

WORKING PAPER

#161

From: J2  
TO: COMJTF

14 Jul 88

MG Vaughn,

COMJTF ✓  
DePUTY \_\_\_\_\_  
COVER \_\_\_\_\_

— Sir, I believe ~~any~~ we will have to execute in 7-21 days\*

— Listed below are a few <sup>SEE [P. 2]</sup> ideas for your consideration concerning ~~forward~~ HELIX Deployment, Insertion techniques, Spectral/Command + Control Presence and Extraction.

~~(S)~~ — Helix Deployment  
— <sup>File</sup> ~~Make~~ Norfolk Helix's in 21s to Dover at dusk, move into Hangar, disassemble, Transport to [REDACTED] for assembly and further movement by ship and/or ~~air~~ self contained air.

E

- 1 -

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
INITIATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DESK USE DEVIATION TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple sources

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Declassified ONR OADR

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#524  
pg. 1000

2 of 78

Cmus and Support C130 BB

E ~~(C)~~ - Move [Spectro] to Europe  
to support TRAINING EXERCISE.

GreatLacm

E ~~(C)~~ - Move [Spectro] and C130 BB  
to [redacted] of

J, C, E ~~(S)~~ - Begin irregular ~~character~~  
flights of [redacted]

[redacted] and  
[redacted], with occasional  
Run at both Locations.

A ~~(S)~~ - Two/three flights before possible  
evacuation based selected crew  
members of Talon/Spectro fly  
[redacted]

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(4) - Possibly Equip <sup>2 of 78</sup> & Charters  
[REDACTED]

A: Compound [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(5) - Night Pair to execution  
[REDACTED] with [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED] lands  
at ~~Mehrabad~~ at  
Mehrabad and Ron's.

(6) - Next day [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] receive the

A, C select evacuation strip deposit  
[REDACTED] schedules

- That night charter departure  
from Mehrabad approx 90 minutes  
A Hand at Execution  
window - delays depart  
30-40 minutes checking  
NAV. gear - finally departs (5)

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45-30 minutes prior to  
Execution window - Departs  
- goes out bound - and  
30 minutes out in order  
from Com JTF ~~to~~ Progress  
Abt - (may declare emergency)  
~~land returns to~~ Fly, to  
pickup landing site -  
(may re declare emergency  
say they are crashing  
(Report wrong location)  
Lands at P/U site after  
Ground Execution has  
started - prep blackout  
itself out - prepares to  
receive Delta + Hostages.

ALTERNATIVE  
on next pages

(4)

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5 of 8

A (P) ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Helio Movement  
into country

(1) Establish ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ at ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ F27/B  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ arranged

C (1) Establish ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ along  
INSURE route ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ arranged charter  
Cargo flights - 3-5 days  
prior to execution day  
— Night

(2) ~~On day~~ be  
(2) Night Before execution  
the charter flight with  
spare fuel for Helio -  
acts as pathfinder for  
Helios / Helios land at  
selected "concealment site"

maxK landing <sup>6 of 1st</sup> at step here  
Charter // Charter lands  
unloads fuel ~~into~~ <sup>into</sup> tank  
and resumes flight.

(3) Helo - + Crews etc go  
into concealment

A (4) Execution Night Helos  
initiate [redacted]  
Appropriate time - Charter  
homes/circles // Helo's  
LIFT OFF and [redacted]  
[redacted] which is actually  
on this mission, [redacted]  
~~of [redacted]~~ acting as  
[redacted] and airborne  
[redacted] for ComJTF -

A (5) ~~[redacted]~~ Acts as  
Pathfinder for Helo -  
- ComJTF Directs insertion  
(8)

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offset to  $\frac{1}{8}$   
of Halo from Airborne  
orbit or from ground  
steering axis

(c) If multiple chaff flights  
could be developed/patterned  
additional a few days  
before execution additional  
Aircraft, [REDACTED]  
could be brought into the  
area to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Airlift, or airborne ground  
reinforcement.

A, B

(7)

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G WORKING PAPER FOR COL [REDACTED]

#162

INFILTRATION OF [ADVANCE PARTY] FOR RICE BOWL

1. PROBLEM (TS): To infiltrate advance parties of various size and composition into Tehran in support of RICE BOWL.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM (TS)

a. The major means of legitimate entry into Iran are by commercial air from Europe/Asia; by road from Pakistan Turkey, and Iraq; by rail from Turkey; and by ship from another Persian Gulf port or some more distant location.

b. [REDACTED] particularly the border areas and unpopulated eastern deserts is possible if thoroughly planned. Means of such entry include

AC

[REDACTED]; etc.]

c. RICE BOWL has demonstrated a capability to introduce mission personnel into IRAN by both legitimate means [REDACTED] and through [REDACTED] insertion.

3. ASSUMPTIONS (TS)

A

a. That infiltration of advance party personnel to support RICE BOWL could be by either legitimate [REDACTED] means.

b. That current Iranian entry procedures will remain relatively unchanged during the foreseeable future and that commercial airlines will continue to service Tehran and other Iranian airports.

C

c. That [REDACTED] will support RICE BOWL with [REDACTED] as required.

d. That any decision to infiltrate advance party personnel into Iran would not constitute a firm commitment to launch the actual mission.

A

e. That [REDACTED] will be available [REDACTED] if required.

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DICTATED ON 12 Aug 73  
PREPARED BY PPO NMCC  
DECL GRD DOWN TO SECRET  
W ON OADR  
INFO FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

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f. That the political climate in Iran, while unstable, will remain such that foreigners can legitimately move about the country.

4. DISCUSSION (TS) (S)

a. The presence of a limited number of RICE BOWL personnel in Tehran prior to the execution of the actual mission would serve to materially enhance the chances of success. These personnel could perform the following types of activity:

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

b. Recent experience with both [REDACTED] and legitimate infiltration techniques has demonstrated that both methods are feasible given proper detailed planning and development. [REDACTED] entry [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] offers the advantage of allowing both personnel and equipment to be introduced at the same time and place. Legitimate entry establishes a bonafide reason for being in Iran and consequently allows a similar means of exfiltration/departure. In either case, all advance party personnel would require [REDACTED]

c. The timeframe for insertion of advance parties is [REDACTED] prior to the actual execution of the Compound assault. Because of the unrest in the Turkish and Iraqi border areas, infiltration by overland means [(truck/train)] would be dangerous and time consuming. The same circumstances apply, although to a lesser degree, in the case of the Iran-Pakistan border. Insertion overland from Iraq is an even less palatable option. Commercial airlines serve Iran from points in both Europe and Asia. US military aircraft have the capability to [REDACTED]

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C [REDACTED] With proper individual or small group can enter Iran without undue difficulty or risk. There are several hotels in Tehran at which foreign travellers comprise the normal clientele. Iranian diplomatic posts are issuing visas for travel to Iran. Arrival and departure formalities are more stringent for Iranians than for foreigners. While individuals can enter and exit Iran relatively freely, the introduction of equipment such as radios could not be accomplished by this means.

5. CONCLUSIONS (TS) (S)

a. Insertion of advance parties could significantly contribute to the success of the RICE BOWL mission.

C b. Insertion is feasible by legitimate, [REDACTED] or a combination of the two means.

c. Support would be required from [REDACTED]

d. Any infiltration entails risk to both the involved personnel and to operations security for the mission. The size and nature of the advance party would dictate the location means and timing of insertion.

e. The mission of each advance party element would dictate its activities and location once in Iran.

AC f. A minimum [REDACTED] would be required to develop [REDACTED] for personnel being introduced through Tehran International Airport. Advance party members inserted by [REDACTED] means would have to be prepositioned in the Middle East at least [REDACTED] prior to infiltration for rest/final briefings.

g. Phasing of the infiltration would allow decision makers to cancel or modify the operation as it proceeds.

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6. RECOMMENDATION (S): That COMJTF explore the idea of an advance party with the CJCS at an appropriate juncture to avoid expenditure of resources and planning time sans raison.

A  
Appendix A: Listing of possible [redacted] and current JTF in-house [redacted] by country/language.

Appendix B: Recapitulation of operational needs which can only be satisfied by in-country advance party personnel. Notional time sequence of infiltration flow for personnel and equipment.

G

[redacted]

25 GC, USAK  
J2/

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

①-163

22 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program, Update #3

This memo provides chronology of [redacted] insertion program.

[redacted]

(S)  
C

for

JAMES B. VAUGHT  
Major General, USA

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO-NMCC

DEEL ECL DOWN TO Secret

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program Update #2

1. The following is update to my memoranda of 12 and 16 April, same subject. This memorandum also requests authority to proceed with

[REDACTED]

C

*James B. Vaughn*  
JAMES B. VAUGHN  
Major General, USA

OK  
Weg

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY



~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

16 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program, Update #1 (TS)


1. (U) The following is an update to my memorandum of 12 April 1980, same subject.

*BC*  
6 (TS) The Army is working to develop several other sources capable of reporting on the situation in Tehran. I view these as longer term propositions which are still tentative in nature. If the present contacts prove to be promising, it will still require [redacted] of processing, training, and evaluation before we could logically expect to employ any of the prospects.

C

7. (TS) Collectively, the above actions and associated travel expenses are projected to cost [REDACTED] over the next several months. None of the Service intelligence elements have budgeted funds to cover such an outlay.

8. (TS) Request CJCS advise Director, DIA, of the priority attached to the RICE BOWL observer program in order that DIA can initiate those actions required to properly obligate necessary funding.

  
JAMES B. VAUGHT  
Major General, USA

12 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: Rice Bowl Observer Program

4/14  
DCI - If we  
can get the  
info in (a)  
from [redacted]  
we should conf.  
Consider what the  
risks of doing!

1. (S) IAW your direction action is underway to develop/expand the DoD Rice Bowl on scene observer program.

2. (S) As of 12 April 1980 the following actions are underway:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. (U) Will provide update status on Wednesday 16 April.

*[Signature]*  
JAMES B. VAUGHT  
Major General, USA

~~SECRET~~

LAGAGAGAGAG

MSG197  
281430Z APR 80

FM JTF RCA [REDACTED] 1503 G  
TO SITE ALPHA [REDACTED]

SUBJ: STATUS OF [REDACTED]

REF: YOUR 280630Z APR 80

[REDACTED] NO STATUS ON REMAINDER. HOWEVER  
MAY GET MORE WHEN [REDACTED] ARRIVES.

REVM 28 APR 10

I-280

C

NNNN

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DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL. DOWNGR TO Secret  
REVM ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

1. Move Vehicles, Equipment and Personnel From [REDACTED] to Tehran via ROUTE:



TEHRAN

2. Move Vehicles and Equipment from [REDACTED] to Tehran, Route as Above, Rendevous with Personnel Between [REDACTED] Tehran.

ASSUMPTION

[REDACTED] Non-Interference

PROBLEM AREAS

1. [REDACTED]-IRANIAN BORDER

Access to [REDACTED] airfield(daylight only/customs)

Access to [REDACTED]

Laager of vehicles/equipment

Snow Conditions

2. BORDER CROSSING

Clearance Rqmts [REDACTED] Iranian

Standing Time/Snow

[REDACTED] Rqmt

3. BORDER-KURD CONTROLLED AREA

Snow Conditions

[REDACTED] Rqmt

4. IRAN ARMY CONTROL AREA-TEHRAN

Standing Time

Fuel Locations

Checkpoint Methodology

Urban Transit

(Rendevous Location)

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Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 72

COMMON PROBLEM AREAS

Control of the Operation by NCA  
Flexibility  
Political Embarrassment Potential  
No Ready extraction/Reaction Capability  
Significant Unknowns  
    Weather  
    Maintenance/POL  
    Checkpoint Methodology  
Four Weather Zones  
Stationary Confinement of Personnel en route  
Rqmt for Constant Truck Movement  
    Sleep  
    Exercise  
Language  
Papers  
Actions on Detection/Capture

OPTION ONE

E (X) VEHICLE, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL MOVE TOGETHER FROM [REDACTED]

NOT RECOMMENDED

High Risk of Detection  
No Flexibility  
Poor Control by NCA  
Physical Hardship/Danger for Personnel  
High Political Embarrassment Potential

OPTION TWO

E (X) VEHICLE, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL MOVE TOGETHER FROM [REDACTED]

NOT RECOMMENDED

A Requires [REDACTED] Approval  
Poor Control by NCA  
High Political Embarrassment Potential  
Physical Hardship on Personnel  
Minimal Flexibility  
High Detection Risk in Iran

OPTION THREE

EQUIPMENT TRANSIT BY VEHICLE, PERSONNEL INFILTRATE TO TEHRAN

RECOMMENDED

High Probability of Success  
Best Control Option  
Most Flexible  
Lowest Embarrassment Potential  
Difficulty in Arranging Rendezvous  
Uncontrollability of Maintenance

E (S) FOOT CROSSING OF [REDACTED] IRAN BORDER

Necessitated by high risk checkpoint (if determined)

- (S) Requires 5-8 mile cross country move
- snow pack most likely
- at night
- navigation difficulties ( [REDACTED] option)
- rendevous problem with [REDACTED]
- detection probability 25%

RENDEVOUS PERSONNEL WITH TRUCK PRIOR TO TEHRAN

Necessitated by distance/risk

- Rendevous selection
- Below USSR/IRAN radar (if abn option)
- outside of urban area or checkpoint visual
- identifiable by driver
- probable stop point for a [REDACTED]
- concealment for personnel available

REQUIREMENTS

- (S) Immediate [REDACTED] of route
- Access to [REDACTED] and related commo
- Selection of [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- Internal heat, including rear compartment
- compartmented/ventilated
- Maintenance/POL capability
- [REDACTED] drivers
- [REDACTED]
- Cold weather clothing and equipment
- Forward positioning of vehicles and equipment



~~SECRET~~

29188

2912308 Oct 80

MSG 295  
DTG 291302Z OCT 80  
FM: [REDACTED]  
TO: 1308  
12131  
DELTA  
AZACUS

A

~~(S)~~ THE FOLLOWING E & E CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WAS APPROVED IN PRINCIPAL BY COMMANDER JTD. THE ENTIRE CONCEPT IS STILL OPEN FOR SUGGESTIONS, REVISIONS AND EXPANSION AS E & E WORKING GROUP IS DIRECTED BY INDIVIDUAL UNIT COMMANDERS.

1. (U) SITUATION

a. ENEMY (SEE BASIC OPLAN.)

b. FRIENDLY. [REDACTED]

c. (U) ASSUMPTIONS

- (X)(U) THE HOSTAGE RECOVERY OPERATION IS CONDUCTED INDEPENDENT OF OTHER OPTIONS/OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.
- (X)(U) IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES WILL OPPOSE ALL POST-OPERATION EVASION ATTEMPTS.
- (X)(U) THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WILL ENLIST ALL IRANIANS IN EVASION-LOCATION SEARCHES, COUNTRY-WIDE.
- (X)(U) THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ZONE SEVERELY RESTRICTS ANY MOVEMENT IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF IRAN.
- (X)(U) DUE TO SEVERE COLD DURING NOV-APR EXFILTRATION BY GROUND MEANS INTO TURKEY WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

1,3,C

d. (U) MISSION. MISSION FORCES WILL CONDUCT EVASION AND ESCAPE OPERATIONS, AS REQUIRED, TO ATTAIN REFUGE AND SUBSEQUENT REPARATION OF US CONTROL.

e. (U) EXECUTION:

1. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. SEE BASIC OPLAN.

2. (U) CONCEPT OF E&E OPERATIONS. MISSION SUBORDINATE COMMANDS, ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE DETAILED PLANS WHICH WILL INVOLVE FROM THIS CONCEPT. JOINT E&E OPERATIONS WILL NORMALLY BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE GROUND FORCES COMMANDER OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AS APPROPRIATE. IN CASE OF NO CLEAR COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, THE INDIVIDUAL MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE/EXPERIENCED IN E&E TACTICS SHOULD ASSUME THE COMMAND.

f. (U) TASKS OF SUBORDINATE UNITS:

(1) ALL UNITS WILL PLAN FOR AND ACCOMPLISH TRAINING FOR THE CONDUCT OF E & E AS NOTED ABOVE. (CONCEPT OF E & E OPS)

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET- SYSTEM SAR. THIS SAR WILL COMPRISE THE PRIMARY INITIAL SAR EFFORT DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (SEE NUMBER --).

~~SECRET~~

- (C) (D) FORCES OF FRIENDLY FORCES:
  - (1) (D) NAVAL FORCES SUPPORT EGE OPERATIONS OF THIS PLAN AS DIRECTED BY CINCPAC, TO THE LIMIT OF THEIR CAPABILITY, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CAP AB SUPPORT POST- OPERATION EGE.

C

[REDACTED]

(C) (D) EXTERNAL-BASED SAR EFFORT WILL BE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MISSION COMMANDER. THIS EXTERNAL SAR EFFORT WILL NOT BE INITIATED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF PLANNED EXFILTRATION PHASE OR CANCELLATION OF THE MISSION OR AS DIRECTED BY THE MISSION COMMANDER.

(4) (C) [REDACTED]

A, B, C

2. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) (C) COMMON PROCEDURES:

(A) (U) PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE BY SECURE VOICE RADIO, IF POSSIBLE. BACKUP COMMO WILL BE BY CREW SURVIVAL RADIOS.

(B) (U) HOSTAGES, REGARDLESS OF RANK, WILL NOT ACT WITH COMMAND AUTHORITY, EXCEPT AS DIRECTED BY THE SENIOR RECOVERY FORCE ELEMENT COMMANDER. IN A CONFLICT OF OPINION ON WHERE TO GO, OR HOW TO EVADE BETWEEN DELTA/RANGER [REDACTED] FORCE PERSONNEL AND OTHER PERSONNEL (AIR CREW), THE RANKING DELTA/RANGER [REDACTED] WILL HAVE COMMAND AUTHORITY REGARDLESS OF DELTA/RANGER RANKS.

A

(C) (U) PERSONNEL CONDUCTING E AND E OPERATIONS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REMOVE WOUNDED PERSONNEL WITH THEM AS THEY EVADE. NO MISSION PERSONNEL WILL BE LEFT BEHIND UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO AVOID TOTAL OPERATION/ELEMENT FAILURE. KIA'S LEFT BEHIND WILL BE CONCEALED AS BEST POSSIBLE; IDENTIFICATION AND COMPROMISING DOCUMENTS REMOVED, AND THE LOCATION MARKED ON A MAP FOR FUTURE RECOVERY AND/OR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES.

(D) (U) ONLY PERSONNEL, ONLY, WILL BE BRIEFED ON THE PROBE POINT, TIME, AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO MISSION LAUNCH. OTHER PERSONNEL WILL BE BRIEFED ONLY ON THE E AND E CONCEPT IN BROAD TERMS, AND ONLY PROVIDED WITH INITIAL WALLY POINT/COMMUNICATIONS POINT INFORMATION TO RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. SPECIAL OPS WILL APPROPRIATE BY THEIR COMMANDERS.

(E) (U) SAR EFFORT IS PRIMARILY BASED ON DIRECTING PERSONNEL TO BE USED TO SUPPORT PRE-PLANNED SAR EFFORT CAN TAKE RECOVERY. PRIMARY MEANS OF EVACUATING WOUNDED PERSONNEL IS BY SA, MAINLY SYSTEM-SYSTEM SAR DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE MISSION AND BY WALLY-POSITIONED, PRE-PLANNED, POST-MISSION SA. RECOVERY WILL BE THE LAST OPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL, IF ALL OTHER SAR EFFORTS FAIL.

(F) (U) E AND E CONCEPT WILL BE BROKEN INTO 3 PHASES: COUNTRY INFILTRATION, ENVIRONS OF TENHAN PRIOR TO H HOUR, ENVIRONS OF TENHAN AFTER H-HOUR (PRIOR TO EXFIL "E" HOUR). ENVIRONS OF TENHAN AFTER H-HOUR (POST-EXFIL "E" HOUR), 72 HOURS AFTER H-HOUR, (ENVIRONS E AND E).

~~SECRET~~

(1)(M) COUNTRY/INFILTRATION PHASE: PRIMARY SAS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE HELICOPTER BUDDY-SYSTEM PLAN. IF THIS CANNOT BE COMPLETED, THE DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL GROUP TOGETHER AND REMAIN IN THE VICINITY OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE DOWNED PERSONNEL MUST BE PREPARED TO CONCEAL THEMSELVES AND THEIR AIRCRAFT FROM GROUND OBSERVATION FOR UP TO 36 HOURS.

(2)(M) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN PRIOR TO H-HOUR. ALL DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL BE PICKED UP BY THE BUDDY SYSTEM. IF PICK-UP IS NOT POSSIBLE, AND THE DOWNED PERSONNEL ARE OUTSIDE THE TEHRAN BUILT-UP AREA, MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE CITY PROPER MUST, DEPENDING ON POSITION WHERE DOWNED, EITHER TOWARD EXFIL POINTS AT PEGGY, PATTY OR OTHER DESIGNATED SITES.

(3)(M) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER H-HOUR (PRIOR TO EXFIL "E" HOUR):

(A) FROM EMBASSY:

1. PRIMARY HELICOPTER EXTRACTION IS FROM THE EMBASSY. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT POSSIBLE FROM THE EMBASSY GROUNDS, THE FOLLOWING AREAS WILL BE USED (IN ORDER) TO PROVIDE EXFIL POINTS:

- (A) STADIUM. IF NO PICK-UP, THEN TO
- (B) CONSTRUCTION SITE IN NORTH TEHRAN.

2. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT COMPLETED AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, [REDACTED]

A,B,C

(C) FROM MFA:

PRIMARY HELICOPTER EXTRACTION IS FROM THE MFA GROUNDS. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT POSSIBLE THEN PERSONNEL WILL MOVE TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR EXTRACTION:

- 1. PAKH-SHANK:  
IF EXTRACTION BY HELICOPTER IS NOT POSSIBLE, MOVEMENT MUST BE MADE BY VEHICLE TO CONSTRUCTION SITE.
- 2. CONSTRUCTION SITE IN NORTH TEHRAN:  
IF NO EXTRACTION CAN BE MADE AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, MOVEMENT TO LZ PATTY MUST BE MADE (SEE ABOVE).

(4)(M) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER E-HOUR:

(A) DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL MOVE TOWARD SELECTED HIDING SITES. [REDACTED]

A,B,C

(B) DEPENDING ON POSITION IN THE CITY, PERSONNEL WILL EITHER HIDE AND ATTEMPT TO [REDACTED] OR MOVE DIRECTLY TO THE LAR VALLEY. WITHIN 48-72 HOURS A SAS WILL BE LAUNCHED (W/ PERMITTING) AND DIRECTED TO THE LAR VALLEY FOR EXTRACTION OF STRANDED PERSONNEL.

~~SECRET~~

IF NO PICK-UP IS MADE BY 72 HOURS AFTER EXFIL, THE INDIVIDUAL MUST PREPARE FOR A PROLONGED E AND E SITUATION.

(C) ~~EXFIL~~ HORIZON DESIGNATION. TWO GENERAL AREAS HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED FOR ESCAPE AND EVASION MOVEMENT, REFERRED TO AS THE EASTERN AREA AND THE WESTERN AREA. THE WESTERN AREA IS A NORTH-SOUTH STRIP RUNNING ALONG A LINE SOUTH FROM TEHRAN TO ISFAHAN TO EAFSANJAN SOUTH TO BAKRAH ABBAS. THE EASTERN AREA RUNS FROM SEMNAN SOUTH ALONG THE MAJOR ROAD TO KERMAN THEN S/EAST TO SABZEVARAN, THEN SOUTH TO BAKRAH ABBAS.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. (C) LOGISTICS:

C  
A  
[REDACTED] OTHER LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH [REDACTED] SHOULD SERVICE ELEMENTS BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE; I.E., COMPASSES, SIGNAL PANELS, SIGNAL MIRRORS, ETC. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SURVIVAL BUNDLES TO BE DROPPED TO EVASION ELEMENTS WILL BE CONFIGURED BY [REDACTED] UPON RECEIPT OF D-DAY/C-DAY AUTHORIZATION FROM JCS.

b. (C) ADMINISTRATION. SEE BASIC OPLAN

5. (C) COMBAT AND SIGNAL:

a. (C) SIGNAL. SEE ANNEX THIS OPLAN, AND TAB THIS APPENDIX FOR COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES.

A  
b. (C) COMBAT. POINT E AND E OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SENIOR DELTA/RANGER [REDACTED] PERSON PRESENT, REGARDLESS OF RELATIVE RANK. UNILATERAL E AND E OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SENIOR PERSON PRESENT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL HOSTAGE PERSONNEL BE PLACED IN A COMMAND POSITION OF MISSION FORCES, REGARDLESS OF HOSTAGE RANK/POSITION.

(C) THE ABOVE CONCEPT WILL BE EXPANDED INTO A FULL ANNEX. THERE WILL BE A CONFERENCE HELD AT JID 5-7 NOV TO COMPLETE THE DETAILS OF THIS ANNEX. PLEASE SEND NAME OF ATTENDEE BY 3 NOV 59.

REVISED OCT 59  
BT

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OPSEC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

184

This document addresses general and specific procedures that must be considered to avoid compromise of the operation and to maintain a high degree of OPSEC. Some of the measures have already been incorporated while others remain unfulfilled.

~~(1)~~ I. MOVING FORCE TO OVERSEAS STAGING BASE

A. DELTA

1. HUMINT Threat to include inadvertent disclosure by the press, through family and friends.

E a. [REDACTED] Responsibilities

(1) Continue [REDACTED]

(2) Continue personnel welfare activities such as residence checks, financial support, caring for families, etc.

(3) Monitor [REDACTED] community (especially [REDACTED] for indications through use [REDACTED], and other sources.

(4) Monitor attachments and civilian hire (cooks, KPs, guards, etc.).

(5) Divert press inquiries to HQDA PAO while otherwise refusing to talk to the media.

b. Delta Main REsponsibilities

(1) Conduct stringent OPSEC briefing to personnel.

(2) Train and live in isolation; restrict contact of personnel with others; [REDACTED]

(3) Move in isolation - no exposure when possible, [REDACTED] apply need-to-know principle stringently.

(4) Minimal exposure times on ground.

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Classified By: ~~ES~~ DDONMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

A

A

A, B

(5) [REDACTED]

A, B

(6) [REDACTED] and transport only essential cargo.

(7) Eliminate access to areas by foreign nationals when possible.

2. PHOTINT/SIGINT Threats

a. Program [REDACTED] with movement times and [REDACTED] when applicable.

A, B

b. Emplace [REDACTED]

c. Use maximum COMSEC procedures to include secure systems, [REDACTED] etc.

B. USAF

1. Maintain similar measures as Delta.

2. Special attention [REDACTED] overseas.

A

C. RANGERS

1. Maintain similar measures as Delta

2. Move force under [REDACTED] and have [REDACTED]

D. POTENTIAL DAMAGE FACTORS IN EVENT OF COMPROMISE

1. Hostages killed.

2. Increased security/vigilance by Iranians.

3. Hostages moved.

4. Combination of above.

(6) II. MC-130 INSERT FROM STAGING BASE TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. DELTA MAIN (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Secure storage and facilities for personnel and equipment not taken forward.

2. Continue COMSEC procedures with emphasis on [redacted] from staging base.

B. RANGERS - same as for Delta.

C. USAF

1. Same as for Delta.

2. Minimal use [redacted] to avoid [redacted] by USSR, Iranian, and other applicable ground/air stations.

3. [redacted]

4. Route planning [redacted]

5. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft encountering in-flight emergency.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE

1. Same as I. D. above.

2. Possible decisive engagement of force by air defense guns/missiles and/or aircraft intercept.

III. RH-53 INSERT TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. Develop plan [redacted] Threat is from [redacted]

B. Develop plan to [redacted] of RH-53s. Threat is same as III. A. with additional [redacted]

C. Route planning to [redacted]

D. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft having in-flight emergency.

E. Minimal use of [redacted] with COMSEC emphasis.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - same as II. D. above.

~~(S)~~ IV. TAKEOVER AND LAGER AT NA'IN

A. RANGERS (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Recover/dispose of air items if applicable.

2. Total elimination or capture of guarding force

[REDACTED]

3.

[REDACTED] (e.g. food, water, sanitation, trash considerations; [REDACTED] etc.).

4. Develop plan to give [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. Stress COMSEC procedures.

B. USAF

1. Develop landing techniques to avoid ground observation. Attention to light and noise conditions.

2. Ensure minimal ground time for aircraft with appropriate light/noise discipline - will engines be shut down;=what is parking pattern, turn around, and takeoff procedures; what are refueling procedures?

3. Develop OPSEC procedures if 1 or more aircraft is unable to takeoff.

C. RH-53s

1. Same as for USAF.

2. Develop plan to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

D. DELTA - same as for rangers.

E. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - Same as I. D. as well as possible decisive engagement of the force on the ground.

V. MC-130 RETURN FROM NA'IN TO STAGING BASE

Same as I and II above for USAF.

B

A



VI. RECRUITMENT AND ENGAGEMENT OF DRIVERS AND GROUND TRANSPORT (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Standard agent recruitment procedures must be followed but time may not be sufficient to vet personnel and to ascertain full reliability of drivers.

B. Vehicles must be procured, delivered, and stored in such a manner as to avoid suspicion/investigation.

C. Compromise may result in same potential damage as in I. D. above as well as possible intercept and decisive engagement of force.

VII. GROUND TRANSPORT MOVE FROM TEHRAN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Vehicles must be configured for concealment by trusted and reliable personnel to preclude leaks.

B. Cut-outs should be used to assemble and mate drivers to vehicles to avoid compromise.

C. Plan must be developed to prepare vehicles for movement to link-up point to include appropriate cover, documentation, and procedures for drivers. Route planning must occur for passage of check points and routing of vehicles so driver does not necessarily know true destination.

D. Vehicles must be parked near link-up point with an ostensible reason for being there or with concealment to avoid ground/air observation.

E. Consequences of compromise are the same as VI. C. above.

VIII. AIR MOVE FROM NA'IN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

~~(C)~~ A. RH-53s

1. Establish OPSEC procedures in event 1 or more aircraft cannot take off or have in-flight emergencies.

2. Route planning to [REDACTED]

3. COMSEC measures.

4. Landing must be in isolated area to avoid ground observation with special attention to noise and light discipline.

A, B

A B. DELTA/RANGERS

1. Movement plan from aircraft to vehicles without being detected.

2. Last minute concealment check after loading vehicles and prior to move out.

3. Capture or eliminate any personnel observing aircraft.

(C) IX. RH-53 GROUND TIME (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

A. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. Maintain security around aircraft, capture or eliminate ground observers or passers by.

C. Maintain radio silence.

(U) X. GROUND MOVE FROM LINK-UP TO TEHRAN (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Develop plan to bypass checkpoints or to pass through them to include control of drivers.

B. Noise/light discipline in vehicles.

C. Maintain COMSEC measures.

XI. MC/AC-130 MOVE FROM STAGING BASE TO MANZARIYEH

Same considerations as for II above.

E

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) TIME	EVENT/SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	(U) DECISION/OPTIONS
1700L	1 MC-130 with Rangers depart <u>Egypt</u> Successful Unsuccessful: Launch Rangers in spare A/C within two hours  Unable launch within two hours	None <b>A</b>  Delay entire mission by whatever it takes to get airborne  No force to secure Main, unable to arrive at hideout before sunrise	Go  Go, inform RH-53 KC-135s & MC-130  Abort, inform other forces Delay 24 hours
1730L	5/MC-130 with fuel (3) and Delta (2) depart 10 min separation  If spare is available for launch within two hours  If no spare and a Delta A/C aborts  If no spare and a fuel A/C aborts	Mission will be delayed  Lose 1/2 mission force  Fuel for helos degraded	Go, inform other forces of delay  Abort  Advise Kitty Hawk to only launch four helos
1815 L	Launch 2/air refuelable tanker (ART): If either gets airborne  If delayed less than 2 hours  If delayed more than 2 hours	Sufficient fuel for Ranger MC-130  Must orbit of Ranger MC-130  Cannot get helos to hideout by first light	Go  Go, advise other A/C of delay  Abort, recall MC-130s and helos if launched
1830	6/RH-53 depart Kitty Hawk:  ≥ 4 get airborne  ≤ 3 get airborne	Sufficient helos to accomplish the mission plus one spare  Insufficient helos for mission	Go  Abort, recall MC-130's & KC-135/ARTs

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(U) TIME	EVENT/SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/CPT
1845L	1/KC-135 & 3/ART's launch:  <u>&gt;</u> 2 get airborne  < 2 get airborne	Will have to share fuel from more than one tanker for one of the MC-130s  Not enough fuel for MC-130s	Go, except a for refuelin at least one the MC-130's  Abort, advis MC-130s and helos
1845	If a helo goes down while within the range of the SAR helos --- no injuries  -- with injuries	Aircrew on the ground in Iran  Will use one of mission helos to return crew to the carrier	Go, launch S for pickup  If there are 4 mission he continue - If less th abort, advis KC-135 and M
1920	1/MC-130 air refuels with ARTS:  Unsuccessful:	No Ranger force for security at Main	- Try the se tanker, if g go, if no re possible, ab recall helos MC-130s and KC-130..
1950 2030	5/MC-130s air refuel  with 4/ARTS and 1/KC-135:  - All successful  - One of the fuel A/C fails to refuel  - More than one fuel A/C fails to refuel  - One of the Delta A/C fails to refuel	None  Insufficient fuel for 6/RH-53s  Insufficient fuel for the mission  Insufficient force for the mission	Go  - Instruct a in excess of to return to carrier  Abort, advis MC-130, RH-5 ARTS/KC-135  Abort, advis other aircra(

<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/OPTION</u>
2215L	RH-53s reach turn around point:  4 helos operational	Sufficient helos for operation	Go, from here an abort must worked out of Main
	4 helos operational	Insufficient helos for operation	Abort
2250L	1st MC-130 with Rangers lands at Main to secure the field:  - Runway blocked  - MC-130 has problem on landing	Field will be ready to receive follow-on force  Unable to air land Rangers  Runway must be cleared for follow on force	Go  - Jump rangers into target area to secure the base, clear the runway  - Off load MC-130 clear runway, aircraft will destroyed prior to departure, Abort mission
2320 0000L	Follow-on MC-130s land at Main  - Field not secure when A/C arrive	Delta plus fuel will be ready to receive fuel  Need to complete the security if mission is to go	Go  Land Delta to assist Rangers in completing security. If warning outside Main is suspect abort, refuel helos and send them back to the carrier. Recover rest of force in MC-130s
0000- 0030	2/MC-130s that brought in Delta depart	Partially clears Main for arrival of helos	If problem arises later, fuel MC-130s can carry Delta and Rangers out after re-fueling helos

<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/OPTION</u>
0030	6/RH-53 land at Nain Military to refuel	4 RH-53s operational force is adequate for mission	Go
	- RH-53s unable to find Nain Military by 0100, launch MC-130 to provide UHF/ADF homing from 7000.	Helos must arrive at Nain by 0130 or MC-130s will be short of fuel for return	If helos can arrive Nain by 0130, mission still Go If helos arrive later than 0130
	- RH-53s unable to arrive Nain by 0130	MC-130s must depart to reach tanker with sufficient fuel	- Pump fuel to one bladder on three fuel MC-130s (gives one hour delay). When helos arrive pump remaining fuel to helos to get max number that can return to the ship. all helos back towards carrier and set the fuel helos as necessary, pick up crews and proceed.
0130	The one Ranger and two Delta MC-130 depart for [REDACTED]	Clears ramp. Delta will go with helos. security force will return on the fuel MC-130.	Go
	Any MC-130 has problem and cannot depart Nain	Mission will be compromised	Abort, return helos to carrier, take Rangers Delta to MC-130s.
0130	6/RH-53s with Delta and the Ranger security depart Nain	All of Delta and 12 Rangers can proceed on the mission.	Go

<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/OPTION</u>
	3 helos get airborne	Spread Delta and Rangers	Go
	3 helos get airborne	Mission badly degraded	Continue in degraded status or abort
0310	RH/53s arrive at landing zone to drop off Delta	Delta will depart for Tehran in vehicles	Go
	There are no vehicles at the LZ	Delta unable to move to Tehran	Leave reception team at LZ. Move helos and rest of force to hideout. Delta 24 hrs, 48 hr abort
0330	RH-53s depart LZ to hideout. Delta moves to Tehran		

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TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
2/0800Z (0300 Est)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Est)	Launch MC-130: a. 5/MC-130 Airborne b. 4/MC-130 "	None Reduced fuel for Helo's	Go Go, will provide 19 operational bladders to complete mission
	c. <4/MC-130 Airborne	Insufficient fuel for Helo's	No Go/Delay 24 hr
	d. >1:00 delay in T/O	Will not get fuel to helos in time for them to reach hideout by daylight	No Go/Delay 24 hr
2/1115Z (0615 Est)	KC-135 launch: 3 KC-135 Airborne <3 KC-135 Airborne	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No Go
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch, <2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No go
2/1340Z (0840 Est)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 HELOS Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hideout	Go Go, Foldup 6th Helo and leave it + TACAN
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for Helos	No Go
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch a. 6/Helo airborne (5 w/ Delta/1 w/ extra support equipment, i.e., portable TACAN plus camouflage nets) b. >5/Helo airborne with no more than 1:00 delay c. <5/Helo airborne	Improves Delta's chances of having adequate helo support at the target  AND MINIMUM AIRCRAFT Max delay, and still be able to reach hide out by daylight with sufficient aircraft  Would unacceptably degrade equip and personnel for "Delta"	Go  If there is a delay instruct MC-130s to orbit  No/Go, delay 24 hr Inform MC-130's & KC-135's

< = less than  
 > = greater than  
 <= = less than or equal to  
 >= = greater than or equal to

~~TOP SECRET~~



(U)

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	d.>1:00 Delay	Cannot reach hideout by daylight	No Go, delay 24
2/1430Z 1515Z (1145 EST)	Helo goes down over water - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded	No Go, Recall Helo advise MC-130s to take 2nd refuel and RTB. Scramble SAR from Carrier advise KC-130s/A
	- Cargo Helo down	TACAN and camouflage nets gone	Option 1 - Delta Helos continue, launch SAR from Carrier  Option 2 - Recall Helos advise MC-130s to refuel and RTB launch SAR
2/1640Z (1145 EST)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 helos	Go
	4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hide out	Go, Foldup 6th Helo and leave it + T
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for helos	No Go, recall Helo
2/1515Z 1810Z (1015 EST)	Helo goes down prior to turn around point - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded - may lose TACAN and camouflage nets	Other 5 helos land and spread the 1. Advise MC-130 to delay by no. minutes required recovery.
			- If injuries: Option 1: 6th Helo lands, dumps cargo if necessary, if injured and return to carrier.  Option 2: Abort recall helos, advise MC-130's RTB, advise KC-135's
	Cargo Helo down	Crew requires recovery	Option 1: Launch Delta Helos continue

(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
			Option 2: Last of the other helos and load crew member camouflage on each. The force should be able to go on one of the helos. Advise MC-130's to
	More than one helo goes down	Force unacceptably degraded	Abort, recall, advise MC-130 RTB, call for KC-135 support
2/1810Z 1918Z (310-1416 EST)	6 helos operational for entire route	Arrive at refueling with all Delta and extra equipment	Go
	Delta or cargo helo goes down, no injuries	Part of attack force down, must be recovered	Option 1: Last helos and spare load. Continue to refuel point  Option 2: Last helo and p/u plus crew.
	Delta helo goes down with injuries	Force could be unacceptably degraded	NOTE: Any helo that can recover plus the crew plus the cargo helo is 2000 lbs lighter. Option 1: Proceed to refuel point, take fuel, return to carrier.  Option 2: Proceed to refuel point, helo will return to carrier with Remaining 4 helos on mission. No camouflage can be taken (hideout)

(U) TIME	(U) EVENT/ SITUATIONS	(U) CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/CPE/...
2/1948Z (1448 EST)	<p>Airdrop of fuel bladder:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 5 MC-130's make drop</li> <li>- 4 MC-130's make successful drop. Bladders loaded 5/aircraft; one aircraft only has 4.</li> </ul> <p>&lt;4 MC-130's make successful drop or &lt;19 bladders are usable.</p>	<p>Enough fuel for all 6 helos if all bladders OK</p> <p>Worst case, if no bladders break, there will be 19 available. Best case, 20 bladders available, can break one.</p> <p>Insufficient fuel for 4 helos to make target</p>	<p>Go, can proceed number of helos desired</p> <p>Can go with 4 helos if we get 19</p> <p>Option 1: Try to extract fuel from extra helos so as to get 4 operational</p> <p>Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to ship</p> <p>Option 3: Delay hours to get more fuel the next ni</p>
2/2248Z (1748 EST)	<p>Helos launch from refueling:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6 helos airborne</li> <li>5 helos airborne</li> <li>4 helos airborne</li> <li>3 helos airborne</li> </ul>	<p>Will have extra helo support for extraction</p> <p>Adequate support for extraction</p> <p>Marginal support for extraction</p> <p>Minimum helos for extraction</p>	<p>Go, use 6th helo carry max fuel</p> <p>Go, fold up 6th and leave it. Extract extra fuel operational helo</p> <p>Go, spread Delta Helo crews and equipment over operational helo</p> <p>Option 1: Proceed mission in degraded status</p> <p>Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to carrier.</p> <p>Option 3: Delay place 24 hrs. Try to fix helos or get more fuel, as re</p>

(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
	2 helos airborne	Inadequate helo support for mission	Option 1: Delay hours, try to get helos or get fuel, as required. Option 2: Load personnel on C strip down and to RV near beach. Call for SAR. Option 3: Delay hours, fly per to Manzarieh to meet MC-130 Rangers. Option 4: Delta crews fly to vicinity of Da Takeover airfield the next night. MC-130's land extract.
	1 helo airborne	Same as above	Same as option above except the one helo. Delta from report to vicinity of Darband
	Zero helos airborne	Same as above	Walk to Darband call for MC-130 when ready.
2/2248Z+ 1:00 (1748:1hr Est)	Helos must be off by 2348Z	After this, cannot reach hideout by daylight	Delay 24 hours
2/2318 (1618 EST)	Helos pass point where they could turn around and return to carrier	Once beyond this point, the force is committed to Manzarieh for extraction	JTF Commander recall the force to the carrier. contact means
2-3/2248Z 0124Z (1748-2024 EST)	Helo goes down between refueling point and Delta's dropoff point:		
	- 6 helos available cargo helo goes	Aircrew on the ground with camouflage nets	2 helos land crew and nets
	- 6 helos available, Delta helo goes	Delta force unacceptable degraded	3 helos land, Delta or crew

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(U) TIME

EVENT/  
SITUATIONS

CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

			the cargo helo, Delta board each the other two he
	5 helos available, Delta helo goes	Same as above	4 helos land sgr load the person attempt lift off with nets, if un dump nets.
	4 helos available, Delta helo goes down	Same as above	Abort, strip dow spread personnel among 3 helos, proceed to hideo extract on MC-13 the next night.
	3 helos available Delta helo goes down.	Same as above	From here on we find a recovery airfield to secu and call for the MC-130's
3/0124Z (2024 EST)	Any major problem at the dropoff point	Mission could be blown and/or force degraded	Option 1: Abort, move to hideout, meet MC-130s next night.  Option 2: Contin ground commander's decision.
3/2200Z 2210Z (1700-1710 EST)	Helo goes down enroute to hideout	Will affect ability to perform extraction	If 3 or more helo available, contin if < 3, inform Delt and abort to Manzariyeh.
3/0124Z 2135Z (2/2024 - 3/1635)	Delta is discovered enroute while helos are at hideout	With the force split Delta must be able to call the helos to a predetermined RV	Move helos at nig to RV to p/u Delt then to Manzariye for extraction.

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(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIC
3/1500Z (1050 EST)	AC-130 launch		GO
3/1630Z (1130 EST)	MC-130 Launch 5 MC-130 OK 4 MC-130 OK 3 " " 2 " " <2 " "	Personnel jammed on A/C - Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (149 people)	- P/U only hos + wounded - Direct launch and P/U some leftovers
3/1545 (1045 EST)	KC-135 launch for MC-130 3 KC-135 OK <3 " OK	Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130	Refuel at least MC-130, more if possible.
3/1605 (3/1105 EST)	KC-135 launch for AC-130 MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta and Rangers	Go Same as above
3/1900 (3/1400 EST)	AC-130 Refuel MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK	Same as above	Same as above
3/2135Z (1635 EST)	Helo lift off from hideout >3 RH-53 OK <3 RH-53 OK	Unable to lift out all hostages + Delta	Use extras (>3) CAS - Cycle helos f Manzariyeh to Embassy
3/2230Z (1730 EST)	MC-130's arrive at Manzariyeh find R/W blocked	- Unable to land secure airfield	- Paratroop Rang onto airfield - Wait for Delt helos to arri to secure field clear R/W
3/2230Z (1730 EST)	Helos land at Embassy 5 RH-53 OK	Will have extra helos	- Use extra hel
A 3/2230Z 2300Z (1730-1800 EST)	3 RH-53 OK  <2 RH-53 OK	Min req'd helos for for extraction  Not sufficient helos for extraction	- Land helos si use other 2 for  - Cycle helos f extraction

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
32245Z (1745 EST)	Extraction: 3 Helo's OK 1 Helo OK  Zero Helo's OK	Normal operation Unable to extract all personnel Unable to extract by Helo	Go Cycle Helo's  Use ground vehicle to drive to Manzariychr
32300Z (1800 EST)	Helo's arrive at Manzariych 3 RH-53 OK  <3 RH-53 OK  <3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130  Zero helo's OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130  Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle  Helo's will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground  MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded  - MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded  MC-130 plus 1 or extra MC-130  - Keep all MC-130 ground till per sonnel arrive - Launch two MC-1 for cover relay or for departur
4/0015 (3/19/5 EST)	AC-130 departs area	Mission if blown	- Have Delta set prearranged ral points. If discovered, dis engage, proceed to rally pt. When helo's lif off, direct the to appropriate P/U zone. - Establish Manzariyeh as rally point, He go to Manzariye if no contact with Delta
4/0045 (3/19/5 EST) Movement of Delta	AC-130 refuel  Delta is discovered		

~~TOP SECRET~~

(#188)

1. Brother - Sister. I am a Moslem like you. I was an engineer in Mecca the home of G then I came to Iran. I was working in Kerman when revolution took place.

BARADAR - KHAHAR - MAN MESLE SHOMA MOSALMAN HASTAM. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA D MACCA BUDAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR KERMAN BUDAM KE ENGHELAB SHOD.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country, but he brought me to Tehra He deceived me. Now I am alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHR. AVARD. HALA TANHA VA BE DUNE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 small children, an old mother and father. They are waiting for m You may have children too. You have father and mother and you know how I feel.

MAN ZAN, VA PANJ BACH CHE KUCHAK MADAR VA PEDAR DARAM ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTAN SHOMA HAM BACHCHE - MADAR VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality. For the sake of God help m I need your help.

SHOMA IRANIHA VA MOSALMANHA BE MEHMAN NAVAZI MAAROOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA I MAN KOMAK KONEED. I NEED YOUR HELP.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By ~~JCS~~  
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

Declassified by:  
DDO NMLC

12 Aug 92



~~TOP SECRET~~

HELP  
COME HERE  
DON'T MOVE  
GET DOWN  
SIT DOWN  
STAND UP  
PUT DOWN  
OPEN  
CLOSE  
RIFLE  
PISTOL  
KNIFE  
AMMUNITION  
HAND GRENADE  
MACHINE GUN  
WE ARE BROTHERS  
IMAM

WHERE AM I  
WHICH WAY IS  
NORTH  
SOUTH  
WEST  
EAST  
ROAD  
TRAIN  
BUS  
TAXI

KOMAK  
BIYA ENJA  
TA KAN NA KHOR  
BE KHAB  
BEN SHEINID  
BOLAND SHOW  
BEGZAR ZAMIN  
BAZ  
BAS TE  
TOFANG  
HAF TEAR  
CHA GHO  
FE SHANG  
NARENJAK  
MO SAL SAL  
MA BARADAR HAS TEAM  
EMAM

MAN KOJA HAS TAM  
RAHE KOJAST  
SHOMAL  
JO NOB  
GHARB  
SHARGH  
RAH  
GHATAR  
AUTOBOS  
TAXI

کمک  
بیا اینجا  
کان نخور بخواب  
بنشینید بلندشو  
یلزار زمین باز کن  
بته تفنگ  
هفت تیر چاقو  
فشنگ نازنجک  
ملل ادر میتم  
امام من کجا هستم  
کجا است شمال  
جنوب  
غرب  
شرق راه  
قطار اتوبوس  
ناکی

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BICYCLE	DOCHARKHE
MOTORCYCLE	MOTOR CEAK LET
TRUCK (LORRY)	MACHINE BARY
WATER	AB
BREAD	NAN
CLOTHES	LEBAS
BLANKET	PATO
SHOES	KAFSH
SOCKS	JORAB
HAT	KOLAH
COAT	COAT
PANTS	SHALVAR
OVERCOAT	PALTO

دو چرخه  
موتور سیکلت  
کامیون  
آب  
نان  
لباس  
پتو کفش  
جوراب  
کلاه کت  
شلوار  
پالتو

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۱- برادر - خواهر عزیز . من مثل شما مسلمان هستم . من در حله . خانه خدا  
کار میکنم و مهندس ساختمان هستم . برادران آمدند و در تهران کار میکنم  
که انلاب شد .

۲- مری از من بپرسید که مرا به خارج از کشور ببر ولی مرا گول زد و به  
تهران آورد و الان در تهران سرگردان و بیدار نماز و جا هستم .

۳- من زن و پنج بچه کوچک دیدم در مادر پی درآم که منتظر من هستند . شما هم  
بچه دلا اقل پدر و مادر دارید و حال مرا می فرمید .

۴- شما ایرانی ها و مسلمانان - مهمان نوازی و کمک کردن شهرت دارید بخاطر  
خدا بن کمک کنید من - کمک شما نیاز دارم .

قریبالشها .

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[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22030

191



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF INRA

17 MAR 1981

SUBJECT Worldwide Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Contingency Guide for Southwest Asia (IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN), USAFINTEL 400-10 Volume I

TO JCS/J-3 SOD  
Washington, DC

1. A copy of the SERE Contingency Guide for Southwest Asia with accompanying graphics, is at Attachment 1.
2. This Guide was produced by HQ AFIS/INR, Evasion and Escape/Prisoner of War Directorate of the Air Force Intelligence Service. Assistance in research and analysis is provided by selected members of the Air Force and Navy Intelligence Reserves.
3. Users are reminded that this Guide was primarily intended for use in operational evasion and escape (E&E) planning, E&E intelligence briefings, and various aspects of SERE training. Please refer to the introductory remarks and instructions contained in Section 01 for additional information on this Guide.
4. SERE Guides are furnished to designated Unified, Specified, and Major Commands and other special action agencies/offices noted in distribution list. Request that those distributees arrange for further reproduction and dissemination on a need-to-know basis to subordinate echelons or affiliated commands. Distribution for operational purposes will be determined by the primary distributees. This latter request is predicated on the limited printing and photo reproduction capabilities of the producer and a determination that the primary distributees should control distribution. Computer print tape versions of the Guide are not available.
5. SERE Guides are reviewed for currency as needed. Substantive changes will be forwarded to primary distributees as required.
6. Request that users forward comments, recommendations for improvements, and suggested additions or corrections directly to the producer, at the following address: HQ AFIS/INRA, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
7. Compendia of plants, animals, diseases, and general survival information has been distributed to elements listed in Attachment 1 of this letter. We will no

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Declassified by:  
DPO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

[REDACTED]

longer provide details and 35mm slides in each Guide for individual plants, animals or diseases. If detailed information is needed, users should refer to the compendia.

8. Due to an anticipated six to eight weeks delay in photographic reproduction, only the Potential Evasion Locales (PEL) graphic overlays are included with this volume. 35mm slides will be forwarded with Volume II.

9. When Attachment 1 is withdrawn or not attached, this letter becomes "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY".

*Frank J. Capillupo*

FRANK J. CAPILLUPO, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Director, Evasion and Escape/Prisoner  
Of War

1 Atch  
SWA SERE Guide, 31 January 1981  
[REDACTED] 1 Cy.



6-#155

7 JANUARY 1981

SUBJ: ESCAPE AND EVASION

1. (U) (TS) The following Escape and Evasion plan is the final product, based on Option 12. This plan should be used in its entirety only if Option 12 is used.

2. (U) (TS) The intent of this plan is to provide an off-the-shelf capability to support Option 12 only. However, this document will hopefully also provide the framework for any other option to be developed.

*David G. Prevost*

DAVID G. PREVOST  
Maj, USAF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 17 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECLASSIFIED TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

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INFORMATION CLASSIFIED BY: JCS-53  
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION  
OR ( ) REVIEW  
IS: 5 JAN 2001

~~TOP SECRET~~

ESCAPE AND EVASION

(U) REFERENCES: See basic OPLAN.

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. (U) Enemy. See Annex B, this OPLAN.

b. ~~(S)~~ Friendly. [REDACTED]

A, B, C

However, there are several areas which are designated general Selected Areas For Evasion which should provide water, game, and opportunity to obtain shelter.

c. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Assumptions

(1) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ The hostage recovery operation is conducted independent of other options/operations in the Persian Gulf area.

(2) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Iranian military forces will oppose all post-operation evasion attempts.

(3) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ The Government of Iran will enlist all Iranians in evader location search, country-wide.

(4) The Iran-Iraq war zone limits any movement in the southwestern portion of Iran.

(5) Due to severe cold during Nov-Apr exfiltration by ground means other than vehicles into Turkey would be extremely hazardous.

(6) Although there are networks being used by Iranians opposed to the government to leave Iran covertly into Turkey, no penetration of their structure has yet been made. These networks are dominated by Kurds in the Tabriz and Rezayeh areas.

- 2. (S) MISSION: JTF forces will conduct evasion and escape operations; as required, to return all U.S. forces to U.S. or friendly country control.

3. (U) Execution:

a. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Concept of Operations. See basic OPlan

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REVIEW ON 5 JANUARY 2001

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Tabs -

- A. E and E Phases
- B. SAR SOP (1-75)
- C. Evasion Aids
- D. Visual Signals/LZ Markings
- E. Communications Procedures



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ESCAPE AND EVASION

Country Infil/Exfil

1. Upon boarding any fixed wing aircraft the senior ground commander, or his designated representative, will obtain from the navigator a 1:2,000,000 map with the legs of flight route (for both ingress and egress) depicted, to include approximate flight times for each major leg. (Map will remain with the aircraft). Ground element will then use this chart to flight follow and will be responsible for knowing the approximate position of the aircraft during ingress and egress. For short, rotary-wing legs of flight, the ground forces must flight-follow on their own maps.

2. Actions to be taken on forced/unplanned landing:

a. On decision to execute a forced landing, aircraft navigator will notify ground element commander of aircraft location.

b. Immediately upon stop, all personnel will comply with the directions of aircrew to exit the aircraft.

c. After rallying a safe distance from the aircraft, (500 meters west of the aircraft, if possible) the following actions will be taken

(1) Injured/wounded cared for

(2) Establish local security

(3) Destroy classified material

(4) Inventory personal/aircraft survival and evasion aids.

(5) Senior ground element officer/NCO briefs all personnel on the evasion plan, i.e., breakup in groups and evade, stay together, stay with aircraft.

(a) The decision to take one of these options will depend on the security of the downed aircraft position. If the aircraft is not burning and the downed position is reasonably secure/remote, the first option will be to remain together and within 5 km of the aircraft. If possible, movement should be made on a cardinal heading from the aircraft position toward cover. Mark your direction of movement by placing a "T" (stem at least 15 ft in length) with the bottom of the "T" pointing south. This will be an authenticator. Any other direction of the "T" will indicate compromise. Place the "T" near the quarter of the aircraft, indicating your direction of movement.

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(b) If the aircraft is burning or the landing is made in a populated or hostile area, a determination must be made whether to break into small groups and evade or to attempt to hide as a large group. In all probability, there would be no external SAR effort launched until the objective has been met and exfil is nearing an end. A 24 to 36 hour maximum prior to launch of a SAR effort is realistic. For the timeframe H+36 hours, all personnel should, if possible, attempt to remain in one group. Initial evasion should be attempted in the direction which will provide the most cover and security for the evaders.

(c) SAR forces should make contact within 36 hours of H-hour. In the time between downing and pick-up, a secure zone should be maintained with a safe access to an adequate helo landing area. For contact/pick-up procedures see SAR ANNEX.

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(S)3.

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A

~~(S)~~ TAB B SAR PLAN, 101st ~~██████████~~

I. GENERAL:

A. Purpose: The purpose of this SOP is to outline the basic procedures that will be used by the 6 and 12 man SAR teams. This also outlines the basic organization, responsibilities, procedures and special equipment used by this team.

II. TEAM ORGANIZATION:

A 12-Man Team: The SAR Team should work as a 12-man team whenever possible to provide maximum coverage and security on the target. The 12-man SAR Team is broken down into two elements; the Personnel Rescue Element and the Security Element. The 12-man SAR Team breakdown to include primary and alternate duties are:

PERSONNEL RESCUE ELEMENT:

SAR Team Leader: Responsible for SAR Team; directs all actions on the objective; controls and directs all personnel on the ground; controls the use of the SAR aircraft; directs fire control and fire support.

Aid and Litter Team 1: Consists of 2 men; responsible for transporting all personnel from the right side of downed aircraft to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for security sweep of right side of aircraft; alternate demo team; alternate equipment destruction team; alternate aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 2: Consists of 2 men; responsible for transporting all personnel including navigator from the left side of the downed aircraft to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for security sweep of left-side of aircraft; primary aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 3: Responsible for acting as guides for all uninjured and slightly injured walking personnel to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for engine shut-down and equipment zero; responsible for pilot removal and transportation of injured pilots to appropriate SAR aircraft; primary demolition team/primary equipment destruction team.

Counter: Responsible for accountability of all personnel being picked up according to each aircraft load. Directs flow of personnel being loaded to insure aircraft are loaded equally if possible.

Security Element: Responsible for security of target area while the Personnel Rescue Element works. If needed the Security Element may be reinforced by the Personnel Rescue Element upon direction of the SAR Team leader.

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Assistant SAR Team Leader: Responsible for positioning security forces to secure SAR aircraft and personnel in the target area; keep SAR Team Leader informed on all security matters. Remain updated on all situations in order to assume command of the SAR team if necessary.

Security Personnel: Consists of 2 M-60 gunners and one assistant gunner; responsible for maintaining 100% alertness and observation; informs Security Team Leader of any approaching forces or dangers that may keep the SAR Team from completing its mission safely.

b. 6-Man Team: The capability of the 6-man SAR Team is greatly reduced in comparison to that of the 12-man SAR Team. However, there are situations when the reduced number of personnel would be favorable and still complete the mission. Such situations would include aircraft down due to maintenance where there are no injuries and the area is not populated or built-up. Aircraft down with only the flight crew on board could be handled by the 6-man team. The organization and the duties of the 6-man team follow closely those of the 12-man team:

Team Leader: Responsible for shut-down of engines; zeroing all secure equipment; security sweep of the aircraft; responsible for SAR Team and actions or objective.

Aid and Litter Team 1: Transporting all injured personnel to appropriate SAR aircraft; primary aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 2: Guide for all uninjured and slightly injured personnel to appropriate aircraft; primary demo team; primary equipment destruction team.

Security Team: Consists of one M-60; protect the SAR aircraft; keep team leader informed of the security situation.

(C) III. Weapons and Equipment:

a.

b.

c.

A, B


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- d. Special Equipment:
  - Pry bars: 2
  - Bolt cutters: 2
  - POW kits: 8
  - M5 bags: 2
  - Airborne litters: 2
  - 120' Rope: 2
  - Demo kits: 2
  - Fire Extinguishers: 2

IV. Chalk leads:

SAR Acft 1

SAR Acft 2:



1. Team Leader and Assistant Team Leaders should position themselves on the aircraft so that they are seated to the inside of the formation when flying staggered.
2. Teams should position themselves together on chalk loading.
3. Key personnel and teams should be positioned where they can be controlled by the Team Leader.
4. Always cross load.


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DOWNED AIRCRAFT


V. Landing Configuration:

a.


SAR Acft 2



SAR Acft 1



SAR spare acft



Direction of flight for SAR acft

1. When landing aircraft on the target area SAR aircraft 1 faces the downed aircraft on the right side of the downed aircraft (right side in relation to the direction of flight)
2. SAR aircraft 2 lands to the left of the downed aircraft in relation to the direction of flight, facing the downed aircraft.
3. Spare aircraft should land close by to the downed aircraft maintaining a safety watch on the downed aircraft for any signs of fire.

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5. If downed aircraft is in an area where a simultaneous landing by all three SAR aircraft is impossible, SAR aircraft 1 will land first, off-load SAR team and take off. Then SAR aircraft 2 will land to off-load SAR personnel and take off. The spare SAR aircraft will then land for loading of appropriate personnel and then take off. SAR aircraft 2 will land for loading followed by SAR aircraft 1. Landing will always be with the nose of the SAR aircraft pointed toward the target, if possible. Once an aircraft has cleared the PZ, that aircraft should signal clear to the next aircraft to land.

6. Should a SAR team have to off-load and move a considerable distance to secure a target, the drop-off LZ will be the primary PZ. Once a target is secure or located, an alternate PZ may be selected on the target area or enroute. This will be marked by an IR strobe light. If all three aircraft can land the IR strobe light marks aircraft 1's location. IR chemlights will mark the PZ for aircraft 2 and 3. If only one aircraft can land, the landing sequence will be aircraft 3, 2 then 1.

b. General Procedures:

(1) Once the aircraft has landed, all aid and litter teams 1 and 2 move to their respective areas on the downed aircraft and begin to remove personnel and equipment.

(2) Aid and litter team 3 move to the front of the downed aircraft, assemble all injured and mobile personnel, and guide them to the appropriate aircraft.

(3) The counter will count each individual as he loads the aircraft.

(4) A&L 1 and 2 will remove all injured personnel to appropriate aircraft from their location.

(5) A&L 3 will return and extract pilot and co-pilot.

(6) A&L 3 or 1 will then either destroy equipment or aircraft after A&L 3 or 1 zeros the equipment.

(7) Once personnel are removed, weapons and sensitive material will be removed and loaded on A&L team aircraft.

(8) SAR Team Leader will direct and supervise.

VI. Loading of Injured and Uninjured from Downed Aircraft:

a. Loading of uninjured or slightly injured:

(1). Enroute to objective, any uninjured or slightly injured mission ground team members including the pilot of the downed aircraft and who are able to continue the mission, will be loaded on the spare aircraft to continue the mission.

(2) The ground team leader will decide whether a man is able to continue his mission.

(3) The copilot, navigator and crew chief along with all injured personnel unable to continue the mission will be loaded equally on SAR aircraft 1 and 2 in order to receive medical attention.

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(4) Injured will be loaded to the front first with their backs against the crucible.

(5) Load priority:

- a. Mission able personnel
- b. Walking wounded
- c. Seriously injured
- d. Dead

VII. Priorities of SAR Team At The Objective Area:

- a. Security
- b. Load uninjured and mission-able injured to continue mission.
- c. Load seriously injured
- d. Zero equipment and collect sensitive material and weapons.
- e. Destruction of equipment and/or aircraft
- f. Perform first aid in flight.

VIII. Actions Of Personnel In Downed Aircraft:

- a. Shut down engines, fuel system and electrical system.
- b. Assemble all injured at the nose of the downed aircraft.
- c. Uninjured form local security in front of the aircraft.
- d. Remove all weapons and sensitive material and secure.
- e. Each individual should retain personal gear.
- f. Attempt to zero all secure equipment and leave hood up as signal to the SAR team that this has been accomplished.
- g. Maintain a fire watch to provide warning if the aircraft catches fire.
- h. Set up IR strobe to signal SAR aircraft that LZ is clear and secure.
- i. Be prepared to assist Aid and Litter Teams.
- j. Pilot is in charge of personnel until SAR arrives.

IX. Demolitions:

a. SAR team will be responsible for destruction of aircraft:

(1). No aircraft will be blown enroute to the objective. All secure gear and control panels will be smashed.

(2) Demolitions of aircraft enroute from objective to transload point:


- a. Demo will be set on command of the SAR commander.
- b. Demo will be set after area is clear just prior to SAR aircraft take off.
- c. 5 minute time fuze will be used.
- d. Primary demo location will be the left side fuel cap:
- e. Alternate demo location will be inside the aircraft, next to the auxiliary fuel tanks.

x: Larger Area Security:

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


a. Security for 3 SAR aircraft:



Security for 3 SAR aircraft will be formed by placing half moon perimeters on each side. M60 #1 has front security. M60 #2 has rear security.

b. Security for additional aircraft:



For additional aircraft in the Laager area, the additional aircraft must land between SAR aircraft #1 and #2. Half moons will be to the front and rear with flank security provided by the door guns.

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- XI. Aircraft Accessories needed for SAR:
  - a. Head sets for ground commander on each aircraft.
  - b. All seats out except Pilot and navigator.
- XII. Command and Signal:
  - a. Communication:
    - (1) Ground to air (SAR Team Leader to flight leader) FM (secure)
    - (2) Communications between the 2 SAR elements while in the air will be conducted through the pilots' over-the-flight net.
    - (3) SAR element communications while on the ground will be conducted over MX-360.
  - b. Signals:
    - (1) Downed aircraft signal, clear to land: IR strobe light.
    - (2) 100% accountability of SAR team: up and down movement of Illum tape.

**ANNEX:**

- 1. Zeroing Secure Equipment
- 2. Location of Sensitive Material
- 3. SAR Support Plan from Objective Area

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ANNEX 1 ZEROING SECURE EQUIPMENT TO SAR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.

A. General: There are a total of five pieces of equipment on a UH-60 to be zeroed to prevent compromising communications security. Four of five pieces of this equipment can be zeroed manually. The manual method will be used by the SAR element.

B. Location of equipment to be zeroed:

(1) The equipment to be zeroed is located in the nose of the aircraft.

(2) The nose hood can be lifted by releasing two latches.

(3) The nose hood may be secured with a lock. It can be easily broken by using a pry bar or axe.

(4) Once the hood is up, three of the items to be zeroed are located under a black cover which is along the back portion of the compartment. This cover can be removed by pulling the cover

off. The equipment will be three gray boxes side by side. Each has a sliding type button on the front. To zero, slide each button up.

(5) Item number four is a black box located to the right, in the main compartment. It can be zeroed by pushing a button located on the front of the box.

(6) Item number five is a long gray box located in the center of the compartment. It can only be zeroed from the pilot control panel. Facing the panel, the knob to zero the equipment is to the left of the flight instruments. The knob must be turned all the way to the left to zero it.

(7) Once zeroed, all equipment will be smashed with an axe unless the aircraft is being destroyed. The instrument panel and navigational computer will also be smashed.

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ANNEX 2 - LOCATION OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL TO SAR SOP

..A. General: To insure the successful recovery of sensitive papers, codes, and maps, these items should be kept in a single location when not in use. They should be in some type of binder or folder. This container should be located between the copilot's seat and the instrument console.

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ANNEX 3 - SAR SUPPORT PLAN FROM OBJECTIVE AREA TO SAR SOP

SAR Flight #1

- 10: PW's
- 11: PW's
- 12: SAR Element
- Empty Hawk

SAR FLIGHT #2

- #6: PW's
- #7: PW's
- #13: SAR Element
- Empty Hawk

A, B ~~set~~ 

SAR FLIGHT # 3:

- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- #2 Security Elem.(Black)
- Empty Hawk
- Empty Hawk

SAR FLIGHT # 4:

- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- #3 Security Elem (Black)
- Empty Hawk
- Empty Hawk

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"BLOOD CHIT"

1. Brother- Sister. I was an engineer in Mecca, the home of God, then I came to Iran. I was in Ahwaz when the Iraqis attacked.

BARADAR - KHAHAR. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA DAR  
MACCA BODAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR VAKTI KE IRAQIAN  
TAARUZ KARDAND MAN DAR AHVAZ BODAM.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country, but he brought me to Tehran. He deceived me. Now I am alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI  
OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHRAN AVORD. HALA TANHA VA  
BE DONE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 kids, an old mother and father. They are waiting for me. You may have kids, you have father and mother and you know what I feel.

MAN ZAN, PANJ BAHCHE, MADAR VA PEDAR-E-PEER DARAM.  
ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTAND. SHOMA HAM BAHCHE- MADAR  
VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality. For the sake of God, help me. I need your help.

SHOMA IRANI HA VA MOSALMAN HA BE MEHMAN MAVAZI  
MAAROOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA BE MAN KOMAK  
KONEED. MAN KOMAK MIKHAM.

HELP

KOMAK

COME HERE

BIYA ENJA

DONT MOVE

TA KAN NA KHOR

ک  
یا اینجا  
تکن خور

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GET DOWN	BE KHAB	خواب
SIT DOWN	BENESHEE	نشستن
STAND UP	BOLAND SHOW	بلند شو
PUT DOWN	BEGZAR ZAMIN	نگذار زمین
OPEN	BAZ KON	باز کن
CLOSE	BASTE	بسته
RIFLE	TOFANG	تفنگ
PISTOL	HAFTEAR	هفت تیر
KNIFE	CHAGHO	چاقو
AMMUNITION	FESHANG	فشنگ
HAND GRENADE	NARENJAK	نرنجک
MACHINE GUN	MOSALSAL	مسلسل
WE ARE BROTHERS	MA BARADAR HAS TEAM	ما برادر هستیم
IMAM	EMAM	امام
WHERE AM I	MAN KOJA HASTAM	من کجا هستم؟
WHICH WAY IS	RAHE _____ KOJAST	راه _____ کجاست
NORTH	SHOMAL	شمال
SOUTH	JONOB	جنوب
WEST	GHARB	غرب
EAST	SHARGH	شرقی
ROAD	RAH	راه
TRAIN	GHATAR	قطار
BUS	AUTOBOS	اتوبوس
TAXI	TAXI	تاکسی
BICYCLE	DOCHARKHE	دوچرخه
MOTORCYCLE	MOTOCEAKLET	موتوسیکلت
TRUCK	KAMYUN	کامیون

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WATER	AB	آب
BREAD	NAN	نان
CLOTHES	LEBAS	لباس
BLANKET	PATO	پاتو
SHOES	KAFSH	کفش
SOCKS	JORAB	جراب
HAT	KOLAH	کلاه
COAT	COAT	کوت
PANTS	SHALVAR	شلوار
OVERCOAT	PALTO	پالتو

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 US ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP  
 US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND  
 FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

194

IAGPC-OP

23 May 1980

SUBJECT: FISCAL/Man Hour Expenditures (U)

Special Operations Division  
 Room 2C840 Pentagon  
 ATTN: LTC [REDACTED]  
 Washington, DC 20310

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

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REVISED ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

1. (U) Reference phonecon between LTC [REDACTED] and LTC [REDACTED] on 20 May 80, subject: SAB.

2. (S/NOFORN) Per request, above reference, the following information is provided. Operational expenses were incurred during the period [REDACTED] 80. [REDACTED]

a. [REDACTED]

(1)	[REDACTED]	\$15,000
(2)	[REDACTED]	2,825
(3)	[REDACTED]	1,750
(4)	[REDACTED]	1,700
(5)	[REDACTED]	5,990
(6)	[REDACTED]	2,000
(7)	[REDACTED]	
		2,500

SUB TOTAL

\$31,765

b. O&MA

(1) Travel, Lodging Per Diem Expenses (Europe)	\$5,000
(2) CONUS Travel/Per Diem	<u>9,000</u>

SUB TOTAL

\$14,000

c. Total Expenditures

\$45,765

d. In addition to the above, additional expenditures are required due to the fact that [REDACTED] are continuing in CONUS. [REDACTED] is being considered for [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11, ENCL 3  
 REVIEW 23 MAY 2000

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IAGPC-OP  
SUBJECT: FISCAL/Man Hour Expenditures (U)

23 May 1980

[REDACTED] Estimated expense for the remainder of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] IS [REDACTED]

3. ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ The following is a breakout of the total manhours committed exclusively for the coordination, control, and tasking of [REDACTED]

- a. HQ INSCOM (ADCSOPS) (Approx. 5 persons) 50
- b. HQ [REDACTED]
  - (1) Operations Section - (8 persons) 321
  - (2) Collection Requirements Section (3 persons) 191SUB TOTAL (11 persons) 512
- c. [REDACTED]
  - (1) Command/Operations (2 persons) 376
  - (2) Case Officers (4 persons) 1256SUB TOTAL (6 persons) 1632
- d. Total Manhours (22 persons) 2194

FOR THE COMMANDER:

G [REDACTED]  
LTC, MI  
Operations Officer

Copy Furnished:  
ADCSOPS  
[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

198

SOW

TOR/2317067

~~BREJRCILHLDPANRQ~~  
TLMMSG NO: 0123  
DTG: 231655Z MAY 80  
FM: 1 SOW/A-2  
TO: JTF/J-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT  
REFERENCE: YOUR MSG/ DTG 221527Z MAY 80 (SAME SUBJECT)

- 1. THE BEST ESTIMATE OF INTELLIGENCE MAN HOURS EXPENDED IN SUPPORT OF THE MISSION ARE AS FOLLOWS:
  - A. 7 NOV 79 TO DEPLOYMENT DATE: 3,600 MAN HOURS (INCLUDES JTF MISSION INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AT [REDACTED])
  - B. DEPLOYMENT DATE TO 30 APR 80: 1200 MAN HOURS.
- 2. ALL FIGURES INCLUDE ESTIMATE OF [REDACTED] INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WHO WERE INVOLVED.

RVW 23 MAY 80  
BT

48

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2244).)&,/(75-

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY RPO NMCC  
 DEEL (EP-DOWN) TO CONFID  
 REVM ON OADL  
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

# DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

IAFM-OPS-HU-SA

SUBJECT

Intelligence Support

i-195

to Special Operations Div (SOD) FROM ADCSOPS-HUMINT

DATE 22 May 1980

CMT 1

JCS

USAINSCOM

LTC [redacted] 1f/7829

Pentagon

ATTN: LTC [redacted]

G

1. Per your request, the following data pertaining to subject is provided:

a. 129 intelligence reports were prepared and disseminated to your organization during the period 23 Nov 79 to 23 May 80. Approximately 1032 manhours were expended in data acquisition, transcription/assembly, and preliminary analysis of these reports

b. Courier distribution of the finished intelligence reports is estimated at 104 manhours.

c. General intelligence analysis, assembly of operational data, analyst-analyst meetings, and other operational planning activities are estimated at 160 manhours.

d. Total estimated manhour expenditure by this activity in support of your requirements is 1296 manhours.

2. Other fiscal expenditures are estimated as follows:

a. 129 cassette tapes = \$225.75.

b. Incidental technical equipment = \$4.96.

c. Facilities rental = \$153.61.

d. Mileage reimbursement for mission essential POV travel = \$310.00.

e. Total monetary expenditure is estimated at \$694.32.

3. INSCOM Action Officer is LTC [redacted] IAFM-OPS-HU-SA, AVN:923-7829/2769, CIV:(301)677-7829/2769.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The three day period of intensive support from 220600 April 80 to 250230 April 80 resulted in a dedication of approximately 236 manhours, of which 160 hrs are already included in para 1d above. Again, I stress that overall figures are on the conservative side.

Regards,

[redacted]

Classified By: JCS

Declassified ON: OAI

Declassified by:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

G

G

~~TOP SECRET~~  
WORKING PAPER  
4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NOV 77 - 30 April 80

MAN HOURS      EXCESS COST

DIA	min 35,000	H	\$6,000
DMA	14,094(?)	H	\$50,000
ARMY (crew)	25,194	H	50,000
(WAF)	1,032	H	,700
USAF (7602)	525	H	\$,000
(OSI)	79	H	~
(Poly)	120	—	\$128 (1,000)

49,884

\$165,828

~~OPERATIONAL FORCES~~

- SADD	-	6,132	-	-
- [REDACTED]	-	-	-	-
- 7 SOW	-	4,800	-	3,000
JTF	-	5,000	-	5,000

15,932

\$123,828  
126,000

50,500

A  
17,000

Classified By: ~~DDO~~ DDONmcc  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WORKING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

#201

Field 22

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION <del>TOP SECRET</del>	SOD CONTROL NUMBER
-------------	---	--------------------

SUBJECT:  Blivet Drop Concept (PS) (U)	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	COORDINATION	OTHER
			X	

**REMARKS**

- (U) (PS) The attached concepts were developed in response to verbal instructions.
- (U) (PS) Three options are outlined. They are as follows:
  - 2 Night Option
  - 3 Night Option
  - 4 Night Option

Classified By: ~~DDANmcc~~  
 Declassified ON: OADR  
 Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
 13 Aug 93

**ACTION OFFICER**  
 [Redacted]  
 COL, USA  
 SOD, J-3  
 EXT 55078

INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
J-3	P					
EXEC						
TM C/S						
VCOPE						
COPE						
DATE OF PREPARATION						
28 March 80						

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WORKING PAPER  
(Destroy when no longer needed)

I. SUBJECT: Blivet Drop Concept.

II. PURPOSE: To address the blivet drop concept.

III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. The helos must be refueled at some point along the ingress route.

B. Blivet drop specifics:

- The blivets are 500 gal collapsable fuel bladders of which approximately 450 gal can be pumped into the helicopters.
- If Delta and attachments were transported aboard helicopters from the carrier to a HLZ, a minimum of six helicopters would be required.
- A minimum of 28 blivets are required to refuel the helos at the selected refuel site.
- Six MC-130s can deliver 30 blivets, 3 M-274 (mules) and associated pumps.

C. Operational Concepts

OPTION 1:

- Delta is prepositioned on the carrier with helicopter crews.
- First night. 6 MC-130s insert 30 blivets and a four man (approx) refuel party by parachute at a remote refuel site. The refuel party will consist of Delta personnel so as not to overload the helos during the flight to Tehran. The refuel party will position the blivets,

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~~TOP SECRET~~

check the pumps and camouflage the equipment. If the refuel party reports breakage, the operation will be delayed one night and an additional paradrop conducted the next night to replace the required items.

- Second night. If there are no problems, 6 helos with Delta onboard will fly to the refuel site and conduct refueling operation. The refuel party will depart on the helos with the Delta force.

- Due to the decreasing hours of darkness, the helos will not be able to fly all the way to the original HLZ/hideout. The helos will stop at a new HLZ/hideout located approximately 1-1 1/2 hours from the original HLZ. The helos and Delta will hideout at this location until 1930 hrs. The helos will then fly to the original HLZ arriving at approximately 2100 hours. The Delta force will be met by trucks at this location and proceed immediately into Tehran to conduct the rescue. Extraction will be as originally planned at

Manzariyeh.

OPTION 2:

- E
- Delta is prepositioned on carrier.
  - MC-130s prepositioned at [REDACTED]
  - 1st Night - 6 MC-130s and C-130 (AWADS) deliver by parachute 35 fuel blivets and a refueling team (4-6 man) into a designated remote LZ along helicopter ingress

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

route. Team recovers, inspects, positions, and  
) camouflages blivets and equipment. Status report rendered.

- 2nd Night. If required, MC-130s deliver replacement blivets and equipment prior to helicopter arrival. Six helicopters with Delta aboard launch from carrier and proceed to refueling site. Helicopters refuel, recover refueling party and proceed to hide site.

~~✓~~ - 3rd Night. Helicopters depart hide site, deliver Delta to drop site and then proceed to a temporary hide site.

A Delta moves [REDACTED] to a holding area; conducts reconnaissance. Delta moves into position and assaults compound. Delta extracted from compound and stadium by helicopter and evacuated Manzariyeh air field. Manzariyeh evacuation would be as originally planned.

OPTION 3:

- Prepositioning same as Option 2 above.

- First Night. Same as Option 2 above.

- 2nd Night. Same as Option 2 above.

~~✓~~ - 3rd Night. Helicopters depart initial hide site, proceed to Delta drop off point and then enter a new hide site.

A Delta moves [REDACTED] to warehouse. Conducts coordination with in-country assets and prepares for leaders recon.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4th Night. Delta moves from hide site and assaults compound as envisioned in current plan. Compound extraction and Manzariyeh/evacuation would also be as originally planned.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS/J-3	CLASSIFICATION <del>TOP SECRET</del>	SOD CONTROL NUMBER <b>1-203</b>
SUBJECT:  Request for MC-130 Flight Across [REDACTED]	ACTION	
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE
	X	X

**REMARKS**  
 (S) The attached message requests RADM Packer to task one EUCOM C-130 to fly a survey route across [REDACTED]. The purpose of the flight is to attempt to [REDACTED]. Routing will approximate that to be flown during the rescue mission.

(U) Full requirements for mission to include routing, timing, altitudes, etc. have been passed telephonically to [REDACTED] at OTFE.

(U) Request signature on attached message. SOD will deliver to SSO Privacy Communication Office upon approval.

Point Paper on MC-130 Signature [REDACTED]

Classified By: **JCS DDO nmcc**  
 Declassified ON: **OADR**  
 Downgraded by: **DPO NMCC**  
 12 Aug 92

ACTION OFFICER	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
[REDACTED]	J-3	P				[Signature]	55078
OD, J-3	EXEC						
XT 55078	TM CHF						
	VCOPS						
	COPS						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
4 March 80							

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE		LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY		
		ACT	INFO				DATE-TIME	MONTH	YR
01 of		00			TT				MAR 80

BOOK MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: JCS  
TO: SSO USEUCOM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR RADM PACKER, EUCOM/J3 FROM LTGEN SHUTLER, JCS/J3  
SUBJ: CONFIRMATION OF REQUEST FOR ROUTE ACROSS [REDACTED] {TS}  
REF: TELECON BETWEEN RADM PACKER AND LTGEN SHUTLER

- {TS} REFERENCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN AVAILABILITY OF MC-130 AIRCRAFT TO FLY A PRESCRIBED ROUTE FROM [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED]
- {TS} REQUEST ONE MC-130 BE TASKED TO FLY FROM [REDACTED] VIA NORMAL AIRWAYS TO [REDACTED] PROPOSE THAT, IF POSSIBLE WITHIN NORMAL CLEARANCE PROCEDURES, AUTHORITY BE REQUESTED FOR THE FLIGHT TO DEVIATE FROM STANDARD AIRWAYS TO CONDUCT LOW LEVEL TRAINING DURING THE RETURN FLIGHT. FULL PARTICULARS, OBJECTIVES, ROUTING AND OTHER RELATED INFORMATION HAVE BEEN PASSED TO [REDACTED] OF SOTFE/J3.

REVW 25 MAR 80  
DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS

DISTR:

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
RELEASER	TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE		
	SIGNATURE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DATE TIME GROUP

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY		
		ACT INFO				DATE-TIME	MONTH	YR
01 OF		00		TT				MAR 87
BOOK	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS							

FROM: JCS

TO: SSO USEUCOM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR RADM PACKER, EUCOM/J3 FROM LTGEN SHUTLER, JCS/J3

SUBJ: CONFIRMATION OF REQUEST FOR ROUTE ACROSS [REDACTED] <sup>(S)</sup> ~~TOP SECRET~~

REF: TELECON BETWEEN RADM PACKER AND LTGEN SHUTLER

1. <sup>(S)</sup> ~~TOP SECRET~~ REFERENCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN AVAILABILITY OF MC-130 AIRCRAFT TO FLY A PRESCRIBED ROUTE FROM [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED]

2. <sup>(S)</sup> ~~TOP SECRET~~ REQUEST ONE MC-130 BE TASKED TO FLY FROM [REDACTED] VIA NORMAL AIRWAYS TO AND FROM [REDACTED] FULL

PARTICULARS, OBJECTIVES, ROUTING AND OTHER RELATED INFORMATION HAVE BEEN PASSED TO [REDACTED] OF SOTFE/J3. DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

DISTR:

[REDACTED] DATE		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
J-3, EXT 55078			
RELEASER	TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE		DATE TIME GROUP
	SIGNATURE		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-204

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

FROM SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

TO AMEMB [REDACTED]

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR [REDACTED]

SUBJ: C-130 USE OF [REDACTED] (U)

1. (S) TO FACILITATE SHIFT FROM [REDACTED] OF FLEET SUPPORT OPERATIONS, AS AGREED DURING RECENT NEGOTIATIONS ON ACCESS, AND TO CONDUCT TRAINING EXERCISES WITH AND SUPPORT OF TF-70,

EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO FORMALLY APPROACH GOVERNMENT OF [REDACTED] FOR USE OF [REDACTED] 18-26 APRIL. THIS ACTIVITY IS OF AN URGENT NATURE AND MUST BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD SPECIFIED IN ORDER TO MESH WITH TF 70 CHANGEOVER SCHEDULE.

2. (S) SEA SURVEILLANCE TRAINING EXERCISES/SUPPORT MISSIONS WOULD BEGIN ABOUT 18 APRIL. APPROXIMATE SCHEDULE IS FOR ONE MC-130 TO ARRIVE FROM [REDACTED] ON 18 APRIL, TWO MC-130S FROM [REDACTED] ON 20 APRIL AND THREE C-130S/ONE MC-130 FROM [REDACTED] ON 22 APRIL. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD EXPECT TO OPERATE C-130 MISSIONS FROM [REDACTED] PROVIDING SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR THESE ACTIVITIES ON 18, 22 AND 24 APRIL, AND ONE OR TWO C-141 SUPPORT MISSIONS FROM [REDACTED] ON 24 APRIL. WE ANTICIPATE NO MORE THAN EIGHT AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AT ANY ONE TIME. THIS EXERCISE IS PLANNED AT THIS TIME TO LAST ONLY A FEW DAYS. A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 100-125 PERSONNEL WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE, AND THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THEIR OWN FOOD AND BILLETING.

3. (S) FUEL REQUIREMENTS (JET A-1) FOR THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE A TOTAL OF 175,000 U.S. GALLONS. COMPENSATION FOR FUEL WILL BE PROVIDED BY AF FORM 15 WHICH CAN BE PROCESSED THROUGH THE DAO.

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

25B21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDON mcc  
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

4. ~~(S)~~ FOR PURPOSE OF THIS OPERATION WE DESIRE BLANKET DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR OPERATIONS AT [REDACTED] 18-26 APRIL WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC NOTES SUBMITTED AS PRESENTLY REQUIRED ON EACH AIRCRAFT IN ADVANCE. HOWEVER, FLIGHT DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY ICAO FLIGHT PLANS.

G 5. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED], PLUS TWO, WILL BE IN COUNTRY MISSION COORDINATOR. THEY WILL ARRIVE [REDACTED] ON 15 OR 16 APRIL AND CONTACT EMBASSY PERSONNEL PRIOR TO TRAVEL TO [REDACTED]

E 6. ~~(S)~~ REQUEST YOU APPROACH [REDACTED] GOVERNMENT AT HIGHEST LEVEL AND OBTAIN APPROVAL AS SOON AS PRACTICAL BUT NOT LATER THAN APRIL 16. ABOVE INFORMATION CAN BE RELEASED ON A CLOSE HOLD BASIS AS NECESSARY TO SECURE APPROVAL.

DECL 14 APR 86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

00 201400Z APR 68  
FM 00 JTF, SITE ALPHA  
TO 00PCOM JTF, WASH DC

0011

7/14/74  
10

~~SECRET~~

JUST LEARNED FROM LOCAL USAF BASE COMMANDER THAT THE  
LOCAL ██████████ SECURITY FORCE COMMANDER, A FIRST  
LIEUTENANT, MAY ATTEMPT TO OBSERVE EACH OF OUR ARRIVING  
AIRCRAFT LOADS WHICH ARE DUE IN TONIGHT. HE TAKES ORDERS  
ONLY FROM ██████████ HENCE HE CANNOT BE INFLUENCED BY THE  
LOCAL COMMANDER. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE GEN ██████████  
IN ██████████ TO ASK HIS HELP. HAVE LOW CONFIDENCE THAT WE  
CAN WORK THIS PROBLEM SATISFACTORY FROM HERE. PLEASE  
ASK HIGHEST LEVELS THERE TO HELP. MEANWHILE WE WILL DO  
WHAT WE CAN FROM HERE.

#  
263

Classified By: ██████████ DDONMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC

12/1/82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0310Z

JTG 152322Z APR 80  
FM: JTF/LTC [REDACTED]  
TO: SITE ALPHA/ET CCL [REDACTED]

50

~~SECRET~~  
PASS TO JOSE HOOIG,  
LT CCL [REDACTED] IS NOW SAC TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER. EFFECTIVE  
25 APR 80 LT CCL [REDACTED] WILL BECOME TTFC.  
BT

E, G

#  
i-262

NNNNJ

Classified By ~~DDO NMCC~~  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 202035E  
VC

0015

070201900Z APR 63  
FM : JTF  
TO: JCS/ RC

SUBJ: JTF SITREP NO 1 (AS OF 211800Z)

1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. JTF STAFF AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL (41 TOTAL) ARRIVED

██████████ 200032Z APR

B. HELO FORCES AND CARRIER LIAISON GROUP (63 PERSONNEL) ARRIVED ██████████ 200600Z AND NIMITZ 200515Z.

C. TWO MC-130 ARRIVED ██████████ FROM

██████████ 200810Z/0505Z.

D. TWO KC-135 TANKERS ARRIVED ██████████ 201400/1410Z.

2. JTF FORCES NOW ON STATION:

A. JTF STAFF AT ██████████

B. THREE MC-130S AT ██████████

C. EIGHT HELOS AND CROWS ON NIMITZ

D. THREE KC 135 TANKERS AT ██████████

E. FOUR KC-135 TANKERS AT ██████████

(U) 3. OPERATION PREPARATIONS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY.

(U) 4. COMMUNICATIONS:

A. ██████████ SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING NOISE BURST DURING PERIODS WHEN INSUFFICIENT POWER IS TRANSMITTED TO THIS LOCATION. THESE BURST ARE DISRUPTIVE TO SECURE VOICE AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS. ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM YOUR HQ. P. ALL CIRCUITS UP AT THIS TIME.

XXXXXVOLUTARY CORRECTION: PART 1. PARAGRAPH \*\*B\*\* CHANGE TO READ 63 PERSONNEL INI 63 PERSONNEL VICE 60 PERSONNEL.

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By ~~325~~ DDOWmcc  
Declassified ON OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

259

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT / 202005-2  
130W

0016

~~██████████~~ 258

██████████  
PRIORITY

FM: JTF NINITE (PITMAN)

E TO: JTF ██████████ (VAUGHT)

G JOC (JOC) ██████████

SUBJ: HELO DET. STAFF (U)

(U) 1. ██████████ TONIGHT'S PERSONAL RECON INDICATES HELO LAUNCH  
COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EARLY AS 1500Z (1900Z LCL)  
BASED ON ACTUAL LEVEL OF ADDRESS. ACTUAL COAST IN WILL  
BE OUT ABOUT 30 MIN AFTER LAUNCH. THIS WILL PERMIT A SLIGHTLY  
EARLIER ARRIVAL AT REFUEL POINT.

E, A 2. (S) NON-REF PINS, SERNO 107 AND 111 RETURNED TO  
██████████ TODAY VIA MAC 8-121. DOCUMENT INDICATED MARCH  
REF AS FINAL DESTINATION.

██████████  
FDSOTCUP XFX

Classified by: DDO NMCC  
Declassify on: OADR

~~Classified By: JCS~~  
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BB25  
O 210745Z APR 80  
FM SITE ALFA/J2  
TO JCS/RC-J2  
BT

TOT / 0905  
RC /

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: TGT PRIORITIES

1. COMJTF HAS REQUESTED A J2 RECOMMENDATION ON WHICH OF THE TARGET ALREADY NOMINATED SHOULD BE ATTACKED BY [REDACTED] PROTECT/ENHANCE MSN. CHOICES INCLUDE:

A

- A. [REDACTED]
- B. [REDACTED]
- C. [REDACTED]
- E. [REDACTED]
- F. [REDACTED]
- G. [REDACTED]

248

2. OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER:  
AL MAJ [REDACTED] IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION INDICATED [REDACTED] ESPECIALLY AT [REDACTED] WOULD POSE A THREAT TO [REDACTED] AND OTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA, USING THEIR OWN ON-BOARD RADAR. HE ALSO INDICATED [REDACTED]

A, B, C

[REDACTED] WHAT DO OTHER AGENCIES SAY ABOUT WHERE ALERT A/C ARE KEPT?

[REDACTED] MEANING VITAL [REDACTED] NEED TO BE [REDACTED] BEFORE [REDACTED]

3. WITH SOME OF THE ABOVE IN MIND, WOULD APPRECIATE AN RC/J2 RECOMMENDATION ON WHICH [REDACTED] AND IN WHAT ORDER (WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO FIGHTER THREAT ASSESSMENT AND HOW BEST TO NEUTRALIZE.)

A

BT  
#0325

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DESCRIPTIVE CL BY DPO NMCC  
 DECL. EX-DOWNGR TO CONFID  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources  
JS, [REDACTED]

NNNNAAAA

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 09557  
RA

#247

SSN 0027  
O 210905Z APR 88  
FM SITE ALFA/J2  
TO JCS/RC-J2

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

- E (S) SUBJECT: [REDACTED] REACTION TO US OVERFLIGHTS DURING EXECUTION PHASE.
- (S) REQUEST J2 UPDATE ON PROBABLE REACTION IF KC-135'S OR OTHER USN A/C ARE DETECTED OVER [REDACTED] IF THEY SCRAMBLE FIGHTERS AND IDENTIFY A/C AS U.S. WILL THE [REDACTED]
  - A. ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE US A/C TO LAND.
  - B. ESCORT US A/C OUT OF [REDACTED] AIRSPACE
  - C. ENGAGE IF US A/C DO NOT COMPLY WITH [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS
- E (S) IF [REDACTED] FIGHTERS CANNOT IDENTIFY OUR A/C, WILL THEY ENGAGE THEM?

BT  
#0027

NRGN  
AAK

Classified By: ~~DDO~~ DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#236

A 03052

FR JTF NIMITZ

06 SEP 1992  
06 SEP 1992 1200Z  
FM JTF  
TO 000 NIMITZ/...

A

1. DELTA HAS 87 MEN (LESS DRIVERS AND MONITORS) 270 LBS PER-MAN. 97 DELTA PLUS 2 DELTA RT019 ABOARD SHIP, 3 MONITORS, PLUS 2 RED EYE GUNNERS (FOUR WEAPONS), 5 DRIVERS, 7 [REDACTED] FOR A TOTAL OF 116 PERS. WITH THE NUMBER OF PAX WEAPONS, AND AMMO DELTA WILL WEIGH 5200 LBS PER HELO (5 HELOS). RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS 400 LBS OVER YOUR MAX. REQUEST THAT YOU REDUCE TO ONE 50 CAL AND ONE GUNNER. PUT ALL SECOND 50 CALS AND SECOND GUNNERS ON SEVENTH RH 53. IF ONLY SIX A/C MAKE REFUEL SITE THEN SECOND 50 CALS AND GUNNERS PLUS CREW FROM SEVENTH A/C WILL COME BACK VIA C-130. IF SEVEN AIRCRAFT DEPART DESERT AND ONE GOES DOWN INROUTE THEN SECOND 50 CALS WILL HAVE TO BE LEFT AT P/U SITE. IF SEVEN AIRCRAFT MAKE IT TO HIDE OUT THEN SECOND 50 CAL AND GUNNER WILL BE PUT BACK ON 6 RH-53'S
2. REQUEST THAT YOU PERSONALLY INSPECT ALL HELOS TO ENSURE NO EXTRA WEIGHT IS TAKEN.
3. DETAILED WT. AND COMPOSITION OF EACH LOAD FOR SIX RH-53'S WILL BE SENT IN APPROX 9 HOURS.
4. IF EIGHT RH-53 IS OP READY FLY IT, EMPTY LOAD, AS FAR INTO MISSION AS POSSIBLE. COL KYLE HAS ASSURED ME THAT SUFFICIENT FUEL IS ON HAND TO FUEL EIGHT HELO. DETAILS ON REFUEL FOR EIGHT HELO WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY SEP MSG. UNDERSTAND PROBABILITY OF 8 HELOS LAUNCHING IS NOT GOOD BUT TRY YOUR BEST.
5. GEN VAUGHT SENDS
- BT

NNNN

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Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

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#235

J O I 219272  
RS

SSN 0040  
DTG 211500Z APR 80  
FM JTF  
TO: JCS / RC  
~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: JTF SITREP NO 2 (AS OF 211800Z)  
1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

J-3  
H21 CofA

- A. THREE EC-130 ARRIVED [REDACTED] 202020Z, 202030Z, AND 202110Z.
- B. TWO MC 130S ARRIVED [REDACTED] 202100Z AND 210145Z.
- C. THREE C-141S W/DELTA FORCES ARRIVED [REDACTED] 210535Z, 210630Z, AND 211150Z.
- D. THREE KC-135S ARRIVED [REDACTED] 211517Z, 211523Z, AND 211633Z

E

2. JTF FORCES NOW ON STATION:

- A. JTF STAFF AT [REDACTED]
- B. THREE KC-130S AT [REDACTED]
- C. TWO MC-130S AT [REDACTED] ONE TO MOVE TO [REDACTED] ON 22 APR.
- D. THREE EC-130S AT [REDACTED] UNTIL 22 APR.
- E. EIGHT HELOS AND CREWS ON NIMITZ
- F. SIX KC-135S AT [REDACTED]
- G. FOUR KC-135S AT [REDACTED]

E

(U) 3. COMMUNICATIONS: THE SHF SYSTEM TO FT DETRICK WAS ONLY APPROX 50 PERCENT USABLE DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS. IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT IS REQUIRED TO INSURE A POSITIVE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS LINK WITH WASHINGTON.

BT

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12 Aug 92

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232

CSF  
101  
2120512  
BWS

OSL 2300Z

MSG 845

DTG: 212210Z APR 88

FM: SITE ALPHA/J2

TO: JCS/RC-J2

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

(U) 1. REF MSG 212010Z APR 88 FM HELO DET. SAG.

2. REQUEST UR VIEWS ON SOVIET VESSELS [REDACTED]

A. HOW OFTEN HAVE THEY DONE THIS IN THE PAST?

B. HOW LONG AGO WAS THE LAST INCIDENCE?

A C. SIGNIFICANCE TO [REDACTED] PLANNING IF RE-POSITIONING OFFORGES IS TAKING PLACE?

D. ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TIME FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE?

3. CONCERNING HEADNET RADAR: HOW CLOSE TO THE [REDACTED] CIP FLIGHT ROUTE MUST THE KRIVAK BE IN ORDER TO DETECT THE A/C FLYING AT 502' AGL AND BELOW?

(U) 4. PERHAPS WE CAN ADD THIS TO THE "CRY WOLF" LIST.

(U) 5. NO OFFENSE INTENDED ON S-TRAM COVERAGE FONECON. JUST ANTICIPATING AS YOU RECOMMENDED.

BT

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12 Aug 92

209152

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL  DOWNGR TO COME

KEYW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Smear

[REDACTED] JS

NNNN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

228

TOT/0713

E KC

[REDACTED]

RELAY TO Nim

TO: [REDACTED]  
FROM: [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

E, G

1. RPT FX USS NIMITZ THAT [REDACTED] LAST LOG 01 02W/002 10E  
ON COURSE 190 DEG AT 17 00N [REDACTED]

C

2. KATYUK HUNTERS HEAD OFF [REDACTED] AND COULD POSE THREAT  
TO [REDACTED] FLT CRMS.

C, E

3. FURTHER DETAILS ON LOG [REDACTED] WILL BE [REDACTED] NIMITZ.  
ADDITIONAL INFO ON UNIPAC [REDACTED] [REDACTED] FORTHCOMING.

G

Adel.

BT

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MESSAGE 24 RECEIVER.

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TOT 1355Z  
JPH  
#218

M  
MSG 067  
DTG 221245Z  
FM: CDRJTF SITE ALPHA  
TO: JTF/RC SDD

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SENATIVE LETTERS

(U) REFERENCE HY 220915Z APR 83

E, G

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR [REDACTED] FOLLOW. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED [REDACTED] IS TDY EUCOM FOR A SECURITY ASSISTANCE MEETING. ESTIMATED TO RETURN [REDACTED] LATE FRIDAY OR SATURDAY.

E, G

COL [REDACTED] IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO [REDACTED] EVENING OF 23 APR. HE OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT AWARE OF [REDACTED] SCHEDULE.

E, G

THIS REQUIRES ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON TWO COUNTS. FIRST, WE SHOULD CONSIDER TASKING [REDACTED] TO BRIEF A TRUSTED AGENT WHO WOULD BE AT [REDACTED] MAC CREWS SHOULD HAVE A CONTACT FOR BRIEFINGS AND ASSISTANCE. SECOND CONSIDERATION: IF [REDACTED] TRAVELS TO [REDACTED] WE WOULD NOT HAVE SECURE VOICE INTO [REDACTED] NOR WOULD WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO INFORM [REDACTED] MILITARY THAT AN EXERCISE IS ABOUT TO KICK OFF OR UNDERWAY.

E

GAST PROVIDED GEN SHUTLER WITH THOUGHTS ON ADVISING [REDACTED] YOU MAY WISH TO DWAN ON THEM.

E, G

THERE ARE SEVERAL OPTIONS. RECOMMEND THAT [REDACTED] BRIEF TRUSTED AGENT ENOUGH ON IMPORTANCE OF DELIVERY OF LETTER TO [REDACTED] ONLY. [REDACTED] REMAINS AT [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] RETURNS ON 24 APR. [REDACTED] VALUE [REDACTED] MATURITY BUT WOULD BE COMFORTABLE WITH [REDACTED] ON SCENE. IF IT IS TOO TOUGH TO GET [REDACTED] BACK, BURNIE SHOULD BRIEF TRUSTED AGENT AT [REDACTED] ALL TRUSTED AGENTS SHOULD BE MILITARY. GAST SENDS

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12 Aug 92

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TO TC | 14045

GRK

#217

SSN 0068  
O 221330Z APR 58  
FM CHDR JTF SITE ALPHA  
TO JTF/HC SOD  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] DEFENSE RADARS

E, G

1. ON 28 APR 58 COL [REDACTED] AF SECTION [REDACTED] ADVISED LT COLS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] OF USAF AIR DEFENSE STUDY FOR [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED] PLANNED TO REVIEW STUDY AND FORWARD RECOMMENDATIONS IF APPROPRIATE. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST.

BT  
#0266

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12 AUG 92

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#  
E-210

E

E

(U) [REDACTED] APPROXIMATELY [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] FULL [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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12 Aug 92

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MSG 333  
DTG 222200Z APR 88  
FM: SITE ALPHA/JEP CDR JTF  
TO: NMITZ  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: COORDINATION DATA (U)  
REF: TELECON PITTMAN AND GAST

#209

0125

(U) 1. OVER THE WALL TIME IS PLANNED FOR 2100Z.

2. **DELTA** PLANS TO CALL AT 2020Z. THIS CALL WILL PROVIDE LATEST ESTIMATE FOR OVER THE WALL TIME. (ASSUMING MISSION IS A GO).

(U) 3. HELOS SHOULD BE IN POSITION FOR PICKUP PLUS 15 MINUTES AFTER ESTIMATED OVER THE WALL TIME.

4. IF HELOS DO NOT HEAR A CALL FROM **DELTA**, ASSUME RADIO PROBLEMS AND PLANNED OVER THE WALL TIME OF 2100Z. HELOS SHOULD LAUNCH IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO BE IN POSITION FOR FIRST PICKUP AT 2115Z.

~~TOP SECRET~~

BT

NNNN

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Declassified ONI OADR

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DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92

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0135

#207

J-2

G

SSN 0101  
DTG 222355Z APR 80  
FM: JTF MAIN: CCL [REDACTED]  
TO: USS NIMITZ/COL [REDACTED]  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUEJ: TACAIR CAP SUPPORT (S)

REF 1 (U) USS NIMITZ 221425Z APR 80  
REF 2 (U) CINCPAC SUBJ TACAIR CAP SUPPORT (U)

1. (U) REF 1 NIGHT ONE REFUELING SUPPORT  
REQUEST FOR AIR CAP SUPPORT, A KC-135  
AIR REFUELABLE TANKER (ART) REFUELED BY TWO (2)  
KC135A AIRCRAFT CAN PROVIDE A FOUR (4)  
HOUR LOITER PERIOD OVER 2420N 58E OFFLOADING  
32K LBS. REF 2 LIST 1930-2330Z AS  
THE MOST CRITICAL TIME PERIOD. ANY POSITION  
NORTH OF THE ARCP NEAR THE END OF THE LOITER  
PERIOD WOULD REDUCE OFFLOAD/LOITER.  
THIS SUPPORT PLUS PREVIOUS JTF MISSION TASKING  
UTILIZES ALL TANKER ASSETS AT [REDACTED]  
AND DOES NOT ALLOW FOR MECHANICAL  
FAILURES.

E

2. (U) FYI: FOUR KC-135'S WILL TRANSIT YOUR  
AREA ENROUTE TO ARCP AT 2300N 5833E.

FOR C-130 REFUELING SUPPORT. TWO KC-135'S WILL  
BE ON STATION 2215-2315Z WITH TWO MORE  
2315-0020. AIR REFUELING FREQUENCY IS 321.6 SECURE.

3. (U) NIGHT 2 REF MSG PARA 6 ADDRESSED  
BY SEPARATE MSG.  
BT

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12 Aug 92

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#  
L-205

101 / 230555Z  
Baw / ~~SSA~~

QSL 230555Z

Copy to  
J-2

MSC 100  
UTC 230515Z APR 67  
FM SITE ALPHA/J2  
TO JCS/J2  
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: TEHRAN STREET RENOVATION.

RPTS HAVE SHOWN CONSIDERABLE TURMOIL SINCE THE HELIPAD ON AND AROUND  
CAMPUS OF TEHRAN UNIV. DLS PROVIDE NO EST OF EFFECT THESE  
DEMONSTRATIONS MAY HAVE, IF ANY, ON PLANS TO APPROACH MATSAP'LT MCA  
AND CHEASSY.

~~SECRET~~

BT

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DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

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2-268

TOR/230/138  
CS

MCN  
101

copy 2

CLASSIFIED

MSG #72  
DTG 222325Z APR 88  
FM: JCS/RCS  
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2  
INFO: SFOD/S2  
1 SOW/A2

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: THREAT REVIEW  
SITE ALPHA/J2 PASS TO COMJTF

CLASSIFIED

- 1. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS COPY OF MEMO PROVIDED TO CJCS ON 22 APR 88.
- 2. THE FOLLOWING COMPRISES THE JTF J-2 ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO RICE BOWL POSED BY SOVIET, IRANIAN, AND OTHER MIDEAST NATIONS' RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE SCAPABILITIES. THE ASSESSMENT IS DIVIDED BY COUNTRY AND COLLECTION MEANS.

3. SOVIET CAPABILITIES.

A. PHOTO

1. SATELLITE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE:

[REDACTED]

2. AIRCRAFT PHOTO/VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE: THE SOVIETS PRESENTLY HAVE FOUR IL-38 MAY RECON AIRCRAFT IN PROXIMITY TO THE RICE BOWL AREA OF OPERATIONS. TWO OF THESE ARE AT ADEN AND TWO ARE AT ASMARA. THE IL-38'S PRIMARY MISSION IS MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND ASW.

[REDACTED] THE MAY HAS AN OPERATING RADIUS OF 1400 NM.

3. SOVIET COVERAGE OF [REDACTED] AND THE HELO HIDE SITE WOULD HAVE TO BE PROVIDED BY SATELLITE. COVERAGE OF [REDACTED] COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EITHER SATELLITE OR AIRCRAFT. WE PROJECT [REDACTED] REACTION TIME FOR SUCH COVERAGE IS THE SOVIETS RECEIVE INDICATIONS OF INCREASED



~~TOP SECRET~~

IRANIAN DETECTION/SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES.

A. IRANIAN PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE: IRAN HAS A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PHOTOGRAPH OR VISUALLY RECONOITER US NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE PERSIAN GULF OR NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA UTILIZING P-3 AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONALLY, IRANIAN F-4S AND C-132S HAVE SOME VISUAL RECON CAPACITY. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY THREAT TO SECURITY OF RICE BOWL FROM ANY OF THESE PLATFORMS IS NEGLIGIBLE.

B. AURAL DETECTION: WE BELIEVE THAT THE GREATEST DANGER OF DETECTION FOR BOTH THE HELICOPTER AND FIXED-WING ELEMENTS OPERATING IN IRANIAN AIRSPACE ON NIGHT #1 IS POSED BY GENDARMERIE POSTS. THESE POSTS (USUALLY CONSISTING OF 6-10 MEN) ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ALONG MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. MISSION PLANNING HAS TAKEN THEIR LOCATIONS INTO ACCOUNT AND FLIGHT ROUTES ARE DESIGNED TO AVOID ALL KNOWN POSTS.

CLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

C. VISUAL DETECTION: DESPITE FLIGHT ROUTES WHICH AVOID POPULATED AREAS, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE SEEN BY MOTORISTS OR NOMADS. THE LATTER, LACKING COMMUNICATIONS, CAN BE DISCOUNTED AS A WARNING SOURCE. CRITICAL AREAS FOR VISUAL DETECTION ARE THE GULF COASTAL REGION, THE REFUELING SITE, AND THE TRANSFER POINT/HELO SHIDE AREA. WE ASSESS THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION AT MANY OF THESE LOCATIONS AS LOW-MODERATE. WHETHER A TRUCK DRIVER WOULD BOTHER TO REPORT SIGHTING AIRCRAFT [REDACTED] TO SOME OFFICIAL ENTITY OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS PROBLEMATICAL.

D. SAC PENETRATION ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL GENERIC LOW LEVEL ROUTES INDICATED LOW PROBABILITY OF DETECTION/INTERCEPTION ON ALL THE INBOUND LEGS AND ONLY A SLIGHTLY HIGHLY POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION/INIERCEPTION ON THE EGRESS ROUIES. SAC TEAM PREPARED STUDY FOR MC130 AT 500 FEET, AND STATED PROBABILITIES WOULD INCREASE IF C141 OPERATING AT HIGHER ALTITUDES (1,500-2,000 FEET) WAS USED. HOWEVER THE PROBABILITIES WOULD STILL BE ON THE LOW END OF THE SPECTRUM IF ROUTE PLANNING TOOL ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE TERRAIN AIR DEFENSE NETWORK WAS NOT ON HIGH/ACTIVE ALERT POSTURE.

4. REVIEW OF INCOUNTRY TACTICAL PHASES IS UNDER PREPARATION WILL FORWARD UPON COMPLETION.

BT

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., and the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

286

22  
TOR / 2130Z  
JB / MCN 089  
Bretsch / 001523A

0 222345Z APR 88

FM NIMITZ/PITMAN  
TO JTF/VAUGHT

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: STATUS (U)

A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220945Z APR 88  
1. PLEASE CORRECT REF A. PARA 3, LINE 7 TO READ - ONLY 200  
RDS AMMO VCR SUP WITH ADDITIONAL AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND...  
REVW: 21 APR 88  
BT

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOR/2325  
JB/meng 2

(C) 0 221745Z APR 80  
FM [REDACTED]  
TO JC37300  
JTF/ LTG GAST

BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJ: SITRLP #6

(1.) [REDACTED] COMMANDER, [REDACTED] WILL ARRIVE [REDACTED] 23 0743Z APR. 80  
HE HAS ASKED TO MEET WITH LT/COL. [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]  
AND WILL PRESUMABLY ASK TO VISIT CAMP SITE AND  
TOUR AN AIRCRAFT.

①-280

(2.) WE PLAN TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST  
SUPPORT FOR DELIVERY OF SENSITIVE LETTER  
TO U.S. AMBASSADOR IN [REDACTED] UP COMING  
MUSLIM WEEKEND, [REDACTED] WEEKENDS STANDDOWN, [REDACTED]  
WEEKEND STANDDOWN, AND LACK OF SECURE COMM.  
BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] MAKE  
IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE USE THIS OPPORTUNITY  
TO BROACH THE SUBJECT WITH [REDACTED].

(3.) WE PROPOSE TO INFORM [REDACTED]  
THAT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO  
[REDACTED] ON 29 APR. TO PROVIDE U.S. AMBASSADOR  
WITH A DETAILED INTERIM REPORT ON SEA SURVEILLANCE  
ACTIVITIES TO DATE AND THAT [REDACTED] SUPPORT IS  
REQUESTED.

(4.) WILL INFORM YOU OF RESULTS OF MEETING WITH  
BENNETT AS SOON AS COMPLETED.

(5.) REMAINING EC-130 AND MC-130 AIRCRAFT ARRIVED BET-  
WEEN 1145Z AND 1230Z. ALL AIRCRAFT NOW IN PLACE.  
BT

NNNN

Classified By [REDACTED] DDONMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 72

DDRFHCYIHRV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RSCB76  
DTG: 230015Z APR 68

TOP SECRET  
RS | MCN 099

FM: JCS/RC-J2  
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: C-130 ACTIVITY TAPES

G

1. COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF, WILL DEPART CONUS 23 APRIL FOR ALPHA VIA RAMSTEIN. COLONEL [REDACTED] HAS IN HIS POSSESSION: MAGNETIC TAPES CONTAINING VOICE, C-130 AIR COMMUNICATIONS; A TAPE RECORDER; AND COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS CARDS REQUESTED BY YOUR SITE.

copy to

2. HIS ITINERARY:

ETD DOVER - 230500Z

ETA RAMSTEIN - 231330Z

ETD RAMSTEIN - 240515Z

ETA ALPHA - 241045Z.

#274

5-2

G

3. COLONEL [REDACTED] IS TOP SECRET SIXTK CLEARED AND HAS EXTENSIVE SIGINT EXPERIENCE.  
BT

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DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92



FM: JIF/RC  
TO: JIF COR/SITE ALPHA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

OR | E, R  
RS | 0201  
MCN 098

SUBJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS  
REF: YOUR 222345Z APR 68

E, G

(\*) 1. UNDERSTAND YOUR NEED TO HAVE AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF LETTERS  
ASAP. GEN PUSTAY INFORMED FIRST CHANCE YOU HAVE TO GIVE GEN. [REDACTED]  
LETTER IS 230730Z.

Copy to  
G Col [REDACTED]

(U) 2. AUTHORITY FOR YOU TO RELEASE LETTERS TO DESIGNATED US MILITARY  
OFFICERS HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN OBTAINED YLT.

E, G  
C

(\*) 3. AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR GEN. [REDACTED] GEN. [REDACTED]  
AND COL. [REDACTED] EXPECTED AT 231600Z AFTER AN SCC MEETING. CURRENT  
PLAN IS TO SEND THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO YOUR LOCATION AT THE TIME  
AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE IS APPROVED. AT THAT SAME TIME [REDACTED]  
COMMUNICATIONS SITES WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO FACILITATE  
NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATED MILITARY OFFICERS SO THEY CAN  
ACCOMPLISH FINAL RELEASE OF LETTERS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE AMERICAN  
AMBASSADORS. WHEN THAT AUTHORITY HAS BEEN OBTAINED.  
BT

#272  
L-272

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12 Aug 72

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WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DATA AS AVAILABLE

12. SOVIET PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT MOSCOW HAS ALREADY  
BEGUN EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT A POSSIBLE US BLOCKADE OF IRAN. AN  
ARTICLE IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "MOSCOW NEWS WEEKLY" SAID CARGO  
FROM WEST EUROPE IS POURING INTO IRAN, AND THAT TRANSIT OF IRANIAN  
IMPORTS VIA SOVIET TERRITORY IS OF "VITAL IMPORTANCE TO IRAN  
BECAUSE OF A THREATENED US ECONOMIC BLOCKADE."

A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE TO THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA

[REDACTED]

THEIR WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN.

0. DEHALAK [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15. SATELLITE OVERVIEW: AS OF 2100Z FRIDAY (18 APRIL)

[REDACTED]

Classified by JCS  
Declassified on: OADR

NR001

TOP SECRET

303

FH NIMITZ/COI  
TO JTF/J3

REF JTF/J3 2014052 APR 88

SUBJECT - FLEET TANKER SUPPORT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. REF REQUESTOR TX-70 KC-135 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY 1: WHEN CALLED FOR BY  
CJTFF PILOTS, TF-70 CAN PROVIDE 2-3 REFUELING OVER HORIZON  
(HORST SADE) ARRIVING AT 1 PLUG 50 FOR 2 PLUG 45 (OVER FLIGHT  
AT 1150 2 ROCKY, 2 AIM-9, 1000 KG BOMB PER AIRCRAFT) USING  
ONLY FLEET REFUELING ASSETS AND 1 SET OF EXHAUST  
TANKER FROM A 5 MIN. SHORT ALERT POSTURE. SUFFICIENT COVERAGE  
MUST BE SUPPORTED BY KC-135'S. REFUELING FOLLOWING DISPOSITION  
KC-135'S IF ONLY 5 KC-135 ARTS AVAILABLE:

TARGET WORD  
"JUSTI SONING"

2 ARTS, 2 ALFA (STRIP ALERT/ARTS) CASSET  
FROM COMBINATION OF 20 WING OR 20 MESSINS IN CASUALTY FORM, BUT  
WILL IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH A CASSET STRIP ARTS AND COMBINATION  
ALFA TANKER FOR TANKER REFUELING. TANKER TO  
24-400. TANKER TO BE AVAILABLE  
REFUELING TANKER SHOULD BE AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 HRS  
COSTS OF TANKERS WILL LAUNCH AS NEEDED AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 HRS.  
TF-70 CAN MAINTAIN AIR ASSETS TO COVER EMERGENCY  
SITUATIONS AS WELL AS TANKERS SHOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE TO  
PROVIDE IN-TARGET COUNTRY AIRCRAFT WITH FUEL IN EMERGENCY  
VICINITY OF GROUND TARGETS. TANKER SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY TF-70'S  
TANKER SUPPORT COULD ALSO BE PROVIDED BY NATIONALLY OWNED  
KC-135'S FROM [REDACTED] AT INTERVALS DURING AVAILABLE  
RELIABILITY PERIODS, WHILE MAINTAINING THE TANKER'S HIGH-ALTITUDE  
ESTABLISHED.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY TWO: TF-70 WILL PROVIDE FOUR F-14  
AIRCRAFT TO CAP PLANNED EXFILTRATION ROUTE FROM AN  
LAUNCH POINT IN VICINITY OF 20-14N 106-45E. KC-135 TANKERS WILL  
LAUNCH NATIONALLY (INTERVAL DURING IN-TARGET AREA) FROM  
[REDACTED] TO ARRIVE OVER TF-70 AT PLANNED ARRIVAL TIME. IF  
ARTS AVAILABLE, 3 HOURS INTO HOSTILE SITUATION WILL BE LAUNCH  
ARTS 1.5 HOURS OF ORBIT PLUG 50, 1.5 PLUG 45, 1.5 PLUG 40  
CAPABILITY. (FOUR F-14'S REQUIRE 45000 LBS FOR 3 HOURS LOITER).  
KC-135(S) ARRIVE VICINITY OF NIMITZ F-14'S WILL LAUNCH, JOIN  
AND COVER THEM TO ABOVE MENTIONED ORBIT POINT. TANKER CAPABILITY  
CAPABILITY CAN BE INCREASED BY [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED].

3. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING COMMON REFERENCE POINTS TO BE USED BY  
IN-TARGET COUNTRY FOR REFUELING TO FACILITATE LITR OPS:

- 1. CAP ALFA (REFUEL POINT) 30-40N 106-45E
- 2. CAP ALFA (HELD HIDE) 20-14N 106-45E
- 3. CAP CHARLE (MARCH) 20-34N 106-45E
- 4. CAP DELIA (COMBATO) 30-40N 106-45E
- 5. CAP FONG (MANNAN) 24-30N 106-45E
- 6. CAP FORTACT (KHARIDA) 30-27N 106-45E
- 7. CAP HOLE (MARAJ) 20-14N 106-45E
- 8. CAP HOTEL (MANNAN) 24-30N 106-45E

GROUND TARGETS WILL BE COORDINATED PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION.  
(PRIMARY) 24-30N 106-45E (SECONDARY) 20-14N 106-45E  
GROUND TARGET SHOULD HAVE 5000 KG AIRCRAFT MANNING LEVELS.

ALL OPS WILL BE COORDINATED PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION.  
6. AIRCRAFT IF RANGE OF ACTION IS SUBSTANTIAL, TF-70 WILL SUPPORT FROM  
GROUND FORCES IS LIMITED WITHOUT KC-135 AIR REFUELING SUPPORT.  
MINIMUM FUEL RECOVERIES INTO [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED]  
SUFFICE POTENTIAL. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AN AIR REFUEL TARGETING  
SIGNATURE WHICH MUST BE OBSERVED (1 MESSINS-100)

AND CAN BE USED AS COVER TO DISCREETLY REPOSITION TANKER AT  
ALTITUDE DURING PERIODS OF VULNERABILITY. NECESSARY MINIMUM MESSINS  
ASSETS (A-6'S, KA-50'S) REMAIN DEDICATED THROUGHOUT. ALL  
TF-70 TANKER PILOTS ARE NOW QUALIFIED IN KC-135 REFUELING.

ANNEX WITHDRAWAL ALTITUDE OF OPERATION 1-141' MSL. KC-135'S FROM  
TARGET COUNTRY ON DAY ONE IS A CONTINGENCY MEASURE. BY  
THE F-14 CAP 1 CONSIDERED A PRUDENT ENHANCEMENT FOR MISSION  
SUCCESS.  
VERY RESPECTFULLY [REDACTED]

Classified By [REDACTED] DDO NMC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92



~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

TOT / 0710Z  
KCL

#  
i-313

EG

SSN 0052  
O 220600Z APR 80  
FM ALPHA/12  
TO [REDACTED]  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION  
FOLL IS ANTICIPATED RECON/SURV COVERAGE  
DURING PERIOD 200400/000001 TO 240400/240000  
FOR UR LOG:

[REDACTED]

0052

~~Classified By [REDACTED] DDONMCC  
Declassified On [REDACTED] OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12356  
REVIEWED BY [REDACTED]  
REVIEWED BY DDONMCC  
EFFECTIVE DATE 12 AUG 92  
REVIEWED BY OADR  
REVIEWED FROM Multiple Sources

FH/JCS/ROA/12  
TO: SITH ALPHA/33  
1. SON/AZ  
11/89/52

~~SECRET~~  
(317)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SATRAM EXTENSION

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE  
COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 200401/200401 TO 200401/240000

*1/E*  
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 72

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DEGRADATIVE BY: DDA/NMCC  
 DECLASSIFIED TO: Secret  
BY: OADR  
DERIVED FROM: Multiple  
SMMs  
DIA

2003010 APR 80  
FM WALNUT  
TO BUCKHUNTER/MAJ  
BT

351

SUBJ: SITREP NUMBER 1  
COMMUNICATION CENTER IS OPERATING ON COMMERCIAL POWER WITH GENERATORS  
AS BACK UP.

EQUIPMENT STATUS

- 2 GENERATOR GREEN
- 1 GENERATOR AMBER. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT REPAIRED TODAY. TWO OF THEM HAD WATER AND SAND IN FULL CYCLE.
- 1 TT-75 AMBER. KEY BOARD NEEDS REPLACING.
- 1 UGC-120 GREEN
- 1 WSC-3 GREEN
- 1 KW-7 GREEN
- 2 TH-22'S GREEN.

ALL OTHER ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED.

- 1, TT-75 KEYBOARD
- 1 THREE MAN TENT WITH POLES AND METAL STAKES
- 3-RATIONS FOR THREE MEN TO LAST AT LEAST 12 DAYS.

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS NEEDED.

- SOFT DRINKS, ICE IF POSSIBLE, COLEMAN STOVE OR HOT PLATE AND
  - SOME JUNK FOOD.
- MORAL IS GOOD THIS FAR. THANKS FOR ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE US "T"

NNNN

Classified ~~TOP SECRET~~  
Declassified ON: ~~QADR~~

Declassified by:  
DDO. NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
@H/Keyle

TOR-12002  
KCL 2

INTERCOMMUNICATIONS AND IMMEDIATE MESSAGES

210100Z APR 68  
FM JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)  
TO JTF [REDACTED] (VAULT)  
BT

E

[REDACTED] T//COMINT DO NOT PASS ON INTEL BROADCAST  
INFO: ARRIVAL REPORT [REDACTED] (U)

E

[REDACTED] PARTY OF SIXTY THREE ARRIVED [REDACTED] 200000Z AND NIMITZ  
ARRIVED.

MCN

013

350

E, G

1. [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED] ONE OF THE DUTY WORKING PARTY PROVIDING  
SUPPORT DURING 0-141 LAYOVER WAS MEMBER OF HM-18 AND RECOGNIZED  
HM-18 MEMBERS IN OUR PARTY. OSD [REDACTED] THE  
HM-18 SAILOR INVOLVED, WAS THEN TAKEN TO NIMITZ WITH THIS PARTY.  
OSTENSIBLY, HE WAS TO ESCORT SPECIAL DELIVERY LIGHT CARGO TO HIS  
SHIP. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY ANNAK THAT SOMETHING WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE  
HE WORE HIS OUNG, [REDACTED] FROM HM-18 TO TELL HIM WHO HE'D SEEN.  
LT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN CAUTIONED, AND TOLD THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE ESCORTING  
HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE NIMITZ. AN USUAL REACTION EXPECTED  
WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR.

(U) 2. [REDACTED] REQUEST LATEST DATA ON LC-100 FULL OFF LOAD CAPABILITY  
USING 6000 GALLON SYSTEM. LAST REPORT INDICATED 500 GALLONS  
UNUSABLE. -

(U) 3. [REDACTED] CURRENT HELD STATUS GIVEN OUT OF EIGHT MISSION CAPABLE  
(HM-18 REPORT).

(U) 4. [REDACTED] REQUEST PROVIDE DAILY SURFACE TO 2000 FT WINDS FORECAST  
FOR TRACK, TEMPERATURE AND DENSITY ALTITUDE PREDICTIONS ON THE  
SURFACE AT LAND AND TAKE-OFF TIMES FOR SHIP, DESERT TRACK, HIDE  
AND CITY.

(U) 5. [REDACTED] REQUEST HELD LOADS BY AIRCRAFT 1 THROUGH 6. NUMBER OF PAX,  
THEIR WEIGHT (WITH GEAR), CARGO WT AND ITS DESCRIPTION.

(U) 6. CINCPAC LNO HAS DISCUSSED WITH TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER  
RE: OPTIONS FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT REFUELING. 20 FLEET AIRCRAFT  
(F-14, RA-66) COMPLETED LAST NIGHT, EXPECT AS MANY MORE TONIGHT.  
ALL TRAINING DONE WITH OBSERVANCE OF SECURE VOICE.

BT

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~ DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

348

0000001174), 10,74933)12311#-777

TOR | 1451 Z  
KCL

Relay to [Signature]

P 201225Z  
FM [Redacted]  
TO JTF  
BT  
JCS/SOD(TYGEN GAST)

MCN

TOT | 017  
RC | 1530 Z

SUBJ: [Redacted] SITREP #2  
1. SECURITY ON AND AROUND THE AIRBASE IS NO PROBLEM, HOWEVER OUR PRESENCE HAS BECOME COMMON KNOWLEDGE ON THE [Redacted]  
2. SCULP 52 AND GORL 93 (MC-130'S) ARRIVED ON 26 APRIL AT 2530Z AND 0810Z RESPECTIVELY. JST 12 GROUND ABORTED ITS MORNING MISSION FOR IGNITION EXCITER AND INS PROBLEMS. EXPECT TO HAVE IT FIXED TODAY. FLEW ONE SEA SURVEILLANCE MISSION TAKEOFF 201200Z APR 82 AND ETR 201500Z APR 82.  
3. FUEL COSTS TRANSMITTED IN SITREP #1 SHOULD READ APPROXIMATELY ONE DOLLAR AND FIFTY CENTS PER GALLON.  
4. IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO ORDER AN ADDITIONAL 88 AIR MATTRESSES SINCE MOST COMING OUT OF PACAF HAD HOLES IN THEM. IN ADDITION, REQUESTS HAVE BEEN PASSED TO LOGCOM VIA THE JTF FOR ADDITIONAL STORES: ELECTRICAL CORD, TOILET CHEMICALS, TRASH BAGS, PORTABLE SHOWERS ETC.

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDDNMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21  
0529  
VC/ 125  
055

C-338

E

JIF  
SUB/COM (ALTS EAST)

E

BE ADVISED THAT

GROUP WILL BE LEADED BY

WE ARE ALSO INFORMED THAT

WILL ACCOMPANY THE GROUP AS WELL AS SEVERAL

REPORTERS.

E

WERE ADVISED LAST EVENING BY JIF CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF  
AIRFIELD FOR C-141 OPERATIONS. APPARENTLY MAC IS RELUCTANT TO  
USE THE FIELD WITHOUT FIRST CONDUCTING AN OFFICIAL MAC SURVEY. SUCH A  
SURVEY DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY AT THIS TIME NOR WOULD IT BE POLITICALLY  
PRUDENT SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO OVERLOAD THE SYSTEM WITH ANOTHER SHORT  
NOTICE DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE REQUEST. BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACILITY  
AND THE JUDGEMENT OF FORMER C-141 CREWMEMBERS WHO ARE WITH THE HC-130  
DETACHMENT, THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN USING THE MAIN RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF  
AND LANDING AND THE PARAPACK AIRSTRIP FOR TAXI AND OFFLOAD. THE DIRT  
RUNWAY IS COMPOSED OF A TOP LAYER OF TWO INCHES OF COMPACTED SAND AND  
GRAVEL OVER A BEDROCK BASE. FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON AIRFIELD,  
OPERATORS SHOULD REFER TO THE TECHNICAL FACILITIES REPORT, FEBRUARY  
1967, REFERENCE IN REPORT TO THE RUNWAY BEING C-130 CAPABLE HAS BASED ON  
CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS, LAUNCH AND TAKEOFFS OF C-130 AIRCRAFT.

C  
E

Classified By ~~DDO~~ DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

BDALYKSELQXIAINSEJENH 89 37-

010011 7:25J 0745/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 0758Z  
KCL |

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

MCN  
036

#337

0758Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOXFIRE

O 210511Z APR 80  
FM HELO DET/SZ  
TO SITE ALFA/JTF J-2  
BT

(u)

~~SECRET - THIS MESSAGE IS NOT TO BE RELEASED OVER AIRTEL BROADCAST~~

SUBJ: PRDG REP 01  
1. HELO INTEL NODE OPERATIONAL AS OF 20 APR 80. MSN PLANNING  
PROCEEDING IN DEDICATED SPACES.  
2. YOUR AIR SUMMARY IN ABBREVIATED FORMAT IS SAT FOR OUR  
PURPOSES.  
3. WE ARE WAITING FIRST WX. REQ EXPEDITE TRANSMISSION.  
4. ANY POSSIBILITY OF GETTING US DMA MFA GRID?  
REVW: 21APR80  
BT

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 1136ZV  
KCL

# 334

MCN  
038

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

E [REDACTED] P 211177Z APR 82  
FM [REDACTED]  
TO JCS/305 (LTS GAST)  
BT

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP #4  
REF SITREP #3 DTG 210550Z APR 82

E 1. REF DISCUSSED 24 APR VIP VISIT TO [REDACTED] WITH [REDACTED] OPERATIONS OFFICER  
HE ASSURED US THAT IT IS [REDACTED] DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW NEWSMEN TO ACCOMPANY  
VIPS. EXPECT THE VISIT TO BE ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL.

NNNN

Classified By: ~~708~~ DDD NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDD NMCC  
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



332

TOR / 12382  
RC  
MCN ✓  
Ø41

MESSAGE 63 RECEIVED.

1236Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOXFIRE

O 211145Z APR 84  
FM CTF 78  
TO JCS  
BT

~~REVIEW 20 APR 84~~  
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL channels.  
SUBJ: KR-030 SITREP 211145Z APR (U)  
1. SEVEN ACFT IN FULL UP STATUS. EIGHTH ACFT UP  
FOR POST MAINTENANCE TEST FLIGHT.  
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 74 RECEIVED.

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~


MSG #37  
UTC 211423Z APR 80  
FM JCS/RC-J-2  
TO: SITE ALPHA  
SF00/SZ  
1-30W/SZ

#328 (TOP) 1754  
JPH C

MCN  
046-

SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE  
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 222400/224000Z  
TO 240400/240000Z



CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDonmcc  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO Secret  
REVISED ON OADR  
REMOVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO DMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG 034  
DTG 212015Z APR 60  
FM: JTF RC  
TO ALPHA

*325*

*YDR 1212/522*  
*CT MCN51*  
*copy to*

~~SECRET~~

REF: A. YOUR MSG DTG 211036Z AP 80 SUBJ: LOG SUPPORT UPDATE

B. MSG (KYLE) DTG 211035Z AP 80 SUBJ: LOG SUPPORT

C. MSG THIS HQ DTG 211245Z AP 80 SUBJ: RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS.

1. REF A ESTABLISHED MOVEMENT PRIORITIES FOR REMAINING GEAR IN EUCOM ACKNOWLEDGED AND SAID THAT EQUIPMENT SHOULD ARRIVE YOUR LOCATION APPROXIMATELY 221300Z AP. PER PARA 2 YOURS, WE CONSIDER YOUR MA-3 AC RONT IS FILLED.

2. REF B ROSTO ADDITIONAL PARTS FOR [REDACTED] RECEIVED REF C AND B AND IS WORKING TO FILL. INDICATIONS ARE THAT PARTS WILL DEPART COMIS TOMORROW.

3. RADAR PARTS WILL DEPART [REDACTED] 220400L AP 80.

4. THIS HQ INFORMED [REDACTED] THAT ENGINE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ALONG WITH [REDACTED] [REDACTED] LINES CLOSED [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PLEASE INFORM IF THIS IS NOT SO.

5. MAINTAIN A SENSE OF HUMOR.  
BT

*E*  
*A*  
*A*

*Classified by DDM/mcc*  
*Declassify on: OADR*  
*Declassified by [signature]*  
*Downgraded by:*  
*DDG/mcc*  
*15 Aug 92*

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

012010Z  
FM: HLLD DET/S-21)  
53 517J-2  
SCEJF INTREP 22

~~SECRET~~

C

TOP/2/11  
JB/mcu

1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY INDICATIONS OF  
BY ARABIAN SEA PLATFORMS.

KRIVAK 693 HAS DEPARTED CTF 73 MCDLOG. KRIVAK LAST  
LOCATED VIC 21 58N 862 13E ON COURSE 193 + 10 KTS AT  
191900Z.

AGI 477 REMAINS IN SURVEILLANCE  
OF AMPHIB READY GROUP. [REDACTED] IN STRAIT OF

[REDACTED]

USS GRUMBY MAU  
RECONNOITERED BY IRANIAN C-130 VIC 25. IN 857 46E AT 0650Z.

NIMITZ IS ENDEAVORING TO GET POSITIVE PLOT IN KRIVAK 693.  
MEANTHILE,

IS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO FLIGHT OPS VIC AL NASIRAH.  
IF 693 IS IN THAT AREA.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE WX EARLY AM 22 APR 88Z  
FATHER BOE

NO TAPE  
S-2 has  
copy

324

Classified By ~~JCS~~  
Declassified ON ~~OADR~~

WANT ASLGM AND I NEED ZON OF YOUR LAST &  
SCEJFJSA

2833/??

.11 XHP1MKD  
YANTHCGRUPCLL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY JCS  
EXEMPTED BY 177-310  
REMOVED BY [REDACTED]  
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]  
BY OADR [REDACTED]  
REMOVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

RSC542  
DTG: 220030Z APR 88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM: JCS/RC-J2  
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOR | 220310  
VC | 057

SUBJECT: C-141 ACFT FROM [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: SITE ALPHA/J-2 MSG 202130Z APR 88

copy to  
J-2 +  
MAC

E  
A, E  
A  
A

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST IN REFERENCE, WE SUGGEST THAT MAC C-141 ACFT FILE [REDACTED] FLIGHT PLAN FROM [REDACTED] FOLLOWING TAKE-OFF. ACFT SHOULD ATTAIN NORMAL ALTITUDE (ABOUT 3000FT) FOLLOWING FLIGHT ROUTE A-1 AND BEGIN [REDACTED] BEGIN SLOW DESCENT [REDACTED] AT CAPE CHECK POINT [REDACTED] UPON REACHING [REDACTED] TURN NORTH TO INTERSECT COAST LINE AT CP [REDACTED]

2. FROM COASTAL CHECK POINT, FLY BY DIRECT ROUTE CLIMBING TO ATTAIN [REDACTED] TO CHECK POINT AT [REDACTED] FROM THIS POINT, TURN [REDACTED] TO INTERSECT NEXT CHECK POINT [REDACTED] MAINTAIN NORMAL ALT OF 6000 FT AGL FOR THIS LEG TAKING CARE NOT TO DIRECTLY OVERFLY [REDACTED] THIS ROUTE SHOULD MINIMIZE CHANCES OF DETECTION BY [REDACTED]

3. FROM CHECK POINT [REDACTED], FOLLOW ROUTE SIMILAR TO THAT ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR MC-130 ACFT AT [REDACTED] AGL ALONG RIDGELINE TO CHECK POINT [REDACTED] REMAINDER OF C-141 ROUTE IS THE SAME AS MC-130 ROUTE MAINTAINING [REDACTED] FT AGL ALTITUDE.  
BT

Classified By [REDACTED] DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

318

NNNNK

AND MAE THAT IS ALL FOR M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APR 82

FBI JTI

TOP SECRET

STATE ALPHA

TOR/16492 ✓  
RC

#361

SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT IRAN

1. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THESE FURTHER SANCTIONS:

- NO FINANCIAL TRANSFERS BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO U.S. JURISDICTION EXCEPT IN NEWS GATHERING OR TO HOSTAGES BY THEIR FAMILIES;
- AN ON IRANIAN IMPORTS TO THE U.S.;
- NO TRAVEL BY U.S. CITIZENS TO IRAN EXCEPT FOR NEWS GATHERING.

2. IN ADDITION, MILITARY EQUIPMENT IMPOUNDED AFTER PURCHASE BY IRAN IS TO BE USED BY THE U.S. OR SOLD. THE PRESIDENT WILL ASK CONGRESS FOR AUTHORITY TO PAY REPARATIONS OUT OF IRANIAN ASSETS; THESE ASSETS WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE TO PAY AMERICAN CLAIMS.

3. THE A CONSTRUCTIVE IRANIAN RESPONSE IS NOT FORTHCOMING. FUTURE STEPS WILL INCLUDE HANNING U.S. ASSETS OF GOLD AND SILVER TO IRAN AND CONSULTATION WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES REGARDING IRANIAN USE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.

4. IN RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, IF THE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AND ACTIONS BY OUR ALLIES IS NOT SUCCESSFUL, "THEN THE ONLY NEXT STEP AVAILABLE THAT I CAN THINK OF IS SOME SORT OF MILITARY ACTION." THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID "I CANNOT PRECLUDE" THE OPTION OF INTERFERING IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

5. FRANK - THE FOREIGN MINISTER ADDRESSING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: "...THE SOLIDARITY THAT UNITES FRANCE TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE CRUEL OFFENSE THAT IT UNDERGOES CANNOT BE BROKE. FRANCE REFUSES TO FORGIVE HERSELF, AND AT THE CURRENT MOMENT, THE MEASURES WHICH SHE JUDGES TO BE MOST APPROPRIATE TO BE EFFICIENT."

6. FRANK - THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO A PRESS CONFERENCE IN CONN-  
ECTICUT: "TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.A. WE DO NOT APPROVE OF THE (HOSTAGE-TAKING) AS IT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC CONVENTIONS MUST BE RESPECTED."

7. FRANK - THE ECONOMIC MINISTER TO THE FUNDSTAG: EVEN IF THE U.S. DOES NOT TAKE A COMMON STAMP, THE MAJORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WILL OPT FOR LOYCOTT MEASURES. THE FARMERS MUST LOSE THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE U.S. THROUGH "ACTIONS AND FEELS".

8. ORGANIZEN GENERAL ASSEMBLY - UNGA PRESIDENT SALIN IN TOKYO: THE HOLDING OF THE HOSTAGES IS "COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE," CONTRARY TO ALL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. "GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ALL CONCERNED IT WOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND ON THE OTHER HAND SATISFY SOME OF IRANIAN DEMANDS."

9. THE IRANIAN INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT THE SECOND ROUND OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, SCHEDULED FOR MAY 2, MAY BE DELAYED FOR TWO WEEKS BECAUSE OF HOLIDAYS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF CRIMES IN THE FIRST ROUND.

*Secret*

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CI BY DDO NMCC  
 DECI  CONTINUED TO \_\_\_\_\_  
 REPH BY OARL  
 SOURCE Multiple Sources

TOP SECRET

1. A PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE REPORTED BY AFP  
ANNOUNCED APRIL 17 THAT PORTUGAL HAS DECIDED TO BREAK OFF  
ITS TRADE RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

2. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

A. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE  
CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE  
GROUPS AND AMBULOUS REALNESS GROUP ALPHA.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] FROM PREVIOUS REPORTING WITH INCREASED ANTI-US  
SENTIMENT. [REDACTED] HAS ISSUED NEW COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY  
[REDACTED] THE POSSIBILITY OF POSSIBLE US MILITARY INTERVENTION.

[REDACTED]



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 16402  
RC

363

TO: 142255Z APR 68  
FM: JTF 702  
TO: ~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: MFA HOSTAGES

A

1. ON 16 APRIL 1968 DOS/ING RECEIVED TELECON FROM LAINGEN, HOWLAND, 30M SOUTH. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM DOS MLPC: THE TRIO HAS BEEN MOVED TO A NEW ROOM WITHIN THE PROTOCOL SUITE OF OFFICES. BRUCE DESCRIBED IT AS THE DINING ROOM. HE SAID THEY ARE NOW ALLOWED ONE HOUR A DAY IN THE OUTSIDE GARDEN UNDER SUPERVISION OF A GUARD. UNQUOTE.
2. DURING CONVERSATION LAINGEN GAVE THEIR NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER AS 321-246 REPEAT 321-246.
3. JTF EXPLORING ALL MEANS TO DETERMINE EXACT LOCATION WITH MFA FLOC.

REVW 1. APR 18

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DEEL REL. DOWN TO CONF  
 REVW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM JS

~~SECRET~~



TOR / 1415Z  
RC

MESSAGE 1 RECEIVED.

BTG 171430Z APR 80  
FROM JTF/J2  
TO [REDACTED]

**A**  
**G**

SEC/ASST  
SITE ALIWA [REDACTED]

#367

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN ON 17 APRIL 1980

1. YESTERDAY, THE RULING REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ANNOUNCED IT IS CONSIDERING YET ANOTHER POSTPONEMENT OF THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PARFYTAEGLEH34500. THE SECOND ROUND, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED FOR 2 MAY, WILL BE POSTPONED FOR AN ADDITIONAL WEEK IF APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL. NO REASON FOR THE DELAY WAS PROVIDED. FOLLOWING THIS ANNOUNCEMENT, AYATOLLAH KHOMENI, LEADER OF THE HARSH FRACTION IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, SAID THE FUTURE PARLIAMENT MIGHT NOT DECIDE WHAT TO DO WITH THE HOSTAGES UNTIL JULY. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE END OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD CHANGE THE SITUATION OF THE HOSTAGES. IN FACT HE CLAIMED THAT "THEIR PERSONAL SITUATION WILL BE BETTER DEALING WITH THEM." HE SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR IRAN TO PARDON THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT A TRIAL IF THE "POLITICAL BACKGROUND WAS RESOLVED." HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION MIGHT HELP IN THIS RESPECT.

2. HEALTH OFFICIALS WHO VISITED THE HOSTAGES CONFIRMED IN A PRESS INTERVIEW YESTERDAY THAT SEVEN OR EIGHT HOSTAGES WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SPIES ARE BEING KEPT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.

3. PRESS REPORTS QUOTE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL ANNOUNCE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY AN EMBARGO ON FOOD SHIPMENTS TO IRAN AND ASK THE UNITED STATES ALLIES TO FOLLOW SUIT. ALTHOUGH SUCH AN EMBARGO WOULD HAVE A SLIGHT EFFECT AS FAR AS AMERICAN SHIPMENTS ARE CONCERNED, THE ADMINISTRATION REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT A FOOD EMBARGO BY U.S. ALLIES WOULD BE A SEVERE BLOW TO IRAN. JOEY POWELL DENIED THE CREATION OF AN EMBARGO BUT THAT THERE WERE ARENALS COMMUNICATED IT TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM LONDON, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAN, SIR JOHN GRAHAM, WAS TO RETURN TO HIS POST THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16. THE EC-3 NATIONS ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING A WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR AMBASSADORS FROM TEHRAN.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DEEL  OWNER TO \_\_\_\_\_  
 REVW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources



~~SECRET~~

[ ]

REF ID: A67777

369

OR/0300Z  
VC

X

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/  
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 170400Z/120000Z  
ON 0100Z/120000Z

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ EB 12355  
COMPLETED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DER. IS DOWN TO Secret  
REVW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM DIA

REVW 18 APR 10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

372

25 JANUARY 1980

G

From: Maintenance Officer, HELMINERON SIXTEEN  
TO: [REDACTED] USMC

SUBJ: Inventory and custody of special mission items.

ENCL: (1) Serial numbers of items "t." through "x."

1. Inventory of subject items is as follows:

- a. pilot's oxygen masks.....8
- b. sleeping bag straps.....44
- c. ammo pouch (old style).....19
- d. canteen covers.....80
- e. canteen (plastic).....80
- f. cartridge belts.....40
- g. first aid packs.....41
- h. belt suspenders.....40
- i. aviation body armor.....38, 21 (3 short; 10 reg; 14 long)
- j. ponchos.....40
- k. poncho liners.....32, 12
- l. aviation gas masks.....65
- m. watch caps (wool knit).....40
- n. sleeping bags.....40, 38 (bolt of material)
- o. scarf material.....1
- p. compass (magnetic).....40
- q. SVRB aviation survival vests.....40
- r. rations, "C" TYPE.....119
- s. water cans (5 gal, plastic).....14
- t. M16A1 rifles.....40 (serial numbers attached)
- u. Caliber .38 pistols.....40 (serial numbers attached)
- v. Caliber .50 MG, M2.....16 (serial numbers attached)
- w. Pyrotechnic pistol MK8.....20 (serial numbers attached)
- x. Night vision goggles.....20 (serial numbers attached)
- y. flight jackets, nomex.....39 (16 small; 17 med; 6 large)
- z. thermal underwear (bottoms).....41 (21 large; 20 medium)
- aa. thermal underwear (tops).....38 (19 large; 19 medium)
- bb. desert boots.....35 (1-7D; 1-7½D; 3-8D; 1-8E; 5-8½D; 3-9D; 7-9½D; 4-10½D; 3-11D; 1-11½D; 3-11½E; 1-12D; 212½E)
- cc. canteen cups.....40
- dd. duffelbags.....40
- ee. camouflage netting.....
- ff. netting support braces.....
- gg. M55 ENCL. A2 MIN (SIS).....8 Tony
- hh. Caliber .50 MG M2.....16 Tom
- ii. Caliber .38 M&S.....41 Tom
- jj. EXTRAORDINARY RANGE TIPS.....24 Tom

KK. M16 POUCHES... 80  
LL. M16 MAGAZINES... 240

2. The above items are on board USS NIMITZ (CV-68) and secured in storage area 5-138-2Q. Access to this space is restricted to five officers. The following officer has assumed control and custody by affixing his signature to this memorandum and initialing all changes or additions.

[REDACTED], Lieutenant Commander, USN, [REDACTED]

G

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: DJ50A  
Declassified ON: OADR

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1) to basic memorandum on inventory and custody of special mission items dtd 25 JANUARY 1980.

1. Serial numbers of Pyrotechnic Pistols (MK8): (20 count)

E77890; 265923; 282175; 275394; E109697; 268983; 290353; ; 276333;  
268503; 276057; E139217; 283007; 268105; E226573; 281709; 265808; 268964;  
287906; 268523; 276035

2. Serial numbers of night vision goggles: (20 count)

2015C; 1985C; 1978C; 1979C; 1975C; 1992C; 1972C; 1999C; 2242C; 1974C; 1977C;  
1965C; 2264C; 1983C; 2240C; 1981C; 2026C; 1967C; (+ 29 Batteries); 2000C; 2257C

3. Serial numbers of M16A1 Rifles: (40 count)

747034; 643585; 638298; 688264; 746488; 643182; 992581; 774466; 580823; 665754  
746116; 616322; 685230; 668738; 688329; 1078311; 1625732; 1093105; 1062406;  
1793826; 1624267; 1628398; 622392; 740840; 690440; 1659076; 1630348; 769924;  
778020; 1629502; 770571; 1898229; 745897; 778236; 689001; 1193976; 675030;  
1630554; 857857; 703802.

4. Serial numbers of Caliber .50 MG,M2s: (16 count)

1170273; 1170879; 1164568; 1141547; 1143410; 1169450; 1612714; 1142323;  
458473; 1146842; 1143737; 1251051; 1169711; 1142381; 1164578; 2023125.

5. Serial numbers of Caliber .38 pistols: (40 count)

4D13332; 4D17794; 4D17908; 4D17489; 4D17481; 4D12074; 4D13095; 4D13384;  
4D13364; 4D13024; 4D17499; 4D13376; 4D17572; 4D17362; 4D13437; 4D13487;  
4D13743; 4D13930; 4D17326; 4D13740; 4D11822; 4D13594; 4D13677; 4D13485;  
4D17793; 4D13161; 4D13018; 4D16316; 4D13117; 4D17866; 4D16895; 4D13509;  
4D13822; 4D17457; 4D17857; 4D13449; 4D12380; 4D13483; D156285; 153-57582.

G

  
LCDR, USN

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET PLAN~~  
INTRODUCTION

President

(# 370)

TF - Formed mid-November

- Mil options discussed with you on 8 Dec - ability then too low.

- Since then capability has been strengthened significantly.

1 (X) INTEL - Much better in all respects. (Big [redacted])

PLANNING - A sound mechanically achievable plan has been devised.

TRAINING - Four full scale rehearsals have been conducted in the US.

7 (X) EQUIPMENT - Night vision devices, precise navigation aids, air landed rapid refueling system, satellite comms, silent, [redacted]

(X) SUPPORT - Eight RH-53's on Nimitz; [redacted]

In sum, the Joint Chiefs agree that we have a sound achievable plan.

Next, I'd like to outline briefly the current situation and then follow with the plan.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY PPO NMCC

DECL 125 DOWN TO Secret

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~  
Classified by [redacted]  
Declassify on: OADR

~~Downgraded to Secret for security PPO (NMCC) 1240Z 11/20/90~~

~~SECRET~~  
[redacted]

Classified By: DISBA-18 October 1982  
Declassified ON: OADR

HOSTAGES

50 at Emb

3 at FM

- Reasonably sure we know where they are.
- Kept by 125-150 persons at least a third armed with rifles and pis
- Embassy is 27 acres - with fence 10 - 12 ft high.

~~(S)~~ LIKELY REINFORCEMENTS

- ~~up to 100~~ persons from nearby stations could arrive within 10-15 minutes after the rescue has begun.
- 200 + more in the next 15 minutes.
- Several hundred could be expected within 45 minutes.
- Organized elements of the regular armed forces are not expected during the first hour.
- There is a low probability that the regular armed forces will discover or interfere.

(S) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The operation would be accomplished during a nine day period (7 days for warning and positioning the force and 2 days for execution and recovery). Heavy helicopters (RH-53s), AC and MC-130 aircraft, KC-135 tankers, C-141 airlifters, and one C-5A will be used. The helicopters will launch from the Nimitz. Other air operations will be from [REDACTED]

- The operation in Iran takes approximately 38 hours (two nights and one day). It is divided into three phases - Insertion, Hostage Release and Extraction.

Upon last light of the insertion day, SOFD-Delta (90 Delta personnel plus [REDACTED] monitors) and Rangers (46 personnel) will be airlifted by 3 MC-130s from [REDACTED] to Nain Military Airfield, Iran.

-- The first MC-130, equipped with FLIR, will overfly the airfield and indicate clearance for the Ranger MC-130 to land. Upon landing, the Rangers will secure the field and prepare for reception of the two Delta MC-130s.

-- These 3 A/C will soon be followed by 3 MC-130s w/fuel bladders.

-- In the meantime, 6 RH-53s will have departed the USS Nimitz to marry up with the force at Nain. While at Nain, the helos will refuel from the MC-130 bladder birds and load the Delta personnel. (The refuel and load evolutions should take approximately 40 minutes.)

-- Once refueled and loaded, the helos will fly to a hideout area which is located approximately 100 KM from Tehran.

-- The MC-130s at Nain will return to [REDACTED] leaving a force of 22 Rangers and two friendly [REDACTED] to maintain control and insure that the operation is not compromised.

-- Once the helos reach the hideout area, they will be camouflaged and defensive positions set up. This evolution will be completed prior to sunrise.

-- The Delta force will [REDACTED] from the hideout area to a warehouse which is located approximately 15 KM from Tehran [REDACTED]

-- While at the warehouse, final preparations will be made for the hostage release phase.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A ~~That night, Delta will be moved into Tehran [redacted] enter the compound during the early morning hours.~~

-- The hostage release can be completed in less than one hour - most will be out in 30 minutes or less.

-- Two AC-130s will fly from [redacted] compound and provide on-call gunfire support if required.

FE -- In the meantime, 5 MC-130s w/Rangers (75 personnel) will capture Manzariyeh and prepare for arrival of a C-141 [redacted] and the helos from Tehran.

-- A third AC-130 will be available to provide on call gunfire support at Manzariyeh.

-- Once Delta has initiated the hostage release by entering the Embassy compound, the helos will be called in for extraction and transportation of the hostages and Delta [redacted].

-- A separate fully coordinated plan will be used to free Mr. Laingen + 2 from the Foreign Ministry.

FE -- At Manzariyeh the former hostages will be loaded on the C-141 which is staffed with an emergency medical team. The C-141 will fly to the nearest US military hospital, [redacted] on to Germany.

-- All other personnel will board the MC-130s and depart for [redacted].

FE -- A sixth MC-130 from [redacted] will extract the main force once the Manzariyeh extraction has been completed.

FE -- All AC-130 flights from [redacted] to Iran and return will require air refueling over [redacted].

TO SUM UP -

- The mission can be done.
- It is highly dependent upon surprise.
- The next best time is 27-29 March followed by 3-5 Apr.
- After 5 April, shorter nights drive us to (3-day plan with increased risk).
- Sir, we await your orders.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

373

~~SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

A (S) Subject: Concept for use of [redacted] in Hostage Recovery Option

(S) 1. CONCEPT.

- Based on force capability, weather [redacted] and environment, the [redacted] is best munitions to achieve desired results.

B

[redacted] along the south wall, as required, prior to [redacted] at the [redacted]

- Specific employment techniques and crew training will be accomplished prior to operation.

(S) 2. MUNITION DESCRIPTION. (See attached photo)

- The [redacted] includes a [redacted] and [redacted] each containing [redacted]

- [redacted] permits [redacted] of [redacted] from various [redacted] between [redacted]

B

- When the [redacted] functions, the [redacted] over the target area.

- After [redacted] desired [redacted] should [redacted] for approximately [redacted]

(S) 3. AVAILABILITY.

- Army has 1964 at [redacted] Depot.

- Shipping weight is [redacted]

B

(S) 4. Delta Force will also have [redacted] munitions for use, as required.

(S) 5. No [redacted] should result from use of [redacted] are [redacted] but should pose no greater hazard than [redacted] if employed in buildings or urban areas.

1 Enclosure  
A/S

DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

Classified By: [redacted]  
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~  
SOD SUMMARY SHEET

(#314)

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION <del>TOP SECRET</del>	SOD CONTROL NUMBER			
-------------	---	--------------------	--	--	--

SUBJECT:  Use of [REDACTED] in Iran Hostage Rescue (TS)	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
	X		X	

**REMARKS**

1 (TS) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of discriminate use of [REDACTED] during the hostage rescue in Iran.

2 (TS) The JTF was previously authorized\* to plan for use and train in the use of [REDACTED]. However, final approval to use [REDACTED] was deferred.

3. (U) Recommend the attached memorandum be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of defense.

\* Summary Sheet/Memo, Subject Use of [REDACTED] in Iran Hostage Rescue (TS)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO Secret  
 REVW ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM JS

ACTION OFFICER [REDACTED] SOD, J-3 EXT 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL							
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION	
	J-3 P							
	EXEC							
	TN CH							
	VCOPS							
	COPS							
DATE OF PREPARATION 13 April 80								

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ ~~SECRET~~

# DJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CJCS ✓	CLASSIFICATION <del>TOP SECRET</del>	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE <del>SECRET</del>
THRU: <i>Hansen</i>	<b>EYES ONLY</b>	DJSM NO. <del>SECRET</del>
DJS		DJSM DATE

SUBJECT:  Use of <del>██████████</del> Tehran Hostage Rescue (TS) (S)	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
	X	X		

**REMARKS**

1. (TS) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of discriminate use of ~~██████████~~ during the hostage rescue in [Tehran] from ~~██████████~~.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on proposed memorandum.

In view of the ~~██████████~~ of this final approval to ~~██████████~~ it is suggested that the team be authorized to plan for use and train in the use of ~~██████████~~ requested but the final authority to use ~~██████████~~ for operation not be issued until the deployment order is approved.

*Philip D. Shields*

Return to (Secretariat)

EYES ONLY

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~██████████~~  
 DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION: ~~██████████~~  
 OR (X) REVIEW: ~~██████████~~  
 IS: 21 November ~~██████████~~  
 EXTENDED BY: ~~██████████~~  
 REASON: ~~██████████~~

ACTION OFFICER: <del>██████████</del>	COORDINATION/APPROVAL			
OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME
J-3	<i>Philip D. Shields</i>			

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Use of [redacted] in Tehran Hostage  
Rescue (TS) [redacted]

1. (TS) The current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from the Embassy has established a requirement for authority to discriminately use [redacted]. The intention is to use an [redacted] with [redacted] characteristics and minimum [redacted] at the Embassy Compound to [redacted] predictable enemy reaction.

2. (TS) The advantages of limiting [redacted] by exercising [redacted] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [redacted] risk to the hostages and Iranians.

3. (TS) As a point of information, [redacted] have been used [redacted]

4. (TS) It is recommended that approval be granted to assemble the necessary supplies, conduct training, and prepare to use [redacted] as outlined in paragraph one above.

A

1, B

1, B

From  
CJCS

OK -  
But not approved  
New for [redacted]  
Each approval would  
be [redacted]

22  
Nov  
79

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS  
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION  
OR (X) REVIEW  
IS: 22 November 2009

~~EYES ONLY~~

EXTENDED BY:

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A Subject: Use of [redacted] in Iran Hostage  
Rescue (TS) (S)

A, B 1. (S) (TS) Current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from Iran has established a requirement for authority to [redacted]. An [redacted] with [redacted] characteristics and [redacted] would be used to [redacted] predictable enemy reaction.

A 2. (S) (TS) The advantages of limiting [redacted] by exercising [redacted] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [redacted] and [redacted] risk to the hostages and Iranians.

A 3. (S) (TS) As a point of information, [redacted] have been used [redacted]

A 4. (S) (TS) It is requested that approval be granted to use [redacted] as outlined in paragraph one above.

David Jones

4/14  
Approved.  
Harold Brown

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS  
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION  
OR (X) REVIEW  
IS: 12 April 2010  
EXTENDED BY:  
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

**SECRET**

**DISG SUMMARY SHEET**

**375**

CLASSIFICATION <del>TOP SECRET</del>	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING OFFICE			
DISM NO.	DATE DISCONTINUED			
DISM DATE				
SUBJECT  Use of [redacted] in Tehran Hostage Rescue (787) (S)	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INITIALS	DATE
	X	X		

REMARKS

1. The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of [redacted] during the hostage rescue in Tehran.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on proposed memorandum.

CLASSIFIED BY: DDO NMCC  
 DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION OADR  
 OR ( ) REVIEW  
 IS: 12 Aug 82  
 EXTENDED BY:  
 REASON:

ACTION OFFICER	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTEN
[redacted] J-3, SOD EXT 75279	JTA	[redacted]	55805			
	J-33	[redacted]	74008			
	J-31	[redacted]	Has seen [redacted]			

**SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



~~EYES ONLY~~

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Use of [REDACTED] in Tehran Hostage Rescue ~~(S)~~ (TS)

A, B

1. ~~(S)~~ (TS) The [REDACTED] by the rescue force is considered a necessity to [REDACTED] levels. Minimum force is being employed, both inside and outside the Embassy, while maintaining a capability to affect a successful egress from the Embassy [REDACTED]

A

2. ~~(S)~~ (TS) An evaluation of the following [REDACTED] is being conducted by the rescue force; [REDACTED]. The desire is to employ an [REDACTED] reasonable period of [REDACTED]

A, B

3. ~~(S)~~ (TS) The members of the rescue force are familiar with both employment of [REDACTED] conduct of operations while [REDACTED]

4. ~~(S)~~ (TS) The primary advantages of limiting the [REDACTED] by exercising [REDACTED] while greatly enhancing the probability of mission success, far outweigh the [REDACTED]

5. (U) Strongly recommend approval and that the attached proposed memorandum be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

*James B. Vaught*  
JAMES B. VAUGHT  
MG USA  
CJTF - RICE BOWL

Attachment  
a/s

APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_

CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3  
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION  
OR (X) REVIEW  
IS: 21 November 2009

EXTENDED BY:  
REASON:

*Downgraded to Secret  
by DDON MCC  
12 Aug 02*

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~





THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A

Subject: Use of [redacted] in Tehran Hostage  
Rescue (TS) (S)

A

1. (TS) The current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from the Embassy has established a requirement for authority to [redacted]

The intention is to use [redacted] at the Embassy Compound to [redacted] predictable enemy reaction.

A

2. (TS) The advantages of limiting [redacted] by exercising [redacted] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [redacted]

A, B

3. (TS) As a point of information, [redacted] have been used [redacted]

4. (TS) It is recommended that approval be granted to assemble the necessary supplies, conduct training, and prepare [redacted] as outlined in paragraph one above.

From CJS  
OK -  
But not approved  
now for use.  
Such approval will  
be addressed later  
[Signature]

22  
Nov  
79

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS  
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION  
OR (X) REVIEW  
IS: 22 November 2009  
EXTENDED BY:  
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME  
THU IRAN

EVENT/  
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTION

535 2005

1/MC-130 w/ 50  
DELTA Dep [REDACTED]  
- MC-130 Aborts

Lead DELTA Team  
late or unavailable

- Abort  
- Have spare MC-130 ready; transload DELTA continue

555 2025  
556 2026

1/MC (50 DELTA)  
& 1/EC (FUEL)  
T/O from [REDACTED]  
- MC-130 ABORT  
  
- EC-130 ABORT

OK,  
  
DELTA unavailable  
  
- REQUIRE 2/EC-130 AT REFUEL POINT.

- ABORT advise [REDACTED]  
- Transload DELTA spare - continue  
- USE 3RD EC-130 AS SPARE FUEL A/C

E

NOTE: Any delay of these A/C beyond 10 min requires notification to Helos for possible delay

556 2026

7/Helos dep carrier  
6 airborne  
5 airborne  
  
>5 airborne

OK  
Allows only one spare for entire mission  
Insufficient helos for mission

Continue  
Depending on execute ... abort  
  
ABORT

602/3/4

1/MC-130 (21/ DELTA)  
2/EC-130 (FUEL)  
T/O from [REDACTED]  
- 1/MC-130 Abort

Equip & parts of DELTA unavailable

Transload to spare MC-130, if unavailable .. ABC and recall all forces

- 1/EC-130 ABORT

Still sufficient fuel at refuel point for helos

Continue

2/EC-130 ABORT

Insufficient fuel for helos

- If no refueling available for MC-130 ... ABORT  
- If refueling available, continue give 5000# from 3/MC-130s to helos, plan a 5 helo launch out of refueling

TIME  
TU IRAN

EVENT/  
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

35

1/MC-130 (DELTA  
lands at refuel  
point

OK

Continue

Blind landing

gui  
pilot to landing  
the road

- A/C damaged or  
breaks through  
crust on landing

A/C will have to  
be destroyed in  
place

- ABORT: Land t  
helos at the ref  
point, on load f  
from the MC-130,  
split the 60  
personnel betwee  
helos and return  
the carrier

OR

Make damaged A/C

Continue

and burn it

39

Helos pass turn  
around

5 helos OK

Sufficient force to  
to support extraction  
Insufficient helos

Continue

<5 helos OK

ABORT

55

2nd/MC-130  
lands at refuel  
point

OK

Continue

- A/C damaged  
or breaks through  
crust

Our presence will be  
discovered the next day

ABORT - Land helo  
take fuel out of  
damaged MC-130 f  
helos, load 60  
people on 1st MC  
return to  
destory MC-130 in  
place, helos retu  
to carrier.

A, E

~~TOP SECRET~~

17 10/17

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME  
LU IPAN

EVENT/  
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

058

1st/EC-130 lands  
- A/C damaged

If we are allowed to use a security force to prevent word of our presence from getting out fro 24 hours  
OR  
Make A/C [redacted] burn it

Continue as plan bring an MC-130 back in the 2nd night to destroy damaged aircraft and remove the security force  
Continue

002

A

3rd MC-130 lands  
- A/C damaged

If we have security force  
Make A/C [redacted] burn it  
OR  
OK  
Presence will be discovered

Continue, bring crew out on MC-1  
CONTINUE  
Continue  
ABORT ... all personnel return initial departur point. Destroy A/C in place

005

2nd/EC-130 lands  
- A/C damaged  
  
- Becasue of damage or malfunction, unable to pass fuel

With security force  
OR  
Make A/C [redacted], burn it

Continue  
Continue

006

3rd EC-130 enters orbit over landing site

OK  
- Same options as above  
- LAND 3<sup>rd</sup> EC-130

Continue.  
Same as above  
CONTINUE

020

Helos arrive at landing site  
  
- If helos are more than min late

Provide terminal guidance for helos  
  
OK  
  
Not enough darkness to reach hideout.

Continue  
  
Continue  
  
Helos refuel and move north to desert hide location -- noti reception party OF DELAY

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME  
FLU IRAN

EVENT/  
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

100

(S)

Helos depart refuel point with DELTA  
5 OK

Sufficient helos for operation

Continue

<5 OK

Insufficient helos for operation

Good helos return to carrier, rest of force return [redacted] on C-130

NOTE: If there is a problem with any A/C departing the refuel point, it will be destroyed in place and [redacted]

320

Helos arrive at dropoff with DELTA  
- No reception party

OK

Continue

DELTA unable to move to city

- DELTA moves to hideout with helos  
- DELTA remains dropoff to wait trucks

- Helo breaks at dropoff

Possibility of discovery

- Leave [redacted] at Helo [redacted]

- Force discovered at dropoff

- Mission blown

- Load force on and return to desert track  
- If possible, capture discover keep with helos hideout, release when helos leave continue

350

Helos depart dropoff

OK

Continue

005

Helos arrive hideout

OK

Continue

Helos must be in the hideout by 0016Z to arrive in total darkness

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TIME  
DU IRAN

EVENT/  
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

07/9

2/MC-130 depart

OK

Continue

-1/MC-130  
aborts

Rangers/CCT not  
available at  
Manzariyeh

Transload to spare MC-130  
continue

-2/MC-130s  
abort..Launch  
spare

Reduced force to  
secure Manzariyeh

- 24 hour hold  
- Continue, [redacted]

- 3/MC-130s abort

No security force

- 24 hour hold  
- Continue, MC/EC-130s fr  
[redacted] proceed to  
Manzariyeh without  
security, CCT will set  
lights for C-141's.

- 1/EC-130 aborts

*No extra fuel, reduced b/u  
extraction capability*  
OK

03

3/AC-130 depart

Minimum support

- Go

1 Depart

[redacted] support

- 24 hour hold, recall  
force  
- Continue

**A, E**

1 Depart

- 24 hour hold, recall  
force  
- Continue, don't tell  
Charlie

20

1/MC&2/EC-130  
Depart [redacted]  
for Manzariyeh

OK

- Continue

39

1/KC-135 depart

OK

- Continue

- KC-135 aborts,  
launch spare

OK

- Continue

- No KC-135

No Refuel

- MC-130s continue, get  
fuel at Manzariyeh

51

3/KC-135's depart

OK

- Continue

- 1/KC-135 Abort

Insufficient fuel  
for A/C 130

Launch spare

NOTE: If this  
launch requires the  
use of ~~more than two~~  
spares we will affect  
the return refuel-  
ings.

35

2/MC-130s refuel

OK

- Continue

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~~TOP SECRET~~

*920000 withdrawn*

TIME  
W IRAN

EVENT/  
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

- 1/MC-130 unable to receive fuel  
Reduced security force for Manzariyeh

- Continue  
The MC-130 that cannot refuel will continue to Manzariyeh to get fuel

- KC-135 unable to pass fuel or both MC-130s unable to receive  
MC-130s will require fuel from EC-130 at Manzariyeh

- Continue rest of mission on schedule, land both MC-130s at Manzariyeh, take fuel from EC-130.

53

~~2/AC-130's~~ refuel OK

- Continue

≥ 1 A/C 130 unable to refuel  
Minimum AC-130s available to support DELTA

- Continue

No AC-130s able to refuel  
No gunship support for DELTA

ABORT, recall all forces

- Continue, have AC-130s land at [redacted], refuel and launch for Tehran.  
- If MC-130s have successfully refueled: continue to Manzariyeh & refuel from EC-130  
- Continue, AC-130s, return to [redacted]

11

2/C-141 depart [redacted] for Manzariyeh  
1/C-141 OK

Sufficient airlift to carry out 307 personnel  
Max load departing Manzariyeh using MC-130 support

- Continue

- Continue

[redacted] will not let C-141s launch

Insufficient airlift to extract personnel

- Utilize alternate rescue party from [redacted] (MC/EC-130)

40

AC-130 arv at Embassy  
NOTE: AC-130s will have 2+00 station time available.

OK

- Continue

NOTE: If EC-130s with fuel are at Manzariyeh and the other forces (MC-130s) have sufficient fuel, an AC-130 can land and take on fuel at Manzariyeh to extend station time.

45

2/MC-130s land at Manzariyeh  
OK

- Continue

- Find R/W blocked  
Unable to airland

Jump in Rangers to clear runway then land.

NINE  
LU IRAN

EVENT/  
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

56

2/C-141 arrive  
Manzariyeh

OK

- Continue

- 1st/C-141  
crashes on  
R/W

R/W particully  
blocked if 2nd C-141  
cannot land,  
insufficent airlift to  
evacuate all forces.

- Land the 2nd/C-141 and  
use him to extract  
hostages, use MC/EC-  
130s to extract combat  
force.

- Send 2nd/C-141 back, us  
MC/EC-130s to extract  
entire force.

NOTE: C-141s will require  
at least 5000' to operate  
at moderate loads.

Call

Helos start up

00

DELTA exectute  
at Embassy (approx  
time)

OK

- Continue

Call

Helos arrive at  
Embassy

- 5 OK

Sufficient helos for  
extraction

- Continue

5 4

Will require helos to  
shuttle to Manzariyeh

- Conside fuel for AC-130  
to provide extra static  
time.

Zero helos

Unable to extract by  
helo

Will have to reach  
Manzariyeh by ground  
vehicle

10

2/C-141s depart  
Manzariyeh

OK

- Continue

- Only 1/C-141  
able to depart

Some of force will  
have to come out on  
MC/EC-130

Transload force to MC/EC-  
130 for extraction.

- Zero C-141s  
depart Manzariyeh

Entire force must  
come out on MC/EC-130

Transload force to MC/EC-  
130s

15

MC/EC-130s depart  
Manzariyeh

OK

Continue

≥ 3 MC/EC-130  
depart

OK

Continue

< 3 MC/EC-130  
depart

Insufficient lift for  
entire force

Force transition to E&E  
plan, make pickup at  
predetermined location ne  
night.



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379

G

SEE: [redacted] for details of questions on info provided below.

EX [redacted] SUPPORT AVAILABLE

E

(2)

15 Jan 80:

ITEM	ON-SITE	REQUIREMENT	SHORTFALL	IN-THEATER ?
COTS	200	800	600	Harvest Eagle
MATTRESSES	50 (not good)	800		Recommend Sleeping Bags per man
BILLETS (US assigned)	280	800	600	Requires [redacted] Govt turnover for US use.
LATRINES	19	24	5	Being constructed
SHOWERS	11 (HEADS)	19	8	Harvest Eagle
WATER	3 Buffalos 10 Lister Bags	6 Buffalos 20 Lister Bags	3 Buffalos 10 Lister Bags	Harvest Eagle
Water Storage w/demin	4x500gal	8x500gal	4x500gal	Harvest Eagle
A-2 Water Trucks	1	2	1	Not in theater (SA)
Water Kits for KC135	0	as req	as req	KC-135 deploy with them.
MOBILE CLINIC	1	1	0	n/a
INSECT REPELLANT	1 per pers	1 per pers		each pers deploy insect repellant
LAUNDRY	3 washers	6	3	In Theater Quarte:
CLASS VI	BEER 330 cases Soda 100 cases	as required " "	get from AAFES, EUR	Yes
RUNWAY LIGHTS	MINIMAL	VACI	VACI	Not in Theater (TA)
R-14 Berms	1	2	1-2	[redacted] will construct with 24 hrs notice.
ELECT POWER	175 KW, 380V, 50 Cycle (220V) 2x6hr periods	Present + 2x200KW	2x200KW Convertible to 220, 60Cy	[redacted]

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(A) E

LIGHTING	ALL Shelters and Buildings	Same	Wire/Pigtails	[REDACTED]
MHE	1 All Terrain Forklift w/ long forks	2 of same	1 All terrain w/long forks	ALCE?
PALLET LOADER	NONE	?	?	ALCE?
POL	240,000gal on base ? +100,000gal avail w/24hrs notice		?	[REDACTED] need 48 hr notice to assure no shortfall

2/0200Z (0300 Est)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Est)	Launch MC-130: a. 5/MC-130 Airborne b. 4/MC-130 "	None Reduced fuel for Helo's	Go Go, will provide 19 operational bladders to complete mission
	c. <4/MC-130 Airborne	Insufficient fuel for Helo's	No Go/Delay 24 hr
	d. >1:00 delay in T/O	Will not get fuel to helos in time for them to reach hideout by daylight	No Go/Delay 24 hr
2/1115Z (0615 Est)	KC-135 launch: 3 KC-135 Airborne <3 KC-135 Airborne	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No Go
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch, <2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No go
2/1340Z (0840 Est)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 Helos Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hideout	Go Go, Foldup 6th He and leave it + TA
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for Helos	No Go
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch a. 6/Helo airborne (5 w/ Delta/1 w/ extra support equipment, i.e., portable TACAN plus camouflage nets) b. >5/Helo airborne with no more than 1:00 delay c. <5/Helo airborne	Improves Delta's chances of having adequate helo support at the target Max delay, and still be able to reach hide out by daylight with sufficient aircraft Would unacceptably de-grade equip and personnel for "Delta"	Go If there is a del instruct MC-130s orbit No/Go, delay 24 h Inform MC-130's & KC-135's

< = less than  
> = greater than  
≤ = less than or equal to  
≥ = greater than or equal to

TS

I-378

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~  
Declassified ON: OADR 12 Aug 92

Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~TOP SECRET~~  
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TIME	EVENT/SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	d. > 1:00 delay	Cannot reach hideout by daylight	No Go, Delay 24 h
2/1430Z 1515Z (0150000)	Helos goes down over water - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded	No Go, Recall Helos advise MC-130s to take 2nd refueling and RTB. Scramble SAR from Carrier, advise KC-130s/AR
	- Cargo Helo down	TACAN and camouflage nets gone	Option 1 - <del>Go</del> Helos continue, launch SAR from Carrier  Option 2 - Recall Helos advise MC-130 to refuel and RTB launch SAR
2/1640Z (1150000)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 helos Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hide out Insufficient fuel for helos	Go Go, Foldup 6th Helo and leave it + TACAN No Go, recall Helos
2/1515Z 1810Z (0150000)	Helos goes down prior to turn around point - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded - may lose TACAN and camouflage nets	Other 5 helos land and spread the load. Advise MC-130 to delay by no. of minutes required for recovery. - If injuries: Option 1: 6th Helo lands, dumps cargo if necessary, pick up injured and return to carrier.  Option 2: Abort, recall helos, advise MC-130's RTB, advise KC-135's
	Cargo Helo down	Crew requires recovery	Option 1: Launch Delta Helos continue

TS

EVENT/  
SITUATIONS

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

2/1810Z  
1918Z  
(1310-1418 1ST)

More than one helo goes down

6 helos operational for entire route

Delta or cargo helo goes down, no injuries

Delta helo goes down with injuries

Force unacceptably degraded

Arrive at refueling with all Delta and extra equipment

Part of attack force down, must be recovered

Force could be unacceptably degraded

Option 2: Land one of the other 5 helos and load 1 crew member and 1 camouflage net on each. The TACAN should be able to go on one of the helos. Advise the MC-130's to delay

Abort, recall helo advise MC-130's to RTB, call for early KC-135 support

Go

Option 1: Land all helos and spread load. Continue to refuel point

Option 2: Land cargo helo and p/u Delta plus crew.

NOTE: Any one helo can recover Delta plus the crew. The cargo helo is 2000 lbs lighter

Option 1: Abort, proceed to refuel point, take max fuel, return to carrier.

Option 2: Proceed refuel point, one helo will return to carrier with injuries. Remaining 4 helos on mission. (NOTE: No camouflage nets can be taken to hideout)

2/1948Z  
(144510)

Airdrop of fuel bladder:  
- 5 MC-130s make drop  
- 4 MC-130's make successful drop. Bladders loaded 5/aircraft; one aircraft only has 4.

<4 MC-130's make successful drop or <19 bladders are usable.

Enough fuel for all 6 helos if all bladders OK  
Worst case, if no bladders break, there will be 19 available. Best case, 20 bladders available, can break one.

Insufficient fuel for 4 helos to make target

Go, can proceed w/ number of helos desired  
Can go with 4 helos if we get 19 bladders

Option 1: Try to extract fuel from extra helos so as get 4 operational

Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to ship

Option 3: Delay 24 hours to get more fuel the next night

2/2248Z  
(174815)

Helos launch from refueling:

6 helos airborne

5 helos airborne

4 helos airborne

3 helos airborne

Will have extra helo support for extraction

Adequate support for extraction

Marginal support for extraction

Minimum helos for extraction

Go, use 6th helo to carry max fuel

Go, fold up 6th helo and leave it. Extract extra fuel from operational helos

Go, spread Delta Helo crews and equipment over operational helos.

Option 1: Proceed mission in degraded status

Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to carrier.

Option 3: Delay 24 hrs. Try to fix helos or get more fuel, as req'd

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	2 helos airborne	Inadequate helo support for mission	Option 1: Delay 2 hours, try to fix helos or get more fuel, as required  Option 2: Load all personnel on 2 helo strip down and fly to RV near beach. Call for SAR.  Option 3: Delay 2 hours, fly person to Manzarieh in t to meet MC-130s a Rangers.  Option 4: Delta a crews fly to vicinity of Darba takeover airfield the next night. MC-130's land and extract.
	1 helo airborne	Same as above	Same as option 4 above except cy the one helo wi Delta from refuel point to vicinity of Darband
	Zero helos airborne	Same as above	Walk to Darband, call for MC-130's when ready.
2/2248Z+ 1:00 (174811.1.81)	Helos must be off by 2348Z	After this, cannot reach hideout by daylight	Delay 24 hours
2/2318 (174811.1.81)	Helos pass point where they could turn around and return to carrier	Once beyond this point, the force is committed to Manzarriyeh for extraction	JTF Commander ca: recall the force to the carrier, contact means Go
2-3/2248Z 0124Z (1748-20248Z)	Helo goes down between refueling point and Delta's dropoff point:		
	- 6 helos available cargo helo goes	Aircrew on the ground with camouflage nets	2 helos land at crew and nets
	- 6 helos available, Delta helo goes	Delta force unacceptable degraded	3 helos land, 13 Delta or crew bc

TS

EVENT/  
SITUATIONS

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

5 helos available,  
Delta helo goes

Same as above

the cargo helo, 5  
Delta board each o  
the other two helo

4 helos land sprta  
load the personnel  
attempt lift off  
with nets, if unah  
dump nets.

4 helos available,  
Delta helo goes  
down

Same as above

Abort, strip down,  
spread personnel  
among 3 helos,  
proceed to hideout  
extract on MC-130'  
the next night.

3 helos available  
Delta helo goes  
down.

Same as above

From here on we mu  
find a recovery  
airfield to secure  
and call for the  
MC-130's

3/0124Z  
(1024 EST)

Any major problem  
at the dropoff  
point

Mission could be  
blown and/or force  
degraded

Option 1: Abort,  
move to hideout,  
meet MC-130s next  
night.

Option 2: Continue  
ground commander's  
decision.

3/2200Z  
2210Z  
(1750-1710 EST)

Helo goes down  
enroute to hideout

Will affect ability  
to perform extraction

If 3 or more helos  
available, continu  
if < 3, inform Delta  
and abort to  
Manzariyeh.

3/0124Z  
2135Z  
(12024 - 3/1335)

Delta is discovered  
enroute while helos  
are at hideout

With the force split  
Delta must be able to  
call the helos to a  
predetermined RV

Move helos at night  
to RV to p/u Delta  
then to Manzariyeh  
for extraction.

TS



TIME/ SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTION



3/1500Z AC-130 launch  
3/1630Z AC-130 Launch  
(1730Z) 5 MC-130 OK  
4 MC-130 OK  
3 "  
2 "  
<2 "

Personnel jammed on A/C -  
Unable to extract all  
hostages + Delta  
+ Rangers (149 people)

GO  
- P/U only hostages  
+ wounded  
- Direct [redacted]  
launch and P/U  
some leftovers

3/1545 KC-135 launch for  
(1645Z) MC-130  
3 KC-135 OK  
<3 " OK

Insufficient fuel  
for 5 MC-130

Refuel at least 2  
MC-130, more if  
possible.

3/1605 KC-135 launch for AC-130  
(3/1605Z) MC-130 refuel  
>2 MC-130 OK  
<2 MC-130 OK

Unable to extract  
all hostages + Delta  
and Rangers

Go  
Same as above

3/1900 AC-130 Refuel  
(2/1900Z) MC-130 refuel  
>2 MC-130 OK  
<2 MC-130 OK

Same as above

Same as above

3/2135Z Helo lift off from  
(1635Z) hideout  
>3 RH-53 OK  
<3 RH-53 OK

Unable to lift out  
all hostages + Delta

Use extras (>3) for  
CAS  
- Cycle helos from  
Manzariyah to  
Embassy

3/2230Z MC-130's arrive at  
(1730Z) Manzariyah find R/W  
blocked

- Unable to land  
secure airfield

- Paratroop Rangers  
onto airfield  
- Wait for Delta  
helos to arrive  
to secure field and  
clear R/W

3/2230Z Helos land at  
(1730Z) Embassy  
5 RH-53 OK

Will have extra helos

- Use extra helos  
provide [redacted]

3 RH-53 OK

Min reqd helos for  
for extraction

- Land helos singly  
use other 2 for  
[redacted] if need

<2 RH-53 OK

Not sufficient helos  
for extraction

- Cycle helos for  
extraction

3/2230Z  
2300Z

(1730Z)

TIME	EVENT/SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
32245Z (3/15/51)	Extraction: 23 Helo's OK 21 Helo OK  Zero Helo's OK	Normal operation Unable to extract all personnel Unable to extract by Helo	Go Cycle Helo's  Use [REDACTED] Manzariych
3300Z (3/15/51)	Helos arrive at Manzariych. 23 RH-53 OK  <3 RH-53 OK  <3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130  Zero helo's OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130  Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle  Helos will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground  MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded  - MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded  MC-130 plus 1 or 2 extra MC-130  - Keep all MC-130's ground till per- sonnel arrive - Launch two MC-130 for [REDACTED] or for departure
4/0015 (3/17/51)	AC-130 departs area		
4/0045 (3/17/51)	AC-130 refuel  Delta is discovered	Mission if blown	- Have Delta set up prearranged rally points. If discovered, dis- engage, proceed to rally pt. When helo's lift off, direct them to appropriate P/U zone. - Establish Manzariych as rally point, Hel go to Manzariych if no contact with Delta

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SR 458 1607Z

#458

SSN 2141  
O 231505Z APR 82  
FM: SITE ALPHA/JTF  
TO: JTF/RG  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJ: [REDACTED] OVER FLIGHTS  
REF: COMJTF MSG 230950Z APR, SAME SUBJECT AS ABOVE.

1. SUBJECT MISSION HAD SOME OMISSIONS PLEASE CHANGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

[REDACTED]

2. THE COMMANDER THOUGHT THAT THE SUGGESTED APPROACH COULD BE USED BY [REDACTED] IF THE FORCE WERE DISCOVERED IN [REDACTED] AIRSPACE ENROUTE TO OBJECTIVE AREA.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
BT

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~ 12 Aug 92  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#457

1. THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS WILL BE USED BY THESE ELEMENTS:

THE SUPER-10 WILL BE WITH HELIOS,  
THE OTHER ELEMENTS WILL BE WITH CAMBERG AND MANZARIYER.

THE FOLLOWING COMPOSITIONS WILL BE USED BY THESE ELEMENTS:

ELEMENT      AN/PPH-15 CODE

HELIOS  
DELTA  
AMBERG

2. FORWARD AIR CONTROL WILL BE ON UNIFORM FREQUENCIES (PRIMARY) IN ACCORDANCE WITH C-01.

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by  
DDO nmcl  
12/11/99

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET  
2000000 APP 70  
1000000  
1000000

EG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION IS A SUMMARY OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE SOURCE  
AND IS NOT NECESSARILY AVAILABLE AS OF 1200000 03 00000

ORIGIN	FLY NO.	ORIG	DEST	CLASS/REF
IRAN	IR 1703	TEHRAN	FRANKFURT	230000/
YUGOSLAV	JP 1950	TEHRAN	LJUELJANA	230000/230000
SYRIAN	YKAF0 (VIP)	DAMASCUS	TEHRAN	231400/231015

#  
455

4007031

013/0112  
1141236  
2103  
ST  
7013

Classified By ~~DDONMCC~~ DDONMCC  
Declassified On OADR 12 Aug 99  
Amended by DDONMCC  
12 Aug 99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

142

#454

TO: [REDACTED]  
FROM: [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

EG

1. DELTA SECURITY FORCE EQUIPMENT  
2. CLOUDBURST NETS FOR HELOS WILL ARRIVE HOUR 130 VIA C-130  
3. 240322Z APR 60. ADDITIONALLY LOAD WILL CONSIST OF TWO (2)  
MOTORCYCLES ONE (1) 1/4 TON JEEP AND SIX (6) MEMBERS FROM DELTA  
SECURITY FORCE.  
4. REQUEST YOU HAVE [REDACTED] DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY ON THE THREE EC-130'S  
TO EXPEDITE TRANSFER OF DELTA FORCE AT [REDACTED] ALSO BRIEF EC-130  
CREWS TO KICK OUT [REDACTED] AT REFUEL SITE.  
5. THE 1/4 TON JEEP AND MOTOR BIKES AND PAX MUST BE  
MANIFESTED ON THE FIRST MC-130 FLYING TO REFUEL SITE.  
BT  
#0142

E

*Downgraded by COMSEC  
DDO NMCC to CONF  
12 May 92*

Classified By: *DDO NMCC*  
Declassified ON: *12 Aug 92*  
*OADR*

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CLASSIFIED BY  
DECLASSIFY ON  
 DECLASSIFY ON  
REVIEW ON  
REVIEW BY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

[REDACTED]

NOT  
107

E, G

[REDACTED]

(c) 1. EXECUTE ABOVE RELEASE AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIME.

SSN # ~~0154~~  
#447

E, G

(c) 2. FINAL RELEASE: COL [REDACTED] AND LTC [REDACTED] ARE BEING DIRECTED TO PERSONALLY DELIVER RESPECTIVE LETTERS TO [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] U.S. AMBASSADORS IN [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] WILL BE ADVISED OF LETTER CONTENT SUBSEQUENT TO CUCS AUTHORITY FOR FINAL RELEASE.

E, G

(c) 3. A COPY OF LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR COL [REDACTED] IS BEING FORWARDED TO YOU. REQUEST COLONEL [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS BE PLACED IN A SEALED ENVELOPE AND BE PROVIDED TO [REDACTED] FOR DELIVERY TO [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] SHOULD BE ADVISED TO DELIVER BOTH THE RESIDENTIAL LETTER AND THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO COLONEL [REDACTED].

G

(c) 4. LTC GAST IS RECEIVING SEPARATE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR COORDINATION WITH LTC [REDACTED] ET

NNNN

DDOJmcc  
Classified By: JES 12 Aug 9  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDOJmcc  
12 Aug 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# 446

TO JCS/RC

1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS AS FOLLOWS:  
 (1) TWO C-141 ARR [REDACTED] MANAGERS: 231731Z AND 230845Z  
 (2) ONE C-141 ARR [REDACTED] W/MEDICAL: 231120Z  
 (3) ONE MC-130 ARR [REDACTED] : 231150Z  
 (4) TWO AC-130 ARR [REDACTED] : 231400Z AND 231450Z  
 (5) FIVE KC-135 ARR [REDACTED] : 231500Z, 231627Z, 231406Z, 231417Z, AND 231530Z

2. JTF FORCE NOW ON STATION:

- (1) JTF STAFF
- (2) THREE MC-130. 567 NMC PARTS. 572 NMC #4 PROP VALVE HOUSING CHANGE. ETIC 240400 LOCAL.
- (3) FOUR AC-130. 569 NMC MINOR ENG. PROBLEM. 572 NMC INERTIAL NAV. ETIC 240400 LOCAL.
- (4) ELEVEN KC-135. ALL FMC
- (5) DELTA. MOVES TO [REDACTED] TOMORROW.
- (6) [REDACTED] MOVES TO [REDACTED] TOMORROW
- (7) [REDACTED]

A, E

- (1) THREE EC-130. ALL FMC
- (2) FOUR MC-130. ALL JMC
- (3) NIMITZ. EIGHT HELOS AND CREWS. ALL HELOS CAMOFLAGE PAINTED AND FMC.
- (4) [REDACTED] FOUR KC-135. ALL FMC.
- (5) OPERATIONAL REHEARSALS CONDUCTED BY DELTA AND CCTS LAST NIGHT. REHEARSALS AND RANGER TRAINING TO BE CONDUCTED TO NITE.
- (6) COMMUNICATIONS.
- (7) AFTER EXTENSIVE SYSTEM RECONFIGURATION AND REALIGNMENT THE JHF SYSTEMS LOOK THE BEST THEY HAVE EVER BEEN.
- (8) C141 WITH MSC-3 ARRIVED TODAY. IT CHECKED GOOD IN SATCOM MODE WHILE ON THE GROUND THIS LOCATION.
- (9) AS OF THIS TIME ADEQUATE COMMS ARE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT MISSION.
- BT

Classified By: ~~JES~~ DDON/mcc  
Declassified ON: OADR 12 Aug 92

Downgraded to CONF by DDON/mcc 12 Aug 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



G

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] WILL RECEIVE APPROX 550 GAL  
[REDACTED] AMMO FOR HELICOPTERS. CREW CHIEFS  
WILL HAVE TO ASSIST [REDACTED] IN LOADING

#445

G

FIRST TWO HELICOPTERS WILL RETURN TO  
TRAP POINT MIDWAY TO TANGO AS BACKUP.  
INTELL/COORD POINT WILL BE AT MID POINT  
TRAP WAY. REQUIRE THIRD HELICOPTER TO REFUEL  
AND POSITION AT POINT TANGO AND REMAIN  
MOTORS RUNNING UNTIL ALL BUT LAST C-130  
HAS DEPARTED. SHUTDOWN WILL BE ON  
FORWARD.

G (U)

C-130'S LOADING SIX BLIMITS. A C-130 [REDACTED]  
WILL BE AT FULL POINT WITH GUNS AND AMMO.  
[REDACTED] WILL BE AT DESERT TRACK. [REDACTED] WILL BE  
INSTRUCTED TO PUT HIM ON HELICOPTER WITH PATMAN.  
RECREAT LAST MIN CHANGES BUT WANT YOU TO RECEIVE THIS INFO.  
BEN VAUGHT SENDS.  
BT

Classified by JCS  
Declassified by OADR  
Declassified by  
DDONMCD  
12 Aug 92

XXXX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOO 74  
TOT  
2328  
/

NO EOM.

SSM126  
NY TTTT  
0 2328Z  
FM JTF ALPHA  
TO USM1HITZ  
JCS/RG  
BT

E,G

1. CTF 78 WILL SUPPLY CAP SUPPORT TO GROUND/AIR UNITS  
REQUIRING ASSISTANCE. UNITS MUST  
HAVE UHF COMM ON 341.4 MHZ (PRI) AND 240.5MHZ  
(SEC) BEFORE CAP UNITS CAN COMMIT. USE UNIT  
CALL SIGNS LISTED IN CE01 AND GIVE POSITION  
USING ECAP POINT CODE WORD. GROUND UNITS USE SMOKE TO  
ASSIST IF POSSIBLE.

#443

ECAP POINT	DISCRIPTION	COORDINATES
ALPHA	REFUEL AREA	33-0425N/55-52-55E
BRAVO	HEL0 HIDE-	
CHARLIE	WAREHOUSE-	
DELTA	EMBASSY	35-42-43N/51-25-30E
ECHO	MANZARIYCH-	
FOXTROT		
GOLF		
HOTEL		
INDIA	ROAD RAILROAD JUNCTION	35-15-08N/52-45-02E

A

2. CAP A/C WILL MONITOR TACAN-CHAN 90. GIVE POSIT  
IN RANGE AND BEARING FROM NEAREST ECAP POINT. IF  
NOT POSSIBLE PROVIDE LAT LONG COORDINATES.  
3. PASS THIS INFO TO ALL UNITS PRIOR TO  
START OF MSN.  
4. REQUEST CTF 78 PUBLISH CAP CALL SIGN TO  
ALCON ASAP.  
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 26 RECEIVED.

NO EOM.

Classified By ~~DDO~~ NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR 12 Aug 92

Downgraded to  
CONF by DDONM  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
✓  
✓  
④ 450

WEATHER OBS FOR REQUESTED STNS WYKMIL FOR 23/1800Z HOUR.  
PLAZENATL  
WIND DIR, HGT - VIS, WVA - TMB DIR/SP (KT3) - SEA LVL PRESS - TEMP

TABRIZ  
007 1800-1800M - 07KM, BCEL - 24/112 - 1000.0MB - 21 DEG C.

REZA'JIYEH  
007 1800-1800M - 08KM, HAZE - 350/10 - 1026.1MB - 20 DEG C.

TEHRAN  
007 1800-1800M - 05KM, I. WOPM - 240/20 - 1007.1MB - 26 DEG C.

DEHAHAN/KHATAM  
007 1800-1800M - 10KM, NONE - 240/10 - 1000.0MB - 26 DEG C.

BIRJAND  
007 1800-1800M - 12KM, NONE - 230/10 - 1073.6MB - 30 DEG C.

ISFHAH  
007 1800-1800M - 08KM, DUST - 100/12 - 1026.2MB - 32 DEG C.

ZAHEDAN  
CLEAR - 12KM, NONE - 630/10 - 1007.0MB - 32 DEG C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BT  
#0144

Classified by:  
DDO NMcL  
12 Aug 92  
Declassify on: OADR  
Downgraded to  
conf by  
DDO NMcL  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

707

438

(U) 1. TO ENSURE MOST RELIABLE PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY, ALL MISSION PERSONNEL WILL BE MANIFESTED AND LOADED AFTER A PRELIMINARY MISSION ROSTERS AND CHECKS HAVE BEEN MADE. INDIVIDUALS ASSIGNED TO THE MISSION WILL BE FACILITATED WITH A WORKING LISTING OFFICER/RECOVERY OFFICER. THIS WILL BE PLACED ON THE MISSION REPORT PRELIMINARY. ROSTERS AND CASUALTY REPORTING: PRELIMINARY ROSTERS WILL BE REPORTED ONCE ALL AIRCRAFT HAVE REPORTED. HOWEVER, THIS REPORT SHOULD BE RECEIVED WITH SKETICISM BECAUSE OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY WILL BE ACQUIRED.

E

(C) 2. UPON ARRIVAL AT [REDACTED] ALL PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE HOSTAGES AND AIRCREWS WILL BE MET BY RECEIPT TEAMS. EACH INDIVIDUAL TO BE CHECKED BY NAME AS THEY DEBOARD. DATA WILL BE COMPILED AT JTF HQ. ONCE COMPILED, A SECOND RELIABLE REPORT WILL BE RENDERED.

E

(C) 3. CASUALTY REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AFTER SECOND BY NAME ON OR AT [REDACTED]. AGREE CASUALTY NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY RESPECTIVE SERVICE. POSITIVE ID OF KIA, IF ANY, WILL BE ATTEMPTED.

E

DO NOT BELIEVE IT FEASIBLE TO RETROGRADE THOSE HELD PERSONNEL NOT LAUNCHED ON MISSION. THOSE MISSION CREWS WILL BE RETROGRADED THROUGH [REDACTED] PROVIDED CLEAN CLOTHING AND SHIPPED WITH DELTA TO CONUS FOR DEBRIEFING. THOSE REMAINING ABOARD THE NIMITZ WOULD BE TRANSPORTED THROUGH CHANNELS. THEIR ARRIVAL IN CONUS WOULD COINCIDE WITH OR SHORTLY THERE AFTER RELEASE OF MISSION CREWS FROM ISOLATION.

(C)

[REDACTED] AND SELECTED STAFF WILL REMAIN BEHIND TO COMPLETE ROLLOUP. CONUTE, DECONUTE TENTATIVELY WILL DEPART WITH DELTA.

Classified by DDOW/mcl/raus

Declassify on OADR

Downgraded by DDOW/mcl/raus by 12 Aug 97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: JES  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E, G

~~[REDACTED]~~

E

~~[REDACTED]~~

1. THERE ARE THREE AIRLIFT SUPPORT MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE ~~[REDACTED]~~ 24 APR 68.  
2. THE THREE MISSIONS ARE SCHEDULED AS FOLLOWS:

AIRCRAFT	ETA	FUEL REQ
C-130	240548Z APR	3,700 G
C-141	241045Z APR	20,000 G
C-141	241115Z APR	20,000 G

3. THE C-141S SHOULD ONLY REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 18,000 GALLONS OF FUEL EACH. HOWEVER, WE ARE REQUESTING THE HIGHER AMOUNT IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE IMPACT ON OUR FUEL SUPPLIES.  
BT

UNNN

*437*

*DDO, NMCC  
12 Aug 68*

Classified By: OADR  
Declassified ON: OADR

*Downgraded to CONF  
by DDO, NMCC  
12 Aug 68*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 24/1452

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

ONE MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED.  
FLIGHT WITH OTHER LABEL, AND  
WAS TO DELTA FORCE. MESSAGE  
TO THE CHAIRMAN AT THE MEETING.

#436

~~Classified BY JCS  
Declassified ON OADR~~

SECRET

MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC

DECL  THRU TO Secret

REVISED BY OADR

CLASSIFIED BY ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7/7/15/4E  
②

G

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: PAR PREPARATIONS  
1. ENSURE THAT SAC COMMUNITY TREATS  
KNOWLEDGE AND ANTICIPATED PREPARATIONS FOR  
SAC EFFORT IN SENSITIVE COMPARTMENT CHANNELS.  
2. PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT  
ALLOWABLE PRIOR TO SOURCE'S APPROVAL  
OF

# 435

SIAM

Declassified by *DD nmcc*  
*12 Aug 92*  
Classified By: *JCS*  
Declassified ON: *OADR*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COM 1177  
12-1530T APR 80  
SITE ALPHA/J2  
FM: MINITE/HELD JET

REFRANS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

#427


MS3124  
CTG: 240335Z APR 80

FM: JCS/PC-J2  
TO: SITE ALPHA

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: HOSTAGES LOCATION

1. THIS OFFICE HAS BEEN RECEIVING FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS AND SEPARATE SOURCES OF UNKNOWN RELIABILITY THAT



2. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IT BE KEPT IN MIND ALL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THIS POINT WILL BE DATED BY THE TIME OF OPERATION. DUE TO DEMONSTRATIONS EXPECTED ON THE 24TH AND POSSIBLY THE 25TH THERE MAY AGAIN BE A RESHUFFLE/CONSOLIDATION OF THE HOSTAGES AND INCREASE IN MILITANT/REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ALERTNESS ON THURSDAY NIGHT AT LEAST. THIS SITUATION COULD LAST INTO FRIDAY IF DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE AND COME NEAR THE COMPOUND.

3. FOR MAJ [REDACTED] PLS PASS BEST WISHES/LUCK TO COL PITTMAN FOR ME, AND TO THE CREWS FM J2. THANX, [REDACTED]

G

~~TOP SECRET~~  
BT

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 1235  
CONDUCTED BY [Signature]  
REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC  
[Signature]  
BY [Signature]  
BY DIA

NNNN



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSA 1175  
NY TTTT  
LTC 2-11-83  
FM JTF  
TO JCS/NO

#425

(c) [REDACTED]  
SUBJ: MOVEMENT  
TWO C-141S W/ [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
FOR [REDACTED] AND 240500Z APR 83  
ET [REDACTED] 241400Z AND 241100Z.  
BT  
#0175

E

NNNN

Classified By ~~DDO~~ DDO, Nmcc  
Declassified ON: OADR 12 Aug 92  
Downgraded to CONF  
by DDO Nmcc  
12 Aug 92

RRR QSL AT 2000Z INT 3608Z AND IF U DONT HAVE  
ANYMORE I HAVE ONE FOR U INT-RRR RRR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SSN 0177

NOT RECORDED  
NSL 06302

E, G

FLY/CH FLY/CH  
TO [REDACTED]  
008/008  
BT

#423

RELAX

E

1.) REQUEST IN [REDACTED] QUERY OF AMEMB  
[REDACTED] TO DETERMINE LOCATION OF [REDACTED]  
2.) LTC COL. [REDACTED] IS PLANNING TO DELIVER  
SENSITIVE LETTER TO THE [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED]  
HOWEVER, ON 18 APRIL THE [REDACTED] AS IN  
THE [REDACTED] NEED TO  
KNOW HIS PRESENT LOCATION.

E, G

3.) REQUIRE ANSWER AT EARLIEST. BECAUSE OF  
MUSLIM WEEKEND, ADDRESS ALL MESSAGES  
TO AMEMB [REDACTED] MIACI IMMEDIATE.

4.) IF [REDACTED] IS IN [REDACTED] IT WOULD  
EXPEDITE MATTERS TO HAVE U.S. AMBASSADOR  
MEET [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED]

(b) 5.) IF LTC GAST IS COMING WITH INFORMATION,  
DISREGARD THIS REQUEST.

BT  
#016

Classified By  
Declassified ON

DDO nmc  
12 Aug 92  
DADR  
DDO nmc  
12 Aug 92

NNNNBZSS0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

090 0170  
ZNY TTTTT  
LTC C 240340Z APR 80  
FM JTF  
TO JTF/RG  
BT

107  
10712  
542 070

#422

E/G

(S) ~~██████████~~ LOCATION OF ~~██████████~~ MISC  
REFERENCE ~~██████████~~  
242815Z APR 80  
REQUEST YOUR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE  
IN LOCATING THE ~~██████████~~ AND  
IF APPROPRIATE COORDINATE MEETING  
BETWEEN ~~██████████~~ AND US AMBASSADOR  
IN ~~██████████~~  
BT  
#0179

NNNN

Classified By ~~██████████~~ DDO NMC  
Declassified ON 0ADR 12 Aug 92

Declassified by:  
DDO NMC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT / 17-  
TOT / 10-21  
R-1 / 10-14

(E) (S) LTO 032315Z APR 68  
FM JCMJTF  
TO DEPOCM JTF, FIXED WING AIR OPS, [REDACTED] COL KYLE  
DEPOCM JTF, HELO OPS, NIMITZ / COL PITTMAN

~~SECRET~~

#018  
#421

COEJ: REPORTS  
1. (S) THE FOLLOWING REQUIRED REPORTS ARE IN ADDITION TO THOSE LISTED IN PARA 84, JTF 79 CECI (18 APR 1968)

INDIV MAKING REPORT	ACTIVITY REPORTED	CODEWORD	MEANS
COL KYLE (WOODPECKER)	ALL 130 TYPE ACFT DEPARTED DESERT LAND	SWEETROLL	MC 130/WSC3 SECURE
COL PITTMAN (ZEBRA)	RH53'S ARRIVED AT HIDEOUT LOCATION	HONEY DEW	WSC3 SECURE OR PT 25 SECURE OR PSC-1

BT

NNNN

Classified By ~~DDO~~ 12-1-68  
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by DDO/MC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

107  
2410914  
652 2915-

#418

SSN 1184  
ZNY TTTT  
DTG 240800Z APR 82  
FM COMJTF/VAUGHT  
TO CJCS  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: SENSITIVE LETTER

1. I HAVE PASSED THE [REDACTED] LETTER TO [REDACTED] HE WILL PASS IT TO [REDACTED] WHO WILL CONVEY IT TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WILL STAY IN [REDACTED] THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION. [REDACTED] WILL STAY IN [REDACTED] TO FACILITATE THE C-141

MISSION AND PROVIDE ASSURANCES AND CLARIFICATION ON ANY ACTIVITY DETECTED BY [REDACTED]

2. ALL PARTIES WILL BE TIED IN WITH GEN EAST BY SECURE COMMUNICATION. EACH WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO. THEY WILL BE TRUEFUL OR [REDACTED] WOULD LIKE STATE OR SOMEONE TO BRIEF [REDACTED] ABOUT THE SAME TIME

[REDACTED] IS INFORMED.

3. ALL ELSE GOES WELL. WEATHER LOOKED GOOD AT 0700Z. WILL MAKE DECISION ABOUT 1300Z..

BT  
#B184

E  
I, E, G  
ETC  
(u)

Classified By [REDACTED] DDO N M CC  
Declassified ON: OADR 12 Aug 92

Normalized to conf  
by DDO N M CC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SC / JSC 09282

#417

SSN 2187  
ZNY TTTT  
DTG 240920Z APR 82  
FM ALPHA/J2  
TO JCS/RC-J2  
BT

SUBJECT: FIGHTER REACTION TIMES

(G)(U)

1. AFTER QUESTIONING HAS [REDACTED] HAVE LEARNED THAT ALERT FIGHTERS CAN START ENGINES WHILE STILL IN HANGAR.
  - HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE AN ALERT F-4 WITH ENGINE RUNNING TO BECOME AIRBORNE ONCE IT EXITS ITS HANGAR?
  - HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE AN ALERT F-4 THAT IS NOT IN A HANGAR TO BECOME AIRBORNE ONCE MAINT/TECH PERSONNEL ARRIVE AT THE A/C AND BEGIN TO PREPARE IT FOR LAUNCH?
2. WHAT IS EST. EST. OF FIGHTER ON-STATION TIME AT [REDACTED] ONCE ACTIVITY AT THAT LOC IS DETECTED?

A

BT  
#0187

Classified By ~~DDO NMC~~ 12 Aug 92  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded to CONF  
By DDO JMC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*45C 09302*

*#415*

REF ID: A66017  
ZNY  
TO: JCRC/RC

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT STATUS

AIRCRAFT STATUS AC OF 240930Z APR 82 IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. NIMITZ - EIGHT HELOS ALL FMC

B.

(1) THREE MC-130S. ONE NMC DUE TO LACK OF BRAKE PARTS (ETIC PARTS PLUS 1).

(2) FOUR AC-133S. ONE PMC DUE TO AUTOPILOT HOLD INOP/ALR-46 INOP (ETIC PARTS PLUS 2).

(3) ONE C-141 FMC. TWO ENROUTE TO [REDACTED]

(4) ELEVEN KC-135S. ALL FMC.

C.

(1) FOUR MC-130S FMC

(2) THREE EC-130S FMC.

D. SEVEN KC-135S ALL FMC.

E. IF PARTS DO NOT ARRIVE FOR NMC MC-130 AND PMC AC-132, CANNIBALIZATION FROM C-130S WILL BE CONSIDERED.

BT

#2168

NNNN

*Classified By JES  
Declassified ON OADR*

*Downgraded by:  
DDO/NMCC  
12 Aug 92*

*Classified by  
DDO/NMCC  
12 Aug 92  
Declassify on  
TOP SECRET*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

76 T  
1-17

152 APR 80

FULL RETRANS FOR US INFO  
SUBJECT: SATRAM EXTENSION (U)

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/  
INTS:

SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 230400/120000  
TO 270400/240000

[REDACTED]

#414

[REDACTED]

REVW 23 APR 80

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL EX DOWNGR TO Secret  
REVW ON OADR  
EXEMPT FROM JS DIA

~~SECRET~~



CSM 1101  
NY TTTT  
DTG 0 231602Z APR 80  
FM HELD DET/NIMITZ/J-2  
TO SITE ALFA/J-2  
INFO JCC/RC-J2/LEHANN

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

OSC 10552  
#091

E, G

BT  
TOP SECRET // DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST  
SUBJ: INT REP 85

1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY

[REDACTED]

2. AGI 472 PERHAPS SELL SOVIET SURVEILLANCE PLATFORM IN  
OUR IMMEDIATE AREA. AS OF 231702Z SNOOPER WAS LOC VIC 22.2N  
62.5E IN TRAIL OF ARG.

AT 0730Z FRENCH DDG 640  
AND FR 725 WERE SIGHTED BY NIMITZ SCOUT A/C VIC 22.1N 63E  
ON NW COURSE AT 12KTS. SECOND SCOUT LOCATED FRENCH AOR 626 28NH  
EAST OF AL NASIRAH (VIC 22.2N 65.1E) PROCEEDING E@ AT 12KTS.

ANTICIPATE THEY WILL BE WELL CLEAR OF OUR AO BY TOMORROW  
A.M. NO KNOWN SOVIET MESHIPS IN THE BOX ALTHOUGH AOR LEMINA IS  
UNLOCATED. BUT WE  
ARE STILL CHECKING TODAY'S FAC RECCE PHOTOS.

3. IN ADDITION TO IL-39 ACTIVITY REPORTED IN MY INT  
REP 84.

BOTH [REDACTED] REMAINED MINIMUM 250NM FROM NIMITZ  
AND DISPLAYED NO INTEREST IN CTF 70. IRANIAN A/R RECCE PREVIOUSLY  
NOTED. NO INDICATION OF CONCERN IN [REDACTED]

4. AT APPROX 0800Z LT COL SIEFFERT AND CAPT [REDACTED] (NSM PRIMARY  
NAVY) FLEW LEADERS AERIAL RECCE OF CIP IN YA-35 N-6E. REVIEW OF  
FLIR TAPES AND DEBRIEF INDICATE OUR CHARTS OF CIP AREA ARE  
ACCURATE.

5. NEXT INT REP WILL BE ON THE WAY NLT 240930Z AS PER YOUR  
REQUEST.

BEVW: 23APR80

BT

410

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12956

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL  DOWNGR TO Secret

REVW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

NNNN

RCR OSL AT 0555Z -1M1 OSL AT 0555Z MKKK

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

USN 112  
ZNY TTTT

~~SECRET~~

(#409)

0 241020Z APR 60  
FM HFO DET/NIMITZ/S-2  
TO SITE ALPHA/J-2  
INFO

JCS/RC-J2/LENINAR

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ // DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST  
SUBJ: INT REP 66

1. ALL SOVIET NAVAL COMBATANTS REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF NIMITZ  
AGI 477 IS LOCATED

WESTERN OF ARC ALFA CURRENTLY MAINTAINING  
SURVEILLANCE OF CTF 70 UNITS. AS OF 240800Z 477 WAS 212NM FROM  
NIMITZ AT APPROX 22.00N 063.19E PROCEEDING CRSE 100. SPEED 18KTS.  
2. PRIMARY SOVIET PLATFORM OF CONCERN IS AOR LENINA. LAST  
POSITIVELY LOCATED

HOWEVER, CTF 70 UNITS AND A/C MONITORING PERSTAN  
WLF HAVE NOT SIGHTED LENINA IN TRANSIT

FLEET SCOUT A/C  
OPERATING IN THIS AREA HAVE NOT SEEN HER BUT NIMITZ IS SCHED TO  
FLY ANOTHER MISSION THIS AFTERNOON.

3. GIVEN UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING AOR'S LOC BELIEVE IT PRUDENT  
TO CONCLUDE SHE IS IN MASIRAH AREA AND PLAN ACCORDINGLY. LENINA  
HAS NO AIR SEARCH RADAR BUT MUST BE CREDITED WITH PASSIVE  
COLLECTION CAPABILITIES FOR BOTH ELINT AND COMINT. CONSEQUENTLY  
RECOMMEND THAT MC-130'S USE RADAR ALTIMETER ONLY (VICE TERRAIN  
MAPPING) IN GULF TRANSIT AND STAY OFF THE AIR AS PLANNED. SIDE  
LOBE PATTERN OF ALTIMETER AT 500 AGL IS SO SMALL THAT LIKELIHOOD OF  
DETECTION IS NEAR ZERO. CHANCE OF VISUAL ID IN PROJECTED FLIGHT  
ROUTE CLEARING DARKNESS IS SAME. SAME LEVELS OF CAUTION ADVISED  
ON OUTBOUND OVER WATER LEG.

4. NO KNOWN RED FLAG MERCHANTS IN THE BOX BUT COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC  
REMAINS HEAVY THROUGH STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

6. FURTHER INTREPS WILL BE ON AS REQUIRED BASIS FOCUSING ON LENINA  
AND AGI. YOUR MSG 882 OF 221930Z REQUESTED "LOCATION AND DTG OF  
INFO ON SOV AND OTHER SHIPS" IN THE BOX. GIVEN COURSE/SPEED  
POSSIBILITIES, TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE MERCHANTS IN THE AREA WILL  
REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 4 PAGES OF SINGLE SPACE POSITS AND TWO  
MAN DAYS OF CALCULATION. UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED INTEND TO  
REPORT RED FLAGS ONLY.

BEYM: 26APR60

BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EA 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 72

DERIVATIVE OF BY DDO NMCC

DESL  CONTROL TO Secret

REYN ON OADR

DELETED FROM

NRG:WV

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT/1117  
KCL

E, G

UPON ARRIVAL OF [REDACTED] YOUR  
LOCATION. IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN KEILIST  
SERIALS 490 AT, DAY 24 AND KEY GUN.  
PROGRAM AND COORDINATE WITH  
[REDACTED] TO KEY UP ALL AC-119

#402

G

1. INTEGRATE IN TANKER TASK FORCE.  
2. INSURE THAT KEYING IS DONE AFTER  
AIRCRAFT IS ON OWN INTERNAL POWER  
AS KY-29 WILL UNKEY WHEN POWER IS  
CHANGED FROM POWER CART TO APU.  
3. LISTED BELOW IS KEY SETTING FOR DAY 24  
TO BE USED SHOULD SALVAN NOT  
ARRIVE IN TIME. PROCURE KEY GUN  
FROM LOCAL RESOURCES [REDACTED]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
MP	MN	LN	MP	LP	MN	MP	LP	MN	G	D	F	K	E	G
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26				
H	J	A	J	A	B	C	E	C	H	E				
27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37				
K	MN	MN	LP	MP	LN	MN	LN	MP	LP	MN				
38	39	40	41											
LN	MP	MP	MP											

4. INSURE ALL AIRCRAFT ARE KEYED WITH SAME  
KEY GUN.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
BT  
#8132

NNNN

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassify on: OADR  
Downgraded  
DDO: [REDACTED]  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7/7/13  
13107

#401

ZZ 24 1000Z APR 68

FM COMJTF (VAUGHT)

TO DEPCOMJTF (CAST)

DEPCOMJTF/FIXED WING AIR OPS/ (KYLE)

COM (BECKWITH)

DEPCOM HELO OPS NIMITZ (PITTMAN)

INFO JTF/RC

BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER

EXECUTE MISSION AS BRIEFED

WE ARE READY AND ABLE. GOD SPEED

BT

Classified by: S. D. ...  
Declassified by: JES  
Downgraded by: OADR  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 1300  
RCL  
EG

#400

SSM 203

ZNY TTTT

ZZ 24 125 12 APR 83

FM JTF/

TO

BT

EG

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER

THIS IS EXECUTE ORDER FOR

MISSION. LAUNCH KC-135 AIRCRAFT

FOR PREPLANNED SUPPORT OF CTF 70 AND

MC/EC-130 MISSIONS.

BT

NNNN

Classified By: JES  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE 1 JUL AT 1234 0000 0000

# 399

2/OSC 12428/K

SSN 1153  
FM SITE ALPHA  
TO JTF/J-3  
JTF/KC  
INFO JTF  
BT

SUBJECT SCHEDULE ADJUSTMENT  
REQUEST YOU MAKE THE FOLLOWING  
CHANGES TO NIGHT TWO FLOW PLAN:

- A. ADJUST AC-130 DEPARTURE TIME FROM [REDACTED] TO 1420Z (VICE 1503Z)
- B. ADJUST AC-130 PRE-ARCT TIME TO 1730Z (VICE 1753-1818Z)
- C. ADJUST DC-130 POST-ORCT TIME TO 0120Z (VICE 0134Z)
- D. ADJUST AC-130 RECOVERY TIME TO 0450Z (VICE 0459Z)

CHANGES ARE REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE 15 MINUTE SENSOR ALIGNMENT (OVERHEAD [REDACTED] AND FINAL FLIGHT PLANNING BASED ON UPDATED ENROUTE WIND PREDICTION. ~~2015~~ REVISED TIMES DO NOT AFFECT TIMES AT THE ORBIT POINT OR AVAILABLE TIME ON TARGET.

BT  
#3156

Classified By 303 DDO NMCC  
Declassified ONI OADR  
Downgraded by DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

File



~~SECRET~~

707-1000  
[scribbles]

0241312Z APR 92  
FM ALFA/J2  
TO JCS/RC-3-2  
BT

#398

1. REQUEST ASSESSMENT OF FIGHTER  
THREAT TO AC-130 GUNSHIPS OPERATING  
OVER [REDACTED]  
SPECIFICALLY, INCLUDE ESTIMATES OF TIME  
REQUIRED FROM [REDACTED]  
UNTIL FIGHTERS ARRIVE OVER [REDACTED] AND  
EFFECTIVENESS OF FIGHTERS AGAINST  
[REDACTED]

B,  
C

2. TO REDUCE/ELIMINATE CHANCES OF  
FIGHTERS FINDING FRIENDLY A/C AT [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] WHICH  
[REDACTED]

3. SAME QUESTION AS PARA 2 ABOVE  
FOR [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

#0201

NNNN00

Classified By: ~~30~~ DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1007 005.2000  
- 1337 A  
10 - 1337 A

395

TO TTTT  
TO 240123 APP  
ALPHA/02  
TO JCS/AF-32

E, G

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

INFO: MTF HQ

1. ONCE HELOS/LEO'S LAUNCH,  
[REDACTED] TO OR LOCS  
WOULD NORMALLY FOLLOW.

A, C

2. IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS  
[REDACTED] JTF WILL XMIT

TFC TO OR LOCS DURING  
EXECUTION PHASE OF OPN. ON WSC-3 UPLINK FREQ 285.875 TFC  
WILL INCLUDE COMPLETELY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OF TFC

[REDACTED] XMITTED TO YOU. QSL  
IF THIS TRAFFIC BY YOUR STA IS NOT DESIRED.

3. TFC WILL BEGIN AND  
END WITH CODEWORD QUOTE  
NOWBAT END QUOTE.

BT  
#2188

NNNN

Classified By: ~~DDO~~ NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

RRRRRRR QSL AT 0320Z IMI QSL 5 0520Z KKKKKK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

392

TOT / 1541Z  
KC

0901 2204  
ZNY TTTTT  
INFO 241440Z APR 84  
FM JTF  
TO JTF/RG  
BT

SUBJ: C-141 INGRESS/EGRESS ROUTES TO MANZARIT  
1. C-141 INGRESS ROUTE FROM [REDACTED] BASED ON A PLANNED TAKEOFF OF 1811Z. NUMBER TWO AIRCRAFT WILL FOLLOW AT 15 MINUTE INTERVAL.

[REDACTED]

ETE	ETA
12	1823
3	1826
35	1901
19	1920
6.6	1926.6
4.7	1931.3
6.1	1937.4
9.5	1946.9
3.7	1950.6
15.0	2005.6
5.5	2011.1
6.2	2017.3
4.6	2021.9
7.0	2028.9
12.0	2040.9
3.9	2044.8
7.2	2052.0

2. C-141 EGRESS ROUTE COORDINATES FOLLOW WITH ETE.

[REDACTED]

- 2.0
- 8.2
- 5.4
- 6.8
- 7.3
- 5.8
- 13.8
- 3.5
- 5.5
- 5.7
- 4.3
- 6.1

3. LAST COORDINATE IS COAST OUT POINT. ROUTE FROM THIS POINT WILL BE A VFR CLIMB TO INTERCEPT NORMAL IFR ROUTES TO CROSS

#204

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

.....  
CSM 0206  
ZNY TTTT  
ZC 241510Z APR 83  
FM JTF SITE ALPHA  
TO JCS/RC  
BT

390

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: ALERT ORDER  
REF: A. JCS/RC 241227Z APR 83  
1. CINCPAC INST 83710.10 AND  
MODIFYING MESSAGES LISTED IN  
REF A ARE NOT HELD AT THIS SITE.  
2. REQUEST SPELL OUT APPLICABLE NOE  
IN EFFECT FOR TAC AIR SUPPORT  
BT  
#0285

NNNN

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On OADR

ESM 7287  
DNY  
ZTC 241521Z APR 80  
FM ALPHA ZIC  
TO ALC/AF-02

LOCATION REQUEST  
PROVIDE LOC OF IRAQI  
BAGGY IN TERRAIN. CURRENT  
MIL MAPS AT THIS LOC SHOW  
IT AT 2 DIFFERENT PLACES.  
BT  
BT207

101 / 115,272  
R2  
#389

~~Classified by JCS~~  
~~Declassified on OADR~~

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#388

SSW 1233  
ZNY  
ZC 041845Z APR 68  
FM JTF  
TO JCS/RC

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT LAUNCH  
1. EIGHT HELOS AIRBORNE 1527Z.  
2. THREE MC130S AND THREE EC-130S  
AIRBORNE ON TIME FROM [REDACTED] LAST  
[REDACTED] AIRBORNE 1527Z  
BT  
#3208

Classified by: DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92  
Declassify on:  
ADA

~~Classified By: JCS~~  
~~Declassified on: OADR~~

Downgraded by:  
NMCC DDO  
12 Aug 92

WV:av

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

384

MSG 1010  
FM JTTC  
TO 24-2001 APR 68  
FM JTTC  
TO JOE/RC  
BT

EX

SUBJECT: C-141 EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT STATUS  
1. TWO C-141 FMC [REDACTED] ONE C-141 35- 511-#4-, 242110Z APR.  
2. FLIGHT NON-PASS VNT PAK SPENDING NIGHT ON A/C EQUIPPED WITH  
3. A/C POWER.  
4. JOSE RIGGING A/C FOR WHICKEY 3 ANTENNA. WILL ATTEMPT CONTACT  
WHEN INSTALLED.  
5. CLEARANCE RECEIVED FOR [REDACTED] OVERWATER [REDACTED] EXERCISE.  
6. [REDACTED] ENROUTE [REDACTED] TO HANDLE ANY [REDACTED] GOVT  
PROBLEMS.  
BT  
0010

7E, G

6WRN0V

OPRR3ECTOPMS  
DTG 242005Z  
PARA 1 ETA EXX DHAMARAN

Classified By ~~DDO~~ DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92  
Declassified ONY GADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

OSL DTG 242055.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

.....  
SSN 0010  
ZNY TTTTT  
Z 24100Z APR 69  
FM JTF/GEN VAUGHT  
TO WITZ/ [REDACTED]  
BT  
[REDACTED]

383

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORTS

1. ADVISE [REDACTED] ELEMENT AT YOUR LOCATION  
THAT ALL REPEAT ALL SITUATION REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED  
FROM JTF HQ ONLY. REQUEST [REDACTED] FOR DESIST IN  
REPORTING TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY.

BT  
#3217

NNNN

~~Classified By: [REDACTED]~~  
~~Declassified On: [REDACTED]~~  
~~Downgraded by: [REDACTED]~~  
~~DDO NMCC~~  
~~12 Aug 92~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY: [REDACTED]  
CONDUCTED ON: [REDACTED]  
REVIEWED BY: [REDACTED]  
 UNCLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REVIEW ON: [REDACTED]  
REVIEW BY: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TOR / 0215  
121168

0  
MSGID  
DTG: 071330Z APR 80

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 REL US-DOWNS TO Secret  
REVISED BY OADR  
ORIGIN Multiple Sources

#467

FHQ JC5/RC  
TO: ALPHA  
DELTA  
1507

SUBJ: IRAN SITREP AS OF 0520 27 APRIL 1980

1. IN RESPONSE TO THE AGONY US RESCUE ATTEMPT ON 24-25 APRIL.

[REDACTED] THE AREA WAS VISITED BY NUMEROUS  
IRANIAN NOTIARIES INCLUDING AYATOLLAH KHAKALI AND THE CDR OF  
IRAN'S ARMY AVIATION, GEN GHODADI, IN CHARGE OF THE SEARCH OPERATION.  
REPORTED THAT 2 HELICOPTERS REMAINED INTACT AND THAT MAPS, WEAPONS,  
MONEY (1 MILLION RIALS AND \$1,000) HAD BEEN FOUND AT THE SITE ALONG  
WITH 3 DAMAGED HELICOPTERS AND 1 DAMAGED C-130. THE BODIES OF 5 US  
SERVICEMEN WERE RECOVERED AND FORWARDED TO TEHRAN.

2. IRANIAN PRESIDENT BANI-SADR STATED ON THE 20TH THAT THE BODIES  
OF US SERVICEMEN KILLED IN THE RESCUE ATTEMPT WOULD BE RETURNED TO  
THE US WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. TO DISCOURAGE ANY FURTHER RESCUE  
ATTEMPTS, HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE REMOVED FROM  
THE EMBASSY AND BE DISPERSED AROUND TEHRAN. THE MILITANTS AT THE  
EMBASSY ANNOUNCED THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD LATER BE DISPERSED AROUND  
THE COUNTRY, WITH THE FIRST GROUP BEING DISPATCHED TO THE CITY OF  
SOFI.

3. [REDACTED]

THE IRANIAN AF CDR ADMITTED TO THE PRESS ON 26 APRIL THAT THE IRANIAN  
AIR FORCE HAD BOMBED AND STRUCK 2 OF THE US HELICOPTERS TO  
PREVENT THEIR FUTURE USE BY US FORCES. IN THIS OPERATION, THEY HAD  
INADVERTENTLY KILLED 2 IRANIAN SOLDIERS WHO WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY  
CONDUCTING A GROUND SEARCH OF THE AREA. FURTHER MILITARY RESPONSES TO  
THE US OPERATION MAY FORTHCOMING AFTER A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE  
EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS DISCOVERED AT THE TABAS SITE.

4. [REDACTED]

ALTHOUGH  
PRESIDENT BANI-SADR CALLED FOR A UNILATERAL GOVERNMENT CEASEFIRE  
IN KURDISTAN ON 26 APRIL, KURDISH SPOKESMEN EXPRESSED THEIR  
CONTINUED DISTRUST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE  
THEIR FIGHT FOR SOME FORM OF AUTONOMY.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] IA CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT FULL-SCALE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN ARE UNLIKELY ALTHOUGH BORDER INCIDENTS ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.  
[REDACTED]

8. IN BAHRAIN GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES HAD TO USE TEAR GAS TO DISPERSE DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE ALLEGED USE OF BAHRAINI FACILITIES FOR REFUELING US AIRCRAFT IN THE RESCUE ATTEMPT. INTERNATIONALLY, DIPLOMATIC RESPONSES WERE MUCH AS COULD BE EXPECTED WITH EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EXPRESSING SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING WHILST THE SOVIET UNION, PLO, AND OTHER COUNTRIES CLOSE TO IRAN CONDEMNING THE LATEST US MOVE.

7. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR, IN SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA WAS SIGHTED REPLENISHING FROM AN OILER YESTERDAY.  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

9. SOVIET PRESS: THE SOVIETS ARE STANDING BY THEIR DENOUNCEMENT OF THE ABORTIVE U.S. RESCUE ATTEMPT. NO NEW COMMENTARY HAS APPEARED.  
ET

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 12356

CONDUCTED ON \_\_\_\_\_  
DERIVATIVE CL BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO \_\_\_\_\_  
REVISED ON \_\_\_\_\_  
RECEIVED FROM \_\_\_\_\_

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On OADR

NOV 81

SECRET [REDACTED]



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

①-# 505

Addressed to  
JCS AC

FM: JTF/33  
TO: JCS AC

TOR / 1609  
KEL / 025

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

① 281500Z APR 68

E

TO: JCS AC

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT REDEPLOYMENT

1. U-130 04-0301 IS TO BE RETURNED TO LAG ON 21-15. THIS AIRCRAFT WAS KEPT OUT OF MAJOR REPAIR TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION SINCE IT WAS SUBJECT TO HIGH IMPACT LANDING ON NIGHT ONE OPERATION. IT IS UNDER GOING INSPECTION AT THIS TIME. PENDING OUTCOME OF THAT INSPECTION RECOMMEND ITS RETURN FLIGHT TO CONUS BE KEPT TO MAINTAIN FULL RETURN OF APPROXIMATELY 48,000 POUNDS OF FLIGHT FUEL.

E

2. U-130 04-0301 AND THE CONUS WOULD MINIMIZE STRESS ON AIRCRAFT. AIRCRAFT WOULD RECEIVE APPROXIMATELY 10,000 POUNDS OF REMAINING FUEL.

3. U-130 04-0301 HAS AMP THAT WILL NOT HOLD IN LOCKED POSITION UNLESS UNDER HYDRAULIC PRESSURE OR WHEN AIRCRAFT IS PRESSURIZED. REPAIR CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXIST HERE OF [REDACTED] RECOMMEND THIS AIRCRAFT REDEPLOY THROUGH THE IN-MAIN OR OTHER U-130 MAINT FACILITY FOR REPAIR BEFORE RETURNING CONUS.

E

BT

Classified By: JCS DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO NM  
17 AUG 69

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 2604  
ST men 2.

EG

TOP SECRET  
SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL  
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INTEL SPT  
1. REQUEST THE FULL T-113 INFORMATION FOR SUPPORT  
OF NO-TIME S&W SURVEILLANCE MISSION.  
2. LOCATION AND DIRECTION OF TRAVEL OF  
CURRENT SOVIET INVAL FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN.  
3. SECURITY/PROSECURE FACILITIES AND  
CALL SIGNS OF US NAVY FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN.  
4. T-113-1000 WARD DEPT TIME 207000Z APR 92  
BT

500

INSTRUCTED VIA WSC-3  
TO RECODGES QUESTIO  
TO JTF/RC (J-2)

Classified By: JES DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TTTTT ZMS1235  
00 280537 APR 68

TOR / 064  
KCL / # 0:

E, G

REQUEST [REDACTED] LANDING APPROVAL FOR C-130  
AIRCRAFT FLYING IN SUPPORT OF JTF 70.  
PERTINENT INFORMATION FOLLOWS:

E

A. AIRCRAFT DATA

SN	CALL SIGN	ETA	LTD
042564	FLOUG 42	270000Z	263700Z
637785	QUEST 14	270130Z	260730Z
621843	NUDE 73	271000Z	260000Z

# 496

B. PERSONEL DATA

SN	AIRCRAFT COMR	TOTAL CREW/PAX
042564	CAPT [REDACTED]	24
637785	CAPT [REDACTED]	21
621843	CAPT [REDACTED]	21

G

C. REQUEST ARRIVAL DATA BE PASSED TO LTC [REDACTED]  
BT  
2235

NNNN

Classified By JCS DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

NO EOM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL. CS-DOWNGR TO CONFID

REFN ON OADR

DECLASS FROM JS

*TO R AC 0901*  
*VC 226*

DECL 01262

PER USL AND HERE IS THE NEXT

**490**

ASG-166  
268828Z APR 82  
FM JCRC  
TO DIA WASH DC

RE: [unclear] LIST  
[unclear] [unclear]

REF: [unclear] OF ITEMS DEPARTING NHAITE ON USN ACFT.

ARE ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS LIST WHICH WERE ON ACFT RECOVERING  
TO NIMITZ. IF SO REQUEST DESIGNATION BY DTG AND SERIAL NUMBER OF THOSE

*Retransmitted  
to Nimitz*

*Classified By [unclear]*  
*Declassified ONY OADR*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HM HOW ON THAT ONE KK

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO CONFID  
REVW ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM JS

OSL 0802

TOR / 26/0903  
VC / 0227

489

MSG 157  
250655Z APR 88  
FM JTF/RC  
TO JTF ALPHA  
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: EOD  
REF: JTF 260635Z APR 88

1. EOD TASKING PROVIDED EUCOM 260655Z APR 88.

2. REQUEST ADDITIONAL INFO AS FOLLOWS:

- A. APPROX GTE AND GENERAL TYPE OF CHARGE.
- B. DESARM AND MOVE, OR DETONATE AT [REDACTED]
- C. ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED?

E ( )  
of

acknowledged

Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassify on [REDACTED]

AND HATE THAT HAS THE LAST 6 HAVE ATT INT OSL KKK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 142  
ST. 201572Z APR  
FM: CDR [REDACTED]  
TO COM JTF77 ATTN: [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A, G

SUBJ: RANGER RETURN

TOR/10  
VC/8

A

1. FIRST C-141 RETURNING [REDACTED] ARRIVED  
200630Z. AIRCRAFT #3 WITH REMAINING FUEL AND ALL PASSENGER  
EQUIPMENT IS ON AIRGROUNDS 200630Z.

2. THE FOLLOWING STEPS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN IMMEDIATELY UPON  
RETURN:

A. ALL RANGERS ON THE MISSION WERE ISOLATED AND BRIEFED ON THE  
COMJTF GUIDANCE THAT ALL INCIDENTS ARE NOTED WITH THE RESPONSE OF  
"NO COMMENT".

B. NO PHONE CALLS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED.

C. THE BATTALION IS CONDUCTING A DEBRIEFING OF ALL PER-  
SONNEL INDIVIDUALLY FOR THOSE ON NIGHT #1, BY TEAM OF THOSE  
INVOLVED IN NIGHT #2.

D. ONLY THE BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND THOSE DUTY  
PERSONNEL AT THE AIRFIELD KNOW OF THE RANGER RETURN.

#488

3. THE FOLLOWING STEPS ARE PLANNED:

A. COMPLETE EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

B. CONDUCT A COMPLETE SHAREFORM INSPECTION OF ALL PERSONNEL

C. BEGIN RELEASING RANGERS A 201700Z UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

4. NATURALLY, QUESTIONS EXIST OVER FUTURE PLANS,  
AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN A SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE. IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE  
IS NECESSARY IF CHANGES IN RANGER PROCEDURE IS REQUIRED.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ACP.

BT

*Assisted*  
*[Signature]*

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NMCC

Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC

12 AUG 92

MESSAGE BE RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1321

MSG 71  
261310Z APR 87

FM JTF/AC  
TO ALPHAS (PASS TO NIMITZ)

# 485

SUBJECT: REDEPLOYMENT OF JTF PERSONNEL REGARD NIMITZ

1. REQUEST YOU CDD REF 20 PERSONNEL FROM NIMITZ  
TO [REDACTED] IN TIME TO REDEPLOY WITH MC OR EC -130  
ACFT [REDACTED] ACFT CURRENTLY SUE TO DEPART  
[REDACTED] ON 27 APR 87.

2. FOR [REDACTED] PLS ADVISE TO ALL ADDRESSES SCHEDULED  
DEPARTING TIME OF MC & EC 130'S FOR [REDACTED]

~~REF 26 APR 87~~

NIMITZ

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ON 12350  
CONDUCTED ON 72 AUG 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DECL. EXEMPTED TO CONFID  
REF ON OADR  
DERIVED FROM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





~~TOP SECRET~~

TOR/13352  
RC

MSC 178  
261115Z APR 80  
FM JCS/RC-J2  
TO: SITE ALPHA  
INFO: [REDACTED]


AG

BT

MCN  
#0231

SUBJ: INTELL SUPPL. SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 ESTG APR 24 80

483



2. IN RESPONSE TO THE ABORTED US RESCUE ATTEMPT, THE MILITANTS AT THE US EMBASSY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD KILL THE HOSTAGES IF ANOTHER ATTEMPT IS MADE. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION YET THAT THE MILITANTS PLAN TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST THE HOSTAGES AT THIS TIME. ACCORDING TO THE LATEST REPORTS, THE MILITANTS HAVE CALLED FOR REMOVAL OF THE US AND BUILD UP THE 24-HOUR PATROLS AROUND THE EMBASSY. THE REACTION BY THE MILITANTS COULD BE TO MOVE SOME OF THE HOSTAGES TO ONE OR MORE UNOCCUPIED LOCATIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS WOULD OCCUR. THE MILITANTS ARE CURRENTLY AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS IN THE AREA. THE MILITANTS ARE SUPPORT PROBLEMS NEARBY. THE MILITANTS ARE CURRENTLY LIKELY INCREASE THE READINESS OF ALL FORCES AND THE MILITANTS NEAR TEHRAN AND THE GULF.

CLASSIFIED BY 1755  
EXEMPTED BY 12 AUG 9  
REPORT OF DT-DBB-DM  
LOADR  
[REDACTED]

3. AYATOLLAH KHOMAYNI WILL MOST LIKELY USE THE MILITANTS TO ONCE MORE DIVERT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE'S ATTENTION FROM DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND TO REVIVE PERSEAN PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION. HE WILL CITE THE ABORTED RESCUE ATTEMPT AS EVIDENCE THAT THE US IS TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE REVOLUTION.



TOP SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 261715Z  
MC 237

010000Z APR 82  
FM NIMITZ HELL SET  
TO JTF MAIN/LOL  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] ROLL AWAY OR SIMC

TE, G

1. TRANSPORTATION PLANS FOR NIMITZ SET  
(U) 2. FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED TO CONFIRM INFO PASSED TO AGENTS  
[REDACTED] BY VET.

E

3. PRESENT PLAN IS TO MOVE SET FROM NIMITZ TO CORAL SEA  
BY HELICOPTER FOR FURTHER TRANSPORT TO [REDACTED] BY C-2.  
CORAL SEA REPORTS C-2 NOW IN DOWN STATUS. IF C-2 REMAINS DOWN,  
SET WILL REMAIN IN NIMITZ UNTIL 29 APRIL WHEN WE WILL MOVE TO  
[REDACTED] OR MAC CHANNEL LINK UP. C-2 WILL REQUIRE TWO SORTIES TO  
MOVE SET FROM CORAL SEA TO [REDACTED] (THREE HRS REQUIRED PER SORTIE)

#  
E-477

G

(V) 4. HELICOPTER CONTAINS 15 SOALS WITH PERSONAL BAGGAGE. CARGO  
IS TWO (2) 30 CU FT BOXES OF PERSONAL BAGGAGE REMAINING FROM  
HELL SETS. WT ESTIMATED AT 2200 LBS TOTAL.  
ALSO MAJ [REDACTED] STEEL CLASSIFIED ROLL AWAY CONTAINER  
WILL GO. THIS ESTIMATED AT 30 CU FT AND 200 LBS. TOTAL CARGO IS  
30 CU FT AND 2200 LBS.  
(V) 5. IF SET FALLS BACK TO MAC CHANNEL TRANSPORTATION, BOTH  
CARGO BAGGAGE AND [REDACTED] CONTAINER WILL REMAIN IN NIMITZ.

NOTE  
C

DDO NMCC  
JES  
Classified By  
Declassified On OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

WWWVKKY000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 261011Z APR 92  
FM HELLB/RC-4  
TO KCF/RC  
BT

~~FOR 12/2/92~~  
~~RC~~ ~~RC~~  
17/02/92

SUBJ: SERIALIZED ITEMS ISV

A. JTF/RC 260922Z APR 92

1. REF REQUESTS SERIALIZED ITEMS RECOVERED ABOARD SHIP AFTER TERMINATION OF OPERATION.

2. ACCORDINGLY, FOLLOWING SERIALIZED ITEMS ARE CURRENTLY IN CUSTODY HELB ABOARD SHIP:  
40 RIFLE, M16A1

6476

- 7
- 148P
- 746115
- 778236
- 578230
- 502442
- 1589229

B. CAL .38 PISTOL

- 40 13740
- 40 13743

40 17309

40 17431

C. PINS

- 226
- 283

D. ~~ARC-90~~

- 1 18135
- 14567
- 16348
- 15869

EJK MOTOROLA MX350

NONE

F. CAL .53 MG

- 1159453
- 1146242K

1169711 11645182

G. ~~ARMS-5~~ (NWG)

- 19780
- 19970
- 31490
- 19836
- 19770

BT

3/31/92

NOT 1-1-1

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 27031  
VC | 0243

#  
-472

E  
[REDACTED]

G  
SENSITIVE LETTER  
DELIVERED LETTER 26 2400T APR 52  
COMPLIES WITH INSTRUCTION IN REF. MSG.

DDO NMCC  
Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92  
NOTED  
Retransmitt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

700  
M

#  
-506

1. AT 1115 EST THE WHITE HOUSE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT:

A. THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF AN OPERATION IN IRAN WHICH WAS UNDERWAY TO PREPARE FOR A RESCUE OF OUR HOSTAGES. THE MISSION WAS TERMINATED BECAUSE OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE DURING THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL THERE WAS A COLLISION BETWEEN OUR AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AT A REMOTE DESERT LOCATION IN IRAN.

B. THERE WERE NO MILITARY HOSTILITIES, BUT THE PRESIDENT DEEPLY REGRETS THAT EIGHT AMERICAN CREW MEMBERS OF THE TWO AIRCRAFT WERE KILLED AND OTHERS WERE INJURED IN THE ACCIDENT. AMERICANS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION HAVE NOW BEEN AIRLIFTED FROM IRAN AND THOSE WHO WERE INJURED ARE BEING GIVEN MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ARE EXPECTED TO RECOVER.

C. THIS MISSION WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY HOSTILITY TOWARD IRAN OR THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AND THERE WERE NO IRANIAN CASUALTIES.

D. PREPARATIONS FOR THIS RESCUE MISSION WERE ORDERED FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THIS COUNTRY, AND TO ALLEVIATE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO ATTEMPT THE RESCUE.

E. THE NATION IS DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO THE BRAVE MEN WHO WERE PREPARING TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES.

F. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

G. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS DETERMINED TO OBTAIN THEIR SAFE RELEASE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

H. THE PRESIDENT WILL ADDRESS THE NATION THIS MORNING AT 1008 EST. FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS JUSTICE/SSC/WHK ALSO BRIEFED. AT THIS TIME, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY REPRISALS AGAINST THE HOSTAGES.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR REACTION FROM TEHRAN TO THE NEWS OF THE RESCUE OPERATION. AS OF 0400 EST, TEHRAN RADIO HAD NOT YET CARRIED ANY REPORTS IN ITS LOCAL BROADCASTS. ACCORDING TO AFP, IRANIAN LEADERS HAVE ORDERED AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT. ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SHADMEH SAID HE HAS NO INDICATION OF EXACTLY WHERE THE AIRCRAFT COLLIDED. SHADMEH SAID A STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED LATER IN THE DAY.

3. THE MILITANTS AT THE COMPOUND SAID THEY WOULD RELEASE A COMMUNIQUE IF THE NEWS WERE CONFIRMED. THIS COMMUNIQUE WOULD SPECIFY WHAT ACTION THE MILITANTS WOULD TAKE. A SPOKESMAN INDICATED AS OF 0430 EST THE MILITANTS HAD NOT YET MADE ANY STATEMENTS.

[REDACTED]

4. THE FIRST BULLETIN FROM TASS CARRIED THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT IN A FACTUAL MANNER WITHOUT COMMENT. SYRIAN STATE RADIO HAS CALLED THE REPORTED ATTEMPT AN "OVERLY ACT OF AGGRESSION." ISRAELI RADIO REPORTS THAT THE RESCUE MISSION WAS LAUNCHED IN DAWN AND STOPPED OVER THE DESERT. SOURCE IN TEHRAN SPECULATED THAT THE MISSION WAS ABORTED BECAUSE OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE.

5. TEHRAN RADIO AT 0430 EST REPORTS THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES AT THE U.S. EMBASSY WITHOUT COMMENT. PARS NEWS AGENCY IS CARRYING AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE WRECKAGE OF AN AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN SPOTTED NEAR TABAS IN EASTERN KHORASAN PROVINCE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 17256  
CONDUCTED ON 17 AUG 82  
REVISIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
CLASSIFIED BY SECRET  
REVIEW BY OADR  
REMOVED FROM Multiple Sources

SECRET

6. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT ON THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN ABORTIVE RESCUE ATTEMPT, OTHER THAN TO ORDER AN IMMEDIATE PROBE INTO THE INCIDENT. DIA EXPECTS A HARDENING OF THE MILITANTS' POSITION ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE.

7. THE LATEST PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN KURDISH GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD TAKEN ON THE FORM OF A FULL SCALE WAR. A GROUP IN TEHRAN KNOWN AS THE KURDISH SOCIETY SAID YESTERDAY THAT 60 PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND MORE THAN 120 WERE INJURED ON THE 23RD WHEN THE ARMY FIRED ON THE KURDITAN (PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF SANANDA) FROM HELICOPTERS. IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTEDLY LAUNCHED A ROCKET ASSAULT FROM PHANTOM JETS IN WHICH PART OF THE CITY'S ONLY HOSPITAL WAS DESTROYED. IN A STATEMENT YESTERDAY THE ARMY ACKNOWLEDGED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT IT WAS USING HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS IN THE SANANDA FIGHTING.

10. ON 21 APRIL THE PAKISTANI PRESS REPORTED THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT APPROVED AIRLINE CALLED SHAHEEN AIRLINES. IT WILL RUN PASSENGER SERVICES ON DOMESTIC ROUTES AND CARGO FLIGHTS TO THE PERSIAN GULF.

THE PRESS RELEASE NOTED THAT THE COMPANY WOULD PURCHASE EIGHT BOEING 747 AIRCRAFT, WHICH INDICATES THE IRANIANS MAY USE THEIR AIR FORCE 747'S FOR THIS PURPOSE. IT IS POSSIBLE THE IRAN AIR ARMY IS TESTING THE AIRLINES 747 NEARLY AS A PROOF OF CONCEPT FOR CARGO IN ORDER TO MAIN-  
TAIN AIRCRAFT.

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR

SECRET

1/15/80 NEW BRN DE TIGER, BAW... HERE WITH LEE WITH ONE

030100Z

PROCEEDING WILL SHIFT BACK TO DE BOY VOY FOR DSL

Address A  
to JCS/AE  
HAW

TCR 1630  
1/17  
507

O 251430Z APR 80  
FM NIMITZ HELO DET  
TO JTF MAIN  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ // DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER SPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJ: CASUALTY REPORTS

1. MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL REQUIRES A CASUALTY REPORT IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT WITHIN 48 HRS OF DEATH. THIS UNIT POSSIBLY RECORDS OF EMERGENCY DATA ON ALL HELO VICTIMS, THEREFORE MUST INITIAL REPORT. THE FOLLOWING FOUR MESSAGES HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR RETRANSMISSION TO REQUIRED ADDRESSES INDICATED AT YOUR DISCRETION. MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET FOR EXERCISE PURPOSE ONLY. PROCEEDING RELEASING AS UNCLAS, SECURITY PERMITTING, TO FACILITATE CASUALTY PROCEDURES.

2. PROPOSED CASUALTY REPORTS AS FOLLOWS:

.. SERGEANT JOHN D. HARVEY USMC  
FROM: JCS  
TO: CMC WASHINGTON D.C.  
INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.  
NAVY BUDGET WASHINGTON D.C.  
MCFC KANSAS CITY MO  
CG SECOND MAJ  
MAG TWO SIX  
HMM FOUR SIX ONE  
CMC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE  
REF: (a) MCG P3240.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

1. INW REF A FOL INFO RPT.  
.. SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED] 0612/0632 USMC  
C. KIA  
D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 2200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAKING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A MH-130 ACFT AND WAS ENVELOPED IN FLAMES.

E. ORN  
F. 040125

H. NO  
I. PAY DATA  
(1) 773307-133  
(2) 1570.00  
(3) NONCOM MEMBER  
(4) NONCL  
(5) LAST LES IN SRC REPORTING OF NOV 73

J. SGLI DATA  
(1) 120,000.00  
(2) 70320

.. CAPTIST COUNCILER-NO ATTENTION COMPLAINT  
L. MAJOR LESLIE [REDACTED] USMC-NIA  
MAJOR JAMES H. SCHAEFER JR [REDACTED] USMC-NIA  
STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY L. JOHNSON [REDACTED] USMC-KIA  
CORPORAL GEORGE H. HOLMES [REDACTED] USMC-KIA  
.. 030424

M. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)  
.. STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY L. JOHNSON USMC

FROM: JCS  
TO: CMC WASHINGTON D.C.  
INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92



NAVY BUREAU WASHINGTON D.C.  
MCFC KANSAS CITY MO  
CG SECOND MAW  
MAG TWO SIX  
HHH FOUR SIX ONE  
CNC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE  
REF: (A) MCO P3843.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

- 1. TAG REF A FOL INFO RPT:
- A. STAFF SERGEANT DENEY LEE JOHNSON [REDACTED] 6123 BORG
- B. HHM 461 MAG 26 20MAW RUCF 01401
- C. KIA
- D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A HL-133 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.
- E. DD FORM 1300
- F. 800112

[REDACTED]

- 1. PAY DATA
- (1) 668412
- (2) 698.30
- (3) 95.00 CREW MEMBER
- (4) NONE
- (5) LATEST LE IN SER FOR MONTH OF OCT 79

- J. SOLI DATA
- (1) 120,000.00
- (2) 702505

- K. PROJECT NO ATTENDING COMPELL
- L. MAJOR LOUIE A. PLETTY [REDACTED] USMC-41
- 1966 CAPTAIN H. SCHAEFER JR [REDACTED] USMC-41A
- SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED] USMC-41A
- CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [REDACTED] USMC-41A
- 80424
- M. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)
- N. CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES JR. USMC

INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.  
NAVY BUREAU WASHINGTON D.C.  
MCFC KANSAS CITY MO  
CG SECOND MAW  
MAG TWO SIX  
HHH FOUR SIX ONE  
CNC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE  
REF: (A) MCO P3843.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

- 1. TAG REF A FOL INFO RPT:
- A. CORPORAL GEORGE NIEMEYER JONES JR [REDACTED] 113 BORG
- B. HHM 461 MAG 26 20MAW RUCF 01401
- C. KIA
- D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A HL-133 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.
- E. DD FORM 1300
- F. 800112

[REDACTED]

- 1. PAY DATA
- (1) 781214
- (2) 523.00
- (3) 78.00 CREW MEMBER
- (4) NONE
- (5) LATEST LE IN SER FOR MONTH OF OCT 79

- J. SOLI DATA



MCFC KANSAS CITY MO  
CG SECOND MAW  
MAG TWO SIX  
HHH FOUR SIX ONE  
CNC FOR HSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE  
REF: (A) MCO P3843.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

- 1. TAG REF A FOL INFO RPT:
- A. STAFF SERGEANT DENEY LEE JOHNSON [REDACTED] 0123 BURE
- B. HMM 461 MAG 26 20MAR RUCF 01401
- C. KIA
- D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE OH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAKING OFF AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A HU-133 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.
- E. CINN
- F. 800112

[REDACTED]

- 1. PAY DATA
- (1) 660412
- (2) 698.30
- (3) 95.00 CREW MEMBER
- (4) NONE
- (5) LAST LEA IN SER FOR MONTH OF OCT 73

- J. SOLI DATA
- (1) 123,002.00
- (2) 700005
- K. CONTACT-NO ATTENDING COMBAT
- L. MAJOR LESLIE G. PLETY [REDACTED]
- MAJOR CARLOS H. SCHNEIDER JR [REDACTED]
- CAPTAIN JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED]
- CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [REDACTED]

M. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)  
CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES JR. USMC

TO: CMC WASHINGTON D.C.  
INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.  
NAVY BUREAU WASHINGTON D.C.  
MCFC KANSAS CITY MO  
CG SECOND MAW  
MAG TWO SIX  
HHH FOUR SIX ONE  
CNC FOR HSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE  
REF: (A) MCO P3843.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

- 1. TAG REF A FOL INFO RPT:
- A. CORPORAL GEORGE NIEMEYER WAGES JR [REDACTED] 113 BURE
- B. HMM 461 MAG 26 20MAR RUCF 01401
- C. KIA
- D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE OH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAKING OFF AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A HU-133 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.
- E. CINN
- F. 800112

[REDACTED]

- 1. PAY DATA
- (1) 700000
- (2) 523.00
- (3) 70.00 CREW MEMBER
- (4) NONE
- (5) LAST LEA IN SER FOR MONTH OF OCT 73

J. SOLI DATA

(2) 110015  
K. LUTHERAN NO. ATTENDING CHAPLAIN [REDACTED] USMC-VIA  
MAJOR LESLIE B. PETTY [REDACTED] USMC-VIA  
MAJOR JAMES H. SCHAEFER JR [REDACTED] USMC-VIA  
STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY L. JOHNSON [REDACTED] USMC-VIA  
SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED] USMC-VIA

N. REASON RPT. DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)  
O. MAJORS LESLIE B. PETTY USMC AND JAMES H. SCHAEFER USMC

FROM: JCS  
TO: CMC WASHINGTON D.C.  
FOR MCPA-1  
SUBJ: HOSTILE CASUALTY  
REF: (A) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)  
(1) A. MAJOR LESLIE B. PETTY [REDACTED] 56473902 USMC  
B. HMH 461 MAG 2612DMAH RUC 01461  
C. 800424  
D. IRAN  
E. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. INJURED WHEN THE RH-53,  
WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING,  
COLLIDED WITH A MC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.  
F. CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS: SECOND DEGREE BURNS/UNK  
G. PRESENT LOCATION: (TO BE INCLUDED)

H. YES  
I. [REDACTED]  
(2) A. MAJOR JAMES HENRY SCHAEFER JR [REDACTED] 756477577/2133  
USMC  
B. HANTS-1 3DMAH RUC 01243  
C. 800424  
D. IRAN  
E. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. INJURED WHEN THE RH-53,  
WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING,  
COLLIDED WITH A MC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.  
F. CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS: SECOND DEGREE BURNS/UNK  
G. PRESENT LOCATION: (TO BE INCLUDED)  
H. YES  
I. [REDACTED]

REVW 25 APR 80  
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

MMH

KK

NO EOM.

DR 2511 412  
BWD/MCW  
MCN 0/2/11

MSG 084  
230900Z APR 80  
FM: JCS/RC-J-2  
TO: SITE ALPHA  
INFO: SFOD  
1ST SQ  
RANGERS

591

SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500Z 23 APR 80

1. TEHRAN RADIO REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT CAMPUS UNREST AROUND THE COUNTRY HAD CALMED, AS VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS CLOSED THEIR OFFICES. IN TEHRAN, SUPPORTERS OF THE LEFT-WING FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT REPORTEDLY EVACUATED TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AFTER A DAY OF FIERCE CLASHES WITH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS WHICH LEFT THREE DEAD AND AT LEAST 360 WOUNDED.

C

3. IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTEZADEH APPARENTLY STILL HAS PLANS TO VISIT VARIOUS ARAB STATES TO PLEAD HIS CASE FOR ISLAMIC UNITY AGAINST VARIOUS THREATS, INCLUDING THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS AND IGNORANCE CONCERNING THE GOALS OF HIS COUNTRY'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. ACCORDING TO THE MOST RECENT INFORMATION HE PLANS TO VISIT AT LEAST SYRIA, LEBANON, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARAB AND THE UAE, PROBABLY DEPARTING SOMETIME THIS WEEK.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUED IN SANANDAJ YESTERDAY. KURDISH GUERRILLAS REPORTEDLY BESIEGED THE IRANIAN ARMY OFFICER'S CLUB AND THE LOCAL RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION. THE ARMY SAID KURDISH REBELS SURROUNDED THE OFFICER'S CLUB AND HAD CUT OFF WATER, ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE LINKS. NEITHER SIDE GAVE FIGURES FOR YESTERDAY'S CASUALTIES, BUT THE ARMY ADMITTED LOSING 29 DEAD AND 36 WOUNDED ON THE 21ST WHEN KURDISH GUERRILLAS ATTACKED AN ARMY COLUMN SKIRTING SANANDAJ ON ITS WAY NORTH TO RELIEVE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN SAOQEZ. MEANWHILE, KURDISH SOURCES IN SAOQEZ REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT FIERCE FIGHTING WAS STILL RAGING THERE. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE ARMY WAS SHELLING HOUSES FROM A HILLTOP GARRISON AND HAD EMPLOYED PHANTOM FIGHTER PLANES SPORADICALLY TO FIRE ROCKETS AT GUERRILLA POSITIONS.

Classified By JC  
Declassified ON: a

C

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 1254  
DATE 11/20/92  
BY DDC/MCE  
DATE 08/02/92  
BY [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

**SECRET**  
**SECRET**

C  
C  
G. SATELLITE OVERVIEW: AS OF 2100Z TUESDAY (22 APR) THERE WERE ONE HIGH-RESOLUTION PHOTO SATELLITE, ONE MANNED SPACE STATION WITH A POSSIBLE VISUAL/PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY, ONE EORSAT, TWO SECOND-GENERATION ELINT AND SIX THIRD-GENERATION ELINT SATELLITES IN ORBIT.

H. SOVIET PRESS (U): NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORTING WITH INCREASED ANTI-US POLEMICS IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND NEW COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY WARNS TEHRAN AND THE ARAB WORLD OF POSSIBLE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

707  
RC

# 509

UNIT  
UNIT  
UNIT

1. BE ADVISED THAT THE FOLLOWING UNITS  
HAVE BEEN INITIATED

UNIT	TIME	WFO	TIME
DELTA	(1) 201102	LANCLEY	200440Z
	(2) 201102	LANCLEY	201010Z
RANGERS	(1) 201102	[REDACTED]	200910Z
	(2) 201102	[REDACTED]	201740Z

2. COMJTF DEPARTS THIS LOCATION ON SECOND DELTA A/C.  
3. PLEASE NOTIFY [REDACTED] RANGER ARRIVAL TIME.

BT  
#248

Classified BY: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONTROLLED BY: 52

REVIEW BY: NMCC

DEL. DS. CONFID

REVIEW ON: S

REVIEW BY: S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COM 2245  
INFO 3333  
O 281600Z APR 92  
FM JTF/J-3  
TO JTF/AC  
BT

TOT/1450Z  
RC

# 510

SUBJ: MC/EC/AC-130 REDEPLOYMENT

1. UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED, PLAN TO REDEPLOY AS FOLLOWS:

A. AC-130 (4) RETURN FROM [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] IN TWO CELLS OF TWO AIRCRAFT EACH (24 HOUR SEPARATION BETWEEN CELLS). WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 26/0600Z AND CLOSE 26/2300Z. RON 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [REDACTED]

E B. PACAF MC-130 (3). RETURN FROM [REDACTED] IN A SINGLE CELL. WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 27/0600Z AND CLOSE 26/0200Z. PLAN 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [REDACTED]. WILL REQUIRE THAILAND OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE. PLAN TO CONDUCT FINAL OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SORTIE FROM [REDACTED] 26 APR.

E C. COMUS MC-130 (4) ABCCC (2). RETURN FROM [REDACTED] TO HURLBURT IN THREE CELLS OF TWO AIRCRAFT EACH. WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 27/0600Z AND CLOSE 26/1945. PLAN 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [REDACTED]. ONE MC-130 WILL PROCEED ON TO ONTARIO CA (DEPOT) AND THE ABCCS TO KEESLER. DEPARTURES MAY HAVE TO SLIP PENDING REPAIR OF AIRCRAFT AT [REDACTED] AND RETURN TO [REDACTED]

A, E 2. REQUEST YOU ASSIST IN OBTAINING THAILAND OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE. DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED BY JTF [REDACTED] 30(15) FOR [REDACTED]. REQUEST YOU COORDINATE REQUIRED ENTRIES FOR THAT OVERFLIGHT TO JTF/AC. PLAN IS TO DEPART [REDACTED] 26 APR/1992Z BT

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12 AUG 92

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TOR 1310Z  
KCL MCN  
0209

130000Z  
OO 251135Z APR 67  
FM [REDACTED]  
TO J117J-  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~  
MESSAGE NUMBER 5

- 1. EC-130/021417/REPULLIC 5/241535Z/2602.0Z
- 2A. NTP
- 2C. GOOD-HAZE LAYER STARTED APPROX 25 DEGREES AND CONTINUED TO LB
- 3. LZ 33P427N281524E
- 3A. SCHEDULED 1930
- LANDED 1930
- 7B. SUCCESSFUL INFIL A 35,000 LBS HP-1
- 7C. N/A
- 7E. LANDED LAST, TAXIED TO POSITION, RECEIVED ONE HELO, REPUBLIC 4 HAD 2 HELOS, MUCH CONCERN IF EXERCISE WAS GOING TO CONTINUE.
- HELO ROTOR BLADE WAS SPINNING ON FRONT OF FUSelage. HELO PILOT JUMPED OUT OF WINDOW AND WALKED OVER AND STOOD IN FRONT OF NUMBER 1 PROP. CREW CRIED FROM ONE OF THE MARINE HELOS LEE PILOT TO THIS ACFT. SECURED THE AREA PICKED UP ALL POSSIBLE PERSONNEL WITHIN THE AREA AND TAXIED.
- DRAGON 3 TOOK OFF FOLLOWED BY REPUBLIC 5. REPUBLIC 16 FOLLOWED REPUBLIC 5 FOR

**515**

TAKEOFF AND

- 3F. GOOD/CLEAR BUT A LOT OF DUST AND SMOKE VERY 4 MILES
- 5A. SOME [REDACTED] INTERFERENCE (1) POSSIBLE [REDACTED] FROM ANOTHER ACFT AND (2) SINGLE STROBES OF SLOTS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN GROUND RADAR.
- 5B. FLEW MODIFIED HOP IN AREA OF THREATS
- 5C. SAME AS INGRESS
- 5. LZ CONDITION WAS NOT AS BRIEFED
- POL PEOPLE COULD NOT SEE HELOS AND VICE VERSA.
- BT
- 30

A

...XLYU00

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Declassified ONY **OADR**  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP / 251115  
MCH 0206

MESSAGE TO RECEIVED.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 03/18/2009 BY [redacted]  
[redacted]

# 517

WIDGER NUMBER 34  
1. YUC-100/07/FULL-1-701007/101007  
2. N/A  
3. N/A  
4. N/A  
5. LOW VISIB. AT 11:00 AM. 1000 FT. OFF MILLS  
6. LT. COL. [redacted]  
7. DIRECT  
8. [redacted]  
9. [redacted]  
10. [redacted]  
11. [redacted]  
12. [redacted]  
13. [redacted]  
14. [redacted]  
15. [redacted]  
16. [redacted]  
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97. [redacted]  
98. [redacted]  
99. [redacted]  
100. [redacted]

0007

Classified By: JGS DDO NM  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO A  
12 AUG

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NO 488709  
FM 001 JTF  
TO 0000

70T/1029Z  
RC

- (U) FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR AND PRESUMED TO HAVE PERISHED IN THE 2-10 HELICOPTER COLLISION:
- (A) LEIS, HAROLD E. JR. CAPT USAF 84034600
  - (A) CREW MEMBER
  - (A) MCINTOSH, LARRY. CAPT USAF 248711001
  - (A) CREW MEMBER
  - (A) HAYC, JOEL C. TOPT USAF 26801100
  - (A) CREW MEMBER
  - (A) HAYNE, RICHARD L. CAPT USAF 28771100
  - (A) CREW MEMBER
  - (A) McWILLIAMS, CHARLES W. CAPT USAF 24871100
  - (A) CREW MEMBER
  - (A) JOHNSON, DENNY L. CAPT USMC 241721

#520

- 074
- RH53 CREW MEMBER
- (G) HARVEY, JOHN S. SGT USMC 220521040
- RH53 CREW MEMBER
- (G) COLMES, GEORGE W. JR. CPL USMC
- 401-0-1341, RH53 CREW MEMBER

(U) PERSONNEL INJURED AS A RESULT OF REF COLLISION AND CURRENTLY BEING PLACED ABOARD C-17 TO LIVE A AREA:

- (A) BRETT, ERIC L. MAJ USMC
- [REDACTED] STATUS - 32-36 PERCENT SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS OF EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND IS CURRENTLY STABLE
- (G) SHAEFFER, JAMES H. MAJ USMC
- [REDACTED] RH53 CREW MEMBER.
- STATUS - 5 PERCENT SECOND DEGREE BURNS OF FACE AND IS CURRENTLY STABLE.
- (G) HARRISON, JEFFERY B. ILTJ USAF
- [REDACTED] 130 CREW MEMBER
- STATUS - 5 PERCENT SECOND DEGREE BURNS OF FACE AND IS STABLE
- (G) BEYERS, JUSTIN J. USOF USAF [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] CREW MEMBER
- STATUS - 5 PERCENT SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS OF FACE, EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND IS STABLE.
- (G) KOWLE, WILLIAM V. MAJ USAF [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] SPECIALIST. STATUS - 5 PERCENT BURN OF TRUNK.
- [REDACTED] THREE OTHER PERSONNEL WERE TREATED FOR MINOR BURNS AND ONE TREATED FOR BROKEN FINGER. ALL WERE RELEASED.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON \_\_\_\_\_

DERIVATIVE CL BY \_\_\_\_\_

DECL  DOWNGR TO \_\_\_\_\_

REVISED ON \_\_\_\_\_

DERIVED FROM \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by:  
DDO USMC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82/09108  
#098

MSN 3322  
25 20 27 APR 32  
FM [REDACTED] AIR INT  
TO [REDACTED]  
BT

EG

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: FORCE STATE

E

1. REALIZE THAT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WILL GOVERN HOW LONG WE REMAIN AT [REDACTED] OUT FORCE STATUS FOLLOWS FOR PLANNING.
2. THERE ARE TOTAL OF 168 PERSONNEL HERE
3. AIRCRAFT STATUS FOR 6 C-130S:
  - A. THREE IN COMMISSION
  - B. THREE OUT OF COMMISSION
4. MC-565 HAD 4 AND ONE HALF GALS LANDING AT REFUELING SITE WITH 150,000 POUNDS ABOARD. THIS IS AIRCRAFT OVERDUE PMV. WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE INSPECTION TEAM TO INSPECT WINGS AND MEN AND MATERIALS.
5. EC-130 AND 1307 NEEDS SEAL ASSEMBLY FOR ACCESSARY HOUSING, WILL FORWARD PARTS LIST LATER
6. EC-130 NO. 1315. ON TAKE OFF BECAUSE OF HEAVY LOAD AND RISING TERRIAN PILOT OVEG TORQUED ALL FOUR ENGINES FOR ONE AND ONE HALF MINUTES. WE ARE INSPECTING ENGINES. MAY BE ABLE TO CLEAR FOR ONE TIME FLIGHT. WILL ADVISE.
7. PACAF MC-130S CAN TRANSPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT EASTWARD. 8. CONUS BOUND C-130S REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT BECAUSE EC-130S HAVE FUEL BLADDERS INSIDE WHICH PRECLUDES OTHER LOADS. ALSO MC-130 565, WHICH WAS OVER GS SHOULD NOT CARRY LOAD EVEN IF INSPECTION PERMITS FLIGHT. WE ESTIMATE TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT FOR PALLETS TO BE 17-19 POSITIONS (INCLUDE ROLLING STOCK). ALSO HAVE REQUIREMENT TO MOVE APPROX 90 PEOPLE. ALL OF THIS PARA IS FOR CONUS.

#521

3322

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92  
J4  
MAC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 1110  
KCL / #0205

11257 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

G  
02011007 RPT  
FM NMCC  
TO JCR JTF-ALPHA  
BT

REF: [REDACTED] // DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER UNCLASSIFIED CHANNELS

- (U) 1. RFE REQUESTS TANKER SUPPORT REQUEST SITUATION.
- 2. [REDACTED] 11-70 APPROPRIATE AVAILABILITY OF TANKERS AND LOGS
- ARTS AND REQUESTS SUPPORT ON 11-70 REQUESTS TO KNOW
- REQUIREMENTS AT THIS TIME.
- VERY RESPECTFULLY
- ALVA: [REDACTED]
- BT

(-1522)

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Declassified by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

ZYU.

0518/21713

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR

1035Z

RCL

#0204

NO EOM.

00 251100Z APR 68  
FM [REDACTED]  
TO 51/3-2

BT

SUBJ: HISREP NUMBER 22

1. MC-130/505/DRAAGON-1/241407/244-007

2A. EMO NO INDICATIONS

2B.

2C. HAZE VSBY: 3 MILES

3. LT 0304N05504E

3A. 241100Z

3E. SUCCESSFUL INFIL - TO PAX

3C. N/A

3D. EMO NONE

3E. TRACK NOTED ON ROAD NEARBY WEST

DURING FLIP-PASS. TWO OTHER

VEHICLES NOTED ON ROAD. LARGE EXPLOSION,

FIREBALL NOTED AT CRASH SITE WEST OF LT, 2-4 MILES.

LANDED NEXT TO A CUL. ORIGINALLY

WERE GOING TO LAFIL 444 PRISONERS. DID NOT SEE

TO LOST PAX WEAPON.

3F. HAZE VSBY: 3 MILES

3A. N/A

3A. POS F-4 WHILE AT 250000 FT.

SITING WAS NEAR AT 3 O'CLOCK. WEATHER

UNKNOWN. ASFT HEARD AT 1000 FT. ALT.

3B.

3C. HAZE VSBY: 3-4 MILES

3. GENERAL REMARKS: CAT COMB IN AREA 1000 FT

HOURS OF BOTH INFIL AND EMO. 1000 FT

UPON LANDING.

BT

0325

#524

Classified By: JES DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NM.  
12 AUG 9.

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JOR / 1035Z  
RCL / # 0203

E  
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0326  
00 001257 APR 82  
FM [REDACTED]  
TO JTF/J-2  
BT

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MISSED NUMBER 023  
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Classified By ~~SP5~~ DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NM  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DT/0910Z  
RC

00  
JCN 2230  
ZNY ~~XXXX~~  
DTG 250000Z APR 82  
FM JTF  
TO JCRC/RC  
BT

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: POST MISSION DEBRIEF/ISOLATION AREAS  
REF: JTF/RC 250700Z APR 82  
R. JTF/J3 250317Z APR 82  
1. RANGERS SHOULD REDEPLOY TO ~~REDACTED~~ NO ISOLATION REQUIRED. REFS A AND B REFER.  
BT  
#230

A

521

Classified By: ~~JES~~  
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~ File

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~ED 1155~~  
CONDUCTED BY: ~~M. AUG 92~~  
REVIEWED BY: ~~DR. NMCC~~  
 DATE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
REVIEWED BY: ~~OADR~~  
REVIEWED BY: ~~S~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TO 7  
KCL | 0932 Z

061022Z  
FM JTF  
TO JTF/RC  
USS NIMITZ  
BT

SUBJ: RETURN OF HELO MISSION MEMBERS  
TO CONUS

1. REQUEST THAT ALL HELO MISSION  
MEMBERS INCLUDING SUPPORT PERS  
BE RETURNED TO CONUS FOR

TRANSFER OR DEBRIEF. FOR JTF/RC  
REQUEST THAT YOU TASK CINCPAC FOR PRIORITY AIRLIFT.  
REQUEST USS NIMITZ ASSIST TO PICKUP POINT.  
BT

*C-301*

*i-529*

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958  
COMPLETED ON 12 AUG 93  
RECLASSIFIED BY DDO NMCC  
 DESK USE CAPTION TO Secret  
REVIEW BY OADR  
SERIES [REDACTED]

~~Classified By JCS~~  
~~Declassified On OADR~~

*File*

~~SECRET~~

COMM 210  
FM JTF  
TO 107AC

TOT 23/6  
VCL

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION FROM COMMANDING OFFICER JTF HELO DET

STATEMENT OF DEATH FOR  
STAFF SERGEANT DENEY D. JOHNSON USMC  
SERGEANT JOHN D. HARVEY SMC  
CORPORAL GEORGE W. HOLMES USMC

1. SUBJECT INDIVIDUALS WERE CREW MEMBERS ABOARD RH-53 HELICOPTER WHICH CRASHED EARLY AM 25 APRIL 82 INTO A C-130.
2. I WAS ANY EYE WITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT FROM A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS. THE RH-53 WAS SITTING ADJACENT TO THE C-130. THE CABIN AREA OF THE H-53 BURST INTO FLAMES ON IMPACT AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLODED.
3. THE CONFIGURATION OF THE H-53 CABIN, WITH TWO FULL INTERNAL FUEL CELLS (APPROX 550-600 GALS OF JP-4) AND MISCELLANEOUS GEAR WOULD HAVE BEEN TOTALLY PROHIBITIVE FOR REASONABLE EGRESS.
4. SUBJECT MARINES ARE DECLARED DEAD. SIGNED [REDACTED] USMC

6-508

STATEMENT OF DEATH CONCERNING SSGT D. JOHNSON, SGT HARVEY, CPL HOLMES

I WAS SITTING IN MY RH53 ABOUT 100' FROM THE C-130 A/C RH-53 NUMBER 3 WAS THE SECOND PLANE TO MY LEFT. RH53 NUMBER 3 (300 GAL) FULL INTERNAL FUEL CELLS, 2 (300 GAL) EXTERNAL TANKS AND 2 FULL (300 GAL SPONSOR TANKS. ABOUT 1000Z RH53 (3) PICKED UP AND FLEW AT AN ESTIMATED ALTITUDE OF ABOUT 25'-50' AGL TOWARD THE LEFT SIDE OF THE C-130 TO OUR FRONT. THE DUST BECAME VERY BAD BUT I COULD STILL MAKE OUT THE C-130 AND RH53-(3) AS THE RH53-(3) WAS OVER THE C-130 THERE WAS THE LOUDEST EXPLOSION I HAVE EVER HEARD ABOUT 30 SEC LATER THE C-130 STARTED EXPLODING. IN MY OPINION NOBODY IN THE BELLY OF THE RH53 COULD HAVE SURVIVED THE BLAST. SIGNED [REDACTED] USMC

REPORTING STATEMENT OF DEATH  
CASE OF: (1) SSGT D. JOHNSON, SGT HARVEY AND CPL HOLMES.

I WAS THE CRASH OF THE H-53 HELO THAT HIT THE C-130 AIRCRAFT. I WAS ABOUT 75 FT. BEHIND THE C-130 WHEN THE ACCIDENT OCCURED. IMMEDIATELY UPON IMPACT BOTH AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES. THE H-53 CABIN AREA WAS ENVELOPED COMPLETELY. IN MY OPINION, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO SURVIVE THAT CRASH IF THEY WERE IN THE CABIN AREA. THERE WERE 2 INTERNAL FUEL TANKS, 2 EXTERNAL TANKS, THE RAMP WAS CLOSED AND THE PERSONNEL DOOR WAS ALSO CLOSED. MOBILITY IN THE CABIN AREA WAS RESTRICTED BECAUSE OF THE FUEL TANKS, EXTERNAL TANK STRAPS, AND MISCELLANEOUS GEAR. I SAW NO ONE EXIT THE CABIN. SIGNED [REDACTED] USMC

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Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92



STATUS:

MSG SEG ORIG

01 02 R  
03 SEGMENTS AVAILABLE.

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

*TOR / 0900Z*  
*KCL / 0197*

*E*

MON 0021  
00 252410Z APR 80  
FM [REDACTED]  
TO JTF-2  
BT

~~SECRET~~  
MISREP NUMEEG 01

- 1. A/C TYPE/TAIL NO./CALL SIGN/TAKE OFF/LANDING  
MU-138/564/DRAGON-2/15172/2335Z
- 2A. EWO NO INDICATIONS
- 2B. NTR
- 2C. GOOD
- 3. LZ 33304N25557E
- 3A. 191 WITH ONE GO ARU
- 3E. SUCCESSFUL INFIL XSI PAX
- 3C. N/A
- 3D. EWO NO INDICATIONS
- 3E.
- 3F. GOOD VIZ APPX 7NM  
ALL QUADRANTS
- 2. N/A
- 5A. EWO NO INDICATIONS
- 5B. CREW SAW KC-135 BEACON BUT COULD NOT  
ESTABLISH EITHER COMM OR JOIN-UP
- 5C. GOOD VIZ APPX 7NM ALL QUADRANTS
- 5A. EET SIGHTED POSS. POL TRUCK ON FIRE ON HIGHWAY/  
33025N255512E. WITH SECONDARY EXPLOSION.

*530*

*Wped*

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MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

Classified By *JES* DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: *OADR*

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12 AUG 92

NO EOM.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP  
RCL  
0847  
0196

ENR C BAYESONE MORE TO C 00 AND HERE IT IS

O 250543Z APR 84  
FM HELO BDT /NIMITT/3-2 AND 3-3  
TO SITE ALFA J-2

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA SPINTEL BROADCAST  
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE  
REF: FONECON OF 250543Z APR 84 SAME SUBJ

- (U) 1. (U) FOLLOWING IS HARD COPY BACK-UP REQUESTED DURING REF FONECON.
  - a. EACH A/C CMDR WAS ISSUED BLUE BINDER CONTAINING EMERGENCY LIT'S IN TEHRAN. THIS BOOK IS FAMILIAR TO MAJ. [REDACTED] BUT I WILL REPORT CONTENTS --- EACH LT WITH PHOTO (CAPTIONS/CODEWORDS REMOVED) AND COORDINATES; CITY MAP WITH EACH LT MARKED; PHOTO STRIP MAPS OF HELO HIDE, TEHRAN EAST APPROACH, TEHRAN-MANTARIYEH, TEHRAN-KARAJ. ALL PHOTO STRIPS WERE MARKED QUOTE SECRET UNQUOTE BUT MOST PILOTS HAD SANITIZED BY CUTTING OFF CLASSIFICATION. BELIEVE SHOULD ASSUME ALL OF THESE BLUE BINDERS ARE COMPROMISED UNTIL THEY ARE RETURNED OR OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR.
  - b. S-3 PREPARED KNEECARD CARDS FOR ALL PILOTS WHICH LISTED EMERGENCY COMBAT AIR PATROL CHECKPOINTS. ONE OF THESE WAS QUOTE [REDACTED] UNQUOTE WITH GEO REF COORDINATES. WHILE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT [REDACTED] KNEECARD CARDS WERE LOST, PRUDENCE DICTATES CHECK AT [REDACTED] THERE WERE NO, REPEAT, NO PHOTOS OF [REDACTED] GIVEN TO [REDACTED].
  - c. ALL PILOTS WERE ISSUED PHOTO PRODUCTS QUOTE DESERT TRACK 1 AND DESERT TRACK 2 UNQUOTE. THESE ARE IN SAME CATEGORY AS SUEPARA ALFA ABOVE.
  - d. ALL PILOTS REC'D GEO EXTRACT OF VARYING DETAIL TAILORED TO INDIVIDUAL PILOT NEED. THE GEO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED COMPROMISED.
  - e. DELTA MATERIAL ISSUED AND NOT ACCOUNTED FOR AT THIS TIME INCLUDES ONE (1) COPY OF USRAF 8812, ONE (1) COPY OF USKAT 2372 EDITION ALFA REG NO 14 DATED 24 APRIL 83 ONLY, ONE (1) KI-65 (PARKHILL) AND ONE (1) KI-110 NETER.

G

CE

531

JK  
JK

NNNN

MESSAGE 04 RECEIVED.

AND DE TIGER RAD OSL FM FM M FML  
K K K K K

NO EOM.

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Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP~~  
250425Z  
0187

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MSG 143  
080415Z APR 80  
FM JCS/AFM (LIC)  
TO JTF: ( )  
BT

~~SECRET~~

1. AIRCRAFT COVERED IN REFERENCE WERE SCHEDULED TO MOVE FORWARD TO COVER AFB IN ANTICIPATION OF FURTHER FORWARD DEPLOYMENT.
  2. BASED ON INFORMATION THAT ALL PERSONNEL ARE ACCOUNTED FOR, ALL PREPARATIONS FOR SAR PLANNING ARE CANCELLED.
- LT


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① #532

NR001

~~Classified By: JCS~~  
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0-539 1172

SITUATION REPORT

E (u) THE C-141 LOAD OF CARGO AND TRUCKS CURRENTLY ARE AWAITING PICKUP  
AT THIS LOCATION IS LISTED ABOVE.

WITH EXCEPTION OF THE SUPPLY AND THE PERSONNEL ALL OF THE SQM HAS

E (u) THE ELEMENT AT [REDACTED] WILL DEPART FOR HANSTEIN ON MAC CHANNEL  
ON [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] WILL REMAIN AT HANSTEIN AND CONTINUE TO MAC

UNTIL THE ELEMENT, FOURTH [REDACTED] PERSONNEL AND NINE [REDACTED] BEAR  
AWAITING DEPARTING THIS LOCATION AT APPROXIMATELY 251045Z FOR RAM-  
MUNDEN AND ANDREWS ON MAC CHANNEL. REQUEST TRANS-  
PORTATION FOR THE ELEMENT AND HOLD PERSONNEL BE COORDINATED/PROVIDED.

LOADS AWAITING TRANSPORTATION THIS LOCATION:

- 1. MAINTENANCE PARTS AND EQUIP (LIST BELOW).
- 2. JOBS (SPALLETS)
- 3. K1135 MAINT EQUIP AND PARTS.
- 4. [REDACTED]
- 5. [REDACTED] PERSONNEL AND EQUIP.

(u) FOUR KC-135S REMAIN. TWO ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART TOMMORROW AND  
TWO WILL DEPART ON WEDNESDAY.

E (u) UNISSUED AMMO, CS AND PREPARED CHARGES HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO  
THE COMMANDER AND USAF EOD TEAM. CHARGES WILL BE DESTROYED AT THIS  
LOCATION. COORDINATED [REDACTED].

(u) [REDACTED] WILL DEPART ON [REDACTED] MORNING 25  
[REDACTED] WILL DEPART THIS LOCATION ON 20 LOADS TOMMORROW AFTER-  
NOON. ALL REMAINING LOADS WILL BE MARSHALLED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

#539

Classified By [REDACTED] DDO NMCC  
Declassified On [REDACTED] OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 280636Z  
RSL QSL 0637Z

05N 0257  
0 050636Z APR 80  
FM SITE ALPHA/JTF  
TO: JIF/RC  
BT

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: STATUS OF INSERTED ASSETS  
HAVE ASSETS BEEN ABLE TO INFILTRATE?  
BT

542

Received  
Verbal response  
[Signature]

BT

~~Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON OADR~~

Declassified by:  
D. M. NMCC  
AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

701/87372  
RC

SSN 3281  
O 270725Z APR 67  
FM JTF/J3  
TO JTF/RC

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT

- (C) 1. TWO MC-130 AIRCRAFT (762,867) DEPARTED OUR LOCATION 270630Z AND 270635Z. EST. [REDACTED] (APPROX) 271132.
  - (C) 2. TWO MC-130 AIRCRAFT (507,875) DEPARTED OUR LOCATION 270702Z AND 270725Z. EST. [REDACTED] (APPROX) 272332.
  - 3. REQUEST RELAY POC AT HQ TAC.
- BT  
#0281

547

NNNN

DDO NMCC  
JCS  
Classified By  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

TOT | 27/6/92  
VC

G Col [REDACTED]

MESSAGE IS ASSIGNED.

SSSSN 8276  
O 270500Z APR 80  
FM JTF READ SITE ALPHA  
TO JCS/RC  
SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING STATEMENT  
REQUEST YOU SEND FORMATTED  
JTF RICEROML DEBRIEFING STATEMENT  
VIA TTY  
BT

! #550

Classified By: JES  
Declassified On: OADR

NNNN

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

TOT 0628Z  
RC

SSN #277  
O 270515Z APR 60  
FM JTF/ALPHA  
TO JTF/RC  
BT

SUBJ: MSG. DELTA LTC 261230Z AND SUBJ. DELTA STATUS RPT AND MORE.

(U) 1. REF UR MSG NO. 176 LTC 261350Z APR 60 SUBJ SAME AS ABOVE

(U) 2. LTC [REDACTED] KEEP THIS LOCATION ON HQC SAAM NO. 1160/13 ENROUTE TO POPE. ETA ANDREWS 071400Z APR 60. SUGGEST COORDINATE [REDACTED] MOVEMENT TO LTC FROM LOCATIO.

(U) 3. ONLY 5 DELTA SUPPORT PERSONNEL REMAIN AT THIS SITE. INTEND TO REMAIN UNTIL ROLLUP IS COMPLETE. ONE DELTA OPERATOR IS REGARD NIMITZ AND ONE AT [REDACTED] ATTEMPTING TO RECOVERY BOTH TO ALPHA TO DAY. ETA CONUS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

BT  
#277

#551

NNNN

DDO NMCC  
Classified By ~~SSA~~  
Declassified ON: OADR

Downloaded by  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



SSN 0286  
P 260530Z APR 70

G FM: JTF [REDACTED]  
TO: JTF/RC  
SUBJECT: STATUS OF JTF FORCED  
BT

TOT 0550  
VCT

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: STATUS OF JTF FORCED

- 1. HAVE RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION THAT VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE JTF HAVE BEEN CHOPPED FOR REDEPLOYMENT
  - 1. E. MCS AND AC TO ENCOM.
  - 2. PLEASE ADVISE.
- BT

RRNN

#564

File

~~Classified By JRS~~  
~~Declassified ON OADR~~

Declassified  
DDO 11/30/01

MESSAGE 21 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

T011359212  
CT

A. 3

TO: JTF ALPHA  
FROM: WASHINGTON (PITMAN)  
JTF/0

SUBJ: MISSION HELO PERS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FROM USS NIMITZ

1. USS NIMITZ HAS 21 MISSION HELO  
PERS AND 2000 LBS CARGO HELO  
PERS BAGGAGE TO RETURN TO COMUS.  
2. HELO WILL TAKE TWO 000 FLIGHTS.  
3. REQUEST JTF/RC EXPIDED RETURN  
FOR PERS.

FOR INFO COML JTF 000 PERS  
WILL REMAIN IN [REDACTED] UNTIL  
04.07 APR.

A. G  
E

4. PITMAN AND [REDACTED] ARE  
CONSIDERING COMMERCIAL TRAVEL  
TO WASHINGTON VIA [REDACTED]  
PARTICIPATE IN HELO OVER SOUTHER  
5. FOR USS NIMITZ HELO STATUS  
OF HELOS FROM OVER SOUTHER  
FOLLOWS

6. NR 1 HELO NO PROBL  
7. NR 2 NO STAGE PUMP FAILURE  
8. NR 3 2 NO STAGE PUMP FAILURE  
FAILURE ENROUTE. CRASHED IN  
LC

9. NR 4 NO PROBL  
10. NR 5 1 HELO LIFT LAMBS AND  
ABANDONED LARGE DEBERT OFF  
LAKE APPROX 1 HR INTO  
FLT AFTER CONFIRMING LAD  
CLASH. 4/3 WAS HAVING FULL  
TRANSFER PROBL ALSO  
11. NR 7: MINOR APUS PROBL  
ENROUTE. NR 8 1 HELO SERVING INTERMEDIATE  
SEASIDE SHIP LIGHT AT COAST IN  
PINE. CONT INFLU TO LC.

12. REQUEST HELO CREWS TO DEPART JTF ALPHA  
FOR COMUS TOMORROW  
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355  
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DESI BELONGING TO CONFID  
REVW ON OADR  
REVISED FROM JS

565

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSC161  
251530Z APR 82

FM JIF-RC  
TO JIF

[REDACTED]

TOR / 15302  
RC / # 0214

1. DECISION MADE NOT TO SUPPORT  
JCRX FLINTLOCK 28 WITH SECOND TAC  
MC-130 FROM YOUR ASSETS. TAC,  
AIR STAFF AND USECOM CONCUR.

REVW 25; 04 82

NNNN

#567

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

707 / 1150 Z  
KCL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- SUBJ: RECOVERY OF EQUIPMENT
1. DURING EXTRACTION ON NIGHT OF 24 APRIL BETA PERSONNEL LOADED EQUIPMENT FOUND IN THE FIELD ONTO VARIOUS DEPARTING AIRCRAFT. IDENTITY OF A/C IS UNKNOWN. PERSONNEL DID NOT DEPART ON THE SAME AIRCRAFT.
  2. SM STATED THAT HE PERSONALLY LOADED TWO RUCKSACKS, ONE PISTOL BELT W/HANDGUN, AND OTHER ITEMS ON AN AIRCRAFT.
  3. THIS EQUIPMENT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED WITH THE PERSONNEL.
  4. REQUEST A THOROUGH SEARCH BE MADE FOR ANY EXTRA EQUIPMENT WHICH MAY BE ON THE AIRCRAFT. EXERCISE CARE WHEN HANDLING RUCKSACKS OR OTHER ITEMS. THEY MAY CONTAIN DEMOLITIONS, AMMUNITION AND GRENADES, OR FRAGILE COMM/NIGHT VISION ITEMS.
  5. REPORT ANYTHING FOUND TO CPT. J-4 FOR DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.

B1  
B1

#573

UNCLASSIFIED

Classified By: JES  
Declassified On: OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12/85

CLASSIFIED BY: JES

CLASSIFIED ON: OADR

CLASSIFIED BY: JES

CLASSIFIED ON: OADR



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT / 1150Z  
KOL

(C) 1277  
E [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
CLASSIFIED ON 12 AUG 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY CONFID  
KEYW CH OADR  
REVIS JS

SUBJECT: C-130 SUPPORT  
1. PART LISTED PART 100 YOUR MESSAGE OR NOT  
ON HAND THIS STATION. AS AN ALTERNATIVE  
TO POSSIBLE LOGGING DELAY IN PART SHIPMENT  
FROM USAF, I SOW/AM I PROPOSING ENGINE  
CHANGE. ENGINE AVAILABLE. ONLY QUESTION  
IS WHETHER CRANK OR SIMILAR  
EQUIPMENT TO HOIST PROXY/ENGINE IS AVAILABLE  
YOUR LOCATION. PLEASE ADVISE.  
(U) 2. TENTATIVELY PLANNING FOR C-130 AIRLIFT  
SORTIE TONIGHT.

BT  
#8237

Classified By: JES  
Declassified ON: OTM

*i* #574

NMCM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT / 1045Z  
KCL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12358

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 97

DERIVATIVE CL BY RDO NMCC

DECL ES-DOWNER TO CONFID

REVW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM JS

② 8235  
NY  
DTG 251035Z APR 80  
FM ALPHA/J2  
E, TO ██████████ COL KYLL

SUBJ: OPSEC VIOLATION

1. ~~SECRET~~ REPORTS THAT A USAF MAJOR WAS TAKING PHOTOS OF  
ACTIVITIES AT DESERT TRACK AND IN ██████████ WITH 35MM CAMERA. HE  
IS MEMBER OF EC- OR HC-130 FLIGHT CREW. ONLY IDENTIFICATION MAJOR,  
LIGHT BROWN HAIR.

(U) 2. PLEASE OBTAIN FILM OF INDIVIDUAL AND SEND IT TO JTF

8235

① 575

~~Classified By~~ JES  
~~Declassified ON~~ OADR

MANNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TST / 25 / 250  
JOC

4-578

SSN 8221  
ZNY TTTT  
O 268240Z  
FM JTF/VAUCHT  
TO JCS  
BT

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE  
1. INITIAL DEBRIFFINGS INDICATE THAT  
SUBSEQUENT TO THE COLLISION AND EXPLOSION OF THE RH-53 AND EC-135  
AT DESERT TRACK, HELICOPTER ROUTE, MAPS, CEOI'S, KEYLISTS AND  
OTHER SENSITIVE MATERIAL WERE INADVERTENTLY LEFT ABOARD THE  
ABANDONED HELICOPTERS. CEOI'S INDICATE [REDACTED]

E (U) 2. WHILE TIS IS A SERIOUS CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE, I RECOMMEND  
AGAINST A DESTRUCTIVE STRIKE TO DESTROY THIS MATERIAL.

Classified By: JES DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

4-578

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10T / 0400Z  
PM

579

SSN 0222  
O DTG 250315Z APR 80  
FM: JTF/MOORE  
TO: JTF/RC

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: PROPOSED DRAWDOWN OF JTF KC-135 (TS)  
1. (TS) RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE FOR  
REDUCING KC-135 ACTIVITY AT SITE ALPHA AND

27 APRIL: 3 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY SITE ALPHA  
TO [REDACTED]

2 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY [REDACTED]  
TO GUAM

28 APRIL: 1 KC-135 ART AND 2 KC-135A'S REDEPLOY  
SITE ALPHA TO [REDACTED]

1 KC-135 ART AND 1 KC-135A REDEPLOY  
TO GUAM.

ONCE REACHING [REDACTED] AND GUAM, AIRCRAFT  
COULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE EUROPEAN/  
PACIFIC TANKER TASK FORCE REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE.

2. (TS) FOUR AIRCRAFT WOULD REMAIN AT  
SITE ALPHA AND [REDACTED] TO CONTINUE  
KC-135 PRESENCE. IF IT IS DESIRABLE TO  
RETAIN THESE LEVELS, AIRCRAFT COULD BE  
REPLACED BY EUROPEAN/ PACIFIC TANKER  
TASK FORCE ASSETS.

3. (TS) [REDACTED] WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE COULD  
BE ADJUSTED TO SUPPORT REDEPLOYMENT OF  
KC-135'S TO [REDACTED] IF DESIRED.  
BT

579

File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: JES DDO NMCC  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAIL COACH

TO T 10600Z  
10Z

(C) SS1027E  
NY TTTT  
O 250500Z  
FM JTF/ALPHA  
TO NIMITZ

(i-587)

[REDACTED] 6 CYS  
FOR ALL ELEMENT  
INFO JCS/RC  
BT

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: JTF 79 CE01 (18 APR 82) (U)

1. LPST SUBJ CE01 NO LONGER REQUIRED. REQ ALL ADDRES DEST  
REF CE01 AND FVD DEST REPORT DIRECT MAIL TO JCS JS ATTN SOD.

[REDACTED] INSURE ALL CYS RECD AND DIST ARE  
ACCOUNTED FOR.

2. (U) REQ ALL ADDRES ACK RECT THIS MSG BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS AVAIL  
BT

NICIN

#581

Classified By: JES  
Declassified On: OADR  
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

*Fixed  
& Col [redacted]  
Section  
24/14102*

REDBARN. DE [redacted]  
PASS [redacted]

EM [redacted]

STATES NO RPT NO QUESTION PERTAINING TO URSTA  
FLASH MSG DTG 241251Z AND NO PROBELMS ON THIS END  
ATT. DO URSTA COPY TTY MSG  
GGMBYR117

G

*#585*

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

306XX

RED BARN BE EDSEL AND FORSR I WAS JUST ASKED BY LTC [REDACTED] IHI LTC [REDACTED]  
(NAVY) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE GENERATORS THAT THEY SEND YOU FROM [REDACTED]  
.....THEY (GENERATORS) WERE SENT OUT WITH [REDACTED]  
ON THE 3-13-5.....NEED TO KNOW IF THEY ARRIVED OR AND IF IN  
THEY ARE OPERATIONAL AND FIVERS.....KKK//KKN  
NNNNJOTJDUKMD  
P:6728281: \*3Y6NLRXOVnTnT0IMPYURVNMZF LMMIO LLTL.

EG

*Take copy of [unclear]*

22;

i-4587

Classified By  
Declassified On

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



TOR / 1309Z  
EUCOM #0124

HSC 08  
170 251327Z APR 68

FM: CJC  
TO: SITE ALPHA/CDR JTF

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: OPERATION "RICE BOWL/EAGLE CLAW"

REF YOUR 250518Z APR 68  
CONCUR WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION.

REVA 25 APR 68

588

NNNN

Declassified by  
DDO/SMCC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1807 05 18 REC 1403.

EG ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] OK

MCN 0118

CS

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: INTEL SUPPORT  
1. INFORMATION CONCERNING POSITION DIRECTION  
SPEED OF BKR 6834 STOROCHENCO, KRIVAK 1  
LAST NOTED [REDACTED] END AGI PELENG  
LAST NOTED [REDACTED] REQUIRED AT THIS  
UNIT.  
2. ADDITIONALLY REQUEST YOU PROVIDE THIS UNIT WITH  
ALL CURRENT NAVAL POSITIONS IN GULF OF OMAN  
AND ARABIAN SEA. INFO REQUIRES NO LATER  
THAN 24100Z.  
REVIEW 23 APR 10  
BT  
3313

594

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E8 12356  
CONDUCTED BY 12 Aug 92  
APPROVED BY DDO/mcc  
DATE 12 Aug 92  
BY DA  
REVIEW FROM 10/10/92 Jms  
LIA LTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ON 0212  
230300Z APR 82  
TO JTF/LIG GAST

~~SECRET~~

- 1.) 30 MINUTE C-141 SEPARATION SHOULD POSE NO PROBLEM. WE WILL PART AND OFF LOAD C-141'S ON LOOP TAXIWAY AT NORTH END OF MAIN RUNWAY. AFTER OFF-LOAD, THEY WILL TAXI TO NORTH RAMP NEAR TOWER. C-141 REFUELING WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER C-130 LAUNCH.
- 2.) INSURE THAT INBOUND C-130 ON 24 APR ARRIVES NLT 0800Z. REFUELING CAPABILITY INADEQUATE TO REFUEL C-130/C-141'S AND TOP OFF MC/EC-130S AT SAME TIME.
- 3.) ATC PROBLEMS AT [REDACTED] HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. SILENT ARRIVAL AND

#595

PAGE 2 ~~TOP SECRET~~  
DEPARTURE ARE NO PROBLEM AS LONG AS WE ARE ADVISED AHEAD OF TIME AND GIVEN ACCURATE ETA'S FOR COORDINATION PURPOSES.

4.) MET WITH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] INFORMED US THAT HIS [REDACTED] INSTRUCTED [REDACTED] TO STAND BACK AND OFFER SUPPORT ONLY WHEN REQUESTED TO DO SO. HE DID NOT QUESTION THE SEA SURVEILLANCE EXPLANATION. SPECIAL AIRLIFT FOR [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] ON 25 APR WILL BE PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] WILL PLAN TO RETURN TO [REDACTED] AT 0640Z 26 APR ON A SCHEDULED [REDACTED] FLIGHT.

BT  
0012

Classified By: [REDACTED]  
Declassified ON: OADR

DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92  
Downgraded by  
DDO NMCC  
12 Aug 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10/10/57  
JUL 19 0116

MSC 766  
250015Z APR 62  
FM: CJCS  
TO CDR, JTF  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

E (ADMIRAL LONG AND I AGREED THAT PACOM MC-130'S AT [REDACTED] ARE  
CHOPPED TO JTF EFFECTIVE 2-1-62Z.  
BT

596

NNNN

Classified By: ~~JCS~~  
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

BT

Classified by  
DWO NMCC  
12 Aug 94  
Declassify on OADR  
inquired from  
by DWO NMCC  
12 Aug 94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

██████████  
██████████

██████████ REFERENCE TO ██████████ BY AIRMAIL OVER SPINTEL BROADCAST

██████████ 214467 APR 62

██████████ REF PROVIDED MOVES TO DATA AND REQUESTED ██████████

██████████ PLAN FOR MIXED-USE ACTIVITIES.

██████████ PRIME CONSIDERATIONS AND TRADEOFF OF ██████████

██████████ NORMAL FLYING PERIODS CAN COVER REQUESTED (4-8 ACFT) WINDOWS.

██████████ WILL THAT SATISFY ██████████ LEVEL DESIRED OR DO WE NEED LARGER EFFORT, WHICH COULD DEGRADE ALERT STATUS AND SUBSEQUENT CONTINGENCY RESPONSE.

REV 1: 23APR62

BT

A

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

i-598

Classified by: DDON/mc  
12 Aug 92  
OADR

Declassify on:  
DDON/mc  
13 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~ (A) (ED)

TAPE FURS.

ZNY TTTT ZFD  
O 231752Z APR 80  
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/S-2  
TO SITE ALFA/J-2  
INFO JCS/RG-J2  
BT

SC/TOT/13208

~~TOP SECRET~~ /DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST  
REF SITE ALFA MSG 052 DTG 221830Z  
SUBJ: HELO DET INTREP 04

1. AS OF 0700Z 23 APR 80 SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS ORIENTED  
WELL TO SE OF NIMITZ TG.

VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER SOVIET SURFACE COMBAT-  
ANTS ARE WITHIN 200 NM OF THIS POINT

2. AGI 477 IS STILL [REDACTED]. CTF 70 IS IN  
PROCESS OF MOVING ARG EASTWARD. THIS WILL UNCOVER AIRSPACE FOR  
130 MISSIONS OUT OF [REDACTED] (AGI HAS [REDACTED])  
OF TRACKING OUR BIRDS.

3. TWO ILGAEI'S FM [REDACTED] TO  
SE OF SOCOTRA THIS MORNING.

ADDITIONALLY, IRANIAN P-3 AND C-130 ARE ACTIVE IN VISUAL  
RECON OF US NAVAL UNITS IN GULF AND JUST SOUTH OF STRAITS. MORE  
INFO WILL FOL IN NEXT INTREP. NO AIR ACTIVITY HAS BEEN DIRECTED  
AT NIMITZ THUS FAR.

4. REF AREA OF INTEREST DESCRIBED IN YR MSG 082, AGI 477 IS ONLY  
PLATFORM IN OR NEAR BOX AT THIS TIME. ANTICIPATE INTREP 05 WILL  
BE COMING YOUR WAY APPROX 231800Z. WE HAVE GOOD HANDLE ON SIT AT  
THIS END AND ARE PROVIDING INTEL SUPPORT TO CAG-8 FOR FIGHTER  
COVERAGE OF NIGHT NR. 2 EXFIL OPS.

REWW 23 APR 00  
BT

#599

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E3 1256  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC  
EXECEL CO-DIGRESS TO Secret  
REVIEW ON OADR  
DIA

RECEIVED

MCN 112

MSG  
ZTC: 200145Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2  
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

REFERENCE: SITE ALPHA/J2 MSG 221705Z APR 80

BASED ON RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO YOUR SITE, INCLUDING INFORMATION FROM CYNOS, WE BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE PROBABLY IN A BETTER POSITION THAN US TO ASSESS THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE ARABIAN SEA AREA. WE STAND READY, HOWEVER, TO PROVIDE ANY BACKUP SUPPORT THAT YOU MAY REQUIRE, ALTHOUGH OUR INFORMATION MAY NOT BE AS COMPLETE OR CURRENT AS YOURS.  
BT

*L* **#601**

NNNN

Classified By *JCS*  
Declassified On: OADR

*Classified by  
DDO NMAC  
12/25/85*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A DUPLICATE

TOR / 230541Z  
RAN / MCN 109

MSG# 791  
DTG: 230035Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2  
TP: SITE ALPHA/J2

SUBJ: KC-135 DETECTION

- 1. REF YOUR MSG 221710 APR 80, SA.
- 2. KC-135 ACFT COULD BE DETECTED AT 25,000 FT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IF DETECTED [REDACTED] WOULD PROBABLY QUERY FIRST VIA OPEN ATC COMMO AND [REDACTED] AND, IF THESE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, INTERCEPT WITH FIGHTERS FOR VISUAL IDENTIFICATION. THE IDENTITY OF THE ACFT WOULD PROBABLY BE ANNOUNCED IN THE CLEAR TO GROUND CONTROLLERS, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD ENGAGE. FOLLOWING A SIMILAR IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE, IRAQ WOULD PROBABLY ENGAGE IF THEY PERCEIVED A THREAT FROM THE AIRCRAFT. IRAN WOULD ALSO PROBABLY FOLLOW A SIMILAR IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE. ALTHOUGH IRAN WOULD PROBABLY NOT ENGAGE IF THE ACFT STAYED OUT OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE, THEY WOULD ANNOUNCE THE AIRCRAFT PRESENCE THROUGH THE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM.

3. REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION IS NOT CONSIDERED POSSIBLE ET

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92  
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON/mcc  
 DECL  DOWNGR TO CONF  
 REYN ON OADR  
 DERIVED FROM DIA

i #604

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG 8811  
O 230745Z APR 88  
FM [REDACTED] KYLE  
TO JTF/VAUGHT  
INFO JTF/BECKWITH [REDACTED]  
BT

EG  
AEP  
AD  
HC

SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF DELTA FROM C-141 TO MC-130 AT [REDACTED]

1. (U) I HAVE OBTAINED TWO TRUCKS LOCALLY FROM [REDACTED] THAT ARE DEDICATED ASSETS FOR OUR EXCLUSIVE USE 24 APR 88. TWO (2) MAJ [REDACTED] ADVANCED PARTY HAVE INSPECTED VEHICLES AND HAVE PRACTICED DRIVEN SAME. VEHICLES ARE [REDACTED] ARMY STYLE AND IN EXCELLENT CONDITION. ESTIMATE 20-30 PERSONNEL CAN BE MOVED ON EACH SHUTTLE FROM OFFLOAD AREA TO MC-130 MARSHALLING AREA. WE TIME THE DRIVE AT THREE MINUTES (3) FROM OFF-LOAD POINT TO MC-130 AREA FOR ON LOAD. WILL CONSTRUCT COVER FOR TRUCK BED (TENT) TO ENSURE SECURITY OF CARGO/PAX MOVEMENT. ESTIMATE 100 PERSONNEL CAN BE TRANSLOADED IN 40 MINUTES (40). IF 2-C-141'S ARE LOADED TO SPRING DELTA, WE CAN PREPARE PATIENCE AND SECURE OPERATION. IF MOST OF [REDACTED] DRIVE ON FIRST C-141, WE WILL MOVE THEM IN SHUTTLE ORDER. PATIENCE REQUESTED.  
2. (U) I HAVE COME OUT TO THE RUNWAY WITH [REDACTED] AND LT COL [REDACTED] TO PACE OFF POSSIBLE BACKING UP C-141 TO C-141 FOR TRANSLOAD. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY AWKWARD AND POTENTIALLY ACCIDENT PRODUCING SITUATION SINCE WE HAVE NOT PRACTISED SUCH AN OPERATION.

3. (U) I STRONGLY RECOMMEND TRUCKING AS SUREST, SECUREST, AND MOST EFFICIENT MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THE JOB. THE AREA SELECTED FOR C-141 PARKING IS DEPARTURE END OF RUNWAY [REDACTED] (SHALL LOOP AROUND TAXIWAYS). [REDACTED] HAS BEEN TO AREA AND PAVED OFF WING CLEARANCE. C-141'S WILL NEED TO SHUT DOWN OUT BOARD ENGINES PRIOR TO LEAVING ACTIVE RUNWAY. C-141'S WILL REMAIN ON HARD SURFACE TAXIWAYS AT ALL TIMES. FOLLOW ME WILL LEAD C-141 TO OFF-LOAD POINT [REDACTED] WILL PART. C-141'S MAY OR MAY NOT SHUT DOWN, YOUR CHOICE. SUBSEQUENT TO OFF-LOAD WILL REPORT C-141'S AT BASE OPS RAMP FOR REFUEL AND RELAUNCH. ANTICIPATE FUEL DELAY DUE TO LIMITED TRUCKS WITH LIMITED CAPACITY. AFTER ALL MC/EC-130'S HAVE BEEN TOPPED OFF, GAS TRUCKS WILL PROCEED TO C-141, SUPPORT FROM [REDACTED] TODAY SUPER. WE ARE WORKING INTO THEIR WEEKEND SCHEDULE NOW TO ENSURE NECESSARY SUPPORT IS AVAILABLE TO OUR OPERATION.

4. (U) I AM AWAITING YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.  
BT  
8811

#605

Classified By [REDACTED] DDOW mcc  
Declassified ON: OADR  
DDOW mcc 12 Aug 92  
DDOW mcc 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

McN  
102

UNIT  
TO: 271100Z APR 80

FM: HQ/RC-J2  
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

SUBJ: EMERGENCY LZ'S FOR KC-135's

RESPONDING TO YOUR REQUEST 222340Z APR 80 SAB, THE FOLLOWING LZ'S MEET THE REQUIREMENT SPECIFIED:

- A. SAUDI ARABIA
  - (1) AL FATIN (2754N 04631E)
  - (2) AL JORY (2947N 04006E)
  - (3) RISHA (1959N 04238E)
  - (4) DAHRAN INT'L (2616N 05009E)
  - (5) GASSIM (2618N 04346E)
  - (6) SIFAN (1654N 04035E)
  - (7) HAIL (2727N 34142E)
  - (8) JIBBAH INT'L (2130N 03912E)
  - (9) KHAMIS MUSHAIT (1619N 04229E)
  - (10) MEDINA (2433N 03942E)
  - (11) NEJRAN (1737N 04426E)
  - (12) RUJADH INT'L (2443N 04644E)
  - (13) SHARURAH HS (1725N 04706E)
  - (14) SULAYEL (2028N 04536E)
  - (15) TAEUK (2622N 03638E)
  - (16) TAIJ (2129N 04033E)
  - (17) WEJH (2612N 03629E)
  - (18) YENBO (2409N 03807E)

- B. KUWAIT
  - (1) KUWAIT INT'L (2914N 04759E)
  - (2) KUWAIT MAINBASE (2856N 04747E)
  - (3) KUWAIT WEST (2921N 04731E)

- C. OMAN
  - (1) MASIRAH (2041N 05653E)
  - (2) SALALAH (1702N 05406E)
  - (3) SEER INT'L (2336N 05017E)
  - (4) THUMRAIT (1740N 05401E)

BT

#607

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by  
DDO NMC  
12 Aug 9

0 00100 2 APR 77  
 FM: HELD DET/SI  
 TO: JTF/J1  
 INFO: JTF/RC

101  
 2015

STATUS AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENT

REF: (A) JTF/J1 220420Z APR 77

1. FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENT AS REQ BY REF (A) IS PROVIDED.  
 ACFT BUREAU NUMBER USED INSTEAD OF TAIL NUMBER. NONE OF THE  
 ACFT WILL HAVE TAIL NUMBERS. LIST IN FIVE COLUMNS.

ACFT NO	BUREAU NO	NAME	RANK	SER	SSAN
-1	150744	[REDACTED]	LTJCL	USMC	
			CAPT	USMC	
			GYSGT	USMC	
			AD3	USN	
			USMC	[REDACTED]	
-2	150753	[REDACTED]	SSGT	USA	
			MAJ	USMC	
			CAPT	USMC	
			SSGT	USMC	
			AT2	USN	
-3	150761	J.H. SCHAEFER W.B. PETTY J.L. JOHNSON J.N. HOLMES, JR J.D. BRYET	MAJ	USMC	
			MAJ	USMC	
			SSGT	USMC	
			CPL	USMC	
			SGT	USMC	
-4	150893	[REDACTED]	MAJ	USMC	
			CAPT	USMC	
			SSGT	USMC	
			CPL	USMC	
			GYSGT	USMC	
-5	150754	[REDACTED]	LCDR	USN	
			CAPT	USMC	
			GYSGT	USMC	
			CPL	USMC	
			SGT	USMC	
-6	150750	C.H. PITMAN [REDACTED]	SGT	USA	
			COL	USMC	
			MAJ	USMC	
			LT	USN	
			SSGT	USMC	
-7	150698	[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
			CPL	USMC	
			CAPT	USMC	
			CAPT	USAF	
			GYSGT	USMC	
-8	150758	[REDACTED]	AT2	USN	
			GYSGT	USMC	
			CAPT	USMC	
			LCDR	USN	
			AMH1	USN	
			SSGT	USMC	
			AE2	USN	

G

2. ABOVE INFO BASED ON LAUNCH OF B ACFT. IF NO. 8 IS NOT A  
 FLYER, CREW COMPOSITION WILL CHANGE. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

BT

Classified By JCS  
 Declassified ON: OADR

10/11/77  
 JCS  
 12/11/77

TOP SECRET 223102  
LT 11/11/51

MSG #71  
DTG 222145Z APR 51  
RHH 1-30M  
TO: SITE, ALPHA

#616

[REDACTED]

G ATTN: [REDACTED]  
SUBJ: A/C 695569

1. AIRCRAFT 695569 MAY HAVE DEPARTED HOME STATION WITH THE FOLLOWING PROBLEM:  
NUMBER THREE ENGINE TEMP DATUM SYSTEM INOPERATIVE, FLY IN NULL.
2. PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE, THE FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE ACTIONS WERE PERFORMED TO RESOLVE TD PROBLEM.
  - A. REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE RELAY BOX, COORDINATOR, AND TD AMP.
  - B. TROUBLESHOOT THE LEFT HAND ELECTRICAL HARNESS.
    - (1) EVERYTHING W/ LEFT HAND ELECTRICAL HARNESS
    - (2) NINE WIRES WERE FOUND DANGLING IN THE ELECTRICAL HARNESS JUNCTION BOX, WIRES WERE REMOVED. THESE WIRES MAY HAVE CAUSED FAILURE OF THE PREVIOUSLY CHANGED TD SYSTEMS COMPONENTS.
3. THE ABOVE IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST IN FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING IF PROBLEM STILL EXISTS WITH THE TEMP DATUM SYSTEM.  
BT

NNNN

~~Classified by [signature]~~  
~~Declassify on: OADR~~  
Declassified by  
DDO/ME  
12 Aug 92



0 220950Z APR 80  
FM NIMITZ/PITMAN  
TO JTF/VAUGHT ✓

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: COORDINATION DATA (U)

- A. SECURE PHONECON LTG GAST/COL PITMAN 221730Z APR 80
- B. SECURE PHONECON COL PITMAN/CCL KYLE 221745Z APR 80
1. AS PER REF, UNDERSTAND PLANNED "OVER THE WALL" TIME IS 2100Z. REQUEST FIRM TIME WHEN HELOS SHOULD GET AIRBORNE IN THE EVENT ALL COMM FAILS; NO RADIO LAUNCH TIME SHOULD PROVIDE FAIL SAFE METHOD OF LAUNCH.
2. REQUEST EXPECTED TIMING BETWEEN MFA AND COMPOUND INFILTRATIONS, I.E. SIMULTANEOUSLY, MFA WHEN FORCE REACHES THE WALL, NJ WHEN OTHER FORCE DISCOVERED. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE EVENT OF LOST COMM BETWEEN GROUND FORCES?
3. WEATHER DATA EXCELLENT DETAIL AND LOOKS GOOD FOR TARGET DATE.
4. HELO STATUS 221900Z SEVEN MISSION CAPABLE. EIGHTH HELO, 736, UL HAS FLOWN BUT IS DOWN EST. UP BY 231000Z. FOUR HELOS HAVE BEEN PAINTED (LOOKS GOOD) AND THE OTHER FOUR ARE PRIMED. EST COMPLETION AT 231400Z.
5. IN DISCUSSING PLANNED TACAIR SUPPORT ANCHORED AT NORTHWESTERN END OF PERSIAN GULF ON NIGHT TWO, THE LIKELIHOOD OF NEEDING FIGHTERS TO PROTECT AIRBORNE WITHDRAWAL WOULD SEEM MORE PREVALENT THAN A REQUIREMENT FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. INDICATIONS IN REF A WERE THAT FIGHTERS WERE TO PROTECT THE TANKER AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT (A-6) WOULD RENDER CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, IF REQUIRED. REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF TACAIR MISSION NIGHT TWO. CTF 70 HAS INDICATED THAT HE COULD PROVIDE 4 F-14'S AND 2 A-6 TRAMS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FIGHTER COVER FOR THE EXTRACTION FORCE AS WELL AS THE TANKER AND NIGHT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY.
6. REF B CONFIRMED TANKING PLAN FOR DESERT ONE IF EIGHT HELOS ARRIVE. NO. 1 AND 2 ON NORTHERN MOST TANKER, NO. 3, 4 AND 5 ON MIDDGF TANKER (NORTH SIDE) AND 6, 7 AND EIGHT ON SOUTHERN TANKER. EST. 1600 GAL REQUIRED BY EACH HELO.
7. STANDING BY FOR PAX/CARGO WT. BREAKDOWN FOR FIRST SIX HELOS.
8. CONCERNING EMBASSY EXTRACTION, STADIUM LZ/STILL CONSIDERED PRIMARY AND BEST FOR MISSION DUE TO SPACE AND DEPARTURE AREA WHICH WILL PERMIT HEAVIER LOADS. UNDERSTAND REQUIREMENT MAY COME UP FOR USE OF EMBASSY LZ. THIS WILL BE PASSED TO INBOUND HELOS BY LZ CONTROL. RECOMMEND USE OF PRIMARY ZONE IF POSSIBLE.

REVW: 22 APR 80

BT

702/2206  
58  
NEW ONE  
#617

Dickson  
DDA



DWP

21342

TOP  
38

71212 0309

#618

O 222045Z APR 90

FM NIMITZ/PITMAN  
TO JTF/VAUGHT ✓

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: STATUS (U)

A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220845Z APR 90

1. PLEASE CORRECT REF A, PARA 3, LINE 7 TO READ - ONLY 200  
RDS AMMO VKR GUN WITH ADDITIONAL AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND...

REVH: 21 APR 00

BT

NNNN

*Delivered*  
300  
12

*TOP SECRET*  
*50*  
*K-21002*  
*MIN EN 03*

9ERB2E0 0NB80KVA8008FORBEE .

NEL ON  
E U

BERGO

*#619*

0 222040Z APR 80  
FM NIMITZ/PITMAN  
TO JTF/J-4

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT FOR HELO DET

A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220845Z APR 80

1. PARA 3 AND 4 OF THE REF REFER. REQUEST VERIFY FOLLOWING MISSION  
EQJAP IN QUANTITIES/LOCATIONS INDICATED:

ITEM	QTY	LOC
<del>CARTRIDGE</del> NEP /SUPPORT 48		DESERT ONE
SYSTEMS (SACFT)		
CAL .50MG	02	
CAL .50 AMMO	1500 RDS	<del>MANZREYER</del>

BT

NNNNJVH

*JCS*  
*Classified by*  
*Declassified on: OADR*  
*Declassified*  
*DDO*  
*12/01*

~~SECRET~~

TOR/227/28  
JC/MC/ES

OSL DTG 221710Z AT 2125Z

MSG #65  
DTG 221930Z APR 50  
FM: JTF/RC  
TO: JTF/CDR

622

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS

1. CHIEF U.S. [REDACTED] IS DEPARTING  
EUCOM FOR [REDACTED] VIA [REDACTED] DEPARTURE FROM EUCOM 2400HOURS  
EUCOM TIME TODAY. HE WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO PICK UP A PACKAGE FROM [REDACTED]  
FOR DELIVERY TO [REDACTED] GEN. PUSTAY WILL DISPATCH  
SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH GEN. GAST AND [REDACTED] USMTM

2. YOUR [REDACTED] SUGGESTION BEING IMPLEMENTED HERE. YOU WILL GET  
A COPY OF [REDACTED]  
BT

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On: OADR

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED  
APR 22 1950  
JTF/RC

EMITE

RAMERS

1 50  
SITE ALPHA

TCR/2221Z  
VC/MCN/23

SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500 22 APRIL 1963

[REDACTED]

625

2. FIGHTING BROKE OUT AGAIN YESTERDAY BETWEEN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST AND LEFTISTS ON THE TEHRAN UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. THE FUNDAMENTALISTS, NOT ALL OF WHOM APPEAR TO BE STUDENTS, HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SIMILAR CLASHES THROUGHOUT IRAN OVER THE PAST THREE DAYS AS OF YESTERDAY.

3. PRESIDENT-ELECT BANI-SADR DENOUNCED THE RIGHTWING MUSLIM ATTEMPTS TO TAKE OVER UNIVERSITIES AS BEING "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY," AND SAID THESE ACTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL BACKING ENJOYED HIS GOVERNMENT AMONG MODERATE, CENTRISTS, AND OTHER GROUPS. HOWEVER, THE ISLAMIC JUNDAMENTALISTS HAVE THE BACKING OF THE QOM THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY (WHICH HAS CLOSE TIES TO KHOMEINI) AS WELL AS SUPPORT FROM THE CLERGY-DOMINATED ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. THESE ACTIONS, WHICH ARE PROBAELE DESIGNED TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE CLERGY'S HOLD ON THE COUNTRY, APPEAR TO BE YET ANOTHER FACET OF THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MODERATE SECULARISTS AND THE HARDLINE CLERGY.

4. SHOOTING BETWEEN ARMY TROOPS KURDISH GUERRILLAS ENTERED ITS FOURTH DAY YESTERDAY IN THE KURDISH TOWN OF SAGGEZ.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THIS IS PROBAELE THE RESULT OF INTENSE EFFORTS BY THE IRANIANS TO IMPROVE AIR DEFENSE READINESS ALONG ITS WESTERN BORDER BECAUSE OF RECENT PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ.

JCS  
DADR  
red by [unclear]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



SOVIET PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT MOSCOW HAS ALREADY  
MADE EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT A POSSIBLE US BLOCKADE OF IRAN. AN  
ARTICLE IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "MOSCOW NEWS WEEKLY" SAID CARGO  
FROM WEST EUROPE IS POURING INTO IRAN, AND THAT TRANSIT OF IRANIAN  
CARGOES VIA SOVIET TERRITORY IS OF "VITAL IMPORTANCE" TO IRAN  
BECAUSE OF A THREATENED US ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. THERE ARE INDICA-  
TIONS, HOWEVER, THAT RAIL TRAFFIC THROUGH JOLFA AND ASTARA IS  
STAGNANT, AND THAT THE FREIGHT TIE-UP COULD LAST FOR MONTHS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
14. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA  
A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR  
AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE AO THE USS NIMITZ AND USS  
CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA.

F. INDICATIONS OF TU-95/BEAR DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN:  
NO CHANGE, NO ACTIVITY.

G. IL-38/MAR DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN AND IL-38 RECCE MISSIONS:

TOR 30/0.2  
1 C / 1950.2  
MEM 075

630

MSG #88  
DTG 221805Z APR 67  
FM: CJCS  
TO: JTF CDR/SITE "1"

1. EUCOM HAS VERBALLY CHOPPED THEIR FORCE INVOLVED IN RICE BOWL TO THE JTF EFFECTIVE 1800Z TODAY. WAS AGREED TO BY GENERAL ROGERS, CINCEUR. HE HAS SO INSTRUCTED GEN. ALLEN, DCINCEUR AT EUCOM. GENERAL HUYSER, CINCHAC, HAS INSTRUCTED HIS PEOPLE TO COMPLY WITH YOUR OPERATIONAL ORDERS ON USE OF C-141 DURING EXECUTION PHASE.

2. WOULD YOU SEE ANY PROBLEM IN OUR CALLING THE EXECUTION PHASE EAGLE CLAW. THIS WOULD DIFFERENTIATE EARLIER PHASES FROM EXECUTION. ALSO EAGLE CLAW WILL CANNOT A STRONGER IMAGE IN THE AFTERMATH THAN RICE BOWL. IF ANY PROBLEM WITH THIS, WE WILL LEAVE ALONE.  
BT

NNNN

Classified By ~~SCS~~  
Declassified ~~ON OADR~~  
Declassified by  
DDONMCL  
12 Aug 92

2644Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOX FIRE

*JCF 06463*  
*MCN 107*  
*#631*

G

0 230645Z APR 80  
FM NIMITZ  
TO CDR JTF  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ T//DO NOT RETRANSMIT ON OPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJECT: COORDINATION DATA

REF: JTF 222353Z APR 80

1. REF REQUESTS CAP DATA

2. FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED IN RESPONSE PARA 5, REF:

FUEL REQUIRED:

2F-14 PLUS 2A6: 2 HOURS...53,000 LBS; 3 HOURS...73,000 LBS.

4F-14 PLUS 2A6: 2 HOURS...81,000 LBS; 3 HOURS...111,000 LBS.

3. RATIONALE FOR 4 F-14S BASED ON POSSIBLE AIR THREAT FOR WITHDRAWING FORCES.

4. ORDNANCE LOADS: EACH F-14...4SPW, 4SW & GUN; EACH A-6 (TRAM)... B-APAM (CBU-59).

5. NO, REPEAT NO, OTHER MISSION PRIORITY HAS EVER OR NOW STANDS IN WAY OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY

REVM: 23APR80

BT

NNNN

*Declassified by*  
*DDO/MCE*  
*72 Aug 92*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MJR BT  
DTG 221445Z 50 57  
FROM JTF RC/MJ-4  
TO ALPHA //COOL [REDACTED] //COOL KYLE//LTG [REDACTED]

G

MCN  
#73

1. ALL ITEMS REQUESTED BY [REDACTED] DTG 211930Z,  
LESS THOSE TASKED TO ENCOM TOOK OFF FROM [REDACTED]  
220000 LOCAL APR 68. INCLUDED ARE 45 1ST AID PACKETS  
FOR [REDACTED]

A

2. ITEMS TASKED TO ENCOM ARE:  
1942 50 T SWITCH  
TUBING  
SLEEVES  
HYDRO PACKING ITEMS  
5985-30-353-8518

3. MEDEVAC ACFT THAT DEPARTED POPE 22 APR 68 WILL  
HAVE 45 AID PACKETS FOR [REDACTED] THIS WILL FILL  
THEIR TOTAL RGMT.  
BT

A

635

NNNNT

Classified By: DDONmcc  
Declassified On: OADR  
Downgraded by:  
DDONmcc  
12 Aug 92

RCRORS QSL-1543Z  
KRRKKKK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

221500Z APR 80  
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/3-2  
TO SITE ALFA/J-2  
BT

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

TOR 15  
KCL

SECRET//NO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST  
INT RLP 83

ACTIVITY IS NOW WELL SE OF NIMITZ. I ESTIMATE FOCUS OF USSR

2. KRIVAK 593 IS STILL UNLOCATED DESPITE AIR RECON

NEGATIVE SIGHTINGS VIC MASIRAH IT APPEARS 593 IS BASED ON

HER VIC 013N 061E. 300 EP-3 FLYING FROM DJIBOUTI SIGHTED ROGOV  
GROUP VIC 23 22N 065 27E AT 0145Z

3. ONLY AGI 477 REMAINS IN CTF 76 SURVEILLANCE ROLE AT PRESENT.  
477 IS IN TRAIL OF AMPHIB READY GROUP VIC 22 53N 060 05E.

4. SOVIET MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY AERIAL SURVEILLANCE  
OF ROGOV BY IL-38 MAYS BASED IN ADE. MISSION WAS FLOWN  
ENTIRELY DURING 21-22 APRIL PERIOD OF DARKNESS. OTHER SOVIET AIR  
ACTIVITY OF INTEREST

EXCESS OF 300NM) CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH TO NIMITZ WAS IN

5. AS OF 222000Z APRIL 80, NO INDICATION OF IRANIAN SOVIET OR  
OTHER 3RD COUNTRY INCREASED INTEREST IN NIMITZ OR HELO OPS.

6. REF MFA GRIDS. WE REQUIRE 3 COPIES ONLY AT DESERT TRACK.  
BT

MCN  
070

638

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 94  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/mcc  
EX-1001 (EX-1001) TO JCS  
REF ON OAR  
REMOVED BY multiple smc

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET  
WE

MSG 52  
UTC 231707Z APR 60  
FROM JCS- RC (LTC [REDACTED])  
TO JTF-SITE ALPHA (LTC [REDACTED])

G

SUBJ: RECOMMENDED CHANGE TO CE01.  
PARAGRAPH 5. C. (1) REPLACE PERIOD AFTER  
[REDACTED] WITH COMMA.

MCN  
869 ✓

PARAGRAPH 5. C. DECODE SECTION.  
(\*) INSERT FOLLOWING CODEWORDS/MEANING  
IN EXISTING PARAGRAPH IN ALPHABETICAL  
ORDER.

ICY TO [REDACTED]  
ICY TO CAL [REDACTED]

CODEWORD	MEANING
ERONSON	[REDACTED] CC-141 BASE
CONCEPT	[REDACTED]
ELECTION	[REDACTED]
HERETIC	CORAL SEA
RED EARN	JTF-MAIN [REDACTED]

E

PARAGRAPH 7. A. CHANGE FIRST  
KY-70 NUMBER TO 75847 RPT 75847.  
CHANGE SECOND KY-70 NUMBER (CJCS) TO  
75845 RPT 75845.  
BT

#639

Classified By  
Declassified ON: 0 ADR

DDO NMC  
12 Aug 92  
Annotated to Galt  
by DDO NMC  
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE 07 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ST  
REF ID: A6617700 ( ) TRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJ: STATUS (U)

- A. JTF 220150Z APR 80
- B. SECURE PHONE CON JTF CDR/DEHELO OPS 220330Z APR 80
- 1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, ALL HELOS STRIPPED OF MIN. WT. AND PAINTING HAS COMMENCED. EST. PAINTING COMPLETE 231400Z. ENTIRE SHIP HAS TURNED TO IN SUPPORT OF JTF JET.
- 2. HELO STATUS AS REPORTED REF B, SEVEN OF EIGHT UP. EIGHTH HELO UP FOR TEST 220630Z. BASED ON REF A AND B GUIDANCE EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO TAKE EIGHT.

TOR | 0920  
RLL |

MCN  
066 ✓

AW REF B, ~~NETS~~ FOR UHF AND FM WILL BE REMOVED. EACH OF FIRST SIX HELOS WILL EXPECT CLOSE TO 5200 LBS OF PAX/CARGO AT DESERT TRACK PLUS SIX SETS OF ~~NETS AND POLES~~ FOR EACH HELO. NUMBER EIGHT HELO WILL REQUIRE SIX ADDITIONAL NETS AND ~~POLES~~ RECOMMEND BRINGING OLD ~~NETS AND POLES~~ SINCE THERE ARE ONLY 42 SAND COLORED NETS AT YOUR LOCATION. HELO CREW WILL REMAIN FIVE, WITH TWO GUNNERS. ONLY 200 RDS AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND EIGHT HELO AS WELL AS 1500 RDS PLUS TWO .50 CAL GUNS BEING POSITIONED AT CWO ~~REFUEL POINT AT~~.

4. REQUEST DETAILS OF MC/EC 130 FLT ROUTES INBOUND DAY ONE. HELO DATA BASED ON ESTIMATED WIND IS AS FOLLOWS:

POINT SHIP	LAT/LONG	TIME (ZULU)
COAST-IN		1505
TP 1		1534
TP 2		1544
TP 3		1616
TP 4		1711
DESERT 1		1739
DEPART DESERT 1		1933
TP 5		2033
TP 6		2038
TP 7		2237
DZ		2244
DEPART DZ		2246
HIDE		2251
		2306

642

5. CTF 70 HAS REQUESTED MOVING JTF SPECIAL COMM INTO FLAG BRIDGE AREA. INTEND TO RESPOND THAT COMM WILL REMAIN JTF DISCRETE UNTIL DISCOVERY OR ASSAULT TIME TO PRECLUDE EXPOSING OUR PLAN UNNECESSARILY. HOWEVER, ALL OUR DATA RECEIVED VIA BREVITY CODE OR OTHER MEANS WILL BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO CTF 70, SO THAT HE MAY TRACK OUR PROGRESS. ONCE HIS FORCES ARE INVOLVED OR ABOUT TO BE INVOLVED, WE CAN REMOTE DIRECTLY TO HIS STAFF TO PROVIDE NECESSARY COORDINATION AND CONTROL. THIS REMOTING HAS ALREADY BEEN TESTED.

LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.

21 APR 80

Classified by  
 DSO nml  
 12 AUG 92  
 Declassify on OADR  
 MORGAN  
 by DSO



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORY CLEAR.

TOR/0509Z  
JB/MCN 062V

MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

EG (C) SSN 0307  
O 220515Z APR 80  
FM [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED]  
TO JCS/SOD/LT GEN GAST  
JCS/OPG/COL [REDACTED] JCS  
JTF/LTCOL [REDACTED]  
BT

Handwritten notes in circles:  
1. ZFD to JCS  
2. U-646

E ← SUEJ: [REDACTED] SITREP NUMBER 5  
1.) HAVE USED 26,000 U.S. GALLONS  
JET A-1 FROM 19-21 APRIL. TOTAL  
COST IS \$37,924 AT \$1.46  
PER U.S. GALLON.  
E ← 2.) MORALE OF TROOPS IS EXCELLENT.  
[REDACTED] PERSONNEL HAVE  
COOPERATED FULLY AND CONTINUE  
TO BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR NEEDS.  
BT

Classified By [REDACTED]  
Declassify on [REDACTED]  
ES DDO NMC  
12 AUG 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TOP/22 04/46  
RCS/RC/J2  
#64B

NSC047  
DTG: 220510Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2  
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

REF: UR 212210Z APR 80, SAB

1. CHECK WITH [REDACTED] AND DIA FAILED TO CONFIRM YOUR IMPLICATION THAT [REDACTED] HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING DATA IS PROVIDED PER YOUR REQUEST:

A. SOVIET SURFACE UNITS OPERATING IN THE ARABIAN SEA HAVE NEVER [REDACTED]

B. THE LAST INCIDENCE NOT APPLICABLE.

C. SIGNIFICANCE TO POTENTIAL FRIENDLY OPERATIONS ARE PROBABLY MINIMUM AS THE BASIC PEACETIME PURPOSE OF [REDACTED]

D. UNABLE TO PREDICT ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TIME FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE. NOMINALLY SPEAKING WHEN WORKING IN A CONFINED AREA SUCH AS THE NORTHERN [REDACTED] THE PERIOD WOULD BE MEASURED IN HOURS VICE DAYS.

E. THE KRIVAK UTILIZING IES HEADNET RADAR WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHIN [REDACTED] OF THE [REDACTED] FLIGHT ROUTE TO DETECT A/C FLYING AT 500FT ASL AND BELOW.

BT

CIE

Classified By JCS  
Declassified On OADR

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 1255  
COMPLETED ON 12 Aug 92  
REVIEWED BY DDO  
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING TO CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

FM 100/AC-JE/ ✓  
TO SILET ALPHA 30 ✓  
EST 10 00 00 ✓

~~SECRET~~

#  
i-649

SUBJECT: TOT PRIORITIES

REF: UR MSG 210754Z APR 68

1. RECOMMENDED TARGET PRIORITIES AND STRIKE TIMES ARE PROVIDED PER YOUR REQUEST

(A) TEHRAN AREA

- (1) KARIM KHAN 5 TAND POWER SUB-STATION TRANSFORMER YARD. STRIKE TIME TO COINCIDE WITH DETECTION OF GROUND ASSAULT
- (2) SEPAH SQUARE PTT MICROWAVE POWER COMPLEX. STRIKE TIME ASAP, AFTER FORCE INITIATES COMPOUND ASSAULT.
- (3) MEHRAHAD ATC TOWER ASSOCIATED F4 ALERT AIRCRAFT. STRIKE TIME 7-10 MINUTES AFTER COMPOUND ASSAULT INITIATED.
- (4) NATIONAL IRANIAN TV/RADIO ANTENNA. STRIKE TIME 10-12 MINUTES AFTER COMPOUND ASSAULT INITIATED.

(B) MANZARIYEH AREA

- (1) KUSHK-E NUSRAT ATC RADAR SHORTLY BEFORE ARRIVAL OF F4 AND HELICOPTERS.
- (2) KUSHK-E NUSRAT GROUND RELAY TOWERS SHORTLY BEFORE ATC RADAR.

2. PRINCIPAL AIR THREAT TO EMBASSY WILL COME FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AIR THREAT FROM OUTSIDE TEHRAN AREA WILL COME FROM [REDACTED]

3. PRINCIPAL AIR THREAT TO MANZARIYEH WILL COME FROM [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BUT AIRCRAFT REMAIN A THREAT TO [REDACTED] IF THE LOCATION BECOMES [REDACTED] PINPOINTED. BOTH F4 AND F14 CARRY 20MM CANNON. F-4 ALSO CARRIES SIDEWINDER AND SPARROW AAM.

REVH 21 APR 68

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 1755

CONTROLLED BY

BY [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

101-22 041662  
P/M 11/11/80 058

650

MSG 846  
DTG: 220235Z APR 80

FM: JTF RC/ [REDACTED]  
TO: JTF/J-3 [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

- (U) 1. HIGH LEVEL INTEREST HERE IN STATUS OF EC-130 AIRCRAFT (GENERATED BY ENGINE CHANGE) AND STATUS OF EIGHT HELOS ABOARD CV, REQUEST YOU PROVIDE UPDATE BY 22/0400Z IF POSSIBLE.
  - (U) 2. FROM CHANGE IN TANKER RCMTS FIRST NITE OPS, APPEARS SOME CHANGES IN FLOW/PROFILE HAVE BEEN MADE. REQUEST INFO ON ANY CHANGE, BE RELAYED TO THIS LOCATION TO UPDATE BRIEFING CHARTS.
  - (U) 3. REQUEST YOU CONFIRM THAT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON OPERATION OF PPN-18 BEACON, METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT, AND RESULTS TO EXPECT I.E. NO COMMO REQUIRED BETWEEN A-6 ACFT AND GROUND UNIT.
  - (U) 4. REF OUR 211842Z APRIL 80 MSG, SUBJ: DELIVERY OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE LETTERS. [REDACTED] (USA) WILL COURIER LETTERS VICE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AS STATED IN REF MSG.
- BT

Classified By ~~SES~~  
Declassified ON ~~OADR~~

Declassified by  
D. D. N. O. C.  
12 Aug 81

NNNN

FOR THAT IS ALL



TO 218711 APR 68  
FROM HQS/DC-JE  
SITE ALPHA  
INFO [redacted]

#  
i-652

SUBJECT: OVERFLIGHT REACTION  
REF: UR SSN 0027 DTG 218711  
[redacted] REACTION TO US OVERFLIGHT TO.

C  
A/E

(1) EXAMINATION OF [redacted] REPERATION  
TEAM ANALYSIS OF [redacted]  
OVER FLIGHT ROUTE INDICATES  
PROPOSED ROUTE IS BEST FEASIBLE

[redacted] RADIO SILENCE IS STILL  
ESSENTIAL. RECOMMENDED [redacted]  
[redacted] EGRESS FOR  
MC 130 IS ALONG LINE

[redacted]  
[redacted] THEN TURNING NORTH TO OIP.

C  
A/E

(2) IF [redacted] WERE TO DETECT  
KC 135/MC 130 DURING REFUELING  
THEY WOULD (A) CHALLENGE, SCRAMBLE  
TO INVESTIGATE, IDENTIFY AND UPON RECOGNITION  
WOULD VOICE CHALLENGE THEN SAF  
AIRCRAFT AND DEPENDING  
THE US EXPLANATION AND DIRECTION  
FROM THE [redacted] FIGHTER CONTROLLER  
WOULD DIRECT THE AIRCRAFT TO  
A [redacted] AIR FIELD OR ESCORT  
THE AIRCRAFT OUT OF [redacted]  
AIRSPACE.

C  
A/E

(3) IF [redacted] SUSPICIONS COULD BE [redacted]  
[redacted] IT IS AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT  
THE [redacted] MAY ALLOW THE ACFT TO PASS.

C  
B/E

(4) [redacted] ACFT WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE LIKELY TO ATTEMPT  
FORCE DOWN OR TO ENGAGE AN ACFT WHICH COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP/220156Z  
1501 055

MSG #41  
BTG 212300Z APR 69  
FM: JCS-RC  
TO: ALPHA (RELAY TO USS NIMITZ)

FOR CDR [REDACTED]  
FM: LTC [REDACTED]

REQUEST FOLLOWING

- UHF FREQUENCY FOR KC-135 TANKERS TO CONTACT USS NIMITZ ON NIGHT 1 AND 2.
- STATUS OF HELO WSC-3 AND FLIGHT TEST.

EX HOW DO YOU CALL [REDACTED] FROM USS NIMITZ.  
BT

Relayed  
Nimitz  
MSG #049  
AT  
220220Z

# 653

NNNN

Classified By JSD DDO N mcc  
Declassified ON: OADR 12 Aug 92

Classified by [unclear]  
Declassified on [unclear]  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 2340  
VC /

MSG036

DTG 212200Z APR 67

FM JTF/RC  
TO CDR JTF

SITE ALPHA (RELAY TO [REDACTED])

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: UPDATE REPORT

Relayed us  
050  
22/03132

(U) 1. SITE ACTIVATION. CJCS WILL ACCOMPLISH BY PHONCON TO CINOS. ADVISE US BY LATE 21 APR OUR TIME OR EARLY 22 APR OUR TIME. WE WILL ADVISE.

(U) 2. CJCS CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR DOWN BLADDER BIRD. PLANNING HERE IN PROGRESS TO GET YOU ANOTHER AIRCRAFT BUT DOUBTFUL. ADVISE US IF YOU THINK YOU CAN GET THREE OPERATIONAL.

(U) 3. SENSITIVE LETTER. WILL CONTACT [REDACTED] TO HAVE HIM REPORT TO [REDACTED] 0800Z 23 APR TO PICK UP A LETTER AT [REDACTED] LOCATION.

654

(U) 4. JTF CMDR NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE ANY SENSITIVE LETTER TO ANY ONE UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY FURTHER COMMUNICATION.

[REDACTED] COORDINATE CONTACT WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GEN GAST TO DELIVER [REDACTED] BUT NOT PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR [REDACTED] DELIVERY.

(U) 5. SENSITIVE LETTER DELIVERY. LETTERS TO BE PLACED IN U.S. MILITARY HANDS FOR DELIVERY TO U.S. AMBASSADORS. THE HOURS OF DELIVERY TO BE DETERMINED BY THE U.S. MILITARY. NOTIFICATION OF DELIVERY TO RESPECTIVE U.S. AMBASSADORS DONE ONLY ON THE DIRECTION OF CJCS. CJCS WILL AUTHORIZE DELIVERY OF LETTERS AFTER SECURING APPROVAL AND KNOWLEDGE THAT VALLEY HAS BEEN CROSSED.

(U) 6. REPEAT: JTF CMDR NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE ANY SENSITIVE LETTER TO ANY ONE UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS.

(U) 7. FOR GEN GAST, HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCE NAVY AWARE OF [REDACTED] WITH GROUND FORCE.

REVN 21 APR 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



FM: WLLD 08T/8-2(1)  
53 15170-2  
31000 INTREP 02

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

TOR 2/10  
15B  
NO TAPE

KRIVA

1 FFG 693 HAS DEPARTED CTF 70 MODLOC. KRIVAK LAST  
LOCATED VIC 21 53N 362 13E ON COURSE 190 T 10 KTS AT  
131900Z.

AGI 477 REMDINS IN SURVEILLANCE  
OF AMPHIB READY GROUP

THIS ACTIVITY MAY BE  
RELATED TO MOVEMENT OF IVAN BOGOV TASK GROUP.

NO SOVIET MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY TODAY. US BRUMBY WAO  
RECONNOITERED BY IRANIAN C-130 VIC 25 057 46E AT 0650Z

- ING 0800 HOURS
  - 4. NIMITZ IS ENDEAVORING TO GET POSITIVE PLOT MN KRIVAK 693.  
MEANWHILE, BELIEVE JTF SHOULD BE AWARE THAT HEADPET RADAR  
IS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO FLIGHT OPS VI
  - 693 IS IN THAT AREA.
  - 5. WOULD APPRECIATE WX EARLY AM 22 APR 80.
- FATHER 808  
BT

DTG  
2/20/03

658

NINT OSLGMM ANN D NEED ZDK OF YOUR LAST K  
8808FJSA

2830/??

XHP IMKD  
B YRNTHCQURDPCLE

Classified By JES  
Declassified on DA PK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

047

✓  
TOR/1805  
VC/ Nimitz

MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

JRGHP

NO EOM.

659

FM NIMITZ/COL  
TO JTF/J3

REF JTE/J3 201855Z APR 80

SUBJECT - FLEET TACAIR SUPPORT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(U) 1. (TS) REF REQUESTED TX-70 KC-135 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

2. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY 1: WHEN CALLED FOR BY CJTF RICEBOWL, TF-70 CAN PROVIDE [REDACTED] (WORST CASE) ARRIVING AT 1 PLUS 50 FOR 2 PLUS 45 (NEW FLIGHT AT :15; 2 ROCKEYE, 2 AIM-9, 1000 RDS 20MM PER AIRCRAFT) USING ONLY FLEET REFUELING ASSETS AND 35589, 8, & 1 SET OF EXTERNAL TANKS FROM A 5 MIN COCKPIT ALERT POSTURE. SUBSEQUENT COVERAGE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY KC-135'S. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING DISPOSITION OF KC-135'S IF ONLY 5 KC-135 ARTS AVAILABLE:

INSERT WORD  
"JETTISONING"

[REDACTED] 2 ARTS, 2 ALFA (STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET - 3 ARTS/6 ALPHA (5/3 ARTS) STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET UPON COMPROMISE OF RICE BOWL MISSION IN DAYLIGHT HOURS, CJTF WILL IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH A BASKET EQUIPPED ARTS, AND COMPANION ALPHA TANKER FOR BUDDY REFUEL, FROM [REDACTED] DIRECT TO 24-40N, 56-00E. (ETE AT 480KTS - 2.8 HRS) TO MAXIMIZE AVAILABLE OFF LOAD TANKER SHOULD PLAN TO RECOVER WITH MINIMUM FUEL AT [REDACTED] FOLLOW ON TANKERS WILL LAUNCH AS NEEDED AT APPROPRIATE INTERVALS. TF-70 CAN THEN MAINTAIN AIR ASSETS TO COVER EMERGENCY [REDACTED] DISPOSITION AS REQUIRED. TANKERS SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR

AG  
AG

...TANKER SUPPORT COULD ALSO BE PROVIDED BY NOTIONALLY LAUNCHING KC-135'S FROM [REDACTED] AT INTERVALS DURING DUTY AND VULNERABILITY PERIODS, THUS MAINTAINING THE TRAINING SIGNATURE PRESENTLY ESTABLISHED.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY TWO: TF-70 WILL PROVIDE [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT TO CAP PLANNED EXFILTRATION ROUTE FROM AN ANCHOR POINT IN VICINITY OF 29-00N, 50-00E. KC-135 TANKERS WILL LAUNCH NOTIONALLY (INTERVAL DEPENDS ON ARTS/ALPHA MIX) FROM [REDACTED] TO ARRIVE OVER TF-70 AT PLANNED ASSAULT TIME. IF ARTS AVAILABLE, 3 HOURS INTO MISSION BUDDY REFUELING WILL GIVE EACH ARTS 3.5 HOURS OF ORBIT PLUS 50,000 LBS AN HR OFFLOAD CAPABILITY. (FOUR F-14'S REQUIRE 40,000 LBS FOR 3 HOURS LOITER). AS KC-135(S) ARRIVE VICINITY OF NIMITZ F-14'S WILL LAUNCH, JOIN AND ESCORT THEM TO ABOVE MENTIONED ORBIT POINT. TANKER ON-STATION CAPABILITY CAN BE INCREASED BY [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] RECOVERY.

3. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING COMMON REFERENCE POINTS BE USED BY CAP AIRCRAFT/GROUND FORCES TO FACILITATE LINK-UPS:

- E CAP ALFA (REFUEL AREA)
- E CARUBRAVO (HELICOPTER)
- E CAP CHARLIE
- E CAP DELTA (EMBASSY)
- E CAP ECHO
- E CAP FOXTROT
- E CAP GOLF
- E CAP HOTEL

GROUND FORCES/AIR FORCES MUST HAVE ONE RADIO CONTACT ON 341.4 MHZ (PRIMARY), 240.5 MHZ (SECONDARY) BEFORE AIR FORCES CAN COMMIT. GROUND FORCES SHOULD HAVE SMOKE OR SIMILAR MARKING DEVICE. CALL SIGNS WILL BE COORDINATED PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION.

4. SUMMARY: IF RADIUS OF ACTION IS SUBSTANTIAL, STE-70 WITH SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES IS LIMITED WITHOUT KC-135 AIR REFUELING SUPPORT. MINIMUM FUEL RECOVERIES INTO [REDACTED] ENHANCE OFFLOAD POTENTIAL. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AN AIR REFUEL PRACTICE SIGNATURE WHICH MUST BE CONTINUED (1 MISSION A DAY).

[REDACTED] AND CAN BE USED AS COVER TO DISCREETLY PREPOSITION [REDACTED] AT ALTITUDE DURING PERIODS OF VULNERABILITY. NECESSARY BOMBING MISSION ASSETS (A-6'S, KA56'S) REMAIN DEDICATED THROUGHOUT. [REDACTED] TF-70 TACAIR PILOTS ARE NOW QUALIFIED IN KC-135 REFUELING. NEED

PLANNED WITHDRAWAL ALTITUDES OF SVTRACTION C-141'S/AC, KC-135'S FROM TARGET COUNTRY ON NIGHT TWO. WHILE DAY ONE IS A CONTINGENCY CONCEPT, DAY TWO F-14 CAP U CONSIDERED A PRUDENT ENHANCEMENT FOR MISSION SUCCESS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY, [REDACTED]

Classified By: *DDONMCC*  
Declassified ON: *OADR* *12 Aug 92*

*Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL by DDONMCC 12 Aug 92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*i-659*

~~SECRET~~

1754

MSG 107  
JCS 311400L APR 67  
FM: JCS/RC-U-2  
TO: SITE /ALPHA  
INFO: SFC/S2  
1-SAW/S2

~~SECRET~~

MCN  
046

SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE  
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 233400Z/23 APR 67  
TO 240400Z/24 APR 67

660

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Classified By: OADR  
Declassified On: OADR

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 9  
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCS  
EXEMPTED FROM DECLASSIFICATION TO Secret  
DATE 040  
BY DIA

~~SECRET~~

MSG #25  
DTG 211245Z APR 88  
FM JTF RC/  
TO: [REDACTED]  
INFO: ALPHA/ [REDACTED]

*(Handwritten signature/initials)*

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS

1. YOUR ELEMENTS REQUEST THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO BE FORWARDED BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS:

- A. 1942 50TW SWITCH 2EA
- B. ZC 5898 NSN 6145-00-035-1536  
COMMO CORD 500FT ROLL
- C. PN U544U NSN 5935-00-553-9352  
CONNECTOR TEN EACH
- D. PN HG 005004  
ALTIMETER ONE EACH
- E. PN MS 3106A-145-5P  
IP CONNECTORS TEN EACH
- F. PN MS 3057-02  
CONNECTOR TEN EACH
- G. 15 FOOT INTERCOM CORD ASSY  
FOR HJTR POSITION
- H. PN MS 20320-A1  
POT RELAY/50-08 TWO EACH
- I. TMS PROGRAMMER (PSP) ONE EACH
- J. POP IIIVIT SET ONE EACH
- K. NSN 0605-00-033-7011  
INDICATOR THREE EACH
- L. 5005-02-353-0510  
HF COUPLER TWENTY FIVE EACH
- M. 5021-02-000-2070  
HF RT UNIT ONE EACH
- N. METHOL ETHYL KETONE TWENTY GALLONS
- O. 5041-00-007-7040  
ONE EACH  
DOPPIER FREQ TRACKER
- P. YELLOW LOX ENGINE ANALYZER
- Q. TUBING, ASSORTED 3/8 OR 1/2 INCH
- R. F NUTS AND SLEEVES FOR TUBING
- S. HACK SAW FRAME AND BLADES
- T. #40 DRILL BITS TWO EACH
- U. TULC FLARE/CUTTER ONE EACH
- V. HYDRAULIC PACKING  
STS PK 300-02 FIFTEEN EACH  
STS PK 300-06 FIFTEEN EACH  
LS4634-7 FIFTEEN EACH  
LS4634-10 FIFTEEN EACH  
LS4634-12 FIFTEEN EACH
- W. SHEET METAL PATCH FLAP
- X. ATH SOLENOID  
1650-00-703-0722 ONE EACH  
1650-00-703-0722 ONE EACH
- Y. C-12 ENGINE OIL DIP STICK
- Z. CABLE 3/32 AND 3/16 IN FOOT CABLE  
FITTINGS FOR SWAGE FOR EACH SIZE  
AA. RG 58H COAX CABLE ELEC HUNDRED FOOT  
AB. OYLITE 2003 (FUEL) ONE BOX  
AC. WINE TOOTH BRUSHES FOR FUEL ONE BOX  
AD. ACID BRUSHES FOR FUEL ONE BOX  
AE. BRICK BATTERY CHARGER ONE EACH  
AF. BRICK BATTERY TWO EACH

2. PLEASE ADVISE ON YOUR CAPABILITY TO MEET AND SHIP THIS REQUIREMENT. ITEM II IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE.

*Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR  
Declassified by  
DDO w/m cd  
12/11/99*



INT OML PLS YKORP

RSR7 AND WSL 1715Z

MSG030  
DTG 211600Z APR 80

FM: JTF RC//  
TO: ALPHA//

SUBJECT: LOG UPDATE

(U) 1. CRITICAL RADAR PARTS WILL DEPART 1ST SQW LOCATION  
221300Z TO ARRIVE 231400Z.

(U) 2. C130 ENGINE REPAIR PARTS & GROUND EQUIPMENT WILL  
LAND YOUR LOCATION 1800Z TODAY.

(U) 3. FULTON RIG FENDING LINES WILL ARRIVE FROM  
EUCOM TODAY AT 1800Z.

(U) 4. 1ST SQW TASKED TO PROVIDE ITEMS REQUESTED IN  
MSG. DTG 211245Z APR 80 SUBJ RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS.  
PARTS SHOULD DEPART EGLIN NLT 221300Z ARRIVING 231400Z.

(U) 5. REQUEST STATUS OF MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS.

(U) 6. IF RADAR PARTS ARE FOR FORWARD DEPLOYED ACFT, RECOMMEND  
YOU CANNABALIZE FROM YOUR LOCATION (COMMENT FROM J-3).

(U) 7. PLEASE FORWARD ANY UNRESOLVED LOG ACTIONS WITH  
DESIRED PRIORITIES.

REVW 21 APR 80

669

Declassified by  
D. D. M. C.  
12 Aug 94



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TW 1122E  
100

MCN

838  
666

MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

P 211117Z APR 60  
FM [REDACTED]  
TO JCS/S05 (LTG GAST)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ [REDACTED] SITREP #4  
REF SITREP #3 DTG 210850Z APR 60

1. REF DISCUSSED 24 APR VIP VISIT TO [REDACTED] WITH [REDACTED] OPERATIONS OFFICER  
HE ASSURED US THAT IT IS [REDACTED] DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW NEWSMEN TO ACCOMPANY  
VIPS. EXPECT THE VISIT TO BE ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL.

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

Classified By ~~DDO~~ NMC  
Declassified ON: OADR 12 Aug 92

Downgraded by  
DDO NMC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOV 11 1957

TO DIRECTOR ✓

SUBJECT: VISIT TO [REDACTED]

WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR VISIT TO BE CANCELLED.

REV. 01 1957

11/11  
1957

# 667

NNNN

Classified by [unclear]  
Declassify on: OADR  
Revised to [unclear]  
by [unclear]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR 0710Z  
ALL

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

0 210925Z APR80  
FM WALNUT  
TO DUCKHUNTER  
BT

MCN  
1137  
668

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT PARTS REQUIREMENTS.

1. ACFT 62-1843 REQUIRES

- A. PUMP ASSY, FUEL P/N 6827283 T.O. 2J-T56-44  
FIG. 4 INDEX-1 1 EACH
- B. PACKING, PREFORMED P/N M59321-213 T.O. 2J-T56-44  
FIG. 4 INDEX-33 4 EACH
- C. PACKING, PERFORMED P/N MS 9020-04 T.O. 2J-T56-44  
FIG. 4 INDEX-25 2 EACH
- D. PACKING, PREFORMED P/N MS 9020-10 T.O. 2J-T56-44  
FIG. 4 INDEX 28 2 EACH

2. ACFT 63-7785 REQUIRES

- A. VALVE, ANTI-ICING P/N 26130010 T.O. 1C-130(H)H-10  
FIG. 4-7 INDEX 22 1 EACH
- B. GASKET P/N 750244-4 T.O. 1C-130(H)H-10  
FIG. 4-7 INDEX 23 2 EACH

BT

Classified By JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by  
DAN MCC  
[Signature]

NNNN



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 210518Z  
C 2935

# 670

210500Z APR 80  
FM [REDACTED]  
TO JTF [REDACTED]  
JCS/SCD (LTG GAST)

BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP #3

1. BE ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] AIRFIELD WILL BE VISITED BY A PARTY OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] DIGNITARIES ON THURSDAY 24 APRIL BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0800-1000 LOCAL. THE GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

WE ARE ALSO INFORMED THAT [REDACTED] WILL ACCOMPANY THE GROUP AS WELL AS SEVERAL [REDACTED] NEWS REPORTERS.

2. WE WERE QUERIED LAST EVENING BY JTF CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF [REDACTED] AIRFIELD FOR C-141 OPERATIONS. APPARENTLY MAC IS RELUCTANT TO USE THE FIELD WITHOUT FIRST CONDUCTING AN OFFICIAL MAC SURVEY. SUCH A SURVEY DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY AT THIS TIME NOR WOULD IT BE POLITICALLY PRUDENT SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO OVERLOAD THE SYSTEM WITH ANOTHER SHORT NOTICE DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE REQUEST. BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACILITY AND THE JUDGEMENT OF FORMER C-141 CREWMEMBERS WHO ARE WITH THE MC-130 DETACHMENT, THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN USING THE MAIN RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF AND LANDING AND THE [REDACTED]

FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON [REDACTED] AIRFIELD, OPERATORS SHOULD REFER TO THE [REDACTED] TECHNICAL FACILITIES REPORT, FEBRUARY 1980. REFERENCE IN REPORT TO [REDACTED] BEING C-130 CAPABLE WAS BASED ON CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS, LANDING AND TAKEOFFS, OF C-130 AIRCRAFT.

Classified By: JDD  
Declassified ON: OADR  
DDO MNC  
DDO MNC  
12 BY 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

210300Z APR 67  
FM: JTF RESPONSE CELL  
TO: JTF ONDR SITE "A"  
BT

34  
# 671

~~SECRET~~

E

LTG GAST ARRIVING BY KC-135, ETA YOUR LOCATION 211505Z. REQUEST  
YOU CONSIDER HIS PLANNED DEPARTURE FOR [REDACTED] ON A LATER AIRCRAFT.  
BT

~~Classified By: JCS~~  
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

Classified by  
DDO NMC  
12 Aug 92  
Declassified by  
CONF by  
DDO NMC  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG 1  
LTC BRUCE WARR  
FROM JTF RESPONSE CELL  
TO ALPHA/CCL

*7-18-70*  
*VC*

*✓(1)*

G

REF: YOUR MSG DTG 201501Z APR 66 (LTC RICHARDS)

*674*

1. SLEEPING EQUIPMENT & CANTEENS WILL ACCOMPANY  
CO 130 FROM [REDACTED] THAT DEPART 210500Z.

2. FENDING LINES ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT [REDACTED]  
1ST SOW INDICATES LINES ACCOMPANIED BASIC PIG. USAF  
HAS BEEN TASKED TO PROVIDE TWO SETS FOR CARGO  
ON HC130 THAT DEPARTS E-M TOMMOROW 2700Z. IS THIS  
SUFFICIENT?

3. MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS ARE NOT AT RAMSTEIN.  
IF AC UNITS ARE NOT YET AT YOUR LOCATION WE  
WILL GO BACK & TRACE FROM ORIGINAL SOURCE.  
PLS ADVISE.  
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 07 RECEIVED.

47478

*Classified By: [REDACTED]*  
*Declassified ON: OADR*  
*Declassified by [REDACTED]*  
*DDO nmc*  
*12 Aug 92*



TOP- 2020092

C-# 678

MSG 17  
UTC 281935 Z APR 68  
FROM JTF RICE SOUL (REAF)  
TO ALPHA/

REF YOUR MSG 201638Z APR 68

1. REF INDICATED NO MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS HAVE ARRIVED. INDICATED THAT THREE HAVE ARRIVED. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT A TOTAL OF FIVE ARE REQUIRED.

2. PLS INFORM US:  
HOW MANY HAVE ARRIVED?  
ARE THEY NEW?  
HOW MANY MORE DO YOU REQUIRE?

3. BE INFORMED RAMSTIEN HAS 14 PALLETS BACKLOGGED.  
WE ARE WORKING TO EXPEDITE SHIPMENT.  
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 34 RECEIVED.

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR  
Declassified by  
DDO Wmcc  
12/11/92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET

J  
CBMBIRMBREBDE.FOXFIRE JMCYOU HAV

SAW YURCU43U.2?

8629-1\$ NO TXPING 4.

-- WILL SEJATWS  
ZFEOCRON YU ESSAGE S H  
CI ROEFIVER:3MHGTEN IS EE  
HE VOICE ..

25  
#679  
RETRNS 00005Z  
BDM JCS

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRIORITY

FM: JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)

TO: JTR (VAUGHT)

JCS (SOD)

SUBJ: HELO DET. STATUS (TS)

1. (U) (TS) TONIGHT'S PERSONAL RECON INDICATES HELO LAUNCH  
COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EARLY AS 1500Z (1900 LCL)  
BASED ON ACTUAL LEVEL OF DARKNESS. ACTUAL COAST IN WILL  
OCCUR ABOUT 25 MIN AFTER LAUNCH. THIS WILL PERMIT A SLIGHTLY  
EARLIER ARRIVAL AT REFUEL POINT.

2. (TS) NON-REF PINS, SER NOS: 007 AND 011 RETURNED TO  
[REDACTED] TODAY VIA MAC C-121. DOCUMENT INDICATED MARCH  
AFB AS FINAL DESTINATION.  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR  
Classified by  
DSON/ML  
12 Aug 92  
DSON/ML  
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

0 231800Z APR 88  
FM TALMUT  
TO BUCKHUNTER  
BT

G

TOP 1616Z  
REL

MCN  
024

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT PARTS/MISSION STATUS

1. WE REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING PARTS FOR OUR AIRCRAFT.  
IGNITION RELAY PN6792947 T/O 20-700-44 FIG 6 IND 14

NAVIGATION COMPUTER UNIT P/N 783220-1 T/O 10-130(Y)-4 2 EA  
FIG 50 IND 17

MEMORY MODULE UNIT P/N 782320-1 T.O. 10-130(Y)-4 2EA  
FIG. 50 IND. 22

RT /APN153 DOPPLER RCVR/TYMR 2 EA  
FIG. 50 IND. 9

2. FLEW ONE SEA SURVELANCE MISSION  
BT

1 CY TO M  
VAU  
1 CY TO C

G ->

#680

NNNN

Classified By: JCS  
Declassify ON: OADR  
Declassified by  
D.D. N.M.C.  
12 Aug 89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

1800 14  
LTG 201801Z APR 68  
FROM DEPCOM JTF WASH DC  
INFO COMJTF, [REDACTED]

EC [REDACTED]

ER SUBJECT: [REDACTED] COMPROMISE

WE HAVE JUST TALKED TO CGW [REDACTED] HE WILL  
DO WHAT HE CAN. ACTION WILL BE TAKEN  
MORNING, YOUR TIME.  
BT

70R / 1112  
AC  
MCW  
003  
#681

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified On: OADR

NNNN

Classified by [REDACTED]  
Declassify on  
OADP  
[REDACTED] to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ASC 1.  
BTG 201800Z APR 77  
FROM JCC/EC-J2  
TO SITE ALPHA/J2

G  
SUBJECT: ██████████ REQUEST

(1) WILL HAVE SAC PENETRATION ANALYSIS TEAM IN BLDG TOMORROW (21 APRIL 77)

(2) REQUEST YOU PROVIDE SPECIFIC MAC QUESTIONS VIA MESSAGE TO REDUCE CHANCE OF MISINTERPRETATION.

(3) WILL PROVIDE RESULTS AS OBTAINED.  
BT

NNNN

7CA 1545Z  
SPH

✓ MCN  
822

#682

Classified by *tas*  
Declassified by *ADR*  
*Declassified by*  
*DP & NM*  
*2/2/82*

~~SECRET~~


TOR / 1510Z  
RC / 20

684

MSG 11  
DTG 201445Z APR 80  
FROM JCS/RC-J2  
TO SITE ALPHA/J2 ✓

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJECT: QUERY RESPONSE  
REF: (A) UR DTG 201445Z APR 80  
SUEJ: HOSTAGE UPDATE

(B) JCS/RC-J2/DTG 201330Z APR 80  
SUEJ: REQUEST FOR INFO



(2) REF B CAUTIONS AGAINST  
ASSUMING ALL HOSTAGES ARE  
BEING HELD IN CHANCERY.

NNNN

Classified by JCS  
Declassified on OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 1235  
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 82  
REVALUED BY BDO n/m  
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JACKHUNTER DE FOXFIRE RE TWO IMMEDIATE MESSAGES

TCR/1200Z  
KCL/12

0 201015Z APR 80  
FM JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)  
TO JTF [REDACTED] VAUGHT)  
BT

689

~~SECURE ATTACHMENT DO NOT PASS ON INTEL BROADCAST~~

ARRIVAL REPORT (TS)

- 1. (TS) PARTY OF SIXTY THREE ARRIVED [REDACTED] 200600Z AND NIMITZ 200315Z.
- 2. (TS) AT [REDACTED] ONE OF THE DUTY WORKING PARTY PROVIDING SUPPORT DURING C-141 LAYOVER, WAS MEMBER OF HM-16 AND RECOGNIZED HM-16 MEMBERS IN OUR PARTY. [REDACTED], THE HM-16 SAILOR INVOLVED, WAS THEN TAKEN TO NIMITZ WITH THIS PARTY. OSTENSIBLY, HE WAS TO ESCORT SPECIAL EVENING LIGHT CARGO TO HIS SHIP. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE HE WOKE HIS OINC, [REDACTED] FROM HM-16 TO TELL HIM WHO HE'D SEEN. LT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN CAUTIONED, AND TOLD THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE ESCORTING HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE NIMITZ. NO UNUSUAL REACTION EXPECTED WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR.
- (U) 3. (TS) REQUEST LATEST DATA ON EC-130 FUEL OFF LOAD CAPABILITY USING 6000 GALLON SYSTEM. LAST REPORT INDICATED 900 GALLONS UNUSEABLE.
- (U) 4. (TS) CURRENT HELO STATUS SEVEN OUT OF EIGHT MISSION CAPABLE (HM-16 REPORT).
- (U) 5. (TS) REQUEST PROVIDE DAILY SURFACE TO 2000 FT WINDS FORECAST FOR TRACK, TEMPERATURE AND DENSITY ALTITUDE PREDICTIONS ON THE SURFACE AT LAND AND TAKE-OFF TIMES FOR SHIP, DESERT TRACK, HIDE AND CITY.
- (U) 6. (TS) REQUEST HELO LOADS BY AIRCRAFT 1 THROUGH 6. NUMBER OF PAX, THEIR WEIGHT (WITH GEAR), CARGO WT AND ITS DESCRIPTION.
- (U) 7. CINCPAC LNO HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER RE: OPTIONS FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT REFUELING. 20 FLEET AIRCRAFT IF-14, RA-651 COMPLETED LAST NIGHT, EXPECT AS MANY MORE TONIGHT. TRAINING DONE RADIO SILENCE ON SECURE VOICE.

Classified by: JES  
Declassified on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



TOP  
VC

P. 200300Z APR 83  
FM WALNUT  
TO DUCKHUNTER/MAJ G  
BT

~~SECRET~~  
SUBJ: SITREP NUMBER 1  
COMMUNICATION CENTER IS OPERATING ON COMMERCIAL POWER WITH GENERATORS  
AS BACK UP.

EQUIPMENT STATUS

- 2 GENERATOR GREEN
- 1 GENERATOR AMBER. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT REPAIRED TODAY. TWO OF THEM HAD WATER AND SAND IN FUEL BOWL.
- 1 TT-76 AMBER. KEY BOARD NEEDS REPLACING.
- 1 UGC-129 GREEN
- 1 WSC-3 GREEN
- 1 KH-7 GREEN
- 2 TH-22'S GREEN

ALL OTHER ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED.

- 1. TT-76 KEYBOARD
- 1. THREE MAN TENT WITH POLES AND METAL STAKES
- C-RATIONS FOR THREE MEN TO LAST AT LEAST 12 DAYS.

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS NEEDED.

SOFT DRINKS, ICE IF POSSIBLE, COLEMAN STOVE OR HOT PLATE AND SOME JUNK FOOD.

MORAL IS GOOD THIS FAR. THANKS FOR ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE US "J"

692

NNNN

Classified by FCS  
Declassified on OADR  
Declassified by  
DDO/MAC  
12 Aug 92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

70R / 16402

~~696~~

PTC 132755T APR 68  
FM: JTF 732  
TO: [REDACTED]

A3

SUBJ: MFA HOSTAGES

1. ON 16 APRIL 1968 DOS/1WG RECEIVED TELECON FROM LAINGEN, HOWLAND TOM SETH. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM DOS MEMO: THE TRIO HAS BEEN MOVED TO A NEW ROOM WITHIN THE PROTOCOL SUITE OF OFFICES. BRUCE DESCRIBED IT AS THE DINING ROOM. HE SAID THEY ARE NOW ALLOWED ONE HOUR A DAY IN THE OUTSIDE GARDEN UNDER SUPERVISION OF A GUARD. UNQUOTE

2. DURING CONVERSATION LAINGEN GAVE THEIR NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER AS 321-246 REPEAT 321-246.

3. JTF EXPLORING ALL MEANS TO DETERMINE EXACT LOCATION WITH MFA FLOC.

REVW 15 APR 68

NNNNX

Classified by  
DOD office  
12 Aug 12  
Declassify on: OADR  
DDO  
12 Aug

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AND MATE 1 QSL AT 1632 1632  
GO10 AHEAD WITH UR TRAFFIC KKKKK

TUR / 1635  
32

DTG 190001Z APR 80

FM JTF  
TO USS NIMITZ

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: INOPERATIVE PINS

REQUEST INOPERATIVE PINS SER NOS 011 AND 007  
BE BROUGHT TO [REDACTED] COO/VOD FLT FOR RETROGRADE VIA  
[REDACTED] BRINSING COL PITMAN AND PAX ON 20 APR.

REQUEST THAT NON OPERATIONAL PINS BE ADDRESSED

ED MARCH APR, CALIF.  
MARKED [REDACTED] ONE, BRAVO, TWO  
ATTN [REDACTED] 15TH AE/DODD

TEL 047-4551

DETH 13 APR 10

697

Classified by  
DDO NMC  
12 Aug 95

Declassify on  
Downgraded to  
by DDO NMC  
12 Aug 95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

... U.S. ... AGAINST IRAN.  
SOME OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE THAT THE U.S.  
HAS PRESENTED THEM A FILE ACCORD TO WITHOUT REGARD TO ITS ALLIES  
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND POLICY CONSULTATION.

I-698  
"2"

[REDACTED]

6. WHILE THE AMBASSADORS OF COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH THE U.S.  
ARE RETURNING HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, SEVERAL  
NATIONS ARE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN.

[REDACTED]

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ REMAIN TENSE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

18. WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR MIDDLE EAST - 17 APRIL 1960

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR/1002  
KCL

MEMORY CLEAR.

701  
[REDACTED]

MESSAGE 81 RECEIVED.

P 200985Z APR 80  
FM WALNUT  
TO DUCKHUNTER  
INFO EUCOM  
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: DREAM LIST  
1. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WOULD BE DESIRABLE AT THIS LOCATION TO IMPROVE MORALE.

- 2. STERNO FUEL 200 CANS
- STERNO STOVES 100 EA
- 200' EXTENSION CORDS W/LIGHTS 12 EA
- COLEMAN LANTERNS W/FUEL 12 EA
- COLEMAN STOVES W/FUEL 6 EA.
- Q-TIPS
- BASEBALL CAPS (VARIOUS SIZES FROM 7 TO 7 5/8)
- AIR MATTRESSES 80 EA
- MATTRESSES 8 EA
- BEHNSAMS 8 EA
- LARGE POT 3 EA
- BAR-B-QUE GRILL 3 EA & CINDER BLOCKS 12 EA
- ICE MAKER
- PANTRY TRASH BAGS
- SMALL COOKING POTS
- COORDINATES FOR BOTH ENDS ACTIVE RUNWAY
- WHISKEY (MEDICINAL) DRINKING
- PILLOWS 70 EA
- WILLS (ASSORTED) 10 LBS
- KOOL AID
- ALUMINUM FOIL
- BREAD
- FIELD REFRIGERATOR 3 EA
- TOILET CHEMICALS
- COFFEE 30 LBS
- SUGAR 18 LBS
- SBY CREAMER 5 LBS
- CANNED HAM
- PORTABLE SHOWERS

Classified By: JES  
Declassified On: OADR

Classified by [unclear]  
DDO r/mde  
Declassify on: OADR  
- made to DD [unclear]  
by [unclear]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



**CONFIDENTIAL**

TOR | 1220  
HCL

G

170 101 007 000  
FROM LT  
101 000 NIMITZ  
830

JTF DEPLOYMENT LIST (14 APR 70)

TOT | 1407  
HCL P PMTB

1. (U) INDEX  
INDEX  
CALL SIGNS  
RADIO NETS, FREQUENCIES AND KEYLIST  
TELEPHONE LISTINGS

ITEM NO  
1  
2  
3  
4

(U) CALL SIGNS

ONE COPY TAKEN  
BY TSgt

A/S  
A/E

JCS (SOD)  
JTF MAIN  
JTF ALTERNATE  
NIMITZ (LT BRAGG)  
MC-141  
MC-130  
NIMITZ  
HELICOPTER BOARD NIMITZ)

TOOTHPICK  
DUCKHUNTER  
SKYLIVER  
TRANSFER  
WALNUT  
MOON GLOW  
TIDE RIP  
BROADWAY  
STARLIGHT  
FOXFIRE  
FLACKHEAD  
CROWS NEST

MEN DOGS

107

(U) ATLANTIC OCEAN MSC-3 UHF TACSAT NET SECURE

VOICE OR TTY. JCS IS NCS

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JCS JTF MAIN JTF ALTERNATE

(2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: ATLANTIC OCEAN TACSAT-3

(3) FREQUENCIES: UPLINK XMIT 295.875 MHZ, DOWNLINK 261.475 MHZ (OFFSET 33.6 MHZ)

(4) KEYLIST: PARKHILL USKA CRESTS: USKA

(5) THIS NET MAY ONLY BE USED IN SECURE MODE. EVEN INITIAL CONTACT WILL BE MADE IN SECURE MODE. PLAIN TRANSMISSIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

(U) INDIAN OCEAN MSC-3 TACSAT NET SECURE  
JTF MAIN IS NCS

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JTF MAIN JTF ALTERNATE NIMITZ

(2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: INDIAN OCEAN TACSAT-3

(3) FREQUENCIES: UPLINK XMIT 295.875 MHZ, DOWNLINK 262.875 MHZ (OFFSET 33.6 MHZ)

(4) KEYLIST: PARKHILL USKA CRESTS: USKA

(5) THIS NET MAY ONLY BE USED IN SECURE MODE. EVEN INITIAL CONTACT WILL BE MADE IN SECURE MODE. PLAIN TRANSMISSIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

12/20/70

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) [unclear]

PARKHILL  
TTY  
[unclear]  
[unclear]

898-2128  
898-2130  
[unclear]

E

JTF MAIN [redacted]  
ANTICOMBAT NEST  
PARKHILL  
TTY  
[unclear]

[redacted]

[unclear]

JTF ALTERNATE [redacted]  
PARKHILL TTY

[redacted]

A/E

ANTICOMBAT NEST  
PARKHILL

[redacted]

[unclear]

[redacted]

PARKHILL  
TTY

[redacted]

A/S

[redacted]

PARKHILL  
TTY

[redacted]

(U) Co

YUMA (HELOS)  
PARKHILL  
TTY

898-2128  
898-2130

NOTE: WHEN CALLING JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE SAY ONLY "GO GREEN"  
WHEN PARTY ANSWERS AND IMMEDIATELY GO PARKHILL  
SECURE. JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE WILL IDENTIFY THEMSELVES ONLY BY TELEPHONE  
NUMBER, NOT NAMES OR LOCATION. PLAIN CONVERSATIONS EVEN OF  
UNCLASSIFIED MATTERS WITH THESE TWO LOCATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.  
THESE RESTRICTIONS ALSO APPLY TO CALLS ORIGINATING AT  
JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE.

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 1600  
UC

TOT / 1654  
RC

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

DTG 0315

DIG 031515 APR 50

FM JTF/CS

TO: USS NIMITZ / [REDACTED]

717

SUBJ: FORCE DEPLOYMENT RECALL

1. (U) REFERENCE: MSG 021500Z SUBJ: ARRIVAL ARRAGEMENT.

2. (U) THE ANNOUNCED DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINE ELEMENT TO THE NIMITZ HAS BEEN DEFERRED INDEFINITELY.

3. (U) YOUR ADVANCE ELEMENT WAS DIRECTED BY A SEPERATE MESSAGE TO RETURN TO CONUS.

4. (U) REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

BT

NNNN

~~Classified By: JCS~~  
~~Declassified ON: 07/01/92~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by  
50 NMC  
2 Aug 92



~~TOP SECRET~~

BTG 311507Z MAR 80  
FM: JTF/J-2/  
TO: ~~SECRETARY OF DEFENSE~~  
~~STATION ALPHA~~

JC1  
MCD  
4/7/84  
721

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EST, MARCH 31 1980

1. WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN JODY POWELL DENIED AGAIN LAST NIGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SENT A LETTER TO IRAN SUCH AS THE ONE ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI FROM PRESIDENT CARTER. AT THE SAME TIME, POWELL SAID HE WOULD "NOT DISPUTE" A SWISS FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT SWITZERLAND'S CHARGE IN TEHRAN PASSED A MESSAGE TO KHOMEINI AND PRESIDENT BANI-SADR FROM PRESIDENT CARTER EARLIER THIS WEEK.

2. TEHRAN RADIO'S DOMESTIC SERVICE THIS MORNING REPORTS, ACCORDING TO FEIS, THAT "JODY POWELL HAS CONFIRMED THAT CARTER SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF IRAN". THE BROADCAST SAID THE MESSAGE, RECEIVED LAST WEEK, WAS MEANT "TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS BETWEEN AMERICA AND IRAN AND EXPEDITE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES." POWELL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT REVEALING THE DETAILS OF THE MESSAGE "MIGHT ENDANGER FINDING A SOLUTION" TO THE CRISIS.

3. THE WASHINGTON POST TODAY WRITES THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GHOZARZEH BELIEVES, THANKS TO "PRESIDENT CARTER'S NOW ADMITTING MISTAKES IN PREVIOUS U.S. POLICY," THAT HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO IRANIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL. HOWEVER, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE THIS MORNING CLAIMS IRANIAN OFFICIALS SEE THE U.S. MESSAGE AS THREATENING."

4. KHOMEINI IS NOW REPORTED BY AP AS SAYING HE WILL ALLOW A VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT THE FIFTY HOSTAGES. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE FILM CLIP ON WHICH THE REPORT IS BASED IS RECENT AND REPRESENTS A NEW DEVELOPMENT OR NOT. "IF THE POPL WANTS TO BE REASSURED ABOUT THE CONDITION OF THE HOSTAGES, HE MAY SEND AN ENVOY TO COME AND SEE," KHOMEINI IS SHOWN TELLING THE PAPAL NUNCIO IN TEHRAN.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1255  
EXEMPTED ON 12 Aug 92  
AUTHORITY OF DADR  
COLLECTED BY DADR  
NETW-01  
REVIEW FROM Multiple Sites

5. THE NINE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES SENT LETTERS OVER THE WEEKEND TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES URGING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, ACCORDING TO AP. BRITISH AND WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAVE WRITTEN TO BANI-SADR, BUT THE DETAILS OF THEIR MESSAGES WERE NOT DISCLOSED.

6. FORMER IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SEAN MCBRIDE TOLD REUTER TODAY THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS APPROVED A MCBRIDE PLAN FOR A NURMFURG-STYLL INTERNATIONAL TRIAL OF THE DEPOSED SHAH. THE TRIBUNAL WOULD BE CREATED UNDER U.N. SPONSORSHIP, ACCORDING TO MCBRIDE. THE U.N. WOULD ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE VERDICT WAS CARRIED OUT. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION FROM IRANIAN SOURCES THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS ENDORSED MCBRIDE'S PROPOSAL.

7. THE DOS MANAGED TO CONTACT BRUCE LAINGEN YESTERDAY. HE AND POLITICAL OFFICER TOMSETH INDICATED THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PRESS PLAY IN TEHRAN OVER THE PURPORTED CARTER-KHOMEINI MESSAGE. TOMSETH FELT THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE TRYING TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. THE CONVERSATION WAS TERMINATED AFTER ABOUT SEVEN OR EIGHT MINUTES.

8. A REPORT BY CBS CORRESPONDENT TO FENTON IN TEHRAN HAS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL VOTING TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL. ACCORDING TO THE CBS NEWS DESK, FENTON CLAIMS AYATOLLAH HAJAVI KANI PROVIDED A CRUCIAL SHING VOTE. REPORTEDLY, OPPONENTS OF THE TRANSFER WILL TRY TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATIONS TO BLOCK THE MOVE. HAJAVI KANI HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT REITERATING ALL CONCERNED THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORITIES ARE NOT PERMITTED, EXCEPT FOR THE STATEMENT ABOUT NO DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT PERMIT. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THE

~~TOP SECRET~~

A.C


11. IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ REMAIN COOL WITH BOTH  
NATIONS CONTINUING TO ACCUSE THE OTHER OF HINDERING DIPLOMATIC  
ACTIVITY. IRAN ALSO REMAINS WARY OF IRAQI MILITARY INTENTIONS

PRE'S, HOWEVER, STATED THAT THE FIGHTING IN WEST AZERBAI-  
JAN PROVINCE HAS BEEN FAR MORE EXTENSIVE WITH SEVERAL LOCATIONS  
TO THE SOUTH OF URMİYEH INVOLVED (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

I-725



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~IRANIAN P-3 ORION CONDUCTED AN AERIAL SUR-~~  
~~VEILLANCE MISSION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ON 27 MARCH~~

~~THE P-3 CIRCLED AT LEAST TWO OF THE SHIPS AT AN ALTITUDE OF~~  
~~6,200 FEET, PASSING WITHIN 1,000 YARDS OF THE VESSELS.~~

BT

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121200Z APR 68  
[REDACTED]  
1001r  
JCS/LTS CASY/WASH DC

SECRET  
SUBJ: DEPLOYMENT REPORT [REDACTED] NUMBER 1.  
1.) [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] COOPERATION AND SUPPORT HAS BEEN EXCELLENT SO FAR.  
2.) HOWEVER, AS SIZE OF FORCE GROWS, [REDACTED] OFFICES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE. THIS MAY BE DUE TO ABSENCE OF [REDACTED] WHO HAS BEEN OUT OF COUNTRY SINCE BEFORE WE ARRIVED AND HAS NOT BEEN IN ON THE PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING NORMALLY. [REDACTED] INVOLVES HIMSELF IN EVEN THE ROUTINE [REDACTED] DECISIONS AND THIS OPERATION IS OF GREATER MAGNITUDE THAN THAT TO WHICH [REDACTED] IS ACCUSTOMED.  
3.) JET A-1 STORES AT [REDACTED] TOTAL

7000  
#727

PAGE 2 TOP SECRET  
OVER 1 MILLION [REDACTED] GALLONS. VERSUS EARLIER ESTIMATE OF 2.4 MILLION. HOWEVER, [REDACTED] INDICATES THIS IS NO PROBLEM. REFUELING OPERATIONS ON 19 APR TOTALLED 12,000 [REDACTED] GALLONS. PROCEDURE OF TRUCKING FUEL FROM TANK FARM BY THE THREE AVAILABLE REFUELERS HAS WORKED SATISFACTORILY. CONTRACTOR WILL PROVIDE AFTER-HOUR SERVICE IF NECESSARY. ANTICIPATE NO DIFFICULTIES WITH REFUELING.  
4.) REPLENISHMENT OF [REDACTED] FUEL STORES SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 13 MAY, PRIOR TO MONSOON SEASON. JET A-1 PRICE IS APPROXIMATELY 50 CENTS PER GALLON.  
5.) [REDACTED] C-130 AND [REDACTED] MC-130 ARRIVED WITH MOST REQUIRED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. WE DO NOT HAVE LATRINE CHEMICAL, GARBAGE BAGS, AND LIGHTS FOR

PAGE 3 TOP SECRET  
CAMP. REQUIRE C-RATIONS FOR 3 COMM PERSONNEL WHO ARRIVED WITHOUT. CHARCOAL WOULD BE A HELPFUL QUID TO GIVE TO THE [REDACTED] SINCE THERE IS NO FIRE WOOD ON THE [REDACTED]  
(U) 6.) AIRCRAFT AND CAMP ARE CO-LOCATED AT EAST END OF DIRT RUNWAY, A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM BASE PROPER.  
(U) 7.) WE ARE USING BASE ELECTRICAL POWER TO OPERATE W-3 SYSTEMS. [REDACTED] HAS SET UP TELEPHONE LAND LINE FROM CAMP TO TOWER AND SQUADRON OPERATIONS.  
(U) 8.) TEMPERATURE TODAY WAS 103 DEGREES. PEOPLE ARE TAKING PRECAUTIONS. WOODEN TENT PEGS WON'T PENETRATE GROUND. WE PRECURED METAL STAKES IN LOCAL VILLAGE.  
(U) 9.) ADVISE MAC THAT [REDACTED] HAS NO CAPABILITY FOR TRANSMITTING FLIGHT PLANS OR PROVIDING ENROUTE WEATHER.

DDO N M  
12  
Classified By: [REDACTED]  
OADR



~~SECRET~~  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON D.C 20301

1-735

THE JOINT STAFF

12 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAROLD L. MILLER, LEGAL ADVISOR AND  
LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT  
CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Helicopter Maintenance Records

1. Maintenance records for the eight US Navy RH-53D aircraft used on the attempted hostage rescue in Iran are available for review as requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Please contact me, RADM Tom Cassidy (ext 52749), or LTC Stephen D. Olynyk (ext 74546) when arrangements have been made for the review.
2. Attached is a summary prepared on the basis of a careful review of both the helicopter maintenance records and the performance of the eight RH-53Ds on the rescue effort. It is intended that a copy be provided SASC personnel when they review the records.
3. This has been a major area of interest and we stand ready to assist with records review or answer questions as appropriate.
4. Note that the attached report is SECRET.

CHARLES W. DYKE  
Major General, USA

Attachment  
a/s

Declassified by:  
DDO NMCC  
12 AUG 92

~~WITHOUT ATTACHMENT  
THIS MEMORANDUM IS  
UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8 May 1980

~~SECRET 73~~

OPERATION EVENING LIGHT

POST MISSION SUMMARY

RH-53D HELICOPTER

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CONDITION

~~NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS  
PRIVILEGED INFORMATION AND IS  
NOT FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS  
Declassified ON: OADR

30A02

~~SECRET~~  
OPERATION EVENING LIGHT

POST MISSION SUMMARY  
RH-53D MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CONDITION

1. (U) PURPOSE. To determine the adequacy of maintenance performed on HM-16 RH-53D aircraft used on the rescue mission, to evaluate maintenance/ supply support procedures used to prepare the aircraft for the mission, and to assess the failures that occurred to helicopters in the mission.

2. (U) SCOPE. Effort expended and sources of information utilized were as follows:

- a. Review of CTF-70/NIMITZ message traffic
- b. Review of OPG point papers
- c. Review of mission aircraft logs and maintenance records.
- d. Personal interviews with:
  - (1) Mission flight crews
  - (2) Mission aircraft maintenance officer
  - (3) Selected passengers in mission aircraft
  - (4) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance officer
  - (5) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance control officer
  - (6) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance control chief.

3. (U) AIRCRAFT DESCRIPTION

a. The single main rotor RH-53D helicopter is designed for both land and ship based operation. The helicopter was manufactured by Sikorsky Aircraft. It is powered by two General Electric T64-GE-415 turboshaft engines. The Automatic Flight Control System gives the helicopter an all weather capability. An auxiliary power plant (APP) gives the helicopter a self-starting capability. The helicopter has a fuel jettisoning system, rescue hoist, and seats for 37 passengers or 24 litters. It also has a rear ramp loading system and cargo tiedown facilities. There are provisions for external auxiliary fuel tanks, internal range extension tanks, air-to-air, and helicopter in flight refueling (HIFR) capabilities. It also has an external cargo hook and provisions for door guns. See TAB A for an aircraft illustration.



b. The primary mission of the RH-53D is airborne mine counter-measures (AMCM), which includes mine sweeping and ancillary tasks. The helicopter's secondary utility mission involves the movement of cargo and equipment and the transportation of passengers. The helicopter may be used for the rescue of personnel and the transportation of external cargo or inoperable aircraft.

c. The aircraft utilized for EVENING LIGHT were modified with commercial Omega navigation systems and provisions for the palletized inertial navigation system (PINS). Two internal fuel tanks and door mounted .50 caliber guns were also installed. Flight crewmembers were equipped with night vision goggles and aircraft landing lights were modified with infrared filters. Various items considered non-essential for this mission were removed for weight reduction. Items removed/added are contained in TAB B. Normal allowable gross weight for the RH-53D is 42,000 pounds. The Naval Air Systems Command provided a waiver to operate to 47,500 pounds for this mission.

4 ~~(8)~~ SUMMARY OF EVENTS

a. Pre-Mission Phase

E (1) On 21 November 1979, six (6) RH-53D helicopters from HM-16 were air lifted from Norfolk to [redacted] by C-5, reassembled, and flown aboard KITTY HAWK on 28 November 1979.

E (2) On 29 December 1979, two (2) additional RH-53Ds were transported by C-5 from Norfolk to [redacted]. The helos were reassembled and flown aboard NIMITZ at [redacted] on 2 January 1980.

(3) On 23 January, the six (6) RH-53Ds, HM-16 personnel, and equipment were cross-decked from KITTY HAWK to NIMITZ making a total of eight (8) helicopters aboard NIMITZ. It was the determination of mission planners, based on past operational history, that eight RH-53D aircraft would support a launch of seven

(4) During the period the RH-53Ds were deployed aboard KITTY HAWK and NIMITZ, they were flown at such a rate and in such a manner as to maintain maximum readiness and OPSEC. See TAB C for pre-mission flight-time and TAB D for pre-mission availability.

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(5) The mission aircraft maintenance officer had visited the ship approximately three weeks prior to mission execution to review maintenance records and personally inspect the aircraft. He had provided specific and detailed guidance to HM-16 squadron maintenance supervisors regarding items to be inspected, additional maintenance actions desired, and other pre-mission preparations to be accomplished. He also screened all related records and log books and did not note any components that exceeded allowable removal times. Based upon his guidance, the HM-16 squadron aircraft maintenance officer developed a pre-mission checklist and procedures for its completion (See TAB E). Completion of these actions was verified by the mission aircraft maintenance officer upon his return to NIMITZ on 20 April.

(6) On 20 April, eight mission aircrews and supporting personnel arrived aboard NIMITZ. The total team consisted of 50 personnel. During the period 20-24 April, mission crews participated in familiarization flights, maintenance check flights, deck turn-ups and mission preparation activities. All eight aircraft were given a full functional check flight during this period and the engines were adjusted to provide maximum allowable power. At least one pilot in each assigned mission flight crew was a qualified functional check pilot. Maintenance records were reviewed by the mission aircraft maintenance officer for appropriate maintenance action, and crewmembers made repeated inspections of their assigned aircraft.

(7) The loading of mission equipment commenced early evening of 23 April immediately upon completion of painting. All eight aircraft were turned up and those discrepancies noted were corrected (TAB F). Except for assistance specifically requested by mission maintenance crews, HM-16 personnel were restricted by HM-16 CO's direction from aircraft access. Without exception, all mission equipment was loaded exclusively by mission crews.

(8) The engine air particle separators (EAPS), one for each engine, were designed to remove sand, dust, and other foreign particles entrained in the engine inlet air. The foreign particles are scavenged and exhausted overboard allowing clean air to enter the

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engine. The aircraft mission commander directed the removal of EAPS. There is no prohibition from removing the EAPS from the RH-53D. EAPS removal increases power available from each engine by 2% and reduces weight of each aircraft by approximately 200 lbs. A decrease in overall engine life was not a factor for the relatively short total time of this mission. Although sand and dust were anticipated, engine damage from FOD was not a consideration because of the conditions at the planned landing sites. Aircraft weight and power available from the engines were critical factors in mission planning.

(9) All eight RH-53D aircraft were full mission capable to perform the rescue mission at the time of execution. Aircrews were familiar and comfortable with their assigned aircraft. Mission pilots reported the material condition of their aircraft was excellent. All agreed that mission aircraft were in better material condition than either the CH-53s or the RH-53s in which they trained in CONUS.

(10) HM-16 troubleshooting teams were assigned to each aircraft for the mission launch with spare parts immediately available and were standing by on deck to provide assistance for the launch. Assistance requested was of a minor nature and was not related to navigational equipment.

b. Mission Execution Phase

(1) On 24 April, eight fully mission capable aircraft launched on the mission. Shortly after take off, aircraft #8 experienced an intermediate gearbox chip warning light. Since this gearbox had been recently replaced, this discrepancy was not considered aborting. Such occurrences are common during break-in of a new gearbox. The mission was continued uneventfully.

(2) Approximately two hours into the flight aircraft #6 experienced an in-cockpit redundant BIM (Blade Inspection Method) indication of impending main rotor blade failure and made an emergency landing in the desert. After rotor shutdown, the crewchief confirmed visually by checking the indicator on the blade that one main rotor blade had lost pressure, indicating a possible cracked spar. This was an aborting discrepancy since it cannot be determined

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in the field if a crack has developed in the blade or if the indicator is faulty. Average flight time on all blades on this aircraft was 956 hours and the high time blade was 1546 hours. Main rotor blade established replacement life is 3000 hours. It is not known which blade failed. Aircraft #6 had experienced a second stage hydraulic system low pressure indication a short time earlier; however, hydraulic quantity was normal. This situation is not uncommon and could have been an indicator problem. The crew was in the process of changing the indicator in flight when the blade emergency occurred. Further, the crew suspected fuel was not transferring from one of the two internal range extension tanks. Manual transfer would have been possible. Neither the hydraulic pressure indication nor the perceived electric fuel transfer problem were causes for aborting the mission.

(3) Aircraft #8 landed and recovered the crew and classified material from aircraft #6. At this point seven RH-53Ds were proceeding with the mission.

(4) Shortly after departure from the NIMITZ, #5 experienced loss of the TACAN (ARN-52) and loss of yaw stabilization associated with the AFCS. The copilot, who was in control of the aircraft, was required to continuously make heading corrections with the rudder pedals. Since the copilot was wearing night vision goggles, the pilot was required to monitor the needle ball and continually advise the copilot of required rudder inputs. Once in the sand/dust storm, the situation became very vertigo-inducing. Because of the reduced visibility and an abrupt maneuver by the aircraft flying lead, flight integrity was lost. At this point the co-pilot notified the pilot that he had vertigo. The pilot took control of the aircraft, leveled the wings, and noticed that the RMI was frozen and there was a 15 degree bank error in his vertical gyro indicator. This was verified by checking the needle ball. By actuating the vertical gyro transfer switch, the pilot switched to the copilot's gyro. At this point the cockpit conditions were extremely difficult. The wet compass was required for heading information and navigation was limited to the PINS System, which the pilot reported had an approximate 5 NM error. With an inaccurate navigation system, lack of precise heading instrumentation, aircraft



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stabilization problems, and no TACAN, the pilot considered mission continuation in instrument meteorological conditions at low level through the mountains which lay ahead to be impossible. Based on these factors, the decision was made to abort the mission and return to NIMITZ. Upon returning to NIMITZ, inspection revealed failure of the ASN-50 power supply by overheating due to failure of the power supply cooler blower. The ASN-50 powers the AHRS and AFCS. The TACAN blower motor, which is located in the nose electronics compartment, was also found inoperative. Although these failures caused an abort under the unexpected IMC flight conditions experienced, #5 could have continued the mission if forecast visual meteorological conditions had existed. On #5's recovery on NIMITZ, HM-16 maintenance personnel found one mission duffle bag wedged between a rib next to the left gunner station and the ASN-50 cooling intake. Overlapping the top of the air duct and the duffle bag were two mission flak jackets. The items were heavy enough and wedged in place securely enough to avoid movement under normal aircraft maneuvering. The positioning of these items severely restricted the airflow. A quantification of this restriction is not possible, however, it is the opinion of squadron maintenance personnel that the airflow intake was essentially secured by the mission equipment. Loading of mission equipment commenced on 23 April immediately after completion of painting. Except for assistance specifically requested by mission crews, HM-16 personnel were restricted from aircraft access and Marine guards were posted. Without exception, all mission equipment was loaded by mission crews. It cannot be determined when the items were placed against the intake. The aircraft commander supervised placement of mission gear on 23 April 80 and stated that gear was not placed in the area of the ASN-50 intake. The aircraft commander further stated that in his personal estimation and direct observation that gear stored directly in front of the master internal fuel cell was moved by maintenance personnel to the vicinity of station 222 port side to gain access to the ASN-50 compartment (after landing). It is not possible to arrive at any firm conclusion regarding the possible obstruction of the cooling air intake.

(5) Six aircraft eventually landed at the refueling site. Arrivals were approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour and 25 minutes later than the planned estimated time of arrival. The delays were caused by weather and visibility problems experienced enroute that

AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

(c)

The aircraft Logs and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed. The aircraft was received from Sikorsky Aircraft by HM-12 on 1 Nov 73 and was transferred to HM-14 on 12 May 78. On 28 Dec 79 aircraft was disassembled for C-5A airlift to [REDACTED] and reassembled. It was flown aboard NIMITZ on 2 Jan 80. Aircraft was transferred to HM-16 on 23 Jan 80.

E

The last major rework was completed at NARF North Island on 15 Dec 76. On 1 Feb 80, the aircraft commenced a 3 month extension of its service period. A one hundred hour Phase D scheduled airframe inspection was completed on 1 Apr 80. No significant discrepancies were noted during this review. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 78.5 hours.

All maintenance records indicate the aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

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AIRCRAFT SUMMARY

MISSION #4 BUNO: 158693 MODEX: 631  
MISSION STATUS: Full mission capable  
HOURS FLOWN: 19-23 Apr: 8.8  
Total Apr: 9.1  
Total Dec 79 - Apr 80: 83.1

MISSION EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

Aircraft was left at Desert One upon mission abort. No abort discrepancies existed at Desert One.

PRE-MISSION MAINTENANCE SUMMARY (19-24 Apr)

No significant maintenance discrepancies existed prior to the mission (TABS F and I).

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SUMMARY (Dec 79-Apr 80)

A review of all reported maintenance discrepancies and corrective actions revealed no outstanding, or significant discrepancies that would affect/degrade mission performance.

(c) AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Log and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed.

E The aircraft was received in the Navy by HM-12 on 6 Feb 74. The aircraft was transferred to HM-16 on 27 Oct 78. On 21 Nov 79, the aircraft was disassembled for airshipment via C-5A, and was reassembled at [REDACTED] on 25 Nov.

The last major rework was completed by NARF Pensacola on 25 Oct 77. On 1 Mar 80 this aircraft commenced a 3 month extension of its service period. A 100-hour Phase "C" scheduled airframe inspection was completed on 18 Mar 80. No significant discrepancies were noted. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 85.3 hours.

All maintenance records indicate aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.



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AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Logs and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed.

The aircraft was received in the Navy by HM-12 on 20 Jul 73. Aircraft was subsequently transferred to HM-16 on 27 Oct 78. The aircraft completed scheduled depot level maintenance by NARF Pensacola on 14 December 1979. The aircraft was disassembled on 28 Dec 79 for transport aboard a C-5A and was received aboard NIMITZ 2 Jan 80. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 42.3 hours.

All records indicate this aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

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7. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ SUPPLY SUPPORT PROCEDURES

a. Normal Support. When deployed, RH-53Ds are supported by a 90 day pack-up kit for support of 8 aircraft. The kit consists of 1289 line items including dynamic components. Historically, these pack-up kits have been deployed with 85% range and depth. Follow-on support during deployment is as follows:

- (1) Common items are obtained from nearest Naval Air Station.
- (2) All requirements that cannot be satisfied at the operating site are passed to supply officer NSA, Norfolk via phone or message. He coordinates supply action with other supply activities and the inventory control point.
- (3) Material is transported via Air Parcel Post, QUICK TRANS and MAC as appropriate.

b. EVENING LIGHT. The following actions constituted special, high priority treatment of support for the RH-53D mission:

- (1) A 90 day pack-up of 1289 line items was deployed with 99.2% range and 98.8% depth.
- (2) An additional pack-up of 169 line items augmented the normal 90 day pack-up. This additional pack-up increased the depth of some dynamic components by over 100%.
- (3) Special logistics procedures to provide follow-on support were established on 27 Dec 1979. A special project code 807 was established for EVENING LIGHT. All support activities were directed to expedite all requirements identified to that project code. No reference was made as to what Project EVENING LIGHT entailed.
- (4) Points of contact were established at NAS Cubi Point, COMNAVAIRLANT, and COMNAVAIRPAC.
- (5) All requisitioning and expedite action was accomplished by phone or priority message. No reference to aircraft type was made in telephonic exchanges.

A, B

A

A

B

(6) All requisitions for RH-53D aircraft on KITTY HAWK/NIMITZ were processed through NAS Cubi Point. Cubi conducted an in-theater screen for assets. If not available in-theater, requirements were passed to NAS Norfolk. All actions were coordinated with points of contact established at various support activities.

(7) On 5 March 1980, NAVSUP initiated action to establish contact points at various transportation activities such as NAVMTO Norfolk, NATCO Travis AFB, and NATCO Clark AFB to coordinate the expeditious movement of material for EVENING LIGHT.

(8) In early March OP-51D was designated as OPNAV contact point to monitor movement of material. Daily phone contact with COMNAVAIRPAC provided a constant monitoring of material flow. Additional action was directed whenever material movement appeared stalled. This involved duplicate shipment of material in several instances.

(9) A daily SITSUM was provided both to OP-05 and the OPG in JCS.

c. Supply Support Summary. During the entire support phase of the RH-53D mission, supply support was considered excellent. The daily monitoring by OP-51D which began in March indicated that for the most part 7 aircraft had no unresolved material requirements and were reported in an up status.

8.(u)

(S) CONCLUSIONS

a. Maintenance performed on the eight mission RH-53Ds was adequate in all respects. Special maintenance procedures in the form of additional check lists, which included extensive inspection procedures, were accomplished to the satisfaction of the mission maintenance officer. Mission pilots felt the aircraft were in excellent material condition. The aircraft had been flown as necessary to exercise the dynamic components and to verify/evaluate maintenance actions. Special supply support was also provided. Eight mission ready RH-53Ds launched from NIMITZ on time for the rescue mission.

b. Transition from maintenance by HM-16 squadron personnel to mission preparation by mission flight crews was accomplished smoothly and professionally. Independent

~~SECRET~~SPECIAL PROCEDURES ACCOMPLISHED SPECIFIC TO MISSION PREPARATION  
ONBOARD NIMITZITEMS REMOVED FOR WEIGHT CONSIDERATION (WEIGHT INDICATED IN LBS)

Crew Chief Seat (11)	Cargo Hooks (42)
KB-18 (3)	MCM Cutter Supports (7)
MCM Mirrors (94)	IFR Probes (242)
Cargo Winches (94)	Heaters (86)
Cargo Pendants (3)	Rescue Hoists (Except for 2 ACFT) (-)
Cargo Straps (85)	Exposure Suit Blowers/Hoses (30)
Smoke Flares (25)	Upper Personnel Doors (15)
Stowage Container (21)	Passenger Seats/Fittings (121)
Tow Lines (5)	Tie Down Fittings (6)
Equipment Container Bags (8)	IFF and Control Box (21)
Heater Ducting (10)	Ky-28 (20)
Windshield Anti-Ice Control (2)	Ky-28 Control Panel (2)
EAPS and Control Panel (201)	Drip Pans (10)
#7 Tail Rotor Drive Shaft Cowling (10)	ICS Overhead Reels (11)
Emergency Exit Lights (3)	External ICS Phone (2)
Static Discharge/Excitor Box (56)	Tow Winch Guillotine Tester (14)

ITEMS ADDED FOR MISSION

PINS (101)	50 Cal Mounts (86)
OMEGA (61)	50 Cal Weapons (164)
Range Extension Tanks (Int) (700)	Armor Plating (Engine) (200)
Crew Night Vision Goggles (40)	IR Filters on Landing Lights (0)

ITEMS RECEIVING SPECIAL INSPECTION/ADJUSTMENT

Engine topping increased	
Hydraulic lines/fittings checked for leakage	
Fuel lines checked for leakage	
Clocks synchronized (GMT)	
Dampeners checked for wear/limits	
Sleeve and spindles checked	
All rotor blades inspected	
Hydraulic pumps inspected for leakage	
Primary servos/AFCS servos	TOTAL REMOVED -1308
Flight controls/linkages	TOTAL ADDED -1352
Hydraulic compartment control rods	
Rotor head control rods	
Tail rotor control rods	
Tail rotor control cables	
Thomas couplings	
APP drive shaft/couplings	
MGB oil cooler	
MGB oil cooler drive shaft/couplings	
MGB high speed drive shaft/couplings	
All lights	
Windscreens	
HF radios	
FM radios	
Rescue hoist (2 ACFT)	
Cockpit instruments	
Armor plating (Engine)	

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TAB C

AIRCRAFT PRE-MISSION FLIGHT HOURS (While Embarked)

<u>158744/632 (#1)</u>	
DEC 79	4.8
JAN 80	42.7
FEB 80	29.2
MAR 80	52.9
APR 80	32.7
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>162.3</u>

<u>158753/634 (#2)</u>	
JAN 80	12.2
FEB 80	13.9
MAR 80	48.7
APR 80	17.1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>91.9</u>

<u>158761/637 (#3)</u>	
DEC 79	3.1
JAN 80	21.5
FEB 80	9.3
MAR 80	20.7
APR 80	24.0
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>78.6</u>

<u>158693/631 (#4)</u>	
DEC 79	10.7
JAN 80	29.2
FEB 80	17.9
MAR 80	16.2
APR	9.1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>83.1</u>

<u>158754/635 (#5)</u>	
DEC 79	5.7
JAN 80	24.6
FEB 80	56.0
MAR 80	25.7
APR 80	19.6
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>131.6</u>

<u>158750/633 (#6)</u>	
JAN 80	6.0
FEB 80	0.0
MAR 80	8.6
APR 80	22.1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>36.7</u>

<u>158686/630 (#7)</u>	
DEC 79	6.8
JAN 80	19.6
FEB 80	54.0
MAR 80	27.2
APR 80	15.1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>122.7</u>

<u>158758/636 (#8)</u>	
DEC 79	2.4
JAN 80	4.8
FEB 80	36.1
MAR 80	0.0
APR 80	1.2
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>44.5</u>

<u>TOTAL FOR DET</u>	
DEC 79	33.5
JAN 80	160.6
FEB 80	216.4
MAR 80	200.0
APR 80	140.9
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>751.4</u>

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TAB D

PRE-MISSION AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

<u>0800-0800</u> <u>DAY</u>	<u>UP/ASSIGNED</u> <u>STATUS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>
25 MAR 80	6/8	0	0.0
26 MAR 80	6/8	4	13.6
27 MAR 80	7/8	0	0.0
28 MAR 80	7/8	0	0.0
29 MAR 80	7/8	1	3.7
30 MAR 80	7/8	2	6.1
31 MAR 80	6/8	4	15.7
1 APR 80	6/8	2	7.0
2 APR 80	6/8	5	14.2
3 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
4 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
5 APR 80	7/8	1	3.5
6 APR 80	7/8	2	10.0
7 APR 80	7/8	1	0.1
8 APR 80	7/8	2	2.1
9 APR 80	6/8	2	3.6
10 APR 80	6/8	3	6.1
11 APR 80	6/8	2	6.2
12 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
13 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
14 APR 80	7/8	4	10.2
15 APR 80	7/8	1	1.5
16 APR 80	7/8	4	10.1
17 APR 80	7/8	2	7.5
18 APR 80	7/8	2	7.2
19 APR 80	7/8	3	5.6
20 APR 80	7/8	7	7.1
21 APR 80	7/8	6	13.2
22 APR 80	7/8	2	4.0
23 APR 80	8/8	0	0.0

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TAB F

MAINTENACE TURN-UP/DRESS REHEARSAL ON THE NIGHT OF 23 APRIL 80

The below listed discrepancies were noted by mission crews and squadron personnel during a maintenance turn-up/dress rehearsal on the night of 23 April:

MISSION #1

1. Upper rotating beacon needs more -I/R paper.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: This discrepancy was repaired by the mission crew.
2. Install spot light panel and check operation.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Installed spot light panel and functionally operated system.
3. Install rescue hoist and panel.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Installed hoist and control panel, operationally checked good.

MISSION #2


1. TACAN inoperative.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Operationally checked, TACAN worked as it should. The ships TACAN was not transmitting during this turn-up evolution.

MISSION #3

1. HF&FM inoperative.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced both receivers and transmitter.
2. Gunner's ICS inoperative.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Repaired cannon plug and operationally checked system, it worked as it should.
3. Master caution light illuminated periodically during engine turn.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced master caution panel and checked same.
4. Tail rotor anti-collision light needs more paper.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Mission crew repaired this light.

MISSION #4

1. Lower anti-collision lite inoperative.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced lower anti-collision light.





MISSION #5 CONTINUED

1. Pilot's 8 day clock in operative.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced clock.

2. Pilot's spot light rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to absence of spare spot lights and with direction from mission #5 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

MISSION #6

1. No UHF side tone.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced UHF radio.

2. 8 day clock inoperative.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced 8 day clock.

MISSION #7

1. Pilot's spot rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to the absence of spare spot lights and with direction from Mission #7 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

MISSION #8

1. UHF radio inoperative.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced UHF radio.

2. Pilot's spot light rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to absence of spare spot lights and with direction from mission # 8 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

3. #2 internal fuel tank will not transfer.  
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced tank and pressure refueled aircraft in order to check for leakage.

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TAB I

~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #1SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
4 Dec	Rotor	#1 blade dampener bearing high limit	Removed and replaced
17 Dec	Fuselage	Pilot's windshield needs replacement	Removed and replaced
21 Dec	Airframe	Massive oil leak #2 nose gear box	Reseated "O" ring in filter
24 Dec	Flight Control	Lateral cyclic stick drive, both directions	remove and replace roll trim sensor
31 Dec	Airframe	Pilot's emergency exit window latch broken	Repaired latch
1 Jan	Rotor	Steady #2 BIM caution light	Found and repaired bad electrical connection
4 Jan	Rotary Wing	#1 high speed shaft Thomas coupling out of limits	Removed and replaced shaft/couplings
9 Jan	Electrical	#2 nose gear box pressure switch sticks	Removed and replaced
18 Jan	Rotary Wing Drive	Accessory gear box chip light	Cleaned and replaced chip plug, cleaned filter and did 30 min. penalty run
21 Jan	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged during move	Removed and replaced
30 Jan	Landing Gear	Port main mount tire bald	Replaced tire
3 Feb	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged	Removed and replaced
4 Feb	Radar Nav	Radar altimeter failed	Removed and replaced
12 Feb	Rotor System	#3 Main rotor blade Pocket #18 bent down	Removed and replaced blade

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #1 (continued)SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
14 Feb	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged	Removed and replaced
15 Feb	Transmission	Intermediate gear box leaks	Removed and replaced
17 Feb	Transmission	Accessory gear box chip light	Replaced APP clutch
19 Feb	Flight	1st stage hydraulic filter button	Found bad pump; removed and replaced same
24 Feb	Flight Reference	Pilot's turn-rate needle inop	Replaced Pilot's turn rate gyro
1 Mar	Electrical	Cyclic trim inop	Found broken wire to roll servo, repaired same
3 Mar	Radio Nav	TACAN inop. No DME Azimuth good	Removed and replaced
10 Mar	Radio Nav	TACAN inop. No DME	Replaced TACAN. Checks O.K.
10 Mar	Flight Control	Pilots beeper trim intermittent	Replaced bad switch
11 Mar	Flight Control	Beeper trim still inop.	Replaced pilot's cyclic stick
15 Mar	Rotor	Solid #1 cockpit BIM	Found and repaired two broken wires
24 Mar	Engine	When motoring #1 engine, #2 engine would motor also	Replaced dual start valve
1 Apr	Electrical	#2 generator quit	Replaced #2 generator
2 Apr	Flight Ref	Pilot's turn rate gyro has full deflection	Replaced bad gyro
6 Apr	Radio Nav	TACAN breaks lock-on	Removed and replaced

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #1 (continued)

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
6 Apr	Radio Nav	Omega dropped off line five minutes	Replaced control box
11 Apr	Rotor	#4 Blade BIM check out of limits	Replaced main rotor blade
14 Apr	Radio Nav	Erratic TACAN Azimuth/DME	Replaced TACAN
17 Apr	Radar Nav	Radar altimeter inop.	Replaced bad alt
20 Apr	Radio Nav	TACAN stopped after one hour	Replaced TACAN
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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
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MISSION AIRCRAFT #2

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
24 Jan	A/C	HM-16 Acceptance Inspection	Complied with acceptance inspection
3 Feb	Rotor Sys	A/C has medium freq in all flight regimes	Inspected all main rotor components. Found 3 bad dampners; removed and replaced. A/C checks good.
19 Feb	Flt Controls	2nd stage hyd sys overserviced	Deserviced
21 Feb	Radio Nav	DME portion of TACAN inoperative	Removed and Replaced TACAN
21 Feb	Instruments	Flickering BIM	Could not duplicate discrepance 2 adel clamps replaced, cleaned all cannon plugs.
21 Feb	Navigation	Litton Omega Nav wanders 150 miles west SW during flt	System checked good on ground power
28 Feb	Navigation	TACAN bearing inop DME good	Removed and replaced TACAN
1 Mar	Navigation	Litton Omega Nav inop all modes	Tech Rep check system - Checks good on ground power.
1 Mar	Navigation	TACAN inop both DME and Azimuth	Found suppression pulse cables crossed. Corrected cables. System checks good on ground power.
1 Mar	Navigation	BIM #2 flickers constantly in flight	Troubleshoot system. Found bad #1 harness; removed and replaced same.
6 Mar	Navigation	TACAN - No DME or Azimuth any channel	Removed and replaced. Checked bad on ground power, no DME.
6 Mar	Navigation	Litton Omega outputs unreliable	Removed and replaced Omega

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
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MISSION AIRCRAFT #2 (continued)

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
9 Mar	Navigation	TACAN - No DME Azimuth O.K.	Removed and replaced TACAN. Checks good on channel
15 Mar	Flt Control	2d stage hyd system between Yellow & Green on deck. Drops 1/4" into Yellow inflight. Suspect air in system.	Serviced 2d stage to proper level cockpit qty level chec good. Found no air in syste
21 Mar	Airframe	Inspect all rigid & flex hyd lines in cabin ovhd for chafing, proper routing and replacement if needed.	Complied with same.
24 Mar	Navigation	Omega nav showed 75 mile error from known position.	Omega check good on next flight.
24 Mar	Airframe	2d stage hyd qty sys has mod leak. Dropped from full to top of yellow in 2.5 hrs. Suspect air.	Bled reservoir and serviced to proper level. No evidence of leakage.
24 Mar	Rotor	#2 blade BIM block cracked all the way through.	Potted crack in #2 BIM block.
26 Mar	Airframe	2nd stage hyd press filter button found popped on pre-flt insp.	Replaced 2nd stage pressure filter element.
9 Apr	Transmission	#1 NGB chip lite, 10 mins after T/O. Recycled ckt bkr...Lite stayed on.	Pulled chip detectors and oil filters, found no chips. Flushed NGB twice and reserviced. Checked good after 30 min penalty run.
11 Apr	Main Rotor Blade	#5 blade heavily scratched (to metal) 3rd pocket from inboard side.	Blended, cleaned and preserved.

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #2 (continued)

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
11 Apr	Main Rotor	#4 blade pocket dented, 2d pocket from tip	Inspected pocket, O.K.
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
3 Jan	Airframe	Both wind screens scratched	Replaced same
5 Jan	Engine	#2 engine would not start	Replaced ignitor plugs
7 Jan	Ground Accident	Tail rotor gearbox Tail rotor hub assy Tail rotor pitch beam assy Tail rotor pitch link assy Tail rotor blades (3) Main rotor head Swashplate Main rotor blades (4) Pitch rod assy	Removed and replaced damaged components
20 Jan	Fuselage	Winch-engine start pump case cracked	Replaced pump
22 Jan	Electrical	#2 steady BIM light	Replaced electrical harness
29 Jan	Rotor	#1 and #6 main rotor blades damaged	Replaced blade
14 Feb	Rotor	Tail rotor blade cracked	Replaced blade
28 Feb	Instruments	1st stage hydraulic quantity low light pressure & quantity O.K.	Replaced caution panel
22 Mar	Radio Nav	Omega display frozen	Repaired by FSR
8 Apr	Electrical	#2 generator failed in flight	Replaced supervisory panel
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #4

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
<u>79</u>			
07 Dec	Main Rotor Blade	Bad BIM indication on #3 blade. Shows partly black	Removed and replaced #3 main rotor blade
23 Dec	Navigation	TACAN #2 needle would not search	Removed and replaced TACAN
<u>80</u>			
<u>16</u> Jan	Flight Reference	Pilot's gyro has intermittent "OFF" flag	Troubleshooting pilots gyro using ASN-50 test set found power supply to be bad. Removed and replaced power supply.
16 Jan	Navigation	TACAN has no DME	Removed and replaced TACAN
18 Jan	Hydraulic	1st Stage manifold filter popped	Checked manifold for metal particles and replaced filter.
26 Jan	BIM	Flickering #2 BIM in flt.	Cleaned #6 BIM block and harness. Checked Good.
11 Mar	T/Rotor Blade	T/R blade has 4 dents on leading edge	Removed and replaced T/R Blade.
20 Mar	Hydraulic	2nd stage hyd qty indicator fluctuates from center green to 1/8 inch from bottom of yellow in 3.1 hr Flt.	Serviced reservoir system checks good.
21 Mar	Hydraulic	Inspect all rigid and flex hyd lines in cabin ovhd area for chaffing proper routing, and replacement if needed.	Complied with same.
29 Mar	BIM Sys	#1 MRB has 2 cracks in BIM block	Repaired BIM block

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
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MISSION AIRCRAFT #4

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u> <u>80</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
08 Apr	Engine	#1 Engine experienced 3 loud pops, followed by another pop and torque decreased from 80% to 30%. Incident occurred after maint hover, when A/C transitioned to fwd flt.	Removed and replaced #1 engine
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #5

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
17 Dec	Flight Reference	ASN-50 Power Supply missing from Acft	Installed ASN-50 Pwr supply
17 Dec	Airframe	Pilot's windshield hazy	Replaced windshield
27 Dec	Integrated Guidance	Roll trim inop all AFCS channels	Found disconnected cannon plug. Reconnected same.
01 Jan	Flight Reference	Compass card on BDHI frozen	Replaced ASN-50 Gyro
05 Jan	Fuel	Internal range extension tank control box inop	Removed, repaired and replaced
09 Jan	HF Comm	HF Radio inop	Replaced HF Radio
02 Feb	Radio Navigation	TACAN inop in Azimuth/DME	Removed and Replaced
06 Feb	Electrical	Lost #2 Generator	Replaced #2 Generator
08 Feb	Radio NAV	TACAN 40 <sup>0</sup> lock-off	Replaced TACAN
11 Feb	UHF Comm	UHF failed after take-off	Removed and replaced UHF
15 Feb	Rotor	Tail rotor blade bent	Replaced T/R blade
16 Feb	Rotor	#4 Main rotor blade has bad pocket	Replaced #4 MRB
16 Feb	Power Plant	Auxiliary power plant shaft sheared	Removed and replaced APP support/shaft
23 Feb	Integrated Guidance	AFCS YAW problems above 150' and 60 Kts	Replaced AFCS AMP and blown Fuse
27 Feb	Integrated Guidance	AFCS YAW hardover #2 AFCS	Repaired broken wire
28 Feb	Integrated Guidance	Stiff right pedal with #1 AFCS servo on	Replaced bad #2 dual input servo valve

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
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MISSION AIRCRAFT #5 (continued)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
07 Mar	Integrated Guidance	AFCS and CoPilot Gyro problem in roll	1080Y Gyro found bad, replaced same.
12 Mar	HF Comm	HF Radio inop	Replaced HF Radio
01 Apr	Rotor	Tail rotor blade has FOD damage	Replaced T/R blade
14 Apr	Integrated Guidance	With AFCS AMPS off got sharp yaw kick when switching servo from #1 to #2	Adjusted #2 Moog valve check good
14 Apr	Radio NAV	TACAN inop all channels Azimuth/DME	Removed and replaced TACAN
19 Apr	Rotor	Remove and Replace tail rotor blade due to bad balance	Completed same.
19 Apr	Radio NAV	#2 needle on TACAN will not rotate	Removed and replaced blower motor and TACAN
24 Apr	Aircraft	None, noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #6

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
24 Jan	A/C	A/C acceptance inspection	Performed acceptance inspection
25 Jan	Main rotor blade	Removed #3 MRB for installation on A/C #3	Replaced on 28 Feb 80
28 Jan	Hydraulics	Removed 1ST stage hydraulic pump for A/C #8	Replaced on 31 Jan 80
28 Jan	Hydraulics	Removed winch engine start pump for A/C #8	Replaced on 25 Feb 80
15 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #1 MRB for A/C #4	Replaced blade 28 Feb 80
15 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #6 MRB for A/C #7	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
16 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #5 MRB for A/C #5	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
18 Feb	Intermed. gearbox	Removed IGB for A/C #1	Replaced on 19 Feb 80
20 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #4 MRB for #5	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
28 Feb	A/C	Ground incident involving T/R blade striking overhead	Replaced all dynamic components aft of main gear box during period from 28 Feb to 19 Mar 80
13 Mar	Hydraulics	Removed 1ST stage hydraulic pump for A/C #1	Replaced 18 Mar 80
16 Mar	Full system	Check all internal tanks	Complied with same

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #6

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
21 Mar	Hydraulics	Insp all rigid and flex. hyd. lines in cabin ovhd. for chafing, proper routing and replacement, if needed	Complied with same
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None, aircraft full mission capable

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
06 Dec	Instruments	Pilots AFCS indicator erratic regardless of AFCS status	Removed and replaced
18 Dec	Integrated Guidance	Hardover to right in yaw with both feet off pedals	Repaired bad AFCS control panel
30 Jan	Integrated Guidance	AFCS has right hardover	Indicator out of adjustment. Repaired same.
12 Feb	Flight Control	Cyclic hunts and drives any configuration	Replaced bad roll sensor
13 Feb	HF Comm	Unable to transmit or receive on HF	Removed and replaced
14 Feb	Rotor	#6 Main rotor blade has cracked 3rd pocket	Replaced main rotor blade
16 Feb	Flight Controls	Cyclic hunts in roll	Replaced bad AFCS roll sensor
20 Feb	Integrated Guidance	#1 AFCS Amp on with #2 Amp off result in full right YAW	Replaced Lateral accelerometer
21 Feb	Flight Reference	Copilot turn Rate Gyro inop in norm position	Replaced Turn Rate Gyro
21 Feb	Navigator	OMEGA INOP	Replaced OMEGA Control Box
28 Feb	Flight Control	Excessive Force Required to move cyclic with Trim off	Replaced Roll Trim Valve
7 Mar	Navigation	OMEGA quit half way through flight	Replaced Power Supply
16 Mar	Integrated Guidance	Acft yaws right any AFCS Configuration	Adjusted Lateral accelerometer



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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
16 Mar	Flight Reference	Pilot's Gyro Precesses in flight	Replaced ASN 50 Gyro
29 Mar	Engine	Unable to start Aux Power Plant	Replaced ignitor Plugs
29 Mar	Engine	Aux Power Plant pump cavitated	Replaced pump
30 Mar	Integrated Guidance	With AFCS 1 or AFCS 2 Servo on and AFCS #1 amp off, have outer loop drive	Replaced bad AFCS Roll Sensor
11 Apr	Flight Reference	Pilot's Gyro shows extreme nose down	Replaced ASN 50 Gyro
11 Apr	Integrated Guidance	AFCS has roll oscillations	Replaced bad AFCS Amp
11 Apr	Rotor	Tail rotor blade cracked	Replaced blade
19 Apr	Instruments	1st stage hydraulic pressure fluctuations	Replaced bad indicator
19 Apr	Integrated Guidance	#2 YAW indicator stays 1 mark to right of neutral	Replaced bad AFCS Amp
22 Apr	Nav	OMEGA Alert Lite intermittent	Replaced by FSR
23 Apr	Rotor	Tail Rotor Blade Abrasive Strip coming off	Replaced T/R Blade
24 Apr	Aircraft	None, noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #8

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
10 Dec 79	Transmissions	#1 nose gear box chip-lite, recycled chip detector CKT-BKR lite went out.	Removed and cleaned chip-detector, No evidence of fuzz.
30 Dec 79	Transmission	#1 nose gear box chip lite.	Removed and cleaned chip detector, no evidence of fuzz. Penalty run conducted, system checks good.
8 Jan 80	Flight Reference	Pilot's attitude gyro warning flag stays on-Transfers to Co-pilot when VGI transfer switch activated.	ASN-50 power supply system bad. Removed and replaced.
8 Jan 80	Transmissions	#1 nose gear box chip lite illuminated stays on when CKT-BKR is reset.	Removed all chip detectors, no evidence of metallic chips. Electrical continuity checks performed. 30 Min penalty run. No lite.
28 Jan 80	Hydraulics	1st stage hyd system pressure did not come online.	Removed and replaced 1st stage hyd. Pump reservice Checks good.
5 Feb 80	AFCS	Heading hold hunts with feet off pedals.	Replaced yaw sensor.
11 Feb 80	AFCS	#2 amplifier has no dampening in roll mode. @ 140kts A/C has porpoise in pitch.	Removed and replaced roll-rate and pitch-rate gyros.
21 Feb 80	Hydraulics	Cannibalization of 1st stage hyd pump.	Replaced pump on 29 Feb 80
4 Mar 80	Intermed GB	Removed IGB for A/C #6	Replaced on 22 Mar 80

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MISSION AIRCRAFT #8

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
21 Apr 80	Aircraft	Functional check flight flown with following discrepancies: - Dampners require servicing. - FM squelch does not work. TACAN no lock-on.	All discrepancies repaired prior to mission launch
24 Apr 80	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

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V.A. [unclear]

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## JTD Exercise

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355

CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92

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
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REF ID OADR

REASON Multiple Sources

[redacted]

# STORM CLOUD



~~CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD  
REVIEW ON 15 NOVEMBER 2000  
EXTENDED BY JCS, J-3,  
REASON 5200.1R, PAR 2-301c(5)~~

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OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (U) Situation
2. (U) Mission
3. (U) Execution
4. (U) Support
5. (U) Command Control, Communications

ANNEXES:

- A. (U) Task Organization
- B. (U) Intelligence
  - Appendix 1 (U) Weather
- C. (U) Operations
  - Appendix 1 (C) Delta
  - Appendix 2 (C) Rangers
  - Appendix 3 (U) Helo Ops
  - Appendix 4 (C) [REDACTED]
  - Appendix 5 (U) MC/EC-130
  - Appendix 6 (U) [REDACTED]
  - Appendix 7 (U) Air Defense
  - Appendix 8 (U) C-5/C-141B
  - Appendix 9 (U) KC-135
  - Appendix 10 (U) [REDACTED]
  - Appendix 11 (U) Airfield Plans, Clamity Jane procedures
- D. (U) Logistics
  - Appendix 1 (U) Medical
- J. (U) Command Relationships
  - Appendix 1 (U) Command Structure Chart
- K. (U) Communications
- L. (U) Operations Security
- X. (U) Flight routes, Flow Chart

A

1. (U) Situation:

(U)  
(S) General: A wealthy, radical "third world" nation, Calivada, is in the final stages of becoming a nuclear power. Peaceful nuclear facilities purchased from European nations have helped this process. Recently this nation has decided to speed the process by kidnapping three US nuclear physicists and stealing components and plans for nuclear weapons. The self proclaimed President-for-Life of Calivada has clearly stated that he will attempt to use his future nuclear capability to coerce the US on a number of regional issues. The US has confirmed that Calivada was responsible for the kidnapping and theft. An exhaustive search has located the US physicists and the plans/components (hereafter collectively referred to as "critical cargo") in a large city within the country.

(U)  
(S) The physicists are being held in a government research office, BACON, while the plans and components are being kept at a nearby reseach facility, LIMESTONE.

(U)  
(S) The objective of JTD Exercise STORM CLOUD is to recover the critical cargo intact and the physicists alive and well.

(U)  
(S) Enemy: The country of Calivada is extremely hostile to the US. The neighboring countries of Arizona and New Mexico, while hostile to both the US and Calivada, would nonetheless probably warn Calivada of any US attempt to recover the critical material. Although Calivada's armed forces are relatively inefficient, there are adequate military resources available to present a hostile environment to any US recovery attempt.

(U)  
(S) Friendly: The countries east of the Mississippi are sympathetic to the US and have granted the US overflight rights and a few staging facilities. These facilities are in sufficiently remote areas to allow short-term use without drawing undue attention.

(U)  
(S) Mission: JTD STORM CLOUD forces covertly penetrate the hostile territory of Calivada and conduct simultaneous air assault operations to recover the US assets being illegally held at locations LIMESTONE and BACON.

3. (U) Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operation

A

(1) (S) Phase I. Pre-Deployment. At D-1, [redacted] and DELTA move to an isolated area of Ft Bragg to conduct day and night rehearsals. [redacted] conducts rehearsals at a site to be determined.

b. (U) Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) (U) Annex A - Task Organization
- (2) (U) Annex C - Operations
- (3) (U) Annex X - Execution Time Chart
- (4) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Location Designators:

CAMELOT (Edwards AFB)  
RIVERSIDE (Desert Rock)  
EVERGLADE (Indian Springs)  
BACON (Jackass Flats)  
LIMESTONE (MX Site)  
BROOMCORN (Campbell)  
CANVASBACK (Hurlburt)  
HORSESHOE (Bragg)  
REMINGTON (Hunter)  
GARRISON (Pahute Mesa)

- (5) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ CPX to be conducted 19 Nov. Message to follow.
- (6) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Alternate evacuation sites are RIVERSIDE and CAMELOT in order.

(7) (U) Tasking:

(U) JTD:

- (a) (U) Provide OPSEC/cover story.
- (b) (U) Staff weather services.
- (c) (U) Provide overall guidance/command.

A

<sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (RGR) [REDACTED] Inf.

- (a) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide required forces for LIMESTONE, RIVERSIDE and EVERGLADE.
- (b) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide OPFOR at exercise area. OPFOR to deploy to GARRISON 20 Nov.
- (c) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Assist at CAMELOT as required.

(C) DELTA

- (a) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide required forces for LIMESTONE.
- (b) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide control of UH-60 assets during assault phase.

A

(c) (C) Provide guidance/control of [REDACTED] assets chopped to use in assault phase.

(C) [REDACTED]

- (a) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide required forces for BACON.
- (b) ~~(S)~~ Provide control of OPCON [REDACTED] assets during assault phase.
- (c) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Verify headcount to DELTA at EVERGLADE.

A

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

- (a) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Construct BACON/LIMESTONE objectives.
- (b) ~~(S)~~ Provide control of their [REDACTED] during attack phase.
- (c) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide OPSEC evaluation of exercise area at conclusion of trainex.
- (d) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide focal point for coordination with DOE.

<sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ 101st

- (a) (U) Provide required helo force. ?
- (b) (U) Provide admin recovery capability for downed helos.
- (c) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Coordinate administrative backhaul from Edwards AFB.
- (d) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Schedule assault force arrival at BROOMCORN to preclude standing time.
- (e) ~~(S)~~ Interface with [REDACTED]

A

(C) 1st SOW

- (a) (U) Provide required fixed wing support.
- (b) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide CCT support as required.
- (c) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Insure CCT conducts liaison with CAMELOT and EVERGLADE prior to 21 Nov 80.
- (d) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Coordinate emergency abort plan and Calamity Jane procedures with ground commanders.
- (e) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Develop helo ground refuel plan and provide OPCON of 101 Pathfinders for refuel operations at EVERGLADE.



~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] AWACW

A

(a) (U) Provide AWAC support as required.

(b) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Develop, coordinate and control under separate Frag Order: F-14 Cap, F-4 Aggressor package and associated tanker support.

(C) USA QM Unit

(a) (U) Support as required.

(b) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Establish FAR system at EVERGLADE and RIVERSIDE.

(8) (U) Debrief will be conducted at 1300 on 25 November 1980. Commanders and unit representatives should report to the Pentagon, Room 2C840.

- 4. (U) Support.  
Annex D - Logistics
- 5. (U) Command, Control, Communications

- a. (S) Communications:

- (1) (S) There will be three JTD Command Nets; SATCOM, ALPHA, SATCOM BRAVO, and HF CHARLIE. All will operate in the secure voice mode.
- (2) (S) The mission element nets will operate in the categories of inter-air, air-ground, ground, and fire support. HF VHF-FM, VHF-AM, and UHF, both secure and non-secure, will be the modes of operation.
- (3) (U) See C-E Annex K and the CEOI, published separately, for additional information.

- b. (U) Command and Control:

- (1) (S) JTD command communications will operate from eight locations; the JTD base (photography), two JTD relays (POCKETBOOK and RYE GRASS), the JTD forward command posts (CAMELOT and EVERGLADE), a JTD response cell (BRASS RING), the JTD airborne command posts (E-3A and AC-130), and the JTD Main (HAMMER).
- (2) (U) All primary element commanders will report directly to the CDR, JTD.
- (3) (U) The Main JTD command post will be located with the CDR, JTD at all times.
- (4) (U) See Annex J for additional information.

A

ROBERT A. TURNER  
Colonel, USA  
Joint Test Director

OFFICIAL:

*Robert C. Dutton*  
ROBERT C. DUTTON  
Colonel, USAF  
J-3

(S) DISTRIBUTION

Unit	Cys
[REDACTED]	2
1 SOW	4
[REDACTED]	2
101st	4
DELTA	2
[REDACTED]	1
AWACS	2
C-141/C-5	5
KC-135	2
JTD	6
[REDACTED]	6
USA Om Unit	1
CCM (Charleston)	1

ANNEXES:

- A. Task Organization
- B. Intelligence
- C. Operations
- D. Logistics
- J. Command Relationships
- K. Communications-Electronics
- L. OPSEC
- X. Time Chart

A

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

(U) Task Organization

1. ~~(S)~~ Unit:

JTD HQ

[REDACTED]

TF 79.1 (DELTA)

[REDACTED]

101st AVN GP (-)

1st SOW(+)

AIR CAP (F-74)

AWACS

QM Det

Ele JCSE

Ele ADA

2. ~~(S)~~ Mission Area:

LIMESTONE

BACON

RIVERSIDE

TF 79.1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CO,

[REDACTED]

Ele, 1st SOW

EVERGLADE

OTHER

FIRE SUPPORT

1st SOW (-)

Ele ADA

QM DET

JTD HQ

AWACS

[REDACTED]

AC-130

AIR CAP

AH-1G

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) (U)

a. (S) Strategic Setting: Joint Training Exercise STORM CLOUD will be held utilizing the following: Hurlburt Field, FL; Ft. Bragg, NC; Ft. Campbell, KY; Edwards AFB, CA; Indian Springs Aux, NV; Desert Rock Aux, NV; and Nevada Test Site. This is a JCS coordinated, JTD sponsored exercise. The setting is a representation of world-wide capabilities in a hostile environment.

b. (U) Setting Countries: In the exercise strategic setting, country Calivada is surrounded by countries inimical to its own as well as to US interests. In the region there are friendly countries which will allow US forces use of their territories as landing/staging sites, as long as the influx of forces are kept as inconspicuous as possible.

c. (U) Political Situations: Country Calivada has long been suspicious of US and European motives in the region. Despite Calivada's continuing attempts to rid the region of US and European influence, it has continued to do business and purchase arms from both. Calivada is also regarded by its neighbors as being a threat to the stability of the area. Its neighbors suspect Calivada of planning to develop a nuclear capability that will allow it not only to influence US actions, but to intimidate its neighbors as well. There is ample reason for this suspicion, as Calivada has had historical territorial designs on its neighbors as well as a history of irrational actions. Calivada's armed forces, while inefficient by Western standards, is one of the largest and best equipped in the area. Calivada has shown itself to be extremely security conscious and has attempted to arm itself with the best and latest military equipment.

APPENDIX 1 (WEATHER) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) (U)

Situation Climatic Brief  
CAMELOT

November

1. General. Site E is generally clear to partly cloudy in November with chilly nights and mild days. Skies are clear 42-68% of the time. Maximum cloudiness occurs between 0900 and 1700 local time. Mean cloudiness is 17-23% at night and 28-34% during the day. Morning minimum temperatures average 36F increasing to 66F during the afternoon. Precipitation occurs on about three days per month. Thunderstorms are very rare. The prevailing surface wind direction at night is southwest to west (11-17% of the time) at mean speeds of 3-10 knots. Calm winds occur 19-29% of the time. Daytime wind directions are variable, but show a slight tendency to be north-easterly. Speeds are 3-16 knots, and calms occur 19-34% of the time.

2. Flying Weather. Good to excellent. Cloudy and rainy conditions are infrequent. Ceilings less than 5000 feet, and/or visibilities less than 5 miles occur 3-6% of the time; less than 1500/31% of the time or less. Conditions less than 55/1 are rare. Icing and turbulence are usually not a problem.

3. Exposure Weather. Generally pleasant. Nighttime temperatures are chilly, but reach the mid 60's during the afternoon. Sunshine is abundant and rain is rare. Relative humidity varies from an early morning high of 60-65% to an afternoon low of 35-40%.

ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	85
MEAN MAXIMUM	66
MEAN MINIMUM	36
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	16
NUMBER OF DAYS WITH PRECIPITATION	3
SNOW	*
FOG	1
95% WORST DA	4800 Ft
95% WORD PA	2400 Ft

\* = Less than 0.5 day

- e. (U) Coordinating Instructions:
  - (1) (U) Actions at downed aircraft: TAB C (Downed Aircraft)
  - (2) (U) Aircraft load plans: TAB D (Load Plans)
- 4. (U) Service Support: SOP
- 5. (U) Command and Signal:
  - a. (U) Signal: TAB E (SIGNAL)
  - b. <sup>(U)</sup>(S) Command: The TF 79.1 Commander is in UH-60 #4 during the assault flight, in the vicinity of point GRANGE during the assault, in the vicinity of the SW corner of EZ WHISKEY after the evacuation to objective GOLD, and is UH-60 #6 during the exfil.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DELTA: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

EVENT	XMIT TO	BREVITY
1. ASSAULT FORCE ON GND, ASSAULT IN PROGRESS.	[REDACTED] RGR BN CDR TO DELTA CDR, DELTA CDR TO CDR, [REDACTED]	ACCLAIM
2. # PERSONNEL ENROUTE TO EXFIL AIRFIELD.	DELTA CDR TO CDR [REDACTED]	ANTELOPE
3. FORCES DEPART OBJ, RGR BN CDR ASSUMES FSC.	DELTA CDR TO [REDACTED] RGR BN CDR,	BASKETBALL
4. FORCES CLOSED INTO FIELD.	DELTA CDR TO CDR [REDACTED]	CITADEL
5. TM DELTA (-) ENROUTE TO EXFIL AFLD VIA HELO.	[REDACTED] RGR BN CDR TO CDR [REDACTED]	DENTIST
6. TM RANGER ENROUTE TO EXFIL AFLD VIA HELO.	UH-60 FLIGHT LDR TO CDR JTF.	FOOTNOTE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PHASE I

CAMELOT

(U) 1. OFF LOADING/BUILD UP

(U) 2. ASSEMBLY AREA

~~(S)~~ 3. T/O TIME

A. 4 UH-60	0310Z
B. 8 AH-1S	0320Z
C. [REDACTED]	0321Z
D. 20 UH-60	0515Z

(U) 4. ENROUTE MAP

~~(S)~~ 5. ARRIVAL AT RIVERSIDE

A. 4 UH-60	0428Z
B. 8 AH-1S	0438Z
C. [REDACTED]	0508Z
D. 20 UH-60	0633Z

~~(S)~~ 6. REFUELING TIME

A. AH-1S	0508Z
B. [REDACTED]	0633Z (21)
	0648Z (24)



PHASE II

RIVERSIDE TO BACON & LIMESTONE

- (c) 1. T/O TIME (RIVERSIDE)
  - A. 16, [REDACTED] 1, AH-1S 0824Z
  - B. 24, UH-60/2, AH-1S 0825Z
  - C. 8, [REDACTED] 0826Z
  - D. 3, AH-1S 0829Z
  - E. 1, AH-1S 0832Z
  - F. 1, AH-1S 0838Z

- (U) 2. ENROUTE MAP
- (U) 3. AH-1S TARGET MAP

- (c) 4. EGRESS TIME
  - A. 16, [REDACTED] 0900Z
  - B. 8, [REDACTED] 0902Z
  - C. 8, UH-60 0915Z
  - D. 16, UH-60 0945Z
  - E. 8, AH-1S 0945Z

PHASE III

EVERGLADE:

~~(S)~~ 1. ARRIVAL AT EVERGLADE

- A. 16, [REDACTED] 0932Z
- B. 8, UH-60 0939Z
- C. 16, UH-60 1009Z
- D. 8, AH-1S 1005Z

(U) 2. REFUEL/DEPARTURE

- A. 8, UH-60 1004Z
- B. 16, UH-60 (8) 1034Z
- (8) 1039Z
- C. 8, AH-1S 1139Z

RIVERSIDE:

- ~~(S)~~ 1. 5, [REDACTED] ARRIVE 0923Z
- 2. 5, [REDACTED] DEPART 1003Z

APPENDIX 5 (MC/EC-130) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Seven (7) Aircraft (5-MC's/2-EC's)
2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Takeoff CANVASBACK - 0100Z to 0130Z (as required)
3. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Refueling Times: 0300Z - 3 aircraft  
(at the ARIP) 0310Z - 2 aircraft  
0320Z - 2 aircraft
4. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Low level entry times: 0430Z till 0455Z  
  
Low level entry point: N35-07 W99-50
5. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ TOT's:
  - a. EVERGLADE - 0845/46/47/48/55Z
  - b. RIVERSIDE - 0855Z/0905Z
6. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Takeoff times: (Approx 2 hrs on ground)  
  
1045Z till 1115Z
7. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Low level exit time: 1500Z till 1520Z (N35-07 W99-50)
8. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Refueling times: 1540/1550/1600Z
9. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Land times CANVASBACK: 1820/1830/1840Z

APPENDIX 8 (C-5, C-141B OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. (U) TASKS:

(a) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide 8 C-5 and 3 C-141B aircraft to airlift JTD STORM CLOUD forces/equipment to required destinations.

(b) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Provide Combat Control Team as required to:

(1) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Exercise positive control of all fixed wing and rotary wing takeoffs and landings except for initial blacked out MC-130 landings at EVERGLADE and RIVERSIDE and initial helicopter landings at RIVERSIDE.

A

(2) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Assist and plan with [redacted] for the safe transloading of passengers from helicopters to fixed wing assets.

(3) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Coordinate emergency abort plan with the on-scene ground commander.

(4) (U) Develop helicopter ground refueling flow plan.

2. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ COMMAND AND SIGNAL: COMJTF exercises command and control of MAC forces through the COMALF.

3. (U) EXECUTION:

a. <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ C-5: 8 C-5 aircraft will airlift helicopters and forces from BROOMCORN to CAMELOT.

#1	T/O BROOMCORN	212030
#2	"	212040
#3	"	212050
#4	"	212100
#5	"	212110
#6	"	212120
#7	"	212130
#8	"	212140
#1	ARV. CAMELOT	220130
#2	"	220140
#3	"	220150
#4	"	220200
#5	"	220210
#6	"	220220
#7	"	220230
#8	"	220240
#1-8	ON-LOAD	221800
-	CAMELOT	

b. (U) Depart times and arrival times at BROOMCORN to be determined.

c. (U) (S) C-141B EVERGLADE 3 C-141B aircraft will airlift fuel blivets.

#1	T/O HORSESHOE	220333
#2	"	220335
#3	"	220337
#1	ARCP	220500
#2	"	220500
#3	"	220500
#1	ARV. EVERGLADE	220908
#2	"	220913
#3	"	220918
#1	T/O EVERGLADE	221000
#2	"	221020
#1	ARCP	221330
#3	"	221350
#1	SVN/POB	221530
#3	"	221550

d. (U) (S) #2 C-141B will remain at EVERGLADE to admin airlift bivits and load personnel to HORSESHOE. T/O time to be determined.

e. (U) LOAD/BACKHAUL PLAN:

See Charts

APPENDIX 9 (KC-135 OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. (U) (S) Concept of Operations: SAC will provide inbound and outbound refueling support for AC/MC/EC-130 and C-141B aircraft, as well as refueling for E-3A/F-14 fighter cap package. The 1SOW will coordinate special tracks for low altitude refueling. For high altitude operations, fighter cap package will use A/R 3E, while C-141Bs will use AR 112 W/E. All refueling operations will be conducted using only minimum essential communications.

a. (U) (S) E-3A/Fighter Support: A tanker task force at March AFB will support F-14 refuelings with drogue-equipped KC-135s. Specific mission details will be contained in E-3A air-to-air annex for STORM CLOUD.

b. (U) (S) C-141B Support: Altus AFB KC-135s will support both inbound and outbound refuelings in A/R 112, using point parallel procedures. The inbound ARCT will be a firm preplanned time; outbound ARCT will be adjusted based on the receiver's launch time. Tankers will be prepared to hold, awaiting C-141 late outbound arrival.

TANKER CALL SIGN	RECEIVER CALL SIGN	A/R TRACK	RATIO TNKR/RCVR	ARCT	ALTITUDE	OFFLOA
THEM 51	TBD	112W	1:3	220500Z	270	15m ea
THEM 52	TBD	112E	1:1	221330Z	270	25m
THEM 53	TBD	112E	1:1	221350Z	270	25m

c. (U) Communications/Rendezvous Plan is as published in FLIP.

d. (U) (S) AC/MC/EC-130 Support: A tanker task force at Grissom AFB will support all 1SOW refuelings, using overhead comm-out rendezvous for inbound refueling; modified point parallel for outbound A/R. Inbound ARCT (time at the RZ point) will be preplanned; outbound ARCTs will be adjusted based on receiver launch time. The 1SOW will coordinate the special low altitude refueling tracks to be used for this exercise.

(1) (U) (S) Planned A/R tracks:

TRACK	RZ POINT	ARCP	EAR
A	TXK 316/33	ADM 087/85	ADM 067/20
B	ADM 306/33	ADM 067/20	TXK 316/33
C	(Between Abilene, TX and Roswell, NM)		
D	(Between Prescott VORTAC and St Johns VORTAC)		

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Final determination of AR Tracks will depend upon ISOW requirements and FAA constraints.

(2) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ MC/EC-130 Support:

<u>TANKER CALL SIGN</u>	<u>RECEIVER CALL SIGN</u>	<u>A/R TRACK</u>	<u>ARCT(Z)</u>	<u>ALT</u>	<u>RECVR ON-LOAD</u>	<u>A/A TACAN</u>	<u>KC-13 BEACC</u>
BAR 11/12	TBD (3)	A	220300Z	11,000	25m	31/94	1-1-
BAR 13	TBD (2)	A	220310Z	11,000	25m	32/95	2-1-
BAR 14	TBD (2)	A	220320Z	11,000	25m	33/96	2-1-
A/R FREQ	P.366.3	/BU	391.8				
BAR 15/16	TBD (3)	B	221540Z	11,000	25m	31/94	1-1-
BAR 17	TBD (2)	B	221550Z	11,000	25m	32/95	2-1-
BAR 18	TBD (2)	B	221600Z	11,000	25m	33/96	2-1-
A/R FREQ:	P.366.3/B.U.		391.8				

<sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ ██████████ Support:

A

<u>TANKER CALL SIGN</u>	<u>RECEIVER CALL SIGN</u>	<u>A/R TRACK</u>	<u>ARCT(Z)</u>	<u>ALT</u>	<u>RECVR ON-LOAD</u>	<u>A/A TACAN</u>	<u>KC-13 BEACO</u>
BAR 21/22	TBD (2)	C	220455Z	10,000	32m	30/93	2-1-
BAR 25/26	TBD (2)	D	221140Z	11,000	38m	30/93	2-1-
A/R FREQ:	P.361.7/B.U.		350.7				

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APPENDIX 10 (Det A Operations) TO ANNEX C (Operations)

A

1. ~~(S)~~ Mission: [REDACTED] conducts [REDACTED] assault of BACON at 220745Z Nov 80 to recover US assets.

2. ~~(S)~~ Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operations: The operation will be conducted in three phases.

(1) ~~(C)~~ Phase I: Unit will be moved from CANVASBACK to BROOMCORN on 21 Nov in time to outload on C-5s.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Phase II: Unit will conduct [REDACTED] assault of BACON to recover assets.

A


(3) ~~(S)~~ Phase III: Unit will exfiltrate [REDACTED] to EVERGLADE where they will transload to C-141 aircraft for return to CANVASBACK.



# Everglade:

## MC-130 OFF-LOADING POSITIONS

MC-130 #1 LANDS AT H HOUR  
MC-130 #2 LANDS AT H+1MIN  
MC-130 #3 LANDS AT H+2  
MC-130 #4 LANDS AT H+3  
EC-130 #5 LANDS AT H+10




~~SECRET~~

# Everglade

## C - 141B GROUND MARSHALLING PLAN

1 & 3 MAKE 180°  
TURNS WHEN FINAL PARK  
LOCATION IS REACHED



# Everglade

## PARKING PLAN:


~~SECRET~~

UH-60 TRANSLOAD POINT

OH-6A LZs

26


84



~~SECRET~~

# Everglade

## REFUEL / DEPARTURE OPERATIONS:



SECRET

~~SECRET~~OPERATIONS: CLAMITY JANE PROCEDURES

CALAMITY JANE Procedures - ELEVATE. The "CALAMITY JANE" procedure is devised in the interest of safety and to insure orderly aircraft spacing in the event that any go around is required.

Format: "(Aircraft Flight) This is (Command Agency), ELEVATE XX at YY; acknowledge." Where (Aircraft Flight) is the string of aircraft to which the procedure applies, and (Command Agency) is the agency commanding the procedure.

XX is the number of minutes each aircraft will delay.  
YY is the time in minutes at which the procedure will be initiated.

Procedure: If necessary to implement a "CALAMITY JANE" procedure, the ELEVATE call will be given early enough to allow each aircraft to receive and acknowledge the call prior to YY. After acknowledgement, all aircraft will fly their assigned route to the location corresponding to time YY. At YY, all aircraft will initiate a 180 degree standard rate turn to the right. Even suffixed aircraft will initiate a climb to base altitude plus 500 feet. Aircraft will fly a single holding pattern so as to arrive back at YY location at time YY plus XX. Even suffixed aircraft will descend to base altitude when reestablished on course.

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)

LOGISTICS (U)

1. (U) Concept. Initial logistics provisioning will be through normal Service channels to the extent possible. Equipment maintenance is a responsibility of the providing Service/ command. Minimum resupply is planned. Emergency requirements which cannot be satisfied in objective areas will be forwarded to JTD J-4.

a. (U) Supply:

(1) Class I. Operational rations will be used throughout. Each command is responsible to deploy into area with sufficient rations for consumption until return to home station.

(2) (U) Class III:

(a) (S) 101st will operate FARRP (2 points) at RIVERSIDE. POL, Blivit and pumps will be provided from JTD assets at Ft Bragg. 101st will coordinate pickup of material.

(b) (S) QM detachment will operate refuel point (8 points) at EVERGLADE.

(c) (S) Refuel of AH-1G [redacted] by UH-60 refuelers will be conducted by 101st at RIVERSIDE.

(d) (S) [redacted] will be refueled administratively at EVERGLADE after ENDEX either by QM detachment or base tanker truck in order of priority.

(e) (U) No other refueling except for air refueling of aircraft is planned.

(3) (U) Class V:

(a) (U) All deploy with sufficient Class V for conduct of operation.

(b) (S) Only resupply is at FARRP at RIVERSIDE for AH-15 [redacted] Requirements to be determined by 101st. (Simulate carrying Class V into RIVERSIDE.)

(4) (U) Other Classes of Supply: No other resupply is scheduled.

b. (U) Medical. Tab 1.

c. (U) Transportation. Deployments/redeployments will be coordinated between HQ JTD and MAC. Requirements for additional transportation will be forwarded to JTD-J4.

APPENDIX 1 (MEDICAL) TO ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)

MEDICAL SUPPORT

1. (U) Unit level medical support utilizing organic medical assets will be the responsibility of the organization commander.
2. (U) Medical support beyond the capability of unit level medical personnel will be planned, coordinated, and controlled by the designated JTD Surgeon.
3. (U) JTD level medical support for Exercise STORM CLOUD is as follows:
  - a. (U) ~~(S)~~ CAMELOT Forces: Aboard C-5A #6, two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests. (101 Flight Surgeon to accompany UH-60 flight at the discretion of Helicopter Air Mission Commander.)
  - b. (U) ~~(S)~~ EVERGLADE Forces: (MC-130) Two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests aboard aircraft #5.
  - c. (U) ~~(S)~~ EVERGLADE Forces: (C-141) Two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests aboard C-141 # 1.
  - d. (U) RIVERSIDE Forces: Medical support to be provided by 1st SOW flight surgeon personnel.
4. (U) ~~(S)~~ Evacuation procedures in the event of actual evacuation requirements during staging activities (Campbell, Pope, Hurlburt) casualties should be evacuated to local base medical facility. Evacuation of personnel involved in operations in-and-around Edwards AFB should be directed to USAF Medical Clinic, Edwards - Main. Evacuation of personnel involved in operations in-and-around DOE, Indian Springs, and Desert Rock should be directed to Nellis AFB Hospital. Air crews should be briefed on potential evacuation requests and routes.
5. (U) In the event of actual emergencies--evacuation procedures will be handled in accordance with normal SAR.

~~SECRET~~

ANNE J (COMMAND AND CONTROL) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (S) JTD Succession of Command:

A

<u>Individual</u>	<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Location</u>
a. HAMMER	LANCER	JTD MAIN
b. STONE	ARCHER	[REDACTED]
c. SNUFFY	CYCLONE	SCORPION (AWACS)
d. BG SCHOLTES	OUTLAW	EVERGLADE
e. Col TURNER	COMANCHE	PHOTOGRAPH

2. (U) Command Relationships (See attached diagram Appendix 1):

A

- a. (U) JTD CDR - Is in full, overall command of all forces, during all phases of the exercise. (See paragraph 1 above for Command Succession). All of the following commanders report directly to the JTD commander when appropriate and required. (See paragraph 3 for Command Concept).
- b. [REDACTED] JTD Deputy Commander - Located [REDACTED]
  - (1) [REDACTED] Manages and directs [REDACTED] AH-1S assets in providing supporting fires in response to assault commander within pre-established priorities.
  - (2) (U) Manages and directs SAR assets and efforts.
  - (3) [REDACTED] Controls [REDACTED] assets upon their completion of initial objectives.
- c. (C) Air Support Commander - Located AWACS.
  - (1) (U) Manages and directs the employment of E-3A and F-14 assets in provision of CAP.
  - (2) (U) Manages the employment of all KC-135 assets.
  - (3) (U) Provides track information and firing recommendations on low altitude targets to the ADA controllers at designated ground sites.
  - (4) (U) Manages the employment of all KC-135 assets.
- d. (U) Air Mission Commanders (CAMELOT, EVERGLADE, RIVERSIDE):
  - (1) (U) Command all fixed wing assets designated to support their respective objectives.

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(2) (U) Each is Dominant Authority while airborne on his in-bound and out-bound routes.

(3) (U) Responsive to Ground Commander while landed.

A

(4) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] assets chop to JTD Deputy Commander during on station time.

e. (U) Ground Commanders (CAMELOT, EVERGLADE, RIVERSIDE).

A

(1) ~~(S)~~ Command all security (~~(S)~~ Rangers) forces, CT personnel, and support elements at their respective locations.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Security forces include, under the subordinate command of the on-site Ranger Commander, the ALO, Fire Support Coordinator, and ADA elements.

(3) (U) Support elements include Medics and a substantial DACO effort at EVERGLADE, and a FARRP at RIVERSIDE.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Is the Dominant Authority at their location while forces are on the ground.

f. (U) LIMESTONE Assault Commander.

A

(1) ~~(S)~~ Commands LIMESTONE assault forces (Delta, [redacted])

(2) ~~(S)~~ Commands LIMESTONE UH-60 assets from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Dominant Authority from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

A

(4) ~~(S)~~ Determines time of final assault (H-Hour) within guidance provided by JTD Commander, and coordinates launches of BACON assault forces/helicopter assets, [redacted] helicopter assets, and attack helicopter assets at appropriate times.

g. (U) BACON Assault Commander.

(1) (U) Commands BACON assault forces (Detachment A).

(2) ~~(S)~~ Commands BACON [redacted] from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

A

(3) (U) Dominant Authority (along with LIMESTONE Assault Commander who has priority) from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

h. (U) ~~██████████~~ Commander.

(1) (C) Commands ~~██████████~~

A

(2) (C) Commands designated ~~██████████~~ assets from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Upon completion of initial assigned mission chops to JTD Deputy Commander for employment in SAR and/or combat forces role.

i. (U) Helicopter Mission Commander.

(1) (U) Becomes the Ground Commander at CAMELOT on landing at that location.

A

(2) (C) Commands all helicopter assets from CAMELOT take-off until RIVERSIDE landing. The Deputy Helicopter Mission Commander in the flight of four UH-60 refueling helicopters will in fact, for the HMC, command all ~~██████████~~ AW-15 assets from CAMELOT take-off to RIVERSIDE landing. DHMC during this period will report directly to JTD if required.

(3) (U) Chops all assets to appropriate mission commanders at RIVERSIDE.

(4) (U) Commands all UH-60 and AH-1S forces upon exfiltration take-off from EVERGLADE.

3. (U) JTD Command Concept:

a. (U) The Commander, JTD, is in full overall command of all forces, during all phases of each JTD operation. All subordinate commanders will function in an Imperative Activity/Dominant Authority Mode.

b. (U) Imperative Activity is defined as the portion of the operation which, at a given point in time, is critical to successful mission completion.

c. (U) The term Dominant Authority denotes the commander responsible, at that time, for execution of the Imperative Activity.

d. (U) The Dominant Authority concept implies temporary OPCON of one or more lateral elements; not a formal transfer of command. For example, during an airfield seizure phase, the Ground Forces Commander (GFC) has the


Imperative Activity and, for that period, is the Dominant Authority. The Air Mission Commander (AMC) who had just landed, would remain in the JTD command net, but would be prepared to execute, on order of the GPC (under the monitoring of the Commander, JTD), various tasks necessary to successfully complete the seizure phase of the operation.

- e. (U) At certain times during an operation, there may be more than one Dominant Authority. An example might be the Air Support Commander defending against an air attack over the target area at the same time the ground assault phase was in progress. In these instances the general situation and the nature of events will dictate which commanders respond to the requirements of the others. Priorities will be monitored and adjusted, and positive command guidance will be provided when required, by the Commander, JTD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 JTD COMMAND STRUCTURE  
 EXERCISE STORM CLOUD

APPENDIX 1 (JTD COMMAND STRUCTURE)  
 TO ANNEX J TO OPOD STORM CLOUD (U)

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----- FIRE SUPPORT REQUESTS  
 ..... PROGRESS/STATUS REPORTS

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ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (U) Communication Doctrine.

a. (U) Radio listening silence is required for OPSEC reasons in certain situations prior to H-Hour.

(1) (U) When Direction Finding (DF) or local monitoring of aircraft station transmissions would reveal movement towards or within a hostile country.

(2) (U) When DF or local monitoring of ground station transmissions at in-country staging/refueling sites would reveal the in-country presence and possibly the exact location of such sites.

A

b. (U) Once the actual assault has begun there are few security limitations. [REDACTED] should probably remain secure (on FM or UHF), but most other transmissions can be made in the clear, and as often as necessary.

2. (U) Procedures for EXERCISE STORM CLOUD.

a. (U) General: Except for JTD Base and relay stations operating in the Broadcast Mode;

(1) (U) Radio listening silence to maximum degree practical.

(2) (U) Minimum transmissions are at other times.

b. (U) Procedures by phase.

(1) (U) Pre-deployment. For one week prior, establish patterns of base stations/relay stations broadcasting messages on secure SATCOM and secure HF. Each message acknowledged by at least one other base or relay station and broadcast back. Stations include unit admin stations at home bases, and JTD deployed base/relay stations.

(2) (U) Deployment. Same as pre-deployment.

(3) (U) Insertion (includes all inbound fixed-wing flights, landing at Camelot, assembly, flights to Riverside, and staging at Riverside).

(a) (U) Nominal radio listening silence by all aircraft and ground stations on all frequencies.

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(b) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Base stations periodically broadcast information messages on secure SATCOM and secure HF. Acknowledged (and repeated) only by other base or relay stations. These transmissions include weather updates, time checks, and aircraft progress reports (as observed by the AWACS).

(c) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Transmissions by aircraft/ground stations only when absolutely required to report difficulties. Use the ZEBRA channels in the clear, with the ZEBRA number code. The in-the-clear, numeric transmissions reduce the total time on the air, eliminate the give-away sounds of the PARKHILL, and eliminate the use of English spoken code words. The base stations will then initiate detailed questions, comments, and instructions, fully secured on the broadcast channels, with answers, if required, using in-the-clear numbers on the ZEBRA channels.

(d) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ In cases of extreme difficulty approval may be given to use secure UHF between aircraft, if the situation permits.

(4) (U) Assault.

(a) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Enroute is the same as the Insertion Phase until H-Hour, or until operation is detected, whichever comes first.

(b) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ During assault  should use secure FM and/or UHF. All other transmissions in extraction zone areas secure or in the clear if needed to facilitate operations. During this period, all the out-of-CALIVADA transmissions will use two-way secure SATCOM and HF radio (single channel), on the SATCOM ALPHA or BRAVO net as appropriate.

A

(5) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Extraction (includes flights to Riverside, transloading, and outbound flights).

(a) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Same as Assault through outbound flight Riverside.

(b) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(S)~~ Absolutely minimum transmissions on outbound flights.

4. (U) For all other communications information, see CEOI.

ANNEX L TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U) OPERATIONS SECURITY (U)

References:

- a. (U) JCS Pub 18, "Doctrine for Operations Security."
- b. (U) DODR 5200.1R

1. (U) GENERAL: This annex provides guidance for the secure planning and conduct of exercise STORM CLOUD (U).

2. (U) RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPSEC: All participants in this exercise share responsibility for OPSEC. In order to efficiently manage this responsibility OPSEC points of contact (POC) will be appointed by each participating unit and cognizant higher headquarters. These POC's will work directly with JTD security to coordinate all security matters. JTD security will provide a specific hostile all source intelligence collection report at D-3., Updates will be provided as required.

3. (U) OPSEC THREAT: Because the STORM CLOUD exercise areas are normally associated with high priority science and technology, a potential OPSEC threat exists at both home bases and in the exercise areas.


a. (S) SIGINT - A variety of hostile spaceborne, seaborne, and land based stations pose a threat to this exercise. Among these will be: Soviet and Cuban land based HF DF stations; diplomatic missions in Washington, San Francisco, and Mexico



In addition, periodic overflights by Communist Bloc airlines pose a threat.

b. (S) The WSC-3/Parkhill communications signature which is identifiable with the JTD may be subject to hostile traffic analysis techniques. Pre and post exercise management of traffic levels will partially counter this threat. Specific guidance on desired traffic levels will be provided in separate message. Another partial counter to this traffic analysis threat will be the use of Parkhill secure phones. Outside of maintaining minimum acceptable traffic levels on the WSC-3, an effort should be made to use the PARKHILL secured phone lines for necessary coordination. The possibility of detecting phone conversations is less than radio-satellite communications.

c. (S) HUMINT. This threat is posed by both both overt and covert means. Among these are hostile diplomatic travel, merchant seamen transiting the CONUS, students and cultural/scientific exchange personnel. The best counter to this



threat is good continuing unit OPSEC training and clear guidance concerning current activity. Specifically, unit personnel should, to the degree possible, act in a business as normal manner. While there is no desire to publically announce the exercise, it is recognized all necessary preparations cannot remain hidden. Therefore, unit personnel should understand that the unit will/did participate in a TRAINEX is unclassified.

- (U)
- d. (S) Open sources. Media stories currently present an extremely great threat to STORM CLOUD security. The unusually large deployment/redeployment activity at Campbell may provoke media inquiries. The on-going exercise BRIGHT STAR, increases this possibility. Noise or accidents during the exercise may also result in media inquiries. The primary means of defusing this threat will be timely responses to inquiries. This will require a combination of contingency press releases and rapid cross tell between units and JTD HQ in the event of inquires. FAA flight plans and communications frequency coordination are also potential open source threats. To the extent possible, frequency coordination will be done via secure means. While hostile intelligence will be able to note fixed wing flight plans to the Edwards and Nellis AFB areas, rotary wing aircraft operating between these points will attempt to file flight plans for general radi of action vice specific routes.
- (U)
- e. (S) PHOTINT: Soviet photo satellites may pose a threat to the deployment/redeployments and to the construction of exercise facilities. JTD security will provide satellite warnings and to the extent possible, daylight exercise related activities will be adjusted. Separate JTD message will provide further details on this threat.

4. (U) EXECUTION:

a. (U) JTD will provide:

- (1) Satellite warnings for home bases and all exercise locations beginning on D-3 with updates as appropriate.
- (2) AGI, merchant ship, Communist Bloc airline warnings beginning on D-3 with updates as appropriate.
- (3) Notices of pertinent Soviet Bloc attache travel will be provided when available.
- (4) Liaison with OSD, JCS, and service public affairs officers as required.



(5) Numbered, accountable copies of this OPORD.

b. (U) All units will:

- (1) (U) Make the maximum use of secure vice non-secure comms.
- (2) ~~(S)~~ (U) Immediately report to JTD HQ any incidents which have a potential security impact. Aircraft accidents or personnel injuries are prime examples.
- (3) (U) Provide daily (NLT 2400 local) feedback on security situation. Reports should begin on D-3 and extend through D+3. Security situations requiring assistance/coordination with JTD should be reported ASAP.
- (4) ~~(S)~~ (U) Politely refer all media/public inquiries to public affairs channels and immediately alert JTD security. Inform the person who makes the inquiry that it is the function of the public affairs to provide the information they seek.
- (5) ~~(S)~~ (U) Instruct all personnel, that in the event of an accident/incident they should provide as necessary; name, rank, unit, and if necessary, admit to participating in a joint training exercise. Provocative actions or words (classified, sensitive, etc) should be avoided. Additional inquiries should be directed to public affairs.
- (6) ~~(S)~~ (U) Appoint a POC to liaison with INSCOM team performing counter-intelligence assessment. Note, INSCOM team will not be cleared for JTD information. Neither confirm or deny INSCOM findings; however, use their information to take corrective action. If necessary INSCOM reps can be asked for clarification of their findings or OPSEC recommendations.
- (7) (U) Transmit INSCOM reports to JTD HQ in a timely fashion.
- (8) (U) At the conclusion of the exercise each unit may retain one copy of OPORD STORM CLOUD. All other copies of the OPORD are to be collected and returned to JTD HQ.
- (9) ~~(S)~~ (U) Beginning on D-8, all units will insure that at least a minimum level of activity is established on the WSC-3. Details on this will be provided in separate message.

- (10) (U) (S) The use of Edwards AFB will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL information until arrival at Edwards AFB. As an exception to this pre-exercise coordination with MAC concerning airfields usage at Fort Campbell and Edwards will be For Official Use Only. To the extent possible this coordination information should be limited to as few personnel as required. After arrival of the main body of exercise forces at Edwards, the Edwards AFB location will no longer be treated as CONFIDENTIAL. All other locations will, however, be classified as CONFIDENTIAL prior to, during and after the exercise.
- (11) (U) (S) All unit personnel will be briefed that the fact that the unit participated in a TRAINEX is unclassified. Unit personnel should also be briefed to refer to all requests for specifics of the TRAINEX to their unit commander.

c. (U) Unit hosting exercise debrief:

- (1) (U) Insure that normal security procedures contained in DODR 5200.1R and service supplements are followed. Among these are:
- (a) (U) Insure that adequate space is available for conducting TOP SECRET debriefings.
  - (b) (U) Insure that access to debriefing is controlled.
  - (c) (U) Double check the conference area at conclusion of the debrief.
- (2) (U) 101st will:
- (a) (U) To the extent possible, avoid overflight of inhabited areas between exercise points.
  - (b) (U) (S) Act as primary security POC for Edwards AFB.
  - (c) (U) (S) Perform a double check to insure that no classified information is left at Edwards AFB.
  - (d) (U) (S) Coordinate directly with Delta and JTD HQ to insure that the cross load at Campbell is conducted in a low key, non-provocative manner.
- (3) (U) Rangers will:
- (a) (U) (S) Act as primary security POC for Indian Springs.

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- (b) (U) Perform a double check to insure that no classified information is left at Indian Springs.

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(4)

- (a) (U) Act as primary security POC for Desert Rock and exercise locations within the Department of Energy (DOE) area.

- (b) (U) Perform a sweep to insure that no classified information is left in above mentioned area.

- (5) (U) ISOW will:

- (a) (U) To the extent possible, avoid low altitude flights of inhabited sections of the exercise area.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX L TO EXERCISE STORM CLOUD OPLAN ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION

<u>Subject Requiring Protection</u>	<u>Plan Phase</u>	<u>Prep Phase</u>	<u>Exec Phase</u>	<u>Post Phase</u>
A Participation of DELTA, [REDACTED]	X	X	X	X
A Identities of Personnel attached to DELTA, [REDACTED]	X	X	X	X
Use of Edwards AFB range	X	X		
Use of NTS areas	X	X	X	X
Lessons learned	N/A	N/A	N/A	X
Identification of specialized equipment not normally a part of a units TA	X	X	X	X

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JTD Exercise

# STORM CLOUD


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JTD Exercise

# STORM CLOUD



ANNEX X TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U)  
ROUTE CHART


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
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OPERATION POTENT CHARGE

(U) Purpose -

1. Train to deployability readiness a SNOBIRD mission-capable force consisting of 4 UH-1H's, 5 HH/HH-53C's, 5 CH-47C's (HICAP), 10 UH-60A's (HICAP).
2. Train a cadre of mission - ready crews for the purpose of conducting SNOBIRD - oriented individual and unit training.
3. Articulate doctrine and procedures for the conduct of joint helicopter special operations missions, and document for the future.

(U) Concept -

1. 1 Aug 80 - Establish Joint Aviation Plans and Operations Directorate directly subordinate to JTF.
2. 6 to 8 Aug 80 - Conduct Joint Helicopter Operations Doctrine and Procedures Conference, sponsored by JTF. Attendees from HQ, JTF; HQ, 101 AVN CG; HQ, 1st Special Operations Wing; US Army Aviation Center; and Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One. Determine, in conference, using HONEY BADGER evaluations as a basis, doctrine and procedures for conduct of future helicopter special missions. Document procedures.
3. 19 to 31 Aug 80 - Conduct operational training of a mission package to refine and test doctrine and procedures. Conduct a mission-oriented exercise over realistic distances, in a type mission environment. Evaluate special mission package potential to successfully conclude a SNOBIRD mission.

(U) Assets -

- 10 - UH60 HICAP
  - 5 - CH47 HICAP
  - 5 - HH53H
  - 5 HH/CH53C/D
- Select crew:
- 8 UH60, Army
  - 4 CH47, Army
  - 4 HH53H, Air Force
  - 4 HH/CH53, Air Force/USMC

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 Declassified On: OADR  
 Declassified by:  
 DDO NMCC  
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(U) Doctrinal/Procedural Subject Areas -

1. Briefings:

- a. Briefing format/guide
- b. Pre-mission data checklists
- c. Map/chart/flight log presentation
- d. Formation briefs
- e. Emergency procedures briefs
- f. Cell standardization
- g. Tactical situation briefs
- h. Mission note cards

2. Mission, profile, enroute phase -

- a. Ground abort procedures
- b. Communications plan
- c. Spare aircraft procedures
- d. Departure join-up
- e. Enroute link-up
- f. Lost lead link-up
- g. Formation visual signals
  - (1) lead change
  - (2) frequency change
  - (3) position change
  - (4) emergency
  - (5) break
- h. NVG navigation check points - route selection
- i. Lost comm
- j. Lost visual contact - signals and procedures
- k. Evasive maneuver battle drill
- l. Wing man abort
- m. Downed crew recovery
- n. Re-link procedures, enroute, holding area, LZ/PZ.
- o. IP procedures
- p. Holding area procedures
- q. Hides
- r. AR procedures
  - (1) timing
  - (2) missed AR
  - (3) cell procedures
  - (4) lighting

3. Mission profile, terminal phase

- a. Aircraft spotting in LZ/PZ/holding area
  - b. ROE/LZ status/threat/security
  - c. Rejoin by aircraft left in holding area
  - d. RRP closeout procedures - signals and counts
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- e. PZ closeout procedures - signals and counts
- f. Authentication procedures
- g. Evasive maneuver, re-link
- h. Pax onload/offload procedures
  - (1) count
  - (2) control
  - (3) conform
- i. Lost lead
- j. LZ lost comm
  - (1) visual signals
  - (2) withhold
- k. Rescue and recovery response procedures
- l. Signals - compromise/pickup/proceed
- m. Holding area communications -
  - (1) call forward plan
  - (2) re-link plan
  - (3) withhold plan
  - (4) NLT times
- n. Passenger instructions
- o. Transload area procedures
  - (1) pax instructions
  - (2) pax marking
  - (3) pax accounting
  - (4) ingress/egress
  - (5) lighting
  - (6) communications plan
  - (7) lost comm plan - signals
  - (8) control points/holding areas
- p. RRP/LZ/PZ timing/traffic/holding
- q. RRP/LZ/PZ HA procedures
- r. Go around procedures
- s. CCT/Pathfinder coordination

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5 August 1980

JTD PROCEDURAL CONFERENCE  
EXERCISE POTENT CHARGE - PHASE I




Following is a list of participants in POTENT CHARGE Joint  
Doctrine Conference:

<u>NAME/RANK</u>	<u>CLEARANCE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>SSN</u>
COLONEL [REDACTED]	TS	USAAVNC	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	DA, ODCSOPS (JCS)	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	USAAVNC	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	TS	USAAVNC	[REDACTED]
CWO-3 [REDACTED]	S	USAAVNS	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	101 AVN GP	[REDACTED]
CWO-3 [REDACTED]	S	D/158 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
CWO-3 [REDACTED]	S	C/158 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	S	C/158 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
CWO-4 [REDACTED]	S	A/159 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	1st SOW	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	AF/RDQL	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	S	1st SOW	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	TS	1st SOW	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	437 MAW/CCT	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	MAWTS-1 Yuma AZ	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	HMX-1 Quantico	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	6510th Test Wg (JCS)	[REDACTED]

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EXPENDABLES

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	
250	40MM 	Anniston	
400		Anniston	
300	Ammo Pouches	Anniston	
660	7.62MM Tracer Ctg.	Anniston	
48	White Smoke Grenade	Navy	
400	Concussion Grenades	Navy	
100	Practice Concussion Grenades	Navy	D
272	Rocket Incendiary 66MM 4rd Clip	Anniston (48 Bragg)	Del
936	40MM CTG HEDP for M79	Anniston	
40	All weather goggles	Bragg	Delta
100	Ear Protectors	DSC Richmond	Delta
100	Navy Watch Caps	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
272	Navy Watch Caps	DLA	Delta/
100	Navy Watch Sweaters	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
60	Navy Watch Sweaters	DLA	Delta/H
150 (1)	Mountain Sleeping w/covers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
150	Air Mattresses	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
10 (1)	5 gal water cans	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
100	Panel Markers SRU-22/P	DPSC	Delta
5130	"C" Ration Meals	Bragg	Delta

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EXPENDABLES

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
250	40MM [REDACTED]	Anniston	Delta
400	[REDACTED]	Anniston	Delta
300	Ammo Pouches	Anniston	Delta
660	7.62MM Tracer Ctg.	Anniston	Delta
48	White SMOke Grenade	Navy	Delta
400	Concussion Grenades	Navy	Delta
100	Practice Concussion Grenades	Navy	Delta
272	Rocket Incendiary 66MM 4rd Clip	Anniston (48 Bragg)	Delta
936	40MM CTG HEDP for M79	Anniston	[REDACTED]
40	All weather goggles	Bragg	Delta
100	Ear Protectors	DSC Richmond	Delta
100	Navy Watch Caps	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
272	Navy Watch Caps	DLA	Delta/[REDACTED]
100	Navy Watch Sweaters	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
60	Navy Watch Sweaters	DLA	Delta/H
150 (1)	Mountain Sleeping w/covers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
150	Air Mattresses	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
10 (1)	5 gal water cans	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
100	Panel Markers SRU-22/P	DPSC	Delta
5130	"C" Ration Meals	Bragg	Delta

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DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
*	M16 Repair Parts	Belvoir/Bragg	Delta
48	Batteries for goggles	Sacramento	Delta
4 (1)	Immersion heaters & cans	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
89	Distress Markers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
8	A2 Marking Lights	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
*	Various gear to rig loads for airdrop	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
60 (1)	Parachutes [REDACTED]	82nd	JTF
*	Railroad ties	[REDACTED]	JTF
*	Demolitions	Navy	JTF
204	Shoulder Patches (American Flag)	Local Procurement	Delta [REDACTED]
995	Ctg, Barrier Penetrating Model SGA-300	Local Procurement	Delta
400	Baseball grenades	Local Procurement	Delta
200 lbs	C-3	[REDACTED]	Delta
5	BAT Drones for Redeye Tng	Red River AD	Delta
54	[REDACTED]	Letterkenny AD	Helo/1st SOW
6 Boxes	Grenade Hand Smoke	Sierra AD	Helo
12	IR Filters	Anniston AD	[REDACTED]
60 sets	Air Force Fatigues (JTF)	JTF/Delta	DLA

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
60 sets	Air Force Flight Suits (JTF)	DLA	JTF/Delta
12 sets	Air Force Fatigues	DLA	[REDACTED]
50	Parkaliners and sweat pants	DLA	JTF
100 pr	Boot Socks	DLA	JTF
6 pr	Combat Boots	DLA	[REDACTED]

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NONEXPENDABLES

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDER</u>
8	TRK, M274A4 (mule)	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
6	TRK, M151A2 1/4T	"	[REDACTED]
66	Parachute T-10	"	JTF/Delta
29	" G-12D	"	JTF
69	" G-11A	"	JTF
4	Mount Pedestal	"	[REDACTED]
90	Drum Fuel Collection	"	JTF
42	LSS	"	JTF
36	LSS Support	"	JTF
2	Pump 100 GPM	"	Helo
2	Nozzle	"	Helo
43	Parachute Ext 15'	"	JTF
32	" Pilot 68"	"	JTF
20	Container A22	"	JTF
8	Dirt Bikes	Intelligence Materiel Support Office (IMDSO)	[REDACTED]
120	Protective Masks	IMDSO	Delta
35	Kevlar Vests	Natick Labs	Helo
12	Riot Guns	IMDSO	Delta
41	Evasion & Escape Kits	Langley	Delta
20	M16A1 Rifles	Anniston AD	Delta
8	Inerital Nav Sys	SOFD-D	CV
6	Walkie Talkies	SFOD-D	Helo
8	Fares W/8-100GPM Pumps	2/Bragg & 6/Campbell	JTF

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356  
 CONDUCTED ON 17 AUG 92  
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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
1	350 GPM	Ft Campbell	JTF
7	AN/PAQ4 IR Aiming Light	Night Vision Labs	Delta
9	T-MEG Beacons	Hurlburt	Delta
1	Small Arms Repair Kit	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
72 (40)	AN/PVS-5A Night Vision Goggles	Sacramento AD	Delta 1 SOW/MAC
4	PSC-1	Ft Monmount	Delta
75	Promethium Night Sight (M16)	IMDSO	Delta
5	3000 Gal bladders & 10 pumps for airborne refueling system	MacDill (Harvest Eagle)	1st SOW
2	R-144 Refuel system (100,000 Gal)	EUCOM	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
6	Omega Navigation Systems	CINCLANT	Helo
	Commo Equipment	JCSE	
9	PRC 90 Radios	Eglin AFB	[REDACTED]
10	Search light set, infra-red AN/VSS-3A	Tobbyhanna AD	helo/1st SOW
2	R-9 Tankers	EUCOM	[REDACTED]
2	Coleman Tugs	EUCOM	[REDACTED]
1	Demineralization Trucks	EUCOM (SAC)	[REDACTED]

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<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u> <del>(S)</del>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u> <del>(S)</del>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u> <del>(S)</del>
2	100 GPM Filter Separators	Ft Stewart	1st SOW
2	350 GPM Filter Separators	Ft Stewart	1st SOW
8	Fuel Filter Separators	Tooele AD	1st SOW
144	Fuel Filters	Tooele AD	1st SOW
18	Shoulder Holsters	Red River AD	[REDACTED]
50	45 Cal SMG AMMO pouches	DLA	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
40	[REDACTED]	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
70	[REDACTED] magazines	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Rangers	[REDACTED]
3	Daytime Filters for PVS-5's	Ft Rucker	1st SOW
10	Motorola PT-25-A Radios	CERCOM	Delta
24	MX360 Motorola Radios plus components	Local Procurement	[REDACTED]

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ARMY AIR SUPPORT FOR JTF

Aircraft used were U-21/C-12

<u>ONLOAD</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
APG, MD	Langley	Protective Mas
Simmons AF	Langley	AMMO
Anniston	Langley	AMMO
Davidson	Pat Henry Airport	Pax
Davidson	Ft Stewart	FTX Plan
Elizabeth City	Cherry Point	Pax
Davidson	Pope	Pax
Elizabeth City	Pope	Pax
Pope	Elizabeth City	Pax
Davidson (NOTE)	Pope	Pax
Pope	Davidson	Pax

NOTE: Numerous trips between JTF HQ and POPE have been conducted to include return flights.

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12 AUG 92

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MAC MISSIONS FOR JTF

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<u>MSN</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ONLOAD</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
2101-01	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo's & Pax
2101-02	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Crane & Pax
2101-03	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo & Pax
2101-04	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo & Pax
2101-05	C-141	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo Spt Equi
2101-06	C-141	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo Spt Equi
2101-07	C-141	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo Spt Equi
2101-08	C-141	Cherry Point	[REDACTED]	Fuel Tanks
2101-09	C-141	Cherry Point	[REDACTED]	Wpn, Ammo & P
1092-01	C-130	Maxwell/Pope	Langley	Ammo, vehicle bladders
1092-02	C-130	Hanscon	Cherry Point	Protective ve
1092-03	C-130	Pope/Andrews/Maxwell	[REDACTED]	Jeeps, Bikes, explosives
1092-04	C-130	Langley	N/A	Air Drop
1092-05	C-130	Bergstom	Langley	Radios
1092-06	C-130	Maxwell	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
1092-07	C-130	Virginia	Langley	Helo Pilots
1092-08	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Helo Pilots
1092-09	C-141	McDill	Laguna	JCSE
1092-10	C-130	Virginia	Langley	Delta & Equip
1092-11	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Delta & Equip

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<u>MSN</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ONLOAD</u> (6)	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CARGO</u> (5)
1092-12	C-141	Langley	Laguna	<del>Equip</del> & Equip
1092-13	C-141	<del>██████████</del> /Pope A	Yuma	Equip & Pax
1092-14	C-141	Pope	Davis Monthan	Fuel Blivets
1092-15	Cancelled			
1092-16	C-141	Pope/Andrews	Yuma/Monthan	Fuel Blivets Commo
1092-17	C-141	Yuma	Langley	<del>Delta</del>
1092-18	C-141	Yuma	Langley	<del>Delta</del>
1092-19	C-130	Langley	Farm	Delta (shutt.)
1092-20	C-141	Monthan	Pope	Fuel Blivets
1092-21	C-141	Yuma	Pope	Cargo & Pax
1092-22	C-130	Maxwell	Langley	Wpns
1092-23	C-130	Farm	Langley/Phillips	Delta & Palle
1092-24	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Pax
1092-25	C-141	Pope	Norton	Fuel Blivets
1092-26	C-130	Maxwell	Langley	Ammo
1092-27	C-130	Farm	Pope	Delta & Equip
1092-28	C-141	Laguna	Pope/Charleston	Pax & Equip
1092-29	C-141	Yuma	Cherry Pt/Norfolk	Pax & Equip
1092-30	C-130	Yuma	Tampa	Trucks, Pax
1092-31	C-130	Yuma	Tampa	Trucks, Pax
1092-32	Cancelled			
1092-33	C-130	Travis	McDill	Trucks & Pax
1092-34	C-130	Norton	Pope	Blivets, Pax

<u>MSN</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ONLOAD</u>	<u>Destination</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
1092-35	C-130	Norton	Pope	Blives, Pax
1093-01	C-141	Norfolk	Yuma	Pax
1093-02	C-130	Pope	Yuma	Pax, Nets
1093-03	C-130	Yuma/RR	Pope	Nets, Bats
1093-04	C-130	Pope	Eglin	Jeep
1093-05	C-130	Pope/Warminister	Yuma	Qrt, Searchl
1093-06	C-141	Hurlburt	Yuma	[REDACTED]
1093-07	C-130	McChord	Yuma	Wpns
1093-08	C-130	Yuma	[REDACTED]	Pax & Wpns
1093-09	C-130	Andrews/HAAF	Nellis	Model, Pax, ?
1093-10	C-141	[REDACTED]	Hurlburt	[REDACTED] Equip
1093-11	C-141	[REDACTED]	Hurlburt	[REDACTED] Equip
1142-01	C-141	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Equip
1142-02	C-141	Hurlburt	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Equip
1142-03	C-141	Nellis	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Truck
1142-04	C-141	Yuma	Cherry Pt., Norfolk Andrews/McDill	Helo Pax, JCS

II In addition to above flights, fourteen T-39/T-43 flights provided to JTF for passengers and intelligence material movements.

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