THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

9 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Vaught, USA
Lieutenant General Gast, USAF
Colonel Beckwith, USA
Colonel Kyle, USAF
Lieutenant Colonel Seiffert, USMC
Lieutenant Colonel Guidry, USAF
Captain [redacted]

Subject: Testimony Relating to the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 May 1980 (U)

1. Attached is a working copy of the official transcript of the hearings on testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 7 May 1980, relating to the Iranian hostage rescue mission. The witnesses in these hearings were: MG Vaught, LTG Gast, COL Kyle, COL Beckwith, LTC Seiffert, LTG Guidry, and CPT [redacted]

2. Request the addressees review the text of the testimony for the following purposes:

a. To insure accuracy of information provided by the hearing sitnesses.

b. To provide information for the record which the witnesses were not in the position to do so during the hearings.

c. To identify classified information in the text of the testimony, if any.

3. In reviewing the text, the following procedures should be used:

a. Edit the text for accuracy and grammatical errors.

(1) In no case should changes be made which will change the context of the testimony given by the witnesses.

(2) All changes should be made in pencil. Deletions of portions of the text other than classified should be lined out in pencil, without bracketing (see subparagraph c below).

Downgraded Unclassified when separated from Classified enclosure

SECRET

WITHOUT ATTACHMENTS THIS MEMORANDUM IS UNCLASSIFIED

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassified ON: [redacted]

b. If any of the witnesses stated during the hearings that they would supply information for the record, submit that information on DD Form 2136, a copy of which is attached. The form may be reproduced if additional copies are needed.

c. Bracket in pencil that portion of the transcript which is classified and indicate degree of classification.

4. Request you return the reviewed and corrected copy of the transcript with inserts, if any, to this office (LTC S. D. Olynyk, J-3, ext 50987) NLT 1200, Tuesday, 13 May 1980. LTC Olynyk will incorporate all changes provided by the addressees into one edited copy for submission to the Legal Advisor and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

H-6

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MG VAUGHT

Subject: HAC Hearing 2 June 1980 1330

BACKGROUND

WITNESSES

MR. CLAYTOR
LTG PUSTAY
LTG GAST
MG VAUGHT
COL BECKWITH

DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE CLOSED SESSION

CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON COMMENTS

This will be an attempt by GOP members to regain the initiative/ limelight.

Following topics will probably be covered:

Helo maintenance

Parts
History
Quality of mechanics

Star articles

MG VAUGHT PERSONAL
Plan Loopholes

Jack Edwards (GOP) will probably lead.

It is anticipated that each witness will discuss his portion of the operation. Game plan next week.

Army budget liaison will brief personalities at 1100 today.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Read enclosures.

Bring LTC PERRYMAN and LTC SIEFERT as backups.

INCLOSURES

Probable questions based on Star articles A

Star articles B

Article by Edward Luttwak C

Operations costs submitted to Sen. Hollings D

UNCLASSIFIED

QUESTIONS ON HELO MAINTENANCE

Is it true there were no special maintenance standards for the mission birds?

Why not?

Why did you select these birds over others?

Did the training phase indicate any helo maintenance problems?

Did you have spare parts based on anticipated maintenance problems?

Did you have any problems acquiring spare parts?

If you spent 6 million on maintenance as reported to Sen. Hollings, shouldn't this have been a good indicator on the unreliability of the helo?

Why weren't the helo's on the NIMITZ flown longer if that was Col. Pitman and Capt. Sherwood's recommendation based on an earlier visit?

Why did you fly the mission with helo #8 when you knew that the EISENHOWER was bringing newer and better birds than the "hanger queen"?

What was the quality of maintenance of the NIMITZ helos when your crews reached ship?

What maintenance was done to the birds prior to launch?

Did the pre-mission helo flights indicate any maintenance problems?

Were the ship's captain and helo personnel aware of the mission so they would take special interest in the helos or was it "Business as Usual" to preserve OPSEC?

Why didn't helo #5 go to Desert 1?

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QUESTIONS ON PLANNING

Why did you fail to provide for a duststorm contingency?

Did your people know that duststorms could occur?

What were their instructions?

Why did the helo's and the C-130's fly at different altitudes?

Why did't the helo's and C-130's fly the same route with the C-130's reporting the duststorms to the helo's?

Why didn't the helo's report the duststorms?

Why didn't Colonel Kyle report the duststorms?

Where were you?

Were training missions called off for bad weather?

Why?

How could you expect to fly the mission if you didn't train under worst case conditions?

Did the air traffic controller on the ground at Desert 1 give improper instructions to the helo that crashed?

Was there a contingency plan for an emergency evacuation of Desert 1? If not, why not?

Was there panic?

If not, why was so much classified material left?

Why weren't people sanitized before the mission?

If they were, why was so much classified left? Is this indicative of a discipline and leadership problem?

Why was there no apparent attempt to sweep the helo's before departure?

Why weren't the helo's destroyed?

Where did the money come from for the escape kits?

A-6

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QUESTIONS ON MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT

Why were you selected for this mission?

What are your qualifications in the area of special operations?

Who did you respond to for planning guidance?

Why wasn't this operation conducted by EUCOM or REDCOM?

Did you become involved in negotiations or contacts with other countries?

How did you intend to notify other countries of the hostage snatch?

Did other countries know what you were doing from their soil?

Why didn't you use more helos?

What were the planning assumptions?

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WASHINGTON STAR Sunday, May 18, 1980 A-1 A-6

Gaps Seen in Training For Rescue Attempt

By Lisa Myers
Washington Star Staff Writer

Planners of the ill-starred U.S. raid to free American hostages in Iran failed to train or prepare for many of the contingencies they finally encountered — including the sandstorm and the emergency withdrawal which turned chaotic.

Interviews with a score of officials involved in planning and executing the raid reveal that it was assumed that the operation would be postponed in the event of bad weather and that there was no contingency plan to be implemented if bad weather was encountered after the mission was launched.

Training missions conducted in preparation for the raid were called off whenever weather significantly impaired visibility, military sources say. Yet, helicopter pilots were not told whether the same "abort" directive applied if bad weather was encountered on the mission itself.

When the C-130s encountered the sandstorm, the commander, Air Force Col. James H. Kyle, considered warning the following helicopters. But 45 minutes later the weather broke and Kyle opted not to send a message.

Apparently even the top commander, Army Maj. Gen. James B. Vaught, was unprepared to deal with weather problems. When the helicopter flight leader, Marine Lt. Col. Ed Seiffert, informed Vaught of the dust storm, sources say Vaught replied: "What are you going to do?"

Seiffert, who had turned back and landed after encountering the sandstorm, elected to continue because only one of the seven other helicopters had followed him out of the cloud.

Lack of planning also contributed to chaos after the disaster at Desert 1, when a helicopter veered into a C-130 loaded with fuel, killing eight men. The mishap was caused, sources say, when the air traffic control officer gave incorrect instructions to the helicopter, which was refueling at the C-130 into which it crashed.

Officers on the scene describe the aftermath as fiery chaos, noting that there was no contingency plan for an emergency evacuation in the event of such a disaster.

Kyle, the on-site commander, decided to get out immediately. Taking time to destroy the abandoned helicopters and recover the classified documents they contained would have risked the lives of all involved, he concluded.

In reporting the calamity, Kyle recommended to Vaught that fighters be dispatched to blow everything up. "You might want to run some fighters over to destroy the surviving helos," Kyle is reported to have said. No air strike was ordered.

Col. Richard Abel, sokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says no strike was run for fear of killing Iranians. "Had they destroyed (the helicopters) and by destroying them, cost Iranian casualties, you would have put the lives of our hostages at greater risk," he explained.

Officials also point to major planning and execution errors involving precautions to be taken to avoid detection by the Iranians and preparation of the helicopters.

Although Secretary of Defense Harold Brown says "secrecy was paramount," Marine and Air Force pilots seemingly had different understandings of what they safely could do. While the helicopters struggled through the sandstorm, closely following the terrain to avoid detection by Iranian radar, the Air Force pilots flew all the way at a high altitude. The failure of the helicopters ultimately caused the mission to be aborted because only five, instead of the required six, helicopters arrived at the rendezvous point in satisfactory shape.

Worried about radio intercepts, the Marines also observed strict radio silence, even under the two-hour duress of the disorienting sandstorm. In contrast, the first C-130 pilot to reach Desert 1 risked compromising the mission by announcing his arrival on an open frequency. His non-interceptable radio had broken under the impact of landing. But Army Col. Charles A. Beckwith had another secure radio on site.

Abel maintains that there was no security breach because the C-130s flew low enough to escape Iranian radar. He says there was "no evidence that the Iranians knew anything about the mission until it was over."

The Iranians, however, later learned that the radar covering that sector of the country was turned off the night of the raid. They reportedly are investigating why.

Interviews also reveal that no special maintenance standards were established for the eight RH-53s being asked to perform a task for which they were not designed — flying 500 miles across a hot, sandy desert. Moreover, they were not flown as much in preparation for the ordeal as was recommended.

When Marine Col. Charles Pitman, commander of the helicopter task force, visited the carrier Nimitz in January, he told the ship's commanding officer that the helicopters needed considerably more flight time. The helicopter maintenance officer, Marine Capt. Sherwood, visited the Nimitz in March and also recommended more flight time.

Yet, sources say, seven helicopters averaged a total flight time of 20 to 25 hours between January and mid-April, as opposed to the 110 hours considered optimal by Pitman. The eighth chopper was out of commission part of this time, awaiting spare parts for repairs.

Although blinding sandstorms are not uncommon in the Iranian desert, the helicopter pilots were not fully trained for that contingency, sources say. They did practice wearing night vision goggles in darkness and fog and experienced the resulting nausea, vertigo and loss of depth perception. But in practice sessions, visual terrain references were available. During the sandstorm, they were not.

Abel says the adequacy of training and maintenance is evidenced by the fact that seven of the eight helicopters made it to Desert 1. He acknowledges there was no specific directive on what to do if bad weather was encountered, but insists "the helicopters had the authority to recommend an abort if they thought they could not proceed."

Pentagon weather experts still are unable to explain what caused the sandstorm, which they describe as a fog-like cloud of dust. They claim it was not forecastable.

7

THE WASHINGTON STAR Sunday, May 18, 1980 A-1

Investigators Wonder About The Leader

By John Fialka
Washington Star Staff Writer

Some of the investigators probing the aborted raid to save the hostages in Tehran have come to the conclusion that one of the most fundamental errors in the raid may have been the initial selection of its commander, Maj. Gen. James B. Vaught.

Although the major focus of the investigations thus far has been on the equipment failures, Vaught — a much-decorated Army paratrooper — apparently did not make a favorable impression during his testimony on Capitol Hill before the armed services committees.

One Senate investigator who interviewed Vaught and the other commmanders of the raid has concluded that Vaught may have been "simply beyond his depth" in his position as the man who planned the overall nature of the raid and selected the subordinate commanders who carried it out.

But his view was called completely "off-base" by an officer who served with Vaught at Ft. Bragg, who said the men there would "walk to hell and back" for him.

On the other hand, a conservative congressman and former combat veteran who heard Vaught testify described him as a "super macho, gung-ho type who believed that nothing was going to stop him."

"I just didn't believe him," said the congressman, who asked not to be identified. "He's the kind of guy who would lead you into combat and get your ass shot off."

A military aide to a liberal member of the Senate Armed Services Committee found Vaught's testimony "incredible."

"If this was Saturday Night Live, all you'd have to do is run the tape," he said, adding that Vaught spent a considerable amount of time telling the committee members of his previous combat record. "The real question," the aide said, "is who picked a man like that for this mission."

At the moment, Vaught has become a "non-person" as far as the Pentagon's public affairs office is concerned. Previously released biographical information on Vaught has been pulled back and Vaught's picture is no longer considered public information.

Photo From Fayetteville Observer

GEN. JAMES VAUGHT

According to the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Tom Ross, nothing about the overall commander of the raid has been released and the reason for this is that the commander may be used for other special missions. Ross said that any publicity about him may harm his effectiveness.

One result of this policy is that most of the publicity surrounding the raid has centered around Col. Charlie Beckwith, who would have been the ground commander had the mission gone on to Tehran. Beckwith was made available to a selected group of Pentagon reporters on the understanding that no pictures would be taken of him and that no recordings of his voice were made for broadcast.

Beckwith, a tough-talking, no-nonsense combat type, told reporters that he was brought to the point of tears when malfunctions of three of the eight helicopters sent into Iran and then a fiery crash between a fourth helicopter and one of the mission's six C-130 transports ended the mission before the crucial second phase began.

Just what Vaught's reaction was is unknown. What is known, according to Pentagon sources, is that Vaught monitored the failure of his brainchild from a specially designed command post in another C-130, sitting at an airport somewhere outside of Iran.

MORE

Vaught, according to these sources, had been picked to plan counter-terrorist operations by Gen. Edward C. Meyer, the Army's chief of staff, before the hostages were taken in the U.S. embassy in Tehran. As a result, on Nov. 11 when the planning for the raid began, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. David C. Jones, told Vaught to begin picking his team for the raid.

Under Vaught and the Joint Chiefs, the raid became what is known in the Pentagon as a "combined arms operation." Marine pilots flying Navy helicopters were to meet Beckwith's team of Army commandos that were flown to the first of three bases to be used in the mission by Air Force C-130's.

Gen. Jones, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and other Pentagon officials have said, without specifically naming Vaught, that they gave the commmander of the mission all the people, equipment and maintenance backup that he requested.

Vaught's problem, according to some of those who interrogated him, was that he did not appear to have the diplomatic or strategic skills necessary to pull off the complex operation that evolved. "What we expected was a tactician, a planner. What we got was another Charlie Beckwith, a super gung-ho, charismatic combat type, somebody who would have been more at home running a brigade or a company," said one of them.

Col. Richard Abel, spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said of Vaught: "He has been responsible for planning the readiness of a number of Army units whose mission has been counter-terrorism. He has also been involved in a number of unconventional military operations and involved in both the planning and execution of unconventional warfare operations."

According to his biography in Who's Who, Maj. Gen. Vaught, 54, was born in Conway, S.C., and went into the Army in World War II. He saw combat in Korea and in Vietnam and, is, among other things, the holder of the Silver Star and the Legion of Merit.

3

After Vietnam, Vaught went to Fort Bragg, N.C., where he became chief of staff of the 18th Airborne Corps in 1973. An officer who served under him there, who also asked not to be identified, said that criticism of Vaught was "totally off base. Anybody who knows him would walk to hell and back for him."

He said that the day Vaught was named brigadier general at Ft. Bragg, "damn near the whole brigade stopped. They were all happy for him."

In 1976 Vaught went to Izmir, Turkey, where he was chief of staff for Allied Land Forces in Southeastern Europe, a NATO command. Afterwards, until shortly before the raid, he was commander of the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Ga.

At Bragg, Vaught, a big, broad-shouldered man, was known as a master parachutist and something of a logistics expert. He reportedly had developed the paratrooper's traditionally intense dislike for the Marines. He kept a sign on his desk that said "Trust in God, But All Other Things Check Out."

As more elements of the overall plan become known, there are signs that the focus of investigative interest is shifting from the hardware failures of the raid to what are seen as failures in the assumptions supporting its overall strategy. Some of the outside critics of the mission have been quite blunt about it.

"Whoever planned this thing was a fool," asserts Edward N. Luttwak, a senior military analyst at Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"It gives meaning and depth to a whole range of stories you've been hearing on competence and manpower problems in the Army," said Luttwak, once an aide to former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.

Luttwak asserts that special operations types in the U.S. Army are now chosen for their "swagger rather than for their brains" because the Army's ability to run commando-type missions has seriously eroded in recent years as "business school-type" managers have taken over the top commands.

"Not having a clue of what was the right kind of person for this thing, they went and got Hollywood characters for it. Beckwith is a classic barroom toughie," said Luttwak, who asserted that the rescue plan was far too complicated to work and relied on too few helicopters.

Those few who have actually seen Beckwith's commander, Maj. Gen. Vaught, will not go that far, but Vaught's appearance before them was apparently a memorable one. "This was indeed a character," said another Senate military aide.

"He was a gung-ho type of which there are few that we ever see. He's definitely what you'd call a muddy boots kind of soldier."

END

THE WASHINGTON STAR Saturday, May 17, 1980 A-8

Private Pleads Innocent In Officer's Death

FORT BRAGG, N.C. (AP) — An Army private entered a plea of innocent yesterday to a murder charge stemming from the death of an officer whose parachute failed to open.

Pfc. Alvin Williams, a 20-year-old parachute rigger, is accused of sabotaging a parachute worn by Capt. Lawrence D. Hill, who fell to his death March 26 when his parachute failed to open during a routine jump at Fort Bragg.

lanagement techniques and systems analysis ave created U.S. armed forces that may be fficient but are not very effective.

A critical view of the U.S. military establishment

ward N. Luttwak of the Georgetown Center for Strategic & International Studies
his country hasn't had a major successful military operation in 30 years."

PLAYING "WHAT'S WRONG with the military?" has become a favorite American game since the embarrassing failure of the Tehran rescue mission. Some of the least encouraging answers come from Edward N. Luttwak, a professional military analyst who has been a consultant to the Secretary of Defense and is the author of nine books and studies of war. The senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic & International Studies has criticized the raid to free the hostages in Tehran, not because of the effort but because of its apparent ineptness. FORBES put some simple questions to Luttwak and got some pessimistic answers.

Luttwak: Let's start with the things that are hard and physical. The fighter planes of the Air Force, are they ready to fly? Are the ships ready to sail? Are the radar and the missile launchers ready to function? Are they maintained? We all know it's very expensive in manpower and spare parts to keep everything working 100%, 100% of the time. Readiness is very perishable; like French bread, you have to buy it every day, it doesn't last. So 100% readiness would be terribly wasteful, but we have to keep the whole machine going at considerably better than zero. The question is, how much? For this purpose targets are laid down.

Let's say 70% to 80% of top fighters in Europe are to be ready at all times. Maybe in the States it is 60%, ready to fly. When you look at what they want, you find a big gap. In practice if the U.S. has 400 F-15 fighters, to make up a number, it has only 150 ready to fly. This means you are spending a lot of money to buy aircraft you don't actually have. They are on the lists but not actually available to shoot. This is a straightforward problem, the consequence of lack of money.

In the Air Force, it may be lack of money for spare parts and technicians. In the Navy it is a huge shortage of technicians. The Navy is supposedly short 10,000 to 15,000 technically trained petty officers and men. Naval aviation is hit both ways, short of people and spare parts. But we are talking here only of the physical readiness of equipment.

There is a second question. Are these people combat-ready in the sense that they have the training, the experience, the discipline to actually fight? Here the picture varies considerably from service to service. The low average mental level of Army enlisted manpower and the practice of the Army to send its better people into maintenance and support and management and administration, leaving only the dregs for the combat units, means that what we have in those units are very simple people using very complicated equipment. The only way you can do this is with very, very rigorous training. But they don't do very much training. They mainly sit around

in barracks because training is expensive. If it's artillery you have to shoot it. If it's armor you have to move it and shoot. So you have people of low mental categories who don't do much training spending a lot of time sitting around the barracks and therefore don't have the competence. They don't have the morale and the discipline, which is a function of morale. People who are bored and idle will not be disciplined.

The Army, therefore, is in very bad shape. It seems the Marine Corps is getting better manpower, more dedicated, more motivated, and spending more of its money on more intensive and more interesting training.

In the case of the Navy, it's a mixed picture. Apparently the Navy is badly afflicted by the loss of highly trained technical men and the cascade effect—if you're short of technicians, those left have to work harder, spend more time at sea, and this creates more unhappiness, which leads to more shortage.

The Air Force has much less of this problem. They are just short of money for spare parts, and in the case of the Strategic Air Command, short of money for fuel to fly their planes.

FORBES: But isn't this just the problem of the peacetime military? *Any* peacetime military?

Luttwak: That is almost an excuse. The truth is, we are in the position of someone who is trying to drive a car, a very powerful car, trying to drive it sideways. You can't do it. Sure, we are spending $150 billion, but we are spending in a way that is structurally wrong. You see, there are only a certain number of ways you can get men and train them into units.

One way is if you have national conscription. As a matter of course every 18-year-old knows and expects that when he reaches his birthday he will go into the service.

Another way is to have a truly professional army where you set very high standards for admission and you pay very well. That way you pick and choose and wind up with wonderful manpower and have no training or discipline problems. This is what the Indians do. It is a very poor country, and although the pay of soldiers is low by our standards, by India's standards it is high. So they have a truly professional army and get the very best of the population volunteering.

The third kind is to pick up the dregs of society, scouring the saloons, dragging them off the streets and out of the prisons. But then you have iron discipline, court martials, no appeals, corporal punishment. You make up with iron discipline what you don't have from motivation or enthusiasm.

The current American military force does not have mass conscription, does not have the high standards and selectivity of a truly professional army and does not have the discipline of an 18th-century army. It falls between alternatives and is not workable. You can only try to get capability by drowning the problem in money, but we're not drowning it in money. If we wanted to have a really effective army, with the present structure of the volunteer army we'd have to spend $250 billion a year, not $150 billion. The volunteer army is the most expensive way of getting true combat capability. It doesn't work.

FORBES: Doesn't our technological advantage, better weaponry, make up for those problems?

Luttwak: Technology or no technology, in the reality of warfare as opposed to paper calculations, the intangibles of leadership, command experience, tactical ingenuity, morale and skill of troops are much more important than materiel factors, your firepower, mobility and so on. It's not that these intangibles—from leadership to skill—will make the difference of 10% around the margin. From everything we know about warfare, ancient and modern, these intangibles easily dominate. It's not 10% around the margin, it's more like 200% to 300%.

"A broadly capable armed enemy, like the Soviet Union, with its tanks, artillery, mechanized infantry, its gas forces, will not be defeated by devices of narrow ingenuity, by gimmicks like the wired missile or assault breakers."

You have to realize this is a very gadget-oriented society and the military share in this fascination. We have so many physicists and engineers prominent in our top defense policymaking and they, of course, wildly overestimate the importance of gadgets. Every time we finally come to confront the reality of the Soviet armored threat, we think seriously for a while until somebody comes up with a new gadget that will solve the problem.

A few years ago there was much talk of these wire-guided [antitank] missiles. We'll get a few thousand of them with a few thousand men and they'll go behind a few thousand trees and we'll pick off the Russians as they come. Unfortunately, in war the technical is dominated by the tactical. The perfect wire-guided-missile kill rate of 90% goes to 50%, 40%, 30% or 20% when the other fellow is shooting at the fellow with the missile. And the armor is working to come behind you, and then the missile suddenly operates at 10%.

That we have all these engineers and physicists in our defense policymaking men who are so enamored of technical solutions, is a disservice because it distracts from the real problem. A broadly capable armed enemy, like the Soviet army, with its tanks, with its artillery, with its mechanized infantry, with its gas forces, will not be defeated by devices of narrow ingenuity, by gimmicks like the wired missile or the assault breaker. The assault breaker is the latest gadget. You just instrument the battlefield and you sit behind and press buttons and all these missiles will come down and kill everything moving on it.

FORBES: Yet our equipment used in combat by allies such as the Israelis has been superior on the battlefield.

Luttwak: You mention the Israelis. If you look at the American defense establishment, it is full of engineers and some systems analysts. The Israeli defense establishment consists largely of soldiers on one hand and clerks on the other. The clerks, who are engineers and scientists, serve as advisers, strictly subordinate, at lower levels. It's not incorrect to say that American equipment has been operated better by the Israelis than by the U.S., and deployed better, too.

The problem is, and I am talking as a civilian analyst, that there is a deformity, a real deformity at the very center of our defense establishment. Serious study of warfare, on the art of warfare, has been suppressed by the brutal imposition of analytical techniques which measure wonderfully what they measure but which don't happen to measure the really significant aspects of war.

The tactical, the leadership, the morale, the skill, are so much more important than the material things. Yet the different techniques we use, the systems analysis, the programming, all capture only the material aspects.

FORBES: For example?

Luttwak: An example: Every person who has seriously studied war knows that it is critically important to allow the combat unit to develop kinship and solidarity. Men under fire don't fight for their country; they fight for their buddies. Everyone knows this and every serious army makes it a point to have very stable structures, regiments and the like. But that is not efficient. For simple efficiency you want to have all the manpower in a big pool and send the correctly trained person where he is needed most. But when you move the guy, you are disrupting two organizations; and there is no way you can put the morale—the terribly important but completely unmeasurable development of solidarity—into those computers.

If you look at our Army units, you'll see what enormous turbulence there is. People come and go all the time. Companies, battalions, platoons are not the

homes of men, not a social group at all; they are just an administrative box into which manpower is flown in and out. This is one of many different examples of the same phenomenon, efficiency versus effectiveness. The conflict between civilian efficiency and military effectiveness runs right down the organization. Conflict is different from civilian activity, and leadership in war is totally different from management. Our people are managers in uniform. Actually, the American armed forces are very efficient; they just aren't very effective.

FORBES: Would you have any evidence for that?

Luttwak: The whole Vietnam War. During the entire conflict the efficiency of American military organizations was constantly manifested. The efficiency of communications, the efficiency with which firepower was administered, the efficiency of transportation and distribution, of medical services; but it was just not an effective war machine. The firepower, so efficiently administered, was not effective because the enemy refused to assemble in conveniently targetable massed formations. Less-efficient and less-managerial officers would have worked to find a method of war capable of dealing with people who refuse to assemble in conveniently targetable massed formations instead of concentrating on improving the efficiency of their firepower.

Armies are not efficient; armies are horribly inefficient; armies are wasteful, and so it should be.

FORBES: What should we do?

Luttwak: Shake them up a little. Come to grips with the fact that this country hasn't carried out a single major successful military operation in the last 30 years. [He mentions the Inchon landing in the Korean War as being that last success.] Accept this fact instead of pushing it under the rug.

The second part is to realize that the armed forces have deviated from the true study, exercise and tactics of warfare and become managerial institutions, largely concerned with the management of personnel and equipment, contemptuous of the art of war and indifferent to everything that is of war, like tactics and operations. Recognize these things and then move on reform.

FORBES: Such as?

Luttwak: One, for example, would be to reduce the number of officers. [He notes there is one officer today for each 6.4 enlisted men, including noncoms.] Or better still, greatly increase the manpower but don't increase the officers. These officers are layer upon layer upon layer of management, which slows initiative, slows decisionmaking, complicates any development. Now we have a queue of ten people wanting to command each battalion. The way we accommodate them is that the tours of commanders are very short. This prevents the unit from stabilizing under a leader. It violates good military practice.

FORBES: Why do you criticize the raid on Iran?

Luttwak: It was an unsound military plan that contradicts the four magic rules for commando operations.

One: Take a man's force to do a boy's job. Because you are inferior overall, you must be very superior at the point of contact; 97 Germans against 4 terrorists at Mogadishu [the commando attack on a hijacked airliner in Somalia]; 150 Israeli troops against 60 Ugandans.

Two: Combat risks being so high, no technical risk whatsoever is acceptable. If you land in fragile helicopters and you need 6, you take 12, 18—not 8.

Three: In all commando operations there is only one commander and he is on the spot. He doesn't need satellite communications because the only information he can send back is so sketchy and vague that any direction he gets from above is bound to mislead.

Four: The abandonment of the dead, of secret documents and intact helicopters is contrary to all the customs of war and the usages of the service. This has a powerful effect in intensifying the great loss of prestige that the country has suffered as a result of this debacle. A powerful effect. God knows how many Israeli commando operations have failed over the years, aborted. God knows, but the enemies of the Israelis don't, because the Israelis left no tracks.

This plan was a manifestation of the perverted use of military power, a perversion of the rules, the stripping of the combat content from a commando operation, which must be a combat operation by nature. ■

Social Security, says this financial expert, is run in a way that diminishes our living standard and promises to reduce it much further.

The shocking shape of things to come

By Ashby Bladon

AT THE AMERICAN COUNCIL of Life Insurance annual meeting in Washington in December 1978, there was a debate about that much overworked topic, Social Security, between Professor Martin Feldstein (who is one of my heroes because he is almost unique among professional economists in his understanding of the way our financial system really works) and the famous liberal economist Joseph Pechman. Mr. Pechman finally admitted that there is indeed a problem with Social Security; but, he asked, if it won't become a crisis for a quarter-century or more, why should this Congress worry about it? The answer, of course, is that failing to face up to it amounts to misleading young people about the standard of living they can expect to have after they retire. A timely and orderly transition to a financially viable Social Security system is likely to occur only if thoughtful business people, like the readers of FORBES, who understand the difference between responsible and irresponsible finance, demand it. Perhaps you noticed that the Republican candidates for the presidency debated Social Security in New Hampshire, and it was perfectly obvious that not one of them understands the basic problem. The Republicans!

As it stands today, Social Security is simply an income transference scheme. A payroll tax is levied, taking money away from workers and their employers, and the proceeds are given to Social Security beneficiaries. Nearly all of the proceeds are consumed. Nothing is invested.

To understand why this can't go on indefinitely we have to understand what productive investment really is. Under a private financial system productive people who are currently producing more than they need or desire to consume, and who wish to provide for their future

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1950 hours 6 May 1980

STATEMENT BY
MAJOR GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT, USA
COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE - 79

ON THE HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT IN
IRAN, APRIL 24 1980

Opening Statement. Mr Chairman, Ladies and

(U) Gentlemen, we will attempt to provide you the maximum amount of information in the minimum time. I believe it would be appropriate, with your concurrence, for me to proceed in the following manner: In layman terms I will describe my mission and its inherent risks; sketch the history of the Joint Task Force; list the organization we formed to do the job; and then cover planning, training; the decision making process; deployment and actions taken up through Desert-1. Then we would take your questions.

(C) (S) First the mission. On 12 November 1979 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed me to prepare a joint task force to go to Iran, free our hostages and return them to US control. He reviewed for me what had been done between 4 [redacted] and 12 November. I then organized an austere but typical Joint Staff organization containing J1 personnel, J2, J3, J4, J5, J6, etc. Most of this staff were already members of a Joint Staff element, ~~the~~ known as the Special Operations Division or SOD. However, before going further I'd like to focus a bit more on the nature of the mission. I've been in the hostage rescue and counter-terrorist business very deeply for the past three years in several capacities. Operational security and surprise ~~surprise~~ are absolute prerequisities to success in all

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO
CONFIRMED ON 12 May 1992
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~Classified By:~~ [redacted]
~~Declassified ON:~~ OADR

counter-terrorist activities at all times. From the outset, our plan placed heavy emphasis upon maintaining total operational security in order to achieve complete surprise up until the point that our rescue force would have crossed the wall at the Embassy. Hostage rescue is always a very dangerous and uncertain undertaking from beginning to end. The chances for success are measured very carefully and it is understood that even the smallest problem can have a major adverse impact on those chances. No matter how hard we may try, things can simply go to hell in a handbasket at any point from start to finish. If one does not accept this fact then there is no reason to plan and train. One only has to refer to the events in London on Monday to validate this fact. Returning to the planning phase, my staff also included weather and medical officers, and other specialists. As we planned the mission we examined the region, the distances, friendly bases, and the capabilities of various US forces and equipment. In the early days, we worked very hard to put together what one might call an emergency capability. By the 20th of December, we had a plan of sorts but it was not sufficiently complete or strong in its components to enable me to recommend to my superiors that it be used [redacted] We needed to learn the true nature of the Iranian defense and security forces, their intelligence and

[illegible], the true character of the hostage holders and their modus operandi, and the situation in and around Tehran itself. We continued to make a vigorous intelligence collection effort and at the same time to test various components of our force and our plan by conducting training. Initially we conducted training along the east coast of the US but we knew we would be working in a desert environment when we implemented the plan so we quickly changed our focus to the western desert of the US -- the Arizona, California, Nevada areas -- where we trained extensively from December 1979 to 15 April 1980. From the outset, the decision making process and the chain of command was very clear. I reported directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All other members of the Joint Chiefs were available to me at any time for council and advice. They were fully informed of the status of my planning, training, and any problems encountered. At the appropriate time, I personally briefed the President with the National Security Council present. This session lasted for nearly three hours. The President asked many appropriate questions ~~and made several helpful suggestions~~, approved the plan and authorized deployment to begin. He made it very clear to all present that the chain of command ran from him through the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to me. This chain was never challenged or violated.

(U) Deployment at our forward bases went as planned and by

By April all components of the force were at their launch locations and in a "go readiness posture." A detailed weather briefing was given and the decision to continue as planned was announced. On 24 April six C130s and eight RH53 helicopters launched and proceeded to enter Iran at first darkness. The helicopters were flying in a single eight ship formation. The 130s were phased in with one preceding the others by about one hour in order to secure and prepare the landing fields at Desert 1. The first C130 landed on time. The security plan was implemented, the airfields were delineated and validated. Three of the 130s brought fuel, two of the 130s brought people and one 130 brought people and 1500 gallons of contingency fuel. ~~It is now common knowledge~~, The helicopters experienced more difficulty than the 130's on the way to Desert 1. Between one and one-half and two hours into the mission, number 6 helicopter noted a blade failure warning light and immediately landed. It's crew was picked up per plan by number 8 and the mission continued. Later along the way, the helicopters encountered two areas of reduced visibility due to suspended dust. Their passage through these areas thoroughly tested their skill and training. Unfortunately one helicopter, number 5, experienced a failure of some essential navigational aids and elected to turn back to the carrier after it had completed about two thirds of the distance to Desert 1. However, six of the helicopters did arrive at Desert 1 in time to be

[illegible] and continue the mission to the next location as planned. While the last two helicopters to arrive at Desert 1 (numbers 1 and 2 were being refueled), number 2 affirmed an indication, they had noted in flight, that they may have experienced hydraulic failure in one of its flight control systems. It was determined that the hydraulic pump had failed, the helicopter was in a non-flyable status.

(U) It had been previously agreed and was an established part of the plan, that a prerequisite for mission continuance beyond Desert 1 was that we must have at least six helicopters in flyable condition. ~~When I was advised of the fact that we were down to five helos, my on-scene commander pointed out that we were now in an abort condition.~~ I asked if he ~~felt~~ thought we could proceed with five helos. After a short pause, during which time I understand he conferred with the Sub-Task Force Commanders, he recommended that we should withdraw from Desert 1. I told the on-scene commander to begin implementation of the withdrawal plan but not to depart until I gave him the order. I then called the Chairman of the JCS and informed him of the situation at Desert 1. I recommended that we cancel the mission and withdraw. He asked me how much time he had to confer with others before I must have a decision. I told him he had 10 and not more than 15 minutes. He informed me that he would speak with the Secretary of Defense and the President and get back to me soonest. In about eight

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~~I was to be called and told the President has affirmed my recommendations to withdraw and to do so per plan; that is, the helos and C-130's would return to their launch sites.~~

(U) About eight minutes later I received a flash report from the desert that a helicopter had collided with a C130, that there would most likely be massive casualties. I immediately imposed minimize conditions on all radio messages downward and directed my staff to request medical assistance. The injured were treated by medical personnel at the refueling site. The on-scene commander conducted a rapid but complete withdrawal from the desert in approximately 23 minutes, ~~under most difficult conditions~~. In addition to the burning aircraft and the ordnance that was cooking-off, there was an existing possibility of one of the abandoned helos being torched which, because of the proximity of the loaded C-130s, could have caused further casualties to the force. After checking the crash scene for any further survivors or bodies and releasing the 44 Iranian bus passengers unharmed, the C-130s carrying all living Americans departed Desert 1. Once the injured were back at the command base, they were immediately flown ~~back to the United States burn center~~ out of the area for further treatment.

(U) The above is a brief summation of what occurred up through Desert 1. It is my understanding that we are not expected to address today those aspects of the operations which were planned to take place beyond Desert 1. We are now ready to take your questions.

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A-#14

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN D. OLYNYK, USAR

SUBJECT: Senate Armed Services Committee Request

1. The SASC has requested that they be provided with a complete organizational chart/wiring diagram that shows the entire chain of command for the Iranian hostages rescue mission. The diagrams should include names, as well as positions, and should be detailed to the extent that it even shows which pilots were in which helicopters.

2. In addition, the Committee has requested information concerning the eight helicopters used in the aborted mission. The Committee understands that six of the helicopters were originally [redacted] loaded onto the carrier NIMITZ when the NIMITZ arrived from the Mediterranean. With respect to those six helicopters, the Committee wants to know what happened to each of the six, whether they malfunctioned, continued to operate, etc. The Committee further understands that two of the helicopters were shipped at a later time, that they were flown to the Mediterranean, and placed on the NIMITZ and brought around to the Indian Ocean on the NIMITZ. The Committee would like the same information with respect to those two choppers--whether those two malfunctioned, continued to operate, completed the mission, etc.

HAROLD L. MILLER
Colonel, JAGC, USA
Legal Adviser & Legislative Assistant
to the Chairman, JCS

Classified by: DJSOA 18 Oct 8
Declassify on: OADR

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~
Downgraded by: DDO, 12 Ma

[redacted]

Rescue Mission for American Hostages

#18

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(U) 1. The Joint Task Force's (JTF) mission was to rescue the hostages held at the American Embassy compound and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The goal was to rescue them and recover the rescue force intact. The task force was trained and guided to minimize Iranian casualties. In short, the rescue mission was designed to be a surgical operation with the sole objectives to rescue the hostages, to provide for protection of the rescue force and ~~absolutely~~ minimize casualties and damage to Iranian people and property. The most important and key ingredient for success was to reach the American Embassy compound in Tehran without detection and to surprise the militant captors. The time for the assault, one thirty, shortly after midnight, was chosen to reduce the probabilities of detection in the approach to the compound. It was also judged that the guard force would be comparatively less alert at this hour and reinforcements to ~~the~~ guard force would be less responsive.

(U) 2. The criteria for surprise was a driving and overriding factor in all of the planning, training and conduct of the operation. All the actions in and over Iran were required to be conducted during the hours of darkness. Because of the geographical size of Iran and the distance to be traveled by the rescue force over Iran, contrasted by the hours of darkness per 24 hour period, the mission required

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Classified by: Dir JSOA 18 Oct 88

Declassify: OADR

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8B02 Downgraded by DDO, NMCC 12 May 92

~~Classified By: JCS~~ [redacted]

~~Declassified On:~~

two nights and one full daylight period. The force was to be inserted the first night, spend one daylight period in hiding, then conduct the rescue and the extraction during darkness of the second night. Failure occurred during the first night when weather and technical problems caused the JTF to recommend to higher authorities that the mission be terminated. To have continued was not feasible and in our judgement would have led to failure with much larger consequences.

(U) 3. Within a few days following the Militants take-over of the Embassy a small team of experts was formed to develop plans and capabilities to rescue the hostages. There was no time table set for implementation of the rescue mission.

4. Early in the planning, several considerations and planning factors were identified which required detailed planning and special Training ~~had to be resolved~~. One of the major factors was the great distances which the force must travel to Iran and then the large geographical size of Iran proper. These distances were a determining factor in deciding that the operation would require one night of darkness then one daylight period to be followed by the second night for the rescue and extraction. The plan was developed into three phases. Phase One, the first night, was the insertion phase which included the hideout of the helicopters within a hundred miles of Tehran and the initial staging point of the ground rescue force. Phase Two was to begin immediately but in a methodical and gradual fashion and it included reconnaissance of the highways and approaches to the Embassy. [redacted] were

available for this part of the operation. Shortly after midnight the actual rescue was to begin. As hostages were freed they and the rescue force were to be picked up by the helicopters and flown to an abandoned airfield. Long range fixed wing aircraft were to be in position and protected by a security force. As the helicopters arrived, transfer was to be made to the fixed wing aircraft which were medically manned and equipped. The fixed wing aircraft were scheduled to depart to another location with eventual transfer to final destinations. The helicopters would have been left behind intact. There was not sufficient fuel nor hours of darkness available to fly them out of Iran.

(U) 5. A second set of factors, which required resolution, was also caused by the geographical size of Iran, Iranian armed forces capabilities and radar detection capabilities. It was determined that the best approach was to launch the helicopters from a position south of the Iranian coast in the Gulf of Oman. The helicopters could fly northward in the eastern part of Iran, a comparatively low populated part of Iran and where few radars were positioned, none of them with the capability to detect low flying aircraft. However the distance to the helicopter drop off point for the ground rescue force and helicopter hideout area was great - approximately 1000 miles. There was a further requirement for the helicopters to have several hours of fuel remaining at the hideout. This additional fuel would enable them to pick up the former hostages and the rescue force and deliver them to

[redacted]

the ~~extraction~~ landed airfield where the fixed wing aircraft were to be waiting for the extraction. Although the RH-53D helicopter, utilized in the mission, has very good range, it ~~did~~ has not have sufficient fuel to complete the mission. Consequently the helicopters required refueling on the ground enroute from the aircraft carrier to the ~~hiding area in the vicinity of Tehran.~~ hide out site The fuel was flown in aboard C-130 aircraft. These aircraft were equipped with fuel bladders, pumps and hoses to conduct the refueling. It was at this location and after the helicopters were refueled that the mission was terminated. There were only five operational helicopters at this point ~~and~~ the mission required a minimum of six.

(U)

6. From the outset, in mid November 1979, the Joint Task Force (JTF) was instructed to develop initial capabilites in the event that an early rescue was required. The JTF was also directed to continue refinement in training, equipment, and planning. The developed force capability was the result of an evolutionary process. The JTF was provided ready and total access to the entire resources of ~~the U.S. Government~~, the Department of Defense and other departments. Equipment and personnel from the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force were identified. The latest technology that could be applied feasibly was available. In fact several new equipment prototypes were tested and used by the JTF, ~~and~~ all very successfully. Other equipment capabilities, procedures and techniques were developed by the JTF, frequently with the assistance of research and development facilities.

procured for minesweeping. It is a long range helicopter but required additional auxillary fuel tanks to be carried. Its rotor blades and tail rotor fold to facilitate ship handling. It has sufficient navigation equipment for minesweeping but not judged to be adequate for their mission. Two navigation systems were installed on the helicopters: Omega and inverted navigation systems. These systems were imployed as aids to lead Reckoning Navigation. Lead Reckoning Navigation requires that the pilot navigate at night utilizing night vision goggles to confirm visually terrain, roads, towns and checkpoints along the planned flight route. It was judged infeasible to install higher technology navigational aides such as Forward Looking Infarred (FLIR) and terrain following radar. The amount of engineering and added weight was prohibitive. The planned method of navigation for the helicopters then was to fly in clear air with five meters or more visability to enable the aircrews to navigate visually with the navigation systems as an aide. The plan required good weather. During training and rehersal exercises the concept was validated repeatedly. Weather, then, became a primary consideration in the decision making process on when to begin the rescue mission. Two nights of suitable weather were required. The RH-53D is judged to be a reliable aircraft. Based on several years of maintenance data collection and experience gained by the helicopter rescue mission aircrews and maintenance personnel, the decision was made to launch eight aircraft from the

daily since December. Weather fronts, jet streams, density variables, cloud cover, temperatures and winds were forcast each day and on the following day a comparison was made of forecast and actual weather. All of the U.S. weather resources were available. Subsequent to the Iranian revolution there has been a paucity of weather reporting stations in Iran in particular the desolate and harsh eastern and southern Iran where the helicopters were to fly. Nevertheless, the availability of weather data was judged to be adequate for the forecasters to make ~~good~~ valid forecasts. On 24 April the Forecaster forcasted suitable weather for the next two days. Clear skies and light winds were forecasted for the helicopter route.

B. Intelligence: All indications were favorable.

C. Maintenance: All aircraft were mission capable and judged to be in very good condition.

D. Overall conditions. The force was able, prepared and ready for the mission. The JTF Commander directed that the mission begin.

11. The mission: On the afternoon of 24 April six air refuelable C-130s and eight helicopters took off on schedule. All aircraft were performing well. Approximately two hours after take off, one of the helicopters, number six in the flight of eight, developed mechanical problems. Cockpit instruments indicated that one of the main rotor blades had

Fire broke out immediately and both aircraft became quickly engulfed in flame. The C-130 was heavily loaded with personnel and munitions. Personnel in both aircraft were extracted through superhuman disciplined efforts. However regretably 5 Air Force personnel perished in the cockpit of the C-130 and 3 Marines perished in the helicopter. The fire was far too intense to recover them. Munitions began to Cook-off and fragments began striking helicopters. Two were damaged, one resulted in a fuel leak. The heat became so intense that adjacent helicopter crews felt ~~that~~ their aircraft were endangered. The C-130s were moved forward. At this point the deputy commander for operations at the refueling site consulted with the helicopter commander and determined that their was no alternative but to shut down the helicopters and move the C-130s away from the fire for onloading the helicopter crews. Some of the helicopter personnel attempted to return to the helicopters to recover the classified material, and consideration was given to destroying the helicopters. but the heat and exploding ammunition and flying projectiles was too intense. Five helicopters with some classified material were left, INTACT.

The force was now faced with the potential of further disaster. Personnel accountability, assistance to the wounded, release of the prisoners, reloading the C-130s were only a few of their problems. The commander ~~again~~ consulted with CCT and developed a plan for departure. Within 20 minutes following the aircraft accident, the three C-130s were airborne with all personnel accounted for. Hours later they landed and were met by medical personnel.

(U) 12. Command control. Lines of responsibility and authority were firmly established and understood. The commander of the JTF (CJTF) had reliable and ~~abundant~~ secure voice contact with the force. There were three deputy commanders: Deputy for C-130 Operations, Deputy for Helicopter Operations and Deputy for the Ground Rescue Force.

The chain of command ran from the President to the Chairman, JCS (CJCS), to the Joint Task Force Commander to the Deputy Commanders. The Joint Task Force Commander was assigned the responsibility and authority for the conduct of the mission. He was provided full latitude and flexibility for the conduct of mission as prebriefed to the President. There were instant and secure communications to the CJCS for consultation should the need arise and also to provide recommendations or request for guidance. The CJCS was in direct secure contact with the President.

The Deputy for C-130 Operations was in command of the C-130s and ground rescue force enroute to the refueling site. The Deputy for Helicopter Operations was in command of the helicopters to the refueling site. The Deputy for C-130 operations was designated commander of all forces at the refueling site. The Deputy for C-130 Operations was charged to consult with the Deputies for Helicopters and the Ground Rescue Force but any required decision or guidance at the refueling site was his responsibility. Any requests for guidance from or recommedations to the CJTF were to come from him. This command arrangement worked well, ~~and~~ there were no deviations.

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[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

A-8

Doctrine →

Surprise —

Expertise

proven capability —

Redundancy where feasible on plausible —

positive Secure Long Range Comms —

Helos used in Exercises of necessity, were not the same ones sent to DT

(e) [redacted] Weather Equip [redacted]

[redacted]

Background —

Mission — Target Location

Training and preparation

Guidelines —

— Security —

— Achievement oriented — Not Clock

— (within this window) Driven

Force Composition

Environment

Intell — Initial Estimations

— Later —

— Never adequate

Launch Base availability —

— Strategic Security —

— Complications

Organization —

[redacted]

A-432

12 June 80

DRAFT

OSD PAO News Release

Elements of the 101st Abn Div (Air Assault) deployed from Ft. Campbell Ky to Norton AFB, CA on 10-11 June in a deployment readiness exercise. Men, equipment and helicopters from several of the Division's units have been formed into the 158th Composite Aviation Battalion which will remain in the Norton area for several weeks of intensive individual and unit training. Central to the training are 30 UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters, the Army's newest and most advanced utility helicopter. The Black Hawk has been designed to perform missions of troop and equipment transport, resupply, aeromedical evacuation and command and control. The 101st is the first Army unit to be equipped with the Black Hawk and the current exercise is designed in part to give air crews greater experience and qualification in the helicopter. Supporting the training are 8 CH-47C Chinook helicopters. Elements of the following 101st units are involved:

D/158 Asslt Helo Bn

B/101 Asslt Helo Bn

159th Cmb Supt Helo Bn

5th Trans Bn

101st Aviation Group

63D MAW at Norton is acting as host and supporting training.

Number of men: approx 450

[redacted]

Declassified by
DDO, DMCC
12 May 1992

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassified ON: [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

A-#33

X

DRAFT

Contingency Press Guidance for Activity at
Ft Bliss- White Sands

The following statement is proposed for your use if an announcement is required:

" During the period of 15 June-10 July 80, a small scale exercise involving ground and air units will be conducted in the Ft Bliss-White Sands area. Besides day time activity, there will also be some limited operations at night. The exercise will involve some low altitude flights by helicopter and fixed wing aircraft. Both small arms and close air support firings will be conducted on the White Sands-Ft Bliss ranges."

The following is proposed in response to specific queries:

Q1. How many personnel are involved in the exercise?

A1. The number of personnel involved will vary with the maximum number being 900.

Q2. What is the purpose of the exercise?

A2. The personnel and exuipment of selected units will be evaluat on their ability to deploy, establish proper command and control, and successfully execute a variety of tasks to include: air field defense, close air support, and aerial resupply.

Q3. What units will/are involved in the exercise?

A3. In order to maintain the short or no notice aspects of this evaluation, we can not announce the unit designations at this time. Any query that cannot be answered within the context of this message should be referred to_____.

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

[redacted]

[redacted] JCS
Declassified [redacted]

Forwarded to Memo to Services 192

[redacted]

A-#34

DRAFT

Contingency Press Guidance Concerning HH-53 PAVE LOW Deployment

This guidance would not be prepositioned, instead it would be retained by the Test Directorate and used to assist Service PAO to respond to specific inquiry.

X

The following statement is proposed for use in response to query only:

" Four Air Force HH-53-H helicopters and approximately 70 aircrew and maintenance personnel have deployed to the Ft Bliss area. These aircraft will be operating in the general area of Ft Bliss for approximately three weeks. The HH-53H, nicknamed the PAVE LOW, is a modified version of the HH-53C. This variant is just entering the US Air Force inventory. This deployment is part of the operational test and evaluation of the helicopter and continuation training for the aircrew and maintenance personnel."

[redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: [redacted]

[redacted]

Declassified by
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

[redacted] DRAFT

Contingency Press Guidance for Activity at Dugway

The following statement is proposed for your use if an announcement is required:

"Elements of the]0]st Abn Div (Air Assault) Ft. Campbell Ky will deploy to Dugway Army Proving Grounds on 26 June 80 in a deployment readiness wxercise. Men, equipment and helicopters from several of the Division's units have been formed into the]58th Composite Aviation Battalion which will remain in the Dugway area for several weeks of intensive individual and unit training. Central to the training are 26 UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters, the Army's newest and most advanced utility helicopter. The Black Hawk has been designed to perform a variety of missions to include: troop and equipment transport, resupply, aeromedi evacuation and command and control. The]0]st is the first Army unit to be equipped with the Black Hawk and the current exercise is designed in part to give air crews and maintenance personnel greater experience an qualification in the helicopter. Supporting the training will be 4 CH-47C Chinook helicopters and USAF transport and helicopter aircraft. The maximum number of personnel involved in the training will be approximately 500.

Any query which cannot be answered within the context of this message should be referred to _____.

[redacted]

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Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

~~SECRET~~ H-20

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J-3)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DATE 20 May 80

MEMORANDUM FOR LTGEN Pustay
GEN Jones

SUBJ: Request for Cost: Senator Hollings' Letter of 6 May 80

Sir, Senator Hollings has requested (brown tab) cost estimates of the rescue attempt. He requested this data initially by 12 May but through coordination with his office and interim response (orange tab), we have delayed a final response until this week. Proposed final response, which has been coordinated with Service representatives and office of ASD(Compt), is at blue tab. The total is just under $200 million. A summary of the cost is immediately beneath the blue tab, followed by a summary of the cost associated with each Service.

I would appreciate your review, and General Jones', today if possible. General Jones does want to see this prior to release.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Copy to:
MG Vaught
LTGEN Gast

~~Downgraded~~

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

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~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

SUMMARY*

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended on the mission	Estimated Cost
Army	$ 1,151,541
Navy	161,200,000
Air Force	15,806,319
Subtotal	$178,157,860

2. Training & Preparation	Actual Cost
Army	$ 190,762
Navy	6,500,000
Air Force	3,534,588
Subtotal	$ 10,225,350

3. Airlift and Other Support	Actual Cost
Army	$ 44,627
Navy	6,000
Air Force	9,499,628
Subtotal	$ 9,550,255

Estimated Grand Total $197,933,465

* For detail accounting see Service enclosures, attached

CLASSIFIED BY: J-3
REVIEW ON: 15 MAY 86

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US ARMY
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended on the mission	Estimated Cost
2020 Minor weapons, clothing, communications and miscellaneous stock funded items	$1,037,591
2035 Communications equipment and non-standard items	100,294
2033 Research and development items and REDEYE systems	13,656
Subtotal	$1,151,541
2. Training and Preparation	**Actual Cost**
2020 Base support	$ 190,762
3. Airlift and Other Support	**Actual Cost**
2020 Army airlift and temporary duty	$ 44,627
Estimated Grand Total, Army	$1,386,930

CLASSIFIED BY: Dir, DCSOP, OD
REVIEW ON: 15 May 86

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US NAVY
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended on the mission	Estimated Cost
1506 RH-53D	$158,100,000 (FY-81/82/83)*
1109 Marine Night Vision and other special equipment	800,000
1804/1106 Components, Paint	2,300,000
Subtotal	$161,200,000

* 7 RH-53E aircraft would be procured to replace the out-of-production RH-53Ds. FY 1981 funds (9.0M) provide advance procurement. FY 1982 funds (128.1M) provide for aircraft procurement. FY 1983 funds (21.0M) provide for modification kits to incorporate a mine countermeasures capability in the aircraft.

2. Training and Preparation	Actual Cost
1804 Emergency Repairs - RH-53D	$ 3,000,000
1804 Component Repairs - RH-53D	3,500,000
Subtotal	$ 6,500,000

3. Airlift and Other Support	Actual Cost
1106 Temporary Duty	6,000

Estimated Grand Total, Navy $167,706,000

CLASSIFIED BY: CNO
REVIEW ON: 15 MAY 86

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US AIR FORCE
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended on the mission	Estimated Cost
3010 C-130 destroyed	$14,500,000
3010 Palletizied Inertial Navigation Systems (PINS)	1,015,000
3080 M-151A2 Jeep destroyed	3,196
3080 Fuel System	130,025
3080 Miscellaneous Equipment	158,098
Subtotal	$15,806,319

2. Training and Preparation	Actual Cost
KC-135 Tanker support during training, deployment and employment	
3010 Depot Spares	$ 85,873
3400 Aviation POL, Depot Equipment Maintenance (DPEM), Supplies	3,341,438
C-130 Support provided above normal training requirements	
3010 Depot Spares	10,430
3400 Aviation POL, Depot Equipment Maintenance (DPEM), Supplies	96,847
Subtotal	$ 3,534,588

CLASSIFIED BY: HQ TAC/DO Msg 132300Z May 80
DECLASSIFY ON: 13 May 88

3. Airlift and Other Support	Actual Cost	
ASIF airlift in support of training, deployment, medical evacuation and redeployment. Allocation of these costs to the using Service is presently in work.	$ 8,396,768	
3400 TDY expenses	1,066,667	
3400 Reconstitution of refueling system	19,193	
3500 Rations consumed	17,000	
Subtotal	$ 9,499,628	
Estimated grand total, Air Force		$28,840,535

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

21 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Cost Associated with Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt

(U) 1. Mr. Al South (OASD/C) has passed on telephonically to LTC Olynyk the following information with respect to the status of the cost package:

a. The package has been passed from Mr. Hamilton to the OSD Comptroller, and is with Mr. South.

b. The following changes to the package were agreed upon by Mr. Hamilton and OSD Comptroller and will be introduced into the package, with copies furnished to MG Dyke:

The cost for RH-53D and C-130 aircraft will be deleted, with a footnote added as follows: The cost for these aircraft is excluded on the basis that the decision has not been reached as to when, how, and to what extent this capability will be replaced.

b. The package with a cover letter will be signed today, 21 May, and forwarded to Senator Hollings. MG Dyke will be provided with a copy.

c. Mr. South recommended that MG Dyke insure that Mr. Hamilton understands that US Army "covert costs" associated with the mission were not included in the package.

d. The cover letter to Senator Hollings will indicate that this package has been coordinated with Mr. Joy. Mr. South assumed that MG Dyke discussed the package with Mr. Joy only in broad outlines, not in any detail.

e. The letter will also state that the costing was compiled with the cut-off date at the point of mission abort.

S. J. OLYNYK
LTC, USA

~~SECRET~~

Draft
April 26, 1980

Dear [Mr. Speaker]
[Mr. President]

This is the Report required by Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-138) and, to the extent applicable, by Section 4(a)(1) of that Resolution.

On April 24, 1980 I directed elements of the United States Armed Forces to commence the positioning stage of a rescue operation which was designed, if the subsequent stages had been executed, to effect the rescue of the American hostages who have been held captive in Iran since November 4, 1979 in clear violation of international law and the norms of civilized conduct among nations. The subsequent phases of the operation were not executed. Instead, for the reasons described below, all these elements were withdrawn from Iran, and no hostilities occurred.

The sole objective of the operation that actually occurred was to position the rescue team for the subsequent effort to withdraw the American hostages. The rescue team was at all times under my command and control and required my approval before executing the subsequent phases of the operation designed to effect the rescue itself. No such approval was requested or given because, as described below, the mission was aborted.

Beginning approximately 10:30 AM EST on April 24 six U. S. C-130 transport aircraft and eight RH-53 helicopters entered Iran air space. These aircraft were not equipped for air combat or bombing. Their crews were not equipped for combat. Some of the C-130 aircraft carried a force of approximately 90 members of the rescue team equipped for combat, plus various support personnel.

From appoximately 2 to 4 PM EST the six transports and six of the eight helicopters landed at a remote desert site in Iran approximately 200 miles from Tehran where they disembarked the rescue team, commenced refueling operations and began to prepare for the subsequent phases.

During the flight to the remote desert site, two of the eight helicopters developed operating difficulties. One was forced to return to the carrier Nimitz; the second was forced to land in the desert, but its crew was taken aboad another of the helicopters and proceeded on to the landing site. Of the six helicopters which landed at the remote desert site, one developed a serious hydraulic problem and was unable to continue with the mission. The operational plans called for a minimum of six helicopters in good operational condition able to proceed from the desert site. Eight helicopters had been included in the force to provide sufficicient redundancy without imposing excessive strains on the refueling and exit requirements of the operation. When the number of helicopters available to continue dropped to five, it was determined that the operation could not

proceed as planned. Therefore, on the recommendation of the force commander and my military advisers, I decided to cancel the mission and ordered the United States Armed Forces involved to return from Iran.

During the process of withdrawal, one of the helicopters accidentally collided with one of the C-130 aircraft, resulting in the death of eight personnel and the injury of several others. At this point, the decision was made to load all surviving personnel abroad the remaining C-130 aircraft and to abandon the remaining helicopters at the landing site. Altogether, the United States Armed Forces remained on the Ground for a total of approximately three hours. The five remaining aircraft took off about 5:45 PM EST and departed from Iran airspace without further incident at about 8:00 P.M. EST ~~and departed from Iranian airspace without further incident at about 8:00 PM EST~~ on April 24. No United States Armed Forces remain in Iran.

The remote desert area was elected to conceal this phase of the mission from discovery. At no time during the temporary presence of United States Armed Forces in Iran did they encounter Iranian forces of any type. We believe, in fact, that no Iranian military forces were in the desert area, and that the Iranian forces were unaware of the temporary presence of United States Armed Forces until after their departure from Iran. As planned, no hostilities occurred during this phase of the mission - the only phase

At one point during the period in which United States Armed Forces elements were on the ground at the desert landing site a bus containing about fifty Iranian civilians happened to pass along a nearby road. The bus was stopped and disabled. Its occupants were detained by United States Armed Forces until their departure, and then released unharmed. One truck closely followed by a second also passed by while United States Armed Forces elements were on the ground. These elements stopped the first truck ~~by a shot into the engine.~~ firing over the vehicle. The driver ran to the second truck which then escaped across the desert. Neither of these incidents affected the subsequent decision to abort.

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue operation had been commenced it had an excellent chance of success. They ~~were all volunteers~~ had all volunteered for the [illegible] they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them.

To the families of those who died and who were injured, I have expressed the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; It was not directed

against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It caused no Iranian casualties.

This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(d)(1)of the War Powers Resolution. In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them.

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A-846

J3M 813 '80
5 May 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Subject: Senate Armed Services Committee Request

(U) 1. Reference is made to your memorandum for LTC S.D. Olynyk, dated 2 May 1980, subject as above.

(U) 2. At inclosures A and B are the responses to the questions by the Senate Armed Services Committee, as outlined in the references:

Inclosure A. Organizational Chart of the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission

Inclosure B. Information on the eight helicopters used in the hostage rescue operation.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA
Vice Director for Operations

Attachment
a/s

Copy provided
- CJCS
- ACJCS
- LTG Gast
- MG Vaught
- COL Miller, LL Asst to CJCS
- Mr. Stempler

X Included as par [illegible]
A-106 [illegible]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT

Classified by: DIR JSOA 18Oct85
Declassify on: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO/NMCC to CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ENCLOSURE B TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Response to Staff Query, Senate Armed Services Committee

(U) 1. Eight RH-53 helicopters were utilized for the rescue operations. All eight helicopters were from USN Minesweeper Squadron HM-16 based at Norfolk, Virginia.

~~(C)~~ ~~(U)~~ 2. In mid-November 1979, six of the eight RH-53 helicopters were partially disassembled and airlifted by C-5 aircraft from Norfolk [redacted] where they were reassembled and flown aboard KITTY HAWK. In early January the two additional RH-53 helicopters (numbers 2 and 6 on the rescue mission) from HM-16 were airlifted from Norfolk to the Mediterranean where they were reassembled and loaded aboard the NIMITZ. The NIMITZ sailed from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and relieved the KITTY HAWK on station on 23 January 1980. The six RH-53 helicopters aboard the KITTY HAWK were loaded aboard the NIMITZ, making a total of eight.

E

(U) 3. All eight RH-53's were fully operational when they took off from the NIMITZ on 24 April 1980. The mission performance of each helicopter is outlined below:

HELO NUMBER	PERFORMANCE	REMARKS
1	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No problems
*2	Arrived at Desert One (Not mission capable)	Second stage hydraulic pump failure.
3	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	Low first stage hydraulic quantity. Prepared to service.
4	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No discrepancies
5	Returned to NIMITZ (Aborted mission)	Attitude reference system failure/TACAN failure
*6	Down after 2 hours (Aborted mission; crew picked up by helo #8)	Rotor blade indication failure
7	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No problems
8	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	Intermittent chip light indication on takeoff. Not an abort discrepancy.

(U) * Helos 2 and 6 arrived aboard NIMITZ. There is no correlation with the failure of these two aircraft and the coincidence of their arrival in the Indian Ocean aboard NIMITZ.

SECRET



SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

A - #43
Dup of A-54 1-7-92

THE JOINT STAFF

27 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Notes Taken During Interviews by Senate Armed Services Committee Staff, 23 May 1980

A, G 1. Major James H. Schaefer, Jr., USMC, and [redacted] appeared on 23 May 1980 before Senator Warner and staff members of the SASC for interviews concerning the attempt to rescue US hostages in Iran.

G 2. These notes are not verbatim transcripts of the questions and answers, but serve to provide the gist of each session. They are accurate in thrust and content, but may not be precise in terms of actual words or language used.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
Mr. Ross - 2E800
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst/CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel - 2E857

~~REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: DJSOA 180ct85
Declassify on: OADR
[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL
~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Downgraded to: CONFIDENTIAL by: DDO, NMCC
[redacted] SECRET

Policy Guidance: Hostage Locations Aug/Sep 80

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

A # 44

X

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

WARNING

ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!

EYES ONLY FOR: SECDEF

CJCS

LTG PUSTAY

ADM HANSON

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 May 1992
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
☐ DECL [X] DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted]

RETURN TO SOD, 2C840

A/G

ACTION OFFICER [redacted]

TELEPHONE: EXT [redacted]

(C)

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

Classified By: ~~DDS~~ Dir JSOA
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded to SECRET By DDO, NMCC, 12 May 92

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	SOD CONTROL NUMBER
CJCS	[redacted] ~~SECRET~~	

SUBJECT:	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
PAO GUIDANCE	X			

REMARKS

Attached memorandum requests CJCS discuss with SECDEF the development of PAO guidance regarding the hostages for use by all USG departments.

ACTION OFFICER	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
[redacted]	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
	J P						
	EXEC						
	TM CHF						
	VCOPS						
	COPS						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
23 JUL 80							

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

2 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Policy Guidance--Hostage Locations (TS) (U)

(U)

1. (TS) On 1 August COMJTF SNOWBIRD forwarded a memorandum to CJCS requesting CJCS recommend to SECDEF that he coordinate with Secretary of State on development of policy guidelines concerning official statements regarding hostage locations. On 5 August, the Director Joint Staff and Service Operations Deputies approved the memo and forwarded it to CJCS (Atch #1).

(U)

2. (TS) Subsequently, CJCS requested DJS to discuss the suggestion with Ambassador Komer, who in turn discussed it with Mr. Ross, OSD/PAO. Mr. Komer indicated Mr. Ross was dubious and made the following points;

a. (U) Quote. Statement we don't know is not entirely true. UnQuote.

(U)

b. [redacted]

3. (TS) [redacted]

4. (TS) [redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD
REVIEW ON 2 SEPTEMBER 2000

[redacted]

(4)

5. (TS) In light of the information stated above, request the subject of official statements regarding hostage location be made an agenda item at future SCC or NSC meeting and guidelines as proposed in original memo be considered for discussion.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

[redacted] SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT STAFF

1 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: PAO Policy Guidance: Hostage Locations

Request you recommend to SECDEF his coordination with SECSTATE or the NSC Staff to obtain approval of a policy note to be circulated to all government departments. The note would dictate the following PAO guidelines regarding statements to the press on the hostage locations. Points to be made are:

C ~~(E)~~ - [redacted]

- USG continues to receive conflicting reports of unknown reliability.
- USG is concerned first and foremost with a resolution of the crisis and speedy safe return of the hostages.
- C ~~(E)~~ USG believes that continued speculation (particularly crediting "Official Sources") is counter-productive to the welfare of the hostages and may be [redacted] and other morale sustaining efforts to and from the hostages.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
MAJOR GENERAL, USA

Approved by the Operations Deputies.
Tom Hamson
8/5/80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [redacted] SECRET

ATTACHMENT 1

5

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL DAVID C. JONES
CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM TO: DJS

DATE ____________

Thor - Request you discuss with Amb Komer.

DCJ

Thor

Tom Ross is dubious

1. Statement we don't know is not entirely true.

C 1st 2 [redacted]

Ref

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OK
RL

OO RUEAIIF
DE RUEIZJC #0322 2382120
ZNY ITTTT
O 252100Z AUG 80
FM JTF/SNOWBIRD/J2
TO [redacted]
BT
[redacted] S E C R E T CITE J3 0322

SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY GUIDANCE

1. ON 1 AUGUST, JTF SNOWBIRD FORWARDED A MEMORANDUM TO CJCS REQUESTING CJCS RECOMMEND TO SECDEF HE COORDINATE WITH SECSTATE OR THE NSC STAFF TO OBTAIN APPROVAL OF A POLICY NOTE TO BE CIRCULATED TO ALL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. THE NOTE WOULD PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING PAO GUIDELINES REGARDING STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS ON THE HOSTAGE LOCATIONS. POINTS TO BE MADE WERE:

(A) [redacted]

(B) USG CONTINUES TO RECEIVE CONFLICTING REPORTS OF UNKNOWN RELIABILITY.

(C) USG IS CONCERNED FIRST AND FOREMOST WITH A RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS AND SPEEDY SAFE RETURN OF THE HOSTAGES.

(D) USG BELIEVES THAT CONTINUED SPECULATION (PARTICULARLY CREDITING "OFFICIAL SOURCES") IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THE WELFARE OF THE HOSTAGES AND MAY BE [redacted] AND OTHER MORALE SUSTAINING EFFORTS TO AND FROM THE HOSTAGES. D)

2. REACTION TO THE MEMORANDUM WITHIN JCS WAS FAVORABLE, HOWEVER THE FINAL DOD RESPONSE WAS NOT. [redacted]

3. [redacted]

4. [redacted]

REVW 25 AUG 00
BT
#0322

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A #45

LIST OF CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS/INTERVIEWS
ON THE IRAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT

DATE/DAY	COMMITTEE/STAFF	WITNESSES	TESTIMONY TRANSCRIPT
28 Apr 80 Monday	HADSC*	Sec Claytor LTG Pustay	Verbatim Official Transcript
29 Apr 80 Tuesday (at Pentagon)	SASC Staff & Sen Warner	BG Todd RADM Cassidy COL Pitman COL Perryman LTC Seiffert [redacted]	None G, P
30 Apr 80 Wednesday	SFAC** & Sen Warner/Staff	LTC Seiffert [redacted]	None G, A
1 May 80 Thursday	SASC Staff & Sen Warner	1 May, A.M. COL Pitman LTC Seiffert [redacted]	None G, P
		1 May, P.M. [redacted]	None G, P
2 May 80 Friday	SASC	[redacted]	Informal Notes (LTC Williamson) G, P
	SASC Staff & Sen Warner	COL Kyle (0930) COL Pitman [redacted] (1200)	None G, A
5 May 80 Monday	SASC Staff & Sen Warner	LTG Gast MG Vaught	Informal Notes (LTC Williamson)
	SASC Staff	COL Beckwith	Informal Notes (LTC Williamson)
	SASC Staff & Sen Warner	LTC Guidry	Informal Notes (LTC Williamson)

* House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee
** Senate Foreign Affairs Committee

~~Classified By: JOS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

~~Declassified by: DDO~~
Downgraded by: DDO, NMCC
to CONFIDENTIAL on 04 MAY 07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: DJSC
18 Oct 8
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIST OF CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS/INTERVIEWS
ON THE IRAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT

DATE/DAY	COMMITTEE/STAFF	WITNESSES (C)	TESTIMONY TRANSCRIP
6 May 80 Tuesday	HASC*	LTG Gast MG Vaught	Informal Notes (LTC Williamson)
7 May 80 Wednesday AM & PM	SASC	LTG Gast MG Vaught COL Beckwith COL Kyle LTC Seiffert LTC Guidry [redacted]	Official Verbatim Testimony /G
8 May 80 Thursday	SASC (closed hearings)	SECDEF CJCS CSA CNO CMC	Official Verbatim Transcript
16 May 80 Friday	SASC Staff & Sen Warner	COL Perryman G [redacted]	Informal Notes (COL G. Miller)
19 May 80 Monday	SASC Staff & Sen Warner	[redacted] AG	Informal Notes (LTC Williamson)
20 May 80 Tuesday	SASC Staff	COL King CAPT Fleming	Informal Notes (LTC Kvederas)
23 May 80 Friday	SASC Staff & Sen Warner	MAJ Schaefer [redacted] AG	Informal Notes (LTC Kvederas)
2 Jun 80 Monday	HADSC**	Sec Claytor LTG Pustay LTG Gast MG Vaught COL Beckwith With back-up: COL Perryman LTC Seiffert	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

* House Armed Services Committee
** House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A-46

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATION: CONTROL SHEET

4-46

ISSUE	SUSPENSE INT/EXT	REQUESTED BY	DATE	TYPE OF REQUEST	REFERRED TO	ACTION TAKEN
1. Maintenance Records on RH-53		SASC	29Apr80	Memo OSD/LLA	ADM Cassidy & CNO	Response 6 May.
2. Names, Rank, branch of service, organization, experience of pilots and 20-man maintenance crew		SASC	29Apr80	Memo OSD/LLA	COL Pitman	See also #4; Completed 9 May 80
3. Organization and location of 8 RH-53 helos by task no.		SASC	29Apr80	Memo OSD/LLA		Input to COL H. Miller, 6 May 80 #
4. Dates each pilot and maintenance crew member joined SW training unit		SASC	29Apr 80	Memo OSD/LLA		Part of #2 Completed 8 May 8(
5. Reports on next scheduled maintenance		SASC	29Apr80	Memo		Response to LLA, CJCS, 6 May #5
6. Weather reports esp sand storm						Response, 7 May 8(
7. Special checklists						Response, 6 May 8
Maintenance on 8 helos		SASC	29Apr80	OSD/LLA	ADM Cassidy	Over-and-above Completed 6 May
9. Complete org chart/ wiring diagram	5May/	SASC	2May	LLA CJCS		Completed 5 May
10. Hist of 8 helos enroute to NIMITZ	5May	SASC		LLA CJCS		Completed 5 May
11. Req for personal data helo crewmembers		J-31	5May	J-31 Same as #2	MG Vaught Attn: COL Pitman	See #2 Completed 9 May 8

Classified by: DJSOA, 18Oct85
Declassify on: OADR

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~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATION: CONTROL SHEET

ISSUE	SUSPENSE INT/EXT	REQUESTED BY	DATE	TYPE OF REQUEST	REFERRED TO	ACTION TAKEN
12. Reiterated req for maint records	9 May	SASC	5May800	ASD (LA)	MG Vaught	Completed 6 May; see #1; 2 boxes in OPG for review.
13. Info on failure rate of helos during tng	8May	SASC	5May80	LLA/CJCS AG	ADM Cassidy COL Pitman	Completed 8 May 80
14. Map of helo and C-130 flight route in Iran	6May/7May	SASC	6May80	Mr. Stempler	MG Vaught	Completed (COL King
15. Chart of helo and C-130 refueling at Desert 1	6May/7May	SASC	6May80	Mr. Stempler	MG Vaught	Completed (COL King
16. Info on portions of OPLANS	6May/7May	SASC	6May80	Mr. Stempler	MG Vaught	CDR, JTF-79 does no want plan released
17. Plan to have available [redacted] for interview (& MAJ Schaffer)	6May	SASC	6May	Mr. Stempler	MG Vaught A,G	[redacted] on ca in hospit MAJ Shaffer in hosp
18. Info on education levels of mission personnel	15May	HASC	5May	LLA/CJCS	MG Vaught COL Pitman	Completed, 9 May 80 see also #29
19. [redacted] available (on call)		SASC	6May	Mr. Stempler	COL Pitman	On call
20. Info on education level of helo maint pers (on NIMITZ and 20)	15May/ 16May	HASC	6May	LLA/CJCS	COL Pitman G	Completed, 9 May 8 see also #2, #4, and #29
21. Fact sheet on weather & dust storm in Iran			5May		CPT [redacted]	Completed 5 May
22. Fact sheet on mission abort by helo 5			5May		ADM Cassidy COL Pitman	Completed 5 May

11A22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

SSUE	SUSPENSE INT/EXT	REQUESTED BY	DATE	TYPE OF REQUEST	REFERRED TO	ACTION TAKEN
3. Statement for SASC Hearings, 7May80	6May/ 6May	SASC	5May80	LLA/CJCS	MG Vaught	Completed and approved by SCEDE 6 May
4. Report on Hostage Rescue Opn					LTG Gast	Completed 6 May
5. Background papers for GEN Pustay for HASC Hearing	0700 8May	MG Dyke	6May80	to GEN Dyke	LTC Olynyk	Completed 8 May
6. Review of LTG Pustay's Testimony before SASC	7May	LLA/CJCS	3May	Oral to LTC Olynyk	LTG Gast MG Vaught RADM Cassidy	- Inserts completed 7May - Review completed 7May
7. Follow-on Questions on Hostage Rescue (Mr. Ross)	6May	SAPA/CJCS	6May	Oral to MG Dyke	MG Dyke	Completed 6May
8. Comments on R. Burt's Story in NYT	6May	ASD(PA)	6May	Memo	MG Dyke	Completed 6May
9. Recap of Tasks #2, #4, #11, #18, #20	15May	MG Dyke	7May	Memo	MG Vaught RADM Cassidy COL Pitman	Completed 9 May 8
0. Helo navigation equipment	8May	SAPA/CJCS	8May	Tele	MG Dyke	Completed, 8 May
1. Awards for hostage mission participants	8May	ACJCS	8May	Tele	MG Dyke	Completed, 8 May
2. Cost estimate for hostage rescue effort to SECDEF	Sen. Hollings		6May	Letter	ASD(C)	- Svc POCs notified & tasked. - Interim response to Sen. Hollings 9 May 80.
3. Navy Q&A on RH-53 contracts		OSD(PA) thru DJS PA	8May	Q&A	CDR George	Completed answers provided by DJS (PA) & Apvd by J31 9 May 80.

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CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATION: CONTROL SHEET

ISSUE	SUSPENSE INT/EXT	REQUESTED BY	DATE	TYPE OF REQUEST	REFERRED TO	ACTION TAKEN
34. Review of Testimony on hearings by SASC 7 May 80	15 May	LLA/CJCS	12 May	Memo	Witnesses	Completed
35. Inserts for closed testimony be SECDEF, CJCS, & Service Chiefs before SASC, 8 May 80	1200 16 May	LLA/CJCS	14 May	Memo	LTG Gast	In process
36. Sen. Tower's concept on Integrated Organization for Anti-Terrorist Ops	27 May	LLA/CJCS	14 May	Memo	BG Johnson & OPG	In process
37. OSD questions on rescue attempt in Iran	1100/1200 15 May	OSD	14 May	Pers to LTG Gast	LTG Gast Adm Cassidy Col Kyle LTC Sieffert	Completed 16 May 80
38. Query from Hearst Newspapers	16 May	Col Able	16 May	Memo	LTG Gast	Completed 16 May
39. Request for additional witness before SASC & Sen. Warner's staff	Continued	SASC via LLA/	15 May	Memo	MG Vaught	Continued
40. Query from the New York Times re hostage rescue attempt	16 May	Col Able	16 May	Memo	LTG Gast	Completed 16 May
41. Query from the Washington Star	16 May	Col Able	16 May	Tele	LTG Gast	Completed 16 May
42. Talker & background paper for Mr. Claytor & LTG Pustay on Intell support to JTF-79	1000/1200 19 May	LTG Pustay	16 May	Personal to LTC Olynyk	MG Vaught	Completed 19 May 80

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CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TACT RESCUE OPERATION: CONTROL SHEET CONFIDENTIAL

ISSUE	SUSPENSE INT/EXT	REQUESTED BY	DATE	TYPE OF REQUEST	REFERRED TO	ACTION TAKEN
43. SASC request for addl info on helos	COB 21 May	COL G. Miller	20 May	MFR	RADM Cassidy	Completed 22 May 80
44. Sen Stennis/Schweiker request for info on helos	COB 22 May		21 May	Memo	RADM Cassidy	Completed 22 May 80
45. Cong Wright's inquiry re "sanitization" of Iran hostage rescue personnel		LLA/CJCS	21 May	Memo	LTC Kvederas	Completed 22 May 80
46. Possible Compromise of classified info re hostage rescue attempt	1500 23 May	Leon Schachter OSD Gen Counsel	22 May	Verbal	CAPT Hall AC	Completed 23 May Revision submitted 28 May 80
47. Insert to GEN Jones' Testimony, 8 May 80-- "Chronology"		LLA/CJCS	14 May	Memo	LTC Olynyk	Completed 27 May 80
48. Query from Lisa Myers, The Washington Star	1500 28 May	SA(PA) CJCS	28 May	Memo	CAPT Hall	Completed 28 May
49. Hostage Rescue Aircraft Accident Board	-	JCS/J3	31 May	JCS msg 310237Z May 80	CAPT Hall	Recorded
50. Terms of Reference-- Special Ops Review Group		CJCS	28 May		ADM Holloway	Ongoing
51. Request for names & location of Iran MAAG personnel during final year		LLA/CJCS	2 Jun	Memo	LTG Gast CAPT Hall Services	
52. Query from Rep. Levitas' Office		LLA/CJCS	3 Jun	Congressional	CAPT Hall	Completed 4 Jun
53. Testimony before HADSC	COB	LLA/CJCS	4 Jun	Memo	Witnesses and RADM Cassidy Col Pitman	Completed 9 Jun 80
a. Review of Draft	6 May/ COB 9 May					
b. Inserts for Record-1						
c. Inserts for Record-2 Additional Questions	COB 9 May	LLA/CJCS CONFIDENTIAL		Memo	LTG Gast MG Vaught Col Pitman	Completed 9 Jun 80

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT STAFF

5 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Notes Taken During Interviews by Senate Armed Services Committee Staff, 4 June 1980

A,G

1. [redacted] Sikorsky Tech Rep, appeared on 4 June 1980 before staff members of the SASC for interviews concerning the attempt to rescue US hostages in Iran.

(U)

2. These notes are not verbatim transcripts of the questions and answers, but serve to provide the gist of each session. They are accurate in thrust and content, but may not be precise in terms of actual words or language used.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
Mr. Ross - 2E800
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst/CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel - 2E857

~~REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: DJSOA, 18Oct85
Declassify on: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~JOINT CHIEFS~~

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

27 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Query on Nose Wheel Damage

1. Major Schaefer was contacted at his home in Arizona and provided the additional information at the enclosure. Although I had been told earlier of some helicopter tires losing air due to the sand, damage to a nose wheel to the extent described was new information for me. I personally spoke with Major Schaefer today after reading his comments and asked him to expand on this information, particularly as it may have contributed to the accident. Major Schaefer said that the requirement to lift the aircraft to a low hover to taxi was a contributing factor to control of the aircraft. Further, the requirement to hover in order to taxi raised more dust, reducing visibility at the critical point when near the C-130.

2. Only LTG Gast and MG Vaught have received distribution of this memorandum.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
LTG Gast
MG Vaught

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

Classified By: ~~JCS DTGR~~
Declassified ON:

Declassified by
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

AMPLIFYING STATEMENT BY MAJOR JAMES K. SCHAEFER, USMC

ON NOSE WHEEL DAMAGE TO HIS AIRCRAFT

Shortly after putting the helicopter on the ground, the nose wheel struck one of the nuts left by a C-130 during its landing. The contact with the nut caused the nose wheel to turn [illegible] to the right. This deflated both tires and caused the nose wheel steering device to lose its effectiveness. At the time, the helicopter was traveling at about 3 knots and under positive direction of a ground controller equipped with lighted wands. Since the nose wheel was no longer operable, I had to air taxi the helicopter into position. This was accomplished in a series of 5-10 yard increments. After each segment of the taxi, I would have to wait for the dust to clear. For the final increment, I lifted the helicopter into a shallow orbit above the dust cloud, lined up on the north-south refueler, and made a standard fly-in air taxi approach. The nose wheel damage prevented an attempt to ground taxi.

INSERT FOR THE RECORD

A-56

APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE	HOUSE / X SENATE	ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE	HOUSE / SENATE	OTHER
DATE	TRANSCRIPT PAGE NO	LINE NO	INSERT NO	
Y 1980				X

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Question: What are the implications of the failure of this mission, and the technical shortcomings of the helicopters employed, for our ability to project conventional military power on a regional or global basis? How serious is our overall tactical helicopter readiness problem and within what timeframe can the necessary fixes be reasonably achieved?

Answer: The failure of this highly specialized rescue mission has no implications whatsoever on our abilities to project conventional military force anywhere in the world. One simply cannot extrapolate from the unique circumstances of this mission to overall US military capabilities.

Of the heavy lift helicopter units in the US Armed Forces, 72% are currently combat ready. [3% are not combat ready because of programmed equipment conversion; and 25% are not combat ready due primarily to personnel, training, and supply deficiencies.] The readiness problems of US tactical helicopters worldwide are thus similar to those associated with the readiness of fixed wing aircraft units--the readiness levels of both types reflect current training and experience levels of maintenance personnel and the availability of repair parts for scheduled and unscheduled maintenance. The solution to improving the readiness of these aviation forces can only be addressed in the broader context of improved personnel availability and training levels and overall material support improvements.

~~Classified by: OSJCS~~
~~Declassified on: 3 Jun 86~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Subject: Congressional Request for Information Concerning Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt

Reference: Memorandum for the Record, OATSD(LA), 19 May 1980, "Hostage Rescue Mission" (attached)

1. The following information is submitted in response to your request (reference above) which requested clarification of testimony by COL Perryman and [redacted] before Senator Warner's group and the SASC staff on 16 May 1980.

2. Mr. Roberts requested information as a result of [redacted] statement that helicopter #6 was the aircraft which was involved in the accident onboard the NIMITZ. According to Mr. Roberts, Senator Warner's group had been told previously that it was #8 helicopter that was involved in the accident.

a. After a review of all available maintenance records and interviews with HM-16 key maintenance personnel by the Post Mission Maintenance Review Team it was determined that helicopter #6 was the aircraft involved in the ground incident aboard NIMITZ.

b. The following information, which is excerpted from the "Post Mission Summary, RH-53D Helicopter Maintenance and Material Condition," a copy of which was previously submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee Staff, is provided:

On 28 February, damage occurred to aircraft #6 during deck handling operations. A NIMITZ deck handling crew was towing the aircraft from elevator #3 into the hangar bay when one tail rotor blade impacted an overhead padeye structure. The director in charge of moving the aircraft knew the tail pylon was spread but felt it would clear the overhead structure. The Naval Air Rework Facility Pensacola was requested to provide guidance for repair and recommended changing only the damaged blade assembly and inspecting the other components. As a safeguard, the squadron applied the most stringent interpretation of the General Information Servicing Manual and replaced the tail rotor blade, rotary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

f. Q: With respect to the servo which failed on helicopter #2, what was the life point for that servo?

A: H-53 helicopters with aluminum primary servo housings have a servo removal interval of 1200 hours. All RH-53Ds are equipped with improved steel servos which are removed on condition only. A record is not kept of time accumulated on components that do not have established finite removal intervals.

f. Q: Is it unusual to have five extensions on an aircraft?

A: The average RH-53D is on its second 27-month SDLM period, has 1408 flight hours on the airframe, has accumulated 59 operational service months and has been granted 1.8 extensions. Mission aircraft #5 on 24 April was one month into the fifth extension of its first SDLM period; however, due to a prolonged bailment period at Sikorsky, the aircraft had accumulated only 27 operational service months and 1342 airframe flight hours.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
Mr. Ross - 2E800
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
GEN Jones
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
RADM Cassidy
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel - 2E857
COL Pitman

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

19 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Hostage Rescue Mission

CDR [redacted] and COL Perryman were interviewed by John Roberts, Steve Dotson, and Bud McFarland. CDR [redacted] told the group that the RH-53D helicopter is normally due for major maintenance every 27 months. However, extensions of three months are frequently granted and not uncommon.

With respect to the eight helicopters assigned to this mission, three were beyond the 27 month period. However, the types of failures associated with helicopters #6, 5, and 2, would not normally be discovered during a major rework.

CDR [redacted] reported to the group that he and his crew had absolute top priority while onboard the NIMITZ, and that at the time the mission occurred he was convinced that the helicopters were ready to fly.

According to CDR [redacted] helicopter #6 was the helicopter which had the accident onboard the NIMITZ; this particularly caught John Roberts' attention, who pointedly stated that up until now the Warner group always had been told that aircraft #8 was involved in the NIMITZ accident. Roberts asked that this discrepancy be clarified.

The attached questions were prepared by Bud McFarland:

(1) What is the criteria for scheduling special depot level maintenance (SDLM)? Is it based upon a fixed number of flight hours or an arbitrary calendar life?

(2) When an aircraft exceeds the criteria for SDLM, what authority exists for extending its retention in an operational status? What criteria must be met before that authority is exercised?

(3) Are any restrictions imposed on an aircrafts use once it is beyond the time requiring SDLM?

(4) What exactly takes place during SDLM? Would any or all of the parts which failed on the mission, have been replaced during SDLM?

(5) Please provide the same explanation for the Phase A-D 100 hour maintenance checks.

COL Perryman confirmed the maintenance practices for the RH-53D. Some members of the Warner group placed a great deal of emphasis on the maintenance policies associated with the President's helicopters. They noted that all dynamic systems are replaced at their 50% life.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

With respect to the SERVO which failed on helicopter #2, the Warner group asked "what was the life point for that SERVO"? The group also asked COL Perryman to provide the answer to the question "is it unusual to have five extensions on an aircraft"? COL Perryman, like CDR [redacted] stated he did not know what he would have done any differently to assure that the helicopter portion of the mission would succeed.

G

GRANT MILLER
COL, USAF

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A #60

THE JOINT STAFF

21 May 1980

X

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Cost Estimates for the Hostage Rescue Operation

Attached for your information is a copy of the dispatched response (TAB A) to Senator Hollings' request for an estimate of the costs of the rescue attempt. Note that the costs of the RH-53D and C-130 aircraft have been excluded from the totals. The memorandum for record at TAB B provides some of the background on this.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
Mr. Ross - 2E800
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LLA/CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel - 2E857

~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

COMPTROLLER

21 MAY 1980

Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
Chairman, Committee on Budget
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In further response to your letter of May 6, the attached estimates of the costs of the hostage rescue operation are submitted. These estimates, listed by Military Departments, are presented to show estimated cost for certain items expended on the mission. The costs shown for training and preparation are those over and above programmed expenditures. Military and civilian personnel pay are not included.

The enclosed information has been discussed with Mr. Mike Joy of your office. We sincerely hope that it meets your requirements and contributes to the overall understanding of defense needs. Should there be other requirements in this matter, we are prepared to assist.

Thank you for your long-standing support and continuing interest in the readiness and adequacy of our defense programs.

Sincerely,

John R. Quetsch
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)

Enclosures

SECRET

WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY[a]/

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1.	Estimated value of items expended on the mission	Estimated Cost
	Army	$ 1,151,541
	Navy	3,100,000
	Air Force	1,306,319
	Subtotal	$ 5,557,860
2.	Training and Preparation	Actual Cost
	Army	$ 190,762
	Navy	6,500,000
	Air Force	3,534,588
	Subtotal	$ 10,225,530
3.	Airlift and Other Support	
	Army	44,627
	Navy	6,000
	Air Force	9,499,628
	Subtotal	$ 9,550,255
	Total	$25,333,465

a/ Detail by Military Department is attached.

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~Dir, J-3, JCS~~ DJSA
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~May 21, 1986~~ OADR

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US ARMY
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

	Estimated Cost
1. Estimated value of items expended on the mission	
2020 Minor weapons, clothing, communications and miscellaneous stock funded items	$1,037,591
2035 Communications equipment and non-standard items	100,294
2033 Research and development items and REDEYE systems	13,656
Subtotal	$1,151,541
	Actual Cost
2. Training and Preparation	
2020 Base Support	$ 190,762
3. Airlift and Other Support	
2020 Army airlift and temporary duty	44,627
Total, Army	$1,386,930

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~Dir, DCSOP~~ DJSOA, OB
REVIEW ON: ~~15 May 86~~ OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US NAVY
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1.	Estimated value of items expended on the mission a/	Estimated Cost
	1109 Marine Night Vision and other special equipment	$ 800,000
	1804/1106 Components, Paint	2,300,000
	Subtotal	$ 3,100,000
2.	Training and Preparation	Actual Cost
	1804 Emergency Repairs - RH-53D	$ 3,000,000
	1804 Component Repairs - RH-53D	3,500,000
	Subtotal	$ 6,500,000
3.	Airlift and Other Support	
	1106 Temporary Duty	$ 6,000
	Total, Navy	$9,606,000

a/ Excludes costs of the seven RH-53B aircraft expended since no decision has been made on whether, when, how or to what extent replacement of this capability will be required.

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~DJSM Dir, J-3, JCS~~ OADR
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~May 21, 1986~~

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COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US AIR FORCE
(ALL COSTS IN FY 80-DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended [a] on the mission	Estimated Cost
3010 Palletizied Inertial Navigation Systems (PINS)	$1,015,000
3080 M-151A2 Jeep destroyed	3,196
3080 Fuel System	130,025
3080 Miscellaneous Equipment	158,098
Subtotal	$1,306,319

2. Training and Preparation	Actual Cost
KC-135 Tanker support during training, deployment and employment	
3010 Depot Spares	$ 85,873
3400 Aviation POL, Depot Equipment Maintenance (DPEM), Supplies	3,341,438
C-130 support provided above normal training requirements	
3010 Depot Spares	10,430
3400 Aviation POL, Depot Equipment Maintenance (DPEM), Supplies	96,847
Subtotal	$3,534,589

[a] Excludes costs of the C-130 aircraft destroyed during the mission since no decision has been made concerning whether replacement will be programed, and if so, when.

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~HQ TAC/DO Msg 132300Z May 80~~ JJSOA

DECLASSIFY ON: ~~May 13, 1988~~ OADR

~~SECRET~~

3. Airlift and Other Support	Actual Cost	
ASIF airlift in support of training, deployment medical evacuation and redeployment. Allocation of these costs to the using Service is presently in work.	$ 8,396,768	
3400 TDY expenses	1,066,667	
3400 Reconstitution of refueling system	19,193	
3500 Rations consumed	17,000	
Subtotal	$ 9,499,628	
Total, Air Force		$14,340,535

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

21 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Cost Associated with Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt

Mr. Al South (OASD/C) has passed on telephonically to LTC Olynyk the following information with respect to the status of the cost package:

a. The package has been passed from Mr. Hamilton to the OSD Comptroller, and is with Mr. South.

b. The following changes to the package were agreed upon by Mr. Hamilton and OSD Comptroller and will be introduced into the package, with copies furnished to MG Dyke:

The cost for RH-53D and C-130 aircraft will be deleted, with a footnote added as follows: The cost for these aircraft is excluded on the basis that the decision has not been reached as to when, how, and to what extent this capability will be replaced.

c. The package with a cover letter will be signed today, 21 May, and forwarded to Senator Hollings. MG Dyke will be provided with a copy.

d. The cover letter to Senator Hollings will indicate that this package has been coordinated with Mr. Joy. Mr. South assumed that MG Dyke discussed the package with Mr. Joy only in broad outlines, not in any detail.

S. D. OLYNYK
LTC, USA

SECRET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

20 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Notes Taken During Interviews by Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Personnel, 20 May 1980

1. [redacted] appeared on 20 May 1980 before staff members of the SASC (Messrs. Roberts and Dotson) for interviews concerning the attempt to rescue US hostages in Iran.

(U) 2. These notes are not verbatim transcripts of the questions and answers, but serve to provide the gist of each session. They are accurate in thrust and content, but may not be precise in terms of actual words or language used.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
Mr. Ross - 2E800
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst, CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel/LTCOL Wheeler - 2E857

~~DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: DJSOA 18Oct85
Declassify on: OADR

~~Classified by: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Downgraded by: DDO, NMCC 12 May 1992

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~ A HGS

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

9 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Notes Taken During Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee on 8 May 1980

G

1. Attached is the transcription of notes taken by LtCol C. A. Williamson, Special Operations Division, J-3, during the appearances before the House Armed Services Committee on 8 May 1980 of Col Kyle, LtCol ~~Guidry~~, and [redacted]

2. These notes are not verbatim transcripts of the questions and answers, but serve to provide the gist of each session. They are accurate in thrust and content, but may not be precise in terms of actual words or language used.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst, CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel/LTCOL Wheeler - 2E857

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

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DDO NMCC
12 May 1992

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~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A #67
Sec 77-179

9 MAY 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Response to Query on Hostage Rescue Mission

1. References:

a. Memorandum, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, 29 April 1980, subject: Hostage Rescue Mission.

b. Memorandum, Legal Advisor and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, 5 May 1980, subject: House Appropriations Committee Request for Information--Hostage Rescue Attempt.

2. This memorandum is in response to question number 2 and 4 in reference a, and question number 3 in reference b. This completes action on all responses required by reference a.

a. Reference a requested personal data (name, rank, branch of service, parent organization), experience levels, and dates of assignment to Southwest Training Unit of the helicopter pilots and helicopter maintenance crew that accompanied the pilots onboard the NIMITZ.

b. Reference b requested information on the educational level of the helicopter maintenance personnel which boarded the NIMITZ with the mission maintenance officer, Captain [redacted] and the pilots and air crewmembers who participated in the rescue attempt.

3. At the inclosure is a list containing requested data on the helicopter pilots and the maintenance crewmembers who accompanied the pilots to the NIMITZ. This maintenance crew included four HM-16 maintenance personnel who joined the mission helicopter element from Norfolk and assisted in maintaining the aircraft used in training and rehearsals in the Southwestern United States.

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1998

~~Classified By: Les~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11A08

4. The name information and data on the HM-16 helicopter maintenance personnel who were aboard the NIMITZ as members of the embarked HM-16 has been requested from the Chief of Naval Operations, and will be provided to you as soon as it is received.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
GEN Jones
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel/LTCOL Wheeler -2E857

NOTE: Further distribution of the attached personal data should be governed by Privacy Act considerations.

11A09

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SSN/MOS	[redacted]	UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	11 yrs 07 mos	09 yrs 05 mos	Mech Fund Avn Mech Mate Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: 11 grades
[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMH-204	21Nov79	14 yrs 03 mos	10 yrs 05 mos	Mech Fund Avn Mech Mate Basic Helo Crs [redacted] CH-53A/D CH-53E Civ Educ: HS GED
[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	13 yrs	11 yrs 03 mos	Mech Fund Avn Mech Mate Basic Helo Crs CH-53 [redacted] CH-53A/D [redacted] Civ [redacted]

Note: The distribution of this document and the release of information contained herein is governed by the provisions of the Privacy Act.

SSN/MOS		UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]	/6113 USMC	HMT-204	13Dec79	13 yrs 08 mos	9 yrs 07 mos	Helo Fund [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad
[redacted]	6113 USMC	HMT-301	29Nov79	11 yrs 03 mos	8 yrs 05 mos	Mech Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] CH-53A/D Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad
[redacted]	/6113 USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	6 yrs 09 mos	3 yrs 06 mos	Aviation Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Systems CH-53 [redacted] Civ Educ: HS GED [redacted] CH-53

16

Note: The distribution of this document and the release of information contained

SSN/MOS		UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	9 yrs 08 mos	8 yrs 09 mos	Mech Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: GED [redacted]
[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	Records available at HQMC (KIA)		
[redacted]/3072	USMC	H&MS-16	12Dec79	7 yrs 10 mos		
[redacted]/6123	USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	8 yrs 09 mos	7 yrs	Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted] Mech [redacted] Basic Helo Crs H-53 [redacted] H-53 [redacted] CH-53 [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]
[redacted]/7041	USMC	MWHS-3	21Dec79	Records not available (Member did not participate in actual operation)		
[redacted]/6055	USMC	HMT-301	30Nov79	6 yrs 11 mos	2 yrs 11 mos	CH-53A/D [redacted] Civ Educ: [redacted]

Note: The distribution of this document and the release of information contained herein is governed by the provisions of the Privacy Act.

[redacted]

SSN/MOS		UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]	6055 USMC	HMH-461	12Dec79	3 yrs 10 mos	2 yrs 01 mo	Aviation Fund [redacted] G Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted] Testing
[redacted]	6612 USMC	HMH-461	9Jan80	Records available at HQMC (KIA)		
[redacted]	113 USMC	HMT-301	11Dec79	9 yrs 09 mos	8 yrs 08 mos	Mech Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs G [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted] for the CH-53
[redacted]	6082 USMC	HMH-161	30Nov79	Records not available (Member did not participate in actual operation)		
[redacted]	6042 USMC	HMH-461	9Jan80	3 yrs 09 mos	2 yrs 09 mos	Aviation Fund [redacted] G Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]
[redacted]	6113 USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	2 yrs 10 mos	2 yrs	Avn Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Related Sys Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]

Note: The distribution of this document and the release of information contained herein is governed by the provisions of the Privacy Act.

[redacted]

SSN/MOS		UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMT-301	30Nov79	2 yrs 09 mos	1 yr 11 mos	Avn Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad
[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMT-461	21Nov79	Records available at HQMC (KIA)		
[redacted]6113	USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	3 yrs 08 mos	2 yrs 08 mos	Avn Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs CH-53 [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad
[redacted]1391	USMC	WES-27	4Jan80	3 yrs 3 mos	2 yrs 05 mos	[redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad
[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMT-301	30Nov79	2 yrs 11 mos	2 yrs 01 mo	Avn Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad, [redacted]
[redacted]/3534	USMC	WIS-27	4Jan80	Records not available (Member did not participate in actual operation)		

Note: The distribution of this document and the release of information contained herein is governed by the provisions of the Privacy Act.

[redacted]

SSN/MOS		UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]6113	USMC	HMT-301	11Dec79	2 yrs 11 mo	1 yr 11 mo	Avn Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad
[redacted]6042	USMC	HMT-301	30Nov79	Records not available (Member did not participate in actu operation)		
[redacted]300	USMC	WES-27	4Jan80	Records not available (Member did not participate in actu operation)		
[redacted]8226	USN	HM-16	21Nov79	8 yrs 11 mos	2 yrs 08 mo	Avn Fund Crs [redacted] H-53 [redacted]
[redacted]8226	USN	HM-16	21Nov79	Records not locally available		
[redacted]8226	USN	HM-14	4Jan80	Records not locally available		

Note: The distribution of this document and the release of information contained herein is governed by the provisions of the Privacy Act.

[redacted]

[redacted]

SSN/MOS		UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]/8226	USN	HM-16	21Nov79	Records not locally available		
[redacted]8226	USN	HM-14	15Dec79	Records not locally available	6	[redacted]
[redacted]8226	USN	HM-14	17Dec79	Records not locally available		[redacted]

Note: The distribution of this document and the release of information contained herein is governed by the provisions of the Privacy Act.

[redacted]

[redacted]

I/MOS		UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	TOTAL FLT HRS	TOTAL H-53 FLT HRS	TOTAL FLT HRS RH-53	TOTAL H-53 FLT HRS W/JTF DAY	TOTAL H-53 FLT HRS W/JTF NIGHT	MISSION HELO
[redacted]	7564 USMC	HQMC	8Dec79	18 yrs 08 mos	5500	2500	71.6	39.2	96.0	1
	7564 USMC	HMH-363	8Dec79	11 yrs 08 mos	1660	1510	50.1	70.1	90.2	2
	7564 USMC	HMX-1	5Jan80	12 yrs 07 mos	3309	2470	80.1	72.0	78.3	6
	7564 USMC	H&MS-26	21Nov79	11 yrs 11 mos	3350	1244	67.7	31.3	135.2	4
	7564 USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	11 yrs 03 mos	2080	1503	55.4	84.3	115.3	3
	7564 USMC	MAWTS-1	27Nov79	13 yrs 05 mos	3700	3400	48.4	49.3	78.2	3
	1310 USN	HM-12	19Nov79	08 yrs 07 mos	2710	1510	1264.9	89.1	134.0	5
	1310 USN	HM-14	10Apr80	10 yrs 03 mos	1550	280	281.7	4.0	14.0	8
	1310 USN	HM-14	10Apr80	09 yrs 07 mos	DID NOT FLY MISSION		-	-	-	-
	7564 USMC	HMM-261	21Nov79	09 yrs 03 mos	1580	1197	58.0	81.8	107.4	5
	7564 USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	04 yrs 11 mos	1048	837	4.5	40.4	110.5	8
	7564 USMC	MAWTS-1	8Dec79	08 yrs 04 mos	1688	1432	60.7	70.8	91.6	2
	7564 USMC	MAWTS-1	8Dec79	09 yrs 11 mos	2564	1569	96.9	55.8	113.3	1
	6002 USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	18 yrs 06 mos	[redacted]					
[redacted]	7564 USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	07 yrs 04 mos	1764	1167	59.5	77.5	112.9	4
	7564 USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	09 yrs 10 mos	1764	1541	45.3	62.4	110.6	7
	M1025F USAF	602 TAIRCW	2Apr80	07 yrs	1365	1165	22.7	9.5	19.9	7
	1310 USN	HM-16	21Nov79	04 yrs 01 mo	807	540	440.7	86.3	81.4	6
	2015 USN(MC)	VF-126	30Nov79	-	FLIGHT SURGEON					
	3002 USMC	H&MS-32	4Jan80	-	SUPPLY OFFICER					
	0170 USMC	MWHS-2	4Jan80	10 yrs 04 mos	ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER					
	1390 USMCR	WES-27	21Nov79	11 yrs 03 mos	FUELS OFFICER					

H-53 Acft. Attended following schools/courses:

[redacted]

G

CH-53

TE: The distribution of this document and the release of information contained herein is governed by the provisions of the Privacy Act.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ~~SECRET~~
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

7

~~SECRET~~ A #359

17 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT, USA
ATTN: LTC [redacted] USA

Subject: (U) Talker and Backgrounder on Intelligence Support to the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission

Ref: Letter, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 14 May 1980 (attached)

1. Mr. W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Lieutenant General John S. Pustay, USAF, Asst to the Chairman, JCS, are scheduled to appear before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Tuesday, 20 May 1980, at 1400.

2. LTG Pustay has requested that the following information be provided:

a. (S) For Mr. Claytor and LTG Pustay -

A talker (1 1/2 pages) outlining and evaluating the adequacy of intelligence support for the planning and execution of the Iran rescue mission, and the role played by various intelligence agencies (DIA, [redacted] DMA, etc.) in providing that support. The scope of this paper should cover both pre- and post- Desert One phases of the mission.

b. (S) For LTG Pustay -

A backgrounder, providing a more in-depth exposition of the role played by intelligence agencies in providing intelligence support to the Iran rescue mission (i.e. DIA, [redacted] DMA, etc.).

RESPONSE ON FILE IN SOD

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 May 1992
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
MARKED FROM [redacted]

[redacted]

14B14

~~SECRET~~ Classified By: DJS

Classified By:
Declassified On:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

9-2

ENT J. ZABLOCKI, WIS.
D. BURLISON, MO.
IAN F. MURPHY, ILL.
SPIN, WIS.
LES ROSE, N.C.
NO L. MAZZOLI, KY.
IAN Y. MINETA, CALIF.
ER, JR., GA.
OBINSON, VA.
ROOK, OHIO
LORY, ILL.
LIAM WHITEHURST, VA.
BILL YOUNG, FLA.

AS K. LATIMER, STAFF DIRECTOR
EL J. O'NEIL, CHIEF COUNSEL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

May 14, 1980

Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As part of its continuing oversight and evaluation of the intelligence community, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was briefed by Director Turner on May 7, 1980 on intelligence aspects of the rescue mission in Iran.

During the course of that session, several Members asked questions concerning aspects of the military role in the mission. Director Turner stated that the military aspects were not within his purview and that such questions should be raised with you.

As you know, this Committee is interested both in the intelligence support for the planning and execution of the mission and in the evaluation of that support by the policy makers and operational commanders. Committee Members are also interested in some of the military planning and operational aspects of the mission.

Therefore, I invite you to appear before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in executive session on Tuesday, May 20, at 2:00 p.m. in Room H-405 to discuss these matters.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD P. BOLAND
Chairman

[redacted]

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24021

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

matters also. One likely area of interest: maintenance patterns on the helicopters and other equipment.

3. The session will be held in room H-405 at the Capitol.

COLONEL MILLER

COPY TO: BG TODD
COL ABEL
~~LTC OLYNK~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


ARRIVES DESERT ONE
2101 ALL 6 HELOS AT DESERT ONE
1810 FIRST MC-130 LANDS
A-361
1900 HELOS REVERSES
DUST
1700*1 MC-130 ENTERS SECOND DUST AREA
1630*1 MC-130 ENTERS FIRST DUST AREA
1745 HELOS 1&2 REVERSE COURSE
1740 HELOS ENTER FIRST DUST AREA
1705 HELO 6 LANDS
BANDAR ABBAS
1540 HELICOPTER FORMATION CROSSES IRANIAN COAST
HELO RTE
MC/EC-130 RTE

4-#362

Subject: Visit of Rescue Operation Personnel with the President

1. Units which participated in the rescue operation not yet visited by the President have been requested to have representatives available for movement to Washington to meet with high level officials on short notice. The total number alerted for this purpose is 26. In addition, 10 personnel (not associated with these units) who served on the Joint Task Force staff have also been identified (but not notified) for a total of 36. In view of the size of this group, three alternatives have been developed for consideration:

a. Option 1: One-half of the personnel who have been alerted for this possibility can be moved to Washington and visit with the President at the White House, the Pentagon, or some other location as may be desired.
Major Advantage: Reduces the size of the group to meet with the President and correspondingly reduces the administrative, transportation, and security requirements.
Major Disadvantage: One-half of the people who may now be expecting a trip to Washington to meet with high government officials will be disappointed.

b. Option 2: Continue with plans and assemble all 36 personnel in Washington. One-half would meet with the President and the other half would meet with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Major Advantage: All personnel now expecting a trip to Washington would be given the opportunity and all personnel would meet with senior officials, providing personal recognition for their participating in the rescue effort.
Major Disadvantage: The one-half not seeing the President could be disappointed.

c. Option 3: Invite all personnel now alerted to Washington and have all 36 personnel tentatively identified visit with the President at the White House, the Pentagon, or some other location as may be desired.
Major Advantage: All personnel now alerted would meet with the President.
Major Disadvantage: The size of the group could entail more extensive administrative, transportation, and security arrangements than those required for Options 1 or 2.

2. Recommendation: It is recommended that Option 3 be selected and that Option 2 be the fall back position.

Declassified by
DDO NMCC
Classified By: DJSOA
Declassified ON: OASD
12 May 4

[redacted]

2 May 3

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 May 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Confidential
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

A367

THE JOINT STAFF

21 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Subject: Inserts for the Record for Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 May 1980

References: a. Memorandum, LLA/CJCS, 20 May 1980

b. Telephone Request, 21 May 1980

1. Attached per your request (reference a) are the following inserts for the record for the testimony on the hostage rescue attempt held before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the afternoon session on 7 May 1980:

(C) a. Page 7, line 11 1/2: Dates and information on the Soviet naval exercise [redacted] provided separately). C

b. Page 111, line 5 1/2: Average hours of helicopter/C-130 peacetime training flying time (not associated with hostage rescue mission). The information provided covers both US Navy and US Marine Corps helicopter and USAF C-130 pilots.

c. Page 130, line 3: List of contents of the cross-country kit taken aboard hostage rescue mission helicopters.

d. Page 144-5: A chart showing the pattern of aircraft (helicopters and C-130s) landing and refueling at Desert One.

2. The OPORDER or excerpts thereof (page 172 of the testimony) have not been included. A response on this issue is being prepared by LTG Gast.

3. A copy of the map showing flight routes of the helicopters and C-130s from the Iran coast point of entry to Desert One is provided per reference b as an insert to the morning session of the SASC hearings on 7 May 1980. (Referenced pages in the text of the testimony are page 34, line 18; page 35, line 33; page 49.) This map was

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Downgraded by: DDO/NMCC 12 May 1992

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: DJSOA, 180ct80 Declassify: OADR

~~Classified by: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

originally classified TOP SECRET, and subsequently downgraded to SECRET, as is reflected in the testimony on above referenced pages. As a result of recent exposure to the public of a map with similar information on ABC TV network, it was decided to declassify the map, which is attached.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Ross
Mr. Stempler
CJCS
ACJCS
DJS
J-30
LTGEN Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, OATSD(LA)
COL Abel
[redacted]
COL Paschall

AG

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MEMO TO:

Received 20 1300 May 80

Inserts required from 7 May PM session - SASC.

✓p. 7, l. 16½ - dates of [redacted]

p. 111, l. 5½ - average hours of flying time - not associated with mission.

p. 130, l. 3 - list of what's in a cross-country kit.

p. 144-5 - chart/map used.

✓p. 172 - op order. ✓

[redacted]

Classified By: DJS
Declassified On: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J-3)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DATE 21 May 80

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Received telephone request from the Office of the LLA to CJCS (Ms J. Jones), 21 May 80, for a copy of the map showing routes of flight by the helicopters/C130s during Iran hostage rescue attempt.

The map was referenced during the hearings (A.M.) before SASC on 7 May 80, and will be used as insert to official transcript (pp. 34, 35, and 49).

AC S. D. Olson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DJS
1 OADR

4


SECRET
RESCUE MISSION
Desert Track LZ
Helo #5 Turns Back
Dust
Helo #6 Down
Helicopter Route
MC-130 Route
SECRET

~~SECRET~~ A-#383

All external fuselage/running lights
All sleeve and spindle assemblies
All dampner accumulators
Cockpit instruments and lights
Windscreens (clear of paint and scratches)
Pilot's and copilot's control spot lights
All rotor blades (main and tail)

3. Response to Question 8: The checklist items above constituted checks "over and above" those routinely required by US Navy inspection checklists and maintenance procedures. To more thoroughly understand what transpired, it should be noted that on 20 April, mission aircrews and supporting personnel arrived aboard NIMITZ. During the period 20-24 April, mission crews participated in familiarization flights, maintenance check flights, deck turn-ups and mission preparation activities. All eight aircraft were given a full functional check flight during this period. At least one pilot in each assigned mission flight crew was a qualified functional check pilot. Maintenance records were reviewed by the mission aircraft maintenance officer for appropriate maintenance action, and crewmembers made repeated inspections of their assigned aircraft. The mission aircraft maintenance officer had visited the ship approximately three weeks prior to review maintenance records and personally inspected the aircraft. He had provided specific and detailed guidance to HM-16 squadron maintenance supervisors regarding items to be inspected, additional maintenance actions desired, and other pre-mission preparations to be accomplished. He also screened all related records and log books and did not note any components that exceeded allowable removal times. Based upon his guidance, the HM-16 squadron aircraft maintenance officer developed a pre-mission checklist and procedures for its completion. Completion of these actions was verified by the mission aircraft maintenance officer upon his return to NIMITZ on 20 April.

4. This memorandum, together with reference b, completes response to questions 1, 3, 5, 7, and 8. Responses to questions 2, 4, and 6 are working. Answers will be provided as soon as possible. All personnel requested to date have been provided, with the exception of Major Schaeffer who remains under hospital care.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler (3E822)
CJCS
ACJCS
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) (3D918)
COL Abel, Spec Asst PA, CJCS (2E857)
Mr. Peter Hamilton (3E880)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] SECRET

INCLOSURE 1 TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Response to Staff Query, Senate Armed Services Committee

(U)
1. Eight RH-53 helicopters were utilized for the rescue operations. All eight helicopters were from USN Minesweeper Squadron HM-16 based at Norfolk, Virginia.

2. In mid-November 1979, six of the eight RH-53 helicopters were partially disassembled and airlifted by C-5 aircraft from Norfolk t[redacted] they were reassembled and flown aboard KITTY HAWK. In early January the two additional RH-53 helicopters (numbers 2 and 6 on the rescue mission) from HM-16 were airlifted from Norfolk to the Mediterranean where they were reassembled and loaded aboard the NIMITZ. The NIMITZ sailed from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and relieved the KITTY HAWK on station on 21 January 1980. The six RH-53 helicopters aboard the KITTY HAWK were loaded aboard the NIMITZ, making a total of eight.

(U)
3. All eight RH-53's were fully operational when they took off from the NIMITZ on 24 April 1980. The mission performance of each helicopter is outlined below:

HELO NUMBER	PERFORMANCE	REMARKS
1	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No problems
*2	Arrived at Desert One (Not mission capable)	Second stage hydraulic pump failure.
3	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	Low first stage hydraulic quantity. Prepared to service.
4	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No discrepancies
5	Returned to NIMITZ (Aborted mission)	Attitude reference system failure/TACAN failure
*6	Down after 2 hours (Aborted mission; crew picked up by helo #8)	Rotor blade indication failure
7	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No problems
8	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	Intermittent chip light indication on takeoff. Not an abort discrepancy.

* Helos 2 and 6 arrived aboard NIMITZ. There is no correlation with the failure of these two aircraft and the coincidence of their arrival in the Indian Ocean aboard NIMITZ.

[redacted]

Enclosure 1

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

A #391

X

HE JOINT STAFF

6 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT
RADM TOM CASSIDY, OPG
COLONEL CHARLES H. PITTMAN

Subject: Request for Information and Material for Congress Concerning Attempted Hostage Rescue in Iran

1. The following requirements have been received and require support as indicated:

a. For MG Vaught:

(u) (1) Maps showing helicopter and C-130 aircraft flight routes over Iran during rescue attempt. Maps should not show points of origin but only flight routes over Iran (Item 1, Incl 1, TAB A). Suspense: 1500, 6 May 1980. #14

(a) (2) Charts showing planned and actual aircraft and helicopter parking/refueling patterns at Desert One site. Major [redacted] reportedly used a similar chart when he appeared before Senator Warner and the SASC staff personnel. (Item 2, Incl 1 to TAB A). Suspense: 1500, 6 May 1980. A, G #15

(3) Provide information on the availability of any portion of the operations plan for the rescue attempt (Item 3, Incl 1 to TAB A). Suspense: 1500, 6 May 1980. #16

(e) (4) Have plans to have Major [redacted] Sergeant [redacted] Major [redacted] available for interview by SASC staff personnel or for possible appearance at the SASC hearings (Incl 1 to Tab A). Suspense: Continuing. A, G #17

(u) (5) Provide information concerning education levels of soldiers associated with rescue attempt as outlined in items (1) and (2), Tab B. Suspense: COB 15 May 1980. #18

Classified By: [redacted] DirJSOA
Declassify On: OADR 18 Oct

29A6

[redacted]

b. For RADM Cassidy:

(1) (U) Have Commander [redacted] Maintenance Officer for HM-16 available (on call) for the SASC. (Incl 1 to Tab A). Suspense: Continuing.

(2) (U) Provide information regarding failure rate of helicopters during training and rehearsals (TAB A). Suspense: 8 May 1980.

(3) (U) Provide information concerning the educational level of the helicopter maintenance personnel on the NIMITZ (HM-16 personnel) and the 20-man helicopter maintenance team under Captain [redacted] who went aboard the NIMITZ with three helicopter aircrews. (Item (3), Tab B). Suspense: COB 15 May 1980.

(4) (U) Provide informatin on how to respond to the request for the maintenance records of the eight RH-53 helicopters used on the mission. It is understood that the Navy would prefer to respond to specific questions rather than submit technical records for interpretation by the Congress. The task is for a draft response which either forwards the records with appropriate caveats or for a response which gives the position preferred by the Navy. (TAB C). Suspense: 9 May 1980.

c. For Colonel Pittman:

(1) (U) The four pilots listed below are to be alerted (but not moved) for possible appearance before the SASC) as previously discussed (5 May 80):

- LCDR [redacted] USN
- CAPT [redacted] USMC
- CAPT [redacted] USAF
- MAJ [redacted] USMC

Suspense: Continuing

[redacted]

(w)

(2) In addition to the four officers listed above, the SASC staff has also requested to see Major Schaeffer when his medical condition will permit. I do not perceive this as an urgent requirement. Suspense: Continuing.

6

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA
Vice Director for Operations

3 Incl
a/s

Copy Furnished:
Mr. Stempler
CJCS
ACJCS
DJS
LTG Gast
LTG Shutler
COL Miller, LLA to CJCS
COL Miller, OSD/LLA
COL Abel, SA/PA to CJCS

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

5 May 1980

MEMO TO: MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES W. DYKE

SUBJECT: Iranian Rescue Mission

#13

In addition to the items requested in the attached memo from Jack Stempler, the SASC is also requesting information concerning the failure rate of helicopters during the training period preceding the rescue mission. I understand that during the course of his interview, COL Chuck Pitman was asked concerning the failure rate during training, and Pitman indicated to the Committee that such information was available. If that information is correct, would you please provide that information to my office for further provision to the SASC.

James L. Miller

COLONEL MILLER

TAB A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Charles W. Dyke, USA, Vice Director for Operations, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Iranian Rescue Operation

(U) In connection with the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing scheduled for this Wednesday, the Committee has made the following requests:

1. Without revealing the origin of flight, a map showing the various routes flown by the C-130s and RH-53 helicopters to the Desert One site. #19

2. A chart showing the location on the ground of the C-130s and the helicopters at Desert One. (PLANNED AND ACTUAL). #15

3. To the extent that such information can be disclosed, the Committee has asked for the operation plan until such time as the mission was aborted. #16

(C) Committee staff has alerted us that at some point, the staff may wish to meet with Major [redacted] (intelligence briefer), Commander [redacted] (helicopter maintenance officer), Sergeant [redacted] and Major Schaffer. #17 #19

A(1)(4)

(U) I would appreciate it if you could arrange to provide an appropriate response to the requests in items 1 to 3 above. Such response should be furnished to this office for transmittal to the Committee prior to the Wednesday hearing.

Jack L. Stempler
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs)

INCL 1
TAB A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D C 20301

3 MAY 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

AFI 401

#26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OPERATIONS PLANNING GROUP (OPG)
ATTN: REAR ADMIRAL CASSIDY

Subject: General Pustay's Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee

1. We have received a transcript of General Pustay's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 28 April 1980, which is attached. The text of the testimony should be reviewed for two reasons:

a. To insure accuracy of information or data provided by General Pustay.

b. To provide information or data in those instances where General Pustay was not in the position to furnish the requested information and promised to supply it at a later date. These places are marked in the text.

2. Request your staff provide the required information in draft form by COB 5 May 1980 to LTC S.D. Olynyk, J-3/SOD, who will prepare the input as inserts to the testimony for submission to the Legislative and Legal Assistant to the Chairman, JCS.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA
Vice Director for Operations

Attachment
a/s

completed 1 May 80

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT, THIS MEMO IS DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED

27B23

Declassified by:
DDO/NMCC
12 May 1992

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

A-410

(U)
e. Awards by Each Service: Awards in this category would not be under JTF control, although MG Vaught's views could be influential with regard to the policy adopted by each Service. Presently, the Army has no recommendation for awards through Service channels now being processed and the DA officer responsible (LTC Hull, USA MILPERCEN, 325-8700) is aware of none. The 1st Special Operations Wing Commander reportedly desires that 1st SOW personnel who penetrated Iranian airspace receive the DSSM. This appears ~~contrary to MG Vaught's guidance and is an internal JTF issue at this point.~~

(U)
3. There are no plans underway, at least no organized effort, to recognize staff personnel in Washington and elsewhere. My recommendation is that no such effort be made. There are literally hundreds of people who have been involved in many locations. Those singled out for recognition by the JTF Commander or by the normal chain of supervision should be recognized but a concerted effort to present awards to staff members would pose difficult problems of equity and run the risk of "cheapening the coin." For staff personnel, we need to let the system work.

(U)
4. The JTF seems to have a practical, workable plan for properly recognizing participants. It is an area which MG Vaught wants to control personally. I stand ready to assist as may be appropriate or as requested.

[signature]

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

CF: MG VAUGHT, CDR, JTF
LTG GAST, DEP CDR, JTF
COL [redacted] JTF C/S

G

Note: Classification of this memorandum is based on material obtained from JTF.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL DAVID C. JONES
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM TO: DATE __________

We should make sure
no service makes any more
[illegible] coordinating
[illegible] DepSec should [illegible]
Peter Hamilton

J

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

A-413

A-#413

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

8 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Vaught
Lieutenant General Gast

Subject: Request for Cost Estimate of Iranian Rescue Effort

1. Attached is a copy of a 6 May 1980 letter from Senator Hollings to Secretary Brown requesting a cost estimate of the attempted rescue in Iran. Senator Hollings has asked that this estimate be provided by Monday, 12 May 1980, with a breakdown by appropriation account with relevant programmatic detail.

2. I recommend that Service points of contact be advised. The action has been assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for direct reply to Senator Hollings. I will attempt to obtain a copy of the response for your information.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
CJCS
ACJCS
LTG Shutler
COL Miller, LL Asst, CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel, Spec Asst PA, CJCS - 2E857

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 May 1992
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted] JS

~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

Downgraded by DDO NMCC

Classified by: JCS
Declassified on: OADR

Classified by: DJSOA
180ct88

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1745
9 May 1980

MEMO TO: Gen Jones
LTG Pustay

Subject: Costs associated with Rescue Attempt

Sir: Senator Hollings letter of 6 May 1980 is being worked by OSD Comptroller, OSD Legislative Affairs and service comptroller representatives. I met with all today. The plan is:

- Interim response to Senator Hollings (today)
- Appeal format which addresses items consumed (e.g. helo's + C-130); training and preparation costs (using addition, incremental costs only); and airlift and support costs. Costs for equipment will be procurement costs and replacement cost as provided by the services. Only incremental costs will be used for all others.
- Will make final response by 16 May, per agreement with Senator Hollings office.

~~[illegible] Chairman JCS~~

Very happy! –

Bill Dyke

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

MEMO

Subject: JTF Training Costs

XVIII ABN CORPS	750,000	(Approx)
YPG	95,000	
ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT	55,000	
REDCOM	150,000	
DAAF	75,000	
[redacted]	[redacted]	
TDY (DA)	25,000	
TDY (OTHER)	40,000	
MCAS YUMA	150,000	
UNPROGRAMMED MAINT	100,000	
MISC	50,000	
[redacted]		

NOTE:

a. No Airlift Cost Included
b. Cost Data Approximate Based on Reconstitution/Inventory Data Not Yet Received.

[redacted]

Major, USA[redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

#3

MEMO

Subject: Initial Funding Analysis

1. Reconstitution of lost/damaged equipment appears to require the following funding by Service:

USN/USMC		21,785,467 ($21M for Helos)
USAF		13,408,848 ($11M for C-130)
ARMY		1,500,000 ($1M for Comm)
	TOTAL	36,694,315

2. Information does not include airlift costs. Further, cost data is very approximate pending total inventory.

3. Costs incurred by CINCPAC and CINCEUR are not now available.

[redacted]

Major, USA

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

ZCZCDP0274
DAN: M16-M41217
INPUT CUS* = UKA601
TOR: 141534Z MAY 80 TOT: 14163AZ MAY 80

AUTO=** UNASSIGNED **

~~EYES ONLY~~

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= J-3(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=78

OTTMZYUW YDHODS 0729 1351625-MORN--YEKDQH.
ZNY MMORN
ZK7K 0C SOA DE
O 141500Z MAY 80 ZYH
FM AFSSO USAFE//CAT
TO JCS//J3
INFO SSO USEUCOM//CAT//ECJ-3
ZEM
T O P S E C R E T NOFORN EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY ON COST OF IRANIAN RESCUE ATTEMPT (TS-NF)
QUOTE
FM AFSSO USAFE//CAT//
TO JCS//J3//
INFO SSO USEUCOM//CAT//
ZEM
T O P S E C R E T NOFORN
SUBJ: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY ON COST OF IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT ~~(TS/NF)~~
1. (U) ~~(TS/NF)~~ HQ USAF/ACS 101600Z MAY 80, SUBJ AS ABOVE, REQUESTED ALL MAJCOMS PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF COSTS INCURRED IN SUPPORT OF THE RESCUE EFFORT. SUBJECT MSG WAS UNCLASSIFIED BUT WE ARE PROVIDING DATA TO YOU VIA AFSSO CHANNELS TO PREVENT COMPROMISING CONNECTION WITH PROJECT EC-79 AND THIS COMMAND'S INVOLVEMENT. GUIDANCE PROVIDED USAFE REGARDING THIS PROJECT HAS STRESSED THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN ALL ACTIVITY WITHIN A "CLOSE HOLD" CONTEXT.
2. (U) ~~(TS/NF)~~ BEST ESTIMATE OF COSTS INCURRED AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE RESCUE ATTEMPT ARE AS FOLLOWS. THESE QUOTED COSTS ARE THOSE INCURRED DURING THE FIVE DAY PERIOD PRIOR TO 25 APR IN SUPPORT OF THE [redacted] OPERATIONS AND REPRESENT ONLY THE IMMEDIATE COST OF THE MISSION.
A. (U) ~~(TS/NF)~~ 3080, M-151A2 JEEP, NSN 2320 00 177 9258, REG NR

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

NBOOLH, ACQUISITION COST UNK, REPLACEMENT COST $3196. JEEP
WAS ISSUED TO J-4 (LOGISTICS REPRESENTATIVE) AT [redacted] AND
CANNOT BE RETURNED. REPORTED AS DESTROYED.
B(U)(~~TS/NF~~) APPROPRIATION CODE 3400, PERDIEM, HQ USAFE AND [redacted]
LIAISON IN SUPPORT OF RESCUE CONSISTING OF 5 DAYS FOR 30 PERSO
IN SUPPORT OF [redacted] AND 4 DAYS FOR 3 PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF
1SOW DEPLOYMENT. TOTAL $2552.
C. (TS/NF) APPROPRIATION CODE 3500
(1) (TS/NF) USAF SERVICE UNIFORMS AND ACCESSORIES PROVIDED TO 4
OFFICERS AND ONE NCO FROM 1SOW WHO WERE DESIGNATED AS ESCORTS F
THE RETURN OF THE REMAINS. TOTAL $553.69
(2) (TS/NF) INCREASED COMMISSARY COSTS FOR PERIOD 23 THRU 28 AP
$17,200.
3.(C)(~~TS/NF~~) TOTAL FLYING HOURS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF RESCUE: 40.0
HRS AT $1127/HOUR. TOTAL [redacted] CONSISTING OF DEPLOYMENT OF 2
MC-130 ACFT FROM [redacted] ONE FROM [redacted] AND RETURN OF BOTH ACFT TO [redacted]
4. (TS/NF) OTHER EXPENSES IN TRAINING AND PREPARATION OVER AND
ABOVE NORMAL TRAINING AND READINESS:
A. (TS/NF) TOTAL UNPROGRAMMED FLYING HOUR COST $217,232. CONSIS
OF 30.9 HRS AT JAN 80 F/H COST OF $549/HR AND 177.7 HRS AT FEB-
COST OF $1127 HR.
B.(C)(~~TS/NF~~) TOTAL TDY PER DIEM FOR [redacted] FOR JAN THRU APR 80 $786
(U)5.(C)(~~TS/NF~~) TOTAL REPORTED EXPENITURES IN SUPPORT OF PROJECT EC-
THRU 30 APR 80 TOTAL $673,000 AS FOLLOWS:
A. (~~TS/NF~~) TDY: $61,000
B. (~~TS/NF~~) SUPPLIES & EQPT: $319,000
C. (~~TS/NF~~) COMMISSARY: $188,000
D. (~~TS/NF~~) DUE-IN REQUISITIONS: $105,000
6.(U)(~~TS/NF~~) TOTAL COSTS OF PROJECT INCURRED BY THIS COMMAND
MUST INCLUDE EXPENDITURES FOR ALL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES STARTING
ON 7 DEC 79 AND EXTENDING TO THE PRESENT TIME.
7.(U)(~~TS/NF~~) IN VIEW OF CLASSIFICATION AND CLOSE HOLD NATURE OF E
REQUEST YOU REVIEW THE ABOVE AND PASS THE APPROPRIATE DATA TO
HQ USAF/ACB.
REVIEW 14 MAY 2010.
UNQUOTE
REVIEW ON: 14 MAY 2000
#0729

NNNN

#32

[redacted] TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

ZCZCDP0450
DAN: 017-001154 TOP SECRET PAGE 1 OF 1
INPUT CDSN = KDA015
TOR: 141841Z MAY 80 TOT: 141932Z MAY 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=43

OATMZYUW YWQRON 2632 1351814-MNSH--YEKDQH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK 00 SOA DE
D 141724Z MAY 80
FM SSO SAC//DO8//
TO JCS//J3//
ZEM
T O P S E C R E T EYES ONLY
QQQQ
FOR MGEN DYKE. PASS TO AIR FORCES CELL OPG.
SUBJ: COST ESTIMATES F/X RESUE ATTEMPT (U)
REF: HQ USAF/ACB (U) MSG 101600Z MAY 80
1. (U) THE FOLLOWING ARE BEST ESTIMATES OF THE COSTS REQUESTED I
REFERENCE MESSAGE.
A. (U) ITEMS CONSUMED:
(1) (TS) PALLETIZED INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM (7)
ACQUISITION COST -$122,000 EACH
REPLACEMENT COST -$145,000 EACH (X7 = $1,015,000.00)
B. (U) TRAINING AND PREPARATION:
A,E (1)(S)(TS) TDY COST (INCLUDE TRAVEL/PER DIEM EXPENSES TO [redacted]

[redacted]	252.4	(THOUSANDS)
	50.0	
	25.0	
• [redacted]	8.6	
TOTAL TDY COSTS:	$336,000.00	

NOTE: UNIT FIGURES ARE APPROXIMATE AND REPRESENT AMOUNTS ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT EC-79. HQ SAC FIGURE IS ACTUAL COSTS.
2. (U) FLYING HOUR COSTS:
A.(S)(TS) TRAINING/PREPARATION: HOURS
E INITIAL DEPLOYMENT/ROTATION TO [redacted]: 362.0

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

A. AC-130 [redacted] 400.0
CONUS REHEARSAL MISSIONS 217.8
CTF-70 F14 TRAINING 90.8
B. (TS) STAGING/DEPLOYMENT/REDEPLOYMENT SUPPORT:
E 10 KC-135 RTS STAGE TO [redacted] (18-23 APR) 126.0
2 KC-135 RTS STAGE TO [redacted] (20-22 APR) 55.9
AC/MC/EC-130 DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT (18-21 APR) 65.5
E KC-135S REDEPLOY [redacted] TO CONUS (27-30 APR) 126.9
KC-135S REDEPLOY [redacted] TO CONUS (27-30 APR) 58.0
AC/MC/EC-130 REDEPLOYMENT SUPPOR (28-30 APR) 49.8
C. (TS) MISSION ACTIVITY:
CTF-70 FIGHTER CAP SUPPORT(24 APR) 29.5
EC/MC-130 EGESS REFUELING SUPPORT (24 PR) 39.0
E [redacted] TO [redacted] CTF-70 SUPPORT (24 APR) 13.8
E D. (TS) OTHER:
STAGING FOR KC-15 [redacted] 71.0
TOTAL: 1706.0
TIMES STANDARD COST FOR ONE KC-135 HOUR 3184.0
TOTAL FLYIG HOUR COSTS: $5,431,904.00

DECLASSIFY ON 13 MAY 86
#2632

NNNN

TOP SECRET

See reverse version of 21 May 80

#4

#413

File

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J-3)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DATE 20 May 80

MEMORANDUM FOR LTGEN Pustay
GEN Jones

SUBJ: Request for Cost: Senator Hollings' Letter of 6 May 80

Sir, Senator Hollings has requested (brown tab) cost estimates of the rescue attempt. He requested this data initially by 12 May but through coordination with his office and interim response (orange tab), we have delayed a final response until this week. Proposed final response, which has been coordinated with Service representatives and office of ASD(Compt), is at blue tab. The total is just under $200 million. A summary of the cost is immediately beneath the blue tab, followed by a summary of the cost associated with each Service.

I would appreciate your review, and General Jones', today if possible. General Jones does want to see this prior to release.

Bill D

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Copy to:
MG Vaught
LTGEN Gast

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (J-3)
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR #413
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM

Date 20 may 81

For: LTG Gast, MG Vaught

Subject: Cost Estimate for Sen Hollings.

Have sent the attached to LTG Pustay and Gen Jones. We are in a bind for time on this & would appreciate your views asap. Thanks.

[illegible] J31

CF: Col Miller, LL Asst to CJCS

UNCLASSIFIED

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

COMPTROLLER

#413

21 MAY 1980

Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
Chairman, Committee on Budget
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In further response to your letter of May 6, the attached estimates of the costs of the hostage rescue operation are submitted. These estimates, listed by Military Departments, are presented to show estimated cost for certain items expended on the mission. The costs shown for training and preparation are those over and above programmed expenditures. Military and civilian personnel pay are not included.

The enclosed information has been discussed with Mr. Mike Joy of your office. We sincerely hope that it meets your requirements and contributes to the overall understanding of defense needs. Should there be other requirements in this matter, we are prepared to assist.

Thank you for your long-standing support and continuing interest in the readiness and adequacy of our defense programs.

Sincerely,

John R. Quetsch

John R. Quetsch
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)

Enclosures

~~SECRET~~

WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

SUMMARY*

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended on the mission	Estimated Cost	
Army	$ 1,151,541	
Navy	161,200,000	
Air Force	15,806,319	
Subtotal	$178,157,860	
2. Training & Preparation	**Actual Cost**	
Army	$ 190,762	
Navy	6,500,000	
Air Force	3,534,588	
Subtotal	$ 10,225,350	
3. Airlift and Other Support	**Actual Cost**	
Army	$ 44,627	
Navy	6,000	
Air Force	9,499,628	
Subtotal	$ 9,550,255	
Estimated Grand Total		$197,933,465

* For detail accounting see Service enclosures, attached

SECRET

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US NAVY
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended on the mission a/	Estimated Cost
1109 Marine Night Vision and other special equipment	$ 800,000
1804/1106 Components, Paint	2,300,000
Subtotal	$ 3,100,000

2. Training and Preparation	Actual Cost
1804 Emergency Repairs - RH-53D	$ 3,000,000
1804 Component Repairs - RH-53D	3,500,000
Subtotal	$ 6,500,000

3. Airlift and Other Support	
1106 Temporary Duty	$ 6,000

Total, Navy $9,606,000

a/ Excludes costs of the seven RH-53B aircraft expended since no decision has been made on whether, when, how or to what extent replacement of this capability will be required.

SUMMARY[a]/

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1.	Estimated value of items expended on the mission	Estimated Cost	
	Army	$ 1,151,541	
	Navy	3,100,000	
	Air Force	1,306,319	
	Subtotal	$ 5,557,860	
2.	Training and Preparation	Actual Cost	
	Army	$ 190,762	
	Navy	6,500,000	
	Air Force	3,534,588	
	Subtotal	$ 10,225,530	
3.	Airlift and Other Support		
	Army	44,627	
	Navy	6,000	
	Air Force	9,499,628	
	Subtotal	$ 9,550,255	
	Total		$25,333,465

a/ Detail by Military Department is attached.

CLASSIFIED BY: DJSOA Dir, ~~J-3, JCS~~
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~May 21, 1986~~ OADR

3. Airlift and Other Support	Actual Cost	
ASIF airlift in support of training, deployment, medical evacuation and redeployment. Allocation of these costs to the using Service is presently in work.	$ 8,396,768	
3400 TDY expenses	1,066,667	
3400 Reconstitution of refueling system	19,193	
3500 Rations consumed	17,000	
Subtotal	$ 9,499,628	
Estimated grand total, Air Force		$28,840,535

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US AIR FORCE
(ALL COSTS IN FY 80-DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended a/ on the mission	Estimated Cost
3010 Palletizied Inertial Navigation Systems (PINS)	$1,015,000
3080 M-151A2 Jeep destroyed	3,196
3080 Fuel System	130,025
3080 Miscellaneous Equipment	158,098
Subtotal	$1,306,319

2. Training and Preparation	Actual Cost
KC-135 Tanker support during training, deployment and employment	
3010 Depot Spares	$ 85,873
3400 Aviation POL, Depot Equipment Maintenance (DPEM), Supplies	3,341,438
C-130 support provided above normal training requirements	
3010 Depot Spares	10,430
3400 Aviation POL, Depot Equipment Maintenance (DPEM), Supplies	96,847
Subtotal	$3,534,588

a/ Excludes costs of the C-130 aircraft destroyed during the mission since no decision has been made concerning whether replacement will be programed, and if so, when.

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~HQ TAC/DO Msg 132300Z May 80~~ JCS M

DECLASSIFY ON: ~~May 13, 1988~~ OADR

~~SECRET~~

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US NAVY
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended on the mission	Estimated Cost
1506 RH-53D	$158,100,000 (FY-81/82/83)*
1109 Marine Night Vision and other special equipment	800,000
1804/1106 Components, Paint	2,300,000
Subtotal	$161,200,000

* 7 RH-53E aircraft would be procured to replace the out-of-production RH-53Ds. FY 1981 funds (9.0M) provide advance procurement. FY 1982 funds (128.1M) provide for aircraft procurement. FY 1983 funds (21.0M) provide for modification kits to incorporate a mine countermeasures capability in the aircraft.

2. Training and Preparation	Actual Cost
1804 Emergency Repairs - RH-53D	$ 3,000,000
1804 Component Repairs - RH-53D	3,500,000
Subtotal	$ 6,500,000

3. Airlift and Other Support	Actual Cost
1106 Temporary Duty	6,000

Estimated Grand Total, Navy $167,706,000

SECRET

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT - US ARMY
(ALL COSTS IN FY-80 DOLLARS)

1. Estimated value of items expended on the mission	Estimated Cost
2020 Minor weapons, clothing, communications and miscellaneous stock funded items	$1,037,591
2035 Communications equipment and non-standard items	100,294
(c) 2033 Research and development items and REDEYE systems	13,656
Subtotal	$1,151,541
2. Training and Preparation	**Actual Cost**
2020 Base support	$ 190,762
3. Airlift and Other Support	**Actual Cost**
2020 Army airlift and temporary duty	$ 44,627
Estimated Grand Total, Army	$1,386,930

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~Dir, DCSOP, OD~~ DJSOA
REVIEW ON: ~~15 May 86~~ OADR

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

#3

THE JOINT STAFF

21 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Cost Associated with Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt

1. Mr. Al South (OASD/C) has passed on telephonically to LTC Olynyk the following information with respect to the status of the cost package:

a. The package has been passed from Mr. Hamilton to the OSD Comptroller, and is with Mr. South.

b. The following changes to the package were agreed upon by Mr. Hamilton and OSD Comptroller and will be introduced into the package, with copies furnished to MG Dyke:

The cost for RH-53D and C-130 aircraft will be deleted, with a footnote added as follows: The cost for these aircraft is excluded on the basis that the decision has not been reached as to when, how, and to what extent this capability will be replaced.

b. The package with a cover letter will be signed today, 21 May, and forwarded to Senator Hollings. MG Dyke will be provided with a copy.

c. Mr. South recommended that MG Dyke insure that Mr. Hamilton understands that US Army "covert costs" associated with the mission were not included in the package.

d. The cover letter to Senator Hollings will indicate that this package has been coordinated with Mr. Joy. Mr. South assumed that MG Dyke discussed the package with Mr. Joy only in broad outlines, not in any detail.

e. The letter will also state that the costing was compiled with the cut-off date at the point of mission abort.

S. D. OLYNYK
LTC, USA

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

A #417

12 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Vaught, USA
Lieutenant General Gast, USAF
Colonel Beckwith, USA
COL Kyle, USAF
Lieutenant Colonel Seiffert, USMC
Lieutenant Colonel Guidry, USAF
Captain [redacted] USAF

Subject: Testimony Relating to the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 May 1980

1. Attached is a working copy of the official transcript of the hearings on testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the afternoon session on 7 May 1980, relating to the Iranian hostage rescue mission. The witnesses in these hearings were: MG Vaught, LTG Gast, COL Kyle, COL Beckwith, LTC Seiffert, LTC Guidry, and CPT [redacted]

2. Request the addressees review the text of the testimony for the following purposes:

a. To insure accuracy of information provided by the hearing witnesses.

b. To provide information for the record which the witnesses were not in the position to do so during the hearings.

c. To identify classified information in the text of the testimony, if any.

3. In reviewing the text, the following procedures should be used:

a. Edit the text for accuracy and grammatical errors.

(1) In no case should changes be made which will change the context of the testimony given by the witnesses.

(2) All changes should be made in pencil. Deletions of portions of the text other than classified should be lined out in pencil, without bracketing (see subparagraph c below).

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassified ON: [redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

Declassified
DDO/NMCC
7 May 19

b. If any of the witnesses stated during the hearings that they would supply information for the record, submit that information on DD Form 2136, a copy of which is attached. The form may be reproduced if additional copies are needed.

c. Bracket in pencil that portion of the transcript which is classified and indicate degree of classification.

4. Request you return the reviewed and corrected copy of the transcript with inserts, if any, to this office (LTC S. D. Olynyk, J-3, ext 50987) NLT 1200, Wednesday, 14 May 1980. LTC Olynyk will incorporate all changes provided by the addressees into one edited copy for submission to the Legal Advisor and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

9 May 1980

MEMO TO: MAJOR GENERAL DYKE

SUBJECT: SASC 7 May 1980 Hearing on Testimony Relating to the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission; MG Vaught, LTG Gast, Col. Kyle, Col. Beckwith, LTC Seiffert, Capt [redacted], LTC Guidry

Attached are five working copies of the transcript of subject hearing. Please edit the testimony of these witnesses for accuracy and grammatical errors. In no case should changes be made which will change the context of the testimony given at the time of the appearance of the witnesses. If they stated during their testimony that they would supply information for the record, please submit that information on DD Form 2136 in duplicate and bracket the classified information on the copy. Also bracket in pencil that information considered to be classified in the transcript. Please return one edited/bracketed copy of the transcript and the inserts required, if any, by noon, Wednesday 14 May 1980.

HAROLD L. MILLER
Colonel, JAGC, USA
Legal Adviser and Legislative
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A #424

THE JOINT STAFF

16 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Subject: SASC Request for Witnesses

Reference: Memorandum, Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, 15 May 1980, subject as above (attached)

1. In response to your request (reference above), the following individuals have been notified to appear before the SASC - Senator Warner's team, to testify on the Iran hostage rescue attempt:

a. Colonel James M. Perryman, USMC
Project Manager for H-53 Helicopter Series,
Naval Systems Command, at 1400 hours

b. Commander [redacted]
Maintenance Officer for HM-16 Helicopters
at 1500 hours

2. The meeting will take place on Friday, 16 May 1980, at 1400 and 1500 hours, respectively, in room 212 Russell Senate Office Building.

3. LTC Charles Williamson, J-3/SOD, will accompany the officers to the hearings.

STEPHEN D. OLYNYK
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
CJCS
ACJCS
DJS
LTG Gast
J-30
MG Vaught
J-33
RADM Cassidy
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified By: DJS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

Classified by: DJSOA
18 Oct 85
Declassify on: OADR

[redacted]

[redacted]

A,G [redacted]

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

15 May 1980

MEMO TO: GENERAL DYKE

SUBJECT: SASC Request for Witnesses

We have just been informed that the SASC Warner team (Warner, Roberts, Dotson & McFarlane) would like to see any two of the following:

- Maj. Schaeffer
- Sgt. [redacted]
- Pilot of C-130 #2
- Pilot of first tanker to arrive
- The J-4 of Gen. Vaught's team
- Maj. [redacted]
- Cdr. [redacted]
- Sikorsky TecRep who was aboard NIMITZ
- Col. Perryman.

The meeting will be held in Room 212 Russell Senate Office Building with witness #1 to be heard at 1400 and witness #2 at 1500, tomorrow, 16 May.

HAROLD L. MILLER
Colonel, JAGC, USA
Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

[redacted]

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

[redacted]

A #425

THE JOINT STAFF

16 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Subject: SASC Request for Witnesses

Reference: Memorandum, Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, 15 May 1980, subject as above (attached)

1. In response to your request (reference above), the following individuals have been notified to appear before the SASC - Senator Warner's team, to testify on the Iran hostage rescue attempt:

a. LTC [redacted]
Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission, 1000 hours

b. MAJ [redacted]
Marine Intelligence Officer
Hostage Rescue Planning Team, 1100 hours

2. The meeting will take place on Monday, 19 May 1980, at 1000 and 1100 hours, respectively, in room 212 Russell Senate Office Building.

3. LTC Charles Williamson, J-3/SOD, will accompany the officers to the hearings.

PHILIP C. GAST
Lieutenant General, USAF

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
CJCS J-33
ACJCS RADM Cassidy
DJS COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
J-30 COL Abel - 2E857
J-31
MG Vaught

[redacted] DJS
OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: DJSOA - 18 Oct 85
Declassify on: OADR

[redacted]

;G COL [redacted]
G LTC [redacted]

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

15 May 1980

MEMO TO: GENERAL DYKE

SUBJECT: SASC Request for Witnesses

We have just been informed that the SASC Warner team (Warner, Roberts, Dotson & McFarlane) would like to see any two of the following:

- Maj. Schaeffer
- Sgt. [redacted]
- Pilot of C-130 #2
- Pilot of first tanker to arrive
- The J-4 of Gen. Vaught's team
- Maj. [redacted]
- Cdr. [redacted]
- Sikorsky TecRep who was aboard NIMITZ
- Col. Perryman.

The meeting will be held in Room 212 Russell Senate Office Building with witness #1 to be heard at 1400 and witness #2 at 1500, tomorrow, 16 May.

HAROLD L. MILLER
Colonel, JAGC, USA
Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

[redacted]

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

A #427

23 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Subject: SASC Request for Witnesses

Reference: Memorandum, Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, 15 May 1980, subject as above (attached)

1. In response to your request (reference above), the following individuals have been notified to appear before the SASC - Senator Warner's team, to testify on the Iran hostage rescue attempt:

a. Major James H. Schaefer, Jr., USMC, Pilot, Helicopter #3

b. Major [redacted]

2. The meeting will take place on Friday, 23 May 1980, at 1400 and 1500 hours, respectively, in Room 212 Russell Senate Office Building.

3. LTC Robert A. Kvederas, J-3/TOD, will accompany the officers to the hearings and take notes.

4. The above named personnel will meet in Room 2E841 at 1340. COL Miller, LLA/CJCS, will arrange transportation.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
CJCS
ACJCS
DJS
LTG Gast
J-30
MG Vaught
J-33
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel - 2E857
LTC Kvederas
MAJ Schaefer [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] DJS
[redacted] OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: DJSOA
18Oct85

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff
15 May 1980

MEMO TO: GENERAL DYKE

SUBJECT: SASC Request for Witnesses

We have just been informed that the SASC Warner team (Warner, Roberts, Dotson & McFarlane) would like to see any two of the following:

- Maj. Schaeffer
- Sgt. [redacted]
- Pilot of C-130 #2
- Pilot of first tanker to arrive
- The J-4 of Gen. Vaught's team
- Maj. [redacted]
- Cdr. [redacted]
- Sikorsky TecRep who was aboard NIMITZ
- Col. Perryman.

The meeting will be held in Room 212 Russell Senate Office Building with witness #1 to be heard at 1400 and witness #2 at 1500, tomorrow, 16 May.

HAROLD L. MILLER
Colonel, JAGC, USA
Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

THE JOINT STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A #428

2 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Gast, USAF
Major General Vaught, USA

Subject: SASC Request for Information and Additional Witnesses Concerning the Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt

Reference: Memorandum, LLA/CJCS, 2 June 1980, "SASC Requests--Rescue Mission" (attached)

(U)
1. Per reference cited above, Senator Warner has requested additional information and witnesses in connection with the Iranian hostage rescue attempt.

(U)
2. For LTG Gast: Senator Warner has requested that the SASC be provided with the names and present location of all members of the Iran MAAG who served during the last year in which the MAAG operated in Iran. #51

(U)
3. For MG Vaught: SASC has requested that the following individuals be made available to appear before the SASC staff on Wednesday, 4 June 1980, at 1400: #39c

MSGT [redacted] Air Combat Controller on site
Mr. [redacted] Sikorsky RH-53D Tech Rep aboard NIMITZ

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler
Mr. Ross
CJCS
ACJCS
DJS
J-30
Col Miller, LL/CJCS
Col Miller, OATSD(LA)
Col Abel

Classified By: DJS
Declassify On: OADR

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: DJSOA
18 Oct 85
Declassify: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff
2 June 1980

MEMO TO: MAJOR GENERAL DYKE

Attention: Captain Hall

SUBJECT: SASC Requests--Rescue Mission

(u)
1. Senator Warner has requested that the SASC be provided with the names of all members of the Iran MAG who served during the last year in which the MAG operated in Iran, and that he also be provided with their present location. #51

(S)
2. The Committee has requested that Sergeant [redacted] and [redacted] (Sikorsky Tech Rep) be available to appear before them at 1400, Wed., 4 June 1980, if available. In the event they are not available at this time, please advise me at your earliest convenience so a different date for their appearance can be arranged. #39a

: A, G, G

HAROLD L. MILLER
Colonel, JAGC, USA
Legal Adviser & Legislative
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

No change

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT STAFF

A #4429

3 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Subject: SASC Request for Witnesses

Reference: Memorandum, Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, 2 June 1980, subject as above (attached)

(C) 1. In response to your request (reference above), the following individuals have been notified to appear before the SASC - Senator Warner's team, to testify on the Iran hostage rescue attempt:

a. [redacted] Sikorsky RH-53D Tech Rep aboard NIMITZ. [redacted] will be accompanied by [redacted] Sikorsky Aircraft Company.

b. MSGT [redacted] Air Combat Controller on site.

2. (U) The meeting will take place on 4 June 1980, at 1400 and 1500 hours, respectively, in Room 212 Russell Senate Office Building.

3. (U) LTC Robert A. Kvederas, J-3/JOD, will accompany the individuals to the hearings and take notes.

4. (U) The above named personnel will meet in Room 2E841 at 1340. COL Miller, LLA/CJCS, will arrange transportation.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:

CJCS	LTG Shutler	LTC Kvederas
ACJCS	MG Vaught	[redacted]
DJS	COL Miller, OATSD(LA)	MSGT [redacted]
LTG Gast	COL Abel	

Classified by: DSOA, 18 Oct 8[illegible]
Declassify: OADR

[redacted]

[redacted]

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff
2 June 1980

MEMO TO: MAJOR GENERAL DYKE

Attention: Captain Hall

SUBJECT: SASC Requests--Rescue Mission

(W)
1. Senator Warner has requested that the SASC be provided with the names of all members of the Iran MAG who served during the last year in which the MAG operated in Iran, and that he also be provided with their present location.

(W)
2. The Committee has requested that Sergeant [redacted] (Sikorsky Tech Rep) be available to appear before them at 1400, Wed., 4 June 1980, if available. In the event they are not available at this time, please advise me at your earliest convenience so a different date for their appearance can be arranged.

HAROLD L. MILLER
Colonel, JAGC, USA
Legal Adviser & Legislative
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

[redacted]

[redacted]

A-#431

#27B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MG Dyke ↗

22 May 80

LTC ~~Olynyk~~

LTC ~~Kordens.~~

Please insure that we have a file copy & that all participants/witnesses have a copy. No cover memo needed.

Thanks.

[illegible]

Delivered + posted 23 May 0800 ADO

Declassified by: DDO NMCC 12 May 1992

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~DJS OADR~~

Red-1

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff
22 May 1980

MEMO TO: LIEUTENANT GENERAL PUSTAY

SUBJECT: House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee Hearing--Rescue Mission

1. There seems to be a good deal of confusion concerning the time, date and place for subject hearing. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I discussed the hearing with Ralph Preston, the Staffer in charge of the hearing for the Subcommittee. According to Preston, the hearing is scheduled for 1300 hrs, 2 June in Rm H-140 (Capitol). In addition to yourself, the Committee wants to hear from the following witnesses:

- Mr. Claytor;
- LTG Gast;
- MG Vaught; and
- COL Beckwith

2. With respect to a written statement, Preston indicates that is optional with the witnesses. He did state, however, that each witness would be expected to make an oral statement when the hearing commences. As I believe you know, the hearing will be closed.

3. We face the same problem with COL Beckwith that we had with the SASC. That is, how to get him in and out of the building without having his picture taken by members of the press. I discussed this problem with Preston and he has

Read - 1

greed to leave Beckwith's name off the published list of witnesses scheduled to appear at the hearing. In addition, we are to consult at a later time concerning arrangements to get Beckwith in and out of the building without being noticed.

COLONEL MILLER

Copy to:
MG Dyke
BG Todd

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff
22 May 1980

A-432

MEMO TO: LIEUTENANT GENERAL PUSTAY

SUBJECT: House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee Hearing--Rescue Mission

1. There seems to be a good deal of confusion concerning the time, date and place for subject hearing. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I discussed the hearing with Ralph Preston, the Staffer in charge of the hearing for the Subcommittee. According to Preston, the hearing is scheduled for 1300 hrs, 2 June in Rm H-140 (Capitol). In addition to yourself, the Committee wants to hear from the following witnesses:

- Mr. Claytor;
- LTG Gast;
- MG Vaught; and
- COL Beckwith

2. With respect to a written statement, Preston indicates that is optional with the witnesses. [redacted] did state, however, that each witness would be expected to make an oral statement when the hearing commences. As I believe you know, the hearing will be closed.

3. We face the same problem with COL Beckwith that we had with the SASC. That is, how to get him in and out of the building without having his picture taken by members of the press. I discussed this problem with Preston and he has

[illegible]reed to leave Beckwith's name off the published list of witnesses scheduled to appear at the hearing. In addition, we are to consult [illegible] later time concerning arrangements to get [illegible]kwith in and out of the building without being noticed.

COLONEL MILLER

Copy to:
MG Dyke
BG Todd

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#4

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

A #437

20 May 1980

X

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Vaught, USA
Rear Admiral Cassidy, USN

Subject: Congressional Request for Information Concerning Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt

Reference: Memorandum for the Record, 19 May 1980, "Hostage Rescue Mission" (attached)

G

1. As a result of testimony by COL Perryman and CDR [redacted] before Senator Warner and the SASC Staff on 16 May 1980, the following requests for additional information were submitted by Mr. Roberts and Mr. McFarland:

G a. Based on CDR [redacted] statement, helicopter #6 was the aircraft which was involved in the accident onboard the NIMITZ. According to Mr. Roberts, Senator Warner's group had been previously told that it was #8 helicopter that was involved in the accident. Mr. Roberts requested that this discrepancy be clarified.

b. The following questions were submitted by Mr. McFarland:

(1) What is the criteria for scheduling special depot level maintenance (SDLM)? Is it based upon a fixed number of flight hours or an arbitrary calendar life?

(2) When an aircraft exceeds the criteria for SDLM, what authority exists for extending its retention in an operational status? What criteria must be met before that authority is exercised?

(3) Are any restrictions imposed on an aircraft's use once it is beyond the time requiring SDLM?

(4) What exactly takes place during SDLM? Would any or all of the parts which failed on the mission have been replaced during SDLM?

(5) Please provide the same explanation for the Phase A-D 100 hour maintenance checks.

Declassified by:
DDO/NMCC

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OAD~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6 With respect to the SERVO which failed on helicopter #2, the Warner group asked "what was the life point for that SERVO"? The group also asked COL Perryman to provide the answer to the question "is it unusual to have five extensions on an aircraft"? COL Perryman, like CDR [redacted] stated he did not know what he would have done any differently to assure that the helicopter portion of the mission would succeed.

GRANT MILLER
COL, USAF

[redacted]

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

19 May 1980

Note: 7 Jan 92
This Memorandum is Doc 4-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Hostage Rescue Mission

CDR [redacted] and COL Perryman were interviewed by John Roberts, Steve Dotson, and Bud McFarland. CDR [redacted] told the group that the RH-53D helicopter is normally due for major maintenance every 27 months. However, extensions of three months are frequently granted and not uncommon.

With respect to the eight helicopters assigned to this mission, three were beyond the 27 month period. However, the types of failures associated with helicopters #6, 5, and 2, would not normally be discovered during a major rework.

CDR [redacted] reported to the group that he and his crew had absolute top priority while onboard the NIMITZ, and that at the time the mission occurred he was convinced that the helicopters were ready to fly.

According to CDR [redacted] helicopter #6 was the helicopter which had the accident onboard the NIMITZ; this particularly caught John Roberts' attention, who pointedly stated that up until now the Warner group always had been told that aircraft #8 was involved in the NIMITZ accident. Roberts asked that this discrepancy be clarified.

The attached questions were prepared by Bud McFarland:

(1) What is the criteria for scheduling special depot level maintenance (SDLM)? Is it based upon a fixed number of flight hours or an arbitrary calendar life?

(2) When an aircraft exceeds the criteria for SDLM, what authority exists for extending its retention in an operational status? What criteria must be met before that authority is exercised?

(3) Are any restrictions imposed on an aircrafts use once it is beyond the time requiring SDLM?

(4) What exactly takes place during SDLM? Would any or all of the parts which failed on the mission, have been replaced during SDLM?

(5) Please provide the same explanation for the Phase A-D 100 hour maintenance checks.

COL Perryman confirmed the maintenance practices for the RH-53D. Some members of the Warner group placed a great deal of emphasis on the maintenance policies associated with the President's helicopters. They noted that all dynamic systems are replaced at their 50% life.

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

ACT	DIVISION	PRI	INFO
	J-33		
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	JOD		
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	RECON OPS		
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	J-36/OES		
	EXEC/J30/31		
	MIL SEC		
	FILE		

1063

cont. mike Hall

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RUEBJMA/CG MCDEC QUANTICO VA
RUCLSLA/437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//DOXX//
RUCLHUA/1SOW EGLIN AF AUX FLD 9 FL
INFO RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC
BT
1063
SUBJ: HOSTAGE RESCUE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD
1. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SUBJECT BOARD AT THE TIME/DATE INDICATED.
A. 2 JUNE 1980.
H&MS-26
HMH-461
CCT
CCT
B. 3 JUNE 1980:
1030 - LT HARRISON, J. B., 1 SOW
1 SOW
HMX-1
2. THE BOARD WILL MEET IN ROOM 140, BUILDING T-26, NAS, NORFOLK, VA.
3. UNIFORM OF THE DAY IS APPROPRIATE.
4. BERTHING INFORMATION MAY BE OBTAINED FROM MRS. R. DOUGHERTY, COMNAVAIRLANT CODE 0143, AUTOVON 690-2437 OR 3212.
5. THIS MESSAGE CONFIRMS PRIOR TELCON THIS SUBJECT.
6. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS APPRECIATED.
BT
#5167
ANNOTES
MAC

PAGE 1 00001001

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Classified By: DJSOA 18Oct8[illegible]
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

#69
A

THE JOINT STAFF

8 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GRANT MILLER, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)

Subject: Helicopter Performance During Training and Rehearsals for the Hostage Rescue Attempt in Iran

1. Attached is a fact sheet in response to a request by Senator Warner and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff during the 29 April and 2 May interviews with Colonel Charles H. Pitman and other helicopter personnel who participated in the hostage rescue attempt.

2. This information is based on interviews with the aircrew and maintenance personnel who were involved in both the training and rehearsals and the actual mission. It must be emphasized that the aircraft used for training and rehearsals were not (and were never intended to be) used on the actual mission. Every expectation was that the eight RH-53D aircraft aboard the NIMITZ would be in better mechanical condition than were the aircraft used in training. By all indications available, to include maintenance and flight records and extensive pre-mission checks, these aircraft were in better condition at the time the launch decision was made.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
Mr. Ross - 2E800
CJCS
ACJCS
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst, CJCS - 2E841

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

8 May 1980

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Helicopter Performance During Training for the Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt

1. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning helicopter performance during training and rehearsals for the hostage rescue attempt in Iran.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. On 29 April and 2 May 1980, Colonel Charles H. Pitman was interviewed by the Senate Armed Services Committee (Senator Warner and SASC staff members). During this interview, Colonel Pitman was requested to provide data on helicopter performance during the rehearsal and training period for the attempted rescue of US hostages in Iran.

b. The rescue mission preparation phase included rehearsals during which distances and conditions for the helicopters similar to those encountered on the actual rescue mission were approximated. In all but two rehearsals, all helicopters reached the refuel site and subsequent landing sites. In each of the other two exercises, one helicopter had an abort condition for mechanical problems. One helicopter experienced an indicated blade spar failure (the Blade Inspection Method--BIM--warning light came on after departing the refuel site en route to the next landing site.) This is the same indicated failure experienced by helicopter number six en route to the refueling site on the actual mission. During the rehearsal, the aircraft with the BIM warning light landed. A main rotor blade was subsequently replaced and the aircraft returned to the exercise.

c. The second mechanical failure which resulted in an abort during training was the loss of a second stage hydraulic pump, similar to the failure experienced by helicopter number 2 on the actual mission. The aircraft which had the hydraulic pump failure during training was repaired in the field by flying in the replacement pump and performing the repairs on site. The aircraft was then returned to home station since the failure occurred as the exercise was ending.

d. Other mechanical malfunctions occurred during training and rehearsals but were of a minor nature which permitted field maintenance to make on-the-spot corrections, allowing the aircraft to continue. Some malfunctions were so minor that they were deferred until the aircraft reached a point in the mission where repairs could be accomplished so as not to interfere with training. Still a third category of malfunctions occurred where aircraft were returned to base for

repairs which would not have been required for flight under actual mission conditions. The decisions to return these aircraft to home base were in keeping with the stringent safety standards applied during training.

e. Data obtained from the H-53 program office at the Naval Air Systems Command on the reliability of the RH-53D aircraft in Navy fleet operations indicates that the abort rate for RH-53D aircraft, once airborne on an Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) mission, is 8.8%. Because more systems--and far more complex systems--are involved in the AMCM mission, it is estimated that the abort rate for the RH-53 in the troop transport or flight ferry mode is approximately 5%. It must be emphasized that the probability of completing a mission by fully mission capable aircraft once all systems are operating (as was the case with eight RH-53D helicopters which departed the NIMITZ) is the relevant issue, not the fleet "operationally ready" or "mission capable" rate.

f. Attached is the record of day-to-day readiness of the training aircraft for the months of February, March, and April 1980. The on-hand aircraft during this period ranged from six to eight and the operational readiness rate for this small fleet, maintained under austere conditions, averaged 74%. This readiness was achieved at remote sites, with limited facilities and with no intermediate level maintenance support such as that found in a normal squadron or shipboard operation. Further, supply items were located several hundred miles away and were obtained through a very informal system established to preserve operational security. The training aircraft were not used on the mission. The RH-53D helicopters aboard the NIMITZ were in a much better maintenance environment than were those used for training and rehearsals.

g. The experience of the Joint Task Force with the RH-53D aircraft during training, coupled with Naval Air Systems Command data, gave a high assurance of at least six of the eight helicopters completing the flight from the NIMITZ to the refueling site at Desert One in condition to continue the mission.

Attachment
a/s

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A #71

THE JOINT STAFF

8 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Notes Taken During Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 7 May 1980

1. Attached is the transcription of notes taken by LTCOL C. A. Williamson, Special Operations Division, J-3, during the appearances before the Senate Armed Services Committee at 1000 hours on 7 May 1980 of LTGEN Gast, USAF; MG Vaught, USA; COL Kyle, USAF; COL Beckwith, USA; LTCOL Guidry, USAF [redacted] with COL [redacted], USMC; [redacted] as backup.

7, G

2. These notes are not verbatim transcripts of the questions and answers, but serve to provide the gist of each session. They are accurate in thrust and content, but may not be precise in terms of actual words or language used.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst to CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel/LTCOL Wheeler - 2E857

~~DOWNGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS~~

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Downgraded by:
DDS, NMCC
- 12 May 1992

Classified by: DJSOA
18 Oct 85
Declassify on: OAD

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A-72 Copy A

THE JOINT STAFF

7 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Notes Taken During Testimony Before Congressional Committees on 5 and 6 May 1980

1. Attached are the transcriptions of notes taken by Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Williamson, USAF, Special Operations Division, J-3, during the appearances of the following personnel:

5 May 1980: COL Charles Beckwith before the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee (TAB A)

5 May 1980: LTCOL Roland Guidry before Senator Warner and staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee (TAB B)

5 May 1980: LTGEN Gast and MG Vaught before Senator Warner and staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee (TAB C)

6 May 1980: MG Vaught and LTGEN Gast before the House Armed Services Committee (TAB D)

2. These notes are not verbatim transcripts of the questions and answers, but serve to provide the gist of each session. They are accurate in thrust and content, but may not be precise in terms of actual words or language used.

Charles W. Dyke

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
Mr. Peter Hamilton - 3E880
LTGEN Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst to CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel/LTCOL Wheeler - 2E857

Declassified by: DDO, NMCC, 12 May 1992

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

The two questions in the last paragraph of your memorandum are answered as follows:

1. As outlined in comments in paragraph 1 above, weather conditions caused an abort only once during training and that was primarily because of the stringent safety restrictions applied to the training situation. There were plans to delay or, if en route, abort the mission should weather require. The visibility conditions encountered were difficult. However, six aircraft did arrive at Desert One.

2. With regard to question 2, any weather decision would be ultimately based on subjective judgment and evaluation of meteorological phenomena. A decision on the number of aircraft merely required a count. Six of the helo pilots correctly judged the weather and arrived at Desert One. When one of those aircraft experienced hydraulic difficulties, responsible personnel on the ground counted the five remaining and decided, based on previously established criteria, to terminate the mission.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

1 INCL A/S

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler
CJCS
ACJCS
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Abel
COL Miller, LL Asst, CJCS
COL Miller, OASD LA
COL Kyle
COL Beckwith
COL Pitman
LTC Seiffert

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A

THE JOINT STAFF

3 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Notes Taken During Senate Armed Services Committee Discussions with Rescue Force Members

Attached is the transcription of notes taken by LTCOL Charles A. Williamson, USAF, Special Operations Division, J-3, on 2 May 1980, during appearances before Senator Warner and Senate Armed Services Committee staff members by personnel who participated in the rescue effort. These notes are not verbatim transcripts of the questions and answers but serve to provide a gist of each session. They are accurate in thrust and content, but not precise in terms of actual words or language used.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA
Vice Director for Operations

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Hon Jack L. Stempler (Asst to SECDEF, LA)
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL H. L. Miller (LL Asst CJCS)

~~Classified by: Vice Dir, J3~~
~~Declassified on: 3 May 86~~

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

THE JOINT [redacted] STAFF

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

Date 5 May

To: Col Peschell — MG VAUGHT

Subject: Required Info.

[redacted]

A, CG

[redacted]

C

V.P.

Downgraded by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 92

DIR, JSOA

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ 18Oct85
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted] SECRET

[redacted] ROUTING AND TRA[redacted] SECRET

TO: (Name, office symbol or location)	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
[redacted] G	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CON-VERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 May 1992
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

[redacted]

REMARKS

GC
A MG VAUGHT NEEDS TO KNOW:

[redacted] TIME ON GROUND

A [redacted]

E [redacted]

C

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE
Col Peschell [redacted]	05 0950 MAY
	PHONE

[redacted] SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 100-11.206

...070 O - 406-308 5041-101

BRIEFING OUTLINE FOR HOUSE COMMITTEE

6 MAY 1980

Opening Statement.

Gentlemen, we will attempt to provide you the maximum amount of information in the minimum time. I believe it would be appropriate, with your concurrence, for me to proceed in the following manner: describe my mission and its inherent risks; sketch the history of the Joint Task Force; list the organization we formed to do the job; and then cover planning, training; the decision making process; deployment and actions taken up through Desert 1. Then we would take your questions.

First the mission. On 12 November 1979 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed me to prepare a joint task force to go to Iran, free our hostages and return them to U. S. control. He reviewed for me what had been done between 4 November and 12 November. I then organized an austere but typical Joint Staff organization containing J1 personnel, J2, J3, J4, J5, J6, etc. Most of this staff were already members of a Joint Staff element known as SOD Special Operations Division. However, before going further I'd like to focus a bit more on the nature of the mission. I've been in the hostage rescue and counter-terrorist business very deeply for the past three years in several capacities. Operational security and surprise are absolute prerequisities to success in all counter-terrorist activities at all times. From the outset our plan placed heavy emphasis upon maintaining total operational security in order to achieve complete surprise up until the point that our rescue force would have crossed the wall at the Embassy. Hostage rescue is always a very dangerous and uncertain undertaking from beginning to end. The chances for success always run somewhere between 0 and 100 and these numbers are often very close together.

[redacted]

No matter how hard we may try things can simply go to hell in a handbasket at any point from start to finish. If one does not accept this fact then there is no reason to plan and train. One only has to refer to the events in London yesterday to validate this fact. My staff also included weather and medical officers, and other specialists. As we planned the mission we examined the region, the distances, friendly bases, the capabilities of various U. S. forces and equipment. In the early days we worked very hard to put together what one might call an emergency capability. By the 20th of December we had a plan of sorts but it was not sufficiently complete or strong in its components to enable me to recommend to my superiors that it be used. In addition [redacted] We needed to learn the true nature of the Iranian defense and security forces, their intel and warning system, the true character of the hostage holders and their modus operandi, and the situation in and around Tehran itself. We continued to make a vigorous intelligence collection effort and at the same time to test various components of our force and our plan by conducting training. Initially we conducted training along the east coast of the U. S. but we knew we would be working in a desert environment when we implemented the plan so we quickly changed our focus to the western desert of the U. S. -- the Arizona, California, Nevada areas -- where we trained extensively from December 1979 to 15 April 1980. From the outset the decision making process and the chain of command was very clear. I reported directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All other members of the Joint Chiefs were available to me at any time for council and advice. They were kept fully informed of the status of my planning, training, and any problems encountered. At the appropriate time I personally briefed the President with the National Security Council present. This session lasted

for nearly three hours. The President asked many appropriate questions and made several helpful suggestions, approved the plan and authorized deployment to begin. He made it very clear to all present that the chain of command ran from him through the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff to me. This chain was never challenged or violated.

Deployment at our forward bases went as planned and by 24 April all components of the force were at their R land launch locations and in a "go readiness posture." A detailed weather briefing was given and the decision to continue as planned was announced. ~~Just before dark~~ On 24 April six C130s and eight RH53 helicopters launched and proceeded to enter Iran at first darkness. The helicopters were flying in a single eight ship formation. The 130s were phased in with one preceding the others by about one hour in order to secure and prepare the landing fields at Desert 1. The first C130 landed on time. The security plan was implemented, the airfields were delineated and validated. Three of the 130s brought fuel, two of the 130s brought people and one 130 brought both people and 2,000 gallons of contingency fuel. The helicopters experienced more difficulty on the way to Desert 1 than the 130s. Between one and one-half and two hours into the mission number 6 helicopter noted a blade failure warning light and immediately landed. It's crew was picked up per plan by number 8 and the mission continued. Later along the way all helicopters encountered two dust formations. Their passage through these formations thoroughly tested their skill and training. Unfortunately one helicopter, number 5, experien-ed a failure of some essential navigational aids and elected to turn back to the carrier after it had completed about two-thirds of the distance to Desert 1. However, six of the helicopters did arrive at Desert 1 in time to be refueled and continue the mission to the next location as planned.

While the last two helicopters to arrive at Desert 1 (numbers 1 and 2 were being refueled) number 2 affirmed an indication, they had noted in flight, that they may have experienced hydraulic failure in one of its flight control systems. It was determined that the hydraulic pump had failed, the helicopter was in a non-flyable status.

It has been previously agreed among all the Sub-task Force Commanders that a prerequisite for mission continuance beyond Desert 1 was that we must have at least six helicopters in flyable condition. Since this fundamental pre-requisite was not met, I asked my on-scene commanders to consult among themselves and reaffirm our previously agreed abort threshhold "six was the minimum required." The on-scene commander promptly advised me that they had discussed the status of the helicopters and that all were in agreement that the mission should not be continued and that we should withdraw from Desert 1. I told the on-scene commander to begin implementation of the withdrawal plan but not to depart until I gave him the order. I then called the Chairman of the JCS and informed him of the situation at Desert 1. I recommended that we cancel the mission and withdraw. He asked me how much time he had to confer with others before I must have a decision. I told him he had 10 and not more than 15 minutes. He informed me that he would speak with the Secretary of Defense and the President and get back to me soonest. In about eight minutes he called me and said the President had affirmed my recommendation to withdraw and to do so per plan.

About eight minutes later I received a flash report from the desert that a helicopter had collided with a C130, that there would most likely be massive casualties. I immediately imposed minimize conditions on all radio messages downward and directed my staff to request medical assistance. The injured were treated by medical personnel at the refueling site. The on-scene commanders

conducted a rapid but complete withdrawal from the desert in approximately 23 minutes. Some 44 Iranian bus passengers were released at the scene unharmed. All living Americans were evacuated from Desert 1 in those 23 minutes. Once the injured were back at the command base they were immediately flown back to the United States burn center.

The above is a brief summation of what occurred up through Desert 1. It is my understanding that we are not expected to address today those aspects of the operations which were planned to take place beyond Desert 1. We are now ready to take your questions.

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Hostage Rescue Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee,. 7 May 1980

(U) 1. The formal hearings on the Hostage Rescue Operation before the Senate Armed Services Committee have been confirmed for Wednesday, 7 May 1980, beginning at 1000 hours.

(S) 2. Although not confirmed, it now appears that the principal witnesses listed below will appear jointly, in panel fashion, with COL Pitman as backup. A prepared statement is required. Witnesses required are as follows:

MG Vaught
LTG Gast
COL Kyle
COL Beckwith
LTC Seiffert
COL Pitman (as backup; not at table)

[redacted]

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA
Vice Director for Operations

Copy furnished:
Each witness
LL Asst, CJCS

Classified by:
DIR, JSOA, 18Oct85
Declassify on: OADR

~~Classified by: DJS~~
~~Declassified on: OADR~~

[redacted]

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

A #90

A/ 74. When was the production date of the MCs and ACs that were used in the operation?

ANS:

AC-130 (TAC)

69-6567 30 Aug 69
69-6569 16 Sep 69
69-6570 30 Sep 69
69-6575 30 Oct 69

A

EC-130 (TAC)

62-1809 8 Feb 63
62-1818 18 Mar 63
62-1857 1 Aug 63

MC-130 [redacted]

[redacted] 27 Aug 65
30 Sep 65
18 Aug 65

MC-130 [redacted]

[redacted] 7 Jun 63
2 Oct 63
1 Sep 65
20 Sep 65

Dates are official AF acceptance dates from Lockheed.

75. How long would it have taken to pull off the blower on No. 5 and put in on #2 at Desert #1?

ANS: No. 5 had a failed cooler blower and ASN-50.

No. 2 had a failed jam nut in second stage hydraulic flight control system which resulted in the system bleeding empty and subsequent failure of the hydraulic pump.

If #5 had arrived at Desert #1 a choice would have been available as to taking the hydraulic pump from #5 to repair #2 or removing the blower and ASN-50 from #2 to repair #5. Considering the

Downgraded by: DDO/NMCC 12 May 1992

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Classified by: DJSO 18 Oct 8

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassify: OAD

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[redacted]

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

			ACTION
1 TO (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post) [redacted] A #91		INITIALS	CIRCULATE
		DATE	COORDINATE
2		INITIALS	FILE
		DATE	INFORMATION
3		INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
		DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4		INITIALS	SEE ME
		DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

MG VAUGHT NEEDS YOUR HELP FOR HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS.

1) WHEN WAS THE PRODUCTION DATE OF THE MCs AND ACs THAT WERE USED IN THE OPERATION?

2) ~~IF YOU~~ DON'T WORRY ABOUT ~~HAVE~~ DATA ON THE PACAF A/C.

3) WOULD LIKE TO HAVE DATES POSTED TO TAIL NUMBERS.

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE
COL PASCHALL	4 MAY
	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

GPO : 1970 O - 408-309

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Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

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DDO NMCC
12 May 1992

~~SECRET~~

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Declassify on: OAD

~~SECRET~~

AC-130 (TRC)

69-6567	30 AUG 69
69-6569	16 SEP 69
69-6570	30 SEP 69
69-6575	20 OCT 69

EC-130 (TRC)

62-1809	6 FEB 63
62-1818	18 MAR 63
62-1857	1 AUG 63

A

MC-130 [redacted]

[redacted]

	29 AUG 65
	30 SEP 65
	18 AUG 65

MC-120 [redacted]

[redacted]

	7 JUN 63
	2 OCT 63
	1 SEP 65
	20 SEP 65

DATES ARE OFFICIAL AF ACCEPTANCE DATES FROM LOCKHEED.

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

A-92

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION
1 TO (Name, office symbol or location) [redacted]	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

MG VAUGHT NEEDS TO KNOW:

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED ZERBE
CONDUCTED ON: 12 May 1992
DERIVATIVE CL BY: DDO, NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO: Secret
REVIEW ON: OADR
DERIVED FROM: [redacted]

Dir, JSOA, 180185

Classified By: ~~DOS~~
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE
[redacted]	05 0950 MAY
	PHONE

Downgraded by DDO, NMCC 12 May 19[illegible]

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967

5041-101

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION
1 TO (Name, office symbol or location)	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
MG VAUGHT	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CON-VERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

COAST GUARD HELOS:

AVL OFFICE CLAIMS THEY HAVE NO 53's - THEY HAVE ONLY THE OLD (1961) SINGLE ENGINE HH52A. THEY ONLY REQUIRE 1 OUT OF 3 TO BE READY AT ANY ONE TIME BUT SAY IF THE BUT THEIR ENTIRE FLEET OF 79 IN THE AIR - 10 WOULD BE IN MAINTENANCE AND ABOUT 77% OF THE REMAINING 69 WOULD BE FMC

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE
COL RUSHALL	5 MAY
	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

GPO : 1970 O - 406-308 5041-101

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION
1 TO (Name, office symbol or location)	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
Col PITMAN!	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

MG MAGHT WANTS TO KNOW IF CHOPPERS COAST IN TIME WAS LATE. HE BELIEVES THEY WERE ON TIME OR WAS TO CIRCLE FOR AWHILE.

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE
COL. PASCHALL	0500 4 MAY
	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

GPO : 1970 O - 406-308 5041-101

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

A #92

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION
1 TO *(Name, office symbol or location)* J-2	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CON-VERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

MG VAUGHT WANTS TO KNOW AS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY WHERE HELO # 3 WAS FLOWN TO.

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM *(Name, office symbol or location)*	DATE
Col. Paschall	050400 MAY
	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

UNCLASSIFIED

GPO : 1970 O - 406-308 5041-101

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

1 TO (Name, office symbol or location) [redacted]	INITIALS	ACTION: CIRCULATE	
	DATE	COORDINATION	
2	INITIALS	FILE	
	DATE	INFORMATION	
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN	
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION	
4	INITIALS	SEE ME	
	DATE	SIGNATURE	

AG

#193

REMARKS

MG Vaught needs your help:

1) What type of helicopters were used in the SonTay operation? HH-53 HH-3

2) Where did they fly from? UDORN TH

3) How was refueling done? INFLIGHT

4) How were they maintained? DON'T KNOW HH-3 WAS OLD CHOPPER DUE TO BE SHIPPED TO AIRFORCE MUSEUM?

INFO NEEDED FOR HIS TESTIMONY TO CONGRESS

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE
[redacted] ~~SECRET~~	4 May 82
	PHONE 5-5078

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

GPO : 1970 O - 406-308 5041-101

OVER

Classified By: Dir, JSOA 16Oct82
Declassified On: OADR

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DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

SECRET

Rez 1 - PRI FLIGHT CONTAINED

3 5 EA HH 53s & ONE HH-3

= 2nd FLIGHT 15 MILES AWAY FM TGT CONTAINED 4 HH 53s

??

2d FLT HAD OUTMOVED ...

1) The HELO OPN WAS DONE BY ~~AH~~ AD HOC USAF CREWS - NO ONE UNIT

2. PRACTICE ON ONE SET OF HELOS IN FLORIDA - ACTUALLY FLEW ANOTHER SET THAT WERE PREPOSITIONED IN THAILAND

YOU FOLLOWED THE PROCEDURE USED AT SON TAY - THERE WAS NO DIFFICULTY W/ HELOS THERE DESPITE SOME VERY TRICKY TECHNICAL ASPECTS

~~SECRET~~ Paschall -

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION
1. ~~TO (Name, office~~ symbol or location) COL. CITMAN.	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

MG VAUGHT NEEDS YOUR HELP WITH HIS CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY:

1) WHAT WAS THE NAVY "SWAP OUT" PLAN (THE THREE RH 53s ON THE EISENHOWER TO REPLACE THE TWO RH53 ON THE NIMITZ)

2) WHICH TWO RH53 WERE TO BE TAKEN OFF THE NIMITZ ?

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE
COL. PASCUALE	4 MAY 80
	PHONE 55072

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

GPO : 1970 O - 406-308 5041-101

~~SECRET~~

2

[redacted]

SECRET

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION
1 TO (Name, office symbol or location) [redacted]	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

MG VAUGHT NEEDS A CALENDAR (OR SCHEDULE) OF ALL EXERCISE DATES STARTING WITH THE PRELIMINARY ONES ON THE EAST COAST. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE TNG AFTER ACTION REPORTS ALSO

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE
COL. PASCHALL	4 MAY
	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

GPO : 1970 O - 406-308 5041-101

SECRET

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SECRET

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION
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LTC DUTTON	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

MG Vaught needs your help for his congressional testimony:

i) How far can the HH53 w/crew alone fly w/o refueling?

(REAL REASON FOR QUESTION IS THAT HE NEEDS TO REFRESH HIS MEMORY ON WHY THE HHs WERE REJECTED. UPT AND I THINK IT HAS TO DO W/ INTERNAL SPACE LIMITATIONS IN IT.)

YOU MIGHT CHECK W/ CDR PITMAN

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE 4 MAY
CDR PASCHALL	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

GPO : 1970 O - 406-208 5041-101

SECRET

[redacted]

4

SECRET

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION
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	DATE	COORDINATION
2	INITIALS	FILE
	DATE	INFORMATION
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION
4	INITIALS	SEE ME
	DATE	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

MG VAUGHT NEEDS YOUR HELP. NEED TO KNOW:

1) When did the Navy make the decision to buy the RH53? WHAT is its purchase history?

2) what is the failure rate of ~~RAC~~ RH53s ~~&~~ after they have been declared FMC

3) How many RH53s flew ~~hostile~~ to [redacted] He needs memory refreshed on any breakdowns.

4) How many of the pilots completed air refueling training?

INFO NEEDED FOR HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL CMTES.

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

FROM (Name, office symbol or location)	DATE
COL PASCHALL	4 May 80
	PHONE 55078

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206

GPO : 1970 O - 406-308 5041-101

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES (

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT	PRECEDENCE INFO	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER O DATE-TIME	MONT
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BOOK | MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: JCS

TO: SSO USEUCOM
SSO MAC
CINCPAC
SSO REDCOM
SSO SAC

INFO: AFSSO USAFE
AFSSO TAC

#96

X A

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12MAY
CONDUCTED ON 12 may 1992
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
☐ NSC ☐ DOWNGRADED TO Confident
REVIEW ON DADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sour
[redacted]

C, E [redacted] (E)

~~TOPSECRET~~ EYES ONLY [redacted]

(E) PERSONAL FOR RADM PACKER, USEUCOM J3; MGEN BAGINSKI, MAC DO;
MGEN DAVIS, CINCPAC J3; BGEN RUSSELL, USREDCOM J3; MGEN PRINGLE,
SAC DO; INFO MGEN FALLS, USAFE DO&I; MGEN WELCH, AFRED DO;
E [redacted], FROM LTGEN SHUTLER, JCS J3

E SUBJECT: CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE [redacted] (U)

1. (U) PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF RECENT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BY
E [redacted] OF US USE OF FACILITIES AT [redacted] IT IS

E 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

DISTR:

CJCS(1) J3(1) CSAF(1)

0

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE
B. [redacted] FREEMAN, LTC, USAF/JOD J3
EXT 52541/9 JUN 80/wcp

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS [redacted]
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 May 1992

RELEASER
TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE
SIGNATURE Philip D. Shutler
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]
DATE TIME GROUP

DD FORM 1 DEC 70 173 (OSD) REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 68, WHICH WILL BE USED
*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES (

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT	PRECEDENCE INFO	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY	DATE—TIME	MONTH
02 OF					TT				

BOOK | MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM:

TO:

APPROPRIATE THAT WE UPDATE THE CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE REGARDING OUR ACTIVITIES THERE.

2. (U) IN ORDER TO FACILITATE LONG TERM PLANNING FOR US ACTIVITIES IN THE ALL-IMPORTANT MIDEAST-SOUTH WEST ASIA REGION, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES CONCERNING [redacted] COOPERATION ARE REVISED AS FOLLOWS:

A. (E) THE FACT THAT THERE HAVE BEEN E-3A, KC-135, AND AIRLIFT MISSIONS INTO AND OUT [redacted] AND THAT EXERCISES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED WITH [redacted] IS DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE. (DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE FOR [redacted] PROVIDED SEPARATELY IN JCS [redacted]

B. (E) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS REMOVED FROM THE COMPARTMENTED SYSTEM BUT WILL REMAIN SECRET NOFORN [redacted]

(1) (E) [redacted] DETAILS CONCERNING [redacted] TO INCLUDE EQUIPMENT DEPLOYED BY THE US AND [redacted] TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

6543210

0

DISTR:

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
RELEASER: TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE	
SIGNATURE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]
	DATE TIME GROUP

DD FORM 1 DEC 70 173 (OSU) REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: [redacted]

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted] EYES O

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT	PRECEDENCE INFO	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER O	DATE-TIME	MONTH
03 OF					TT				

BOOK | MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

(C) (2) (C) [redacted] DETAILS OF [redacted] PROCEDURES TO INCLUDE INGRESS/EGRESS COVER AND OTHER AIR DEFENSE MATTERS.

(C) (3) (C) [redacted] ALL ASPECTS OF [redacted] MC-130 TRAINING OPERATIONS [redacted] INCLUDING COMBINED [redacted] ACTIVITIES.

(C) C. (U) INFORMATION WHICH DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY PERTAIN TO COMBINED [redacted] OPERATIONS WILL BE GOVERNED BY ITS OWN SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES, (EG. LESSONS LEARNED ON BARE BASE OPERATIONS, OR E-3A INTERFACE WITH TF 60 AND TF 70).

(C) 3. (U) ALL INFORMATION DIRECTLY RELATED TO SPECIAL MISSION SUPPORT ACTIVITIES [redacted] WILL REMAIN TOP SECRET WITH ACCESS LIMITED TO SPECIFICALLY CLEARED PERSONNEL.

4. (U) PUBLIC OR MEDIA QUESTIONS ON THE AFOREMENTIONED ACTIVITIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE REFERRED TO OSD/PA.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

REVW 9 JUN 00

6 5 4 3 2 1 0

DISTR:

0

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

[redacted]

RELEASER

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

SIGNATURE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

DATE TIME GROUP

EYES O

DD FORM 1 DEC 70 173 (OSU) REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 68, WHICH WILL BE USED

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [redacted]

6 May 1980

A-107

~~SECRET~~

INCLOSURE 1 TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Response to Staff Query, Senate Armed Services Committee

(U)

1. Eight RH-53 helicopters were utilized for the rescue operations. All eight helicopters were from USN Minesweeper Squadron HM-16 based at Norfolk, Virginia.

2. In mid-November 1979, six of the eight RH-53 helicopters were partially disassembled and airlifted by C-5 aircraft from Norfolk to [redacted] where they were reassembled and flown aboard KITTY HAWK. In early January the two additional RH-53 helicopters (numbers 2 and 6 on the rescue mission) from HM-16 were airlifted from Norfolk to the Mediterranean where they were reassembled and loaded aboard the NIMITZ. The NIMITZ sailed from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and relieved the KITTY HAWK on station on 21 January 1980. The six RH-53 helicopters aboard the KITTY HAWK were loaded aboard the NIMITZ, making a total of eight.

3. All eight RH-53's were fully operational when they took off from the NIMITZ on 24 April 1980. The mission performance of each helicopter is outlined below:

HELO NUMBER	PERFORMANCE	REMARKS
1	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No problems
*2	Arrived at Desert One (Not mission capable)	Second stage hydraulic pump failure.
3	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	Low first stage hydraulic quantity. Prepared to service.
4	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No discrepancies
5	Returned to NIMITZ (Aborted mission)	Attitude reference system failure/TACAN failure
*6	Down after 2 hours (Aborted mission; crew picked up by helo #8)	Rotor blade indication failure
7	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No problems
8	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	Intermittent chip light indication on takeoff. Not an abort discrepancy.

* Helos 2 and 6 arrived aboard NIMITZ. There is no correlation with the failure of these two aircraft and the coincidence of their arrival in the Indian Ocean aboard NIMITZ.

~~SECRET~~

Incl

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D C 20301

[redacted]

THE JOINT STAFF

J3M- 813 '80
5 May 1980

X

A = 108

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Subject: Senate Armed Services Committee Request

1. Reference is made to your memorandum for LTC S.D. Olynyk, dated 2 May 1980, subject as above.

2. At inclosures A and B are the responses to the questions by the Senate Armed Services Committee, as outlined in the references:

Inclosure A. Organizational Chart of the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission

Inclosure B. Information on the eight helicopters used in the hostage rescue operation.

Attachment
a/s

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA
Vice Director for Operations

Copy provided
- CJCS
- ACJCS
- LTG Gast
- MG Vaught
- COL Miller, LL Asst to CJCS
- Mr. Stimpler

[redacted]

Classified by: DDSOA
18 Oct 85
Declassify on: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE B TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Response to Staff Query, Senate Armed Services Committee

(U)

1. Eight RH-53 helicopters were utilized for the rescue operations. All eight helicopters were from USN Minesweeper Squadron HM-16 based at Norfolk, Virginia.

(C)

2. In mid-November 1979, six of the eight RH-53 helicopters were partially disassembled and airlifted by C-5 aircraft from Norfolk to [redacted] where they were reassembled and flown aboard KITTY HAWK. In early January the two additional RH-53 helicopters (numbers 2 and 6 on the rescue mission) from HM-16 were airlifted from Norfolk to the Mediterranean where they were reassembled and loaded aboard the NIMITZ. The NIMITZ sailed from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and relieved the KITTY HAWK on station on 23 January 1980. The six RH-53 helicopters aboard the KITTY HAWK were loaded aboard the NIMITZ, making a total of eight.

(U)

3. All eight RH-53's were fully operational when they took off from the NIMITZ on 24 April 1980. The mission performance of each helicopter is outlined below:

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1	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No problems
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7	Arrived at Desert One (Mission capable)	No problems
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* Helos 2 and 6 arrived aboard NIMITZ. There is no correlation with the failure of these two aircraft and the coincidence of their arrival in the Indian Ocean aboard NIMITZ.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

11 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Point of Contact for Matters Relating to Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt

1. Effective 17 June 1980, matters concerning Congressional testimony, press inquiries, and other matters related to follow-up questions on the operation to rescue US hostages held in Iran will be staffed by the Joint Operations Division (J-3), within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Principal point of contact is LTC R. A. Kvederas, USA, room 2B887, extension 52994.

2. Freedom of information requests on this subject will continue to be staffed by COL Robert Redmond, USA, Special Operations Division (J-3), room 2C839, extension 75279.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Copy to:
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
Mr. Ross - 2E800
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
Mr. Schachter - 3E963
LTG Pustay -
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
BG Johnson (J-33)
COL Miller, LL Asst/CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel, 2E857
COL Callaghan

My sincere appreciation to all for the outstanding support and cooperation we have received.
Bill D

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

~~Classified By: D.S.~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

#134

A

THE JOINT STAFF

19 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Notes Taken During Interviews By Senator Warner and Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Personnel, 19 May 1980

A. 1. Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] USA, and Major [redacted] USMC, appeared before Senator Warner and staff members of the SASC (Messrs Roberts and Dotson) for interviews concerning the attempt to rescue US hostages in Iran, 24 April 1980.

2. These notes are not verbatim transcripts of the questions and answers, but serve to provide the gist of each session. They are accurate in thrust and content, but may not be precise in terms of actual words or language used.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
Mr. Ross - 2E800
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst, CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel/LTCOL Wheeler - 2E857

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT

Classified by: DJSOA
18Oct85
Declassify on: OADR
Downgraded by:

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

#136

19 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Gast
Major General Vaught

Subject: Schedule for Further Interviews by SASC Concerning the Attempted Hostage Rescue Operation in Iran

1. Senator Warner has requested that two personnel associated with the rescue attempt appear before him and the SASC staff members assigned to this effort (Messrs. Roberts, McFarlane, and Dotson) on Tuesday, 20 May 1980, and two more on Friday, 24 May 1980.

(c) 2. On 20 May 1980, Colonel [redacted] Captain [redacted] USAF, pilot of C-130 #3, will appear in Room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, at 1400. Colonel [redacted] and Captain [redacted] will be accompanied by LTC Kvederas who will take notes. All personnel will meet at 1320 hours, 20 May 1980, with Colonel Miller, Legal and Legislative Assistant to CJCS, in room 2E841, Pentagon. Colonel Miller will arrange transportation.

(c) 3. On Friday, 23 May 1980, Major [redacted] USAF, pilot of C-130 tanker #6, and [redacted] Sikorsky RH-53D Tech Rep aboard NIMITZ, are tentatively scheduled to appear before Senator Warner's group. Details will be provided when available.

(u) 4. Senator Warner's group has requested through Mr. Stempler's office that the following additional personnel who have not yet been interviewed be made available:

Name	Status
(c) 1. Sergeant [redacted] USAF, CCT Deputy	Not yet scheduled
(c) 2. Pilot of first C-130 tanker to land (Major [redacted] who piloted the last tanker to land and the last C-130 to depart Desert One will substitute; tentatively scheduled for 24 May 1980)	Killed in accident at Desert One

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Declassify: OADR

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~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Name	Status
3. Pilot of C-130 #2 (Captain [redacted] who piloted C-130 #3 will substitute; scheduled for 20 May 1980)	E [redacted]
4. Major Schaeffer, USMC, pilot, helicopter #5	Not yet available from USMC

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Copy to:
Col [redacted]
Col Pitman
Col Kyle
Col Paschall
Mr. Stempler
Mr. Ross
CJCS
ACJCS
DJS
J30
Col Miller, LL, CJCS
Col Miller, OATSD (LA)
Col Abel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

16 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Subject: SASC Request for Witnesses

Reference: Memorandum, Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, 15 May 1980, subject as above (attached)

1. In response to your request (reference above), the following individuals have been notified to appear before the SASC - Senator Warner's team, to testify on the Iran hostage rescue attempt:

a. LTC [redacted] USA, J-4
Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission, 1000 hours

b. MAJ [redacted] USMC
Marine Intelligence Officer
Hostage Rescue Planning Team, 1100 hours

2. The meeting will take place on Monday, 19 May 1980, at 1000 and 1100 hours, respectively, in room 212 Russell Senate Office Building.

3. LTC Charles Williamson, J-3/SOD, will accompany the officers to the hearings.

PHILIP C. GAST
Lieutenant General, USAF

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
CJCS J-33
ACJCS RADM Cassidy
DJS COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
J-30 COL Abel - 2E857
J-31
MG Vaught

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: DJSOA 18 Oct 85
Declassify: OADR

~~Classified By: DJS~~
~~Declassify: OADR~~

[redacted] SECRET

A-#144

8 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR BG TODD

Subject: Information for the Senate Record

Reference: Points Aircraft Encountered Sand/Dust Storm

- First MC-130 took off at 1405Z.

- All helos were airborne as a flight at 1506Z.

- Remainder of MC/EC-130s launched between 1511 and 1519Z.

- #1 MC-130 encountered dust approximately 45 minutes - one hour in from the Iranian coast. Exact time is not certain because of the insidious nature of the dust plus a cloud layer over the moon and use of night vision devices lulled crew into thinking the lack of visibility was due to the lack of moonlight.

  -- Occurred at approximately 58°22'E, 29°22'N.
  -- Time based on one hour from the coast was 1630Z.
  -- Aircraft altitude was approximately 2,000-3,000 feet AGL.
  -- Helos were approximately 140 NM South of the C-130 position at this time.

- Helicopter formation encountered the dust at 1740Z (position 58°22'E, 30°10'N).

  -- C-130 was approximately 110 NM North of this position at that time.
  -- Helicopter altitude was approximately 500-1,000 feet AGL.

- Conditions improved gradually. C-130's were clear approximately 15 minutes (about 50 NM) prior to Desert Site 1.

- Dust was continuous from entry to exit but may have varied in intensity.

- Other C-130 flying the same route and altitudes as the #1 MC-130 reported encountering and leaving the dust at relatively the same positions as #1 MC-130.

A, G

[redacted]
COLONEL, USA

SECRET
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Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO, NMCC
17 May 1992

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

8 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Helicopter Navigational Equipment

1. This is in response to your request for additional information concerning visual navigational equipment available to the RH-53D pilots and copilots. As pointed out on page 7 of the "Executive Summary" of the report, each aircraft was equipped with both OMEGA and inertial navigation systems. Each pilot and copilot was equipped with AN/PVS-5A night vision goggles. Two of the pilots had experimental models (Phase III, AN/PVS-5A night vision goggles).

2. One question that continues to come up is whether or not the helicopters were equipped with Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR). They were not. The MC-130 aircraft were so equipped.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
CJCS
ACJCS
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst, CJCS (2E841)
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) (3D918)

Declassified by
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

[redacted]

A-4147

THE JOINT STAFF

7 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT, USA

Attention: COL Charles H. Pitman, USMC; RADM Thomas J. Cassidy, Jr.,

Subject: Request for Information and Material for Congress Concerning Attempted Hostage Rescue in Iran

1. References (appended):

a. Memorandum, 29 April 1980, subject: "Hostage Rescue Mission."

b. Memorandum for MG Vaught, 5 May 1980, subject: "Request for Personal Data on Helicopter Crewmembers Who Participated in Rescue Attempt."

c. Memorandum for MG Vaught, RADM Cassidy, and Colonel Pitman, 6 May 1980, subject as above.

d. JCS message, 071747Z May 1980, requesting personal data on RH-53D maintenance personnel aboard USS NIMITZ.

2. The Senate Armed Services Committee has requested personal data on participants in the hostage rescue mission. The specific requirements which remain unanswered are recapitulated and assigned as follows:

a. Educational levels of all helicopter pilots and the 20-man maintenance crew which accompanied the pilots on board the NIMITZ (para 2, ref a; para 1, ref b; and para 1b(3), ref c).

Responsibility: Colonel Pitman. Suspense: COB 15 May 1980.

b. The dates each pilot and maintenance crewmember joined the JTF training effort (para 4, ref a, and para 2, ref b).

Responsibility: Colonel Pitman. Suspense: COB 15 May 1980.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: DJSOA
18 Oct 85
Declassify: OADR

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~
Downgraded by: DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

~~SECRET~~

1

30 April

MEMO TO: B/Gen Smith

Carl — I have not cleared with Chairman. He is fired up.

— Bottom lines:

— I think we should give raw data in maintenance forms only if accompanied by an explanation understood by laymen.

— I think we should open up to interviews by Cong members the key conduct of operation.

John

J.S. PUSTAY, Lt Gen, USAF
Assistant to the Chairman

Ref A

29 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Stiglitz

THROUGH: General Pike

SUBJECT: Hostage Rescue Mission

As a result of yesterday's briefing to Senators Stennis and Warner and [illegible] staff, we have been requested to provide, as soon as possible, the following:

1. The maintenance records for the 8 RH-53 helicopters. In this connection, the staff is particularly interested in obtaining a detailed history of the 8 helicopters while they were on the aircraft carrier. The staff has received a report that one of the helicopters had an accident while on the Nimitz.

2. The names, ranks, branches of service, organizations, and experience levels of the 16 helicopter pilots and the 20 member special maintenance crew that accompanied the pilots onboard the Nimitz. With respect to the experience levels of the 16 pilots, such report should include total flying hours, as well as the number of hours flown in the RH-53.

3. The organization and location of the 8 RH-53 helicopters, by tail number, prior to their assignment to the special mission group.

4. The dates, individually, when the 16 pilots and 20 member maintenance crew joined the southwest training unit.

5. The staff has asked for a report on the next scheduled check-out or maintenance for all parts and systems that failed during the course of the mission.

6. The Committee has asked what weather reports were available, particularly those reports, if any, concerning the sand storm.

7. The Committee would like to obtain any and all special check lists which the 20 member special maintenance crew used in performing its mission while onboard the aircraft carrier.

8. The Committee has also asked what "over and above" normal maintenance was performed on the 8 helicopters.

I have verified the above request with John Roberts this morning. As you know, both Senators Stennis and Warner are anxious to conduct and complete the Committee investigation of this matter. They both expressed a desire

to look at a [illegible] helicopter and talk with the pilots. Naturally, they have assigned it top priority. With this background, John Roberts telephoned this morning and relayed some additional requirements. John Roberts, Steve Dotson, and Bud McFarland have been assigned as the Committee personnel responsible for this inquiry. They have been instructed by Chairman Stennis to proceed as expeditiously as possible.

1. Roberts has requested that they meet with MGen Vaught, Colonel Beckwith, and the pilots this afternoon in the Pentagon. This is their number one priority.

2. The staff team would like to talk to the Marine captain and his 20 member maintenance crew.

3. The staff would like to meet with the weather officer who is reported to have accompanied the special mission group.

4. Roberts has requested to meet with the colonel in charge of overall training at the southwestern U.S. training site.

5. The staff would like to meet with those personnel responsible for the materiel planning of the mission.

6. The Committee is interested in learning the sequence of events in the delivery of the helicopters and what plans were made for spare parts.

Grant Miller
Colonel, USAF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

5 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT, USA

Attention: COL Charles H. Pitman, USMC

Subject: Request for Personal Data on Helicopter Crewmembers Who Participated in Rescue Attempt

1. The Senate Armed Services Committee has requested the following personal data on all helicopter pilots and the special 20-man maintenance crew which accompanied the pilots aboard the NIMITZ:

- Name, rank, branch of service
- Organization
- Experience level, to include length of service
  - -- For pilots, include total flying hours and hours flown in the RH-53
  - -- For mechanics, include special schooling or training and experience on RH-53

2. The dates when each pilot and maintenance crewmember joined the JTF training effort is also required.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA
Vice Director for Operations

CF: CJCS
ACJCS
LTG GAST
COL MILLER, LL ASST TO CJCS

~~CLASSIFIED BY: Vice Dir, J-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 5 May 1986~~

~~SECRET~~

Ref B

c. By message (ref d), the CNO has been requested to provide educational and experience data on the HM-16 group rescue personnel.

Responsibility: RADM Cassidy. Suspense: 15 May 1980.

d. Educational levels of all other personnel (US Army and US Air Force) associated with the rescue attempt (para 1a(5), ref c).

Responsibility: MG Vaught (accepted per discussion 6 May 1980). Suspense: 15 May 1980.

3. Request that the information and data requested in references a through d be assembled and provided this office NLT COB 15 May 1980.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler
CJCS
ACJCS
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
COL Miller, LL, CJCS
COL Miller, OATSD(LA)
[redacted]
COL Paschall
COL Abel
LTC Seiffert

A,G

C

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D C 20301

[redacted]

THE JOINT STAFF

6 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT
RADM TOM CASSIDY, OPG
COLONEL CHARLES H. PITTMAN

Subject: Request for Information and Material for Congress Concerning Attempted Hostage Rescue in Iran

(U) 1. The following requirements have been received and require support as indicated:

(U) a. For MG Vaught:

(1) Maps showing helicopter and C-130 aircraft flight routes over Iran during rescue attempt. Maps should not show points of origin but only flight routes over Iran (Item 1, Incl 1, TAB A). Suspense: 1500, 6 May 1980.

A, G (2) Charts showing planned and actual aircraft and helicopter parking/refueling patterns at Desert One site. Major [redacted] reportedly used a similar chart when he appeared before Senator Warner and the SASC staff personnel. (Item 2, Incl 1 to TAB A). Suspense: 1500, 6 May 1980.

(3) Provide information on the availability of any portion of the operations plan for the rescue attempt (Item 3, Incl 1 to TAB A). Suspense: 1500, 6 May 1980.

A, G (4) Have plans to have Major [redacted] Sergeant [redacted] available for interview by SASC staff personnel or for possible appearance at the SASC hearings (Incl 1 to Tab A). Suspense: Continuing.

(5) Provide information concerning education levels of soldiers associated with rescue attempt as outlined in items (1) and (2), Tab B. Suspense: COB 15 May 1980.

[redacted]

29A6

[redacted]

b. For RADM Cassidy:

(1) (U) Have Commander [redacted] Maintenance Officer for HM-16 available (on call) for the SASC. (Incl 1 to Tab A). Suspense: Continuing.

(2) Provide information regarding failure rate of helicopters during training and rehearsals (TAB A). Suspense: 8 May 1980.

(3) (U) Provide information concerning the educational level of the helicopter maintenance personnel on the NIMITZ (HM-16 personnel) and the 20-man helicopter maintenance team under Captain [redacted] who went aboard the NIMITZ with three helicopter aircrews. (Item (3), Tab B). Suspense: COB 15 May 1980.

(4) (U) Provide informatin on how to respond to the request for the maintenance records of the eight RH-53 helicopters used on the mission. It is understood that the Navy would prefer to respond to specific questions rather than submit technical records for interpretation by the Congress. The task is for a draft response which either forwards the records with appropriate caveats or for a response which gives the position preferred by the Navy. (TAB C). Suspense: 9 May 1980.

c. For Colonel Pittman:

(1) The four pilots listed below are to be alerted (but not moved) for possible appearance before the SASC) as previously discussed (5 May 80):

- LCDR [redacted] USN
- CAPT [redacted] USMC
- [redacted] USAF
- [redacted] USMC

Suspense: Continuing

[redacted]

(2) In addition to the four officers listed above, the SASC staff has also requested to see Major Schaeffer when his medical condition will permit. I do not perceive this as an urgent requirement. Suspense: Continuing.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA
Vice Director for Operations

3 Incl
a/s

Copy Furnished:
Mr. Stempler
CJCS
ACJCS
DJS
LTG Gast
LTG Shutler
COL Miller, LLA to CJCS
COL Miller, OSD/LLA
COL Abel; SA/PA to CJCS

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

5 May 1980

MEMO TO: MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES W. DYKE

SUBJECT: Iranian Rescue Mission

In addition to the items requested in the attached memo from Jack Stempler, the SASC is also requesting information concerning the failure rate of helicopters during the training period preceding the rescue mission. I understand that during the course of his interview, COL Chuck Pitman was asked concerning the failure rate during training, and Pitman indicated to the Committee that such information was available. If that information is correct, would you please provide that information to my office for further provision to the SASC.

COLONEL MILLER

TAB A.

3. I am using the following assumptions on developing JTF cost data:

a. TDY is 100 percent chargable.

b. Use of Davison AAF is 100 percent chargable.

c. Normal depreciation is chargable for hardware.

d. [redacted]

4. Apparently, the President has indicated that costs of this operation will be recouped through Frozen Iranian Assets.

[redacted]

Major, USA

Enclosure
a/s

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A #158

X

THE JOINT STAFF

6 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT

Subject: Request for Appearance Before House Armed Services Committee: Colonel James Kyle

(U) 1. The House Armed Services Committee has requested that Colonel James Kyle appear before the Committee at 1400, 8 May 1980. One helicopter pilot and one C-130 pilot (LTC Guidry preferred) are to accompany Colonel Kyle.

2. The purpose of this appearance is to discuss the attempt on 24-25 April 1980 to rescue US hostages in Iran.

3. This appearance by Colonel Kyle is instead of his previously scheduled appearance before the HASC at 1000 hours, 7 May 1980. This frees Colonel Kyle to appear with others scheduled for the SASC hearing at 1000, 8 May 1980 (memorandum attached).

Charles W. Dyke

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

1 Incl A/S

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler
CJCS
ACJCS
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
COL Miller, LL Asst to CJCS
COL Miller, OATSD(LA)

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified By: DJS
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Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
13 May 1992

Talk to them / 130? Should ...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D C 20301

5 MAY 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Hostage Rescue Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee,, 7 May 1980

(U) 1. The formal hearings on the Hostage Rescue Operation before the Senate Armed Services Committee have been confirmed for Wednesday, 7 May 1980, beginning at 1000 hours.

(U) 2. Although not confirmed, it now appears that the principal witnesses listed below will appear jointly, in panel fashion, with COL Pitman as backup. A prepared statement is required. Witnesses required are as follows:

MG Vaught
LTG Gast
COL Kyle
COL Beckwith
LTC Seiffert
COL Pitman (as backup; not at table)

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA
Vice Director for Operations

Copy furnished:
Each witness
LL Asst, CJCS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A #1

X

THE JOINT STAFF

7 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Response to Query on Hostage Rescue Mission

Reference: Memorandum, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, 29 April 1980, "Hostage Rescue Mission"

(U) 1. This memorandum is in response to question number 6 in the reference. The question addressed states. . ."What weather reports were available, particularly those reports, if any, concerning the sandstorm?" (Note: This leaves only questions 2 and 4 in reference, concerning personal data on participants, not fully answered.)

(U) 2. In preparation for supporting the rescue mission, the following actions were accomplished:

a. In November 1979, an experienced military weather officer was assigned full time to become acquainted with forecasting the weather in Iran and to provide that support required to execute the mission.

b. In November 1979, a special cell of forecasters was created at Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) to generate daily both area and terminal forecasts for select locations in Iran.

c. In November 1979, the Environmental Technical Applications Center began preparing special climatic studies for select areas and locations in Iran.

d. Satellite data was received in the Pentagon on a daily basis from the Worldwide Satellite Imagery Data Base at AFGWC. This imagery was used as an aid for weather briefings presented to the JTF Commander.

e. AFGWC reviewed the surface observations received from Iran for both quantity and quality. Available observations were sparse, but generally of acceptable quality. Only two stations in the entire country reliably reported each hour.

Declassified by DDO, NMCC 12 May 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified By: TCS~~
~~Declassified ON: 0428~~

f. In March 1980, a Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Tactical Van, a Communications Satellite Terminal, and a Tactical Forecast Van were moved to the forward area to support the JTF Commander. The DMSP van is capable of receiving satellite imagery in a real time mode from overhead satellites. The communications van provided a communications link back to the forecasting cell at AFGWC, and the Tactical Forecasting Van provided workspace and additional weather communications to receive local teletype and facsimile weather data.

(U) 3. On 24 April 1980, observations were received from 11 reporting locations in the southern half of Iran, some locations reported only once, others each 3 hours, many at random times. Satellite imagery was received approximately each four or five hours by the tactical van. The team at AFGWC prepared its forecast and transmitted it to the forward location. The mission forecast was prepared using all available data and the skills of three well qualified weather officers deployed to the forward area.

(U) 4. Post analysis indicates that there was no "sandstorm" or even a "duststorm," both terms implying high surface winds lifting sands or dust from the surface. What was encountered was an area of calm, or light winds with suspended dust in the air restricting visibility. This restriction to visibility appeared to be a localized phenomenon, appearing in two regions, the larger extending for approximately 150 miles. Forecasting events of this scale in a data sparse area is beyond the current state of the art.

(U) 5. Two attached fact sheets provide additional information on the weather support concept and the forecasts prepared for the specific rescue route.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler - 3E822 /ML Loss
CJCS
ACJCS
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) 3D918
COL Abel, Spec Asst PA, CJCS - 2E857

MISSION ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Air Weather Service (AWS) has conduted an in-depth post-event analysis of the environmental forecasts provided for the mission. Data available to weather analysts after the mission began were included to gain possible insight into physical factors which caused observed conditions to occur. The weather forecast of temperatures and surface winds for the hideout location and the city of Tehran verified accurately for the nights of 24 and 25 April 1980, respectively. The weather forecasts for the entire Middle East region verified for all weather elements, with the exception of restricted visibility in two regions of the total RH-53 route.

The C-130 route forecast (to include the refueling site) was also verified. It was during portions of the last half of the RH-53 route that suspended dust severely reduced visibility, occasionally to zero. Our analysis of the nighttime satellite imagery shows that isolated thunderstorms did develop (as forecast) at the higher elevations along the ridge to the west of the RH-53 route. One can speculate that the downrush of air from these thunderstorms could be of sufficient magnitude to lift and spread fine, powdery dust into the air and have it remain suspended along the route of the helicopters. These small-sized particulates could conceivably have remained suspended in the air for a period of hours. It is important to note that none of the available weather reporting stations spread across central Iran indicated the presence of large areas of suspended dust or severe restrictions to visibility. There are no active reporting stations along the route of flight. We conclude the occurrence was a very localized phenomenon; to forecast the occurrence of such an event, and its spatial and temporal extent with any degree of reliability, is beyond the current state of the art.

MISSION ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT

A. BACKGROUND

1. Planning

a. Climatological Support. The Joint Task Force Environmental Officer (JTFEO) provided to the JTF staff historical climatic narratives, extensive statistical data, and planning information (e.g., deployment computer flight plans (C-130), temperatures, rainfall amounts, winds, ceiling and visibility, illumination data, the probability of consecutive good weather days, etc.). JTFEO prepared the weather support annex to the mission OPLAN.

b. Operational Support

(1) Air Weather Service (AWS) studied reporting stations in the operational area to determine the quality and quantity of weather data, and monitored data received from the Automated Weather Network (AWN) for possible data falsification; with minor exceptions, AWN data were considered reliable and there was no detectible data denial in the area during the entire period. (Iran is considered a sparse weather data area.)

(2) A select group at the Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) commenced preparation of daily weather forecasts for the operational area in November 1979. This area included the eastern Mediterranean, Iran, and the surrounding area. AFGWC provided daily short range forecasts, long range outlooks, and aircraft route weather (i.e., winds, temperatures, visibilities, density altitudes, altimeter settings, flight hazards (icing, turbulence, thunderstorms), etc.). Forecasts were based on numerical model guidance and the AFGWC global satellite data base. AFGWC provided similar products to support JTF practice exercises in the CONUS. AFGWC transmitted products to the JTFEO in the CONUS during planning stages, and to deployed forecasters before and during the mission.

(3) Three weather officers and associated support personnel moved to the deployed location. Equipment deployed consisted of weather teletype and facsimile receivers, dedicated circuits, and a Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) direct read-out facility.

2. Execution

a. Equipment. Weather teletype and facsimile receivers and communications circuits were extremely reliable. The DMSP facility overcame initial minor difficulties associated with deployment and was fully operational throughout the period 1-26 April 1980.

b. Products. AFGWC bulletins were received as planned at the deployed location. JTFEO and assistant weather officers used the basic AFGWC products, updated by more recent data from the Middle East area, to prepare route bulletins for C-130s and RH-53s; to prepare weather briefing statements for C-130s, RH-53s, and the JCS; and to brief the JTF Commander.

3. Constraints

a. The operation required accurate weather support in a data sparse area, a problem compounded by the fact that the frequency of surface weather observations decreases significantly during the hours of darkness. Consequently, weather satellite data, along with numerical model forecasts, were the key elements in AFGWC forecast generation. The weather satellite data at the deployed location were invaluable to the JTFEO for finalizing the operational forecasts for the mission and briefing the JTF Commander and staff.

b. Due to Operations Security (OPSEC) constraints, we limited the number of people involved to the absolute minimum. These same OPSEC constraints restricted the amount of detailed information which could be included in the AFGWC forecast bulletin (e.g., countries, city names, and latitude/longitude points along aircraft routes could not be used to identify specific weather element locations). Secure voice coordination from the deployed location via JCS to AFGWC was attempted to alleviate some of these OPSEC-imposed problems. However, these constraints did not adversely affect the quality of weather support to the mission.

B. METEOROLOGICAL SITUATION

At 24 April 0000Z, a weak frontal system was located on a line from northeast Iran southwestward into the central Persian Gulf, causing mostly cloudy skies in central Iran (ceilings greater than 10,000 feet). Skies were fair to partly cloudy elsewhere. An area of isolated thunderstorm activity was observed in the central Zagros Mountains. Upper level features indicated: (1) the front's northern portion in southern USSR was the strongest and would move to the northeast, (2) the southern portion of the front would continue to weaken, and (3) the mountain thunderstorm activity would decrease during the daylight hours. By 24 April 1200Z, the system had moved approximately 120 miles to the east. An upper level disturbance formed over southwest Iran and caused thunderstorm activity to continue and increase over the Zagros Mountain area. Widespread cloudy skies were observed throughout central Iran. However, skies in southeastern Iran were basically clear in the area of the dissipating southern portion of the frontal system. By 25 April 0000Z, the northern portion of the system moved into Afghanistan with the southern portion essentially dissipated. Partly to mostly cloudy skies remained in central Iran with the supper level disturbance (here again, ceilings greater than 10,000 feet).

C. OPERATIONAL VERIFICATION

(U) 1. Rescue Mission Forecast Verification

a. The weather forecast of temperatures and surface winds for the hideout location and city of Teheran verified accurately for the nights of 24 and 25 April 1980, respectively.

b. The weather forecasts for the entire Middle East region verified for all weather elements, with the exception of restricted visibility along latter portions of the total RH-53 route, caused by the suspended dust.

(U) 2. C-130 and RH-53 Route Verification

a. The lead C-130 aircrew reported route weather was as briefed. Weather at the refueling site was as forecast; light surface winds, good moonlight illumination with some high cirrus cloudcover, and good visibility. (Visibility did decrease at the refueling site when the helicopters landed due to disturbance of surface dust by rotor downwash).

See change!

b. The helicopter crews crossed the coastline 12 minutes late and arrived at Turnpoint 4 (halfway along the initial route) 12 minutes late, indicating wind forecasts were accurate. Visibility was hazy over water and crystal clear over land, with clear skies and good moonlight illumination from takeoff to Turnpoint 4. Shortly after Turnpoint 4, the helicopter pilots reported encountering restricted visibility due to suspended dust (powder in mouth rather than abrasion or noise from sand). The helicopters regrouped and flew north again along the route, and ran into a second region of reduced visibility. Helicopter crews reported the horizontal extent of the area of restricted visibilities to be some 200 miles along their route of flight. Within that overall distance, there were varying degrees of visibilities, ranging from zero to 5 plus miles. Helicopter crews reported wearing night vision goggles throughout their flight. Six helicopters were able to navigate through the dust, breaking into the clear again approximately 40 miles from the desert refueling site. The helicopter crews debriefed by the JTFEO stated that they encountered no gusty winds within the regions of reduced visibilities; further, flight within these regions was smooth and stable.

(U) D. CONCLUSION

Meteorological satellite imagery revealed enhanced cumulus/towering cumulus activity over the Zagros Mountain Range to the west of the route during the maximum daytime heating. The next meteorological satellite coverage showed that isolated thunderstorms (with associated cirrus blowoff) had developed over the eastern-most ridge of the Zagros Range. The thunderstorm cells

occurred at the higher elevations west of the C-130 and RH-53 routes. One could speculate that a downrush of air from these thunderstorms could be of sufficient magnitude to lift and spread fine, powdery dust into the air and along the route of the helicopters. These small-sized particulates could conceivably have remained suspended in the air for a period of hours. It is important to note that none of the available weather reporting stations spread across central Iran indicated the presence of large areas of suspended dust or severe restrictions to visibility. There are no active reporting stations along the route of flight. We conclude the occurrence was a very localized phenomenon: to forecast the occurrence of such an event, and its spatial and temporal extent with any degree of reliability, is beyond the current state of the art.

5 May 1980

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Environmental Factors Affecting Hostage Rescue Effort

1. PURPOSE: This sheet describes environmental factors provided with regard to the projected helicopter route.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Winter storms with low clouds, icing, freezing temperatures, turbulence, and strong headwinds dominated the period from December through February when length of nighttime darkness was optimum. As spring months (March-May) passed, the storm track gradually moved northward into southern USSR and the available nighttime darkness (necessary for operations) decreased while average temperatures increased. Rising temperatures and density altitudes presented critical barriers to helicopter performance capabilities replacing the earlier concerns with icing, freezing temperatures, and other winter conditions outlined above.

b. Dust/sandstorms occur throughout the year showing a general decrease of occurrence in April after the windy month of March. Dust/sandstorms in Iran have a higher frequency and severity during the summer months in the desert region. The period from May-September brings the "Wind of 120 Days" to the eastern Iranian desert region accompanied by extremely dry air, duststorms, and violent gusty winds. These winds are strongest during the daytime and weaken or lull to a breeze at night. Wind speeds of 25 knots or greater are reported 5-15% of the time over most of Iran. Severe dust/sandstorms may last for several days.

c. Enclosure 1 provides climate statistics for available meteorological stations in the Iranian desert along the projected helicopter route. As can be seen from this data, the number of sand and duststorms at those observation points closest to the flight route do not increase from March to April but actually decrease at all but one point (Kerman) where the data remains constant. As has been discussed frequently, the mission was terminated at the "Desert One" refueling site, making the data with regard to Teheran not applicable.

Climate Statistics - Mean Number Of Days With Dust.

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	POR
Zanhedan	6	6	10	5	5	11	10	6	3	2	3	4	7-11
Kerman	8	6	9	9	11	10	13	11	8	4	2	4	3-7
Birjand	0	4	4	3	0	2	5	0	0	1	1	0	3
Yazd	4	2	7	4	8	4	6	3	3	1	1	1	3-5
Teheran	1	*	1	2	2	2	3	1	2	2	1	1	13-15

NOTE: * 0.5 Day

POR= Period Of Record (Number Of Years)

Enclosure 1

Reference "Mission Environmental [illegible]

C.2.a., "The lead C-130 aircrew reported route weather was as briefed.....

(U) [redacted] JTF Weather Officer, verbally debriefed Colonel James H. Kyle at the Forward Operating Location after the mission concerning weather. Col Kyle stated "Stormy, you don't have anything to worry about, the weather was as briefed. Our C-130's flew the mission without any weather problems and the weather at Desert One was as forecast". Col Kyle described the weather along the route as clear skies with good moonlight illumination during the first portion of the flight, then under high thin cloudcover with reduced visibility due to lack of moonlight during the latter part. He described the weather at Desert One as high thin overcast cloudcover, good moonlight illumination, 3-5 miles visibility, and light surface winds. When asked about whether he encountered any turbulence or wind gusts at flight level, he stated that it was a smooth ride except some light chop over first two ridges. When asked if there was any weather problems at Desert One, he stated that the helicopters had stirred up dust when landing and moving around, but otherwise no weather problems. When asked if he was aware of any visibility problems along the route as reported by the helicopters, he stated that his C-130 had encountered some type of reduced visibility below their flight level about 200 miles south of Desert One for a short period of time, but that this did not affect the C-130's.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

7 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAROLD V. MILLER, LEGAL ADVISOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Response to Congressional Query Concerning Hostage Rescue Attempt in Iran (Questions Relate to RH-53 Helicopters)

References: a. Memorandum, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs), 29 April 1980, "Hostage Rescue Mission"

b. Memorandum by MG Dyke to the Legal Advisor and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 May 1980, "Response to Congressional Queries"

1. This memorandum responds to questions 7 and 8 on page 1 of reference a and is in addition to data previously provided by reference b in response to questions 1, 3, and 5 of reference a.

2. Response to Question 7: The following items were checked in addition to normal maintenance inspection requirements:

Items checked: (for operation and/or security)

Engine topping (a/c logbook entry)
Aircraft clocks (for operations)
Engine armor (for security)
Omega (checked by FSR)
Extended range tanks (for security and operation)
.50 cal mounts (for security)
All hydraulic lines
All fuel lines
Hydraulic pumps
Hydraulic filters
Primary servos
AFCS servos
Aircraft control linkages and cables
Tail rotor drive shaft thomas couplings
APP drive shaft coupling
MGB oil cooler drive shaft and coupling
MGB D/S (high speed) and couplings
Rotor tip lights

All external fuselage/running lights
All sleeve and spindle assemblies
All dampner accumulators
Cockpit instruments and lights
Windscreens (clear of paint and scratches)
Pilot's and copilot's control spot lights
All rotor blades (main and tail)

3. Response to Question 8: The checklist items above constituted checks "over and above" those routinely required by US Navy inspection checklists and maintenance procedures. To more thoroughly understand what transpired, it should be noted that on 20 April, mission aircrews and supporting personnel arrived aboard NIMITZ. During the period 20-24 April, mission crews participated in familiarization flights, maintenance check flights, deck turn-ups and mission preparation activities. All eight aircraft were given a full functional check flight during this period. At least one pilot in each assigned mission flight crew was a qualified functional check pilot. Maintenance records were reviewed by the mission aircraft maintenance officer for appropriate maintenance action, and crewmembers made repeated inspections of their assigned aircraft. The mission aircraft maintenance officer had visited the ship approximately three weeks prior to review maintenance records and personally inspected the aircraft. He had provided specific and detailed guidance to HM-16 squadron maintenance supervisors regarding items to be inspected, additional maintenance actions desired, and other pre-mission preparations to be accomplished. He also screened all related records and log books and did not note any components that exceeded allowable removal times. Based upon his guidance, the HM-16 squadron aircraft maintenance officer developed a pre-mission checklist and procedures for its completion. Completion of these actions was verified by the mission aircraft maintenance officer upon his return to NIMITZ on 20 April.

4. This memorandum, together with reference b, completes response to questions 1, 3, 5, 7, and 8. Responses to questions 2, 4, and 6 are working. Answers will be provided as soon as possible. All personnel requested to date have been provided, with the esception of Major Schaeffer who remains under hospital care.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler (3E822)
CJCS
ACJCS
[illegible] Shutler
[illegible] Gast

COL Miller, OATSD(LA) (3D918)
COL Abel, Spec Asst PA, CJCS (2E857)
Mr. Peter Hamilton (3E880)
Adm Cassidy - OPG

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

30 April

MEMO TO: B/Gen Smith

Carl — I have not cleared with Chairman. He is tied up.

— Bottom lines:

— I think we should give raw data in non-technical forms only if accompanied by an explanation understood by laymen.

— I think we should open up to interview by Comte members the key conduct of operation.

John

J.S. PUSTAY, Lt Gen, USAF
Assistant to the Chairman

UNCLASS

Incl A

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

29 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Steigler

THROUGH: General Pace

SUBJECT: Iran Rescue Mission

As a result of yesterday's briefing to Senators Stennis and Warner and [illegible] staff, we have been requested to provide, as soon as possible, the following:

1. The maintenance records for the 8 RH-53 helicopters. In this connection, the staff is particularly interested in obtaining a detailed history of the 8 helicopters while they were on the aircraft carrier. The staff has received a report that one of the helicopters had an accident while on the Nimitz.

2. The names, ranks, branches of service, organizations, and experience levels of the 16 helicopter pilots and the 20 manber special maintenance crew that accompanied the pilots onboard the Nimitz. With respect to the experience levels of the 16 pilots, such report should include total flying hours, as well as the number of hours flown in the RH-53.

3. The organization and location of the 8 RH-53 helicopters, by tail number, prior to their assignment to the special mission group.

4. The dates, individually, when the 16 pilots and 20 manber maintenance crew joined the southwest training unit.

5. The staff has asked for a report on the next scheduled check-out or maintenance for all parts and systems that failed during the course of the mission.

6. The Committee has asked what weather reports were available, particularly those reports, if any, concerning the sand storm. — Fact Sheet

7. The Committee would like to obtain any and all special check lists which the 20 manber special maintenance crew used in performing its mission while onboard the aircraft carrier.

8. The Committee has also asked what "over and above" normal maintenance was performed on the 8 helicopters.

I have verified the above request with John Roberts this morning. As you know, both Senators Stennis and Warner are anxious to conduct and complete the Committee investigation of this matter. They both expressed a desire

UNCLASS

to look at a RH-53 helicopter and talk with the pilots. Naturally, they have assigned it top priority. With this background, John Roberts telephoned this morning and relayed some additional requirements. John Roberts, Steve Dotson, and Bud McFarland have been assigned as the Committee personnel responsible for this inquiry. They have been instructed by Chairman Stennis to proceed as expeditiously as possible.

1. Roberts has requested that they meet with Mgen Vaught, Colonel Beckwith, and the pilots this afternoon in the Pentagon. This is their number one priority. We have already given [illegible]

2. The staff team would like to talk to the Marine captain and his 20 member maintenance crew. I think we must do this.

3. The staff would like to meet with the weather officer who is reported to have accompanied the special mission group. Yes

4. Roberts has requested to meet with the colonel in charge of overall training at the southwestern U.S. training site. Pittman is on Chesapeake

5. The staff would like to meet with those personnel responsible for the materiel planning of the mission. OK

6. The Committee is interested in learning the sequence of events in the delivery of the helicopters and what plans were made for spare parts.

OK

Grant Miller
Colonel, USAF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

6 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MILLER, LEGAL ADVISOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Response to Congressional Queries

This information is in partial response to that requested in Colonel Grant Miller's memorandum on this subject of 29 April 1980. The requests for personnel who participated in the rescue attempt to meet with either members or Congressional staff personnel, as outlined in the second half of Colonel Grant Miller's memorandum, have been met. Questions posed in the first half of the memorandum are answered below. Numbers reflect item numbers in Colonel Miller's memorandum.

1. Request for the maintenance records of the eight RH-53D helicopters used on the rescue attempt (Item 1): The Navy is in process of reviewing all aspects of maintenance performed on the RH-53D helicopters involved in this mission and is assessing impact of failures reported. To accomplish this requires access to the maintenance records. Therefore, the Navy would prefer to answer any specific questions rather than submit technical records and unevaluated raw data.

3. Organization and location of the eight RH-53 helicopters, by tail number, prior to their assignment to the special mission group: All eight RH-53 helicopters used on the rescue attempt were assigned to HM-16 based aboard USS NIMITZ. At Inclosure 1 is a copy of a paper previously provided. A correlation of aircraft tail numbers and mission numbers (1-8) is as follows:

Mission Number	Bureau Number	Side Number
1	158744	632
2	158753	634
3	158761	637
4	158693	631
5	158754	635
6	158750	633
7	158686	630
8	158758	636

5. Next scheduled check out on maintenance for all parts and systems that failed during the course of the mission: There were three failures, as discussed below. Also, see Inclosure 1:

a. Aircraft number 6 landed in the desert with indication of a possible failed rotor blade. The service life of the six main rotor blades on the RH-53D aircraft is 3,000 hours. The average life of the blades on helicopter number 6 was 956 hours. The blade with the highest time was 1,546 hours. It is not known which blade had the possible failure. In any event, all of the blades were well within service life criteria with only one blade at approximately half-time.

b. Helicopter number 2 experienced a second stage hydraulic pump failure two hours prior to landing at Desert One refueling site. This failure was caused by a fluid system loss as a result of a cracked "B" nut. This item is not changed on the basis of service life. The system is checked for leaks prior to flight. The hydraulic pumps for both the first and second stage systems are replaced only upon failure and are not on a time or service life replacement schedule.

c. Helicopter number 5 returned due to degraded navigational and flight instruments which precluded safe flight in the low altitude weather conditions experienced. A paper provided previously is at Inclosure 2.

Items 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 continue to be worked. Answers will be provided as soon as possible.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

2 Inclosures
a/s

Copy furnished:
Mr. Stempler
CJCS
ACJCS
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, OATSD(LA)

UNCLASS

[redacted] SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A #177

THE JOINT STAFF

8 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Notes Taken During Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 7 May 1980

1. Attached is the transcription of notes taken by LTCOL C. A. Williamson, Special Operations Division, J-3, during the appearances before the Senate Armed Services Committee at 1000 hours on 7 May 1980 of LTGEN Gast, USAF; MG Vaught, USA; COL Kyle, USAF; COL Beckwith, USA; LTCOL Guidry, USAF; MAJ [redacted] with COL Pitman, USMC; and COL [redacted] as backup.

2. These notes are not verbatim transcripts of the questions and answers, but serve to provide the gist of each session. They are accurate in thrust and content, but may not be precise in terms of actual words or language used.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler - 3E822
Mr. Hamilton - 3E880
LTG Pustay
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Gast
MG Vaught
COL Miller, LL Asst to CJCS - 2E841
COL Miller, OATSD(LA) - 3D918
COL Abel/LTCOL Wheeler - 2E857

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT

Classified by: DJSOA 18 Oct 84
Declassify: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO/NMCC
12 May 1992

[redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassify On: [redacted]

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A-179

29 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. St[illegible]er

THROUGH: General P[illegible]

SUBJECT: Hostage Rescue Mission

As a result of yesterday's briefing to Senators Stennis and Warner and selected staff, we have been requested to provide, as soon as possible, the following:

1. The maintenance records for the 8 RH-53 helicopters. In this connection, the staff is particularly interested in obtaining a detailed history of the 8 helicopters while they were on the aircraft carrier. The staff has received a report that one of the helicopters had an accident while on the Nimitz. (RADM CASSIDY) – (TASKED) #1

2. The names, ranks, branches of service, organizations, and experience levels of the 16 helicopter pilots and the 20 member special maintenance crew that accompanied the pilots onboard the Nimitz. With respect to the experience levels of the 16 pilots, such report should include total flying hours, as well as the number of hours flown in the RH-53. (Col PITTMAN) #2

3. The organization and location of the 8 RH-53 helicopters, by tail number, prior to their assignment to the special mission group. (RADM CASSIDY) #3

4. The dates, individually, when the 16 pilots and 20 member maintenance crew joined the southwest training unit. (Col PITTMAN) #4

5. The staff has asked for a report on the next scheduled check-out or maintenance for all parts and systems that failed during the course of the mission. (RADM CASSIDY) #5

6. The Committee has asked what weather reports were available, particularly those reports, if any, concerning the sand storm. DONE (Remit – LTC Schmidt) #6

7. The Committee would like to obtain any and all special check lists which the 20 member special maintenance crew used in performing its mission while onboard the aircraft carrier. (RADM CASSIDY) #7

8. The Committee has also asked what "over and above" normal maintenance was performed on the 8 helicopters. (RADM CASSIDY) #8

I have verified the above request with John Roberts this morning. As you know, both Senators Stennis and Warner are anxious to conduct and complete the Committee investigation of this matter. They both expressed a desire

UNCLAS[illegible]

attachment 2

to look at a MH-53 helicopter and talk with the pilots. Initially, [redacted] assigned it top priority. With this background, John Roberts telephoned this morning and relayed some additional requirements. John Roberts, Steve Dotson, and Bud McFarland have been assigned as the Committee personnel responsible for this inquiry. They have been instructed by Chairman Stennis to proceed as expeditiously as possible.

1. Roberts has requested that they meet with MGen Vaught, Colonel Beckwith, and the pilots this afternoon in the Pentagon. This is their number one priority.

2. The staff team would like to talk to the Marine captain and his 20 member maintenance crew.

3. The staff would like to meet with the weather officer who is reported to have accompanied the special mission group.

4. Roberts has requested to meet with the colonel in charge of overall training at the southwestern U.S. training site.

5. The staff would like to meet with those personnel responsible for the materiel planning of the mission.

6. The Committee is interested in learning the sequence of events in the delivery of the helicopters and what plans were made for spare parts.

Grant Miller
Colonel, USAF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

8 May 80

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Response to Query on Hostage Rescue Mission

1. References:

a. (U) Memorandum, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, 29 April 1980, subject: Hostage Rescue Mission.

b. (U) Memorandum, Legal Advisor and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, 5 May 1980, subject: House Appropriations Committee Request for Information--Hostage Rescue Attempt.

2. (U) This memorandum is in response to question number 2 and 4 in reference a, and question number 3 in reference b. This completes action on all responses required by reference a.

a. (U) Reference a requested personal data (name, rank, branch of service, parent organization), experience levels, and dates of assignment to Southwest Training Unit of the helicopter pilots and helicopter maintenance crew that accompanied the pilots onboard the NIMITZ.

b. (U) Reference b requested information on the educational level of the helicopter maintenance personnel which boarded the NIMITZ with the mission maintenance officer, Captain [redacted] and the pilots and air crewmembers who participated in the rescue attempt.

3. (U) At the inclosure is a list containing requested data on the helicopter pilots and the maintenance crewmembers who accompanied the pilots to the NIMITZ. This maintenance crew included four HM-16 maintenance personnel who joined the mission helicopter element from Norfolk and assisted in maintaining the aircraft used in training and rehearsals in the Southwestern United States.

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NAME	RANK	SSN/MOS	UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	TOTAL FLT HRS	TOTAL H-53 FLT HRS	TOTAL FLT HRS RH-53	TOTAL H-53 FLT HRS W/JTF DAY	TOTAL H-53 FLT HRS W/JTF NIGHT	MISSION HELO
SEIFFERT, E. R.	LTCOL	[redacted] 7564 USMC	HQMC	8Dec79	18 yrs 08 mos	5500	2500	71.6	39.2	96.0	1
	MAJ	7564 USMC	HMH-363	8Dec79	11 yrs 08 mos	1660	1510	50.1	70.1	90.2	2
	MAJ	7564 USMC	HMX-1	5Jan80	12 yrs 07 mos	3309	2470	80.1	72.0	78.3	6
	MAJ	7564 USMC	H&MS-26	21Nov79	11 yrs 11 mos	3350	1244	67.7	31.3	135.2	4
	MAJ	7564 USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	11 yrs 03 mos	2080	1503	55.4	84.3	115.3	3
*SCHAEFER, J. H.	MAJ	7564 USMC	MAWTS-1	27Nov79	13 yrs 05 mos	3700	3400	48.4	49.3	78.2	3
	LCDR	1310 USN	HX-12	19Nov79	08 yrs 07 mos	2710	1510	1264.9	89.1	134.0	5
	LCDR	1310 USN	HM-14	10Apr80	10 yrs 03 mos	1550	280	281.7	4.0	14.0	8
	LCDR	1310 USN	HM-14	10Apr80	09 yrs 07 mos	DID NOT FLY MISSION		-	-	-	-
	CAPT	7564 USMC	HMM-261	21Nov79	09 yrs 03 mos	1580	1197	58.0	81.8	107.4	5
	CAPT	7564 USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	04 yrs 11 mos	1048	837	4.5	40.4	110.5	8
	CAPT	7564 USMC	MAWTS-1	8Dec79	08 yrs 04 mos	1688	1432	60.7	70.8	91.6	2
	CAPT	7564 USMC	MAWTS-1	8Dec79	09 yrs 11 mos	2564	1569	96.9	55.8	113.3	1
	CAPT	6002 USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	18 yrs 08 mos	[redacted]					
	CAPT	[redacted] 7564 USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	07 yrs 04 mos	1764	1167	59.5	77.5	112.9	4
	CAPT	7564 USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	09 yrs 10 mos	1764	1541	45.3	62.4	110.6	7
	CAPT	M1025F USAF	602 TAIRCW	2Apr80	07 yrs	1365	1165	22.7	9.5	19.9	7
	LT	1310 USN	HM-16	21Nov79	04 yrs 01 mo	807	540	440.7	86.3	81.4	6
	LT	2015 USN(MC)	VF-126	30Nov79	-	FLIGHT SURGEON					
	1stLT	3002 USMC	H&MS-32	4Jan80	-	SUPPLY OFFICER					
	CWO-2	0170 USMC	MWHS-2	4Jan80	10 yrs 04 mos	ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER					
	CWO-2	1390 USMCR	WES-27	21Nov79	11 yrs 03 mos	FUELS OFFICER					

[redacted]
H-53 Acft
CH-53

* DEPLOYED TO NIMITZ

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NAME	RANK	SSN/MOS	UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]	GYSGT	[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	11 yrs 07 mos	09 yrs 05 mos	Mech Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: 11 grades, [redacted] CH-53A/D
[redacted]	GYSGT	[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMH-204	21Nov79	14 yrs 03 mos	10 yrs 05 mos	Mech Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] CH-53A/D CH-53C Air [redacted] Civ Educ: HS GED
[redacted]	GYSGT	[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	13 yrs	11 yrs 03 mos	Mech Fund [redacted] Avn Mech Inte[redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] CH-53 [redacted] CH-53A/D [redacted] Civ Educ: HS GED

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NAME	RANK	SSN/MOS	UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]	GYSGT	[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMT-204	13Dec79	13 yrs 08 mos	9 yrs 07 mos	Helo Fund [redacted]
[redacted]	GYSGT	[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMT-301	29Nov79	11 yrs 03 mos	8 yrs 05 mos	Mech Fund [redacted]
[redacted]	SSGT	[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	6 yrs 09 mos	3 yrs 06 mos	Aviation Fund [redacted]

CH-53

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NAME	RANK	SSN/MOS	UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]	SGT	[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	9 yrs 08 mos	8 yrs 09 mos Mech Fund [redacted] Basic Hele Crs Civ Educ: GED [redacted]
JOHNSON, D. L.	SSGT	[redacted]/6113	USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	Records available at HQMC (KIA)	
[redacted]	SSGT	[redacted]/3072	USMC	H&MS-16	12Dec79	7 yrs 10 mos	Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]
[redacted]	SSGT	[redacted]/6123	USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	8 yrs 09 mos	7 yrs Mech Fund Basic Hele Crs H-53 Sys H-53 CH-53 Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]
[redacted]	SSGT	[redacted]/7041	USMC	MWHS-3	21Dec79	Records not available (Member did not participate in actual operation)	
[redacted]	SGT	[redacted]/6055	USMC	HMT-301	30Nov79	6 yrs 11 mos	2 yrs 11 mos CH-53A/D [redacted] Civ Educ: [redacted]

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NAME	RANK	SSN/MOS		UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]	SGT	[redacted]	/6055 USMC	HMH-461	12Dec79	3 yrs 10 mos	2 yrs 01 mo	Aviation Fund [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]
HARVEY, J. D.	SGT	[redacted]	/6612 USMC	HMH-461	9Jan80	Records available at HQMC (KIA)		
[redacted]	SSGT	[redacted]	/6113 USMC	HMT-301	11Dec79	9 yrs 09 mos	8 yrs 08 mos	Mech Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted] for the CH-53
[redacted]	SGT	[redacted]	6082 USMC	HMH-161	30Nov79	Records not available (Member did not participate in actual operation)		
[redacted]	SGT	[redacted]	6042 USMC	HMH-461	9Jan80	3 yrs 09 mos	2 yrs 09 mos	[redacted]
[redacted]	CPL	[redacted]	/6113 USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	2 yrs 10 mos	2 yrs	Avn Fund [redacted] Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]

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	RANK	SSN/MOS	UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]	CPL	[redacted] 6113	USMC	HMT-301	30Nov79	2 yrs 09 mos	1 yr 11 mos	Avn Fund Basic Helo Rotors Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]
HOLMES, G. N., JR	CPL	[redacted] 6113	USMC	HMH-461	21Nov79	Records available at HQMC (KIA)		
[redacted]	CPL	[redacted] 113	USMC	HMT-204	21Nov79	3 yrs 08 mos	2 yrs 08 mos	Avn Fund Basic Helo CH-53 [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]
[redacted]	CPL	[redacted] 1391	USMC	WES-27	4Jan80	3 yrs 3 mos	2 yrs 05 mos	[redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad
[redacted]	CPL	[redacted] 113	USMC	HMT-301	30Nov79	2 yrs 11 mos	2 yrs 01 mo	Avn Fund Basic Helo Crs [redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad [redacted]
[redacted]	CPL	[redacted] 3534	USMC	WTS-27	4Jan80	Records not available (Member did not participate in actual operation)		

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NAME	RANK	SSN/MOS		UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]	[redacted]L	[redacted]	6113 USMC	HMT-301	11Dec79	2 yrs 11 mo	1 yr 11 mo	Avn Fund[redacted] Basic Helo Crs[redacted] Civ Educ: HS Grad
[redacted]	LCPL	[redacted]	6042 USMC	HMT-301	30Nov79	Records not available (Member did not participate in actual operation)		
[redacted]	PFC	[redacted]	1300 USMC	WES-27	4Jan80	Records not available (Member did not participate in actual operation)		
[redacted]	AMH1	[redacted]	8226 USN	HM-16	21Nov79	8 yrs 11 mos	2 yrs 08 mo	Avn Fund Crs [redacted]
[redacted]	AE2	[redacted]	8226 USN	HM-16	21Nov79	Records not locally available		
[redacted]	AE2	[redacted]	8226 USN	HM-14	4Jan80	Records not locally available		

[redacted] R-53 [redacted]

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NAME	RANK	SSN/MOS	UNIT	DATE JOINED DET	LENGTH OF SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	SCHOOLS AND TRAINING
[redacted]	AT2	[redacted]8226 USN	HM-16	21Nov79	Records not locally available		[redacted]
	AD3	[redacted]226 USN	HM-14	15Dec79	Records not locally available		
	AE2	[redacted]8226 USN	HM-14	17Dec79	Records not locally available		

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Statement: Well, what you have is a strip map which was used by one of the pilots to work his way in from where he first made landfall, as you can see, and then the varous sectors that he would take when he saw the visual references which he would need to change direction.

Q: These are all visual references?

A: Well, these are visual, yes, and this was being done... The precisenes of the route was determined [redacted] (Yes.) And it does specify where the landing zone is for Desert One, which you had. And that's where the refueling took place and I think all of the information up until that point has been covered rather thoroughly in the press reports. Now, what you have beyond that then is the location of the so-called mountain hideaway that I identified in the first backgrounder that I gave that Saturday and that's where the helicopters were going to roost for the evening and, of course, the troops would either roost in that area or they would move to another area. It would be the call of the commander. There's a lot of flexibility that's built into this and as you begin to ask me questions, I want you to know that the reason why I won't be able to answer some of them definitively is because the situation is very cohesive in terms of concept and benchmarks but it gives the commander on the scene a lot of flexibility to ascertain, you know. what the local situation is like and he has options that he could select from among in order to maximize his chances of surprise, shock, and the actual penetration of the compound. Now, the second item that you have, the color photograph, and I don't know whether you have it there or not, Bob. I guess I have the burned copies but..

(Yes)

Q: Is that the map of [redacted] SECRET

A: Yes. The map of Teheran. The principal utility of this map was to depict the various, you might call, prudential, alternate landing zones. If things went wrong anywhere along the evolutin of the plan as it was being executed. These pilots had to know the logical places where they could go to extract people under emergency circumstances. Or it could even be a helicopter that went down. The helicopter crew would know to go to, you know, such and such a site and the rescue helicopter dedicated to the rescue mission would know that that's where it could go and safely get in there and extract the people. The other interesting item on this particular map was the yellow line

(Which is now a black one here.)

which is now a black one which comes up and is the one that would have been followed by trucks should we have elected to use that particular mode of transportation for getting the rescue force into town and that was one of hte principal ways of getting them into the area.

Q: You're not implying there was another more logical way?

A: No. Not a more logical way but, again, we did have flexibility.

Q: It was meant to be the principal?

A: It was meant to be one of the principals. Yes. It was definitely meant to be one of the principal ones but again you had some flexibility if you wanted to go another way (Yes) if the circumstances dictated it that way. Then, as you know, the terminal point, as I recall on this thing, would have been at the Embassy compound and there you had an LZ in the compound itself and then you had an LZ in the stadium which was across the way and both of those would have been used or could have been used, depending again upon circumstances, for extraction of the force and the hostages. The thing that I would, you know, like to

sort of emphasize as an overview is that right from that one chart where you begin your landfall, which was the place where you had absolutely minimal chance of detection and also you had fairly decent visual references, so that you could make your penetration, make your long distance navigation rather effectively with little digressions, little distractions, fully suggest, I think, the amount of detail that we put into formulating this particular plan. The Desert One site was very deliberately selected. It took an awful lot of time and a lot of analysis. Both in terms of the geography and the geometry of the distances involved, in terms of the topography and the geology of the surface, and all of that just worked beautifully. We got the 130's in there. We landed them on a remote site in the middle of nowhere at night. Got them all set up, got the hoses out, were all ready to receive and refuel the choppers as they started coming in. Again, everything well orchestrated. The plan was moving as we had predicted except we started to get the interruptions as the helicopters came in. Beyond that, we had very good intelligence that everything was solid in the other areas. We had great confidence that had we gotten by Desert One, that we had a situation there that would have permitted us to roost for an appropriate amount of time before taking on the next step. All of the resources that we needed were available to us and again, a series of green lights. Everything was go. We had very good intelligence at that point on the compound itself, using all resources that are available to us. Nothing very special or very dramatic. But it's the pulling together of a lot of stuff and here again we had every reason to believe that we could have successfully pulled that off. And then the exit from the area again, that was well thought out and now we get into a very murky area and we're going to have to deliberately keep that murky beyond the compound

and beyond the point where you've got the hostages and the rescue force in the choppers leaving the area.

Now, I'll be happy to answer your questions.

Q: Alright. Let's start back at Drop Zone 7. That's that triangular area that was to have been the mountain hideaway. What was going to happen there? Were they going to land, drop jeeps or armored vehicles from the air? What sort of vehicles were waiting there already to transport the commandos in? How many commandos were going to go in aboard these vehicles? Were there going to be Iranian markings on the sides of them?

A: No, the .. first of all the ... we had not contemplated using anything such as armored vehicles or anything of that nature. (No) No. The principal purpose of the roosting point or the hideaway was simply a place where you could hide the choppers, hide the troops if you were going to keep them there, and wait for darkness again.

Q: How many choppers, exactly? Can you disclose the precise number because I have (Well) completely blocked up on this one. We've heard different reports in Iran and so on that've only been out for about a week. Perhaps the number has been published, perhaps not. But I've heard speculation that as far as C-130's goes, as many as eight might have been involved in this operation. Can you clear that up in any way? Just the flying hardware? ..

A: You mean going in, (Yes) Bob, or..No, I'd rather not get into the total number of C-130's but you're in the ballpark.



Q. What about the choppers themselves? How many choppers were to have been hidden?

A. Everyone that you could've gotten off of DESERT ONE.

Q. Were you going to drop jeeps and machine guns?

A. Again, the primary purpose of that area was to roost, to give you the time that you needed to regroup and wait for the optimum time for the rescue.

Q. How many men would've gone down or reached there with the choppers? 90?

A. It would've been the number that has been posted.

Q. Was the roosting point the construction site?

A. No, this was up in the mountains.

Q. What was the construction site?

A. That's just one of those many primitive landing zones in the area that's used in emergencies.

Q. Were there emergencies?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that you tried to fly the rescue team in? Was that one of the contingency plans, instead of driving them? Or was it going to be one big dramatic landing on the football field next to the Embassy?

A. That could've been one of the options that the Commander could've entertained if for some reason we found that you had impassable roads, etc. you would've had to look on to a series of alternatives--if everything else still looked good. If the roads were impassable, but for reasons which didn't suggest a compromise to the plan, then he would've had to try some other alternative. As I said earlier, that was one of our principal ways of getting in.



Q. Could you have used buses as an alternative?

A. Well, trucks or buses. Whatever.

Q. Civilian trucks or buses or trucks and buses disguised as Iranian military vehicles?

A. Trucks and buses would have looked like buses that would've been on the road. In other words, they wouldn't have any specific or unique markings or painted in any particular way. They would have blended in very nicely.

Q. Were there any plans to use Iranian military, air force, or any kind of Iranian marking?

A. No. I guess the Milakakhali found some decals that were available but there were no plans specifically to say put them on trucks or put on this or that.

Q. Is this part of the overall contingency?

A. I am not conceding that we had them. I'm just saying that is has been reported that they were found with the material. I don't know that.

Q. What is the significance of, at this point General--we have the line coming to this construction site, a very very large area. Just one big vacant lot really. But at this junction, one line goes north. We know that this goes up toward Pastorone HQ in the north part of town, the other goes south for the obvious reason. Why the line north?

A. Because in order to get on that road, to head back south again, you have to head north for awhile. There is no shortcut to get across and get into the flow of traffic going this way. The only way you could make that would be to go up here, turn around and then come back.

Q. So this is not a maneuver to cut off the Pasterones from the southern part of the city to block them off.

A. No. There was no specific reason for that. This would be a logical place to look over your shoulder to make sure you're organized and you've got the control you want for your force, but it had no significance.

Q. What time of morning is this supposed to happen?.

A. Now we're getting into the mechanics and tactics which we still want to preserve because some of the stuff we might want to use again.

Q. After a certain hour, it's almost impossible for anyone to move--say this distance--without encountering some vehicles containing either Pasterones or people perporting to be Pasterones. Getting through the city quietly and unobserved could be difficult on that point--controlling radio contact with one another. As to the entry into the compound itself--were that true, if you guys would have done it--what would they have done? Would they have gone in armed, disguised as, or what kind of stuff?

A. I'm afraid I'll have to disappoint you on that one. That's a part of the kit that the rescue force for future operations would like to keep classified.

Q. We heard one analysis that said that they were supposed to enter the compound very quietly, not so much with even silenced firearms, but with very sharp daggers; the primary weapon on this with which to silence the militants who threw up any resistance.

A. Again, I am not going to comment on any of the tactics or techniques which would be the MO of that particular rescue force. We just can't do that.

Q. It has been mentioned that perhaps once inside the compound--everybody collected and safe--that instead of attempting to remove them directly from the Embassy, or from the stadium or the schoolyard down here, that many of the hostages were to be dispersed in private cars and so on to the outskirts of town so that as they exploded outward just about the time that the authorities were realizing what was happening, they would have been on the

outskirts about the same time that the reactive forces were settling into the center of the city.

A. That could have been one way. Again, if the circumstances would have dictated that, perhaps that would have been one thing that we could have contemplated. But it would have just been one among several. It was not a primary way of doing that.

Q. The primary way was . . . .?

A. I'm not going to get into that.

Q. How many American fatalities might have been calculated into this? It would seem reasonable to assume that some of these were not going to make it. Perhaps for whatever reasons, it was going to work into any sort of plan, this sort of plan, something that has never been tried before.

A. We had a pretty good feel that we could virtually get everybody out.

Q. Virtually everybody?

A. Virtually. I mean we had a reasonably good chance, we thought, of getting everybody out. When I said virtually, I meant you know that there might be some casualities. The point that I'm trying to make is that there was a reasonable expectation you could get all of the hostages out of there, we thought, without suffering a casualty. But, we had to be realistic. We had to assume that depending upon the degree of surprise, then the number of casualties obviously would have to become a factor.

Q. You have a complex high risk operation of this kind and you believe that there is a very good chance of getting them all out. You know, this seems to defy logic, the kind of logic that I'm familiar with at least.

A. One of the central elements of making this thing work was secrecy, shock, surprise, good intelligence, and a highly trained, highly exercised, in terms of practice and proof. We thought that we had all of these ingredients, and with all these ingredients we felt that we had a reasonably good chance of keeping casualties to an absolute minimum. To even include at the outside getting everybody out, all of the hostages out without sustaining a casualty.

Q. Mechanical failure, mechanical reliability is not one of these?

Q. How many bus stops, how many so-called bus stops were there to be? I read the list and it's confusing. How many were there to be overall?

A. Well, you have 12 of them listed over there. And again, they are fields that would accommodate a helicopter, and based in areas where if you had to move something, if something went wrong, it would be a logical place for people to move to for extraction.

Q. Are you saying that those 12 bus stops would have been used only in emergency--if something went wrong--?

A. I'm stating that's there primary _____.

Q. Well, what about 13 and 14 which are backup?

A. The bulk of them. We already identified the compound and the stadium as having somewhat special significance.

Q.. What about the two fixed-wing backup stops, 13 and 14 _____ and _____? Were they military airfields?

A. I don't -- They might have been at one time. I'm not sure the degree of occupancy of them. I think they did have some military role at one point. Some of them right now may be in a semi-dormant state.

Q. Is there anything you can tell us about the amount of cooperation that you might have received from the Iranian air force and government officials and civilians? You say you have very good intelligence from the Embassy itself.

A. No, I said we had very good intelligence from all sources which gave us confidence that we could pull this off. But I'm not going to identify specific sources.

Q. Are 13 and 14 semi-dormant? ... I mean, you ought to know right now if they are semi-dormant...or are they part of a functioning Iranian air force base?

A. Well, as I indicated, they had a certain degree of dormancy which made them reasonable candidates for an emergency situation and we had an emergency ...

Q. Reasonably good condition to take a C-130 force

--- Desert One took C-130s

A. Took 130's

Q. This is, as far as we know, about the only chief military field there which is the one that you fly in and out of when we have to go to that terrible place. What can you tell us that isn't here right in front of us about any of the other ways that you might have planned in this operation to get the hostages out?

A. Now here again you are getting into things which are still more of the doctrine, the tactics which I think you would appreciate, we want to

try and preserve because I think terrorism is going to be around for awhile.

Q. This is one track from one helicopter, this material here. Is it reasonable to assume that the other seven helicopters have charts with the same forces blocked out?

A. I think it's reasonable to assume that each pilot did his the way he, you know, would feel comfortable and it would have something comparable to a strip map, yes, with things that are peculiar to him---

Q. The helicopters that might have had to move here and one you had to move here--wherever-- where were they based as the convoy came in like this? Did -- were all eight of them ...moved to the construction site which is enormous? Or were they to stay down at the mountain highway?

A. That's again a part of the tactics--the ground-air interface which ---

Q. General, that's interesting because that's one thing that's been puzzling me since the start. What you're saying is they went to a mountain hideway, a roosting place, and it was not the construction site.

A. The construction site is the one that you referring to.

Q. Right there

A. That's right.

Q. This is -- seems to have been given particular significance, perhaps because this one helicopter might have had this as his bus stop.

A. Now, not necessarily. I...

Q. According to an initial plan but subject to change, (Well) conditions warranting or whatever.

so-called bus stops and maybe the very fact that we selected this codeword is adding a little extra quality into things. --
They are not to be read that way. They are alternative landing zones that were pre-selected in the event that you had to abort the mission for whatever series of reasons, whether it be an individual helicopter had to go down, whether for some reason you were already on the ground moving and that had to be interrupted and it had to be dispersed--that kind of a thing.

--.

Q. It was only to be used under those circumstances when everything might have gone wrong

A. That's right, with the exception of the two that I talked

--.

Q. -- was different than using the bus stops

A. It was. Yes, it was different than you think of bus stops.

Q. -- we have absolutely no confirmation from you that this thing is genuine and that the other thing was genuine.

A. From what I could see, yes, they definitely

--

Q. Do you want to say anything at all about what are your suspicions about how we came upon this? Do you see any psychological warfare purpose or any effort to mislead on the part of the Iranians or anyone else?

A. I don't think so. I haven't really given that much thought but I think it's worth pursuing why they were released and the way they were released but I haven't given it that much thought, John.

Q. You know, we're very curious as you know --.

A. Yes

Q. We're a resourceful outfit and we're trying very hard always to --- the competition but sometimes we get information (yes) that sometimes becomes too readily available.

A. Yes, understand that. Understand in your case it was a was a colleague who --

Q. Well, I cannot say for sure but it came from a British television unit who has--which has over a period of time had a fairly easy relationship with the characters inside the compound. And I would think that this probably came to them from the militants or possibly with ---. colleague o.k. One last one. There's a ---- away up here north -- so far up here --you have it on your slide --way the hell up here -- a long way up there --long way from the Embassy -- really a long drive. ...

Number four, yes.

That's pretty far from the Embassy. But it's pretty close to Khomeini's house. Were you thinking of nipping the old man?

...

A. Again, these were distributed throughout because of contemplated ways that the force might be confronted with an emergency and then the best places for them to move to to have minimally detectible, interceptable extraction. That's the whole reason behind this series ..

Q: General, is your main thesis that all of these so-called bus stops and all of these landing sites and zones were basically emergency zones?

A. Basically, emergency zones.

.. hoped to help us cope in some preplanned fashion ..

[redacted] SECRET

Q. Isn't it curious that a pilot would wind up with a plan that had only emergency instructions?

Q: John --

A. Why would you say he only had one?

Q: General, you mentioned that there was particular interest in the football stadium next to the Embassy and athletics ground in the compound itself. --- He has not confirmed that they were the primary zones. This one here is put down as the primary zone. So perhaps we could take this, the Embassy which is not marked with an arrow as-- Would it be unfair and running across your grain if we kind of suggested that that was the key pickup area?

A. The one that is here marked as primary -- no that would be alright.

Q. How about the racetrack? What is the racetrack?

A. No, again you are talking about

[redacted] SECRET

[redacted] SECRET

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

13 May 1980

MEMO TO: MAJOR GENERAL DYKE

SUBJECT: SASC 8 May 1980 Hearing on Testimony Relating to the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission; General Jones/SecDef

Attached are questions asked of SecDef during subject hearing. Please prepare appropriate responses to these questions and submit on DD Form 2136, in duplicate, bracketing on the copy that information considered classified. Please submit these responses by COB Thursday, 15 May.

HAROLD L. MILLER
Colonel, JAGC, USA
Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

PRIF page

[redacted] SECRET

Regraded Unclassified when separated from Classified enclosure

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D C 20301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT STAFF

13 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Map/Chart Classification

During the course of mission planning and execution all charts depicting in-country operations, actual or alternate locations or route, were considered highly sensitive and were strictly controlled.

Subsequent to the mission these products, particularly those that applied to helicopter operations exclusively are no longer considered sensitive as the products themselves were unclassified and it was the addition of the operational annotations that made the products sensitive.

Specific products that fall into this category are the ONC route charts and the Tehran (Special/1:50,000).

[redacted]
LtCol, USAF
JTF/J-2

[redacted]
Maj, USMC
Helio Det/S2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~


RESCUE MISSION
Desert Track LZ
Helo #5 Turns Back
Dust
Helo #6 Down
Helicopter Route
MC-130 Route
MOUNTAINS
GREAT SALT DESERT
ESFAHAN
YAZD
SHIRAZ
BANDAR ABBASS
KERMAN
ZAHEDAN
35°
30°
55°
60°

DESERT ONE LANDING/REFUELING



1 — 5 LAND FIRST
1 — 2 TAKE-OFF
6 LAND

~~SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

A p.184

30 May 1980

I. SUBJECT: Hostage Rescue Issues

II. PURPOSE: To summarize issues related to the attempt to rescue the US hostages in Iran.

III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. (U) General Issues

- Release of information to Congress pertaining to unexecuted portions of the plan.

  --Analogy to oversight of covert activities.

- Leaks to the press of information which is being withheld from Congress.

  --Congressional fear of future embarrassment.

  --Investigation by DOD or FBI. (TAB A)

- Organization/establishment of some form of permanent CT command and control structure. (TAB B)

  --Reaction time for this or new incident.

  --Preservation of capabilities.

B. (U) Issues Related to the Executed Portions of the Operation

- OPLAN and tapes for Congressional review. (TAB C)

- Adequacy of weather support. (TAB D)

  --Dust phenomenon.

- Adequacy of helicopter maintenance. (RH-53D BLUE BOOK)

  --Education level and experience of maintenance personnel. (TAB E)

  --Quality of aircraft and maintenance. (TAB F)

  --Use of different aircraft for training and mission. (TAB G)

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 May 1992

Classified by: DJSOA
15 Oct 85
Declassify: OADR

- Training procedures for helicopter pilots/units (esp. radio transmission and weather abort procedures) which resulted in "problems" during mission execution.

- Helicopter pilot excessive autonomy.

- Lack of helicopter redundancy. (TAB H)

--Failure to use Operations Research methods to determine needed number of mission aircraft.

- Lack of coordination between lead C-130 and helicopters. (TAB I)

--Failure to warn on weather conditions (dust phenomenon).

--"Perceived" differences as to hostile radar capability.

- "Panic" at Desert One. (TAB J)

--Allegations of Inter-Service disputes.

--Failure to remove or destroy classified material.

c. (U) Other Issues

- Cost of mission. (TAB K)

- Independent expert analysis of all aspects of operation to include unexecuted portion. (TAB L)

AP-022
R W

(RESCUE)

WASHINGTON (UPI) - A SECRET PENTAGON CRITIQUE OF THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO RESCUE U.S. HOSTAGES IN IRAN CHARGES HELICOPTERS WERE INADEQUATELY MAINTAINED, HELICOPTER PILOTS NEVER PRACTICED IN BAD WEATHER AND WEATHER FORECASTERS MISSED A 200-MILE, 6,000-FOOT-HIGH DUST FOG, IT WAS REPORTED TODAY.

SCRIPPS-HOWARD NEWS SERVICE SAID SENIOR MILITARY EXPERTS INTERVIEWED MORE THAN TWO DOZEN MEMBERS OF THE ABORTED RAID AND CONCLUDED MAJOR ERRORS WERE MADE IN PLANNING, APPOINTING COMMANDERS AND EXECUTING THE OPERATION.

EIGHT U.S. SERVICEMEN LOST THEIR LIVES ON AN IRANIAN DESERT SONE 200 MILES FROM TEHRAN IN THE ABORTED APRIL 24 MISSION.

THE CONCLUSIONS - AND SOME PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED FACTS ABOUT THE MISSION - WERE OBTAINED BY SCRIPPS-HOWARD FROM PENTAGON SOURCES.

THE CANDID CRITIQUE DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO EVALUATE WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED HAD THE MISSION CONTINUED, SCRIPPS-HOWARD SAID. IT MERELY CITES REASONS THE MISSION FAILED WHEN IT DID.

THE TOP-SECRET DOCUMENT SAID A KEY FACTOR IN THE FAILURE OF THE MISSION WAS THE SELECTION OF MAJ. GEN. JAMES VAUGHT AS ITS COMMANDER. THE CRITIQUE NOTED THAT WHILE VAUGHT IS AN OUTSTANDING SOLDIER, HE LACKS EXPERIENCE IN PLANNING OPERATIONS INVOLVING SEVERAL MILITARY BRANCHES - IN THIS CASE THE ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE AND MARINES.

VAUGHT WAS DRAFTED FOR THE MISSION AFTER TWO YEARS ON EDUCATIONAL DUTY AT THE CITADEL, A SOUTH CAROLINA MILITARY SCHOOL. HE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A DIVISION COMMANDER IN COMBAT BUT DID NOT HAVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXPERIENCE. VAUGHT WAS TAPPED FOR THE JOB BY ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. EDWARD MEYER. AT THE TIME, VAUGHT WAS SERVING AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS AS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND RELATIONS.

ACCORDING TO THE CRITIQUE, THE CREWS NEVER PRACTICED FLYING WHEN THEY ENCOUNTERED BAD WEATHER SUCH AS SAND STORMS IN THE AMERICAN DESERT. THE CREWS ASSUMED THAT IF THEY ENCOUNTERED BAD WEATHER IN IRAN, THE MISSION WOULD BE CANCELED.

UPI 05-30 09:51 AED

(UNCLAS)

UNCLASSIFIED

May 30, 1980

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) THOMAS B. ROSS IN RESPONSE TO QUERY:

No such documents exists. The after-action inquiry has not been completed and no critique of the rescue mission has been drawn up. The Scripps-Howard story is a mish-mash of erroneous rumors and speculations that have previously been knocked down by the facts.

--END--

Cy to: General Gast
General Dyke

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

A #193

Comments on Army Times Article, May 19, 1980 entitled "Iran Raid Radio Tapes Suggest Chaos."

1. "Sources said that weather conditions were such that at least some of the helicopter crews were requesting the mission be aborted long before the helicopters arrived at the desert site where they linked up with other elements of the raiding force."

Comment: There were no requests. The helicopter flight leader reported that he had encountered poor visability. He and his wingman returned to clear air mass. Based on the absence of radio calls from other helicopter pilots he made the judgment all were proceeding. The helicopters proceeded, none requesting or recommending abort. Six arrived. The only one to turn around was number five because he lost a key navigation system. He reported that he was returning.

2. "Those sources said that the weather problem was a sandstorm of incredible density not a huge dust cloud as claimed by the Pentagon."

Comment: Interviews of the helicopter crews and testimony do not characterize the phenomena as a sand storm. There was no blowing sand, no wind, no significant turbulence or any other indications of a sand storm. The phenomena was suspended dust.

3. "The intensity of sandstorm encountered was such sources said - that the helicopters' radar was 'completely blocked out'".

Comment: The RH-53 is not equipped with radar. Crews did report they had difficulty at times seeing terrain features through night vision goggles. This was caused by dust and low moon illumination while in heavy dust.

4. "Sources said that one helicopter crew tried in vain to shovel sand out its aircraft during the storm."

Comment: There was no dust storm. Sand in the aircraft was not a problem because none was present. Suspended dust probably did enter the cockpit but caused no problems. One pilot noted that the powdery substance accumulated on his lips, but there was no substantial accumulation.

5. "'There was more than one foot of sand inside one helicopter when it had to land', the source said."

Comment: There is no debrief or testimony to substantiate any accumulation of sand in the helicopters. One or two helicopters did report that upon landing at Desert One, their helicopter wheels sank into the sand several inches. There was not a major problem. C-130s landed, taxied, and took off in the same conditions.

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. "Another problem encountered during the mission, sources said, was the amount of radio traffic generated by various elements of the command structure. This created a logjam of communications, they said."

Comment: It is unclear which command net is described. There were many calls made by various JTF elements during the Desert One period. There were disciplined and necessary radio communications. Debrief of all commanders has not highlighted this as a problem. To the contrary, the calls enabled decision makers to report and make necessary judgments, recommendations and decisions.

(U) If the "source" is referring to the Desert One command net which was separate from the JTF command net and on a separate frequency, there is no basis for the comment. The site commander was well informed and radios were necessary to make judgments and decisions.

7. "When the helicopters and the remainder of the raiding party - which included a special 90-man team led by COL Charles A. Beckwith - linked up at the desert site, sources said, a number of 'strap hangers' were among those present. When ammunition began to explode after a helicopter and a C-130 collided, sources said, 'the strap hangers thought they were under fire and panicked.'"

Comment: There were no personnel at the site who did not have a specific requirement during the mission. Weight, security, and tasks for personnel were factors which drove the number down to where only those present were needed or desired.

8. "Sources described a pell-mell rush to the C-130 by those 'strap hangers.' At this point Beckwith's raiding force was continuing to react in a calm disciplined manner, sources said, but at the 'point' they had to run like hell to get aboard (the departing C-130s) or they would have been left behind.' The C-130s were airborne in 3 minutes, they added."

Comment: There were no "strap hangers" as commented on in 7, above. We know of no instance of panic, though it can be surmized that the reaction to an aircraft collision, fire and exploding ammunition caused some initial anxiety and confusion among those most proximate to the explosion. However, all of the force in a very disciplined manner began to help sort things out, extract people from the C-130 and helicopters, gather up personnel and equipment, bring in the security force and methodically load the C-130s. The first C-130 to take off was approximately 20 minutes after the collision and the last 23 minutes, not three. No C-130 pilot planned nor did in fact take off until ordered by the site commander who left on the last C-130. No one alive was left. Medical care was provided on the ground and while enroute.

9. "Another occurrence at the desert rendezvous site, revealed by those sources, adds much fuel to the controversy about the raid. Army Times has decided to

[redacted]

13. Q: Why weren't all other helos destroyed using time-delay mechanisms?

A: No delay fusing for explosives was available that allowed safe distance for evacuating force safety. Even had they been available the fuses would probably not have been used due to risk of injury or death to the bus passengers who had been left behind.

SECRET
[redacted]

withhold those details from publication at this time out of concern for the safety of 53 hostages in Iran."

Comment: We do not know what is alluded to here - but if the sources of information portray similar inaccuracies as the foregoing it will not be helpful to anyone.

10. "We need a thorough investigation of what happened to include a complete examination of top level planning and the role played by (AF) LT Gen Philip Gast, the Special Air Advisor, a source said. 'It needs to be taken apart.'"

Comment: The Senate Armed Services Committee is conducting an examination. So is the Department of Defense. LT Gen Gast was an advisor to the Commander of the Joint Task Force (JTF) because of his extensive knowledge of Iran and his extensive experience in air operations. He was designated Deputy Commander of the JTF for the mission.

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE	
Documents Division: Joint Secretariat	~~SECRET~~	DJ- 973A-80	30 MAY 1980
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~		DJSM NO.	OJCS SUSPENSE DATE
		DJSM DATE	

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information (FOI) Request

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X			

REMARKS

1. (U) The FOI request discussed below is the second received from Mr. Jack H. Taylor, of "The Daily Oklahoman", concerning the release of RICE BOWL information. The first request* was denied for operational security reasons. Mr. Taylor subsequently submitted an appeal restating his original request**

2. (U) FOI #579*** requested that "The Daily Oklahoman" be provided with "monetary costs assocated with organization and operations" of Operation RICE BOWL. The policy enunciated by Secretary Brown on 8 May 1980**** provides specific guidance for the release of RICE BOWL matters relating to tactics and techniques. However, given the nature of congressional hearings, it is probable that at least the gross cost data from the operation will be provided, formally or informally, to the media. It should be noted that only the Army cost data is in fact classified to protect SFOD Delta and classified inter-agency funding systems and mechanisms.

3. (U) The FOI action also requested details concerning aircraft maintenance and performance data on the RH-53D (para 2,3,4, & 5 of reference). These items have been referred to the Navy for the development of an appropriate response.

4. (U) Recommend the following be declassified and provided to the requester:

The estimated value***** of items expended during the hostage rescue operation was 5.6 million dollars, excluding the replacement costs of aircraft destroyed or left in Iran. In addition, approximately 19.7 million dollars were expended during the training phase of the operation, for aircraft, and for other support requirements. The details associated with this cost data are properly classified in that their disclosure could provide potential adversaries with an understanding of unit capabilities by disclosing types of equipment, thereby reducing the potential effectiv-

ACTION OFFICER	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
R. S. REDMOND COL, USA SOD, J-3	SOD	CAPT TREBBE	72650		Declassified by:	
	J-33	BGEN JOHNSON			DDO NMCC	
	J-31	MGEN DYKE	50977		12 May 1992	
EXT 73455		LTGEN GAST			~~Classified By:~~	
					~~Declassified ON: OADR~~	
DATE OF PREPARATION					Classified by: DJSM 1800-85	
29 May 1980		~~CONFIDENTIAL~~			Declassify on: OADR	

JCS [illegible] 9

A #183

~~SECRET~~ Sen Pentagon:

Has been reviewed and approved by the JCS but SecDef has reportedly said it will not be sent to Sen Tower at this time. V/R [signature] 30 Aug 80

Honorable John G. Tower
United State Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Tower,

(U) This letter is in response to your question for the record concerning the hostage rescue mission.

(U)(~~S~~) At the time of the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a concept plan which provided options to the National Command Authorities for a military response to terrorist incidents. In addition, the unified commands had supporting plans for response to terrorist incidents in their assigned areas.

(U)(~~S~~) A special task force was formed for the hostage rescue mission within the context of the existing plan. This task force, consisting of personnel and equipment from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, was responsible for the planning, training, and conduct of the mission.

(U)(~~S~~) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the hostage rescue mission. Several alternatives to the existing command relationships and organizational structure have been analyzed with a view toward improving the military response to a terrorist incident.

(S) The Secretary of Defense has approved a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a Joint Task Force with the following mission:

> Conduct military operations to counter terrorist acts directed against United States interests, citizens, and/or property when directed by the National Command Authorities, either unilaterally or in support of a unified command (S).

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: DJSOA, 18 Oct 85
Declassified ON: OADR

A,B

(S) The Joint Task Force will be under the direction of the National Command Authorities through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and A [redacted] Headquarters for the Joint Task Force [redacted] The headquarters will be manned by permanently assigned personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The headquarters will perform A [redacted]

(U) Pending determination of security aspects, the establishment of this Joint Task Force to counter acts of terrorism is being done on a strict need-to-know basis within the Department of Defense. It is requested that the distribution of information on the Joint Task Force be similarly limited within the Congress.

(S) The operating components of the force will consist of specially organized, equipped, and trained forces assigned to the Joint Task Force and will be under the operational control of the Commander, Joint Task Force. Additional forces will be available for assignment to the force if required. Dedicated A [redacted] also be provided for the force.

(S) The functions of the Service components. These components will be:

A (S) Army. [redacted]

(S) Navy. [redacted]

(S) Air Force. [redacted]

(S) The Joint Task Force established for the hostage rescue mission has been retained. Its mission and worldwide counterterrorism operations will be assumed by the Joint Task Force described above when it is operational. The establishment of this force is a matter of high priority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(S) The impact of the establishment of a Joint Task Force on presently authorized appropriations has not yet been determined. Should fiscal initiatives be required they will be coordinated with the Secretary of Defense.

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET A-#199.

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE
Documents Division Joint Secretariat	UNCLASSIFIED	J3M- 1023'80 10 JUN 1980
		DJSM NO. / ODJS SUSPENSE DATE
		DJSM DATE

SUBJECT:

Freedom of Information (FOI) Request #576A

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X			

REMARKS

1. FOI Request #576A* is an appeal of FOI Request #576** from Mr Jack H. Taylor, of "The Daily Oklahoman". The original request was for the release of specifically identified documents pertaining to the "Iran Hostage Rescue Task Force" that was denied by DJSM 995-80.***

2. The essence of Mr Taylor's appeal is that we have made a "wholesale denial" that is not within the letter or spirit of the law because many of the documents relate only to a 24 hour period and some of this material was captured by the Iranians. He also stated that no effort was made to provide sanitized documents.

3. Recommend the following response:

The appeal of the Freedom of Information Request denial of 16 May 1980 concerning the "Iran Hostage Rescue Task Force" is also denied because of the requirement to maintain the capability to conduct similar military operations in the future; the requested information remains currently and properly classified as indicated in previous correspondence.

* Freedom of Information Request #576A dtd 21 May 1980
** Freedom of Information Request #576 dtd 13 May 1980
*** DJSM 995-80

ACTION OFFICER	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
R.S. Redmond COL, USA SOD, J-3	SOD		55814			
	J-33		72608			
	J-31		x50987			
73455	LTGEN Gast					
	MilSec					
DATE OF PREPARATION 06 June 1980						

JCS FORM NO. 9

13 May 80

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

Subject: Freedom of Information Request #576 (80-DFOI 463)

1. Reference your 29 April 1980 Freedom of Information Action Assignment which forwarded a request from Jack B. Taylor, Jr., The Daily Oklahoman-Oklahoma City Times, for ten specifically identified documents pertaining to the "Iran Hostage Rescue Task Force."

2. The requester may be advised that the nature of the rescue operation and the requirement to maintain the capability to conduct similar military operations in the future, precludes the disclosure of information concerning unit and individual special capabilities or the specifics of tactics and techniques employed by units or individuals associated with this operation. Comments concerning the specific items requested by Mr. Taylor are provided below and are keyed to the paragraph numbers of his request.

a. Para 1 - The detailed roster of personnel assigned to the task force is currently and properly classified. The only exception to this policy was the release of the names of the principal leaders directly involved in the operation. The disclosure of any additional personnel information would prejudice the use of these highly qualified personnel in any future operations by revealing individual specialties. By inference, this information would provide potential opponents with a good understanding of unit missions and capabilities.

b. Para 2 - Official biographies, photographs, and statements of service of the principal leaders directly involved in the operation are not maintained by the OJCS.

c. Paras 3, 4, and 8 - The TO&E, general, specific, or other orders, and the morning or daily reports, or the equivalents are currently and properly classified for the same reason cited for paragraph 1.

***

Although an operation plan, tailored to the specific requirements of this special mission, was prepared, the primary management tools employed were flow and event charts. These will be incorporated into the after action report as appropriate. All of this material remains currently and properly classified to protect operational techniques, concepts, and capabilities.

e. Para 6 - Logs or journals compiled during the rescue mission are properly classified to protect the organizational structure of the units involved and the specific locations of the participants.

f. Para 7 - Communications are properly classified for the reasons cited for paragraph 6 and to protect the types and capabilities of communications equipment involved.

g. Para 9 - After action reports, as such, for individual training exercises were not prepared during the training phase of the operation. Specific training programs are currently and properly classified to protect tactics and techniques that can be employed in the future.

h. Para 10 - A classified after action report on the operation is presently being prepared. In conjunction with the preparation of the report, the entire hostage rescue operation is being reviewed to maximize the amount of information that can be released as unclassified.

3. The applicable FOIA exemption for denial of the information is 5 USC 552(b)(1).

4. Attached for release to the requester is the detailed, unclassified, account of the hostage rescue operation that was released by the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 May 1980.

5. DD Form 2086 and "Request Information Sheet" for this inquiry are attached.

SIGNED

JAMES E. DALTON
Major General, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Attachments

Prepared by:
H. J. McIntyre, Maj, USAF,
ActingCh, IRAS Br, DocDiv, 78747

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

A-#212

X

THE JOINT STAFF

5 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Gast, USAF
Major General Vaught, USA
Rear Admiral Cassidy
Colonel Pitman, USMC

Subject: Insert for the Record Into the Official Testimony Transcript Relating to the Iranian Rescue Mission Taken During Hearings Before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, 2 June 1980

1. On 2 June 1980, a formal hearing was held before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee concerning the Iran hostage rescue attempt. Copies of the draft official transcript are currently being reviewed by the witnesses participating in the hearings.

2. In the course of the hearings, several questions were asked to which the witnesses were not in the position to provide a response, and promised to provide for the record appropriate information obtained from individuals knowledgeable in the subject area.

3. Attached are relevant pages from the transcript on which the questions are raised and discussed. The names of individuals to whom these questions are referred are indicated in the margin.

4. Request you provide this office appropriate information in response to the question to be inserted into the record by COB Friday 6 June 1980.

M. R. Hall
for CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROUTING SLIP

ACTION		INFO
	DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF	✓
	SECRETARY, JCS	X
	~~DIRECTOR, J-2~~	
	DIRECTOR, J-3	✓
	~~DIRECTOR, J-4~~	
	DIRECTOR, J-5	
	DIRECTOR, C^3S	
	SAGA	
	DAS	
	J-5(NSC)	
	J-3(JRC)	

TYPE OF ACTION

	Appropriate Action		Preparation of Reply		Reply Direct (cy to CJCS)

REMARKS

Info to:

E S LTC KUEBERAS

F ____

R ____

Info - SOD, JOD

cy - J-30-31-33

~~Classified By: DJS~~

~~Declassified On: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 may 1992
UNCLASS

SUSPENSE DATE	ROUTING DATE	CJCS CONTROL NO.
	21 Jan 80	1712

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

June 18, 1980

MEMO TO GENERAL GAST

Dave Martin promises these are his final, final questions:

1. Why wouldn't it have been possible to dump fuel at Desert One so as to get all men and equipment aboard five helos?

2. The trouble with the helo that turned back to the Nimitz was all electronic? Couldn't the dousing have had something to do with that?

3. Why wasn't a weather reconnaissance plane sent in ahead of the helos? (I gather Pittman may have expressed second thoughts about that to Martin.)

4. What did Seifert tell Vaught about the impact of the dust on the helos during the flight to Desert One?

5. You mentioned that there were three different astronomical sunrises. What was the time of daybreak or sunup as a layman understands it?

6. In his press conference, Beckwith indicated that there had never been a practice of aborting by getting off the helicopters and onto the C-130s. Is that so?

7. Were the electronics on these helicopters standard equipment or special for the mission? If special, were they too handled by a special parts priority system?

Many thanks. Martin's number is 626-2056.

Tom

Thomas B. Ross

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 May 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified By: DJS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

June 17, 1980

MEMO TO GENERAL GAST

Dave Martin of Newsweek has posed the following questions as his final attack on the subject:

1. He has been told that a Pentagon computer calculation put the probable fatality toll at 11 hostages, 30 commandos and 80-90 Iranians. Another source said there was a prediction of 20 percent casualties. Is there anything in this? (If so, we ought to say -- if true -- that it was a worst case assessment.)

2. Martin understood you to say that one of the helicopters could have been repaired at Desert One, if a pump had been available, and the mission could have proceeded even after daylight to a point short of the hideaway. Did he get you right? If so, why didn't you send a pump rather than a [illegible]fold?

3. Was General Vaught in a C-130 on the ground or actually on the ground?

4. The Star carried a story saying a "Defense readiness report" said ten helicopters would be needed at the start to get the right number at the finish. Is that so?

5. Sam Stratton is quoting Beckwith as testifying that he would have had to have left 15 of his men behind with only five helicopters and that he couldn't do that because all of them had required jobs to do. Why wasn't there a contingency plan to do it with less, if necessary?

6. Martin has heard of a disagreement on the ground about what to do with the bus passengers, suggesting that there was no plan for what to do if Iranians were encountered. Why wasn't there a contingency? yes

7. Was the Iranian radar turned off as reported afterwards from Teheran?

8. Any plans for issuing decorations to those involved in the rescue mission?

9. How much did the operation cost?

10. You said the CH53 helicopter was never considered because of insufficient range. How then was it possible to train on a full mission profile?

Martin's deadline is Thursday evening.

Tom

Thomas B. Ross

9. How much did the operation cost?

Answer: The estimated value of items expended during the hostage rescue operation was 5.6 million dollars, excluding replacement cost of aircraft destroyed or left in Iran. In addition, approximately 19.7 million dollars were expended during the training phase of the operation for aircraft and other support requirements.

1. He has been told that a Pentagon computer calculation put the probable fatality toll at 11 hostages, 30 commandos and 80-90 Iranians. Another source said there was a prediction of 20 percent casualties. Is there anything in this? Answer: We are not aware of any such calculation.

4. The Star carried a story saying a "Defense readiness report" said ten helicopters would be needed at the start to get the right number at the finish. Is that so?

Answer: DOD calculations, based on RH-53 aircraft configured for the mission and supported and operated as they were in preparation for the mission, showed that eight aircraft ~~should~~ would be adequate to support the mission. We are not aware of any report to the contrary. It should be noted that although the RH-53 in its normal configuration includes airborne minesweeping capability in its readiness data, the helicopters assigned for this mission had the minesweeping equipment removed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

17 July 1980

SLN/R

MEMORANDUM FOR LTCOL. KVEDERAS

Subject: FOIA Request by The Washington Post for Records on RH53D Helicopters

1. In response to an FOIA request from The Washington Post for records on RH53D Helicopter availability/ readiness for 1979 and 1980 (Tab A), the Department of the Navy has prepared the attached proposed response (Tab B).

2. The Navy has denied all documents responsive to items 1, 2, and 3 of the request on the basis of current and proper classification.

3. The Navy authorizes release of maintenance records for the years 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980 - item 4 of the request.

4. Also provided will be the maintenance manual for the RH53D helicopter - item 5 of the request.

5. Prior to release of the memorandum by the Navy, the OJCS has been requested to review and comment.

E. E. Lowry Jr.

E. E. LOWRY, JR.
Chief, Documents Division
Joint Secretariat

~~Downgraded by~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~Classified By: DJS~~ ~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1992

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A-234

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

23 July 1980

Memorandum for LTC Olynyk

Subject: FOIA Request by Jack Taylor for Information on RH53D Helicopters

1. In response to an FOIA request from Jack Taylor for Accident and Aircraft Performance Measurement Reports pertaining to the RH 53D helicopters (TAB A), the Department of the Navy has prepared the attached proposed response (TAB B).

2. The Navy has denied release of Aircraft Accident Reports (item 1 of the request) by separate correspondence.

3. Prior to release of the memorandum at Tab B, OASD (PA) requests OJCS review and comments.

Attachments

E. E. Lowry Jr.
E.E. Lowry
Chief, Documents Div
SJCS

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC
12 May 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified By: DJS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

EDWARD L. GAYLORD
PRESIDENT, PUBLISHER

20747

THE OKLAHOMA PUBLISHING COMPANY
THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN-OKLAHOMA CITY TIMES
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73125

19 May 1980

Vice Admiral Earnest Seymour
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
Department of the Navy
ATTN: John Lenahan
FOI Coordinator
Washington, D.C. 20361

re: FREEDOM of INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

Dear Sir:

Your attention is invited to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), as amended, and to implementing Department of Defense, Department of the Navy and Naval Air Systems Command instructions and regulations.

Under provisions of the above cited authority, request that we be provided with copies of the following documents pertaining to each of the eight (8) RH 53-D Sea Stallion mine countermeasures helicopters from the U.S.S. Nimitz assigned to the Iran Hostage Rescue Task Force which participated in the attempted rescue mission of 24 April:

1. Reports of Aircraft and Motor Vehicle Accidents, filed in accordance with DoD Instruction 7730.7, or any equivilent reports relating to accidents, during the year preceeding the 24 April mission.

2. Aircraft Performance Measurement Reports of Meantime Between Engine Overhaul, filed in accordance with DoD Instruction 5010.25, or any equivilent reports relating to meantime between engine overhaul, during the year preceeding the 24 April mission.

We are willing to provide reimbursement for reproduction costs, but request waiver of all fees, under Navy Department guidelines, since release of the information would be in the public interest.

Sincerely,

JACK H. TAYLOR
Special Assignments/
Investigations

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE
DJS	UNCLASSIFIED	

THRU:	DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE
JCS	DJSM DATE	

SUBJECT:

Freedom of Information Act Request - Jack Taylor

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X			

REMARKS

1. OASD(PA) memorandum, 18 August 1980, requests telephonic JCS approval for the Navy to provide access to the Aircraft Log Books, for each of the RH-53D SEA Stallion Helicopters from the USS Nimitz assigned to the IRAN Hostage Rescue Mission of 24 April 1980, to Mr. Jack H. Taylor, Jr., of the Daily Oklahoman.

2. The Aircraft Log Books are unclassified and the Navy has recommended providing access to Mr. Taylor.

3. Based on the fact that the Navy interposes no objection to release, there is no basis for denial by the OJCS under the provisions of the FOIA.

4. In response to the OCJCS request to be informed of any FOI requests re the Iranian Raid, LA&LA was asked to inform Gen Pustay. Please note their chop below.

UNCLASS

ACTION OFFICER

T. A. HOUGHTON, Maj, USAF
AsstCh, IRAS Br
DocDiv
78747

DATE OF PREPARATION

21 Aug 80

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
DocDiv	LOWRY	55363			
IRAS	J. Lelong	78747			
LA&LA	[illegible]	71309			
J-3	for N Bissell	78263			

JCS FORM NO. 9 JULY 77

JBLIC AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, D C. 20301

18 AUG 1980

Ref: CORR 80-307

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
ATTN: Ms. Dondy

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY
ATTN: LTC Green

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(Legislative Affairs)
ATTN: COL Miller

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JOING CHIEFS OF STAFF
ATTN: Captain Kuhlke, USN

SUBJECT: DoN Freedom of Information Act Request; Jack Taylor

The purpose of this memorandum is to seek telephonic approval for the release of records pertinent to Mr. Taylor's FOIA request (copy attached). I am advised by the Department of the Navy that the requested Log Books are unclassified and in the physical possession of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Action Officer and alternate for my Directorate are Mr. McDonald, x72716, and Cdr Stier, x74803.

Charles W. Hinkle
Director, Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Attachment

UNCLASS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 14-231

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE
JCS	UNCLASSIFIED	J3M- 1525'80 11 SEP 1980
...RU:		DJSM NO. / ODJS SUSPENSE DATE
Chief, DOC DIV		DJSM DATE

SUBJECT:
Freedom of Information Request - Jack Taylor

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X			

REMARKS

1. The request by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy* has been reviewed and was found appropriate.

2. Director, J-3, JCS, has no objection to the release of duplicate SDLM records for RH-53D helicopters to Mr. Jack Taylor, Jr., in accordance with the governing provisions of appropriate DOD directives and Joint administrative instructions.

3. The tapes of SDLM records are located in the Special Operations Division, J-3, OJCS.

Reference:
* Memo by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, 26 August 1980, "Freedom of Information Act Appeal submitted by Mrs. Jack Taylor, Jr."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified By: DJS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

Declassified by DDO, NMCC 12 May 1992

ACTION OFFICER

S.D. Olynyk
LtCol, USA
SOD, J-3

EXT 73455

DATE OF PREPARATION
9 Sept 80

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
J-3	[signature]	73762			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: SJCS	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE	
: Chief, DOC DIV		DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE
		DJSM DATE	

SUBJECT:
Freedom of Information Request - Jack Taylor

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X			

REMARKS

1. The request by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy* has been reviewed and was found appropriate.

2. Director, J-3, JCS, has no objection to the release of duplicate SDLM records for RH-53D helicopters to Mr. Jack Taylor, Jr., in accordance with the governing provisions of appropriate DOD directives and Joint administrative instructions.

3. The tapes of SDLM records are located in the Special Operations Division, J-3, OJCS.

erence:
* Memo by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, 26 August 1980, "Freedom of Information Act Appeal submitted by Mrs. Jack Taylor, Jr."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: ~~[illegible]~~ DJS
~~Declassified ON:~~ OADR

TION OFFICER
:.D. Olynyk SOD
.tCol, USA
:OD, J-3
:XT 73455

TE OF PREPARATION
Sept 80

COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
SOD	[signature]	55814			
MilSec	[signature]	54512			
J-33 A	Brady	72656			
Exec	[initials]				
J-31	[signature]				

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY SECRETARY, J-3

Subject: Freedom of Information Request # 623 (CORR 80-319)

1. Attached for your agency's action is an FOI request for concurrence in the release of duplicate SDLM records for RH-53D helicopters involved in the Iran rescue operation. The tapes refered to were provided to (Encl 4) LtC Kvederas, SOD, on 2 Sep 80. Enclosure (3) and (5) to the Navy Judge Advocate General letter were not provided to this office. We will attempt to acquire and provide them to the AO. Subject was peripherally address in FOI #579, copy attached.

2. The provisions of DOD Directives 5400.10 and 5400.7, and JAI 3000.8 apply to this action. To assist the action officer, a summary of the key portions of the directives are attached.

3. Your response, recommending either total release, partial release, or total denial and record of coordination on JCS Form 9 should be addressed to the Secretary, JCS through the Chief, Documents Division. All manhours expended on this action must be recorded on the attached cost data sheet.

4. If partial or total denial is recommended, your response should include, as the basis for a DJSM, identification of the applicable FOIA exemption(s) and the specific reasons for denial. Please note that the law requires release of any reasonably segregable portion of a record after deletion of legitimately denied information. This requirement severely limits the ability of an agency to deny a document in its entirety, and necessitates a detailed review of each document requested under the FOIA. All information proposed for denial should be indicated in brackets.

5. A recommendation to withhold material must demonstrate that denial serves a significant and legitimate government purpose. When denial is based on security classification, the explanation must logically relate the content of the requested record to criteria in a specified paragraph of DOD Regulation 5200.1R or another authoritative classification guide.

6. The cost sheet, all attachments to the memo, and your response should be returned to Room 2B941 by 10 Sep 80 . If you anticipate problems or need assistance in interpreting the pertinent directives, please contact this office (78747, 79660) well in advance of the suspense date. Our action officer is Maj Houghton.

Classified By: DJS
Declassified ON: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

E. E. Lowry Jr.
E. E. LOWRY, JR.
Chief, Documents Division
Joint Secretariat

Attachments — 9

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHARGE DATA-CASE #_____

The following data must be maintained on this case until final action is taken. The information in Part I may be charged to the requester. Search costs only involve the costs of locating and identifying the records requested. Information in Part II will be used to report costs of administration of the Act. This data includes time spent determining releasability (classification review, extracting, etc.), administrative handling, coordination, supervisory review, etc.

PART I				PART II	
SEARCH			COPYING*	REVIEW	
Grade/Agency of Individual	Manual Hours/@	Computer Hours/@	Items/@	Grade/Agency of Individual	Hours/@
				OJCS/J3/SOD LTC S.D. Olynyk	2 hrs
				OJCS/J3/SOD LTC R. Kvederas	1 hr

Subtotal $_____ $_____ $_____ $_____

TOTAL $_____

*DocDiv use only.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified By: DJS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

A-238

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORTATE	
CHIEF, DOC DIV	~~SECRET~~ CONF	2229 80	22 DEC 1980
THRU:	CONFIDENTIAL	DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE
		DJSM DATE	

SUBJECT:	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
(U) Declassification Review of Audio-Visual Material on Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)	X	X		

REMARKS

(U) 1. Reference your request* to review still and motion picture photography on Operation EVENING LIGHT for declassification and possible release in response to a request** from OASD(PA).

2. The photography has been reviewed in this Directorate, and there is no objection to its being declassified.

(U) 3. However, because of continued sensitivity of some statements made by selected members of the Iran hostage rescue mission prior to its execution, it is requested that access to the audio-visual material be limited to US Government agencies only and that the material be labelled accordingly and reposited in OASD(PA).

4. The material (photography and magnetic tape) is currently located in the Special Operations Division, J-3 (POC: LTC ~~S. D. Olynyk~~, Ext 73455).

5. Time spent for review and coordination: 20 hours.

References:

* Memo by Chief, Doc Div, OJCS, 21 Oct 80, subject as above.

** Memo by Director, FOI&SR, OASD(PA), 21 Oct 80 (C) "Still and Motion Picture Photography--Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)"

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL per authority of DDO (NMCC) 11/20/90

Declassified by: DDO NMCC 12 May 92

Classified By: DJSOA 18 October 1985
Declassified ON: OADR

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

ACTION OFFICER	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
~~S. D. OLYNYK~~ LTC, USA SOD, J-3 Ext 73455	J-3	[signature]	56243			
DATE OF PREPARATION 22 Dec 80						

CONFIDENTIAL

Cont

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

#75

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORTATE	
J-31	~~SECRET~~		
RU:	~~CONFIDENTIAL~~	DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE
		DJSM DATE	

SUBJECT:
Declassification Review of Audio-Visual Material on Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X	X		

REMARKS

1. Chief, Doc Div, OJCS, has referred* to Director, J-3, for concurrence a request** from OASD(PA) to review audio-visual material related to Operation EVENING LIGHT for declassification and possible release.

2. The background on the origins and current status of OASD(PA) is contained in attached fact sheet***.

3. The material was reviewed in SOD/J-3 and found to be unclassified but sensitive in view of some statements made by selected members of RH-53D helicopter crew on the NIMITZ the day before the execution of the Iran hostage rescue mission.

4. As a result of informal coordination with OASD(PA), it is understood that OASD(PA) will restrict access to the audio-visual material to US Government agencies only and will label the material accordingly.

5. Recommend approval and dispatch of the attached response (JCS Form 9) to Chief, DOC DIV.

References:
* Memo by Chief, Doc Div, OJCS, 21 Oct 80, subject as above
** Memo by Director, FOI&SR, OASD(PA), 21 Oct 80 (C) "Still and Motion Picture Photography – Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)"
*** Fact Sheet, 22 December 1980, (C) "Audio-Visual Material – Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)"

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL per authority of DDO, NMCC 18 Dec 90

Classified By: DJSO 4 — 18 OCT 85
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

Unclassified

Declassified DDO, NMCC 12 May 92

ACTION OFFICER
S. D. OLYNYK
LTC, USA
SOD, J-3

Ext 73455

DATE OF PREPARATION
22 Dec 80

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
SOD	Stearns	55814			
MILSEC	Joan Hoppe				
J-33					
EXEC					
J-31	Johnson	56243			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JCS FORM 9   PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

Date 22 Dec 80

To: LTG GAST

Subject: Audio-visual Material on ~~Operation EVENING LIGHT~~

1. Attached is a proposed alternate respons to request from OASD(PA) to approve release of audio-visual material on Operation EVENING [redacted]

2. The response is based on additional information as to the origin of this request and its purpose (See Fact Sheet attached).

3. I would recommend that perhaps it is more appropriate for J-31 to sign JCS Form 9 to Chief Doc Div, since MG Johnson was not directly involved in JTF-79.

I am available to discuss this action and staff it accordingly.

S [redacted] OLYNYK
LTC, USA
73455/75279

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL per authority of DDO NMCC

Classified By: DJSM
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Declassified by DDO, NMCC 12 May 92

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FACT SHEET

Subject: Audio-Visual Material - Operation EVENING LIGHT

1. PURPOSE: To provide information on the origins and current status of the OSD request* for release of still and motion picture photography related to Operation EVENING LIGHT.

2. BACKGROUND: On 30 April 1980, OASD(PA) requested** CINCPAC for any audio-visual coverage made aboard NIMITZ of RH-53D helicopters and crews assigned to the Iran hostage rescue mission. The stated intent was to insure preservation of such material for record and use by JCS and OSD(PA).

3. Similar requests were made verbally by OASD(PA) to HQDA and HQUSAF, and coordinated with Colonel Able, Spec Asst to CJCS(PA).

4. CTF Seven Zero provided OASD(PA) subject photography via NAVCHINFO:

- The material was reviewed by Colonel Able and declared unclassified but sensitive.
- Colonel Able requested OASD(PA) that any action to release the photography should be coordinated with J-3, JCS.
- Subsequently, the material was reviewed by the Security of Military Information Division, OCNO, and declared unclassified and releasable.

5. In accordance with previous agreement between OASD(PA) and Colonel Able (JCS), the former requested* JCS to review the material for releasability.

- On 11 November 1980, the material was reviewed, in OJCS, by Colonel Pitman, CSG, Commander Goodloe, OPNAV 95F (former CDR HM-56), and LTC Olynyk, SOD/J-3, who agreed that
  -- The photography and tapes are unclassified.
  -- The magnetic tape recording of interviews with selected RH-53D crew members prior to the execution of the Iran hostage rescue mission contains statements which, if released now, may be misconstrued by the public and the media, with respect to the planning and training for the mission, and readiness and individual competence of the mission members.

Declassified by: DDO, NMCC 12 May 92

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL by authority of DDO NMCC 11/20/91

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: DJSOA 18 OCT 83
Declassified ONE OADR

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

6. CURRENT STATUS:

a. The audio-visual material is currently stored in SOD/J-3.

b. As a result of informal coordination between SOD/J-3 (LTC S. D. Olynyk) and OASD(PA) (Mr. E. A. Michalski) it was agreed that -

(1) There is a justifiable need to limit the use of the audio-visual material to US Government agencies, at least for the duration of the US hostage captivity in Iran.

(2) OASD(PA) will retain the repository of the audio-visual material and label it "LIMITED TO US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ONLY." This will restrict any request for release of the material outside US Government.

References:
* Memo by Chief, DocDiv, OJCS, 21 Oct 80, "Declassification Review of Photography on Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)"
** SECDEF (OASDPA), 302325Z Apr 80

Prepared By:
COL OLYNYK
USA
SOD, 73455
22 December 1980

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORTATE
CHIEF, DOC DIV	SECRET	2229 '80 DEC 1980

THRU:	DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE
[redacted]	DJSM DATE	

SUBJECT:	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
Declassification Review of Audio-Visual Material on Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)	X	X		

REMARKS

1. Reference your request* to review still and motion picture photography on Operation EVENING LIGHT for declassification and possible release in response to a request** from OASD(PA).

2. The photography has been reviewed in this Directorate, and there is no objection to its being declassified.

3. However, because of continued sensitivity of some statements made by selected members of the Iran hostage rescue mission prior to its execution, it is requested that access to the audio-visual material be limited to US Government agencies only and that the material be labelled accordingly and reposited in OASD(PA).

4. The material (photography and magnetic tape) is currently located in the Special Operations Division, J-3 (POC: LTC S. D. Olynyk, Ext 73455).

5. Time spent for review and coordination: 20 hours.

References:
* Memo by Chief, Doc Div, OJCS, 21 Oct 80, subject as above.
** Memo by Director, FOI&SR, OASD(PA), 21 Oct 80, "Still and Motion Picture Photography--Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)"

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL per authority DDO NMCC 11/20/90

Classified By: DJSM 18 OCT 85
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by: DDO, NMCC 12 May 92

ACTION OFFICER	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
S. D. OLYNYK LTC, USA SOD, J-3 Ext 73455	J-3	[redacted]	56243			

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE OF PREPARATION
22 Dec 80

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D C 20301

21 Oct 80

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY SECRETARY, J-3

Subject: Declassification Review # 1959 (OASD/PA Memo, 21 Oct 80

1. Reference the attached 21 Oct 1980 ~~XXXX~~ correspondence from the OASD/PA which requested a security declassification review in accordance with E.O. 11652 and DOD Regulation 5200.1R. The attached material (still & motion picture photography) appears to be under your cognizance.

2. Request review of the attached material and submission of recommendations as to (a) declassification, regrading, or continued classification and (b) the releasability of declassifiable/unclassified contents.

3. General instructions for the reviewer are attached. The following comments and special instructions also apply:

a. Report total review time in JCS Form 9.

b. Photography pertains to Operation Evening Light

c. Review has been precoordinated with LtCol ~~X~~vederas, SOD.

4. This review package with all attachments and your comments and record of coordination/approval on JCS Form 9 should be returned to the Documents Division by 4 November 1980 ~~XXXX~~ .

5. Without classified attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

E. E. Lowry Jr.
E. E. LOWRY, JR.
Chief, Documents Division
Joint Secretariat

Attachments

c/o: Major Houghton, ext 78747
(Name & phone number)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

21 OCT 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ATTENTION: Mr. Lowry
Room 2B941

SUBJECT: Still and Motion Picture Photography--Operation Evening Light

The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your assistance in determining the releasability of the attached material. It was received by NAVCHINFO from CTF Seven Zero and forwarded to this Directorate for release determination. The Office of the Director, Security of Military Information Division (OP-009D) has reviewed the material and posed no objection to its release.

Charles W. Hinkle
Director, Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Attachments

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

8

~~SECRET~~

PACIFIC FLEET COMBAT CAMERA GROUP
PHOTOGRAPHERS DATA SHEET
SIND-NAIRPAC-3150/7 (6-68)

OJ NO.	TITLE	CLASSIFICATION
6-79/1	A/V Support of I.O. ops	

DIRECTOR	CAMERAMAN	CAMERA AND CAMERA NO.	MAG NO.
PHC T.E. RYALS	RYALS	CP16 1531 R	— — —

FILM TYPE AND SIZE	AMOUNT OF FILM	LOCATION	SPECIAL PROJ. SUPERVISOR
ECO/EF - 16mm	2400 FT	USS NIMITZ	— — — —

ROLL NO. AND DATE	SC.	TK.	DESCRIPTION	FTG.	SD. NO.
:S/10			Head slate	0'-5'	
20/80			XO of USS NIMITZ CVN-68 being		
:CO			frocked To Capt. CDR Richard C.		
			Macke, was frocked by The C.O.,		
			Capt. J.R. Batzler and CTF 70 -		
			RADM R.E. Kirksey	5'-150'	
:/10			RH-53 Hurracanes used in Operation		
30			"Evening Light" ~~After~~ before being painted		
-0			on hangar bay of Nimitz, with		
			Marine guards		
			CUTS are on JS/19	150'~~400'~~	
			— — — — END RS/10 — — — — — —		
			Head slate	0'-5'	
:/11			RH 53 Hurracanes on Hangar Deck	5'-300'	
23/80			~~After~~ painting; and Flight Deck before		
F			— — — — END RS/11 — — — — — —		
			Head slate		
S/12			RH-53 Hurracanes in hangar bay After	0'-5'	
-3/80			Painting	5'-100'	
F					

NOTES OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PACIFIC FLEET COMBAT CAMERA GROUP
PHOTOGRAPHERS DATA SHEET (BACK)
11ND-HAIRPAC-3150/7 (6-68)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

PROJ NO.			TITLE	CLASSIFICATION	
116-79/1			A/V support of IO ops		
ROLL NO. AND DATE	SC.	TK.	DESCRIPTION	FTG.	SD. NO.
RS/13 t/24/80 ECO USH1STOP			Head slate Interview with RH-53 Hurracane Crewmen on The day of [redacted] Light The subjects are back lighted intentionaly so as To obscure their features, otherwise they would not permit us to shoot - - - - - END RS/13 - - - -	0'-5' 5'-400'	JS/1
RS/14 /24/80 EO USH1STOP			Head slate Interview with HM-16 Crewmen on The day of [redacted] - - - - - END RS/14 - - - - -	0'-5' 5-1100	
S/15 24/80 EO 1 ~~USH2STOPS~~			Head slate Interview with RH-53 Hurracane Crewmen on The afternoon of Operation "Evening Light" subjects were intentionaly backlighted to obscure features - - - - - END RS/15 - - - -	0-5 5'-400'	JS/2

NOTES OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

RS/13, RS/14 } ECO - Push Process one stop

(RS/15) ECO - Do NOT push

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

11

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3 OCT 1980

MEMORANUDM FOR NAVY DIVISION, DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY REVIEW, OASD/PA

SUBJECT: (U) Still and Motion Picture Photography - Operation Evening Light

1. The inclosed still and motion picture photography was received by CHINFO from CTF Seven Zero and provided to this office after the motion picture film was processed at NPC. The still photography was received with an overall classification of Confidential. The motion picture photography was received with an overall classification of Secret.

2. This film was forwarded to OASD/PA in response to a request we made to CINCPAC. Related correspondence for this project is attached. JCS coordinated on our message to CINCPAC requesting recovery of this photography (Col. Richard Abel, USAF, then Special Assistant to the Chairman for Public Affairs) with the proviso that all photography be submitted to the Chairman for review prior to any release. Upon receipt of the material at this office, all material was handcarried to and given to JCS (Col Abel) who eventually returned it with the guidance that JCS considered the material to be unclassified but sensitive. He further indicated that prior to any release, this should be coordinated with J-3, JCS.

3. Request a determination be made as to the proper classification of subject film and potential releasability from Security Review viewpoint if it is unclassified. If a security classification is retained for subject film, request advice and guidance as to classification of each individual still photo and/or motion picture scene per Section 2, 4-202 Portion Marking par d., DOD Information Security Program Regulation 5200.1-R dtd Dec 78.

DONALD E. BARUCH
Chief, Audiovisual Division
Directorate for Defense
Information

Atch
1-Messages
2-Still film
3-Mopix film

Declassified by DJSM
Classified By: DJSOA
Declassified On: OASJR
12 May 1992

[redacted]

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

13

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

Date 12 Nov 80

To: GEN GAST

Subject: (U) Review of Photography on Operation EVENING LIGHT

(U) The photography and the tapes were reviewed by the following personnel:

COL C.H. PITMAN, USMC, CSG

CDR V. GOODLOE, USN, OpNav 954F
(Was on the NIMITZ)

S.D. OLYNYK
LTC, USAR
73455

13 Nov
See me re para 3 of Form 9, pls
Gast

Downgraded to CONFID per authority DDO NMCC 11/20/90

Classified By: DJSOA
Declassified ON: OADR

UNCLASS

Declassified by: DDO NMCC 12 May 1992

~~SECRET~~

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CHIEF, DOC DIV

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORTATE

THRU: [redacted]

DJSM NO.

ODJS SUSPENSE DATE

DJSM DATE

SUBJECT: (U) Declassification Review of Photography on Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)

ACTION

APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X	X		

REMARKS

1. Reference your request* to review still and motion picture photography on Operation EVENING LIGHT for declassification and possible release in response to a request** from OASD(PA).

2. The photography has been reviewed in this Directorate and there is no objection to its being declassified.

3. However, the magnetic tape portion, containing the record of interviews with selected members of the Iran hostage rescue mission prior to its execution, should not be released at this time for the following reasons: While most of the recorded interviews are innocuous, some of the comments made by interviewed Servicemen may be misconstrued by members of the media or general public with respect to the planning and training for the rescue mission, and the readiness and individual competence of hostage rescue mission members.

4. The material (photography and magnetic tape) is currently located in the Special Operations Division, J-3 (POC: LTC S. D. Olynyk, X73455).

5. Time spent for review: 4 hours.

References:
* Memo by Chief, Doc Div, OJCS, 21 Oct 80, subject as above.
** Memo by Director, FOI&SR, OASD(PA), 21 Oct 80, (C) "Still and Motion Picture Photography--Operation EVENING LIGHT (U)"

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL per authority DOC NMCC ... 1990

[redacted]

ACTION OFFICER

S. D. OLYNYK
LTC, USA
SOD, J-3

Ext 73455

DATE OF PREPARATION

12 Nov 80

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
SOD		55814			
MILSEC		54532			
J-33		53436			
EXEC		52863			
J-31		56243			
J-30					

Declassified by DDO/NMCC 12 May 9?

Classified By: DJSOA
Declassified ON: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

JCS FORM 9 AUG 80 Previous editions of this form may be issued.

7+30 min ~~SECRET~~ Page

-9 indiv interviewed by USN Pl

_ Statements subject to misinterpret

-- Rescue may increase Pres. popularity.

-- H-53 crewman, USN, 31 yrs autoflight control; avionic

--TNG: Had not previous fired weapons; just qualified on M-1 rifle for the mission

Was not crewman pa Trained for the missi

-- Admitted possibility of mechanical failure & lack of good intell.

-- Chance for success [illegible]

-- Gunnery SGT: 15-min to pa never involved in anything close to the mission-type

23

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-- USN YO: "without ^ equipment
~~went used to~~ "

--- ~~I~~ [illegible] about ~~the~~ mission; not yet told

--- no previous similar experience.

-- S/SGT; mechanic + door gunner on RH53

--- "~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~
~~what were doing here~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A- #239

TO:			
SJCS			
FROM: Chief, DOC DIV			
SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Request	X	X	

REMARKS

1. This is in response to an FOI request* for documents relating to the weather conditions in Iran during the attempted hostage rescue mission.

2. All pertinent documents relating to the subject matter were reviewed and it was determined that all documents, except those attached, are still properly classified in the interest of the national defense in accordance with the provisions of DOD Reg 5200.1R, para 2-301c3, 4, 5, & 6. It was further determined that a significant and legitimate governmental purpose exists for preserving the secrecy of these exempt matters, because their disclosure would be expected to nullify the effectiveness of present and future military plans. Consequently, to the extent that the requested documents contain matters which cannot be released, the request of these documents must be denied.

3. Attached are documents which can be released to the FOI requestor. (Tabs A through D). In addition, we are providing (at Tab E) a list of references which were used as a basis for evaluation of climatological conditions in the Middle East region during the planning phase for the hostage rescue mission.

Reference:
* Freedom of Information Request #697(81-DFOI-50)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~Classified By: DJS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by: DDO NMCC 12 May 1992

ACTION OFFICER

S.D. Olynyk
LtCol, USAR
SOD, J-3
EXT 73455

DATE OF PREPARATION

23 Jan 81

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
J3	[signature]	75707			

B. Maximum predicted abort rates implicit in the decision to deploy eight helicopters. Information is provided only to show that statistical abort rates double that experienced by HM-16 actual operations should have still supported the number of helos required by commencing with eight.

1. Navy-wide in-flight abort rates are normally expressed in terms of number of mission aborts per one hundred (100) flight hours flown. Although not routinely reported, a better pretakeoff indicator of aircraft availability/reliability is the preflight abort rate expressed in number of preflight aborts per one hundred flights scheduled.

2. The planned first phase of the mission, in approximate terms, provided for the following scenario: take-off from NIMITZ; fly 30 minutes to the coast in point; fly another four hours and 30 minutes to Desert One, land and refuel (without systems shutdown); take-off from Desert One and fly for 1 hour and 30 minutes to Mountain Hideout; land and shutdown and be prepared to initiate rescue from Mountain Hideout.

3. By scheduling eight helicopters to insure seven arrive at the coast in point, a planned preflight abort rate (assuming no inflight aborts for the first 30 minutes) of 12.5 is implied. The availability of six helicopters at Desert One, assuming seven departed NIMITZ and after 5 hours of flight, implies an inflight abort rate of 2.86. Projecting this rate for one hour and 30 minutes over the next leg of the flight would establish 5.74 aircraft arriving at the Mountain Hideout. Planning on 5 aircraft subsequently departing from Mountain Hideout implies an abort rate for this takeoff of 12.89 which is more than double the rate actually experience by HM-16.

13B03

HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS

I. Purpose

To assess the adequacy of the number of helicopters positioned for the mission.

II. Background

1. A review of the abort rates experienced by the eight HM-16 mission RH-53Ds during flight operations from NIMITZ/KITTY HAWK during the period immediately preceeding EVENING LIGHT execution, though not timely for mission planning, is valuable in assessing the validity of the planner's estimates. The following HM-16 flight statistics are a matter of record:

	45 Days 10 Mar-24 Apr	115 Days 1 Jan-24 Apr
Flight hours	208	718
Flights scheduled	79	191
Preflight aborts	5 (3)	10 (6)
Inflight aborts	8 (4)	16 (6)
Preflight abort rate (per 100 flights)	6.3 (3.8)	5.2 (3.1)
Inflight abort rate (per 100 flight hours)	3.8 (1.9)	2.2 (0.8)

2. A statistical reconstruction of the helicopter mission scenario utilizing abort rates experienced by HM-16 using the 45 day period indicates that statestically, with eight RH-53Ds scheduled, 7.5 should launch, 6.1 should depart Desert One, 5.8 should arrive at Mountain Hideout, with 5.4 subsequently available for the rescue.

III. Main Points

1. A review of mission aircraft logs and maintenance records reveals that using realistic mission launch/continuation/abort criteria vice normal shipboard operating criteria for the 45-day sample period, considerably higher helicopter availability at Mountain Hideout could have been anticipated. Adjusting these values for non-mandatory mission aborts indicates that abort rates of 3.8 and 1.9 for preflight and inflight, respectively, could have been predicted. Again, with 8 aircraft

( ) predicted number if mission abort criteria utilized

13B04

[redacted] SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE
SJCS	UNCLASSIFIED	
THRU:	DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE
Chief, DOC DIV	DJSM DATE	
SUBJECT:	ACTION	

APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X	X		

Freedom of Information Request

REMARKS

1. This is in response to an FOI request* for documents relating to the weather conditions in Iran during the attempted hostage rescue mission.

2. All pertinent documents relating to the subject matter were reviewed and it was determined that all documents, except those attached, are still properly classified in the interest of the national defense in accordance with the provisions of DOD Reg 5200.1R, para 2-301c3, 4, 5, & 6. It was further determined that a significant and legitimate governmental purpose exists for preserving the secrecy of these exempt matters, because their disclosure would be expected to nullify the effectiveness of present and future military plans. Consequently, to the extent that the requested documents contain matters which cannot be released, the request of these documents must be denied.

3. Attached are documents which can be released to the FOI requestor. (Tabs A through D). In addition, we are providing (at Tab E) a list of references which were used as a basis for evaluation of climatalogical conditions in the Middle East region during the planning phase for the hostage rescue mission.

Reference:
* Freedom of Information Request #697(81-DFOI-50)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~Classified By: OJS~~ ~~Declassified On: OADR~~

ACTION OFFICER
S.D. Olynyk/jeo
LtCol, USAR
SOD, J-3
EXT 73455

DATE OF PREPARATION
23 Jan 81

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
SOD	[signature]	72602			
MilSec	[signature]	54532			
J-33	[signature]	72656			
J-31	[signature]	56243			
EXEC	[signature]	78863			

scheduled to launch from NIMITZ, 6.5 could have been expected to take-off from Mountain Hideout. Further, since there were no preflight aborts aboard NIMITZ, 6.7 RH-53Ds could have been expected to depart Mountain Hideout.

2. Statistical analysis notwithstanding, the actual inflight helicopter abort rate for the first five hour leg of the mission far exceeded all predictions based upon RH-53D history and recent operational experience with the eight mission aircraft. Those inflight failures encountered were not uncommon to H-53 helicopters. The failure modes were predictable; the frequency of the aborting failures encountered was not. Two flight essential systems failures (a main rotor blade on aircraft #6 and a second stage hydraulic system failure on #2) plus a flight/navigation instrumentation failure (ASN-50 and TACAN on aircraft #5) in adverse weather conditions resulted in the mission helicopters experiencing a 7.5 or greater inflight abort rate. Conversely, the preflight abort rate had been 0.0 for the take-off from NIMITZ.

3. The severity of the inflight malfunctions and the appropriateness of the actions taken by the pilots are not at issue.

(A) Dual electrical BIM (Blade Inspection Method) indications inflight of an impending rotor blade failure, confirmed by a mechanical indicator upon landing, are normally cause for an abort. Three fatal H-53 accidents have been attributed to blade failure, one of which occurred 16 flight hours after failure indications had been ignored. A total of 31 blades have been found during rework to have had spar cracks, all of which were removed due to BIM mechanical indications. Determination of a faulty indicator vice a failing blade is not possible in the field and the crack propagation rate at high helicopter weights is difficult to predict. Had flight been continued by aircraft #6, a castastrophic failure further into the mission was possible.

(B) Prolonged flight following failure of one of the two redundant primary servo hydraulic systems is not prudent. The pilot of aircraft #2 proceeded to Desert One following 2d stage hydraulic system failure (flight

I. Purpose

To discuss RH-53D reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) Historical Data.(U)

II. Background. A review of 3M (maintenance, material management) data for the 18 month period ending 31 Dec 79 Navy wide for the 30 aircraft RH-53D fleet reveals the following:

Average number of aircraft reporting monthly	19.9
Utilization (average flight hours per aircraft per month	24.6
Total flight hours	8811.7
Total flights aborted	841
Preflight aborts	555
Inflight aborts	286
Overall abort rate (per 100 flt hrs)	9.5
Preflight abort rate (per 100 flt hrs)	6.3
Inflight abort rate (per 100 flt hrs)	3.3
Mission Capable Rate (% aircraft hours per month mission capable)	42%
NMCS Rate (% aircraft hours per month not mission capable for supply)	26%
NMCM Rate (% aircraft Hours per Month not mission capable for maintenance)	32%
Direct maintenance man-hours per flight hour	46

III. Main Points

A. Determination of the number of helicopters required for the mission. The initial requirement levied on COMNAVAIRLANT was to provide one Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) Squadron. HM-16 with six (6) RH-53D helicopters was deployed. As mission planning changed to require a minimum of six helicopters launching on the mission, two additional helicopters, were deployed. Subsequent planning called for a minimum of seven helicopters airborn and mission capable at the coast in point and six at Desert One for mission continuation. Such planning was keyed to a requirement for five mission capable helicopters at Mountain Hide-out. Eight mission RH-53Ds was considered adequate based upon past operational and maintenance experience.

13B02

duration of approximately two hours). Assessing the failure at the refueling point and then determining that a replacement pump was not available, the pilot and the flight leader declared the aircraft not mission capable. Failure of the remaining hydraulic system inflight would have rendered the helicopter uncontrollable. Further, the demanding flight control movements associated with landing in and taking off from a confined area while heavily loaded could have exceeded the capability of the one remaining system to provide adequate control of the aircraft for safe flight.

(C) Failure of the ASN-5Q and its associated flight instruments and the TACAN were not of themselves aborting discrepancies. The aircraft commander felt that continued flight into the mountains in instrument conditions at low altitude without adequate heading information and without aircraft stabilization was not possible. The aircraft commander also felt that with no indication that the weather would improve ahead on the flight path, he could not have expected to penetrate through instrument conditions and locate the refueling point without an operating TACAN. The pilot felt his only course of action was to abort the mission and return to NIMITZ.

4. Finally, the overall material condition of the mission helicopters should be considered. A comparison of fleet-wide and mission aircraft reliability, availability and maintainability is provided below:

	ALL NAVY JUL 78-DEC 79	MISSION ACFT 1 JAN - APR 80
Preflight abort rate (per 100 hrs)	6.3	2.4
Inflight abort rate (per 100 hrs)	3.3	3.8*
Mission capable (MC) (%)	42	73
Not mission capable - supply (NMCS) (%)	26	13
Not mission capable - maintenance (NMCM) (%)	32	14
Direct maintenance manhours/ flight hour (DMMH/FH)	46	114

*Skewed upward because a relatively high percentage of post maintenance inspection flights wherein premission maintenance actions were being test flown.

13B06

Analysis of these data confirm that the eight mission RH-53D helicopters demonstrated high reliability and availability during the period they were deployed when compared to other RH-53D's Navy wide. The special supply support procedures extablished resulted in the NMCS rate of HM-16 aircraft being half that of other fleet users. Equally impressive as a result of the dedicated maintenance effort was the high mission capable rate maintained and the significant number of maintenance man hours per flight hours expended on the RH-53Ds. HM-16 expended approximately two and one half times the number of maintenance man hours per flight hour than the average other Navy users.

IV. Helicopter Assessment Summary. Regarding the adequacy of RH-53D helicopters planned for the mission, it is concluded that:

(A) The number of helicopters provided to support the mission was considered adequate based upon operational and maintenance experience. Implicit in this decision was the planning for slightly lower than average inflight failure rates but an exceptionally high number of pre-flight aborts. On balance the planning could be considered conservative.

(B) Statistically, eight helicopters would have been sufficient to insure five mission capable at Mountain Hideout.

(C) The helicopters received priority supply support and intensive pre-mission maintenance.

(D) Operational experience with these helicopters immediately prior to the mission indicated a high probability of success with eight aircraft operational upon mission execution.

(E) The aborting failures experienced on this mission were not uncommon to helicopters in general and H-53s in particular.

(F) The high failure/abort rate experienced could not have been predicted.

CONFIDENTIAL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MARINES

#285 A

A, C,

X

PITMAN, CHARLES H. COLONEL USMC

DATE OF RANK: 1 OCT 76

DATE OF BIRTH: 20 OCT 35

PLACE OF BIRTH: CHICAGO, ILL

HOME OF RECORD: MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: HEADQUARTERS, USMC.

PERRYMAN, JAMES M COLONEL USMC

DATE OF RANK: 1 FEB 78

DATE OF BIRTH: 7 FEB 33

PLACE OF BIRTH: WASHINGTON, D.C.

HOME OF RECORD: WASHINGTON, D.C.

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: HEADQUARTERS, USMC

[redacted] CAPTAIN USMC

DATE OF RANK [redacted]

DATE OF BIRTH [redacted]

PLACE OF BIRTH: [redacted]

HOME OF RECORD: [redacted]

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: 2D MARINE AIR WING, NEW RIVER, NORTH CAROLINA

G

SEIFFERT, EDWARD B. LIEUTENANT COLONEL USMC

DATE OF RANK: 1 JULY 79

DATE OF BIRTH: 20 APRIL 40

PLACE OF BIRTH: ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

HOME OF RECORD: ERIE, NEW YORK

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: HEADQUARTERS, USMC

Classified by: DJSOA 18 Oct 85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL

OK DJSOA 18 Oct OADR

ST, PHILIP C LIEUTENANT GENERAL USAF

DATE OF BIRTH: 9 JAN 30

PLACE OF BIRTH: PHILADELPHIA, MISSOURI

DATE ENTERED SERVICE: AUGUST 52

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: LANGLEY, VIRGINIA(VICE COMMANDER, TACTICAL AIR COMMAND)

KYLE, JAMES H. COLONEL USAF

DATE OF BIRTH: 19 DEC 32

PLACE OF BIRTH: KANSAS CITY, KANSAS

DATE ENTERED SERVICE: JULY 54

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE(ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, 1606TH AIR BASE WING)

(C) [redacted]

DATE OF BIRTH [redacted] G,A

PLACE OF BIRTH [redacted]

DATE ENTERED SERVICE [redacted]

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT [redacted]

[redacted]

DATE OF BIRTH [redacted] G

PLACE OF BIRTH [redacted]

DATE ENTERED SERVICE [redacted]

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: HEADQUARTERS, AIR WEATHER SERVICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. [redacted]

NAME: JAMES BENJAMIN VAUGHT

RANK: MAJOR GENERAL, USA

DOB: 3 NOVEMBER 1926

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT: DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AND READINESS, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS, UNITED STATES ARMY, WASHINGTON, DC.

DATE ENTERED SERVICE: 21 FEB 1946 - TEMPORARY PROMOTION TO 2LT

PLACE OF BIRTH: CONWAY, SOUTH CAROLINA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

A-#310

THE JOINT STAFF

2 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Gast, USAF
Major General Vaught, USA

Subject: SASC Request for Information and Additional Witnesses Concerning the Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt

Reference: Memorandum, LLA/CJCS, 2 June 1980, "SASC Requests--Rescue Mission" (attached)

1. Per reference cited above, Senator Warner has requested additional information and witnesses in connection with the Iranian hostage rescue attempt.

2. For LTG Gast: Senator Warner has requested that the SASC be provided with the names and present location of all members of the Iran MAAG who served during the last year in which the MAAG operated in Iran.

3. For MG Vaught: SASC has requested that the following individuals be made available to appear before the SASC staff on Wednesday, 4 June 1980, at 1400:

MSGT [redacted] Air Combat Controller on site
Mr. [redacted] Sikorsky RH-53D Tech Rep aboard NIMITZ

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Copy to:
Mr. Stempler
Mr. Ross
CJCS
ACJCS
DJS
J-30
Col Miller, LL/CJCS
Col Miller, OATSD(LA)
Col Abel

~~Classified By: DJS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: DJSOA
18 Oct 85
Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

A-#311

X

J3M- 1008'80

5 June 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training)/Chief of Naval Personnel
Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower

Subject: Information Concerning Personnel Assigned to Iranian MAAG

1. Senator John Warner (R, VA) has requested that the Senate Armed Services Committee be provided with the names and current addresses of personnel assigned to the ARMISH MAAG (Iran) during the last twelve months of its existence. For the purposes of developing a response, this period is being defined as 1 February 1978 - 1 February 1979.

2. Request you provide a listing of officer personnel of your Service assigned to ARMISH MAAG during this timeframe, along with the current military address of each. In the event that any of the officers identified are no longer in Military Service, request you provide the best available civilian address.

3. The Joint Staff point of contact is LTC Robert Kvederas, USA, J-3, AV 225-2994.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Copy to:
Commander, US Army Military Personnel Center
Commander, Naval Military Personnel Center
Commander, US Air Force Manpower Personnel Center

Classified by: DJSM 18 Oct 85
Declassify: OADR

~~Classified By: DJS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A-#319

(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

6/9/80

Memo for Dick

Would you please get answers for Tom Ross to the questions checked on the attached (#s 9, 10 and 11).

F/I: TR can handle the other questions, either because of his own knowledge or by not answering the questions.

Don

Donald Y. Wakefield
Colonel, USA
Military Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

9

QUESTIONS:

(1) Why was some equipment not destroyed when our troops left Iran?

(2) Is there a possibility that Army equipment would have been better suited than Navy equipment for a mission of this nature?

PROPOSED RESPONSE:

(1) A considered decision was made not to destroy equipment left in Iran, based on several factors. The C-130 had been on the ground at Desert One longer than originally planned and their fuel was becoming critical for their own departure. Delay to destroy equipment would have exacerbated the situation. Small arms ammunition from the aircraft involved in the collision was cooking off from the heat of the fire and was exploding. In addition, the helicopters were next to the C-130s and the risk of damaging the C-130s while purposely destroying the helos was considered too great. Delayed explosives were not available to allow destruction of equipment after the C-130s departed.

(2) Navy RH-53 helicopters were chosen for this mission because of their long range and heavy load-carrying capabilities. In addition, with their folding tail and rotor blades, they were uniquely suited to be accommodated aboard ship, the helicopter launch site. The parameters of the mission were extremely demanding, and neither the Army nor the Air Force has helicopters as well suited. Mission security considerations also made the Navy helo more attractive for the operation.

Enclosure

QUESTIONS:

(1) Why was some equipment not destroyed when our troops left Iran?

(2) Is there a possibility that Army equipment would have been better suited than Navy equipment for a mission of this nature?

PROPOSED RESPONSE:

(1) A considered decision was made not to destroy equipment left in Iran, based on several factors. Foremost was the desire to maintain the element of surprise so that the presence of our forces would not be detected and reacted against until they had safely withdrawn. In addition, every effort was made to avoid unnecessary fatality or injury to Iranians, which delayed destruction might inadvertantly cause.

(2) Navy RH-53 helicopters were chosen for this mission because of their long range and heavy load-carrying capabilities. In addition, with their folding tail and rotor blades, they were uniquely suited to be accommodated aboard ship, the helicopter launch site. The parameters of the mission were extremely demanding, and neither the Army nor the Air Force has helicopters as well suited.

Enclosure

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(2) Is there a possibility that Army equipment would have been better suited than Navy equipment for a mission of this nature?

PROPOSED RESPONSE:

(1) A considered decision was made not to destroy equipment left in Iran, based on several factors. Foremost was the desire to maintain the element of surprise so that the presence of our forces would not be detected and reacted against until they had safely withdrawn. In addition, every effort was made to avoid unnecessary fatality or injury to Iranians, which delayed destruction might inadvertantly cause. Access to the equipment by Iranians would not give them any increase in capability which would be detrimental to US interests.

(2) Navy RH-53 helicopters were chosen for this mission because of their long range and heavy load-carrying capabilities. In addition, with their folding tail and rotor blades, they were uniquely suited to be accommodated aboard ship, the helicopter launch site. The parameters of the mission were extremely demanding, and neither the Army nor the Air Force has helicopters as well suited.

Enclosure

A-347

[redacted]

INFORMATION POSSIBLY OBTAINED BY IRANIANS	INFORMATION PROVIDED CONGRESS?	REMARKS
"BLUE BINDER" - Emergency LZ Location/ Photos/Tehran Maps	Yes	Discussed by Sec Claytor/Gen Pustay HAC 2 Jun
[redacted] INFORMATION SHEET (Call signs/frequencies, CAP reference points, nav points (e.g., helo hide, warehouse, Manzariyeh)	Yes	Concept of total mission discussed with HAC 2 Jun. Complete details of times and locations of planned mission not discussed or requested during testimony.
Flight Route Maps	Yes	Maps covered helo portion of mission. Discussed in concept with HAC 2 Jun.
Brevity Codes (Codewords for radar site Manzariyeh, MFA [redacted]	Yes	Not directly related to concept of operation Can assist in reconstruction of mission plan by inference. Mentioned by Gen Vaught to SASC on 7 May.
Daily Changing Code Words for 24 Apr	No	Tactical flight information cards not specifically hostage mission related.
CVW-8 Card of the Day	No	Standard Air Wing card of ship call signs. Not hostage mission related.

NOTE: Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee 7-8 May was limited, generally, to events leading up to and during Desert 1. Testimony to House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on 2 Jun expanded frame of reference to portions of extraction phase.

[redacted]

Enclosure

[redacted]

LIST OF FORMAL CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON RESCUE MISSION

Date	Committee	Witnesses
28 April 1980	House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee	DepSecDef Claytor LtGen Pustay, USAF
7 May 1980	Senate Armed Services Committee	LtGen Gast, USAF MG Vaught, USA COL Beckwith, USA LtCol Seiffert, USMC LtCol [redacted], USAF
8 May 1980	Senate Armed Services Committee	SecDef Brown Gen Jones, USAF Gen Meyer, USA ADM Hayward, USN Gen Mathis, USAF Gen Barrow, USMC
2 June 1980	House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee	DepSecDef Claytor LtGen Pustay, USAF LtGen Gast, USAF MG Vaught, USA COL Beckwith, USA COL Perryman, USMC LtCol Seiffert, USMC

Enclosure

SECRET

Questions and Proposed Answers

H-564

1. Do tapes exist for the Iran Rescue Mission with recordings of various radio transmissions? If so, to whom do they belong or what government agency has custody of them? Are the tapes classified? If so, what is their classification?

Answer: Some tape recordings do exist for the Iran rescue mission. They are classified and remain in the custody of the Department of Defense.

2. Who has heard the tapes?

Answer: Defense civilian and military officials.

3. I would like a DOD comment on the following allegations made by my sources:

a. The tapes reportedly reveal troops on the ground were under the impression that they were under enemy fire after the helicopter collision and departed in a disorderly way for that reason ... leaving material behind.

b. The tapes also reveal troops "panicked" after the crash--with "crying and screaming" transmitted.

By Mr. Hamilton
Per Mr. Kerr
17 June 80

Answers:

This is incorrect.

a. The force acted in a very orderly way to extract people from the C-130 and helicopters, gather up personnel and equipment at the site, and load the C-130s. Equipment on the helicopters in the vicinity of the collision was, for the most part, left in place because of the danger caused by the exploding ammunition and extreme heat of the burning aircraft. Colonel Beckwith described the

Enclosure

scene and orderly load-up and departure in some detail in his press conference of May 1. There was a good deal of heroism displayed under very dangerous circumstances.

b. As we have said in the past, we [have no evidence from any source know of no instance] of panic, though it can be surmised that the reaction to an aircraft collision, fire and exploding ammunition caused some initial anxiety and confusion among those closest to the explosion. [While the specific contents of the tapes remain classified, there is nothing in the recordings that might indicate "panic".]

Changed by Mr. Hamilton per Mr. Sherman 17 Jun 80

4. Have the tapes been subpoenaed by Congress? Is the DOD negotiating with any other branch of the government regarding release of the tapes?

Answer: Congress has requested tapes of the rescue mission. DOD has said it will review what is available and get back to Congress. There is no subpoena or pending legal action by Congress to obtain the tapes.

DRAFT RESPONSES: "The Nation" news queries of June 13

1. Tape recordings do exist for the Iran rescue mission. They are classified and remain in the custody of the Department of Defense.

2. Defense civilian and military officials.

3. a. As we have said in the past, we know of no instance of panic, though it can be surmized that the reaction to an aircraft collision, fire and exploding ammunition caused some initial anxiety and confusion among those most proximate to the explosion. All of the force acted in a very disciplined manner to extract people from the C-130 and helicopters, gather up personnel and equipment, bring in the security force and methodically load the C-130's. Colonel Beckwith described the scene in some detail in his press conference May 1. His force went to great lengths to insure no member of the mission was inadvertently left behind prior to the departure of the last C-130 following the collision. Colonel Beckwith stated that his officers went into every helicopter to insure his personnel and equipment were removed and that the only equipment he lost was destroyed on the C-130 involved in the collision.

b. To repeat, we know of no instance of troops "panicking" following the crash. We have no comment on what transmissions may or may not have transpired from the C-130 and helicopter involved in the collision.

4.

Drafted by: LCDR G.I. PETERSON, USN
Operations News Branch, DDI OASD-PA
x75331



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

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

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

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Stempler and East. Current status: East and Hamilton feel we should wait until Senate can participate, either first or in conjunction with House. Stempler apparently feels we should go ahead with House.

- Only our Red Book has been kept up to date. Actions have just about stopped! Copies of all actions have been provided Sens. Vaught and East, but no attempt to keep up their books.

- Anything that comes up between now and your return has been funneled to Steve Olynyk.

- Enjoy!

Mike

P.S. - You probably will want to gather up the books that have been sent out on distribution.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified By: DJS

Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A-339

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Date 25 July 1980

MEMO TO: GENERAL ~~GAST~~ C-in-C Olympic affairs

SecDef received the attached correspondence from Congressman Aspin. The subject of his constituent's letter has come up before, but we have not had a formal rebuttal. Would appreciate any input you may provide upon which to base a reply. If possible, would like response by 30 July.

Thanks for your help.

Dick

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: DJS
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

Declassified by DDO, NMCC 12 May 1992

RICHARD F. ABEL, COLONEL, USAF
Special Assistant to the Chairman for Public Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A-337

Declassified by DOD NMCC 11 May 92

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

Date 22 July

To LTG Gast

Subject: Congressional Request

I have been asked by COL. Miller to draft a reply to attached request.

I would appreciate any guidance you may have on the content of the proposed response.

LTC S. Olynyk
7345/7279

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Classified By: DJS

F

were answered verbally by LT GEN Gast to OSD(PA)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

June 17, 1980

A #328

MEMO TO GENERAL GAST

Dave Martin of Newsweek has posed the following questions as his final attack on the subject:

1. He has been told that a Pentagon computer calculation put the probable fatality toll at 11 hostages, 30 commandos and 80-90 Iranians. Another source said there was a prediction of 20 percent casualties. Is there anything in this? (If so, we ought to say -- if true -- that it was a worst case assessment.)

2. Martin understood you to say that one of the helicopters could have been repaired at Desert One, if a pump had been available, and the mission could have proceeded even after daylight to a point short of the hideaway. Did he get you right? If so, why didn't you send a pump rather than a manifold?

3. Was General Vaught in a C-130 on the ground or actually on the ground?

4. The Star carried a story saying a "Defense readiness report" said ten helicopters would be needed at the start to get the right number at the finish. Is that so?

5. Sam Stratton is quoting Beckwith as testifying that he would have had to have left 15 of his men behind with only five helicopters and that he couldn't do that because all of them had required jobs to do. Why wasn't there a contingency plan to do it with less, if necessary?

6. Martin has heard of a disagreement on the ground about what to do with the bus passengers, suggesting that there was no plan for what to do if Iranians were encountered. Why wasn't there a contingency?

7. Was the Iranian radar turned off as reported afterwards from Teheran?

8. Any plans for issuing decorations to those involved in the rescue mission?

9. How much did the operation cost?

10. You said the CH53 helicopter was never considered because of insufficient range. How then was it possible to train on a full mission profile?

Martin's deadline is Thursday evening.

Tom

Thomas B. Ross



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[redacted] AF-343

COMPONENT OJCS CONFIDENTIAL DEFENSE WITNESS/BRIEFER LOG - WEEK ENDING

DATE	PRINCIPAL WITNESS/ BRIEFER	NO. SUPPORT PERS.	OFFICE	MEMBER, STAFF OR COMMITTEE	SUBJECT	HOURS
5 Apr	Claytor, Pustay			HASC SASC	Iran Hostage Rescue Mission	1 1/4 1
8 Apr	Claytor, Pustay			HAC Def Sub	" " "	2
8 Apr	Cassidy			SASC	" " "	3
9 Apr	Cassidy			HASC	" " "	2
9 Apr	Cassidy, Todd, Pitman, Perryman, Seiffert, [redacted]			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	3
0 Apr	Seiffert, [redacted]			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	3
1 May	Pitman, Seiffert, [redacted]			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	10 3/4
2 May	Pitman, Kyle, [redacted]			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	8 1/2
5 May	Beckwith, Guidry, Gast, Vaught			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	6
5 May	Beckwith			HASC	" " "	2
6 May	Gast, Vaught			HASC	" " "	3
7 May	Gast, Vaught, Beckwith, Seiffert, [redacted] Kyle, Pitman			SASC	" " "	6 3/4
8 May	Jones, Brown, Meyer, Hayward, Mathis, Barrow			SASC	" " "	4 3/4

[redacted]

Classified By: ~~[redacted]~~
Declassified ON: ~~[redacted]~~

DJSOA, 18Oct85
OADR

COMPONENT OJCS [redacted] DEFENSE WITNESS/BRIEFER LOG - WEEK ENDING

DATE	PRINCIPAL WITNESS/ BRIEFER	NO. SUPPORT PERS.	OFFICE	MEMBER, STAFF OR COMMITTEE	SUBJECT	HOURS
8 May	Pustay			HFAC	Iran Hostage Rescue Mission	1
8 May	Kyle, [redacted] Guidry			HASC	" " "	3
2 May	Pustay			HASC, Stennis, Tower	" " "	1 3/4
6 May	Perryman, [redacted]			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	3
9 May	[redacted]			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	3
0 May	Claytor, Pustay			House Intel	" " "	2
0 May	King, Fleming			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	2
3 May	[redacted] Shaefer			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	2
? Jun	Claytor, Pustay, Beckwith (Perryman, Seiffert)	Gast, Vaught,		HAC Def Sub	" " "	2 1/2
4 Jun	[redacted]			SASC/Warner Group	" " "	2

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

i-743

THE JOINT STAFF

29 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Deficiencies Noted During HONEY BADGER

Deficiencies or problem areas noted during HONEY BADGER/ TRAINEX PHOENIX.

- Personnel problems
  - The crew force is undermanned - JTD requires 12 qualified crews to man Pave Low aircraft.
  - TDY status of personnel - Crew members cannot be kept in TDY status indefinately.
  - Training and upgrade of new personnel in special operation procedures basic night nvg operations and Pave Low.
- Operations
  - See Atch 1, Atch 2, and Atch 3.
  - Basic special operations skills of helicopter pilots.
  - Inter-service coordination lacking
  - Mission briefings and briefing guides non-existant or inadequate for all phases of mission.
  - Terminal operations
    - Landing zone procedures
    - Pickup zone procedures
    - Holding area procedures
    - Refueling zone procedures
    - Transhipment zone procedures
    - Ground control
    - CCT activities
    - Lost comm
  - Planning staff inadequate
- Aircraft
  - Qualify H-53 cockpits for NVG operations
  - ~~Camoflage techniques to hide aircraft during daylight~~
  - Development of medical evacuation capability and emergency pickup of downed aircrews.

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Classified By: ~~JCS~~
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~
Declassified by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

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C-740

AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS
RELATED TO HONEY BADGER

1. The following aircraft incidents have occurred during Operation HONEY BADGER on the indicated dates:

11 July

P.L. #790

Collapsed nose gear - roughly midnight, approximately 10 miles from Dugway - training mission night of 11 July, during landing in remote LZ work, collapsed its nose strut. Normal mishap procedures utilized. Aircraft presently Hill AFB undergoing repairs. Estimate up status two to three weeks.

15/16 July Exercise

15 July

Approximately 2240 local, Pave Low #648, experienced a suspected engine fire in flight and landed beside a highway approximately 15 miles SSE of Ely, Nevada. Upon landing crew observed exhaust deflector disattached. Aircraft repaired, returned to Dugway next day.

15 July

HH-53 Slick, had to RON Las Vegas due to loss of vertical gyro. Aircraft returned to Dugway next day during daylight hours.

15 July

UH-60, during TONOPAH operations encountered mechanical problems. Repaired aircraft and departed for Dugway approximately 0800, 16 July (Major [redacted] on scene as JTD Coordinator.)

16 July

In a related matter, JTD was called on 16 July by TAC HQ and asked if a light plane that had crashed with General Phillips on board was connected with HONEY BADGER activities. Following check of deployed HONEY BADGER Headquarters, provided a negative reply which was forwarded to TAC HQ.

Classified By: ~~JCS~~
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

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Declassified by
DT

AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS
RELATED TO HONEY BADGER (Continued)

17 July

CH-47, Tail # 7422290, departing Norton AFB, in redeployment to Ft. Campbell, crashed approximately 1720Z 25 NM ENE Norton. Crashed in wooded remote site. One fatality, three (3) injuries. Suspect blade stall.

18 July, Approximately 1145 EDT

CH-53C, tail # 695786, assigned to 1550 ATTW, Kirtland AFB, NM, on a deployment flight from Dugway to Hurlburt crashed approximately 220 NM NW of Kirtland AFB, NM. One fatality, six injuries. Aircraft was lead in flight of four. Approximately 1000 AGL, crew experienced an uncommanded flight control input; while attempting emergency landing, aircraft crashed. Suspect AFCS malfunction. Weather not a factor. Initial report indicated that aircraft was tail #431 and assigned to Eglin AFB. Information corrected late afternoon of 18 July. Reason for error in S/N is unknown at this time.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL
FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 23801

J-(52)

ATSM-DTA 15 December 1980

SUBJECT: JTF 1-79 After Action Report (November 1979 to December 1980)

Commander
JTF 1-79
JCS
Washington, DC 20301

1. References:

a. Airdrop Annex to OPLAN (19 November 1979 to 19 February 1980).

b. Airdrop Annex to OPLAN (Part II, 20 February 1980 to 29 April 1980).

c. Airdrop Annex to Honey Badger (18 June 1980 to 17 July 1980).

2. (U) General: The parachute rigging element was formed on 19 November 1979 to provide responsive conventional/unconventional heavy drop support to all elements within the JTF. The above references cover the detailed sequence of test events, airdrops, and operations that transpired during the transition from an airdrop mode of insertion of POL support to the combat off-load techniques developed. The role of the rigging element was also modified concurrently with a shift from airdrop support to the operational conduct of the Forward Area Refueling/Rearming Point (FARRP) locations. This mission shift forced the augmentation of the rigging element with trained POL personnel to perform the actual pumping operation. As this training became more advanced and concentrated, a complete new pumping system had to be developed and tested to replace the standard 100 GPM Fare System in order to achieve the desired pumping pressures and refueling times. At the present time, the rigging element has the total capability to conduct low level airdrops of all POL systems, bulldozers and special items of equipment, combat off-load of POL systems and ammunition, and when augmented, the operations of FARRP's.

3. (S) Unit Organization:

a. In November 1979, the Airborne developed a special operations rigging element consisting of (1) O-6, (1) WO, (9) NCO's from within its TDA assets.

b. In May 1980, a mission statement was obtained from Commander, JTF 1-79, and a permanent augmentation of (1) WO and (9) NCO's were added to the TDA of the Airborne Department, QMS, to provide continuous support and training to all elements of the Task Force.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: DEPT OF THE ARMY
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded to Secret
DDONMIC 4 Aug 92

ATSM-DTA 15 December 1980
SUBJECT: JTF 1-79 After Action Report (November 1979 to December 1980)

c. The rigging detachment has been recommended for retention as a [redacted] unit under the [redacted] structure.

4. (S) Refueling Equipment:

a. Fifteen new lightweight refueling systems (175-300 GPM pumps, 200 GPM Filter/Separators) along with 15 modified M274 weapons carriers and 40, 500 gallon collapsible drums, plus PLL's are assembled at Fort Bragg, NC, for operational support as necessary. There is no formal accountability on this equipment.

b. Discussions with the J-4, [redacted] on this problem resulted in a message to DA proposing that the equipment be positioned with the 101st Airborne Division. It is envisioned that the accountability of the equipment will be formalized and a special POL team developed to support and trained for future operations.

c. Recommend the transfer of this equipment and the establishment of the special POL team be expedited.

5. (S) Hostage Rescue Task Force Achievements:

a. Developed low level night airdrop techniques for 500 gallon collapsible drums, 100 GPM Fare Systems and M-274 weapons carriers in a modified CDS configuration. Drop aircraft tested:

(1) MC-130.

(2) C-141B (long range penetration w/in-flight refueling).

b. Developed low level night airdrop techniques for motorcycles for use by Delta/Ranger forces. Personnel jump behind the motorcycles. Modified CDS configuration used in MC-130 and C-141B aircraft.

c. Developed low level night airdrop techniques for the following bulldozers [redacted] Type aircraft used: MC-130, EC-130.

d. Developed combat off-load techniques of POL systems and prime movers from MC-130 and C-141B aircraft.

e. Developed, tested, and trained on an improved (175-300 GPM) light-weight FARE system with the capability of high pressure refueling the Pave Low (CH-53) UH-60, AH-1S, [redacted] CH-47 helicopters.

f. Developed, in conjunction with the CCT/Pathfinder elements, blackout refueling and rearming techniques.

G [redacted]
Parachute Rigging Element Commander

7 Incl
1. AD Annex to OPLAN
2. AD Annex to OPLAN, Part II
3. AD Annex to Honey Badger
4. Honey Badger OT&E Act Rpt, ATSM-DT-A-07
5. Honey Badger OT&E Act Rpt, ATSM-DT-A-08
6. Honey Badger OT&E Act Rpt, ATSM-DT-A-09
7. Honey Badger OT&E Act Rpt, ATSM-DT-A-10

Airdrop Annex to OPLAN

1. (U) Mission:

a. Airdrop from low altitude, sufficient JP-4 in 500 gallon collapsible drums, 100 GPM FARE Systems, and M-274 ½ ton weapons carriers to refuel six (6) CH-53 Marine Helicopters at a pre-determined location in _____.

b. Prepare a back-up airdrop refueling system for the primary mission or for use as a contingency.

2. (U) Organization and Forces:

a. Primary rigging element consisted of (1) O-6, (1) WO and (9) NCO's from the Airborne Department, QMS, Fort Lee, VA (Incl 1).

b. Rigging support element at the primary CONUS operational location was the Air Delivery Branch of the USA Airborne Test Board, Fort Bragg, NC (Incl 2).

c. Two additional personnel were attached to the primary rigging element from the 82d Airborne Division to service the 100 GPM FARE Systems and M-274 ½ ton weapons carriers (Incl 1).

d. Logistical source for this mission was the G-4 Office, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC.

3. (U) Command and Control:

a. Command and control was primarily provided through the JTF J-3 with additional direction given by the JTF Commander and Chief of Staff.

b. The lack of a sustained JTF J-4 system required supporting logistical demands for other elements of the JTF. These were usually requested by whoever needed the support.

c. Command and control at forward departure bases were relayed through the senior JTF member at the location to the rigging element.

4. (U) Intelligence: Necessary intelligence was obtained from the JTF J-2 as required.

5. (U) Planning:

a. An initial analysis of the mission indicated that conventional techniques for the heavy drop or low altitude parachute extraction (LAPES) could not be used for the following reasons:

(1) The MC-130's (Combat Talon) were to be the air delivery aircraft. These aircraft did not have operational dual-rail systems for either mode of delivery.

(2) The mission was to be conducted at night over an unlighted, unknown area and LAPES techniques have not been developed for this type drop.

A nonstandard system was developed to drop 500 gallon collapsible drums (Blivets) from an altitude of 750' using a Container Delivery System (CDS) from the C-7A Caribou manual, modifying the roller conveyor system in the Combat Talon and using standard C-130 CDS airdrop techniques. The M-274. ½ ton weapons carrier (Mule) was also to be dropped in this same nonstandard configuration. All accompanying loads were to be added to the Mule system. The 100 GPM FARE pump systems were to be rigged in a standard A-22 CDS container with the exception of the long grounding rods; these were on the Mule systems.

b. The initial requirement for airdrop was to provide 51,000 lbs of JP-4 to five CH-53 helicopters. The airdrop loads required four Combat Talon aircraft for delivery and consisted of 19 Blivets, 4 A-22's and 2 Mule loads. The Combat Talon modified for CDS has 27' 6" of useable floor space from the buffer board stop to the beginning of the lower ramp. Inclosure 3 contains the air loading table for this requirement and the back-up system.

c. A revised requirement was subsequently decided upon by the JTF to airdrop 30 Blivets (90,000 lbs of JP-4), 6 A-22's and 3 Mules to refuel six CH-53 helicopters (Incl 4). Six Combat Talon aircraft were now available for the airdrop. The back-up system to be used as a contingency would now consist of 22 Blivets, 3 A-22's, and 2 Mule loads.

d. For the purpose of load identification at night, the loads would have the following markings: Blivets - 2 each green chemical lights, A-22's - 2 each blue chemical lights, Mules - 2 each blinking red pathfinder marking lights.

6. (U) Training:

a. The primary rigging elements were fully qualified parachute riggers that required only minimal additional training to adapt to the nonstandard techniques being utilized in the execution of this mission.

b. The rigging of the 100 GPM FARE System in the A-22 container for a 750' airdrop posed no technical problems. Without exception, this type always functioned properly without damage to the equipment. The rigged weight of this airdrop load is 970 lbs. Rigging instructions are contained in Incl 5.

c. The first airdrop of the Mule from 750' with a single G-12D cargo parachute and a direct break-away hook-up revealed that the load had

insufficient time to stabilize under the canopy before hitting the ground. Oscillation upon impact caused a crack across the front differential housing, making the vehicle inoperative. This was corrected by using two G-12D cargo parachutes with a modified 15' unreefed extraction parachute in lieu of direct break-away hook-up to the anchor line cable in the aircraft. These changes resulted in a less violent opening thus reducing the oscillation and a slower, stable rate of descent for the load. No further problems or damage occurred with this load. The rigged weight of this airdrop load is 1990 lbs. Rigging instructions are contained in Incl 5.

d. The Blivet was initially rigged with a single G-11A unreefed cargo parachute with a direct break-away hook-up to the anchor line cable in the aircraft. On 25 November 1979, a test drop of one Blivet load was authorized and conducted at Fort Bragg. The drop from 750' was totally satisfactory. On 3 December 1979, another drop consisting of a Blivet load and an A-22 was launched from Davis-Monthan AFB. This drop was also without incident. On 5 December 1979, two full aircraft loads were launched for drop. The compressed Blivets had a sling-shot effect in the aircraft when released. The dumping effect plus the heavy weight of the loads broke the aircraft's anchor line cables, causing the loss of seven out of 10 Blivets. Rigging procedures were changed by using two G-12D cargo parachutes and a modified 15' unreefed extraction parachute in lieu of the direct break-away hook-up system. An intermediate gate system was also installed on the Blivet loads. The intermediate gate system eliminated the sling-shot effect in the aircraft when the compressed loads are released. The different parachute system eliminated the violent opening and excessive stress on the anchor line cable in the aircraft. Subsequent tests at Fort Bragg and exercises in the field with the JTF confirmed the reliability of these procedures and techniques. The rigged weight of a Blivet load is 3500 lbs. Rigging procedures and type aircraft loads are contained in Incl 5.

7. (U) Logistics: The parachute rigging element received total support from the XVIII Airborne Corps and had no reportable problems. Accountability of air items and equipment issued was maintained by the Corps G-4 Office. Support by the USAF at departure air bases was considered to be outstanding.

8. (U) OPSEC Considerations: The selection of Airborne Test Board site at Pope AFB was considered to be ideal for the preparation, staging, movement and storage of the rigged heavy drop loads required to support this mission. Maintaining OPSEC throughout this period posed no significant problems.

9. (U) Recommendations:

a. The dual rail systems in the MC-130 (Combat Talon) be restored to an operational state and a functional tow plate be installed in the aircraft. This would increase the aircraft's versatility to use all available airdrop systems.

b. A night LAPES airdrop capability be developed with the Combat Talon. After having made several black-out landings in this aircraft, it appears feasible to me that as the radar navigators are giving glide-path data to the pilots during a landing approach, the drogue parachute can be released at a height of 35' and then extraction parachutes released at a height of 5-10'. The aircraft does not have to touch down but continues to fly low until the load exits the ramp, then departs the extraction zone. The impact point for the LAPES load would be the touch down coordinates used by the radar navigators.

c. A J-4 be activated concurrently with future JTF's.

d. The Airborne Department, QMS, continue to provide parachute rigging support to the JTF.

5 Incl
as

G [redacted]
Parachute Rigging Element Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIMARY RIGGING ELEMENT
AIRBORNE DEPARTMENT
US Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, VA

NAME	SSAN
[redacted]	[redacted]

AUGMENTATION
782d MAINTENANCE BATTALION
82d AIRBORNE DIVISION

[redacted]	[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIR DELIVERY BRANCH
US ARMY AIRBORNE TEST BOARD
FORT BRAGG, NC

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NAME	SSAN
W4 [redacted]	[redacted]
SG [redacted]	[redacted]
FC [redacted]	[redacted]
FC [redacted]	[redacted]
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27 November 1979

AIR LOADING TABLE

#NR	LOAD	WT.(lbs)	LOAD LGTH	PAX	REMARKS
5	5 BLIVETS 1 M-274, *Nets, (4) 5 gal cans MOGAS W/Nozzles, (2) 8' ladder, 2 sheets plywood, (4) 2"X6"X6', 1g grounding rods	17,500 1,990		1	*#1 load - 3 nets PAX - Rigger
	TOTAL	19,490	26'7"	1	
9	4 BLIVETS 1 A-22 W/100GPM Pump, Filter Separator, Accessory Kit W/Marine CCR Nozzle 1 M-274, Nets (4) 5 gal cans MOGAS W/Nozzles, (2) 8' ladder, 2 sheets plywood, (4) 2"X6"X6', 1g grounding rods	1,400 970 1,990		1	*#9 load for training #2 load - 3 nets #9 load - No Marine Nozzle PAX - Rigger
	TOTAL	16,960	26'	1	
	5 BLIVETS 1 A-22 W/100GPM, Pump, Filter Separator, Accessory Kit W/Marine CCR Nozzle	17,500 970		1	PAX - Rigger
	TOTAL	18,470	26'	1	
	5 BLIVETS 2 A-22's ea/W 100GPM Pump, Filter Separator, Accessory Kit W/Marine CCR Nozzle	17,500 1,940		1	PAX - Rigger
		19,440	26'	1	

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7 December 1979

AIR LOADING TABLE

#NR	LOAD	WT.(lbs)	LOAD LGTH	PAX	REMARKS
	5 BLIVETS 1 M-274, * Nets, (4) 5 gal cans MOGAS W/Nozzles, (2) 8' ladder, 2 sheets plywood, (4) 2"X6"X6', lg grounding rods	17,500 1,990		1	Mule load - 3 nets PAX - Rigger
	TOTAL	19,490	26'7"	1	
	5 BLIVETS 1 M-274, * Nets, (4) 5 gal cans MOGAS W/Nozzles, (2) 8' ladder, 2 sheets plywood, (4) 2"X6"X6', lg grounding rods	17,500 1,990		1	Mule load - 3 nets PAX - Rigger
	TOTAL	19,490	26'7"	1	
	5 BLIVETS 1 M-274, * Nets, (4) 5 gal cans MOGAS W/Nozzles, (2) 8' ladder, 2 sheets plywood, (4) 2"X6"X6', lg grounding rods	17,500 1,990		1	Mule load - 3 nets PAX - Rigger
	TOTAL	19,490	26'7"	1	
	5 BLIVETS 2 A-22's ea/W 100GPM Pump, Filter Separator, Accessory Kit W/Marine CCR Nozzle	17,500 1,940		1	PAX - Rigger
	TOTAL	19,440	26'	1	
	5 BLIVETS 2 A-22's ea/W 100GPM Pump, Filter Separator, Accessory Kit W/Marine CCR Nozzle	17,500 1,940		1	PAX - Rigger
	TOTAL	19,440	26'	1	
	5 BLIVETS 2 A-22's ea/W 100GPM Pump, Filter Separator, Accessory Kit W/Marine CCR Nozzle	17,500 1,940		1	PAX - Rigger
	TOTAL	19,440	26'	1	

Rigging Pump and Filter Systems
(Airdrop)

1. The Pump and Filter Systems are rigged in a standard A-22 container. The procedures for rigging a standard A-22 container are outlined in FM 10-501, Chapter 3, Paragraph 3-3.

Rigging M-274, ½-Ton Weapons Carrier
(Airdrop)

1. The procedures for rigging the M-274, ½ Ton Weapons Carrier were taken from two separate chapters of TM 10-500-3. Chapter 10 was used for preparing the honeycomb stacks, the weapons carrier, and installing suspension slings.

2. Chapter 22 was used for preparing platform, positioning carrier, installing lashings and towing slings described as extraction attaching point. No parachute release assembly is used on the load. Two-inch by 6-inch lumber was used in lieu of 2" x 4" lumber for platform construction.

3. The accompanying load of ladders, lumber and nozzles is secured on the bed of the carrier. The nets and grounding rods are secured to the platform. Two extra sheets of 3/4-inch plywood is tacked to the platform after the grounding rods have been secured in place.

4. The parachute system for the load is the same as the bladder load.

Rigging 500-Gallon Tank on Skidboard
(Airdrop)

1. The procedures used for rigging the bladders are in TM 10-500-3, Chapter 15, with the exception of cargo parachute and release assembly. The G-11A cargo parachute was replaced with two G-12D cargo parachutes, the 68-inch pilot chute was replaced with a 15-ft unreefed cargo extraction parachute. There is no parachute release assembly used on this load. The two G-12D cargo parachutes were attached to the load by using two 3-ft cargo slings as riser extensions, attaching one end of each 3-ft sling to each G-12D clevis, and the other end attached to the large clevis on the rigged load. The two G-12D cargo parachutes are positioned on the load side by side and clustered together in the center by use of the clustering ties on the parachutes. The cargo parachutes are secured to the load with one single length of Gutted Type III nylon cord at each outside corner.

2. The 15-ft extraction parachute is packed in accordance with procedures outlined in TM 10-1670-215-23. There were some changes made to the pack procedures for this type of airdrop. The bag retaining line was not used, a breakcord tie was made of one turn double Type I cotton webbing from the canopy bridle loop to the breakcord attaching loop on the deployment bag. The tie was secured with a surgeon's knot and locking knot. A 15-ft static line was used, and attached to the breakcord attaching loop with one turn single ½-inch tubular nylon secured with a surgeon's knot and locking knot and overhand knots on the running ends. Both metal V-rings were removed from the bag to prevent damage to the aircraft. The 60-ft extraction line was removed and replaced with a 9-ft (2 loop) cargo sling using procedures

outlined in FM 10-501, Chapter 4, Paragraph 4-6, page 4-8. Secure the 15-ft extraction parachute on top of one of the G-12D cargo parachutes with one turn single Ticket #5 cotton thread at each corner.

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stalation of knife used to cut type III nylon webbing

FRONT VIEW



FIGURE A

REAR VIEW



FIGURE B

ure A. Using a length of type VIII Nylon Webbing, form a loop and position in center of ider, secure running ends to loop formed by webbing used to secure bladder to skidboard. prevent webbing from falling on aircraft rollers, safety to bladder with a length of type nylon webbing by securing one end to loop of 8-ft sling on one end of bladder, through p formed in type VIII nylon webbing and secure to loop in 8-ft sling on opposite end of dder using 3 half hitches and overhand knots on running ends.

ure B. Secure running end of webbing on knife to loop of type VIII nylon webbing on front bladder with 3 half hitches and overhand knot on running end. Length of knife should be usted so knife will clear floor of aircraft. Fold excess and tape. Safety knife to vent from going up into parachute after exit from aircraft by using a length of type III on webbing. Form a non-slip loop in center of bladder and pass knife through loop. ure running ends to tiedown clevises on each end of bladder with 3 half hitches and rhand knot on running ends.

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





Install the single type VIII release gates by securing one end to tiedown provision on the floor of the aircraft, pass the running end through tiedown clevis on bladder, across the front of bladder through tiedown clevis on other end of bladder, and secure to tiedown provision on floor of aircraft.

Attach knife to release gate and safety with one turn ~~double~~ single 5 cord cotton.



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AIRDROP ANNEX TO OPLAN

(Part II, 20 Feb 80 to 29 Apr 80)

1. (U) Mission: (Added)

a. Airdrop from low altitude, the necessary JP-5 in 500 gallon collapsible drums, 100 GPM FARE Systems, and M-274 ½ ton weapons carriers from C-141B aircraft.

b. Airdrop motorcycles for the Delta Force.

2. (U) Organization and Forces: No changes to the original organization and forces.

3. (U) Command and Control:

a. The JTF established a functional J-4 office which enabled the rigging element to receive its support, direction and guidance from a single staff element. This facilitated the flow of coordinated information and requirements throughout the operation.

b. In March 1980, command and control at the overseas staging base lacked positive lines of authority. This appeared to correct itself with the closing of the JTF Headquarters in April 1980.

4. (U) Intelligence: Necessary intelligence continued to be obtained from the JTF J-2. No problems encountered.

5. (U) Planning:

a. The planning and training for the MC-130's (Combat Talons) remain valid with minor changes so that the equipment to be dropped can be used in either the MC-130 or the C-141B.

b. The MC-130 requires a center row of intermediate rollers as well as the CDS kit in order to be operational. It was found that the intermediate rollers in the C-141B are closer together and therefore do not require a center row.

c. A revised requirement was decided upon by the JTF to airdrop 33 Blivets (99,000 lbs of JP-5), seven A-22's containing one FARE System each, and six M-274 weapons carriers (Mules) to refuel seven RH-53 helicopters. Three C-141B aircraft would be the primary airdrop aircraft. This requirement was again revised to eight A-22's and eight Mules for the refueling of eight RH-53 helicopters. Adequate fuel was contained in the 33 Blivets. A contingency backup system containing 10 Blivets, three A-22's and two Mules



was displayed forward to the overseas staging base. All other backup systems were derigged.

d. Delta Force's airdrop requirement was for two Yamaha 500cc motorcycles, one Mule, and four A-22's with water, rations and equipment. The MC-130 would be used for this airdrop followed by personnel. The rigging instructions for the motorcycles are contained in Inclosure 1.

e. Load identifications for night operations were not changed.

6. (U) (S) Training:

a. On 25 March 1980, a rigger team of six personnel departed Fort Bragg with the backup airdrop systems for positioning at the forward staging base. Upon arrival, the pump systems and Mules were given an operational check, rerigged and placed in revetments. The team returned to CONUS on 31 March 1980. Upon their return on 23 April 1980, fuel samples were taken and the fuel was found to be fully operational.

b. On 9 April 1980, a C-141A was loaded with eight Blivets, two Mules, and four A-22's. The Mules were loaded length-wise rather than width-wise to provide more stability during the exit sequence (limited floor space in the MC-130 does not permit this positioning). A drop was conducted for the purpose of validating the C-141 aircraft as a delivery system. Drop speed was 150 knots, altitude 750' AGL, clearance time - 23 seconds, drop pattern .9 miles. No damage occurred to any of the equipment. Two changes were made after the operation. The first involved increasing the CDS attitude of the C-141 in order to reduce the clearance time. The second change eliminated the 68' pilot parachute on the A-22 containers and a modified 15' extraction parachute was substituted as a pilot parachute. This provided a more even inflation pattern of the cargo parachutes and faster opening. The modified 15' extraction parachute became the exclusive pilot parachute for all subsequent drops.

c. On 9 April 1980, a C-141B was loaded with 11 Blivets, two Mules, and four A-22 containers. This drop was conducted in 20 knot winds, drop speed 150 knots, 750' AGL. The aircraft clearance time was 20 seconds with a .7 mile drop pattern. No damage occurred to any equipment.

d. The Delta motorcycles were rigged in accordance with the instructions contained in Inclosure 1. Two A-22's (rations, water, equipment), two Mules plus the motorcycles were loaded upon an MC-130 and departed 12 April 1980. Operational feedback on the airdrop reported that there was no damage to any equipment. This was the first airdrop of the motorcycles.

e. Three C-141B aircraft were loaded as shown in Inclosure 2 and departed 13 April 1980. The desired 30 seconds in trail at the TOT could not be

achieved because of inflight refueling limitations. Fifteen minutes in trail was approved by the JTF. The TOT's were met, drop altitude was 750' AGL, clearance times were 20 seconds. Strike reports were all good. The third aircraft race tracked and 14 parachutists jumped in as a fuel point assembly team. The C-141B was reconfigured for a door-jump during the race track. Assembly time for the assembly and operation of the equipment was approximately 7 hours with this limited force. This airdrop mission was 1837 nautical miles, nonstop.

f. The complete system was serviced, rerigged with JP-5 filled Blivets and operationally ready at Fort Bragg by 1200 hours 17 April 1980. This concluded the training.

7. (U) Logistics:

a. CONUS logistical support continued to be outstanding by all services.

b. Inadequate logistical control at the overseas staging base resulted in a premature displacement of positioned equipment. Additional efforts were required to re-establish a minimal backup system.

8. (U) OPSEC: OPSEC continued to be good throughout the duration of the preparatory period of time.

9. (U) Recommendations:

a. The airdrop system has proven to be a reliable method for deep nighttime insertion of fuel systems and should be considered as the primary method of delivery.

b. Future deployments include complete primary and alternate refueling capabilities (air drop and air land). This would give the commander maximum flexibility with a minimal response time.

c. The Airborne Department, QMS, continue its role as the parachute rigging support element to the JTF.

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G [redacted]
Colonel, QMC
Parachute Rigging Element Commander



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RIGGING PROCEDURES FOR AIRDROPPING TWO MOTORCYCLES

1. Basic procedures for the container used for rigging two motorcycles were taken from FM 10-501, Chapter 12. Two A-22 containers were used and assembled as outlined in FM 10-501, Chapter 12, paragraph 12-3, as shown in figure 12-2. The two pieces of Honeycomb 3" x 21" x 84" in figure 12-2B are not used.

2. The construction details for the skidboard were taken from TM 10-500-3, Chapter 15, figure 15-1. One piece of Honeycomb is placed between the two by sixes before positioning the A-22 cargo sling assemblies and covers.

3. Center three layers of Honeycomb on the container 48" long and the width determined by the distance between the front and rear wheels of the motorcycles used. Position the motorcycles on the Honeycomb facing opposite directions. Place two pieces of Honeycomb filler between both motorcycles. The Honeycomb should be cut the same length of the bikes and height. Secure the two motorcycles together with ½" tubular nylon.

4. Honeycomb filler must be used to square the container. The Honeycomb filler must extend to the outer edge of the handlebars in case the load should turn over. Secure the Honeycomb fillers in place with Type III nylon cord around the Honeycomb pieces to the motorcycles. Place small pieces of Honeycomb across the tops of the motorcycles to form a flat surface for the cargo parachute.

5. Close the A-22 cargo sling assemblies as outlined in FM 10-501, Chapter 12, paragraph 12-5.

6. Attach the cargo parachute as outlined in paragraph 12-6.

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7. Use a 15' cargo extraction parachute as a pilot chute. Remove the hardware from the deployment bag, remove the deployment bag safety loop, retaining line and pendulum line. Pack the 15' cargo extraction chute as outlined in TM 10-1670-215-23, with the following exceptions: Make a breakcord tie with one turn double ¼" cotton webbing from the parachute bridle loop to the breakcord attaching loop of the deployment bag. Remove the 60' extraction line and replace with a 9' cargo sling. Attach to the connector links of the extraction chute as outlined in FM 10-501, page 4-8, paragraph 4-6, figure 4-5. Attach a 15' static line to the deployment bag with one turn single ½" tubular nylon using a surgeons knot and locking knot with overhand knots on the running ends.

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13 April 1980

AIR LOADING TABLE

#	LOAD	WT (lbs)	LOAD LGTH	PAX	REMARKS
1	11 Blivets 2 A-22's 2 M-274, each with 3 Nets, (4) 5 gal cans MOGAS w/Nozzles, (2) 8' ladders, 2 sheets plywood, (4) 2"x6"x6', lg grounding rods	39,600 1,940 5,320		2	2 PAX - Riggers
	TOTAL	46,860	73'6"	2	
2	11 Blivets 4 A-22's 2 M-274, each with 3 Nets, (4) 5 gal cans MOGAS w/Nozzles, (2) 8' ladder, 2 sheets plywood, (4) 2"x6"x6', lg grounding rods	39,600 2,880 5,320		2	2 PAX - Riggers
	TOTAL	47,800	77'6"	2	
3	11 Blivets 1 A-22 1 M-274 with 3 Nets, (4) 5 gal cans MOGAS w/Nozzles, (2) 8' ladder, 2 sheets plywood, (4) 2"x6"x6', lg grounding rods	39,600 970 2,260		16	2 PAX - Riggers 14 Jumpers
	TOTAL	42,840	69'6"	16	

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

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AIRDROP ANNEX TO HONEY BADGER (U)

(18 Jun 80 to 17 Jul 80)

1. (U) Mission:

a. Airdrop from a type C-130 aircraft at the lowest acceptable altitude and under blackout conditions, a type [redacted]

A

b. Combat off-load from a MC-130 aircraft, the necessary JP-4 in 500 gallon collapsible drums, 100 GPM FARE Systems, and M-274 ½ Ton weapons carriers to establish helicopter refueling points and operate those refueling points.

2. (U) Organization and Forces:

a. Rigging Support Element - 1 Officer, 1 Warrant Officer, 8 EM.

b. POL Handlers/Mechanic - 3 EM.

c. MAC ALCE Element - 4 EM.

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d. [redacted] Mechanics -- 2 EM.

3. (U) Command and Control:

a. Prior to departure from Fort Bragg on 5 July 1980, all orders, requirements and guidance were provided through the Test Directorate Headquarters, in particular the J-4. This facilitated the planning, preparation and execution of the movement. Ample secure nets were available during this phase.

b. In the Ore Grande area and Condron Airfield location, the command and control was stabilized with the closure of the Test Directorate element which included the J-4. Communications at this location were considered minimal and poor. Logistical requirements generated in this forward area had to be transmitted back to the JTD's permanent location for action. Consequently, quick, accurate responses in solving any problems was a momentous effort. It is felt that the J-4 should have been positioned in the location with the most effective communication system and a J-4 representative plus an airlifter be positioned in the forward areas if it has lesser communications.

c. Upon redeployment back to Fort Bragg on 17 July, adequate communications were again available but only to the JTD's permanent location.

4. (U) Intelligence:

a. There was no central source for obtaining the maps needed for airdrop operations. Maps were obtained by going to subordinate elements of the JTD and looking for extra copies.

[redacted]



b. Current weather forecasts were obtained through the flight service telephone at Condron Airfield. This data was usable in the local areas only. A source for weather information should be established in the JTD forward.

5. (S) Planning:

a. The planning for the airdrop portion commenced in detail on 30 June 1980. Since the [redacted] to be dropped were standard items with procedures in [redacted] air item requirements were easily compiled and forwarded to the G-4, XVIII Airborne Corps. This equipment would permit four drops for each [redacted] Delivery time was set for 1200 hours 3 July 1980 at the Airborne Test Board.

b. The four FARE Systems with POL Handlers and Mechanic were concurrently requested for arrival with the air items. The JP-4 produce (6000 gal), MHE, cranes, and ALCE were programed for delivery upon our arrival at Condron Airfield. MAC Headquarters attached the ALCE to the Rigger Element for the period 5-17 July 1980.

c. The proposed training schedule obtained from JTD on 30 June was used as the base line for airdrop operations.

6. (S) Training:

a. On 18 June 1980, th[redacted] dropped at Fort Bragg from a MC-130 at 1100' AGL. Test Report ATSM-DT-A-01 is at Inclosure 1. The size and weight of the [redacted] constituted a hazard to the safe operation of the aircraft, nor did it permit personnel to jump behind the load. Recommendation was for the use of a smaller [redacted]

b. By 8 July 1980, the [redacted] were rigged and readied for airdrop at Condron Airfield. Twelve Blivets of JP-4, four FARE Systems, and two Mules were also readied for combat off-load operation. Four NVG's were obtained from the Rangers for the off-load operation.

c. Two MC-130 aircraft, each with six Blivets of JP-4, two FARE Systems and one Mule plus refueling team departed Condron Airfield 8 July 1980 for Micheals Airfield. Purpose was to conduct combat off-load, establish refuel points and conduct refueling operations. Each aircraft ACL was 22,000 lbs. Aircraft failure after take-off caused the mission to be aborted and rescheduled for the night of 9-10 July 1980. At Inclosure 2 is Test Report ATSM-DT-A-02 covering this operation. Problems encountered were:

(1) Too much light in the vicinity which reduced the effectiveness of the NVG's.

(2) Confusion caused by too many people involved; i.e., Refueling Team, CCT, Pathfinders, etc. (maximum of three people per point recommended).

(3) One Mule blew spark plugs because of overload.

(4) Since this was the first training with actual helicopters, composite forces, and NVG's, excessive time was used to conduct a partial refueling operation.



Total time elapsed was approximately 3 hours. Five out of eight HH-53's and 12 out of 16 UH-60A's were refueled with 100-200 gallons each. Only three points were established. Rated marginally successful.

d. Test Reports ATSM-DT-A-03 through 06 (Inclosures 3-7) cover the [redacted] airdrop operations from 10-16 July 1980. The [redacted] was attempted in an EC-130 and aborted after take-off because of engine failure (Inclosure 4). This [redacted] was not rescheduled for airdrop. The [redacted] was successfully dropped three times at OI Coe DZ from 850' AGL. [redacted] developed a degree of proficiency in its night time de-rigging and operation (Inclosures 3, 5, and 6). These operations were rated successful. The full rehearsal airdrop at Fallon Airfield during the night of 15-16 July 1980 is rated marginally successful (Inclosure 7). Although the actual airdrop was good with no damage to the [redacted] problems occurred during the de-rigging and operation of the [redacted]. The presence of a clevis bolt left in the [redacted] lifting point jammed the [redacted] and blew a hydraulic seal. The failure to take the [redacted] out of low range reduced its [redacted] High range speed is up to [redacted]

7. (U) Logistics: Adequate time for planning insured the availability of programed logistical support. Unprogramed requirements were hampered by the minimal communications system.

8. (U) OPSEC: OPSEC was good throughout the test period. The use of Honey Badger facilitated the operation.

9. (U) Recommendations/Comments:

a. The [redacted] be selected as the primary [redacted] the immediate time frame. Further recommend that three [redacted] be obtained and test operated to fully determine its adequacy for the mission (to include [redacted] Inclosure 8 is a procedural list for [redacted] de-rigging.

b. Obtain a commercial [redacted] so that an airdrop kit can be developed and tested. The [redacted] should be considered as a replacement for the [redacted]

c. Develop night LAPES capability for the introduction of a [redacted] into an operation. This would provide an alternative means of delivery.

d. Conduct additional combat off-loads, establishment of refuel point and refueling operations in order to train personnel, improve techniques and reduce times.

e. Airdrop refuel points as an alternative to combat off-loading. The volume of fuel that may be required could be beyond the HC-130 capability for delivery. Training in this method is required to develop proficiency within the receiving ground unit.

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[redacted]
Parachute Rigging Element Commander



FORMAT ~~TOP SECRET~~ HTSM-DY-A-01
18 Jun 1980

HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

(U)1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:

Airdrop a [redacted] from MC-130.
[redacted] will be initial [redacted] for test + evaluation.
[redacted] personnel will recover and operate the [redacted]

(U)2. Desired Goal:

Perfect techniques for airdrop of a suitable [redacted] and simultaneous drop of personnel from same a/c from low altitude at night

U)3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.

Daytime drop for initial test at Holland DZ. DTG 180545S, weather clear winds 10 TBK Temp approx 75°F. Drop alt 1100' Ceiling 1500'

U)4. Results:

airdrop was perfect. Rigged wt of 28,420 lbs did not permit accompanying jumpers nor could the MC-130 achieve a safe CG because of 20' platform length.

(U)5. Recommendations:

a. A smaller, lighter [redacted] will have to be used.
b. The acl of MC-130 not to exceed 20,000 lbs.

(U)6. Additional remarks:

a. Ranger personnel were trained in de-rigging procedures and recovery operations
b. Rangers also trained in the operation of [illegible] [redacted] [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

G

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

LOAD DATA CARD

SECTION I (unrigged data)

Project No. *ATSM-DT-A-01*

Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item [redacted]

Item Weight *22,760* Height *78*

Width *110* Length *259*

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Drop time 0845 Holland DZ.
Drop was perfect.
Rangers were given training in the rigging & ~~[illegible]~~ getting [redacted]
off of platform.

TM/FM Used for Ref [redacted]

SECTION II (rigged data)

Drop No. *01*

Size & Type Platform *20' MOD*

Parachute Size *G-11A* NO. *6 ea*

Extraction Parachute Size *28'*

Suspension Sling Size & Type *4 Loop XXVI*

Front *12'* Rear *12'*

Ballast Weight

Type Accompanying Load *NONE*

Total Rigged Weight *25,420*

Rigged Heigth *97*

Rigged Width *110*

Rigged Length *259*

Overhang Front *Ø* REAR *Ø*

Longitudinal C/G-

Type Extraction System *35 K*

Load Rigged for *Low Velocity* Airdrop

DATE RIGGED *17 JUN 80*

DATE DROPPED *19 June '80*

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

FORMAT [redacted] AFSOC-DI-H-02

9 July 1980

HONEY BADGER OT&E ACTIVITY REPORT

1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested: Combat off-load 12 ea 500 gal Collapsible Tanks (Blivets), 4 100 GPM Refueling system (FARE) and 2 M-274 Weapons Carriers (MULES) in total darkness from 2 MC-130 A/C, establish 4 refuel pts and refuel HH-53 and UH-60A helicopters

2. Desired Goal:
Discharge approx 200 gal JP-4 to 8 HH-53H and 16 UH-60A in total darkness under hot refueling condition

3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.
excessive lights in the vicinity instead of total blackout conditions which interfered with the visibility through the NVG's.

4. Results: a. Marginally successful - Msn originally scheduled for 8 July '80 but postponed due to A/C abort.
b. refueled 5 ea HH-53H and 12 ea UH-60A helicopters
c. one Mule broke causing excessive delay in set up
d. Combat-off took approx 5 min for ea A/C - PT set up completed in 1½ hrs - only 3 PTs used

5. Recommendations:
a. Combat-off load be configured on 463L pallets rather than skids. 2 Blivets per skid. Pumps be pre-positioned on Mules.
b. a total of 3 men per point to reduce confusion and control
c. Re train under total blackout conditions.

6. Additional remarks:
Refueling team from Rigger element consisted (1) NCOIC - Rigger (2) Refuelers (76W) (1) Mule / Tow Mechanic. Rigger & mechanic also trained as refuel pt operators. Recommend NCOIC be fully qualified POL man.

G [redacted]

[redacted]



TOP SECRET

LOAD DATA CARD

ION I(unrigged data)

Project No. ATSM-DT-A-02

Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item Refueling operation - Combat Off-Load

Item Weight ______ Height ______

Width ______ Length ______

ELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Combat off LOAD Took 4-5 MIN EACH

1st A/C was not set up on Time Tow vehicle Broke.

SKids Broke After they Hit the NON SKid RAMP.

Could not Tow Blivets w/8' SLING (Need Tow bar)

Refueled — HH-53 See Black Hawks 1200

FM/FM Used for Ref. N/A.

SECTION II(rigged data)

Drop No. CBOL-1

Size & Type Platform 12 Blivets, 2 Mules, 4 A-22's (Forces) - 4 PAX

Parachute Size ______ NO. ___

Extraction Parachute Size ______

Suspension Sling Size & Type ______

Front ______ Rear ______

Ballast Weight ______

Type Accompanying Load ______

Total Rigged Weight 21,000 lbs.

Rigged Heigth ______

Rigged Width ______

Rigged Length ______

Overhang Front ______ REAR ______

Longitudinal C/B ______

Type EXtraction System ______

Load Rigged for ______ Airdrop

DATE RIGGED 7 July 1980

DATE DROPPED ~~8 July 80~~ 9 July '80 A/P aborted

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

TOP SECRET

[redacted]

FORMAT [redacted] HVSM-VI-A-03

9 July 1980

HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:

A Airdrop a [redacted] from MC-130. Airborne [redacted] wt 9,900 will be tested for suitability for obstacle clearance in blackout conditions. Ranger personnel will derig and operate the [redacted]

2. Desired Goal:

A Perfect low-level drop techniques (850' AGL) for simultaneous drop of the [redacted] and Ranger clearance team. Train MC-130 crews in airdrop techniques, train Rangers in recovery techniques.

3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.

DZ - Ol Coe, approx 4000' above sea level
TOT - 2340 hrs lcl
winds - SSE 5K
Vis - Unrestricted
Ceiling - Unlimited
Scattered Thunderstorms in Vic. E-N gusts to 45K

4. Results:

a. Dropped from 850' AGL, G-11B functioned properly, load landed in Vic of desired loc. Pers spread approx 1 mi
7 assembly recovery time on the [redacted] approx 45 min
b. Recovery class given to Rangers

5. Recommendations:

A The [redacted] be considered a prime candidate for the [redacted]

6. Additional remarks:

Good operation

G [redacted] GS C

TOP SECRET



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LOAD DATA CARD

ION I (unrigged data)

Project No. ATSM-DT-A-03

Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item [redacted]

Item Weight 9,900 Height 67"

Width 78 Length 140

ELLANEOUS INFORMATION

PACKERS were given instruction on De-rigging procedures after low ALR drop.

CH/FM Used for Ref. [redacted]

SECTION II (rigged data)

Drop No. 02

Size & Type Platform 16' Type II

Parachute Size G-11 8 NO. 3

Extraction Parachute Size 22'

Suspension Sling Size & Type

Front 9' 3L Rear 9' 3L

Ballast Weight N/A

Type Accompanying Load N/A

Total Rigged Weight 11,875

Rigged Heigth 80

Rigged Width 108

Rigged Length 192

Overhang Front Ø REAR Ø

Longitudinal C/B- 96 Front Edge

Type Extraction System SA/CS 120"

Load Rigged for Low ✓ Airdrop

DATE RIGGED 9 Jul

DATE DROPPED 9 Jul

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

~~TOP SECRET~~



FORMAT ~~TOP SECRET~~

9 July 1980

HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

(S) 1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:

A Airdrop a [redacted] from HC-130 under blackout conditions. [redacted] wt 24,815 lbs will be tested for obstacle clearance and performance overall compared to other drops. Rangers will derig [redacted] and operate.

(S) 2. Desired Goal:

A Conduct a satisfactory night drop of [redacted] from 1500' AGL derig and operate under blackout conditions. Develop comparative data between [redacted]

(U) 3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.

DZ - Ol Co, approx 4000' above sea level
TOT - 0130 10 July '80 (L.L)
Wind - SSE 5K
Vis - Unrestricted
Ceiling - Unlimited

Scattered Thunderstorms in Vic E-N gusts to 45K

(U) 4. Results:

(U) Mission aborted due to A/C engine failure after take-off.

(S) 5. Recommendations:

A Redrop the [redacted] under the same Conditions

6. Additional remarks:

None

G

Incl #17

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

GOKC

[redacted]

LOAD DATA CARD

SECTION I(unrigged data)

Project No. ATSM-DT-A-03A

Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item [redacted]

Item Weight 24815 Height 109-78

Width 96 Length 188

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

~~Load~~ Mission Aborted Due to Aircraft Engine Failure.

TM/FM Used for Ref [redacted]

SECTION II(rigged data)

Drop No. No Drop

Size & Type Platform 20' Mod Type II

Parachute Size G11A NO. 6

Extraction Parachute Size 28'

Suspension Sling Size & Type XXVI

Front 11' 4 Loop Rear 12' 4 Loop

Ballast Weight N/A.

Type Accompanying Load N/A.

Total Rigged Weight 27,100

Rigged Heigth 92

Rigged Width 108

Rigged Length 240

Overhang Front -0- REAR -0-

Longitudinal C/B-126" Front afc plw

Type Extraction System 35KEFTC

Load Rigged for Low V Airdrop

DATE RIGGED 9 Jul

DATE DROPPED No Drop

Msn aborted due to A/C Engine failure after T/O

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

TOP OF [redacted]



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FORMAT

ATSM-DT-A-04
10 July 1980

HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

(U) 1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:

A Airdrop the [redacted] from MC-130 (2nd drop) under blackout condition.

Rangers will de-rig and operate the [redacted]

(U) 2. Desired Goal:

A Determine the serviceability of the [redacted] under sustained airdrops and night operating conditions.

Train MC-130 crews in airdrop techniques, Train Rangers.

(U) 3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.

DZ - Ol Coe, approx 4000' above sea level
VOT - 2130 hrs (lcl). Ceiling - Scattered 7000'
Winds - 7 K SE 13000'
Vis - 40 mi No build-up's 25000'
of thunderstorms

4. Results:

a. Successful drop from 850' AGL, no damage, landed in Vic of desired loc.

b. Recovery conducted by Rangers was excellent

(U) 5. Recommendations:

A Continue to drop test to develop serviceability limits on the [redacted]

(U) 6. Additional remarks:

Good operation

Incl #5 G [redacted] QC

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

LOAD DATA CARD

TION I(unrigged data)

Project No. ATSM-OT-A-04

Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item [redacted]

Item Weight 9,900 Height 67

Width 78 Length 140

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

C/FM Used for Ref.

SECTION II(rigged data)

Drop No. 03

Size & Type Platform 16' TYPE II

Parachute Size G11B NO. 3

Extraction Parachute Size 22'

Suspension Sling Size & Type

Front 9' 3 Loop Rear 9' 3 Loop

Ballast Weight N/A

Type Accompanying Load N/A

Total Rigged Weight 11,875

Rigged Heigth 80

Rigged Width 108

Rigged Length 192

Overhang Front 0 REAR 0

Longitudinal C/B-96 Front Edge

Type Extraction System SLCS 120'

Load Rigged for Low V Airdrop

DATE RIGGED 10 Jul

DATE DROPPED 10 Jul

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ HNSM-VI-H-05

FORMAT

11 July 1980

HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

[redacted]1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:

A airdrop the [redacted] from MC-130 (3d drop) under blackout conditions

Rangers will de-rig and operate the [redacted]

[redacted]2. Desired Goal:

A Build data base on the serviceability of the [redacted] under sustained airdrop and night operating condition

Train MC-130 crews in airdrop techniques, Train Rangers.

(U)3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.

DZ - Ol Coe, approx 4000' above sea level
TOT - 2130 hrs (lcl)
Winds - SSE 5K   Ceiling - Scattered 13000'-15000'
Vis - unrestricted

[redacted]4. Results:

A a. Successful drop from [redacted] no damage, landed in VIC of desired loc

b. Excellent recovery by Rangers

(U)5. Recommendations:

Continue to drop test. Use on full rehearsal test.

6. Additional remarks:

Good operation

Incl #6

[redacted]

OIC

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~~TOP SECRET~~

LOAD DATA CARD

SECTION I (unrigged data)

Project No. ATSM-DT-A-05

Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item [redacted]

Item Weight 9,900 Height 67

Width 78 Length 140

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

M/FM Used for Ref. [redacted]

SECTION II (rigged data)

Drop No. 09

Size & Type Platform 16' Type II

Parachute Size G11B NO. 3

Extraction Parachute Size 22'

Suspension Sling Size & Type

Front 9'34P Rear 9'34P

Ballast Weight N/A

Type Accompanying Load N/A

Total Rigged Weight 11,875

Rigged Height 80

Rigged Width 108

Rigged Length 192

Overhang Front 0 REAR 0

Longitudinal C/B- 96 FRONT Edge

Type Extraction System SA/CS 120"

Load Rigged for Low V Airdrop

DATE RIGGED 10 Jul

DATE DROPPED 10 Jul

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

AFSM-DT-A-06
16 July 1980

FORMAT

HONEY BADGER OT&E ACTIVITY REPORT

1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:

A Airdrop the [redacted] under blackout conditions from MC-130 followed by personnel for recovery as part of full rehearsal of obstacle clearance operation.

2. Desired Goal:

Airdrop [redacted] and personnel from [redacted] recover and clear airfield in minimum time under blackout conditi

3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.

DZ - Fallon

other conditions unknown - (unobserved by Rigger)

4. Results: - From reports - marginally successful, Airdrop was short (appr. 500-800 yds). Recovery team left clevis bolt in the [redacted] frame, prohibiting the [redacted] to rise above 3" & causing a blown hydraulic seal. Left [redacted] in lower range which reduced [redacted] No damage from airdrop

5. Recommendations:

Additional training in de-rigging techniques and [redacted] operations.

6. Additional remarks:

a. Gen Vaught wanted to [redacted] C-130 type a/c with the [redacted] This was not accomplished.

b. The 16' heavy drop platform was left at Fallon

Classified by ~~TOP SECRET~~ C [redacted] OADR



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LOAD DATA CARD

SECTION I(unrigged data)

Project No. ATSM-DT-A-06

Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item [redacted]

Item Weight 9,900 Height 67

Width 78 Length 140

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

RANGERS De-Rigged IN A tactical Situation Cut All Lashings

Broke Seal on hyd-System Due to A clevis Left on Suspension point.

TM/FM Used for Ref. [redacted]

SECTION II(rigged data)

Drop No. 05

Size & Type Platform 16' Type II

Parachute Size G11B NO. 3

Extraction Parachute Size 22'

Suspension Sling Size & Type

Front 9'3Lp. Rear 9'3Lp

Ballast Weight N/A

Type Accompanying Load N/A

Total Rigged Weight 14,875'

Rigged Heigth 80

Rigged Width 108

Rigged Length 192

Overhang Front 0 REAR 0

Longitudinal C/B- 96 Front edge

Type Extraction System 54/CS 120'

Load Rigged for Low Vel Airdrop

DATE RIGGED 15 Jul 80

DATE DROPPED 16 Jul 80

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

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

TOP SECRET

De-rigging procedures for [redacted]

The following steps should be followed in de-rigging the [redacted]

(U) 1. Remove the four large clevis assemblies from the vehicle suspension points. Be sure to install the large clevis bolt and nut back into the large clevis. Leave the suspension slings attached to the four large clevises and the parachute release assembly. Remove the parachute release assembly, the four large clevises and suspension slings as are component.

2. Remove the load cover from the [redacted] Cut ties holding honeycomb on top of [redacted] and remove. Remove the padding from the air cleaner. Remove exhaust pipe from between the seat and frame and reposition.

(U) 3. Remove lashings securing parachute tray. Keep the two large stacks of honeycomb used for the parachute tray. This honeycomb can be used for removing [redacted] from the platform.

4. Remove all tie down assemblies securing the [redacted] to the platform, by opening the binder assembly handle to release tension. Remove the heavy duty "D" ring from the running end of the tie down and pull the tie down through the tie down points. For combat de-rigging, these tie downs would be cut with a knife and removed.

5. Remove the 8-foot sling from the towing pintle at the rear of the [redacted]

The [redacted] is now ready to be [redacted] from the platform.

NOTE: Be sure to remove the large clevis bolts from the suspension points as stated in step one. If the bolts are not removed, the [redacted] will not raise and would also cause damage to the [redacted]

TOP SECRET



(U) 6. Locate the extraction parachute and deployment bags. Separate the three deployment bags and the extraction parachute. Place the extraction parachute in extraction parachute bag. Stretch out the three G-11B cargo parachutes; you must remove the center line from the large clevis assembly to do this. Daisy chain the suspension lines and risers and place each parachute in a parachute deployment bag.

(U) 7. Place all the air item components and the recovered parachutes on the platform.



HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

(U) 1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:
Rig M-561 (Gamma Goat), wt 8670 IAW FM 10-508 w/CH#1, with 26-11B cargo parachutes and air drop from 750' AGL

2. Desired Goal:
Develop crew proficiency for 1st SOS. Five loadmasters required recertification in air drop procedures.

(U) 3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.
Drop alt - 750' AGL
Winds (Surf) - 8K @ 30°
Vis - 4mi Haze
Ceiling - 20,000'
Drop time - 1445 hrs (-lal)
Temp - 96°
DZ - Blackstone

(U) 4. Results:
Strike report - 82 m @ 5 o'clock
operation rated good
3 loadmasters recertified

(U) 5. Recommendations:
Continue air drop proficiency training

(U) 6. Additional remarks:
None

G [redacted]

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

14 Aug '80

LOAD DATA CARD

SECTION I(unrigged data)

Project No._____

Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item M561, 1¼ ton Cargo Truck

Item Weight 7,300 Height 70½

Width 84 Length 227

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

TM/FM Used for Ref [redacted]

SECTION II(rigged data)

Drop No._____

Size & Type Platform 20' Modular

Parachute Size G-11B NO. 2

Extraction Parachute Size 22' UNRE

Suspension Sling Size & Type 11' 3

Front 11' w 3 double Rear 11' w3 w/3' 3

Ballast Weight_____

Type Accompanying Load N/A

Total Rigged Weight 8670

Rigged Heigth 94"

Rigged Width 108"

Rigged Length 240"

Overhang Front N/A REAR N/A

Longitudinal C/B- 124 front edge

Type Extraction System 5-4/C5 120

Load Rigged for Low V Airdrop

DATE RIGGED 12 Aug 80

DATE DROPPED 14 Aug

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

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

FORMAT ~~TOP SECRET~~

HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

(U) 1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:

Rig M-561 (Gamma Goat) wt 8670 IAW FM 10-508 w/dg #1, with 2 G-11B Cargo parachutes and air drop from 750' AG

2. Desired Goal:

Develop air crew proficiency for 1st SOS. Complete re-certification of 5 loadmasters in air drop procedures.

(U) 3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.

Drop alt - 750' AGL
Wind (Surf) - 6 K @ 210°
Vis - 3-4 mi haze
Ceiling - 20000'
Drop Hrs - 0935 hrs (bal)
Temp - 85°
DZ - Blackstone

(U) 4. Results:

Strike report - 195 m @ 11 o'clock - Operation total marginal successful. Developed left hand dual rail malfunction Lost hydraulic pressure, manually rebuild pressure to effect drop. Resulted in 5 min late ADT. 2 loadmasters recertified

(U) 5. Recommendations:

a. Continue air drop proficiency training
b. Re-inspect all dual rail systems for completeness and serviceability

(U) 6. Additional remarks:

None all loadmasters recertified plus 1 crew.

G [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



TOP SECRET

LOAD DATA CARD

SECTION I (unrigged data)

Project No.________

Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item M561, 1¼ ton Cargo Trk

Item Weight 7,300 Height 70½

Width 84 Length 227

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

TM/FM Used for Ref. [redacted]

SECTION II (rigged data)

Drop No.________

Size & Type Platform 20' MOD

Parachute Size G11B NO. 2

Extraction Parachute Size 22' [illegible]

Suspension Sling Size & Type 11' 3 loop 6/3 3

Front (3' 11' 3 loop Double) Rear 11' 6/3' Single

Ballast Weight________

Type Accompanying Load N/A

Total Rigged Weight 8670

Rigged Heigth 94"

Rigged Width 108"

Rigged Length 240"

Overhang Front N/A REAR N/A

Longitudinal C/B- 124" front e

Type Extraction System SL/ES 120

Load Rigged for Low V Airdrop

DATE RIGGED 13 Aug 80

DATE DROPPED 15 Aug 8

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

TOP SE T

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:

Rig M-561 (Gama Goat) wt 8670 IAW FM 10-508 w/Chg 21, with 2 T-11B cargo parachutes and airdrop from 750' AGL.

2. Desired Goal:

Re-Confirm the recertification of the 5 loadmasters and Flight crew.

3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.

Drop Time 1030 hrs (LOT)

Not Flown

4. Results:

Mission aborted because of defective dual anvil system.

5. Recommendations:

None

6. Additional remarks:

None

G

[redacted]

QMF

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

LOAD DATA CARD

SECTION I (unrigged data)

Project No. ________

G Project Officer [redacted]

Project NCO [redacted]

Test Item M561, 1¼ ton CARGO TRK

Item Weight 7,300 Height 70½

Width 84 Length 227 -

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No Drop

A TM/FM Used for Ref. [redacted]

DATE RIGGED 12 Aug 80

SECTION II (rigged data)

Drop No. ________

Size & Type Platform 20' MODU.

Parachute Size G11B NO. 2

Extraction Parachute Size 22' ONE

Suspension Sling Size & Type 11'/3' 36

Front 11' 4/3' (double) Rear 11' 4/3' single

Ballast Weight ________

Type Accompanying Load N/A

Total Rigged Weight 8670

Rigged Height 94"

Rigged Width 108"

Rigged Length 240"

Overhang Front N/A REAR N/A

Longitudinal C/B - 124" front edge

Type Extraction System SL/CS 120"

Load Rigged for Low V. Airdrop

DATE DROPPED 15 Aug ~~14 Aug~~

THIS FORM WILL BE COMPETED BEFORE EACH AIRDROP

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

FOR~~TOP SECRET~~ 24 Sept. '80

HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested:
   a. Combat Off-Load from C-141 B, multiple 100 GPM FARC system ~~w/JP-4~~, Blivets w/JP-4, and M-274 Mules w/tow bars
   b. Establish Hepto refuel points capable of refueling CH-5 UH-60A and [redacted]

(U) 2. Desired Goal:
   a. Establish operational refuel points in 20 min or less time
   b. Train the CCT/Pathfinder/Refueler/Rigger tms in combat off-l and refueling techniques and procedures.

(U) 3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.
   a. Date/Time - 241800 Sept '80
   b. Weather - N/A
   c. Location - Yellow Ramp, Pope AFB

(U) 4. Results: Taxi speed was 5K. Ramp lowered to approx 12" fro ground. Commands given over P.A. syste. 1st Point cleared cir in 15 sec. 2nd Pt cleared a/c in 30 sec. 1st Point operational a Taxiway cleared in 15 min. 2nd point operational a Taxi cleared in 23 min. Tow bars out of adjustment. Four 463L pallets burst from 7000 lbs fuel with HT of drop from ramp of 30". No damage to equipment.

(U) 5. Recommendations:
   a. C-141B Combat off-load of refueling system is a viable option.
   b. Continue to train CCT/Pathfinder/Rigger/Refueler/Loadm personnel in techniques.

6. Additional remarks:

None

[redacted]

Encl 7

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

I-751

Subject: After-Action Report, Army Aviation Participation in JTX Honey Badger, June-July 1980

1. (U) ~~(FS)~~ This is an interim after-action report, consisting of all internal and external reports which will contribute to a final report to be completed at a later date. It is not intended for general dissemination, but for the use of agencies, directorates, and commands supporting the creation of Army aviation forces and units for conduct of Special Missions.

2. (U) (S) The report is organized as follows:

TAB A - Executive Summay of Army Aviation participation in JTX Honey Badger, extracted from a report to the Operations Deputies of the Services.

TAB B - JTD Honey Badger/Army Aviation evaluations. Conducted and reports prepared by US Army Aviation Board, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

TAB C - 101 Aviation Group After Action Report, JTX Honey Badger.

TAB D - Outline of Operation POTENT CHARGE, joint helicopter special missions doctrinal and procedural training and exercising.

G

[redacted]
Army Aviation Officer

4 Enclosures
a/s

Distribution-special

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Subject: JTX Honey Badger After Action Report

1. Attached is the Executive Summary of Army Aviation participation in JTX HONEY BADGER, prepared as part of the JTX After Action Report to the Operations Deputies of the Services.

TAB A

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCLOSURE TEN: BLACKHAWK/CH-47C EVALUATION (TS)

1. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Objectives

a. Create Army aviation capability to support near-term special mission requirements ~~(TS)~~. (U)

b. Create doctrinally sound, logistically sustainable long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations.

2. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Background

a. (U) ~~(S/N)~~ Past efforts in the area of Army aviation support of special operations have been limited by equipment shortcomings, organizational decisions, and resource limitations.

b. (U) ~~(S/N)~~ Special operations support is normally characterized by the requirement for deep penetration, surprise, and complex tasks in the objective area. Until recently, the only assets available which were capable of the ranges and flight profiles meeting those criteria have been fixed-wing aircraft and a few air-refuelable heavy lift helicopters. The special operations aviation capability of the Army has been reduced to an aviation platoon in the Fifth Special Forces Group.

c. (U) ~~(S/N)~~ Army aviation exists for the stated purpose of supporting the land battle with maneuver, combat support, and combat service support vertical-lift units, and limited fixed-wing special support. Special operations on land are normally conducted by Army ground forces. The only identifiable reason the considerable resources of Army aviation have not been fully integrated into joint air support of those operations in the past was that the helicopters did not exist in the inventory which could penetrate deep, with surprise, and conduct close combat operations in the objective area. Notably, the capability to conduct those operations with vertical-lift aircraft in any significant numbers has been virtually non-existent in any service.

d. (U) ~~(TS)~~ The key objective of the HONEY BADGER/Army Aviation (U) effort was to create the basis for presenting the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a viable Army aviation contribution to joint air special missions (TS) in support of special operations This was to include both

modification of aircraft and conduct of individual and unit training which would yield a trained special missions-capable rotary-wing force. The secondary objective, as yet unfulfilled, is to integrate that force into a joint force consisting of Army and Air Force air and ground elements.

3. Concept

a. (U) ~~(TS)~~ In early June, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, directed that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) be designated the major Army organization which would provide special missions crews and aircraft to JCS.

b. (U) ~~(TS)~~ A survey of all aircraft in the Army inventory, directed by the JTF Commander and conducted by the JTF staff in coordination with the Army staff, indicated that the UH-60A and the CH-47C-plus were the Army helicopters with the greatest immediate potential for special missions ~~(TS)~~. (U)

(1) The UH-60 is a highly survivable, fast helicopter with an unusually good power-to-weight ratio and excellent high-density-altitude performance.

(2) The CH-47C-plus has the highest useful load in the inventory, and has an exceptionally large cargo area with the longest center-of-gravity travel of any helicopter in the world. This makes it particularly suitable for long-range logistics haul.

c. Both the UH-60A and CH-47C-plus were found wanting in several areas when profiled against special missions ~~(TS)~~ (U) concepts. In coordination with ODCSOPS, DA; ODCSLOG, DA; and DARCOM, necessary modifications were identified and a program to conduct those modifications initiated. The decision was made to conduct the majority of the work at Norton AFB, in order that

(1) Individual and unit training could be ongoing in the desert/mountain environment, and

(2) For OPSEC purposes, the work could be advertised as part of the Honey Badger test and evaluation.

d. Terminal Training Objectives were extrapolated from specific special missions ~~(TS)~~ (U) Concepts, then refined to reflect a set of capabilities which would allow considerable flexibility in future planning. Fundamentally, they yielded the following objectives.

(1) UH-60. Full night vision qualification, night long-range flight in excess of [redacted] nm, unrefueled, at low level. Coordinated operations with HH-53C, H and CH-47C. Terminal operations [redacted] and with IR searchlight.

(2) CH-47C. Full night vision qualification, night long-range flight in excess of [redacted] nm, unrefueled, at low level. Coordinated operations. Fuel transfer to HH-53, UH-60, and CH-47.

(3) Pathfinders. Integrated operations with CCT, secure rapid refueling points, conduct fuel transfer ops, set up remote navaids.

3. Execution.

a. Equipment modifications. See attachment one.
b. Training. See attachment two.
c. Evaluation. See attachment three.

4. Future Training.

a. Joint training will be conducted at Hurlburt Field, Florida, during the period 18 to 30 August for the purpose of addressing deficiencies identified during Phase II in the areas of planning, coordination, and execution. Lead crews and IP's from 101 ABD, 1 SOW, USAAVNS, and USMC will conduct seminars and flight training to develop special operations joint doctrine. They will then return to train organizations to prepare them for Phase III, beginning 12 September.

Subject: JTX Honey Badger External Evaluation

A

1. (U) Attached are the evaluations conducted by HQ, JTD Honey Badger during June and July 1980.

2. (U) The agency supervising the evaluations and preparing the reports was the US Army Aviation Board, Ft. Rucker, Alabama.

3. (U) The reader should note that these reports were prepared on short suspenses, as were the evaluations themselves, due to the desire of the Joint Test Directorate that each Terminal Test Objective and Terminal Training Objective be driven by preceding evaluations.

TAB B

[redacted] SECRET SECRET

US ARMY AVIATION BOARD

FORT RUCKER, AL 36330

ABBREVIATED

TEST DESIGN PLAN

FOR

Operational effectiveness evaluation (limited) of UH-60A and CH-47C, configured with extended range fuel systems to conduct precisional navigation self-deployment.

by

[redacted]

Test Project Officer

and

[redacted]

Project Analyst

1 July 1980

[redacted] SECRET SECRET

CHAPTER 1

1.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this test is to assess the operational suitability and effectiveness of UH-60A and CH-47C helicopters to conduct precision navigation tactical self-deployment operations.

1.2 BACKGROUND

The Army has demonstrated its commitment for self-deployability of organic aviation assets through various study and evaluation efforts since 1976, the most recent of which culminated in the self-deployment of CH-47C aircraft in operation "Northern Leap." In view of the competition for airlift resources in the event of international termoil, the self-deployability concept has escalated significantly. The ability of operational US Army aviation units to self-deploy is assessed as a critical requirement. As a result, this test was conceived to evaluate the capability of the UH-60A and CH-47C to self-deploy utilizing precision navigation during day/night.

1.3 DESCRIPTION OF TEST ITEM(S)(U)

1.3.1 This evaluation will be conducted utilizing the UH-60A and CH-47C aircraft configured with Mission Equipment Packages (MEPs) required to conduct self-deployment missions.

1.3.2 Specific components, systems, or equipment comprising the MEPs by type aircraft are enumerated below:

a. UH-60A

(1) Navigation

(a) OMEGA Inertial Navigation System (may be deleted)

(b) APX-100 Transponder System

(c) Doppler (128)

(2) Avionics:

(a) Collins 718U-5/5M Lightweight High Frequency (HF) Airborne Transceiver w/KY-75 Secure Device.

(b) FM (2)

(c) UHF (1)

(d) ADF (1)

(3) Extend Range, Internal auxiliary fuel system (6 tanks).

(4) Aircraft servivability equipment (ASE).

(a) AN/APR-39 V(1) Radar Warning Receiver (RVR)

(b) APR-44

(c) M-130 Chaft Dispenser

(d) Aircrew pressurized oxygen system

(e) Aircrew Very Pistols

(f) Infrared (IR) Paint

(5) Night Vision Goggle (NVG) Compatibility Modifications

(a) Cockpit Configuration

(b) Landing/Search Light IR Filter

(6) Spare Parts Kit

(7) Mission Equipment (per unit SOP)

b. CH-47C:

(1) Navigation:

(a) APX-72 Mode 4 Transponder

(b) OMEGA Inertial Navigation System

(2) Avionics

(a) ARC 1-102 HF

(b) FM

(c) UHF-1

(d) ADF-1

(3) Extended Range, Internal Auxiliary Fuel System (4 tanks)

(4) Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE).

(a) AN-APR-39

(b) Aircrew Very Pistols

(c) Aircrew Pressurized Oxygen

(d) Radar Altimeter

(e) Infrared (IR) Paint

(5) Night Vision Goggle (NVG) Compatability Modifications

(a) Cockpit Configuration

(b) Landing/Search Light IR Filter

(6) Spare Parts Kit

(7) Forward Refuse System

(8) Mission Equipment (per unit SOP)

1.4 TEST OBJECTIVES.

1.4.1 To assess the operational effectiveness of UH-60A and CH-47C helicopters in conduct of precision navigation during extended range self-deployment operations.

1.4.2 To assess human factors impact on conduct of tactical self-deployment operations.

1.4.3 To assess suitability of currently provided extended range fuel systems.

1.4.4 To assess suitability and adequacy of mission equipment packages (MEP).

1.4.5 To assess adequacy of premission training.

1.4.6 To assess adequacy of premission planning and coordination.

1.5 SCOPE AND TACTICAL CONTEXT

1.5.1 Scope

1.5.1.1 This evaluation will be limited in that data aggregation devises, instrumentation, and methods will be constrained to the minimum extent possible to preclude unnecessary burdening of test units, and due to limited space and time available. Operational effectiveness of the UH-60A and CH-47C helicopters to conduct precision navigation during extended range self-deployment operations will be assessed utilizing selected operational mission profiles provided by the test proponent. Selected scenarios will be conducted both day and night, with emphasis on the latter while utilizing night vision goggles (NVGs). During initial testing, no transoceanic flights will be conducted.

1.5.1.2 Subject participants will be selected from the 158th and 159th Aviation Battalions, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Assessment of the operational effectiveness of individual crews and the units will be conducted concurrently. Aircrews performing the selected scenarios will be trained and selected by unit commanders and approved by the test proponent. External unit observers will be employed as data collectors to assist in the evaluation of operational effectiveness, and provide expertise in specific areas of concern such as NVG operations, precision navigation equipment, human factors, logistical supportability and physiological considerations. Contractor support will be utilized as required for training, installation, and general support of specific items contained in the mission equipment packages (MEP) which have not been type classified.

1.5.1.3 Threat systems employment is not planned as a part of this evaluation.

1.5.1.4 Evaluation measures will make use of objective and subjective data provided concurrently by the test unit and test directorate personnel. Data sources will include participant completed ground and aircrew questionnaires, debriefing results, observer data sheets, and airborne voice recordings.

1.5.2 Tactical Context

1.5.2.1 Mission profiles will include high gross weight airborne operations over extended ranges, both day and night. Operational flight routes selected by the test proponent will provide for low and medium altitude, multi-ship operations over segments of 600, [redacted] and 1100 nautical miles (NM) (Table 1-1).

TABLE 1-1. AIRCRAFT MISSION PROFILE ROUTE EVENT MATRIX (MINIMUM NUMBER OF ITERATIONS)

MINIMUM ROUTE LENGTH (NM)	TYPE/NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT	
	UH-60A	CH-47C
600	15	4
1100	6	2

1.5.2.2 Measures of Effectiveness (MOE):

a. Altitude: 500-300 feet above ground level (AGL) and below 300 feet AGL where possible.

b. Maintenance of maximum range airspeed when possible.

c. Maximum latteral course deviation ± 1500 meters.

d. Maximum enroute course leg deviation ± 3 minutes (based upon estimated times enroute).

e. Fuel/oil consumption rates - not to exceed mission requirements/parameters provided in applicable technical manuals.

f. No human factors findings which may preclude successful completion of a mission profile.

g. No machine - machine interface findings which may preclude successful completion of a mission profile.

CHAPTER 2

2.1 GENERAL

This chapter constitutes an abbreviated format. Only fundamental factors, conditions, date requirements and data handling methods will be enumerated.

2.2 FACTORS AND CONDITIONS

2.2.1	FACTORS	CONDITIONS
a.	Environment	
	1. Terrain and vegetation (Geographical)	As occurs within the tes areas
	2. Meteorological Conditions	Partially controlled constraints: Day/Night VFR; ambient light conditions; no icing conditions.
b.	Personnel	
	1. Aircrew experience	Partially controlled (In accordance with unit SOP).
	2. Aircrew Training	Partially controlled (academic and individual flight training indigino to mission accomplishmen has been conducted).
	3. Unit Training	Partially controlled (se 2 above)
c.	Threat Systems Operations	Systematically varied by the test proponent
d.	Flight maneuvers	Tactically varied
e.	Aircrew tasks and Coordination Requirements	Partially controlled (de tions to occur in the development of tasks and coordination requirement pertinent to mission accomplishment).

f.	Physiological/Psychological Conditions	As occur
g.	Order of Events	Systematically varied by test directorate.
h.	Aircraft	
	(1) Configuration	Systematically varied to meet mission requireme (then held constant)
	(2) Performance/Endurance Capabilities	As occur

2.3 DATA REQUIREMENTS (See Appendix B).

2.3.1 Types of Data:

2.3.1.1 Objective Data:

a. Data collected by participating units

b. Data collected by observers

(1) Endurance Data

(2) Navigational accuracy data

2.3.1.2 Subjective Data:

a. Aircrew Questionnaire Responses

b. Unit Commanders' Comments

c. Pre and Post mission briefings

d. Ground and airborne observer/controller comment

2.3.2 Dendritic Structure (See Appendix B)

2.4 DATA HANDLING

Objective data from operational mission profiles will be collected, edited, grouped and logged. Logged data will be analyzed by type aircraft, (aircraft configuration nested within), unit selected flights (formation operations and aircrews nested within), flight mode, flight route, mission time, flight altitude, flight airspeed, endurance/fuel consumption rates, and course deviation. The primary method of analysis will be analysis of variance (ANOVA).

Subjective data will be collected via unit Instructor Pilots (IPs), staff and commanders, data observer/recorders, aircrews, ground observers and airborne controllers. These data will be grouped and subjected to parametric and nonparametric statistical analyses to determine factors detrimental to mission accomplishment and "fixes" which can be applied. The primary analytical tool will be the Chi-square statistic.

CHAPTER 3

EVALUATION ASSESSMENTS

3.1 Operational effectiveness

3.2 Human factors

3.3 Extended range fuel systems

3.4 Aircraft Mission Equipment Packages

3.5 Training requirements

3.6 Mission coordination and premission planning requirement.

3.7 Safety

3.8 Logistical supportability

APPENDIX A

DATA COLLECTION SHEETS/FORMS AND CHECKLISTS

INDEX

SECRET

OBSERVER/DATA RECORDER
SELF-DEPLOYABILITY
DATA COLLECTION FORM

Purpose of the attached data collection forms is threefold:

1. To determine adequacy of the extended range fuel system.

2. To evaluate the effects of extended range flights on crewmembers.

3. To determine the adequacy of the navigation system(s) and associated training provided.

Observers/data collectors are being utilized to relieve P/CP/N of additional workload, by collecting additional data in flight.

After mission completion, turn this packet into operations. Operations is to forward all data to [redacted] as soon as possible.

SECRET

1. Complete the following prior to departure from the departure airfield:

A. PERSONNEL

Pilot _____

Co-Pilot _____

Navigator _____

Crewchief _____

Observer/Data Collector _____

Date _____

How many times has crew flown together? _____

Of these, how many were NVG day _____, NVG night _____.

B. AIRCRAFT

Type (Circle One) : UH-60A CH-47C

Serial No. _____

Gross Weight _____

Total Fuel Onboard _____

C. DEPARTURE AIRFIELD

Name _____

Field Elevation _____

Free Air Temperature _____ °C

Pressure Altitude _____

D. PRIOR TO ENGINE START

APU Start Time _____

Total Fuel Indicated on Fuel Gage _____

E. AIRCRAFT TAKEOFF

Time _____

Total Fuel Indicated on Fuel Gage _____

2. Complete the following in flight:

EVENT	TIME (hr:min)	FUEL CONSUMPTION RATE (lb/hr)	A/S (KIAS)	TORQUE	TGT (°C) 1	TGT (°C) 2	PAT (°C)	ALTITUDE MSL	ALTITUDE PA
Hover		X	X						
Takeoff(T)		X	X				X	X	X
Level Off									
T + 1									
T + 2									
T + 3									
T + 4									
T + 5									
T + 6									
T + 7									
T + 8									
T + 9									
Landing									

TOTAL FLIGHT TIME _____ (Hrs:Min)

3. Complete after landing:

A. TOTAL DISTANCE FLOWN _____ (NM)

B. OIL CONSUMED (State pints/quarts/gallons)

ENG #1 _____

ENG #2 _____

UH-60A ONLY

MAIN XMSN _____

T/R GEARBOX _____

INTERMEDIATE GEARBOX _____

~~SECRET~~

CH-47C ONLY

FWD XMSN _____

AFT XMSN _____

COMB XMSN _____

L ENG XMSN _____

R ENG XMSN _____

C. HYDRAULIC FLUID CONSUMED

FLT CONTROL SYSTEM _____

UTILITY SYSTEM _____ (CH-47)

D. TOTAL FUEL ONBOARD _____(Gal)

E. TOTAL FUEL ADDED (IF KNOWN)_____(Gal)

~~SECRET~~

EXTENDED RANGE FUEL SYSTEM

CREWMEMBER QUESTIONNAIRE

NAME/RANK: _____

CREW DUTY: P CP N CE FE
(Circle One)

Left hand column beside each question indicates crewmember who is required to respond. Do not respond to a question if you did not actively participate/observe.

LEGEND

P	-	Pilot
CP	-	Copilot
N	-	Navigator
CE	-	Crewchief
FE	-	Flight Engineer

~~SECRET~~

CREWMEMBER

SAFETY/HUMAN FACTORS

N, CE, FE

1. Were any safety hazards noted due to operation of the extended range fuel system?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

CE, FE

2. Were any unique safety hazards encountered while performing maintenance of the extended range fuel system?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

ALL

3. Were any safety hazards noted during refueling? Are any special precautions required?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

ALL

4. Are any safety hazards associated with fuel transfer/management?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

P, CP, N, CE, FE 5. Does fuel management impact adversely on center of gravity?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

CE, FE 6. Are any hazards associated with installation, removal or maintenance of the extended range fuel system?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

ALL 7. Place a mark on each of the following scales to indicate the amount of physical and mental work you performed during the preceding flight period.

Physical _____

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Light Moderate Heavy Extreme

Mental _____

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Bored Light Moderate Intense Overload

ALL 8. Rate your level of fatigue (circle correct response).

a. Feel good; could fly again immediately.

b. Slightly tired; could fly again in 30 minutes to an hour.

c. Moderately tired; could fly again in 4-5 hours.

d. Severely tired; could fly again in 8-10 hours after a period of sleep.

e. Exhausted; could not fly again within 24 hours.

ALL

9. Place a mark on a scale of 0-8 to indicate the amount each of the following contributed to your level of fatigue.

a. Time at flight controls. P, CP, NAV

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

b. Mission conditions (weather, etc.).

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

c. Noise and vibration.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

d. Mission anxiety (overwater, ice, uncharted terrain mountains).

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

e. Aircraft environment (temperature, lighting, fumes).

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

f. Personal factors (headache, helmet fit, minor illness, personal stress, etc.).

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

g. Boredom

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

h. Aircraft seating or restraining devises.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

i. Aircraft ventilation (air circulation, heating, cooling).

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9. (Continued)

j. Other (Describe) _____

_____

_____

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

ALL

10. What can be done to reduce aircrew fatigue on the mission?

_____

_____

_____

ALL

11. Please comment on the adequacy, comfort and usefulness of the life support equipment.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

ALL

12. Are there additional items of life support equipment which should be included on the mission?

_____

_____

_____

ALL

13. What additional training do you think is necessary for medical, survival, and life support?

_____

_____

_____

ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

ALL

18. Did operation of the extended range fuel system cause any noise or reaction to any other electrical system on the aircraft?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

ALL

19. Did operation of any other electrical system cause malfunction of improper operation of the extended range fuel system?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify. _____

_____

_____

RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY/SUPPORTABILITY

N, CE, FE

20. Did any malfunction of the extended range system occur?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

N, CE, FE

21. What was the corrective action?

_____

_____

_____

CE, FE

22. Are any special tools required to work on extended range fuel system but not provided?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

CE, FE

23. Were the tools in the general mechanic tool box adequate to maintain the extended range fuel system?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify additional tools required._____

_____

_____

CE, FE

24. Were any special tools required to maintain the extended range fuel system?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

CE, FE

25. Were you able to perform all required tasks satisfactorily?

Yes _____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

CE, FE

26. Were you unable to perform any maintenance actions?

Yes_____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

CE, FE

27. Were any maintenance actions required that were not addressed during training?

Yes_____ No _____

Specify._____

_____

_____

TRAINING

ALL

28. What training did you receive on the extended range fuel system? (Check all appropriate blocks.)

Installation _____

Normal Removal _____

Emergency Removal _____

Operation _____

Maintenance _____

Weight & Balance _____

ALL

29. Do you believe you can accomplish the following adequately with training which has been provided?

	TASKS			
CREWMEMBER	INSTAL/REMOVE	OPERATE	MAINTAIN	REGULATE A/C WT & BA
P	X		X	
CP	X		X	
N	X		X	
CE				X
FE				X

COMMENTS:_____

_____

_____

_____

ALL

14. What, if any, problems due to special mission equipment increased your fatigue?

EQUIPMENT	NO PROBLEM	PROBLEM	COMMENT
Doppler			
Omega			
APR-39(1)			
APR-44			
M-130			
HF Radio			
Aux Fuel Sys.			
A PX-100 Transponder			
Forward Refuel System			

P, CP

15. What do you think is the optimum amount of time to be at the flight controls [redacted] on a mission such as this one? Why?

ALL

16. What can be done to improve aircrew comfort on the mission?

ALL

17. Additional Comments (If desired:

~~SECRET~~

FROM: Senior Test Project Officer 1 Jul 80

SUBJ: CH-47C NVG Compatability Emerging Results/Other Findings

TO: Test Director, JTD Honey Badger

1. Significant findings - NVG Compatability

a. Some fuel quantity selector switches are spring loaded to TOTAL. All CH-47C fitted with extended range fuel systems should have switches which are not spring loaded. Inability to monitor main fuel cell quantity during fuel transfer can result in a ruptured main fuel cell.

b. OMEGA lights are too bright; only the digital readout lights can be dimmed. Recommend a slip on/slip off black metal shield be fabricated.

c. Navigator station

(1) Navigator should be seated in the cargo compartment behind the companionway. His equipment should include: portable field table, OMEGA, stop watch and a fixed light source (map light). OMEGA should be mounted on the table in a fashion that it can be transferred to the current location in the cockpit if necessary (if navigator becomes disabled). Working within the companionway does not appear to be the best solution for the navigator due to reflectors from OMEGA and his need to operate with light.

d. FM radio volume is constantly at maximum and not adjustable with KY-28 installed. This is apparently a problem in the wiring.

e. IR illuminator brackets allow illuminators to shake around which distract the pilots. A different mounting bracket should be fabricated.

f. Right position light should have a split element so the bottom half is red which enhances NVG visibility.

g. Some gages, switches, indicators are not visible. The most significant indicator which cannot be easily read is the RMI. (A detailed analysis of CH-47A NVG compatability will follow after pilots complete questionnaires).

h. Cockpit configurations are not standard from one aircraft to another (primarily the center console).

2. Other findings:

a. CH-47C require blackout curtains at the companionway.

~~SECRET~~

b. Extended range fuel system switch assembly should be labeled as indicated at inclosure 1. Some crewchiefs do not understand the system, i.e., that #1, 2, 3, 4 fuel pumps do not correspond to #1, 2, 3, 4 tanks; why only one pump is normally turned on at a time etc.

c. Crewchiefs can complete normal inflight duties while wearing NVG.

d. Aircraft need to be weighed and DD Form 365C updated accordingly.

e. Standard loading configurations need to be developed. For instance, no provisions have been made for crewchiefs to be seated behind M-60 guns. Generally, two footlockers (which contain miscellaneous gear) are used.

f. Standard mission equipment needs to be determined.

g. No emergency repair system has been devised to plug a tank or repair a line.

h. No dip stick has been provided to determine fuel status.

G

(

[redacted]

Sr. Test Project Officer

C

CH-47 NVG COMPATABILITY DATA COLLECTION FORM

NAME AND RANK_____

DUTY POSITION: P, CP, CE, OBS (Circle One)

DATE_____

Purpose of this form is to determine the adequacy of modifications applied to the CH-47 to make it NVG compatible. Rate your ability to locate, operate, and/or use the following items using the scale provided, based upon your judgment. Keep in mind that items indicated may effect preflight/ postflight, VMC, IMC, or NOE profiles, formation or transition from one flight mode to another. Indicate where inadequate procedures, training, publications, equipment modifications are a factor.

SCALE:

1- No improvement required
2- Adequate, but improvement required
3- Minor improvement required
4- Major improvement required
5- Unacceptable unless modified
NA- Not Installed/Observed

SUBJECT ITEM/AREA	1	2	3	4	5	NA	REMARKS
COCKPIT							
NVG Lighting System							
Instrument Panel Flood Lights							
Pilot/Copilot Illuminator							
Master Throw Switch ID/Location							
Reflections on Windshields							
Overhead Switches							
Lighting							
Hydraulics							
Battery/Generators							
APU							
Fuel Pumps							
Flight Controls							
Hoist/Cargo Hook							
Other (Specify)							
AC/DC Circuit Breakers							
Mirror							
FAT Gage							
Compass							

SUBJECT ITEM/ AREA	1	2	3	4	5	NA	REMARKS
Fire Extinguisher							
Pilot Instrument Panel							
Master Caution Light							
Airspeed							
Attitude Indicator							
Altimeter							
Radar Altimeter							
RMI							
Course Indicator							
VSI							
Clock							
Trim							
Torque Meter							
Rotor Tachometer							
Copilot Instrument Panel							
Master Caution Light							
Airspeed							
Attitude Indicator							
Altimeter							
RMI							
VSI							
Clock							
Trim							
Torque Meter							
Rotor Tachometer							
[illegible]se Guide Indicator							
Center Instrument Panel							
Fire Ext Agent Switch							
Fire T-handles							
AC/DA Load Meter							
Cyclic Trim Indicators							
Gas Producer							
[illegible]							
Eng Oil Temp							
Eng Oil Pressure							
Trans Oil Pressure							
Trans Oil Press Selector Switch							
Trans Oil Temp							
Trans Oil Temp Selector Switch							
Hydraulic Pressures							
Fuel Quantity							
Fuel Quantity Selector Switch							
Console							
Caution Panel Lights							
OMEGA							
Radio/Nav Controls							
Stick Positioner							
Engine Condition Levers							

SUBJECT ITEM/AREA	I	2	3	4	5	NA	REMARKS
Normal Engine Trim							
Emergency Engine Trim							
SAS							
PSAS							
Speed Trims							
Other (Specify)							
Cyclic Control Buttons							
Thrust Lever Control Buttons							
COMPANION WAY							
Flight Control Closet							
Filter Buttons							
Other (Specify)							
CARGO COMPARTMENT							
[illegible]gency Exit Lights							
[illegible]nics Compartment							
Heater Compartment							
Winch							
Weapons							
Aux Fuel Cells							
Aux Fuel Cell Switches/Lights							
Winch/Hoist Controls							
Crossfeed Valves and Warning Lights							
Accumulators							
Filter Buttons							
Fire Extinguishers							
Ramp Control Valve							
Other (Specify)							
Rescue Hoist (If installed)							
EXTERIOR							
Landing Lights							
Formation Lights							
Navigation Lights							
Rotating Beacon(s) (Specify)							

SUBJECT ITEM/AREA	1	2	3	4	5	NA	REMARKS
PREFLIGHT/POSTFLIGHT							
Main/Fwd/Aft Fuel Levels							
Cargo Hook							
Engine Oil Levels							
Hydraulis Reservoirs							
Hydraulic Filter Buttons							
Comb & Eng XMSN Oil Levels							
Comb & Eng Filter Buttons							
Dephasing Handle							
Fwd XMSN Oil Level							
Other (Specify)							
GENERAL							
NVG Preparation Procedures							
Cockpit							
Aux Fuel System							
Cargo Compartment							
Ramp Area							
Aircraft Exterior							
Ability to Perform							
Loose Formation Flight (Specify A/C Separation Reqmt in Rotor Discs)							
Effect of Engine Exhaust on Formation Flt (State best Position to Hold)							
IOCL							
External Loads							
Other (Specify)							

RECOMMENDATIONS _____

CH-47 INTERNAL AUX FUEL TANK CONTROL PANEL



STENCIL LINES, ARROWS, WORDS IN DASHED OUTLINED AREAS ON AUX FUEL CONTROL PANEL

SECRET

(5)

CH-47 NVG COMPATABILITY DATA COLLECTION FORM SECRET

RESULTS

NAME AND RANK ______________________

DUTY POSITION: P, CP, CE, OBS (Circle One)

DATE ______________

Purpose of this form is to determine the adequacy of modifications applied to the CH-47 to make it NVG compatible. Rate your ability to locate, operate, and/or use the following items using the scale provided, based upon your judgment. Keep in mind that items indicated may effect preflight/ postflight, VMC, IMC, or NOE profiles, formation, or transition from one flight mode to another. Indicate where inadequate procedures, training, publications, equipment modifications are a factor.

SCALE:

1- No improvement required
2- Adequate, but improvement required
3- Minor improvement required
4- Major improvement required
5- Unacceptable unless modified
NA- Not Installed/Observed

SUBJECT ITEM/AREA	1	2	3	4	5	NA	*Responses*	REMARKS *TOT % #4 & 5 ≥ 10%*
COCKPIT								
NVG Lighting System								
~~Instrument Panel Flood Lights~~	*36*	*55*		*1*			*11*	
(Pilot/Copilot Illuminator)	*20*		*30*	*20*			*10*	*20*
(~~Master Arrow Switch ID/Location~~)	*72*	*27*					*11*	
Reflections on Windshields	*18*	*18*	*45*	*9*	*9*		*11*	*18*
(Overhead Switches Lighting)	*50*	*15*	*20*	*20*			*10*	*20*
* (Hydraulics)	*50*	*20*	*10*	*10*			*10*	*10*
* (Battery/Generators)	*90*			*10*			*10*	*10*
* (APU)	*80*	*10*		*10*			*10*	*10*
(~~Fuel Pumps~~)	*70*		*15*				*13*	
(~~Flight Controls~~)	*100*						*11*	—
(~~Hoist/Cargo Hook~~)	[illegible]					[illegible]	*10*	
Other (Specify).								
[illegible]			[illegible]				*1*	
AC/DC Circuit Breakers	*36*	[illegible]	[illegible]	*18*	*9*		*11*	*27*
(~~Mirror~~)	[illegible]		*1*		*9*	*12*	[illegible]	
(~~HF Gage~~)	[illegible]		[illegible]				[illegible]	
Compass	[illegible]		[illegible]					*18*

(circled): % TOTAL ≥ 50% COLUMN #1

—— : ≥ 10% COLUMNS 4 & 5

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT ITEM/ AREA	1	2	3	4	5	NA	N	REMARKS
Fire Extinguisher	60	30	10				10	
Pilot Instrument Panel								
Master Caution Light	40		20	30		10	10	30
Airspeed	40		20			40	10	
Attitude Indicator	50	10	20			10	10	
Altimeter	40	20	30			10	10	
Radar Altimeter	20	40		30		10	10	30
RMI	40	10	20	20		10	10	20
Course Indicator	25	38	13	13		13	8	13
VSI	33	44	11			11	9	10
Clock	40	30	10	10		10	10	10
Trim	35	11	11	22	11	11	9	33
Torque Meter	40	30	20			10	10	
Rotor Tachometer	27	36	18	9		9	11	
Copilot Instrument Panel								
Master Caution Light	45	18	27	9			11	
Airspeed	56	22	9	9			9	
Attitude Indicator	67	11	11	11			9	11
Altimeter	50	30	10	10			10	10
RMI	40	30	20	20			10	20
VSI	56	22	11	11			9	11
Clock	44	11	11	22		11	9	22
Trim	50		25	25			8	25
Torque Meter	56	22	11	11			9	11
Rotor Tachometer	44	33	11	11			9	11
Cruise Guide Indicator	12	52				28	8	
Center Instrument Panel								
Fire Ext Agent Switch	91		9				11	
Fire T-handles	45	18	9	27			11	27
AC/DA Load Meter	50	20	10	10		10	10	10
Cyclic Trim Indicators	90	10					10	
Gas Producer		80	20				10	
PTIT	40	30	30				10	
Eng Oil Temp	40	30	30				10	
Eng Oil Pressure	40	50	10				10	
Trans Oil Pressure	40	50	10				10	
Trans Oil Press Selector Switch	36	45	9	9			11	
Trans Oil Temp	40	50	10				10	
Trans Oil Temp Selector Switch	36	45	9				11	
Hydraulic Pressures	40						10	
Fuel Quantity	33	33	11		22		9	22
Fuel Quantity Selector Switch	70	20			10		10	10
Console								
Caution Panel Lights	50	40		10			10	
OMEGA						100		50
Radio/Nav Controls	36	45	9	9			11	
Slice Positioner	50	40		10			10	
Engine Condition Levers	80	10					10	

SECRET

SUBJECT ITEM/AREA	1	2	3	4	5	NA		REMARKS
~~Normal Engine Trim~~	83	15	10				10	
~~Emergency Engine Trim~~	73	23					10	
~~SAS~~	70	33					10	
~~PSAS~~	73	23					10	
~~Speed Trims~~	47	33					7	
Other (Specify)								
~~Cyclic Control Buttons~~	63	25		13			8	13
~~Thrust Lever Control Buttons~~	50	10					10	
COMPANION WAY								
~~Flight Control Closet~~	50		17			33	6	
Filter Buttons	43	14				43	7	
Other (Specify)								
CARGO COMPARTMENT								
Emergency Exit Lights	38	15		13	13	25	8	26
~~Avionics Compartment~~	56	11				33	9	
~~Heater Compartment~~						38	8	
~~Winch~~	57					43	7	
Weapons	25				13	50	8	13
Aux Fuel Cells	38	13	13	13		25	8	13
Aux Fuel Cell Switches/Lights	38		13	13		38	8	13
Winch/Hoist Controls	38	13			13	38	8	13
~~Crossfeed Valves and Warning Lights~~	50				13	38	8	13
~~Accumulators~~	50	13			13	25	7	13
~~Filter Buttons~~	50	13			13	25	8	13
~~Fire Extinguishers~~	50	13			13	25	7	13
~~Ramp Control Valve~~	57				14	29	7	14
Other (Specify)								
~~Rescue Hoist (If installed)~~						10	2	
EXTERIOR								
~~Landing Lights~~	60	40						
~~Formation Lights~~	50						3	
~~Navigation Lights~~	73	23						
~~Rotating Beacon(s)~~ (Specify)	90	10						10

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT ITEM/AREA	1	2	3	4	5	NA		REMARKS
PREFLIGHT/POSTFLIGHT								
~~Main/Fwd/Aft Fuel Levels~~	43	29				29	7	
~~(Cargo Door)~~	71					29	7	
~~(Engine Oil Levels)~~	57	14				29	7	
~~(Hydraulic Reservoirs)~~	57	14				29	7	
~~(Hydraulic Filter Buttons)~~	71					29	7	
~~(Cond & Eng XMSN Oil Levels)~~	71					29	7	
~~(Cond & Eng Filter Buttons)~~	71					29	7	
Dephasing Handle	43	14			14	29	7	14
~~Fwd XMSN Oil Level~~	43	29				29	7	
Other (Specify)								
GENERAL								
NVG Preparation Procedures								
Cockpit	29	14		43	14		7	57
Aux Fuel System	33	17	17	17	17		6	34
~~Cargo Compartment~~								
~~Ramp Area~~								
~~Aircraft Exterior~~								
~~Ability to Perform~~								
~~Loose Formation Flight~~								
~~(Specify A/C Separation Reqmt~~								
~~in Rotor Discs)~~	33					67	6	
~~Effect of Engine Exhaust on~~								
~~Formation Flt (State best~~								
~~Position to Hold)~~	17		17			67	6	
~~IOCL~~	33	33		17		17	6	17
~~External Loads~~	20					20	5	
Other (Specify)								

RECOMMENDATIONS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

FINDINGS

CH-47

A (E) [redacted] / AC to install
Phys. look in tanks
Not self-sealing / ballistic tolerant
No emerging repair at cbt damage
Not manually removable
No fuel metering system
Removal of ERK prior to air transport?

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

2 Jul 80

TO: Task Force Commander, JTD Honey Badger

INFO: Test Director, JTD Honey Badger

FROM: USAAVNBD Project Analyst

SUBJ: Emerging Results, UH-60A Aircrew Mission Effectiveness

1. The information contained herein constitutes emerging results found from analyzing fifteen (15) randomly selected UH-60A aircrews by USAAVNC observers with regard to the following measures of effectiveness (MOE) as related to mission effectiveness:

a. Maximum enroute longitudinal course deviation: ±3 minutes (based upon estimated course leg times).

b. Maximum latteral course deviation: ±1500 meters

c. Course Altitude: 300-500 feet above ground level (AGL) and below 300 feet AGL where possible.

2. The information is provided in tabular format for the purpose of identifying collective mission effectiveness parameters assessed to date based upon the random selection of the 15 aircrews observed.

3. The observer's mission effectiveness data collection form from which this data was recorded and reduced is found at inclosure 1.

4. Although these objective findings may provide insight as to the unit's overall mission readiness at this time, it is paramount to consider the following comments based upon sound military judgment and experience:

a. The average aircrew had negotiated route black at least one other time and at least five of the aircrews twice thus establishing a learning curve.

b. Ambient light conditions, both moon phase and azimuth, were generally considered optimal; however, two observations were conducted under reduced visibility due to thunderstorms, rain showers and haze.

c. Aircrews were not found to be standardized as to what percentage of the time they collectively or any one member thereof employed night vision goggles (i.e., aircrew deviation of duration NVGs worn estimated from 2-5 hours).

d. Spacing of individual aircraft (sorties) was not necessarily optimal in as much as several aircraft caught up to each other during the conduct of the flight, in some cases reducing navigation to a "follow the leader" situation.

e. The number of observations for anyone aircrew varied significantly due to any of the below reasons:

(1) Mission aborts - maintenance

(2) Mission aborts - operations

(3) Mission aborts - weather

(4) Aircrew workload between short course segments too rigorous for data aggregation.

(5) Partial lack of standardization in observer instructions.

5. Considering the aforementioned constraints, the objective data pertaining to the MOE found in paragraph 1 is tabulated at inclosure 2 using simple statistical procedures identifying central tendancy.

6. The number of times that any given aircrew exceeded any given parameter found in the MOE is found below..

AIRCREW UH-60A	LONGITUDINAL DEVIATIONS 1 ETA-ACTUAL/±3.0 MINS.	LATTERAL DEVIATIONS 1 LEFT/EIGHT OF CRS ON CRS/21.5 KM	VERTICAL DEVIATIONS 500 FT AGL
1	0	1	2
2	0	0	2
3	1	2	3
4	0	0	0
5	0	0	0
6	1	1	2
7	0	2	1
8	7	0	0
9	0	2	*NA
10	1	1	1
11	0	0	*NA
12	0	0	0
13	0	0	1
14	0	0	**8
15	1	0	**12
SUMMARY			
TOTALS	11	9	**12

*Excluded, measured MSL in lieu of AGL.

**Not counted in summary totals due to IMC weather conditions

7. It is anticipated that certain correlations may exist between the evaluated individual aircrew's effectiveness as related to the constraints previously discussed and the defined MOE. Hense, further covariance techniques could be applied to investigate a possible relation between two primary variables as deemed appropriate. The two variable of immediate interest would be (1) the number of times the particular aircrew previously negotiated the route and (2) the aircrew's prior aviation experience. Because of the manual effort involved and on site personnel constraints, a more detailed analysis will be provided upon request.

G

[redacted]
Project Analyst

SECRET

OBSERVER'S MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

DATA COLLECTION FORM

POINT	TIME ETE / ACTUAL	COURSE 1/ L ON R	ALTITUDE (AGL) 2/	REMARKS
SP				
MIDPOINT				
CP 1				
MIDPOINT				
CP 2				
MIDPOINT				
CP 3				
MIDPOINT				
CP 4				
MIDPOINT				
CP 5				
MIDPOINT				
CP 6				
MIDPOINT				
CP 7				
MIDPOINT				
CP 8				
MIDPOINT				
CP 9				
MIDPOINT				
CP 10				
MIDPOINT				
CP 11				

Cont 1

~~SECRET~~

POINT	TIME ETE / ACTUAL	COURSE 1/ L ON R	ALTITUDE (AGL) 2/	REMARKS
MIDPOINT				
CP 12				
MIDPOINT				
CP 13				
MIDPOINT				
CP 14				
MIDPOINT				
CP 15				
MIDPOINT				
RP				

COMMENTS:

1/ If on course, check "On", if off course indicate left (L) or right (R) in kilometers.
2/ Average altitude (AGL) estimated using radar altimeter.

OBSERVER: _____

PILOT: _____

COPILOT: _____

NAVIGATOR: _____

CREW CHIEF: _____

DATE: _____

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CREW INTEGRITY

How many times has this crew flown together as a mission crew?_

Of these how many were under: NVG daylight _____

NVG night _____

SECRET

RCREW III-60A)	*LOGITUDINAL COURSE DEVIATIONS DELTA TIME (MINUTES) (ACTUAL-ESTIMATED)				*LATTERAL COURSE DEVIATIONS DELTA DISTANCE OFF COURSE				VERTICLE (ALTITUDE) COURSE DEVIATIONS (FEET AGL)			
	NO. OF OBVS	AVG Δ TIME	S.D. Δ TIME	RANGE (MIN-MAX)	NO. OF OBVS	AVG Δ DIST	S.D. Δ DIST TIME	RANGE (MIN-MAX)	NO. OF OBVS	AVG ALT	S.D. ALT	RANGE (MIN-MAX)
1	25	.604	.736	0-2.5	26	.377	.631	0-3.0	31	626	1283	100-3000
2	11	.891	.976	0-2.4	15	.067	.168	0- .6	17	444	327	100-1500
3	15	1.240	.998	0-3.0	14	.629	1.059	0-4.0	23	443	352	150-1500
4	15	1.171	.827	3-2.9	18	.111	.232	0- .8	20	350	89	200- 500
5	8	.250	.378	0-1.0	21	.157	.293	0-1.1	15	190	82	75- 400
6	15	1.253	1.336	0-4.9	20	.445	.704	0-3.0	14	482	114	245- 700
7	16	.213	.418	0-1.6	11	.518	.783	0-2.0	16	464	686	200-3000
8	11	3.118	1.846	.1-5.5	23	.287	.333	0- .8	25	312	98	100- 500
9	29	.365	.510	0-2.5	30	.300	.481	0-1.9	30	**1403	**567	**750-4000
10	11	1.073	1.250	0-4.3	10	.320	.597	0-1.9	15	244	374	40-1500
11	6	.833	.408	0-1.0	9	.200	.300	0- .9	8	**1050	**626	**500-2000
12	14	.486	.483	0-1.0	14	.264	.436	0-1.3	14	450	65	300- 500
13	7	1.000	.816	0-2.0	9	.100	.141	0- .4	9	889	285	500-1500
14	30	.167	.235	0- .8	28	.057	.079	0- .2	30	289	131	150- 750
15	14	.686	1.122	0-3.6	18	.206	.304	0- .8	17	289	502	200-1600
MMARY												
O. OF VS	15	15	NA	15	15	15	NA	15	15	**13	NA	**13
AN	15	.934	NA	.03-2.60	16	.269	NA	0-1.5	19	359	NA	182-1142
D.	7.40	.753	NA	NA	7.35	.169	NA	NA	7.16	143	NA	NA

VIATIONS ARE ALL ABSOLUTE VALUES FROM ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL (ETA) OR FROM DOPPLER INDICATED TRUE COURSE LINE.

DICATES ESTIMATED MSL ALTITUDE DUE TO RADAR ALTIMETER MALFUNCTION OR OBSERVER ERROR.

~~SECRET~~

(12)

3 July 1980

(S) TO: Task Force Commander, JTD Honey Badger

INFO: Test Director, JTD Honey Badger

FROM: USAAVNBD Test Project Officer

SUBJECT: 101st Aviator Flight Experience

1. The following data is provided for information purposes. It reflects responses to Aviator Flight Experience Data Sheets collected from 52 UH-60 pilots and 23 CH-47 pilots as of 30 June 1980.

2. Data is presented only for total aircraft time, time by type aircraft, night vision goggle (NVG) time, and combat time (total and by type aircraft). Recent training in NVGs since 30 June 1980 will comprise a great change in NVG time.

AIRCRAFT TYPE	AVG TOTAL TIME (HR)	AVG TYPE A/C TOTAL TIME(HR)	AVG NVG TIME (HR)		AVG COMBAT TIME (HR)		
			NO. W/ NVG TIME	OVERALL	NO W/ CBT TIME	OVERALL	NO. BY TYPE A/C
UH-60A	1644.4	162.5	(42) 13.44	11.56	(14) 844.9	231.9	NA
CH-47	2785.0	781.1	(7) 4.4	1.7	(10) 1054.4	687.7	(10) 397.8

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

27 June 1980

FROM: Test Director
JCS Honeybadger
Norton AFB CA 92409

SUBJ: Pilot Experience Worksheet

TO: Commander
ATTN: S-3
158th Aviation Battalion
Fort Campbell, KY

1. Pilot Experience Worksheets (Inclosure 1) are to be completed on each aviator participating as an operational pilot during this exercise.

2. Worksheets are to be returned to this test directorate NLT 1600 hours 27 June 1980. Local reproduction of forms is authorized.

3. POC is [redacted] telephone (Autovon) [redacted]

[redacted] Colonel
Test Director

SECRET

PILOT EXPERIENCE WORKSHEET

NAME/GRADE: _____ UNIT: _____

DATE: _____

TYPE AIRCRAFT

	FLIGHT HOURS	
MILITARY	NON-COMBAT	COMBAT
Utility	XX	XX
UH-1	_____	_____
Fixed Wing	_____	_____
Attack		
AH-1	_____	_____
UH-1	_____	_____
Aeroscout	XX	XX
OH-58	_____	_____
OH-6	_____	_____
Cargo		
CH-47	_____	_____
CH-54	_____	_____
Other (Specify)	XX	XX
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
SUBTOTALS	_____	_____
CIVILIAN		
Rotary Wing	_____	
Fixed Wing	_____	
SUBTOTALS	_____	
GRAND TOTALS	_____	_____

QUALIFICATIONS

	YES	NO
IP/SIP	_____	_____
IFE	_____	_____
NOE Qualified	_____	_____

	School Qualified	Mission Qualified	Mission Familiarized
NVG (Check Most Appropriate Block)	_____	_____	_____
Total NVG Flight Hours	_____		

OPERATIONAL UNIT FLIGHT EXPERIENCE

TYPE UNIT	TOTAL MONTHS
Assault	_____
Air Cavalry	_____
Attack Helicopter	_____
Division/Corps Support	_____
Assault Support	_____
Other (Specify)	XX
_____	_____
_____	_____

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~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 156th Aviation Battalion (Aslt Hel)
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Fort Campbell, Kentucky 42223

- 757

AFZB-KF-H

28 July 1980

SUBJECT: After Action Report - JTX Honey Badger, Phase I and II.

TO: Commander
101st Avn Gp (CBT)
101st Abn Div (Air Aslt)
Ft. Campbell, KY 42223

Attached documents forwarded for your review.

G

[redacted]
LTC, IN
Commanding

CG, 101ST ABN DIV
28 JULY 1980

[redacted] FROM CLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE

CY 2 OF CY -

~~SECRET~~ - NO FORN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I: GENERAL

1. The 158th Aviation Battalion (TF Challenge) was comprised of two UH-60 TOE companies (C and D). B Company 158th Aviation Battalion Provided fillers for personnel shortages within C and D companies. Additionally, 23 pilots from the 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion were attached to the companies and were trained as navigators. A Company 159th Aviation Battalion was attached with 8 CH-47 aircraft.

2. Task Organization, Aircraft, and Number of Personnel.

UNIT	OFF	WO	ENL	#AC
HHC 158	12	6	72	0
C 158	10	29	72	15 UH-60
D 158	9	32	65	15 UH-60
ATC	0	0	4	0
Pathfinders	1	0	11	0
A 159	6	18	86	8 CH-47
TOTAL	38	85	310	30 UH-47 8 CH-47

3. Key personnel involved in TF Challenge operations:

[redacted] (B Co Cdr)

[redacted]

SECTION II: NOTIFICATION/DEPLOYMENT

1. The 158th Aviation Battalion was initially notified of deployment at 1000 hours, 2 June 1980.

a. A certain amount of confusion arose over the initial notification due to lack of information on the duration of deployment, what type of move, what equipment was needed, and what could and could not be discussed about the operation. The 101st Aviation Group and 101st Airborne Division assisted in clarifying these areas. The advance warning given for this move precluded the normal EDRE N hour sequence.

b. Fifteen aircraft self-deployed on the 8th of June and arrived at Norton Air Force Base on the afternoon of the 9th of June. The aircraft remained over night at Ft. Bliss, Tx.

c. The remaining personnel, vehicles, and aircraft, were flown to Norton, using C5A and C141 aircraft. The Battalion Task Force used 7-C5A chalks and 21-C141 chalks. The initial C141 departed 10 June at 0600, the last aircraft departed on 11 June at 1900. The movement was well planned and executed with few unresolved problems.

2. A Company 159th Aviation Battalion's initial warning order to deploy was received through command channels the evening of 3 June 80.

a. The unit was undergoing a Battalion ARTEP at the time. The "be prepared" deployment order was received on 4 June 80, at 0909 hours, via field radio. Confirmation of deployment was received on 8 June 80 and unit was ordered back to garrison (ARTEP completed).

b. Ten CH-47C Aircraft (8-A/159th and 2-B/159th) departed Ft. Campbell, Ky for Norton AFB, Ca. at 0730 hours on 11 June 80. The aircraft remained over-night at two different locations; Reese AFB, Tx. and Luke AFB, Az.

Eight A/159th CH-47C aircraft arrived at Norton, AFB Ca. at 1300 hours, 13 June 80. The two B/159th CH-47C aircraft remained at Luke AFB as backup aircraft, but were not required and subsequently returned to Ft. Campbell Ky.

SECTION III: PHASE I

1. Phase I training started on 10 Jun 1980 and ended 3 Jul 1980. Training during this phase was divided into four primary areas; Night Vision Goggle training, Navigator Training, Special Subjects (classroom type training), and Crew Training along a specific route of flight.

2. Night Vision Goggle training is discussed in detail in ANNEX A. The following number of personnel completed the NVG training program.

	IPs	PICs	CPs	NAVs
UH-60	9	17	30	24
CH-47	2	6	8	5

3. Navigator training consisted of 32 hours of classroom instruction followed by practical application along given routes. The 32 hours of classroom instruction included

16 hours Doppler Navigation
3 hours E6B Computer
6 hours Map Reading, Terrain Association
3 hours Time Control Procedure
4 hours Charting Techniques, Layout of Course

Instruction on the Doppler was presented by an Army instructor from Fort Rucker. All other instruction and the evaluation rides were graded by Air Force instructor navigators. At the conclusion of training the navigators were given routes to plan and execute as a demonstration of their proficiency. Due to mission guidance given by army control elements only 12 navigators completed this portion. The remainder of the navigators planned routes Blue, Green, and Black and flew those routes as their evaluation ride. At the conclusion of the routes the navigators were considered mission capable by both the Air Force and the Army instructors.

4. Special subjects were integrated throughout Phase I training and covered the

following subjects:

a. Desert Survival and Flying Techniques - All Flight Crews
b. XM 130 Chaff Dispenser - All *[1]
c. Oxygen System Operation
d. Radar Warning Receiver AN/APR 39 and 44 **[2]
e. Extended Range Fuel System (Emergency Removal and Operation)
f. Operation of High Frequency Radio
g. Mountain Flying Techniques
h. Kneeboard Trainer for AN/APR 39
i. OMEGA Classes Given to CH-47 Crews

*[1] XM-130 Chaff Class was broken down into 3 seperate classes consisting of operation, handling, loading and unloading.

**[2] AN/APR 39 class broken into 3 seperate classes, consisting of operation, identification of sounds and weapons systems, for all crews.

5. During the final days of Phase I all flight crews (UH-60 and CH-47) were required to negotiate a flight route within specific parameters. The UH-60 parameters were to negotiate all check points within ± 1 min and within 500 meters of course, the parameters for the CH-47 were to negotiate all check point ± 3 min and within ½ mile of course.

a. 1) The UH-60 course consists of 3 routes; Blue Route, Black Route, and Green Route. The Blue Route started at Norton AFB and terminated at Cosa Peak. The route was 170 NM in length. The Black Route was 306 Nm starting at Cosa Peak and ending at Fallon NAS, NV. Both routes cross terrain that varies from mountains to desert valleys. The Green Route begins at Fallon NAS and continues in a South Westerly direction to a point in the vicinity of Cosa Peak. The course then follows Blue Route back to Norton AFB. The length of Green Route is 181 Nm, making a total route length of 727 Nm.

2) Black Route has a maximum altitude of 9000 feet and a minimum of below sea level in the desert. Each course consists of a total of 15 check points, with a minimum turn of 3° and a maximum turn of 126°, The longest leg of the course was 70.5 Km and the shortest leg was 13.4 Km. The temperature ranges were 97° to 75° Fahrenheit.

b. The CH-47 Purple Route was 400 Nm in length and negotiated the SIERRA Serria-Nevada Mountains. Midway on the course the CH-47s were to link up with the UH-60s to simulate refueling operations. On the first attempt the CH-47s were not able to link up because of blade icing in the mountains that caused a loss of power. When the route was attempted the second time the link up was completed.

6. At the conclusion of Phase I the unit developed a standard load plan for the UH-60, Incl 1, a standard load plan for the CH-47, Incl 2, and crew duties for the UH-60 with Navigators, Incl 3.

7. At the conclusion of each flight, crews were throughly debriefed. The re-occurring comments from pilot debriefings are contained at ANNEX B.

UH-60 Standard Load Plan

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS



Incl 1

CH-47 Standard Load Plan

A – 2 ea Oxygen Bottles

B – Water Cooler

C – 3 ea Hot WX Survival Kits

D – Hoist Assembly (2 A/C only)

E – C Rations

F – Tool Box

G – Personal TA 50

H – 2 ea 5 Gal Water Cans

I – NVG Containers and Gas Masks

J – OMEGA Black Box

K – Cargo/PAX Seats

L – M60 MG 2ea

M – Fare System to Include Hoses, Grounding Cables, Rods, Pump; 5 Gal Fuel Can, Fire Ext.

N – PAX Seat

O – Small Supply of Assorted Lubricants

P – Navigator Table

Q – Misc. Equipment

All crewmembers wear survival vests, water wings, weapons, flare gun (pilots only)



Crew duties intergrating the navigator into the UH60A.

1. Pilot-in-Command (PIC)
   a. Flying the aircraft (hazard and obstacle avoidance)
   b. Assist in navigation by pointing out significant terrain features to the navigator.
   c. Follow navigational instructions issued by the navigator.
   d. Monitor radios and make radio calls as appropriate.
   e. Designate specific crew duties to copilot, navigator, and crew engineer for the following:
      1. Fuel transfer.
      2. Monitor instruments during Night Vision Goggle (NVG) and Night Hawk flying conditions.
      3. Hourly fuel checks.
      4. TGT checks enroute at different altitudes and temperatures.

2. Copilot
   a. Assist the pilot in hazard and obstacle avoidance by telling him what to expect ahead (map recon of the terrain).
   b. Backup the navigator by knowing aircraft position at all times; follow on the map.
   c. Assist the navigator by pointing out significant terrain features.
   d. Monitor aircraft heading.
   e. Monitor aircraft performance gauges.
   f. Monitor radios and make radio calls as appropriate.
   g. Perform specific crew duties as designated by PIC.

3. Navigator
   a. Navigation (know the location of the aircraft at all times.)
   b. Give navigational instructions to the pilot.
   c. Keep pilot informed on time, distance, and heading to the next check point.
   d. Inform pilot of airspeed necessary to reach checkpoints within (±) 1 min.
   e. Inform pilot of heading (and necessary heading corrections) to reach check points within 500 meters.
   f. Perform specific crew duties as designated by PIC.

4. Crew Engineer (CE)
   a. Monitor the mechanical conditions of the aircraft.
   b. Assist in navigation by pointing out significant terrain features to the navigator.
   c. Observe for obstacle and hazard clearance during hovering and landing operations.
   d. Perform any other specific tasks directed by the PIC.

SECTION IV: PHASE II

1. a. Phase II began on 5 July 80 with the deployment of 26 UH-60 and 7 CH-47 aircraft from Norton Air Force Base, California to Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah. The aircraft deployed in flights of three and four along two different routes. Route Eagle was approximately 650 Nautical Miles and Route Hawk was approximately 1040 Nautical Miles. Six UH-60 aircraft and 3 CH-47 aircraft were to fly Route Hawk without a refueling - total flight time was 7.5 - 8 hours. All UH-60 and 1 CH-47 aircraft completed the route without refueling. Two CH-47s required 1 refuel stop enroute. The air deployment of limited vehicles and approximately 300 personnel took place over a 36 hour period beginning 4 July at 1900 hours.

b. Training began on the night of 6 July 80 with 21 UH-60 aircraft and 4 CH-47 aircraft being launched along two separate routes (approximately 400 Nm long) to conduct link up and refuel operations. The minimum ambient light necessary to use the night vision goggles was not available and created many problems for crews along both routes and prevented link up and refuel operations.

c. On 7 July, 18 UH-60 and 4 CH-47 aircraft launched along two separate routes (400 Nm) and returned and refueled at a Rapid Refueling Point at Michael AAF. Afterwards the UH-60 crews established laager positions and conducted concealment operations. The CH-47 crews did not move to Laager position or conduct concealment operations. No significant problems were encountered during this mission.

d. On 8 July 80, three UH-60 crews (IP's) began formation flight with the Air Force HH53 helicopter (Pave Low) in an attempt to perfect certain fundamental procedures for future training. Additionally 15 UH-60 crews were scheduled to execute a 400 nautical mile route, return to Michael AAF, con-

duct refuel operation from a fare system established from an MC 130 aircraft, then move to a laager position and conduct concealment operations. The CH-47 crews were to fly a similiar mission less the laager and concealment portion. Due to thunderstorms and a cloud cover that restricted the available ambient light for NVG operations the UH-60 crews were not launched. As BMNT arrived and the weather improved the CH-47s did complete their mission.

e. On 9 July 80, 15 UH-60 crews and 2 CH-47 crews negotiated two separate routes and the UH-60 crews established laager positions and conducted concealment operations.

f. On 10 and 11 July the UH-60 crews conducted joint flight operations with the Air Force HH53 helicopters (Pave Low) performing as flight lead. During this period a joint effort by Air Force and Army instructor pilots with the assistance of Ft. Rucker IPs resulted in a Joint Operating SOP to standardize formation flight procedures. A Copy of this SOP is contained at Appendix 1 of ANNEX C. Also during this phase the CH-47 crews were also practicing joint operations with the Air Force HH53 (Slick). Flight lead remained an Army responsibility. An SOP outlining CH-47 and HH53 flight procedures was also established and is contained as Appendix 2 of ANNEX C.

g. On 12 July 80, eleven UH-60 aircraft deployed along a designated route conducted link up and refuel operations with a CH-47 operated fares and continued to Oro Grande, NM for training with the [redacted] Ranger Bn. The mission continued until 14 July 80.

h. The aircraft that did not deploy to Oro Grande continued to conduct joint flight operation with the Air Force, linkup/refuel operations, and M60D machine gun and flare gun firing.

2. At the conclusion of each mission the crew was thoroughly debriefed. Re-occurring comments from Phase II are contained at Appendix 2 ANNEX B.

SECTION V: "RUSTY-BADGER-JTX (15-16 JULY 80)

1. a. Operation Rusty Badger, conducted on 15-16 July 80, was the culmination of all previous individual, crew, and unit training. The scenario developed into two almost identical situations and missions; one in the North in the vicinity of Fallon Naval Air Station and another in the South in the vicinity of Indian Springs. The Northern mission was executed almost entirely by Army aviation elements and therefore the Air Mission Commander was the Task Force Commander. The Southern mission was led by Air Force HH53, Pave Low aircraft and was coordinated and controlled by the Air Force. Within the 158 Task Force, C Co 158 Avn Bn was assigned the Northern mission with 11 UH-60 aircraft. D Company 158 Avn Bn was tasked with support of the Southern mission with 11 UH-60 aircraft. A/159 supported refuel operations in the north and south with 3 CH-47 aircraft in each sector. Both routes were of similiar distance (400 NM) and followed generally the same type of terrain.

b. Northern Sector - 3 CH-47 aircraft and one HH53 (Slick) departed as one flight along route Cat at 1945 (Mountain Time) hours. The route went west from Michael AAF through mountain passes to a refuel site (ANN) along the return route located vicinity N 40° 19.2' W 117° 24.5'. Eleven UH-60 aircraft departed in three flights (4, 4, 3) along route Cat at 2103 (mountain time) to Fallon, NAS where a 10 minute ground time was used to simulate discharge of auxillary fuel tanks. The flights then continued on to a holding area southeast of Fallon vicinity N 30° 59.0' W 118° 15.0' which was 18 NM south of the objective pick up zone. One UH-60 developed hydraulics problems and went down enroute to Fallon and after the remaining 10 aircraft shut down in the holding area 3 more UH-60s failed to start or had maintenance problems

when called forward to the pick up zone. The pick up zone was notified that only 7 aircraft were available for the extraction. The aircraft departed the holding area and pick up zone as scheduled. However the C141 that was supposed to be on the ground at Fallon NAS 3 minutes prior to the arrival of the UH-60 for transloading of the passengers did not arrive, a C130 that should not have been there at all,almost collided with the flight. Transload of the passengers to the C141 was accomplished and the UH-60s departed along Route Dog which went northeast to the refuel point (ANN) then along interstate 80 east to Windover Airfield, direct to Michael Airfield. The refuel operation at Ann went well with each aircraft refueling approximately 1000 pounds with minimum delay. Only seven of the UH-60s took on fuel however and some confusion arose with the CH-47 crews as to when they were finished and should break down and egress the area. The UH-60 flights arrived back at Michael Airfield at approximately 0530 hours and the CH-47s returned approximately 0830 hours. The remaining UH-60 aircraft with maintenance problems all self recovered except one which was recovered by a company maintenance team. Overall the mission in the Northern Sector went well considering the moon illumination was only 8% for less than 1/3 of the mission.

c. Southern Sector - 3 CH-47 and 2 HH53 (Slick) aircraft departed along Route Eagle at approximately 1850 hours (Mountain Time). Route Eagle was southwest of Michael AAF through the mountain passes to a refuel site (Beth) vicinity N 38° 12.5' W 115° 51.5' which was along the return route TALLON for the UH-60 aircraft. One of the CH-47 and one HH53 continued farther down the return route to an emergency MEDEVAC and refuel site (Carol) located at LIDA Junction Airfield. Eleven UH-60 aircraft in four flights led by Air Force HH53 Pave Lows departed Michael AAF beginning at 2107 (mountain time)

hours along a route which was basically a straight line heading 220° to Beth: then proceeded around Tonapah Test Range to the west - then southeast to a holding area vicinity N 36° 23.0' W 116° 0.0'. All aircraft arrived at the holding areas without any problem and without utilizing radio communications. The HH53 Pave Lows went into the pickup zone alone, vicinity Indian Springs, and were to return to the holding area and link up with their respective flights. The air link up operation went poorly and many flights lost integrity and some UH-60 flights even returned without a flight lead. The CH-47 refuel operation went well and the aircraft egressed the area without any problems and arrived at Michael AAF at approximately 0630 hours, except for one aircraft that was forced to land at Tonapah Test Range with maintenance problems and recovered later that day.

2. Some of the reoccurring comments from pilot debriefing for both northern and southern missions are included in Appendix 2 to ANNEX B.

SECTION VI: REDEPLOYMENT

Redeployment to Ft. Campbell, Ky was conducted from Norton AFB, Ca. and from Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah.

a. Dugway Proving Ground to Ft. Campbell, Ky. - 26 UH-60's were launched in flights of five with 30 minute separation, beginning at 0500 hours 18 July 80. The seven CH-47 aircraft were launched in one flight at 0545 hours. One refuel stop was planned at Ft. Riley, Kansas for all aircraft. The CH-47 crews remained overnight at Ft. Riley and continued the following day to New Cumberland, Pa. The UH-60 crews hot refueled and continued flight to Ft. Campbell, Ky. On 19 July 80 two additional aircraft that were unable to depart the previous day (maintenance problems) departed at 0700 hours. The remainder of the Task Force elements were redeployed VIA C141 aircraft in 11 different chalks from 0600 19 July 80 to 0900 21 July 80.

b. Norton AFB to Ft. Campbell, Ky. - two UH-60 aircraft deployed as a flight on 18 July 80 with one refuel stop planned at Ft. Sill, Ok. The remainder of the Task Force elements left at Norton were redeployed to Ft. Campbell, VIA three C5A and 25 C141 Chalk Loads. The first return Chalk arrived at Ft. Campbell at 1330 hours 19 July 80 and the last Chalk arrived 1730 hours 21 July 80.

c. The air loadout at both Norton and Dugway was well organized and executed in a timely fashion. All Task Force organic aircraft self re-deployed except one CH-47 which crashed and was destroyed during an administrative flight from Norton AFB to Dugway, Utah on 17 July 80.

SECTION VI: REDEPLOYMENT

d. All aircraft that self re-deployed arrived at their final destination without major problems except four UH-60's;

986 - Hydraulics, Lake Barkley, Ky

990 - Generator, Ft. Riley, Kn.

723 - 105° Gear Box, Springfield, Mo.

960 - High Trans oil temp/low pressure, Springfield, Mo.

All disabled aircraft were repaired on site and flown to destination on 19 and 20 July 80.

ANNEX A (Night Vision Goggle [NVG]) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

1. This annex deals primarily with the UH-60 NVG training program to train assigned crews to mission profile proficiency. Appendix 1 addresses the CH-47 NVG program, where differences occured. All academic training for both UH-60 and CH-47 Crews was conducted by Standardization Instructor Pilots, (SIP's) from Ft. Rucker, Al. and consisted of the following subjects.

(1) Vision, Depth Perception, Night Vision Orientation.

(2) Introduction to NVG/PVS5.

(3) Aircraft Modification Requirement for NH/NVG Flight.

(4) Night Terrain Interpretation.

(5) Hemispherical Illumination.

(6) NH/NVG Flight; Ground and Air Safety

(7) Aeromedical Factors.

NOTE: 2.0 hours NVG in SFTS was not completed prior to actual NVG flight.

2. a. Projected hours for training:

1) PIC 6 hours day NVG filter (Mission Qualification)
6 hours NVG

2) Co-Pilot and Navigators 2 hours day NVG filter (Orientation)
2 Hours NVG

3). Crewchief 2 hours NVG (Orientation)

b. Total training hours used for UH-60.

NVG 231.6 NVG Day Filter 112.1

3. NVG Flight Training:

a. All flight training was conducted by qualified IP/SIP in NVG mission profile.

b. Maneuvers were flown IAW ATM Manual TC 1-135-1 (UH-60) Draft.

c. NVG mission profile qualification was conducted on a proficiency basis with the following maneuvers evaluated:

(1) 1003 Use DD Form 365F (Weight and Balance)

(2) 1501 Perform Preflight Inspection

(3) 1502 Perform prior to take off checks

(4) 1506 Perform Ground taxi

(5) 1507 Use Performance Charts

(6) 2001 Perform take off to a hover

(7) 2002 Perform Hover (power) Checks

(8) 2003 Perform Hovering turns

(9) 2004 Perform Hovering flight

(10) 2005 Perform Landing from a Hover

(11) 2501 Perform Normal takeoff

(12) 3001 Perform Straight-and-level flight

(13) 3002 Perform Climbs and Descents

(14) 3003 Perform turns

(15) 3006 Perform traffic Pattern Flight

(16) 3006 Perform Fuel Management Procedures

(17) 3010 Navigate by Pilotage and Dead Reckoning (DR)

(18) 3011 Navigate with Doppler

(19) 3501 Perform Before Landing Checks

(20) 3503 Perform VMC Approach

(21) 3506 Perform Go-Around

(22) 3507 Perform Perform Roll-on Landing

(23) 3510 Perform Confined Aera Operation

(24) 3511 Perform Slope Operation

(25) 3512 Perform Pinnacle/Ridgeline Operation

(26) 4010 Describe or Perform Emergency Procedures

(27) 4021 Perform flight with SAS/AFCS off

(28) 4022 Perform Electronic Control Unit ~~(ECU) Lockout~~ Operations

(29) 4023 Perform Single Engine Failure with Roll-on landing

(30) 4024 Perform Stabalator Malfunction

(31) 5001 Perform terrain flight Mission Planning

(32) 5002 Perform terrain flight Navigation

(33) 5003 Perform Low-level flight

(34) 5004 Perform Contour flight

(35) 5005 Perform NOE flight

(36) 5006 Perform Masking and Unmasking

(37) 5007 Perform NOE Deceleration

(38) 5008 Perform Hover Out-of-Ground-offect (OGE)

(39) 5009 Perform terrain flight take off

(40) 5010 Perform terrain flight approach

(41) 5018 Perform Evasive Maneuvers

(42) 5019 Operate Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)

(43) 6001 Perform Multi-Aircraft Operation

(44) 6501 Perform Post Flight Tasks

* Perform FARRP Procedures (Not Numbered in TC 1-135-1)

4. Moon Illumination: NVG flight training was safely conducted during all levels of moon illumination. A day recon of all training sites was conducted to insure suitable touch down sites were available for modified roll-on landings that were used to minimize Brown Out conditions (from sand) during landings.

5. Pilot to IP ratio for PIC training was two to one; with a training objective of 2 hours with the NVG day filter and 2 hours NVG per pilot per 24 hour period. Pilot to IP ratio for Co-Pilot training was three to one with a training objective of 2 hours NVG day filter and 2 hours NVG per pilot per 24 hour period. The 2 hour orientation for the crew chiefs was conducted in conjunction with pilot training.

6. Aircraft Preparation:

a. External lighting: Anti-collision lights were off, top half of position lights were taped, position lights on steady dim, formation lights on position three. For NVG formation flight, formation lights were on position three and were the only external lights.

b. Internal lighting: Panel Lights Kill Switch was engaged, Master Caution and Caution Advisory NVG Dimmer Switch as adjusted to a reduced level. CDU and Co-pilot and Pilot PDU were taped. Pilot and Co-pilot Flight Instrument Rheostat was set so flight instruments are visable without causing a reflection in the wind shields.

7. Flight Following: A Command and Control aircraft was not used. Flight following was conducted between NVG training aircraft or by means of a retransmission site, with flight operations (Norton Base) or the RRP (Nelson Lake). Flig following could be enhanced by using secure HF.

8. Conclusion: The following are the most significant findings concerning UH-6 NVG compatability;

a. The UH-60 is compatible for NVG operation with slight modifications to the instrument panel, approximately 3 - 5 minutes taping.

b. Extended use of NVG is not viewed as a problem.

c. Long range NVG formation flight can be safely accomplished.

d. Transition from NVG to Night Hawk takes approximately 2-5 minutes for full night adaptation.

e. NVG operations and training can be accomplished under all levels of illumination, however, the operational precision and safety is greatly enhance by a IR search light and with ambient light in excess of 20%.

f. Trim ball on Vertical Situation Indicator is not visable and is too smal

g. Center windshield should be glass; plastic windshield currently installe is grazing.

h. Protective covers should be placed over backup pump and hydraulic leak test switches on overhead console.

i. IR illuminators (similar to those provided in the CH-47) should be available in the cockpit.

j. A red lensed flashlight covered with 100 MPH tape with a paper punch-sized hole in the tape provided adequate emergency lighting.

k. All instruments and indicators should be painted with luminous paint. Including:

(1) Stabilator controls

(2) Stabilator indicator

(3) Trim ball in VSI

(4) HSI/VSI needles and command bars

(5) Engine quadrant controls

(6) Altimeters (radar and barometric)

l. Some cockpit lights are too bright; others are too dim. Different lights illuminate at various intensities; not all lights can be varied to an acceptable intensity. Examples:

(1) Segment lights and Master Warning Panel lights cannot be independently varied.

(2) AFCS dimmed lights are too bright.

(3) Central Display Unit and Pilot Display Unit lights cannot be sufficiently dimmed for 0-15% light illumination operations.

(4) CIS and Mode Select panel lights should be disconnected from Panel Lights circuit and attached to a dimming switch.

m. The training program has produced competent UH-60A NVG pilots. They are the best qualified to operate the UH-60A under NVG conditions. The pilots should be considered fully NVG qualified Aviators.

Appendix 1 (CH-47 NVG Training Program) To ANNEX A (Night Vision Goggle [NVG]) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

1. Unit NVG training consisted of classroom instruction and day/night flights. Academic training was identical to UH-60 program. All unit aviators attended these classes with the enlisted crewmembers attending selected ones.

2. Following NVG classroom instruction day/night training flights were conducted to mission qualify all unit aviators. Mission qualification consisted of a minimum of one flight hour with NVG day filters and two night flight hours with NVG's. During these flights the aviators were required to take off, land and fly straight and level for a specified distance at 200 - 300 ft AGL under the goggles. Unit IP's with the assistance of a Ft. Rucker IP (qualified in NVG's were trained first. They in turn trained the unit PIC's who in turn trained the pilots. All unit IPs and PICs completed NVG mission qualification training during Phase I.

3. NVG mission familiarization consisted of a minimum of one flight hour with NVG day filters and one night flight with NVGs. The flight maneuvers to be accomplished during familiarization were the same as those for qualification. All pilots and navigators completed NVG mission familiarization during Phase I with some also becoming mission qualified.

4. In addition the unit IPs and PICs were given the leeway to mission qualify unit pilots without the total required NVG hours depending on individual proficiency.

5. Of the twenty-four assigned/attached unit aviators being utilized through out Phase I and II, sixteen were NVG mission qualified, five were NVG mission familiarized and three were neither (these three were being utilized primarily as navigators).

6. In addition to the NVG classroom instruction the unit aviators participated in practical exercises in taping of cockpit for NVG flight.

Re-Occurring Comments from Pilot

Debriefings

Phase I - Black Route

I. CREW COORDINATION:

A. Pilot or Co-Pilot must navigate while navigator is busy inside Aircraft. Recommend that two sets of maps be carried on the flight with the man not on the controls observing the map.

B. Crew integrity must be maintained throughout the period of training.

C. Crew Coordination and teamwork is a prerequisite for mission accomplishment and safety on this type mission.

II. AIRSPEED AND POWER:

A. Airspeed had to be dissipated to climb.

B. TGT was often in the high range.

C. Rotor droop was experienced while climbing to clear high terrain.

III. NAVIGATION:

A. NVG's are not usable by navigator for map reading.

B. Navigators experienced a heavy work load.

C. Numerous incidents were noted in which Doppler was inaccurate or failed in flight.

D. Doppler worked well after alignment.

IV. TIME ALLOWED:

A. Planning time between briefing and takeoff was not adequate.

B. Navigators must be allowed to plan routes and airspeeds based only upon a target time. Problems with airspeed and power were encountered while trying to meet intermediate checkpoint times.

V. CREW COMFORT:

A. Navigator's seating arrangement is extremely uncomfortable.

B. All crew seats became uncomfortable with prolonged flight.

VI. MISCELLANEOUS: Routes were too congested due to number of Aircraft and spacing.

REOCCURRING COMMENTS FROM

PILOT DEBRIEFINGS

(Phase II - Joint Operations)

I. FORMATION FLIGHT WITH U.S. AIR FORCE

H-53's:

A. UH-60's experienced problems with power and aircraft control when in formation with H-53's due to rotor wash.

B. H-53's tended to terminate approaches to a high hover in landing zones.

C. H-53's flight leaders did not follow route as planned or overfly checkpoints.

D. Communications problems existed due to numerous frequencies for each operation, a misunderstanding of CEOI's and callsigns, inoperative secure gear, and overloaded radio nets caused by confusion during missions.

E. Aerial Link-ups during missions create a mid-air collision hazard. All forming of flights should be done on the ground.

F. Formation lights and blade tip lights only should be used with NVG's.

G. Air Force briefing was incomplete, fragmented, and confusing. Briefing in detail is needed, to include contingencies. Some of the material briefed was not needed for the mission.

II. LAAGER AREAS AND RRP's:

A. Leaking fuel nozzles and low-pressure pumps were common at RRP's.

B. Laager/Holding Areas were difficult to identify. Specific sectors should be assigned to each flight to prevent overcrowding and confusion.

C. Lighting for landings at RRP's, P.Z.'s, and laager sites was generally poor. Radio contact with the ground party was difficult to establish, and air traffic control was often inadequate.

III. CAMOUFLAGE:

A. Set-up times for camouflage nets ranged from 45 minutes during daylight to 2 hours at night. Camouflage teardown times ranged from 15-30 minutes.

B. Three to four camouflage systems are required to cover the aircraft.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS:

A. Identification of enroute checkpoints was difficult or impossible due to low illumination. Illumination was too low for NVG's to be effective.

B. Navigator briefings were sometimes insufficient, with minumal time allowed for mission planning.

C. UH-60's experienced rotor droop while hovering, during landing, and upon take-off. Rolling take-offs and landings are preferred when terrain permits.

D. Filtered searchlights on UH-60's is not adequate for mission requirements.

OPERATION HONEYBADGER
PHASE II USA/USAF
OPERATING PROCEDURES
(HH-53C/UH-60A)

1. Engine Start: As briefed.

2. Aircraft Taxi: As briefed.

NOTE: UH-60's perform all operational hover checks prior to joining HH-53's on parallel.

3. Commo Check:

UHF tower frequency (unsecure) immediately following flight lead's request to take active. Call signs as per current CEOI.

4. Take Active:

NOTE: HH-53's taxi 1000' forward, downwind side of active if crosswind component is on the opposite side of taxiway and perform hover checks. Line up on center line if direct headwind exists. (Formation: Trail, with all anti-collision lights on.)

5. Take-Off Procedures (normal):

a. As lead aircraft completes hover checks, anti-collision light is turned off. Chalks 2-5 turn off anti-collision lights in sequence when ready.

b. When trail turns off anti-collision light, lead executes running takeoff (rotating well forward) UH-60's rotate earlier. (Caution: Wake turbulence)

c. Lead climbs out at 80 KIAS, 500 FPM climb angle until flight is formed with rotor blade separation of 3-5 disks.

d. Lead and flight accelerate to 110 knots ground speed.

e. Climb and formation changes are executed as required.

NOTE: If any individual aircraft problems are encountered, aircraft will leave anti-collision light on andmove to opposite side of active dropping out of formation.

6. Take-off Procedures (aborted):

Aircraft with eminent problem and/or emergency takes unused runway side and maintain clearance from flight members in front of him and attempt to execute a controlled run-on landing on upwind side of active runway.

NOTE: If direct headwind exists, aircraft attempts to fall out left of formation, then into wind.

7. Formation Changes in Flight:

Formation Changes will be acknowledged and executed upon reception of the following IR/flashlight/anti-collision light signals from flight lead:

Light Series	Formation
1	Staggered left
2	Trail
3	Staggered right

NOTES: 1. Changes from staggered left to right or vice versa, will always be executed through trail formation first.

2. If formation change is missed, lead gives signal again.

Lead and all aircraft in flight will leave light signal on for a mimum of 1 second each flash and off 1 second between flashes.

8. Formation Break-up (VFR):

If for any reason, formation break-up is required (i.e., ASE AA warning), all aircraft will break away visually from threat, JINK as required and descend. All aircraft monitor RWR to a lower altitude. If visual link-up cannot be re-established within a reasonable time period, all aircraft will initiate rendezvo join-up procedures as outlined below single ship.

NOTE: Secure communications to assist in aircraft avoidance may be initiat

9. Aircraft Rendezvous/Link-Up Procedures (VFR):

a. Single-ship aircraft with navigator on course or direct to the next succeeding way-point (checkpoint) to initiate link-up (i.e., if break-up is encountered enroute between way-points 3 and 4, link-up will be attempted at way-point 5).

b. Lead or first aircraft to arrive at link-up point will make two left standard rate 360° turns at the link-up point. CAUTION: Numerous merging aircr

c. Groundspeed of 110 will be maintained enroute to link-up point. If link-up is accomplished, each aircraft will join the rear of the flight regardle of previous position. If link-up is missed, proceed single ship to landing/ rendezvous point.

10. Formation Approach (Tactical/Non-Tactical):

a. When on 3 mile final for designated landing area, lead will turn-on his IR landing light (steady on). Flight will take 30 seconds spacing, remaining in current formation position (i.e., staggered left).

b. When 2 miles from LZ, lead will decelerate for landing.

c. All aircraft will touch down with minimum ground roll.

NOTE: CH-53's will use a constant deceleration to a touch down point.

11. Formation Approach "Go-Around" Procedure:

a. Lead will turn off IR landing light designating a go-around and accelera as required to 80 KIAS and climb to assure obstacle clearance and maintain terra definition (NVG).

b. Lead will initiate a left hand standard rate turn (terrain permitting) and attempt another approach.

c. Aircraft in flight will maintain separation.

d. Lead will turn on IR search light for landing and decelerate when estab-lished or final.

e. Any UH-60's requiring go-around will extinguish IR light and do a single ship go-around, joining on rear of flight.

NOTE: If go-around is initiated because of inadequate LZ, preparation or landing conditions, a landing will not be made.

12. Air Refueling:

Left echelon will be established prior to the ARCP. During the air refuelir of the HH-53's, the UH-60 will establish 10-disk separation from lead (or #2 HH-53) and then fly formation off the C-130 maintaining position to allow the 53' maneuvering room. When lead is finished refueling, UH-60's will rejoin and conti the mission. If two 53's are in the formation, each will go to the rear of the echelon formation, then both will pass the formation on the left with UH-60's maneuvering to the stagger left formation.

13. Inadvertent IMC (Lost Visual) Procedures:

Due to the close proximity of aircraft to mountains for masking, a flight could enter IMC. The aircraft entering should alert lead. Lead will state head-ing, altimeter setting, and minimum safe altitude for enroute segment. Lead will accelerate to 110 kts and climb to 400 feet above minimum safe altitude. Aircraf #3 will decelerate to 90 kts and climb 600 feet above minimum safe altitude. Aircraft #4 will decelerate to 80 kts and climb 800 feet above minimum safe altitude. Aircraft #5 will decelerate to 70 kts and climb to 1000 feet above minimum safe altitude. As each aircraft reaches his altitude, he should accelera to 110 kts. As aircraft accelerate, they will make turns to increase separation. Aircraft #2 will turn 30° left for staggered left and trail formation and 30° right for staggered right. After completion of turn, fly 30 seconds, then return to entry heading. Aircraft #3 will turn 30° right for staggered left and trail formation and 30° left for staggered right. After completion of turn, fly 30 seconds, then return to entry heading.

Aircraft #4 will turn 60° left for staggered left and trail formation and 60 right for staggered right. After completion of turn, fly 60 seconds, then turn to entry heading. Aircraft #5 will turn 60° right for staggered left and trail formation and 60° left for staggered right. After completion of turn, fly 60 seconds, then return to lead heading.

After completion of break-up, and lead determines that it is necessary, the flight will contact ATC facilities for approach to the nearest facility. When ATC facilities are not available, lead will determine a location that the flight proceed to and let down to VMC. Lead will give this location in LAT/LONG coordi ates, and the altitude the flight can expect to break-out. Lead will also give a heading to fly from the coordinates. As each aircraft reaches the coordinates he will start his let down to VMC.

NOTE: During IMC procedures, all aircraft will have navigation lights on bright, with no beacons. One crewmember will transition to instruments.

14. Enroute Abort (Downed Aircraft):

a. Lead aircraft aborts by flashing landing IR light and land with IR ligh or execute a standard rate turn 180° and RTB extinguishing IR light. #2 becomes lead and flight continues. Trail checks to insure a safe landing, renders assis required and continues mission. SAR cleanup will be as briefed prior to mission

b. All other aborts will be similarly covered by trail.

c. Trail will be monitored by the helo in front of him, and that helo will escort trail to ground.

d. Use IR lights to indicate landing and no lights to indicate RTB.

STAGGERED LEFT

~~SECRET~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~



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

STAGGERED RIGHT



GLOSSARY

AMC - Air Mission Commander

ASE - Airborne Survivability Equipment

ARCP - Airborne Refueling Check Point

CCT - Combat Control Team

COLD SIDE (Of Active) - Downwind Side

HOT SIDE (Of Active) - Upwind

IMC - Inadvertent Meteorological Conditions

JINK - Displacement in any one or all the combinations of vertical, latitudinac, or longitudinal planes, usually to avoid effective enemy acquisition or engagement.

RTB - Return To Base

RWR - Radar Warning Receiver

SAR - Search and Rescue

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~SECRET~~

OPERATION HONEYBADGER
PHASE II USA/USAF
OPERATING PROCEDURES
(HH-53C/CH-47)

1. This manual describes procedures for HH-53C/CH-47 communications out, night, NVG formation flight. Pre-flight briefings should be detailed, complete, and cove every aspect of the planned mission. Flight lead should brief the following as a minimum:

a. Call Signs: Brief individual tactical call signs for the entire flight.

b. Communications: Brief radio frequencies for the flight. If a frequency change is necessary, brief a geographic point or time when all members of the flight will automatically change frequencies. Identify which radio will be secure and for what portions of the flight they will remain secure (i.e., identify the point during the mission when or where everyone changes to unsecure communications

c. Start Time: Brief engine start time for all elements of the flight.

d. Taxi/Flight Formation/Communications Check: If taxi clearance is require each member of the flight calls for his individual taxi clearance. At a prebriefe time, form the flight at a designated spot near the runway (i.e., the parallel taxiway). Flight lead will make a positive communications check with all element of the flight prior to taxiing on the active runway (i.e., lead, Alpha Golf 78 check-in; flight numbers respond; Alpha Gulf 13, Alpha Gulf 95, etc.). Lead will request clearance onto the active as necessary. Flight elements will form on the downwind side of the runway in trail formation (See Figure 1). Maintain at least 200 feet for take-off. Perform hover check. When each element is ready for takeoff, he will turn his anti-collision lights off.

e. Aircraft Lighting and Flight Signals: For takeoff and flight, use the following aircraft lighting:

(1) Daylight Hours or Dusk: Formation lights - max intensity. Position light - max intensity (all position lights should have one layer of green duct tape covering the lens). Anti-collision lights - off.

(2) Night (NVG): Formation lights - dim. Position lights - dim (all position lights should be covered with one layer of green duct tape). Anti-collision lights - off.

(3) During Flight: Use a standard military flashlight to pass all light signals with red lens at night.

(a) Staggered left formation: 1 flash, 1 second duration.

(b) Trail formation: 2 flashes, 1 second duration, 1 second interval.

(c) Staggered right formation: 3 flashes, 1 second duration, 1 secon interval.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~SECRET~~

(d) Formation signals can be given by lead or #2. #2 can set the formation as he desires. Do not acknowledge formation change signals with a return signal.

(e) Lead change: 1 flash, 5 second duration (See Figure 1). Only flight lead can direct a lead change. (Lead changes will be acknowledged by each wingman, i.e., lead signals #2, #2 returns signal to lead, #2 signals #3, #3 returns signal to #2, etc.)

(f) Prepare for landing: Lead turns IR searchlight on for 5 seconds

f. Takeoff/Abort/Join-up Procedures: After all elements have turned off their anti-collision lights, lead will make a running takeoff. Wingman will takeoff in trail, maintaining 200' separation for takeoff. Lead will maintain 60 kts until his scanners notify him that the flight is formed. Inflight, maintain 3-5 rotor disks separation between aircraft. If any member of the flight aborts during takeoff, he will move to the cold lane (downwind side of the runway) and land. Any aborting aircraft is responsible for separation from other aircraft that might abort in front of him. All other aircraft will proceed as normal. Do not break radio silence! (See Figure 2)

g. Type Formation: The flight will maintain stagger left, trail, or stagge right formation. Maintain 3-5 rotor disks between aircraft. Flight lead or #2 can direct formation changes. Change the formation every 20-30 minutes to reduce pilot fatigue. (If lead or #2 waives the formation occasionally, pilot can rest/ navigate without the additional strain of flying cross cockpit formation.)

h. Approach and Landing: Lead will turn on IR spotlight for 5 seconds prior the approach pattern to notify wingman of impending landing. Wingmen will then fall into trail formation and accomplish before landing checks. Selection of the landing spot will be made by the PICs. Factors to be considered are obstacle clearance, dust conditions, rotor wash, etc.

2. Alternate Leader: The alternate leader will be the number two (2) CH-47 in the formation. HH-53's will lead only as a last resort.

3. Fighter/Ground Fire/AAA Evasion. If flight lead anticipates hostile fire, he is responsible for navigating the flight around the threat. If any aircraft encounters hostile fire notify the flight on primary secure interplane net. Each aircraft will break formation to take evasive action as necessary. When clear of threat proceed to the next checkpoint. Lead will maintain 80 kts until the second checkpoint downtrack from the attack. He will then make two 360° left turns before resuming normal navigation and airspeed. This maneuver gives the wingmen time to maneuver as necessary and rejoin the flight. (*Use scanners to maintain aircraft separation and terrain avoidance while maneuvering for evasion.

4. Lost Visual: Aircraft losing visual reference to the formation will call out on the secure primary interplane frequency "Call Sign, lost visual." Lead will turn on formation and position lights full bright and call out heading, altitude presently holding, and/or altitude climbing to for terrain clearance. Wingmen will also turn on formation and position lights full bright and follow heading, altitude, and airspeed changes as depicted in Figure 3. Joinup will be initiated as soon as visual contact and formation can be maintained. If VMC

TAKEOFF ABORT PROCEDURES



Aircraft aborting will call out on secure voice "Number in formation, Abort Abort Abort" and proceed to the cold lane. Other aircraft will remain clear.

FIGURE 1.

conditions prevail and visual contact with each aircraft is not made, lead will proceed along track to the next checkpoint, execute two 360° left turns, then proceed along track to original destination. If rejoin is not accomplished by this time, wingman will further attempt rejoin along track to destination.

5. Emergency Procedures: If an aircraft experiences a malfunction in flight he has three (3) options: continue the flight, land, or return to base. If an aircraft elects to make a precautionary landing, he will flash his IR landing light, then leave it illuminated. The last aircraft in the flight will follow him to his landing site, note the position or retrieve the crew, then continue with the flight. If the last aircraft makes a precautionary landing, a predesignated aircraft will note his position or retrieve the crew. The flashing IR landing light should alert the rest of the flight that an aircraft is experiencing an emergency. If a member of the flight elects to return to base, he should flash his IR landing light to alert the other members of the flight, then extinguish his IR light.

LEAD CHANGE

All lead changes will be initiated by lead only. For stagger left formation, #1 will signal #2 using 2 foot forward and aft movement of a flashlight on left side of aircraft. #2 will acknowledge repeating and relaying the same signal to #3. Each aircraft in tow will follow suit.



#2 will accelerate past #1 and assume lead upon passing #1's nine o'clock position. #1 will clear to the right of the formation, drop back and reposition himself as last man. Opposite directions apply for stagger right formation.

FIGURE 2

LOST VISUAL

(1) Lead calls out heading and altitude and/or altitude climbing to for terrain clearance. Maintain 80 kts IAS.

(2) Turn left 20° for 30 seconds then resumes lead's heading, climbs to lead's altitude + 200; maintain 80 kts IAS.

(3) Turn right 20° for 30 seconds, then resumes lead's heading, climbs to lead's altitude + 200 maintain 80 kts IAS.

(4) Turns left 40° for 30 seconds, then resumes lead's heading; climbs to lead's altitude + 400; maintain 80 kts IAS.

(5) Turns right 40° for 30 seconds, then resumes lead's heading, climbs to leads altitude + 400; maintain 80 kts IAS.

FIGURE 3.

ANNEX D (Fuel Consumption Data) To Honey Badger After Action Report

UH-60 FUEL CONSUMPTION - Phase I and II Average

AIRCRAFT NUMBER	NUMBER OF FLIGHTS	HOURS FLOWN	AVERAGE BURN RATE (Pounds per Hour)
22722	3	20.5	880
22723	9	53.2	898
22724	2	16.2	749
22725	1	8.0	826
22727	9	50.4	864
22728	4	24.3	852
22960	9	52.6	862
22961	9	52.7	897
22962	8	41.6	868
22966	1	6.0	872
22967	7	41.7	829
22968	6	30.4	817
22969	5	34.6	807
22970	3	17.7	779
22984	10	48.3	878
22986	9	49.6	878
22989	6	43.5	883
22990	8	40.1	915
22991	8	32.7	841
22993	8	37.2	928
22995	9	53.9	896
22996	7	40.4	886
22997	7	37.5	896
22998	5	28.6	936
22999	3	12.7	849
23000	5	24.7	1026
23001	7	39.8	905
23002	5	21.4	881
		AVERAGE FOR FLEET:	871

CH-47

68-16015	25001bs
68-16018	24001bs
67-18527	29001bs
68-15825	26001bs
68-15834	23501bs
68-15845	24001bs
68-15859	26001bs

ANNEX E, (Flying Hours) To Honey Badger After Action Report

1. Phase 1 for all three companies involved in the exercise began with deployment.

A/159	CH-47	446.4
C/158	UH-60	714.6
D/158	UH-60	792.2

2. Phase II began on 5 July and ended 16 July.

A/159	CH-47	173.6
C/158	UH-60	547.6
D/158	UH-60	426.7

3. Redeplcyment Phase 18-20 July 80.

A/159	CH-47	105.1
C/158	UH-60	156.4
D/158	UH-60	173.9

4. Total per Company during exercise.

A/159	CH-47	725.1
C/158	UH-60	1418.6*
D/158	UH-60	1392.8*

5. Total Honey Badger hours flown: 3526.5

* 426.7 hours flown from 3rd quarter allocation, remainder from 4th quarter.

ANNEX F (Safety Observations and Considerations) ~~to~~ Honey Badger After Actions Report

1. Observations: ~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

a. Areas restricted to flight were not covered very well in Phase I or Phase II. The management support team did not provide sufficient information about restricted areas, where deadly force could be used, and Air Force range notams for proper route planning and briefing to crews. Once a mission was handed over to the 158th Opns it was often too late to acquire timely information on the entire route of flight.

b. Landing zone lighting should be standardized with the Y or T information using Kem lights, flashlights, or beam bag lights with an IR strobe for LZ location. Single light sources should never be used. This often causes problems for air crews. All light sources should be fixed to the ground to prevent movement during the landing.

c. Each CH-47 should have at least three 22 pound Halon 1211 (nsn4210-01-003-7709) fire extinguishers for possible aircraft fires during RRP operations. (PARA 7-2b FM 10-68)

d. All UH-60, CH-47 crewchiefs and pathfinder personnel should know and read FM 10-68 (Aircraft Refueling). At present they are not knowledgeable of its contents. Also classes should be given on RRP operations.

e. Fifty pound or 22 pound internal Halon fires extinguishers should be deployed with UH-60 Aircraft for use in staging areas, i.e. parking areas, and tactical field sites for starts and shut-down operations.

f. Each CH-47 with refuel pods installed for UH-60 refueling should have a in-line filter separator to prevent aircraft contamination from dissolved water, free water and microbiological growth. (PARA 2-6, 2-9. FM 10-68)

ANNEX F (Safety Observations and Considerations) To Honey Badger After Action Report

g. Management Support Personnel ordering fuel should [illegible] accomingled fuel. Commingling is mixing of two or more products or grades of products. This could cause small variations in APU and engine performance, that could lead to loss of power and engine failure. (PARA 2-6d FM 10-68)

h. Fuel sampling during the entire Phase I and Phase II was poor. A portable lab should be set up in the field for testing of JP-4 products daily to ensure safe fuel for CH-47 and UH-60 Aircraft.

i. The vest type life jackets for over water flights are poor. The best type is the individual LPU-10s which are inflated by CO_2. A person would never get a chance to inflate a vest type life jacket by blowing in a tube in an actual over water emergency.

2. Safety Consideration:

a. Consideration should be given to having a MEDEVAC aircraft with trained medical people to respond to aircraft mishaps/emergencies. There should also be a chase maintenance aircraft added to aid in maintenance recovery.

b. A Safety Officer should be included into the JTD level or the management support team level for better safety control. One Safety Officer at the 158th Opns cannot gain information early enough to affect good solid safety management prior to mission time.

c. A Safety Officer should be included in the advance party planning for new locations and new phases. Airfield layouts, marked parking spots, fire extinguishers, classes from the local fire department and tactical field lay-outs should be planned in the advance stages of unit moves.

d. Flight following could best be performed using two combat control Jeeps stationed at two high points along the route of flight. The present method of control is poor. Additionally HF coverage from 158th Opns could be effective using a KWM-2 Collins radio which are in the Fort Campbell, Ky. inventory. These methods of flight following were used very well in all types of missions in Central America at high and low altitudes.

ANNEX G (AC Modification) To Honey Badger After Action Report

1. The following modifications were completed on all UH-60 Aircraft.

a. Radar Warning Reciever AN/APR-39.

b. SAM Warning 1 System AN/APR-44.

c. Extended Range Kit consisting of 6 150 gallon UH-1 Fuel Bladder and pumps.

d. HF Radio ~~XX~~ Secure. 174 NWD Ky 75

e. Night Vision Goggle Modification.

f. Addition of Navigator Seat.

g. Addition of Oxygen System.

h. Chaff Dispenser (XM-130).

i. 1 Aircraft per company modified for Knee Board Trainer for AN/APR-39.

j. Addition of Pinklights for Night Vision Goggles.

2. The following modifications were completed on all CH-47C Aircraft.

a. Omega/VLF Navigation System LTN-211.

b. Radar Altimeter, AN209.

c. Radar Warning Receiver, AN/APR-39.

d. Extended Range Kit (consisting of four 600 gal fuel tanks).

e. Aircraft Night Vision Goggle modified (to include cockpit painting, lighting and one searchlight).

PROBLEM: Acquisition and distribution of maps.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

DISCUSSION: Maps that were ordered arrived late, in insufficient quantities and in the wrong scale. During an operation such as this, where navigation is critical, the timely ordering, control, and distribution of the proper maps is of the utmost importance.

RECOMMENDATION: During administrative Cross Country flights (deployment/redeployment) each aircraft should have a complete set of IFR Publications and VFR sectionals for route of flight. During tactical cross country flights the navigator and Co-pilot need a complete set of 1:250,000 scale maps that cover the route, check-point, laager sites, etc. 1:500,000 scale maps may be used during daylight operations or when check points are identified by major road intersections, towns, Airfields, etc.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

PROBLEM: The Battalion Aid Station is poorly equipped to provide adequate medical care without the support of a medical clearing company when functioning as an isolated unit.

DISCUSSION: The TO & E equipment and medications represent 1950's technology and as presently designed cannot offer depth of care as a single entity.

RECOMMENDATION: Major unit surgeon in conjunction with Division Surgeon and DMSO initiate TO & E changes or augment present TO & E structure so that the Battalion Aid Station can function as a separate entity and still deliver in-depth medical care. Action now initiated at FtCky to obtain necessary equipment. for next phase, aid station will be adequately equipped

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After-Action Report

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PROBLEM: Non-standardization of aircraft loading procedures during deployment.

DISCUSSION: Aircraft were prepared for loading and then turned over to the 101st Aviation Battalion to load. Upon arrival several bags of common hardware were missing and stabilators were mixed between aircraft and companies.

RECOMMENDATION: A detailed standard loading procedure should be written by the 101st Aviation Group for use by all battalions. Check lists have been standardized and procedu disseminated to units

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

PROBLEM: Aircraft parts were extremely slow in being replaced.

DISCUSSION: Aircraft parts were promised but seldom received on time or in the right quantities. The parts from the unit's PLL and 5th Transportation Battalion together with cannibalizatic sustained the units for the first 8 days of the exercise before the first part was received from any external source.

RECOMMENDATION: Aircraft parts be given more emphasis prior to, during, and immediately after deployment.

System now exists to expeditiously handle parts resupply.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

PROBLEM: No ASL support forward.

DISCUSSION: Limited ASL support was sent forward to Dugway. This caused excessive delays in handling of parts and repairs.

RECOMMENDATION: Where the majority of aircraft go, the ASL must also go.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

PROBLEM: Human engineering factors prevent navigators from performing in an optimum manner.

DISCUSSION: The cramped navigator's station causes discomfort to the navigator and degrades his performance. The biggest problem is caused by the location of the AUX Fuel Control Panel.

RECOMMENDATION: Move the AUX Fuel Control Panel to another location and design a seat cushion for navigators.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PROBLEM: Secure voice procedures.

DISCUSSION: Secure voice operations are not used during all tactical operations. After an extended effort to repair and key radios daily, seldon is there a time that both Air Force and Army aircraft successfully could use FM and UHF secure with all aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue emphasing operation of radios only under secure modes; and request frequent maintenance assistance to respond to short falls.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

PROBLEM: Receiving supplies they were pushed to S-4 158 Avn Bn that were not identified (i.e. oil, gas nozzles, hose assemblies, adapters) as to which unit they were ordered for.

DISCUSSION: On many occasions items were received thru S-4 that could not be issued due to lack of identification of ordering unit because they were ordered thru DMMC without a document number.

RECOMMENDATION: All requisitions for TF 158 must be submitted through the S-4 in order to establish the proper identity of owner when supplies are received. Also pushed supplies from higher HQ must be earmarked as to whom they are intended.

PROBLEM: Doppler Digital Readout unreadable at low light level.

DISCUSSION: The Doppler digital readout can be clearly read with NVG's at light levels not visable to the naked eye only if all bulbs in the display are of equal brightness. A dim digit in the readout may only be read through NVG's if the remainder of the display is brightened to a point where the entire display is visable to the naked eye.

RECOMMENDATION: That all doppler displays be inspected and serviced to insure equal brightness of all display characters.

PROBLEM: Excess ground support personnel were in the refuel areas creating a safety hazard and command and control problem. Some personnel were observed seemingly unaware of the dangers involved, i.e. running under turning rotor blades, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: The three man CH-47C crew can be utilized as follows: one person at the emergency/manual fuel valve; one person at the pump; one person at the fuel nozzle. Assuming the CH-47's will always be shut down during refueling operations, the individual crewmember at the nozzle can refuel the UH-60. The only requirement for Pathfinder/Combat Control Team (CCT) personnel would be: 1 each Pathfinder at each refuel point for aircraft control, 1 each Pathfinder at holding area, 1 each Pathfinder at Y and 1 each CCT individual for ground to air communication/control.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PROBLEM: Fuel coordination upon arrival at Norton AFB, Ca. was poor.

DISCUSSION: No fuel grounding points were available in the rebuild area. After the aircraft were rebuilt and mission ready they had to be towed to a refuel area. This was during a critical phase of the deployment and was time consuming.

RECOMMENDATION: Attention must be given to coordination of fuel support during training and operational missions.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Probelms) To Honey Badger After Action Report

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PROBLEM: Aircraft flight following.

DISCUSSION: Because of mountains aircraft flight following was very difficult or non-exsistant, except on take off, landing, and refueling. A Retrans Station was set up and radio contact was established with remote sites to provide limited flight following. This was still not an adequate solution.

RECOMMENDATION: Flight following should be done internally between members of a flight using UHF radios. A Collins Base Station Radio, capable of high frequency secure communications, should be purchased and used at Battalion Flight Operations. Action initiated to procure adequate ground station to met secure on all radios.

PROBLEM: There was a dual inspection of vehicle loading conducted with different standards.

DISCUSSION: Vehicles were inspected in the preposition area and then practice weighed. Vehicles were then brought to the scales where they were again weighed and staged. At the second station, an Air Force representative insisted on inspecting some of the connexes/X4s, which supposedly were inspected the first time. Containers were locked; time was lost looking for keys to satisfy the new unexpected requirement. After that, not all containers were inspected.

RECOMMENDATION: Have one inspection with all drivers and personnel present.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

PROBLEM: C Company had no production control clerk available at Dugway.

DISCUSSION: Female soldiers were not allowed in the forward area (unless they were Air Force). C Company has a female production control clerk and her loss required the maintenance officer to perform her duties. This was an overbearing load on the maintenance officer while trying to manage the unit's aviation assets.

RECOMMENDATION: Immediately replace all female soldiers in Aviation units with males if females are not going to be allowed to be deployed.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PROBLEM: Transportation for company's local personnel after arrival at new sites.

DISCUSSION: After each move into a new area, line companys need immediate transportation available to conduct operations. There is a valid requirement for a minimum of 3 M880's (pickup truck-type vehicles). Maintenance, flight platoons, and company headquarters all require transportation to become operational.

RECOMMENDATION: A priority must be established to have 3 vehicles available for unit operations as soon as possible after arrival at a deployment site.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

ANNEX H (Unresolved Probelms) To Honey Badger After Action Report

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

PROBLEM: Ground to Air communications.

DISCUSSION: During operation similar to the test conducted 15 and 16 July, radio communication from laager site to the objective areas was nonexistent. The Air Force aircraft kept the APU's running to attempt continuous radio contact, however, this was not successful.

RECOMMENDATION: A long range portable set (preferably HF) needs to be adopted to insure continuous radio contact under all conditions is maintained.

Action has been initiated PRC 70 radios which provide secure FM and HF from ground.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

PROBLEM: Lack of pertinent flying data available to aircrews when pilot and co-pilot are wearing NVG's. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

DISCUSSION: Flying with max gross weights, high pressure altitudes, and high DA's necessitates close monitoring of critical instruments within the cockpit. Under NVG conditions, the pilot and co-pilot are unable to see instruments within the cockpit.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend the Aircraft be configured to give the navigator an instrument panel to monitor critical instruments during flight. The panel as a minimum should include airspeed, radar altimeter, and engine power settings.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PROBLEM: Postal Operations.

DISCUSSION: During the planning phase, coordination with deployment site postal officer was not conducted.

RECOMMENDATION: Coordination be effected to permit use of a post office box at deployment site, prior to deployment of main body (preferably prior to POR).

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

PROBLEM: Non-compatibility of Army and Air Force Dopplers.

DISCUSSION: Air Force doppler and inertial navigation equipment, which accepts coordinates only in latitude and longitude and reads out distance and groundspeed in nautical miles and knots is not totally compatable with Army doppler equipment, which reads out distance and groundspeed in kilometers and kilometers per hour respectively.

RECOMMENDATION: That coordinate lists, groundspeeds and required time on targets be furnished to Army Navigators sufficiently in advance of any joint operation to allow accurate determination of distance and perception of flight logs. Depending on the number of enroute checkpoints, up to one hour of planning may be required for each hour of flight.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

PROBLEM: Doppler lighting not compatable with NVG flight low ambient light levels.

DISCUSSION: Doppler navigation set lighting is not compatable with NVG flight at low ambient light levels due to glare on the inside of the Pilot's and Co-pilot's windscreen. This problem is heightened by the necessity to either turn on the aircraft console lights or use a flash light during required in-flight reprogramming.

RECOMMENDATION: The use of a field-expedient cardboard glare shield alleviates the first problem, but not the second. Recommend that sheet metal glare shields be fabricated for all doppler navigation sets and that doppler panel lighting be wired through an independent rheostat to allow full control of doppler lighting.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

PROBLEM: Landing Aircraft in laager areas at night with NVG's.

DISCUSSION: In order to [redacted] at night, crews attempted to make maximum use of available cover. After landing in the general vicinity, the crewchief would dismount Aircraft and guide pilots into the final parking area. Cyalome lightsticks were the only acceptable signal light to be used for signal purposes.

RECOMMENDATION: Issue a minimum of four sticks to crews for all night flights requiring use of NVG's.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

PROBLEM: Liaison between JTD and Task Force 158 for daily Mission Planning.

DISCUSSION: Initially at Norton AFB, the 101 Aviation Group S-3 Shop (ACE) served as Liaison between JTD and 158th. The information was passed in an untimely and often incomplete manner, causing many internal problems. At Dugway, the (ACE) acted as the Training Management Cell, although JTD was located in the same building. This caused a problem with command relationship, as well as a lack of timely information flow. When direct coordination with JTD was conducted on some missions, the problems were not apparent. The delays, changes, and lack of information provided by the ACE caused a lack of confidence in the Bn S-3 section within the Battalion and Supported Units.

RECOMMENDATION: If the Group S-3 is going to provide Liaison between JTD and 158th Task Force, they should become a working part of 158th. In this way all planning and actions would be in a more direct manner and the information passed would be more timely and with fewer delays.

OPSEC and other considerations make this recommendation invalid. Information will flow from JTD to Avn Gp S3 to Bn S3. Prompt coordination of all changes will alleviate this perceived problem.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

[redacted]

PROBLEM: Lack of training for Staff Officers.

DISCUSSION: Training guidance given and mission responsibility precluded Staff from participating in pilot training. Although selected crews are trained, there are insufficient crews trained for all the Aircraft. If the occasion arose for all the Aircraft to be used, Staff Officers would be required to fill vacancies and they would not be trained in the mission.

RECOMMENDATION: Allow adequate training time to include Staff Officers in mission training.

[redacted]

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

PROBLEM: The pumps on the AUX tanks became a real problem by failing after a couple weeks of use and after a removal exercise.

DISCUSSION: The AUX tank pumps give no indication of failure. Even when one pump fails, the other pump does not have enough power to keep the main tanks from decreasing in fuel amount.

RECOMMENDATION: That improved tank pumps replace the present pumps in the AUX tanks.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

PROBLEM: Confusion existed between operational planners at Oro Grande, NM and Dugway, UT.

DISCUSSION: A briefing conducted by JTD personnel at Oro Grande NM emphasized positive control of all aircraft around the objective area. Detailed reporting procedures were required. Upon arrival at Dugway, this information was ignored and eventually became the critical mistake of the operation. The helicopter crews were flying totally off time requirements, with no frequency or point of contact on the ground. The crews arrived perfectly on schedule but the C141 was not on the ground.

RECOMMENDATION: Prior to execution of an operation of this magnitude, direct, intense, face-to-face coordination is essential. All parties involved, especially controlling agencies, need to be questioned in detail.

PROBLEM: Numerous aircraft experienced mechanical failures during phases of the mission. The mission was successful but could have been jeoparized.

DISCUSSION: The final mission was perceived by flight crews as the most demanding exercise of the entire deployment due to the integration of all rehearsed mission sub-tasks. Crew fatigue and lack of maintenance time between the Oro Grande phase and the final mission further complicated the problems encountered.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend a two-day unit stand down between phases of training. This would allow some recuperation of crews from long term fatigue and increased readiness of aircraft, resulting in a lower failure rate.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

PROBLEM: Government Pay Checks.

DISCUSSION: Numerous complications and time consumed.

RECOMMENDATION: Mandatory Check-to-Bank Option for all personnel assigned to the unit.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

PROBLEM: Displacement of aviation units in one day when Aircraft are being self-deployed.

DISCUSSION: When total unit displacement takes place in a 24 hour period. The unit has only marginal Aircraft recovery capability. If Aircraft go down on take off, or enroute, most maintenance personnel, and Tech Supply items are aboard Air Force transports.

RECOMMENDATION: When possible, displace over a 2-3 day period, or assign another unit specific recovery tasks. If two line companys displace, move one forward, and have one back if time permits. This gives better overall coverage.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PROBLEM: Inability to maintain single engine flight during first two hours of flight.

DISCUSSION: During the first two hours of flight, with external and internal fuel tanks topped off, single engine flight is not possible. This means any loss of power creates a critical emergency situation. Unless a suitable area for a shallow angle running-landing is available, both the aircraft and personnel are in jeopardy.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to allow sufficient time for premission planning so as to minimize the amount of time single engine flight is not available.

PROBLEM: Aircraft modification work was not well organized.

DISCUSSION: No one individual or agency was in charge of the MWO operation. This resulted in wasted time, and severe post-MWO electrical problems. The cockpits were torn apart three times instead of once.

RECOMMENDATION: When an MWO operation of this magnitude is undertaken in the time period that was allowed, suggest one person or agency be in charge of the overall operation to facilitate a smooth work flow and quality work.

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

[redacted]

PROBLEM: Female Personnel

DISCUSSION: In a unit such as this, female personnel will not be able to be deployed to a forward site. All female armorers, PLL clerks, and typists will have to be replaced with males.

RECOMMENDATION: Designate the battalion as a combat unit, rather than a combat support unit, with all positions filled by males.

[redacted]

ANNEX H (Unresolved Problems) To Honey Badger After Action Report

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PROBLEM: Aircraft tires, brakes, tail wheel axles, windshields, generators, and engines need immediate improvements.

DISCUSSION: Based on usage factors of all mentioned items, it is obvious that the components mentioned, are not sufficiently strong enough to support field operations with out unacceptably high failure rates.

RECOMMENDATION: Improve specifications to insure minimum standards will be meet.

PROBLEM: Loss of leave at end of fiscal year.

DISCUSSION: Many soldiers have in excess of 60 days leave. Over the past year soldiers have frequently been restricted from taking leave as a result of mission requirements and may therefore lose leave at the end of the fiscal year.

RECOMMENDATION: Allow SM's to retain leave above 60 days for a 180 day grace period commencing 1 Oct 80.

PROBLEM: NVG operations with illuminated level below 20% necessitating the use of an artificially generated aircraft illumination source.

DISCUSSION: The searchlight pink filter (filtered down visable light) as used during this exercise produced an incoherent light pattern which is unacceptable for NVG operations at low illumination levels. The installation of the filter increased aircraft weight, parasite drag and caused searchlight drive motor burn out when the light is stowed.

RECOMMENDATION: Replace searchlight bulb with an IR bulb; the searchlight could then be used in all slew modes with no increase in weight or drag.

ANNEX I (Lessons Learned) To Honey Badger After Actions Report

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1. At least 20% moon illumination is ~~required to conduct~~ safe NVG training operations. Effective ambient light is minimum 20% and maximum 80%

2. Camouflage of the UH-60 can be accomplished in a desert environment using a minimum of 3 net systems and 2 support systems. Optimum camouflage was achieved using 4 net systems and 2 support sets.

3. The UH-60 can be expected to perform with gross weight increased to at least 21,500 pounds with a density altitude condition of 7700 feet.

4. The UH-60 proved to be reliable in a desert environment with only minimal maintenance being performed.

5. The UH-60 is NVG compatible with some shortcomings noted. See ANNEX A.

6. UH-60 formations flight can be performed adequately using Night Vision Goggles as long as proper aircraft spacing is maintained (3-5 rotor discs). If this spacing is not maintained, attempts to re-form or close the formation become hazardous with goggles due to limited depth perception.

7. Pink filtered searchlights proved to be inadequate for the mission.

8. Aircraft tires will not adequately withstand the heat, abrasion, and wear encountered during desert operations.

9. FM radios proved to be of limited usefulness for base station flight-following due to terrain masking and range limitations.

10. Present machinegun mounts installed in UH-60 do not allow gunners to place suppressive fire to the forward quadrants.

11. Airborne link-up with H-53s has proven to be unworkable. H-53s must land adjacent to their UH-60 flights, and then execute a formation take off.

12. UH-60s can easily adapt to formation flight with H-53s. Formation flight can be maintained during IFR conditions. Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) is necessary for extensive IFR formation flights

13. UH-60s must maintain adequate separation from H-53s during take-off and lan-

ding to avoid problems with aircraft control and excessive power demands created by the H-53's rotor wash.

14. UH-60s initially have insufficient power to maintain a 6° climb angle (1000 FPM) while in formation with H-53s using terrain avoidance radar. After 1 to 1½ hours of flight, UH-60s will have a reduced fuel level and can maintain a 6°climb angle. The H-53s 12° climb angle at 2000 FPM was impossible for the Blackhawk to maintain in nearly all cases.

15. The UH-60 proved capable of carrying 15 combat-equipped troops (weapons, LBE, and light rucksacks) when auxillary fuel cells 1 through 4 had been removed.

16. Maintaining crew integrity and, if possible the same aircraft, is essential for this type operation.

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entire document

Subject: Operation POTENT CHARGE

1. Attached is the outline of Operation Potent Charge, a vehicle for improving the joint helicopter special missions capability of the Services.

2. POTENT CHARGE will specifically address lessons learned during both phases of JTX Honey Badger with respect to helicopter operations.

3. The Joint Helicopter Doctrine and Procedures Conference has been held, and a draft working copy of the joint procedures handbook is in use.

TAB D

Secret

OPERATION POTENT CHARGE

(U)
(S) Purpose -

1. Train to deployability readiness a mission-capable force consisting of 5 HH-53H's, 5 HH/CH-53C's, 5 CH-47C's (HICAP), 10 UH-60A's (HICAP).

2. Train a cadre of mission - ready crews for the purpose of conducting scenario - oriented individual and unit training.

3. Articulate doctrine and procedures for the conduct of joiknt helicopter special operation smissions, and document for the future.

(S) Concept -

1. 6 to 8 Aug 80 - Conduct Joint Helicopter Operations Doctrine and Procedures Conference, sponsored by JTD. Attendees from HQ, JTD; HQ, 101 AVN GP; HQ, 1st Special Operations Wing; US Army Aviation Center; and Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One. Determine, in conference, using HONEY BADGER evaluations as a basis, doctrine and procedures for conduct of future helicopter special missions. Document procedures.

2. 18 to 30 Aug 80 - Conduct operational training of a mission package to refine and test doctrine and procedures. Conduct a mission-oriented exercise over realistic distances, in a type mission environment. Evaluate special mission package potential.

(S) Assets -

(U)
10 - UH60 HICAP
5 - CH47 HICAP
5 - HH53H
5 HHCH53C/D
Select Crew:
- 8 UH60, Army
- 4 CH47, Army
- 4 HH53H, Air Force
- 4 HH/CH53, Air Force/USMC

(U)
(S) Doctrinal/Procedural Subject Areas -

1. Briefings:

   a. Briefing format/guide
   b. Pre-mission data checklists
   c. Map/chart/flight log preparation
   d. Formation briefs
   e. Emergency procedures briefs
   f. Cell standardization
   g. Tactical situation briefs
   h. Mission note cards

2. Mission, profile, enroute phase -

   a. Ground abort procedures
   b. Communications plan
   c. Spare aircraft procedures
   d. Departure join-up
   e. Enroute link-up
   f. Lost lead link-up
   g. Formation visual signals

      (1) lead change
      (2) frequency change
      (3) position change
      (4) emergency
      (5) break

   h. NVG navigation check points - route selection
   i. Lost comm
   j. Lost visual contact - signals and procedures
   k. Evasive maneuver battle drill
   l. Wing man abort
   m. Downed crew recovery
   n. Re-link procedures, enroute, holding area, LZ/PZ
   o. IP procedures
   p. Holding area procedures
   q. Hides
   r. AR procedures

      (1) timing
      (2) missed AR
      (3) cell procedures
      (4) lighting

3. Mission profile, terminal phase

   a. Aircraft spotting in LZ/PZ holding area
   b. ROE/LZ status/threat/security
   c. Rejoin by aircraft left in holding area
   d. RRP closeout procedures - signals and counts

e. PZ closeout procedures - signals and counts
f. Authentication procedures
g. Evasive maneuver, re-link
h. Pax onload/offload procedures

   (1) count
   (2) control
   (3) conform

i. Lost lead
j. LZ lost comm

   (1) visual signals
   (2) withhold

k. Rescue and recovery response procedures
l. Signals - compromise/pickup/proceed
m. Holding area communications -

   (1) call forward plan
   (2) re-link plan
   (3) withhold plan
   (4) NLT times

n. Passenger instructions
o. Transload area procedures

   (1) pax instructions
   (2) pax marking
   (3) pax accounting
   (4) ingress/egress
   (5) lighting
   (6) communications plan
   (7) lost comm plan - signals
   (8) control points/holding areas

p. RRP/LZ/PZ timing/traffic/holding
q. RRP/LZ/PZ HA procedures
r. Go around procedures
s. CCT/Pathfinder coordination

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(7)

US ARMY AVIATION BOARD

FORT RUCKER, AL 36362

RECOMMENDED

EMERGENCY REMOVAL PROCEDURES

FOR

UH-60A EXTENDED

RANGE FUEL CELLS NUMBERS

1, 2, 3 & 4

Test Project NCO

(G) [redacted]

27 June 1980

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DETAILED REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS

CREWMEMBER	DUTIES
1. Pilot (Prior to Landing)	Informs crew to prepare for emergency removal of extended range fuel cells 1, 2, 3, & 4
2. Navigator	Pull circuit breakers on aux fuel control panel for #1, 2, 3, & 4 fuel cells.
3. Navigator	Inform crewmembers that circuit breakers have been pulled for fuel cells 1, 2, 3 & 4.

4. BEFORE LANDING

CREWMEMBER L/SIDE		CREWMEMBER R/SIDE
4-1 Disconnect #1 fuel cell pump electrical line at quick disconnect (Figure 2).	4-1	Disconnect #2 fuel cell pump electrical line at quick disconnect (Figure 2).
4-2 Cut #1 fuel cell bonding jumper wires on main fuel line and check valve (Figure 3).	4-2	Cut #2 fuel cell bonding jumper wires on main fuel line and check valve (Figure 3).
4-3 Cut forward pallet bonding jumper wire (Figure 4).	4-3	Cut forward pallet bonding jumper wire (Figure 4).

5. PILOT: After landing instructs crew to remove #1, 2, 3, & 4 fuel cells.

6. AFTER LANDING

CREWMEMBER L/SIDE		CREWMEMBER R/SIDE
6-1 Cut #1 fuel cell forward retaining straps at D-rings (6 each) (Figure 5).	6-1	Cut #2 fuel cell forward retaining straps at D-rings (6 each) (Figure 5).
6-2 Disconnect main fuel line for #1 fuel cell at quick disconnect (Figure 6).	6-2	Disconnect main fuel line for #2 fuel cell at quick disconnect (Figure 6).

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6-3 Disconnect fuel drain line for #1 fuel cell at quick disconnect (Figure 7).	6-3 Disconnect fuel drain line for #2 fuel cell at quick disconnect (Figure 7).
6-4 Open left cargo door	6-4 Exit thru window and open right cargo door.
6-5 Cut bonding jumpers on left pallet (between #1 & #3 fuel cells) (8 each) (Figure 8).	6-5 Cut bonding jumpers on right pallet (between #2 & #4 fuel cells) (8 each) (Figure 8).
6-6 Disconnect vent lines at quick disconnects for #1 & #3 fuel cells (Figure 9).	6-6 Disconnect vent lines at quick disconnects for #2 & #4 fuel cells (Figure 9).
6-7 Disconnect #3 fuel cell drain line at quick disconnect (Figure 7).	6-7 Disconnect #4 fuel cell drain line at quick disconnect (Figure 7).
6-8 Cut #1 fuel cell aft retaining straps at D-rings (6 each) (Figure 5).	6-8 Cut #2 fuel cell aft retaining straps at D-rings (6 each) (Figure 5).
6-9 Cut #3 fuel cell fwd retaining straps at D-rings (6 each) (Figure 5).	6-9 Cut #4 fuel cell fwd retaining straps at D-rings (6 each) (Figure 5).
6-10 Cut #3 fuel cell bonding jumper wires (2 ea) on main fuel line and on check valve (1 ea) (Figure 10).	6-10 Cut bonding jumper on #4 fuel cell drain line (No Figure).
6-11 Disconnect #3 fuel cell main fuel line at quick disconnect and reposition fuel lines between #5 & 6 fuel cells (Figure 6).	6-11 Cut #4 fuel cell bonding jumper wires (2 ea) on main fuel line and on check valve (1 each) (Figure 6).
6-12 Disconnect #3 fuel cell pump electrical line at quick disconnect (Figure 2).	6-12 Disconnect #4 fuel cell main fuel line at quick disconnect. Reposition fuel lines between #5 & 6 fuel cells (Figure 2).
6-13 Cut #3 fuel cell aft retaining straps at D-rings (6 ea) (Figure 5).	6-13 Disconnect #4 fuel cell pump electrical line at quick disconnect (Figure 2).
	6-14 Cut #4 fuel cell aft retaining straps at D-rings (6 ea) (Figure 5).

7. LEFT AND RIGHT CREWMEMBERS:

WARNING: Movement from side to side of aircraft should be accomplished around front of aircraft only.

7-1 Remove #3 cell.

7-2 Remove pip pins (4 ea) from left center pallet and rotate pallet aft and inboard (Figure 1).

7-3 Remove #1 cell.

7-4 Remove #4 cell.

7-5 Remove pip pins (4 ea) from right center pallet and rotate pallet aft and inboard (Figure 1).

7-6 Remove #2 cell.

8. NAVIGATOR: Inform pilot when all equipment and crewmembers are secure for takeoff.

TOOLS REQUIRED:

Wire Cutters	2 ea	NSN 5110-00-293-3210
Surgical Knife	2 ea	To be provided.

CHECKLIST

EVENT	NUMBER OF ACTIONS LEFT	RIGHT
Bonding Jumper Wires to Be Cut	14	14
Disconnect Electrical Pump Wires	2	2
Disconnect Quick Disconnects	6	6
Fuel Cell Retaining Straps Cut	24	24
Pip Pins to be Removed	4	4

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TO: Test Director, JCS Honeybadger ~~SECRET~~ 27 Jun 80

FROM: Test Project Officer

SUBJ: UH-60A Human Factors

The following human factors considerations concerning UH-60A have emerged from discussions with operational pilots:

1. Pilot/Copilot Seat

a. Becomes uncomfortable after 2 hours flight. A sheep skin pad would probably be beneficial if added to the seat cushion.

b. Adjustable kidney pads on P/CP seats are too soft and lose resilience, thus becoming ineffective.

2. Navigator seat is too low and navigator must unbuckle seat belt to see/operate Doppler, change radio frequencies, etc. Use of a crew chief/gunner seat and harness assembly or a monkey harness is recommended.

3. Some pilots are counter-balancing helmets by placing weight on the aft portion of their helmets to compensate for weight of NVG. Some are attaching elastic bands between the aft portion of their helmets and their pants belts to reduce neck strain. The formerly mentioned method is hazardous in the event of a crash.

4. Load bearing gear, pencils carried in sleeve pockets on Nomex uniforms, and other items catch on components of extended range fuel systems as crewmembers attempt to move front to rear of aircraft.

5. Cockpit ventilation is inadequate which causes added fatigue to crewmembers during hot weather operations. Additionally, pilots report that numerous P/CP door vent windows do not operate properly.

6. Night operations at high altitudes will require keeping cargo doors closed for crew comfort.

7. Milk should not be placed in box lunches as it sours in hot weather prior to consumption.

8. Relief tubes would be extremely useful. Crewmembers are currently limiting fluid intake before/during extended flights to preclude necessity for urination.

9. ~~Red~~ Green navigation light does not provide adequate lighting for NVG operations; green does.

[redacted]
Senior Test Project Officer

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PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

OTTSZYUW RUCLEUA6950 2072230--RUEADWD.
IMMEDIATE
O 252130Z JUL 80
FM PRESIDENT AVN BD FT RUCKER AL //ATZO-OT-AU//
TO HQ DA WASH DC //DAMO-RQD//
BT

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SECTION 01 OF 02
MAJ [redacted] PASS TO MAJ [redacted]
SUBJ: HONEY BADGER
1. THIS MESSAGE IS A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS WHICH RESULTED DURING EVALUATION OF THE FINAL EXERCISE CONDUCTED DURING PHASE II.
2. PILOT MISSION BRIEFINGS
A. NORTH ROUTE
(1) CONDUCTED BY 158 AVN BN
(2) ADEQUATE WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS
B. SOUTH ROUTE
(1) CONDUCTED BY USAF
(2) UNSATISFACTORY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF WEATHER AND CH-47 RAPID REFUEL OPNS. SITUATION, MISSION AND EXECUTION WERE PRESENTED IN A CONFUSED, UNCLEAR MANNER. NO LOGICAL FORMAT SUCH AS THE 5 PARA FIELD ORDER WAS USED. NUMEROUS CHANGES WERE MADE DURING THE BRIEFING; VISUAL AIDS WERE POOR.
(3) EXTEMPORANEOUS BRIEFINGS BY PIC'S OF FLIGHT LEADS MADE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT POSSIBLE.
C. GENERAL COMMENTS CONSOLIDATED BY EVALUATORS PRESENT AT BOTH PILOT MISSION BRIEFINGS:
(1) NUMEROUS FREQUENCIES AND CALLSIGNS UNKNOWN; SOME CHANGED DURING BRIEFING.
(2) SOME VISUAL AIDS WERE INADEQUATE.
(3) OCCUPATION OF LZ'S WAS NOT PROPERLY BRIEFED.
(4) LINK UP OF UH-60 AND CH-53 AT LZ1 SOUTH WAS POORLY PLANNED; CHANGED DURING THE BRIEFING.
(5) FRIENDLY/ENEMY SITUATION WAS NOT BRIEFED.

ACTION DAMO(12) (U,F)
INFO SAPA(3) DALO(6) DAMI(6) DAPE(3) DAAC(6)
AOC-DAMI WATCH(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 37

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PAGE 01
252130Z JUL 80
SECT 01 OF 02

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(6) NO CH-47 RRP TERMINATION TIME OR SECURITY PLAN WAS BRIEFED.
(7) LZ SECURITY PLAN WAS NOT BRIEFED.
(8) LZ STATUS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE NOT BRIEFED.
(9) AUTHENTICATION TABLES WERE NOT BRIEFED/USED.
(10) THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES WERE NOT ADDRESSED:
(A) EVASIVE MANEUVERS
(B) INSTRUCTIONS FOR PASSENGER DEBOARDING AT AIRFIELDS
(C) INSTRUCTIONS IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF LEAD AIRCRAFT
(D) INSTRUCTIONS FOR LOST COMMO
(E) DOWNED CREW RECOVERY PROCEDURES
(F) SIGNALS FOR FORMATION CHANGE
(11) JOINT OPERATING PROCEDURES. STANDARDIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ARE ESSENTIAL TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

3. PREMISSION PLANNING WAS POOR DUE TO THE FOLLOWING:
A. NAVIGATORS BRIEFED SEPARATELY AND PRIOR TO PILOTS: NUMEROUS CHANGES OCCURRED DURING PILOT BRIEFINGS.
B. 1:500,000 SCALE MAPS ARE INADEQUATE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAIL.
C. HAZARDS INFORMATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE.
D. COMPLETE, DETAILED CREW BRIEFINGS WERE NOT CONDUCTED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TIME.
E. NUMEROUS INADEQUATE AIR NAVIGATION CHECKPOINTS WERE PROVIDED. (PLANNERS SHOULD UTILIZE AN NVG SIP DURING SELECTION OF CHECKPOINTS.)

4. MISSION EXECUTION
A. UH-60/CH-53 INGRESS TO HOLDING LZ'S
(1) THIS PHASE WAS GENERALLY WELL EXECUTED; ENROUTE NAVIGATION/PILOTAGE GOOD.
(2) SOUTH LZ WAS INADEQUATE: 1 INCH POWDERED DUST; SMALL; UH-60'S MADE GO AROUND.
(3) UH-60 CALL FORWARD PLAN WAS UNCLEAR.
(4) UH-60/CH-53 LINK UP PLAN WAS POORLY PLANNED AND EXECUTED.
B. CH-53 INGRESS TO PZ
(1) GENERALLY GOOD
(2) ONE AIRCRAFT MADE A GO AROUND
C. MOVEMENT TO AIRFIELDS
(1) LACK OF A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND EXPERIENCE RESULTED IN MUCH CONFUSION AND DISORGANIZATION WHICH RESULTED IN RELIANCE ON RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.

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(2) NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF AIRFIELDS WERE FLYING IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS WITH NO CONTROL AGENCY RESULTING IN NUMEROUS OVERFLIGHTS. NOT ALL PASSENGERS EXITED HELICOPTERS AT APPROPRIATE POINTS ON AIRFIELDS DUE TO LACK OF PROPER PLANNING. BT

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

(3) MUCH OF FLYING WAS CONDUCTED IN EXCESS OF 1500 FT AGL.

(4) CONFUSION AND DISORGANIZATION RESULTED IN PILOTS USING POSITION LIGHTS, UNFILTERED LANDING LIGHTS AND EXCESSIVE RADIO TRAFFIC.

(5) AIRCRAFT OFTEN LOST SIGHT OF EACH OTHER DURING FORMATION FLYING UNDER NVG'S RESULTING IN STROBE LIGHTS BEING USED TO REGAIN CONTACT BETWEEN AIRCRAFT.

D. REFUELING AT CH-47 RRP'S

(1) ENROUTE PILOTAGE AND NAVIGATION WAS EXCELLENT.

(2) NORTH FLIGHT OVERFLEW THE RRP SITE AND CIRCLED THE AREA FOR APPROX 15 MINUTES TO LOCATE THE PROPER AREA.

(3) ONE CH-47 AT THE SOUTH RRP HAD TO BE REPOSITIONED APPROX 200 METERS DUE TO POORLY SELECTED TERRAIN.

(4) RRP SET UP WAS COMPLETED IN 15 MINUTES.

(5) REFUELING UH-60 WITH 500 LBS OF JP-4 TOOK BETWEEN 6 AND 11 MINUTES. ONE AIRCRAFT TOOK 18 MINUTES DUE TO CREWCHIEF BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CCR NOZZLE.

(6) NUMEROUS PILOTS RECOMMENDED THAT UH-60 LANDINGS BE ACCOMPLISHED AT RIGHT ANGLES TO AND BEHIND CH-47'S FOR SAFETY IN THE EVENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR GO AROUNDS.

(7) ONE CH-53 EXPERIENCED FAILURE OF THE NOSE GEAR AND UTILIZED WHITE LIGHT FOR 11 MINUTES TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

(8) ONE RRP PUMP FAILED; CREW MUST RELEASE PRESSURE IN LINES PRIOR TO CHANGING PUMPS; TIME DELAY WAS NEGLIGABLE.

5. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

A. NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT ONBOARD AIRCRAFT OCCUPIED BY OBSERVERS WORKED WELL; GENERALLY NAVIGATION ERRORS WERE LESS THAN 0.6 MILES.

B. JOINT OPERATING PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED FOR STANDARDIZATION

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AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS IN THE EVENT OF UNEXPECTED OCCURRENCES.

C. AS AMBIENT LIGHT CONDITIONS DEGRADE, FLIGHT ALTITUDES INCREASE IN EXCESS OF 1500 FT AGL.

D. MORE PRACTICE IN FORMATION FLYING WHILE WEARING NVG'S IS REQUIRED.

E. SOME CREW MEMBERS ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CCR NOZZLE REFUELING.

F. CREW COORDINATION AND STANDARDIZATION SHOULD BE IMPROVED.

G. ALL CREW MEMBERS SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH NVG'S; NOT ALL CH-47 ENLISTED CREW MEMBERS AND NAVIGATORS HAD NVG'S.

H. EXTENDED RANGE FUEL SYSTEMS WORKED WELL. (PREVIOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODIFICATION STILL APPLY.)

I. A BLACKOUT CURTAIN BETWEEN THE COCKPIT AND NAVIGATOR AND A COVER OVER THE DOPPLER WERE TESTED; CREW ACCEPTANCE WAS GOOD. [redacted] HAS MATERIALS TO MAKE ADDITIONAL CURTAINS/ COVERS.

J. COMPLETE TACTICAL MISSION BRIEFINGS TO INCLUDE GROUND SECURITY PLANS ARE ESSENTIAL.

K. ADEQUATE TIME MUST BE PROVIDED BETWEEN BRIEFINGS AND MISSIONS TO ALLOW FOR THOROUGH CREW PLANNING AND COORDINATION.

L. PATHFINDERS SHOULD BE INSERTED INTO RRP SITES AT LEAST 15-30 MINUTES PRIOR TO CH-47 ARRIVAL.

M. NOT ALL UH-60'S REFUELED AT THE RRP. CREWS SHOULD COMPLETE ALL REQUIRED TRAINING TASKS DURING EVERY MISSION TO INCREASE PROFICIENCY AND CONFIDENCE.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. UH-60 HYDROMECHANICAL UNIT (HMU) AND APU PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DIAGNOSED AND RESOLVED (RESULTED IN ENGINE FAILURES AND APU FIRES/FAILURES, RESPECTIVELY).

B. LANDING LIGHTS FITTED WITH LIGHT DIFFUSERS BE MODIFIED BY ADDITION OF A LIMITER SWITCH TO PRECLUDE INADVERTENT OPERATION AND DAMAGE/MOTOR BURN OUT.

C. ADDITIONAL MISSION TRAINING OVER SHORTER ROUTES TO PERFECT MISSION EXECUTION.

D. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT OPERATIONS.

E. ALL UH-60 AND CH-47 ACFT BE FITTED WITH CURTAINS BETWEEN NAVIGATORS AND COCKPITS.

F. PROVIDE 48 HOURS OR MORE BETWEEN MISSION NOTIFICATION AND EXECUTION.

7. TEST AND EVALUATION POC IS CPT(P) [redacted]

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entire document

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FROM: Test Project Officer 27 Jun 80

SUBJECT: UH-60A NVG Compatability

TO: Test Director, JTD.
ICS Honeybadger

1. The following are the most significant findings concerning UH-60A NVG compatability; comments were derived from data collection forms received and during interviews with IP's.

a. Trim ball on Vertical Situation Indicator is not visible and is too small.

b. Center windshield should be glass; plastic windshield currently installed is crazing.

c. IR searchlight is needed.

d. Position lights should have split elements so top half is not visible during NVG operations. NOTE: Bottom half of right position light should be green to enhance NVG visibility.

e. Protective covers should be placed over backup pump and hydraulic leak test switches on overhead console.

f. Formation flying is no problem - formation lights must be placed on #3 position to afford adequate visibility over engine exhausts.

g. SR illuminators (similar to those provided in the CH-47) should be available in the cockpit.

h. A red lensed flashlight covered with 100 MPH tape with a paper punch-sized hole in the tape provides adequate emergency lighting.

i. All instruments and indicators should be painted with luminous paint. As example:

(1) Stabilator controls

(2) Stabilator indicator

(3) Trim ball in VSI

(4) HSI/VSI needles and command bars

(5) Engine quadrant controls

(6) Altimeters (radar and barometric)

j. Some cockpit lights are too bright; others are too dim. Different lights illuminate at various intensities; not all lights can be varied to an acceptable intensity. Examples:

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(1) Segment lights and Master Warning Panel lights cannot be independently varied.

(2) AFCS dimmed lights are too bright.

(3) Central Display Unit and Pilot Display Unit lights cannot be sufficiently dimmed for 0-15% light illumination operations.

(4) CIS and Mode Select panel lights should be disconnected from PNL LTS circuit and attached to a dimming switch.

k. Stops produced for Engine Control Levers are not fitting properly; IP's do not believe they are needed and are not using them.

2. Transition from NVG to Night Hawk takes approximately 2-5 minutes for full adaptation; this is not viewed as a problem area at this time.

3. Extended use of NVG is not viewed as a problem. Some pilots have operated for up to 3 hours continuous duration.

4. IP's feel they are competent UH-60A NVG operators, and certainly the best qualified to operate the UH-60A under NVG, and should be considered fully qualified.

[redacted]

Senior Test Project Officer

Cyclic left SAS comes back bright.

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UH-60A NVG COMPATABILITY
DATA COLLECTION FORM

TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS =

NAME AND RANK _____

DUTY POSITION _____ (P, CP, N, OBS, CE)

DATE _____

Rate your ability to locate, operate and/or use the following items using the scale provided, based upon your judgment. Purpose is to determine adequacy of procedures being used to prepare the UH-60A for NVG operations.

SCALE:

1 - No improvement required
2 - Adequate, but improvement required
3 - Minor improvement required
4 - Major improvement required
5 - Unacceptable unless modified

1] PERCENT RESPONSES ≥ 10% ARE REFLECTED IN COLUMNS 4 & 5 (PROBLEM AREAS)

2] ITEM ELIMINATED (—) IF ZERO (Ø) % RESPONSES IN RATING COLS. 4 & 5 (NO PROBLEMS)

SUBJECT ITEM/AREA	1	2	3	4 [1]	5	NO. OF RESPONDENTS	REMARKS
COCKPIT							
Master Warning				10		10	
Pilot Instruments				20		10	
~~Airspeed~~				[2]		~~11~~	
[3] VSI						~~11~~	
HSI				10		10	
Stabilator				09		11	
Mode Select				20		10	
Radar Altimeter				18		11	
~~Altimeter~~						~~11~~	
VSI				18		11	
+ Clock				10		10	
Copilot Instruments				12.5		8	
~~Airspeed~~						~~11~~	
VSI				18		11	
HSI				11		9	
Stabilator				10		10	
Mode Select				10		10	
Radar Altimeter				18		11	
~~HSI~~						~~11~~	
Clock				10		10	≥ 50%

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3] ITEM CIRCLED IF [redacted] RESPONSES IN COL. 1

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SUBJECT ITEM/AREA	RATING 1	2	3	4	5	No. OF RESPONDENTS	REMARKS
Caution/Advisory Panel				1	8	11	
Central Display Unit				2	8	10	
~~Compass~~						~~9~~	
~~AFCS Panel~~						~~10~~	
~~Lower Console~~						~~11~~	
~~Upper Console~~						~~11~~	
~~Engine Fire T-Handles~~						~~10~~	
~~APU Fire T-Handles~~						~~10~~	
~~Free Air Temperature Gage~~						~~11~~	
~~Cockpit Flood Lights~~						~~12~~	
~~Cockpit Utility Lights~~						~~10~~	
~~No. 1 Circuit Breaker Panel~~						~~9~~	
~~No. 2 Circuit Breaker Panel~~						~~9~~	
DC Essential Bus Circuit Breaker Panel						7	
Battery/Battery Utility Bus Circuit Breaker Panel						7	
Navigation Lights				0	8	12	
~~Formation Lights~~						~~11~~	
~~Anti collision Lights~~						~~11~~	
Landing Light				0	9	11	
Search Light				1	8	11	
~~Overhead Switches~~						~~12~~	
~~Engine Control Quadrant~~						~~9~~	
Reflections on Windshield (Indicate source(s))				1	0	10	
~~Collective Grip~~						~~11~~	
~~Cyclic Grip~~						~~11~~	
~~NVG Preparation Procedures~~						~~8~~	
~~-10 TC~~						~~7~~	
~~Transition from NVG to Nighthawk~~						~~8~~	
(write in) CENTER WINDSHIELD				1	0	2	
POSITION LIGHTS				1	0	1	

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SUBJECT ITEM/AREA	RATING 1	2	3	4	5	NO. OF RESPONDENTS	REMARKS
CABIN							
Mission Readiness Circuit Breaker Panel (Cabin)						6	
~~Cabin Lights~~						11	
Doppler				20		10	
OMEGA						4	N/A
Aux Fuel Tanks				25		8	
Accumulator Pressure Gauge				25		8	
Cargo Hook Operation				14		7	
External Lights				11		9	
~~Cabin Lights~~						9	
EXTERIOR							
~~Engine Oil Level~~						6	
~~Main Transmission Oil~~						6	
~~Intermediate Gear Box~~						6	
~~Tail Rotor Gear Box~~						6	
~~Hydraulic Reservoirs~~						6	
~~Level(s)~~						6	
~~Fire Bottle Thermal Plug~~						6	
~~APU Exhaust~~						6	
~~Engine Exhaust~~						6	
Other (Write in)							
VNE						8	
						6	

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UH-60

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FINDINGS

Maint. crane unusable w/ Halon installed
No fuel dump capability on ERK
Internal tiedowns unusable for air compatibility
Navigator - seat too low
- seatbelt unsat (Monkey harness?)
NVG - should not be lent to infantry
- need lens brushes
- need lens cleaning fluid
H.F. Antenna - no access
- ~1¾" below A/C @ antenna
- stowage ~2¼" below antenna
- possible tie down point interference
- possible interference with fuel field
High GW slow engine response in retard droop
NVG Compat
- some lights too bright
- some lights too dim
- Taping marginal, cut
Engine droop causes rotor to go below Normal
Need relief tubes

- seatbelt unsat (Monkey harness?)

NVG – should not be lent to infantry
- need lens brushes
- need lens cleaning fluid

H.F. Antenna – no sleeve
- ~1¾" below A/C @ antenna
- – stiffener ~2¼" below antenna
- – possible tie down point interference
- – possible interference with tail fold

High GW slow engine response in certain areas

NVG Compat
- some lights too bright
- some lights too dim
- – keying marginal, out

Engine droop causes rotor to go below Normal

Need relief tubes

ERK not interchangable
- holes drilled
- routing
- no fuel metering system

Kegs: non std tie down for air transport

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