25 January 2010

Authoritarian Rule to European Union: Romania and Moldova

 

A woman at a Bucharest, Romania, factory sews European Union and Romanian flags in preparation for Romania’s joining the EU in 2007.

A woman at a Bucharest, Romania, factory sews European Union and Romanian flags in preparation for Romania’s joining the EU in 2007.

By Grigore Pop-Eleches

An assistant professor of politics and public and international affairs at Princeton University, Grigore Pop-Eleches has researched the domestic and international dynamics of economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. These subjects are the focus of his book From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Princeton University Press, 2009).

Two formerly Communist-bloc lands have followed diverse political paths. Romania successfully sustained democratic governance and is now a member of the European Union. Moldova’s democratic process has been more difficult. A study of events in these two nations reveals the contribution of civil society and democratic institutions to stable transitions to newly elected governments.

Since the demise of communism in the Soviet Union and its East European satellite states, those nations have established democracy at different paces and with varying degrees of success. One means to explore the reasons for this divergence, and to learn more about the conditions in which democracy thrives, is to study how comparable nations fared in one of the crucial tests of genuine democracy: the peaceful transfer of power between opposing political parties and leaders. A comparison of two post-communist states suggests that domestic reforms, driven by a desire to achieve greater integration with other democratic nations and monitored by an active civil society, strengthen a country’s capacity to transfer power peacefully and to sustain democratic governance.

Electoral Dynamics

One revealing comparison is between the electoral dynamics of Moldova and Romania, from 1989 through their most recent elections. The comparison is justified by their shared culture and history, as well as by their comparable levels of socio-economic development at the outset of the post-communist transition. Moreover, the two countries had (at least superficially) comparable trajectories, with the early 1990s dominated by reformed ex-Communists, who were eventually defeated by broad center-right coalitions, first in Romania (1996) and later n Moldova (1998). While these defeats marked important milestones in each nation’s democratic development, the euphoria was short-lived as the center-right coalitions were undermined by deep economic crises and political infighting. Each suffered a crushing defeat in 2000–01.

However, this is where the parallels end. In Romania, a reformed ex-Communist Party continued economic and political reforms, made significant progress towards European integration, and achieved European Union membership. Moldova became the first European country to return unreformed Communists to power through democratic elections. While the Moldovan Communists moderated their initially shrill anti-market and anti-imperialist rhetoric, their eight years in power nevertheless marked a significant erosion of democratic freedoms. By contrast, the influence of international expectations and the demands of domestic civil society groups significantly contributed to Romania’s more rapid progress in transitioning beyond elections into post-election good governance.

Transfers of Power

 

“No Fraud”: A Moldovan protests at the Chisinau election commission headquarters prior to the July 2009 parliamentary election.

“No Fraud”: A Moldovan protests at the Chisinau election commission headquarters prior to the July 2009 parliamentary election.

In 2009, the results of this divergence became apparent in how each nation responded to hotly contested and very close elections. In each case — the aftermath of the April 2009 Moldovan parliamentary elections and the November/December 2009 Romanian presidential elections — the losing side alleged fraud, but with very different results.

In Moldova, the fraud allegations — at least partially substantiated by foreign observers — triggered massive political protests that turned violent in the capital, Chisinau, and resulted in the destruction of the parliament building and the presidential palace. The reactions of the main Moldovan political parties and mass media reflect the deep divide running through Moldovan politics and society. President Vladimir Voronin and most of the state-run media blamed opposition parties and the Romanian government for supporting the “criminal bands” that they held responsible for the violence. The Moldovan opposition, along with much of civil society and parts of the private mass media, argued that the protests instead represented a spontaneous expression of frustration by anti-communist, pro-Western youths, especially students. Moreover, they insisted that pro-regime instigators initiated the violence to delegitimize protest and pave the way for a restored dictatorship. The heavy-handed official repression that followed resulted in hundreds of arrests and allegations of widespread police violence. While the government eventually agreed to new elections that produced a narrow opposition victory, the Communist Party continues to command enough support to block the economic and political liberalization that could assure peaceful transfers of power in the future.

By contrast, in Romania, the electoral dispute was resolved peacefully after a partial recount of voided votes. The loser, Mircea Geoana, accepted defeat and congratulated his opponent, though he vowed to pursue a parliamentary investigation into the fairness of the presidential contest. The Romanian political elite’s willingness to assert its interests within the framework of Romania’s (admittedly imperfect) democratic institutions explains why the election outcome has sparked few protests and no violence.

Several interrelated factors explain why the potential for post-election violence was greater in Moldova than in Romania. First, Romania’s successful application to and subsequent membership in the European Union (E.U.) encouraged all the main political players to accept shared democratic standards. In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council stipulated that candidate nations for E.U. membership must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.” Because an overwhelming majority of Romanians favored membership, a number of significant reforms followed. These reforms restrained significantly the ex-Communists’ ability to bend the rules in their favor, and helped explain why they agreed to turn over power peacefully after their electoral defeat in 1996.

While Moldova has increased its collaboration with the European Union since 2005, its government’s formal commitment to political, economic, and institutional reforms has not yet produced significant actual results. While reforms are likely to accelerate under the new government, the nation still faces Russian opposition to closer Western integration. Moreover, its civil society institutions by most measures are less deeply rooted than in Romania, in part because Moldova has suffered from much more extensive emigration in the last decade.

Second, a combination of international and civil society pressures has produced a gradual but significant reform of the ex-communist Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSD) whereas the Moldovan Communists are both rhetorically and politically more attached to the Soviet past. The resulting lack of reform has deepened partisan differences between the Communists and the anti-communist opposition, and has narrowed the scope of possible political alliances and compromises to a much greater extent than in Romania.

Finally, the development of an independent mass media started much earlier in Romania than in Moldova because of that country’s greater variety of private media sources and lower government control over the public media. As a result, the dissemination of political information was more balanced in Romania. This in turn lowers the potential for manipulation of information as means of stoking conflict.

New Tools

Looking ahead, modern communication technologies may hold a key to strengthening civil society in both nations. Twitter, Facebook and SMS (Short Message Service) helped Moldovan protesters coordinate and mobilize in a remarkably short time during the 2009 parlimentary elections. The Western media even dubbed the events in Moldova the “Twitter Revolution.” Likewise, in Romania, social media appears to have affected turnout of diaspora voters, who overwhelmingly supported President Traian Basescu and ended up deciding the election.

While the future of these new tools remains unclear, their importance to civil society groups will likely grow. The consequences for democratic elections, and for the freedom of expression they require, may prove an important part of democracy’s story in the 21st century.

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.