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The Liberty Exhibit



On June 8, 1967, the Liberty, a ship of the Naval Security Group, found itself in the middle of the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. Cruising 25 miles off the Gaza coast, it was attacked by Israeli fighters and torpedo boats at 2 o'clock on a clear and sunny afternoon. There was no apparent provocation, and the reason for the attack has never been fully resolved, although Israel described it as an identification error and sent restitution for the damage and loss of life. The U.S. government accepted the explanation of the Israeli government concerning the identification error. The loss of thirty-four men was the largest loss of life in a single event in American cryptologic history. It occurred, ironically, during a war in which the United States was not a participant.

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INTRODUCTION

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On 13 May 1967, NSA requested that the ICS authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY from ABIDJAN to an operational area off PORT SAID to provide vital SIGINT coverage in the Middle East crisis area.

NSA requested ICS approval of specified operational areas in the southeast Mediterranean and proposed that the actual operating areas and the closest point of approach (CPA) should be adjusted as necessary for operational and safety reasons. NSA and US Navy linguists and technical support materials were provided to the USS LIBERTY at ROTA.

reported position prior to the incident (33°06'N by 28°54'E at 070800Z), she was underway and destribed to arrive at 2300Z and remain stationary at a position within 30 mutical miles of 31°45N by 33°30E. This position would be within the previously defined NSA OP area 3 (32°00'N - 33°00' to 34°0'E)

Several JCS actions were taken to redirict progressively the closest point of approach (GPA) of the USS LIBERTY away from the UAR-Israeli coastal area; the last delimiting operations to positions no closer than 100 nautical miles from the UAR and Israel and

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25 nautical miles from Cyprus.

materials and equipments will not be known until an inventory is made of materials remaining aboard the LIBERTY.

The following report will demonstrate on the basis of evidence now available that the USS LIBERTY was an essential augmentation to the Middle East SIGINT posture; that SIGINT command, operational and technical control responsibilities were fulfilled according to existing instructions; and that the position of the USS LIBERTY was operationally and technically proper from a SIGINT standpoint except in the hindsight of the rash Iaraeli act.

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Intelligence (SIGIN		and the balan accomplished	
		area was being accomplished	
through the use of	land-based int	ercept positions at U.S.	, A
	facilities. The	ese facilities were tasked	
with coverage of a	pecific emitters wh	nich had the greatest intelligence	
potential.			
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		Because of their unique	(b)(3 (b) <u>(</u> 3
capability, certai	inclution .	mera essigned VHF/UHF targets	1
in the general loc	ation of the	facility. Line of sight limitations	3.
		s coverage to coastal and other	
hamanar manliid	id Vo-objenation to	3 00101440 to 000000	
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		en underway. Additionally, it	
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
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
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
The major VHF/UHF collection effort was assigned to airborne at the platforms consisting of daily C-130 flights out of Athens, supplemented by New EC-121 collection. The time on station limitations of airborne coverage (i.e., 5 hours on orbit) together with increasing requirements to collect VHF/UHF transmissions in the target area resulted in the determination that a ship platform, properly positioned, would make a significant contribution in collecting VHF/UHF signals on a communous basis. To determine the most appropriate general operating areas, a wave propagation analysis was conducted against known and suspected targets. A summary of the results of this enalysis and a plot of these results on a map of the target area are contained in TAB A.

of communications related to Upited Arad Republic (UAR) Air, Military and Naval Forces activity. The tactical communications of these entities are normally found in the 20-50, 50-70, 100-150 and 300-400 MCS frequency ranges. The UAR is known to use Soviet-provided equipment in these ranges and low-rowered HF communications transmitters as well (TAB B). In addition to specific known

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DEPLOYMENT OF THE TECHNICAL RESEARCH
SHIP, USS LIBERTY (USN-855)

The USS AIBERTY (AGTR-5) is a converted Victory Ship

previously known as the SIMMONS VICTORY. (TAB D)

The conversion to an AGTR (Technical Research Ship) was

made by the William ette Iron and Steel Works, Portland,

Oregon. The USS LIBERTY was commissioned on 30 December 1964.

The principal characteristics of the ship are as follows:

Length, overall

455' - 0"

Beam

52' - 0

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Full Load Draft

24' - 0

(estimated)

. . .

Displacement light

7,190 tons

Displacement, full load

10,680 tons

Maximum Speed

18 knots

Personnel

General Service Allowet

9 Officers

151 Enfisted Men

Navy Security Group Allowed

o Officers

128 Enlisted Men

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The collection and reporting effort assigned to the

USE LIBERTY was directed primarily against UAR tactical
targets in the high frequency, very high frequency and ultra
high frequency ranges. The normal personnel complement
of the USS LIBERTY was augmented by six Arabic Linguists
for this specialized effort.

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(b)(3)-18 USC 798

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

.The proposal to deploy the USS LIBERTY to the

requirements, the anticipated loss of fixed intercept capability, and technical requirements to develop optimum data for SIGINT units providing direct support to U.S. forces which might have become involved in the Middle East Crisis. Recent consumer requirements stressed the importance of information on UAR Waval and Air movements and division level ground forces communications (CIA).

The Defense Intelligence Agency levied a requirement for information on the status of the UAR Air Portegard the UAR Air Defense system. Additionally, DIA noted informally that

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existed These requirements could have been fully eatistied only with a seabome platform positioned off the WAR. As neted previously, wave propagation studies corroborate this assessment.

USC 798 USC 403 _. 86-36

The LIBERTY would have

contributed substantially toward approving the technical base on VHP, UHP, and low-powered HF addical communications of very immediate usefulness to a SIGNT support unit.

The rationale for requesting the positioning of the USS LIBERTY in operation area 3 for initial operations was based upon the following factors:

- The major requirement was for coverage of UAR targets in the VHF/UHF ranges; therefore, the platform was

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requested to operate in an area affording the maximum

-Wave propagation analysis indicated that operational area 3 world ullow for the collection of the greatest number of signals at contrasted with the other specific, approved operating areas.

would be the focal point for significant military action because the ship was not schooled to arrive at this particular operating area until the morning of 8 June, and as the military activity appeared to be moving from East to West, it was recommended to JCS/JRC that approval be given to authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY to operating area? This would have allowed the ship to collect tactical communications specifically related to the tactical situation.

Communications known to be used by the USS LIBERTY are as follows:

- 2 High Frequency Morse circuits
- 2 High Frequency Radio Telephone/Radio Frinter circuits

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1 secure Moon Relay system, one channel capability, 190 words per minute

secure High Frequency circuits plus two spares total of 3 full duplex and 3 half duplex

2 of time encryption/decryption devices.

The ship had the capability of using any combinations of the above but not all simultaneously.

The SIGINT collection was to be processed and reported within on board capabilities.

The LIBERTY was tasked to provide daily electrical technical summaries to other collectors and NSA. These summaries would provide the latest technical information for use by other collectors and would provide to NSA a means of staying abreast of the LIBERTY's SIGINT activities.

All plaintext international shipping activity was to be forwarded electrically to NBA for exploitation.

Upon completion of the deployment the ship was requested to provide all on board collection including unprocessed tapes, to NSA

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<u>OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL RESPONSIBILITIES</u>

command and control of a seaborne SIGINT collection platform is exercised in military command channels. Control is delegated from the JCS to the Unified or Specified Commander and thence to the Naval component Fleet or Force Commander. Gommand control of a technical research ship includes the final determination by military operational commanders that the operation required by NSA is compatible with the pafety of the ship.

Operational and technical control of the SIGINT activities on board the platform's exercised by the Director, NSA.

Documentation dutlin no the responsibilities of NSA,

JCS and others is contained in Tabs E., through N., and is

tummarized as follows:

The Introduction to the Manual of J. S. SIGINT
Operations (MUSSO), dated March 1966, outlines the
means by which the Director, NSA, exercises operational
and technical control of the National SIGINT effort in
accordance with the authority and provisions of Mational
Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID 6) and

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definitions assigning missions, tasks or functions to SICINT organizations." (TAB E)

OPINS 2855 phovides the specific operating instructions for the SIGINT component aboard the Technical Research Ship USP LIBERTY (AGTR-5). It outlines the command relationships, mission, functions, liaison, communications and special instructions for this component. (TAB F)

A JCS Memorandum of 4 May 1966 outlined the responsibilities of NSA and command elements with regard to the specific procedures for the planning and approval of Technical Research Ship schedules. NSA employs this document as the basis for icheduling actions for TRS platforms. (TAB G)

A JCS Message of 6 June 1967, provide the NSA and command responsibilities for the USS LIBERTY while operating in the USCINCEUR area of responsibility, VIALH

On 5 November 1968, the JCS outlined containing planning for TRS operations to be used in general planning

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possage is not specifically related to procedures employed by NSA, it is a JCS statement of command and control responsibilities. (TAS I) Amplification of this statement is provided below.

1

(TABS J and K)

As a result of experien

involving the Technical

Research Ship (TRS) USS BELMONT, DIRNSA determined the need for guidance to operational commanders regarding the employment of the TRS. On 27 May and 4 June 1965 NSA requested JCS To issue general odidance to inform appropriate commenders of the purpose, nature and concept of TRS operations since the USS OXPOAD was being deployed to Southeast Asian waters. The message recommended that such guidance include the following statement:

"Operational and technical control of the SIGINT activities on board the OXFORD is exercised by the Director, NSA."

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the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance on TRS operations
in Southeast Asia on 7 June (JCS 2085-65 0714042 June 1965.)

(TAB L. This message substituted the statement,

"Technical control and signal tasking of SIGINT collection activities about the OXFORD will be as directed by DIRNSA through DIRNAVSECGRU for the desired wording in the DIRNSA suggested guidance: i.e. "Operational and technical control of the SIGINT activities on board the OXFORD is exercised by the Director, NSA."


Subsequently, on 17 June 1985. DIRNSA in commenting on ICS 2085-65, advised that these activities include processing and reporting as well as collection." (TAB M)

On I September 1965, NSA requested that JCS consider issuing general guidance similar to JCS 2085-65 071404Z June 1965 to inform the other unified companiers of the purpose, nature and concept of TRS operations. (TAB N)

In accordance with the NSA request of I September 1965, the ICS issued the guidance on TRS operations on 5 November 1965. This message was sent to all unified commanders and the CNO. The message outlined the purpose, nature and concept of TRS

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
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operations and was made applicable to all TRSs. The
message provides for exercise of "operational and
echnical control of all SIGINT activities (collection,
processing, reporting) on board the ship, by the Director,
NSA (via direct communications to ship or through the
Director, NSG). "The message further states: "operational
control of ship. Military operational control of these ships
will be effected by the cognizant unified or specified commander
through the Navel comment commander to a specific fleet
or force commander... Pasis for collection area assignments...
Determination by military operational commanders that the
operation required by NSA is compatible with the safety of
the ship." (TAB I)

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May

The situation in the Middle East resulted in NSA doctoring a SIGINT Readiness BRAVO. In order to augment coverage in the area, NSA requested JCS/JRC to authorize diversion of the USS LIBERTY from Abidjan, Ivory Coast to Rota, Spain, in preparation for deployment to the Eastern Mediterranean (TAB O) (DIRNSA ADP/224-57 231729A). Since the LIBERTY possessed an excellent capability for collection, processing and reporting of SIGINT, she was considered a superior platform to the USNS VALDEZ which was scheduled to return to New York.

25 May

The following action was initiated:

provision to the LIBERTY of additional linguist capability
in Arabic including three NSA civilians:

Mr. Allen M. Blue, GG-7

Mr. Donald L. Biglock, GG-7

Mr. Robert L. Wilson GG-7

(No Hebrew linguists were available) <

Tasking for both the transit to the operating area and the period while on-station was developed, coordinated and supplied to USN-855 (TAB P) (DIRNSA K12/595 2922012, DIRNSA K12/606 022333Z, K12/511 022335Z)

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ICS approved the NSA request for diversion of the LIBERTY and requested that CINCLANT change OPCON of the LIBERTY from CINCLANT to CINCEUR upon the simp's arrival at Rota, Spain, on or about 31 May.

Additionally, ICS informed CINCEUR to make the necessary properations for extended employment of the LIBERTY to the Eastern Mediterranean (TAB C) (ICS 6493 2915022).

DIRASA requested ICS approval of the operational areas for the LIBERTY and proposed Area 3 (TAB A) as the initial area subject to "adjustment as necessary for operational or safety reasons." (TAB R) (DIRASA ADP/242-67 2920132)

1 June

ICS requested CLACEUR to deploy the LIBERTY on

2 June from Rote, Somm, to Area 3 and stipulated a

closest point of approach (SPAN to Algeria, Libya, and the

UAR of 13 nautical miles during the transit. Upon arrival
in Area 3 on or about 9 June, the SPA stipulated by ICS

was to be 12.5 nautical miles to the BAR and 6.5 nautical
miles to Israel (TABS) (ICS 6724 0215452)

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The LIBERTY deployed from Rota, Spain, at \$2123\$Z through the Straits of Gibralter following a coastal route to Area 3.

In view of the outbreak of hostilities, representatives of the tasking elements of NSA telephoned JCS/IRC and asked whether or not a change in the employment of the LIBERTY was contemplated. Recollection of the repositioning of the OXFORD during the Cuban crisis in 1962 prompted the telephone call. JRC advised that no action was contemplated at that time.

6 June

CINCUS NAVBUR directed Commander, Sixth Fleet

(C) MSIXTHFLT) to take OPCON of the LIBERTY in order to

"facilitate command and control and possible requirement

for protection during Mid-Last hostilities" and additionally

directed LIBERTY to change operational control to COMSIXTHFLT

at \$7\$\$\$IZ. The message also authorized modification of

the initial JCS plan of operations (TAB-6) should safety

reasons so dictate. (TAB T) CINCUSNAVEUR \$61357Z).

Subsequently COMSIXTHFLT issued his OPGON change

message to the LIBERTY (TAB U) COMSIXTHFLT \$62349Z).

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7 June

Since the UAR target entities were moving westerly,
DIRNSA requested JCS for immediate action to change the
operating area of the LIBERTY from Area 3 to Area 2 in order
to satisfy tasking requirements (TABV) (DIRNSA K12/631
0721042).

The LIBERTY reported her position at 070800Z and ctated she would remain stationary within 30 nautical miles of point (31-49N, 33-30E) approximately 63 nautical miles nothers of Port Said upon arrival in Area 3 (TAB W) (USS LIBERTY 070908Z).

On the afternoon of V June, the NSA representative at JRC telephoned the NSA tasking representatives to advise of discussions underway between Navy and JCS/JRC concerning the possibility of changing the LIBERTY's CPA:

There was concern within JRC since the LIBERTY was 350-460 miles from the closest Sixth Fleet ships. The NSA representative at JRC relayed the concern expressed by a member of JRC that is change in the CPA might have an adverse effect on the simp's SIGINT mission. The NSA tasking representatives pointed out that the effect of any

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change in the line of sight capability was a mathematical computation which could be readily derived; however, they declined to make any statement regarding any specific repositioning of the LIBERTY since changes in the CPA for operational or safety reasons were considered a military command decision, and they felt that any specific statement on their part could be interpreted as a defense for pathling the 12.5 mile CPA.

Prior to close of business 7 June, the NSA representative at IRC saw a message originated by JCS/JRC ordering a change in the LIBERTY's CPA to 20 nautical miles to the CHANG-ING UAR and 15 nautical miles to Israel and in the LIBERTY's OP area to Area 2, as requested by DIRNSA on 5 June. However, the message as transmitted by JRC (TAB X) (JCS 6724 072230Z) did not contain the latter change. The JRC member concerned stated that he had decided to do one thing at a time. It leter turned out that JRC was overtaken by events in changing the OP area.

Later in the evening the KoA representative at JRC received a call from JRC recuesting his concurrence in a

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ICS message changing the CPA to 100 nautical miles. The reasons for the change were expressed as being, at the cutset, primarily political in origin: Since the United States Ambassador to the United Nations had stated to that body that there were no U. S. Navy ships within 350-400 nautical miles of the UAR/Israel area, JCS and Navy felt that they must lend support to that position. During the night a message was received by JCS from the Commander. Sixth Fleet (TARY) COMSIXTHFLT 0715032) stating that "no operations, either surface or air, were permitted within 100 miles of Israel, Syria, or Egypt or within 25 miles of Cyprus." The nessage provided a status report on Sixth Fleet operations as of 5/June - at which time the LIBERTY was under the operational control of CINCEUR; transfer of operational control to QOMSIXHELT was effected at 0700012. The status report was apparently prompted by at the UM, that the U.S. and the allegation by the Arays, the British had participated in the Israell air strikes against the UAR. ICS reacted by sending a message to CINCEUR, Info LIBERTY, candelling the 20 nautical mile

TAB A

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Analysis of Propagation Studies Related to UAR Communications Networks

Due to the complexity of the intercept problem (VHF/UHF systems and low-HF networks) it was determined that the best overall coverage would be possible by a ship positioned in proximity to the general area of the target activity. This determination was based on the computed values of VHF path loss which serve as good indicators of what signals. could be intercepted successfully and continuously. Because loss increases with the log of distance, more reliable intercept would be expected close in to the emitters. The computed values of path loss along the 13 mile track indicate values that are completely reasonable for the NSA intercept equipment and that which was installed aboard USS LIBERTY. The values at the 100 mile track are beyond the scope of intercept equipment employed for general field use. In addition, the low HF frequencies employed by the military networks would be expected to be successfully intercepted via ground wave modes only. Analysis of far field sky wave modes for the low HF area indicate little, if any,



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probability of successful intercept at any distance, while the close in points along the recommended track indicates a high probability of support. This technical theory is best illustrated on a chart of the approved operating area which depicts the signal path and DB loss along tracks of 12.5, 100 and 200 nautical miles from the target activity.

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TAB B

Since 1960, the UAR has relied primarily on Soviet military radio equipment and continues to negotiate for it. Most of these equipments are in the R-series and are delivered with aircraft, tanks and radars, or separately as tactical equipments. The infantry and artillery use AM and FM radios operated on frequencies from 1 to 4, 2 to 5 and 20 to 50 mc; armored personnel, carriers and tanks, equipped with AM/FM radios, use frequencies from 1 through 4 mc; aircraft ground-to-air service is on frequencies from 100 through 150 mc. (For military air communications, it has been proposed to gradually phase out use of the 100- to 150-mc band and to use the

225- to 399.9-mc band.)	
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
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TAB E

Introduction to MUSSO

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INTRODUCTION

1 March 1966

- c. Promulgate policy and doctrine governing SIGINT operations within the NSE.
- d. Provide information to SIGINT activities not under the control of the Director, National Security Agency, with a view to facilitating standardization and the exchange of technical support.
- 2. This INTRODUCTION to the Manual prescribes procedures for the preparation, review, publication, dissemination and control of MUSSO documents within the NSE.

SECTION II - DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this document, the following definitions apply:

a. COMINT - Communications Intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities which produce COMINT by the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire or other electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

NOTE: COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall not include (a) any intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda, or (b) censorship.

- b. ELINT Electronics Intelligence. Technical and intelligence information product of ELINT activities. ELINT activities are defined asthe collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonation or radioactive sources.
- c. SIGINT Signals Intelligence. The generic term used to apply to both COMINT and ELINT as those terms are defined above, including the specified limitations of those definitions.
- d. NSE National SIGINT Effort. The SIGINT intercept and processing activities of the U.S. Army Security Agency, the Naval Security Group, the U.S. Air Force Security Service, and the National Security Agency.

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INTRODUCTION

1 March 1966

SECTION III - NATURE OF DOCUMENTS

- 1. MUSSO comprises certain unnumbered publications, and four numbered series. The unnumbered series includes this INTRODUCTION, a Letter of Promulgation, a basic Statement of General Operating Policy (SGOP), an Index of MUSSO Publications (BOXSCORE), and such other documents as may be deemed appropriate in the future. The four numbered series and their definitions are:
- a. OFDOC Operating Doctrine. Enunciation of the principles governing the assignment of missions and tasks and the utilization of SIGINT resources.
- b. OPINS Operating Instructions. Orders or directives assigning missions, tasks or functions to SIGINT Organizations.
- e. TECHNOC Technical Doctrine. Enunciation of the principles governing the determination of techniques, methods, and procedures for fulfilling assigned tasks.
- d. TECHINS Technical Instructions. Orders or directives prescribing techniques, methods or procedures to be used in the fulfillment of assigned tasks.
- 2. The numbered series are thus differentiated according to their concern with operating (OP...) or technical (TECH...) matters and further differentiated according to whether they are instructional (....INS) or doctrinal (....INC). A good index of the difference between operating doctrine or instructions and technical doctrine or instructions is that the former category is concerned with the question, "Who does what?", the latter with the question, "How is it properly done?".
- 3. Instructions (...INS) are tantamount to orders of a detailed nature which must be carried out to the fullest possible extent to satisfy the particular requirements on which they are based. Doctrine (...DC) serves as guidance, embodying the consensus of the best judgment as to the way in which operations should be conducted. It is expected that all SIGINT activities will be governed by such doctrine and, in this respect, doctrine is tentamount to orders of general scope.
- 4. The NSA Circular is used to promulgate philosophy, policy, objectives, program and technical guidance, and other matters in the fields of research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and of scientific, technical, production engineering and logistics information management. The MUSSO, therefore, will not be used for these purposes. MUSSO will be used, however, for issuing research and development operational and technical instructions to cryptologic field activities in those areas of NSA responsibility which are directly related to COMINT and FLINT intercept

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3

INTRODUCTION

1 March 1966

and processing activities which are under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA.

SECTION IV - PREPARATION, REVIEW AND PUBLICATION

- 1. The preparation, review and publication of all MUSSO documents shall reflect the policy and spirit of the Letter of Promulgation and the general principles of the Statement of General Operating Policy (SCOP). The following MUSSO preparation and publication responsibilities and procedures provide guidance and information for all elements of the NSE:
- a. The unnumbered publications referred to in Section III, paragraph 1., will be prepared and published by the National Security Agency. These documents (excepting the BOXSCOME) will be coordinated with the Service Cryptologic Agency Headquarters for appropriate additions, corrections and/or comments.
- b. Operating and Technical Doctrine normally will be prepared and published by the National Security Agency; however, SCA Headquarters may initiate operating doctrine by forwarding drafts of proposed OPDOCs to NSA for publication. NSA will undertake all necessary pre-publication coordination with the other SCAs for comments and/or concurrence.
- c. Operating Instructions and Production Plans for the Service Crytologic Agencies and the National Security Agency Production Organization will be prepared and issued by the National Security Agency with active participation of the organizations concerned. These Operating Instructions include:
- (1) OPINS No. 1, 2 and 3. Task Chiefs of the Service Cryptologic Agencies of the Army, Navy and Air Force, with their respective SIGINT missions. OPINS No. 1, 2 and 3 are used also to delegate operational control of specified COMINT and ELINT facilities and resources for such periods and such tasks as are determined by the Director, NSA.
- (2) OPINS No. 4. Tasks the National Security Agency Production Organization with specific SIGINT responsibilities, analytic, reporting and support functions, and/or other matters as appropriate.
- (3) OPINS No. 10, 20, 30 and 40. Levy SIGINT collection, processing, production and machine processing requirements upon the Army, Navy and Air Force SCAs and the NSA Production Organization, respectively.
- d. The Service Cryptologic Agency Headquarters, or Intermediate SCA Headquarters as designated by their parent service, will prepare and publish OPINS in the 1000, 2000 and 3000 series, tasking individual SCA units with specific SIGINT collection, processing and production functions and whatever additional instructions as are necessary or desirable to the successful accomplishment of assigned missions. In certain situations where joint activities are to be conducted under provisions of OPDOC 18 or by other special arrangements, and where NSA resources, per se,

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Field elements

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are not involved, an OPINS will be prepared jointly by the SCAs involved and published under a double OPINS number (e.g., OPINS 1799/3799). These documents normally will be subject to pre-publication review and approval by the National Security Agency.

e. OPINS in the 4000 and 5000 series will be prepared and issued by MSA, as required, to task MSA Production Organization elements, MSA

Appropriate SCA coordina-

tion will be accomplished whenever SCA resources or major divisions of responsibility within the NSE are involved.

- f. Technical Instructions (TECHINS). To insure necessary uniformity within the NSE, TECHINS normally will be prepared and published by the National Security Agency with the active participation of the SCAs. SCA Headquarters (and SCA Field Headquarters or field units when authorized by parent SCA Hqs) and Joint Processing Centers may prepare basic TECHINS and supplements or Intra-Service variations to NSA TECHINS, according to the following procedures:
- (1) In normal (non-emergency) situations, when necessary instructions are non-existent, or when previously published instructions are inadequate, drafts of proposed TECHINS will be submitted through normal channels to the National Security Agency for review and, if appropriate, publication.
- (2) In emergency situations, TECHINS may be prepared and published without prior coordination with the National Security Agency. Such instructions will be limited to unique situations wherein appropriate instructions from NSA and/or SCA Headquarters are lacking, and the time factor is such that normal pre-publication coordination would seriously hamper or delay fulfillment of a local operating requirement. Implementation of such instructions will be on a provisional basis and TECHINS thus published will be given post-publication review by NSA, in conjunction with the SCAs as in normal situations. The originator will be notified of the results of the review and recommended disposition (e.g., conversion to NSA TECHINS with wider applicability; distribution as a Service TECHINS subject to any necessary emendments; rescission; etc.).
- (3) Supplements or Intra-Service variations may be required to amplify instructions contained in a basic TECHINS in order to meet some specific Service purpose, area need, or local field requirements, over and above what is required by the basic TECHINS.
- (a) SCA Headquarters and Joint Processing Centers may prepare and publish supplements or Intra-Service variations to NSA TECHINS, as required, without pre-publication coordination with the National Security Agency.

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- (b) SCA Field Headquarters or field units, when authorized by SCA Headquarters, may prepare and publish supplements to NSA and SCA Headquarters TECHINS. At a minimum, pre-publication coordination should be conducted, if time permits, with the NSA Field Activity or sub-office. (Field unit pre-publication coordination with intermediate Field Headquarters will be as directed by the SCA Headquarters.) Supplements thus published will be given post-publication reviews by NSA and SCA Headquarters.
- (c) Supplements will not reiterate or duplicate, alter or change the basic text of the publication they augment.
- (d) Supplements or variations are binding on subordinate units of the issuing organization but in no way obviate the requirements expressed in a higher authority supplement and/or basic TECHINS.
- (e) When a basic TECHINS is revised, supplements to the previous version will be reviewed by the issuing organization for conformity and applicability to the new version. Such supplements will be up-dated and reissued or cancelled.
- 2. To achieve uniformity in the system, pre-publication coordination of MUSSO documents, whenever required or appropriate, will be accomplished between and among elements of the NSE as follows:
- a. All NSA drafted MNSSO documents and changes thereto normally will be referred formally to the Service Cryptologic Agencies for comments prior to publication. Formal referral normally will be accomplished by providing copies (in the number desired) of draft MNSSO documents to SCA Representatives at Fort Meade for their respective Headquarters and/or SCA headquarters. Deadline dates for the receipt of comments (normally 3\$\beta\$-45 calendar days from date of receipt by the SCA) will be established, when appropriate. Non-receipt of comments by dates indicated will be construed as "no comments" and publication will normally follow. In emergency situations, NSA draft TECHINS may be issued directly to SCA field units as interim instructions pending completion of formal coordination. Such issuance will be effected in coordination with SCA Representatives at Ft. Meade.

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b. NSA Field Activities	
	rovided with a copy of the initial draft ?
	ent and subsequent drafts, where appropri-
	edlines for receipt of comments will be
	A comments. NSA Field Activities
	electrically, if practicable, in order
to be received for consideration	during internal NSA coordination, or at

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least prior to formal presentation of the draft MUSSO document to the SCAs. SCA Representatives at Fort Meade may be provided copies of initial drafts for informal review, as appropriate.

- c. Requests for extensions of deadlines established by NSA for receipt of SCA Headquarters comments will be honored, where possible; however, requests for extensions to permit receipt of comments from subordinate field units will not normally be approved. Comments from such organizations can be considered for amendments or changes.
- d. To permit prompt review of all Service-originated MUSSO documents, a minimum of 30 copies of draft OPINS and 20 copies of draft TECHINS are required by NSA for pre-publication review. Normal deadlines of not less than 30 days from date of receipt by NSA may be established by the SCA Representatives for receipt of NSA comments.
- 3. Message changes or other operational or technical instructions promulgated by electrical or mail message will be coordinated with SCA Representatives at Fort Meade and will be confirmed in hard-copy MUSSO format within 30 days of transmittal, except where the changes are periodically (quarterly or more often) recapitulated. Changes or instructions not confirmed in hard copy form, except as above, within 90 days will be considered no longer valid.
- 4. Pre-publication coordination and post-publication review of all MMSSO documents at all levels should have the following objectives:
- a. To insure applicability or adaptability, as appropriate, to the world-wide National SIGINT Effort.
- b. To eliminate duplication and/or inconsistency with other MUSSO publications.
- . c. To insure completeness, accuracy, validity and appropriateness of instructions.
- 5. Comments or suggestions regarding draft MUSSO publications or regarding suggested amendments to existing MUSSO documents will include a rationale:
- a. To insure that facts relative to the comment or suggestion are readily apparent.

RATIONALE: Facts concerning a suggestion that are easily

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understood can be collated rapidly to other factors (sometimes unknown or not considered by the suggestor) which may or may not support its adoption or partial adoption.

b. To insure that the purpose or objective intended by the comment or suggestion is not misunderstood.

RATIONALE: The precise point(s) that motivated a comment or suggestion should be made so as not to be overlooked during the decision to accept or reject a suggestion.

6. Comments of an editorial nature or comments which are self-explanatory need not include a rationale.

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
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SECTION VI - CONTENT

1. Normally an OPDOC or TECHDOC will apply to only one subject. A separate TECHINS will be prepared for each individual subject. Each OFDOC, TECHDOC, or TECHINS will have as many sections as necessary, and each section will be given a brief descriptive title. A PURPOSE section should always be included.

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- 2. OFINS also will have as many sections as necessary and appropriate to the document except that OPINS NO. 19, 29, 30 and 40 will adhere to the format prescribed separately in TECHINS NO. 9002.
- 3. An OFINS in the 1000, 2000, or 3000 series will be prepared for each individual SIGINT unit having a SIGINT unit designator (TECHINS NO. 1055 refers) and listed in OPINS NO. 10/20/30, and numbered according to the procedures cutlined in foregoing sections. An OPINS in the 4000 or 5000 series may be prepared for NSA Production elements and for Joint or Special Units, respectively, as appropriate or desired. OPINS are not required for sub-elements or detachments of major units providing the SIGINT activities of such elements or detachments are adequately covered by the OPINS of the parent unit. In addition, OPINS for SIGINT units (e.g., ERU's, STRAC Support, etc.) not under the operational control of DIRNSA should be prepared only at the discretion of the parent SCA.
- 4. Implementation of an OPINS at action units (the tasked element as stated in the OPINS) will be effective upon receipt. OPINS will be implemented separately only when it is specifically stated in the OPINS that implementation will be effected at a later date.
- 5. Under no cicumstances will a TECHINS contain an "implementation" statement. A TECHINS is "effective" upon issue, but implementation of a TECHINS at action units is accomplished separately as deemed appropriate by NSA at the time of issuance in consulation with the SCA Representatives at Fort Meade. Under normal procedures:
- a. ASA and NSG field units will automatically implement a TECHINS upon receipt, as applicable to their mission, unless otherwise notified by higher headquarters. Normally, applicable TECHINS are reflected in the unit OPINS.
- b. AFSS implements TECHINS by message to intermediate field headquarters, information to DIRNSA. Intermediate field headquarters will implement TECHINS by message to subordinate units and reflect such implementation in its quarterly TECHINS IMPLEMENTATION RECORD (UL54 Report) or Annex A to the unit OPINS.
- 6. On occasion, to assure simultaneous implementation of a TECHINS at all affected stations, a specific implementation date will be desired. In such cases, appropriate correspondence to the SCA Headquarters, information to the affected stations, as appropriate, will request implementation on the desired date. This correspondence will be released prior to distribution of the document and/or receipt of the document in the field to permit the normal implementation procedures above.

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7. Preparation of MUSSO documents will be in accordance with Annex A and, within NSA, the MUSSO Typing Instructions. A suggested Unit OPINS format and instructions for completing it are attached as appendix to Annex A. Because of fundamental differences in service organization structure, service operational traditions, and general modus operandi, flexibility has been provided for by making many elements of the format optional. While its use is not mandatory, the format illustrates the preferred order of sections and paragraphs.

SECTION VII - MANUALS

1. SIGINT material considered for manual-tupe presentation must qualify as technical support material under the provision of TECHINS NO. 7971, or be selected as suitable for combined instructions for use within the National SIGINT Effort

2. Material which is considered suitable for issuance as combined instructions may, after appropriate coordination, be produced as a manual and promulgated by all agencies concerned in the publication series used by each agency. For U. S. units, manuals so produced will be promulgated as a MUSSO document. (e.g., the TEXTA Manual, TECHINS NO. 2020). Additionally, material, which would normally be issued as combined instruc tions but is precluded from such treatment

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be produced as a manual for the NSE and promulgated as a MUSSO document (e.g., the SIGINT Publication Manual TECHINS 4010).

3. For convenience of reference, associated OPINS, OPDOCS, TECHINS TECHDOCS, and technical support material may be compiled by recipients thereof into a single binder to form a comprehensive "Manual" on a given subject. Cross referencing from one MUSSO publication to another in associated subject areas will facilitate such compilation.

SECTION VIII - DISTRIBUTION .

- 1. Distribution of MUSSO documents, or portions thereof or changes thereto, will be made directly to elements of the SIGINT producing community and will be as broad as is consistent with need-to-know, security, and usefulness of the document to the recipient.
- 2. A number of MESO documents have been edited or senitized to permit less restrictive handling of the document than required by the contents of the basic document.
 - a. A sanitized version parallels a basic MUSSO document on the

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same subject, normally carries the same number and publication date as the basic document but is identified by a letter suffix in parentheses. The following letter suffixes will be used to identify sanitized MUSSO documents:

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- 3. Non-SIGINT producing organizations will not routinely receive MUSSO documents or portions thereof or changes thereto. To permit distribution outside the cryptologic community in those circumstances where it is necessary to provide pertinent "need-to-know" information to consumers and certain non-cryptologic activities and organizations, the following exceptions to this Agency policy apply:
- a. Technical information may be provided to non-cryptologic organizations, where a valid need-to-know is established and justified, in the form of an INFOCON (Information for Consumers). An INFOCON is the approved vehicle to provide the information contained in a MUSSO document required by a consumer in order to understand the SIGINT product he receives by virtue of the basic MUSSO document.
- (1) INFOCONs must be prepared in a manner which will avoid:
 (a) being instructional in nature; and (b) any reference to SIGINT techniques or "in-house" analytic procedures.
- (2) Numbering of INFOCONs will conform insofar as possible to the numbering of the related MUSSO document (e.g., INFOCON NO. 400 and INFOCON NO. 4301 equate to TECHDOC NO. 400 and TECHINS NO. 4301, respectively). Titles of INFOCONs may be revised where necessary to exclude non-essentials relating to technical preparations and therefore may not always equate to the title of the MUSSO document.
 - (3) INFOCONs will be prepared in the same format prescribed

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for MISSO documents except that INFOCONs will not be issued under a MUSSO coversheet (see Annex A).

- (4) All INFOCONS will be prepared and published at NSA for release by the Director, National Security Agency, in order to maintain centralized accountability.
- b. A copy or reproduction of a TECHINS, per se, may be provided to non-cryptologic or non-SIGINT producing organizations where such instructions are an integral part of an Operations Order, an Operations Plan, or a SIGINT Support Plan, which is accorded security protection at least commensurate with the classification of the TECHINS.
- 4. All requests received from non-cryptologic or non-SIGINT producing organizations for MUSSO documents, other than those qualifying under provisions of paragraph 3.b. above, and those covered by existing INFOCONS appropriate to the intended purpose, must be submitted to the Director, National Security Agency, for decision on an individual basis. All available information and appropriate comments attendant to such requests should be provided to DIRNSA.
- 5. Standard distribution of NSA originated MUSSO documents, sanitized MUSSO documents, and INFCCONs, will be as indicated in Annex B and Appendices thereto.
- 6. Reproduction of NSA originated MUSSO documents by NSA Field Activities, SCA Field Headquarters or subordinate units is authorized to meet local requirements, except where specifically prohibited in the document. This authorization does not extend to reproduction of documents for issue to non-cryptologic organizations except as provided in paragraph 3.b., above.
- 7. Supplements, Intra-Service variations, or original OPINS or TECHINS issued by SCA Headquarters or field elements will be distributed in accordance with the parent SCA Headquarters directives. Distribution will always include: one (1) copy each for area NSA Field Activities and sub-offices and forty-five (45) copies for NSA.
- 8. Requests for additional or replacement copies of MUSSO documents or requests for changes to standard distribution will be addressed to the originator of the document(s). Requests from SCA units will be forwarded through their appropriate SCA Headquarters.
- Changes or amendments or rescission notices to all MUSSO documents will receive the same distribution via the same channels as the basic document.

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SECTION IX - OTHER REMARKS

Suggestions for additions and amendments to the Manual of U.S. SIGINT Operations will be velcome from any member of the SIGINT community. Field elements of the Service Cryptologic Agencies originating such suggestions will forward them through prescribed channels via SCA Headquarters to the Director, National Security Agency, ATTN: PO4.

MARSHALL S. CARTER Lieutenant General, U. S. Army Director

	OFFICIAL:		()	o)(3)-P.L. 8	6-36	
	Chief of Administra	ative Services				
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ANNEX A

PREPARATION AND MAINTENANCE OF MUSSO DOCUMENTS

1. General Instructions

- a. MUSSO documents will be typed on letter size paper (8" x $10\frac{1}{2}$ "), prepunched to permit insertion in standard three-ring, loose-leaf binders. Typing within paragraphs will be single spaced. (Draft versions should be double-spaced to facilitate reviews.) Both sides of the paper will be used in head-to-head printing, unless operational reasons justify single-side printing only. Other single-side printing exceptions will be pointed up in applicable paragraphs to follow. (The term "MUSSO documents" as used herein refers to all documents except OPINS NO. 10, 20, 30 and 40).
- b. Cover Sheets. Front and back cover sheets on MUSSO documents not only serve to identify the MUSSO series publications but help to preserve and protect them. Numbered NSA-originated MUSSO documents will be issued under two-color (blue and black on white) covers. They will be used only on a basic numbered document. They will not be used on the unnumbered MUSSO documents, changes to documents, Memorandum to Holders, or oversize (8" x 13") attachments, nor will they be used on INFOCONs. Changes to basic documents, oversize attachments, and Memorandum to Holders will be issued with a special MUSSO first page format similar to that used on this INTRODUCTION. Other issuing authorities may use cover sheets if practicable and desired. If not used, however, continued use of the special MUSSO first page format is encouraged.

2. Arrangement

- a. MUSSO documents will be prepared in a standard format for the sake of uniformity. The issuing headquarters, effective period, the short title (i.e., OFDOC, OFINS, TECHDOC or TECHINS as applicable) and number, plus the date, full title and table of contents by section will be indicated on the first page of the document.
- (1) The classification of the title, as determined by the originator is entered one space after the last word of the title in brief form, in parentheses, as follows: (U) Unclassified; (C) Confidential; (C-CCO) Confidential, Handle Via Comint Channels Only; (S) Secret; (S-CCO) Secret, Handle Via Comint Channels Only; (SC) Secret, Codeword; (TS) Top Secret; (TS-CCO) Top Secret, Handle Via Comint Channels Only; (TSC) Top Secret, Codeword.
- (2) RCS number, where applicable, is entered inclosed in parentheses immediately under the title.

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- (3) A supersession statement, if applicable, will be entered immediately following the table of contents.
- b. Pages following the title page will carry the short title and date as the first line of printing below the top margin. Two spaces will separate the various elements of each document (i.e., between the title and the Table of Contents, between the Table of Contents and the supersession statement (if applicable) or Section I, between each Section title and the first paragraph of the section, and between paragraphs.)
- c. Sections. Sections will be numbered consecutively with capital ROMAN numerals throughout the publication. Section titles will be in capital letters, centered and underlined.
- d. <u>Paragraphing</u>. Paragraphs, when more than one, will be numbered consecutively within each section with Arabic numbers. Paragraphs will be indented five spaces and subparagraphs will be further indented four spaces. Single paragraphs will not be numbered. Paragraphs and subparagraphs throughout all MUSSO documents and attachments will appear as in this Annex and Appendices.
- e. <u>Pagination</u>. All pages within each MUSSO document will be numbered at the bottom center of the page in Arabic numerals, beginning with page two. The first page will not be numbered. Each page of an attachment will be numbered independently, also starting with page two.
- f. Authentication. MUSSO documents will be authenticated in accordance with the procedures of the issuing organization.
 - g. <u>Inclosure Notations</u>. The inclosure notation (if applicable) will appear on the signature page of the basic document, two spaces following the last line of the authentication block.
 - (1) When there is only one inclosure, type the notation as follows:

"Incl:

ANNEX - INSTALLATION PLANS"

(2) When there is more than one inclosure, number each and type the notation as follows:

*3 Incls:

- 1. ANNEX A PROCEDURES
- 2. ANNEX B REPORTING
- 3. ANNEX C FORMS"

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- h. Attachments. Attachments to MUSSO documents will be annexes, lettered consecutively if there are more than one. A single annex normally will not be lettered. Each annex will be identified as ANNEX at the top of the first page, with a letter, if appropriate, and will bear a title. It will also be identified as an annex to the basic document at the lower left corner of even-numbered pages and lower right corner of odd-numbered pages except where a TOP SECRET control block is entered. In the latter case, the annex identification will be placed in the opposite corners. Appendices will be used for attachments to Annexes, Tabs as attachments to Appendices, Inclosures as attachments to Tabs.
- (1) Format for an Attachment. The attachment letter or number, as appropriate, should appear at the top, center of the first page. The title of the attachment, underlined, should be centered on the page below the attachment letter or number, with a Table of Contents, if used, centered below the title line. Instructions for the remainder of the first page, second and succeeding pages of an attachment are the same as for a basic MUSSO document.
- (2) Attachment Notation. Identify each attachment with the proper notation in the lower right corner of odd-numbered pages and lower left corner of even numbered pages. Examples:

Annex a to techins 4d/01 ded 1 Jan 68	ANNEX A TO TECHINS 1055 DTD 1 JAN 68 (C1-JUN 71)	APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A TO TECHINS 4020 DTD 1 JAN 57	TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO TECHINS 2099 DTD 16 APR 70
			DID TO WEY IN

i. <u>Distribution</u>. Each MUSSO document will show a distribution notation. The word "DISTRIBUTION" will follow two spaces below the last attachment listed, at the left margin, followed by a distribution list or symbol indented two spaces. If no attachments are listed, the distribution will follow the authentication block. If space is limited, the list may be included as the next page of the document, in which case the words, "List Attached," will be included in the available space. If the document carries a special distribution and is attached to the document, type the words, "Special-Attached." If the document carries a special distribution but is not attached to the document, type only the word "Special." The distribution represented by symbols appearing on NSA-issued MUSSO documents is listed in Annex B.

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j. Exceptions. Exceptions to the foregoing procedures, specifically with respect to control and pagination of Annexes, may be made where split routing is required or where the Annexes are distributed at variance from the basic document. In such cases, affected portions will bear unique control numbers and pagination.

3. Classification and Control.

- a. MUSSO documents will be classified according to content.
- (1) For purposes of classification marking, all MUSSO documents, except Manuals, will be considered unbound documents. For TOP SECRET Control purposes a document that is bound by staples or fasteners is considered an unbound publication. The appropriate classification will be plainly and conspicuously marked or printed in the top and bottom margins on all pages. Front and back cover pages, title pages (when used) and the first page will bear the over-all classification of the document. Other pages may be marked according to the classification of their own content. A cover will be marked on its outer surface. When both sides of a page are used, both sides will bear the appropriate classification.
- (2) When a basic document contains no codeword material but one or more of the annexes contain codeword, the basic will bear the classification of the highest classified information contained in the attachments thereto. The attachments will be classified according to content. The basic will be marked "APPENDED DOCUMENT(S) CONTAIN(S) CODEWORD MATERIAL," on the first page only.
- (3) A codeword is not a classification, but signifies a category and requires special handling. Documents that bear a codeword are automatically placed in COMINT channels. Documents containing information related to COMINT or COMINT activities, although not codeword information, will be marked with the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY." This caveat will be placed conspicuously on the cover (if used) and at the bottom of each page, normally at the left margin. Placement of this notation on the page is not critical. If necessary, it may be stamped or typed at different places at the bottom of the page to allow room for notations that take precedence.
- (4) When a basic document containing SECRET Codeword information is classified TOP SECRET because it or attachments to it contain TOP SECRET information, it will be classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD.
- (5) Classified MUSSO documents which do not carry a codeword, codeword warning, downgrading statement, or the HVCCO caveat, must carry an appropriate "Automatic Downgrading or Declassification" statement

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as prescribed in DOD Directive 5200.10. This statement need only appear on the cover.

- (6) Classification and categorization of MUSSO documents will be in accordance with appropriate TECHINS.
- b. Few MUSSO documents will be TOP SECRET Controlled. Top Secret documents bearing a codeword or the HVCCO notation are exempt from TS Control. Documents that are classified TOP SECRET with no COMINT indicator are controlled. When required, the TS Control blocks will appear at the lower right corner of the MUSSO Cover and each odd-numbered page (face page). Each sheet of an unbound Top Secret document is controlled and not necessarily each page. Annexes will bear the same control number as the basic document and be considered a part of the document. The page numbering in the TOP SECRET control block will be consecutive from cover to cover, disregarding any internal page numbering.
- (1) Non-Reproduction Statement. This statement is required on the cover of all TOP SECRET documents. It is not required on the cover of documents which contain codeword material or are marked with the HVCCO notation or contain a downgrading or regrading notation except where sensitivity warrants. This statement, as appropriate, is placed at the left margin as shown below:

"Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with the permission of the issuing office or higher authority."

"Reproduction of paragraph(s) _____ of this document is prohibited except with the permission of the issuing office or higher authority."

e. Reports Control. MUSSO documents requiring submission of reports will normally bear a Reports Control Symbol (RCS). The RCS number should appear under the title of the document on the first textural page. If it is determined that a Reports Control Symbol is not required, an exemption clause will be included stating that the report in question is exempt from assignment of a Reports Control Symbol.

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4. Preparation of INFOCONs. As pointed out in Section VIII, paragraph 3, of this INTRODUCTION, MUSSO documents will not be released, per se, to non-cryptologic organizations. The replacement documents, containing only that information which has been determined to be required by non-cryptologic organizations, titled "INFOCONS," are mutually exclusive of the MUSSO system. INFOCONS will be prepared in exactly the same manner as prescribed for MUSSO documents but will not be issued under a MUSSO coversheet.

5. Maintenance of Documents.

- a. There are two methods used to change MUSSO publications:
- (1) <u>Hard Copy Changes</u>. A printed page or pages containing amendments to a basic publication, published in the same size and format as the publication.
- (2) Message Changes. Used only in extreme situations where priority reproduction and distribution of a printed change will not insure receipt of the information by activities concerned in sufficient time to meet mandatory implementation dates. Messages should include a statement that the instructions will be confirmed by a hard copy change to follow. The hard copy change should be submitted for publication and distribution within 30 days of the date of the message and should contain a statement listing the message change or changes it confirms or supersedes. (e.g., "This hard copy change confirms electrical change 1, DTG ______"; "This hard copy change supersedes electrical changes 1, 2, and 3, DTG ______"). Exceptions are permitted only when the document is under constant change and is periodically revised (e.g., TECHINS 1043 Forwarding Directive).
- b. Hard copy changes will be numbered consecutively beginning with No. 1. Message changes may be numbered for accounting and reference purposes but will not be intermingled and numbered consecutively with hard copy changes due to their temporary nature. The number of changes to any one publication should be kept to a minimum. Upon revision of a MUSSO document, change numbers will revert to "1". Changes to MUSSO documents will be of the following types;
- (1) Pen-and-Ink Changes. Used to make minor changes of not more than a few words, phrases, sentences, or short paragraphs which can be easily inserted by hand. Lengthy paragraph changes should take advantage of the "scissoring" technique mentioned in paragraph 5.c., following.
- (2) <u>Page changes</u>. Used to replace existing pages with new ones. Normally, a page change is used in lieu of pen-and-ink changes when

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use of the latter would involve extensive write-in. Pages which replace complete pages in a document will carry the same date and page number as the superseded page and are further identified by the change notation typed at the bottom of each revised page.

- (3) Additional Paragraphs. Changes and additions may require the insertion of new paragraphs in the text. Insertion of a new paragraphs (s), if not at the end of a section, can be accomplished in two ways. In sections composed of only a few paragraphs, all paragraphs following the inserted new paragraph can be renumbered accordingly. Or, in the second method, by using the decimal system to number the inserted paragraph(s). (Examples: "Insert following new paragraph 2 and renumber existing paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, as paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively." "Insert new paragraph 2.1, between numbered paragraphs 2 and 3.").
- (4) Additional Pages. When changed material requires additional pages, use the number of the original page plus alphabetical suffixes, such as page 2a, 2b, 2c, etcetere.
- (5) Removal of Paragraphs and Pages. When necessary, paragraphs may be deleted on a changed page without losing the numerical sequence of the paragraph numbers by placing a parenthetical statement noting the removal of these paragraphs. For example, if a page contains paragraphs 6 through 12, and paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 are to be deleted, type the statement, "(PARACRAPHS 9, 10 and 11 NOT USED)" in the space between paragraph 8 and paragraph 12. Pages may be removed by using the same method. For example, if pages 6, 7, and 8 of a document are to be removed, a single blank page would be inserted between pages 5 and 9, with the statement "(PAGES 6, 7 AND 8 NOT USED)", typed in the center of the page.
- c. Printing of Changes. Changes which involve insertion of revised sentences, paragraphs or portions of pages will be printed single-side to allow addressees to scissor such changes for insertion into the original document. Changes which will replace complete pages of a document will be printed head-to-head or single-side depending on the format of the original publication.
- d. Changes to TOP SECRET Documents. When revised pages are to be inserted into TOP SECRET Controlled MUSSO documents, the change sheet and the revised pages which it is transmitting will contain the same new TOP SECRET Control number. Type the control block on each face page and number the pages with the control block in sequence. The page number on the revised pages should agree with the pages they replace in the original document.

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HANDLE VIA COMENT CHANNELS ONLY

- e. Distribution of Changes. Instructions which change MUSSO occuments will be published as numbered changes to the pertinent publication and will receive the same distribution as the original document. This does not include distribution of changes to MUSSO documents which are split-routed or where attachments are distributed at variance from the basic document (see paragraph 6.b).
 - 6. In no case will a "MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS" be used to promulgate changes of any kind except as indicated below. A MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS of a MUSSO document may be used for the following purposes:
 - a. To rescind, cancel or revoke a publication, i.e., a complete document. Recission or cancellation of an attachment is considered to be a change to the document.
 - b. To transmit certain attachments of a MUSSO publication or changes thereto to specific units when there is a split distribution of the document.
 - 7. To insure uniformity in the maintenance of the Manual, use of the following prescribed correction procedures is encouraged:
 - a. General Rules for Posting.
 - (1) Exercise care to insure accuracy and legibility.
- (2) In pen and ink changes, draw a single line through changed material, rather than obliterating or blanking it out.
 - (3) Line out old material consisting of three or more lines of text by drawing single, straight lines through the first and last lines and connecting these lines from top right to bottom left, making a "2" shaped figure.
 - (4) Indicate the authority for changing a basic publication in the outside margin of the affected portion (away from the binding).
 - (5) Place a check mark (√) by each item of a change as it is posted, to insure posting of all portions of the change.
 - b. Procedures for Making Minor Additions and Corrections.
 - (1) Line out the deleted portion and if space on the basic publication permits, enter the added portion into the proper place on the text and add the authority "(Cl)" (i.e., Change 1) in the outside margin.

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- (2) If the space on the basic publication does not permit, enter "(WORDS ADDED/C1)" or "(SENTENCE ADDED/C1)", as the case may be into the proper place on the text or in the adjacent margin. Enter the added material at the bottom of the page, appropriately identified by the change authority "(C1)". Arrows showing the exact location of an added portion may be used if necessary for clarity.
- (3) When numerous additions and deletions occur within a limited space in the basic publication, or when added material cannot be either inserted in its proper place or entered at the bottom of the page, it may be more practical to "Z" out the congested portion (provided the printed change restates that portion in its entirety) and the reader referred to the hard copy change itself, by noting in the outside margin "(SEE/C1)". This action will often prevent "patchwork" entries which confuse the reader.
- (4) If a paragraph or subparagraph is to be added, and space does not allow entry in its proper place or elsewhere on the page in the basic document, enter the new paragraph or subparagraph number in its proper numerical sequence in the basic text followed by the words "(ADDED/SEE C1)."
 - c. Procedures for Rescission and Suspension Changes.
- (1) Rescission. Line or "Z" out the rescinded part and enter the notation "(RESC/CI)", in the outside margin.
- (2) <u>Suspension</u>. Place brackets around the affected portion and enter the notation "(SUSP/C1)" in the outside margin.
- 8. Upon completion of the posting required by a change, enter "FOSTED", the date, and poster's initials in a conspicuous position on the first page of change. Copies of hard copy changes should be retained with the original publication.

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APPENDIX 1

SUGGESTED UNIT OPINS FORMAT

OPINS (Number)

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR (Station Designator) (Classification Symbol)

					SECTION
TASK ELEMENT		•	• . •		I
MISSION		•	• •		II
COMMAND RELATIONSH	IIPS•	•	• •		· · III
SIGINI CONTROL .		•	• •	•	• • IV
ASSIGNED ENTITIES		•	• •	• • •	• • V
SIGINT PRODUCTION	FUNC	TION	3 .	• •	• • VI
LIAISON	• •	•	• . •	• • •	• • AII
COMMUNICATIONS .	• •	•	•	• • •	· · VIII

^{*(}Supersession statement, as applicable)

SECTION I - TASK ELEMENT

(Station designator and/or short-title administrative designator, administrative designator, location, classification, if any, of location.)

SECTION II - MISSION

- 1. Provide and operate intercept facilities allocated for the collection of designated foreign communications and non-communications emissions, and conduct such processing as may be required and authorized herein, or otherwise directed by the Director, NSA (DIRNSA), in general support of the National SIGINT Effort.
- 2. Provide direct SIGINT service to theater U.S. military commands, within capability, in response to the SIGINT requirements of those commands.
- *3. When authorized, provide direct SIGINT support to (specific command or commands) in accordance with NSA SIGINT Support Plans or other instructions or directives from DIRNSA.
- *4. Provide for operation of (name of operation, e.g. JDA, JNACC, SHIFWRECK(C), etc.) in accordance with pertinent directives.

*Items so marked may be omitted if not applicable.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66

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OPINS (Number)

SECTION III - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

*1. Subordinate SIGINT units of (station designator) are:

(to be listed by appropriate SCA Hqs)

2. (Additional paragraphs to be inserted by SCA Hqs, if desired, relative to administration, logistics, military justice, command subordination, etc.)

SECTION IV - SIGINT CONTROL

- 1. Operational control of assigned SIGINT collection and production resources and facilities will be exercised by Director, NSA, in accordance with MUSSO procedures and other approved operations orders or plans. (See Appendix 3, Paragraph 3)
- 2. Technical control of assigned SIGINT collection and production resources and facilities will be exercised by the Director, NSA, in accordance with MUSSO procedures.
- 3. Management of designated collection positions will be exercised by the appropriate Collection Management Authority (CMA) in accordance with TECHINS 1056 and/or special purpose plans or directives from the Director, NSA (e.g., NSA SIGINT Support Plans, etc.)

SECTION V - ASSIGNED ENTITIES

(List entities from OPINS 1 1 2 3 assigned for collection and/or processing by the unit and its subordinates, where applicable, or list separately in an Annex, thereby minimizing the need for frequent changes to the basic OPINS.)

SECTION VI - SIGINT PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS

- 1. Collection.
 - a. Intercept, record, and forward emissions from assigned

*Items may be omitted if not applicable.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66

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OPINS (Number)

target entities in accordance with pertinent MUSSO directives. Collection will be accomplished in accordance with COLL GRP listings reflected in the current NSA Collection Group requirement publication.

- *b. Apply special identification techniques, as available, to assigned target entities in accordance with pertinent MUSSO directives.
 - *c. Develop and issue TEXTA in accordance with TECHINS 2020.
- d. Maintain TEXTA and issue TEXIN, TEMPO, and TEXSIG, as required by TECHINS 2020 and in support of intercept effort.
- *e. Maintain ELTEX and other records, as appropriate, in support of assigned ELINT effort.

2. Processing.

- a. Traffic Analysis. Perform traffic analysis, including data reduction, within capabilities, on assigned entities in support of collection, cryptanalytic, and reporting efforts in accordance with pertinent TECHINS and/or Annexes to this OPINS.
- (1) Maintain local traffic analysis records as required in support of collection efforts.
- *(2) Provide Special Identification Techniques (SIT) effort with timely analytical and technical support as required.
- *(3) Integrate SIT results with analytical processing and into analytical reporting media.
- *b. Cryptanalysis. Perform cryptanalysis and decryption within capabilities, on low and medium grade cryptosystems on entities as indicated in Annexes to this OPINS.
- *(1) Perform cryptanalysis, within capability, on high-grade cryptosystems on entities indicated in Annex (or Annexes) to this OPINS.
- (2) Maintain cryptanalytic records as required in support of the local cryptanalytic effort.

*Items may be omitted if not applicable.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO INTRODUCTION . Dtd 1 Mar 66

OPINS (number)

- *c. Signals Analysis. Perform signals analysis of intercepted ELINT signals, within capability, to the extent necessary to determine identification, signal characteristics, and significance of emission.
- *d. Linguistics. Perform scanning, transcription, translation, as appropriate, of plain language and decrypted texts on assigned entities in support of collection, analytic, and reporting tasks.
- *e. Machine Processing. Utilize authorized machine personnel and equipment resources to perform data processing on assigned entities in support of local collection, analytic, and reporting tasks and in support of related SIGINT activities at higher/lower or lateral echelons in accordance with pertinent directives and Annexes to this OPINS.
- *(1) Prepare and forward machine personnel and equipment utilization report in accordance with pertinent directives.
- *(2) Units requiring data processing support will so advise higher headquarters.

3. Reporting

a. Technical

- (1) Issue technical raports required by paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
- (2) Issue technical reports indicated on assigned entities in Annex (or Annexes) _____ to this OPINS.
- (3) Issue technical supplements to SIGINT product, as required, and in accordance with pertinent TECHINS.
- (4) Issue other technical reports required or deemed appropriate, within capability, in accordance with pertinent directives.
- (5) (For Units assigned an ELINT mission.) Issue SERF and SEAR reports in accordance with TECHINS 1302.
- b. SIGINT Product. In accordance with appropriate TECHINS, prepare and issue the following reports.
 - (1) CRITIC Reports

*Items may be cuitted if not applicable

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66

HANDLE VIA COMENT CHANNELS ONLY

OPINS (Number)

- (2) SIGINT Readiness Reports.
- *(3) Spot Reports and ELECTRIGRAMS
- *(4) Translations, gists, or extracts from plain text and decrypted messages.
- #(5) Summary reports required on entities as indicated in Annexes to this OPINS.
 - #(6) Other product reports required in Annexes to this OPINS.
- #(7) (For Units assigned an ELINT mission.) Issue ELL and/or ELO reports in accordance with TECHINS 4301.

4. Training

- a. Conduct, on a continuing basis, a planned and supervised apprenticeship training program designed to qualify enlisted personnel to the level of proficiency required to perform operational duties.
- b. Define and state requirements for Specialized Operational Training (SOT) for personnel enroute to assignment to the unit in accordance with TECHINS 9164.
- 5. Evaluation. Conduct SIGINT collection and reporting evaluation programs in accordance with pertinent directives.

6. Forwarding and Distribution.

- s. Forward raw traffic and technical material in accordance with TECHINS 1042 and 1043 and other pertinent TECHINS.
- b. Distribute SIGINT product in accordance with TECHINS 4003 and other pertinent TECHINS.

7. Technical Support.

a. Provide technical support to and exchange of information with subordinate units and other units engaged in similar or related SIGHAT tasks in accordance with pertinent directives or as authorized herein.

*Items may be omitted if not applicable.

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b. State requirements for technical support through appropriate channels in accordance with pertinent directives.

SECTION VII - LIAISON

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wits	in	accordanc	e with	per	tinent d	lire	ctives.				. + * 2 * * -

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

*** Conduct liaison with local U.S. military intelligence representatives for the purpose of obtaining collateral support. The area MSA Field Activity and area Chief, SCA Field Headquarters, will be kept informed of the nature and scope of such liaison.

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SECTION VIII - COMMUNICATIONS

1. Maintain and operate, on a continuous basis, a SIGINT communications facility to provide for the timely transmission of Critical and Signal Intelligence in support of the National SIGINT Effort and designated U.S. Military Commands.

*Items may be omitted if not applicable.

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OPINS (Number)

- 2. Communications formats and procedures will be in accordance with CRITICOMM Operating Instructions (COI).
- *3. Provide and operate communications facilities as tasked, in support of DF net control flashing and tip-off activities, in accordance with pertinent directives.

(Signature)

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"Items may be omitted if not applicable.

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APPENDIX 2

SUGGESTED FORMAT FOR ANNEX TO UNIT OPINS

ANNEX

(TITLE)

SECTION

TASK I FUNCTIONS II LIAISON III

SECTION I - TASK

The (Administrative designator, SIGINT designator in parentheses) is tasked with the current exploitation and reporting of (entity/entities).

SECTION II - FUNCTIONS

1. Collection.

a. The management of intercept facilities will be in accordance with TECHINS 1056.

b. Utilization of Special Identification Techniques (SIT) on assigned entities will be in accordance with instructions contained in TECHINS No. 1025 and 1026; results thereof will be forwarded in accordance with TECHINS No. 1043. All assignments will be in accordance with the SIT priority list as established by the tasking authority in accordance with TECHINS 1056.

2. Traffic Analysis.

a. In addition to the requirements specified in the basic OPINS, develop and maintain as a minimum the following records for, and as a result of, traffic analysis:

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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	b. In accordance with TECHINS 1943 forward, through appropriate channels, results of traffic analyses to DIRNSA, and to	(b)(1)
	any other U.S. SIGINT field unit known to have a need for the results. c. Long-term research and analysis is authorized when it can be accomplished without detriment to the basic current analysis and reporting missions.	(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	3. Cryptanalysis.	
. ,	a. Conduct cryptanalysis, perform code and key recoveries and decryption, and maintain necessary records on low - and medium-grade cryptographic systems, and on undiagnosed systems unless a determination is made by DIRNSA that such systems are high-grade.	
	b. Develop and maintain as a minimum the following cryptanalytic records for, and as a result of, cryptanalysis:	
	(1) System identification information. (2) Decrypted message file. (3) Undecrypted message file.	•
	c. In accordance with TECHINS No. 1043 forward, through appropriate channels, results of cryptanalysis to DIRNSA, and to any other U.S. SIGINT field units known to have a need for the results.	
	4. Reporting.	(b)(1)
	a. Technical. In addition to the requirements specified in the basic OPINS, issue the following:	(b)(3)-50 USC 40 (b)(3)-18 USC 79 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	(1) Situation SAT ONE and SAT TWO Reports, in accordance with TECHINS No. 2010.	
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- (2) MIAR, in accordance with TECHINS No. 1919.
- (3) Technical reports, as required (e.g., TECSUM, MATSUM, TARUS), in accordance with pertinent TECHINS.
- (4) Informal Technical Notes (T/A and C/A), in accordance with TECHINS No. 7010.
- (5) Temporary Recognition Data (TRD), in accordance with TECHINS No. 3001.
- . (6) Cryptologic Information Publication (CIP), in accordance with TECHINS No. 7011.
 - (7) COMINT Technical Reports (CTR).
 - (8) Working Aids
- b. SIGINT Product. In addition to reports required by the basic OPINS, and utilizing materials from all sources available, prepare and issue SIGINT Product on the above designated entities as follows:
- (1) SIGINT Readiness Reports, in accordance with TECHINS No. 1402.
- (2) Other reports in response to specific theater consumer requirements, including those in accordance with TECHINS No. 4011, which can be undertaken without detriment to the basic timely reporting mission. DIRNSA will be promptly notified, through appropriate channels, of requirements originated by field consumers and of the action taken or proposed in fulfillment of such requirements.

SECTION III - LIAISON

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2. Other limison will be conducted in accordance with Section VII of basic α INS.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66

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APPENDIX 3

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SUGGESTED STANDARD UNIT OPINS FORMAT

- Items indicated by asterisk (*) may be omitted if not applicable.
 - 2. Items in parentheses to be completed by drafting Hqs.
- 3. Paragraph 1 of SECTION IV will normally read as indicated in the suggested Unit OPINS format; however, operational control over specific facilities and resources for a specific period of time may be delegated by Director, NSA, to Chiefs of the SCA's. Such delegation of operational control will be documented in OPINS 1, 2, or 3, as appropriate. Operational control may be re-delegated by the SCA Chief to a subordinate SCA element citing the authority granted in OPINS 1, 2, or 3. When operational control has been delegated or re-delegated, per above, paragraph 1 of SECTION IV should contain one of the following additional statements to reflect such delegation or re-delegation:
 - s. When delegated to SCA Chief, but not re-delegated -

	llocated to the	entity (o	ntrol over SIGIN or entities) has]	been delegated
by DIRNSA to	When re-delegat		(Chief of the	
field unit -				

and facilities allocated to the _____entity (or entities) has been delegated by DIRNSA to (Chief of SCA) and under authority of OPINS (1, 2, or 3) herewith redelegated by (Chief of the SCA) to and will be exercised by _____(Chief SCA Field Hqs or CO of subordinate unit).

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- 4. At the option of SCA Eqs, where "in accordance with pertinent directives" or "in accordance with pertinent TECHINS," etc., is stated in the OPINS, these terms may be replaced by citing actual applicable TECHINS or applicable TECHINS may be listed in an Annex to the OPINS and referenced by footnote where appropriate. Additionally, where training and/or evaluation functions are of such scope to warrant, these functions may be treated in Annexes or as additional Sections to the basic TECHINS in addition to paragraphs of SECTION VI.
- 5. Annexes may be prepared on entities where unit is engaged in a major effort (i.e., other than collection, T/A in support of collection and CRITIC/READENESS or Spot Reporting) against those entities. Annexes should generally be confined to groups of like entities (e.g., all Soviet, or all Satellite, etc.) of no lower than trigraphic breakdown (Country/Service Area). No Annex would be required if all matters concerned can be covered by standard wording in basic OPINS.
- 6. The following paragraph should be included in any Annex concerning ELINT:

Environment Information. The unit will develop and maintain as a minimum, the following information on a non-communication signal environment:

- "a. Bearing or location or emitter.
- "b. Frequency.
- "c. Type emitter.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A TO INTHODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66

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STANDARD MUSSO DISTRIBUTION FOR USE ON NSA-ORIGINATED MUSSO DOCUMENTS AND FOR INTERNAL NSA DISTRIBUTION OF SCA-CRIGINATED DOCUMENTS

LEGEND:

- A NSA-ORIGINATED DOCUMENTS (None-controlled).
- B SAME AS "A" LESS UNITS WITH CAT II CEILING.
- C SPECIAL (e.g., OPDOC/TECHDOC) (None-controlled).
 D SAME AS "C" LESS UNITS WITH CAT II CEILING.
- E SCA-ORIGINATED UNIT OPINS.
- F OPINS 10, 20, 30.
- G SCA-ORIGINATED TECHINS.
- H SPECIAL (ELINT or ELINT Related).
- I MUSSO DRAFTS FOR PRE-PUBLICATION COORDINATION.

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NOTE: Exceptions, additions, deletions to standard distributions for individual documents will be specified in the distribution block on the document. Permanent changes to standard distributions above or specified in the distribution block will be referred to DIRNSA (ATTN: 12141 and PØ4). Non-permanent requests for additional or replacement copies may be made direct to DIRNSA (ATTN: P22132) by elements receiving initial distribution of the document.

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
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(6)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66)

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
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
NOTE: -- - CAT II SIGINT material only.

ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66

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APPENDIX 1

MUSSO "J" DISTRIBUTION

(One copy unless otherwise indicated)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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
- Internal write-in on internal distribution on message form CAG ZIRAV.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66)

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APPENDIX 2

MUSSO "K" DISTRIBUTION



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Internal write-in on internal distribution on message form on CAG ZIRAX.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66)

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APPENDIX 3

MUSSO "P"* DISTRIBUTION

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- For use NSA-P Supplements to TECHINS.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66)

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(b)(3)-18 USC 798

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APPENDIX 4

MUSSO BOX SCORE DISTRIBUTION

(One copy unless otherwise indicated)

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 C2 - Oct 66)

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MUSSO BOX SCORE DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dt1 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66)

HANDLE VIA COMINI CHANNELS ONLY


(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-18 USC 798

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APPENDIX 5

INFOCON "A" DISTRIBUTION

(One copy unless otherwise indicated)



- Internal write-in on internal distribution on message form on CAG IZNAD.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66) DOCID: 3958111 SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66)

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INFOCON "A" (Cont'd)

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66) (b)(3)-P L 86-36

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APPENDIX 6

SPECIAL SCA DISTRIBUTION MUSSO "F" OPINS 10/20/30

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX B TO INTRODUCTION Dtd 1 Mar 66 (C2 - Oct 66)

COMMAND AND CONTROL RESPONSIBILITY

(OPINS 2855)

CNO

Through Command Channels

USS LIBERTY

USN-855

DIRNAVSECCRU SIGINT

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY NAVAL SECURITY GROUP WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EFFECTIVE UNTIL RESCINDED OR SUPERSEDED

MUSSO

MANUAL OF U.S. SIGINT OPERATIONS

OPINS No. 2855

12 March 1965

USN 855 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

TACK EIEMENT	SECT	LON
TWOK PRODUCTIONS	 	Ī
COMMAND RELATIONSHIP	 	II
MISSION		
FUNCTIONS	 	IV
LIAISON	 	
COMMUNICATIONS	 	VI
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS		VII

SECTION I - TASK ELEMENT

U. S. Naval Security Group component (USN 855), aboard the technical research ship USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

SECTION II - COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

- 1. Naval Command and Control Relationships follow:
- a. The Chief of Naval Operations will exercise operational control of the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) through normal naval command channels. The ship's operations will be based on tasks expressed by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) to the Director, Naval Security Group (DIRNAVSECGRU).
- b. The Naval Security Group component aboard the USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5) will be organized within the Operations Department with a separately authorized personnel allowance.

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OPINS No. 2855

Management control of this component will be exercised by DIRNAVSECGRU. Military command will be exercised by the Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

2. SIGINT control relationships follow: (1)

Operational and technical control of the SIGINT mission will be exercised by DIRNSA in accordance with appropriate MUSSO directives.

SECTION III - MISSION

Conduct SIGINT operations as directed in general support of the national SIGINT effort and, as authorized, in direct support of designated U. S. Military Commanders.

SECTION IV - FUNCTIONS

1. Collection.

- a. Intercept, record, transcribe and scan foreign communications and non-communications radiations and forward as directed. (2)
- b. Conduct general and directed search for target signals as directed and/or required. (3)
 - c. Utilize DF capability as required in performance of mission.
 - d. Participate in Intercept Coverage Analysis as directed. (4)
- e. Maintain current TEXTA, TEMPO and TEXIN as required to support intercept of assigned cases. (5)

•	Drangra	and	1	TEMPO/TEVIN		authorized.	(5)
r .	PERDATE	AL DO	188116	TEMPU/IEXIN	4.5	authorized.	1 2 1

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(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)

2. Processing.

- a. Perform traffic analysis on intercepted material in order to:
 - (1) Support intercept effort.
- (2) Provide assistance to other SIGINT units engaged in the intercept of similar or related targets.
- (3) Prepare required technical and SIGINT product reports, as specified in paragraph 3 below.

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SECRET

OPINS No. 2855

- b. Perform processing of designated cipher and plain language material in order to:
 - (1) Support traffic analysis functions.
- (2) Prepare required technical and SIGINT product reports as specified in paragraph 3 below.
- c. Perform signal analysis and evaluation in support of intercept and reporting tasks as directed and/or required.
- 3. Reporting.
 - a. Perform routine and special SIGINT reporting as directed. (6)
 - b. Perform routine and special technical reporting as directed. (7)
 - c. Participate in the SIGINT Readiness Program. (8)
 - d. Participate in the reporting of Critical Intelligence (CRITIC). (9)
- 4. Distribution.

Distribution of technical and SIGINT product reports will be accomplished in accordance with pertinent TECHINS and current instructions.(10)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-18 USC 798

(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- 5. Technical Support.
- a. Conduct, as necessary and appropriate, a continuing and direct exchange of technical information (including raw traffic, certain SIGINT product reports, etc.) with all elements of the national SIGINT community engaged in the intercept of similar or related targets, in recordance with established procedures. (11)
- b. Continuing technical support will be provided by Director, National Security Agency and on occasion by Director, Naval Security
- 6. Research and Development (R&D).

Participate in national SIGINT R&D effort by conducting Systems Engineering, Signals Research and special research assignments as directed.

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OPINS No. 2855

SECTION V - LIAISON

1. Effect liaison with other U. S. SIGINT units as may be required for the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. Raw traffic and/or technical information may be furnished or may be exchanged with such units in accordance with pertinent directives.

(b)(1) (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P L 86-36

SECTION VI - COMMUNICATIONS

- 1. Maintain and operate SIGINT communications facilities in order to provide timely SIGINT support to designated SIGINT consumers.
- 2. Conduct SIGINT communications operations in accordance with established procedures.
- 3. Use on-line cryptographic communications circuits when possible and appropriate using circuits prescribed in communications plans prepared by the Director, Naval Security Group.

SECTION VII - SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Conduct SIGINT operations in accordance with operational and technical directives provided. Such directives include pertinent MUSSO Documents, NSA Circulars, OPNAV Instructions, DNC Instructions, NAVSECGRU Instructions, and Standing Operating Procedures. Conflicting instructions or directives will be immediately brought to the attention of the Director, National Security Agency and/or Director, Naval Security Group.

CCC Cook

Enclosure:

Appendix - References

Distribution: DIRNSA (45) CNO (Op-94G) (10) DIRNAVSECGRULANT (2) DIRNAVSECGRUFAC (2) DIRNAVSECGRUEUR (2) ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU (2) USN 855 (2)

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SECRET

OPINS No. 2855

APPENDIX to OPINS No. 2855

REFERENCES

- (1) Statement of General Operating Policy.
- (2) TECHINS No. 1001, 1002, 1003, 1005, 1024, 1042, 1043, 1056, 1302, 9021.
- (3) Statement of General Operating Policy, TECHINS No. 1007, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1015, 1018, 9021,

(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

- (4) TECRINS No. 1019, 1046, 2003.
- (5) TECHINS No. 2020.
- (6) TECHINS No. 4001, 4010, 4014, 4016, 4301, 9021, TECHDOC 400
- (7) TECHINS No. 1302, 1350, 3002, 9021,
- (8) TECRINS No. 4002, 4003,
- (9) TECHINS No. 4019.
- (10) TECHINS No. 1042, 1043, 4001, 4003, 4015.
- (11) TECHINS No. 1043, 7001, 7005, 7006, 7009.

Note: References have been provided to ensure familiarity with documents of particular concern.

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-SECRET



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

> J3M MAY 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director, National Security Agency

Attention: P212

Commander, Military Sea Transport Service Attention: M-35 Commander in Chief, Pacific

Attention: J382

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Attention: JRC

Assistant for JCS Matters, OP60Bl

Subject: Recommended Actions Resulting from the Technical Research Ship Conference (U)

- 1. (U) A conference was held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Reconnaissance Center) on 28 April 1966 to discuss scheduling and operational control of Technical Research Ships.
- 2. (U) As a result of the discussions the conferees recommended that certain actions be taken which are summarized in the attachment.
- 3. (U) In the interest of improving Technical Research Ship operations, addees are encouraged to carry out the re-commendations of the conferees.

GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12 year Intervals; not automatically declassifie

4. (5) This memorandum and attachment is classified SECRET because it associates the National Security Agency with seaborne SIGINT platforms.

Attachment **a/**8

Copy to:
CNO (OP-333D)
COMSTSLANT (L-36), Mr. Kyle
COMSERVRON 8 (Cdr Jordan)
CINCLANTFLT (LCdr Olson)
NAVSECGRU HQS (Lt Bragoner)

Rage D. Stoking RALPH D STEAKLEY Colonel, USAF Deputy Director for Reconnaissance

Operations Directorate

ATTACHMENT

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING AND APPROVAL OF TECHNICAL RESEARCH SHIP SCHEDULES

1. (S) USNS ships (VAIDEZ and MULLER) operating in CINCLANT's area of responsibility:

a. The following procedures should be used in the planning and approval of routine schedules:

FROM	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>TO</u> .
DIRNSA	-States requirements	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Passes for planning action	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANIFLT	Passes for planning action	COMSTSLANT
COMSTSIANT	Prepares plan to fulfill requirement including dates/ areas of operations, CPA's in transit and passes for approval	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Requests approval	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Requests approval	JCS/JRC
JCS/JRC	Obtains CNO concurrence and approves proposal	CINCLANT
CINCLANT	Directs action	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Passes for action	COMSTSLANT
COMSTSLANT	Issues sailing orders	USNS ships

b. The following procedures should be used in making changes to approved schedules:

Attachment

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GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
Intervels; not
automatically declassified

FROM REMARKS TO DIRNSA States requirement JCS/JRC JCS/JRC Obtains CNO concurrence, CINCLANT approves change and requests action Directs action CINCLANT CINCLANTFLT CINCLANTFLT Passes for action COMSTSLANT COMSTSLANT Issues sailing orders USNS ships

c. The following commands should be addees on all messages pertaining to schedules or schedule changes:

JCS/JRC

CNO

CINCIANT

COMSTS

CINCLANTFLT

COMSTSLANT

DIRNSA

DIRNAVSECGRU

ADIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNAVSECGRULANT

NOTE: The ship involved is not an addee on these messages

- d. COMSTSIANT reserves the sole right to issue movement/sailing orders to the ship.
- 2. (S) USS ships operating in CINCLANT's area of responsibility:
 - a. The following procedures should be used in the planning and approval of routine schedules:

SECRET

FROM	REMARKS	<u>TO</u>
DIRNSA	States requirement	CINCIANT'
COMSERVRON 8	Prepares plan to fulfill requirement including dates/areas of operations, CPA's in transit and passes for approval	COMSERVIANT
COMSERVLANT	Requests approval	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Requests approval	CINCIANT
CINCLANT	Requests approval	JCS/JRC
JCS/JRC	Obtains CNO concurrence and approves proposal	CINCLANT
CINCIANT	Directs action	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Passes for action	COMSERVLANT
COMSERVLANT	Passes for action	COMSERVRON 8
comservron 8	Issues sailing orders	USS ships

b. The following procedures should be used in making changes to approved schedules:

FROM	REMARKS	<u>TO</u>
DIRNSA	States requirement	JCS/JRC
JCS/JRC	Obtains CNO concurrence, approves change and re- quests action	CINCLANT
CINCIANT	Directs action	CINCLANTFLT
CINCLANTFLT	Passes for action .	COMSERVLANT
COMSERVLANT	Passes for action	COMSERVRON 8
COMSERVRON 8	Issues sailing orders	USS ships

c. The following commands should be addees on all messages pertaining to schedules or schedule changes:

JCS/JRC

CNO '

CINCLANT

CINCLANTFLT

COMSERVLANT

COMSERVRON 8

DIRNSA

DIRNAVSECGRU

ADIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNAVSECGRULANT


NOTE: The ship involved is not an addee on these messages.

- 3. (S) The Director, National Security Agency should state requirements a minimum of 60 days prior to ship sailing.
- 4. (U) The Joint Reconnaissance Center, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requires that schedules be received on or before the 20th day of the month preceeding the month for which the schedule is submitted for approval.
- 5. (U) Ships operating in CINCPAC's area of responsibility will continue to be scheduled using procedures in effect.

(AB G

APPROVAL PROCEDURES FOR USS SHIPS IN ATLANTIC

J3M 764-66 DTD 4 MAY 66



APPROVAL PROCEDURES FOR ATLANTIC

J3M 764-66 4 MAY 66

ROUTINE SCHEDULES (VALDEZ/MULLER)

DIRNSA State Requirement . CINCLANT Planning CINCLANTFLI Planning COMSTLANT Plans, operation areas, CPA's in transit CINCLANTFLT Request approval CINCLANT Request approval JCS/JRC Obtains CNO concurrence Approves proposal CINCLANT Directs action CINCLANTFLT For action COMSTLANT ->Sailing Orders

CHANGES TO APPROVED SCHEDULE

J3M 764-66

DED 4 MAY 66

DOCID: 3958111

DIRNBA

State Requirement

JCS/JRC

Obtain CNO concurrence Pass for action

CINCLANT

Directs action

CINCLANTFLT

Pass for action


COMSTLANT +Smiling orders

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CHANGE TO APPROVED SCHEDULE


J3M 764 - 66

DID 4 MAY 66




TAB H

JCS TO CINCEUR (JCS 062050Z JUNE)




MODIFICATION OF APPROVED SCHEDULE (JCS 062050Z)



SECRET

MODIFICATION LESS THAN 48 HOURS FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS (JCS 8628582)



DOCID: PORM NI288 REV SEP 63 operacine N2288 REV AUG 65 be used until depleted) ACTION PRECEDENCE SPECIAL HANDLING INFO PRECEDENCE PRIORITY NONE ROUTINE DISTRIBUTION FM: ACT: JCS DATE:7 JUN 67 Κ1 INFO G ... TO: USCINCEUR /// SUSP DATE: Ø9 JUN 67 /// **G**5 **G**6 DIRNSA /// ADV CPY SNOO G7 INFO: CNO HQ NSAEUR CINCLANT NSAEUR OFF GER PØ2 DIRNAVSECGRU CINCLANTFLT PØ4 **AD IRNAVSECRGU** CINCUSNAVEUR P2 DIRNAVSECGRULANT COMSIXTHFLT ADP CTF 64' DIRNAYSECGRUEUR DIR ADNSG USS LIBERTY SUSP JCS 7206. J-3 SENDS. SUBJ: USS LIBERTY (U) REFS: A. JCS 6724 011545Z JUN 67 B. JCS 5838/052235Z NOV 65 (NOTAL) 1. (S) REQUEST PROCEDURES OUTLINED HEREIN BE . FOLLOWED IN DEVELOPING SCHEDULES FOR LIBERTY WHILE OPERATING IN USCINCEUR'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY: A. PLANNING-APPROVAL OF ROUTINE MONTHLY SKED: (1) DIRNSA STATE REQUIREMENTS TO CINCUSNAVEUR INCLUDING RECOMMENDED PORT OF CALL. (2) CINCUSNAVEUR PREPARE SKED TO FULFILL REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING DATES/AREAS OF OPS, CPA'S, PORTS OF CALL FOR LOGISTICS AND PASS PLAN TO USCINCEUR. (3) USCINCEUR REVIEW AND PASS SKED TO JCS(JRC)

RELEASING OFFICER

YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

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DOWNGRADED AT

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SECRET

PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE ROUTINE


PECIAL HANDLING NONE

OR APPROVAL. PROPOSED SKEDS ARE REQUIRED BY JCS NLT 20TH OF THE MONTH PRECEEDING THE MONTH FOR WHICH THE SKED IS SUBMITTED.

- (4) JCS(JRC) OBTAIN NECESSARY COORDINATION AND NOTIFY USCINCEURIOF APPROVAL OR MODIFICATIONS.
 - (5) USCICCEUR PASS FOR ACTION.
 - (6) CINCUSNAVEUR ISSUE SAILING ORDERS.
- B. MODIFICATION OF APPROVED SKED DUE TO CHANGES IN TECHNICAL TASKING:
 - (1) DIRNSA STATE REQUIREMENT TO JCS (JRC).
- (2) JCS(JRC) OBTAIN NECESSARY COORDINATION AND NOTIFY USCINCEUR OF MODIFICATION.
 - (3) USCINCEUR PASS FOR ACTION.
 - (4) CINCUSANAVEUR ISSUE SAILING ORDERS.
- C. MODIFICATION OF APPROVED SKED INVOLVING A CHANGE OF 48 HOURS OR LESS FOR OPSRATIONAL REASONS:
- (1) CINCUSNAVEUR ISSUS SAILING ORDERS AND INFORM JCS(JRC) AND USCINCEUR OF REASON FOR THE CHANGE.
- D. MODIFICATION OF APPROVED SKED INVOLVING A CHANGE OF MORE THAN 48 HOURS FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS:
- (1) CINCUSNAVEUR PASS PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO USCINCEUR.
 - (2) USCINCEUR REVIEW AND PASS TO JCS (JRC) FOR

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OF HIGH PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.

(1) CLASSIFICATION OF MISSION, AND ANY ASSOCIA-TION WITH NSA OR THE NAVAL SECURITY GROUP (NSG): CONFIDENTIAL.

- (2) CLASSIFICATION OF DETAILS OF SPECIFIC NATURE OF MISSION: REQUIRES HANDLING THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS AND WILL BE CONTAINED IN THE APPLICABLE SIGINT SUPPORT PLAN.
- (3) DIVERSION FROM MISSION, THE TRS IS TO BE EMPLOYED FOR SIGINT PURPOSES ONLY. EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY WILG BE MADE ONLY DURING AN EMERGENCY IN WHICH THE PRO-VISIONS OF JCS PUB 2 (UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES), PARA-GRAPHS 30229 AND 30248 APPLY.
- C. COVER STORY. THE MISSION OF THE TRS IS TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US NAVY ELECTRONIC RESEARCH PROJECTS WHICH INCLUDE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PROPAGATION STUDIES AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, SUCH AS MOON RELAY AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS.
 - D. CONTROL OF TRS.

(1) OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SHIP. MILITARY OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THESE SHIPS WILL BE EFFECTED BY THE COGNIZANT UNIFED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDER THROUGH THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER TO A SPECIFIC FLEET OF FORCE

COMMANDER.	_	
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PECIAL HANDLING

(2) OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CONTROL OF ALL SIGINT ACTIVITIES (COLLECTION, PROCESSING, REPORTING) ON BOARD SHIP. BY DIRECTOR, NSA (VIA DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS TO SHIP OR THROUGH THE DIRECTOR, NSG).

- (3) BASIS FOR COLLECTION AREA ASSIGNMENTS:

 (A) SIGNAL AUDIBILITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL

 FACLORS DETERMINED BY NSA TO BE NECESSARY TO MEET STATED

 REQUIREMENTS, AND
- COMMANDERS THAT THE OPERATION REQUIRED BY NSA IS COM-
- MMANDER INVOLVED AND THE SIGINT TASKING AUTHORITY IS
 REQUIRED TO INSURE MAXUMUM RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE
 REQUIREMENTS AND MAXIMUM SECURITY OF THE SHIP.
 - E. SIGINT SUPPORT OF COMMANDERS.
 - (1) COMMAND CONTINGENCY AND LIMITED WAR PLANS:
- (A) TRS MAY BE UTILIZED BY DIRNSA TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY COMMANDER, IN ADDITION TO PRIMARY MISSIONS.
- B) COMMANDER MAY LEVY IMMEDIATE SIGINT SUPPORT
 REQUIRZMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES TO BE ESTABLISHED.

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(C) DIRNSA, OR HIS FIELD REPRESENTATIVES WHEN SO AUTHORIZED, WILLL:

DIST SUTION

1. ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO RECEIVE AND ACT
LOCALLY ON COMMANDLREQUIREMENTW.

2. EFFECT PROMPT TASKING OF SIGINT RE-SOURCES, INCLUDING THE TRS, WHICH MAY BE ASSIGNED TO AN AREA TO SUPPORT A GIVEN CONTINGENCY SIUTATION.

(D) CONTROL OF TRS:

1. OPERATIONALL CONTROL OF SHIP: SAME AS IN ROUTINE OPERATIONS (SEE PARAGRAPH D(1) ABOVE).

2. OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CONTROL OF ALL SIGINT ACTIVITIES: SAME AS IN ROUTINE OPERATIONS (SEE PARA-

F. COMMAND OFLANS:

L (1) NSA REFRESENTATIVES ACCREDITED TO COMMANDS:
WORK WITH COMMAND PLANNERS IN DEVELOPMENT OF APPROPRIATE
WORDING FOR INCLUSION IN THE SIGINT APPENDIX TO THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX OF COMMAND OFLANS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE NSA
DETERMINES THE TRS WILL ME EMPLOYED.

(2) NSA: INFORM USCINCSOUTH (NO NSA REPRESENTATIVE ACCREDITED) OF INSTANCES WHERE TRS WILL BE EMPLOYED. GP-3

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ن. سنر	1. REF A CONCURRED I	N THE PROPOSAL TO DIV	ert one trs to southea	ST .
C	A.			
	2. REF B DESIGNATED	THE USS OXFORD FOR SU	BJ DEPLOYMENT.	
	3. SINCE THE OXFORD	WHICH WILL ARRIVE IN	subic bay o/a 3 june i	S
	THE FIRST TRS TO OPER	ATE IN THE CINCPAC AR	EA, IT IS SUGGESTED TH	AT .
	THE JCS CONSIDER ISSU	ING GENERAL GUIDANCE	TO INFORM APPROPRIATE	
*	COMMANDERS OF THE PUR	POSE, NATURE AND CONC	EPT OF TRS OPERATIONS.	
<i>:</i> *	4. DIRNSA RECOMMENDS	THIS GUIDANCE INCLUDE	E THE FOLLOWING: A.	THE
	WHICH ARE K	• .	RESEARCH SHIPS (TRS) ECURITY AGENCY TO COLL	Post
OH	ELECTRONIC SIGNALS FO	R INTELLIGENCE PURPOS	ES. THE TRS ARE UNARM	ED, PH
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CAL SAFETY OF THE	SHIP) WHICH WILL BE	ASSIGNED BY DI	RNSA THROUGH	,	
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WILL THEN RECOMMEND THE	AT COMUSMACY INITIAT	E A REQUEST TO	COMSEVENTHELT	4	
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SPECIFIC BLOCK FOR A SPECIFIC TIME, SUCH ASSIGNMENT TO BE BASED UPON:

(A) SIGNAL AUDIBILITY AND OTHER TECHNICAL FACTORS DETERMINED BY NSA TO BE NECESSARY TO MEET STATED REQUIREMENTS, AND (B) DETERMINATION BY COMUSMACV, OR OTHER PACIFIC THEATER MILITARY COMMAND WHEN APPROPRIATE, THAT THE OPERATION REQUIRED BY NSA TASKING IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE SAFETY OF THE SHIP. EXTREMELY CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE U. S. MILITARY AUTHORITIES INVOLVED AND THE SIGINT TASKING AUTHORITY WILL BE NECESSARY TO INSURE MAXIMUM RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND MAXIMUM SECURITY OF THE SHIP. ANY DIVERSION OF THE TRS WHICH DETRACTS FROM ITS SIGINT MISSION RISKS LOSS OF SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE;

FORE, THE OXFORD IS TO BE DEPLOYED FOR SIGINT PURPOSES ONLY.

E. THE FACT THAT THE OXFORD HAS AN INTELLIGENCE MISSION IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL AND SHOULD BE MADE KNOWN TO THE MOST LIMITED NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL NECESSITY. ANY ASSOCIATION OF THE OXFORD WITH NSA OR NSG IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. DETAILS OF THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION ARE CLASSIFIED AS HIGH AS TOP SECRET AND REQUIRE HANDLING THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS. THE FOLLOW-ING UNCLASSIFIED MISSION STATEMENT, WHICH IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE ELEC-

PRONIC	CONFIGURATION OF	THE SHIP, MAY	BE USED BY APPROPRIATE COMMANDERS	
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COMMANDING OFFICERS, AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS AS NECESSARY, TO SATISFY VALID INTERESTS OF PORT AUTHORITIES, LOCAL PRESS, LOCAL NATIONALS, ETC: QUOTE THE MISSION OF THE USS OXFORD IS TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF U.S. NAVY ELECTRONIC RESEARCH PROJECTS WHICH INCLUDE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC PROPAGATION STUDIES AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS MOON RELAY AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. UNQUOTE.

F. ANY ADDITIONAL COMMAND REQUIREMENTS FOR SIGTMY SUPPORT WHICH THE PRESENCE OF THE OXFORD IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN WATERS MIGHT SUGGEST SHOULD NOT BE LEVIED DIRECTLY ON THE OXFORD, BUT SHOULD BE SUPPLIFTED Existing procedures to JCS/DIA FOR VALIDATION AND PRESENTATION

TO MSA. HOWEVER, MSAPAC REP VIETNAM IS AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE AND " and commands to positive to ACT ON IMPEDIATE SIGNAT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS OF MACY/AND EXTECT APPROPRIATE TASKING OF APPROPRIATE SIGIRT RESOURCES, INCLUDING THE TRS. IF REDEPLOYMENT IS DETERMINED TO HE REQUIRED, NSAPAC REP VIETNAM WILL REQUEST MACV TO THEORIA CONSEVENTHEM.

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SHOWN TO: ADMSG, CDR Adkisson CONCUR: D32 P04 Mr. Iltus (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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
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commands concerning t	he <u>operations of</u> TRS	in that area. Thi	s mag	
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Memo 65-36 dtd 18 May	65 which requested	"take action to hav	e ground	
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
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
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THE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE APPENDIX TO THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX OF COMMAND

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3958111 NOA POPM MEERS MEV AUG 64 Supremedia N2388 REV AUG 63 to be used best! depleted) COPY NR. ACYION PRECEDENCE ROUTING NONE ROUPITNE DATE (1) · 大小 OPLANS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE NEA DETERMINES IT WILL EMPLOY TRS (8) NSA WILL PROVIDE THIS INTO DIRECTLY TO USCINCBOUTH SINCE THERE IS NO NSA REPRESENTATIVE AT THAT COMMAND. TOP This message prepared by D31 in response to ARN Memo 65-36 dtd 18 May 65 which directed "take action to have ground rules for TRS operations in a SIGIRT support to Military Operations Role incorporated in appropriate Command Operations Plans and NSA and Naval Security Group SIGIRT Support Plans." This mag required to have JCS promulgate guidance to the other unified commands (CINCEUR, CINCEUR, CINCIANI CINCSOUTH). Upon issuance by the JCS of a message similar to reference (a), D31. will initiate action with MSA planning representatives in these areas to smend the non-codeword format for the SIGMAL INTELLIGENCE appendix to the Intelligence Annex to the Command OFLANS and the amending of the SSPs in which the IRSs are cited as means of providing support to the command. Regotiations with CINCPAC (thru MSAPAC) based on ref (a) are being handled via separate massage. CONCUR: P2, E. Sheck PØ2, Mr. J ADIRNSG, CER Adkisson В, 11.5 G1, 86 A, C Col Keller D31, D32, Ĭ, ş.: ADP, Mr. Mitchell F. Schramm/D312/3076s/30 Aug 65/bir DOCUMENT MARKING ... 4 OF 277/0/

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TO:

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DATE: 29 MAY 67 INFO: DISTRIBUTION K.T G G6 G7.

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CONFIDENT

JCS 6499 J3 SENDS.

SUBJECT: USS LIBERTY (U)

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DOCID: 3958114 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION .∵ŒIMMI DATE: \$6 JUN 67 FROM: COMSIXTHELT A3 B 201; ADV CPY P21 / TO: USS LIBERTY D32 -P21 or factorise at the contract TI D33 COMSERVLANT INFO: CINCUSNAVIEUR USCINGEUR ADN COMSERVEON EIGHT ADP * CTF SIX FOUR
NKOIO JCS CNO -ADNSG 6 DIRNSA NAVCOMMSTA MOROCCO CINCLANTELT CINCLANT DIRNAVSECERU OTF SIX THREE OTF SIX SEVEN DIRNAVSECTRUEUR ASST. DIRMAVSECGRU NAVCOMMSTA GREECE DIRNAVSEGEQULANT NAVCAXS MOROCCO HQ NSAEUR 🐇 NAVCOMMSTA SPAIN COMFAIRD CONFIDEM TIAL USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL CONTROL A. CINCUSNAVEUR Ø61357Z JUN 67 NOTAL B. JCS 011545Z MUN 67 NOTALB C.SLINCUSNAVEUR 31175 0Z MAY 67 (MOVORD 7-67) NOTAL D. CINCUSNAVEUR Ø11305Z JUN 67 NOTAL E. COMSIXTHELT SPORD 1-66 NOTAL F. CINCUSNAVEURINST P03120.5B NOTAL 1. UPON CHOP TO COMSIXTHELT AT 070001Z, CONDUCT OPERATIONS IAW REF B. C. AND D. 2. IN VIEW PRESENT ARAB/ISRAELI SITUATION AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF UAR ACTIONS. MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF VIGILANCE AGAINST ATTACK OR

THREAT OF ATTACK. REPORT BY FLASH PRECEDENCE ANY

THREATENING OR SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST YOU OR ANY

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ERSION FROM SCHEDULE NECESSITATED BY EXTERNAL THREAT. ADVISE

IF LOCAL SITUATION DICTATES CHANGE IN AREA OF OPS ASSIGNED BY REF B.

3. KEEP COMSIXTHFLT AND CTF 63 INFORMED OF LOGISTIC NEEDS SUFFIC
TENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ENABLE ORDERLY LOGSUP PLANNING. MAIL DELIVERY

WILL BE ARRANGED IF FEASIBLE.

- 4. INCLUDE COMSIXTHELT AS INFO ADDEE ON REPORTS REQUIRED BY PARA
 2 REF B AS MODIFIED BY REF C AND D.
- 5. SUBMIT REPORTS OF CONTACT WITH SHIPS AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES WHICH ARE UNIDENT, HOSTILE, OF INTELL INTEREST OR ENGAGE IN HARASSMENT, IAW REF F. EMERGENCY PLAN CHARLIE NOW IN EFFECT IN
 - O. COMSIXTHFLY OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON ALERTS, EMERG ACTIONS AND NUCLEAR RELEASE WILL NOT BE PROVIDED. THEREFORE, ACTION IS NOT WIRED ON NATIONAL EXERCISE AND DRILL MSGS IDENTIFIED BY FLAG WORD WHITE OR BLUE DELTA. NO ACTION REQUIRED NATO EXERCISE MSGS.

 IN EVENT OF ACTUAL ALERT OR OTHER EMERGENCY, COMSIXTHFLT WILL SEPARATELY DIRECT LIBERTY BY CLASSIFIED MSG.
 - 7. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX CHARLIE REF E.
 - A. COPY KR BROADCAST ADVISE IF CARDS AVAILABLE TO COPY KRA BCST.
 - B. IF PERMENANT TERMINATION REQUIRED WITH MED COMM STA SUBMIT-REQUEST IAW APPENDIX XVI TO ANNEX CHARLIE TO REF E.
 - C. ALTHOUGH NOT ASSIGNED TO IF 60 UTILIZE IF 60 TACTICAL CIRCUITS AS REQUIRED

D. AUTHGRA TO ENTER SIXES ALFA AS REQUIRED.

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USS LIBERTY OPERATIONAL SCHEDULE CHANGE	
REF: A. UR ØY1545Z (NOTAL)	
B. MY 292013Z MAY, ADP/2422 (NOTAL)	
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TIONS IN OP AREA 2 AS DEFINED IN REF ALFA TO SATISFY TECH I	DOULAMENTS.
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MESSAGE

FORM N2288 REV SEP 65 (Supersedee N2288 REV AUG 65 to be used until depleted)

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FLASH

IMMEDIATE

NONE

FROM:

COMSIXTHFLT

DATE: 7 JUNE 67

TO:

JCS

INFO: CNO

CINCUSNAVEUR USCINCEUR CINCUSAFE DIA DIRNSA DIR

HOLTUBIATER

O E O R E T

- A. COMSIXTHFLT Ø7Ø626Z JUN 67
- 1. THIS AMPLIFIES REF A.
- 2. PRIOR TO \$52\$15Z JUN 67 SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT WERE ENGAGED IN NORMAL TRAINING OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF CRETE AND SOUTH OF THE WESTERN END OF CRETE. NO AIR OPERATIONS WERE AUTHORIZED EAST OF LAT 3\$\psi\$E OR WITHIN 1\$\psi\$\$\$ MILES OF THE EGYPTIAN COAST. THESE RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED A MINIMUM APPROACH DISTANCE FOR AIRCRAFT TO THE COASTS OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA OF NO LESS THAN 2\$\psi\$\$\$ MILES AND TO THE COAST OF EGYPT FROM ALEXANDRIA WEST OF NO LESS THAN 1\$\psi\$\$\$ MILES. AT \$\psi\$52\$\$\$15Z JUN 67 THE OPERATING AREA FOR SIXTHFLT UNITS WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE EASTERN MED EXCEPT THAT NO OPERATIONS, EITHER SURFACE OR AIR, WERE PERMITTED WITHIN 1; MILES OF ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT OR WITHIN 25 MILES OF CYPRUS.
- 3. ON 5 MAY BOTH CARRIERS WERE OPERATING IN POSITIONS WHICH WERE IN EXCESS OF 400 MILES FROM ISRAEL OR SINAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS

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NONE NONE

ON AMERICA WERE CONDUCTED FROM Ø915Z UNTIL 1235Z AND ON SARATOGA FROM Ø828Z UNTIL 1313Z. FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES AND WERE ROUTINE IN ALL ASPECTS. ON 6 JUN LIMITED UR OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED DURING THE DAY FOR ROUTINE PURPOSES. NO NIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY EITHER CARRIER. 4. ALL SIXTHELT CVA PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AIR OPERATIONS ON 5 AND 6 JUN HAVE BEEN QUERIED CONCERNING THEIR TRACK LINES. AND ANY VOICE COMMUNICATIONS EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECE VED. AT NO REPEAT NO TIME WERE THE AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS SET FORTH IN PARA 1. ABOVE VIOLATED, I.E., ON 5 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL OR SINAL COASTLINE CLOSER THAN 240 MILES AND ON 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT CVA AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE ISRAEL, SYRIA OR EGYPT COASTLINES CLOSER THAN 100 MILES. TRACKS FLOWN WERE ACTUALLY FARTHER FROM ISRAEL/SYRIA/EGYPT THAN THE ABOVE LIMITING FIGURES. DURING THESE FLIGHTS NO REPEAT NO SIXTHFLT PILOT EITHER TRANSMITTED OR RECEIVED ANY RADIO TRANSMISSIONS FROM STATIONS EITHER IN OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE MIDEAST. ENGAGED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR IND RECTLY BY RELAY. IN SHORT, ON 5 AND 6 JUN NO SIXTHFLT AIRCRAFT OVERFLEW ISRAEL, SYRIA, OR EGYPT AND NO COMMUNICATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED BY SIXTHFLT PILOTS WITH ANY RADIO STATIONS CONTROLLED OF UTILIZED

5. NO FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 7 JUN FOR EITHER

BY ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES.

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DOCID: 3958111 FORM N2288 REV SEP 65 (Supercedes N2288 REV AUG 65 to be used until depleted) ACTION PRECEDENCE INFO PRECEDENCE SPECIAL HANDLING FLASH IMMEDIATE NONE DISTRIBUTION SARATOGA OR AMERICA. THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN PARA ABOVE CONTINUE IN EFFECT. L23 NOTE: THIS MSG HANDLED BY P21; MAT RUN OFF FOR D1.

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(unclassified until filled) MATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

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WARNING

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