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Gordon S. Heddell
Inspector General
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on

"Oversight of Reconstruction Contracts in Afghanistan
and the Role of the Special Inspector General"

REVISED

Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Brown, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon to discuss our oversight efforts in Afghanistan.

As the principal oversight agency within the Department of Defense, the DoD IG is committed to providing effective and meaningful oversight of U.S. contingency operations in Southwest Asia. Our priorities are to improve the effectiveness of DoD programs and to assist DoD and the Congress in identifying and deterring waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer monies. Most importantly, we aim to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of our troops. Today I will discuss the efforts of my auditors, investigators, and evaluators in providing effective oversight in the region.

Before that, I would like to state that the coordination and cooperation among the various oversight agencies to support our country's collective Southwest Asia effort is a great success story and a notable achievement/milestone in the development of effective oversight of contingency operations.

PRESENCE IN THE REGION

Since the start of operations in Southwest Asia, over 200 DoD IG personnel have been deployed into the region for a significant amount of time, providing "boots on the ground" oversight. Today, the DoD IG is operating at its highest level in Southwest Asia. At the beginning of this month, 50 DoD IG personnel were deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar on six to 12 month rotations. In addition to approximately 25 auditors, 2 evaluators and 18 Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) special agents working out of seven offices – three in Afghanistan, three in Iraq, and one in Kuwait – there are also teams of auditors, agents, inspectors and engineers constantly entering and exiting the region on temporary duty assignments. In fact, I will be making a trip to Afghanistan in the near future.

During FY 2010, on average, we had 12 auditors stationed on the ground in Afghanistan focusing in the areas of contracting, financial management, construction, and safety. In addition, up to 12 additional auditors per month traveled temporary duty assignments to Afghanistan to augment the in-country teams or perform other oversight involving contracting, financial management, and construction issues. In FY 2011, we are targeting to have 17 auditors deployed to Afghanistan and an additional five auditors deployed to Qatar as a rear detachment for Afghanistan oversight continuing our oversight emphasis on contracting, financial management, and construction issues, as well as oversight efforts related to the \$14.2 billion in additional funding for Afghan Security Forces. The personnel deployed to Qatar will travel in and out of Afghanistan on TDY, as needed, to complete their fieldwork.

DCIS has a current in-theater work force consisting of 15 DCIS agents and one administrative assistant currently deployed in support of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). DCIS personnel in Afghanistan in FY 2011 are projected to remain at the current level of 8 DCIS agents. These agents investigate matters involving corruption, theft, procurement fraud, bid-rigging, product substitution and conflicts of interest. Our investigative efforts in the region have identified corrupt business practices, loss of U.S. funds through contract fraud, and theft of critical military equipment destined for Coalition Forces in Southwest Asia.

In FY 2010, the Special Plans & Operations (SPO) directorate of the DoD IG placed two personnel on the ground in Kabul and has plans to place two additional personnel in Kandahar in FY 2011. These evaluators conduct assessments, liaison with the commands, and support TDY teams coming into Afghanistan.

EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT COORDINATION

The DoD IG has primary responsibility within the DoD for providing oversight of defense programs and funds appropriated to the Department at home and around the world, to include Southwest Asia. In this role, the DoD IG oversees, integrates, and attempts to ensure there are no gaps in the stewardship of DoD resources. In furtherance of this responsibility, the DoD IG is committed to maintaining an effective working relationship with other oversight organizations, including other Federal agencies, to minimize duplication of efforts and to leverage resources to provide more comprehensive coverage. Effective interagency coordination, collaboration, and partnerships within the oversight community are essential to providing comprehensive reviews of wartime programs and expenditures to identify whether critical gaps exist and recommend actions to address those gaps. Based on our experience in Southwest Asia, we have established mechanisms to augment our core oversight coordination processes to better coordinate, report, and share our plans, activities, and results in a contingency environment.

Special Deputy Inspector General for Southwest Asia. The Special Deputy Inspector General for Southwest Asia (SDIG-SWA) is my senior level representative in Southwest Asia who acts on my behalf to coordinate and deconflict oversight efforts within Southwest Asia. The SDIG-SWA spends the majority of his time forward deployed to Southwest Asia and continues to improve the communications within the Defense and Federal oversight community by offering an authoritative source to coordinate and facilitate various oversight efforts within the legal authorities of the DoD IG. The SDIG-SWA also serves as a liaison with DoD leadership and the supporting commands in Southwest Asia to identify oversight requirements and to facilitate interaction with oversight organizations.

The SDIG-SWA serves as chairperson of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, established in April 2007 as the principal Federal interagency forum to promote coordination and cooperation among the member organizations toward the common

objective of providing comprehensive Southwest Asia oversight. The Joint Planning Group, which meets quarterly or more frequent as needed, is made up of representatives from over 25 DoD and Federal oversight agencies or functional components. The Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group facilitates the compilation and issuance of the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia in response to the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, and also issued two reports that provided oversight observations¹ and summarized the challenges² impacting Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.

A recent initiative of the SDIG-SWA, as the chairperson of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, is the development of a comprehensive strategy for the oversight of the training, equipping, and mentoring of the Afghanistan National Security Forces. More than 50 percent of reconstruction funds are going to this critical mission and the success of efforts in this area is critical to achieving the goals of the United States. The DoD IG, working with the other members of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, plans to have this strategy completed in the second quarter of FY 2011. Once this strategy is finalized, the group will develop a comprehensive strategy for the oversight of contracts and contingency contracting in Afghanistan. SIGAR reported in its October 30, 2010, quarterly report that DoD, DoS, and USAID had obligated more than \$17.7 billion to as many as 6,900 contractors and other entities from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2009. We plan to have the strategy for oversight of contracting in Afghanistan completed by the fourth quarter of FY 2011.

Southwest Asia Comprehensive Oversight Plan. The DoD IG, in coordination with multiple federal Inspectors General and DoD oversight agencies, issues the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia which includes the planned and

¹ DoD OIG Report No. SDIG-SWA-10-01.

² DoD OIG Report No. D-2008-086.

ongoing oversight efforts of the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development; the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; and the ongoing efforts of the Government Accountability Office. The plan also includes the planned and ongoing audit work of the U.S. Army Audit Agency, Naval Audit Service, and Air Force Audit Agency. We update the Comprehensive Plan annually, with the plan covering Fiscal Year 2011 to be issued later this month. Key updates to the plan since its first issuance have been the inclusion of asset accountability audits as requested by the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Section 852³ required oversight efforts within the Defense oversight community.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Subgroup. In May 2009, the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group established a new subgroup to coordinate oversight work solely in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This subgroup was established because of concerns expressed by senior U.S. Government and DoD officials regarding the seemingly overwhelming planned and ongoing oversight pertaining to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the large amounts of U.S. resources that will be expended, and the supplemental funding that several of the statutory inspectors general received specifically for the oversight of program activity. This subgroup, chaired by the Inspector General for the U.S. Agency for International Development, first met in June 2009 and has met periodically since then. To provide a focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan related oversight, the subgroup issues the Afghanistan-Pakistan Comprehensive Oversight Plan, a subset of the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia. The subgroup plans to issue another plan in November 2011.

³ P.L. 110-417, Section 852, “Comprehensive Audit of Spare Parts Purchases and Depot Overhaul and Maintenance of Equipment for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,” October 14, 2008.

Other Coordinating Activities. In addition to the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, we participate in the tri-weekly U.S. Forces-Afghanistan oversight Shura. This forum provides another opportunity for each of the oversight community in-country representatives to update the status of their current and planned projects. This forum is also used to notify U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan of findings so that corrective action can be taken immediately instead of waiting for reports to be issued. The Shura is chaired by the Chief of Staff for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. The Command also uses the Shura as an opportunity to brief the oversight community on Command programs. For example, at one Shura, the Command provided a briefing on its Commander's Emergency Response Program, an area in which the DoD IG, Army Audit Agency, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction were and continue to coordinate ongoing and future oversight.

Our Auditing component has always had an effective and comprehensive coordination process both internal to DoD oversight agencies and Federal oversight agencies, and uses several means to coordinate audit efforts with other oversight agencies. First, in developing our annual audit plan, including Southwest Asia related projects, we vet the proposed plan with the Service Audit Agencies (Army Audit Agency, Naval Audit Service, and Air Force Audit Agency) to identify potential duplication of effort. Second, in announcing the start of audit projects, we coordinate each proposed audit with the Service Audit Agencies, the Government Accountability Office and the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction based on the proposed oversight. Third, the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing meets quarterly with the Service Audit Agency Chiefs to discuss current issues and efforts, including areas of potential duplication or concerns.

In developing SPO assessment projects, we make every effort to coordinate with other Federal oversight organizations. Further, due to the complex operational nature of SPO assessments, SPO makes great efforts to coordinate with respective commands to 1)

solicit input on the issue areas that we have identified, 2) solicit input on any other areas that should be assessed, and 3) generate support for the assessment topic and especially for the in-country portion of the assessment. To this end, we always coordinate through the CENTCOM IG, the IGs of the respective commands in country, and, as appropriate, with general officers in the in-theater commands.

Coordination of Investigations. Because of the magnitude and scope of alleged criminal activity relating to Overseas Contingency Operations, DCIS continues to collaborate with its mission partners including the Department of Justice, in order to combat fraud, waste and abuse in Southwest Asia and to successfully prosecute criminal violations. In addition, DCIS is involved in various task forces to deconflict and maximize collaborative efforts.

DCIS maintains a close working relationship with the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF), which was formed to maximize collaborative efforts to effectively investigate and prosecute fraud and corruption criminal cases involving Southwest Asia. The primary goal of the ICCTF is to combine the resources of multiple investigative agencies to effectively and efficiently investigate and prosecute cases of fraud, waste, and abuse related to U.S. Government spending in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. The task force, with its main operational body, the Joint Operations Center, is an effective fraud and corruption fighting team. The ICCTF has proven to be very efficient in avoiding duplication of efforts and effective in the sharing of resources. Perhaps most importantly, the ICCTF has led to prompt dissemination of relevant information to all ICCTF members.

DCIS is also assigned as a member of the Task Force 2010 and works with mission partners such as the Department of Homeland Security, SIGAR, FBI and Afghan investigators in an effort to develop greater visibility of the flow of contracting funds below the prime contractor level in order to better employ contracting in support of counterinsurgency operations. The task force fuses, augments, and drives existing efforts

to provide actionable information regarding key contracting networks, money flows, and linkages to better utilize contracting dollars intended for the Afghan people.

DoD IG ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

DoD IG oversight efforts in Afghanistan, including collaborative efforts with other agencies, have identified issues with the Afghan National Police Training; shoddy construction; poor contract oversight, millions of dollars needlessly wasted; risks to life and safety; bribery, fraud, and corruption; weaknesses in the visibility, accountability, and transfer of weapons, equipment, and facilities funded with Afghanistan Security Forces funds. In addition, we continue to find challenges in the Afghan National Forces training efforts. Other areas of focus include military construction efforts, implementation of information operations, force protection, Afghanistan National Police training, and the management and execution of the expected additional \$14.2 billion in Afghanistan Security Forces funds.

Highlights of Key Afghan Related Audits: DoD IG audits have had a significant impact on improving Afghanistan reconstruction efforts. In September 2005, we first reported on the lack of adequate contract administration in Afghanistan to include inadequate requirements definition, ineffective use of competition, use out-of-scope items, and improperly awarded task orders. Our primary focus areas in Afghanistan remain contract administration and oversight, management and execution of the Afghanistan Security Force funds, military construction, and the training of the Afghanistan National Police (ANP). A few highlights include:

- ***Afghan National Police Training Program.*** As we have testified previously before this Subcommittee, the Department of State Civilian Police Program contract did not meet DoD's needs in developing the ANP to provide security in countering the growing insurgency in Afghanistan. Specifically, DoS did not

maintain adequate oversight of Government-furnished property; maintain contract files as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation; always match goods to receiving reports; or follow internal control procedures requiring in-country contracting officer's representatives to review contractor invoices to determine if the costs were allowable, allocable, or reasonable prior to paying and validating deliverables. The DoS and DoD agreed to have DoD assume contractual responsibility for the primary ANP training program, which includes Regional Training Centers, basic ANP training, mentoring within the Afghan Ministry of Interior, and DoD police mentor teams embedded in ANP units in districts throughout Afghanistan. DoD and DoS IGs recently announced a joint follow up review that will include an assessment of the transition of the ANP training contract from DoS to DoD, assessing the cost, performance measures, and planning efforts associated with the transfer to ensure enhanced contract oversight. Additionally, once the contract is transitioned from DoS to DoD we will evaluate DoD contracts related to ANP to include contract award, management, and funds allocation.

- ***Construction Effort.*** We identified inadequate contingency construction contracting procedures which resulted in shoddy construction work at Bagram Air Field and New Kabul Compound. For example, at Bagram Air Field, we identified projects that were accepted in substandard condition and required \$3.4 million in extensive rework to bring newly constructed buildings in Afghanistan up to standard. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) accepted the New Kabul Compound facilities where force protection on the compound was inadequate, the communication infrastructure was incomplete, and there was no plan for continued building maintenance. Additionally, officials from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District, and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan did not monitor threat levels during construction, did not conduct required annual evaluations for

compliance with force protection standards, and did not adequately coordinate or plan the construction or maintenance at New Kabul Compound. This resulted in more than \$1.4 million in additional spending to fix inadequate communication and force protection deficiencies. New Kabul Compound sat vacant for a year because forces could not occupy facilities until conditions were corrected.

- ***Inadequate Oversight.*** As we identified in our report, “Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform,” May 14, 2010, one of the most frequent contract administration weaknesses we found was in contract oversight and surveillance. With our recently completed and ongoing oversight efforts of OCO contracting, we continue to identify a lack of sufficient and adequate contracting oversight. As discussed previously, one of the most significant deficiencies with the management of the DoS contract for the training of the Afghan National police was the lack of adequate contracting officer representatives to oversee the contractor. Other oversight efforts have also identified inadequate quality assurance surveillance plans for construction projects, the lack of actual oversight personnel and the contracting officer not requesting that the contractor for the Parwan Detention facility extend their bank guaranty letter to cover warranty work required and not properly notifying the contractor of warranty work required to address failures, defects, or damage by the end of the warranty period to preserve the Government's warranty rights.
- ***Afghan Security Forces Fund.*** Through our previous series of reviews of the management and execution of the Afghanistan Security Forces (ASF) funding we noted deficiencies with accountability, visibility, and transfer of weapons; faulty construction and unsafe working conditions; failure to meet contract requirements for real property; inadequate processes to transfer real property to the Afghans; and inadequate controls over the inventory or accountability of equipment transferred to the Afghans. In FY 2011, we will continue our oversight of the ASF funds as NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTMC-A)/CSTC-A is expected to

receive about \$11.6 billion in ASF funds for sustainment, infrastructure, equipment and transportation, and training and operations activities.⁴ Oversight will include the transition of the ANP training program from DoS to DoD, DoD management of ANP, procurement of vehicles and equipment, payroll, and facilities construction.

- ***Life and Safety.*** Throughout our oversight efforts the DoD IG is attentive to issues we identify related to the safety of Service members, DoD civilians, and contractors. We identified several safety issues which we addressed through the use of quick-action memorandums. For example, we identified problems with buildings constructed in Afghanistan . Specifically, the contractor did not adequately install and maintain the electrical and fire suppression systems so that they operated in accordance to contract requirements and applicable building codes. We found serious issues with the New Kabul compound design and construction, which resulted in potential risks to the life and safety of U.S. personnel.

DCIS Highlights in Afghanistan: DCIS has been engaged in investigations involving DoD operations in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan since 2003. As a result of the magnitude and scope of alleged criminal activity relating to OCO, DCIS has made criminal investigations of contract fraud and corruption related to U.S. operations and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan an agency priority. As of September 30, 2010, DCIS had a total of 241 open investigations related to Overseas Contingency Operations and the agents in Southwest Asia were actively working 41 investigative cases or proactive projects in theater. DCIS will continue to focus on protecting the warfighter by investigating significant fraud and corruption impacting crucial DoD operations throughout Southwest Asia, with particular emphasis on schemes that

⁴ An additional 2.6 billion was appropriated for ASF in the FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-212, to remain available until September 30, 2011.

potentially affect the health, safety, welfare, and mission-readiness of U.S. troops assigned to theater.

One area where we have directed a great deal of investigative attention has been the Commander's Emergency Relief Program and other civil works project contracts awarded to Afghan companies. CERP funds are intended to swiftly provide payment to local contractors for civil work projects. The CERP bolsters the "Afghan First" program which promotes hiring Afghan companies and Afghan personnel to construct needed roads and facilities to support the development and expansion of the Afghan government and organizations, but have proven problematic. For example, the use of U.S. currency and vouchers versus electronic funds transfers and a payment process with critical internal control weaknesses makes this program vulnerable in an environment and culture where fraud and corruption are habitual.

Of the 241 open investigations related to Overseas Contingency Operations, 68 percent of those investigations are related to bribery and financial crimes. Eleven percent of the investigations are related to theft, eight percent are kickback investigations, and eight percent are product substitution investigations. The remaining five percent of the OCO investigations relate to general crimes, technology transfer, and terrorism investigations. The following are two significant case examples that demonstrate the successful collaborative effort with our mission partners in Southwest Asia:

Between January and February 2010 a former U.S. Army sergeant stationed in Afghanistan admitted to aiding and abetting a co-conspirator's solicitation and acceptance of more than \$400,000 in bribes from a government contractor, all in exchange for his co-conspirator's creation and submission of fraudulent paperwork permitting that contractor to steal fuel from Forward Operating Base Shank. The sergeant also admitted to helping his co-conspirator conceal the money in various locations in and around FOB Shank. The total value of the fuel stolen during the course of the scheme was at least \$1.39 million. This case resulted in the former U.S. Army

sergeant pleading guilty to bribery in connection with a fuel theft scheme to solicit bribes from a government contractor in Afghanistan. As a result, a second former U.S. Army sergeant was charged with a single count of conspiracy to commit theft of government property in a criminal complaint filed in Eastern District of Virginia on June 24, 2010. The sergeants were stationed at FOB Shank, in support of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. The sergeant that pled guilty had responsibilities that included supervision of FOB Shank's fuel redistribution process. At sentencing, he faces a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison and a fine of \$250,000; twice the gross gain or loss from the scheme; or three times the value of the payments solicited or received. The two former sergeants have also been suspended by the Department of Army. This was a joint investigation by the following members of the ICCTF: DCIS, Army CID and FBI.

On August 7, 2009, two dual Afghan/U.S. citizens pled guilty after being charged with conspiracy and bribery in connection with a scheme to offer \$1 million in bribes to a U.S. Army contracting official to influence the award of a road construction contract in Afghanistan. The two subjects allegedly offered a bribe of \$1 million to the Contracting Officer's Representative in return for the award of the Commander's Emergency Response Program project. The CERP project was for the construction of a road from Pule Alam, Afghanistan to Akundkhel, Afghanistan. The subjects estimated they could construct the road for about \$9 million; however, they intended to bid \$18 million for the project and offered the COR \$1 million in exchange for the COR's influence in awarding them the contract. The contractors threatened that if they did not get the award, they would use their political connections to blacklist the awardees and DoD's efforts to fulfill the contract would be severely disrupted. On November 13, 2009, the subjects were each sentenced to 48 months confinement followed by 36 month of propation, and ordered to pay \$30,000 in fines. This case was the result of efforts by the International Contract Corruption Task Force members, including DCIS, the FBI and Army CID.

Overall Southwest Asia statistical data (including Afghanistan) for DCIS investigations since September 27, 2003 to present consists of 180 criminal charges ; 88 arrests; 120

felony convictions; 44 debarments; 155 suspensions; \$55,899,148 in fines, penalties and other monetary recoveries; \$19,469,964 in forfeitures; \$2,239,293 in recovered property and \$203,335,400 paid to the U.S. in restitution.

For Afghanistan alone, since August 5, 2004 to present, DCIS investigations have resulted in: 71 criminal charges; 37 arrests; 44 convictions; six debarments; 31 suspensions; \$5,395,782 in fines, penalties and other monetary recoveries; \$546,627 in forfeitures; \$17,198 in recovered government property and \$55,239,385 paid to the U.S. in restitution.

Special Plans and Operations:

SPO has conducted a number of assessments that have had relatively immediate impact on national security challenges in Afghanistan, including:

- Identifying contracting-related bottlenecks that would impede development of the infrastructure necessary to support expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces.
- Improving the capability of the U.S. military to provide accountability and control of weapons and ammunition supplied to the Afghan National Security Forces, thus limiting fraud, waste and abuse concerning this equipment and protecting a significant investment of U.S. funds used in its purchase.
- Increasing the capacity of the U.S. Security Assistance Office to provide equipment required to rapidly expand the Afghan National Security Forces.
- Implementing a U.S. Congressionally-legislated requirement and DoD directive for the U.S. Security Assistance Office oversight of sensitive defense technology supplied the Afghan National Security Forces.

- Identifying significant constraints that could have prevented execution of U.S. plans to expand the Afghan National Security Forces, thereby facilitating their growth and capability to operate without dependency on U.S. forces.

LESSONS LEARNED REGARDING OVERSIGHT

As an organization we have gained valuable experience in terms of establishing an in-theater presence and deploying auditors, investigators, evaluators and inspectors. An in-theater presence is essential to ensuring visibility of oversight operations as well as reaching out to the military and civilian leadership in-theater to ensure our oversight is meaningful, effective, and on target.

One of the most important lessons we have learned is the value of having the Special Deputy IG for Southwest Asia as our single point of contact in the region for coordinating oversight efforts and to ensure effective communication with the senior civilian leadership and the Commanders in the theater. This is key for minimizing the impact on the daily operation of the activities we visit, and provides those activities a single point of contact.

Another important lesson learned is that contracting in a contingency environment presents many challenges. In May 2010, we summarized our experiences in the report “Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform”. This report identified key systemic contingency contracting issues and identified actions that need to be taken to correct these issues for future contracting. DoD components, including NTM-A/CSTC-A and the Army Contracting Command, proactively leveraged this product as a tool to improve their contracting efforts. NTM-A/CSTC-A referred to the report as an “...absolutely first rate document on best and worst practices of contracting in a contingency environment.”

The U.S. and coalition efforts to establish, support, and maintain a sovereign, free and democratic Afghanistan require a broad spectrum of U.S. and coalition capabilities, both military and civilian. The oversight organizations within their respective statutory authorities and standing expertise need to be proactively engaged. It is absolutely essential that the full spectrum of the supporting oversight community (Inspectors General, Service audit and investigative agencies, GAO, and others) work in concert to ensure effective and efficient oversight.

I want to assure the committee that we are intensifying our oversight in Afghanistan and providing leadership in an effort to ensure interservice and interagency collaboration. Fostering an open dialogue and coordinating and integrating our efforts within the oversight community are critical to providing effective oversight in Afghanistan. The Federal oversight community has established an historic and unprecedented level of cooperation and coordination, including all the members present today. We are collectively deterring and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse, improving efficiencies in operations as well as protecting our warfighters, civilians, and contractors.

In closing, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss our work in Afghanistan and look forward to continuing our strong working relationship with the Congress and with all oversight organizations in Southwest Asia. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.