Final Report:

"Reducing Violent Crime and Firearms Violence: The Indianapolis Lever-Pulling Experiment"

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Executive Summary

Introduction

This report is based on an experimental evaluation of a lever-pulling strategy implemented in Indianapolis, Indiana. The lever-pulling model was first developed as part of a broad-based, problem-solving effort implemented in Boston in the mid-1990s. One of the most intriguing elements of this effort was the attempt to deter the future violent behavior of chronic offenders by first communicating directly to them about the impact that violence had on the community and the implementation of new efforts to respond to it, and then giving credibility to this communication effort by using all available legal sanctions (i.e., levers) against these offenders when violence occurred. The reduction of violent crime in Boston, after the implementation of this strategy, was impressive: violent gang offending slowed, youth homicides, which were the focus of the effort, declined, as did shots fired and youth gun assaults. Although successes have been observed in other cities such as Indianapolis, Indiana, Stockton, California, and Winston-Salem, North Carolina, other jurisdictions have experienced implementation problems (i.e., Baltimore, San Francisco) and/or have been unable to sustain the program (Kennedy 2006). The original design implemented in Boston, despite its success, ended in 2000 (Braga and Winship 2006).

There has been an important body of research published that outlines the key elements of this strategy (Kennedy 2006; Braga and Winship 2006). First, it applies a problem-solving approach, where a specific problem is selected and then quantitative and qualitative data are collected to achieve a deep understanding of the nature of the problem. Qualitative data collection focuses on enhancing this understanding by collecting front-line intelligence related to understanding the network of offenders involved in gang-related violence. Second, the effort is coordinated by an interagency working group involving federal and local police, probation, prosecutors, and community resource personnel. For example, the interagency working group in Boston coordinated the activities of the Boston Youth Violence Strike Force—a unit with 40 detectives or officers (Braga and Winship 2006). Third, there is an effort to communicate directly and persuasively to the offending population that the "rules of the game" have changed and that there is an intensive effort ongoing to disrupt specific problem area activities. In general, this communication occurs at a "call-in" meeting between probationers and members of the working group. Fourth, the message delivered includes a summary of the changing nature of the criminal justice response (sticks) and available opportunities for program participation (carrots). Finally, follow-up includes applying "levers" where appropriate. A response is specifically tied to behavior, and includes exploring all possible sanctions for individuals involved in the offending group.

Indianapolis was one of many cities that implemented lever pulling in some format as a potentially important violence-reduction strategy. When lever-pulling was first introduced in early 1998, the strategy that was implemented closely resembled the Boston strategy. For example, the working group involved in Indianapolis was motivated by a concern about an unprecedented level of violence, it focused on bringing in groups of known, chronic offenders and their associates, and it delivered a message that clearly tied action to behavior and substantial efforts were made to apply levers to support the communicated message. Although lever-pulling was only one part of a comprehensive,

problem-solving effort, the results that have been published on the impact of the strategy on crime generally support the impact findings from Boston. Specifically, homicide rates declined significantly during the intervention period, gun assaults and armed robberies went down, and the type of homicide that was targeted for intervention—homicides involving guns, gangs, and drugs—were reduced.

Since 1998, and perhaps because of the early success of the model, policymakers in Indianapolis have continued to use lever pulling and expanded and altered its use to respond to various offending populations. In 2002, the working group of criminal justice officials used the strategy in an attempt to reduce violent, drug, and gun probationers, but communication was occurring in two very different meeting formats. One group of probationers had face-to-face meetings with federal and local law enforcement officials who heard primarily a deterrence-based message, but community officials also discussed various types of job and treatment opportunities. Another group of probationers attended meetings with community leaders and service providers only who focused on the impact of violence on the community and available services. This meeting structure provided an opportunity to assess how probationers were impacted by their participation in one of these types of meeting.

Unlike other published evaluations that have focused on general impacts of this strategy on crime and types of crime, the format provided the opportunity to examine the specific effects of lever pulling on the individuals exposed to the meeting. Specifically, the strategy provided an opportunity to gather information about probationers' perceptions of these two different meetings. What about the meeting was meaningful and helpful to them? What did they remember about the meeting, and did they understand why they were attending and the significance of it? Did they discuss the message with others in their social network thus diffusing it through the general offending population? Was a meeting an effective way to communicate information about the "risks" of offending and the value of participating in service opportunities? There was also the potential opportunity to assess the impact of the meeting and the lever pulling follow up on various behavioral outcomes. An important question is whether the strategy influenced their offending patterns in any way. Were probationers attending the two types of meeting less likely to recidivate? Did they recidivate less frequently? Did they commit different and less serious types of offense? Were they more likely to comply with their conditions of probation? Were they more likely to take advantage of the opportunities for treatment and service?

Research Design and Data Elements.

In 2002, a two meeting format was adopted. One type of meeting—the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting—was similar to what had typically been used in Indianapolis and modeled some of the principles of the Boston approach. The second meeting was called the community leader lever-pulling meeting. Probationers were randomly assigned to the law enforcement focused lever-pulling group (group 1), the community leader lever-pulling group (group 2), or a regular probation control group (group 3).

The law enforcement lever-pulling meeting occurred at the courthouse. Twenty to thirty probationers and an equal number of criminal justice practitioners and community officials attended these meetings. The overall message included concern

about violence in the community, the consequences that probationers would face if they committed violent acts, and the opportunities that were being made available to them (i.e., "carrots and sticks.") Most of the speakers stressed how their organization would respond to continued involvement in crime by "pulling all levers" if they decided to be involved in criminal activities. The community speakers (and to a lesser extent one or two law enforcement officials) talked specifically about programs and opportunities. In contrast, the community leader lever-pulling meeting occurred at a community center. Three to five well known community leaders spoke at the meeting about their concern for violence in the community, program and treatment opportunities, and faith-based services.

The evaluation of the lever-pulling program in Indianapolis used an experimental design. Probationers were randomly assigned to the two types of meeting (law enforcement and community) or to a control group during six months between June 2003 and March 2004 (June/July; September/October; February/March). All felony probationers convicted of thirteen violent, drug, gun, and property offenses were eligible for random selection. There are a total of 540 probationers in the study—180 probationers in each group. Sixty-four percent of the sample was on probation for drug offenses, sixteen percent were violent crime offenders, ten percent were weapons offenders, and ten percent were property offenders. Most of the probationers in the study were single (74.6%), male (87.6%), black (71.9%), and have little income. Over 60 percent of the probationers made less than 10,000 per year. Probationers were about 31-years-old, and had an eleventh grade education.

Three types of data were collected to assess perceptions about the meeting, offending behavior, program participation behavior, and the levers pulled. First, interviews were conducted approximately seven months after being assigned to a group. The instrument included questions about their perceptions of the meeting and the message delivered at the meetings, their perceptions of risk of arrest, conviction, and sanction, their impressions of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and attitudes about guns and gun use. Questions were also asked about criminal activities and program participation since attending the meeting. Second, the *complete* criminal history for probationers was collected one-year after their meeting data. Data include number of arrests, arrest charges, convictions, conviction charges, felony and misdemeanor charges. number of times on probation, jail, prison, and the length of various types of sentence, and first date of arrest and first date of conviction post-treatment. Third, all available probation data were collected 365 days after the meeting date. Data include meeting attendance and punctuality, number of home, work, and sweep visits, employment information, residence information, program related concerns, and information about any contacts or responses to violations. Other variables include the number of urine screens ordered, results of the screen, and response to positive screens; number of administrative hearings, reasons for the hearings, and response; and number of revocation hearings, reasons for the hearing, and response.

In order to document whether the experiment was implemented as intended and the dosage of the treatment, especially concerning how the meeting follow-ups were executed, a comprehensive process evaluation was also conducted. Several types of process data were collected. First, the interview, criminal history, and probation instruments included information related to treatment dosage. Examples of data include

the number of contacts with various criminal justice and community officials, number of meetings and contacts with probation officers, number of urine screens ordered and response to probation violations, and the types of sentence for convictions. Second, all lever-pulling meetings that occurred during the project period were observed. Third, informal and formal interviews with key informants from participating agencies were conducted.

Findings

1. Lever-pulling meetings are an effective mechanism to communicate directly with an offending population and disrupt perceptions of risk related to sanction.

The interview results indicated that the probationers had a favorable impression of the treatment meetings. Probationers in both treatment groups strongly agreed or agreed that they made better choices because they attended the meetings, law enforcement would follow through on their promises to crack down on violent crime, participating in the meetings discourage people from breaking the law, probationers are being watched more closely, and community leaders were willing to work with them to find opportunities to succeed. Importantly, the probationers attending the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting were different than the community group probationers in a way that was consistent with the message that was emphasized at each respective meeting: the law enforcement group probationers were significantly more likely to remember that law enforcement is cracking down on violent crime, cracking down on gun crime, that they will go to federal prison if caught carrying a gun, that probation is watching their behavior closely, and that law enforcement wants them to make good choices.

Probationers discussed their participation in the meeting with many other individuals in their social network. Such meetings thus provide an opportunity to identify "common ground between authorities and offenders" (see Kennedy 2006: 167), and inject critical information to potential offenders through the "offender grapevine." Nearly 80 percent of the law enforcement group and 73 percent of the community group shared their meeting experience with at least one other percent. For example, 55 percent of law enforcement group probationers discussed the meeting with their family, 52 percent discussed it with a significant other, 49 percent discussed it with friends, 21 percent discussed it with co-workers, and 19 percent discussed it with neighbors. The law enforcement group was significantly more likely to discuss the meeting with their friends and neighbors compared to the community group.

An important element of a lever-pulling strategy is the attempt to change probationers' expectations about the risks and rewards of offending. The invitation to meet with law enforcement and community officials is designed to be a critical turning point for probationers in that the message includes the promise of shifting priorities by criminal justice personnel. All probationers who attended the meeting arrived with an understanding about the likelihood of arrest, punishment if caught, and intensity of current probation supervision. The findings support the conclusion that their perceptions related to the risk of sanction and federal court involvement changed significantly after attending the meeting. Although treatment probationers' perceptions regarding the certainty of arrest and prison were not significantly different compared to the control probationers for various offenses, the law enforcement probationers were significantly

more likely to think they would get a long prison term or their case would be taken to federal court if committing a gun crime. The law enforcement group was less likely to believe that they could get away with a lot of crimes. There were few differences comparing the groups for questions on their general attitudes towards guns, but the law enforcement group was more likely to state that the legal penalties for carrying a gun were much more and the law enforcement probationers stated that the federal system provided harsher penalties for gun crimes.

2. The treatment group probationers' post-meeting offending behavior was not different than the control probationers.

The interview, criminal history, and probation data all confirm that there were few differences between the groups. The treatment groups did not admit committing fewer crimes, were not arrested less frequently, and did not wait to recidivate longer compared to the control group. The treatment groups were not significantly less likely to be convicted of a new offense after the lever-pulling meeting, their time to conviction failure was not significantly greater, and there were no differences by type of conviction for most categories and only a few small effect sizes are noted. For example, nearly 43 percent of the probationers that were interviewed admitted to some type of criminal activity in the period between the meeting (or meeting date) and the interview date. A smaller number of the treatment probationers admitted to any criminal activity compared to the control, but the differences were not statistically significant. Approximately 33 percent of the law enforcement and control probationers, and 28 percent of the community group probationers were arrested following the meeting. On average, the law enforcement probationers failed in 140 days, the community probationers failed in 147 days, and the control probationers failed in 149 days.

Multivariate recidivism models also indicate that the treatment groups were not significantly less likely to recidivate after the meeting, did not recidivate less frequently, and were not charged with fewer crimes after the meeting. Probationers who were divorced (compared to single probationers), young, and those with lengthy criminal histories were more likely to recidivate, recidivate more frequently, and were charged with more offenses. The results comparing models for each group are quite similar--males in the control group were somewhat more likely to recidivate, recidivate more frequently compared to females, and were charged with more crimes compared to females.

Event History Analysis, or Survival Modeling, allows researchers to assess whether fixed effects substantively influence time until failure across groups and to determine if these changes can be attributed to explanatory covariates. Assignment to the group did not change the survival distribution for all offenses for those probationers tracked in the follow-up period, but the community group did recidivate to a felony faster compared to the control group and the law enforcement group was somewhat slower to commit a felony. Consistent with the recidivism models, the most important factors affecting timing of rearrest are the number of prior convictions and age. Those offenders with no or one prior conviction took longer to reoffend than offenders with two or more convictions, and older offenders remain crime-free longer than younger offenders. In addition, analysis of survival times for each group separately indicated that age seems to have the most influence on timing of recidivism for those in the "community group" more

than the law enforcement or control group. In addition, gender becomes important when looking at performance in each group, with women responding most positively to the traditional criminal justice response (as opposed to either treatment group). Interestingly, less serious offenders (those not charged with weapon or violent offenses) tend to recidivate more quickly in the control group.

3. The treatment and control probationers committed similar types of offenses after the meeting, although the law enforcement probationers were more likely to recidivate downwards (commit a less serious crime).

There were few differences comparing post-meeting offense behaviors. The law enforcement group was significantly more likely to be arrested for driving without a license, but were arrested for a similar number of violent, property, and alcohol offenses. The law enforcement group reported that they sold, possessed, or used drugs following the meeting significantly less compared to the control. The criminal history data shows that the law enforcement probationers did commit fewer drug offenses after the meeting, but the results are not significantly different. There are not any significant differences comparing the community and control group results, although the community group was somewhat less likely to be arrested for a drug possession offense or a resisting law enforcement offense.

We compared probationers' current probation offense to their first post-meeting criminal offense. Twenty-five percent of the post lever-pulling offenses committed by the law enforcement group were more serious, 66.7 percent were less serious, and 8.3 percent were similarly serious. Twenty-four percent of the community group committed a more serious offense, 46 percent committed a less serious offense, and 30 percent committed a similarly serious offense. Finally, 26.7 percent of the control group committed a more serious post lever-pulling offense, 51.7 committed a less serious offense, and 21.7 percent committed a similarly serious offense. A similar number of probationers in each group recidivated to a more serious offense, but the law enforcement group was significantly more likely to recidivate down in the post lever-pulling period.

Although researchers argue that "lever pulling" has potential application to a wide variety of individuals including domestic violence offenders (Kennedy 2006), its most common usage has been in response to firearms violence. Although some gun offenders were randomized into the study, there were not enough probationers whose current sentence was a weapons offense to include only these offenders. The probationers that were randomized into the study, however, had extensive criminal histories and many had committed weapons offenses. Only 10 percent of probationers current sentence was for a weapons offense, but 36 percent had been arrested or convicted previously for firearms violations. We explored whether the treatment influences weapons offenses in two ways: first, we compared the types of offenses committed after the meeting; second, we examined whether probationers convicted of firearms violations behaved differently after the meetings.

The self-report data indicates that a small number of probationers reported any gun activity following the meeting. Although somewhat fewer law enforcement probationers admitted firearms activities (13 percent of the law enforcement group; 15 percent of the community group; 17 percent of the control group), there were no significant differences in self-reported gun activities when comparing the treatment to the

control groups. The criminal history data presents a mixed picture. These data indicate that law enforcement probationers were significantly less likely to be arrested for a firearms offense, but the number of number of arrest charges for weapons offenses was not significantly different.

The pattern of offending by offense for the law enforcement and control group is very similar. Forty-four percent of the weapons offenders in the law enforcement group and 43 percent of the weapons offenders in the control group recidivated after the meeting. Similarly, the number of arrests, arrest charges, and time to failure is quite similar.

4. The number and type of technical violations identified by the probation department following the meeting was not different when comparing the treatment to the control groups.

Following the lever-pulling meeting date, 36 percent of the law enforcement group, 33 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and over 37 percent of the control group failed at least one urine screen. There were no significant differences when comparing the results by group for the post lever-pulling period. We also examined the number of times a probationer failed a urine screen test and the number of times they failed to report for a screen when requested. There were few differences comparing the results by group, and each group failed a similar number of times. On average, the law enforcement group had 2.1 failures, the community leader lever-pulling group had 1.7 failures, and the control group had 1.9 failures noted in their record. The majority of probationers tested positive for cocaine or tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).

The most likely response to a failed screen, both before and after the meeting, was to file a violation of probation with the court. Probationers filed a violation of probation for nearly 42 percent of the overall failures and for nearly 50 percent of the failures that occurred after the meeting date. Probation officers, however, also frequently did nothing when a probationer tested positive. The probation officers did nothing for over 25 percent of the probationers that failed after the meeting, and nearly 37 percent of the probationers that failed before the meeting. Although there were some small differences in the response to positive urine screens before the meeting, there were no differences following the meeting. Specifically, probation officers were not significantly more likely to file violation of probation when a treatment probationer tested positive, and were not less likely to do nothing.

5. The treatment probationers were not more likely to take advantage of community programming following the meeting, but they were less likely to miss meetings with their probation officers.

Interviews with probationers and probation case coding indicated that the law enforcement group was significantly less likely to miss a meeting with their probation officer, and probationers from both treatment groups were significantly more likely to contact community leaders seeking help. The results also indicate, however, that the law enforcement group was not more likely to take advantage of various types of community programming: they were not more likely to start an education program, treatment program, work program, or faith-based programming. The community group

probationers were significantly less likely to have entered treatment compared to the control group.

A similar percentage of probationers were employed at intake, employed post-lever pulling meeting, lost a job before and after the meeting, and had a similar number of jobs after the lever-pulling meeting. Approximately 66 percent of the probationers were employed at intake, and a somewhat higher percentage had a job in the period following the lever-pulling meeting date. Seven-nine percent of the law enforcement group, and 80 percent of the community and control groups, had a job after the lever pulling meeting. Similarly, there was not much difference in whether probationers were fired and/or lost a job before and after the lever-pulling meeting.

It is not surprising that most of the probationers in this study have participated in some type of drug treatment program and community work service hours, and the participation and completion is similar across groups. Surprisingly, the community group probationers were significantly less likely to have been required to participate in an education or work programs, and less likely to have completed an education program but more likely to complete a work-related program if they participated. The results show that there were no or small differences in program sessions noted in probation officer notes. The law enforcement group, however, was significantly more likely to have had program meetings after attending a lever-pulling meeting, but, of those probationers who had program meetings following the meeting date, they were only slightly more likely to complete these programs.

6. The post-meeting follow-up with probationers was seriously limited: there is little evidence that a consistent range of levers were pulled after the meeting. The "call in" meetings were the primary mechanism used to alter the behavior of probationers.

Because of how the strategy was implemented in its emphasis on individual offenders (as opposed to gangs or groups of offenders), probation officers were in an important position to legitimize the message delivered at the treatment meetings. Officers could increase the contacts they had with treatment probationers, make use of sanctioning "levers" such as urine screen tests, administrative hearings, and violation of probationers, and identify additional treatment opportunities and increase program participation. The meeting was a promise, and the promise had more or less credibility depending on whether the risks of arrest increased, how the probation department responded when the probationer tested positive for drugs or violated some other condition of her probationer, how prosecutors and judges responded to new arrests or violation of probation charges, and whether informal follow-up contacts were made. It was anticipated that probationers who attended the law enforcement lever-pulling group in particular would be exposed to more levers than the control, but the results show only little support for this conclusion. The self-report, criminal history, and probation data provided little evidence that "levers were pulled" in response to violations. Probationer officers made a similar number of contacts following the meeting, similar number of home, work, and probation sweep contacts, and ordered a similar number of urine screens. Administrative hearings occur rarely, very few probationers had more than one administrative hearing, and there were no overall differences comparing the number of hearing results, and no significant differences comparing how the department punished

the probationer after the hearing. Probation officers filed significantly more violations of probations against the law enforcement group probationers following the meeting. Rather than request an administrative hearing, it appears that probation officers would more frequently file a probation violation against the law enforcement lever-pulling group compared to the control probationers.

All charges were dismissed for 63 percent of the probationers charged with a post lever-pulling offense. If the prosecutor's office was a legitimate lever contributing to the initiative, one would expect that charges to be significantly less likely to have been dismissed for the treatment groups. The results do not support this conclusion and actually are in the opposite direction of what was expected: the control group had somewhat fewer post lever-pulling charges dismissed. Sixty percent of the control and community leader lever-pulling group, and 68 percent of the law enforcement group had all post lever-pulling charges dismissed. Probationers in the treatment groups were not sentenced more times to probation, jail, or prison, and did not receive longer probation or jail sentences on average. Finally, interviews with the probationers indicate that they were contacted a similar number of times by police officers, community leaders, clergy, and probation officers following the meeting.

Policy Implications

The law enforcement meeting was a potentially promising way to directly communicate with the offending population. Offenders have a working knowledge of how the system works—its strength and weaknesses—but these understandings are malleable. Attending one of these meetings can be a turning point that leads to the successful completion of probation in the short term. The reactions of the probationers in the courtroom were quite powerful: they seemed to be very uncomfortable and concerned about the implications of the message. They also left the meeting quickly, but talked about it with other important people in their social network. Interviews with probationers took place between months seven and nine post-meeting/post-meeting date: one would suspect considerable decay about the importance of the message and what they could recall about the meeting. They did recall, however, the most salient issues that were stressed at the meeting and many took the initiative to contact the community leaders seeking help. The important aspects of the message could have been enhanced significantly with some limited attempt of follow-up: their probation officer could have discussed the lever-pulling message at their next meeting, probation staff could have reminded them about the meeting during a probation sweep visit, or a community leader could have called them asking for assistance. There was no evidence of any such follow up occurring with the probationers in the study, but it is interesting that parts of the message still resonated strongly with probationers who attended the law enforcement group.

The unfortunate conclusion of this report is that "lever pulling" as implemented in Indianapolis had little effect on the probationers that attended the meetings. It is at first glance a surprising finding considering the success documented in Boston and in Indianapolis from 1998-2000. It is important to note, however, that the result is not an indictment of lever pulling, but it does illuminate the substantial obstacles policymakers face when implementing such a strategy. The extensive data collected related to process clearly leads to the conclusion that arguably the most important element of the strategy

was ignored—very little follow-up occurred after the meeting and few levers were pulled. The threat and carrots offered at the meeting lacked credibility. It is thus not surprising that the strategy had little effect on the dependent variables of interest. Contrary to what occurred for this study, there were solid collaborative partnerships in place and then an incredible influx of resources/personnel dedicated to the effort in Boston, and in the early years of Indianapolis, to accomplish the specific goals of the strategy. The urgency in responding to violence in Indianapolis was muted by the time the experiment began, and importantly, there was not an additional commitment of resources/personnel dedicated to pulling levers. Although the experiment held together reasonably well, the program was attempted with resources already in place which did not result in the necessary dosage to have any impact. The results on impacts and the problems with implementation provide valuable lessons about why strategies that might succeed in some locations, sometimes fail. These lessons are discussed below.

First, there is a general resistance to organizational change and innovation. Often, federal dollars are made available to attempt new strategies but such reforms are only adopted symbolically—there is an appearance that the strategy is adopted and operating as intended but actual operations change only slightly. There is a significant body of research that shows the capacity of the criminal justice system to absorb reform (see Hagan 1989). Indianapolis appeared to be an ideal site to test the effectiveness of the strategy—policymakers had been committed to it for a long time and collaborative relationships appeared to be in place. However, by the time the experiment was in the field, the urgency to respond to violence by working collaboratively had dissipated and the working group could no longer overcome political and organizational obstacles.

Second, there has been an increasing number of multi-agency, collaborative task force strategies used to respond to a variety of criminal offenses. Researchers discuss that Boston had in place "a very powerful "network of capacity""—the "network was well positioned to launch an effective response to youth violence because criminal justice agencies, community groups, and social service agencies coordinated and combined their efforts in way that could magnify their separate effects" (Braga and Winship 2006: 178). Similarly, Zimmermann's (2006) recent research examining the adoption of federal incentives to respond to firearms violence finds significant differences in the extent of adoption. Furthermore, she finds that successful efforts to adopt PSN-related initiatives is influenced by strong information infrastructures, experience in collaborative and strategic planning efforts, effective leadership, widespread commitment, and community involvement.

Thus, an important question for policymakers to consider when deciding to implement a lever-pulling strategy is whether a working group is willing to commit the time and resources for effective follow-up. Multi-agency collaboration is fundamental to the success of such a strategy: all of the participating organizations have resource constraints that limit how many and what personnel can be committed to responding to an offense identified as a priority. If multiple agencies contribute some resources, however, then the collective goals of the project can still be accomplished. There are certainly ways to prevent overextending the groups involved in such a project. One could, for example, limit the number of groups and/or individuals targeted instead of implementing a broad-based strategy as was evaluated here. Another important consideration could be to not think of applying levers as add-on responsibilities, but to more strategically

distribute available resources. However, even if the number of groups and/or individuals targeted for such a strategy was limited, the application of levers, organizing a coordinated response, and the commitment of personnel from many different organizations to pull these levers in accordance with the message delivered at the meetings, is a significant undertaking.

Third, lever-pulling in Indianapolis was implemented by a group of dedicated individuals who believed in the strategy and invested considerable time and effort. The strategy is time consuming and draining—meetings to understand the nature of the problem, coordinate attendees and speakers, and make arrangements to deliver the message took a significant number of hours. Moreover, probably the most significant time has to be spent on follow-up: identifying appropriate responses to give the message credibility. This latter element was not implemented. It demonstrates another common symptom of failed strategies: often the only officials who know about a strategy and its goals are those directly involved in the program. Researchers refer to this as an "innovation ghetto" (Toch and Grant 1991). Organizations are limited in their ability to communicate priorities, and line-level workers still have considerable discretion to decide the nature of a response, even when requested to make one. When conducting the interviews at the probation offices, there was an opportunity to interact informally with probation officers and talk about lever-pulling. It was actually surprising how most probation officers knew about the lever-pulling program, but few understood the nature of the strategy and importantly did not know that they played a critical role in its success. Critical to the success of lever-pulling is the involvement of individuals from various organizations—the need for training to inform staff of their role and to develop communication networks to share these needs is critical to the success of such a strategy.

Conclusion

In general, the experiment was implemented as intended and the groups were equivalent prior to assignment. But because a large number of probationers had to be randomly chosen for the study in a relatively short amount of time, it overwhelmed the capacity of the criminal justice organizations to follow-up with the probationers. In addition, because of how the list of probationers were provided to us by the probation department, it was impossible to eliminate the probationers who were on the list but were not technically meeting with their probation officer. Many of the non-attendees, for example, had already failed. Although one would suspect that many of the control probationers also had already failed at assignment, it would have been a much cleaner experiment if the status of the probationer at assignment and time to probation completion could have been included in the eligibility criteria for the random selection process. Analysis were conducted to examine whether threats to validity, such as meeting attendance, time of exposure to the treatment, and type of offender and criminal history, were examined and few significant differences were uncovered.

One of the strengths of this study was the amount of information collected from various sources to understand issues related to dosage of the treatment. Detailed information was collected on important outcomes, but also a large amount of data on the levers pulled. The information about the levers pulled was collected with the hope of identifying whether there is a "right mix" of levers to be used to respond to offenders, as well as how that mix might vary by type of offender. Since there was little difference in post-meeting attention to the probationers in the study, there was no value in exploring

this line of research but it is an important consideration for future research. The process evaluation clearly showed that following up with such a large number of offenders was much too cumbersome.

Finally, one of the significant differences between lever-pulling in Boston (and in the early years of the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership) was that meetings were group based and that conduct of one group member would impact the consequences for all members. A group-based research design was impossible because of the commitment to the field experiment. Individuals who attended the meetings were not necessarily affiliated with a group of known chronic offenders and specific criminal activities was not what brought them into the "call-in" meeting. The plan was to "back-up" the message by responding specifically to individual violations. There was an expectation that their probation violations would be a higher priority, new cases would be treated differently by the local prosecutor or turned over to the United States Attorney's Office, and the working group would use other levers at their disposal, such as doing home visits and visiting them on inter-agency sweeps, but such a strategy, even if implemented as intended, is probably an ineffective way to implement the strategy.

Chapter 1
The Indianapolis Lever-Pulling Experiment

Introduction

One of the most intriguing criminal justice interventions implemented in the 1990s was "Operation Ceasefire." Starting in 1995, a multi-agency working group of mostly line-level criminal justice personnel, practitioners, and researchers in Boston met to analyze, design, implement, and assess responses to violent crime (Braga and Kennedy 2002; Kennedy, Piehl, & Braga, 1996; Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy & Braga, 1998; Kennedy, 1998; Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001; McDevitt, Braga, Nurge, & Buerger, 2003). After analyses indicated that gangs and violent gang behavior accounted for most of the homicides that occurred in Boston, the multi-agency team implemented a strategy to disrupt the cyclical and retaliatory pattern of gang-related violence. The response was multidimensional and evolved over time, but one element in particular is the focus of this study: The multi-agency working group attempted to deter the future violent behavior of chronic offenders by informing gang members that violence was no longer going to be tolerated and would be met with a certain and severe criminal justice response. Known as "pulling levers," the agencies involved backed up the message by using all available legal sanctions against the targeted offenders when violence occurred (Kennedy 1997). The results from research analyzing the impacts of "Operation Ceasefire" in Boston and from similar programs in other cities are impressive (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl, 2001; Braga and Kennedy 2002; Braga and Pierce 2005; Kennedy 1997; but see Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Baumer 2005). For example, violent gang offending slowed dramatically in Boston, and youth homicide in Boston fell by two-

thirds after the strategy was put into place (Kennedy 1998: 3). The intervention also produced significant reductions in shots fired, gun assaults, and youth gun assaults. In fact, it accounted for a 63 percent decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides, 25 percent decrease in assaults with firearms, and 32 percent decrease in shots fired. Moreover, Boston experienced the largest statistically significant decline in youth homicide when compared to other cities (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001). Some jurisdictions, such as Minneapolis and Indianapolis, experienced reductions in homicide after having implemented a lever-pulling strategy (McGarrell and Chermak 2003; Kennedy, 1998; Kennedy & Braga, 1998), but other jurisdictions have experienced implementation problems (i.e., Baltimore, San Francisco) and/or have been unable to sustain the program (Kennedy 2006). The original design implemented in Boston, for example, ended in 2000 (Braga and Winship 2006).

This success led the National Institute of Justice to support efforts to replicate the Boston model in ten other cities. Similar efforts were supported as "Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiatives" (SACSI), and the Department of Justice's Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN) initiative has provided an infusion of both resources and energy that has expanded the use of multi-agency, data-driven strategic approaches. The PSN and SACSI sites have tailored their responses to local crime and offending patterns, but many have adopted lever pulling and lever-pulling meetings or "offender notification meetings" as part of their strategic action plan. According to McDevitt et al. (2006: 3), offender notification meetings are being used in at least 36 PSN sites. Research, however, has not yet systematically evaluated this innovative intervention strategy. Filling this gap will help PSN jurisdictions, as well as other locales using

similar strategies, to more effectively implement collaborative efforts to reduce violence, gun crime, and other types of crime.

This research project accomplishes three objectives. First, it provides an experimental evaluation of the "pulling levers" strategy. Although the lever-pulling strategy has become a foundational element of many collaborative partnerships across the country, is a central element of the strategic plans of many PSN jurisdictions, and is considered a promising strategy for the reduction of violent crime, there has not been a strong empirical test of this strategy. This study addresses the effects of lever pulling as it was implemented in Indianapolis using an experimental design. The focus is on the specific effects on probationers after participating in one of the treatment groups. Second, this research project evaluates different types of lever-pulling meetings. At the time the experiment was going into the field, Indianapolis was experimenting with two different types of lever-pulling meeting: one where probationers were assigned to face-to-face meetings with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials who focused primarily on a deterrence-based message (similar to the Boston lever-pulling meeting) and the second where probationers attended meetings with community leaders and service providers who focused solely on a compliance message and available community services. Probationers were randomly assigned to attend one of these two types of meetings and were compared to a control group of probationers who were on regular probation supervision. Third, this project provides a process oriented account of lever pulling in action. The process analysis was an important element of the evaluation because it 1). Allows for the documentation of how lever pulling was implemented during the study period, and how it compared to lever pulling in Boston and in

Indianapolis in 1998; 2). Allows for the documentation of the treatment regiment; and 3). Allows for the determination of whether the experiment, and the treatment, were implemented as designed. These three objectives are closely intertwined, but we think it is necessary to provide a process assessment to better understand the successes, failures, implementation hurdles, and operational issues that impacted the delivery and effectiveness of the treatment and the dosage regarding the levers pulled.

This final report includes six chapters. In this first chapter, I discuss the nature of the implemented strategy in Indianapolis. In Chapter 2, the research design and methodological issues are discussed. In Chapter 3, results from interviews with probationers who attended the meetings are provided. Chapter 4 presents the post-meeting recidivism behavior, measured by official arrest statistics. Chapter 5 includes the results of analysis using data from probation records. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the overall findings and policy implications.

Statement of the Problem

One of the most significant challenges faced by communities today is responding more effectively to violent crime. There is a range of available estimates and evidence of general downward trends, but what we know about violence and gun crime paints a grim picture. National Crime Victimization figures for 2004 indicate that 24 million crimes were committed (U.S. residents 12 or older) and that over twenty percent of these crimes were violent (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004). Uniform Crime Reports show that over 1.35 million violent crimes were reported to the police in 2004 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2004). Most homicides are committed with some type of firearm. For

2003, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that sixty-nine percent of all homicides were committed with a firearm, and UCR figures indicate that firearms were present in twenty-six percent of all index crimes in 2004. Researchers conclude that "while gun violence is highly concentrated in the United States, our rates of gun violence are so high that even people who are at relatively low risk by American standards are "at risk" by international standards" (Cook and Ludwig 2000: 27). Black males and juvenile and/or young offenders have the highest rates of victimization and offending (Moore and Tonry 1998; Kennedy & Braga, 1998; Cook & Laub, 1998). For example, the black homicide offending rate in 2002 was 24.9 per 100,000, while white homicide offending rate was 3.6 (BJS, 2004).

The statistics we have about crime are used by policymakers to make informed policy decisions and ultimately may influence criminal justice priorities. Despite the well-known limitations of these sources, the figures are useful as an indicator of the total amount of crime and long-term trends. However, what such statistics fail to capture is the impact that crime has on crime victims and society. The numbers tend to overshadow the harm, suffering, and trauma caused by crime to victims and the community. Victims are affected physically, psychologically, emotionally, and socially. One of the most important studies examining the costs of victimization is a 1996 report published by the National Institute of Justice entitled, *Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look* (Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema, 1996). This study finds that personal crimes cost over $100 billion dollars annually in tangible losses, such as property damage and loss, medical and mental health care, productivity losses, and costs related to providing assistance to victims. The study also calculates intangible losses, such as the amount of

pain, suffering, and reduced quality of life caused by crime. When these intangible losses are considered, the costs of victimization increase to over $450 billion dollars annually. What is even more staggering about these figures is that they exclude several types of serious crimes from the cost-estimations, including white-collar and drug crimes. Other estimates of the annual costs of gun violence are at about 100 billion dollars (Cook and Ludwig 2000).

The extent of violence and its impact highlight a critical need to develop and implement programs to reduce violence and victimization. There clearly has been an effort to implement worthwhile strategic interventions and the number and types of programs have undergone dramatic changes in the last twenty years (see Decker 2003). Although several innovative programs, like Operation Ceasefire, the Kansas City Gun and Indianapolis Directed Patrol Experiments have shown promising results (see Kennedy 1997; McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, and Wilson 2001; Sherman, Shaw and Rogan 1995; Wellford, Pepper and Petrie 2005), there remain significant gaps in our understanding about why some programs show potential at being successful violence-reduction strategies. There is a significant need for additional assessments of promising initiatives using strong research methodologies (Piquero 2005; Reed & Decker, 2002; Rosenfeld and Decker, 1996).

It is impossible to cite all of the different types of programs and their impacts on crime, but some general conclusions are worth noting. First, collaborative partnerships involving multiple agencies are worth pursuing as an effective response to violent crime. The boundaries between criminal justice organizations have become increasingly blurry, and it appears that the sharing of intelligence, data, and resources are critical to effective

intervention. Second, research on community-based partnerships support the conclusion that any collaboration must be broad-based and include law enforcement officials, policymakers, community partners, and service providers to maximize both short- and long-term effects. Third, strategic interventions must be guided by data-driven problem analysis. The growth and increased sophistication of crime analysis and data application, and using analysis as a precursor to intervention, can increase the impact of an intervention. Fourth, there may be value in attempting to enhance the impact of a strategic intervention by communicating directly with the general public and the offending population. In Boston and Minneapolis, for example, policymakers had face-to face meetings and used other strategies to communicate that violence was no longer going to be tolerated and the consequences of continued violence (Kennedy 1997; Kennedy and Braga 1998). Although very good research has been published that lends supports to these conclusions, it is important to continue to more rigorously evaluate promising strategies to document what about these programs work.

This research builds on the body of research evaluating the impacts of crime-fighting innovations in two ways. First, it provides a thorough evaluation of a lever-pulling strategy as implemented in Indianapolis, Indiana. There is both anecdotal and general evaluative support for the promise of this approach (see Braga and Kennedy 2002; Braga and Pierce 2005; Kennedy 1997; Kennedy and Braga 1998; Tita, Riley, and Greenwood 2003). It is important to more thoroughly examine the impact of such a strategy because it is apparent that other cities and programs are adopting the general model as a central component of a violent crime reduction strategy. This study is also important because not only will it provide an evaluation of lever pulling, but also it will

explore two lever-pulling models that will be used to communicate different messages to the targeted population. Whether lever-pulling works, and which model works most effectively, will be of considerable interest to policymakers, practitioners, and scholars.

Second, we have a rare opportunity to evaluate this strategy using an experimental design. The strengths of the experimental method are well documented (Cook and Campbell 1979; Farrington 1983); one of its key features is random assignment. Random assignment "provides a statistical basis for making the assumption that the outcomes observed by researchers results from the interventions they study" (Weisburd and Garner 1992: 3). Robert Boruch's (1997: 3-4) important book on randomized experiments summarizes the two key benefits of randomized trials quite effectively: first, randomized trials permit a fair comparison and the estimates of differences will be unbiased. In addition, it increases one's confidence in the results of the study—that is, statistical tests "are less biased and more powerful" and we can "have greater faith both in magnitude estimates of effects in inferences about rejecting the null hypothesis" (Cook and Campbell 1979: 342). Despite the value of experimental designs, it has generally been an underutilized methodology in criminal justice and criminological research. In general, "experiments have until recently remained on the sidelines in the development of empirical criminology" (Weisburd and Garner 1992: 3; see also Farrington 1983). This long term commitment to link research and data analysis to criminal justice policy and practice, and the working collaborations that have occurred between the researchers and practitioners have provided a window of opportunity to evaluate an important criminal justice strategic intervention by conducting an innovative research design. The project discussed in this report provides evidence of this benefit.

Review of Relevant Literature

The 1990s witnessed unexpected declines in crime as well as changes in criminal justice practice. One area of significant development was in the application of problem solving approaches to many different crime issues and criminal justice problems. Sparked by Herman Goldstein's (1990) seminal writing on problem-oriented policing and linked to the community policing movement, numerous examples have emerged where criminal justice officials have systematically analyzed a crime problem to understand the nature of it and its underlying causes, developed responses based on what was learned, and then assessed the impact of an implemented change. Problem-solving is an iterative process where adjustments are made based on analysis and evaluation. For example, New York Police Department's COMPSTAT program initiated under former Mayor Giuliani and former commissioners Bratton and Safer is an example of an initiative that formalized the problem solving process into the day-to-day administration of the department (Silverman, 1999). Under COMPSTAT, top officials from NYPD convened twice weekly crime analysis meetings whereby precinct commanders were questioned about crime patterns in their geographic commands, their strategies for addressing these problems, and their evidence that their strategies were having an impact. Reacting to crime was no longer acceptable. Police managers were held accountable for knowing the nature of crime, developing and assessing strategies for reducing crime, and ultimately for reducing crime rates. Although difficult to assess the direct impact of COMPSTAT on levels of crime, the dramatic declines in crime in New York City that coincided with

the implementation of this managerial strategy convinced NYPD officials that this proactive accountability model played a significant role in crime reduction.

Recent research indicates that the COMPSTAT model specifically, and problem-solving generally, have been widely adopted (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, and Willis 2003). In collaboration with the Police Foundation, these researchers surveyed all police agencies with over 100 officers and also 100 agencies that had less than 100 but more than 50 officers. There are several important findings from this research. First, they found that COMPSTAT-like reforms were implemented broadly following the highly publicized NYPD model. Second, they found that strategic problem solving practices were occurring in police agencies prior to the development of COMPSTAT. Finally, many police departments that did not claim to adopt a COMPSTAT model have nevertheless adopted some COMPSTAT principles.

Problem-oriented police strategies have been shown to be effective for responding to variety of crime problems, including drugs, burglary, homicide, and other violent crimes (Eck and Spelman 1987; Hope 1994; Braga et al. 1999; White, Fyfe, Campbell, and Goldkamp 2003). For example, Anthony Braga et al. (1999: 547) examined whether problem-oriented police strategies can be an effective response to violence that occurs at problem places. These researchers used a variety of analyses to identify violent crime "hot spots," matched these places, and then randomly assigned the places to control and treatment groups. The researchers concluded that the problem-oriented strategies implemented by the officers effectively reduced social and physical incivilities. Importantly, the total number of crime incidents and calls for service were significantly lower in the experimental areas compared to the control areas.

Another successful problem solving approach that has received considerable public and scholarly attention is Operation Ceasefire. Beginning in early 1995, a multi-agency working group of Boston officials and researchers began to meet on a bi-weekly basis to engage in the problem solving processes of research and analysis, strategy design, implementation, and assessment (Braga and Kennedy 2002; Braga and Pierce 2005; Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996; Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl, 2001). The working group included mostly line-level workers representing the police, probation and parole, prosecution, school police, outreach workers, federal agencies including the U.S. Attorney and BATF, and researchers from Harvard University. Operation Ceasefire sought to study crime patterns and to craft interventions based on analysis. During the analysis stage, the group employed multiple methods and relied on multiple sources of information, including official crime statistics, BATF gun tracing data, formal and informal interviews with criminal justice actors and youth workers, interviews with probationers, emergency room records, and related data. Although the focus was initially directed at reducing firearms-related violence generally, Operation Ceasefire evolved because analyses indicated that gang members who had prior involvement in the criminal justice system dominated this small pool of violence-involved youth. The pattern of youth homicide uncovered in the analysis stage suggested that the intervention be focused on gang-involved youth, particularly youth with criminal histories, in targeted areas of Boston.

One of the interesting elements of the Ceasefire strategy was that an attempt was made to establish new norms for gang members as part of the strategic plan. This approach was intriguing for two reasons. First, others have discussed that one way to

respond to gangs is to attempt to change the underlying values that "are the foundation of the gang" (Decker and Curry 2000: 565). Second, it was an attempt to upset the cyclical and retaliatory patterns that often define gang-related violence. A violent action or a threat of violent action by a gang or gang member can result in an equal or more violent reciprocal reaction by a competing gang or gang member. Researchers describe how violence and the threat of violence create an interconnectivity between gangs, enhance the solidarity of members, and may be a way to recruit new members (Decker and Van Winkle 1996; Decker 1996). This process has been referred to as a "network contagion" (Decker 1996; Loftin 1984; Papachristos 2005). Papachristos concludes that "seemingly trivial events that trigger a single homicide can organize patterns of group relations for years as the consequences of that murder ripple through the network" (p. 5).

Ceasefire members systematically informed chronic offenders that violence would no longer be tolerated and would be met with unprecedented multi-agency law enforcement response. The rationale was that the response might serve as a "fire break" that would interrupt the cycle that characterized gang violence (Braga et al. 2001). Their response was credible. That is, offenders often hear "tough talk" from criminal justice officials, but they also learn that it is just talk. When a violent incident occurred in Boston, the multi-agency team responded by imposing all possible sanctions on chronic offenders residing or found within the high crime area where the incident occurred or associated with the individuals involved in the violence. This comprehensive use of sanctions became known as applying levers. When a violent incident occurred, all potential levers were pulled. The strategy was feasible because of the characteristics of

high crime offenders. By its very nature, their chronic offending left them particularly vulnerable to a varied menu of sanctions (Kennedy, 1997).

The apparent success of the Boston project led the Department of Justice to initiate the "Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative" (SACSI). The SACSI model was originally implemented in five cities and later expanded to five additional cities. The key components of the SACSI approach included a multi-agency working team, collaboration with a research partner, and application of formal problem solving techniques to a locally chosen serious crime problem. Indianapolis was one of the cities that participated in the SACSI program. The Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership has been in operation since 1998. The focus of this partnership from the beginning was to assess the violent crime problem and implement strategies to respond to it by working with a multi-agency coalition of criminal justice agencies and community partners, committed to employing a strategic problem-solving approach. This coalition has studied patterns of homicide and firearms violence in Indianapolis, crafted interventions, assessed the impact of these interventions, and revised the strategy. One of the components of the implemented strategy, borrowed from Boston's Ceasefire, was what became known as lever-pulling meetings. These meetings involved face-to-face meetings with groups of high-risk probationers and parolees. Criminal justice officials and community members described their concern that the probationers/parolees were at high risk of either committing a violent crime or of being a victim of a violent crime. A deterrence message was communicated with an explanation of the severe penalties available under federal law for felons in possession of a firearm and the commitment of local, state, and federal law enforcement to impose severe sanctions for firearms crimes.

In addition, probationers and parolees were urged to take advantage of a range of services and opportunities including mentoring from ex-offenders, employment, housing, substance abuse, education, and vocational training. For over two and a half years, at least one lever-pulling meeting was held per month, and the focus on was the criminal activities of violent offenders and their gang associates.

Lever Pulling and Deterrence

Indianapolis, Boston, Minneapolis, Baltimore, Los Angeles, and Stockton, California have included lever pulling or offender notification as part of larger violent crime, problem-solving process, and several of these cities experienced violent crime reductions after the initiation of this type of intervention, but it has been difficult to precisely document what about this strategy is effective and contributed to the decreases in crime. Although there are other potential benefits of lever pulling and the communicative aspect of it may lead to general declines in crime (as examined in previous research on lever-pulling), this study focused only on the effects on the probationers assigned to the treatment groups. Kennedy (1997, p. 479) noted that, "the strategic use of information is central to the 'pulling levers' concept, because it can increase general offender knowledge, can be used to **explain the nature of the strategy to the targeted population**, and can be used as a substitute for action" [emphasis added]. A summary of this strategy is provided by David Kennedy (1998: 3):

> "[D]eterring violent behavior by chronic gang offenders by reaching out directly to gangs, setting clear standards for their behavior, and backing up that message by "pulling every lever" legally available when those standards were violated.

> The deceptively simple operation that resulted made use of a wide variety of traditional criminal justice tools but assembled them in fundamentally new and different ways."

There are several reasons to suspect that this element of the implemented strategy contributed to the success observed in Boston and other cities (see Kennedy 1997; 1998). First, it takes advantage of the long established conclusion that a small number of offenders account for a disproportionate number of crimes (Chaiken and Chaiken 1982; Moore 1984; Wolfgang et al., 1972) and serious crimes (Rolph et al, 1981). For example, Wolfgang et al.'s classic study concluded that six percent of delinquents committed more than 50 percent of all delinquent acts. An important study that extended this research was conducted by the RAND Corporation (Chaiken and Chaiken 1982). They found that twenty percent of offenders accounted for 80 percent of crimes committed by a sample of jail and prison inmates in three states, and other research indicates that a very small percentage of offenders may commit over 50 serious offenses in a year (Rolph et al, 1981). The chronic offending pattern of a few individuals is a robust finding that has important implications for organizing and implementing criminal justice interventions (see Wellford, Pepper and Petrie 2005). In short, chronic offenders "le[ave] themselves open to an enormous range of sanctions, exactly because they [are] so highly criminal" (Kennedy 1997: 461). In Boston, about 1,300 gang members in 61 gangs accounted for sixty percent of all youth homicides (Braga, et al., 2001: 198).

Second, because such a strategy is designed, implemented and supported by a multi-agency working group, there are a variety of sanctions available to be used against the offenders. It is a good strategy to more effectively direct resources to the most

salient, pressing crime and disorder problems. All criminal justice organizations suffer from resource and manpower limitations and thus make tough decisions about establishing crime and program priorities. Moreover, the additional responsibilities of integrating local and state law enforcement into broad terrorism strategies has made it even more pressing to use data strategically to respond to the crime problems that are most pressing. Multi-agency working groups provide one potential solution for better managing resources. Instead of a response being solely the responsibility of a local police department, other agencies can be integrated into a strategic response: local police might use "hot-spots" patrol strategies, undercover operations, or community policing programs to respond to a group that continues to commit violence after such a meeting. Federal law enforcement agencies might be brought into these strategies to collaborate or might pursue these groups independently. Since a high percentage of such offenders are likely to be on parole or probation, these agencies can shift these offenders to specialized caseloads, make frequent home visits, or use other compliance strategies in response. Local prosecutors could reopen past cases and federal prosecutors can consider using federal firearm statutes for those felons who continue to commit violence using weapons. In short, the involvement of many agencies focused on a specific problem should increase the severity and the certainty of penalties. The message that violence is a top priority and will be met by criminal justice agencies swiftly is balanced with the acknowledgement that appropriate and meaningful alternatives and services must be made available.

Third (and similarly), deterrence is augmented by this approach because it includes directly confronting offenders by providing what Kennedy calls a "retail deterrence message" (Kennedy 1998: 4). Offenders are told what types of behavior will

not be tolerated and highlights how the system will respond to violations of these new standards. Meeting with offenders and other critical events might be an important first step in altering perceptions about sanction risk (see Horney and Marshall 1992; Nagin 1998; Pogarsky, Piquero, and Paternoster 2004). Stafford and Warr's (1993) important work in this area highlights how the possibility of punishment avoidance encourages crime much more than actual punishment deters crime. Lever-pulling seeks to specifically deter chronic offenders by convincing them that punishment is not likely to be avoided—that there is a relationship between the behavior of the targeted population and how criminal justice officials react to crime.

Another relevant line of research on the impacts of publicity and communication on offending patterns is in the area of crime prevention. Research has examined how the publicity of a crime prevention activity (via newspapers, interviews, leaflets, posters, informal communication channels) may enhance the effort by increasing offenders' perceptions of risks (Johnson and Bowers 2003; Smith, Clarke, and Pease 2002). For example, Johnson and Bowers examined the impacts of the timing and intensity publicity of 21 burglary reduction schemes. They found that publicity campaigns reduced burglary and the reductions were consistent with intense periods of publicity. They argued that the mechanism through which publicity deterred crime was through changing offenders' perceptions of risk (p. 515). Similarly, and like Kennedy et al.'s discussion of the retailing deterrence, research discusses that publicity that occurs prior to implementation reduced burglary--it was an anticipatory benefit of the crime reduction scheme (Smith et al. 2002).

Fourth, such a strategy attempts to influence the informal communication networks of offenders by advertising to them the changes that can be expected and the reasons for the changes. Again, this aspect of the strategy attempts to enhance its deterrent capacity. Deterrence scholars discuss how offenders are constantly revising their perceptions of the risks and rewards of criminal behavior based on new information (see Nagin 1998: 16; Horney and Marshall 1992). Pogarsky et. al (2004: 344) refer to this process as "belief updating," and state that "rather than being static, sanction threat perceptions continuously evolve in response to ongoing experiences of the actor." Most scholars focus on evaluating the "general" deterrent and or the "specific" deterrent effects of a particular strategy, punishment, or new legislation. Braga et al. (2001: 201) discuss the deterrent principles at work in the Operation Ceasefire strategy as a "meso-deterrence" strategy: "Beyond the particular gangs subjected to the intervention, the deterrence message was applied to a relatively small audience (all gang-involved youth in Boston) rather than a general audience (all youth in Boston) and operated by making explicit cause-and-effect connects." Interactions between offenders in jail, court, and on the streets can help spread information about new initiatives in place to respond to crime and how such programs might directly affect their activities.[1] Ceasefire members spread the message using various strategies: formal meetings with gang members, face-to-face meetings with inmates, police and probation contacts, and through outreach workers. Spreading the message via lever-pulling meetings and an affirmative follow-up response

[1] If such communication patterns exist, this reality is certainly a contamination threat. That is, probationers assigned to the control group might also have updated their beliefs about sanction risk based on what they have heard "on the streets." If it is true, we would still expect the treatment groups, especially the law enforcement group, to be significantly more likely to be affected by the program because of communication of change would be "backed-up" with real action. In addition, we specifically asked a question of the surveyed control group to examine their level of knowledge of lever pulling.

are the types of new information that can cause offenders to update and reassess the risks and rewards of being involved in violent crime.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the "pulling levers" strategy has not yet been empirically tested. Since the strategy was initially an artifact of the problem-solving process that occurred in Boston, researchers were unable to *directly test* how this intervention contributed to the reduction in homicides and violent crime, although there have been several good studies that have assessed the overall impact of Ceasefire (Braga et al. 2001; Braga and Kennedy 2002; Braga and Pierce 2005; Kennedy 1997). Because of the nature of the intervention and the fact the its an examination of a program implemented in one location, it is difficult to know what mechanisms were at work that contributed to the reduction of violence in Boston.

After assessing the general body of research on guns and violence, the National Research Council's Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms concluded: "The relationship between other similar types of targeted policing programs is still evolving. The lack of research on these potentially important kinds of policies is an important shortcoming in the body of knowledge on firearms injury interventions. These programs are widely viewed as effective, but in fact knowledge of whether and how they reduce crime is limited" (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie 2005: 9). Although the "pulling levers" strategy has been implemented in other cities and has been evaluated in some manner (see below), the deterrent effects have not been tested using a controlled experiment. Doing so was among the National Research Council's Committee's recommendations. It stated: There is a need to "conduct randomized experiments to

disentangle the effects of the various levers, as well as to more generally assess the effectiveness of these targeted policing programs" (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie 2005: 9).

Evaluating the Lever-pulling Strategy

In the late 1990s, after recognizing that homicides in Indianapolis involved groups of known, chronic offenders, crime justice officials began to implement various strategies to respond to violent crime. One strategy was to attempt to deter the individuals most likely to engage in violence by what became known as lever-pulling meetings. The individuals invited to attend one of the meetings had to meet one of three criteria: they had to be on probation for a felony offense, have an extensive criminal history, and had to be in a gang or associated with a gang and/or had committed a drug or gun offense.
A dual message was presented to offenders attending these meetings. First, potential offenders were warned by the multi-agency team that violence was no longer going to be tolerated, they would describe the various sanctions or levers that would be applied to those continuing to engage in violence, and when a homicide or shooting occurred involving the above elements the law enforcement team would respond to the group or drug market and apply as many sanctions as possible. In other words, the groups would learn that violating the rule against firearms violence would mean an aggressive law enforcement response. Second, an additional component to the lever-pulling strategy involved developing relationships with different community groups in order to provide positive alternatives to gangs, drugs, and violence. That is, if law enforcement was going to emphasize the costs for continuing involvement in violence, then it was clear that opportunities for moving in a prosocial direction also had to be part of the strategy.

The third element was based on a multi-agency response following incidents. Specifically, for homicides that appeared to involve street violence involving groups of known, chronic offenders, drug markets, and high crime locations, the strategy called for a significant law enforcement response. Essentially this involved applying levers or sanctions in the way promised in the lever-pulling meetings. This could mean directed police patrol, probation and parole home visits, nuisance abatement enforcement, crackdowns on drug markets, service of outstanding warrants, and similar activities.

Lever-pulling in Indianapolis was one element of a comprehensive, problem-solving strategy implemented to respond to homicide, violent crime, and gun crime. The Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership was tasked with coordinating this problem-solving effort and implementing the lever-pulling strategy. The outcome analysis supported the conclusion that this effort significantly reduced homicides and reduce violent crime (McGarrell and Chermak 2003; Chermak and McGarrell 2004). Two quasi-experiments of the impact of lever pulling on probationers who participated in lever-pulling in Indianapolis were also completed to assess it impacts. These studies provided valuable information that were used to inform the experimental design discussed below. The first evaluation compared the perceptions and behavior of lever-pulling violent offender attendees to a matched control group of like probationers/parolees. The criminal histories of attendees were compared on criminal behavior before and after having attended their first lever-pulling meeting, compared attendee criminal histories to the control group, and attempts were made to survey the attendee and control groups. A second but similar evaluation was completed of offenders recently released from prison as part of a reentry project (McGarrell, Hipple, and Banks

2003). This evaluation consisted of having recently released inmates attend a neighborhood-based group meeting convened by criminal justice officials and including community representatives and service providers. The treatment group consisted of 93 former inmates who attended one of five meetings. The comparison group consisted of 107 former inmates released at the same time period as the treatment group but in a different neighborhood. Official records were the primary source of data used for comparing the offending behavior of the two groups.

These studies produced similar results. In general, there was little difference between the groups. Offenders that had been exposed to the treatment were as likely to be rearrested and convicted as the control offenders. The treatment offenders were somewhat less likely to commit serious crimes, and the re-entry treatment group survived longer (average = 172 days) than did the comparison group (120 days) before being re-arrested. The survey results indicated that the treatment group was not more likely to use the community services offered to them at the lever-pulling meetings.

There are three possible explanations for the limited effects observed in these two studies. First, it is possible that such a strategy just does not produce a deterrent effect, at least among those attending a meeting.[2] Second, the research is limited by its design. It is difficult to know how well the groups were matched and both studies included only a small sample of offenders. Third, the treatment may not have been implemented as intended. The results from these studies were provided to the working group in order to inform the problem-solving process. The working group was understandably

[2] The Indianapolis study did reveal evidence of a more general deterrent impact on the population of recently arrested individuals. Thus, the meetings may be effective in communicating a deterrent effect to the network of offenders even if they do not significantly alter the behavior of the most serious offenders attending the meetings (see McGarrell and Chermak, 2003).

disappointed about the results but was committed to examining why it did not work. They concluded that the group was not well informed about who had attended a meeting so it was impossible to pull levers. Meetings were occurring twice per month, and over thirty meetings were scheduled during an 18-month period. It appeared that the message delivered at the meeting lacked credibility. The other problem identified was in the delivery of the message. The majority of the speakers at the meetings were law enforcement officials stressing a deterrence-based message. This left little time for the community and service providers to discuss alternatives.

The Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership continues to meet, and over the course of the seven-year existence, the partnership has used lever-pulling to respond to variety of offenders. In early 2002, the working group again changed the effort, developing two different types of meetings—one presented by law enforcement and community officials, and the second run only by community officials. Violent, drug, and gun probationers were assigned to these meetings. This two meeting structure became the focus of this evaluation.

Conclusion

The apparent success of "Operation Ceasefire" in Boston has led many jurisdictions to consider, borrow, and implement various aspects of the model. One element that has been adopted by other jurisdictions, including Indianapolis, is the lever-pulling model. Despite this adoption, there have been only a few evaluations that have examined the impacts of this strategy and none have used a controlled experiment. This study was funded to examine the effects of two different lever-pulling models using a

randomized controlled experiment. In chapter 2, the background and the research design are discussed.

Chapter 2
Research Design

Introduction

Indianapolis was one of the first cities to adopt elements of Boston's Operation Ceasefire into local practice. There were several reasons why the strategy was appealing to Indianapolis policymakers. First, Marion County, Indiana experienced a record high for homicides and other violent crimes in the mid-1990s. In fact, the number of homicides recorded in 1997 was more than double the number of 1990 homicides. These numbers were of particular concern because many other cities had experienced downward trends. Second, the results observed in Boston were striking. Information about the strategy and its impacts was becoming increasingly well known, and thus there was strong momentum for replication. Third, the National Institute of Justice provided essential technical and financial support for cities like Indianapolis to learn about the strategy and adapt it to local patterns. Fourth, several of the elements that were crucial to the success in Boston were familiar to political and criminal justice leaders in Indianapolis. For example, Indianapolis had institutionalized community policing and also adopted a version of New York's CompStat management model—thus leaders had already embraced the need for data driven response strategies and evaluation. In addition, academics from Indiana University were already well known and had collaborated with criminal justice practitioners on the implementation and evaluation of several successful strategic initiatives in Indianapolis (McGarrell and Chermak 2003). This foundation of trust was crucial to having such a large number of agencies commit to participate in the multi-agency working group.

In early 1998, a working group of criminal justice practitioners was convened with the hope of reducing violent crime in Indianapolis, using Operation Ceasefire as a model. Key federal, state, and local organizations were involved in the working group. The following organizations were represented by one or several of its personnel: the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Indiana, the Mayor's Office, the Indianapolis Police Department, the Marion County Sheriff's Department, Indiana Department of Corrections, Marion County Justice Agency, Marion County Probation, Marion County Prosecutor's Office, Indiana State Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Marshal Service, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Drug Enforcement Administration, the Hudson Institute, and Indiana University. The working group, eventually called the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership (IVRP), committed to strategic problem solving and analysis of data related to homicides, firearms violence, and other violent crime. Data analysis included examining calls for service data, incident related data, investigation data, and criminal history data, supplemented with additional data collected bi-weekly through formal incident reviews. These analyses established that the majority of homicide victims and suspects had extensive criminal histories, were active participants in area drug markets, and were connected to "groups of chronic offenders." The results of the analysis were not surprising, but they did solidify a cross-agency understanding of the etiology of homicide as well as shape the nature of any strategic response that would be implemented.

There were many interesting elements of the response implemented in 1998, but one of the central strategies was lever-pulling meetings. Leaders from Indianapolis observed the Boston meetings, discussed their implications with the researchers involved,

borrowed scripts from the presenters, and eventually tweaked the approach in a way that was consistent with the violent crime issues and the personalities of the presenters in Indianapolis. At various times since 1998, lever-pulling meetings have been used in Indianapolis for different audiences. In fact, one of the amazing stories of the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership is that the working group has continued to meet at least once a month to coordinate strategic responses to violence. The lever-pulling meetings that have occurred have focused on responding to at risk violent crime offenders, on probation or parole, linked to known offending groups. However, the meetings have also been used as part of a geographic initiative, to respond to domestic violence offenders, as a reentry tool, and with juveniles who committed more minor offenses.

In 2002, a core group of individuals who had been long-time participants in the IVRP, and were key role players in the lever-pulling initiative, were growing increasingly skeptical about the effectiveness of the approach. Although the number of homicides had declined significantly between 1997 and 2000, those numbers had leveled off and remained relatively constant. There had been a previous evaluation of the lever-pulling meetings, and the results were fed back to the working group in the interests of understanding the impacts of the program and tweaking its implementation (McGarrell and Chermak 2003). These results, however, had been presented to the working group in early 2000. A continued interest and a desire to understand the effectiveness of the strategic intervention led to the suggestion to study the meetings using an experimental design. The working group agreed to be involved with the best intentions in mind: with their long-term commitment and the number of resources devoted to the initiative, they

wanted to evaluate whether lever pulling was effective. The rest of this chapter describes the research design implemented to answer this question.

Lever Pulling in Indianapolis: A Study of Two Different Types of Meeting

The discussion about the evaluation of lever-pulling meetings and the concerns highlighted about its effectiveness resulted in the working group exploring the possibility of changing the format of the meetings. Several alternative models were discussed, but the working group ultimately decided to adopt two different meeting types. The first was referred to as the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting and was consistent with what had typically been used in Indianapolis before and modeled some of the principles of the Boston approach. The second meeting was called the community leader lever-pulling meeting. Probationers were randomly assigned to the law enforcement focused lever-pulling group (group 1), the community leader lever-pulling group (group 2), or a regular probation control group (group 3). The format, message, and follow-up response strategies are discussed below.

Law Enforcement Lever-Pulling Meeting

Probationers who attended the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting were essentially exposed to *the type of meeting* that had occurred in Boston. As a condition of their probation, felony probationers were told by their probation officer and/or informed by letter of invitation to attend a mandatory meeting at the county courthouse. Probationers arrived around 5 p.m. and then reported to a specific courtroom. The atmosphere was tense. Although all probationers had to go through a security checkpoint

upon arrival, they were frisked before entering the courtroom. Attendees were asked to sit in the observer seats of the courtroom (essentially in the back of the courtroom, facing the judge's bench). While they sat silent waiting to learn more about why they had received this invitation, two things were happening around them. First, a slideshow that included the mug shots of homicide victims or offenders was shown on a large screen in front of the judge's bench. Each slide included prior offenses, violent criminal history, and probation status. Second, probationers noticed that the seating areas on their left and right began to fill up with officials: police officers, individuals dressed professionally and some casually. By the time the formal presentation began, there was anywhere from 20-25 probationers in attendance and about the same number of officials. The presentation began after each of the observers stood up to introduce themselves and the agency they represented.

The formal program lasted about 75 minutes. Six to nine speakers talked to the probationers. Over half of the speakers were affiliated with a criminal justice agency: there was typically one speaker from the Marion County Justice Agency, the Indianapolis Police Department, Marion County Probation, Marion County Prosecutor, and the United States Attorney's Office. In addition, two or three community leaders, representatives of the faith community, community centers, or an employment program, addressed the probationers. Most speakers talked between five and ten minutes.

The overall message that was weaved into these short presentations was the concern about violence in the community, the consequences that probationers would face if they committed violent acts, and the opportunities that were being made available to them (i.e., "carrots and sticks.") Probationers were told how violence was affecting the

community and their neighborhoods, warned that all the partners took the problem very seriously, and that committing violent acts was not going to be tolerated. Most of the speakers stressed how their organization would respond to continued involvement in crime. The speakers stressed that the probationers were part of the problem, that the groups would be watching their activities closely, and would respond by "pulling all levers" if they decided to be involved in criminal activities. The community speakers (and to a lesser extent one or two law enforcement officials) stressed a combination of hope ("I got out of the life and so can you,"), concern because of the extent of violence in the community, and opportunities available to them for success (e.g., job, education and treatment programs). Some of the community speakers talked specifically about programs and opportunities, but others simply offered contact information to address any problems that they needed help with.

Several levers were mentioned within these presentations, but it needs to be stressed that the critical lever that was threatened was the potential involvement of the federal government via the United States Attorney's Office. The speaker from the US Attorney's Office usually spoke the longest, stressing the role of the federal government in violent crime cases, and potential sanctions, both in terms of length and location. The US Attorney would talk about the collaborative information sharing and task force work that was occurring to increase the certainty of arrest in response to violence. The US Attorney would also highlight the elements of the various sentencing statutes that could be applied in a firearms-related case, the unlikelihood of being released on bail after arrest, the length of prison for various types of firearms-related crime, the percentage of

time that would be served, and where they might have to do their time. Specific examples or scenarios were provided to illustrate the power of the federal sanction.

The final speaker revisited the overall themes, stressing the importance of making good choices and providing examples of probationers who did not make good choices. Examples were either probationers who attended a lever-pulling meeting but were later murdered or a probationer that was supposed to attend a meeting but did not attend because he was murdered. This message was supported by action in two ways. First, this speaker told the attendees that a warrant will be issued for all probationers who were supposed to attend the meeting but did not. Second, all in attendance were required to give a urine screen before the lever-pulling meeting, and any probationer that tested positive was arrested at the end of the meeting. One or two probationers were arrested at the conclusion of every meeting.

One of the great values of the lever-pulling approach deployed in Boston (and in the early years of the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership) was that meetings were group based and that conduct of one group member would impact the consequences for all members. In addition, their specific criminal activities was what drew the interest of the working group. A group-based research design was impossible because of the commitment to the field experiment. Individuals who attended the meetings were not necessarily affiliated with a group of known chronic offenders. The plan was to "back-up" the message by responding specifically to individual violations. There was an expectation that their probation violations would be a higher priority, new cases would be treated differently by the local prosecutor or turned over to the United States Attorney's

Office, and the working group would use other levers at their disposal, such as doing home visits and visiting them on inter-agency sweeps.

Community Leader Lever-Pulling Meeting

The second type of lever-pulling meeting was different in atmosphere, message, and messenger. These meetings took place in the evening at a very active and well-known community center. There were always several programs in progress when they arrived, such as various youth programs, academic classes, and job skills programs. The community leader lever-pulling meeting usually occurred in a classroom. Unlike the stoic look of probationers who watched the slideshow at the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting, the community leader lever-pulling probationers mingled and helped themselves to the soft drinks provided. There were very few criminal justice officials in attendance—only a probation officer dressed casually who was charged with checking people in who did not speak at the meeting and the chief probation officer who spoke briefly at the end of the meeting.

This meeting lasted, on average, about 65 minutes. There was between three and five speakers from the community. Most of the community speakers were well known and respected community leaders. In addition, another speaker would talk about his or her success—a former probationer who was able to take small steps and turn her life around. The message that was delivered was a combination of concern, hope, faith, and opportunity. The broad narrative of the presentation, like the message delivered at the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting, was that the community was concerned about neighborhood violence. Most of the speakers talked about violence in the community

and its impact on children. Each speaker emphasized opportunities for change. For example, two of the high profile community leaders discussed their offending past and what changes they made, and several speakers emphasized faith as their strength. At least one speaker was a minister, but usually one or two other speakers talked about faith in their presentation. Finally, several of the speakers highlighted opportunities to succeed. They discussed specific programs that were available, discussed how they could help overcome some of the obstacles they faced (e.g., such as attending a job interview with them), and all probationers were provided contact information for the speakers. The meeting ended after a question and answer period where probationers would frequently raise concerns and ask for specific types of help.

The expectation of follow-up after these meetings was less defined. Probationers were encouraged to follow-up with the speakers by telephone if they were interested in being connected to services. There was no way to know exactly how many probationers contacted the speakers, but informally the speakers noted that they would receive two or three calls after the meeting. In addition, probation officers assigned to them were asked to talk about the meeting and encouraged them to take advantage of the programs or programs within the probation department. In addition, many of the probationers would stay after and informally discuss their needs and the opportunities following the meeting.

Research Design

The research design consists of two levels of evaluation. First, the effectiveness of the strategy was assessed by conducting an experimental evaluation, comparing treatment group 1 and treatment group 2 behaviors to the control group. Second, the

implementation of the strategy and the treatment regime was examined by conducting a process evaluation.

Experimental Design

The evaluation of the lever-pulling program in Indianapolis used an experimental design. Probationers were randomly assigned to the two types of meeting (law enforcement and community) or to a control group during six months between June 2003 and March 2004 (June/July; September/October; February/March). The law enforcement and community meetings occurred on consecutive evenings, and the IVRP administered the meetings in two consecutive months before taking a short break. This break was necessary because of the amount of time that was required for the probation department to organize participation and invite speakers. It was also desirable from a theoretical and project administration standpoint. Lever-pulling is resource draining. There are many time-consuming aspects, including organizing and attending the meetings, ensuring compliance with the conditions of probation, and responding to a violent act. The short breaks allowed the working group time to respond if necessary. In addition, the interview follow-up process (discussed below) was cumbersome. The research team benefited from having time to complete additional interviews.

Eligibility Criteria and Randomization Procedure

In each month that the treatments were administered, the probation department would provide a list of probationers that met several eligibility criteria. First, probationers had to be actively on probation. Second, individuals had to be on probation

for a drug, violent crime, weapon, or property offense. Table 2.1 provides the eligible offenses. Third, the probation offense for most of the probationers was a felony, however, probationers carrying handguns without a license were eligible whether convicted of a felony or misdemeanor. Only three probationers convicted of a misdemeanor firearms offense were randomly selected for the study.

The list that was provided included approximately 1000 probationers that satisfied these eligibility criteria. Since the strategy is draining on organizational resources, it was important to equally balance the number of probationers assigned to each group per month. If a simple allocation procedure was used, it is possible that in some months there might be 35 probationers assigned to the law enforcement group, 20 to the community group, and 35 to the control group (see Boruch 1997). The disparity would be less of an issue over time, but it was important to control the number of probationers assigned each month. A blocked randomization allocation procedure was used to respond to this issue. Boruch (1997: 112) summarizes the approach in this way: "Put briefly, the arrangement requires that individuals first be blocked into groups of two or more, for subsequent random allocation to two or more treatments. The random assignment within a block is such that the same number of individuals is assigned to each treatment." Thirty probationers were assigned to each group (90 per month) in each of the six months. The blocked randomization procedure was used for each subsequent month with only one caveat: probationers who were selected in a previous month and were still on probation were removed from the list.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the construction of the sample and its size. Ninety probationers were selected (30 law enforcement/30 community/30 control) for each of

the six months that the program was in the field. There are a total of 540 probationers in the study—180 probationers in each group. Figure 2.1 also shows that a large number of offenders assigned to the meeting groups did not attend. Sixty-three percent of the law enforcement lever-pulling group and 58 percent of the community leader lever-pulling meeting group attended the meeting when assigned to do so. In the analyses that are presented probationers are treated as randomized. However, since such a large number of probationers missed the meeting, data are also presented comparing the attendees to the non-attending groups.

Interviews and follow-up with probation staff indicated that there were several reasons why probationers would not attend the meetings. First, although probationers were technically on active probation (one of the eligibility criteria), they may not have been meeting with their probation officer but formal revocation papers had not been filed. Second, many of the probationers had incorrect addresses and did not receive adequate notice to attend. Third, transportation to probation meetings, as well as these extra program meetings, was problematic for many probationers.

Data Collection

Three types of data were collected from the groups to assess whether the lever-pulling strategy prevented re-offending and led to positive changes in offender behavior. We collected self-report data, criminal history data, and probation data.

Self-Report Surveys

Data were collected using a self-report survey instrument. Many of the questions included were influenced by previous research examining deterrence and risk assessment issues (see Chaiken and Chaiken 1982; Horney and Marshall 1991; 1992a; 1992b; Miranne and Geerken 1991; Lonza-Kaduce 1988; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo and Chiricos 1985). Three types of data were collected with this interview instrument: meeting evaluation and perception of risk, self-reported offense and gun use behavior; and demographics. Section I of the survey focused on gathering information about the meetings, the law enforcement response, whether they have used the community resources made available to them, and what types of behavioral changes have occurred. This section also collected information about their perceptions of risk of arrest, conviction, and sanction, and gathered their impressions of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Section II included questions about attitudes towards gun use, self-report criminal activities, gang, and criminal history data. A series of questions about different types of offenses (guns, drugs, nonviolent, violent crime) were asked, including whether they committed the type of offense, how often if they did, and used a variation of the event calendar approach discussed in prior research (Horney and Marshall 1991; 1992a; 1992b) to more closely examine frequency of occurrence. Section III gathered demographic data. Data on age, race, marital status, employment, and income status were collected.

Computer-assisted interviews via laptop computer were completed approximately seven months after the meeting dates.[3] The interview process (setting up interviews, administering the interviews, and assigning interviewers) was challenging. Each group

[3] Using the laptops was the preferred method of administration, but interviewers made paper forms available as well.

was in the field for interviews for approximately eight weeks. For example, interviews with the June 2003 group (the meeting occurred late in the month) started in February 2004 and were pulled from the field by early April. The initial plan was to interview probationers before or after their meeting with their probation officer at the department. We sent a letter to the probationer before the meeting that introduced the project, that we were not affiliated with the probation department, and that we would pay them ten dollars to complete the interview. The problem with this initial plan was that only 41 percent were actively on probation at the date of the interview. Approximately 28 percent were discharged, 12.8 percent were revoked, 2.4 percent were transferred, 15.7 percent were incarcerated for violation of probation or a new offense, and three probationers were dead.

This issue resulted in the need to refine the process used to complete interviews. We continued to use the meeting date as an opportunity to interview active probationers, but we also used three strategies to interview probationers who had been revoked, discharged, or incarcerated. First, we attempted to contact them at home. The letter was followed-up with a phone call. Second, we used a community center run by a former gang leader as a base of operation. Our letter to them would highlight a series of dates when we would be at the community center, and subjects would either come to the center or we would go to their homes from the center. Third, we made arrangements with the Marion County Sheriff's Department to conduct interviews with probationers who were incarcerated in jail.

Figure 2.2 depicts information about the response rate by group. We completed 235 interviews (43.5%). Forty-three percent of the law enforcement group, forty-one

percent of the community group, and forty-seven percent of the control group was interviewed. Most of the interviews were completed at the probation department (see Table 2.3). Approximately 83 percent of the interviews were completed at the probation department, fourteen percent at the jail, and four percent occurred at the community center or at the probationer's home. Table 2.2 also shows that these figures did not vary by meeting type.

Criminal History Data

The second type of data collected was criminal history information. The *complete* criminal history for probationers was collected one-year after their meeting data. For example, in June 2004, we pulled the entire criminal history record of the ninety probationers in group 1 (June 2003). These data provide a good sense of each probationer's complete offending history, but also their criminal activities after the treatment for one year. Data include number of arrests, arrest charges, convictions, conviction charges, and felony and misdemeanor charges. Sentencing data were also collected, including number of times on probation, jail, prison, and the length of various types of sentence.

Critical information was collected about their criminal activities between the meeting date and 365 days after the meeting date. Data include the number of arrests, arrest charges, felony and misdemeanor classification, convictions, and post-treatment sentencing decisions. In addition, type of offense and first date of arrest and first date of conviction post-treatment were collected. We also calculated time-to-failure (date of first arrest post meeting – date of meeting).

Probation and Other Outcome Data

The third type of data we collected was probation history data. These data were collected 365 days after the meeting date. For example, in June 2004, we not only collected the criminal history data but also the probation data for all June 2003 subjects. These data allow us to understand their general probation behavior (their entire probation record was coded) as well as their behavior on probation following the treatment meetings. Some of the data collected from probation records was easily accessible. For example, demographic information and probation status variables were straightforward to collect. To get a better understanding of an individual's behavior on probation, it was also necessary to collect information by analyzing the probation officer case notes. We used each meeting between a probation officer and probationer as a unit for coding, collecting information about meeting attendance, employment information, residence information, program related concerns, and information about any contacts or responses to violations. These data are rich in that we have extensive information about their participation and behavior in various types of program (whether it was completed, how often attended). In addition, the case note data provide a good understanding of the number and types of levers pulled. Variables include the number of urine screens ordered, results of the screen, and response to positive screens; number of administrative hearings, reasons for the hearings, and response; and number of revocation hearings, reasons for the hearing, and response. We also collected information about the number of meetings, telephone contacts, home visits, work visits, and the number of times probationers were involved in probation sweeps.

Statistical Analysis, Data Challenges, and Variable Coding

The statistical analysis proceeded in the following way for each data source. First, t-tests, chi-square tests, and effect sizes were used to generally assess whether the treatment groups were different from the control group. Researchers have increasingly stressed the need to "evaluat[e] the practical importance of a finding" by providing both effect size estimates and *p* values" (McCartney and Rosenthal 2000: 174). There are two types of effect size estimates: "*r* is typically used when the relation is assessed via a correlation, and *d* is typically used when the relation is assessed via comparison of group means" (McCartney and Rosenthal 2000: 174). When presented, p-values and effect sizes calculated using *d* are presented when significant and/or when the effect size is at least .15. General conventions are considered to connote small (.20), moderate (.50), and large (.80) effect sizes (McCartney and Rosenthal 2000).

Second, key dependent variables are examined using multivariate models. Logistic, multiple, or count regression are used when appropriate. Finally, there are several data challenges examined. We assess how the probationers that attended the treatment meetings were different from the non-attendees, because nearly 40 percent of probationers assigned to the treatment groups did not receive the treatment. Analysis comparing the attendee to the non-attending groups are presented. Since a range of felony probationers were included within the parameters of the randomization criteria, we examine whether there are similarities and differences of the results for different types of offenders.

Variable Coding

Table 2.3 presents basic demographic, probation characteristics, treatment participation, and criminal history variables for the total sample and each group. Importantly, there were no significant differences between the groups—the randomization procedure worked as intended.[4]

The coding of the control variables for the multivariate analyses is straightforward. Prior probation research focuses on controlling for demographic and criminal history variables. In addition, several treatment related variables, such as participation in work, drug, and education treatment programs, are also used as control variables. These variables are presented in Table 2.3.

The demographic controls include gender (dummy coded, with females as the reference category), race (dummy coded with whites being compared to nonwhites as the reference group), marital status (two dummy coded variables, with being married or being divorced compared to being single as the reference category), employment (dummy coded with being employed compared to not being employed as the reference category). Most of the probationers in the study are male (87.6%), nonwhite (74.1%), single (74.6%), and employed (65.9%). Other demographic variables controlled for in later analyses include age (31.1), education (11.27), and number of residence changes (1.36).

Table 2.3 also includes the coding of the treatment variables. Variables include whether a probationer participated in drug, work, or education treatment programs and also if she completed the program. For example, 71.7% of the probationers participated

[4] Similar analyses were run for each data source with similar results. For example, we compared the demographic and criminal history characteristics of the probationers that were interviewed and there were no differences by group. In addition, we present not only post lever-pulling probation and offending behavior in Chapters 4 and 5, but also comparisons for the entire criminal history and probation record.

in a drug treatment group and 59.1% successfully completed it. Nearly 30% of the probationers participated in a work program and 30% completed the work program. Finally, only 16.1% of the probationers were involved in education programming and 34.5% of them actually completed the programming.

The criminal history control variables focus on the frequency of crime and criminal justice system involvement. Sixty-four percent of the sample was on probation for drug offenses, sixteen percent were violent crime offenders, ten percent were weapons offenders, and ten percent were property offenders. The control group was somewhat more likely to be drug offenders and less likely to be violent offenders compared to the law enforcement group, and somewhat more likely to be property and violent crime offenders compared to the community group. The average length of probation for offenders is just over two years and sentences were under ten years. Criminal history variables used as controls include the mean number of arrests (8.70), arrest charges (14.47), felony charges (6.03), violent crime convictions (.54), property crime convictions (.75), drug convictions (1.26), alcohol convictions (.36), weapons convictions (.36), resisting law enforcement convictions (.46), and other convictions (.58). Other criminal history variables include number of times on probation (2.16), number of times in jail (1.58), number of times in the department of corrections (1.17), and whether they were arrested within a year prior to the lever-pulling meeting (32% were arrested). The criminal history variables are highly collinear. In general, only the effects of the number of arrests variable is included in the analysis.

Process Evaluation

Another objective of this study was to thoroughly document whether the lever-pulling strategy was implemented as intended.

Some questions of interest include:

- What criminal justice agencies participated?
- What levers were pulled?
- What community groups/service providers participated?
- How well were the activities coordinated across organizations?
- How well was the need for a response communicated to participating organizations?
- What types of strategic activities were implemented?
- Was the response linked to message?

Three types of data were used to assess the implementation of the treatment. First, each type of data discussed provides an opportunity to collect important assessment data. For example, the interview instrument included questions about contacts with law enforcement officials, probation officer contacts, and community service provider contacts. We also asked them about the meetings and what they remembered about the message that was delivered at the meetings. The probation records provided an opportunity to collect data on variables like the number of meetings attended, number of contacts, and response to violations. Second, all lever-pulling meetings that occurred during the project period were observed. We generally arrived 30 minutes before the start of the meeting and stayed after at least 30 minutes to observe the probationers as they arrived, during the meeting, and what happened when they were free to go. The

observations provided an opportunity to gauge their reactions to the message, the different speakers, and their initial behavior following the meeting. Did probationers linger following the meeting? Did they ask the speakers for help? Did they collect the contact information that was made available? The observation of the treatment meetings also provided an opportunity to record information about the message delivered and whether it was consistent over the course of they study within meetings and how it varied by type of meeting.

At least one member of the research team also attended the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership (IVRP) and Project Safe Neighborhood activities. The IVRP meetings were coordinated by the Marion County Justice Agency, and most of the regular attendees were from criminal justice or government agencies. The focus of these meetings was how to effectively coordinate responses to violence. Recent homicide incidents were discussed and potential responses to groups or locations would be discussed. These meetings were also the primary venue to discuss the lever-pulling strategy and implementation of the initiative. The coordination of activities and response possibilities, such as probation sweeps, were discussed. At least two to four of the law enforcement treatment group speakers would regularly attend the bi-monthly meetings.

Several members of the IVRP would also be regular attendees of Project Safe Neighborhood meetings and activities. The United States Attorney was responsible for coordinating the activities and efforts of Project Safe Neighborhoods. A broader range of agencies participated in these meetings, including members of community agencies, schools, and faith-based organizations. Most of the speakers for the law enforcement and

community lever-pulling meetings attended PSN meetings or where involved in PSN-related activities.

The final research method was to conduct informal and formal interviews with key informants from participating agencies. The coordination and delivery of levers fell disproportionately on two criminal justice agencies. The research team was in frequent contact with individuals representing these agencies, and structured interviews were conducted at the end of the study with key personnel. In addition, other speakers were interviewed. These interviews provided an opportunity to assess perceptions of the activities of the working group, discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the process, and identify how well the treatment regime was being implemented.

Chapter 3
Survey Results

Introduction

The self-report instrument focused on several issues, including probationers' general impressions of the meetings, opinions about the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, perceptions on the likelihood of arrest and punishment for various offenses, attitudes towards guns and gang involvement, self-report involvement in gun, drug, violent, and non-violent criminal activities, and basic demographic and prior involvement in crime and the criminal justice system.

After a brief discussion of the general characteristics of the probationers that were interviewed and their impressions about the two types of treatment meetings, the focus of this chapter turns to assessing differences between the treatment and control group.

Characteristics of the Probationers Interviewed

We were able to complete 235 probationer interviews. Table 3.1 presents self-report demographic and prior crime and criminal justice involvement data. Nearly 90 percent of the probationers interviewed were male, 70 percent were African American, and 34 percent were married or living with a partner. On average, these probationers reported having two children. Seventy-three percent were employed at the time of the interview, and the average income for a typical month was about 1,300 dollars. Overall, only 44 percent of the sample completed high-school or had gotten a GED, and the mean grade completion was 11.6. The demographic characteristics of the interviewed probationers are similar to the entire sample (see Table 2.3). Multivariate analysis

indicated that the interview and non-interviewed probationers were very similar, although the interviewees were significantly more likely to be employed and to have participated in drug treatment programming. In addition, the demographic characteristics for each group are quite similar, although significantly fewer community attendees were currently married or living with a partner compared to the control group (p=.02).

Table 3.1 also includes information probationers provided about their criminal history. Most of these questions used the following response options: 0-never, 1-once, 2-2-5 times, 3-6-10 times, 4-11-20 times, 5-21-50 times, and 6-more than 50 times. The results indicate that the probationers, and their families and friends, had multiple and frequent contact with the criminal justice system. On average, the probationers reported that they were arrested 6 to 10 times, convicted 2 to 5 times, and had been incarcerated between 2 and 4 years of their lives. Over 70 percent had a family member who spent time in prison, over 80 percent had friends who spent time in prison, nearly 50 percent had friends who were gang members, and 50 percent had a friend or family member murdered.

The results also show that the probationers interviewed had extensive criminal histories. Nearly 36 percent of the sample reported that they had committed at least one violent crime, 78 percent committed at least one nonviolent crime, 73 percent sold drugs, and 86 percent purchased drugs. The results presented in Table 3.1 also support the conclusion that these probationers committed these offenses frequently. For example, 35 percent of the probationers said that they sold drugs and 50 percent said they purchased drugs more than 50 times in their lifetime.

General Impressions of Meeting

Each interview with the law enforcement and community lever-pulling group probationers began with questions about the message delivered at the meetings, whether a probationer discussed their attendance with family and friends, and their overall impressions of the message. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present these results.

Table 3.2 presents data on what was said at the meeting and whether probationers discussed the message with others, and highlights whether there were differences between the treatment groups. The observations of the meetings illustrated that two very different messages were delivered at the meetings, and the results in Table 3.2 shows that probationers remembered very different aspects of what was said at the meetings. The law enforcement lever-pulling group was significantly more likely to remember that law enforcement is cracking down on violent crime (p=.09; es=.29), law enforcement is cracking down on gun crime (p=.06; es=.32), that they can go to federal prison if caught carrying a gun (p=.01; es=.42); that probation is watching their behavior closely (p=.03; es=.37), and that law enforcement wants them to make good choices (p=.12; es=.25). Approximately 71 percent of the community group attendees remembered that community leaders have opportunities for them to get a job, but the differences comparing the groups is not significant and the effect size is small (es=.17). In addition, there were no differences between the groups about community leaders being willing to help in any way and that they should stay out of trouble. It is important to remember that a community-related message was delivered by two to four community leaders at both types of meeting.

Most probationers left the meeting and then discussed their attendance and the message that was delivered with other people. For example, 78 percent of the law enforcement group and 73 percent of the community group discussed the meeting with at least one other person. Almost 55 percent of the law enforcement group discussed the meetings with their family, 52 percent with a significant other, 49 percent with friends, 21 percent with co-workers, and 19 percent with neighbors. Similarly, approximately 46 percent of the community group discussed the meeting with their family, 37 discussed it with a significant other, 32 discussed it with friends, 12 percent discussed with co-workers, 3 percent discussed with neighbors, and 34 discussed it with probation officers. The law enforcement probationers were significantly more likely to discuss the meeting with their friends (p=.04; es=.35) and neighbors (p=.002; es=.56) compared to the community group, and somewhat more likely to discuss it with their spouse (p=.07; es=.31). The effect size for discussing the meeting with their spouse or friends is moderate, but it is large for discussing the meeting with a neighbor. These differences support the claim that the message delivered at the law enforcement meeting made a strong impression, and that probationers who attended this meeting discussed it with many different social groups.

The diffusion of the lever-pulling message raises concerns related to the contamination of the control group. One could argue that the potential for deterrence of lever-pulling is in how the message delivered at the meeting and any follow-up response diffuses to the general offending population. The results indicate that meeting attendees discussed the message delivered with other key individuals in their social network, and thus there is the potential of influencing the perceptions and behaviors of other

probationers including those in the control group. This potential contamination threat is explored in detail later in the report.

Table 3.3 presents the results on how they reacted to the message that was delivered at the meetings. Although both groups were generally positive about the meetings, most of their reactions were not statistically different. Both groups strongly agreed or agreed that they made better choices because they attended the meeting, that law enforcement would follow through on their promise to send them to federal prison, community leaders were willing to help find them opportunities to succeed, that the meetings discourage people from breaking the law, and that probationers are being watched more than usual. The probationers were somewhat likely to agree that the meetings were helpful, that they are less likely to break the law because of the meetings, and they think about the message delivered somewhat frequently. Approximately, 60 to 65 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with these statements. The law enforcement probationers were significantly more likely to agree that law enforcement would follow through on their promises to crack down on crime (p=.02; es=-.510) and that the meetings would make it more difficult for an arrestee to get out of the criminal justice system (p=.03; es=-.45). Although not statistically significant, the effect size calculations indicate small differences for three other questions. The law enforcement group was somewhat more likely to agree that the probation department is watching more people than usual, and that the community leaders followed through on their promises for services. The community group was somewhat more likely to agree that community leaders were willing to find them an opportunity to succeed.

Perceptions of Risk

An important element of a lever-pulling strategy is the attempt to change probationers' expectations about the risks and rewards of offending. The invitation to meet with law enforcement and community officials is designed to be a critical turning point for probationers in that the message includes the promise of shifting priorities by criminal justice personnel. All probationers who attended the meeting arrived with an understanding about the likelihood of arrest, punishment if caught, and intensity of current probation supervision. If the message was understood, they should leave the meeting less confident about those risks and the future. The general message delivered at the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting touched on issues related to both certainty and severity, but the process data results indicate that the message focused much more on sanction-based costs of offending. In particular, the United States Attorney clearly articulated the federal sanctions that the government had at its disposal for convicted felons as well as federal case processing levers (e.g., right to deny bail, placement in remote federal penitentiaries, truth-in-sentencing). Probationers exited the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting with expressions of concern and anxiety, and it was clear that the message would have more or less meaning based on the post-meeting follow-up actions of participating organizations.

One method to assess the impact of the message and whether the strategy effectively changed their certainty and severity assessments was to ask probationers a series of questions related to perceptions of risk. The expectation was that probationers who attended the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting would think that the risks of arrest, going to prison, receiving a long sentence, or having a new arrest transferred to

federal court would be greater compared to the control group. Since the message delivered at the community leader lever-pulling meeting focused more on opportunities for change, it was anticipated that there would be no difference when comparing assessments of risk between the community leader lever-pulling group and the control group. The results of these analyses are presented below.

Probationers were first asked to assess whether, in general, the chances of arrest, conviction, and going to prison changed since they had attended the lever-pulling meeting (or since the date of the lever-pulling meeting for the control probationers). Five options were provided, ranging from much more likely to much less likely. A lower number indicates that the respondent believed that the chances of arrest, conviction, and going to prison were greater. Table 3.4 provides the mean scores, standard deviations, significance test results, and the effect size results. Overall, all three groups generally stated that the chances of arrest and going to prison were between much more and somewhat more likely compared to before the lever-pulling meeting date, but importantly, there were no differences when comparing the treatment groups to the control group for most questions. There were no significant differences when comparing the community leader lever-pulling results to the control. In addition, the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting attendees were no more likely to think that their chances of arrest or their chances of going to prison were greater. However, the law enforcement group was somewhat more likely to think that their chances of conviction were greater (p=.06; es=-.32). In addition, the following question was asked: “If you’re careful, you can get away with committing a lot of crimes” (strongly agree-strongly disagree). Over 40 percent of the law enforcement group, but only 25 percent of the

control group strongly disagreed with this statement. These results are significantly different (p=.03; es=.34). Thirty-three percent of the probationers interviewed from the community group strongly disagreed with this statement.

Table 3.5a (law enforcement v. control) and Table 3.5b (community v. control) presents the results on the chances of arrest for eleven offenses (assault, writing a bad check, burglary, stealing a car, gun, murder, robbery, rape, theft, selling drugs, and purchasing drugs). Respondents were provided six options: 1=no chance, low chance, some chance, good chance, high chance, and 6=completely certain. Overall, the probationers responded that the chance of arrest was between having some chance or a good chance. There were no significant differences when comparing the law enforcement lever-pulling group and the control, and the mean scores were identical for several offenses. There were two small effect size differences, but the control group responded that their chances of arrest for murder and rape were somewhat greater. The community group consistently noted that there chances of arrest was lower. The effect differences indicate small effects, and there was only statistically significant differences for murder (*p*=.053) and rape (*p*=.03), but the pattern is still surprising.

Probationers were more intimidated by the threat of sanction. In general, probationers thought that there was a good to high chance of going to prison if caught, and the results show that their perceptions of risk increase with the seriousness of the offense. The average score for prison, rape, selling drugs and gun offenses was over five (on a six point scale), and the scores for burglary, assault, writing a bad check, purchasing drugs, stealing a car, and theft for all groups ranged between four and five. The comparisons between the treatment and control groups are provided in Tables 3.6a

and 3.6b. There are no significant differences comparing the treatment groups to the control, and small effects are only observed when comparing the law enforcement to the control group for assault (es=.28), burglary (es=.16), gun (es=.18), and theft (.18).

Another question asked probationers to estimate the sentence that would be given if convicted of any of the eleven offenses. Response options included warning, arrest, fine, probation, short prison, and long prison (See Table 3.7). There were no significant differences between the community leader lever-pulling group and the control group, and the effect size differences are quite small. Probationers who attended the law enforcement lever-pulling group had higher expectations of sanction for all eleven offenses. Both groups generally had expectations of prison for these offenses, but the law enforcement group leaned more to long prison sentences and the control group to short prison sentences. Importantly, the law enforcement group had significantly higher expectations of sanctions for burglary (p=.02; es=.40), assault (p=.03; es=.35), theft (p=.03; es=.36), and gun offenses (p=.04; es=.34). Small effect differences were also observed for robbery (.25) and stealing a car (.17).

The final table (Table 3.8) related to the perception of risk focuses on evaluations of the chances that a case would be handled by the federal court system. The six-item likert scale was used (1=no chance to 6=completely certain) for seven offenses. The results indicate that there were no significant differences comparing the law enforcement to the control for most offenses, but the probationers that attended the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting were significantly more likely to think that their case would be transferred to federal court for gun offenses. There was a large difference between the

groups for gun offenses (*p*=.000; es=.71), and this finding is consistent with the message emphasized at this meeting.

It is again surprising that there are small effect differences comparing the community leader lever-pulling probationers to the control for several offenses. Specifically, their expectations of receiving a federal sanction for murder (p=.12; es=-.25), purchasing drugs (p=.09; es=-.28), rape (p=.05; es=-.31) and robbery (p=.33; es=-.26). Although the differences are only small, the results are difficult to explain. One of the community leaders who spoke at the community meeting briefly discussed the possibility of being sent to federal prison in remote South Dakota. This threat might have been perceived as being so far-fetched that it undermined the credibility of the sanction. It may also be that the probationers left the meeting with the impression that the system actually was getting softer on probationers.

In summary, Tables 3.4 through 3.8 produce a somewhat mixed picture. As anticipated, there were very few differences when comparing the community leader lever-pulling meeting attendees and the control group, and there were some small effect differences in the opposite direction than what was expected. One would not anticipate differences considering the message delivered and the expectations about the nature of follow-up. The results comparing the law enforcement lever-pulling attendees to the control are more intriguing. There were few differences when asked about the certainty of arrest and the chances of going to prison. Both groups responded that there was a good chance of going to prison for the offenses examined. The groups were somewhat different in their evaluations of length of sentence. Both groups thought prison was likely, but the law enforcement lever-pulling group expected longer sentences for more

offenses. The strong difference on expectation of having a gun case transferred to federal court is consistent with the message that was emphasized at the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting.

Lever-pulling has been used nationally as a program to reduce firearms activity. Although scholars have argued that it can be used for other types of offenders (see Kennedy 2006; McGarrell and Chermak 2003), the message emphasized in Indianapolis was related to violent crime and firearms violence. One would expect that the treatment groups would have different attitudes towards gun use (examined in the next section) and greater risk of certainly and severity of criminal justice sanctions if involved in gun-related crimes. Some of the results support the conclusion that there were differences related to risk, but it was important to examine these findings using multivariate models. These results are presented in Table 3.8a.

The four questions related to the risks of gun use (chances of being arrested for gun crime, chances of going to prison for a gun crime, most serious sanction for a gun crime, and chances of federal court involvement if convicted of a gun offense) were recoded as dichotomous variables, with completely certainly coded as 1 and all other chance categories coded as 0. The logistic regression results are presented in Table 3.8a, and are consistent with the findings presented above.

The first column includes the results for the certainty of arrest for gun crimes. Males (p=.05), Older probationers (p=.05), and Whites (p=.10) were less likely to believe that it was completely certain they would be arrested if committing a gun crime. Divorced (p=.10) and married (p=.10) probationers were somewhat more likely than single probationers to believe that it was completed certain they would be arrested for

committing a gun crime. The community group probationers were somewhat less likely to think that it was completely certain they would be arrested for committing a gun crime (p=.10). Males (p=.05) and married probationers (p=.10) were more likely to believe that it was completely certain they would go to prison if convicted of a gun crime compared to females and single probationers.

The most serious sanction variable was recoded to compare the likelihood of a long prison term to all other responses for gun crimes. Males (p=.05) were more likely to conclude that they could get a long prison term if convicted of a gun crime compared to females. None of the other control variables are significantly, but both the law enforcement and community treatment groups were somewhat more likely to believe they would get a long prison term for a gun crime compared to the control group.

The multivariate results again support the conclusion that the emphasis of potential federal court involvement at the law enforcement treatment meeting made a strong impression on the probationers. The law enforcement probationers were significantly more likely to state that they were completely certain that a gun case would result in federal court involvement (p=.01).

Attitudes about Guns

We asked a large number of questions about attitudes towards guns and how the criminal justice system responds to gun crimes. These results are provided in Tables 3.9, 3.9a, and Table 3.10. Overall, the probationers stated that they have little trouble buying a gun. In fact, over 70 percent stated that they would have little or no trouble getting a gun if they did not have one. Most of the probationers (82.5%) stated that the primary

reason why somebody owns a gun in their neighborhood is for protection, and most would purchase a gun from somebody who sells them illegally (46.8%) or from somebody they know (30%). Most probationers stated that they would throw the gun away when they were ready to dispose of it (47.0%). Other frequent methods of disposal included selling it to a friend (25.1%) or a gun dealer (17.9%). When asked what was the important thing that would stop them from using a gun in crime, most probationers stated that concerns for their family (36.4%) or the threat of being arrested (27.6%). Other responses included concerns about going to state prison (12.7%), concerns with going to federal prison (15.4%), concerns about their own safety (5.7%) and how they would be treated in prison (2.2%). Although the results for this question varied by group--the law enforcement group was less likely to note concerns for their family (32.4%) and more likely to state their chances of going to federal prison (18.9%), and the control group noted a higher level of concern for their family (42.7%) and less of a concern about federal prison (11.0%), the comparisons were not significantly different and the effect sizes were small (es=.23).

Table 3.9 presents the results for questions related to their concerns about how the criminal justice system responds to guns. The first four questions in each comparison (law enforcement-control; community-control) asked the probationer to assess changes in arrest, general use, and legal penalties for gun crimes. Consistent with the perception of risk questions, there were few differences when comparing the results across groups, but the law enforcement group was significantly more likely to state that the legal penalties for carrying a gun were much more (p=.01; es=-.42). There were not significant differences on knowledge about the laws regulating firearms ownership and the existence

of federal penalties for illegally carrying a gun, but there were significant differences on perception of system harshness. Almost 91 percent of the law enforcement probationers stated that the federal system provided harsher penalties for gun crimes compared to 73 percent of control probationers (p=.004; es=.36). There were no significant differences when comparing the community and control groups, and the effect sizes were minimal or small, but the community group was somewhat more likely to know that there were federal penalties for guns (p=.12; es=. 24).

Since the law enforcement meeting emphasized the legal penalties for using a gun, logistic regression was used to examine these effects in more detail. Table 3.9a provides the results. The dependent variable for the first equation is the system harshness question. Consistent with the results above, the law enforcement group was significantly more likely to say that the federal government had harsher penalties compared to the control group (p=.01). In addition, probationers who were married thought the federal system was harsher, and probationers involved in work programs were significantly less likely to think the federal system had harsher penalties. The likert item examining their perceptions of legal penalties for carrying gun was dichotomized where "much more" equals 1 and all other responses were recoded as 0. The law enforcement group was somewhat more like to state that the penalties for carrying a gun were much more, controlling for other variables (p=.10). Probationers who were employed stated that the legal penalties were much more (p=.05), Whites were less likely to state the penalties were much more compared to nonwhites (p=.01), and the more educated respondents were also less likely to state the penalties were much more (p=.05).

Table 3.10 provides the results for a series of questions about general attitudes towards gun, gun usage, and interactions with friends and family who have guns. These questions were all likert items (1=strongly agree to 4=strongly disagree). For most questions, there were no significant differences comparing the groups and most of the effect sizes are small. Overall, probationers generally agree that they will ask friends to leave their guns at home, that situations get worse when someone pulls a gun, that you should stay at home if you need a gun, and that carrying a gun is not worth the risk. Probationers disagreed that it is alright to use a gun to scare someone, that they need to carry a gun in their neighborhood, and that there is nothing you can do to stay out of a gun fight. The only significant difference was when probationers were asked if it is ok to shoot somebody if they are about to kill or hurt you. Both treatment groups were significantly more likely to disagree with this statement (law enforcement v. control p=.05; es=.33; community to control p=.000; es=.77). When observing the effect sizes, the community group was somewhat more likely to disagree that if you need a gun you stay at home, was somewhat more likely to agree that carrying a gun is not worth the risk, and was more likely to disagree that it is alright to have a gun to scare someone.

Changes in Behavior

The message that was delivered focused on contrasting choices. On the one hand, the speakers, particularly at the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting, discussed how they were concerned about the level of violence and were willing to take whatever steps they could within the boundaries of the law, to respond to acts of violence. There was also an acknowledgement by the speakers that it was important to provide specific help to

attendees to get them access to programs and job opportunities. This section discusses how the probationers responded to these choices. It was hypothesized that both treatment groups would be more likely to take advantage of positive opportunities and less likely to break the law in the months following the meeting compared to the control.

Positive Changes

Table 3.11 provides the mean and standard deviations for any activities that probationers started since attending the meeting. The law enforcement group was not significantly more likely to have gone back to school, entered treatment, start going to church, attend counseling, contact law enforcement, contact community organizations, or ask their probation officer for help compared to the control group. They were, however, significantly more likely to have contacted community leaders, and significantly less likely to have gotten a job or missed a meeting with their probation officer. The effects are moderate to large. The community group probationers were significantly less likely to have gotten a job, enter treatment, contact law enforcement, but were significantly more likely to contact community leaders for help and assistance.

It is interesting that both groups were much more likely to reach out to the community speakers and/or community leaders asking for help, but were not more likely to enter treatment or counseling or go back to school. Both groups were significantly less likely to have gotten a job since attending the meeting. There are actually two possible interpretations of these results. On the one hand, the results may indicate that the treatment groups were in fact less likely to try to find a job after attending the meetings. The discussion of jobs and job seeking delivered at the meetings was not always positive.

In fact, most of the speakers who discussed jobs provided a very realistic view of job opportunities for felons—that they would have a difficult time getting a job and would have to work hard and start from the bottom. The results might indicate that they were discouraged by this message. Another possible interpretation of the differences is that the treatment groups had a more consistent job history since attending the meeting. That is, the question asked whether they had gotten a job since attending the meeting. Another interpretation of the data is that the control group may have been more likely to have changed jobs and gotten a new job in the period after the meeting date. These explanations will be examined more closely in the chapter examining the probation data.

Criminal Behavior

Table 3.12 includes the results for questions about post-meeting criminal activities. Although the message delivered at the meeting focused on concerns about violent crime and gun activity, probationers were asked about a wide range of criminal activity. Probationers were asked about gun activity (guns in home, outside the home, threatened, injured, or shot at with a gun), drug activity (possess, sell, or use), alcohol use, non-violent criminal activity (burglaries, thefts, pass bad checks, and steal cars), and violent criminal activities (personal or business robberies, assault). If a probationer admitted criminal behavior, we would ask a series of follow-up questions on frequency of occurrence. We first asked whether they had done the criminal activity everyday, several times a week, every week, and less than every week, and then depending on how they responded, asked them to try to specifically identify the number of times. For example, if

a probationer admitted using drugs several times a week, we would also ask them about how many times per week they used drugs.

Nearly 43 percent of the probationers that were interviewed admitted to some type of criminal activity in the period between the meeting (or meeting date) and the interview date. A smaller number of the treatment probationers admitted to any criminal activity compared to the control, but the differences were not statistical significant. Approximately 40 percent of the law enforcement and community group probationers, and over 46 percent of the control group admitted to some type of criminal activity.

Only a small percentage of probationers reported any gun activity since the meeting date. Approximately 13 percent of the law enforcement group, 15 percent of the community group, and 17 percent of the control group admitted some type of gun-related activity. Importantly, there were no significant differences in self-reported gun activities when comparing the treatment to the control groups. Four percent of the law enforcement group had a gun in the home, one percent of the group had a gun outside the home, nine percent were threatened with a gun, three percent were shot at with a gun, and three percent were injured with a gun. Although the control group was somewhat more likely to have been threatened with a gun (13%), the number of control probationers admitting gun possession, use, injury, and being shot at was almost identical compared to the law enforcement group. The community lever group probationers were less likely to admit having a gun in the home, outside the home, and being threatened with a gun, but somewhat more likely to have been shot at or injured with a gun. The results also includes that there are no significant differences when comparing the frequency of all

types of gun activity (1-everyday, 2-several times a week, 3-every week, 4-less than every week).

Probationers were more likely to report some drug involvement since the meeting date. Four percent of the law enforcement group admitted selling drugs illegally, 13 percent admitting purchasing drugs illegally, and 19 percent admitted using drugs. Similarly, 11 percent of the community probationers admitted purchasing drugs, 6 percent admitted selling, and 16 percent admitted using drugs. A somewhat higher percentage of control probationers admitted to selling drugs, purchasing drugs, and using drugs, but the differences are not significant and the effect sizes are small. The law enforcement group was significantly less likely to report some type of drug activity compared to the control (p=.05; es=.33). Eighteen percent of the law enforcement group, 22 percent of the community group, and 32 percent of the control group admitted to purchasing, selling or using drugs after attending the meeting. Although fewer law enforcement group probationers admitted to selling or purchasing drugs, the probationers that reported that they purchased or sold drugs did so more frequently than the control. The law enforcement probationers admitted to purchasing and/or selling several times a week. In contrast, the control probationers said that they purchased or sold almost every week or less than every week. Approximately 37 percent of the probationers in each group admitted to some alcohol use.

A very small number of probationers admitted any type of involvement in non-violent and violent criminal activity, and the treatment probationers were not significantly less likely to participate in these activities. Only about 5 percent of the probationers admitted to property crime activity and 19 percent admitted to violent crime activity. The

latter includes minor assaults and fighting. Only about one percent of probationers admitted committing burglaries, thefts, and motor vehicle thefts, and approximately 2.5 percent of probationers admitted passing a bad check or using a credit card illegally. None of the treatment probationers admitted to committing a business or personal robbery, and only one percent of the control admitted committing a business robbery. A much higher percentage of probationers admitted being involved in a fight—18 percent of the law enforcement group, 22 percent of the community group, and 17 percent of the control group admitted being involved in a fight. There were no significant differences comparing the treatment groups to the control.

Table 3.12a presents the results of logistic regression equations examining the combined criminal activity variables (reported any type of criminal, gun, drug, property, or violent criminal activity). The results confirm the analysis presented above: the treatment groups were not less likely to admit any criminal, gun, drug, violent, and nonviolent activities. Although the law enforcement group report less overall drug use following the meeting, the results are not statistically different with other control variables. Older probationers were significantly less likely to admit committing any crimes, gun crimes, and violent crimes. Probationers that were employed were less likely to admit any criminal activity, drug activity, or violent crime activity, and probationers were a higher number of arrests were more likely to admit any criminal and violent crime activity.

Pulling Levers

The interviews also provided an opportunity to assess whether there were actual differences in service delivery and response post-meeting attendance. The meeting was a critical moment because the message delivered and expectation of change. The threat of sanction would only be credible if the participating groups delivered on the promises to respond specifically to continued participation in criminal activities. It was expected that the law enforcement group would be more likely to be contacted by criminal justice personnel following the meeting, have more frequent contacts, and more likely to have been arrested. These results are presented in Table 3.13.

There were no significant differences comparing the law enforcement group to the control. Only about 8 percent of the law enforcement group was contacted by law enforcement since the meeting, none of the probationers were contacted by prosecutors, three percent were contacted by community representatives, and four percent were contacted by clergy. Approximately 30 percent of these probationers were contacted at home, 7 percent were contacted at work, and 37 percent were contacted by their probation officer by telephone. A similar percentage of control probationers were contacted by probation officers at home and work, and a higher percentage were contacted by telephone and this group actually met somewhat more frequently with their probation officer. A higher percentage of the law enforcement group was arrested since attending the meeting (41% v. 35%), but the results are not statistically different.

There are some differences in the results when comparing the community leader lever-pulling results to the control. It is interesting that the community group probationers were significantly less likely to meet their probation officers at the office, but they were not significantly less likely to meet their probation officer at work, home,

or be contacted by telephone. The community group was significantly more likely to be contacted by community representatives since attending the meeting, but overall, only seven percent of the interviewed probationers were contacted. This group was significantly less likely to have reported being arrested in the last six months. Only 16 percent of the community group reported being arrested in the last six months, but 35 percent of the control group reported being arrested.

Additional Issues

Another concern was whether the control group was aware of the treatment and made adjustments to their behavior because of this awareness. As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, lever-pulling had been frequently used in Indianapolis. Moreover, one of the conclusions discussed in this chapter was how the treatment probationers shared their meeting experience with friends, family, neighbors, and others. If the message and delivery of the treatment is so powerful that it spreads via the various networks that each probationer is connected with, then there is great potential for broad deterrent effects. One potential success of the communicative element of this strategy is that other offenders hear about the initiative, talk about it, attempt to understand what it means, and even alter behavior. The methodological dilemma that this raises is that the effectiveness of the initiative is more difficult to document because the control group heard about it and adjusted their perceptions about the risk of arrest and sanction, the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and even attitudes towards guns. In this section, we describe how we attempted to evaluate this threat.

The control group was asked whether they had heard anything about the lever-pulling meetings being conducted by law enforcement and community leaders. Only 16 percent of the control group said that they had heard about these meetings. Of those that heard about the meeting, 70 percent heard about it from their probation officer, 23 percent heard about it from their friends, and 8 percent (1 control probationer) heard about lever-pulling on television.

We first examined whether those that heard about the meetings were different from those that did not on the perceptions of risk questions, attitudes towards guns, and self-reported criminal behavior. In general, the probationers that heard about the meetings were not significantly different from those that did not in most areas. Specifically, there were no differences between those that heard and those that did not hear about lever-pulling on the general risk questions, attitudes towards gun questions, and no differences on self-report criminal behavior questions.

We also examined whether there were differences on the chances of arrest, sanction, length of sanction, and transfer to federal court for gun offenses. Probationers that heard about the meetings were significantly more likely to think their chances of arrest for gun crime was greater (p=.01), and were somewhat more likely to think that there chance of going to prison was higher (p=.10) and having the federal court consider their case (p=.08). The control probationers that had heard about the meetings were somewhat more likely to believe that their chances of arrest and having their case go to federal court and risk of imprisonment was greater. We examined whether these probationers influenced the results by excluding the control probationers who said they

had heard about the meetings, and comparing the group difference results. The results do not change.

Attend v. Non-Attendees

Since nearly 40 percent of the treatment groups missed the meeting, we wanted to examine whether the nonattendees were different from the attendees in any way in how they responded to the questionnaire. In general, the probationers who attended and those that did not were not much different. In fact, the attendees did not rate their general chances of risk of arrest, going to prison, or conviction as being higher, and did not think that their chances of arrest, severe punishment, long prison terms, or having their case transferred to federal court for the offenses examined were greater. There were few significant differences on self-reported criminal behavior (the attendee group was not significantly less likely to report having participate in most of the offenses examined), but they were significantly less likely to report any gun activity following the meeting when controlling for the demographic and criminal history variables. This difference will be explored furthered with the criminal history data in the next chapter. There were no differences on most questions that probed their attitudes towards guns, although the attendee group was somewhat more likely to disagree with the statement that you need to carry a gun in their neighborhood.

The community leader group attendees did not think that there chances of arrest, sanction, and having their case transferred to federal court was greater compared to the nonattendees. They were also not significantly less likely to report involvement in criminal activities since attending the meeting, but the community group attendees were

more likely to agree that carrying a gun is not worth the risk and more likely to agree that carrying a gun is not worth the risk of being arrested.

Chapter 4
Criminal History Results

Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis related to criminal activities of the probationers in the study. The source of data for these analyses was criminal history files. These data were collected 365 days after the lever-pulling meeting date, and included arrest data, arrest charge data, offense classification (felony/misdemeanor; class a-d), case outcome, and disposition data related to criminal activities occurring prior to and following the lever-pulling strategy. The complete criminal history was coded. Most of the information pertained to criminal behavior in Marion County, but some arrest and conviction information from other jurisdictions was included when available. Before presenting the post-meeting results, the next section presents data on the type of offender in the study.

Offense Categories

The offenses eligible for study inclusion (Table 2.1) were recoded into seven categories presented in Table 4.1 to illustrate the high number of drug offenders that were randomized into the study. Sixty-four percent of the offenders were on probation for a drug offense. Nearly 39 percent were convicted of selling cocaine, 16 percent were convicted of possessing cocaine, and 10 percent were on probation for selling marijuana or some other controlled substance. The distribution of offenses for each group is quite similar. Although the number of probationers in the community group on probation for motor vehicle theft was somewhat less, and the number of law enforcement probationers

on probation for robbery was somewhat more, there were no significant differences comparing the treatment groups to the control.

It is important to note that a "lever pulling" or "offender notification" strategy has generally been used to reduce gun violence. According to McDevitt et al. (2006: 5), "if the strategy is to be effective, it is important that the targets for the meetings be limited and focused on serious gun crime offenders in the community. This may not always be the most serious offenders, but it must include individuals who are at high risk of involvement in gun violence." Although some gun offenders were randomized into the study, there were not enough probationers whose current sentence was a weapons offense to include only these offenders. Almost ten percent of the probationers were in the study because they were convicted and on probation for a weapons offense--most were convicted of carrying a handgun without a license. Most probationers in the study were convicted of only one offense—they may have been charged simultaneously with multiple offenses, but several charges would be dismissed as part of a plea agreement, and in general, they would be convicted of the most serious offense. For example, many of the probationers convicted of violent crime and drug sale crimes were also charged with firearms violations, but these latter offenses were dismissed as part of a plea agreement. Some study probationers were convicted of multiple offenses. Approximately 19 percent of the sample was actually convicted of a second offense and 5.6 percent was convicted of three offenses. The three most frequent second and third offenses were weapons offenses, resisting law enforcement, and possession of cocaine. Over 16.2 percent of second and 23 percent of third offenses were handgun offenses, 20 percent of the second offenses and 10 percent of third offenses were resisting law

enforcement, and 16 percent of second offenses and 10 percent of third offenses were for possession of cocaine. Many more probationers, at some point, were arrested for a weapons violation. Overall, 36 percent of the sample had been charged with a weapons offense at some point in time.

Table 4.2 presents the self-report interview results on gun results for the various types of offender in the study (combining the self-report and criminal history data results). There are some differences in self-report gun activity by type of offender, but the results are unexpected. When asked the question, "When did you possess your last gun?," over 32 percent of probationers said they never owned a gun. There are variations by type of offender consistent with what one might expect: property offenders and those on probation for selling a drug other than cocaine (mostly marijuana dealers) were much more likely to say they never owned a gun. Approximately 34 percent of the violent crime probationers, 31 percent of those on probation for selling cocaine, and 29 percent of those who possessed cocaine said they never owned a gun. It is interesting that over ten percent of the probationers convicted of a firearms violations said they never owned a gun. The last three columns of Table 4.2 focus on gun and criminal activity since the meeting date. The table includes information on whether a probationer admitted to ever owning a gun, reported any type of gun activity after the meeting date (possess, sell, threatened or injured with a gun), used or sold drugs since the lever-pulling meeting, and reported any criminal activity since the meeting. All of the drug offenders interviewed were much less likely to admit owning a gun since the meeting date—only six percent of the probationers convicted of selling drugs, 13 percent of probationers possessing drugs, and 13 percent of probationers selling other drugs said they owned a gun. In comparison,

26 percent of gun and violent crime offenders, and over 30 percent of property offenders, said they owned a gun since attending a meeting. Property and weapons offenders were also more likely to admit selling or using drugs and additional criminal activities since the meeting. Thirty-nine percent of property offenders and almost 32 percent of weapons offenders admitted drug sale or use, and over 50 percent of weapons and nearly 70 percent of property offenders admitted post-meeting criminal activity.

Criminal History

The probationers in the study have extensive criminal histories. Table 4.3 presents the number of arrests, arrest charges, and number of convictions and Table 4.4 includes the number of times on probation, jail, and in prison. On average, the probationers had nearly nine arrests, charged with almost fifteen offenses, and had over nine misdemeanor charges and six felony charges. More specifically, they had, on average, 1.86 charges for violent offenses, 2.59 charges for property offenses, 3.66 drug offense charges, 1.58 charges for alcohol offenses, .74 weapons charges, 1.45 resisting law enforcement charges, and 2.58 charges for other offenses. Table 4.3 also indicates that the probationers had long conviction histories. Probationers had 2.19 felony convictions and 2.14 misdemeanor convictions. Nearly 34 percent of the probationers had at least one violent crime conviction, 38.3 percent had at least one property crime conviction, 73.9 percent had a drug conviction, 20.2 percent had an alcohol conviction, 24.6 had a weapons conviction, 29.8 had a conviction for resisting law enforcement, and 32 percent had a conviction for another offense. There were not any significant differences comparing the arrest, charge, conviction and type of offense variables

between the law enforcement and the control group, and the control group had only significantly more arrest charges (p=.02) and convictions (p=.05) for resisting law enforcement compared to the community group.

The punishment history of these probationers is what would be expected considering their lengthy criminal history. These results are presented in Table 4.4. On average, these probationers were on probation 2.16 times, were sentenced to jail 1.58 times, and sentenced to prison 1.17 times. They averaged over 1,300 days on probation, 270 days in jail, and over 2,100 days in prison. Over 40 percent of the offenders had spent time in a prison facility before their current probation began, 15.2 percent were released to probation after spending part of their sentence incarcerated in jail or a community corrections facility, eight percent of the sample transferred to the probation department from another jurisdiction, and 36.1 percent went directly to probation after sentencing. The length of probation for their lever-pulling offense averaged about 1,000 days. Importantly, the punishment histories were not significantly different when comparing the treatment and control groups.

Arrest Activity 1-year Prior and Post Lever-Pulling Meeting

Table 4.5 presents data on whether and how often the probationers in the study were arrested in the year before the meetings occurred and then in the year following the meeting. Thirty-two percent of the sample was arrested in the pre lever-pulling period, and 31 percent were arrested after the meeting date. There are no significant differences comparing the treatment groups to the control group.

Thirty-three percent of the probationers in the law enforcement and control groups failed during the post-meeting period, and 28 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group failed. Most of the probationers, if arrested, were only arrested once in the post lever-pulling meeting period, and overall, there were no differences comparing the number of times failed in the post-meeting period.

Table 4.5a and 4.5b provide recidivism models for all offenders, and then for each group. Recidivism was measured in Table 4.5a as any arrest occurring after the meeting, and measured as the number of arrests following the meeting in Table 4.5b. Logistic regression was used when the dependent variable was dichotomous, and negative binomial regression was used for the number of arrests since it was skewed. The first dependent variable is The control variables include demographic (i.e., age, race, gender), stability (i.e., marital status, residence changes, employment), and criminal history variables (i.e., number of arrests). The overall model indicates that the treatment groups were not significantly less likely to recidivate after the meeting and did not recidivate less frequently. Consistent with prior recidivism literature, probationers who were divorced (compared to single probationers), young, and those with lengthy criminal histories were more likely to recidivate and recidivate more frequently. The results comparing the models for each group are quite similar, however, the gender variable was modestly significantly in the control equations, but was not in the law enforcement or community equations. Specifically, males in the control group were somewhat more likely to recidivate and recidivate more frequently compared to females.

Time until Failure

Table 4.5 also includes data on the length of time it took to recidivate for all offenses, for only those probationers who attended a meeting, and for probationers to commit a felony. There were no significant differences comparing three time to failure mean measures—time to fail for any offense, time to fail for the treatment group meeting attendees (compared to all control probationers who failed), and the time to a felony failure. On average, the probationers failed at 145 days after the meeting, 149 days when only the treatment attendees are included, and 141 days before committing a felony. The time to failure results are very similar across group, and the law enforcement group failed somewhat sooner overall and to a felony, and the community group probationers committed a felony, on average, 30 days sooner, compared to the control. Although a similar percentage of probationers in the community and control groups committed a felony as their post-meeting offense, the community groups failed somewhat faster.

The longitudinal data collected provide an opportunity to conduct more powerful statistical tests in order to determine the effect of time between the law enforcement, community and control groups. The analysis of time-dependent covariates (e.g., time until failure) requires the use of models that are specific to this type of analysis. Specifically, one of the main interests is to see whether these groups recidivated differently over the one year of follow-up data collection.

When traditional cross-sectional methods are employed to data that varies over time, estimates may be biased and unreliable (Allison, 1984). Specifically, examining whether or not people simply recidivate (yes or no) over a one-year follow-up will lead to biased estimates and also fails to answer a pivotal question: is there something unique about those people assigned to the groups who went longer without failing?

In this case, Event History Analysis, or Survival Modeling, allows researchers to assess whether fixed effects[5] substantively influence time until failure across groups and to determine if these changes can be attributed to explanatory covariates. Survival Analysis is contingent upon the utilization of a Hazard Function, which requires some elaboration. This analysis uses an adoption of the discrete time Hazard Rate seen in Allison (1984).

The Hazard Function (q_j) can be written as follows:

$$q_j = \frac{d_j}{n_j \uparrow \frac{m_j}{2}}$$

Where q_j is the conditional probability of the discrete time hazard rate

Where d_j is the number of people who fail at a discrete time interval (j)

Where n_j is the number of people who are at risk at a discrete time interval (j)

Where m_j is the censored cases at a discrete time interval (j)[6]

It is of fundamental importance to describe the measurement of time, censoring and intervals. Time is operationalized in discrete form as the number of days from release until the day of first arrest (recidivism). Censoring means that the follow-up study ends before a person has the event, which in this case means that the person did not

[5] Although it is not done in this report, Event History Analysis also provides an opportunity to assess whether time-varying covariates co-vary with the hazard rate.

[6] It is also an assumption of the discrete time test that censored cases have one-half the interval exposure as those who fail at any time (j) (Allison, 1995)

recidivate before the 365th day. The choice of the interval for the analyses is 30 days, or one-month intervals, across the entire annual distribution of cases.[7]

In terms of the analyses conducted here 169 of the 540 individuals tracked recidivated within the year. The other 371 individuals are censored in the final interval because they did not have the event (e.g., did not recidivate) before the end of data collection. For those individuals who recidivate in a given month, their information is included in the estimate of q_j for that month and then they are excluded from estimates of successive intervals. Those who do not recidivate within the month are included in the next interval.

One of the first steps in conducting Event History Analysis is to conduct life table estimates, or actuarial models, to see if the survival distribution differs by the groups in the study. Survival curves used to analyze recidivism data are based on the Conditional Probability of Failure (CPF) estimates that a person will be arrested in an interval, given that he made it to the start of the interval (Allison, 1995: p. 44). The CPF (S_t) is given as: $\prod(1-q_j)$. Interpretively, the survival curve distribution is probability of surviving to the next interval (e.g., month), given the person has survived from the previous interval (month).

Figure 4.1 displays the survival curves stratified by group (law enforcement, community, or control) for all types of offenses. As you can see in the graph, the community group has a higher survival distribution than both the control and the law enforcement group.

[7] It is important to note that other intervals were chosen between 14 days (2 weeks) and 90 days (3 months). The estimates are reliable across the different intervals. For the sake of simplicity, one-month intervals were chosen in the analyses presented here.

The Wilcoxon statistic is assessed in order to test if the differences observed below are statistically significant. The Wilcoxon Chi-Square statistic tests whether or not the observed number of events (number recidivated) significantly differs between groups. The Wilcoxon statistic is given as: $\sum n_j(d_{1j}-e_{1j})$

Where n_j is the number of groups (three groups)

Where d_{1j} is the number of events (offenses) that occur in group 1 at time j

Where e_{1j} is the expected number of events (offenses) that occur in group 1 at time j

However, the differences between the groups are not statistically significant when the Wilcoxon Chi-Square statistic is examined (χ =1.46, df=2, p=.48). It is apparent that assignment to the group did not change the survival distribution for all offenses for those probationers tracked in the follow-up period.

In addition to analyzing survival models that assess the time until failure for all offenses, it is of particular interest to assess if these three groups differed among felony offenses. Were there any differences in time to arrest for serious crimes (defined by the criminal justice system as a felony) between the groups?

Figure 4.2 displays survival curves for felony offenses among the law enforcement, community and control groups. The law enforcement survival distribution is consistently the highest survival curve. This means that the law enforcement group does not commit felony offenses as fast as the other two groups, although this difference is not statistically significant. The community survival curve is actually lower than the control group until the ninth month of follow-up, at which point it is within the two other

groups. The control group has the lowest survival curve at the end of the yearlong follow-up period. The Wilcoxon Chi-square statistic (χ =1.84, df=2, p=.39) is not statistically significant when examining felony recidivism patterns between the three groups.

While the survival distribution is not significantly different between these three groups across the year, Figure 4.2 shows that there is a disparity between the groups across specific points in time. Specifically, the three groups do not recidivate proportionally similar to each other across the entire year-long interval. In order to display the differences between these three groups, the Hazard Function distribution is shown.

Figure 4.3 displays the Hazard Function for time until failure for felony offenses among the three groups. We increase the interval length to three months in order to have a more representative distribution. The Hazard Function distribution (q_j) is effected by the different number of offenses in a given interval. Increasing the interval size loses some of the annual variability between the groups, but also ensures an increase in the number of offenses during a given interval, thus improving its reliability.[8] Figure 4.3 does confirm that the community group did recidivate to a felony faster compared to the control group and the law enforcement group was somewhat slower to commit a felony.

Table 4.6 contains the results from preliminary multivariate survival analysis, using Cox Proportional Hazard Regression. Offenders in the treatment groups did not differ significantly from offenders in the control group. The most important factors affecting the median time to rearrest are the number of prior convictions and age. Those

[8] The survival distribution controls for the different number of offenses in an interval because it is calculated as the *product* of one minus the hazard function at a given interval, across the entire distribution.

offenders with none or one prior conviction median time to failure is longer compared to probationers with two or more convictions, and older offenders median time to failure is longer than younger offenders.

Although participating in a treatment group did not have a direct effect on time until recidivism, it is possible that treatment may have a conditional effect—that is, all offenders may not respond equally to the same treatment. That is, treatment may be more effective for offenders with less experience in the criminal justice system. The next survival analyses will determine whether less serious offenders are more likely to respond to treatment than more serious offenders.

We begin by examining the survival times for each group separately. Note that in Table 4.6a, the only variable significant at the .05 level from the full models (number of prior convictions) is no longer significantly related to time until failure. There are two important coefficients in these models—age seems to have the most influence on timing of recidivism for those in the "community group" more than the law enforcement or control group. In addition, gender becomes important when looking at performance in each group, with women responding most positively to the traditional criminal justice response (as opposed to either treatment group). However, this finding is based on a small number of females (24 in the control group), and this finding warrants additional examination with more cases. Because Table 4.6a contains analysis based on a relatively small number of cases, we place less importance on the significance of coefficients in the model and greater importance on the direction of relationships across each model. For example, less serious offenders (those not charged with weapon or violent offenses) tend to recidivate more quickly in the control group.

Failure to Type of Offense

Table 4.7 presents the type of post lever-pulling offenses for the first recorded offense after the meeting by the probationers in each group. Overall, 20 percent were arrested for a violent crime, 17 percent for a property offense, 9 percent for a drug possession offense, 7 percent for a drug sale offense, 25 percent for driving without a license, 12 percent for alcohol-related offenses, 3 percent for firearms-related offenses, and 5 percent for resisting law enforcement. There are some differences comparing the types of offense committed by group. For example, the law enforcement group was significantly more likely to be arrested for driving without a license post lever-pulling meeting (p=.02; es=.24), and significantly less likely to be arrested for a firearms offense (p=.05; es=-.29). There are not any significant differences comparing the community and control group results, although the community group was somewhat less likely to be arrested for a drug possession offense (p=.13; es=-.18) or a resisting law enforcement offense (p=.18; es=-.18).

Table 4.8 presents the total number of arrest charges before and after the lever-pulling meeting, arrest charges by type of offense, and by felony and misdemeanor charges. Probationers had .89 arrest charges prior to the lever-pulling meeting and .87 charges following the meeting. The probationers were charged with somewhat more misdemeanors in the post lever-pulling period and somewhat fewer felonies. They were charged with .64 violent crimes, .46 nonviolent crimes, .49 drug offenses, .29 alcohol offenses, .08 weapons offenses, .26 resisting law enforcement offenses, and .54 other offenses. Effect size differences above .15 are presented. These results show that there

were few differences comparing the treatment to the control groups. The law enforcement group was charged with somewhat fewer drug offenses, but more alcohol offenses and offenses categorized generally into the other category (most of these offenses were driving with their license suspended). The community group was charged with somewhat fewer alcohol and resisting offenses, but somewhat more violent offenses. It is surprising that the number of arrest charges do not vary significantly when comparing the groups. In fact, the only difference observed is that the law enforcement group was significantly more likely to be charged with other offenses compared to the control.

The multivariate results are presented in Table 4.8a and are similar to what is discussed above. Involvement in a treatment group does not decrease the number of arrest charges. Probationers who were divorced, young, had several residence changes, or had a long record had significantly more arrest charges filed in the post meeting period. The variables that are significant for the group models are similar—young probationers and probationers with long criminal histories increase the number of arrest charges filed for all groups. Male probationers in the control group had significantly more arrest charges filed compared to females, and divorced probationers in the community group had significantly more arrest charged filed compared to single probationers.

Another issue examined whether there were variations in the offending pattern of groups following the meeting. That is, was their post lever-pulling offense similarly serious, more serious, or less serious compared to their current probation offense? For example, if an offender on probation for robbery committed a drug possession offense in

the post meeting period, their offense would be coded as less serious, and if they committed another robbery or violent crime, it would be coded as being similarly serious. If an offender was on probation for selling coke, and then was arrested for possession of coke or driving with their license suspended in the post lever-pulling period, these arrests would be coded as less serious offenses. Twenty-five percent of the post lever-pulling offenses committed by the law enforcement group were more serious, 66.7 percent were less serious, and 8.3 percent were similarly serious. Twenty-four percent of the community group committed a more serious offense, 46 percent committed a less serious offense, and 30 percent committed a similarly serious offense. Finally, 26.7 percent of the control group committed a more serious post lever-pulling offense, 51.7 committed a less serious offense, and 21.7 percent committed a similarly serious offense. A similar number of probationers in each group recidivated up in the post lever-pulling period: they committed a more serious offense, but the law enforcement group was significantly more likely to recidivate down in the post lever-pulling period. Probationers in the law enforcement group were significantly more likely to commit a less serious offense than the control (p=.04; es=.33).

Conviction and Post Lever-Pulling Sentencing Activity

Since only a year's worth of post lever-pulling meeting data were collected, there is much less information about charging and sentencing activities, although the results with data that were available are consistent with the previous discussion of arrest activity. In short, the treatment groups were not significantly less likely to be convicted of a new offense after the lever-pulling meeting, their time to conviction failure was not

significantly greater, they did not have significantly more charges dismissed, and there were no differences by type of conviction for most categories and only a few small effect sizes are noted (see Table 4.9).

Fifty probationers, less than one percent of the sample were convicted of a new offense in the post lever-pulling meeting period. Similarly, 14 law enforcement probationers, 17 community leader probationers, and 19 control probationers were convicted of a new offense. On average, the number of days until conviction for all probationers was 229 days. The law enforcement group was convicted somewhat faster compared to the control. The conviction time to failure for the law enforcement group was 214 days, and was 235 days for both the community leader and control groups. Approximately 22.6 percent of all probationers were convicted of a felony and 22.1 percent were convicted of a misdemeanor following the lever-pulling meeting. Eighteen percent of the law enforcement group, 28 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and 22 percent of the control group was convicted of a felony. Twenty-eight percent of the control group, 16.7 percent of the community-leader group, and 20.5 percent of the law enforcement group were convicted of a misdemeanor. There are no statistically significant differences comparing the treatment to the control groups, and most effect sizes are below .15 so they are not reported. The effect sizes noted in the Table 4.9 indicate that there were only very small effects. There was no significant differences comparing the number of felony or misdemeanor convictions, although the community group had somewhat more felony convictions (p=.22; es=.26) and fewer misdemeanor convictions (p=.43; es=.17). The law enforcement group was convicted of somewhat fewer property offenses (p=.29; es=-.24) and alcohol offenses (p=.36; es=-.20),

but somewhat more drug (*p*=.51; es=.17) and other offenses (*p*=.48; es=.16). The community group were somewhat less likely to be convicted of other offenses (*p*=.32; es=-.19), but somewhat more likely to be convicted of violent (*p*=.17; es=.33) and drug offenses (*p*=.13; es=.36).

All charges were dismissed for 63 percent of the probationers charged with a post lever-pulling offense. If the prosecutor's office was a legitimate lever contributing to the initiative, one would expect that charges to be significantly less likely to have been dismissed for the treatment groups. The results do not support this conclusion and actually are in the opposite direction of what was expected: the control group had somewhat fewer post lever-pulling charges dismissed. Sixty percent of the control and community leader lever-pulling group, and 68 percent of the law enforcement group had all post lever-pulling charges dismissed.

Table 4.10 provides information on post lever-pulling meeting punishments. Limited information on sentencing was available because few probationers, if arrested and convicted in the post lever-pulling period, were also sentenced within 365 days of the meeting, In general, probationers in the treatment groups were not sentenced more times to probation, jail, or prison, and did not receive longer probation or jail sentences on average. The control group was sentenced to significantly more days compared to the law enforcement lever-pulling group.

On average, the law enforcement lever-pulling group was sentenced to 340 days on probation, 119 days in jail, and 304 in prison if convicted of an offense after the lever-pulling meeting data.[9] The community leader lever-pulling group was sentenced to 449

[9] A probationer could have more than one sentence coded for an offense. The record would include the executed sentence, the amount suspended, and if there are more than one type of sentence. For example, an

days to probation, 322 days in jail, and 1,584 days in prison, and the control group was sentenced to 397 days to probation, 284 days in jail, and 1,642 days in prison if convicted of an offense after the lever-pulling meeting date.

The jail and prison sentences for probationers convicted of felonies in the post lever-pulling meeting period were examined. On average, probationers convicted of a felony were sentenced to 661 days in jail and 1,427 days in prison. Judges sentenced the community leader lever-pulling probationers and control probationers to a similar of jail days (approximately 850 days) and prison days (approximately 1750 days). The law enforcement probationers convicted of a felony were sentenced to only 95 days in jail and 290 days in prison. It is important to note that very few probationers were convicted of felonies in each group, but the differences across group is not what one would expect.

Validity Concerns

An experiment is valuable for many reasons including that it minimizes the impact of problematic research design issues and implementation problems, but randomization does not necessarily eliminate all concerns that can arise. There are numerous threats to validity that must be considered and examined, and it is important to note that such threats can lead to both false positives and false negatives (Cook and Campbell 1979). The randomization comparisons presented in the earlier chapters, combined with the overall criminal history similarities and pre-treatment meeting comparisons presented in this chapter (and Chapter 5), supports the conclusion of pre-

offender might be sentenced to two years in prison, all of it suspected, and 365 days probation. This would be coded as a sentence to prison with 730 days, and a time to probation for 365 days.

treatment equivalence. The rest of this chapter, and a section of Chapter 5, focuses on accounting for post-assignment threats to validity.

The following three issues are the primary concern. The first concern is treatment attrition. Nearly 40 percent of the probationers assigned to the law enforcement and community groups did not attend the meeting that initiated a probationer into a group. The meetings were designed to be a turning point—critical because of the specific communication of changes in operational principles in justice system processing ("carrots and sticks"), but many probationers did not get this formal introduction. All of the assigned probationers were supposed to be targeted for response actions and treatment support, but it would certainly be much more difficult for nonattendees to identify the reasons for the changed response if such a change did in fact occur. In addition, since very few levers were actually pulled (see Chapters 3 and 5), attending the meeting was essentially the critical difference between the groups and the attendees/nonattendees. The first set of analyses compares the law enforcement attendees to nonattendees and community leader attendees and nonattendees.

As noted in Chapter 2, there were a high number of probationers who were invited but did not attend the meetings (approximately 60%). This attrition, however, does not appear to be related to the delivery of the treatment. Table 4.11 compares the law enforcement and community group attendees to those probationers who did not attend, and there were no significant differences comparing the attendee to the nonattendee results. Thirty-three percent of the probationers that attended and 32 percent of the probationers that did not attend the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting were arrested following the meeting, and both groups were arrested a similar number of times.

There was little variation by the number of arrest charges, misdemeanor, and felony charges. The group of law enforcement probationers that did not attend the meeting failed 21 days sooner overall and 44 days sooner for a felony, but these differences are not significant. The community group attendees are also quite similar to the nonattendees: a similar percentage failed, were arrested a similar number of times, and had similar number of charges, felonies, and misdemeanors. The attendee group took, on average, seven more days to fail overall, but committed a felony 28 days sooner compared to the nonattendee group. Again, none of the differences are significant.

Since the attendee group is similar to the non-attending group when comparing their demographic characteristics and criminal behavior after the meeting, it is not surprising that there were few statistically significant differences comparing the attendees in each group to the control. Logistic or negative binomial regression was used, and indicated that the probationers who attended either the law enforcement or community meeting were not less likely to be arrested, arrested less frequently, were not charged with fewer crimes, and did not have fewer misdemeanor or felony charges after the meeting.

The second threat examined is the possibility of treatment enhancement or depletion. The former accounts for the fact that an organization or a group providing a treatment might actually provide it more effectively over time—roles are more clearly identified, problems are more easily solved, and improvements are made. This is a potentially important threat because the nature of post-meeting intervention was open-ended—many different levers could have potentially been pulled in response, but is probably less of concern because Indianapolis' long history using this type of strategy.

The much more likely threat is the depletion of the treatment. There are two related concerns. The first relates to the fact that the program has been in place for such a long period of time, and as mentioned when explaining the circumstances in which this evaluation occurred, some key stakeholders were skeptical of its effectiveness. Another important concern was the large number of meetings that had to occur in a relatively short time in order to achieve a large sample size. It was difficult for stakeholders to keep track of all probationers in the study, and which group they were assigned, and thus follow-up was a challenge and burn-out of participating officials was an issue. Several of the stakeholders that were interviewed noted their frustration with the implementation of the program and argued that experiment overwhelmed the resources of the responding agencies. These issues are explored in a series of analyses comparing the results by month of assignment.

Month by Month Analysis

The six months of treatment delivery was recoded into three categories: Phase 1 (month 1; month 2 probationers), Phase 2 (month 3; month 4 probationers), and Phase 3 (month 5; month 6 probationers). Two comparisons are presented below. The first comparison is within each group. Since treatment burnout was the primary concern, the focus of the analysis was determining whether Phase 1 probationers were significantly less likely to be arrested compared to Phase 2 and Phase 3 probationers. For example, we examined whether the probationers assigned to the law enforcement group in Phase 1 were less likely to be arrested compared to Phase 2 and Phase 3 law enforcement probationers. The second set of analyses compare the treatment to control probationers

within a Phase. Although the number of probationers who reoffended is quite small, it was important to examine whether any differences exist within a Phase. Table 4.12 (each group is presented on a different page) presents these results.

For the first set of comparisons, we did a series of logistic regression equations using the arrest/no arrest post-meeting dichotomy. Each phase was dummy-coded, and the Phase 1 groups were used as the reference category. Thus we are examining whether the Phase 2 probationers and the Phase 3 probationers were significantly more likely to be arrested in the post-meeting period compared to the Phase 1 probationers for both treatment groups. There are some differences comparing the Phases: 28 percent of Phase 1 law enforcement probationers, 30 percent of Phase 2 probationers, and 40 percent of Phase 3 probationers recidivated in the post-meeting period, although these differences are not statistically significant the differences are not significant (Phase 2: B=.08; Sig. .84; Phase 3: B=.523; Sig. .17). There were smaller differences by Phase comparing the community leader lever-pulling results: 32 percent of Phase 1 probationers, 22 percent of Phase 2 probationers, and 30 percent of Phase 3 probationers assigned to the community leader treatment group recidivated after the meeting. Phase 2 or Phase 3 probationers were not significantly more likely to recidivate (Phase 2: B=-.52; Sig. .22; Phase 3: B=-.08; Sig. .84).

Several other dependent variables were examined for Phase result differences, including the number of arrests, the number of charges, and the number of felonies, and the number of misdemeanors after the meeting date. Since each of these variables are a skewed distribution, with the majority of probationers in each group receiving a 0 as their score, it was necessary to run these analyses using negative binomial regression. In

general, there were few differences comparing the Phase results for these dependent variables. Specifically, for the law enforcement group, there were no significant differences for the number of post-meeting arrests, charges, and misdemeanors comparing Phase 2 and Phase 3 results to the reference category. Phase 2 probationers, however, were arrested for significantly more felonies compared to the Phase 1 probationers (p=.02). When examining the community group results, Phase 2 probationers were arrested significantly fewer times (p=.06) than Phase 1 probationers and arrested for fewer misdemeanors (p=.06). There were no differences comparing the number of charges and the number of felonies by Phase.

Finally, we compared the variables by group within each Phase. Here, the interest is whether there are any significant differences comparing a treatment group to the control. In general, there are very few differences. At Phase 1, the law enforcement group was somewhat more likely to be charged with alcohol (p=.06; es=.64) and other offenses (p=.04; es=.71) and somewhat less likely to be charged with felonies (p=.07; es=-.34) and weapons offenses (p=.09; es=.86). There were no differences comparing the law enforcement to the control at Phase 2, and the law enforcement group was only significantly more likely to be charged with other offenses at Phase 3 (p=.05; es=.63). There were no differences comparing the community probationers to the control probationers at Phase 1 or Phase 3, but the community group had somewhat fewer arrest charges at Phase 2 (p=.07; es=-.24).

The third issue that is explored is variations by type of offender. Since the randomization procedure could not include only gun offenses, one potential explanation is that this study does not include the type of offenders that would mostly likely be

deterred by a lever-pulling strategy. In addition, inclusion criteria of felony probationer and weapons offenders resulted in a wide range of probationers with significantly different criminal backgrounds. Some probationers, for example, had a single felony conviction compared to others that had multiple convictions with previous time served in prison. There are some theoretical reasons to suspect that a lever-pulling strategy has only potential for deterring the light-felons (are less likely to reoffend because of the increased costs are not greater than the benefits), and that hard-core felons might not be responsive to such a strategy (they are not "rational," but more impulsive, and less susceptible to sanction threats--see Nagin and Pogoarsky 2001; Nagin and Paternoster 1994; Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2005).

Table 4.13 presents the criminal history information for each group by the type of lever-pulling offense. This classification is based solely on the current offense—the offense that made a probationer eligible for the study. There were very few differences comparing the groups, and the pattern of arrest, arrest charges, felony charges, misdemeanor charges, and time to failure results are quite similar.

The pattern of offending by offense for the law enforcement and control group is very similar. For example, 64 percent of law enforcement property offenders, 44 percent of the weapons offenders, 26 percent of cocaine and other drug dealers, 24 percent of probationers convicted of drug possession, and 29 percent of violent offenders recidivated in the post-lever pulling period. In comparison to the control group, 62 percent of property offenders, 43 percent of weapons offenders, 27 percent of cocaine and 13 percent of other drug dealers, 41 percent of probationers convicted of possessing cocaine, and 22 percent of violent crime offenders recidivated. Similarly, the number of

arrests, arrest charges, and time to failure is quite similar for almost all of the offenses. However, the law enforcement probationers sentenced for some other type of drug offense were somewhat more likely to be arrested (p=.08; es=.33), had somewhat more arrest charges (p=.07; es-.40), and more misdemeanor charges in the post-lever pulling period (p=.06; es=.84).

Eighty-two percent of the property offenders in the community group committed another offense following the lever-pulling meeting. These property offenders were somewhat more likely to be arrested (p=.10; es=.44), had significantly more arrest charges in the post-lever pulling period (p=.05; es=.72), and significantly more felony charges (p=.002). Twenty-one percent of the weapons offenders, 16 percent of cocaine dealers and 11 percent of other drug dealers, 40 percent of those convicted of possessing cocaine, and 36 percent of the violent offenders in the community group recidivated in the post-lever pulling period.

Criminal History Analysis

Table 4.14 presents arrest, charging, and time-to-failure data for the probationers with less serious criminal histories. The first columns present the group results for those probationers with only 1 or fewer felony convictions (the three probationers convicted of misdemeanor firearms violations). Overall, and as would be expected, these probationers were somewhat less active following the lever-pulling meeting. Twenty-five percent of the law enforcement group, 16 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and 23 percent of the control group were arrested following the meeting. In addition, the law enforcement group had .32 arrests, the community group had .21 arrests, and the control

group had .28 arrests. In comparison, 40 percent (.58 arrests) of law enforcement probationers, 37 percent (.59 arrests) of the community leader lever-pulling group, and 42 percent (.66 arrests) of the control probationers with more than one felony conviction recidivated following the meeting. There was only one significant difference comparing the groups: the probationers in the community leader lever-pulling group were charged with significantly more violent offenses in the post-meeting period (p=.01).

The last columns of this table present data for probationers who have never served any time in prison. Thirty percent of the law enforcement group, 20 percent of the community leader group, and 26 percent of these control group probationers' recidivated in the post-meeting period. There were only some modest differences comparing the results by group. For example, the law enforcement group failed somewhat faster (p=.06) and committed a felony faster (p=.10) compared to the control group, but they were charged with fewer violent offenses (p=.10). The community leader lever-pulling group was significantly less likely to be charged with resisting law enforcement charges in the post-meeting period (p=.10).

Chapter 5
Probation Record Results

Introduction

The probation department collects extensive data about all probationers, including demographic characteristics, probation and criminal history, program participation, and program successes and failures. Since almost all probationers in this study were convicted of felonies, they were also required to meet regularly, at least once a month, with a probation officer. A probation officer submits a case note record to a probationer's file at the conclusion of each meeting, any time the officer makes contact (e.g., home visit, telephone call, other correspondence), and when there is a change in the status of the case. Each case note record includes standard items, such as address, employment status, treatment program participation, court payments, and attendance status (e.g., did the probationer arrive on time?). In addition, general comments were included that reflected their impressions about how a probationer was doing, the results of all other actions taken, such as urine screen test results, court actions, and new arrests, and next meeting dates and issues to consider. Some of the probation file data were provided in a format that was easy for coders to record, but the case note records were cumbersome. Each case note entry was treated as a coding unit, and any available information, such as meeting attendance, residence change, job status, and actions taken by the probation officer, would be recorded. Once all case note entry data was recorded, we would then sum the frequency of all actions (number of meetings attended, number of meetings missed, number of residence changes, etc.), and record the outcomes of

probation officer actions (what was the judge's decision when a violation was filed?) and note the date of activities (when was a violation of probation filed?).

The probation records were collected for the ninety probationers in a group one-year after the meeting date. The entire record that was available was downloaded, and we coded the actions and activities of the probationers for the entire record, for 365 days prior to the lever-pulling meeting date, and for 365 days post lever-pulling date. This chapter presents the results from the analysis of these data.

Levers Pulled

In general, the probation department played an important role planning and coordinating the lever-pulling meetings. Probationers in the treatment groups were required to attend the law enforcement or community leader lever-pulling meeting as a condition of their probation. Probation officers had many levers available to them to legitimize the message delivered at the treatment meetings. Although there were general expectations guiding supervision strategies, it could be argued that probation officers had considerable discretion in how they implement these rules. Their discretion could have been used to accomplish the goals of the lever-pulling meetings. For example, the once-a-month contact provided an opportunity to remind the probationer about the message. Tools that were available that might enhance the credibility of the message included requiring more meetings, visiting or calling the probationer at home, requesting additional urine screens, and asking the "sweep team" to make contact. Probation officers also had several options when violations occurred, including doing nothing, requesting an administrative hearing (an informal hearing that included a supervisor, the

officer, and the probationer and the result usually was additional conditions being added), and filing a formal violation of probation. They could also discuss potential service, treatment, and employment opportunities. It was anticipated that probationers who attended the law enforcement lever-pulling group in particular would be exposed to more levers then the control, but the results show only little support for this conclusion. Table 5.1 presents these results.

The first area examined was the number and type of contacts probation officers had with probationers. Variables included the number of contacts made (meetings, phone calls, visits, etc.), number of face-to-face meeting contacts, and visits at home, work, and during probation sweeps. On average, officers had 25 contacts with the probationers in the study, and in the year prior to the lever-pulling meeting, probation officers averaged less than one contact a month. Although the overall contacts increased following the lever-pulling date for all groups, the increase was small and there was little variation by type of group. This finding is similar across all types of contacts. For example, all groups had, on average, about seven meetings with their probation officer before and after the meeting. The average number of meetings between the probation officer and probationer increased only slightly for the control group when comparing pre and post lever-pulling results.

The data also reveal that probation officers had very few contacts with probationers outside of the office. Probationers were rarely visited at home, work, or during probation sweeps. For example, in a typical year, most probationers received fewer than four calls or visits at home and rarely would a probation officer visit them at work. Probation officers made 2.29 visits to the law enforcement probationers, 1.41

visits to the community leader probationers, and 1.79 visits to the control. Although the number of visits at home post lever pulling is larger for the law enforcement group, and smaller for the community group, the effects sizes are quite small (.14 law enforcement v. control; .17 community v. control). The average number of home visits increased for all groups after the meeting or meeting date, but the total number was still very small. On average, probation officers visited the law enforcement probationers at home less than twice a year prior to the meeting and just over two times a year after the meeting. The control probationers were visited just over once a year prior to the meeting and twice a year after the meeting date. The number of sweep contacts was also not significantly different comparing the groups. Overall, the control was slightly more likely to be visited at work prior to the lever-pulling meeting date, but the law enforcement (p=.05; es=.25) and the community leader group (p=.06; es=.22) were significantly more likely to be visited at work following the lever-pulling meeting.

Table 5.1 also includes the total number of urine screens ordered, warrants filed, administrative in-house hearings held, and violations of probation filed. Probation officers ordered about three urine screens a year, the average number decreased somewhat after the lever pulling meeting date compared to the pre lever-pulling period, and the number of urine screens ordered was similar across the three groups. Administrative hearings are a tool used by officers to send a message to the probationer after one or two technical violations—it is structured to be a stern warning and last-chance before a violation of probation will be filed. It is at the discretion of the officer to request an administrative hearing, and most do not make such a request preferring instead to file a formal violation after several violations are recorded. Administrative hearings

occur rarely, very few probationers had more than one administrative hearing, and there were no overall differences comparing the number of hearing results. Approximately 26 percent of the law enforcement group, 25 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and 32 percent of the control group had an administrative hearing. Only 11 percent of the law enforcement lever-pulling group had an administrative following the meeting. In contrast, 15 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group and 19 percent of the control group had a post-meeting administrative hearing. In fact, the control group was significantly more likely to have an administrative hearing compared to the law enforcement treatment group (p=.03; es=.23).

We examine the law enforcement and control post-meeting results in more detail by examining the reasons for the administrative hearing and the results of the hearing. The primary reason for a post lever-pulling meeting administrative hearing was a failed urine screen. Nearly 48 percent of the law enforcement group and 45.6 percent of the control group had administrative hearings because they tested positive for drugs. Approximately 23 percent of the law enforcement group and 21.2 percent of the control group had an administrative hearing because of failure to make court payments. Other reasons for these hearings include failure to report to a meeting or a program activity and not complying with community work hours.

There were no significant differences comparing how the department punished the probationer after the hearing. The probation department decided to do nothing beyond continuing probation after 21.2 percent of the administrative hearings with law enforcement probationers and 26.3 percent of administrative hearings with control probationers. At the conclusion of nearly 30 percent of the law enforcement group

administrative hearings, the probation department ordered the probationer to participate in some type of treatment program, and after 17 percent of these hearings a zero tolerance policy was instituted—one more violation and a violation of probation would be filed. Eleven percent of the administrative hearings with the controls ended with a request for treatment, and 16 percent ended with either a violation of probation filed or added conditions to their probation.

Warrants were usually requested if a probationer failed to report for meetings or court hearings. Although warrants were somewhat more frequently filed for the law enforcement group, the results are not significantly different. The results on whether the probation officer filed a violation are actually quite interesting. Overall, 51 percent of the probationers had a violation order filed following the lever-pulling meeting date. Violations were filed against 56 percent of the law enforcement group, 46 percent of the community group, and 49 percent of the control group. Probation officers filed significantly more violations of probations against the law enforcement group probationers overall (p=.10; es=.17) and following the meeting (p=.03; es=.24). Rather than request an administrative hearing, it appears that probation officers would more frequently file a probation violation against the law enforcement lever-pulling group compared to the control probationers.

Table 5.2 presents data about the primary reason for the filing of a violation of probation with the court. This table also includes the punishment that was given to the probationer for that violation. It is important to note that these results are only for the first violation filed after the lever-pulling meeting or meeting date. Although there were some small differences comparing the reasons for a violation and the court decision from

that violation, there were no significant differences comparing the treatment to the control results.

Most probationers had violations filed by their probation officer for positive urine screens. Nearly 34 percent of the probationers had a violation filed after testing positive for drug use. A somewhat higher percentage of the law enforcement group (38 percent) and somewhat lower percentage of the community group (25 percent) had violations filed for testing positive compared to the control group. Violations of probation were also filed frequently for an arrest or an arrest with additional concerns. In these cases, the arrest typically was the last straw: the probation officer would note other concerns in the file, such as failure to report for a meeting, failure to make restitution payments, or testing positive for drugs, and then a new arrest would result in the violation being filed that included all of these issues. Twelve percent of the law enforcement group, 13 percent of the community group and 9 percent of the control group had violations filed for a new arrest. When additional concerns are included with the arrest, 23 percent of the law enforcement group, 22 percent of the community group, and 32 percent of the control group had violations filed.

It is surprising that there are no differences comparing the punishment for the violations filed against probationers. In nearly 20 percent of the cases, the judge decided to do nothing and these results are fairly similar by group. The judge revoked their probation about 30 percent of the time, and the revocation occurred somewhat more frequently for the control group. Judges used a short or long jail term about four percent of the cases, required treatment for 13 percent of the probationers, and amended the conditions of their probation for 14 percent of the probationers.

Meeting Attendance and Punctuality

Table 5.3 provides the results on whether there were differences in promptly attending meetings with their probation officer. We were interested in examining whether the treatment probationers were less likely to miss a meeting with their probation officer, less likely to report late, or were more likely to report on time or early for their meeting.

Over 61 percent of all probationers missed at least one meeting with their probation officer. Overall, 55 percent of the law enforcement probationers, 62 percent of the community leader probationers, and 67 percent of the control probationers missed at least one meeting during their probation history. The law enforcement group was significantly less likely to miss a meeting (p = .02; es=-.25) and the community leader group was somewhat less likely to have missed a meeting with their probation officer. There were no significant differences when examining meeting attendance in the year prior to the meeting date: approximately 35 percent of each group missed at least one meeting with their probation officer during the pre-meeting period. Both treatment groups, however, were less likely to miss a meeting with their probation officer following the lever-pulling meeting, but the results are not statistically significant. Thirty-five percent of the law enforcement group, 37 percent of the community leader group, and over 43 percent of the control group missed a meeting with their probation officer after the meeting.

Although there were some slight differences in whether they missed a meeting, there were not significant differences by the frequency of missed meetings. On average,

probationers missed 1.64 meetings with their probation officer during their probation tenure. The law enforcement and community group probationers missed somewhat fewer meetings than the control (1.53, 1.61 v. 1.78), but the results are not statistically different. We also examined whether there were differences when a probationer would miss a meeting—that is, were the treatment probationers more likely to contact their probation officer to explain why they were missing the meeting? There were no differences comparing the groups.

In general, the treatment groups were not significantly more likely to report on time to meetings with their probation officer. The law enforcement group was somewhat more likely to report early and late to their probation officer meeting in the post meeting period. The community leader lever pulling group was, however, significantly more likely to have reported early to their meeting with the probation officer compared to the control in the post lever-pulling period (p=.003; es=.44).

Arrests, Charges, Drugs, and Alcohol Use

Table 5.4 provides data on the number of times arrested (for both technical violations and new crimes), arrested for new crimes only, number of times charged while on probation, the number of failed urine screens and the number of times the probationer failed to report to the test center for a urine screen, and the number of times where there is evidence of alcohol use in the record (e.g., the probationer admits drinking or the officer suspects the probationer has been drinking). It is important to note that the arrest and charge data presented include the combined results for the entire probation record.

New arrest data is typically only recorded in the probation record if the probationer is actively meeting with their probation officer when the arrest occurs. These arrest data are not as complete as what was presented in the criminal history chapter, but these data do provide another indicator of behavior changes after attending the lever pulling meeting. An arrest for a new crime will almost automatically result in a violation of probation being filed, but there were exceptions depending on the seriousness of the crime and past probation history. In addition, 15 percent of the new arrests noted in the record were actually for violations of probation instead of an additional incident—the probationer had stopped attending meetings and was picked up on an arrest warrant. Over 53 percent of the probationers were arrested at least once while on probation--fifty-eight percent of the law enforcement group, 49 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and 54 percent of the control group were arrested. In comparison, 42 percent of the probationers were arrested for new crimes—43 percent of the law enforcement group, 38 percent of the community group, and 45 percent of the control group. Table 5.4 includes the average number of times arrested, arrested for a new crime, and charged while on probation. On average, probationers were arrested .89 times while on probation, .67 times for a new crime, and charged .67 times. The important conclusion about these arrest and charge statistics is that there were no differences comparing the treatment groups to the control group.

Table 5.4a provides type of offense data. Specifically, this table includes the results for the first arrest offense while on probation noted in a probationer's record. Overall, the law enforcement probationers were less likely to be arrested for drug possession (p=.13; -.17), drug sale (p=.08; es=.26), resisting law enforcement (p=.05;

es=-.21) and more likely to be arrested for violating the conditions of their probation (p= .04; es=.20). The community group probationers were more likely to be arrested for violent crimes (p=.02; es=.25), and less likely to be arrested for drug possession (p=.13; es=-.17), alcohol-related offenses (p=.15; es=-.16), resisting law enforcement (p=.004; -.44), and other offenses (p=.008; es=-.40). We were unable to record the date of the arrest because the record usually did not include it (just that an arrest occurred), and it was not known how close the case record entry date for the arrest was to the actual arrest date.

Table 5.4b provides the logistic regression results for three dichotomous variables: arrested for a technical or new crime while on probation, arrested for a new crime while on probation, or failed a drug test after the meeting. It is not surprising that the treatment groups were not significantly less likely to be arrested or fail a drug screen following the meeting. Young probationers and probationers with extensive criminal histories were significantly more likely to be arrested for a technical and/or a new crime. In addition, males were more likely than females, employed probationers were less likely than unemployed, and increases in education decreased the likelihood of be arrested for a technical and/or a new crime. The only variables that increased the log odds of failing a drug screen test after the meeting were the number of residence chances and prior criminal record.

One of the important supervision tools used relatively frequently by probation officers is to request a urine screen test. The primary way that a probation officer interacts with the probationer is in a meeting at the probation office, because of large caseloads and limited time for home visitations. The meeting interview was also

relatively short and it was difficult to ascertain how well the probationer was doing beyond whether they were attending meetings and completing court-ordered treatment. The urine screen was a tool to help overcome these limitations to more reliably gauge probationer compliance. Over 97 percent of the probationers in this study were required to submit urine specimens by request as a condition of their probation, but requesting urine screens was not a lever used by the probation department. Table 5.4 indicates that the number of urine screen tests requested did not vary significantly by group.

Sixty-two percent of the probationers had at least one urine screen failure noted in their record. Similarly, 63 percent of the law enforcement group, 59 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and 63 percent of the control group had at least one urine screen failure noted in their record. Forty-four percent of the probationers had a urine screen failure noted in the pre lever-pulling meeting period (365 days), and the law enforcement group was somewhat more likely to have failed in the pre lever-pulling period. Nearly half of the law enforcement group failed in this period, 37 percent of the community leader group, and 44 percent of the control probationers failed in this pre-period. Following the lever-pulling meeting date, 36 percent of the law enforcement group, 33 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and over 37 percent of the control group failed at least one urine screen. There were no significant differences when comparing the results by group for either the pre or post lever-pulling period.

We also examined the number of times a probationer failed a urine screen test (total, pre, and post lever-pulling meeting), and the number of times they failed to report for a screen when requested. These results are also presented in Table 5.4. There were few differences comparing the results by group. On average, the law enforcement group

had 2.1 failures, the community leader lever-pulling group had 1.7 failures, and the control group had 1.9 failures noted in their record. Each group failed a similar number of times following the meeting, but the law enforcement group failed somewhat more urine screen tests prior to the lever-pulling meeting (p=.10; es=.18).

Overall, 26.5 percent of the probationers failed to report for a urine screen at least one time, 13.7 percent failed in the pre meeting period, and 14.4 percent failed in the post meeting period. In the pre lever-pulling meeting period, 15.6 percent of the law enforcement group, 12.2 percent of the community group, and 13.3 percent of the control group failed to report for a urine screen. In the period following the meeting or meeting date, 18.3 percent of the law enforcement, 11.1 percent of the community group, and 16.1 percent of the control group failed to report for a urine screen test. The differences in failure to report for a urine screen test overall, before, and after the meeting are not significant.

We also collected data about the type of drug found indicated by the urine screen. Table 5.5 presents the results. Not surprisingly, the majority of probationers tested positive for cocaine or tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Approximately 27 percent of probationers tested positive for cocaine prior to the meeting and 35 percent tested positive in the post lever-pulling meeting period. Nearly 41 percent of probationers tested positive for THC both before and after the meeting. In addition, probationers submitted a diluted sample approximately 21 percent before and 16 percent after the meeting. A smaller percentage of probationers test results indicated a combination of drugs, ethanol, or some other type of drug. It is interesting that a much higher percentage of law enforcement lever-pulling attendees tested positive for cocaine after the meeting

compared to before the meeting. Over 43 percent of the law enforcement lever-pulling probationers tested positive for cocaine after the meeting compared to 29.5 percent in the year before their meeting. Thirty percent of the control probationers who tested positive indicated cocaine use. The differences comparing the law enforcement and control group are not significant (*p*=.22; es=.15). Fewer probationers in the law enforcement group, however, submitted a sample that tested positive for THC (44.3% v. 33.8%) or one that was diluted (19.3% v. 13.8%) in the post-meeting period, and the control probationers were somewhat more likely to test positive with THC (*p*=.11; es .17). There was little change when comparing the two periods for the community leader lever pulling probationers—approximately 31 percent tested positive for cocaine, 36 percent tested positive for THC, 23 percent submitted a diluted sample, 1.6 percent tested positive for ethanol, 3.5 percent submitted a sample with a combination of drugs, and 2.0 percent submitted a sample with other drugs. The community probationers were somewhat less likely to test positive for THC (*p*=.11; es=.17) and more likely to submit a diluted sample (*p*=.19; es=.17) compared to the control probationers.

Finally, a somewhat higher percentage of control probationers submitted samples with cocaine and THC after the meeting date compared to before the meeting date. For example, approximately 21 percent of the control probationers submitted a sample that tested positive for cocaine before the meeting and 32 percent submitted a sample with cocaine after the meeting, and 41 percent of the sample tested positive for THC before and 49 percent tested positive for THC after the meeting. Over 21 percent of the control probationers submitted a diluted sample prior to the meeting, and nearly 12 percent submitted a diluted after the meeting.

Table 5.5a presents data about how the probation officer responded when a probationer tested positive for drugs. These data are provided for the first time that the probationer failed (as indicated in their overall probation record), and for the first time the probationer failed after the lever-pulling meeting date. The most likely response to a failed screen, both before and after the meeting, was to file a violation of probation with the court. Probationers filed a violation of probation for nearly 42 percent of the overall failures and for nearly 50 percent of the failures that occurred after the meeting date. Probation officers, however, also frequently did nothing when a probationer tested positive. The probation officers did nothing for over 25 percent of the probationers that failed after the meeting, and nearly 37 percent of the probationers that failed before the meeting. The data presented in this table also indicates that there were very few differences comparing the response to positive drug screens by group. Although there were some small differences in the response to positive urine screens before the meeting, there were no differences following the meeting. Specifically, probation officers were not significantly more likely to file violation of probation when a treatment probationer tested positive, and were not less likely to do nothing.

Residence Changes, Restitution, Job Activity

Table 5.6 provides the results of analysis examining several variables related to life stability. We examined whether the treatment groups were less likely to change residences during probation, prior to the meeting date, and following the meeting date. In addition, we consider whether they paid court costs and what percentage of the court

costs ordered did they pay. Finally, their job status at intake, post lever-pulling meeting, and the number of jobs are examined. The mean scores comparing the groups are quite similar, and there were no significant differences comparing these results.

Approximately 58 percent of the probationers changed residence at least once while on probation. On average, probationers changed residence 1.36 times. The law enforcement group changed residence somewhat less overall, and the community group changed residence somewhat more compared to the control. The number of residence changes for the two treatment groups increased slightly in the post lever-pulling meeting period, but there were no statistical differences comparing the treatment groups to the control. Almost all probationers made some effort to make court payments, although only 32 percent paid their court costs in full. A similar percentage of probationers in each group made an effort to pay, paid their court costs in full, and paid a similar percentage of the total amount ordered. On average, the law enforcement group paid 46 percent, the community leader group paid 55 percent, and control group paid 52 percent of the restitution ordered.

The employment results are different compared to the employment-related interview data. Recall that there a higher percentage of control probationers had gotten a job within the time period between meeting/meeting date and the interview. The results presented in Table 5.6 indicate no difference in the groups. Specifically, a similar percentage of probationers were employed at intake, employed post-lever pulling meeting, lost a job before and after the meeting, and had a similar number of jobs after the lever-pulling meeting. Approximately 66 percent of the probationers were employed at intake, and a somewhat higher percentage had a job in the period following the lever-

pulling meeting date. Seven-nine percent of the law enforcement group, and 80 percent of the community and control groups, had a job after the lever pulling meeting. Similarly, there was not much difference in whether probationers were fired and/or lost a job before and after the lever-pulling meeting. Thirty-one percent of the law enforcement probationers lost at least one job in the pre-meeting period, but only 24 percent lost a job after the meeting. The percent of community leader lever pulling attendees and control probationers declined in the post-meeting period. For example, 25 percent of the community leader group was fired before the meeting and 20 percent was fired after the meeting.

Treatment

Table 5.7 presents data on the types of treatment programs participated in while on probation, whether the probationer completed these treatment programs, and the number of times it was reported that a probationer missed a treatment meeting. We collected two types of treatment variables. First, the probation department collects general data for each probationer on the types of programs that they have participated in and completed. Unfortunately, these data were provided without participation date making it impossible to determine what, if any, programs started or were completed following the lever-pulling meeting. Second, we attempted to overcome this limitation by coding treatment meeting participation from the officer's case notes. Probation officers would usually make a note of the types of program that a probationer was participating in, and then would provide occasional updates in the notes about their participation—whether they completed the program, whether they had stopped going, and

if they had missed any meetings. For example, a probation officer might note that she received a letter from a probationer's drug treatment provider stating that the probationer had attended 8 of 10 treatment sessions.

It is not surprising that most of the probationers in this study have participated in some type of drug treatment program, and the participation and completion is similarly between groups. Seventy-four percent of the law enforcement group, 67 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and 74 percent of the control probationers have had some type of drug treatment program. Sixty-two percent of the control probationers, 56 percent of the law enforcement group, and 59 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group actually completed their drug treatment program.

Fewer probationers were required to participate in education and work-related programs. Fifteen percent of the law enforcement lever-pulling group, 12 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and 21 percent of the control group were assigned to an education program. In fact, the control group was significantly more likely to have been required to participate in an education program compared to the community leader lever-pulling group (p=.02; es=-.24). The control group was also more likely to have completed an education program (p=.30; es=-.32). Thirty-eight percent of the control group completed an education program compared to only 24 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group. The community leader lever-pulling group was significantly less likely to be required to participate in a work-related program (p=.03; es=.24). Thirty-five percent of the control group and 30 percent of the law enforcement lever-pulling group participated in a work-related training program, but only 24 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group participated in a work program. It is interesting,

however, that those probationers in each treatment group assigned to a work program were much more likely to complete it compared to the control. Thirty percent of the law enforcement probationers and 37 percent of the community leader pulling probationers, and twenty percent of the control probationers completed the required work program. Although not statistically significant, the differences produced small effect sizes (es=.27; es=.38). A similar percentage of each group also was required and completed community work service hours. Approximately 26 percent of probationers were required to do community service hours, and 56 percent actually completed their required number of hours. Twenty-eight percent of the law enforcement group, 24 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group, and 26 percent of the control group were assigned community service hours. Over 57 percent of the control group, 52 percent of the law enforcement group, 59 percent of the community leader lever-pulling group completed their community work service hours.

The treatment related data discussed above focuses on program participation and completion. In contrast, the case note coding collected information related to treatment related sessions. Although the case note information on treatment variables is crude and many probation officers would not make any reference to their participation, it was the only way (besides the interview instrument) where we could attempt to get a sense of treatment participation after the lever-pulling meeting.

The results presented in Table 5.7 show that there were no or small differences in program sessions overall and before the lever-pulling meeting. On average, probation officers noted participation in about twenty program related sessions while on probation and a high percentage of these programs were completed. The law enforcement group,

however, was significantly more likely to have had program meetings after attending a lever-pulling meeting (*p*=.05; es=.22), but, of those probationers who had program meetings following the meeting date, they were only slightly more likely to complete these programs (*p*=.24; es=.18).

Validity Concerns

The final section of Chapter 4 focused on identifying whether they were any major validity concerns. In general, the results indicated that there were very few differences comparing attendee to non-attendee groups, time receiving treatment (Phases), and type of offenders. These concerns were examined again with these probation data and produced a similar result: there were few significant differences comparing meeting attendees to non-attendees, comparing Phase 1 to Phase 2 and Phase 3 probationers, and comparing type of offenders. This section discusses these analyses.

Attendees/Non-Attendees

First, we examined whether meeting attendees were significantly more likely to have levers pulled, less likely to behave badly (measured by missing meetings, being arrested, and having VOPs filed), and were likely to have stable personal life (less likely to be fired from any jobs, less residence changes, and more likely to be employed). These results were completed for each treatment group.

There were few differences comparing the law enforcement meeting attendees to the non-attendees. The attendees were significantly more likely to have contact with their probation officer post lever-pulling meeting (*p*=.02) and have more meetings

(*p*=.02), but were not more likely to have a violation of probation order filed, have an administrative hearing, and have more urine screens requested. The attendees were not less likely to miss a meeting with their probation officer after the meeting and not more likely to fail a drug screen. The attendees were somewhat less likely to have been arrested while on probation (*p*=.10). Attendees were not less likely to be fired from any jobs, less likely to have residence changes, but did have more jobs following the lever-pulling meeting (*p*=.09).

The community leader lever-pulling group attendees were not more likely to be contacted during sweeps, have more administrative hearings, have more urine screens requested, or have more violation of probation orders filed. Similar to the law enforcement group, they were more likely to have contact with their probation officer following the meeting (*p*=.05), and have more meetings (*p*=.02). The community group attendees were not less likely to fail a drug screen following the meeting, were not less likely to miss a meeting with their probation officer, but were less likely to be arrested while on probation (*p*=.06). The community group attendees were not more likely to have been fired from any jobs, but were more likely to change residences after the meeting date (*p*=.06).

Phase Comparison

We examined whether the probationers who attended the lever-pulling meetings in Phase 1 (June/July 2003) were different from probationers who attended at Phase 2 and Phase 3. There were no differences by Phase comparing the law enforcement probationers. Specifically, the Phase 1 law enforcement probationers were not more likely to be arrested, have a violation of probation or have more violation of probations

filed, have an administrative hearing, did not have more meetings or contacts with their probation officer, were not more likely to test positive for drugs, and did not have more residence changes.

There were some modest differences comparing the community leader probationers. Specifically, the Phase 2 probationers (September/October) had more urine screen test requests (p=.06), were more likely to fail a urine screen post lever-pulling meeting (p=.08), had more contacts with their probation officer (p=.09), and had more administrative hearings in the probation department (p=.03). Importantly, however, they were not more likely to be arrested, were not arrested more frequently, did not have more violations of probation filed, and did not change jobs or residences more frequently compared to the Phase 1 probationers.

Type of Offense Differences

Table 5.8 presents several of the variables examined within this chapter for each group by type of offense. Approximately 38 percent of law enforcement probationers in each offense category missed a meeting with their probation officer, although over 50 percent of the weapons offenders missed a meeting. Property and violent crime offenders in the law enforcement group were somewhat more likely to be arrested, test positive for drugs, have a violation of probation filed, and change residences. Property offenders and those of probation for possessing cocaine in the community group were more to have missed a meeting with their probation officers, be arrested while on probation, and have a violation of probation filed. Similarly, the property offenders in the control group were

also the probationers that missed somewhat more meetings with their probation officer, were arrested more frequently, and had violations of probation filed.

The important conclusion, however, is that there are very few differences comparing the group results by type of offender. Specifically, there were no differences comparing the treatment offenders on probation for possessing cocaine, selling other drugs, and for violent offenses to the control results. There were no differences between the law enforcement and control weapons offenders, but the law enforcement property offenders had significantly fewer administrative hearings and offenders on probation for selling drugs and assigned to the law enforcement group were significantly less likely to miss a meeting with their probation officer. The community probationers sentenced for weapons offenses had significantly more administrative hearings, and the community probationers sentenced for selling drugs were less likely to miss a meeting with their probation officer and test positive for drugs compared to the control.

Chapter 6
Report Summary and Policy Implications

Introduction

In several ways, the criminal justice system and related agencies have been extraordinarily innovative in adapting to external environmental pressures. New strategies and programs are constantly being developed and implemented to satisfy various goals of criminal justice. Of course, there have been successful strategies, failed strategies, and most probably have had mixed impact: parts of the strategy worked or had some redeeming qualities, and other parts of the strategy did not work. The body of research knowledge to evaluate these programs is impressive, and the results have been presented back to the practitioner community in an effort to iteratively identify what works and what's promising for responding to various types of public safety concerns. Programs that have been shown to have promising results in one jurisdiction are not simply implemented in additional sites, but have to be adapted to fit the political, community, and bureaucratic issues of another jurisdiction. The very important research on policy innovations in criminal justice has rightly focused on identifying the elements of programs that are promising and the types of implementation obstacles that need to be identified and overcome in order to succeed.

It is difficult to predict what programs steamroll their way to widespread adoption, but certainly those that include a promise of dramatic impact are given widespread consideration. Project Ceasefire was one of the most intriguing interventions to be implemented in the 1990s—it had great success in reducing serious violent crime. Both qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the strategy have provided good, sound

evidence that the program did have a significant impact. Its success also resulted in other cities modeling the Ceasefire model closely, and others copying elements that fit local crime patterns. However, since there were many different elements of the Ceasefire program, it is difficult to know what factors or combination of factors contributed to its success.

Pulling levers was one of the many intriguing components of the Boston Intervention, and many other jurisdictions have adopted some type of offender notification program as a promising component of a violent crime reduction strategy. This project was funded to examine the effects of a lever-pulling project in Indianapolis, Indiana. The objectives of the project were 1). To provide an experimental evaluation of the "pulling levers" strategy, 2). To evaluate different types of "lever pulling" meetings, and 3). To provide a description of how the program was implemented.

Indianapolis stakeholders had decided in early 2002 to expand what was an already established lever-pulling meeting program. First, they decided to continue to use a type of lever-pulling meeting that closely resembled the meetings that occurred originally in Boston. Although called law enforcement lever-pulling meetings throughout this report, the message delivered at these meetings included a combination of law enforcement officials and community leaders. The message was delivered in a tense atmosphere, and the message highlighted critical "carrots and sticks." Second, several key stakeholders decided to propose a different type of meeting—referred here as the community leader lever-pulling meeting. In contrast to the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting, the message was delivered by community leaders who greatly emphasized the positive opportunities available to help probationers succeed.

These stakeholders agreed to allow an evaluation using an experimental research design. Probationers were randomly assigned to treatment 1 (the law enforcement group), treatment 2 (the community leader group), or a control group. The two types of meeting (law enforcement and community) were administered during six months between June 2003 and March 2004. The sample size for the study is 540 probationers--Ninety probationers were assigned each month —30 probationers who attend the law enforcement meeting, 30 probationers who attended the community meeting, and 30 control probationers. Multiple sources of data were collected for this study. First, probationers were interviewed to assess their impressions of the meetings, perceptions of risk and effectiveness of the criminal justice system, attitudes towards guns, prior and present involvement in gangs, and their offending behavior after attending the meeting. Second, criminal history data were collected to assess whether and how often they were arrested, charged and convicted within one year of attending the meeting, the types of offenses they had committed in the lifetime and after attending the meeting, and the number of days until failure after attending the meeting (or from the meeting data for the control group). Third, probation data were collected. Variables included number of contacts and meetings, number of violations filed and actions taken, number of urine screens ordered, the test results, and how the probation officer responded to positive tests, and the number and type of treatment programs participated in and completed. All available data (their complete criminal and probation history) were collected, and their post-meeting behavior was emphasized in this report.

These data provided the opportunity to assess the impact of the program on the probationers, assess the implementation of the program, and to identify critical issues related to the success and/or failure of the program. One difficulty with having so much

data is being able to identify the important conclusions from the results presented. This final chapter attempts to make sense of what was learned about this strategy and then it concludes with policy implications. The findings assessing the impact of these meetings, and whether the treatments were implemented as intended, are discussed below.

Major Findings

1. Lever-pulling meetings are an effective mechanism to communicate directly with the offending population and disrupt perceptions of risk related to sanction.

It appears that the delivery of a message that includes an emphasis on the "risks" of offending and the "potential rewards" of available services in a meeting setting is an effective way to communicate directly with the offending population. One of the great potentials of a lever-pulling strategy lies in its attempt to completely reconfigure the standard operating principles of the criminal justice system as understood by the offending population. The working principals of criminal justice are learned experientially and through informal contacts with others: the offender has an understanding of the likelihood of arrest, expectations about sentencing, and knowledge about the range of acceptable behaviors while on probation. The lever-pulling meeting was designed to be a promise that their working understandings were no longer reliable. New information was provided to offenders strategically in a very powerful and meaningful setting. The message that was communicated to the law enforcement meeting attendees was that key criminal justice leaders knew that they were an important

part of the violence problem in the community. In addition, they communicated a sense of urgency for a response, and that the nature of that response included focused attention on meeting participants. In these meetings, the power of the criminal sanction was emphasized with a particular focus on the federal justice system.

The message that was delivered at the community leader lever-pulling meeting included concern about the extent of violence in the community. The meeting was also an opportunity to change expectations about how services are distributed to clients in the community. That is, like offenders that have a working knowledge of what to expect from the criminal justice system, they also have preconceived understandings about the type and quality of treatment, employment, and educational services provided in the community. Many of them, and/or their family members, friends, and other contacts, have had or been required to use them. The message delivered at the community meeting emphasized direct caring and concern about the probationers, encouragement for their success, and a promise of special delivery of services.

Although probationers attending both types of meeting agreed that they made better choices because they attended the meeting and that the meetings were helpful, a very different message was heard by probationers attending the two types of meetings. Specifically, the law enforcement meeting attendees left the meeting with very different expectations about the criminal justice system. For example, these probationers were more likely to remember that law enforcement is cracking down on violent and gun crime and that law enforcement would follow through on their promises to crack down on crime, that they can go to federal prison if caught carrying a gun, that the meetings would make it more difficult to get out of the criminal justice system, that probation is watching

their behavior closely, and that law enforcement wants them to make good choices. The community group attendees were somewhat more likely to think that the leaders were willing to help them get a job, but both groups were similar in their thinking about the willingness to help and wanting to stay them out of trouble. The results also indicated that the message delivered in the law enforcement meeting setting made a strong impression, and the probationers discussed their attendance with a variety of people in their social network, including their partners, friends, and neighbors.

Most of the speakers talked briefly during the law enforcement lever-pulling session, but the theme emphasized by the criminal justice officials was consistent: lengthy sanctions would be used if the terms of this new contract were violated and their case could be transferred to federal courts. In fact, the US Attorney spoke longer than any other speaker and the discussion of all the potential federal levers had a dramatic impact. The probationers' body language and facial expressions clearly showed that the message struck a chord. The interviews, conducted between seven and nine months after the meeting, demonstrated that the critical aspects of the message still lingered in the minds of probationers. The perceptions of risk results indicated that neither treatment group believed that their risks generally and for variety of offenses of arrest and going to prison was not much different. Probationers in all groups rated the effectiveness of the criminal justice system as being very high. There were group differences on their assessments of the likelihood of conviction, length of prison sentence, and harshness of the federal system. The law enforcement probationers thought it was less likely that they could get away with a lot of crimes, and concluded that there was a higher likelihood of conviction, expected longer sentences if convicted of burglary, assault, theft, gun

offenses, robbery and stealing a car, and strongly anticipated having their case transferred to federal court if caught with a gun. In addition, the law enforcement group was significantly more likely to state that the penalties for carrying a gun were greater and that the federal system provides harsher penalties for gun crimes. There were few differences comparing perceptions of risk assessments for the community leader and control probationers.

The results concerning general attitudes about guns and using guns to resolve disputes were generally not different comparing the groups. Most probationers agreed that they should not use guns and should not put themselves in situations where having a gun was necessary. Both treatment groups were more likely to strongly disagree that it is ok to shoot somebody if they are about to kill or hurt you, and somewhat more likely to disagree that they need to carry a gun in their neighborhood and carrying a gun is not worth the risk of getting caught. Although there was some discussion at the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting about responding seriously to guns, the message focused more on general concerns about violent crime and community safety. In addition, only a portion of the offenders in the study were on probation for gun offenses (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5) and thus many probationers in each group of the study already had strong apprehensions about carrying and using a gun.

2/3. The treatment group probationers' post-meeting offending behavior was not different than the control probationers. In addition, the treatment and control probationers committed similar types of offenses after the meeting, although the law

enforcement probationers were more likely to recidivate downwards (commit a less serious crime).

Boston experienced a significant decline in violent crime and youth homicides after the implementation of "Operation Ceasefire." Because of this success, and some other successes observed when implemented in other cities, it was anticipated that modest to strong effects would occur and the offending behavior of the law enforcement lever-pulling group would be much lower compared to the control group. The results presented in this report, using various measures of criminal activity following the meeting, do not support this hypothesis. The interview results for criminal behavior, criminal history data on number and type of arrests charges, and probation data on arrests, urine screen results, and alcohol use indicated that there was very few differences comparing the law enforcement to the control group. The law enforcement group was not significantly less likely to commit an offense, did not commit fewer offenses, and did not wait longer to commit a new offense. The law enforcement group was slightly more likely to be charged with other offenses following the lever-pulling meeting. The results indicated that the law enforcement group was significantly more likely to be arrested for driving without a license post lever-pulling, but significantly less likely to be arrested for a firearms offense. In addition, the offending patterns for the law enforcement group was different compared to the control: although they recidivated overall similarly to the control, they committed an offense that was less serious. The law enforcement group was significantly more likely to recidivate down (there post-meeting offense was less serious than the current probation offense). Although the results are not significant, the survival

analysis results did show that the law enforcement group was somewhat slower to commit a felony.

Consistent with the results presented above, there were very few differences comparing the community and control groups. That is, the community group was not more or less likely to commit gun offenses, other property offenses, commit more misdemeanor or felonies, or test positive for drugs in the post meeting period. Moreover, the community group was somewhat more likely to purchase drugs illegally, use drugs, and was charged with more violent crimes in the post meeting period. The number of days to failure also indicated that this group committed a felony faster than the control. Although the differences are not dramatic, the community group did show a somewhat greater propensity to commit drug and violent crimes following their attendance at the meetings. These differences are difficult to explain. One possible explanation is that the community group probationers may have thought that they had a "free pass" after hearing the message at the meeting—that the criminal justice system might actually be less likely or was not prepared to respond to new offenses. Another possible explanation might be that this group was frustrated about the opportunities they had for success. The community leader message was positive overall, but among the points made was the difficulty for felons to get a meaningful job. The community leaders offered assistance, but if the probation asked for help and still had difficulty getting a good job, the frustration might have led to the small differences in criminal behavior observed. The probationers in this study—felony probationers and many who had multiple felonies—have had many contacts with community service and treatment providers and thus have an understanding about the nature of service delivery. Some of the differences observed

between the two groups could also be that they were quite hopeful when they left the meeting of a promising opportunity, but were very disappointed when faced with the same hurdles when involved in any other previous treatment programs.

4. The number and type of technical violations identified by the probation department following the meeting was not different when comparing the treatment to the control groups.

There were no significant differences comparing urine screen test results by group. The treatment probationers were not less likely to fail a urine screen test and did not fail the test less frequently. On average, the law enforcement group had 2.1 failures, the community leader lever-pulling group had 1.7 failures, and the control group had 1.9 failures noted in their record. The majority of probationers tested positive for cocaine or tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).

The most likely response to a failed screen, both before and after the meeting, was to file a violation of probation with the court. Probationers filed a violation of probation for nearly 42 percent of the overall failures and for nearly 50 percent of the failures that occurred after the meeting date. Probation officers, however, also frequently did nothing when a probationer tested positive. The probation officers did nothing for over 25 percent of the probationers that failed after the meeting, and nearly 37 percent of the probationers that failed before the meeting. Although there were some small differences in the response to positive urine screens before the meeting, there were no differences following the meeting. Specifically, probation officers were not significantly more likely

to file violation of probation when a treatment probationer tested positive, and were not less likely to do nothing.

5. The treatment probationers were not more likely to take advantage of community programming following the meeting, but they were less likely to miss meetings with their probation officers.

It is important to remember that a similar number of criminal justice and community leaders spoke at the law enforcement lever-pulling meeting. These community leaders emphasized opportunities for success. The speakers talked about choices, and acknowledged that the standard treatment/service delivery also had its flaws, and that this meeting was an opportunity for the probationer to reach out to get the help that they need. These opportunities were fundamental to the message that was delivered at the community leader lever-pulling meeting. The three or four speakers acknowledged the difficulties of "living right," but that there were various pathways to success that the speakers would help them to succeed. The community leader message delivered at both meetings had an impact: the probationers assigned to each treatment group were significantly more likely to contact community leaders in the post meeting period seeking help.

The law enforcement group was significantly less likely to miss meetings with their probation officer following the meeting. The interview results indicate a strong difference, and the probation data (which included all probationers) indicate modest differences. These probationers were somewhat more likely to complete a work program, had more treatment/education meetings, and completed somewhat more of these

meetings compared to the control group. They were also somewhat less likely to contact law enforcement and start going to church following the meeting. The interview data results indicate that they were significantly less likely to get a job following the meeting, but the probation data results indicate that they were not more likely to have more jobs or get fired from a job after the meeting. The community leader group was also significantly less likely to contact law enforcement following the meeting and less likely to miss meetings with their probation officer. Although these probationers were somewhat more likely to complete a work-related probation program, they were less likely to have started a job or job training, less likely to have entered treatment, and less likely to complete an education program.

6. The post-meeting follow-up with probationers was seriously limited: there is little evidence that a consistent range of levers were pulled after the meeting. The "call in" meetings were the primary mechanism used to alter the behavior of probationers.

The message was supposed to be accompanied by an altered response to these offenders if they participated in any new criminal activities. In addition, it was important to remind the probationers about why they attended the meeting. For example, after leaving the meeting, their probation officer could have asked the probationer about the meeting at their next face-to-face and what they learned at the meeting, community leaders could have contacted them asking them about their needs, and probation officers could have visited them at home, work, or during probation sweeps. The meeting was a promise, and the promise had more or less credibility depending on whether the risks of

arrest increased, how the probation department responded when the probationer tested positive for drugs or violated some other condition of her probationer, how prosecutors and judges responded to new arrests or violation of probation charges, and whether informal follow-up contacts were made. The self-report, criminal history, and probation data provided little evidence that "levers were pulled" in response to violations.

There were very few differences comparing the law enforcement to the control probationers, and the differences that are observed are small. The law enforcement group probationers were not more likely to be contacted by criminal justice or community officials, and were not much more likely to meet or have contacts with their probation officer at the office. The criminal history reveals that they were also not more susceptible to criminal justice sanctions: they were not arrested more frequently, and if convicted of a new offense in the post meeting period, they did not receive longer probation, jail, or prison sentences. The probation data also indicated that probation officers did not meet more frequently with these probationers at the probation office, they were not more likely to visit them at work, they requested to have an administrative hearing with fewer probationers, but filed significantly more violations of probation. Other research presented in the report indicates that probation officers did not react differently to any probationers assigned to the treatment groups: they were not more likely to violations and were not less likely to do nothing when a treatment probationer tested positive.

Similarly, there are few differences comparing the community leader to the control probationers, and several of the observed differences are in the direction opposite of what was anticipated. For example, the probationers in the community leader lever-pulling that were convicted did not receive longer probation, jail, or prisons sentences, and they

were not more likely to be contacted by criminal justice or community officials. In addition, probation officers were not any more or less likely to have administrative hearings with these probationers or file violations of probation. The interview results indicated that the community leader lever-pulling probationers were less likely to meet with their probation officer and less likely to be arrested, but the official data are not consistent with these results. The criminal history data indicate that the community leader group was not arrested more frequently, and the probation data indicate that there were no differences in the number of contacts or meetings with probation officers, but they were somewhat more likely to be visited at work and less likely to be visited at home by probation officers. It is difficult to explain these inconsistencies, although it is important to remember that only a portion of the offenders in each group were able to be interviewed.

Implications for Policy and Practice

It is important to know what works in responding to crime and firearms violence. The costs of violence are so great that effective interventions "essentially pay for themselves" (Cook and Ludwig 2000: 138). It is difficult to identify clearly successful program or programs that are complete failures—instead, there has been an expanding body of literature that has identified best practices, has highlighted strengths and weaknesses of various strategies, and has encouraged further developing and revising a strategy. Understanding what does and does not work is an iterative process where promising strategies are introduced, evaluated, implemented in multiple settings, and then research results are disseminated for consideration. This evaluation of the lever-pulling

project was an attempt to add to the knowledge base about the promises and pitfalls of strategies to reduce violent crime and firearms violence. This final section highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the study, and attempts to identify what this evaluation adds to the extant understanding of violent crime strategies generally and lever-pulling specifically.

As was highlighted above, the law enforcement meeting was a potentially promising way to directly communicate with the offending population. It is interesting that practitioners and policymakers have increasingly assumed that there is added value in communicating a project's goals and objectives to the public and/or the offending population. Communication is of course one important element of a lever-pulling approach, but many PSN sites have used a broad media message approach, like the communication strategy from Project Exile (see Richman 2001). It is a leap of faith to assume that communication plays an important role in programmatic outcomes as media effects research frequently notes the complexity through which values, insights, and behaviors may or may not be shaped by external sources. There is a limited understanding of how criminal justice messages are shared with and spread throughout the offending population. This study, especially the interview results, was a good first step in noting the potential of communicating directly with the offending population to influence their informal communication networks (e.g., the offender grapevine). Such communication can be an element of many different types of strategies.

Offenders have a working knowledge of how the system works—its strength and weaknesses—but these understandings are malleable. Attending one of these meetings can be a turning point that leads to the successful completion of probation in the short

term. The reactions of the probationers in the courtroom were quite powerful: they seemed to be very uncomfortable and concerned about the implications of the message. They also left the meeting quickly, but talked about it with other important people in their social network. Interviews with probationers took place between months seven and nine post-meeting/post-meeting date: one would suspect considerable decay about the importance of the message and what they could recall about the meeting. They did recall, however, the most salient issues that were stressed at the meeting and many took the initiative to contact the community leaders seeking help. The important aspects of the message could have been enhanced significantly with some limited attempt of follow-up: their probation officer could have discussed the lever-pulling message at their next meeting, probation staff could have reminded them about the meeting during a probation sweep visit, or a community leader could have called them asking for assistance. There was no evidence of any such follow up occurring with the probationers in the study, but it is interesting that parts of the message still resonated strongly with probationers who attended the law enforcement group.

The strategy implemented in Indianapolis had very little impact on the criminal and probation behaviors examined. If a probationer planned to make positive changes after leaving the meeting, or if the meeting forced probationers to reevaluate the risks and rewards of offending, then these changes were watered down by the limited follow-up after the meeting. The probationer soon learned that the message lacked credibility. It is very possible that, although overall recidivism rates were similar comparing the groups, their path to reoffending might have been quite different. For example, one might suspect that the probationers who attended the law enforcement meeting might wait

somewhat longer to commit a felony (the Hazard Function displayed as Figure 4.3 does lend some support to this conclusion), but when they learned that the message was not credible, perhaps offended at even a greater rate compared to the control.

An important question for policymakers to consider when deciding to implement a lever-pulling strategy is whether a working group is willing to commit the time and resources for effective follow-up. Such strategies require a "network of capacity" (see Braga and Winship 2006). Multi-agency collaboration is fundamental to the success of such a strategy: all of the participating organizations have resource constraints that limit how many and what personnel can be committed to responding to an offense identified as a priority. If multiple agencies contribute some resources, however, then the collective goals of the project can still be accomplished. There are certainly ways to prevent overextending the groups involved in such a project. One could, for example, limit the number of groups and/or individuals targeted instead of implementing a broad-based strategy as was evaluated here. Another important consideration could be to not think of applying levers as add-on responsibilities, but to more strategically distribute available resources. However, even if the number of groups and/or individuals targeted for such a strategy was limited, the application of levers, organizing a coordinated response, and the commitment of personnel from many different organizations to pull these levers in accordance with the message delivered at the meetings, is a significant undertaking.

One of the strengths of this study was the amount of information collected from various sources to understand issues related to dosage of the treatment. Detailed information was collected on important outcomes, but also a large amount of data on the levers pulled. The information about the levers pulled was collected with the hope of

identifying whether there is a "right mix" of levers to be used to respond to offenders, as well as how that mix might vary by type of offender. Since there was little difference in post-meeting attention to the probationers in the study, there was no value in exploring this line of research but it is an important consideration for future research. The process evaluation clearly showed that following up with such a large number of offenders was much too cumbersome. Organizations are limited in their ability to communicate priorities, and line-level workers still have considerable discretion to decide the nature of a response, even when requested to make one. When conducting the interviews at the probation offices, there was an opportunity to interact informally with them and talk about lever-pulling. It was actually surprising how most probation officers knew about the lever-pulling program, but few understood the nature of the strategy and importantly did not know that they played a critical role in its success.

It certainly was beneficial to evaluate lever-pulling using an experimental design with random assignment. Indeed, several of the projects that have had substantial effect on policing and criminal justice practice, such as preventive patrol, field interrogation, responding to gun and drug hot spots, and arrest for domestic violence offenders, used experimental designs (see Boydstun 1975; Kelling et al. 1974; Sherman and Berk 1984; Sherman and Weisburd 1995; Sherman and Rogan 1995). In general, the experiment was implemented as intended and the groups were equivalent prior to assignment. But because a large number of probationers had to be randomly chosen for the study in a relatively short amount of time, it overwhelmed the capacity of the criminal justice organizations to follow-up with the probationers. In addition, because of how the list of probationers were provided to us by the probation department, it was impossible to

eliminate the probationers who were on the list but were not technically meeting with their probation officer. Many of the non-attendees, for example, had already failed. Although one would suspect that many of the control probationers also had already failed at assignment, it would have been a much cleaner experiment if the status of the probationer at assignment and time to probation completion could have been included in the eligibility criteria for the random selection process. Analysis were conducted to examine whether threats to validity, such as meeting attendance, time of exposure to the treatment, and type of offender and criminal history, were examined and few significant differences were uncovered.

The Indianapolis working group decided to try another type of lever-pulling meeting when discussions were underway about conducting this evaluation. Although it complicated the design, it was valuable to see some of the differences in the impact that the message had in the two meetings. The reaction of probationers who attended the community leader lever-pulling meeting was very different: probationers stayed after to talk to the speakers, asked questions at the conclusion of the presentation, and had positive attitudes when they left. Most of the probationers who attended the law enforcement meeting left stunned and/or angry—the probationers who attended the community meeting actually had good attitudes. The comparisons between the treatment groups indicated that the probationers did remember the very different message that was delivered at these meetings. The probationers who did attend the community leader lever-pulling meeting did seek out help from either the speakers or other community leaders following the meeting, but this effort did not result in a reduction in recidivism

and the community group attendees were somewhat more likely to commit violent and drug offenses after the meeting.

Conclusion

It was surprising to find that the lever-pulling program in Indianapolis had limited effects. The results not should be taken as an indictment of the strategy, but hopefully considered alongside other studies about the strategy. The context to consider is in the evaluation of the amount and type of levers pulled following attendance at the meeting. Policymakers will need to consider the organizational capacity to apply levers and implement a strategic plan to ensure delivery when evaluating whether such a strategy is worth adopting. It would make sense to assign a coordinator who would be monitor and coordinate required responses to any violent actions. The strategy in Boston took full advantage of the collective stake in avoiding enforcement for an entire gang: an offender's actions were not only significant to the individual but to the other members in his gang as well. It was impossible to design this experiment by randomly assigning groups to the treatments, and it might be impossible to do such a study in most cities, but future research needs to evaluate the collective impact of the strategy on a group or gang. It was valuable to be able to do this field experiment, and there are certainly other types of experiments that could be used to further evaluate the lever-pulling strategy. For example, one could randomly assign levers and other procedures to start to disentangle the types of follow-up that increase the likelihood of a successful intervention.

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Table 2.1. Eligibility Offenses

DRUG OFFENSES	Conspiracy to Commit Dealing in Cocaine Dealing Cocaine Dealing Marijuana Dealing I, II, III Controlled Substance Possession of Cocaine/Narcotic Possession of Cocaine (Added Weight) Other Drug Offenses (e.g, Prescription Offenses)
VIOLENT OFFENSES	Car Jacking Robbery Conspiracy to Commit Robbery Criminal Confinement Resisting Law Enforcement
WEAPONS OFFENSES	Carrying a Handgun without a License (felony/misdemeanor)
PROPERTY OFFENSES	Auto Theft Burglary

Table 2.2. Interviews Completed by Location.

Location of Interview	Total	Law	Community	Control
Probation Department	82.6%	71.4%	83.8%	79.8%
Incarcerated	13.7	22.1	12.1	17.8
Community Center/Home	3.8	6.5	4.1	2.4

Table 2.3. Basic Demographic, Treatment, Criminal History, and Current Probation Sentence Characteristics

Demographic Variables	Total	Law	Community	Control
Marital Status				
Single*	74.6%	78.3%	73.3%	72.2%
Married/Living With Partner	12.7	10.6	13.3	14.4
Divorced, Widowed, Separated	12.6	11.1	13.3	13.3
Gender				
Male	87.6%	90.6%	85.6%	86.7%
Female*	12.4	9.4	14.4	13.3
Race				
White	25.9%	28.9%	22.8%	26.1%
Black*	71.9	69.4	75.6	70.6
Other*	2.3	1.7	1.7	3.3
Age	31.11	31.58	30.96	30.78
Education	11.27	11.17	11.43	11.21
Income				
0-5,000	54.4%	52.8%	57.2%	53.3%
5,000-9.999	9.3	8.3	9.4	10.0
10,000-14,999	16.7	18.9	14.4	16.7
15,000-19,999	9.8	11.7	7.2	10.6
20,000-N	9.9	8.4	11.7	9.4
Residence Changes	1.36	1.19	1.57	1.33
Treatment Variables				
Drug Treatment?	71.7%	73.9%	67.2%	73.9%
Completed Drug Treatment?	59.1%	56.5%	58.6%	62.3%
Work Program?	29.8%	15.0%	12.2%	21.0%
Completed Work Program?	29.6%	39.0%	24.0%	39.0%
Education Programming?	16.1%	30.0%	24.4%	35.0%
Completed Education Program?	34.5%	32.0%	37.0%	20.0%

Criminal History Variables				
Length of Probation (Days)	863.00	857.42	826.89	904.71
Length of Sentence (Days)	3425.27	3205.25	3530.22	3540.35
Type of Offender				
Drug	64.1%	60.0%	67.2%	65.0%
Property	10.0	12.2	6.1	11.7
Violent	16.1	17.8	17.2	13.3
Weapon	9.8	10.0	9.4	10.0
Number of Arrests	8.70	8.62	8.13	9.34
Number of Arrest Charges	14.47	14.37	13.82	15.23
Number of Felony Charges	6.03	5.82	6.07	6.21
Number of Times on Probation	2.16	2.24	2.08	2.16
Number of Times in Jail	1.58	1.57	1.53	1.65
Number of Times in DOC	1.17	1.15	1.12	1.24
Arrested Pre-LP Period	.32	.30	.30	.37
Violent Convictions	.54	.62	.51	.48
Property Convictions	.75	.78	.67	.79
Drug Convictions	1.26	1.12	1.38	1.28
Alcohol Convictions	.36	.42	.31	.34
Weapon Convictions	.36	.36	.29	.44
Resisting Law Enforcement Convictions	.46	.43	.38	.57
Other Convictions	.58	.56	.57	.62

*Reference Category

Figure 2.1: Composition of the Sample



Figure 2.2: Composition of the Interview Sample



Table 3.1 Demographic and Criminal Justice Involvement by Group

	N	Total	Law	Community	Control
Demographics					
Percentage Male	235	88.1	89.6	83.8	90.5
Percentage African-American	234	70.1	67.5	72.6	70.2
Age	234	31.7	32.6	32.3	30.4
Percentage Married/LWP	228	34.2	35.6	**24.3***	**42.0**
Percentage Employed	235	72.8	67.5	74.3	76.2
Education	234	11.6	11.3	11.6	11.7
Number of Children	234	1.9	2.0	1.6	2.0
Total Legal Income (Month)	224	1281.9	1101.0	1391.2	1347.9
Criminal Justice Involvement					
Friends/Fam. Homicide Victim	229	.50	.49	.49	.51
Age (first arrest)	233	18.64	17.59	19.55	18.77
Times Arrested in Life (1-6)[1]	234	2.80	2.88	2.73	2.80
Age (first conviction)	232	21.63	21.00	22.72	21.23
Times Convicted in Life (1-5)[2]	234	1.81	1.88	1.73	1.82
Violent Crimes in Life (1-6)	235	1.76	1.82	1.82	1.65
Nonviolent Crimes in Life (1-6)	234	2.93	2.99	2.75	3.02
Purchased Drugs in Life (1-6)	235	4.25	4.05	4.30	4.39
Sold Drugs in Life (1-6)	235	3.03	2.92	3.09	3.08
Locked Up in Your Life (1-6)	231	3.31	3.49	3.23	3.18
Felony Convictions (1-7)[3]	233	1.61	1.76	1.45	1.61
Ever been in Treatment?	234	.79	.79	.76	.83
Family Members Serve Time?	224	.72	.70	.74	.72
Friends Serve Time?	215	.81	.80	.78	.86
Friends Are Gang Members?	214	.48	.37	.54	.53

* p=.02

[1] 1=Once; 2=2-5 Times; 3=6-10 Times; 4=11-20 Times; 5=21-50 Times; 6=More Than 50 Times
[2] 1=Once; 2=2-5 Times; 3=6-10 Times; 4=11-20 Times; 5=More than 20 Times
[3] 1=One; 2=2-3; 3=4-6; 4=7-10; 5=11-15; 6=16-25; 7=More than 25

Table 3.2 **Remember What Was Said at the Meeting and Discussed With Others**

		Law Enforcement	Community	*p*	d-value
Law enforcement is cracking down on violent crime	%	69.9	55.9	.09	.29
	sd	.462	.500		
Law enforcement is cracking down on gun crime	%	74.0	58.8	.06	.32
	sd	.442	.496		
I can go to federal prison if I carry a gun	%	79.5	60.3	.01	.42
	sd	.407	.493		
Probation is watching my behavior closely	%	67.1	48.5	.03	.37
	sd	.473	.503		
Law enforcement wants you to make good choices	%	68.5	55.9	.12	.25
	sd	.468	.500		
Community leaders have opportunities for you to get a job	%	63.0	70.6	.34	-.17
	sd	.486	.459		
Community leaders are willing to help you in any way they can	%	64.4	69.1		
	sd	.482	.465		
I should stay out of trouble	%	76.7	72.1		
	sd	.426	.452		
Talk about it with Family	% (sd)	54.8 (.501)	45.6 (.502)	.28	.18
Significant Other		52.1 (.503)	36.8 (.486)	.07	.31
Friends		49.3 (.503)	32.4 (.471)	.04	.35
Co-Worker		20.5 (.407)	11.8 (.325)	.16	.25
Neighbors		19.2 (.396)	2.9 (.170)	.002	.56
Probation officer		39.7 (.493)	33.8 (.437)		

Table 3.3 Reaction to the Meetings

		Law Enforcement	Community	*p*	d- value
Made better choices because I attended the meeting.	**M**	1.9	2.0		
	sd	.805	.738		
Law enforcement would follow through on the promise they make to crack down on crime	**M**	1.6	2.0	.018	-.510
	sd	.715	.854		
Law enforcement would follow through on the promise to send me to federal prison if I got carrying a gun	**M**	1.30	1.31		
	sd	.495	.668		
Law enforcement agencies have followed through on their promises.	**M**	1.87	1.87		
	sd	.797	.726		
Community leaders were willing to help me find opportunities to succeed.	**M**	1.98	1.79	.145	.268
	sd	.790	.624		
Community leaders followed through on their promises.	**M**	2.06	2.20	.453	-.176
	sd	.736	.853		
How often think about the message that was delivered at the meetings	**M**	2.56	2.47		
	sd	.985	.984		
How helpful do you think these meetings were for you	**M**	2.24	2.16		
	sd	1.056	1.014		
The meetings should continue.	**M**	1.61	1.56		
	sd	.731	.688		
The meetings discourage people from breaking the law.	**M**	2.04	2.08		
	sd	.873	.874		
The meetings are just scare tactics.	**M**	3.11	3.06		
	sd	.846	.777		
Law enforcement does not have the time or money to follow through with the promise delivered at the meetings	**M**	2.91	2.88		
	sd	.812	.789		
Community leaders can't provide me with a job where I can make money	**M**	2.93	2.87		
	sd	.800	.825		
Watching probationers more than usual.	**M**	2.00	2.20	.281	-.249
	sd	.858	.749		
The meetings will make it difficult for arrestees to get out of the criminal justice system	**M**	2.42	2.82	.028	-.45
	sd	.906	.858		
I am less likely to break the law because of the message I heard.	**M**	2.25	2.36		
	sd	1.052	.890		
I have heard another probationer talk about the meetings	**M**	2.81	2.79		
	sd	.962	1.073		

1=Strong Agree, 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree

Table-3.4 Perception of Chance of Arrest, Conviction, Prison

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	*p*	d-value
Chance of arrest.	**mean**	1.5	1.5		
	sd	.79	.80		
Chance of conviction.	**mean**	1.4	1.8	.056	-.319
	sd	.800	1.26		
Chance of going to prison.	**mean**	1.6	1.7		
	sd	1.19	1.23		
		Treatment-Community	**Control**	***p***	**d-value**
Chance of arrest.	**mean**	1.5	1.5		
	sd	.98	.80		
Chance of conviction.	**mean**	1.6	1.8		
	sd	1.21	1.26		
Chance of going to prison.	**mean**	1.8	1.7		
	sd	1.48	1.23		

Scale= 1- 5 (1=Much More, Somewhat, About the Same, Somewhat Less, 5=Much Less)

Table-3.5a Perception of Chance of Arrest- Law Enforcement and Control

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	*p*	d-value
Arrest for assaulting someone.	**mean**	4.2	4.2		
	s.dev	1.70	1.44		
Arrest for writing a bad check.	**Mean**	3.9	3.9		
	s.dev	1.78	1.65		
Arrest for burglary.	**mean**	4.0	4.0		
	s.dev	1.68	1.53		
Arrest for stealing a car.	**mean**	4.0	4.1		
	s.dev	1.77	1.55		
Arrest for a gun.	**mean**	3.9	3.9		
	s.dev	1.72	1.68		
Arrest for murdering someone.	**mean**	4.5	4.8	.226	-.195
	s.dev	1.86	1.53		
Arrest for robbery.	**mean**	4.3	4.2		
	s.dev	1.75	1.56		
Arrest for raping someone.	**mean**	4.5	4.8	.221	-.194
	s.dev	1.76	1.53		
Arrest for theft.	**mean**	3.9	3.8		
	s.dev	1.65	1.55		
Arrest for selling drugs.	**mean**	4.2	4.1		
	s.dev	1.65	1.62		
Arrest for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	3.7	3.9		
	s.dev	1.77	1.72		

Scale= 1- 6 (1=No Chance, Low, Some, Good, High, 6=Completely Certain)

Table-3.6a Perception of Chance of Going to Prison- Law Enforcement and Control

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	Sig. (2-tailed)	d-value
Prison for assaulting someone.	**mean**	4.8	4.4	.100	.280
	s.dev	1.26	1.52		
Prison for writing a bad check.	**mean**	4.2	4.2		
	s.dev	1.50	1.69		
Prison for burglary.	**mean**	4.9	4.7	.321	.159
	s.dev	1.26	1.38		
Prison for a gun.	**mean**	5.1	4.9	.284	.177
	s.dev	1.16	1.43		
Prison for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	4.4	4.4		
	s.dev	1.54	1.66		
Prison for murdering someone.	**mean**	5.3	5.4		
	s.dev	1.25	1.07		
Prison for raping someone.	**mean**	5.1	5.2		
	s.dev	1.32	1.20		
Prison for robbery.	**mean**	5.0	5.0		
	s.dev	1.19	1.21		
Prison for stealing a car.	**mean**	4.7	4.6		
	s.dev	1.26	1.49		
Prison for selling drugs.	**mean**	5.1	5.1		
	s.dev	1.18	1.21		
Prison for theft.	**mean**	4.5	4.3	.259	.178
	s.dev	1.40	1.62		

Scale= 1- 6 (1=No Chance, Low, Some, Good, High, 6=Completely Certain)

Table-3.5b Perception of Chance of Arrest--Community and Control

		Treatment-Community	Control	p	d-value
Arrest for assaulting someone.	**mean**	3.8	4.2	.125	-.248
	s.dev	1.54	1.44		
Arrest for writing a bad check.	**Mean**	3.6	3.9	.298	-.169
	s.dev	1.78	1.65		
Arrest for burglary.	**mean**	3.6	4.0	.224	-.195
	s.dev	1.64	1.53		
Arrest for stealing a car.	**mean**	3.7	4.1	.214	-.199
	s.dev	1.75	1.55		
Arrest for a gun.	**mean**	3.6	3.9	.170	-.224
	s.dev	1.71	1.68		
Arrest for murdering someone.	**mean**	4.3	4.8	.053	-.310
	s.dev	1.89	1.53		
Arrest for robbery.	**mean**	3.9	4.2	.208	-.199
	s.dev	1.75	1.56		
Arrest for raping someone.	**mean**	4.2	4.8	.029	-.354
	s.dev	1.86	1.53		
Arrest for theft.	**mean**	3.6	3.8		
	s.dev	1.62	1.55		
Arrest for selling drugs.	**mean**	3.9	4.1		
	s.dev	1.72	1.62		
Arrest for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	3.5	3.9	.251	-.180
	s.dev	1.73	1.72		

Scale= 1- 6 (1=No Chance, Low, Some, Good, High, 6=Completely Certain)

Table-3.6b Perception of Chance of Going to Prison--Community and Control

		Treatment-Community	Control	*p*	d-value
Prison for assaulting someone.	**mean**	4.5	4.4		
	s.dev	1.48	1.52		
Prison for writing a bad check.	**mean**	4.2	4.2		
	s.dev	1.73	1.69		
Prison for burglary.	**mean**	4.8	4.7		
	s.dev	1.32	1.38		
Prison for a gun.	**mean**	4.8	4.9		
	s.dev	1.39	1.43		
Prison for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	4.5	4.4		
	s.dev	1.57	1.65		
Prison for murdering someone.	**mean**	5.4	5.4		
	s.dev	1.15	1.07		
Prison for raping someone.	**mean**	5.2	5.2		
	s.dev	1.34	1.20		
Prison for robbery.	**mean**	4.8	5.0		
	s.dev	1.39	1.21		
Prison for stealing a car.	**mean**	4.5	4.6		
	s.dev	1.55	1.49		
Prison for selling drugs.	**mean**	4.9	5.1	.286	-.176
	s.dev	1.28	1.21		
Prison for theft.	**mean**	4.4	4.3		
	s.dev	1.58	1.62		

Scale= 1- 6 (1=No Chance, Low, Some, Good, High, 6=Completely Certain)

Table-3.7 Expectation of Sanction Seriousness

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	p	d-value
Serious sanction for writing a bad check.	**mean**	4.57	4.54		
	s.dev	1.349	1.383		
Serious sanction for burglary.	**mean**	5.42	5.03	.015	.400
	s.dev	.791	1.155		
Serious sanction for a gun.	**mean**	5.50	5.13	.035	.341
	s.dev	.959	1.210		
Serious sanction for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	5.02	4.84		
	s.dev	1.126	1.426		
Serious sanction for raping someone	**mean**	5.73	5.71		
	s.dev	.789	.737		
Serious sanction for robbery.	**mean**	5.67	5.43	.140	.247
	s.dev	.737	1.201		
Serious sanction for stealing a car	**mean**	5.10	4.92	.298	.169
	s.dev	1.014	1.117		
Serious sanction for assaulting someone.	**mean**	5.25	4.82	.032	.349
	s.dev	1.034	1.424		
Serious sanction for murder.	**mean**	5.92	5.88		
	s.dev	.587	.524		
Serious sanction for selling drugs.	**mean**	5.60	5.51		
	s.dev	.833	1.124		
Serious sanction for theft.	**mean**	5.10	4.73	.029	.360
	s.dev	.841	1.213		
		Treatment Community	**Control**	***P***	**d-value**
Serious sanction for writing a bad check.	**mean**	4.67	4.54		
	s.dev	1.250	1.383		
Serious sanction for burglary.	**mean**	5.08	5.03		
	s.dev	1.131	1.155		
Serious sanction for a gun.	**mean**	5.28	5.13		
	s.dev	1.176	1.210		
Serious sanction for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	4.95	4.84		
	s.dev	1.276	1.426		
Serious sanction for raping someone	**mean**	5.52	5.71	.192	-.212
	s.dev	1.049	.737		
Serious sanction for robbery.	**mean**	5.36	5.43		
	s.dev	.987	1.201		
Serious sanction for stealing a car	**mean**	4.86	4.92		
	s.dev	1.162	1.117		
Serious sanction for assaulting someone.	**mean**	4.78	4.82		
	s.dev	1.357	1.424		
Serious sanction for murder.	**mean**	5.79	5.88		
	s.dev	.827	.524		
Serious sanction for selling drugs.	**mean**	5.58	5.51		
	s.dev	.844	1.124		
Serious sanction for theft.	**mean**	4.81	4.73		
	s.dev	1.130	1.213		

Scale= 1- 6 (1=Warning, Arrest, Fine, Probation, Short Prison, 6=Long Prison)

Table-3.8 Expectation of Federal Court Referral

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	Sig.(2-tailed)	d-value
Expectation of federal court for gun.	**mean**	4.77	3.69	.000	.710
	s.dev	1.292	1.749		
Expectation of federal court for murder.	**mean**	3.98	4.02		
	s.dev	1.807	1.759		
Expectation of federal court for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	3.17	3.00		
	s.dev	1.611	1.642		
Expectation of federal court for rape.	**mean**	3.14	3.36		
	s.dev	1.725	1.835		
Expectation of federal court for robbery.	**mean**	3.32	3.23		
	s.dev	1.526	1.697		
Expectation of federal court for selling drugs.	**mean**	3.93	4.00		
	s.dev	1.594	1.520		
Expectation of federal court for burglary.	**mean**	2.78	2.61		
	s.dev	1.481	1.589		
		Treatment Community	**Control**	**Sig.(2-tailed)**	**d-value**
Expectation of federal court for gun.	**mean**	3.90	3.69		
	s.dev	1.817	1.749		
Expectation of federal court for murder.	**mean**	3.55	4.02	.122	-.250
	s.dev	1.992	1.759		
Expectation of federal court for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	2.55	3.00	.090	-.277
	s.dev	1.600	1.642		
Expectation of federal court for rape.	**mean**	2.79	3.36	.054	-.307
	s.dev	1.868	1.835		
Expectation of federal court for robbery.	**mean**	2.97	3.23	.327	-.261
	s.dev	1.669	1.697		
Expectation of federal court for selling drugs.	**mean**	3.77	4.00		
	s.dev	1.680	1.520		
Expectation of federal court for burglary.	**mean**	2.45	2.61		
	s.dev	1.462	1.589		

Scale= 1- 6 (1=No Chance, Low, Some, Good, High, 6=Completely Certain)

Table-3.8a Logistic Regression for Perceptions of Risk and Gun Sanction Variables

Independent Variables	Risk of Arrest for Gun Crime	Risk of Prison for Gun Crime	Most Serious Thing For Gun Crime	Risk of Federal Court for Gun Crime
Law Enforcement Group	-.16	.09	.65*	1.16***
Community Group	-.76*	-.10	.62*	.55
Married	.95*	.79*	-.04	.04
Divorced	1.2**	.57	-.06	-.01
Male	-1.3**	.99**	.88**	.31
Age	-.07**	-.02	.03	-.002
White	-.85*	-.33	-.48	.006
Education	-.07	-.006	-.04	-.04
Employment	-.37	-.26	.24	-.09
Drug Treatment	-.25	-.32	.41	-.27
Education Program	-.45	-.13	.18	-.29
Work Program	.45	.04	.04	.15
Number of Arrests	.004	-.004	.005	-.05*
Constant	2.97**	.18	-1.8	-.85
Pseudo R^2	.09	.05	.07	.06

****.001; *** .01; **.05; *.10

Table-3.9 Criminal Justice Response to Guns

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	*p*	d-value
Someone's risk of being arrested. (since the meeting)[1]	**mean**	2.15	2.37	.241	-.187
	s.dev	1.235	1.117		
Confronting someone on the street with a gun (since the meeting)[1]	**mean**	3.60	3.41	.350	.153
	s.dev	1.252	1.227		
Legal penalties for carrying a gun. (since the meeting) [1]	**mean**	1.85	2.25	.010	-.417
	s.dev	.896	1.022		
Likelihood that you will use a gun. (since the meeting) [1]	**mean**	3.92	3.90		
	s.dev	1.129	1.001		
Consider the penalties for carrying a gun[2]	**mean**	1.54	1.49		
	s.dev	.803	.757		
Felon carry a gun?	**% Yes**	5.2	4.8		
Federal penalties for carrying a gun	**% Yes**	92.0	89.3		
Harsher penalties for carrying a gun	**% Federal**	90.7	72.8	.004	.362
		Treatment-Community	**Control**	***p***	**d-value**
Someone's risk of being arrested. (since the meeting) [1]	**mean**	2.51	2.37		
	s.dev	1.175	1.117		
Confronting someone on the street with a gun (since the meeting) [1]	**mean**	3.49	3.41		
	s.dev	1.355	1.227		
Legal penalties for carrying a gun. (since the meeting) [1]	**mean**	2.14	2.25		
	s.dev	1.092	1.022		
Likelihood that you will use a gun. (since the meeting) [1]	**mean**	3.75	3.90	.369	-.180
	s.dev	1.103	1.001		
Consider the penalties for carrying a gun[2]	**mean**	1.36	1.49	.283	.189
	s.dev	.618	.757		
Felon carry a gun?	**% Yes**	5.4	4.8		
Federal penalties for carrying a gun	**% Yes**	95.9	89.3	.120	.24
Harsher penalties for carrying a gun	**% Federal**	72.6	72.8		

[1] 1=Much More; 2=Somewhat More; 3=About the Same; 4=Somewhat Less; 5=Much Less

[2] 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree

Table-3.9a Logistic Regression for Perceptions of Risk and Gun Sanction Variables

Independent Variables	Federal System has Harsher Penalties	Legal Penalties for Gun are Much More
Law Enforcement Group	1.55***	.672*
Community Group	.08	.312
Married	1.63**	-.548
Divorced	-.283	.309
Male	.638	-.303
Age	.016	-.001
White	.48	-1.3****
Education	-.056	-.185**
Employment	-.699	.728**
Drug Treatment	.280	.520
Education Program	-.067	-.339
Work Program	-1.03**	.296
Number of Arrests	-.02	-.017
Constant	1.237	1.11
Pseudo R^2	.13	.12

****.001; *** .01; **.05; *.10

Table-3.10 Attitudes About Guns- Treatment and Control

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	*p*	d-value
Need to carry a gun in my neighborhood.	**mean**	3.17	2.97	.168	.223
	s.dev	.849	.940		
Easy for felons to get guns.	**mean**	1.676	1.679		
	s.dev	.921	.959		
Ask my friends to leave their guns at home	**mean**	1.67	1.69		
	s.dev	.841	.822		
Situations get worse when someone pulls a gun.	**mean**	1.3816	1.3810		
	s.dev	.631	.742		
If you need a gun you should stay home.	**mean**	1.34	1.30		
	s.dev	.667	.639		
It is Ok to shoot somebody if they Are about to hurt or kill you.	**mean**	2.20	1.90	.053	.332
	s.dev	1.051	.756		
I can help reduce gun violence in my community.	**mean**	1.87	1.96		
	s.dev	.881	.883		
It is alright to have a gun to scare someone.	**mean**	3.45	3.47		
	s.dev	.722	.592		
There is nothing that you can do To stay out of a gun fight.	**mean**	2.64	2.77		
	s.dev	1.090	.987		
Carrying a gun is not worth the Risk.	**mean**	1.28	1.30		
	s.dev	.584	.619		
		Treatment Community	**Control**	***p***	**d-value**
Need to carry a gun in my neighborhood.	**mean**	3.06	2.97		
	s.dev	.751	.940		
Easy for felons to get guns.	**mean**	1.73	1.67		
	s.dev	.834	.959		
Ask my friends to leave their guns at home.	**mean**	1.61	1.69		
	s.dev	.903	.822		
Situations get worse when someone pulls a gun.	**mean**	1.31	1.3810		
	s.dev	.549	.742		
If you need a gun you should stay home.	**mean**	1.48	1.30	.124	.250
	s.dev	.798	.639		
It is Ok to shoot somebody if they are about to hurt or kill you.	**mean**	2.54	1.90	.000***	.766
	s.dev	.914	.756		
I can help reduce gun violence In my community.	**mean**	1.97	1.96		
	s.dev	.909	.883		
It is alright to have a gun to scare someone.	**mean**	3.64	3.47	.073	.295
	s.dev	.561	.592		
There is nothing that you can do to stay out of a gun fight.	**mean**	2.91	2.77		
	s.dev	.988	.987		
Carrying a gun is not worth the Risk.	**mean**	1.18	1.30	.195	-.229
	s.dev	.427	.619		

Scale: 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 4=Strongly Disagree

Table-3.11 Activities Since Attending the Lever-Pulling Meeting

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	*P*	d-value
Gotten a job or started job training?	**mean**	.25	.61	.000	-.78
	s.dev	.434	.491		
Gone back to school?	**mean**	.22	.26	.543	
	s.dev	.417	.442		
Entered treatment?	**mean**	.39	.42	.727	
	s.dev	.491	.496		
Going to church?	**mean**	.23	.33	.162	-.15
	s.dev	.426	.474		
Start to attend counseling?	**mean**	.16	.15	.985	
	s.dev	.365	.364		
Missed meetings with probation	**mean**	.06	.20	.011	-.43
	s.dev	.248	.404		
Contacted law enforcement	**mean**	.05	.12	.131	-.26
	s.dev	.223	.326		
Contacted community leaders	**mean**	.14	.04	.02	.29
	s.dev	.352	.187		
Contacted community organizations	**mean**	.14	.13	.826	
	s.dev	.352	.339		
Asked probation officer for help	**mean**	.27	.25	.743	
	s.dev	.448	.436		

		Treatment-Community	Control	*p*	d-value
Gotten a job or started job training?	**mean**	.43	.61	.03	-.24
	s.dev	.499	.491		
Gone back to school?	**mean**	.20	.26	.38	
	s.dev	.405	.442		
Entered treatment?	**mean**	.27	.42	.05	-.32
	s.dev	.447	.496		
Going to church?	**mean**	.28	.33	.502	
	s.dev	.454	.474		
Start to attend counseling?	**mean**	.11	.15	.39	
	s.dev	.313	.364		
Missed meetings with probation	**mean**	.11	.20	.11	-.17
	s.dev	.313	.404		
Contacted law enforcement	**mean**	.01	.12	.009	-.50
	s.dev	.116	.326		
Contacted community leaders	**mean**	.22	.04	.000	.60
	s.dev	.414	.187		
Contacted community organizations	**mean**	.16	.13	.58	
	s.dev	.371	.339		
Asked probation officer for help	**mean**	.36	.25	.12	.16
	s.dev	.485	.436		

Table 3.12. Post-Meeting Criminal Behavior

	Law	SD	Community	SD	Control	SD	Law v. Ctrl (p; es)	Comm v. Ctrl (p; es)
Any Criminal Activity	0.40	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.46	0.50		
Gun Activity								
Guns in your home	0.04	0.20	0.01	0.12	0.04	0.19		
Guns outside the home	0.01	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.11		
Threatened with gun	0.09	0.29	0.12	0.33	0.13	0.34		
Shot at with gun	0.03	0.16	0.08	0.27	0.04	0.19		
Injured with a gun	0.03	0.16	0.04	0.20	0.04	0.19		
Self-report any gun activity	0.13	0.34	0.15	0.36	0.17	0.37		
Drug Activity								
Purchase drugs illegally	0.13	0.34	0.11	0.31	0.18	0.39	.39; .14	.21; .20
Sell drugs illegally	0.04	0.19	0.06	0.23	0.07	0.26		
Any drug use	0.19	0.39	0.16	0.37	0.26	0.44	.29; .17	.17; .24
Consume alcohol	5.71	1.94	5.94	1.72	5.94	1.67		
Any drug actvitiy	0.18	0.39	0.22	0.41	0.32	0.47	.05; .33	
Property Crime Activity								
Commit any burglaries	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.00	0.00		
Commit any thefts	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.12	0.02	0.15		
Steal any cars	0.01	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.15		
Pass any bad checks	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.12	0.04	0.19		
Any property crimes	0.05	0.22	0.04	0.20	0.06	0.24		
Violent Crime Activity								
Commit any business robberies	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.11		
Commit any personal robberies	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
Involved in any fights	1.21	0.47	1.29	0.62	1.23	0.61		
Any violent crimes	0.18	0.22	0.04	0.20	0.06	0.24		

Table-3.12a Logistic Regression for Type of Crime Variables

Independent Variables	Any Crime Activity	Any Gun Activity	Any Drug Activity	Any Property Crime Activity	Any Violent Crime Activity
Law Enforcement Group	.017	.015	-.64	.12	.42
Community Group	-.11	-.06	-.54	-.52	.40
Married	-.36	-.52	-.29	1.3	-.87
Divorced	-.25	.34	-.31	1.3	-.33
Male	.34	-.02	-.62	XX	-.62
Age	-.08****	-.09***	-.04	-.19	-.08***
White	-.02	-.20	.50	.87	.13
Education	.08	.14	-.01	.10	.11
Employment	-1.3****	-.564	-1.4****	-.84	-1.26****
Drug Treatment	.05	-.004	.59	-.54	.03
Education Program	.31	.48	.08	-1.04	.79*
Work Program	.11	-.23	.21	-.09	-.18
Number of Arrests	.05**	.00	.04	.06	.07**
Constant	1.8	-2.74	.96*	1.2	.03
Pseudo R^2	.16	.07	.13	.07	.13

****.001; *** .01; **.05; *.10

Table-3.13 Levers Pulled Since Attending the Meeting

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	*P*	d-value
Contacted by police?	**mean**	.08	.11		
	s.dev	.269	.311		
Contacted by prosecutors?	**mean**	.00	.02		
	s.dev		.153		
Contacted by community representatives?	**mean**	.03	.00		
	s.dev	.16			
Contacted by clergy?	**mean**	.04	.06		
	s.dev	.19	.238		
Often meet probation officer?[1]	**mean**	2.04	2.14		
	s.dev	.677	.604		
Meet PO at home?	**mean**	.30	.30		
	s.dev	.462	.459		
Meet PO at work?	**mean**	.07	.06		
	s.dev	.252	.238		
PO called?	**mean**	.37	.48		
	s.dev	.487	.502		
Contacted during probation sweep?	**mean**	.12	.13		
	s.dev	.323	.339		
Arrested since the meeting?	**mean**	.42	.35		
	s.dev	.496	.479		
		Treatment-Community	**Control**	***P***	**d-value**
Contacted by police?	**mean**	..07	.11		
	s.dev	..253	.311		
Contacted by prosecutors?	**mean**	.04	.02		
	s.dev	.199	.153		
Contacted by community representatives?	**mean**	.07	.00		
	s.dev	.253			
Contacted by clergy?	**mean**	.05	.06		
	s.dev	..228	.238		
Often meet probation officer?[1]	**mean**	1.90	2.14	.011	-.41
	s.dev	.557	.604		
Meet PO at home?	**mean**	.40	.30		
	s.dev	.492	.459		
Meet PO at work?	**mean**	.06	.06		
	s.dev	.232	.238		
PO called?	**mean**	.42	.48		
	s.dev	.498	.502		
Contacted during probation sweep?	**mean**	.15	.13		
	s.dev	.360	.339		
Arrested since the meeting?	**mean**	.16	.35	.007	-.44
	s.dev	.371	.479		

[1] 0=Not at all; 1=Less than every month; 2=Every month; 3=Every week; 4=Several times a week; 5=Every day.

Table 4.1. Probationers by Type of Offense

Lever-Pulling Offense	Total	Law Enforcement	Community	Control
Auto Theft	8.9%	11.1%	4.4%	11.1%
Burglary	1.1	1.1	1.7	0.6
Firearms Violation	9.8	10.0	7.8	11.7
Cocaine Sale	38.9	36.1	41.1	39.4
Cocaine Possession	15.6	13.9	16.7	16.1
Sell Other Drug	9.6	10.6	10.0	8.3
Robbery/Other Violent	16.1	17.2	18.3	12.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 4.2. Gun Activities by Type of Offender

	% Never Owned A Gun?	Any Self-Report Gun Activity Since Meeting Date?	Admit Sale/Use of Drugs Since the Meeting?	Admit Any Criminal Activity Since the Meeting
Total	32.3%	14.9%	24.3%	42.6%
Property Offenders	43.5	30.4	39.1	69.6
CHWOL	10.5	26.3	31.6	52.6
Sell Cocaine	31.4	5.9	17.6	31.4
Possess Cocaine	28.9	13.2	28.9	42.1
Sell Other Drugs	53.3	13.3	20.0	26.7
Violent Crime	34.2	26.3	26.3	57.9

Table 4.3 Arrest, Charge and Conviction Data Pre and Post Lever-Pulling Meeting

	Total (Mean)	SD	Law (Mean)	SD	Community (Mean)	SD	Control (Mean)	SD	Law v. Ctrl	Comm. V. Ctrl
Arrest Activity										
Number of Arrests	8.70	7.47	8.62	6.39	8.13	7.57	9.34	8.32		
Arrest Charge Activity										
Number of Arrest Charges	14.47	11.46	14.37	10.08	13.82	11.66	15.23	12.52		
Number of Charges for Violent Offenses	1.86	2.50	1.81	2.19	1.82	2.52	1.96	2.76		
Number of Charges for Property Offenses	2.59	3.57	2.69	3.28	2.41	3.96	2.67	3.45		
Number of Charges for Drug Offenses	3.66	3.36	3.21	3.19	3.97	3.53	3.81	3.33		
Number of Charges for Alcohol Offenses	1.58	2.78	1.93	2.95	1.30	2.72	1.50	2.62		
Number of Charges for Weapon Offenses	0.74	1.28	0.76	1.33	0.68	1.30	0.79	1.22		
Number of Charges for Resisting Arrest	1.45	2.25	1.42	2.34	1.20	1.74	1.73	2.57		**p=.02**
Number of Charges for Other Offenses	2.58	3.47	2.54	2.96	2.44	3.89	2.76	3.52		
Number of Misdemeanor Charges	9.17	8.25	9.02	7.13	8.75	8.87	9.77	8.71		
Number of Felony Charges	6.03	4.64	5.82	4.33	6.07	4.71	6.21	4.88		
Conviction Activity										
Number of Misdemeanor Convictions	2.14	2.96	2.18	2.95	1.99	2.88	2.24	3.06		
Number of Felony Convictions	2.19	1.67	2.17	1.68	2.15	1.56	2.23	1.78		
Number of Violent Convictions	0.54	0.96	0.62	1.03	0.51	0.84	0.48	1.00		
Number of Property Convictions	0.75	1.39	0.78	1.23	0.67	1.35	0.79	1.56		
Number of Drug Convictions	1.26	1.18	1.12	1.03	1.38	1.34	1.28	1.13		
Number of Alcohol Convictions	0.36	0.92	0.42	0.90	0.31	0.96	0.34	0.89		
Number of Weapons Convictions	0.36	0.73	0.36	0.74	0.29	0.62	0.44	0.83		
Number of Resisting Convictions	0.46	0.91	0.43	0.83	0.38	0.73	0.57	1.13		**p=0.05**
Number of Other Convictions	0.58	1.13	0.56	1.16	0.57	1.02	0.62	1.21		

Table 4.4. Punishment History

	Total (Mean)	SD	Law (Mean)	SD	Community (Mean)	SD	Control (Mean)	SD
Length of Probation for LP Offense	992.64	1022.21	961.64	1119.24	954.04	653.35	1,062.25	1208.10
Number of Times on Probation	2.16	1.50	2.24	1.41	2.08	1.42	2.16	1.67
Length of Probation (Days)	1,309.78	1019.70	1,371.58	1128.14	1,238.28	724.99	1,319.49	1150.49
Number of Times in Jail	1.58	1.96	1.57	1.78	1.53	1.77	1.65	2.30
Length of Time in Jail (Days)	270.59	483.29	210.41	349.04	306.17	569.11	297.82	506.54
Number of Times in DOC	1.17	1.19	1.15	1.10	1.12	1.15	1.24	1.31
Length of Time in DOC (Days)	2,138.74	2668.21	2,039.43	2597.84	2,347.25	2503.93	2,035.04	2890.52

Table 4.5. Arrests Before and After the Lever-Pulling Meeting

	Total	SD	Law	SD	Community	SD	Control	SD	Law v. Ctrl (*p* ; es)	Comm. V. Ctrl (*p* ; es)	
Arrested Pre-lever Pulling	0.32	0.47	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.46	0.37	0.48			
Number of Arrests Pre LP meeting	0.46	0.78	0.42	0.75	0.43	0.75	0.53	0.83			
Arrestted Any Time After LP	0.31	0.46	0.33	0.47	0.28	0.45	0.33	0.47			
Number of Arrests After Lever-Pulling	0.46	0.81	0.46	0.81	0.43	0.83	0.48	0.79			
Time to Failure All Offenses (days)	145.21	99.24	140.44	96.05	146.56	101.72	148.78	101.69			
Attended a Meeting and Failed (days)	149.17	98.71	148.41	97.79	149.57	96.03	149.46	102.36			
Time to Failure to a Felony (days)	141.85	100.06	145.73	94.28	122.47	96.62	155.19	106.92		**.20; .32**	

Table 4.5a. Logistic Regression for Post-Meeting Arrest Behavior

Independent Variables	All Offenders	Law Enforcement Group	Community Group	Control Group
Law Enforcement Group	.266	X	X	X
Community Group	-.102	X	X	X
Married	-.105	-.785	.529	-.057
Divorced	1.143***	.859	.998	1.696**
Male	.145	-.575	-.478	-.164*
Age	-.129****	-.116****	-.141****	-.164****
White	-.330	-.456	-.089	-.298
Education	-.079	-.083	.001	-.085
Employment	-.267	.032	-.289	-.523
Residence Changes	-.098	-.179	-.08	-.065
Number of Arrests	.112****	.161****	.083***	.111****
Constant	2.997****	3.13*	3.015*	2.260
Pseudo R^2	.18	.20	.15	.27

****.001; *** .01; **.05; *.10

Table 4.5b. Negative Binomial Regression for Post-Meeting Arrest Frequency

Independent Variables	All Offenders	Law Enforcement Group	Community Group	Control Group
Law Enforcement Group	.198	X	X	X
Community Group	.046	X	X	X
Married	-.098	-.465	.295	-.077
Divorced	.568**	.373	.727	.504
Male	.029	-.463	-.35	1.32*
Age	-.093****	-.08****	.124****	-.095****
White	-.288	-.274	-.058	-.339
Education	-.07**	-.049	-.058	-.068
Employment	-.158	-.082	-.013	-.335
Residence Changes	-.05	-.16*	-.008	-.009
Number of Arrests	.073****	.10****	.088****	.047****
Constant	2.04****	1.92*	2.68**	1.18
Pseudo R^2	.12	.15	.12	.17

****.001; *** .01; **.05; *.10

Table 4.6. Initial Multivariate Survival Model of Time Until Failure (N=540).

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error
Female	.062	.138
Black	-.083	.098
Age	.010*	.005
HS Grad	.101	.091
Employed	-.036	.093
Married	.119	.134
At least one residence change	-.075	.093
No/few prior convictions	.212**	.092
Never incarcerated	-.047	.104
Non-serious offense (drug, property)	.011	.100
Law Enforcement Group	.004	.107
Community Group	.073	.107

*p < .01; **p < .05

Table 4.6a: Comparison of Survival Times Across Treatment and Control Groups

Variable	Law Enforcement Group (n=180)		Community Group (n=180)		Control Group (n=180)	
	Coeff	Std. Error	Coeff	Std. Error	Coeff	Std. Error
Female	-.101	.283	-.081	.222	.466*	.240
Black	-.179	.168	-.129	.176	.056	.178
Age	.003	.009	.015*	.008	.007	.009
HS Grad	.174	.162	-.021	.159	.089	.165
Employed	-.068	.170	.037	.165	-.035	.166
Married	.241	.251	.067	.240	.051	.220
Res change	-.153	.169	-.041	.158	-.018	.168
No/one prior conv	.125	.170	.206	.159	.200	.163
No prior incar	.040	.190	.063	.179	-.043	.184
Less serious offense	.027	.176	-.126	.180	-.190	.183

*p<.10

Table 4.7 Post Lever-Pulling Offense by Group

	Total (%)	Law (%)	Community (%)	Control (%)	law v. ctrl (*p* ; es)	comm v. ctrl (*p* ; es)
Violent	20.6	18.3	28.0	16.7		
Property	17.1	11.7	22.0	18.3		
Drug Possession	8.8	6.7	6.0	13.3		.13; -.18
Drug Sale	7.1	5.0	10.0	6.7		
Driving Without a License	25.3	40.0	16.0	18.3	.02; .24	
Alcohol-Related	12.4	13.3	10.0	13.3		
Firearms-Related	2.9	0.0	2.0	6.7	.05;-.29	
Resisting Law Enforcement	4.7	5.0	2.0	6.7		.18; -.18
Other	1.2	0.0	4.0	0.0		

Table 4.8. Arrest Charges Pre and Post Lever-Pulling Meeting

	Total (Mean)	SD	Law (Mean)	SD	Comm. (Mean)	SD	Control (Mean)	SD	law v. ctrl (*p;* es)	comm v. ctrl (*p;* es)
Arrest Charges (Pre and Post Meeting)										
Number of Arrest Charges Pre LP meeting	0.89	1.70	0.83	1.81	0.84	1.61	1.01	1.68		
Number of Arrest Charges After LP meeting	0.87	1.74	0.95	1.94	0.82	1.81	0.83	1.45		
Charges by Type of Offense										
Number of Violent Charges After LP meeting	0.64	1.46	0.52	1.02	0.96	2.12	0.48	1.10		.12; .29
Number of Property Charges After LP meeting	0.46	0.84	0.43	0.83	0.54	0.89	0.42	0.81		
Number of Drug Offenses After LP meeting	0.49	1.07	0.35	0.97	0.62	1.26	0.53	1.00	.33; -.18	
Number of Alcohol Offenses After LP meeting	0.29	0.75	0.43	0.96	0.12	0.44	0.30	0.72	.38; .15	.13; -.31
Number of Weapons Offenses After LP meeting	0.08	0.36	0.07	0.41	0.08	0.34	0.10	0.35		
Number of Resisting Offenses After LP meeting	0.26	0.61	0.35	0.76	0.16	0.47	0.27	0.55		.29; -.22
Number of Other Offenses After LP meeting	0.54	0.75	0.72	0.80	0.48	0.74	0.41	0.68	.03; .42	
Misdemeanor and Felony Charges (Pre and Post Meeting)										
Number of Misdemeanor Charges Pre LP meeting	0.49	1.06	0.42	1.04	0.48	1.01	0.57	1.12		
Number of Misdemeanor Charges After LP meeting	0.51	1.15	0.57	1.14	0.46	1.24	0.51	1.07		
Number of Felony Charges Pre LP meeting	0.41	1.03	0.43	1.11	0.33	0.85	0.48	1.12		
Number of Felony Charges After LP meeting	0.33	0.91	0.32	1.08	0.34	0.89	0.32	0.72		

Table 4.8a. Negative Binomial Regression for Post-Arrest Charges

Independent Variables	All Offenders	Law Enforcement Group	Community Group	Control Group
Law Enforcement Group	.314	X	X	X
Community Group	.122	X	X	X
Married	-.019	-.558	.314	.253
Divorced	.902***	.699	1.20*	.919
Male	-.126	-1.07*	-.456	1.63**
Age	-.113****	-.108****	-.157***	-.110****
White	-.189	-.220	-.296	-.294
Education	-.052	-.08	.037	-.05
Employment	-.208	-.123	-.292	-.273
Residence Changes	-.094*	-.197*	-.056	-.008
Number of Arrests	.105****	.145****	.116****	.056***
Constant	2.77****	3.83***	3.23**	1.44
Pseudo R^2	.08	.10	.08	.09

****.001; *** .01; **.05; *.10

Table 4.9 Convictions Post Lever-Pulling Meeting

	Total	SD	Law	SD	Comm.	SD	Control	SD	law v. ctrl (p; es)	comm v. ctrl (p; es)	
Time to Conviction Failure	229.04	85.26	213.57	96.39	235.47	77.04	234.68	86.86			
Convictions by Type of Offense											
Number of Post LP Violent Convictions	0.09	0.38	0.07	0.25	0.17	0.58	0.04	0.20		.17; .33	
Number of Post LP Property Convictions	0.13	0.40	0.07	0.25	0.17	0.49	0.15	0.41	.29; -.24		
Number of Post LP Drug Convictions	0.05	0.22	0.05	0.21	0.10	0.30	0.02	0.14	.51; .17	.13; .36	
Number of Post LP Alcohol Convictions	0.04	0.21	0.02	0.15	0.05	0.22	0.06	0.24	.36; -.20		
Number of Post LP Weapons Convictions	0.01	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.15	0.00	0.00		.48; .16	
Number of Post LP Resisting Convictions	0.07	0.26	0.09	0.29	0.05	0.22	0.08	0.28			
Number of Post LP Other Convictions	0.10	0.33	0.16	0.43	0.05	0.22	0.10	0.31		.32; -.19	
Felony and Misdemeanor Convictions (Pre and Post Meeting)											
Number of Felony Convictions Pre LP	0.12	0.39	0.15	0.43	0.09	0.35	0.13	0.40			
Number of Felony Convictions Post LP	0.27	0.55	0.18	0.39	0.40	0.73	0.24	0.48		.22; .26	
Number of Misdemeanor Convicts Pre LP	0.07	0.30	0.05	0.24	0.09	0.32	0.08	0.31			
Number of Misdemeanor Convictions Post LP	0.27	0.56	0.30	0.67	0.21	0.52	0.30	0.51		.43; -.17	
Charges Dismissed											
Number of Post LP Charges Dismissed	2.33	1.96	2.47	2.43	2.50	1.94	2.08	1.44	.32; .20	.22; .25	

Table 4.10 Post Lever-Pulling Meeting Punishment Data

	Total	SD	Law	SD	Comm.	SD	Control	SD
Number of Times on Probation Post Lever-Pulling	0.06	0.45	0.04	0.28	0.03	0.18	0.09	0.70
Length of Probation Post Lever-Pulling (Days)	395.40	198.69	340.33	278.87	448.50	157.94	396.88	169.60
Number of Times in Post Lever-Pulling	0.06	0.26	0.07	0.33	0.04	0.21	0.06	0.24
Length of Time in Jail Post Lever-Pulling (Days)	241.96	467.82	119.11	122.39	322.63	452.36	283.82	644.19
Number of Times in DOC Post Lever-Pulling	0.04	0.23	0.03	0.16	0.06	0.30	0.04	0.21
Length of Time in DOC Post Lever-Pulling (Days)	1301.48	1710.55	304.40	76.85	1584.25	2187.43	1641.88	1624.12

Table 4.11. Attendees v. Non-Attendees

	Law/No	SD	Law/Attend	SD	Community/NO	SD	Community/Yes	SD
Arrestted Any Time After LP	0.33	0.48	0.32	0.47	0.27	0.45	0.29	0.45
Number of Arrests After Lever-Pulling	0.47	0.85	0.46	0.80	0.40	0.79	0.45	0.86
Time to Failure All Offenses	127.05	93.74	148.40	97.79	142.05	112.14	149.57	96.03
Time to Felony Failure	118.20	72.90	162.90	103.94	135.94	107.12	107.07	84.30
Number of Arrest Charges Post LP	0.91	1.95	0.97	1.93	0.87	1.81	0.79	1.81
Number of Misdemeanor Charges Post LP	0.55	1.15	0.59	1.14	0.43	1.13	0.49	1.31
Number of Felony Charges Post LP	0.35	1.00	0.31	1.13	0.41	0.93	0.29	0.86

Table 4.12. Arrest, Charge, and Time to Failure by Phase

Law Enforcement Group	Phase 1	SD	Phase 2	SD	Phase 3	SD
Arrestted Any Time After LP	0.28	0.45	0.30	0.46	0.40	0.49
Number of Arrests After Lever-Pulling	0.45	0.89	0.40	0.81	0.53	0.75
Time to Failure All Offenses	117.88	86.98	165.78	98.84	137.42	99.46
Time to Felony Failure	100.80	53.04	172.77	104.99	129.88	90.30
Number of Arrest Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.90	1.89	1.00	2.31	0.95	1.56
Number of Violent Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.53	1.07	0.67	1.19	0.40	0.87
Number of Property Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.41	0.94	0.72	1.02	0.24	0.52
Number of Drug Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.12	0.33	0.61	1.20	0.32	1.07
Number of Alcohol Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.88	1.15	0.22	0.94	0.29	0.75
Number of Weapons Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.73	0.00	0.00
Number of Resisting Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.29	0.77	0.50	0.99	0.28	0.54
Number of Other Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	1.00	0.79	0.39	0.61	0.76	0.88
Number of Misdemeanor Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.60	1.18	0.37	1.01	0.75	1.22
Number of Felony Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.15	0.55	0.62	1.65	0.20	0.63

Table 4.12. Arrest, Charge, and Time to Failure by Phase

Community Group	Phase 1	SD	Phase 2	SD	Phase 3	SD
Arrestted Any Time After LP	0.32	0.47	0.22	0.42	0.30	0.46
Number of Arrests After Lever-Pulling	0.53	0.96	0.27	0.55	0.48	0.89
Time to Failure All Offenses	151.32	119.16	150.38	101.60	138.78	86.04
Time to Felony Failure	112.42	112.14	130.88	106.24	127.80	75.53
Number of Arrest Charges Post Lever-Pulling	1.12	2.39	0.55	1.31	0.80	1.52
Number of Violent Charges Post Lever-Pulling	1.47	3.10	0.77	1.17	0.56	1.15
Number of Property Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.32	0.58	0.46	0.66	0.83	1.20
Number of Drug Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.79	1.55	0.77	1.09	0.33	1.03
Number of Alcohol Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.11	0.46	0.23	0.60	0.06	0.24
Number of Weapons Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.05	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.51
Number of Resisting Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.21	0.54	0.15	0.55	0.11	0.32
Number of Other Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.58	0.69	0.15	0.38	0.61	0.92
Number of Misdemeanor Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.72	1.81	0.30	0.79	0.37	0.80
Number of Felony Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.38	0.88	0.22	0.69	0.42	1.06

Table 4.12. Arrest, Charge, and Time to Failure by Phase

Control	Phase 1	SD	Phase 2	SD	Phase 3	SD
Arrestted Any Time After LP	0.37	0.49	0.30	0.46	0.33	0.48
Number of Arrests After Lever-Pulling	0.48	0.72	0.52	0.89	0.45	0.75
Time to Failure All Offenses	150.95	103.65	158.50	96.82	137.65	107.80
Time to Felony Failure	168.15	105.69	180.36	99.97	118.08	113.00
Number of Arrest Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.78	1.21	0.92	1.74	0.80	1.36
Number of Violent Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.55	0.91	0.72	1.67	0.19	0.40
Number of Property Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.14	0.47	0.78	1.06	0.38	0.74
Number of Drug Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.36	0.73	0.61	1.04	0.62	1.20
Number of Alcohol Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.27	0.77	0.22	0.55	0.38	0.80
Number of Weapons Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.23	0.53	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.22
Number of Resisting Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.14	0.35	0.28	0.57	0.38	0.67
Number of Other Offenses Post Lever-Pulling	0.48	0.68	0.44	0.78	0.30	0.57
Number of Misdemeanor Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.42	0.83	0.58	1.29	0.52	1.05
Number of Felony Charges Post Lever-Pulling	0.37	0.74	0.30	0.77	0.30	0.67

Table 4.13. Arrest, Charge, and Time to Failure by Type of Offender and Group

Law Enforcement Probationers	Property	SD	Weapon	SD	Sell Coke	SD	Possess Coke	SD	Other Drug	SD	Violent	SD
Arrestted Any Time After LP	0.64	0.49	0.44	0.51	0.26	0.44	0.24	0.44	0.26	0.45	0.29	0.46
Number of Arrests After Lever-Pulling	0.91	1.11	0.72	0.96	0.31	0.56	0.28	0.54	0.42	0.77	0.48	1.03
Time to Failure All Offenses	131.21	96.35	144.13	97.14	144.76	109.17	181.67	73.98	114.60	96.26	130.22	98.20
Time to Felony Failure	128.40	118.62	151.00	73.63	126.14	98.05	171.25	87.14	214.00	12.73	136.75	132.28
Number of Arrest Charges Post Lever-Pulling	1.91	2.47	1.33	1.81	0.69	1.69	0.48	0.96	0.68	1.25	1.13	2.69
Number of Misdemeanor Charges Post LP	1.05	1.21	0.94	1.51	0.38	0.93	0.24	0.66	0.53	0.84	0.71	1.55
Number of Felony Charges Post LP	0.41	0.85	0.33	0.69	0.29	1.32	0.24	0.66	0.26	0.81	0.42	1.31

Community Probationers	Property	SD	Weapon	SD	Sell Coke	SD	Possess Coke	SD	Other Drug	SD	Violent	SD
Arrestted Any Time After LP	0.82	0.40	0.21	0.43	0.16	0.37	0.40	0.50	0.11	0.32	0.36	0.49
Number of Arrests After Lever-Pulling	1.55	1.21	0.36	0.84	0.23	0.59	0.53	0.73	0.11	0.32	0.61	1.06
Time to Failure All Offenses	101.78	89.52	162.33	140.02	154.50	78.93	143.25	104.55	198.00	175.36	163.00	119.08
Time to Felony Failure Failure	101.78	89.52	83.00	.	125.50	73.17	167.33	129.78	74.00	.	121.67	103.97
Number of Arrest Charges Post Lever-Pulling	3.45	2.91	0.50	1.09	0.41	1.07	0.90	1.47	0.28	0.96	1.24	2.62
Number of Misdemeanor Charges Post LP	1.18	2.09	0.36	0.84	0.31	0.81	0.50	0.90	0.22	0.73	0.70	2.02
Number of Felony Charges Post LP	2.18	1.54	0.14	0.53	0.09	0.44	0.33	0.76	0.06	0.24	0.52	1.09

Control Probationers	Property	SD	Weapon	SD	Sell Coke	SD	Possess Coke	SD	Other Drug	SD	Violent	SD
Arrestted Any Time After LP	0.62	0.50	0.43	0.51	0.27	0.45	0.41	0.50	0.13	0.35	0.22	0.42
Number of Arrests After Lever-Pulling	0.90	0.89	0.57	0.81	0.38	0.68	0.69	1.00	0.13	0.35	0.30	0.70
Time to Failure All Offenses	142.23	91.28	140.89	114.04	145.63	111.63	155.50	104.89	261.00	91.92	131.00	76.97
Time to Felony Failure	142.20	103.94	152.67	130.30	174.10	121.58	174.50	105.19	196.00	.	88.33	59.18
Number of Arrest Charges Post Lever-Pulling	1.67	2.06	1.10	1.45	0.59	1.13	1.21	1.78	0.27	0.80	0.48	1.16
Number of Misdemeanor Charges Post LP	1.00	1.64	0.62	1.16	0.34	0.67	0.83	1.39	0.07	0.26	0.35	1.03

Table 4.13. Arrest, Charge, and Time to Failure by Type of Offender and Group

Number of Felony Charges Post LP	0.71	0.90	0.48	0.81	0.23	0.66	0.38	0.78	0.20	0.77	0.13	0.34

Table 4.14. Arrest, Charge, and Time to Failure for Probationers by Criminal History

	Law/(0-1)	SD	Comm. (0-1)	SD	Control (0-1)	SD	Law/No Prison	SD	Comm/ No Prison	SD	Control/ No Prison	SD
Arrestted Any Time After LP	0.25	0.44	0.16	0.37	0.23	0.42	0.30	0.46	0.20	0.40	0.26	0.44
# Arrests After Lever-Pulling	0.32	0.62	0.21	0.55	0.28	0.55	0.36	0.61	0.28	0.61	0.35	0.64
Time to Failure All Offenses	134.24	98.69	161.75	88.93	157.11	106.66	124.29	106.29	192.20	125.40	202.00	92.44
Time to Felony Failure	146.11	101.81	106.40	65.13	160.20	123.79	100.33	79.13	140.67	127.26	192.00	101.11
# Arrest Charges Post LP	0.55	1.08	0.39	1.07	0.40	0.84	0.77	1.35	0.60	1.47	0.65	1.48
# Violent Charges Post LP	0.45	1.06	1.17	1.27	0.30	0.57	0.20	0.77	1.30	1.83	1.08	1.83
# Property Charges Post LP	0.27	0.55	0.25	0.62	0.25	0.44	0.40	0.63	0.40	0.70	0.33	0.65
# Drug Offenses Post LP	0.27	0.70	0.58	1.00	0.40	0.82	0.33	0.82	0.80	1.87	0.25	0.62
# Alcohol Offenses Post LP	0.45	1.05	0.25	0.62	0.35	0.67	0.79	1.37	0.10	0.32	0.50	0.90
# Weapons Offenses Post LP	0.05	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.32	0.00	0.00
# Resisting Offenses Post LP	0.18	0.39	0.08	0.29	0.10	0.31	0.27	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.45
# Other Offenses Post LP	0.45	0.67	0.17	0.39	0.25	0.44	0.47	0.83	0.30	0.48	0.08	0.29
# Mis. Charges Post LP	0.38	0.85	0.30	0.86	0.25	0.60	0.57	1.17	0.30	0.79	0.46	1.19
# Felony Charges Post LP	0.19	0.61	0.09	0.40	0.14	0.42	0.21	0.62	0.28	0.86	0.20	0.50
Valid N (listwise)												

Figure 4.1: Survival Distribution Function (All Offenses)



Figure 4.2: Survival Distribution Function (Felony Offenses)



Figure 4.3. Hazard Function Distribution (Felony Offenses)



Table 5.1. Levers Pulled by Group

	Total	SD	Law	SD	Comm.	SD	Control	SD	Law v. Ctrl (*p* ; es)	Comm v. Ctrl (*p* ; es)
Contacts and Meetings Data										
Total Number of Contacts	25.15	13.92	25.06	14.72	25.26	13.64	25.12	13.45		
Total Number of Contacts Pre-LP	9.92	5.60	9.73	5.54	10.20	5.68	9.83	5.61		
Total Number of Contacts Post LP	10.58	8.60	10.97	10.37	10.64	7.48	10.12	7.67		
Total Number of Meetings	18.41	10.33	17.99	10.58	18.32	10.68	18.94	9.74		
Total Number of Meetings Pre LP	7.39	4.46	7.25	4.52	7.41	4.62	7.51	4.26		
Total Number of meetings Post LP	7.29	5.36	7.25	5.36	7.15	5.00	7.48	5.73		
Number of Sweep Contacts	0.30	0.64	0.27	0.61	0.34	0.69	0.29	0.62		
Total Number of Calls/Visits at Home	3.75	5.61	4.49	6.76	3.12	3.78	3.65	5.81		
Total Number of Calls/Visits at Home Pre LP	1.45	2.67	1.81	2.84	1.30	2.18	1.23	2.89	.05; .20	
Total Number of Calls/Visits at Home Post LP	1.83	3.29	2.29	4.66	1.41	2.02	1.79	2.52		.11; -.17
Total Number of Call/Visits at Work	0.15	0.65	0.17	0.69	0.17	0.73	0.12	0.50		
Total Number of Call/Visits at Work Pre LP	0.06	0.37	0.05	0.29	0.06	0.42	0.07	0.39		
Total Number of Call/Visits at Work Post LP	0.08	0.46	0.12	0.62	0.09	0.47	0.02	0.18	.05; .25	.06; .22
Drug Use Data										
Total Number of Urine Screens Requested	7.28	4.82	7.56	5.30	7.17	4.68	7.12	4.46		
Total Number of Urine Screens Pre LP	3.16	2.50	3.31	2.42	3.15	2.62	3.01	2.45		
Total Number of Urine Screens Post LP	3.07	3.19	3.31	3.59	2.89	3.02	3.00	2.91		
Disciplinary Activities										
Total Number of Administrative Hearings	0.30	0.50	0.28	0.50	0.28	0.51	0.33	0.51		
Any Administrative Hearings Post LP	0.15	0.36	0.11	0.31	0.15	0.36	0.19	0.39	.03; -.23	
How Many Warrents Filed	0.61	0.84	0.66	0.96	0.57	0.77	0.62	0.76		
How Many VOPS Filed	1.49	1.50	1.65	1.62	1.43	1.50	1.39	1.37	.10; .17	
Have a VOP filed Post LP	0.51	0.50	0.56	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.49	0.50		
How many VOPS filed Post LP	0.90	1.17	1.06	1.26	0.84	1.19	0.79	1.03	.03; .24	

Table 5.2. Reason for Violation of Probation and Court Response

Reason for VOP	Total	Law	Community	Control
Arrest	11.4	11.9	13.3	9.0
Arrest Plus Additional Reason (Failure to Pay, Address, + Urine Screen and/or Employment)	25.3	22.8	21.7	31.5
Fail to Report	13.9	10.9	20.5	11.2
Fail to Report Plus Additional Reason	8.1	7.9	12.0	4.5
Positive Urine Screen	33.7	38.6	25.3	36.0
Failure to Make Payments	7.3	7.9	6.0	7.9
Unknown	0.4	0.0	1.2	0.0
Result of VOP	Total	Law	Community	Control
Short Jail/Prison [0-60 days]	3.7	5.9	2.4	2.2
Long Jail/Prison [60+ days]	4.4	1.0	8.4	4.5
Strict Probation/Amend Conditions	14.3	15.8	14.5	12.4
Treatment	12.5	9.9	13.3	14.6
Nothing	19.8	18.8	22.9	18.0
Revoked	29.0	27.7	24.1	34.8
Home Detention	2.9	3.0	2.4	3.4
Unknown	13.6	17.8	12.0	10.1

Table 5.3 Meeting Attendance and Punctuality

	Total	SD	Law	SD	Comm.	SD	Ctrl	SD	law v. ctrl (p; es)	comm v. ctrl (p; es)
Total Number of Meetings Missed	1.64	2.07	1.53	2.05	1.61	2.19	1.78	1.97		
Missed A Meeting?	0.61	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.62	0.49	0.67	0.47	0.02; -.25	
Missed Any Meetings Pre LP	0.35	0.48	0.33	0.47	0.34	0.48	0.37	0.48		
Missed Meeting Post LP	0.38	0.49	0.35	0.48	0.37	0.48	0.43	0.50	0.11; -.16	
Total Number of Times Reported Early Post LP	1.44	1.98	1.38	1.93	1.90	2.08	1.03	1.86	.22 ; .18	.003; .44
Total Number of Times Reported Late Post LP	1.12	1.40	1.28	1.52	1.12	1.41	0.99	1.28	.17 ; .20	
Total Number of Times Report on Time Post LP	5.35	4.26	5.36	4.11	5.07	3.85	5.63	4.78		

Table 5.4. Arrest, Charge, Drug and Alcohol Use by Group

	Total	SD	Law	SD	Community	SD	Control	SD	Law v. Ctrl (p; es)	Comm v. Ctrl (p; es)
Arrest and Charge Data										
Arrested While on Probation?	0.54	0.50	0.58	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.54	0.49		
Number of Times Arrested While on Probation	0.89	1.07	0.90	1.11	0.86	1.11	0.89	0.98		
Number of Times Charged while on Probation	0.67	1.13	0.64	1.27	0.68	1.09	0.69	1.03		
Arrested For New Crime While on Probation?	0.42	0.49	0.43	0.50	0.38	0.49	0.45	0.50		
Number of Times Arrested For New Crime	0.67	0.97	0.67	1.06	0.62	0.93	0.73	0.91		
Drug Use Data										
Number of Urine Screens Failed or Diluted	1.90	2.33	2.09	2.42	1.72	2.18	1.89	2.38		
Number of Urine Screens Failed/Diluted Pre LP	0.86	1.34	1.09	1.45	0.64	1.17	0.84	1.36	0.10; .18	.14; -.16
Number of Urine Screens Failed/Diluted Post LP	0.80	1.44	0.86	1.48	0.75	1.44	0.79	1.41		
Failed at least one urine screen	0.62	0.49	0.63	0.48	0.59	0.49	0.63	0.48		
Failed any screen Pre LP	0.44	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.37	0.48	0.44	0.50		
Fail any screen Post LP	0.35	0.48	0.36	0.48	0.33	0.47	0.37	0.48		
Number of Times Admit Drug Use	0.74	1.12	0.85	1.30	0.65	0.95	0.71	1.08		
Number of Times FTR for Drug Screen	0.52	1.19	0.64	1.52	0.51	1.09	0.41	0.88	0.08; .19	
Number of Times FTR for Drug Screen Pre LP	0.21	0.63	0.25	0.70	0.19	0.61	0.18	0.56		
Number of Times FTR for Drug Screen Post LP	0.26	0.82	0.37	1.11	0.21	0.66	0.21	0.60	0.09; .19	
Other Evidence of Drug Use	1.87	0.33	1.86	0.35	1.86	0.35	1.90	0.30		
Alcohol Use Data										
Times Where Evidence of Alcohol Use	0.41	0.86	0.39	0.77	0.42	0.75	0.40	1.03		
Times Where Evidence of Alcohol Use Pre LP	0.21	0.49	0.21	0.46	0.23	0.47	0.18	0.53		
Times Where Evidence of Alcohol Use Post LP	0.11	0.44	0.13	0.47	0.09	0.39	0.11	0.47		

Table 5.4a. Types of Arrest Offenses Committed on Probation

	Total (%)	Law (%)	Comm.(%)	Ctrl (%)	law v. ctrl (p; es)	comm v. ctrl (p; es)
Violent	15.5	14.4	23.9	9.2		.02; .25
Property	10.0	7.7	11.4	11.2		
Possession Drug	4.8	2.9	3.4	8.2	.13; -.17	.13; -.17
Selling Drug	1.7	0.0	2.3	3.1	.08; -.26	
Driving-Related	20.7	22.1	21.6	18.4		
Alcohol-Related	9.7	9.6	6.8	12.2		.15; -.16
Firearm-Related	1.4	1.0	2.3	1.0		
Resisting Law Enforcement	3.4	1.9	0.0	8.2	.05; -.21	.004; -.44
VOP or Other Violation of Conditions	27.9	33.7	28.4	21.4	.04; .20	
Other	4.8	6.7	0.0	7.1		.008; -.40

Table 5.4b. Logistic Regression for New Crime and Technical Violations

Independent Variables	Any Arrest in Probation Record	Any Arrest For A New Crime	Failed Any Screen Post LP Meeting
Law Enforcement Group	.319	.112	.909
Community Group	-.110	-.150	-.185
Married	.209	.254	.017
Divorced	.351	.450	.108
Male	.583*	.698**	-.204
Age	-.072****	-.094****	-.013
White	-.122	-.183	.027
Education	-.104**	-.102**	.022
Employment	-.653**	-.607**	-.267
Residence Changes	.030	-.006	.107**
Number of Arrests	.077****	.080****	.031**
Constant	2.674****	2.725****	-.504
Pseudo R^2	.15	.17	.03

****.001; *** .01; **.05; *.10

Table 5.5. Urine Screen Results by Type of Drug and Group

	Total		Law		Community		Control	
	PRE (%)	POST (%)	PRE (%)	POST (%)	PRE (%)	POST (%)	PRE (%)	POST (%)
Cocaine	26.8	35.1	29.5	43.1	29.9	32.2	21.3	29.9
THC	40.9	40.3	44.3	33.8	35.8	37.3	41.3	49.3
Ethanol	1.7	2.1	0.0	3.1	1.5	1.7	3.8	1.5
Diluted	21.3	16.2	19.3	13.8	23.9	23.7	21.3	11.9
Combination	6.4	5.2	6.8	6.2	6.0	3.4	6.3	6.0
Other	3.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.7	6.3	1.5

Table 5.5a. Response to Positive Urine Screens Pre and Post Lever-Pulling Meeting

Response to Positive Drug Screen (pre)	Total (%)	Law (%)	Comm. (%)	Control (%)	law v. ctrl (p; es)	comm v. ctrl (p; es)
Administration Hearing	4.3	4.5	3.0	5.0		
VOP	41.7	46.6	43.3	35.0	.08; .18	
Treatment	2.1	2.3	0	3.8		.08; .26
Amended Conditions	1.7	1.1	1.5	2.5		
Retest	13.6	12.5	11.9	16.3		
Nothing/Warning	36.6	33.0	40.3	37.5		
Response to Positive Drug Screen (post)	Total (%)	Law (%)	Comm. (%	Control (%)		
Administration Hearing	4.7	6.2	1.7	6.0		
VOP	49.7	52.3	42.4	53.7		.12; .17
Treatment	4.2	4.6	5.1	3.0		
Amended Conditions	3.1	4.6	3.4	1.5		
Retest	13.1	12.3	15.3	11.9		
Nothing/Warning	25.1	20.0	32.2	23.9		

Table 5.6. Residence Change, Restitution, and Job Activity by Group

	Total	SD	Law	SD	Community	SD	Control	SD
Residence Data								
Total Number of Residence Changes	1.36	1.69	1.19	1.52	1.57	1.78	1.33	1.76
Total Number of Residence Changes Pre LP	0.55	0.91	0.47	0.80	0.61	0.91	0.57	1.00
Total Number of Residence Changes Post LP	0.60	1.04	0.55	0.99	0.68	1.04	0.56	1.08
Restitution Data								
Pay any Resititution	0.97	0.17	0.97	0.16	0.96	0.19	0.98	0.15
Amount of Restitution	1346.66	881.45	1438.83	1157.74	1343.15	863.81	1258.44	489.30
Amount of Restitution Paid	614.29	525.99	575.23	553.94	643.75	506.02	624.16	517.29
Percent of Restitution Paid	0.51	0.40	0.46	0.41	0.55	0.40	0.52	0.40
Employment Data								
Total Number of Jobs Pre LP	1.35	1.19	1.28	1.23	1.40	1.21	1.38	1.13
Total Number of jobs post LP	1.30	1.38	1.24	1.39	1.32	1.37	1.34	1.37
Fired From Any jobs Pre LP	1.71	0.45	1.68	0.47	1.75	0.43	1.69	0.47
Fired From Any Jobs Post LP	1.78	0.42	1.77	0.42	1.79	0.41	1.77	0.42
Employed	0.66	0.47	0.68	0.47	0.66	0.47	0.64	0.48
Employed Post Lever-Pulling Date	0.79	0.41	0.77	0.42	0.80	0.40	0.80	0.40

Table 5.7 Treatment Differences by Group

	Total	SD	Law	SD	Community	SD	Control	SD	law v. ctrl (p; es)	comm v. ctrl (p; es)
Drug Treatment	0.72	0.45	0.74	0.44	0.67	0.47	0.74	0.44		
Complete Drug Treatment	0.59	0.49	0.56	0.50	0.59	0.49	0.62	0.49		
Education Program	0.16	0.37	0.15	0.36	0.12	0.33	0.21	0.41	.13 ; -.16	0.02; -.24
Complete Education Program	0.34	0.48	0.39	0.50	0.24	0.44	0.39	0.50		.30 ; -.32
Work Program	0.30	0.46	0.30	0.46	0.24	0.43	0.35	0.48		0.03; .24
Complete Work Program	0.30	0.46	0.32	0.48	0.37	0.49	0.20	0.41	.38 ; .27	.18 ; .38
Community Work Service	0.26	0.44	0.28	0.45	0.24	0.43	0.26	0.44		
Complete Community Work Service	0.56	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.59	0.50	0.57	0.50		
Number of Times Have Other Program Meetings	19.99	35.74	21.30	29.38	18.62	38.65	20.03	38.54		
Total Number Completed	18.01	33.78	17.98	27.28	18.11	34.90	17.96	38.69		
Number of Times Have Other Program Meetings Pre LP	7.69	16.41	7.77	11.81	7.99	23.07	7.31	11.77		
Total Number Completed Pre LP	8.59	17.85	7.51	9.64	10.88	28.37	7.76	11.72		.26 ; .16
Total Number of Times Have Other Program Meetings Post LP	8.41	17.69	11.01	21.74	7.12	15.89	7.11	14.38	0.05; .22	
Total Number Completed Post LP	12.25	18.97	14.57	24.06	10.37	14.09	11.09	15.29	.24; .18	

Table 5.8. Probationer Behavior and Lever-Pulling by Type of Offender

	Property	SD	Weapon	SD	Sell Coke	SD	Possess Coke	SD	Sell Other Drug	SD	Violent	SD
Missed Meeting Post LP	0.37	0.50	0.53	0.52	**0.32**	0.47	0.38	0.49	0.26	0.45	0.35	0.49
Times Arrested While on Probation	1.16	1.83	0.93	0.88	0.85	0.92	0.72	1.03	0.96	1.19	1.00	1.12
Total Number of Urine Screens Post LP	3.42	3.63	3.80	2.91	3.27	3.67	3.00	2.79	3.87	4.48	2.80	3.94
Total Number of Urine Screens Failed or Diluted Post LP	1.47	2.14	0.73	0.88	0.70	1.12	0.93	1.75	0.61	1.34	1.10	1.89
Number of Times Fail to Report for Drug Screen Post LP	0.16	0.37	0.27	0.80	0.41	1.30	0.34	0.67	0.52	1.68	0.35	0.75
Any Administrative Hearings Post LP	**0.10**	0.32	0.13	0.35	0.14	0.34	0.07	0.26	0.09	0.29	0.05	0.22
Have a VOP filed Post LP	0.63	0.50	0.47	0.52	0.59	0.49	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.55	0.51
Total Number of Residence Changes Post LP	0.63	1.12	0.60	1.12	0.49	0.98	0.52	0.91	0.52	0.99	0.75	0.97
Total Number of jobs post LP	0.53	0.84	1.67	1.76	1.14	1.25	1.14	1.30	1.83	1.64	1.50	1.57

Table 5.8. Probationer Behavior and Lever-Pulling by Type of Offender

Community Probationers	Property	SD	Weapon	SD	Sell Coke	SD	Possess Coke	SD	Sell Other Drug	SD	Violent	SD
Missed Meeting Post LP	0.50	0.52	0.40	0.50	**0.31**	0.47	0.50	0.51	0.31	0.48	0.34	0.48
Times Arrested While on Probation	1.67	1.44	0.76	0.93	0.68	1.00	0.71	0.86	1.19	1.38	0.95	1.23
Total Number of Urine Screens Post LP	2.58	3.09	2.80	2.16	2.62	3.12	3.71	3.06	3.88	2.68	2.58	3.43
Total Number of Urine Screens Failed or Diluted Post LP	0.92	2.02	0.60	1.04	**0.46**	0.81	1.42	2.17	1.25	1.88	0.66	1.46
Number of Times Fail to Report for Drug Screen Post LP	0.08	0.29	0.24	0.72	0.11	0.40	0.21	0.72	0.19	0.40	0.39	1.00
Any Administrative Hearings Post LP	0.42	0.51	**0.28**	0.46	0.08	0.27	0.21	0.41	0.19	0.40	0.05	0.23
Have a VOP filed Post LP	0.67	0.49	0.56	0.51	0.46	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.38	0.50	0.34	0.48
Total Number of Residence Changes Post LP	0.67	0.78	0.92	1.15	0.74	1.09	0.79	1.14	0.81	1.33	0.29	0.61
Total Number of jobs post LP	1.17	1.11	1.12	1.01	1.34	1.14	2.13	2.35	1.06	1.06	1.08	1.17

Table 5.8. Probationer Behavior and Lever-Pulling by Type of Offender

Control Probationers	Property	SD	Weapon	SD	Sell Coke	SD	Possess Coke	SD	Sell Other Drug	SD	Violent	SD
Missed Meeting Post LP	0.52	0.51	0.31	0.48	0.51	0.50	0.29	0.46	0.38	0.51	0.41	0.50
Times Arrested While on Probation	1.09	1.00	1	0.82	0.85	0.97	0.90	1.16	0.69	0.95	0.90	0.94
Total Number of Urine Screens Post LP	3.04	3.10	2.31	2.14	3.28	2.98	3.23	2.75	2.23	2.62	2.69	3.23
Total Number of Urine Screens Failed or Diluted Post P	0.91	1.24	0.62	1.12	0.85	1.53	0.87	1.67	0.46	0.78	0.72	1.36
Number of Times Fail to Report for Drug Screen Post LP	0.52	1.12	0.08	0.28	0.18	0.46	0.10	0.54	0.15	0.55	0.21	0.41
Any Administrative Hearings Post LP	0.43	0.51	0	0	0.23	0.42	0.10	0.30	0.15	0.38	0.10	0.31
Have a VOP filed Post LP	0.65	0.49	0.46	0.52	0.45	0.50	0.45	0.51	0.54	0.52	0.52	0.51
Total Number of Residence Changes Post LP	0.61	0.84	0.46	0.66	0.75	1.41	0.32	0.60	0.23	0.44	0.52	1.02
Total Number of jobs Post LP	1.52	2.04	1.31	0.85	1.61	1.53	0.97	0.95	1.15	1.28	1.03	0.68

Table-3.6a Perception of Chance of Going to Prison- Law Enforcement and Control

		Treatment-Law Enforcement	Control	Sig. (2-tailed)	d-value
Prison for assaulting someone.	**mean**	4.8	4.4	.100	.280
	s.dev	1.26	1.52		
Prison for writing a bad check.	**mean**	4.2	4.2		
	s.dev	1.50	1.69		
Prison for burglary.	**mean**	4.9	4.7	.321	.159
	s.dev	1.26	1.38		
Prison for a gun.	**mean**	5.1	4.9	.284	.177
	s.dev	1.16	1.43		
Prison for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	4.4	4.4		
	s.dev	1.54	1.66		
Prison for murdering someone.	**mean**	5.3	5.4		
	s.dev	1.25	1.07		
Prison for raping someone.	**mean**	5.1	5.2		
	s.dev	1.32	1.20		
Prison for robbery.	**mean**	5.0	5.0		
	s.dev	1.19	1.21		
Prison for stealing a car.	**mean**	4.7	4.6		
	s.dev	1.26	1.49		
Prison for selling drugs.	**mean**	5.1	5.1		
	s.dev	1.18	1.21		
Prison for theft.	**mean**	4.5	4.3	.259	.178
	s.dev	1.40	1.62		

Scale= 1- 6 (1=No Chance, Low, Some, Good, High, 6=Completely Certain)

Table-3.5b Perception of Chance of Arrest--Community and Control

		Treatment-Community	Control	p	d-value
Arrest for assaulting someone.	**mean**	3.8	4.2	.125	-.248
	s.dev	1.54	1.44		
Arrest for writing a bad check.	**Mean**	3.6	3.9	.298	-.169
	s.dev	1.78	1.65		
Arrest for burglary.	**mean**	3.6	4.0	.224	-.195
	s.dev	1.64	1.53		
Arrest for stealing a car.	**mean**	3.7	4.1	.214	-.199
	s.dev	1.75	1.55		
Arrest for a gun.	**mean**	3.6	3.9	.170	-.224
	s.dev	1.71	1.68		
Arrest for murdering someone.	**mean**	4.3	4.8	.053	-.310
	s.dev	1.89	1.53		
Arrest for robbery.	**mean**	3.9	4.2	.208	-.199
	s.dev	1.75	1.56		
Arrest for raping someone.	**mean**	4.2	4.8	.029	-.354
	s.dev	1.86	1.53		
Arrest for theft.	**mean**	3.6	3.8		
	s.dev	1.62	1.55		
Arrest for selling drugs.	**mean**	3.9	4.1		
	s.dev	1.72	1.62		
Arrest for purchasing drugs.	**mean**	3.5	3.9	.251	-.180
	s.dev	1.73	1.72		

Scale= 1- 6 (1=No Chance, Low, Some, Good, High, 6=Completely Certain)