



GF #1

24 November 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

Subject: Security Guidance

1. (U) Enclosed is the EC-79 Briefing Guide to be used when briefing new personnel on EC-79. Additionally, all personnel currently briefed for EC-79 should be familiar with its contents. You are encouraged to use it for a refresher briefing for those persons.
2. (U) Also enclosed is a copy of the JTF 1-79 classification guide, intended to assist you in properly classifying project related information originated by your organizations. It is especially important that any material to be retained for historical purposes carry the proper classification and declassification/downgrading instructions. Specific instructions on disposal of project material will be issued at the appropriate time.
3. (U) Due to the sensitivity of the enclosed documents, they are being closely controlled. Reproduction of either document IS NOT authorized.

*James B. Vaught*  
JAMES B. VAUGHT  
Major General, USA

2 Enclosures  
a/s

CLASSIFIED BY J-3, OJCS  
REVIEW ON 28 NOVEMBER 2000  
EXTENDED BY J-3, OJCS  
REASON: PARA 2-301(c) 6

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*Downgraded to Secret  
by DDO, NMCC  
11 August 1992*

~~TOP SECRET~~

750 pwp

~~SECRET~~

Distribution:

JTF 1-79 (7)

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*Secret*

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EC-79 SECURITY BRIEFING GUIDE

1. (U) INTRODUCTION

You are about to begin an indoctrination preparing you for access to an extremely sensitive project, EC-79. Prior to granting you access to this sensitive information, both your need-to-know and personal eligibility for access were subjected to a most stringent appraisal. To provide maximum protection of this information to which you are about to be granted access, it is necessary that you firmly and clearly recognize its vital importance, its sensitivity, and the basic requirements which are placed on you for insuring its protection. In this respect, you must execute an oath that you understand the nature of your obligation and that you will, to the best of your ability, fulfill this obligation.

2. (U) GENERAL

(TS) The Joint Task Force 1-79 (JTF) is responsible for the planning and execution of hostage rescue missions in Iran. The very existence of JTF is classified TOP SECRET. Likewise, any information revealing association with JTF carries the same classification. This includes details of plans, units and personnel involved in JTF plans and operations, relationship to other organizations or projects, and all other information which would reveal the name or existence of JTF. Information concerning JTF should be discussed only in secure areas and only with persons who have executed the EC-79 Security Oath. If a person's access is not known, do not discuss the JTF project until their access has been checked. Access to [REDACTED] projects (discussed below) should not be confused with access to JTF information. Nor is access to JTF information [REDACTED] programs to be considered automatic access to special compartmented intelligence (SCI) or other compartmented intelligence programs.

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REVIEW ON 24 NOVEMBER 2000  
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REASON: PARA 2-301(c) 2,3,5,6

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(1) (TS) The codeword SNOWBIRD (S) is used to cover JTF planning, training, and execution. When used alone, it is classified SECRET, however, its association with JTF [redacted] projects or information is TOP SECRET. Under no circumstances should it be revealed to unauthorized persons or through non-secure communications. No JTF/SNOWBIRD (S) messages will be transmitted outside JTF communications channels (SSO channels are no exception). Hardcopy JTF/SNOWBIRD (S) documents will be kept to a minimum and will be handcarried, not transmitted through ARFCOS, mail, or other administrative channels.

(2) (TS) EC-79 is an unclassified term which covers JTF operations. It's association with JTF however, is TOP SECRET.

(3) (U) RICEBOWL is the unclassified nickname used for the April 1980 hostage rescue attempt. It is unclassified only when used alone. It's association with the hostage rescue attempt is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

(4) (TS) [redacted] The [redacted] in that it conducts legitimate operational [redacted] evaluation projects. While [redacted] projects are conducted in support of JTF plans and operations, [redacted] projects/tests and [redacted] from JTF and the JTF mission. To the extent possible, all JTF coordination, training, and other actions are done under the [redacted]. The [redacted] unclassified, however, much information pertaining to its projects, exercises, personnel and equipment, is classified. The unclassified nicknames HONEY BADGER and ELITE GUARD are used for [redacted]. There are numerous individuals briefed on the HONEY BADGER/ELITE GUARD projects who are not cleared for access to SNOWBIRD (S) and are unaware of the [redacted]. Again, you are cautioned not to confuse the JTF and [redacted] and reveal SNOWBIRD (S) information to individuals having access only to the HONEY BADGER/ELITE GUARD projects.

3. (U) OPSEC

a. (TS) At this point it should be apparent that nearly everything associated with the [redacted] projects is classified. The main exception to that rule is information contained in official press guidance for an individual test. That is not to be confused with the appearance of

A  
a piece of information in the newspaper. Just because something appears in the news media, it is not declassified. The rule in such instances is to neither confirm nor deny the information. If any doubt exists as to the classification of [redacted] information, it should be treated as classified until such time a positive determination to the contrary can be made. The foregoing is especially applicable prior to discussing [redacted] information over unsecure communications or with persons whose access/need-to-know is unknown or questionable. Most classification questions can be answered by reference to the [redacted] Classification Guide.

~~(S)~~  
A b. (TS) The need for constant security awareness cannot be over emphasized. The sensitive nature of the [redacted] projects makes them especially vulnerable to hostile intelligence collection efforts.

~~(S)~~  
A (1) (TS) Maximum use of secure communications is required at all times when discussing [redacted] matters. Attempts to "talk-around" classified topics on unsecure communications are not acceptable. Personnel who are unsure about proper communications security procedures should familiarize themselves with them prior to discussing any [redacted] related information on unsecure communications.

~~(S)~~  
A (2) (TS) The HUMINT threat exists not only from hostile intelligence services, but from the news media and the curious as well. Any attempt by any unauthorized persons to gain information concerning [redacted] operations/exercises, should immediately be reported to [redacted] Security. Under no circumstances will any information be revealed, confirmed or denied, or any commitments made to the individual. No attempt to pursue or investigate the matter will be made by the individual approached.

~~(S)~~  
A (3) (TS) OPSEC is a primary consideration in all [redacted] matters. The goal of the OPSEC Program is not only to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of [redacted] information, but to prevent the release of bits and pieces of unclassified information which might be pieced together, and to minimize the amount of outside attention drawn to [redacted] projects and exercises.

4. (U) INDOCTRINATION AND DEBRIEFING

(c) A a. (TS) Only the Commander, JTF is authorized to grant access to EC-79 information based upon strict interpretation of the need-to-know principle. No one will be given EC-79 access until that approval has been given. Once approval is given to grant EC-79 access, [redacted] assumes the access will be given, and places the individual on the access roster. If for any reason the individual is not given access after approval has been given to grant it, JTD [redacted] security should be notified immediately so the name can be withdrawn from the access roster. When [redacted] gives approval for an individual to be given EC-79 access, it is with the implied understanding that no access will be given until the individual has signed the EC-79 security oath and been properly briefed. Only after those actions have been accomplished, is the individual considered "read on" or "indoctrinated." EC-79 access does not automatically grant full access to all [redacted] actions, plans or programs; need-to-know principle prevails.

A b. (TS) When individuals depart or no longer require access to EC-79 information, they will execute an EC-79 Debriefing Statement and [redacted] will be notified that the individual was debriefed. It is the responsibility of both the unit and the individual to insure that a Debriefing Statement is executed when EC-79 access is terminated.

A c. (TS) When an uncleared individual is inadvertently exposed to EC-79 information, a judgement decision is required. Under most circumstances, the individual will be required to execute an Inadvertent Disclosure Statement. In some cases however, an individual may not be aware of the information they were exposed to. In such instances, asking the individual to sign an Inadvertent Disclosure Statement might do more harm than good, by highlighting the fact that they were exposed to sensitive information. In all cases however, the details of the disclosure will be reported to [redacted] security and guidance requested if necessary. Under no circumstances will an individual who has been inadvertently exposed to EC-79 information be exposed to more information in the form of explanations, warnings, etc..

5. (U) SUMMARY

When in doubt, ask. If you are not sure about any security matter, get the answer before acting. JTD security is prepared to assist you with your security problems. Too many lives are at stake in this operation. A minor security violation could prove fatal.

CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

SUBJECT	CURRENT CLASSIFI- CATION	CLASSIFICATION AFTER RELEASE OF HOSTAGES	DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
<u>I. GENERAL</u>			
CODEWORD RICEBOWL WHEN USED ALONE	U	U	N/A
CODEWORD RICEBOWL WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH APRIL 1980 HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION	C	C	DECL 6 YEARS
CODEWORD DOUBLESTAR (S)	C	U	2 YEARS AFTR TERM OF JTD
CODEWORD SNOWBIRD (S) WHEN USED ALONE	S	S	DECL 6 YEARS
CODEWORD SNOWBIRD (S) WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH JTF 1-79, [REDACTED] EC-79, IRAN, HOSTAGE RESCUE PLANNING	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
TERM EC-79 WHEN NOT ASSOCIATED WITH JTF 1-79 OR JTF 1-79 OPERATIONS	U	U	N/A
NICKNAMES POWDER KEG, NITE FITE AND POTENT CHARGE WHEN USED ALONE	U	U	N/A
ASSOCIATION OF POWDER KEG [REDACTED] OPERATIONS	S	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
NICKNAMES HONEY BADGER, ELEGANT LADY AND ELITE GUARD WHEN USED ALONE	U	U	N/A
ASSOCIATION OF HONEY BADGER, ELEGANT LADY, ELITE GUARD [REDACTED] WITH JTF 1-79 MISSION	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
NICKNAMES OF FIELD EXERCISES WHEN USED ALONE	U	U	N/A
ASSOCIATION OF EXERCISE NICKNAMES WITH OCONUS LOCATIONS	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
REVEALING THAT [REDACTED]	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS

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SUBJECT	CURRENT CLASSIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION AFTER RELEASE OF HOSTAGES	DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
[. GENERAL (CONTINUED) <del>(S)</del>			
NAME OR EXISTENCE OF JTF 1-79 SINCE 26 APR 80	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
NAME OR EXISTENCE OF JTD	U	U	N/A
REVEALING THAT MG VAUGHT IS THE ACTUAL AUTHORITY [REDACTED] SINCE 26 APRIL 80	C	C	DECL 6 YEARS
REVEALING PARTICIPATION OF [REDACTED] BASED UNITS	TS	TS	RE VW 20 YEARS
REVEALING PARTICIPATION OF [REDACTED]	TS	TS	RE VW 20 YEARS
ASSOCIATION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH JTF 1-79 OPERATIONS AND PLANNING	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
REVEALING NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE RICEBOWL OPERATION	C	C	DECL 6 YEARS
REVEALING NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN RICEBOWL PLANNING	C	C	DECL 1 JUL 81



SUBJECT	CURRENT CLASSIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION AFTER RELEASE OF HOSTAGES	DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
<u>II. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY.</u> <del>(S)</del>			
REVEALING THAT A SECOND HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION IS/WAS PLANNED	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
SPECIFIC DECEPTIONS USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
GENERAL DECEPTION METHODS OR OTHER OPSEC METHODS ASSOCIATED WITH RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD	C	C	RE VW 20 YEARS
INFORMATION REVEALING ASSISTANCE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN JTF OPERATIONS	TS	TS	RE VW 30 YEARS
INFORMATION DIRECTLY RELATED TO USE OF OCONUS LOCATIONS DURING RICEBOWL EXECUTION OR PLANNED SNOWBIRD OPERATIONS (CONFIDENTIAL IF NO REFERENCE TO RICEBOWL OR SNOWBIRD OPERATIONS IS MADE)	TS	TS	RE VW 20 YEARS
INFORMATION REVEALING SECURITY DEFICIENCIES OR VIOLATIONS IN ██████████ PROJECTS AND OPERATIONS (MAY BE HIGHER BASED ON THE SPECIFICS OF THE SITUATION)	C	C	DECL 6 YEARS

SUBJECT	CURRENT CLASSIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION AFTER RELEASE OF HOSTAGES	DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
IV. JTD OPERATIONS (U)			
FUND CITES, OJCS PROJECT CODE 9WW AND OSD FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR	U	U	N/A
IDENTITIES OF THREE OR MORE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE HONEY BADGER/ELITE GUARD OT&E PROJECT	C	U	N/A
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN OFFICIAL PRESS GUIDANCE FOR AN INDIVIDUAL TEST	U	U	N/A
OVERALL OT&E PROJECT GOALS AND RESULTS	TS	S	REVW 20 YRS
SPECIFICS OF A GIVEN TEST TO BE UNDERTAKEN AND ITS RESULTS (MAY BE CLASSIFIED HIGHER ACCORDING TO SENSITIVITY OF THE INFORMATION)	C	C	DECL 6 YRS
REFERENCES TO NEW CONCEPTS, PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS, OR UNUSUAL CONFIGURATIONS IF A PLAUSIBLE, UNCLASSIFIED COVER STORY DOES NOT EXIST. (CLASSIFICATION MAY ALSO BE BASED ON TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED)	C	C	DECL 6 YRS
MODIFICATIONS TO AIRCRAFT AND OTHER EQUIPMENT PENDING FINAL TEST RESULTS AND DECISIONS TO RETAIN OR DE-MODIFY	C	C	DECL 6 YRS
INFORMATION ON TEST ACTIVITY WHICH IS MORE SPECIFIC THAN MONTH AND GENERAL AREA	C	U	N/A
JTD EXERCISE OPORDERS (SHOULD BE RETURNED TO JTD)	S	S	REVW 20 YEARS
UNIT OPORDERS (CLASSIFICATION SHOULD BE BASED ON CONTENT AND GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN THIS GUIDE)	AS APPLICABLE	AS APPLICABLE	AS APPLICABLE
JNIT CT SOP'S (CLASSIFICATION SHOULD BE BASED ON CONTENT AND GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN THIS GUIDE)	AS APPLICABLE	AS APPLICABLE	AS APPLICABLE

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SUBJECT	CURRENT CLASSIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION AFTER RELEASE OF HOSTAGES	DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
<b>V. COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICS</b>			
TOTAL COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT CAPABILITY OF JTF 1-79	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
COVERT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT TO/FROM OUTSIDE AGENCIES	TS	TS	RE VW 20 YEARS
OTHER COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT TO/FROM OUTSIDE AGENCIES (MAY BE HIGHER ACCORDING TO CONTENT)	C	C	RE VW 20 YEARS
CEOI'S (MAY BE HIGHER ACCORDING TO CONTENT)	S	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
COMMUNICATIONS CALL SIGNS/CODEWORDS USED IN [REDACTED] OPERATIONS/EXERCISES	S	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
AUTHENTICATION CODES USED IN [REDACTED] OPERATIONS/EXERCISES	S	C	DECL 6 YEARS
CRYPTO KEY IDENTIFIERS USED IN [REDACTED] OPERATIONS/EXERCISES	S	C	DECL 6 YEARS
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS USED FOR TRAINING	S	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS FOR EMPLOYMENT	TS	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
FREQUENCIES USED FOR NETWORKS	S	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
VX-360 FREQUENCIES	TS	TS	RE VW 20 YEARS
VX-360 CODES	S	S	RE VW 20 YEARS
CIRCUITS AVAILABLE AT A CONUS DEPLOYMENT LOCATION	C	C	RE VW 20 YEARS
SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT TYPES EQUIPPED WITH SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY	C	C	RE VW 20 YEARS

SUBJECT	CURRENT CLASSIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION AFTER RELEASE OF HOSTAGES	DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
V. COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICS (CONTINUED) <del>(S)</del>			
EXISTENCE OR DESCRIPTION OF [REDACTED]	TS	TS	RE VW 20 YEARS
EQUIPMENT IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (UNLESS THE EQUIPMENT CARRIES A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION)	C	C	RE VW 20 YEARS UNLESS ITEM IS DECLASSIFIED EARLIER
REVEALING THE EXISTENCE OF UNUSUAL, UNIQUE, OR NON-STANDARD EQUIPMENT, NOT ON A UNIT'S TO&E, FOR WHICH A [REDACTED] DOES NOT EXIST OR WHOSE EXISTENCE COULD ASSOCIATE THE UNIT WITH JTF OPERATIONS (UNLESS THE EQUIPMENT CARRIES A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION)	C	C	RE VW 20 YEARS
LISTINGS OF EQUIPMENT EXCESS TO A UNIT'S TO&E WHICH WAS PROCURED AT THE DIRECTION OF [REDACTED] (WILL BE HIGHER IF EXISTENCE OF INDIVIDUAL PIECES OF EQUIPMENT CARRIES A HIGHER CLASSIFICATION)	C	C	RE VW 20 YEARS
ADMINISTRATIVE AIRLIFTS WITHIN CONUS (MAY BE CLASSIFIED IF REVEALING THE SPECIFICS OF THE TEST OR UNITS INVOLVED - SEE SECTION IV)	U	U	N/A

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FROM: JTF [REDACTED]  
TO: SFOD DELTA [REDACTED]  
INFO: [REDACTED] RGR

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J2 | R9  
|  
a # 2

LIMDIS FOR CDRS/S3/S2

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #3

REFS:

- A. JTF MSG044 SUBJ: INTELL SUMMARY DTG 142015R NOV 79
- B. JTF MSG008 SUBJ: SITUATION SUMMARY DTG 151800Z NOV 79
- C. JTF MSG024 SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE UPDATE DTG 201320Z NOV 79
- D. JTF MSG056 SUBJ: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT DTG 260945R NOV 79
- E. JTF MSG010 SUBJ: COMPOUND SITUATION UPDATE DTG 040100Z DEC 79
- F. JTF MSG023 SUBJ: COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DTG 092100Z DEC 79

1. THIS ASSESSMENT CONSOLIDATES AND SUPERCEDES DATA CONTAINED IN REFERENCES. THE FORMAT OF THIS ASSESSMENT IS IAW WITH THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX OF AN OPLAN/OPORD AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH. MAJOR CHANGES/SUPPLEMENTS TO THIS ASSESSMENT WILL BE MADE BY TTY AND WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN THE SUBJECT AS SUCH. THE FOLLOWING INDEX IS PROVIDED AS A BASE OF REFERENCE

A. PART I SITUATION

- A. GENERAL
- B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA
- C. [REDACTED]
- D. [REDACTED]
- E. [REDACTED]
- F. [REDACTED]
- G. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
- H. PROBABLE ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION

B. PART II BACKGROUND

- A. GROUND FORCES
- B. AIR DEFENSE/AIR FORCES
- C. NAVAL FORCES

C. PART III KEY EXTERNAL LOCATIONS

- A. MAIN MILITARY AFLD
- B. SEMAN NEW AFLD
- C. MANZARIYEH AFLD

2. PART I SITUATION

A. GENERAL: ON 4 NOVEMBER 1979 MEMBERS OF AN IRANIAN STUDENT GROUP SWARMED ON TO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND IN TEHRAN, TOOK THE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE AND STATED THEY WOULD HOLD THE EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE UNTIL THE USG RETURNED THE SHAH TO IRAN FOR TRIAL. THE TAKE OVER WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT BLOODSHED. APPROXIMATELY 62 AMCITS AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF IRANIAN AND 3RD COUNTRY CITIZENS WERE INITIALLY HELD. SHORTLY AFTER THE TAKE OVER THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL WERE RELEASED. ON 19 NOVEMBER THE "STUDENTS" BEGAN TO RELEASE SELECTED HOSTAGES, LARGELY NON-WHITE AMCIT MALES, AMCIT FEMALES AND 3RD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THE REMAINING AMERICAN HOSTAGES INCLUDE TWO WOMEN AND 48-50 MALES. THE "STUDENTS" REMAIN ADAMANT IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR THE RETURN OF THE SHAH AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE IRAN GOVERNMENT (REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) HAVE REFUSED TO HONOR THE INJUNCTION OF THE WORLD COURT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND RETURN THE EMBASSY TO AMERICAN CONTROL

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CONDUCTED ON 12 August 1992  
RELEVANT CL BY DDONMCC  
 DECL. EXCEPTED TO: Secret  
KEY: CH OADR  
NOTE: Multiple Sines

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR

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- IN ADDITION BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE "STUDENTS" HAVE STATED THEY PLAN TO PUT THE REMAINING HOSTAGES ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE. ALTHOUGH THE LABEL "STUDENTS" IS USED IN THE MEDIA AND IN THIS REPORT WHEN REFERRING TO THE PRINCIPAL CAPTIVES THE LABEL IS NOT CORRECT. [THE "STUDENT CAPTIVE" FORCE CONSISTS OF A GROUP OF SENIOR MEDICAL, ENGINEERING AND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS BELONGING TO THE MOJAHEDIN FACTION WHICH SUBSCRIBES TO A BLEND OF ISLAM AND MARXISM. SEVERAL LEFTIST INSTRUCTORS FROM TEHRAN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, MEMBERS OF THE TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY MAY HAVE ALSO INFILTRATED THESE GROUPS. IN ADDITION, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COLLECTIVE GROUP (WHICH IS CALLED A COMMITTEE) RECEIVES COUNSEL ON PROPAGANDA, AND SECURITY MATTERS FROM PLO AND FEYADEEN ADVISORS.) THE SITUATION HAS NOW CRYSTALLIZED TO THE POINT THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTRACTED AND UNCOMPROMISING NATURE OF THE IRANIAN POSITION. THE SITUATION APPEARS TO BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM WITHOUT AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN OR THE USG.

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA: THE EMBASSY COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN CENTRAL TEHRAN (UTM 39S-WV-383518//GEOGRAPHIC 4230N/5125E). THE COMPOUND AREA CONSISTS OF 27 ACRES OF FLAT TERRAIN SHAPED IN BASICALLY A RECTANGLE PATTERN RUNNING NORTH/SOUTH. THE COMPOUND IS BOUNDED ON THE SOUTH BY TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD WHICH IS A MAJOR EAST/WEST THOROUGHFARE; ON THE EAST BY ROOSEVELT STREET, (A RELATIVELY BUSY NORTH/SOUTH ROAD); ON THE WEST BY AMERICA AVENUE AND THE NORTH BY ARDALAN STREET. THE MAIN BUILDING (CHANCERY) RUNS EAST/WEST AND FORMS THE BASE LINE REFERENCE POINT. THE CHANCERY FACES ON TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD. THE COMPOUND CAN BE DIVIDED INTO FOUR GENERAL AREAS, GROUPED AROUND TWO PLAYING FIELDS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF THE COMPOUND. THE CHANCERY AND MOTOR POOL AREA ARE TO THE SOUTH. THE WAREHOUSE, TEMPORARY APARTMENTS AND SUPPLY AREA ARE TO THE NORTH. THE COMMISSARY, CONSULATE STAFF COTTAGES AND OLD POLICE QUARTERS ARE TO THE WEST. THE AMBASSADOR'S AND DCM RESIDENCES ARE LOCATED IN THE EASTERN HALF OF THE COMPOUND WHICH IS FORESTED WITH HIGH TRUNKED PINE TREES. THE NORTHWEST SEGMENT OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND ABUTTS AN IRANIAN ARMY DEPOT. THE COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A SERIES OF WALLS AND FENCES WHICH RESTRICT INTERIOR VISIBILITY FROM THE SURROUNDING STREETS. STREET AND BUILDING LIGHTS ARE LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE COMPOUND AND SURROUNDING AREAS BUT MANY ARE NOT FUNCTIONING.

(1) THE COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN DOWNTOWN TEHRAN IN THE MIDST OF A MIXED BUSINESS AND RESIDENTIAL AREA, WITH RELATIVELY EASY ROAD ACCESS FROM THE NORTH AND EAST. SEVERAL HIGH BUILDINGS IN THE AREA PROVIDE GOOD VANTAGE POINTS FOR VIEWING THE INTERIOR OF THE COMPOUND. A MAJOR SPORTS COMPLEX WITH LARGE STADIUM AND SEVERAL PLAYING FIELDS IS LOCATED NORTHEAST OF THE COMPOUND DIAGONALLY ACROSS ROOSEVELT AVENUE. A LARGE PARKING LOT IS ALSO LOCATED EAST OF THE COMPOUND ON ROOSEVELT, MIDWAY BETWEEN THE STADIUM AND TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD.

(2) THE BUILDINGS FACING THE COMPOUND ON THE SOUTH (TAKHT-E-JAMSHID) ARE MOSTLY OFFICE BUILDINGS WITH SOME RESIDENTS. ON THE WEST SIDE THE PRINCIPAL STRUCTURES APPEAR TO BE FOUR SMALL BUT AFFLUENT PROFESSIONAL OFFICE BUILDINGS SURROUNDED BY TREES AND BACKED BY TWO LARGE PARKING LOTS. THE NORTH SIDE OF THE COMPOUND BACKS INTO A MIDDLE CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA CONSISTING OF THREE BLOCKS OF MULTI-STORY APARTMENT HOUSES.

~~SECRET~~

(3) ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE EMBASSY TAKEOVER IS LARGELY LOCALIZED WITHIN A TWO BLOCK RADIUS OF THE COMPOUND EVEN WHEN MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ON GOING.

(4) TRAFFIC IN THE CITY IS HIGHLY CONGESTED BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0600-2300 DURING THE ISLAMIC WORK WEEK (SAT-WED) DECREASING IN VOLUME ON THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND (THURS-FRI) ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC ACTIVITY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE THURSDAY NIGHT UNTIL 0200 FRIDAY MORNING.

(5) THE EMBASSY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KM WEST OF THE NEAREST AIRFIELD (DOSHAN-TAPPEH AFB WHICH IS A NON COMBAT BASE). TWO OTHER AIRFIELDS ARE WITHIN 10KM, GHALI-MORGHI, [REDACTED] IS 8KM SSW AND MEHRABAD INTERNATIONAL [REDACTED] IS LOCATED 10 KM WSW.

(6) WEATHER AT THIS TIME OF YEAR IS COMPARABLE TO NW UNITED STATES/ DENVER COLORADO WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS, OCCASSIONAL MIST/RAIN IN THE CITY AND SNOW IN THE NEARBY MOUNTAINS. WINTER TEMPERATURES ORDINARILY RANGE BETWEEN 20 AND 40 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AT NIGHT RAISING TO THE MID FIFTIES DURING THE DAY.

[REDACTED] WAS USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF VARIOUS COMPOUND BUILDINGS AND WITH DUE CONSIDERATION OF THE BUILDINGS PREVIOUS FUNCTION [REDACTED]

A. CHANCERY [REDACTED]

B. MOTOR POOL AREA - FOCUS OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA/MEDIA EFFORT, CENTER FOR STAGING PUBLIC DISPLAYS OF HOSTAGES AND CONTROL OF VISITORS TO THE COMPOUND.

C. STAFF COTTAGES [REDACTED]

D. COMMISSARY/COMMISSARY WAREHOUSE [REDACTED]

E. CONSULATE BUILDING [REDACTED]

F. OLD POLICE GUARD QUARTERS, AND UTILITY WORKSHOPS, CURRENT FUNCTION UNKNOWN. MAY BE USED AS QUARTERS FOR PASDARAN ELEMENTS OF INTERNAL GUARD FORCE.

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G. WAREHOUSE

BASEMENT FLOOR USED BY ELEMENTS OF MARINE GUARD AS SLEEPING QUARTERS PRIOR TO TAKE OVER. PART OF SPACE WAS USED AS SNACK BAR NICKNAMED MUSHROOM INN

H. TEMPORARY APARTMENTS/OLD MARINE HOUSE -

I. DCM RESIDENCE - SINGLE STORY RESIDENCE CAPABLE OF ACCOMODATING 8-12 HOSTAGES

J. AMBASSADOR RESIDENCE - TWO STORY BUILDING WITH A SMALL GLASS PENT HOUSE ON ROOF. THE BUILDING IS CAPABLE OF HOUSING 12-16 HOSTAGE IN THE RESIDENCE PROPER AND ANOTHER 6- TO 8 IN THE ADJOINING SERVANTS QUARTERS.

(C) HOSTAGE DISTRIBUTION

AN OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT IS THAT MOST HOSTAGES REMAIN UNDER "STUDENT" CONTROL AND REMAIN IN THE COMPOUND. CURRENT ESTIMATES INDICATE THE HOSTAGE TOTAL AS 49-52 AND INCLUDES AT LEAST TWO FEMALES. BELIEVE THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN CATEGORIZED INTO AT LEAST TWO-POSSIBLY THREE CATEGORIES.

- CATEGORY ONE PROBABLY CONSISTS OF 8 TO 9 HOSTAGES WHO HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS OR ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING "SPIES". THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE PROBABLY BEING HELD INDIVIDUALLY AND ARE LIKELY CANDIDATES FOR TRIAL. INDIVIDUALS SUSPECTED OF FALLING INTO THIS CATEGORY ARE:

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G. WAREHOUSE

BASEMENT FLOOR USED BY ELEMENTS OF MARINE GUARD AS SLEEPING QUARTERS PRIOR TO TAKE OVER. PART OF SPACE WAS USED AS SNACK BAR NICKNAMED MUSHROOM INN

H. TEMPORARY APARTMENTS/OLD MARINE HOUSE -

I. DCM RESIDENCE - SINGLE STORY RESIDENCE CAPABLE OF ACCOMODATING 8-12 HOSTAGES.

J. AMBASSADOR RESIDENCE - TWO STORY BUILDING WITH A SMALL GLASS PENT HOUSE ON ROOF. THE BUILDING IS CAPABLE OF HOUSING 12-16 HOSTAGE IN THE RESIDENCE PROPER AND ANOTHER 6- TO 8 IN THE ADJOINING SERVANTS QUARTERS.

(S) HOSTAGE DISTRIBUTION


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
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- CATEGORY TWO PROBABLY CONSISTS OF 10 TO 12 HOSTAGES WHO HAVE THROUGH THEIR ATTITUDE OR JOB POSITION ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF THE GUARD FORCE. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE PROBABLY BEING HELD SINGULARLY OR IN SMALL GROUPS OF 2-3. CANDIDATES FOR THIS CATEGORY ARE:

CG  
19  


- CATEGORY THREE PROBABLY CONSISTS OF THE BALANCE OF HOSTAGES (28-30) WHO IN THE MINDS OF THE CAPTORS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN ANY SPY ACTIVITY AND THEIR EMBASSY FUNCTIONS WERE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE/HOUSE KEEPING NATURE. INDIVIDUALS LIKELY TO BE INCLUDED IN THIS CATEGORY ARE:

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[REDACTED], THE FOLLOWING ESTIMATE IS PROVIDED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

- ALSO OF CONCERN ARE OTHER OFFICIAL AMCITS LOCATED IN TEHRAN. DATA AVAILABLE THIS LOCATION INDICATES TWO GROUPINGS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER PROTECTIVE CUSTODY:

- BRUCE LAINGEN
- VICTOR TOMSETH
- MICHAEL HOWLAND

(2) AT LARGE AT UNKNOWN LOCATION:

- ROBERT ANDERS
- JOSEPH STAFFORD
- MARK LIJEK
- PLUS TWO UNIDENTIFIED

D. GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION

1. COMPOUND INTERNAL SECURITY:

THE SITUATION IN THE COMPOUND HAS NOW SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE WITH DEMONSTRATIONS PERIODICALLY STAGED OUTSIDE THE CHANCERY/MOTOR POOL GATE ON TAKHTE-JAMSHID BLVD. CROWD SIZE VARIES FROM 50-75 CURIOSITY SEEKERS TO SEVERAL THOUSAND AT LUNCH/PRAYER TIME OR WHEN ANNOUNCEMENTS GO OUT VIA THE RADIO AND THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM.

A. SECURITY OF THE HOSTAGE AREAS IS MAINTAINED BY [REDACTED] PERSONNEL.

PERSONNEL WITHIN THE COMPOUND ARE MADE UP OF SEVERAL FACTIONS IN APPROXIMATELY THE FOLLOWING PROPORTIONS:

ACTUAL STUDENTS // 60 PERCENT // 80-90 PERSONNEL

FATAH TRAINED MILITANTS // 12-15 PERSONNEL

PASDARAN // 15 PERCENT // 20 PERSONNEL

[REDACTED] INCLUDING UNIVERSITY/RELIGIOUS LEADERS

[REDACTED] PERSONNEL

PLO ADVISORS // 5-7 PERSONNEL

NOTE: PLO ADVISORS ARE ONLY PRESENT DURING THE DAY AND IN THE EVENINGS WHEN STRATEGY MEETINGS ARE BEING HELD.

THE ACTUAL STUDENTS FUNCTION AS PERSONAL GUARDS OF THE HOSTAGES AND AS PROPAGANDISTS AND IDEOLOGUES TRYING TO INDOCTRINATE THE HOSTAGES. THE PLO FUNCTION AS OBSERVERS, ADVISORS, AND PROPAGANDISTS.

THE FATAH TRAINED MILITANTS SUPERVISE SECURITY, INTERROGATION, AND DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION.

THE PASDARAN, BESIDES PROVIDING EXTERNAL SECURITY, MAINTAIN A PRESENCE WITHIN THE COMPOUND, PRIMARILY PROVIDING SENTRIES. WITHIN THE BUILDINGS, THE STUDENTS TYPICALLY CARRY PISTOLS OR G-3 RIFLES. THOSE ON DUTY OUTSIDE TYPICALLY ARE ARMED WITH G-3 RIFLES. GUARDS CARRYING RIFLES HAVE NOT BEEN OBSERVED CARRYING ANY SPARE MAGAZINES FOR THEIR WEAPONS.

REPORT

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B. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL PRESENT SEEMS TO VARY ACCORDING TO THE OCCASION AND DAY OF THE WEEK. OTHER FACTORS BEING EQUAL, THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IN THE COMPOUND DROPS ON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY (THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND, WHEN SOME LEAVE TO VISIT FAMILIES).

C. [REDACTED] THERE IS ANOTHER REDUCTION WHEN SOME MEMBERS OF THE OCCUPATION FORCE (STUDENTS) LEAVE THE COMPOUND TO ATTEND CLASSES.

C. GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION IS ESTIMATED AS FOLLOWS WITH A DAY/NIGHT DUTY RATIO OF [REDACTED]

C. D. [REDACTED]

C. E. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OF SOME SORT. THE STUDENTS HAVE INSTALLED ADDITIONAL LIGHTING AND LOUDSPEAKERS IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS.

C. [REDACTED]

THREE BASE STATION RADIOS; IN THE AMBASSADOR RESIDENCE, THE CONSULATE, AND THE CHANCERY ARE PROBABLY USED TO CONTROL SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND THE COMPOUND.

C. [REDACTED]

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2. COMPOUND EXTERNAL SECURITY

A. [REDACTED]

B. EAST WALL: (ROOSEVELT AVENUE)

[REDACTED]

ROOSEVELT SHOULD BE RELATIVELY WELL LITED BY THE STREET LIGHTS WHICH ARE SPACED ABOUT 75 FEET APART. HOWEVER ILLUMINATION WILL BE DECREASED BY THE TREES WHICH LINE THE STREET.

C. SOUTH WALL: (TASHT-E-JAMSHID)

[REDACTED]

THE LIGHTING ALONG THE SOUTH WALL IS EXCELLENT WITH STREET LIGHTS ON BOTH SIDES OF TAKHT-E-JAMSHID WITH MINIMUM INTERFERENCE FROM TREES.

D. WEST SIDE (AMERICA)

[REDACTED]

THERE ARE STREET LIGHTS ALONG AMERICA ALLEY BUT THEY WERE SHOT OUT IN FEBRUARY AND WHETHER THEY HAVE BEEN REPLACED OR NOT IS UNKNOWN.

[REDACTED]

THERE ARE STREET LIGHTS ALONG ARAK AND ON THE STREET RUNNING NORTH TO ARDALAN

[REDACTED]

E. NORTH SIDE (ARDALAN)

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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F. THE GUARD DISPOSITION DESCRIBED IN PRECEDING PARA WOULD REQUIRE APPROX [REDACTED] PERSONNEL.

[REDACTED]

E. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES

REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE STUDENT GUARDS AND PASDARAN ARE AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PRINCIPAL FORCES AND THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OR HEARD A MAJOR DISTURBANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND ARE SHOWN BELOW.

A. WITHIN 5-7 MIN-FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

B. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HQS AND PASDARAN

KOMITEH STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.

C. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 PASDARAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS.

D. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES PASDARAN REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

E. WITHIN 30-40 MINUTES PASDARAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

F. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

G. WITHIN 60 MINUTES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT [REDACTED] COULD REACT AND ATTEMPT A LAUNCH AGAINST ANY ORBITTING AIRCRAFT.

H. WITHIN ONE HOUR IT IS POSSIBLE THAT [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] COULD LAUNCH AND ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT THE FORCE.

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G # 8

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT/WEATHER

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

1. THE THREE MAJOR NETWORKS HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WILL AIR FILM CLIPS OF INTERVIEWS WITH FOUR HOSTAGES MADE DURING THE CHRISTMAS VISIT BY THE CLERGYMEN TO TEHRAN. THE INTERVIEWS ARE TO BE SHOWN THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 31.

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/MCC  
 DEEL  COPIES TO Secret  
BY OAD  
Multiple

2. REACTION IN IRAN TO GENERAL WALDHEIM'S VISIT IS MIXED. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOIBZADEH HAS SAID "SINCE OUR COUNTRY IS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL DID NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTS TO WALDHEIM'S TRIP TO IRAN. WALDHEIM CAN COME TO IRAN AND LEARN OUR WAYS." THE EMBASSY CAPTORS ON THE OTHER HAND HAVE SAID THAT THEY DID NOT ACCEPT WALDHEIM AS A TRUE REPRESENTATIVE. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL SEE WALDHEIM IN TEHRAN.

[REDACTED SECTION]

7. BAHRAIN HAS INFORMED THE UNITED STATES OF ITS DECISION TO BAN U.S. NAVAL VESSELS IN THE PERSIAN GULF FROM CALLING AT BAHRAINI PORTS. THE BAHRAINI GOVERNMENT EXPLAINED ITS DECISION BY ITS STRIVING TO PREVENT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXACERBATION OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS.

8.

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9. IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTION HAS DROPPED SHARPLY SINCE CHRISTMAS. ACCORDING TO NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY FIGURES, ONLY ABOUT 1.7 MILLION BARRELS WERE PRODUCED ON DECEMBER 29 AS COMPARED WITH 3.2 MILLION BARRELS A WEEK EARLIER. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASCRIBE POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE RELATIVELY SHORT TERM FLUCTUATION IN PRODUCTION.

10. WEATHER

A. MID-RANGE FORECAST FOR U.S. EAST COAST  
CLOUDY SKIES WITH ISOLATED RAINSHOWERS IN THE SOUTHERN 2/3'S OF SOUTHEAST COAST UNTIL 01/18Z WITH REDUCED VISIBILITY IN FOG AT NIGHT AND DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS. CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES FOR WASHINGTON D.C. AREA BOTH DAYS, AND CLEARING IN SOUTHERN 2/3'S OF COAST AFTER SYSTEM MOVES EASTWARD.  
1-4 JAN: PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER ENTIRE REGION WITH NO SIGNIFICANT STORM SYSTEM EXPECTED UNTIL THE 4TH.

B. LONG - RANGE OUTLOOK FOR SOUTHWEST U.S.A.  
31 DEC - 1 JAN: PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES, GUSTY SURFACE WINDS, AND ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS EXPECTED FROM WEAK FRONTAL SYSTEM PASSING THROUGH NORTHERN PORTIONS OF DESERT REGION, PRIMARILY CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA.  
2 - 8 JAN: HIGH PRESSURE IS EXPECTED TO DOMINATE THE REGION WITH CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES AND GOOD VISIBILITIES UNTIL THE 5TH. HIGH PRESSURE SURFACE WINDS ARE INFLUENCED BY TOPOGRAPHY AND DIURNAL HEATING/COOLING: CALM AT NIGHT, GUSTY IN THE AFTERNOON HOURS AT 10-15 KNOTS. A WEAK FRONT IS EXPECTED TO MOVE INTO CALIFORNIA WITH INCREASING CLOUDINESS AND A CHANCE OF RAIN. THIS WEAK SYSTEM SHOULD GRADUALLY MOVE THROUGH DESERT REGION BY THE 7TH, BUT WITH RESIDUAL CLOUD COVER AFTER FRONTAL PASSAGE.

C. ANALYSIS WEATHER FOR MIDDLE EAST - 31 DEC 79  
CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER MOST OF THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY. A WEAK FRONTAL SYSTEM HAS CLOUDY SKIES, LIGHT RIME ICING, REDUCED VISIBILITIES IN RAIN/SNOW/FOG, AND GUSTY SURFACE WINDS AFFECTING TURKEY.

(1) LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK FOR MIDDLE EAST (EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, TURKEY)  
31 DEC - 2 JAN: HIGH PRESSURE TO DOMINATE MOST OF THE MIDDLE EAST WITH CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES AND COLD TEMPERATURES. A WEAKENING STORM OVER TURKEY WILL BE FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER FRONT ON THE 2ND.  
2-9 JAN: BAD NEWS FOR THE TURKS THROUGH ENTIRE PERIOD AS STORMY WEATHER KEEPS PREDOMINATELY CLOUDY SKIES, RAIN/SNOW, ETC. OVER TURKEY. CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MIDDLE EAST AS HIGH PRESSURE ATTEMPTS TO DOMINATE THE REGION.

(2) WIND/TURBULENCE FORECAST FOR IRAN & PERSIAN GULF  
IRAN: LIGHT AND VARIABLE SURFACE WINDS. NO TURBULENCE.  
PERSIAN GULF: SURFACE TO 15000FT AGL WINDS NE AT 6-15 KNOTS. NO TURBULENCE.  
RVW 31DEC09  
BT

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OO RUEAIIF  
DE RUEIZJC #0036 3581545  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 241350Z DEC 79  
FM JTF/RICE BOWL

TO [REDACTED]  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ CITE J3 00036

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

#11  
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 August 1992  
REVIEWED BY DDonmcc  
 DESL DS-DOWNED TO Secret  
REVISED BY DADR  
SCAFFER FROM Multiple Smcbs  
[REDACTED]

1. SEVERAL CLERGYMEN ARE APPARENTLY TO BE PERMITTED TO VISIT THE HOSTAGES ON CHRISTMAS. IN ADDITION TO THE THREE AMERICANS, THE CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF ALGIERS WAS REPORTEDLY BEEN INVITED BY KHOMEINI TO SEE THEM. YESTERDAY A SPOKESMAN FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL SAID THAT KHOMEINI HAD ALSO AUTHORIZED REPORTERS TO MEET WITH THE HOSTAGES ON CHRISTMAS EVE. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH SUBSEQUENTLY "CLARIFIED" THIS BY SAYING THAT IT WAS ONLY A POSSIBILITY, BUT THE STUDENT SPOKESMEN MINCED NO WORDS, SAYING THAT NO ONE WOULD SEE THE HOSTAGES BEFORE THE CLERICAL DELEGATION, AND THERE WERE NO PLANS FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT VISITS.

[REDACTED]

SAYS ALL THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN MOVED OUT OF THE OCCUPIED US EMBASSY TO OTHER PLACES IN THE IRANIAN CAPITAL. THE SOURCE WOULD NOT GIVE ANY DETAILS OTHER THAN TO SAY THE HOSTAGES ARE IN TEHRAN, BUT NOT IN THE EMBASSY. A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MOSLEM MILITANTS HOLDING THE EMBASSY REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THE REPORT. HE SAID, ANY NEWS ABOUT THE HOSTAGES MUST COME FROM US. AND HE SAID, WE WILL NOT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONFIRMING OR DENYING OTHER PEOPLES ANNOUNCEMENTS. THERES BEEN SPECULATION SOME OF THE HOSTAGES MIGHT BE IN A HEAVILY-GUARDED APARTMENT BLOCK ADJACENT TO THE EMBASSY.

[REDACTED]

5. FORMER IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SEAN MCBRIDE IS CURRENTLY IN TEHRAN. HE HAS HELD TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GOTBZADEH. MCBRIDE HAS TOLD THE PRESS THAT HE FEELS THAT THINGS ARE WORSE THAN THREE WEEKS AGO WHEN HE VISITED TEHRAN, AND THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS THERE DO NOT LEAVE HIM PARTICULARLY OPTIMISTIC. MCBRIDE IS PLANNING TO LEAVE TEHRAN FOR DUBLIN TOMORROW. HE IS NOT SCHEDULED TO VISIT THE HOSTAGES.

6. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY AND KITTY HAWK TASK GROUPS: A MINESWEEPER AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE ARE CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF THE MIDWAY AND KITTY HAWK TASK GROUPS, RESPECTIVELY. A REFRIGERATED STORES SHIP, AN AUXILIARY AND A NAVAL SUBORDINATED TANKER CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THOSE UNITS. A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER CONTINUES A BARRIER PATROL IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR REMAINS IN THE VICINITY OF THE US TASK GROUPS. A FRIGATE MAY BE TRAVELING NORTHERLY, SOUTHWEST OF THESE UNITS.

[REDACTED]

8. ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF DIEGO GARCIA: NONE. RVW 24 DEC09

BT  
#0036

G-1B

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY [redacted]  
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] 17 July 1992  
CLASSIFICATION [redacted] DDENMCC  
 DISC  DOWNGR TO  
EXEMPT CA [redacted] CADD  
EXEMPT FROM [redacted]

SUBJECT: NAVAL SUPPORT FOR IRAN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AL HAWAF REPORTED THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMENI  
IS TO DECIDE SOON ON THE FATE OF THE HOSTAGES. HE IS TO MEET WITH  
THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN SOON TO HEAR COUNCIL MEMBERS' VIEWS,  
AND TO BE ADVISED OF THEIR CONTACTS WITH VARIOUS MEDIATORS WHO HAVE  
OFFERED TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES. FOR THE MEANWHILE, THE  
HOSTAGES, IF RELEASED, WILL BE TAKEN BY THE IRAN HIMSELF AND WILL BE  
NOT RECEIVABLE AND NEGOTIABLE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

8. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL REPORTEDLY APPROVES REGULATION FOR  
LOCAL ELECTIONS. INTERESTED CANDIDATES HAVE UNTIL  
NOW TO REGISTER. THE ELECTION WILL TAKE PLACE 25 JANUARY  
AND SINGLE NO CANDIDATE RECEIVE AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY A RUN-OFF  
ELECTION BETWEEN THE TWO TOP CANDIDATES WILL BE HELD ON 9 FEB.  
AYATOLLAH KHOMENI, ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, HAS THE POWER TO  
VETO AN ELECTED PRESIDENT FOR "REASONS OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST."

[REDACTED]

9. "COLLECTION" ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY AND KITTY HAWK TASK  
GROUPS: A MINESWEEPER AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE ARE CONTINUING  
SURVEILLANCE OF THE MIDWAY (TC 70.1) AND KITTY HAWK (TC 70.2) TASK  
GROUPS, RESPECTIVELY, WHILE A REFRIGERATED STORES SHIP AND TWO  
NAVAL SUBORDINATED TANKERS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THOSE UNITS. THE  
GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER HAS PROBABLY MOVED NORTHWEST INTO THE GULF  
OF OMAN AREA. THE IL-38/41 AIRCRAFT  
DEPLOYED TO ADEN ARE ALSO INVOLVED IN RECONITERING THE MIDWAY  
AND KITTY HAWK TASK GROUPS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

... ECONOMIC ...  
... CONFIDENTIAL ...  
... INFORMATION ...  
... CONSTRUCTION ...

... QUANTITY ...  
... INFORMATION ...  
... LEVEL ...

... SECURITY ...  
... INFORMATION ...  
... CUSTOMER ...

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION: REVIEW BY JZSE  
11/20/1992  
D50/AMCC  
MULTI-SITE

MSG154  
161400R DEC 79

FM JTF  
TO [REDACTED]  
JTF FORWARD

G# 19

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SUBJ: IRANIAN SITUATION REPORT

1. FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH FROM THE UNITED STATES, IRANIANS HOLDING AMERICAN HOSTAGES HAVE THREATENED TO PROCEED WITH THEIR THREAT TO TRY THE HOSTAGES IF THE SHAH LEFT THE UNITED STATES FOR ANY PLACE OTHER THAN IRAN. PARS NEWS AGENCY SAID THAT THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE MADE THE TRIAL "INEVITABLE". NO TRIAL DATE HAS BEEN SET. THE CAPTORS HAVE ALSO CHOSEN TO IGNORE THE RULING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. A SPOKESMAN SAID THE DECISION WAS "NOT IMPORTANT FOR US . . . . THE HEARING WAS HELD AT AMERICA'S REQUEST AND ITS VERDICT IS ALSO BASED ON THE DEMAND OF AMERICA". FURTHER COMMENTARY IS EXPECTED WHEN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH APPEARS ON "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" LATER TODAY.

2. ANOTHER HOSTAGE HAS BEEN PERMITTED TO PHONE RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES. THE RECIPIENT OF THE CALL WAS CONVINCED THAT THE CALLER WAS UNDER DURESS AND FORCED TO SPEAK FROM A PREPARED SCRIPT.

3. THE SITUATION IN TABRIZ REMAINS CONFUSED. PRO-KHOMEINI STUDENTS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY ARE CLOSING THE UNIVERSITY AND THE HIGH SCHOOL FOR TWO DAYS TO DEMAND THE DISSOLUTION OF SHARIAT-MADARI'S MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY (MPRP), HOWEVER [REDACTED] SAID THE SCHOOLS, SHOPS, AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS WERE CLOSED YESTERDAY TO OBSERVE A RELIGIOUS HOLIDAY. ALSO YESTERDAY THE MPRP ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS CLOSING ALL OF ITS OFFICES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY UNTIL THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN IRAN IMPROVES. THIS APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THE MPRP WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE CLANDESTINELY. THERE ARE PRESENTLY ONLY TWO MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES OPERATING OPENLY, THE RIGHT-WING, PRO-KHOMEINI ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE PRO-SOVIET TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY. SHARIAT-MADARI ALSO MAY BE PLANNING TO ASSUME A LOW

PROFILE. THE AYATOLLAH'S OFFICE ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT HE WOULD NOT RECEIVE ANY JOURNALISTS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JES  
Declassified ON: OADR

IRAN OFFICIALLY CONTINUES TO DENY  
MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING THIS MATTER INDICATES THIS EVENT WAS

B. A. ANALYSIS WEATHER FOR U.S. - 16 DEC 79  
A MAJOR STORM SYSTEM IN NORTHERN CANADA IS PRODUCING CLOUDY SKIES WITH RAIN AND SNOW IN THE NORTHEAST U.S. ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER THROUGH THE GREAT LAKES AND INTO THE DAKOTAS. A LINGERING FRONT OFF THE SOUTHEAST COAST OF THE U.S. EXTENDS WEST INTO THE GULF OF MEXICO BRINGING CLOUDY SKIES, THUNDERSTORMS, RAIN/RAINSHOWERS TO THE SOUTHEAST U.S. AND ALONG THE EAST COAST THROUGH EASTERN VIRGINIA. THE REMAINDER OF THE U.S. HAS CLEAR TO PARTLY SKIES ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH PRESSURE.

B. MID-RANGE FORECAST FOR U.S. EAST COAST  
16-18 DEC: A RAPIDLY MOVING COLD FRONT WILL BRING MOSTLY CLOUDY SKIES WITH RAIN/RAINSHOWERS AND GUSTY SURFACE WINDS (30-35 KNOTS) TO MOST OF THE AREA WITH SNOW IN THE N1/4, ENDING BY THE 17TH. RAPID CLEARING WILL BRING FAIR SKIES TO THE ENTIRE AREA BY THE 18TH.  
18-25 DEC: CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD WILL BECOME MOSTLY CLOUDY AS A FRONT MOVES INTO THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE EAST COAST ON THE 22ND AND INTO THE CENTRAL PORTION ON THE 24TH. RAINSHOWERS AND GUSTY SURFACE WINDS WILL ACCOMPANY THE FRONTAL PASSAGE. HIGH PRESSURE WILL RETURN WITH FAIR SKIES BY THE 25TH.

C. 16-25 DEC: CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER THE SOUTHWEST DESERT REGION AS HIGH PRESSURE CONTINUES TO DOMINATE THE AREA UNTIL THE 22ND WHEN THE TRAILING EDGES OF A FRONTAL SYSTEM WILL BRING ISOLATED RAINSHOWERS, ENDING THE 23RD. GOOD VISIBILITIES EXPECTED THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD EXCEPT NEAR POPULATED AREAS. SURFACE WINDS UNDER HIGH PRESSURE CONDITIONS ARE PRIMARILY INFLUENCED BY TOPOGRAPHY AND DIURNAL HEATING/COOLING: CALM AT NIGHT, GUSTY IN THE AFTERNOON 10-15 KNOTS.

D. ANALYSIS WEATHER FOR MIDDLE EAST - 16 DEC 79  
A MAJOR STORM SYSTEM IS MOVING THROUGH MOST OF IRAN TODAY WITH CONSIDERABLE CLOUDINESS AND ASSOCIATED WEATHER. A SECOND STORM SYSTEM IS MOVING FROM THE AEGEAN SEA INTO TURKEY WITH A COLD FRONT EXTENDING BACK ACROSS THE LEBANON - ISRAELI COAST INTO NORTHERN EGYPT. JET STREAM CIRRUS EXTENDS NORTHEAST TO SOUTHWEST ACROSS THE SE 1/4 OF SAUDI ARABIA. THE REST OF THE MIDDLE EAST IS UNDER CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES INFLUENCED BY A HIGH PRESSURE SYSTEM.

E. LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK FOR MIDDLE EAST (EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, TURKEY)  
16-18 DEC: THE MAJOR STORM SYSTEM IN IRAN WITH LOW CEILINGS, RAINSHOWERS, THUNDERSTORMS, GUSTY SURFACE WINDS, ICING AND TURBULENCE, AND REDUCED VISIBILITIES AFFECTING E 2/3'S OF IRAN SHOULD MOVE EASTWARD OUT OF THE AREA BY 17/00Z. A HIGH PRESSURE SYSTEM GIVES CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES, MORNING FOG AND REDUCED VISIBILITIES, AND COOLER TEMPERATURES TO IRAN, TURKEY, AND NW 1/3 OF SAUDI ARABIA AFTER THE FIRST FRONTAL PASSAGE. A SECOND STORM SYSTEM MOVES INTO TURKEY TODAY AND SHOULD REACH W 1/3 OF IRAN BY 17/01Z WITH CLOUDY SKIES AND ASSOCIATED WEATHER. THIS SECOND FRONT EXTENDING BACK OVER THE N 1/4 OF EGYPT BRINGS CLOUDY SKIES, FOG AND REDUCED VISIBILITIES. HIGH PRESSURE WILL GIVE CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER S 3/4 OF EGYPT AND MOST OF SAUDI ARABIA. THE SE 1/4 OF SAUDI ARABIA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE JET STREAM CIRRUS IN A NARROW BAND.

~~SECRET~~

TOT/011300

G55

*Phelan*

MSG085  
011045R DEC 79

FM JTF  
TO DELTA  
INFO ~~████████~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDU/mcc  
 REF. TO SECRET  
REF. TO GADA  
Multiple Smcs

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EST DEC 1, 1979

1. CHARGE LAINGEN TOLD TO LEAVE IRAN:  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS INSTRUCTED CHARGE LAINGEN TO INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH THAT HE AND HIS TWO COLLEAGUES WISH TO LEAVE IRAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. LAINGEN IS TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO A GUARANTEE OF SAFE PASSAGE TO THE AIRPORT. THE SECRETARY HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT CALLING ON THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE THE GROUP A SUITABLE ESCORT. LAINGEN HAS ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH GHOTBZADEH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF A MEETING AS YET.

A. THE STUDENTS AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HAVE ALREADY CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, GHOTBZADEH. FOLLOWING GHOTBZADEH'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE AMERICAN CHARGE AND TWO OTHER EMBASSY OFFICIALS PRESENTLY HELD AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY COULD LEAVE IRAN, THE STUDENT IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED THAT THE THREE DIPLOMATS SHOULD BE PUT ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE.

B. THE ANNOUNCED SPY TRIALS WILL REPORTEDLY TAKE PLACE AFTER COMPLETION OF REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION SCHEDULED FOR 23 DECEMBER.

2. TEHRAN, NOV 30, REUTER - MOSLEM STUDENTS HOLDING 50 AMERICANS HOSTAGE AT THE US EMBASSY CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF NEW FOREIGN MINISTER SADE GHOTBZDEH AND SAID THREE US DIPLOMATS HE WANTED TO RELEASE SHOULD BE PUT ON TRIAL IN IRAN FOR ESPIONAGE. MR GHOTBZADEH TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER TODAY THAT US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES BRUCE LAINGEN AND TWO OTHER MEN, HELD AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN PROTECTIVE CUSTODY SINCE THE EMBASSY WAS OCCUPIED ON NOV 4, WERE FREE TO TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. BUT ONE OF THE STUDENTS AT THE EMBASSY TOLD REUTERS BY TELEPHONE: "WE HAVE GOT DOCUMENTS PROVING THAT THESE MEN ARE SPIES, SO THEY MUST NOT BE RELEASED"

3. IRAN SQUABBLE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS:  
IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH HAS PLAMED NEIGHBORING IRAQ FOR AN ATTACK ON A TELEVISION TRANSMITTE STATION IN WESTERN IRAN LAST SUNGAY. AT HIS FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE SINCE TAKING CHARGE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON WEDNESDAY, GHOTBZADEH ACCUSED IRAQ OF "DIRECT INTERFERENCE" IN IRAN'S PROVINCES OF KORDESTAN AND KHUZESTAN. ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT IRAQ HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR A MACHINE GUN AND GRENADE ATTACK BY SOME 500 ARMED MEN ON THE TELEVISION STATION IN ILAM PROVINCE ON THE BORDER WITH IRAQ, HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE REPLIED "UNFORTUNATELY, I DO BELIEVE SO". THE IRANIANS HAVE ACCUSED IRAQ OF ENCOURAGING AUTONOMY-SEEKING KURDS IN TE MOUNTAINS OF KORDESTAN AND OF SUPPORTING REBELLIOUS ETHNIC ARABS IN OIL-RICH KHUZESTAN.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ACTION TO FREE SOME ASSETS.  
IRAN BEGAN LEGAL ACTION OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES  
NOVEMBER 30 TO CHALLENGE PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION  
TO FREEZE OFFICIAL IRANIAN ASSETS AT U S BANKS. CHASE  
MANHATTAN'S LONDON SUBSIDIARY, THE MAIN BANK INVOLVED  
IN AN ACTION LAST WEEK DECLARING IRAN IN DEFAULT ON A  
500 MILLION DOLLAR LOAN, SAID TODAY ITS LAWYERS HAD  
BEEN SERVED WITH A WRIT. CHAS IS THE ONLY AMERICAN  
BANK SERVED WITH SUCH A WRIT SO FAR, SETTING 14 DAYS  
FOR PAYMENT BY CHASE OF SUMS CLAIMED DUE BY THE IRANIAN  
CENTRAL BANK.

THE IRANIAN ACTION IS TO SHOW THAT PRESIDENT  
CARTER'S MEASURES HAVE NO LEGAL STANDING OUTSIDE THE  
UNITED STATES AND AIMS AT THE RELEASE OF IRANIAN FUNDS  
HELD AT BRANCHES OF U S BANKS ABROAD.

4. STUDENT EMPHASIS ON MARTYRDOM:  
THE STUDENTS HOLDING 50 AMERICAN HOSTAGES HERE COMPARED  
THEMSELVES TO THE FOLLOWERS OF HUSSEIN WHO DIED FOR THEIR  
SHI'ITE FAITH, AND THEY COMPARED AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO  
HUSSEIN. THEIR STATEMENTS AROUND WITH PHRASES SUCH AS  
"WE WILL HAPPILY SHED OUR BLOOD FOR THE IMAM (KHOMEINI)  
AND ISLAM. THE RED FLAGS CARRIED BY SOME OF THE TWO  
MILLION FAITHFUL WHO MARCHED OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY COMPOUND  
AFTER PRAYERS ON ASHURA REPRESENTED TO BLOOD OF  
THEIR NATION'S MARTYRS. NOBODY, IT SEEMS, IS AFRAID  
TO DIE FOR IRAN OR IF THEY ARE, THEY ARE KEEPING QUIET  
ABOUT IT.  
ANALYST COMMENT:

THIS PUBLIC DISPLAY OF INCLINATION TO MARTYDOM IS SUPPORTED  
BY AND IS COMPLEMENTARY TO FRAGMENTARY BUT UNCONFIRMED REPORTING  
INDICATING THAT HAND GRENADES HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE  
INTERIOR GUARDS INCLUDING THE WOMEN WHO HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR MAINTAINING 1ST ECHELON SURVEILLANCE OF THE HOSTAGES.

5.

6. KEY SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN: A MINESWEEPER  
CONTINUES SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE USS MIDWAY TASK GROUP IN  
IN THE NORTHWESTERN ARABIAN SEA, WHILE A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE  
IS OPERATING IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ/GULF OF OMAN AREA. AN OILER IS  
PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE SOVIET UNITS  
OPERATING IN THE AREA.

7. DESPITE RUMORS THAT HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING TO THE CONTRARY,  
USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES ARE BEING HELD,  
AS BEFORE, IN THE COMPLEX OF BUILDINGS OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY.

A. THE NEW IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, SADEQ GHOTBZADEH, WANTS NOTHING  
TO DO WITH THE AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.  
THE CHARGE MAY THUS SOON BE MOVED TO WHERE THE REST OF THE  
HOSTAGES ARE.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. THE INNER CIRCLE OF THE GROUP OCCUPYING THE EMBASSY HAS NOT CHANGED ITS COMPOSITION. IT HAS SET UP HOUSEKEEPING AND HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL A FIELD KITCHEN.

C. IN THE OUTER CIRCLE, BESIDES THE PASDARAN, A UNIFORMED GROUP HAS RECENTLY APPEARED. THE UNIFORMS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE IRANIAN ARMY. THE GROUP IS BEING LED BY A MULLAH IN THE SAME KIND OF (NON IRANIAN ARMY) UNIFORM.

D. THE ANNOUNCED SPY TRIAL IS SUPPOSED TO TAKE PLACE AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION (VOTING TAKES PLACE ON 3 DECEMBER 1979, RESULTS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE BY END OF WEEK). THE COURT WILL BE LOCATED IN THE EMBASSY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INFORMED OBSERVERS IN TEHRAN HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE US HOSTAGES WILL NOT BE PHYSICALLY HARMED, BEFORE OR AFTER THE SPY TRIALS, SO AS TO FORESTALL THE KIND OF RETALIATION BEING MENTIONED BY US POLICY MAKERS. IT IS WIDELY ASSUMED IN TEHRAN THAT THE HOSTAGES WILL BE SENTENCED TO BETWEEN 10 AND 25 YEARS AND THEN DISAPPEAR INTO IRANIAN PRISONS. IN THIS CASE, THE IRANIAN LEADERS COULD WAIT IN PEACE FOR EVENTS TO DEVELOP FURTHER.)

RWW 01DEC09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

MSG056  
260945R NOV 79

FM JTF/J2  
TO: DELTA/J2  
INFO: [REDACTED] /S2

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992

DERIVATIVE CL BY [REDACTED]

DER. 25 DOWN TO SECRET

RETR ON OADR

REMOVED FROM Multiple Smas

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

REF: A. ..MSG/052/241415R NOV 79//CRITICAL INFO GAPS  
B. MSG056/251130R NOV 79//CRITICAL EEI

(U) 1. THE RESPONSES PROVIDED BELOW ARE KEYED TO THE APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPHS IN REFERENCE ALPHA.

2. EMBASSY COMPOUND/HOSTAGES

A. ALTHOUGH THE EXACT LOCATIONS AND NUMBERS OF HOSTAGES ARE UNKNOWN AND OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT IS THAT PRIOR TO INITIATION OF "TRIALS" IN THE COMPOUND THE HOSTAGES WILL CONTINUE TO BE ROTATED BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS: THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, THE CONSULATE BLDG, AND THE STAFF COTTAGES. SELECTED "HARD CASES" OR SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE LIKELY BEING HELD SEPARATE, POSSIBLY IN THE [REDACTED] BASEMENT OR THE DCM RESIDENCE STORE ROOM. ONCE THE "TRIALS" ARE IMMINENT THE HOSTAGES MAY BE REGROUPED AND SEGREGATED BY THE DEGREE OF THEIR "CRIMES". LIKELY HOLDING LOCATIONS FOR THE "SENIOR SPIES" ARE THE CLOAK ROOM IN THE BASEMENT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, THE WAREHOUSE BASEMENT, OR POSSIBLY STORE ROOMS IN THE CHANCERY BASEMENT.

B. HOSTAGE CONDITION: AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT BUT SUGGEST A FEW HOSTAGES MAY BE PHYSICALLY INCAPACITATED AT EXECUTION TIME OR BECOME SO SHOCKED IF EXECUTION IS REACTED TO IMMEDIATELY AND VIOLENTLY BY HOSTILE FORCES THAT SOME MAY NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE "SECURITY" OF THEIR ENVIRONMENT.

C. HOSTAGE COUNT: AGREE WITH THE THRUST OF YOUR COMMENTS AS DOES COMJTF. ANALYSIS CONDUCTED HERE INDICATED FOUR INDIVIDUALS LISTED AS HOSTAGES BY DOS WERE NOT [REDACTED] THE FOUR NAMES ARE:

IN ADDITION, [REDACTED] REVEALED NAMES OF AT LEAST SIX INDIVIDUALS HELD AS HOSTAGES THAT DO NOT APPEAR ON DOS LISTING. NAMES ARE:

(NO FURTHER INFORMATION)

U/1 AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN  
TOTAL COUNT IS [REDACTED] AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUSPECT BUT RECOMMEND BASE LINE FIGURE OF 49-52 BE USED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE NAMES OF THE FIVE INDIVIDUALS YOU CITED ARE BELIEVED TO BE THE FIVE OFFICAL AMCITS THAT HAVE BEEN AT LARGE IN THE CITY, MOVING OCCASIONALLY AND PERIODICALLY CHECKING IN WITH LAINGEN, TOMSETH, AND HOWLAND BY PHONE. THE PAST THREE INDIVIDUALS ARE LOCATED IN THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER PROTECTIVE CUSTODY.

D. COMPOUND HARDENING: BELIEVE "HARDENING MEASURES" ARE RELATIVELY LIMITED AND INITIATED BY STUDENTS IN REACTION TO

EXTERNAL STIMULUS; RUMORS OF AMERICAN ASSAULT. FROM NATURE OF PREPARATIONS STUDENTS ANTICIPATE ASSAULT TO BE HELICOPTERBORNE, NOT GROUND INITIATED.

~~SECRET~~

3. ESTIMATES OF STUDENT/GUARD STRENGTH:

A. THIS FLUCTUATES WITH SOURCES AND TIME OF OBSERVATION. CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT OF THIS LOCATION PLACES TOTAL STUDENT STRENGTH AT 280-300 WITH UP TO 2/3 THAT NUMBER WITHIN THE COMPOUND DURING THE DAY, PARTICULARLY ON DAYS WHEN DEMONSTRATIONS ARE SCHEDULED. BELIEVE THE NUMBER DROPS DURING THE NIGHT, WITH A RANGE OF 80-120 AVAILABLE WITHIN THE COMPOUND. OF THIS NUMBER, ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD ARE ON GUARD DUTY AT ANY ONE TIME. OF THIS NUMBER, HALF OR SOME 20 WOULD BE ON DUTY OUTSIDE OF HOSTAGE BUILDINGS, WITH ANOTHER HALF DOZEN ON ROOF OBSERVATION DUTY. ALL EXTERIOR GUARDS MUST BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND AT LEAST AN EQUAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS INSIDE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED, BUT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DIFFERENTIATE.

B. CANNOT CONFIRM GUARD/STUDENT LOCATIONS BUT CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT OF KNOWN AND SUSPECTED LOCATIONS.

4. CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH FOUR.

5. COMPOUND EXTERIOR:

A. AGREE THAT A THREAT EXISTS FROM THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS AND THE CHANCERY. THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS THREAT IS ESTIMATED TO BE SO HIGH THAT THE ATHLETIC FIELDS IN THE COMPOUND WOULD BECOME KILL ZONES WITHIN 7-12 MINUTES AFTER THE ASSAULT ACTION IS IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND/OR A WARNING/CALL FOR HELP IS BROADCAST ON THE PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM CONTROLLED FROM THE CHANCERY.

B. IN ADDITION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED STUDENTS IN THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS OTHER ELEMENTS WHO MIGHT WANT TO HUMILIATE THE UNITED STATES COULD BE ALSO POSITIONED IN THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS--I.E. THE PLO/PLFP ACTIVISTS SEEKING REVENGE FOR ENTEBBE, OR THE KGB SEEKING REVENGE FOR SON TAY. SOMMENT TO DELTA S2: [REDACTED] WHERE IS CARLOS, THIS SMELLS OF POSSIBLE SETUP OF USG.

6. RECOGNIZE YOUR CONCERN FOR ROAD BLOCKS AND CHECK POINTS [REDACTED] STILL WORKING THIS PROBLEM, WITH GREAT EMPHASIS PLACED ON SUBJECT BY MG VAUGHT.

7. CONCUR WITH YOUR PARA 7. WE CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR A RELIABLE AND SECURE MEANS OF INTRODUCING FORCE. THIS IS CONSISTENT MAJOR WEAKNESS IN CURRENT PLANS. MG VAUGHT GREATEST CONCERN.

8. CONCUR AND RECOGNIZE YOUR CONCERNS-COMMENTS IN PARA 7 APPLY.

9. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS APPLY TO YOUR REF B.

10. REACTION TIMES: AT YOUR REQUEST AND BASED UPON CONTINUING CONCERN FOR ASSAULT FORCES THE FOLLOWING REVISED HOSTILE FORCE REACTION TIMES ARE PSOTULATED: (ALL TIMES ARE ESTIMATED FROM THAT POINT IN TIME WHEN THE RECOGNITION OF THE ASSAULT REACHES THE CHANCERY AND THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONS.)

- A. WITHIN 5-7 MIN-FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND ANY WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.
- B. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFORCEMENTS FROM LOCAL IRG MILITIA/PASDAHAN STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.
- C. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 MILITIA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS
- D. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES IRG MILITIA REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

- 3. WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES IRG BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS;
- F. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

RECOGNIZE THAT THE [REDACTED] WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS OF HOSTILE FORCES AND CROWDS, THE CRITICAL PHASE OF "IN TOWN OPERATIONS" WILL BE THAT TIME WHEN THE EXTRACTION HELICOPTERS ARE ON THE GROUND LOADING. THE POTENTIAL FOR HOSTILE DISABLING FIRE WILL STILL BE HIGH AS LONG AS THE LZ IS WITHIN THE COMPOUND.

FM JTF  
TO DELTA

1. (A)

G-74

1. (B) FROM KUWAIT OPTIC, IT APPEARED THAT IRAN'S  
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WAS HAVING DIFFICULTIES IN DEALING  
WITH STUDENTS, WITNESS DELAYS IN GETTING RELEASE OF  
THIRTEEN HOSTAGES. PLAYING DEVIL'S ADVOCATE, HE WONDERED  
IF KHOMEINI STATEMENT OF INTENT TO TRY AMERICAN HOSTAGES  
WAS NOT IN FACT LAYING BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN  
HIMSELF AND STUDENTS. WHILE THIS THREAT IS ABHORENT TO  
AMERICANS, HE WONDERED IF THIS WAS NOT A METHOD TO CONTROL  
HIGH EMOTIONS OF STUDENTS. HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE  
A WAY TO DESENSE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH  
SHAH FROM THAT OF WHAT TO DO WITH HOSTAGES. HE CLAIMED  
KHOMEINI HAD SAID IN TV INTERVIEW THAT AMERICANS WOULD  
BE TRIED BUT NOT KILLED. A "TRIAL" FOLLOWED BY  
DEPORTATION MIGHT BE WAY OUT OF DILEMMA BETWEEN IRAN  
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND STUDENTS.

CLASSIFIED BY 8175  
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION  
DATE 01-11-2001 BY SP-6/MLC  
AUTHORITY 25 USC 552  
DATE 01-11-2001 BY SP-6/MLC  
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION  
DATE 01-11-2001 BY SP-6/MLC  
AUTHORITY 25 USC 552

[Redacted content]

[Redacted content]

4. (A) FROM A TRAVELLER: THE IRANIS HAVE EVACUATED PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND OFFICES IN THE VICINITY OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN TEHRAN.

(B) FROM AN EMPLOYEE OF A BUSINESS FOR SPARE PARTS: PLO FORCES IN TEHRAN ARE POSTED ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE THROUGHWAY FROM TEHRAN TO KARAJ, ABOUT 5-6 KM FROM MAIDAN-E-AZAI. THERE ALSO ARE PASDARAN FORCES AT THIS LOCATION. THERE IS A PLO HEADQUARTERS CO-LOCATED WITH THE FEDAYEEN KHALQ IN THE BUILDING ON THE CORNER OF ROOSEVELT AND KEYVAN ALLEY.

6. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY BATTLE GROUP: A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE, A MINESWEEPER, AND AN OILER REMIAN IN SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS MIDWAY BATTLE GROUP IN THE NORTH ARABIAN SEA/GULF OF OMAN ENTRANCE. SIGHTINGS CONTINUE FROM UNITS OF THE MIDWAY TASK GROUP.

*Fact*  
7. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST [REDACTED] THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO SOVIET NAVAL/ASSOC UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF [REDACTED] HOWEVER, A SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER, AN AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE LANDING SHIP AND AN AUXILIARY REMAIN IN THE VICINITY OF THE COETIVY ANCHORAGE.

8.

9. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP: A GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER AND GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER REMAIN AT A CONTINGENCY STATION SOUTHWEST OF SPRATLY ISLAND, IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, IN POSSIBLE REACTION TO ALLIED SHIPPING IN THE AREA. ONE, OR BOTH, OF THESE UNITS MAY ASSUME SURVEILLANCE OF THE KITTY-HAWK TASK GROUP AS SHE TRANISTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN.

10.

(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

182

MSG #28  
DTG 211530Z APR 80  
FM: JCS/RC J-2  
TO: SITE ALPHA  
INFO: SFOD/S-2  
Ac/s [redacted] S-2  
J-50W/S-2

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ID 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DESCRIPTIVE CL BY DDO dmc  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO  
SEYM ON OADR  
REMOVED FROM Multiple Sm.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EST, APRIL 21, 1980

1. REUTER AND AP REPORT THAT THE MILITANTS WILL ALLOW MRS. TIMM TO VISIT HER HOSTAGE SON. THIS FOLLOWED AN EMOTIONAL APPEAL BY MRS. TIMM TO THE MILITANTS TO THE EMBASSY DATE AND WERE REPORTED BY THE CAPTORS FROM BANI-SADR AND GHOTEH-DEH. THE LETTER WAS RECEIVED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. THE MILITANTS REPORTED THAT THEY WANT THE MRS TO FIRST VISIT THE TEHRAN CEMETERY FOR MARTYRS OF THE REVOLUTION.

2. AP REPORTS MRS. TIMM WAS ESCORTED BY TWO GUARDS TO LEAVE ON APRIL 21 FROM HER HOTEL TO VISIT FIRST THE CEMETERY AND THEN RETURN IN THE EMBASSY.

3. ACCORDING TO AP, SOCIAL ACTIVIST RICK GREGORY, IDENTIFIED WITH PRESIDENT CARTER'S HANDLING OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE OPERATIONS, WAS IN THE SECOND DAY OF A TOTAL FAST APRIL 21 WHILE WAITING IN TEHRAN TO MEET WITH AYATOLIAH KHOMENI. GREGORY FLEW FROM PARIS TO TEHRAN ON THE FLIGHT WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTEH-DEH APRIL 19.

4. HOOK NEWMAN, A PROFESSOR AT HOWARD UNIVERSITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C., SAID IN A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW FROM TEHRAN SUNDAY THAT GREGORY WAS FASTING AND HOPED TO MEET WITH THE SUP AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS AT THE U.S. EMBASSY. NEWMAN AND THE REV. DR. CHARLES MOORE OF HOUSTON, WHO HAVE BEEN IN TEHRAN SINCE APRIL 13, ARE STAYING WITH GREGORY. NEWMAN SAID HE SAID THEY HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THEIR RECEPTION FROM THE IRANIANS. "EVERYTHING IS GOING GOOD," NEWMAN SAID. "THE GOVERNMENT IS GETTING READY TO MOVE. THEY'VE SCHEDULED A PRESS CONFERENCE FOR TUESDAY MORNING TO DISCUSS THE HOSTAGE SITUATION." GREGORY OBSERVED A STRICT FAST WHEN HE ARRIVED IN IRAN ON SATURDAY AND WILL OBSERVE THAT PATTERN, NEWMAN SAID.

5. LAST MONDAY, A MUSLIM STUDENT MOVEMENT WITH LINKS TO THE ISLAMIC HOLDING THE US EMBASSY STARTED A COORDINATED CAMPAIGN OF STUDENT OCCUPATIONS TO PURGE IRAN'S UNIVERSITIES OF LEFTIST AND UN-islamic ACTIONS WERE IN RESPONSE TO KHOMENI'S CALL LAST MONTH FOR THE MASS ISLAMICIZATION OF IRAN'S COLLEGES. ON FRIDAY, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL FOLLOWED THE STUDENTS LEAD AND ORDERED ALL POLITICAL GROUPS TO CLOSE THEIR CAMPUS OFFICES WITHIN THE NEXT 7 DAYS. IN AN EFFORT TO ENFORCE ITS DECREE WHICH HAS CLEARLY DECLARED TO ERADICATE LEFTIST INFLUENCE IN IRAN'S UNIVERSITIES, ON SATURDAY THE COUNCIL ORDERED ALL UNIVERSITIES TO CLOSE FOR 2 DAYS. SUPPORTERS OF THE RADICAL ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ISLAMIC STUDENTS INITIALLY SAID THEY WOULD RESIST THE ORDER, AND THE GOVERNMENT ENFORCED THE RESULTANT INJURIES WERE PRIMARILY BLINDNESS AND STONE INJURIES, ALTHOUGH AT LEAST ONE DEATH WAS REPORTED. ON MONDAY THE FUNDAMENTALISTS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE CAMPUSES RATHER THAN FACE A TAKEOVER OF THEIR OFFICES BY ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS.

[redacted] HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE IRANIAN REPRESENTATIVE THERE THAT HE URGED HIS GOVERNMENT TO TURN TO THE COMMUNITIES WORLD FOR THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT. [redacted] AND POSSIBLE EUROPEAN BOYCOTT.

[redacted] TURNED DOWN THEIR SUGGESTIONS, SAYING IRAN WILL STAND ON ITS OWN. NEVERTHELESS, AN IRANIAN TRADE DELEGATION IS PREPARING TO VISIT CZECHOSLOVAKIA SOON AND A POLISH ECONOMIC COMMISSION IS TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN ON 2 MAY. BULGARIA ALSO OFFERED ASSISTANCE IN PURCHASING GOODS FOR IRAN.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR:

*If you want, I will  
no. 12/1/54*

*12/1/54*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DAVID C. JONES, GENERAL USAF  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF



# SOD SUMMARY SHEET

<b>TO:</b> CJCS	<b>CLASSIFICATION</b> <del>TOP SECRET</del>	<b>SOD CONTROL NUMBER</b>			
<b>SUBJECT:</b>  Intelligence and Collection Approval		<b>ACTION</b>			
		<b>APPROVAL</b>	<b>SIGNATURE</b>	<b>INFORMATION</b>	<b>OTHER</b>
		X	X		

~~SECRET~~

**REMARKS**

Attached memorandum requests CJCS approval to [REDACTED] the Humint source identified as Pencil One. Purpose of mission is to [REDACTED]

**ACTION OFFICER**

[REDACTED]  
Lt Col, USAF  
J-3, SOD  
Ext 55078

**INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL**

OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
J-3	P					
EXEC						
TRM CHF						
YCOPO						
COPO						
<b>DATE OF PREPARATION</b>						
10 Jun 80						

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCDVA306  
OO RUEAIIF  
DE RUEIZJC #0152 1611745  
ZNY TTTT  
O 091740Z JUNE 80  
FM JTF/SNOWBIRD/J2  
TO [REDACTED]  
BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE J3 00152

SUBJ: SOURCE EVALUATION

1. [REDACTED]  
THIS OFFICE UNABLE TO COMPLETELY VALIDATE OR NEGATE THE  
SUBSTANCE OF PREVIOUS REPORTING.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (TS) BASED UPON  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] THIS OFFICE WILL REQUEST CJCS/SECDEF  
APPROVAL  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]  
RVW ON 09 JUNE 80  
BT  
#0152

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

G 280

28 July 1988



MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Proposed Insertion of an American Intelligence Asset into Iran (TS)

1. (TS) The need to develop a viable in-country support structure for support of a military option is still considered critical. To assure this support structure's success, a great deal of information about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is needed. One such effort to gain timely, first-hand information is being developed by my element. It involves the insertion of an American citizen in cover status into Iran.

2. (TS)

3. (TS)

4. (TS)

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EN 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO N M C C  
 NEED FOR REVIEW TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
REMOVED FROM multiple Smcs

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On OADR

5.

6.

*Yes* I understand that SECDEF approval is required for insertion of an American citizen/asset into Iran. With that and the importance of time in mind, I am proceeding with all preliminary measures to insure this plan is sound.

*C* [Redacted]

8. (U) This memo is for your information. Shortly, you will receive another requesting the Secretary of Defense's approval.

*James B. Vaught*  
JAMES B. VAUGHT  
Major General, USA

7/30/88

*The Operations Director and I approve this concept. You should proceed with your memo of request.*

*Tim Hanson  
VAOM, USN*

~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

# ***SENSITIVE MATERIAL***

## ***WARNING***

**ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A  
STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!**

***EYES ONLY FOR:***

Gen Jones *h*

LTG Pustay *P*

MG Vaughn *29/8/74*

VAdm Hansen *H*

**RETURN TO SOD, 2C840**

**ACTION OFFICER:**

Col [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED] *G*

**TELEPHONE: EXT**

54087

**SECURE** 2810

~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE

TO: CJCS

THRU:

DJSM NO.

ODJS SUSPENSE DATE

DJSM DATE

SUBJECT:

SNOWBIRD Support (TS)

ACTION

APPROVAL

SIGNATURE

INFORMATION

OTHER

X

X

X

REMARKS

1. (TS) The attached memorandum requests permission to provide an American citizen [redacted] into Iran [redacted]

2. (TS) This mission will be that of an observation agent only. [redacted]

5. (U) Recommend memorandum be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

\* Memorandum for the [redacted]  
Subject: SNOWBIRD Support (TS)

ACTION OFFICER

Col, USA  
J-3, SOD  
Ext 54087

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION

DATE OF PREPARATION

1 Aug 80

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SNOWBIRD Support ~~(TS)~~

1. <sup>(1)</sup> (TS) The development of a viable in-country structure for support of a military option is being pursued. We have screened and selected DOD assets and our posture in this effort is much improved. One such plan to obtain in-country data, which is greatly needed, is outlined below. Because it involves inserting an American citizen into Iran, your approval is required.

2.

3. (TS) Our insert's intelligence collection mission will be that of an observation agent only.

4. (TS) Our experience in RICE BOWL clearly demonstrated that a trained US military observer is the best source of accurate and timely reconnaissance data.

Given the

training program and cover development already underway, I believe that the projected mission has a high probability of success with relatively low risk.

5. (U) This memorandum is for your approval.



~~TOP SECRET~~

7 Aug 80

Mon -

From a policy stand -  
point I do not approve  
this proposal unless it  
is carried out by the  
Executive Agent for the  
Secretary of Defense - the  
Department of the Army -  
operating under the  
provisions of DoD.

Directive 5-5105.29, dated  
1 December 1978. I strongly  
recommend that the  
Joint Staff stay out of

~~TOP SECRET~~

C

Clandestine intelligence  
operations. \*

~~TOP SECRET~~

\* If time is problem

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] - even then I do  
not believe an American  
[REDACTED] should be  
inserted.

~~TOP SECRET~~

8/8/60

The Operations Deputies,  
considering the DIA  
Director's comments, do  
not recommend that this  
agent be inserted.

Should this man be  
killed or captured, DOD  
would be in an unsupportable  
situation.

Thor Hanson

THOR HANSON  
VICE ADMIRAL, USN  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5/9/80

C

CJCS noted the Ops Dept  
& DIA concerns and  
directed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] This should be  
arranged through Gen. Tigher.  
Thor Hanson

THOR HANSON  
VICE ADMIRAL, USN  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~



25 July 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: [REDACTED]

1. A meeting was held on 25 July 1980 to discuss [REDACTED]  
Persons present at the meeting were: [REDACTED]

G  
OPS GP - LTC [REDACTED]  
CW [REDACTED]  
MR. [REDACTED]

3  
SNOWBIRD: COL [REDACTED]  
MAJ [REDACTED]  
MAJ [REDACTED]  
MAJ [REDACTED]

2. After much discussion, it was agreed that [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED] OPSGP will determine if it is feasible [REDACTED]. If so, he will accomplish this immediately.

A 3. [REDACTED] asset will be placed in contact with [REDACTED] probably NET 10 August, with an expected launch date [REDACTED]

A 4. [REDACTED] should meet [REDACTED] early for coordination in [REDACTED]

(S) 5. [REDACTED]

A 6. [REDACTED]

7. (u) Next meeting to be 29 July 1980.

G  
[REDACTED]  
MAJOR, USA

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 82  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/mce  
 RECLASS DOWN TO Secret  
KEYW ON DAOR  
REMOVED FROM multiple sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified BY JCS  
Declassified ON OADR

G-286

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 15 JULY 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: IR HOSTAGE SITUATION (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: OBSERVATIONS ON TEHRAN FOREIGN MINISTRY BUILDING AND US HOSTAGES IN IRAK (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: [REDACTED]  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

DIA

OADR

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SUMMARY: THIS REPORT FURNISHES INFO ON SOURCE'S OBSERVATIONS OF THE IR FOREIGN MINISTRY COMPLEX IN TEHRAN. ALSO INCLUDED ARE SOURCE'S OBSERVATIONS OF A BUILDING IN IRAN.

S. (C/NOFORN) A. DETAILS

[REDACTED]

G  
[REDACTED]

G

1 SW  
[REDACTED]  
SFO

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

G 289

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] LNSCOM

TITLE: U.S. HOSTAGE LOCATIONS AND DR. PEYMAN (U)

[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NFN 240348 HAS REPORTED ON SUBJECT INFORMATION

[REDACTED]

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION.

SOURCE: NFN 240348 IS

[REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT  
DAMI - ISH  
Room 2C840  
DOD HUMINT  
BG FLYNN

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DES. USE DOWN TO Secret

KEYW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

[REDACTED] DIA  
Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~



REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: STATUS OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH (U)  
[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NFN 240348 HAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON [REDACTED] ON  
[REDACTED] INFORMATION  
CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT TENDS TO BEAR OUT NFN'S EARLIER REPORTS  
[REDACTED]

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE: NFN 240348 IS AN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DAI - ISH [REDACTED]  
Room 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DDG HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

SECRET HAS SEEN

15 JAN 1981

~~SECRET~~

*codes J.14*  
*ALICES P*  
*COE CAP 14*  
*PITTMAN*

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DE RUEIZJC #0535 0141450  
ZNY TTTT  
O 141440Z JAN 81  
FM [REDACTED] WDC/J2  
TO [REDACTED] MAIN/J2

INFO [REDACTED]  
NSA [REDACTED]  
DIA [REDACTED] (ZEN)

BT

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS CITE J2 0535//EYES ONLY FOR [REDACTED]

SUBJ: INFORMATION REPORT

(S) FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM DOD SOURCE NFM-240308,  
[REDACTED] (HARD COPY REPORT HAS NOT YET BEEN  
RECEIVED FROM USA OPS GR).


PAGE 2 RUEIZJC0535 ~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

3. (NOTE: SOURCE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY STATE THAT "ALL" HOSTAGES  
ARE TO BE RELEASED IN A FEW DAYS, HOWEVER, THIS IS INFERRED BY [REDACTED])

REVW 14 JAN 01  
BT  
#0535

~~SECRET~~

NNNN



~~SECRET~~

DATE: 18 December 1980 **G 293**

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFH 240348 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: STATUS OF KHONCINI'S HEALTH - UPDATE (U)  
(OO: 17 DECEMBER 1980)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Cy to: ABSOPS - HUMINT (COL WHITE/LTC HAWES)  
DAMI - JSH (LTC SASAI)  
Room 2C840 (LTC LENAHAN/MAJ FRIEDEL)  
DOD HUMINT (COL LUNT/MR. O'BRIEN)  
BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO BE MADE  
EXEMPTED BY 11 Aug 82  
REVIEWED BY DDANMCC  
 PERIODICALLY BY Just  
EXEMPTED BY OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

[REDACTED]

~~Classified by: [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassify on: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

15  
A.C  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (U)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (U)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~



G 244

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: STATUS OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(S/E ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE: NFN 240348 [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 1285  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC/nmc  
 DER. EXTENDED TO Secret  
KEY ON OADR  
PERIOD FROM Multiple Amies

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: AHSOPS - HUMINT([REDACTED])  
DAMI - ISH([REDACTED])  
Room 2C840([REDACTED])  
DOD HUMINT([REDACTED])  
EG FLYNN

G

348

Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassified On: OADR

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FM JIF/J2  
TO [REDACTED]  
INFO [REDACTED] J2  
BT

A, C

LINDBIS CITE J2 0475

SUBJ: SOURCE REPORTING


1. J2 SOURCE NFN 240348 REPORTED [REDACTED]

2. (S) NOTE: LOS SITREP NO 525 DTD 14 DEC 1988 STATED KHOMEINI'S OFFICE DENIED A KUWAITI NEWS REPORT ATTRIBUTED TO A FRENCH DOCTOR

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0475 ~~SECRET~~  
THAT KHOMEINI WAS AILING. ACCORDING TO THE KUWAITI REPORT THE FRENCH DOCTOR AND TWO OTHERS HAD EXAMINED KHOMEINI O/A 4 DEC 88. IN DENYING THE KUWAITI REPORT KHOMEINI'S OFFICE NOTED THAT KHOMEINI HAD EARLIER THAT DAY (O/A 14 DEC) ADDRESSED A LARGE AUDIENCE.

REF: 15 DEC 88  
BT  
0475

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

9217

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 17 SEPTEMBER 1980


REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:  INSCOM

TITLE: PARTIAL RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS INFORMATION AND PARTIALLY RESPONDS TO  
(SEE ATTACHED) 9 SEP 80 TASKING. ITEMS OF INTEREST:



ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE (SEE ATTACHED REPORT).

SOURCE: SOURCE NFN 240348 IS 

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12256

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 81

REVIEWED BY DDP/mcc

BEEN FORWARDED TO Acct

REF ID: OADR

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

Classified By DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

240348

JAGPC-CR

DATE: 16 Oct 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240331 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCO

TITLE: Name Changes of Teheran Streets (U)  
(Partial Response to 9SEP80 EEI)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: This Report details a list of Teheran Street name changes, as of  
(SEE ATTACHED) 10 Oct 80.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: Meydun-E translates to square; Jiabanc translates to street.  
Information was obtained from [REDACTED] and is believed  
to be an accurate repetition of data provided by [REDACTED]

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE: NFN 240331 [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12266  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 82  
INITIATIVE BY DDONMCC  
 BYEL DISCLOSED TO SECRET  
REF ON OADR  
EXCERPTS Multiple copies

Classified By [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR



~~SECRET~~

From: JCS/Snowbird/SECRET  
CPTO  
INFO  
S GOD DOGTS/SZ  
TOP SECRET

REF 240551 provides the following streets within Tehran with both old and new names  
are listed: (S) ARE provided for your information.

OLD NAME	NEW NAME
a) Farah Aead Ave	Piruzzi Ave
b) Meydun-E-Jaleh	Meydun-E-Shohada
c) Jaleh Str	Jiabane Shohada
d) Shah Reza Ave (From Merdows)	Jiabane Zadi
(VIC SQUARE EAST)	
e) Shah Reza Ave (Along Tehran)	Engelab Ave (Revolution Ave)
(VIC UNIVERSITY)	
f) Meydun-E Fuzie	Meydun-E-Iman Hossein
h) Meydun-E-Shayad	Meydun-E-Azadi
i) Khañ Str	Palestine Str
j) Pahlavi Ave	Mossadeq Ave
k) Aryamehr Stadium	Azadi Stadium
l) Kurosh Kabir Ave (Sheniran Ave) Dr.	Shariati Ave

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

H. AREA IN FRONT OF MOTOR POOL/GENERAL SERVICE AREA; LIGHTS ON WALLS OF BUILDINGS.

I. FRONT AND BACK OF CHANCERY ARE WELL LIGHTED; EAST END WELL LIGHTED BECAUSE THIS WAS THE PRIMARY AFTER-HOURS ENTRANCE PRIOR TO OCCUPATION.

(5) INDIVIDUAL NOTED THAT IN MAY 1979 FIRE FROM EITHER RIFLES OR AUTOMATIC WEAPONS USING TRACER AMMO HAD BEEN DIRECTED INTO THE COMPOUND FROM THE FOLLOWING SIX LOCATIONS:

(A) VICINITY SEMIRAMIS HOTEL (VICINITY SW CORNER OF ROOSEVELT AND TAKHTE-JAMSHID).

(B) FROM MULTI-STORY BLDG ON EAST SIDE OF ROOSEVELT APPROX DUE EAST OF CHANCERY.

(C) FROM A BUILDING DUE SOUTH OF CHANCERY, DIRECTLY ACROSS TAKHTE-JAMSHID.

(D) FROM A BLDG SOUTHWEST OF CHANCERY, SOUTH OF TAKHTE-JAMSHID.

(E) FROM TALL BUILDING ON NORTHWEST CORNER OF AMERICA AND TAKHTE-JAMSHID.

(F) FIRE AT ONE TIME CAME THROUGH THE FRONT OF THE AMB RESIDENCE, APPARENTLY FROM BUILDINGS NORTH OF THE COMPOUND.

(G) THE PRECEDING INDICATES THAT SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN BY STUDENTS

[REDACTED] ETC) EXHIBIT A BASIC CONCERN

AGAINST A PREVIOUSLY DEMONSTRATED THREAT. RVW 27DEC09

BT

~~SECRET~~

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240241 (U)

G 3.12

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: POSSIBLE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT  
(SEE ATTACHED).

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

SOURCE: NFN 240241 IS [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ON 1256  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
IDENTIFIED BY DDA dmcc  
 NEED COUNTER TO Sent  
REVISED ON OADR  
REMOVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT([REDACTED])  
DANI - ISH([REDACTED])  
Room 2C840([REDACTED])  
DOD HUMINT([REDACTED])  
BG FLYNN

Classified By [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassified ON OADR

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~~SECRET~~

VZCZ CD JA 170

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DE RUEIZJC #0511 0321915

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FM [REDACTED] WDC/J2

TO [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ I NOFORN CITE J2 0511

SUBJ: SOURCE REPORTING

REVW 02 JAN 01

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
~~SECRET~~ ~~INFORMATION~~

~~1~~

1

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G

(THIS INFORMATION PASSED VIA KY-3 TO MAJOR [REDACTED] ROOM 2C840, 1240 HOURS,  
31 DEC 80, by [REDACTED] AL BARI)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

G393

21 April 1980

Chuck,

Got a call from the WFA on Saturday, 19 April. They've been moved from the conference room where they were being held to the "former state dining room". It's located on the west side of the building, same floor, the third.

The toilet they use (apparently there was quite a to do about it recently) is still located just outside the door of their present location. The shower facilities are on the fourth floor. Because of one of Mike's papers, they're no longer allowed to use the elevator. Coming back from the shower recently with his guard, when the elevator reached the third floor the guard got out, Mike waved goodbye to him and went down to the ground floor. Mike could hear the guard madly running down the three flights of stairs and waited inside the elevator for him. Just as the guard could see him Mike again waved and went back up to the third floor, and back into the room. (Thought you'd be interested to see they haven't lost their sense of humor.)

Their guards have been changed and Mike said he thinks the new ones have close contact with the "students" on the compound. He can no longer call our friends "up north", nor can he run on the stairs for exercise. He said they are very closely watched. He still, however, sits in the window for a couple of hours every day "working on his tan" -- he won that battle with the guards. He said he went into more detail in a letter which is on its way -- I'll let you know.

~~SECRET~~

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ONI OADR

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Hauger

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G399

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DE RUEIZJC #0052 0381805  
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SECRET CITE J3 00052

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D, E

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1. MAIN MFA BLDG IS OLD ORNATE BLDG RUNNING EAST TO WEST, FACING ON FORUGHI STREET ACCROSS FROM MINISTRY OF WAR. LAINGEN, HOWLAND, TOMSEITH HELD ON THIRD (TOP FLOOR) IN BALLROOM AT WEST END OF CENTRAL SECTION.

2. NORMAL ENTRY IS VIA GROUND FLOOR LEVEL AT EAST END OF BLDG WITH PARKING IN THE "U" COURTYARD. ENTRANCE IS DOUBLE CLEAR GLASS DOORS, PROBABLY LOCKED AT NIGHT. NO WALL OR FENCE IN THIS AREA.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0052 ~~SECRET~~  
VEHICLES ARE DRIVEN AND PARKED TO WITHIN 20-30 FEET OF ENTRANCE.

3. GUARDS ARE CONSCRIPT TYPE SOLDIERS LOCATED INSIDE THE LOBBY - (POSSIBLY PULL DUTY FROM MINISTRY OF WAR COMPOUND LOCATED NEARBY). GUARDS DESCRIBED AS LOW RANKING, BARELY ABLE TO SPEAK PERSIA. DURING THE DAY (3) ON DUTY. CAN BE BLUFFED THROUGH W/SHOW OF AUTHORITY. CREDENTIALS CHECKED DURING THE DAY BY "OLD TIME" CIVILIAN SITTING AT DESK ON LEFT AS YOU ENTER. STAIRWAY TO UPPER FLOORS ON THE LEFT AS YOU ENTER. ALL STAIRS MARBLE W/CARPET RUNNERS.

4. STRAIGHT/LONG MARBLE HALLWAY WITH CARPET RUNNER LEADS TO WEST END OF CENTRAL SECTION OF BUILDING. OFFICES ON RIGHT (NORTH) SIDE OF HALLWAY, WINDOWS ALONG LEFT (SOUTH) SIDE OF HALLWAY.

5. NORMAL ACCESS TO 3RD FLOOR (TOP FLOOR) IS UP THE STAIRWELL AT WEST END OF CENTRAL SECTION. UPON REACHING THIRD FLOOR LANDING TURN BACK TO LEFT AROUND STAIRWELL, TURN LEFT AT END OF STAIR WELL INTO ENTRY AREA TO "DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION ROOM" - SINGLE CIVILIAN GUARD ON DUTY THIS LOCATION DURING DAY-DOOR NOT LOCKED DURING DAY (UNKNOWN AT NIGHT). LAINGEN, HOWLAND, TOMSETH, RESIDE INSIDE THIS ROOM ON THE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 82  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/mcc  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO  
REVW ON OADR  
REASON FOR MULTIPLE WARRS

~~SECRET~~

6. ROOM IS LARGE BALLROOM WITH UNBARRED WINDOWS ON BOTH SIDES (NORTH VIEW IS MOUNTAINS/SOUTH VIEW IS GARDEN AND HELO PAD). WINDOWS ARE BELIEVED TO OPEN IN/OUT AND LEDGE IS BROAD AND REMEMBERED TO BE FLAT. DOORS AT EAST END ARE CHAINED AND LOCKED FROM 3RD FLOOR CENTRAL BLDG AREA.

7. OTHER ACCESS TO AREA COULD BE THROUGH SOUTH FORMAL ENTRANCE (VICINITY BUS PARKING) THROUGH THE HALL OF MIRRORS, AND UP FORMAL WIDE STAIRS TO TOP FLOOR. REPORTER DID NOT BELIEVE THIS ENTRANCE IN NORMAL USE, PRESUMED TO BE LOCKED EXCEPT FOR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS (HOWEVER PRESENCE OF BUSES IN PHOTOGRAPHY MAY INDICATE OTHERWISE.)

8. NORMAL WORKING HOURS AT MFA ARE REPORTEDLY 0730 (0800)-1400 (1500).

1D, E

9. [REDACTED] FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

10. VISITATION BY SWISS FOR PURPOSES OF MAIL DELIEVERY IS FREQUENT.

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0052 ~~SECRET~~  
VISITS BY DUTCH, UK, AUSSIE WERE PERIODIC, PACKAGES CAN BE DELIEVERED (USUALLY UNOPENED) VIA PROTOCOL OFFICE (2ND FLOOR) WEST END OF CENTRAL SECTION OF BLDG. VISITS SET UP THROUGH THE OFFICE OF CHIEF OF PROTOCOL. RVW 07FEB10  
BT  
#0052

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TO RUEAIIF

GC

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ CITE JS 02000

SUBJ: INTEL REPORT

FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFO AND USE.

C

"SOURCE OBSERVED THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY COMPLEX IN TEHRAN AT [REDACTED] LOCAL TEHRAN TIME, [REDACTED] AND AT THE SAME TIME [REDACTED] SOURCE WALKED ALONG QAVAM SALTANEH STREET WHICH IS THE WESTERN PERIMETER OF THE COMPLEX. DURING BOTH OBSERVATIONS, SOURCE NOTED THE ABSENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS OUTSIDE THE FENCE WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED IN [REDACTED] OBSERVATIONS. THERE WERE NO OTHER VISIBLE SECURITY POSITIONS OR SENTRIES VISIBLE IN THE PERIMETER OBSERVED BY SOURCE. SOURCE FURTHER NOTED THAT THE CLOSEST REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WERE LOCATED INSIDE THE FORMER IRANIAN OFFICER'S CLUB (NORTH OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMPLEX) ON SEVOM ESFAND AVENUE. SOURCE BELIEVED THAT REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT AT THIS CLUB DURING PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS."

RW 18 JUL 69

BT

#0230

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY [REDACTED]  
EXEMPTED ON [REDACTED]  
DERIVATIVE OF [REDACTED]  
EXEMPTED FROM [REDACTED]  
DATE ON [REDACTED]  
EXEMPTED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



G42-

18 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD SECORD

SUBJECT: FBI Liaison

Reference: Memorandum for Director, DIA, dtd 7 Aug 80, subject SAB.

G

1. ~~(S)~~ (U) On 12 August 1980, LTC [redacted] (DIA JSJ-1X) coordinated with Mr. [redacted] (Terrorism Section, FBI) in regard to obtaining current information on hostage locations.

2. ~~(S)~~ (U) The conversation resulted in the following disclosures:

C

a. ~~(S)~~ (U) Any information that the FBI obtained from their sources in regard to the 4 November 1979 US Embassy incident in Iran was and is being passed to the Department of State [redacted]

b. ~~(S)~~ (U) The FBI will review their files for any significant current information (if any) concerning hostage locations and provide said information to DIA.

3. (U) Close coordination will be maintained with the FBI and information obtained will be provided to your planners.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

[redacted signature block]

for JCS Support

G

~~DIA~~  
Classified By  
Declassified ON: OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO n mcc  
 OEC  DOWNER TO  
REV BY OADR  
REMOVED FROM [redacted]



THE JOINT STAFF

2 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL TIGHE

Subject: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Status

1. This memorandum provides a summary of the current intelligence and operational support requirements of Project SNOWBIRD. The requirements have been divided into three major categories:

B, C

- a. Category One [REDACTED]
- b. Category Two: Establishing an in-country support structure.
- c. Category Three: Maintaining a cognizance of political, military, and civil events in the region which could have an impact on mission planning.

2. The balance of this memo will address the status of the individual requirements contained within each category:

a. Category One

(1) Penetration Agent (Possible reinsertion of "Pencil One").

C

(2) Technical identification [REDACTED]

(3) Surveillance and tracking (Vehicle drive-by planned).

C

(4) [REDACTED]

b. Category Two

(1) Acquire in-country assets.

(2) Establish in-country communications base.

(3) Acquire transportation means.

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW: ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92

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DECLASSIFIED TO Secret

REVIEW BY OADR

multiple smis

- (4) Acquire in-country safehouses.
- (5) Develop equipment infiltration means

AIC

[REDACTED]

c. Category Three

- (1) Environmental data [REDACTED]
- (2) Military/political activity [REDACTED] (A Photo).
- (3) Air and air defense activity [REDACTED] (IA Photo).

C

3. Other special programs being coordinated by SNOWBIRD/J-2:

[REDACTED]

- a. DOS interface [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED] interface on DOD agents.
- e. Identification and screening of DOD support assets.
- f. Establishment of field training office for DOD SNOWBIRD support assets.
- g. [REDACTED] ICRS photo tasking.
- h. Test of SR 71-HRR capability.
- i. Radar planning chart (DMA).
- j. LZ search project.
- k. Imagery transformation (DARPA).

C

C

4. Request DIA review the above and advise of any assistance or additional capabilities that could be used.

*James B. Vaught*  
 JAMES B. VAUGHT  
 Major General, USA

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

CZ CDVA 099

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SUBJ

1. (S) THIS OFFICE AND SFOD DELTA  
DECREASE

2. (S) RECOGNIZE DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING  
QUANTITY

3. (U) REQUEST COMMENTS BE PROVIDED

REVW 16 DEC 00

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~~SECRET~~ CITE J2 0450  
SUBJ: RECONNAISSANCE

REF: [REDACTED]

1. (S) [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
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G485

12 September 1980

JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM TO ATTENDEES

Subject: SNOWBIRD Operational Intelligence and In-Country Mission Support Requirements (TS)

1. (TS) This paper provides a baseline of mission-related intelligence requirements which are considered essential to effective planning and eventual mission success. Due to the critical limitations imposed by time, resources and personnel and the need to avoid their inefficient use, satisfaction of these requirements will require a coordinated and cooperative effort by all intelligence and field operational entities involved in supporting SNOWBIRD.

2. (TS) The task of matching capabilities with these requirements is complicated by the [REDACTED]. For planning purposes, however, a structure to support simultaneous assaults on six geographically separated targets is considered essential. To assist in sizing the structure and associated requirements, a matrix style spread sheet has been prepared on each of the following targets.

- TEHRAN - MEA Building
- Chancery Building (U.S. Embassy)

[REDACTED]

3. (TS) A basic list of requirements has been compiled and divided into the following categories to simplify a "needs versus capabilities" analysis.

CATEGORY I - In-Country Support Network:

- a. Transportation
- b. Communications

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
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 BEE  BOWNER TO [REDACTED]  
 REVISED ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tabriz

- g. Tabriz
- h. Vayqan
- i. Rezaiyeh International

Mashhad

- j. Mashhad
- k. Gonabad

NOTE: Generic EEI lists for active and inactive airfields are attached for planning purposes.

4. (PS) This paragraph briefly summarizes existing (E) or potential/desired capabilities. (P)

**C**  
DOD:

- C**  
**A**
- Net Control Agents (2), CONUS (P)
  - Operatives (30+), CONUS (P)
  - Special Vehicles (2)
  - Econovans (2), CONUS
  - Pickups (2), CONUS
  - Sedans (2)
  - Air Infiltration (8), CONUS (E)

Commercial:

- Informant Agents
- Net Control Agents
- Field Operatives
- Vehicles
- Quarters

Attachments:

- 1 - Active Airfield EEI
- 2 - Inactive Airfield EEI
- 3 - Target Data Sheets



Target Name: [REDACTED]

Description:

Hostage population 6-12 . Guard Force size Int Ext 6-10/Unknown

Defenses UNK - None noted in immediate vicinity - 1 park guard.

Distances to nearest:

**B, C**

(a) HLZ w/u 200m (b) FW/LZ 7 km SE (c) Active Airfield [REDACTED] Doshan-Tappeth

(d) Komitee/Pasdaran location 1.5 km SE

(e) Police/Gendarmerie Station 500 m SW

**B, C**

(f) Army Post 4 km SE (g) Air Force Base [REDACTED] Doshan-Tappeth

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CATEGORY I										
(Support)										
a. Trans										
b. Comm										
c. Housing										
d. Survey										
CATEGORY II										
(Surveillance)										
a. Confirm										
b. Hostile										
c. Physical										
d. Select										
e. Survey										

c. Housing and Subsistence

d. Survey of Metropolitan Entry Zones

**CATEGORY II - Target Area Surveillance:**

a. Confirmation of Indicators

b. Hostile Security Measures

c. Physical make-up of Target

d. Selection of Approach and Egress Routes

e. Survey of Extraction Zones

**CATEGORY III - Mission Support Measures**

a. Force Reception

b. Pathfinder Actions

c. Communication Neutralization

d. Diversions

e. Blocking Actions

**CATEGORY IV - Post-Mission Support**

a. Stay-Behind Communications

b. E & E Link-up Points

c. E & E Safehouses

d. Extraction Zone Marking

e. Secure Transport Net

f. Stay-Behind Informant Network

**CATEGORY V - Airfield Data Collection**

**Tehran**

a. Mehrabad

b. Doshan-Tappeh

c. Manzariyeh

d. Semnan New

e. LZ Susan

f. LZ Donna

Target Name [REDACTED]

Description:

Hostage population 12-18 . Guard Force size 6-10/20-30

Int / Ext

Defenses Walls or fences/guard towers/machine guns, small arms

Distances to nearest:

(a) HLZ \_\_\_\_\_ (b) FW/LZ \_\_\_\_\_ (c) Active Airfield Mehrabad, Doshan-Tappeth, Chale Morgi

(d) Kommittee/Pasdaran location See map

(e) Police/Gendarmerie Station See map

(f) Army Post See map (g) Air Force Base Mehrabad, Doshan-Tappeth

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CATEGORY I									
(Support)									
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b. Comm									
c. Housing									
d. Survey									
CATEGORY II									
(Surveillance)									
a. Confirm									
b. Hostile									
c. Physical									
d. Select									
e. Survey									

Target Name: US EMB

Description:

Hostage population 6-12 . Guard Force size Int 6-10/ Ext 30-50

Defenses Walled compound, sandbagged positions, small arms, mines?


Distances to nearest:

(a) HLZ on site (b) FW/LZ 3.5km E. (c) Active Airfield Doshan-Tappeth 3.5 km E.  
200 m E

(d) Kommittee/Pasdarán location 1 km W.

(e) Police/Gendarmerie Station 2 km SE.

(f) Army Post 1.5 km WEST (g) Air Force Base Doshan-Tappeth 3.5 km E.



CATEGORY I  
(Support)

a. Trans									
b. Comm									
c. Housing									
d. Survey									

CATEGORY II  
(Surveillance)

a. Confirm									
b. Hostile									
c. Physical									
d. Select									
e. Survey									

CATEGORY III																				
(Mission)																				
a. Force																				
b. Path																				
c. Comm																				
d. Diver																				
e. Blocking																				

CATEGORY IV																				
(Post)																				
a. Stay-																				
b. E & E																				
c. E & E																				
d. Extract																				
e. Secure																				
f. Stay-																				

CATEGORY V																				
(Support A/F)																				
a. Mehrabad																				
b. Doshan-T																				
c. Manzariy																				
d. Semnan N																				
e. LZ Susan																				
f. LZ Donna																				
g. Tabriz																				
h. Vayqan																				
i. Rezaiyeh																				
j. Mashhad																				
k. Gonabad																				

Attachment 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Target Name: MFA

Description:

Hostage population 3 . Guard Force size Int 3-4/ Ext 4-6

External Defenses None noted in immediate vicinity

Distances to nearest:

- (a) HLZ 200 m (b) FW/LZ EAST 4.5 km to ME Doshan-Tappeth
- (c) Active Airfield 4.5 km E.
- (d) Kommittee/Pasdarán location 1.5 km E.
- (e) Police/Gendarmerie Station 100 m E.
- (f) Army Post 3 km NE (g) Air Force Base 4.5 km E. Doshan-Tappeth

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CATEGORY I										
(Support)										
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b. Comm										
c. Housing										
d. Survey										
CATEGORY II										
(Surveillance)										
a. Confirm										
b. Hostile										
c. Physical										
d. Select										
e. Survey										

~~TOP SECRET~~

CATEGORY III

(Mission)

a. Force

b. Path

c. Comm

d. Diver

e. Blocking

CATEGORY IV

(Post)

a. Stay-

b. E & E

c. E & E

d. Extract

e. Secure

f. Stay-

CATEGORY V

(Support A/F)

a. Mehrabad

b. Doshan-T

c. Manzariy

d. Semnan N

e. LZ Susan

f. LZ Donna

g. Tabriz

h. Vaygan

i. Rezaiyeh

j. Mashhad

k. Gonabad

Attachment 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Target Name: [REDACTED]

Description:

Hostage population 12-18 . Guard Force size Int / Ext 6-10/6-10

Defenses UNK - ZU 23-2 posi at afd.

Distances to nearest:

(a) HLZ UNK (b) FW/LZ UNK (c) Active Airfield [REDACTED]

(d) Kommittee/Pasdarán location LOC UNK - Strength c. 1000

(e) Police/Gendarmerie Station [REDACTED]

(f) Army Post [REDACTED] SW part of [REDACTED]  
Barracks (g) Air Force Base [REDACTED] as FOB no  
Storage Depot Div. AOB assigned.

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CATEGORY I									
(Support)									
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b. Comm									
c. Housing									
d. Survey									
CATEGORY II									
(Surveillance)									
a. Confirm									
b. Hostile									
c. Physical									
d. Select									
e. Survey									



CATEGORY III

(Mission)

a. Force

b. Path

c. Comm

d. Diver

e. Blocking

CATEGORY IV

(Post)

a. Stay-

b. E & E

c. E & E

d. Extract

e. Secure

f. Stay-

CATEGORY V

(Support A/F)

a. Mehrabad

b. Doshan-T

c. Manzariy

d. Semnan N

e. LZ Susan

f. LZ Donna

g. Tabriz

h. Vaygan

i. Rezaiyeh

j. Mashhad

k. Gonabad

Attachment 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Target Name: [REDACTED] Description:

Hostage population 5-7 . Guard Force size Int / Ext 12-20/6-10

Defenses Walled compound, guard towers, sandbagged positions outside compound.

Distances to nearest:

on  
(a) HLZ site (b) FW/LZ 7.5km NW (c) Active Airfield 7.5 km NW

(d) Komitee/Pasdar location UNK

(e) Police/Gendarmerie Station UNK

(f) Army Post 1.5 km E. (g) Air Force Base 7.5 km NW.

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CATEGORY I									
(Support)									
a. Trans									
b. Comm									
c. Housing									
d. Survey									

CATEGORY II									
(Surveillance)									
a. Confirm									
b. Hostile									
c. Physical									
d. Select									
e. Survey									

CATEGORY III									
(Mission)									
a. Force									
b. Path									
c. Comm									
d. Diver									
e. Blocking									

CATEGORY IV									
(Post)									
a. Stay-									
b. E & E									
c. E & E									
d. Extract									
e. Secure									
f. Stay-									

CATEGORY V									
(Support A/F)									
a. Mehrabad									
b. Doshan-T									
c. Manzariy									
d. Semnan N									
e. LZ Susan									
f. LZ Donna									
g. Tabriz									
h. Vaygan									
i. Rezaiyeh									
j. Mashhad									
k. Gonabad									

Attachment 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

CATEGORY III									
(Mission)									
a. Force									
b. Path									
c. Comm									
d. Diver									
e. Blocking									

CATEGORY IV									
(Post)									
a. Stay-									
b. E & E									
c. E & E									
d. Extract									
e. Secure									
f. Stay-									

CATEGORY V									
(Support A/F)									
a. Mehrabad									
b. Doshan-T									
c. Manzariy									
d. Semnan N									
e. LZ Susan									
f. LZ Donna									
g. Tabriz									
h. Vaygan									
i. Rezaiyeh									
j. Mashhad									
k. Gonabad									

Attachment 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

CATEGORY III

(Mission)

a. Force

b. Path

c. Comm

d. Diver

e. Blocking

CATEGORY IV

(Post)

a. Stay-

b. E & E

c. E & E

d. Extract

e. Secure

f. Stay-

CATEGORY V

(Support A/F)

a. Mehrabad

b. Doshan-T

c. Manzariy

d. Semnan N

e. LZ Susan

f. LZ Donna

g. Tabriz

h. Vaygan

i. Rezaiyeh

j. Mashhad

k. Gonabad

Attachment 3

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

538 INCOMING

PAGE 01 OF 02 MSS = 4801  
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PRINTER ASSIGNED BY MSS:  
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B012 (1), C014 (1), D010 (1), D510 (1), D501 (1),  
D517 (1),

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G9, IRAN, USDAO, SPAIN, KUWAIT, AHS IR, JORDAN,  
AFRICA, IRAN TF, DAO RPT, MISSILE, JSW HEAF,  
ECONOMIC, GIBRALTAR, TERRORIST, ELECTRONIC, MIDDLE EAST,  
MUSCAT OMAN, MIDDLE EAST BRANCH, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,  
GENSER TASKING TIPOFF,

DICTIONARY: G9, PROFILE:  
36 59 72 103 111 157 160 164 193 220 227 239  
243 267 270 279 311 318 325 385 386 487 532

NMIC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:  
154-143616

PRINTER ASSIGNED BY REVIEW:

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ACTION  
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ATSD: AE (01) ASD:PA&E (01) ::DIA (20) NMIC  
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- CSA WASHINGTON DC

- SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
- NSA WASH DC  
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
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
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EZ04:  
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EZ05:

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  - (U) DATE OF INFO: 800620
  - (U) CRIG: USDAO (DATT) MUSCAT, OMAN
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  - (C//NOFORN) SOURCE: OTS/SCI 6 874 0012.




PAGE 2  
PAGE 3  
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58262



- (U) PROJ NO/ N/A
- (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE
- (U) SPEC INST: NONE, DIRC: NONE
- (U) PREP BY: R. A. STEWART, LTCOL, USMC, DATT.
- (U) APP BY: R. A. STEWART, LTCOL, USMC, DATT.
- (U) REQ EVAL: YES; REL TO: NONE
- (U) ENCL: NA
- (U) DIST BY ORIG: NA
- DECL: 24 JUN 80

NOFORN

*Handwritten signature/initials*



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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 12356  
COMBOD ON 11 Aug 92  
DECL BY DDO NMCC  
DOWNGR TO CAPL

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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G-557

(C) MSG 234  
DTG 192210Z NOV 90  
FM [REDACTED] JP  
TO [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: MATERIAL SHIPMENT

1. (S) [REDACTED]

COMJTF IS CONSIDERING REQUEST (VIA COVERED COMMERCIAL SHIPMENT) MISSION ESSENTIAL ITEMS SUCH AS.

- A. PT 25/250 RADIO
- B. PARKHILL ENCRYPTION DEVICE
- C. R24 RADIO TRANSMITTER
- D. MX 360 RADIOS
- E. REMOTE ACTIVATED BEACONS
- F. SILENCED WEAPONS
- G. FLARE GUNS
- H. PYRONAL GUNS
- I. 15-20 LBS BULK (C-4) EXPLOSIVE

2. (S) REQUEST [REDACTED] PROVIDE BY RETURN MESSAGE LISTING OF MISSION ESSENTIAL ITEMS IN SHIPMENT OF NO MORE THAN 60 LBS PER.

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE OF BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL. FOR DOWNGRADING TO Secret  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

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G564

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RU E A I I J R U E A I I F  
DE RUEIZJC #0111 1361300  
ZNY TTTT  
O 151301ZMAY 80  
FM JTF/RICE BOWL  
TO RUEAIIJ/DELTA  
RUEAIIF// [REDACTED]

C

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~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE J3 00000

SUBJ: REPLY TO QUERIES

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL. (DOWNGR. TO) Secret

REVW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

[REDACTED]

REF: (A) SFOD MSG 016, SUBJ SI/SAO ACCESS  
POLICY DTG 061250Z MAY 80

(B) SFOD MSG 017, SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION  
DTG 061342Z MAY 80

C

(C) [REDACTED]

THIS MESSAGE REponds TO EACH REFERENCE BY SUBPARA BELOW

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0111 ~~TOP SECRET~~

A. SI/SAO ACCESS POLICY EMPLOYED DURING RICEBOWL WILL BE CONTINUED WITH

ONE TIME ACCESS GRANTED ON BASIS OF BASIS OPERATIONAL NEED. PHYSICAL CONTROL OF SI/SAO MATERIAL IS BASIS REQUIREMENT EVEN WHEN MATERIAL HAS BEEN SANTIzed TO PROVIDE PROTECTION OF SOURCE DATA AND SYSTEM CAP-ABILITIES.

B. HOSTAGES LOCATION: THE TASK OF [REDACTED] IS BEING PURSUED ON SEVERAL FRONTS. ALL A FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OR FEASIBILITY RESEARCH. [REDACTED] IS ONE OF THESE POSSIBILITIES REGARDLESS OF HOSTAGES LOCATIONS. BE ASSURED YOU WILL BE INFORMED WHEN THESE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES REACH A STAGE WHERE THEIR EMPLOYMENT APPEARS IMMINENT.

for C.

A,C

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0111 ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

G 301

Item Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Line of Sight Analysis - LZ SUSAN

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (TS) DMA conducted line of sight analysis between selected points in the LZ SUSAN.
2. (TS) Analysts produced terrain profiles showing terrain relationships between selected points.

COMMENTS:

1. ( ) LOS charts were produced in limited quantities for briefing and planning.
2. (TS) LOS charts could be used to determine maximum safe flying altitudes vic SUSAN to avoid visual detection.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. ( ) That DMA be used to produce LOS analysis of critical operational areas as necessary.
2. ( ) That only highly specific and defined areas be tasked since this process is highly man intensive.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [REDACTED] Cpt [REDACTED]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DMA - Col [REDACTED] - 254-4426

ATTACHMENT:

LOS Analysis - LZ SUSAN (SEP)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DEEL DEL DOWN TO Secret  
 REW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources  
 [REDACTED]

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Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

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~~THREAT NR 2 (U) (SUSAN)~~

~~THREAT ASSESSMENT SUSAN (351610N/0533110E)~~

DESCRIPTION: AN APPARENTLY UNINHABITED, FLAT, OPEN AREA IN THE DASHI-E KAVIR. AN AREA APPROXIMATELY 12,000' X 1000' IS SUITABLE FOR FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OPERATION. THE AREA, DIVIDED INTO 2 PARALLEL FWLZ'S IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 18 NM SSE OF SEMNAN CITY APPROXIMATELY 13 NM SW OF SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD.

1. ON-SITE THREAT AS OF 14 NOV 80: NONE. NO HUMAN ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED IN THIS AREA SINCE COLLECTION BEGAN IN MAY 80 NOR ON ANY COVERAGE FROM PRIOR YEARS BACK TO 1972. ALTHOUGH TRAILS CRISSCROSS THE AREA, THEY ARE PROBABLY A RESULT OF ANIMALS (E. G. CAMELS) THAT HAVE BEEN NOTED IN THE AREA.

2. THE CLOSEST MAN-MADE FACILITY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 4 NM NNW AND CONSISTS OF SUPPORT BUILDINGS FOR A NON-ACTIVE OPEN PIT SULFUR MINE. APPROXIMATELY 12 MAJOR STRUCTURES ARE LOCATED HERE, BUT NO ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED SINCE CURRENT COLLECTION BEGAN IN MAY 80, NOR ON ANY COVERAGE FROM PRIOR YEARS BACK TO 1972.

3. ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS AS OF 13 OCT 80 SHOW NO REGULAR ARMY UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF SUSAN. APPROXIMATELY 100-150 AIR FORCE SUPPORT PERSONNEL ARE STATIONED AT THE SEMNAN NEW SUPPORT AREA (APP 15 NM NE) TO SUPPORT THE SEMNAN NEW HAWK TRAINING/FIRING RANGE.

C

LAUNCHERS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT DEPLOYED BUT NO MISSILES. HAWK EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWAL ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED AT SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD RECENTLY. HAWK EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN PROBABLY CAME OUT OF STORAGE, SINCE NO EQUIPMENT IS MISSING FROM THE TRAINING/FIRING RANGE. SEMNAN NEW AFLD HAS NO ACTIVE AIR DEFENSES AND IS NO LONGER BLOCKED. PREVIOUS BLOCKADE WAS DONE WITH VEHICLE TIRES.

4. DUE TO NON-EXISTENCE OF ROADNET BETWEEN SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD AND SUSAN AND GIVEN THE DIFFICULTY OF CROSS COUNTRY NAVIGATION AT NIGHT, IT WOULD BE SEVERAL HOURS AFTER DETECTION BEFORE A LANDBASED REACTION FORCE FROM SEMNAN NEW COULD REACH SUSAN.

5. CHANCE OF VISUAL DETECTION OF FLIGHT/SOUND ACTIVITY AT SUSAN BY OBSERVERS AT SEMNAN NEW IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY LOW, DUE TO DISTANCE (12NM) AND LINE OF SIGHT OBSTRUCTIONS DUE TO TERRAIN VARIINGS.

6. THE CLOSEST PARA-MILITARY FORCES ARE LOCATED IN THE CITY OF SEMNAN. GIVEN THE LOCATION AND SIZE OF THE CITY, IT IS PROBABLE THAT A REVGUARD REACTION FORCE WOULD AMOUNT TO NO MORE THAN 50 PERSONNEL. BEING PARA-MILITARY, THE REVGUARDS DO NOT HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF MILITARIZED TRUCKS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. OUGH TERRAIN AND A VEHICLES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO TRAVEL FROM SEMNAN TO SUSAN. ALTHOUGH THE ROAD FROM SEMNAN CITY TO THE AREA IS UNIMPROVED, THE DISTANCE IS SHORT ENOUGH THAT A REACTION FORCE COULD BE MUSTERED IN SHORT ORDER.

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8. (C) THE TRAIL FROM THE SULFUR MINE TO SUSAN IS EVEN LESS WELL-DEFINED AND ALSO CROSSES STREAM BEDS. WHILE NONE OF THE TERRAIN SHOULD POSE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFICABILITY PROBLEMS FOR 4 X 4 VEHICLES, THE LACK OF IDENTIFIABLE TERRAIN FEATURES AND THE PRESENCE OF MANY STREAM BEDS WOULD CAUSE SEVERE NAVIGATION PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT, UNLESS PERSONNEL WERE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA AND POSITIVELY KNEW THE LOCATION OF SUSAN. ALTHOUGH SEMNAN IS ONLY 18 NM FROM SUSAN, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT GROUND TRAVEL TIME WOULD BE AT LEAST 2-3 HOURS AT NIGHT.

9. (C) SIX GENDARMERIE POSTS COMPRISE THE SEMNAN CO DISTRICT. ONLY 2 POSTS (SEMNAN POST 353336N/0532324E, 18 NM FROM SUSAN; SAROKH POST 352912N/0531312E, 26NM FROM SUSAN) ARE CLOSE ENOUGH TO INVESTIGATE SUSAN. BOTH POSTS ARE OUT OF AUDIBLE DETECTION RANGE FOR LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT APPROACHING SUSAN FROM THE SOUTH. GENDARMERIE POSTS TYPICALLY HAVE 7-10 PERSONNEL ASSIGNED. THE GENDARMERIE PERSONNEL AND PARA-MILITARY FORCES WOULD UTILIZE THE SAME ROUTES, WITH TRAVEL TIME TO SUSAN ESTIMATED AT A MINIMUM TO BE ONE AND HALF TO TWO HOURS.

10. (C) UPON DETECTION AND GIVEN NOTIFICATION OF A US FORCE AT SUSAN, THE IIAF COULD PLACE 2 X F-4'S FROM TEHRAN MEHRABAD OVER SUSAN WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES. AIRCRAFT WOULD BE LOADED WITH AIM-7/9 AAM'S AND 20MM CANNON. HOWEVER, THEIR ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY INTERDICT U.S. OPERATIONS WOULD BE SEVERELY RESTRICTED DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.

11. (C) SUMMARY- GIVEN THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN, IT IS REASONABLE TO ESTIMATE THAT 2-3 HOURS OF OPERATIONS ON SUSAN ARE POSSIBLE BEFORE ANY OVERT INVESTIGATION OR REACTION; ASSUMING FORCE INGRESS AND LANDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT DETECTION/IDENTIFICATION. THE MOST LIKELY COMBAT REACTION WOULD BE BY THE IIAF F-4'S FROM TEHRAN/MEHRABAD. INVESTIGATION BY GENDARMERIE/REV GUARDS BY GROUND/LIGHT AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTER COULD ALSO OCCUR, ALTHOUGH THIS POSSIBILITY IS FAR LESS LIKELY, PARTICULARLY SINCE NO HELICOPTERS ARE KNOWN TO BE BASED IN THE SEMNAN AREA.

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SUBJ: LZ ASSESSMENT (U)

(S) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND.

THE AREA DESIGNATED LZ SUSAN IS RELATIVELY SMOOTH, PROBABLY WITH PEBBLE OR GRANULAR SURFACE. NORTH OF THE AREA DESIGNATED SUSAN TO THE HEAD OF THE FAN THE SURFACE PROBABLY PROGRESSES FROM PEBBLE TO SAND AND POSSIBLY EVEN BOULDER SIZED ROCKS. FROM THE SOUTHERN ONE HALF OF SUSAN TO THE TOE OF THE FAN (THE EXTREME SOUTHWESTERN EDGES) THE SURFACE PROBABLY PROGRESSES FROM PEBBLE, GRANULAR TO FINE SOIL (SILT AND CLAY). PRESENCE OF TRAILS INDICATE NOTHING LARGER THAN PEBBLES AND THAT THE ENTIRE FAN HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY INUNDATED IN ATLEAST 8 YEARS. PRESENCE OF WATER AT THE TOE OF THE FAN INDICATES WATER IS PERCOLATING THROUGH THE FAN AT THIS TIME.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0456 ~~TOP SECRET~~

LANDING AT THIS TIME WITHOUT PRIOR RECONNAISSANCE WOULD BE QUESTIONABLE FOR LARGE AIRCRAFT EVEN IF CONFINED TO THE NORTHERN ONE HALF OF SUSAN. SOIL PROFILES 3 TO 5 FEET DEEP (NOT SURFACE SAMPLES) ARE NEEDED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE BEARING STRENGTH OF SUSAN AND THE SOUTHERNMOST LOCATION THAT WOULD WITHSTAND THE LANDING IMPACT OF LARGE AIRCRAFT.

2. (S) DMA PERFORMED LINE OF SIGHT ANALYSIS OF THE LZ SUSAN/ SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD AREA WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS: THERE IS NO LINE OF SIGHT BETWEEN LZ SUSAN AND SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD, OR LZ SUSAN AND THE SEMNAN NEW SUPPORT CANTONEMENT AREA, OR BETWEEN SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD AND THE SEMNAN NEW SUPPORT CANTONEMENT AREA.

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COMMENTS: None.

RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED:

LTC [REDACTED] (USA), [REDACTED]

Major [REDACTED] (USA), ODCSOPS, DA

POINTS OF CONTACT:

[REDACTED] Defense

Intelligence School, Tel: 9-433-3802

Mr. [REDACTED] HQ OSI, Bolling AFB, MD

Tel: 9-767-5144

ATTACHMENT:

Interview Form

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27 NOV 79

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rescue of the hostages will be accomplished by Delta in a night attack ( ) on the Embassy. The Delta force will be transported by 5/PH-53s from the [redacted] airfield. In order to gain the range to reach the Tehran area, the PH-53's will make a refueling stop at a predetermined spot in the desert approximately 165 NM west of Esfahan. Once the PH-53's have landed and established a drop zone, the fuel will be delivered in palletized bladders by air drop from 5 MC-130's. The MC-130's launch from [redacted] and accomplish two aerial refuelings en route to the drop zone. We estimate it will take three hours and thirty minutes to move the fuel bladders to the Helo's, complete the refueling and be ready to launch. Once airborne the Helo's with Delta aboard will proceed to a drop off point approximately [redacted] miles southeast of Tehran where they will be met by an agent arranged for by [redacted]. At this time the 5 Helo's will move to a predesignated hiding area where they will go under camouflage until the next evening. All flying operations are scheduled to be completed by 0515 Tehran time which is one hour before first light. Therefore, the entire flying schedule just described has a maximum of one hour slippage available. After drop off, Delta will move to a prearranged safe haven, then to the Embassy in time to reconnoiter (2000 L) prior to a 0130 L attack. The helo's will depart their hiding area in time to arrive at the Embassy 15 minutes after the initiation of the attack. The primary extraction zone will be the field behind the Embassy. It will require at least three PH-53's to extract all of the US personnel.

E

C

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12356  
 DATED ON 11 Aug 92  
 EVALUATED BY RDR UMCC  
 BY Secret  
 IN OADR  
 BY Multiple Sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS  
 Declassified ON: OADR



~~TOP SECRET~~

At the same time that Delta evacuates the Embassy, 5 MC-130's will land and deliver 75 US Army Rangers on an isolated airstrip (Manzariyeh), located approximately 100 miles southwest of Tehran. Once the field is secure the MC-130's will prepare to receive the hostages, Delta and the Rangers. The MC-130's will carry all US personnel to a third country. The OH-53's will be destroyed in place.

The following is a chronological summary of the major events, possible problems and alternative courses of action available to the Joint Task Force Commander.

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TIME	ACTION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION
2/0800Z (0300 Est)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Est)	Launch MC-130: a. 5/MC-130, OK b. 4/MC-130, OK  c. 4/MC-130, OK	None Reduced fuel for Helo's by #19575  Insufficient fuel for Helo's	Go Require 19 operational bladders to complete mission No go/Delay 24 hr
2/1115Z (0615 Est)	KC-135 Launch: 3 KC-135, OK 3 KC-135, OK	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch, OK 2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch, OK	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No go
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch a. 6/Helo, OK  b. 5/Helo with no more than 1:00 delay  c. 5/Helo, OK by 1530Z	None Max delay and still be able to reach hide out by daylight  Would degrade equip and or personnel for "Delta"	Go Instruct MC-130 orbit  -No/Go, delay 24 hr Inform MC-130's & KC-135's -Go degraded by ..
2/1645Z & 2245Z (1145 & 1745 Est)	MC-130 refuelings 4 successful 4 successful	None Insufficient fuel for Helo's	Go, inform Helo's -24 Hr delay, Helo continue -No go, recall Helo's
2/Helo's	One of 1st 5 Helo's goes down enroute before 250 NM point (mechanical failure)  No. 6 Helo goes down before 250 NM point  2 Helo's go down before 250 NM point	Force is degraded; US US personnel on the ground in Iran  Other 5 Helo's unable to make P/U due to  Beyond capability of No. 6 Helo to recover	6th Helo acts as chase till 250 NM Wil  All RTB-cycle one Helo to P/U survivors  All RTB-cycle required another Helo's for ..

TIME

ACTION

CONSEQUENCES

2/1810Z

Helo pass point of no return  
5 MC-130, OK  
4 MC-130, OK  
>4 MC-130, OK

None  
Reduced fuel for Helo's  
Insufficient bladders  
to accomplish mission

Go  
Require 19 operational bladders to complete mission  
No Go - Advise Helo to recover to carry  
Advise KC-135 of a refuel requirements

2/

Helo goes down after 250 NM point  
(Note: Helo should be able to proceed to refuel point single engine)

Force is degraded; US personnel on the ground in Iran

Remaining four Helo land and pick up personnel and equipment

2/2248Z

Helo launch from refueling  
- On time  
- 5 helo, OK  
- 4 helo, OK  
  
- 3 helo, OK

None  
Spread "Delta" crew and equipment over 4 good helo's. Probable rolling T/O  
Would have to leave equipment and/or people

Go  
Go  
  
- Go in degraded status  
- Delay 24 hrs, attempt to fix Helo's  
- About mission, spread 2 Helo load over remaining Helo's strip down return to ship (ship may have to close with the beach)  
Go

< Delay 1:00 to 2348  
> 1:00 DELAY

Longest acceptable delay and reach hide out by first light  
CANT REACH HIDEOUT BY 1st LIGHT

2/

Helo goes down between refueling point and drop off point (Note: Helo's will have limited single engine capability)

Reduced force, troops on ground

Remaining Helo's go down to pick up personnel and equipment

TIME	ACTION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION
3/0124Z	Any major problem at the drop off point	"Delta" or a portion is unable to link up with agent	- Pick up "Delta" and move out (Mission abort) - Leave "Delta" to clear problem or move to hide out
3/	Helo goes down en-route to hide out: 54 Helo, OK	Helo could be spotted Reduced capability for extraction	Will have to shift on the extraction. "Delta" must be notified on 1st contact
3/0145Z	Helo's arrive at hide out		

TIME	ACTION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION
31630Z	MC-130 launch 5 MC-130 OK 4 " " 3 " " 2 " " <2	RECEIVED TANKS OF A/C MAY LOAD Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (W/P)	} GO - P/U only hostages + wounded - Direct gunship to launch and P/U some leftovers
3	KC-130 launch 3 KC-135 OK <3 " OK	Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130	Refuel at least 2 MC-130, more if possible
3	MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers	GO Same as above
3	MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK	Same as above	Same as above
32135Z	Helo lift off from hideout >3 RH-53 OK <3 RH-53 OK	Unable to lift out all hostages + Delta	Use extras (>3) for CAS - Cycle Helo's from Manzariych to Embassy
32230Z	MC-130's arrive at Manzariych find R/W locked,	- Unable to land secure airfield	- Parachute Rangers onto airfield - Wait for Delta Helo's to arrive to secure field & clear R/W
32230Z	Helo's land at Embassy 5 RH-53 OK	Will have extra Helo's	- Use extra Helo's to provide <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 15px; margin-top: 5px;"></div>
A	3 RH-53 OK	Men required Helo's for extraction	- Land Helo's single use other two for cover fire if needed
	2 RH-53 OK	Not sufficient Helo's extraction	- Cycle Helo's for extraction

TIME	ACTION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION
322452	Extraction: >3 Helo's OK 51 Helo OK  Zero Helo's OK	Normal operation Unable to extract all personnel Unable to extract by Helo	Go Cycle Helo's  Use ground vehicles to drive to Manzariych
323002	Helo's arrive at <del>Manzariych</del> >3 RH-53 OK  <3 RH-53 OK  <3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130  Zero helo's OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130  Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle  Helo's will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground  MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded  - MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded  MC-130 plus 1 or 2 extra MC-130  - Keep all MC-130's ground till per- sonnel arrive - Launch two MC-130 for cover relay or for departure - HAVE DELTA SET UP PRE ARRANGED RALLY POINTS, IF DISCOVERED DISENGAGE, PROCEED TO RALLY PT. WHEN HELO'S LIFT OFF, DIRECT THEM APPROPRIATE. P/D EOM - ESTABLISH MANZARIYCH RALLY POINT, HELO'S TO MANZARIYCH IF NO CONTACT WITH DELTA
MOVEMENT OF DELTA	DELTA IS DISCOVERED	MISSION IS BLOWN	

~~TOP SECRET~~  
A brief listing of the subjects and dates of correspondence will provide the reader with perspective on the dialogue.

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page a.  
page b includes.

C


a. [REDACTED]

b. Memo to CJCS, 21 Jul 80, subj: Intelligence Support Schedule...provided schedule for establishing an effective in-country support structure to support the planning of simultaneous assaults against five separate locations.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
EXEMPTED ON 11 Aug 92  
EXEMPTED BY DDO - NMCC  
EXEMPTED BY Secret  
EXEMPTED BY OADR  
EXEMPTED BY Multiple Sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: ~~JCS~~  
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~



- 1. [REDACTED]
- 2. [REDACTED]
- 3. [REDACTED]
- 4. [REDACTED]

(S) 5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bldg, Tehran Memo stated practically speaking, sixty days or more will (would) be required to establish the necessary structure, unless drastic measures are taken to upgrade the priority accorded this project by the [REDACTED] Memo closed with the following statement, "Recommend priority of intelligence support to SNOWBIRD be addressed at senior levels of DOD [REDACTED]... Action...subject considered for discussion.

c. Memo to CJCS, 23 Jul 80, Subj: Collection (Mission) Approval. ...Requested CJCS approval for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Action: OPSDEPS recommended against [REDACTED] due to risk to source.

(S) d. Memo to CJCS, 23 Jul 80, subj: Authorization for Civilian Contact...Advised CJCS of proposals from Civilian Business person of willingness to assist in locating and freeing the hostages. Action: OPSDEP indicated proposal had merit but [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] not independently or directly from (by) DOD.



(s) e. Memo to CJCS, 24 Jul 80, subj: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Review... Provided CJCS with summary of 23 Jul 80 meeting of JTF Executive Intelligence Review Group chaired by COMJTF. This was the first of a series of such review meetings to be held through December 1980. Attendees included reps from the following offices: CJCS, JCS/J3, [REDACTED] DIA, [REDACTED] COMJTF, JTF/J2 and [REDACTED] High-lights: [REDACTED]

C  
B  
[REDACTED] DOD assessment stated hostages were probably being detained in Tehran, [REDACTED] at a minimum.

C (s) f. Memo to CJCS, 28 Jul 80, subj: Proposed Insertion of American [REDACTED] into Iran... Advised CJCS & SECDEF that COMJTF would be requesting approval for insertion to perform road & security reconnaissance. Action: OPSDEPS approved the concept for development as a formal proposal. On 7 Aug 80 Director, DIA, stated in a note to OPSDEPS that "from a policy standpoint

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S) he did not approve of the proposal unless carried out by DA acting as executive agent for clandestine OPS for SECDEF... Dir, DIA, [REDACTED]

C

[REDACTED]

should be inserted...Based upon Dir, DIA, comments OPSDEPS and CJCS recommended [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

g. Memorandum to CJCS, 1 Aug 80, subj: PAO Policy Guidance:

(S)

Hostage locations...Requested CJCS recommend to SECDEF he coordinate with SECSTATE or NSC Staff to obtain approval of Policy Note to be circulated to all government departments which would provide PAO guidelines regarding statements to the press on hostage locations. Points to be made were:

B, C

- [REDACTED]
- USG continues to receive conflicting reports of unknown reliability,
- USG is concerned first and foremost with a resolution of the crisis and speedy safe return of the hostages.
- USG believes that continued speculation (particularly crediting "Official Sources" is counter-productive to the welfare of the hostages and may be restricting mail flow and other morale sustaining efforts to and from the hostages.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S) The OPSDEPS approved the suggestion and forwarded it to CJCS on 5 Aug 80. CJCS directed DJS discuss subject with Ambassador Komer. In note back to DJS Amb Komer stated he had discussed matter with Mr. Ross (DOD PAO) and noted Ross was dubious and indicated, "Statement we don't know is not entirely true., and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On 2 Sep 80 JTF summarized the above sequence of events and suggested based on Iranian use of US media that the matter be tabled at a NSC meeting. The correspondence never went forward.

(S) h. Memo to Dir, DIA, 2 Sep 80, subj: Asset Approval...

Summarized the case for [REDACTED] USAINSCOM source whose [REDACTED] had been turned down previously (ref para c above). [REDACTED] request based on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] fluidity of the situation, uncertainty of the technical collection programs, and the lack of an

[REDACTED] Action on this proposal was put in abeyance and follow up work was assumed by the [REDACTED] and USAINSCOM. Note: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

indicated

key elements of this source reporting regarding hostage location was incorrect.

(5) i. Memo for Record, 4 Sep 80, subj: (2nd) Executive Level Intelligence Review Meeting, 3 Sep 80. Attendees included representation from [REDACTED] DIA, NSC, CJCS, USA/ACSI JTF [REDACTED] and JCS/J3. COMJTF lead meeting with statement the key intelligence question [REDACTED] and that it appeared that sometimes it was more difficult to get our own organizations to cooperate than working against the enemy. COMJTF made the key point that a much larger [REDACTED] effort would be required. [REDACTED]

B/C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.


2.

3.

4.

5.

C



COMJTF raised the subject of the need for a governmental policy on official announcements regarding [REDACTED]. The need was agreed to and NSC rep stated he would mention subject to National Security Advisor along with status of [REDACTED] proposal during the course of his back brief on the meeting. NCS rep asked JTF/J2 opinion on what was needed to satisfy KIC [REDACTED]. JTF/J2 replied a combination of reliable HUMINT reporting including [REDACTED] agents as well as the employment of several of the technical collection efforts would be required to [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] Another subject that was raised by COMJTF was suggested development of mid-level inter-agency cooperative group to consider the full scope of psychological actions that could be employed to convince the Iranian power elite that it was counterproductive to detain the hostages. A clear opinion on composition of such a group was not reached. The only subject on the agenda that was not discussed was the proposal to conduct an air penetration reconnaissance mission to confirm useability of a potential insertion airhead.

j. Memo to Attendees, 12 Sep 80, subj: SNOWBIRD Operational Intelligence and In-country Mission Support Requirements. Provided a baseline of mission related intelligence requirements which were considered essential to effective planning and eventual mission success. For planning purposes an in-country

support structure to support six geographically separated targets was considered essential. Requirements were divided into five categories.

- CAT I ... In country support network
- CAT II... Target Area Surveillance
- CAT III.. Mission Support measures
- CAT IV... Post-Mission Support
- CAT V ... Airfield Data Collection

JTF/J2 had identified six facilities as actual or generic target (hostage detention) sites. These were:

B, C

- a. Tehran ... MFA Bldg, Chancery, [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]

Attendees at the meeting included [REDACTED] DIA, [REDACTED] JTF and the [REDACTED] Copy of memorandum was provided [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

k. Memorandum For Record, 9 Oct 80, subj: Intell Review meeting #3 ..... Reprs included NSC, [REDACTED] DIA, [REDACTED] CJCS, JCS/J3, USA/ACSI, JTF/J2 and [REDACTED] COMJTF lead off meeting with review of training and operational concepts one of which involved

[REDACTED]

(S) premission survey of clandestine landing site. [REDACTED]

publicizing data on locations. JTF/J2 briefed on site of potential clandestine airhead and need to conduct survey.

[REDACTED]

of [REDACTED] provided overview of training and cover development indicating [REDACTED] were fully coverable [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. Memorandum for Record, 12 Nov 80, subj: Minutes of 6 Nov

Intell rev meeting (#4). COMJTF led off mtg with review of

[REDACTED] transition efforts indicating the turnover would take place no earlier than 15 Dec 80. [REDACTED] reported [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] coverable. Rumors of release of hostages regarded as nothing more than rumors. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COMJTF raised subject of pressuring GOI for hostage accountability through Algerian, diplomatic visit, publicizing mail denial, seeking medical conditions.

[REDACTED]

m. Memorandum for Record, 9 Dec 80, subj: Minutes of 9 Dec Intell review meeting. COMJTF led off mtg by indicating operational change of command to [REDACTED] anticipated on 15 Dec 80, however, the requirement to continue an active and aggressive intelligence effort is essential as the (rescue) mission has not changed. Based on HUMINT reporting consensus was that some, possibly all hostages, continue as of 6/7 Dec (DOI: HUMINT Observations [REDACTED] Near term termination of situation was <sup>Not</sup> envisioned, however, [REDACTED]




~~TOP SECRET~~

*C*  
~~[REDACTED]~~

n. On 15 Jan 81 message announcing date of 6th intell review meeting was disseminated with tentative date of 19 Jan 81 established. NOTE: Meeting was postponed to 21 Jan 81 and then cancelled due to release of hostages.

~~TOP SECRET~~



G-614

MSG032  
211400R NOV 79

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNPER TO \_\_\_\_\_  
RTVM ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources

FROM JTF/ [REDACTED]  
TO DELTA PLANNING STAFF/S2A [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. THE FOLLOWING MSG REPLIES TO YOUR EEI REQUESTS AS CITED BELOW:

- REF A. LTR//INTELL REQUIREMENTS//13NOV79
- REF B. MSG//EEI UPDATE//141755R79
- REF C. MSG//EEI UPDATE//151615R79
- REF D. MSG//PASS TO [REDACTED]//160745R79
- REF E. MSG//PASS TO SENIOR INTEL REP//16223R79
- REF F. MSG//BRIEFING REQUEST//190905R79
- REF G. MSG//INTELL REQUIREMENTS//191705R79
- REF H. MSG//REQUEST FOR//201200R79

2. REPLIES KEYED TO REFERENCE A:

- PARA 2 MAPPING COVERAGE PROVIDED
- PARA 3 WEATHER DATA PROVIDED
- PARA 4 (-) ANALYSIS CONTINUING AND DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILAPLE
- PARA 4(PLUS) COLLECTION ONGOING DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE
- PARA 5 COLLECTION ONGOING, DATA FLOWING AS AVAILABLE
- PARA 6 ESTIMATES PROVIDED, FULLER ANALYSIS BEING COMPILED.
- PARA 7 E&E GRAPHIC BEING PREPARED, PHOTO MATERIAL PROVIDED

3. REPLIES KEYED TO REFERENCE B.

- ITEM
- 1 HOSTAGE DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE COLLECTION CONTINUES
- 2 ORDER OF BATTLE - GUARD FORCE DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE
- 3 ORDER OF BATTLE-OUTSIDE DATA PROVIDED, UPDATES FORWARDED AS AVAILABLE
- 3 E&E DATA BEING SOUGHT AND DMA PREPARING TO PRODUCE E&E MAP OF INNER CITY ON DEMAND
- 4 [REDACTED] COORDINATING THE ACTION
- 5 PHOTO/HUMINT SEARCH IN PROGRESS FOR INFIL/EXFIL DATA
- 6 DIVERSION/DECEPTION SPECIAL PLANS TEAM PREPARING SUPPORTING MEASURES
- 7 COMMO DATA PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE-REGRETABLELY CAPABILITY IS LIMITED
- 8 MATERIAL PROVIDED
- 9 WEATHER DATA PROVIDED ON CONTINUING BASIS

4. REPLIES KEYED TO REF C

PARA 1 UNABLE TO CONFIRM PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF RANGER COMPANIES IN INSTALLATION IS STILL ACTIVE.

PARA 2 - DATA HERE INDICATES F4/F5 ARE NOT LOADED WHILE ON ALERT, BUT REACTION TIME FOR ALERT AIRCRAFT IS 5-15 MINS. ORDNANCE RELIABILITY IS QUESTIONABLE.

PARA 3 - PERCEPTION OF STUDENT GUARDS IS PROBABLY THAT A US ASSAULT ON

ENLISTED PERSONNEL WERE BEING HELD IN CONSULATE  
NOT THE OLD MARINE QUARTERS

PARA 6. CHECK POINTS WITHIN THE CITY ARE FEW, RARELY FOUND ON MAJOR STREETS, HOWEVER STREET BARRICADES ARE ERECTED AROUND THE EMBASSY AT NIGHT, ON THE MAIN STREETS ROOSEVELT, AND TAKHT-E-JAMSHID. THE NORMAL CHECKPOINT IS MANNED BY 2-3 PASDARAN ARMED WITH G3 RIFLES. NORMALLY ONE COMES FORWARD TO CHECK CREDENTIALS, A SECOND HOLDS BACK BEHIND THE BARRICADE WHILE A THIRD MAINTAINS AN DISCRETE DISTANCE.

PARA 7. [REDACTED] WORKING ON THIS POSSIBILITY - ASSESSMENT IS THAT IT CAN BE DONE

PARA 8. SAME STATUS AS PARA 7

PARA 9. SAME STATUS AS PARA 7

PARA 10. SAME STATUS AS PARA 7

PARA 11. SAME STATUS AS PARA 7

5. REPLIES KEYED TO REF D

A//PARA 1/A  
REACTION TIMES HAVE BEEN REVISED AND PROVIDED IN SEPARATE ESTIMATE. THEY ARE STILL ON THE SHORT TIME SIDE BUT IT WAS PREFERRED TO LEAN TO WORST CASE, BASED ON MAJOR DISTURBANCE WITH LOUD NOISE HEARD AT DISTANCES OF 2KM. FROM COMPOUND.

A//PARA 1/B AGREE THAT MOST SPECIAL FORCES HAVE PROBABLY BEEN MOVED TO KURDESTAN AND QUOTE THE "RANGER COMPANY/IRG SPECIAL FORCES" ARE PROBABLY INDIVIDUALS DEDICATED TO THE IRG AND/OR KHOMENI WHO HAVE ASSUMED THE ROLE OF "RANGERS/SF" WITHOUT THE ASSOCIATED TRAINING, HOWEVER THE ALLEDGED UNITS STILL POSE A POTENTIAL REINFORCEMENT THREAT EQUAL TO TWO COMPANIES.

C/PARA 2 (SEE ABOVE)

D PARA 3//A// ARMOR UNIT DOES NOT EXIST AT WV315485. HISTORICAL [REDACTED] INDICATES ONLY MINOR MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES AND THE TOTAL NUMBER AT THE SERVICE AREA AND THE STORAGE AREA HAVE ALMOST ALWAYS BEEN CONSTANT, INDICATING A LOW OPERATIONAL LEVEL.

B. AIR ORDER BATTLE FOR TEHRAN AREA PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY. MEHRABAD MAINTAINS AIRCRAFT ON ALERT WITH HOT ORDNANCE. NORMAL ALERT WOULD BE 2/F4'S. INTERCEPT CAPABILITY IS EXTREMELY LIMITED AT NIGHT AND WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY THE LOW LEVEL REQUIREMENT.

C. ARMOR CONCENTRATIONS - ANALYSIS OF CITY FAILED TO INDICATE ANY NEW INTRODUCTION OF ARMORED UNITS AND THE ACTIVITY OF THOSE LOCATED WITHIN CITY CONFINES INDICATES A QUESTIONABLE OPERATIONAL STATUS.

D. HAWK BATTERIES - TWO HAWK BATTERIES ARE DEPLOYED IN THE TEHRAN AREA AND [REDACTED] IN THE PAST 30 DAYS, PHOTOGRAPHY CONFIRMED THE SITES BUT FAILED TO REVEAL ANY SIGNS OF MISSILES IN OR NEAR THE SITES.

REF E SEE PARA E ABOVE

REF F SUMMARIES AND UPDATES ARE PROVIDED AS DATA AND ANALYSIS BECOMES AVAILABLE - WORK UNDERWAY TO COMPILE A COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE

ASSESSMENT - EXPECTED COMPLETION IS 22 NOV79. -- CRITICAL INFORMATION IS PASSED AS SOON AS RECEIVED. COMPLETE ASSESSMENT OF ALL EEI SUBMITTED BY "BEECHTREE". REGRET UNABLE TO PROVIDE BRIEF REQUESTED IN YOUR 190905R NOV 79

REF G PARA 1/2 - CURRENT LISTING OF OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN TEHRAN PROVIDED YOUR LOCATION 20NOV79 PHOTOGRAPHS WERE FORWARDED AS PROVIDED BY PARENT AGENCY/SERVICE

PARA 3 DATA ON TRAFFIC PATTERN REQUESTED FROM AGENCY OBSERVATIONS FILED TO DATE HAVE TYPICALLY BEEN DAY LIGHT AND NOT DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED W/EMBASSY. DATA WILL BE PROVIDED AS BECOMES AVAILABLE.

PARA 5 - DATA ON COMMISSARY REQUESTED FROM STATE VIA DIA

PARA 6 - DATA ON ACTIVITY IN QUARTERMASTER COMPOUND ADJACENT TO EMBASSY FORWARDED VIA COURIER 21NOV79

PARA 7 DATE REQUESTED FROM STATE/STATE ADVISED NO DATA AVAILABLE

REF H - FULL REQUEST PASSED TO DIA AND [REDACTED] FOR ACTION. WILL PROVIDE AS DATA BECOMES AVAILABLE.

RVW 21NOV79



~~SECRET~~  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

637

12 February 1980


THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIA

SUBJECT: Project RICE BOWL Intelligence Support

Ref: DIA Memo U-026/JSJ DTD 31 JAN 80

1. Concur with the procedures outlined in the reference.
  - a. Access for key DIA personnel is authorized.
  - b. Existing communications and support personnel including and NSA/CSS will remain in place.
  - c. A JTF Operational Coordinating Element will remain in place and will contain a principal point of contact for all operational matters.
2. Once the JTF displaces, I will look to DIA to serve as the focal point for all intelligence judgements, analysis, and timely distribution of information related to the RICE BOWL mission.

  
 James B. VAUGHT  
 MGEN USA  
 COMMANDER, JTF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CO 12355  
 CONDUCTED BY 11 Aug 92  
 DEPUTYATIVE CL BY DDDMCC  
 DECL DOWN TO Secret  
 REVM ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

G-638

81 JAN 1986

U-026/JSJ

MEMORANDUM FOR MG VAUGHT

SUBJECT: DIA Intelligence Support During Deployment/Execution Phase of Project Rice Bowl (S) ✓

1. (S) ✓ The purpose of this memo is to outline DIA's general plan for intelligence support during the critical period when and if the JTF staff deploys to a forward area.
2. (S) ✓ All of DIA's resources will be available during the operation. To insure continuous, timely and well-coordinated intelligence support, however, DIA will dedicate key personnel solely to JTF support.
3. (S) ✓ A 24 hour intelligence cell will be established under the direction of LTC [REDACTED], USA. This cell will operate as the JTF, J2 REAR and be responsible for insuring timely reporting, tailored specifically to the operation. The cell will be the intelligence focal point in the Pentagon and will monitor the reporting of [REDACTED].
4. (S) ✓ The DIA intelligence cell will prepare an especially tailored situation report (SITREP) [REDACTED] for transmission to the JTF. The format and frequency of these reports will be developed by LTC [REDACTED] and LTC [REDACTED]. Additionally, significant intelligence will be transmitted as spot reports by the most expeditious means available. Also, the DIA cell will prepare and present briefings as required to the CJCS and his staff.
5. (S) ✓ In addition to the intelligence cell, a team of DIA Imagery Interpreters (II) will be dedicated to the operation. This team, using specially designed matrices, will provide [REDACTED] directly to the JTF.
6. (S) ✓ To insure a maximum support capability, it is requested that: [REDACTED] and three members (on each shift) of the DIA cell be authorized to operate out of the SOD Office.

Existing communications and communications personnel be maintained.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 11/29/89  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD/AMC  
 DECLASSIFY TO [REDACTED]  
 DECLASSIFY TO SECRET  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY DIAJSJ  
 DECLASSIFY ON 01 Jan 1986

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] be requested to maintain present communications and liaison arrangements.

- DIA, [REDACTED] through the DIA cell be kept fully abreast of the operational plan and changes thereto.

7. (S) Attached is the proposed composition of the DIA cell. LTC [REDACTED] and the top three members of each team would operate out of the SOD office. The rest of the team members would report directly to LTC [REDACTED] from the DIA NMIC.

8. (U) Request any comments, clarifications and or your concurrence in the above outline be directed to Captain [REDACTED], DIA Liaison Officer.




A.L. KELLN  
RADM, USN  
Deputy Director, DIA

1 Enclosure a/s

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CELL



[redacted]

~~SECRET~~



NOC 558  
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OO RUEAIIJ RUEAIIJ  
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~~SECRET~~

G-640

C  
O 031700Z FEB 87  
FM: JTF/PICF BOWL  
TO: RUEAIIJ  
INFO: RUEAIIJ  
BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE J3 20069

SUFJ: [REDACTED] IPNG OPS  
REF: SFOP MSG 006/DIG 151940Z FEB 87.

C.D.

INVESTIGATION BY DUCON WITH [REDACTED] INDICATES [REDACTED] HAS NOT BEEN TRAINING WITH A MOCK UP OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN AND IIP IS REPORTING OF PRESS SPECULATION AND DIPLOMATIC CHIT CHAT WITH NO BASIS IN FACT.  
REVW 03 FEB 87  
BT  
#2069

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL. GR-DOWNGR TO Secret  
REVW ON 0 ADR  
DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources  
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

G-642

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

PTTCZYUW RUEBJFI2722 0242022  
ROUTINE

241415Z JAN 80  
FM CDRUSAOPSGP, FT MEADE MD //IAOPC-GP//  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUOHAAA/CDRINSCOM AFS VA //IAOPS-ICC//  
ZEN/DCDR INSCOM FT MEADE MD //IAFM-OPS-HU-C//  
RUEADWD/CA WASHCC //LAMI-ISH/DAMI-FII//  
RUJHAAAB/CDRUSAITAC AFS VA //IAX-TA-C//  
RUJHAAA/CDRINSCOM AFS VA //IAX-TA-D//  
RUJLAKA/CDRUSAITAC FT ERAGG NC //IAX-TA-G//  
RUEATIA [REDACTED] /RES/HSG//  
RUEHFB/FBI WASHCC //INTD//  
RUJFHRN/USDAO BEAM GERMANY  
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 97  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DEEL  DOWNGR TO UPGRD SECRET  
REVISED ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NCFORN

SUBJECT: THIS IS IIR 2 201 4017 80 (U)  
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) COUNTRY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (GE)
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: 2 201 4017 80
3. (U) TITLE: GE SPECIAL UNIT TRAINING IN HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS (U)
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: 202200
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 791228
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 800123
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 800118; WASHINGTON, DC
8. (U) REFERENCE: C-RSS-49990; A-TAC-49396
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: SOURCE B, INFO 3
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED] INSCOM, ALEX VA
11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: NC
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: [REDACTED] CPT, MI, DESK OFFICER
13. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED] LTC, MI, COMMANDING
14. (U) SOURCE NUMBER: 2 243 0053

ACTION DAMI(6)  
INFO DAMOT(2) ACC-DAMI WATCH(1) Z-FILE(1)  
\*\*\*\*\* AMRC \*\*\*\*(0)

(U, B, F)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 20

MCN=80024/19385 TOR=80024/2057Z TAD=80024/2057Z CDSN=SCD288

\*\*\*\*\*  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
\*\*\*\*\*

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: THIS IIR SHOULD NOT RECEIVE FOREIGN DISSEMINATION SINCE SUCH DISSEMINATION COULD LEAD TO THE COMPROMISE OF THE COLLECTION ACTIVITY INVOLVED. DIRC. NO

16. (C/NOFORN) SUMMARY: THIS IIR FORWARDS COMMENTS PROVIDED BY [REDACTED]

ON PERTAINING TO A NEW HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONAL UNIT BEING TRAINED IN GE.

17. THROUGH 21. (U) OMITTED

22. (C/NOFORN) DETAILS: A SPECIAL GE UNIT (NFI) IS PRACTICING HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS WITH A MOCKUP OF THE US EMBASSY, TEHRAN.

18. THE LOCATION OF THE MOCKUP AND TRAINING IS UNKNOWN. A RESCUE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES, NOW BEING HELD CAPTIVE IN IR, WOULD BE POSSIBLE THOUGH THEY (GE) MAY NOT BE ABLE TO GET ALL THE AMERICAN PRISONERS OUT ALIVE. THE OPERATION COULD BE SUCCESSFUL ONLY IF THE ATTENTION OF THE STUDENTS HOLDING THE HOSTAGES WERE DIVERTED ELSEWHERE. A DIVERSION OPERATION WOULD BE SIMPLE (NFI).

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: (C/NOFORN) INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY SOURCE, A US ARMY OFFICER, DURING A SOCIAL CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] REVIEW ON 23 JANUARY 2000.

BT

~~SECRET~~

G-643

252300Z FEB 80

FM: JTF/J2  
TO: SFOD/S2

~~TOP SECRET F T~~

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

REF: (A) SFOD 252030Z FEB 80/SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION  
(B) [REDACTED]

(1) THIS MSG RESPONDS TO REF ALPHA.

(2) REFERENCE BRAVO STATED [REDACTED]

(3) DISCUSSION WITH SFOD REP AT THIS LOCATION 25 JAN INDICATED THAT SFOD MISSION PLANNING EMPHASIS WAS DIRECTED TO BASEMENT OF CHANCERY.

(4) SFOD REP WAS APPRAISED OF INFORMATION IN REF BRAVO AND PLACED SECURE CALL TO SFOD TO PASS ON DATA.

(5) THERE WAS NO INTENT BY JTF/J2 TO INDICATE THAT [REDACTED]

(6) JTF/J2 HAS PREPARED UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATIONS WHICH WILL BE RELEASED AFTER OBTAINING APPROVAL OF COMJTF.

REVW 25 FEB 2010

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON/mcc  
 DECL  COMPCR TO Secret  
REVW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

JTF 15/1800Z NOV79 G # 4  
MSC #008

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SITUATION

(1) GENERAL: ON 4 NOVEMBER MEMBERS OF AN IRANIAN STUDENT GROUP SWARMED ONTO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND AND TOOK THE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES CAPTIVE AND STATED THEY WOULD HOLD THE EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE UNTIL THE USG RETURNED THE SHAH TO IRAN FOR TRIAL. THE TAKE OVER WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT BLOODSHED. APPROXIMATELY 62 AMCITS AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF IRANIAN AND 3RD COUNTRY CITIZENS WERE INITIALLY HELD. SHORTLY AFTER THE TAKEOVER THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL WERE RELEASED. ON 19 NOVEMBER THE STUDENTS BEGAN TO RELEASE PERSONNEL WITH THE EXCEPTION OF "WHITE MALE CITIZENS", WHO ARE BEING HELD FOR TRIAL ON CHARGES OF ESPIONAGE. NO SPECIFIC DEADLINE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED HOWEVER THE "TRIALS" ARE LIKELY TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT 24 NOV AND CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS WITH SENTENCING LIKELY TO COINCIDE WITH OR TAKE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER 28-29 NOV 79. THESE DATES ARE KEY RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS IN THE ISLAMIC SHIITE FAITH COMMEMORATING THE MARTYRDOM OF A HIGHLY VENERATED RELIGIOUS FIGURE.

(2) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA: THE EMBASSY COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN CENTRAL TEHRAN (UTM 39S-WV-3835)S//GEOGRAPHIC 4230N/5125E). THE COMPOUND IS BASICALLY A RECTANGLE RUNNING NORTH SOUTH WITH THE MAIN BUILDING (CHANCELLORY) RUNNING EAST/WEST FACING ON TAKHT-E-JAMSHID PLVD A MAJOR THOROUGHFAIR. THE COMPOUND CONSISTS OF MISCELLANEOUS COLLECTION OF PLDGS GROUPED INTO FOUR GENERAL AREAS, (AROUND TWO PLAYING FIELDS ONE OF WHICH HAS BEEN USED AS A HELICOPTER LANDING AREA) THE CHANCELLORY (SOUTH) THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM RESIDENCE AREA (EAST) THE STAFF QUARTERS/CONSULATE/ COMMISSARY AREA (WEST) AND THE WAREHOUSE AND SUPPLY AREA (NORTH) THE COMPOUND IS BOUNDED THE SOUTH BY TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD, ON THE EAST BY ROOSEVELT STREET, ON THE WEST BY AMERICAN AVE AND THE NORTH ARDALAN STREET. THE COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED ON ALL SIDES BY SEVERAL HIGHER BUILDINGS WHICH PROVIDE GOOD FIELDS OF OBSERVATION. THE COMPOUND ABUTS AN ARMY DEPOT ON THE NW CORNER. A LARGE SPORTS COMPLEX WITH PLAYING FIELDS AND STADIUM IS LOCATED DIAGONALLY FROM THE NW CORNER OF THE COMPOUND ACROSS ROOSEVELT. THE COMPOUND IS LANDSCAPED WITH HIGH TREES DOMINATING THE WESTERN HALF OF THE COMPLEX (AMP/DCM RESIDENCE AREA).

AMZ

THE COMPOUND IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KM WEST OF THE NEAREST AIRFIELD (DOSSHAN TAPPEH AIR FORCE BASE). TWO OTHER AIRFIELDS ARE WITHIN 10 KM. GHALE-MORGHY, AN ARMY LIGHT AIRCRAFT HELICOPTER FIELD IS 8 KM SSW AND MEHRABAD INTERNATIONAL 10 KM WSW. TEHRAN CITY IS A HIGHLY CONGESTED METROPOLIS DURING THE HOURS OF 0600-2300 DURING THE ISLAMIC WEEK AND UNTIL 0200 OR LATER ON THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND (THURSDAY/FRIDAY). WEATHER AT THIS TIME OF THE YEAR IS COMPARABLE TO NE UNITED STATES WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS FORECAST FOR THE 20-30 NOV PERIOD AND TEMPERATURES DROPPING TO 30-40 AT NIGHT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 93  
 REWRITING CL BY DDD, NMLC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM \_\_\_\_\_

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3. ENEMY DISPOSITION: THE SITUATION IN THE COMPOUND HAS NOW SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE WITH DEMONSTRATIONS PERIODICALLY STAGED OUTSIDE THE CHANCELLORY GATE ON TAKTI-E-JAMSHID BLVD. CROWD SIZE VARIES FROM 50-75 CURIOSITY SEEKERS TO SEVERAL THOUSAND AT LUNCH/PRAYER TIME OR WHEN ANNOUNCEMENTS GO OUT VIA THE RADIO AND THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM. SECURITY OF THE AREA IS PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] GUARDS AT THE CHANCELLORY GATE, [REDACTED] ANOTHER GROUP OF SOME [REDACTED] STUDENTS ARE LOCATED IN THE CHANCELLORY BUILDING. SECURITY OF THE HOSTAGE AREAS IS MAINTAINED BY [REDACTED] STUDENTS. WITHIN THE BUILDINGS THE STUDENTS CARRY PISTOLS, WHILE THOSE ON DUTY OUTSIDE THEY CARRY G3 RIFLES OR UZI SUBMACHINE GUNS. THE OVERALL COMPOUND MAY BE UNDER PROTECTIVE SURVEILLANCE FROM THE WINDOWS OF SEVERAL SURROUNDING BUILDINGS. [REDACTED]

ANALYSIS OF ALL REPORTING INDICATES THE HOSTAGES MAY BE HELD IN [REDACTED]

GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION IS ESTIMATED AS FOLLOWS WITH A DAY/NIGHT DUTY RATIO OF [REDACTED]

THE PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES ARE LISTED BELOW WITH THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES FOR THE 0200-0400 TIME FRAME.

- A. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES - LOCAL IRG MILITIA/PASDARAN 50-100 FROM TWO NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS LESS THAN 1 KM SOUTH WITH NOMINAL STRENGTH OF 250.
- B. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES - LOCAL CROWDS 100-300 PLUS MILITIA
- C. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES - IRG STRIKE TEAM 150-200 (MOTORIZED)
- D. WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES - IRG BACK-UP STRIKE FORCES 1,000-1,500 AND LARGE CROWDS
- E. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES - IRG STRIKE FORCE RESIDUAL AND MOPS 2,000-3,000

*INTERNAL  
+ immediate  
reaction  
Korcen*

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(4) HOSTILE COURSES OF ACTION: THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION ARE OPEN TO THE STUDENT CAPTORS AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD COMMAND.

(A) ELECT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES.

(B) ELECT TO KILL SOME OR ALL HOSTAGES.

(C) ESTABLISH DEADLINE FOR RETURN OF SHAH, DEMAND USG ADMIT THAT EMBASSY WAS "SPY NEST" AND RELEASE HOSTAGES IF SHAH WAS RETURNED.

(D) CONDUCT ESPIONAGE TRIALS AT COMPOUND, RELEASE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL, FIND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AND SELECTED EMBASSY STAFF GUILTY OF SPYING AND SENTENCE TO LONG PRISON TERMS OR DEATH.

(5) WHILE THE TERRORISTS ARE CAPABLE OF FOLLOWING ANY OF THESE COURSES OF ACTION, THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE HANDLING OF THE HOSTAGES SINCE THE TAKEOVER IS FOR THE STUDENTS TO CONDUCT ESPIONAGE TRIALS WITHIN 5-10 DAYS IN THE CHANCELLORY BUILDING, FIND SELECTED INDIVIDUALS GUILTY, FREE THOSE FOUND NOT GUILTY, TURN THE GUILTY OVER TO THE IRG FOR TRANSFER TO QASR PRISON FOR EXECUTION OF SENTENCE.

RVW 19NOV09

168925R DEC 79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G 11

FM:JTF REAR  
TO:JTF FORWARD  
INFO:DELTA

Adt

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT:CRITICAL DIMENSIONS

THE FOLLOWING DIMENSIONS OF THE STADIUM EAST OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND WERE DERIVED FROM [REDACTED] AND ARE THE MOST ACCURATE AVAILABLE AND SHOULD BE USED AS COMMON REFERENCE BY ALL CONCERNED.

- A. HEIGHT OF LIGHT TOWERS 98.8 FEET ABOVE THE PLAYING FIELD
- B. HEIGHT OF NORTH SCORE BOARD 26.5 FEET ABOVE THE ROAD
- C. HEIGHT OF NORTH WALL 13.0 FEET ABOVE THE ROAD
- D. HEIGHT OF N WALL EXTENSION 21.1 FEET ABOVE THE ROAD
- E. LENGTH OF PLAYING FIELD 347.9 FEET
- F. WIDTH OF PLAYING FIELD 233.8 FEET
- G. LENGTH OF STADIUM 638.0 FEET
- H. WIDTH OF STADIUM 463.6 FEET
- I. O/A WIDTH OF STADIUM 480.6 FEET
- J. O/A LENGTH OF PRACTICE FLD 371.4 FEET
- K. WIDTH OF PRACTICE FIELD 240.3 FEET
- L. HEIGHT OF PRESS BOX 35.4 FEET ABOVE THE ROAD
- M. MAX HEIGHT OF BOX (TOWERS) 40.2 FEET ABOVE THE ROAD
- N. HEIGHT OF TENNIS COURT POLES 30.0 FEET
- O. HEIGHT OF TREES SURROUNDING PRACTICE FIELD 60.0 FEET
- P. HEIGHT OF SOCCER GOAL 8.2 FEET
- Q. HEIGHT OF MULTI STORY BLDG 1332 FEET S OF STADIUM 341.0 FEET

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E3 12358  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 JUL 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM Multiple Source  
 [REDACTED]

BT  
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Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~SECRET~~

TO  
271210  
[Signature]

MSG 188  
270945R DEC 79

FM JTF/J-2  
TO DELTA /J-2

INFO: [Redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12799

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92

DERIVATIVE CL SI DDO, NMCC

DECL 5A DOWNGRADED TO Secret

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources G #10

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(1) FOLLOWING INFO FROM FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW WITH [Redacted] AND CONDITIONS IN COMPOUND IN MAY 79. NOTE: THESE OBSERVATIONS ARE FROM SOURCE'S MEMORY ALONE, AND NOT FROM HARDCOPY RECORDS.

(2) ACCORDING TO SOURCE, MARINES HAD FLACK JACKETS, AND IT IS POSSIBLE A SMALL QUANTITY OF OTHER BODY ARMOR WAS AVAILABLE IN THE COMPOUND. [Redacted]

(3) THE APARTMENTS ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF BIJAN HAVE BARS ON THEIR NORTH WINDOWS.

(4) GENERAL COMMENTS ON LIGHTING WITHIN COMPOUND-  
A. THE WOODED AREA IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE COMPOUND IS RELATIVELY DARK. THERE ARE SMALL MUSHROOM-SHAPED MARKER LIGHTS ALONG THE DRIVEWAYS TO THE AMB AND DCM RESIDENCES. (THE DRIVE TO THE AMB RESIDENCE RUNS THROUGH THE EASTERN PART OF THE WOODED AREA AND THE DRIVE TO THE DCM RESIDENCE RUNS ALONG THE WEST.) LIGHTS ARE APPROX 1 METER HIGH, 10M APART, AND DIMLY ILLUMINATE APPROX 3M CIRCLES.

B. THE AREA IMMEDIATELY INSIDE THE SOUTHEAST GATE IS WELL LIGHTED, BY A LIGHT ON A POLE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE GATE AND POSSIBLY OTHER LIGHTS.

C. THE AMB AND DCM RESIDENCES ARE NOT ILLUMINATED BY DECORATIVE LIGHTS OR FLOODLIGHTS DIRECTED IN TOWARDS THE STRUCTURES. SUBJECT INTERVIEWED COULD NOT REMEMBER ANY LIGHTING WHICH DIFFERED FROM LAYOUT PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED.

D. GARDEN AREA AT NE CORNER OF COMPOUND RELATIVELY DARK; TENNIS COURT TO WEST OF GARDEN IS POTENTIALLY WELL-LIGHTED.

E. APARTMENTS WITHIN NORTH WALL ARE WELL LIGHTED. ALSO SOME LIGHTING AROUND POOL BETWEEN APARTMENTS AND WAREHOUSE. LIGHTS ON WAREHOUSE AT BOTH ENDS AND ALONG NORTH AND SOUTH SIDES.

F. SUBJECT REMEMBERS STREET TO NORTH OF CONSULATE AS POORLY LIGHTED; RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL LIGHTING (BELIEVED TO BE IN PLACE NOW) ON N. SIDE OF CONSULATE. [Redacted]

G. SUBJECT RECALLS AREA AROUND STAFF COTTAGES AS POORLY LIGHTED WITH POSSIBLE 1M HIGH MUSHROOM LIGHTS ALONG WALK WEST OF COTTAGES. [Redacted]

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G # 12

MSG182  
231010R DEC 79

FM JTF  
TO DELTA

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENT NUMBER 2

1. AMBASSADOR MCHENRY SENT FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL DECEMBER 22.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

- "DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

- ON NOVEMBER 4, 1979, 63 AMERICANS AS WELL AS PERSONNEL OF OTHER NATIONALITIES WERE SEIZED WHEN A DISCIPLINED, ARMED GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS INVADE THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN TEHRAN. WHILE THIRTEEN OF THOSE CAPTURED HAVE BEEN RELEASED, AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, SEVEN WEEKS LATER, 50 AMERICANS REMAIN CAPTIVE.

- ON NOVEMBER 25, 1979, SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM, INVOKING ARTICLE 99 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER TO REQUEST AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, DECLARED THE PRESENT CRISIS A SERIOUS THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

- ON DECEMBER 4, 1979, THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 457 URGENTLY CALLING UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IMMEDIATELY TO RELEASE THE PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY BEING HELD IN TEHRAN, PROVIDE THEM PROTECTION AND ALLOW THEM TO LEAVE IRAN. THIS RESOLUTION ALSO CALLED ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES TO SEEK A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS.

- ON DECEMBER 15, 1979, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ISSUED AN ORDER CALLING FOR "THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE, WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTION," BY IRAN OF ALL AMERICANS HELD IN IRAN AND FOR THEIR SAFE DEPARTURE FROM IRAN.

Classified by:

DDO, NMCC

Declassify on  
DAOR

Downgraded by

DDO, NMCC

22 June 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G # 17

FM JTF  
TO DELTA  
BT  
FORWARD

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SUBJECT: INTELL SUPPLEMENT

A. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH TOLD IRANIAN TELEVISION SUNDAY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HOPES TO FORM AN INTERNATIONAL PANEL "BEFORE CHRISTMAS" TO EXAMINE "THE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES." GHOTBZADEH ALSO SAID IRAN HAD NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO TRY THE 50 AMERICAN EMBASSY WORKERS HELD HOSTAGE BY ISLAMIC MILITANTS. "THEIR JUDGMENT IS A SECONDARY PROBLEM," HE SAID. HE ALSO SAID THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HOPED TO RECRUIT JUDGES, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FIGURES FOR THE "MISSION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE" THAT WILL LOOK INTO U.S. POLICIES IN IRAN. THE MUSLIM STUDENTS HOLDING THE HOSTAGES HAVE RULED OUT AN EARLY RELEASE; AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WHO ACTUALLY WILL DECIDE ON THIS ISSUE HAS ANNOUNCED HE HAS NO COMMENT FOR THE MOMENT.

! ! ! ! !

B. REPORTS FROM RADIO STATION KANU IN LAWRENCE, KANSAS INDICATE TWO UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS PROFESSORS HAVE BEEN INVITED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH TO NOMINATE AN AMERICAN TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO INVESTIGATE THE SHAH'S CRIMES AND U.S. INTERVENTION IN IRAN. THE TWO K.U. PROFESSORS VISITED IRAN RECENTLY AS SPOKESMEN FOR A GROUP CONCERNED ABOUT ENDING THE IRAN CRISIS. HOW THEY WILL RESPOND TO THE INVITATION IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME.

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C. PRESIDENT CARTER REACTED CAUTIOUSLY TO GHOTBZADEH'S REMARKS ON ABC'S ISSUES AND ANSWERS YESTERDAY, TELLING REPORTERS "WE'RE NOT DISPLEASED WITH THE INTERVIEW. I THINK ACTION WOULD BE MORE INDICATIVE THAN WORDS." HE ALSO SAID HE HOPED THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH FROM THE UNITED STATES TO PANAMA WOULD BE A STEP TOWARD THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THE PRESIDENT REPEATED THE US POSITION THAT ALL THE HOSTAGES MUST BE RELEASED BEFORE THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER ANSWERING IRANIAN CHARGES THAT IT AIDED THE SHAH AND WAS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ALLEGED CRIMES. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS NO QUARREL WITH IRAN, ADDING, "OUR LONG RANGE HOPE IS TO BE FRIENDS WITH THE PEOPLE OF IRAN BUT UNTIL THEY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES SUCH A RELATIONSHIP WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE."

! ! ! ! !

D. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN, IN A SEPARATE TELEVISION INTERVIEW, SAID THE UNITED STATES WANTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. "WE DO NOT WANT TO BE THE FIRST TO SHED BLOOD" HE SAID ON CBS-IV. BUT BROWN SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER ANY TRIALS OF THE HOSTAGES AS AN ESCALATION OF THE CRISIS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AN APPROPRIATE U.S. RESPONSE. HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

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E. IRANIAN AUTHORITIES TODAY ORDER THE EXPULSION OF TWO CORRESPONDENTS OF TIME MAGAZINE FOR ALLEGED BIASED REPORTING OF THE US EMBASSY HOSTAGE CRISIS. THE EXPULSION ORDER APPLIES TO TIME'S AMERICAN STAFFER BRUCE VAN VOORST AND MALTESE ROLAND FLAMINI. SOME 5,000 DEMONSTRATORS YESTERDAY MARCHED THROUGH CENTRAL TEHRAN DEMANDING AN END TO ALLEGED BIASED REPORTING BY WHAT THEY CALLED ZIONIST AND IMPERIALIST NEWS AGENCIES AND BACKING THE EXPULSIONS SO FAR ORDERED BY THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE.

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F. FBIS REPORTS IRAN RADIO TODAY AS SAYING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS UNDER THE NEW IRANIAN CONSTITUTION WILL TAKE PLACE ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 25 AND THAT NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS WILL START ON FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1980. CHARGE LAINGEN CONFIRMS THAT THIS MORNING'S PAPERS IN TEHRAN ALSO CARRY THE ANNOUNCEMENT.  
RVW 17DEC09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by:  
DDO, nmcc  
Declassify on: SAOR  
Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL  
by DDO, nmcc

FM JTF/REAR  
TO JTF/FORWARD  
INFO USMC HELO DETACHMENT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CO 2225  
CONDUCTED ON 22 June 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDA NMSC  
CL DECL IS DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
OBTAINED FROM Mutual Intelligence

G 44

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. THERE ARE FURTHER INDICATIONS OF THE GROWING POLITICAL STRUGGLE WITHIN IRAN'S RULING CIRCLE. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER BANI SADR HAS APPEALED FOR THE RELEASE OF THE US HOSTAGES AND SAID THAT THE UN RESOLUTION PAVED THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAS LAUNCHED A THIMBLY VEILED ATTACK ON QOTBZADEH AND LECTURED THE STUDENTS IN THE EMBASSY.

THE MAIN DRAMA STILL LIES AT THE US EMBASSY, BUT ON THE SIDELINES THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL OF IRAN CONTINUES AND WILL LIKELY INTENSIFY IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.

2. IT APPEARS THAT THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS MOUNTED A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN REGARDING THE CURRENT CRISIS WITH THE US. IN LATE NOVEMBER, THE MINISTRY REPORTEDLY ISSUED A CIRCULAR NOTIFYING IRANIAN EMBASSIES THAT THEY SHOULD UNDERTAKE SUCH A CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF THE SEIZURE OF THE US EMBASSY AND THE HOLDING OF THE HOSTAGES. EMBASSIES ARE TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE PRESS AND OTHER DIPLOMATS IRANIAN STATEMENTS ON THE ISSUE. IN THIS REGARD, ON 4 DECEMBER THE US EMBASSY IN SANA, YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, RECEIVED AN ENVELOPE FROM THE IRANIAN EMBASSY WITH A COPY OF KHOMEINI'S REPLY TO THE POPE'S DEMARCHE AND A LETTER FROM ONE OF THE US HOSTAGES. THE LETTER IS THE ONE WHICH WAS PUBLICIZED BY THE STUDENTS IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE OCCUPATION. THUS, IT SEEMS THAT THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IS UNDERWAY.

3. IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER QOTBZADEH HAS LOST HIS POST AS HEAD OF NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION (NIRT), WHICH HE HAD HELD SINCE MID-FEBRUARY. A BROADCAST COUNCIL IS TO MANAGE NIRT. QOTBZADEH HAS BEEN VERY CONTROVERSIAL IN THE POST AND HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF USING IT TO FURTHER HIS OWN ENDS AND TO STIFLE DISSIDENT VIEWS. THE ACTION COMES AFTER A REPORT THAT THE NEWSPAPER SUPPORTING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S POLITICAL PARTY HAS ATTACKED QOTBZADEH FOR BEING TOO HARDLINE CONCERNING THE RECENT RESOLUTION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT TEHRAN RADIO MAY BE TAKING A MORE CONCILIATORY LINE, WITH A COMMENT TODAY THAT THE UN RESOLUTION HAS LEFT OPEN THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS NOT YET CERTAIN WHO IS BEHIND THIS POSITION, BUT THE REPLACEMENT OF QOTBZADEH COULD BE A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT.

4. MOSCOW HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED ITS ANTI-US PROPAGANDA BY ACCUSING THE US OF WHIPPING UP THE HOSTAGE CRISIS INTO ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS SINCE WORLD WAR II. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR DISAPPROVAL OF THE VIOLATION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, THEY NOW TREAT THAT ASPECT OF THE CRISIS AS MINOR COMPARED WITH THE GRAVITY OF US MILITARY THREATS AGAINST IRAN. BY FANNING THE FIRES OF ANTI-US FEELINGS, MOSCOW CALCULATES THAT IT HAS LITTLE TO LOSE. ITS MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY FOR IRAN WILL ADD TO ANTI-US SENTIMENT NOT ONLY IN IRAN BUT IN OTHER MUSLIM NATIONS AS WELL.

5. OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS, MILITARY ACTIVITY HAS INCREASED, PROBABLY IN CONTINUED RESPONSE TO WIDESPREAD PUBLIC SPECULATION THAT US FORCES WOULD ATTACK IRAN DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN DECEMBER.

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6. TWO OF THE IRANIAN COMBATANT HARPOON-CAPABLE MISSILE BOATS

ON 5 DEC AN IRANIAN P-3 APPEARED IN THE CENTRAL MILES OF THE MIDWAY. THE IRANIANS ARE PROBABLY EXPERIENCING LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN LOCATING THE TASK FORCE BECAUSE OF ITS HIGH COMMS AND NAVID/TACAN PROSILE. THIS INDICATE A GREATER IRANIAN P-3 CAPABILITY THAN WAS PREVIOUSLY ASSESSED.

G-44

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FOREIGN OWNERS OF CARGO LINERS THAT NORMALLY DELIVER GOODS TO IRAN APPARENTLY HAVE BEGUN TO A WITHDRAWAL FROM IRANIAN TRADE. THIS IS PROBABLY MOTIVATED BY THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE SITUATION AND THE RISK OF LOSS OF CARGO BECAUSE OF HOSTILITIES. THEY MAY ALSO BE MOTIVATED BY THE DECREASING AVAILABILITY OF CARGO FOR IRAN. IN ADDITION, INSURANCE RATES WERE QUADRUPLED ON WEDNESDAY AFTER LONDON MARINE UNDERWRITERS DECLARED THE PERSIAN GULF A WAR ZONE.

! ! ! ! !

IRAN IS DEPENDENT ON WATER-BORN FREIGHT FOR ABOUT 40,000 METRIC TONS OF GOODS A DAY. IRANIAN SHIPS COULD HANDLE AT PEAK CAPACITY LESS THAN HALF THAT AMOUNT. SIMILARLY IRANIAN SHIPS COULD CARRY LESS THAN 15 PERCENT OF IRAN'S OIL EXPORTS AT THIS TIME. IT IS UNLIKELY, THOUGH, THAT THERE WOULD BE A COMPLETE CUT-OFF OF IRAN'S OIL SUPPLY IN THE PERSIAN GULF. SOME COMMERCIAL LINES INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO VISIT IRANIAN PORTS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ARAB SHIPPING LINES WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO VISIT IRANIAN PORTS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

! ! ! ! !

ALTHOUGH OVERLAND TRANSPORT LINKS HAVE A COMBINED CAPACITY OF ABOUT 100 MILLION TONS PER YEAR, THESE ROUTES HAVE CARRIED ONLY ABOUT 10 MILLION TONS PER YEAR. IRANIAN OVERLAND TRANSPORT LINKS CARRIED ABOUT 75 MILLION TONS PER YEAR.

! ! ! ! !

OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE LOWER OIL PRICES AND ARE DRAGGALY REDUCING PRODUCTION. ON 17 DECEMBER VENEZUELA ANNOUNCED A NEW PRICE STRUCTURE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REFUSING TO ACCEPT THE US DOLLAR IN PAYMENT FOR OIL.

! ! ! ! !

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE IRAQI DEVELOPMENT FUND HAS SAID THAT IRAQ DOES NOT SUPPORT A SHARP INCREASE IN OIL PRICES. IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, WHICH MIGHT BE EXACERBATED BY AS WELL AS FRIENDLY INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES WHO ARE AGAINST FREEZING PRICES AND BELIEVES THAT OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES SHOULD MAINTAIN THEIR CURRENT PRICES.

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COMMENTARY ON THE IRAN CRISIS... MOSCOW'S DISAPPROVAL OF THE AYATOLLAH KHOMENI'S DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM... THE US GOVERNMENT HOPES TO CONVEY... THE USSR OFFICIALS ON RECORD AS... INTERVENTIONS.

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13. A GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER, A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER, A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE ARE CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS KETT BAWK (TG 70.2) TASK GROUP, WHILE A MINESWEEPER REMAINS WITH THE USS MIDWAY (TG 70.1) TASK GROUP. AN OILER, A NAVAL SUBORDINATED MERCHANT TANKER, AND A REFRIGERATED STORES SHIP ARE PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THESE UNITS. A PAIR OF IL-38/MAY ASW AIRCRAFT CONDUCTED RECONNAISSANCE OF BOTH US TASK GROUPS ON 5 DEC. A LIGHT FRIGATE REMAINS IN THE WESTERN B...  
[REDACTED]

14. WEATHER FORECAST SUMMARY

(A) FORECAST FOR U.S. EAST COAST

6-8 DEC: CLOUDY SKIES WITH WARM MOST AIR MASS MOVING INTO AREA FROM GULF OF MEXICO AHEAD OF FRONTAL SYSTEM WINGING THROUGH MIDWEST, LOW CEILINGS, LIGHT TO MODERATE RAIN, REDUCED VISIBILITIES EXPECTED AS SYSTEM MOVES THROUGH REGION. TEMPERATURES WARMER THAN RECENT PAST FEW DAYS AS PREFRONTAL RAIN FALLS OVER AREA, THEN DROPPING BACK DOWN TO COLDER TEMPERATURES AFTER FRONTAL PASSAGE.

8-11 DEC: FIRST FRONT MOVES THROUGH AREA RAPIDLY FOLLOWED BY A SECOND FRONT WITH ASSOCIATED LOW CEILINGS, RAIN SHOWERS (POSSIBLE SNOWSHOWERS), GUSTY SURFACE WINDS AND LOWER TEMPERATURES. THIS SECOND FRONT WILL LINGER SLIGHTLY OVER EAST COAST MOVING OFFSHORE AT END OF PERIOD.

(B) FORECAST FOR SOUTHWEST U.S.A.

6-14 DEC: UPPER LEVEL RIDGE WILL CONTINUE TO DOMINATE THE DESERT REGION. ASSOCIATED SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE WILL GIVE GOOD VISIBILITIES IN THE DESERT EXCEPT NEAR POPULATED AREAS. SURFACE WINDS ARE INFLUENCED BY TOPOGRAPHY AND DIURNAL HEATING/COOLING: CALM AT NIGHT, GUSTY IN THE AFTERNOON AT 10-15 KNOTS. UPPER LEVEL RIDGING PRODUCES CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES; HIGH LEVEL CLOUDS ASSOCIATED WITH JET STREAM.

(C) OUTLOOK FOR IRAN

6-7 DEC: SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE TO DOMINATE REGION. SURFACE LOW PRESSURE CENTER MOVING INTO CASPIAN SEA HAS FRONT EXTENDING SOUTHWARD INTO NORTHERN IRAN WITH SCATTERED LOW AND MIDDLE LEVEL CLOUDS. NO SIGNIFICANT WEATHER EXPECTED IN IRAN. HIGH CLOUDS OVER SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL IRAN ASSOCIATED WITH UPPER LEVEL RIDGE.

7-15 DEC: UPPER LEVEL RIDGE AND SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE WILL DOMINATE DURING PERIOD KEEPING ALL FRONTS NORTH OF IRAN. BATTLE FOR DOMINANCE WILL BEGIN TOWARD END OF PERIOD FOR RETURN OF FRONTAL SYSTEMS AND ASSOCIATED BAD WEATHER.

RVW 06DEC09

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G 60

MSG055  
251655R NOV 79

FM JTF  
TO DELTA

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DIN, NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET THREAT TO JAM U.S. COMMO DURING  
EXECUTION EXTRACTION

3. THE TASK GROUP 70.2, HEADED BY THE USS KITTY HAWK, MAY ALSO  
BE CURRENTLY UNDER SURFACE SURVEILLANCE BY THE KYNDA CLASS ROCKET  
CRUISER (RKR) 019 "ADMIRAL FOXIN" [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] RKR 019  
IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE SAM KOTLIN CLASS DESTROYER (EM) 785  
"VOZRUZHDENNYJ" AND THE MERCHANT TANKER "LENINA."

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~~SECRET~~

G 66 ✓

MSG053  
251153R NOV 79

FM JTF  
TO DELTA

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO Nmcc  
 DECL ED DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON SADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

SUBJECT: WORKING PAPER [FOR DELTA]

1. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY TASK GROUP: COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE USS MIDWAY TASK GROUP REMAINS CONSTANT DURING THE LAST 24 HOURS. WITH A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE AND A MINESWEEPER (SUPPORTED BY AN OILER) REMAINING WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 15 NM OF THE TASK GROUP.

2. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST [REDACTED]. THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO SOVIET NAVAL/ASSOC UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF [REDACTED] HOWEVER, A SOVIET-GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER AND AN AUXILIARY REMAIN IN THE VICINITY OF THE SEYCHELLE ISLANDS, WHILE AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIP AND AN AUXILIARY ARE TRANSITING NORTHERLY NORTH OF THE ISLANDS.

3. DISPOSITION OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP: AT PRESENT NO SOVIET SURFACE UNITS ARE IN SURVIELLANCE OF THE KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP. HOWEVER, A GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER, A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER, AND A NAVAL ASSOCIATED MERCHANT TANKER ARE LOCATED AT THE NORTHERN APPROACHER OF THE MALACCA STRAIT AND MAY REMAIN THERE FOR THE KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP TRANSITING NORTHERLY IN THE CENTRAL MALACCA STRAIT.

5. [REDACTED]

RVW 25 NOV 09

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G 76


SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS IN TEHRAN/D

01 20 NOV 79

A. AIRPORT

(R)

(1) PROCEDURES CLEARING OUT OF AIRPORT:  
DO NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY MORE STRINGENT THAN OTHER TRIPS MADE DURING JUNE/JULY 1979. REVOLUTIONARY GDS (RG) ARE IN SUPERVISORY POSITIONS. HOWEVER, MOST OFFICIALS ARE REGULAR CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION OFFICERS SEEN PRIOR TO REVOLUTION. MAINLY CONCENTRATING ON PAPERS, DOCUMENTS, ANYTHING ROLLED (E.G. BLUEPRINTS) OR ANYTHING WITH NUMBERS. ENTIRE DOCUMENT PACKAGE CONFISCATED. HOWEVER,



THERE ARE NO ROAD/VEHICLE CONTROLS ON WAY TO AIRPORT. FIRST CONTROL IS INSIDE MAIN DEPARTURES HALL WHERE BAGGAGE TO BE CHECKED IS PLACED ON TABLES AND CHECKED SUPERFICIALLY. PROCEEDING TO APPROPRIATE AIRLINE COUNTER PASSPORT CHECK, IN-PROCESSING BY AIRLINE PERSONNEL AND FINAL CARRYON BAGGAGE CHECK BY RG PERSONNEL. THEY PURPORT TO BE AIRLINE PERSONNEL PUT ARE OBVIOUSLY NOT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12258  
CONDUCTED ON 28 June 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DBO, NMC  
 DECL ED DOWNGRADED TO CONF  
REVIEW ON JADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]


(2) NIGHT TIME AIRPORT LIGHTING:  
FROM ABOUT TEN MINUTES OUT (BY BUS) AIRPORT PLDGS, AND SURROUNDING AREAS ARE VERY WELL SEEN (LIGHTED). APPROACH TO TERMINAL, PARKING AREAS, HARDSTANDS AND IMMEDIATE VICINITY RUNWAY AREA ALSO WELL LIGHTEN. AI BELIEVES THAT THE AIRPORT HAS GROUND POWER UNITS AVAILABLE BUT DOES NOT RATE RELIABILITY FACTOR VERY HIGH. GENERALLY, EQUIPMENT CONDITIONS ARE IN STATE OF DETERIORATION THROUGHOUT COUNTRY.

(3) SECURITY: NO ARMY UNITS SEEN ANYWHERE IN CITY AND VICINITY. RG AND OTHER CIVILIAN ORGANS ARE PERFORMING WHAT LITTLE POLICE FUNCTIONS ARE STILL VIABLE. TRAFFIC POLICE PRACTICALLY POWERLESS--NO ONE PAYS ATTENTION TO THEIR DIRECTIONS.

B. ROADWAY FM AIRPORT TO CITY:

(1) ASPHALT PAVED (POOR CONDITION, NOT HOLED BUT ROUGH) FOUR LANE HIGHWAY (CIRCA 20 FT WIDE/TWO LANES EACH DIRECTION) WITH NARROW MEDIAN STRIP PLANTED WITH SHRUBS AND TREES. HVY TRK TRFC HAS CAUSED DAMAGE TO SURFACE..

(2) TFC PEAKS BETWEEN 0645 THRU 0830 HRS WORK DAYS. OTHER TIMES GENERALLY DENSE BUT HIGH-SPEED MIXED VEHICLE TRFC. (USUAL SPEED IS 50-60 MPH FOR CARS, BUSES, TRKS). MUCH DUMP TRK TRAFFIC. HOWEVER, COMMERCIAL TFC NOT ALLOWED EAST OF QUOTE OLD TOLL STATION UNQUOTE ON TEHERAN-KARAJ HIWAY. SINCE APPROX TWO WEEKS INTERCHANGE ON TEHERAN-KARAJ HIWAY LEADING ON TO MOHAMMAD ALI JENAH ROAD (ROUTE FM CITY TO AIRPORT) HAS BEEN CHANGED. FORMERLY TFC FM CITY TO AIRPORT LEFT HIWAY BEFORE REACHING MOHAMMED ALI JENAH ROAD AND HAD TO STOP FOR TFC BEFORE TURNING SOUTH ONTO MOHAMMED ALI JENAH ROAD TO PROCEED DIRECTION OF AIRPORT. TFC NOW CROSSES OVER MOHAMMED ALI JENAH ROAD AND EXISTS RIGHT, CIRCLES DOWN TO MERGE WITH SOUTHBOUND TFC ON MOHAMMED ALI JENAH ROAD. DECREASED DRIVING TIME CIRCA TEN MINUTES IN PEAK TFC HRS. ENTRY ONTO HIWAY NORTHBOUND ON MOHAMMED ALI JENAH ROAD FM AIRPORT TO CITY HAS NOT BEEN CHANGED. IT IS SIMPLY A RIGHT HAND ACCESS RAMP WITH MERGE ONTO HIWAY. ROADWAY (HIGHWAY) IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING LARGE TRKS. ALL FORMS OF VEHICULAR TRFC. USUALLY DENSE



WITH MORNING PEAK LISTED ABOVE (THREE OR FOUR ACFT DEPART AIRPORT DURING MORNING HOURS ACCOUNTING FOR MUCH OF THIS OUTBOUND TRFC. INBOUND TRFC DURING MORNING HRS IS USUALLY HEAVY, BUT LESS TRFC OUTBOUND.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(3) ROAD HIWAY LIGHTED VERY WELL FM AIRPORT TO CITY SUPURBS. INGRESS INTO CITY (VIC AMEMB) IS ON TARASHT HIWAY, WHICH IS EXTENSION OF TEHRAN-KARAJ HIWAY IN NORTH EASTERLY DIRECTION. ONE CAN EXIT AS FIRST SIGNAL LIGHT ON HIGHWAY, AND DRIVING EAST (PASS TWO SIGNAL LIGHTS) ENTER THE SOUTHWIND VANAK HIWAY WHICH EMPTIES ONTO KENNEDY. TURNING EAST ON SHAH REZE (BLVD/SIC) ONE COMES INTO THE CITY APPROX TWO/THREE BLOCKS SOUTH OF AMEMB.

C. EMBASSY:

(1) CONDITIONS IN FRONT OF AMEMB VARIES WITH NUMBERS OF DEMONSTRATIONS TAKING PLACE. TAKHT-E-JAMSHID (STREET) EXTENDS ALONG SOUTH OF AMEMB COMPOUND WHERE MAIN ENTRANCE IS ALSO LOCATED. THAT STREET IS MAIN THROUGHFARE AND TRFC POLICE TRY TO KEEP IT CLEAR HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE DURING DEMOS. THERE SEEMS TO BE NO CYCLICAL FREQUENCY TO DEMOS. NOR CONSISTENTLY AVERAGE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS. A2 WAS TOLD BY AN LN (LOCAL NATIONAL) EMPLOYEE THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY OBSERVED RGS PASSING OUT MONEY TO PERSONS IF THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN DEMOS. A2 CONCLUDES THAT THERE ARE THE FERVENT FEW AND THE PAID CROWDS. UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS (NO OR FEW DEMOS); A2 REPORTS THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PASS IN FRONT OF AMEMB COMPOUND IN A VEHICLE. PASSENGERS WOULD PROBABLY BE SUBJECTED TO HECKLING AND VERBAL ABUSE, BUT NO VIOLENCE. THERE WERE NO ROADBLOCKS ON ROADWAYS LEADING INTO THE VICINITY OF THE AMEMB AS OF 16-17 NOV 79.

(2) A2 REPORTS THAT AMEMB GRNDS HAVE STANDARD STREET LIGHTING IN FRONT, HOWEVER, THE SIDES AND REAR OF THE COMPOUND ARE POORLY LIGHTED [REDACTED] AND REMARKED THAT THE AREA BETWEEN THE REAR (NORTH) OF THE MAIN EMBASSY BLDGS AND THE AMPASSADOR'S HOUSE WAS VERY DIMLY LIGHTED. HE COMPARED IT TO CENTRAL PARK.

(3) LIMITED AND INFREQUENT PERIPHERAL OBSERVATION DURING DAYTIME HOURS SINCE THE TAKEOVER BY BOTH A1 AND A2 REVEALED THAT THE INTERIOR PERIMETER/OF THE AMEMB COMPOUND APPEARED TO BE WELL GUARDED BY ARMED GUARDS WITH SMG & G3'S NO INFORMATION OF CONTROLS IN VICINITY OF AMEMB ENTRANCE. HOWEVER, A2 RESPONDED THAT ANYONE RESEMBLING AN AMERICAN WOULD CERTAINLY BE STOPPED AND INVESTIGATED BY RGS BEFORE HE COULD GET CLOSE TO THE MAIN ENTRANCE. A1 OPINES THAT USE OF ANY MILITARY FORCE TO RELEASE HOSTAGES WOULD RESULT IN THEIR DEATH.

RVW 21NOV09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CEXISUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: ~~SECRET~~

*JCS  
copy*

TITLE: POSSIBLE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD FACILITY (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT  
(SEE ATTACHED)

~~SECRET~~

*C*

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM ~~SECRET~~

SOURCE:

~~SECRET~~

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

Classified By: *DIA*  
Declassified ON: *OADR*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

G-81

153 0810

JTB 021533Z APR 00

FM: JIF 13-1/

TO: SFOU 13-1/

Ac [redacted] 13-2/  
13-1/

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Apr 02  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

BT

~~Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR~~

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

FROM JTF  
TO 130W  
INFO  
ALY

G-102

SECRET  
O THE  
REVIEW ON  
SECRET

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500 9 APRIL 1980

1. IN POLITICAL EVENTS, KHOMEINI HAS CHARACTERIZED THE BREAKING OF  
RELATIONS BY THE US AS A VICTORY FOR IRAN, SINCE THIS SHOWS "THE  
US GOVERNMENT HAS LOST ALL HOPE OF CONTROLLING IRAN." REVOLUTIONARY  
COUNCIL SPOKESMAN, HABABI, DECLARED A "BELT-TIGHTENING HOLY WAR" IN  
RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S EMBARGO, SAYING IT WOULD MEAN RATIONING  
OF CONSUMER GOODS, PUTTING A LID ON SALARIES AND OVERTIME, AND  
CLEANING UP ON HOARDERS AND OTHERS WHO CAUSE DOMESTIC SHORTAGES.  
THE US EMBARGO WILL ACTUALLY HAVE LITTLE OR NO AFFECT ON IRAN'S ECONOMY  
WITH THE HELP OF ALLIES. HOWEVER, IRAN WILL PROBABLY BLAME MOST OF  
ITS PAST DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ON THE US EMBARGO.

2. RIDING TO NEW HEIGHTS OF NEWSPEAK, MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY  
CONGRATULATES AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI THIS MORNING ON INSISTING "FROM THE  
VERY START" ON SEVERING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IN A  
STATEMENT BROADCAST BY TEHRAN RADIO, THE MILITANTS CALLED FOR A  
"SERIAL GENERAL MARCH" ON FRIDAY TO DEMONSTRATE IRANIAN UNITY IN THE  
FACE OF THE U.S. THREAT. THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING UNITY CROPS  
IS EMPHASIZED IN THIS STATEMENT.

3. PRESIDENT LARI SADR, DURING A TEHRAN RADIO INTERVIEW YESTERDAY,  
ACCUSED IRAN OF PERFIPOUS IRANIS. HE ALSO WARNED THE EUROPEANS NOT TO  
SUPPORT THE U.S. TRADE EMBARGO. HE HINTED THAT THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE  
YET FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST IRAN, AND SAID IRAN ALSO, COULD ACT.  
HE APPARENTLY SAID THAT IRAN HAS THE MOST TO FEAR FROM DOMESTIC  
DISSENT.

4. LARI SADR ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT KHOMEINI HAD URGED THE IRANIAN  
GOVERNMENT TO POSITION AN OBSERVER AT THE EMBASSY TO ENSURE THE  
HOSTAGES' "HUMANITARIAN RIGHTS ARE MET." HE GAVE NO DETAILS AS  
TO WHEN OR HOW THIS DIRECTIVE WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

5. KHOMEINI LAST NIGHT RECEIVED ARCHBISHOP HILARION CAPUCCI WHO  
PARTICIPATED IN THE EASTER CEREMONIES THAT WERE CONDUCTED FOR THE  
U.S. HOSTAGES. NO DETAILS WERE GIVEN BY TEHRAN RADIO AS TO WHAT  
WAS DISCUSSED.

6. A U.S. SPOKESMAN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF  
SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM YESTERDAY. "THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS  
DISAPPOINTED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE FACT THAT NO SOLUTION TO  
THE CRISIS HAS BEEN FOUND. IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS  
WORKED OUT WITH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED. HOW-  
EVER, THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO  
ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THE SAFE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES.

7. WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN JUDY POWELL TOLD REPORTERS YESTERDAY  
THAT HELD SUPPORT FOR U.S. MEASURES TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS WOULD  
BE ESSENTIAL IF ADDITIONAL MEASURES INVOLVING EVEN GREATER RISKS  
FOR ALL ARE TO BE AVOIDED. POWELL CHARACTERIZED HIS REFERENCE TO  
POSSIBLE FURTHER ACTIONS AS A STATEMENT OF POLICY.

8. IRAN AND IRAQ ARE CONTINUING THEIR PROPAGANDA WAR, AND APPEAR ON A  
COLLISION COURSE. AS YESTERDAY IRAQI PRESIDENT SADEK HUSSEIN DECLARED  
HIS COUNTRY WAS READY TO DO BATTLE. DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN TEHRAN TOLD  
OFFICIALS THAT IRAN HAD DISPATCHED REINFORCEMENTS TO SEVERAL SECTIONS  
OF ITS BORDERS WITH IRAQ OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS.

9. [REDACTED]

10. IN A PROBABLY RELATED DEVELOPMENT, IRAN IS BEGINNING TO REDEPLOY  
ITS AAA WHICH WERE WITHDRAWN IN MID-FEBRUARY.

11. [REDACTED] IS LIKELY THE AAA WILL BE  
REDEPLOYED AT OTHER LOCATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE IRAQI THREAT

13. THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM DIA SPECIAL ASSESSMENT ON IRANIAN HOSTAGES

1. THE HOLDING OF HOSTAGES IS NOT NEW IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS RECENTLY AS 1962, THE IRAN ARMY OF YEMEN HELD THE SONS OF TRIBAL LEADERS TO ASSURE THE GOOD BEHAVIOR OF THE ZAIDE TRIBES. THE LEADERS DELIVERED THEIR SONS VOLUNTARILY, THEREBY DEMONSTRATING THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF HIS MORAL AUTHORITY AS ORDAINED BY GOD. THE SONS WERE WELL TREATED AS EVIDENCE OF THE IMAM'S MORAL AUTHORITY. AND SO IT IS WITH KHOMEINI. THE HOSTAGES ARE NOT AMERICAN QUILLENCE, BUT OUR QUILESCENCE DEMONSTRATES HIS MORAL AUTHORITY. THE DEMAND OF THE IRANIANS, FIRST THAT US APOLOGIZE FOR OUR SUPPORT OF THE SHAH AND THEN THAT US DELIVER HIM FOR JUSTICE HAS THE SAME PURPOSE TO SHOW IRANIAN MORAL AUTHORITY. FOR THE IRANIANS, USG ARE INFERIOR IN THESE TERMS, WHATEVER US MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

2. THE PROSPECT REMAINS THAT THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENT COULD FREE THE HOSTAGES. IT ADDRESSES THE ISSUE IN JUNE OR JULY. THIS PROSPECT IS NOT PROMISING ALTHOUGH IT COULD BE KHOMEINI'S ESCAPE-VALVE. TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES, SUCH AS KHOMEINI HAS FASHIONED, OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS. IN TRADITIONAL ISLAM, A PARLIAMENT WAS NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF REPRESENTATION, BUT RATHER IF EMBODIED A POPULAR CONSENSUS, WHICH ITSELF WAS INSPIRED BY GOD. IF KHOMEINI FREES THE HOSTAGES ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY, HIS OPPONENTS COULD CHARGE HE HAD MOVED AGAINST GOD'S WILL. BUT THIS CHARGE COULD NOT BE MADE AGAINST THE VOICE OF CONSENSUS. KHOMEINI WILL HAVE NO TROUBLE ACCEPTING THE PARLIAMENT'S JUDGEMENT, WHATEVER IT MAY BE. HOWEVER, THE PARLIAMENT'S WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY FREE THE HOSTAGES. IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE UNSURE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY AND HESITANT TO ESTABLISH REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS. ALSO, IT WILL PROBABLY BE DOMINATED BY THE HARD-LINE, CLERGY-ORIENTED ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY.

3. WE (USG) THEN FIND OURSELVES IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE. KHOMEINI CANNOT FREE THE HOSTAGES. THE PARLIAMENT CAN, BUT IT IS NOT LIKELY TO DO SO. IT WILL PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES FOR FEAR OF GOING AGAINST THE WISSES OF THE IMAM. THUS, MAKING ANY DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS, WE BELIEVE THE HOSTAGES WILL NOT BE RELEASED PRIOR TO THE CONVENING OF PARLIAMENT IN JUNE OR JULY. MOREOVER, THE PARLIAMENT WILL PROBABLY DETERMINE THAT THE HOSTAGES MUST BE HELD UNTIL THE SHAH AND HIS WEALTH ARE RETURNED.

14. WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST - 9 APRIL 1980

PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OVER IRAN TODAY WITH ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS FROM CENTRAL SAUDI ARABIA INTO NE IRAN ASSOCIATED WITH UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE & LOW PRESSURE CENTER NEAR MOSCOW WITH FRONTAL BOUNDARY SOUTH ACROSS CENTRAL TURKEY LACK INTO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN HAS CONSIDERABLE CLOUDINESS, RAINSHOWERS, AND ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS.

15. LONG - RANGE OUTLOOK FOR THE MIDDLE EAST REGION

9-11APR: THUNDERSTORM ACTIVITY DISIPATING IN IRAN-SAUDI ARABIA REGION BY THE 10TH AS THE FRONTAL SYSTEM IN TURKEY MOVES EASTWARD. A SECONDARY LOW PRESSURE CENTER IN TURKEY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FRONTAL BOUNDARY FROM THE NORTH WILL VARY CLOUDY SKIES AND POOR WEATHER ACROSS CENTRAL-MIDDLE EAST AFFECTING EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAQ, AND IRAN AS THIS SYSTEM MOVES EAST. ANOTHER STORM SYSTEM MOVES INTO WESTERN TURKEY ON THE 11TH. SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD ESCAPE THE MAJOR AFFECTS OF THE STORM SYSTEM MOVEMENTS, EXCEPT FOR THE N1/4 REGION. GUSTY SURFACE WINDS SHOULD PRECEED THE FRONTAL SYSTEM MOVEMENT WITH BLOWING EASTWARD REDUCING VISIBILITY.

11-13APR: CLOUDY SKIES OVER IRAN WITH POOR WEATHER AS FRONTAL SYSTEMS MOVE WE OUT OF COUNTRY BY 12-13TH. UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE MOVES ACROSS TURKEY 11-13TH INTO IRAN AND GRADUALLY THROUGH IRAN THROUGH THE 10TH WITH A CHANCE OF SURFACE FRONT DEVELOPMENT PRODUCING CONSIDERABLE CLOUDINESS, RAINSHOWERS, AND ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS. ANOTHER UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE MOVES INTO WESTERN TURKEY ABOUT 13-17TH IN EASTWARD PROGRESSION.

16. WIND/TURBULENCE FORECAST FOR IRAN & PERSIAN GULF

IRAN: SURFACE WINDS N1/2 SW-NW 5-15 KNOTS WITH AFTERNOON GUSTS TO 20-25 KNOTS WITH OCCASIONAL LIGHT TURBULENCE FROM SURFACE TO 500 FT. S1/2 WINDS 5-15 KNOTS, NO TURB. PERSIAN GULF: SURFACE WINDS 5-15 KNOTS, NO TURB.

1138  
013 101834Z APR 80  
FM: JIF/JE  
TO: SF03/SZ  
AS [redacted] /SZ  
[redacted] /AZ

G-108

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO [redacted]  
CONDUCTED ON [redacted]  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO VMPK  
 DECL. OR DOWNGRADED TO [redacted]  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EST, APRIL 10, 1980

1. THE PRG HAS INDICATED IT WILL TAKE ACTION TO SUPPORT U.S. EFFORTS TO WIN THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. POSSIBLE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN -- AND THAT COULD BE TAKEN BY OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS -- ARE TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE DURING A MEETING, NOW UNDERWAY, IN LISBON.
2. TOKYO KYODO THIS MORNING REPORTS THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED IT WILL ALSO TAKE SUPPORTIVE STEPS. A "PACKAGE" WILL INCLUDE LIMITATION EXPORTS TO IRAN TO PRESENT LEVELS, HOLDING OIL IMPORTS TO PRESENT LEVELS, NOT ACCEPTING NEW COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS FROM IRAN AND REFUSING FURTHER IRANIAN DEMANDS FOR OIL PRICE RISES ON IRAN CONTRACTS.
3. IN AN UNATHIBUTED COMMENTARY, TEHRAN RADIO YESTERDAY BROADCAST A FAIRLY LENGTHY STATEMENT ON THE U.S. DECISION TO S. EVEN DIPLOMATIC TIES. MOST OF THE BROADCAST WAS TAKEN UP WITH INCOMPLEMENTARY INVECTIVE AGAINST "CARTER AND HIS RIGID" FOR ATTEMPTION TO THWART THE "WILL OF THE PEOPLE." TO THE EXTENT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIVE POINT IT WAS THAT THE BREAK FURTHERED IRAN'S REAL INTERESTS BY PUTTING GREATER DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. NO THREATS WERE MADE.



4. THE MILITANTS ISSUED A STATEMENT YESTERDAY DECLARING THAT IF THE US IMPLEMENTS THE "SLIGHTEST INTERVENTION AGAINST IRAN," THEY WILL "DESTROY ALL OF THE HOSTAGES ON THE SPOT." IN ANOTHER PRESS INTERVIEW, AYATOLLAH SEHESHTI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND LEADER OF THE HARDLINE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY (IRP), SAID THAT PUTTING SOME OF THE HOSTAGES ON A I.E. IS STILL A POSSIBILITY. HE REFUSED TO SAY HOWEVER, WHAT LINE HIS PARTY WOULD TAKE ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE WHEN THE PARLIAMENT CONVENES. (NOTE: THE IRP IS EXPECTED TO DOMINATE THE FUTURE ELECTIONS, AND WILL LIKELY DO ITS UTMOST TO SEE THAT THE HOSTAGES ARE NOT RELEASED.)

5. IRANIAN T.V. ALSO SHOWED A FILM OF ALLEGED SPY CONFESSIONS BY TWO HOSTAGES WHOSE IDENTITIES WERE NOT MADE CLEAR. IN THE FILM, ONE HOSTAGE IS SAID DISCUSS "ELECTRONIC MONITORING EQUIPMENT" WHILE THE OTHER MAN TALKS OF "AERIAL SPYING." THE SERVICES SPECULATE THIS MAY BE A PRECURSOR TO HOSTAGE TRIALS.

7. FOREIGN MINISTER SHOTLEZADEN YESTERDAY TOOK A MODERATE LINE IN A LIVE INTERVIEW WITH CBS AND SAID HE PERSONALLY FAVORED ALLOWING THE HOSTAGES, FAMILIES TO VISIT THEM. HE TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE FREQUENT HUMANITARIAN VISITS WITH THE MILITANTS. HOWEVER, UPI REPORTS A MILITANT AT THE ENERGY YESTERDAY AS SAYING "THERE IS NO NEED FOR OTHER PEOPLE TO VISIT." SHOTLEZADEN SAID YESTERDAY TRIALS ARE "OUT OF THE QUESTION."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G-119

G-119

121600Z APR 80

TO: [REDACTED]

1. THE FOLLOWING IS FROM A SOURCE OF RELIABLE SOURCE.  
[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] IN THE COURSE OF THE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

3. ON 01 MARCH, A LARGE BLUE STATION WAGON WAS SEEN DRIVING SOUTH ON ROOSEVELT. SOURCE SPOKE TO 3 INDIVIDUALS IN VEH, WHO SAID THEY WERE "SHARING THE SPY NETS". BASE APPEARS TO BE THE BUILDING ON [REDACTED], PREVIOUSLY NOTED AS A BASE AREA. ROUTE APPEARS TO BE WEST OF [REDACTED], SOUTH ON ROOSEVELT.

4. AT STATION, TWO UNARMED POLICE WERE NOTED AT Y-19, INSIDE WEST [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

5. THERE IS A NEW GENDARMERIE BUILDING IN SHARIFABAD. THE OLD [REDACTED] [REDACTED], BUT IT HAS BEEN MOVED TO A POINT [REDACTED] WEST OF THE [REDACTED] INTERSECTION, NORTH OF THE ROAD. (THERE IS ALSO A TRAFFIC POLICE POST RIGHT AT THE INTERSECTION, ON THE NORTH SIDE).

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Confidential  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

G-130

PRG 341492Z APR 80

TO: SEOD/S-2/  
A/S-2/  
S-2/A-2/  
HELOS DET

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/  
EZ05:  
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 130480/000001  
TO 170480/240000;

FOR SITE POINT H 320035N 0310346W

COV DATE/TIME INSV

[REDACTED]

FOR POINT Y.P.G. 330000N 1140000W

[REDACTED]

FOR E 302500N 0264000W

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. (S) [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 12258  
CONDUCTED ON 28 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDP NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NNNNA

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

G-145

MSG 911

DIG 152335Z APR 80  
FM: JTF/J2  
TO SFOD/S2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

1. A SECRET/SENSITIVE REPORT RECEIVED FROM USDOS ON THEIR CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING.

[REDACTED]

3. WE ARE FOLLOWING UP AGGRESSIVELY. FULL TEXT OF STATE MEMO WILL BE BROUGHT DOWN BY [REDACTED] DETAILS WILL BE FORWARDED IMMEDIATELY AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

BT

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 RECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

MSG JDB  
DTG 201332Z APR 80  
FM: JTF/J2  
TO: SFOD/S2  
F-50W  
SITE ALFA  
SHEPHERD WIRE TO CV

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMcC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON 10 APR  
G DERIVED FROM Multiple Source

3-175

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN ON 20 APRIL 80

1. LOUISA KENNEDY TOLD REPORTERS THAT IN THE END THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOT BLOCK RELATIVES FROM GOING TO IRAN. SHE SAID THAT IF A FAMILY WANTED TO SUBJECT ITSELF TO THE PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IT WOULD FACE FROM A SHORT VISIT, IT WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THAT PERSONAL DECISION. BUT SHE SAID THE MORE PROPAGANDA THE MILITANTS MIGHT GAIN FROM SUCH VISITS, THE LONGER THEY MIGHT KEEP THE HOSTAGES.
2. MRS. KENNEDY WAS SPEAKING AT A NEWS CONFERENCE AT WHICH SHE ANNOUNCED A TRIP TO WESTERN EUROPE BY FOUR RELATIVES OF HOSTAGES ON A BID TO WIN PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT. THE FOUR WILL TRAVEL TO LONDON, PARIS, BONN, ROME AND LUXEMBOURG FROM APRIL 22 TO 29 IN HOPES OF MEETING NATIONAL LEADERS, REPORTERS AND MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC. "WE WANT THE EUROPEANS TO SUPPORT US. WE ARE OFFERING NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS" SHE SAID.
3. THE TRIP WILL BEGIN THE DAY AFTER EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET IN ROME TO DISCUSS THE IRAN CRISIS AND END IN LUXEMBOURG THE DAY WESTERN EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEET TO DECIDE ON A COMMON POLICY. SHE SAID THE TRIP WAS BEING FINANCED FROM PRIVATE DONATIONS. THE IDEA CAME FROM THE HOSTAGE FAMILIES THEMSELVES, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS NOT HELPING IN THE ORGANIZATION. FLAG, WHICH ACTS AS LIAISON TO ALL 53 HOSTAGES FAMILIES, WAS TOTALLY INDEPENDENT FROM THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, SHE ADDED.
4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, MOMENTUM IN FAVOR OF SOME ACTION AGAINST IRAN IS BUILDING WITHIN THE NINE-NATION EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. BUT THE OUTCOME OF THE EEC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG NEXT MONDAY AND TUESDAY IS STILL IMPOSSIBLE TO FORECAST. MUCH DEPENDS ON FRANCE, WHICH SO FAR HAS BEEN COOL TO THE IDEA OF BREAKING DIPLOMATIC AND TRADE RELATIONS. THE FINAL DECISION IS LIKELY TO BE MADE BY THE APRIL 27-28 EC SUMMIT. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, COMPOSED OF DELEGATES FROM THE NINE EEC NATIONS, ADOPTED A NON-BINDING MOTION IN STRASBOURG ON APRIL 17 CALLING FOR THE RELEASE OF THE 53 HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN AND RECOMMENDING THAT MEMBER COUNTRIES ENVIAGE SUSPENDING DIPLOMATIC TIES.
5. JAPAN HAS JOINED SOUTH KOREA AND PORTUGAL IN PLEDGING SUPPORT FOR US ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAN. ON SATURDAY THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY INSTRUCTED JAPANESE FIRMS NOT TO NEGOTIATE NEW TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH IRANIAN FIRMS, AND ON SUNDAY JAPAN ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD NOT PAY THE OIL PRICE INCREASES BEING DEMANDED BY IRAN. ALTHOUGH THESE MOVES FALL SHORT OF THE FULL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BEING IMPOSED BY THE US, THEY WERE SEEN BY THE IRANIS AS HOSTILE ACTS AND IRAN HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL SHUT OFF ALL OTHER OIL SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN.
6. TEHRAN DOMESTIC RADIO ANNOUNCED APRIL 19 THAT IN RETALIATION FOR PORTUGAL'S BREAK IN TRADE RELATIONS WITH IRAN IN RESPONSE TO THE U.S. CALL FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ALL IRANIAN OIL DELIVERED TO PORTUGAL WILL STOP. NON-PORTUGUESE OIL COMPANIES DELIVERING IRANIAN OIL TO PORTUGAL WILL BE BLACK LISTED.
7. DIPLOMATIC AND PRESS SOURCES INDICATE THAT SEVERAL CLAIMS HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON MOST MAJOR IRANIAN EMBASSIES. ~~UNIDENTIFIED~~ ~~IN~~ ~~THE~~ ~~LAST~~ ~~TWO~~ ~~DAYS~~ ~~LEAVING~~ ~~AN~~ ~~ESTIMATED~~ ~~100~~ ~~PERSONS~~ ~~IN~~ ~~IRAN~~ ~~AND~~ ~~IN~~ ~~THE~~ ~~NEAR~~ ~~BY~~ ~~TO~~ ~~THE~~ ~~REVOLUTIONARY~~ ~~GUARDIAN~~ ~~AND~~ ~~TO~~ ~~BRIDGE~~ ~~THE~~ ~~AMERICAN~~ ~~EMBASSY~~

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~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM OF US IMPERIALISM AND ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIES, A CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN CLASHING WITH LEFTISTS AND HAVE EFFECTIVELY CLOSED DOWN THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM. MAJOR INCIDENTS ARE REPORTED OVER THE WEEKEND IN NASHIK, MIRAZ, TEHRAN, AND QOM.

ALTHOUGH THE ALLEGED GOALS OF THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS ARE JUST TO REMOVE LEFTISTS POLITICAL ACTIVISTS FROM THE CAMPUSES, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE "PURGE" WILL IN EFFECT CURTAIL THE FACILITIES AND ADMINISTRATION OF UNIVERSITIES LEADING TO THE ELIMINATION FROM THE COURSE OF STUDY OF NON-TRADITIONAL SUBJECTS CONSIDERED "DECADENT" OR "MATERIALISTIC" BY THE AYATOLLAH. THE NEW DEVELOPMENT IS BEING HALLED IN IRAN AS A "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND REFERRED TO AS THE THIRD STEP IN FASHIONING THE NEW IRAN (AFTER THE OVERTHROW OF THE SHAH AND (2) THE SEIZING OF THE REGIMEN).

9. PRESS REPORTS FROM IRAN INDICATE THAT A MAJOR CONFRONTATION IS FORMING BETWEEN KURDS AND THE 28TH INFANTRY DIVISION AT SANANDAJ. ARMY TROOPS MOVING TO REINFORCE THE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER HAVE BEEN BLOCKED AT SANANDAJ BY KURDISH INSURGENTS WHO FEARED THAT THE ARMY'S REAL MISSION WAS TO CRUSH THE KURDISH SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS. ON SATURDAY THE ARMY ISSUED AN APPEAL TO THE KURDS TO LET THEM PASS, THREATENING MASSIVE RETALIATION IF THE ARMY WAS NOT ALLOWED TO CARRY OUT ITS FUNCTIONS. THE SITUATION HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED AS OF THIS MORNING AND THE POTENTIAL FOR A SERIOUS OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE KURDS IS CONSIDERED TO BE HIGH.

10. ACCORDING TO TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE TEHRAN NEWS PAPER HEADLINES PROCLAIM WITHOUT ELABORATION QUOTE "THE PENTAGON ANNOUNCES THAT A NAVAL BLOCKADE AGAINST IRAN WILL BEGIN THE NEAR FUTURE," AND "THE UNITED STATES IS IN THE PROCESS OF PLANTING MINES ON IRAN'S SOUTHERN BORDERS." UNQUOTE.

11. THERE IS NO SIGNIFIANT CHANGE IN SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AREA.

12. THERE WILL BE NO MESSAGE TODAY DUE TO LACK OF ADEQUATE COVERAGE.

BT

~~Classified By: JCS~~  
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

DTG 221700Z APR 68  
FM 4012Z ALPHA  
TO: WASH DC

G-176

SITE OF WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR MIDDLE EAST-SUBAR 50  
CLEAR SKIES AND FAIR WEATHER OVER EASTERN PORTION OF MID-EAST UNDER  
HIGH PRESSURE INFLUENCE. LOW PRESSURE CENTER OVERS GREECE WITH RAIN  
SHOWERS & ISOLATED THUNDER STORMS MOVING INTO W TURKEY. MID AND HIGH  
LVL CLOUDS ASSOCIATED WITH STORM ADVANCING OVER TURKEY-NW IRAN WITH  
FRONTAL BOUNDARY FROM TURKEY TO N LIBYA-EGYPT. SURFING TEMPERATURES  
OVER EGYPT - SAUDI ARABIA REGION WITH CHYTY AFTERNOON SURFACE WINDS  
PRODUCING BLOWING DUST/DIRT.

SHORT RANGE FORECAST FOR MIDDLE EAST : 22-22 APR 68  
STORM SYSTEM SHOULD MOVE NE THROUGH TURKEY INTO SOUTHERN  
USSR-CASPIAN SEA REGION BY 22ND. FRONTAL BOUNDARY  
WILL TRAIL TO THE SW ACROSS W EGYPT THROUGH SYRIA &  
IRAQ INTO NW IRAN BY 22ND. MID & HIGH LVL CLOUDS  
SHOULD ADVANCE OVER NW 1/2 IRAN 22-22ND. EXPECT GUSTY SFC WINDS,  
LOW LEVEL TURBULENCE, AND BLOWING DUST/SAND ALSO  
TAL VLY

BOUNDARY. A SECOND LOW PRESSURE CENTER IS EXPECTED  
TO DEVELOPE OVER E TURKEY 21ST MOVING NE INTO USSR ALONG THE FRONTAL  
BOUNDARY BEHIND THE 1ST LOW. FRONTAL BOUNDARY WEAKENING WITH TIME.  
HIGH PRESSURE DOMINATES EASTERN PORTION OF MIDDLEEAST  
WITH HOT TEMPERATURES CLIMBING.

LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK FOR MIDDLE EAST: 22-29 APR 68

UPPER ATMOSPHERE RIDGING OVER EASTERN PORTION OF  
MIDDLE EAST TO MAINTAIN SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE OVER  
SAUDI ARABIA & IRAN. STORM SYSTEMS EXPECTED  
TO MIGRATE FROM CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN NE ACROSS  
TURKEY WITH TRAILING FRONTAL BOUNDARIES AFFECTING  
EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAQ, AND NW IRAN.

WIND TURBULENCE FORECAST FOR IRAN & AND PERSIAN GULF.  
IRAN: SFC WINDS WESTERLY 5-15 KNOTS, ISOLATED GUST TO 25 KNOTS.  
NO TURBULENCE.

PERSIAN GULF: SFC TO 1500FT AGL WINDS SE-NW 5-15  
KNOTS, NO TURBULENCE.

SITE ALPHA OBS-1300L TEMP 128F. WINDS  
SOUTHERLY S-SW 18G 22KNOTS. PREVAILING VSBY 7  
MILES INTER 3 MILES BLOWING DUST. MAX/ MIN 19TH  
WAS 104/78F. AT SITE ALPHA.

MIN AT TEHRAN ON 19TH 64/52F. WINDS 26G22G28 KNOTS.

~~Classified By: JCS~~  
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by  
DDO [unclear]  
20 June 1992

WANN

7. ANTI-MOJTEHEDI DEMONSTRATIONS WERE STAGED IN TEHRAN  
UNIVERSITIES ON 16 OR 18 APRIL, PROBABLY TO PROTEST THE POSSIBLE  
CLOSURE OF ALL IRANIAN UNIVERSITIES. THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE  
REPORTING THE PROTEST EXPECTED VIOLENCE TO ERUPT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. IN RESPONSE TO THE CONTINUING INSTABILITY ALONG THE  
IRANIAN-IRAQI BORDER, ADDITIONAL ARMY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY  
BATTALIONS ARE BEING PREPARED TO DEPLOY TO THE SOUTHERN PORTION  
OF THE FRONTIER. AN ARMORED BRIGADE APPARENTLY IS TO BE RELO-  
CATED TO THIS REGION AS WELL. TWO ARMED IRANIAN F-4 (PHANTOM II)  
FIGHTERS ARE TO PROVIDE CLOSE SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN NAVAL VESSELS  
BETWEEN 20 AND 24 APRIL, PROBABLY IN REACTION TO THE IRAQI NAVAL  
EXERCISE SCHEDULED DURING THAT TIME.

10. ALSO PROBABLY IN RESPONSE TO THE HEIGHTENED TENSION  
IN IRAN-IRAQ RELATIONS AS WELL AS TO THE U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL,  
THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES APPARENTLY HAVE RECALLED SOME OF THEIR  
CIVILIANS. INFORMATION OF HIGH-ARBITER INDICATES BOTH THE GROUND AND  
AIR FORCES ARE INVOLVED.

12. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA.  
A. SHIP ACTIVITY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCDVA126  
OO YFQDIZ YHRDAGC  
DE YEKOHAI #0097 1221522  
ZNY MMXOL  
O 241520Z APR 80 ZYH  
FM JCS/RC-J2  
TO SITE ALPHA

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E8 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC  
 DECLASSIFIED TO Secret  
REVISED ON 1992  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

198

~~SECRET~~ - CITE J2 00097

SUBJECT: SOVIET/IRANIAN/OTHER VESSELS OPERATING IN THE NORTH ARABIAN SEA  
UD

1. (U) THIS IS THE UPDATE REPORT PREPARED AS OF 241500Z APRIL 1980. THE LATEST OR PROJECTED LOCATION OF ALL VESSELS IN THE SUBJECT AREA IS VEN. IF A VESSEL HAS DEPARTED THE SUBJECT AREA SINCE THE FIRST REPORT IT HAS BEEN SO NOTED. ANY ADDITIONAL SIGHTINGS SINCE THE FIRST REPORT HAVE BEEN AD. IF FURTHER REPORTING IS DESIRED PLEASE RESPOND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT ANALYTICAL AND RESPONSE TIME.

2. (S) SOVIET NAVAL AND AUXILIARY VESSELS:

A. ASI PELENG/INTEL COLLECTOR/2813N/06314E/COM IN TRAIL OF ARS ALP/232000Z.

B. NO OTHER SOVIET NAVAL OR AUXILIARY VESSELS IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA. JUST OUTSIDE OF THE SUBJECT AREA A SOVIET PATROL FRIGATE WAS SIGHTED AT 2638N/05630E/221400Z. ALSO STOROZHEVOY/FFG/WAS ID NORTH OF 00COIRA 1437N/5356E/231000Z.

3. (C) IRANIAN NAVAL - NONE SIGHTED IN SUBJECT AREA.

4. OTHER NAVIES:

A. AL HANBUR/PTG/MU/2635N/05631E/FIXED/0.0K/240621Z/VISUAL A-6E AIRCRAFT.

B. RAICHARIT/PTG/TH/WITNAYAKHUN/PTG/TH/UDONKI/PTG/TH/2351N/06002E/0701/25K/221130Z APRIL 80/VISUAL A-6E AIRCRAFT. NO FURTHER SIGHTINGS

C. GEORGES LEYBUES/DD/FR/VICTOR SCHULCHER/FF/FR/2211N/06301E/3051/12K/230730Z/VISUAL EA-6B AIRCRAFT.

E. LA GIARENTE/ADR/FR/2021N/03012E/0101/12K/230745Z/VISUAL.

F. HANBOR/SS /PK/DPTD MUSCAT 22 APRIL ENR KARACHI/OPNS IN NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA (ETA 25 APR).

SECRET

5. (U) (C) MERCHANT SHIPS - ALL PSN GIVEN ARE AN ESTIMATE OF THE PROJECTED LOCATION AS OF 241900Z BASED ON DEAD RECKONING.

- A. ENERGY GROWTH/TKR/LI/2051N/06338E/315T/8.5K
- B. ESSO BILBAO/TKR/LI/2600N/05529E/238T/16.0K
- C. ESSO LANGUEDOC/TKR/FR/2055N/05909E/205T/17.0K
- D. GUNVER CORD/BLK/LI/2334N/06102E/313T/13.7K
- E. JAPAN WISTERIA/TKR/JA/2313N/06045E/314T/12.2K
- F. LATIRUS/TKR/ML/2259N/06046E/315T/11.1K
- G. PALACE TOKYO/TKR/JA/2120N/06332E/314T/10.7K
- H. RYUYO MARU/TKR/JA/2149N/06230E/315T/16.1K
- I. VANJA/TKR/NO/2338N/05831E/IN PORT MUSCAT.
- J. WORLD SAGA/TKR/LI/2210N/06205E/315T/16.0K
- K. KONSOMOLETS LENINGRADA/TKR/UR/24132/05603E/198T/17.0K

6. (U) (C) OTHER SIGHTINGS: IF THE TIME OF INFORMATION RECEIVED WAS NOT CURRENT, ANALYTICAL DEAD RECKONING WAS USED TO PROJECT THE PROBABLE LOCATION AS OF 241900Z.

- A. CORAGGIO/TKR/IT/IN ROUTE PORT IN PERSIAN GULF/241900Z
- B. KOTA JASE/CGO/SN/IN PORT IN PERSIAN GULF/2419000Z.
- C. KRYM/TKR/UR/OUT OF SUBJECT AREA HEADING SE/241900Z.
- D. ESSO BILBAO/TKR/LI/2625N/05600E/235T/14.0K/241900Z
- E. TOKUYAMA MARU/TKR/JA/2518N/05758E/260T/4.0K/241900Z.



~~SECRET~~

500

G-205

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ON 12355

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DERIVATIVE OF BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVISED ON OADR  
REVIEWED BY Multiple Sources

OPERATIONS CENTER  
IRAN WORKING GROUP  
Sitrep No. 297

SECRET  
37 (2)  
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Situation in Iran as of 0530 EST, April 27, 1980

(U) Movement of Hostages and Threat of Trial

In a statement broadcast today by Tehran Radio, the student militants declared that they have decided to move the hostages to various cities in Iran. One city to which some of the hostages are to be transferred is Qom, according to the statement. The students added "several of the students stationed in the den of expionage will accompany these hostages to guard them. And we ask our brothers of the Revolution Guards corps to keep the security of the place around where they live."

The militants in their statement also renewed their threat to try the hostages and announced that "if America refuses to return the traitorous Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his plundered wealth to the brave nation of Iran, we can put this mother of corruption of the century on trial by trying the spy hostages."

In his press conference today, President Bani-Sadr is reported to have said that the hostages have already been moved out of the Embassy compound. Bani-Sadr is quoted as saying that the hostages were moved "in order to be prepared for the probable attacks that may occur in the future and so that the students do not have to take measures that we are not willing to have happen." This is an apparent reference to student threats that the hostages would be killed if the United States attempted a second rescue mission.

[REDACTED]

(U) Further Iranian Reaction to the Rescue Mission

According to FBIS reports, Iranians were called upon to climb on to their roofs last night and chant "Allah O Akhbar" (God is great) for 10 minutes to celebrate the abortive rescue mission.

There are reports that also last night Iranian television showed the first film of the landing site of the airborne rescue mission. The film showed the wreckage of the C-119 transport plane, the helicopter, the bodies of six U.S. commandos, and bundles of dollar bills and Iranian currency reportedly found at the scene.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 4/27/86

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Classified ON: OADR

Iranian security forces are reported to be on alert in the region 250 miles southeast of Tehran, in an effort to seek out any of the U.S. force still in Iranian territory. According to Reuter, gendarmes and Revolutionary Guards are spread out in an area 50 miles from the landing site searching for the U.S. commandos that they insist are hiding. The landing site and surrounding areas have been sealed off to all but security forces.

In an interview broadcast yesterday by Tehran Radio, General Bagheri, Iranian Air Force Commander, denied that Iranian jets had chased U.S. aircraft and shot some down. Bagheri added that two helicopters used in the rescue mission were destroyed by the Iranian military planes, leaving three helicopters intact.

(U) Return of Dead in Rescue Mission to U.S.

Bani-Sadr is quoted in press reports as saying that the bodies of the eight members of the rescue team who perished in the mission will be returned to the U.S. "with no conditions attached." "Diplomatic sources" are reported as saying that the bodies are now in the town of Tabas, near the landing site of the rescue mission and will be handed over to the Swiss Embassy, now representing U.S. interests in Iran.

(U) Arrival of Injured Members of Rescue Team in U.S.

Five servicemen injured in the abortive rescue mission arrived at Kelly Air Force Base in Texas yesterday. The four most seriously injured were to be taken to Brooke Army Medical Center at Fort Sam Houston, site of the well-known burn treatment center. The fifth man was to be taken to the Air Force hospital located at Lackland Air Force Base. The five arrived earlier at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey and were reported conscious and in good spirits during the 2-hour layover there.

(U) Iranian Reaction to EC Measures

The measures decided by EC foreign ministers at Luxembourg so far have received a low key reaction in Tehran. There have been no official comments from official sources on the measures and the media has concentrated on other subjects. Still, there has been some tendency in the press to focus on the U.K. as the primary force behind the EC action.

(U) Late Item: Transfer of the Hostages

According to today's edition of the Israeli evening paper Ma'ariv, the 50 hostages have been transferred to Qom. The newspaper's source is a militant on guard at the Embassy compound in Tehran.

~~SECRET~~

G215

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[REDACTED] - auto 923-3355  
[REDACTED]

G

[REDACTED] AUTOVON 923-7020  
[REDACTED]

G

A7C [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REF BY OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~  
JCS  
OADR

~~SECRET~~ HUMINT Project ~~Secret~~  
~~SECRET~~ THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF NOFORN

MEMORANDUM

Date 7 April 80

To: Reed

Subject:

① Col [redacted] (?) ASCI DA

G Wants message from JTF  
to: ACSZ DA (DAMI-ISH)

C [redacted]  
Support is required to enhance  
intell support to JTF and  
request [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

② Col [redacted] wants meeting w/USAF  
GC [redacted] & [redacted] on P.M. of  
SECRET 8 April. Told me to let you

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

Set it up through already established  
contacts.

C (2)

(5)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 18 January 1981

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 243317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED], INSCOM

TITLE: RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES (U)

*Feed  
19 Jan  
G-216*

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: THIS REPORT FROM NFN 240317 FURTHER STATES THAT THE HOSTAGES WILL BE RELEASED.

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT  
DANI - ISI  
Room 2C840  
DOD HUMINT  
BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
REVIEWED BY: DDO/mcc  
 DECLASSIFIED TO: Secret  
REVIEW ON: OADR  
REVIEW FROM: Multiple Sources  
J5, DIA

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 16 JAN 81

~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY:  INSCOM


G-218  
Rec'd 19 JAN


TITLE: NON-RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: THIS REPORT FROM NFN INDICATED THAT THE HOSTAGES RELEASE WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE. (NOTE: SUBSEQUENT REPORTING STATED THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS NOT CORRECTLY VERIFIED PRIOR TO AGENT'S REPORTING).

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS 

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1972  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO  
REFN ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM 

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Classified By ~~DIA~~  
Declassified On ~~OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 13 Jan 81

0217

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

G-219

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: POSSIBLE RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES (U)

|||||

|||||

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED).

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|||||

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: THIS IS THE FIRST REPORT FROM NFN 240317 THAT INDICATES A DEFINITE DATE FOR RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES.

C [REDACTED]

|||||

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS A [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED]

|||||

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
IDENTIFIED BY DDD/AD/CC  
 DECLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]  
BY [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
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Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassified By [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DATE: 12 JANUARY 1981

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

G-220

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: LOCATION OF US HOSTAGES (U)

C D) [REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: THIS IS THE FIRST REPORT FROM NFN 240317, [REDACTED]

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Cy to: A&SOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DAMI - IS [REDACTED]  
Room 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1256  
COMPLETED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DECLASSIFY ON: DDD/kmcc  
EXECEL 240317 TO: Secret  
REVIEW ON: OADR  
REMOVED FROM: [REDACTED] Multiple Sources

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified On: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

G-220

LTG GAST

PTG JOHNSON

ADM WATSON

CPT

G  
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P

MSG NR 091  
DTG 121515Z JAN 81  
FM WDC/J2  
TO MAIN/J2

A.C

INFO  
NSA  
DIA (ZEN)

~~TOP SECRET~~ LINDIS //EYES ONLY FOR

(S) FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NFM: 248317

(HARD COPY REPORT FROM

RECEIVED.)

107

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

3. ~~SECRET~~ AGREE THAT MOST OF THE HOSTAGES COULD NOW BE ON THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. HOWEVER, IT IS LIKELY THAT SOME HOSTAGES WILL BE HELD SOMEWHERE OFF THE COMPOUND (1 OR MORE LOCATIONS) UNTIL A SHORT TIME BEFORE A RELEASE ACTUALLY OCCURS.

REVW 12 JAN 81  
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DATE: 7 JANUARY 1981

NOT RELEASABLE TO PERSONS UNAUTHORIZED

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFI 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] DISCOM

TITLE: POSSIBLE TRIALS OF US HOSTAGES (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

THIS LATEST REPORT BY NFI 240317 IS CONSISTENT WITH NFI'S PREVIOUS 1980 REPORTING ON

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12356  
 CONDUCTED BY 11 Aug 1992  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 REVIEW BY OADR  
 REVIEWED FROM Multiple Sources

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
 1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]  
 DAMI - ISI [REDACTED]  
 Room 2CB40 [REDACTED]  
 DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
 BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: DIA  
 Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

OK

REF ID: A6528 0082100

WDC/052 DTG 072045Z JAN 81, SA9 *(S)* A, C

CITE J-2 0528

SOURCE REPORTING

WDC/052 DTG 072045Z JAN 81, SA9 *(S)* A

REF PROVIDED ADVANCE INFORMATION FROM DOD SOURCE 247317 U/  
REF ALSO STATED COMPLETE TEXT WOULD BE FORWARDED

COMPLETE TEXT FOLLOWS:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

10 JAN 81

G 226

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: US HOSTAGE SITUATION - UPDATE (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: See Attached Report  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

*Passing to*  
[REDACTED]

*IN [REDACTED] 12/20/82*  
*AS [REDACTED] c. 0195*  
*24/112357*

SOURCE: NFN 240317 is [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DANI - ISH [REDACTED]  
Room 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

Classified By: *DVA*  
Declassified ON: *OMDR*

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: ~~REDACTED~~ INSCOM

TITLE: U.S. HOSTAGE SITUATION - UPDATE (U)

DOI: 4 JAN 81

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED).

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: THIS LATEST REPORT BY NFN 240317 IS CONSISTENT WITH NFN'S  
PREVIOUS 1980 REPORTING

~~REDACTED~~

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS ~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT  
DAMI - ISH  
Room 2C840  
DOD HUMINT  
BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDE/mcc  
 BECL EXCLUDED TO ADR  
BYWH ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

00 RUEAIIF  
DE RUEIZJC #0522 0871255  
ZNY TTTT  
071245Z JAN 81  
FM [REDACTED] WDC/J2  
TO [REDACTED]  
INFO [REDACTED] VJ2  
BT  
TOP SECRET LIMDIS CITE J2 0522

~~SECRET~~

C  
A.G

SUBJ: LOCATION INFORMATION (U)

REF: [REDACTED] WDC/J2 CITE 0518/DTG 051730Z JAN 1981/SAB

(S) THE FOLLOWING DATA IS HARDCOPY TRANSCRIPT OF FULL REPORTING  
SITED IN REFERENCE.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0522 TOP SECRET LIMDIS

[REDACTED]

2.0

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0522 TOP SECRET LIMDIS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4.

[REDACTED]

REVW 07 JAN 81  
BT  
#0522

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MSB NBR 052  
DTG 072045Z JAN 81  
FM [REDACTED] WDC//J-2//  
TO [REDACTED]  
ZEN/DIA

~~TOP SECRET LINDIS~~

SUBJ: SOURCE REPORTING

1. ~~CS~~ THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES INFORMATION FROM DOD (ARMY) SOURCE  
REF 210317. REPORT CONTAINS DATA WITH

2.

3.

1.

2.

3.


4.

2. (U) COMPLETE TEXT OF REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED UPON RECEIPT.

REVW 07 JAN 81  
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~





G 227

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ INSCOM

TITLE: US HOSTAGE SITUATION - UPDATE (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

1. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

2. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

4. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

C

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS AN IRANIAN NATIONAL WHO HAS REPORTED RELIABLY ON IRAN SINCE APRIL 1980.

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

DAHI - ISH ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Room 2C840 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

DOD HUMINT ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

BG FLYNN

G

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992

REVIEWED BY DDA/MCC

DECLASSIFIED TO ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

REVIEW ON OADR

REPORT FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By: ~~DIA~~

Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

G-227

VZCZCV169  
OO RUEAIIF  
DE RUEIZJC #0510 0021900  
ZRY TTTT  
U 021640Z JAN 60  
FM [REDACTED] WDC//A-2//  
TO [REDACTED]  
INFO [REDACTED] //A-2//

BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ E I LINDIS NOFORN CITE J-2 0510

SUBJ: SOURCE REPORTING

1. (S//NOFORN) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PROVIDED BY DOD (ARMY)  
SOURCE 240517 ON DATES INDICATED [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ E I LINDIS NOFORN

4. (S//NOFORN) [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ E I LINDIS NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

G-229

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: HOSTAGE INFORMATION - UPDATE (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS INFO CONCERNING U.S. HOSTAGES  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE - SEE REPORT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ON 12/25/86  
COMPLETED ON 11 Aug 1992  
REVISOR BY: [Signature]  
 REEL CHALLENGER TO: [Signature]  
REVISOR: OADR  
[REDACTED]

SOURCE: NFN 240317 IS AN [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]

DAMI - ISH [REDACTED]

Room 2C840 [REDACTED]

DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]

HG FLYNN

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

G-229

VZCZCDVA112

RUEAIIIF

RUEIZJC #0480 3531930

NY IIII

181925Z DEC 80

FM

TO

INFO

J2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: INFORMATION REPORT

(S) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DOD (ARMY) SOURCE NFN 240317 WITH DOI OF 17 DEC 80

A. REF: PREVIOUS 317 REPORT OF

317 REPORTS NO CHANGE TO

ABOVE

B. SOURCE 317 ALSO REPORTED THAT

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0480 ~~TOP SECRET~~

NOTE #1 PREPARATIONS FOR THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY WAS REPORTED BY DOD240434 ON 2 NOV 80.

NOTE #2 THIS OFFICE HAS SPECULATED PREPARATIONS FOR SOME TYPE OF MEDIA EFFORT WERE UNDERWAY IN THE 2ND/3RD OF SEPTEMBER 1980, WHEN THE MAJLIS WERE ACTIVELY DISCUSSING THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

REVW 19 DEC 80

BT

#0480

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

G 240

OK

OO RUEAIIF  
DE RUEIZJC #0373 2701245  
ZNY TTTT  
O 261240Z SEP 80  
FM JCS/SNOWBIRD//J2//

INFO ZEN/USAINSCOM//USAOG  
BT  
J3 0373

SUBJ: SOURCE VALIDATION

REF: ARMY SOURCE NFN 240317

1. (TS) INFORMATION RECENTLY OBTAINED FROM

SUPPORTS DATA PROVIDED BY 317 IN SECTION 3

OF REFERENCE.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC0373 ~~SECRET~~

3. (TS)

REV 20 SEP 80  
01  
#0373

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDANMCC  
 DEEL  BOWTHER TO Just  
REVISED BY OADR  
REMOVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

X MITTED

G 241

VZCZCDDVH488  
OO RUEKJIF  
DE RUEIZJC #0366 2671740  
ZNY 11111  
O 151742Z SEP 88  
FM SIO 5169702

C1 4 [REDACTED]

~~1- [REDACTED] - E I CITE JS 0366~~

3800: INFORMATION REPORT

THE FOLLOWING REPORT RECEIVED FROM US ARMY SOURCE NFN 240317, WHO

C  
C

[REDACTED]

FROM RUEIZJC 3800 3-0 P-0 H-C-E-F-Y

C

[REDACTED]

BT  
#0366

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DESCRIPTIVE CL BY DDO/mce  
 BEST ESTIMATED TO Secret  
REVIEW BY OADP  
REVIEW DATE Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

G243

THE JOINT STAFF

18 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Hostage Trials

The inclosed reports were received from US Army source  
NPN 240317 (Pencil)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
TAB A is a summary. TAB B is the full  
report. Both have been forwarded to DIA, ~~TOP SECRET~~

RICHARD V. SECORD  
Major General, USAF

Attachments  
a/s

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DERIVATIVE CL BY D. D. Mcc  
 BECAME UNCLASSIFIED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
EXEMPT FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

# SOD SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION <del>TOP SECRET</del>	SOD CONTROL NUMBER			
SUBJECT:  Hostage Trials		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
				XX	

## REMARKS

Inclosed reports received from US Army source 240317 (Pencil).  
[REDACTED]  
TAB A is a summary. TAB B is the full report. Both  
have been forwarded to DIA, [REDACTED]

### ACTION OFFICER

[REDACTED]  
LtCol, USAF  
SOD, J-3  
X55078

### INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INPD	COCD	NAME	EXTENSION
J- P						
EXEC						
TM CHF						
VCOPB						
COPG						
DATE OF PREPARATION						
17 Sep 80						

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

WZCZCUBA799  
OO RUEAIF  
DE RUEIZSC #8000 261180E  
ZNY TITTI  
O 171645Z SEP 68  
FM JTF/SNOWBIRD/31

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] SPOC/  
(ZEM) 312/3  
SI  
T [REDACTED] E F CITE TO 3000

SUBJ: HOSTAGE TRIALS

(ZS) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM ARMY SOURCE  
240017

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FM JTF/SNOWBIRD/31  
[REDACTED]

REV. 17 SEP 68  
SI  
#2000

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: HOSTAGE TRIALS

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE: SOURCE NFN 240317, WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND HAS REPORTED  
FAVORABLY IN THE PAST, FROM NFN 240447 [REDACTED] WHOSE RELIABILITY  
HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

TO: Director, DIA	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE	
	<del>TOP SECRET</del>	6-244	
SUBJECT: Asset Approval	DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE	
	DJSM DATE		
	ACTION		
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION
	XXX		

REMARKS:

Attached memorandum provides summary of events regarding the past use of Army Source 240317 (PENCIL ONE) and requests approval of Intelligence Policy Review Council to [REDACTED]

ACTION OFFICER	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
[REDACTED]						
LTCol, USAF J-3, JTD						
DATE OF PREPARATION						
2 Sep 80						



~~SECRET~~

G 244

4 September 1980

THE JOINT STAFF


MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Asset Approval, Comments Reply

Ref: JCS memorandum, subject: Asset Approval, dtd 2 Sep 80

1. (TS) Reference memorandum for Director, DIA requested approval to [REDACTED] and allocation of [REDACTED] to support the operation.
2. (TS) This correspondence provides reply to Director, DIA comments of 2 September regarding above.

C



b.

3. (TS) A meeting between Army representative COL [REDACTED] detailed to [REDACTED] as MG Thompson's executive agent, [REDACTED] is scheduled for Friday 5 September. The purpose of the meeting is to resolve questions concerning 240317's [REDACTED] and future operational utilization.

JAMES B. VAUGHT  
Major General, US Army

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. (S) Given the fluidity of the situation, the uncertainty of the technical collection programs, [REDACTED], recommend that the Senior Intelligence Review Committee:

- a. Approve the [REDACTED] and
- b. Allocate [REDACTED] to INSCOM from DIA Intelligence Contingency funds to support the operation.

*James B. Vaught*  
 JAMES B. VAUGHT  
 Major General, USA

1. What would be mission of 240317? [REDACTED]

2. DIA has no contingency funds tappable in support.

3. [REDACTED]

*John Olsen*

G 249



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

15 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Hostage Trials; [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED]  
This data was provided to you on 8 August.

C [REDACTED]  
3. Source 240317 has provided apparently credible information in the past, portions of which have been corroborated. He [REDACTED]

*Richard V. Secord*


RICHARD V. SECORD  
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 1992  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC  
 DECL. DOWN TO Secret  
KEYW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On OADR


~~TOP SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

OO RUEAIIIF  
DE RUEIZJC #0272 2211745  
ZNY TTTT  
O 081742Z AUG 80  
FM JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2  
TO   
BT

~~T-O P-O F-O R-L-T CITE J3 0272~~

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE TRIALS

ON 8 AUG THIS OFFICE WAS ADVISED BY SECURE PHONE FROM  
 OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

 ARMY SOURCE 240317

REVW 28 AUG 80  
BT  
#0272

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COMEBACK cy

G:256

NO RUEATL  
REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768

REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768  
REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768  
REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768

REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768

SOURCE ASSESSMENT

REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE TRIALS

REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768

SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF TRIALS

REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768  
REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768  
REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768

SOURCE INDICATED

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 RUEZJC 0253 025768

[REDACTED]

REF: RUEZJC 0253 025768

01  
#0000

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DSP/almcc  
 DESL (DOWN) TO Secret  
REF ON JADR  
REF: RUEZJC Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

G 261

VECZC00VABSC  
OO RUEAIF  
DE RUEIZJC #0205 2261220  
ZNY 11111  
O 131215Z AUG 68  
FM JTF/SNOWBIRD/J2  
TO [REDACTED]  
BT  
I CITE JC 5202

SUBJ [REDACTED]

REF: (A) JCS/SNOWBIRD/CITE  
(B) JCS/SNOWBIRD/CITE

(1) (S) THE [REDACTED] SOURCE [REDACTED]

PAGE 2

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EB 12356

CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC

DEEL  DOWNGR TO Secret

REYN ON OADP

REMOVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~

**SOD SUMMARY SHEET**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

<b>TO:</b> CJCS	<b>CLASSIFICATION</b> <del>TOP SECRET</del>	<b>SOD CONTROL NUMBER</b>			
<b>SUBJECT:</b> Hostage Trials; [REDACTED]		<b>ACTION</b>			
		<b>APPROVAL</b>	<b>SIGNATURE</b>	<b>REFORMATION</b>	<b>OTHER</b>
				XX	

**REMARKS**

Memorandum summarizes information from HUMINT source concerning hostages.

<b>ACTION OFFICER</b> [REDACTED] LT COL, USAF J-3, SOD X-55078	<b>INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL</b>						
	<b>OFFICE</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>OFFICE</b>	<b>INFO</b>	<b>COORD</b>	<b>REMARK</b>	<b>EXTENSION</b>
	J P						
	EXEC						
	TRM CHF						
	VCCPB						
COPB							
<b>DATE OF PREPARATION</b>							
15 AUG 1980							

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 15 August 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] USAOG

TITLE: [REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS [REDACTED]  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT WAS OBTAINED FROM [REDACTED]

SOURCE: SOURCE NFN 240317, WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST.

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
REVIEWED BY DDO, R MCC  
 RECLASSIFIED TO Secret  
BY ON OADR  
REVIEWED BY Multiple Sources

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~[REDACTED]~~  
~~[REDACTED]~~  
~~[REDACTED]~~  
~~[REDACTED]~~  
~~[REDACTED]~~

C

G

INFORMATION PROVIDED TO LTC ~~[REDACTED]~~ VIA SECURE PHONE 141715  
AUG 80.

~~[REDACTED]~~

~~SECRET~~

(A)

INFO DIV. (P)  
J3  
J2 / R2

P

VZCZCDVA656  
OO RUEAIIF  
DE RUEIJJC #8294 2272288  
ZNY TTTT  
O 142145Z AUG 88  
FM JCS/SECDEF/OP  
TO [REDACTED]  
BT  
T O P S E C R E T CITE J3 8294

SUBJ: [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

REVV 14 AUG 88  
BT  
#8294

DOS - 15/1245  
Ans PO  
G

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

G 262

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 12 August 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] INSCOM

TITLE: POSSIBLE TRIAL OF US HOSTAGES DURING AUGUST 1980 (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAIL [REDACTED]  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE: SOURCE 240317, WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, HAS REPORTED FACTUALLY IN THE PAST.

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDAD/MCC  
 DECLASSIFY TO Secret  
REVIEW BY OADR  
REASON FOR Multiple Sources

~~Classified By DIA  
Declassified On OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

G-262

JZCZCVAGSD

OO RUEAIIF

DE RUEZJJC #0270 2251330

ZNY TTTT

O 121315Z AUG 80

FM JCS/SROBIRD/J2

TO

BT

1. CITE JS 3276

SUBJ: POSSIBILITY OF TRIALS

REF: JCS/SROBIRD 12/12 MSG, 061742Z AUG 80; SUBJ: HOSTAGE TRIALS

1. 240317 PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 RUEZJJC0276 T ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

121315Z AUG 80

~~SECRET~~

9 263

TAGPC-CR

DATE: 8 August 1986

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED] USACG

TITLE: Trial of U.S. Hostages (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: This report details the question of impending trials of the U.S. Hostages in Tehran.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: None.

SOURCE: SOURCE 240317, who has reported [REDACTED] in the past.

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED  
 Declassify on: [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~

OO RUEALIF  
DE RUE IZUC 2272 2311705  
ZNYTTTT  
G OB 1742Z AUG 77  
FM JCS/SNWB/J2

TO [REDACTED]  
BT  
TOP SECRET - CITE UJ

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE TRIALS

ON 8 AUG THIS OFFICE WAS ADVISED  
[REDACTED] OF THE PROCEEDINGS

[REDACTED]

REVW 28 AUG 77  
BT  
22 77

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TRANSMITTED

G 260

VZCZCDVA411  
OO RUEAIF  
DE RUEIZJC #0191 1791910  
ZNY TTTT  
O 271905Z JUN 80  
FM JIF/SNO WDIRS/J2

TO [REDACTED]  
BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE JS 0191

SUBJECT: SOURCE EVALUATION  
REF: CENSUS CAR REPORTING

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON MCC  
 BECL  DOWNGR TO Secret  
KEYW ON OADR  
RECEIVED FROM multistate Smc

1. ALTHOUGH A REVIEW OF [REDACTED] A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE THREE SUBSTANTIVE REPORTS FROM PENCIL ONE DEBRIEFING SESSIONS, RELIEVED SOME DATA WHICH PUTS SOME ASPECTS OF SOURCE'S CLAIMED ACCESS IN QUESTION.

2. BRIEF LISTING OF THESE ITEMS FOLLOWS:

(A) USE OF EVIN PRISON TO HOLD HOSTAGES IS INCONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS FACTS, BUT CONSISTENT WITH STREET RUMOR CIRCULATED IN THE PAST.

(B) EXTENSIVE REFERENCES BY SOURCE [REDACTED] IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS SECURITY PROCEDURES.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0191 [REDACTED]  
(E) SOURCE REPORTING [REDACTED] IS NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY ANOTHER SOURCE OF GREATER CREDIBILITY.

(F) SOURCE'S IDENTIFICATION OF [REDACTED] SOURCE'S CREDIBILITY.

(G) [REDACTED]

(H) [REDACTED]

SECRET

(L) SOURCE'S COMMENT THAT [REDACTED] SEEMS EXAGGERATED AND BASED ON STREET RUMORS. VIOLENCE FACTS AS REPORTS FROM RELIABLE OBSERVERS INDICATE THAT. ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL TO HEAR SMALL ARM FIRE AT NIGHT. THE COMPOUND WAS NOT A NIGHTLY TARGET.

(M) ALTHOUGH SOURCE'S CLAIM [REDACTED] CANNOT BE REPUDIATED. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AS STATED IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.

3. AFTER REVIEWING ALL REPORTS, IT APPEARS THAT [REDACTED] IT ALSO APPEARS

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0191 [REDACTED]  
THAT HIS REPORTING OF THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE RESCUE ATTEMPT WAS MORE FACTUAL THAN REPORTING AFTER THE ATTEMPT. PERHAPS THE SOURCE IN HIS EFFORT TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE STORY INCORPORATED EVERYTHING HE SAW, READ, OR HEARD INTO HIS DEBRIEFING.

4. IN SUMMARY, BELIEVE THAT WITH PROPER MISSION BRIEFING SOURCE COULD PROVIDE USEFUL HOSTAGE RELATED DATA.

REVW 27 JUNE 68  
#0191



27 June 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR USAOG, DET A

Info: [REDACTED]

Subject: Source Evaluation

Ref: Census Car Reporting

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NIMCC  
 DEEL  DOWNGR TO Secret  
REVISED BY OADR  
REASON FOR Multiple Sources

(C)

1. Although a review of [REDACTED] a detailed analysis of the three substantive reports from Pencil One debriefing sessions relieved some data which puts some aspects of source's claimed access in question.

2. Brief listing of these items follows:

- (a) Use of EVIN PRISON to hold hostages is inconsistent with previous facts, but consistent with street rumors circulated in the past.
- (b) Extensive references by [REDACTED] in not consistent with previous security procedures.
- (e) Source reporting of [REDACTED] is not substantiated by another source of greater credibility.
- (f) Source's misidentification of [REDACTED] undermine source's credibility.

(g)

(h)

(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

(l) Source's comment that compound is [REDACTED] seems exaggerated and based on street rumors vice facts as reports from reliable observers indicate that although it was not unusual to hear small arms fire at night. [REDACTED]

(m) Although source's claim [REDACTED] cannot be repudiated the sequence of events as stated is difficult to accept.

3. After reviewing all reports, it appears that [REDACTED]

It also appears that his reporting of the situation prior to the rescue attempt was more factual than reporting after the attempt. Perhaps the source in his effort to provide a complete story incorporated everything he saw, read, or heard into his debriefing.

4. In summary, believe that with proper mission briefing source could provide useful hostage related data. [REDACTED]

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

G-271

20 June 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Collection Approval

1. (TS) This memorandum requests CJCS approval of [REDACTED]

2. (TS) The source has provided apparently credible but unverifiable information concerning [REDACTED]

3. (TS) Total cost is estimated at [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] deposited to a [REDACTED] account. The balance will be held in the [REDACTED] and will be used only if essential. The individual will receive [REDACTED]

4. (TS) Based upon [REDACTED], request approval to [REDACTED]

*Red Marshall Col. USA for*

JAMES B. VAUGHT  
Major General, USA

*To Gen Vaught  
Returned per our conversation  
DJ*

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 11 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONNICK  
DOWNGR TO Secret  
OADR  
REMOVED FROM multiple copies

~~Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

G-181

NOE 401  
LTC 211407Z APR 68  
FM JCS/RC-112  
TO: SITE ALPHA  
INFO: SFCO/32  
LCS/W/S2

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: SATPAN LYTENSON (U)

5000  
Unreliable  
as a matter  
of fact  
will pass  
OSM

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 210400Z/240001Z TO 240401Z/240001Z FOR SITE L718CDS 1722400E

COV DATE/TIME INSV

COV DATE/TIME	INSV
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

E

NO EOM.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

TO T 220530K  
185

MSC 44  
LTOR 201452 APP 51

FM JCS/AC-J2  
TO: SITH ALPHA/J2  
1 SOWAR

Acc [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E3 1235  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON 2 APR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources  
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: PATRAN EXTENSION

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE  
COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 201450/000001 TO 240450/240000

A. FOR SITE POINT H. 321035N 0611040W  
COV DATE/TIME

[Large redacted area for Part A, with 'C' and 'INSV' markings]

B. FOR E 302500N 0864000W

[Large redacted area for Part B, with 'C' and 'INSV' markings]

C. FOR [redacted] COV DATE/TIME

[Large redacted area for Part C, with 'C' and 'INSV' markings]



~~SECRET~~

3

G-194

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Apr 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

101/240618  
el

MSG 125  
240535Z APR 80  
FM: JCS/RC-J2  
TO: ALPHA/J2  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SOV NAVAL ACTIVITY  
REF: UR 221700Z APR 80, SAB

1. PER UR REQUEST THIS IS FIRST OF 2 REPORTS CONTAINING INFO AS OUTLINED IN UR PARA 3.

2. THIS IS THE BASELINE REPORT PREPARED AS OF 240500Z APRIL 1980. AN UPDATE REPORT WILL BE PUBLISHED AS OF 241400Z APRIL 80. GENERAL FORMAT AS FOLLOWS: NAME OF VESSEL; TYPE OF VESSEL; NATIONALITY; LOCATION; HEADING; SPEED; TIME OF INFORMATION; AND HOW ACQUIRED IF KNOWN.

3. SOVIET NAVAL AND AUXILIARY VESSELS:

A. AGI PELENG/INTEL COLLECTOR/2213N/06314E/030T/10.0K/232000Z/RADAR.

B. NO OTHER SOVIET NAVAL OR AUXILIARY VESSELS IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA. JUST OUTSIDE OF THE SUBJECT AREA A SOVIET PATROL FRIGATE WAS SIGHTED AT 2630N/05630E/221400Z. ALSO STOROZHEVOY/FFG/WAS ID NORTH OF SOCOTRA 1437N/5356E/231828Z.

4. IRANIAN NAVAL - NONE SIGHTED IN SUBJECT AREA.

5. OTHER NAVIES:

A. AL MANSUR/PTG/MU/2419N/05803E/330T/10K/221028Z APRIL 80/VISUAL A-6E AIRCRAFT.

B. RATCHARIT/PTG/TH/WITHAYAKHUM/PTG/TH/UDOMET/PTG/TH/2351N/06002E/078T/28K/221138Z APRIL 80/VISUAL A-6E AIRCRAFT.

C. GEORGES LEYGUES/DD/FR/VICTOR SCHOELCHER/FF/FR/2211N/06301E/305T/12K/230730Z/VISUAL EA-6B AIRCRAFT.

D. [REDACTED]

E. LA CHARENTE/AOR/FR/2021N/05912E/010T/12K/230745Z/VISUAL

~~SECRET~~

99  
DTG 231550Z APR 80  
FM: JCS/RC-J-2  
TO: SITE ALPHA/J-2

TOT 231720Z

G-189

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE REPORTING

REF: CUR MSG 201332Z APR 80

1. THE CREDIBILITY OF REPORTING FROM TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE HAS PROVED TO BE PARTICULARLY LOW IN THE PAST. THE REPORT OF TODAY'S DATE, CONCERNING A "CIA PLAN TO KIDNAP THE US HOSTAGES," MUST BE VIEW WITH CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM.

2. FOR EXAMPLE, IN ITEM 10 OF REFERENCE, TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE REPORTED "WITHOUT ELABORATION" THAT THE U.S. WAS IN THE PROCESS OF MINING IRAN'S SOUTHERN BORDER WATERS.

3. WITHOUT MORE COMPLETE DETAILS AND CORROBORATION, ALL SUCH REPORTS FROM TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE SHOULD BE VIEW WITH A VERY HIGH DEGREE OF SKEPTICISM, AND CONSIDERED A TOOL OF IRANIAN PROPAGANDA.

4. FULL TEXT OF HEADLINES REGARDING THE HOSTAGES, WHICH WAS BROADCAST AT 0710Z ON 23 APRIL IN ARABIC, READS: "IRAN WILL USE SOVIET TERRITORIES FOR ITS FOREIGN TRADE IF UNITED STATES CLOSES OUR WATERWAYS; THERE ARE GREAT POSSIBILITIES THAT PUMPING OF NATURAL GAS TO SOVIET UNION WILL RESUME;" AND "A CIA PLAN TO KIDNAP THE U.S. HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN HAS BEEN REVEALED."

BT

NNNN

Declassified by  
DDO, NMCC  
22 Jun 92

~~SECRET~~

6. MERCHANT SHIPS - ALL PSN GIVEN ARE AN ESTIMATE OF THE PROJECTED LOCATION AS OF 241200Z BASED ON DEAD RECKONING.

- A. ENERGY GROWTH/TKR/LI/2001N/06417E/314T/16K
- B. ESSO BILBAO/TKR/LI/2619N/05603E/238T/19.2K
- C. ESSO LENGUEDOC/TKR/FR/2239N/06007E/145T/4.5K
- D. GUNVER CORD/BLK/LI/2228N/06217E/314T/13K
- E. JAPAN WISTERIA/TKR/JA/2208N/06147E/313T/12.6K
- F. LATIRUS/TKR/NL/2203N/06142E/315T/11.2K
- G. PALACE TOKYO/TKR/JA/2028N/06429E/314T/15.5K
- H. RYUYO MARU/TKR/JA/2024N/06350E/314T/15.6K
- I. VANJA/TKR/NO/2315N/05827E/159T/0.6K
- J. WORLD SAGA/TKR/LI/2045N/06326E/314T/15.6K
- K. KOMSOMOLETS LENINGRADA/TKR/UR/2346N/05939E/141T/9.2K

7. OTHER SIGHTINGS:

- A. CORAGGIO/TKR/IT/2138N/06002E/360T/10K/220708Z/VISUAL.
- B. KOTA JASA/CGO/SN/ 2157N/06155E/300T/10K/220556Z/VISUAL.
- C. KRYM/TKR/UR/2548N/05657E/144T/6.0K/231030/VISUAL.

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TOP SECRET / 241110  
ep / G-195

0 241000Z APR 80  
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/S-2  
TO SITE ALPHA/J-2  
INFO [REDACTED]  
JCS/RC-J27

A, C  
DE

EG

BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ // DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJ: INT REP 06

1. ALL SOVIET NAVAL COMBATANTS REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF NIMITZ AS EXERCISE CONTINUES. AGI 477 IS LOCATED EASTERN OF ARG ALFA AND IS ONLY KNOWN SNOOPER CURRENTLY MAINTAINING SURVEILLANCE OF CTF 70 UNITS. AS OF 240830Z 477 WAS 212NM FROM NIMITZ AT APPROX 22.59N 063.19E PROCEEDING CRSE 100, SPEED 10KTS.
2. PRIMARY SOVIET PLATFORM OF CONCERN IS AOR LENINA, POSITIVELY LOCATED VIC 17.44N, 060.15E AT 201908Z.

C

[REDACTED] CURRENTLY HOLDS HER THERE; HOWEVER, CTF 70 UNITS AND A/C MONITORING PERSIAN GULF HAVE NOT SIGHTED LENINA IN TRANSIT. VERY TENTATIVE OUTBOARD DF WITHIN LAST 6 HOURS HAD LENINA ASSOCIATED CALL SIGNS POSSIBLY EMANATING FROM AREA JUST SOUTH OF AL MASIRAH ON ONE CUT AND BETWEEN MASIRAH AND OMAN MAINLAND IN ANOTHER. FLEET SCOUT A/C OPERATING IN THIS AREA HAVE NOT SEEN HER BUT NIMITZ IS SCHED TO FLY ANOTHER MISSION THIS AFTERNOON. OMANIS, WHOSE REPORTING HAS BEEN EXCELLENT IN THE PAST, HAVE NOT LOCATED LENINA IN THIS AREA SINCE THE 20TH.

3. GIVEN UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING AOR'S LOC BELIEVE IT PRUDENT TO CONCLUDE SHE IS IN MASIRAH AREA AND PLAN ACCORDINGLY. LENINA HAS NO AIR SEARCH RADAR BUT MUST BE CREDITED WITH PASSIVE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES FOR BOTH ELINT AND COMINT. CONSEQUENTLY RECOMMEND THAT MC-130'S USE RADAR ALTIMETER ONLY (VICE TERRAIN MAPPING) IN GULF TRANSIT AND STAY OFF THE AIR AS PLANNED. SIDE LOBE PATTERN OF ALTIMETER AT 500 AGL IS SO SMALL THAT LIKELIHOOD OF DETECTION IS NEAR ZERO. CHANCE OF VISUAL ID IN PROJECTED FLIGHT ROUTE CLEARING DARKNESS IS SAME. SAME LEVELS OF CAUTION ADVISED ON OUTBOUND OVER WATER LEG.

4. NO KNOWN RED FLAG MERSHIPS IN THE BOX BUT COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC REMAINS HEAVY THROUGH STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

5. [REDACTED]

6. FURTHER INTREPS WILL BE ON AS REQUIRED BASIS FOCUSING ON LENINA AND AGI. YOUR MSG 082 OF 221830Z REQUESTED "LOCATION AND DTG OF INFO ON SOV AND OTHER SHIPS" IN THE BOX. GIVEN COURSE/SPEED POSSIBILITIES, TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE MERSHIPS IN THE AREA WILL REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 4 PAGES OF SINGLE SPACE POSITS AND TWO MAN DAYS OF CALCULATION. UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED INTEND TO REPORT RED FLAGS ONLY.

REVW: 24APR00  
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 June 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret

REVIEW ON SAOC

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~



G-222

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

C

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: REPORTED PHYSICAL ASSAULT ON AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI (U)  
(DOI: 11 JAN 81)



THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

C

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

C

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12258  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD, NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNLOADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DANI - ISH [REDACTED]  
Room 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

3

Classified By: ~~BDIA~~  
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

10

G-203

NNNNMVV EIA666NCA387  
PP RUE IZJC  
DE RUE IZTI #0105 1171900  
ZNY TITTT  
P 261900Z APR 80  
FM DELTA/ADVANCE//S-2  
TO JCS/RC-J2  
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ IZSES  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DOO, Nmcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON 04 Dec  
DERIVED FROM \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET~~ 261845Z CITE DELTA/ADVANCE 0105


SUBJECT: COMMENT ON INTEL SUPP

1. (U) REF JCS/RC J-2 MSG 170  
261115Z APRIL 80.

2. (S) [REDACTED] ALL ALERTS INITIATED  
PROBABLY CAUSED BY RELEASE OF FORTY FOUR (44) IRANIANS TEMPORARILY  
DETAINED BY RESCUE FORCE.

(Bus People)

RVW 26APRIL 2010  
BT  
#0105



SSN 0191  
ZNY TTTT  
DTG 0 231810Z APR 80  
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/J-2  
TO SITE ALFA/J-2  
INFO JCS/RC-J2/

ABF  
C

TOP SECRET  
G-197

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~//DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST  
SUBJ: INT REP 05

1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUATION OF EXERCISE IN S. ARABIAN SEA/N. INDIAN OCEAN. EXERCISE NOW INVOLVES AT LEAST TEN UNITS AND INCLUDED SECOND CONSECUTIVE DAY OF IL-38 OPS. CTF 70 OUTBOARD RDF PROVIDED FIRST LOCATING DATA ON KRIVAK 693 CONFIRMING SHE IS DEFINITELY OUT OF [REDACTED] PICTURE.

2. AGI 477 REMAINS SOLE SOVIET SURVEILLANCE PLATFORM IN OUR IMMEDIATE AREA. AS OF 231700Z SNOOPER WAS LOC VIC 22.2N 62.5E IN TRAIL OF ARG. OUTBOARD RDF CONFIRMS PGF 679 ON STRAITS OF HORMUZ PATROL. AT 0730Z FRENCH DDG 640 AND FF 725 WERE SIGHTED BY NIMITZ SCOUT A/C VIC 22.1N 63E ON NW COURSE AT 12KTS. SECOND SCOUT LOCATED FRENCH AOR 626 [REDACTED] PROCEEDING 010 AT 12KTS. ALL THREE FRENCH SHIPS ARE REPORTEDLY ENROUTE KARACHI FOR PORT CALL. ANTICIPATE THEY WILL BE WELL CLEAR OF OUR AO BY TOMORROW A.M. NO KNOWN SOVIET MERSHIPS IN THE BOX ALTHOUGH AOR LENINA IS UNLOCATED. NIMITZ FLAG INTELL O BELIEVES SHE IS ENROUTE ADEN BUT WE ARE STILL CHECKING TODAY'S FAC RECCE PHOTOS.

4. AT APPROX 0800Z LICOL STEFFERT AND [REDACTED] (MSN PRIMARY NAV) FLEW LEADERS AERIAL RECCE OF CIP IN VA-35 (A-6E). REVIEW OF FLIR TAPES AND DEBRIEF INDICATE OUR CHARTS OF CIP AREA ARE ACCURATE.

5. NEXT INT REP WILL BE ON THE WAY NLT 240930Z AS PER YOUR REQUEST.

REVM: 23APR00

BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD Nme

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret

REVIEW CH DAOR

DERIVED FROM Multiple

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

4225

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: - US Hostage Situation - Update (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: See Attached Report.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: None.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, Nmic  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT  
DAMI - ISH  
Room 2C840  
DOD HUMINT  
BG FLYNN

Classified by [REDACTED]  
Declassified on: OADR



G-217

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN DISSEM CHANNELS

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TOPIC: RELEASE OF US HOSTAGES (U)

*PP  
Revised 15 Dec*

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW HQ 12358  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMIC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

RESTRICTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DANI - ISIA [REDACTED]  
Room 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN

*Classified By DDIA  
Declassified On OADR*

~~SECRET~~

6-221

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: POSSIBLE CANCELLATION OF US HOSTAGE TRIALS (U)  
(DOI: 11 JAN 81)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED).

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 1258  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DAMI - ISH [REDACTED]  
Room 2C84Q [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

G

Classified By DDIA  
Declassified On OADR

~~SECRET~~

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: SOVIET PRESENCE IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING INFO: (DOI: 17 Dec 80)  
(SEE ATTACHED)

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]

*To be published*

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: None. See attached report.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12358  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD/wmce  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
 1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT  
 DANI - ISH  
 Room 2C840  
 DOD HUMINT  
 BG FLYNN

Classified By: *DIA*  
Declassified On: *OADR*

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 22 Dec 80

9220

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: STATUS OF U.S. HOSTAGES (U)  
DOI: 20 DEC 80

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED).

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT  
DAMI - ISH  
Room 2C840  
DOD HUMINT  
BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12268  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 15 DECEMBER 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: HOSTAGE LOCATION (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED).

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY JDD, NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]  
ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

367

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: UPDATE - SITUATION IN TEHRAN (U)

(DOI: 10 Dec 80)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:  
(SEE ATTACHED).

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

- 1 cy to:
- ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]
  - DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]
  - ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]
  - DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]
  - BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12256  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRAGED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

SECRET

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

OK

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: LOCATIONS OF U.S. HOSTAGES (U)  
(DOI: 6 DEC 80)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY JDD, NMCC

BECL  DOWNLOADED TO

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SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]  
ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 2 Dec 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: PARTIAL RESPONSE TO EEI (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED).

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY JDO N/mce  
 DEEL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: DOI: 25 Nov 80

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION:

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]  
ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN

Classified By  
Declassified ON

DIA  
OADR

~~SECRET~~



REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: LOCATION OF U.S. HOSTAGES (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

*NOT DISSEMINATED  
Due to  
3rd Hand  
NATION  
And  
lack of  
any supporting  
indicators  
RJ*

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE. SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

*4/12/82*

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

- 1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]
- DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]
- ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]
- DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]
- BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Apr 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DD NMIC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM DIT

Classified By: *DIA*  
Declassified On: *OADR*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G-236

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: HOSTAGE INFORMATION (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: DOI: 30 NOV 80.

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION:

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT  
DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]  
ROOM 2C84 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12256  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD NMCC  
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REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET INFORMATION~~

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 26 Sep 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DOD NMCE

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DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

9235

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: [REDACTED]

(SEE [REDACTED])

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12350  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DEGRADATIVE CL BY DDD WMC  
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DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified On: OADR

9259

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 29 Sep 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO 9 Sep 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: [REDACTED]  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY JDO NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 19 Sep 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240317

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: U.S. HOSTAGE TRIALS

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: [REDACTED]  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12236  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 9  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DOD/NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

240317

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 2 September 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: INFORMATION ON US HOSTAGES IN TEHERAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE. SEE ATTACHED.

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12366  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECLASSIFIED  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified On: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

G259

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: Trial of U.S. Hostages (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: This info passed to [REDACTED] on 12 Aug 80 via KY-3r

A

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12256

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCS

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive.

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~



G 260

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 14 August 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CENSUS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: Possible Trial of US Hostages (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

[REDACTED]

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ER 12266  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC  
CI DECL CI DOWNGRADING TO  
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DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 2 JUNE 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CEISUS CA? (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: (1) [REDACTED]

TITLE: DEBRIEF OF PENCIL 1 (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ATTACHED AT ENCLOSURES IS DEBRIEFING CONDUCTED BETWEEN 26 - 28 MAY AND CONCERNS SITUATION IN TEHRAN, IR. ALSO INCLUDED ARE ANSWERS TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS PREPARED BY INFORMATION CONSUMERS.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

SOURCE: SOURCE 240317, WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, HAS REPORTED FACTUALLY IN THE PAST.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 22356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD/WMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
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3

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REPORT FROM  
INSCOM

G 273

~~SECRET~~

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TO SSO FT MEADE

ZEM

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 25 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO N M C  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
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DERIVED FROM

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN LIMDIS FKT 0513

PASS TO LTC

OFC 3953/7823

LTC

OFC 2642/7418

NIGHT ACTION REQUIRED

**NFN 240312**

SUBJECT: ~~SECRET~~ DEBRIEF SESSION WITH PENCILMAN

[REDACTED]

(24 USC 1652-06-20582 MAY 80 for restriction)

Classified by JSOR  
Declassified on: OADR

(2)

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~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

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TO SSO FT MEADE

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~~SECRET~~ NCFORN LINDIS PKT 0314

SECTION 22 OF 03

PASS TO LTC



OFC 3953/7820

LTC



OFC 2643/7418

NIGHT ACTION REQUIRED

25

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ZEM

~~SECRET NOFORN~~ LIMDIS PTK 0815

FINAL SECTION 03 OF 23

PASS TO LTC

OFC 3953/7520

LTC

C 2642/7413

NIGHT ACTION REQUIRED

SUBJECT: SECOND DEBRIEF SESSION WITH PENCIL 1

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE OF DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
ORIG. AUTHORITY [REDACTED]

G 2 74

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

8 MAY 80: Pages 6 and  
7 HAVE BEEN ADDED;  
PREVIOUS MSG WAS  
INCOMPLETE, DUE TO  
TRANSMISSION DIFFICULTIES

C

~~[REDACTED]~~ SOURCE  
# 240317

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DIRECTORATE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 OF 3

REF ID: A66877 [REDACTED] DPO 3962/7000

[REDACTED] DPO 3962/7000

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: LOCATION OF US HOSTAGES

PARAGRAPH 1 CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(1)  
(2)  
(1)

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REF ID: A442

OPERATION TIGER 0000 127000-NOFORN--780000

ENR 0000

ENR 00 00A 00

O 000000 MAY 00 00A

FM 000 00 CORPS

TO 000 00 MEADE

0000

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SECTION 2 OF 3

FROM: LTC [REDACTED] 140 0000/7-00

TO: [REDACTED] 140 0000/7-00

FROM: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

7 MAR 79 01 22 z

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DETMZYUW YFQLAL 0035 127040R-HORN--YEXACV.

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TO SSG FT MEADE

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN LINDIS PAT 0816

G

SECTION 23 OF 43

PASS TO LTC [REDACTED]

OFC 3953/7820

LTC [REDACTED]

OFC 2640/7418

NIGHT ACTION REQUIRED

[REDACTED]

(SM)

[REDACTED]



VZCZCVCN449

OPTIMIZW YFCBWS 0024 1270400-ANSA--YLR

LN1 ANLISH

BRKR OO SOA DE

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FM USO V CORPS

TO USO WASH

BT

~~SECRET NOFORN~~ LINDIS SEC 3 OF 3

PR1 0300

C

[REDACTED]

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 23 SEP 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240241

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: POLICE STATION, TEHRAN, IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: [REDACTED]  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

INFORMATION MAY BE OF USE TO CONSUMER.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12325  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD/mcc  
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DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR~~  
DIA

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 4 AUGUST 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: CRISIS CAR (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

C  
JCS  
copy

TITLE: POSSIBLE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD FACILITY (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1225  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 82  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC  
 RECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
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DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 29 JULY 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: RESPONSE TO TASKING (U)

C

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: REPORT FORWARDS OBSERVATIONS OF SOURCE AND RESPONSES TO SPECIAL TASKING.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD N MCE  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE (SEE ATTACHED)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

~~DIA~~  
Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 23 JULY 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: IRAN SITUATION REPORTING (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: DUE TRIP FROM TEHRAN TO WEST EUROPE (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

[REDACTED]

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12358  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DECLASSIFY CL BY DDD N MCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION:

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Classified By: [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR



4202

18 July 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED BY 22 June 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR COL [REDACTED]

Subject: 0153 Tasking

1. Information received from 0153 debriefings has proved valuable in our intelligence program. Source provides good data derived from peripheral observation and elicitation, and he appears to be reliable. We regret that your office cannot make wider dissemination of his IIR's, but security requirements preclude this.

2. Request that 0153 be debriefed on [REDACTED]  
Questions apply to Iran [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. Request that 0153 be tasked to obtain the following information

[REDACTED]

d. Activities at the following locations:

[REDACTED]

4. We understand that 0153

Request you determine if 0153

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
LtCol, USAF

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~NOCONTRACT~~

G 283

# LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

VZCZCVNA934

OTTMZYUW YFQNAH 5036 2031800-MORN--YEXAQR.  
ZNY MRCRN

ZKZK OO SOA DE.

O 211730Z JUL 80

FM AFSSO USAFER//

TO SSC MEADE

INFO SSO MUNICH

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN LIMDIS NOCONTRACT UNINTEL

NIGHT ACTION REQUIRED ZE ADDRESSEE ONLY

SSC MEADE PASS TO CDR

SSO MUNICH PASS TO OIC

~~SUBJECT: IRAN SPECIAL TASKING RESPONSE (U)~~

REF: SECORD TELCON OF 19 JUL 80 (LTC)

1. (S/NOFORN/LIMDIS/NOCONTRACT/UNINTEL) IN RESPONSE TO

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE PROVIDED FOLLOWING ARE RESPONSES OBTAINED.

FROM 2 242 0153 DEBRIE

**UNINTEL**  
 CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED BY 22 Jun 92  
 DERIVATIVE BY DDO NMC  
 DECL  COMBINED TO  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM DIA passed to  
JTF 1530  
21 JUL  
by KY-3

G

10



G 288


IAGPC-CR

DATE: 15 July 1980



REPORT NAME/NUMBER: OBSERVATION OF US EMBASSY (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]




TITLE: SECURITY AT US EMBASSY, TEHRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]




ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

[REDACTED]



SOURCE:

[REDACTED]




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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1236  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
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DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348 (U)


REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 


*RS*  
*April 1977*

TITLE: KHOMEINI'S HEALTH AND RPT OF NEW DOCTOR FOR KHOMEINI (U)






THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE


SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT (U)  
(SEE ATTACHED)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 1-133  
CONDUCTED ON *22 Jun 92*  
DERIVATIVE CL BY *DDO N MCC*  
 DECL  DOWNGRADING  
REVIEW ON *OADR*  
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ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: 

SOURCE: 

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Copy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT   
DAMI - ISH   
Room 2C840   
DOD HUMINT   
BG FLYNN 

Classified By   
Declassified On: *OADR*

G290

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NEW 240348 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: VISITS BY NEH TO WYATT & HILTON HOTELS (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DSO ALMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

- 1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]
- DAMI - ISH [REDACTED]
- Room 2C840 [REDACTED]
- DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]
- EG FLYNN [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

G-291

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 210348

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: STATUS OF KHOMENINI'S HEALTH - UPDATE (U)

*And Hostage movement o/B-22 Dec 80*

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT  
(SEE ATTACHED)

*Nepalish*

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

- 1 cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]
- DAWI - ISH [REDACTED]
- Room 2C840 [REDACTED]
- DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]
- BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON *22 Jun 92*  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY *DDO NMCC*  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
 REVIEW ON *OADR*  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By [REDACTED]  
 Declassified ON *OADR*

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

G-292

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NEN 24034B (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY [REDACTED]

FILE: STATUS OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH (U)

DOI: 19 DEC 80

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DERIVATIZE CL BY DDD/mcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS -- HUMINT [REDACTED]

DAHI -- ISH [REDACTED]

Room 2C840 [REDACTED]

DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]

BC FLYNN

G

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified On: OADR

~~SECRET~~

C-295

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: DR. PEYMAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 12355

CONDUCTED ON 22 June 82

DERIVATIVE CL BY DSO NMC

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT

DAMI - ISI

Room 2C840

DOD HUMINT

BG FLYNN

Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

348

G. W. W.

OK

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: U.S. HOSTAGES AND DR. PEYMAN (U)  
(DOI: 7 DEC 80, 2100 HRS)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED).

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDB NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]  
ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

[REDACTED]

1AGPC-CR

DATE: 2 Dec 80 C-297

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CALLS FROM TEHERAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: DOI: 25 NOV 80

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12358  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY JSD Nmcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]
- DAMT-ISH [REDACTED]
- ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]
- DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]
- BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

INFO NOT PUBLISHED

SECRET REPORT

Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR



REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240348

REPORT ORIGINATED BY [REDACTED]

TITLE: PARTIAL RESPONSE TO EEI (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION:

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]  
DAMI-TSH [REDACTED]  
ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN

INFO NOT PUBLISHED

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC  
 DECI  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW OK OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

(S)

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240434 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: SW #5

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

- 1. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION MEDIATOR (U)
- 2. COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN IRAN (U)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
 1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]  
 DAMI - JSH [REDACTED]  
 Room 2C840 [REDACTED]  
 DOJ HUMINT [REDACTED]  
 BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By [REDACTED]  
 Declassified ON: OADR

PORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240434 (U)

PORT ORIGINATED BY [REDACTED]

FILE: SW #4 (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

- 1. POLITICAL CONFLICT IN IRAN (U)
- 2. COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN IRAN (U)
- 3. APPEARANCE OF SOVIET WEAPONS IN IRAN (U)

*No publish*

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION: EXCLUSIVE

1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT [REDACTED]  
 DAMI - ISH [REDACTED]  
 Room 2C840 [REDACTED]  
 DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]  
 BG FLYNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By [REDACTED]  
 Declassified ON: OADR

40-302

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: RFN 240434 (U)

NO

REPORT ORIGINATED BY [REDACTED]

TITLE: HOSTAGES IN IRAN

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDORMC

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

- 1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]
- DAMI-TSH [REDACTED]
- ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]
- DOD HUMINT [REDACTED]
- BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NPN 240434

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: #3 SW MESSAGE

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

- 1. STATUS OF U.S. HOSTAGES IN IR (AS OF o/a 2 Nov 80).
- 2. POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF IR POPULATION.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG LES  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/mcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION:

1 copy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]  
 DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]  
 DOD POC [REDACTED]  
 ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]  
 BG FLYNN [REDACTED]

ORIG: FILE

(REPORT NOT PUBLISHED IN NORMAL DOD CHANNELS)

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
 Declassified ON: OADR

9307

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 21 October 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240434

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: #2 SW COMMUNICATION (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

THIS REPORT DETAILS:

- (1) [REDACTED]
- (2) [REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/mce  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
 Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G 300

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240 331 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: Mossatolah Musavie Khovcini (U)  
(Partial Response to 9 Sep 80 EEJ)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED) This report provides information concerning the activities of Musavie Khoveini, and his relationship to the students guarding the US hostages.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: Consumer should be aware of the spelling of Khovcini's name. He has been referred to (in previous news media) as Khomeini. The correct spelling should receive appropriate dissemination.

"REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION"

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/nmcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
REMOVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~ KOFORM

G 301

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240434 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: INFLUENCE OVER US HOSTAGES IN IR (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT CANNOT BE DETERMINED AT THIS TIME.

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED BY 22Jm92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassified On: OADR

~~SECRET~~



G 200

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 25 Sep 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240331

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (DOT: 8 Sep 80) THIS REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION CONCERNING  
(SEE ATTACHED) GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN [REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: PORTIONS OF THE INFORMATION REPORTED BY NFN HAVE BEEN REPORTED  
IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. AS IS INDICATED BY CONTENT, REPORT  
IS INDICATIVE OF POLITICAL/RELIGIOUS MIDDLE CLASS IRANIANS WHO  
MANAGE TO REMAIN INFORMED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN ON A DAY-TO-  
DAY BASIS.

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

NFN'S REPORTING RELIABILITY CANNOT BE DETERMINED AT THIS TIME. [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ON [REDACTED]  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DECLASSIFIED BY DDD NMC  
 DECL  FORWARDED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DECLINED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

4309

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 9 Sep 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240434 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: Continued Debrief of NFN 240434 (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: None, See Attached.

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD/mcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRAGED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassified On: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

G 310 *[Handwritten initials]*

DATE: 3 September 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240434 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: *[Redacted]*

*Soul*

TITLE: US EMBASSY COMPOUND - TEHERAN

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

*[Redacted summary text]*

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE:

*[Redacted source information]*

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1258  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DSO/RMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM *[Redacted]*

~~Classified By: *[Redacted]* DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR~~

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 3 September 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240434 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO SPECIAL TASKING - IRAN, (U)

*Peru*

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: THIS REPORT DETAILS INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NFN 240434  
(SEE ATTACHED) RESPONDING TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE - SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/mcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET NOFORN~~  
~~SECRET NOFORN~~

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 26 Sep 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240241

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW FD 12258  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD N MCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~Classified By: [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~CLASSIFIED~~

G 315

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFM 240497 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: OPINIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF FORMER MILITARY OFFICER CONCERNING CURRENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT.

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BC FLYNN  
VAMI-ISH [REDACTED]  
ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT POC

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12256  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD NMLC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

G 31b

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 14 Nov 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: LANDING DOLLAR 2 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: EXPILTRATION METHOD AND ROUTE OF LANDING DOLLAR 2 (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

THIS REPORT DETAILS ~~INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EXPILTRATION~~  
METHOD AND ROUTES FROM IRAN.

note  
page 4

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

240497

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD N mce  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]  
DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]  
ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DOD HUMINT POC

Classified By: [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NO DISSEMINATION TO THE PRESS

Pr  
G-317

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240483 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: STATUS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE IRANIAN ARMY (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED).

THIS REPORT DETAILS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE IRANIAN GROUND FORCES AND ITS CURRENT ORGANIZATION TO INCLUDE SOME OF THE KEY MILITARY OFFICERS IN COMMAND OF THE CURRENT IRANIAN ARMY.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

[REDACTED]

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive

- 1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]
- BG FLYNN [REDACTED]
- DAMI-ISH [REDACTED]
- ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]
- DOD HUMINT POC [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 80 1256

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC  
 DECLASSIFIED  DOWNGRADED TO  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By [REDACTED] DIA  
 Declassified On OADR

~~SECRET~~



G 318

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240497 (U)

R

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: INTERNAL SABOTAGE OF IR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICAL SYSTEM (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT: (SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE.

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 80 1258  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO N/mcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
ORIGINED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

1 cy to: ADCSOPS-HUMINT [REDACTED]  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]  
DAMI-ISH ([REDACTED])  
ROOM 2C840 [REDACTED]  
DDD HUMINT POC [REDACTED]

G

Classified By: [REDACTED] DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4511

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240483

REPORT ORIGINATED



TITLE: EXFILTRATION METHOD AND ROUTE OF "LANDING DOLLAR" (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE


SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

REPORT DETAILS INFORMATION ON EXFILTRATION ROUTE AND PERSONALITIES INVOLVED.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE:



DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

- 1 cy to: ADCSOPS
- BG FLYNN
- DAMI-ISH
- ROOM 2C840
- DOD HUMINT POC

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1258  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCE  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM

Classified By:  DIA  
 Declassified ON: OADR

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT  
EVALUATION

1. CUSTOMER NO		2. IR NO <b>G-319</b>		INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT EVALUATION			
3. TARGET COUNTRIES		4. REPORTER'S NAME (DAO'S ONLY)			5. IR DATE		
					YEAR	MONTH	DAY
6. SOURCE NO		7. PROJECT NO		8. SUBJECT CODE(S)		9. REC'D BY DISSEM	
						YEAR	MONTH
						DAY	
10. REFERENCE(S) <input type="checkbox"/> A. REQUIREMENTS (cite): (ICR/CIR/DIRM 3/DIRM 9) <input type="checkbox"/> B. INITIATIVE REPORT				11. REASON FOR EVALUATION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. ICR RESPONSE <input type="checkbox"/> B. COLLECTOR'S REQ <input type="checkbox"/> C. SEL BY ANALYST <input type="checkbox"/> D. SEL BY COL MGR			
12. VALUE OF INFORMATION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE <input type="checkbox"/> B. OF VALUE <input type="checkbox"/> C. OF NO VALUE			14. TYPES OF PRODUCTS TO BENEFIT FROM USE OF IR: <input type="checkbox"/> A. BASIC INTELLIGENCE <input type="checkbox"/> B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE <input type="checkbox"/> C. ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE <input type="checkbox"/> D. S&T INTELLIGENCE		16. DEGREE OF REQUIREMENT SATISFACTION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. COMPLETELY SATISFIED <input type="checkbox"/> B. PARTIALLY SATISFIED <input type="checkbox"/> C. NOT SATISFIED AT ALL		
13. REASON INFORMATION IS OF NO VALUE (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. TOO FRAGMENTARY <input type="checkbox"/> B. DUPLICATIVE <input type="checkbox"/> C. UNTIMELY <input type="checkbox"/> D. NOT RESPONSIVE TO TASKING CITED			15. NAME OF PRODUCT(S)				
17. COLLECTION GUIDANCE (Mandatory unless 16A, above, is checked)							
18. REMARKS (Optional)							
19. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE DATA							
A. EVALUATOR'S RECOMMENDATION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> RELEASABLE <input type="checkbox"/> EVALUATION NOT REQUESTED. <input type="checkbox"/> EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE. <input type="checkbox"/> PARAS ( ) ABOVE IS/ARE THE GOVT(S) OF _____				B. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE AUTHORITY DECISION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE. <input type="checkbox"/> NON-CAVEATED PORTIONS OF THIS EVAL AS PERMITTED MAY BE REL TO THE GOVT(S) OF _____ AT THE DISCRETION OF THE ORIGINATOR			
20. EVALUATOR'S NAME		21. EVALUATOR'S OFFICE SYMBOL		SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (DOWNGRADING, DECLASS, AND SPECIAL)			
23. DATE OF EVALUATION YEAR MONTH DAY		22. ORIGINATOR OF IR		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 6 Nov 80

G 320

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240483 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: ABSENCE OF IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES IN AREA WEST OF REZAIYEH, IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

THIS REPORT DETAILS LIMITED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ABSENCE OF IR. MILITARY UNITS, TO INCLUDE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, IN THE AREA WEST OF THE IRANIAN CITY OF REZAIYEH.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to: ADCSOPS (COL [REDACTED])  
BG FLYNN [REDACTED]  
DAMI-ISH (LTC [REDACTED])  
ROOM 2C840 (LTC [REDACTED])  
DOD HUMINT POC [REDACTED]

G

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1255  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DSO NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

CUSTOMER NO

2. TR NO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EVALUATION

3. TARGET COUNTRIES

4. REPORTER'S NAME (DAO'S ONLY)

5. IR DATE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

6. SOURCE NO

7. PROJECT NO

8. SUBJECT CODE(S)

9. REC'D BY DISSEM

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

10. REFERENCE(S)

- A. REQUIREMENTS (CITE): (ICR/CIR/DIRM 3/DIRM 9)
- B. INITIATIVE REPORT

11. REASON FOR EVALUATION (SELECT ONE ONLY)

- A. ICR RESPONSE
- B. COLLECTOR'S REQ
- C. SEL BY ANALYST
- D. SEL BY COL MGR

12. VALUE OF INFORMATION (SELECT ONE ONLY)

- A. OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE
- B. OF VALUE
- C. OF NO VALUE

14. TYPES OF PRODUCTS TO BENEFIT FROM USE OF IR:

- A. BASIC INTELLIGENCE
- B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
- C. ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE
- D. S&T INTELLIGENCE

16. DEGREE OF REQUIREMENT SATISFACTION (SELECT ONE ONLY)

- A. COMPLETELY SATISFIED
- B. PARTIALLY SATISFIED
- C. NOT SATISFIED AT ALL

13. REASON INFORMATION IS OF NO VALUE (SELECT ONE ONLY)

- A. TOO FRAGMENTARY
- B. DUPLICATIVE
- C. UNTIMELY
- D. NOT RESPONSIVE TO TASKING CITED

15. NAME OF PRODUCT(S)

17. COLLECTION GUIDANCE (Mandatory unless 16A, above, is checked)

18. REMARKS (Optional)

19. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE DATA

A. EVALUATOR'S RECOMMENDATION (SELECT ONE ONLY)

- RELEASABLE EVALUATION NOT REQUESTED.
- EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE.
- PARAS (S) \_\_\_\_\_ ABOVE IS/ARE RELEASABLE TO THE GOVT(S) OF \_\_\_\_\_

B. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE AUTHORITY DECISION (SELECT ONE ONLY)

- EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE.
- NON-CAVEATED PORTIONS OF THIS EVALUATION AS RELEASABLE MAY BE REL TO THE GOVT(S) OF \_\_\_\_\_ AT THE DISCRETION OF THE ORIGINATOR.

20. EVALUATOR'S NAME

21. EVALUATOR'S OFFICE SYMBOL

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (DOWNGRADING, DECLASS, AND SPECIAL HANDLING)

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

22. ORIGINATOR OF IR

DD Form 1300

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DD FORM 1300

15 JUL 73, IS OBSOLETE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~SECRET~~

U S 21

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 6 November 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240483 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: 

TITLE: SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT IN TEHRAN (U)

DOI: 12 OCTOBER 1980

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE


SUMMARY OF REPORT: PROVIDES LIMITED INFORMATION CONCERNING SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT IN TEHRAN, IR, AS OF 12 OCTOBER 1980.  
(SEE ATTACHED)







ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -


SOURCE 

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E8 12358  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
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REVIEW ON OADR  
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DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

1 cy to: ADCSOPS (COL   
BG FLYNN   
DAMI-ISH (LTC   
✓ ROOM 2C840 (LTC   
DOD HUMINT POC

G

Classified By:   
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CUSTOMER NO 2. IR NO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT EVALUATION

3. TARGET COUNTRIES 4. REPORTER'S NAME (DAO'S ONLY) 5. IR DATE  
 YEAR MONTH DAY

6. SOURCE NO 7. PROJECT NO 8. SUBJECT CODE(S) 9. REC'D BY DISSEM  
 YEAR MONTH DAY

10. REFERENCE(S)  
 A. REQUIREMENTS (cite): (ICR/CIR/DIRM 3/DIRM 9)  
 B. INITIATIVE REPORT

11. REASON FOR EVALUATION (SELECT ONE ONLY)  
 A. ICR RESPONSE  
 B. COLLECTOR'S REQ  
 C. SEL BY ANALYST  
 D. SEL BY COL MGR

12. VALUE OF INFORMATION (SELECT ONE ONLY)  
 A. OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE  
 B. OF VALUE  
 C. OF NO VALUE

14. TYPES OF PRODUCTS TO BENEFIT FROM USE OF IR:  
 A. BASIC INTELLIGENCE  
 B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
 C. ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE  
 D. S&T INTELLIGENCE

16. DEGREE OF REQUIREMENT SATISFACTION (SELECT ONE ONLY)  
 A. COMPLETELY SATISFIED  
 B. PARTIALLY SATISFIED  
 C. NOT SATISFIED AT ALL

13. REASON INFORMATION IS OF NO VALUE (SELECT ONE ONLY)  
 A. TOO FRAGMENTARY  
 B. DUPLICATIVE  
 C. UNTIMELY  
 D. NOT RESPONSIVE TO TASKING CITED

15. NAME OF PRODUCT(S)

17. COLLECTION GUIDANCE (Mandatory unless 16A, above, is checked)

18. REMARKS (Optional)

19. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE DATA  
 A. EVALUATION RECOMMENDATION (SELECT ONE ONLY)  
 RELEASED  
 EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE  
 PARAS ( ) ABOVE IS/ARE (THE GOVT(S) OF \_\_\_\_\_)

B. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE AUTHORITY DECISION (SELECT ONE ONLY)  
 EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE.  
 NON-CAVEATED PORTIONS OF THIS EVALUATION IS/ARE RELEASABLE TO THE GOVT(S) OF \_\_\_\_\_ AT THE DISCRETION OF THE ORIGINATOR.

20. EVALUATOR NAME 21. EVALUATOR'S OFFICE SYMBOL  
 22. ORIGINATOR OF IR

23. SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (DOWNGRADING, DECLASS, AND SPECIAL AG)

24. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

4 5

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 6 Nov 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240483 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: OPINIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF FORMER IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICER CONCERNING  
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE

REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE

1 cy to: ADCSOPS (COL [REDACTED])  
EG FLYNN [REDACTED]  
DAMI-ISH (LTC [REDACTED])  
ROOM 2C840 (LTC [REDACTED])  
DOD HUMINT POC [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT  
EVALUATION

1. CUSTOMER NO		2. IR NO					
3. TARGET COUNTRIES		4. REPORTER'S NAME (DAO'S ONLY)			5. IR DATE		
					YEAR	MONTH	DAY
6. SOURCE NO		7. PROJECT NO		8. SUBJECT CODE(S)		9. REC'D BY DISSEM	
						YEAR	MONTH
						DAY	
10. REFERENCE(S) <input type="checkbox"/> A. REQUIREMENTS (cite): (ICR/CIR/DIRM 3/DIRM 9) <input type="checkbox"/> B. INITIATIVE REPORT				11. REASON FOR EVALUATION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. ICR RESPONSE <input type="checkbox"/> B. COLLECTOR'S REQ <input type="checkbox"/> C. SEL BY ANALYST <input type="checkbox"/> D. SEL BY COL MGR			
12. VALUE OF INFORMATION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE <input type="checkbox"/> B. OF VALUE <input type="checkbox"/> C. OF NO VALUE			14. TYPES OF PRODUCTS TO BENEFIT FROM USE OF IR: <input type="checkbox"/> A. BASIC INTELLIGENCE <input type="checkbox"/> B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE <input type="checkbox"/> C. ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE <input type="checkbox"/> D. S&T INTELLIGENCE		16. DEGREE OF REQUIREMENT SATISFACTION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. COMPLETELY SATISFIED <input type="checkbox"/> B. PARTIALLY SATISFIED <input type="checkbox"/> C. NOT SATISFIED AT ALL		
13. REASON INFORMATION IS OF NO VALUE (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. TOO FRAGMENTARY <input type="checkbox"/> B. DUPLICATIVE <input type="checkbox"/> C. UNTIMELY <input type="checkbox"/> D. NOT RESPONSIVE TO TASKING CITED			15. NAME OF PRODUCT(S)				
17. COLLECTION GUIDANCE (Mandatory unless 16A, above, is checked)							
18. REMARKS (Optional)							
19. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE DATA							
A. EVALUATOR'S RECOMMENDATION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> RELEASABLE <input type="checkbox"/> EVALUATION NOT REQUESTED. <input type="checkbox"/> EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE. <input type="checkbox"/> PARAS 1-4 ABOVE, IS/ARE RELEASABLE TO THE GOVT(S) OF _____				B. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE AUTHORITY DECISION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE. <input type="checkbox"/> NON-CAVEATED PORTIONS OF THIS EVALUATION MAY BE REL TO THE GOVT(S) OF _____ AT THE DISCRETION OF THE ORIGINATOR			
20. EVALUATOR'S NAME		21. EVALUATOR'S OFFICE SYMBOL		SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (DOWNGRADING, DECLASS, AND SPECIAL)			
22. YEAR MONTH DAY		23. ORIGINATOR OF IR		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G 305

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240483 (U)

FUR

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: Current Use of Former US Military Facilities (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DOI: 12 October 1980 & Earlier

SUMMARY OF REPORT: This report details information on the current use of [REDACTED]  
(SEE ATTACHED) [REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NFN 240483 is voluntarily providing info to USAI.

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO USIS  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Apr 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD N MCE  
 DECL  DECLASSIFIED TO  
REVIEW BY OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive.

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

SECRET

NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT EVALUATION

1. CUSTOMER NO	2. IR NO							
3. TARGET COUNTRIES	4. REPORTER'S NAME (DAO'S ONLY)	5. IR DATE <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>YEAR</td> <td>MONTH</td> <td>DAY</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	YEAR	MONTH	DAY			
YEAR	MONTH	DAY						

6. SOURCE NO	7. PROJECT NO	8. SUBJECT CODE(S)	9. REC'D BY DISSEM <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>YEAR</td> <td>MONTH</td> <td>DAY</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	YEAR	MONTH	DAY			
YEAR	MONTH	DAY							

10. REFERENCE(S) <input type="checkbox"/> A. REQUIREMENTS (cite): ((ICR/CIR/DIRM 3/DIRM 9) <input type="checkbox"/> B. INITIATIVE REPORT	11. REASON FOR EVALUATION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. ICR RESPONSE <input type="checkbox"/> B. COLLECTOR'S REQ <input type="checkbox"/> C. SEL BY ANALYST <input type="checkbox"/> D. SEL BY COL MGR
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12. VALUE OF INFORMATION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE <input type="checkbox"/> B. OF VALUE <input type="checkbox"/> C. OF NO VALUE	14. TYPES OF PRODUCTS TO BENEFIT FROM USE OF IR: <input type="checkbox"/> A. BASIC INTELLIGENCE <input type="checkbox"/> B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE <input type="checkbox"/> C. ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE <input type="checkbox"/> D. S&T INTELLIGENCE	16. DEGREE OF REQUIREMENT SATISFACTION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. COMPLETELY SATISFIED <input type="checkbox"/> B. PARTIALLY SATISFIED <input type="checkbox"/> C. NOT SATISFIED AT ALL
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13. REASON INFORMATION IS OF NO VALUE (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> A. TOO FRAGMENTARY <input type="checkbox"/> B. DUPLICATIVE <input type="checkbox"/> C. UNTIMELY <input type="checkbox"/> D. NOT RESPONSIVE TO TASKING CITED	15. NAME OF PRODUCT(S)
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17. COLLECTION GUIDANCE (Mandatory unless 16A, above, is checked)

18. REMARKS (Optional)

19. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE DATA A. EVALUATOR'S RECOMMENDATION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> RELEASABLE <input type="checkbox"/> EVALUATION IS NOT REQUESTED. <input type="checkbox"/> EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE. <input type="checkbox"/> PARAS ( ) ABOVE, IS/ARE RELEASABLE TO THE GOVT(S) OF _____	B. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE AUTHORITY DECISION (SELECT ONE ONLY) <input type="checkbox"/> EVALUATION IS NOT RELEASABLE. <input type="checkbox"/> NON-CAVEATED PORTIONS OF THIS EVAL AS PART OF RELEASABLE CONTROL TO THE GOVT(S) OF _____ AT THE DISCRETION OF THE ORIGINATOR.
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20. EVALUATOR NAME	21. EVALUATOR'S OFFICE SYMBOL	SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (DOWNGRADING, DECLASS. AND SPECIAL AG)						
22. DATE EVALUATED <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>YEAR</td> <td>MONTH</td> <td>DAY</td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	YEAR	MONTH	DAY				23. ORIGINATOR OF IR	
YEAR	MONTH	DAY						

24. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

G 324

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 30 October 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: NFN 240483 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED: [REDACTED]

*PK*

TITLE: Partial Response to 9 Sep 80 EEI Tasking (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DOI: October 1980

SUMMARY OF REPORT: [REDACTED]  
(SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NFN 240483 is voluntarily providing info to USAF.

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY BDO nmc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
REMOVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958

CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret

REVIEW ON JADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources  
JS

G-325

INFO WAS OBTAINED FROM RELIABLE REPORTED  
SOURCE ONLY.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

G-326

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: OTS-E-005

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: RESPONSE TO 9 SEP 80 TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT (SEE ATTACHED) [REDACTED]

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: SEE ATTACHED REPORT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1236  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jan 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY D.D. N.M.C.C.  
 DECL  DECLASSIFIED TO  
REVIEW ON 2 ADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Smu  
[REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

Rep to Be Published  
Copy to [REDACTED]  
A [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE  
1 Cy to: ADSOPS - HUMINT (COL [REDACTED] LTC [REDACTED])  
DAMI - ISH (LTC [REDACTED])  
Room 2C840 (LTC [REDACTED])  
DOD HUMINT (COL [REDACTED])  
BG FLYNN

Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

45011

Fulk

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: OTS-M-014-80 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: SECRET Iranian Overseas Bank Accounts (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DOI: OCT 1980

SUMMARY OF REPORT:  
(SEE ATTACHED)

[REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS:

[REDACTED]

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 1256  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DBO NMEC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: Exclusive.

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

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~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

G 320

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 27 Oct 80

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: OTS-E-001-80 (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

TITLE: PARTIAL RESPONSE TO EEL TASKING (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT (SEE ATTACHED)

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS

- REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION -

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 1225  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC  
 DECL  COMPAKED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED] Multiple Smiles

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~



REPORT NAME/NUMBER: OTS-M-0012

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: [REDACTED]

*MLA*

TITLE: POSSIBLE LOCATION OF U.S. HOSTAGES (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY OF REPORT (SEE ATTACHED) [REDACTED]

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

*-REQUEST WRITTEN EVALUATION-*

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DBON/MLC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION: EXCLUSIVE.

Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR



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G330  
15 SEP 1980  
PW

MEMORANDUM FOR General Tighe

SUBJECT: Meeting with Source (X)

G  
C, E  
G

1. (S/NF) Source came to my office to report on his trip to Egypt and his meeting with Queen Farah. Source went to Egypt at the request of [redacted] who had maintained close contact with the Shah during the latter's stay in Egypt. In addition to Source and [redacted]

[redacted] was present at the meeting with Farah. [redacted] reportedly has close contacts in the clergy and knows which clergy are pro and anti-Khomeini. [redacted] was also there at the request of [redacted]. No members of either the Oveisi or Bakhtiar groups were present at the discussions with Farah. Source said they [redacted] and Source were met in Egypt by [redacted]

[redacted] upon their 7 Sep 80 arrival. There were registered in a hotel under assumed names and escorted into the palace where Farah lives in a manner which caused minimum notice.

2. (S/NF) There were two, three hour meetings with Farah. She said it is her duty to try and overthrow Khomeini and has convinced the Crown Prince (who was not present) he must be the symbolic leader of the opposition movement. She realizes the Crown Prince does not have the experience to be the actual leader and asked for recommendations from which she could select a leader. Farah said since neither Oveisi or Bakhtiar seem to be able to get anything started she wanted to establish her own organization with the Crown Prince at the head. The Crown Prince may announce his intentions to assume the position of Shah on his 20th birthday at the end of October 1980.

3. (S/NF) Source [redacted] proposed the organization (attached at Enclosure 1) which in its entirety is to be called the Council of Leadership. They also submitted a list of names for her to select the leader and the staff positions for the High Command Council, which in turn would select the heads of the Executive Committees in the US and Europe who are to coordinate the recruitment and transportation of personnel to the staging area of the opposition force (nfi).

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO N MCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By: DIA  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U)  
4. (S/NF) Once the organization is staffed, delegations will be sent to Bakhtiar and Oveisi asking for their support and possible participation. Simultaneously, delegations will be sent to Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, US, etc, to solicit support for the movement. Farah was initially against seeking US support as she believes the fall of the Shah was a US conspiracy but agreed to the group's recommendations to include the US.

6  
5. (S/NF) The next step, that of naming the High Command Council, will be initiated by Farah and carried out by [REDACTED] who has remained in Egypt to assist her. Once this has been accomplished another series of meetings will follow. Source was impressed with Farah's poise, knowledge of the situation and purpose. He said this visit and the organization being developed are very sensitive and should be closely held. (Comment: The press has already picked-up on this story over this past week-end).

(U)  
6. (S/NF) Comment:

- If Farah's scheme materializes this would insert another player into the opposition movement scene. I question how much support Farah's movement would receive especially from inside Iran. This may be the work of Princess Ashraf who would like to see the Pahlavi Family back in Iran in some official capacity in order to regain some of her former influence and wealth. It will be interesting to see Oveisi's/Bakhtiar's reaction to this scheme, I cannot see them subordinating themselves to the Crown Prince but frustration may breed some strange coalitions.

6  
- Attached as Enclosure 2 is a photograph of Evin prison where a large number of former military officers are imprisoned including [REDACTED]. I have no further identifying data as to date, direction, etc, but I will provide a copy to our Iran Desk if you have no objections. Source got this from [REDACTED].


Encl  
a/s

G  
[REDACTED]  
LTC, USA  
DI-A(NFIB/MIB)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


COUNCIL OF LEADERSHIP



Total number of personnel excluding the Executive Committees is 25. However, this is a very tentative figure and will probably be expanded.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



EVIN Rooftop

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
CONTACT REPORT

G 334 (E)

Name: [REDACTED]  
Date of Contact: 26 July 1980  
Report #1

1. Circumstances of Contact: Arlington VA in the apartment of a mutual friend.

Date, Time and Place of Meeting: 26 July 1980, approximately 9:30 until 11:00.

Travel and Itinerary: None involved.

Security Measures: None

Cover: None.

Unusual Occurrences: None.

Language Used: English.

2. Personalia and Reason for Contact: [REDACTED] is approximately 34 years old and extremely thin. He has long straight blondish hair and a beard. He wears metal-rimmed glasses and generally seems to be somewhat of an aged hippie. His dress on the other hand is neat and stylish. The clothing is expensive and new in appearance. [REDACTED] speaks Farsi and lived in Iran a number of times since the early 60's. He is a graduate of Tehran Community School.

He was in Iran as a freelance writer (with a press card) at the beginning of 1980 and was counted among American journalists when the Iranian government ordered expulsion. Following the US rescue attempt in April, [REDACTED] decided to attempt a personal initiative for the release of the hostages. Some hostages (unnamed) are personal friends of his. Through the son of an Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who is a personal friend of [REDACTED] arranged to acquire a special visa in Bahrain and travel to Iran in the early part of May 1980. He remained there until the 26th of June when he traveled to Egypt, France and then to the United States arriving here in early July.

[REDACTED] is a sincere, pacifistic individual whose actions seem motivated by a honest interest and concern for Iran and its future. He has many friends in the country. He is intelligent, articulate and quite practical in his idealism, and seems to be sincerely saddened by his inability to contact any of the hostages or their captors.

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

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Declassified by  
WDO NMC  
22 Jun 92

Having failed in his personal diplomatic initiative, [redacted] decided to acquire further information for a book which he has been planning for some time, and to remain in Iran as long as possible for that purpose. In connection with those plans, he later decided to travel to Egypt in order to personally learn of the Shah's condition. Subsequently, he went to Paris, where he hoped to meet Former Prime Minister Bakhtiar. He said that he did speak with him by phone some six days before the assassination attempt on Bakhtiar's life.

He departed Iran on the 26th of June because of Iranian government actions regarding American journalists. The Iranian government allowed visas to expire as a means for having journalists leave. [redacted] learned through his contacts that the last of these journalists were to depart Iran on 25 June. By leaving a day later, he would be the "last" American out of Tehran, and felt that might be an important feature should he publish his book. Iran subsequently permitted the return of two US journalists, who left again on 26 July.

Upon his arrival in Tehran, [redacted] checked into an inexpensive hotel where he stayed for 3-4 days. He called the individual who had arranged his visa and announced his arrival, asking what steps he should take next. This person indicated by his response that he was unable to talk with [redacted] and further advised that it would be unwise for [redacted] to call him again.

He then returned to his hotel where he established some contacts with a [redacted]. This [redacted] and other members of the [redacted] invited [redacted] to stay with them. The [redacted] does not pay well and therefore houses its personnel in its building, in the top floor or the one immediately below it. There are several room and [redacted] was invited to either stay in one of those or, if he preferred, to sleep on the roof (customary in Iran during the summer). For the remainder of his time in Iran, [redacted] lived in the top floors of the [redacted] and slept on the roof.

Shortly after moving in, [redacted] went to the Ministry of Public Affairs and inquired about the possibility of obtaining a new press card. He was advised to direct himself to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and apply. When he did so, he commented to them that he had been a validated correspondent up until the departure of Americans from Iran in the earlier part of the year. The Iranians, however, could find no record of that, and asked about his purposes at this time. He explained that he was researching a book, which he planned to publish upon his return to the United States. He showed them

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the visa which had been arranged for him in Bahrain. They accepted that but advised him that it would be best for him to continue merely as a "diplomatic tourist" rather than to get a press authorization. He was advised to be somewhat cautious about what questions he asked and was given some specific advice about how he should approach members of the Revolutionary Guard.

G During the following month and a half, [REDACTED] was able to move freely about the city of Tehran, at all hours, day and night. He said that at least five nights out of seven he was on the streets wandering around between the hours of 11:00 and 1:00 in the morning. At no time was he approached by any member of the Revolutionary Guard nor was he harassed by any official Iranian other than one incident which took place approximately three weeks after his arrival. Having returned from a tennis game, he went to meet a friend at the Hotel Intercontinental. When he entered the hotel, another person pointed him out to a policeman, (that is an official government policeman, not a Revolutionary Guard). The policeman took [REDACTED] to a back room where he forced him to strip and examined him for marks that would indicate he was an addict to some kind of a drug, probably heroin. [REDACTED] felt quite apprehensive that he would be turned over to the Khomeini following this examination, but upon completion of the exam, was released. Other than this incident, he had no trouble with the Guards or the police. One may speculate that [REDACTED] appearance following a tennis game was somewhat unkempt and he might possibly have been suspected of using drugs.

E During this time in Iran he met with a physician [REDACTED] who was an old friend; the physician who treated Khomeini during the FIRST period after Khomeini returned to Iran in 1979. The physician related several incidents. He told [REDACTED] that the first time he was called to visit Khomeini was shortly after Khomeini had returned to Iran. The Ayatollah had become ill as a result of drafts experienced in the helicopter while he was flying around the city, and required some medical attention. In addition to the Doctor, a Professor from the University of Tehran was asked to come. The Dr. told [REDACTED] that he and the Professor were waiting in an outer room when the doors opened and they were ushered into Khomeini's presence. The Professor from the university began groveling and bowing low along the floor and then prostrated himself in front of Khomeini to kiss his feet. The physician couldn't resist the impulse and supposedly kicked the prostrate professor in the rear while at the same time observing Khomeini's reaction. He told [REDACTED] that Khomeini smiled slightly and then returned to his normal stern visage. The Dr. claims to have subsequently treated Khomeini six or seven times. Simultaneously, of course,

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the situation in Iran was deteriorating. He told [redacted] that the last time he was asked to come to treat Khomeini was approximately a year or six months ago (time uncertain) but that [redacted]

[redacted] He claims to have used these words. Following these comments he was fired from his job at [redacted] but has continued to practice privately.

[redacted] apparently made several attempts to contact the hostages without success. He said that every time he thought he might be making progress in this regard, he ran into a blank wall. He visited with several other friends and had no trouble at all, including the [redacted] and their mother [redacted] all of whom are known to me. Apparently there was no problem at all for either [redacted] to meet with an American.

[redacted] said that he never claimed to be anything but an American. In fact, he advertised it quite freely since he didn't want anyone to think he was doing anything devious. He avoided the appearance of spying or anything of that nature.

The meeting ended shortly thereafter and we agreed to meet again for breakfast the following morning--the 27th of July. An agency check was conducted of [redacted] on the 25th of July with no record.

Comments: [redacted] is a very sincere, very capable man. He is obviously quite well-educated and cannot be classified as a starry-eyed idealist. He is however, very much a pacifist, and would be disinclined to cooperate with the intelligence agency or the Dept of Defense. Nonetheless, he represents an interesting prospect since he is willing to return to Iran and probably will do so. Our common friends provide a basis for mutual understanding. He seems to trust me and feels quite at ease discussing his experiences with me. This experience of [redacted] provides some detailed insight into the ease with which an American could move about in Tehran, and quite a bit of information for us in regard to the lack of tight security in that country.

27 July 1980  
Report #2

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Met again with Mr. [REDACTED]. There were a few anecdotal reports of his travels in Iran prior to this last visit. Also present, however, was [REDACTED] who is [REDACTED] under the Shah.

There are eight male members of the [REDACTED] family who were all quite influential in Iran. [REDACTED] was the wealthiest of this group. All eight of these men have been marked by the Revolutionary Guards for arrest or trial. Two are currently in jail in Iran, and one is dead. The remainder of the family has gotten out of Iran and is in the States or Europe. [REDACTED] left Iran in Oct 79 after much difficulty and by means of a great deal of bribery. It was interesting to see her discussions with [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] was able to report to her on the condition of her properties at the Caspian Sea (they have been seized by the Revolutionaries) and the conditions of her furniture, which is still in her home in Tehran. Apparently the system now is that when the Revolutionary Guards or the Pasdaran come to inspect, i.e., when they suspect there is furniture or some possession that should be the property of the State, advance warning is given the families and they move the furniture around. There are groups of people that are making their living by moving the possessions of wealthy people from one place to another to be hidden while the inspections are taking place.

The meeting concluded more or less on notes of this nature, basically anecdotal and of very little substance. I will be having dinner this evening with [REDACTED] and a number of members of the family. Her husband is currently in San Francisco, however, and will not be there.

Continuation 27 July

Dinner meeting with [REDACTED] and several others, among whom was [REDACTED] who is related to the [REDACTED] and was a fairly high level Ministry of Foreign Affairs official during the time of the Shah. He left Iran in Sep or Oct 79. Most of the conversation related to political discussions and the implications of the Shah's death today.


Little of substance was discussed other than one interesting point. [REDACTED] pointed out that the primary route currently being used by wealthy Iranians to escape Iran is

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to drive to Sanandaj in Kurdestan. There they link with Kurdish individuals who place them in jeeps and drive them to a town called Bane on the Turkish-Iranian border. According to Sharoukh there are four towns named Bane. At that town, the escaping Iranian is met by a Turkish driver in a different jeep who takes them across the border. The Turk at the border also provides the escapee with a passport and all other related documents. There were a number of discussions about discontent in the Iranian population. One of the points was that the cohesion which had existed up until a few months had now been eroded. Even the peasant class, formerly quite loyal to Khomeini, now feels that his position is probably in error. These observations were, of course, made by fairly influential Iranians rather than by peasants themselves, although Sharoukh claimed that his gardener had said as much the last time they had talked (by phone, last week).

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LATITUDE: 2616 N

LONGITUDE: 05010 E

ALTITUDE: 00023 M

G 336

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
15 APR 1980	15/0056	15/0125	15/0152	15/0215	15/1504	15/1527	15/1555	15/1623
16 APR 1980	16/0055	16/0123	16/0151	16/0214	16/1505	16/1528	16/1556	16/1624
17 APR 1980	17/0054	17/0122	17/0150	17/0213	17/1505	17/1528	17/1556	17/1625
18 APR 1980	18/0053	18/0121	18/0149	18/0212	18/1506	18/1529	18/1557	18/1625
19 APR 1980	19/0052	19/0120	19/0148	19/0211	19/1506	19/1529	19/1557	19/1626
20 APR 1980	20/0050	20/0119	20/0147	20/0210	20/1507	20/1530	20/1558	20/1627
21 APR 1980	21/0049	21/0118	21/0146	21/0209	21/1507	21/1530	21/1559	21/1627
22 APR 1980	22/0048	22/0117	22/0145	22/0209	22/1508	22/1531	22/1559	22/1628
23 APR 1980	23/0047	23/0116	23/0144	23/0208	23/1508	23/1531	23/1600	23/1629
24 APR 1980	24/0046	24/0115	24/0143	24/0207	24/1509	24/1532	24/1600	24/1630
25 APR 1980	25/0045	25/0114	25/0143	25/0206	25/1509	25/1533	25/1601	25/1630
26 APR 1980	26/0044	26/0113	26/0142	26/0205	26/1510	26/1533	26/1602	26/1631
27 APR 1980	27/0043	27/0112	27/0141	27/0204	27/1510	27/1534	27/1602	27/1632
28 APR 1980	28/0042	28/0111	28/0140	28/0203	28/1511	28/1534	28/1603	28/1632

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2616 N

LONGITUDE: 05010 E

ALTITUDE: 00023 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
29 APR 1980	29/0041	29/0110	29/0139	29/0202	29/1511	29/1535	29/1604	29/1633
30 APR 1980	30/0040	30/0109	30/0138	30/0202	30/1512	30/1535	30/1604	30/1634
01 MAY 1980	01/0039	01/0108	01/0137	01/0201	01/1512	01/1536	01/1605	01/1635
02 MAY 1980	02/0038	02/0108	02/0137	02/0200	02/1513	02/1537	02/1606	02/1635
03 MAY 1980	03/0037	03/0107	03/0136	03/0159	03/1513	03/1537	03/1606	03/1636
04 MAY 1980	04/0036	04/0106	04/0135	04/0159	04/1514	04/1538	04/1607	04/1637
05 MAY 1980	05/0035	05/0105	05/0134	05/0158	05/1515	05/1538	05/1607	05/1638
06 MAY 1980	06/0034	06/0104	06/0133	06/0157	06/1515	06/1539	06/1608	06/1638
07 MAY 1980	07/0033	07/0103	07/0133	07/0157	07/1516	07/1539	07/1609	07/1639
08 MAY 1980	08/0032	08/0103	08/0132	08/0156	08/1516	08/1540	08/1609	08/1640
09 MAY 1980	09/0031	09/0102	09/0131	09/0155	09/1517	09/1541	09/1610	09/1641
10 MAY 1980	10/0030	10/0101	10/0131	10/0155	10/1517	10/1541	10/1611	10/1641
11 MAY 1980	11/0030	11/0100	11/0130	11/0154	11/1518	11/1542	11/1611	11/1642
12 MAY 1980	12/0029	12/0100	12/0129	12/0153	12/1518	12/1542	12/1612	12/1643

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA ALL TIMES IN GMT

*Declassified by  
DDO/MCC  
22 Jun 92*

Classified By: *DJSor*  
Declassified ON: *OAD*

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DATE	BEGIN TWILIGHT				END TWILIGHT			
	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
13 MAY 1980	13/0028	13/0059	13/0129	13/0153	13/1519	13/1543	13/1613	13/1644
14 MAY 1980	14/0027	14/0058	14/0128	14/0152	14/1519	14/1544	14/1613	14/1644
15 MAY 1980	15/0026	15/0058	15/0128	15/0152	15/1520	15/1544	15/1614	15/1645
16 MAY 1980	16/0026	16/0057	16/0127	16/0151	16/1520	16/1545	16/1615	16/1646
17 MAY 1980	17/0025	17/0056	17/0126	17/0151	17/1521	17/1545	17/1615	17/1647
18 MAY 1980	18/0024	18/0056	18/0126	18/0150	18/1522	18/1546	18/1616	18/1647
19 MAY 1980	19/0024	19/0055	19/0125	19/0150	19/1522	19/1547	19/1617	19/1648
20 MAY 1980	20/0023	20/0055	20/0125	20/0149	20/1523	20/1547	20/1617	20/1649
21 MAY 1980	21/0022	21/0054	21/0124	21/0149	21/1523	21/1548	21/1618	21/1650
22 MAY 1980	22/0022	22/0054	22/0124	22/0149	22/1524	22/1548	22/1619	22/1650
23 MAY 1980	23/0021	23/0053	23/0124	23/0148	23/1524	23/1549	23/1619	23/1651
24 MAY 1980	24/0021	24/0053	24/0123	24/0148	24/1525	24/1549	24/1620	24/1652
25 MAY 1980	25/0020	25/0052	25/0123	25/0148	25/1525	25/1550	25/1620	25/1653
26 MAY 1980	26/0020	26/0052	26/0123	26/0147	26/1526	26/1550	26/1621	26/1653

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2616 N                      LONGITUDE: 05010 E                      ALTITUDE: 00023 M

DATE	BEGIN TWILIGHT				END TWILIGHT			
	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
27 MAY 1980	27/0019	27/0052	27/0122	27/0147	27/1526	27/1551	27/1622	27/1654
28 MAY 1980	28/0019	28/0051	28/0122	28/0147	28/1527	28/1551	28/1622	28/1655
29 MAY 1980	29/0019	29/0051	29/0122	29/0147	29/1527	29/1552	29/1623	29/1655
30 MAY 1980	30/0018	30/0051	30/0121	30/0146	30/1528	30/1553	30/1623	30/1656
31 MAY 1980	31/0018	31/0050	31/0121	31/0146	31/1528	31/1553	31/1624	31/1656
01 JUN 1980	01/0017	01/0050	01/0121	01/0146	01/1529	01/1554	01/1625	01/1657
02 JUN 1980	02/0017	02/0050	02/0121	02/0146	02/1529	02/1554	02/1625	02/1658
03 JUN 1980	03/0017	03/0050	03/0121	03/0146	03/1529	03/1555	03/1626	03/1658
04 JUN 1980	04/0017	04/0049	04/0120	04/0146	04/1530	04/1555	04/1626	04/1659
05 JUN 1980	05/0016	05/0049	05/0120	05/0145	05/1530	05/1555	05/1627	05/1659
06 JUN 1980	06/0016	06/0049	06/0120	06/0145	06/1531	06/1556	06/1627	06/1700
07 JUN 1980	07/0016	07/0049	07/0120	07/0145	07/1531	07/1556	07/1628	07/1700
08 JUN 1980	08/0016	08/0049	08/0120	08/0145	08/1532	08/1557	08/1628	08/1701
09 JUN 1980	09/0016	09/0049	09/0120	09/0145	09/1532	09/1557	09/1628	09/1701

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA ALL TIMES IN GMT

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DATE	BEGIN TWILIGHT				END TWILIGHT			
	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
10 JUN 1980	10/0016	10/0049	10/0120	10/0145	10/1532	10/1558	10/1629	10/1702
11 JUN 1980	11/0016	11/0049	11/0120	11/0145	11/1533	11/1558	11/1629	11/1702
12 JUN 1980	12/0016	12/0049	12/0120	12/0145	12/1533	12/1558	12/1630	12/1703
13 JUN 1980	13/0016	13/0049	13/0120	13/0145	13/1533	13/1559	13/1630	13/1703
14 JUN 1980	14/0016	14/0049	14/0120	14/0146	14/1534	14/1559	14/1630	14/1704
15 JUN 1980	15/0016	15/0049	15/0120	15/0146	15/1534	15/1559	15/1631	15/1704
16 JUN 1980	16/0016	16/0049	16/0120	16/0146	16/1534	16/1600	16/1631	16/1704
17 JUN 1980	17/0016	17/0049	17/0121	17/0146	17/1535	17/1600	17/1631	17/1705
18 JUN 1980	18/0016	18/0049	18/0121	18/0146	18/1535	18/1600	18/1632	18/1705
19 JUN 1980	19/0016	19/0049	19/0121	19/0146	19/1535	19/1600	19/1632	19/1705
20 JUN 1980	20/0016	20/0050	20/0121	20/0146	20/1535	20/1601	20/1632	20/1705
21 JUN 1980	21/0017	21/0050	21/0121	21/0147	21/1535	21/1601	21/1632	21/1706
22 JUN 1980	22/0017	22/0050	22/0121	22/0147	22/1536	22/1601	22/1633	22/1706
23 JUN 1980	23/0017	23/0050	23/0122	23/0147	23/1536	23/1601	23/1633	23/1706

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2616 N                      LONGITUDE: 05010 E                      ALTITUDE: 00023 M

DATE	BEGIN TWILIGHT				END TWILIGHT			
	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
24 JUN 1980	24/0017	24/0051	24/0122	24/0147	24/1536	24/1601	24/1633	24/1706
25 JUN 1980	25/0018	25/0051	25/0122	25/0148	25/1536	25/1601	25/1633	25/1706
26 JUN 1980	26/0018	26/0051	26/0123	26/0148	26/1536	26/1602	26/1633	26/1706
27 JUN 1980	27/0018	27/0051	27/0123	27/0148	27/1536	27/1602	27/1633	27/1706
28 JUN 1980	28/0019	28/0052	28/0123	28/0148	28/1537	28/1602	28/1633	28/1706
29 JUN 1980	29/0019	29/0052	29/0124	29/0149	29/1537	29/1602	29/1633	29/1706
30 JUN 1980	30/0019	30/0052	30/0124	30/0149	30/1537	30/1602	30/1633	30/1706

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\* GIVE WITH EACH TIME GROUP. UNLIKE THE SUN, THE MOON IS NOT ON A 24 \*  
 \* HOUR CYCLE AND OFTEN RISES AND SETS ON DIFFERENT DAYS. ON SOME DAYS \*  
 \* DURING THE MONTH, IT DOES NOT RISE OR SET AT ALL, WHICH IS INDICATED \*  
 \* WITH ALL 9'S OR ALL 8'S IN THE TIME GROUP. \*  
 \*

\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*

MOONRISE/MOONSET-DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 2616 N

LONGITUDE 05010 E

ALTITUDE 00023

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
15	APR	1980	106/0232Z	106/1527Z	0
16	APR	1980	107/0319Z	107/1633Z	1
17	APR	1980	108/0407Z	108/1737Z	5
18	APR	1980	109/0456Z	109/1838Z	11
19	APR	1980	110/0548Z	110/1936Z	20
20	APR	1980	111/0641Z	111/2029Z	29
21	APR	1980	112/0736Z	999/9999Z	39
22	APR	1980	113/0830Z	112/2118Z	49
23	APR	1980	114/0923Z	113/2202Z	59
24	APR	1980	115/1015Z	114/2243Z	68
25	APR	1980	116/1106Z	115/2320Z	76
26	APR	1980	117/1156Z	116/2355Z	84
27	APR	1980	118/1246Z	118/0029Z	90
28	APR	1980	119/1336Z	119/0103Z	95
29	APR	1980	120/1428Z	120/0137Z	98
30	APR	1980	121/1520Z	121/0213Z	100

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA

ALL TIME IN GMT

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01	MAY	1980	122/1613Z	122/0251Z	99
02	MAY	1980	123/1707Z	123/0332Z	97
03	MAY	1980	124/1801Z	124/0416Z	93
04	MAY	1980	125/1855Z	125/0504Z	87
05	MAY	1980	126/1948Z	126/0557Z	79
06	MAY	1980	127/2039Z	127/0654Z	70
07	MAY	1980	999/9999Z	128/0752Z	60
08	MAY	1980	128/2126Z	129/0852Z	49
09	MAY	1980	129/2212Z	130/0954Z	37
10	MAY	1980	130/2255Z	131/1057Z	27
11	MAY	1980	131/2339Z	132/1201Z	17
12	MAY	1980	133/0022Z	133/1306Z	9
13	MAY	1980	134/0107Z	134/1411Z	3
14	MAY	1980	135/0154Z	135/1517Z	1
15	MAY	1980	136/0243Z	136/1620Z	1
16	MAY	1980	137/0334Z	137/1721Z	3

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 2616 N

LONGITUDE 05010 E

ALTITUDE 00023

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
17	MAY	1980	138/0428Z	138/1818Z	8
18	MAY	1980	139/0523Z	139/1910Z	15
19	MAY	1980	140/0618Z	140/1957Z	23
20	MAY	1980	141/0713Z	999/9999Z	33
21	MAY	1980	142/0807Z	141/2040Z	42
22	MAY	1980	143/0859Z	142/2119Z	52
23	MAY	1980	144/0950Z	143/2156Z	61
24	MAY	1980	145/1040Z	144/2230Z	70
25	MAY	1980	146/1130Z	145/2303Z	79
26	MAY	1980	147/1221Z	146/2337Z	86
27	MAY	1980	148/1312Z	148/0012Z	92
28	MAY	1980	149/1406Z	149/0049Z	96
29	MAY	1980	150/1501Z	150/0129Z	99
30	MAY	1980	151/1556Z	151/0213Z	100
31	MAY	1980	152/1651Z	152/0300Z	99
01	JUN	1980	153/1745Z	153/0352Z	95

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA

ALL TIME IN GMT

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DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
02	JUN	1980	154/1836Z	154/0448Z	90
03	JUN	1980	155/1925Z	155/0547Z	82
04	JUN	1980	156/2012Z	156/0647Z	73
05	JUN	1980	999/9999Z	157/0748Z	63
06	JUN	1980	157/2055Z	158/0849Z	51
07	JUN	1980	158/2137Z	159/0950Z	40
08	JUN	1980	159/2219Z	160/1053Z	29
09	JUN	1980	160/2301Z	161/1156Z	19
10	JUN	1980	161/2345Z	162/1300Z	11
11	JUN	1980	163/0032Z	163/1403Z	5
12	JUN	1980	164/0122Z	164/1505Z	1
13	JUN	1980	165/0214Z	165/1603Z	0
14	JUN	1980	166/0309Z	166/1658Z	2
15	JUN	1980	167/0404Z	167/1749Z	6
16	JUN	1980	168/0501Z	168/1835Z	11
17	JUN	1980	169/0556Z	169/1916Z	18

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 2616 N

LONGITUDE 05010 E

ALTITUDE 00023

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
18	JUN	1980	170/0650Z	170/1954Z	27
19	JUN	1980	171/0742Z	171/2030Z	36
20	JUN	1980	172/0832Z	999/9999Z	45
21	JUN	1980	173/0922Z	172/2103Z	55
22	JUN	1980	174/1013Z	173/2137Z	64
23	JUN	1980	175/1104Z	174/2211Z	73
24	JUN	1980	176/1156Z	175/2246Z	81
25	JUN	1980	177/1250Z	176/2325Z	88
26	JUN	1980	178/1346Z	178/0007Z	94
27	JUN	1980	179/1442Z	179/0054Z	98
28	JUN	1980	180/1537Z	180/0144Z	100
29	JUN	1980	181/1631Z	181/0239Z	99
30	JUN	1980	182/1722Z	182/0338Z	97

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SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY ~~SECRET~~ ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 3700 N LONGITUDE: 03525 E ALTITUDE: 00073 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
15 APR 1980	15/0132	15/0205	15/0237	15/0302	15/1615	15/1640	15/1712	15/1746
16 APR 1980	16/0130	16/0204	16/0236	16/0301	16/1616	16/1641	16/1713	16/1747
17 APR 1980	17/0128	17/0202	17/0234	17/0300	17/1617	17/1642	17/1714	17/1748
18 APR 1980	18/0127	18/0201	18/0233	18/0258	18/1618	18/1643	18/1715	18/1749
19 APR 1980	19/0125	19/0159	19/0231	19/0257	19/1619	19/1644	19/1717	19/1750
20 APR 1980	20/0124	20/0158	20/0230	20/0256	20/1620	20/1645	20/1718	20/1752
21 APR 1980	21/0122	21/0156	21/0229	21/0254	21/1621	21/1646	21/1719	21/1753
22 APR 1980	22/0120	22/0155	22/0227	22/0253	22/1621	22/1647	22/1720	22/1754
23 APR 1980	23/0119	23/0153	23/0226	23/0252	23/1622	23/1648	23/1721	23/1755
24 APR 1980	24/0117	24/0152	24/0225	24/0250	24/1623	24/1649	24/1722	24/1757
25 APR 1980	25/0115	25/0150	25/0223	25/0249	25/1624	25/1650	25/1723	25/1758
26 APR 1980	26/0114	26/0149	26/0222	26/0248	26/1625	26/1651	26/1724	26/1759
27 APR 1980	27/0112	27/0147	27/0221	27/0247	27/1626	27/1652	27/1725	27/1800
28 APR 1980	28/0111	28/0146	28/0219	28/0245	28/1627	28/1653	28/1726	28/1802

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 3700 N LONGITUDE: 03525 E ALTITUDE: 00073 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
29 APR 1980	29/0109	29/0145	29/0218	29/0244	29/1628	29/1654	29/1727	29/1803
30 APR 1980	30/0108	30/0143	30/0217	30/0243	30/1629	30/1655	30/1728	30/1804
01 MAY 1980	01/0106	01/0142	01/0216	01/0242	01/1629	01/1656	01/1729	01/1805
02 MAY 1980	02/0105	02/0141	02/0214	02/0241	02/1630	02/1657	02/1730	02/1807
03 MAY 1980	03/0103	03/0139	03/0213	03/0240	03/1631	03/1658	03/1732	03/1808
04 MAY 1980	04/0102	04/0138	04/0212	04/0239	04/1632	04/1659	04/1733	04/1809
05 MAY 1980	05/0100	05/0137	05/0211	05/0238	05/1633	05/1700	05/1734	05/1810
06 MAY 1980	06/0059	06/0135	06/0210	06/0237	06/1634	06/1700	06/1735	06/1812
07 MAY 1980	07/0057	07/0134	07/0209	07/0236	07/1635	07/1701	07/1736	07/1813
08 MAY 1980	08/0056	08/0133	08/0208	08/0235	08/1636	08/1702	08/1737	08/1814
09 MAY 1980	09/0054	09/0132	09/0207	09/0234	09/1636	09/1703	09/1738	09/1815
10 MAY 1980	10/0053	10/0131	10/0206	10/0233	10/1637	10/1704	10/1739	10/1817
11 MAY 1980	11/0052	11/0130	11/0205	11/0232	11/1638	11/1705	11/1740	11/1818
12 MAY 1980	12/0050	12/0128	12/0204	12/0231	12/1639	12/1706	12/1741	12/1819

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY ALL TIMES IN GMT

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G337

*Declassified by  
DPO NMCC  
22 Jun 92*

Classified By: DJ50A  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

LATITUDE: 3700 N

LONGITUDE: 03525 E

ALTITUDE: 00073 M

## BEGIN TWILIGHT

## END TWILIGHT

~~SECRET~~

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
13 MAY 1980	13/0049	13/0127	13/0203	13/0230	13/1640	13/1707	13/1742	13/1821
14 MAY 1980	14/0048	14/0126	14/0202	14/0229	14/1641	14/1708	14/1743	14/1822
15 MAY 1980	15/0047	15/0125	15/0201	15/0228	15/1642	15/1709	15/1744	15/1823
16 MAY 1980	16/0046	16/0124	16/0200	16/0227	16/1642	16/1710	16/1745	16/1824
17 MAY 1980	17/0044	17/0123	17/0159	17/0227	17/1643	17/1711	17/1746	17/1825
18 MAY 1980	18/0043	18/0122	18/0158	18/0226	18/1644	18/1712	18/1747	18/1827
19 MAY 1980	19/0042	19/0121	19/0157	19/0225	19/1645	19/1712	19/1748	19/1828
20 MAY 1980	20/0041	20/0121	20/0157	20/0224	20/1646	20/1713	20/1749	20/1829
21 MAY 1980	21/0040	21/0120	21/0156	21/0224	21/1646	21/1714	21/1750	21/1830
22 MAY 1980	22/0039	22/0119	22/0155	22/0223	22/1647	22/1715	22/1751	22/1831
23 MAY 1980	23/0038	23/0118	23/0155	23/0223	23/1648	23/1716	23/1752	23/1833
24 MAY 1980	24/0037	24/0117	24/0154	24/0222	24/1649	24/1717	24/1753	24/1834
25 MAY 1980	25/0036	25/0117	25/0153	25/0221	25/1649	25/1717	25/1754	25/1835
26 MAY 1980	26/0035	26/0116	26/0153	26/0221	26/1650	26/1718	26/1755	26/1836

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY ALL TIMES IN GMT.

LATITUDE: 3700 N

LONGITUDE: 03525 E

ALTITUDE: 00073 M

## BEGIN TWILIGHT

## END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
27 MAY 1980	27/0034	27/0115	27/0152	27/0220	27/1651	27/1719	27/1756	27/1837
28 MAY 1980	28/0033	28/0115	28/0152	28/0220	28/1652	28/1720	28/1757	28/1838
29 MAY 1980	29/0033	29/0114	29/0151	29/0219	29/1652	29/1721	29/1758	29/1839
30 MAY 1980	30/0032	30/0113	30/0151	30/0219	30/1653	30/1721	30/1759	30/1840
31 MAY 1980	31/0031	31/0113	31/0150	31/0219	31/1654	31/1722	31/1759	31/1841
01 JUN 1980	01/0031	01/0112	01/0150	01/0218	01/1654	01/1723	01/1800	01/1842
02 JUN 1980	02/0030	02/0112	02/0149	02/0218	02/1655	02/1723	02/1801	02/1843
03 JUN 1980	03/0029	03/0111	03/0149	03/0218	03/1655	03/1724	03/1802	03/1844
04 JUN 1980	04/0029	04/0111	04/0149	04/0217	04/1656	04/1725	04/1802	04/1845
05 JUN 1980	05/0028	05/0111	05/0148	05/0217	05/1657	05/1725	05/1803	05/1845
06 JUN 1980	06/0028	06/0110	06/0148	06/0217	06/1657	06/1726	06/1804	06/1846
07 JUN 1980	07/0027	07/0110	07/0148	07/0217	07/1658	07/1727	07/1805	07/1847
08 JUN 1980	08/0027	08/0110	08/0148	08/0217	08/1658	08/1727	08/1805	08/1848
09 JUN 1980	09/0027	09/0109	09/0148	09/0216	09/1659	09/1728	09/1806	09/1848

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY ALL TIMES IN GMT.

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BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
10 JUN 1980	10/0026	10/0109	10/0147	10/0216	10/1659	10/1728	10/1806	10/1849
11 JUN 1980	11/0026	11/0109	11/0147	11/0216	11/1700	11/1729	11/1807	11/1850
12 JUN 1980	12/0026	12/0109	12/0147	12/0216	12/1700	12/1729	12/1807	12/1850
13 JUN 1980	13/0026	13/0109	13/0147	13/0216	13/1701	13/1730	13/1808	13/1851
14 JUN 1980	14/0026	14/0109	14/0147	14/0216	14/1701	14/1730	14/1808	14/1851
15 JUN 1980	15/0026	15/0109	15/0147	15/0216	15/1701	15/1730	15/1809	15/1852
16 JUN 1980	16/0026	16/0109	16/0147	16/0216	16/1702	16/1731	16/1809	16/1852
17 JUN 1980	17/0026	17/0109	17/0147	17/0216	17/1702	17/1731	17/1809	17/1853
18 JUN 1980	18/0026	18/0109	18/0147	18/0217	18/1702	18/1731	18/1810	18/1853
19 JUN 1980	19/0026	19/0109	19/0148	19/0217	19/1703	19/1732	19/1810	19/1853
20 JUN 1980	20/0026	20/0109	20/0148	20/0217	20/1703	20/1732	20/1810	20/1854
21 JUN 1980	21/0026	21/0110	21/0148	21/0217	21/1703	21/1732	21/1811	21/1854
22 JUN 1980	22/0026	22/0110	22/0148	22/0217	22/1703	22/1732	22/1811	22/1854
23 JUN 1980	23/0027	23/0110	23/0149	23/0218	23/1703	23/1732	23/1811	23/1854

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 3700 N

LONGITUDE: 03525 E

ALTITUDE: 00073 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
24 JUN 1980	24/0027	24/0110	24/0149	24/0218	24/1703	24/1733	24/1811	24/1854
25 JUN 1980	25/0027	25/0111	25/0149	25/0218	25/1704	25/1733	25/1811	25/1854
26 JUN 1980	26/0028	26/0111	26/0149	26/0218	26/1704	26/1733	26/1811	26/1854
27 JUN 1980	27/0028	27/0111	27/0150	27/0219	27/1704	27/1733	27/1811	27/1854
28 JUN 1980	28/0029	28/0112	28/0150	28/0219	28/1704	28/1733	28/1811	28/1854
29 JUN 1980	29/0029	29/0112	29/0151	29/0220	29/1704	29/1733	29/1811	29/1854
30 JUN 1980	30/0030	30/0113	30/0151	30/0220	30/1704	30/1733	30/1811	30/1854

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\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*  
\*  
\* WHEN USING MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA, YOU MUST USE THE JULIAN DATE THAT IS \*  
\* GIVEN WITH EACH TIME GROUP. UNLIKE THE SUN, THE MOON IS NOT ON A 24 \*  
\* HOUR CYCLE AND OFTEN RISES AND SETS ON DIFFERENT DAYS. ON SOME DAYS \*  
\* DURING THE MONTH, IT DOES NOT RISE OR SET AT ALL, WHICH IS INDICATED \*  
\* WITH ALL 9'S OR ALL 8'S IN THE TIME GROUP. \*  
\*  
\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 3700 N LONGITUDE 03525 E ALTITUDE 00073

DAY	MUNTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
15	APR	1980	106/0327Z	106/1638Z	0
16	APR	1980	107/0408Z	107/1748Z	1
17	APR	1980	108/0452Z	108/1856Z	5
18	APR	1980	109/0538Z	109/2000Z	11
19	APR	1980	110/0628Z	110/2059Z	20
20	APR	1980	111/0720Z	999/9999Z	29
21	APR	1980	112/0815Z	111/2152Z	39
22	APR	1980	113/0911Z	112/2239Z	49
23	APR	1980	114/1008Z	113/2321Z	59
24	APR	1980	115/1103Z	114/2358Z	68
25	APR	1980	116/1158Z	116/0031Z	76
26	APR	1980	117/1252Z	117/0102Z	84
27	APR	1980	118/1347Z	118/0132Z	90
28	APR	1980	119/1442Z	119/0201Z	95
29	APR	1980	120/1537Z	120/0231Z	98
30	APR	1980	121/1634Z	121/0303Z	100

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY ALL TIME IN GMT

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LATITUDE 3700 N

LONGITUDE 03525 E

ALTITUDE 00073

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
01	MAY	1980	122/1731Z	122/0337Z	99
02	MAY	1980	123/1828Z	123/0415Z	97
03	MAY	1980	124/1924Z	124/0456Z	93
04	MAY	1980	125/2019Z	125/0543Z	87
05	MAY	1980	126/2111Z	126/0636Z	79
06	MAY	1980	999/9999Z	127/0734Z	70
07	MAY	1980	127/2159Z	128/0835Z	60
08	MAY	1980	128/2244Z	129/0939Z	49
09	MAY	1980	129/2325Z	130/1046Z	37
10	MAY	1980	131/0004Z	131/1154Z	27
11	MAY	1980	132/0041Z	132/1304Z	17
12	MAY	1980	133/0119Z	133/1414Z	9
13	MAY	1980	134/0159Z	134/1525Z	3
14	MAY	1980	135/0241Z	135/1634Z	1
15	MAY	1980	136/0326Z	136/1741Z	1
16	MAY	1980	137/0415Z	137/1844Z	3

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 3700 N

LONGITUDE 03525 E

ALTITUDE 00073

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
17	MAY	1980	138/0507Z	138/1941Z	8
18	MAY	1980	139/0602Z	139/2032Z	15
19	MAY	1980	140/0659Z	140/2117Z	23
20	MAY	1980	141/0756Z	999/9999Z	33
21	MAY	1980	142/0854Z	141/2157Z	42
22	MAY	1980	143/0950Z	142/2232Z	52
23	MAY	1980	144/1045Z	143/2304Z	61
24	MAY	1980	145/1139Z	144/2334Z	70
25	MAY	1980	146/1234Z	146/0003Z	79
26	MAY	1980	147/1329Z	147/0033Z	86
27	MAY	1980	148/1425Z	148/0104Z	92
28	MAY	1980	149/1522Z	149/0137Z	96
29	MAY	1980	150/1621Z	150/0213Z	99
30	MAY	1980	151/1719Z	151/0254Z	100
31	MAY	1980	152/1814Z	152/0340Z	99
01	JUN	1980	153/1908Z	153/0431Z	95

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY

ALL TIME IN GMT

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LATITUDE 3700 N

LONGITUDE 03525 E

ALTITUDE 00073

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
02	JUN	1980	154/1958Z	154/0527Z	90
03	JUN	1980	155/2044Z	155/0628Z	82
04	JUN	1980	156/2126Z	156/0732Z	73
05	JUN	1980	999/9999Z	157/0837Z	63
06	JUN	1980	157/2205Z	158/0943Z	51
07	JUN	1980	158/2242Z	159/1050Z	40
08	JUN	1980	159/2319Z	160/1158Z	29
09	JUN	1980	160/2356Z	161/1307Z	19
10	JUN	1980	162/0035Z	162/1416Z	11
11	JUN	1980	163/0117Z	163/1523Z	5
12	JUN	1980	164/0203Z	164/1627Z	1
13	JUN	1980	165/0253Z	165/1727Z	0
14	JUN	1980	166/0347Z	166/1822Z	2
15	JUN	1980	167/0444Z	167/1910Z	6
16	JUN	1980	168/0542Z	168/1953Z	11
17	JUN	1980	169/0641Z	169/2031Z	18

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 3700 N

LONGITUDE 03525 E

ALTITUDE 00073

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
18	JUN	1980	170/0738Z	170/2105Z	27
19	JUN	1980	171/0835Z	171/2136Z	36
20	JUN	1980	172/0930Z	999/9999Z	45
21	JUN	1980	173/1024Z	172/2205Z	55
22	JUN	1980	174/1119Z	173/2234Z	64
23	JUN	1980	175/1214Z	174/2304Z	73
24	JUN	1980	176/1311Z	175/2336Z	81
25	JUN	1980	177/1409Z	177/0011Z	88
26	JUN	1980	178/1507Z	178/0050Z	94
27	JUN	1980	179/1605Z	179/0134Z	98
28	JUN	1980	180/1701Z	180/0223Z	100
29	JUN	1980	181/1754Z	181/0318Z	99
30	JUN	1980	182/1842Z	182/0418Z	97

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SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2335 N

LONGITUDE: 05817 E

ALTITUDE: 00014 M

~~SECRET~~  
9338

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
15 APR 1980	15/0028	15/0056	15/0123	15/0145	15/1429	15/1452	15/1519	15/1546
16 APR 1980	16/0027	16/0055	16/0122	16/0144	16/1430	16/1452	16/1519	16/1547
17 APR 1980	17/0026	17/0054	17/0121	17/0144	17/1430	17/1453	17/1520	17/1548
18 APR 1980	18/0025	18/0053	18/0120	18/0143	18/1430	18/1453	18/1520	18/1548
19 APR 1980	19/0024	19/0052	19/0119	19/0142	19/1431	19/1454	19/1521	19/1549
20 APR 1980	20/0023	20/0051	20/0118	20/0141	20/1431	20/1454	20/1521	20/1549
21 APR 1980	21/0022	21/0050	21/0117	21/0140	21/1432	21/1454	21/1522	21/1550
22 APR 1980	22/0021	22/0049	22/0116	22/0139	22/1432	22/1455	22/1522	22/1551
23 APR 1980	23/0020	23/0048	23/0116	23/0138	23/1433	23/1455	23/1523	23/1551
24 APR 1980	24/0019	24/0047	24/0115	24/0138	24/1433	24/1456	24/1523	24/1552
25 APR 1980	25/0018	25/0046	25/0114	25/0137	25/1433	25/1456	25/1524	25/1552
26 APR 1980	26/0017	26/0045	26/0113	26/0136	26/1434	26/1457	26/1525	26/1553
27 APR 1980	27/0016	27/0044	27/0112	27/0135	27/1434	27/1457	27/1525	27/1554
28 APR 1980	28/0015	28/0044	28/0111	28/0134	28/1435	28/1458	28/1526	28/1554

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2335 N

LONGITUDE: 05817 E

ALTITUDE: 00014 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
29 APR 1980	29/0014	29/0043	29/0111	29/0134	29/1435	29/1458	29/1526	29/1555
30 APR 1980	30/0013	30/0042	30/0110	30/0133	30/1436	30/1459	30/1527	30/1555
01 MAY 1980	01/0012	01/0041	01/0109	01/0132	01/1436	01/1459	01/1527	01/1556
02 MAY 1980	02/0011	02/0040	02/0108	02/0132	02/1437	02/1500	02/1528	02/1557
03 MAY 1980	03/0011	03/0040	03/0108	03/0131	03/1437	03/1500	03/1528	03/1557
04 MAY 1980	04/0010	04/0039	04/0107	04/0130	04/1437	04/1501	04/1529	04/1558
05 MAY 1980	05/0009	05/0038	05/0106	05/0130	05/1438	05/1501	05/1530	05/1559
06 MAY 1980	06/0008	06/0037	06/0106	06/0129	06/1438	06/1502	06/1530	06/1559
07 MAY 1980	07/0007	07/0037	07/0105	07/0128	07/1439	07/1502	07/1531	07/1600
08 MAY 1980	08/0006	08/0036	08/0104	08/0128	08/1439	08/1503	08/1531	08/1601
09 MAY 1980	09/0006	09/0035	09/0104	09/0127	09/1440	09/1503	09/1532	09/1601
10 MAY 1980	10/0005	10/0034	10/0103	10/0127	10/1440	10/1504	10/1532	10/1602
11 MAY 1980	11/0004	11/0034	11/0103	11/0126	11/1441	11/1504	11/1533	11/1603
12 MAY 1980	12/0003	12/0033	12/0102	12/0126	12/1441	12/1505	12/1534	12/1603

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIMES IN GMT

*Declassified by  
DDO WMC  
22 Jun 92*

Classified By **DJ30A**  
Declassified On: **OADR**



LATITUDE: 2335 N

LONGITUDE: 05817 E

ALTITUDE: 00014 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
13 MAY 1980	13/0003	13/0033	13/0101	13/0125	13/1442	13/1505	13/1534	13/1604
14 MAY 1980	14/0002	14/0032	14/0101	14/0125	14/1442	14/1506	14/1535	14/1605
15 MAY 1980	15/0001	15/0031	15/0100	15/0104	15/1443	15/1506	15/1535	15/1605
16 MAY 1980	16/0001	16/0031	16/0100	16/0124	16/1443	16/1507	16/1536	16/1606
17 MAY 1980	17/0000	17/0030	17/0059	17/0123	17/1444	17/1507	17/1537	17/1607
18 MAY 1980	17/2400	18/0030	18/0059	18/0123	18/1444	18/1508	18/1537	18/1607
19 MAY 1980	18/2359	19/0029	19/0059	19/0123	19/1444	19/1508	19/1538	19/1608
20 MAY 1980	19/2358	20/0029	20/0058	20/0122	20/1445	20/1509	20/1538	20/1609
21 MAY 1980	20/2358	21/0028	21/0058	21/0122	21/1445	21/1509	21/1539	21/1609
22 MAY 1980	21/2357	22/0028	22/0057	22/0121	22/1446	22/1510	22/1539	22/1610
23 MAY 1980	22/2357	23/0028	23/0057	23/0121	23/1446	23/1510	23/1540	23/1611
24 MAY 1980	23/2356	24/0027	24/0057	24/0121	24/1447	24/1511	24/1541	24/1611
25 MAY 1980	24/2356	25/0027	25/0056	25/0121	25/1447	25/1511	25/1541	25/1612
26 MAY 1980	25/2356	26/0026	26/0056	26/0120	26/1448	26/1512	26/1542	26/1612

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIMES IN GMT

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LATITUDE: 2335 N

LONGITUDE: 05817 E

ALTITUDE: 00014 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
27 MAY 1980	26/2355	27/0026	27/0056	27/0120	27/1448	27/1512	27/1542	27/1613
28 MAY 1980	27/2355	28/0026	28/0056	28/0120	28/1449	28/1513	28/1543	28/1614
29 MAY 1980	28/2354	29/0026	29/0055	29/0120	29/1449	29/1513	29/1543	29/1614
30 MAY 1980	29/2354	30/0025	30/0055	30/0120	30/1450	30/1514	30/1544	30/1615
31 MAY 1980	30/2354	31/0025	31/0055	31/0119	31/1450	31/1514	31/1544	31/1615
01 JUN 1980	31/2354	01/0025	01/0055	01/0119	01/1450	01/1515	01/1545	01/1616
02 JUN 1980	01/2353	02/0025	02/0055	02/0119	02/1451	02/1515	02/1545	02/1617
03 JUN 1980	02/2353	03/0024	03/0054	03/0119	03/1451	03/1516	03/1546	03/1617
04 JUN 1980	03/2353	04/0024	04/0054	04/0119	04/1452	04/1516	04/1546	04/1618
05 JUN 1980	04/2353	05/0024	05/0054	05/0119	05/1452	05/1517	05/1547	05/1618
06 JUN 1980	05/2353	06/0024	06/0054	06/0119	06/1452	06/1517	06/1547	06/1619
07 JUN 1980	06/2352	07/0024	07/0054	07/0119	07/1453	07/1517	07/1548	07/1619
08 JUN 1980	07/2352	08/0024	08/0054	08/0119	08/1453	08/1518	08/1548	08/1620
09 JUN 1980	08/2352	09/0024	09/0054	09/0119	09/1453	09/1518	09/1548	09/1620

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIMES IN GMT

~~SECRET~~

LATITUDE: 2335 N LONGITUDE: 05817 E ALTITUDE: 00014 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

~~SECRET~~

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
10 JUN 1980	09/2352	10/0024	10/0054	10/0119	10/1454	10/1519	10/1549	10/1620
11 JUN 1980	10/2352	11/0024	11/0054	11/0119	11/1454	11/1519	11/1549	11/1621
12 JUN 1980	11/2352	12/0024	12/0054	12/0119	12/1455	12/1519	12/1550	12/1621
13 JUN 1980	12/2352	13/0024	13/0054	13/0119	13/1455	13/1520	13/1550	13/1622
14 JUN 1980	13/2352	14/0024	14/0054	14/0119	14/1455	14/1520	14/1550	14/1622
15 JUN 1980	14/2352	15/0024	15/0054	15/0119	15/1455	15/1520	15/1551	15/1622
16 JUN 1980	15/2352	16/0024	16/0055	16/0119	16/1456	16/1520	16/1551	16/1623
17 JUN 1980	16/2353	17/0024	17/0055	17/0119	17/1456	17/1521	17/1551	17/1623
18 JUN 1980	17/2353	18/0024	18/0055	18/0120	18/1456	18/1521	18/1551	18/1623
19 JUN 1980	18/2353	19/0025	19/0055	19/0120	19/1456	19/1521	19/1552	19/1623
20 JUN 1980	19/2353	20/0025	20/0055	20/0120	20/1457	20/1521	20/1552	20/1624
21 JUN 1980	20/2353	21/0025	21/0055	21/0120	21/1457	21/1522	21/1552	21/1624
22 JUN 1980	21/2353	22/0025	22/0056	22/0120	22/1457	22/1522	22/1552	22/1624
23 JUN 1980	22/2354	23/0026	23/0056	23/0121	23/1457	23/1522	23/1552	23/1624

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2335 N LONGITUDE: 05817 E ALTITUDE: 00014 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
24 JUN 1980	23/2354	24/0026	24/0056	24/0121	24/1457	24/1522	24/1553	24/1624
25 JUN 1980	24/2354	25/0026	25/0056	25/0121	25/1458	25/1522	25/1553	25/1625
26 JUN 1980	25/2355	26/0026	26/0057	26/0121	26/1458	26/1522	26/1553	26/1625
27 JUN 1980	26/2355	27/0027	27/0057	27/0122	27/1458	27/1523	27/1553	27/1625
28 JUN 1980	27/2355	28/0027	28/0057	28/0122	28/1458	28/1523	28/1553	28/1625
29 JUN 1980	28/2356	29/0027	29/0058	29/0122	29/1458	29/1523	29/1553	29/1625
30 JUN 1980	29/2356	30/0028	30/0058	30/0123	30/1458	30/1523	30/1553	30/1625

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\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*

\*  
\* WHEN USING MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA, YOU MUST USE THE JULIAN DATE THAT IS \*  
\* GIVEN WITH EACH TIME GROUP. UNLIKE THE SUN, THE MOON IS NOT ON A 24 \*  
\* HOUR CYCLE AND OFTEN RISES AND SETS ON DIFFERENT DAYS. ON SOME DAYS \*  
\* DURING THE MONTH, IT DOES NOT RISE OR SET AT ALL, WHICH IS INDICATED \*  
\* WITH ALL 9'S OR ALL 8'S IN THE TIME GROUP. \*  
\*

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\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 2335 N

LONGITUDE 05817 E

ALTITUDE 00014

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
15	APR	1980	106/0200Z	106/1451Z	0
16	APR	1980	107/0248Z	107/1556Z	1
17	APR	1980	108/0336Z	108/1659Z	5
18	APR	1980	109/0427Z	109/1800Z	11
19	APR	1980	110/0519Z	110/1857Z	20
20	APR	1980	111/0613Z	111/1951Z	29
21	APR	1980	112/0707Z	999/9999Z	39
22	APR	1980	113/0800Z	112/2040Z	49
23	APR	1980	114/0853Z	113/2125Z	59
24	APR	1980	115/0944Z	114/2206Z	68
25	APR	1980	116/1034Z	115/2244Z	76
26	APR	1980	117/1123Z	116/2320Z	84
27	APR	1980	118/1212Z	117/2355Z	90
28	APR	1980	119/1302Z	119/0030Z	95
29	APR	1980	120/1352Z	120/0105Z	98
30	APR	1980	121/1444Z	121/0142Z	100

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

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LATITUDE 2335 N

LONGITUDE 05817 E

ALTITUDE 00014

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
01	MAY	1980	122/1536Z	122/0221Z	99
02	MAY	1980	123/1629Z	123/0302Z	97
03	MAY	1980	124/1722Z	124/0347Z	93
04	MAY	1980	125/1816Z	125/0436Z	87
05	MAY	1980	126/1910Z	126/0528Z	79
06	MAY	1980	127/2001Z	127/0624Z	70
07	MAY	1980	999/9999Z	128/0722Z	60
08	MAY	1980	128/2049Z	129/0822Z	49
09	MAY	1980	129/2136Z	130/0923Z	37
10	MAY	1980	130/2220Z	131/1024Z	27
11	MAY	1980	131/2305Z	132/1127Z	17
12	MAY	1980	132/2349Z	133/1231Z	9
13	MAY	1980	134/0035Z	134/1335Z	3
14	MAY	1980	135/0123Z	135/1439Z	1
15	MAY	1980	136/0213Z	136/1542Z	1
16	MAY	1980	137/0305Z	137/1642Z	3

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 2335 N

LONGITUDE 05817 E

ALTITUDE 00014

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
17	MAY	1980	138/0359Z	138/1739Z	8
18	MAY	1980	139/0454Z	139/1832Z	15
19	MAY	1980	140/0549Z	140/1920Z	23
20	MAY	1980	141/0643Z	141/2003Z	33
21	MAY	1980	142/0736Z	999/9999Z	42
22	MAY	1980	143/0828Z	142/2043Z	52
23	MAY	1980	144/0918Z	143/2121Z	61
24	MAY	1980	145/1007Z	144/2156Z	70
25	MAY	1980	146/1056Z	145/2230Z	79
26	MAY	1980	147/1145Z	146/2305Z	86
27	MAY	1980	148/1236Z	147/2341Z	92
28	MAY	1980	149/1329Z	149/0019Z	96
29	MAY	1980	150/1423Z	150/0100Z	99
30	MAY	1980	151/1518Z	151/0144Z	100
31	MAY	1980	152/1612Z	152/0232Z	99
01	JUN	1980	153/1706Z	153/0324Z	95

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

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LATITUDE 2335 N

LONGITUDE 05817 E

ALTITUDE 00014

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
02	JUN	1980	154/1758Z	154/0419Z	90
03	JUN	1980	155/1848Z	155/0517Z	82
04	JUN	1980	156/1935Z	156/0617Z	73
05	JUN	1980	999/9999Z	157/0716Z	63
06	JUN	1980	157/2020Z	158/0816Z	51
07	JUN	1980	158/2103Z	159/0917Z	40
08	JUN	1980	159/2146Z	160/1018Z	29
09	JUN	1980	160/2229Z	161/1120Z	19
10	JUN	1980	161/2314Z	162/1223Z	11
11	JUN	1980	163/0002Z	163/1325Z	5
12	JUN	1980	164/0052Z	164/1426Z	1
13	JUN	1980	165/0145Z	165/1525Z	0
14	JUN	1980	166/0240Z	166/1620Z	2
15	JUN	1980	167/0335Z	167/1711Z	6
16	JUN	1980	168/0431Z	168/1757Z	11
17	JUN	1980	169/0526Z	169/1840Z	18

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MUSCAT, OMAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 2335 N

LONGITUDE 05817 E

ALTITUDE 00014

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
18	JUN	1980	170/0619Z	170/1919Z	27
19	JUN	1980	171/0710Z	171/1955Z	36
20	JUN	1980	172/0800Z	999/9999Z	45
21	JUN	1980	173/0849Z	172/2030Z	55
22	JUN	1980	174/0938Z	173/2104Z	64
23	JUN	1980	175/1028Z	174/2139Z	73
24	JUN	1980	176/1120Z	175/2216Z	81
25	JUN	1980	177/1213Z	176/2255Z	88
26	JUN	1980	178/1308Z	177/2338Z	94
27	JUN	1980	179/1403Z	179/0025Z	98
28	JUN	1980	180/1459Z	180/0116Z	100
29	JUN	1980	181/1552Z	181/0210Z	99
30	JUN	1980	182/1644Z	182/0309Z	97

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SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR 2632N 03307E

ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2632 N LONGITUDE: 03307 E ALTITUDE: 00354 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

~~SECRET~~

G 340

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
15 APR 1980	15/0204	15/0232	15/0300	15/0321	15/1615	15/1636	15/1704	15/1732
16 APR 1980	16/0203	16/0231	16/0259	16/0320	16/1616	16/1636	16/1704	16/1733
17 APR 1980	17/0202	17/0230	17/0258	17/0319	17/1616	17/1637	17/1705	17/1733
18 APR 1980	18/0200	18/0229	18/0257	18/0318	18/1617	18/1637	18/1705	18/1734
19 APR 1980	19/0159	19/0228	19/0256	19/0317	19/1617	19/1638	19/1706	19/1735
20 APR 1980	20/0158	20/0227	20/0255	20/0316	20/1618	20/1639	20/1707	20/1735
21 APR 1980	21/0157	21/0226	21/0254	21/0315	21/1618	21/1639	21/1707	21/1736
22 APR 1980	22/0156	22/0225	22/0253	22/0314	22/1619	22/1640	22/1708	22/1737
23 APR 1980	23/0155	23/0224	23/0252	23/0313	23/1619	23/1640	23/1708	23/1738
24 APR 1980	24/0154	24/0223	24/0251	24/0312	24/1620	24/1641	24/1709	24/1738
25 APR 1980	25/0152	25/0222	25/0250	25/0311	25/1620	25/1641	25/1710	25/1739
26 APR 1980	26/0151	26/0221	26/0249	26/0310	26/1621	26/1642	26/1710	26/1740
27 APR 1980	27/0150	27/0220	27/0248	27/0310	27/1621	27/1642	27/1711	27/1741
28 APR 1980	28/0149	28/0219	28/0248	28/0309	28/1622	28/1643	28/1712	28/1741

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR 2632N 03307E ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2632 N LONGITUDE: 03307 E ALTITUDE: 00354 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
29 APR 1980	29/0148	29/0218	29/0247	29/0308	29/1622	29/1644	29/1712	29/1742
30 APR 1980	30/0147	30/0217	30/0246	30/0307	30/1623	30/1644	30/1713	30/1743
01 MAY 1980	01/0146	01/0216	01/0245	01/0306	01/1623	01/1645	01/1714	01/1744
02 MAY 1980	02/0145	02/0215	02/0244	02/0306	02/1624	02/1645	02/1714	02/1744
03 MAY 1980	03/0144	03/0214	03/0243	03/0305	03/1625	03/1646	03/1715	03/1745
04 MAY 1980	04/0143	04/0213	04/0242	04/0304	04/1625	04/1647	04/1716	04/1746
05 MAY 1980	05/0142	05/0213	05/0242	05/0303	05/1626	05/1647	05/1716	05/1747
06 MAY 1980	06/0141	06/0212	06/0241	06/0303	06/1626	06/1648	06/1717	06/1747
07 MAY 1980	07/0141	07/0211	07/0240	07/0302	07/1627	07/1648	07/1718	07/1748
08 MAY 1980	08/0140	08/0210	08/0240	08/0301	08/1627	08/1649	08/1718	08/1749
09 MAY 1980	09/0139	09/0209	09/0239	09/0301	09/1628	09/1650	09/1719	09/1750
10 MAY 1980	10/0138	10/0209	10/0238	10/0300	10/1628	10/1650	10/1720	10/1750
11 MAY 1980	11/0137	11/0208	11/0237	11/0259	11/1629	11/1651	11/1720	11/1751
12 MAY 1980	12/0136	12/0207	12/0237	12/0259	12/1629	12/1651	12/1721	12/1752

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR 2632N 03307E ALL TIMES IN GMT

*Declassified by  
DDO/V/mcl  
22 June 92*

~~Classified By DJSON  
Declassified ONI OADR~~

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
13 MAY 1980	13/0135	13/0206	13/0236	13/0258	13/1630	13/1652	13/1722	13/1753
14 MAY 1980	14/0135	14/0206	14/0236	14/0258	14/1631	14/1653	14/1722	14/1753
15 MAY 1980	15/0134	15/0205	15/0235	15/0257	15/1631	15/1653	15/1723	15/1754
16 MAY 1980	16/0133	16/0205	16/0234	16/0256	16/1632	16/1654	16/1724	16/1755
17 MAY 1980	17/0132	17/0204	17/0234	17/0256	17/1632	17/1654	17/1724	17/1756
18 MAY 1980	18/0132	18/0203	18/0233	18/0256	18/1633	18/1655	18/1725	18/1756
19 MAY 1980	19/0131	19/0203	19/0233	19/0255	19/1633	19/1655	19/1726	19/1757
20 MAY 1980	20/0130	20/0202	20/0232	20/0255	20/1634	20/1656	20/1726	20/1758
21 MAY 1980	21/0130	21/0202	21/0232	21/0254	21/1634	21/1657	21/1727	21/1759
22 MAY 1980	22/0129	22/0201	22/0231	22/0254	22/1635	22/1657	22/1728	22/1759
23 MAY 1980	23/0129	23/0201	23/0231	23/0253	23/1635	23/1658	23/1728	23/1800
24 MAY 1980	24/0128	24/0200	24/0231	24/0253	24/1636	24/1658	24/1729	24/1801
25 MAY 1980	25/0128	25/0200	25/0230	25/0253	25/1636	25/1659	25/1729	25/1802
26 MAY 1980	26/0127	26/0159	26/0230	26/0252	26/1637	26/1659	26/1730	26/1802

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR 2632N 03307E

ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2632 N

LONGITUDE: 03307 E

ALTITUDE: 00354 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
27 MAY 1980	27/0127	27/0159	27/0230	27/0252	27/1637	27/1700	27/1731	27/1803
28 MAY 1980	28/0126	28/0159	28/0229	28/0252	28/1638	28/1701	28/1731	28/1804
29 MAY 1980	29/0126	29/0158	29/0229	29/0252	29/1638	29/1701	29/1732	29/1804
30 MAY 1980	30/0125	30/0158	30/0229	30/0251	30/1639	30/1702	30/1732	30/1805
31 MAY 1980	31/0125	31/0158	31/0229	31/0251	31/1639	31/1702	31/1733	31/1806
01 JUN 1980	01/0125	01/0157	01/0228	01/0251	01/1640	01/1703	01/1733	01/1806
02 JUN 1980	02/0124	02/0157	02/0228	02/0251	02/1640	02/1703	02/1734	02/1807
03 JUN 1980	03/0124	03/0157	03/0228	03/0251	03/1641	03/1704	03/1735	03/1807
04 JUN 1980	04/0124	04/0157	04/0228	04/0251	04/1641	04/1704	04/1735	04/1808
05 JUN 1980	05/0124	05/0157	05/0228	05/0250	05/1642	05/1704	05/1736	05/1809
06 JUN 1980	06/0123	06/0156	06/0228	06/0250	06/1642	06/1705	06/1736	06/1809
07 JUN 1980	07/0123	07/0156	07/0228	07/0250	07/1643	07/1705	07/1737	07/1810
08 JUN 1980	08/0123	08/0156	08/0227	08/0250	08/1643	08/1706	08/1737	08/1810
09 JUN 1980	09/0123	09/0156	09/0227	09/0250	09/1643	09/1706	09/1737	09/1811

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR 2632N 03307E

ALL TIMES IN GMT

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
10 JUN 1980	10/0123	10/0156	10/0227	10/0250	10/1644	10/1707	10/1738	10/1811
11 JUN 1980	11/0123	11/0156	11/0227	11/0250	11/1644	11/1707	11/1738	11/1811
12 JUN 1980	12/0123	12/0156	12/0227	12/0250	12/1644	12/1707	12/1739	12/1812
13 JUN 1980	13/0123	13/0156	13/0228	13/0250	13/1645	13/1708	13/1739	13/1812
14 JUN 1980	14/0123	14/0156	14/0228	14/0251	14/1645	14/1708	14/1739	14/1813
15 JUN 1980	15/0123	15/0156	15/0228	15/0251	15/1645	15/1708	15/1740	15/1813
16 JUN 1980	16/0123	16/0156	16/0228	16/0251	16/1646	16/1709	16/1740	16/1813
17 JUN 1980	17/0123	17/0156	17/0228	17/0251	17/1646	17/1709	17/1740	17/1814
18 JUN 1980	18/0123	18/0157	18/0228	18/0251	18/1646	18/1709	18/1741	18/1814
19 JUN 1980	19/0123	19/0157	19/0228	19/0251	19/1646	19/1709	19/1741	19/1814
20 JUN 1980	20/0124	20/0157	20/0228	20/0251	20/1647	20/1710	20/1741	20/1815
21 JUN 1980	21/0124	21/0157	21/0229	21/0252	21/1647	21/1710	21/1741	21/1815
22 JUN 1980	22/0124	22/0157	22/0229	22/0252	22/1647	22/1710	22/1742	22/1815
23 JUN 1980	23/0124	23/0158	23/0229	23/0252	23/1647	23/1710	23/1742	23/1815

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR 2632N 03307E ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2632 N

LONGITUDE: 03307 E

ALTITUDE: 00354 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
24 JUN 1980	24/0125	24/0158	24/0229	24/0252	24/1647	24/1710	24/1742	24/1815
25 JUN 1980	25/0125	25/0158	25/0230	25/0253	25/1648	25/1711	25/1742	25/1815
26 JUN 1980	26/0125	26/0158	26/0230	26/0253	26/1648	26/1711	26/1742	26/1815
27 JUN 1980	27/0125	27/0159	27/0230	27/0253	27/1648	27/1711	27/1742	27/1815
28 JUN 1980	28/0126	28/0159	28/0231	28/0253	28/1648	28/1711	28/1742	28/1816
29 JUN 1980	29/0126	29/0200	29/0231	29/0254	29/1648	29/1711	29/1742	29/1816
30 JUN 1980	30/0127	30/0200	30/0231	30/0254	30/1648	30/1711	30/1742	30/1815

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\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*

\* WHEN USING MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA, YOU MUST USE THE JULIAN DATE THAT IS \*  
\* GIVEN WITH EACH TIME GROUP. UNLIKE THE SUN, THE MOON IS NOT ON A 24 \*  
\* HOUR CYCLE AND OFTEN RISES AND SETS ON DIFFERENT DAYS. ON SOME DAYS \*  
\* DURING THE MONTH, IT DOES NOT RISE OR SET AT ALL, WHICH IS INDICATED \*  
\* WITH ALL 9'S OR ALL 8'S IN THE TIME GROUP. \*  
\*

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\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR 2632N 03307E

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 2632 N

LONGITUDE 03307 E

ALTITUDE 00354

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
15	APR	1980	106/0343Z	106/1639Z	0
16	APR	1980	107/0429Z	107/1744Z	1
17	APR	1980	108/0517Z	108/1848Z	5
18	APR	1980	109/0607Z	109/1950Z	11
19	APR	1980	110/0658Z	110/2047Z	20
20	APR	1980	111/0752Z	111/2140Z	29
21	APR	1980	112/0846Z	999/9999Z	39
22	APR	1980	113/0940Z	112/2229Z	49
23	APR	1980	114/1033Z	113/2313Z	59
24	APR	1980	115/1125Z	114/2353Z	68
25	APR	1980	116/1216Z	116/0030Z	76
26	APR	1980	117/1306Z	117/0105Z	84
27	APR	1980	118/1356Z	118/0139Z	90
28	APR	1980	119/1447Z	119/0212Z	95
29	APR	1980	120/1539Z	120/0247Z	98
30	APR	1980	121/1631Z	121/0323Z	100

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR 2632N 03307E

ALL TIME IN GMT

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DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
01	MAY	1980	122/1724Z	122/0401Z	99
02	MAY	1980	123/1818Z	123/0442Z	97
03	MAY	1980	124/1912Z	124/0526Z	93
04	MAY	1980	125/2006Z	125/0615Z	87
05	MAY	1980	126/2059Z	126/0708Z	79
06	MAY	1980	999/9999Z	127/0804Z	70
07	MAY	1980	127/2150Z	128/0903Z	60
08	MAY	1980	128/2237Z	129/1003Z	49
09	MAY	1980	129/2322Z	130/1105Z	37
10	MAY	1980	131/0006Z	131/1208Z	27
11	MAY	1980	132/0049Z	132/1312Z	17
12	MAY	1980	133/0132Z	133/1418Z	9
13	MAY	1980	134/0217Z	134/1523Z	3
14	MAY	1980	135/0304Z	135/1628Z	1
15	MAY	1980	136/0353Z	136/1732Z	1
16	MAY	1980	137/0445Z	137/1832Z	3

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR 2632N 03307E

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 2632 N

LONGITUDE 03307 E

ALTITUDE 00354

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
17	MAY	1980	138/0538Z	138/1929Z	8
18	MAY	1980	139/0633Z	139/2021Z	15
19	MAY	1980	140/0728Z	140/2108Z	23
20	MAY	1980	141/0823Z	999/9999Z	33
21	MAY	1980	142/0917Z	141/2151Z	42
22	MAY	1980	143/1010Z	142/2230Z	52
23	MAY	1980	144/1101Z	143/2306Z	61
24	MAY	1980	145/1151Z	144/2340Z	70
25	MAY	1980	146/1241Z	146/0013Z	79
26	MAY	1980	147/1331Z	147/0047Z	86
27	MAY	1980	148/1423Z	148/0122Z	92
28	MAY	1980	149/1517Z	149/0159Z	96
29	MAY	1980	150/1612Z	150/0239Z	99
30	MAY	1980	151/1707Z	151/0323Z	100
31	MAY	1980	152/1802Z	152/0411Z	99
01	JUN	1980	153/1856Z	153/0503Z	95

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR 2632N 03307E

ALL TIME IN GMT

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LATITUDE 2632 N

LONGITUDE 03307 E

ALTITUDE 00354

~~SECRET~~

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
02	JUN	1980	154/1947Z	154/0558Z	90
03	JUN	1980	155/2036Z	155/0657Z	82
04	JUN	1980	156/2122Z	156/0758Z	73
05	JUN	1980	999/9999Z	157/0858Z	63
06	JUN	1980	157/2206Z	158/1000Z	51
07	JUN	1980	158/2248Z	159/1102Z	40
08	JUN	1980	159/2329Z	160/1204Z	29
09	JUN	1980	161/0011Z	161/1307Z	19
10	JUN	1980	162/0055Z	162/1411Z	11
11	JUN	1980	163/0142Z	163/1514Z	5
12	JUN	1980	164/0232Z	164/1616Z	1
13	JUN	1980	165/0324Z	165/1715Z	0
14	JUN	1980	166/0419Z	166/1809Z	2
15	JUN	1980	167/0515Z	167/1900Z	6
16	JUN	1980	168/0611Z	168/1945Z	11
17	JUN	1980	169/0706Z	169/2027Z	18

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR 2632N 03307E

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 2632 N

LONGITUDE 03307 E

ALTITUDE 00354

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
18	JUN	1980	170/0800Z	170/2104Z	27
19	JUN	1980	171/0852Z	171/2140Z	36
20	JUN	1980	172/0943Z	999/9999Z	45
21	JUN	1980	173/1033Z	172/2213Z	55
22	JUN	1980	174/1123Z	173/2246Z	64
23	JUN	1980	175/1214Z	174/2320Z	73
24	JUN	1980	176/1307Z	175/2356Z	81
25	JUN	1980	177/1402Z	177/0035Z	88
26	JUN	1980	178/1457Z	178/0117Z	94
27	JUN	1980	179/1553Z	179/0204Z	98
28	JUN	1980	180/1648Z	180/0255Z	100
29	JUN	1980	181/1742Z	181/0350Z	99
30	JUN	1980	182/1833Z	182/0448Z	97

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LATITUDE: 2711 N

LONGITUDE: 05617 E

ALTITUDE: 00009 M

G-341

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
10 JUN 1980	09/2348	10/0022	10/0053	10/0119	10/1510	10/1535	10/1607	10/1641
11 JUN 1980	10/2348	11/0022	11/0053	11/0119	11/1510	11/1536	11/1608	11/1641
12 JUN 1980	11/2348	12/0021	12/0053	12/0119	12/1510	12/1536	12/1608	12/1642
13 JUN 1980	12/2348	13/0022	13/0053	13/0119	13/1511	13/1536	13/1608	13/1642
14 JUN 1980	13/2348	14/0022	14/0053	14/0119	14/1511	14/1537	14/1609	14/1642
15 JUN 1980	14/2348	15/0022	15/0054	15/0119	15/1511	15/1537	15/1609	15/1643
16 JUN 1980	15/2348	16/0022	16/0054	16/0120	16/1512	16/1537	16/1609	16/1643
17 JUN 1980	16/2348	17/0022	17/0054	17/0120	17/1512	17/1538	17/1610	17/1643
18 JUN 1980	17/2348	18/0022	18/0054	18/0120	18/1512	18/1538	18/1610	18/1644
19 JUN 1980	18/2348	19/0022	19/0054	19/0120	19/1512	19/1538	19/1610	19/1644
20 JUN 1980	19/2349	20/0022	20/0054	20/0120	20/1513	20/1538	20/1610	20/1644
21 JUN 1980	20/2349	21/0023	21/0054	21/0120	21/1513	21/1539	21/1611	21/1644
22 JUN 1980	21/2349	22/0023	22/0055	22/0121	22/1513	22/1539	22/1611	22/1645
23 JUN 1980	22/2349	23/0023	23/0055	23/0121	23/1513	23/1539	23/1611	23/1645

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR BANDAR ABBAS, IRAN ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 2711 N

LONGITUDE: 05617 E

ALTITUDE: 00009 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
24 JUN 1980	23/2349	24/0023	24/0055	24/0121	24/1513	24/1539	24/1611	24/1645
25 JUN 1980	24/2350	25/0024	25/0055	25/0121	25/1513	25/1539	25/1611	25/1645
26 JUN 1980	25/2350	26/0024	26/0056	26/0122	26/1514	26/1539	26/1611	26/1645
27 JUN 1980	26/2350	27/0024	27/0056	27/0122	27/1514	27/1540	27/1611	27/1645
28 JUN 1980	27/2351	28/0025	28/0056	28/0122	28/1514	28/1540	28/1612	28/1645
29 JUN 1980	28/2351	29/0025	29/0057	29/0123	29/1514	29/1540	29/1612	29/1645
30 JUN 1980	29/2352	30/0025	30/0057	30/0123	30/1514	30/1540	30/1612	30/1645

LATITUDE: 3918 N

LONGITUDE: 04430 E

ALL TIMES IN GMT

ALTITUDE: 01295 M

G 342

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
15 APR 1980	15/0049	15/0124	15/0156	15/0218	15/1547	15/1609	15/1641	15/1716
16 APR 1980	16/0047	16/0122	16/0155	16/0216	16/1548	16/1610	16/1642	16/1717
17 APR 1980	17/0045	17/0120	17/0153	17/0215	17/1549	17/1611	17/1643	17/1719
18 APR 1980	18/0044	18/0119	18/0152	18/0213	18/1550	18/1612	18/1645	18/1720
19 APR 1980	19/0042	19/0117	19/0150	19/0212	19/1551	19/1613	19/1646	19/1721
20 APR 1980	20/0040	20/0116	20/0149	20/0210	20/1552	20/1614	20/1647	20/1723
21 APR 1980	21/0038	21/0114	21/0147	21/0209	21/1553	21/1615	21/1648	21/1724
22 APR 1980	22/0036	22/0112	22/0146	22/0208	22/1554	22/1616	22/1649	22/1725
23 APR 1980	23/0035	23/0111	23/0144	23/0206	23/1555	23/1617	23/1650	23/1727
24 APR 1980	24/0033	24/0109	24/0143	24/0205	24/1556	24/1618	24/1652	24/1728
25 APR 1980	25/0031	25/0108	25/0141	25/0203	25/1557	25/1619	25/1653	25/1729
26 APR 1980	26/0029	26/0106	26/0140	26/0202	26/1558	26/1620	26/1654	26/1731
27 APR 1980	27/0028	27/0105	27/0139	27/0201	27/1559	27/1621	27/1655	27/1732
28 APR 1980	28/0026	28/0103	28/0137	28/0159	28/1600	28/1622	28/1656	28/1734

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 3918 N

LONGITUDE: 04430 E

ALTITUDE: 01295 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
29 APR 1980	29/0024	29/0102	29/0136	29/0158	29/1601	29/1623	29/1658	29/1735
30 APR 1980	30/0022	30/0100	30/0134	30/0157	30/1602	30/1624	30/1659	30/1737
01 MAY 1980	01/0021	01/0059	01/0133	01/0156	01/1603	01/1626	01/1700	01/1738
02 MAY 1980	02/0019	02/0057	02/0132	02/0154	02/1604	02/1627	02/1701	02/1739
03 MAY 1980	03/0017	03/0056	03/0131	03/0153	03/1605	03/1628	03/1702	03/1741
04 MAY 1980	04/0016	04/0054	04/0129	04/0152	04/1606	04/1629	04/1704	04/1742
05 MAY 1980	05/0014	05/0053	05/0128	05/0151	05/1607	05/1630	05/1705	05/1744
06 MAY 1980	06/0013	06/0052	06/0127	06/0150	06/1608	06/1631	06/1706	06/1745
07 MAY 1980	07/0011	07/0050	07/0126	07/0149	07/1609	07/1632	07/1707	07/1747
08 MAY 1980	08/0009	08/0049	08/0124	08/0147	08/1610	08/1633	08/1708	08/1748
09 MAY 1980	09/0008	09/0048	09/0123	09/0146	09/1611	09/1634	09/1710	09/1749
10 MAY 1980	10/0006	10/0046	10/0122	10/0145	10/1612	10/1635	10/1711	10/1751
11 MAY 1980	11/0005	11/0045	11/0121	11/0144	11/1613	11/1636	11/1712	11/1752
12 MAY 1980	12/0003	12/0044	12/0120	12/0143	12/1614	12/1637	12/1713	12/1754

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

ALL TIMES IN GMT

Declassified by  
DDO NMC  
22 June 92

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

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Release in full

LATITUDE: 3918 N

LONGITUDE: 04430 E

ALTITUDE: 01295 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

~~SECRET~~

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
13 MAY 1980	13/0002	13/0043	13/0119	13/0142	13/1615	13/1638	13/1714	13/1755
14 MAY 1980	14/0001	14/0042	14/0118	14/0141	14/1616	14/1639	14/1715	14/1756
15 MAY 1980	14/2359	15/0040	15/0117	15/0140	15/1617	15/1640	15/1717	15/1758
16 MAY 1980	15/2358	16/0039	16/0116	16/0140	16/1618	16/1641	16/1718	16/1759
17 MAY 1980	16/2356	17/0038	17/0115	17/0139	17/1618	17/1642	17/1719	17/1801
18 MAY 1980	17/2355	18/0037	18/0114	18/0138	18/1619	18/1643	18/1720	18/1802
19 MAY 1980	18/2354	19/0036	19/0113	19/0137	19/1620	19/1644	19/1721	19/1803
20 MAY 1980	19/2353	20/0035	20/0112	20/0136	20/1621	20/1645	20/1722	20/1805
21 MAY 1980	20/2351	21/0034	21/0112	21/0135	21/1622	21/1646	21/1723	21/1806
22 MAY 1980	21/2350	22/0033	22/0111	22/0135	22/1623	22/1647	22/1724	22/1807
23 MAY 1980	22/2349	23/0032	23/0110	23/0134	23/1624	23/1648	23/1725	23/1809
24 MAY 1980	23/2348	24/0031	24/0109	24/0133	24/1625	24/1649	24/1726	24/1810
25 MAY 1980	24/2347	25/0031	25/0109	25/0133	25/1625	25/1650	25/1728	25/1811
26 MAY 1980	25/2346	26/0030	26/0108	26/0132	26/1626	26/1650	26/1729	26/1812

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 3918 N

LONGITUDE: 04430 E

ALTITUDE: 01295 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
27 MAY 1980	26/2345	27/0029	27/0107	27/0132	27/1627	27/1651	27/1730	27/1814
28 MAY 1980	27/2344	28/0028	28/0107	28/0131	28/1628	28/1652	28/1730	28/1815
29 MAY 1980	28/2343	29/0028	29/0106	29/0131	29/1628	29/1653	29/1731	29/1816
30 MAY 1980	29/2342	30/0027	30/0106	30/0130	30/1629	30/1654	30/1732	30/1817
31 MAY 1980	30/2341	31/0026	31/0105	31/0130	31/1630	31/1654	31/1733	31/1818
01 JUN 1980	31/2341	01/0026	01/0105	01/0129	01/1631	01/1655	01/1734	01/1819
02 JUN 1980	01/2340	02/0025	02/0104	02/0129	02/1631	02/1656	02/1735	02/1820
03 JUN 1980	02/2339	03/0025	03/0104	03/0128	03/1632	03/1657	03/1736	03/1821
04 JUN 1980	03/2338	04/0024	04/0103	04/0128	04/1633	04/1657	04/1737	04/1822
05 JUN 1980	04/2338	05/0024	05/0103	05/0128	05/1633	05/1658	05/1737	05/1823
06 JUN 1980	05/2337	06/0023	06/0103	06/0128	06/1634	06/1659	06/1738	06/1824
07 JUN 1980	06/2337	07/0023	07/0102	07/0127	07/1634	07/1659	07/1739	07/1825
08 JUN 1980	07/2336	08/0023	08/0102	08/0127	08/1635	08/1700	08/1739	08/1826
09 JUN 1980	08/2336	09/0022	09/0102	09/0127	09/1636	09/1701	09/1740	09/1827

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN ALL TIMES IN GMT

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LATITUDE: 3918 N

LONGITUDE: 04430 E

ALTITUDE: 01295 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

~~SECRET~~

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
10 JUN 1980	09/2336	10/0022	10/0102	10/0127	10/1636	10/1701	10/1741	10/1827
11 JUN 1980	10/2335	11/0022	11/0102	11/0127	11/1637	11/1702	11/1741	11/1828
12 JUN 1980	11/2335	12/0022	12/0102	12/0127	12/1637	12/1702	12/1742	12/1829
13 JUN 1980	12/2335	13/0022	13/0102	13/0127	13/1637	13/1703	13/1742	13/1829
14 JUN 1980	13/2335	14/0022	14/0102	14/0127	14/1638	14/1703	14/1743	14/1830
15 JUN 1980	14/2334	15/0022	15/0102	15/0127	15/1638	15/1703	15/1743	15/1830
16 JUN 1980	15/2334	16/0022	16/0102	16/0127	16/1639	16/1704	16/1744	16/1831
17 JUN 1980	16/2334	17/0022	17/0102	17/0127	17/1639	17/1704	17/1744	17/1831
18 JUN 1980	17/2334	18/0022	18/0102	18/0127	18/1639	18/1704	18/1744	18/1832
19 JUN 1980	18/2335	19/0022	19/0102	19/0127	19/1640	19/1705	19/1745	19/1832
20 JUN 1980	19/2335	20/0022	20/0102	20/0127	20/1640	20/1705	20/1745	20/1832
21 JUN 1980	20/2335	21/0022	21/0102	21/0127	21/1640	21/1705	21/1745	21/1833
22 JUN 1980	21/2335	22/0022	22/0102	22/0128	22/1640	22/1705	22/1745	22/1833
23 JUN 1980	22/2335	23/0023	23/0103	23/0128	23/1640	23/1706	23/1746	23/1833

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 3918 N

LONGITUDE: 04430 E

ALTITUDE: 01295 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
24 JUN 1980	23/2336	24/0023	24/0103	24/0128	24/1640	24/1706	24/1746	24/1833
25 JUN 1980	24/2336	25/0023	25/0103	25/0128	25/1641	25/1706	25/1746	25/1833
26 JUN 1980	25/2337	26/0024	26/0104	26/0129	26/1641	26/1706	26/1746	26/1833
27 JUN 1980	26/2337	27/0024	27/0104	27/0129	27/1641	27/1706	27/1746	27/1833
28 JUN 1980	27/2338	28/0025	28/0105	28/0130	28/1641	28/1706	28/1746	28/1833
29 JUN 1980	28/2338	29/0025	29/0105	29/0130	29/1641	29/1706	29/1746	29/1832
30 JUN 1980	29/2339	30/0026	30/0105	30/0130	30/1641	30/1706	30/1745	30/1832

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\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*

WHEN USING MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA, YOU MUST USE THE JULIAN DATE THAT IS GIVEN WITH EACH TIME GROUP. UNLIKE THE SUN, THE MOON IS NOT ON A 24 HOUR CYCLE AND OFTEN RISES AND SETS ON DIFFERENT DAYS. ON SOME DAYS DURING THE MONTH, IT DOES NOT RISE OR SET AT ALL, WHICH IS INDICATED WITH ALL 9'S OR ALL 8'S IN THE TIME GROUP.

\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*

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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 3918 N

LONGITUDE 04430 E

ALTITUDE 01295

DAY MONTH YEAR MOONRISE MOONSET % ILLUMINATION

15	APR	1980	106/0248Z	106/1602Z	0
16	APR	1980	107/0328Z	107/1714Z	1
17	APR	1980	108/0410Z	108/1823Z	5
18	APR	1980	109/0456Z	109/1928Z	11
19	APR	1980	110/0545Z	110/2027Z	20
20	APR	1980	111/0637Z	999/9999Z	29
21	APR	1980	112/0732Z	111/2120Z	39
22	APR	1980	113/0829Z	112/2207Z	49
23	APR	1980	114/0926Z	113/2248Z	59
24	APR	1980	115/1022Z	114/2324Z	68
25	APR	1980	116/1118Z	115/2356Z	76
26	APR	1980	117/1213Z	117/0026Z	84
27	APR	1980	118/1309Z	118/0055Z	90
28	APR	1980	119/1405Z	119/0124Z	95
29	APR	1980	120/1502Z	120/0153Z	98
30	APR	1980	121/1559Z	121/0224Z	100

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

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LATITUDE 3918 N

LONGITUDE 04430 E

ALTITUDE 01295

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
01	MAY	1980	122/1657Z	122/0256Z	99
02	MAY	1980	123/1755Z	123/0333Z	97
03	MAY	1980	124/1851Z	124/0414Z	93
04	MAY	1980	125/1947Z	125/0500Z	87
05	MAY	1980	126/2039Z	126/0553Z	79
06	MAY	1980	999/9999Z	127/0650Z	70
07	MAY	1980	127/2127Z	128/0752Z	60
08	MAY	1980	128/2211Z	129/0857Z	49
09	MAY	1980	129/2251Z	130/1005Z	37
10	MAY	1980	130/2328Z	131/1115Z	27
11	MAY	1980	132/0005Z	132/1226Z	17
12	MAY	1980	133/0041Z	133/1338Z	9
13	MAY	1980	134/0120Z	134/1450Z	3
14	MAY	1980	135/0200Z	135/1600Z	1
15	MAY	1980	136/0244Z	136/1708Z	1
16	MAY	1980	137/0332Z	137/1812Z	3

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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 3918 N

LONGITUDE 04430 E

ALTITUDE 01295

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
17	MAY	1980	138/0423Z	138/1909Z	8
18	MAY	1980	139/0518Z	139/2000Z	15
19	MAY	1980	140/0616Z	140/2045Z	23
20	MAY	1980	141/0714Z	999/9999Z	33
21	MAY	1980	142/0812Z	141/2124Z	42
22	MAY	1980	143/0909Z	142/2158Z	52
23	MAY	1980	144/1006Z	143/2229Z	61
24	MAY	1980	145/1101Z	144/2258Z	70
25	MAY	1980	146/1157Z	145/2326Z	79
26	MAY	1980	147/1253Z	146/2355Z	86
27	MAY	1980	148/1350Z	148/0025Z	92
28	MAY	1980	149/1448Z	149/0057Z	96
29	MAY	1980	150/1548Z	150/0132Z	99
30	MAY	1980	151/1646Z	151/0212Z	100
31	MAY	1980	152/1742Z	152/0256Z	99
01	JUN	1980	153/1837Z	153/0347Z	95

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

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LATITUDE 3918 N

LONGITUDE 04430 E

ALTITUDE 01290

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
02	JUN	1980	154/1926Z	154/0444Z	90
03	JUN	1980	155/2011Z	155/0545Z	82
04	JUN	1980	156/2052Z	156/0650Z	73
05	JUN	1980	999/9999Z	157/0756Z	63
06	JUN	1980	157/2131Z	158/0903Z	51
07	JUN	1980	158/2206Z	159/1012Z	40
08	JUN	1980	159/2241Z	160/1121Z	29
09	JUN	1980	160/2317Z	161/1231Z	19
10	JUN	1980	161/2355Z	162/1341Z	11
11	JUN	1980	163/0036Z	163/1449Z	5
12	JUN	1980	164/0121Z	164/1555Z	1
13	JUN	1980	165/0210Z	165/1655Z	0
14	JUN	1980	166/0304Z	166/1750Z	2
15	JUN	1980	167/0401Z	167/1838Z	6
16	JUN	1980	168/0500Z	168/1920Z	11
17	JUN	1980	169/0559Z	169/1957Z	18

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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR MAKU, IRAN

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 3918 N

LONGITUDE 04430 E

ALTITUDE 01295

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
18	JUN	1980	170/0657Z	170/2030Z	27
19	JUN	1980	171/0755Z	171/2100Z	36
20	JUN	1980	172/0851Z	999/9999Z	45
21	JUN	1980	173/0947Z	172/2129Z	55
22	JUN	1980	174/1042Z	173/2157Z	64
23	JUN	1980	175/1139Z	174/2225Z	73
24	JUN	1980	176/1236Z	175/2256Z	81
25	JUN	1980	177/1335Z	176/2330Z	88
26	JUN	1980	178/1435Z	178/0008Z	94
27	JUN	1980	179/1533Z	179/0051Z	98
28	JUN	1980	180/1629Z	180/0140Z	100
29	JUN	1980	181/1722Z	181/0234Z	99
30	JUN	1980	182/1810Z	182/0335Z	97

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G343

ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: [REDACTED]

LONGITUDE: [REDACTED]

ALTITUDE: 00003 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

~~SECRET~~

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
15 APR 1980	15/0002	15/0027	15/0051	15/0112	15/1309	15/1330	15/1355	15/1419
16 APR 1980	16/0002	16/0027	16/0051	16/0112	16/1309	16/1330	16/1354	16/1419
17 APR 1980	17/0002	17/0027	17/0051	17/0112	17/1308	17/1329	17/1354	17/1418
18 APR 1980	18/0002	18/0027	18/0051	18/0112	18/1308	18/1329	18/1354	18/1418
19 APR 1980	19/0002	19/0027	19/0051	19/0112	19/1308	19/1329	19/1353	19/1418
20 APR 1980	20/0002	20/0026	20/0051	20/0112	20/1307	20/1328	20/1353	20/1417
21 APR 1980	21/0002	21/0026	21/0051	21/0112	21/1307	21/1328	21/1353	21/1417
22 APR 1980	22/0002	22/0026	22/0051	22/0112	22/1306	22/1327	22/1352	22/1417
23 APR 1980	23/0001	23/0026	23/0051	23/0112	23/1306	23/1327	23/1352	23/1417
24 APR 1980	24/0001	24/0026	24/0051	24/0112	24/1306	24/1327	24/1352	24/1416
25 APR 1980	25/0001	25/0026	25/0051	25/0112	25/1305	25/1326	25/1351	25/1416
26 APR 1980	26/0001	26/0026	26/0051	26/0112	26/1305	26/1326	26/1351	26/1416
27 APR 1980	27/0001	27/0026	27/0051	27/0112	27/1305	27/1326	27/1351	27/1416
28 APR 1980	28/0001	28/0026	28/0051	28/0112	28/1304	28/1326	28/1350	28/1415

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR [REDACTED] ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: [REDACTED]

LONGITUDE: [REDACTED]

ALTITUDE: 00003 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
29 APR 1980	29/0001	29/0026	29/0051	29/0112	29/1304	29/1325	29/1350	29/1415
30 APR 1980	30/0001	30/0026	30/0051	30/0112	30/1304	30/1325	30/1350	30/1415
01 MAY 1980	01/0001	01/0026	01/0051	01/0112	01/1303	01/1325	01/1350	01/1415
02 MAY 1980	02/0001	02/0026	02/0051	02/0112	02/1303	02/1325	02/1350	02/1415
03 MAY 1980	03/0001	03/0026	03/0051	03/0112	03/1303	03/1324	03/1349	03/1414
04 MAY 1980	04/0001	04/0026	04/0051	04/0112	04/1303	04/1324	04/1349	04/1414
05 MAY 1980	05/0001	05/0026	05/0051	05/0112	05/1302	05/1324	05/1349	05/1414
06 MAY 1980	06/0001	06/0026	06/0051	06/0112	06/1302	06/1324	06/1349	06/1414
07 MAY 1980	07/0001	07/0026	07/0051	07/0112	07/1302	07/1323	07/1349	07/1414
08 MAY 1980	08/0001	08/0026	08/0051	08/0112	08/1302	08/1323	08/1348	08/1414
09 MAY 1980	09/0001	09/0026	09/0051	09/0113	09/1302	09/1323	09/1348	09/1414
10 MAY 1980	10/0000	10/0026	10/0051	10/0113	10/1301	10/1323	10/1348	10/1413
11 MAY 1980	11/0001	11/0026	11/0051	11/0113	11/1301	11/1323	11/1348	11/1413
12 MAY 1980	12/0001	12/0026	12/0051	12/0113	12/1301	12/1323	12/1348	12/1413

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR [REDACTED] ALL TIMES IN GMT

Classified By: DJSOA  
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded  
to CONFIDENTIAL  
by [signature]

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BEGIN TWILIGHT

~~SECRET~~

END TWILIGHT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
13 MAY 1980	13/0001	13/0026	13/0051	13/0113	13/1301	13/1323	13/1348	13/1413
14 MAY 1980	14/0001	14/0026	14/0051	14/0113	14/1301	14/1322	14/1348	14/1413
15 MAY 1980	15/0001	15/0026	15/0052	15/0113	15/1301	15/1322	15/1348	15/1413
16 MAY 1980	16/0001	16/0026	16/0052	16/0113	16/1300	16/1322	16/1348	16/1413
17 MAY 1980	17/0001	17/0026	17/0052	17/0114	17/1300	17/1322	17/1348	17/1413
18 MAY 1980	18/0001	18/0026	18/0052	18/0114	18/1300	18/1322	18/1348	18/1413
19 MAY 1980	19/0001	19/0026	19/0052	19/0114	19/1300	19/1322	19/1348	19/1413
20 MAY 1980	20/0001	20/0026	20/0052	20/0114	20/1300	20/1322	20/1348	20/1413
21 MAY 1980	21/0001	21/0027	21/0052	21/0114	21/1300	21/1322	21/1348	21/1413
22 MAY 1980	22/0001	22/0027	22/0052	22/0114	22/1300	22/1322	22/1348	22/1413
23 MAY 1980	23/0001	23/0027	23/0053	23/0115	23/1300	23/1322	23/1348	23/1413
24 MAY 1980	24/0001	24/0027	24/0053	24/0115	24/1300	24/1322	24/1348	24/1414
25 MAY 1980	25/0001	25/0027	25/0053	25/0115	25/1300	25/1322	25/1348	25/1414
26 MAY 1980	26/0001	26/0027	26/0053	26/0115	26/1300	26/1322	26/1348	26/1414

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR [REDACTED] ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: [REDACTED]

LONGITUDE: [REDACTED]

ALTITUDE: 0003 M

E

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
27 MAY 1980	27/0002	27/0027	27/0053	27/0115	27/1300	27/1322	27/1348	27/1414
28 MAY 1980	28/0002	28/0028	28/0053	28/0116	28/1300	28/1322	28/1348	28/1414
29 MAY 1980	29/0002	29/0028	29/0054	29/0116	29/1300	29/1322	29/1348	29/1414
30 MAY 1980	30/0002	30/0028	30/0054	30/0116	30/1300	30/1322	30/1348	30/1414
31 MAY 1980	31/0002	31/0028	31/0054	31/0116	31/1300	31/1322	31/1348	31/1414
01 JUN 1980	01/0002	01/0028	01/0054	01/0116	01/1300	01/1322	01/1348	01/1414
02 JUN 1980	02/0002	02/0028	02/0054	02/0117	02/1300	02/1323	02/1349	02/1415
03 JUN 1980	03/0003	03/0029	03/0055	03/0117	03/1300	03/1323	03/1349	03/1415
04 JUN 1980	04/0003	04/0029	04/0055	04/0117	04/1301	04/1323	04/1349	04/1415
05 JUN 1980	05/0003	05/0029	05/0055	05/0117	05/1301	05/1323	05/1349	05/1415
06 JUN 1980	06/0003	06/0029	06/0055	06/0118	06/1301	06/1323	06/1349	06/1415
07 JUN 1980	07/0003	07/0029	07/0055	07/0118	07/1301	07/1323	07/1349	07/1415
08 JUN 1980	08/0003	08/0030	08/0056	08/0118	08/1301	08/1323	08/1349	08/1416
09 JUN 1980	09/0004	09/0030	09/0056	09/0118	09/1301	09/1323	09/1350	09/1416

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR [REDACTED] ALL TIMES IN GMT

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BEGIN TWILIGHT

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END TWILIGHT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
10 JUN 1980	10/0004	10/0030	10/0056	10/0118	10/1301	10/1324	10/1350	10/1416
11 JUN 1980	11/0004	11/0030	11/0056	11/0119	11/1301	11/1324	11/1350	11/1416
12 JUN 1980	12/0004	12/0030	12/0057	12/0119	12/1302	12/1324	12/1350	12/1416
13 JUN 1980	13/0004	13/0031	13/0057	13/0119	13/1302	13/1324	13/1350	13/1416
14 JUN 1980	14/0005	14/0031	14/0057	14/0119	14/1302	14/1324	14/1351	14/1417
15 JUN 1980	15/0005	15/0031	15/0057	15/0120	15/1302	15/1325	15/1351	15/1417
16 JUN 1980	16/0005	16/0031	16/0057	16/0120	16/1302	16/1325	16/1351	16/1417
17 JUN 1980	17/0005	17/0031	17/0058	17/0120	17/1302	17/1325	17/1351	17/1417
18 JUN 1980	18/0005	18/0032	18/0058	18/0120	18/1303	18/1325	18/1351	18/1417
19 JUN 1980	19/0006	19/0032	19/0058	19/0120	19/1303	19/1325	19/1352	19/1418
20 JUN 1980	20/0006	20/0032	20/0058	20/0121	20/1303	20/1325	20/1352	20/1418
21 JUN 1980	21/0006	21/0032	21/0059	21/0121	21/1303	21/1326	21/1352	21/1418
22 JUN 1980	22/0006	22/0032	22/0059	22/0121	22/1304	22/1326	22/1352	22/1418
23 JUN 1980	23/0007	23/0033	23/0059	23/0121	23/1304	23/1326	23/1352	23/1419

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR [REDACTED] ALL TIMES IN GMT

E

LATITUDE: [REDACTED]

LONGITUDE: [REDACTED]

ALTITUDE: 0003 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
24 JUN 1980	24/0007	24/0033	24/0059	24/0122	24/1304	24/1326	24/1353	24/1419
25 JUN 1980	25/0007	25/0033	25/0059	25/0122	25/1304	25/1327	25/1353	25/1419
26 JUN 1980	26/0007	26/0033	26/0100	26/0122	26/1304	26/1327	26/1353	26/1419
27 JUN 1980	27/0007	27/0033	27/0100	27/0122	27/1305	27/1327	27/1353	27/1419
28 JUN 1980	28/0008	28/0034	28/0100	28/0122	28/1305	28/1327	28/1353	28/1420
29 JUN 1980	29/0008	29/0034	29/0100	29/0122	29/1305	29/1327	29/1354	29/1420
30 JUN 1980	30/0008	30/0034	30/0100	30/0123	30/1305	30/1328	30/1354	30/1420

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WHEN USING MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA, YOU MUST USE THE JULIAN DATE THAT IS GIVEN WITH EACH TIME GROUP. UNLIKE THE SUN, THE MOON IS NOT ON A 24 HOUR CYCLE AND OFTEN RISES AND SETS ON DIFFERENT DAYS. ON SOME DAYS DURING THE MONTH, IT DOES NOT RISE OR SET AT ALL, WHICH IS INDICATED WITH ALL 9'S OR ALL 8'S IN THE TIME GROUP.

\*\*\*\*\* C A U T I O N \*\*\*\*\*

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MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR [REDACTED] ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE [REDACTED] LONGITUDE [REDACTED] ALTITUDE 00003

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
15	APR	1980	106/0114Z	106/1334Z	0
16	APR	1980	107/0213Z	107/1428Z	1
17	APR	1980	108/0311Z	108/1522Z	5
18	APR	1980	109/0410Z	109/1617Z	11
19	APR	1980	110/0506Z	110/1712Z	20
20	APR	1980	111/0601Z	111/1805Z	29
21	APR	1980	112/0654Z	112/1858Z	39
22	APR	1980	113/0743Z	999/9999Z	49
23	APR	1980	114/0830Z	113/1948Z	59
24	APR	1980	115/0914Z	114/2036Z	68
25	APR	1980	116/0955Z	115/2123Z	76
26	APR	1980	117/1035Z	116/2207Z	84
27	APR	1980	118/1115Z	117/2251Z	90
28	APR	1980	119/1155Z	118/2335Z	95
29	APR	1980	120/1236Z	120/0020Z	98
30	APR	1980	121/1319Z	121/0106Z	100

E

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR [REDACTED] ALL TIME IN GMT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
01	MAY	1980	122/1403Z	122/0153Z	99
02	MAY	1980	123/1449Z	123/0242Z	97
03	MAY	1980	124/1538Z	124/0332Z	93
04	MAY	1980	125/1630Z	125/0424Z	87
05	MAY	1980	126/1724Z	126/0517Z	79
06	MAY	1980	127/1819Z	127/0611Z	70
07	MAY	1980	999/9999Z	128/0704Z	60
08	MAY	1980	128/1915Z	129/0756Z	49
09	MAY	1980	129/2010Z	130/0846Z	37
10	MAY	1980	130/2105Z	131/0937Z	27
11	MAY	1980	131/2201Z	132/1028Z	17
12	MAY	1980	132/2258Z	133/1119Z	9
13	MAY	1980	133/2355Z	134/1212Z	3
14	MAY	1980	135/0054Z	135/1307Z	1
15	MAY	1980	136/0152Z	136/1402Z	1
16	MAY	1980	137/0251Z	137/1457Z	3

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR [REDACTED]

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE [REDACTED]

LONGITUDE [REDACTED]

ALTITUDE 0003

E

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
17	MAY	1980	138/0348Z	138/1553Z	8
18	MAY	1980	139/0443Z	139/1647Z	15
19	MAY	1980	140/0535Z	140/1739Z	23
20	MAY	1980	141/0624Z	141/1830Z	33
21	MAY	1980	142/0710Z	999/9999Z	42
22	MAY	1980	143/0753Z	142/1918Z	52
23	MAY	1980	144/0834Z	143/2004Z	61
24	MAY	1980	145/0914Z	144/2048Z	70
25	MAY	1980	146/0953Z	145/2132Z	79
26	MAY	1980	147/1033Z	146/2216Z	86
27	MAY	1980	148/1115Z	147/2301Z	92
28	MAY	1980	149/1159Z	148/2348Z	96
29	MAY	1980	150/1245Z	150/0037Z	99
30	MAY	1980	151/1334Z	151/0127Z	100
31	MAY	1980	152/1426Z	152/0220Z	99
01	JUN	1980	153/1520Z	153/0313Z	95

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR [REDACTED]

ALL TIME IN GMT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET

DAY MONTH YEAR MOONRISE MOONSET % ILLUMINATION

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02	JUN	1980	154/1615Z	154/0407Z	90
03	JUN	1980	155/1711Z	155/0501Z	82
04	JUN	1980	156/1806Z	156/0553Z	73
05	JUN	1980	157/1900Z	157/0644Z	63
06	JUN	1980	999/9999Z	158/0734Z	51
07	JUN	1980	158/1955Z	159/0823Z	40
08	JUN	1980	159/2049Z	160/0912Z	29
09	JUN	1980	160/2144Z	161/1002Z	19
10	JUN	1980	161/2240Z	162/1054Z	11
11	JUN	1980	162/2338Z	163/1148Z	5
12	JUN	1980	164/0035Z	164/1243Z	1
13	JUN	1980	165/0133Z	165/1338Z	0
14	JUN	1980	166/0229Z	166/1434Z	2
15	JUN	1980	167/0323Z	167/1528Z	6
16	JUN	1980	168/0415Z	168/1620Z	11
17	JUN	1980	169/0503Z	169/1710Z	18

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE

LONGITUDE

ALTITUDE 00003

E

DAY MONTH YEAR MOONRISE MOONSET % ILLUMINATION

18	JUN	1980	170/0548Z	170/1758Z	27
19	JUN	1980	171/0630Z	171/1843Z	36
20	JUN	1980	172/0711Z	999/9999Z	45
21	JUN	1980	173/0750Z	172/1927Z	55
22	JUN	1980	174/0830Z	173/2011Z	64
23	JUN	1980	175/0910Z	174/2055Z	73
24	JUN	1980	176/0953Z	175/2141Z	81
25	JUN	1980	177/1038Z	176/2229Z	88
26	JUN	1980	178/1127Z	177/2319Z	94
27	JUN	1980	179/1218Z	179/0011Z	98
28	JUN	1980	180/1312Z	180/0105Z	100
29	JUN	1980	181/1407Z	181/0200Z	99
30	JUN	1980	182/1504Z	182/0255Z	97

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Addendum

G-344

(10)

Exposure Weather - [REDACTED]

	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
Absolute Maximum ( F )	104	109	111	105	99	100	99
Mean Maximum	91	95	94	89	86	86	88
Mean Minimum	74	79	78	75	73	73	73
Absolute Minimum	61	68	68	71	69	68	66
Mean # Days $\geq$ 90 F	18	30	27	11	5	4	10
Mean Precipitation (Inches)	0.76	0.22	0.09	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.05
Mean Relative Humidity	64	64	72	78	78	78	70
# Days Rainfall	2	1	*	*	*	0	*
# Days Thunderstorms	1	*	0	*	*	0	0
# Days Duststorm	5	12	24	28	24	9	2
% Frequency Winds $\geq$ 17 knots	11	24	55	63	52	27	5
% Frequency Winds $\geq$ 27 Knots	*	*	3	4	3	*	*
* Frequency Visibility < 6 Miles							
0700	3	5	26	65	55	10	5
1000	3	4	20	48	33	4	1
1600	4	5	22	49	28	4	2
2200	4	5	24	49	30	4	1
* Frequency Visibility < 2 1/2							
0700	*	2	1	4	1	1	3
1000	1	1	3	4	2	0	0
1600	1	2	4	6	2	*	*
2200	*	2	5	6	1	0	0

\* 0.5 % or day

G 345

April-May

1. General. The Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) moves northward in April and May. The island experiences northwesterly winds when located north of the ITCZ and the southeast trades after the passage of the ITCZ. Cloudiness is less extensive, but precipitation is still abundant and the weather is warm and humid. Tropical cyclones and/or hurricanes are virtually non-existent during this period.

2. Flying Weather. Generally good. Cloud bases are usually between 1500-3000 feet. The percent frequency that the ceiling/visibility is less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles ranges from 10-15%, less than 1500/3 is 5%, and less than 500/1 occurs about 1% of the time. Ceiling/visibility is restricted primarily due to heavy rainshowers. Fog is rarely observed. Thunderstorms are infrequent, but massive cumulonimbus clouds may reach to 40,000-50,000 feet.

3. Terminal Weather. Mean cloudiness during this period averages 4/8-5/8. Precipitation is less abundant than the rainy months, but still significant in that it averages approximately 7 inches per month. The percent frequency that the ceiling/visibility is less than 300/1 is less than 1% per month. Crosswinds greater than 15 knots are expected 1% of the time.

4. Reconnaissance Weather. Fair during April, but improves substantially during May. During April cloud cover is less than 3/8ths 10-15% during daylight hours and 25-35% of the time between sunset and sunrise. During May the cloud cover is less than 3/8ths 25-35% of the time during daylight hours and 35-45% during the hours of darkness. Cloud types are mainly cumulus with extensive areas of cirrus. The sky is seldom free of clouds and overcast skies are expected 15-20% of the time.

5. Exposure Weather. The weather is warm and humid with moderate precipitation. Relative humidity averages 75-90%.

	APR	MAY
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM ( F)	91	91
MEAN MAXIMUM	87	86
MEAN MINIMUM	78	77
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	70	70
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	7.4	6.7
# DAYS RAINFALL	18	16
# DAYS THUNDERSTORM	*	*

\* = less than 0.5 day

Classified By: DJSOA  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded to Confidential  
11/18/00 NMC  
2/2/02

6. Port/Beach Conditions. On the open sea, winds are greater than 16 knots 5% of the time in April and 15% in May. Gale force winds are rare in both months. Amphibious landing craft or small boats may encounter rough seas 10% of the time. Tropical cyclones or hurricanes are rare during this period.

E ~~(S)~~ 7. Astronomical Data. [REDACTED]

	APR	MAY
CIVIL TWILIGHT (LOCAL TIME)	15	15
FIRST LIGHT	0551	0551
LAST LIGHT	1830	1822

G [REDACTED] Capt, USAF  
DOD Climatological Officer  
Pentagon Telephone: 697-1638

Prepared Date: 14 April 1980

G 3416

[REDACTED]  
June-September

1. General. The season of the southeast trades is characterized by winds predominantly out of the southeast at about 10 knots. The weather is normally fair and warm; however, precipitation averages 6-9 inches per month. Precipitation is usually a heavy shower, but periods of steady rain may persist for several hours. The Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) is at its northernmost position during this season. In late August and September tropical cyclones/hurricanes sometimes form or pass to the south of the island, producing moderate rainfall and fresh westerly winds.

2. Flying Weather. Generally good. Cloud bases are most frequently between 1500-3000 feet. The percent frequency that the ceiling/visibility is less than 5000 feet and/or 6 miles ranges from 15-20%; less than 1500/3 ranges from 5-10% and less than 500/1 is expected less than 1% of the time. The ceiling/visibility is restricted primarily by heavy rainshowers. Fog is rare. Thunderstorms are expected less than 1 day per month; however massive cumulonimbus clouds often reach to 40,000-50,000 feet.

3. Terminal Weather. Generally good. Low ceilings or visibilities associated with rainshowers result in restrictions to flying activities about 1% of the time. Crosswinds greater than 15 knots are expected 1-2% of the time. Generally the strongest winds occur in the early morning hours or the late afternoon.

4. Reconnaissance Weather. Fair to poor. Although visibility is generally good, cloudiness is quite extensive. Cloud types are mainly cumulus and cumulonimbus, but thick layers may persist for several hours. Reconnaissance weather is generally the poorest between sunrise and sunset. During daylight hours sky cover less than 3/8 is expected only 5-10% of the time. At night the sky is seldom free of clouds; overcast skies are expected 15-25% of the time.

5. Exposure Weather. The weather is warm and humid with moderate precipitation. The relative humidity averages 75-85%.


[REDACTED]	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
Absolute Maximum ( F)	95	88	88	88
Mean Maximum	84	83	83	83
Mean Minimum	76	75	75	75
Absolute Minimum	70	70	66	70
Mean Precipitation (Inches)	5.9	6.2	6.2	9.2
# Days Rainfall	16	18	16	17
#Days Thunderstorm	*	*	*	*

\* = Less than 0.5 day

Classified By **DJ50A**  
Declassified On **OADR**  
*Downgraded to Confidential  
by DDD a MCC  
22 Jun 92*


6. Port/Beach Conditions. On the open sea, winds greater than 16 knots are expected 30-40% of the time. Gale force winds are expected 1-3% of the time. Amphibious landing craft or small boats may encounter rough seas 15-30% of the time. Tropical cyclones and/or hurricanes forming or moving south of the island may cause heavy seas and high winds in the vicinity of Diego Garcia.

7. Astronomical Data.



	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
Civil Twilight (Local Time)	15	15	15	15
First Light	0556	0610	0557	0542
Last Light	1824	1830	1811	1827

3

 Capt, USAF  
DOD Climatological Officer  
Pentagon Telephone: 697-1638

Prepared Date: 14 April 1980

~~SECRET~~

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5. EXPOSURE WEATHER. The weather is hot, dry and dusty over most of Iran. Temperatures may exceed 120F in the interior desert regions. Sandstorms/duststorms are frequent and may last for several days.

TEHRAN, IRAN	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCT
ABS MAX	97	103	108	107	100	89
MEAN MAX	81	92	97	95	88	76
MEAN MIN	59	67	72	71	64	53
ABS MIN	37	48	57	52	51	38
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	.5	*	*	*	*	*
# DAYS PRECIP	6	1	1	*	*	2
# DAYS TSTMS	2	1	*	*	*	*

\* = Less than 0.5 inch/0.5 Day

6. PARADROP WEATHER. Over most of Iran the weather conditions are favorable for paradrops 75-95% of the time. However, in southern Iran, from approximately 31N southward, during the afternoon hours, weather conditions are favorable only 35-45% of the time. Over all of Iran weather conditions are unfavorable for paradrops primarily due to winds in excess of 13 knots. Generally, only in northern Iran, particularly along the Caspian Sea would cloudiness and/or rainfall be a factor.

7. TRAFFICABILITY. Most of Iran has a cone index (CI) rating of 150 or greater (soil will support most surface vehicles and helicopters). Isolated sections along the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf and the Central Plateau have a much lower CI rating. In the Central Plateau region there are large marsh areas that are impassable even to men on foot.

8. ASTRONOMICAL DATA. Tehran, Iran

Civil Twilight (Standard Time of the Meridian 52 DEG 30 Min)

	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEP	OCT
FIRST LIGHT	0432	0418	0430	0456	0521	0545
LAST LIGHT	1931	1952	1950	1922	1838	1756

G [Redacted] Capt, USAF  
DOD Weather Liaison Officer  
Pentagon Telephone: 697-1638

Prepared: 22 January 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SITUATION CLIMATIC BRIEF

ADDENDUM

IRAN

<u>Exposure Weather - Jask, Iran (Gulf of Oman)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	110	113	112	110	107
MEAN MAXIMUM	93	97	97	95	92
MEAN MINIMUM	78	83	85	84	81
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	65	73	76	63	70
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.00
# DAYS RAINFALL	*	*	*	*	*
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	0	*	0	0	0
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS					

<u>Exposure Weather - Zanhedan, Iran (Desert)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	104	106	108	107	104
MEAN MAXIMUM	90	96	99	96	92
MEAN MINIMUM	61	64	67	63	55
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	46	51	46	50	42
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
# DAYS RAINFALL	*	*	0	0	0
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	*	0	*	*	*
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	5	11	10	6	0

<u>Exposure Weather - Kerman, Iran (Southern Mountains)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	98	103	105	105	96
MEAN MAXIMUM	86	95	96	95	89
MEAN MINIMUM	54	62	65	62	50
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	43	51	46	49	39
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.43	0.00	0.06	0.03	0.00
# DAYS RAINFALL	1	0	*	*	*
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	2	0	1	*	*
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	11	10	13	11	8

<u>Exposure Weather - Birjand, Iran (Desert)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	97	108	113	102	100
MEAN MAXIMUM	85	97	99	94	91
MEAN MINIMUM	58	64	69	63	50
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	46	54	55	52	43
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
# DAYS RAINFALL	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	0	2	5	0	0

\* = Less Than 0.5 Day

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<u>Exposure Weather - Yazd, Iran (Southern Mountains)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	97	108	111	108	104	93
MEAN MAXIMUM	89	99	102	100	94	81
MEAN MINIMUM	63	70	75	71	62	52
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	50	61	61	55	45	37
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
# DAYS RAINFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS SNOWFALL	*	0	0	0	0	*
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	*	0	0	0	0
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	8	4	6	3	3	1
<u>Exposure Weather - Qom, Iran (Northwest Desert)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	104	108	113	111	104	99
MEAN MAXIMUM	89	98	103	101	93	81
MEAN MINIMUM	61	70	74	71	63	53
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	45	54	59	57	46	39
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.5	0.1	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.3
# DAYS RAINFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	2	*	0	0	0	*
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS						
<u>Exposure Weather - Teheran, Iran (Northwest Desert)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	99	107	109	109	102	93
MEAN MAXIMUM	71	82	93	99	97	90
MEAN MINIMUM	58	66	72	71	64	53
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	37	46	57	52	46	38
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.50	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.30
# DAYS RAINFALL	1	*	*	*	*	1
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	4	1	1	1	*	*
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	2	2	3	1	2	2
<u>Exposure Weather - Kazvin, Iran (Northwest Desert)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	93	104	104	106	100	91
MEAN MAXIMUM	82	91	96	95	89	76
MEAN MINIMUM	51	58	63	63	55	45
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	34	46	50	50	43	32
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5
# DAYS RAINFALL						
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	*	*	*	*	1
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS						
<u>Exposure Weather - Zanzan, Iran (Northwest Mountains)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	90	102	102	104	97	84
MEAN MAXIMUM	76	85	91	90	83	71
MEAN MINIMUM	46	53	60	58	50	41
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	32	39	48	46	34	21
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.2	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.6
# DAYS RAINFALL						
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	4	2	*	0	0	1



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<u>Exposure Weather - Tabriz, Iran (Northwest Mountains)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	90	96	104	102	101	84
MEAN MAXIMUM	73	83	89	90	83	69
MEAN MINIMUM	50	57	63	63	56	45
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	30	46	45	52	43	28
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.71	1.17	0.26	0.06	0.28	0.91
# DAYS RAINFALL	4	2	1	*	1	2
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	5	4	1	1	1	1
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	1	2	2	2	1	1

<u>Exposure Weather - Khvoy, Iran (Northwest Mountains)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	93	97	108	102	99	90
MEAN MAXIMUM	76	85	91	91	84	69
MEAN MINIMUM	51	56	61	61	53	44
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	32	41	41	41	29	12
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	2.2	1.6	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.8
# DAYS RAINFALL						
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	4	6	2	1	2	1
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS						

<u>Exposure Weather - Shiraz, Iran (Southern Mountains)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	97	102	104	105	102	92
MEAN MAXIMUM	86	96	99	97	92	83
MEAN MINIMUM	55	62	68	65	58	49
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	43	54	57	55	48	37
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
# DAYS RAINFALL	2	0	*	0	0	0
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	0	0	*	0	0
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	3	1	4	4	2	1

<u>Exposure Weather - Bushehr, Iran (Southern Coast)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	115	112	115	115	109	106
MEAN MAXIMUM	89	92	95	97	94	88
MEAN MINIMUM	76	81	84	84	79	72
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	58	63	70	69	60	55
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.10
# DAYS RAINFALL	*	0	0	*	0	*
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	*	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS						

<u>Exposure Weather - Kermanshah, Iran (Northwest Mountains)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	94	103	108	107	103	92
MEAN MAXIMUM	79	90	99	99	90	79
MEAN MINIMUM	44	47	56	55	45	38
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	26	31	38	42	31	17
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.60	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.40
# DAYS RAINFALL	3	*	*	*	*	1
# DAYS SNOWFALL		0	0	0	0	
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	5	1	0	0	1	2
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS						

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<u>Exposure Weather - Bandar Abbas, Iran (Southern Coast)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	108	117	113	109	108	108
MEAN MAXIMUM	97	101	101	100	99	95
MEAN MINIMUM	79	84	88	88	85	77
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	68	72	82	84	75	64
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.1	0.0	0.05	0.0	0.05	0.05
# DAYS RAINFALL						
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	*	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS						

<u>Exposure Weather - Abadan, Iran (Southern Coast)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	117	121	127	122	120	109
MEAN MAXIMUM	102	110	112	113	109	98
MEAN MINIMUM	73	79	81	80	73	63
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	43	70	70	54	61	50
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.69	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.68
# DAYS RAINFALL	2	0	0	0	0	*
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	0	*	0	0	*
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	12	16	15	15	9	6

<u>Exposure Weather - Hamadan, Iran (Northwest Mountains)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	83	97	102	99	93	82
MEAN MAXIMUM	72	83	90	90	83	69
MEAN MINIMUM	46	51	58	57	50	44
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	34	28	45	46	36	25
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.66	0.44	0.00	0.17	0.01	0.82
# DAYS RAINFALL	3	1	0	*	*	2
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0		0	0	0	
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	4	1	0	*	*	1
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	2	3	3	2	1	2

<u>Exposure Weather - Jahrom, Iran (Southern Mountains)</u>	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	104	109	113	109	106	99
MEAN MAXIMUM	93	102	104	103	98	87
MEAN MINIMUM	62	69	74	73	64	53
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	48	57	64	63	48	43
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
# DAYS RAINFALL						
# DAYS SNOWFALL						
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS						
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS						

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZANHEDAN

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0100	4	11	15	5	2	0
0400	7	9	18	5	3	1
0700	4	3	8	4	1	1
1000	4	7	15	7	2	2
1300	7	13	19	9	4	2
1600	12	27	29	16	8	5
1900	7	23	24	17	9	4
2200	6	19	24	13	3	4

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0400	1	2	7	1	1	0
0700	0	0	1	0	0	0
1000	1	2	6	1	0.5	0
1600	4	11	16	5	3	0.5
2200	3	4	8	3	0	1

KERMAN

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0100	15	8	13	8	3	0
0400	12	8	10	6	3	1
0700	18	12	10	7	2	2
1000	17	12	17	7	3	5
1300	17	9	17	9	0	4
1600	22	11	19	11	5	2
1900	31	17	15	7	7	4
2200	12	8	13	10	4	2

KERMAN

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0400	1	0	0	0	0	0
0700	3	2	0	2	0	1
1000	3	2	2	1	0.5	0.5
1600	2	2	3	2	0.5	0
2200	2	0	1	0	0	0

BIRJAND

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0400	3	7	7	6	0	0
0700	3	8	4	3	0	0
1000	1	7	9	7	0	0
1300	2	5	12	6	0	0
1600	4	5	9	4	2	2
1900	0	6	4	0	0	0

BIRJAND

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0400	0	0	2	0	0	0
0700	0	0	4	0	0	0
1000	0	1	2	1	0	0
1600	0	0	2	0	0	0

YAZD

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0400	11	8	8	3	2	3
0700	2	13	13	0	0	2
1000	10	9	12	7	3	3
1300	6	11	17	2	2	2
1600	4	7	7	3	3	1
1900	6	8	7	2	0	0
2200	12	8	3	2	1	1

YAZD

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0400	4	1	4	3	1	2
0700	2	6	0	0	0	0
1000	3	1	3	3	0	0
1600	2	1	2	0	0	0
2200	3	4	8	3	0	1

TEHERAN

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0000	0	2	6	1	2	2
0300	1	7	3	0	1	0.5
0600	1	2	7	4	1	2
0900	5	2	0.5	2	0.5	2
1200	2	3	5	1	2	2
1500	2	3	5	1	9	3

TEHERAN

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0300	0	5	1	0	0	0
0600	1	0	1	0	0	0
0900	0	0	0	0	7	0.5
1500	0.5	0	1	0	7	1
2100	0	0	1	1	0.5	0.5

TEHERAN

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1800	4	5	5	1	2	4
2100	2	4	8	3	2	2

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1800	4	5	5	1	2	4
2100	2	4	8	3	2	2

TABRIZ

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0000	0	0	0	1	1	2
0300	3	1	1	2	2	3
0600	1	0	1	1	0	1
0900	5	2	0.5	2	0.5	2
1200	1	1	2	3	2	1
1500	3	1	2	2	3	4
1800	2	3	4	3	2	3
2100	2	4	8	3	2	2

TABRIZ

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0300	1	0	0	0	0	0.5
0600	0	0	0	0	0	0
0900	1	1	0	0	0	0
1500	0	0	0.5	0	0	0
2100	1	0.5	0.5	0	0	1

SHIRAZ

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0400	3	2	7	7	3	0
0700	15	8	47	36	14	4
1000	21	14	25	23	9	1
1300	10	11	26	28	4	0
1600	12	5	17	10	3	1
1900	7	14	24	23	0	0
2200	5	6	12	13	5	1

SHIRAZ

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0400	0	0	0	0	0	0
0700	0	0	0	0	0	0
1000	0	1	1	1	1	0
1600	0	0	1	0	1	0
2200	0	0	1	0	1	0

KERMANSHAH

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0000	6	0	0	0	0	0
0300	4	0.5	5	2	1	1
0600	7	0	2	0	1	1
0900	5	1	6	3	2	0
1200	6	1	5	3	1	0
1500	8	4	13	9	5	2
1800	4	1	2	1	1	1
2100	5	2	3	2	1	1

KERMANSHAH

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0300	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.5
0600	3	0	1	0	0	0
0900	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	0
1500	0.5	0	0	0.5	0	0
2100	0	0	0	0.5	0	0

ABADAN

	% Freq Vsby < 6 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0000	5	14	21	15	7	3
0300	6	11	17	9	6	6
0600	19	12	27	24	14	25
0900	20	14	26	17	11	11
1200	19	23	30	27	12	11
1500	20	36	35	30	18	9
1800	18	33	31	28	15	8
2100	9	23	26	20	9	3

ABADAN

	% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles					
	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
0300	1	0.5	2	1	1	4
0600	4	2	4	3	1	8
0900	5	3	7	2	2	2
1500	7	17	18	13	8	3
2100	1	5	8	7	4	1

*Handwritten mark*

SITUATION CLIMATIC BRIEF

TURKEY

APRIL - MAY

1. GENERAL. This season is generally characterized by decreasing cloudiness and precipitation, and mild temperatures. Locations in central Turkey normally experience their greatest precipitation amounts and highest thunderstorm frequencies during these months. Morning minimum temperatures range from the mid 40's (F) in the interior to 50-60F on the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea Coasts to 10-14 days on the Black Sea Coast. Thunderstorms occur on 2-5 days per month along the coasts and 5-8 days per month in the interior. The Sirocco, a hot, dry, dust-laden wind originating in North Africa, occurs most frequently in these months.

2. FLYING WEATHER. Flying weather is generally good. Ceiling/visibility is less than 5000/6 15-25% of the time and less than 1500/3 1-2% of the time. Ceiling/visibility less than 500/1 is rare in Turkey during these months. Icing can be expected above the freezing level in the stratified cloudiness and thunderstorms that accompany migratory low pressure systems. Mountain wave turbulence can be expected occasionally, but data on its frequency are not available.

3. RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER. Reconnaissance weather is generally fair to poor. The mean number of days with cloud cover 2/8 or less ranges from 5-15 days along the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea Coasts to 0-8 days over interior Turkey. Maximum cloudiness tends to occur during the early afternoon. Visibility is usually good except along portions of the Black Sea Coast where fog can be a problem.

4. TERMINAL WEATHER. Terminal weather is generally good. Samsun on the Black Sea Coast has more cloudiness than the other terminals. Ceiling/visibility less than 300/1 is very

Distribution: OJCS/J-36  
 AF/XOOOX, OLA  
 USAFETAC/CBD/ENO  
 SWW/DNC  
 SWS/DO  
 Det 3, SWS/CC

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*DDO NMC*  
*22 Jun 92*  
 Classified By: *DJSDA*  
 Declassified ON: *OADR*

See Atch 1

rare at any location. Crosswinds are greater than 15 knots 5-10% of the time except at Izmir where they are greater than 15 knots 15-25% of the time. Crosswinds are generally strongest in the mid and late afternoon. Ankara and Izmir usually experience their highest thunderstorm frequency of the year in May.

5. EXPOSURE WEATHER. Most locations are partly cloudy to cloudy with mild temperatures and moderate amounts of precipitation.

	SAMSUN		ANKARA		ADANA	
	APR	MAY	APR	MAY	APR	MAY
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	99	99	89	94	98	106
MEAN MAXIMUM	59	66	63	72	74	83
MEAN MINIMUM	46	53	40	49	52	59
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	28	37	19	32	32	45
PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	2.1	1.7	1.3	2.0	1.8	2.0
# DAYS RAINFALL	12	13	10	12	8	6
# DAYS SNOWFALL	*	0	*	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	3	2	6	3	5

\* = LESS THAN 0.5 DAY

6. PARADROP WEATHER. Paratrop weather is generally poor during the mid and late afternoon due to winds in excess of 13 knots. The percent frequency that winds exceed 13 knots during the mid and late afternoon ranges from 30-50% except at Izmir where it ranges from 50-70% of the time.

7. TRAFFICABILITY. Large portions of Turkey have a cone index (CI) rating of 76-150 (soil will support most all-wheel drive trucks, a number of trailered vehicles, heavy tanks and most helicopters). About 30% of the area has a CI rating greater than 150 (soil will support most surface vehicles and helicopters). Large sections along the Black Sea Coast have a CI rating of 46-75 (soil will support vehicles with low contact pressures). Mountain passes above 4000-6000 feet may still be blocked with snow at this time of year.

8. PORT/BEACH CONDITIONS. Winds exceeding 16 knots are experienced in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas 10-20% of the time. Gale force winds occur about 5% of the time in April decreasing to 1% of the time in May.

Amphibious craft or small boats may encounter rough seas 1-5% of the time in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, and 5-10% of the time in the Black Sea. Wind speed data are not available for the Black Sea, but the incidence of rough seas indicates that gale force winds may be common there.

9. ASTRONOMICAL DATA. Incirlik (Adana), Turkey.

Civil Twilight (Local Time)	APR	MAY
	15	15
First Light	0438	0502
Last Light	1839	1908

G [REDACTED] Capt, USAF  
DOD Weather Liaison Officer  
Pentagon Telephone: 697-1638

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SITUATION CLIMATIC BRIEF

TURKEY

APRIL - MAY

EXPOSURE WEATHER.

	BALISKESIR		CAKMAKLI		CORLU		KOSEKOY IZMI	
	APR	MAY	APR	MAY	APR	MAY	APR	MAY
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM	95	97	86	88	86	88	86	86
MEAN MAXIMUM	68	76	62	70	62	70	64	72
MEAN MINIMUM	44	51	46	54	46	54	47	55
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	28	36	32	37	32	37	34	41
PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.95	1.70	.96	1.11	.96	1.11	2.35	1.67
# DAYS RAINFALL@	4	4	2	3	2	3	4	3
# DAYS SNOWFALL	*	*	0	0	0	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3
% FREQ LES 5000/5	31	27	40	35	40	35	42	38
% FREQ LES 1500/3	4	4	12	10	12	10	9	7

\* = LESS THAN 0.5 DAY

@ = OR GREATER THAN 0.1 INCHES

EXPOSURE WEATHER. Increased frequency of thunderstorm activity noted during month of May for these four locations.

	ERHAC		ERZURUM		ESKISEHIR AB		ORTAKOY	
	APR	MAY	APR	MAY	APR	MAY	APR	MAY
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM	84	91	68	77	88	90	79	84
MEAN MAXIMUM	66	75	50	61	64	71	60	69
MEAN MINIMUM	44	51	33	41	39	47	46	54
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	21	34	5	21	21	30	32	39
PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.98	1.84	1.61	3.33	1.36	2.31	1.66	1.56
# DAYS RAINFALL@	4	4	3	6	3	4	3	3
# DAYS SNOWFALL	*	0	*	*	*	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	3	6	2	7	3	7	2	5
% FREQ LES 5000/5	36	27	42	39	39	35	25	19
% FREQ LES 1500/3	5	2	9	5	3	2	5	2

\*=LESS THAN 0.5 DAY

@=OR GREATER THAN 0.1 INCHES

NOTE: 1. Last two entries for Exposure Weather are ceiling/visibility criteria measured in feet/miles respectively.

2. Exposure Weather for Adana and Ankara in primary Situation Climatic Brief.

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6-362

MONTH APRIL 1980 YEAR

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Good LIGHT BUILDING - ENDS ON 12 <sup>th</sup>						0905 DARK MOON 0330-0500
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Poor Light						
20	21	22	23	24	25	26 *
MOON Light building Good for 3-4 DAY OPTION						
27	28	29	30	1	2	
CARRIES through until 2-3 MAY 1980						

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Intelligence Historical Report

Subject: ~~(S)~~ Executive Summary For Weather Support to American Hostage Rescue Efforts.

Time Frame: (U) November 1979 - December 1980.

Purpose: (U) The attached reports describe the scope of weather support provided to the Joint Task Force 1-79 and [redacted] concerned with the American hostages in Iran during this period. Each of the eight reports addresses a separate issue or portion of support relevant to the planning, exercises, rescue attempt and subsequent events. To gain a full appreciation of the depth of support and the problems encountered one needs to review the complete series of reports.

Recommendations: ~~(U)~~ Planners and operational personnel need to closely coordinate with their staff weather officer through all phases of the planning cycle, mission implementation, and post evaluation to enhance the probability of success. The key point to stress for future efforts is the absolute necessity of a resident staff weather officer dedicated to the support effort to be incorporated into the planning/operational staff in a full-time status.

Summary: ~~(S)~~ Weather played a key role in the planning and execution phases of the American Military Rescue Attempt on 24 April 1980 and subsequent efforts by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J2 Personnel Involved: [redacted] USAF/XOOOX, AV227-1638.

Attachments:

1. [redacted]
2. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Acquisition and Deployment of Meteorological Equipment to FOL.
3. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Exercise Weather Support, Pre Raid.
4. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Exercise Weather Support, Post Raid.
5. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Climatological Planning Data.
6. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Meteorological Satellite Shortfalls.
7. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Remote Tactical Weather Sensors.
8. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 22 Jun 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM Multiphase

Subject: Acquisition and Deployment of Meteorological Equipment To FOL

Time Frame: Jan - Apr 80

Acronyms:

- 1. DMSP - Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
- 2. TWAC - Tactical Weather Analysis Center
- 3. DSTE - Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report reviews the initial taskings, the subsequent plans, coordination, acquisition and deployment of meteorological support equipment to a Forward Operating Location (FOL)

2. ~~(TS)~~ The Joint Task Force (JTF) Staff Weather Officer (SWO)

*E* was tasked on 7 Jan 80 to prepare plans for a deployment to [redacted] to support the COMJTF. He began initial communication resource planning with the JTF Communications Officer at this time. See attachment 1 - After Action Report, 7-10 Jan 80 portion for more details about initial contacts, taskings and planning.

*G* 3. ~~(TS)~~ On 9 Jan 80 Lt Col [redacted] tasked the JTF SWO to prepare a paper describing the current weather support in the Pentagon and how we would envision FOL weather support. Attachment 2, presented to MG Gast on 10 Jan 80, outlines the initial plans for deployment

*E* to [redacted]

*4* ~~(TS)~~ In late January, after a Fort Bragg conference where weather was highlighted as being more critical to the operation than originally thought, the JTF SWO was tasked to prepare a fact sheet describing a FOL at [redacted]. This led to the development

*E* of a deployment package with TWAC, DSTE and DMSF equipment as opposed to simple autodin, secure phone, and teletype traffic at [redacted]. See attachment 3, fact sheet, 28 Jan 80.

5. (U) (TS) During February and March a great deal of coordination occurred between the JTF SWO; HQ Air Weather Service (AWS); HQ Air Force Communications Command (AFCC); 2049 CIG/LGK at McClellan AFB, CA; and 2044 CG/LGM2 in the Pentagon. HQAWS arranged for an equipment modification of the Mark III contingency DMSP van at McClellan to receive NOAA satellites due to failing DMSP satellite capabilities. The JTF SWO worked through both HQ AFCC and local 2044 CG personnel to verify acquisition of required operational supplies and support equipment before deployment from McClellan AFB. HQAWS selected a DMSP Satellite Officer from Air Force Global Weather Central, [redacted] and two backups with passports, clearances and shot records to accompany the DMSP vans to FOL for additional weather support manpower.

6. (U) (TS) During this same period the JTF SWO coordinated with Lt Col [redacted] JTF Communications Officer; Lt Col [redacted], JTF Transportation Officer; and [redacted] HQ AWS Action Officer to set up arrangements for acquisition of TWAC and DSTE equipment, and their deployment to FOL. This required an evaluation by HQ AWS of the TWAC for FOL use and subsequent addition of EURFAX compatible facsimile machines with supplies by AFCC; the development of a contingency communication weather package for transmission from Croughton AB, England Automated Digital Weather Switch to the FOL; the tasking for AFCC and DCA to provide a dedicated full-duplex communication link from Croughton to the FOL via satellite for the TWAC and DSTE operations; the acquisition of the DSTE and support personnel from Robbins AFB, GA; and the load planning for C-5 deployment from conus to FOL.

7. (TS) On Mar 23rd the JTF SWO and DMSP Satellite Officer deployed from conus locations via C-5 containing DMSP, DSTE, TWAC and all support personnel. Attachment 4, 12 Apr 80, describes the set up of the DMSP

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Site 12 at FOL. Attachment 5 highlights some problems encountered with the TWAC reception capabilities.

Comments:

1. (U) OPSEC limited coordination efforts between key agencies as only a small group of individuals were allowed to make all the decisions required for selection and deployment of equipment. This bypassed normal channels of communications or set procedures leading to a lot of confusion, extra research efforts to acquire information already available in proper channels, and possible errors in judgment.

2. (U) Lack of antenna receipt capabilities limited acquisition of known meteorological facsimile products from foreign meteorological centers in the Europe - Middle East region.

Recommendations:

1. (U) Evaluate the use of portable Mark IV DMSP C-130 deployable vans with remote readout capabilities for future efforts. (These vans first became available the fall of 1980)

2. (U) Investigate the development of more reliable antenna receipt capabilities by the TWAC or other futuristic meteorological communication equipment used in bare base sites.

Other Related Items: See reports on Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls, Meteorological Satellite Shortfalls, and Remote Tactical Weather Sensors.

J2 Personnel Involved: [REDACTED] AF/XOOOX, A227-1638.

Point of Contacts:

3  
1. [REDACTED] HQ AWS/ DOJ (Directorate of Readiness), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4911.

2. [REDACTED], HQ AFCC/LGMKS (DMSP Management), Scott AFB, IL, A638-2580.

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3. ~~TOP SECRET~~ AFGWC/WFM (DMSP Operations), Offutt AFB,

NE, A271-5451.

Attachments:

1. ~~(S)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> After Action Report, Weather Annex, 8 - 10 Jan 80.  
Weather Support Activities to the Joint Task Force Planning Group.
2. ~~(S)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> Weather Support Concept Paper, 10 Jan 80.
3. ~~(S)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> Weather Support Concept Paper, 28 Jan 80.
4. (U) After Action Report for the Setting Up of the Site 12  
Transtern, 12 Apr 80.
5. ~~(S)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> Notes on TWAC and DSTE Operations, 26 Apr 80.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

WEATHER ANNEX

8-10 Jan 80 - I prepared a message to AFGWC documenting the station list requirements and sent it before the morning briefing. I presented the morning weather briefing to the two Major Generals. The station list had not arrived from Offutt yet, so we arranged to meet again when I had it ready. I worked again today with the C-130 group trying to get their routes and heights above ground determined. By the end of the day we had the initial routes set-up, coordinates selected, and codes, so I prepared and sent the message requirement for wind route bulletin XXI to AFGWC for support to begin on 9th. AFGWC forwarded the station list to me by mid-day. I prepared a typed listing of the observation stations, both surface and upper air, and prepared maps visually depicting their locations. I presented the list and maps to both generals in the afternoon and briefed them on the sparsity of meteorological information in the Middle East. In particular I pointed out the lack of data in the country of Iran where the number of reliable stations has dwindled to only three 24-hour a-day stations since the Iranian revolution. The sparsity of data in the desert areas is quite evident in the map display, especially for the helicopter route. As of this date there are only 16 other reporting stations in the country of Iran that provide some observations and these are primarily only daylight reports with little or no data at night or on weekends. There are eight upper air stations in Iran that have a pretty good record for reporting. Kerman is the only one near the helicopter route leaving the vast majority of the desert region without any wind data to prepare forecasts for the helicopter bulletin. This is also quite evident in the map display. Presented morning briefing to Lt Col. [REDACTED] and Col. [REDACTED] Chief of Staff. Provided first C-130 bulletin XXI to the C-130 planning group. [REDACTED] gave me a new requirement to prepare a paper describing the current weather support in the Pentagon as opposed to how it would work in the field at a FOL, i.e. what weather information do we currently receive at AFGWC to prepare weather support, where does our climatological data come from, how does the information flow to the Pentagon, how long does it take to prepare the data for presentation to the customer, what confidence factors do we have for our forecasts, how would we provide weather to a FOL, and how would we disseminate the information to other locations in the Middle East for the FOL. I called AFGWC to discuss requirement with the Chief of Special Operations. He set out to obtain detailed information for me to plug into the paper, while I continued working on writeup format. I was called upstairs to see Col Kyle; they had changes to the C-130 bulletin already. They changed the time block slightly, altered the routes, and added a refueling area with different altitudes. I coordinated these changes with AFGWC and sent documenting message. By the end of the day I had the paper pretty well written describing the different weather support scenerios. AFGWC did not have forecast confidence figures for that region, so gave reliability figures for the reconnaissance forecasts for that region as a first guess. The figures given were approved at the command level at AFGWC as this was a highly unusual request. First wind verification bulletin for route XIX arrived today for forecast made for the 8th of January.

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10JAN 80

Presented the morning briefing to the two Major Generals again and gave them the paper on weather support scenerio's. We went over the paper line by line discussing how and why things are done; MGen Gast asked me to add clouds and visibility comments on the route forecasts, which I coordinated with AFGWC to begin the following day. Lt Col [redacted] tasked me to provide another weather officer or senior NCO from AWS resources to be here by the 15 - 16th for in-brief. The individual should be an experienced meteorologist with Middle East experience preferred. He gave me the name of Maj [redacted] at 12WS in Colorado as a likely candiate, whom MGen Gast had recommended. I received [redacted] approval to call BGen Kaehn, Commander of AWS for the selection of this individual. I called BGen Kaehn to pass the tasking. BGen Kaehn stated that [redacted] had been in Iran but not as a meteorologist. BGen Kaehn would prefer to select an individual from AFGWC resources who knows the capability of the central to provide support. I gave him [redacted] authorization to select whomever, but to keep OPSEC in mind, use face-to-face contact or secure phone contact for negotiation. I checked with AFGWC to arrange for top level discussions with BGen Kaehn by key command elements. BGen Kaehn and staff selected [redacted] at AFGWC. BGen Kaehn asked for permission to brief CINCMAC of tasking and the support that AWS was providing. I coordinated request with Lt Col [redacted] and received his approval for briefing to CINCMAC with qualification that BGen Kaehn was to mention that AWS support was associated with support being done by MAC Special Operations with the connection being the name of a specific contact individual in that group.

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*Drafted Lin Sheet  
on 10 Jan 80*

Weather Information.

(S) 1. All weather forecast information is derived from a select group of individuals at the Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) at Offutt AFB, NE.

- 05-07Z*
- a. Satellite data - DMSP ~~07-09Z~~ daily
  - b. Weather observations - 00Z plus available 03Z
  - c. Upper air soundings (RAOB's) - 00Z
  -  same as conventional currently
  - e. AIREPS - random

2. Climatological information is obtained either locally in our own resource library or obtained from USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center (USAFETAC) at Scott AFB, IL.

Information flow from AFGWC to Pentagon.

1. Overall Middle East and Iran forecasts are initiated at 00Z. The forecaster reviews the last 24hrs of data and computerized progs for the region. A hand analysis of the region is prepared every three hours to check the accuracy of the computerized products. The 00Z data base becomes available in an analysis form and in progs between 05-0600Z. Based upon the latest and most reliable data base the forecaster fine tunes his impression of what is to occur for the next 24 hours out to 10 days. The forecaster prepares a written draft between 06-0700Z and has it in final form on DD Form 173 for communication center normally by 0800Z. Depending upon backlog in the com center the message will arrive in the Pentagon somewhere between 0845 and 1130Z.

*G*  
*All Weather Collection* - *Called Hq AFGWC for addition to bulletin XIX & XX*  
2. Route wind forecasts. These are prepared for transmission out of AFGWC by 09-10Z and arrive at the Pentagon between 10-12Z. They use the 00Z data base to prepare these route bulletins.

3. Satellite photos. These photos are shipped daily to the Pentagon over a dedicated circuit to a unique Digital Facsimile System between 08-1100Z.

Weather preparation for customer.

1. It takes approximately 2½ - 3 hours to prepare package of information for delivery to customer currently due to inclusion of United States forecast package. Present delivery time varies between 1330-1400Z.

Confidence figures in forecasts.

- 1. The following information was coordinated with AFGWC.
  - a. Short-range forecasts: 24-48 hours - 75-80%
  - b. Medium-range forecasts: 3-5 days - 65%
  - c. Long-range forecasts: 6-10 days - 55%

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TASK FORCE WEATHER SUPPORT

(c) AFGWC will provide Autodin message traffic with all weather forecasts. Weather observations from the Middle East need to be obtained locally via teletype circuit. The Croughton, England Automated Weather Network (AWN) center will have to transmit required weather observations to the communications site in [REDACTED]. Coordination with Lt Col [REDACTED] indicates the teletype circuit is already in place for use by Navy personnel stationed there. I need to coordinate requirement for specified blocks of data and frequency of transmission. AFGWC will provide the following information:

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Bulletin XVII - Weather analysis, every six hours.

Bulletin XII - 1-10 Day forecast for Middle East including [REDACTED] Iran and [REDACTED]

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Bulletin XIX - Route wind forecast for helicopters.

Bulletin XXI - Route wind forecast for C-130's including refueling areas.

Note: Bulletin XII also contains forecasts for point locations - Teheran [REDACTED]. This can be adjusted to [REDACTED] Gulf of Oman, and [REDACTED] quite easily. The bulletin also contains wind and turbulence forecasts out to 48 hours for Iran and the Persian Gulf.

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(c) Dissemination of Weather Information from [REDACTED] and Carriers.

Weather information should arrive between 9-1100Z in Greece from Offutt. The information can be turned around within less than two hours for retransmission to [REDACTED] and Carriers for launch decision. Information will be passed either by autodin or secure voice.

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Weather briefing can be presented to Task Force Commander informally or formally within minutes after receipt of messages from AFGWC, formally taking longer to prepare slides or typed material.

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WEATHER SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR TASK FORCE

1. BARE BASE REQUIREMENTS- AUTODIN AND SECURE PHONE.

PROVIDE PREFORMATTED WEATHER INFORMATION TO DESCRIBE CURRENT WEATHER, FORECAST WEATHER, AND ROUTE WINDS FOR ENTIRE MISSION.

3 2. VARIOUS EXPANDED WEATHER SUPPORT OPTIONS:

A. ADD TELETYPE CIRCUIT TO RECEIVE

1. OBSERVATIONS OF WEATHER OCCURRING
2. FORECASTS FROM INDIGENOUS LOCATIONS
3. FORECAST BULLETINS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL FOR REGIONAL MOVEMENT OF WEATHER SYSTEMS.

B. ADD FACSIMILE CIRCUIT TO PROVIDE WEATHER CHARTS FOR AREA OF CONCERN

C. DEPLOY A DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM (DMSP) CONTINGENCY VAN INTO THE FORWARD LOCATION FOR DIRECT READOUT OF CURRENT WEATHER AS SEEN BY THE SATELLITE. DMSP VAN SUPPORTED BY SUPPLY VAN AND GENERATOR TRAILER.

3. ADDITION OF SUPPORT OPTIONS ABOVE REQUIRE MATERIAL AND MANPOWER SUPPORT, I.E. TELETYPE TERMINALS, FACSIMILE EQUIPMENT, EXPENDABLE SUPPLIES, MAINTENANCE FOR A 1 OFFICER AND 7 NCO'S FOR DEPLOYMENT OF VANS TO INCLUDE GENERATORS REQUIRING DIESEL FUEL TO SUPPLY UNINTERRUPTED POWER FOR SATELLITE TRACKING. SETTING UP A SMALL WEATHER STATION FOR OBSERVING CHANGING WEATHER ELEMENTS OVER A 24-HOUR PERIOD FOR SEVERAL DAYS REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL WEATHER FORECASTER TO ASSIST THE PRIMARY OFFICER IN CHARGE.

Briefed Lt Col Vaught & Last 28 Jan 80  
Copy given to Col [redacted] 28 Jan 80

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FROM: AFGWC MSC (Major [REDACTED] 45451)

12 Apr 80

SUBJ: After Action Report for the Setting-Up of the Site 12 Transponder

TO: AFGWC/DO

1. Description of Duties: Meteorological Satellite Coordinator (MSC) with the Site 12 MARK III Transponder (TTS).

2. Timetable of significant events:

FIRST DAY: After a local noon arrival, the TTS, supply van and generator trailer were offloaded. Initial site surveyed for TTS determined to be unsatisfactory due to obstructions to north and west; soft sand; and proximity to communications transmitters. Some deliberation followed and the result was an excellent location on a concrete hardstand. While moving the trailers to the hardstand, trouble was experienced with the brakes on all three units. The process of unbraking was awkward and frustrating. Repeated attempts and swapping of air hoses finally brought success. (The air system from the tractor may have been the source of the problem.) A short-notice, high priority requirement was received to have the antenna pedestal and dish mounted by 9 o'clock the following morning. Local crane and crew were obtained to speed the mounting of the pedestal atop the TTS. Pedestal was in position shortly after dark. Generator's performance proved unsatisfactory; one LIT-15 couldn't be started because of a stuck relay; and, the other ran OK but the frequency of the three phases remained unstable. A lighting cart and drop cord light were borrowed from the ACE unit for illumination to aid unpacking during the night.

SECOND DAY: Antenna dish that had been assembled during the darkness was mounted at first light, while the winds were light. Feedhorn was bolted on later in the morning. By mid morning, winds were southerly 20-25 gusting 38 knots with visibility greatly reduced by blowing sand. Generator power was still unreliable. Air conditioner in TTS failed after intake screen plugged with dirt and sand. Air conditioner maintenance got unit going again. Maximum temperature for the day peaked at 100°F. Supply van unpacking continued.

THIRD DAY: Winds switched to northwest 10-15 knots during the night and visibility improved—sandstorm abated. 48 hours had passed since arrival when first DMSP F-4 (FTV 15539) imagery processed successfully. Power supply was unstable and effected sweep alignment. Wide angle phase demodulator unit for TIROS-N reception could not be located. Requested McClellan to send one. Borrowed extra generator (LIT-15 series) so the generators (LIT-15 series) could be worked on.

FOURTH DAY: Beautiful weather finally. Three passes (real time directs) expected this day from F-4, however western pass was not available due to command unlink impossible in darkness on the other side of the world. Message sent to AFGWC/AFCS stating site 12 requirements for real time directs. The F-4 data that was copied was of excellent quality and hardcopies (TPL110) were provided to the base forecaster. Arrangements were made for hard copies to be provided daily.

FIFTH DAY: Tracked two F-4 passes but had video problems which were later corrected by reseating a loose card in the Block V.

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SIXTH DAY: Two-pass day for F-4 and data quality was excellent.

SEVENTH DAY: Lost first F-4 pass due to tracking calculation error. Rapid recal-  
culation allowed recovery of the second pass. TIROS-N wide angle phase demodu-  
lator arrived. Subsequently, the 1520 cards in the A-4 drawer was noted as missing  
--fortunately identical cards for the GDS circuitry was available and repositioned  
to make the TIROS-N circuits complete. Selector switch for five channel TIROS-N  
capability defective on two positions. Switch was quickly repaired. Air condi-  
tioner compressor section failed which prevented evening satellite readouts.

EIGHTH DAY: First full coverage of both EREP and TIROS-N spacecraft. Quality of  
all images was excellent. Site was fully operational. (The air conditioner and  
generator failures remained with us. Backup generator stayed at the site while  
work continued on the ENU-15s. Air conditioner limped along while parts were  
being flown in for repair of the compressor section.)

### 3. Critique and Recommendations.

a. ENU-15 generators: Although these units were certified before shipment,  
the question that should have been addressed by the certifying individuals was,  
"can they operate for sustained periods of time without extensive maintenance?"  
One ENU-15 ran OK but had a frequency problem. It wouldn't settle down. The  
second ENU-15 had a hung relay in the safety circuitry that had to be bypassed  
for starting. After running awhile, this generator began throwing oil. (Also  
upon initial inspection, one of the output cables had a split in the insulation  
which could have allowed the wire to contact the frame.) Some of the criticism  
levied against the ENU-15s follows: unstable power under varying load condi-  
tions, hydraulic governor which is speed sensing rather than load sensing, anti-  
quated (servicing personnel were unfamiliar with the unit) and overly complex  
safety circuitry, and excessive physical size and weight. Recommend a smaller  
four stroke diesel (MTech series) or turbine generator (AEU24-9) to replace the  
ENU-15 on the TTS. If the ENU-15's are to be continued, a qualified maintenance  
person should accompany the generators to insure their operation. *MEP was included  
in equipment for backup and testing as a future replacement for the ENU's.*

b. Air Conditioner: This unit was described as difficult to maintain. Rec-  
ommend a portable unit be supplied that could be set up and maintained separately  
from the TTS. Also, a qualified air conditioner maintenance person should accom-  
pany the TTS to insure correct operation. (It should be noted that it was one  
refrigeration man's opinion that the failure on the eighth day of the compressor  
section could have been related to the sustained usage of unstable generator  
power.)

NOTE: Tactical/contingency equipment should be of the highest quality so opera-  
tions are not plagued with uncertainties about equipment failure. Especially in  
remote areas, neither the parts nor the extra experienced personnel are available  
to rebuild these units.

c. Status of the site L2 TTS: It appeared that this TTS had several roles.  
It was the contingency van, the prototype/mock-up van, and the training van.  
Under this concept of operations, it was understandable how equipment such as  
the wide angle phase demodulator and cards from the A-4 drawer would be missing.  
If the present concept of operations for the TTS is to continue, recommend that  
in the future the HSC be present to certify the van as operational before it is  
packed up.

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d. Electrical grounding of the site: It was found that an electrical ground was almost impossible to obtain due to the high resistance of the soil. A 19-20 volt potential was measured where a reading of millivolts was expected. (One suggestion was to dig a pit, fill it with charcoal and salt, and frequent waterings would complete the job.) Recommend that vans be supplied with alternate procedures and materials for establishing a good electrical ground in areas where high soil resistance is present.

e. Overcurrent Protection Circuitry: The initial set up of the Block V equipment was complicated by the 28 volt power supply, overcurrent protection circuit. Finally the overcurrent circuit was adjusted above tolerances to allow for routine operation. (In retrospect this was the same solution that was applied years ago at the Guam DMSP site.) Recommend that this protective circuitry on the power supply be examined by the shop to determine if a design is necessary or a change to the T.O. would be appropriate, or both.

f. TIROS-N Channel Selector: The presence of a selector switch which allowed access to any of the five channels of High Resolution Picture Transmission (HRPT) from the TIROS-N spacecraft proved invaluable. Of particular importance were the two channels in the visual spectrum—one channel enhanced cloud while the other heightened land-water contrast which was essential for precision gridding of the transparencies. Recommend that the Block V racks that have received the TIROS-N modification also acquire the five channel capability. This capability is already being designed into the AFSC/ADCS equipment.

g. TIROS-N Visual Imagery: Due to the reduced signal level within the range of voltage available, a brilliance inversion ((310x2)INV) setting was used. This made the "washed out" images sharp and crisp with an excellent black-to-white contrast. Recommend this setting be used as a first guess when higher contrast images are desired.

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h. Tracking Calculations: Two items were needed to supplement the excellent tracking software that was worked up by SCIT [redacted]. These were the microfiche nodal summary for DMSP vehicles and a plotting board for earth central angles which allow azimuth and elevation to be determined manually without computer assistance. Recommend future checklists include these items so they will arrive with the TTS.

i. Lighting: Because of the importance of getting a TTS operational as soon as possible on location, adequate lighting was essential for unpacking and assembling equipment during the hours of darkness. Recommend that the security lights be packed last so that they are one of the first items available upon unpacking. Two security lights would be adequate; four would be ideal. Also a set of drop cord lights should be included for close work (i.e., generator/air conditioning repairs, antenna assembly, etc.).

j. Paper hardcopies: The one roll of TPL101 for copies of satellite imagery was old and unusable. Fortunately, sheets of hardcopy TPL110 were available, although a roll was preferable since the length of the images vary considerably within the station circle. A replacement roll of TPL110 was requested from another site which expressed difficulty in acquiring any more through supply channels. (In retrospect, the availability of this high quality paper (TPL101 and now TPL110) has been a problem for several years). Because of the excellent gray scale response of this paper, it could retain the detail

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of the original transparency for picture interpretation, briefing, or retransmission. Normal black image paper lost too much detail. Recommend that the DMSP system manager (Sm-mc) handle TPL10 as a special item. They could work with AFCC/ADCS, who currently obtains TPL10 in rolls. The vendor only took up semi-annually to meet bulk requirements. If this is not within reason, an acceptable substitute paper should be identified and made available.

k. Billeting and Messing: Use of the supply van/TTS complex as an operational site and living quarters was undesirable. Although it was advantageous to have technicians close by to handle equipment problems, it was unsettling to have the site double as a housing/relaxation area. The crisp distinction between operational and billeting/messing functions was needed. Recommend that TTS facilities and living quarters not be colocated. Only when there are absolutely no billeting/messing facilities available should this distinction between these two important and separate functions be blurred.

4. In summary (and most important of all) the cooperation and performance of the McClellan and Team [redacted] were outstanding. Only by their personal sacrifice, "can-do" spirit, and noteworthy extra efforts could the site have been established in so short a time. Also the site NOICs [redacted] handling of the interface and integration into the base communication service structure was absolutely outstanding. In this regard, not enough can be said in praise for the support provided by the host AFCC personnel and their OIC, particularly with respect to the ailing generators and air conditioning.

SIGNED

[redacted] USAF  
Meteorological Satellite Coordinator

Cy to: AHS/DO [redacted]  
- Det 2, HQ AHS [redacted]  
HQ AFCC/LMHS [redacted]

[redacted]

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### Notes on TWAC and DSTE Operations

1. The TWAC facsimile product was limited due to capability of the installed HF whip antenna. The HF antenna was only able to receive EURFAX and Cairo products. All attempts to reach other stations were fruitless. The whip antenna is an omni-directional antenna with low gain. We attempted to acquire Rota, Spain; Guam; Ankara, Turkey; Rome; Italy; Nairobi, Kenya; New Delhi, India; Paris, France; and Khabarook and Moskva, USSR.
2. We requested the maintenance technician to try a dipole antenna. This antenna is directional, receiving in two directions at once, however the gain is only slightly better than the whip antenna. The receipt capability for Cairo was improved, but we still could not obtain other stations.
3. A third step was then taken after consulting with the communications engineer. The technicians constructed a vertical half rhombic antenna, a highly directional antenna receiving in only one direction. The antenna has a gain of about 6db. The antenna was oriented 295° to intercept Rota, Spain. The result was reception of the Rota products with minimum fading/interference, but the quality of the product was quite poor due to the omnidirectional broadcast mode of the Rota facsimile station. This antenna required a lot of ground space to install. Our communication site was congested making it difficult to reorient the directional cable for receipt of other stations. The vertical height of the tower for this antenna was 48 feet with 500 feet of cable used to establish the antenna.
4. The DSTE support was excellent after we were able to get the equipment operational. No significant problems encountered with equipment or personnel. Both TWAC and DSTE traffic were limited at times due to environmental interference between satellite and conus.

Originally prepared on 26 Apr 80 in hand written notes by JTF SWO.

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Subject: Exercise Weather Support, Part 1

Time Frame: Dec 79 - Apr 80

Summary:

1. ~~(U)~~ Purpose: This report highlights the types of exercise weather data requested by the JTF staff planners and transmitted to the field during this period in addition to the normal daily weather discussion briefings for the east coast and <sup>south</sup> southwest desert areas of the USA.

2. (U) Weather support to the five exercises during this period began in a rather ad hoc manner, i.e., requested at the last minute for specific information at specified locations. OPSEC constrained coordination of optimum weather support to the exercises, although coordination did improve for the latter exercises as it became increasingly evident to the planners that the impact of weather was critical to the overall mission success. All weather support was coordinated between the [REDACTED] JTF Staff Weather Officer, and the <sup>JTF</sup> planning staff in the Pentagon with no contact between [REDACTED] and the field operators except for weather messages sent to the field.

3. (U) Exercise 1 support for the first weekend of Dec 79 began abruptly with a phone call to [REDACTED] home Friday evening, shortly after a late afternoon confirmation from the planners that no weekend weather support was required. The planner was referred to a secure contact with the Air Force Global Weather Central duty officer for desired weather information. Solar/lunar data was provided early Saturday morning for the Yuma Proving Grounds location to the planners in computer table format similar to the attached solar/lunar data.

4. (U) Exercise 2 at the Nevada Proving Grounds during the [redacted]

G week of 15-19 Jan 80 received a little better weather support due to prior notification of event occurrence. [redacted] prepared a message for field distribution by secure communications in the format specified by planners in addition to local weather briefings for SW desert areas.

5. (U) Exercise 3, during the 26 Jan - 2 Feb 80 period, again at Nevada Proving Grounds, received much more weather support, due to poor weather affecting the entire southern half of the USA, delaying the start of exercise by several days, and greater concern on the part of planning staff about impact of weather. Twice daily weather briefings for both the east and west coasts also included mid-continent refueling area climatology and wind/temperature/turbulence forecasts. Field units were given brief weather text description and message format data.

6. (U) Exercise 4, 21-27 Feb 80, again centered on Yuma Proving Grounds with extensive weather support provided locally to planners through solar/lunar data, daily weather forecasts for first 24hrs, and 10-day outlook trends. Field units received weather table format messages and brief text discussion of weather information by secure means.

7. (C) Exercise 5, 21-26 Mar 80, centered on Indian Springs, NV with extensive weather planning coordination, daily weather briefing support to the planning staff, and messages to the field. LtCol [redacted] was briefed into the staff to provide weather support for this exercise while [redacted] was TDY to [redacted] setting up weather support facility in [redacted]

Comments:

1. (U) Formal climatological evaluations of selected exercise

areas for comparability with Middle East locations were ~~not~~ requested nor developed during this period; somewhat different from Exercise Weather Support, Part 2.

2. (U) It is extremely important for the planner or operator to extensively discuss the exercise (i.e., purpose, types of aircraft, routes, areas of concern, flight levels, times, dates, refueling areas, etc.) with the staff weather officer well in advance of the exercise and as changes are made to the plans to optimally tailor the weather support.

Recommendations: The planners/operators need to closely coordinate with their staff weather officer through all phases of the exercise planning cycle and implementation of mission to insure the best possible weather support and to decrease the chances of mission delay or failure.

Other Related Items: See reports on Meteorological Support Package Development, Climatological Planning Data, and Exercise Weather Support, Part 2.

6 J2 Personnel Involved: ~~████████████████████~~ AF/XOOOX, A227-1638.

Point of Contact:

6 1. ~~████████████████████~~ Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC/WFO), Offutt AFB, NE, A271-6019 (Operational Monitor).

Attachments:

1. (U) Light Data, date irrelevant, Edwards AFB.
2. (U) Lunar Data, date irrelevant, Edwards AFB.
3. (U) Weather Message, 26 Jan 80, Exercise at Nevada Proving Grounds.

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR EDWARDS AFB CA

ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 3454 N

LONGITUDE: 11752 W

ALTITUDE: 00705 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
01 JAN 1981	01/1328	01/1359	01/1430	01/1453	02/0056	02/0119	02/0150	02/0221
02 JAN 1981	02/1328	02/1359	02/1430	02/1453	03/0056	03/0119	03/0151	03/0221
03 JAN 1981	03/1329	03/1359	03/1430	03/1453	04/0057	04/0120	04/0151	04/0222
04 JAN 1981	04/1329	04/1359	04/1430	04/1453	05/0058	05/0121	05/0152	05/0223
05 JAN 1981	05/1329	05/1400	05/1431	05/1453	06/0059	06/0122	06/0153	06/0223
06 JAN 1981	06/1329	06/1400	06/1431	06/1453	07/0100	07/0122	07/0153	07/0224
07 JAN 1981	07/1329	07/1400	07/1431	07/1454	08/0100	08/0123	08/0154	08/0225
08 JAN 1981	08/1329	08/1400	08/1431	08/1454	09/0101	09/0124	09/0155	09/0226
09 JAN 1981	09/1329	09/1400	09/1431	09/1453	10/0102	10/0125	10/0156	10/0226

11752 W  
 3454 N  
 00705 M

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1-1-81

MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR EDWARDS AFB CA

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 3454 N

LONGITUDE 11752 W

ALTITUDE 00705 M

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
12	JAN	1981	012/1919Z	999/9999Z	34
13	JAN	1981	013/1956Z	013/0759Z	45
14	JAN	1981	014/2035Z	014/0905Z	57
15	JAN	1981	015/2117Z	015/1012Z	68
16	JAN	1981	016/2203Z	016/1118Z	78
17	JAN	1981	017/2254Z	017/1222Z	87
18	JAN	1981	018/2350Z	018/1323Z	93
19	JAN	1981	020/0049Z	019/1420Z	98
20	JAN	1981	021/0150Z	020/1511Z	100
21	JAN	1981	022/0251Z	021/1556Z	99
22	JAN	1981	023/0351Z	022/1636Z	97

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THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC WEATHER APPLIES TO NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS FOR THE PERIOD

26-30 JANUARY

<u>(ALL TIMES ZULU)</u>	<u>26 SAT</u>	<u>27 SUN</u>	<u>28 MON</u>	<u>29 TUES</u>	<u>30 WED</u>	<u>31 Thurs</u>
A. Moon Rise	26/2048Z	27/2134Z	28/2223Z	29/2315Z	31/0009Z	01/0104Z
B. Moon Set	27/1100Z	28/1158Z	29/1251Z	30/1340Z	31/1424Z	01/1512Z
C. BMNT	26/1352Z	27/1351Z	28/1351Z	29/1350Z	30/1349Z	31/1349Z
D. EENT	27/0200Z	28/0201Z	29/0202Z	30/0203Z	31/0204Z	01/0205Z
E. Sun Rise	26/1444Z	27/1443Z	28/1442Z	29/1442Z	30/1441Z	31/1440Z
F. Sun Set	27/0108Z	28/0109Z	29/0110Z	30/0111Z	31/0112Z	01/0113Z
G. Illumination	65	75	84	91	96	99
H. Mtn. Temp.	35/58	30/52	26/48	22/44	32/52	
I. Desert Temp.	45/65	40/62	35/55	32/55	42/62	
J. Wind Dir.	W	NW-NE	N-NE	NE	E-SE	
K. Wind Speed	10-15K	10-15K	10-15K	10-15K	5-10K	
L. Wind Chill	Plus 15	Plus 10	Zero	Minus 5	Plus 15	
M. Clds/Vsby.	Clear/7	Broken/3-5	Broken/5	Scat/7	Clear/7	
N. Precipitation	None	Rain/Snow	Chance of	None	None	
			Rain/Snow			

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Intelligence Historical Report

Subject: Exercise Weather Support, Part 2

Time Frame: May - Dec 80

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report highlights support and lessons learned during deployed exercises for the time frame.

2. (U) HONEY BADGER

A. (U) Pre-Deployment (May - June)

(1) (U) Daily and weekly meteorological comparisons of maximum temperature, maximum pressure altitude, and maximum density altitude were made between CONUS test sites and key Middle East locations (copy of this work is an attachment to the historical report on Climatological Planning Data). *This was the first exercise that the comparisons were used.*

(2) (U) Based on preliminary planning a meteorological Mission Control Forecast (MCF) Bulletin from Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) was devised. This bulletin provided data (for not only) sites, but also routes to be used (Centralized Support Bulletin XV - copies were destroyed).

(3) (U) Daily forecasts and light data for selected CONUS test sites were provided to the J3 (see attachment 1).

3  
[redacted] (J2). The test thresholds were to be:

(a) (U) Ceilings less than 1500 feet.

(b) (U) Visibility less than 3 miles.

(c) (U) Moderate or greater turbulence.

(d) (U) Any severe weather phenomena (i.e., floods, freezing precipitation)

(e) (U) Jump winds greater than 13 knots.

(f) (U) Surface winds equal to or greater than 45 knots.

B. (U) Deployment (July)

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(1) (U) A total of eight weather personnel deployed to support this exercise (Major [redacted] one member from the weather support element of the 101st Avn Gp), and six members of the 1st Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT)). All members either operated out of White Sands or Dugway.

(2) (U) Besides MCF bulletins from AFGWC to White Sands and Dugway, weather stations at both locations were used.

(3) (U) Daily weather briefings were given to elements of the 1st SOW by their weather officers and to elements of the 101st Avn Gp by its weather fore-caster.

(4) (U) During the exercise night a SOWT observer deployed with the CCT and took remote observations. These observations were not ~~to be~~ passed to the command and control location <sup>because</sup> ~~unless~~ unforecasted weather conditions <sup>[did not]</sup> developed.

(5) (U) Night Vision Goggles were used for the first time by weather personnel to assist them in taking nighttime observations.

(6) (U) Problems encountered are highlighted in the Comments section of this report.

### 3. (U) POTENT CHARGE (Sep)

#### A. (U) Pre-Deployment

(1) (U) Comparative climatological data were prepared and used to help determine test locations (see attachment 2).

(2) (U) Light data was also provided.

(3) (U) Hurricane Allen was closely monitored for potential problems to training elements prior to the exercise.

(4) (U) Coordination on support for the Navy (F-14 exercise operations) by AFGWC was accomplished.

(5) (U) A MCF bulletin from AFGWC was devised and sent to the Pentagon and Hurlburt Field for exercise support (see attachment 3).

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B. (U) Deployment

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G (1) (U) All weather personnel were at Hurlburt to support the exercise (Major [redacted] and the SOWT).

(2) (U) No weather personnel deployed forward to Reese AFB.

(3) (U) Some logistical problems were encountered (see Comments).

4. (U) POISON DART (Sep)

A. (U) Pre-Deployment

(1) (U) Light data and climatological data for deployment locations provided.

(2) (U) High Frequency propagation forecasts for both the Middle East and CONUS test sites given to the J6.

A (3) (U) Centralized MCF for AWACs (Tinker AFB), Navy F-14s, and ground elements were coordinated. Weather forecasts for [redacted] were to be transmitted by the SOWT at Hurlburt Field at 00Z and 12Z beginning on 26 Sep 80 (see attachment 4). In addition, observations in accordance with the CEOI were also to be passed back from [redacted] site to Hurlburt. However, [redacted] could not be contacted although efforts were made daily to do so.

(4) (U) Like POTENT CHARGE all of the meteorological support was to be provided by the SOWT. However, two member of the SOWT (one officer forecaster and an enlisted observer) were to deploy forward with the helicopters to Ft Hood.

B. (U) Deployment

(1) (U) The weather ~~for the first time in any exercise~~ was a big problem (with this exercise) as a stationary frontal system developed along the Gulf. Moist air pumped over the system caused low ceilings, rain, and thundershower activity which remained a problem for several days (see attachment 5 for synoptic review). These adverse conditions caused most of the exercise to be accomplished in the Hurlburt area (see Comments).

(2) (U) Based on previous exercises an extensive MCF package was developed (see example in attachment 6).

5. (U) STORM CLOUD (Nov)

~~SECRET~~

A. (U) Pre-Deployment

A (1) (U) Extensive meteorological support planning on this exercise with [redacted] and AFGWC.

(2) (U) Situational climatology for the exercise sites for Edwards AFB, CA and Indian Springs, NV were provided. Unfortunately, only the Edwards one was published in the OPlan (a sample in attachment 7).

(3) (U) In addition to the situation climatology an area climatology was also provided to the J3 (see attachment 8).

(4) (U) Light data provided for exercise locations (see attachment 9).

(5) (U) Based on the weather problems experienced during POISON DART a more extensive meteorological pre-deployment watch was initiated (see sample in attachment 10).

B. (U) Deployment

(1) (U) None, exercise cancelled.

(2) (U) Problems are noted in Comments section.

Comments:

G 1. (U) During all exercises Major [redacted] provided in-house support to the planners.

2. (U) HONEY BADGER

A. (U) The largest problem I faced supporting any JTD training exercise was getting the J3 to specifically tell me what was planned. Although I was under J2 control (the interest of the J2 primarily focused on the Middle East weather support), when it came to CONUS exercise support I was thrust over to the J3 with infrequent assistance and guidance at times. This situation gave way to incomplete information and sometimes degraded support.

B. (U) Another large meteorological support problem with this exercise was:

(1) (U) Knowing what unit or system to support, how and when. In all fairness the entire JTD staff element was feeling its way along on this exercise.

(2) (U) Trying to determine the type and number of weather personnel

deployed to the field. Then after finding this out, trying to make contact with them to assist in providing ~~them with~~ a MCF.

C. (U) The secure KY 70 was a big help in the exercise. This aided in obtaining much needed support from AFGWC and the Pentagon.

3. (U) POTENT CHARGE. No real major problems except being kept informed by the J2/J3 elements.

4 B. (U) POISON DART

A. (U) The first problem ~~was~~ in the planning <sup>war</sup> being able to support not only the work in the Pentagon but also providing an experienced planner at Hurlburt.

~~██████████~~ the 1st SOW Staff Weather Officer, was pressed into service and did a very fine job, except <sup>that</sup> he had to split his time between his job and the planning. ~~and~~ <sup>A</sup> also, he did not possess the inside knowledge of the JTD.

B. ~~██████████~~ Communications with ~~██████████~~ were disastrous. They were later appraised of our efforts and problems.

C. (U) Some deficiencies early in the meteorological watch of the exercise areas posed some minor problems that were later adjusted in STORM CLOUD.

5. (U) STORM CLOUD

A. (U) Found out about this exercise by accident.

B. (U) Was not afforded the opportunity to pre-brief expected weather for the exercise locations to the operational commanders.

C. (U) Was not told by JTD that the exercise was cancelled prior to TDY departure time. Fortunately, my ~~██████████~~ counterpart called to warn and stop me.

Recommendations:

1. (U) The main one is "Keep the Weatherman Informed"! Tell <sup>him</sup> ~~his~~ what, how, why, and when is to be supported as soon as possible.

2. (U) Start <sup>intensive</sup> meteorological watch of the exercise or test area at least 2-4 days ahead of time.

3. (U) If possible, get a representative from AFGWC in the planning phase (even a TDY) as soon as productively possible.

4. (U) Construct climatological overviews of exercise (test) locations (like

attachments 7 and/or 8) plus light data as soon as possible.

5. (U) Write a weather support annex or plan for every exercise. Make sure the weather support personnel are identified and that they know their tasks as early as possible.

6. (U) Identify meteorological communications requirements to the J6 as early as possible.

Other Related Items: See topics on Exercise Weather Support, Part 1 and Climatological Planning Data.

J2 Personnel Involved: Major [redacted] A227-1638.

Points of Contact:

- 1. [redacted], AFGWC/WFO, Offutt AFB, NE, A271-6019 (Operational Support Contact)
- 2. [redacted] Staff Weather Officer or Capt [redacted]  
[redacted] Hurlburt Field, FL, A872-6198 or 7348, (Operational Field Support).
- 3. [redacted] AWS/DOJ (Readiness Division), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4911.

Attachments:

- 1. (U) Sample of light data for Dugway, UT
- (U) 2. (S) Station Comparison Data for POTENT CHARGE.
- (U) 3. (S) Sample of the MCF bulletin for POTENT CHARGE-
- (U) 4. (S) POISON DART CEOI (segment for reporting and receiving meteorological data including the centralized forecast), effective 26/1500Z Sep 80.
- 5. (U) POISON DART synoptic weather review (27/04Z, 28/04Z, and 28/23Z).
- (U) 6. (S) Sample of the MCF for POISON DART.
- 7. (U) Sample situation climatic brief for Edwards AFB, CA for November.
- 8. (U) Southern Sierra Nevada Climatology for October-November.
- 9. (U) Graphic light data for Indian Springs, NV (26 Oct - 20 Dec).  
(NOTE: A new display developed for the JTF, 1-79 Support)
- (U) 10. (S) Pre-deployment Meteorological Watch bulletin for STORM CLOUD exercise area.

SUNRISE-SUNSET-TWILIGHT DATA FOR DUGWAY PRV GRND UT

ALL TIMES IN GMT

LATITUDE: 4012 N

LONGITUDE: 11256 W

ALTITUDE: 01326 M

BEGIN TWILIGHT

END TWILIGHT

DATE	ASTRON	NAUTIC	CIVIL	SUNRISE	SUNSET	CIVIL	NAUTIC	ASTRON
10 JUN 1980	10/0959	10/1047	10/1128	10/1153	11/0309	11/0334	11/0415	11/0504
11 JUN 1980	11/0959	11/1047	11/1128	11/1153	12/0309	12/0335	12/0416	12/0504
12 JUN 1980	12/0958	12/1047	12/1128	12/1153	13/0310	13/0335	13/0416	13/0505
13 JUN 1980	13/0958	13/1047	13/1128	13/1153	14/0310	14/0336	14/0417	14/0506
14 JUN 1980	14/0958	14/1047	14/1128	14/1153	15/0311	15/0336	15/0417	15/0506
15 JUN 1980	15/0958	15/1047	15/1128	15/1153	16/0311	16/0337	16/0418	16/0507
16 JUN 1980	16/0958	16/1047	16/1128	16/1153	17/0312	17/0337	17/0418	17/0507
17 JUN 1980	17/0958	17/1047	17/1128	17/1153	18/0312	18/0337	18/0418	18/0508
18 JUN 1980	18/0958	18/1047	18/1128	18/1153	19/0312	19/0338	19/0419	19/0508

SECRET

## MOONRISE/MOONSET DATA FOR DUGWAY PRV GRND UT

ALL TIME IN GMT

LATITUDE 4012 N

LONGITUDE 11256 W

ALTITUDE 01326 M

DAY	MONTH	YEAR	MOONRISE	MOONSET	% ILLUMINATION
10	JUN	1980	162/1040Z	163/0043Z	11
11	JUN	1980	163/1123Z	164/0150Z	5
12	JUN	1980	164/1209Z	165/0254Z	1
13	JUN	1980	165/1301Z	166/0352Z	0
14	JUN	1980	166/1356Z	167/0443Z	2
15	JUN	1980	167/1454Z	168/0529Z	6
16	JUN	1980	168/1553Z	169/0608Z	11
17	JUN	1980	169/1653Z	170/0643Z	18
18	JUN	1980	170/1751Z	171/0714Z	27
19	JUN	1980	171/1848Z	999/9999Z	36
20	JUN	1980	172/1945Z	172/0743Z	45

SECRET

SECRET

# CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA SHEET

STATION: STATION COMPARISON

PERIOD OF RECORD:

DATA:

	① AUG	② AUG	① SEP	② SEP										
1 Vs 9														
Mean Max Temp	102	97	96	90										
Mean PA	1904	4152	1829	3992										
Mean DA	4900	7200	4300	6600										
2 Vs 9	(2)	(9)	(2)	(9)										
Mean Max Temp	89	97	79	90										
Mean PA	1332	4152	1289	3992										
Mean DA	5250	7200	2000	6600										
3 Vs 9	(3)	(9)	(3)	(9)										
Mean Max Temp	98	97	91	90										
Mean PA	927	4152	918	3992										
Mean DA	5500	7200	2200	6600										
4 Vs 10	(4)	(10)	(4)	(10)										
Mean Max Temp	92	97	86	90										
Mean PA	4830	4152	4205	3992										
Mean DA	8000	7200	7800	6600										
5 Vs 11	(5)	(11)	(5)	(11)										
Mean Max Temp	93	90	88	83										
Mean PA	4232	3450	4220	3300										
Mean DA	7200	6000	7000	5700										
6 Vs 12	(6)	(12)	(6)	(12)										
Mean Max Temp	93	113	87	107										
Mean PA	925	524	913	320										
Mean DA	5400	4000	3050	3500										

- REMARKS: Legend
- |                   |                 |                   |                  |
|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1 - Nellis AFB    | 5 - White Sands | 9 - Tehran        | 13 - Rezaiyeh    |
| 2 - McConnell AFB | 6 - Ft. Hood    | 10 - Manzariyeh   | 14 - Semanan New |
| 3 - Mineral Wells | 7 - Dugway      | 11 - Gonabad      |                  |
| 4 - Socorro       | 8 - Cannon AFB  | 12 - Ras Safaniya |                  |

44.2

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

19 SEP 80 20 53

DTTSZYUW RHHWAAA1559 2541855-GRUEAHQA.  
IMMEDIATE  
101849Z SEP 80  
M. AFGVC OFFUTT AFB NE//WF//  
O RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
UCLHUA/DET 75 3 WS HURLBURT FIELD FL  
T-

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-24(U)  
FORECASTS VALID 11/0000Z TO 13/0000Z SEP 80  
SYNOPTIC DISCUSSION...

UPPER HIGH PRESSURE CENTERED OVER CENTRAL AREA2 WITH A SURFACE HIGH  
PRESSURE TO THE N OF AREA2 DOMINATE THE REGION AT THE BEGINNING OF  
THE PERIOD. A WEAK, DIFFUSE FRONTAL BOUNDARY EXTENDS THROUGH NE AREA1  
INTO CENTRAL AREA2, DISSIPATING IN WRN AREA2. THIS BOUNDARY WILL CON-  
TINUE TO WEAKEN THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD, PRODUCING NO SIGNIFICANT WEAT-  
HER. STRONG UPSLOPE, INDUCED BY THE ANTICYCLONIC FLOW AROUND THE  
SURFACE HIGH, IS GENERATING AN EXTENSIVE AREA OF LOW STRATUS, FOG, AND  
MIZZLE WITH ISOLATED IMBEDDED TSTMS IN EXTREME WRN AREA2 AND ERN 1/3  
AREA3.

EXPECT THE SURFACE RIDGE TO WEAKEN AND MOVE E THROUGH THE PERIOD AS  
WEAKENING SHORT WAVE TROUGH TRACKS FROM THE SW SLOWLY PUSHING THE  
RIDGE TO THE S. BY 12/00Z, THE UPPER TROUGH WILL HAVE MOVED TO  
POSITION IN EXTREME WRN AREA3, INDUCING A LEESIDE SURFACE LOW N OF  
EA3, WITH THE ASSOCIATED TROUGHING SWRD. THIS PATTERN WILL CAUSE  
THE UPSLOPE EFFECT TO DIE, CUTTING OFF THE LOW LEVEL MOISTURE, ENDING  
PRECIP ACTIVITY IN AREAS 2 AND 3 BY 12/12Z AND CLEARING OF THE LOW  
CLOUDS BY 12/18Z. EXPECT SCATTERED CONDITIONS TO PREVAIL IN ALL  
AREAS FROM 12/18Z TO 13/00Z.

CL 31 DEC 86  
AS 6

\*\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*

2 HQ AWS VIA X000, ACT

ADV 1

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

ICN=80254/20278 TOR=80254/20462 TAD=80254/20482 CDSN=AFC063

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\* ~~SECRET~~ \*  
.....  
PAGE 01 OF 0100  
101849Z SEP 80



PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

10 SEP 007 21

TTSTGBC RHWWAAA3823 2541949Z RUEAHQA,  
IMMEDIATE  
101949Z SEP 80  
1 AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE  
1 RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
1 CLHUA/DET 75 3WS HURLBURT FLDBFL  
1 CLBVA/6550ABW PATRICK AFB FL//OTM//

~~SECRET~~ AFGWC  
SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-B

CRT 09/10 1947Z

\*CORRECTED COPY CORRECTED COPY CORRECTED COPY CORRECTED COPY\*\*\*\*  
TERMINAL FORECASTS VALID 11/00Z - 13/00Z SEP 80

0000  
/0024...18004 8000 05HZ 2CU030 1CI300 QNH 2994INS TS/RASH VCNTY TIL

23  
GRADU 0729 20000 32000109R 1AC100 1CI300 QNH2997INS  
GRADU 1315 20006 8000005HZ 2CU030 1CI300 QNH2992INS TS/RASH  
VCNTY AFT 20

TEMPS...MAX 92F/33C MIN 72F/23C MAX PA...+30FT MAX DA...+2600FT

/0024...20005 8000 05HZ 2CU035 2AC100 2CI300 QNH2992INS CIGN0  
TS/RASH VCNTY TIL 0300

GRADU 0709 VRS03 16000109R 1CI300 QNH2995INS  
GRADU 1315 20007 6000005HZ 2CU030 2CI300 QNH2992INS TS/RASH  
VCNTY AFT 20

TEMPS...MAX 90F/32C MIN 73F/24C MAX PA...N/C MAX DA...+2500FT

SSS  
/0024...10006 9999 6ST010 8SC025 8AC070 5CI280 QNH3020INS CIG010  
GRADU 0405 29005 6000050DZ 10BR 8ST005 8SC025 8AC070 5CI280

QNH3022INS CIG025

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2 HQ AWS VIA X000...ACT

ADV 1

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CN=80254/20914 TOR=80254/2102Z TAN=80254/2104Z CDSN=AFC070

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PAGE 01  
101949Z SEP 80

~~SECRET~~

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

GRADU 1718 15007 999903ST015 4SC030 2AC100 2CI280

QNH3016INS CIG030

GRADU 2223 VP005 999901SC035 1AC100 1CI300 QNH3015INS

TEMPS...MAX 89F/31C MIN 66F/19C MAX PA...+3100FT MAX DA...+5900FT

LEVEL WINDS/TEMPS VALID 11/0000Z-1200Z

10006/24C

12010/24C

14015/24C

0024...34205 9999 SKC QNH3010INS

GRADU 1415 20212 999901CU030 1AC120 2CI300 QNH3006INS

TEMPS...MAX 87F/30C MIN 61F/16C MAX PA...+3200FT MAX DA...+5900FT

L 31 DEC 86

S 6

IN=80254/22914

TOR=80254/21022

TAN=80254/21042

CDSN=AF0070

~~SECRET~~

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

10 SEP 80 20 55

TSZYUW RHHWAAA1561 25419107 RUEAHGA,  
MEDIATE  
101851Z SEP 80  
AFGWC ROFFUTT AFB NE//WF//000  
RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
CLHUA/DET 75 3 WS HURLBURT FIELD FL

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-C (U)  
ROUTE FORECASTS VALID 11/00Z-12Z SEP 80

ROUTE 1	WINDS/TEMPS (FL TEMPS ARE NEGATIVE)			LOCATION
G	FL200	FL25000	FL300	FIRST 1/2
00-SSSS	01020/11C	04025/21C	03035/34C	SECOND 1/2
	09010/11C	03020/20C	02025/32C	
SS-0000	10007/11C	05020/20C	04025/32C	FIRST 1/2
	36020/12C	03025/21C	02035/34C	SECOND 1/2

HAZARDS

HAZARDS	LOCATION
00-SSSS	AREA 1 AND 2
LOUDS (SFC-400 ALL LYRS).....	ERN 1/30 AREA 3
2CU030/080 1CI300/330	ERN 1/30 AREA 1
8ST025/020 5SC030/060 8AC070/150 5CI290/330	REST OF ROUTE
UNDERSTORMS..... FEW MAX TOPS 480 70-03Z	
ISOLD MAX TOPS 450	

RBC (MDT OR GTR).....NONE.  
G (LGT OP GTR).....NONE.  
C VSBY LT 3 NM.....N/A.  
CL 31 DEC 86  
AS 6

\*\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*

T 2 HQ AWS VIA X000, ACT ADV 1  
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

MCN=80254/20319 TOR=80254/2047Z TAD=80254/2049Z CDSN=AF0065

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

10 SEP 80 121 32

DTTSZYUW RHHWAAA1592 25419257-RUEAHQA.  
IMMEDIATE  
O 101852Z SEP 80  
FM AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE//WF//  
TO RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
RUCLHUA/DET 75 3WS HURLBURT FIELD FL  
BT-

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XVCD (U)  
OUTLOOK VALID 13/0200Z TO 16/0200Z SEP 80  
SYNOPTIC DISCUSSION... AT START OF PERIOD A FNTL SYSTEM IS N OF THE  
REAS. AS LOW NE OF AREAS MOVS EWD THE FNT WILL DRIFT SLOWLY S INTO  
THE N PART OF AREA 2 BY 14/00Z. S/W PART OF AREA 1 EXTDG E-W ACROSS  
AREA 2 BY 15/00Z AND BY THE END OF THE PERIOD THE FRONT WILL EXTD  
FROM THE CENTER OF AREA 2 NORTHEAST ACROSS THE W 1/3 OF AREA 1.  
SOME SCT TO BKN LOW-MID-HI CLDS CAN BE EXPECTED WITH THE FRONT ALONG  
WITH A POSSIBILITY OF SOME ISOLD RASH/THUNDERSTORMS ALTHOUGH THE FNT  
WILL BE FAIRLY WEAK IN THESE AREAS. VSBY WILL BE GOOD OCCASIONALLY  
AIR IN THE RASH/THUNDERSTORMS AND WINDS WILL BE S BECOMING W AS THE  
FNT MOVS THRU THE AREA. PORTIONS OF THE AREAS AWAY FROM THE FRONT  
WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE SCT SKIES AND GOOD VSBY AND WINDS WILL BE G  
GENERALLY SOUTHERLY.  
OCL 31 DEC 86  
OAS 6

\*\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*

T 2 HQ AWS VIA XCOO...ACT

ADVER 1

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ICN=80254/20869 TOR=80254/2101Z TAD=80254/2110Z CDSN=AFC073

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SECRET  
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PAGE 01 OF 01  
101852Z SEP 80

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

10 SEP 80 720 53

TTSZYUW RHHWAAA1568 2541900-RUEAHQA;  
 IMMEDIATE  
 101850Z SEP 80  
 1 AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE/WF//  
 2 RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
 JCLHUA/75 3 WS HURLBURT FIELD FL

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XVSE (U)

HF FORECAST  
 FORECAST SUPPORT 15E  
 UT=UNIVERSAL TIME  
 MUF=MAXIMUM USUABLE FREQUENCY  
 FOT=FREQUENCY OF OPTIMUM TRANSMISSION

UT	MUF	FOT	• •	UT	MUF	FOT
1	18.1	15.6	• •	13	16.4	14.3
2	16.8	13.7	• •	14	19.1	16.7
3	14.8	12.0	• •	15	20.3	17.6
4	12.8	11.0	• •	16	20.4	18.1
5	12.3	9.9	• •	17	20.4	18.6
6	12.1	9.8	• •	18	20.5	18.8
7	11.8	9.6	• •	19	20.6	18.9
8	11.3	9.1	• •	20	20.7	18.6
9	10.5	8.6	• •	21	20.9	18.2
0	9.9	8.1	• •	22	21.0	18.2
1	10.5	8.6	• •	23	20.7	18.0
2	12.9	10.6	• •	24	19.8	17.2

CL 31 DEC 86  
 AS 6

\*\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*

T 2 HQ AWS VIA X000...ACT

ADV 1

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

MCN=80254/20303

TOR=80254/2047Z

TAD=80254/2048Z

CDSN=AFC264

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~~SECRET~~  
 .....

PAGE 01 OF 0100  
 101850Z SEP 80

#3

Item PD-4  
Communications Instructions  
(Continued)

POISON DART CEOI

Published: 22/2300Z SEP 80  
Effective: 26/1500Z SEP 80

WEATHER REPORT FORMATS:

1. The "FORECAST" format will be used in transmitting forecasted information to field elements. Do not transmit data in parenthesis:

- A. Forecasts
- B. (Day-Month)
- C. (ZULU times) either 00-12 OR 12-00
- D. (Sky condition) clear/partly/cloudy
- E. (Ceiling) None/XXXX (Feet)
- F. (Visibility) Unlimited/X (MILES)
- G. (Precipitation) None/Rain/Fog
- H. (Winds-Direction/Max) Calm/SE AT 5
- I. (Temperature-Max/Min) 73 and 64

NOTES: Unlimited Visibility = Greater than 7 miles.  
Temperatures are for next 24 hours.

2. Example:

- A. FORECAST
- B. 27 SEP
- C. 00-12
- D. PARTLY
- E. 5,000
- F. 5
- G. NONE
- H. NW AT 10
- I. 72/57

20 SEP 80 19 24

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

SFGBC RHWAAA2778 2721808--RUEAHQA.  
EDIATE  
81808Z SEP 80  
AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE  
RUEAHGA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
LHUA/DET 75 3WS HURLBURT FLD FL

~~CRST~~ AFGWC  
SUBJECT: FORECAST (U)  
29 SEPTEMBER  
/ALID: 0000Z-1200Z.  
SKY CONDITION...PARTLY CLOUDY.  
CEILING...NONE.  
/SBY.....7+.  
WEATHER...NONE.  
WINDS.....34008.  
TEMPS.....MAX 78F MIN 57F.  
REMARKS...MIN ALTIMETER..2990INS.  
31 DEC 86  
6

\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*  
NCE COPY TO: DET 2 HQ AWS VIA X000 TUBES

2 HQ AWS VIA X000...ACT	ADV	1
ON DET 2 HQ AWS (VIA X000)(1)	ADV	1
	(M,C)	
	TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED	2

N=80272/06294 TOR=80272/1808Z TAD=80272/1815Z CDSN=SCM262

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* ~~SECRET~~ \* PAGE 01 OF 01  
\* 281808Z SEP 80 \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

POISON DART CEOIPublished: 22/2300Z SEP 80  
Effective: 26/1500Z SEP 80

3. The "OBSERVATION" format will be used in transmitting locally observed information from field elements. Do not transmit data in parenthesis:

- A. OBSERVATION
- B. (Day-Month)
- C. (ZULU-time of Observation)
- D. (Sky condition) Clear/Partly/Cloudy
- E. (Ceiling Estimated) None/XXXX (Feet)
- F. (Visibility Estimated) Unlimited/X (Miles)
- G. (Precipitation) None/Rain/Fog
- H. (Winds Estimated - Direction/Max) Calm/SE AT 5
- I. (Temperature) 70 (Degrees F.)
- J. (REMARKS)


## 4. Example:

- A. OBSERVATION
- B. 27 SEP
- C. 1430
- D. CLOUDY
- E. 7,000
- F. 3
- G. FOG
- H. CALM
- I. 70
- J. LOW PATCHES OF FOG SEEM TO BE LIFTING



# Poison Dart

JTD Briefing  
20 Oct 80




○ - ceiling less than 3000 ft

27/04Z

~~SECRET~~


Atch 5

# Poison Dart



28/23Z

# Poison Dart



~~SECRET~~

28/04Z

20 SEP '80Z 18  
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

TSEGRG RHNWAAA2646 2721655--PUEAHQA.  
MEDIATE  
281655Z SEP 80  
AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE  
RUFHQQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
CLHQA/DET 75 3WS HUPLEURT FLD FL

~~SECRET~~ AFGWC

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-4(U)  
FORECASTS VALID 29/0000Z SEP 80 TO 01/0000Z OCT 80  
NOPTIC DISCUSSION...

PER-AIR FLOW HAS BECOME ZONAL ACROSS THE AREA AS THE LONG WAVE TROF OF AREA 1 HAS SHIFTED TO THE EAST. THE UPPER-AIR TROF STILL PERSISTS SW OF AREA 4. SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE CELL HAS PUSHED WELL TO THE OF AREA 1. THE SURFACE FRONT LIES JUST SOUTH OF SPARKLER, SHAM-CK, AND COFFEE AND THEN WEST TO VENDETTA. MOISTURE IN THE MID LEVEL CONTINUES TO POUR OVER THE NORTHERN 1/2 OF AREA 1 FROM AREA 2. 700MB DGE CONTINUES TO HOLD ITS POSITION JUST SOUTH OF AREA 1. THE 700MB WDS OVER THE WESTERN PORTION OF AREA 1 HAVE VEERED DURING THE PAST HOURS ALLOWING MOISTURE TO BE ADVECTED OVER THE FRONTAL BOUNDARY STERN AREA 1. SAT PICS CONTINUE TO HOLD THE MID AND HI CLOUDS FROM ST SOUTH OF SPARKLER TO JUST NORTH OF OLIVE AND THEN WEST. LFM TGS SHOW LITTLE CHANGE IN THE POSITION OF THE MID LEVEL MOISTURE BAND ACROSS THE AREA OF INTEREST. THIS APPEARS REASONABLE. THE LOCATION OF THE MOISTURE BAND AT THE MID LEVELS AND THE ELONGATED UPPER-2 TROF NOW POSITIONED OVER AREA 2 AND PROGGED TO MOVE EAST WILL BE FAVORABLE FOR CONTINUED RAIN AND LOWERING CEILINGS ACROSS THE NORTHERN 1/2 OF AREA 1. RAIN TO CONTINUE OVER SOUTHEAST 1/2 OF AREA 2 FOR 24-36 HOURS AND THEN DECREASE SUBSTANTIALLY THEREAFTER. THE 700MB FLOW BECOMES DRYER FROM THE NORTHWEST. A FRONTAL WAVE WILL RIPPLE ALONG THE FRONT AND WILL BE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF MOOL IN 36 HOURS. THIS WAVE WILL BE WEAK AS THE UPPER-AIR SUPPORT

\*\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*

DANCE COPY TO: X000

2 HQ AWS VIA X000...ACT

ADV 1

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

ICN=80272/05897 TOR=80272/1655Z TAD=80272/1659Z COSN=AF0187

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\* ~~SECRET~~ \* PAGE 01  
\*\*\*\*\* 281655Z SEP 80

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45

20 SEP '80Z 19 54

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

NTTSFGRC RHWAAA2654 2721657--RUEAHQA.  
IMMEDIATE  
O 291657Z SEP 80  
FM AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE  
TO RUFHQ/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
RUCI.HUA/DFT 75 3WS HURLBURT FLD FL  
BT

~~SECRET~~ AFGWC

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-8 (U)

1. TERMINAL FORECASTS VALID 29/00Z SEP 80 - 01/00Z OCT 80

A. SHAMROCK

29/0024...17006 9999 2CU030 2CI250 QNH2995INS TS VCNTY TIL 03  
GRADU 0809 17007 4800 10PR 6ST010 2CU030 QNH2992INS CIG010  
TS/RASH VCNTY  
GRADU 1415 20016 9999 3CU030 2AC100 4CI250 QNH2983INS  
CIG250 TS VCNTY AFT 20

TEMPS...MAX 89F/31C MIN 72F/22C MAX PA...+130FT MAX DA...+2400FT

30/0024...24008 9999 2CU030 1AC100 4CI250 QNH2983INS CIG250

TS VCNTY TIL 03  
GRADU 1011 21005 6000 10PR 2CU030 4CI250 QNH2982INS CIG250  
TS VCNTY AFT 20

TEMPS...MAX 88F/31C MIN 70F/21C MAX PA...+440FT MAX DA...+2450FT

H. LETTERHEAD

29/0024...34008 9999 1AC120 3CI250 QNH2990INS

GRADU 0910 01006 9999 SKC

TEMPS...MAX 78F/26C MIN 57F/14C MAX PA...+4370FT MAX DA...+6650FT

30/0024...09005 9999 SKC QNH3003INS \*

TEMPS...MAX 74F/23C MIN 52F/11C MAX PA...+4240FT MAX DA...+6200FT

I. SCHOOL

29/0024...06005 9999 6ORA 6SC020 8AS100 6CS200 QNH2994INS CIG020

GRADU 0608 04005 4800 6ORA 10PR 6ST008 8AS100 5CS200 CIG008

GRADU 1617 20006 8000 05HZ 5SC020 5AC100 5CI250 QNH2987INS

\*\*\*\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*

ADVANCE COPY TO: XOOD

DET 2 HQ AWS VIA XOOD...ACT

ADV 1

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

MCN=80272/05919 TOR=80272/1659Z TAD=80272/1700Z CDSN=PR8392

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PAGE 01  
291657Z SEP 80

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20 SEP '80Z 18 10

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

TSFGBC RHWAAA2656 2721700--RUEAHQA.

IMMEDIATE

281700Z SEP 80

AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE

RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC

DLHUA/DET 75 3WS HURLBURT FLD FL

~~SECRET~~ AFGWC

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-C PART 1(U)

TERMINAL FORECASTS VALID 29/00Z SEP - 01/00Z OCT 80

OFFEE

0024...VR805 9999 05HZ 1CU030 2AC080 4CI250 QNH3000INS CIG250

GRADU 0809 24006 2400 10BR 8ST010 QNH2995INS

CIG010 TS/RASH VCNTY

GRADU 1516 30008 6000 60RA 10BR 8ST015 QNH2987INS CIG015

TS/RASH VCNTY

TEMPS...MAX 87F/30C MIN 68F/20C MAX PA...+80FT MAX DA...+2100FT

0024...30008 6000 60RA 10BR 8ST015 QNH2985INS CIG015

TS/RASH VCNTY TIL 03

GRADU 1516 24006 6000 10BR 8ST015 QNH2983INS CIG015

INTER 1620 34008 4800 60RA 10BR 6ST015 8NS050 CIG015

TS/RASH VCNTY AFT 17

TEMPS...MAX 87F/30C MIN 69F/20C MAX PA...+120FT MAX DA...+2250FT

SANDPIPER

0024...05010 9999 5SC030 8AC100 4CI250 QNH2992INS CIG030

INTER 0504 05010 6000 60RA 10BR 8ST010 CIG010

GRADU 0405 08010 4800 60RA 8ST005 5AC050 QNH2990INS CIG005

GRADU 1011 03010 3200 60RA 8ST005 QNH2986INS CIG005

TS VCNTY

TEMPS...MAX 80F/27C MIN 67F/19C MAX PA...+110FT MAX DA...+1800FT

0024...06010 6000 60RA 8SC015 8NS050 QNH2985INS CIG015

GRADU 0809 08006 6000 60RA 10BR 6ST008 8SC015 QNH2982INS

\*\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*

ANCE COPY TO: X000

2 HQ AWS VIA X000...ACT

ADV 1

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

CN=80272/05928 TOR=80272/1701Z TAD=80272/1725Z CDSN=SCM249

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PAGE 01  
281700Z SEP 80

20 SEP '80Z 18 09

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SFGBC RHWAAA2681 2721711--RUEAHQA.  
EDIATE  
31711Z SEP 80  
AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE  
RUEAHQA/DET 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
HUA/DET 75 3WS HURLBURT FLD FL

~~SECRET~~ AFGWC  
JECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-D (U)  
PURPLE ROUTE

TE FORECAST WINDS/TEMPS/DA/PA/D-VALS VALID 29/00Z-30/00Z SEP 80  
FL 03Z 09Z 15Z 21Z PARAMETER  
AA 005 12010/30C 15015/23C 21020/22C 24012/29C AA DA 2400 PA 130  
AB 005 12010/27C 15015/18C 21020/17C 24012/26C AC DA 2050 PA 220  
AB 020 14010/22C 16010/17C 17010/16C 18010/21C AA DVAL 250 000  
AO 005 12010/25C 15015/18C 21020/17C 24012/24C CO DA 2650 PA 370  
A3 005 12010/30C 15015/23C 21020/22C 24012/24C A3 DA 2250 PA 40

AIR REFUEL ROUTE.....VALID 28/2100Z-29/0900Z  
AS AT FLD50-160.....24020  
.....P10C  
L.....P550FT000  
E FORECAST HAZARDS VALID 29/00-24Z SEP 80

PURPLE  
DS (SFC-140)... LOCATION  
8ST015/030 6AS050/080 AA-MIDPT AA/6B  
4ST015/030 8NS050/080 MIDPT AA/BB-MIDPT AC/AD  
8ST005/030 8NS050/080 MIDPT AC/AD-3/4PT CR/AA  
8ST010/030 6AS050/080 3/4PT CR/AA-AA

\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*  
NCE COPY TO: X000

2 HQ AWS VIA X000...ACT ADV 1  
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

N=80272/06001 TOR=80272/1712Z TAD=80272/1727Z CDSN=SCM253

\*\*\*\*\* PAGE 01  
\* ~~SECRET~~ \* 281711Z SEP 80  
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PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

UNDERSTORMS.....ISOLD MAX TOPS 450 RTE  
RBC (MDT OR GTR).....NONE.  
; (LGT OR GTR).....NONE.  
; WEATHER.....STEADY RAIN/RAINSHOWERS MIDPT AA/AB-3/4PT CR/AA  
VSBY 1-3 RAIN/RAINSHOWERS AD-AF  
VSBY LESS THAN 1 FOG CQ-3/4PT CR/AA  
VSBY 2-3 FOG 3/4PT CR/AA-AA

AIR REFUELING VT 28/2100Z-29/0900Z  
UUS (050-160).....  
4AS050/080 6CS250/300

LOCATION  
RTE0000  
RTE

UNDERSTORMS.....ISOLD MAX TOPS 450  
RBC (MDT OR GTR).....NONE.  
; (LGT OR GTR).....NONE.

L 31 DEC 86

S 6

IN=80272/06001 TOR=80272/1712Z TAD=80272/1727Z CDSN=SCM253

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PAGE 02 OF 02  
281711Z SEP 80



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Situation Climatic Brief

Edwards AFB, CA

November

1. General. Site E is generally clear to partly cloudy in November with chilly nights and mild days. Skies are clear 42-68% of the time. Maximum cloudiness occurs between 0900 and 1700 local time. Mean cloudiness is 17-23% at night and 28-34% during the day. Morning minimum temperatures average 36F increasing to 66F during the afternoon. Precipitation occurs on about 3 days per month. Thunderstorms are very rare. The prevailing surface wind direction at night is southwest to west (11-17% of the time) at mean speeds of 3-10 knots. Calm winds occur 19-29% of the time. Day-time wind directions are variable, but show a slight tendency to be north-easterly. Speeds are 3-16 knots, and calms occur 19-34% of the time.

2. Flying Weather. Good to excellent. Cloudy and rainy conditions are infrequency. Ceilings less than 5000 feet and/or visibilities less than 5 miles occur 3-6% of the time; less than 1500/3 1% of the time or less. Conditions less than 500/1 are rare. Icing and turbulence are usually not a problem.

3. Exposure Weather. Generally pleasant. Nighttime temperatures are chilly, but reach the mid 60's during the afternoon. Sunshine is abundant and rain is rare. Relative humidity varies from an early morning high of 60-65% to an afternoon low of 35-40%.

ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	85
MEAN MAXIMUM	66
MEAN MINIMUM	36
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	16
#DAYS WITH PRECIPITATION	3
SNOW	*
FOG	1
95% WORST DA	4800Ft
95% WORST PA	2400Ft

\* = Less than 0.5 day

~~SECRET~~

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Southern Sierra Nevada Climatology  
for October-November

44

The weather in this area during late October and early November is characterized by mild temperatures and a high percentage of clear skies or scattered clouds. Precipitation amounts increase from .1 - .2 inches in October to about .5 inches in November. Mean maximum temperatures decrease from the low 80's (deg F) to the upper 60's; mean minimums decrease from near 50 to about 40. The percent of time that a cloud ceiling exists increases from about 25% in October to around 35% in November. Ceilings less than 5000 feet and/or visibilities less than 5 miles occur rarely in October and less than 2% of the time in November. Winds below 1000 feet AGL tend to be northerly or northeasterly at 10-12 knots. From 1000 feet to 5000 feet AGL winds are south-southwesterly at 15-20 knots with a secondary direction from the north-northeast. The prevailing surface wind direction is northerly (on the east side) and southwesterly (on the west side) at 8-10 knots (about 10% of the time with that wind speed). However, calm winds occur about one-third of the time. Surface winds occasionally (about 1% of the time) stir up dust during the afternoon, especially in October. Icing should not be a problem due to the relatively warm temperatures and lack of low level cloudiness.


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NORMING DARKNESS AFTERNOON

LOCAL (Z - 8.0 HRS) NAUTICAL TIME - INDIAN SPRINGS, NEVADA



MORNING  
 DARKNESS  
 AFTERNOON



~~SECRET~~

13 NOV 80Z

10 30

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

OTTSFGRC RHWWAAA3262 3240905  
IMMEDIATE  
O 190905Z NOV 80  
FM AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE  
TO RUFHQO/DFT 2 HQ AWS WASHINGTON DC  
RUCLHUA/CFT 75 3WS HURLBURT FLD FL  
RUCLAKA/ [REDACTED] 13 21/11  
BT

~~SECRET~~ AFGWC

SUBJECT: FORECAST SUPPORT XV-A(U)  
SYNOPTIC DISCUSSION VALID 21/1200Z - 24/0000Z NOV 80  
AT 500MB... MODEL OUTPUT STILL SHOWS SIGNS OF INSTABILITY FROM ONE \*  
PROG CYCLE TO THE NEXT. THE BASIC PATTERN OF THE SYNOPTIC SCALE  
WAVES, BOTH UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM OF THE AREA OF INTEREST ON EACH  
PROG CYCLE, AGREES, BUT THE SPEED OF THE WAVES ARE IN DISAGREEMENT.  
THE EFFECT THIS INSTABILITY WILL HAVE ON THE FORECASTS WILL INVOLVE  
THE POSITIONS OF THE PRIMARY SURFACE LWS, WHICH WILL REMAIN WELL  
NORTH OF THE FORECAST AREAS, AND THE LOCATION OF THE TRAILING FRONT.  
THE ONLY ADJUSTMENT ON THIS FORECAST FROM THE PREVIOUS FORECAST  
INVOLVES THE LOCATION OF THE COLD FRONT THAT WILL SETTLE DOWN ACROSS  
THE CENTRAL REGIONS, EAST TO WEST, OF AREAS 2 AND 3. AT 21/127 A  
RAPIDLY MOVING, FULL LONGITUDINAL TROF WILL BE OVER CENTRAL AREA 1  
AND MOVING EAST AT 25KTS. BY 22/00Z THE TROF WILL BE APPROACHING  
THE EAST EDGE OF AREA 1 AND BY 22/12Z WILL BE EAST OF AREA 1. THE  
ASSOCIATED FRONTAL SYSTEM WITH ITS CLOUDS AND WEATHER WILL STAY WELL  
TO THE EAST OF AREA 1. AS RIDGING DEVELOPS AT ALL LEVELS OVER AREA 1  
GUSTY SURFACE WINDS A POSSIBILITY ALONG EAST EDGE OF AREA 1 AS  
PRESSURE GRADIENT TIGHTENS IN RESPONSE TO DEVELOPING SYSTEM TO THE  
EAST. SURFACE WINDS WILL ABATE BY 22/12Z AS LOW MOVES EAST.  
NEXT UPSTREAM TROF WILL BE APPROACHING THE REGION NORTH OF AREA 4  
BY 21/12Z AND WILL MOVE EAST AT 30KTS. BY 23/00Z THE TROF WILL BE  
OVER CENTRAL AREA 2. SIGNIFICANT PUSH OF COLD AIR WILL FORCE  
THE SURFACE FRONT TO THE NORTHERN REGIONS OF AREAS 3 AND 4 BY 22/00Z

\*\*\*\*\* AIR FORCE MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*

DFT 2 HQ AWS VIA XCCC...ACT

ADV 1

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

MCN=80324/11151

TOR=80324/0906Z

TAJ=80324/0917Z

COSN=PRB21A

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PAGE 01

190905Z NOV 80

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
Subject: Climatological Planning Data

Time Frame: Nov 79 - Dec 80

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report highlights the climatological data (historical meteorological information) provided to the planners and/or the operators during this period to optimize decision <sup>making</sup> ~~action~~.
2. (U) Most of the background climatological information used during the period came from the USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center (USAFETAC) at Scott AFB, IL.
3. (U) Climatological information was necessary to help support route planning, flight times, check aircraft load requirements, size exposure weather requirements, determine if test locations was compatible with Middle East locations, and many other interest and planning items.
4. (U) Most of the products provided during the period fall into the following categories (examples of each are found in the attachments):
  - A. (U) Seasonal Location Summaries. These included situational climatic briefs, usually of several pages, which were generally on Middle East countries of interest and used mostly by the intelligence community.
  - B. (U) Monthly Summaries. These are items of paragraph length that highlight specific geographic locations (i.e., Tehran) or planned operations (i.e., routes) used by both the planner and operator.
  - C. (U) Monthly Parameter Values. Usually a tabular display of data provided to planners or operations personnel containing some expected values in CONUS or the Middle East. This also included monthly and/or daily comparisons of several parameters between CONUS test sites and Middle East operation locations.

Comments: (U) It is extremely important for the planner or operator to discuss with the staff weather officer needed climatological support. The weather man needs to know what data are required and why so that the greatest benefit can be gained from the information.



Recommendations:

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1. (U) If climatological data are needed the following information is helpful:

A. (U) What is planned or why is the information needed (see Comments)?

B. (U) Location(s), Date(s), and Time(s).

C. (U) The desired parameters to be provided, such as temperatures, cloud cover, visibility, ceilings, precipitation, pressure altitude, etc.

D. (U) The information is desired in what form (i.e., narratives, tabular, or maps/charts)?

2. (U) If a training exercise or an actual operation is planned, the following is needed:

A. (U) Type of aircraft, system, or organization.

B. (U) Route or area of interest.

C. (U) Flight level, if applicable.

D. (U) Take-off and Landing Times (this item and C above help to develop a computerized flight plan to check planned times against climatological winds).

E. (U) What environmental criteria would terminate operations (specific values help, i.e., 3000 foot or less ceilings; not just ceilings).

F. (U) Refueling Area/Time.

Other Related Items: See topic Exercise Weather Support, Part 1 & 2.

J2 Personnel Involved: Majors [redacted] and [redacted] AF/XOOOX, A227-1638.

Points of Contact:

1. [redacted] AF/XOOOX, A227-1638 (The DOD Climatologist).

2. AWS/DOOX (Central Support Division at Air Weather Service Headquarters), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4673 (Requirements).

3. USAFETAC/DO (Operations Branch), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4024 (Operational Monitors).

Attachments:

1. (U) Iran Situation Climatic Brief (May-October).

2. (U) Weather Information for NW Iran.

3. (U) Tabriz, Iran Temperature, Pressure Altitude, and Density Altitude Data.

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E

4. ~~(S)~~ July Daily Temperature Comparisons Between Dugway, UT and 

5. (U) Iran/Afghanistan Mean Thaw Date of Surface Soil.

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## SITUATION CLIMATIC BRIEF

## IRAN

MAY - OCTOBER

1. GENERAL. The weather is hot, dry, windy and virtually rainless. Temperatures along the Persian Gulf Coast and the southern interior reach daily maximums of 100-120F. Locations in the north and along the Caspian Sea reach daily maximums of 85-100F. Except for the Caspian Sea area, all of Iran reports less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch of rainfall per month. Many locations report no rainfall at all. Skies are virtually cloudless 70-80% of the time. June through the middle of July is dominated by the "Shamal". This wind blows down the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers across western Iran creating almost a constant dust/sand storm problem which may last several days. Winds from the northwest across the Seistan Valley (approximately 31 N, 61 E) during May through September cause frequent dust storms. This phenomena is called the "Wind of 120 Days". Both these wind systems are dry and the result of the thermal low pressure system dominate over the Persian Gulf during the summer months. These winds are strongest during daytime, sometimes as high as 60 knots, but usually weaken to a breeze at night. Wind speeds of 25 knots or greater are reported 5-15% of the time over most of Iran.
2. FLYING WEATHER. Flying weather is generally good. The percent frequency that the ceiling/visibility is less than 5000 feet/6 miles ranges from 5-10%; less than 1500/3 approximately 1% of the time. Flying activities may be restricted due to high winds and/or sandstorms/duststorms.
3. RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER. Reconnaissance weather is generally good. The percent frequency that the cloud cover is less than  $\frac{2}{8}$ ths ranges from 80-95%. The visibility is less than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles 1-5% of the time over most of Iran. Generally the late evening or early morning hours are the most favorable for aerial reconnaissance. Sandstorms/duststorms may lower the visibility during the afternoon hours.
4. TERMINAL WEATHER. Tehran, Iran. The weather is hot, windy and virtually rainless and cloud free. During the hottest months, the daily maximum temperatures will be in the "high 90's and will reach 110F on rare occasions. Rainfall is expected on 6 days in May and on 1-2 days the rest of the months. Ceiling/visibility less than 300/1 is rare. Gusty surface winds greater than 16 knots are expected 10-20% of the time for June through August and 5% in other months. Gale force winds are rare. Runway crosswinds greater than 15 knots are expected approximately 1% of the time.
5. EXPOSURE WEATHER. The weather is hot, dry and dusty over most of Iran. Temperatures may exceed 120F in the interior desert regions. Sandstorms/duststorms are frequent and may last for several days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TEHRAN, IRAN	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM	97	103	108	107	100	89
MEAN MAXIMUM	81	92	97	95	88	76
MEAN MINIMUM	59	67	72	71	64	53
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	37	48	57	52	51	38
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCH)	.5	*	*	*	*	*
#DAYS PRECIPITATION	6	1	1	*	*	2
#DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	2	1	*	*	*	*

\* = Less than 0.5 inch/0.5 Day

6. PARADROP WEATHER. Over most of Iran the weather conditions are favorable for paradrops 75-95% of the time. However, in southern Iran, from approximately 31N southward, during the afternoon hours, weather conditions are favorable only 35-45% of the time. Over all of Iran weather conditions are unfavorable for paradrops primarily due to winds in excess of 13 knots. Generally, only in northern Iran, particularly along the Caspian Sea would cloudiness and/or rainfall be a factor.

7. ASTRONOMICAL DATA. Tehran, Iran

Civil Twilight (Standard Time of the Meridian 52 DEG 30 Min)

	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
	15	15	15	15	15	15
FIRST LIGHT	0432	0418	0430	0456	0521	0545
LAST LIGHT	1931	1952	1950	1922	1838	1756

Prepared: 4 November 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

58

SEPTEMBER

UNCLASSIFIED

September weather is hot, dry, and dusty. Average temperatures range from a low in the low to mid 60's to a high in the mid to upper 80's. Skies are clear to partly cloudy with ceilings only six percent of the time. Visibility is good with dust being observed only two days per month. Rainfall for the month is normally less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch. Thunderstorms are very rare. The prevailing wind direction is northerly in the morning backing to a southerly direction by mid-afternoon. The average windspeed is five knots.

OCTOBER

Temperatures begin to drop with a diurnal range in the low 50s to the middle 70s. This cooling trend is accompanied by an increase in cloudiness. Ceilings prevail over the area about 20 percent of the month. Visibility is good with dust being a problem only two days during the month. Rain falls on an average of two days in October totaling less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch. The winds are northerly at five knots during the morning, becoming westerly at eleven knots in the afternoon.

NOVEMBER

The transition to winter is now completed with average high temperatures now reaching only in the low 60s, and the lows are in the low 40s. Ceilings are present 31 percent of the time. Visibility remains above  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles 99 percent of the time with dust a problem generally one day during the month. An average of 0.8 inches of rain fall on about five days during November. Winds are northerly at four knots during the morning and westerly at eleven knots in the afternoon.

DECEMBER

During December the mercury reaches a high of only 50 degrees and lows are at the freezing mark. Ceilings persist 42 percent of the time. Visibility stays above  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles 96 percent of the month. Dust is observed one day during the month. Snow falls on an average of two days per month and rain falls seven days during December. Precipitation normally totals 1.2 inches for the month. Winds are northerly at four knots during the morning hours and westerly at eleven knots in the afternoon.

UNCLASSIFIED

# CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA SHEET

STATION: TABRIZ, IRAN


PERIOD OF RECORD: JAN 1973 - DEC 1979

DATA:

TEMP	00Z	03Z	06Z	09Z	12Z	15Z	18Z	21Z	MEAN				
ABSOLUTE	85	85	90	98	104	100	114	86	114	A			
95% WORST	81	80	87	96	100	98	91	84	96	U			
90% WORST	79	78	86	94	98	96	86	82	94	G			
MEAN	72	72	76	86	91	90	80	76	80				
ABSOLUTE	76	74	86	92	94	92	84	76	94	S			
95% WORST	72	68	80	90	92	90	80	75	88	E			
90% WORST	70	66	77	87	90	88	78	74	85	P			
MEAN	62	59	69	78	82	80	70	64	71				
PA													
ABSOLUTE	*	5000	*	5000	*	5000	*	*	5000	A			
95% WORST		4950		4950					5000	U			
90% WORST		4900		4900					4900	G			
MEAN		4700	*	4700	*		*		4700				
ABSOLUTE		4800	4700	4800	4800	4800	4800		4800	S			
95% WORST		4700	4650	4750	4750	4750	4750		4750	E			
90% WORST		4650	4600	4700	4700	4700	4700		4700	P			
MEAN	*	4500	4450	4500	4550	4550	4550	*	4500				
DA													
ABSOLUTE	*	7600	*	8400	8400	8400	8000	9000	8600	A			
95% WORST		7600		8400	8400	8300	7900	7900	8280	U			
90% WORST		7400		7900	8000	8200	7800	7800	8200	G			
MEAN	*	6800	*	7600	7650	7750	7700	6920	7400				
ABSOLUTE	6500	6600	7200	7700	7800	7800	6700	6800	7800	S			
95% WORST	6300	6600	7200	7700	7800	7400	6600	6500	7700	E			
90% WORST	6500	6470	7050	7660	7600	7200	6500	6500	7500	P			
MEAN	5900	6000	6200	6900	7100	6950	6150	6300	6500				

REMARKS:

\* - No Data Available



**CONFIDENTIAL**


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
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

**CONFIDENTIAL**

JULY



SECRET



**Iran / Afghanistan**

**MEAN THAW DATE OF SURFACE SOIL**

1 - FIRST HALF OF MONTH  
2 - LAST HALF OF MONTH

J - JANUARY, F - FEBRUARY,  
M - MARCH, A - APRIL,  
MY - MAY

• METEOROLOGICAL STATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

41-15

~~SECRET~~

Subject: Meteorological Satellite Shortfalls

Time Frame: Nov 79 - Dec 80

Terms:

1. DMSP - Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
2. NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report highlights the operational loss of orbital weather satellites during the period. Other meteorological satellites are also noted in the report.

2. (U) Entire Time Frame:

- A. (C) During this period four weather satellites (all orbital) either totally or partially suffered operational failure.
- B. (C) One replacement DMSP vehicle failed to achieve orbit in July 1980.
- C. (U) Other historical events are highlighted in the attachments.

3. (U) The Raid:

- A. ( ) During the raid only two DMSP vehicles were operational or partially operational during daylight hours and none were operational during nighttime hours.
- B. ( ) Also during the raid two NOAA civilian satellites were in operation and were used to make the <sup>final</sup> initial forecast.

Comments: None

Recommendations:

1. (U) Continue to monitor satellite status.
2. (C) Continue to investigate the receipt of all available geostationary satellite data to supplement existing orbital data. This is especially true of the METEO SAT II being launched in Europe in March 1981.

Other Related Items: See the report topic on Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls.

J2 Personnel Involved: [REDACTED] AF/XOOOX, A227-1638 or 1159.

G

~~SECRET~~

Points of Contact:

~~SECRET~~

- G [REDACTED] Air Force Global Weather Central, Offutt AFB, NE, A271-5451 (Operational Source).
- G 2. [REDACTED] Air Force liaison to NOAA National Earth Satellite Service, (301) 763-7820 (Civilian NOAA R&D Source).
- G 3. [REDACTED] AF/RDSL, A224-8570 or [REDACTED] AF/XOOTF, A227-4399 (DMSP R&D Sources).

Attachments:

1. (S) Memo for MG Secord, 12 Aug 80, Degradation of the DMSP Data on Operational Forecasting.
2. (S) Memo for Director JCS, 10 Sep 80, Degraded Weather Forecasting Capability.
3. (S) Memo for MG Vaught, 4 Nov 80, Operational Loss of the TIROS-N (NOAA One) Meteorological Satellite.
4. (S) 22 Dec 80 Analysis of the Percent Availability of Required Weather Satellite Data (Orbital).



12 August 1980

**SUBJECT:** Degradation of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Data on Operational Forecasting

1. **Problem:** The DMSP (F-4 satellite) permanently lost all operational capability on 9 Aug 80 at 0721Z.

2. **Current Capability:** There are three meteorological satellites currently in orbit. Two civilian NOAA satellites (NOAA Six and TIROS-N) make two passes (one daylight and one nighttime) per day. The DMSP F-3 satellite also makes two passes per day; however, the infrared (for nighttime photographs) capability is no longer operational.

3. **Impact:** The F-4 satellite loss leaves the Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) with only five usable satellite passes per day. AFGWC cannot at present process the fine resolution (one kilometer) data from the NOAA satellite passes. Fine resolution data are used to detect localized dust/sand storms and expand/blow up an area for a closer look. The loss of F-4 fine data and the inability to process the NOAA fine resolution data at AFGWC tremendously impacts the daily forecasting capability, especially in data sparse areas or in resolving small scale phenomena. The F-3 only provides limited daylight area coverage and degraded visual images every second or third day over the Middle East.

4. **Additional Information:**

a. A new NOAA satellite (TIROS-N) is scheduled for launch in April 1981.

b. The DMSP is tri-service used and is funded through USAF. The next DMSP (F-6 satellite) launch is scheduled for Sep - Nov 1981. The F-5 satellite failed upon launch on July 1980.

c. The tactical MARK III satellite van at Wadi Kena has the capability to receive fine civilian NOAA data down to one kilometer resolution. With only five passes a day; however, the data are not as timely as it was prior to the F-4 failure. In addition, the data received at the van cannot be transmitted back to AFGWC for centralized forecasting.

5. **Possible Solutions:**

a. The Secretary of the Air Force has requested that AFSC's Space Division, the DMSP SPO, convert block V central display machines at AFGWC to process the fine (one kilometer) TIROS-N series satellite imagery. This conversion display will greatly improve AFGWC's current capability. The current NET date is 15 Oct 1980 for the conversion and a NLT date of 1 Apr 1981.

~~SECRET~~

ATK 1

b. A Meteo Sat II (European Meteorological Satellite) is scheduled for launch about Nov 1980 with a capability similar to the U.S. GOES (Geostationary Environmental Satellite) product seen on television weather shows. Fine resolution (about 1/2 mile) and an expand capability should be available from Meteo Sat over the Middle East. Present planning calls for receipt of this data only at civilian European sites; however, we are favorably pursuing a method of obtaining this data in CONUS.

G



Maj, USAF



THE JOINT STAFF

10 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Degraded Weather Forecasting Capability

1. I am distressed by the degraded state of our weather forecasting capability. As you can see from the attached paper, the capability of the Defense Meteorological Satellite program will soon be zero. The TIROS-N civilian system could deteriorate.
2. In view of all the criticism leveled about weather the last time, I want to be sure that everyone above me understands that the present forecasting capability is considerably less than what we had in April. It is clearly below the present state of the art. In a word, unsatisfactory.

JAMES B. VAUGHT  
Major General, USA

~~SECRET~~

Atch 2'

SUBJECT: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and Civilian Satellite Status Sheet (U)

I. DMSP: Minimum stated requirement is for two polar orbital satellites taking two photos per vehicle (one night/one day).

- During a military crisis these systems provide the only encrypted satellite data. The civilian data might be denied.
- Picture resolution is 1/3 mile across the entire photo.

II. TIROS-N (US Civilian/NOAA)

- Presently two polar orbital vehicles up and operating; however, one is past its design lifespan. New vehicle scheduled for launch in Apr 81.
- Each system is estimated to be 60% the capability of a DMSP vehicle.
- Picture resolution is 1/2 mile at photo center and 3 1/2 miles at the edge.
- Pictures are taken by TIROS-N (past its design lifespan) at 1530 and 0330 hours (local) and NOAA 6 at 1930 and 0730 hours.

III. METEOSAT (European Civilian/Geo-Stationary orbit)

- Expected launch date is Feb 81.
- Useful data are limited to 50N and 50S by 40W and 40E (not helpful east of Turkey and central Saudi Arabia).
- Picture resolution is 1/2 mile at photo center and about 100 miles at the edge.
- Presently evaluating receive capability for tactical location.


IV. METEOR (Soviet Civilian/Polar Orbital Satellites)

- Currently about six to eight operating.
- Soviets command on/off capability making the reliability very erratic with respect to time and area coverage.
- Presently trying to determine if data can be received at a tactical location. If attainable, it should not be more than 20% as capable as a DMSP vehicle.

~~SECRET~~

At 1.7<sup>2</sup>

PERCENT AVAILABILITY OF REQUIRED WEATHER SATELLITE DATA




LEGEND

- 1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
- 2 - F-4 vehicle had a power problem on 27 Dec 79 causing IR sensor loss.
- 3 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80.
- 4 - F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
- 5 - The TIROS-N, civilian satellite, is past its design lifespan and has technical problems which could cause failure at anytime.
- 6 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in Apr 81.
- 7 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in late CY 1981.
- 8 - F-7 vehicle expected to be launched about 2 - 3 months after F-6.

SECRET

Atch 1'



**LEGEND**

- 1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
- 2 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80. This vehicle lasted 19 months past its design lifespan.
- 3 - F-3 vehicle began to obtain limited daytime data in Apr 80.
- 4 - F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
- 5 - F-4 vehicle failed on 9 Aug 80.
- 6 - The TIROS-N, civilian satellite, is past its design lifespan and has technical problems which could cause failure at anytime.
- 7 - F-3 vehicle is very dependent upon the earth's angle to take photographs. As winter begins the capability to capture any daylight data becomes less of a reality. This situation will improve to a limited extent again in spring and summer.
- 8 - A new NOAA satellite is programed for launch in Apr 81.
- 9 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in late CY 1981.
- 10 - F-7 vehicle expected to be launched about 2 - 3 months after F-6.

SUBJECT: Operational Loss of the TIROS-N (NOAA One) Meteorological Satellite (U)

1. (S) Purpose: The purpose of this memo is to inform you of the total operational loss of the TIROS-N meteorological satellite on 2 Nov 80 at 2202z and its impact on our mission capability.

2. (U) References:

a. (S) Your classified SECRET memo to Director, Joint Staff, "Degraded Weather Forecasting Capability", 10 Sep 80.

b. (S) My classified SECRET memo to MG. Secord, "Degradation of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Data on Operational Forecasting", 12 Aug 80.

3. (S) Current Capability: The loss of this satellite (imagery times of 0321 and 1521 local sun time) leaves only the NOAA Six satellite (imagery times of 0735 and 1935 local sun time) with Middle East capability. The NOAA Six is currently operating at 100 percent capability.

4. (S) Impact: This situation leaves both the Air Force Global Weather Central and our forward operating location at Wadi Kena with only two usable satellite passes per day (the previous satellite impact analysis is attached).

5. (U) Additional Information: The NOAA Six is not forecast to have any problems until after the next NOAA satellite is launched. This launch is currently projected for early April 1981.


 Major, USAF

1 Atch  
(S) Satellite  
Impact Analysis

~~SECRET~~

# WEATHER SATELLITE DATA

Daytime




## LEGEND

- 1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
- 2 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80. This vehicle lasted 19 months past its design lifespan.
- 3 - F-3 vehicle began to obtain limited daytime data in Apr 80.
- 4 - F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
- 5 - F-4 vehicle failed on 9 Aug 80.
- 6 - The TIROS-N, civilian satellite, is past its design lifespan and has technical problems which could cause failure at anytime.
- 7 - F-3 vehicle is very dependent upon the earth's angle to take photographs. As winter begins the capability to capture any daylight data becomes less of a reality. This situation will improve to a limited extent again in spring and summer.
- 8 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in Apr 81.
- 9 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in late CY 1981.
- 10 - F-7 vehicle expected to be launched about 2 - 3 months after F-6.



# PERCENT AVAILABILITY OF REQUIRED WEATHER SATELLITE DATA



## LEGEND

- 1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
- 2 - F-4 vehicle had a power problem on 27 Dec 79 causing IR sensor loss.
- 3 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80.
- 4 - F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
- 5 - The TIROS-N, civilian satellite, is past its design lifespan and has technical problems which could cause failure at anytime.
- 6 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in Apr 81.
- 7 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in late CY 1981.
- 8 - F-7 vehicle expected to be launched about 2 - 3 months after F-6.


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PERCENT AVAILABILITY OF REQUIRED WEATHER SATELLITE DATA (ORBITAL)

As Of: 22 Dec 80

Daytime




LEGEND

Note: One NOAA satellite is "subjectively capable" to 60% of a DMSP vehicle.

- 1 - F-3 vehicle primary sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
- 2 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80. This vehicle lasted 19 months past its design lifespan.
- 3 - F-3 vehicle began to obtain limited daytime data in Apr 80.
- 4 - F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
- 5 - F-4 vehicle failed on 9 Aug 80.
- 6 - TIROS-N, civilian satellite, failed on 2 Nov 80 losing all imagery.
- 7 - F-3 vehicle is very dependent upon the earth's angle to take photographs. As winter approaches the capability to capture any daylight data becomes less reliable.
- 8 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in early May 81.
- 9 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in early CY 82.
- 10 - Another new NOAA satellite programmed for launch in Apr 82.

At 154



Note: One NOAA satellite is "subjectively capable" to 60% of a DMSP vehicle.

**LEGEND**

- 1 - F-3 vehicle sensor failed on 2 Dec 79 losing all imagery.
- 2 - F-4 vehicle had a power problem on 27 Dec 79 causing IR sensor loss.
- 3 - F-2 vehicle failed on 17 Feb 80.
- 4 - F-5 vehicle failed to obtain orbit in Jul 80.
- 5 - TIROS-N, civilian satellite, failed on 2 Nov 80 losing all imagery.
- 6 - A new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in early May 81.
- 7 - F-6 vehicle expected to be launched in early CY 82.
- 8 - Another new NOAA satellite is programmed for launch in Apr 82.
- 9 - F-7 vehicle expected to be launched by mid CY 82.

Attachment 2

Subject: Remote Tactical Weather Sensors

Time Frame: Jun - Oct 80

15

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report reviews the actions taken during the period in estimating the feasibility of producing a remote weather station capable of transmitting via secure satellite communications necessary tactical weather information.

2. (U) Late in June a proposal was made by MG Vaught to investigate the feasibility of acquiring a remote weather sensor package.

3. (U) An exercise and the lack of "read in" experienced research and development weather personnel initially limited work on the proposal.

G

4. (U) In a late July meeting with Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) [redacted] surfaced past and current advances in remote weather sensors.

A. (U) In the early 1970's the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory (now designated the AF Geophysics Laboratory) designed and tested an air implanted package known as the Expendable Remote Operating Weather Station (EROWS). The system obtained limited weather data (wind speed and direction, temperature, pressure and dewpoint) and had only a line-of-sight transmission capability. (For more information see AFCRL-72-0501 publication (Instrumentation Paper 179), 21 Aug 72, by Peirce and Church).

B. (U) Recently, the US Army at the Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory (ASL) has tested a hand implanted unit (AN/TMQ 30) that also transmits via line-of-sight. This package has almost the same sensors as the EROWS unit. (The AN/TMQ 30 is known as the Automatic Meteorological Station, POC at ASL is [redacted]).

G

C. (U) After reviewing the current state-of-the-art in remote sensors, it was decided by [redacted] and the JTD/J2 element (LtCol [redacted] and Majors [redacted] and [redacted] to let AFSC examine the feasibility of building a remote weather package. The project would examine the use of existing sensors (temperature, dewpoint, wind speed and direction, and pressure) and include a satellite communications capability (see attachment 2).

G

G

6. (U) In late August, [redacted] stated that AFSC could build six, five-sensor packages in three months with the desired satellite communications link for \$300,000. In addition, AFSC would like Air Weather Service (AWS) to fund this acquisition (see attachment 2).

G

7. (U) After reviewing the original sensor package outlined in paragraph 5, weather personnel from HQ AWS and the Pentagon felt that the meteorological information gained from the proposed package by AFSC was not sufficient to merit the cost of the project.(see comments). Major [redacted] met with [redacted] to discuss the AWS position and show [redacted] the documented requirements for Pre-Strike Surveillance/ Recon System (PRESSURS). (Ref. AWS Capabilities Master Plan 1980-1994, June 1980, page E-4).

A. (U) The PRESSURS requirement is to observe and collect essential weather information in mission arenas not under friendly control and provide it to in-theater weather facilities in near real-time. Timely weather information is vital to the mission director in making effective tactical decisions. The required data are: clouds (cover, bases, and tops), contrast transmission (visible wavelength), path transmission (infrared and millimeter wavelengths), wind, temperature, pressure, and humidity. Currently, HQ USAF has issued a PMD in November 1979 which directs development of tactical sensors supporting the use of infrared systems in the hostile tactical areas.

G

B. (U) The PRESSURS requirements were agreed to in principle by [redacted] [redacted] at Eglin AFB was contacted by [redacted] so that the unit at Eglin could begin a feasibility review of the requirement and provide a time and cost estimate.(see attachment 1).

G

8. (U) In mid-September Major [redacted] met with [redacted] and some of the staff working on the project at Eglin AFB to discuss the proposal face-to-face.

G

9. (U) The results of AFSC's efforts are stated in [redacted] 17 Oct 80 letter to Major [redacted] (see attachment 2).



~~SECRET~~  
Comments: (U) The basic instrument package (temperature, winds, pressure, and dewpoint) is not hard to produce. However, with only those measured parameters very little meteorological intelligence is gained (estimated less than 5%) by the weather forecaster. An increase in meteorological information to a usable intelligence level (estimated 10% increase or greater) would require the measured parameters of ceilings, cloud cover, visibility and some way of determining present weather conditions (i.e., snow falling).

Recommendations: (U) AFSC should review all currently marketed commercial equipment during the systems acquisition phase for possible use.

Other Related Items: Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls.

J2 Personnel Involved: [REDACTED] AF/X000X, A227-1638.

Point of Contact:

1. [REDACTED] OUSDR&E, A225-9604 (R&D).
2. [REDACTED] AF/XOOTF, A227-4399 (R&D).
3. [REDACTED] AFSC/DLZ, A858-4215 (AF Systems Command [REDACTED]).
4. [REDACTED] AF/RDSL, A224-8570 (R&D).

Attachments:

1. (U) Memo for Record, 11 Sep 80, Remote Weather Sensors.
2. (U) AFSC/DLZ Letter, 17 Oct 80, Portable Remote Weather Station.

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Remote Weather Sensors

G 1. On 2 Sep 80 I called [REDACTED] to say that HQ Air Weather Service would be willing to listen to AFSC's proposal for an eight sensor package (temperature, dew point, pressure, winds (speed and direction), ceiling, visibility, and some measure of present weather). [REDACTED] gave me the name and number of [REDACTED] at Eglin AFB to talk to about our proposal.

G 2. Called [REDACTED] on 3 Sep 80 to ask him if they could come up with a proposal for the eight sensors and a dollar amount. I also provided him with the AWS requirements for PRESSURS. He told me he would see what he could do and G would get back to me in about two to three weeks.

[REDACTED], Major, USAF

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND  
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20334



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

DLZ (981-4215)

17 October 1980

SUBJECT: Portable Remote Weather Station

*AF 24 Oct 80*

TO: OJCS/SOD [REDACTED]

*G*

1. In August I proposed that AFSC construct six portable unmanned weather stations measuring wind velocity, wind direction, temperature, humidity and atmospheric pressure. The cost was approximately \$100K exclusive of the radio transmitter. Delivery in 10-12 weeks was committed.

2. After our discussions the problem of funding the effort was turned over to [REDACTED]

*G*

3. [REDACTED] in subsequent discussions with [REDACTED] of AFSC/AD added several additional measurements to the task including cloud height, visibility, atmospheric transmission, and other parameters.

4. We have determined that instruments to make these additional measurements remotely and compactly are not commercially available, and considerable additional risk is associated with making these measurements.

5. AFSC, therefore, cannot commit to the production and delivery of remote weather stations having the requested capabilities at this time.

*G* [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Atch 2



~~SECRET~~  
Intelligence Historical Report

Subject: Meteorological Surface and Upper Air Data Shortfalls

Time Frame: Nov 79 - Dec 80

Summary:

1. (U) Purpose: This report highlights the surface and upper air data quantity and acquisition problems encountered during the period.
2. (U) Major events on this subject through 21 Oct 80 are found in the attachment.
3. (S) Since the attached memorandum was written the quantity of meteorological data from Iran seems to have remained relatively constant. [REDACTED]

Comments:

1. (S) [REDACTED]

2. (U) Weather observations, whether surface or upper air, from the Middle East are scarce and are frequently unreliable except for those observations taken at international airports. Political problems in a country can definitely disrupt the flow of weather data. For these reasons it might be necessary to use remote weather sensors and/or special operations weather personnel to supplement existing observations during periods of increased military operational emphasis.

Recommendations: (U) Develop a contingency for denied or limited data.

Other Related Items: (U) See topics on Meteorological Satellite Shortfalls, Remote Tactical Weather Sensors, and Exercise Weather Support, Part 2.

J2 Personnel Involved: Majors [REDACTED] AF/X000X, A227-1638.

Point of Contact:

1. [REDACTED] Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC/WFO), Offutt AFB, NE, A271-6019 (Operational Monitor).

2. HQ AWS/DOK (Air Weather Service Communications), Scott AFB, IL, A638-4721.

Attachments:

1. (S) Memo to [REDACTED] J2, 21 Oct 80, Surface and Upper Air Reporting Weather Stations Iran.

SUBJECT: Surface and Upper Air Reporting Weather Stations in Iran

1. From November 1979 through March 1980 there was significant variations in the number of weather reporting stations in Iran (see the table below). Capt [REDACTED] bore this fact out initially in detailed memorandums prepared for the [REDACTED] Commander on 17 Nov 79 and 8 Jan 80.


2. After the Iraq-Iran conflict began these surface and upper air reports were stopped through normal channels. Very few Iranian surface reporting stations had 24 hour a day hourly reports. Most stations prior to the conflict were three hourly reporting and only about 30-40% of those reported during the night.

<u>Reporting Weather Stations in Iran</u>				
	<u>As of Date</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Hourly</u>	<u>Upper Air</u>
	17 Nov 79	37	3	8
	8 Jan 80	19	3	8
Until	20 Sep 80	57	2	4
After	20 Sep 80	0	0	0 (Normal Channels)

NOTE: By comparison, if the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada were grouped together (reporting stations in an area of similar terrain and area - 613,000 square miles for these states compared to 636,000 square miles for Iran) their station reporting statistics would be:

<u>Total</u>	<u>Hourly</u>	<u>Upper Air</u>
150	75	12

3. Since 20 Sep 80 the only source of weather data at the Air Force Global Weather Central has been special weather (intercept data) USA C. Initially the amount of this data were small (less than ten reporting stations once daily). During the past week, however, the amount of data have been increased to 25-30 stations plus some local and area forecasts (received at 12Z or 15Z, sometimes 18Z, daily).



- 2 Atch
- 1. (S) 17 Nov 79  
Data Memo
- 2. (S) 8 Jan 80  
Data Memo

Air stations

	ICAO	Fuel	Hourly	3HR	6HR	Shutdown	212-
1.	407030 KHOY	-			X		X
2.	407060 Tabriz OITT			X			002 X
3.	407120 Rezaieh OITR			X			X
4.	407180 PAHLAVI	-		X			X
5.	407190 RASHT INTL	-		X			X
6.	407230 BOJNOURD				X		X
7.	407310 GHAZVIN				X		X
8.	407330 FARUL SAR			X			X
8.	407380 GORGAN			X			<del>Reported</del>
9.	407320 Ramsar OIER			X			X
10.	407390 SHAHRUD				X		X
11.	407430 SABZEVAR			X			X
12.	407450 Mashhad OIMM			X			Reported
13.	407470 SANANDAJ			X			X
14.	407540 Tehran OIII	⊕	X				Reported
15.	407570 SEMNAN			X			X
16.	407620 TORBAT-KEYDARIEH			X			X
17.	407660 Kermanshah OIRK			X			Reported
18.	407670 Hamadan OIHH			X			X
19.	407690 ARAK			X			Reported
20.	407820 KARRAMABAD			X			X
21.	407850 KASHAN			X			X
22.	407950 <sup>Dezful</sup> <sup>Vahdati</sup> OIAD			X			X
23.	407980 SHAHRE-KERD			X			X
24.	408020 Esfahan OIFF	⊕	X				Reported
25.	408090 GIRJANB			X			X
26.	408110 Ahwaz OIANW						Only 1.17
27.	408130 ABQDEN	<del>SECRET</del>	X				X

~~SECRET~~

- (28) 408210 rank OIYY
- (29) 408310 Medan OIAA
- (30) 408410 Kerinci OIKK
- (31) 408480 Shiny OIAS
- 32. 408560 Jabukan OIZH
- 33. 408580 Busuhur OIAB
- 34. 408590 FASA
- 35. 408750 <sup>Banyuwangi</sup> ~~None~~ OIKB
- 36. 408790 IRANSHARR
- 37. 408830 BANDAR-LENGEH

⊕ X

⊕

X

.

X

X

---

X

X

X

X

X

X

Reported

X

X

Only 1 ok

Reported

X

X

X

X

A Fix

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT REPORTING WEATHER OBSERVATION STATIONS IN IRAN

<u>BLOCK STATION NUMBER</u>	<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>HRLY</u>	<u>3-HRLY</u>
407060	OITI	TABRIZ		X
407120	OITR	REZAIYEH		X
407180	OIEP	PAHLAVI		X
407360	OIEB	BABULSAR		X
407430	OIMS	SABZEVAR		X
407450	OIMM	MASHHAD		X
407540	OIII	TEHERAN	X	
407660	OIRR	KERMANSHAH		X
407670	OIHH	HAMADAN		X
407690	OIFA	ARAK		X
408000	OIFF	ESFAHAN	X	
408090	OIMB	BIRJAND		X
408210	OIYY	YAZD		X
408310	OIAA	ABADAN	X	
408410	OIKK	KERMAN		X
408480	OLAS	SHIRAZ		X
408590	N/A	FASA		X
40 8750	OIKB	BANDAR-ABBAS		X
40 8830	N/A	BANDAR-LENGEH		X

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT REPORTING WEATHER OBSERVATION STATIONS


<u>SAUDI ARABIA</u>		<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>HRLY</u>	<u>3-HRLY</u>
40356	(1)	OETR	TURAIIF	X	
40362	(3)	OERF	RAFHAR	X	
40375	(6)	OETB	TABOUK	X	
40373	(5)	OEPA	QUTASUMAH	X	
40394	(7)	OEHL	HAIL	X	
40372	(4)	OKBK	MAGWA (KUWAIT)	X	
40477	(14)	OEJD	JEDDAH	X	
40480	(15)	OETF	TAIF	X	
40400	(8)	OEJW	EL-WEJH	X	
40498	(16)	OEBH	BISHA	X	
40361	(2)	OESK	ALJOF-SAKAKA	X	
40405	(9)	OEGS	GASSIM	(I)	
40416	(10)	OEDR	DHAHRAN	X	
40430	(11)	OEMA	MEDINA	X	
40438	(12)	OERY	RIYADH	X	
40439	(13)	OEYN	YENBO	X	

<u>BAHRAIN</u>		<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>HRLY</u>	<u>3-HRLY</u>
40427		OBBI	BAHRAIN	X	
40428		OTBD	DEHA	X	

<u>UNITED ARAB EMIRATES</u>		<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>HRLY</u>	<u>3-HRLY</u>
40445		OMAD	ABU-DHABI	(I)	
40448		OMDB	DUBAI	X	
40449		OMSJ	SHARJAN	X	
40452		OMRK	RAS-AL-KHAIMAH		X

<u>OMAN</u>		<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>HRLY</u>	<u>3-HRLY</u>
40462		OOMS	MUSCAT		X
40564		OOMA	SUR MASIRAH		X

~~SECRET~~



0

CURRENT REPORTING RAOB STATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST

SAUDI ARABIA

	<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
40375	OETB	TABDUK
40438	OERY	RIYADH
40477	OEJD	JEDDAH
40495	OESL	SULAYEL
40569	OEKM	KHAMIS-MUSHAIT
40572	OEGN	GEZAM

IRAQ

	<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
40650	ORBB	BAGHDAD

IRAN

	<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
40706	OITT	TABRIZ	(I)
40745	OIMM	MASHHAD	(I)
40754	OIII	TEHERAN	(R)
40766	OIRR	KERMANSHAH	(I)
40795	OIAD	DESFUL	(I)
40800	OIFF	ESFAHAN	(I)
40841	OIKK	KERMAN	(I)
40848	OIAS	SHIRAZ	(I)

AFGHANISTAN

	<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
40938		HERAD	(R)


KUWAIT

	<u>ICAO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	
40372	OKBK	MAGWA	(R)

~~SECRET~~



# LINKENI KHUO LUPIEK AIR REPORTING STATIONS






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**CONFIDENTIAL**

16 G 394  
H

*[Faint, illegible text]*




CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 15 July 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DBD/mcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO CONF  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

M F 15

1. Exercise in garden out of doors.
  2. New chief of protocol
  3. TIMM only family
  4. Pictures got out
- 17' walk left side  
sun coming in thru windows unknown  
what time of day



gold curtains  
2 big windows

3/18/80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IAGPC-CR

DATE: 30 MAY 1980

REPORT NAME/NUMBER: IRAN SITUATION (U)

REPORT ORIGINATED BY: ~~REDACTED~~

TITLE: IR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUILDING (U)

~~THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE~~

SUMMARY OF REPORT: REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION DERIVED FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS  
(SEE ATTACHED) CONCERNING EXTERNAL SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT AT THE MFA, TEHRAN.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: NONE (SEE ATTACHED)

SOURCE: ~~REDACTED~~

DISTRIBUTION:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 15 July 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDA/mcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO CONF  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM ~~REDACTED~~

Classified By ~~REDACTED~~  
Declassified ON OADR

PRIORITY

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SUSPECTED DUPLICATE

PT 09300

149/1504Z

PAGE 01

A I	A I	A I	A I	A I	A I	A I
CHAP ( / )	ORR-CRI ( / )	AFPRO ( / )	FO/CTO ( / )	MEPCOM ( / )	USAFHA ( / )	
DCSLG ( / )	PAO ( / )	ARR 3 ( / )	IASO ( / )	NECFD ( / )	USARCS ( / )	
DCSOI ( / )	PM ( / )	CAHAR ( / )	INDC ( / )	NEPRC ( / )	IRCID ( / )	
DCSPA ( / )	SGS ( / )	CI/SYG ( / )	INOSO ( / )	NSGA ( / )	97TH ( / )	
DCSRM ( / )	SJA ( / )	COMIGP ( / )	INRF ( / )	OIC ( / )	549TH ( / )	
DCSRT ( / )	SURGN ( / )	TENG ( / )	JHU ( / )	FCCF ( / )	902MI ( / )	
DMIS ( / )	AFCEI ( / )	RENTAC ( / )	MEDAC ( / )	RODCA ( / )	6970 ( / )	
IG ( / )	AFOSI ( / )	FRGN ( / )	MEDLB ( / )	USACC ( / )	SVC ( / )	

PTTCZFDY RUFLEHMA4309 1491430 RUEO-CCCC--RUEBJFA.

PTTCZYUM RUFLEHMA4309 1491430-CCCC--RUEBJFA.

ZNY CCCC

P 281240Z MAY 80

FM CDR 66TH MIG MUNICH GF/

TO: CDR USAOG FT MEADE MD//

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NOFORN

SUBJ: DRAFT INTEL REPORT IR 2 762 0082 80 (U)

1. (U) CTRY: IRAN (IR)

2. (U) TITLE: IR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' BUILDING (U)

3. (U) DATE OF INFO: 800515

4. (U) ORIG: DETIE, OPS GP, INSCOM

5. (U) REQ REFS:

6.

7. (C/NOFORN) SUMMARY: THIS REPORT FORWARDS INFO DERIVED FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING EXTERNAL SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT AT THE IR MFA, TEHRAN, IR, AS OF 15 MAY 80.

8A. (U) DETAILS:

PAGE 2 RUFLEHMA4309

(2) (C) SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE LOCATIONS OF THE HOSTAGES WITHIN THE MFA.

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
\*\*\*\*\*

SUSPECTED DUPLICATE

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUSPECTED DUPLICATE

PAGE 3 RUFLMMA4309

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

BB. (C/HOFORN) ORIG CPTS: VERACITY OF INFO CANNOT BE JUDGED.

PAGE 4 RUFLMMA4309

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOURCE HAS FREQUENTLY REPORTED ON THE SIT IN IR IN THE PAST.

9. (7) PROJ NO: 2154.31

10. (U) COLL MGMT CORES:

11. (U) SPEC INST: DIRC: NO

12. (U) PRFP BY:

13. (U) APP BY:

14. (U) REQ EVAL: YES. REL TO:

15. (U) ENCLS: N/A

16. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

17. (U) ADMIN NOTE: THIS IS MSG NO. 118.

NO NITE ACTION REQUIRED

REVW ON 28 MAY 2000

BT

#4309

NNNN

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUSPECTED DUPLICATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9410

ZCZCOPQ076  
DAN: 037-042770  
INPUT CDSN = DKA223  
TOR: 211626Z FEB 80

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO\*\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

ACTION\*\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

INFO= ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001  
RTR=48

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 12356

CONDUCTED BY 15 Jul 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NCC  
 DEEL  DOWNGRADED TO C/NF  
REVIEW ON 0AOK  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]



OTTMZYUW YDHANO 0015 0521330-MNSH--YEKQGH,  
ZNY MNSH  
ZKZK OO SOA DE  
O 211131Z FEB 80 ZYH  
FM SSO USEUCOM  
TO JCS//J3-SOD//  
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VHN 0957 ECJ3-EE  
PERSONAL FOR LT COL [REDACTED] FROM MAJ [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SUITABILITY INTERVIEW WITH ALPHA FOUR (U)

1. (TS) BACKGROUND. AS REQUESTED BY COMJTF, ALPHA FOUR WAS INTERVIEWED [REDACTED] TO DETERMINE HIS SUITABILITY AS AN IN-COUNTRY ASSET UNDER US MILITARY CONTROL. THE RESULTS OF THIS INTERVIEW ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW.

2. (TS) GENERAL TEHRAN INFORMATION.

A.

[REDACTED]

B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

D. [REDACTED]

2. (U) MISSION SUPPORT.

A. [REDACTED]

REVW 21 FEB 2010  
#0015

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



G 411

G

To: Col [REDACTED]

Subj: Contact with U.S. Citizen Returning from Iran

G

(c)  
1. As proposed by LtCol [REDACTED] and coordinated through Air Force Intelligence channels, I intend to contact this person on [REDACTED] to discuss specifically his capabilities and assistance to the JTF.

2. I intend to determine the following:

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]
- e. [REDACTED]
- f. [REDACTED]
- g. [REDACTED]
- h. [REDACTED]
- i. [REDACTED]
- j. [REDACTED]
- k. [REDACTED]
- l. [REDACTED]
- m. [REDACTED]

ES

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 1226  
 AUTHORITY BY 15 Jul 92  
 DERIVED FROM DDO Nmcc  
 DESI  DOWNGRADED TO CONF  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: JCS  
 Declassified ON: OADR

IDENTIFIED FACILITIES, VICINITY MFA


- 1. MFA BUILDING
- 2. MFA ANNEX
- 3. LIBRARY / ETHNOLOGICAL MUSEUM
- 4. ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM
- 5. NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (MFA)
- 6. POLICE HQ
- 7. MINISTRY OF WAR
- 8. OFFICER'S CLUB
- 9. STAFF COLLEGE
- 10. MINISTRY OF WAR
- 11. OPERA HOUSE
- 12. COMMITTEE PRISON
- 13. BANK-E SEPAH
- 14. FERDOWSI HOTEL
- 15. BANK-E MELLI
- 16. ORPHANAGE / BIMARESTAN-E FARAHNAZ-E PAHLAVI
- 17. DOCUMENT REGISTRATION
- 18. BANK-E RAHNI
- 19. BANK-E ETEBARAT-E IRAN
- 20. CROWN JEWELS TREASURY
- 21. BASHGAH-E BANK-E MELLI (ZURKHANEH) - "HOUSE OF STRENGTH"
- 22. BANK-E MARKAZI
- 23. TURKISH EMBASSY
- 24. BANK-E OMRAN
- 25. F R G EMBASSY
- 26. IMPERIAL ORGANIZATION FOR SOCIAL SERVICES
- 27. SANATI ZADEH MUSEUM
- 28. POST OFFICE (CENTRAL)
- 29. POST CUSTOMS
- 30. MINISTRY OF POWER AND WATER
- 31. NIOC HOSPITAL
- 32. SCHOOL (NFI)

*Consulate  
Security  
Iran Air  
ANNEX*


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 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By [REDACTED]  
 Declassified ON OADR

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




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
IRAKIAN ARM  
ORDNANCE  
DEPT.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Declassified by  
DDO N mcc  
15 Jul 92

11/29/79  
692-633  
G. 412C

SUMMARY OF ROOF ANALYSIS (WAREHOUSE)

- WAREHOUSE ROOF WAS NOT DESIGNED TO SUPPORT HELICOPTER LOADING. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE DESIGN LIVE LOAD WAS 390 kg/m<sup>2</sup> THE CAPACITY OF THE ROOF BEAM JOISTS AND GIRDERS, AND BUILDING COLUMNS IS FULLY LOADED SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ONE OR MORE CH55D HELICOPTERS (OR EQUIVALENT) AT ANY ORIENTATION ON THE BUILDING ROOF.

ELASTIC ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE ROOF BEAM JOISTS WILL BE STRESSED ABOVE DESIGN ALLOWABLE FOR WORST CASE WHEEL LOADING, BUT PLASTIC ANALYSIS INDICATES A LARGE RESERVE CAPACITY.

- AS A RESULT OF NORMAL SPACING REQUIRED BY ROTORS OF ADJACENT HELICOPTERS, LANDING OF MORE THAN ONE HELICOPTERS WILL NOT CREATE ANY SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ROOF STRUCTURAL SYSTEM

- BECAUSE OF ROOF COVERING CONSTRUCTION, THE COVERING MAY BECOME DEPRESSED UNDER THE WHEELS, THERE

Classified By  
Declassify On: ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(2)

11/29/79

CKW

WOULD BE NO DANGER OF ROOF PENETRATION.

- ADDITIONAL ROOF LOADING AS A RESULT OF PEOPLE WALKING IN VICINITY OF HELICOPTER WILL NOT CREATE A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM IN ROOF.

~~SECRET~~





G426

THE JOINT STAFF

19 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Reaction Capability

1. ( [redacted] ) reported that IIAF fighters airborne on CAP would likely be the first aircraft to respond to a significant threat to Mehrabad. Follow-on fighters would come from Shahrokhi. Finally, Mehrabad fighters would launch.

2. ( [redacted] ) Request DIA evaluation of fighter reaction directly from a CAP orbit, assuming Mehrabad does not go to "Red Alert" until H-Hour.

a. Reaction Times:

(1) Full fuel load when alerted.

(2) Air-refuel required before approach to Tehran.

b. Expected aircraft numbers and mix, i.e. F-4's alone or mix of F-4's/F-14's.

c. Will tanker maintain orbit or move closer to Tehran.

d. Which CAP will provide the fighters.

e. Considering the propensity for Iranian fighters to avoid air-to-air engagements with Iraqi aircraft, probability that CAP fighters will actually engage US aircraft.

[redacted]

Major, USA

G

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO \_\_\_\_\_

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

G422

7 August 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: FBI Liaison

1. (TS) During RICEBOWL planning in 1979, several reports were received that American students in U.S. universities were in telephone contact with the Iranian militants holding the U.S. hostages in Iran.
2. (U) Recent news reporting indicates that Iranian activists in the U.S. are now in telephone contact with the militants and are receiving funding from Iran.
3. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ The Iranian activist groups, themselves, and international telephone conversations between Iranian/U.S. personnel in CONUS and the militants in Iran would seem to be lucrative sources of intelligence concerning the hostages.
4. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Therefore, request DIA obtain any and all available information on hostage locations that the FBI has derived from these sources and provide this data to JTF SNOWBIRD.

RICHARD V. SECORD  
Major General, USAF

Classified By ~~TOP SECRET~~  
Declassified by  
JCS  
OADR  
DDO NMEC  
15 Jul 92

~~TOP SECRET~~



G4130

THE JOINT STAFF

19 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

Subject: Persian Gulf Activity

1. Request DIA provide baseline analysis of daily commercial shipping through the straits of Hormuz into the northern portion of the Persian Gulf.
2. Thereafter, request DIA provide a periodic (every 7-10 days) report on actual ship traffic through the Straits of Hormuz into the northern portion of the Gulf.
3. Information should include:
  - a. Type/category of ship (e.g., tanker, breakbulk cargo, container, RORO).
  - b. Nationality (actual and registry).
  - c. Weight.
  - d. Type cargo.
  - e. Port-of-call in the Gulf (in sequence).
  - f. Length of stay in the Gulf.

[REDACTED]  
Major, USA

*Declassified by  
DDA/mc  
15 Jul 92*

Classified By: **JCS**  
Declassified ON: **OADR**


8 July 1980

MEMORANDUM TO DIA/JSJ-1

Subject: EVIN PRISON

1. Request DIA analysts review existing photo coverage of EVIN PRISON, TEHRAN, approximately 1 image per month and preferably Saturday from November 1979 to present, to determine number of vehicles present. List information by date in the following categories: (1) within the cell block area walls and (2) within the EVIN complex but outside the cellblock area.

2. Request information be provided by COB, 10 Jul 80, if possible.

  
LTCL USAF

G

*Declassified by  
DDDNMC  
15 Jul 92*

~~Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



17 JUL 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL VAUGHT

SUBJECT: Personnel Request (U)

We will be glad to support your request of 15 July 1980. I have directed  
my staff to work out the details with Lt Col [REDACTED]

G

*John B. Marks*  
JOHN B. MARKS, Lt Col, USAF  
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence

*Declassified by  
300 NMC  
15 Jul 91*

~~(Classified By: OJCS  
... ON: DAOR)~~

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON D C

G43



15 JUL 1980

IN

Personnel Support

J-3 Special Operations Division (Major General Vaught)  
Office, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference your memo of 7 July 1980, same subject. Permission is granted to use Mr. [REDACTED] Lt Col [REDACTED] or both as executive agents for the subject project. We are happy to assist you in anyway possible.

*John B. Marks*  
JOHN B. MARKS, Major General, USAF  
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence

*Declassified by  
DDO NMC  
15 Jul 92*

Classified By: OTC  
[REDACTED] ON: [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9300

08 2107  
# 35

Deck

A  
UNSC HP 000  
UNSC HP 00057 OCT 80  
FM CDR 1-75//S-2//  
TO //J-2//  
INFO DELTA

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR EET (STADIUM) (IS)



(u)  
1. (S) THE FOLLOWING ARE EET FOR THE STADIUM NE OF AMERICAN EMBASSY:

- A. WHAT IS COMPOSITION OF GATES INTO STADIUM?
- B. IN WHICH DIRECTION DO THE GATES OPEN?
- C. WHAT TYPE OF LOCKS ARE ON THE GATES?
- D. WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE BUNKER?
- E. HOW MANY PERSONS MAN THE BUNKER?
- F. WHAT TYPE OF WEAPONS ARE THE PERSONNEL EQUIPPED WITH?
- G. ARE ANY OTHER WEAPONS IN THE BUNKER?
- H. WHAT IS THE REACTION TIME OF PERSONNEL IN THE BUNKER TO AN ASSAULT?
- I. WHAT ROUTES ARE THERE FROM THE BUNKER TO STADIUM?
- J. WHAT TIME DOES THE GUARD CHANGE?
- K. WHAT TYPE OF COMMO IS THERE IN THE BUNKER?
- L. WHAT IS THE BASIC LOAD OF ALL WEAPONS IN THE BUNKER?
- M. WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE TENNIS COURTS?
- N. WHAT TYPE OF LIGHTS ARE IN THE STADIUM?
- O. WHAT TYPE OF POLES ARE LIGHTS MOUNTED ON?
- P. WHERE IS THE MAIN SWITCH FOR LIGHTS LOCATED?
- Q. WHAT IS THE WIRING PATTERN IN VICINITY OF STADIUM?
- R. WHAT TYPE OBSTACLES ARE IN VICINITY OF STADIUM?
- S. WHEN IS STADIUM LIGHTED?
- T. WHAT TYPE OF GLARE IS USED IN LIGHTS?
- U. WHAT IS COMPOSITION (HEIGHT, THICKNESS, MATERIAL) OF WALL AROUND SPORTS COMPLEX?
- V. ARE THERE ANY BARRIERS ON THE WALL?
- W. WHAT IS TRAFFIC DENSITY ON STREETS IN IMMEDIATE AREA OF STADIUM FROM D-1 HOUR TO D PLUS 3 HOURS?
- X. WHAT IS PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC IN VICINITY OF STADIUM FROM D-1HR TO D PLUS 3 HRS?
- Y. ARE THERE ANY SECURITY ELEMENTS WITHIN SPORTS COMPLEX?
- Z. ARE THERE ANY OBSTACLES WITHIN STADIUM?
- AA. WHAT IS HEIGHT OF PRESS BOX ABOVE GROUND?
- BB. WHERE ARE ENTRANCES TO PRESS BOX?
- CC. WHAT TYPE OF LOCKS ARE ON THE ENTRANCES?
- DD. HOW IS ACCESS TO ROOF OF PRESS BOX GAINED?

2. (S) REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (PHOTOS, REACTION STUDIES, TROOP STRENGTHS, ETC.) CONCERNING TEHRAN AND FORCES LOCATED THEREIN. REQUIRE THIS INFORMATION GLT 14 OCT 80.

RVW OR OCT 80  
BT

Classified by  
750 NMEC  
15 Jul 92  
Declassify on: OADR



MSG 116  
DTG: 101610Z OCT 80  
FM: [REDACTED]  
TO: 475TH [REDACTED]  
INFO: DELTA/2  
BT

6551

SUBJ: FBI  
A. HQ MSG, 091825Z OCT, RM SAB  
B. HQ MSG, 092005Z OCT, RM SUBJ: REQUEST FOR FBI (STADIUM) (IS)

1. (U) (THIS PARA RESPONDS TO FBI CONTAINED IN PARAS D-1- K, L, PEF B) BUNKERS REFERRED TO IN REFS ARE ACTUALLY SANDBAGGED PSNS, 3-5 FEET HIGH. THEY NORMALLY HAVE NO OVERHEAD COVER, ALTHOUGH UMBRELLAS ARE SOMETIMES USED FOR PROTECTION FROM THE ELEMENTS. THE PSNS HAVE AN ENTRANCE ON THE SIDE, WIDE ENOUGH FOR 1 PERSON. THE SANDRAG POSITIONS ARE MANNED BY USUALLY 1, SOMETIMES 2 GUARDS, ARMED WITH A RIFLE (USUALLY G-3) AND PERHAPS PISTOLS. AMOUNT OF AVAILABLE AMMO IS UNKNOWN ALTHOUGH MOST GUARDS AT THE EMBASSY HAVE BEEN SEEN WITH ONLY 1 MAGAZINE FOR THEIR WEAPONS. REPORTS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE PSNS MAY BE LINKED BY LADDLINE TO A LOCATION INSIDE THE EMBASSY (WIRES GO OVER THE WALL.) THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT PERSONNEL IN THESE PSNS HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY MEASURES AT THE STADIUM. MORE THAN LIKELY, THEIR SOLE RESPONSIBILITY IS THE EMBASSY. IF THEY MOVE FROM THE PSNS TO THE STADIUM THEY WILL PROBABLY GO DIRECTLY ACROSS ROOSEVELT. SPECIFIC REACTION TIMES ARE UNKNOWN, BUT PERSONNEL IN THE PSNS WILL PROBABLY RETURN FIRE FROM THEIR PSN WHEN FIRED UPON.

2. (THIS PARA ADDRESSES FBI A, B, C, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, DD REF B) TENNIS COURTS AT THE EMBASSY ARE CEMENT. TENNIS COURTS AT THE STADIUM COMPLEX ARE EITHER CEMENT, PAINTED ASPHALT OR POSSIBLY CLAY. STADIUM LIGHTING IS PROBABLY MERCURY OR SODIUM VAPOR. THE FOUR LIGHTING POLES FOR THE STADIUM ARE OF GIRDERED DERRICK TYPE CONSTRUCTION APPROXIMATELY 93 FEET ABOVE THE PLAYING FIELD. THE MAIN LIGHT SWITCH AND WIRING VICINITY THE STADIUM IS UNKNOWN. WIRING FOR STADIUM LIGHTS IS UNDERGROUNDED. THERE HAVE BEEN NO OBSTACLES NOTED IN VICINITY OF THE STADIUM. IN THE PAST THE STADIUM HAS BEEN LIGHTED DURING ATHLETIC EVENTS OCCURRING DURING THE NIGHT OR PERIODS OF REDUCED VISIBILITY. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE WAR AND IMPOSED BLACKOUT OF TEHRAN IT IS NOT BEING USED FOR NIGHT ACTIVITIES OR LIGHTED AT NIGHT. GLASS FOR THE LIGHTS WOULD BE TRANSLUCENT AND NOT BULLET PROOF. THE EXACT DIMENSIONS OF THE WALL AROUND THE STADIUM COMPLEX IS NOT KNOWN BUT HAS BEEN TASKED FOR STUDY. THERE HAVE BEEN NO BARBED WIRE NOTED ON THE WALL, THE MAIN STADIUM GATE ON THE WEST SIDE IS ON ROLLERS NOT HINGES AND IS LARGE ENOUGH TO PASS VEHICLE TRAFFIC. THE GATE AT THE SW CORNER IS ONLY LARGE ENOUGH FOR PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC. ALL GATES ARE HEAVY WROUGHT IRON AND THE LOCKING MECHANISMS ARE UNKNOWN. VEHICULAR AND PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC IN THE STADIUM WAS EXTREMELY LIGHT TO NON-EXISTANT AFTER 2200 HRS PRIOR TO THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. DUE TO THE WAR, SHORTAGE OF PETRO AND BLACKOUTS, EXPECTED TRAFFIC CAN BE LESS THAN BEFORE. NO SECURITY ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN NOTED WITHIN THE STADIUM. HOWEVER THE PRESENCE OF SOME SECURITY GUARDS WOULD NOT BE UNLIKELY. NO OBSTACLES OF ANY TYPE HAVE BEEN NOTED WITHIN THE STADIUM. THE PRESS BOX IS 35 FEET ABOVE THE ROAD. ON EITHER SIDE OF THE PRESS BOX THERE APPEARS TO BE A RAMP POSSIBLY LEADING DOWN TO STREET LEVEL. ACCESS DOORS TO PRESS BOX CANNOT BE DETERMINED. ACCESS TO THE ROOF MAY BE OBTAINED AT THE SIDES OF THE PRESS BOX AT THE TOP OF THE BLEACHER SEATING. THERE APPEARS TO BE NO STAIRWAY OR LADDER LEADING TO THE ROOF. THE FORWARD PORTION OF THE PRESS BOX ROOF DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE LEVEL OR USED BY PHOTOGRAPHERS IN THE FASHION OF STADIUM PRESS BOX ROOFS IN THE US SINCE THERE DOESNT APPEAR TO BE ANY TYPE OF FENCE AROUND THE ROOF.

3. (U) RECOMMEND YOU CONTACT THE DELTA 2 DIRECTLY FOR TRANSFER AND SHIFING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON THE COMPOUND EXTERNALS AND STADIUM THAT DELTA HOLDS. IF NECESSARY A MEETING TO SERVE THIS PURPOSE SHOULD BE MUTUALLY AGREED TO AND INCLUDE JTF/2 REPRESENTATIVE.

4. (U) POC MAIL [REDACTED] /CPT [REDACTED], AV 2255075/5805.  
EVM 10 OCT 80  
BT

Classified by  
DDO NMC 15 JUL 9  
[REDACTED]



XMITT

553

A

1. (U) THE USE OF SOIL PENETROMETERS IS A COMMON METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE SHEARING STRENGTH OF SOILS IN THE FIELD. THE PENETROMETER IS A DEVICE WHICH MEASURES THE RESISTANCE OF THE SOIL TO PENETRATION BY A CONE OF DEFINITE SIZE AND WEIGHT. THE DATA IS PROVIDED BY:

2. (U) THE PENETROMETER IS OPERATED BY THE FIELD OPERATOR WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROPER POSITIONING OF THE PENETROMETER. THE PENETROMETER IS HELD AGAINST THE SOIL BY A CEMENT PLATE IS PLACED ON THE 1" TRENCH AND CONSIDERED TO BE AN INDEX OF THE SHEARING RESISTANCE OF THE SOIL AND IS CALLED THE CONE INDEX OF THE SOIL IN THAT PLANE.

3. (U) EVEN THOUGH SOIL PENETROMETERS CAN PROVIDE AN ACCURATE MEASURE OF SOIL SHEARING STRENGTH (CBR - CALIFORNIA BEARING RATING), MORE ACCURATE CLASSIFICATION CAN BE OBTAINED THROUGH THE USE OF PISTON SAMPLES AND AUGERED HOLES. PENETROMETERS CAN BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THESE TECHNIQUES TO DETERMINE AHEAD OF TIME FOR SOIL LAYERS BELOW THE SURFACE. AN ALTERNATE METHOD TO DETERMINE SHEARING STRENGTH BELOW THE SURFACE WOULD BE TO EXCAVATE HOLES WITH A SHOVEL OR PICK AND TAKE PENETROMETER READINGS PROGRESSIVELY DEEPER INTO THE HOLES. DEPTH BELOW SURFACE AND READINGS MUST BE CAREFULLY RECORDED FOR ANALYSIS. PISTON SAMPLES AND LOOSE SAMPLES OBTAINED BY AUGER CAN BE ANALYZED FOR COMPACTION AND MOISTURE CONTENT. THE USE OF ALL THREE METHODS, SOIL PENETROMETER, PISTON SAMPLES, AND LOOSE SAMPLE FROM SURFACE IS THE IDEAL METHOD FOR ANALYZING THE STRENGTH OF THE SOIL IN A GIVEN GENERAL AREA.

4. (U) THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS HAS AND TEACHES THE USE OF THE PENETROMETER SUPPLIED IN THEIR TEST SET, SOIL COMPACTABILITY (CAN 6635.0524125A).

5. (U) ADDITIONAL SOIL PENETROMETERS ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH SCIENTIFIC, INC., 2205 LEE ST, EVANSTON, IL 60222. TWO PARTICULAR MODELS WITH POSSIBLE APPLICATION ARE THE POCKET PENETROMETER MODEL CL-700 AND THE SM 155 GEOSTICK.

6. (U) PRICE AND AVAILABILITY THROUGH A LOCAL DISTRIBUTOR IS AS FOLLOWS, SO. OF THE POCKET PENETROMETER AND GEOSTICK ARE:  
POCKET PENETROMETER - 37.72 ON HAND  
GEOSTICK - 215.00 - 3-4 WEEK ORDER

7. (U) PLEASE INFORM [REDACTED] OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS AND DESIRED [REDACTED].

Classified by  
DPO NMC 15 Jul 92

G 559

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EA 12358  
CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO nmcc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OAOR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

MSG NBR 158  
O 151430Z OCT 80  
DELTA/INTEL  
TO JCS/SNOWBIRD/J-2  
BT


SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED EEI/OIR (U)

1. (S) A REVIEW OF DELTA'S STANDING EEI/OIR HAS BEEN MADE IN LIGHT OF ADDITIONAL MISSION GUIDANCE AND INFORMATION PROVIDED TO DATE. THE FOLLOWING IS A CONSOLIDATED LISTING OF PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED AND NEW EEI/OIR. NEW EEI/OIR ARE MARKED WITH AN ASTERISK (\*).

PROVIDE STRAY CAL REPORTS

FOR ALL LOCATIONS.

[REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~

TOP SECRET  
061640Z  
J-2 ACTION

MSG : 0016  
DTG : 061250Z MAY 80  
FROM : CDR SFOD-D//S-2//  
TO : COMJTF//J-2//  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: ~~SECRET~~ ACCESS POLICY

1. (U) OPERATIONAL MEMBERS OF THIS UNIT WERE GIVEN ONE TIME ACCESS FOR THE DURATION OF RICEBOWL/EAGLE CLAW. AS YOU KNOW, THIS GREATLY FACILITATED OPERATIONAL PLANNING - IN SHORT VERY LITTLE COULD HAVE BEEN DONE AT TACTICAL LEVEL WITHOUT THIS ACCESS.
2. (U) DELTA SELF IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON HARD COPY ~~SECRET~~ DOCUMENTS. NONE WERE CARRIED FORWARD OF ~~SECRET~~. NO RESTRICTIONS WERE IMPOSED UPON THE UNIT BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND THIS ALLOWED FOR THE MAXIMUM IN FLEXIBILITY. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF SNOW BIRD, SOME DIRECTION MAY BE DESIRED.
3. (U) REQUEST GUIDANCE AS TO GROUND RULES FOR THE PROTECTION OF COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION INCLUDING DECOMPARTMENTATION PROCEDURES DURING THE PLANNING OF THIS OPTION.

REVW 06MAY00  
BT

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO J.m.c.  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM Multiple sources

~~SECRET~~

G568

MSG : 0025  
DTG : 121319Z MAY 80  
FROM: SFOD-D//S-2//  
TO : : COMJTF//J-2//  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SHARING INTEL WITH 4TH PSYOPS GROUP, FT. BRAGG, N.C.

1. (S) (U) 4TH PSYOPS GROUP HAS APPROACHED S-2 DELTA AND INDICATED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN TASKED TO WRITE A COMPREHENSIVE PSYOPS PLAN FOR IRAN BY COMJTF. THEY HAVE REQUESTED DIRECT EXCHANGE OF INTEL WITH DELTA IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION.

2. (S) (U) DELTA S-2 WILL PER PHONCON THIS DATE WITH JTF J2, PROVIDE M  
G [REDACTED] 4TH PSYOP GROUP S-2, WITH JTF INSUMS COVERING THE LAST 30  
DAYS.

REVM 12MAY00  
BT

NNNN

Declassified by  
DAN MCC 15 Jul 97

~~SECRET~~

G571

A ~~(S)~~ TO [REDACTED] OCT 80  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
TO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

SUBJ: ~~(S)~~ ACCESS TO SNOWBIRD ~~(S)~~ INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC

REF: ~~(U)~~ [REDACTED] MSG DTG 071255Z SEP 80. SUBJ: SECURITY OF INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC

1. ~~(U)~~ THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL FROM 1-75TH HAVE ACCESS TO SNOW- BIRD ~~(S)~~ INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC:

NAME	SSN	RANK	POSITION
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	LTC	BN CDR
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	LTC	2N XO (LNC)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	MAJ	3N XO
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	MAJ	S-2
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	MAJ	S-3
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	CPT	S-4
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	CPT	HHC CC. CDR
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	CPT	A CC. CDR
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	CPT	E CC. CDR
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	CPT	C CC. CDR

2. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL FROM 24TH ID (M) HAVE ACCESS TO SNOW- BIRD ~~(S)~~ INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC:

4. CDR, 24TH ID (M), MG COCHRAN

5. ADCM, 24TH ID (M), BG STOTSER

3. ~~(U)~~ CPT [REDACTED] 902D MI GROUP AUG-  
MENTED TO THE 1-75TH, ALSO HAS SNOWBIRD ~~(S)~~ INTELLIGENCE  
7. [REDACTED] ACCESS.

6. ~~(U)~~ THE ABOVE NAMED INDIVIDUALS ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO ALL SNOW- BIRD ~~(S)~~ INFORMATION FOUND IN MESSAGE TRAFFIC.

FROM 2 OCT 80

Classified by:  
DBENMCC 15 Jul 92  
[Signature]

~~SECRET~~

G 572

G [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC.

REF: SOURCE: NSG 255, DTG 071056Z SEP 81.

1. (U) REFERENCE MESSAGE REQUIRED NOTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS AS TO SENSITIVITY OF SNOOPED INTELLIGENCE. THE FOLLOWING REFLECTS THOSE INDIVIDUALS ALLOWED ACCESS TO SNOOPED INTELLIGENCE TRAFFIC:

G [REDACTED]

2. (U) ALL PERSONNEL LISTED ABOVE POSSESS A TOP SECRET CLEARANCE WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE (SCI) GRANTED BY SPECIAL SECURITY GROUP (SSG) IN COMPLIANCE WITH APPROPRIATE REGULATIONS.

REVW 01 OCT 80  
BT

NNNN

Declassified by  
DDO NMCC 15 Jul 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Item Number: 9574

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Geodetic Data Point Reduction

TIMEFRAME: NOV 79 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (TS) J2 tasked DMAAC to provide precise coordinates for specified locations in Iran, for navigation and planning.
2. (TS) DMAAC utilizing satellite imagery and computerized Geodetic Data Point Reduction Methods Products locations in chart related, <sup>G</sup>WGS-72, and European Datums and UTM coords.
3. (TS) Locations difficult to describe precisely required J2 to provide DMAAC <sup>by</sup> annotated photographs pinpointing the location.
4. (TS) Even though computerized, this process is very manpower intensive because imagery must be selected and points located manually so that the computer can provide data.

COMMENTS:

1. (TS) DMAAC provided data point reductions for pre and post 24 April 1980 planning.
2. (TS) Data point reductions are highly manpower intensive and may require liaison to DMAAC in St. Louis, MO.
3. (TS) Due to the nature of work and impact on programmed projects maximum leadtime available should be allotted to DMAAC.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: ~~JOS~~ <sup>DDO NMCC</sup>  
 Declassified ON: ~~OSD~~ <sup>ISSUE</sup> OADR  
 Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL  
 DD NMCC  
 2.292

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ That DMAAC be used to provide precise data point reduction coordinates if mission planning time allows.
2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ That if used, the most precise and specific details be provided DMAAC for reduction.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED] Cpt [REDACTED]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DMA - Col [REDACTED] HQ DMA - 254-4445

DMAAC - Mr. [REDACTED] DMAAC (314) 263-4806 (AV) 693

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Pre 24 Apr 80 Data Reduced Coordinate Reference Points
2. Post 24 Apr 80 Data Reduced Coordinate Reference Points

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

POINT RF -

NW END OF RUNWAY - MANZARIYEH AFLI

a. WGS-72 Datum

(1) Coords:  $34^{\circ}59'22.0"N$   $050^{\circ}47'21.4"E$

(2) Horiz. Acc. 75 Ft.

(3) MSL Elev. 2985 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 75 Ft.

b. European Datum

(1) Coords:  $34^{\circ}59'26.0"N$   $050^{\circ}47'21.5"E$

(2) Horiz. Acc. 75 Ft.

(3) MSL Elev. 2985 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 75 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

(1) JOG NI 39-6, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971

(2) Coords:  $34^{\circ}59'00"N$   $050^{\circ}47'15"E$

POINT RF -

SE END OF RUNWAY - MANZARIYEH AFLI

a. WGS-72 Datum

(1) Coords:  $34^{\circ}58'41.5"N$   $050^{\circ}49'22.3"E$

(2) Horiz. Acc. 75 Ft.

(3) MSL Elev. 2895 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 75 Ft.

b. European Datum

(1) Coords:  $34^{\circ}58'45.5"N$   $050^{\circ}49'22.5"E$

(2) Horiz. Acc. 75 Ft.


(3) MSL Elev. 2895 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 75 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

(1) JOG NI 39-6, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971

(2) Coords:  $34^{\circ}58'25"N$   $050^{\circ}49'15"E$

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~



**SECRET NO FORTY**

TCT / 15 15 30 Z  
AB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG 282

151330Z FEB 80

FM: JTF/J-2  
TO: 1 SOW/A-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: DMA DATA REDUCED COORDINATES (U)

REF: YR MSG 031 DTG 052100Z FEB 80

(C) 1. REF DATA FOR RUNWAYS AT [REDACTED] FOLLOWS.

POINT RF - END OF RUNWAY [REDACTED]

- A. WGS-72 DATUM
  - (1) COORDS: [REDACTED]
  - (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75 [REDACTED]
  - (3) MSL ELEV. [REDACTED], MSL VERT. ACC. 80 [REDACTED]
- E B. EUROPEAN DATUM
  - (1) COORDS: [REDACTED]
  - (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75 [REDACTED]
  - (3) MSL ELEV. [REDACTED], MSL VERT. ACC. 80 [REDACTED]
- C. CHAPT RELATE DATA
  - (1) JOGRNG [REDACTED] ED, DATE MAR 75 [REDACTED]
  - (2) COORDS: [REDACTED]

POINT RF - END OF RUNWAY [REDACTED]

- A. WGS-72 DATUM
  - (1) COORDS: [REDACTED]
  - (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75 [REDACTED]
  - (3) MSL ELEV. [REDACTED], MSL VEPT. ACC. 80 [REDACTED]
- E B. EUROPEAN DATUM
  - (1) COORDS: [REDACTED]
  - (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75 [REDACTED]
  - (3) MSL ELEV. [REDACTED], MSL VEPT. ACC. 80 [REDACTED]
- C. CHAPT RELATED DATA
  - (1) JOGPNG [REDACTED] ED DATE MAR 75 [REDACTED]
  - (2) COORDS: [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) POINT RF - END OF RUNWAY [REDACTED]

E

- A. WGS-72 DATUM
  - (1) COORDS: [REDACTED]
  - (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75 [REDACTED]
  - (3) MSL ELEV. [REDACTED], MSL VERT. ACC. 80 [REDACTED]
- P. EUROPEAN DATUM
  - (1) COORDS: [REDACTED]
  - (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75 [REDACTED]
  - (3) MSL ELEV. [REDACTED], MSL VERT. ACC. 80 [REDACTED]
- C. CHART RELATED DATA
  - (1) JOGRNG [REDACTED] ED. DATE MAR 75
  - (2) COORDS: [REDACTED]

POINT RF - END OF RUNWAY [REDACTED]

E

- A. WGS-72 DATUM
  - (1) COORDS: [REDACTED]
  - (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75 [REDACTED]
  - (3) MSL ELEV. [REDACTED], MSL VERT. ACC. 80 [REDACTED]
- P. EUROPEAN DATUM
  - (1) COORDS: [REDACTED]
  - (2) HORIZ. ACC. 75 [REDACTED]
  - (3) MSL ELEV. [REDACTED], MSL VERT. ACC. 80 [REDACTED]
- C. CHART RELATED DATA
  - (1) JOGRNG [REDACTED] ED. DATE MAR 75
  - (2) COORDS: [REDACTED]

REVW 15 FEB 2010

NNNN

POINT REF - /

- a. WGS-72 Datum - NW POINT OF LAND
  - (1) Coords: 25° 26' 40.8" N 059° 15' 21.9" E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 108 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 0 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 15 Ft.
- b. European Datum
  - (1) Coords: 25° 26' 45.4" N 059° 15' 21.4" E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 108 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 0 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 15 Ft.
- c. Chart Related Data
  - (1) JOG NG 40-12, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1962
  - (2) Coords: 25° 27' 10" N 059° 15' 10" E

POINT REF - /A INTERSECTION OF ROAD + TRAIL

- a. WGS-72 Datum
  - (1) Coords: 25° 37' 11.1" N 059° 14' 01.1" E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 108 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 59 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 96 Ft.
- b. European Datum
  - (1) Coords: 25° 37' 15.7" N 059° 14' 00.5" E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 108 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 59 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 96 Ft.
- c. Chart Related Data
  - (1) JOG NG 40-12, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1962
  - (2) Coords: 25° 37' 10" N 059° 14' 00" E

~~SECRET~~

POINT RF -2 WEST TIP OF LAND IN DRY LAKE \*

a. NGS-72 Datum ←

- (1) Coords: 27° 32' 41.9" N 058° 58' 50.6" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 1144 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

b. European Datum ←

- (1) Coords: 27° 32' 46.4" N 058° 58' 50.1" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 1144 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data ←

- (1) JOG NG 40-4, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
- (2) Coords: 27° 33' 20" N 059° 01' 20" E

POINT RF -2A INTERSECTION OF TWO STREAMS \*\*

a. NGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 27° 39' 17.5" N 059° 02' 08.2" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 1169 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 27° 39' 22.0" N 059° 02' 07.6" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 1169 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NG 40-4, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
- (2) Coords: 27° 39' 20" N 059° 02' 10" E

\* NO VILLAGE DISCERNIBLE  
\* ROADS NOT VISIBLE

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(2)

POINT RF - 3

ISOLATED PEAK (SPOT ELEV. 1998)\*

- a. NGS-72 Datum ~~2017-11-13 10:10:10~~
  - (1) Coords: 28° 55' 54.6"N 059° 06' 20.9"E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 1946 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- b. European Datum
  - (1) Coords: 28° 55' 59.0"N 059° 06' 20.3"E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 1946 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- c. Chart Related Data
  - (1) JOG NH 40-16, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
  - (2) Coords: 28° 55' 55"N 059° 07' 05"E

POINT RF - 3A MILE NADERI RUINED TOWER

- a. NGS-72 Datum
  - (1) Coords: 29° 04' 39.0"N 059° 08' 51.6"E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 1627 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- b. European Datum
  - (1) Coords: 29° 04' 43.4"N 059° 08' 51.0"E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 109 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 1627 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- c. Chart Related Data
  - (1) JOG NH 40-12, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
  - (2) Coords: 29° 04' 35"N 059° 09' 05"E

\* ORIGINAL REF. COORDS. IN ERROR.

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POINT RF - 4 DARBAND AFLD EAST END RUNWAY

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 31° 46' 33.5 N 057° 00' 11.5 E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 114 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2097 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 31° 46' 37.8 N 057° 00' 11.1 E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 114 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2097 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NH 40-3, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
- (2) Coords: 31° 47' 25" N 057° 00' 45" E

POINT RF - 4A DARBAND VOR\*

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 31° 47' 01.2 N 056° 59' 33.2 E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 114 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2088 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 31° 47' 05.5 N 056° 59' 32.8 E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 114 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2088 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 77 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NH 40-3, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1969
- (2) Coords: 31° 47' 40" N 057° 00' 20" E

\* VOR DOES NOT EXIST AT ~~THIS~~ FURNISHED REF COORDS.



POINT RF - **4B**

~~SECRET~~  
INTERSECTION OF ROAD + TRAIL

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords:  $33^{\circ} 04' 33.2'' N$   $055^{\circ} 45' 35.7'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 119 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2536 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 79 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords:  $33^{\circ} 04' 37.4'' N$   $055^{\circ} 45' 35.4'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 119 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2536 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 79 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 40-10, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords:  $33^{\circ} 04' 35'' N$   $055^{\circ} 45' 35'' E$

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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(6)

POINT RF - 5

- a. WGS-72 Datum *INTERSECTION OF HIGHWAY & ROAD\**
- (1) Coords:  $33^{\circ} 04' 35.6'' N$   $053^{\circ} 24' 39.9'' E$
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 106 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 3506 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- b. European Datum
- (1) Coords:  $33^{\circ} 04' 39.8'' N$   $053^{\circ} 24' 39.8'' E$
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 106 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 3506 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- c. Chart Related Data
- (1) JOG NI 39-12, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1971
  - (2) Coords:  $33^{\circ} 04' 40'' N$   $053^{\circ} 24' 40'' E$

POINT RF - 5A

- a. WGS-72 Datum *TELEPHONE/ROAD CROSS OVER PT*
- (1) Coords:  $33^{\circ} 08' 18.0'' N$   $053^{\circ} 29' 31.1'' E$
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 106 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 3232 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- b. European Datum
- (1) Coords:  $33^{\circ} 08' 22.2'' N$   $053^{\circ} 29' 31.0'' E$
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 106 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 3232 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- c. Chart Related Data
- (1) JOG NI 39-12, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1971
  - (2) Coords:  $33^{\circ} 08' 20'' N$   $053^{\circ} 29' 40'' E$

\* A/F NOT VISIBLE.

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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(7)

POINT RF - **5B** WEST END SEMNAN NEW AFLD

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 22' 53.0'' N$   $053^{\circ} 39' 07.8'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 100 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 3665 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 22' 57.0'' N$   $053^{\circ} 39' 07.7'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 106 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 3665 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-4, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 23' 50'' N$   $053^{\circ} 40' 15'' E$

POINT RF - **6** CAVANSERY RUINS

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 15' 39.2'' N$   $052^{\circ} 10' 59.2'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2957 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 15' 43.2'' N$   $052^{\circ} 10' 59.9'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2957 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 15' 45'' N$   $052^{\circ} 10' 50'' E$

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN ENTITIES

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(8)

POINT RF - **6A** ROAD BRIDGE \*

a. NGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 14' 28.5" N 052° 13' 09.7" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2841 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 14' 32.5" N 052° 13' 09.8" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2841 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NJ 39-3, Ed. 1 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords: 35° 14' 30" N 052° 13' 15" E

\* POINT RF - **6B**

a. NGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords:
- (2) Horiz. Acc. Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords:
- (2) Horiz. Acc. Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG , Ed. Ed. Date
- (2) Coords:

\* To BE DACOM 20 DEC 79

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POINT RF - 7

TRAIL + ROAD INTERSECTION

a. WGS-72 Datum

(1) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 55' 39.4'' N$   $052^{\circ} 00' 49.3'' E$

(2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.

(3) MSL Elev. 2765 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

(1) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 55' 43.4'' N$   $052^{\circ} 00' 49.3'' E$

(2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.

(3) MSL Elev. 2765 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

(1) JOG NI 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971

(2) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 55' 45'' N$   $052^{\circ} 00' 50'' E$

\* NEW DMARC PT. BRIDGE DID NOT EXIST AT  
FURNISHED REF. COORDS.

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

~~SECRET~~

(9)

POINT RF - 7A

TRAIL INTERSECTION

a. NGS-72 Datum

(1) Coords: 34° 49' 00.3N 052° 03' 47.2E

(2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.

(3) MSL Elev. 2748 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 74 Ft.

b. European Datum

(1) Coords: 34° 49' 04.4N 052° 03' 47.2E

(2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.

(3) MSL Elev. 2748 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 74 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

(1) JOG NI 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971

(2) Coords: 34° 49' 45"N 052° 03' 55"E

POINT RF - 7B

POINT ALONG SIGNIFICANT STREAM \*  
ADJACENT TO DRY LAKE BED (NORTH SHORE)

a. NGS-72 Datum

(1) Coords: 34° 46' <sup>41.0</sup> ~~40.0~~ N 051° 54' 59.6E

(2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.

(3) MSL Elev. 2634 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

(1) Coords: 34° 46' 45.0N 051° 54' 59.6E

(2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.

(3) MSL Elev. 2634 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

(1) JOG NI 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971

\* (2) Coords: 34° 46' 45"N 051° 52' 30"E

\* DMARC SELECTED POINTS ARE EAST OF  
FURNISHED COORDS.

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(7C)

POINT RF - 7C

POINT ALONG SIGNIFICANT STREAM  
ADJACENT TO DRY LAKE BED (NORTH SHORE) \*

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 34° 47' 47.9" N 051° 52' 45.2" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2547 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 34° 47' 52.0" N 051° 52' 45.3" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2547 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- \* (2) Coords: 34° 47' 35" N 051° 51' 30" E

POINT RF - 7D

INTERSECTION CONTOUR LINE 3285 &  
STREAM BED

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 34° 52' 31.1" N 051° 53' 31.0" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- \* (3) MSL Elev. 3268 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 34° 52' 35.2" N 051° 53' 31.1" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 3268 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords: 34° 52' 45" N 051° 53' 30" E

\* DMAAC SELECTED POINTS ARE EAST  
OF FURNISHED COORDS.

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\* POINT RF - **8** POINT WHERE DRAIN CROSSES 2625 CONDUIT

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 53' 15.8'' N$   $051^{\circ} 44' 46.8'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 26.26 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 53' 19.8'' N$   $051^{\circ} 44' 46.8'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 26.26 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 53' 20'' N$   $051^{\circ} 44' 47'' E$

POINT RF - **8A** ISOLATED PEAK (3960)

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 59' 31.0'' N$   $051^{\circ} 43' 23.0'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 3935 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 59' 35.0'' N$   $051^{\circ} 43' 23.1'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 3935 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-7, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 59' 35'' N$   $051^{\circ} 43' 20'' E$

\* DMAAC SELECTED POINT. COULD NOT LOCATE POINT DESCRIBED.



~~SECRET~~

(12)

POINT RF - 9

RAILROAD BRIDGE OVER STREAM

a. NGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 10' 40.4'' N$   $051^{\circ} 56' 20.5'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2651 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 74 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 10' 44.4'' N$   $051^{\circ} 56' 20.6'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 110 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2651 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 74 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 10' 40'' N$   $051^{\circ} 56' 20'' E$

POINT RF - 9A

CENTER OF CHANDAB VILLAGE

a. NGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 25' 25.2'' N$   $051^{\circ} 56' 05.5'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 3772 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 25' 29.2'' N$   $051^{\circ} 56' 05.6'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 3772 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords:  $35^{\circ} 25' 25'' N$   $051^{\circ} 56' 05'' E$

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POINT RF - ~~88~~ CENTER OF SANGAREYUM VILLAGE

- a. WGS-72 Datum
  - (1) Coords: 35° 41' 15.9" N 051° 42' 01.1" E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 4601 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- b. European Datum
  - (1) Coords: 35° 41' 19.8" N 051° 42' 01.2" E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 4601 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- c. Chart Related Data
  - (1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
  - (2) Coords: 35° 41' 15" N 051° 42' 00" E

POINT RF - ~~90~~ NORTHEAST CORNER OF NARMAK

- a. WGS-72 Datum
  - (1) Coords: ~~35° 45' 07.7" N~~ 35° 45' 07.7" N 051° 30' 26.4" E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 4524 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- b. European Datum
  - (1) Coords: 35° 45' 11.7" N 051° 30' 26.5" E
  - (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
  - (3) MSL Elev. 4524 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.
- c. Chart Related Data
  - (1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
  - (2) Coords: 35° 45' 25" N 051° 30' 35" E

POINT RF - **10** CENTER OF STADIUM TO EAST OF EMBA:

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 42' 38.2" N 051° 25' 38.0" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 4043 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 42' 42.2" N 051° 25' 38.1" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 4043 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords: 35° 42' 40" N 051° 25' 30" E

POINT RF - **10A** HIGHWAY JUNCTION

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 43' 49.8" N 051° 25' 36.4" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 4260 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 43' 53.8" N 051° 25' 36.5" E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 111 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 4260 Ft.; MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-3, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords: 35° 43' 50" N 051° 25' 30" E

POINT RF - *11* SOUTH END KARAJ AFLD

a. NGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 46' 24.6N 050° 53' 00.6E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 4044 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 73 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 46' 28.5N 050° 53' 00.8E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 4044 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 73 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG *NI39-2*, Ed. *21* Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords: 35° 46' 25"N 050° 53' 05"E

POINT RF - *11A* EAST END KUSHE-NOSRAT AFLD

a. NGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 01' 34.6N 050° 49' 18.6E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2890 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords: 35° 01' 38.6N 050° 49' 18.8E
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2890 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG *NI39-2*, Ed. *1* Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords: 35° 01' 40"N 050° 49' 15"E

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(16)

POINT RF - **11B** CENTER OF PARALLEL TAXIWAY  
MANZARIYEH AFLD

a. WGS-72 Datum

- (1) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 58' 54.1'' N$   $050^{\circ} 48' 17.1'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2986 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

b. European Datum

- (1) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 58' 58.2'' N$   $050^{\circ} 48' 17.3'' E$
- (2) Horiz. Acc. 113 Ft.
- (3) MSL Elev. 2986 Ft., MSL Vert. Acc. 76 Ft.

c. Chart Related Data

- (1) JOG NI 39-6, Ed. 2 Ed. Date 1971
- (2) Coords:  $34^{\circ} 58' 30'' N$   $050^{\circ} 48' 10'' E$

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DATA REDUCED COORDINATE REFERENCE POINTS

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POINT RF: 1 (NW POINT OF LAND)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 25 26' 40".8N 059 15' 21".9E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 108 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 0 FT MSL VERT ACC: 15 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 25 26' 45".4N 059 15' 21".4E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 108 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 0 FT MSL VERT ACC: 15 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NG 40-12 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
- B. COORDS: 25 27' 10"N 059 15' 10"E

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POINT RF: 1A (INTERSECTION OF ROAD AND TRAIL)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 25 37' 11".1N 059 14' 01".1E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 108 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 59 FT MSL VERT ACC: 96 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 25 37' 15".7N 059 14' 00".5E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 108 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 59 FT MSL VERT ACC: 96 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NG 40-12 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
- B. COORDS: 25 37' 10"N 059 14' 00"E

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POINT RF: 2 (WEST TIP OF LAND IN DRY LAKE \*)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 27 32' 41".9N 058 58' 50".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 1144 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT


EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 27 32' 46".4N 058 58' 50".1E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 1144 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NG 40-4 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
- B. COORDS: 27 33' 20"N 059 01' 20"E

\* NO VILLAGE DISCERNIBLE



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POINT RF: 2A (INTERSECTION OF TWO STREAMS \*)

WGS-72 DATUM

A. COORDS: 27 39' 17".5N 059 02' 08".2E

B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT

C. MSL ELEV: 1169 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

A. COORDS: 27 39' 22".0N 059 02' 07".6E

B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT

C. MSL ELEV: 1169 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

A. JOG NG 40-4 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969

B. COORDS: 27 39' 20"N 059 02' 10"E

\* ROADS NOT VISIBLE

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POINT RF: 3 (ISOLATED PEAK--SPOT ELEVATION 1998 \*)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 28 55' 54".6N 059 06' 20".9E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 1946 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 28 55' 59".0N 059 06' 20".3E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 1946 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NH 40-16 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
- B. COORDS: 28 55' 55"N 059 07' 05"E

\* ORIGINAL REF COORDS IN ERROR

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POINT RF: 3A (MILE NADERI RUINED TOWER)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 29 04' 39".0N 059 08' 51".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 1627 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 29 04' 43".4N 059 08' 51".0E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 109 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 1627 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NH 40-12 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
- B. COORDS: 29 04' 35"N 059 09' 05"E

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POINT RF: 4 (DARBAND AIRFIELD EAST END RUNWAY)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 31 46' 33".5N 057 00' 11".5E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 114 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2097 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 31 46' 37".8N 057 00' 11".1E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 114 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2097 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NH 40-3 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
- B. COORDS: 31 47' 25"N 057 00' 45"E

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POINT RF: 4A (DARBAND VOR \*)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 31 47' 01".2N 056 59' 33".2E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 114 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2088 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 31 47' 05".5N 056 59' 32".8E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 114 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2088 FT MSL VERT ACC: 77 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NH 40-3 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1969
- B. COORDS: 31 47' 40"N 057 - 00' 20"E

\* VOR DOES NOT EXIST AT FURNISHED REF COORDS

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POINT RF: 4B (INTERSECTION OF ROAD AND TRAIL)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 04' 33".2N 055 45' 35".7E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 119 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2536 FT MSL VERT ACC: 79 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 04' 37".4N 055 45' 35".4E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 119 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2536 FT MSL VERT ACC: 79 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 40-10 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 33 04' 35"N 055 45' 35"E

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POINT RF: 5 (INTERSECTION OF HIGHWAY AND ROAD \*)

NGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 04' 35".6N 053 24' 39".9E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3506 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 04' 39".8N 053 24' 39".8E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3506 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-12 ED.1 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 33 04' 40"N 053 24' 40"E

\* A/F NOT VISIBLE

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POINT RF: 5A (TELEPHONE/ROAD CROSS-OVER POINT)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 08' 18".0N 053 29' 31".1E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3232 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 08' 22".2N 053 29' 31".0E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3232 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-12 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 33 08' 20"N 053 29' 40"E

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POINT RF: 5B (WEST END, SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 22' 53".0N 053 39' 07".8E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3665 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 22' 57".0N 053 39' 07".7E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 106 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3665 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-4 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 23' 50"N 053 40' 15"E

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POINT RF: 5C (CENTER OF EAST END OF PAVED RUNWAY--NAIN)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 05' 10".0N 053 25' 25".5E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 105 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3534 FT MSL VERT ACC: 75 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 05' 14".2N 053 25' 25".5E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 105 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3534 FT MSL VERT ACC: 75 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-12 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 33 05' 15"N 053 25' 25".5E

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POINT RF: 5D (CENTER OF WEST END OF PAVED RUNWAY -- NAIN)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 05' 31".0N 053 24' 39".0E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 105 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3523 FT MSL VERT ACC: 75 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 33 05' 35".2N 053 24' 38".9E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 105 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3523 FT MSL VERT ACC: 75 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 34-12 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 33 05' 35"N 053 24' 40"E

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POINT RF: 6 (CAVANSERY RUINS)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 15' 39".2N 052 10' 59".2E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2957 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 15' 43".2N 052 10' 59".9E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2957 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 15' 45"N 052 10' 50"

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POINT RF: 6A (ROAD BRIDGE \*)

NGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 14' 28".5N 052 13' 09".7E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2841 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 14' 32".5N 052 13' 09".8E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2841 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 14' 30"N 052 13' 15"

\* NEW DMAAC POINT. BRIDGE DID NOT EXIST AT FURNISHED COORDS.

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POINT RF: 6B (ROAD/TRAIL INTERSECTION)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 32' 17".5N 52 09' 43".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2597 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 32' 21".6N 52 09' 46".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2597 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-1 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 34 32' 20"N 52 09' 50"E

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POINT RF: 7 (TRAIL AND ROAD INTERSECTION)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 55' 39".4N 052 00' 49".3E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2765 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 55' 43".4N 052 00' 49".3E.
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2765 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 34 55' 45"N 052 00' 50"E

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POINT RF: 7A (TRAIL INTERSECTION)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 49' 00".3N 052 03' 47".2E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2748 FT MSL VERT ACC: 74 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 49' 04".4N 052 03' 47".2E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2748 FT MSL VERT ACC: 74 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 34 39' 45"N 052 03' 55"E

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POINT RF: 7B (POINT ALONG SIGNIFICANT STREAM ADJACENT  
TO DRY LAKE BED -- NORTH SHORE) \*

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 46' 41".0N 051 54' 59".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2634 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 46' 45".0N 051 54' 59".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2634 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 34 46' 45"N 051 52' 30"E

\* DMAAC SELECTED POINTS ARE EAST OF FURNISHED COORDS.

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POINT RF: 7C (POINT ALONG SIGNIFICANT STREAM ADJACENT  
TO DRY LAKE BED -- NORTH SHORE) \*

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 47' 47".9N 051 52' 45".2E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2547 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 47' 52".0N 051 52' 45".3E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2547 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- \* B. COORDS: 34 47' 35"N 051 51' 30"E

\* DMAAC SELECTED POINTS ARE EAST OF FURNISHED COORDS.

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POINT RF: 7D (INTERSECTION OF CONTOUR LINE 3285 & STREAM BED)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 52' 31".1N 051 53' 31".0E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3268 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 52' 35".2N 051 53' 31".1E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3268 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 34 52' 45"N 051 53' 30"

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POINT RF: 8 (POINT WHERE DRAIN CROSSES 2625 CONTOUR) \*

NGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 53' 15".8N 051 44' 46".8E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2626 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 53' 19".8N 051 44' 46".8E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2626 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 34 53' 20"N 051 44' 47"E

\* DMAAC SELECTED POINT/COULD NOT LOCATED POINT DESCRIBED.

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POINT RF: 8A (ISOLATED PEAK -- 3960)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 59' 51".0N 051 43' 23".0E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3935 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 59' 35".0N 051 43' 23".1E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3935 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-7 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 34 59' 35"N 051 43' 20"E

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POINT RF: 9 (RAILROAD BRIDGE OVER STREAM)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 10' 40".4N 051 56' 20".5E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2651 FT MSL VERT ACC: 74 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 10' 44".4N 051 56' 20".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 110 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2651 FT MSL VERT ACC: 74 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 10' 40"N 051 56' 20"E

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POINT RF: 9A (CENTER OF CHANDAB VILLAGE)

NGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 25' 25".2N 051 56' 05".5E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3772 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 25' 29".2N 051 56' 05".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 3772 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 25' 25"N 051 56' 05"E

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POINT RF: 9B (CENTER OF SANGAREYUM VILLAGE)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 41' 15".9N 051 42' 01".1E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4601 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 41' 19".8N 051 42' 01".2E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4601 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 41' 15"N 051 42' 00"E

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POINT RF: 9C (NORTHEAST CORNER OF NARMAK)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 45' 07".7N 051 30' 26".4E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4524 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 45' 11".7N 051 30' 26".5E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4524 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 45' 25"N 051 30' 35"E

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POINT RF: 10 (CENTER OF STADIUM TO EAST OF EMBASSY)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 42' 38".2N 051 25' 38".0E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4043 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 42' 42".2N 051 25' 38".1E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4043 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 42' 40"N 051 25' 30"E

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POINT RF: 10A (HIGHWAY JUNCTION)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 43' 49".8N 051 25' 36".4E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4260 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 43' 53".8N 051 25' 36".5E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 111 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4260 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-3 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 43' 50"N 051 25' 30"E

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POINT RF: 11 (SOUTH END OF KARAJ AIRFIELD)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 46' 24".6N 050 53' 00".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4044 FT MSL VERT ACC: 73 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 46' 28".5N 050 53' 00".8E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 4044 FT MSL VERT ACC: 73 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-2 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 46' 25"N 050 53' 05"E

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POINT RF: 11A (EAST END OF KUSH-E-NOSRAT AIRFIELD)<sup>K</sup>

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 01' 34".6N 050 49' 18".6E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2890 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 35 01' 38".6N 050 49' 18".8E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2890 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-2 ED. 1 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 35 01' 40"N 050 49' 15"E

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POINT RF: 11B (CENTER OF PARALLEL TAXIWAY--MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD)

WGS-72 DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 58' 54".1N 050 48' 17".1E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2986 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

EUROPEAN DATUM

- A. COORDS: 34 58' 58".2N 050 48' 17".3E
- B. HORIZ ACC: 113 FT
- C. MSL ELEV: 2986 FT MSL VERT ACC: 76 FT

CHART RELATED DATA

- A. JOG NI 39-6 ED. 2 ED DATE: 1971
- B. COORDS: 34 58' 30"N 050 48' 10"E

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TEHRAN AREA

	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<b>GROUP I</b>		
1.	Mehrabad	Center and end points of runways
2.	Open area	
3.	Dirt road	
4.	Open area	
5.	Open area	
6.	Helipad	
7.	Roadway	
8.	Open area	
9.	Stadium	
10.	Racetrack	
11.	Athletic field	
12.	Dirt road	
13.	Dirt road (PATTY)	
14.	Construction road (TERESA)	
15.	TBD	
16.	TBD	
17.	TBD	
18.	TBD	
19.	TBD	
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<b>GROUP II</b>		
20.	Ghale Morghi	Intersection and end points of runways
21.	Park	
22.	Stadium	
23.	Construction Site	
24.	Underground Reservoir	
25.	Athletic Field	
26.	Racetrack	
27.	Golf Course	
28.	Pasture	
29.	TBD	
30.	Stadium	
31.	Stadium	
32.	Racetrack	
33.	Doshan Tappeh	Center and end points of runways
34.	Stadium	
35.	TBD	
36.	TBD	
37.	TBD	
38.	TBD	
39.	TBD	



TEHRAN AREA

	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
GROUP III		
40.	Karaj Airfield	Center and end points of runways
41.	Kharizak Airstrip	Center and end points of runways
42.	Kushk-e-nosrat Airstrip	Center and end points of runways
43.	Manzariyeh Airfield	Center and end points of runways
44.	Namak Airstrip	Center and end points of runways
45.	Semnan New Airfield	Center and end points of runways
46.	Semnan Airfield	Center and end points of runways
47.	Nain Military Airfield	Center and end points of runways
48.	LZ DONNA (Open area)	
49.	LZ SUSAN (Open area)	
50.	LZ BARBARA (Open area)	
51.	TBD	
52.	TBD	
53.	TBD	
54.	TBD	
55.	TBD	
56.	TBD	
57.	TBD	
58.	TBD	
59.	TBD	

TABRIZ AREA

	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
GROUP IV		
60.	Tabriz Intn'l Airport	Center and end points of runways
61.	Vayqan Airstrip	Center and end points of runways
62.	Rezaiyeh Int'l Airport	Center and end points of runways
63.	Khanian Airfield	Center and end points of runways
64.	Maragheh Highway Strip	Center and end points of runways
65.	Mianeh Airfield	Center and end points of runways
66.	Sarab Airfield	Center and end points of runways
67.	TBD	
68.	TBD	
69.	TBD	
70.	TBD	
71.	TBD	
72.	TBD	
73.	TBD	
74.	TBD	
75.	TBD	
76.	TBD	
77.	TBD	
78.	TBD	
79.	TBD	

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MASHHAD AREA

	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
GROUP V		
80.	Mashad Airport	Center and end points of runway
81.	Gonabad Airfield	Center and end points of runway
82.	Kapkan Airfield	Center and end points of runway
83.	Torbat E Hey Dariyeh North	Center and end points of runway
84.	TBD	
85.	TBD	
86.	TBD	
87.	TBD	
88.	TBD	
89.	TBD	
90.	TBD	
91.	TBD	
92.	TBD	
93.	TBD	
94.	TBD	
95.	TBD	
96.	TBD	
97.	TBD	
98.	TBD	
99.	TBD	

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SHIRAZ AREA

GROUP VI

	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
100.	Shiraz Intn'l Airport	Center and end points of runways
101.	Yasuj Airfield	Center and end points of runways
102.	Jahroom Airfield	Center and end points of runways
103.	Jahroom East Airfield	Center and end points of runways
104.	Jahroom North Airfield	Center and end points of runways
105.	Sarvestan Airfield	Center and end points of runways
106.	TBD	
107.	TBD	
108.	TBD	
109.	TBD	
110.	TBD	
111.	TBD	
112.	TBD	
113.	TBD	
114.	TBD	
115.	TBD	
116.	TBD	
117.	TBD	
118.	TBD	

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
1A	3900'	75'	NI 39-3 354135N/0511859E	354125.5N/0511846.1E 75'	354129.5N/0511846.2E 115'	WV2830649842
1B	3870'	75'	NI 39-3 354125N/0511849E	354117.5N /0511847.5E 75'	354121.5N/0511847.6E 115'	WV2834149596
1C	3955'	75'	NI 39-3 354145N/0511728E	354139.8N/0511731.1E 75'	354143.8N/0511731.3E 115'	WV2642150278
1D	3955'	75'	NI 39-3 354158N/0511735E	354147.9N/0511729.5E 75'	354151.9N/0511729.6E 115'	WV2637950526
1E	3780'	75'	NI 39-3 354114N/0512005E	354104.3N/0511959.7E 75'	354108.3N/0511959.8E 115'	WV3015749195
1F	3775'	75'	NI 39-3 354059N/0512000E	354056.6N/0511959.4E 75'	354100.6N/0511959.5E 115'	WV3015148958
2	3990'	75'	NI 39-3 354231N/0511800E	354226.1N/0511753.9E 75'	354230.1N/0511754.0E 115'	WV2698851707
3	4000'	75'	NI 39-3 354223N/0511805E	354218.0N/0511759.6E 75'	354222.0N/0511759.7E 115'	WV2113151458
4	4035'	75'	NI 39-3 354238N/0511730E	354236.3N/0511719.4E 75'	354240.2N/0511719.5E 115'	WV2112152016

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
5	4070'	75'	NI 39-3 354310N/0511729E	354305.5N/0511716.0E 75'	354309.5N/0511716.1E 115'	WV2603352918
6	4080'	75'	NI 39-3 354253N/0511645E	354251.5N/0511641.3E 75'	354255.4N/0511641.4E 115'	WV2516252482
7	4080'	75'	NI 39-3 354242N/0511647E	354244.6N/0511639.2E 75'	354248.6N/0511639.3E 115'	WV2510952271
8	4040'	75'	NI 39-3 354235N/0511640E	354238.3N/0511631.0E 75'	354242.3N/0511631.1E 115'	WV2490452076
9A	4125'	75'	NI 39-3 354330N/0511634E	354327.8N/0511630.3E 75'	354331.8N/0511630.4E 115'	WV2488253601
9B	4160'	75'	NI 39-3 354322N/0511623E	354320.1N/0511619.6E 75'	354324.1N/0511619.7E 115'	WV2461453363
10	4080'	75'	NI 39-3 354238N/0511550E	354239.3N/0511548.6E 75'	354243.2N/0511548.7E 115'	WV2383852102
11	4095'	75'	NI 39-3 354300N/0511519E	354258.2N/0511513.4E 75'	354302.2N/0511513.5E 115'	WV2295352684
12	4115'	75'	NI 39-3 354308N/0511521E	354303.6N/0511510.6E 75'	354307.6N/0511510.7E 115'	WV2388352850

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
13	4290'	75'	NI 39-3 354517N/0511040E	354511.9N/0511043.9E 75'	354515.9N/0511044.0E 115'	WV1617456788
14	3415'	75'	NI 39-3 353321N/0511537E	353314.1N/0511542.3E 75'	353318.0N/0511542.4E 115'	WV2372734689
20A	3615'	75'	NI 39-3 353847N/0512250E	353841.4N/0512249.2E 75'	353845.3N/0512249.3E 115'	WV3443644807
20B	3610'	75'	NI 39-3 353915N/0512240E	353906.2N/0512238.5E 75'	353910.2N/0512238.6E 115'	WV3416345572
20C	3610	75'	NI 39-3 353848N/0512225E	353843.1N/0512220.3E 75'	353847.0N/0512220.4E 115'	WV3370744857
20D	3590'	75'	NI 39-3 353821N/0512302E	353817.2N/0512300.2E 75'	353821.1N/0512300.3E 115'	WV3471444063
20E	3595'	75'	NI 39-3 353845N/0512335E	353839.1N/0512327.3E 75'	353843.0N/0512327.4E 115'	WV3539444740
21	3745'	75'	NI 39-3 354055N/0512500E	354101.0N/0512501.6E 75'	354104.9N/0512501.7E 115'	WV3174549122
22	3970'	75'	NI 39-3 354241N/0512533E	354239.1N/0512536.4E 75'	354243.1N/0512536.5E 115'	WV3160952149

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
23	4325'	75'	NI 39-3 354419N/0512540E	354416.2N/0512539.7E 75'	354420.2N/0512539.8E 115'	WV3867855142
24	4295'	75'	NI 39-3 354343N/0512405E	354342.2N/0512359.7E 75'	354346.2N/0512359.8E 115'	WV3617154084
25	4305'	75'	NI 39-3 354350N/0512330E	354349.0N/0512329.3E 75'	354353.0N/0512329.4E 115'	WV3540654289
26	5095'	75'	NI 39-3 354650N/0512409E	354646.6N/0512408.4E 75'	354650.6N/0512408.5E 115'	WV3636659765
27	5105'	75'	NI 39-3 354705N/0512350E	354656.2N/0512343.5E 75'	354700.2N/0512343.6E 115'	WV3574060058
28	4975'	75'	NI 39-3 354636N/0512410E	354630.4N/0512402.0E 75'	354634.4N/0512402.1E 115'	WV3620759266
30	4995'	75'	NI 39-3 354731N/0512900E	354726.8N/0512900.4E 75'	354730.8N/0512900.5E 115'	WV369061038
31	4300'	75'	NI 39-3 354434N/0513029E	354428.3N/0513031.3E 75'	354432.3N/0513031.4E 115'	WV380155550
32	4095'	75'	NI 39-3 354230N/0513100E	354227.2N/0513105.5E 75'	354231.2N/0513105.6E 115'	WV387951823

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
33A	3950'	75'	NI 39-3 354213N/0512828E	354209.8N/0512828.0E 75'	354213.7N/0512828.1E 115'	WV4292451265
33B	4020'	75'	NI 39-3 354235N/0512858E	354230.0N/0512854.9E 75'	354234.0N/0512855.0E 115'	WV4359751892
33C	3910'	75'	NI 39-3 354150N/0512803E	354151.3N/0512802.7E 75'	354155.2N/0512802.8E 115'	WV4229150692
34A	3880'	75'	NI 39-3 354110N/0512942E	354105.3N/0512943.2E 75'	354109.3N/0512943.3E 115'	WV4482449288
34B	3895'	75'	NI 39-3 354120N/0512953E	354113.7N/0512954.7E 75'	354117.7N/0512954.8E 115'	WV4511249549
40A	4040'	75'	NI 39-2A 354628N/0505308E	354625.1N/0505300.4E 75'	354629.0N/0505300.6E 115'	VV8946959033
40B	4035'	75'	NI 39-2A 354642N/0505254E	354637.3N/0505247.3E 75'	354641.2N/0505247.4E 115'	VV8914059410
40C	4045'	75'	NI 39-2A 354652N/0505240E	354649.4N/0505234.3E 75'	354653.4N/0505234.5E 115'	VV89181559784

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
41A	3555'	75'	NI 39-3A 352709N/0511920E	352655.3N/0511855.9E 75'	352659.3N/0511856.0E 115'	WV2863823034
41B	3545'	75'	NI 39-3A 352716N/0511900E	352700.0N/0511837.3E 75'	352704.0N/0511837.4E 115'	WV2816823178
41C	3535'	75'	NI 39-3A 352722N/0511840E	352704.5N/0511817.9E 75'	352708.5N/0511818.0E 115'	WV2767923316
42A	2900'	75'	NI 39-2A 350136N/0504840E	350140.7N/0504830.6E 75'	350144.7N/0504830.8E 115'	VU8253576347
42B	2855'	75'	NI 39-2A 350135N/0504855E	350137.8N/0504854.8E 75'	350141.8N/0504855.0E 115'	VU8314976255
42C	2830'	75'	NI 39-2A 350133N/0504915E	350134.9N/0504918.4E 75'	350139.0N/0504918.5E 115'	VU8374576167
43A	3035'	75'	NI 39-6R 345914N/0504808E	345921.7N/0504721.3E 75'	345925.8N/0504721.4E 115'	VU8076972070
43B	2945'	75'	NI 39-6R 345858N/0504850E	345902.4N/0504820.4E 75'	345906.4N/0504820.6E 115'	VU8226871470

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
43C	2860'	75'	NI 39-6R 345846N/0504929E	345843.5N/0504916.7E 75'	345847.6N/0504916.9E 115'	VU8369470887
44A	2575'	80'	NI 39-7A 343220N/0520950E	343217.1N/0520946.1E 75'	343221.2N/0520946.1E 115'	XU0670722620
44B	2600'	80'	NI 39-7A 343205N/0521015E	343201.8N/0521009.6E 75'	343205.8N/0521009.6E 115'	XU0731222154
44C	2605'	80'	NI 39-7A 343157N/0521040E	343146.6N/0521032.3E 75'	343150.7N/0521032.3E 115'	XU0789621694
45A	3675'	75'	NI 39-4A 352350N/0534015E	352251.4N/0533915.1E 75'	352255.4N/0533915.0E 115'	YV4110618711
45B	3685'	75'	NI 39-4A 352402N/0534035E	352321.6N/0534016.6E 75'	352325.6N/0534016.5E 115'	YV4263219682
45C	3800'	75'	NI 39-4A 352415N/0534100E	352351.5N/0534117.4E 75'	352355.5N/0534117.3E 115'	YV4414320645
46A	3705'	75'	NI 39-4A 353545N/0532945E	353543.2N/0532957.3E 75'	353547.2N/0532957.2E 115'	YV442542129
46B	3765'	75'	NI 39-4A 353530N/0532930E	353522.7N/0532936.8E 75'	353526.7N/0532936.7E 115'	YV4392541484

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
46C	3685'	75'	NI 39-4A 353510N/0532920E	353502.7N/0532917.0E 75'	353506.7N/0532916.9E 115'	YV2544140854
47A	3530'	75'	NI 39-12A 330515N/0532515E	330509.3N/0532524.3E 75'	330513.5N/0532524.2E 115'	YS2619863608
47B	3555'	75'	NI 39-12A 330522N/0532440E	330518.7N/0532500.6E 75'	330522.9N/0532500.5E 115'	YS2557763885
47C	3465'	75'	NI 39-12A 330530N/0532412E	330530.5N/0532439.2E 75'	330534.6N/0532439.1E 115'	YS2501364233
47D	3535'	75'	NI 39-12A 330555N/0532402E	330551.2N/0532423.3E 75'	330555.4N/0532423.2E 115'	YS2458664864
47E	3555'	75'	NI 39-12A 330532N/0532428E	330533.3N/0532439.3E 75'	330537.4N/0532439.2E 115'	YS2501464319
47F	3615'	75'	NI 39-12A 330508N/0532445E	330512.8N/0532452.2E 75'	330517.0N/0532452.1E 115'	YS2536263697
48	2945'	75'	NI 39-4A 350650N/0535750E	350655.5N/0535816.7E 75'	350659.5N/0535816.6E 115'	YV2380290069
49	2950'	75'	NI 39-4A 351610N/0533110E	351606.6N/0533106.6E 75'	351610.6N/0533106.5E 115'	YV23230595

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
50	2530'	75'	NI 39-8A 345855N/0524515E	345900.9N/0524522.0E 75'	345905.0N/0524522.0E 115'	XU6029372817
60A	4505'	80'	NJ 38-7R 380807N/0461410E	380801.7N/0461408.4E 75'	380805.5N/0461409.0E 115'	PH0831121570
60B	4510'	80'	NJ 38-7R 380845N/0461305E	380839.2N/0461307.2E 75'	380843.0N/0461307.8E 115'	PH0680522705
60C	4515'	80'	NJ 38-7R 380730N/0461509E	380722.7N/0461507.3E 75'	380726.5N/0461507.9E 115'	PH0976120386
60D	4515'	80'	NJ 38-7R 380745N/0461450E	380740.8N/0461445.5E 75'	380744.6N/0461446.1E 115'	PH0922420937
60E	4480'	80'	NJ 38-7R 380735N/0461410E	380734.2N/0461406.5E 75'	380738.0N/0461407.1E 115'	PH0827620721
60F	4540'	80'	NJ 38-7R 380755N/0461520E	380747.6N/0461523.6E 75'	380751.4N/0461524.2E 115'	PH1014821160
61A	4265'	80'	NJ 38-7R 380420N/0454310E	380414.1N/0454310.0E 75'	380417.9N/0454310.6E 115'	NH6312214078
61B	4260'	80'	NJ 38-7R 380400N/0454250E	380401.8N/0454250.8E 75'	380405.6N/0454251.5E 115'	NH6265813694

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
61C	4265'	80'	NJ 38-7R 380430N/0454340E	380430.6N/0454336.0E 75'	380434.4N/0454336.7E 115'	NH6375314593
62A	4310'	80'	NJ 38-11R 374005N/0450415E	374009.7N/0450410.6E 110'	374013.5N/0450411.3E 140'	NG0615669320
62B	4340'	80'	NJ 38-11R 373930N/0450340E	373929.1N/0450337.1E 110'	373932.9N/0450337.8E 140'	NG0533768069
62C	4255'	80'	NJ 38-11R 374045N/0450450E	374051.6N/0450444.9E 110'	374055.4N/0450445.6E 140'	NG0699770611
63A	4295'	80'	NJ 38-11R 372900N/0455500E	372855.7N/0455458.0E 110'	372859.6N/0455458.6E 140'	NG2101348941
63B	4280'	80'	NJ 38-11R 372845N/0455435E	372846.6N/0455437.4E 110'	372850.4N/0455438.0E 140'	NG8051048655
63C	4330'	80'	NJ 38-11R 372900N/0455515E	372905.2N/0455518.7E 110'	372909.0N/0455519.4E 140'	NG8151949238
64A	4370'	80'	NJ 38-11R 372050N/0460740E	372052.6N/0460737.3E 110'	372056.5N/0460737.9E 140'	NG9983934255
64B	4325'	80'	NJ 38-11R 372050N/0460640E	372048.6N/0460638.9E 110'	372052.5N/0460639.5E 140'	NG9840434115

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
64C	4410'	80'	NJ 38-11R 372050N/0460845E	372056.9N/0460838.3E 110'	372100.8N/0460838.9E 140'	PG0133834407
66A	5645'	80'	NJ 38-12R 375615N/0474015E	375617.5N/0474010.5E 75'	375621.3N/0474011.0E 115'	QH3461902505
66B	5630'	80'	NJ 38-12R 375610N/0473950E	375614.4N/0473946.3E 75'	375618.2N/0473946.8E 115'	QH3403102395
66C	5645'	80'	NJ 38-12R 375625N/0474040E	375620.8N/0474034.5E 75'	375624.6N/0474035.0E 115'	QB3520202624
80-1	3255'	75'	NJ 40-16R 361325N/0593931E	361325.1N/0593926.1E 75'	361329.0N/0593925.5E 115'	GP3883112214
80-2	3255'	75'	NJ 40-16R 361453N/0593733E	361452.5N/0593732.6E 75'	361456.5N/0593732.0E 115'	GP3592314832
80-3	3255'	75'	NJ 40-16R 361412N/0593830E	361408.6N/0593829.5E 75'	361412.5N/0593828.8E 115'	GP3738013515
81-1	3540'	75'	NI 40-8A 342300N/0583831E	342252.8N/0583827.4E 75'	342256.9N/0583826.8E 115'	EP5085405846
81-2	3540'	75'	NI 40-8A 342248N/0583800E	342239.4N/0583755.4E 75'	342243.5N/0583754.8E 115'	EP504305419

Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
81-3	3540'	75'	NI 40-8A 342312N/0583902E	342306.5N/0583859.2E 75'	342310.6N/0583858.7E 115'	FD5166106279
82-1	5020'	75'	NJ 40-12A 371649N/0584934E	371645.7N/0584938.5E 75'	371649.6N/0584937.9E 115'	FG6199327616
82-2	5020'	75'	NJ 40-12A 371651N/0584911E	371648.3N/0584913.8E 75'	371652.2N/0584913.2E 115'	FG6138327684
82-3	5020'	75'	NJ 40-12A 371647N/0584957E	371643.4N/0585002.9E 75'	371647.3N/0585002.3E 115'	FG6259527556
83-1	4765'	75'	NI 40-4A 351936N/0591110E	351930.6N/0591115.4E 75'	351934.7N/0591114.8E 115'	FE9883811486
83-2	4765'	75'	NI 40-4A 351924N/0591120E	351919.4N/0591124.8 75'	351923.5N/0591124.2E 115'	FE9908211147
83-3	4765'	75'	NI 40-4A 351948N/0591100E	351941.7N/0591106.0E 75'	351945.8N/0591105.3E 115'	FE9859111823
83-4	4800'	75'	NI 40-4A 351948N/0591115E	351943.3N/0591118.6E 75'	351947.4N/0591118.0E 115'	FE9891011879
83-5	4800'	75'	NI 40-4A 351935N/0591110E	351933.2N/0591112.9E 75'	351937.2N/0591112.3E 115'	FE9977211565



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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
83-6	4800'	75'	NI 40-4A 352000N/0591120E	351952.9N/0591124.6E 75'	351957.0N/0591123.9E 115'	PE9905312178
100 CN	4875'	75'	NH 39-12 293233N/0523515E	293225.9N/0523527.5E 115'	293230.3N/0523527.5E 145'	XN5416369112
100 EN	4870'	75'	NH 39-12 293204N/0523637E	293157.4N/0523638.9E 115'	293201.8N/0523638.9E 145'	XN5609668260
100 WN	4930'	75'	NH 39-12 293257N/0523412E	293255.0N/0523414.8E 115'	293259.4N/0523414.8E 145'	XN5219469981
100 CS	4880'	75'	NH 39-12 293221N/0523506E	293212.4N/0523521.4E 115'	293216.8N/0523521.4E 145'	XN5400368693
100 ES	4875'	75'	NH 39-12 293148N/0523633E	293144.1N/0523632.1E 115'	293148.5N/0523632.1E 145'	XN5591967849
100 WS	4930'	75'	NH 39-12 293244N/0523405E	293241.6N/0523407.6E 115'	293245.9N/0523407.6E 145'	XN5200669564
101-C	5835'	100'	NH 39-7 303830N/0513520E	303833.8N/0513519.4E 75'	303838.1N/0513519.5E 115'	PE541690338
101-E	5835'	100'	NH 39-7 303830N/0513540E	303833.9N/0513538.9E 75'	303838.2N/0513539.0E 115'	PE5493490343

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
101-W	5805'	100'	NH 39-7 303830N/0513500E	303833.7N/0513459.1E 75'	303838.0N/0513459.2E 115'	WP5587590331
103-C	3370'	75'	NH 39-16 283517N/0533455E	283513.6N/0533500.3E 75'	283518.0N/0533500.3E 115'	YM5267165150
103-E	3380'	75'	NH 39-16 283520N/0533524E	283517.2N/0533528.0E 75'	283521.6N/0533527.9E 115'	YM5342065276
103-W	3350'	75'	NH 39-16 283510N/0533428E	283510.4N/0533433.5E 75'	283514.8N/0533433.4E 115'	YM5194365036
104-W	3805'	75'	NH 39-16 283117N/0533952E	283114.1N/0533955.5E 75'	283118.5N/0533955.4E 115'	YM6085757951
104-C	3860'	75'	NH 39-16 283117N/0534025E	283114.2N/0534023.1E 75'	283118.6N/0534023.0E 115'	YM6160757971
104-E	3915'	75'	NH 39-16 283117N/0534054E	283114.2N/0534051.1E 75'	283118.6N/0534051.0E 115'	YM6236957989
105-W	3385'	75'	NH 39-16 283535N/0533643E	283532.8N/0533639.9E 75'	283537.2N/0533639.8E 115'	YM5336465800
105-C	3405'	75'	NH 39-16 283543N/0533703E	283537.1N/0533700.7E 75'	283541.5N/0533700.6E 115'	YM5392765944

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Point Number	MSL Elev	MSL V Acc	Chart Rel Data JOG Coords	WGS-72 Datum Coords Hori Acc	European Datum Coords Hori Acc	UTM Coords Zone/Coords
105-E	3405'	75'	NH 39-16 283545N/0533726E	283541.8N/0533721.9E 75'	283546.2N/0533721.8E 115'	YM5649866103
106-C	4905'	75'	NH 39-12 291408N/0530734E	291406.5N/0530738.1E 75'	291410.9N/0530738.1E 115'	YN0675436093
106-E	4915'	75'	NH 39-12 291403N/0530800E	291402.8N/0530801.2E 75'	291407.2N/0530801.2E 115'	YN0738035991
106-W	4895'	75'	NH 39-12 291411N/0530709E	291410.3N/0530714.3E 75'	291414.6N/0530714.2E 115'	YN0610836198

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CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

Item Number: \_\_\_\_\_

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM \_\_\_\_\_

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Video Taping of Network News Broadcasts


TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. ( ) National Military Command Center maintains capability to monitor and record TV news footage on a 24-hour basis through the Visual Record Facility (VRF).

2. ( ) At various times, J2 requested VRF to tape news footage of the hostages, specifically, and Tehran, in general. Tapes were provided to J2 on the day following the broadcast.

3. ( ) News footage provided valuable updated appearance of the hostages and were used for assessments of hostage conditions



4. ( ) Coverage of Tehran provided <sup>current</sup> environmental data of the city that affected JTF clandestine operations and assault planning.

COMMENTS:

5. The JTF/J2 acquired a portable copy camera from INSCOM on loan and used the capability to make stills from video tapes, copy hostage letters and make several copies of planning and briefing materials. Photo of Kit is attached.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

J2 should have access to VRF Record

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OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [REDACTED] (USAF).

POINTS OF CONTACT: VRF: 8-227-9033

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

G577

Item Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Photo Analysis - Special Projects

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ J2 requested several special photo analysis products to support EC-79.
2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ The requested special products took anything from 2-3 days to 2-3 weeks to complete.
3. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Typical special photo products include the following:
  - a. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Area/strip orientation from vic LZ PATTY East to Tehran Shayad Monument. Package was composed of 20 x 24 prints.
  - b. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Area orientation showing geography linking Karaj, Tehran, and Qom to put into perspective LZ PEGGY, LZ ANN, LZ PATTY and LZ LOIS (5 20 x 24 prints).
  - c. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ The American Embassy and Amjadiyeh Stadium were analyzed for vulnerability to incoming fire and the positions from which small arms fire could be directed. These studies pointed out key buildings and approaches to minimize risk.
  - d. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Mehrabad, Doshan-Tappeh and Ghale Morghi were analyzed to determine areas of minimum small arms threat to parked aircraft and sectors most likely to present a hostile fire threat.

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15 Jul 92

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- e. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Special ADA fields of fire studies were made of Ghale Morghi and Doshan Tappeth to determine if any existing ground structures would mask the ZU 23-2's and Rapiers creating a gap in coverage of low flying aircraft.
- f. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Mehrabad International was analyzed to locate all POL facilities and functions and all ADA were identified, classified and plotted. Vehicle counts of all vehicles present within the Mehrabad complex were also made.
- g. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ All Tehran airports were studied for vertical obstructions on the approaches to all runways.
- h. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Intensive terrain analysis was conducted of selected areas chosen as possible FWLZ/HLZ/DZs. Multiple sources and agencies were utilized (e.g., LZ SUSAN, LZ ANNE, LZ PATTY, etc.).
- i. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ DIA also provided analysis and photographs of ADA in Tehran not located at one of the airfields (2 Oerlikons in North Tehran).

COMMENTS:

1. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Special photo products require highly defined requirements.
2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ Special photo products may require in progress review between requestor and analyst.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS: STUDIES were also accomplished on Iran Radio, + TV Network, Power Grid, POL. Network and Major Lines of Communications.

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J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED] Cpt [REDACTED]

G Cpt [REDACTED]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DIA - LTC [REDACTED] JSJ-1 (NMIC 2782R) 90-3243 (G) 2581 (R)  
695-1032

G LTC [REDACTED] JSJ-1

LTC [REDACTED] JSJ-1

AFINTEL - CPT [REDACTED] - AFIS/INOP Bldg 213 - 3-3815 (G)  
351-3101

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Mehrabad POL Study (Sep)
2. Mehrabad ADA Study (Sep)
3. Mehrabad Approach Study (Sep)

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4578

Item Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Photo Analysis Support (AF INTEL)

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

- 1. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(S)~~ J2 contacted the AF <sup>and Army</sup> INTEL (PI) sections at Bldg 213, Washington Navy Yard with permission of AF <sup>and Army</sup> ACSI for detailed Photo Interpretation support.
- 2. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(S)~~ <sup>Both</sup> AF INTEL provided detailed 2nd and 3rd phase photo interpretation and products.

COMMENTS:

- 1. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(S)~~ AF INTEL was utilized <sup>to provide Air Related</sup> in ~~addition of other agencies~~ 2nd and 3rd phase readout/analysis on selected Tqts so as to not overload any single agency.
- 2. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(S)~~ <sup>Army</sup> AF INTEL ~~provided excellent products and analysis~~ <sup>was provided detailed 2nd/3rd phase</sup> readout of military installations in/maround TOTTAN.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(S)~~ <sup>SERVICE PHOTO Intell Teams</sup> That ~~AF INTEL~~ continue to be used on longer term 2nd and 3rd phase PI requirements.
- 2. ~~(TS)~~ That if used, only longer term projects be requested.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:


J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC Cpt

POINTS OF CONTACT:

AF INTEL - Cpt AFIS/INOP 351-3103  
KY3 - 3815/16

~~AFIS/INOP 351-3103~~

~~3815/16~~



Classified By ~~JCS~~  
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by  
DDO Wmck  
15 Jul 92

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Item Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/nmcc  
DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Conf  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: \_\_\_\_\_ - Use of ITV Tapes

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - 15 January 1981

SUMMARY:

1. (U) American commercial television broadcasts of videotapes provided by Iran of visits by clergy, dignitaries and relatives of the hostages at various times (Christmas, Easter, etc.) were recorded by the Video Recording Facility (VRF) in the Pentagon \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

1. (U) In some cases hostage groupings at Christmas services were obviously unchanged from everyday groupings, in other cases they were obviously a mix of everyday groupings.

2. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

By freezing the recording of that broadcast, it was possible to ascertain what group that hostage was a part of.

4. (U) Overall, the films provided many bits of information which aided in confirming previous conclusions and in revising/improving analysis methods.

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Declassified ON: OADR

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5. (U) A key element to the success of obtaining the video footage is advance detailed briefing of VRF personnel as to what is desired and constant watching by intelligence personnel of national news broadcasts to ensure no key footage is missed.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Capt  SMC.

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G-581

Item Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Hostage Biographical and Personal History Data

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - 15 January 1981

SUMMARY:

1. (U) Some biographical and personal history data about the hostages was obtained from the various branches of services.
2. (U) These types of data about the hostages were, to the extent available, used to verify or understand certain hostages

COMMENTS:

1. (U) At no time did the data approach the quantity or quality desired. In major part this was due to three factors:
  - a. (U) The only medical information on military personnel was located at the Embassy.
  - b. (U) Early, very strict security measures limited contact with families/relatives of hostages and precluded obtaining information of this type from them.
  - c. (U) A lack of cooperation by the State Department made it very difficult to obtain information of this type about those hostages employed by the State Department.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92

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Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

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2. (U) Such data could have provided colateral confirmation of reports such as one of a Marine hostage with a tatoo on thumb side of wrist reportedly seen in a prison.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (U) In hostage situations early contact should be made with agencies, departments and companies for whom the hostages work to obtain such data and at the same time establish a channel of communication through which later detailed questions may be put.

2. (U) Contacts with the agencies, departments and companies should be made by J-2 personnel under a cover that minimizes any possible connection with the OJCS and Department of Defense.

3. (U) Departments and agencies should be required to maintain in CONUS much more complete medical and personal data records of their personnel assigned overseas.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

G J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LtCol [REDACTED] USMC; Capt [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] USMC.

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Item Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - Hostage Family Contacts

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - 15 January 1981

SUMMARY:

1. <sup>April</sup> (S) From November 1979 through ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ 1980 JTF contact with hostage families was extremely limited for operational security reasons.

2. (S) Beginning in <sup>MAY</sup> ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ 1980 an effort was made to cultivate sources within and through the ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ first by gaining their confidence and then by a steadily increasing solicitation of information.

a. (S) ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ who were in daily contact with relatives of hostages were periodically asked to solicit specific bits of information from relatives as required to clarify information about or in letters from hostages.

b. (S) JTF-J2 personnel developed the confidence of a number of wives of hostages and thus were able to, in some cases, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and in other cases receive information otherwise withheld from all other ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ the wife.

COMMENTS:

1. (S) In some cases the gaining of confidences proved very valuable. An example is the acquisition from one wife of ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ information ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CO 1225  
CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
REDACTIVE CL BY DDDN/CS  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO CONF  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

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Declassified ON: OADR

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(U)  
2. (S) Some wives were very hesitant to give information to personnel associated with DOD because of their opposition to any potential military action and concern that providing such information might contribute ultimately to a decision to execute such an operation. *whereas other families would provide data to DOD but not DOS.*

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (U) In any situation similar to the seizing of the American hostages by Iran, plans and efforts should be made to establish early rapport with both relatives of hostages as well as other Service, executive branch and company personnel tasked to assist and work with those relatives.
2. (U) A cover should be used in establishing contacts, much as was used in the JTF 1-79 operation. The cover story should minimize association with the defense department, particularly with the OJCS and any operational forces.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LtCol [REDACTED] USAF,

Capt [REDACTED] USMC.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

G 584

Item Number: 5

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Control of US Military Drivers/Monitors

(Farsi Linguists)

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - April 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) J2 was single POC for US military drivers/monitors.
2. (U) Drivers/monitors remained at home stations until required for driver training or integrated training with SFOD-D.
3. (U) Respective Service POC's had established procedures with each driver/monitor's home station to insure TDY orders were issued immediately, with no bureaucratic delay.
4. (U) Drivers/monitors returned to home stations after each training phase/exercise.

COMMENTS:

1. (U) Drivers/monitors' home stations funded the TDY trips. Severe financial problems arose at installations whose TDY budgets were not ~~adequate~~ adequate to cover this requirement.
2. (U) Control of drivers/monitors at JTF vice SFOD-D level was advantageous due to JTF direct contact with Service POC's and wider perspective of training requirements.
3. (U) OPSEC problems occurred several times, when home stations inadvertently identified OJCS and J3-SOD on TDY orders rather than DIA (which was supposed to be used as cover). Further, numerous unexplained TDY trips led to

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Declassified ON: OADR



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speculation at home stations concerning nature of drivers/  
monitors' absences. This OPSEC problem was particularly  
true for the one native Iranian US military driver.

RECOMMENDATIONS: ( ) To avoid such OPSEC problems, drivers/  
monitors or similar support personnel should be attached to

~~OPSEC at Ft. Bragg~~  
TO JTF.

*Service staffs on DIA then detached*

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Maj [REDACTED], ODCSOPS, DA

POINTS OF CONTACT: Service POC's

ATTACHMENTS: None

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G 585

Item Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Iran Area Overview Studies

TIMEFRAME: ~~August-October~~ - December 1980  
November 1979

SUMMARY:

- (U) ~~(S)~~ *Initially*
- (U) ~~(S)~~ J2 tasked DIA to provide an Iran overview analysis showing LOC, GOB, AOB, *w/emphasis on TEHRAN AREA.*
  - (U) ~~(S)~~ Additional ~~overview~~ studies were requested *in MAY 80* of selected cities to show major military installations, gendarmerie and revolutionary guard facilities. Power, water, oil and communications facilities were depicted in various overlays.
  - (U) ~~(S)~~ Tehran, Tabriz, Esfahan, Shiraz and Mashad were analyzed, *w/emphasis on Airheads, LZ, and LOC's.*

COMMENTS:

- (U) ~~(S)~~ These products are very man intensive in production and required several weeks for completion.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Although information was in many cases dated, it provided a good *BASE for* intelligence *AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING* and feel for geography.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LtCol [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED] CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

POINTS OF CONTACT:

- DIA - LTC [REDACTED] JSJ-1 (NMIC 2782R)  
 - LTC [REDACTED] - JSJ-1 (G) 90-3243  
 - LTC [REDACTED] JSJ-1 R-2581 - 695-1032

CONDUCTED ON 15 June 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY BDO  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

Classified By: ~~JCS~~  
Declassified On: ~~OADR~~

SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ARMY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

REFERENCE: TEHRAN, IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO

DISCUSSION:

1. (S/NOFORN) Iranian Ground Forces and national defense organizations normally garrisoned in the Tehran area are listed below:

Ministry of National Defense  
Tehran Ministry of Defense  
BE 0428-00144  
35-41-30N 051-24-55E

General Staff of the Iranian Islamic Armed Forces  
Tehran Supreme Command Staff Headquarters  
BE 0428-00122  
35-43-58N 051-26-49E

Iranian Islamic Ground Forces Headquarters  
Tehran IIGF HQ and Barracks Lavizan  
BE 0428-00673  
35-47-20N 051-31-42E

1st Headquarters Infantry Division  
Tehran Army Barracks and Military University Faranabad  
BE 0428-00241  
35-41-27N 051-29-40E

2nd Infantry Division  
Tehran Barracks and Brigade HQ Lavizan  
BE 0428-00722  
35-46-45N 051-30-50E

23rd Special Forces Brigade  
Tehran Barracks and Special Forces BDE HQ Bagh e Shah  
BE 0428-00097  
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

33rd Field Artillery Group  
Tehran Barracks and Artillery Brigade HQ Jai  
BE 0428-00099  
35-40-50N 051-20-55E

NOTE: The 397th Field Artillery Battalion (8 in. self-propelled howitzer) is located at Tehran Bde Impl Grd Bde Salatanabad, BE 0428-00238, 35-46-32N 051-28-27E.

Military Intelligence Group  
Tehran Barracks and SF Bde HQ Bagh e Shah  
BE 0428-00097  
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

402nd Electronic Warfare Company  
unlocated within the Tehran area

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DB 3C  
29 May 2000

SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ARMY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES (continued)

Third Area Support Command  
unlocated within the Tehran area

NOTE: The Third Area Support Command is comprised of at least the following units: 501st Medical Depot, 502nd Area Hospital, 543rd Logistics BN, 544th Quartermaster CO, 547th Truck Transportation BN.

National Defense College  
Tehran War College  
BE 0428RB1107  
35-41-33N 051-23-07E

Command and General Staff College  
Tehran Command and General Staff College  
BE 0428-00240  
35-41-31N 051-23-08E

Military Academy  
Tehran Military Post and Academy  
BE 0428-00203  
35-41-07N 051-24-02E

1st Training Center (cadre)  
Tehran Barracks and SF Bde HQ Bagh e Shah  
BE 0428-00097  
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

Military Intelligence School  
Tehran Barracks and SF Bde HQ Bagh e Shah  
BE 0428-00097  
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

Special Forces School  
Tehran Barracks and SF Bde HQ Bagh e Shah  
BE 0428-00097  
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

Signal Training Center  
unlocated within Tehran

2. (S/NOFORN) Iranian paramilitary units normally garrisoned in the Tehran area are listed below:

Gendarmerie Central Headquarters  
35-42-05N 051-23-35E

1st District (Central) Headquarters, Gendarmerie  
Tehran Military Barracks  
BE 0428-00237  
35-39-58N 051-24-15E

NOTE: There are normally approximately 300 gendarmerie garrisoned in this facility.

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DB3C

29 May 2000

SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ARMY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES (continued)

Gendarmerie Ordnance Depot, Hospital and Officer Academy  
Tehran Barracks and Ordnance Depot Gendarmerie  
BE 0428-00721  
35-46-10N 051-24-30E

Gendarmerie Aviation Battalion  
Tehran/Ghale Morghi Airfield  
BE 0428-08010  
35-38-45N 051-22-54E

NOTE: The gendarmerie area is in the northwest corner of the airfield.  
Equipment is limited to light fixed wing and helicopter aircraft.

National Revolutionary Guard Headquarters  
Tehran Iranian National Parliament  
BE 0428-00315  
35-41-24N 051-26-10E

NOTE: Reportedly 1,000 to 1,500 Revolutionary Guards are here. It is unlikely that more than 50 remain after normal work hours.

Revolutionary Guard Tehran Headquarters  
Tehran Barracks Imperial Guard Brigade Saltanabad  
BE 0428-00238  
35-46-32N 051-28-27E

Tehran Gendarmerie Regiment

Shahr Ray Company

Shahr-Ray Post	35-38-00N 051-26-00E
Farah-Abad Post	35-39-00N 051-25-00E
Nemat-Abad Post	35-37-30N 051-20-00E
Hassen-Abad Post	35-21-30N 051-14-30E
Nak-Rizak Post	35-31-00N 051-21-00E
Hashem-Abad Post	35-36-00N 051-31-00E
Kazaneh Post	35-38-00N 051-21-00E
Nouhem-Abad Post	35-36-00N 051-23-30E
Amin-Abad Post	35-35-30N 051-29-00E
Ghaleh Post	35-16-00N 051-00-30E
Ghaleh-Nou Post	35-31-00N 051-31-00E
Ghassem-Abad Post	35-34-30N 051-14-30E

Shemirant Company

Tehran-Now Post	35-43-00N 051-30-30E
Tehran-Pars Post	35-44-00N 051-31-00E
Solimanieh Post	35-39-00N 051-30-00E
Koyeh-Norou Post	35-40-30N 051-31-00E
Lavassanat Post	35-50-00N 051-46-00E
Lash-Garak Post	35-49-30N 051-35-00E
Farsham Post	35-56-00N 051-31-30E
Kamard Post	35-45-00N 051-43-30E

Shahr-Ara Company

Shara-Ara Post	35-42-30N 051-23-30E
Amir-Abad Post	35-43-00N 051-25-00E
Vanak Post	35-46-00N 051-24-00E
Mehr-Abad Post	35-40-00N 051-18-00E

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ARMY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES (continued)

Mehr-Abad Shoumali Post	35-41-00N 051-28-00E
Karavan-Sara-Sang Post	35-42-00N 051-05-00E
Velan-Jack Post	35-47-00N 051-25-00E
Aria-Shakr Post	35-42-00N 051-22-00E
Kan Post	35-45-00N 051-17-00E
Damavand Company	
Damavand Post	35-43-00N 052-04-12E
Jaban Post	35-39-00N 052-15-36E
Firuz-Kouh Post	35-41-00N 052-46-12E
Zarrin-Dasht Post	35-37-12N 052-36-00E
Rud-Hen Post	35-35-00N 051-55-12E
Gilan Post	35-33-36N 052-10-12E
Arjmand Post	35-48-36N 052-30-36E
Akh-Tar Post	35-39-36N 053-07-12E
Karaj Company	
Karaj Post	35-48-36N 051-00-00E
Niggi-Eman Post	35-57-00N 050-40-12E
Shahr-Yar Post	36-29-30N 051-05-00E
Tal-Ghan Post	36-23-24N 050-31-48E
Adran Post	35-56-24N 051-04-12E
Roubat-Karim Post	35-28-12N 051-04-48E
Shah-Dasht Post	35-43-12N 050-49-12E
Gach-Sar Post	36-06-36N 051-30-36E
Jo-Ghin Post	36-35-24N 051-00-36E
Mehr-Dasht Post	35-49-12N 050-51-36E
Esh-Tehart Post	35-43-12N 050-21-36E
Varamin Company	
Varamin Post	35-20-30N 051-38-24E
Pishva Post	35-01-12N 051-43-48E
Mamazan Post	35-28-48N 051-40-48E
Janat-Abad-Eyvanaki Post	35-20-24N 052-03-36E
Garm-Sar Post	35-12-36N 052-18-36E
Bagher-Abad Post	35-24-36N 051-34-48E
Hassar-Hassan Post	35-12-36N 051-43-12E
Arandan Post	35-15-00N 052-29-24E
Sharif-Abad Post	35-25-48N 051-46-12E
Bagheh-Khavasse Post	35-19-48N 051-33-36E
Namak Company	
Narmak Post	35-46-00N 051-30-30E
Majidieh Post	35-45-00N 051-26-30E
Narmak NR 2 Post	35-46-00N 051-31-30E
Vahidieh Post	35-43-40N 051-26-30E
Zarab-Khaneh Post	35-46-00N 051-26-10E
Oz-Goal Post	35-49-00N 051-30-00E

SECRET

ALL HEADQUARTERS  
 Central) GENDARMERIE HEADQUARTERS  
 Ordnance Depot, Hospital  
 Academy  
 Aviation Battalion  
 Air Regiment  
 Company  
 Kazaneh Post  
 Noughem Abad Post  
 Amin Abad Post  
 Challeh Post  
 Chaleh-Now Post  
 Ghassen Abad Post

TEHRAN Gendarmieric Regiment

Shenirant Company

Tehran Now Post  
 Tehran Pars Post  
 Koych Korou Post  
 Lavassanat Post  
 Lash-kerak Post  
 Farsham Post

TEHRAN Gendarmieric Regiment

Shahr Ara Company

Shahr Ara Post  
 Amir Abad Post  
 Vahid Post  
 Mehr Abad Post  
 Karaman Sara Sang Post  
 Tan Post  
 Velan Jack Post  
 Aria Shahr Post

TEHRAN Gendarmieric Regiment

Narmak Company

Narmak Post  
 Majidieh Post  
 Narmak # 2 Post  
 Vahidieh Post

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY QASR E QAJAR  
BE 0428-00098  
35-44-00N 051-27-05E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS A NAT DEF UNIV QASR E, QAJAR IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The following force is suspected of being garrisoned at this installation:

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 2. <sup>(U)</sup> [REDACTED] Description:

This installation, in central Tehran, houses an unidentified unit and consists of an administration area, two barracks areas and a large vehicle storage area. The administration area consists of four administration-type buildings, eight support buildings and a swimming pool. This area may possibly house an officers club. One barracks area, east of the administration area, consists of seven small barracks, three large barracks, one vehicle shed and seven support buildings. An additional three large barracks have been totally burned down and only the foundations remain. The second barracks area, west of the administration area, consists of 31 barracks, three administration buildings in a heavily wooded area, a vehicle park, and a parade field. The vehicle storage area consists of 15 vehicle parks, nine support buildings, and a parade field with a helicopter landing pad. A separately secured area with three large circular foundations for POL tanks is adjacent and due north of the vehicle storage area.

Tehran Supreme Command Staff Headquarters which houses the General Staff of the Iranian Islamic Armed Forces is located at 35-43-58N 051-26-49E (BE 0428-00122), just at the southwest corner of the installation. It is believed an extensive underground command post was constructed here. Navy headquarters is just south of the installation. (BE 0428-00252 35-43-50N 051-26-50E)

<sup>(U)</sup> 3. ~~(S)~~ Security:

There are no known special security procedures in effect at the installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN IIGF HQ AND BARRACKS LAVIZAN  
BN 0428-00673  
35-47-20N 051-31-42E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN IIGF HQ A, BKS LAVIZAN, IRAN.

DISCUSSION:

1. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Iranian Ground Forces units normally found at this installation are listed below:

Iranian Islamic Ground Forces Headquarters

Capability: The ground forces headquarters and some support elements are located at this facility. Strength figures are not available but it is estimated 1,000 to 2,000 persons are employed here. There are no combat units distinguishable, however a small quick-reaction guard force is undoubtedly assigned to the headquarters.

2. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Description:

This installation was constructed during the later half of the 1970's. It is located on the northeast edge of Tehran. It is wall and fence secured. In addition to the Ground Forces Headquarters, an unidentified electronics facility is located adjacent to the northeast edge of the installation and contains a control building, four circular pads, each with two communications antenna masts.

3. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Security:

A quick-reaction guard force is probably employed around the clock to secure the installation and its occupants. No other extraordinary security measures are known to be in force.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN ARMY BARRACKS AND MILITARY UNIVERSITY FARANABAD  
BE 0428-00241  
35-41-27N 051-29-40E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN ARMY BKS A MIL UNIV FARANABAD IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. [REDACTED] Iranian Ground Forces units normally found at this installation are:

[REDACTED]

Capability: Authorized personnel strength for the unit is approximately 14,000 troops. Estimated strength is 7,000. Five infantry battalions are believed deployed outside the Tehran area. The division is dogged by poor discipline, training and logistics support. The 1st HQ Inf Division and the 2nd Inf Division were formed out of the old Imperial Guard Brigade and other forces stationed in the Tehran area. A limited number of these troops (two battalions) saw duty in Oman in 1975. They were involved in patrolling, setting ambushes, road clearing, and vehicle checks.

2. [REDACTED] Description:

This installation is located in southeastern Tehran, just southeast of Tehran/Doshan Tappeh Airfield, BE 0428-08001. The installation is divided into three separate areas. The southern and northern areas house major ground forces maneuver elements. The central area contains a storage depot. The southern area includes three POL points, a large parade field with four helipads and two obstacle courses. The installation is wall and fence secured.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN ARMY BARRACKS AND MILITARY UNIVERSITY FARANABAD (continued)

3. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Security:

There are no known special security procedures in effect at this installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with duty officer on watch.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND BRIGADE HQ LAVIZAN  
BE 0428-00722  
35-46-45N 051-30-50E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS A BDE HQ LAVIZAN IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. [REDACTED] The following units are normally found at this installation:

[REDACTED]

Capability: Authorized personnel strength for the division is approximately 14,000 troops. Estimated strength is 4,000 men.

A small number of these troops served in Oman in 1975. They were involved in patrolling, setting ambushes, road clearing, and vehicle checks.

2. [REDACTED] Description:

This installation is located in northeast Tehran, approximately 5 NM NNE of Tehran/Doshan Tappeh AFLD, BE 0428-08001. It is situated between a mountain and a large communications facility. The facility is well secured with a fence and six guard towers. IIGF HQ is located just north of the installation. Included within the installation are two helipads near the division headquarters, a large parade field, two swimming pools, tennis courts, and three POL points.

3. [REDACTED] Security:

There are no known special security procedures in effect at the installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.

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SUBJECT: ~~TEHRAN BARRACKS AND ARTILLERY BDE~~  
~~REF ID: A628-000712~~  
~~33-50-50N 051-20-55E~~

REFERENCE: ~~TEHRAN BARRACKS, A ARTY BDE HQ, SAJ, IRAN~~

DISCUSSION:

1. (S/NOFORN) The following army units are normally garrisoned here:

~~[REDACTED]~~

Capability: Authorized personnel strength is 4,000 men. Estimated current strength is 2,000 men. ~~[REDACTED]~~

2. ~~[REDACTED]~~ Description:

The installation is located on the western edge of Tehran, and is wall secured. A parade field and an obstacle course are included within the installation. At least 15 barracks/support buildings are burned out. The motor park where the artillery pieces are stored is fence secured.

3. ~~[REDACTED]~~ Security:

There are no known special security procedures in effect at this installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS IMPERIAL GUARD BRIGADE SALTANABAD

~~0288~~  
~~07-46-52N-01P28-27~~

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS IMPRL GRD BDE SALTANABAD, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. ~~(b)(7)(C)~~ The following army and paramilitary units are normally stationed at this installation:

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Capability: Authorized personnel strength is 500 men. Estimated strength of this unit is 250 men.

Revolutionary Guard Tehran Headquarters

Capability: Reportedly a total of 2,000 Revolutionary Guards are stationed here of which 250 are headquarters staff and guards. Two units are formed with 250 men each to serve a "strike forces" as an emergency on-call force.

2. ~~(b)(7)(C)~~ Description:

The installation is wall-secured and road served. It is located in north-eastern Tehran and is adjacent to Tehran Ammo Plant Saltanatabad, BE 0428-00212. Two large parade field, one soccer field and a swimming pool are present. A Yagi antenna is adjacent to the headquarters area. One of the parade fields includes a soccer field, a basketball court and an obstacle course.

3. ~~(b)(7)(C)~~ Security:

There are no known special security procedures in effect at this installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND SPECIAL FORCES BDE HQ BAGH E SHAH  
BE 0428-00097  
35-41-17N 051-23-21E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS A SF BDE HQ BAGH E SHAH IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. [REDACTED] The following army and paramilitary units are normally found at this installation:

[REDACTED]

Capability: Authorized personnel strength is approximately 1600 men. Estimated current strength is 1000 men. The unit is equipped with light arms and has received anti-hijacking training from the Israelis. Training was based on the lessons learned from Entebbe. Using Boeing 707 and 727 aircraft, the men were trained in the use of the Israeli Uzi submachine gun, as well as the use of Israeli commando tactics, methods of boarding aircraft and demolitions. Prior to the revolution the unit had the mission of infiltrating Iranian student groups and other radical organizations opposed to the Shah's rule and, in several cases, participated in the subsequent raids on meeting places used by such groups. There was much coordination between this unit, the Imperial Iranian Police and SAVAK, the Iranian secret police. The brigade operates its own jump school. Each battalion is divided into a number of B Teams which control six A Teams. The unit was employed in Oman beginning in 1972. They have displayed a weakness in small unit tactics and patrolling discipline. They are unable to rig their own loads. Personnel are in excellent physical condition. At least 200 men are deployed outside the Tehran area.

[REDACTED] No further information.

[REDACTED] No further information.

[REDACTED] No further information.

2. (v) [REDACTED] Description:

This road-served, fence-secured installation is in central Tehran and houses the above mentioned units and an unidentified supply and transportation unit. Facilities include a soccer field, one swimming pool, three large vehicle parks and a parade field. Training facilities include two aircraft mockups, an airborne associated jump tower, an obstacle course, a repelling tower and a parade field. The National Defense College (Tehran War College) BE 0428RB1107 35-41-33N 051-23-07E is located adjacent to the northwest corner of the installation. The Military Academy (Tehran Military Post and Academy), BE 0428-00203, 35-41-07N 051-24-02E is located just east of the installation and the Military

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High School (no BE number) is located adjacent to the northeast corner of the installation.

3. [REDACTED]

C are on call 24 hours a day for the Revolutionary Guard Corps as quick-reaction force. These troops are regarded as the primary force to repel any counter-revolutionary force. Additionally, it is presumed guard posts are manned at night with a duty officer on watch.



SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS ORDNANCE DEPOT AND HEADQUARTERS ASHRATABAD  
BE 0428-00096  
35-42-40N 051-26-30E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS ORD DPO A HQ ASHRATABAD, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> This installation is occupied by an unidentified unit. No combat equipment is observed.

2. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> Description:

The installation is located in the center of Tehran. Facilities present include 40 barracks, one multiwing administration building, two vehicle sheds, 13 storage buildings/warehouses, and 24 support buildings. The facility is in a state of disrepair. Five barracks, the corner of one long warehouse and one vehicle shed have been burned out. This damage occurred during the revolution. Also present are two parade fields and a soccer field. An obstacle course was observed adjacent to the soccer field and another adjacent to one of the parade fields. Installation is approximately 1 NM east of the American Embassy.

3. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ <sup>(U)</sup> Security:

No firm information is available, however it is likely that this installation is unguarded during non-work hours.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND TRAINING CENTER LASHGARAK  
BE 0428-00714  
35-48-50N 051-35-20E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS A TNG CTR LASHGARAK, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S//NOFORN)~~ This installation houses an unidentified unit. No combat equipment is observed.
2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S//NOFORN)~~ Description:  
The installation is located approximately 10 NM northeast of the center of Tehran. The facility is wall and fence secured, though there are breaks in them. Included within the facility is a large parade field, and a POL point. It appears that only a caretaker force is present.
3. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S//NOFORN)~~ Security:  
No information is available, however it is likely that this installation is unguarded during non-work hours.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN BARRACKS AND ORDNANCE DEPOT GENDARMERIE  
BE 0428-00721  
35-46-10N 051-24-30E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN BKS A ORD DPO GENDARMERIE IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The following paramilitary organizations are normally housed at this installation:

Gendarmerie National Ordnance Depot: National level repair depot for gendarmerie equipment.

Gendarmerie National Hospital: National level hospital only for Gendarmerie.

Gendarmerie Officer Academy: An OCS-type school to produce Gendarmerie officers.

2. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Description:

This installation is located in northern Tehran. It is wall and fence secured containing a soccer field, tennis courts, a hand-to-hand combat pit, helipad, and a POL point. Two additional helipads are located on the north side of the installation.

3. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Security:

There are known special security procedures in effect at the installation other than those normally associated with any military post, i.e. guard posts manned at night with a duty officer on watch.

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SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED INSTALLATION  
35-45-20N 051-35-30E

REFERENCE: U/I INSTALLATION, IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S//NOFORN)~~ This installation houses an unidentified unit. No combat equipment is observed.

2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S//NOFORN)~~ Description:

The installation is located approximately 5 NM northeast of the center of Tehran. It appears to be still largely underconstruction. A soccer field with an obstacle course, two parade fields and two possible small arms ranges are observed. The installation is, for the most part, unsecured.

3. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S//NOFORN)~~ Security:

No information is available, however it is likely that this installation is unguarded during non-work hours.

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SUBJECT: Tehran/Mehrabad  
BE 0428-08824  
323418N 0514112E

REFERENCE: TEHRAN/MEHRABAD INT'L AIRFIELD. IRAN

DISCUSSION:

1. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ This airfield is a dual military/civil facility. It serves as the 1st Tactical Fighter Base, which consists of [REDACTED], and as the 1st Transport Base, which [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Assigned to this airfield are 23 F-4E, 27 F-4D, 13 RF-4E, 11 RF-5A, 6 F-5B, 8 T-33A, 3 RT-33A, 26 C-130, 11 KC-707, 3 KC-747, 7 Boeing 747, and some light VIP utility aircraft. In addition, there are 5 CH-47C, 3 AB-212, 33 AB-214C, 5 UH-1H, and 2 SH-3D helicopters at this facility. Numerous civilian transports are normally observed on the civil side. The latest OB data indicates that 32 F-4, 13 F-5, 21 C-130, 5 CH-47, and 15 UH-1 aircraft have been observed.

2. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ This fence-secured airfield, located on the western edge of Tehran, consists of 2 parallel asphalt runways (one 4000 x 45 meters NW/SE and one 4000x 60 meters NW/SE). The taxiway system includes one parallel taxiway, 2 end connecting links, 7 asphalt cross-overs, a loop asphalt taxiway to the civil terminal area, loop/link taxiways to 3 military parking areas and a loop taxiway to the military hangar area. Parking facilities include 8 various sized hangars and 2 alert shelters on the military side, 9 various sized hangars on the civil side, 16 major parking aprons and 17 revetted concrete arched drive-thru hangar areas. Support facilities include 2 major aircraft overhaul facilities, 1 terminal, 1 civil air terminal, and a large housing area located south of the runway. Munitions storage is located 1 KM SW of the center of the airfield and consists of 17 storage bunkers, 15 revetted storage buildings, 1 below ground unidentified building, 4 medium storage buildings, and 19 support buildings. POL storage is located approximately 300 meters SW of the center of the airfield and consists of 2 underground vertical cylindrical tanks. A POL handling facility is located approximately 300 meters NW of the center of the field and contains approximately 20 support buildings, a probable transloading area, a vehicle parking area, and probably is served via pipeline. On the SE section of the airfield adjacent to the end of the runway is an I-Hawk SAM complex which houses storage and training facilities for I-Hawk equipment. Two fixed firing sites with two complete batteries (12 launchers with associated radars) are located in this area and two training configured sites complete with equipment are located near the storage buildings where approximately 4 batteries (24 launchers and associated radars) are stored. This facility

is used for initial I-Hawk crew training. Additional details on the airfield are provided in the attached Airfield Facilities Report.

3. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Security forces for the airbase are provided by a small airpolice detachment and a detachment of army personnel from 3rd Area Support Command located at Tehran. At least two BTR-60 vehicles have been observed at this airbase. Air defenses for this facility include 21 ZSU 23-2 AAA guns, 2 Oerlikon 35-mm AAA gun sites (4 guns), 4 Rapier SAM launchers, and the I-Hawk SAM training sites described above. While the I-Hawk are in a training status they could be used to engage attacking aircraft.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ARMY AND AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT RESPONSE TIMES

1. Army and Air Force aircraft assets within 20 NM of Tehran are included in the preceding airfield analyses.

2. The only known Army or Air Force aviation outside the Tehran area which is within 150 NM of the city is at Shahroki AB. Shahroki AB is located approximately 150 NM from Tehran. This airbase is equipped with at least 59 F-4E fighter-bombers. The F-4 OR rate is estimated to be 40 .. Therefore, as many as 24 aircraft would probably be available.

~~3. [REDACTED]~~

Assuming 5 minutes to call the scramble through the C system and a flight speed of 600 MPH, the response time to Tehran for these alert aircraft would be [REDACTED] minutes. Probably 15-20 aircraft could respond incrementally as pilots become available over the next 12-24 hours and the remainder within 36 hours.

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SUBJECT: TEHRAN AREA, IRAN - SUMMARY OF MAJOR WATER SUPPLY FACILITIES

REFERENCE: TEHRAN IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO-WATER FACILITIES

DISCUSSION:

1. ~~(S)~~ Tehran's principal water sources are two large dam-impounded reservoirs on mountain streams northwest and northeast of the city respectively.

(a) Karaj reservoir and dam (coordinates 35-57-20N/051-05-30E) is located about 40 km. northwest of the city center (BE #0428-0161, refers to adjacent hydroelectric powerplant). This source provides about 530,000 cubic meters/128 million gallons per day.

(b) Farahnaz-e-Pahlavi (name undoubtedly changed by current regime) dam and reservoir (BE #0428-0319) is located at 35-42-25N/051-40-40E, about 24 km. northeast of the city; it provides about 220,000 cubic meters/58 million gallons per day.

Both large dams/reservoirs are connected to Tehran by large underground aqueducts (exact dimensions/capacities not available); smaller secondary dams also lie about 1-2 km. downstream of each large dam and also probably serve as intake points.

Lesser sources included a variety of deep wells and galleries scattered about the area. The two main sources described above, however, supply more than three-fourths the daily consumption of the metropolitan area.

2. <sup>U</sup> ~~(S)~~ Three major water treatment facilities (and several scattered smaller chlorinator facilities) are located in the urban area. The largest treatment facility identified lies in the northwestern environs (BE #0428-0200) near Kar. (coordinates 35-42-29N/051-19-02E); capacity is estimated at between 25 and 50 million gallons per day. A second large treatment facility (BE #0428-0152) is

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probably located in conjunction with reservoirs and the reported Tehran Water Authority headquarters in the north-central part of the city near 35-42-58N/051-23-52E; treatment capacity is reported to be between 20-30 million gallons per day. A third large treatment/filtration facility (no BE #, no capacity data available) is located in the northeastern suburb of Pars near 35-44-30N/051-35-30E. (Insufficient data are available to reconcile the wide differences between reported sources and treatment capacities).

3. (S) Several very large distribution reservoirs (all generally concrete/underground) are scattered across the higher elevations of the northern half of the city. In addition, numerous secondary/smaller distribution/storage facilities <sup>are scattered</sup> throughout the metropolitan area. The estimated storage capacity of just three of the largest facilities is 70 million gallons; more detailed storage data are not available.

4. (S) The distribution system serves most parts of the metropolitan area through piped networks; some areas are served only by public taps and fountains. Gravity flow is augmented in many places by pumped assist. Supplies are generally considered potable. Supplies are barely adequate for daily requirements, and additional sources/facilities have been constantly under development. Since 1977 water consumption in the Tehran metropolitan area (total estimated population over 4 million) has ranged between 850,000 and 1 million cubic meters (225-265 million gallons) per day. Consumption has been increasing an average of 12% annually in recent years with demand ever pressing available supplies and the distribution system. Water rationing has been used fairly often in mid-to late-summer months to conserve the principal reservoir and ground water sources during dry spells.

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5. (S) The water supply system is most vulnerable at the two principal reservoir/intake sites, then at the two or three major treatment facilities astride the major source aqueducts. Loss by physical destruction could cause long-term and potentially catastrophic disruption of water supplies for a large population group. Loss/damage of electric power supplies and selected component parts/controls could cause short to medium term reductions or cut-offs of supplies, the precise extent of which cannot be determined. Total storage capacity within the distribution system, however, probably does not exceed a few days supply at normal consumption rates.

DOI: To August 1979

DIA/DB-4D2; 23 May 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY 1787  
DATE 82-01-1 2000  
REASON

**SUBJECT: TEHRAN-ELECTRIC POWER**

**REFERENCE: TEHRAN, IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO-ELECTRIC POWER**

Tehran city is serviced by a double circuit 230 kilovolt (kV) loop which encircles the city. The loop encompasses two powerplants (BE 0428-00137 and 0428-00445) and six operational transformer stations (BEs 0428-00690, 0428-00689, 0428-00738, 0428-00692, 0428-00683 and 0428-00691). Power within the city is supplied by underground cable.

1. 0428-00444 354727N/0514039E Tehran HPP Farahnaz Pahlavi Latiyon, plant has 45,000 kW capacity using two 22,500 kW generators. Plant feeds single circuit 66 kV to BE 0428-00809 and single circuit 66 kV eastward. Vulnerable at transformers and power lines in adjacent transformer station. Generators also vulnerable.

2. 0482-00809 354420N/0513415E Tehran TS Hakimeh, substation under construction. Will be part of 230 kV loop around Tehran and terminus for 400 kV from BE 0338-00490 and 66 kV from BE 0428-00444.

3. 0428-00689 354155N/0512950E Tehran TS East, substation is component of 230 kV loop around Tehran. Taps 230 kV double circuit. Walled with access control building. Substation personnel probably control access to facility. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

4. 0428-00445 353843N/0512535E Tehran GTPP and TPP Farahabad, plant has capacity of 392,500 kW using 3-82,500 kilowatts (kW) oil fired steam units, 2-60,000 kW gas turbine and 1-25,000 kW gas turbine. Plant is in a walled complex area with controlled access probably provided by plant

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personnel or security personnel. Transformers and powerlines of servicing transformer yard are vulnerable as are the gas turbines, generators and boilers. Plant feeds national grid and Tehran loop.

5. 0428-00810 353545N/0512510E Tehran TS Shah Rey, small substation fed double circuit probably 132 kV from BE 0428-00445. Feeds double circuit possibly 132 kV westward. Fenced area with restricted access probably controlled by station personnel. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

6. 0428-00768 353305N/0512545E Tehran TPP Pet Ref, plant has estimated capacity of 30,000 kW using 3-10,000 kW oil fired steam units. Plant is located within refinery complex and serves the complex. Generators and boiler units are vulnerable.

7. 0428-00774 353300N/0512605E Tehran GTPP Pet Ref, plant has capacity of 40,000 kW using 2-20,000 kW gas turbines and serves the refinery. Plant is located within refinery complex. Gas turbines are vulnerable.

8. 0428-00769 353225N/0512545E Tehran TPP Pet Ref 2, plant has an estimated capacity of 40,000 kW using 4-10,000 kW oil fired steam units. Plant serves the refinery and is located within the complex. Generators and boiler units are vulnerable.

9. 0428-00699 353140N/0512450E Tehran GTPP Shah Rey Refinery, plant has capacity of 1,340,600 kW using 28-24,000 kW; 6-32,000 kW, 7-35,000 kW and 3-77,200 kW gas turbines. Plant is fenced or walled in with controlled access probably by plant personnel. Plant feeds the Tehran loop and

national grid. Transformers and lines of servicing transformer station and gas turbines are vulnerable.

10. 0428-00738 353730N/051820E Tehran TS SW 400 kV, a principal national grid transformer station and key transformer station in Tehran loop. Substation receives power via single circuit 400 kV from powerplants to the south, and 230 kV circuits from BE 0428-00699 (double circuit) and BE 0428-00651 (one double and one single circuit). A second single circuit 400 kV line from the south has not been completed. Substation is component of the 230 kV double circuit Tehran loop and provides some local service. Substation is walled or fenced with limited access. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

11. 0428-00692 354222N/0511505E Tehran TS Mehrabad, substation is part of Tehran loop and handles both 230 kV and probably 132 kV power. Substation is walled or fenced with limited access probably controlled by substation personnel. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

12. 0428-00811 354405N/0511540E Tehran TS WNW, substation is small serving local area using double circuit probably 132 kV power tapped from line fed from BE 0428-00137. Substation is walled with controlled access. Transformers and power lines are vulnerable.

13. 0428-00683 354600N/0511745E Tehran TS, substation is a key transformer station in the Tehran 230 kV loop. It provides switching service for BE 0428-00137 and the loop. Substation feed 230 kV double circuit from BE 0428-00137 and feeds power into the loop and westward. Substation

is walled with controlled access probably by station personnel. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

14. 0428-00137 354330N/0512117E Tehran TPP and GTPP Alstom Tarasht, plant has capacity of 75,000 kW using 4-12,500 kW oil fired steam units and 2-12,500 kW gas turbines. Plant feeds Tehran loop and national grid. Plant feeds a double circuit 230 kV to BE 0428-00683 and to westward and a double circuit prob. 132 kV parallel to loop (west and south) and one north probably to BE 0428-00691. Plant is walled with controlled access. Transformers and powerlines of adjacent transformer yard are vulnerable. Also gas turbines, generators and boilers are vulnerable.

15. 0428-00691 354545N/0512330E Tehran TS Amerabad, substation serves local area using 230 kV double circuit tap on Tehran loop and possibly 132 kV double circuit from BE 0428-00137. Substation is walled with limited access. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

16. 0428-00690 354125N/0512915E Tehran TS Saltanatabad, substation is component of Tehran loop. Substation is walled with controlled access. Transformers and powerlines are vulnerable.

**SUBJECT: TEHRAN-POL**

**REFERENCE: TEHRAN. IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO-ELECTRIC POWER**

1. 0428-00686 Tehran Pet Storage Kan  
354645N/0511745E  
CAT 21810  
Capacity = 1,120,000 barrels

Site contains 9 large vertical POL storage tanks of which 4 are floating roofed. Facility consists of a pumphouse, several storage buildings, and a truck loading area. Facility is pipeline and road served. Tanks are surrounded by low berms to contain spillage. Entire site area is surrounded by a security wall. Products stored should include motor fuels and some packaged products.

2. 0428-00685 Tehran Pet Storage Saltanatabad  
354720N/0513230E  
CAT 21810  
Capacity = 791,000 barrels

Site consists of 8 large vertical storage tanks, of which 4 are floating roofed. Vents for eight underground tanks are located westerly of the above ground tanks. Facility is pipeline and road served. Storage tanks are surrounded by a low berm to contain spillage, entire site is surrounded by a security fence. Site is located near military storage areas and may be military reserve POL storage for motor fuels and other related products.

3. 0428-00019 Tehran Petroleum Storage NIOC  
353939N/0512325E  
CAT 21810  
Capacity = 641,000 barrels

Facility consists of 6 large vertical tanks and 9 medium vertical storage tanks. Site contains open drum storage, 2 pumphouses, several support

DB 30

29 May 2000

buildings, POL packaging building, administration building, truck loading area, rail loading/unloading area. Facility would contain motor fuels and many other types of oil and greases. Site is pipeline, railroad, and road served.

4. 0428-00445 Tehran GTPP A TPP Farahabad  
353840N/0512530E  
CAT 21810  
Capacity = 43,000 barrels

Facility consists of 6 medium and 3 small vertical POL storage tanks to provide fuel for the adjacent power station. Tanks are surrounded by low berms to contain spillage. Site is pipeline and road served.

5. 0428-00138 Rey Petroleum Rfy and Storage  
Refinery Units (21130)  
353212N/0512525E  
Petroleum Product Storage (21840)  
353250N/0512550E  
Crude Petroleum Storage (21700)  
3532202N/0512535E  
Pumpstation (21510)  
353224N/0512540E

Capacity - 21130 = 200,000 barrels per day  
10 million metric tons per year  
21840 = 9,217,000 barrels  
21700 = 2,234,000 barrels

Facility is located 10 NM south of Tehran on an all weather road. Site is railroad, pipeline and road served. The site is composed of several areas. In the southwest section of the facility is the original refinery and products storage which began operations in 1968. The new sections, completed in 1974, are in the northwestern part of the facility. The facility is a high-grade refinery, capable of producing high-grade fuels, specialized fuels, and a range of lubricating oils.



**SUBJECT:** Tehran Ammunition Storage

**REFERENCE:** TEHRAN, IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO-LOGISTICS

**DISCUSSION:**

The Tehran Ammo Depot Northeast (BE 0428-00723, coord 35-47-10N/051-33-30E) is 8 kilometers northeast of Tehran and consists of 30 bunkers totaling 19,900 square meters of ammunition storage space.

DB 3C

29 May 70

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**SUBJECT:** Tehran/Mehrabad Transportation

**REFERENCE:** TEHRAN, IRAN ORIENTATION PHOTO-LOGISTICS

**DISCUSSION:**

**Rail** - Tehran is the hub of the Iranian rail network with the main north-west, eastern, and southern lines of the country radiating out from the major yard and station (BE 0428-00020, 35°39'29"N/051°23'51"E) in the southern end of Tehran. All the lines are standard-gauge, and are operating at a very reduced level due to a shortage of equipment. The main facility in Tehran consists of a station, a 612-meter, 28-track classification yard, and a repair shop. The station is 2.4 km. northeast of Ghale Morghi Airfield and 7.8 km ESE of Mehrabad and consists of a 3-story concrete building, 2 covered loading platforms served by 4 tracks and an uncovered platform served by 2 tracks. The station is 6.7 kilometers south of the U.S. Embassy.

**Highway** - Tehran, the focal point for major roads in Iran is cleared by several excellent roads in all directions. To the west is a good four (4) lane divided freeway traversing flat to undulating terrain with a capacity of over 77,000 metric tons per day. It also provides access to a major rail/highway transshipment point in the city. To the north is a good bituminous road, 18 to 22 feet wide with a capacity of 20,000 metric tons per day. This route traverses mountainous terrain and there are several tunnels and many sharp curves and steep grades. The road to the south provides access to Qom, is a fairly new 108-foot wide (6 lanes) bituminous highway in excellent condition. The road to the east, although a good bituminous road clearing Tehran, has stretches between Tehran and Meshed which are still gravel, limiting the capacity to a little over 7,000 metric tons per day. The route is subject to snow blockage in winter, and flooding and sand/dust storms much of the year.

**Airfields Clearance:**

**Tehran/Doshan Tappeh:** Adjacent to bituminous surfaced Tehran/Mashhad road in eastern part of Tehran. A railroad station is 4.7 miles SW of the airfield.

**Tehran/Ghale Morghi:** This airfield has a bituminous surfaced access road connecting to the main Tehran-Esfahan and Tehran-Qom road. It is also clear by the railroad west to Tabriz, south to Yazd, east to Mashhad, and north to Bandar Shah. Nearest rail station is in Tehran, 2.4 kilometers northeast.

**Tehran/Mehrabad Int'l:** A good bituminous surfaced access road connects this airfield to the main Tehran /Kazvin road which is adjacent to the north side of the field and another good two lane bituminous road adjacent to the south side. A standard gauge, single track railroad is to the south of the field. Nearest rail station is located in Iran 7.8 kilometers to the east.

The eight military (ground) installations are in developed portions of Tehran and clearance is provided by congested city streets.

DB3C

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79 May 2000

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LOGISTICS OVERLAY TO BE PROVIDED AT A LATER DATE

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

DIA/DB-3C  
5 June 1980

SUBJECT: Response to Intelligence Requirement

REFERENCE: JCS Letter, 13 May 1980, Subject: Intelligence Requirements

(U) Enclosed are five studies which are in partial response to reference.

5 Enclosures

1. Intelligence Study - Bushehr

(U) (S//~~INTEL~~/NOFORN)

2. Intelligence Study - Tabriz

(U) (S//~~INTEL~~/NOFORN)

3. Intelligence Study - Kerman

(U) (S//~~INTEL~~/NOFORN)

4. Intelligence Study - Mashhad

(U) (S//~~INTEL~~/NOFORN)

5. Intelligence Study - Manzariyeh

(U) (S//~~INTEL~~/NOFORN)

Classified by DIA/08

Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_  
Review on 5 June 2000

WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE  
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis - LZ SUSAN (DMA)

TIMEFRAME: November 80

SUMMARY:

1. (U) DMA provided a terrain analysis of LZ SUSAN upon request of J2.
2. (TS) Analysis was principally done through available
3. (U) Unbiased analysis generally supported the selection of LZ SUSAN for fixed wing operations.

COMMENTS:

1. (TS) DMA analysts performed work without knowledge of our proposed use so that as complete yet unbiased a report as possible could be obtained.
2. (U) Analysis required several man-<sup>days</sup> work.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (U) Terrain analysis specialists are available at DMA/HTC and should be given ample time for work if utilized.
2. (U) That DMA/HTC terrain analysts be used to provide unbiased terrain analysis.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC                     , Cpt                     

POINTS OF CONTACT:

1. DMA - Col                      HQ DMA - 254-4426
2. DMA - Mr.                      DMA/HTC - 227-2736

ATTACHMENTS:

DMA Terrain Analysis

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO nmc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM                     

Classified By JCS  
 Declassified On OADR

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DMA

TERRAIN ANALYSIS  
(LZ SUSAN)

1. The area is covered with wormwood or sagebrush rather widely spaced. Typically 30-40 cm occasionally up to one meter high. This vegetation would cause a degree of roughness but would not be an obstacle. It is visible in the center of existing tracks indicating that vehicles can drive over it.
2. Vehicle tracks deviate to by-pass minor relief features. There are signs of considerable maneuver at the washes adjacent to the area in order to cross them. Tracks appear to have some relief to them. This could be caused by disturbance of the surface and wind removal of the silt sized material. Two of the tracks crossing the area appear to have this characteristic. This rutting could cause a slight roughness but would not be considered an obstacle.
3. Both the north and south ends of the area appear to contain washes. On the northern end the washes (two or three) are broad and low with no significant escarpments. These would cause no significant problems. In the southern part of the area there are a number of washes which increase in size and depth as they proceed to the south, terminating at a relatively high escarpment. These washes appear to have lateral escarpments which should be considered as potential obstacles. There are also a couple minor escarpments on the extreme eastern side of the area. They are rather limited in extent and are not a major problem but should be avoided if possible.
4. Surface materials should be adequate to support the craft. It consists of alluvial (fan) material near the lower extremity of the fan. Typically these are a mixture of gravels, sands and silts with sands and silts predominating. The surface is normally covered with gravels and coarse sand. The silt and clay sized material is removed by the wind. The gravel material at the surface becomes varnished (dark brown) after a long period of time (hundreds of years). Disturbance of this surface causes the unvarnished (light colored) side of these gravels to be exposed. Tracks thus exposed will remain indefinitely.
5. The surface configuration of the area is relatively flat with an overall less than three percent and possibly as low as one percent. The surface is not perfectly smooth. It appears to contain small undulations with relief of these closely spaced features probably in the 5 to 20 centimeter range.

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DMA / 11 NOV 80

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6. Disturbance of the surface materials top layer could free the silt sized material and could produce a potential dust problem. Numerous passes over the same path could accentuate the problem:

7. Moisture (rainfall) would not normally create any difficulty. Runoff would be rapid and soils would soak up the balance rapidly. The coarse textured surface would be supportive re-gardless of moisture. During a rain storm, even a relatively small one, flash flooding could occur in the washes adjacent to the area on either side. Caution would have to be taken in the event of rain in traversing these washes. If flash floods occur they are normally of short duration, usually only minutes.

8. Adjacent to the site in the northeast there are tracks which appear to be tank tracks. This area may have been used as a military training area. This fact does not appear to have any significance in terms of the terrain analysis of the study area.

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

4598

CONTENTS- BASIC INTEL PACKAGE AS OF 27 NOV 1979

TAB A BASIC SITUATION IN OBJECTIVE AREA  
TAB B UPDATES BASIC SITUATION IN TAB A  
TAB C INTEL ASSESSMENT, CITY AREA  
TAB D FIXED/ROTOR WING LINKUP AREA  
TAB E COUNTRY WIDE INTEL ASSESSMENT  
TAB F E&E OUTLINE  
TAB G WEATHER / CLIMATOLOGY  
TAB H ILLUMINATION DATA

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12856  
CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY D.DONMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By: FCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

AS OF 27 NOV 1979



3. ENEMY DISPOSITION: THE SITUATION IN THE COMPOUND HAS NOW SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE WITH DEMONSTRATIONS PERIODICALLY STAGED OUTSIDE THE CHANCELLORY GATE ON TAKTI-E-JAMSHID BLVD. CROWD SIZE VARIES FROM 50-75 CURIOSITY SEEKERS TO SEVERAL THOUSAND AT LUNCH/PRAYER TIME OR WHEN ANNOUNCEMENTS GO OUT VIA THE RADIO AND THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM. SECURITY OF THE AREA IS PROVIDED BY 20-30 IRG GUARDS AT THE CHANCELLORY GATE, SUPPORTED BY FOOT AND VEHICLE PATROLS. ANOTHER GROUP OF SOME 20-30 STUDENTS ARE LOCATED IN THE CHANCELLORY BUILDING.

SECURITY OF THE HOSTAGE AREAS IS MAINTAINED BY 125-175 STUDENTS. WITHIN THE BUILDINGS THE STUDENTS CARRY PISTOLS, WHILE THOSE ON DUTY OUTSIDE THEY CARRY G3 RIFLES OR UZI SUBMACHINE GUNS. THE OVERALL COMPOUND MAY BE UNDER PROTECTIVE SURVEILLANCE FROM THE WINDOWS OF SEVERAL SURROUNDING BUILDINGS. NO OBSERVATION POSTS OR GUN POSITIONS HAVE BEEN SEEN ON SURROUNDING ROOFTOPS.

ANALYSIS OF ALL REPORTING INDICATES THE HOSTAGES MAY BE HELD IN

- AT
- A.
- B.
- C.
- D.
- E.

[REDACTED]

GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION IS ESTIMATED AS FOLLOWS WITH A DAY/NIGHT DUTY RATIO OF 60/40.

- A.
- B.
- C.
- D.
- E.
- F.

[REDACTED]

THE PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES ARE LISTED BELOW WITH THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES FOR THE 0200-0400 TIME FRAME.

- A. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES - LOCAL IRG MILITA/PASDARAN 50-100 FROM TWO NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS LESS THAN 1 KM SOUTH WITH NOMINAL STRENGTH OF 250.
- B. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES - LOCAL CROWDS 100-300 PLUS MILITIA
- C. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES - IRG STRIKE TEAM 150-200 (MCTORIZED)
- D. WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES - IRG BACK-UP STRIKE FORCES 1,000-1,500 AND LARGE CROWDS
- E. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES -IRG STRIKE FORCE RESIDUAL AND MOPS 2,000-3,000

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(4) HOSTILE COURSES OF ACTION: THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTION ARE OPEN TO THE STUDENT CAPTORS AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD COMMAND.

(A) ELECT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES.

(B) ELECT TO KILL SOME OR ALL HOSTAGES.

(C) ESTABLISH DEADLINE FOR RETURN OF SHAH, DEMAND USG ADMIT THAT EMBASSY WAS "SPY NEST" AND RELEASE HOSTAGES IF SHAH WAS RETURNED.

(D) CONDUCT ESPIONAGE TRIALS AT COMPOUND, RELEASE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL, FIND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AND SELECTED EMPASSY STAFF GUILTY OF SPYING AND SENTENCE TO LONG PRISON TERMS OR DEATH.

(5) WHILE THE TERRORISTS ARE CAPABLE OF FOLLOWING ANY OF THESE COURSES OF ACTION, THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE HANDLING OF THE HOSTAGES SINCE THE TAKEOVER IS FOR THE STUDENTS TO CONDUCT ESPIONAGE TRIALS WITHIN 5-10 DAYS IN THE CHANCELLORY BUILDING, FIND SELECTED INDIVIDUALS GUILTY, FREE THOSE FOUND NOT GUILTY, TURN THE GUILTY OVER TO THE IRG FOR TRANSFER TO QASR PRISON FOR EXECUTION OF SENTENCE.

(6) CRITICAL FACTORS: ANALYSIS OF SITUATION TO INCLUDE EXAMINATION OF POTENTIAL GROUND REINFORCEMENTS AND LIKELIHOOD OF AIR INTERDICTION/INTERCEPTION AFTER EXECUTION STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT EXTRACTION PHASE WILL BE EXTREMELY CRITICAL. THE FACTOR OF SURPRISE WILL HAVE BEEN NEUTRALIZED, AND THE REGULAR MILITARY UNITS AND THE GENERAL POPULATION ALERTED. A CRITICAL POINT IN PLANNING DECEPTION, DIVERSION, AND ACTUAL OPERATIONS IS TO INSURE OR MINIMIZE THE SCALE OF OPERATIONS SO THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTIONS IS LIMITED TO A RESCUE MISSION AND NOT AN INVASION OR SERIES OF MAJOR INDISCRIMINATE DESTRUCTIVE STRIKES. CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO AVOID AROUSING FEELINGS OF NATIONALISTIC SELF DEFENSE OR REVENGE, BOTH OF WHICH COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RESCUE FORCE DURING EXFILTRATION.

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
FROM: JTF/J2

TO: [REDACTED] J2

INFO: [REDACTED] S2

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SUBJECT: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

REF: A UR 241415R NOV 79//CRITICAL INFO GAPS

B UR 251130R NOV 79//CRITICAL EEI

1. <sup>(U)</sup> ~~(TS)~~ THE RESPONSES PROVIDED BELOW ARE KEYED TO THE APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPHS IN REFERENCE ALPHA.

2. <sup>(S)</sup> ~~(TS)~~ EMBASSY COMPOUND/HOSTAGES

a. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT IS THAT PRIOR TO INITIATION OF "TRIALS" IN THE COMPOUND THE HOSTAGES WILL CONTINUE TO BE ROTATED BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SELECTED

[REDACTED] "HARD CASES" OR SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE LIKELY BEING HELD SEPARATE, POSSIBLY IN THE [REDACTED] BASEMENT OR THE DCM RESIDENCE STORE ROOM. ONCE THE "TRIALS" ARE IMMINENT THE HOSTAGES MAY BE REGROUPED AND SEGREGATED BY THE DEGREE OF THEIR "CRIMES". LIKELY HOLDING LOCATIONS FOR THE "SENIOR SPIES" ARE THE CLOAK ROOM IN THE BASEMENT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, THE WAREHOUSE BASEMENT, OR POSSIBLY STORE ROOMS IN THE CHANCERY BASEMENT.

b. HOSTAGE CONDITION: AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT BUT SUGGEST A FEW HOSTAGES MAY BE PHYSICALLY INCAPACITATED AT EXECUTION TIME OR BECOME SO SHOCKED IF EXECUTION IS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Com JTF | ✓  
C/S(S) | ✓  
J2 | [REDACTED] | G

REACTED TO IMMEDIATELY AND VIOLENTLY BY HOSTILE FORCES THAT SOME MAY NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE "SECURITY" OF THEIR ENVIRONMENT.

c. HOSTAGE COUNT: AGREE WITH THE THRUST OF YOUR COMMENTS AS DOES COMJTF. ANALYSIS CONDUCTED HERE INDICATED FOUR INDIVIDUALS LISTED AS HOSTAGES BY DOS WERE NOT MENTIONED BY ANY RELEASEES. THE FOUR NAMES ARE:

G [REDACTED] DOS  
[REDACTED] DOS  
[REDACTED] USMC  
[REDACTED] USMC

IN ADDITION, ANALYSIS OF DEBRIEFINGS REVEALED NAMES OF AT LEAST SIX INDIVIDUALS HELD AS HOSTAGES THAT DO NOT APPEAR ON DOS LISTING. NAMES ARE:

G [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (NO FURTHER INFORMATION)  
U/I AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN

TOTAL COUNT IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUSPECT BUT RECOMMEND BASE LINE FIGURE OF 49-52 BE USED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE NAMES OF THE FIVE INDIVIDUALS YOU CITED ARE BELIEVED TO BE THE FIVE OFFICIAL AMCITS THAT HAVE BEEN AT LARGE IN THE CITY, MOVING OCCASIONALLY AND PERIODICALLY CHECKING IN WITH LAINGEN, TOMSETH, ANDLHOWLAND BY PHONE. THE LAST THREE INDIVIDUALS ARE LOCATED IN THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER PROTECTIVE CUSTODY.

d. COMPOUND HARDENING: BELIEVE "HARDENING MEASURES" ARE RELATIVELY LIMITED AND INITIATED BY STUDENTS IN REACTION TO EXTERNAL STIMULUS; RUMORS OF AMERICAN ASSAULT. FROM NATURE OF PREPARATIONS STUDENTS ANTICIPATE ASSAULT TO BE HELICOPTERBORNE, NOT GROUND INITIATED.

3. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ ESTIMATES OF STUDENT/GUARD STRENGTH:

a. THIS FLUCTUATES WITH SOURCES AND TIME OF OBSERVATION. CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT OF THIS LOCATION PLACES TOTAL STUDENT STRENGTH AT 280-300 WITH UP TO 2/3 THAT NUMBER WITHIN THE COMPOUND DURING THE DAY, PARTICULARLY ON DAYS WHEN DEMONSTRATIONS ARE SCHEDULED. BELIEVE THE NUMBER DROPS DURING THE NIGHT, WITH A RANGE OF 80-120 AVAILABLE WITHIN THE COMPOUND. OF THIS NUMBER, ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD ARE ON GUARD DUTY AT ANY ONE TIME. OF THIS NUMBER, HALF OR SOME 20 WOULD BE ON DUTY OUTSIDE OF HOSTAGE BUILDINGS, WITH ANOTHER HALF DOZEN ON ROOF OBSERVATION DUTY. ALL EXTERIOR GUARDS MUST BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND AT LEAST AN EQUAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS INSIDE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED, BUT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DIFFERENTIATE.

b. CANNOT CONFIRM GUARD/STUDENT LOCATIONS BUT CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT OF KNOWN AND SUSPECTED LOCATIONS.

4. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ CONCUR WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH FOUR.

5. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(TS)~~ COMPOUND EXTERIOR:

a. AGREE THAT A THREAT EXISTS FROM THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS AND THE CHANCERY. THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS THREAT IS ESTIMATED TO BE SO HIGH THAT THE ATHLETIC FIELDS IN

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE COMPOUND WOULD BECOME KILL ZONES WITHIN 7-12 MINUTES AFTER THE ASSAULT ACTION IS IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND/OR A WARNING/CALL FOR HELP IS BROADCAST ON THE PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM CONTROLLED FROM THE CHANCERY.

b. IN ADDITION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED STUDENTS IN THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS OTHER ELEMENTS WHO MIGHT WANT TO HUMILIATE THE UNITED STATES COULD BE ALSO POSITIONED IN THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS--I.E. THE PLO/PLFP ACTIVISTS SEEKING REVENGE FOR ENTEBBE, OR THE KGB SEEKING REVENGE FOR SON TAY. COMMENT TO DELTA S2: ~~REDACTED~~ WHERE IS CARLOS, THIS SMELLS OF POSSIBLE SETUP OF USG.

G  
C  
6. ~~(S)~~ (TS) RECOGNIZE YOUR CONCERN FOR ROAD BLOCKS AND CHECK POINTS ~~REDACTED~~ STILL WORKING THIS PROBLEM, WITH GREAT EMPHASIS PLACED ON SUBJECT BY MG VAUGHT.

7. ~~(S)~~ (TS) CONCUR WITH YOUR PARA 7. WE CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR A RELIABLE AND SECURE MEANS OF INTRODUCING FORCE. THIS IS CONSISTENT MAJOR WEAKNESS IN CURRENT PLANS. MG VAUGHT GREATEST CONCERN.

8. ~~(S)~~ (TS) CONCUR AND RECOGNIZE YOUR CONCERNS- COMMENTS IN PARA 7 APPLY.

9. ~~(S)~~ (TS) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS APPLY TO YOUR REF B.

10. ~~(S)~~ (TS) REACTION TIMES: AT YOUR REQUEST AND BASED UPON CONTINUING CONCERN FOR ASSAULT FORCES THE FOLLOWING REVISED HOSTILE FORCE REACTION TIMES ARE POSTULATED: (ALL TIMES ARE ESTIMATED FROM THAT POINT IN TIME WHEN THE RECOGNITION OF THE ASSAULT REACHES THE CHANCERY AND THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONS.)

a. WITHIN 5-7 MIN- FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND ANY WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

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B-4

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b. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFORCEMENTS FROM LOCAL IRG MILITIA/PASDARAN STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.

c. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 MILITIA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS

d. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES IRG MILITIA REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

e. WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES IRG BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

f. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

<sup>1st</sup> RECOGNIZE THAT THE VOLUME OF FRIENDLY FIRE, [REDACTED]

A

[REDACTED] WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS OF HOSTILE FORCES AND CROWDS, THE CRITICAL PHASE OF "IN TOWN OPERATIONS" WILL BE THAT TIME WHEN THE EXTRACTION HELICOPTERS ARE <sup>LANDING</sup> ON THE GROUND <sup>and departing the Comp:</sup> LOADING THE POTENTIAL FOR HOSTILE DISABLING FIRE WILL STILL BE HIGH AS LONG AS THE LZ IS WITHIN THE COMPOUND.

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
TEHRAN AND IMMEDIATE VICINITY

General. The city is densely populated with a potential for heavy traffic congestion at rush hour periods or if a demonstration or mob activity is taking place. The population is generally distributed with Europeans and high-income housing in the North. There are three major air fields: Mehrabad, Ghale-Morhi, and Dohman Tappeh on the West, South and East of town, respectively.

Weather. Winter weather is generally cold and partly cloudy. Morning lows average low 30's F in the morning to mid 40's and low 50's in the afternoon. Winds over 16 kts 5% of the time. Mean sky cover ranges 30-60%. Precip expected 3-7 days/month; snow 1-3 days. (Detailed info in WX section)

<u>LIGHT</u>	<u>NOV 15</u>	<u>DEC 15</u>
First light	0613	0638
Last light	1725	1721

(Detailed info in light data section)

Enemy Forces

1. Students. Tehran University is the primary origin of students involved in the current situation. They can probably muster crowds of several thousand, on sufficient notice, to carry out demonstrations and provide at least moral support.
2. Revolutionary Guards - (Pasadaran). The most active security force in the city, there are approx 4000 Revolutionary Guards in the city; in various states of organization, training, and readiness. An estimated 3000 are undergoing training at military



installations in the city. Komiteh's or local units of Revolutionary Guards have been reported approx 400 M north of the Embassy (150 pers) and 800 M south of the Embassy (2 Komiteh's of 250 pers each). Other concentrations of Revolutionary Guards are reported in Zafar St., approx 6.5 KM north of the Embassy, and Saltanatabad Barracks, approx 9 KM to the northeast. There are reportedly a total of 12 local units of 300 pers each and 5 reserve units of 150 men each of 12 hours call.

3. The Gendarmerie. Numbering approx 75,000 prior to the revolution, they are a lightly armed paramilitary force mainly responsible for border and rural security. Their ranks have been reduced by desertions particularly in Kurdish areas.

4. The National Police. Responsible for urban law enforcement, the national police do not represent a major tactical force in the Tehran area.

5. Regular Army. Army units in the Tehran area recently consisted of an under-strength infantry division, a special forces brigade, two armored brigades, two artillery brigades, and various support units. Most of the special forces brigade and several battalions of the infantry division are in the northwest fighting the Kurds. Recent analysis indicates almost all combat gear administratively parked, indicating a low alert status. Significant recent dispositions include:

- a. Lavizan barracks (northeast edge of town) (UTM WV 4559)
  - 42 X Chieftan Tanks
  - 48 X BTR/OT-64
  - 9 X M113

b. Saltanatabad barracks (north-northeast edge of town) (UTM WV 4529)

12 X FA pieces

12 X mortars

c. Vic Doshan-Tappeh airfield (east edge of town) (UTMWV 4250)

35 X M-46's (artillery)

8 X U/I artillery pieces

50 X possible tanks

12 X possible mortars

d. Baggi-E-Shah compound (approx) 4KM west-southwest of Embassy)

12 X companies of "rangers" (Regular Army, defected to the Khomeini/IRG cause).

e. Vic Niavaran Palace (north edge of town) (UTMWV 4264)

f. Vic Mehrabad Airfield

2 X infantry companies, reported low combat effectiveness

36 X M-46 artillery pieces.

It is notable that at some Army posts, such as Abbasabad compound (approx 2-3 KM northeast of embassy), Army troops are not all armed and may be mixed with or under control of Revolutionary Guards.

Army units are generally manned at half strength and are experiencing maintenance and supply problems. Although the Army is well equipped, difficulties in maintaining armor and breakdowns of support equipment and transportation vehicles have been reported.

There is little capability to guarantee coordinated tactical control by the opposition. The Revolutionary Guards might be able to control their actions internally, but not with other elements such as students, police, public, or

~~TOP SECRET~~

military. Despite this, a convergence of opposition forces and the public around the embassy is likely, with a sharply increasing response within 30-45 minutes of an alarm.

6. Air. Air elements immediately within the Tehran area include the first fighter base at Mehrabad. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Maintenance and supply have reduced pilot training and operational capability. Mehrabad is the home of the 11th Combat Crew Training Squadron and 12th Fighter Squadron, with 27 X F4D and 25 X F4E aircraft. Recent dispositions of significant aircraft include:

Doshan-Tappeh:

14 X F-27

1 X C-130

Ghale-Morghhi

38 X light aircraft (including O-1's and O-2's)

20 X UH-1

1 X CH-47

Mehrabad:

31 X F-4's

16 X F-5's

7 X T-33

11 X KC-135

23 X C-130

6 X CH-47

14 X UH-1

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7. Air Defense. Air defense weapons recently reported in the Tehran area include:

5 X Hawk sites vic Mehrabad (2 reported occupied, no missiles)

1 X BN 23 NM AD guns, in depot east of Mehrabad (64 X Wpns)

Maintenance and air defense coordination will seriously limit any coordinated air defense effort in the objective area.

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MANZARIYEH ORIENTATION DATA

I. TARGET DESCRIPTION -

MANZARIYEH AIR FIELD IS AN AIR AND GROUND TRAINING FACILITY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE IIAF WHICH APPEARS TO BE USED DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY. THE MAIN FACILITY IS THE 3322M X 45M ASPHALT RUNWAY, MARKED WITH AZIMUTH HEADINGS AND RUNWAY EDGES (POSSIBLY USEFUL RECOGNITION FEATURES). THE RUNWAY IS ORIENTED WNW X ESE WITH NO APPARENT RUNWAY LIGHTS OR APPROACH LIGHTS. ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE RUNWAY THERE IS A CIVILIAN PASSENGER TERMINAL, A CONTROL TOWER, AND FIVE SMALL SUPPORT BUILDINGS. WATER MAY BE AVAILABLE AT TERMINAL.

OTHER FACILITIES IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA INCLUDE:

A. KUSHK E NOSRAT AIRFIELD, A GRADED EARTH STRIP WITH A RADIO/WEATHER STATION AND A BOMBING/GUNNERY RANGE. KUSHK E NOSRAT IS LOCATED APPROX 5KM NORTH OF MANZARIYEH AIR FIELD, AND LINKED BY GROUND CABLE.

B. A RAPIER SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITE APPROX 1.7 KM NORTH OF THE CENTER OF MANZARIYEH'S RUNWAY. THIS SITE APPEARS TO HAVE 3X LAUNCHERS APPROX 150-200M APART. VEHICLES HAVE BEEN OBSERVED AT THESE LAUNCHERS, BUT NONE WERE PRESENT ON 20 NOV.

*Later Proven  
Not to be site*

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D-1

C. A BARRACKS AREA APPROX 1.8 KM SE OF THE EAST END OF THE RUNWAY.

D. AN AMMUNITION STORAGE DEPOT APPROX 8.5 KM SOUTH OF MANZARIYEH FIELD.

E. AN UNIDENTIFIED GROUP OF BLDGS APPROX 3.5 KM SOUTH OF MANZARIYH FIELD.

II. LOCATION

MANZAIYEH AIRFIELD IS LOCATED APPROX 5 MI NORTH BY WEST OF MANZARIYEH, 20 MI NORTH OF QOM, AND 50 MI SOUTHWEST BY SOUTH OF TEHRAN.

III. COORDINATES

THE CENTER OF THE RUNWAY IS LOCATED GEOGRAPHIC 34 58 39" N. 050 48' 12" E. UTM 39S VU 82 048 70636 (THIS MAY BE A USEFUL REF PT FOR AIR/GROUND COORDINATION WITHOUT DETAILED MAPS AVAILABLE.)

IV. MAP REF

A) 1:1,000,000 ONC G5

B) 1:250,000 JOINT OPERATIONS GRAPHIC SERIES 1501

SHEET NI39-6

C) MAP-SUBSTITUTE: MANZARIYEH PHOTO WITH GRID APPROX SCALE 1:25,000

V. WEATHER AT MANZARIYEH (SPECIFIC POINT) NOV DEC

A. CLIMATOLOGY: MEAN PRECIP (INCHES)	.6	.4
MAX TEMP (DEGREES)	60	52
MEAN TEMP	55	49
MIN TEMP	45	36

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON CLIMATOLOGY, SEE ATTACHMENT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

B. LIGHT DATA: SEE LIGHT DATA ON TEHRAN AREA (ATTACHED)

## VI. TOPOGRAPHY

MANZARIYEH IS ON FAIRLY FLAT BUT ROUGH TERRAIN WITH NATURAL DRAINAGE. AREA IS TRAFFICABLE OFF-ROAD BY HIGH AXELED WHEELED VEHICLES (NOTE RAPIERS AND ASSOCIATED VEHICLES WERE NOT MOVED INTO POSITION ON ROADS.) PEAKS OF 4347' AT 3MI TO WSW AND 3451' AT 1.2MI WEST.

## VII. ENEMY

A. AIR - NO AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED RECENTLY AT MANZARIYEH AS OF 20 NOV.

B. MISSILE - RAPIER TRAINING SITE WITH THREE LAUNCHERS IS APPROX 1.7 KM NORTH OF THE CENTER OF THE RUNWAY. NO VEHICLES WERE OBSERVED AT THE SITE ON 20 NOV.

C. GROUND - ALTHOUGH INTEL ESTIMATES HAVE GIVEN A POTENTIAL OF 500 X PERSONNEL THROUGH-OUT THE AREA (INCLUDING THE AMMUNITION DEPOT, THE BARRCKS AREA, AND THE FIELD OF KUSHK-E-NOSRAT) THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITY OBSERVED AT MANZARIYEH RECENTLY. IT IS ALSO ESTIMATED THIS AREA IS ONLY USED DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.

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THERE ARE NO REGULAR IRANIAN ARMY GROUND FORCE UNITS LOCATED WITHIN 50 NAUTICAL MILES OF QOM/MANZARIYEH AMMO DEPOT. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SECURITY/ADMIN UNITS AT QOM/MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD (COMPANY PLUS). THESE UNITS COULD REACT WITHIN 5-10 MIN, OR LESS, DEPENDING ON STATE OF ALERT.

THERE ARE AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS IN THE CITY OF QOM, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY 29 KM FROM QOM/MANZARIYEH. TRANSIT TIME FOR THESE UNKNOWN FORCES, ASSUMING TRAVEL BY TRUCK, IS APPROXIMATELY 40 MINUTES.

~~TOP SECRET~~

D-4



~~TOP SECRET~~  
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

GENERAL:

Although the military command structure in the Iranian armed forces is weak and insubordination is not unusual, the majority of the military would obey orders if Iran were attacked or threatened with imminent invasion.

The Iranian officer corps is divided between royalists (supporting restoration of the Monarchy), revolutionaries (supporting Khomeini), and moderates (who are politically ambivalent but dissatisfied with the military situation). The moderates are upset by the lack of discipline, the status of the military in society, and religious interference in the military, such as ordering participation in demonstrations. The moderates are disorganized and have adopted a wait and see attitude. They lack a clear definition of the military's role in society, largely due to recent purges of ranking military officers. While many moderates continue to believe they should protect the country against external aggression, they have serious doubts about involving themselves in the suppression of internal opposition. In Kurdistan these doubts have caused several incidents of refusal to obey orders and subsequent executions.

The military self-image was seriously affected after the revolution. They do not believe they can oppose the, "Will of the People." The military attempted to do this prior to the revolution and were defeated. The moderate officers doubt they could lead an uprising against the Islamic Government because the military are not considered a, "Progressive," force due to their previous support of the Shah.

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E-1

COUNTRY WIDE

Air Defense

(S) 1. Fighter Aircraft. The overall operational effectiveness of the IIAF has been seriously impaired by maintenance, supply, and training problems. Although flying squadrons are fully manned, pilots fly only 2 to 5 hours per month, with no advanced combat maneuver training permitted. F-14 aircraft should present less threat than the better maintained, more familiar F-4 and F-5's.

Iran has a total of approx 90 X F-4, 135 X F-5, and 77 X F-14 fighters deployed at eight bases, primarily in western Iran. (A ninth base, Chah Bahar has been used for occasional F-4 deployments) The post revolution sortie rate has been only [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which may indicate (and contributes to) an impaired operational capability.

F-14's are suffering for parts, maintenance, and trained pilots; reportedly only 20 pilots had been through intercept training and only 3 had finished the complete air defense/air superiority course and were operationally qualified at the time of the revolution. Only 15 IP's were trained weapon systems officers, and had only been through first-phase training (single missile on a single target). Since the revolution, there has been little training [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Also, Iran's only F-14 F-14 simulator is at least partially inoperative.

Only 2 firings of the Phoenix missile were conducted before the revolution. Only 30 of 268 Phoenix missiles are operational. according to one report, although estimates have run as high as 200.



Other ADA systems available include 23MM Soviet and 35MM Oerlikon guns. Their effectiveness will be impaired by C&C problems, but they still could pose a local threat.

Ground Forces

The Regular Army numbers approx 150,000, about half what it was prior to the revolution. The bulk is stationed along borders with Iraq and the Soviet Union. Except for small units fighting the Kurds, there have been no major redeployments since the revolution.

The Army is well equipped but hindered by lack of maintenance and spare parts. Discipline and morale are low in some units, due to interference by the Revolutionary Guard and support conditions, but have improved slightly over the last few months.

The Army is supplemented by the paramilitary field police (Gendarmerie) and Revolutionary Guards (Pasadarn) numbering something under 75,000 and approx 20,000 respectively.

Dispositions: (see map for Hq locations)

Northwest	64 Inf Div
Iraqi border	28 Inf Div
	81 Armd Div
	84 Inf Bde
Southwest (oil fields)	92 Armd Bde
	55 Abn Bde
Northeast (USSR/ Afghanistan)	77 Inf Div
Southeast (Pakistan/ Afghanistan)	88 Armd Div

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Units in the northwest and Iraqi border areas are occupied with suppressing the Kurds. An extra 10,000 troops and 5,000 revolutionary guards have been deployed to the areas as reinforcements.

In the southwest there has been some guerrilla activity by Arabs, but this has not reached the dimensions of the Kurdish problem. Iraq could increase pressure in the West by actively supporting either the Arabs or the Kurds.

Navy.

The Navy's operational capability has been increasingly impaired since the revolution due to maintenance and military discipline problems, compounded by a lack of parts and revolutionary interference in command channels. The Navy has put in a poor showing on the only two exercises it has held since summer.

~~TOP SECRET~~ The Navy's nine harpoon-firing guided missile patrol boats are probably in the best condition of all Iranian ships. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

There are also 3 destroyers in the Iranian inventory, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These ships each carry 4 "Standard" (name of missile) Surface to Surface missiles with 1 reload capability. Maintenance may have reduced the missile capability. [REDACTED]

The Navy also has 2 coastal minesweepers, based at Khorramshahr and 6 RH-53D minesweeping helicopters, based at Bushehr. All are

~~TOP SECRET~~

E-5

currently grounded for maintenance and parts. There are also a squadron each of SM-3D and AB-313 helicopters with anti-sub and anti-surface missions, which are reported as operational. The F-27 logistics support aircraft used by the Navy are also reported as operational.

The Iranian Navy is not believed to have any mines or mine-laying capability.



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## IRANIAN EQUIPMENT INVENTORY

### GROUND

3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS  
4 ARMORED DIVISIONS (1 AT BRIGADE STRENGTH)  
1 SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE  
1 SEPARATE AIRBORNE BRIGADE  
  
250 LIGHT TANKS (SCORPIONS)  
1765 MAIN BATTLE TANKS (M60, M47, CHIEFTIAN)  
2300 APCs (M113, BMP, BTR-60, BTR-50)  
525 SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY (M109, M107, M110)  
700 TOWED ARTILLERY (M101, M46, M59, M115)  
1800+ ATGMs (TOW, DRAGON, SAGGER)

### NAVAL

3 DESTROYERS (2 SUMNER/US AND 1 BATTLE/UK CLASS)  
4 FRIGATES (VOSPER MK-V)  
9 MISSILE BOATS (LA COMBATTANTE)  
14 HOVERCRAFT

### AIR


403 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (F-4D/E, F-14A, F-5A/E)  
35 COMBAT CAPABLE TRAINERS (F-5B/F)  
29 RECON (RF-4E, RF-5A, P-3F)  
14 TANKERS (KC-747, KC-707)  
937 HELICOPTERS (AH-1J, CH-47C, B-214/C, AB-212, RH-53D, SH-3D,  
AB-205, AB-206)

### AIR DEFENSE

17 HAWK BATTERIES  
10 SEACAT BATTERIES  
8 RAPIER BATTALIONS  
32 SA-7 PLATOONS

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IRANIAN AIR BASES




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IRANIAN GROUND FORCES

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E-1

19 November 1979

IRANIAN GROUND FORCES

Personnel	
Army	Approx. 150,000
Gendarmerie	Unknown, 75,000 prior to revolution
Revolutionary Guards	20,000
Tanks	
Scorpion	250
M60	460
M47	415
Chieftain	890
	<hr/>
	2,015
Armored Personnel Carriers	
M113	810
BMP	60
BTR-60/OT-64	585
BTR-50/OT-62	850
	<hr/>
	2,305
Artillery (100mm and over)	
Self-propelled	525
Towed	700
	<hr/>
	1,225
Anti-tank Missile Launchers	
TOW	575
Dragon	1,218
SAGGER	unknown
	<hr/>
	1,793+
Air Defense Artillery	
ZSU-57/2	80
ZSU-23/4	55
	<hr/>
	135

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E & E OUTLINE

I. SCOPE: THIS OUTLINE IS INTENDED AS GUIDANCE TO AIRCREW AND RANGER PERSONNEL; IF DELTA FORCE PERSONNEL ARE IN THE EVADING PARTY, TAKE DIRECTION FROM THEM DUE TO THEIR MISSION ORIENTATION, TRAINING, AND DETAILED PREPARATION FOR THE EVASION OPTION.

II. AREAS: THIS OUTLINE ADDRESSES TWO GENERAL AREAS, REFERRED TO AS THE WESTERN AREA AND THE EASTERN AREA. THE EASTERN AREA IS A NORTH-SOUTH STRIP RUNNING ALONG A LINE RUNNING FROM KMARK ISLAND NORTH TO TEHRAN, EXTENDING EAST TO A WIDTH OF APPROX 50 MILES ON THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE AREA. THE EASTERN AREA EXTENDS FROM THE COAST NEAR THE PAKISTANI BORDER NORTHWEST TO A POINT NEAR TABAS AND THEN WEST-NORTHWEST TO TEHRAN.

III. GENERAL INFLIGHT PROCEEDURES:

A. AT LEAST ONE INDIVIDUAL IN EACH TACTICAL FORCE OF TROOPS CARRIED SHOULD BE DESIGNATED TO KEEP TRACK OF THE AIRCRAFT'S LOCATION AT ALL TIMES, BASED ON CHECK POINTS AND TIME SINCE THE LAST CHECK POINT, ESPECIALLY IF TROOPS ARE RIGGED FOR AIRDROP AND FACING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EMERGENCY EXIT.

B. IN THE EVENT OF FORCED LANDING, PERSONNEL WILL RALLY A SAFE DISTANCE OFF THE NOSE OF THE AIRCRAFT. INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE DESIGNATED TO GRAB DOOR GUNS, MEDICAL KITS, AND ANYTHING ELSE USEFUL. AIRCRAFT RADIOS SHOULD BE MOVED OFF FREQ AND CRYPTO ZEROIZED IF THEY

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ARE NOT GOING TO BE USED AGAIN AND IF THERE IS TIME.

C. GROUND-FORCE PERSONNEL: SET UP SECURITY AND OBTAIN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY, USING THE AIRCRAFT AS A REFERENCE POINT FOR A CLOCK ORIENTATION. A NON-FIRE CORRIDOR WILL BE DESIGNATED TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS MOVING FROM THE AIRCRAFT TO THE RALLY POINT. (THIS PROCEDURE IS IMPORTANT ESPECIALLY IF THE AIRCRAFT COMES DOWN IN A CONCENTRATION OF HOSTILE FORCES, BUT WILL ASSIST IN CONTROL IN ANY EVENT. IT WILL ALSO PROVIDE READY REFERENCE TO ANY FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT AS TO WHERE THE FRIENDLIES ARE IF FIRE SUPPORT OR QUICK PICKUP ARE AVAILABLE.)

D. INITIAL HIDING PLACE: AS SOON AS ACCOUNTABILITY IS OBTAINED, A DECISION WILL BE MADE BY THE SENIOR MAN PRESENT AS TO WHETHER IMMEDIATE PICKUP IS LIKELY, SUCH AS PICKUP BY ANOTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE SAME FORMATION. (BE CAREFUL OF EXTENSIVE CLEAR TEXT VOICE TRANSMISSIONS ON GUARD CHANNEL.)

(c) IF IMMEDIATE PICKUP IS UNLIKELY, PERSONNEL SHOULD MOVE OUT OF THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE AIRCRAFT TO THE CLOSEST COVERED AND CONCEALED POSITION, FAVORING THE NORTH AND <sup>WEST</sup> ~~EAST~~ QUADRANTS IF ALL OTHER FACTORS ARE EQUAL. THIS STANDARD PROCEDURE WILL ASSIST FRIENDLIES IN LATER LOCATING EVADERS IF POSSIBLE. THE SITUATION, INCLUDING ENEMY, TERRAIN, AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE WILL PROBABLY DICTATE WHERE TO MOVE IF THE DECISION IS MADE TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, IF IT DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE OTHERWISE, GO [REDACTED] IN ORDER OF PRIORITY. IF MOVING AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT, TRY TO LEAVE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

E. PERSONNEL RIGGED FOR PARADROP AND FORCED INTO AN EMERGENCY EXIT WILL ASSEMBLE IN THE AIR, USING STEERABLE CANOPIES, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND ASSEMBLE ON THE GROUND TOWARDS THE CENTER OF THE STICK.

I. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO FORCED LANDING AT INDIGENOUS AIRDROMES ENROUTE AND USING SURPRISE AND/OR TACTICAL ASSETS ON BOARD TO COMMANDEER ESCAPE AIRCRAFT. OTHERWISE, THE DRIVING CONSIDERATION FOR A FORCED LANDING WILL BE TO SELECT AN ISOLATED AREA.

G. IF A FORCED LANDING IS MADE IN AN ISOLATED AREA AND THE EVADERS MOVE TO AN INITIAL HIDING PLACE AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT, ONE OF TWO COURSES OF ACTION ARE OPEN.

1. REMAIN AT INITIAL HIDING PLACE/MOVE TO A NEW HIDING PLACE TO AWAIT PICKUP. AT THIS TIME, NO ASSETS ARE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THIS OPTION.

2. ENTER A LONG RANGE E&E OPTION BASED UPON THE AREA; EITHER PARAGRAPH H OR I BELOW.

H. LONG RANGE EVASION, EASTERN AREA:

1. SOUTHERN THIRD (COASTLINE TO LEVEL OF PAKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN BORDER; APPROX 30 DEG N): IF FORCED DOWN IN THIS AREA, THE OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO MOVE EAST TO THE PAKISTAN/IRAN BORDER, CROSS AND TURN SELF IN TO PAKISTANI POLICE OR BORDER GUARDS. DESPITE RECENT ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN PAKISTAN, INTELLIGENCE INDICATES A FAVORABLE RESULT IF EVADERS REACH PAKISTANI CONTROL.

THE KERMAN-BAM-ZAMEDAN ROAD, ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER OF THE

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SOUTHERN THIRD, MAY BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE VEHICLES TO BE BRIBED OR COMANDEERED. THERE IS A GENDARMERIE POST AT BAM, AND MAY BE OTHER CHECKPOINTS ON THE ROUTE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO STOW AWAY ON A TRUCK ON A SLOW CURVE OR AT A HALT. GENERALLY THERE IS LITTLE TRAFFIC, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT. THERE IS ALSO A SECONDARY ROAD NETWORK ON THE EASTERN PORTION OF THIS AREA WHICH CONNECTS WITH PAKISTAN. ONE GROUP OF PEOPLE ALONG THE EASTERN EDGE OF THE AREA, THE BALUCHI, MIGHT PROVIDE SUPPORT TO EVADERS. NOMADIC TRIBESMEN, THE BALUCHI MIGHT BE BARTERED WITH FOR SURVIVAL ITEMS AND TRANSPORTATION.

2. MIDDLE THIRD (APPROX 30 DEG N TO VIC TABAS, APPROX 33 DEG N): PERSONNEL IN AN EVASION SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE THIRD WILL BE FACED PRIMARILY WITH A DESERT SURVIVAL PROBLEM. THIS AREA HAS THE ADVANTAGE THAT THE RISK OF DETECTION AND AGGRESSIVE ENEMY REACTION IS GREATLY REDUCED. MOVEMENT SHOULD BE AT NIGHT FOR CONCEALMENT, TO KEEP WARM, AND TO CONSERVE WATER. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE WILL STILL BE TO MOVE SOUTH AND THEN EAST, INTO PAKISTAN.

3. NORTHERN THIRD (VIC TABAS WEST-NORTHWEST TO TEHRAN) THIS LEG IS OVER EXTREME DESERT CONDITIONS, AND DESERT SURVIVAL IS AGAIN A CRITICAL CONSIDERATION. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT DELTA FORCE WILL BE ABOARD AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN THIS AREA. THEIR PLANNING AND TACTICAL ABILITIES SHOULD BE RELIED UPON. EVASION ON THIS LEG WILL CALL FOR A DECISION TO GO SOUTH AND EAST TO PAKISTAN, OR WEST TO TURKEY. THE ELBURZ MOUNTAINS, TO THE NORTH, ARE A POSSIBLE AREA TO

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PROVIDE SHELTER AND SURVIVAL SUPPORT. INDIVIDUALS IN THE AREA OF THE CASPIAN SEA SEE THEMSELVES AS DIFFERENT, AND MIGHT BE LESS DANGEROUS TO ENCOUNTER THAN PEOPLE IN THE TEHRAN AREA. IF ABLE TO GET WEST OF TEHRAN, TRUCKS MOVING WEST THROUGH TABRIZ AND THEN TO TURKEY MIGHT PROVE USEFUL FOR TRANSPORTATION. IF MOVING EAST, STAY OUT AFGHANISTAN.

I. LONG RANGE EVASION, WESTERN AREA:

1. SOUTHERN ONE-QUARTER (COAST TO ZAGROS MOUNTAINS): THIS AREA IS POPULATED AND THERE IS A HIGH RISK OF BEING PICKED UP. EVADERS IN THIS AREA HAVE THE OPTION OF MOVING NORTH AND THEN WEST TO TURKEY, OR SOUTH ACROSS THE PERSIAN GULF TO SAUDI ARABIA. THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS OR SYMPATHETIC IRANIANS IN THE OIL OR SHIPPING INDUSTRY MIGHT PROVIDE SUPPORT. APPENDIX 1 CONTAINS USEFUL EXTRACTS FROM AN E&E AREA TO THE EAST OF OUR AREA OF INTEREST. IT IS WRITTEN FOR AN AREA WHERE THE MOUNTAINS REACH ALL THE WAY TO THE SEA, WITHOUT A COASTAL PLAIN, BUT PROVIDES SOME INSIGHT TO THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE WESTERN AREA IN THIS PAPER, MOUNTAINS AND COASTAL PLAIN.

2. MIDDLE ONE-QUARTER (ZAGROS MTNS):

THIS AREA IS EXTREMELY RUGGED TERRAIN. AGAIN; USEFUL DETAILS CAN BE FOUND IN APPENDIX 1 OR 2. THERE ARE SEVERAL TRIBAL GROUPS IN THESE MOUNTAINS, ANY ONE OF WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE SUPPORT TO EVADERS. THE OBJECTIVE FROM THIS AREA IS TO MOVE NORTH AND WEST TO TURKEY; STAY OUT OF IRAQ. ALONG THE WESTERN BORDER OF IRAN, KURDS MAY BE ENCOUNTERED. THE KURDS ARE A SEPERATE ETHNIC GROUP WHICH CURRENTLY AT ODDS WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. KURDS COULD POSSIBLY BE RECOGNIZED BY THEIR DISTINCTIVE DRESS, WHICH MAY INCLUDE PANTALOONS AND FRINGED

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TURBAN OR A DISTINCTIVELY SHAPED HAT WITH BRIMS ON THE FRONT AND BACK WHICH FOLD UP OR DOWN.

3. NORTHERN ONE-HALF (NORTH OF ZAGROS MINS). CONSULT APPENDIX 2 FOR GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION. (ALTHOUGH APPENDIX 2 IS WRITTEN FOR AN AREA WEST OF THE PRIMARY AREA OF INTEREST, IT PROVIDES USEFUL BACKGROUND DATA, FOR THIS AREA AND THE AREA TO THE SOUTH.) IN THE AREA THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO MOVE NORTH AND EAST TO TURKEY. THE KURDS TO THE WEST AND THE TEHRAN - TABRIZ - MAKU HIGHWAY TO TURKEY MAY BE USEFUL.

IN THE MANZARIYEH AREA, WORKERS ON THE NORTH-SOUTH OIL PIPELINE WHICH RUNS TO THE EAST OF THE AIRFIELD MAY BE SYMPATHETIC. WORKERS BASED IN AHMADABAD, NORTH OF MANZARIEYH WERE FRIENDLY AND SUPPORTIVE OF THEIR AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS EVEN AFTER THE RECENT INCIDENT HAD BEGUN.

- APPENDIXES: 1. EXTRACTS FROM SAID548-1  
2. EXTRACTS FROM SAID428-1

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Inland where approach is feasible the harsh, barren environment almost precludes extended-period evasion without outside assistance. In the mountains where the rugged terrain affords a reasonable amount of concealment, food and water are nearly nonexistent. In the populated valleys, where some food and water can be found, the risk of detection is high because of the meager concealment and the proximity of people to available sources of subsistence. The oppressive heat during much of the year, especially from June through September, makes physical movement during mid-day impracticable and intensifies the ever present risk of dehydration associated with the lack of readily accessible water. The rugged, northwest - southeast trending mountains and intervening valleys provide fairly good orientation but makes travel difficult when the evader must traverse the ridges. The evader can expect to encounter border guard patrols anywhere within the STUDY region or its adjacent coastal waters.

(S) TERRAIN

Terrain in the STUDY region consists of rugged, mountain ranges which generally trend northwest - southeast and narrow, nearly flat-bottomed valleys located between the ridges. Elevations range from sea level along the PERSIAN Gulf to above 7,000 feet in the northeast. However most of the mountains have crests 3,000 to 5,000 feet in elevation and local relief is generally 2,000 to 5,000 feet. Drainage features in the region include numerous intermittent streams and a few small springs. Streams generally can be crossed throughout the year. They are commonly dry except during the high-water period (December through February). During this period, the streams are generally less than one foot deep,

xcept for brief periods of flooding following infrequent heavy rains. Streambanks are commonly low and sandy and streambeds are mainly coarse gravel, changing to sand and silt near the coast.

Terrain in the area consists of rocky mountains ridges and nearly flat valley plains. Elevation range from sea level along the coast to more than 4,500 feet in the northeast. Most mountain crests are generally 2,500 to 4,000 feet in elevation, and local relief is mainly 2,000 to 3,500 feet. Drainage features consist of two westward-flowing intermittent streams and their tributaries. The streams have characteristics similar to those described for the rest of the STUDY region.

#### (U) CLIMATE

This desert STUDY region features a predominantly clear and arid, but humid climate with 2 principal seasons. These seasons consist of a comfortable period with infrequent rainfall which occurs from November through April and a hot to oppressively hot and humid season which prevails during the remainder of the year.

During the milder season, climatic conditions generally favor outdoor activities but occasionally temperatures drop to near freezing at sea level and several degrees colder at the higher elevation. Virtually all of the region's meager annual precipitation of about 10 inches occurs during the months of December, January, and February.

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~~(S)~~ SECURITY

The internal security forces of IRAN consist of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie, Iranian National Police Force,

and Iranian Armed Forces. In concert, these forces maintain close control over the internal security of IRAN. Controls include such measures as surveillance of possible dissident groups and a universal system of personal identification requiring both citizens and foreign visitors to carry individual identity documents.

The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie is a rural police force, organized along military lines. The force is responsible for police protection, intelligence collection, and border control and anti-smuggling operations. Members of the force are stationed throughout the country in units of various sizes. Units engaged in border guard duties are deployed along frontiers, including coastal areas. Border guard units employ both light aircraft and boats, as appropriate, in the accomplishment of their mission. Uniforms worn by the gendarmerie are similar to those worn by the Iranian Army.

The Iranian National Police Force is responsible for protecting urban areas with over 5,000 residents. National Police Force personnel do not have as high a literacy rate nor are they as well trained as the gendarmerie. Within this force, morale is far from high and corruption and inefficiency are fairly widespread. Members of the National Police Force wear blue uniforms similar to those worn by U.S. police forces.

The Iranian Army is still the dominant element in the field of internal security. Units of this force assist police and gendarmerie in controlling disturbances and in maintaining an intelligence network. Army uniforms consist of an olive-drab uniform for winter and one of khaki for summer.

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~~(S)~~ SECURITY

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## ~~(S)~~ CONCEALMENT

Concealment within the nearly barren STUDY region is mostly poor; adequate concealment is available locally. Poor concealment is afforded by widely spaced desert shrubs along lower slopes of mountains. The shrubs are generally less than 3 feet high and spaced 15 to 100 feet apart. Poor to fair concealment is provided by shrubs and bushes in valleys along stream-courses. These shrubs and bushes are commonly 3 to 5 feet high and closely spaced along most valley sides. Fairly good concealment is available in dense clumps and small patches of bushes, which occur along most low-lying stretches of the coast. The bushes are in thick clumps up to 50 feet in diameter and over 5 feet high, or in patches up to several hundred feet wide, composed of closely spaced individual bushes. In the mountains, surface irregularities provide much additional concealment and primarily consist of numerous rocky ridges, escarpments, and narrow valleys of tributary streams.

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PEOPLE

The overall population density is slightly less than 60 people per square mile for this region compared to about 22 persons per square mile in the ~~Arab~~ Area. Most inhabitants of the STUDY region reside in small villages or settlements consisting of a few dozen dwellings.

Arabs comprise the majority ethnic group residing in the STUDY region. The Persian minority consists mostly of government and military personnel. The Arabs are a very independent, tribal people, most of whom are peasant farmers. They do not consider themselves a component of the Iranian nation and resent efforts of the government to assimilate them into a nation-state. This attitude, however, may have been mitigated to a degree by the government's recent efforts to improve economic conditions. Although the Arabs feel little loyalty to IRAN, the outward manifestations of discontent are minimal. Persian is the language taught in schools, Arabic is the language most commonly used. Both Arabs and Persians are followers of the Moslem religion.

The outside world is generally viewed with distrust and suspicion; however, strangers normally can be expected to be treated hospitably as long as local customs are respected. Basic social values are family loyalty, personal honor, and hospitality.

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Terrain conditions mainly of rugged mountains, scattered hills and lowlands. Features that trend northwest - southeast through the STUDY region. Elevation of elevation range from about 1,000 feet in the southwest corner of the region to 12,000 feet above sea level in the northeast. Most of the region, however, lies at elevations between 5,000 to 6,000 feet. The mountains are mainly rugged and sharp crested; summits are rocky, and there are many "V" shaped narrow valleys. Mountain slopes are moderate to steep; average maximum local relief is about 2,500 feet. The flat to rolling plains in the northern part of the STUDY region range in elevation between about 4,000 to 5,000 feet above sea level. Numerous streams head in the mountains and flow outward in various directions; several converge at lower elevations and continue flowing westward and southward into IBAQ and the HERSHMAN GULCH, respectively. Generally, mountain streams flow easterly between steep, rocky banks which become gorges in some places. As some streams leave the mountains they flow into braided channels where banks are commonly sandy but fairly steep and velocities are moderate, except during high water when some streams become swift and turbulent. High water is normally from December through June with a peak period associated with the spring rains from March through May. During the low-water period (August through November), all streams are greatly reduced in volume and many become dry river beds. Except in the flood stage during the period of high water, all streams should be fordable within the STUDY region.

Terrain within the SAFT area is consistently mountainous though generally less severe than in other parts of the STUDY region. Elevations range between about 3,000 to 7,200 feet and the average maximum local relief is about 2,000 feet. Major drainage consists of several southerly flowing streams which converge in the southern part of the area, creating some rugged terrain over which the crawler may travel.

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## (U) CLIMATE

The climate of the STUR region is characterized by cool, moist, partly cloudy winters and hot, dry, almost cloudless summers. Spring and autumn are transition seasons with spring characterized by an increase in rainfall and autumn marked by a gradual decrease in temperature.

During the winter (December through February), temperatures usually very freeze the low 40's during the day to below freezing at night. Winter relative humidity averages between 70% and 80%, accentuating the colder temperatures. Snow covers the ground in the higher elevations for most of the season and accumulates to depths estimated near 12 inches by February. Snow cover usually disappears by mid-March.

Spring (March through May) is a season of frequent showers and thunderstorms and a gradual increase in temperature. The shower activity of the season frequently results in flash and local flooding.

Temperatures in the summer (June through August) average in the high 90's in the afternoon and frequently exceed 100°F. The almost cloudless skies and absence of precipitation combine with the heat of the day and chilly nights to make summer an extremely uncomfortable season.

In autumn (September through November) temperatures decrease and cloud and precipitation amounts increase toward the horrors of winter. Autumn is the most favorable season for outdoor activity.

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The overall population density of the STUDY region is about 57 people per square mile whereas in the less populous Area the density is about 37 people per square mile. Most of the inhabitants reside in small villages and cultural settlements having an average size of 200 people. However, more than a third of the total population live in towns ranging in size from 7,000 to 14,000.

The Kurds and the Lurs, two distinct tribal descendants of original Indo-Iranian stock live within the STUDY region. The Kurds generally live in the northern part of the region while the Lurs' domain is to the south. The Lurs living in rural areas are primarily seasonal nomads, wintering in the plains and migrating the summer in the mountains. The Kurds are mainly sedentary though nomadic element moves relatively freely into Kurdish territories in Iraq and Turkey. Both tribes speak separate dialects related to Persian, the most important language of Iran.

The Lurs, who generally follow Shiah Islam, the predominant religion of Iran, are typically fiercer than most Iranians. They are much divided among themselves and held in contempt by neighboring peoples, particularly the Kurds. Contact with the Lurs, however, has shown them to be quite reliable. They follow the Sunnite branch of Islam, a difference which plays a great role in their social and political life in Iran. The Iranian government has found them to be difficult to control and assimilate. The army maintains numerous garrisons in Kurdish territory and maintains close surveillance of tribal activity. Soviet agents have played on the Kurdish anti-government attitude so that pro-Soviet sympathies may be found among these tribesmen.

Foreigners are generally viewed with suspicion among all tribal groups, though a newcomer can expect to be treated with hospitality if he is respectful of local customs. Iranians reputedly enjoy adventure and intrigue, especially if associated with the possibility of personal gain.

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~~(S)~~ CONCEALMENT.

Concealment in the STUDY region ranges from fair to poor. The best concealment is provided by open stands of deciduous woods and high brush combined with surface irregularities. Most trees in the region are widely spaced scrub oaks which average 15 to 40 feet in height and grow generally in gulleys or in numerous or hilly areas. Eucalyptus and grasses growing to a height of 2 to 3 feet are found in areas that have intermittent supplies of water. Surface irregularities afford little concealment on the plains but furnish fair concealment from ground observation in the rugged hills and mountains which predominate in the STUDY region. Concealment is poor in the flat valley areas which generally have little or no vegetative cover except where perennial streams can provide cover for cultivation or brush cover. Numerous ruins and abandoned forts throughout the region may provide concealment and shelter in an emergency.

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The evader will have to rely primarily upon scattered areas of tree cover among the surface irregularities for the best concealment opportunities.

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ZNY SSSSS  
O 192000Z NOV 79  
FM USAFETAC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//  
TO RUEAMQA/DET 1, AFGWC WASH DC//CC//  
INFO FMWAAA/AFGWC OFFUTT AFB NE//DCC//  
BT

SECTION 01 OF 02  
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO CLIMATOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE REQUEST (U).  
1. TEMPERATURES - TEMPERATURE MEANS AND EXTREMES FOR AVAILABLE  
LOCATIONS ALONG THE ROUTE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

13 NOV 79 12:21

TEMPERATURES  
NOVEMBER

JASK  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
KERMAN  
YA7D  
TARAS  
OCM  
TEHFRAN

EXTREME MAXIMUM	MEAN MAXIMUM	MEAN MINIMUM	EXTREME MINIMUM
94	84	68	52
93	84	66	51
90	73	49	30
90	65	30	9
82	66	37	14
90	72	43	23
81	64	41	19
84	63	43	19

(Q)  
KA7VIN  
KHVOY  
TARPI7

EXTREME MAXIMUM	MEAN MAXIMUM	MEAN MINIMUM	EXTREME MINIMUM
79	60	35	10
77	55	34	14
72	53	35	1

TEMPERATURES  
DECEMBER

JASK  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
KERMAN  
YA7D  
TARAS  
OCM

EXTREME MAXIMUM	MEAN MAXIMUM	MEAN MINIMUM	EXTREME MINIMUM
88	78	63	46
88	77	60	43
82	64	42	21
93	56	23	12
72	55	28	3
75	50	33	19
72	53	34	12

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TEHRAN	68	51	33	10
KAZVIN	66	50	31	7
KHVOY	64	45	25	12
	EXTREME	MEAN	MEAN	EXTREME
	MAXIMUM	MAXIMUM	MINIMUM	MINIMUM
	59	40	25	1

7. (U) APPROPRIATILITIES OF HEAVY RAINFALL DATA ARE NOT AVAILABLE. MEAN MONTHLY, MAXIMUM MONTHLY AND MAXIMUM 24 HOUR AMOUNTS ARE AVAILABLE AND HAVE BEEN TABULATED FOR STATIONS NEAR THE PROPOSED ROUTE.

NOV. (IN INCHES)

	MEAN MONTHLY	MAXIMUM MONTHLY	MAXIMUM 24-HR AMOUNTS
JASK	0.3	1.7	1.7
RAM	0.1	0.4	0.4
KERMAN	0.2	3.2	2.0
TAFAS	0.2	0.5	0.4
YAZD	0.1	1.3	0.4
TEHRAN	1.0	4.3	1.4
(C) KAZVIN	0.7	1.2	0.7
ZANJAN	0.8	1.6	1.0
TABRIZ	0.9	2.7	0.9
KHVOY	1.7		

DEC. (IN INCHES)

	MEAN MONTHLY	MAXIMUM MONTHLY	MAXIMUM 24-HR AMOUNTS
JASK	1.2	4.8	2.3
RAM	0.2	0.3	0.2
KERMAN	0.9	1.4	1.0
TAFAS	0.3	0.6	0.5
YAZD	0.1	0.3	0.2
TEHRAN	1.0	3.4	1.5
(C) KAZVIN	0.8	2.3	1.7
ZANJAN	0.7	2.2	0.6
TABRIZ	0.9	1.5	0.6
KHVOY	0.4		

3. (U) MECHANICAL TURBULENCE DUE TO UPPER AIR WIND FLOW ACROSS AND AROUND TERRAIN: SACR 105-10 GIVES A SAC DETERMINED EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WIND COMPONENTS PERPENDICULAR TO TERRAIN AND MECHANICAL TURBULENCE FOR P-52 TYPE AIRCRAFT OPERATING AT LOW LEVELS. SACR 105-10, PARA 3F, STATES THESE CRITERIA:  
 (1) NORMAL COMPONENT EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN 25 KNOTS AND LESS

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50 KNOTS AT RIDGE LEVEL.

(A) SEVERE TURBULENCE MAY BE FOUND UP TO 50 MILES LEEWARD OF THE RIDGE, FROM RIDGE LEVEL UP TO 5,000 FEET ABOVE. SEVERE TURBULENCE MAY ALSO BE FOUND AT HEIGHTS UP TO THE TROPOPAUSE IN STABLE LAYERS.

(B) MODERATE TURBULENCE MAY BE FOUND UP TO 150 MILES LEEWARD OF THE RIDGE FROM THE SURFACE TO THE TROPOPAUSE, ESPECIALLY IN STABLE LAYERS

(2) NORMAL COMPONENT EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN 50 KNOTS AT RIDGE LEVEL

(A) EXTREME TURBULENCE MAY BE FOUND IN OR NEAR THE ROTOR CLOUDS (ROLL CLOUDS) FOUND AT OR NEAR RIDGE HEIGHT ON LEEWARD SIDE OF THE RIDGE.

(B) SEVERE TURBULENCE MAY BE FOUND AT THE TROPOPAUSE UP TO 150 MILES LEEWARD OF THE RIDGE. THE LAYER OF TURBULENCE MAY BE UP TO 5,000 FEET THICK.

(C) MODERATE TURBULENCE MAY BE FOUND UP TO 300 MILES LEEWARD OF THE RIDGE FROM THE SURFACE TO 10,000 FEET ABOVE THE TROPOPAUSE.

THE FOLLOWING DATA ARE GIVEN FOR THE PERCENT OF OBSERVATIONS EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THE STATED WIND SPEED AT THE AVERAGE RIDGE HEIGHT.

(NOTE: 'GE' IS THE ABBREVIATION FOR GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO).

ROUTE FROM X TO R

1ST PART - SOUTH OF E-W RIDGE LINE

NOV AND DEC	WINDS GE 25 KTS	5 PCT	GE 50 KTS	0 PCT
-------------	-----------------	-------	-----------	-------

2D PART - NORTH OF THIS RIDGE LINE

NOV AND DEC	WINDS GE 25 KTS	2 PCT	GE 50 KTS	0 PCT
-------------	-----------------	-------	-----------	-------

ROUTE FROM B TO H -- MOUNTAINS ON 3 SIDES INFLUENCE THIS PART OF ROUTE.

NOVEMBER	WINDS GE 25 KTS	15-20 PCT	GE 50 KTS	0 PCT
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DECEMBER	WINDS GE 25 KTS	33-40 PCT	GE 50 KTS	0 PCT
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ROUTE FROM H TO M -- THROUGH AND/OR ALONG EASTERN SLOPES.

NOVEMBER	WINDS GE 25 KTS	22-30 PCT	GE 50 KTS	0 PCT
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DECEMBER	WINDS GE 25 KTS	50-60 PCT	GE 50 KTS	2 PCT
----------	-----------------	-----------	-----------	-------

ROUTE FROM M TO E -- NATURE OF TERRAIN IS GENERALLY MOUNTAINOUS.

NOVEMBER	WINDS GE 25 KTS	25-35 PCT	GE 50 KTS	1-2 PCT
----------	-----------------	-----------	-----------	---------

DECEMBER	WINDS GE 25 KTS	35-45 PCT	GE 50 KTS	1-3 PCT
----------	-----------------	-----------	-----------	---------

4. ~~LOW~~ LOW-LEVEL PREVAILING WINDS, EXTREMES, AND DIURNAL VARIATIONS: LOW-LEVEL WINDS OVER THE REGION ARE GENERALLY NORTHERLY (N-NW) DURING THE EVENING AND NIGHT TIME HOURS. DURING MID-MORNING TO EARLY AFTERNOON HOURS WINDS ARE GENERALLY SW TO SE. GENERALLY, WIND SPEEDS ARE 5 TO 10 KNOTS FOR PREVAILING DIRECTIONS DURING BOTH DAY AND NIGHT SITUATIONS. WINDS ARE GENERALLY CALM 20-30 PERCENT OF THE TIME.

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WINDS IN THE COASTAL AREA TEND TO BE WEST 70 PERCENT OF THE TIME  
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<u>Exposure Weather - Yazd, Iran (Southern Mountains)</u>	NOV	DEC	JAN
Absolute Maximum (F)	79	72	72
Mean Maximum	63	58	57
Mean Minimum	40	34	33
Absolute Minimum	18	14	18
Mean Precipitation (Inches)	0.65	0.01	0.39
# Days Rainfall	1	*	1
# Days Snowfall	1	2	1
# Days Thunderstorms	0	0	0
# Days Duststorms	0	1	1

<u>Exposure Weather - Qom, Iran (Northwest Desert)</u>	NOV	DEC	JAN
Absolute Maximum (F)	81	72	72
Mean Maximum	64	53	50
Mean Minimum	41	34	31
Absolute Minimum	19	12	12
Mean Precipitation (Inches)	0.4	0.5	0.7
# Days Rainfall	1	1	1
# Days Snowfall	*	1	1
# Days Thunderstorms	*	*	*
# Days Duststorms	0	0	0

<u>Exposure Weather - Tehran, Iran (Northwest Desert)</u>	NOV	DEC	JAN
Absolute Maximum (F)	84	68	65
Mean Maximum	63	51	45
Mean Minimum	43	33	27
Absolute Minimum	19	10	-5
Mean Precipitation (Inches)	0.80	1.20	1.80
# Days Rainfall	2	3	4
# Days Snowfall	1	2	3
# Days Thunderstorms	*	*	*
# Days Duststorms	1	1	1

<u>Exposure Weather - Kazvin (Northwest Desert)</u>	NOV	DEC	JAN
Absolute Maximum (F)	79	66	68
Mean Maximum	60	50	46
Mean Minimum	35	31	25
Absolute Minimum	10	7	0
Mean Precipitation (Inches)	0.70	0.80	2.10
# Days Rainfall	N/A	N/A	N/A
# Days Snowfall	0	2	5
# Days Thunderstorms	N/A	N/A	N/A
# Days Duststorms	0	0	0

\* = Less Than 0.5 Day

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<u>Exposure Weather - Zanzan, Iran (Northwest Mountains)</u>	NOV	DEC	JAN
Absolute Maximum (F)	75	63	61
Mean Maximum	55	45	39
Mean Minimum	32	25	20
Absolute Minimum	7	0	-22
Mean Precipitation (Inches)	0.80	0.70	1.40
# Days Rainfall	N/A	N/A	N/A
# Days Snowfall	*	3	6
# Days Thunderstorms	N/A	N/A	N/A
# Days Duststorms	0	0	0

<u>Exposure Weather - Tabriz, Iran (Northwest Mountains)</u>	NOV	DEC	JAN
Absolute Maximum (F)	72	59	52
Mean Maximum	53	40	37
Mean Minimum	35	25	20
Absolute Minimum	1	1	-9
Mean Precipitation (Inches)	1.06	0.88	0.79
# Days Rainfall	2	2	2
# Days Snowfall	1	3	7
# Days Thunderstorms	*	*	*
# Days Duststorms	*	*	1

<u>Exposure Weather - Khvoy, Iran (Northwest Mountains)</u>	NOV	DEC	JAN
Absolute Maximum (F)	77	64	59
Mean Maximum	55	45	38
Mean Minimum	34	25	20
Absolute Minimum	14	12	-22
Mean Precipitation (Inches)	1.20	0.40	0.90
# Days Rainfall	N/A	N/A	N/A
# Days Snowfall	3	4	5
# Days Thunderstorms	N/A	N/A	N/A
# Days Duststorms	0	0	0

\* = Less Than 0.5 Day

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Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Non-Standard Maps (Foreign Source)

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) (S) J2 established the requirement for available large scale maps of selected cities and areas in Iran.
2. (U) (S) ~~Since~~ Since large scale mapping of Iran by DMA had not been completed domestic Iranian maps had to be located and reproduced.
3. (U) (S) DMA searched all available sources including the Library of Congress to locate and subsequently reproduce any available maps.
4. (U) (S) Foreign Iranian maps, in many cases, were only in Farsi which made utilization difficult.

COMMENTS:

1. (U) (TS) In some cases foreign source maps may be all available.
2. (U) (TS) You must have a capability to interpret foreign language to use the maps.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

*Several editions and scales may be needed to obtain maximum information. Obtain all available maps on critical*

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [redacted] Maj [redacted] Cpt [redacted]

Cpt [redacted]

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*Declassified by  
DAN mcl  
15 Jul 92*



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POINTS OF CONTACT:

DMA - Col [REDACTED] HQ DMA, 254-4426

ATTACHMENTS:

1. ARAK 1:50,000 reduced
2. Qum tourist (sep)

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Intelligence Historical Report  
J2, JTF 1-79

Item Number: \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis - Geologist/ERTS

TIMEFRAME: - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (TS) J2 obtained the Services of a geologist who did his doctoral research in Iran.
2. (TS) ERTS computer enhanced satellite coverage was obtained of proposed landing areas in the Great Kavir.
3. (TS) The geologist; employee of USGS, provided copies of his doctoral research material and direct interpretation of areas on ERTS [REDACTED]
4. (TS) Geologist's expertise was utilized in selection of Desert Track 1 and refinement of post 14 April 1980 LZ selections (e.g. LZ SUSAN).

COMMENTS:

1. (TS) Geologist was compartmented from mission planners and given only materiel of area to be analyzed.
2. (TS) Geologist assisted in analysis of soil samples taken at Desert Track 1.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (TS) That knowledgeable geologists be utilized early in planning for terrain analysis and FWLA selection.
2. (TS) Geologists need not be completely read-on to program.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [REDACTED] Maj [REDACTED] Cpt [REDACTED]  
Cpt [REDACTED]

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Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

POINTS OF CONTACT:

USGS - Dr. \_\_\_\_\_

ATTACHMENTS:

- MFR, 11 Dec 80, Geologist's Comments on Landing Zones (U) (25)

SECRET



11 December 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Geologist's Comments on Landing Zones (U)

(U)  
1. (TS) Analysis of LZ SUSAN follows:

(U)  
a. (TS) The area designated LZ SUSAN is relatively smooth probably with pebble or granular surface. North of the area designated SUZAN to the head of the fan the surface probably progresses from pebble to hand and possibly even boulder sized rocks. From the southern half of SUSAN to the toe of the fan (the extreme southwestern edges) the surface probably progresses from pebble, granular to fine soil (silt and clay). Presence of trails across center portion indicate nothing larger than pebbles, and that the entire fan has not been inundated in at least eight years. This indicates some degree of stability.

(U)  
b. (TS) The major concern with LZ SUSAN is the bearing strength of the gravel and fines (silts and clays) since LZ SUSAN is located on an alluvial fan. The area may be underlined with incompetent miocene rocks (mostly silts and clays) which have no bearing strength when wet.

(U)  
c. (TS) Seasonal moisture patterns in Iran indicate that the soil in the area would have greatest strength in the August to September time frame. Moisture begins to accumulate in late October/November and dry beginning late March/April. Rainfall in the SUSAN area is higher than Desert One but still extremely low, with less than .04 inch average in December, with .07 inch being the highest recorded in a 24 hour period. The highest recorded for the entire month of December was 3 inches. The fan on which LZ SUSAN is located is the northern half of the lowest terrain in the area. As such, the majority of moisture moving through SUSAN is in the form of runoff, surface and ground water, from precipitation and snow melt, in the Elburz Mountains to the North. During the wet season the water table rises and increases the bog area south of the toe of the fan. Water feeding the bog will come principally via the two well-defined primary drains along the western and eastern edges of the fan with an undetermined amount percolating through the fan as ground water.

A<sup>(S)</sup> CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD  
REVIEW ON 11 DECEMBER 2000

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(U)  
d. (TS) Presence of water at the toe of the fan indicates water may be percolating through the fan at this time. Landing on the south half of the fan at this time without prior reconnaissance would be questionable. Landing of low foot print weight aircraft (C130) on the northern half is possible but ground survey should be conducted before-hand for mission safety. Soil profiles 3 to 5 feet deep (not surface samples) are needed in order to determine bearing strength of SUSAN and the southernmost location that would withstand the parking weight of large aircraft. Soil profiles taken on LZ SUSAN must be sealed in plastic to avoid dehydration. Failure to do so would result in inaccurate analysis. As a minimum, multiple soil penetrometer readings should be taken.

(U)  
2. (TS) The subject of NAMAK LAKE, specifically the area east of SARGADANI ISLAND vic coords 34 23N/051 55E, was surfaced. The geologist indicated this area has suitable strength to land any aircraft. He equated it to the BONNEVILLE Salt Flats and stated the salt was 3-5 feet to as much as 20 feet thick with very little micro relief. We are currently searching this area for suitability of fixed wing operations.

A.G.

  
CPT, MI  


MSG 080  
O 292200R NOV 79  
FM CDR DELTA//BECKWITH//  
TO COM JTF//MG VAUGHT//  
BT

G- (676)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: SITREP

1. (XIS) NIGHT TNG CONTINUES FOR OUR HUNTER-KILLER TMS. THE AIM OF THE TNG IS TO REHEARSE THE SKILLFUL TAKING-OUT OF PERS AT CHECK POINTS AND SENTRY POSTS IN AND AROUND THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. AL CONTINUES TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE ABOVE EFFORT. DUE TO THE PAUCITY OF HARD INTELLIGENCE AT THIS TIME, I ENVISION WE WILL STUMBLE INTO CHECK POINTS AND SENTRIES AS WE APPROACH TEHRAN VIA TRUCK.

2. (XIS) THE PLANNING CONFERENCE CONDUCTED AT THIS LOCATION THIS AFTERNOON BY YOU AND YOUR STAFF WAS VALUABLE, AND VITAL PARTS OF THE PLAN ARE FALLING INTO PLACE; HOWEVER, WE STILL HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE WE CAN ACTUALLY MOUNT A RESCUE OPN TO RECOVER OUR HOSTAGES. WE MUST NOT ALLOW MISSION SUPPORT, SUCH AS HELOS, MC130 COMBAT TALONS AND SPECTRE GUNSHIPS, TO DICTATE THE PHASING OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN INSTEAD OF SUPPORTING THE PLAN.

(U) 3. (XIS) THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS PROVIDED US WITH A VAST AMOUNT OF INFORMATION AND I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE NO CHOKE POINTS IN THE FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE; HOWEVER, MY MOST CRITICAL EEI'S REMAIN UNANSWERED. THESE ARE THE VITAL QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE ANSWERED TO REDUCE THE CURRENT RISK AND ACCOMPLISH OUR RESCUE MISSION: A. ARE ALL THE HOSTAGES ACTUALLY IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS? B. WHERE AND IN WHAT STRENGTH ARE CHECK POINTS ALONG MAJOR ROUTES, IN TEHRAN, WHICH LEAD TO THE EMBASSY COMPOUND? C. WHAT ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT CAN BE PROVIDED TO DELTA BY IN-PLACE ASSETS? D. WHO WILL DRIVE THE TRUCKS IF AND WHEN FRANKO OBTAINS THEM? E. ARE THERE ANY SAFEHOUSES VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND WHICH DELTA COULD USE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL RESCUE? F. WHAT IS THE NIGHT TIME NO OF ROVING PATROLS AND SENTRY POSTS IN AND AROUND THE COMPOUND? (AGAIN, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO STUMBLE INTO THE ENEMY.) G. WHAT IS THE STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY INSIDE THE COMPOUND DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS? CAN THE ENEMY REINFORCE THE COMPOUND? IF SO, IN WHAT STRENGTH?

(U) 4. (XIS) FROM THE OUTSET, I HAVE STATED THAT ANY PLAN DESIGNED TO RESCUE OUR HOSTAGES HAS TO BE SIMPLE, AND PERMIT DELTA TO ACHIEVE THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE AS IT ENTERS THE COMPOUND.

WE BELIEVE THE TROJAN HORSE CONCEPT UP TO THE WALL IS VITAL IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH OUR MISSION. WITHOUT THE SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE OF IN-PLACE ASSETS, WHO CAN HELP ME AS WE TRANSIT THE CITY TO THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, THE RISK REMAINS HIGH. AGAIN, HARD INTELLIGENCE IS THE KEY TO OUR SUCCESS. I ALSO REALIZE I AM PREACHING TO THE CHOIR, HOWEVER, OTHERS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN WHERE THE RUBBER MEETS THE ROAD IN THIS TYPE OF SPECIAL OPN.

REVV 30 NOV 2009  
BT

Declassified by  
DDO n/mcc  
15 Jul 95

~~SECRET~~



G602

16 January 1980

SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subj: Latest Intelligence from Iranian Naval Sources

G  
1. The following is a summary of the key ideas received/exchanged with [REDACTED] during a two-hour discussion with him yesterday, 15 January.

a. Concerns.

(1) Mining. U. S. should down play talk of mining Persian Gulf as he feels this is one tactic which could be used by most any level of revolutionists or terrorists causing havoc and great difficulty in removal.

(2) There is great concern over Soviet intervention in Iran at this time. As you know, the 1921 treaty with the USSR permits them to intervene when internal affairs become confused or when a third power comes in to attack Iran. The divisions now poised on the western border of Afghanistan conceivably represent such an intervening force.

✓(3) TIMES' "Man of the Year" was a boom to the Khomeini regime and to the poor and ignorant of Iran who have been led to believe that Khomeini was pictured as the man of the year because of his great contribution to Iran. As TIME has put it, Khomeini was selected simply because he succeeded in making so much news during 1979. The Iranian masses, unfortunately, do not understand these nuances of our sophisticated press.

✓(4) Do not count on Islam being a safeguard against a communist takeover. The masses to whom Islam principally appeals are the uneducated, primitive portions of the Iranian population who, in view of Khomeini's abject failure economically, could be persuaded to support communism or any other "ism" which promised to better their lot.

✓(5) Food is getting scarce in Iran; in particular, meat is almost non-attainable. Prices have skyrocketed and queues are quite long.

✓(6) Gas and naph supplies still appear to be adequate with the refineries in Tehran, Abadan and Tabriz working at capacity. The refinery at Esfahan is still out of

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 1256

CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92

DEFINITIVE CL BY DDD/mcs

DECL  DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON OAR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

Classified By

DJ50A  
- 418

commission.

b. [REDACTED] had the following recommendations:

(1) There are currently over 100 officers and ratings from the Imperial Navy in this country. Would there be any possibility of them supporting the U. S. Navy in some manner: perhaps in the area of maintenance or logistics or perhaps administrative? Many of the officers have security clearances, particularly those who were working with harpoon and the mark-44 torpedo and other systems which were purchased from the United States. The intent is not to have them join the U. S. Navy but rather to support it during the interim period until they can return to their own country. One suggestion was that perhaps they could be used in our buildup at [REDACTED] since it will be remote and lonely duty. These people, now unable to earn a living because of the anti-Iranian feeling plus their tenuous status, would be willing to do almost anything in order to provide support for their families.

(2) A counter-move by the United States against some Soviet interest in the Western Hemisphere might prove to be a good negotiating chip in the current situation involving the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

c. At this point I entered a discussion with [REDACTED] concerning the current stalemate situation regarding the hostages and suggested that perhaps the best action might come from an internally generated one by Iranians. I queried [REDACTED] about the availability of naval officers still loyal to Iran who might be enlisted to participate in such an activity. He promised to give the matter serious consideration and get back to me. Since travel in and out of Iran is still fairly unrestricted, we should be able to get word to these people without a great deal of difficulty.

2. Following are some thoughts gained from a conversation with [REDACTED] before the downfall of the empire. [REDACTED] arrived in the States [REDACTED]. He has been out of Iran now for about two months.

a. The IIN is in exceedingly poor materiel condition. All of the senior talent has deserted or refused to serve. The fire control equipment in particular in the fleet is in a down condition.

b. Air Force is in very poor shape. During the Kurdistan uprising, the Air Force was ordered to fly against the rebels. Twenty-eight of the pilots refused to fly, whereupon they were summarily executed. Pilot availability is very poor, flying



SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

time has been reduced below the safe proficiency level and in general the Air Force is considered to be unlikely to be able to react effectively against any crisis.

G  
c. [redacted] gave me the gist of an interview he heard with BAKHTIAR while he was still in France. According to BAKHTIAR he has formed a shadow government, has ministers to fill all of the posts, has created the skeleton framework for an armed force from people primarily in Europe and he claims further that he has an organization in country ready to react.

G  
d. [redacted]'s assessment was that Iran stood in very dire threat of being taken over by the communists. He felt the move to take the hostages was communist-inspired and felt further that KHOMEINI was impotent to do anything about it. He suggested that anything that could be done to stimulate KHOMEINI to shift his energies and his anger against the communists would be for the good of Iran at this point.

e. The executions are still in progress in country. Since most of the top leaders have been either executed or exiled, the thrust now is toward the less senior and middle grade officers, most of whom are still completely uncooperative with KHOMEINI's regime. The people that we see on TV in uniform are phonies, they do not belong to the armed forces.

G  
f. [redacted] indicated that he would be happy to cooperate with intelligence in any way that he could, and if they are interested I will be happy to put them in contact with [redacted]

Very respectfully,

*Frank*

F. C. COLLINS, JR.  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

Copy to:  
Op-009B

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

G6 03

28 September

Had extended conversations with [REDACTED], who has been in regular contact with a number of relatives in Iran. During our talks, we placed a call to, and spoke with [REDACTED], who resides on [REDACTED] in Northern Tehran. During the short time I spoke with him, and continually throughout the conversation, we were interrupted by loud explosions. Ali explained that an anti-aircraft gun had been emplaced next to his house. He reported that he goes up on his roof to watch "all the action," and that "the Iraqi jets fly right over" his house.

Ali also remarked that the traffic ban hadn't made movement any easier. In fact, pedestrians have "taken over the streets" and travelling by taxi takes even longer. Ali continues to work, and reported that many businesses continued to operate normally. He did say that there were shortages in many foodstuffs and commented that people were expressing great apprehension about the expected fuel shortages during the coming winter.

G

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

Declassified by:  
DDO Nmcc  
15 Jul 92

Classified By: DJSOA  
Declassified ON: OADR

FROM JCS ~~TOP SECRET~~

NOV 79

TO: DIA

G-610

SUBJECT: EEX

REQUEST action be taken to satisfy the following EEX with action to continue until completion.

(1) REQUIRE ANALYSIS OF Media Reports by major source

- a Student Announcements #1-3
- b IRG Leadership
- c IRAN Foreign Ministry
- d Religious Leadership

(2) Request total evaluation of situation in the compound on the city streets: main roads, airport. Differentiate between times of day and days of week

(3) Request Analysis of Imagery of "RANGER" Containment Area to determine if the (2) Ranger Co previously reported ~~is~~ is still the

(4) Request Hourly Time Analysis of the extent of military / civilian air traffic operating in the TEHRAN Area during the hours of 2100 - 0800 by day of the week.

(5) IR's on Road from Turkish/IRAN Border @ MAKU (IRAN) to TEHRAN.

RZ

Declassified by  
DDO nmc  
15 Jul 92

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

(6) Check Recent and Historical  
Coverage of MANZARIyah Airfield  
to determine location of reported  
Raspier Site "just off the west  
northwest end of runway"

G

16/1330 NOV 79

~~TOP SECRET~~

**SECRET**

G-612

Retrol - J2

Process address

BB [REDACTED] G

NOV 29

MSG 018  
O 161223R  
FM DELTA PLANNING STAFF//O  
TO DELTA REP//  
BT

PASS TO SENIOR INTEL REP

- (S) 1. BECKWITH AND [REDACTED] DISTURBED OVER LACK OF [REDACTED] OF SITUATION IN TEHRAN.
- 2. FREQUENCIES AND POWER OUTPUT (INCLUDING 80 WATT TRANSMITTER) OF CAPTURED US EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN PASSED TO YOUR LOCATION.
- (S) 3. REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS [REDACTED]

4. FURTHER REQUIRE INFORMATION ON CAPABILITIES FOR [REDACTED] DURING KEY PHASES OF PROPOSED OPERATION.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON/mc  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
 REVIEW ON OADR  
 RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED]

[Large scribbled-out area]

Classified by JCS  
Declassify on OADR

Ref E

~~**SECRET**~~

MS3026

0 191715R

Nov 79

G-613

FM CDR DELTA//BECKWITH  
TO COM JTF//MS VAUGHT//  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

(U) I. (TS) WITH REGARD TO INFILTRATION, I SPENT THREE HRS THIS MORNING WITH ASSET NAMED AL, AND MOST OF THE AFTERNOON WITH ASSET NAMED FRANKO. BASED ON DETAILED MAP STUDY AND ASSETS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE ON THE GROUND I NOW BELIEVE THAT THE BEST OPTION OPEN TO US AT THIS TIME, BASED UPON THE CURRENT SITUATION, IS TO ENTER IRAN BY COMBAT TALON. AIR LAND 35-40 KM EAST OF TEHRAN AND QUICKLY TRANSFER PERSONNEL AND GEAR TO THREE TRUCKS WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED BY FRANKO. MOVE BY TRUCK TO THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, CROSS THE WALL AT TWO SEPARATE POINTS, RESCUE THE HOSTAGES AND EXFILTRATE THE COMPOUND BY HELOS. IN THE EVENT THE MISSION GOES SOUR AND EXTRACTION FROM THE COMPOUND BECOMES IMPRACTICAL, DELTA WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MOVE TO THE STADIUM. WE WOULD ALSO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO TAKE ONE OR TWO OF THE

Declassified by  
DDO nmc  
15 Jul 92

AND NIGHT ALLOW DELTA TIME TO DEFEND UNTIL EXTRACTED,  
REINFORCED OR FORCED TO IMPLEMENT THE E AND E PLAN.

2. (U) BOTH ASSETS BELIEVE THAT TRUCK INFILTRATION  
FROM TURKEY OR PAKISTAN TO TEHRAN IS TOO RISKY. FRANKO  
DEPARTED TEHRAN 10 NOV 79. THIS ASSET FURTHER RECOMMENDED  
THAT THREE DELTA PERSONNEL DRIVE TRUCKS FROM LZ TO TARGET.  
I WILL SUBMIT A PROPOSAL TO YOU LATER WHICH ENVISIONS  
FIVE DELTA PERSONNEL TO PRECEED FORCE AND GET INTO POSITION  
IN-COUNTRY. I FURTHER ENVISION THREE DELTA TRUCK DRIVERS,  
ONE DELTA MAN IN OP AND ONE ON LZ. THIS MAN TO SELECT

LZ AND LINK UP TRUCKS WITH DELTA FORCE.

3. (U) I HAVE REQUESTED AN 18 WHEEL VEHICLE AT THIS  
SITE TO TRAIN SELECTED PERSONNEL TO HANDLE TRUCKS.

FRANKO RECOMMENDED WE USE LARGE 16 WHEEL TRUCKS, PREFERABLY  
MACK OR MERCEDES.

4. (U) RESPECTFULLY REQUEST SOMEONE BE TASKED TO DETERMINE  
THE AVAILABILITY OF THE M-202 FLASH/FLAME 66 MM  
INCENDIARY ROCKET LAUNCHER. TOTAL AMOUNT NOT KNOWN AT THIS  
TIME BUT WILL BE FORWARDED IF ITEM IS AVAILABLE.

5. (U) TEN PERSONNEL ARRIVED THIS SITE 191700 LOCAL NOV.  
FROM FORT BRAGG.

REVW 29 NOV 2009

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G-645

113 211

0 250131E FAN 21  
FM 15F02-8  
TO JTF/ [REDACTED]  
BT

G

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE LOCATION

1. (S) OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS OF 15F02-8 ARE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT JTF HAS UNREFUTED HARD INTELLIGENCE THAT HOSTAGES ARE LOCATED ON THE SECOND FLOOR OF THE CHANCERY. OPERATIONAL PLANS ARE BEING FORMULATED ON THIS ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION WHICH WAS PASSED BY J-2 TO DELTA OPERATIVES.

2. (S) ALL THAT DELTA/S-2 HAS SEEN HERE HAS BEEN J-2 ANALYST'S CONCLUSION. THERE HAS BEEN NO [REDACTED] HENCE NO HARD INTELLIGENCE. DELTA'S OPERATIONAL ASSETS AVAILABLE FOR THE CHANCERY MISSION ARE LIMITED. HOWEVER, UNLESS YOU CAN SHOW HARD INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY A TESTED SOURCE WITH CONTINUOUS ACCESS, THE ENTIRE BUILDING WILL HAVE TO BE CLEARED. OTHERWISE, WE RISK MISSING A HOSTAGE IN THE CHANCERY AND MIGHT AS WELL NOT CLEAR THAT FACILITY AT ALL. THIS INTEL EFFORT IS NOT AN INTELLECTUAL ENTERPRISE, IT IS A LIVE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EFFORT.

3. (S) PLEASE INFORM [REDACTED] THAT YOUR ANALYSIS IS AN ESTIMATE NOT A PROVEN FACT. THE CRITICAL EBI IS - WHICH FLOOR DOES DELTA SEARCH FIRST - BASEMENT OR SECOND FLOOR. A PRIORITY MUST BE ESTABLISHED - BUT NOT TO EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER FLOORS.

RW 25 FEB 82  
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1236  
CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO CONF  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM DIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



**SECRET**

FOR 217025Z G-6  
G-653

85H 3820  
O 210335Z APR 60  
FM SITE ALPHA//J2  
TO JCS//NO-J2  
BT

G  
C

SUBJ: INTEL FLOW  
1. LTC [REDACTED] CSG. INFORMED ME THAT  
EXTRANEOUS POL/ECO MSGS WILL NOT  
BE FWD TO THIS LDC AUTOMATICALLY.  
ONLY THOSE THAT HAVE DIRECT IMPACT  
ON OPN.  
2. IF YOU RECEIVE A POL/ECO MSG FROM [REDACTED]  
THAT YOU THINK WE SHOULD RECEIVE,  
PLS DOUBLE-CHECK TO SEE IF SPEC  
IF APPROVED IT TO US.

J-2  
ACTION

HAS XMITED  
2.S.

[POL/ECO?]

NNNN

Classified By: ~~JCS~~  
Declassified On: ~~OADR~~

MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 15 APR 1972  
DERIVATIVE CL BY D. B. N. MCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

C-654

Comdt

ib5

J3

J2

MSG 089

9 210115Z FEB 80  
FM DELTA  
TO JTF//VAUGHT/  
BT

SUBJ: RESCUE OF HOSTAGES LOCATED IN THE CHANCERY (TS)

A. JTF 231400Z FEB 80 (TS)

1. (TS) REF A REQUESTER DELTA'S CURRENT PLAN BE CHANGED ACCORDINGLY TO RESCUE HOSTAGES BEING HELD IN THE CHANCERY.

2. (TS) DELTA'S PRESENT PLAN IS TO RESCUE HOSTAGES IN SIX PRIMARY LOCATIONS BASED ON AVAILABLE INTEL. THOSE LOCATIONS AND ADDITIONAL

[ADD - CHAN C]

SECONDARY TARGETS AND ALSO MUST BE CLEARED.

3. (TS) INTELLIGENCE HAS INDICATED THAT HOSTAGES MAY BE HELD IN THE CHANCERY OF THE HOSTAGES MAY BE TAKEN TO THE CHANCERY FOR MEETINGS OR DEBRIEFINGS WITH VISITORS OF THE PRESS, RESPECTFULLY. DELTA, THEREFORE, WILL BEGIN RESCUE PLANNING FOR THE CHANCERY BUILDING AND AS A SECONDARY TARGET.

4. (TS) THIS INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF BUILDINGS TO CLEAR AND THE INCREASED AREA TO SECURE WILL FURTHER INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF TIME OF THE RESCUE FORCE IN THE USEM COMPOUND. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL SUPPORT ELEMENTS CONCERNED BE NOTIFIED THAT DELTA'S TIME PERIOD IN THE CRISIS POINT WILL BE EXTENDED TO CLEAR THE CHANCERY.

FM 21 FEB 80  
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 15 Jul 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD/MCC  
 DECL  DOWNGRADED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM

~~SECRET~~