

### **Title V, “Resilient Youth Program,” University of Utah**

The Resilient Youth Program is funded through Title V and is focused on increasing problem-solving capacity and life resilience among disadvantaged youths in the western part of Salt Lake City, which somewhat overlaps with the Weed and Seed area. This project was originally funded by the Comprehensive Communities Program. The U. S. Attorney General was said to have designated Salt Lake City as an exemplary site, in part because of this program, conducted under the auspices of the Health Behavior Laboratory within the Department of Health Education at the University of Utah.

This project focuses on helping youths pay attention to their “essence.” It draws from several intellectual models, each of which suggests people can look past their differences to see some inner good in others and thereby reduce interpersonal conflict and violence. The program incorporates 33 modules of self-reflection and coping instruction into school-based classroom programs. It is currently implemented in two Salt Lake City middle schools, one of which is an alternative school for troubled youths in the Weed and Seed area. It is anticipated this training will be expanded to parents and communities over the coming years.

### **Poplar Grove Boys and Girls Club (safe haven)**

The Poplar Grove Boys and Girls Center was created through the Comprehensive Communities Program as a safe haven for troubled youths in the Poplar Grove community. The club was an abandoned property identified by the executive director of the Boys and Girls Club that was remodeled and opened to provide an alternative to joining local gangs within this part of the Weed and Seed area. The first orders of business in the club were to repel local gang members who had historically used the building as a headquarters and to encourage youths in the neighborhoods to attend the club (the area was perceived to be dangerous because of drive-by shootings). The Poplar Grove Boys and Girls Club has expanded its typical focus beyond recreational and afterschool programs to include case management for troubled youths and families, as well as employment counseling. The club also belongs to two CATs in this Weed and Seed target area, affording staff added opportunities to advocate for their clients with other agencies.

## **5.8 Operational Relationships with Other Organizations**

Given the loose funding structure associated with Weed and Seed in Salt Lake City and the confounding influence created from other Federal initiatives, the coordination and integration of program elements generally does not occur. At this writing, there are no local assessments of these linkages or institutional analysis of their effects. An analysis of the Comprehensive Communities Program (BOTEC, 1997) came to a similar conclusion, noting individual programs appeared to function reasonably well, but the coordination mechanisms for interagency decisionmaking were neither in place nor planned for the near future.

Moreover, there has been considerable shifting in city agencies responsible for overseeing Weed and Seed, and there is a general lack of authority and/or time to oversee and link agency efforts. Collectively, this has resulted in decentralized operations and program management. However, it is important to note the Sorenson Center, a safe haven in Salt Lake City, plans to house a number of social service programs that are interested in integrating their services and working together. Because the center is still relatively new and many of the programs have not officially begun providing services, it remains unclear whether these efforts will come to fruition.

In terms of linking the Salt Lake City Police Department with other agencies, several task forces have been created to pursue drug- and gang-related activity within the Weed and Seed communities. These task forces typically involve local police and Federal agencies which target locations and individuals for selective surveillance, arrest, and prosecution. This process does not appear to be well integrated, if integrated at all, with the community policing efforts identified with the Weed and Seed program.

## **5.9 Concluding Observations**

The director of capital planning, who is the financial manager for Weed and Seed, indicated she (and the city) felt the goals of Weed and Seed were not clearly articulated in Washington or well separated from those of the Comprehensive Communities Program. This led to some initial local confusion about what the grant was to do. Had the aims of Weed and Seed been better understood from the outset, she suggested, they could have been more effectively integrated into ongoing city and other community-based interventions. However, she also suggested, once better understood, the effort was successful in causing the city to rethink and restructure local relationships in the pursuit of a community government approach to governing.

In addition, the Weed and Seed program had substantial effects in Salt Lake City and its targeted communities. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these are associated with its continuation of community-policing efforts within the police department, as well as the continuation of community problem-solving efforts within city government. Weed and Seed funding has provided an opportunity for public and private agencies to rethink their relationships with one another, while joining forces toward more clearly defined community objectives. It has been a struggle for agencies to link their individual efforts in the past, and this continues to be a challenge during the implementation of Weed and Seed in Salt Lake City. However, a climate for cross-agency communication and coordination has begun through Weed and Seed, an initiative upon which subsequent efforts, perhaps, can be built.

While the Salt Lake City site does not represent a dramatic program of change and impact, it does represent one city's struggle to build a more responsive government linked to community concerns. The overall innovation in Salt Lake City is the process for community input and communication which has taken several years to realize. Nevertheless, such a linkage between government and the community affords an opportunity for more focused interventions into communities with extant leadership and clearly defined goals and objectives. As Weed and Seed programs typically are located in communities that lack such community organization and leadership, the process of converting Salt Lake City from a response-driven community to one with a linked set of safety services is an important and noteworthy accomplishment.

## **6.0 Effects of Weed and Seed**

### **6.1 Analysis of Crime Data**

In this section, police data is used to analyze trends in crime rates before and after the implementation of Weed and Seed in Salt Lake City. At the outset, it is important to note any observed changes in crime rates in the target area during this period might reflect factors other than Weed and Seed activities. For instance, changes in crime reporting may cause the reported crime rates to rise or fall independent of any true shift in crime incidence. Changes in the regional or national economic context may also affect trends in local crime, favorably or unfavorably. Additionally, an observed reduction in crime for the target area may occur through displacement of crime to adjacent or nearby areas, where crime rates would rise correspondingly. In addition, as noted previously, there are a number of other initiatives in Salt Lake City, such as CCP, that may have affected the crime rates in general.

Incident-level police data and geo-mapping methods are used to identify crimes that have occurred in the target area and the rest of the city. The rest of the city provides a logical comparison area, in which to monitor possible changes in local crime reporting, shifts in local economic conditions or other conventional factors, and the possibility of crime displacement to other areas within the city. Target area crime data only dates back to March 1995 which is 5 months prior to when Salt Lake City was officially recognized by EOWS and received funding; the Salt Lake City Police Department recently changed computer systems and does not have data available prior to March 1995.


Exhibit 6.1 shows the number of Part 1 crimes by month per 1,000 residents from early 1995 to late 1997.<sup>6</sup> For the 5-month period before the official start date of Weed and Seed—March through July 1995—the number of crimes per month in the target area averaged 11. In a similar period after Weed and Seed's implementation—March through July 1997—the number of Part 1 crimes per month averaged 12.5 in the target area; this change denotes an increase of approximately 23 percent. Although this appears to be a large increase in criminal activity, by 1997 the number of Part 1 crimes

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<sup>6</sup> As noted, incident-level data prior to March 1995 were not available from SLCPD.

## Exhibit 6.1

### Part 1 Crimes per Capita by Month



declined by approximately 8 percent, compared to a decrease of less than 1 percent in the rest of the city during those periods—March through July—between 1996 and 1997. Therefore, it appears from these graphs the rate of Part 1 crimes is currently declining more quickly in the target area, compared to the rest of the city.

## 6.2 Survey of Community Residents

### Survey methods used in 1995 and 1997

In each of the eight sites participating in the national evaluation, a survey of target area residents was conducted at two separate time intervals. From March to July 1995, the Institute for Social Analysis conducted a total of 1,531 interviews among the eight sites. From December 1997 to January 1998, Abt Associates Inc. conducted a total of 1,995 interviews with a separate group of residents in the same eight target areas. In the following material, we refer to these data collection efforts as the 1995 and 1997 surveys.

### General survey design and operations

The objective of the survey data collection and analysis was to measure changes in citizens' awareness of the Weed and Seed program and their opinions about police activity, crime, public safety, and the general quality of life in their neighborhoods. The 1997 survey was comparable to the prior survey through the following features:

- The geographical boundaries of the survey area were the same.
- The verbatim wording of questions from the 1995 survey was retained in 1997, with the exception of additional response categories to selected items in 1997. For these items, care was taken in the analysis to aggregate responses in ways that would preserve the comparability of the findings across the two surveys.<sup>7</sup>

Nonetheless, there were some notable differences in the methods used in the two surveys, due to barriers in recruiting participants, as follows:

- The 1995 survey consisted of in-person interviews, based on city-provided address lists. The 1997 interviews were conducted by telephone, based on listed telephone numbers for residential addresses within the survey area.
- The 1995 survey consisted of 83 substantive items. The 1997 survey included only a subset of these 31 substantive items. (For both surveys, the count excludes items related to respondent demographic characteristics and other basic interview data.) The 1995 interviews required 30 to 40 minutes. The 1997 interviews typically lasted 12 to 15 minutes.

The decision to proceed in 1997 with telephone interviewing and a shortened instrument was based on the failure across all eight sites in 1995 to complete the targeted number of 400 interviews. The 1997 survey design called for 300 completed interviews per site and increased the number of cases in 6 of the 8 sites, including Salt Lake City, which collected 91 surveys in 1995 and 300 in 1997. The final disposition of the number of homes called and the breakdown of how many calls were ended by a middle of the survey "break-off," how many were ended due to a language barrier, and so forth, is represented in the table above.

### *Demographic characteristics of respondents (Exhibit 6.2)*

The demographic information for respondents in 1995 and 1997 did not vary considerably in Salt Lake City. As evidenced in exhibit 6.2, the target neighborhood respondents to the Salt Lake City survey are mostly white, nonelderly, long time residents. Seventy-six percent of respondents in 1995 and 86 percent in 1997 have lived in the target area neighborhood for more than 2 years. Average respondent age was 46 years old in 1995 and 47 years old in 1997. Slightly more than half of respondents in both surveys were women.

Respondents working full time account for nearly half of all those surveyed in 1995 (46 percent) and in 1997 (50 percent). The percentage of unemployed or otherwise not looking for work was low in both 1995 and 1997 survey years, 4 percent and 3 percent, respectively. There was a large increase (47 percent) in respondents who identify themselves as homemakers, probably due to differences in survey methodology. Disabled persons made up 10 percent of respondents in 1997 and 8 percent of

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7 For example, in questions on "how good a job are the police doing" in different aspects of law enforcement, the 1995 survey allowed the respondent to indicate "a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job." Additionally, the 1997 survey also allowed the respondent to indicate "a very poor job." The findings below have aggregated the "poor job" and "very poor job" responses for 1997 before comparing the pattern of responses with 1995.



respondents in 1995. In addition, the number of respondents who go to school either part, or full time, was up from 1995.

Household composition across survey years remained similar. Respondent households with no children (people less than 18 years old) in both years made up 58 percent of those surveyed, while about 30 percent of respondents had children living in the households, while the remaining 15 percent had three or more children. Households with one to two adults made up 70 percent of respondents in 1997 and nearly 70 percent in 1995. The number of households with no adults dropped 4 percent from 1995.

The racial make-up of respondents was also similar across the two surveys, with about three-quarters of respondents being white, between 13 percent and 18 percent Hispanic, and very few black.

**Exhibit 6.2: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>
<i>Age of respondent</i>	n = 91	n = 300
18-29	13 (14%)	61 (20%)
30-39	23 (25%)	51 (17%)
40-49	6 (7%)	56 (19%)
50-59	17 (19%)	37 (12%)
60 or older	27 (30%)	91 (30%)
Other	5 (6%)	4 (1%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Mean Value</b>	<b>46.4</b>	<b>47.1</b>
<i>Employment status</i>	n = 91*	n = 300*
Working full time	42	149
Working part time	3	44
Unemployed and looking for work	4	10
Retired or otherwise not looking for work	15	88
Homemaker	10	173
Disabled	7	30
Full-time student	2	17
Part-time student	0	26
Other	0	8
Refused	0	1
Don't know	27	0
<b>Mean Value</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.2</b>

\* Respondents were allowed to make more than one selection.

**Exhibit 6.2: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>
<i>Number of people in household less than 18 years old</i>	n = 91	n = 300
0	50 (58%)	172 (58%)
1-2	24 (28%)	86 (29%)
3 or more	13 (15%)	41 (14%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Mean Value</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.9</b>
<i>Number of people in household more than 18 years old</i>	n = 91	n = 300
0	6 (7%)	10 (3%)
1-2	63 (69%)	210 (70%)
3 or more	22 (24%)	80 (27%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Mean Value</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>2.0</b>
<i>Ethnic identity</i>	n = 91	n = 300
Black	1 (1%)	7 (2%)
White	67 (74%)	224 (75%)
Hispanic	16 (18%)	39 (13%)
Asian/Pacific Islander	0 (0%)	12 (4%)
American Indian	1 (1%)	8 (3%)
Something else	1 (1%)	5 (2%)
Refused	5 (6%)	5 (2%)
Don't know	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Mean Value</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>2.2</b>

**Exhibit 6.2: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>
<i>Gender</i>	n = 91	n = 300
Male	35 (39%)	138 (46%)
Female	52 (57%)	161 (54%)
Other	4 (4%)	1 (<1%)
Total	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Mean Value</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>1.6</b>

<sup>a</sup> Columns may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

***Perceptions of the neighborhood (exhibit 6.3)***

General satisfaction with the target area neighborhood remained similar from 1995 to 1997. Though not statistically significant, there was a slight decrease in the proportion of respondents who indicated they were very dissatisfied with their neighborhood as a place to live, from 14 percent in 1995 to 6 percent in 1997. Further, there was an overall increase in respondent feelings of safety when out alone after dark and a 15 percent drop in respondents reporting not going out at night ( $p < 0.1$ ). The number of respondents who reported their neighborhood has become a safer place to live in the past 2 years increased from 10 percent in 1995 to 19 percent in 1997 ( $p < 0.01$ ).

Perceptions of drug dealers on streets or in other public places as a big problem rose 4 percent (from 14 percent to 18 percent), but the proportion of respondents who see drug dealers on the streets as no problem also increased, from 34 percent in 1995 to 42 percent in 1997. The dealers may have moved off the streets and into homes and apartments. General respondent perceptions of crime in the neighborhood saw a significant increase ( $p < 0.01$ ) in property crime, assaults and other street crime, gang activity, drug use, and in violent crime (although the number of people viewing violent crime as a big problem decreased 6 percent between 1995 and 1997).

**Exhibit 6.3: Perceptions of the Neighborhood  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>In general, how satisfied are you with this neighborhood as a place to live?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Very satisfied	25 (28%)	87 (29%)	
Somewhat satisfied	43 (47%)	149 (50%)	
Somewhat dissatisfied	10 (11%)	46 (15%)	
Very dissatisfied	13 (14%)	17 (6%)	
Don't know	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	1 (<1%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>In general, how safe do you feel out alone in this neighborhood during the day? Do you feel...</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Very safe	35 (39%)	127 (42%)	
Somewhat safe	42 (46%)	134 (45%)	
Somewhat unsafe	12 (13%)	29 (10%)	
Very unsafe	0 (0%)	8 (3%)	
Don't know	2 (2%)	1 (<1%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	1 (<1%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Exhibit 6.3: Perceptions of the Neighborhood  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>In general, how safe do you feel out alone in this neighborhood after dark? Do you feel...</i>	n = 91	n = 300	*
Very safe	8 (9%)	29 (10%)	
Somewhat safe	18 (20%)	94 (31%)	
Somewhat unsafe	13 (14%)	82 (27%)	
Very unsafe	25 (28%)	52 (17%)	
Don't go out at night	25 (28%)	40 (13%)	
Don't know	2 (2%)	2 (<1%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	1 (<1%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>In general, in the past 2 years, would you say this neighborhood has become a better place to live, a worse place to live, or stayed about the same?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Better	9 (10%)	57 (19%)	
Worse	39 (43%)	92 (31%)	
About the same	26 (29%)	142 (47%)	
Did not live here 2 years ago	14 (15%)	7 (2%)	
Don't know	3 (3%)	2 (<1%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Exhibit 6.3: Perceptions of the Neighborhood  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>Do you think drug dealers on streets, or in other public places are a big problem, small problem, or no problem in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Big problem	13 (14%)	55 (18%)	
Small problem	20 (22%)	98 (33%)	
No problem	31 (34%)	125 (42%)	
Don't know	27 (30%)	22 (7%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>Do you think drug sales out of homes or apartments are a big problem, small problem, or no problem in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Big problem	15 (17%)	85 (28%)	
Small problem	21 (23%)	99 (33%)	
No problem	25 (28%)	82 (27%)	
Don't know	30 (33%)	34 (11%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Exhibit 6.3: Perceptions of the Neighborhood  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>Do you think burglary and other property crimes are a big problem, small problem, or no problem in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Big problem	25 (28%)	97 (32%)	
Small problem	32 (35%)	150 (50%)	
No problem	18 (20%)	45 (15%)	
Don't know	16 (18%)	8 (3%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>Do you think robbery and other street crimes are a big problem, small problem, or no problem in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Big problem	13 (14%)	79 (26%)	
Small problem	25 (28%)	134 (45%)	
No problem	29 (32%)	74 (25%)	
Don't know	24 (26%)	13 (4%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	



**Exhibit 6.3: Perceptions of the Neighborhood  
Salt Lake City**

	1995 Survey <sup>a</sup>	1997 Survey <sup>a</sup>	Chi Square Statistic <sup>b</sup>
<i>Do you think violent crimes, such as shootings, assault, and so forth, are a big problem, small problem, or no problem in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Big problem	36 (40%)	103 (34%)	
Small problem	22 (24%)	140 (47%)	
No problem	20 (22%)	51 (17%)	
Don't know	13 (14%)	6 (2%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>Do you think gang activity is a big problem, small problem, or no problem in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Big problem	40 (44%)	145 (48%)	
Small problem	22 (24%)	104 (35%)	
No problem	16 (18%)	39 (13%)	
Don't know	13 (14%)	12 (4%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Exhibit 6.3: Perceptions of the Neighborhood  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>Do you think drug use is a big problem, small problem, or no problem in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Big problem	18 (20%)	101 (34%)	
Small problem	21 (23%)	112 (37%)	
No problem	21 (23%)	47 (16%)	
Don't know	31 (34%)	38 (13%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	2 (<1%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<sup>a</sup> Columns may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

<sup>b</sup> Significance of differences between 1995 and 1997 in the distribution of responses for each survey question.

\*\*\* Statistically significant at 1-percent level

\*\* Statistically significant at 5-percent level

\* Statistically significant at 10-percent level

n.s. Not statistically significant

***Victimization (exhibit 6.4)***

With the exception of home break-ins, which declined 4 percent among respondents, reports of victimization either increased or remained about the same from the 1995 survey. Incidents of stealing by force, or threat of force, increased by 5 percent. The percentage of respondents and family members who were knifed, shot at, or attacked with some other weapon by anyone in their neighborhood remained the same in 1997 as in 1995.

**Exhibit 6.4: Victimization  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>In the past 2 years, has anyone broken into your home, garage, or another building on your property in this neighborhood to steal something?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Yes	27 (30%)	77 (26%)	
No	59 (65%)	221 (74%)	
Don't know	5 (6%)	2 (0.7%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>In the past 2 years, has anyone stolen something from you or a member of your family by force or by threat of force in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Yes	3 (3%)	24 (8%)	
No	82 (90%)	275 (92%)	
Don't know	6 (7%)	1 (<1%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Exhibit 6.4: Victimization  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>Other than the incidents already mentioned, in the past 2 years, have you or a member of your family been beaten up, attacked, or hit with something such as a rock or bottle in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Yes	5 (6%)	20 (7%)	
No	81 (89%)	280 (93%)	
Don't know	5 (6%)	0 (0%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>Other than the incidents already mentioned, in the past 2 years, have you or a member of your family been knifed, shot at, or attacked with some other weapon by anyone in this neighborhood to steal something?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Yes	5 (6%)	19 (6%)	
No	82 (90%)	281 (94%)	
Don't know	4 (4%)	0 (0%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<sup>a</sup> Columns may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

<sup>b</sup> Significance of differences between 1995 and 1997 in the distribution of responses for each survey question.

\*\*\* Statistically significant at 1-percent level

\*\* Statistically significant at 5-percent level

\* Statistically significant at 10-percent level

n.s. Not statistically significant

***Police response (exhibit 6.5)***

Most respondents to the 1997 survey felt, in general, the police were doing a good or very good job at keeping order on the streets and sidewalks in the neighborhood, a general sentiment which is a significant improvement over that of the 1995 respondents ( $p < 0.1$ ). The strongest improvement was found in the perceptions of improvements in controlling the street sale and use of illegal drugs in the neighborhood ( $p < 0.01$ ), perhaps due to a shift in drug sales from the streets to homes and apartments. Further, the percentage of respondents who have seen police officers chatting or having friendly conversation with people in the neighborhood in the month prior to the interview increased significantly, from 18 percent in 1995 to 28 percent in 1997.

**Exhibit 6.5: Police Response  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>In general, how good a job are the police doing to keep order on the streets and sidewalks in this neighborhood these days? Would you say they are doing a...</i>	n = 91	n = 300	*
Very good job	8 (9%)	49 (16%)	
Good job	48 (53%)	125 (42%)	
Fair job	22 (24%)	93 (31%)	
Poor job	5 (5%)	18 (6%)	
Very poor job	Not a response category	8 (3%)	
Don't know	8 (9%)	6 (2%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	1 (0.3%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>How good a job are the police doing in controlling the street sale and use of illegal drugs in this neighborhood these days? Would you say they are doing a...</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Very good job	10 (11%)	37 (12%)	
Good job	25 (28%)	115 (38%)	
Fair job	17 (19%)	76 (25%)	
Poor job	8 (9%)	27 (9%)	
Very poor job	Not a response category	10 (3%)	
Don't know	31 (34%)	35 (12%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Exhibit 6.5: Police Response  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>During the past month, have you seen a police car driving through your neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Yes	78 (86%)	243 (81%)	
No	12 (13%)	50 (17%)	
Don't know	1 (1%)	7 (2%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>During the past month, have you seen a police officer walking around or standing on patrol in the neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Yes	16 (18%)	37 (12%)	
No	74 (81%)	260 (87%)	
Don't know	1 (1%)	3 (1%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Exhibit 6.5: Police Response  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>During the past month, have you seen a police officer patrolling in the back alleys or in the back of buildings in your neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Yes	23 (25%)	79 (26%)	
No	67 (74%)	204 (68%)	
Don't know	1 (1%)	17 (6%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>During the past month, have you seen a police officer chatting/having a friendly conversation with people in the neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	**
Yes	16 (18%)	84 (28%)	
No	74 (81%)	210 (70%)	
Don't know	1 (1%)	6 (2%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	



**Exhibit 6.5: Police Response  
Salt Lake City**

	1995 Survey <sup>a</sup>	1997 Survey <sup>a</sup>	Chi Square Statistic <sup>b</sup>
<i>In general, how responsive are the police in this neighborhood to community concerns? Are they...</i>	n = 91	n = 300	n.s.
Very responsive	25 (28%)	93 (31%)	
Somewhat responsive	46 (51%)	132 (44%)	
Somewhat unresponsive	8 (9%)	32 (11%)	
Very unresponsive	3 (3%)	17 (6%)	
Don't know	9 (10%)	26 (9%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<sup>a</sup> Columns may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

<sup>b</sup> Significance of differences between 1995 and 1997 in the distribution of responses for each survey question.

\*\*\* Statistically significant at 1-percent level

\*\* Statistically significant at 5-percent level

\* Statistically significant at 10-percent level

n.s. Not statistically significant

***Community involvement (exhibit 6.6)***

Community involvement has increased dramatically in the 2 years following the 1995 survey ( $p < 0.01$ ). Attendance or participation in all of the following activities is up by at least 10 percent: antidrug rallies, vigils or marches (up 10 percent), citizen patrols (up 10 percent), and neighborhood watches (up 15 percent). The percentage of 1997 respondents who attended or participated in a neighborhood cleanup project is up 24 percent from the 1995 survey.

**Exhibit 6.6: Community Involvement  
Salt Lake City**

	1995 Survey <sup>a</sup>	1997 Survey <sup>a</sup>	Chi Square Statistic <sup>b</sup>
<i>During the past 2 years, have you attended or participated in an antidrug rally, vigil, or march in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Yes	2 (2%)	35 (12%)	
No	87 (96%)	264 (88%)	
Don't know	2 (2%)	1 (0.3%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>During the past 2 years, have you attended or participated in a citizen patrol in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Yes	3 (3%)	39 (13%)	
No	86 (95%)	259 (86%)	
Don't know	2 (2%)	2 (<1%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>During the past 2 years, have you attended or participated in a neighborhood watch program in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Yes	12 (13%)	85 (28%)	
No	77 (85%)	214 (71%)	
Don't know	2 (2%)	1 (0.3%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Exhibit 6.6: Community Involvement  
Salt Lake City**

	1995 Survey <sup>a</sup>	1997 Survey <sup>a</sup>	Chi Square Statistic <sup>b</sup>
<i>During the past 2 years, have you attended or participated in a neighborhood cleanup project in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Yes	16 (18%)	127 (42%)	
No	74 (81%)	172 (57%)	
Don't know	1 (1%)	1 (0.3%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<sup>a</sup> Columns may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

<sup>b</sup> Significance of differences between 1995 and 1997 in the distribution of responses for each survey question.

\*\*\* Statistically significant at 1-percent level

\*\* Statistically significant at 5-percent level

\* Statistically significant at 10-percent level

n.s. Not statistically significant

***Perceptions of social services and other programs (exhibit 6.7)***

Perceptions of city services and other programs are better in 1997 than in 1995 (again significant at the .01 level on all measures). Respondents reported higher overall satisfaction with the availability of sports, recreation, and other programs for youths, the availability of drug treatment services, and the availability of job opportunities in the neighborhood.

**Exhibit 6.7: Perceptions of Social Services and Other Programs  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>In general, how satisfied are you with the availability of sports, recreation, and other programs for youths in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Very satisfied	18 (20%)	87 (29%)	
Somewhat satisfied	30 (33%)	142 (47%)	
Somewhat dissatisfied	9 (10%)	24 (8%)	
Very dissatisfied	3 (3%)	9 (3%)	
Don't know	31 (34%)	36 (12%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	2 (<1%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<i>In general, how satisfied are you with the availability of drug treatment services in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Very satisfied	1 (1%)	28 (9%)	
Somewhat satisfied	12 (13%)	81 (27%)	
Somewhat dissatisfied	6 (7%)	34 (11%)	
Very dissatisfied	5 (6%)	24 (8%)	
Don't know	67 (74%)	132 (44%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	1 (0.3%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

**Exhibit 6.7: Perceptions of Social Services and Other Programs  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>In general, how satisfied are you with the availability of job opportunities in this neighborhood?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	***
Very satisfied	8 (9%)	54 (18%)	
Somewhat satisfied	9 (10%)	109 (36%)	
Somewhat dissatisfied	13 (14%)	38 (13%)	
Very dissatisfied	8 (9%)	29 (10%)	
Don't know	53 (58%)	67 (22%)	
Refused	0 (0%)	3 (1%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

<sup>a</sup> Columns may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

<sup>b</sup> Significance of differences between 1995 and 1997 in the distribution of responses for each survey question.

\*\*\* Statistically significant at 1-percent level

\*\* Statistically significant at 5-percent level

\* Statistically significant at 10-percent level

n.s. Not statistically significant

***Perceptions of the Weed and Seed program (exhibit 6.8)***

Name recognition for the Weed and Seed program improved in 1997 (up 11 percent from 1995), with almost 20 percent of respondents having heard of the program. Specific neighborhood programs have similar recognition. Fifty-five percent are aware of the Poplar Boys and Girls Club, 60 percent of the Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center, and 70 percent of respondents are aware of the Mobile Watch program in their neighborhood.

**Exhibit 6.8: Perceptions of the Weed and Seed Program  
Salt Lake City**

	<b>1995 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1997 Survey<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Chi Square Statistic<sup>b</sup></b>
<i>Have you heard of a program called the Weed and Seed program?</i>	n = 91	n = 300	**
Yes	7 (8%)	56 (19%)	
No	83 (91%)	239 (80%)	
Don't Know	1 (1%)	5 (2%)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

1997 Respondents Only<sup>a</sup>

<i>Are you aware that the following programs are available in this neighborhood?</i>	Yes	No	Don't know	<b>Total</b>
				n = 300
Poplar Boys and Girls Club	164 (55%)	132 (44%)	3 (1%)	<b>100%</b>
Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center	179 (60%)	114 (38%)	7 (2%)	<b>100%</b>
Youth and Family Specialists	42 (14%)	252 (84%)	6 (2%)	<b>100%</b>
Mobile Watch Program	209 (70%)	87 (29%)	4 (1%)	<b>100%</b>

<sup>a</sup> Columns may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

<sup>b</sup> Significance of differences between 1995 and 1997 in the distribution of responses for each survey question.

\*\*\* Statistically significant at 1-percent level

\*\* Statistically significant at 5-percent level

\* Statistically significant at 10-percent level

n.s. Not statistically significant

## **General observations on the survey findings**

Although reports of victimization increased slightly from 1995 to 1997, the survey findings show an improvement in feelings about public safety and city services. Further, community involvement increased dramatically from 1995 to 1997, and respondents' feelings about police response was significantly more positive. This improvement in residents' perceptions was coupled with a greater awareness of Weed and Seed-funded programs.

Although one could interpret each of these trends as reflecting favorably or unfavorably on the Weed and Seed program, it would be incorrect to attribute the observed changes to the Weed and Seed efforts alone. The measured changes may, in part, be the result of the different survey methods used in 1995 and 1997. Even more importantly, it is essential to remember Weed and Seed was already being implemented in Salt Lake City in 1995 (when the first survey was conducted). Finally, although the observed changes in residents' attitudes may indeed have resulted from Weed and Seed and various community changes set in motion by the program, one could also make the case that improving economic conditions in the United States are instead primarily responsible.

## **6.3 Seeding Program Participant Interviews**

To gain the perspective of individuals in the community whom the seeding programs were intended to benefit, interviews were conducted with 40 to 60 program participants in Salt Lake City. Evaluators visited four programs and conducted interviews in groups of 7 to 10 people. These interviews were not intended to measure outcomes of the programs that were visited; rather they were designed to learn the perceived benefits and drawbacks of the programs for the individuals who participated in them.

This analysis is not meant to prove causality, and, in fact, there is no way to be certain the benefits or hindrances these people faced during the time they took part in the program are explicitly due to their participation. Further, the analysis is meant to present individual perceptions based on present involvement with these specific programs; long-term affects of these programs on the lives of the participants cannot be deduced from the interviews.

It is also important to note the interviews were arranged by each site's Weed and Seed coordinators. At the request of the evaluators, the site coordinators worked with the program directors to arrange the time, place, and group of individuals who were to be interviewed. The seeding participant interviews, therefore, are not intended to be representative of all participants and may involve self-selection bias; interviewees were selected at the discretion of the program managers, based on participants' availability and their own willingness to be interviewed.

Interviews were conducted with participants from the following Salt Lake City seeding efforts: the Mobile Neighborhood Watch program; the Poplar Boys and Girls Club After School Sports Program; Jackson Elementary School Music Program; and Youth and Family Specialist clients. The participants of these programs were therefore asked questions to elicit their perceptions of the affect their respective seeding programs have had on their lives. The following is a general program description followed by a summary and analysis of the interviews.

### **Mobile Watch interview**

The Mobile Neighborhood Watch program, made up solely of volunteers, involves community residents patrolling their neighborhoods in marked vehicles looking for any criminal activity. One man explained he saw his MNW as a bridge for improving the relationship between citizens and police officers. When the MNW was first initiated, participants reported strained relationships with police, who were not supportive of the program. Over time, however, MNW has gained the confidence of many police officers patrolling the Weed and Seed target area, and this has helped to create a stronger bond between police and the community.

Members of the Mobile Neighborhood Watch generally felt residents were more comfortable sharing information regarding criminal activity with the neighborhood watch rather than trying to flag a police officer who is often times too busy to deal with their everyday concerns. Police in many of these target areas often must focus on violent and dangerous crimes, which leaves them little time to focus on nonviolent problems that annoy community residents, such as noise disturbances. MNW volunteers, on the other hand, can spend the time that police don't have collecting data, observing, and documenting events. Participants in this community believe this effort has helped to adequately address communities' concerns.

Participants also had suggestions for improvements within the program. All of the individuals interviewed, for example, agreed that more publicity is needed for the program, that a pamphlet or a flier should be printed that could be distributed or posted around the community, in addition to the volunteers' marked cars. Such publicity would enhance the program's visibility, not only for recruitment but also with criminals who may be deterred by the knowledge the area is patrolled. In addition, every interviewee agreed more training is needed for volunteers in the program. They all felt the training was their own responsibility, rather than that of their local police department. They believed training would clarify which events are relevant to report to dispatch and would improve the safety of the volunteers. Finally, participants voiced concern over the high turnover rate among volunteers. Although the individuals interviewed had all been with the program for at least 1 year, the average time spent in the program is less than that. One way these participants hope to combat this high turnover rate is through more intensive training at the outset.

Generally speaking, the individuals who were interviewed believe there had been noticeable changes in their community since the inception of MNW. They stated they believed street prostitution had gone down considerably, the amount of graffiti had decreased, and shots were fired less frequently. Although they were unable to quantify the improvements, there was a qualitative change in their communities they believe resulted from the program.

### **Youth and Family Specialist participants interview**

Weed and Seed funding was used to pay the salaries of two Youth and Family Specialists (YFS), who are based in the Office of Community Policing. They offer counseling services to young people who have been involved with the law and their families. Interviews were conducted with a group of individuals who had received services from the YFS.



All of the individuals who evaluators spoke with had heard of YFS through either a court order, a school counselor, or the COPS office. The length of time they had spent working with YFS varied from 6 months to 3 years. The Youth and Family Specialists spent individual time with each of the people interviewed. YFS have relationships with the families' educators and leave their number with the teachers to contact them if there are any problems.

The participants interviewed unanimously enjoyed working with YFS. They explained YFS connected them with various resources they were previously unaware of, such as parenting classes, afterschool programs, and summer camps. One young woman explained her mother attended parenting classes and now knows "how to handle" her and how to discipline her.

In addition to connecting participants with services, Youth and Family Specialists are also available to their clients when they are in a crisis. For example, one young man explained his YFS was helpful to talk with and visited him once a week to make sure he did not get into trouble. In addition, the young man told evaluators if he felt as if he was going to "get himself into trouble," he always beeped his YFS before acting on his anger in the hope the specialist could help him work through his anger in a more productive way.

When asked if the program should be expanded to serve more families, the participants wholeheartedly said they thought it should. One mother explained she knew many of her son's friends were not getting any help at home or at school. If children do not get placed in the Colors of Success program at their school (a program designed to help kids stay out of trouble for which there is always a waiting list), then they have no alternatives.

### **Music group interview**

Jackson Elementary School runs a music program for its students that was partially funded through Weed and Seed moneys. For one academic year, Weed and Seed funded one-quarter of a teacher's salary and paid for some instruments to be repaired. The children at Jackson Elementary attend music class daily and learn to play four instruments over the course of their 6 years in the school. The younger grades (1-3) play the xylophone and the keyboard, and the older grades (4-5) play the violin and the recorder. The children also learn how to read music and perform on stage. In addition, the children's classroom teachers also are learning to play these instruments through this program. Two groups of children who participate in the music program were interviewed.

The children told evaluators they learn how to read and write music and how to play songs on string instruments. Over the years, they have learned how to play four instruments: violin, keyboard, xylophone, and recorder. One girl said she thinks "it is nice to learn music because it prepares you for when you get older, and it sort of helps you to know what you want to be." When asked if she had decided to work in the music field because of this experience, she said she wanted to be a pianist. Other children then chimed in that they would like to continue taking lessons after they leave Jackson Elementary. Two of the children said their parents were going to buy them a violin so they could play at home. Still others said without this class, they would never learn to play an instrument because it is too expensive to take lessons but "cheap to play at school."

When asked what they liked best about the program one child responded he liked how the teachers trust him to take care of the instruments. Another girl said she thought it was "neat how she got to learn to write and read in a different language instead of just letters." When asked if they would recommend this program to their friends, the answer was a resounding yes. In fact, one girl said she told her friend she should switch schools so she could play the violin.

Following the interview, the teacher explained she thought the program taught the children discipline and teamwork, as well as built their confidence every time they successfully completed a song, explaining: "It helps kids feel like they can master something, which is something many of these kids have not yet been able to do."

### **Boys and Girls Club interview**

Weed and Seed moneys were used to fund the start-up costs of the Poplar Grove Boys and Girls Club After School Sports Program. Interviews were conducted with boys and girls ranging in age from 10 to 12 who participated in the afterschool sports program three to four times a week. Weed and Seed funds enabled the Boys and Girls Club to buy uniforms, a batting machine, and other equipment that would last long after the funding disappeared and ensured the program could remain in existence.

A number of the participants said if it were not for this program, they would get into trouble, do drugs, or just hang around their house watching television. Participating in this afterschool program allows them to spend time with friends, exercise, and travel to other areas of Salt Lake City to compete in sporting events. For many of these children, these events are the only time they get out of their own neighborhood.

In between seasons, the kids told evaluators their coach meets them after school and takes them to the movies or to the club to participate in the other activities offered there, such as homework time, computer classes, using the pool table, or playing other games. However, the children were quick to tell evaluators there are not enough afterschool programs for children their age in their neighborhood. They would all like to see more places like the Poplar Boys and Girls Club that have structured activities for them to participate in after school.

## **7.0 Future Directions and Degree of Institutionalization**

Programs like Weed and Seed and Comprehensive Communities have succeeded in strengthening informal processes and networks in Salt Lake City. Weed and Seed funds have provided resources the city cannot directly provide, such as money for leadership training for community groups. Such resources strengthen the capacity of these groups to work with the city to address persistent community problems. It is clear a system for agency communications and programming is emerging from the oftentimes frustrating experiences of those associated with planning and operating Weed and Seed efforts in Salt Lake City. The building of the Sorenson Center and, to a lesser extent, the Boys and Girls Club of Poplar Grove, provide examples of this emerging communications system; having such places now has created a desire to coordinate activities at these sites, as well as to elaborate on the range of services that can be brought to bear on community problems.

In addition, Salt Lake City continues to use the Community Action Teams as its centerpiece of community mobilization and problemsolving. This is generally coupled with the Mobile Neighborhood Watch, which actively engages community members in coproducing order maintenance services in the three targeted communities associated with Weed and Seed in Salt Lake City. The Community Action Teams and the Mobile Neighborhood Watch are important illustrations of community-directed public safety activities. These efforts have caused the Salt Lake City Police Department to rethink its community and problem-oriented strategies, providing an important community platform for future interventions.

The project has created an opportunity for SLCPD to elaborate on its neighborhood police station process, build accountability for local police services, and reorient the supervisory and command staff toward a more community-centered approach to law enforcement. This is a work in progress, however. Subsequent needs within the department include increased training, performance standards by which to judge success, and increased linkage with other government and nonprofit agencies serving the community. Perhaps most important is the need to increase the department's ability to engage in serious organizational change—a precursor to effectively institutionalizing Weed and Seed into a new style of policing that is emerging in Salt Lake City.

These conclusions are buttressed by the fact the Salt Lake City Police Department has successfully obtained a grant from the Office of Community Oriented Police Services and is now designated as a Community Policing Demonstration Center. Past learning and the infusion of Federal funds from several sources, including Weed and Seed, have resulted in positioning the Salt Lake City Police Department for further pursuit of community and problem-oriented policing—strategies that form the core of the overall Weed and Seed program.

## About the National Institute of Justice

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a component of the Office of Justice Programs, is the research agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. Created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, NIJ is authorized to support research, evaluation, and demonstration programs, development of technology, and both national and international information dissemination. Specific mandates of the Act direct NIJ to:

- Sponsor special projects, and research and development programs, that will improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and reduce or prevent crime.
- Conduct national demonstration projects that employ innovative or promising approaches for improving criminal justice.
- Develop new technologies to fight crime and improve criminal justice.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs and identify programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated.
- Recommend actions that can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments as well as by private organizations to improve criminal justice.
- Carry out research on criminal behavior.
- Develop new methods of crime prevention and reduction of crime and delinquency.

In recent years, NIJ has greatly expanded its initiatives, the result of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the Crime Act), partnerships with other Federal agencies and private foundations, advances in technology, and a new international focus. Some examples of these new initiatives:

- New research and evaluation are exploring key issues in community policing, violence against women, sentencing reforms, and specialized courts such as drug courts.
- Dual-use technologies are being developed to support national defense and local law enforcement needs.
- The causes, treatment, and prevention of violence against women and violence within the family are being investigated in cooperation with several agencies of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
- NIJ's links with the international community are being strengthened through membership in the United Nations network of criminological institutes; participation in developing the U.N. Criminal Justice Information Network; initiation of UNOJUST (U.N. Online Justice Clearinghouse), which electronically links the institutes to the U.N. network; and establishment of an NIJ International Center.
- The NIJ-administered criminal justice information clearinghouse, the world's largest, has improved its online capability.
- The Institute's Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program has been expanded and enhanced. Renamed ADAM (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring), the program will increase the number of drug-testing sites, and its role as a "platform" for studying drug-related crime will grow.
- NIJ's new Crime Mapping Research Center will provide training in computer mapping technology, collect and archive geocoded crime data, and develop analytic software.
- The Institute's program of intramural research has been expanded and enhanced.

The Institute Director, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, establishes the Institute's objectives, guided by the priorities of the Office of Justice Programs, the Department of Justice, and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice professionals and researchers in the continuing search for answers that inform public policymaking in crime and justice.