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**General  
Hansford T. Johnson**



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## PREFACE

On 4 June 1992, General Johnson called us into his office to initiate planning for his oral history. His guidelines were straightforward. He wanted us to work together to produce a single oral history, not separate ones for his unified and Air Force commands. He limited the time frame to his past three years at Scott Air Force Base. He asked that we conduct the interviews over several sessions. And he wanted to begin soon.

The interviews took place on 15, 24, and 31 July in the small Command Conference Room at United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) headquarters. Each session lasted approximately two hours. The first focused on operations, the second on organizational matters, and the third covered miscellaneous topics. A month before the interviews began, we submitted about one hundred questions as starting points for our discussions.

General Johnson's oral history, we believe, is honest, candid, and heartfelt. Always illuminating, it is often provocative. Although he told us that he had always been skeptical about the value of "personal history," General Johnson realized that he was, in his words, "blessed to come here at a momentous time in our nation's and our world's history," and he appreciated that he was in a unique position to discuss for the record the activities of his two commands during these historic times. This oral history will likely inspire government and business policy and decision makers, guide defense transportation operators and planners, and furnish academic and government historians with primary research materials for years to come.

Three of our assistants deserve special thanks for their help on this project. Ms. Kathy Wilcoxson, the editorial assistant in the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Office of History, and Mr. Kevin Safford, the USTRANSCOM History Office's summer hire, transcribed the interview tapes in record time. Ms. Cora Holt, also from the USTRANSCOM History Office, edited the manuscript, compiled the glossary, and prepared the final copy for printing. We greatly appreciate their dedication and professionalism. Finally, our thanks to graphic artist Airman Mark Waldon, from Headquarters AMC's Command Presentations, for designing the history's cover, front and back.

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## BIOGRAPHY

### GENERAL HANSFORD T. JOHNSON

General Johnson was born 3 January 1936 in Aiken, South Carolina, where he graduated from high school in 1953. He then attended Clemson College. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1959 as the outstanding graduate in thermodynamics and aerodynamics. The general received a master's degree in aeronautics from Stanford University in 1967 and a master's degree in business from the University of Colorado in 1970. He completed Squadron Officer School in 1965, Army Command and General Staff College in 1972, National War college in 1976, and the advanced management program at Dartmouth College in 1980.

He earned his navigator wings while a cadet at the Academy. Upon graduation, he attended flying training at Bartow Air Base, Florida, and then Laredo Air Force Base, Texas, receiving his pilot wings in July 1960. His first operational assignment was to the 317th Troop Carrier Wing, Evreux-Fauville Air Base, France, where he flew C-130 transports throughout Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and West Asia. He continued flying with the 317th when the wing transferred to Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio.

After completing graduate school at Stanford University, General Johnson volunteered for duty in the Republic of Vietnam. In 1967 he flew as a forward air controller in support of the Republic of Vietnam army and United States Marine Corps forces in the northern province and the demilitarized zone. He directed tactical close air support strike missions against enemy supply, storage, vehicle, and troop targets. During the latter half of the year, he operated out of Pleiku Air Base along the Ho Chi Minh trail at night. During his tour of duty, he flew 423 combat missions, 71 of which were over North Vietnam and the demilitarized zone.

From May 1968 to July 1971 General Johnson was an instructor and assistant professor of aeronautics at the Air Force Academy. After graduating from Army Command and General Staff College, he served three years in the Plans Directorate, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, DC. During his first year he was in charge of developing the tactical airlift force structure. He later became the leader of the team that developed and evaluated the Air Force inputs to military strategy.

The general graduated from National War College in June 1976 and then was assigned to the 93d Bombardment Wing, Castle Air Force Base, California, as Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations. He also performed duties as the Assistant Deputy Commander for Maintenance, Deputy Commander for Operations, and Vice Commander. He served as Commander of the 22d Bombardment Wing at March Air Force Base, California, from April 1979 until February 1981. General Johnson was then assigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans.

In November 1982 the general returned to Air Force headquarters as Deputy Director of Programs and Evaluation, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Resources, and served as Chairman of the Program Review Committee. General Johnson served as the Director of Programs and Evaluation, and Chairman of the Air Staff Board, from July 1984 to October 1985, when he became Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at Strategic Air Command headquarters. In December 1986 he was assigned as Vice Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. In August 1987 General Johnson became Deputy Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, during Operation Earnest Will, the United States tanker reflagging operation in the Persian Gulf. In November 1988 he became Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, DC. General Johnson assumed his duties as Commander in Chief of the United States Transportation Command and the Military Airlift Command on 22 September 1989. He

was promoted to general effective 1 October 1989, with the same date of rank. On 1 June 1992, General Johnson became the first Commander in Chief of the Air Mobility Command upon the Military Airlift Command's inactivation, while remaining Commander in Chief of the United States Transportation Command. He relinquished command of both organizations to his successor, General Ronald R. Fogleman, on 25 August 1992 and retired from active duty effective 1 September 1992.

General Johnson is a command pilot with more than 7,200 flying hours, more than 1,000 of which were flown under combat conditions. He has also qualified as a navigator and a parachutist. He is a registered professional engineer in the state of Colorado. His military decorations and awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Service Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Silver Star, Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with 22 oak leaf clusters, Presidential Unit Citation, Navy-Marine Corps Presidential Unit Citation, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with "V" device and three oak leaf clusters, Air Force Organizational Excellence Award, Combat Readiness Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with service star, Vietnam Service Medal with three service stars, Humanitarian Service Medal, Air Force Overseas Ribbon-Short, Air Force Overseas Ribbon-Long with oak leaf cluster, Air Force Longevity Service Award Ribbon with seven oak leaf clusters, Air Force Training Ribbon, Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Honor Medal First Class with service star, and the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal.

General Johnson is married to the former Linda Ann Whittle of Augusta, Georgia. They have three children: Richard, Mrs. Elizabeth Trojan, and David.

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## INTRODUCTION

General Hansford T. Johnson assumed command of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) on 22 September 1989, one day after Hurricane Hugo, the tenth most destructive in US history, slammed ashore near Charleston, South Carolina. He relinquished command to his successor, General Ronald R. Fogleman, on 25 August 1992, one day after Hurricane Andrew, even more destructive than Hugo, ravaged south Florida and headed for a second landfall in Louisiana. The thirty-five months between these two natural disasters encompassed one of the most historic periods in the history of the United States and the world and brought unprecedented challenges for the United States Transportation Command and its component commands.

Within hours of taking command in September 1989, General Johnson began directing the movement of relief supplies to the victims of Hurricane Hugo in the islands of the Caribbean and in South Carolina. Shortly thereafter, USTRANSCOM and MAC undertook relief efforts in response to the northern California earthquake of 17 October 1989 and forest fires that raged throughout the western states. These were but the first of many humanitarian operations the commands would engage in during General Johnson's tenure.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, heralding the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, was soon overshadowed by events in Central America. In December 1989, when American lives and interests were threatened by the regime of Manuel Noriega in Panama, USTRANSCOM and MAC became key participants in Operation Just Cause. In total, the commands transported nearly 40,000 troops and more than 20,000 tons of cargo to Panama during the contingency. In the early hours of the operation, the airlift forces overcame severe weather--including freezing rain, snow, and fog--and successfully conducted the largest nighttime combat airdrop since the D-Day invasion of World War II. Remarkably, there were less than one percent casualties on drop zones that were under fire.

Following Operation Just Cause, USTRANSCOM continued its activities in support of ending Cold War tensions. General Johnson played a critical leadership role in Operation Steel Box, the transfer of chemical munitions from the Federal Republic of Germany to Johnston Atoll in the Pacific for destruction. The sealift phase of Steel Box, executed flawlessly under intense public scrutiny, represented USTRANSCOM's first operation as a supported command.

Operation Steel Box was still in progress when Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait on 2 August 1990, prompting President George Bush to order an immense deployment to the Arabian peninsula. From 7 August 1990, the day Operation Desert Shield began, to 10 March 1991, when the redeployment officially started following Operation Desert Storm, the combat phase of the operation, USTRANSCOM and its component commands--the Air Force's Military Airlift Command, the Army's Military Traffic Management Command, and the Navy's Military Sealift Command--moved to the Persian Gulf region nearly 504,000 passengers, 3.7 million tons of dry cargo, and 6.1 million tons of petroleum products. This equated roughly to the deployment and sustainment of two Army corps, two Marine Corps expeditionary forces, and twenty-eight Air Force tactical fighter squadrons.

The deployment's scale and pace invites historical comparison. During the first three weeks of Desert Shield, USTRANSCOM moved more passengers and equipment to the Persian Gulf than the United States transported to Korea during the first three months of the Korean War. By the sixth week, the total ton-miles flown surpassed that of the 65-week-long Berlin Airlift. For the first time ever, the command activated the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the Fast Sealift Ship force, and the Ready Reserve Force for wartime operations. In comparative terms, USTRANSCOM moved, via air and sea, the rough equivalent of the population of Atlanta, Georgia, along with their clothing, food, vehicles, and other belongings, a third of the way around the world in just under seven months. General H. Norman



Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, called the task "daunting" and the result "spectacular." Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney termed the deployment a "logistical marvel," while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, told Congress it had proven USTRANSCOM's worth. He called Desert Shield/Desert Storm the command's "graduation exercise," and as far as he, Secretary Cheney, and President Bush were concerned, USTRANSCOM had "graduated magna cum laude." The redeployment of this force, its equipment, and its supply stocks was an equally prodigious, if less hurried, task that was completed on 12 May 1992 when the *Leslie Lykes* docked in New Jersey.

Following Desert Shield/Desert Storm, General Johnson orchestrated the transportation for numerous humanitarian efforts of historical importance and significance. These included Operation Provide Comfort, the provision of food, clothing, and shelter to Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq and Southern Turkey; Operation Sea Angel, the delivery of relief supplies and equipment to typhoon victims in Bangladesh; Operation GTMO, logistical support for Haitian refugees encamped at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba; Operation Fiery Vigil, the evacuation of US citizens from the Philippines following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo (the largest peacetime evacuation of Americans in history); Operation Provide Hope, the airlift of food and medical supplies to the former Soviet republics; Operation Provide Promise, the airlift of humanitarian aid to besieged Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Provide Transition, airlift transportation for the demobilization of civil war combatants in Angola; and Provide Relief, the airlift of food and medicine into drought stricken and war-torn Somalia. And even as General Johnson prepared for his change of command and retirement ceremony on 25 August 1992, USTRANSCOM forces were gearing up to assist in the relief efforts following Hurricane Andrew.

In addition to leading USTRANSCOM and the component commands in the accomplishment of these operations, General Johnson played a seminal role in shaping the future of military transportation. As the Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command, he participated in the largest reorganization of the Air Force since its creation as a separate service in 1947. On 1 June 1992 the Military Airlift Command was inactivated, and the Air Mobility Command, integrating the nation's air refueling and airlift forces into a single organization, was activated under this command. General Johnson's leadership was also critical to the development of the Department of Defense's Mobility Requirements Study, the blueprint for the nation's future strategic transportation force structure. In addition, he was a successful advocate for increased intermodalism in the Department of Defense. For example, designating 1992 the "Year of the Container," General Johnson expanded the use of containers for the transport of unit equipment and ammunition during exercises so that the services would be better prepared to use containers during war. Likewise, he won Joint Staff support for expanded use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System during exercises, further increasing readiness.

General Johnson continued to give impetus to the fielding of computerized command and control systems in MAC and USTRANSCOM, including development of the Global Transportation Network, a single automated data processing system to provide intransit visibility for cargo and passengers and facilitate timely and accurate financial management of transportation operations. His advocacy of reserve augmentation culminated in Joint Staff approval and implementation of the first joint reserve unit, USTRANSCOM's Joint Transportation Reserve Unit. General Johnson made the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve full partners in MAC, and in yet another Total Force initiative, he obtained Department of Defense support for the establishment of a Ready Mobility Force to "prime" the Defense Transportation System prior to a 200,000-person Presidential call-up. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the future of the Defense Transportation System, General Johnson's leadership resulted in the Secretary of Defense chartering USTRANSCOM with a peacetime, as well as wartime, mission. The command's new charter empowered the Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, as the nation's single manager of defense transportation resources.

**GENERAL HANSFORD T. JOHNSON**  
**COMMANDER IN CHIEF**  
**UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**  
**and**  
**AIR MOBILITY COMMAND:**  
**AN ORAL HISTORY**

Dr. Matthews: About three months after you arrived, you had your first major contingency to face, Operation Just Cause. Curiously, my responsibility as your [US]TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] historian was to record why TRANSCOM appeared to some to be on the sidelines during that operation. Was this true? And, I wonder if you would explain to us how the decision not to use JOPES [Joint Operation Planning and Execution System] transpired. Was there a meeting where you and the CINCs [commanders in chief] of the other unified commands discussed TRANSCOM's possible role in Just Cause?

General Johnson: To answer the end of the question first, I don't recall sitting in a meeting with other CINCs talking about TRANSCOM's role. In fact, TRANSCOM's role was not questioned by anyone except, perhaps, some in our components. TRANSCOM did play a role. Just Cause was an odd operation in that it began as a "special access required" [SAR] program and remained so almost up until execution. Certainly the CINC and DCINC [Deputy Commander in Chief] of TRANSCOM and TCJ3/J4 [USTRANSCOM Operations and Logistics Directorate] were involved. JOPES at that time could not be used for special access required kinds of planning. So, it wasn't used. And, quite frankly, the TRANSCOM staff was not as mature as it is today. But TRANSCOM did not sit on the sideline. The first call came to me in my role as commander in chief of TRANSCOM. The TRANSCOM Crisis Action Team was not greatly involved because we were not mature enough yet. It was a fast-moving operation. The primary limitation was the special access required. If that kind of operation happened today, TRANSCOM would be much, much more involved, but, at the time, the staff did not have the special access required-type clearances.



Dr. Smith: What special challenges did Just Cause pose for the MAC [Military Airlift Command] staff and airlift operations?

General Johnson: Well, on the airlift side, unfortunately, Just Cause was treated like all our other support to the special operations community. Over time, MAC had developed a very close relationship with special ops. MAC had a large amount of coordinating to do. At the same time, because of the security classification, MAC SAR staff was not allowed to talk to a lot of people. I recall calling the various airlift wings and telling them to bring crews in, but, yet, I couldn't talk about what we were doing. So, the MAC staff at the time, and to this day, is very well configured to handle special access-type missions.

Dr. Smith: What did Just Cause tell us about command and control? Did we have problems?

General Johnson: Just Cause, as almost everything else, tells us that it's very important to use proper procedures. In those days, the relationship between MAC and the special ops community was very cozy. A lot of things would be done informally at the working level. I think Just Cause showed us that, regardless of the size of an operation, we have to use proper procedures. I recall working in the [United States] Central Command with General Crist [George C., GEN, USMC, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command], and we became experts at joint planning procedures, writing the warning orders, the operations orders, and so forth. We didn't do that very well in Just Cause.

Dr. Matthews: General Johnson, what did we learn from Just Cause that proved useful during Operation Desert Shield?

General Johnson: In Just Cause we learned that we have to spin-up very quickly. We have to expect the unexpected. We certainly need strong leadership at both the onload and en route locations, although in Just Cause the en route and final destination were usually the same.

As you recall in Just Cause, our biggest challenge was the weather. Through a herculean effort by many, many different people, we had the aircraft, the loads, the crews, and everything set. But then we had an ice storm which prevented us from taking off on time at Pope Air Force Base [North Carolina] and Fort Bragg [North Carolina]. We had the worst snow storm in ten years at Charleston Air Force Base [South Carolina]. And at Travis Air Force Base [California], where we were bringing out the troops from Fort Ord [California], airplanes literally had to be towed to the departure end of the runway and pointed down the runway for take off because the visibility was so poor. So, the biggest challenge in Just Cause, in the end, was weather. Of course, the planning and coordination were great hurdles along the way.

As we look at Desert Shield, the same things came up again. And, as always, we didn't totally learn the need to put senior leadership at the onload and en route locations. We also didn't learn that weather could be a big factor. In December of 1990, weather became the limiting factor primarily for the ships. We who wear the light blue uniforms always think that weather affects aircraft most. We found out it affects ships even more. In the northern European ports and the North Sea, ships literally couldn't get to docks, couldn't load, and couldn't depart. Unfortunately, we had planned on perfect weather. We as in a large "we." Our country. And the weather ended up being a controlling factor.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything else you'd like to put on the record about Just Cause before we move on into the thrust of our conversation today, Desert Shield/Desert Storm?

General Johnson: I believe that Just Cause was a turning point in America's participation in conflicts. Once our nation decides to intervene, we intervene very quickly like a raging thunderstorm, as some have said, with an overwhelming force. We do the job, and we withdraw almost equally as quickly. We've seen that in Just Cause, and I think we'll see that again in the future. Now that's not just a self-serving observation, but it certainly supports the need for the United States Transportation Command, which enables an overwhelming force to arrive like a raging thunderstorm, do the job, and come home again.

Dr. Matthews: Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and the first MAC airplane landed in Saudi Arabia on 8 August. When in this week, or even prior to this week, did USTRANSCOM and MAC begin to be involved in the planning for the deployment?

General Johnson: My memory is a little bit clouded, but even before Iraq invaded Kuwait, we had some false starts. I think it was the Saturday before the invasion that we were turned on and then off again by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We formed a crisis cell on 2 August [1990] in United States Transportation Command. MAC brought one up about the same time. USTRANSCOM worked on plans for 48 hours, and then a CAT [Crisis Action Team] was formed. MAC activated its CAT briefly and then shut it down again while Transportation Command, as I recall, kept its CAT up. United States Transportation Command initially underestimated the scope of the effort. We were not alone in that; everyone underestimated the scope. Certainly, the massive size of the deployment and the nature of the facilities available in the Persian Gulf region were not fully appreciated. Only a draft operations plan was available, and, as has been well reported, we and the Central Command had not yet evaluated its transportation feasibility. That certainly was a problem. We did not have time-phased force deployment data. We also knew we would have a full demand for our airlift, but we would have to continue supporting our users around the world. Finally, we knew we'd need a large sealift requirement, but we didn't fully appreciate the size.



Dr. Smith: Was TRANSCOM consulted before the decision to deploy troops was made or only after the President made his decision?

General Johnson: I was called by the Chairman [Colin L. Powell, GEN, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff], as I had been in Just Cause, and, in essence, I confirmed that we could handle the task. The task was defined in general terms, of course, but, yes, General Colin Powell and I talked before the final decision was made, certainly before it was announced to us.

Dr. Smith: What were the biggest problems or your greatest concerns during those first couple of weeks of Desert Shield?

General Johnson: In our business the biggest problem or biggest challenge always is to ensure that we meet the customer's requirements, his needs--in this case, within [US]CINCCENT's [Commander in Chief, United States Central Command's] priorities. We early on established that CINCCENT had to give us the transportation priorities. The TPFDD [Time Phased Force Deployment Data] by itself was not definitive enough to provide them. The second area we, perhaps, didn't appreciate enough was the en route support. And the third area would be the coordination of loading and the calling forward of the loads for the ships.

Initially, airlift was a top priority. We had to go from our normal peacetime flow to a maximum effort very, very quickly. It took a few hours to get up to maximum wartime efficiency. We never got more than about two-thirds of our effort focused on Desert Shield. In other words, a third or a little less, perhaps, of our effort was still going into carrying out the day-to-day missions around the world, the high-priority missions that had to go. As good Americans, we always focus on pushing things forward. We measured our success by the departure of troops and materiel and not always by the arrival on the other end. Now, as we were doing this, we certainly were working the priority system with [US]CENTCOM [United States Central Command], as I mentioned earlier, to properly apportion the available military and

civilian lift. At the same time, we had some problems with JOPES, but we'll talk about that separately. Initially, customer discipline was shaky. Everybody wanted to move forward very, very quickly. However, CENTCOM took our advice, got control over its components, and somewhat restrained their impatience to break ranks and hurry to war by setting priorities. At the same time, we were breaking out ships, moving them to the proper ports, and, again, trying to get the discipline to get the right loads on the right ships.

Dr. Matthews: You mentioned that you didn't quite appreciate the en route support in the early stages. Of course, Germany and Spain, in particular, gave us tremendous en route support for airlift, as did Portugal in the Azores for tankers and airlift. Was there something more that our allies could have provided us in regard to that issue?

General Johnson: I wasn't talking about the support from our allies. Frankly, we had a difficult time getting support from some USAFE [United States Air Forces Europe] bases. We had good support from Rhein-Main [Air Base, Germany], but Torrejon [Air Base, Spain] was reluctant to give us additional space on their parking ramp. The Spanish commander moved his forces before the US commander moved his to give us more space. In fact, the US commander only responded after we went to USAFE and demanded space. So, the governments never, ever, to my knowledge, delayed us with diplomatic clearances or support. What I was referring to was **our** en route support.

One humorous, but serious, anecdote also concerns Torrejon. MAC knew how to do stages, but, yet, we hadn't done much staging recently. We put all of our crews--we sent them over very quickly--to bed in an open-bay recreation center. When the first crew was to be alerted, everybody had to be wakened because we had failed to use the age-old procedure of putting a number on each bed to identify where each person was sleeping. After the first wake-up, you can rest assured we took care of that problem.



So, it was our inadequacies that I was talking about, not the host nations'. I'm not sure we'll talk about that elsewhere, but host nations provided us tremendous support. President George Bush and Ambassador Tom Pickering [Thomas P., United States Mission Ambassador to the United Nations, New York], whom I believe is an unsung hero, did a phenomenal job of uniting almost all the nations of the world in our effort. We never asked for a diplomatic clearance, we never asked for anything from a country that wasn't given. Sometimes we didn't get exactly what we wanted, but more often than not that was because we or they found a better alternative. The various nations supported us extremely well.

Dr. Matthews: Including the former Eastern Bloc nations? They authorized overflights?

General Johnson: Yes. Getting ahead of our story a little bit, early on we asked for permission to fly over Austria. Having been a young lieutenant in France flying around Central Europe, I always wanted to fly over Austria, where airspace was closed to military flights. Bringing that experience with me and thinking that the flying time to the Persian Gulf would be greatly reduced if we could fly over Austria, we asked for overflight permission. Initially, we got it on a case-by-case basis; later, we received a blanket clearance. In the end, it only cut our flying time by 15 minutes, but it was a great example of cooperation. On New Year's eve at the end of 1990, I was going to Saudi Arabia, and I knew we had been planning to fly over the Eastern Bloc countries. As we flew in a C-5 from Dover [Air Force Base, Delaware] to Rhein-Main and on in to Saudi, we flew over the former East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, the first time a US military plane, certainly one going to Saudi, had taken that route. It became routine thereafter. We also, as you well know, moved many supplies and pieces of equipment from the Eastern Bloc.

Dr. Matthews: Please elaborate on the problems encountered by airlifters at USAFE bases.

General Johnson: I would be very critical of the support we received from the Air Force. My biggest criticism is for Torrejon Air Base. Our crews were treated more as a profit potential for the base's MWR [Morale, Welfare, and Recreation] office than as members of the Air Force team. I know because I visited there. The base had closed the Officers' Club and stopped selling beer in the billeting office. They then opened a beer sales shop with jacked-up prices. They provided few opportunities for our people to eat. They put them three to a room to get higher rates for their rooms, while Air Force members from other commands stayed one to a room. We were treated worse than any foreign country would treat us. We were treated better at Utapao in Thailand than we were by the base at Torrejon, initially. We eventually got that squared away.

Dr. Matthews: How?

General Johnson: I visited Torrejon, and I was treated very, very shabbily. I called my classmate and friend, General Bob Oaks [Robert C., Gen, USAF, Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces Europe]--they found him on vacation in Monaco--and went down the long list of things that needed fixing, and the support got better very quickly.

Dr. Matthews: Were there similar problems in the AOR [area of responsibility]?

General Johnson: We also had MAC people who went into Dhahran [Saudi Arabia] who were not given access to quarters. They were not allowed to eat in the TAC [Tactical Air Command] dining hall. One MAC unit had to go to the 82d Airborne to find quarters. So, I was very disappointed about how the Air Force treated us.

Dr. Matthews: What did you do about it?

General Johnson: I didn't know about all of the problems until it was too late to do anything about them. But, eventually, being typical Americans, our troops went out and fended for themselves and solved their problems. But when people tell me "Trust us," I say, "Let me tell you how we have trusted you in the past and what you've done." And they become very defensive and run.

Dr. Smith: You touched on this a little bit already, but as the Desert Shield airlift expanded very quickly to enormous proportions, were there some other things in the first few days that happened that you didn't expect?

General Johnson: I guess we expected the sort of things to happen that happened, but it was a little disconcerting that everybody wanted to rush off to the war. Everybody said they had a very high priority. The second week, I think on the 15th of August [1990], I went to a CINCs' conference in Washington [DC] and said, "We must be doing about right because the Army is convinced that we're tilting in favor of the Air Force in the early moves, and the Air Force is about to disinherit me." We followed very, very carefully General Schwarzkopf's [H. Norman, GEN, USA, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command] priorities, and everybody understood that. Several times during the conflict, people would question what we were doing. Each time we would go to CENTCOM and say, "Reaffirm your priorities." And as soon as that was done, there was no more discussion. As I mentioned earlier, airlift was an early problem because we were focused on pushing. We weren't as efficient at turning the aircraft at the en route stations. Looking back, I wish I'd placed more emphasis there. We also didn't manage the offload points very well. Later, we started managing the airlift from the offload end as opposed to the onload. We would still onload everything that was scheduled to move, but we would hold the loads at an en route location if necessary so that they would arrive in an orderly fashion at the offload destination. Consequently, the throughput was greatly increased.



Dr. Matthews: I'd like to ask you a question on sealift now, sir. Desert Shield/Desert Storm represented the first major activation of the Ready Reserve Force. Would you relate to us your thought processes for activation of the RRF [Ready Reserve Force] and the role that your DCINC, Admiral Butcher [Paul D., VADM, USN], also former commander of MSC [Military Sealift Command], played in that decision?

General Johnson: The initial sealift estimates were staggering--over 300 shiploads. The final result was even higher. In the end, we moved 459 shiploads plus 37,000 containers, as I recall. It was very difficult to manage because no one really believed the TPFDD initially. And in the end, it proved not to be totally accurate. The timelines were vertical. The ships were dispersed. With airlift, the aircraft were readily available, but you have to break out ships, which can cost upwards of \$2 million. We had not broken out ships before except in exercises, and it wasn't very clear exactly how we should go about it. Our role in United States Transportation Command was somewhat ambiguous because the Secretary of the Navy was the single manager for sealift. And the Secretary of the Navy [H. Lawrence Garrett III] was the one who directed the breakout. The TRANSCOM staff made a recommendation early on to break out everything at once. In the end, we wisely chose to break them out in stages. The first stage, as I recall, was all the roll on/roll off ships, 18 of them. We did that in a very orderly fashion.

Looking back, we certainly could have broken out the RRF a little quicker. The decision was made on a Friday afternoon at four o'clock, as I recall, and we wanted them out in five days. The union halls had closed. They were reopened. The unions are unsung heroes. They met every demand that we placed on them. Only one ship, to my knowledge, ever left the breakout port undermanned. It was short one person, whom they picked up at the onload point. The breakout went about as we had expected. We had known that we could not possibly break out ships as fast as our plans called for. We were disappointed in the rate we got; about a third were ready within their readiness status guidelines. Once they were broken out, however, these RRF ships operated at an in-commission level as high as the US Navy ships. They

operated very, very well. Certainly, there were limits. They were old ships. They were in a poor state of readiness. Many of the key crewmembers came on cold to break out an old ship, which is very, very difficult to do.

As far as the roles that various people played, certainly Admiral Butcher had a lot of experience which was very useful to us. He also brought with him his experience from MSC. Some of the thinking about how we would go about breaking out ships that was current at the time is now out of date. Now we could do it much, much more quickly. I'm sure Admiral Butcher would agree, but back then we were operating under guidelines and experiences which were not very good. The RRF served us very well. We broke out and used 72 ships for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. We didn't break out all of them because we didn't need all the break bulk capability. We did rely a great deal on foreign shipping, and I believe that that will be true in the future as long as we have a Tom Pickering and a President Bush that can gain that international support.

Dr. Matthews: Have we rectified that initial ambiguity about USTRANSCOM's role in the RRF?

General Johnson: Yes. Under new guidance, TRANSCOM is responsible for the decision to break out the RRF. I think you also asked about the SRP [Sealift Readiness Program]. That program was not used for several reasons. We have the right to call 50 percent of the ships that are enrolled in the SRP, which is primarily all US-registered ships. Ships that receive operating subsidies, or construction subsidies, or that are just engaged in US trade, are enrolled in the SRP. The ships we really wanted from the US flag fleet were the roll on/roll off ships. There were a small number of those. We already had one short of 50 percent, and we eventually got another one. So, in essence, we gained the roll-on/roll-off SRP ships. We didn't want to call up the container ships for several reasons. We'll talk about containers later, but they were not the right kind of ship for moving unit equipment early on. Looking back and looking into the future, we might containerize more equipment.



We're working very, very hard in that direction. But, in essence, we got the ships that we would've gotten if we had called the SRP, without actually doing so. It would have made a strong political statement to call the SRP. But in the end, we decided not to do that.

Dr. Matthews: Perhaps you can explain to me the background to breaking out the West Coast RO/ROs [roll-on/roll-off] out of Suisun Bay fleet and then having them go around to the Gulf [of Mexico] for loads. Why didn't we transport some of the Army unit cargo to the West Coast and load them there? Some of those West Coast ships didn't actually get underway until a month after they were broken out.

General Johnson: We certainly tried in all cases to do the most efficient move. As you mentioned, it took a long time for those ships to get underway. But if we had transported the early loads to the West Coast, their arrival in the theater of operations would have been delayed. Most of the units were in the central and the eastern United States. By moving them to the Gulf of Mexico and eastern ports, we certainly got the equipment to the Persian Gulf much quicker. I believe we made the right decision. In other words, we gave priority to the troops and equipment that were available to load. If we had done as you suggested, taken them to the West Coast, the troops that were ready to move would have arrived much later. So, proper sequencing dictated we ship them from the East Coast. If the world were perfect, we, perhaps, would do all of our shipping out of Jacksonville [Florida] or some such East Coast port because we could move things overland so much quicker. Because that isn't feasible, it made sense to use Houston [Texas] and Beaumont [Texas] because of the port facilities and the closeness to the units moving. Plus, we didn't want to saturate Jacksonville totally. Jacksonville, however, was by far the largest port of embarkation.

Dr. Matthews: You mentioned a bit about [Admiral] Butcher's role in the deployment. Would you also comment on the special strengths of each of your USTRANSCOM advisors like General Kross [Walter, Maj Gen, USAF, Director, Operations and Logistics Directorate (TCJ3/J4)], General Stanford [John H., MG, USA, Director, Plans and Resources Directorate (TCJ5)], General Landry [Jerome A., Brig Gen, USAF, Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate (TCJ6)], General Piatak [John R., MG, USA, Commander, Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)], and also Admiral Donovan [Francis R., VADM, USN, Commander, Military Sealift Command (MSC)] at MSC. What did each of them contribute to the crisis planning and management?

General Johnson: I don't think it's useful to talk about specific personalities. I will say, overall, that all of the deputies, and the CINC and DCINC, were generally unprepared, as was everyone else. No exercise could ever train us for an operation of this size at the executive level. Overall, we required the tremendous talents of all the people to do the job. Initially, Admiral Donovan and General Piatak worked their commands more along the lines that they had worked in peacetime. They were notionally part of TRANSCOM, but it took awhile to make the transition to integration. They served our customers and, in turn, us very, very well.

As far as our staff is concerned, certainly Admiral Butcher's advice and counsel was very, very important to me as the CINC. He portrayed the sealift perspective very, very well. His counsel was highly valued; he played a large role. The three people who really ran the CAT--and we decided to have a general or a flag officer on duty all the time--were General Kross, General Stanford, and General Landry. General Kross had been here only three or four months. Stanford had been at MTMC and understood transportation from the ground standpoint; of course, Admiral Butcher brought the sealift perspective, and General Kross, the airlift. So, I was well served by all of them. A person that requires special note is Jerry Landry. He was our communicator, our J6. But yet, almost from the first day, he acted like an operator and learned

about everything we do. I was as comfortable with him on duty as I was with the others. Another person who later on played a bigger role was Rear Admiral Marty Leukhardt [Martin W., RADM, USN, Mobilization Assistant to the USTRANSCOM Deputy Commander in Chief]. He was our reserve mobilization assistant. He spent many weekends and weekdays here, and every time he was here, he pulled a full load. In case we don't talk about it elsewhere, I must say that forty to sometimes fifty percent of the people working in the TRANSCOM CAT were reservists. Before the conflict, we had a Navy reserve unit [Naval Reserve USTRANSCOM Detachment 118] which had come up from Tampa [Florida] and was stationed in St. Louis [Missouri]. They were kind of the nucleus because they were already formed as a unit. We then had individual mobilization augmentees from all the services. We, in essence, put all those together into a Joint Transportation Reserve Unit. Subsequently, after the conflict, we have the only joint reserve unit in our nation serving at our headquarters. They served very, very well and continue to serve our headquarters with distinction.

Dr. Matthews: Sir, were there other individuals of special note that helped facilitate the deployment? In the "J" staff? At the supported command, CENTCOM? Perhaps at the DOT [Department of Transportation]? You mentioned Ambassador Pickering. Is there anyone else who comes to mind in particular who was a tremendous help to you?

General Johnson: I can't say enough about the Department of Transportation. The Secretary of Transportation [Samuel K. Skinner] was as concerned about everything we did and as supportive as the Secretary of Defense [Richard B. Cheney], which was tremendous. Secretary Skinner came out to USTRANSCOM several times, and any time we asked for anything from him, it was given very, very quickly. He had to make some hard decisions. As far as the State Department is concerned, we got the diplomatic clearances we needed, and that was never a problem. They leaned forward and helped us. General Powell was also particularly supportive.



Early in the conflict, we found that many people could and did find fault. It was always easy to blame someone else. I must admit that in my professional career that's a trait that I find least admirable in people. But it was suggested by my good friend, General Carns [Michael P. C., Lt Gen, USAF, Director, The Joint Staff], who was director of the Joint Staff, that I send a daily "personal for" message to General Powell. Paul Butcher and I would collaborate along with the other CAT members. The messages provided a little update, never pointing fingers, showing General Powell where we were and what pitfalls lay ahead. And we'd send them almost every evening. The next morning, the Chairman would get them and take action. He never, ever acknowledged getting them until much, much later. Once I sent one, that had to be in November 1990, that had to do with moving troops and equipment from Europe to the Persian Gulf. I talked about the great challenges and about the fact that we were all waiting until the end to start moving. You recall that we had a 15 January [1991] closure date, and everybody backed off from there. Looking back, we would have been better off to have had a phased closure date, with some people closing earlier. But I also went so far as to say in that message that US forces in Europe were not as prepared to move as our continental forces. What I was saying, and what General Powell understood, was that [United States] European Command had been in the mode of receiving reinforcements as opposed to developing a mobility role for themselves. That caused some consternation. It was passed to the Army and on to General Saint [Crosbie E., GEN, USA, Commander, Central Army Group NATO and Commander in Chief, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army] in Europe, who took personal exception to my comments. Despite that one incident, our "personal for" messages were a very good way to keep General Powell informed, but yet not waste a lot of his time with conversations. We talked on the telephone when we needed to talk, but we communicated very, very quickly. General Powell and I can cover hours' worth of work in a three-minute phone call. So, certainly he was very supportive.

On the Joint Staff, the J4 [Logistics Directorate] was quite supportive. The J3 [Operations Directorate] did not show as much interest. In fact, they were more often in the critical role as opposed to the supporting role.

Dr. Smith: Would you care to comment on the decision to change MAC DOs [Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations] in the early days of Desert Shield?

General Johnson: On the MAC side, everything was considered business as usual when Desert Shield began. We had been in many, many, many large operations, but yet Desert Shield wasn't a business as usual operation. This was bigger than anyone in MAC had ever experienced. And because they had the feeling that it was just a notch higher than previous operations, MAC didn't do some of the difficult planning that we did in TRANSCOM. I suspect the other two components had the same problem. MAC did not always lean forward as much as they should have.

Getting away from the story a little bit, MAC leaned forward in the end so much so that they almost got into trouble with the Antideficiency Act. We were spending money that we didn't have because we would perform a mission and collect later. On the sealift side, MSC was much more insistent that we have a fund cite before we did an operation. Now, I believe that MAC was correct; we were in a crisis. We had never fought a war before where we had to use industrial funds, but yet we found that we could do that by knowing who the customer was and billing them. But we didn't demand payment before moving.

I needed a lot of help in MAC in working the details. We had a new DO at the time, and, quite frankly, he didn't have the experience, nor, in my view, the ability to cope with the demands. Our users were experiencing difficulties, and I was having difficulty getting the MAC CAT to lean forward and make things happen in a much more timely fashion. I certainly don't back away from difficult decisions, but I must admit that the decision to change DOs was very difficult. It was made



by me alone. I got counsel as I made that decision, but no one else encouraged it. Once I carried out that decision, everything improved immensely. Now I recognize--and I will take with me for the rest of my life--the difficulty of relieving a senior officer. I realize I did great damage to him and his family's future, but yet at the time I was convinced that we had to make the move. And you cannot imagine the tremendous impact it had throughout the airlift system, and I suspect throughout our military. I was talking to General Schwarzkopf once a little later, and I related the difficulty of that decision, and he said, "Yes, I know about that. I know you had to make it, and I and all the people respect you for making it."

Once I made the decision, of course, I talked to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force [Michael J. Dugan, Gen, USAF] and explained everything, gained agreement, called in the individual, and it was a very quick, professional discussion. He certainly will carry the scars from being relieved, but he has been supportive in every way. I could not have more personal respect for the DO and his wife, but there is a time in our professional career that we have to make hard decisions, and I made one. From my perspective, it was right. I suspect from his perspective, it was not quite so clear cut.

Dr. Smith: You talked about the role that many of your key TRANSCOM staff played in crisis planning and management. How about on the MAC side?

General Johnson: When we changed DOs, the new DO certainly had his marching orders, and that was to lean forward. By this time, we were well on our way to implementing the Quality Air Force culture. General Kondra [Vernon J., Maj Gen, USAF], the new DO, used quality principles to really make a big difference in the way we did business, even in the middle of a war. So, we smoothed out very, very quickly, and General Kondra was far and away the leader on the MAC side. Certainly, General Nowak [John M., Maj Gen, USAF], Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, was a strong leader. He was very, very helpful in making sure that our equipment was always prepared to go.

On the MAC side, I must also compliment the guard and reserve advisors. They made things happen with the guard and reserve so that it was a Total Force effort. The guard and reserve were full participants. I never, ever asked for anything from the guard and reserve that was not given. Their people responded and went far beyond the letter of their commitment and the law in serving our country.

Dr. Smith: That kind of moves us naturally into this next question about the Total Force. The Persian Gulf War was the first major test of the Total Force policy and underscored the mobility forces' dependence, especially, on the reserve component. Can you recall your thoughts as you approached the decision to request call-up authority in 1990?

General Johnson: I must admit, number one, that I brought a lot of experience with, and tremendous respect for, the reserve forces from previous opportunities to serve with them. I never, ever questioned whether the reserve forces would be there or not. In fact, that, perhaps, lulled me into a false sense of security and, perhaps, delayed my demand that we call up the reserve forces.

I had no right to, but on the very first day of Desert Shield, I asked for all the assigned C-5s and C-141s from the reserve forces. They gave us all the aircraft. I asked for volunteers, and we became oversubscribed. That continued throughout the operation. Initially, we had enough crews with the volunteers. I wasn't quite as forward looking as I should have been. We had a problem in that we were running strategic crews out of flying time. Normally, aircrews are not to exceed 125 flying hours a month. We had decided some time ago that we would change that to 150 hours the first month. The original rule was 125, and 330 hours for three months. I had changed that to 150 and also changed the 330 to 350. We never had to go past 330, to my knowledge. But as we used all the available crews, we ran them out of flying time. As we approached the end of their time restrictions, I and

all the people involved realized that we had to call up forces. We called all the C-5 units in a couple of increments, and we called 11 of the 15 C-141 units. We needed them.

Since the war, USTRANSCOM has asked that a Ready Mobility Force be established that we can call up early in a contingency. This force would not be limited to airlift aircraft operations. In MTMC, we have no *Transportation Terminal Units in the active force*; they all come from the reserves. We have no Navy control of shipping personnel in the active force. They all come from the reserves.

So, the reserve forces are an integral part of what we do, and we must have early access to them. In this particular crisis, we did get access on a volunteer basis. But it's one thing for people to voluntarily leave *civilian employment and go into the reserves*; it's another for the President to call them. I saw the need for the President to call them. We asked and, of course, that was forthcoming.

Dr. Matthews: In regard to the Ready Mobility Force, sir, what kind of support do we have in the Department of Defense for such a proposal? Does it look like it's going to be a go?

General Johnson: Yes. In fact, we asked for a force of about 12,500; the Joint Staff and others have increased that to about 25,000. The proposal is in Secretary Cheney's office. I'm not sure why it's not already signed, but I know of no one who disagrees with it.

Dr. Matthews: Will it include specialties other than transportation?

General Johnson: That's where the additional 12,500 that brings the total up to 25,000 comes from. A lot of those are Army personnel. The Army has difficulty in that a lot of expertise that it needs early access to, such as civil affairs and some special operations specialists, is in the reserve forces.



Dr. Matthews: Would you give us your feelings on what TRANSCOM's value added was during Desert Shield/Desert Storm?

General Johnson: Yes. Of course, this was the first major test of Transportation Command. I'm not sure how it had been done before. I had been the director of the Joint Staff and looked at some exercises, and the Joint Staff played a much larger role before USTRANSCOM. But during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, General Powell and General Schwarzkopf essentially allowed Transportation Command to orchestrate the transportation activities.

As I mentioned earlier, initially some of the components continued their peacetime relationships. Over time, Transportation Command was able to pull the components together into one team to provide the proper direction and information flow, but also to meet the priorities of General Schwarzkopf, first, and certainly General Powell's at the same time. We worked very hard with that. Looking back, we might have declared at some point, "We're no longer peacetime; we're now wartime. You components work for CINCTRANS [Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command]." At the time, it was a gradual move. We never, ever made a declaration. The component commanders certainly recognized the need to work through TRANSCOM.

I must tell you that CINCMAC [Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command] and CINCTRANS got along pretty well [General Johnson commanded both commands, i.e., CINCMAC and CINCTRANS were one and the same], but the respective staffs had difficulties on occasions. The MTMC and MSC staffs had similar difficulties working with the TRANSCOM staff. In Transportation Command, we made the conscious decision, and continue to make that decision every day, that everything doesn't have to be directed from this headquarters. We believe in decentralized execution within the guidelines that we establish. By C plus ten, things were pretty smooth.

Since the conflict, everyone has recognized that there should be one single manager for transportation; then, there were four. The Transportation Command was the single manager, but the Secretaries of the Army [Michael P. W. Stone], Air Force [Dr. Donald B. Rice], and Navy [H. Lawrence Garrett III] were single managers for their part. So, there were mixed loyalties. Secretary Cheney published a memorandum about a year after the victory which clearly said there is one single manager for air, land, and sea transportation, and that's the Transportation Command. Every day I see that principle being strengthened more and more.

Dr. Matthews: One specific example stands out among others. The one I'm referring to is the *Antares* incident where CINCTrans, sitting above all the transportation modes, orchestrated the transload of the *Antares* cargo--the 24th Infantry Division unit equipment--which involved coordinating the airlift, sealift, and port operations of all three of the components. Are there other examples that we could point to that demonstrate how TRANSCOM facilitated the deployment?

General Johnson: Early on, service chiefs and everyone else wanted to do everything possible to ensure our nation's success. My good friend, General Vuono [Carl E., GEN, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army], tracked the Fast Sealift Ships across the ocean that were carrying the 24th Infantry Division. He also tracked when we were going to have the troops there. We made a commitment to have the troops there in a certain time period. We met our commitment on the first ship. General Vuono never, ever asked again, "Are the troops going to arrive on time?" The point of the story is that by performance we increased the confidence of others in our activities, and the meddling ceased. If we had been unsuccessful, we would have gotten a lot of concern. If we had been unsuccessful with the *Antares*, we would've gotten a lot more "help" from others. But through our components, we were able to make that transition, as difficult as it was, very quickly. So, our command earned its spurs through performance, not by edict.

There are, perhaps, other examples. There are many, many examples, but I think that's the proper flavor at this time.

Dr. Smith: Sir, one of the success stories of Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the first-time activation and use of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. How did the activation procedures work?

General Johnson: The CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] had been on the books since 1951 as I recall. It has been a partnership between the carriers and the Department of Defense. It had also been a way of allocating cargo. I'm not sure that many people thought we would actually call on it. When it was time to activate it, on the 17th of August, we had a unique situation. We were in the peak summer travel period. The airlines, quite frankly, could hardly keep up with their business. We already had some volunteers from the airlines working for us. At that time we had ships arriving at the forward locations so we needed to move the troops. We needed passenger aircraft. I knew that as CINCMAC I had the authority to call CRAF Stage I with no one else's OK, but I didn't quite know how to do that. I discussed it informally with the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell], before I actually did it. I also talked to the Chief [of Staff of the Air Force, General Dugan]. I tried to talk to the Secretary [of the Air Force, Dr. Rice] but couldn't get through so I had to leave a message. Once we decided to call Stage I, I asked our expert, Ron Priddy [Ronald N., Col, USAF, Assistant for Civil Air, Directorate of Operations and Transportation, Military Airlift Command], "How do we do that"? Ron said, "Well, you sign this memo." The memo said in essence, "I hereby call Stage I of CRAF." I said, "OK, now what happens"? He said, "Well, we put this out on ARINC [Aeronautical Radio, Inc]," which is a communications service for the airlines, "and everybody will respond." And they did.



Later that evening, the Deputy Secretary of Transportation [Ms. Elaine L. Chao], who happened to be at a function in St. Louis, asked me if I had checked with the White House before I requested Stage I. I told her, "I'm sure the Secretary of Defense did." And then she said, "Did you check the effect on the national economy?" I said, "Yes, it will be nil." So calling of CRAF Stage I was a historic event. The response from the carriers was overwhelming. They all came. A couple of lower level people asked, "Do we really have to send one," but each time we held fast and said, "Yes." And they all responded positively.

Dr. Smith: So none of the CRAF carriers were less than cooperative throughout the contingency?

General Johnson: No. The CRAF carriers continued to do their jobs. As an American, I was concerned about the possible impact CRAF activation would have on the crews over the Christmas holidays. At one point, General Saint suggested we take Christmas and New Year's off and not move any troops. We told him that to do so meant that we would have to stop the deployment three days before and three days after the holidays if we were going to have our crews home. And very soon, with some prompting from the Chairman, I suspect, we worked right through. But the carriers supported the activities over the holidays as much as they did on non-holidays. There was no dip. By the 17th of January, we had a different problem. The air war had begun, and we had a tremendous amount of cargo at Dover [Air Force Base, Delaware]. To make sure that the fighting forces had what they needed, people sometimes double-shipped things by air. So we called Stage II of CRAF, the cargo aircraft only. And the airlines again responded positively. We were supposed to get something on the order of 37 aircraft, and within two or three days we had 73 US commercial cargo aircraft operating for us. So CRAF was a total success, and we are working very hard to make sure that this partnership continues. It's a partnership in peacetime, but it also sets the parameters for war and allows us to transition to war very, very quickly.

Dr. Smith: What lessons did we learn about management of CRAF?

General Johnson: Quite frankly, I didn't do well in anticipating CRAF crew apprehensions resulting from watching CNN [Cable News Network]. We had crews who would hear and see SCUDs [surface-to-surface missiles] falling all over, and sometimes they were reluctant to go. Unfortunately, we had decided that we wouldn't give the carriers chemical gear prior to their flight, but rather we would give it to them when they landed in the AOR [area of responsibility]. Several times we dropped the ball, and, again, normally it was when we were going into a potentially dangerous airfield. In the end, we did two things: one, we had intelligence officers brief the crews with the latest facts at their last en route station; two, we also had the chem[ical] gear prepositioned there so they could try it on and become familiar with it before they departed. Looking back, I would have initiated such procedures early in the deployment.

Also, with hindsight, I would have formally instituted the Senior Lodger program at the various en route support locations. The Senior Lodger is a facilitator. It's a commercial carrier that all the airlines can call upon and get support as they go through a particular location. The Senior Lodger could have coordinated intelligence briefings and life support training for the CRAF crews. In general, we didn't do a very good job of servicing any of our CRAF aircraft. Certainly that was the case for CRAF Stage II aircraft. In particular, we had problems handling free fuel. As planned, the CRAF people would sign for it, and subsequently the Saudis would pay for it. But reimbursement was not always forthcoming. Looking back, I would have had the Senior Lodger sign for all the fuel, thus eliminating that problem as well. We've said in our new CRAF contract that anytime we activate CRAF, not just in Stage III as in the past, we will have Senior Lodgers. Overall, the CRAF carriers were tremendous heroes. They flew a large percentage of our passenger and cargo missions. I couldn't be more pleased with the system.

Dr. Smith: You talked about some of the concerns the aircrews had from time to time. What concerns did the carriers have?



General Johnson: The carriers were legitimately concerned about loss of business. In particular, Northwest was concerned about loss of business in the Pacific region. You might recall that the Japanese gave us free air and sea transportation, but on the air side, they didn't give us aircraft and crews. They chartered Evergreen Airlines and also Martin Air from Europe to fly for them, thus leaving them to compete in an undegraded fashion in the Pacific. American Airlines was concerned about the reserve call-up, which took many of its crewmembers. American had an unique situation. They were in negotiations with their union. Their union is American-only. The union had just transitioned from the old leadership to younger leadership. You might recall American and other airlines had hired new people in different payscales so the union negotiations were extremely difficult. UPS [United Parcel Service] was very supportive. UPS went out on the market, and sometimes at a higher cost, to get alternate aircraft, so they could meet their commitment to CRAF. I just couldn't say enough good about all of the carriers.

Dr. Matthews: Did you seriously consider activating CRAF Stage III?

General Johnson: We certainly did the planning for it. We laid out the requirements. We showed where CRAF Stage III could help. There was a discussion at various levels about calling it. There were some in the Department of Defense, I can't recall who, but there were several personalities pushing hard to do it; they wanted to call Stage III. Not the Secretary but at lower levels. But, the bottom line is Stage III is for national emergencies, and Desert Storm didn't fit that category. And we didn't need it. The proper decision was made not to call Stage III.

Dr. Matthews: Let's talk a bit about the Phase II requirement and how you met it. That must have been a very tense time. A rollercoaster almost. It's October. You're going, "Well, I've got all these ships, should we send them back? Should we keep them? What should we do with them?" Then shortly after that, a month later, we're looking for every RO/RO



ship we can get on the market. Would you discuss some of the major problems that you encountered and how you overcame them to meet the Phase II requirement?

General Johnson: I had some advance knowledge of the planning of Phase II. We intentionally held ships near the SPOEs [Seaports of Embarkation], in particular in the Gibraltar area, anticipating that we would have to use them. But with sealift, and with all of transportation, there always has to be a payer. And the question was "Who is going to pay the per diem for those ships while I held them?" We in the Transportation Command had no money, fortunately. If we had had money, they would have said "Over to you." The Navy, I suspect with some encouragement, decided they would pick up the per diem of the ships that were tarrying. So when Phase II began, we were ready to move but more quickly than the troops were. Because the unit equipment wasn't ready to move, the VII Corps was not as prepared to move as other US units that have an active mobility requirement day-to-day, and we couldn't fully use the capability that we had. If we had had a phased move in Phase II--i.e., the first units were directed to move very quickly--we probably could have done it with the shipping on hand. But as it was, each unit looked at 15 January and based their departure planning on meeting that date, so the big push didn't come until well after Thanksgiving. Consequently, we lost a full month's worth of move time. That hurt us immensely. The bad weather and the holiday season also hurt us, but not nearly as much as I thought it would. At the same time we were going on the open market for Roll-On/Roll-Off ships, the British were moving forces too. They took many of the international ships that we would have used. But again, it was primarily scheduling problems that created difficulties in finding ships.

Dr. Matthews: A VII Corps after action report that I recently read was critical of the lack of synchronization between airlift and sealift in Phase II. It implied very strongly that it would have been much better, since the sealift couldn't make the schedules, that the air flow, which was going pretty nearly as scheduled, be turned down. Should we have turned down the airlift spigot to limit troop concentration at ports in the AOR?

General Johnson: Certainly lessons learned are a good opportunity to second guess. The first VII Corps troops arrived in the AOR two to five days ahead of the ships, as we had planned. Subsequently, bad weather in northern Europe, delays by the VII Corps in onloading, en route slowdowns because of weather, and other problems resulted in some late closures. But I must tell you that we, VII Corps, and CENTCOM decided when troops should move. VII Corps was pushing very, very hard to move the troops. And we moved them! Looking back, we all could have made different decisions. But at the time, we were using available resources, and we used them to the very best of our ability. No matter what anybody might say in after action reports, it was an incredible feat to move the VII Corps as quickly as we did.

Dr. Matthews: Fast Sealift Ships: let's discuss their role in the war. They were a tremendous success if you look at the percentages they carried--19 percent of unit cargo. True, we had one major breakdown. But if you look more closely at the records, I believe every one of the other ships at one time or another had to go in for some repairs. Maybe we were just lucky that we didn't have more breakdowns, and the Fast Sealift Ship role in the deployment should be reappraised.

General Johnson: I don't think we were lucky. I think that the people who operate those ships did a magnificent job. All of them operated very well with exception of the *Antares* which had had problems prior to the war. As the crew turned up the superheat, turned up the speed of the *Antares*, the boilers failed. Another ship, the *Bellatrix*, was in drydock, and it came out very quickly. The other ships limped along on occasion. But we ran them well past their scheduled maintenance. If they had been diesel ships, I don't think we would have had as many problems. Those steam ships don't age as well as do diesels. But FSSs [Fast Sealift Ships] are a national asset. We should plan to use them, and the Mobility Requirements Study adds to them. Importantly, though, it adds diesel powered ships.



Dr. Matthews: I'd like to ask a question on Sealift Express. Sure it was faster than the SMESA [Special Mideast Sealift Agreement], but it was really slower than most every other type of ship traveling point-to-point. Wouldn't it be better next time to use the flexibility of CONUS [Continental United States] landlift to consolidate excess air-eligible cargo at the port for loading on ships moving unit cargo for direct delivery to the AOR?

General Johnson: Early on, from my background and experience, I said we ought to do shipping the same as we do air carriage. That is we ought to accumulate it at a port, have a container ship come in and pick it up. I was properly persuaded that the right way to do it was to allow the commercial industry to do it the way they do it all the time: take the containers to the onload location, move them by rail or truck to the seaports, and have the shipping companies deliver them. That was SMESA, and it worked extremely well.

As far as the speed is concerned, we did establish something called Sealift Express. We were using the analogy to Airlift Express or Desert Express. For Sealift Express we said, "If you have the container at a particular port on a particular day, we guarantee 23-day service." That worked well.

Looking back, I wish we would have had better intransit visibility, but more importantly, better discipline on the part of the shippers by telling us what was in the various containers. Sometimes we allowed shippers to ship containers to sealift lots with nothing more than "Saudi Arabia" stated as the destination. No manifest and so forth. Consequently, we had a few horror stories. Containers, for example, were often unstuffed at ports in Saudi to see what was inside and then restuffed for transport to forward positions. Other units, not knowing where their containers were, ordered their goods twice, further burdening the transportation system. But if you look at the total number of containers, 37,000, the number we had problems with was a small percentage. Yet that small percentage makes a big difference to those who were expecting them. I maintain that we lost a tremendous opportunity by not enforcing document discipline.



Dr. Matthews: Why didn't we containerize more ammunition?

General Johnson: We certainly should have containerized more ammunition. For ammunition movement, we used primarily the port at Sunny Point, North Carolina. We also used Concord, California, and Earle, New Jersey, for ammunition container loadout. But Sunny Point was the primary port. That port was built to handle containerized ammunition. I recall asking several times why we weren't containerizing more ammunition. Each time, we blamed the shipper for refusing to use containers. After the war was over, in meeting with all the joint logistics commanders, I realized that no one said no to containerizing ammunition. We simply did not push hard enough for it. The containerization of ammunition is a must, from a safety standpoint and from a handling standpoint.

Dr. Matthews: Did we have the ability to receive it in the AOR?

General Johnson: Now once we get it to the far end, we have to have the equipment to handle it. And that could be had. First, we should have insisted that MTMC operate the ports in the AOR. We did not push for that until after the conflict was over. Second, one of our biggest mistakes was not to take advantage of an offer from the Japanese. The Japanese offered to provide containers and container handling equipment, up to so many millions of dollars, for use in the AOR. CENTCOM legitimately had the responsibility to respond, but they did not move out. Looking back, as the transportation commander, I wish I had taken over that responsibility and made it happen. So we missed a big opportunity in the containerization business by not gaining enough confidence in the eyes of our shippers, not pushing them to containerize, and not taking advantage of the Japanese offer. We are now working very hard on containerization. In fact, for one of the big exercises in the Pacific we have commitments from everybody to use containers. This is one way, through exercises, that we in the Transportation Command can gain the confidence of the shippers.

Dr. Matthews: What could we do to get the services to containerize more of their unit cargo?

General Johnson: We have to use exercises. We need to develop the procedures, and convince the services that we will in fact deliver. Again, exercises can offer the proof. Once you convince someone that you will do the task, they will accept containerization. But it will take a lot to convince them because we haven't done a very good job in the past.

Dr. Matthews: One thing that surprised me was when I went into the CAT during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it was very difficult to get information on tankers. Why didn't USTRANSCOM get more involved in tanker operations and the movement of POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] to the AOR?

General Johnson: We believed in decentralized execution. MSC handled those operations very, very well. The operations were primarily for one major customer, and the ships are specialized. The priorities were straightforward. There was nothing to sort out. We certainly could have been more involved, but there was no reason to impose ourselves into a system that was running smoothly. And we continue to support that approach.

Dr. Matthews: Throughout the war and after, USTRANSCOM and MSC have come up with nearly identical statistics on sealift. However, the two commands continue to give them different twists. USTRANSCOM emphasizes the nation's heavy reliance on foreign flags for delivery of unit equipment during surge operations, while MSC emphasizes the overall--that's sustainment, POL, and unit equipment--contribution by the US Flag fleet. How can we account for these two different perspectives?

General Johnson: When you look at what both commands are saying, both are accurate. We simply have different viewpoints. There's no reason why we have to have "groupthink" and say exactly the same thing. The statistics are well captured. We were very fortunate that early on our historian in the Transportation Command graciously stepped forward to be the person who would capture the statistics. That has to be a first in any history office. And the statistics are accurate. You can draw different conclusions from the statistics. Certainly, we have to recognize that we relied heavily on foreign countries for strategic sealift. But secondly, we in the Transportation Command are a little bit neglectful in not stressing the US Flag Fleet contribution even more. We in the Transportation Command don't emphasize enough the US Flag Fleet's contribution in the area of sustainment, to SMESA. From the MSC standpoint, they would like to show the importance of sealift. They normally stress that 95 percent went by sea. Transportation Command would say 85 percent. Transportation Command needs to add the words "dry cargo." For dry cargo, eighty-five percent did go by sea. If you add the POL, 6.1 million tons, then MSC is correct. There is nothing wrong with having two different statistics. They are well captured. Jim Matthews [Dr. James K. Matthews, Command Historian, USTRANSCOM] did an outstanding job doing that.

Dr. Smith: How might we have used air refueling resources better in support of airlift operations?

General Johnson: Early on, to make sure that we carried as much as possible, and also to make sure that we didn't have excessive ground times, we tried to use some air refueling for airlift, but quite frankly, the location of the AOR was such that there wasn't much advantage to it. The en route bases in Europe were equidistant from the CONUS East Coast and AOR. About 3,500 miles each leg. So it made sense to stage from the East Coast, fly to primarily Frankfurt, Germany, or Madrid, Spain, change crews, and go downstream. Our ACL [allowable cabin load] was based on a 3,500 nautical mile leg, so there was nothing to be gained. You couldn't move more cargo by air refueling on either end, unless you did both. On several occasions, we used refueling in the AOR



because of ground fueling limitations, but we had difficulty in coordinating. Certainly with Air Mobility Command playing a larger role in air refueling, we will do a better job, because as you well know, the air refuelers can carry cargo. They can extend airlift. They provide mobility. And that's what we're all about in Air Mobility Command and US Transportation Command. Another advantage of having tankers and airlifters in one command, Air Mobility Command, is better coordination of ramp space for the big aircraft. I believe that will be an AMC [Air Mobility Command] value added in a future conflict.

Dr. Smith: There was considerable confusion in the early days of Desert Shield regarding the deployment of MAC C-130s to the theater, most notably the deployment of the volunteer Air National Guard unit and the 37th Tactical Airlift Squadron from Germany. The deployment of theater airlift is arguably as important as the deployment of fighter units, which appear to have been given priority by USCENTCOM. What can be done to ensure our AMC-provided C-130 units are properly incorporated into theater reception and employment planning and execution?

General Johnson: First of all, I don't think there was mass confusion. Secondly, I support the fact that the fighter forces were the top priority for beddown in the AOR. Initially, there weren't as many requirements for C-130s in theater. They were certainly used to carry things between the bases within the theater. They were also used to move the WRM [War Reserve Materiel] stocks from various locations within the theater. But the demand for them at first was not that high. Quite frankly, the theater commander didn't need them and wasn't ready for them as quickly as we mobilized them. That's an interesting side story. Having been in the reserve business for some time, I knew that we could not mobilize and send forward individual C-130 aircraft, but rather we had to mobilize a whole unit. But I also knew we couldn't mobilize a unit without an official call-up, so I asked the guard and reserve representatives to consider how we would put together a provisional unit. That was in the morning, and that afternoon they came back and said, "Here's the two units. The guard will be led by Charleston, West

Virginia, and the reserve by Dobbins Air Force Base, Marietta, Georgia. And here's where the aircraft and crews will come from. Where do you want them to go?" We didn't yet have a specific requirement. The reserves, as I recall, moved forward, to Alconbury [Royal Air Force (RAF), England], and waited there for an interminable time as we pushed to get them in country. The guard stayed in this country. Now for those who did not move forward, we did get individual crews, and units from the reserve forces that volunteered to fly within the CONUS. Under the code name Arc Wind, they provided feeder support throughout our country and served with great distinction. So, I think that I inadvertently pushed too hard to get C-130s in country. The pull was not there. Looking back, we could have done it a little more orderly.

Dr. Smith: Do you think that now that the theater commanders have some organic C-130 capability of their own that they may put their requirements for additional C-130s on a higher priority as they gain a better understanding of their utility and importance?

General Johnson: I don't think so. I think that, as is shown here in the current activities in Sarajevo [Yugoslavia], theater commanders will want to go off and do their own thing. In the end, they cannot do that. I suspect that over time we'll transition back to the old way of doing business, where we have one airlift force that supports many users around the world. As it is now, we have six different commands that own airlift and air refueling forces. The dispersal of those forces will greatly complicate the AMC and USTRANSCOM effort and significantly decrease the overall airlift and air refueling capabilities of our nation.

Dr. Smith: General Tenoso [Edwin E., Maj Gen, USAF, Director, Operations and Logistics Directorate, USTRANSCOM], on the basis of his experiences as commander of airlift forces in the desert, recommended improving the avionics of C-130s and increasing emphasis on combat training for C-130 crews. What has the Air Force been doing along these lines since Desert Storm?



General Johnson: General Tenoso, like every other combat commander, would like to have more and better avionics. We continue to outfit aircraft with the SCNS [Self-Contained Navigational System] and will continue that program. The problem is, in Saudi and elsewhere, when you have a war, you turn off all of the nav[igational] aids. So you need an internal system. And we're proceeding along that line. We have done nothing extraordinary since the war other than continue those programs.

Dr. Matthews: I noticed yesterday in staff meeting that the CEO [Chief Executive Officer] of SRA [Systems Research and Applications] Corporation, Mr. Brehm [William K.], is going to be in town again shortly to see TRANSCOM's senior staff, which prompts my next question dealing with Proud Eagle. About the time you came on board as CINTRANS, Proud Eagle was about the most important issue for USTRANSCOM. The exercise, evaluated by SRA, was going to set the baseline for the command from which to measure USTRANSCOM's progress for years to come. In the post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm era, we hardly ever hear about Proud Eagle. Are its lessons forgettable?

General Johnson: Proud Eagle occurred within a month of my assumption of command, and I certainly learned a lot from it. Any command post exercise is very, very useful, and Proud Eagle was no exception. We ought to have more of them. It was important in working JOPES and other activities, and more importantly, it got the attention of the senior leaders that we support around the world. It would be interesting to go back and look at the Proud Eagle lessons. I daresay that many things we're doing as a result of Desert Shield/Desert Storm fix the problems we identified in Proud Eagle. Proud Eagle continues to be a watershed in our history, and it will help us in Desert Shield-type activities. Along that line, we were scheduled for a follow-on to Proud Eagle. It was canceled for some reason. I can't recall exactly why. A Proud Eagle now, within a year or two of the war, would be of great value to the US Transportation Command.



Dr. Matthews: If you were to point to one or two transportation lessons learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, what would they be?

General Johnson: From the transportation standpoint, there were several. One, we have to build feasible, executable deployment plans based on realistic capabilities. Second, we have to fund, acquire, field, and rigorously exercise transportation capabilities. Third, we have to insure a fluid, understandable, coordinated command and control system that facilitates and makes us responsive to the customer's demands.

Dr. Smith: What was your most difficult decision during Desert Shield/Desert Storm?

General Johnson: It had to be to relieve the MAC DO. It was a personal thing. It was very, very difficult to do, and I've talked about that earlier. I'm convinced it was the right decision, and eventually history will show that. But it will never relieve me of the personal agony and responsibility of having made that decision.

Dr. Smith: Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the largest operational test of JOPES. Although it proved to be the best single source of information, numerous critics point out that data was inaccurate, and the system was not responsive to changing and unstable requirements. MAC had to confirm by telephone each requirement with the moving unit, prepare hard copy requirements based on unit corrections and validations, and then type schedules into the ADANS [Airlift Deployment and Analysis System]. In view of the dynamic nature of requirements during contingencies, do you believe JOPES to be viable?

General Johnson: Yes. I cannot conceive of doing any large deployment without a JOPES-like system. Most people who say they don't require JOPES are fooling themselves. JOPES has the same shortcomings common to any computer-based system. The same old adage applies: garbage in - garbage out. JOPES is only as good as the data that's put in it. JOPES is an immature, early version. It's an arcane data system. Perhaps the biggest problems are too few trained users and not enough nodes.

Also, it could not handle the highest classification. All of these problems made the system difficult to use. Earlier on in the deployment, we had to walk away from JOPES temporarily. The Chairman and also the Central Command brought discipline back, and we started using JOPES and learned that it was a very, very helpful way to do business. One major advancement since the war is we are now required to use JOPES in every JCS-funded exercise. Some of these exercises are very small, but they get the user into the habit of using JOPES. It's only as good as the users and their confidence in the system. If no one has faith in it, it will not work.

We have made many improvements to JOPES and have some more on the drawing board. Now, as we speak, we're making some hard decisions about what to do with JOPES in the future. I'm convinced that we have to move JOPES up another level, and then we can stop and build a new system. That new system would be based on a robust database with modules operating against the database to support the various users. We cannot do an operation without a JOPES-like system.

Jay, you asked a question about telephone calls as a backup to JOPES. Telephone calls to units will continue to be an important part of our command and control. It's a last check, and it is certainly less expensive than flying an airplane. For example, early on in the conflict we had a requirement at Shaw Air Force Base [South Carolina] for passengers that could have been verified via phone. We flew two commercial aircraft in to carry them wherever they were going to go. When the aircraft got there, they found a load for only one of them. In this case we had two deadheaded legs, from Paris to the CONUS and return. We, as a command and as a nation, cannot afford the expense of doing business that way. So those telephone calls are very, very important.

Dr. Matthews: Are we going to follow sealift tanker operations and try to track POL information in JOPES?

General Johnson: It's conceivable, but I'm not sure we need to do that. Now in JOPES you have a module that can track resupply and sustainment-type items. We could put POL in there. But I don't perceive POL to have the same challenges as the other items, so I don't think we need to include it in the system.

Dr. Matthews: Recently, I reviewed for you the Les Aspin [Representative from Wisconsin and Chairman, Committee on Armed Services] report on Desert Shield/Desert Storm. One thing that struck me is its cursory coverage of strategic deployment successes and shortfalls. Historically, postwar momentum to improve US deployment readiness wanes quickly. Is Congress already losing interest in mobility issues?

General Johnson: Absolutely not. Certainly all the documents from Congress, Department of Defense, JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], and the services support a strong sealift and also total mobility. In fact, Mr. Aspin, in the hearings I had before him, stressed that the size of our armed forces should be paced by the mobility assets to move them. I didn't agree with him, but his assessment of the situation attests to a strong commitment for mobility programs from Congress, our Secretary of Defense, and our Chairman, who personally works very hard to push for them.

Dr. Matthews: Recently, we completed Provide Hope, humanitarian support to the former Soviet Republics. Do you believe you should have been the supported CINC during Provide Hope, and what advantages would there have been had you been the supported CINC?

General Johnson: I believe Provide Hope was an example of where US Transportation Command should have been the supported CINC. There were several things at work here. The former Soviet Union--like Canada, Mexico, and Antarctica--is not assigned to a regional CINC. [US]CINCEUR [Commander in Chief, United States European Command] very much wants to have the former Soviet Union in his AOR. So he pushed to be the Provide Hope supported CINC. I decided not to oppose that thinking and chose instead to believe that USEUCOM [United States



European Command] would provide us a great deal of support. I found they did not. We had to provide all of our own support, such things as intelligence, reporting back, and so forth. They had no value added. I believe that the supported CINC should be the CINC with the highest level of interest, and in Provide Hope that was us. I believe that over time, Transportation Command will do more operations independently. If a regional CINC genuinely has an interest, he ought to be involved. If it is strictly transportation, then Transportation Command should be the supported CINC.

Dr. Matthews: Why are we not using C-141s going into Sarajevo?

General Johnson: A C-130 is more compatible with the combat-like activity that is going on in Sarajevo. Also, the regional CINC is in charge. And the C-130s belong to him, and he wants to use them. If we were really doing a life-sustaining airlift into Sarajevo, and the nations of the world wanted to do it, the C-141s and perhaps the C-5s would be the weapon system of choice.

Dr. Matthews: Over the years MAC has, in a variety of ways, supported counter-narcotics operations, and now AMC as well. The primary reason we went into Panama during Just Cause was to take out one of the kingpins in the narcotics trade, Manuel Noriega. What are your thoughts on increasing military involvement in the drug war?

General Johnson: Simply put, the role of the military in the drug operation is coordinated by our Secretary of Defense and the Chairman. I support them and don't personally have a view about whether we should do more or less. I will say for US Transportation Command that we are eager to provide transportation for any of the military or the civilian agencies combating drugs. We do that on a day-to-day basis. We do it sometimes in very, very sensitive situations. We ought to continue that. We play a very, very useful role there.

Dr. Matthews: General Johnson, what did you see as your biggest challenge on becoming USCINCTRANS?

General Johnson: The biggest job was setting up an operational command, properly connecting the components, and setting that in the context of the people we support. We had to create a focus on customers. The biggest challenge was that the components, under the original charter, did not work for me in peacetime. Over time, we worked out pretty good relationships. But the components had a dual chain, dual loyalties, because the service secretaries were also the single managers for the three transportation modes. The current charter takes that ambiguity away. It is much easier.

Dr. Smith: How about the biggest challenge as CINCMAC?

General Johnson: The biggest challenge as CINCMAC was to become a part of the MAC team and to encourage the members of the MAC team to recognize that we were in the support business, that we have customers, and that we have to focus on our customers. That was the biggest initial challenge. Of course, MAC launched on a quality journey and that brought with it additional challenges, but also great fulfillment.

Dr. Smith: What was your vision for the two commands on becoming USCINTRANS and CINCMAC?

General Johnson: Well the vision was, as I mentioned already, pulling together all parts of each command, and in the case of TRANSCOM, pulling three commands together, and gaining a focus on service to our customers.

Dr. Matthews: General Johnson, how will the proposed draft charter for USTRANSCOM rectify some of the problems that you've discussed and others that you encountered when you became CINTRANS?

General Johnson: The draft charter does an outstanding job of placing total focus within TRANSCOM for the transportation requirements of our armed forces. It gives us exactly what we need. I'm not sure if I had been able to lay it out, I would have been able to do so as articulately as the Secretary of Defense did. He went far beyond what I could have reasonably asked for. We have all the tools, assuming we get the manpower and the approval of the charter, to do our job. We have not yet fully set up our staff to oversee the various roles that we have, and we also have not pulled together our three components as well as we want. I must tell you that early on the CINCTrans and the CINCMAC got along pretty well, but the staffs did not necessarily get along very well. That's not true anymore. The AMC staff understands its relationship with TRANSCOM, and certainly General Kross, formerly the J3/J4 at TRANSCOM, and now the Vice Commander in Chief of AMC, understands the proper relationship. We have not yet gotten the same closeness with MSC and MTMC, although it's moving in the right direction. We'll get there over time. I have intentionally not forced it too fast.

Dr. Matthews: What will be the impact of the USTRANSCOM charter on MSC, AMC, and MTMC?

General Johnson: Well, it gives them clear focus about who they work for. It gives them one boss. When the DBOF [Defense Business Operations Fund] is fully implemented, it gives them one source of funding, and it clearly puts the authority and responsibility in the right channels. I believe it will help our Department of Defense.

Dr. Matthews: There is some concern here at the command about how much we're biting off. Will we have the manpower to do the job that's going to be delegated to us when the charter's signed, sealed, and delivered? What is the status of our manpower request?



General Johnson: The manpower request is ready to go. We were advised not to float it until the charter was approved, so that approval of the charter would not be tied directly to the manpower. I wanted very badly for the Secretary of Defense to direct the manpower. Having worked in the Joint Staff, and also having worked this issue from here, I know it's awfully hard, through the joint process, to get manpower approved because the services get to vote. They are also the manpower providers. Anything the services can prevent us from getting keeps them from having to give up something. So, I wanted very badly for the Secretary of Defense to direct the manpower, and I wrote our response accordingly. We have not yet gotten there.

Dr. Smith: What circumstances prompted transferring responsibility for managing the CRAF from AMC to USTRANSCOM?

General Johnson: There were several things. We were looking for parallels. We couldn't very well say that the activation of the Sealift Readiness Program should be a TRANSCOM responsibility, but the activation of CRAF Stage I should be AMC's. If there had been a TRANSCOM when CRAF was established, TRANSCOM would have had the authority to execute Stage I. So it made sense to move that to TRANSCOM. AMC's role will be essentially unchanged. They will just advise TRANSCOM, and TRANSCOM can activate Stage I. AMC, through TRANSCOM, would go to the Secretary of Defense for Stages II and III. So, from the AMC standpoint, it makes no difference.

Dr. Smith: Earlier this year, there seemed to be some debate at the Secretary of Defense level on whether CINCAMC would be dual-hatted as CINCTRANS. What was the rationale for separating the two positions, and what caused the idea to be dropped?

General Johnson: I don't know all the discussions that took place in Washington. For a long time, the Deputy DOD [Department of Defense] Inspector General, Mr. Derek J. Vander Schaaf, had been advocating separating the two. On occasions other services had advocated separating them also. I believe over time we've been able to show impartiality, and the services are not quite so strongly in favor of separation. I had said myself it was a matter of the number of four-star slots. When the directive was given to make the positions separate, that same argument was made. They looked at the number of four-star slots and found out that the Army was not using all of theirs, so that argument was not valid anymore. I don't know what drove the move to end the dual-hatting other than the fact that I was coming up for nomination for CINCAMC, and that triggered the discussion. For several weeks, my nomination was delayed while they debated it, and Mr. Atwood [Donald J., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense] came out and actually said it would be separated. The Air Force, and perhaps others, weighed in and got that reversed. But my position when I leave is nominative. Any service can nominate against it.

Dr. Matthews: Do you have any reservations about someone from another service becoming USCINTRANS? What are the pros and cons of another service providing the CINTRANS?

General Johnson: I have no personal disagreement with that. Any service can do it. The Army is far and away the biggest customer, so an Army CINC would be a plus from the customer standpoint. I'm not sure how a Navy CINC would work. If they were totally objective and became "purple" [a synonym for "Joint" referring to the color made by mixing the four service colors together] that is, dedicated to serving the customers, it would work well. If they were parochial, it would destroy the command. The Air Force has a strong interest because in every case, the quick reaction activity of United States Transportation Command will be done by AMC. So, it makes sense that an Air Force general have the job. As far as the cons are concerned, I mentioned some of those. Being dual-hatted, the tendency is to focus on the air component. I'm sometimes accused of doing that. I work very, very

hard to make sure that's not a valid complaint. I strain, as I'm sure you've seen in staff meetings, to distinguish between the two roles. If there are two four-stars here, whether from the same or different services, there will be some friction. But with all people being focused on our missions, certainly it could be done. I would not want to see Air Mobility Command downgraded to a three-star billet just to accommodate a different service as CINCTrans. Air Mobility Command, by every measure of merit, deserves a four-star. If the hats are separated, I'd rather see two four-star generals assigned rather than have the AMC commander downgraded to a lieutenant general.

Dr. Matthews: What was your perception of USTRANSCOM's relationship with Congress when you came on board, and how has that relationship changed during your time in command here?

General Johnson: General Cassidy [Duane H., Gen, USAF, USCINCTrans, 1 July 1987 to 22 September 1989] had worked the Congress very hard. We had become somewhat of an advocate for some of the things Congress was considering, such as providing for a strong Merchant Marine regardless of military needs. Over time we've developed a much more mature relationship. Congress genuinely seeks our advice. I think I was one of the first CINCs that was invited to testify before Les Aspin's [Democratic Congressman, Wisconsin] committee [House Armed Services Committee] this year. He argued that if we couldn't move a force, we don't need it. I obviously did not agree with that. But he recognized that great emphasis should be placed upon the transportation required to move our forces. All of Congress has done that, and they have been very, very supportive. I could not ask for better support than Congress has given.

Dr. Matthews: What recommendations would you make for those who follow regarding our relationship with Congress, and do you have any unfinished business with Congress?



General Johnson: We always have unfinished business with Congress because it's an ongoing relationship. I would like to see us get more and more involved in the various committees that work different aspects of transportation. Sealift is the one that cuts across the most committees from the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee to Commerce [Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation], and so forth. I'd like to see us work that one a little more carefully. I'd like to see the Armed Services Committees work more of the maritime issues. We've been successful in gaining support for the C-17, but we haven't had overwhelmingly extraordinary support. They all say we need it, but we've not had the great advocacy in the Congress that I would like to see. My successor will certainly have to work that very hard. But sealift is the one that requires the most continuing care. I'm not sure we have a problem with ground transportation. We duly note the requirements of ground transportation, but we have never had to work those issues. I'm talking about the infrastructure--roads, bridges, rails--and also the regulation of the industry. Of course, it's almost totally deregulated, and it works pretty well. Perhaps in the future we'll have to work these issues as we take on more and more of the single manager role.

Dr. Matthews: Other unified commands maintain offices with several personnel in Washington, DC. In fact, we've considered beefing up the TRANSCOM office there in the past. Is this something we should look at again?

General Johnson: Well, looking back, I perhaps feel most neglectful because we have not used the US Transportation Command office in Washington. We've used them as a facilitator, not as a real liaison in a representational role. We've also put MAC-oriented people into that office, not real transporters. It was announced a couple days ago that when Colonel Davis [James H., Col, USAF, USTRANSCOM Liaison Officer, Joint Staff/Transportation Command Washington Office] retires, he'll be replaced by Colonel Barnaby [Richard J., COL, USA]. Colonel Barnaby has been the MTMC commander in Rotterdam and knows our business very, very well. He's a proactive person, and we'll have better

representation with him. Should we have more? Probably not. When you send people off to Washington, they often get captured. It would be better to have Colonel Barnaby working our issues and send people up to help him when need be.

Dr. Matthews: Sir, last session we discussed the issue of our relationship with the ship tanker business. I just have one other question about that. Do you think we should strengthen our relationship with the Defense Fuel Supply Center?

General Johnson: Yes, I do. We certainly get along. There is no tension. But we do need to strengthen our relationship. We perhaps need to form a joint process action team to look at how we support petroleum distribution around the world. CINCTRANS should instigate that. I think we can serve all the customers a little better by doing that.

Dr. Matthews: I want to elaborate on another discussion we had last session. In our discussion of containerization, you said we should have gotten MTMC involved earlier in the reception of cargo in the AOR during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Where do you believe USTRANSCOM's responsibility should end? In the AOR? Should we go in-theater?

General Johnson: We should have command arrangement agreements. We did not yet have one with Central Command. I'm not confident we do now, although we've worked that very hard. Those agreements should say that we operate the ports for them. Our official responsibility should end at the port in the overseas area, whether it be the aerial port or the seaport. If the overseas command asks for MTMC, AMC, or whoever to operate beyond the ports, we should respond. But they should ask, because it is legitimately their responsibility. I maintain we ought to provide intransit visibility from the place where MTMC, or it could be AMC, picks up the cargo until it reaches the port of debarkation. We should also give advance information on the shipment to the theater commander in a format that he can use. When it's delivered, if the theater commander asks us to maintain intransit visibility over the goods until they arrive at their final destination, we should do so,



with his inputs. We should not go into his theater without being asked, but at the same time we ought to provide the service, with his inputs, to continue to track the material.

Dr. Matthews: Have you been asked to do that? Is there any operation where we've already done that?

General Johnson: The US Army has asked us to do it. They have something called Total Assets Visibility, and I think in the future we will be asked to do that. We have a program within Europe where we've been asked to be, in essence, the interface with all commercial transportation in Europe. That's not yet come to fruition, but we've been asked to do that, and I agreed, over the opposition of some of my staff. Not General Starling [James D, LTG, USA, Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM]. General Starling and I agree.

Dr. Matthews: How might USTRANSCOM change or influence the relationship between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation?

General Johnson: The charter certainly empowers US Transportation Command with a much higher and greater responsibility there. Other DOD and JCS directives continue to build in this direction. We've been given a great opportunity to work with DOT [Department of Transportation]. And now when we work with DOT, we're working on behalf of Secretary Cheney. We've been asked in essence to write a contract with MARAD [Maritime Administration] on the management of the RRF. It is very, very important that we write a good contract and hold them to it. Contracts have been rather haphazard in the past and done more often through friendships than pieces of paper. Our challenge will not be to have enough authority, but to have the time and make the effort to use the authority that we have. We'll have a little difficulty because every so often the Navy, OP 42 [Strategic Sealift Division, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)] to be specific, will want to go direct to MARAD and tell them what the US Navy needs. But



the charter clearly says that the US Transportation Command speaks for the Department of Defense. We have the charter. Now it's a problem of executing it correctly.

Dr. Matthews: A couple of months ago, during a staff meeting, General Starling commented on a newspaper article that described an initiative in Congress for the Department of Defense to take over MARAD funding. He wanted to make it clear to everyone at the table that TRANSCOM did not initiate that, although we'd probably get blamed for it. Anyway, I'm curious, who did initiate that proposal? What's the background there?

General Johnson: I'm not sure. I suspect it came from the Comptroller's office in the Department of Defense. There has been a long-held concern about stewardship over Department of Defense funds that are made available to MARAD to operate the RRF. We certainly could operate that. We neither seek it nor expect it. Our role is going to be one of working with MARAD, but also one of trying to make them more efficient and to meet the contract that we write with them. Contract is too big a word. It will be a memorandum of understanding. If we can do that, I think we can quiet the concerns.

Dr. Matthews: How has our support for and participation in the National Defense Transportation Association borne fruit during your time as CINCTRANS?

General Johnson: The NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association] has been very, very helpful. They have helped us accomplish our mission and integrate our activities with industry. NDTA has been helpful in sealift, airlift, and ground transportation. Each of those modes has a separate committee. MTMC, MSC, and AMC are advisors or co-chairmen to the ground, sealift, and airlift committees respectively. We established a fourth committee *during my tenure dealing with technology*. We asked them to work with the transportation technology center up in Cambridge [Cambridge Technology Group, Cambridge, Massachusetts] that does transportation for everybody under the

Department of Defense. Our J6 [Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate, USTRANSCOM] works with them, and we've had some good interchanges through that committee. The airlift committee has perhaps been the most active over time. The sealift committee had initial difficulty in getting focused. I'm not sure the ground transportation committee has done very much. But we've had good cooperation on ground transportation matters, so we really haven't had any problems. The one that has gone the furthest, obviously, is the technology committee because it just began. The sealift committee had not been established for very long, about three years.

Dr. Matthews: What direction should that relationship take in the future?

General Johnson: It should continue to be a very close relationship. But on the other hand, the NDTA is not accountable to anyone. They are advisory in nature. That's a good partnership, but ultimately the CINC is the one who is accountable for the results. It provides a tremendous forum to interact with industry. Industry seeks that. I believe we've been good partners. Could we do better? Of course. And we will continue to work at that.

Dr. Matthews: Is there anything in particular that comes to mind where the NDTA has really helped you or the command?

General Johnson: They are doing some work now on sealift that is very, very useful. They not only brought together the two biggest carriers, Sea-Land [Service] and American President Lines, but they have also brought together the smaller carriers and gained pretty good support that would have not been possible without such a forum. The same can be said on the airlift side. Quite frankly, we've not called on them enough regarding the CRAF enhancements program, because we aren't quite there yet on what it is we'd like to do.

Dr. Matthews: Would you summarize for us, sir, USTRANSCOM's position on the state of the US maritime industry? What have we done to improve the situation?

General Johnson: The lessons from Desert Shield and Desert Storm were pretty clear. We obviously need more organic and more commercial sealift capability. The Mobility Requirements Study and congressional funding have been and are keys. I believe that the MRS [Mobility Requirements Study] is a landmark study. Not only is it accurate, it's affordable. We have tremendous teamwork between DOT and DOD. I believe that Secretary Card's [Andrew H., Jr., Secretary of Transportation] commission [Maritime Policy Working Group] did a great deal, and if the Congress will cooperate, it is also executable. I believe the [NDTA] sealift committee has worked very hard to develop a partnership between the industry and MSC. I would like to see MSC lean forward a little more on the partnership role, and we're working that very hard. In fact, there's a meeting on the issue at MSC as we speak. We'll continue to work that partnership.

Dr. Matthews: How have our relationships with the component commands changed over your tenure as CINCTRANS? How can we improve those relationships?

General Johnson: Certainly we have improved them over my tenure. The AMC/USTRANSCOM staff relationship, as I mentioned earlier, has certainly *matured*. At MSC, the commander has made some great strides, but the Navy bureaucracy still has a way to go. MTMC is very supportive. MTMC, perhaps more than MSC, has a lot of tentacles into the policy-making apparatus that does not include going through TRANSCOM. Over time we need to work that. But anything TRANSCOM demands ought to have some value added.

The Secretary Cheney letter strengthened our hand. As CINCTRANS, I could call up the component commanders and direct that they do certain things. I've been reluctant to do that because I wanted a true partnership. If we made a demand to them, I wanted to make sure our



staff could carry through and support what it is we demanded. As we already discussed, MSC is handling tankers very well. Why then should USTRANSCOM take it over? I've tried to use a statesman-like approach. It's worked. The component commanders certainly respond. I believe that all three components have found the value added by working through us. In summary, everything we do has to meet the following test: it has to be right for the country, it has to serve the customer, and we have to have value added.

Dr. Smith: Following up on Jim's question, do you foresee the Tanker Airlift Control Center ever working directly for TRANSCOM as opposed to AMC? Or establishing a similar transportation control center that will handle customer requests for transportation of all kinds?

General Johnson: We decided early on that we were going to use our components for execution. Today, US Transportation Command has a daily request net. Air requests that come from the JCS or any CINCs go to TRANSCOM. Some routine things, channel missions and so forth, might go directly to AMC. In the past, channels were established by the transportation directorate at Air Force headquarters. In the future, they'll be established by TRANSCOM. So we have the relationship you are talking about. I suspect that the TRANSCOM command center talks more often to the TACC [Tanker Airlift Control Center]. They also talk to MSC and MTMC. So that relationship is there today. I don't see it changing.

Dr. Smith: Sir, the next several questions focus on the Air Force reorganization. Within the last year the Air Force has undergone the biggest reorganization since its creation as a separate service in 1947. The Air Force Logistics Command and the Air Force Systems Command have merged into the Air Force Materiel Command. And more importantly for us, SAC [Strategic Air Command], MAC [Military Airlift Command], and TAC [Tactical Air Command] have been inactivated, and the Air Combat and Air Mobility Commands created in their place. At what point in the conceptualization of the restructure of the operational commands did you become involved?

General Johnson: I'm not really sure about the exact point. The initial thrust was that the Strategic Air Command missions would be taken over by the Tactical Air Command. The first place I remember it being discussed was at the Desert Shield "hot wash" at Maxwell [Air Force Base, Alabama], and I can't remember the exact date. General Butler [George L., Gen, USAF, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command] in essence stood up and told the assembled group that he thought SAC should cease to exist and that its assets should be transferred to the Tactical Air Command. There wasn't much other talk about that. At some point in July of 1991, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force [Merrill A. McPeak, Gen, USAF] called me in and said that he wanted the overseas C-130s to go to the theater commanders. He also wanted Pope Air Force Base [North Carolina] to go to TAC and become a composite wing base. He told me that I had the choice of participating in that, or he would wait and my successor would. He then called back within a few days and said to consider including tankers in MAC. That was the first time it came up. I'm not sure who decided that. He and the Secretary of the Air Force [Dr. Rice] have both said that they don't know who decided it. So I don't know who decided it. I went back and said, obviously, that I would participate, and I would welcome bringing the tankers together with the airlifters. There was a great deal of concern that any tanker that was on someone else's base ought to be a part of a composite wing. We were successful in saying, in essence, that all tankers except those that were part of a particular composite wing or based overseas would belong to Air Mobility Command.

Once we made those individual decisions, there was a meeting, I don't remember when, exactly, where General Butler [George L., Gen, USAF, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command], General Loh [John Michael, Gen, USAF, Commander, Tactical Air Command], and I--SAC, and TAC, and MAC--and our deputy chiefs of staff for plans [Thomas R. Griffith, Brig Gen, USAF, TAC; Robert E. Linhard, Brig Gen, USAF, SAC; and James C. McCombs, Maj Gen, USAF, MAC] got together at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. It was to be one of several meetings. But I remember very distinctly the TAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, General Griffith, talking about TAC taking

over SAC. And I remember saying, "Let's place this on a higher plane. Let's work to disestablish all three commands and establish two new commands." That was picked up on by the Chief and the Secretary, and with some exceptions, that philosophy, which was a very holy philosophy, carried the day. Initially it seemed the Chief's overriding interest was in breaking up MAC, but as time went on, he recognized our value, and he also recognized our global reach. Our Secretary coined the phrase "Global Reach and Global Power." And if you look at the reorganization, that's what we've used as watch words. The global reach is Air Mobility Command. The global power is Air Combat Command. There are some exceptions, as there always could and should be.

Dr. Smith: I understand there was a meeting on 13 August in which General McPeak laid out a lot of this framework for the senior leadership.

General Johnson: Where was that meeting held?

Dr. Smith: I thought in Washington. I can recall you coming back and briefing the staff a couple of days later. It was your first general announcement to the staff that this restructure was coming.

General Johnson: As I recall, we did have a meeting, and 13 August might have been the right time, where we talked about it in general. At the time, it looked like we were going to get half the tankers. This was just before the CINCs' conference, and the Chief presented it to the CINCs' conference. He also wanted to take all the C-130s and give them to Air Combat Command and the overseas commands. I was successful in convincing him not to do that.

Dr. Smith: Although the reorganization was downward directed, there were positions that you led the MAC and the provisional AMC staffs to take on a number of issues, like combatant command, team travel, operational support airlift, aeromedical evacuation, rescue, basing, and so forth. Can you talk some about your thinking on these issues?



General Johnson: Ask about them individually, and I'll talk about them.

Dr. Smith: Combatant command for airlift and tankers.

General Johnson: The Chief and the Secretary, the Secretary in particular, don't appear to fully understand combatant command. Every force that's in the "Forces For" document, the JCS document, has to be assigned to a unified command. That's called combatant command. I understand that fairly well since I wrote it when I was Director of the Joint Staff. So everything that's assigned to AMC is assigned to TRANSCOM. The forces that are assigned to TAC, and now to ACC [Air Combat Command], were always an exception because when the Army's Forces Command was established as a specified command, the Air Force decided not to make TAC a specified command or a part of Forces Command. Initially, TAC was treated like a specified command for tasking, but now, I believe, most of ACC's forces are assigned to [US] Atlantic Command or some other joint command. So TAC and its successor, ACC, have always been oddities because they cannot have forces in the "Forces For" document. There was some concern about who would own these forces.

Dr. Smith: What about team travel and operational support aircraft?

General Johnson: Team travel was never, and never should be, assigned to a CINC. Operational support aircraft should not have been either, but US Transportation Command was tasked for and responded to OSA [operational support aircraft] requirements in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. So by definition, we had COCOM [combatant command]. It is a blurry question that is not yet resolved, nor do I intend to make an issue of it.

Dr. Smith: As part of the decision on where to place various air resources in the forming of AMC and ACC, what directions did you lead the MAC and provisional AMC staffs in regarding air rescue?

General Johnson: Rescue, aeromedical evacuation, combat camera, Air Weather Service, Defense Courier Service, and so forth, all these were services that our early leaders recognized ought to be assigned to one command. Initially they assigned them to the Air Transport Command. They were assigned there to take care of customers around the world. And that worked very well. General McPeak does not accept that rationale and believes that things in-theater ought to belong to the theater commander.

Dr. Smith: Do you think that Air Rescue Service at some point in the future will move out from AMC to ACC?

General Johnson: That's under active consideration. The problem is, Air Rescue Service and other services like it will not be supported by the theater commanders. One of my most difficult tasks occurred as General Ryan [Thomas M., Jr., Gen, USAF, Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command, 30 June 1983 to 19 September 1985] was about to retire. He was pushing very hard for the MH-60 helicopter which was to be a much too sophisticated H-60 aircraft for rescue. I was head of the Air Staff Board at the time and was charged with working out the priorities for programming within our Air Force. We all admired General Ryan, and I recall writing a message to all the commanders, including General Ryan, that said, "we don't have room in the budget for the MH-60. It's there to serve each of you, and we would like to know if you have anything you can give up to help pay for the MH-60." I called General Ryan, and he was ecstatic. He said, "We'll get support from around the Air Force." We got zero support, and it was killed. In the future, it will be the same. The theater commanders and the Air Combat Command will not support the MH-60. The Air Force must support it, or it will always be prioritized lower than fighters.

Dr. Smith: Another of the difficult issues of reallocating the resources of three different operational commands was basing. Will AMC have enough bases in the right places to rebase the tanker aircraft?

General Johnson: We need a south central US base, ideally McConnell Air Force Base [Kansas], as a tanker base. If we could get McConnell, we would be in good shape. We have done a study in AMC that shows the requirement for tankers versus the basing of tankers. And it clearly shows we need one, about where McConnell is. We would propose moving B-1s from there and making it all tanker. I suspect ACC will oppose that. So I don't know how that will work out, but that's our concern.

Dr. Smith: In your view, why is the Air Force reorganizing? Certainly the end of the Cold War is one of the determining factors.

General Johnson: I don't think that had anything to do with it. I think, number one, that reorganization had been germinating for some time in the Chief's mind. I think that when General Butler acknowledged publicly that it was time to take away the distinction between strategic and tactical, that gave the Chief, and also the Secretary, who I think had the same ideas, the opportunity to reorganize. The Secretary, as I mentioned earlier, had already espoused the philosophy of Global Power and Global Reach, and it made sense to organize the Air Force along those lines. We had to be careful because certain things like aeromedical evacuation and combat air rescue are kind of in the middle and can go either way. I would hope they will stay with AMC somewhat because of overall balance, but also I think they will be better supported in the trade-offs than with ACC or other people. I feel strongly that we should pull all the tankers and all the airlift back together, including aeromedical evacuation. But my advice and counsel has not been accepted on that to date.

Dr. Smith: Were there any lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War that had something to do with the restructuring? The blurring of the distinction between tactical and strategic was certainly reinforced by that conflict.



General Johnson: That was reinforced, but I'm confident that we would have done the same thing without the war. The end of the Cold War certainly decreased the need for strategic bombers. That might have encouraged change. But Desert Shield/Desert Storm gave us an excuse to do things that people already wanted to do.

Dr. Smith: What was MAC's opinion of General McPeak's original proposal regarding objective wings, which is another aspect of the Air Force reorganization?

General Johnson: I'm not sure how objective wings began. I must tell you that we went to a meeting in Washington, it happened to be at Andrews, on objective wings with all the four-stars, or perhaps just the CONUS ones. Certainly I was there. And with some minor exceptions, such as comptroller squadrons, which are much too small to be squadrons, and some other things, my view on the big issues was the same as the Chief's view. In many cases our two views ran counter to everyone else's, but carried the day. The only thing that we did differently was the maintenance in our large aircraft wings, the C-5 and C-141 units. I was successful in convincing the Chief that maintenance should be kept under the logistics group as opposed to being put in the flying squadrons because while the aircraft go around the world, the squadrons do not move. Moreover, our maintenance capability is distributed throughout the airlift system. So I was successful there. But on many issues, the Chief and I were alone and carried the day. You might find one or two little things that I would have gone the other way on, but in general I was pleased with it.

Dr. Smith: Can you recall any of those other issues that you and the chief disagreed on?

General Johnson: I didn't raise the issue about the comptroller squadrons. I don't know how it got started but it should have never been. I remember once mildly opposing putting the chaplain on the wing commander's staff instead of on the group commander's. I think he could very well serve the group commander since he had been doing that forever. I recall another one about Morale, Welfare, and Recreation that I'm still concerned about. When we put the MWR [Morale, Welfare, and Recreation] and Services [i.e., the service squadrons] together, we chose to make MWR a squadron, which is OK. If you choose to make it a squadron, you have to figure out how you are going to have a civilian, when the civilian is most qualified, to command that squadron. More often than not, certainly in our command, the civilian is always the most qualified in the MWR area because we had excluded military from that career field. In the Tactical Air Forces, certainly in TAC, they always had military personnel in charge of MWR on the bases. I would have liked to have seen the new MWR and Services organization kept as a directorate so we wouldn't have the problem of putting a civilian in charge of a military organization. It doesn't make sense to me to put someone in charge and then say the deputy, who is military, really does the discipline. I was directly involved in establishing the wing command centers, with all of the command functions in one facility. I stood alone on the issue of consolidating the operations and logistics plans functions into a single wing plans office. I offered to back off, but the Chief said he liked my idea better than the others, so we went that way. So, in general, I am pleased with the objective wing.

Dr. Smith: Turning to the Tanker Airlift Control Center: what was the thinking behind organizing that outfit?

General Johnson: That's a very interesting thing in that sometime before, when we last reduced the numbered air force headquarters staffs, I had proposed doing this. My advisor at the time, General Kondra, and others, convinced me that I should not do that, that the system would not work unless we had decentralized execution. I was always concerned that no one organization really knew what was going on. I was also concerned that here in the headquarters, our people were not fully used at times. When we had to discontinue the overseas air divisions, and cut the NAF [Numbered Air Force] to 99 people, it gave us a perfect opportunity to establish what I had wanted all along, an Airlift Control Center. And when the tankers came in, it became the Tanker Airlift Control Center. I believe that its wisdom has already been proven. They're still some things to work out.

The biggest thing I was worried about is dropping the ball on important coordination activities, the most important of which is diplomatic clearances. In reading this quarter's wing commander's comments, I'm concerned that that's not perfect yet. The biggest diplomatic clearance center was the Twenty-First Air Force, and Mr. Tom Wellmon [Flight Clearance Specialist assigned to the International Operations Division] had been doing diplomatic clearances there for many years, and was very good at it. I will tell you a little story here to juice up your history. The only thing the Chairman criticized me for as we kicked off Desert Shield was that we told the embassies around the world that we were taking troops to Saudi before the State Department did. We were directed to plan the missions, and Mr. Wellmon sent out the appropriate dip clearance messages, and all of a sudden the embassies around the world figured out what we were doing. General Powell was somewhat excited about that but got over it fairly quickly. But Mr. Wellmon was doing what he was supposed to do. Looking back, if we had been more careful, we might have gone through more secure channels with the embassies. But my point is Mr. Wellmon did his job properly, and no one ever told him to be sensitive about it. You can write in the history that we told the embassies before the State Department did that we were going to go to war.



Dr. Smith: What were the most difficult tasks associated with activating and bringing up to speed the Tanker Airlift Control Center?

General Johnson: There were several things at work. Number one, we needed a larger area. The base put together a team that built the TACC very, very quickly. But then we had to establish its role. Certainly, no one wanted to give up anything. In some of the quarterly letters from commanders I am reading now, the overseas commanders say that the TACC is not properly doing this, that, or the other. They still want to operate the way they did before. The dip clearances was a great concern. Then there was the issue of manning. Unfortunately, at the same time we were establishing the TACC, we had an all volunteer manning policy, which meant we had to convince people to come to the TACC. They were reluctant because over time, we have not promoted people in the command and control business very well. We didn't want the old majors, we wanted the young captains to come. So it took us longer to man the TACC than I would have liked.

The greatest disappointment of the whole thing, and this goes back to the reorganization, is that we lost a relationship in the theater which hopefully someday will be recovered. If it's not, it will be the greatest loss certainly in my tenure. That was the dual-hatted division commander relationship, where the airlift division commander not only worked for MAC, but also for the overseas commander. We had a seamless situation because he handled the C-130 airlift for the theater commander, and he also integrated the strategic airlift. And now there's no such office. That worries me a very great deal. We're trying to work out ways to overcome that. We have something working right now, an exercise called Sand Eagle. In Sand Eagle, we established two things. We established a TRANSCOM liaison with the unified commander, in this case the commander of a joint task force; and then we established a commander of mobility forces at the Air Force component headquarters. His job is to coordinate the tanker and airlift requirements. If we can get that working, perhaps we can convince the Chief that this is the way we ought to do business. The Chief [of Staff of the Air Force, General McPeak] is on record as wanting the

theater commander to do everything. But he doesn't have the capability to do it, so we're trying to prove through exercises a new concept of how we can provide that support.

Dr. Smith: What's been the customer response to the TACC after several months now?

General Johnson: The responses I've received are mixed. Most customers like it because they know exactly where to go to for help. One European commander in his quarterly report stated that the TACC told him that worrying about Russian navigators who showed up during an exercise wasn't their concern. Of course, my note on the letter said everything is the TACC's concern. I worry about the TACC having too much power and influence and becoming imperial and arrogant. General Handy [John W., Brig Gen, USAF, Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center] is working very hard to make sure that doesn't happen. Except for diplomatic clearances, I know of no problems. Some people predict that the TACC will be overwhelmed in a conflict. I don't think that'll happen. If we really get the GDSS [Global Decision Support System] working properly, then the TACC won't have to make ten phone calls; they'll make one entry in the GDSS, and everybody will be updated. So, technology will allow the TACC to be successful.

Dr. Smith: You mentioned that the execution of airlift operations used to be decentralized under MAC. We had numbered air forces and the airlift divisions. The airlift divisions are gone. The rest of the execution authority has been brought into the TACC. Where does that leave the NAFs? What kind of role do you envision them playing?

General Johnson: Having been in the Pacific, you'll understand something called the ATO [Air Tasking Order] used by the Tactical Air Forces. Think of the TACC as putting out an Air Tasking Order and following up on it. The ATO skips various echelons and goes directly to the units executing the missions. We're doing the same thing. The NAF still monitors execution through the GDSS. But now the NAF commanders are charged with being commanders, with getting out and being with the

units. They're charged with facilitating. They aren't tied up every day looking at execution, so they can be true commanders. And I personally think there's plenty to do there, and they can serve that role very well.

We've also placed the NAF commanders in an evaluation role. We've said that they will lead the evaluation teams that go out and visit their bases. The Chief [of Staff of the Air Force, General McPeak] has insisted that they be qualified in an aircraft and be able to give check rides. So, their responsibilities have been directed more in command channels.

Dr. Smith: Do you see those responsibilities still requiring a three-star billet in the future?

General Johnson: Yes.

Dr. Matthews: I would like to back up a few questions here. When discussing the Air Force reorganization, you used the word "holy" to describe the philosophy of disestablishing three commands and creating two new ones. I trust you meant blessed rather than full of holes?

General Johnson: I meant that this was the right way to do it so that everyone could feel good about it. If I say, "I'm going to take you over," that's a superior/subservient relationship. What I was trying to do was to say, "Let's stand back and really disestablish three and start two more." Jay will tell you that I've bent over backwards to do that. I've changed signs. I've changed names. I've pulled down pictures of former CINCMACs--to my own embarrassment when I tried to show someone her husband's picture. But we really strained to make sure we disestablished MAC and established the Air Mobility Command. I trust ACC has done that too. I don't think they've worked at it quite as hard as we have.

Dr. Matthews: In other words, you approached it from the standpoint of starting something new and going forward to the future.



General Johnson: Right.

Dr. Matthews: Why would General McPeak be motivated to "break up MAC?"

General Johnson: I don't know. There are several possible answers. He might have been disappointed with something that MAC did along the way. Coming from the TAF [Tactical Air Forces], he always felt that MAC was not as sharp as the TAF. And when he was commander of the Pacific [Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF)], he tried to do several of the things that he's done now, and the Chief [of Staff of the Air Force] said, "No." He tried to take over weather units in the Pacific belonging to the Air Weather Service, and we were successful in thwarting his efforts. When he became Chief, I suspect that he decided he could do what he wanted to do.

Dr. Matthews: Do you feel that TRANSCOM's customers, particularly the Army, had adequate input into the Air Force restructuring process?

General Johnson: Absolutely not.

Dr. Matthews: What would you point to in particular?

General Johnson: Pope [Air Force Base]. The Army was not a partner; they were issued the changes. The Chief of Staff of the Army [GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, USA] was gracious enough to agree with the Air Force changes, but the Army certainly was not consulted ahead of time.

Dr. Matthews: Would you please discuss the Air Force reorganization wearing your CINCTRANS hat?

General Johnson: I'll be glad to. My great concern from a Transportation Command standpoint is that we currently have six commands that operate airlift and tanker assets. The six commands are obviously AMC, ACC, USAFE, PACAF, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. Unless you have a very strong lead command relationship, you're going to get into deep trouble. Our charter in Air Mobility Command has given us

the right to write the regulations, to manage the fleet, and so forth. If one of those six commands chooses to go their own way, then we will not have a unified effort in mobility.

Dr. Smith: What do you think overall about the Air Force reorganization? Has it made sense?

General Johnson: It makes sense if you want to do away with the Strategic Air Command. The way we did that was as good as can be done. I disagree totally on how we've broken up the tankers and the airlift. We've set ourselves up to have a catastrophic problem at some point. It'll be our job in Air Mobility Command to keep it pulled together, but it would sure be a lot easier if AMC owned all those assets.

Dr. Smith: In what ways will AMC's having control of the predominance of the airlift and tanker forces improve our future mobility operations?

General Johnson: We found in Desert Shield/Desert Storm that we didn't coordinate very well on bedding down big airplanes. Number one, Air Mobility Command can handle that much, much better. We can also better use our limited assets to project forces, to give us true Global Reach, by pulling together the tankers and the airlift. So, from that standpoint, it was the right decision. Having been in SAC for awhile, I know that tankers were not treated as equals. I believe they will be equal partners in Air Mobility Command. We've worked very hard to make sure that's true. So, I believe the tanker community will be better served in Air Mobility Command.

Dr. Smith: Will one of those ways that we can make better use of the tankers include exploiting their cargo and passenger-carrying capability?

General Johnson: We certainly will use the KC-10 more efficiently. We will use the KC-135 some for cargo and passenger carrying, perhaps, but we'll never, ever try to make it an airlifter. It would be very expensive to change the floor and put in rollers. Plus, the KC-135Rs have a duct that runs the length of the cargo compartment and then, at the front,

branches out to the wing. The auxiliary power unit forces air through that duct to start the engines. The duct blocks the cross-section of the cargo compartment, making its use as a universal airlifter very, very difficult, if not impossible.

Dr. Smith: You talked a little already about the Mobility Requirements Study, calling it a landmark study. You discussed it primarily with regard to its importance on the maritime side. What do you also see as the strengths and weaknesses of that study on the air mobility side?

General Johnson: It did a good job on sealift. It did a good job on the airlift structure. It did a good job on the surface transportation. Almost as a given going in, it was decided that because of resource constraints the study would not allow the C-17 requirement to float. The final draft, in essence, traded off C-17s for prepositioning. I don't believe the study includes enough airlift to accommodate the additional prepositioning. To close 16,000 Marines in a squadron of four or five Maritime Prepositioning Ships takes about 250 C-141 equivalents. During Desert Shield, it took 264 aircraft the first time we moved that large of a force. I asked how many of those 250 C-141 loads could have been moved on commercial passenger aircraft, and the answer was 34. The reason for so low a number is that you don't preposition afloat high-value equipment such as helicopters, some weapons, and so forth. So, you still have a tremendous cargo airlift requirement to close a unit on prepositioned ships. Most people don't recognize that. The study does not. The study was so good overall that I chose not to disagree. I brought the subject up, but the study did so much for us that it was not worth fighting over.

Dr. Matthews: Is there any way in the next two volumes that we could rectify that inadequacy?

General Johnson: No, because it had to do with affordability. Although other alternatives in the study recognized we don't have enough airlift, we made the right decision in selecting the affordability alternative. And the study does talk about the potential future need for, I think it was 34, C-17s.



Dr. Matthews: I missed a chance earlier to ask you some questions about TRANSCOM's proposed charter and our organization. When you took over as CINCTRANS, you and I discussed the possibility of merging MTMC and MSC into a surface transportation component command. You at first thought that was a good idea, and then, for various reasons, you decided that it wasn't. Have you changed your mind on that issue?

General Johnson: It could work either way. The idea originally came from Mr. Derek Vander Schaaf, the Deputy DOD Inspector General. Twice, we successfully dissuaded the Secretary of Defense from adopting that approach. There's great advantage in having links to the services, and that's what components do for you. In the future, when we use Defense Business Operations Fund procedures--DBOF-T for transportation--the service lines will be somewhat blurred, but we will still need the services. Furthermore, we will still need our people to have service connections. So, I still support three components. I believe we can do our job very, very well by using the components. It could work the other way. Then we would become a Defense agency, and that would take away a great deal. A CINC has stature and opportunities that the head of a Defense agency lacks. I believe that in the current arrangement we serve our warfighters better than we would as a Defense agency, and I don't think it would save any resources.

Dr. Matthews: Are there any other organizational changes we should contemplate in the future either in the field, in the components, or internally in USTRANSCOM headquarters that would better serve our customers?

General Johnson: We have liaisons at various places. At one point, I advocated making those liaisons at the unified commands into booking offices. I think at some point we will evolve to that arrangement. For example, when [US]EUCOM [US European Command] has a movement requirement, they would go to the booking office and work with us to arrange the transportation. I had also envisioned that the booking office would be the core of information. If a unified command didn't have the

information they needed, the booking office would either have it or could get it for them. In other words, it would be a super liaison for them. EUCOM, in particular, wants to establish a movements control office, and they would like our people to be a full part of that. I don't mind them being collocated with the EUCOM people, but if we're part of that office, then our people cease to be Transportation Command liaison officers. They have to work for us to be able to provide the support that those unified commands need. I cannot afford to give EUCOM the people to run their movement control office. I have no problem with collocating our booking office with their movement control office, but it must continue to work for TRANSCOM or we will lose all the synergism that we have.

Dr. Matthews: What prompted the establishment of the J8 [Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate] here in TRANSCOM?

General Johnson: We established a J8 for several reasons. We had a Comptroller shop that was established to provide budgeting for TRANSCOM headquarters. We had a Plans shop that did programming and budgeting, and we had the legislative liaison. So, in essence, we had three different budgeting and programming offices. We pulled all these together, and J8 was the right title. Based on available talent, we chose to dual-hat the J5 [USTRANSCOM Plans and Policy Directorate], Admiral Clark, [Vernon E., RADM, USN] as the J8. We chose not to call him J5/8, as we had done with the J3/4, but to say, "Okay, you have a J5 hat, and you have a J8 hat." While the dividing line between J3 and J4 activities is kind of blurred, the J5 and J8 have distinctly different responsibilities. I believe that's a good organization. Captain Hood [William T. T., Jr., CAPT, USN, Deputy Director, TCJ8] has done a good job establishing it, and we're getting the very best programmer, budgeteer, in the entire Navy--people on the Navy staff tell me what a great guy he is--to be the new Deputy J8 [CAPT Robert R. Osterhoudt, USN]. The J8 is going to have an increasingly difficult job in running the DBOF-T. The funds will come to J8, and we will distribute them directly to our components. So, our J8 responsibilities are going to multiply, perhaps, more than the others.



Dr. Matthews: Should it be headed then by a flag?

General Johnson: There's no way to get more flags. That's why we chose to have J5 wear both hats. The current J5 can handle both hats very, very well. Future J5s may or may not, but we'll have to work that out later. We're very fortunate with our flag officers now. Our DCINC was once our biggest customer and understands the other end. Our J3/4 had been the COMALF [Commander of Airlift Forces] during Desert Storm. Our J5 and J8 had been an O-6 on the Joint Staff working the Crisis Action Team during Desert Shield/Desert Storm and understands the JCS perspective. And our J6 [John R. Wormington, Brig Gen, USAF] brings a tremendous background in program directorship and program management, which will help him bring on our computer systems. So, we're very well blessed on our staff with our flag officers. And our historians.

Dr. Matthews: Are there any other organizational changes needed of the magnitude of creating a J8? We're missing a "7." Should we throw one in for good measure?

General Johnson: We don't need a "7." Our legal side will increase somewhat. Our contracting staff, for oversight, will be increased. I know the J3/4 wants many more people. The J2 [USTRANSCOM Intelligence Directorate] also needs more people to establish a JTIC [Joint Transportation Intelligence Center]. We have a JTIC, but it's grossly undermanned. The J2 is dual-hatted as the AMC Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence. As we reallocate all the joint billets, we ought to be able to get enough to establish a proper JTIC. We've been promised some manpower, and I think it'll come.

Dr. Smith: Sir, this talk about flag officer billets in TRANSCOM reminded me of a question I had intended to ask about our AMC NAFs. About a year ago, those NAFs were changed from two-star to three-star billets, and I wondered if you could give me some insight on how that happened.



General Johnson: Sure. We were reducing the number of general officers on the Air Staff, and we had the head room. Those positions should have always been lieutenant general positions.

Dr. Matthews: What has USTRANSCOM and its component commands done to strengthen ties between the US military and the former Soviet military?

General Johnson: Well, we certainly have carried the flag of our country in visiting the various parts of the former Soviet Union. We have not established sister relationships. There was a program to do that, and it was done with the tankers and the bombers, but I don't think it was done by anyone else. I don't know where that stands. We have gone into the former Soviet Union more than anybody else, but we have not established those relationships. The wing at Charleston [Air Force Base, South Carolina] was to be our first one to establish a sister unit relationship, but I don't know what happened. To my knowledge, it has not matured.

Dr. Matthews: Talking about organizational changes, is there any way the JCS might consider reorganizing to help us do our job better?

General Johnson: Like?

Dr. Matthews: Well, studies are done in different places. Should they be consolidated, or should the Joint Staff reorganize to do transportation better?

General Johnson: They won't change to do transportation better. I would like the J3 to show more interest in us. The J3 during the war, General Kelly [Thomas W., LTG, USA, Director, Joint Staff Operations Directorate], only bad-mouthed MAC. In fact, I think I said at the last session that we were getting bad publicity, and it was suggested by my friend, General Carns, who was Director [of the Joint Staff] at the time, that I send a "personal for" message to the Chairman every night. I started doing that, and the bad-mouthing stopped. The J3 has not always been as supportive as they ought to be. The J4 is very jealous of their relationship of "owning" TRANSCOM. If the MRS [Mobility

Requirements Study] had been done by the J4, it would have failed. By moving studies to the J8 [Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate], it was successful. The reason why it would have failed in J4 is not that they don't have good people, but because they have vested interests. Again, I'd like to work more directly with the J3, but the J4 has the LRC [Logistics Readiness Center] that, in essence, gets the tasking and passes it to us. You're not going to reorganize the Joint Staff any time soon.

Dr. Matthews: How has USTRANSCOM contributed to jointness in the Department of Defense?

General Johnson: Being a common-user support command, our transportation assets are allocated through the joint system. The JCS allocates the transportation, and the supported CINC sets the priorities. So we work in a totally joint environment. We also try to instill discipline in the transportation system, and never tilt in favor of one service or another. We meet the allocation from JCS and the priorities of the supported CINC.

Dr. Matthews: I know we've also established the first ever Joint Transportation Reserve Unit here at USTRANSCOM. Are some of the other unified commands looking at doing something similar?

General Johnson: It's an interesting concept. The services use their reserves to support the headquarters differently. The Navy had a reserve unit [Naval Reserve USTRANSCOM Detachment 118] that supported the headquarters. The Army and Air Force always used Individual Mobilization Augmentees. An IMA [Individual Mobilization Augmentee] works directly for the person they support, whereas a unit is assigned a specific mission. We added the IMAs to the Navy reserve unit and, in essence, they helped run the USTRANSCOM Crisis Action Team. A full 40 percent of the members of the Crisis Action Team throughout the war were reservists. After the war, we asked to have the first-ever joint reserve unit. It was approved. I believe it will become the model for all unified commands.

Dr. Matthews: Do you believe there are any areas in the DOD where jointness has gone too far?

General Johnson: I'm not sure it can ever go too far. There's no concept in my mind that implies that jointness could ever go too far. It's certainly gone further in some areas than in others.

Dr. Matthews: Any areas in particular that we need to concentrate on making more "purple?"

General Johnson: Well, I think that when it comes to warfighting, there is no such thing as a service. We work for unified commands, and we ought to wear our purple hat, or we're not part of the combined combat forces.

Dr. Matthews: Do you feel that USTRANSCOM has the right service mix? We've been accused in the past of being too "blue."

General Johnson: We have the right service mix in our fully assigned personnel. We still have a number of people who work for both TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command in a dual rule. Eventually TRANSCOM should get the full-time slots. But if you look at full-time slots, we're pretty equal in the services.

Dr. Matthews: Are there any billets in particular you'd recommend changing the service of in TRANSCOM?

General Johnson: No. I think that one service should never have both the J5/J8 and the J3/J4. Those should always be from different services. Of course the CINC and Deputy CINC should be from different services. There are no positions that I see that necessarily ought to belong to one service or another. The J6 could be any service. We've been well served with the Air Force J6 only because the Air Force is our executive agent, and we ultimately have to go to them to get funding for our projects.

Dr. Matthews: Would that change under DBOF? Will we have the possibility of having another service head the J6?



General Johnson: We could have another service today. Under DBOF, the equipment purchases would still come through the executive agent service.

Dr. Matthews: Do we need a transportation school or a mobility school to teach mobility and develop doctrine from the joint perspective?

General Johnson: Long term, yes. The transportation school of the US Army has a joint course. We participated in building that course. It's not under the US Transportation Command. Perhaps we need to play a little bigger role there, but that's the proper place. For the last year, the joint school at Norfolk, the Armed Forces Staff College, has brought each class here, and we've actually sat them down with JOPES. That's a great stride forward. That school is the one that prepares our officers to go out to joint billets. So bringing them here, showing them how we operate, and getting them familiar with our systems is very, very important.

Dr. Matthews: We discussed containerization before, but I'd like to give you a chance to expand upon your earlier comments. You've made this the Year of the Container. I'd like you to tell us why, and what more can we do to containerize unit equipment and ammo. What are the obstacles?

General Johnson: I made 1992 the Year of the Container for a lot of reasons. One, I wanted our staff and our customers to focus on container issues because that's where our nation's strength in sealift lies. There is very little business that our country's Merchant Marine carriers participate in other than container trade. There is very little Roll-On/Roll-Off trade in our country except for car carriers, and most of those are foreign-flagged. The ones that are US-flagged have decks that are much too close together and too weak to handle our equipment. So if we want to use the US maritime capability, we really have to stress containers. The container ships can carry all sorts of equipment either in containers or using flat racks. We in the military have not done that for several reasons. Our customers stress unit integrity, perhaps to a fault, and don't allow us to use what makes sense from the shipping standpoint. We have to be able to show that we can in fact take the

equipment and marry it up with the personnel at the proper place and the proper time. Then we'll get the units to go with containers. There's no reason in the world why we can not do much, much more with containers. The first focus was on ammunition during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. We didn't use containers near enough for ammunition. They tell me that four container ships could have carried all the ammunition that we carried in breakbulk, and much more safely. In Europe, initially we were bringing all the conventional ammunition back to the United States breakbulk. And now, as we speak, we are up above 30 percent, and by September we'll be up to 70 percent, of the Army ammunition coming home in containers. The Air Force use of containers has gone up more rapidly just because theirs is better configured to fit in containers.

Dr. Matthews: How important is it that we get a containerized ammo port on the West Coast?

General Johnson: It's important only because we want to have a high throughput capability. Any port that can handle ammo can also handle containers. If you are going to use a containerized ammo system, you need to have a port with certain characteristics. We've looked all up and down the West Coast, and there are pluses and minuses at many different places. Concord is the one that comes out to be the easiest and the best. We have to do an environmental impact review on Concord because ships have to come under the Golden Gate Bridge to get there. We've looked up in the state of Washington, and while there are some isolated port facilities, we don't have the infrastructure, the rail lines and so forth, to bring ammo to the port area economically.

Dr. Smith: Let's turn now to some questions on industrial funding and the Defense Business Operations Fund. How effective has ASIF [Airlift Service Industrial Fund] been during your watch as CINCMAC/CINCAMC?

General Johnson: We could not do our job if we did not have the discipline that ASIF, and also the allocation system, brings. If we had a service that was funded at the DOD level and the customers did not have to pay for it, the discipline would not be there and the system would not work. So our system of transportation would not work without the customer paying. Of course ASIF is the way we do it on the airlift side.

Dr. Smith: Have there been any places that ASIF needed shoring up in the last couple of years, anything that perhaps came out of the Desert Shield experience?

General Johnson: I think that we learned a few things in ASIF. I was proud that MAC moved cargo and collected later, whereas others would collect and then move. But, sometimes MAC was not as expeditious in identifying the customer and collecting. I've asked the TACC to identify the customer, the payer, before the cargo or the people move. This will help us to have more timely and complete billing, and it will help our customers too.

Dr. Smith: Do we need an industrial fund for tanker operations?

General Johnson: I don't know. At some point, I would not be surprised if tankers don't get involved in industrial funding. This will take years. The services will resist that. But in the end, the tankers, like airlift, will probably have to use industrial funds to discipline the system. Today, all users are served by the tanker force. The US Navy doesn't pay anything for the use of our tankers. As their demand goes up, they'll have to pay, or it won't be available. Industrial funding would work for tanker business. I will not personally pursue it, but in the future it will happen.

Dr. Matthews: Sir, would you discuss for us what you see as the advantages and the disadvantages of DBOF?



General Johnson: I will tell you what I know. DBOF is, in the very basic sense, an industrial fund, where a service is provided and paid for by the customer. It provides discipline, it provides emphasis on efficiencies, and it encourages development of a very efficient system. Now some parts of DBOF are misunderstood. If a whole command, or a whole group of people, is under DBOF, some things will still be funded from other than user fees. For instance, MTMC will be under DBOF, but the only fees MTMC receives are the funds that users pay for using the ports. The other activities of MTMC are paid for by means of a government bill of lading. All the overhead of MTMC is paid for now by the US Army. If you put MTMC in a DBOF, then that overhead funding has to go directly into DBOF and then be dispersed from there. MTMC is pretty straightforward. All of MTMC is under TRANSCOM. MSC is quite different. Probably over two thirds of MSC has nothing to do with common-user transportation, but rather is fleet support. Fleet support would not be in the transportation DBOF. MSC will have a little difficulty dividing the overhead between those two missions. Air Mobility Command is also complicated. The Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force are negotiating on how it ought to be done in AMC. Certainly the common-user transportation ought to be under DBOF-T. The tankers and other activities probably should not be. We will do whatever OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the Air Force decide is best.

Dr. Matthews: Are there any other ways that DBOF might change USTRANSCOM's and its components' ways of doing business?

General Johnson: DBOF will change US Transportation Command and its components in that DBOF will be issued to the Transportation Headquarters, and then TRANSCOM will re-issue it to the components. TRANSCOM will be directly involved in the financial workings of the components, in peace and war. This will bring our commands much closer together.

Dr. Matthews: We're going to be funded out of DBOF for our headquarters operations. What does that mean for your staff here at the headquarters level?

General Johnson: It should not mean anything. In other words, the staff should be the same size, and they won't see any difference between DBOF and service funding. Over time, I would be surprised if all DBOFs were not required to show improvements in efficiency. So at some point I wouldn't be surprised to see us encouraged to be more efficient through the DBOF. Certainly I think that's the only way you sell DBOF within the Department of Defense.

Dr. Matthews: What will be the ramifications under DBOF for civilian personnel as far as staffing, classification, and reduction in force for instance?

General Johnson: I think that with our new responsibilities, the civilian dimension should improve significantly. We'll have a requirement for more expertise on the civilian side, and I think that it will expand over time in the Transportation Command.

Dr. Matthews: This discussion is related to the business case. I had the privilege of reading the first draft of our business case and was impressed by how it interrelated ideas of quality, strategic vision, and profitability. Is that our goal in TRANSCOM, to run the command as a business in the black?

General Johnson: We are a customer of the Department of Defense and support our many customers around the world, and we have to pay our own way. We have to develop a business case so that systems we install contribute to efficiency. A business case in a commercial venture would be profit, ours would be efficiency and service to the customer. We are quite fortunate that as we went through the process of building the business case, we were also beginning a quality journey. We were able to tie the two together. Certainly that is a good way to go about developing a realistic business case.

Dr. Smith: Turning now to quality issues, could you provide your assessment of the quality movement in TRANSCOM and in Air Mobility Command?

General Johnson: The quality movements in Air Mobility Command and TRANSCOM were intentionally kept separate. We began the quality movement in AMC back in mid-1990. We intentionally did not involve Transportation Command at the time. The DCINC then, Admiral Butcher, and I decided not to move TRANSCOM into quality at that particular time. So I've had the good fortune to go through the initial stages of a quality journey twice in different commands. When TRANSCOM began I asked them not to go to AMC, but to go to other places to seek help in building the quality program. It wasn't that I didn't like what AMC was doing, but I didn't want the fact that I had a foot in both camps to drive the quality journey in the Transportation Command. More importantly, I wanted Transportation Command to own its quality movement. I wanted them to have a stake in the outcome. If we had gone across the street and brought the AMC quality program to Transportation Command, the people in TRANSCOM would not have bought into it.

Quality has certainly been very, very helpful in both commands. The Air Mobility Command is further along than Transportation Command only because they started sooner. Also, AMC has a little advantage in that they talk to and work with the people who actually produce the product. The Transportation Command, however, is a headquarters that deals with other headquarters. Our staff does not work directly with the people moving cargo; AMC, MSC, and MTMC do that. By focusing on processes, we have been able to make great improvements. That is certainly true in AMC, and I see worthwhile opportunity. Quality gives you a good framework to make decisions and make continuous improvements.

Dr. Matthews: General Johnson, what role has the CINC played, or should the CINC play, in instituting and moving the quality philosophy into the other two components, MSC and MTMC?



General Johnson: When we began quality in TRANSCOM, one of the first things we did was bring together the leaders of the headquarters and the commanders of the components to develop the TRANSCOM vision. Thus, our components got to buy into the TRANSCOM headquarters vision. I have not dictated an approach to quality to MSC or MTMC. Each of their services has a little different approach to quality, and I'm not qualified to judge the success of either of those programs.

Dr. Smith: Sir, were you the instigator of the quality movement in both commands?

General Johnson: Yes.

Dr. Smith: Where did you pick up your personal commitment to quality, and what prompted you to begin implementing quality in AMC in mid-1990 and later on in TRANSCOM?

General Johnson: When I was selected to become the commander of MAC and Transportation Command, I wrote out some things that I thought our commands ought to do. In MAC, I wanted to focus on our people, facilities, physical fitness, and doing things better. Early on, I gained support from MAC to do those programs. Just before I came to Scott, someone gave me a book on Total Quality Management and said "you ought to read this." And as I read the book I realized we were using total quality principles to do things, but we were not really committed to quality. We didn't have a quality culture. General Loranger [Donald E., Jr., Brig Gen, USAF, Inspector General], General Kondra [Vernon J., Maj Gen, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations], General Nowak [John M., Maj Gen, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics], and others in MAC realized that we could put our programs together in a Total Quality Management setting, and a powerful quality culture would evolve from it. So on the MAC side, it was pretty straightforward. We were motivating people, empowering them, and we could make tremendous progress on several things we wanted to do using a quality approach.

It was more difficult on the TRANSCOM side. Quite frankly, Admiral Butcher asked me not to bring quality over right away. Later he became very much interested in quality and asked me for books on quality to read for his personal development. By the time we got started on quality in AMC, the war was just about to come. We had not yet begun to implement quality in TRANSCOM, so we delayed it there until after the war. Since the war, TRANSCOM has done great things in quality and is moving along the quality road very, very well.

Dr. Smith: What are some of the difficulties that you encountered in implementing quality in both commands?

General Johnson: The biggest problem, of course, was gaining a commitment to quality at the top levels, and then the intermediate levels of the command. The bottom levels were always eager to embrace quality. So first I had to convince my staff, some of whom were never convinced, and then we had to convince everyone all the way down. We're quite fortunate that General Loranger and the Inspector General staff, which we renamed Quality Support and Readiness, were able to adopt quality very quickly. When the IG [Inspector General] went out to visit the units, and they demonstrated a commitment to quality, people said, "Ah! It's not just an inspection in different clothing." So the QS [Quality Support and Readiness] was very, very helpful in deploying quality very quickly throughout the command.

Dr. Smith: The IG, which was redesignated Quality Support and Readiness about a year and a half ago, was the catalyst for instilling quality throughout MAC. Now, effective 1 August that organization is going to be called the IG again. Does this signal that AMC has reached a major milestone on the quality journey?

General Johnson: It signals that a major milestone has been reached and that names are not quite so important. The Air Force, certainly the Inspector General leadership, did not embrace the change to Quality Support and Readiness. The IG is a very honorable institution that we have had in our services since we became a nation. General George Washington and Baron von Steuben developed that term and that function. But the IG in AMC is forever changed because of its quality journey. They will not turn back on the quality approach they take on inspections. I thought it was time to change back to the more traditional name, and we will do that on the 1st of August. The reason we changed the name in the first place is that we were looking for a focal point for quality. Initially we chose the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs as the quality leader, who was then Colonel Loranger. Then we figured that if we were ever going to do quality, we ought to get the IG changed first, and we put the quality office there. Once we did that, we realized that perhaps we ought to change the title of the IG to Quality Support and Readiness. That change really made a big difference, not only in our command, but outside also. It showed the world that I was willing to change a whole tradition. Furthermore, when those Quality Support and Readiness teams went out to visit the units, they showed that we were serious about quality. They made it happen, not me.

Dr. Smith: So while the name changes from QS back to IG, the principles of doing quality assessments and results oriented versus compliance oriented operational readiness inspections remain?

General Johnson: Yes. The Air Force IG would like to standardize inspections or assessments. The Air Force Quality Council, of which I'm a part, decided that the unit effectiveness inspections would be called Quality Air Force Assessments. How we do those is left up to the individual commands. We'll continue doing our Quality Air Force Assessments much like the Quality Visits. We kept the same name but we've changed the way we go about doing ORIs [operational readiness inspections]. And we've gained support from the Air Force and even beyond for both of these programs.



Dr. Smith: Here's a case, then, where quality principles not only improved command operations, but led AMC to have an impact on the Air Force as a whole. Are there other examples that you're proud of where quality has improved command operations in TRANSCOM and AMC?

General Johnson: In both commands, our people believe and know that they are empowered to do their jobs. They know that, number one, we'll let them do their jobs; number two, we will listen. Performance has improved dramatically. When we send people a long way from home, we empower them to make decisions. They have more facts than we have back here. We have worked very hard to push decision-making to the very lowest levels. We certainly have to integrate the whole effort, and we do that at TRANSCOM. Our components are more and more seeing the value added by the TRANSCOM staff and are asking for more assistance. On the AMC side, it's the same story. The TACC is in charge of command and control, but they let the aircraft commander decide if the airplane is flyable or not. They let the aerial porter do his job, and more importantly, they empower him to do it better.

Dr. Smith: Do you think quality will be more than just another fad?

General Johnson: I think so. We have had a lot of fads during our time. But quality is not a program, it's a culture, and no one can ever say, "I don't want to do things in a quality manner." No one can ever say, "I don't want to be part of a quality culture." So I believe that it will stick. I know in AMC that we've had an NCO [noncommissioned officer] say "quality doesn't belong to H. T. Johnson. It belongs to me, and let someone try to take it away from me." I love that, because that's the way it has to be. I've watched the new tanker units as we stand up Air Mobility Command. They know the things we've done, and they're just thirsting to do some of them. Sometimes I visit a unit, as I did the other day, that has not yet stepped into the modern way of doing business. The commander has not empowered his people. He still has to check up on them and hand-feed them. They will never get better until he changes. Fortunately, I have some control over that. The quality culture is

spreading like wildfire within our command, across our Armed Forces, and hopefully across our country. Our QS and others that have worked in quality have gotten tremendous accolades from academia, journalists, and people who genuinely want to do their jobs better.

Dr. Matthews: The last time we talked to you, you said that it would be a good idea to form a Process Action Team to look at the Defense Fuel Supply Center and its relationship with TRANSCOM. Are there other processes that we should form teams to look at?

General Johnson: As TRANSCOM takes on a much larger, more in-depth role, there are a lot of things that we will need to look at, especially in MTMC's and AMC's areas. Such things as how we handle household goods, how we most efficiently move cargo in the continental United States by surface transportation, how we book transportation for our customers. There are many opportunities. If I could today, I would not commission a hundred PATs [Process Action Teams]. Commissioning a PAT before you are ready is not very useful. Do we have opportunities? Yes. Ten successful years from now, will we have opportunities? You betcha. There will always be opportunities to improve.

Dr. Matthews: Does USTRANSCOM still have a recognition problem? Do we need to work on advertising ourselves to our customers?

General Johnson: We do have a recognition problem. Any support organization will continually have a recognition problem because no matter how good you are, how good your service is, the customer becomes used to that and wants it just a little bit better. Our job is one of demanding continuous improvement, if we're going to continue to gain and to maintain credibility with our customers. I measure credibility in many ways, but one of the best ways is by how often people ask us to help them. If we're asked to help plan, if we're asked to take over activities for others, then that's a tremendous indication of the respect that the community has for us. Our job, and quite frankly the DCINC worries about this more than I do, is to continue to deliver. We want to be careful that our plate doesn't become so full that we can't handle it all.

Dr. Matthews: Why was Admiral Butcher reluctant to adopt quality, and what do you think turned him around?

General Johnson: I think that he was reluctant because we were very, very busy during the war days, and I suspect that initially he didn't appreciate the value of quality. Admiral Butcher, and H. T. Johnson, and Jim Matthews, and maybe even Jay Smith, know that it's much more fun to direct than it is to take the time to help other people become self-motivated. Quality takes an awful lot of time, and I suspect that initially Admiral Butcher felt that we had so much to do that we shouldn't push quality. Later, as I mentioned, he became quite a convert, but he left by the time we really introduced it.

Dr. Matthews: Was there any book in particular that you would recommend to people just getting started on quality? Authors in particular that you would stress?

General Johnson: There are many good books. You are always a product of what you did first, perhaps. Three books that I like best are by Joseph Juran. Juran is one of the early quality gurus. I never was very successful in reading W. Edward Deming's book. Another man that I don't think we pay enough attention to is Karl Albrecht. Quite frankly, he has the words, but he doesn't have the tools. His books are very, very good, and they give me ideas, but Juran and some of the others actually give you checklists. As far as a personal quality book, the best one I have seen is one called Seven Habits of Highly Effective People by Steve Covey. It's good on quality for family life as well as organizational quality.

Dr. Matthews: Our Business Case 1st Draft discusses the Global Transportation Network, not only how it can help us do our business, but how it can save us money. Will the Global Transportation Network be our salvation?



General Johnson: Ultimately, the Global Transportation Network will be the automated data processing system for US Transportation Command. We will still have something like JOPES, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, for the various operation plans. But you have to have a way of communicating the transportation requirement from JOPES to the mode operator. Then you have to follow the shipment, advise a customer when it is arriving, and provide feedback. GTN [Global Transportation Network] will do all of that. But in doing so, it will allow us to do a lot more than just the things I've outlined. It will allow us to have total asset visibility, at least for the time the cargo is in the transportation system. It allows us to execute our missions with better, more timely information. It allows everybody in the system to know the same thing at the same time. In our business, our customers spend a lot of time following up with telephone calls. If the information is there, we don't need to make a phone call.

Dr. Matthews: Are you comfortable with where we are with GTN? Do we need to put more money into it? Push it harder?

General Johnson: I'm never totally comfortable with anything that I'm assigned the responsibility of executing, because I always feel we can and should, and must do things more rapidly than we realistically can. So I'm never totally satisfied because I always have that yearning to go for just a little more. But certainly we are on the right track, and I don't want something that is invented overnight. I want it to evolve, to meet the needs as we go along.

Dr. Matthews: We've talked about JOPES several times in our discussions. Is there anything more we could do to get people to use JOPES in peacetime so that they'll be prepared to use it in wartime?

General Johnson: Every operation that we've done in the last six months or so, we've used JOPES, even when it was easier not to. Even when it was a very small operation. We've also got the Joint Staff to insist that anytime JCS exercise funds are used for an exercise, you must use JOPES. People are finding that it is very convenient to use JOPES, and they are using it. We will continue to work in that direction.

Dr. Matthews: Would you please discuss USTRANSCOM's responsibility for monitoring and evaluating service readiness programs for the active and reserve component units supporting USTRANSCOM?

General Johnson: I'm not sure we have done that as well as we ought to. All CINCs have the responsibility to assess the readiness of their components. None of them do it very well. Most of them use the joint readiness reporting system. And we do that, but I don't think we do that very well. We have not worked as hard as we could, but quite frankly, the only forces we own are in the Air Mobility Command. You can say we own the eight ships in MSC, the eight Fast Sealift Ships. MTMC has a headquarters, but they really don't have very many forces. They don't have truck companies and so forth. They have port operators, and we could assess their readiness. But we have a lot of room to improve.

Dr. Matthews: Our charter states that we're going to have some responsibility for monitoring and evaluating the RRF [Ready Reserve Force]. What does that mean?

General Johnson: The RRF is owned and maintained by the Department of Transportation under the Maritime Administration. In the past, the Navy has had the responsibility to monitor their readiness, but quite frankly no one in the Department of Defense has done it. There has been a great deal of concern about the product that MARAD provides, but yet no one has ever told MARAD exactly what we want. So with that situation, our job is now to go out and write a contract with MARAD to say that we want the following types of ships to be in the

following state of readiness, and this is how we will judge it. That's a very solemn responsibility, but one that we can do and MARAD can meet. We'll have our component, MSC, administer most of that for us.

Dr. Matthews: There are certainly some costs involved in that. Wouldn't there be more breakouts required? And more manpower?

General Johnson: Yes, but we will have to temper our requirements according to the funds available. We can have fewer ships and a higher level of readiness. What we want to do is have some ships that have a ROS [Reduced Operating Status] status. That means that they have some assigned crewmembers, and if we break them out, we add crewmembers to the cadre, if you will, much as we do with the Fast Sealift Ships. In other cases we may say that we don't need this ship for twenty days. But TRANSCOM has that responsibility, and it is properly placed.

Dr. Smith: What are the greatest challenges to readiness facing Air Mobility Command?

General Johnson: If you look at the TRANSCOM headquarters itself, our readiness is measured in our ability to bring together the transportation resources of our nation to serve whoever needs it at the time. So our job is really one of integration, orchestration, and command and control. Our components have to insure that their individual parts are ready. MTMC primarily procures commercial transportation resources, so like TRANSCOM headquarters, it performs an integration effort. MTMC has many opportunities to improve how it accomplishes that. MSC has a similar mission, and also manages the Fast Sealift Ships. MSC has opportunities to improve its readiness, through its relationship with MARAD, and also through improved operation of the ships it currently owns and the ones we are going to buy for MSC so their fleet "will get better." The readiness of AMC will vary depending on the amount of money that is spent on the fleet. It's the only fleet we own, except for



the FSSs. C-5 readiness is quite low. The C-130s and C-141s are in pretty good shape. Overall, the airlift fleet is in pretty good shape, although the KC-10 fleet is not always properly funded.

Dr. Smith: Turning now to Total Force issues: throughout your tenure as USCINCTRANS and CINCMAC/AMC, you've placed great emphasis on the Total Force concept. How important will the reserve component be for USTRANSCOM and AMC in the future?

General Johnson: In transportation, in all the components, we can not operate without the reserves. In AMC, a full 50 percent of our capability is in the reserve force. The same is true in MTMC. They have no Transportation Terminal Units in the active force. All of them are in the reserve forces. In MSC, the Navy control of shipping is totally in the reserve force. So, in transportation, at our headquarters and in our components, we have to be committed to the Total Force. I define the Total Force a little differently than everyone else. I define the Total Force as the active, reserve, the guard, and also the commercial sector. And that's very much a part of everything we do.

Dr. Smith: Looking down the line, do you see the reserve component growing in size?

General Johnson: There will be a continuing desire to transfer more and more to the reserve forces. Our problem is that our day-to-day workload is pretty high, and pure reservists, people who have two jobs, cannot handle it. So we'll have to keep a good portion in the active force to handle the day-to-day workload, with augmentation by the reserves. We'll have to be very careful not to put too much in the reserve forces. One of our biggest jobs is humanitarian lift, and, of course, that's more of an active duty day-to-day mission than a typical reserve mission.

Dr. Smith: What issues regarding the guard and reserve will TRANSCOM and AMC need to focus on more in the future?

General Johnson: We're already focusing heavily on making the guard and reserve a full part of all of our decision-making processes. We try to involve them in everything we do, from day-to-day type activities up through full mobilization. By doing so we make them full partners, so we can depend on them to do the task when the time comes.

Dr. Matthews: We're going to go into a summary now with you General Johnson. What are USTRANSCOM's greatest weaknesses and greatest strengths?

General Johnson: Our greatest strength is obviously the single focus on our mission. We have strong Secretary of Defense and Chairman support. We have reasonably good support from Congress. We have support from the services, but more often than not, the services see jointness as a threat as opposed to an opportunity. Our weaknesses: we need to continually build our credibility in the eyes of those whom we support. Also we will always have to rely on the services for resource support, and they don't want to give up control. To them giving USTRANSCOM control over resources equates to loss of power and influence. Our biggest challenge will continue to be to gain support from the services. At the same time, I would not want to become disassociated from the services, because it is important to have a strong relationship with them and I want to keep that, even though at times it is painful.

Dr. Smith: What about AMC's strengths and weaknesses?

General Johnson: AMC has a little identity crisis with the Secretary of the Air Force, and perhaps with the Chief, but more with the Secretary who wants to treat AMC as only a major command totally under the Department of the Air Force. AMC is a full partner in the joint Transportation Command. Every major command within our Air Force, save for Air Training Command and Air Force Materiel Command, work for a joint command. ACC is not quite like AMC, because they are not tied to just one CINC, although essentially all of their forces work for CINCs. AMC is unique in that they only serve one CINC, CINCTRANS, who in turn serves other CINCs.

Dr. Smith: What about the greatest strengths of Air Mobility Command?

General Johnson: The greatest strength is its tremendous capability to serve not only our country, but countries around the world. Service, the ability to provide transportation to any part of the world, is its strength. AMC provides Global Reach not only for our Air Force, but also our nation. So does the Transportation Command as a whole.

Dr. Matthews: I would imagine people would also be one of our greatest strengths. TRANSCOM has the greatest troops I've ever worked with.

General Johnson: Certainly the members of TRANSCOM are dedicated, and they are professionals. They are committed to one thing, and that is transportation. This is particularly visible in the Army. They have a very strong transportation corps. The other services do not have such a focused approach. The Air Force is more so because of AMC, but in the Navy there's nothing that logically feeds into the transportation business other than some supply activities. The Marine Corps has transportation specialists, but they don't normally come to TRANSCOM. Normally operators come to TRANSCOM headquarters.

Dr. Matthews: Do you think the services are sending us their best and their brightest?

General Johnson: It gets better and better every year, for many reasons, least of which is that in 1994, to be promoted to high level, you must have had joint service. We certainly offer that opportunity. We have been getting very good people, I suspect you noticed that, from the beginning.

Dr. Matthews: Yes, sir.

Dr. Smith: What do you consider to be your biggest successes as USCINCTRANS and CINCAMC?



General Johnson: Success is always in the eye of the beholder. Any success that I take credit for is the people's performance. I personally have done very little, but our people have had the opportunity during the period of time that I've been here to contribute not only in wartime, but also in the humanitarian arena. As you look at what we've done in Just Cause, the desert operations, the activities associated with the end of the Cold War, the achievements are impressive. The ones that are the most personally satisfying, of course, are the humanitarian ones.

Dr. Smith: The real world ops tempo picked up considerably about the time of Just Cause and has remained at a very high level ever since. Do you think this will continue indefinitely?

General Johnson: I don't see any end in sight. Our nation is the only nation in the world that can do the things that we do. More often than not, AMC has the lead among our commands in carrying the nation's flag and its influence around the world. It's a very solemn responsibility, but also a very joyous one to help the peoples of the world. When we go in with America's flag flying high, the nations of the world take note and it helps our country to be the most respected in the world. We're pleased to help maintain that status.

Dr. Matthews: Sir, what would you have done differently during your tenure as CINCTRANS and CINCMAC/AMC?

General Johnson: There are a lot of individual things that I would have done a little differently if I had the chance to do them over again. I guess I would have pushed quality earlier. I would have made some personnel moves a little differently, perhaps. I think I would have made the same moves, but I would have been a little more careful in how I did them.

Dr. Smith: What do you see as the commands' greatest problems in the future?

General Johnson: The greatest challenge is providing service to those we support. Every time we provide a higher level of service, expectations grow. I take that as a great opportunity as opposed to a challenge. But, there is much, much room for us to support our customers more effectively and efficiently. We need no transportation for ourselves. Our job is to provide the full gamut of transportation for others.

Dr. Matthews: Speaking as a visionary, what are the greatest contributions USTRANSCOM can make to the nation and to the world?

General Johnson: Our greatest contribution is to provide true Global Reach for our armed forces and our nation wherever it's needed, within our own country or around the world. We have to provide that in a very responsive, efficient, and effective manner. That's our job, and as I mentioned earlier, no matter how good you get, you can always get better. So, Transportation Command can never declare it has arrived, because as soon as you reach one plateau, you have to set your sights on the next. That's the way it should be and always will be.

Dr. Smith: Who are the people at MAC/AMC and USTRANSCOM that you'll remember the most and why?

General Johnson: I will not pick out individuals, because when I do that I leave out many others. The people I remember most are those who have been able to bring service to our customer to fruition. You can say you remember mostly the people who work in the Crisis Action Team, but yet, you realize that they are only facilitators. The people who are at the front line loading the ships, sailing the ships, operating the ports, arranging transportation, or even flying aircraft are the ones that are most important. Last night I got some pictures from a guy named Marty D.; his name is Marty D. Parnell. He is in the 5th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron at Mildenhall [Air Base, United Kingdom]. When I met Marty D., who is a very colorful individual, he was preparing to take a team to pick up Topaz II, which is a space reactor from the former Soviet Union, at St. Petersburg, Russia. He very graciously talked to

me after the mission, and he later sent me some pictures of him and his crew doing their job. Those are the people who mean the most to me. Many of them are nameless and faceless, but yet they all have very special names and faces that mean an awful lot to me and all that we support. You certainly get to know the headquarters people better, but they are no better than the people out in the field making it happen.

Dr. Matthews: How would you describe H. T. Johnson's leadership style?

General Johnson: I hope you would describe it in terms of empowering people to do their job, and then supporting them in the process. I don't think there is a real title for the kind of leadership that I've aspired to and our nation needs. It has to do with the quality revolution, if you will. It's called empowerment. It's called continuous improvement; not always waiting for a gigantic leap, but yet improving each item, making it a little better as you go along. I'm not a person who has to have the perfect solution before acting. Each solution, hopefully, is a little better as we go along, but I don't believe that we do very well with gigantic leaps. Often we fall flat. We make continuous improvements all the time, and that would be my approach to life, to make those continuous improvements in our quality environment. In doing that, you have to empower, and by empower I mean trust and have confidence in your people and let them do their work. They are much more effective than I would be in making decisions myself.

I was asked at a conference run by the Juran Institute, attended by thousands of people from around the world, "If your job is so important, how can you afford to be away and be down visiting with us?" And my response was that I had such great trust and confidence in my two deputies at MAC and TRANSCOM, that I felt very comfortable being away. That has certainly been my philosophy throughout my tenure. If it doesn't work when you're away, you have problems. That's a real measure of success, if the organization works when you're not there.



Dr. Matthews: You certainly empowered me to do my job and go in directions that I never dreamed I would have a chance to go. The statistical work I did during the war would be one example. Decorating this headquarters to give it the status and class it deserves to have as a unified command is another. What are ways that Jay and I might have been able as historians to help you and your staff do your jobs better?

General Johnson: I believe strongly in the role of the historian, and I believe that the historian has to be actively involved in day-to-day activities. You were involved in every CAT I think. I don't know why your wife puts up with you working so hard. And I remember a couple of times that I, and perhaps Admiral Butcher even more, were pretty tough on you about numbers. The historian ought not to be in the operations analysis business. Yet, you agreed to do that, and there is no question that you understood what went on much better because you lived it.

I first met Jay out at headquarters PACAF. I can almost tell you what we talked about as he was coming out to be the PACAF historian. Throughout, at PACAF and here at Scott, Jay and his staff were writing tomes on individual events. I encouraged them to capture events; not accolades for H. T. Johnson, but accolades for Marty D. Parnell. Accolades for people who went out and made things happen. I was confronted one day about the Desert Express. I was asked by the Chief, "Well, who did that?" I could easily have said, "I did." Instead I said, "I believe Colonel Craig Thompson [Craig R., Col, USAF, Deputy Director for Operations, Operations and Logistics Directorate, USTRANSCOM] did that. It was not my idea." I believe very strongly in letting people show initiative, and also giving them credit.

I think that historians and public affairs people ought to have a closer relationship, not that historians ought to work for the public affairs office or vice versa; but the real life stories, history, ought to be recorded in publications. Several times Jay probably got disgusted with me because I would say, "Let's make sure we tell this story." Now a lesser historian would say, "Aw, that's a public affairs story," but yet Jay would grab that and tell it from the history standpoint.

Dr. Matthews: Would you give us your heartfelt assessment of your assignment as CINCTRANS and CINCAMC?

General Johnson: I was blessed to come here at a momentous time in our nation's and our world's history. And I'm blessed to have outstanding people that were able to do the task assigned and I believe do it very, very well. Although TRANSCOM has a very short heritage, our commands have strong heritages. Those heritages were enhanced in the past few years. I don't like to say my tenure, but during our tenure all of our commands, TRANSCOM and the three components, have been very, very successful. I feel quite fortunate to have served in this period of history.

Dr. Matthews: How about some guidance for your successor?

General Johnson: My successor has many opportunities. He will do things differently than I would. And that's why, we, as a nation, do so well. If each one of us were products of the same cookie cutter, we would never make changes. We would be so afraid to make changes that nothing would ever happen.

Dr. Matthews: Any advice for who may follow?

General Johnson: No. I believe very strongly in not giving advice. I believe very strongly in transitioning. When my time comes to depart, I will depart. People will think that I have lost interest; that's not true. But I also will not keep in close contact. I will personally, but not professionally.

Dr. Smith: Sir, are there any other topics that you would like to discuss for the record that we might not have covered?

General Johnson: I have none. I have enjoyed working with both of you. I must tell you that when you write your personal synopsis of your time here, you can truly say that you did more than be mere historians. It's been more difficult, but it's also very, very rewarding. I once had a secretary who worked for me. My predecessor had not used her abilities, and I told her that I wanted her to be my executive secretary. I assured her she would work harder than she had ever worked in her life, and she would enjoy it more. I hope that you feel the same way.



## GLOSSARY

ACC	Air Combat Command
ACL	Allowable Cabin Load
ADANS	Airlift Deployment and Analysis System
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARINC	Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated
ASIF	Airlift Service Industrial Fund
ATO	Air Tasking Order
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCAMC	Commander in Chief, Air Mobility Command
CINCMAC	Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CNN	Cable News Network
COMALF	Commander of Airlift Forces
CONUS	Continental United States
COCOM	Combatant Command
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DBOF-T	Defense Business Operations Fund-Transportation
DCINC	Deputy Commander in Chief
DOD	Department of Defense
DOT	Department of Transportation
FSS	Fast Sealift Ship
GDSS	Global Decision Support System
GTN	Global Transportation Network
IG	Inspector General
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JS/J3	Joint Staff/Operations Directorate
JS/J4	Joint Staff/Logistics Directorate
JS/J8	Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate
JTIC	Joint Transportation Intelligence Center
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAC/DO	Military Airlift Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

NAF	Numbered Air Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
ORI	Operational Readiness Inspection
OSA	Operational Support Aircraft
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PAT	Process Action Team
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
QS	Quality Support and Readiness
RAF	Royal Air Force
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
RO/RO	Roll-On/Roll-Off
ROS	Reduced Operating Status
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAR	Special Access Required
SCNS	Self-Contained Navigational System
SCUDs	Surface-to-Surface Missiles
SMESA	Special Mideast Sealift Agreement
SPOEs	Seaports of Embarkation
SRA	Systems Research and Applications Corporation
SRP	Sealift Readiness Program
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TAF	Tactical Air Forces
TACC	Tanker Airlift Control Center
TCJ2	USTRANSCOM Intelligence Directorate
TCJ3/J4	USTRANSCOM Operations and Logistics Directorate
TCJ5	USTRANSCOM Plans and Policy Directorate
TCJ6	USTRANSCOM Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate
TCJ8	USTRANSCOM Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TTU	Transportation Terminal Unit
UPS	United Parcel Service
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces Europe
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCENT	Commander in Chief, United States Central Command
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, United States European Command
USCINTRANS	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps

USN  
USTRANSCOM  
WRM

United States Navy  
United States Transportation Command  
War Reserve Materiel



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