

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Item Number: B-232

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: LZ/DZ Search and Identification

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

- (u) 1. [REDACTED] COMJTF provided J2 with commander's guidance on parameters for selection of FWLA's and HLZ's.
- (u) 2. [REDACTED] J2 initially applied commander's guidance in conducting map reconnaissance for selection of areas that might contain suitable FWLA's and HLZ's.
- (u) 3. [REDACTED] J2 identified areas for DIA to conduct photo search and analysis for suitability.
- (u) 4. [REDACTED] Areas identified through photography were intensively studied, targeted for collection and analyzed by a geologist.

COMMENTS:

1. [REDACTED] Clear guidance must be utilized to avoid wasted time in searching non-suitable areas.
- (u) 2. [REDACTED] Basic geological knowledge or familiarity of an area of operation by intel personnel is desirable.
3. [REDACTED] Photo reconnaissance has limitations in analysis that can only be overcome by actual ground reconnaissance.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified ON: OADR

Completed by
DIO, NMCC

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

DIA [REDACTED] - JSJ-1 (NMIC 2782R) 90-3243 (G) 2581 (R)

695-1032

6

[REDACTED] JSJ-1

[REDACTED] JSJ-1

DMA [REDACTED] HQ DMA, 254-4426

[REDACTED] DMA/HTC, 227-2734

[REDACTED]

ATTACHMENTS:

TABRIZ - LZ SEARCH (SEP)

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]



Fast B-200

Working Paper for J-3

SUBJECT: Iran Situation Report as of 0500, 29 November 1979 (U)

Significant Events:

The guard at the US Embassy is reportedly more relaxed.

Once again, private statements by the PLC are at great variance with statements issued to the press.)

Significant Military Activities:

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN NOCONTRACT/ORDON/WHATEL

Classified by [redacted]
Classified by Multiple Sources

Declassify on _____
Review on 29 Nov 09

[redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- (U) Comments on Iranian Press :

-- (U) Khomeini made a plea for an affirmative vote on the 2 December Constitutional referendum. He called the new draft constitution one of the greatest fruits of the Islamic revolution. The National Front and other groups have already called for a boycott of the referendum because of their many differences with the draft.

- (U) Significant Propaganda:

-- (U) The Revolutionary Council, in common with the people and the Imam, will in advance declare any decision by this satanical security council null and void. The US government must know that it has no alternative but to surrender to the will and demands of our nation. It must as soon as possible return this fugitive criminal with all the wealth he has plundered from Iran, to our nation. Otherwise the trial of the hostages will be a certainty.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

B-239

NOV 79
052115Z
DELTA
TO COMJTF/MC VAUGHAN

COL PITMAN 61

SRJ: STEEP/CJ REQUIREMENTS
(U) OPS REPORT FOR 25 NOV 79

	TODAY	TC DATE
FLT HRS	6.6	66.6
AVG PILOT HRS	1.3	9.5
WTE HRS	6.8	47.7
AVG WTE HRS/ PILOT	1.3	5.8

C. (U) AIRCRAFT STATUS

RR-531	UP
RR-534	UP
RR-536	UP
CH-B1	UP
CH-B4	UP
CH-15	UP

3. (U) REQUIREMENT TO BE DELIVERED TO [REDACTED] THIS LOCATION TO COMPLETE PICK-UP OF PARTS.

A. AIRCRAFT EOOT SIZES

1-7D	1-7-1/2D
1-3C	1-3E
1-3D	1-3EE
4-9-1/2D	1-3-1/2E
3-9D	5-9-1/2D
1-9-1/2E	1-9-1/2C
1-13D	2-10E
1-13-1/2D	3-11D
3-11-1/2E	1-11-1/2D
1-12D	2-12-1/2D

dave -

E. FLIGHT SUITS

2-38S
5-35R
2-43S
1-43R
4-42F
4-42L
1-44R

dave -

C. 70 MAGAZINE POUCHES (33 RD TYPE)
D. 35 FIRST AID KITS (782 TYPE)

E. 35 W-16 SLINGS
F. 12 SINGLE CELL UNIDIRECTIONAL FLASHLIGHT MARKERS WITH 72

4. REQ STATUS OF A/C PARTS NY 052115Z NOV 79
REV 25 NOV 23:19
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: [REDACTED]
Declassify on: OADR

MSG #01
O 252115R NOV 79
FM DELTA7/BECKWITH/
TO COMJTF/NG VAUGHT
BT

~~SECRET~~

B-240

SUBJ: SITREP/REQ HM-16.1

	TODAY	TO DATE
1. (U) 24 NOV 79	27.7	58.0
FLIGHT HRS.		
AVG PILOT HRS	2.0	4.1
NITE HRS.	15.0	31.9
(U) AVG NITE HRS/PILOT	1.1	2.3

2. (U) AIRCRAFT	STATUS
RH 531	UP
RH 534	UP
RH 536	UP
CH 01	UP
CH 04	UP
CH 15	UP

A

3. (U) REQ FOLLOING PARTS BE DELIVERED TO NORVA FOR PICK UP (AM) 26 NOV 79:

- A. PART NUMBER - WBS24ATC50/ ALT. PART NUMBER - KSBY12NER -QTY 2 EA
- B. ROTATION BEACON (ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT) COMPLETE ASSEMBLY, UPPER AND LOSER - QTY 1 EA.

POC FOR ARRIVAL TIME OF PARTS AT THIS LOCATION.
REVW 25 NOV 2009
T

A, G

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

Classified by:
D 00 N.M.C.
Declassify on: OADR

Disseminated by:

~~SECRET~~
33 - 3185

Gordon
JIBBLE
B-241

G

[REDACTED]

Action
Helo GD

- support -

MSG 055

0 253730R NOV 79

FM DELTA CDR //BECKWITH

TO COMJTF / [REDACTED]

BT

G

SUBJ: RH-53D ASSUALT/RESCUE CDR REQUEST

1. REQUEST SIX HAND PUMPS 'WABBLE' SHIP TO USS KITTY HAWK FOR BACK UP FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM.

2. REQUEST [REDACTED] TRANSPORTED TO RH-53D BUILD-UP SITE TO ENSURE PMS INSTALLATION AND ALIGNMENT PLUS ACCOMPANY HELO'S TO USS KITTYHAWK. THIS IS CONSIDERED VITAL TO ENSURE PRIMARY NAV SYSTEM OPERABLE DURING SHIP TRANSIT TIME.

3. REQUEST TWO ROTARY SISSORS BERINGS UPPER AND LOWER WITH SHIMS AND BUSHINGS PLUS DIAL INDICATOR STAGED NAS NORVA BASE OPERATIONS FOR PICK UP BY ASSUALT/RESCUE CDR. 26 NOV 79.

POC [REDACTED] THIS LOCATION.

REVW 25 NOV 2039

BT

G

4. 100 HAT (Black knit

27 BLACK sweaters

12 med

12 large

3 Ex Large

27

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC

~~SECRET~~

B-242

~~SECRET~~

11/26

MSG048
O 241026R NOV 79
FM CDR DELTA/BECKWITH
TO COMJTF// MG VAUGHTZ
BT

G

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: RH-53D SUPPORT

G

G

1 (U) (TS) [REDACTED] (CO HELO ASSAULT/RESCUE SQUADRON)
REQUESTS ELECTRONIC BLADE TRACKER BE DELIVERED TO USS KITTY
HAWK FOR ON LOAD WITH RH-53D ASSETS.
REVW 24 NOV 2009
BT

NNNN

JONE
11/24
Shipped on C-141
From Norfolk

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC

~~SECRET~~

B-243

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

MSG 172
O 201201Z NOV 79
FM DELTA/BECKWITH/DAVIS
TO JTF/MG VAUGHT/COL PITMAN
BT

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ G
FROM: HM-16.1
TO DELTA/BECKWITH
REQUEST FOWARD TO JTF MG VAUGHT/COL PITMAN

1. ~~SECRET~~ (U)
OPS REPORT THRU 27 NOV 79

R	TODAY	TO DATE
FLIGHT HOURS	13.4	56.5
AVERAGE PILOT HOURS	1.5	12.4
NIGHT HOURS	7.4	55.9
AVERAGE NIGHT HOURS/PILOT	1.1	3.3

2. ~~SECRET~~ (U)

AIRCRAFT	STATUS
RH531	UP
RH534	UP
RH535	UP
CH31	UP
CH34	UP
CH15	UP

END OF MSG/MARY KXX
REVW 25 NOV 2009
BT

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

Info B-244
October 54
Helo Gp

RRYRYRYRYRYRYR HOW CI COPY
YKKKDMGUPA
AND IF U RD ME SEND
TYPE TO ME
KKKKJOD COPY SEND YOUR MSG
MSG 071
O 272117Z NOV 79
FM CDR DELTA/YSECKWITH
TO COMJTF//MS VAUGHT
BT

G [REDACTED] G

SURJ: OR
[REDACTED] HAS INDICATED AN URGENT REQUEST FOR VERTICAL
GYRO P/R: 134538-32-31 DELIVERED TO [REDACTED]
3900L 28 NOV 79
2(U) [REDACTED] REQ 20 CRUISE BOXES AND 40 PADLOCKS.
ADVISE [REDACTED] THIS LOCATION WHEN READY FOR TRANS.
REVW 27 NOV 79
BT

A

G

G

[REDACTED] done

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by:
DDO NMCC
Declassify on: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MESSAGE CENTER

B. 245

VZCZCMLT624SCP017 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ZYUW

21582

MULT
ACTION

J3(08)

DISTR

CJCS:(02) CJCS DJS(02) SJCS(01) J4(04) J5(02) J3:NMCC
C3S(05) SECDEF(07) SECDEF: USDP(15) DIA: :DIA:(05) NMIC
NIDS FILE

(051)

TRANSIT/3320256/3320320/000:32TOR3320301

DE RUHQSGG #8393 3320256

ZNY CCCCC

O 280250Z NOV 79

FM CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

IMMEDIATE

TO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC

RHHMRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUHVAHA/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//AF/DO/LG/XP//

RUMHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI//APOP-OP/APLG-TR//

RUCIMAA/HQ MAC SCOTT AFB IL//DO/LG/TR/XO//

RULSSDA/COMSC WASHINGTON DC

RUEBDSA/DFSC CAMERON STA VA

RUADJNA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA

RUKGTC/CDRMTMC WASHDC

RUWTEKA/HQ SAC OFFUTT AFB NE//DO/LG/XP//

RUCIPBA/USCINCFRED LANGLEY AFB VA//DO/LG/XP//

RUCJAAA/JDA MACDILL AFB FL

RUCJAAA/USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL//RCJ3//RCJ4//

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XO/LE//

RUEADWD/DA WASH DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOREA

RUEHBAC/CINCPACREP CANBERRA AS

RUHJHNA/CINCPACREP GUAM

RUHJWUA/CINCPACREP PHIL SUBIC BAY RP

INFO RUVNSAA/NAVSUPPFAC DIEGO GARCIA

RUMTBK /CHJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK TH

RUMTBK /USDAO BANGKOK TH

RUEHGP /USDAO SINGAPORE

RUMJKL /USDAO KUALA LUMPUR MY

RUADKHA/COMSCFE YOKOHAMA JA

RUMMEK0/COMSCPAC OAKLAND CA

PAGE 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00110011

5/

Declassified by
JDD, NMCC

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MESSAGE CENTER

B-205

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21582

RUMCFEA/22AF TRAVIS AFB CA//DO/TR//
RUHVAAA/834ALD HICKAM AFB HI//TR/LG//
RUHVAAA/PACE HICKAM AFB HI//CC//
RHMIAAAA/374 TAW CLARK AB RP//DO/TR//
RUHG0AA/COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MOVEMENTS TO/FROM DIEGO GARCIA (U)

1. (U) (C) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MSG IS TO CENTRALIZE CONTROL OF ALL AIR/SEA MOVEMENTS TO/FROM DIEGO GARCIA.
2. (U) (C) THE LIMITED BASE SUPPORT AND FACILITIES ON DIEGO GARCIA DICTATE CENTRAL CONTROL OF AIR AND SEA MOVEMENTS INTO AND OUT OF DIEGO GARCIA. EFFECTIVE 291800Z NOV 79, ALL MOVEMENTS SCHEDULED TO/FROM DIEGO GARCIA MUST RECEIVE CINCPAC CONCURRENCE EXCEPT FOR THE P-3 AIRCRAFT BASED THERE.
3. (U) (C) REQUEST FOR MOVEMENT WILL BE MADE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE MSG TO CINCPAC (FOR LRC), INFO CINCPACFLT AND NAVSUPFAC DIEGO GARCIA. (TELCON ACCEPTABLE WITH MSG FOLLOW-UP.) AIR MOVEMENT REQUESTS ARE REQUIRED NLT 72 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF SCHEDULED DEPARTURE FROM ORIGIN (OR IMMEDIATELY, IF DEPARTURE LESS THAN 72 HOURS AWAY) AND SEA MOVEMENTS SEVEN DAYS IN ADVANCE OF SCHEDULED DEPARTURE FROM ORIGIN. MOVEMENTS MAY PROCEED IF NO NEGATIVE RESPONSE IS RECEIVED FROM CINCPAC WITHIN 24 HOURS OF SUBMISSION.
4. (U) ABOVE PROCEDURES PLANNED TO BE EFFECTIVE FOR 60 DAYS, UNLESS SOONER RESCINDED/SUPERSEDED.
5. (U) CINCPAC POC IS LCOL BRYANTON, USAF, J43, 477-6777, SECURE VOICE DROP 106. UPON ACTIVATION OF LOGISTICS READINESS CENTER (LRC) AT 281800Z NOV 79, 477-6671/6769, SECURE VOICE DROP 106.

DECL 26NOV85

BT

#8393

ANNOTES

ABW

PAGE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00110011

NNNN

280329Z

Subject: [REDACTED] Facility (SAL Option)
Concept: [REDACTED] delivered into the general objective area by [REDACTED] SEALs depart [REDACTED] and proceed into the target area in two small rubber boats. Swimmers, equipped with closed circuit scuba, attach limpet mines to the [REDACTED]. In addition, the swimmers would cut the [REDACTED] moose from the pier and time the detonation of the limpets to coincide with ebb tide which should bring the ship in or toward the channel. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would be utilized to cut anchor chains and cables. Upon completion of the placement of the charges and the cutting of the mooring lines, [REDACTED] to the [REDACTED] and depart area.

Forces Required: [REDACTED]
 - 1 [REDACTED]

Times: [REDACTED] (provide).
 - Timing would primarily be dependent upon the time it would take [REDACTED] to provide the [REDACTED]

Routes: [REDACTED] would proceed to within [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] facility.

[REDACTED] with silent outboard engines, would proceed into the general target area.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 12356
 CONDUCTED ON 21 Jun 92
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDo n/mcc
 NEEL EX-100000 TO Secret
 REVW ON OADR
 DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By: JCS
 Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

Issues/Problems:


A

- The [redacted] and/or other shipping in the [redacted] facility can be sunk; however, the likelihood of this action being perfectly timed with the tides to result in blockage of the channel is questionable.
- Intelligence indicates there are a large number of Italian construction workers located at the [redacted] and some of these personnel may be lodged on the [redacted]. The possibility of injury or death to some of these personnel must be considered.
- This option would inject 14 personnel into country; however, the risk for the personnel involved is considered low to medium. The possibility of detection of [redacted] would be highest during the removal of the mooring lines on the pier.
- The use of [redacted] for delivery of [redacted] into the object area has been discounted due to the [redacted] [redacted] (rubber boats or swimmer delivery vehicles) [redacted] drop off point into the target area.

A

~~TOP SECRET~~

DELTA



~~DELTA~~ ~~NEW DELTA~~

FOR DUAT

2 MC-130


- TALK TO COMBAT
- MOBILE W/OUT
- STAN FACILE
- OBTAI + DISMIS
- CRITICAL CE NON
- PSC-1 POW/UNIT

2 MC-130

A/B

8-248

(1600 EST)





CIVIL ALERTED

UNIT NOT ALERTED

GO
30 MINS



CIVIL 288



2 MC-130
DEPART (0230Z)

(36 HRS)

2 MC-130S
DEPART HUB/DEPT 0930Z



2TF
140
1700Z

2 KC-1
2 KC-2
LANCH TANKED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(1)
P
2
7



~~TOP SECRET~~
BASE CASE OPTION


*Classified by:
DDI, NMCC
Declassify on:
OADR*

~~TOP SECRET~~
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~~TOP SECRET~~

B-248

~~TOP SECRET~~

CP 3/4



~~SECRET~~ B-251

Preliminary assessment (much information is still soft).

Furthermore, assessment has not been formally coordinated with intelligence agencies.

SITUATION:

1. The current situation is the result of several weeks of detailed planning and is sanctioned by the Ayatollah Khomeini. The situation has been and will continue to be orchestrated by the shiite religious leadership using the students and the Revolutionary Guards propaganda and security apparatus.
2. The situation at the compound has now settled into a routine with demonstrations periodically staged outside the Chancellory Gate on Takhi-E-Jamshid Blvd. Crowd size varies from 50 curiosity seekers to several thousand at lunch/prayer time when announcements go out via the radio and the local public address system.

[REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW (S) 1235
CONDUCTED ON 21 Jun 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO: NMC
 DECL CONTROL

[REDACTED]

7. The principal external reaction forces are listed below with their estimated reaction times for the 0200 - 0400 time frame (from notification).

- A. Within 10 - 15 minutes - local IRG Milita/Pasdaran - 50 - 100 (see note below) [REDACTED]
- B. Within 15 - 20 minutes - local crowds - 100 - 300
- C. Within 20 - 30 minutes - [REDACTED]
- D. [REDACTED]
- E. Within 30 - 45 minutes - IRG back-up strike forces - 1,000 - 1,500 [REDACTED]
- F. Within 45 - 60 minutes - [REDACTED] Residual - 1,500 - 2,000 *late arrivals*

NOTE: Of special significance is the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Force of greatest concern!

CONCEPT

a. 75 Delta military personnel required to assault compound (high risk but entry is "doable" providing intelligence is accurate and surprise is achieved).

b. Insertion of one or more Delta persons into country day or two in advance of insertion.

c. Delta team trains at special stateside location.

Transportation to [REDACTED] by C141, to [REDACTED] by special MC-130's.

Air refuelable Combat Talon (low level covert infiltration aircraft) MC-130s fly to [REDACTED] from Pacific and Florida.

Delta team inserted by MC-130's. [REDACTED] rest for 24 hours in Tehran. Safe haven [REDACTED]

Assault compound in middle of night. Free hostages and proceed to pick up point.

MC-130s make blackout, night assault landing, pick up personnel and fly to 3rd country.

Extraction most difficult part of operation and is very high risk.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

TIME CONSUMING ACTIONS TO ENHANCE BASE CASE SUCCESS

- A. Obtain additional intelligence on compound and city activities.
- B. DELTA continues to train, review mockup, study intelligence and review planning.
- C. ~~_____~~ communication and other requirements to support insertion/extraction.
- D. Determine feasibility of inserting 15 man advance element by covert/ clandestine means.
- E. Determine if better way to insert through covert means.
- F. Establish close, definite contact with 3rd country with help in Iran, for insertion, aid in objective area and extraction or movement to safe haven.
- G. Improve communications capability for positive control at each decision point.
- H. Develop detailed deception plans, to include method of creating local diversions, neutralizing radio/TV stations and developing capability to shut off commercial power.
- I. Develop national diversions (KURDISH, etc.)
- J. Assure vehicle availability both for insertion/extraction use.
- K. Identify multiple extraction assault landing areas.
- L. Arrange for safe havens for all if assault extraction delayed or unsuccessful.
- M. Develop ~~_____~~ for MC-130 operations from ~~_____~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROBLEM: Analyze pros and cons of one or more nights between insertion of rescue force and assault/extraction, *V.S.* single night operation.

One or More Nights

- Pro: - Provides more flexibility for JTF to gauge weather, local threat, etc.
- Simplifies tanker MC-130 maintenance and aircraft problems
- Reduces requirement for "D" advance party
- Enables air land or airdrop further from city
- Provides significantly more time for D-Force regroup, transportation, orientation and observation and preparation
- Provides flexibility for D-Force selection of rescue time for best conditions
- Cons: - Increases possibility of exposure and alarm for initial insertion, and while in city

Single Night

- Pro: - Reduces possibility of exposure at ISB
- Reduces exposure of group while in the city
- Overall reduction in possibility of exposure of aircraft and D-Forces
- Cons: - Reduces flexibility for D-Force execution (wx etc)
- Requires "one shot" decision by JTF CO
- Doubles tanker and MC-130 requirement
- Complicates tanker MC-130 maintenance and air crew problems
- Requires "D" Force advance party
- Shortens time for D-Force regroup, transportation to city infiltration, orientation, and preparations for assault
- Increases significantly the probability of aircraft detection during insertion

← overfly the during daylight

PROBLEM: DISRUPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATION

STIPULATION: TARGETS MUST PREVENT CALL-UP OF REACTION FORCE, AIR SUPPORT OR GENERAL POPULACE

TARGETS MUST BE ACCESSIBLE AND VULNERABLE [REDACTED] ATTACK WITH [REDACTED]

<u>TARGETS</u>	<u>CRITICALITY</u>	<u>ACCESSIBILITY</u>	<u>VULNERABILITY</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	13 STORY BDDG	ONLY ANTENNA TOWERS	REMOVAL OF THIS FACILITY WILL NOT OUT ALL COMMUNICATIONS AVAILABLE CALL OUT REACTION FORCES SINCE HF SYSTEMS ARE PLENTIFUL IN AREA AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.
A. MICROWAVE DISHES ON CEMENT TOWER	[REDACTED]	ON TOP OF BLDG.	EASY TO DAMAGE AND MISALIGN WITH [REDACTED]	
B. WAVE GUIDES IN BOTH TOWERS	NEEDED FOR ALL ANTENNAS	VISIBLE IN TOWER BUT PROTECTED IN CEMENT TOWER	DIFFICULT TO HIT	
C. SWITCHING FRAMES	NEEDED FOR ALL COMMO	DIFFICULT SINCE IN BLDG.	WELL PROTECTED BY CEMENT WALLS	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	GOOD LOCATION WITH LITTLE HABITATION IN IMMEDIATE AREA	ONLY ANTENNA TOWER	[REDACTED]
K. ANTENNA/WAVE GUIDES	ONE TOWER HOLDS ALL ANTENNAES, WAVE GUIDE BUNDLED IN MIDDLE THIS STEEL TOWER.	[REDACTED]	EASY ACCESS FROM AIR TO TOWER BUT DIRECT HIT ON WAVE GUIDES LITTLE MORE DIFFICULT	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	LOCATED IN ISOLATED AREA ON IDENTIFIABLE ROAD.	DIFFICULT TO HIT ALL TOWERS OR PENETRATE BLDGS.	
A. POWER PANEL	BOTH AUX. AND CITY POWER PASS THROUGH PANELS.	POWER PANEL IN BLDG SEPARATED FROM CONTROL BLDG.	DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE BLDGS HIT PANEL.	CAN BE DAMAGED BUT SEVERAL BOUNDS NEEDED.
F. CONTROL/TRANSMITTER	ALL EQUIPMENT CO-LOCATED WITH NO BACK UP.	BLDG ACCESSIBLE IN ISOLATE AREA -EQUIP. INSIDE TWO STORY BLDG	DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE	NOT A GOOD TARGET.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 03 1258
 COMPLETED ON 21 Jun 92
 REVISOR G. W. DDD, W/MC
 REEVALUATED TO CONFIDENTIAL
 BY W. OADR
 REVIEWED BY [REDACTED]

A

A. MICROWAVE DISHES ON CEMENT TOWER [REDACTED] ON TOP OF BLDG. EASY TO DAMAGE AND MISALIGN WITH [REDACTED]

OUT ALL COMMUNICATIONS AVAILABLE CALL OUT REACTION FORCES SINCE HI SYSTEMS ARE PLENTIFUL IN AREA AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

B. WAVE GUIDES IN BOTH TOWERS | NEEDED FOR ALL ANTENNAS | VISIBLE IN TOWER | DIFFICULT TO HIT BUT PROTECTED IN CEMENT TOWER

A.C

SWITCHING FRAMES | NEEDED FOR ALL COMMO | DIFFICULT SINCE IN BLDG. | WELL PROTECTED BY CEMENT WALLS

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] GOOD LOCATION WITH ONLY ANTENNA TOWER LITTLE HABITATION IN IMMEDIATE AREA

[REDACTED]

C. ANTENNA/WAVE GUIDES ONLY ONE TOWER HOLDS ALL ANTENNAS. WAVE GUIDE IS BUNDLED IN MIDDLE THIS STEEL TOWER.

EASY ACCESS FROM AIR TO TOWER BUT DIRECT HIT ON WAVE GUIDES LITTLE MORE DIFFICULT | WAVE GUIDES EASILY DISRUPTED BY CUTTING OR FRAGMENTATION.

[REDACTED]

LOCATED IN ISOLATED AREA ON IDENTIFIABLE ROAD. | DIFFICULT TO HIT ALL TOWERS OR PENETRATE BLDGS.

POWER PANEL BOTH AUX. AND CITY POWER PASS THROUGH PANELS. | POWER PANEL IN BLDG SEPARATED FROM CONTROL BLDG.

DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE BLDGS | CAN BE DAMAGED BUT SEVERAL ROUNDS NEEDED. HIT PANEL.

A.C CONTROL/TRANSMITTER ALL EQUIPMENT CO-LOCATED WITH NO BACK UP. | BLDG ACCESSIBLE IN ISOLATE AREA -EQUIP. INSIDE TWO STORY BLDG.

DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE | NOT A GOOD TARGET.

[REDACTED]

FLASH

~~SECRET~~

15-257

ZCZCDPG120
DAN: 003-013302
INPUT CDSN = K04076
TOR: 292253Z APR 80 TOT: 292254Z APR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR#29

SOD

ZTTMZYUW YEDAXR 0129 1202230-MXOL--YEKQGH.
ZNY MMXOL
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z 292225Z APR 80
FM AFSSO AD//~~SECRET~~/CC//
TO JCS/J3 LT GEN SHULTZ
INFO AFSSO TAC/DO MAJ GEN WELCH
ZEN

~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT: ACCOUNTING OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN IRAN RESCUE ATTEMPT (TS)
REF: YOUR 291330Z APR 80.
1. THE ~~SECRET~~ DEPLOYED FOUR AIRCRAFT AND CREWS IN COUNTRY FOLLOWING
IS A COMPLETE LISTING OF CREWS BY CREW NUMBER.
CREW #1

~~SECRET~~
CREW #1
1. CAPT. [REDACTED]
2. CAPT. [REDACTED]
3. CAPT. [REDACTED]
4. CAPT. [REDACTED]
5. CAPT. [REDACTED]
6. CAPT. [REDACTED]
7. CAPT. [REDACTED]
8. CAPT. [REDACTED]
9. CAPT. [REDACTED]
10. CAPT. [REDACTED]
11. CAPT. [REDACTED]
12. CAPT. [REDACTED]
13. CAPT. [REDACTED]
14. CAPT. [REDACTED]
15. CAPT. [REDACTED]
16. CAPT. [REDACTED]
17. CAPT. [REDACTED]
18. CAPT. [REDACTED]
19. CAPT. [REDACTED]
20. CAPT. [REDACTED]

G

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ON 12/25/92
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWER CL BY DDD NMCC
 DESL DOWNGR TO CONFIDENTIAL
REVIEW ON OADR
REVIEW FROM [REDACTED]

PAGE 2

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

C

[REDACTED]

G

ALL OF THE ABOVE HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR EXCEPT CAPT LEWIS, CAPT MCINTOSH, CAPT BAKKE, CAPT MCMILLAN, AND TSGT MAYO. IN ADDITION [REDACTED] WERE INJURED AND AIR EVACUATED TO CONUS. 2. PERSONNEL WHO AUGMENTED OR WENT IN-COUNTRY WITH EACH CREW ARE AS FOLLOWS:

G

CREW #1
[REDACTED]

G

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

C

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

C

PAGE 3

G

[REDACTED]

ALL OF THE ABOVE WERE ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE UNITS INVOLVED. UNITS OF ASSIGNMENT ARE INDICATED FOR YOUR DIRECT CONTACT. (S)
3. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, TWO PACAF CREWS [REDACTED] UTILIZED IN THE MISSION. ALL WERE ACCOUNTED FOR ON RETURN. HOWEVER, FOR FINAL ACCOUNTING CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE DIRECTLY AT THEIR PRESENT LOCATION. REDEPLOYMENT WAS EAST FROM EMPLOYMENT SITE AND KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR PRESENT POSITION IS UNKNOWN HERE.
REVW: 29 APR 2000
#0129

NNNN

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

C

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

21 JUL 80
B-262

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 Jun 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
Secret
EXTN ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

WARNING

ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!

EYES ONLY FOR: CJCS *h.s.*

LTG PUSTAY

MG VAUGHT *✓ 23 July*

*Men Jones
D. J. thinks it's time for
me to have another
chat with Frank C.
10/19/80*

RETURN TO SOD, 2C840

G ACTION OFFICER: [REDACTED] Lt Col, USAF

TELEPHONE: EXT 55078 SECURE 2817

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

21 JUL 1980

~~SECRET~~

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER			
--------------------	--	---------------------------	--	--	--

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support Schedule	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
			X	

REMARKS

Attached memorandum provides a schedule of events for establishing an effective in-country support structure in support of SNOWBIRD.

ACTION OFFICER
 [Redacted]
 Lt Col, USAF
 J-3 [Redacted]
 Ext 55078

INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
J-3 P						
EXEC						
TN CIP						
VCOPS						
COPS						
DATE OF PREPARATION						
23 Jul 1980						

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

21 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Intelligence Support Schedule

1. Per your request, this memo forwards a schedule for establishing an effective in-country support structure. The schedule was prepared against a Generic Operational Concept which envisioned simultaneous assaults against [REDACTED] locations as listed below:

C [REDACTED]

2. The following generic description applies to all targets: two-three story masonry building within a walled compound; located in a suburban environment approximately 30 minutes helicopter flight time from an adequate fixed wing offset insertion site; and 30 minutes driving time (or 12 minutes helicopter flight time) from the nearest potential fixed wing extraction site.

3. The following intelligence and mission support requirements apply to all target locations:

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

e. [REDACTED]

f. [REDACTED]

g.


[REDACTED]

h.

[REDACTED]

4. The support schedule outlined on the next page would require 92 calendar days if conducted sequentially. Time could be saved if some actions were accomplished in an overlap fashion. However, practically speaking, sixty days or more will be required to establish the necessary structure, unless drastic measures are taken to upgrade the priority accorded this project [REDACTED]

5. Recommend priority of intelligence support to SNOWBIRD be addressed at senior levels of DOD and [REDACTED]


JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

Attachments
a/s


M.B.C.

C
C
C

C

(S)

C



--- TASKING & RESERVE SUPPORT
- - - FEEDBACK



~~TOP SECRET~~




050

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

Subject: Iran Situation Report as of 0500 26 April 1980

(U) Significant Events:



--(C) In response to the aborted US rescue attempt, the militants at the US Embassy announced that they would kill the hostages if another attempt is made.

According to one press report, the militants have called for Revolutionary Guards to build up the 24-hour patrols around the embassy. One possible reaction by the militants could be to move some or all of the hostages to one or more undisclosed locations. Militating against this action, however, would be the additional control and coordination problems it would cause as well as logistic support problems. ~~near the embassy~~ likely increase the readiness of ~~the Revolutionary Guards~~ near Tehran and the Gulf.

--(C) Ayatollah Khomeini will most likely use the incident to once more divert the Iranian people's attention from pressing domestic problems and to revive popular fervor for his Islamic revolution. He will cite the aborted rescue attempt as proof that the US is trying to undermine the revolution.

(U) Significant Military Activity:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

D-207
EYES ONLY B

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		ACT	INFO				DATE - TIME	MONTH	YR	
01 OF		PP			TT					

BOOK	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS	CY NR
	MAR 7 49 53'00	

FROM: JCS
 TO: CINCPAC
 INFO CNO
 SSO CINCLANT

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0741

J30	1
J31	1
J32	
OPE	2
SOP	3
J33	
J34	
J38	
J38	
FILE	1

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

FOR ADM LONG, CINCPAC, INFO ADM HAYWARD, CNO, ADM TRAIN, CINCLANT,
 FROM GEN JONES, CJCS

SUBJ: ARABIAN SEA/PERSIAN GULF POSTURE (C)

REF: CINCPAC SSO 271956Z APR 80 (NOTAL)

1. (U) (TS) REFERENCE MESSAGE REVIEWED SEVERAL ASPECTS CONCERNING US POSTURE IN THE ARABIAN SEA AND PERSIAN GULF. INCLUDED WERE COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CVBG TURNOVERS, MIDEASTFOR EMPLOYMENT, MISSION RESPONSE TIMES, ARG/MAU PRESENCE, AND RH-53 ASSETS. VERBAL APPROVAL WAS GIVEN TO ADM LONG ON A NUMBER OF THE ITEMS.
2. (TS) CONCUR WITH PLANS TO REDEPLOY MIDEASTFOR INTO PERSIAN GULF, TO CONDUCT RELIEF TURNOVERS FOR THE CORAL SEA/CONSTELLATION TWO DAYS SOUTH OF MODLOC, AND TO TRANSFER [REDACTED] EQUIPMENT TO

Cy 3 of 3 Cys

DISTR:

CJCS (J3) J3:OPG


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26A24		REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.	
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SIGNATURE		Dele only in: OADR	
		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
		TOP SECRET	
		DATE TIME GROUP	
		DDO, NMCC	

B.266

26 April 1980

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

--- Results of photo coverage not yet available.



A news release from Iran indicates one Revolutionary Guard was killed and two others were injured "when the Iranian Army blew up the helicopters". The official PARS News Agency quoted the Office of the Chief of Joint Staff, General Mohammad Hadi Shadmehr as confirming the destruction of the helicopters, but denying that they had been bombed by jet fighters.

--- No new HUMINT reports have been received regarding the possible regrouping or transfer of the hostages.

--- In a late news item; ~~REUTERS reports that a spokesman for the militants stated the hostages will be moved to different cities as a security precaution against another rescue attempt.~~

OVERALL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- The operation will be accomplished during a nine day period (7 days for warning and positioning the force and 2 days for execution and recovery). Heavy lift helicopters (RH-53s), AC and MC-130 aircraft, refuelable C-130Es, C-141 airlifters and KC-135 tankers will be used. The helicopters will launch from the Nimitz. Other air operations will be conducted from [REDACTED]
- The operation in Iran takes two nights and one day. It is divided into three phases - Insertion, Hostage Release and Extraction.
- Upon last light of the insertion day, SFOD-Delta [REDACTED] will be airlifted [REDACTED] to an isolated desert LZ in Iran.
- The first MC-130 will land on the desert LZ and Delta forces will immediately set up blocking positions on the road in order to control any vehicular traffic transiting the area.
- The second and third MC-130 land desert LZ where number one has secured the area.
- The MC-130 aircraft will be followed by three EC-130s from [REDACTED]. Each of these aircraft will have two fuel bladders for a total of 18,000 gallons of fuel available for refueling purposes. Once the EC-130s have landed and are in position, the 3 MC-130s will depart for [REDACTED].
- Concurrently, 7 RH-53s will depart the USS Nimitz to marry up with the forces at the LZ. While at the LZ, the helos will refuel from the EC-130s and load the Delta personnel (the [REDACTED]).
- Once refueled and loaded, the helos will fly to a hideout area which is located approximately 100 km from Tehran.
- The MC & EC-130s at the desert LZ will depart [REDACTED].
- Once the helos reach the hideout area, they will be camouflaged and defensive positions set up. This evolution will be completed prior to sunrise.

E

A

E

E

The Delta force will [redacted] hideout area to a warehouse which is located approximately 15 KM from Tehran [redacted] previously purchased [redacted].

-- While at the warehouse, final preparations will be made for the hostage release phase.

That night, Delta will [redacted] enter the compound early the next morning.

-- The hostage release can be completed in less than one hour - most will be out in 30 minutes or less.

-- Two AC-130s will fly from [redacted] to the compound and provide on-call fire support as required.

-- Concurrently, 4 MC-130s w/Rangers (75 personnel) and fuel blivets from [redacted] will secure Manzariyeh. Two C-141s from [redacted] will [redacted] and immediately thereafter and prepare for the arrival of the helos from Tehran.

-- A third AC-130 from [redacted] will be available to provide on call fire support at Manzariyeh.

-- Once Delta has entered the Embassy Compound and initiated the hostage release, the helos will be called in for extraction and transportation of the hostages and Delta to Manzariyeh.

-- A separate fully coordinated, concurrently executed plan will be used to free Mr. Laingen + 2 from the Foreign Ministry.

-- At Manzariyeh the former hostages and any wounded JTF personnel will be loaded on the C-141 which will be staffed with an emergency medical team. This aircraft will fly to the nearest US military hospital [redacted].

-- Other personnel (Delta helo crews) will board the second C-141 and fly to [redacted] for further transportation to CONUS.

-- The AC and MC-130s (with 75 Rangers) will return to [redacted] or to other airfields, as the situation requires. All MC/AC-130 flights from [redacted] to Iran and return will require air refueling over [redacted].

PENETRATION OF IRANIAN AIRSPACE

Q: What was the first take off time for the helicopters departing the carrier?

A: 1507Z (1007 EST) (1937 Tehran local)

Q: What was the first take off time for the C-130 aircraft?

A: The first aircraft departed at 1400Z (0900 EST) (1830 Tehran local)

9

[REDACTED]

Q: At what time did the helicopters enter Iranian airspace?

A: Based on an estimated position of 50 NM from the land mass of Iran and recognizing a 12 mile boundary from the coast, the aircraft should have entered Iranian airspace at 1518Z (1018 EST) (1948 Tehran).

Q: When did the C-130s first enter Iranian airspace?


A: Again using the 12 mile limit as criteria, the first C-130 would have been in Iranian airspace at 1531Z (1031 EST) (2001 Tehran).

Q: When did the aircraft depart the carrier?

A: The exact time of departure and route flown by the aircraft are unknown. Estimated departure time was 2245Z.

Q: When did the aircraft depart Iranian airspace on return?

A: The exact time is unknown. Based on the expected coast out time, the aircraft would have passed the 12 mile limit at 0113Z (2113 EST) (0543 Tehran).



Q: What was the exact number of US personnel on or over Iranian soil?

~~(A)~~ A: The exact number is unknown due to changes in the force made up after the JTF had moved to its forward location. However, based upon best information available here, the force was between [REDACTED]

A

NOTE: This can be broken down into:
Aircrew: [REDACTED]
Others: [REDACTED]
Both figures are approximate

Q: What was the nature of the operation?

A: The mission was humanitarian in nature and designed solely to rescue Americans held hostage in the Embassy in Iran with minimum injury to Iranians. Evidence of this was the detaining and subsequent release of Iranian citizens at the desert site.

Q: What was the maximum penetration of Iran?

A: Distance from the coast to the actual landing site is approximately 500 Nautical Miles.

Q: How long was the force actually on the ground?

A: As the actual departure time is unknown, an exact answer cannot be given. However, from the landing of the first aircraft at 1813Z until the estimated departure time of 2245Z is four hours and 32 minutes.

~~SECRET~~

JTF SITREP NO. 5 (AS OF 250100Z)

SSN0214
ZNY TTTTT
Z 250120Z
FM JTF
TO JCS/RC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT: JTF SITREP NR5 (AS OF 250100Z)

1. JTF FORCE DISPOSITION AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) [REDACTED]
- (2) RANGERS
- (3) AC-130. THREE FMC
- (4) AC-130 FOUR FMC
- (5) KC-135 ELEVEN FMC

A C AND FORCE RETROGRADE.

C. ON GROUND IN IRAN

- (1) SIX RH-53 AT DESERT TRACK.
(ONE DESTROYED IN FIRE/FIVE ABANDONED)
- (2) ONE EC-130 AT DESERT TRACK.
(PARTIALLY DESTROYED IN FIRE/ABANDONED)
- (3) ONE RH-53 ALONG TRACK VICINITY
DRY LAKE [REDACTED] 28 DEG 27' N 58 DEG 40' E (ABANDONED)

D. ENROUTE

- (1) ONE MC-130 W/LTA EMBARKED.
- (2) TWO EC-130 W/DELTA AND [REDACTED] EMBARKED.
- (3) [REDACTED] WE HAVE FIVE HELO CREWS AND [REDACTED] WE HAVE SIX [REDACTED]

E.

- (1) [REDACTED] MC-130
- (2) [REDACTED] EC-130

F.

- (1) 4 KC-135'S NOW REFUELING CTF-70
CAP.

G. NIMITZ

- (1) ONE RH-63

5. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS (READ TWO COLUMNS)

DTG (ZULITLV)	EVENT
[REDACTED]	1 MC-130 DEPARTED [REDACTED] REFUEL SITE
1507Z	8 RH-53 DEPARTED NIMITZ FOR REFUEL SITE
1510Z	1 MC-130 DEPARTED [REDACTED] FOR REFUEL SITE
1513Z	1 EC-130 " " "
1521Z	1 MC-130 " " "
1526Z	1 EC-130 " " "
1527Z	1 EC-130 " " "
1720Z	HELO CDR REPORTS TWO RH-53'S ON GROUND. LOCATION UNKNOWN
1737Z	3 KC-135 DEPARTED [REDACTED] ON TIME FOR ARCT OFF NIMITZ
1811Z	FOUR HELOS PROCEEDING TO REFUEL SITE TWO HELOS DOWN; TWO HELO ASSISTING THE TWO DOWN (BASED ON SKETCHY COMMS)

~~SECRET~~

1845Z

THE TWO ASSIST HELOS ENROUTE TO REFUEL SITE. NO CLEAR STATUS ON TWO DOWNED HELOS.

1357 CST

1813Z

ONE MC-130 ARRIVED REFUEL SITE

1836Z

ONE MC-135 DEPARTED [REDACTED] FOR ARCTIC DEF NIMITZ

1300 CST

1930Z

TWO MC-130'S ARRIVED REFUEL SITE. SECURITY FORCE ENGAGED BUS, GAS TRUCK, AND UNK THIRD VEHICLE. GAS TRUCK BURNING THIRD VEHICLE ESCAPED TO WEST. BUS CAPTURED AND 53 HOSTAGES TAKEN.

1300 (6) downed
one at [REDACTED]
1600 CST

2000Z

ONE MC-130 AND THREE C130 REPORTED ON GROUND AT REFUEL SITE. FIRST TWO MC-130 DEPART FOR [REDACTED]

2024Z

FIRST RH-53 ARRIVED REFUEL SITE.

2030Z

SECOND RH-53 ARRIVED REFUEL SITE.

2035Z

THIRD RH-53 ARRIVED REFUEL SITE.

TWO RH-53 ONE AT 2100Z. OTHER HELO STATUS NOT KNOWN.

2050Z

FOUR RH-53 (TOTAL) NOW AT REFUEL SITE.

2100Z

SIX RH-53 (TOTAL) NOW AT REFUEL SITE. ✓

STATUS OF REMAINING TWO RH-53 NOT KNOWN.

2135Z

FIVE RH-53 FMC. SIXTH RH-53 HARD DOWN FOR HYDRAULICS. COMJTF REQUESTED THREE ON SCENE COMMANDERS (DEP COMJTF FOR AIR/DELTA/RH-53) TO CONSIDER FORCE REDUCTION TO ALLOW MISSION TO CONTINUE, AND ADVISE.

2148Z

ON SCENE COMMANDER REQUESTED DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS FOR 53 HOSTAGES AND THE CAPTURED BUS IN THE EVENT OF A DECISION TO ABORT.

2149Z

JTF ADVISES DELTA TO PREPARE TO DESTROY SIXTH (DOWN) RH-53

2205Z

COMJTF CONFERS WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

2212Z

COMJTF DIRECTS ON-SCENE COMMANDERS TO ABORT MISSION, TO RELEASE HOSTAGES, AND TO RECOVER HELOS AND FIXED WING TO NIMITZ AND [REDACTED] RESPECTIVELY.

2227Z

DELTA ADVISES THAT HELO IMPACTED IN EC-130. EC-130 AND HELO ON FIRE. JTF HQ STAFF INITIATES RECOVERY PLAN.

2250Z

DELTA ADVISES NO SURVIVORS FROM HELO. MANY INJURED, SOME BURNED (PRESUMED TO BE EC-130 PERSONNEL/PAXS)

2251Z

DELTA REQUESTED JAC AIR TO DESTROY HELOS. ALL C-130 EXCEPT DAMAGED ONE WILL ABORT AND MAKE

[REDACTED] WITH ON BOARD FUEL.

2257Z

JTF ADVISES JCS SAR AND CAP MAY BE REQUIRED. DELTA REPORTS THAT SOME PEOPLE MAY HAVE BEEN TRAPPED IN EC-130 FIRE TOO INTENSE TO SEARCH. MC-130 AND 2 EC-130 ENROUTE [REDACTED]

2300Z

ONE OF TWO MISSING RH-53 (5) ARRIVED NIMITZ.

2320Z

EC-MC-130'S REPORTED INTERIM PERSONNEL FIGURES [REDACTED] ROUGH COUNT)

2341Z

1 C-141 DEPARTED [REDACTED] AS MEDEVAC.

2352Z

JTF REQUESTED [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] MEDEVAC FROM MAC [REDACTED]

AIRPLANE
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER REPORTED THAT MISSING HELO CREW WAS PICKED UP BY ANOTHER HELO PRIOR TO ARRIVAL AT DESERT TRACK. ONLY CREW NOT PRESENT IS CREW ON RH-53 THAT CRASHED INTO C-130 AT DESERT TRACK.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING AND RECOVERY EFFORTS UNDERWAY.

4. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS:

A. MISSION WAS PROGRESSING WITHIN EXCEPTABLE RANGE UNTIL ON SCENE COMMANDER REPORTED ONLY 5 HELICOPTERS FMC. WE STILL HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO REACH DROP OFF/HIDEOUT AREA BEFORE DAYLIGHT

B. SINCE ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO [REDACTED] GA OF FUEL TO MANZARIYEH, JTF HQ THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE MISSION BEYOND DESERT ONE WITH 5 FMC HELICOPTERS.

C. IN VIEW OF THE THREE ON SCENE COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THE MISSION BE ABORTED (THIS CONFORMS WITH THE ORIGINAL DECISION SCENARIO) I TENTATIVELY CONCURRED WITH THEIR RECOMMENDATION AND REQUESTED THEY WAIT WHILE I CONFER WITH HIGHER AUTHORITY. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIGHER AUTHORITY I ORDERED ON SCENE COMMANDERS TO ABORT, INITIATE EXTRACTION, AND RETURN FORCES TO POINT OF ORIGIN.

D. PER OUR PLAN, HELICOPTERS WERE TO FLY BACK TO NIMIZ WITH ONLY THEIR CREWS AND REMAINING 4 C-130'S (ONE HC AND 3 EC'S) WERE TO EXTRACT ALL OTHERS TO LAUNCH BASE. ON SCENE COMMANDERS ACKNOWLEDGED DECISION AND INITIATED EXTRACTION AT 2212Z.

E. AT THIS POINT, NO LIVES HAD BEEN LOST (TF OR IRANIAN).

F. WE HAD JUST BEGAN NOTIFYING LOCAL JTF REAR COMPONENTS TO PREPARE TO RECEIVE THE RETURNING TASK ELEMENTS WHEN WE WERE INFORMED THAT AN ACCIDENT HAD OCCURRED BETWEEN AN RH-53 AND A C-130 AT DESERT TRACK.

G. THE STAFF THEN BEGAN TO FORMULATE EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPORT PLANS TO COMPIMENT THE EXTRACTION.

H. OTHER DETAILS OF ACTION TAKEN AT DESERT TRACK MUST AWAIT DEBRIEF OF OTHER TASK FORCE PERSONNEL WHO WERE AT THE SCENE. WILL PROVIDE ORAL PROGRESS REPORTS UNTIL NEXT SITREP. CAUTION AS ABOVE DATA WAS DERIVED FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT HQ LOCATION ONLY AND LIMITED MONITORING OF SUB-ELEMENTS TRANSMISSION. HOWEVER, INTERNAL JTF COMMUNICATIONS WORKED EXCEPTIONALLY WELL THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION. WE HAD EMPHASISED STRICK COMMUNICATIONS DISCIPLINE, HENCE DETAILS WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE AVAILABLE WERE NOT TRANSMITTED

BT

NNNN

OPERATIONS LOG

JTF REACTION CENTER

TIME (ZULU)

EVENT/COMMENT/NAME

241105' 1 MC-130 launched
 1506 8 helos launched
 1530 1 MC-130 launch/1 EC-130 launch
 1530 1 MC-130 launch/2 EC-130
 1600 2 KC-135 take off fm [REDACTED]
 1710 2 helos rptd down at 1210L by Site Alpha
 29-16N 58-55E (our computation)
 1742 [REDACTED] reports J-3 estimate of downed helos at
 29-16N 58-55E
 1814 C of S reqstd study on possibility/options of
 recovery w/Fulton Rigs
 1800 (Delay Log) Mr [REDACTED] called secure fm Bragg.
 Acft being loaded crew not full - will advise.
 1836 Tasked to develop recovery plan for downed crew.
 Consider fixing Loc by RDF on Guard & IR strobe
 by returning acft from Desert One & then return
 in 24hrs for Fulton recovery or SAR.
 1905 C of S (Relay fm JTF) confirm 2 helos on ground
 for mechanical. Crew on extraction birds. Msn
 going on. Bad commo w/birds to Vaught. No update
 probably for 2 hrs. (MG Vaught indicated this
 was his supposition based on poor commo).
 1910 We think 2 MC-130 on ground at Desert One.
 1857 Confirmed acft on ground (1) msg fm Alpha.
 (unk how many)
 1856 3d MC-130 rptd landing at Desert One (NSE rpt)
 (3 now on ground)
 1952 Msg fm Alpha: (1952Z)
 (3 vehicles on road. 1 escaped. 1 vehicle was a
 bus w/44 pax. Gas truck on fire. 2 MC-130s
 at Desert Track. No injuries.
 2006 Msg 1955Z:
 5 Sierra called by RH-53 requesting position.
 2020 2020 speculative lift-off helos
 1924 speculative lift-off MC-130s
 2030 Foncon CPT [REDACTED] - USAF - (2444) - at [REDACTED]
 Can't fly [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] will talk
 to him.
 2047 [REDACTED]
 2050 We think #3 helo is attempting to return to
 NIMITZ. Comm from Vaught to Desert One is poor.
 2052 Trying to confirm that KC-135 tankers are aloft.

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~~SECRET~~ Code word

TIME (ZULU)

EVENT/COMMENT/NAME

242109 Msg 24055Z fm JTF C-141 extraction acft status
See file.

2110 Vaught to CJCS indicates that 6 helos are on
ground with 4 refueled & 2 taking on fuel.
Should leave in 40 min. Msn continues.
Escapee moved south. No pax injured at
Desert One.

2140 CINCPAC trying to contact NIMITZ ref the helo
apparently trying to gain ship.

2147 Power went out in Comms Room.

2150 C of S indicated that MG V rcmded abort in that
6th helo is down. NCA developing decision.

2158 C of S - indicated plan is to recover helos on
NIMITZ. Speculation on whether or not to
launch SAR fr Kirtland AFB. One helo crew
unaccounted. Do we launch fm [REDACTED]

2207 C of S indicated CJCS will talk to Gen [REDACTED]
& begin moving SAR acft east.

2210 JTF RC rcmds using [REDACTED] as SAR point.

2219 C of S indicated: 5 helos w/7 crews flyable
at Desert One. One dead bird at Desert One,
one dead bird on flight route, one bird
returning to NIMITZ.

2226 Call fm Mr [REDACTED] C-141B crew (refuel) will
arrive at [REDACTED] 2000L. Will advise when ready
to launch.

2236 C of S passed CJCS desire to indicate flight
profile if a 1700L EST lift off. (JTF RC
indicates a 4 hr flight).

2244 Call from Alpha. Rqstd we advise NIMITZ of
possible TAC AIR CAP on return.

2248 Rpt, fm CINCPAC. Apparently one helo bumped a
C-130 at refuel point causing a burn victim.
Hostages apparently released. MEDEVAC for
[REDACTED] rqstd.

2302 [REDACTED] to Alpha. Do you desire C-141 at
[REDACTED] configured for medical launch now?
Yes. Instructions to JTF RC: Launch 1 C-141
[REDACTED] to [REDACTED] engine run 1 C-141 and
hold at [REDACTED] Cock 1 C-141 at [REDACTED]
MED 141 & C-9 to [REDACTED] ASAP.

2318 Fm Alpha: Need F [REDACTED] hospital prepared. Bring
blood w/acft - 20 units per acft. Do not
delay for blood. Neg info on casualties.
Passed to MAC.

2320 Fm Alpha: Hold C-141 fm [REDACTED]

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TIME (ZULU)

EVENT/COMMENT/NAME

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242323

Fm [redacted]. Extend tkrs over NIMITZ, launch what is available from [redacted]

2330

[redacted] Will rtn call when he contacts [redacted] Notified EUCOM Ops to be prepared to rcv an unspecified amount of burn casualties.

2339

Told to keep it low key (Col [redacted] 6420). C of S indicates that one crew is unaccounted for. Rqst [redacted] assist.

2340

[redacted] to BIF: What do you want to do to helos? (Do not destroy helos) NIMITZ prepared to launch a RH-53. Understood one man dead. EC-130 pilot & one RH pilot missing. (Fm [redacted] believed to be one more dead.

2349

Query fm LTG Shutler. Can we get an RDF on the beeper? Guidance: / Get to [redacted] & tell him to tell C-130s at Desert to try & get an RDF fix.

2355

[redacted] Try to get acft to monitor guard & get a fix (WILCO)

250001

CJCS confirmed not destroying helos. Try & maintain low profile on extract.

0007

MEDEVAC due into [redacted] 0800Z (MAC).

0009

0110Z Coast out. [redacted] to [redacted] 0240Z [redacted] arrival

0033

(Transfer at [redacted] to be as low vis as possible but top priority is safety & well being. CJCS CMT) CINCPAC advises that 7 pax w/helo closed on NIMITZ.

0038

- confirmed -
[redacted] to Group -
C-141 at [redacted] - 1 launched
5 C-130s cleared coast 0110Z
0250Z in [redacted]
0800Z C-9 lands [redacted]
5 hr flt fm [redacted] to [redacted]
C-141 MED at [redacted] delayed - Alpha alert -
one CH-53 crew status still unknown
US hostages are now top concern
NIMITZ has SAR mission. Tanker problem if KC [redacted] goes to [redacted] a 3 hr gap on coverage for SAR.
[redacted] decision rqrs CJCS decision.

0053

Under last mover in coast line.

0057

J-3 concern that fuel on board xtraction acft may be a critical problem.

0105

C of S to [redacted] Outlined tanker rqmts. [redacted] will return w/desires.

TIME (ZULU)

EVENT/COMMENT/NAME

0138

Col [redacted] to CJCS: Presented tkr recommendation to CJCS: See [redacted] note. (CJCS said execute) 2018 call from [redacted] to Vaught. [redacted] in contact w/Col [redacted] (NIMITZ) [redacted] sees no further need for [redacted] ers.

0150

[redacted] Tankers will go to orbit. After departing orbit will [redacted] at [redacted] (possible pbldm w/9th tkr landing at [redacted] (ramp space)).

0154

J-3 now forecasts no critical fuel problem. Tanker is an ARC model. [redacted] has tkr on strip alert to feed him.

0158

C of S called directing [redacted] to execute tanker spt plan. MG Dyke queried LTC [redacted] on our satellite coverage.

0130

(Delayed) Service Chiefs left.

0210

MG [redacted] to JTF RC. Pres & SECDEF very concerned [redacted] any indicator from P.G. area. Asks that

0211

[Large redacted block]

0240

Compiled list of "sensitive" items aboard helos. list in file.

0242

JTF SITREP. Eff 250100Z

- 6 RH-53 Desert Track
- 1 EC-130 Desert Track
- 1 RH-53 28 20N, 58 40E

Know we have 5 helo crews, think we have 6 enroute [redacted]

0242

Vaught sends to all CMDS: 250145Z

- OPSEC is Key
- No CMB to anyone
- Operation is Top Secret Sensitive
- All CMDRS will brief & acknowledge

0254

Msg Vaught to JCS 250240Z. Summarizes potential equip compromise. Rcnds against destructive strike.

0257

CJCS informed JTF RC eff 2147, all pax evacuated closed [redacted] In process of counting heads. (Call from Vaught)

[Redacted block]

~~TOP SECRET~~

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TIME (ZULU)

EVENT/COMMENT/NAME

250335 [REDACTED] passed to [REDACTED] to reduce Army personnel at Pope w/C-141 from 1 hour standby to 4 hour standby.

0350 ADM [REDACTED] states all personnel accounted for. No injury list yet.

0355 Gen Johnson passed - Pane Low mission cancelled. Msg sent to JTF Col [REDACTED] (250415Z APR 80) In file.

0400 Col [REDACTED] passes: 3 KIA helo, 5 KIA EC-130, all bodies left in place. / 3 burns (2 secondary, 1 lesser) Undetermined number of injuries. MG Vaught states capability at [REDACTED] to handle injuries.

- 0315Z first C-141 depart [REDACTED]
- 0845Z ETA C-9 from [REDACTED] w/medical (burn) team.

Indications, only complete CEOI was in Col Pittman's helo, which is on NIMITZ.

0415 Rec'd msg from JTF [REDACTED] to JTF/RC on proposed drawdown of JTF KC-135 (DTG 250315Z APR 80) Msg in file.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WEAPONS FOR JTF

1. The following weapons were provided to elements of the JTF for its mission execution. This is the best estimate available.

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
12	[REDACTED]	DELTA
20	M16A1 Rifles	DELTA
40	M16A1 Rifles	On board NIMITZ
10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
250	40MM Grenades	DELTA
400	Concussion Grenades	DELTA
400	Baseball Grenades	DELTA
200 lbs	C-3	DELTA
40	Cal .38 Pistols	On board NIMITZ
18	Cal .50 MG, M2	On board NIMITZ
20	Pyrotechnic Pistols, (MK8)	On board NIMITZ
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	DELTA
Unknown	Other sidearms (e.g. Cal .45 Pistols)	

2. The following weapons (serialized items only) were put aboard mission aircraft and were introduced into Iran:

- 40 M16A1s
- 40 Cal .38 Pistols
- 18 Cal .50 MG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Draft.
April 26, 1980

Dear [Mr. Speaker]
[Mr. President]

This is the Report required by Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-138) and, to the extent applicable, by Section 4(a)(1) of that Resolution.

On April 24, 1980 I directed ^{elements of Special Forces of the 8} United States ~~forces~~ to commence the positioning stage of a rescue operation which was designed, if the subsequent stages had been executed, to effect the rescue of the American hostages who have been held captive in Iran since November 4, 1979 in clear violation of international law and the norms of civilized conduct among nations. The subsequent phases of the operation were not executed. Instead, for the reasons described below, ^{all these elements} ~~the United States~~ ^{of the United States} ~~United States forces~~ were withdrawn from Iran, and no hostilities occurred.

The sole objective of the operation that actually occurred was to position the rescue team for the subsequent effort to withdraw the American hostages. The rescue team was at all times under my command and control and required ^{my approval} ~~[further orders]~~ before executing the subsequent phases of the operation designed to effect the rescue itself. ~~[While the subsequent phases could have resulted in hostilities if orders to execute these phases had been issued]~~ ^{No} such orders were issued, and instead ~~the mission was aborted.~~

approval was requested on given. as described below, the mission was aborted.

Beginning approximately 10:30 AM EST on April 24 six U. S. C-130 transport aircraft and 8 RH-53 helicopters entered Iranian air space. These aircraft were not equipped for air combat or bombing. Their crews were not equipped for combat. Some of the C-130 aircraft carried a force of approximately 90 members of the rescue team equipped for combat, plus various support personnel.

From ^{approximately 2} 1:57 to ⁴ 4:02 PM EST the six transports and six of the eight helicopters landed at a remote desert site in Iran approximately 200 miles from Tehran where they disembarked the rescue team, commenced refueling operations and began to prepare for the subsequent phases.

During the flight to the remote desert site, two of the eight helicopters developed operating difficulties. One was forced to return to the carrier Nimitz; the second was forced to land in the desert, but its crew was taken aboard another of the helicopters and proceeded on to the landing site. Of the six helicopters which landed at the remote desert site, one developed a serious hydraulic problem and was unable to continue with the mission. The operational plans called for a minimum of six helicopters ^{in good ~~operational~~ condition} able to proceed from the desert site. Eight helicopters had been included in the force to provide sufficient redundancy without imposing excessive strains on the refueling and exit requirements of the operation.

When the number of helicopters available to continue dropped to five, it was determined that the operation could not proceed as planned. Therefore, on the recommendation of the force commander and my military advisers, I decided to cancel the mission and ordered the U. S. force to return from Iran.

During the process of withdrawal, one of the helicopters accidentally collided with one of the C-130 aircraft, resulting in the death of eight personnel and the injury of several others. At this point, the decision was made to load all surviving personnel aboard the remaining C-130 aircraft and to abandon the remaining helicopters at the landing site. Altogether, the U. S. force remained on the ground for a total of approximately three hours. The five remaining aircraft took off about 5:45 PM EST and departed from Iranian airspace without further incident at about 8:00 PM EST on April 24. No U. S. Armed Forces remain in Iran except *those held in captivity as hostages.*

The remote desert area was selected to conceal this phase of the mission from discovery. At no time during the temporary presence of U. S. forces in Iran did they encounter Iranian forces of any type. We believe, in fact, that no Iranian military forces were in the desert area, and that the Iranian forces were unaware of the temporary presence of U. S. forces until after their departure from Iran. As planned, no hostilities occurred during this phase of the mission - the only phase

that was executed.

At one point during the period in which U. S. forces were on the ground at the desert landing site a bus containing about fifty Iranian civilians happened to pass along a nearby road. The bus was stopped ^{and disabled,} and its occupants were detained by U. S. forces until the departure ^{and then} (of U. S. forces) at which time they ^{Low states, the vehicle was} were released unharmed. One truck ^{one} closely followed by ~~a passenger car also~~ passed by while U. S. forces were on the ground. U. S. forces stopped ^{just} the truck by a shot into the engine. The driver ^{of that vehicle} ran to the ^{second truck} passenger car which then took off ^{forward} across the desert - an escape routine usually associated with smuggling) ^{and did not} neither of these incidents affected the ^{decision to abort the mission.} (safety or concealment of the mission) ^{the units involved and}

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue ^{plan of the} operation had ~~been~~ commenced ^{that} it had an excellent chance of success. ~~They~~ ^{but} were ^{All personnel involved had} all volunteers, ^{the units involved and} they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them.

To the families of those who died and who were wounded, I have expressed the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It caused no Iranian casualties.

This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them.

Nothing in this report is intended to waive the constitutional authority of the President expressly reserved in Section 8(d)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.

Dear Mr. [Speaker:
[President:

On April 24, 1980, I directed United States forces to commence the ^{positioning stage of} execution of an operation, ^{which if the further steps had been} designed to effect the rescue of the American hostages who ^{had} been held captive in Iran since November 4, 1979, in clear violation of international law and the norms of civilized conduct among nations. The ^{subsequent phases of the operation were not executed,} sole objective of this operation was to ^{position the rescue team for the subsequent} ~~withdrawal of~~ the American hostages. ^{The rescue team was at all times under command and control and organized further orders before} The measures taken and planned were limited to those ^{strictly necessary to} rescue those hostages and to ensure the safety of the U.S. forces involved.

In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed on this matter, and pursuant to Section 4 (a) (2) of the War Powers Resolution, I wish to report to you concerning the circumstances of this rescue operation.

~~At about 1018 EST on April 24,~~ ^{at about 1018 EST on April 24,} six U.S. C-130 transport aircraft and eight MH-53 helicopters entered Iranian airspace en route to a remote desert landing site approximately 200 miles from Tehran ^{at which the helicopters were} ~~for the purpose of refueling~~ ^{refueled} operations.

These aircraft carried a force of approximately ninety members of the rescue team, and about an equal number of air-crew and support personnel. During the flight to this landing site, two of the eight helicopters developed

*Speaker
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operating
~~(mechanical)~~ difficulties. One was forced to return to the carrier Nimitz; the second was forced to land in the desert, but its crew was taken aboard another of the helicopters and proceeded on to the landing site. *Of the 6 helos*
landed at the same desert site, one At the landing area, *a main hydraulic* a third helicopter developed ~~mechanical~~ problems and was unable to continue with the mission. ←

Because of the operational requirements of the rescue mission, it was determined that the operation could not continue *from this point* as planned with as few as five helicopters.

Therefore, I decided to cancel the mission and ordered the U.S. force to return from Iran.

During the process of withdrawal, one of the helicopters accidentally collided with one of the C-130 aircraft, resulting in the death of eight personnel and the injury of several others. At this point, the decision was made to load all surviving personnel aboard the remaining C-130 aircraft and to abandon the remaining helicopters at the landing site. Altogether, the U.S. force remained on the ground for a total of approximately three hours. The five remaining aircraft departed from Iranian airspace without further incident ~~at about 0100 on April 23~~ *at about 8 PM EST 23*. No U.S. ^{ground} forces remain in Iran.

announced 800 PM (EST) of April 24

As planned,

*The route down
area was selected to avoid
any land this portion of
operation from discovery.*

- 3 -

temporary removal of U.S. forces in show

At no time during the ~~mission~~ did U.S. forces in Iran encounter Iranian forces of any type. We believe, in fact, that Iranian ^{military} forces were unaware of the ^{temporary} presence of U.S. forces until after their departure from Iran. ~~At~~ At one point during the period in which U.S. forces were on the ground at the desert landing site, ^{a bus containing about 50} a group of about fifty Iranian civilians happened to pass by in a bus, and were detained by ^{the rescue team} U.S. personnel until the departure of U.S. forces, at which time they were released unharmed. In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them. This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's Constitutional Executive power and his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION

Command and control of the rescue effort required the establishment of a highly reliable, secure system from the National Command Authority to the Joint Task Force Headquarters (and alternates) and from that location to deployed elements.

The system was tailored to the unique operations requirements and exercised extensively. The training program the JTF developed and implemented allowed the simulation and testing of the command and control networks in a very realistic environment. Effective command and control could have been exercised in the event of plan execution as early as late November 1979. The fact that execution was not effected, however, allowed responsible individuals several months in which to test a variety of techniques, procedures and equipments. Thus, by the time the rescue plan was implemented high confidence had been attained in overall system reliability, security, and responsiveness to operational needs.

The concept of operations provided for a chain of command from the NCA thru the CJCS direct to Hq JTF, and from the JTF to deployed force elements.

The systems were in every case secure and redundant. Reliance was primarily on satellite media, backed up by HF/SSB. Codewords were provided for personnel, events and locations for use in both secure and non-secure modes and to reduce broadcast signatures. Force elements used no fixed communications; all equipments were mobile and portable. These latter factors significantly reduced our power available due to weight constraints and dictated the development of a highly disciplined system relying on the UHF satellites.

Four networks were established for command and control purposes. Not included herein are radio equipments used within the various force elements for intra-unit functions.

Command Net Alpha: Designed to provide the essential link from the NCA/CJCS to Hq JTF (JTF main) and to the limited alternate facility (see diagram A attached).

Command Net Bravo: Provided command and control from Hq JTF to the staging base, and the various force elements. (See diagram B).


Command Net Charlie: The intra-theatre command and control net. Not used as primary where UHF satellite capability could be used effectively by those units possessing (see diagram C).

Command Net Delta: The basic redundant capability but also used as primary path when desired (see diagram D).

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
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


~~TOP SECRET~~

— — UHF SATCOM

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-o- UHF SATCOM (WSC-3)

— DCS

ooo HF RADIO

* AIRBORNE PLATFORMS

MOBILE/PORTABLE


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As of 251228 Local

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ESTIMATED REDEPLOYMENT FLOW

E

<u>SAAM #</u>	<u>LOAD</u>	<u>DEPART</u> [REDACTED] (EST)	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>ARRIVAL</u> (EST)
1068-04	DELTA	250700	Langley	260100
1068-05	DELTA	250705	Langley	260100
1065-05	RANGERS	250630	Hunter	260130
1065-06	RANGERS/ CARGO	250800	Hunter	260300
1105-02	JTF/HELO	260430	Andrews	262230
1105-03	MISC JTF/ CARGO	260930	Andrews	270330

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ALL MISSIONS WILL CYCLE THRU [REDACTED] THEN TO CONUS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINT PAPER

Subject: JTF Training Exercises

- o There were seven major training exercises conducted by the JTF that included all JTF components (entire mission package current at the time):

- 3-6 Dec 79
- 16-28 Dec 79
- 16-18 Jan 80
- 29-31 Jan 80
- 26-27 Feb 80
- 25-27 Mar 80
- 14-15 April (partial exercise)

- o Training exercises included:
 - o Navigational training
 - o Nite landing training
 - o Refueling practice
 - o Practice assaults on the AMEMB
 - o Securing airfield
 - o Contingency options
- o Training Exercises were conducted in operational sequence and approximate mission distances.
- o There was a continuous unit training cycle prior and subsequent to each major exercise.
- o Each exercise included comprehensive command/control and communications training.

TRAINING SUMMARY:

In all major exercises, the assault package was rehearsed in its entirety using real time and distance factors. Additionally, various options, force packages and contingency situations were fully rehearsed and provided. Each aspect of the system was tested individually and then as part of the whole. Modifications were made continuously as the situation dictated. The results of each exercise consistently indicated that the amount of helos and USAF aircraft was optimum for the plan.

POINT PAPER ON MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS

1. Crew status on RH-53 helicopters:

- 43 personnel from the four Services served as crew members on the eight helicopters used in the operation. There were 32 USMC, 8 USN, 2 USA and 1 USAF crew members.

#1 - 4 USMC, 1 USN, 1 USA

#2 - 4 USMC, 1 USN

#3 - 5 USMC

#4 - 5 USMC

#5 - 5 USMC, 1 USN, 1 USA

#6 - 4 USMC, 1 USN

#7 - 3 USMC, 1 USN, 1 USAF

#8 - 2, USMC, 3, USN

2. EC-130/RH-53 fire at Desert One:

- Both the EC-130 and the RH-53 were seen burning by ground force and aircrew members at the time of egress from Desert One. One aircrew member was pulled from the cargo compartment of the burning EC-130 just prior to egress.

3. Air refueling capability of MC/EC-130s:

- All MC-130 and EC-130 aircraft used in the operation were air refuelable and had participated in aerial refueling operations during training and deployment.

4. Number of detainees:

- Debrief of Ranger security personnel at Desert One revealed that the only detainees were 44 personnel, to include the driver, who were on the bus that was stopped.

5. RH-53 Operational Summary:

- Eight RH-53's departed NIMITZ for Desert One.

- One RH-53 had equipment problems and was forced to land. A second RH-53 landed to provide assistance. The crew from the RH-53 that was forced to land transferred to the assisting RH-53 and also continued toward Desert One. Subsequently, two others landed during a sandstorm and remained on ground for about 45 minutes until WX permitted them to continue toward Desert One.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- One RH-53 became separated and headed back for Nimitz.
- Six RH-53s landed at Desert One.
- One of the six RH-53s was determined incapable of completing the mission. Decision was made to abort mission and return.
- One of the five remaining mission capable RH-53s collided with an EC-130. Both caught fire.
- Four remaining mission capable RH-53s, one not mission capable RH-53 and burning RH-53 and EC-130 were abandoned at Desert One. Personnel egressed from Desert One aboard MC-130 and remaining EC-130 aircraft.
- One RH-53 recovered at Nimitz, three MC-130s and remaining two EC-130s recovered at [REDACTED]

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN

Subject: Discrepancies between JCS LOG/JTF Reports

INITIAL DOWN RH53 STATUS

Two Helos reported down by JTF 1210 EST. (2140Z)
No report of two additional assisting

JTF SITREP 2142L (EFF 250100Z)

Recap of JTF Ops log

Indicates 2 helos went down 1720Z

Indicates 2 helos assisting at 1837Z

Indicates 4 helos at desert track 2050Z

Indicates 6 helos at desert track 2102Z

Status of 2 Helos UNK

A JTF RC aware through [REDACTED] channels a RH53 was closing on NIMITZ 0120Z.

JTF Ops log indicates RH53 arrived NIMITZ eff 2300Z

SUMMARY

JTF RC unaware of 2 good helos assisting 2 down helos

JTF CDR apparently initially unaware one bad helo was later flyable and RTB.

JTF RC prepared to initiate SAR plan until helo RTB on NIMITZ

DUST STORM REPORT

First indicated in debrief report 251135Z

Required IFR most of route

Formation flying impossible

Altitude required 7,500 feet

HOSTAGES CAPTURED

Initial report to JTF RC was 44 hostages captured (1945Z)

JTF SITREP, 250100Z, stated 53 hostages

FONCON w/Col [REDACTED] this AM indicated that a subsequent rpt from field was 53, since changed back to 44, correct figure to be confirmed by debrief.

BLADE STRIKE INCIDENT

Initial indication was foncon from CINCPAC to JTF RC 0328Z
JTF provided input 0428Z.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PRINCIPAL DISCREPANCIES

Duststorm not reported with effect on flight planning.
Confusion regarding status of two down helos.
Number of hostages.
Blade strike info late in arriving.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

POINT PAPER

on

Why 8 Helos and Why Use of Carrier

Background:

- At outset of mission planning, lift requirements for inserting team and extracting Americans dictated four helos minimum required.
 - Temperature in target area cold.
 - Were not going to attempt rescue at Ministry Bldg.
- In mid Nov six helos taken to [REDACTED] by C-5.
 - Flown aboard Kitty Hawk.
- As mission refined, equipment and personnel required to be moved forward dictated use of six helos minimum.
 - Moved two additional helos aboard Nimitz when deployed.
 - When helo transfer accomplished, gave us eight helos aboard Nimitz to assure six available for mission launch.
- When decision made to attempt rescue at Ministry Bldg also
 - Additional rescue personnel required.
 - Requirement for extraction helo rose to five.
- With requirement for minimum of five, planned to launch seven to assure five.
 - Eighth helo was broken for 2 months due to onboard accident.
 - Decision to use all eight helos made *just* prior to launch date when the last helo came in commission.
 - Higher temperature in Teheran one reason for decision.
 - Insurance another reason.
- Why didn't we move more helos forward?
 - Would have had to remove tactical aircraft from Nimitz.
 - This was not the only mission the Nimitz was to be prepared to do.
 - OpSec was a driving consideration.
 - Would have had trouble moving additional helos for-

ward, could have blown cover of force presence.

- Availability of foam-filled external fuel tanks restricted adding assets.
- Availability of portable internal navigation systems (PINS)
 - We were using nearly all of SAC's inventory (14 of 20).

Every helo we added meant additional EC-130s with fuel tanks.

- Required larger refueling area.
- Why did we not use a helo carrier (LPH) vice a normal carrier.
 - Would have had to increase force presence in operations area.
 - Would have signaled intent to use sea launched helo force.
 - The fact that an LPH would have given us a better maintenance capability and force size did not override the OpSec nor the additional support (EC-130) considerations.

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20:2 HELO'S
ARRIVE DESERT ONE
21:01 ALL 8 HELOS AT
DESERT ONE

DESERT TRACK LZ

1810 FIRST MC-130 LANDS

1800 HELO'S REVERSE

1750 MC-130 ENTERS
SECOND DUST AREA

1730 MC-130 ENTERS
FIRST DUST AREA

1740 HELOS ENTER
FIRST DUST AREA


1740 HELOS REVERSE COURSE

1850 RTE
MC RC-130 RTD

1840 HELICOPTER FORMATION
CROSSES IRANIAN COAST

1827 MC-130 CROSSES
IRANIAN COAST

~~TOP SECRET~~



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30 May 8
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FM JTF//S.M.O.E.I.R.S./J2
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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 1256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC
 DECL DOWN TO
KEY ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

SECRET CITE 00 00106 SECTION 1 OF 2
SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NBR 6

1. EVENTS OF THE LAST THIRTY DAYS HAVE HAD A PROFOUND IMPACT ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION, THE RESULTS OF WHICH ARE ONLY FAINTLY DISCERNABLE AT THIS TIME. ANY PROJECTION OF FUTURE EVENTS AND THEIR FINAL OUTCOME IS AT BEST AN EDUCATED GUESS BASED ON VERY LIMITED DATA PLAYED AGAINST A DYNAMIC BACKDROP OF COMPETING POLITICAL FACTIONS WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THE FOUR PRINCIPAL FACTIONS ARE:

A. THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SUCH AS BANI-SADR WHO SEE THE HOSTAGE ISSUE AS A LIABILITY AND WISH TO END IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT RECOGNIZE THEIR OPINION IS AT ODDS WITH THE SENIOR CLERICS.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0136 [REDACTED]

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- B. THE HARDLINE CLERICS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WHO SEE THE HOSTAGE ISSUE AS A MEANS OF HUMILIATING THE UNITED STATES AND EVENTUALLY OBTAINING COMPENSATION FROM THE USG WITHOUT BECOMING SUBJECT TO U.S. ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, OR MILITARY INFLUENCE.
- C. THE PARLIAMENT WHO SEE THE ISSUE AS A "TAR BABY" AND ARE CAUGHT IN A DILEMA OF THEIR OWN PRIVATE CONVICTIONS, AND PRESSURE FROM KHOMEINI TO PRESERVE THE PURITY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION.
- D. THE MILITANTS WHO SEE THEMSELVES IN THE VANGUARD OF THE REVOLUTION AND BELIEVE THAT AS LONG AS THEY HOLD THE HOSTAGES THEY HAVE A POWERFUL WEAPON TO INFLUENCE THE DIRECTION OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT.

2. BEFORE MAKING ANY ASSESSMENT, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BRIEFLY REVIEW SOME OF THE EVENTS, SUSPICIONS, AND PRECEPTIONS WHICH (ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT THE U. S. GOVERNMENT DID EXERCISE MILITARY FORCE IN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES) WILL HAVE A BEARING ON THE INTERPLAY DURING THE NEXT

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- A. IRANIAN AWARENESS THAT U.S.S. PATIENCE HAS LIMITATIONS.
- B. IRANIAN RECOGNITION THAT U.S. MILITARY FORCES CAN PENETRATE IRANIAN TERRITORY UNDETECTED.
- C. IRANIAN SUSPICIONS THAT PART OF THE IRANIAN POPULATION SUPPORTED THE U.S. EFFORT.
- D. CONCERNS BY SOME IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IS ESSENTIAL.
- E. EVALUATION BY EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS THAT ALTHOUGH CERTAIN IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FAVOR AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE HOSTAGES, THE ISLAMIC HARDLINE CLERICS ARE IN A HURRY TO REACH A SETTLEMENT.
- F. BELIEF BY SOME IRANIAN CLERICS THAT THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT CLEAR U.S. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF GUILT AND SOME FORM OF RECOMPENSATION IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION.
- G. CONFIRMATION THAT THE HARDLINE CLERICAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY WILL DOMINATE THE NEWLY SELECTED IRANIAN PARLIAMENT (THE MAJLIS).

- H. KHOMEINI'S 26 MAY 68 CHARGE TO THE MAJLIS TO MAINTAIN UNITY AND PROTECT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REVOLUTION. THIS WAS REINFORCED IN KHOMEINI'S ADDRESS READ TO MAJLIS BY HIS SON AT THE OPENING OF THE ASSEMBLY ON THE 26TH.
- I. ALSO ON THE 26 MAY MILITANT RADIO BROADCAST WHICH RE-STATE THE THREAT OF TRIALS FOR THE HOSTAGES UNLESS THE SHAH IS RETURNED. THE STATEMENT ALSO CHARGED THE PARLIAMENT THAT ANY DECISION OTHER THAN THE ABOVE SHOULD HAVE A LEGITIMATE REASON WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRANIAN NATION.

[REDACTED]

AND THAT THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE TO BE USED IN THE FUTURE AS IT HAS BEEN PERIODICALLY THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS.

- K. RECENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTING INDICATES A FACTION IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MILITANTS WHICH COULD PORTENT A FAR GREATER DEGREE OF INSTABILITY IN THE OPERATION OF THE COMPOUND AND HANDLING OF THE HOSTAGES. ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, A HARDLINE RADICAL WITH MIXED ISLAMIC/MARXIST PHILOSOPHY AND

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STRONG ENGINEERING PERSONALITY MAY BE EMERGING AS A DOMINANT FORCE. SUCH A PERSONALITY IS LIKELY TO TAKE OR ORDER PRECIPITOUS ACTIONS WHICH PUT THE SAFETY AND LOCATION OF THE HOSTAGES INTO AN UNKNOWN EQUATION.

3. THE FOLLOWING IS A LISTING OF KEY DATES WHICH PROVIDE A CHRONOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ESTIMATE PRESENTED IN THE CONCLUDING PARAGRAPH

- A. 28 MAY - CONVOCAION OF PARLIAMENT
- B. 5 JUNE - NATIONAL DAY OF REVOLUTIONARY MOURNING - LARGE POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS POSSIBLE
- C. 2-5 JUNE - CONFERENCE OF THIRD WORLD NATIONS TO REVIEW IRANIAN CHARGES OF U.S. CRIMES AGAINST IRAN DURING THE RULE OF THE SHAH.
- D. 11 JUNE - FESTIVE RELIGIOUS PARADES CELEBRATING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE PROPHET
- E. 13 JUNE - FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF ALGIERS ACCORD BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ - ANTI-IRAQ POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS POSSIBLE
- F. 29 JUNE - CELEBRATION OF THE BIRTHDAY OF HIDDEN IMAN
- G. 14 JULY - BEGINNING OF THE ISLAMIC MONTH OF RAMADAN - HIGHLY RELIGIOUS WITH DAILY FASTING DURING THE DAY FOR THE NEXT

PAGE 6 RUEIZJC 0136
30 DAYS.

- H. 21 JULY - 2ND ANNIVERSARY OF THE '78 INCIDENT IN MASHHAD DURING WHICH MANY PEOPLE WERE KILLED BY THE GOVERNMENT FORCES.

4. IN ATTEMPTING TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS IN THE NEXT SIXTY TO NINETY DAYS IT IS NECESSARY TO REVIEW THE THREE BROAD SCENARIOS THAT COULD PREVAIL.

- A. THE MOST LIKELY IS THAT THE PARLIAMENT WILL ADJOURN AT THE START OF RAMADAN O/A 14 JULY WITHOUT HAVING TAKEN ANY DEFINITIVE ACTION ON THE HOSTAGE QUESTION. FROM A MORE OPTIMISTIC PERSPECTIVE THE BEST THAT COULD BE EXPECTED PRIOR TO RAMDAN WOULD BE A SYMBOLIC RELEASE OF A TOKEN NUMBER OF HOSTAGES.
- B. THE OTHER TWO SCENARIOS THAT COULD APPLY ARE UNPREDICTABLE AS TO TIMING, HIGHLY REACTIVE IN NATURE AND BOTH WOULD PUT THE HOSTAGES AT RISK. NEITHER ARE VERY LIKELY BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR OCCURRING MUST BE CONSIDERED.
- C. THE FIRST OF THESE IS THE UNEXPECTED DEATH OF KHOMEINI PARTICULARLY IF HIS DEATH OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF A REAL OR ALLEGED ASSASSINATION. IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN GENERAL CHAOS WOULD

RVW 30 MAY 80

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TO RUEAIIF [REDACTED]
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~~SECRET~~ CITE J3.00137 SECTION 2 OF 2

SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NBR 6
RESULT, EMOTIONS WOULD RUN HIGH AND AFTER THE INITIAL PERIOD OF MOURNING THE HOSTAGES WOULD PROBABLY BECOME THE FOCUS OF REVENGE.
D. THE OTHER UNPREDICTABLE EVENT WOULD BE THE INITIATION OF AN ARMED COUNTER-REVOLUTION BY DISSIDENT ELEMENTS WHICH WAS PERCEIVED BY THE CLERICS AND MILITANTS TO BE AMERICAN INSPIRED. IF THIS WERE TO OCCUR SECURITY AROUND THE HOSTAGES WOULD INCREASE AND IF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES APPEARED TO BE THREATENING THE COMPOUND, IT IS POSSIBLE THE MILITANTS WOULD TAKE SOME COMBINATION OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS
(1) KILL SOME OR ALL HOSTAGES WHILE HOLDING THE COMPOUND
(2) KILL SOME HOSTAGES AND DISPERSE OTHERS TO HIDDEN LOCATIONS

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0137 ~~SECRET~~
(3) DISPERSE ALL THE HOSTAGES UNDER 2:1 CONTROL AND GO INTO HIDING.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE BASIC PROBLEM REMAINS THE NEED TO CONVINCING THE HARDLINE CLERICS INCLUDING KHOMEINI AND BEHESTI THAT IT IS IN THEIR BEST INTEREST TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES.
6. SUMMARY, IF NO POSITIVE ACTION (RELEASE OF SOME OR ALL HOSTAGES) BY MID-JULY IS TAKEN BY THE IRANIAN PARTIES CONCERNED THE LIKLIHOOD OF A RELEASE IN THE FOLLOWING THIRTY DAYS IS CONSIDERED LOW, AND AS TIME PASSES AND THE FIRST YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE TAKE OVER APPROACHES THE ODDS OF A RELEASE PRIOR TO NOVEMBER FOURTH DECREASE DRASTICALLY.

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CONDUCTED ON 13 JUN 92
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MSG 73
DTG 111600Z JUNE 80
FROM [REDACTED]
TO ISCW (S)

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SUBJ: COORDINATION ASSESSMENT (S)

1. (S) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT EXTENT OF COORDINATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN IRANIAN MILITARY, PARAMILITARY, GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND THE MILITANTS CONTROLLING THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

2. SHORTLY AFTER THE ABORTED AMERICAN RESCUE ATTEMPT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0157-1-0-5-5-0-5-1

[REDACTED]

4. GIVEN THIS ENVIRONMENT, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN REPORTING AND COORDINATION BETWEEN THE GERDARMERIE NETWORK, THE MILITARY STRUCTURE, AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAS OCCURRED. IT MUST ALSO BE RECOGNIZED THAT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND SELECTED HARDLINE CLERICS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (SUCH AS BEHESTI) HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN IMPROVED. IT ALSO MUST BE ACCEPTED THAT COMMUNICATION FROM BEHESTI, KHALKHALE AND AHMAD KHOMEINI TO THE MILITANTS IS NOW A FACT OF LIFE AND A TELEPHONE CALL FROM ONE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS TO THE MILITANTS COULD SUBSTANTIALLY DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION AND INCREASE THE PASDARON/ MILITANT ALERT POSTURE.

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3 RUEIZJC 0157 TOP SECRET
UNDETECTED AMERICAN PENETRATION AND UNIMPEDED WITHDRAWAL.
THE GOVERNMENT WAS AND IS UNDER PRESSURE TO SHOW THE CLERICS
THAT THE CIVIL LEADERS AND MILITARY HEIRARCHY ARE RESPONSIBLE
AND EFFECTIVE WITHIN THEIR OWN SPHERES. AS LONG AS THIS
SITUATION PREVAILS THE CHANCE OF THE REPORTING OF RANDOM
DETECTION INCIDENTS BY THE GENDARMERIE AND THE AIR DEFENSE
STRUCTURE IS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. UNIDENTIFIED HELICOPTER
ACTIVITY WILL BE REPORTED AND REACTED TO IN SOME MANNER.
SUSPICIOUS GROUND ACTIVITY WILL BE REPORTED IF IT APPEARS TO
HAVE A MILITARY CONNOTATION.

6. CONCLUSION: RECOGNIZING THESE POSSIBILITIES THE CHANCES OF
A MAJOR AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAN BEING DETECTED, IDENTIFIED
AND REACTED TO HAS INCREASED OVER WHAT IT WAS IN APRIL 1980
AND WILL BE INCREASED AGAIN BY SOME UNKNOWN FACTOR FOR
EVERY ADDITIONAL AIR FRAME EMPLOYED , FOR EVERY EXTRA HOUR SPENT
ON THE GROUND, PARTICULARLY IF IN A STATIC MODE.

REVW ON 11 JUNE 80
BT
#0157

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THE GOVERNMENT IS UNDER PRESSURE TO SHOW THE CLERICS
THAT THE CIVIL LEADERS AND MILITARY HEIRARCHY ARE RESPONSIBLE
AND EFFECTIVE WITHIN THEIR OWN SPHERES. AS LONG AS THIS
SITUATION PREVAILS THE CHANCE OF THE REPORTING OF RANDOM
DETECTION INCIDENTS BY THE GENDARMERIE AND THE AIR DEFENSE
STRUCTURE IS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. UNIDENTIFIED HELICOPTER
ACTIVITY WILL BE REPORTED AND REACTED TO IN SOME MANNER.
SUSPICIOUS GROUND ACTIVITY WILL BE REPORTED IF IT APPEARS TO
HAVE A MILITARY CONNOTATION.

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B-274



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FM JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2
TO [REDACTED]
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~~SECRET~~ CITE J3 0288

SUBJ: 60-90 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION

REF: A. JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2 CITE 0274

B. JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2 NBR 065

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CO 12356
RETRACTED ON 21 JUN 92
REINSTATE CL BY DDO/AMC
 DECLASSIFIED TO [REDACTED]
REVISED ON 01 APR 77
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1. (S) MESSAGES CITED ABOVE PROVIDED JTF ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATIONS BASED ON DATA DATED AS OF 18 JUN THROUGH 31 JULY 1980. RECENT POLITICAL EVENTS IN IRAN AND CONUS PLUS REVEALED REPORTS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF HOSTAGE TRIALS WARRANT A REEXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION AND THE DISSEMINATION OF AN 60-90 DAY EVENTS PROJECTION. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES SUCH AN ASSESSMENT.

2. (S) A MAJOR GOAL OF KHOMEINI IS TO ESTABLISH A PURE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT DEVOID OF WESTERN INFLUENCE AND AT THE SAME TIME HUMILIATE THE UNITED STATES, OBTAIN U.S. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ITS "SINS" DURING THE REGIME OF THE SHAH, AND PUNISH THE U.S. PRESIDENT WHO PROTECTED THE SHAH (AN AVOWED TARGET OF KHOMEINI'S HATE). THE PROTRACTION OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION ACHIEVES SOME

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0288 ~~SECRET~~
OF THESE OBJECTIVES SPECIFICALLY; HUMILIATION OF USG, AND PUNISHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT BY THEORETICALLY REDUCING HIS POTENTIAL FOR REELECTION.

3. (S) BASED UPON ONGOING EVENTS IN IRAN, SUCH AS THE CONTINUING PURGE OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS WITH WESTERN BACKGROUNDS INCREASING CONTROL BY IRP, AND SELECTION OF IRP ISLAMIC HARDLINER AS PRIME MINISTER IT IS CLEAR THAT SECULAR (MODERATE) INFLUENCE IS DECLINING AS THE POWER OF THE HARDLINER AND CLERICS RISES. THESE INFLUENCES ARE NOT LIKELY TO ASSIST IN OBTAINING A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

4. (S) BASED UPON THE FOREGOING THE FOLLOWING PROJECTION OF EVENTS IS PROVIDED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

(A) NO HOSTAGES WILL BE RELEASED PRIOR TO U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS UNLESS USG MEETS IRANIAN DEMANDS OR ANOTHER HOSTAGE MEDICAL PROBLEM OCCURS.

(B) REPORTING ON POSSIBLE TRIALS WILL INCREASE, BUT ACTUAL

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TRIALS OF INDIVIDUALS IS UNLIKELY ALTHOUGH A "GRAND JURY STYLE" OF INDICTMENT PROCEEDINGS IS POSSIBLE.

(C) TEMPO OF ACTIVITY WILL PICKUP WITH THE APPROACH OF U.S. ELECTIONS, REACHING A PEAK IN MID-LATE OCTOBER.

(D) IF PRESIDENT CARTER LOSES THE ELECTION, KHOMEINI THRU THE MAJLIS MAY DIRECT THE INCREMENTAL RELEASE OF MOST OF THE HOSTAGES, RETAINING SOME NUMBER (5-10) AS SPIES AND WAR CRIMINALS, HOPING TO OBTAIN CONCESSIONS FROM THE NEW PRESIDENT IN JANUARY. HOWEVER, IF PRESIDENT CARTER WERE TO BE RE-ELECTED IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL THAT ANY OF THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE RELEASED WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS BY THE US.

5. (U) IN SUMMARY, THE CURRENT JTF ANALYSIS IS THAT NO BREAKTHROUGH IS LIKELY PRIOR TO THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL LOCATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTREMELY RESTRICTED WHILE EXTENSIVE DECEPTION ACTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE EMPLOYED.

REVW 14 AUGUST 80

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LOCATIONS BASED ON DATA OBTAINED AS OF 18 JUNE THROUGH 31 JULY 1979 (12) MESSAGES CITED ABOVE PROVIDED THE ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE

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REF: A* 7C2\2M0BIBD\75 CITE 0514

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FM JCS/SNOWBIRD/J3
TO [REDACTED]
BT
~~FOR SECRET~~ CITE J3 0293

SUBJECT: COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

REF: JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2 CITE 0288 SUBJECT: 60-90 DAY PROJECTION

1. (S) ACTING COMMANDER HAS REVIEWED REFERENCE AND AGREES WITH THE ESTIMATE WITH THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS.

(A) CC JUDGES THE LIKLIHOOD OF INDIVIDUAL HOSTAGE TRIALS TO BE 50/50

(B) CC JUDGES THE INCREMENTAL RELEASE OF SOME HOSTAGES IS POSSIBLE BEFORE OR AFTER THE U.S. ELECTIONS AND REGARDLESS OF THE U.S. POLITICAL SITUATION.

(C) CC SUMMARIZES THE SITUATION AS FOLLOWS.

SUMMARY:

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0293 ~~FOR SECRET~~

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FM [REDACTED]
TO [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1235
COMPLETED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDA, NMCC
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A

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.

REF: JCS/SNOWBIRD/03 CITE 0288 SUBJ: 62-90 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION

A

THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A HARDCOPY FOLLOW-UP TO THE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT PRESENTED AT THE [REDACTED] PLANNING CONFERENCE. AND IS A SUPPLEMENT TO REFERENCE.

A. THE AMERICAN-IRANIAN HOSTAGE SITUATION REMAINS AS IT DID IN NOVEMBER AND DURING THE INTERVENING MONTHS, IT IS A POLITICAL PROBLEM WITHOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION. POLITICAL SOLUTIONS ARE THE PRODUCT OF COMPROMISES. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, THE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING PARTIES THE USG AND THE IRANIAN ENTITIES ARE NON-NEGOTIABLE.

B. ALTHOUGH A HUMANITARIAN SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE THE POLITICAL IMPASSE IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE PAST 4 NOVEMBER BEFORE A MAJOR CHANGE. AFTER 4 NOVEMBER IRANIAN OPTIONS INCLUDE A RELEASE OF SOME HOSTAGES WHILE REQUESTING CONCESSIONS FROM THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION (IF THERE IS A NEW ADMINISTRATION), OR THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF MOST OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE INITIATION OF A GRAND JURY TYPE TRIAL HEADING TO THE INDICTMENT OF THE USG AND SEVERAL OF THE HOSTAGES.

C. A MAJOR UNKNOWN IN THE PROJECTION EQUATION IS THE HEALTH OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. HE IS CURRENTLY A MAJOR STABILIZING FORCE; IF HE WERE TO DIE OF NATURAL CAUSES AND HIS DEATH ACKNOWLEDGED AS SUCH NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE HOSTAGE SITUATION IS LIKELY TO OCCUR AS THE HARDLINE CLERICS NOW POSSESS A FAR GREATER DEGREE OF CONTROL THAN THEY DID PRIOR TO THE ELECTION OF THE PARLIAMENT AND NAMING OF THE PRIME MINISTER. HOWEVER, IF KHOMEINI WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED OR HIS DEATH CLAIMED BE THE RESULT OF AN AMERICAN PLOT THEN CHAOS AND CONFUSION WOULD RESULT AND WITHIN THREE-FIVE DAYS THE LIVES OF THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE AT SERIOUS RISK.

2. [REDACTED] IN REVIEWING THE THREAT, FIVE ENTITIES WARRANT DISCUSSION.

A. THE CONVENTIONAL IRANIAN MILITARY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE DUE TO INTERNAL PURGES OF THE PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP AND DIFFICULTIES IN MAINTAINING SOME OF THE MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS. HOWEVER

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B. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD STRUCTURE IS BECOMING MORE STRUCTURED AND IS UNQUESTIONABLY A TOOL OF THE CLERICS. IN THE RURAL AREAS THE GUARD HAS ATTEMPTED TO REPLACE THE ARMY BUT INTERGRATION HAS NOT OCCURRED. IN THE LARGER CITIES PARTICULARLY TEHRAN REPORTS NOW INDICATE GUARD MEMBERS HAVE TAKEN TO BULLYING THE POPULATION AT THE SLIGHTEST OPPORTUNITY AND SOME HAVE ESTABLISHED A NEIGHBORHOOD PROTECTION PAYOUT MECHANISM.

C. THE COMPOSITION OF THE MILITANTS SEEMS TO HAVE CHANGED SOMEWHAT WITH THE HARD CORE RADICALS, MANY WITH MARXIST INFLUENCED BACKGROUNDS, CONTINUING TO CONTROL THE FATE OF THE HOSTAGES, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED ASSISTANCE FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD AND HARDLINE CLERICS SUCH AS AYATOLLAH BEHESTI.

D. THE U.S. MEDIA AND SELF PROCLAIMED POLITICAL MORALISTS POSE A SIGNIFICANT DANGER TO ANY PROSPECTS OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND A TREMENDOUS THREAT TO MILITARY PLANNING WITH FALSE LEAKS AND COMPROMISES THEIR REAL DANGER LIE IN THEIR POTENTIAL FOR CREATING A DANGEROUS DEGREE OF INSTABILITY IN BOTH HOSTAGE LOCATION AND SECURITY.

E. THE FIFTH THREAT ENTITY IS THE INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS OF THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES.

C [REDACTED] AND WHILE AWAITING THE ADVENT OF ONE OF THESE POSSIBILITIES, THE USSR IS BUSILY LAYING THE PROPAGANDA GROUND-WORK TO CAPITALIZE ON THE ABOVE AND JUSTIFY A UNILATERAL MOVE ON THE PRETEXT OF COUNTERING THE ALLEDGED PRESENCE OF COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY FORCES OPERATING IN IRAN AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGANHISTAN.

3. ~~(S)~~ HOSTAGE SITUATION:

B.C. [REDACTED] AND
A. [REDACTED]
FACT: PLANNING MUST CONSIDER MULTIPLE TARGETS

C [REDACTED]
B. CURRENT ESTIMATES PUBLISHED AS FOLLOWS: MFA (3), EMBASSY [REDACTED]

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4. (U) (S) OPERATIONAL PLANNING. DURING THE REVIEW AND CROSSCHECKING OF POSSIBLE LOCATIONS WE HAVE LOCATED AT LEAST ONE POTENTIAL FIXED WING LANDING ZONE WITHIN 100NM OF EACH OF THE MORE LIKELY HOSTAGE DETENTION LOCATION, AND AT LEAST ONE ACTIVE AIRHEAD WITH EXTRACTION POTENTIAL WITHIN 12-15 MILES. OF ALL THE LOCATIONS TEHRAN OFFERS THE GREATEST NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES FOR INSERTION AND EXTRACTION.

A. IN THE CITY PROPER BOTH [MEHRABAD AND DOSHAN TAPPEH] HOLD POSSIBILITIES WITH D/T BEING WITHIN 5-6 MINUTES DRIVING TIME OF THE COMPOUND AND M/B WITHIN 20-25 MINUTES DRIVING TIME.

B. IN THE IMMEDIATE SUBURBS AT LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL SITES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS C130 CAPABLE AND TWO OTHERS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WITHIN 30 NM.

C. FARTHER OUT [MANZARIYEH] STILL HOLDS A POTENTIAL FOR USE. IN ADDITION THREE FIXED WING CAPABLE SITES (ONE C141) HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE SEMMAN AREA.

D. THE SEARCH FOR ADDITIONAL SITES IS CONTINUING AND FIELD SURVEY OF THE MORE PROMISING SITES IS HOPED TO BE STARTED WITHIN 3-4 WEEKS.

5. (U) (S) IN SUMMARY THREE POINTS ARE IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER DURING FUTURE PLANNING AND TRAINING.

A. THE SITUATION IS NOT STABLE AND THE CONFIRMED LOCATIONS OF TODAY CAN BE INVALID TOMORROW BECAUSE OF A MILITANT REACTION TO A NEWS RUMOR.

B. THE SECOND POINT IS THAT THE SOVIETS

PROLONGED-WIDE-SPREAD RESCUE OPERATION THAT CARRIED A LARGE SIGNATURE BEFORE OR DURING THE OPERATION COULD PROVIDE THEM WITH THE RATIONAL TO REACT AGAINST AN "AMERICAN INVASION".

C. THE THIRD AND FINAL POINT IS THAT REGARDLESS OF THE HOLLOWAY BOARD'S INFERENCE THAT OPSEC WAS TOO RESTRICTIVE DURING THE PLANNING FOR THE LAST ATTEMPT, IT WAS ESSENTIAL THEN AND AN ABSOLUTE IMPERATIVE NOW. SECRECY WAS PARAMOUNT TO MISSION SUCCESS THE LAST TIME, AND THE SAME IS DOUBLY TRUE NOW, SECRECY IS ESSENTIAL FOR MISSION SUCCESS AND FOR WORLD PEACE. THE BEAR IS STANDING IN WINGS ANTICIPATING THE SCRIPT AND WATCHING FOR HIS CUE TO ENTER STAGE NORTH.

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Return
G [redacted]
B-281

MSG SP 142
DTG 171255Z SEP 92
FM SMCBIFB/12
TO DELTA/S2
A [redacted] /S2
IP1ST/32

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1255
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92 B-281
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 USE BORROWED IN
BY OADR
CLASSIFIED BY Multiple Sources
[redacted]

SUBJECT: LOCATION DESCRIPTIONS

FOLLOWING DATA IS CURRENT J2 ASSESSMENT OF [redacted] HOSTAGE DETENTION SITES. INFO SHOULD BE USED FOR NEAR-TERM OPERATIONAL AND EXERCISE-SCENARIO PLANNING:

1. US EMBASSY

[redacted]

(5)

2. MFA

A. HOSTAGES: 3

[redacted]

(3)

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] C


B-277

~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT/ORCON/WNINTEL~~

9/7/80

WORKING PAPER FOR SOD

Subject: DIA Assessment of Hostage Locations



E.L.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] C
~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT/ORCON/WNINTEL~~

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

RETURN COPY [REDACTED]

B- 282

VZCZCZCZCZCZCZ
OO RUEAIIF
RR RRR1230 23076 271140Z
ZNY 11111
O 2714 02 SEP 92
FM [REDACTED] C
TO [REDACTED]
BT
[REDACTED] CITE JO 09076

SUB: HOSTAGE GROUPINGS/DISPOSITIONS

1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES LATEST JID ESTIMATE OF NUMBER, GROUPING AND POSSIBLE LOCATIONAL DISPOSITION.

[REDACTED]

OO RFA (S)
L 183 1, 1000 11, 1000 11

[REDACTED]

RRR1230 23076 271140Z

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

R.V. 27 SEP 92
BT
1-576

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1235
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
INITIATIVE OR BY DDO, NMCC
 NEAR DOWNSIDE TO
REFR ON DADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Images

B-285

~~SECRET~~

MSG 311
DIG 351200Z OCT 80
FM JCS/SNOBRIED/10
TO

30W
131
DELTA
AWACS

ZEN: DIA/JS-1/IF

SUBJ: ADDENDUM TO INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NO. 7

REF JTF MSG DIG 221130Z OCT 80, SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NO. 7

1. (13) REFERENCE OMITTED DESCRIPTION OF "ANNE" [REDACTED]

2. (13) FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDES DISTANCE AND THREAT DATA FOR ANNE AND SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO REF:

A. (INSERT IN PARA 6 OF REF)

- AIR DIST TO US EMB: 17NM
- DIST TO NEAREST POPULATION: 4 NM
- DIST TO MAJOR POPULATION: 20 KM

B. (INSERT IN PARA 9 OF REF)

- DETECTION: LOW
- REPORTING: LOW
- PARA-MILITARY - REACTION: LOW-MOD
- REGULAR ARMY - REACTION: LOW
- AIR FORCE: LOW-MOD

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12565
 COMPLETED ON 21 JUN 92
 RECLASSIFIED BY DDO, NMCC
 DER DOWNGR
 REVW BY OADR
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C. (INSERT IN PARA 10 OF REF)

- 15-20 MIN: NONE
- 30-45 MIN: GENDARMIE/REVOLUTION GUARDS
- 45-60 MIN: POSS OBS HELD [REDACTED] GEND OR REV GD
- 60-90 MIN: POSS F-4'S [REDACTED] ADD'L REV GDS
- 120 MIN: ADDITION F4'S [REDACTED] POSS REGULAR ARMY FROM TEHRAN

REVW 30 OCT 80
BT

~~SECRET~~



[REDACTED]

WORKING COPY

1180
B-286

[REDACTED]-34,607/DB

Working Paper for J-3

SUBJECT: Comments on Intelligence Assessment No. 7 (U)

1. (U) Reference paragraph 9. Detection of the force at "Peggy" would probably fall in the "mod-high" category given the presence of the air-traffic control radar near Manzarlyeh and the major highway just east of the airfield. Likewise, the reporting probability should also increase to "mod-high". Detection of the force at "Anne" would probably be "mod-high" due to coverage from the air traffic control radar at Tehran/Mehrabad. [REDACTED] Additionally, a major highway lies just west of the airstrip. Commensurately, reporting would also likely be "mod-high".

2. (U) Reference paragraph 10. "Elements from Kathy" are listed under "Kathy" column during the 45-60 minute time frame. This comment probably belongs under the "Susan" column.

3. (U) Reference paragraph 11, AMERICAN EMBASSY. Arrival of regular Army and Air Force within 60-90 minutes is almost certain. However, the arrival of these forces is much more likely to occur at 60 minutes rather than 90 minutes.

G


[REDACTED]

Western Division
Directorate for Research

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: OADR

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

B-287
Info  C
(10)

MSG 0260
DTG 25 1245Z OCT 80
FM: JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2
TO: SEOD

101ST
1 SOW
AWACS

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 DEL DOWNGR TO
REVW ON OADR
REMOVED FROM multiple sources

~~FOR EYES ONLY~~ LINDIS

SUBJ: RELEASE ASSESSMENT


REF: (A) JCS/SNOWBIRD/0230/DTG 221130Z OCT 80 SUBJ: INTELL ASSESSMENT
(B) JCS/SNOWBIRD/0243/DTG 231605Z OCT 80 SUBJ: OPSEC

1. (U) DESPITE MEDIA SPECULATION AND ONGOING BEHIND THE SCENES NEGOTIATIONS THIS OFFICE (JTF/J2) DOES NOT FORESEE THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ALL THE HOSTAGES. GIVEN THE DICHOTOMY OF OPINIONS BETWEEN THE IRANIAN SECULAR OFFICIALS AND THE CLERICAL HARDLINERS WHO DOMINATE THE MAJLIS A COMPROMISE "RELEASE PROGRAM" IS MORE LIKELY THAN A COMPLETE RELEASE PRIOR TO 4 NOV 80.

2. (U) IN THE OPINION OF THIS OFFICE (JTF/J2) THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO SEEMS POSSIBLE. A PARTIAL RELEASE OF MORE THAN HALF OF THE HOSTAGES BEFORE 4 NOV WITH THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF APPROXIMATELY A DOZEN HOSTAGES AT LEAST PENDING "PROOF" OF USG FULLFILLMENT OF IRANIAN DEMANDS AND AS INSURANCE (A BARGAINING CHIP) AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN US LEADERSHIP.

3. (U) BASED ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME HOSTAGES MAY BE RELEASED

QUESTIONS FOLLOW



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MSG 010
DTG 031250Z NOV 80
FM JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2
TO ISEOD
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290
B-
[Handwritten initials]

SUBJ: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT SEVEN BRAVO

REF: A. JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2/DTG 221130Z OCT 80/ASSESSMENT NO. 7
B. JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2/DTG 3101200Z OCT 80/ADDENDUM

1. (U) REF ALPHA WAS A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION. REF B PROVIDED SUPPLEMENTAL DATA ON A POTENTIAL LANDING ZONE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A 30 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION.
 2. (U) THE CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE MAJLIS ARE NOT NEW AND NOT EASILY MET. SIMULTANEOUS OR COMPLETE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES IN THE SHORT TERM (2-3 WEEKS) IS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL.
 3. (U) AS NEGOTIATIONS DRAG ON, DISPUTES WITHIN IRAN WILL GROW, PARTICULARLY IF THE US ADMINISTRATION IS TRANSITORY VICE PERMANENT AND GIVEN TRUCE OR STAGNATION ON THE IRAN/IRAQ BORDER THE MAJLIS MAY ASSUME A SELF PERCEPTION OF IRAN AS HAVING AN INDEPENDENT SENSE OF VIEABILITY SUFFICIENT ENOUGH TO FOSTER A CONTINUATION OF ITS REVOLUTIONARY TACT. CONVERSELY A TRANSITORY ADMINISTRATION OR FLARE UP ON THE BORDER WILL PROVIDE THE RADICALS WITH A REASON TO HOLD AT LEAST A FEW TRUMP CARDS (HOSTAGES) AGAINST A POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN US POLICY, A RESUMPTION OF IRAQ AGGRESSION, OR THE ACTIVE INITIATION OF AN ACTIVE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WITHIN IRAN BY ONE OR BOTH OF THE EXILE MOVEMENTS.
 4. (U) CONTINUED SUPPORT BY NORTH KOREA, LIBYA AND OTHER ARMS SOURCES WILL PROVIDE AN AURA OF MILITARY SUBSTANCE BUT ACUTE SHORTAGES OF DOMESTIC HEATING FUEL WILL HAVE A COUNTERVENING IMPACT OFFSET ONLY BY CONTINUED CALLS BY THE REVOLUTIONARY CLERICS FOR THE NEED TO SACRIFICE TO INSURE THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION SURVIVES.
 5. (U) IN SUMMARY, PARTIAL RELEASE OF SOME, POSSIBLY HALF OF THE HOSTAGES, IS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, BUT THE OUTLOOK FOR AN EARLY AND COMPLETE RESOLUTION OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION SHORT OF PUBLIC INTERVENTION BY AYOTOLLAH KHOMEINI IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY.
- REVW 3 NOV 80

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON _____

DERIVATIVE CL BY _____

DECL SECURITY TO _____

REVW ON _____

REVISED FROM _____

Classified by: DDC, NMCC

Declassify on: OADR

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

JQ

18/11 29
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1

REMITTED
A to
1 SOW/181230Z
181305Z

MSG 177
DTG 171220Z NOV 88
FM JCS/SNOWBIRD/12
TO 101ST [REDACTED]
1 SOW [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EJ 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD, NMCC
 DEEL DOWNGR TO
REVISED ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multitoll Source

~~TOP SECRET LIMDIS~~

SUBJ: CRITICAL FACILITIES ASSESSMENT

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED FACILITIES WHICH COULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON MISSION EXECUTION. THE LIST CONTAINS THREE CATEGORIES OF FACILITIES.

(A) CATEGORY ONE ARE THOSE FACILITIES WHOSE UNOBTUSIVE NEUTRALIZATION PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION WOULD INCREASE THE LIKLIHOOD OF MISSION FORCES CLOSING WITH THE CRITICAL TACTICAL OBJECTIVES PRIOR TO THEIR DETECTION.

(B) CATEGORY TWO ARE THOSE FACILITIES WHOSE NEUTRALIZATION SIMULTANEOUS WITH OR FOLLOWING SHORTLY AFTER H-HOUR WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE FORCE ATTRITION DUE TO HOSTILE ACTION.

(C) CATEGORY THREE INCLUDES FACILITIES WHOSE NEUTRALIZATION WOULD INCREASE PROBABILITY OF UNOPPOSED FORCE EGRESS.

2. (U) THE LIST CONTAINS 24 FACILITIES. THE FIRST FIVE MEET THE CRITERIA FOR ALL THREE CATEGORIES. THE NEXT TEN FACILITIES (6-15) MEET THE CRITERIA FOR CATEGORY TWO. THE LAST NINE MEET THE CRITERIA FOR CATEGORY THREE AND FOR THE MOST PART ARE MISSION ENHANCING VICE MISSION CRITICAL AS ARE THE 15 CAT I/CAT II FACILITIES.

3. (U) THE 24 FACILITIES ARE LISTED BELOW ALONG WITH AN ESTIMATE OF EFFECTIVENESS BY WEAPONS SYSTEM, WITH A PRIME CONSIDERATION GIVEN NOT ONLY THE SYSTEMS BASIC EFFECTIVENESS BUT ITS SURVIVABILITY. THE SYSTEMS CODE USED IS [REDACTED]

THE LISTING IS NOT ALL ENCOMPASSING, EXCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, SITUATION-SENSITIVE FACILITIES NEAR THE COMPOUND SUCH AS THE [REDACTED] THE LIST SHOULD BE USED AS A PLANNING REFERENCE NOT DECISION DOCUMENT. ASSIGNMENT OF WEAPON SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AT LATER DATE AT [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

(1)	[REDACTED]	FAIR	GOOD	GOOD
(2)	[REDACTED]	POOR	GOOD	GOOD
(3)	[REDACTED]	FAIR	FAIR	GOOD
(4)	[REDACTED]	POOR	GOOD	GOOD
(5)	[REDACTED]	POOR	GOOD	FAIR
(6)	[REDACTED]	POOR	GOOD	FAIR
(7)	[REDACTED]	FAIR	FAIR	FAIR
(8)	[REDACTED]	POOR	FAIR	GOOD
(9)	[REDACTED]	POOR	FAIR	GOOD
(10)	[REDACTED]	POOR	FAIR	GOOD
(11)	[REDACTED]	FAIR	FAIR	FAIR
(12)	[REDACTED]	POOR	POOR	FAIR
(13)	[REDACTED]	FAIR	GOOD	FAIR
(14)	[REDACTED]	POOR	POOR	FAIR
(15)	[REDACTED]	POOR	POOR	FAIR
(16)	[REDACTED]	POOR	FAIR	FAIR
(17)	[REDACTED]	POOR	FAIR	FAIR
(18)	[REDACTED]	POOR	FAIR	FAIR
(19)	[REDACTED]	POOR	FAIR	FAIR
(20)	[REDACTED]	POOR	FAIR	FAIR
(21)	[REDACTED]	FAIR	FAIR	POOR
(22)	[REDACTED]	POOR	POOR	FAIR
(23)	[REDACTED]	POOR	POOR	FAIR
(24)	[REDACTED]	FAIR	GOOD	GOOD

A, B, C

REVW 17 NOV 88
BT

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

B270

ASSISTANT DIRECTORATE FOR JCS SUPPORT

Response to Request for Intelligence



Date: 20 NOV 1980
 To: J-2 (Snowbird), OJCS
 Subject: Assessment of likelihood of hostage release/transfer (U)
 Requirement: Assess the likelihood of a full or partial release of the hostages prior to 1 December, 1 January, or 1 February, and the likelihood of the transfer of control over the hostages prior to their-release.

1. ^(U) ~~(S/NOFORN/NNINTEL)~~ A release of all 52 of the hostages at any time prior to 1 February appears unlikely. Although domestic support within Iran for a release has grown since the war began in September, any move to return the hostages remains highly vulnerable to a last minute spoiling action by any of a number of key individuals or groups. It does seem possible, however, that during the Christmas holidays a limited number of hostages might be released as a humanitarian gesture. The likelihood of such a gesture would increase if negotiations between Iran and the US on Tehran's public demands are proceeding well from the Iranian perspective. By 1 February it appears highly possible that many of the hostages, possibly all but eight or ten, will be returned. Those hostages which Iran has charged with espionage are unlikely to be released until: (1) all of Iran's public demands including a return of the former monarch's wealth and a complete release of Iranian assets are met; (2) Tehran receives some type of assurance from the new US administration that Iran will not be subjected to any sort of political, economic, or military reprisals for seizing the American diplomats; and (3) Iraq withdraws its forces from all Iranian territory. Concerning the last point, any significant defeat by Iranian forces in the current conflict would probably precipitate a major government crisis in Tehran. Political moderates and the military would press even harder for a release of the hostages as a means of gaining access to Western arms and equipment. They would be opposed by radical clerics who would advocate drastic action -- such as a trial of the hostages and/or military/terrorist strikes against Arab and European governments which they perceive as having supported Iraq. The outcome of such a crisis remains problematic at best.

Classified by DIA JS
 Declassify on 20 NOV 1988

~~WARNING NOTICE / INTELLIGENCE
 SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

~~SECRET~~


~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

Declassified by:
 DDO, NMC

2. ^(U) ~~(S//NOFORN//UNINTEL)~~ The Iranians would gain maximum propaganda value from any partial release. World reaction to a Christmas release would be favorable; therefore, Iran could be expected to attempt to achieve maximum propaganda value from such a humanitarian gesture before releasing other hostages. The Iranian's may also reason that by releasing some of the hostages while the current administration is still in office, they will be able to deal with the new administration on fresh terms. This would ease the way to have economic sanctions lifted by the European Community, thereby relieving a growing requirement for certain economic and military/industrial goods. If no release occurs on or before the end of January, the next logical period would be just prior to the 20/21 March 81 Iranian New Year. Traditionally, this is a time when one settles debts and cancels out old requirements in preparation for the new year.

3. ^(U) ~~(S//NOFORN//UNINTEL)~~ All available evidence indicates that the hostages remain under the physical control of the student militants, although the Iranian government now ostensibly has the authority to arrange for their repatriation. We expect the hostages to remain under the control of their captors until such a time as they are handed over at the airport to whatever party has actually arranged for their transportation out of Iran. Any of several "neutral" parties could be called upon to make such arrangements including: (1) international organizations such as the Red Cross or the UN; (2) friendly Muslim countries like Syria or Algeria; or (3) "neutral" countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, or Austria.

PREPARED BY:
Iran/Iraq Task Force
Ext. 71888


JAMES L. BROWN
Major General, USAF
Assistant Director for
JCS Support

~~ALL MATTER - UNCLASSIFIED
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~SECRET~~

B-302
Date: 12/24/79

MSG NR 030
INTC 041020
TO [REDACTED] 06410
INFO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

DEC 20

SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT
REF: (A) [REDACTED] CITE [REDACTED] TG 171947Z DEC 79 / 248 (C) (U) C
(B) [REDACTED] CITE [REDACTED] TG 171950Z DEC 79 / 248

[REDACTED]

C

REF: (A) [REDACTED] CITE [REDACTED] TG 171947Z DEC 79 / 248 (C) (U) C
(B) [REDACTED] CITE [REDACTED] TG 171950Z DEC 79 / 248

C

NOTE: THIS MESSAGE SUPPLEMENTS OPINION EXPRESSED IN [REDACTED] C
WHICH RELIABLE INFORMATION COVERING THE PERIOD MAY 1979
LATE NOVEMBER HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CONFIRMS EARLIER REPORTS THAT
REPORTS THAT

[REDACTED] W/EXTR DOI 9/NOV/80

[REDACTED]

AND THOSE OFTEN LOCATED BY COMING AT LIONS, IS LI
LIKELIHOOD SOME OF THESE HOSTAGES MAY BE TERRIBLY ILL
A "HOTEL (C)" FOR MEDIA PROPAGANDA

C
L. [unclear]
Dissemination
Action

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

C

REVW 24 DEC 79
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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 1235
COMPLETED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDD, NMCC
 N/A APPROVED
REV BY SAAR
REMOVED FROM Multiple Copies

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P-303

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VZVZCDVA 153
OO RUEA IIF RUEA IIJ
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FM JTF/SKOWS IIR/J2
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BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ LINDIS CITE J2 0502

SUBJ: HOSTAGE CONTROL

1st IT IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE APPARENT THAT A CHANGE IN CONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES HAS EVOLVED DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS.

(A) PRIOR TO THE APRIL RESCUE EFFORT HOSTAGE CARE AND CONTROL WAS PRINCIPALLY A FUNCTION OF THE STUDENT MILITARIAS WITH SOME GUIDANCE FROM AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF HANGLINE CLERICS AND REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITIES, AND PHYSICAL SUPPORT FROM REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ELEMENTS AND AT LEAST THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC0502 ~~TOP SECRET~~ LINDIS

(B) SUBSEQUENT TO THE APRIL RESCUE ATTEMPT THE INFLUENCE OF THE CLERICS GREW AND THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENTAL AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ASSISTANCE (IN TRANSPORTATION, MOVEMENT SECURITY, AND DETENTION SITE SUPPORT) INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY.

(C) BEGINNING IN MID-SEPTEMBER AS THE INFLUENCE OF THE CLERICS AND THE PRIME MINISTER GREW AND THESE ENTITIES CAME TO REALIZE THAT CONTINUED DETENTION OF THE HOSTAGES, ITS ASSOCIATED ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND RESULTING DEPLETION OF IRAN FUNDS WAS HAVING A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON IRAN'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A RESPECTABLE INTERNATIONAL CREDIT POSTURE, THE WHEELS WERE SET IN MOTION FOR ANOTHER CHANGE. THE IMPACT OF THE IRAQI WAR ON HOSTAGE DISPOSITION IS UNKNOWN HOWEVER,

C
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC0502 ~~TOP SECRET~~ LINDIS

C

C
2. IS HIGHLY LIKELY IF NEGOTIATIONS BREAKDOWN AND/OR PROTRACTED DETENTION IS ANTICIPATED.

REVW 30 DEC 00
BT
#0502

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1256
COMPLETED ON 21 JUN 92
REVISOR CI BY DDO, NACC
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REVW BY OADR
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Section 10/24
B-306

VZCZC0VA157
OO RUEALIF RUEALIJ
DE RUEIZJC #03 35 2215
ZNY TTTT
O 341157 DEC 80
FM [REDACTED] 06/82
TO [REDACTED] J2
INFO RUEALIF [REDACTED] C
RUEALIJ/DELTA/732
ZEN/DIAZ/1-1

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDO, NMCC
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SUBJ: CHRISTMAS '80 FILMING

1. (S) THIS IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF FILM FOOTAGE AND SOME STILL PICTURES RELEASED BY IRAN 25 TO 29 DECEMBER 1980.
2. (U) ALTHOUGH RELEASED OVER A FIVE DAY PERIOD, ALL FILMING WAS COMPLETED ON OR BEFORE 26 DECEMBER 1980 AND FOR PURPOSES OF ANALYSIS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS TWO SEPARATE PARTS: (1) CHRISTMAS SERVICES (24/25 DEC), AND (2) DIPLOMATIC VISIT BY THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR TO TEHRAN (25-26 DEC 80)

PAGE 2 RUAIZJC 0503 ~~TOP SECRET~~

3. (S) CHRISTMAS SERVICES TOOK PLACE IN TWO SEPARATE, RATHER NON-DISTINCT ROOMS. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, SOME NOTICEABLE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THESE ROOMS AND THE ROOMS THE HOSTAGES WERE LIVING IN WHEN VISITED BY THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR. FOR PURPOSES OF DIFFERENTIATION, THE ROOMS IN WHICH CHRISTMAS SERVICES TOOK PLACE ARE LABELED THE CURTAIN ROOM AND THE RIBBON ROOM.

A. 26 HOSTAGES WERE SEEN IN SIX GROUPS IN THE CURTAIN ROOM BY THE VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO TEHRAN. THESE GROUPS OF HOSTAGES WERE:

- 1) GROUP 1 (5): LEWIS, MOORE, HERMENING, WARD, MCKEEL
- 2) GROUP 2 (4): SCOTT, SHARER, RAGAN, MOREFIELD
- 3) GROUP 3 (5): ROYER, COOK, PERSINGER, HALL, KIRTLEY
- 4) GROUP 4 (2): KOOB, SWIFT
- 5) GROUP 5 (5): ROSEN, LAUTERBACH, ENGELMANN, GERMAN, KEOUGH

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PAGE 3 RUEIJZC 0503 ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

(S) GROUP 6 (5): ODE, BELK, MIELE, GRAVES, SCHAEFER

B. ELEVEN HOSTAGES MAKING UP FOUR GROUPS PLUS ONE HOSTAGE BY HIMSELF WERE SEEN BY TWO IRANIAN CHRISTIAN CLERGYMEN IN THE RIBBON ROOM. THESE GROUPS OF HOSTAGES WERE:

(1) GROUP 7 (5): SICKMAN, GILLETTE, GALLEGOS, SOLACINSKI, PLOTKIN

(2) GROUP 8 (2): HOLLAND, LIMBERT

(3) GROUP 9 (2): NEEDHAM, MOELLER

(4) GROUP 10 (2): ROEDER, METRINKO

(5) AHERN (ALONE)

(S) (S) HOSTAGE JONES WAS NOT SEEN IN FILM OF CHRISTMAS SERVICES, BUT WAS SEEN IN FILM OF GROUP FIVE MEETING IN THEIR ROOM WITH THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR.

PAGE 4 RUEIJZC 0503 ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

(S) (S) HOSTAGE MORGAN WAS SEEN ONLY IN A STILL PICTURE SAID TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN AT THE RECENT CHRISTMAS SERVICES.

(S) (S) THE THREE HOSTAGES HELD IN THE WPA WERE SEEN IN A STILL PICTURE OF THEM MEETING IN AN U/I ROOM WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

(S) (S) NOT SEEN IN ANY PICTURES WERE (S) HOSTAGES: DAUCHERTY, KALP, LEE, BLUCKER, BARNES, LOPEZ, SUBIC, KENNEDY, AND KUPKE.

(S) (S) THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ IS SHOWN IN FILM FOOTAGE WITH ELEVEN HOSTAGES IN FOUR GROUPS AND ONE HOSTAGE ALONE. (LOCATIONS APPEAR TO BE THE ROOMS THE HOSTAGES WERE BEING HELD IN TEMPORARILY.) THE HOSTAGE GROUPS SEEN WERE IDENTICAL IN COMPOSITION TO THOSE SEEN DURING CHRISTMAS SERVICES AND WERE GROUPS 4, 7, 8 AND 9. THE LONE HOSTAGE WAS AHERN. THE AMBASSADOR'S VISIT OCCURRED AFTER THE CHRISTMAS SERVICES, PROBABLY THE NEXT DAY.

LOCATION:

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PAGE 5 RUE LIZC 0503
(S) ANALYSIS.

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SUBJ: CHRISTMAS '80 FILMING

3) YOUNG MILITARY WERE FILMED IN SETS OF THREE IN THREE GROUPS: LEWIS, MCKEEL, HERMENDING IN GROUP ONE; PERSINGER, HALL, AND KIRLEY IN GROUP THREE; GALLEGOS, GILLETTE, SICKMAN IN GROUP SEVEN.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0504 ~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

C) [REDACTED] ALL EXCEPT ONE WORE IDENTICAL SHIRTS AND THE EXCEPTION STATED HUMOROUSLY THAT HE WAS "OUT OF UNIFORM" BECAUSE HE WAS NOT GIVEN ONE OF THE SHIRTS CHRISTMAS 1979.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0504 ~~TOP SECRET~~

1) THE ROOMS IN WHICH KOUB AND SWIFT, AND GRAVES WERE SEEN HAD SEMI-DECORATIVE/QUASI-RESIDENTIAL SHELVING ALONG ONE WALL.

2) THE ROOMS IN WHICH NEEDHAM AND MOELLER, AND HOLLAND AND LIMBERT WERE FILMED HAD SMALL ROUND TABLES AND NIGHTSTAND-TYPE TABLES WITH LAMPS.

3) THE ROOM IN WHICH HOLLAND AND LIMBERT WERE FILMED HAD A BATHROOM WITH BATHTUB WITHOUT SHOWER CURTAIN, INITIAL IN MIRROR, TOILET SINK, DUSH AND TOPLESS COMMODE.

[REDACTED]

6. (S) CONCLUSION. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ALL THE HOSTAGES ASSEMBLED FOR THE CHRISTMAS SERVICES (PROPAGANDA FILMING) HAVE REMAINED IN THOSE LOCATIONS BEYOND 28 DECEMBER 80.

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SUBJ: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT (U)

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PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 8523 [REDACTED]
RAJAI STATED ON IRANIAN TELEVISION THAT KHOMEINI
HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT AN ALGERIAN OFFER OF ITS GOOD OFFICES TO RESOLVE
THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND GOI.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. (U) ALTHOUGH ALL OF THE ABOVE IS PROBABLY TRUE, RECENT MEDIA
REPORTS AND SPECULATION COULD JEOPARDIZE ANY TENTATIVE AGREEMENTS.
IT MUST BE RECALLED THAT AT LEAST FOUR TIMES DURING THE PAST THIRTEEN
MONTHS THE POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE WAS VIEWED, AT LEAST BY SOME OPTI-
MISTS, AS BEING IMMINENT. IN EACH CASE THE POSSIBILITY WAS STYMIED
MORE OR LESS AT THE LAST MINUTE AS A RESULT OF IN-FIGHTING BETWEEN
CONTENDING FACTIONS WITHIN TEHRAN.

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 8523 [REDACTED]
5. (U) THE SPECULATION OF AN IMMINENT HOSTAGE RELEASE WILL CON-
TINUE TO PERSIST FOR THE NEAR TERM. THE POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE, HOW-
EVER, COULD BE INVERTED AT ANYTIME FOR ANY NUMBER OF REASONS RELATED
TO THE POLITICAL FACTIONALISM. ADDITIONALLY, EVEN IF A HOSTAGE RELEASE
IS ANNOUNCED, THE POSSIBILITY STILL EXISTS THAT SOME HOSTAGES COULD
BE DETAINED AT THE LAST MOMENT WITHOUT ANY FOREWARNING TO US.

6. (U) COORDINATION WITH DIA, [REDACTED] THIS DATE HAS CONFIRMED
THAT ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE HOSTAGES ARE CONTIN-
UING, AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL ALL 52 HOSTAGES ARE IN US HANDS.

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SUBJ: RELEASE ASSESSMENT

1. (u) ALTHOUGH THERE CONTINUES TO BE MANY POSITIVE INDICATIONS THAT A NEGOTIATED END TO THE HOSTAGE ISSUE IS NEAR THERE HAS BEEN NO FORMAL AGREEMENT AND ACTUAL RELEASE IF IT COMES COULD STILL BE DAYS AWAY.

A. SECURITY SURROUNDING THE HOSTAGES UNTIL THEY CLEAR IRANIAN AIRSPACE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A CONCERN BOTH TO THE IRANIAN PARTIES SEEKING TO END THE SITUATION AND TO THE USG.

B. GIVEN THE RECOGNITION THAT COMPETING POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE STILL ACTIVE IN TEHRAN AND THERE ARE SPINTER GROUPS CAPABLE OF ATTEMPTING PHYSICAL DISRUPTION OF ANY HOSTAGE TRANSFER THE DANGER OF A SPOILER ACTION PERSISTS.

2. [REDACTED]

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SUBJ: SOURCE REPORTING 17 JAN 81

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS REPORTED BY [REDACTED] ON 17 JAN 1981. INFO RELAYED TELEPHONICALLY [REDACTED] 17 JAN 81.

(A) ACCORDING TO SOURCE [REDACTED]

(B) SOURCE ALSO INDICATED [REDACTED]

2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS REPORTED ON 17 JAN 81 BY DOD [REDACTED]

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SUBJ: HOSTAGE DEBRIEFING REPORT


1. (S) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(A) A JOINT DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS)/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) DEBRIEFING TEAM INTERVIEWED 50 OF THE 52 RETURNEES DURING A TWO AND

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC0548 ~~S E C R E T / N O F O R M L I M I T S~~ A HALF DAY PERIOD IN WEISBADEN USAF HOSPITAL, GERMANY. TWO RETURNEES WERE NOT DEBRIEFED FOR MEDICAL REASONS.

(B) LOCATION OF THE HOSTAGES FLUCTUATED BETWEEN CONSOLIDATION AND DISPERSION. THREE DETENTION SITES IN TEHRAN WERE USED BETWEEN 4 NOVEMBER AND MID-DECEMBER 1979, THE EMBASSY COMPOUND AND TWO PRIVATE RESIDENCES. DURING THIS INITIAL PERIOD MORE THAN 20 HOSTAGES WERE ROTATED BETWEEN THE COMPOUND AND THE TWO RESIDENCES. BY MID-DECEMBER ALL HOSTAGES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE THREE WHO RESIDED IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA), WERE BACK ON THE COMPOUND WHERE THEY REMAINED, DISPERSED INTERNALLY UNTIL MARCH 1980. BEGINNING IN MID-MARCH ALL WERE CONSOLIDATED IN THE CHANCERY WHERE THEY STAYED TOGETHER UNTIL THE EVENING OF 25 APRIL 1980.

(C) DURING THE NIGHT OF 25/26 APRIL 1980 A RAPID AND ALMOST COMPLETE DISPERSION TOOK PLACE. THREE SMALL GROUPS WERE LOCATED WITHIN TEHRAN; IN THE CHANCERY, EVIN PRISON, AND A PRIVATE RESIDENCE. THE REMAINDER OF THE HOSTAGES WERE IMMEDIATELY DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THOSE IN EVIN AND THE TEHRAN RESIDENCE WERE MOVED OUT OF TEHRAN WITHIN A FEW DAYS, THOSE IN THE CHANCERY REMAINED.



PAGE 3 RUEIZJC0548 ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN LIMDIS

(D) BEGINNING IN JUNE 1980 A RECONSOLIDATION INTO TEHRAN BEGAN. AS THE HOSTAGES RETURNED TO TEHRAN MOST WERE PLACED IN KOMITEH PRISON. BY SEPTEMBER THE MAJORITY WERE HELD IN THE KOMITEH PRISON. AT THE END OF OCTOBER THE FIVE IN THE CHANCERY WERE RELOCATED AND SPLIT BETWEEN KOMITEH AND EVIN PRISONS. BY 1 NOVEMBER THE EMBASSY COMPOUND WAS VACANT OF AMERICANS.

(E) ASSEMBLY OF THE HOSTAGES AT THE PRE-RELEASE SITE, A COMPLEX IN NORTHERN TEHRAN, BEGAN IN MID-DECEMBER AND WAS CONCLUDED BY 24 DECEMBER WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MFA TRIO. THE MFA HOSTAGES WERE TAKEN TO KOMITEH PRISON ON 3 JANUARY AND REMAINED THERE UNTIL 15/16 JANUARY WHEN THEY WERE TAKEN TO THE PRE RELEASE SITE.

(F) DEPARTURE FROM THE PRE-RELEASE SITE TO THE AIRPORT CAME ON SHORT NOTICE, LESS THAN FIFTEEN MINUTES. AT THE AIRPORT THE HOSTAGES WAITED LESS THAN AN HOUR BEFORE BOARDING THE ALGERIAN AIRCRAFT FOR THE FLIGHT TO WEISBADEN VIA ALGERIA.

(G) HOSTAGE TREATMENT DURING CAPTIVITY VARIED BUT INCLUDED BEATINGS LONG PERIODS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, EXTENDED PERIODS OF BEING TIED OR HANDCUFFED, MOCK FIRING SQUADS, IN SEVERAL CASES DENIAL OF

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC0548 ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN LIMDIS

MEDICAL ATTENTION OR MEDICATION, AND THREATS OF BEING THROWN TO THE CROWD OR SHOT. INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING SERIOUS ABUSES APPEAR TO FALL INTO THREE CATEGORIES; THOSE WHO WERE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CIA/INTELLIGENCE; THOSE WHO ATTEMPTED ESCAPE; AND THOSE WHO ANTAGONIZED THEIR CAPTORS.

2. ~~(S/NFO)~~ CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

(A) AT APPROXIMATELY 1015 HOURS ON 4 NOVEMBER 1979 DEMONSTRATORS WERE OBSERVED CLIMBING OVER THE MAIN GATE OF THE EMBASSY. THEY SUCCEEDED IN OPENING THE GATE ALLOWING A LARGE GROUP OF CHADOR-CLAD FEMALES, CARRYING PLACARDS AND BANNERS, TO ENTER THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. NATIONAL POLICE IN THE AREA DID NOT MOVE TO STOP THE INTRUDERS. PART OF THE CROWD COLLECTED IN FRONT OF THE CHANCERY, OTHERS WENT DIRECTLY TOWARD THE RESIDENCES. ONE GROUP BROKE OFF FROM THE OTHERS AND PROCEEDED TO THE REAR OF THE CHANCERY AND BEGAN A FORCED ENTRY THROUGH THE BASEMENT. ANOTHER GROUP HAD GAINED ENTRANCE TO THE CONSULATE AND FORCED AN ENTRY THROUGH AN UNBARRED, SECOND STORY BATHROOM WINDOW.

(B) WORD OF THE PRESENCE OF DEMONSTRATORS ON THE COMPOUND QUICKLY

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SPREAD AMONG EMBASSY PERSONNEL, BUT THERE WAS NO PANIC. THE CHANCERY AND CONSULATE BUILDINGS WERE SECURED. OFF DUTY MARINES IN THE BIJON APARTMENTS WERE CALLED AND TOLD TO REMAIN WHERE THEY WERE. THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CAPTURED. TELEPHONE CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE CHARGE AT THE MFA WHERE HE HAD A 1000 HOURS APPOINTMENT. TELEPHONE

EMERGENCY DEFENSE PLAN. UPON LEARNING SOME OF THE CROWD HAD PENETRATED THE BASEMENT OF THE CHANCERY RSO WENT DOWN, HAD A DISCUSSION WITH THE STUDENT LEADER, CONVINCING HIM TO WITHDRAW THE GROUP. MEANWHILE, ALL EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN THE CHANCERY HAD MOVED TO SECOND FLOOR.

(D) THE RSO DEPARTED THE CHANCERY THROUGH THE WINDOW THE PENETRATORS HAD USED, WITH THE GROUP'S LEADERS AND WENT TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION AT THE CONSULATE BUILDING. HE FOUND THE BUILDING SECURE AFTER THE ATTEMPTED PENETRATION THROUGH THE SECOND FLOOR WINDOW WAS THWARTED BY MARINE GUARD, THE RSO THEN RETURNED TO THE CHANCERY WITH

PAGE 6 RUEIZJC0548 ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN LIMDIS
THE STUDENT LEADER.

(E) DUE TO A LACK OF DEMONSTRATORS NEAR THE CONSULATE, MOST OF ITS OCCUPANTS WERE ABLE TO ESCAPE IN SMALL GROUPS. THE LAST GROUP OF FIVE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CAPTURED A FEW BLOCKS FROM THE COMPOUND BY A COMBINATION OF STUDENTS AND PASDARAN. NATIONAL POLICE IN THE AREA DID NOT INTERFERE. THIS GROUP OF AMERICANS WAS TAKEN TO THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE WHICH APPARENTLY HAD BEEN PREDESIGNATED AS A HOSTAGE ASSEMBLY POINT.

(F) DURING THIS TIME THE RSO, AFTER ENTERING THE CHANCERY, RECEIVED PERMISSION FROM THE CHARGE TO GO BACK OUTSIDE AND ATTEMPT TO DIFFUSE THE CROWD IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING. HE LEFT HIS FLAK JACKET AND WEAPON WITH THE MARINE GUARD AND AGAIN DEPARTED THE CHANCERY BUILDING. THE RSO BEGAN A DIALOGUE WITH THE STUDENT LEADERS ALONG THE LINES OF ALLOWING THEM TO CONDUCT A SIT-IN. DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS, WHICH APPEARED TO BE BRINGING SOME CONTROL TO THE SITUATION, TWO OLDER INDIVIDUALS EMERGED FROM THE CROWD. THE CROWD NOW CONTAINED A NUMBER OF MALES, SOME OF WHOM WERE CARRYING CLUBS PAINTED WITH "DOWN WITH AMERICA".

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(G) THE TWO OLDER INDIVIDUALS USHERED THE STUDENT LEADER ASIDE, TOOK THE RSO'S RADIO AND TOLD HIM TO HAVE THE DOOR TO THE CHANCERY OPENED. THE RSO TOLD HIS CAPTORS SUCH A DECISION WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE CHARGE. THE RSO THEN SHOUTED TO THE MARINE INSIDE THE BUILDING WHO HAD BEEN COVERING HIM TO CALL THE CHARGE AND TELL HIM IT WAS JUST LIKE FEBRUARY 14. THIS HAD NO IMMEDIATE RESULT, AND THE RSO WAS LED AWAY TO THE BUILDING BEHIND THE MOTOR POOL, TIED, AND PLACED UNDER ARMED GUARD.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC0549 ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN LINDIS

(H) APPROXIMATELY TEN MINUTES LATER HE WAS TAKEN BACK INTO THE BASEMENT OF THE CHANCERY THROUGH THE ORIGINAL PENETRATION POINT. INSIDE THE BUILDING THE STUDENTS HAD STARTED A FIRE ON THE FIRST FLOOR TO DISPELL THE EFFECTS OF A TEAR GAS GRENADE WHICH WAS ACCIDENTALLY DISCHARGED.

(I) THE RSO WAS LED TO THE SECOND FLOOR AND USED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE PEOPLE IN THE SECURE AREA. AFTER SOME DELAY, DURING WHICH THE SITUATION WAS DISCUSSED VIA TELEPHONE BETWEEN THOSE IN THE SECURE AREA AND THE CHARGE, THE CHARGE MADE THE DECISION TO OPEN THE DOOR. THIS ORDER WAS PASSED AND THE DOOR WAS OPENED. AS AREAS OF THE CHANCERY CAME UNDER STUDENT CONTROL, THEY WERE RANSACKED AND DEFACED. ATTEMPTS TO COERSE AMERICANS TO OPEN SAFES, OFTEN AT GUN OR KNIFE POINT WERE COMMON. THE TAKEOVER WAS COMPLETED BY 1500 HOURS.

(J) AS THE AMERICANS WERE CAPTURED THEIR HANDS WERE TIED WITH PRE-

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AND AFTER CAPTURE, THE AMERICANS WERE CONFINED TO EITHER THE AMBASSADOR RESIDENCE OR ONE OF THE STAFF COTTAGES. DURING THE NEXT THREE DAYS, A GENERAL SCREENING AND IDENTIFICATION PROCESS OF THE AMERICANS WAS CONDUCTED BY THE IRANIANS. THIS SOMETIMES INCLUDED BEING BROUGHT BACK TO A WORK AREA AND BEING ASKED TO OPEN SAFES. IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE SECOND DAY THAT KOBE, WHO HAD BEEN AT THE ICA OFFICES OFF THE COMPOUND WAS CAUGHT, AND TAKEN CAPTIVE.

(K) BEGINNING ON 6 NOVEMBER THE MILITANTS RELOCATED SOME OF THE AMERICANS TO ONE OF TWO PRIVATE RESIDENCES IN NORTHERN TEHRAN. EVENTUALLY MORE THAN TWENTY MALE AMERICANS WERE ROTATED THROUGH THESE TWO BUILDINGS, WITH A NORMAL OFF COMPOUND NUMBER AVERAGING TWELVE. ALL THE AMERICANS WERE RETURNED TO THE COMPOUND BY MID-DECEMBER.

(L) DURING THE THIRD WEEK OF NOVEMBER, THIRTEEN OF THE ORIGINAL 63 COMPOUND HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED AND IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT MFA TRIO OF LAINGEN, HOWLAND, AND TOMSETH HAD LOST THEIR IR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. ANOTHER SIX AMERICANS ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY WERE LUCKY ENOUGH TO HAVE BEEN OFF THE COMPOUND AT THE TIME OF THE TAKEOVER AND WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR REMAINED OUT OF SIGHT AND EVENTUALLY WERE ABLE TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY UNDETECTED WITH CANADIAN ASSISTANCE.

(M) DURING THE PERIOD MID-DECEMBER THROUGH MID-MARCH, AMERICAN HOSTAGES WERE HELD IN THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, THE ~~CHANCERY~~ AND THE CHANCERY, WITH A SINGLE STAFF COTTAGE USED ONCE. BY MID-MARCH ALL THE AMERICANS WERE BEING HELD IN THE CHANCERY, WHERE THEY REMAINED UNTIL THE NIGHT OF 25/26 APRIL WHEN ALL BUT FIVE WERE RELOCATED OFF THE COMPOUND.

(N) DISPERSIONS OUT OF TEHRAN BEGAN THAT NIGHT WITH SOME 34 HOSTAGES MOVED BY CLOSED VANS IN SMALL CONVOYS TO THE CITIES OF TABRIZ, HAMADAN, QOM, ESFAHAN, SHIRAZ, YAZD, AND POSSIBLY JAHROM. THE OTHERS WERE HELD IN THE TEHRAN AREA FOR A FEW DAYS AND THEN DISPERSED. FIVE WERE FLOWN TO MASHAD, AND THE OTHERS HELD IN SMALL TOWNS A FEW HOURS FROM TEHRAN.

(O) RECONSOLIDATION INTO TEHRAN BEGAN IN EARLY JUNE AND CONTINUED UNTIL LATE AUGUST. BY 1 SEPTEMBER ALL AMERICAN HOSTAGES WERE IN TEHRAN, WITH THE MAJORITY (44) HELD IN KOMITEH PRISON, NEAR THE MFA. FIVE WERE HELD IN THE CHANCERY AND THREE AT THE MFA.

(P) DURING THE LAST WEEK OF OCTOBER 1980, APPROXIMATELY A DOZEN OF THE SENIOR OFFICERS WERE RELOCATED TO THE EVIN PRISON COMPLEX. BY THE END OF OCTOBER THE COMPOUND HAD BEEN EMPTIED OF AMERICANS WITH THE FORMER CHANCERY DETAINEES BEING RELOCATED, THE WOMEN TO EVIN AND THE MEN TO KOMITEH.

(Q) DURING THE WEEK BEFORE CHRISTMAS ALL OF THE KOMITEH POPULATION WAS MOVED TO THEIR FINAL DETENTION SITE, A COMMANDEERED HOTEL COMPLEX IN NORTHERN TEHRAN. THIS COMPLEX WAS THE SITE OF THE CHRISTMAS TV FILMING AND THE FOLLOW-ON ALGERIAN VISITS.

(R) BEGINNING ON 19 JANUARY, THE AMERICANS WERE TOLD INDIVIDUALLY, THEY WERE CANDIDATES FOR RELEASE AND THEIR ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT

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(7) BEGINNING ON 19 JANUARY, THE AMERICANS WERE TOLD INDIVIDUALLY, THEY WERE CANDIDATES FOR RELEASE AND THEIR ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONDITIONS OF THEIR CAPTIVITY WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THEIR CHANCES FOR RELEASE. THEY ALSO WERE READ AN ARTICLE FROM AN ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITION OF AN 18 JANUARY TEHRAN NEWSPAPER WHICH SUMMARIZED THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. EACH, WAS BRIEFLY INTERVIEWED BY A FEMALE MILITANT AND ANSWERED WITH NO COACHING. THE INTERVIEWS WERE FILMED "FOR THE STUDENT RECORDS." FOLLOWING THE INTERVIEW, EACH AMERICAN WAS GIVEN A GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAM BY THE ALGERIAN DOCTORS, AND RETURNED TO THE ROOM.

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(S) AT APPROXIMATELY 1900 TEHRAN TIME ON 20 JANUARY THE AMERICANS, WERE TOLD THEY HAD AN HOUR TO PACK. WITHIN 15 MINUTES, THE GUARDS CAME BACK AND TOLD THEM THEY WERE LEAVING. THE AMERICANS WERE BLINDFOLDED, PLACED ON SEVERAL BUSES AND DRIVEN TO MEHRABAD AIRPORT. ONE AMERICAN, METRINKO, WAS PULLED OFF THE BUS BEFORE IT LEFT THE HOTEL BECAUSE HE REPLIED TO SOME PROFANITIES MADE BY A GUARD. HE WAS DELIVERED TO THE AIRPORT SEPARATELY IN A SEDAN.

(T) THE TRIP TO THE AIRPORT TOOK APPROXIMATELY THIRTY FIVE MINUTES. THE AMERICANS WAITED ON THE BUSES BETWEEN 30-45 MINUTES, BEFORE BEING TAKEN OFF ONE AT A TIME AND USHERED THROUGH A HUMAN CORRIDOR OF APPROXIMATELY FIFTY MILITANTS. NONE OF THE RETURNEES CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN HIT OR SWUNG AT DURING THE MOVEMENT TO THE AIRCRAFT, BUT THE MILITANTS CHANTED FANATICALLY "DOWN WITH AMERICA."

3. (U) ~~(S)~~ CONTROL, DIRECTION AND SUPPORT:

(A) THE MILITANTS EXERCISED DIRECT PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE AMERICANS FROM CAPTURE TO RELEASE. THE AMERICANS WERE BLINDFOLDED AND TIED UPON SEIZURE AND A NO-TALKING RULE WAS IMPOSED. THESE RESTRICTIONS REMAINED IN FORCE FOR THE FIRST THREE MONTHS. THEREAFTER, THE

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NO-TALKING BAN WAS LIFTED BETWEEN ROOMMATES. HOWEVER, THE BLINDFOLD RULE WAS APPLIED ON ALL MOVEMENT OUT OF A CELL OR ROOM AND THE HANDS TIED PROCEDURE WAS ENFORCED ON ANY OUT-OF-BUILDING TRANSFERS. PHYSICAL SECURITY WAS HIGH THROUGHOUT, BUT VARIED WITH TIME, LOCATION AND PRISONER. DURING THE FIRST FEW MONTHS IT WAS NOT UNCOMMON FOR AMERICANS HELD IN ISOLATION TO HAVE AN ARMED MILITANT GUARD PRESENT. BY MARCH THIS PROCEDURE HAD BEEN DROPPED, WITH UNARMED GUARDS

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC0550 ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN LIMDIS
IN THE HOSTAGE HALLWAYS AND ARMED GUARDS AT KEY ENTRY AND CONTROL POINTS AND EXTERNAL PERIMETERS. CONTROL EXTENDED TO CENSORSHIP OF BOTH OUTGOING AND INCOMING MAIL. CENSORSHIP WAS A FUNCTION OF PRISONER BEHAVIOR, TRANSLATION COMPETENCY OF THE GUARD GROUP, VOLUME OF MAIL, AND EXTENT OF CONFLICTING MILITANT DUTIES.

(B) ALL EXTERNAL MOVES, EVEN TRIPS FROM THE CHANCERY TO MUSHROOM INN AND THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE FOR SHOWERS, WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN CARS OR VANS AND UNDER GUARD. ALL OFF-COMPOUND TRANSFERS WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN VANS WITH THE WINDOWS BLACKED OUT. CIRCUITOUS ROUTING WAS OFTEN USED TO CONFUSE THE AMERICANS AS TO DISTANCE AND DIRECTION. THIS PRACTICE CONTINUED UNTIL 24 DECEMBER 1980 WHEN SEVERAL AMERICANS WERE MOVED FROM ONE BUILDING WITHIN THE PRE-RELEASE COMPOUND TO ANOTHER. THE AMERICANS WERE BLINDFOLDED, HANDS TIED, PLACED IN A CLOSED VEHICLE AND DRIVEN AROUND FOR APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES THEN BROUGHT BACK TO THE BUILDING ADJACENT TO THEIR POINT OF ORIGIN. TRANSFER FROM THE PRE-RELEASE SITE TO THE AIRPORT WAS DONE UNDER BLINDFOLD AND VEHICLE DARKENED CONDITIONS ONLY. HANDS WERE NOT TIED.

(C) THE MILITANTS WERE CONTROLLED AND RESPONDED TO DIRECTION FROM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC0550 ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN LIMDIS

A HARDLINE FACTION OF THE ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS HIERARCHY. THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF MULLAHS AT THE COMPOUND AND VARIOUS DETENTION SITES CONFIRMED THE EXTENT OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT. THE MULLAHS IN TURN CONTROLLED REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ENTITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. RAPID DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 25 APRIL DISPERSAL PLAN IS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THIS INTERFACE. MANY OF THE DISPERSED DETENTION SITES WERE GUARDED BY MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD, AND SOME ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN PASADARAN TRAINING SITES. THE EXTENDED USE OF KOMITEH PRISON, WHICH IS RUN UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CONTROLLED BY THE CLERICS, IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT.

(D) ALTHOUGH THE MILITANTS ACCOMPLISHED MUCH OF THEIR OWN HOUSE-KEEPING CHORES, THEY DID RECEIVE SUPPORT AT LEAST TACTILY FROM SECULAR SEGMENTS OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE. SUCH SUPPORT INCLUDED NEWS COVERAGE; RADIO AND TV BROADCAST TIME AND SUPPORT (ALL KEY EVENTS WERE VIDEO TAPED BY TECHNICAL TEAMS FROM THE GOVERNMENT-RUN TV); AS WELL AS TELEPHONE, WATER AND POWER SERVICE. REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MAINTAINED SECURITY AROUND THE COMPOUND, BUT ALLOWED FREE MOVEMENT TO THE MILITANTS. THE MILITANTS WERE GIVEN SMALL ARMS

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC0550 ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN LIMDIS

TRAINING EITHER BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD OR THE CONVENTIONAL ARMY. THEY WERE PROVIDED VERY SOUND SECURITY ADVICE BY KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS THROUGHOUT, AND GIVEN THE MEANS AND GUIDANCE TO CARRY IT THROUGH. THEY RECEIVED SUPPORT, AT LEAST INDIRECTLY FROM THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ELEMENTS IMMEDIATELY AFTER 25 APRIL 1980, WHEN MEASURES WERE INITIATED TO DETER ANOTHER RESCUE ATTEMPT. IN ADDITION THE MILITANTS RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION, MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT FROM IRANIAN STUDENT GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES.

(E) IN SUMMARY, THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FIFTEEN MONTHS BEAR THE HALLMARKS OF AN ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE INFLUENCE OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY HARDLINERS, HUMILIATE THE UNITED STATES, AND PURGE AMERICAN INFLUENCE AND VALUES FROM IRANIAN SOCIETY.

REVW 03 FEB 01

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B-316

CTA [REDACTED]

LOGGING APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS AGO

CA [REDACTED] C

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REC'D 20 OCT 90

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[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY 1255
 DECLASSIFIED ON 21 JUN 92
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 REVIEW BY DAOR
 REVIEW DATE [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

B-318

THE JOINT STAFF

11 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Through: Vice Admiral Hanson, Director, Joint Staff
Lieutenant General Tighe, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency

Subject: Status of SNOWBIRD Technical Collection (U)

1. [REDACTED] In early May, following the April rescue attempt, and [REDACTED]ing hostage dispersion may have occurred, the SNOWBIRD J2 initiated actions to determine the feasibility of employing several technical methods to locate the hostages. These methods included: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] Once this preliminary work was begun, JCS/ SNOWBIRD/J2 requested a meeting of [REDACTED] and INSCOM representatives to discuss these technical options. The first meeting was held on 29 May [REDACTED]. Five possible means and potential actions were discussed, as outlined below:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E8-1255
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDA NMCC
 DECLASS DOWNGRADE TO Secret
REVISED BY OADR
REVISED FROM [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[REDACTED]

1-1-68

a. [REDACTED]

C

[REDACTED]

D/B

C

[REDACTED]

D/B

C

d. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

C

4. (U) Status as of 6 August:

a. [REDACTED]

C

[REDACTED]

C

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

AC

AC

[REDACTED]

FILE

5. ~~PS-~~ In summary, all these actions are moving ahead.
However,

[REDACTED]

C

Richard V. Secord
RICHARD V. SECORD
Major General, USAF

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

B-319

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

WARNING

ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!

EYES ONLY FOR: Gen Jones
Vice Admiral Hanson
LtGen Tighe

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REWRITING BY DDO, NMCC
 DEL NOTIFY TO Secret
REVISED ON OADR
REVISED FROM [REDACTED]

G

RETURN TO SOD, 2C840

ACTION OFFICER: [REDACTED]

TELEPHONE: EXT 55078 SECURE 2817

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

15 August 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Through: Vice Admiral Hanson, Director, Joint Staff
LtGen Tighe, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Subject: Status of SNOWBIRD Technical Collection

1. (S) On 11 Aug 1980, MG Secord forwarded a memo to the above on the status of SNOWBIRD technical collection.

2. (S) On 13 Aug 1980, this office was advised by the Department of State/Iran Working Group that Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David Newsom, [REDACTED]

3. (S) On 14 Aug 1980, this office was informed at the weekly Technical Collection Coordinating meeting [REDACTED] based on the Newsom statement, [REDACTED]

4. (S) [REDACTED] will recommend that the subject be raised at a SCC or NSC meeting for a policy decision. Recommend that DOD representative support the need to continue the program [REDACTED] approach represents [REDACTED]

R V Secord
RICHARD V. SECORD
Major General, USAF

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

26
SFC J...
Fund...

TO: DJS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE	
THRU:		DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE
		DJSM DATE	
SUBJECT: Funding Request	ACTION		
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION
	XXX	XXX	

REMARKS

1. ~~(S)~~ On 7 Aug 80 [REDACTED]

2. ~~(S)~~ On 11 Aug 80 the SNOWBIRD staff forwarded the request to the DJS for consideration by the OpsDepts. The OpsDepts referred the subject to the Intelligence Policy Review Counsel (IPRC). On 25 September 1980, the IPRC approved the proposal.

3. ~~(S)~~ The attached draft memo from CJCS to SECDEF advises SECDEF of IPRC opinion and requests SecDef approval [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] now involves a policy dispute between DCI(For) and Under Secretary of State Newsom (Against).

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 7256
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 [REDACTED]

ACTION OFFICER [REDACTED] J-3, Ext 55078	COORDINATION/APPROVAL				
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified BY [Signature]
Declassified ON: OADR

A, G

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Funding Request

1. ~~(S)~~ (TS) On 25 September the Intelligence Policy Review Counsel approved SNOWBIRD request [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] On 26 September the OpsDepts met in formal session and concurred in IPRC opinion.

2. ~~(S)~~ (TS) Although there currently is a policy dispute on the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] as the dispute may be resolved favorably during the production lead time (3 weeks), and even without a favorable resolution during this situation, [REDACTED] would then be readily available for use in future situations.



B-322

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

B-32-

24 SEP 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THRU: DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Intelligence Policy Review Council (U)

- References:
- a. Chairman, JCS memorandum, dated 25 Aug 80, subj: Intelligence Support for SNOWBIRD(TS) and Related Matters (TS)(U)
 - b. MG Vaught memorandum, dated 2 Sept 80, subj: Delay in Technical Collection Programs (U)

1. ^(U) Per reference a, I have established the Intelligence Policy Review Council. A preliminary meeting was held on 12 September 1980.

[REDACTED]

3. ^(U) The Policy Council reviewed the Technical Collection programs cited in reference b. Following are the Policy Council's views on each program:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA JSJ
REVIEW ON: 24 Sep 2000

Downgraded by ?

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

C [REDACTED] *C*
e. (TS) [REDACTED] This program has potential and involves very little risk, despite its high initial cost, this program has a potential which extends beyond the present crisis and is a capability which should be available to this country at all times. The council recommends DoD fully support [REDACTED] *C*

Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.

EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

~~TOP SECRET~~

B-323



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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REVISED ON _____
REMOVED FROM _____~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12358
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
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28 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Hostage Location and Intelligence Collection (C)

[REDACTED]

2. (TS) This analysis suggests that in addition to the three in the MFA, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

..... Regretably, this type of analysis is always outdated by approximately three-four weeks, nor does it include all of the hostages; and events such as the Iraq/Iran conflict and Jack Anderson "Revelations" have a tendency to destabilize the situation.

3. (TS) [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

acquaintances and friends in Tehran have reported that "all" of the hostages are in Tehran and upwards of twenty were seen as recently as 16 September 1980 in the residence of the former Ambassador. At this time there is no way to validate [REDACTED] and one or both of the principal sources could be fabricators or deception agents. At the present time, however, we have no way to independently evaluate the reliability of either of these sources or any of the other numerous informants that volunteer information.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By JCS
Declassified On: OADR

5. (TS) In May shortly after the reports of hostage dispersion became known, several suggestions were made to [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]

a. (TS) To date only one of the programs [REDACTED] the least promising, has been implemented. To date, this project has not provided any useable data.

b. (TS) The most promising project [REDACTED]

c. (TS) The two other technical programs [REDACTED] designed to assist in identifying probable hostage detention sites have been stalled for more than two months. This is a result of a policy decision by Under Secretary of State Newsome [REDACTED]. The most recent event regarding this program is an alleged decision by National Security Advisor Brzezinski to suspend the [REDACTED]

6. (TS) Although political initiatives are being pursued to obtain the release of the hostages, there is no guarantee that they will be successful or that all of the hostages will be released as a result thereof. Prudence would demand that every precaution be taken against the possibility that some of the hostages will be held prisoners indefinitely.

7. (TS) Recommend that:

a. (TS) The above information be provided to the Secretary of Defense.

RICHARD V. SECORD
Major General, USAF

ALL RW

~~SECRET~~

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

15-2-

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER			
SUBJECT: SNOWBIRD Intelligence	ACTION				
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER	
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356 CONDUCTED ON <u>21 JUN 92</u>				XXX	

REMARKS

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY: DDO ALCC

REL DOWN TO Secret

REV BY: OASD

REVISED FROM: Multiple Sources

Attached memorandum ~~to SECDEF~~ provides summary of key DOD SNOWBIRD intelligence initiatives and recommends SECDEF raise the subject at NSC meeting and seek approval of the recommendations contained in paragraph four of memo.

James B. Vaught
JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

MFR

6 Oct 80

Attached draft returned by LTC Cost
Chief Airland to structure of paper
along lines of attach. Memo and
provide them with step procedure
Airland Draft proposed to [redacted]

ACTION OFFICER [redacted] J-3, Ext 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL							
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION	
	J P				SOD	[redacted]	72602	
	EXEC							
	TRM CDF							
	VCOFB							
DATE OF PREPARATION 2 Oct 1980	Classified By: <u>TCS</u> Declassified ON: <u>OASD</u>							

~~TOP SECRET~~



2 October 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SNOWBIRD Intelligence Status

314
1. (S) Pursuant to NCA direction of 28 April 1980, Joint Task Force 1-79 began on 1 May to rebuild and prepare various military forces for another rescue effort. Since that time and continuing unabated to date, the men of JTF 79-1, and many elements of the military Services and DOD agencies have invested substantial time, effort, personnel, equipment, and funds to reconstitute the force and improve its capabilities. These goals have essentially been accomplished. DOD capabilities today are several fold more redundant and reliable than last April. However, this large investment does not appear to have been matched by a similar intelligence community effort. The basic charge given the DCI by the NCA on 28 April remains unfulfilled. [REDACTED] C

2. (S) While the safe return of the hostages through diplomatic negotiations is the preferred means and we recognize military force is the option of last resort, it is imperative that intelligence keep abreast if not ahead of operational planning if we are to be able to effectively apply military force should the situation dictate.

3. (S) [REDACTED] C
[REDACTED] DOD proposals appear to have received only marginal CIA indorsement. For example, the status of several DOD initiatives are outlined below:

C
TOP SECRET

b. Another program with promise which was intended to assist in confirming hostage detention sites and provide a possible means of [REDACTED]

BC

[REDACTED] This program has been "suspended" by a mid-level decision within Department of State. [REDACTED]

13 August 80 Under Secretary of State Newsom ruled against the dispatch. On or about 16 September the DCI raised the subject with Dr. Brzezinski without a final decision being reached.

c. In a separate effort following approval by the Director, DIA, the JTF working with NAVINSCOM [REDACTED] dispatched on 19 September 1980 the first of a series of [REDACTED]

On 24 September 80, the Intelligence Policy Review Group in a memorandum to CJCS recommended that this program receive SCC approval prior to [REDACTED]

4. ~~(178)~~ In light of the foregoing, it would appear appropriate to review the entire intelligence effort to identify hostage locations and maintain continuity. To press the location effort, the following suggestions are offered for consideration.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

e. Establish an Inter-Agency Senior Level work group focused on the hostage issue and empowered to search [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

for new ideas and make authoritative judgements and recommendations on actions designed to assist in obtaining the release of the hostages. Membership of this group should include: DOD (International Security Affairs), JCS (J3 and J5), Department of State, Drug Enforcement Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation), and a National Security Council Staff representative. The group should be chaired by NSC and could be called into session by any member.

~~TOP SECRET~~ C
5. ~~TOP SECRET~~ Recommend SECDEF raise the ~~TOP SECRET~~ at a NSC meeting and seek approval of the suggestions outlined in paragraph four. D

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

B-325

6 October 1980

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DoD NMCC

DECLASSIFIED TO Secret

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SNOWBIRD (TS) Intelligence

1. (S) During the past five months the JTF has proposed several initiatives [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Regretably most of these proposals have received only marginal CIA support and DOS rejection. For example, the status of several of the initiatives are outlined below:

[REDACTED]

b. Another DOD initiative with promise which was intended to assist in confirming hostage detention sites and provide a possible means of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This program has been "suspended" as a result of a 13 August 1980 decision by Under Secretary of State Newsom who ruled against the dispatch. On or about 16 September the DCI raised the subject with Dr. Brzezinski without a final decision being reached.

c. On 19 September 1980, following approval by the Director, DIA, the JTF working with NAVINSCOM [REDACTED] dispatched the first of a series [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 24 September 1980, the Intelligence Policy Review Group in a memorandum to CJCS recommended that this program receive SCC approval prior to [REDACTED]

2. (S) (TS) In light of the current instability in Iran and the potential threat such instability holds for the hostages, recommend SECDEF discuss with the DCI and Secretary of State the need to pursue the initiatives listed below:

[REDACTED] Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

A
B

[REDACTED]

C

d. Development of joint [REDACTED] in the telephone exchange serving the Embassy.

C

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OO RUEAIF
DE RUEIZJC #0452 3431530
ZNY TTTT
O 081535Z DEC 80
FM JTF/SNOWBIRD/12
TO [REDACTED]
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE JS 0452

SUBJ: SEIZURE OF OPPORTUNITY (U)

1. (S) ANALYSIS OF RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY IRANIAN SECULAR REVOLUTIONARIES AND KEY CLERICS (SUCH AS BEHESTI, RAFSANJANI AND RAJAI) PLUS THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INDICATES THAT ONLY 10 TO 20 OF THE EMBASSY HOSTAGES, IF ANY, MIGHT BE RELEASED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (2-3 WEEKS). SUCH A RELEASE WOULD BE FROM THE IRANIAN VIEWPOINT, A GESTURE OF RECOGNITION THAT THE USG CAN AND PROBABLY WILL HONOR TWO OF FOUR CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE MAJLIS. FOR THE SAME REASON (PARTIAL FULL-FILLMENT OF DEMANDS) THE REMAINDER OF THE EMBASSY HOSTAGES PLUS THE MFA TRIO WILL CONTINUE TO BE DETAINED WELL INTO 1981, AND INFORMATION REGARDING THEIR LOCATION (S) WILL CONTINUE

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0452 ~~TOP SECRET~~
TO BE TIGHTLY HELD.

2. (S) WITH THE APPROACH OF THE U.S. HOLIDAY SEASON, THE HOSTAGE FAMILIES AND WELL WISHERS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN ALL LIKELIHOOD [REDACTED] CLOSE TO OR AFTER [REDACTED] WHICH WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE THE THEORETICAL RELEASE POSTULATED IN PARAGRAPH ONE OF THIS MESSAGE.

3. (S) [REDACTED]

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B-23

PAGE 1

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SMUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS, G
FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 142 AS OF 220700Z MAY 80 (TS/NF) G
A. SSO USEUCOM 010641Z MAY 80, VHN 2397 (SITREP 140) (TS/NF) G
B. USCINCEUR 300315Z APR 80 (C) NOTAL
1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) E-3A.
(1) (U) E-3A 353 LAUNCHED 010654Z MAY 80 AND E-3A 560
LAUNCHED 010745Z MAY 80 FOR CREEK SENTRY TRAINING WITH ELEMENTS OF
2/4 ATAF. ACFT 353 AIRBORNE 6.6 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 011328Z
MAY 80. ACFT 560 AIRBORNE 6.7 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 011348Z
MAY 80. ACFT 353 AND ACFT 560 FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.

B. (TS/NF) COMPLETED PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 2-3 MAY 80
DEPLOYMENT OF E-3A DETACHMENT TO [REDACTED]

C. (U) USCINCEUR 011130Z MAY 80 (NOTAL) PUBLISHED DIRECTING
A THREE HOUR READINESS POSTURE FOR THOSE ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN
RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL REMAINS CITED REF. B.
2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

Classified by
DDO, NMCC
Delaney, m. OAD.

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DDO, NM

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PAGE 1

B-230

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FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHRDALC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.2
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
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DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~RECAP DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 089 (U)~~

1. ~~THE~~ FOLLOWING IN SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 210801Z - 220800Z FEB.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHISIS ON MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE.

B. ~~RH-53~~ HELO FLEW THREE SORTIES FOR 9.8 HOURS.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
POSSIBLE TASKING OF RH-53 HELOS, REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL OTHER
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~THE~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 220900Z).

A. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA/REEVES
TEXAS (ETD 28 FEB)

23-00N/061-00E
DIEGO GARCIA

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B-230

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PAGE 2

LASALLE
MILLER
AINSWORTH (ETO 25 FEB)
KOELSCH (ETO 01 MAR)
TATTNALL
MISPILLION
ROANOKE (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 26 FEB)

26-00N/055-30E
26-05N/055-31E
BAHRAIN
MOMBASA
26-03N/055-20E
23-00N/062-00E
17-00N/063-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD/RIGEL
HALSEY (ENR SINGAPORE ETA 27 FEB)
W.H. STANDLEY
PASSUMPSIC
KILAUEA (ENR MODLOC ETA 24 FEB)

22-00N/062-00E
11-45N/070-20E
23-45N/060-15E
21-50N/062-10E
08-00N/066-30E

(3) SUBMARINES:

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO (ETO 22 FEB)
MOBILE (ETO 23 FEB)
SAN BERNARDINO (ETO 23 FEB)

SUBIC BAY
ILOILO
BACOLOD

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

- (1) 3 P-3C, 1 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135
- (2) 3 AC-130
- (3) 1 AC-130

3. (u) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 12 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
EA-3B: 2 OF 2 FMC, 2 MC

#2291

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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DAN: 039-022026
INPUT CDSN = DKA126
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QAAMZYUW YHLHDR 2292 0530303-MNSH--YEKQGH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 220800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHRDALC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
YHLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.
FINAL SECTION OF TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 089 (U)

- EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC
- S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC
- ~~SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC~~ (NOTE)
- SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
- C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
- D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
- ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
- 18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS
- 5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
- NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

NOTE: EXPECT SIXTH AIRCRAFT IN UP STATUS 23 FEB. 5 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS.

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 13 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC

A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC

A-6E: 3 OF 10 FMC, 6 MC

KA-6D: 0 OF 5 FMC, 2 MC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 1 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING SOTRES: 8 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP STATUS AT [REDACTED]: 15,960,000 GALLONS.

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]

A. NIMITZ: 5 OF 5 SATISFACTORY

~~RF-8G: 2 OF 4 SATISFACTORY~~

7. (TSCW) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN VICINITY OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO AND CHARLIE REMAINS LOW. AGI 477 CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF NIMITZ THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND MAINTAINED POSITION CAPABLE OF MONITORING NIMITZ-TO-[REDACTED] FLIGHT ACTIVITY. [REDACTED]

B. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED IN VICINITY BATTLE GROUPS BRAVO AND CHARLIE DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS.

8. (U) (TS) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 21 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

#2292

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0933

DAN: 041-026347

INPUT CDSN = OKA3AC

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=68

DAAMZYUW YHLHOR 2300 0560759-MNSH--YEKQGH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZX 00 SOA DE

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TRIST, COMSEVENFLT

RAOM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RAOM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHRDINC/RAOM GURECK, CTG70.0

YHLOKOC/RAOM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RAOM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

CINCPACFLT OPERATIONS SYRREP 002 (U)

1. (U) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS

FOR PERIOD 240801Z - 250800Z FEB 80.

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS

ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

CORAL SEA OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIR WINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE

ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. (U) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 250900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA
TEXAS (ETD 28 FEB)
REEVES
LASALLE/MILLER/TATTNALL
AINSWORTH (ETD 25 FEB)
KOELSCH (ENR DJIBOUTI ETA 28 FEB)
MISPILLION
ROANOKE (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 28 FEB)

23-15N/061-00E
DIEGO GARCIA
24-00N/061-00E
27-00N/051-30E
BAHRAIN
03-40N/047-50E
23-15N/062-00E
00-10N/068-50E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
HALSEY (ENR SINGAPORE ETA 27 FEB)
W.H. STANDLEY
PASSUMPSIC (ENR SUBIC ETA 06 MAR)
KILAUEA
RIGEL (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 27 FEB)
NAVASOTA (ENR MODLOC ETA 29 FEB)

22-00N/062-00E
06-00N/090-50E
24-00N/061-00E
13-25N/058-55E
23-15N/061-00E
03-30S/069-10E
06-10N/079-10E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE
SAN BERNADINO
(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

ZAMBALES
ZAMBALES

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED]: 3 P-3C, 3 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 6 KC-135
(2) [REDACTED]: 3 AC-130
(3) [REDACTED]: 1 AC-130

3 (73000) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

(u) A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 9 OF 20 FMC, 4 MC
A-6E: 7 OF 12 FMC

KA-60: 2 OF 4 FMC
EA-33: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC

#2300

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

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ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=68

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ZNY MNSH
ZKZK 00 SOA DE
O 250800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIPKSEY, CTF70
YHRDIHC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.2
YHL0K0C/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZFM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 092 (U)

A. HIMITZ: (CONT'D)

- EA-63: 2 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
- RF-33: 2 OF 3 FMC
- S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
- ~~RH-53: 6 OF 28 FMC (NOTE)~~
- SH-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC
- C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
- D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
- ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
- 18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT
NOTE: 6 OF 9 PH-53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS.

3. CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 13 OF 21 FMC, 7 MC
- A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC
- A-6E: 1 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
- KA-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 1 OF 4 FMC

U-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 7 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 15,696,200 GALS. E

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ ATTEMPTED FOUR WITH FOUR SATISFACTORY HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]. E

7. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: [REDACTED] UNSATISFACTORY.

4. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS AT LOW LEVEL WITH CONTINUED ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DID NOT OPERATE IN VICINITY OF BATTLE FORCE.

8. (TS) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW: 25 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS,
#2381



LASALLE/TATTNALL
MILLER (ETO 05 MAR)
AINSWORTH
KOELSCH (ETA DJIBOUTI 23 FEB)
MISPILLION
ROANOKE (ETO 29 FEB)
2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
KILAUEA
W.H. STANDLEY
RIGEL (ETA DIEGO GARCIA 27 FEB)
NAVASOTA (ETA CVBG MODLOC
ETA 29 FEB)

28-00N/050-00E
BAHRAIN
28-00N/050-55E
10-00N/052-50E
23-15N/062-00E
DIEGO GARCIA

22-00N/062-00E
24-00N/061-00E
03-45S/070-00E
08-30N/074-30E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE
SAN BERNARDINO

ZAMBALES

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

(6) SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 6 KC-135
(2) [REDACTED] 3 AC-130

(7) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

NIMITZ:
-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
-7E: 9 OF 20 FMC, 5 MC
-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
A-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
A-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC
A-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
2425

NNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

CZCDP2527

AN: 342-216373

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OR: 260803Z FEB 80 TOT: 260831Z FEB 80

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ZNY MNSH

ZKZK 00 004 DE

O 260803Z FEB 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 22 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHRDIHC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

YWNVHZC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

7EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 093 (U)

RF-AG: 2 OF 3 FMC

3-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

~~3H-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC~~

3-2: 0 OF 1 FMC

3-2: 0 OF 1 FMC

3-724 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

10 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: 50TH ACFT DOWN DUE TO CRACKS IN AILERON POWER BOOST

DISCONNECT LATCH. ETR 31 MAR. 6 OF 8 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS.

3. CORAL SEA:

3-4N: 12 OF 21 FMC, 2 MC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOPG418
OAN: 843-012566
INPUT CDSN = OKA874
TOR: 270804Z FEB 80 TOT: 270806Z FEB 80

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=43

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ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE

~~TOP SECRET~~
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.8
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS SITREP 004 (U)

1. (T) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 260801Z - 270800Z FEB.

A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHA-
SIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEIL-
LANCE. NIMITZ OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~ B-52 HELD SORTIES WERE FLOWN TODAY.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

D. B-52 OPERATIONS WITH USS KOELSCH IN SOCOTRA/GULF OF
ADEN AREA WERE CONDUCTED FROM 260634Z TO 260910Z.

2. (T) ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 270900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA

23-00N/061-02E

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

- TEXAS (ETD 28 FEB)
- REEVES
- LASALLE/TATTNALL
- MILLER (ETD 5 MAR)
- AINSWORTH
- KOELSCH (ETA DJIBOUTI 28 FEB)
- MISPILLION
- ROANOKE (ETD 29 FEB)
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
- CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
- W.H. STANDLEY
- KILAUEA (ETA DIEGO GARCIA 02 MAR)
- NAVASOTA (ETA MODLOC 29 FEB)
- RIGEL (ETD 29 FEB)
- PASSUMPSIC (EXIT I.O. 2 MAR)
- (3) SUBMARINES:

DIEGO GARCIA
 24-00N/061-00E
 28-00N/050-00E
 BAHRAIN
 25-51N/056-32E
 12-15N/046-30E
 23-00N/062-00E
 DIEGO GARCIA

22-00N/062-00E
 23-45N/060-15E
 17-30N/063-00E
 12-00N/070-15E
 DIEGO GARCIA
 06-35N/078-05E



A, B



A, B

- (4) ARG ALFA:
- OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE
- SAN BERNARDINO
- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
- DIXIE

SUBIC BAY

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

- (1) 3 P-3C, 2P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135
- (2) 3 AC-130
- (3) 1 AC-130

(4) ~~SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A. NIMITZ:
- F-14: 14 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
- A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
- A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC

#2499

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1
EYES ONLY

ZCZCOPG424
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TOR: 270807Z FEB 80 TOT: 270808Z FEB 80

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000
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ZNY MNSH
ZXXZ OO SOA DE
O 270800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 094 (U)

KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
EA-38: 0 OF 2 FMC
EA-6B: 1 OF 3 FMC
E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
RF-4E: 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC
S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
~~RH-53: 0 OF 0 FMC. (NOTE)~~
SH-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC
C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS
3 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT
NOTE: 6 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 2

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 13 OF 21 FMC, 6 MC

A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC

A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC

KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS

NO PAYEKNIFF AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: FUEL STATUS [REDACTED] 15,657,600 GALLONS.

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (S) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NIMITZ HAD 4 OF 6 SATISFACTORY.

7. (S) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS AT LOW LEVEL WITH AGI 477 CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF TASK GROUP BRAVO, MOD KASHIN CONTINUES STRAITS OF HORMUZ PATROL.

B. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY TO REPORT.

8. (U) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 26 FEB 10

S90 NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS,
#2500

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

ZCZCOP0525
ZAN: 042-015340
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TOR: 260832Z FEB 80 TOT: 260831Z FEB 80

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ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==
INFO= DNCO(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 03001
RTR=50

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ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SCA DE
O [REDACTED] 80 ZYS ZYM ZFF-6
MAJ GEN [REDACTED] IS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, J2 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHROIHC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
YWNVHZC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~COMBAT DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 093~~ (U)

1. [REDACTED] FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 250801Z - 260800Z FEB 80.
- A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE. NIMITZ OBSERVED STANDDOWN.
3. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.
4. NO RH-53 HELO FLIGHTS WERE FLOWN TODAY!
2. [REDACTED] KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 260900Z).

1. SHIPS:
 - (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA	23-15N/061-00E
TEXAS (ETO 28 FEB)	DIEGO GARCIA
REEVES	24-00N/061-20E

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~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGE 1

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DAN: 044-004402
INPUT CDSN = DKA093
TOR: 280800Z FEB 80 TOT: 280829Z FEB 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=74

DAAMZYUW YHLHOR 2552 0590405-MNSH--YEK00H.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O ~~280800Z FEB 80~~ ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, J2 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF73

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ YES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS, SITREP 095 (U)

1. (U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 270801Z - 280800Z FEB 80.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~ RH-53 HELOS FLEW TWO SORTIES FOR 3.3 HOURS.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 280900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA

23-00N/064-30E

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP~~

~~SECRET~~

TEXAS (ENR MODLOC ETA 02 MAR)
REEVES

LASALLE/TATTNALL
MILLER (ETO 05 MAR)

AINSWORTH
KOELSCH (BSF)

MISPELLION
ROANOKE (ETO 29 FEB)

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD

W.H. STANDLEY
NAVASOTA (ENR MODLOC ETA 29 FEB)

KILAUEA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 02 MAR)
RIGEL (ETO 29 FEB)

PASSUMPSIC (EXIT I.O. 02 MAR)

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

05-50N/070-45E
24-00N/061-00E
26-00N/051-00E
BAHRAIN
25-50N/056-50E
DJIBOUTI
23-00N/061-30E
DIEGO GARCIA

22-00N/062-00E
23-45N/060-15E
16-25N/066-43E
10-10N/065-05E
DIEGO GARCIA
05-40N/083-39E

[REDACTED]

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNADINO

SUBIC BAY

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135

(2) [REDACTED] 3 AC-130

(3) [REDACTED] 1 AC-130

#2552

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOPQ254
OAN: 044-004420
INPUT CDSN = OKA094
TOR: 280801Z FEB 80 TOT: 280830Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000
RTR=74

0AAMZYUW YHLHOR 2553 0590405-MNSH--YEKQGH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 280800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.2
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 095 (U)
3. (U) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:
F-14: 15 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
EA-38: 0 OF 2 FMC (NOTE 1)
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC
S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC (NOTE 2)
~~RH-53: 0 OF 8 FMC (NOTE 3)~~
SH-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC
C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
O-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT
NOTE 1: ETR FIRST ACFT 01 MAR
NOTE 2: ETR TWO ACFT 28 FEB
NOTE 3: 7 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS

8. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 12 OF 21 FMC, 7 MC
A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC
A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

0-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 15 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 FUEL STATUS AT [REDACTED] 3,477,000 GALLONS.

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ CONDUCTED SIX SATISFACTORY HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] TWO OF WHICH WERE COMPLETED VIA NAVCAMs MED.

#2553

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE

TOT: 280830Z FEB 80

NED

.ED

00000

LHDR 2554 0590405 YWHA-MNSH--YEKQGH.
LHDR 2554 0590405-MNSH--YEKQGH.

JA DE

FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

SN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

N SHUTLER, J3 JCS

JM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

XON, 02 CINCPACFLT

C/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

IRKSEY, CTF70

GURECK, CTG70.0

CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 095 (U)

7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY ~~TOP SECRET~~ AGI 477

CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF TASK GROUP BRAVO, MOD KASHIN CONTINUES STRAITS OF HORMUZ PATROL. AGI 477 SENT LIGHT SIGNAL TO NIMITZ AT 270825Z WITH MESSAGE: QUOTE WE CONGRATULATE YOUR HOCKEY TEAM AND HOPE YOUR OLYMPIC TEAM SHOWS ACHIEVEMENT IN MOSCOW. UNQUOTE. NIMITZ ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT.

3. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY TO REPORT.

3. ~~TOP SECRET~~ REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY, LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 28 FEB 10

3SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
PAGE

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INPUT CDSN = OKA095
TOR: 280804Z FEB 80 TOT: 280830Z FEB 80

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO*** UNASSIGNED **
TOTAL COPIES = 00000
RTR=74

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0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 2554 0590405-MNSH--YEKQGH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 280800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VAOM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RAOM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
RAOM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RAOM GURECK, CTG70.0
RAOM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RAOM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 095 (U)

- 7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
 - A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY ~~TOP SECRET~~ AGI 477
CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF TASK GROUP BRAVO, MOD KASHIN CONTINUES STRAITS OF HORMUZ PATROL. AGI 477 SENT LIGHT SIGNAL TO NIMITZ AT 270825Z WITH MESSAGE: QUOTE WE CONGRATULATE YOUR HOCKEY TEAM AND HOPE YOUR OLYMPIC TEAM SHOWS ACHIEVEMENT IN MOSCOW. UNQUOTE. NIMITZ ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT.
 - 3. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY TO REPORT.
 - 3. ~~TOP SECRET~~ REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

ISO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3554

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZCZCOP0562
OAN: 871-836455
INPUT CDSN = OKA469
TOR: 298531Z MAR 80 TOT: 290536Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=74

~~EYES ONLY~~

QAAMZYUW YLHOR 3732 0890109-MNSH--YEKQGH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 290400Z MAR 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-6
FM CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~CINCPAC/OPINTEL OPERATIONS SITREP 125 (U)~~

1. ~~OPINTEL~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 280001Z - 290800Z MAR 80.
A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED SSC AND CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE. CORAL SEA DID NOT FLY.
~~3. RH-53 HELOS DID NOT FLY.~~

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~OPINTEL~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 290900Z).

A. SHIPS:
(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS
CALIFORNIA

23-15N/061-00E
24-00N/061-00E

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY TO 88 88 Copies

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

A-7E: 11 OF 15 FMC, 1 MC

A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 3 MC

KA-60: 2 OF 5 FMC, 1 MC

E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

RF-4G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 15 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS.

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED]

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]

4. NIMITZ: 2 OF 4 SATISFACTORY

7. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS LOW WITH AGI 477 CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF TASK GROUP BRAVO. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MAYS WERE EXCORTE BY CORAL SEA P-4 AIRCRAFT WHILE IN TASK FORCE VICINITY. CPA ON 2 PASSES OF NIMITZ WAS 503 YARDS STARBOARD AT 500 FEET. [REDACTED]

1. (TS) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT. REVW 25 FEB 10

3SD NOTE: DELVIER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#2426

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2

PAUL F. FOSTER (ENR SUBIC, ETA 4 APR)

06-00N/091-30E

LASALLE

26-36N/051-18E

R.E. BYRD

26-20N/054-04E

KOELSCH (ENR DJIBOUTI, ETA 31 MAR)

16-10N/055-00E

TATTNALL (ETD 28 MAR)

DJIBOUTI

BRUMBY

25-50N/056-50E

MISPILLION (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 31 MAR)

12-30N/070-00E

WHITE PLAINS (ETD 30 MAR)

MUSCAT

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/COOK

22-45N/061-30E

F. HAMMOND

21-00N/061-00E

W.H. STANDLEY (TAV 27 MAR - 03 APR)

DIEGO GARCIA

REEVES

22-45N/061-00E

J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD (ENR SUBIC, ETA 04 APR)

06-00N/091-30E

KILAUEA (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 01 APR)

05-51N/066-55E

NAVASOTA

22-30N/062-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A

(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/

19-00N/066-00E

GRIDLEY/BARBEBY

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135

#3732

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCDPQ563
DAN: 871-836468
INPUT CDSN = DKA478
TOR: 298533Z MAR 80 TOT: 298536Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000
RTR=74

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ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 298400Z MAR 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-6
FM CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC
O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 125 (U)
3. (U) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14:	15	OF	24	FMC,	2	MC
A-7E:	12	OF	20	FMC,	3	MC
A-6E:	9	OF	12	FMC		
KA-6D:	3	OF	4	FMC		
EA-38:	0	OF	2	FMC,	1	MC
EA-6B:	2	OF	3	FMC		
E-2B:	3	OF	4	FMC		
RF-8G:	1	OF	3	FMC		
S-3A:	0	OF	4	FMC,	1	MC
TRW-53:	7	OF	8	FMC (NOTE)		
SH-3H:	0	OF	6	FMC,	4	MC
D-704	REFUELING STORES:		6	OF	13	UP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 28 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NOTE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS.

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 14 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC

A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC

KA-60: 2 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 13,049,400 GALLONS

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF NIMITZ H.F. COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3 OF 4 SATISFACTORY.

#3733

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

ZCZCDP0564
OAN: 071-036507
INPUT CDSN = DKA472
TOR: 290535Z MAR 80 TOT: 290536Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= ONCO(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

JAAMZYUW YHLHDR 3734 0890109-MNSH--YEKQDH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
J 290400Z MAR 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-6
FM CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 125 (U)
7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF POSSIBLE RELOCATION OF
SOVIET ~~TOP SECRET~~ AND CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE
OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA. ~~TOP SECRET~~

[Large black redaction block]

A, B, C

KRIVAK 1 FFG 693 CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF BG BRAVO WHILE AGI 477
REMAINED WITH TG 76.3. T-58 PGF 679 REMAINED IN VICINITY OF

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2

STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

B. FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE SECOND SUCCESSIVE DAY OF IRANIAN P-3F ACTIVITY

[REDACTED]

THE IRANIAN P-3F, SIDE NUMBER 5-8702, APPROACHED FROM NORTHWEST, SURVEILLED BRUMBY WITH 2 PASSES CPA 1000 YDS AND DEPARTED TO NORTHWEST

C. [REDACTED]

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT. REVW: 28 MAR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

#3734

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

DDPQ655
: 073-023712
UT CDSN = OKA788
: 10737Z APR 80 TOT: 10816Z APR 80

TO*** UNASSIGNED **
TION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
TR=54

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NY MMNSH
KZK OO SOA DE
010426Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
M CAPT MARTIN, CINCPAC J3(A)
D YEKQDHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VAOMTOST, COMSEVENFLT
HLKMLC/RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
IAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
HLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

~~SECRET~~ (U)
FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
OR PERIOD 310001Z MARCH - 010800Z APRIL 80.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
MPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK GROUP SUR-
EILLANCE. PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS, CORAL
SEA LAUNCHED ALERT ACFT IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET AN-12 CUB ACTIVITY.
EE PARA 7 B

~~SECRET~~ HELOS/PLEN FOUR SORTIES FOR 15.7 HOURS.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 010900Z).

- 5) A. SHIPS:
(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS
CALIFORNIA

23-15N/061-00E
24-00N/061-00E

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

28 Copies

LASALLE/BRUMBY
KOELSCH
TATNALL
R.E. BYRD
MISPILLION
WHITE PLAINS

26-00N/052-20E
12-30N/043-30E
19-06N/039-46E
25-50N/056-50E
23-15N/062-00E
23-40N/058-35E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/REEVES/COOK
W.H. STANDLEY (TAV 27 MAR-03 APR)
F. HAMMOND
KILAUEA
NAVASOTA

22-45N/061-30E
DIEGO GARCIA
21-05N/061-00E
22-00N/062-00E
24-00N/060-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
GRIDLEY/BARBIEY

20-00N/062-40E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 2 P-38, 1 P-3C, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135
OPERATIONAL READINESS-KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 15 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC
A-7E: 8 OF 20 FMC, 6 MC
A-6E: 8 OF 20 FMC
KA-60: 2 OF 4 FMC
EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

3828

INN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

JPQ656

073-023723

T COSN = OKA789

10738Z APR 80 TOT: 10816Z APR 80

J*** UNASSIGNED **

ION*** UNASSIGNED **

FO* DNCO(1)

TAL COPIES = 02001

R=54

~~TOP SECRET ONLY~~

IAAMZYUW YLHOR 3829 0920425-MNSH--YEKQHC.

NY MNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

010426Z APR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

M CAPT MARTIN, CINCPAC J3(A)

O YEKQHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VAADMTRST, COMSEVENFLT

HLKHLG/ROOM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

AJ GEN THOMSON, DU CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

HLDKOC/ROOM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ ES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 120 (U)

-20: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

F-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~ 6 OF 8 FMC (NOTES 1, 2)

H-3H: 0 OF 5 FMC, 4 MC

-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 13 UP

ROL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

9 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS

OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

OTE 1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ 8 RH-53 H.F. COMMS IN UP STATUS

2. ONE ACFT IN DOWN STATUS REQUIRES MAIN ROTOR HEAD

SLEEVE AND SPINDLE CHARGE; ETR 02 APR.

. CORAL SEA:

-4N: 17 OF 21 FMC, 2 MC

-7E: 10 OF 15 FMC, 2 MC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
A-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
F-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
H-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
ERDL POOS: 3 OF 3 UP

2 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS
(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT DIEGO GARCIA: 12,894,840 GALLONS.
(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.
(TS) COMMUNICATIONS:
RESULTS OF H.F. COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH NCS NEA MAKRI,
RECE: NIMITZ HAD 1 OF 2 SATISFACTORY AND RH-53 HAD 2 OF 4
SATISFACTORY.
SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: NONE.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SUR-
VEILLANCE OPERATIONS. KRIVAK I FFG 693 CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF
G BRAVO, WHILE T-58 PGF 579 REMAINED ON PATROL IN THE STRAIT OF HOR-
UZ (SOH). DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON OF 30 MAR, AGI 477 DEPARTED
IC OF ARG ALFA TO TRAIL OKINAWA ENROUTE RENDEZVOUS WITH KILAUEA.

[REDACTED] ABC
[REDACTED]
ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ON 30 MAR INDICATED
[REDACTED]

3829

NNN

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1

CZCDP0657
AN: 073-023733
NPUT CUSA = OKA790
OR: 12738Z APR 80 TOT: 10816Z APR 80

UTO*** UNASSIGNED **

CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

NFO= DNCO(1)

UTAL COPIES = 00001
TR=54

AAMZYU4 YHLHOR 3830 0920425-MNSH--YEKQHC.

NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

010420Z APR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

M CAPT MARTIN, CINCPAC J3(A)

O YEKQHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADMTRCST, COMSEVENFLT

MLKMLC/RAOM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

AJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

MLDKOC/RAOM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

J NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

INAL SECTION OF THREE

URJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 128 (U)

• ~~SECRET~~ FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY

SURVEILLANCE MISSION BY IRANIAN P-3F, SIDE NUMBER 5-8704, IN THE

OH.

[REDACTED]

GAINED RADAR CONTACT AS

HE CUB LEFT THE PAKISTANI COAST AND A CORAL SEA F-4M IDENTIFIED THE
CONTACT AS A CUB, SIDE NUMBER 11104, APPROX 112NM4 NORTH OF CV 43. F-4
NO A-7 ACFT ESCORTED THE CUB AS IT TRANSITED THROUGH THE MOOLOC AREA,
EMAINING AT ALTITUDE AND DISPLAYING NO INTEREST IN TF 70. ESCORT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

AS TERMINATED AT 175NM3 SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF CORAL SEA.
REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFOR-
MATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
EVM 31 MAR 19

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
3430

INN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGE 1

ZCOPG170
R: 475-004484
FUT CDSK = DKA019
R: 20548Z APR 80 TOT: 20549Z APR 80

TU== UNASSIGNED ==

TION== UNASSIGNED ==

FO= DNCO(1)

TAL COPIES = 00001
=40

AMZYUW YHLWDR 3884 0930224-MNSH--YEKQMC.
MMNSH
K DD SOA DE
120400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC
YEKQMC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
D VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
KHLG/RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
IAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
M KIRKSEY, CTF72
DKDC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
M CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

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~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
TION ONE

~~TOP SECRET~~ CINCPAC PACFLT OPERATIONS SITREP 129 (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
ENTS FOR PERIOD 010001Z - 020000Z APR 80.

- A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK UP SURVEILLANCE.
- B. ~~TOP SECRET~~ SIDE NUMBER AG 105, ~~TOP SECRET~~ WITHIN TWO DEGREES OF NIMITZ OPERATING VIC 23-29N/160-32E. CREW RECOVERED IN EXCELLENT CONDITION BY NIMITZ HELO. AG 105 CARRIED ONE AIM-54, AIM-7F AND TWO AIM-9L. ACFT SANK IN WATER DEPTH EXCEEDING 9 FATHOMS.
- C. ~~TOP SECRET~~ HELOS FLEW TWO SORTIES FOR 7.0 HOURS.
- D. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCOP0163

N: 075-004432

PUT CDSN = PKAR20

T: 24552Z APR 80 TOT: 20555Z APR 80

0*** UNASSIGNED **

IDN*** UNASSIGNED **

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MZYUW YHLHDR 3885 0930224-MNSH--YEKQHC.

MNSH

K OO SOA DE

2040Z APR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC

YEKQHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

O VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ANLC/RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

IAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

M KIRKSEY, CTF70

DNOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

M CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

TI ON TWO

J: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 129 (U)

RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC

~~SECRET~~ FMC (NOTE)

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

O-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS

4 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

~~SECRET~~ COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 16 OF 21 FMC, 2 MC

A-7E: 12 OF 16 FMC

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

A-6E: 5 UP 10 FMC, 2 MC
 KA-6D: 2 UP 5 FMC
 E-2B: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
 RF-6G: 2 OF 2 FMC
 SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS

3) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,839,400 GNS.

C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: USS FRANCIS HAMMOND'S LAMPS RETURNED TO UP STATUS.

(TS) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF H.F. COMMUNICATION CHECKS [REDACTED] NIMITZ HAD 3 OF 5 SATISFACTORY AND [REDACTED]

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS, KRIVAK I FFG 693 CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF BG BRAVO, I 477 RETURNED WITH OKINAWA TO THE ARG ALFA MODLOC AND CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF TG 76.3. I-56 PCF 679 REMAINS ON STATION IN THE STRAIT OF MORMUZ (SOH).

[REDACTED SECTION]

(S-20) A 5 1

885

NN

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

PAGE 1

CDPG184
: 075-0F4501
PUT CDSK = DKA425
: 20555Z APR 82 . TOT: 20556Z APR 80

TD= UNASSIGNED

ATION= UNASSIGNED

IFD= DNCO(1)

IPAL COPIES = 00001
R#40

AMZYU- YHLHDR 3686 0930224-MNSH--YEKQHC.

Y MNSH

ZK OO SOA DE

020400Z APR 82 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC
YEKQHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
FO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
LKHLC/RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
LIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
DM KIRKSEY, CTF70
LDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
DM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
IAL SECTION OF THREE

3J: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 129 (U)
FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED

[REDACTED]

THE MAYS WERE INTERCEPTED
NM SOUTH OF NIMITZ. BOTH MAYS WITH TAIL NUMBER 09,
AINED AT ALTITUDE.

A, BC

NIMITZ ACFT REMAINED IN ESCORT
A POSITION 180 NM NORTHWEST OF CVN-68 AS THE MAYS CONTINUED

A, BC

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

[REDACTED]
PROXIMATELY 300 NM. IRANIAN P-3F, SIDE NUMBER 5-8702, CONDUCTED
CONNAISSANCE OF RICHARD E. BYRD TODAY. THE P-3 WAS INITIALLY
TECTED ON RADAR BY BYRD AND ACQUIRED VISUALLY 20 MINUTES LATER
THE ACFT APPROACHED AT LOW ALTITUDE FOR TWO PASSES WITH CPA
200 YDS. [REDACTED]

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
FORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
VN 01 APR 10

NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

886

NN

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

SOD

CZCDPQ706

PAGE 1

AN: 076-001120

NPUT CDSK = DKA267

OR: 30433Z APR 80 TOT: 30435Z APR 80

UTO*** UNASSIGNED **

CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

~~EYES ONLY~~

NFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

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AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3929 0940113-MNSH--YEKDH,

Ny MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

030400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

M CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC

O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

AJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

4LOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS SITREP (30 (U)

(U) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL

EVENTS FOR PERIOD 020801Z - 030800Z APR 80.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK GROUP SURVEILLANCE.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~ HELOS FLEW FIVE SORTIES FOR 14.2 HOURS.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 030900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS

CALIFORNIA

23-15N/061-00E

24-00N/061-00E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

LABALLE/BRUMBY
 KOELSCH (ETA PORT SUEZ 031300 APR)
 MULLINNIX/FOREST SHERMAN (ETA
 DJIBOUTI 06 APR)
 RICHARD E. BYRD
 MISPELLION/WHITE PLAINS
 (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 CORAL SEA/REEVES/COOK
 W. M. STANDLEY (TAV 27 MAR - 03 APR)
 FRANCIS HAMMOND
 KILAUEA (ETA DIEGO GARCIA 07 APR)
 NAVASOTA

BAHRAIN
 28-30N/033/10E
 27-00N/035-00E
 25-50N/056-50E
 23-15N/062-00E
 22-45N/061-30E
 DIEGO GARCIA
 21-00N/061-00E
 16-20N/063-10E
 24-00N/060-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

(4) ARG ALFA:
 OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN
 BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/BARBEY
 (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 DIXIE

20-30N/063-00E
 DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 3 P3-B, 2 P-3C, 4 KC-135
 [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 23 FMC, 1 MC
 A-7E: 10 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
 A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
 KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
 EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC
 EA-6B: 1 OF 3 FMC
 E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

929

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

NN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

ZCDPQ717

IN: 076-001406

INPUT CDSR = DKA278

OR: 30439Z APR 80 TOT: 30444Z APR 80

JTO*** UNASSIGNED **

CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

IR=78

~~EYES ONLY~~

AMPZYUW YHLHDR 3930 0940113-MNSH--YEKDDH.

BY MMNSH

ZK 00 SOA DE

030400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF=6

CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC

LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

DM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

J GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

DM KIRKSEY, CTF70

LDKOC/RAOM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

DM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

M

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR C
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

CTION TWO

BJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 130 (U)

RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~ (NOTE)

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS

4 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

TE: 8 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMUNICATIONS UP.

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 15 OF 21 FMC, 2 MC

A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC

A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KA-60: 3 OF 5 FMC
 E-2B: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
 RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
 SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
 D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS

LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,742,800 GALS.

(C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: CORAL SEA NR.2 MAIN ENGINE IS C-2
 UE TO LUBE OIL LINE LEAK.

COMMUNICATIONS:

A. RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]

NIMITZ HAD 3 OF 4 SATISFACTORY; RH-53 ACFT HAD 2 OF 3
 SATISFACTORY.

B. SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: NIMITZ HAS IXS
 FAILURE. ON-143 MODEM FAILED WHICH REDUCES SHIP-SHORE-SHIP TRAFFIC
 EXCHANGE VIA FDM BY 50 PERCENT. ETR 03 APR.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY A BUILD-UP IN SOVIN-
 DRON UNITS OPERATING IN THE SOCOTRA AREA AND CONTINUATION OF ROUTINE
 SURVEILLANCE IN THE TF 70 MODLOC AREA. WITHIN PAST 24 HOURS ADR
 KEREZINA, KYNDA CG 219, AND AG 218 TAMAN (WITH COMSOVINDRON EMBARKED),
 ARRIVED IN THE VIC OF TAMRIDA ANCHORAGE, SOCOTRA, JOINING THE ES-
 TIMATED SEVEN SOVIET SHIPS ALREADY PRESENT. AGI 477 REMAINED IN
 SURVEILLANCE OF ARG ALFA WHILE T-58 PGF 679 REMAINED ON PATROL IN
 THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ.

FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUA-
 TION OF IRANIAN P-3F ACTIVITY, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE SOVIET CUB
 WAS NOT ESCORTED BY TF 70 AIRCRAFT.

A, BC

1930

NN

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

CZCPO0412
IAN: 077-001166
NPUT CDSN = UKA649
DR: 40519Z APR 80 TOT: 40540Z APR 80

UTOC** UNASSIGNED **

CTION** UNASSIGNED **

1 Copy furnished Maj Joersz OPG

NFO= DNCO(1)

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TR=29

AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3978 0950055-MNSH--YEKDH.
NY MNSH
KZK OO SOA DE
030400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
AJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
1LDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

BRJ: ~~SECRET~~ OPERATIONS) SITREP 131 (U)
FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 030001Z - 040000Z APR 80.

A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK
GROUP SURVEILLANCE.
WMTZ OBSERVED STANDOWN.

~~SECRET~~ HELOS DID NOT FLY.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 040900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS
CALIFORNIA
LASALLE/BRUMBY

23-15N/061-00E
24-00N/061-00E
BAHRAIN

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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MULLINNIX/FOREST SHERMAN (ETA)

DJIBOUTI 06 APR)
RICHARD E. BYRD
MISPILLION
WHITE PLAINS

21-30N/038-00E
26-07N/055-18E
23-00N/063-00E
23-30N/059-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/REEVES
W. H. STANDLEY (ETA CVBG MODLOC 09 APR)
COOK
F. HAMMOND
KILAUEA (ETA DIEGO GARCIA 07 APR)
NAVASOTA

22-45N/061-30E
06-00S/070-45E
25-50N/056-50E
21-00N/061-00E
09-30N/065-15E
22-30N/062-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

A, B



(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN
BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/BARBEY

20-30N/063-00E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE



B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

: 3 P-3B, 3 P-3C, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135

E

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:


C

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 11 OF 23 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 8 OF 20 FMC, 4 MC
A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 1 OF 4 FMC
EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC

3978

INN



~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

CZCDP0413
ANS 077-001207
NPUT CDSN = DKA650
OR: 40521Z APR 80 TOT: 40540Z APR 80

UTO*** UNASSIGNED **

OTIONS*** UNASSIGNED **

NFO= DNCO(1)

DYAL COPIES = 00001
TR=29

AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3979 0950055-HNSH--YEKDGH.

VY MMNSH

(ZK OO SOA DE

040400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

1 MAJ GEN DAVIS J3 CINCPAC

1 LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

1 F0 VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

1 DM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT

1 J GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

1 DM KIRKSEY, CTF73

1 LDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

1 DM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

DM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

INAL SECTION OF TWO

IBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 131 (U)

RF-8G: 0 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~SECRET~~ 7 OF 8 FMC (SEE NOTE)

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL POOS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS

4 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

TE: 7 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS.

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 16 OF 21 FMC, 2 MC

A-7E: 9 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC

KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS.

LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,705,000 GALS.
MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: USS GRIDLEY SPS-43 RADAR IS DOWN,
STR 30 APR 80. GRIDLEY HAS COMPLETE LOSS OF AIR SEARCH RADAR
CAPABILITY.

3. (1) COMMUNICATIONS:

RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]
3 OF 4 SATISFACTORY FORM NIMITZ. 3 OF 4 SATISFACTORY FROM
[REDACTED]

B. RESULTS OF PARKHILL HF TEST WITH NAVCOMMSTA DIEGO GARCIA:
COMMUNICATIONS EVENTUALLY ESTABLISHED VIA CHANNEL 9 OFFSET 500 KHZ
AFTER HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY INITIALLY.

SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: NONE

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE AND
LOGISTICS OPERATIONS. AGI 477 REMAINED IN VICINITY OF ARG ALFA;
-58 PGF 679 REMAINED ANCHORED IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. [REDACTED]

FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS LIMITED TO THE DAILY IRANIAN
P-3 (SIDE NUMBER 5-8702) SURVEILLANCE IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ.
ORAL SEA CAP ACFT WERE VECTORED TO INTERCEPT WHILE P-3 WAS ORBITING
50 NM NW OF CORAL SEA. PRIOR TO INTERCEPT, P-3 DEPARTED TO NW,
PA TO TF 70 WAS 144 NM.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION
PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER
OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
EVN 04 APR 80

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
3979

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

JNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

PD319
R78-030535
NPUT CDSN = OKA914
OR: 78613Z APR 80 TOT: ... 70701Z APR 80

UTC: UNASSIGNED

CTID: UNASSIGNED

NFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
TC=23

AAMZYU YHLHQR 4973 0980502-MNSH--YEKQDH,
NY MMNSH
K7K DD SGA DE
070503Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
ADM VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
MLIAMC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
KOC/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM
~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST/SECTION ONE

UBJ: ~~OPINTEL DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 134 (U)~~
FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 060001Z - 070000Z APR 80.

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON
MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK GROUP SURVEILLANCE.
CORAL SEA OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~ HELIOS FLEW TWO SORTIES FOR 10.0 HOURS.

C. CODEL PRICE WILL ARRIVE USS CORAL SEA AM 7 APR.

D. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES. (POSITS AS OF 070900Z). C

A. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA
LASALLE (RESTRICTED AVAILABILITY)

24-000/060-00E
BAHRAIN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

226-5720
18 04

Page 8 of 8

THRU 30 APR)
MULLINIX/F. SHERMAN
BRUMBY/R. E. PYRO
MISPILLION
WHITE PLAINS
MASSAYAMPA (ETA CVBG MODLOC 14 APR)


13-00N/049-00E
28-40N/050-20E
22-00N/062-00E
23-50N/058-30E
06-10N/094-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/REEVES/F. HAMMOND
W. H. STANLEY (ETA CVBG MODLOC
9 APR)
COOK
KILAUEA (ETA 11 APR)
NAVASOTA

24-00N/059-00E
11-20N/064-30E

25-50N/056-50E
DIEGO GARCIA
24-00N/060-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:



A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN
BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/BARBEY

23-30N/062-00E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

6. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT: [REDACTED] 2 P-3B, 2 P-3C,

1 EA-3B, 6 KC-135; DJIBOUTI: 1 EP-3

3. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 23 FMC
A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
A-6E: 6 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
EA-3F: 2 OF 2 FMC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC
S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
A-53: 7 OF 8 FMC (SEE NOTE)

14073

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

DPG317
07H-03P545
INPUT CDSN = DKA915
TOR: 70613Z APR 80 TOT: ...70700Z APR 80

AUTD== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFC= DNCC(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=47

DAAMZYUW YMLHQR 4074 090250Z-MNSH--YEKQDH,
ZNY MMNSH
ZK7K OO SOA DE
O 070503Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, P2 CINCPACFLT
YMLIAMC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTG70
RADM KOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA AIRTEL BROADCAST/SECTION TWO OF TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 134 (U)

S-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS

NOTE: ~~TOP SECRET~~ RH-53 A.F. COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS

- B. CORAL SEA:
- F-4N: 16 OF 21 FMC, 1 MC
- A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC
- A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
- E-2C: 1 OF 4 FMC
- RF-6G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SM-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

39

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

U-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E HALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS.

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,568,080 GALS.

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

(S) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] 3 OF 3 SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ [REDACTED] SATISFACTORY

B. SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: NONE

(S) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA CONSISTED OF CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. AGI 477 AND KRIVAK I FFG 693 REMAINED WITH ARG ALFA AND BATTLE GROUP BRAVO RESPECTIVELY AND T-58 FGF 679 IS ESTIMATED ON STATION IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ ALTHOUGH NO LOCATING INFO HAS BEEN RECEIVED SINCE LATE 5 APR.

B. FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND WAS NOT ESCORTED.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

EVW 07 APR 10

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
4074

NNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

CZCUM0586
AN: 079-016526
CJSM # 0KA926
02539Z APR 80 TOT: 80549Z APR 80

JTC*** UNASSIGNED **

CTIONS*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: UNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
TR=23

3AMZZSX YMLHDP 4147 0990313-MNSH--YEKDDH.
NY MNSH
07K PP SCA DE
280400Z APR 80 ZYS ZFF-6 ZZS
4 MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
3 LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
WFO MAJN THOST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
AJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF74
HLOKGC/MAJN CHAMBERS, CTF77.3
CMAA CHEATING, COMILEASTFOR

CORRECTED COPY
DESTROY ALL OTHERS

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA INTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION ONE

REJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~OPERATIONS~~ SITREP 135 (U)
(A) ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
OF PERIOD 070801Z - 080000Z APR 80.
1. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK GROUP
SURVEILLANCE.
2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~IN SORTIE FOR 7.1 HOURS~~
3. COLEL PRICE ARRIVED ABOARD CORAL SEA AM 07 APRIL AND RECEIVED
SEA THREAT AND FORCE FAMILIARIZATION BRIEFINGS.
4. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MIS-
SIONS AND ACTIONS.
5. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 080000Z
6. SHIPS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

8 of 8 copies

1 BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 07/TEXAS
 08/ARIZONA
 09/LE (UPKEEP THRU 30 APR)
 10/LLINNIX/F. SHERMAN
 11/UNRY/R.F. BYRD
 12/SFILLION
 13/ITE PLAINS
 14/SSAYAHFA (ETA CVBG MODLOC. 14 APR)
 15/1 BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE
 16/PAL SEA/REEVES/F. HAMMOND
 17/1 HASTANLEY (ETA CVBG MODLOC 09 APR)
 18/0A
 19/LAUEA (ETD 11 APR)
 20/VASOTA

23-15N/061-00E
 24-00N/061-00E
 BAHRAIN
 13-00N/054-50E
 28-44N/050-19E
 22-06N/062-00E
 23-40N/058-40E
 05-30N/088-00E
 22-45N/061-30E
 17-25N/062-45E
 25-50N/056-50E
 DIEGO GARCIA
 22-30N/062-00E

1. SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A.B

2. WING ALPHA:
 01/INAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
 02/IDLEY/GARNEY
 3. MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

20-35N/063-00E

4. SEABASE AIRCRAFT:
 01/3P-39, 2P-3C, 1EP-3, 7KC-135
 02/OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

E C

5. LIMITS:
 01/15 OF 23 FMC
 02/11 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC
 03/05 OF 12 FMC
 04/06 OF 4 FMC
 05/03 OF 2 FMC
 06/02 OF 3 FMC
 07/03 OF 4 FMC
 08/02 OF 3 FMC
 09/04 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
 10/107

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGE 1

ZCOP0565

IN: 679-216505

PUT CDSN = DKA925

08530Z APR 80

TOT:

08549Z APR 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE** UNASSIGNED **

TION** UNASSIGNED **

FC: DNCO(1)

TAL COPIES = 02001

F=23

AMZZSX YHLWDR 4128 0990313-MNSH--YEKDDH,

Y MMSH

ZR PP SGA DE

Z00400Z APR 80 ZYS ZFF-6 ZZS

MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

CG VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

DM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

1 GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

DM KIRKSEY, CTF70

DKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

DM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

CORRECTED COPY
DESTROY ALL OTHERS

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
TRANSMIT VIA OPIATEL BROADCAST.

AL SECTION OF TWO

3J: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 135 (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ (NOTE)

3M: 6 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC

04 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

DL PODS 3 OF 3 UP

OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERODL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS

IF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS

~~TOP SECRET~~ COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS

COMAL SEA:

IN: 15 OF 21 FMC, 1 MC

E: 9 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC

GD: 2 OF 5 FMC

E: 2 OF 4 FMC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ **EYES ONLY** PAGE 2

-BG: 2 OF 2 FMC
-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

724 (FUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
POGS: 3 OF 3 UP

16 A-7E WALLEYE EFOL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS
LOGISTICS: JF-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,475,680 GALLONS

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE

(TS) COMMUNICATIONS:

RESULTS OF H.F. COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]
: 5 OF 5 SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ; [REDACTED] SATISFACTORY FROM [REDACTED]

SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: NONE

AS- OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA CONSISTED OF
ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. KRIVAK I FFG 693 REMAINED DIW IN
E VICINITY OF THE 6G THROUGH MOST OF THE DAY.

(S-000)

A. E. C.

[REDACTED]

CPA TO TF 70 WAS APPROXIMATELY 150 NM, ON THE RETURN
ANSIT, THE P-3 CLOSED COOK TO APPROXIMATELY 63 NM [REDACTED]

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFOR-
MATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

06 APR 10

NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

08

IN

~~TOP SECRET~~ **EYES ONLY**

~~TOP SECRET~~



PAGE 1
~~EYES ONLY~~

CDPOBJA
080-210261
OUT COSM DR4856
TOR: 90441Z APR 80 TDT: 90441Z APR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **
INFO: OACU(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 0001
RTR=23

JAAMZYU W-LWCR 4141 1000040-PNSH--YEKDCG,
ZNY MMNS-
ZKZK OO SCA SE
O 090400Z APR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SPYLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM THOST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, J2 CINCPACFLT
YMLIAMC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
COMDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ()
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA INTEL BROADCAST.
SECTION 2.5

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS, SITREP 136 (U)
1. THE FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS ()
FOR PERIOD 0000Z - 090000Z APR 80.
2. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK GROUP
SURVEILLANCE.
3. ~~TOP SECRET~~ SORTIES FOR 2.1 HOURS.
4. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MIS-
SIONS AND OPERATIONS.
5. ~~TOP SECRET~~ AIR FORCES (POSITS AS OF 000000Z). ()
6. ~~TOP SECRET~~
7. BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/SEAS/CALIFORNIA/WHITE PLAINS 20-55N/061-30E
ASALEE/KEEP THRU 30 APR) BAHRAIN
MULLIN/SMERMAN 18-00N/057-30E

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- E. BYRD
- ISPELLION
- ASSAYAMPA (ETA C65G MODLOC 14 APR)
- 2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
- ORAL SEA/KEEVES/W.H. STANDLEY/NAVASOTA
- HAMMOND
- OOK
- ILAUEA (ETA 11 APR)
- 3) SUBMARINES:

26-33N/051-03E
 25-50N/056-50E
 20-30N/063-32E
 05-20N/061-30E

21-30N/062-03E
 21-00N/061-03E
 24-50N/057-51E
 DIEGO GARCIA



A.B

- 4) ARG ALFA:
- KINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
- RIDLEY/BARBEY
- 5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
- IXIE

20-00N/061-04E

DIEGO GARCIA

- SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
- 2 P-3B, 1 P-3C, 1 EP-3, 1 EA-3B, 4 KC-135
- OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

E

- NIMITZ:
 - 14: 14 OF 23 FMC
 - 7E: 11 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC
 - 6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
 - A-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
 - B: 1 OF 1 FMC (NOTE 1)
 - B: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - 2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
 - F-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - 3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- 4141

NNN



~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

~~RESTRICTED ONLY~~

CDP0072
888-010462
INPUT CDSN = DKA870
TOR: 90449Z APR 80

TOT: 90451Z APR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=78

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 4142 1000040-MNSH--YEKDG.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SDA DE

O 090400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADM KOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

SEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 136 (U)

RH-53: 7 OF 8 FMC (NOTE 2)

RH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC

A-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ROL PODS 3 OF 3 UP

9 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS

OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS

OTE 1. SECOND EA-3B IS SHORE BASED ~~REDACTED~~ AND

WILL BE REPORTED UNDER PARA 2 B.

OTE 2. 8 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS.

• CORAL SEA:

-4N: 15 OF 21 FMC, 1 MC

-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC

A-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC

E

~~RESTRICTED ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

: 1 OF 4 FMC
8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
3H-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

0-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E HALLEYS ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED]: 12,391,694 GALLONS. E

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: USS OKINAWA LOST ONE OF TWO
BOILERS, ETR 09 APR; MAX SPEED AVAILABLE 15 KTS.

(U) COMMUNICATIONS:

RESULTS OF H.F. COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS W/ [REDACTED] M

3 OF 3 FROM NIMITZ SATISFACTORY.

SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: SEVERE HF/RATCOM
DEGRADATION, DUE TO SOLAR FLARES THROUGH 7 AND 8 APRIL.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

[REDACTED]

A, B, C

FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY AN
IRANIAN P-3F FLIGHT. USS COOK MAINTAINED CONTACT ON THE IRANIAN
P-3F, SIDE NUMBER 5-8704, AS THE ACFT FOLLOWED PREVIOUS PATTERNS OF
MAKING ONE SURVEILLANCE PASS WITH A CPA OF 500 YARDS AND ORBITING AT
LOW ALTITUDE IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA/GULF OF OMAN.

[REDACTED]

REMARKS:
4142

NNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

CDPQ099

080-017530

OUT CDSN = DKA874

TOR: 90453Z APR 80

TOT: 90503Z APR 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=23

DAAMZYUW YHLHDR 4143 1000040-FNSH--YEKDH.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 090400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMPSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

DKDC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

M CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA WINTEL BROADCAST.

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 136 (U)

A. GONZO 2-80, A UNI-SERVICE MULTI-THREAT BATTLE FORCE EXERCISE
WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 9-11 APRIL 80. THIS EXERCISE
IS DESIGNED TO EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS IN SURFACE-SUBSURFACE COORDINA-
TION, COVER AND DECEPTION, ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE, ANTI-AIR WARFARE,
AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE.

B. E-3A/B-52/TF 70 INTERFACE TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED ON 08 APR.
ALL MISSION OBJECTIVES WERE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. COMMUNICATIONS
EXCELLENT ON ALL CIRCUITS. HF TADIL-A DATA LINK ESTABLISHED BETWEEN
E-3A, NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA E-2B AIRCRAFT, AND TF 70 SURFACE UNITS;
NO PROBLEMS NOTED. E-3A CONTROLLED B-52 AIRCRAFT FOR RECONNAISSANCE
AND MINE LAYING EXERCISE. E-3A CONTROLLED F-14 FIGHTERS CONDUCTING
INTERCEPTS AGAINST B-52 AIRCRAFT. CTF 70 QUICKREP STATED THIS WAS
MOST SUCCESSFUL INTERFACE TRAINING TO DATE. EXPANDED SUMMARY OF
EXERCISE WILL BE COMPILED AND FORWARDED UPON RECEIPT.

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION
PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
EVM 09 APR 10

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
4143

NNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDP0949
OAN: 059-033754
INPUT CDSN = OK4523
TOR: 270514Z MAR 80 TOT: 270528Z MAR 80

AUTO=** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=95

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3653 0870241-MNSH--YEKDGHC
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 270400Z MAR 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-6
FM CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC
TO YEKDGHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM THROST, COMSEVENFLT
YHLKHLG/RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF 70
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG 70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 123 (U)

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 260801Z - 270800Z MAR 80.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE.

B. RH-53 HELOS FLEW FOUR SORTIES FOR 13.6 HOURS.

C. AWAITING EQUIPMENT FOR NEW CONTINGENCY OPTION. NIMITZ AND
CORAL SEA REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL OTHER MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 270900Z).

A. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP 9RAV0:
 - NIMITZ/TEXAS/WHITE PLAINS
 - CALIFORNIA
 - PAUL F. FOSTER (ENR SUBIC, ETA 24 APR)
 - LASALLE/KOELSCH/BRUMBY

- 23-15N/051-00E
- 24-00N/051-00E
- 05-25N/078-00E
- 26-30N/051-00E

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

11-45N/044-00E
25-50N/056-46E
06-25N/078-00E

TATTNAL
R.E. BYRD
MISPILLION (REFUELING P.F. FOSTER/
SCHOFIELD/J.P. JONES)
(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/REEVES/COOK/FRANCIS HAMMOND
W.H. STANDLEY (TAV 27 MAR - 03 APR)
J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD (ENR SURIC,
ETA 04 APR)
KILAUEA (ETO 28 MAR)
NAVASOTA

22-45N/091-30E
DIEGO GARCIA
06-25N/078-00E

DIEGO GARCIA
22-30N/062-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AB

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN
BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/BARREY

23-00N/062-00E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT: [REDACTED] 2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3,

4 KC-135

3 (U) [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14	15	OF	24	FMC,	1	MC
A-7E:	10	OF	20	FMC,	3	MC
A-6E:	8	OF	12	FMC		
KA-6D:	3	OF	4	FMC		
EA-3B:	3	OF	2	FMC		
EA-6B:	2	OF	3	FMC		
E-2B:	2	OF	4	FMC		
RF-8G:	0	OF	3	FMC,	1	MC
S-3A:	1	OF	4	FMC,	1	MC

#3650

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOP0854

DAN: 070-037160

INPUT CDSN = OKA097

TOR: 280602Z MAR 80 TOT: 280603Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=24

GAAMZYU4 YMLHDR 3679 0980224-MNSH--YEKDDH.

ZNY MMNSH

0ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 280400Z MAR 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-8

FM CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ROOM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAMC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF

ROOM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHLOKOC/ROOM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ROOM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR (

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 123 (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: (

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 14 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC

A-7E: 7 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC

A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC

KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC

EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~ F-15: 7 OF 8 FMC (NOTE) ?

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 13 UP

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 19 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NOTE: 8 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 11 OF 21 FMC, 5 MC

A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC

KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-9G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS

LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 13,090,000 GALLONS. E

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

(T) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMM CHECKS WITH NAVCOMSTA

[REDACTED] NIMITZ HAD 4 OF 5 SATISFACTORY. E

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. KRIVAKI FFG 693 REMAINED IN VICINITY BATTLE GROUP BRAVO THROUGHOUT THE DAY.

[REDACTED SECTION]

(S-CW)

B. FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY IRANTAN P-3F SURVEILLANCE OF RICHARD E BYRD, KOELSCH, AND BRUMBY IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ

(S-CW)

[REDACTED] THE IRANIAN P-3F, SIDE NUMBER

3679

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0865
DAN: 070-037275
INPUT COSN = OKA105
TOR: 280606Z MAR 80 TOT: 280607Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
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TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=24

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3680 0880224-MNSH--YEKQGH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK 00 SOA DE
O 280400Z MAR 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-6
FM CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA INTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 123 (U)
5-8704, APPROACHED FROM NORTH, SURVEILLED KOELSCH AND BRUMBY WITH CPA
1,000 YDS, CIRCLED BYRD WITH CPA OF 1,000 YDS AND DEPARTED TO NORTH.

~~TOP SECRET~~
THIS FLIGHT CONTINUES A RECENT
PATTERN OF P-3 STRAIT OF HORMOZ SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS EVERY SECOND DAY.
REMARKS:
CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO
MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 27 MAR 80

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDPQ954
DAN: P69-034046
INPUT CDSN = DK4527
TOR: 270516Z MAR 80 TOT: 270530Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=55

JAAMZYUW YHLHDR 3651 0870241-MNSH--YFKDQHC

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA OE

J 270400Z MAR 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-6

FM CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC

TO YEKDQHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM THROST, COMSEVENFLT

/HLKHLC/RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

/HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF 77

/HLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG 70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

MEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA INTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF TWO.

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 123 (U)

RH-53: 6 OF 8 FMC (NOTE 1)

3H-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC

)-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS

3 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

10 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE 1: 8 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS.

3. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 14 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC

A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 3 MC

A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC

(A-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

2 OF 2 FMC
1 OF 1 FMC
STAGING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
3 OF 3 UP
7E WALLFYE ERDL CAPABLE. 11 IN UP STATUS

WATERMINE AIRCRAFT
MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: FRANCIS HAMMOND'S SH-2F HELD (C-2)
DUE TO INOPERATIVE BEARING-DISTANCE-HEADING INDICATOR. FTR

COMMUNICATIONS: 2 OF 4 NIMITZ HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS
WERE SATISFACTORY.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY REALIGNMENT OF
SOVIET SURVEILLANCE ASSIGNMENTS IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA.
CORAL SEA ACFT LOCATED KRIVAK I FFG 693 AND MERTKR PAMYET LENINA
ABOUT 22 NM NORTHWEST AND 54 NM WEST OF CV-43 RESPECTIVELY. THE
KRIVAK REMAINED OIW IN THE VICINITY OF BG CHARLIE THROUGHOUT THE
DAY. AGI 477 COMMENCED SURVEILLANCE OF TG 79.3 DURING LATE AFTERNOON
25 MAR. TF 70



~~TOP SECRET~~
A-5

ESTIMATED BY COMPANY, CONTINUED A NORTHROUND
TRANSIT OF THE MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL.

B. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED IN THE TF 70
AREA.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW: 26 MAR 10
SSO NOTE DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#3651

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~
PAGE 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZCZCOP0852
DAN: 070-037022
INPUT CDSN = OKA085
TOR: 280555Z MAR 80 TOT: 280622Z MAR 80

AUTO>** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION>** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001
PTR=24

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NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

1 280400Z MAR 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-6

FM CAPT MARTIN, J3(A) CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLEP, J3 JCS

NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

HLDKOC/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~OPERATIONAL DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 1247~~ (U)

OPERATIONAL DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 1247 (U)
THE FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 270801Z - 280807Z MAR 80.

• CORAL SEA CONDUCTED SSC AND CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE.

~~OPERATIONAL DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 1247~~

• NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS.

• ~~OPERATIONAL DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 1247~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 280900Z).

• SHIPS:

- 1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/TEXAS/WHITE PLAINS
 - CALIFORNIA

23-15N/061-00E
24-02N/061-00E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
PAGE 2

PAUL F. FOSTER (ENR SUBIC ETA 4 APR)
LASALLE/R.E. BYRD
KOELSCH (ETA DJIBOUTI 31 MAR)
TATTNALL
BRUMBY
MISPILLION (ETA CVBG MODLOC 31 MAR)

06-00N/003-10E
26-36N/051-18E
21-00N/060-10E
11-45N/044-43E
25-50N/056-50E
08-30N/071-30E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/REEVES/COOK/F. HAMMOND
W.H. STANDLEY (TAV 27 MAR - 03 APR)
J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD (ETA SUBIC 4 APR)
KILAUEA (ETA CVBG MODLOC 01 APR)
NAVASOTA

22-45N/061-30E
DIEGO GARCIA
06-00N/083-10E
02-00S/069-00E
22-30N/062-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
GRIDLEY/BARBEY

23-30N/061-20E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

[REDACTED]

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
[REDACTED] 2 P-3C, 2 P3-B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135.

E

3678

NNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EVES~~

ZCZCOPQ783
003-027124
T CDSN = OKA277
TUR: 300751Z APR 80 TOT: 300830Z APR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED ** COPY PROVIDED TO OPG/MAJ ELM

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 30001
RTR#40

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ZNY MNSH
KZK OO SOA DE
J 300900Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
CINIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA COMINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 157 (U)

1. (TSEC) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 290801Z - 300800Z APR 80.

A. NIMITZ AND CONSTELLATION CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE. CORAL SEA DID NOT CONDUCT FLIGHT OPS.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~

A.B

C. MULLINNIX, BRUMBY AND R.E. BYRD CONTINUE TRANSIT TO THE
PERSIAN GULF. ETA SOH 2100Z.

D. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
APPLICABLE MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. (TSEC) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 300900Z).

A. SHIPS:
(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA

24-00N/000-00E

8 9

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EVES~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TEXAS
LASALLE
MULLINNIX/BRUMBY/BYRD
F. SHERMAN
WHITE PLAINS (ENR SUBIC, ETA 25 MAY)
WASSAYAMPA/NAVASOTA
MARS

08-30N/061-15E
BAHRAIN
25-30N/053-50E
12-56N/054-20E
05-53N/088-44E
23-00N/060-00E
23-30N/060-00E
DIEGO GARCIA
DIEGO GARCIA

(2) L.Y. SPEAR
DIXIE (ETD 1 MAY)
BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/REEVES/STANDLEY
COOK/F. HAMMOND
ROANOKE

13-30N/069-25E
15-15N/068-15E
12-40N/070-00E

(3) BATTLE GROUP DELTA:
CONSTELLATION/H.E. HOLT
WORDEN
BAGLEY/DAVIDSON/O'BRIEN
TRUXTON
REASONER
SACRAMENTO (ENR. VIC MASIRAH-ETA 03 MAY)
PASSUMPSIC

09-08N/072-50E
10-08N/071-35E
09-08N/072-17E
09-30N/071-15E
06-10N/094-00E
11-30N/070-00E
06-10N/094-00E

(4) BATTLE GROUP GOLF:
EISENHOWER/VIRGINIA/S. CAROLINA

36-00S/030-30E

(5) SUBMARINES:

A, B

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(6) ARG ALFA:
[REDACTED] (ETD, 30 APR)
OKINAWA/SAN BERNARDINO (ETA MOMBASA 04 MAY)
ALAMO/BARBEY (ETA DIEGO GARCIA 05 MAY)
MOBILE (ETD 30 APR)
GRIDLEY (ENR MOGADISCIO, ETA 2 MAY)

11-30N/055-05E
22-00N/061-00E
DIEGO GARCIA
10-00N/054-00E

(7) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

[REDACTED]

15034

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

CDP0784
93-027150
UT CDSN = DKA278
TOR: 300752Z APR 80 TOT: 300830Z APR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 300800Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
LIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF73
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 157 (U)

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

DIEGO GARCIA: 1 EA-3B, 1 EP-3E, 2 P-3B, 2 P-3C, 4 KC-135. E

3. OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14N:	15	OF	23	FMC
A-7E:	12	OF	19	FMC, 3 MC
A-6E:	10	OF	12	FMC
KA-6D:	3	OF	4	FMC
EA-3B:	0	OF	1	FMC, 1 MC
EA-6B:	2	OF	3	FMC
E-2B:	3	OF	4	FMC
S-3A:	1	OF	4	FMC, 2 MC
RH-53:	1	OF	1	FMC

SH-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
18 OF 19 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 15 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 9 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4H: 17 OF 21 FMC
A-7E: 13 OF 16 FMC
A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC
KA-6D: 4 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 4 OF 5 FMC
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

C. CONSTELLATION:

F-14: 14 OF 24 FMC, 3 MC
A-7E: 8 OF 12 FMC, 2 MC
A-6E: 8 OF 10 FMC
KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC
EA-3B: 1 OF 2 FMC
E-2C: 3 OF 4 FMC
S-3A: 5 OF 10 FMC
SH-3H: 3 OF 6 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 9 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
8 OF 12 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS
9 OF 12 A-7E FLIR CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

D. EISENHOWER:

F-14: 12 OF 22 FMC, 1 MC
A-7E: 17 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
KA-6D: 4 OF 4 FMC
EA-6B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
E-2C: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

3035

~~EYES ONLY~~
PAGE

743 020124
CZEDP0787

023-027261

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

T CDSN = 0KA287

OR: 300803Z APR 80 TOT: 300830Z APR 80

UTO*** UNASSIGNED **

CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

NFO# DNCO(1)

TAL COPIES = 00001

FR=40

AMZYUW YHLHOR 5036 1210426-MNSH--YEKDDH,

BY MNSH

(ZK 00 SOA DE

300803Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

ADM VAOM YPOST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

OBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 157 (U)

S-3A: 4 OF 7 FMC, 2 MC

RH-53D: 1 OF 3 FMC

SH-3H: 5 OF 6 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 9 OF 10 UP

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 FUEL STATUS DIEGO GARCIA 15,345,120 GALLONS. E

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO CHANGE

(U) COMMUNICATIONS: NO SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES.

(S) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA REMAINED

A LOW LEVEL. AGI 477 BROKE OFF TRAIL OF OKINAWA DURING THE

MORNING 28 APR. APPROX 300NM SOUTH OF NIMITZ. THE AGI WAS NOT

LOCATED BY NIMITZ SSC ACFT TODAY, AND IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER

AGI 477 WILL RETURN TO MODLOC OR TRANSIT TO THE SOUTHEAST TO MONITOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL - SEA TURNOVER~~

B. NO SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED TODAY. AN IRANIAN C-130, TAIL NO. 5-8528 CONDUCTED SURVEILLANCE THRU CENTRAL GULF OF OMAN DURING THE 0700Z HR. INITIALLY DETECTED AND INTERCEPTED BY NIMITZ F-14 36NM WEST OF CVN68 VIC 24-22N/059-22E. ESCORT WAS TERMINATED AT 0755Z AS THE C-130 ENTERED THE IRANIAN BUFFER ZONE 110NM SW OF NIMITZ.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT. REVN 30 APR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#5838

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

CZCOPR231

AMN 064-821417

COSN = OKA445

18818Z MAY 88 TOT 18819Z MAY 88

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

B#230

UTD*** UNASSIGNED **

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CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

NFO = ONCU(1)

DYAL COPIES = 00001

TR=95

A:AMZYUH YHLHOR 5076 1220022-MNSH--YEK00H,

NY MNSH

KZK DC SOA DE

010800Z MAY 88 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, #2 CINCPACFLT

HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

A KIRKSEY, CTF70

DC/ROOM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

FM

[REDACTED] EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
JNO TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST//SECTION ONE

BJJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 158 (U)

[REDACTED] FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 300801Z APR - 010800Z MAY 88.

[REDACTED] NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON
MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK GROUP SURVEILLANCE.
[REDACTED] ORAL SEA AND CONSTELLATION CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON LONG-RANGE AAWEX, FORCE CAP, AND TASK GROUP SURVEILLANCE.

[REDACTED] COMMENCED TRANSIT TO DIEGO GARCIA.

[REDACTED] NIMITZ AIRWING REMAINS READY TO EXECUTE ALL APPLICABLE MISSIONS
AND OPTIONS.

[REDACTED] (TSCG) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 010900Z MAY 88)

(3)

Copy No. 8 of 9

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

EYES ONLY

SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA
TEXAS

LASALLE (ENR ABU DHABI, ETA 03 MAY)
MULLINIX/R.E. BYRD
F. SHERMAN (ENR DJIBOUTI, ETA 03 MAY)
MASSAYAMPA
NAVASOTA (ENR SUBIC, ETA 13 MAY)
MARS

L.Y. SPEAR
DIXIE (ETD 01 MAY)
BRUMBY (ETD 03 MAY)

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/REEVES/W.H. STNADLEY/
COOK/F. HAMMOND/ROANOKE

(3) BATTLE GROUP DELTA:
CONSTELLATION/WORDEN/TRUXTON/
BAGLEY/DAVIDSON/H.E. HOLT/O'BRIEN
REASONER
SACRAMENTO

(4) BATTLE GROUP GOLF:
EISENHOWER/S. CAROLINA/VIRGINIA

(5) SUBMARINES:

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (ETD 30 APR)
[REDACTED] (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 4 MAY)

(6) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/SAN BERNARDINO (ENR MOMBASA,
4 MAY)
ALAMO/BARBEY (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 05 MAY)
GRIDLEY (ENR MOGADISHU, ETA 02 MAY)

(7) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT: [REDACTED] 2 EA-3B, 1 EA-3E,
2 P-3B, 2 P-3C, 4 KC-135, 1 EP-3E.
E#5076

24-00N/06000E
02-00N/060-30E

25-40N/053-00E
12-20N/049-00E
23-00N/060-00E
17-30N/065-30E
21-00N/063-00E
DIEGO GARCIA
DIEGO GARCIA
SITRA

11-25N/070-30E

14-20N/068-30E

05-50N/088-05E
17-45N/064-50E

29-45S/038-20E

VIC
VIC

[REDACTED]
DIEGO GARCIA
[REDACTED]

06-55N/056-40E
17-30N/063-30E
06-00N/050-00E

DIEGO GARCIA

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCOP0234

RAW: 004-021467
UT CDSN = DKA448
100232 MAY 80 TOT: 10859Z MAY 80

10859Z MAY 80

EYES ONLY

AUTO... UNASSIGNED **

ACTION... UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=29

GAAMZYUW YHLHOR 5077 1220022-MNSH--YEKQGH,
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 010800Z MAY 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
M KIRKSEY, CTF70
KOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST//SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 158 (U)

3. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

- F-14: 15 OF 23 FMC
- A-7E: 13 OF 19 FMC, 2 MC
- A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
- EA-36: 0 OF 1 FMC
- EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
- RH-53: 1 OF 1 FMC
- SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC

unclass

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
18 OF 19 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 15 IN UP STATUS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

PAGE 2

5. OP 5 A-6E TRANSFORMER DESIGNATORS UP

CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 16 OF 21 FMC, 3 MC
- A-7E: 12 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6E: 8 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
- KA-60: 4 OF 5 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 3 OF 5 FMC
- SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

C. CONSTELLATION:

- F-14: 9 OF 24 FMC, 5 MC
- A-7E: 8 OF 12 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6E: 8 OF 10 FMC
- KA-60: 3 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
- EA-3B: 1 OF 2 FMC
- E-2C: 3 OF 4 FMC
- S-3A: 1 OF 10 FMC, 4 MC
- SH-3H: 3 OF 6 FMC, 1 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 9 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
8 OF 12 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS
8 OF 12 A-7E FLIR CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

EISENHOWER:

- F-14: 14 OF 22 FMC, 2 MC
- A-7E: 17 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
- A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 3 MC
- KA-60: 4 OF 4 FMC
- EA-6B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- E-2C: 3 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- S-3A: 6 OF 7 FMC
- RH-53D: 1 OF 3 FMC
- SH-3H: 5 OF 6 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 9 OF 10 UP

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO CHANGE
#5077

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZC DP0236

DATE 884-021825

UNIT CDSN = OKA452

18829Z MAY 88 --TOTL 18900Z MAY 88

~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGE 5

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=29

GAAMZYUW YLHOR 5078 1220022-MNSH--YEKQOH,

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SDA DE

0 018800Z MAY 88 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT

YHLIANG/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF73

ADM KOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST//FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 158 (U)

6. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: NO SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES.

7. (S) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY
CONTINUED AT LOW LEVEL IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA. I-58 PGF 679
REMAINED ON THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ (SOH) PATROL WHILE AO IZHORA
RETURNED TO THE MOOLOC AREA AND WAS LOCATED BY NIMITZ ACFT VIC
22-59N/063-00E AT 290720Z. NIMITZ SSC CONFIRMED THAT AGI 477 WAS
NOT RETURNED TO THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA. OUTBOARD RDF INDICATED
THE AGI WAS POSSIBLY PROCEEDING TO THE SOCOTRA AREA. KRIVAK I
FFG 693, IN TRAIL OF OKINAWA, WAS SIGHTED BY F. SHERMAN VIC
11-53N/055-23E AT 290638Z

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] SEARCH OPERATIONS IN

B,C

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE

2, B, C

SOUTHERN INDIAN OCEAN

[REDACTED]

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 29 APR, A NIMITZ F-14

GAINED RADAR CONTACT ON THREE IRANIAN ACFT VIC 25-46N/057-21E WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY VISUALLY IDENTIFIED AS TWO F-4S AND ONE C-130.

ONE OF THE F-4S TURNED TOWARD THE NIMITZ F-14 BUT, WHEN THE TF 70 ACFT MANEUVERED INTO A POSIT ASTERN THE F-4, THE THREE IRANIAN ACFT IMMEDIATELY TURNED NORTH AND RETURNED TO IRANIAN AIRSPACE.

CPA BETWEEN THE F-14 AND THE F-4 WAS 01 NM, PRECLUDING OBSERVATION OF ANY EXTERNAL STORES ON THE F-4.

D. IN OTHER AIR ACTIVITY, A PAKISTANI C-130 WAS INTERCEPT AND ESCORTED THROUGH THE MOOLOC AREA WHILE A CANADIAN C-1 INTERCEPTED AND IDENTIFIED.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 01 MAY 10

[REDACTED]

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#5078

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZC7COPU2BB
DAN: 095-027227

INPUT: CDSN = DKA272
TOP: 250905Z APR 80 TOT: 250936Z APR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTIONS** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCC(1)

"COPY PROVIDED OPG /MAJ EDM"

TOTAL COPIES = 0001
RTR=23

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25 APR

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ISSUING OFFICE.

	CY NR	SOP
J30	1	
J31	1	
J32		
J33	2	
SOP	2	
J34		
J35		
J36		
FILE	1	
CY 2		20

ZAANZYUW YMLHDR 4840 1160844-MNSH--YEKQDH
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z 250845Z APR 80 ZYS ZYH ZFF-5
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
INFO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
ZEM


~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
A. CJF551 250715Z APR 80
1. (TS) REF A IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
QUOTE:
Z 250815Z APR 80
FM CJTF551//RADM KRKSEY
TO CINCPAC

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
EYES ONLY FOR ADM LONG FROM KIRKSEY
SURJ: RICE BOWL OPERATION SITREP 14 AS OF 250815Z APR 80 (TS)
1. (TS) CAP HAS BEEN POSITIONED IN SUPPORT OF MIDEASTFOR
WITHDRAWAL AT FOLLOWING STATIONS:
2 F-14 FORCECAP (25-00N7/58-00E3) AND 2 A-7 SURCAP (24-00N6/
58-10E4). NO CAP ACFT HAVE BEEN POSITIONED IN SOH OR
PERSIAN GULF. F-14 CAP ACFT HAVE NORMALLY BEEN POSITIONED AT
24-20N8/59-37E7 AND 24-20N8/61-00E7
(TS) COL PITMAN IS ABOARD NIMITZ AFTER RECOVERY IN BLUE BEARD
FIVE. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ANSWERS PARA E REF A.
A. EACH A/C CMDR WAS ISSUED BLUE BINDER CONTAINING EMERGENCY LZ'S
IN TEHRAN. BOOK CONTENTS INCLUDES: EACH LZ WITH PHOTO

~~TOP SECRET~~



CAVEATS/COORDINATES

REMOVED AND COORDINATES; CITY MAP WITH EACH LZ MARKED; PHOTO STRIP MAPS OF HELD HIDE, TEHRAN EAST APPROACH, TEHRAN [REDACTED]

(S) A, E

[REDACTED] ALL PHOTO STRIPS WERE MARKED QUOTE SECRET UNQUOTE BUT MOST PILOTS HAD SANITIZED BY CUTTING OFF CLASSIFICATION, BELIEVE SHOULD ASSUME ALL OF THESE BLUE BINDERS ARE COMPROMISED UNTIL THEY ARE RETURNED OR OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR.

(S) B

S-3 PREPARED KNEEDBOARD CARDS FOR ALL PILOTS WHICH LISTED EMERGENCY COMBAT AIR PATROL CHECKPOINTS, ONE OF THESE WAS QUOTE

A, E

[REDACTED] UNQUOTE WITH GEO REF COORDINATES. CHECK AT [REDACTED] REQUIRED TO ENSURE NO CARDS LOST, THERE WERE NO, REPEAT, NO PHOTOS OF [REDACTED] GIVEN TO AIRCREWS.

(u) C

ALL PILOTS WERE ISSUED PHOTO PRODUCTS QUOTE DESERT TRACK 1 AND DESERT TRACK 2 UNQUOTE. THESE ARE IN SAME CATEGORY AS SUBPARA ALFA ABOVE.

(u) D

ALL PILOTS REC'D CEOI EXTRACT OF VARYING DETAIL TAILORED TO INDIVIDUAL PILOT NEED, THE CEOI SHOULD BE CONSIDERED COMPROMISED.


A, E

[REDACTED] MATERIAL ISSUED AND NOT ACCOUNTED FOR AT THIS TIME INCLUDES ONE (1) COPY OF USKAP [REDACTED] ONE (1) COPY OF USKAT [REDACTED] REG NO 18 DAY 24 APRIL 82 ONLY, ONE (1) KY-65 (PARKBILL) AND ONE (1) KY-118 KEYS.

REVH: 25 APR 80
#4648

INNN

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~EYES ONLY~~

TOP SECRET
SOP2118

042-032354

INPUT CDSN = 0K4093

TOR: 290717Z APR 80 TOT: 290749Z APR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=40

~~EYES ONLY~~

0AAMZYU YHLHOR 4980 1200517-MNSH--YEKQGH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 290800Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

KIRKSEY, CTF70

KOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST/SECTION ONE

SURJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 156 (U)

1. FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS

FOR PERIOD 290801Z - 290800Z APR 80

A. CORAL SEA AND CONSTELLATION CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE. NIMITZ DID NOT CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C. USS MULLINIX, BRUMBY AND R.E. BYRD DETACHED 291100Z, CHOPPED OPCON TO COMIDEASTFOR RETURNING TO PERSIAN GULF PATROL, ETA 30 APR.

D. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL APPLICABLE MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 290900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/TEXAS
 - CALIFORNIA
 - LASALLE (UPKEEP THRU 30 APR)
 - MULLINIX/BRUMBY/R.E. BYRD (ETA PERSIAN GULF 30 APR)
 - F. SHERMAN (ENR DJIBOUTI, ETA 03 MAY)
 - WHITE PLAINS (ENR BSF SPORE, ETA 30 APR)
 - MASSAYAMPA/NAVASOTA
 - MARS
 - L.Y. SPEAR (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 30 APR)
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/REEVES/W.H. STANLEY/COOK/HAMMOND
 - ROANOKE
- (3) BATTLE GROUP DELTA:

23-15/061-00E
 24-00N/061-00E
 BAHRAIN
 25-00N/057-35E
 16-00N/056-20E
 05-50N/088-45E
 22-00N/061-00E
 23-30N/058-30E
 05-00S/067-10E
 21-45N/062-00E
 17-25N/065-30E

CONSTELLATION/H.E. HOLT
 WORDEN/TRUXTON
 BAGLEY/DAVIDSON/O'BRIEN
 SACRAMENTO

06-03N/078-11E
 07-47N/076-35E
 06-20N/077-40E
 06-20N/076-30E

(4) SUBMARINES:

A, B, C

[REDACTED] (ETA 29 APR)
 [REDACTED] (ETA 30 APR)

VIC [REDACTED]

- (5) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO/SAN BERNARDINO/BARBEY
 - GRIDLEY (ENR MOGADISCIO, ETA 02 MAY)
 - MOBILE (ETA 30 APR)
- (6) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

23-00N/060-00E
 13-30N/055-50E
 DIEGO GARCIA
 DIEGO GARCIA

B SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 1 EA-38, 1 EP-3, 3 P-38, 2 P-3C, 4 KC-135
 OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 23 FMC
 A-7E: 13 OF 19 FMC, 1 MC

14980

INNN

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZC CDP0121

042-032500

AT CDSN : DKAR04

TOR: 290742Z APR 80 TOT: 290750Z APR 80

AUTO: UNASSIGNED

ACTION: UNASSIGNED

INFO: DNCC(1)

TOTAL COPIES : 00001
RTP#40

~~EYES ONLY~~

JAAMZYU= YHLHDR 4981 1200517-MNSH--YEKDDH.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK DD SDA DE

J 290800Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, #2 CINCPACFLT

MI IAHG/MAJ GEN THOMPSON, DD CINCPACAF

KIRKSEY, CTF70

KOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST/FINAL SECTION OF TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 156 (U)

A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC

KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

EA-3B: 0 OF 1 FMC, 1 MC

EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

RR-53: 1 OF 1 FMC

SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

18 OF 19 A-7E ARE WALLEYE EROL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

B. CORAL SEA:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

F-4N: 17 OF 21 FMC, 2 [REDACTED]
 A-7E: 12 OF 16 FMC
 A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
 KA-6D: 4 OF 5 FMC
 E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
 RF-8G: 3 OF 5 FMC
 SH-3G: 1 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 10 UP
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
 12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

C. CONSTELLATION:

F-14: 13 OF 14 FMC, 2 MC
 A-7E: 11 OF 12 FMC
 A-6E: 7 OF 10 FMC
 KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
 RF-8G: 3 OF 3 FMC
 EA-3B: 1 OF 2 FMC
 E-2C: 3 OF 4 FMC
 S-3A: 5 OF 10 FMC
 SH-3H: 3 OF 6 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 9 UP,
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
 8 OF 12 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 6 IN UP STATUS
 9 OF 12 A-7E FLIR CAPABLE, 6 IN UP STATUS

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 FUEL STATUS AT [REDACTED]: 15,387,120 GALS. E
 (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

(S) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]: 6 OF 6 SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ.

B. SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: NONE.

7. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA CONTINUED AT A LOW LEVEL. AGI 477 RESUMED SURVEILLANCE OF ARG ALFA IN TRAIL WITH OKINAWA. [REDACTED] B,C

[REDACTED] IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ. B,C

B. SOVIET MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY [REDACTED] B,C

[REDACTED] SIGHTED AN IRANIAN P-3F CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ VIC 25-30N/057-25E.

8 (u) [REDACTED] REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 29 APR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS,
 #4981

~~SECRET~~

CZCOPQ563

PAGE 1

AM 001-037715

NR CDSN = OKA769

OR: 280357Z APR 80 TOT: 280415Z APR 80

UTOC** UNASSIGNED **

ONE COPY FURNISHED OPG (MAJ ELM)

CTIONS** UNASSIGNED **

VFO= ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

FR=54

~~EYES ONLY~~

AMZYUW YLHHR 4932 1190004=MNSH--YEKDGH.

BY MMNSH

ZK OO SOA DE

280400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

1 MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

1 LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

1 FO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

1 DM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

1 LTJMC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

1 AIRKSEY, CTF73

1 LCC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

1 DM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

M

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

CTION ONE

BJ: CINCPAC, DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 155 (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS

R PERIOD 270801Z - 280800Z APR 80

A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON

MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

NIMITZ AND CONSTELLATION DID NOT CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS.

~~B. [REDACTED]~~

B.C

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL APPLICABLE MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 280900Z).

A. SHIPS

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA/HASSAYAMPA

LASALLE (UPKEEP THRU 30 APR)

F. SHERMAN

21-00N/061-00E

BAHRAIN

19-30N/059-20E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE PLAINS (ENR BSF SPORE, ETA 30 APR)
MARS (ENR VIC SEEB, ETA 29 APR)
L.Y. SPEAR (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 30 APR)

05-00N/081-00E
20-10N/063-30E
00-53S/063-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/REEVES/W.M. STANDLEY/COOK/F. HAMMOND
NAVASOTA/BRUMBY/R.E. BYRD/MULLINNIX
ROANOKE (ENR REFUEL TG 70.4, ETA 30 APR)

21-00N/062-00E
20-00N/063-30E

(3) BATTLE GROUP DELTA:

CONSTELLATION/WORDEN/TRUXTON/BAGLEY/
DAVIDSON/H.E. HOLT/O'BRIEN
SACRAMENTO (ENR VIC SEEB, ETA 3 MAY)

05-10N/084-30E
05-10N/083-30E

(4) SUBMARINES:

A, B

VIC
VIC

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (ETA 29 APR)
[REDACTED] (ETA 30 APR)

(5) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/SAN BERNARDINO/BARBEBY
GRIDLEY (ENR MOGADISHU, ETA 2 MAY)
MOBILE

21-00N/062-00E
19-20N/060-00E
DIEGO GARCIA

(6) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIEGO GARCIA

DIXIE

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 1 EA-3B, 1 EP-3, 3 P-3B, 3 P-3C, 8 KC-135
OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

F

NIMITZ:

F-14 13 OF 23 FMC
A-7E: 12 OF 19 FMC, 1 MC
A-6E: 10 OF 12 FMC
KA-60: 3 OF 4 FMC
EA-38: 0 OF 1 FMC, 1 MC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
RH-53: 1 OF 1 FMC
SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 13 UP

332

JN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCOPQ556

001-037703

CDSN = OKA768

260356Z APR 80 TOT: 280413Z APR 80

TO: UNASSIGNED

TION: UNASSIGNED

FO: DNCO(1)

TAL COPIES = 0001

R=78

~~EYES ONLY~~

AMZZSX YHLWOR 4933 1190004-MNSH--YEKDCN

MMNSH

PK 00 SOA DE

280400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6 ZZS

MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

PO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

MC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

IRKSEY, CTF70

OC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

M CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

IAL SECTION OF TWO

UJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 155 (U)

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

18 OF 19 A-7E ARE WALLEYE EROL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

8. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 17 OF 21 FMC, 2 MC

A-7E: 12 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC

A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC

KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

RF-8G: 2 OF 5 FMC

SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

0-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERODL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

CONSTITUTION:

- F-14: 11 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
- A-7E: 9 OF 12 FMC, 2 MC
- A-6E: 8 OF 10 FMC
- KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 3 OF 3 FMC
- EA-3B: 1 OF 2 FMC
- E-2C: 3 OF 4 FMC
- S-3A: 2 OF 10 FMC
- SH-3H: 3 OF 6 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 9 UP

EROL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

OF 12 A-7E WALLEYE ERODL CAPABLE 6 IN UP STATUS

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 FUEL STATUS, [REDACTED] 15,430,800 GALLONS. E

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

(S) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF PARKHILL HF/SATCOM TEST: CON-
ELLATION CONDUCTED SATCOM TEST; UNABLE TO TRANSMIT/RECEIVE IN
PURE VOICE MODE.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINED AT A LOW LEVEL. G-58 PGF 679
CONTINUED PATROL IN SOH.

B. SOVIET MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A, E, C

LEAR OF YF 70 HODLOC ARE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] C, A, B

(S) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
FORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

W: 27 APR 10

NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

33

~~SECRET~~

IN

D

ZCZCDPQ436

PAGE 1

DAN: 088-032643

INPUT COSN = OKA73

170432Z APR 80 TOTL 179442Z APR 80

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO... UNASSIGNED **

ACTION... UNASSIGNED **

INFO... DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=23

0AAMZYUW YLHHR 4507 1080113-MNSH--YEKDGH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK 00 SOA DE

O 170400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF73

YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ /EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST//SECTION ONE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 144 (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 160801Z - 170800Z APR 80

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE.

B. THREE (3) MC-130 ACFT DEPLOYED FROM ~~TOP SECRET~~ TO CONDUCT TRAIN-
ING WITH TF-70, TO INCLUDE SEA SURVEILLANCE. THESE ACFT HAVE ARRIVED
AT ~~TOP SECRET~~ AND ALL ARE MISSION READY.

C. AT APPROXIMATELY 151120Z, WHILE CONDUCTING ROUTINE SEES
AIRHEAD VERTREP WITH BOTH CH-46 HELOS, WHITE PLAINS WAS INFORMED BY
SEEB TOWER OF A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE BRITISH TANKER VIC-
TORIA VENTURE LOCATED 73 NM NW OF MUSCAT. VICTORIA VENTURE REQUESTED
A HELICOPTER TO TRANSPORT AN INJURED CREWMAN TO MUSCAT HOSPITAL.
WHITE PLAINS OFFERED TO ASSIST, AND WHITE PLAINS' MEDICAL OFFICER

8 9

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

12

AND CORPSMAN WERE LANDED ABOARD VICTORIA VENTURE VIA CH-46, AND EMBARKED PATIENT. HELICOPTER ARRIVED AT SEEB INTL AIRPORT AT 151255Z, AT WHICH TIME THE PATIENT AND WHITE PLAINS' MEDICAL OFFICER EMBARKED. PLANCE FOR MUSCAT HOSPITAL.

~~U. S. AIR FORCE - BAHRAIN AIRCRAFT FOR 12 HOURS.~~
E. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 160900Z).

SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

- NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA 23-15N/061-00E
- TEXAS (ENR MODLOC, ETA 18 APR) 20-00N/059-00E
- LASALLE (UPKEEP THROUGH 30 APR) BAHRAIN
- MULLINIX 25-50N/056-50E
- F. SHERMAN/R.E. BYRD 25-26N/055-25E
- BRUMBY (ETD 19 APR) BAHRAIN
- WHITE PLAINS 23-00N/061-00E
- HASSAYAMPA 21-00N/061-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

- CORAL SEA/REEVES 22-30N/061-30E
- W.H. STANDLEY 23-45N/060-15E
- COOK (ETD 22 APR) DIEGO GARCIA
- F. HAMMOND 21-00N/060-30E
- KILAUEA 23-00N/061-00E
- NAVASOTA 22-00N/062-00E
- ROANOKE (ETD 17 APR) DIEGO GARCIA

(3) SUBMARINES:

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] VIC [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (ETA 21 APR)

(4) ARG ALFA:

- OKINAWA/ALAMO/SAN BERNARDINA/GRIDLEY/VIC 23-00N/063-00E
- BARBEY
- MOBILE (ENR MOMBASA, ETA 18 APR) 02-26N/048-36E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

- DIXIE DIEGO GARCIA

#4507

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOPQ437

DAN: 388-632666

UNIT COSM = OKA748

170433Z APR 88 TOT: 170443Z APR 88

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = UNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR#23

DAAMZYUW YHLHOR 4508 1080113-MNSH--YEKQGH,

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA OE

O 170400Z APR 88 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VAOM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF78

YHLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

EHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST//SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 144 (U)

2. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

1 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EA-3B, 4 KC-135, 1 EP-3, 3 MC-130

3. OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14:	12	OF	23	FMC
A-7E:	13	OF	20	FMC, 2 MC
A-6E:	9	OF	12	FMC
KA-60:	2	OF	4	FMC
EA-3B:	0	OF	1	FMC, 1 MC
EA-6B:	1	OF	3	FMC
E-2B:	3	OF	4	FMC
RF-8G:	2	OF	3	FMC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S-3A: 0 OF 14 FMC 3 MC
RH-53: 2 OF 16 FMC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 4 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NOTE: (1) 0 OF 8 RH-53 COMMS ON UP STATUS
(2) 3 RH-53S REMOVED FROM CONUS, ETA FOR
PART 1 SHIPPED FROM CONUS, ETA 20 APR, TWO
CANTONING CH-53 AIRCRAFT ONBOARD OKINAWA.

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 17 OF 21 FMC, 1 MC
A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 4 MC
A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
KA-60: 3 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS

4. LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT 11,533,200 GALLONS. E

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS:

RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] E
CE: 2 OF 2 SUCCESSFUL FROM NIMITZ.

8. SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: HF/SATCOM
COMMUNICATIONS SEVERELY DEGRADED DUE TO CONTINUED ATMOSPHERIC
ANOMALIES.

7. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

[REDACTED]

B/C

NNNN

ZCZCOPQ438

DAN: 088-032710

INPUT CDSN = DKA741

170434Z APR 80 TOT: 170443Z APR 80

PAGE 1

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO*** ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=23

00AANZYU YHLHDR 4509 1080113-MNSH--YEKDDH.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK 00 SOA DE

O 170430Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RAADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RAADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHLDKOC/RAADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RAADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST//FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 144 (U)

VIC ARG ALFA 15 APR AND WAS DETECTED APPROACHING CV-43 FROM THE
SOUTHEAST THE MORNING OF 16 APR. THE AGI REMAINED IN A LOOSE TRAIL
POSITION 07 NM FROM CV-43 DURING THE DAY

[REDACTED]

A, B, C

ESTIMATED TO REMAIN
IN THE DEHALAK AREA.

B. FOREIGN AIR ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF AN IRANIAN P-3F SURVEILL-
ANCE FLIGHT IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. MULLINIX GAINED VISUAL CONTACT
ON THE P-3F (SIDE NUMBER 5-8703) AS IT APPROACHED FROM THE NORTH;

[REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PASSED 81 NM ASTERN AND HEADED SOUTHEAST. NO IFF OR ESM WAS HELD ON THE ACFT AS IT TRANSITED AT 300 FT ALTITUDE TO THE NORTHERN GULF MAN BEFORE RETURNING THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ TO THE ABAR ABAS AREA. MULTINIX HELD INTERMITTENT RADAR CONTACT THROUGHOUT THE FLIGHT.

REMARKS:

CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVH 16 APR 18

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

#4589

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Z 0782
DAN 987-035342
INPUT CDSN = DKA452
TOP: 160534Z APR 80 TOT: 160547Z APR 80

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
HTO=23

PAAMZYUW YMLHOR 4463 1070312-MNSH--YEKDDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZK7K PP SOA DE
P 160400Z APR 80 ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, J2 CINCPACFLT
AMC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 143 (U)

1. FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 150001Z - 160800Z APR 80

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON
MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
CORAL SEA DID NOT CONDUCT CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS.

B. PF-56, SIDE NUMBER/AG-601, WAS UNABLE TO ENGAGE ARRESTING CABLE
DUE TO TAIL HOOK MALFUNCTION AND REQUIRED EMERGENCY DIVERT TO [REDACTED] *E-1*
ACFT LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND CLEARANCE OBTAINED FOR REPAIR CREW
TO ARRIVE [REDACTED] VIA C-2. EST DATE OF REPAIR 16 APR.

C. TEXAS PORT VISIT TO MOMBASA CANCELLED.

D. RH-53 HELO FLEW ONE SORTIE FOR 1.5 HOURS.

E. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MIS-
SIONS AND OPTIONS.

[REDACTED]

A/C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

EYES ONLY

2. KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 160900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA
TEXAS (ENR NUOLOC, ETA 18 APR)
CASALLE (UPKEEP THROUGH 30 APR)

23-50N/060-00E
17-45N/055-40E
BAHRAIN
25-50N/056-50E
25-26N/055-28E
BAHRAIN
06-10N/097-25E
23-00N/063-00E
22-00N/061/00E

MULLINIX
F. SHERMAN/R.E. BYRO
BRUMBY (ETD 19 APR)
MISPILLION (ENR SUBIC, ETA 22 APR, LAST RPT)
WHITE PLAINS
MASSAYAMPA

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/REEVES
W.H. STANDLEY
COOK (EDT 22 APR)
F. HAMMOND
KILAUEA
NAVASOTA
RDANOKE (ETD 17 APR)

23-00N/061-00E
23-45N/060-15E
DIEGO GARCIA
21-00N/060-30E
23-00N/060-00E
21-00N/061-00E
DIEGO GARCIA

(3) SUBMARINES:

A.B.

[REDACTED], ETA 19 APR)
[REDACTED] 21 APR)

VIC [REDACTED]

ARG-ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/SAN BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/
HARVEY
MOBILE (ENR HOMBASA, ETR 18 APR)

VIC 23-00N/063-00E
02-26N/048-36E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 1 P-3B, 2 P-3C, 4 K [REDACTED] 1 EA-3B

*4463

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

EYES ONLY

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

OP0785
487-035421
INPUT CJSN = ZKA457
TOR: 160540Z APR 80 TOT: 160549Z APR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO# ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTP#23

PAAMZYUW YHLHOR 4464 1070312-MNSH--YEK00H.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK PP SOA DE

P 160400Z APR 80 ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YAHHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

KIRKSEY, CTF70

YOKCC/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 143 (U)

31 OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: 2

A. NIMITZ

F-14:	11	OF	23	FMC	
A-7E:	13	OF	24	FMC,	2 MC
A-6E:	8	OF	12	FMC	
KA-6D:	3	OF	4	FMC	
FA-3H:	0	OF	1	FMC,	1 MC
EA-6H:	2	OF	3	FMC	
E-2H:	3	OF	4	FMC	
RF-8G:	2	OF	3	FMC	
S-3A:	0	OF	4	FMC,	2 MC
RM-53:	7	OF	8	FMC (NOTE)	
SM-3H:	2	OF	6	FMC,	2 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

784 REFUELING STORES: 4 OF 13 UP

EROL POOS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 5 A-6E THAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NOTE: 8 OF 8 RH-53 COMMS IN UP STATUS.

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 17 OF 21 FMC, 1 MC

A-7E: 9 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC

KA-60: 1 OF 5 FMC, 1 MC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

HR-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC

SM-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

794 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP

EROL POOS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS.

4 (C) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 11,493,680 GALLONS. **E**

5 (C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: GRIDLEY SPS-48C AND SPS-43 AIR SEARCH RADAR CASUALTIES REDUCED TO C-2. BOTH ARE OPERATIONAL.

6 (W) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH NCS NEA MAKRI, GREECE: 7 OF 7 SUCCESSFUL FROM NIMITZ.

B. SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DESCREPANCIES: HF/SATCOM CONTINUE TO BE DEGRADED DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS.

7 (W) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONTINUED AT ROUTINE LEVELS. KRIVAK I. **C**
FR 693 REMAINED IN SURVEILLANCE OF CORAL SEA WHILE AGI 477 CONTINUED AS TATTLETALE WITH OKINAWA. BRUMBY SIGHTED T-58 PGF 679 AT KHOR IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ.

FOREIGN AIR ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP AND AGR UNITS BY TWO ADEN-BASED IL-38 MAY ACFT. NIMITZ E-2B GAINED RADAR CONTACT 372NM SOUTHWEST OF CVN-68. ESCORT COMMENCED WHEN THE MAYS WERE 200NM FROM THE ARG AND APPROXIMATELY 307NM SOUTH OF NIMITZ. ESCORT CONTINUED FOR THE NEXT FOUR HOURS. A SINGLE LOW PASS WAS MADE BY BOTH ACFT (SIDE NRS 73 AND 75) NEAR NIMITZ AND #4464

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

[REDACTED]
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

PQ787
487-835446
INPUT CUSN = UKA461
TOP: 160545Z APR 80 TOT: 160549Z APR 80
AUTO: UNASSIGNED
ACTIONS: UNASSIGNED
INFO: ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR#23

PAAMZYIM YLHQR 4465 1070312-MNSH--YEKDDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK PP SOA DE
P 160400Z APR 80 ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TRIST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
CINCPAC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
KIRKSEY, CTF70
YLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 143 (U)
CORAL SEA WITH CPAIS OF 1000 YARDS AT 400 FEET AND 500 YARDS AT
1000 FEET, RESPECTIVELY, NIMITZ CAP TERMINATED ESCORT 190NM SOUTH
OF CVN-68 AS THE MAYS WERE HEADED OUTBOUND.
REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY, LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REV# 15 APR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#4465

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OP0161
DAYS: 185-020613
INPUT COSN = OKA136
TOR: 150423Z APR 80 TOT: 150426Z APR 80

PAGE 1
~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=95

0AAMZYU+ YHLHDR 4398 1060245-MNSH--YEKQDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 150400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT
RADM/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG73.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE REF T-0

SURJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 142 (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 140801Z - 150800Z APR 80.

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS
ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
CORAL SEA DID NOT CONDUCT CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS.

VIC 20-02N7253-02E

C. RH-53 HELOS FLEW FOUR SORTIES FOR 10.2 HOURS.

D. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 150900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

Copy No. 8 of 9

~~EYES ONLY~~

NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA
TEXAS
LASALLE (UPKEEP THRU 30 APR)
MULLINIX
F. SHERMAN/R.E. BYRD
BRUMBY (ENR BAHRAIN, ETA 18 APR)
MISPILLION (ENR SUBIC, ETA 22 APR)
WHITE PLAINS
HASSAYAMPA

23-15N/061-00E
03-30N/049-35E
BAHRAIN
25-50N/056-50E
25-38N/055-09E
26-36N/056-28E
06-00N/092-00E
23-40N/058-30E
22-00N/061-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/REEVES
W.H. STANDLEY
COOK (ETD 22 APR)
F. HAMMOND
KILAUEA (ENR CVBG MCDLOC, ETA 15 APR)
NAVASOTA
ROANOKE (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 16 APR)

22-45N/061-30E
23-45N/060-15E
DIEGO GARCIA
21-00N/060-30E
19-20N/062-15E
22-00N/052-00E
05-15S/075-35E

(3) SUBMARINES:

A, B

(4) [REDACTED] VIC [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ETA 19 APR [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] APR)

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/SAN BERNARDINO/
GRIDLEY/BARBEY
MOBILE (ENR MOMBASA, ETA 18 APR)

23-00N/063-00E
05-58N/053-01E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT [REDACTED] 1 P-38, 2 P-3C,

4 KC-135, 1 EP-3, 1 EA-38.

3 [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 12 OF 23 FMC
A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
A-6E: 7 OF 12 FMC
KA-60: 1 OF 4 FMC
EA-38: 0 OF 1 FMC, 0 MC
EA-68: 2 OF 3 FMC

#4398

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PAGE 1

OPQ174
DAN: 085-001025
INPUT COSN = DK1144
TOR: 150441Z APR 82

TOT: 150508Z APR

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=29

0AAMZYU* YHLHQR 4399 1050021-MNSH--YEKDDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SDA DE
U 150400Z APR 82 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN GAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VAUN TROST, COMSEVENFLT
MAJ SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
MAJ KIRKSEY, CTF73
YHLDKOC/RAOM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RAOM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF TWO

SURJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 142 (U)

E-28: 3 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 3 MC

RH-53: 7 OF 8 FMC (NOTE)

SH-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC, 1 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 4 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NOTE: 8 OF 8 RH-53 H.F. COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS.

B, CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 17 OF 21 FMC, 1 MC

A-7E: 8 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC

KA-6D: 1 OF 5 FMC, 1 MC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 1

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDPQ115
JAN: 083-035376
INPUT COSN = DKA649
TOR: 130416Z APR 80

TOT: 130426Z APR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
PTR=95

IAAMZYUW YHLHOR 4348 1032235=MNSH=YEKDGH.

NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

130400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

MLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

MLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EH

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR C

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

INAL SECTION OF TWO

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 140 (U)

EA-38: 0 OF 1 FMC

EA-68: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-28: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

RH-53: 7 OF 8 FMC (SEE NOTES 1 AND 2)

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 4 OF 13 UP

EROL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE EROL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS

4 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NOTE 1: 7 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS.

NOTE 2: EIGHTH HELO REQUIRES TEN PARTS TO MAKE IT MISSION

APABLE; NINE PARTS ENROUTE. CTF 70 ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY WHICH

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

22

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ EYES ONLY

PAGE 2

PARTS ARE ON BOARD KILAUEA ENROUTE MODLOC FROM DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 15 APR. ALSO, CTG 76.3 BEING QUERIED AS TO AVAILABILITY OF PARTS ON JSS OKINAWA. POSSIBLE CANNIBALIZATION OF CH-53 ASSETS WILL BE ADDRESSED ONCE SPECIFIC SHIPMENT STATUS ON ALL PARTS HAS BEEN DETERMINED.

- 3. CORAL SEA:
 - F-4N: 16 OF 21 FMC, 2 MC
 - A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC
 - A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC
 - KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
 - E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
 - RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
 - SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC
 - O-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
 - ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
 - 12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

- (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS A [REDACTED] 12,091,800 GALLONS.
- (C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: STANLEY NO. 1 MISSILE SYSTEM RADAR DOWN. ETR 30 APRIL. FULL CAPABILITY EXISTS WITH NO. 2 SYSTEM.
- (S) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] ARE AS FOLLOWS: 4 OF 4 SATISFACTORY E

- (S) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
 - SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OF NIMITZ BY KRIVAK I FFG 693 AND DEPARTURE OF AGI 477 FROM ARG ALFA AND CLOSE WITHIN ONE NM OF CORAL SEA.
 - FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF AN IRANIAN F-130 WHICH MADE 3 SURVEILLANCE PASSES ON USS MULLINNIX IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ. CPA WAS ONE NM.
- (S) REMARKS:
 - NIMITZ CONDUCTED B-DAY (BEER DAY) AT MODLOC IN CELEBRATION OF 100 DAYS AT SEA. AN ENJOYABLE TIME WAS HAD BY ALL.
 - CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
4348

NNN

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EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

0150
083-011424
CDSN = OKA837
120451Z APR 80 TOT: 120557Z APR 80

O=** UNASSIGNED **

TON=** UNASSIGNED **

O= DNCO(1)

AL COPIES = 00001
=25

MZYUW YHLHOR 4302 1030033-MNSH--YEKOGH.
MMNSH

K PP SOA DE
20400Z APR 80 ZYS ZFF-6
MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
O VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
O SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DG CINCPACAF
IRKSEY, CTF70
C/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
TION ONE

IS CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 139 (U)
FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
PERIOD 110801Z - 120900Z APR 80.
LIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
BASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, TASK FORCE SUR-
VLANCE AND PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE GONZO 2-80.
H-53 HELOS FLEW TWO SORTIES FOR 6.2 HOURS.
LIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
SIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 120900Z).

SHIPS:
(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA
LASALLE (UPKEEP THRU 30 APR)
MULLINIX (ENR SITRA, ETA 13 APR)

22-00N/061-00E
BAHRAIN

26-25N/056-00E
SITRA

F. SHERMAN
BRUMBY

25-50N/056-50E
SITRA

R. E. BYRD
MISPELLION (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 21 APR)

07-30N/075-00E
23-45N/058-40E

WHITE PLAINS

MASSAYAMPA (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 14 APR)

18-00N/055-00E

ROANOKE (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 16 APR)

03-00N/069-20E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/REEVES

20-45N/061-30E

W.H. STANLEY/F. HAMMOND

21-30N/061-00E

COOK (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 15 APR)

01-45N/056-00E

NAVASOTA

22-00N/062-00E

KILAUEA (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 15 APR)

01-00N/068-20E

(3) SUBMARINES:

ABC [REDACTED]

VIC [REDACTED]

(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOSILE/SAN BERNARDINO/

GRIDLEY/BARBEY ENR NEW MODLOC VIC 23-00N/063-00E, ETA PM
12 APR

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT

DIXIE

VIC DIEGO GARCIA FOR
SEA TRIALS

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 2 P-38, 3 P-3C, 1 EP-3, 1 EA-3B, 4 KC-135

(TS [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 23 FMC
A-73: 11 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
EA-3B: 0 OF 1 FMC, 1 MC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

1302

~~EYES ONLY~~

[REDACTED]

NN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~EYES ONLY~~
PAGE

0065
083-011633
OUT COSN: OK4848
21 120500Z APR 80 TOT: 120517Z APR 80

TO: UNASSIGNED **

FROM: UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
40

MZYUW YHLHOR 4303 1030033-MNSH--YEKOGH,
MNSH
K PP SCA DE
20034Z APR 80 ZYS ZFF-6
MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
O VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
O SMITH, M2 CINCPACFLT
O MC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
O IRKSEY, CTF70
O JC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
O M CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
TION TWO

J: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 139 (U)

RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

RH-53: 6 OF 8 FMC, (NOTE)

SH-3H: 3 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 4 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

19 OF 20 A-73 ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS.

4 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP/ ETR FOR FIFTH DESIGNATOR
APR.

E: ENGINE CHANGE ON SEVENTH ACFT COMPLETED; ONE ACFT REQUIRES MAIN ROTOR
DE CHANGE, ETR 12 APR. EXPECT SEVEN IN UP STATUS 12 APR. 8 OF 8
53 H.F. COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS.

CORAL SEA:


F-4N: 16 OF 21 FMC

A-7E: 9 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

24



6 OF 10 FHC, 2 MC
 KA-60: 4 OF 5 FHC
 E-28: 1 OF 4 FHC
 RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FHC
 SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FHC
 D-704 REFUELING STORES 6 OF 10 UP
 EBOL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE EROL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS
 LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,118,580 GALLONS.
 MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: W.H. STANDLEY SPG-53 GUN FIRE
 TROL RADAR DOWN, ETR 30 APR.

COMMUNICATIONS:
 RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]
 6 SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ; 2 OF 2 SATISFACTORY FROM RM-53.
 SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: H.F./SATCOM COMMUNI-
 CATIONS CONTINUE TO BE DOWNGRADED DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC ANOMALIES.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
 SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY KRIVAK I FFG 693
 POSITIONING TO RESUME SURVEILLANCE OF THE BATTLE GROUPS, AGI 477
 CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF ARG A, AND SOVIET [REDACTED]

OTHER FOREIGN NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS NOTED AS SIX PAKISTANI UNITS
 CONSISTING OF THREE DESTROYERS, ONE OILER, AND TWO DAPHNE SUBMARINES
 WERE SIGHTED INBOUND IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. [REDACTED]



~~EYES ONLY~~

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Z 3149
N: 063-011734
PUT CUSN = OKA855
R: 120507Z APR 80 TDT: 120556Z APR 80

TO>** UNASSIGNED **

FROM>** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

PL COPIES = 00001

25

MZYUW YHLHOR 4324 1030033-MNSH--YEK00H,
MNSH

K PP SOA DE
20400Z APR 80 ZYS ZFF-6
MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
MAJ GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
ADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
R SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
C/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DC CINCPACAF
R KSEY, CTF70
C/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
M CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
AL SECTION OF THREE
J3 CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 139 (U)

[REDACTED]

A1BC

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFOR-
MATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

12 APR 80

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDPQ329

QAN: 092-013521

INPUT COSN = OKAS14

FR: 110525Z APR 80 TOT: 110526Z APR 80

UNASSIGNED

ACTION UNASSIGNED

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

TR=25

AAMZYUW YHLHOR 4247 1020130-MNSH--YEKCOM.

NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

110400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, #2 CINCPACFLT

MLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

HUKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

ACTION ONE

URJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 138 (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 100601Z - 110800Z APR 80.

NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE, AND PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE GUNZO 2-80.

~~TOP SECRET~~ FOR 6.1 HOURS.

NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 110900Z).

SHIPS:

1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA

ASALLE (UPKEEP THRU 30 APR)

15-000/004-03E

BAHRAIN

PAGE 2

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Copy No. 8 of 8

26

MULLINIX (ENR SITRA, ETA 14 APR)
F. SHERMAN (ENR SITRA, ETA 12 APR)
BRUNBY
BYRD
MILLION (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA
28 APR)

17-00N/000-00E
25-10N/056-00E
25-50N/256-50E
26-00N/005-40E
10-00N/071-00E

~~SECRET~~

WHITE PLAINS (ENR VIC SEEB, ETA
12 APR)
MASSAYAMPA (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA
14 APR)
ROANOKE (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA
16 APR)
(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/REEVES/W.H. STANDLEY/
COOK/F. HAMMOND/NAVASOTA
KILAUEA (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA
15 APR)

21-00N/050-00E
10-00N/071-00E
05-40N/094-00E
16-00N/060-00E
06-00S/060-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

VIC [REDACTED] A,B
[REDACTED]

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN
BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/BARBEY
(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

17-00N/063-00E

DIXIE
B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT: [REDACTED]
1 EA-38, 4 KC-135.
#4247

DIEGO GARCIA
2P-38, 2 P-3C, 1 EF-3,

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGE 2

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC
O-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS
4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 11,635,680 GALLONS.

5. (C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: GRIDLEY SPS-48C AND SPS-43 AIR
SEARCH RADARS REMAIN DOWN. FINAL ADJUSTMENTS ON SIGNAL DATA
CONVERTER FOR SPS-48C CONTINUE. ETR UNK.

6. (S) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. RESULTS OF H.F. COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] E
[REDACTED] 8 OF 8 SUCCESSFUL FROM NIMITZ.

B. SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: HF/SATCOM
CONTINUE TO BE DEGRADED DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC ANOMALIES. HF
SEVERELY DEGRADED DURING TRANSITION PERIOD 1400-1700Z.

7. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA CONSISTED C
OF ROUTINE LOGISTICS AND SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. AGI 477
CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF OKINAWA WHILE KRIVAK 1 FFG 593 REMAINED [REDACTED]
WITH CORAL SEA. [REDACTED]

A, B, C

[REDACTED]
REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 14 APR 10

ISSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#4399

NNNN

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~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPQ888
DAN: 884-006734
INPUT CDSN * OKA968
TOP: 140416Z APR 80 TOT: 140514Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= ONCC(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=29

0AAMZYUW YHLHOR 4363 1050021-MNSH--YEKDOM,
ZNY MMNSM
ZKZK OO SOA NE
O 140400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 32 CINCPACFLT
YI IANPC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
KIRKSEY, CTF70
KOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE OF TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 141 (U)
THE FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 130801Z - 140800Z APR 80.

A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS
ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
NIMITZ DID NOT CONDUCT CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~ DEPARTED STATION IN WESTERN GULF OF
MEXICO DUE TO CASUALTIES TO SHIPS SERVICE MOTOR GENERATOR (SSMG) SETS
AND IS ENROUTE TO DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 19 APR.

C. RH-53 HELOS DID NOT FLY.

D. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 140900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

Copy No. 8 of 9 Copies

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~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

~~SECRET~~
NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA

TEXAS (ENR MOMBASA, ETA 18 APR)

LASALLE (UPKEEP THRU 30 APR)

MULLINNIX/F. SHERMAN

BRUMBY

R.E. BYRD (BSF, ETO 14 APR)

HISPILLION (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 21 APR)

WHITE PLAINS

HASSAYAMPA

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/REEVES

W.H. STANDLEY

COOK (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 15 APR)

F. HAMMOND

ROANOKE (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 16 APR)

KILAUEA (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 15 APR)

NAVASOTA

(3) SUBMARINES:

AB

VIC

ETA 19 APR

(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/

GRIDLEY/BARBEY

VIC 23-00N/063-00E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

1 EA-3B, 1 EP-3, 2 P-3B, 1 P-3C, 4 KC-135
OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 23 FMC
A-7E: 11 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
EA-3B: 0 OF 1 FMC, 1 MC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

14363

INNN

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOPQ802
DAN: 084-006757
INPUT COSM = DKA962
TOR: 140425Z APR 80 TOT: 140515Z APR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
BTR=29

QAAMZYUW YHLHDR 4364 1050021-MNSH--YEK00M.

ZNY MMNSH
ZK7K OO SOA DE
O 140400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VAOM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 32 CINCPACFLT
AHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 141 (U)

- E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
- S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
- RH-3H: 7 OF 8 FMC (NOTE)
- SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC
- D-704 REFUELING STORES: 4 OF 13 UP
- ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
- 19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS
- 5 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
- NOTE: ALL 8 RH-53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS

- B. CORAL SEA:
 - F-4N: 16 OF 21 FMC, 1 MC
 - A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
 - A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
 - KA-6D: 4 OF 5 FMC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,037,200 GALLONS.

5. (E) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: TEXAS SPG-51 MFCS DOWN; ONE FIRE CONTROL RADAR FULLY OPERATIONAL AND TWO RADARS AVAILABLE AS SLAVED ILLUMINATORS, ETR 12 MAY. GRIDLEY SPS-48C AND SPS-43 REMAIN DOWN; FINAL ADJUSTMENTS ON SPS-48C CONTINUE, ETR 14 APR.

6. (S) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. NO HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] WERE CONDUCTED. E

B. SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: HF COMMUNICATIONS DEGRADED DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS.

7. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

[REDACTED]

A, B, C

A, B, C

[REDACTED] WHICH IS ESTIMATED TO BE THE ABU MUSA/TUNB ISLAND AREA.

C. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED.

8. (S) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT. REVW 14 APR 17

e

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

#4364

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~



:CZCDP0112
:AN: 083-035346
:NFUT CDSN = DKA646
:DR: 130414Z APR 80 TOT: 130425Z APR 80

~~EYES ONLY~~

:UTO** UNASSIGNED **

:ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

:INFO= DNCO(1)

:QAL COPIES = 00001

:TR=95

IAAMZYUW YHLHDR 0347 1032235-MNSH--YEKDOM.

NY MNSH

KZK OO SOA DE.

130420Z APR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

C LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

HLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.5

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

ACTION ONE

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 140 (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS

FOR PERIOD 120801Z - 130800Z APR 80:

- CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK GROUP SURVEILLANCE. IMITZ OBSERVED STANODOWN.

~~TOP SECRET~~ PROSECUTION MAINTAINED SINCE 072215Z APR 80. (A)

• RH-53 HELOS DID NOT FLY.

• NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL

MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

• (TOP SECRET) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 130900Z).

1) SHIPS

1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA
- TEXAS
- LASALLE (UPKEEP THRU 30 APR)
- MULLINNIX (ETO 13 APR)
- F. SHERMAN
- BRUMBY
- R.E. BYRD
- MISPILLION (ETA SUBIC BAY 21 APR)
- WHITE PLAINS
- HASSAYAMPA
- ROANOKE (ETA DIEGO GARCIA 16 APR)
- 2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/REEVES
 - W.H. STANDLEY
 - COOK (ETA DIEGO GARCIA 15 APR)
 - F. HAMMOND
 - KILAUEA (ETA CVBG MODLOC 15 APR)
 - NAVASOTA

- 23-15N/061-00E
- 13-00N/054-20E
- BAHRAIN
- SITRA
- 26-00N/052-55E
- 25-50N/056-50E
- 26-00N/052-55E
- 05-45N/080-40E
- 23-00N/063-00E
- 22-00N/061-00E
- 00-05S/084-10E

3) SUBMARINES:

- 22-45N/061-30E
- 23-45N/060-15E
- 01-00N/066-00E
- 22-10N/062-50E
- 07-30N/066-15E
- 22-00N/062-00E

[REDACTED]

VIC [REDACTED] A, B
VIC [REDACTED]

- 4) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNADINO/
 - GRIDLEY/BARBEY

VIC 23-00N/063-00E

- 5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 - DIXIE (SEA TRIALS)

VIC DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT: [REDACTED] 1 EA-38, 1 EP-3, 2 P-38, 1 P-3C, 4 KC-135.

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C E

- NIMITZ:
 - F-14: 14 OF 23 FMC
 - A-7E: 14 OF 20 FMC
 - A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
 - KA-60: 1 OF 4 FMC

4347

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOP0355

DAN: 882-813656

INPUT COSM: OKA521

112538Z APR 80 TOT: 110603Z APR 80

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00201

TR=40

IAAMZYUJ YLHOR 4248 1020130-MNSH--YEKQGH

NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

110400Z APR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT

HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

HLOKOC/RAUM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

ACTION TWO

URJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 138 (U)

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C

NIMITZ:

-14: 13 OF 23 FMC, 1 MC

-7E: 14 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC

-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC

A-60: 3 OF 4 FMC

A-38: 1 OF 1 FMC, 1 MC

A-68: 2 OF 3 FMC

-28: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

F-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

H-53: 6 OF 8 FMC (NOTE)

H-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC

-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

RDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27

9 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS
OF 5 A-6E TRAN LASER DESIGNATORS
7 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS. 1 RH-53 BELO
DOWN STATUS FOR ENGINE CHANGE, ETR 11 APR.

GENERAL SEA:
-4N: 16 OF 21 FMC, 1 MC
-7E: 12 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC
-6E: 5 OF 13 FMC, 2 MC
A-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC
-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC
F-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
H-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
RDL PDS: 3 OF 3 UP

2 OF 16 A-76E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS
(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,154,887 GALLONS.
(C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: USS COOK ASROC LCHR MK 199 CAN
NOT BE TRAINED USING HYDRAULIC POWER DRIVE; NO ASROC CAPABILITY.
ATTN-UP MADE FOR FIRING HARPOON AVAILABLE, ETR 9 MAY.

(79) COMMUNICATIONS:
RESULTS OF M.F. COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] E
[REDACTED] 4 OF 4 FROM NIMITZ SATISFACTORY.
SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: M.F./SATCOM
COMMUNICATIONS CONTINUED TO BE DEGRADED DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC
ANOMALIES.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUATION [REDACTED] C
[REDACTED] ABC

KYNAWA.
4248

NNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

[REDACTED]

ZCZCOPQ357

PAGE 1

DAN: 082-013740

INPUT CUSN = DKAS25

TOT: 110541Z APR 80 TOT: 110604Z APR 80

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=40

~~EYES ONLY~~

0AAMZYUW YHLHOR 4249 1020130-MNSH--YEKQOH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

U 110400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHLOKOC/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 138 (U)

[REDACTED]

A, B, C

SIGHTED 38 MINUTES LATER AS IT APPROACHED BYRD, FOR SURVEILLANCE
PASSES WITH CPA 500 YDS ASTERN AT 500 FT. THE P-3F PROCEEDED
SOUTHEAST TO ORBIT SOUTH OF JASK AIRFIELD BEFORE RETURNING FOR A
FINAL PASS ALONG BYRD'S PORT SIDE WITH CPA 300 YDS.

A, E, F

CORAL SEA E-2B GAINED RADAR

[REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

Q 8

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 2

NORTH OF CV-43. TWO F-4 ACFT INTERCEPTED THE MAYS
AND ESCORTED THEM THROUGHOUT. THE IL-38'S, BOTH
DESCENDED AND MADE PASSES ALONG THE PORT SIDE OF
1800 FT. ALTITUDE 500 FT. THE ACFT DEPARTED TO THE
WERE ESCORTED 200 NM DISTANCE FROM THE CV. THIS
RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT AGAINST A TF 70 BG. SINCE
THE FIRST TIME TRANSITING MAYS HAVE CONDUCTED CLOSE-IN
SURVEILLANCE.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REV 11 APR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
14249

INNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PG798
081-013254
INPUT COSN = OKA285
TOR: 100538Z APR 80 TOT: 100543Z APR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTIONS** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
LTR=46

~~EYES ONLY~~

IAAMZYUW YHLHOR 4212 101035R-MNSH--YEKQRM.
NY MNNSH
KZK OO SOA DE
100400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
ADM UC/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION ONE

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 137 (U)
FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
OR PERIOD 090801Z - 100900Z APR 80.
NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE, AND EXERCISE GONZO 2-80 PARTICIPATION.

~~TOP SECRET~~ 090801Z - 100900Z APR 80
NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 100900Z).

SHIPS: (NOTE)

1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA/WHITE PLAINS
ASALLE (UPKEEP THRU 30 APR)
JLLINIX (ENR BARRAIN, ETA 13 APR)
SHERMAN (ENR BARRAIN, ETA 12 APR)

17-45N/061-00E
BARRAIN
19-55N/061-00E
22-40N/061-00E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

25-33N/151-WE
25-50N/156-5WE
15-30N/167-30E
07-30N/175-00E

- 1) SPILLION
- 2) MASSAYAMPA (ENR CV86 MOOLOC, ETA 13 APR)
- 3) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - ORAL SEA/REEVES/R.H. STANDLEY/
 - HAMMOND/NAVASOTA
 - OOK
 - ILAUEA (ETA 11 APR)
- 3) SUBMARINES:

17-35N/161-40E
18-05N/161-30E
DIEGO GARCIA

VIC [REDACTED]

A B

- 4) ARG ALFA:
 - KINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
 - RTOLEY/BARBEY

VIC 24-30N/163-00E

- 5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 - IXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

NOTE: BATTLE GROUPS BRAVO AND CHARLIE REPOSITIONED FOR PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE GONZO 2-80.

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 1 P-3B, 1 P-3C, 1 EP-3, 1 EA-3B, 4 KC-135 E

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

NIMITZ:

- 14: 14 OF 23 FMC
- 15: 13 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC
- 16: 8 OF 12 FMC
- 17: 3 OF 4 FMC
- A-3B: 0 OF 1 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
- 28: 3 OF 4 FMC
- 8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
- 3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

4212

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

Z P0800
DAN: 081-013327
INPUT COSN = DKA289
TOR: 100542Z APR 80 TOT: 100544Z APR 80

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==
INFO= UNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=46

JAAMZYUW YHLHOR 4213 1010358-MNSH--YEKODH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 100400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT
H1IAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF..
KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 137 (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ 6 OF 8 FMC (NOTE)

RH-53: 0 OF 8 FMC, 2 MC
-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
RDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
9 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE EROL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS
OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS
OTE: ~~TOP SECRET~~ RH-53 MELO IN
ONE STATUS FOR ENGINE CHANGE, ETR 11 APR.

CORAL SEA:
-4N: 15 OF 21 FMC, 2 MC
-7E: 12 OF 16 FMC
-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
A-60: 3 OF 5 FMC
-28: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
F-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

704 REFUELING STONES: 6 OF 10 UP

DL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS

(E) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,226,200 GALLONS.

(F) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES:

M. H. STANLEY 18 BOILER CASUALTY HAS BEEN REPAIRED.

OKINAWA BOILER CASUALTY HAS BEEN REPAIRED.

(G) COMMUNICATIONS:

RESULTS OF H.F. COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] E

[REDACTED] 2 FROM NIMITZ SATISFACTORY.

RESULTS OF E-3A PARKHILL SATCOM TEST: SATISFACTORY VOICE

MMS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT 6 APR MISSION.

SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: HF/SATCOM COMMUNI-

TIONS DEGRADED DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC ANOMALIES.

[REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ABC

NN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZPQP803
001-013371
INPUT COSN = OKA293
TOR: 100545Z APR 80 TOT: 100545Z APR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **
INFO: DNCO(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
TR=46

~~EYES ONLY~~

AAMZYUW YHLHOR 4214 1010358-MNSH--YEKQRM.
NY MNSH
KZK OU SOA DE
100400Z APR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
MLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
OC/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

FINAL SECTION OF THREE
OBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 137 (U)

REMARKS:
GONZO 2-80: TG 70.2 AND 70.3 COMMENCED AN 8.5KT TRANSIT TO
EW MUDLOC VIC 16-30N/061-00E, ETA 102000Z.

NO ASW TRAINING IS ANTICIPATED DURING THE EXERCISE.
CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING
TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PER-
SONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
EVM 10 APR 80

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
4214

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DP0200

072-038645

INPUT CDSN = DKA584

TOR: 310541Z MAR 80

TOT: 310631Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=48

0AAMZYUW YHLHOR 3789 0910417-MNSH--YEKQDH,

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 310400Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM CAPT MARTIN, CINCPAC, J3(A)

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VAOM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADM KOC/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 727 (U)

1. FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 300801Z - 310800Z MAR 80.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK GROUP SURVEILLANCE.

B. NIMITZ HELD TWO SORTIES FOR 6 HOURS.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 310900Z).

SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS

CALIFORNIA

23-15N/061-00E

24-00N/061-00E

~~SECRET~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Cc

KOELSCH (BSF, ETO 31 MAR)
 TATTNALL
 LASALLE
 BRUMBY
 R.E. BYRD
 MISPELLION
 WHITE PLAINS
 (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 CORAL SEA/COOK/REEVES
 F. HAMMOND
 W.H. STANDLEY (TAV 27 MAR-03 APR)
 KILAUEA (ETA CVBG MODLOC 01 APR)
 NAVASOTA

DJIBOUTI
 10-06N/039-42E
 26-00N/054-30E
 26-55N/055-26E
 25-50N/056-50E
 23-00N/062-00E
 23-00N/061-00E

 22-45N/061-30E
 21-00N/061-00E
 DIEGO GARCIA
 18-40N/061-30E
 22-30N/062-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

A.B
(5)

(4) ARG ALFA:
 OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNADINO/
 GRIDLEY/BARBEY

18-50N/063-30E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 2 P-38, 1 P-3C, 2 EP-3, 4 KC-135

E

89

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPG201
072-030665
INPUT COSN = OKA507
OR: 310545Z MAR 80 TOT: 310631Z MAR 80

UTO*** UNASSIGNED **
CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

NFO = DNCO(1)
OTAL COPIES = 00001
TR=40

AAMZYUH YLHOR 3790 0910417-MNSH--YEKQGH.
NY MMNSH
KZK OO SOA DE
310400Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
1 CAPT MARTIN, CINCPAC, J3(A)
1 LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
1 LIAMC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF72
ADM KOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO
OBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 127 (U)
OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A. NIMITZ:
- F-14: 15 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC
- A-7E: 10 OF 20 FMC, 4 MC
- A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
- KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
- EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC
- EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC
- S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 0 MC
- RH-53: 7 OF 8 FMC (NOTE 1)
- SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC (NOTE 2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
PAGE 2

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
19 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS
4 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP; ETR FOR FIFTH LASER

01 APR.

NOTE 1. [REDACTED] UP STATUS.

NOTE 2. THREE SH-3H'S ARE ASW CAPABLE.

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 17 OF 21 FMC
A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC
A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC
KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS

C. OKINAWA:

CH-46D: 3 OF 12 FMC, 8 MC
CH-53D: 2 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
UH-1N: 2 OF 2 FMC
AH-1T: 4 OF 4 FMC

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 12,936,000 GALLONS.
5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: USS COOK SPG-53F IS C-2 DUE TO
FAULTY TR TUBE; ETR 28 APR.

(TS) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. RESULTS OF M.F. COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] E
[REDACTED] NIMITZ HAD 3 OF 3 SATISFACTORY AND RH-53 HAD 4 OF 4
SATISFACTORY.

B. SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS DISCREPANCIES: NONE.

#3790

INNN

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

~~EYES ONLY~~

DD FORM 1300 1-77
COPQ202
372-030731
INPUT COSN = OKA590
TOR: 310554Z MAR 80 TOT: 310631Z MAR 80

AUTO= UNASSIGNED

ACTION= UNASSIGNED

INFO ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 0001
PTR=40

IAAMZYUW YMLHOR 3791 0910417-MNSH--YEKQOH,
NY MMNSH
KZK OO SCA DE
310400Z MAR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6
M CAPT MARTIN, CINCPAC, J3(A)
O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION THREE.

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 127 (U)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY MOVEMENT OF

[REDACTED]

ABC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

~~IRANIAN SEA~~

BOTH THE LENINA AND DRIVAK I FFG 693 WERE SIGHTED BY NIMITZ AT DAWN TODAY. THOUGH UNCONFIRMED, THE PROXIMITY OF THE TWO UNITS WHEN OBSERVED SUGGESTS A NIGHT ROVU FOR REPLENISHMENT. THE KRIVAK REMAINED IN SURVEILLANCE OF BG BRAVO, WHILE AGI 477 CONTINUED TO SURVEIL TF 70.

ABC

~~[REDACTED]~~

A, BC

B. FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY A SON SURVEILLANCE MISSION BY IRANIAN P-3F, SIDE NUMBER 5-8702,

~~[REDACTED]~~

ABC

THE P-3F APPROACHED BYRD FROM THE NORTHEAST, CLOSED AT 500 FT ALTITUDE AND PASSED DOWN BYRD'S STARBOARD SIDE WITH CPA APPROX 3000 YOS. THE [REDACTED] PROCEEDED.

A, BC

NIMITZ E-2B TRACKED THE CUB NORTHWARD WITH CPA TO TF 70

APPROX 250 NM.
3791

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TOP SECRET
SECRET

ZCZCDPQ20J

PAGE 1

072-030746

T CDSN = DKA592

OR: 310558Z MAR 80 TOT: 310632Z MAR 80

~~EYES ONLY~~

UTO** UNASSIGNED **

CTIONS** UNASSIGNED **

NFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

TR=40

AMZYUW YHLHOR 3792 0910417-MNSH--YEKQGH.

NY MMNSH

ZK OO SOA DE

310400Z MAR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

1 CAPT MARTIN, CINCPAC, J3(A)

1 LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

1 FO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

1 OM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

1 LIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF

1 OM KIRKSEY, CTF70

1 OKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

1 CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

VAL SECTION OF FOUR

3J: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 127 (U)

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

AW: 30 MAR 10

NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

'92

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCOP0688

DAN: 867-035425

INPUT COSN = D0A836

TOR: 250546Z MAR 80 TOT: 250616Z MAR 80

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AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCO(1)

~~EYES ONLY~~

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
PTR=95

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ZNY MNSH
ZKZK ON SOA DE
O 250400Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM CAPT MARTIN, J23A CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, CONSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAC/NAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~CINCPAC~~ DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 101 (U)

1. ~~CINCPAC~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 240001Z - 250000Z MAR 80

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND
FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

B. ~~THREE~~ HELOS FLEW ONE SORTIE FOR 3.8 HOURS.

C. ~~AVIATION~~ EQUIPMENT FOR NEW CONTINGENCY OPTION. NIMITZ AND
CORAL SEA REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL OTHER MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~CINCPAC~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 250000Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA
REEVES

PAUL F. FOSTER (ENR SPORE, ETA 1 APR)
LASALLE

23-15N/061-00E
24-00N/061-00E
15-00N/067-15E
26-33N/052-04E

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

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~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

KOELSCH
TATTNALL (ETD 25 MAR)
BRUMBY
R.E. BYRD
MISPILLION (ENR ROVU WITH
P.F. FOSTER, J.P. JONES AND
SCHOFIELD)

WHITE PLAINS

- 2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/COOK/FRANCIS HAMMOND
 - W.H. STANDLEY (ENR DIEGO GARCIA,
ETA 27 MAR)
 - J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD (ENR SPORE,
ETA 1 APR)
 - KILAUEA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA
25 MAR)
 - NAVASOTA

6-33N/052-04E
ERBERA
26-33N/052-30E
25-50N/056-50E
08-30N/071-00E

23-15N/061-00E

22-45N/061-30E
03-00N/067-35E

15-00N/067-15E


03-25S/069-55E

23-30N/062-00E

3) SUBMARINES:



A, B



A, B

- 4) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
GRIDLEY/BARBIEY

18-50N/066-10E

5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:



2 P-3C, 5 P-3B, 1EP-3.

DIEGO GARCIA

5 KC-135

551

NN

~~EYES ONLY~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0695

DAN: 067-035717

INPUT CDSN = DKAX000TOR: 250615Z MAR 80 TOT: 250621Z MAR 80

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

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ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTP=95

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CORRECTED COPY
DESTROY ALL OTHERS

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 240400Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6 275

FM CAPT MARTAIN, J3A CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM SMITH, O2 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 121 (U)

3 (U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

1. NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC

F-7E: 10 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC

F-6E: 10 OF 12 FMC

A-50: 3 OF 4 FMC

A-38: 0 OF 2 FMC

A-66: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

F-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~ 6 OF 8 FMC (NOTE 1)

H-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 2 OF 6 MC

-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 13 UP

RDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

9 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS
OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
0 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

OTE 1. ~~REDACTED COMMUNICATIONS IN THE STATES.~~

CORAL SEA:

- 4N: 13 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC
- 7E: 12 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
- 6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
- A-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
- 2B: 1 OF 4 FMC
- 8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- 3G: 1 OF 4 FMC
- 2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP

RDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

2 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS

0 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT ~~REDACTED~~ 13,742,400 GALLONS.

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

(S) COMMUNICATIONS: 5 OF 6 RH-53 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS

E

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY RETURN OF
IVAK I FFG-693 TO THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA FOR CONTINUED
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS AFTER MOVEMENT, TO THE SOUTHEAST ON 23 MAR.
ARABIAN SEA ACFT LOCATED MERTKR PAMYAT LENINI DIW ABOUT 33 NM SOUTHWEST
CV-43. AGI 477 REMAINED IN SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO
ROUGHOUT THE DAY.

ABC

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOP069 ~~TOP SECRET~~
DAN: 067-035071
INPUT CDSN = OKAR4R
TOR: 250611Z MAR 80 TOT: 250620Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=95

QAAMZYUW YHLHDR 3553 0850347-MNSH--YEKDDH.
ZNY MNSH

ZKZK 00 SOA DE
O 250400Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM CAPT MARTIN, J3A CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TRUST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP (21 (U))

CONTINUING OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN RED SEA. WHILE ACCURATE
LOCATING INFORMATION HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED ON
IT IS ESTIMATED THAT

NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED IN THE
VICINITY OF IF-70 TODAY. IF-70

REMARKS:

~~SECRET~~

ZCZCDPR442
JAN: 068-048219
INPUT CDSN = OKA235
TOR: 260634Z MAR 80 TOT: 260648Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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PTR=95

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NY MNSH

KZK OO SOA DE
260400Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
M CAPT MARTIN, J31 CINCPAC
O YEKQHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
HLKHLR/ADM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT
HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF 70
ADM CHAMBERS, CTG 70.3
ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

UBJ: CINCPACFLT [REDACTED] SP 122 (U)
[REDACTED] FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
OR PERIOD 250001Z - 260000Z MAR 80.

. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON
MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
NIMITZ DID NOT CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~
. AWAITING EQUIPMENT FOR NEW CONTINGENCY OPTION. NIMITZ AND
CORAL SEA REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL OTHER MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.
KEY FORCES (POSITIONS AS OF 260900Z).

SHIPS:

1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES/WHITE PLAINS
CALIFORNIA
ADM F. FOSTER (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 4 APR)
ADM SALLE/KOELSCH/BRIMBY

23-15N/061-00E
24-00N/061-00E
10-00N/071-30E
26-36N/051-50E

62

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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11-45N/044-00E
25-50N/056-46E
07-00N/075-00E

TATTNALL

R.E. BYRD

MISPELLION (ENR ROVU WITH P.F. FOSTER/J.P. JONES AND SCHOFIELD)

NOTE: USS REEVES WILL CHANGE FROM BG BRAVO TO BG CHARLIE EFFECTIVE 26 MAR.

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/COOK/FRANCIS HAMMOND

W.H. STANDLEY (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 27 MAR)

J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 4 MAR)

KILAUEA (ETA 27 MAR)

NAVASOTA

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, B

23-15N/061-00E
03-25N/069-50E

10-25N/071-25E

DIEGO GARCIA
22-30N/062-00E

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

18-50N/066-10E

DIEGO GARCIA

(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/GRIOLEY/RARBAY

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135.

3. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC

A-7E: 9 OF 20 FMC, 4 MC

A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC

KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

EA-38: 0 OF 2 FMC, 0 MC

EA-68: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

#3607

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOP0443
OAN: 2606-848272
INPUT CDSN = OKA242
TOR: 260640Z MAR 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

TOT: 260640Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

IN0=00000NCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=95

JAAMZYUW YHLHDR 3608 0860322-MNSH--YEKQHC.

NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

260400Z MAR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

M CAPT MARTIN, J31 CINCPAC

O YEKQHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

HLKHLC/RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF 70

ADM CHAMBERS, CTG 70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

ACTION TWO

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 122 (U)

F-6G: 1 OF 3 FMC

-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC

-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 13 UP

ROL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

9 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS

OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

3 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

JTE 1 ~~TOP SECRET~~ COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS

. CORAL SEA:

-4N: 11 OF 21 FMC, 5 MC

-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC

-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

63

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

O-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4 (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED]: 13,246,800 GALLONS.

9 (C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: USS SCHOFIELD HELD IN A DOWN

STATUS DUE TO SHEARED DRIVE SHAFTS ON GENERATORS. ETR 04 APR.

6 (T) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH

[REDACTED]
A. NIMITZ: 2 OF 3 SATISFACTORY

[REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. NIMITZ LOST RADAR CONTACT ON PRI 477 AS IT TRANSITED SOUTH FROM THE BG BRAVO AREA.



A, B, C

3608

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOP044

DAN: 868-848312

INPUT COSM: DKA945

TOR: 260642Z MAR 80 TOT: 260649Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=95

JAAMZYUW YMLHOR 3609 0860322-MNSH--YEKQHC!

NY MMNSH

IKZK 00 SOA DE

260400Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

M CAPT MARTIN, J31 CINCPAC

O YEKQHC/LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VAOM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

HLKHLC/RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF 70

ADM CHAMBERS, CTG 70.3

ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

INAL SECTION OF THREE

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 122 (U)

FOREIGN MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY IRANIAN P-3F
URVEILLANCE OF USS RICHARD E. BYRD IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. THE
-3 MADE A SINGLE PASS ALONG BYRD'S STARBOARD SIDE AT 2000 YDS AND
EADED SOUTH BEFORE TURNING NORTHEAST TO PROCEED OUTBOUND. NO
IDE NUMBER WAS OBSERVED.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
NFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

EVW: 26 MAR 10

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

3609

PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET
ZCZC09191
DAN: 066-043524
INPUT CDSK = RKA739
TOR: 242751Z MAR 80 TOT: 242812Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTIONS** UNASSIGNED **

INFO** ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=24

COPY PASSED TO OPG

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IRY MNSH

IKZK 00 SDA DE

0 240600Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADN SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT

HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF

ADN KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADN CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADN CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

URJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS SI, TRIP 120 (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 230601Z - 240600Z MAR.

. NIMITZ AND COPAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK
FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ FEES, FEEN 5, SOPTIES FOR 14.9 HOURS.

. CTF 70 ABOARD NIMITZ AND CTG 70.3 DEPARTURE VIA FEES
COMPLETED BY 240600Z. TURNOVER BRIEFINGS AND TRANSFER OF MATERIAL/
DATE ACCOMPLISHED ABOARD NIMITZ.

. USS RICHARD E. BYRD RESPONDED TO OMANI NAVY REQUEST TO
ASSIST IT KUWAITI SHIP AL NISAN, ABANDONED AND SINKING IN STRAIT
OF HORMUZ. OMANI POLICE BOAT ON SCENE AND CREW OF SINKING SHIP

PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~
Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

WERE ALL RESCUED BY INDIAN SHIP SHIVAJI. NO ASSISTANCE BY BYRD
REQUIRED.

E. AWAITING EQUIPMENT FOR NEW CONTINGENCY OPTION. NIMITZ AND
CORAL SEA REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL OTHER MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.
2X ([REDACTED] KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 240900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/WHITE PLAINS

TEXAS

PEEVES

CALIFORNIA

PAUL F. FOSTER (ENR SPORE, ETA 1 APR)

MISPELLION (ENR VIC 06-25N/078-00E,
ETA 27 MAR)

LASALLE/KGELSCH/PRIMBY

TATNALL (ETD 25 MAR)

R.F. BYRD

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/COCK/FRANCIS HAMMOND

J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD

W.H. STANDLEY (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA
27 MAR)

NAVASOTA

KILAUEA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 26 MAR)

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
BARBEY/GRIDLEY

MODLOC IN AREA
BOUNDED BY COORDS
17-00N/20-00N/
065-00E/068-00E

3524

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NNN

~~SECRET~~

ZCZCDP0122
DAN: P66-P43635
INPUT CDSN = DK4733
TOR: 240753Z MAR 80

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT: 240812Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: PNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR#24

DAAMZYUN YHLHDR 3525 0040412-MNSH--YEKDOH.

ZNY MNSH
ZK7K OO SOA DE
O 240800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 120 (U)

(S) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIF

DIEGO GARCIA

3. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- NIMITZ:
- 14: 14 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC
- 7E: 11 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC
- 6E: 10 OF 12 FMC
- A-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
- A-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC
- A-6R: 2 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC
S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC

~~████████████████████~~
H-3E: 7 OF 8 FMC, 3 MC
-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 13 IIP
RDL PODS: 3 OF 3 IIP
5 OF 22 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS
OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
0 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

OTE: ~~████████████████████~~ BS

CORAL SEA:

-4N: 14 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC
-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
A-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC
-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC
F-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC
H-3G: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
-2A: 0 OF 1 FMC

-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 IIP
RDL PODS: 3 OF 3 IIP
2 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN IIP STATUS
0 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT ~~████████████████████~~ 13,739,000 GALLONS.

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

(TS) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMM CHECK WITH ~~████████████████████~~

~~████████████████████~~ SATISFACTORY

~~████████████████████~~ SATISFACTORY

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY AGI 477 SURVEILLANCE
BATTLE GROUP BRAVO ~~████████████████████~~

WEST TO VICINITY OF 24-00N/064-00E.

~~████████████████████~~
NIMITZ AIRCRAFT LOCATED MERTKR PAMYAT LENTINA IN
EASTERN GULF OF OMAN. TF 70 ~~████████████████████~~

3525

INN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZC7COP
JAN 1957
DRAJ32
200000Z MAR 60
TOT: 200000Z MAR 60

UNASSIGNED **
UNASSIGNED **

NFO: DNCO(1)
ORAL COPIES = 00001
TR=42

AAMZYU YLHOR 3398 0800048-MNSH--YEKOOH,
NY MMNSH
KZK OO SOA DE
200000Z MAR 60 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
D LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM TRUST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT
LIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
ADM GURECK, CTG70.2
ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST FINAL SECTION OF TWO

JB: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 116 (U)
16 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~TOP SECRET~~ IN UP STATUS

CORAL SEA:
F-4N: 12 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC
A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
KA-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
RF-6G: 2 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 1 OF 4 FMC
C-2A: 0 OF 1 FMC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

3 OF 3 UP
TA-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS
AVERAIFE AIRCRAFT

LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT DIEGO GARCIA 13,981,800 GALLONS.

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

(U) COMMUNICATIONS: 4 OF 4 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] WERE SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ, *BE*

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE
BATTLE GROUP BRAVO BY MOD KASHIN DDG 286, RETURN TO TF 70 OP
REA BY MERTKR PAMYET LENINA, AND SLOW TRANSIT TO NORTH ARABIAN SEA
Y AGI 477, LENINA AND KASHIN DD 286 CONDUCTED PERSONNEL TRANSFER
Y SMALL BOAT, UPON COMPLETION OF TRANSFER LENINA REMAINED
ORTINVEST OF BATTLE GROUP AND KASHIN RESUMED TRAIL OF NIMITZ. TF 70

[REDACTED]

AGI WAS DIW BUT GOT UNDERWAY
D CLOSED TATTNALL TO ABOUT 300 YARDS. CONTACT WAS LOST AFTER
OSE PASS BY AGI. TF 70

[REDACTED]

CONTINUES WESTERLY TRANSIT THROUGH GULF OF ADEN

[REDACTED]

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
FORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT,
VW 19 MAR 10

NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS,
398

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

MN

~~SECRET~~

BE

1900

A, B, C

L

ZCZCDPR193
DAN: 056-043644
INPUT CDSN = DKA734
TOR: 240753Z MAR 80

~~TOP SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **
INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 20001
RTR=24

GAAMZYUW YHLHNR 3526 0840412-MNSH--YFKDQH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SO4 DE
O 240000Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA TOPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 120 (U)
7.8.80 OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (CONT.):
SRIVAK 1 FFG 693 WAS LOCATED BY NIMITZ AIRCRAFT AND IS PROBABLY
ENROUTE TO INTERCEPT TG 76.3 (ARG ALFA)

A, B, C

FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY IRANIAN P-3
SURVEILLANCE OF R.F. BYRD IN VICINITY OF STRAIT OF HORMUZ. P-3
(SIDE NUMBER 5-8704) HAD WHAT APPEARED TO BE A STANDARD P-3
SEARCHLIGHT POD UNDER STRD WING. P-3 MADE TWO STERN TO BOW PASSES
WITH CPA'S OF 1500 YDS AT 500 FT AND 1000 YDS AT 500 FT RESPECTIVELY

~~SECRET~~

(u) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSURE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 24 MAR 19

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#3526

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

ZCDPO188
AN: 866-881738
NPUT CDSN = OKA532
OR: 228748Z MAR 88 TOT: 220857Z MAR 88

UTO*** UNASSIGNED **

CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

NFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 80081
TR=78

~~EYES ONLY~~

AMZYUW YHLHOR 3494 0820322-MNSH--YEKDOH,
MNSH
ZK OO SOA DE
220800Z MAR 88 ZYH ZYS ZFF=6
MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
FD VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
DM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
LIAHC/MAJGEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
DM KIRKSEY, CTF70
DM GURECK, CTG70.0
DM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
DM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

CTION ONE

3J: ~~SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL SECREP 18 (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
PERIOD 210801Z - 220800Z MAR.
NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON
MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
CORAL SEA OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

~~SECRET~~ NIMITZ FLEW SEVEN SORTIES FOR 26.2 HOURS.

NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS
OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 220900Z).

SHIPS:
BATTLE GROUP BRAVO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

MINNETT/TEXAS/REEVES/CALIFORNIA/PAUL F.
 FOSTER
 MISPELLION
 WHITE PLAINS
 LABALLE
 TATTNALL (ETD 22 MAR)
 R.E. BYRD
 KOELSCH (ETD 22 MAR)
 BRUMBY

23-15N/061-00E
 23-15N/062-00E
 23-30N/061-15E
 27-42N/050-34E
 DJIBOUTI
 27-42N/050-34E
 BAHRAIN
 25-58N/055-50E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD/COOK
 W.H. STANDLEY
 NAVASOTA
 KILAUEA (ETA DIEGO 26 MAR)
 FRANCIS HAMMOND (ETA MODLOC 23 MAR)

22-30N/061-30E
 24-00N/061-00E
 22-30N/061-45E
 19-30N/062-15E
 19-05N/064-25E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED] A, B

[REDACTED] A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
 OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
 GRIDLEY/BARBAY (ETA CVBG MODLOC 24 MAR)

12-00N/069-00E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
 [REDACTED] 2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135.
 3494

NNN

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOPG
DANE...
INPUT... DKA538
TOT: 220857Z MAR 80

AUTO... UNASSIGNED **

ACTION... UNASSIGNED **

INFO... DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

TR=78

~~EYES ONLY~~

AAHZYUW YHLHDR 3495 0820322-MNSH--YEKQDH.

NX MNSH

KZK 00 SOA DE

220800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

4 MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

3 LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT

4LIAHC/MAJGEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADM GURECK, CTG70.0

ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

M

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

ACTION TWO

BJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 118 (U)

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

NIMINZ:

14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC

7E: 13 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC

5E: 10 OF 12 FMC

-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC

-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

2B: 3 OF 4 FMC

-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

1A: 1 OF 4 FMC

53: 6 OF 8 FMC (NOTE)

3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

D-784 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
17 OF 26 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 15 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 AGGE TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~STATUS~~

- 5. CORAL SEA
- F-4MC: 14 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC
- A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC
- A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
- KA-6D: 1 OF 5 FMC
- E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- C-2A: 0 OF 1 FMC

D-784 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

- 4. (U) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 13,851-600 GALLONS,
- 5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
- 6. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]

E

A. RNDI: 4 OF 6 SATISFACTORY
~~STATUS: 4 OF 4 SATISFACTORY~~

7. (U) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY INCREASED WITH ARRIVAL OF AGI 477,
SUPPORT OPERATIONS BY MERTKR PAMYAT LENINA AND CONTINUED SURVILLANCE
OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO BY KRYAK FFG 693, TF 70 [REDACTED]

A, B, C

13495

NNN

~~SECRET~~

ZCZCDP0182
DANS 066-002110
INPUT CDSN = DKAS42
TOR: 220801Z MAR 80 TOT: 220858Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
TR=78

~~EYES ONLY~~

AAMZYUW YHLHOR 3496 0820322-MNSH--YEKQGH,
NY MNNSH

- 4ZK OO SOA DE
- 220800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
- 1 MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
- 2 LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
- INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
- ADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
- 1LIAHC/MAJGEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
- ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
- ADM GURECK, CTG70.2
- ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
- ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~SECRET~~ ~~██████████~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
NAL SECTION OF THREE
BJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS, SITREP 118 (U)



ABC

FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY IRANIAN P-3
SURVEILLANCE OF USS BRUMBY WITH 2 PASSES, CPA 500 YARDS, BRUMBY
DETECTED P-3 SQUAWKING MODES ONE AND THREE AND OBSERVED UNKNOWN
TYPE POD, PROBABLY SEARCHLIGHT, HANGING FROM RIGHT SIDE, P-3 SIDE
NUMBER NOT OBSERVED.

REMARKS:
CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 21 MAR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#3496

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCYCOP0235
NAM: 065-003277
INPUT CDSN = KP4332
OR: 210807Z MAR 80 TOTL 210810Z MAR 80

AUTD... UNASSIGNED **

ACTION... UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCD(1)

ORAL COPIES = 00001
TP=42

AAMZYUW YMLHDR 3444 0810353-MNSH--YEKDH,
NY MNSH
KZK OO SOA DE
~~SECRET~~ R-007YH ZYS ZFF-6
M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM THOST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM SMITH, #2 CINCPACFLT
MLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
ADM GURECK, CTG70.0
ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST SECTION ONE

JBJS: ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS (REP-17-01)
FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
OR PERIOD 200801Z - 210800Z MAR 80.
NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS
MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
CORAL SEA OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

~~TOP SECRET~~ POS FLEET & SORTIES FOR 7 HOURS.
NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.
~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 210900Z).
SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES/
 - CALIFORNIA/PAUL F. FOSTER
 - MISPILLION
 - WHITE PLAINS


23-15N/061-00E
23-15N/062-00E
23-30N/061-30E

LASALLE
TATNALL
R.E. BYRD
KOELSCH (ETO 22 MAR)
BRUMBY

26-33N/051-04E
13-15N/048-48E
26-33N/051-04E
BAHRAIN
25-50N/055-50E

- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD/COOK
W.H. STANDLEY (PIRAZ)
NAVASOTA
KILAUEA
FRANCIS HAMMOND (ETA CVBG MODLOC 23 MAR)
- (3) SUBMARINES:

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
22-30N/061-45E
23-15N/061-00E
13-10N/068-22E



A, B

A, B



- (4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNADINO/
GRIDLEY/BARBEY (ETA CVBG MODLOC 24 MAR)
- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

09-11N/071-53E

DIEGO GARCIA

3444

NNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDPG236
OAS: 065-003311
INPUT CDSN = KDA333
TOP: 210000Z MAR 80

TOT: 210010Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTIONS*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTP=42

DAAMZYUW YHLHDR 3445 0810353-MNSH--YEKDD-

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 210000Z MAR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF=6

FM MAJ GEN DAVTS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM SMITH, R2 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR.

LEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST FINAL SECTION OF TWO,
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 117 (U)
SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

~~TOP SECRET~~ 2 P-36, 2 P-3C, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135
OPERATIONAL READINESS = KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C

NIMITZ:

F-14 13 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC

A-7F: 13 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC

A-6E: 10 OF 12 FMC

KA-60: 2 OF 4 FMC

EA-3B: 4 OF 2 FMC

EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~ 6 OF 6 FMC, NOTE

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

D-7R4 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
16 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~MISSION STATUS:~~

8. GULF OF ADEN:

- F-4N: 12 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC
- A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
- E-2R: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- C-2A: 0 OF 1 FMC

D-7R4 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4. LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 13,935,600 GALLONS.

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: 5 OF 9 HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] WERE SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ. 2 OF 2 HF [REDACTED] WERE COMPLETED SATISFACTORYLY FROM AN-88-16 ACFT.

7. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

4. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY KRIVAK FFG 693 RELIEVING 400 KASHIN DDG 286 IN SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO. RICHARD E. BYRD SIGHTED PGF 679 PATROLLING IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ.

[REDACTED] IN WESTERN GULF OF ADEN AND PROCEEDED ENROUTE RED SEA.

3. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY REPORTED.

3. (U) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW: 21 MAR 10

ISSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
13445

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

TOT: 200800Z MAR 80

UNASSIGNED

UNASSIGNED

DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

TR=42

AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3397 0800048-MNSH--YEKDOM.

NY MNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

080 ZYH ZYS ZFF=6

MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

AT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM SMITH, P2 CINCPACFLT

HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADM GURECK, CTG70.2

ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST SECTION ONE

IRJ: ~~SECRET~~ OPERATIONS SITREP 116 CUB

(4) ~~SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS

IR PERIOD 190801Z - 200800Z MAR 80.

CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS

MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

NIMITZ OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

~~SECRET~~ NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL

MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

~~SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 200900Z).

SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/PEEVES/CALIFORNIA/

PAUL F. FOSTER/MISPILLION/WHITE PLAINS

23-15N/061-00E7

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

26-33N/051-10E
16-10N/055-00E
26-23N/055-25E
25-50N/055-50E
25-50N/056-00E

V

ETA 22 MAR)

KOELICH
BRUNBY

BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD/
COOK/KILAUEA
W.H. STANDLEY
NAVASOTA

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
20-30N/061-45E
08-26N/073-32E

FRANCIS HAMMOND (ETA CVBG MODLOC 23 MAR)

(3) SUBMARINES:



A.B

(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
GRIDLEY/BARBEY/ (ETA CVBG MODLOC 24 MAR)

06-53N/077-02E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

2 P-38, 2 P-3C, 1 EP-E, 5 KC-135

(U) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 12 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
E-2R: 3 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

397

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- MISPILLION
- LASALLE
- TATTNALL (ETA DJIBOUTI 22 MAR)
- R. E. BYRD (ETA PERSIAN GULF 21 MAR)
- KOELSCH
- BRUMBY
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
- CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD/COOK
- FRANCIS HAMMOND (ETA CVRG MODLOC 24 MAR)

- 21-15N/062-00E
- 26-33N/051-04E
- 20-10N/059-05E
- 23-25N/060-15E
- 25-50N/050-50E
- 23-05N/060-55E
- 22-30N/061-00E
- 05-34N/060-00E

- W.H. STANDLEY
- NAVASOTA
- KILAUEA

- 24-00N/061-00E
- 22-30N/061-45E
- 22-30N/061-30E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, B

A, B

- (4) ARG ALFA:
- OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/
- SAN BERNADINO/GRIDLEY/BARBEY/
- (ETA CVRG MODLOC 24 MAR)

05-14N/082-16E

- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
- DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED]

2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135.

#3363

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0428
DAN: 063-006017
INPUT CDSN = OKA100
TOR: 190803Z MAR 80 TOT: 190821Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

~~EYES ONLY~~

INFO= DNCO(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=46

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3364 0790422-MNSH--YEKDOH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 190800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 115 (U)
OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A. NIMITZ:
- F-14: 10 OF 24 FMC, 4 MC
- A-7E: 11 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
- A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
- EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC
- EA-6E: 1 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
- S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- ~~SH-3H: 0 OF 8 FMC (NOTE)~~
- SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
- D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~EYES ONLY~~

39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~ONLY~~

15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE. 13 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~ONLY~~

B. CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 14 OF 21 FMC, 3 MC
- A-7E: 8 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC
- A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
- E-2R: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- C-2A: 0 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

- 4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 14,065,800 GALLONS.
- 5. (CC) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
- 6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: 4 OF 8 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] WERE SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ.

43362

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDPR430

DAN: 063-006050

INPUT CDSN = DKA103

TOR: 190804Z MAR 80 TOT: 190821Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=46

~~EYES ONLY~~

DAAMZYUW YHLHQR 3365 0790422-MNSH--YEKQOH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 190800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 115 (U)

7. (S) ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS LOW, WITH MOD KASHIN DDG 286

CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO AND PGF 769

SIGHTED AT ANCHOR IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3. SOVIET AIR ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED

[REDACTED] NIMITZ F-14 CAP AND CORAL SEA F-4 CAP ESCORTED THE MAYS THROUGHOUT THE TRANSIT IN THE BATTLE GROUP BRAVO AND CHARLIE AREAS RESPECTIVELY. CPA TO NIMITZ WAS 5NM. CPA TO CORAL SEA WAS 10NM. MAYS REMAINED AT 23,000 FT THROUGHOUT.

3. (S) ~~TOP SECRET~~ REMARKS:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

C
B, C, D

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

INTEREST: IRANIAN NAVY P-3F (SIDE NUMBER A7021)
ACFT BY USS KOELSCH AT APPROX 0900Z ON 17 MAR IN THE VICINITY
OF HORMUZ. THE ACFT MADE 3 SURVEILLANCE PASSES ON THE
ACFT AT 500 FT WITH CPA OF 500 YARDS. NO WEAPONS WERE NOTED ON THE
ACFT BUT KOELSCH REPORTED FLIR POD UNDER STBD WING. ACFT NUMBER
A7021 IS SUSPECTED TO BE HARPOON CAPABLE AND THIS IS THE FIRST REPORTED
FIGHTING.

3. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING
TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REV: 19 MAR 10

SSO NOTES: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

#3365

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0654
DAN: 062-311763
INPUT CDSN = DKA900
TOR: 180831Z MAR 80 TOT: 180839Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=47

QAAMPZYUH YLHQR 3298 0780501-MNSH--YEKDH
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 180800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 114 (U)
1. ACTS FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 170801Z - 180800Z MAR 80.

A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
NIMITZ OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

B. NO RH-53 SORTIES WERE FLOWN.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ACTS KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 180900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES/CALIFORNIA/

21-15N/061-00E

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAUL F. FOSTER
MISPILLION
WHITE PLAINS
LASALLE
TATTNALL
R. E. BYRD
KOELSCH
BRUMBY

28-15N/062-00E
22-15N/060-00E
26-33N/051-04E
25-10N/057-20E
18-30N/058-45E
25-50N/055-50E
23-00N/061-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD/COOK
W.H. STANDLEY
NAVASOTA
KILAUEA (ETR CVBG MODLOC,
ETA 19 MAR)

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
22-30N/061-45E
16-10N/064-25E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, B

A, B

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/
SAN BERNADINO/GRIDLEY/BARBEY/
FRANCIS HAMMOND (ENR CVBG MODLOC,
ETA 24, MAR)

05-40N/087-50E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

6. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135,

#3298

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0855
DANCE 062-312000
INPUT CDSN = DKA9#2
TOR: 180833Z MAR 80 TOT: 180839Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=47

0AAMZYUW YHLHQR 3299 0780501=MNSH--YEKDDH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 180800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 114 (U)
3 (U) (C) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A. NIMITZ:
- F-14: 11 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
- A-7E: 11 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
- A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
- KA-60: 2 OF 4 FMC
- EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC
- EA-6B: 3 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
- S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
- RH-53: 5 OF 8 FMC (NOTES 1 AND 2)
- SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE 1. 0 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS

NOTE 2. 1 RH-53 IN SKED MAINTENANCE WITH ETC 18 MAR, ACFT
CAN BE MADE MISSION READY WITHIN 6 HOURS AT ANYTIME DURING
MAINTENANCE PERIOD.

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 13 OF 21 FMC, 3 MC

A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC

A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC

KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

C-2A: 0 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 15 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4 (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 14,107,800 GALLONS.

5 (C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: PAUL F. FOSTER AN/SPS400 AIR
SEARCH RADAR OUT OF COMMISSION, ETR 06 APR.

6 (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: 3 OF 8 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH
[REDACTED] WERE SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ. E

43299

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

052-012033

EDSN = DKA987

100838Z MAR 80

TOT: 180841Z MAR 80

~~INFO~~ UNASSIGNED **

~~ATTOR~~ UNASSIGNED **

INFO DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=47

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3300 0780501-MNSH--YEKDOH.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 180800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 114 (U)

7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS LOW, WITH MOD KASHIN DD 286

CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF ~~TOP SECRET~~ BATTLE GROUP BRAVO

~~TOP SECRET~~ SIGHTINGS BY USS BRUMBY

EVENING OF 16 MAR CONFIRM RESTA II CG 573, KYNDA CG 019, KRIVAK

FFG'S 698 AND 806, AGI 422, AD AKTUBA, AND

REMAIN AT SOCDTRA ANCHORAGE

B,C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

FOREIGN MILITARY ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY AN IRANIAN P-3
VICINITY 25-58N/056-52E. KOELSCH
GAINED ESM ON P-3 SQUAWKING MODE 3, CODE 0300 AND LATER
ACFT 8NM DISTANT, APPROACHING FROM THE NORTH AT 500 FT.
SIDE NUMBER 5-8702 MADE THREE PASSES ON KOELSCH WITH INITIAL PASS
YDS. TO STBD AND SECOND AND THIRD PASSES 500 YDS. TO STBD AND
PORT RESPECTIVELY. THIS FLIGHT IS FIRST SIGHTING OF 5-8702. NO
WEAPONS NOTED ON P-3, BUT KOELSCH REPORTED FLIR POD UNDER STARBOARD
WING.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFOR-
MATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW: 18 MAR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#3300

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

0-014117

0KA629

08613Z MAR 80

TOT: 170816Z MAR 80

UNASSIGNED **

ACTION *** UNASSIGNED **

INFO ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=29

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ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SDA DE

O 170800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J5 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM SMITH, P2 CINCPACFLT

YMLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIPKSEY, CTF7M

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS - SITREP 013 (U)

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 160601Z - 170800Z MAR 80.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON COMBINED TASK FORCE ANTI-AIR WARFARE, ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE, AND ANTI-SHIP MISSILE DEFENSE. EXERCISE GONZO 1-80 COMPLETED. NIMITZ ALSO CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS - 001Z-04HOURS.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 170900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/P.F. FOSTER/

21-15N/061-00E

~~EYES ONLY~~

Copy No. 88 of 88 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

MISPELLION
REEVES (PIRAZ)
CALIFORNIA (ETA BG MODLOC 18 MAR)
WHITE PLAINS
LASALLE
MILLER/AINSWORTH/(ETA PORT SUEZ
18 MAR)
TATNALL
R. E. BYRD
KOELSCH
BRUMBY

24-05N/061-00E
08-00N/060-05E
23-15N/061-00E
26-33N/051-04E
22-45N/037-20E

26-33N/051-03E
13-50N/055-05E
25-50N/055-50E
15-00N/055-30E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/W. M. STANDLEY/
J. P. JONES/SCHOFIELD/COOK
NAVASOTA
KILAUEA (ETA BG MODLOC 19 MAR)

21-30N/061-00E
22-30N/061-45E
08-55N/066-15E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, B

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/
SAN BERNADINO/GRIDLEY/BARBAY/
FRANCIS HAMMOND (ETA CVBG MODLOC 24 MAR)

06-25N/093-28E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

[REDACTED] 2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135. E

#3240

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

14233

EDM = DKA637

170020Z MAR 80 TOT: 170622Z MAR 80

~~UNASSIGNED~~

~~UNASSIGNED~~

INFO DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=29

DAAMZYUN YHLHDR 3251 0770210-MNSH--YEKDDH,

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SDA 00

O 170800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM SMITH, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 113 (U)

3. (TS) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NINITY:

F-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 3 MC

A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC

A-6E: 10 OF 12 FMC

KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

EA-39: 0 OF 2 FMC (NOTE 1)

EA-68: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-23: 3 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~ 3: 5 OF 8 FMC (NOTES 2 AND 3)

SH-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
16 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS
8 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: EA-36: ENR WAS CUBI FOR REPAIRS, ETA REPLACEMENT ACFT UNKNOWN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~
~~REPAIRS MUST BE COMPLETED WITHIN 72 HOURS IF REQUIRED.~~
~~COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS~~

B. CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 14 OF 21 FMC, 3 MC
- A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
- KA-6D: 4 OF 5 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-3G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC
- C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 14,141,400 GALLONS.
5.0(C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: STANLEY AN/SPS-48C AIR
SEARCH RADAR REPAIRED
6 (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: 6 OF 7 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH
[REDACTED] WERE SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ, 1 OF 4
HF CHECKS WERE SATISFACTORY FROM HM-16 ACFT.

#3261

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

22002792
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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=29

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ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 170000Z MAR 82 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM SMITH, 72 CINCPACFLT
YMLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 113 (U)
7. (S) ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

SOVIET AIR ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY SEPARATE TRANSITS
OF TWO SOVIET MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION (VTA)
CUB AIRCRAFT. EACH AIRCRAFT WAS INTERCEPTED BY NIMITZ F-14 CAP AND
ESCORTED FOR APPROXIMATELY 40 MINUTES. CPA TO TF 70 WAS 170NM AT
23,000 FT.

8. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS LOW, WITH MOD KASHIN DDG
296 CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO, TF70

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFOR-
MATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW: 17 MAR 82

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZCZCOP0064

QANT: 056-025770

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AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=41

~~TOP SECRET~~

00AMZYUW YHLHOR 3175 0740800-MNSH--YEKQGH.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

070000Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RAOM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RAOM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RAOM GURECK, CTG70.0

RAOM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RAOM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DO NOT

TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST//SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ SUPER TITANS TO REP 510 (U)

1. (U) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 130801Z - 140800Z MAR.

A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE. NIMITZ FLEW LIMITED FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF B-52 INDIAN OCEAN OPERATIONS.

B. B-52 INDIAN OCEAN OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED WITH TF70 FROM 130458Z TO 130614Z MAR. COMPLETE REPORT BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ HELD SORTIES FLOWN.

U. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 140900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/PEEVES/PAUL F. FOSTER/

23-154/061-00E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

WHITE PLAINS
MISPILLION
LASALLE

23-15N/062-00E
26-33N/051-04E
DJIBOUTI
26-00N/055-50E
DJIBOUTI
13-00N/048-30E
25-50N/055-50E
DJIBOUTI
MAURITIUS

MILLER (ETO 16 MAR)
TATTNALL
R.E. BYRD (ETO 15 MAR)
AINSWORTH (ETA OJIBOUTI 15 MAR)
KOELSCH
BRUMBY (ETO 15 MAR)
CALIFORNIA (CONDUCTING STORM EVASION
OFF MAURITIUS ETA 14 MAR WITH ETO 15 MAR)

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
W.H. STANDLEY
COOK (ETA CVBG MOOLOC PM 14 MAR)
NAVASOTA
KILAUEA (ETO 15 MAR)

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
19-30N/064-30E
22-30N/061-45E
DIEGO GARCIA

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, B

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO
(ETO 15 MAR)
GRIDLEY/BARBEY (ETO 15 MAR)

SPORE
SPORE

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 6 KC-135

.75

IN

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

ZCZCOP0861

DANE: 856-826015

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~~EYES ONLY~~

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

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ZNY MNSH

ZKZK CO SOA DE

O 140800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADM GURECK, CTG70.0

ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DO NOT
TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST//SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 110 (U)

3. (TS) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC

A-7E: 11 OF 20 FMC, 4 MC

A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC

KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

EA-38: 0 OF 2 FMC

EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-29: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 2 OF 4 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~ (NOTE)

SH-3H: 3 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC

O-794 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

56

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
17 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 15 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

[REDACTED]

B. CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 12 OF 21 FMC, 5 MC
- A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
- E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
- C-2A: 0 OF 1 FMC

D-794 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

- 4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS [REDACTED] 14,452,200 GALLONS.
- 5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
- 6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] NIMITZ HAD 4 OF 4 CHECKS SATISFACTORY.

E

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUED HQD KASHIN

DDG 286 SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO.

[REDACTED]

C

A, C

#3176

~~TOP SECRET~~


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ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

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RTR=24



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O 140800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR DO NOT
TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST//FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 110 (U)



ABC

U) 000000 REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 13 MAR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#3180



6-11-7

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE

EXPER 0781
0000 000-022618
INPUT EDGN * OKA398
TORI 130758Z MAR 88

TOT: 130811Z MAR 88

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES * 00001
RTR=68

~~EYES ONLY~~

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ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 130800Z MAR 88 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (TOP SECRET)

1. (U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 120801Z - 130800Z MAR 88.

A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS
ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
NIMITZ OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 130800Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES/P.F. FOSTER
CALIFORNIA (CONDUCTING STORM

23-15N/061-00E
MAURITIUS

~~SECRET~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

IC OF MAURITIUS. ETD


- WATSON
- WYDE PLAINS
- WANDRE (ENR PATTAYA, ETA 18 MAR)
- WALLE (BSP, ETD 14 MAR)
- WILKER (ENR DJIBOUTI, ETA 14 MAR)
- WATNALL
- R. E. BYRD/BRUMBY (ENR DJIBOUTI, ETA 14 MAR)
- AINSWORTH (ENR DJIBOUTI, ETA 15 MAR)
- KOELSCH
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
- CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
- W. H. STANDLEY
- COOK (ENR BG MODLOC, ETA 14 MAR)
- NAVASOTA
- KILAUEA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 14 MAR)

23-15N/062-00E
 23-15N/061-30E
 06-00N/097-00E
 BAHRAIN
 17-20N/053-30E
 25-50N/055-50E
 16-25N/040-48E

15-45N/053-40E
 23-00N/061-00E

22-30N/061-30E
 24-00N/061-00E
 19-30N/064-30E
 22-45N/061-00E
 03-10S/070-05E

(3) SUBMARINES:



A, B



A, B

- (4) ARG ALPAT
- OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
- GRIDLEY/BARBEY (ETD 15 MAR)

SINGAPORE

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

(C) DIXIE

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT: [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B,
 8 KC-135
 #3139

EYES ONLY

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 3

022024
000000Z MAR 88 TOT: 130811Z MAR 88

UNASSIGNED **
UNASSIGNED **
ONCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=08

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ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 130800Z MAR 88 ZYM ZYS ZPP-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.8
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 109 (U)
3140-00 OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A. NIMITZ:
- F-14: 11 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC
 - A-7E: 10 OF 20 FMC, 4 MC
 - A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
 - KA-60: 3 OF 4 FMC
 - EA-38: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC
 - EA-68: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - E-28: 2 OF 4 FMC
 - RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - S-3A: 2 OF 4 FMC
 - ~~EA-67: 8 FMC (NOTE 1 AND 2)~~
 - SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
- O-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 OF 3 UP
13 A-7E ARE WALLEYE EROL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIPE AIRCRAFT

~~COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS
NO MAINTENANCE PERIODS AT ANY TIME DURING THE MAINTENANCE PERIOD.~~

- B. CORAL SEA:
- F-4N: 14 OF 21 FMC, 3 MC
- A-7E: 11 OF 18 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6E: 9 OF 18 FMC, 2 MC
- KA-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC
- E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
- C-2A: 0 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
 EROL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
 12 OF 18 A-7E WALLEYE EROL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS
 NO PAVEKNIPE AIRCRAFT
 4 (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 14,532,000 GAL.
 5 (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
 6 (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: 5 OF 5 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH
 [REDACTED] WERE SATISFACTORY FROM NIMITZ. 2 OF 4 WERE SATISFACTORY FROM HM-16 ACFT. E

#3140

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZCZCOP0784
DAN: 855-822632
INPUT CDSN = DKA398
TOR: 138759Z MAR 88 TOT: 138812Z MAR 88

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00081
RTR=68

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ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK 00 90A DE
O 130800Z MAR 88 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.8
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 109 (U)
7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUED
SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP ~~TOP SECRET~~ BY MOD KASHIN DDG 288, TF-70

~~TOP SECRET~~

B, C

8. ~~TOP SECRET~~ REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 13 MAR 88

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#3141

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0815

DAN: 054-021523

INPUT CDSN = DKA151

TOR: 120754Z MAR 80 TOT: 120757Z MAR 80

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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RTR=40

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ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

~~TOP SECRET~~ ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE OF THREE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS REPORT

(U) (S) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 110001Z - 120000Z MAR 80.

. NIMITZ CONDUCTED LIMITED FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET AERIAL SURVEILLANCE FLIGHTS FOLLOWED LATER BY CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND ASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE. CORAL SEA OBSERVED STAND DOWN.

~~TOP SECRET~~ NIMITZ HELOS FLEW FOUR SORTIES FOR 10.5 HOURS!

. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 120900Z). C

. SHIPS (S)

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES/WHITE PLAINS/PAUL
F. FOSTER
CALIFORNIA (ETD 14 MAR)
LASALLE (BSF, ETD 14 MAR)
MILLER
AINSWORTH (BSF, ETD 13 MAR)
KDELSCH
TATTNALL
MISPILLION
ROANOKE (ENR PATTAYA, ETA 18 MAR)

23-15N/061-00E
MAUPITIUS
BAHRAIN
17-30N/053-30E
MUSCAT
19-20N/059-25E
25-50N/056-50E
23-15N/062-00E
05-45N/084-20E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD/NAVASOTA
W.H. STANDLEY
COOK (ENR CVBG MODLDC, ETA 14 MAR)
KILAUEA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 14 MAR)
RIGEL (ENR PORT SUEZ, ETA 14 MAR, FINAL REPORT)

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
08-40N/072-50E
02-45N/066-05E
16-25N/040-35E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALPHA:
KINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/
IDLEY/BARBEY (ETD 150001Z MAR)

SINGAPORE

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

XXIE
SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
[REDACTED] 2 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 6 KC-135

3103

NNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0016
DAN: 054-221533
INPUT CDSN = DKA152
TOR: 120755Z MAR 80 TOT: 0757Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 0001
RTR=40

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3104 0720351- [REDACTED]--YEKQGH.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 120000Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFC-

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 108(U)

(U) [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

NIMITZ:

-14: 12 OF 24 FMC, 1MC

-7E: 11 OF 20 FMC, 3MC

-6E: 7 OF 12 FMC

A-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

A-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1MC

A-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

F-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

-3A: 2 OF 4 FMC

[REDACTED] FMC (NOTE: [REDACTED])

H-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 3MC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ME DURING [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

B. CORAL SEA:
F-14: 13 OF 21 FMC, 1MC
A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 1MC
A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 2MC
KA-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS [REDACTED] 14,586,600 GALLONS.

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (S) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED 7 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] E
[REDACTED] 2 WERE SATISFACTORY.

B. [REDACTED] CONDUCTED 5 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS [REDACTED] E
[REDACTED] 3 WERE SATISFACTORY.

W3104

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOPORNS

OAN: 053-022507

INPIIT CDSH = DKAR5R

TOR: 110755Z MAR 80 TOT: 110802Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000

RTR=74

GAAMZYUW YHLHOR 3016 0710241-MNSH--YEKQDQ.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 110800Z MAR 80 ZYW ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAMC/MAJ GEN THOMPSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 107 (U)

7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUED

SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO BY MOD KASHIN DDG 286

[REDACTED SECTION]

A, E, 2

B. SOVIET AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY A SURVEILLANCE MISSION AGAINST TF 70 BY TWO ~~TOP SECRET~~ IL-38 MAYS. THE MAYS WERE INTERCEPTED BY F-4 CAP AIRCRAFT 202 NM SOUTH OF CORAL SEA AT 12,000 FT. F-4 ESCORTS WERE RELIEVED BY F-14 AIRCRAFT AFTER

(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES AND THE MAYS WERE ESCORTED THROUGHOUT THEIR SURVEILLANCE OF THE TASK FORCE. ESCORT WAS TERMINATED 136 NM SOUTH OF NIMITZ. MAYS CPA TO NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA WERE 500 FT AT ALTITUDES OF 300-500 FT.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 11 MAR 10

ASSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#3316

UNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZCZCDP0521
DAN: 837-831275
INPUT CDSN = DKA835
TOR: 210813Z FEB 80 TOT: 210814Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DNCO(1)

~~EYES ONLY~~

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=46

QAAMZYUW YHLHDR 2246 0520443-MNSH--YEKQOH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O ~~210800Z~~-FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ CHANNELS EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION ONE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 088 (U)
1 (U) (TS) ~~THE~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 200801Z - 210800Z FEB.


A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS
ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
NIMITZ FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE LIMITED TO ROUTINE LOGISTICS FLIGHTS.

~~REHELS HELDS TO REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL OTHER~~
~~MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.~~
C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIR WINGS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF POSS-
IBLE TASKING OF RH-53 HELDS, REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL OTHER
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2 (TS) ~~THE~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 210900Z).
A. SHIPS:
(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA/ROBNOKE 23-55N/058-50E
TEXAS (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 22 FEB) 02-00N/068-00E

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~~TOP SECRET~~



REEVES
 LASALLE/MILLER/TATTNAL
 AINSWORTH (ETD 25 FEB)
 KOELSCH (ETD 23 FEB)
 MISPELLION
 (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
 HALSEY (ENR SPORE ETA 27 FEB)
 W.H. STANDLEY
 PASSUMPSIC
 KILAUEA (ENR CV MODLOC ETA 24 FEB)
 RIGEL

22-00N/062-07E
 28-00N/058-30E
 BAHRAIN
 MOMBASA
 23-55N/058-50E
 24-00N/059-45E
 17-40N/065-30E
 23-45N/060-15E
 21-50N/062-10E
 00-55N/068-25E
 23-00N/061-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
 OKINAWA/ALAMO (ETD 22 FEB)
 MOBILE (ETD 23 FEB)
 SAN BERNARDINO (ETD 23 FEB)

SUBIC BAY
 ILOILO
 BACOLOD

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 211400Z) 07-00S/071-00E

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135
 (2) [REDACTED] 4AC-130

A, E

#2246

NNNN

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCDP0534

DANI 037-031401

INPUT CDSN = DKAB41

TOR: 210821Z FEB 80 TOT: 210822Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=46

DAAMZYUW YHLHDR 2247 0520443-MNSH--YEKDH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SDA DE

O 210800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1

YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ CHANNELS EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 088 (U)

~~(U)~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 11 OF 24 FMC, 2MC

A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 2MC

A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC

KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC

EA-38: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1MC

EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1MC

RF-8G: 3 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2MC

~~REEST 4 OF 8 FMC (NOTE)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~HANDLE VIA~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4MC
C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT IN UP STATUS BY 221800Z.~~
~~NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT DOWNED OR SET ON FIRE.~~
~~NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT COMM IN UP STATUS.~~

B. CORAL SEA:
F-4N: 13 OF 21 FMC, 4MC
A-7E: 7 OF 16 FMC, 2MC
A-6E: 1 OF 10 FMC, 7MC
KA-6D: 0 OF 5 FMC, 3MC
E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 8 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(4) (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 16,014,600 GALLONS.

(5) (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

(6) (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] 8 OF 8 ATTEMPTS BY NIMITZ WERE

SATISFACTORY
02247

E

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0545
DAN: 037-031464
INPUT CDSN = DKA842
TOR: 210827Z FEB 80

TOT: 210832Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO# DNCO(1)

~~EYES ONLY~~

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=46

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 2240 0520443-MNSH--YEKDRH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 210800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
/HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ CHANNELS EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.
FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 088 (U)
(7) (S) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE.
AGI 477 REMAINED IN VICINITY OF NIMITZ THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND MOD
KASHIN CONTINUED OPERATIONS IN STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THE DAILY AIR
DEFENSE EXERCISE CONTINUED.

B. FOREIGN AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY A
SURVEILLANCE FLIGHT OF BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE BY ~~TOP SECRET~~ C
IL-38 MAY AIRCRAFT. THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT CONDUCTED 3 CLOSE-IN
PASSES OF THE CORAL SEA DURING A ONE HOUR SURVEILLANCE.

(8) ~~TOP SECRET~~ REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 20 FEB 10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

SSO NOTES DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#2248

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0651
DAN: 036-035533
INPUT CLSN = DKA565
TOR: 200749Z FEB 80 TOT: 200752Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=95

DAAMZYU4 YHLHDR 2197 0510800-MNSH--YEKQGH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SCA DE
O ~~200806Z FEB 80~~ ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, O2 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, O0 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEC BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

~~SECRET DAILY OPERATIONS REPORT 07 (U)~~

1. (U) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 192801Z - 200800Z FEB.

A. (S) NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK
FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

B. (T) ~~153 HELOS FLEW FOUR SORTIES FOR 13.5 HOURS FLIGHT TIME.~~

C. (C) CORAL SEA LOST AN F-4N OVER THE FANTAIL FURING ROUTINE
DECK OPERATIONS. ACFT SLID SIDWAYS WHILE CORAL SEA WAS IN A SLOW
TURN. ACFT ENTERED WATER INVERTED WITH PLANE CAPTAIN STILL IN COCK-
PIT. PLANE CAPTAIN, RESCUED BY HELO, SUSTAINED ONE BROKEN BONE AND
OTHER MINOR INJURIES. REPORTING HAS BEEN INITIATED THROUGH NORMAL
CHANNELS. copy!

D. (U) AT 191600Z, NIMITZ AND CALIFORNIA WILL COMMENCE A
HIGH SPEED, TOTAL EMCON TRANSIT FROM VIC 23-45N/062-00E TO VIC 24-
30N/059-00E, ETA 192200Z. ROANOKE AND PIGEL WILL JOIN TO PARTICIPATE

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~FOR EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~FOR EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDP0817

PAGE 1

DAN: 054-021541

INPUT CDSN = DKA153

TOR: 120756Z MAR 80 TOT: 120757Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=40

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 3105 #720351-MNSH--YEKDDH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 120800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO, CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 108(U)

7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE

OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO BY MOD KASHIN DDG-286 AND ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ NIMITZ HS-9 HELD DEPLOYED. FOUR BUOY STRAIGHT

LINE PATTERN ACROSS NIMITZ'S WAKE, 4NM ASTERN, KASHIN OBSERVED BUOY

PLACEMENT, ALTERED COURSE, RECOVERED ONE BUOY AND THEN RESUMED TRAIL

OF NIMITZ. ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ COPAL SEA ~~TOP SECRET~~

A, BC

3. SOVIET AIR ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ NIMITZ F-14 CAP INTERCEPTED MAYS 200NM SOUTH FROM

NIMITZ AT 21,000 FT. ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

MAYS CLIMBED TO 23,000 FT AS

THEY PROCEEDED UNDER ESCORT

[REDACTED]

ACT

ESCORT TERMINATED 174NM

NORTHWEST OF NXHTZ AS MAYS CONTINUED ENROUTE
C.

[REDACTED]

ABC

MAINTAINING BARRIER PATROL SOUTH OF TF-70 OPERATING AREA. F-3 ACFT CONDUCTED VIC BATTLE FORCE.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT. REVW 12 MAR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#3105

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCD0689
DANS: 053-222377
INPUT CDSN: 0KA852
TOR: 112751Z MAR 80 TOT: 110751Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES: 00201
RTR: 74

00AMZYUW YHLHCR 3014 0710241-MNSH--YEKDDH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK 00 SOA DE

~~TOP SECRET~~ ZYM ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GUPECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ SUPERVISORS AIRBORNE (U)

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 100001Z - 110000Z MAR 80.

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON
MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
CORAL SEA CONDUCTED LIMITED FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO
SOVIET AERIAL SURVEILLANCE FLIGHT.

~~TOP SECRET~~ E-3A/TF 70 SUPERVISORS AIRBORNE 110000Z MAR 80.

C. E-3A/TF 70 INTERFACE TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED AND INCLUDED
UHF LINK-11/TADIL-A EMPLOYMENT AND FIGHTER CONTROL. EQUIPMENT
DIFFICULTIES ABOARD E-3A PRECLUDED ESTABLISHING HF LINK. COMPLETE
MISSION REPORT WILL FOLLOW BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

D. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 110900Z).

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES
CALIFORNIA (EDT 14 MAR)
PAUL F. FOSTER/WHITE PLAINS
(ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 12 MAR)
LASALLE
MILLER (ENR DJIBOUTI, ETA 14 MAR)
AINSWORTH (BSF, ETD 12 MAR)
KOELSCH
TATTNALL
MISPILLION
ROANOKE (ENR PATTAYA, ETA 18 MAR)

23-15N/061-00E
MAURITIUS
18-00N/065-45E
27-42N/050-30E
19-52N/059-10E
MUSCAT
18-27N/057-50E
25-50N/056-50E
23-15N/062-00E
06-15N/074-15E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
W. H. STANDLEY
COOK (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 14 MAR)
NAVASOTA
KILAUEA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA
14 MAR)
RIGEL (ENR PORT SUEZ, ETA 14 MAR)

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
05-35N/079-50E
22-00N/061-30E
09-45N/066-00E
12-38N/043-22E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/
SAN BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/BARBEY
(ENR SINGAPORE, ETA 12 MAR)

04-00N/104-30E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

#3014

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDPQSMC
CAN: 353-222440
INPUT CDSM = DKA855
TOR: 110754Z MAR 80 TOT: 110754Z MAR 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO*** UNASSIGNED **
TOTAL COPIES = 00000
RTR=74

-0AAMZYUR YHLHCR 3015 0710241-MNSH--YEAORR.
ZNY MMNSH
ZYKZ OO SOA DE
O 110800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 22 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.2
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 107 (0)

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
(1) ~~TOP SECRET~~ 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135
3. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A. NIMITZ:
 - F-14: 10 OF 24 FMC, 3 MC
 - A-7E: 11 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC
 - A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
 - KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
 - EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 0 MC
 - EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - E-2R: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
 - RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- ~~TOP SECRET~~
 - SM-34: 4 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGE 2

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
 15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS,
 5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
 NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 13 OF 21 FMC, 2 MC
- A-7E: 10 OF 15 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
- E-2R: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-4G: 1 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC
- C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
 12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS,
 NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4 (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 14,754,600 GALLONS.

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6 (TS) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED 8 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH NCS
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6 WERE SATISFACTORY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONDUCTED 9 HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7 WERE SATISFACTORY.

E
E

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCDPQ992
DAN: 033-014263
INPUT CDSN = DKA256
TOR: 150810Z FEB 80 TOT: 150811Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=58

~~EYES ONLY~~

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 2021 0460551-MNSH--YEKDH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O [REDACTED] FEB 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, O2 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHL0K00/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

~~SECRET~~

CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 082

1. (U) [REDACTED] FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 140601Z - 150800Z FEB.

A. CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY NIMITZ AND
CORAL SEA WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND
TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] FOR 15.8 FLT HOURS ✓

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO CONDUCT
ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. [REDACTED] KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 150900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA
LASALLE/TATTNALL/MILLER
AINSWORTH (ETD 25 FEB)
KOELSCH (ETD 15 FEB)

23-00N/61-00E
27-15N/50-45E
BAHRAIN
MOMBASA

- HISPILLION
- ROANOKE (ENR BG MODLOC ETA 18 FEB)
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
- CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
- HALSEY
- W.H. STANDLEY
- REEVES (ENR BG MODLOC DTA 20 FEB)
- PASSUMPSIC
- KILAUEA (ENR RG MODLOC ETA 17 FEB)
- RIGEL (ENR BG MODLOC ETA 19 FEB)
- (3) SUBMARINES:

23-00N/62-00E
 00-00N/68-50E
 22-00N/62-00E
 23-38N/60-10E
 24-00N/61-10E
 06-10N/95-40E
 21-50N/62-10E
 02-55N/62-30E
 06-25N/78-55E

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, E

- (4) ARG ALFA:
- OKINAWA/ALAMO (ETD 22 FEB)
- MOBILE/SAN BERNADINO (ETD 17 FEB)
- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
- DIXIE (ETD 18 FEB)

SUBIC BAY
 SUBIC BAY
 PORT LOUIS

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

- (1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 3 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135
- (2) [REDACTED] 3 AC-130
- (3) [REDACTED] 1 AC-130

E

3. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 10 OF 24 FMC, 3 MC
 A-7E: 11 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
 A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
 KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
 EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 2 MC
 EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
 E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
 RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC
 S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 3MC

~~EYES ONLY~~

#2021

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

ZCZCDP0909
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INPLT CDSN = DKA261
TOR: 150817Z FEB 80 TOT: 150829Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=52

~~EYES ONLY~~

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ZKZK DD SCA DE
O 150800Z FEB 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, O2 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF TWO

CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 082 (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ (NOTE)

SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC
C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP
STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: 3 OF 4 HELD COMMS IN UP STATUS

5. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 12 OF 22 FMC, 7 MC
A-7E: 7 OF 16 FMC, 4 MC
A-6E: 7 OF 10 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

KA-6D: 1 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8C: 1 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 16,279,200 GALS.

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ ATTEMPTED FOUR HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]. ALL WERE UNSATISFACTORY. E

7. (S) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY TODAY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. AGI 477 CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF USS NIMITZ THROUGH MOST OF THE NIGHT, HOWEVER, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HOD KASHIN CONTINUED STRAIT OF HORMUZ PATROL OPERATIONS.

B. OMANI JAGUAR ACFT CONDUCTED SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF TG 70.2 DURING THE MIDDAY HOURS.

8. (U) REMARKS:

CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 15 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING ~~WORKING~~ HOURS.
#2022

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

CZCZDP0001
IAN: 032-020516
INPUT CDSN = DKA924
140802Z FEB 80 TOT: 140803Z FEB 80

UTO*** UNASSIGNED **

CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

NFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
TR=55

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AMZYUW YLHHR 1959 0450800-MNSH--YEKQDH,
NY MMNSH
KZK OO SOA DE

~~TOP SECRET~~ 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
AJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
HLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
ACTION ONE

OBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)
FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 130801Z - 140800Z FEB.

A. CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY NIMITZ AND
CORAL SEA WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND
ASST FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ HELD FLEW ONE SORTIE FOR 2.2 HOURS FLIGHT TIME. ✓

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO CONDUCT ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

D. AT 140001Z NIMITZ, TEXAS AND CALIFORNIA WILL DEPART VIC
23-00N/64-30E AND CONDUCT A HIGH-SPEED TRANSIT TO VIC 23-00N/61-00E
AT 140645Z AND THENCE TO VIC 24-30N/59-00E, CONDUCTING FLIGHT OPS
ROUTE, ETA 141400Z. ANTICIPATE OPERATING IN THIS VICINITY UNTIL
COMMENCING TRANSIT TO NORTH MODLOC STATION AT APPROX 141800Z. TG
0.3 HAS COMMENCED MOVEMENT TO THE WEST TO RETURN TO NORMAL OPERAT-
ING AREA VIC 22-00N/62-00E.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

2. (TS) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 140900Z).

A. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA 24-05N/59-50E
 - LASALLE/TATTNALL 27-30N/50-45E
 - MILLER/AINSWORTH 28-00N/50-40E
 - KOELSCH (ETD 15 FEB) MOMBASA
 - HISPILLION 23-00N/61-00E
 - ROANOKE (ENR BG MODLOC ETA 18 FEB) 3-30S/70-30E
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD 22-00N/62-00E
 - HALSEY 23-38N/60-10E
 - W.H. STANDLEY 24-00N/61-00E
 - REEVES (ENR BG MODLOC ETA 20 FEB) 2-49N/100-55E
 - PASSUMPSIC 21-50N/62-10E
 - KILAUEA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 17 FEB) 10-00N/65-40E
 - RIGEL (ENR BG MODLOC ETA 19 FEB) 5-55N/86-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

A13

A1B

- (4) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNADINO SUBIC BAY

- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 - DIXIE (ETD 18 FEB)

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

- (1) [REDACTED] 73 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135
- (2) [REDACTED] KC-130
- (3) [REDACTED] KC-130

E

3. (TS) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

(u) A. NIMITZ:

- F-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
- A-7E: 13 OF 20 FMC
- A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

#1959

INNN

[REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

DEZCOP0087
DAN: 832-020531
INPUT CDSN = DKA925
T 140803Z FEB 80 TOT: 140804Z FEB 80

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=58

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ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
J 140800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF=6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FDLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIPKSEY, CTF70
HLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 081 (U)

- EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC
- EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 3 OF 3 FMC
- S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- ~~RH-53: 0 OF 8 FMC~~ (NOTE)
- ~~SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC~~
- C-2 0 OF 1 FMC
- D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
- ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
- 18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS
- 5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
- NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: 3 OF 8 HELO HF COMMS IN UP STATUS
B. CORAL SEA

~~EYES ONLY~~

F-4N: 12 OF 22 FMC, 8 MC
 A-7E: 9 OF 16 FMC, 4 MC
 A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC
 KA-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC
 E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
 RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
 SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC
 D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 4 UP
 12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS
 NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 16,350,600 GALLONS

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

(S) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ CONDUCTED FOUR SATISFACTORY HF CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]. HELIOS ATTEMPTED SIX [REDACTED]

E

[REDACTED]

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED [REDACTED]

BC

[REDACTED] AGI CONTINUED EAST AND RESUMED SURVEILLANCE DURING AFTERNOON HOURS. [REDACTED]

BC

[REDACTED] DAILY AIR DEFENSE READINESS DRILL CONTINUED DURING THE 1300Z HOUR. [REDACTED]

(U) (S)

A, B

[REDACTED] AIR TRAFFIC ROUTE.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

EVW 14 FEB 10

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS 1960

JNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDP9002
OAN: 133-033024
INPUT CDSN = OKA512
TOR: 133002Z FEB 80

TOT: 130816Z FEB 80

HANDLE VIA PAGE 1

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-ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

-INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000

RTR=11

GAAMZYUW YHLHDR 1932 0440800-MNSH--YEKQGH.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SGA DE

0 [REDACTED] 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

F4 MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

RAFM OIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RAFM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHLDKOC/RAFM CHAMBERS, CTF70.3

RAFM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION ONE

~~OPERATIONAL SYNOPSIS~~ (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 120801Z - 130800Z FEB.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND COORDINATED TASK
FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

~~B. NIMITZ HELD SIX SORTIES FOR 18.1 FLIGHT HOURS.~~

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS ARE READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

D. NIMITZ, CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS WILL COMMENCE A HIGH SPEED
TRANSIT DESIGNATED "FASTBREAK" TO POSIT 23-00N/064-30E, ETA
130400Z. TG 70.3 COMMENCED EARLIER MOVEMENT TO THE EAST AND
WILL COMMENCE RETURN TRANSIT TO CENTER OF TG 70.2 MODLOC,
ETA 140645Z. FASTBREAK WILL ENTAIL FREQUENT, RANDOMLY TIMED,
HIGH SPEED TOTAL ENCON TRANSITS BY NIMITZ, TEXAS AND CALI-
FORNIA. THESE TRANSITS WILL BE 8 HOURS OR LESS IN DURATION
AND WILL NOT TAKE THE TASK GROUP MORE THAN 200NM FROM NORTH

HANDLE VIA

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~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

HANDLE VIA

PAGE 2

~~OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE 12-HOUR AFTERRADIUS FOR PER
ARRIVAL AT OR BEYOND THE FASTBREAK POINTS, AT LEAST ONE DAY
OPERATIONS SHOULD NORMALLY BE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO RETURNING TO
THE PORT OF MODLOC OR TRANSIT TO ANOTHER FASTBREAK
PORT. THESE TACTICS ARE DESIGNED TO~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

V
B

~~ONBOARD FUEL RESERVES OF POTENTIAL TG 70.2
TATTLE TALE UNITS.~~

2. ~~[REDACTED]~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 130900Z)

SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA 23-00N/064-30E
 - D.R. RAY (ENR SUBIC BAY ETA 19 FEB) 06-40N/091-00E
 - LASALLE 27-42N/050-34E
 - MILLER/TATTNALL 26-32N/051-04E
 - AINSWORTH 28-20N/050-00E
 - KOELSCH (ETD 15 FEB) HOMBASA
 - MISPILLION 21-00N/062-00E
 - ROANOKE (ETD 14 FEB) DIEGO GARCIA
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD 22-30N/064-00E
 - HALSEY 23-38N/060-10E
 - STANDLEY 24-00N/061-00E
 - PASSUMPSIC 21-50N/062-10E
 - KILAUEA 18-50N/062-30E
 - RIGEL (ENR CVBG MODLOC ETA 19 FEB) 05-55N/092-10E

(3) SUBMARINES: (NOTE)

~~[REDACTED]~~

A, B

#1930

HANDLE VIA

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~[REDACTED]~~

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE HANDLE VIA

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-ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

*INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000
RTR=11

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ZNY MNSH
ZKZK 03 SOA DE
O 130800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTF70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.
SECTION TWO
CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 080 (U)
NOTE: AS PER JCS REQUEST (PHONECON OF 11 FEB).

[Large redacted area]

A/E

HANDLE VIA

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
 OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO SUBIC BAY
 (ETD 16 FEB)
 (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 DIXIE (ETD 18 FEB) PORT LOUIS
 B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
 (1) [REDACTED] 3P-3C, 2P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135

3. (TSCCO) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS *E*

A. NIMITZ:
 F-14: 10 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
 A-7E: 14 OF 20 FMC
 A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
 KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
 EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 2 MC
 EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
 E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
 RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
 S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
 [REDACTED] NOTE
 S4-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC
 #1931

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA~~

ZCZCOP0029
DAN: 030-033061
INPUT CDSN = OKA514
TOR: 130804Z FEB 80 TOT: 130816Z FEB 80

PAGE 1

~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000
RTR=11

0AAMZYUW YHLHOR 1932 0440800-MNSH--YEKQDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZX 00 SOA DE
O 130800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFP-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF73
YHLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTF70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

FINAL SECTION OF THREE
CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 080 (U)

C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS

6 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOTE: 1 OF 8 HELICOPTER COMMS IN UP STATUS ✓

6. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 11 OF 22 FMC, 9 MC

A-7E: 8 OF 16 FMC, 4 MC

A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC

KA-6D: 1 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

RF-4G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~HANDLE VIA~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

IN TRANSFERRING CARGRU STAFFS FROM/TO SEEB INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR
TURNOVER OPERATIONS. NIMITZ AND CALIFORNIA WILL COMMENCE RETURN TO
BG MODLOC AREA AT 201900Z.

E. (TS) NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE
ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 200900Z). C

SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA/ROANOKE 23-55N/058-50E
 - TEXAS (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 22 FEB) 09-25N/066-20E
 - REEVES (ENR BG MODLOC EAT 201600Z) 20-45N/063-20E
 - LASALLE/MILLER/TATTNALL 28-00N/050-30E
 - AINSWORTH (ETD 25 FEB) BAHRAIN
 - KOELSCH (ETD 23 FEB) MOMBASA
 - MISPILLION (ENR BG MODLOC ETA 21 FEB) 18-00N/065-25E
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD 23-15N/060-50E
 - HALSEY 23-38N/060-10E
 - W.H. STANDLEY 24-00N/061-00E
 - PASSUMPSIC (ENR SUBIC ETD MODLOC 22-30N/062-00E
 - 23 FEB)
 - KILAUEA (ENR BG MODLOC ETA 24 FEB) 05-45S/070-40E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED] A, B

[REDACTED] A, B

- (4) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO (ETD 22 FEB) SUBIC BAY
 - MOBILE (ETD 23 FEB) ILOILO
 - SAN BERNADINO BACOLOD
- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 - DIXIE (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 21 FEB) 14-05S/064-28E

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

- (1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 3 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135 E
- (2) [REDACTED] 4 AC-130

#2197

VNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGE 1

ZCZCOPU652
DAN: 036-035544
INPUT CDSN = DKA5R6
TOR: 200750Z FEB 80 TOT: 200752Z FEB 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED**

ACTION** UNASSIGNED**

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=95

00AMZYUW YHLHQR 2198 0510000-MNSH--YEKDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 200800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO
SHEJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 087 (U)
3 (U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:
A. NIMITZ:

- F-14: 12 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
- A-7E: 14 OF 20 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
- KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
- EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC
- EA-5B: 2 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
- S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
- ~~TH-55: 0 OF 6 FMC (SEE NOTE)~~
- SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC
- C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
-)-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: A RH-53 HELICOPTER COMM CHECKS WERE ATTEMPTED AND COMPLETED SATISFACTORILY BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED].

3. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 11 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC

A-7E: 5 OF 16 FMC, 3 MC

A-6E: 3 OF 10 FMC, 4 MC

A-6D: 0 OF 5 FMC, 1 MC

E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC

SR-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

O-704 REFUELING STORES: 8 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 7 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 16,090,200 GALLONS.

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

(TS) COMMUNICATIONS: FOUR HF COMM CHECKS WERE ATTEMPTED AND COMPLETED SATISFACTORILY BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] E

IMITZ.

2196

NNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDF0653
DAN: 036-035552
INPUT CDSN = DKA587
TOR: 200751Z FEB 80 TOT: 200753Z FEB 80

PAGE 1

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=95

0AAMZYU- YLHOR 2199 0510800-MNSH--YEKDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 200800Z FEB 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, P2 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, D0 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLDKCC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
FM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 087 (U)

7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. ~~TOP SECRET~~ SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEIL-
LANCE OPERATIONS, AGI 477 WITH NIMITZ AND MOD KASHIN DDG 286 IN
STRAIT OF HORMUZ.

3. ~~TOP SECRET~~

. A NIMITZ A-6E WAS INTERCEPTED BY TWO
PAKISTANI MIG-19 ACFT AT 1035Z, 45 NM SW OF KARACHI. INTERCEPT
OCCURRED AT 10,000 FT AS A-6E WAS COMPLETING VISUAL ID OF A FRENCH
FRIGATE. CPA TO USN ACFT WAS 150 FT.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMA-
TION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
EVW 20 FEB 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS,
#2199

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0657
DAN: 035-245022
INPHT CDSN = DKA292
TOR: 190004Z FEB 80 TOT: 190806Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=6

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0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 2157 0500600-MNSH--YEKQDH,
ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SJA DE

O 190000Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

Copy No. 7 of 8 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 180001Z - 190800Z FEB.

- A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE. NIMITZ FLIGHT OPS WERE LIMITED TO ROUTINE LOGISTIC FLIGHTS.
- B. ~~TOP SECRET~~
- C. A USAF E-3A CONDUCTED INTERFACE TRAINING OPERATIONS WITH UNITS OF TF-70. ALL PLANNED TRAINING EVOLUTIONS WERE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED.
- D. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIR WINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 190000Z).

A. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA

23-45N/062-00E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

REEVES (ENR CVBG MODLOC ETA 20 FEB)
LASALLE/MILLER/TATTNAL
AINSWORTH (ETD 25 FEB)
KOELSCH (ETD 01 MAR)
MISPILLION (ENR CVBG MODLOC ETA 21 FEB)
ROENOKI

14-20N/068-15E
28-00N/050-30E
BAHRAIN
MOMBASA
14-20N/068-15E
22-00N/062-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/RIGEL SCHOFIELD
HALSEY
W.H. STANDLEY
PASSUMPSIC
KILAUEA (ETD 200100Z FEB)

23-00N/061-00E
23-38N/060-10E
24-00N/061-00E
22-30N/062-00E
DIEGO GARCIA

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO (ETD 22 FEB)
MOBILE (ETD 23 FEB)
SAN BERNARDINO (ETD 23 FEB)
(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE (ENR DIEGO ETA 21 FEB)

SUBIC BAY
ILOILO
BACOLOD

15-20S/062-30E

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 3 P-38, 3 P-3C, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135.
(2) [REDACTED] 4 AC-130S

(W) (+) [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

E

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 14 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC
A-7E: 10 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC
A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC

2157

JNN

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDPQ863
DAN: 235-245064
INPUT CDSN = DKA295
TOR: 190806Z FEB 80 TOT: 190810Z FEB 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=26

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INY HMNSH
KZK OO SDA DE
190806Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
HLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
INAL SECTION OF TWO

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 026 (U)

- EA-6B: 1 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 3 OF 3 FMC
- S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC

~~RF-53: 6 OF 6 FMC~~ (NOTE)

- SH-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC
- C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 6 A-6E TPAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~NOTE: 4 RH-53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B. CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 12 OF 22 FMC, 5 MC
- A-7E: 9 OF 16 FMC, 3 MC
- A-6E: 3 OF 16 FMC, 5 MC
- KA-6D: 0 OF 5 FMC, 2 MC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 8 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(4)(U) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS [REDACTED]

16,170,000 GALLONS.

(5) (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

(6) (C) COMMUNICATIONS: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(7) [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY TODAY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS. AGI 477 RESUMED SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO DURING THE NIGHT AND REMAINED IN VICINITY OF NIMITZ THROUGHOUT THE DAY. MOD KASHIN REMAINED ON STRAIT OF HORMUZ PATROL. THE DAILY AIR DEFENSE OPILL CONTINUED.

[REDACTED] THERE WERE NO [REDACTED] INDICATIONS TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS REPORT.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY, LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT. REVW 18 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#2158

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 2

HANDLER 977

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS
NO RAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(4) (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 16,409,400 GALS.

(5) (S) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: CORAL SEA LIMITED TO 85
PERCENT FULL POWER ON NUMBER THREE ENGINE DUE TO 3A BOILER,
ETR 9 MAR.

(6) (S) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ ATTEMPTED FOUR HF CHECKS WITH
[REDACTED] AND ALL WERE SATISFACTORY.

(7) [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUED SUR-
VEILLANCE [REDACTED]

B. SOVIET AIR ACTIVITY: TWO [REDACTED] IL-38 MAY AIRCRAFT
CONDUCTED A SURVEILLANCE MISSION AGAINST THE TWO BATTLE GROUPS.
FOUR LOW ALTITUDE PASSES WERE MADE AGAINST NIMITZ AND TWO LOW
ALTITUDE PASSES WERE MADE AGAINST CORAL SEA. CPA TO EACH CV WAS
1000 YARDS. NIMITZ F-14 AIRCRAFT ESCORTED THE MAYS WHILE THEY
WERE IN THE VICINITY OF TF 70.

(8) (S) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 12 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#1932

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOT RELEASED~~

ZCZCDP0031
ZAN: 029-012325
INPUT CDSN = DKA182
TOR: 120810Z FEB 80 TOT: 120814Z FEB 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=55

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ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

J [REDACTED] 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENTHFLT

ADM DIXON, 32 CINCPACFLT

MLIAMC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 90 CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

MLDKOC/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

[REDACTED] EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE OF TWO

1108J: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 079 (U)

(U) [REDACTED] FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 110801Z - 120800Z FEB.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION/RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND COORDINATED TASK
FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

[REDACTED] FOR 13.6 FLT HOURS.

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

3 (U) [REDACTED] KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 120900Z).

A. SHIPS

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA

23-00N/061-00E

D.R. RAY (ENR SUBIC ETA 19 FEB)

05-40N/085-50E

LASALLE (ETO 13 FEB)

BAHRAIN

MILLER/AINSWORTH (BSF)

BAHRAIN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOT RELEASED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- KOELSCH (ENR HOMBASA ETA 130700Z) 00-35S/044-00E
- TATTNALL (ENR PERSIAN GULF) 25-00N/057-00E
- MISPILLION 23-00N/062-00E
- ROANOKE (ETD 14 FEB) DIEGO GARCIA
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD 22-00N/062-00E
 - HALSEY 23-38N/060-10E
 - W.H. STANDLEY 24-00N/061-00E
 - PASSUMPSIC 21-50N/062-10E
 - KILAUEA 22-00N/061-00E
- (3) ARG ALFA:
 - RIGEL (ENR CVBG MOOLOC ETA 19 FEB) 04-50N/098-35E
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO SUBIC BAY (ETD 18 FEB)
- (4) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 - DIXIE (ENR PORT LOUIS, ETA 130400Z 14-00S/062-10E FEB)

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

- (1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135S
- (2) [REDACTED]

#1864

E

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0032
DAN: 029-01235J
INPUT CDSN = OKA184
TOR: 120912Z FEB 80 TOT: 120814Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=55

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ZNY HMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 120800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENTHFLT
RADM DIXON, 32 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, OO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLOKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 079 (U) (CONT)
3 (U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A. NIMITZ:
- F-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
 - A-7E: 13 OF 20 FMC, 1 MC
 - A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
 - KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
 - EA-33: 2 OF 2 FMC, 2 MC
 - EA-69: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - E-29: 2 OF 4 FMC
 - RF-36: 1 OF 3 FMC
 - S-3A: 3 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
 - ~~F-15: 6 OF 6 FMC~~ (NOTE)
 - SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
 - C-2: 3 OF 1 FMC
 - O-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
 - ERDL POOS: 3 OF 3 UP

HANDLE VIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERODL CAPABLE, 15 IN UP STATUS
6 OF 6 A-5E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: [REDACTED]

B. CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 10 OF 22 FMC, 7 MC
- A-7E: 6 OF 16 FMC, 4 MC
- A-6E: 9 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
- KA-50: 1 OF 5 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
- RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-724 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERODL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 16,472,400 GALLONS.

5. (U) (C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: JOHN PAUL JONES NUMBER 28 BOILER HAS BEEN REPAIRED.

6. (S) (C) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ ATTEMPTED FOUR HF CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] AND ALL WERE UNSATISFACTORY. E

7. (S) (C) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY FURTHER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF NIMITZ BY AGI 477. THE MOO KASHIN DDG 285 REMAINS ON STATION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

B. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED TODAY.

8. (U) (C) [REDACTED] REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 11 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#1865

HANDLE VIA [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 8

ZCZCOP0292
DAN: 028-317717
INPUT CDSN = DKA986
TOR: 110804Z FEB 80 TOT: 110806Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=46

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PAAMZYUW YHLHDR 1801 0420054-MNSH--YEKDDH.
ZNY HMNSH
ZKZK PP SOA DE
P 110800Z FEB 80 ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHL0KOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG 70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZFM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE OF THREE

GENERAL DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 078 (U)
FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 102601Z - 110800Z FEB.

1. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS
ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
NIMITZ FLIGHT OPERATIONS LIMITED TO ROUTINE LOGISTICS FLIGHTS.
NO RH-53 SORTIES WERE FLOWN TODAY.

2. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.
KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 110900Z).

3. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA	23-00N/061-00E
D.P. RAY (ENR SUBIC, ETA 17 FEB)	05-35N/079-46E
LASALLE (IN UPKEEP, ETD 12 FEB)	BAHRAIN
MILLER/AINSWORTH	29-05N/049-45E

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

KOELSHC (ENR HONBASA, ETA 13 FEB) 83-55N/049-00E
TATTNALL (ENR PERSIAN GULF) 22-17N/066-23E
HISPILLION 23-00N/062-00E
ROANOKE (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 01-00N/068-38E
12 FEB)

#1801

NNNN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000
RTR=46

PAAMZYUW YHLHOR 1802 0420054-MNSH--YEKQW,
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK PP SOA DE
P 110800Z FEB 80 ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG 70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION TWO OF THREE
CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 078 (U) (CONT)

- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CDRAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD 22-00N/062-00E
 - HALSEY 23-38N/060-10E
 - W.H. STANDLEY 24-00N/061-00E
 - PASSUMPSIC 21-50N/062-10E
 - KILAUEA 22-00N/061-00E
 - RIGEL (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 19 FEB) 01-10N/103-30E
- (3) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO SUBIC BAY
 - (ETD 16 FEB)
- (4) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 - DIXIE (ENR PORT LOUIUS, ETA 13 FEB) 11-20S/065-40E

OP. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
(1) ~~TOP SECRET~~ 3 P-3C, 4 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135
(2) ~~TOP SECRET~~ 4 AC-130

3. (U) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

A. NIIMITZ:

- F-14: 15 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
- A-7E: 6 OF 20 FMC, 6 MC
- A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC (NOTE 1)
- KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
- EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 2 MC
- EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC
- S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
- ~~PH-57: 6 OF 8 FMC (NOTE 2)~~

SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
 C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
 D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
 18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS.
 6 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
 NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT
 NOTE 1: EXPECT IMPROVED FMC STATUS 11 FEB.

B. CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 11 OF 22 FMC, 7 MC
- A-7E: 7 OF 16 FMC, 5 MC
- A-6E: 7 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
- KA-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC
- D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
- ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
- 12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS
- NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

#1802

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCOP0296

DAN: 028-017751

INPUT CDSN = DKA990

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~~EYES ONLY~~

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000

RTR=46

PAAMZYUW YHLHDR 1803 0420054-MNSH--YEKDH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK PP SCA DE

P 110800Z FEB 80 ZYS ZFF-6

F4 MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG 70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 078 (U) (CONT)

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS ~~REDACTED~~ - 16,489,200

GALLONS.

5. (C) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: JOHN PAUL JONES UNABLE TO STEAM AT FULL POWER DUE TO LEAKING SUPERHEATER HEADER PLUGS IN NUMBER 23 BOILER.

6. (S) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS BETWEEN NIMITZ AND

~~REDACTED~~ FOUR OF FOUR SATISFACTORY, E

ALTHOUGH NIMITZ REQUIRED ASSISTANCE FROM NAVCAMS MED TO HAVE

~~REDACTED~~ ANSWER UP ON FREQUENCIES FOR TWO OF THE CHECKS. FRE-

QUENCIES ~~REDACTED~~ KHZ USED.

B. NIMITZ FREQUENCY PREDICTION PROGRAM PREDICTED 13,260KHZ F

AS OPTIMUM, AND THE ASSIGNED TEST FREQUENCY OF ~~REDACTED~~ PROVED

GOOD. THE 25 MHZ FREQUENCIES WERE NEITHER REQUIRED NOR PRE-

DICTED AS SATISFACTORY DURING TEST TIME FRAME.

C. CTF 70 SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED PARKHILL VOICE CIRCUIT

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

PAGE 2

ON NB-8 SATCOM CHANNEL WITH SITE X AND [REDACTED] CIRCUIT
ALSO SUCCESSFULLY TESTED IN KW-7 [REDACTED] MODE.
7. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HAS HIGHLIGHTED BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B, C

P. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED.

8. *WTS* [REDACTED] REMARKS:

CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW: 11 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS
#1803

NNNN

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO# DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
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0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 1724 0400351-MNSH--YEKDDH,
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE

FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST,
SECTION ONE

~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

1. (U) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 00001Z - 00000Z FEB.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND COORDINATED TASK
GROUP SURVEILLANCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ FOUR SORTIES FOR 20.4 HOURS ✓

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS, WITH EXCEPTION OF POSSIBLE
TASKING OF RH-53 HELOS, ARE READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. (TS) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 0000Z):

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/CALIFORNIA
D.R. RAY (ETD 11 FEB)
LASALLE (ETD 12 FEB)
MILLER/AINSWORTH

23-00N/061-00E
SRI LANKA
BAHRAIN
28-44N/050-19E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

KOELSCH (ENR MOMBASA ETA 13 FEB)
TATTNALL (ENR PERSIAN GULF)
MISSPILLION
ROANOKE (ENR DIEGO ETA 12 FEB)
SAN JOSE (ENR SUBIC ETA 16 FEB)

12-06N/053-34E
12-13N/053-00E
23-00N/062-00E
13-00N/063-42E
05-30N/097U45E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
HALSEY
W.H. STANDLEY
PASSUMPSIC

22-00N/062-00E
23-38N/062-00E
24-00N/061-00E
22-00N/061-00E
18-52N/065-02E
SPORE

(3) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO (ENR SUBIC ETA 10 FEB)
MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO
(ENR SUBIC ETA 10 FEB)

18-19N/120-28E
21-30N/122-30E

(4) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) SP-3C, 4 P-38, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135

3. ~~OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:~~

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 11 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 7 OF 20 FMC, 5 MC
A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
EA-3B: 1 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC
S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 3 MC

#1724

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0119
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INFO= DNCO(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
-RTR<12>

SUSPECTED DUPLICATE

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0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 1725 0400351-MNSH--YEKDH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 090800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.
NANAL SECTION OF TWO
CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 076 (U)
SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS
6 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: RH-53 HELICOPTER STATUS 2 OF 8 IN UP STATUS.

B. CORAL SEA:
F-4N: 13 OF 22 FMC, 5 MC
A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 4 MC
A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 8 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
10 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 10 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT
4 (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 16,825,000
GALLONS.
5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
6. (TS) [REDACTED] RESULTS OF MF COMM CHECKS WITH

A. NIMITZ: 6 OF 6 CHECKS UNSAT.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY TRANSIT OF MOD
KASHIN DDG 286 TOWARDS STRAIT OF HORMUZ (SOH), SURVEILLANCE
OPERATIONS AND CONTINUATION OF THE [REDACTED]

B. SOVIET AIR ACTIVITY: TWO SOVIET IL-38 MAY ACFT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] CONDUCT A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION
AGAINST THE TWO BATTLE GROUPS. HI/LO PROFILE WAS USED WHILE IN
VICINITY OF BATTLE GROUPS WITH CPA TO CORAL SEA OF 1,000 FEET
AND NIMITZ CPA OF 3 NM. NIMITZ F-14 AIRCRAFT ESCORTED THE MAYS
WHILE THEY WERE IN THE VICINITY OF TF 70.

8. (TS) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISH-
MENT.

REVW 06 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#1725

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

V

PAGE 1

ZCZCDPQ882

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TOR: 80756Z FEB 80 TOT: 80800Z FEB 80

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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0AAMZYUW YLHOR 1686 0398800-MNSH--YEKDGH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK DO SOA DE

O ~~0398800~~ 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

RAADM DIXON, 22 CINPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RAADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHROHNC/RAADM GURECK, CTG70.1

YHLOKOC/RAADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RAADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 075 (U)

1 (U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 070801Z - 080800Z FEB.

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND COORDINATED TASK GROUP SURVEILLANCE. MIDWAY CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING AND SURFACE SURVEILLANCE. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS CONDUCTING SURFACE/SUBSURFACE SURVEILLANCE COORDINATOR MISSIONS AND A LONG RANGE AAW EXERCISE WITH NIMITZ.

~~2. RH-53 HELOS FLEW FOUR SORTIES FOR 13.2 HOURS FLIGHT TIME.~~

~~C. NIMITZ AIRWING, WITH EXCEPTION OF POSSIBLE TASKING OF RH-53 HELOS DUE TO HF COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS, REMAINS READY TO EXECUTE ALL OTHER MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.~~

D. MIDWAY BATTLE GROUP WILL EXIT THE INDIAN OCEAN AM 9 FEB

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

ENROUTE SUBIC BAY. THIS IS THE FINAL REPORT FOR BATTLE GROUP ALFA.

E. BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE ETA AT MODLOC REMAINS 072215Z.

STANDLEY AND HALSEY WILL RENDEZVOUS WITH TEXAS AT 080400Z TO
COMMENCE TURNOVER OF PIRAZ AND AAWC DUTIES. CTG 70.2/CTG 70.3

STAFF LIAISON WILL COMMENCE ONBOARD NIMITZ PM 8 FEB.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 080900Z):

A. SHIPS:

- | | |
|--|----------------|
| (1) BATTLE GROUP ALFA: | |
| MIDWAY/PARSONS/KNOX/FANNING/
BAINBRIDGE | 06-00N/097-00E |
| D. R. RAY (ETD 11FEB) | SRI LANKA |
| WHITE PLAINS | 06-10N/095-00E |
| (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 14 FEB) | |
| (2) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO: | |
| NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA | 23-00N/061-00E |
| TEXAS | 24-00N/061-00E |
| LASALLE | BAHRAIN |
| (IN UPKEEP, ETD 12 FEB) | |
| MILLER/AINSWORTH | 28-00N/050-24E |
| KOELSCH/TATTNALL | 12-00N/047-40E |
| MISPILLION/PASSUMPSIC | 23-00N/062-00E |
| ROANOKE | 21-30N/063-00E |
| (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 12 FEB) | |
| SAN JOSE | 05-30N/085-00E |
| (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 16 FEB) | |
| (3) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE: | |
| CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD | 23-00N/061-00E |
| W.H. STANDLEY/HALSEY | 24-00N/061-00E |
| KILAUEA | 13-00N/068-00E |
| (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 10 FEB) | |
| RIGEL (ETD 11 FEB) | SINGAPORE |

#1686

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

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ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001
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ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 030800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 075 (U)

(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO

18-37N/123-10E

(ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 10 FEB)

MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO (ETD 9 FEB)

BUCKNER BAY

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) ~~TOP SECRET~~ 3 P-3C, 4 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135

~~TOP SECRET~~ 3 AC-130

~~TOP SECRET~~ 1 AC-130

3. (U) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. MIDWAY:

F-4J: 13 OF 17 FMC, 3 MC

A-7E: 16 OF 18 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

A-6E: 6 OF 7 FMC
 KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
 EA-6B: 3 OF 4 FMC
 E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
 SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
 C-2 : 1 OF 1 FMC
 D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 8 UP
 PAVEKNIFE ACFT: 2 OF 3 UP
 PAVEKNIFE PODS: 2 OF 2 UP
 EROL PODS: 3 OF 4 UP

ALL A-7E ARE WALLEYE AND EROL CAPABLE

B. NIMITZ:

F-14: 9 OF 24 FMC, 3 MC
 A-7E: 9 OF 20 FMC, 4 MC
 A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
 KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
 EA-6B: 1 OF 3 FMC
 EA-3B: 1 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC
 E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
 RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC
 S-3A: 8 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

(NOTE)

SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC
 C-2 : 8 OF 1 FMC, 8 MC
 D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
 EROL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE EROL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS
 6 OF 6 A-6E TRANSLASER DESIGNATORS UP
 NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: TWO OF EIGHT HF COMMS UP
 #1687

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~~EYES ONLY~~

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PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0085

DAN: 026-025055

INPUT CDSN = CKA329

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AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=69

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 1880 4390800 MN SH--YEKQGH.

ZNY MN SH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 000000Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

RAFM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RAFM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHRDHNC/RAFM GURECK, CTG70.1

YHLOKOC/RAFM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RAFM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

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DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 075 (U)

C. CORAL SEA

F-4N: 9 OF 22 FMC, 9 MC

A-7E: 13 OF 16 FMC, 4 MC

A-5E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC

KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC

E-29: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-6G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 8 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE EPDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS [REDACTED] - 15,905,000 GALLONS. E

MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: CALIFORNIA REPAIRS COMPLETED TO

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~~EYES ONLY~~

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EYES ONLY

PAGE 2

FEED PIPE IN FEED SYSTEM IN NUMBER ONE ENGINE.
6. (RTS) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH

E

A. NIMITZ: 3 OF 3 SATISFACTORY

B. [REDACTED]

7. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE RETURN OF AGI 477 TO THE MODLOC AREA AND ASSUMPTION OF SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO, ARRIVAL OF FIVE NEW SOVIET UNITS IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA, AND CONTINUATION OF THE [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED]

B. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED TODAY.

8. [REDACTED] REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 07 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS
#1688

NNNN

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ZCZC000137

DIR: 705-027740

INPUT CDROM = CK4956

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AIRTR: UNASSIGNED **

ACTION: UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DMCN(1)

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00007YU0 YHLHOP 1432 0300000-MNSH--YEKDDH.

ZNY MNSH

ZNY 00 504 DE

0 070000Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO MAJ GEN FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

FROM BIXON, W2 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, D0 CINCPACAF

FROM AIRSEY, CTF70

YERDND/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1

YELKCC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

FROM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

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SECTION ONE

CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 074 (U)

FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS

FOR PERIOD 000001Z - 070000Z FEB.

CONDUCTED CYCLO FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON

AND COORDINATED TASK FORCE SUR-

VEILLANCE OPERATIONS IN THE

AND AIR SERVICES MISSIONS.

HELPS TO MAINTAIN SIGHTS FOR 12.5 HOURS PER DAY.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF POSSIBLE TASKING OF

HELPS TO MAINTAIN SIGHTS FOR 12.5 HOURS PER DAY.

REMAINS READY TO

EXECUTE ALL OTHER MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 070000Z):

SHIPS:

1) BATTLE GROUP ALFA:

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MIDWAY/PARSONS/YMOX/FANNING/
GAINBRIDGE
D.R. PAY
(MODLOC-WILL PROCEED TO SRI LANKA 08 FEB)
WHITE PLAINS
(ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 14 FEB)

05-48N/088-41E
05-10N/079-40E
06-00N/089-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ
TEXAS/CALIFORNIA
LASALLE
(IN UPKEEP, ETD 12 FEB)
HILLER/AINSWORTH
KOELSCH/TATTNALL
(BRIEF STOP FOR FUEL)
MISPILLION
ROANOKE
(ENR CVEG MODLOC, ETA 071700Z)
SAN JOSE
(ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 16 FEB)

23-00N/061-00E
24-00N/061-00E
BAHRAIN

27-50N/050-30E
DJIBOUTI

23-00N/062-00E
21-00N/062-00E

05-30N/081-00E

23-00N/062-00E

(3) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/HALSEY/W.H. STANDLEY/
J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
(ENR CVEG MODLOC, ETA 072215Z)
KILAUOA
(ENR CVEG MODLOC, ETA 10 FEB)

19-15N/064-20E

08-00N/074-00E

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO
(ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 10 FEB)
MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO (ETD 09 FEB)

17-10N/129-30E

BUCKNER BAY

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

- (1) [REDACTED] 3 P-30, 3 P-39, 1-EP-3, 4 KC-135.
- (2) [REDACTED] 3 AC-130.
- (3) [REDACTED] AC-130.

11632

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PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0136
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INPUT CDSH = CKA958
TOP: 7005Z FEB 80 TOT: 70815Z FEB 80

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ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNGO(1)

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ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SGA DE

J 070800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, J2 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

(RADM/RADM GUPECK, CTG70.1

(RADM/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

(ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

FM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

ACTION TWO

CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 074 (U)

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

MIDWAY:

-41: 11 OF 17 FMC, 2 MC

-7E: 10 OF 12 FMC

-6F: 6 OF 7 FMC

A-60: 3 OF 4 FMC

A-43: 3 OF 4 FMC

-2R: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

H-36: 3 OF 4 FMC

-01: 1 OF 1 FMC

-7M REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 8 UP

AVENUE ACFT: 2 OF 3 UP

AVENUE PODS: 2 OF 2 UP

POI, PODS: 3 OF 4 UP

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PAGE 2

ALL A-7E ARE HALLEYE AND ERDL CAPABLE

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3. NIMITZ:

F-14: 11 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 8 OF 20 FMC, 4 MC
A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
KA-60: 3 OF 4 FMC
EA-66: 2 OF 3 FMC
EA-39: 2 OF 2 FMC, 2 MC (NOTE 1)
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
SE-46: 1 OF 3 FMC, 2 MC
S-34: 3 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

OH-3H: 2 OF 5 FMC, 1 MC
S-2: 8 OF 1 FMC, 8 MC
REFUELING STONES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

13 OF 27 A-7E ARE HALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 16 IN UP STATUS.

9 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP.

10 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT.

NOTE 1: SECOND AIRCRAFT ARRIVED 26 FEB FROM CORAL SEA.

15 FEB. TWO OF EIGHT WF COMMS UP.

2. COPAL SEA:

F-4M: 9 OF 22 FMC, 10 MC
A-7E: 12 OF 15 FMC, 2 MC
A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 4 MC
KA-60: 1 OF 5 FMC, 2 MC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
SE-46: 2 OF 2 FMC
OH-3H: 2 OF 4 FMC

REFUELING STONES: 8 OF 10 UP.

ERDL PODS: 2 OF 3 UP.

2 OF 15 A-7E HALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS.

8 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT.

1533

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INPUT CDSN = DKA592
TOR: 60802Z FEB 80 TOT: 60850Z FEB 80

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ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 060800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

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SECTION ONE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 073 (U)

1) (U) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 050801Z - 060800Z FEB.

- A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND COORDINATED TF 70 SURVEILLANCE. MIDWAY AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED HELICOPTER OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF TG 70.1/70.3 TURNOVER.
- B. ~~ARRIVAL HELOS FLEW SIX SORTIES FOR 15 HOURS FLIGHT TIME.~~
- C. TWO AIR FORCE B-52 ACFT PERFORMED SURFACE SURVEILLANCE IN THE TF 70 AREA TODAY. QUICKLOOK WILL BE FORWARDED UPON RECEIPT.
- D. CTG 70.3 RELIEVED CTG 70.1 EFFECTIVE AT 050500Z FEB. TURNOVER BRIEFS AND PERSONNEL/MATERIAL TRANSFERS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.
- E. NIMITZ AIRWING IS READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

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F. [REDACTED] AND CALIFORNIA [REDACTED] INTO THE GULF OF OMAN LAST NIGHT ARRIVING VICINITY 25-00N/057-30E BEFORE COMMENCING RETURN TRANSIT TO CENTER OF MODLOC.

2. (TSCCO) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 0900Z):

A. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP ALPHA:
 - MIDWAY/PARSONS/KNOX/FANNING/
 - BAINBRIDGE
 - D. R. RAY
 - (ENR SRI LANKA ETA 8 FEB)
 - WHITE PLAINS
 - (ENR SUBIC ETA 14 FEB)
- (2) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA
 - TEXAS
 - LASALLE (ETD 12 FEB)
 - MILLER/AINSWORTH (BSF ETD 061200ZFEB)
 - KOELSCH/TATTNALL
 - (ENR DJIBOUTI ETA 070600ZFEB)
 - MISPILLION
 - ROANOKE (ENR CVBG MODLOC ETA 7FEB)
 - SAN JOSE (ENR SUBIC ETA 16FEB)
 - PASSUMPSIC
- (3) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/HALSEY/W. H. STANDLEY/
 - J. P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
 - (ENR CVBG MODLOC ETA 7 FEB)
 - KILAUEA (ENR CVBG MODLOC ETA 8 FEB)
 - RIGEL
 - (ENR SPORE ETA 8 FEB)

05-15N/080-45E
05-10N/079-40E

05-00N/083-00E

23-00N/061-00E
24-00N/061-00E
BAHRAIN
BAHRAIN
16-30N/041-00E

23-00N/062-00E
12-30N/070-00E
05-00N/080-00E
23-00N/062-00E

13-30N/068-55N

11-00N/071-00E
05-00N/098-00E

#1568

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ZNY MMNSH
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O 060800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

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SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 073 (U)

- (4) ARG ALFAF
OKINAWA/ALAMO (ENR SUBIC ETA 10 FEB)
SAN BERNARDINO/MOBILE
(ENR BUCKNER BAY ETA 062300Z FEB)
- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

15-30N/136-30E
25-50N/129-50E

DIEGO GARCIA

- B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
- (1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 3 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135S
- (2) [REDACTED] AC-130
- (3) [REDACTED] AC-130

A, E

3 (U) [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:
A. MIDWAY:
F-4J: 12 OF 17 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 16 OF 18 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

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~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

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A-6E: 6 OF 7 FMC
KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
EA-6B: 3 OF 4 FMC
E-2B: 1 OF 1 FMC
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 8 UP (2 OPERATIONAL D-704'S
TRANSFERRED TO CORAL SEA)
PAVEKNIFE ACFT: 2 OF 3 UP
PAVEKNIFE PODS: 2 OF 2 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 4 UP, 4TH POD AWAITING PARTS. NO ETR.
ALL A-7E ARE WALLEYE AND ERDL CAPABLE
B. NIMITZ:
F-14: 15 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 2 MC
A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
EA-3B: 0 OF 1 FMC, 1 MC (EXPECT 2ND ACFT ON 6FEB)
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC
S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~
SH-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC
C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE
6 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT
NOTE: 4 OF 8 HF COMMS UP
#1569

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INPUT CDSN = DKAU97
TOR: 60805Z FEB 80

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TOT: 60850Z FEB 80

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ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK 00 SOA DE
O 060800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
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FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 073 (U)
C. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 10 OF 22 FMC, 9 MC
A-7E: 7 OF 16 FMC, 7 MC
A-6E: 3 OF 10 FMC, 4 FMC
KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 8 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 2 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT
4(C) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 17,140,200 E
GALLONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~EYES ONLY~~

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES
6. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]

E

(A) NYHIYZ: SIX OF SIX UNSAT

7. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY:

[REDACTED]

B, C
(S-cw)

8. NO FOREIGN MILITARY OR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED TODAY.

B, C
(S-cw)
B, C

9. (U) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 06 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
01570

NNNN

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V

ZCOP0029
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TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
WLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
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SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~OPERATIONAL SYNOPSIS FEB 78-80~~
110 FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 040801Z - 050600Z FEB.

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON
MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND COORDINATED TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE. MIDWAY CONDUCTED FLIGHT OPERATIONS INVOLVING SOVIET
SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT ESCORT AND LOGISTICS FLIGHTS.

~~TOP SECRET~~ HELOS EFFECTIVE SORTIES FOR 19.6 HOURS FLIGHT TIME.

C. TG 70.1 (MIDWAY) AND 70.3 (CORAL SEA) WILL RENDEZVOUS EARLY
AM 05 FEB FOR TURNOVER OPERATIONS.

D. USS KOELSCH AND USS TATTNALL RELIEVED USS GLOVER AND USS
RICKETTS AS UNITS OF COMIDEASTFORCE.

E. NIMITZ AIRING, WITH EXCEPTION OF POSSIBLE TASKING OF RH-53
HELOS, REMAINS READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2 ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 0900Z):

~~TOP SECRET~~

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A. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP ALFA:
 - MIDWAY/PARSONS/KNOX/FANNING/BAINBRIDGE 08-00N/074-55E
 - D.R.PAY (ENR SRI LANKA, ETA 08 FEB) 08-00N/074-55E
 - WHITE PLAINS (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 14 FEB) 06-15N/077-40E
- (2) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA 23-00N/061-00E
 - TEXAS 24-00N/061-00E
 - LASALLE (ETD 12 FEB) BAHRAIN
 - MILLER 27-20N/051-00E
 - AINSWORTH 27-20N/052-00E
 - KOELSCH/TATTNALL (ENR DJIBOUTI, 22-00N/037-40E
 - ETA 070600Z)
 - MISPILLION 23-00N/062-00E
 - ROANOK 08-30N/074-15E
 - SAN JOSE (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 16 FEB) 07-30N/075-30E
 - PASSUMPSIC 23-00N/062-00E
- (3) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/HALSEY/W.H.STANDLEY/ 08-30N/074-15E
 - J.P.JONES/SCHOFIELD
 - (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 07 FEB)
 - KILAUEA (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 08 FEB) 06-17N/077-55E
 - RIGEL (ENR SINGAPORE, ETA 08 FEB)
- (4) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 10 FEB) 14-35N/142-20E
 - SAN BERNARDINO/MOBILE 25-00N/134-30E
 - (ENR BUCKNER BAY, ETA 052300Z FEB)
- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT
DIXIE DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

- (1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 3 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 8 KC-135 (2 KC-135
ETD 051025Z FEB; 2 KC-135 ETD 061025Z FEB).
- (2) [REDACTED] 4 AC-130
- #1500 [REDACTED]

A, F

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGE 1

V

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ZCZCOP0433
DAN: 023-027745
OUT CDSN = DKA409
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DAAMZYUW YLHOR 1501 0360456-MNSH--YEKDGH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 050800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-3
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIPKSEY, CTF70
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
M CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 072 (U)
3. OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A - MIDWAY:
- F-4J: 10 OF 17 FMC, 2 MC
- A-7E: 16 OF 18 FMC
- A-6E: 5 OF 7 FMC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
- EA-6B: 3 OF 4 FMC
- E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
- SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
- C-2: 1 OF 1 FMC
- D-704 REFUELING STORES: 9 OF 10 UP.
- PAVEKNIFE ACFT: 2 OF 3 UP.
- PAVEKNIFE PODS: 2 OF 2 UP.
- ERDL PODS: 3 OF 4 UP.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL A-7E ARE WALLEYE AND ERODL CAPABLE.

B. NIMITZ:

- F-14: 11 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC
- A-7E: 9 OF 20 FMC, 5 MC
- A-6E: 9 OF 12 FMC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
- EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
- EA-3B: 1 OF 1 FMC
- E-2B: 1 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC
- S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC

- ~~SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 3 MC~~
- C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC, 0 MC
- D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP.
- ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP.
- 18 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERODL CAPABLE.
- 6 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP.
- NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT.

~~REMAINING TWO RH-53~~

C. CORAL SEA:

- F-4N: 10 OF 22 FMC, 9 MC
- A-7E: 12 OF 16 FMC
- A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
- KA-6D: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
- D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 8 UP.
- ERDL PODS: 2 OF 3 UP.
- 2 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERODL CAPABLE.
- NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT.

#1501

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
PAGE

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DATA: 223-027751

INPUT CDSN = DKA411

: 50741Z FEB 80 TOT: 50742Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

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RTR=78

*0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 1502 0360456-MNSH--YEKQOH.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 050800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-3

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

RAFM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RAFM KIRKSEY, CTF70

YHRDHNC/RAFM GURECK, CTG70.1

YHLDKOC/RAFM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

FM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

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FINAL SECTION OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 072 (U)

4. LOGISTICS:

A. JP-5 STATUS: 17,178,000 GALLONS.

B. CONTROL OF US-3A, WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY ON BOARD MIDWAY, HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO CTG 70.3.

C. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

D. COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH

A. NIMITZ - FOUR OF EIGHT SUCCESSFUL.

B. ~~OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE~~ BY TWO HELOS, NONE SUCCESSFUL. HELO RADIOS BEING CHECKED.

7. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF SURVEILLANCE AND TRAINING OPERATIONS.

(S-CW)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

B, C

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
D. AN INDIAN AF AN-12 CUB WAS ESCORTED BY NIMITZ F-14 CAP AS IT TRANSITED ON A WESTERLY HEADING, PROBABLY ENROUTE SEEB, OMAN, CPA TO NIMITZ 39 NM.

E. [REDACTED] LIGHT BLUE CAMOUFLAGED IRANIAN P-3F NORTHERN GULF OF OMAN AT 500-1000 FT ALTITUDE. ANTICIPATE P-3F RETURNED TO IRAN SHORTLY AFTER SIGHTING OCCURRED. A, B

B. [REDACTED] REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 05 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

#1502

NNNN

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EVERETT~~
4 FEB 80 09 26 11 Y



ZCZCKDA225
JAAMZYUW YHLHDR 1443 0352428-MVNSH-4YEK004.

ENY MNNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE

~~TOP SECRET~~ 60 ZYM ZYS ZFF-3
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3, CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3, JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 22, CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, D3, CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF72
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

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SECTION ONE
SUBJ CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 071 KU

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 030001Z - 040000Z FEB.

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS
ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND COORDINATED TASK FORCE
70 SURVEILLANCE. MIDWAY DID NOT CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS DURING
PAST 24 HOURS.

~~TOP SECRET~~ EVENTS OVER FOUR SORTIES TODAY

C. BATTLE GROUP ALFA DEPARTED MODLOC AT 022000Z ENROUTE
TO RENDEZVOUS WITH BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE. RENDEZVOUS
SCHEDULED FOR 5 FEB.

D. NIMITZ AIRWING REMAINS READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS
AND OPTIONS. MIDWAY AIRWING IS READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS
AND OPTIONS WITHIN 24 HOURS.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 040000Z)

A. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP ALFA
 - MIDWAY/PARSONS/KNOX/FANNING/
BAINBRIDGE 12-45N/069-48E
 - (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 13 FEB)
 - D. R. RAY (ENR SR LANKA, ETA
8 FEB) 11-30N/070-30E
 - WHITE PLAINS 09-00N/069-40E
 - (ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 14 FEB)
- (2) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA 23-00N/061-00E
 - TEXAS 24-00N/061-00E
 - ROANOKE (ENR RDV TG 70.1,
ETA 4 FEB) 11-15N/070-30E
 - LASALLE (ETD 12 FEB) BAHRAIN
 - MILLER/AINSWORTH 28-00N/050-24E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EVERETT~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GLOVER
PASSUMPSIC/MISSI-LION
SAN JOSE
(ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 16 FEB)

12-00N/043-51E
23-00N/062-00E
10-00N/071-00E

(3) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/HALSEY/W.H. STANDLEY/
J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
(ENR CVBG MODLJC, ETA 7 FEB)

05-30N/078-30E

KILAUEA
(ENR CVBG MODLJC, ETA 8 FEB)

05-10N/081-00E

RIGEL
(ENR SPORE, ETA 8 FEB)

05-50N/092-30E

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO
SAN BERNARDINO/MOBILE
(ENR BUCKNER BAY, ETA 062300Z FEB)

GUAM
24-00N/138-00E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

01443

~~EVERYBODY~~

VNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 FEB 80 04 26

ZCZCKDA227
 JAAMZYUW YHLWDR 1444 0357428-MVSM-00YEKDDJ
 ZNY MMNSW
 ZKZK OO SOA DE
 3 040800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS Z-F-3
 FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, JS, CINCPAC
 TO LT GEN SHUTLER, JS, JCS
 INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENTH
 RADM DIXON, 22, CINCPACFLT
 YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DC, CINCPACAF
 RADM KIRKSEY, CTF78
 KHRDMNC/RADM GURECK, CTG78.1
 YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG78.3
 RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
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SECTION TWO
 SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 071 (U)

A: SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
 (1) ~~TOP SECRET~~ 30, 2 P-38, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135
 (2) ~~TOP SECRET~~ 4 AC-130
 S: (TS000) OPERATIONAL READINESS = KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS *AE*

A: MIDWAY:

F-4J: 13 OF 17 F4C, 2 MC
 A-7E: 15 OF 18 F4C, 1 MC
 A-6E: 6 OF 7 F4C
 KA-6D: 3 OF 4 F4C
 EA-6B: 3 OF 4 F4C
 E-2B: 2 OF 4 F4C, 1 MC
 SH-3G: 3 OF 4 F4C
 C-2: 1 OF 1 F4C

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 9 OF 18 UP.
 PAVEKNIFE ACFT: 2 OF 3 UP.
 PAVEKNIFE PODS: 2 OF 2 UP.
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 4 JP, 4TH POD AWAITING PARTS, NO ETR.
 ALL A-7E ARE WALLEYE AND ERDL CAPABLE.

B: NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 24 F4C, 1 MC
 A-7E: 8 OF 20 F4C, 7 MC
 A-6E: 9 OF 12 F4C
 KA-6D: 3 OF 4 F4C
 EA-6B: 2 OF 3 F4C
 EA-3B: 0 OF 1 F4C
 E-2B: 1 OF 4 F4C
 RF-8G: 2 OF 3 F4C, 1 MC
 S-3A: 1 OF 4 F4C

~~TOP SECRET~~ 7 OF 8 F4C, (NOTES)
 SH-3H: 8 OF 6 F4C, 5 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C-2: 8 OF 1 F4C
D-724 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP;
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 JP,
18 OF 28 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE,
6 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP,
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT,

C: CORAL SEAL

F-4NI 18 OF 22 F4C, 9 MC
A-7E: 12 OF 16 F4C
A-6E: 4 OF 10 F4C, 2 MC
KA-6D: 1 OF 4 F4C, 2 MC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 F4C
RF-8G: 2 OF 2 F4C
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 F4C

D-724 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 8 UP;
ERDL PODS: 2 OF 3 JP,
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

11444

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

4 FEB 80 08 26

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ZCZCKDA229
9AAMZYUW YHLHD 1445 0352428-MNSW-4YEKDD-4.
ZNY MNSW
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 040800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-3
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, JS, CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, JS, JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENTH
RADM DIXON, 22, CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DJ, CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF78
YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
YHLDKOC/RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTOP
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTE. BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 271 (U)
4. LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS [REDACTED] 17,253,600 GALLONS
5. MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
6. [REDACTED] LIMITZ AND RM-55 HELDS ATTEMPTED 6 HEJ
COMMONS [REDACTED] WITH [REDACTED]

X E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY CONSISTED OF ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE
AND TRAINING OPERATIONS. AGI 477 DISCONTINUED CLOSE SURVEIL-
LANCE OF MIDWAY, AS BATTLE GROUP COMMENCED SOUTHERLY TRANSIT.
B. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED IN THE
NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA.
C. [REDACTED] CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO HISION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK
ACCOMPLISHMENT.]

REVW 04 FEB 80

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#1445

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~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3 FEB 80 10 57 ~~EYES ONLY~~

DC	
CCF	
DE	
DT	
DIO	
DB-1	
DB-2	
DE-3	
DB-4	
RSS	
RSS-4	
RCM	
RCM-1	
CJCS	
STCS	
DJS	
DDO	
CMC	
NCR	
DR	
DD	
ADS-3A1	
DWCO	1
ROUTER	42

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 OAMZYUW YHLHDR 1433 0342144-MN6H-7YBKDH
 ZNY MN6H
 ZKZK OO SOA DE
 O 030800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZPF-3
 FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
 TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
 INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
 RADM DIXON, 82 CINCPACFLT
 YHLIAC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, D3 CINCPACAF
 RADM KIRKSEY, CTF78
 YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG78.1
 RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
 ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE
 SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 078 (U)
 FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
 FOR PERIOD 020800Z - 030800Z FEB.

- A. MIDWAY AND NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND COORDINATED TASK FORCE TO SURVEILLANCE.
- B. RH-53S FLEW FIVE SORTIES FOR 14.4 HOURS.
- C. MIDWAY AND NIMITZ REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.
- D. BATTLE GROUP ALFA'S SPRINT TO THE NORTHWEST WAS TERMINATED PRIOR TO 24-15N/059-00E BECAUSE OF HIGH NORTH WESTERLY WINDS.
- E. TG 78.1 WITH EXCEPTION OF PASSUMPSIC WILL DEPART MODLOC 022000Z FEB ENR SUBIC BAY. PASSUMPSIC WILL REMAIN WITH TG 78.2.

~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 030800Z)

- A. SHIPS:
- (1) BATTLE GROUP ALFA:
 - MIDWAY/PARSONS/KNOX/PANNING/BAINBRIDGE 20-00N/063-47E
 - D.R. RAY (ENR SRJ LANKA ETA 08 FEB) 02-18N/072-30E
 - WHITE PLAINS (ENR SUBIC ETA 14 FEB) 15-00N/067-30E
 - LASALLE (ETD 12 FEB) SAHRAIN
 - MILLER/AINSWORTH 20-00N/050-24E
 - GLOVER 12-00N/043-51E
 - (2) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA 23-00N/061-00E
 - TEXAS 24-00N/061-00E
 - ROANOKE (ENR ROV 78.1 ETA 4 FEB) 02-40N/076-00E
 - PASSUMPSIC/MISBILLION 23-00N/062-00E
 - SAN JOSE (ENR SUBIC ETA 16 FEB) 14-00N/068-00E
 - (3) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/HALSEY/W.H. STANDLEY/ 05-30N/086-00E
 - J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

(ENR CVBG MODLOC ETA 7 FEB)
KILAUEA (ENR CVBG MODLOC ETA 8 FEB)
RIGEL (ENR SPORE ETA 8 FEB)

86-00N/073-00E
86-00N/080-00E

(4) ARG ALFAI
OKINAWA/ALAMO (ENR GUAM ETA 032200Z FEB)
SAN BERNARDINO/MOBILE
(ENR BUCKNER BAY ETA 062300Z FEB)

13-30N/147-10E
22-00N/142-30E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 1 B-37C, 2 B-38, 1 EP-37, 4 KC-135

(2) [REDACTED] 4 AC-130'S

A E

3. ~~WTS~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS

A. MIDWAY:

F-4J1 18 OF 17 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E1 17 OF 18 FMC
A-6E1 7 OF 7 FMC
KA-6D1 3 OF 4 FMC
EA-6B1 3 OF 4 FMC

01433

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3 FEB 80 10 57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

DN-2FL	
SWS	
DC	
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CCF	
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DT	
DIO	
DB-1	
DB-2	
DB-3	
DB-4	
RSS	
RSS-4	
RCM	
RCM-1	
CJCS	
SJCS	
DJS	
DDO	
CMC	
NCR	
DR	
DD	
RDS-3A1	
ROUTER	

ZCZCKDA285
 JAAMZYUW YHLHDR I434 0340144-MNSH-0YBKDH,
 ZNY MMNSH
 ZKZK OO SOA DE
 J 030000Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-3
 FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
 TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
 INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
 RADM DIXON, 22 CINCPACFLT
 NLIAMC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, D3 CINCPACAF
 RADM KIRKSEY, CTF78
 YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG78.1
 RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
 ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
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 SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 078 (U)

E=2B1 2 OF 4 FMC
 SH=3B1 3 OF 4 FMC
 C=21 1 OF 1 FMC
 D=704 REFUELING STORES 7 OF 10 UP;
 PAVEKNIFE ACFT 3 OF 3 UP;
 PAVEKNIFE PODS 2 OF 2 UP;
 ERDL PODS 3 OF 4 UP; 4TH POD AWAITING PARTS; NO ETR;
 ALL A-7E ARE HALLEYE AND ERDL CAPABLE.

1. NIMITZI

F=141 15 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC
 A=7E1 9 OF 20 FMC, 6 MC
 A=6E1 9 OF 12 FMC
 KA=6D1 3 OF 4 FMC
 EA=6B1 2 OF 3 FMC
 EA=3B1 0 OF 1 FMC
 E=2B1 3 OF 4 FMC
 RF=8G1 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC
 S=3A1 0 OF 4 FMC
 RH=531 7 OF 8 FMC (NOTE)
 SH=3H1 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
 C=21 0 OF 1 FMC
 D=704 REFUELING STORES 9 OF 13 UP;
 ERDL PODS 3 OF 3 UP;
 18 OF 20 A-7E ARE HALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE;
 6 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP;
 NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT;

OTE: 5 RH=53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS;

2. CORAL SEA

F=4N1 10 OF 22 FMC, 9 MC
 A=7E1 12 OF 16 FMC
 A=6E1 4 OF 13 FMC, 6 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

KA-601 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

E-281 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-801 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-301 3 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 8 UP;

ERDL PODS: 2 OF 3 UP;

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL, 11 IN UP STATUS.

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT;

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS [REDACTED] 17,384,000 GALLONS;

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES;

6. (S) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ ATTEMPTED 2 HF CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] E

WITH NONE SUCCESSFUL.

#1434

VNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 FEB 80 10 57

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

IBC	
DC	
CCF	
DE	
DT	
DIO	
DB-1	
DB-2	
DB-3	
DB-4	
RSS	
RSS-4	
RCM	
RCM-1	
CJCS	
SJCS	
DJS	
DDO	
CMC	
NCR	
DR	
DD	
RDS-3A1	
ROUTER	

ZCZCKDA289
 OAMZYUW YLHHR 1435 0348144-MNSH-VEKDH
 ZNY MNSH
 ZKZK OO SOA DE
 O 030000Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-3
 FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, JS CINCPAC
 TO LT GEN SHUTLER, JS JCS
 INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
 RADM DIXON, 92 CINCPACFLT
 YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 03 CINCPACAF
 RADM KIRKSEY, CTF78
 YHRDHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG78.1
 RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
 ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
 DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
 FINAL SECTION OF THREE
 SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 078 (U)
 7 OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUED [REDACTED] EXERCISES, TAMAN AND AG1677
 CONTINUED TO ACCOMPANY NIMITZ AND MIDWAY, RESPECTIVELY.

B. FOREIGN MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY RESUMPTION OF
 NORTHERN ARABIA SEA SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS BY [REDACTED] SOVIET IL-38.
 MAY AIRCRAFT AFTER 18 DAY GAP, THE MAYS CONDUCTED CLOSE IN SURVEILLANCE
 WITH CPA TO LIMITZ OF 1000 FEET AND MIDWAY CPA OF 1NM.
 REMARKS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFOR-
 MATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY, LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM
 NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT,
 REVH 02 FEB 80

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS;
 #1435

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE

2 FEB 80

ZCSP0367
NR 022-033475
PUT CDSN = OKA152
RT 20000Z FEB 80 TOT: 20010Z FEB 80
TPUT CDSN: SP0367
Q REVIEW: 20010Z FEB 80
Q REVIEW: 20000Z FEB 80
Q REVIEW: 20008Z FEB 80
Q REVIEW: 20008Z FEB 80

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TION*** UNASSIGNED **

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FO# DNCO(1)

AMZYUW YHLHDR 1390 0330800-MNSH--YEKDDH.
Y MNSH
ZK DD SOA DE
020000Z FEB 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-3
MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
FO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
DM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
LIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF
DM KIRKSEY, CTF70
ROHNC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
M CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

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~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

~~TOP SECRET~~ CINC PAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 069 (U)
FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 010001Z - 020000Z FEB.
-MIDWAY CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON
MISSION RELATED TRAINING AND COORDINATED TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
MIDWAY FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE LIMITED TO ROUTINE LOGISTICS FLIGHTS.
NO RH-53 SORTIES FLOWN ON 1 FEB.
MIDWAY AND NEHITZ AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.
BATTLE GROUP ALFA CONDUCTED A 22 KT SPRINT INTO THE
LF OF OMAN, CONDUCTING FLIGHT OPS ENROUTE. THE BATTLE GROUP
TURNED TO MODLOC AT 020200Z.

(TS) ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 020900Z):
SHIPS:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

1 BATTLE GROUP ALFA:
MIDWAY/PARSONS/KNOX/FANNING/
PASSUMPSIC
D. R. RAY (ENR SRI LANKA,)
ETA 8 FEB)
BAINBRIDGE
WHITE PLAINS
(ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 14 FEB)
LASALLE (ETD 12 FEB)
2 MILLER/AINSWORTH
GLOVER (MODLOC WITHIN 100 NM)
3 BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA/HISPILLION
TEXAS
ROANOKE
(ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 4 FEB)
SAN JOSE
(ENR SUBIC BAY, ETA 16 FEB)
RIGEL
(ENR SINGAPORE, ETA 8 FEB)
4 BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/MALSEY/W.M. STANDLEY/
J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
(ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 7 FEB)
5 ARG ALFA:
UKINAWA/ALAMO (ENR GRAM, ETA
032200Z)
SAN BERNARDINO/MOBILE
(ENR BUCKNER BAY, ETA 062330Z)
6 MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

23-00N/061-00E
01-00S/070-55E

23-30N/061-00E
20-00N/054-00E

BAHRAIN
20-30N/050-00E
12-00N/043-51E

23-00N/061-00E
24-00N/061-00E
02-00S/075-00E

17-30N/065-23E

09-00N/073-00E

06-00N/090-00E

14-00N/151-00E

21-00N/146-00E

DIEGO GARCIA

399

4N

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CZCSP0368
ANS: 022-033530
NPUT CDSN # DKA153
OR: 20807Z FEB 80 TOT: 20810Z FEB 80
RO REVIEW: 20810Z FEB 80
RO REVIEW: 20810Z FEB 80
RO REVIEW: 20808Z FEB 80
RO REVIEW: 20808Z FEB 80

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IFOR DNGO(1)

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AMZYU YMLHDR 1400 0330000-MNSH-0YEKDGH.
Y MNSH
ZK OO SOA DE
020800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-3
MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
FO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
DM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
LIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DU CINCPACAF
DM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RDHNC/RAUM GURECK, CTG70.1
DM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

STION TWO
CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 069 (U)
SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135
3 AC-130

E
A

USAN AB, ROK: 1 AC-130
(C) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:
MIDWAY

11 OF 17 FMC, 3 MC
16 OF 18 FMC
7 OF 7 FMC
3 OF 4 FMC
3 OF 4 FMC
2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
2 OF 4 FMC
1 OF 1 FMC
04 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP.
EKNIFE ACFT: 3 OF 3 UP.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

PAVEKNIFE PODS: 2 OF 2 UP.
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 4 UP, 4TH POD AWAITING PARTS. NO ETR.
ALL A-7E ARE WALLEYE AND ERDL CAPABLE.

NIMITZI:

-141: 12 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC

-7E: 9 OF 20 FMC, 6 MC

-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC

-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

-65: 2 OF 3 FMC

-3B: 0 OF 1 FMC, 1 MC

-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC

-5A: 0 OF 4 FMC

-53: 7 OF 8 FMC (NOTE)

-3H: 0 OF 0 FMC, 4 MC

-2: 0 OF 1 FMC

704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP.

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP.

OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE.

OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP.

PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT.

TE: 5 OF 8 RH-53 HF RADIOS IN UP STATUS.

CORAL SEA:

-4N: 10 OF 22 FMC, 10 MC

-7E: 14 OF 16 FMC

-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 3 MC

-6D: 1 OF 5 FMC, 2 MC

-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC

-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

704 REFUELING STORES: 4 OF 6 UP.

ERDL PODS: 2 OF 3 UP.

OF 10 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE.

PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT.

400

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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ZCSPU369
NR 022-033550
PUT CDSN # DKA154
RT 200002Z FEB 80 TOT: 200102Z FEB 80
Q REVIEWS: 200102Z FEB 80
Q REVIEWS: 200102Z FEB 80
Q REVIEWS: 200092Z FEB 80
Q REVIEWS: 200082Z FEB 80

TOP** UNASSIGNED **

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FDB DNCO(1)

~~EYES ONLY~~

AMZYUW YHLMDR 1401 0330000-MNSH--YEKQOH.
Y MMNSH

ZK OO SOA DE
020000Z FEB 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-3
MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
ADM VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
LIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
ADMHC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

AL SECTION OF THREE
JI CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 069 (U)
(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS ~~TOP SECRET~~ 17,363,800
LONS.

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

(S) COMMUNICATIONS:
SCINTILLATION CONTINUES TO DEGRADE CCN CIRCUIT
ING EVENING HOURS.

NIMITZ ATTEMPTED FOUR (4) COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH
~~TOP SECRET~~ ONLY ONE WAS SATISFACTORY.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY RETURN OF
YAT LENINA TO THE MOUTOC AREA, CONTINUATION OF
~~TOP SECRET~~ EXERCISES, AND
VEILLANCE OPERATIONS ~~TOP SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN AIR ACTIVITY WAS DETECTED.
(S) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL

11 ← E

B, C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK
ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVN 81 FEB 10

SSO NOTES DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
81401

INNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

CZCOP0458

021-040110

CPSN = DKA958

10752Z FEB 80

TOT: 10020Z FEB 80

UTO*** UNASSIGNED **

CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

NFO= DNCO(1)

OJAL COPIES = 00001

TR=8

AAMZYUN YHLHDR 1368 0320800-MNSH--YEKQGH.

NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

010800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-3

4 MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

3 LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

4FO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

4J GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

4K KIRKSEY, CTF70

4L NC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1

4M CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

IBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 068 (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS

IN PERIOD 310801Z JAN - 010800Z FEB 80.

MIDWAY CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON
MISSION RELATED TRAINING AND COORDINATED TASK FORCES SURVEILLANCE,
NIMITZ FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE LIMITED TO ROUTINE LOGISTICS FLIGHTS.

CG 70.3, USS CORAL SEA, DESIGNATED BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE IS
ENROUTE TO CVBG MODLOC.

NO RH-53 SORTIES FLOWN ON 31 JAN.

MIDWAY AND NIMITZ AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MIS-
SIONS AND OPTIONS.

BATTLE GROUP ALFA WILL COMMENCE A 22 KT SPRINT INTO THE GULF
OF OMAN AT 011300Z FEB, CONDUCTING FLIGHT OPS ENROUTE. BATTLE GROUP
ALFA WILL ARRIVE VICINITY 24-15N/059-00E AT 011900Z AND THEN RETURN TO
VICINITY 23-15N/061-00E BY 020200Z.

~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 010900Z):

~~EYES ONLY~~

COPY NO. 5 of 7 COPIES

SHIPS:

- 1) BATTLE GROUP ALFA:
 - MIDWAY/PARSONS/KNOX/FANNING/WHITE PLAINS 23-15N/061-00E
 - D.R. RAY (ENR SRI LANKA, ETA 08 FEB) 06-30S/071-00E
 - BAINBRIDGE 23-30N/061-00E
 - PASSUMPSIC 23-15N/061-30E
 - LASALLE (ETD 12 FEB) BAHRAIN
 - MILLER/AINSWORTH 28-30N/050-00E
 - GLOVER (MODLOC WITHIN 100 NM) 12-09N/048-51E
- 2) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA/MISPILLION/SAN JOSE TEXAS 23-00N/062-00E
 - ROANOKE (ETD PM 01 FEB) 24-00N/061-00E
 - RIGEL (ENR SINGAPORE, ETA 08 FEB) DIEGO GARCIA
 - 15-00N/068-30E
- 3) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/HALSEY/W.H. STANDLEY/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD (ENR CVBG MODLOC ETA 7 FEB) 06-10N/095-00E
- 4) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO (ENR GUAM, ETA 022200Z FEB) 16-40N/157-00E
 - SAN BERNARDINO/MOBILE 17-00N/149-30E
 - (ENR BUCKNER BAY, ETA 062300Z)
- 5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 - DIXIE DIEGO GARCIA
- 6) SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
 - 1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-38, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135
 - [REDACTED] 3 AC-130 *ATE*
 - [REDACTED] 1 AC-130

(TS) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

1368 (u)

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

CZCDP0457

ANI 021-040121

CDSN = DKA959

10753Z FEB 80

TOT: 10020Z FEB 80

UTD*** UNASSIGNED **

CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

NFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

TR=23

AAMZYU YHLHDR 1369 0320000-MNSH--YEKDGH.

NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

010000Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-3

M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

D LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

AJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

INC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1

CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

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~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO

IBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 068 (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

MIDWAY:

.4J: 10 OF 17 FMC, 2 MC

.7E: 16 OF 18 FMC

.6E: 6 OF 7 FMC

.6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

.6B: 3 OF 4 FMC

.2B: 3 OF 4 FMC

.3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

.2: 1 OF 1 FMC

.704 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP.

VEKNIFE ACFT: 2 OF 3 UP.

VEKNIFE PODS: 2 OF 2 UP.

DL PODS: 3 OF 4 UP, 4TH POD AWAITING PARTS. NO ETR.

L A-7E ARE WALLEYE AND ERDL CAPABLE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

3 NIMITZ:
 12 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
 6 OF 28 FMC, 8 MC
 7 OF 12 FMC
 (A-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC
 A-6B: 1 OF 3 FMC
 A-3B: 0 OF 1 FMC, (ETR 01 FEB)
 2 OF 4 FMC
 F-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
 S-3A: 0 OF 4 FMC, 0 MC (NOTE 1)
 RH-53: 7 OF 8 FMC (NOTE 2)
 H-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
 2: 0 OF 1 FMC, 0 MC
 704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP.
 RDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP.
 8 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE.
 6 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP.
 0 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT.
 NOTE 1: TWO S-3A ACFT IN DOWN STATUS AT DIEGO GARCIA AWAITING ENGINE/
 AILPIPE CHANGES, ETR UNKNOWN. ONE S-3A IN DOWN STATUS ON NIMITZ FOR
 ARTS, ETR UNKNOWN. ONE S-3A IN DOWN STATUS ON NIMITZ FOR ELECTRICAL
 ROBLEM, ETR UNKNOWN.
 NOTE 2: 5 OF 8 RH-53 HF RADIOS IN UP STATUS.
 CORAL SEA:
 10 OF 22 FMC, 10 MC
 13 OF 16 FMC
 3 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
 1 OF 5 FMC, 2 MC
 2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
 F-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
 H-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
 704 REFUELING STORES: 4 OF 6 UP.
 RDL PODS: 2 OF 3 UP.
 8 OF 10 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, ALL IN UP STATUS.
 0 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT.
 1369

INN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCDP0459
DANS 021-040135
CDSN = DKA961
10755Z FEB 80

TOT: 10021Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000
CTR=23

AAMZYUW YHLHDR 1370 0320800=MNSH==YEKDDH,
NY MNSH
KZK OO SOA DE
010800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZY8 ZFF-3
M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
AJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
NC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1
CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION THREE

OBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 068 (U)
(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS [REDACTED] 17,333,000 GALLONS.
(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
(C) COMMUNICATIONS:
HEAVY SCINTILLATION SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED ALL SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS FOR 3 HOUR PERIOD ON 30 JAN.
NIMITZ ATTEMPTED TWO HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]
BOTH SATISFACTORY.

(TS) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUATION OF [REDACTED]
EXERCISES, AND SUR-
VEILLANCE OPERATIONS.

IN FOREIGN AIR ACTIVITY, FLASHER SIGHTED AN IRANIAN C-130
FLYING AT 2,000 FT IN NORTHWESTERN GULF OF OMAN, AND [REDACTED]

B,C

B,C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) REMARKS:

SUMMARY OF BATTLE GROUP POSTURES DURING MIDWAY/CORAL SEA TURNOVER:

- 1) MIDWAY WILL DEPART MODLOC AM 03 FEB AND RENDEZVOUS WITH CORAL SEA AM 05 FEB. CORAL SEA WILL BE WITHIN 48 HRS OF MODLOC AT THE TURNOVER POSITION.
- 2) NIMITZ WILL ASSUME PRIMARY TASKING UPON DEPARTURE OF MIDWAY. MISSION RELATED EQUIPMENT WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO NIMITZ BY 02 FEB.
- 3) NIMITZ WILL ASSUME 15 HOUR ALERT POSTURE AND SHIFT MODLOC TO VICINITY 23-15N/061-00E UPON COMPLETION OF MISSION RELATED EQUIPMENT TRANSFER. MIDWAY WILL ALSO REMAIN IN 15 HOUR ALERT POSTURE UNTIL DEPARTING MODLOC. THIS WILL EXPEDITE TURNOVER OF PRIMARY TASKING ON 3 FEB WHILE RETAINING OPTION TO EXECUTE PRIMARY TASKING BY EITHER BATTLE GROUP ON 02 FEB.
- 4) CORAL SEA WILL ARRIVE MODLOC AM 07 FEB AND ASSUME BACKUP CONTINGENCY ROLE.
- 5) TEXAS WILL ASSUME DUTIES OF PIRAZ AND ANTI-AIR WARFARE COORDINATOR (AAWC) UPON DEPARTURE OF BAINBRIDGE AM 03 FEB UNTIL ARRIVAL OF TG 70.3.

1370

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

PAGE

ZCZCOP0463

REF ID: A621-848151

CDSN = DKAD62

10755Z FEB 80

TOT:

10821Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1), SECMSG(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00002

PR=8

IAAMZYUW YHLHDR 1371 0320000-MNSH--YEKDDH,

NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE

010800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-3

M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

O LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

NFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT

ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

AJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

NC/RADM GURECK, CTG70.1

CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF FOUR

OBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 068 (U)

5) UPON ARRIVAL OF TG 70.3 ON 07 FEB, THE FOLLOWING

MODLOC/BG POSTURES WILL BE IN EFFECT:

NORTH MODLOC (23-15N/061E)

SOUTH MODLOC (22N/062E)

IMITZ

CORAL SEA

TEXAS

JOHN PAUL JONES

CALIFORNIA

SCHOFIELD

SPILLION

PASSUMPSIC

IRAZ - WILLIAM H. STANDLEY

AWC - HALSEY

AF SHUTTLE - ROANOKE/KILAUEA

CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING
TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

EW 01 FEB 80

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~ PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0240

DAN: 052-021723

INPUT CDSN = DKA639

TOR: 100612Z MAR 80 TOT: 100830Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTIONS** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR#45

00AMZYUJ YLHHR 2975 0700001-MNSH--YEKDH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK 03 SOA DE

0 [REDACTED] MAR 80 ZYK ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, O2 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.2

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS SITREP (U)

[REDACTED] FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 000001Z - 100800Z MAR 80.

. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND ASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE

~~PH-53 HELICOPTERS SORTIES FOR 14 HOURS~~

. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

[REDACTED] KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 100900Z).

. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES

CALIFORNIA (ETD 14 MAR)

PAUL F. FOSTER/WHITE PLAINS (ETA CVBG

23-15N/061-00E

MAURITIUS

11-40N/070-15E

~~TOP SECRET~~

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MODLOC (12 MAR)
LASALLE/MILLER/TATTNALL
AINSWORTH
KOELSCH
MISPILLION

27-45N/050-30E
25-50N/056-50E
13-30N/047-30E
23-15N/062-00E
08-30N/072-45E

ROANOKE (ETA PATTAYA 18 MAR)
(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
W.H. STANDLEY
COOK (ETA CVBG MODLOC 14 MAR)
NAVASOTA
KILAUEA (ETA DIEGO GARCIA 14 MAR)
RIGEL (ETA PORT SUEZ 14 MAR)

22-30N/061-00E
24-00N/061-00E
06-10N/093-35E
22-00N/061-30E
16-30N/063-50E
16-15N/054-10E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED] A, B [REDACTED] A, B
[REDACTED]

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE
SAN BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/BARBEY (ETA SPORE-
12 MAR)

07-50N/103-20E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C

NIMITZ

-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 1MC
-7E: 13 OF 20 FMC, 3MC
-6E: 7 OF 12 FMC
A-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

2975

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0247

DAN: 352-021755

INPUT CDSII = DKA640

TOR: 100915Z MAR 80 TOT: 100830Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=46

DAANZYUW YLHQR 2976 0700001-MNSH--YEKQDQ

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 100900Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TPOST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADM GURECK, CTG70.0

ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

OBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 106 (U)

A-36: 0 OF 2 FMC

A-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

A-7E: 3 OF 4 FMC

F-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC

F-3A: 2 OF 4 FMC

~~TOP SECRET~~ FMC NOTE

A-36: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC

A-7E REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

7 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 15 IN UP STATUS

OF 6 A-6E TRAN LASER DESIGNATORS UP

1 PAVENIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: ONE AIRCRAFT DOWN FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE, ETIC 10 MAR.

REFT CAN BE MADE MISSION READY IN 6 PLUS 00 HOURS, 8 OF 8 RG-53

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 2

HF COMMS IN UP STATUS.

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4A: 13 OF 21 FMC, 3MC
A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 1MC
A-6E: 5 OF 13 FMC, 2MC
KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
E-2R: 2 OF 4 FMC
RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

D-794 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABEL, 10 IN UP STATUS

NO RAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS [REDACTED] 14,792,400 GALLONS.

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

COMMUNICATIONS: RH-53 HELIOS CONDUCTED 3 SATISFACTORY HF COMM CHECKS WITH [REDACTED]

E

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY MOD KASHIN DDG 286

RESUMING SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO AS TEXAS AND REEVES

REJOINED NIMITZ, CORAL SEA [REDACTED]

B,C

NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY IN VICINITY OF TASK FORCE TODAY.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
EVW 09 MAR 10

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
2975

~~TOP SECRET~~

JNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

TOP SECRET
OPD 217
052-201544
CASN 0KA043
0837Z MAR 80 TDT: 90847Z MAR 80

AUTO UNASSIGNED **
ACTION UNASSIGNED **

INFO DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=47

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JAAPZYUW YHLHQR 2065 0690055-MNSH--YEKQDH.
ZNY MNSH
KXZK OO SOA DE

AR 03 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF7A
ADM GUPECK, CTG70.6
ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
SEM

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~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.
SECTION ONE

THE FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 060001Z - 090600Z MAR 80.
NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, ASW AND
ASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ SORTIES FOR 5.5 HOURS.
NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.
KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 090900Z).
A. SHIPS:
(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES
CALIFORNIA (ETD 14 MAR)

23-15N/061-00E
PORT LOUIS,
MAURITIUS
07-35N/075-20E

PAUL F. FOSTER/WHITE PLAINS
(ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 12 MAR)

27-45N/050-30E
25-50N/056-50E
15-15N/052-30E
23-15N/062-00E
13-15N/068-30E

LASALLE/MILLER/TATTNALL
AINSWORTH
KOELSCH
MISPILLION

ROANOKE (ENR PATTAYA, ETA 18 MAR)

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:

CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
W.H. STANDLEY
COOK (ENR CVBG MODLOC, ETA 14 MAR)
NAVASOTA

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
06-15N/094-00E
22-00N/061-00E
23-15N/061-00E
16-10N/054-10E

KILAUEA
RIGEL (ENR PORT SUEZ, ETA 14 MAR)

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/
SAN BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/
BARBEY (ETD 9 MAR)

PATTAYA

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135

E

2965

NNN

[REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP9216
PDAN: 252-001555
INPUT CDSN = DKA044
ATOR: 90839Z MAR 80 TOT: 90847Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00201

RTR=47

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 2056 0690055-MNSH--YEKDH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SJA DE

O 090800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 105 (U)

3.1.1 OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14:	12	OF	20	FMC,	2	MC
A-7E:	12	OF	20	FMC,	3	MC
A-6E:	9	OF	12	FMC		
KA-6D:	3	OF	4	FMC		
EA-35:	2	OF	2	FMC,	1	MC
EA-55:	2	OF	3	FMC		
E-23:	3	OF	4	FMC		
RF-66:	1	OF	3	FMC		
S-34:	2	OF	4	FMC		

~~TOP SECRET~~ OF 6 FMC (NOTE)

SH-34: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 5 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: ~~ACFT CAN BE~~
~~COMMUNICATIONS IN UP STATUS.~~

R. CORAL SEA:

F-4N:	13	OF	21	FMC,	6	MC.
A-7E:	11	OF	16	FMC,	1	MC
A-6E:	5	OF	12	FMC,	2	MC
KA-6D:	3	OF	5	FMC		
E-2B:	1	OF	4	FMC,	1	MC
RF-8G:	1	OF	2	FMC		
SH-3G:	2	OF	4	FMC		
C-2A:	1	OF	1	FMC		

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT 14,868,000 GALLONS.

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

(S) COMMUNICATIONS: HH-16 HELGS CONDUCTED TWO HF COMMUNICATION
CHECKS WITH BOTH WERE SATISFACTORY, NIMITZ *E*
EMCON PRECLUDED CHECKS.

#2966

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOP3219
DAN: 352-971664
INPUT CDSN = DKAB45
TOR: 90338Z MAR 80 TOT: 90847Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

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ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=47

DAAMZYUH YHLHDR 2967 0690355-MNSH--YEKDCM.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SJA DE
O 000900Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TRDST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, O2 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMPSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 105 (U)

7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY MOD KASHIN DDG 286

~~TOP SECRET~~ KASHIN CLOSED TO WITHIN 1 NM
OF COPAL SEA AND REMAINED IN VICINITY OF BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE FOR
APPROXIMATELY 11 HOURS, THEN OPENED TO THE SOUTH. TF 70 AIRCRAFT
SIGHTED KASHIN STEAMING ON SEVERAL DIFFERENT HEADINGS DURING THE
DAY INDICATING THE DDG PROBABLY CONDUCTING SEARCH OPERATIONS.

B, C

B, C

3. T-53 CLASS PGF 679 ESTIMATED CONTINUING PATROL IN STRAIT
OF HOPMUZ.
2. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY NOTED IN VICINITY OF

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

TF 73. (u)
8. (T) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 9 MAR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

#2367

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOPDF56
DAN: 051-323421
INPUT CDS: = OKA312
TOR: 00759Z MAR 80 TOT: 00854Z MAR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DMCO(1)

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00AMZYUW YHLHDR 2937 0600459-MNSH--YEKDDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK 00 SJA DE

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SPUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GUPECK, CTG70.6
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWING, COMDEASTFOR
ZEM

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~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~CINCPAC OCEANIC OPERATIONS SECRETARY TUE~~

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 070001Z - 080800Z MAR 80.

A. CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY NIMITZ AND
CORAL SEA WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, ASW
AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ FOR SORTIES FOR F2 MDUS.

C. NIMITZ AND TEXAS CONDUCTED A HIGH SPEED, EMCON TRANSIT
TO VICINITY 21-00N/163-00E AND ELUDED MOD KASHIN, DDG 285.

D. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 080900Z).

A. SHIPS:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES 21-00N/063-00E
 - CALIFORNIA (ENR MAURITIUS, ETA 9 MAR) 14-30S/065-00E
 - PAUL F. FOSTER/WHITE PLAINS (ETA CVBG 05-45N/082-30E
 - MODLOC 12 MAR)
 - LASALLE/MILLER/TATTNALL 27-45N/050-30E
 - AINSWORTH 25-50N/056-50E
 - KOELSCH 12-30N/047-00E
 - MISPELLION 23-15N/062-00E
 - POALOKE (ENR SINGAPORE) 17-55N/065-07E
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD 23-00N/061-30E
 - W.H. STANDLEY 24-00N/061-00E
 - NAVASOTA 22-45N/061-15E
 - KILAUEA 23-00N/061-30E
 - RIGEL (ENR MED) 20-00N/059-45E
- (3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

- (4) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO/ PATTAYA
 - GRIDLEY/BARBEY/(ETA 9 MAR)
- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 - DIXIE DIEGO GARCIA
- A. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
 - (1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 3 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 6 KC-135

#2937

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOPGW57

DSN: 251-22344

INPUT CDSN = DKA313

TOR: - RJ00Z MAR 80 TOT: 00654Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=47

00AMZYUJ YHLHQR 2938 0600459-MNSH--YEKDOY.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SJA DE

O 0000Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.2

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 104 (U)

3 UNITS OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS: C

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 15 OF 24 FMC, 1 MC

A-7E: 10 OF 20 FMC, 5 MC

A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC

KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

EA-39: 2 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC

EA-68: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-25: 3 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~ (NOTE)

S4-3H: 2 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC

O-7J4 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
15 OF 20 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASEP DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~OPERATIONAL STATUS~~

P. CORAL SEA:

- F-4H: 14 OF 21 FMC, 4 MC
- A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
- A-6E: 6 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC
- KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
- E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC
- RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC
- SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
- C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 15 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

- 4. (S) LOGISTICS: JF-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 14,914,200 GALLONS.
- 5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
- 6. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ CONDUCTED TWO HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] BOTH WEPE SATISFACTORY. *F*
- 7. [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

4. SOVIET NAVAL SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO WAS BROKEN AS NIMITZ AND TEXAS MADE HIGH SPEED TRANSIT TO VICINITY 21-00N/063-00E. MOD KASHIN DOG 286 INCREASED SPEED TO 30KTS IN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN CONTACT AS BATTLE GROUP OPENED TO THE EAST. BATTLE GROUP TURNED SOUTH AFTER SOVIET UNIT FADED FROM RADAR. LATER,

[REDACTED] CORAL SEA AIRCRAFT SUBSEQUENTLY

SIGHTED MOD KASHIN BEING REPLENISHED BY MERTKR YEGORYEVSK.
#2938

B, C

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ICZCDF0258
NAV: 051-023462
INPUT CODE = DKA315
OR: 00001Z MAR 80 TOT: 00054Z MAR 80

INFO=** UNASSIGNED **

SECTION=** UNASSIGNED **

NFO= DNCC(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
TR=47

AAMZYUW YHLHQR 2939 0600459-MNSH--YEKDH,
NY MNSH
KZK OO SDA DE
000000Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
D LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
AJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
ADM GURECK, CTG70.0
ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
FM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF THREE
IBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 104 (U)
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: (CONT'D)

[REDACTED]

BS

NIMITZ F-14 INTERCEPTED CUB 202NM SOUTHEAST OF NIMITZ AND
SCORTED THE AIRCRAFT TO 200NM NORTHEAST OF NIMITZ. CPA OF CUB WAS
10NM TO NIMITZ.

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFOR-
MATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

06 MAR 80

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDD0266

PAGE 1

DATA: 050-026160

INPUT CDSN = DKA144

TOR: 70752Z MAR 80 TGT: 70752Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=26

DAAMZYUW YHLHQR 2087 0670400-MNSH--YEK00M.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SDA DE

O 070600Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DD CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADM GURECK, CTG70.2

ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 103 (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 060001Z - 070600Z MAR 80.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH
EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~

D. B-52 INDIAN OCEAN OPERATIONS CONDUCTED WITH EXCELLENT
COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION THROUGHOUT EXERCISE PERIOD. ONE
SIMULATED MINING RUN COMPLETED WITH TF 70 FIGHTER ESCORT, USING
SOVIET DDG AS REFERENCE SHIP. NO APPARENT REACTION BY SOVIET

B. Fig

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

UNITS TO B-52H PRESENCE. COMPLETE MSN REPORT BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.
E. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

20 [REDACTED] KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 070900Z).

4. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:	
NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES	21-00N/063-00E
CALIFORNIA (ETD 7 MAR)	DIEGO GARCIA
LASALLE/MILLET/TATTNALL	27-42N/050-30E
AINSWORTH	25-50N/056-50E
KOELSCH (ETD 8 MAR)	DJIBOUTI (BSF)
MISPILLION	23-15N/062-00E
ROANOKE	22-30N/061-30E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:	
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD	23-00N/061-30E
W.H. STANDLEY	24-00N/061-00E
NAVASOTA	22-15N/061-45E
KILAUEA	22-30N/061-00E
RIGEL	22-30N/061-15E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) AHC ALFA:

OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/	
SAN BERNARDINO/GRIDLEY/	
BARBEY (ETD 9 MAR)	PATTAYA

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

DIXIE	DIEGO GARCIA
-------	--------------

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 6 KC-135

28R7

NNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0272

DANS: 350-326212

INPUT CDSN = DKA146

TOR: 70754Z MAR 80 TOT: 70756Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=26

0AAMPZYUH YHLHOR 2888 4570400-MNSH--YEKDDH.

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SDA DE

O 070000Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF78

RADM GURECK, CTG72.2

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG72.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZFM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST.

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 103 (U)

3. (U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 12 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC

A-7E: 9 OF 20 FMC, 5 MC

A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC

KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC

EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 3 FMC

RF-6G: 1 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

FILE 2

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: ~~COMMUNICATIONS~~

F. COMBAT

F-4N: 12 OF 21 FMC, 6 MC
A-7E: 9 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC
A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC
KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC
E-25: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC
SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC
C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC
D-754 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

5. (u) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.
6. (YS) COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH
~~COMMUNICATIONS~~ NIMITZ, 3 OF 4 SATISFACTORY

7. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY INCLUDED CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF
BATTLE GROUP BRAVO BY MOD KASHIN AND OPERATIONS BY
VETKR YEGORJEVSK IN VICINITY BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE.

C. NO FOREIGN MILITARY ACTIVITY NOTED IN VICINITY OF TF 70.
8. (u) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 07 MAR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#2668

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZC DP0216
DAN: 049-026537
INPUT CDSII = OK4817
TOR: 50756Z MAR 80 TOT: 60819Z MAR 80

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **
INFO = DVCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=54

00AMZYUW YHLHOR 2R54 0603508-MNSH--YEKDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK 00 504 DE
O [REDACTED] 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENTHFLT
RADM DIXON, J2 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE OF THREE

~~SECRET~~ OPERATIONS SITREP 102 (U)

1. [REDACTED] FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 050601Z - 060800Z MAR 80.

A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS
ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE.
NIMITZ CONDUCTED LIMITED FLIGHT OPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH RECCE FLIGHT
BY TWO MAYS, SEE PARA 7B.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE
ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. [REDACTED] KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 060900Z)

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES
CALIFORNIA (ETD 7 MAR)

23-15N/061-00E
DIEGO GARCIA

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~SECRET~~

LASALLE/MILLER/TATNALL
AINSWORTH
KOELSCH (BSF DJIHOUTI 7 MAR)
MISPILLION
ROANOKE

27-42N/050-34E
25-50N/056-50E
13-10N/046-00E
23-15N/062-00E
23-00N/061-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
W.H. STANDLEY (PIRAZ STATION)
NAVASOTA
KILAUEA (ENR 66 MODLOC, ETA 7 MAR)
RIGEL

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
22-00N/061-00E
14-50N/063-40E
22-30N/061-00E

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/
SAN BERNADINO/GRIDLEY/BARBEY (ETD 9 MAR)

PATTAYA

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

6. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 3 P3-C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 5 KC-135

#2854

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGE 01 Y

ZCZCDP0217
DATE: 049-026566
INPUT CDSN = DKA918
TOR: 60757Z MAR 80

TOT: 60819Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=54

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 2855 0660508-MNSH--YEKQGH.

ZNY MNSH

ZYZK OO SJA DE

O 060800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENTHFLT

RADM DIXON, O2 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIPKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.8

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZFM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION TWO OF THREE

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 102 (U)

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC

A-7E: 7 OF 20 FMC, 7 MC

A-6E: 6 OF 12 FMC

KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

EA-3B: 1 OF 2 FMC

EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC

E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC

RF-4G: 3 OF 3 FMC

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~SECRET~~ OF 3 FMC (NOTET)

SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~████████████████████~~
D. SCORAL SEA:

F-4N: 12 OF 21 FMC, 6 MC

A-7E: 9 OF 16 FMC

A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 2 MC

KA-6D: 3 OF 5 FMC

E-2R: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 1 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT ██████████ 15,124,200 GALS.

(U)(2) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: W.H. STANDLEY NR ONE BRAVO BOILER

CASUALTY REVISED ETR 15 MAR.

(S) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ CONDUCTED FOUR HF COMMUNICATION

CHECKS WITH ██████████ TWO WERE SATISFACTORY.

#2855

E

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ ██████████

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCOPC216
DAN: 049-026577
INPIIT CDSM = JKAB10
TOR: 60757Z MAR 80 TOT: 60819Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=54

DAAMZYUW YHLHQR 2856 0660500-MNSH--YEKDOM.
ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 060800Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENTHFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.2
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 102 (U)

7. ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY INCLUDED CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE OF
BATTLE GROUP BY MOD KASHIN DDG 286.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] B, C
[REDACTED] Y-58 CLASS PGE 679 CONTINUES STRAIT
OF HORMUZ PATROL.

B. TWO MAYS CONDUCTED SURVEILLANCE MISSION
AGAINST BATTLE GROUP BRAVO AND CHARLIE. MAYS WERE INITIALLY INTER-
CEPTED 213 NM FROM NIMITZ AND ESCORTED CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL THEY DE-
PARTED APPROXIMATELY THREE HOURS LATER: CPA TO NIMITZ WAS 3 NM AT

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

1000 FT WHILE CPA TO CORAL SEA WAS 5 NM AT 300 FT.
6. (U) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 6 MAR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#2656

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDP0324

DAN: 048-231301

INPUT CDSN = DKA541

TOR: 50822Z MAR 80 TOT: 50822Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=25

DAAMZYUW YHLHOR 2809 0650513-MNSH--YEKDH,

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DS

~~TOP SECRET~~ YS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMPSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.2

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG72.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

1. (U) (TS) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 040801Z - 050800Z MAR 80.

A. CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE. NIMITZ OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

B. ~~TOP SECRET~~

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. (TS) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 050900Z). c

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES/ROANOKE

23-15N/061-00E

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CALIFORNIA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA,
ETA 6 MAR)
LASALLE/MILLER/TATTNALL
AINSWORTH
KOELSCH
MISPILLION

02-10S/070-00E
26-00N/054-50E
25-50N/056-50E
13-10N/046-00E
23-15N/062-00E

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD/RIGEL
W.H. STANDLEY (PIRAZ STATION)
NAVASOTA
KILAUEA (ENR BG MODLOC, ETA 7 MAR

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
22-30N/061-00E
07-55N/065-45E

(3) SUBMARINES:
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, B

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN
BERNARDINO (ETD 9 MAR)
GRIDLEY/BARBIEY (COMBATANTS ACCOMPANYING
ARG ALFA - ETD 9 MAR)

PATTAYA

PATTAYA

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] 3 P-3C, 2 P-3B, 1 EP-3, 6 KC-135

(2) [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

- F-14: 11 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
 - A-7F: 7 OF 12 FMC, 7 MC
 - A-6E: 7 OF 12 FMC
 - KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
 - EA-3B: 6 OF 2 FMC
 - EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
- #2809

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0327

DANS: 048-031346

INPUT CDSN = DKAS46

TOR: 50807Z MAR 80 TOT: 50823Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=25

DAAMZYUW YLHMR 2812 0650513-MNSH--YEKDH,

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE

O 050000Z MAR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

YMLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 101 (U)

RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC

S-3A: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~
SH-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 12 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: 7 OF 8 RH-53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 10 OF 21 FMC, 8 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

A-7E: 8 OF 16 FMC, 2 MC

A-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC

K4-60: 3 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4 (8) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 15,174,600 GALLONS.

5 (u) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: STANDLEY SUFFERED CASUALTY TO

NO ONE BRAVO BOILER. MAX SPEED 19 KTS. ETR 31 MAR.

6 (u) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ CONDUCTED EIGHT HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] ALL WERE SATISFACTORY. E

7. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: C

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUED

SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO BY MOD KASHIN DDG 286. KASHIN CONTINUES [REDACTED] BC

B. IRANIAN C-130 RECONNOITERED LASALLE AND TATNALL AT

040645Z. CPA WAS 1000 YDS AHEAD OF LASALLE'S BOW AT 1000 FT.

C-130 SIDE NUMBER NOT VISIBLE IN HAZE.

8 (u) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT. REVW 05 MAR 10

SSO NOTE DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

#2910

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0531
DAN: 047-035725
INPUT CDSN = DKA244
TOR: 40815Z MAR 80 TOT: 40822Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=24

0AAMZYUW YHLHDR 2720 0650501-MNSH--YEKDH,
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SDA DE
0 000000 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

~~TOP SECRET~~ DAILY OPERATIONS REPORT (DU)

1. NIMITZ FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 030001Z - 040800Z MAR 80.

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION-RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE. CORAL SEA OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

~~TOP SECRET~~ DAILY OPERATIONS REPORT (DU)

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. NIMITZ KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 040900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES

23-15N/061-00E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOPQ527
DANS: 847-835668
INPUT CDSN = DKA248
TOR: 40811Z MAR 80

TOT: 40812Z MAR 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=24

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ZNY MNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 040000Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 82 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 100 (U)


EA-38: 8 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC
EA-68: 2 OF 3 FMC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
RF-8G: 1 OF 3 FMC, 2 MC
S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SH-3H: 8 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS
5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- CALIFORNIA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 6 MAR) 06-00N/068-00E
- LASALLE/TATTHALL 26-00N/054-50E
- MILLER (ETO 5 MAR) SAHRAIN
- KOELSCH 13-10N/046-00E
- AINSWORTH 25-50N/056-50E
- MISPILLION 23-15N/062-00E
- ROANOKE (ENR BG MODLOC, ETA 5 MAR) 17-40N/063-20E
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 - CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD 22-30N/062-00E
 - W.H. STANDLEY (PIRAZ STATION) 24-00N/061-00E
 - NAVASOTA 23-00N/61-00E
 - KILAUEA (ENR BG MODLOC, ETA 7 MAR) 01-00N/068-35E
 - RIGEL (ENR BG MODLOC, ETA 5 MAR) 17-20N/063-25E
- (3) SUBMARINES:



A, B



A, B

- (4) ARG ALFA:
 - OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/
 - SAN BERNADINO (ENR PATTAYA, ETA 050200Z MAR) 09-16N/102-30E
 - ANCHORAGE (ETO 5 MAR) DJIBOUTI
- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 - DIXIE DIEGO GARCIA

- SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:
 - (1) 3P-3C, 2P-3B, 1 EP-3, 6 KC-135
 - (2) FINAL REPORT: 2 AC-130 DEPARTED HICKAM ENR HURLBURT
- 3. (u) OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A. NIMITZ:
 - F-14: 11 OF 24 FMC, 3 MC
 - A-7E: 10 OF 20 FMC, 5 MC
 - A-6E: 7 OF 11 FMC
 - KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC

#2728

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~



~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 11 OF 21 FMC, 7 MC

A-7E: 18 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC

A-6E: 6 OF 10 FMC

KA-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 3 OF 4 FMC

C-2A: 1 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 8 IN UP STATUS

NO PAYEKNIFF AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 15,313,200 GALLONS.

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. (S) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ CONDUCTED TWO HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH [REDACTED] BOTH WERE SATISFACTORY. E

7. (S) OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO BY MOD KASHIN DDG286. [REDACTED] B,C

B. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY DETECTED IN VICINITY TF70 DURING PAST 24 HOURS.

8. (U) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 04 MAR 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#2729

ZCZCOP0009

DAN: 001-000211

INPUT CDSM: DKA122

TOR: 3000Z MAR 80 TOT: 3000Z MAR 80

AUTO: UNASSIGNED

ACTION: UNASSIGNED

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=46

DAAMZYU YLHQR 2697 0630026-MNSH--YEKQGH.

ZNY MNSH

ZKZK 00 SGA DE

000000 00 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

HLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF

RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

RADM GURECK, CTG70.0

RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

RADM CHEWING, COMIDEASTFOR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

SECTION ONE

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

1. (U) FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS FOR PERIOD 020001Z - 030000Z MAR 80.

A. NIMITZ CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP AND TASK FORCE SURVEILLANCE. CORAL SEA OBSERVED STANDDOWN.

3. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (U)

C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. (U) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 030000Z).

A. SHIPS:

- (1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/TEXAS/REEVES
 - CALIFORNIA/(ENR DIEGO GARCIA)
 - LASALLE/TATTNALL

23-15N/061-00E
 16-00N/063-00E
 26-00N/054-50E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOP012
DANE: 071-000246
INPUT CDSN= CKA173
TOR: 32501Z MAR 88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

~~EYES ONLY~~

TOT: 30806Z MAR 88

AUTO** UNASSIGNED**

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCC(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=46

PAAMZYUR YHLHDR 2698 0630026-MNSH--YEKDOM,
NY MMNSH

ZKZK OO SOA DE
J 030602Z MAR 88 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, O2 CINCPACFLT
YHLIAHC/MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF73
RADM GURECK, CTG70.2
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM
~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR,
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA COMINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 099 (U)

S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOTE:

SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 2 MC

C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

16 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 14 IN UP STATUS

5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

NOTE: 6 OF 6 RH-53 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS

B. CORAL SEA

F-4N: 11 OF 21 FMC, 7 MC

A-7E: 10 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC

A-6E: 4 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BAHRAIN
25-58N/056-50E
13-10N/046-00E
23-15N/062-00E
10-55N/065-25E

22-30N/061-30E
24-00N/061-00E
22-45N/061-00E
05-55S/070-45E
11-00N/065-25E

MILLER (ETA 5 MAR)
AINSWORTH
KOELSCH
MISPILLION
RJANOKE (ENR BG MODLOC, ETA 5 MAR)

(2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
W.H. STANDLEY
NAVASOTA

KILAUEA (ENR BG MODLOC, ETA 7 MAR)
RIGEL (ENR BG MODLOC, ETA 5 MAR)

(3) SUBMARINES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A, E

(4) ARG ALFA:
OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE
SAN BERNARDINO (ENR PATTAYA, ETA 5 MAR)

08-10N/106-00E

(5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

(u) SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

(1) [REDACTED] KC-135

[REDACTED]

OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

A. NIMITZ:

F-14: 14 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
A-7E: 11 OF 24 FMC, 4 MC
A-6E: 7 OF 12 FMC
KA-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC, 1 MC
EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
RF-5G: 2 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC

2597

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

NNN

KA-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC

E-2B: 2 OF 4 FMC

RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC

SH-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

D-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP

ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP

12 OF 16 A-7E MALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS

NO PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 15,313,200 GALLONS.

5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

5. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ CONDUCTED SIX HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS

WITH NCS [REDACTED] AND FOUR WERE SATISFACTORY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TWO OF WHICH WERE SATISFACTORY.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY CONTINUING SURVEILLANCE

OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO BY MOD KASHIN DDG 286, CORAL SEA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B. NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY DETECTED IN VICINITY TF78 DURING PAST 24 HOURS.

(U) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

EVW 03 MAR 16

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

2698

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

E
B, C
(S-CW)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDP0274
DAN: 046-001445
INPUT CDSN = DKA011
TOR: 10003Z MAR 80 TOT: 10036Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=46

DAAMZYUW YHLHDR 2656-0610428-MNSH--YEKDH.
ZNY MNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O [REDACTED] ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
1AJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.2
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: [REDACTED] OPERATIONAL REPORT (U)

THE FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL
EVENTS FOR PERIOD 290001Z FEB 80 - 010000Z MAR 80.
NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE.

PH-30 HELICOPTER SORTIES FOR 3.6 HOURS.
NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE ALL
MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 010900Z).

SHIPS:

- 1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:
 - NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA/REEVES
 - TEXAS (ENR MODLOC ETA 2 MAR)

23-15N/061-00E
13-45N/065-00E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

Copy No. 8 of 8 Copies

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LASALLE/TATTNALL
 MILLER (ETA 5 MAR)
 AINSWORTH
 KOELSCH
 MISPELLION
 ROANOKE (ENR MODLOC ETA 5 MAR)
 BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
 CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
 W. M. STANDLEY
 NAVASOTA
 KILAUEA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA ETA 2 MAR)
 RIGEL (ENR MODLOC ETA 5 MAR)
 PASSUMPIC (EXIT I.O. 2 MAR)

27-40N/050-35E
 BAHRAIN
 25-50N/056-50E
 12-32N/045-00E
 23-00N/061-30E
 02-30S/069-30E
 22-30N/061-30E
 23-45N/060-15E
 22-00N/061-30E
 04-00S/070-15E
 01-50S/069-30E
 06-30N/095-00E

3) SUBMARINES:
 [REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

4) ARG ALFA:
 OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/
 SAN BERNADINO (ENR
 PATTAYA ETA 05 MAR)
 5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
 DIXIE
 SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

14-30N/118-30E

DIEGO GARCIA

[REDACTED]

E

656

~~EYES ONLY~~

NN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOPQ275
DAN: 046-001456
INPUT CDSN = DKA012
TOR: 10004Z MAR 80 TOT: 10036Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

CTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
PTR=46


JAAMZYUW YHLHDR 2657 061042B-MNSH--YEKDH,
NY MMNSH

KZK OO SOA DE
010000Z MAR 80 ZYM ZYS ZFF-6
M MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
D LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
NFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
AJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
ADM GURECK, CTG70.0
ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
EM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
ACTION TWO

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 097 (U)
OPERATIONAL READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:
NIMITZ:

- 14: 14 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
- 7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
- 6E: 6 OF 12 FMC
- A-6D: 3 OF 4 FMC
- A-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC
- A-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
- 2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
- RG: 1 OF 3 FMC, 1 MC
- 3A: 2 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
- ~~4-5B: 0 OF 6 FMC (NOTE)~~
- 4-3H: 0 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
- 2: 0 OF 1 FMC



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 2

J-704 REFUELING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
15 OF 20 A-7E ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS
3 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
10 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

~~_____ STATUS~~

CORAL SEA:
-4N: 11 OF 21 FMC, 7 MC
-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
-6E: 5 OF 10 FMC, 1 MC
A-6D: 1 OF 5 FMC
-2R: 0 OF 4 FMC, 3 MC
F-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
H-3G: 2 OF 4 FMC

-704 REFUELING STORES: 7 OF 10 UP
ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
2 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 9 IN UP STATUS
0 PAVEKNIFE AIRCRAFT

(S) LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS AT _____ 15,418,200 GALS.

(U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

(TS) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ CONDUCTED ONE UNSATISFACTORY

10 FOUR SATISFACTORY HF COMMUNICATION CHECKS WITH _____

HM-16 ACFT ATTEMPTED FIVE HF CHECKS WITH _____, ONE WHICH WAS SATISFACTORY.

E

1657

NN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCDP0276

PAGE 1

DAN: 046-001464

INPIIT CDSN = DKA013

TOR: 10004Z MAR 80 TOT: 10037Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO*** UNASSIGNED **

TOTAL COPIES = 00000

RTR=46

JAAMZYUW YLHNR 2658 0610428-MNSH--YEKQW.

INNY MMNSH

IKZK OO SOA DE

010000Z MAR 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6

FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC

TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS

INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT

ADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT

MAJ GEN THOMSON, DO CINCPACAF

ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70

ADM GURECK, CTG70.0

ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3

ADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR

EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE

UBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 097 (U)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

• SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN TF AREA INCREASED WITH ARRIVAL OF T-56 CLASS PGF 679, MERTKR YEGORYEVSK AND RETURN OF MOD KASHIN FROM STRAIT OF HORMUZ PATROL. KASHIN ILLUMINATED AINSWORTH WITH SEARCH LIGHT WHILE CLOSING TO WITHIN 1000 YARDS. AGI 477 SURVEILLANCE OF NIMITZ WAS BROKEN AS NIMITZ STEAMED WEST AT HIGH SPEED.

• FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY:

1) SURVEILLANCE OF TF 70 BY TWO ~~TOP SECRET~~ F-38 MAY AIRCRAFT. CPA TO BOTH CORAL SEA AND KITTY HAWK WAS 1 NM. MAYS WERE ESCORTED BY NIMITZ F-14'S WHILE IN TF AREA.

2) IRANIAN C-130 SURVEILLED AINSWORTH WITH CPA OF 1500 YARDS WHILE FLYING AT 500 FEET. AFTER MAKING 1 CIRCLE OF AINSWORTH C-130 DEPARTED NORTH.

(4) REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL

PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY, LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO
MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REV# 29 FEB 10

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
#2658

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ZCZCOP0313
DAN: 845-003142
INPUT CDSN = OKA554
TOR: 290754Z FEB 80 TOT: 290800Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=40

QAAMZYUW YHLHDR 2606 0600442-MNSH--YEKQOH,
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE

[REDACTED] ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
SECTION ONE

SUBJ: [REDACTED] (U)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS
FOR PERIOD 280801Z - 290800Z FEB 80.

A. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA CONDUCTED CYCLIC FLIGHT OPERATIONS
WITH EMPHASIS ON MISSION RELATED TRAINING, FORCE CAP, AND AND TASK FORCE
SURVEILLANCE.

[REDACTED]
C. NIMITZ AND CORAL SEA AIRWINGS REMAIN READY TO EXECUTE
ALL MISSIONS AND OPTIONS.

2. (U) KEY FORCES (POSITS AS OF 290900Z).

A. SHIPS:

(1) BATTLE GROUP BRAVO:	
NIMITZ/CALIFORNIA/REEVES	23-15N/061-00E
TEXAS (ENR MODLOC, ETA 2 MAR)	03-40N/067-45E
LASALLE/TATTNALL	27-42N/050-34E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

Copy No. 88 of 88 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

- MILLER (ETO 9 MAR)
- AINSWORTH
- KOELSCH
- MISPILLION
- ROANOKE (ETO 291100Z FEB)
- (2) BATTLE GROUP CHARLIE:
- CORAL SEA/J.P. JONES/SCHOFIELD
- W.H. STANDLEY
- NAVASOTA (ERN MODLOC, ETA 29 FEB)
- KILAUEA (ENR DIEGO GARCIA, ETA 2 MAR)
- RIGEL (ETO 291100Z FEB)
- PASSUMPSIC (EXIT I.O. 2 MAR)
- (3) SUBMARINES:

BAHRAIN
 25-50N/056-00E
 13-40N/048-00E
 23-00N/062-00E
 DIEGO GARCIA

23-00N/061-00E
 23-48N/060-15E
 28-40N/063-15E
 03-25N/067-40E
 DIEGO GARCIA
 05-50N/089-00E

[REDACTED]

A, B

[REDACTED]

A, B

- (4) ARG ALFA:
- OKINAWA/ALAMO/MOBILE/SAN BERNARDINO
- (ETO 1 MAR)

SUBIC BAY

- (5) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:
- DIXIE

DIEGO GARCIA

B. SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT:

- (1) [REDACTED] 3P-3C, 2P-38, 1 EP-3, 4 KC-135
- (2) [REDACTED] 4 AC-130

E

#2606

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET ONLY~~ PAGE 1

ZCZCDPQ317
DAN: 845-003222
INPUT CDSN = DKA559
TOR: 290756Z FEB 80 TOT: 290801Z FEB 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= ONCO(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=46

QAAMZYUW YHLNDR 2607 0600442-MNSH--YEKDGH.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 290800Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM TROST, COMSEVENFLT
RADM DIXON, 02 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, 00 CINCPACAF
RADM KIRKSEY, CTF78
RADM GURECK, CTG70.0
RADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
RADM CHEWNING, COMIDEASTFOR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST
FINAL SECTION OF TWO
SUBJ: CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 096 (U)
3. (U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ OPERATIONS READINESS - KEY AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- A. NIMITZ:
 - F-14: 13 OF 24 FMC, 2 MC
 - A-7E: 12 OF 20 FMC, 3 MC
 - A-6E: 8 OF 12 FMC
 - KA-6D: 2 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC
 - EA-3B: 0 OF 2 FMC
 - EA-6B: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - E-2B: 3 OF 4 FMC
 - RF-8G: 2 OF 3 FMC
 - S-3A: 1 OF 4 FMC, 2 MC
 - ~~SH-3H: 1 OF 3 FMC (NOTE)~~
 - SH-3H: 1 OF 6 FMC, 4 MC
 - C-2: 0 OF 1 FMC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 2

D-784 REFUELLING STORES: 5 OF 13 UP
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
 15 OF 28 A-73 ARE WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 13 IN UP STATUS
 5 OF 6 A-6E TRAM LASER DESIGNATORS UP
 NO PAVENKNIFE AIRCRAFT
 NOTE: 5 OF 8 KR-83 HF COMMS IN UP STATUS

B. CORAL SEA:

F-4N: 12 OF 21 FMC, 8 MC
 A-7E: 11 OF 16 FMC, 1 MC
 A-6E: 5 OF 18 FMC, 1 MC
 KA-6D: 2 OF 5 FMC
 E-28: 8 OF 4 FMC, 1 MC (NOTE)
 RF-8G: 2 OF 2 FMC
 SH-3G: 1 OF 4 FMC

D-784 REFUELING STORES: 6 OF 10 UP
 ERDL PODS: 3 OF 3 UP
 12 OF 16 A-7E WALLEYE ERDL CAPABLE, 11 IN UP STATUS
 NO PAVENKNIFE AIRCRAFT
 NOTE: EXPECT 2 OF 4 FMC 29 FEB

- 4. (S) LOGISTICS: JP-8 STATUS AT [REDACTED] 15,435,000 GALLONS.
- 5. (U) MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
- 6. (S) COMMUNICATIONS: NIMITZ CONDUCTED THREE HF COMM CHECKS WITH NCS [REDACTED] ALL OF WHICH WERE SATISFACTORY. F
- 7. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


AGI REGAINED CONTACT OF BATTLE GROUP BRAVO ON 28 FEB.
 MOD KASHIN DDG 286 CONTINUES PATROL IN STRAIT OF HORMUZ.
 NO FOREIGN MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS NOTED TODAY.
 REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY, LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.
 REVW 29 FEB 10

C
(S-ent)

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.
 #2607

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN



~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

CLOSE ABOARD CORAL SEA UNDER E-4 AND A-7 ESCORT.

LOCATED BY VQ-1

(S-CM)

E-3 WHICH WAS FLYING DIRECT SUPPORT MISSION ENROUTE D/IBOUTI.

[REDACTED]

B,C
(S-CM)

REMARKS: CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO MISSION COUNTRY. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REV 25 FEB 10

NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.

MISSA

11/11

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

ICZPDPJ134
CAN: 025-327771
UNIT CDSI = 04A959
TR: 70307Z FEB 80 TOT: 70815Z FEB 80

DIR: ** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION: ** UNASSIGNED **
INFO: ONCU(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
CTR=53

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IAAMZYU4 YHL4DR 1634 0300000-MNSH--YEK0GH.
117 MNSH
KZY 00 004 0E
I 070000Z FEB 80 ZYH ZYS ZFF-6
FM MAJ GEN DAVIS, J3 CINCPAC
TO LT GEN SHUTLER, J3 JCS
INFO VADM FOLEY, COMSEVENFLT
ADM DIXON, J2 CINCPACFLT
MAJ GEN THOMSON, J3 CINCPACAF
ADM KIRKSEY, CTF70
HRDHHC/ADM GURECK, CTG70.1
HL0K0C/ADM CHAMBERS, CTG70.3
ADM CHENNING, COMIDEASTFOR

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

FINAL SECTION OF THREE
CINCPAC DAILY OPERATIONS SITREP 074 (U)
LOGISTICS: JP-5 STATUS [REDACTED] - 16,926,000 GALLONS.
MATERIAL STATUS CHANGES: CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCED NON-
RELATABLE FEED PIPE RUPTURE IN FEED SYSTEM IN NUMBER ONE ENGINE
ROOM WHICH PREVENTS OPERATION OF NUMBER ONE REACTOR. BOTH
PARTS AVAILABLE. TEMPORARY REPAIRS BEING EFFECTED, ETR 081200Z.
COMMUNICATIONS: RESULTS OF HF COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS
ITH [REDACTED] E

INITIALS: 5 OF 14 SATISFACTORY.
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY INCLUDED CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE
INITIAL BATTLE GROUP AND CONTINUATION OF THE SOVIET INDIAN
SEA SQUADRON (GOVINDORN [REDACTED]) EXERCISE.
THE SOVIET IL-38 WAYS CONDUCTED TWO SURVEILLANCE PASSES

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~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

(S/NF) E-3A 562 LAUNCHES 020800Z MAY 80 FOR DEPLOYMENT
 T [REDACTED] FLIGHT PROFILE INCLUDES FILING FROM [REDACTED] B TO
 [REDACTED] SUBSEQUENT CANCELATION OF IFR FLIGHT PLAN/LANDING AT
 [REDACTED] AND PROCEEDING VFR TO [REDACTED] ESTIMATE
 ARRIVAL [REDACTED] 021330Z MAY 80.

B. (S/NF) E-3A 353 DEPLOYS TO [REDACTED] 3 MAY 80 IAW FLIGHT
 PROFILE 2A ABOVE.

C. (C) RETAIN READY POSTURE FOR THE RECEPTION AND ONWARD
 MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL REMAINS FROM IRAN.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS CONDUCTED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 1 MAY 80.

B. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL).

(1) (TS/NF) TOTAL ON HAND 370.9 (79 PERCENT).

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 1 MAY 80 4.6. 99.4 REQUIRED TO
 COMPLETE FILL.

(U) C. (S/NF) BASE SUPPORT.

(1) (S/NF) INSTALLATION OF DINING HALL DOORS COMPLETED.

(2) (S/NF) NORTH-END SHELTERS 9-16 RETURNED TO [REDACTED]

COMMAND POST OPERATION RELOCATED TO HANGAR 3 AND IN FULL OPERATION. E

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(S/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] MAY 80..

NEXT MISSION SCHEDULED 3 MAY 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. (S/NF) WSC-3 COMMS WERE 100 PERCENT.

B. (S/NF) TSC-85 TRUNK WAS DOWN FROM 010010Z TO 010340Z HRS DUE TO
 R. MUX. ADDITIONALLY THE TRUNK WAS DOWN FROM 012222Z TO 012328Z

C. D POWER FAILURE AT [REDACTED]

(S/NF) HF TTY FROM [REDACTED] WAS OUT
 FROM 012222Z TO 012328Z DUE TO POWER FAILURE AT [REDACTED] E

6. (U) PERSONNEL.

A. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD	USAFE	15
	TAC	19
	USAFE	8
SVCS	TAC	18
	TAC	1
MEQ	USAFE	1
	TAC	23
ENG	SAC	1
	USAFE	14
ENG/SVC	MAC	3
	USAREUR	9
ALCE	AFCC	75
	TAC	19
POL	SAC	2
	AWACW	15
E-3A		1
OTHER		1
	TOTAL	224

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(TS//NF) STATUS - [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACW	1
	TOTAL	2

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.

8. (TS//NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. MAINTAIN STRICT OPSEC AND COMSEC. KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE KNOWN BY THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM NUMBER OF PEOPLE.

REVW: 2 MAY 2000

*SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESS ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

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700000025

1 003-030515

INPUT COSM = DKA335

TOR: 300901Z APR 80 TOT: 300901Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED == COPY PROVIDED TO OPG [REDACTED] G

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DMCO(1)

FLASH

TOTAL COPIES = 20001
RTR=40

ZTTHZYUW YDHANG 0007 1210658-MORN--YEKQDH.
ZNY MDRN
ZKZK ZZ SDA DE
Z O 300657Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6
FM SSO USEUCOM //ECJ3-CAT//
TO JCS WASH DC //J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
SAC //DO//
[REDACTED] /OMC// E

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 2369 ECJ3-CAT SEC 1 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS, G
[REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER.

SURJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 140 AS OF 300700Z APR 80 E

- (TS/NF) (U)
- A. SSO USEUCOM 290813Z APR 80, VHN 2340 (SITREP 139) (TS/NF) (U)
- B. SSO USEUCOM 172031Z APR 80, VHN 2078 (TS/NF) (U)
- 1. (U) OPERATIONS-ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) E-3A.
(1) (C) E-3A (560) LAUNCHED 290703Z APR 80 FOR CREEK SENTRY TRAINING MISSION WITH 4ATAF. ACFT AIRBORNE 5.8 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] AB 291250Z APR 80.

(2) (U) E-3A LAUNCHED 290909Z APR 80 FOR REDEPLOYMENT FROM [REDACTED] ACFT AIRBORNE 0.7 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 290952Z APR 80.

- (3) (U) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.
 - (A) (S) ACFT 353 FMC.
 - (B) (S) ACFT 560 FMC.

(4) (TS/NF) SSO USEUCOM 292023Z APR 80 PUBLISHED DIRECTING

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~~TOP SECRET~~

LOYMENT OF E-3A DETACHMENT FROM [REDACTED] AY 80.

B. (TS/NF) KC-135 ACFT REDEPLOYED FROM [REDACTED] AS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

ACFT	DPT	ARR
642	0728	1301
633	0745	1353
336	0807	1411
011	0823	1419

C. (TS/NF) UPDATE OF U-132 SERIES ACFT DEPLOYED IAW REF B AND REDEPLOYED FROM [REDACTED] 28 APR 80 AS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
0505	290911 [REDACTED]	291305 [REDACTED]	1
0572	291526 [REDACTED]	291939 [REDACTED]	2
1818	300630 [REDACTED]	301030 [REDACTED]	3, 5
1857			4

- NOTES:
1. REQUIRES STRUCTURE INSPECTION. ETC UNKNOWN.
 2. REQUIRES FUEL TANK REPAIR. ETC 010800Z MAY 80.
 3. REQUIRES RAMP REPAIR AND ENGINE INSPECTION. ETC UNKNOWN.
 4. DELAYED FOR MAINT. ETC UNKNOWN.
 5. ARRIVAL TIME ESTIMATED.

D. (U) USCINCEUR 300315Z APR 80 (NOTAL) PUBLISHED TO SUPPORT RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF REMAINS OF PERSONNEL KILLED IN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT. JCS 292344Z APR 80 REFERS (NOTAL)..

(U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (U) E-3A.

- (1) (U) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 30 APR 80.
- (2) (TS/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 2-3 MAY.

80 E-3A DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED]

B. (U) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR RECEPTION AND ONWARD MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL REMAINS FROM HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT.

3. (J) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 29 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-34(C-141) #0007	0619 [REDACTED]	1051 [REDACTED]	

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PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0824

: 033-034376

UT COSM = DKA333

TOR: 300857Z APR 80

TOT: 300858Z APR 80

AUTO==* UNASSIGNED **

ACTION==* UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=40

FLASH

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0008 1210658-MORN--YEKDOH.

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 300657Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS WASH DC//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DD//

AFSSO TAC//DD //

SAC//DD//

/DMC// E

ZLM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 2369 ECJ3-CAT

SECTION 2 OF 2.

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS, 6

FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-32 SITREP 140 AS OF 300700Z APR 80

(S/NF)

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
	12467	1900	
	2216	300730/CONUS	1
1780-50(C-141)	0931	1356	
	1624	2245	
	300246	301130/CONUS	1
1780-38(C-141)	1700	2255	
	300530	301500/CONUS	1

NOTE: 1. CONUS ARRIVAL TIMES ESTIMATED.

B. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL).

(1) (S/NF) TOTAL ON HAND 352.0 (75 PERCENT).

(2) (S/NF) NET FILL 29 APR 80 10.2 118.2 REQUIRED 10

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COMPLETE FILE.

(U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 30 APR 83. E

ALL TERMS ARE EBLU.

NO	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-51(L-141)	0119 [REDACTED]	0603 [REDACTED]	
	0815 [REDACTED]	1406 [REDACTED]	
	1637 [REDACTED]	1733 [REDACTED]	
1780-52(C-141)	0521 [REDACTED]	1003 [REDACTED]	E
	1215 [REDACTED]	2130 [REDACTED]	
1780-53(C-141)	0815 [REDACTED]	1300 [REDACTED]	
	1515 [REDACTED]	2100 [REDACTED]	

NOTE: 1. VIA [REDACTED] RB.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: NO CHANGE.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD	USAFE	16
	TAC	19
	USAFE	8
SVCS	TAC	28
MED	TAC	1
	USAFE	2
	TAC	30
ERG/SVC	SAC	1
	USAFE	20
RED HORSE	USAFE	1
ALCE	MAC	25
COMMS	USAREUR	20
	AFCC	75
POL	TAC	19
	SAC	2
E-3A	AWACH	3
OTHER		2
	TOTAL	272

B. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	2
E-3A	AWACH	1
COMMS	JGSE	4
	TOTAL	7

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.

8. (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. MAINTAIN STRICT OPSEC AND COMSEC. KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE KNOWN BY THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM NUMBER OF PEOPLE.

REVW: 30 APR 2020

NO NOTES: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESS ON RECEIPT. DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

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ZCZCDPQ722
DANI 001-042734
INPUT CDSN = OKA928
TOR: 281100Z APR 80 TOT: 281101Z APR 80

PAGE 1

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AUTO=** UNASSIGNED ** COPY PROVIDED TO OPG/

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=24

FLASH

ZTTHZYUW YDHANO 0006 1190840-MORN--YEKQOH,
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 280817Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS //J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
SSO SAC //DO//
COS [REDACTED] /OMC// E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 2307 ECJ3-CAT

SECTION ONE OF TWO
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER.
SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 138 AS OF 280700Z APR 80 (TS/NF)

A. SSO USEUCOM 270937Z APR 80, VHN 2296 (SITREP 137) (TS/NF) (U)
B. SSO USEUCOM 172031Z APR 80, VHN 2078 (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (C) E-3A, NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 27 APR 80.
E-3A (353) CONTINUES TO SUPPORT [REDACTED]

B. (TS/NF) KC-135. KC-135 REDEPLOYMENT FROM [REDACTED] 27 APR 80 AS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU

ACFT	DPT	ARR
047	0800	1324
049	0815	1348
018	0835	1444

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(TS/NF) C-130 SERIES ACFT DEPLOYED IAW REF B AND REDEPLOYED 27 APR 80 AS FOLLOWS, ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
6567	0701	2045	E
6575	0705	2045	1
0562	0630	2139	1
0567	0635	2139	1

NOTE: 1. VIA

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
A. (C) E-3A, NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 28 APR 80.
B. (TS/NF) KC-135, KC-135 REDEPLOYMENT FROM SCHEDULED 28 APR 80 AS FOLLOWS, ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

ACFT	DPT	ARR
126	0800	1355
362	0815	1415
466	0830	1430

(TS/NF) C-130 SERIES ACFT SCHEDULED FOR REDEPLOYMENT 28 APR 80 AS FOLLOWS, ALL TIMES ARE GMT ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
0565	0531/	2020	1,2
1818	0536/	2025	1,2
0572	0800/	2220	1
1857	0805/	2225	1

NOTE: 1. VIA
2. DEPARTURE TIME ACTUAL.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM 27 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
1780-36(C-141)	0206/	0631/
	0855/	1450/
1780-37(C-141)	0613/	1037/
1780-14(C-130)	0903/	1810/
1780-19(C-130)	1237/	2120/

B. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL).

- (1) (TS/NF) AREA 1: 20.2 (31 PERCENT)
- AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 64.3 (54 PERCENT)
- R-14: 199.1 (99 PERCENT)
- R-9: 15.0 (75 PERCENT)
- TOTAL: 364.6 (78 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 27 APR 80 50.9, 105.8 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL. NOTE: PORTION OF FILL DUE KC-135 DEFUELING.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
(TS/NF) - MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FRO 28 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
1780-47(C-141)	0700/	1130/
	1345/	2000/
	2215/	TBD/CONUS

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PAGE 3

REVW: 28 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESS ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER OT INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

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ZCZCDP0723
DANI 001-042763
INPUT CDSN = DKA929
TOR: 281102Z APR 80 TOT: 281103Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==
INFO= DNCO(1)

EYES ONLY

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=24

ZTYMZYUW YDHANO 0007 1190840-MORN--YEK09H.
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 280617Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS // J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE// DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
SSO SAC //DO//
COS //OMC// E
ZEM

FLASH

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 2307 ECJ3- CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN
ADAMS FROM RADM PACKER.
SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A SITREP 138 AS OF 280700Z APR 80 E
(TS/NF)

SECTION 2 OF 2,
1780-48(C-141)

0915	[REDACTED]	1400	[REDACTED]
1615	[REDACTED]	2230	[REDACTED]
290045	[REDACTED]	TBD/CUNUS	[REDACTED]
0915	[REDACTED]	1400	[REDACTED]
1615	[REDACTED]	2230	[REDACTED]
290045	[REDACTED]	TBD/CUNIS	[REDACTED]
0730	[REDACTED]	1200	[REDACTED]
0730	[REDACTED]	1530	[REDACTED]

1780-38(C-141)
1780-15(C-130)

NOTE: 1. RON. ETD 29 APR 80.

- 5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.. NO CHANGE.
- 6. (U) PERSONNEL.

A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] E
FUNCTION UNIT/CHD TOTAL

EYES ONLY

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EYES ON

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FLASH

CMD	USAFE	E	13
SP	TAF		37
	USAFE	E	8
SVCS	TAF		29
MED	TAF		1
	USAFE	E	2
ENG	TAF		35
	S		1
ENG/SVC	USAFE	E	21
RED HORSE	USAFE		3
ALCE	MAC		27
COMMS	USAREUR		21
	JCSE		4
	AFCC		76
FOL	TAC		18
	SAC		2
E-3A	AWACH		3
TANKER			
TASK FORCE	SAC		70
OTHER			1
	TOTAL		372
B. (TS/NF) STATUS			
FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL	
LIAISON	USAFE		2
E-3A	AWACH		1
COMMS	JCSE		4
	TOTAL		7

- 7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.
 - 8. (U) (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. MAINTAIN STRICT OPSEC AND COMSEC. KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE KNOWN BY THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM NUMBER OF PEOPLE.
- REVW: 28 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESS ON RECEIPT.
 DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0007

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SECRET 0010 W

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FLASH

ZCZCOPQ702
DAN: 088-040505
INPUT CDSN = DKA941
TOR: 170855Z APR 80 TOT: 170856Z APR 80

AUTO=** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED ** COPY PROVIDED TO OPG/ELM

INFO= DNCO(1)

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=23

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0014 1080732-MORN--YEKDGH.
ZNY NMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 170731Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
SSD SAC//DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR
COS [REDACTED] OMC//E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY SEC 1 OF 2 VHN 2081 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS, G
RADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 127 AS OF 173700Z APR 80 (TS/NF)
A. SSO USEUCOM 160727Z APR 80, VHN 2050 (SITREP 126) (TS/NF)(U)
B. SSO USEUCOM 122217Z APR 80, VHN 1994 (TS/NF)(U)
1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (U)(TS/NF) E-3A.
(1)(TS/NF) E3-A(604) LAUNCHED 160708Z APR 80 FOR REDEPLOYMENT
FROM [REDACTED] ACFT ACCOMPLISHED AERIAL REFUELING
EXERCISE 161000Z-161020Z APR 80 WITH [REDACTED] BOUND KC-135. AERIAL
REFUELING EXERCISE CONDUCTED WEST OF 3636N 1930E. ACFT AIRBORNE 5.7 E
HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 61250Z APR 80.
(2)(U)(TS/NF) E-3A(353) LAUNCH FOR PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE CLOUDY
CHORUS CANCELLED DUE ACFT MAINTENANCE PROBLEM.
(3) (U) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:
(1)(U)(TS/NF) ACFT 694 FMC.

copy no. 8 of 9

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(B) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 353 NMCM (BLEED AIR) ETIC 19 APR 80.

B. (U) (S/NF) KC-135.

(1) (U) (S/NF) FOUR KC-135 AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED 16 APR 80 FOR DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] AND ENROUTE AERIAL REFUELING EXERCISE WITH REDEPLOYING E-3A (544). KC-135 CLOSED [REDACTED] AS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ACTUAL.

ACFT	DEPT	ARR	NOTE
466	0708Z	1314Z	1
621	0709Z	1319Z	1
051	0820Z	1403Z	
031	0822Z	1404Z	

NOTES: CONDUCTED AERIAL REFUELING EXERCISE WITH E-3A.

(2) (U) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.

(A) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 621, 031, 317, 543, 036, 466 PMC.

(B) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 051 PMC (BOOM NOZZLE LEAK)

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (U) (S/NF) E-3A. NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY PLANNED 17 APR 80.

B. (U) (S/NF) KC-135. TWO KC-135 LAUNCH 17 APR 80 FOR REDEPLOYMENT FROM [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT LAUNCH AS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

ACFT	DPT	ARR	NOTE
036	[REDACTED]	1151	1
621	[REDACTED]	1155	1

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS DATE.

A. (U) (S/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 6 APR 80. ALL TIMES ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
1780-11 (C-130)	0721 [REDACTED]	154 [REDACTED]

B. (U) (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (200 GAL).

- (1) (U) (S/NF) AREA 1: 23.1 (35 PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14: 190.5 (95 PERCENT)
- TOTAL: 408.6 (87 PERCENT)

(2) (U) (S/NF) NET FILL 16 APR 80 16.1 61.7 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(U) (S/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 17 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1103-31 (C-141)	0415 [REDACTED]	1200 [REDACTED]	
	1415 [REDACTED]	2000 [REDACTED]	
1780-31 (C-141)	0521 [REDACTED]	1000 [REDACTED]	1,2
	1215 [REDACTED]	1800 [REDACTED]	
1780-12 (C-130)	2130 [REDACTED]	160415 [REDACTED]	

NOTES: 1. [REDACTED] DEPARTURE TIME ACTUAL.
2. E-3A SUPPORT.

REVW 17 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE TON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

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~~NOFORN~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCOP9703
DAN: 080-040521
INPUT CDSN = DKA942
TOR: 170856Z APR 80 TOT: 170856Z APR 80

EYES ONLY

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=23

FLASH

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0015 1080732-MORN--YEKDOH.
ZNY MORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 170731Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
SSO SAC//DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR
COS [REDACTED] /OMC/ E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY SEC 2 OF 2 VHN 2081 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO RGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS,
RADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 127 OF 170700Z APR 80 (TS/NF)

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS

- A. (TS/NF) WSC-3 CIRCUIT AT [REDACTED] HAD NO RECEIVE; DUE A BAD DATA BUFFER BOARD.
- B. (TS/NF) TSC-85 TTY AT [REDACTED] HAD 92 PERCENT AVAILABILITY BECAUSE OF CHANGE IN EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION.
- C. (TS/NF) TSC-60 TTY AT [REDACTED] (HF) HAD 92 PERCENT AVAILABILITY BECAUSE OF CHANGE IN EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION.

6. (U) PERSONNEL.

A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD	USAFE	12
SP	TAC	26

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

SVCS	TAC	23	
MED	TAC	2	
	USAFE	2	
ENG	TAC	29	
ENG/SVC	USAFE	14	
RED HORSE	USAFE	2	
ALCE	MAC	2	
COMMS	USAREUR	9	
	JCSE	4	
	AFCC	73	(INCL TWO CIVILIAN)
POL	TAC	15	
TANKER TASK FORCE	SAC	83	

EYES ONLY

TOTAL 296

B. (S/NF) STATUS - [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACH	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	6

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.
 8. (S/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
 REVW 17 APR 2000

SSD NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE BY RECEIPT.
 DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0015

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EYES ONLY

TOP0949

087-042266

INPUT CDSN = DKA517

TOR: 161012Z APR 80 TOT: 161013Z APR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCC(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTP=55

FLASH

ZTTMZYU# YDHANC 0003 1070735-MORN--YEKQGH,

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 160727Z APR 80 ZYM ZFFF 3&6

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS //J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//

AFSSO TAC //DO//

STO SAC //DO//

USNAVEUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ //OMC//E

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 2050 ECJ3-CAT

SECTION 1 OF 2

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS, G

RADM TESH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SITREP 126 AS OF 160700Z APR 80 (TS/NF). U

A. SSO USEUCOM 150739Z APR 80, VHN 2026 (SITREP 125) (TS/NF). U

B. SSO USEUCOM 122217Z APR 80, VHN 1994 (TS/NF). U

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (TS/NF) E-3A.

(1) (U) (TS/NF) E-3A(353) LAUNCHED 150613Z APR 80 FOR CREEK SENTRY MISSION IN SUPPORT OF 4ATAF. AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE 6.7 HOURS AND RECOVERED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 151248Z APR 80.

(2) (U) (TS/NF) E-3A(604) LAUNCHED 160708Z APR 80 FOR REDEPLOYMENT IAW REF B AND IS SCHEDULED TO INCLUDE AERIAL REFUELING EXERCISE (161000Z-1020Z APR 80) WITH KC-135 AIRCRAFT INBOUND TO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ESTIMATE ARRIVAL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 161245Z APR 80. E

(3) (U) (TS/NF) BOTH E-3A ACFT FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.

B. (U) (TS/NF) KC-135. NO KC-135 FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 15 APR 80.

ALL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DEPLOYED KC-135 FMC AS OF THIS REPORT EXCEPT FOR 036

Copy No. 8 of 9 Copies

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EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

S - RADAR PRESSURE PUMP, ETIC 16 APR 80).

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (S/NF) E-3A.

(1) (S/NF) COMPLETE REDEPLOYMENT OF E-3A(604) FROM [REDACTED]

(2) (S/NF) E-3A(604) LAUNCHES 160700Z APR 80 FOR PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE CLOUDY CHORUS. ESTIMATE AIRCRAFT RECOVER [REDACTED] 161300Z APR 80.

B. (S/NF) FOUR KC-135 AIRCRAFT LAUNCH 16 APR 80 FROM [REDACTED] FOR DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] DEPLOYMENT IAW REF B AND IS SCHEDULED TO INCLUDE E-3A AERIAL REFUELING EXERCISE. DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULED AS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

ACFT	DPT	ARR
456	0730	1235
621	0731	1240
051	0815	1310
031	0816	1315

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTION TO DATE.

A. (S/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 15 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1810-01(C-141)	142310 [REDACTED]	0358 [REDACTED]	1
	0638 [REDACTED]	1240 [REDACTED]	
1810-02(C-5A)	030700 [REDACTED]	0802 [REDACTED]	1
	1110 [REDACTED]	1710 [REDACTED]	
1810-03(C-5A)	1148 [REDACTED]	1633 [REDACTED]	1
	1935 [REDACTED]	1601 [REDACTED]	
0-11(C-130)	0708 [REDACTED]	1411 [REDACTED]	2

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA PER REF A.

(U) 2. LOAD DATA: MISC GEN CARGO.

B. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL)

- (1) (S/NF) AREA 1: 33.1 (50 PERCENT)
- AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 102.2 (80 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14: 171.3 (86 PERCENT)

TOTAL: 392.6 (83 PERCENT)

(2) (S/NF) NET FILL 15 APR 80 12.8. 77.7 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

(3) (S/NF) ANTICIPATE START OF FUEL SHUTTLE [REDACTED] 17 APR 80 USING U.S. DEPLOYED FUEL TRACTORS/TRAILERS. MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL DRIVE THE VEHICLES DURING SHUTTLE OPERATIONS. MOST NATION DRIVERS WILL BE TRAINED AND HAVE DEMONSTRATED DRIVING ABILITY PRIOR TO VEHICLE OPERATIONS. USAF DRIVERS WILL NOT ACCOMPANY MOST NATION DRIVERS DURING OFF BASE OPERATIONS. US MILITARY TRUCK/TANKER MARKINGS/SERIAL NUMBERS WILL BE OBLITATED.

C. (S/NF) BASE SUPPORT: BARE BASE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ARRIVED 15 APR 80. TWO EMU-26 GENERATORS UNLOADED AND IN PLACE. EXPANDABLE PERSONNEL SHELTER BEING ERRECTED AND SITING FOR REMAINING EXPANDABLE SHELTERS COMPLETED.

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EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 3

(U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
(TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 16 APR 80. ALL
TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	OPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
17RR-11 (C-130)	273P7 [REDACTED]	160 [REDACTED]

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.
(TS/NF) TTY CIRCUIT CONNECTING [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] VIA TSC-85
WAS DOWN 0730Z TO 0825Z AND 1920Z TO 2024Z. HOURS FOR 91.7 PERCENT RELIA-
BILITY. OUTAGES WERE CORRECTED BY REPLACING A BAD PATCH CORD AT LAND-
STATION AND RESEATING CONNECTIONS IN MULTIPLEX EQUIPMENT AT [REDACTED]
REVIEW 16 APR 2000

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 1

ZCZCRR0455
1 127-042155
JT CUSA = UKA022
TDF: 1010177 APR 80 TOT: 161018Z APR 80

AUTG=** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

FLASH

INFC= UNCD(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTF=55

ZTTKZYU* YOHANO 0008 1070735-MORN--YEKQDM.
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z C 160727Z APR 80 ZYH ZFFF 386

FM SSO USECOM
TO JCS //J3//
INFO AFSSO USAF //DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
SSC SAC //DO//
CINUSNAVEUR

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 2050 ECJ3-CAT

FINAL SECTION OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS,
RADM TESH, FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJ: HQ USECOM E-3A SITREP 126 AS OF 160700Z APR 80 (TS/NF) E
6. (U) PERSONNEL.
A (TS/NF) STATUS

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMC	USAF	12
E-3A	AWAC	36
SP	TAC	26
SVCS	TAC	24
MEC	TAC	3
	USAF	2
ENG	TAC	34
ENG/SVC	USAF	15
RED HORSE	USAF	1
ALCE	MAC	4
COMMS	USAREUR	9

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~~NOFORN~~ EYES ONLY

FORM

EYES ONLY

PAGE 2

7. (INCL ONE CIVILIAN)

16

38

295

HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS.
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT

ON RECEIPT.
DURING DUTY HOURS.

NOFORM

SECRET

EYES ONLY

FLASH

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ZC7CDPQ426
DAN: 087-301600
INPUT CDSN = DKA335
TOP: 151038Z APR 80 TOT: 151040Z APR 80

PAGE 1

AUTO** UNASSIGNED ** COPY PROVIDED TO OPG. [REDACTED] G

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCG(1)

EYES ONLY

TOTAL COPIES = 00201
RTR=95

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0007 1360740-NOFORN--YEKDDH.
ZNY MMORW
ZKZK ZZ SCA DE
Z O JAPUEQZ APR 80 ZYH ZFF 386
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
SSO SAC //DO//
CINCPACFLT
COS [REDACTED] //OMC// E
ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 2026 ECJ3-CAT SEC 1 OF 2.
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, BGEN WELCH, BGEN ADAMS, G
RADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PCKER.

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 125 AS OF 150700Z APR 80 (TS/NF)

A. SSO USEUCOM 140642Z APR 80, VHN 2002 (SITREP 124) (TS/NF). (U)
B. SSO USEUCOM 122217Z APR 80, VHN 1994 (TS/NF). (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (S/NF) (U) E-3A
(1) (TS/NF) E-3A (353) LAUNCHED 140655Z APR 80 FOR REDEPLOYMENT
FROM [REDACTED] ACFT ACCOMPLISHED AERIAL REFUELING
EXERCISE 141000Z-141020Z APR 80 WITH [REDACTED] SOUND KC-135, AERIAL
REFUELING EXERCISE CONDUCTED WEST OF 3635N 1900E. AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE
6.5 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 141323Z APR 80. E

(2) (S/NF) E-3A (353) LAUNCHED 150613Z APR 80 FOR CREEK SENTRY
MISSION IN SUPPORT OF 4ATAF. ESTIMATE RECOVERY [REDACTED] 151200Z APR 80.

- (3) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.
- (A) (S/NF) ACFT 353 FMC.
- (B) (S/NF) ACFT 604 FMC.

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EYES ONLY

B. (U) (S/NF) KC-135
(1) (TS/NF) THREE KC-135 AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED 14 APR 80 FOR DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] AND ENROUTE AERIAL REFUELING EXERCISE WITH REDEPLOYMENT E-3A (353). KC-135 AIRCRAFT CLOSED [REDACTED] S FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

ACFT	DPT	ARR	NOTES
317	0720	1235	1,2
543	0720	1240	1,2
036	0800	1315	1

- NOTES: 1. RECOVERED [REDACTED] WITH APPROX 40K LBS FUEL (2.0 HR FLIGHT TIME).
2. CONDUCTED AERIAL REFUELING EXERCISE WITH E-3A.

- (2) (U) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT
(A) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 317 FMC.
(B) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 036 FMC.
(C) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 543 FMC.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS

- A. (TS/NF) E-3A CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 16 APR 80
E-3A (604) REDEPLOYMENT FROM [REDACTED]
B. (S/NF) KC-135. CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 15 APR
DEPART OF FOUR KC-135 FROM [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED]

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE

- A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 14 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-25(C-141)	0731 [REDACTED]	1157 [REDACTED]	1
	1348 [REDACTED]	2055 [REDACTED]	2

- NOTES: 1. E-3A SUPPORT.
2. VIA [REDACTED]

B. (U) (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (200 GAL).

- (1) (TS/NF) AREA 1: 36.1 (58 PERCENT)
AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
AREA 3: 87.1 (74 PERCENT)
R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
R-14: 174.5 (87 PERCENT)
TOTAL: 405.7 (82 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 14 APR 80 12.6. 64.6 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

C. (U) (S/NF) BASE SUPPORT.

- (1) (TS/NF) REWIRE OF HANGER 1 INITIATED.
(2) (TS/NF) COMPLETED FILLING 12000 GAL BLADDER WITH DEMINERALIZED WATER.
(3) (S/NF) INITIATED CONSTRUCTION OF WOODEN LATRINES FOR NORTH END.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS

- (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 15 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1810-01(C-141)	142310 [REDACTED]	0358 [REDACTED]	1,2

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EYES ONLY

1010-02(00)
1110
REV 15 APR 2 66

061
0587
1700

1,3

E

SSC NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.
#0007

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~~TOP SECRET~~

ZC7000427

DATA: 067-201643

INPUT CODE = DK4386

TO: 151039Z APR 80 TOT: 151040Z APR 80

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PAGE 1

EYES ONLY

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DMCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 20001

RTF#95

ZTTZYUW YDHANO 0002 1060740-MORN--YEKDOH.

ZNY MORN

RRR ZZ SGA DE

0700Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6

USEUCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

AFSSO TAC //DC//

SSO SAC //DO//

CINCUSNAVEUR

COM [REDACTED] //OMC// E

ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHM 2026 ECJ3-CAT SEC 2 OF 2

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO RGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS, G

RADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 125 AS OF 150700Z APR 80 (TS/NF)

1010-03(C--5A) 0800 [REDACTED] 1300 [REDACTED]

1615 [REDACTED] 220 [REDACTED]

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: AIR CONDITIONING/

HARVEST BARE COMPONENTS.

2. [REDACTED] DEPARTURES AND [REDACTED]

ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURES TIMES ACTUAL.

3. [REDACTED] DEPARTURE TIME ACTUAL.

4. RGN. ETD 160630Z APR 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS

A. (S/NF) TSC-85 EUROPEAN CIRCUITS 100 PERCENT RELIABILITY.

B. (S/NF) TELETYPE RECEIVE AT [REDACTED] MSC-3 CIRCUIT DOWN FOR E

FAULTY CIRCUIT CARDS.

C. (S/NF) HF RADIO SCHEDULED OUTAGE AT [REDACTED] 48000Z

141245Z APR 80.

6. (U) PERSONNEL.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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1975 4170 0000 V

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EYES OR

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
COMB	USAFE	12
ENBA	AWACK	35
SP	TAC	26
SVCS	TAC	26
REG	TAC	3
	USAFE	2
	TAC	21
	USAFE	15
ORCE	USAFE	16
ALCE	MAC	4
COMMS	USAREUR	9
	JCSE	4
	AFCC	71 (INCL ONE CIVILIAN)
POL	TAC	16
TANKER TASK FORCE SAC		38
TOTAL:		295

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIATSON	USAFE	1
ENBA	AWACK	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
TOTAL:		6

PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE
 CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS.
 LIMIT NUMBER DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT
 WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 15 APR 2029

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT
 DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.
 #0008

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EYES ONLY

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NOFORN

PAGE 1

JP0902
DATE: 084-010475
INPUT CDSN = DKA051
TOR: 140814Z APR 80 TOT: 140815Z APR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

EYES ONLY

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=95

ZTIMZYUW YOHANO 0002 1050643-MORN--YEKQOH.
ZNY MORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z N 140642Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
SSO SAC//DO//
USNAVEUR

OMC// E

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 2002 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS, G
RADM TESH, FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3 [REDACTED] SITREP 124 AS OF 140730Z APR 80 (TS/NF)

- A. SSO USEUCOM 131101Z APR 80, VHN 1997 (SITREP 123) (TS/NF).
- B. SSO USEUCOM 122217Z APR 80, VHN 1994 (TS/NF).

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A.

- (1) (TS/NF) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 13 APR 80.
- (2) (TS/NF) BOTH E-3A AIRCRAFT FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.
- (3) (TS/NF) COMPLETED PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR GKR APR 80

REDEP

ZYMENT OF ONE E-3A AIRCRAFT TO [REDACTED]

(TS/NF) KC-135. NO KC-135 FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 13 APR 80. COMPLETED PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 14 APR 80 KC-135 REDEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] IAW REF B.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (TS/NF) E-EA.

- (1) (TS/NF) E-3A (353) LAUNCHES 140730Z APR 80 FOR REDEPLOYMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

FROM [REDACTED] DEPLOYMENT IAW REF B AND IS SCHEDULED TO INCLUDE AERIAL REFUELING EXERCISE (141020Z - 141020Z APR 80) WITH KC-135 AIRCRAFT INBOUND TO [REDACTED] ESTIMATE ARRIVAL [REDACTED] 141243Z APR 80.
(2) (S/NF) CONTINUE COORDINATION FOR 16 APR 80 REDEPLOYMENT OF SECOND E-3A FROM [REDACTED]

E

B. (S/NF) KC-135.
(1) (S/NF) THREE KC-135 AIRCRAFT DEPLOY TO [REDACTED] 14 APR 80 IAW REF B AND THE FOLLOWING. DEPLOYMENT TO INCLUDE AERIAL REFUELING EXERCISE WITH REDEPLOYING E-3A (3531). ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

ACFT	DPT	ARR
317	0720	1240
035	0722	1242
543	0800	1320

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (S/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 3 APR 80.

B. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL).

- (1) (S/NF) AREA 1: 58.1 (86 PERCENT)
- AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 74.5 (63 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- SO R-14: 174.5 (87 PERCENT)
- FUEL TRAILERS: 20.0 -9)5 034:3,5)
- TOTAGSC ROEMG KII PERCENT)

(2) (S/NF) NET FILL 13 APR 80 (13.4). 57.2 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

(3) (S/NF) FOUR FUEL TRAILERS FILLED (20.0).

(U) (S/NF) BASE SUPPORT, IN EXCESS OF 7000 GAL OF DEMINERALIZED WATER PROCESSED WITH VERY HIGH PURITY.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(S/NF) MAC MISSION SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 14 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-25(C-141)	0715 [REDACTED]	120 [REDACTED]	1
	1415 [REDACTED]	2115 [REDACTED]	2

E

NOTE: 1. E-3A SUPPORT.

2. VIA [REDACTED]

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. (S/NF) TSC-85 TTY HAD NEG CONTACT FOR 75 MINUTES AT USAFE. NO RFO.

B. (S/NF) HF TTY HAD NEG CONTACT FOR 145 MINUTES. SUSPECTED PROPAGATION PROBLEM.

C. (S/NF) TSC-85 IS NOW BULK ENCRYPTED FROM [REDACTED] TO BOTH [REDACTED] AND CONUS ENDS.

E

6. (U) PERSONNEL. NO CHANGE

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.

8. (S/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 14 APR 2000.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.

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EYES ONLY

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PAGE 3

DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

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EYES ONLY

ZCZCOPG288
DAM: 083-241414
INPUT CDS# = KDAE38
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PAGE 1

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FLASH

ZITMZYUW YDHAND 0027 1041105-MORN--YEKQGH.
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SDA DE
Z 131101Z APR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
CIRCUSNAVEUR
COS [REDACTED] VDMC//E
ZEH

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1997 ECJ3-CAT SEC 1 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, RADM TESH,
[REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 123 AS OF 130700Z APR 80 (TS/NF) E
A. SSO USEUCOM 120923Z APR 80, VHN 1987 (SITREP122) (TS/NF),
B. SSO USEUCOM 122217Z APR 80, VHN 1994 (TS/NF), (U)
1. (U) OPERATIONS-ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (TS/NF) E-3A (353) LAUNCHED 120645Z APR 80 FOR E-3A [REDACTED]
FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHT. AIRCRAFT ON STATION 4.5 HOURS.
[REDACTED] MIRAGE TARGET AND INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED FROM [REDACTED]
AIRFIELD. SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPT ACTIVITY WAS ACCOMPLISHED. AIRCRAFT
AIRBORNE 6.8 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 121327Z APR 80.
B. [REDACTED] E-3A (604) LAUNCHED 120832Z APR 80 WITH [REDACTED] E, G
TO OBSERVE E-3A [REDACTED] FAM/ORIENT FLIGHT CITED PARA 1A ABOVE.
ARRIVED [REDACTED] 1220752Z APR 80 AND CONSISTED OF [REDACTED]

DM PARTY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY [REDACTED]. DV APPEARED EXTREMELY

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EYES ONLY

~~NOT FOR ORAN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

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PLEASED AND DISPLAYED KEEN INTEREST IN E-3A [REDACTED] AND RADAR CHARACTERISTICS. PARTY DEPARTED [REDACTED] 121212Z APR 80. E-3A AIRBORNE 2.9 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 21122Z APR 80. C. (U) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.

A, E

- (1) ~~(S/NF)~~ AIRCRAFT 353 FMC.
- 2. ~~(S/NF)~~ AIRCRAFT 604 FMC.
- D. ~~(TS/NF)~~ REFERENCE B PUBLISHED IN SUPPORT OF JCS TASKING (MACS 122154Z APR 80) TO DEPLOY A FORWARD OPERATING TANKER TASK FORCE TO [REDACTED]

2. (U) OPERATIONS-PLANNED ACTIONS.

- A. ~~(S/NF)~~ E-3A.
 - (1) ~~(S/NF)~~ E- NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 13 APR 80.
 - (2) ~~(TS/NF)~~ E-3A REDEPLOYMENT [REDACTED] REVISED TO ONE AIRCRAFT 14 APR 80 AND ONE AIRCRAFT 16 APR 80. REDEPLOYMENT TO BE IAW REF B.
 - B. ~~(S/NF)~~ KC-135, KC-135 TANKER TASK FORCE BEGINS SEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] WITH ARRIVAL OF THREE KC-135 SCHEDULED 14 APR 80, FOUR ADDITIONAL KC-135 SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE [REDACTED] 15 APR 80.

E C

3. (U) LOGISTICS-ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. ~~(TS/NF)~~ NO MAC MISSIONS TO /FROM [REDACTED] 12 APR 80, MAC MISSION 1782-24 SCHEDULED 13 APR 80 CANCELLED DUE REVISION TO [REDACTED] REDEPLOYMENT.

E

B. ~~(TS/NF)~~ FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.

- (1) ~~(TS/NF)~~ AREA 1: 56.1 (86PERCENT)
 - AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
 - AREA 3: 74.5 (63 PERCENT)
 - R-0: 22.0 (100 PERCENT)
 - R -14: 187.9 (94 PERCENT)
 - TOTAL: 406.5 (86 PERCENT)
 - (2) ~~(TS/NF)~~ NET FILL 12 APR 80 16.1 63.8 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.
- REVW 13 APR 2000
#0027

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ZC7C0PG289
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TOT: 131246Z APR 80 TOT: 131247Z APR 80

PAGE 1

NOFORN

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*INFO= DNEG(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTP=42

FLASH

ZTTZYUW YDHAND 0028 1041105-MORN--YEKDM,
ZNY MORN
ZKZK ZZ SDA DE
Z 131101Z APR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR
TO [REDACTED] VOMC// E
ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1997 ECJ3-CAT SEC 2 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, RADM TESH, 6
FROM RADM PACKER,

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 123 AS OF 130700Z APR 80 (TS/NF) 7
C. (TS/NF) BASE SUPPORT.

- (1) (TS/NF) DEMINERALIZER UNIT OPERATIONALM REWIRING AND RELAMPING OF HANGER 8 COMPLETE.
- (2) (TS/NF) RED HORSE PROJECT STATUS: UPGRADE OF AIR CREW LATRINES, ACTIVATION OF 16-MAN QUARTERS, ACTIVATION OF LATRINES AND SHOWERS, INSTALLATION OF BACK-UP POWER TO POL, AND INSTALLATION OF SECONDARY FEED TO POWER SUBSTATION 4 ALL COMPLETE.
- (3) (TS/NF) GCA SYSTEM OPERATIONALM TWO PAR APPROCHES BY E-3A ACFT SUCCESSFUL. ALIGNMENT OF ASR CONTINUES.

4. (U) LOGISTICS-PLANNED ACTIONS.
(TS/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 13 APR 80.
NEXT MAC MISSION (E-3A EXTRACTION SUPPORT) ETA [REDACTED] 141200Z APR 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.
(TS/NF) THERE WERE NO ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS OUTAGES FOR THIS REPORTING PERIOD. WSC-3 TTY PROBLEM AT [REDACTED] WAS CORRECTED

EYES ONLY

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PAGE 2

BY TIGHTENING A LOOSE WIRE IN THE TTY EQUIPMENT, REPLACEMENT KEY
BLOCKS FOR KW-7 AT GMC PLANNED FOR AIRLIFT FROM [REDACTED] ON 14 APR 80.

- 6. (U) PERSONNEL, NO CHANGE.
- 7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS, NO CHANGE.

- 8. ~~(S/TS/AF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL
MATTERS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 13, APR 2000.

- SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT,
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEE DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0026

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PAGE 1

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UNASSIGNED **
*INFO: ONCD(1)
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R10046

EYES ONLY

ZTTZYUW YD-ANC 000R 1030725-MORN--YEK00H.

ZNY MORN
ZKZK ZZ SCA DE
Z D 120923Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS //J3//
AFSSO USAF //DD//
AFSSO TAC //DD//
SAC //DD//
PAC //J3//

CIRCUSNAVEUP
CDS [REDACTED] //OCC// E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHM 1967 ECJ3-CAT

SECTION 1 OF 2.

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS,
MGEN DAVIS, RADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJ: TO USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 122 AS OF 120700Z APR 80

A. SSO USEUCOM 110633Z MAR 80, VHM 1962 (SITREP 121) (TS/NF).

- 1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
 - A. (S/NF) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 11 APR 80.
 - B. (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT
 - (1) (S/NF) ACFT 353 FMC.
 - (2) (S/NF) ACFT 604 FMC.

- 2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
 - A. (S/NF) E-3A LAUNCHES 120645Z APR 80 FOR E-3A [REDACTED] FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHT. MISSION PROFILE INCLUDES AIR INTERCEPT ACTIVITY WITH [REDACTED] CONTROLLERS ABOARD E-3A CONTROLLING [REDACTED] INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT. ESTIMATED RECOVERY E-3A 121315Z APR 80.
 - B. (S/NF) E-3A LAUNCHES 120645Z APR 80 WITH [REDACTED] CV ABOARD

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EYES ONLY

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TO OBSERVE E-3A [REDACTED] FAN/CREST FLIGHT CITED PARA 24 ABOVE. DV PARTY SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE [REDACTED] 122820Z APR 80 (OMC [REDACTED]) E
091149Z APR 80 REFEST. ESTIMATE RECOVERY DV E-3A [REDACTED]
121130Z APR 80.

C. (TS/NF) OUR TIME PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR E-3A REDEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] REDEPLOYMENT OF BOTH ACFT IN ABEYANCE. ANTICIPATE REDEPLOYMENT OF ONE ACFT 14 APR 80 AND ONE ACFT 16 APR 80.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 11 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

	DEPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1. 22(C-141)	0731 [REDACTED]	120 [REDACTED]	1
	1438 [REDACTED]	202 [REDACTED]	

NOTE: 1. MISC GEN CARGO

B. (U) (TS/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.
(1) (TS/NF) (U) AREA 1: 58.1 (88 PERCENT)
(U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
AREA 3: 67.9 (57 PERCENT)
R-9: 20.7 (100 PERCENT)
R-14: 178.3 (89 PERCENT)
TOTAL: 380.3 (91 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) (U) NET FILL 11 APR 80. 17.4. 90.1 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

C. (U) (TS/NF) BASE SUPPORT.

(1) (TS/NF) (U) UPGRADE OF AIRCREW QUARTERS COMPLETE.
(2) (TS/NF) (U) INSTALLING SECONDARY LINES TO ACTIVATE ELECTRICITY IN AREA B 16-MAN QUARTERS AND LATRINE NUMBER FOUR.

(U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(TS/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 12 APR 80. NEXT MISSION ETA 130600Z APR 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

A. (TS/NF) WSC-3 SECURE VOICE WAS 100 PERCENT. WSC-3 TTY WAS 40 PERCENT. OMC LOCATION HAS 3AD BLOCKS FOR KW-7 AND [REDACTED] HAS UNDETERMINED TTY PROBLEM BETWEEN WSC-3 AND KW-7. REQUIRED REPLACEMENT PARTS WILL BE AIRLIFTED TO BOTH LOCATIONS 13 APR 80.

B. (U) (TS/NF) TSC-85 WAS DOWN FROM 1930" TO 1930Z FOR SATCOM SYSTEM TESTING.

C. (U) (TS/NF) HF SECURE VOICE WAS 100 PERCENT. HF SECURE TTY WAS 85 PERCENT. OUTAGE WAS 0901Z TO 0338Z HOURS DUE TO POOR PROPAGATION.

5. (U) PERSONNEL.

A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CD	TOTAL
COM	USAF	11
E-3A	USAF	79
SP	TAC	27
SVCS	TAC	23
MEQ	TAC	2
	USAF	2

EYES ONLY

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PAGE

REVW 11 APR 2004

SSG NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

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PAGE 1

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 ORG REVIEW: 121151Z APR 80
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ZNY MMORN

TKZK ZZ SOA DE

0 100923Z APR 80 ZYM ZFF3&6

USEUCOM

//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//

AFSSO TAC //DO//

SSO SAC //CO//

CINCPAC //J3//

CINCUSNAVEUR

COS [REDACTED] //OMC//E

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1987 ECJ3-CAT

SECTION 2 OF 2.

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS,

MGEN DAVIS, RADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITRIP 122 AS OF 120700Z APR 80 E

(TS/NF)

ENG	TAC	19
ENG/SVC	USAFE	14
RED HORSE	USAFE	16
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	9
	JCSE	4
	AFCC	71
POL	TAC	15
	TOTAL:	293

(c) E

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~~NOFORN EYES ONLY~~

STATUS	UNIT/CD	TOTAL
LIATION	USAF	1
E-3A	AWACW	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	6

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.

(U) ~~(S/NF)~~ - CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL
LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

LVW 1: APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

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PAGE

ZCZCDF0454

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ACTION>** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 2001
RTR=40

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ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z C 110633Z APR 80 ZYM

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

AFSSO TAC//DO//

SSO SAC//DO//

CINCPAC//J3//

CINCUSNAVEUR

US [REDACTED] /OMC/TE

ZF [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1962 ECJ3-CAT

PL UNAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO RGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS,
MGEN DAVIS, RAUM TESH [REDACTED] FROM RAUM PACKER.

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 121 AS OF 112700Z APR 80 [REDACTED] E

A. SSG USEUCOM 100732Z APR 80 VHN 1935 (SITREP 120) (IS/NE) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (IS/NE) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 10 APR 80 DUE [REDACTED] AND LOW VISIBILITY. E

B. (S/NE) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.

(U) (1) (S/NE) ACFT 353 NMC (BLEED AIRDUCT) ETIC 111745Z APR 80.

(U) (2) (S/NE) ACFT 604 FMC.

2. (U) OPERATIONS PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (S/NE) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 11 APR 80.

B. (IS/NE) COMPLETE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 12 APR 80 DV VISIT E

IAW CCS [REDACTED] 091149Z APR 80 (NOTAL).

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (IS/NE) MAC MISSIONS TO FROM [REDACTED] APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

8 8

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSN 1780-17 (C-134) DPT/LOCATION 0739 [REDACTED] ARN/LOCATION 175 [REDACTED] E

(S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (320 GAL).

- (1) (S/NF) AREA 1: 58.1 (88 PERCENT)
- AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 63.1 (73 PERCENT)
- R-14: 136.8 (58 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.21 (100 PERCENT)
- TOTAL: 364.2 (77 PERCENT)

(2) (S/NF) NET FILL 10 APR 82 19.6, 106.3 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(S/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 1 APR 82. ALL TIMES ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT LOCATION	ALL TIMES ZULU ESTIMATE.	NOTE
1780-22(C-141)	0715 [REDACTED]	1200 [REDACTED]	1
	1415 [REDACTED]	2000 [REDACTED]	

NOTE 1. LOAD DATA: MISC GEN CARGO.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS

A (S/NF) TSC-85 FROM [REDACTED] TO USAFE HAD 93.1 PERCENT RELIABILITY. HIGH DISTORTION ON LINE CORRECTED BY RELAY ADJUSTMENT ON KW-7 AT [REDACTED] E

B (S/NF) HF VOICE AND TTY CIRCUITS TO USAFE VIA [REDACTED] HAD 82.2 PERCENT RELIABILITY BECAUSE OF LINE PROBLEMS BETWEEN TRANSIT SITE AND [REDACTED]

6. (U) PERSONNEL

A (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] ONE ARRIVAL AND ONE DEPARTURE 10 APR 82. TOTAL ASSIGNED 323. E

B (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE. TOTAL ASSIGNED SIX.

(S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. (S/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 11 APR 2000

SSN NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.

DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

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77 00P0933

081-015310

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TOR: 100754Z APR 80

TOT: 100756Z APR 80

PAGE 1

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EYES ONLY

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

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TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=25

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ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 100732Z APR 80 ZYM

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

AFSSO TAC//DO//

SSO SAC//DO//

CINCPAC//J3//

USNAVEUR

[REDACTED] OMC/LH

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2 VHN 1935 ECJ3-CAT

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO RGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN

ADAMS, MGEN DAVIS, PADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RAUM PACKER

SURJ: H [REDACTED] SITREP 20 AS OF 100700Z APR 80

80 (TS/NF)

A. SSO USEUCOM 090725Z MAR 80, VHN 1915 (SITREP 119) (TS/NF)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE

A. (TS/NF) E-3A.

(1) (TS/NF) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 9 APR 80.

(2) (U) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.

(A) (TS/NF) ACFT 353 MMC (BLEED AIR DUCT. PARTS ARRIVED)

[REDACTED] WILL MOVE [REDACTED] 11 APR 80.

(B) (TS/NF) ACFT 634 FRC.

(3) (TS/NF) COMPLETED COORDINATION FOR 12 APR 80 E-3 [REDACTED]

FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHT.

B. (TS/NF) KC-135 REDEPLOYMENT OF KC-135 AIRCRAFT (3) FROM

[REDACTED] COMPLETED WITH LAST AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL

091230Z APR 80.

Copy No. 8 of 9 Copies

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

2. OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A LAUNCHES 100700Z APR 80 FOR E-3A FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHT. MISSION PROFILE INCLUDES AIR INTERCEPT ACTIVITY WITH CONTROLLERS ABOARD E-3A CONTROLLING INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT WORKING AGAINST TARGET AIRCRAFT. ESTIMATE MISSION TERMINATION 101300Z APR 80.

B. (TS/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 11 APR 80 E-3A FLIGHT, 12 APR 80 DV FLIGHT (COS 091149Z APR 80 REFERS - NOTAL), AND 13 APR 80 E-3A REDEPLOYMENT TO

C. (U) CONTINUE PLANNING FOR 15-17 APR 80 HQ USAF HOSTED E-3A/USN INTERFACE TRAINING LESSONS LEARNED CONFERENCE. TENTATIVE AGENDA TIMES INCLUDE TADIL-A/LINK II PROCEDURES, SECURE/CLEAR VOICE COMMUNICATIONS, ALLOCATION OF INTERCEPTORS FOR E-3A CONTROL, E-3A SURVEILLANCE ROLE, COORDINATED EMPLOYMENT OF E-2 AND E-3A, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING INTEROPERABILITY. INVITEES INCLUDE EUCOM, USNAVEUR AND PACFLT REPRESENTATION.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/XROM 9 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	OPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-30(C-5)	0513	1408	1
	1657	2250	
1780-17(C-130)	0550	1300	2

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA PER REF A.
2. LOAD DATA MISC GEN CARGO.

9. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (MM3GAL).

- (1) (TS/NF) AREA 1: 58.1 (99 PERCENT)
- AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 108.4 (92 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14: 90.8 (45 PERCENT)
- TOTAL: 343.3 (73 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 9 APR 80 126.9 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL. KC-135 DEPARTURE WILL FACILITATE REFILL OF STORAGE TANKS.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM 10 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	OPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
1780-17(C-130)	0730	1300

5. COMMUNICATIONS.

A. (TS/NF) WSC-3 SATCOM VOICE AND TTY WAS 100 PERCENT

B. (TS/NF) ONLY OUTAGE ON TSC-85 SATCOM WAS TTY CIRCUIT BETWEEN FOR 71 PERCENT RELIABILITY. OUTAGE FROM 1700Z TO 2400Z WAS CORRECTED BY REPLACING BAD KW-7 A

C. (TS/NF) HF VOICE AND TTY BETWEEN AND 100 PERCENT.
REV#: 10 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOFORN

TOP SECRET

PAGE 1

Z JPQ932
DAN. 081-015223
INPUT CDSN = DKA390
TOR: 100744Z APR 80 TOT: 100745Z APR 80

AUTO=PTQ(1)

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= UNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=25

EYES ONLY

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0005 1010733-MORN--YEKDDH.
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 100732Z APR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
SSO SAC//DO//
PAC//J3//
USNAVEUR

COS [REDACTED] /OMC/L E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2 V4V 1935 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFU BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, 1GEN
ADAMS, MGEN DAVIS, RADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER. G E
SURJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 120 AS OF 100720Z APR E
80 (TS/NF)

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

FUNCTION	UNIT/END	TOTAL
CMO	USAFE	9
E-3A	AWACH	87
SP	TAC	26
SVCS	TAC	23
MED	TAC	2
	USAFE	2
ENG	TAC	20
ENG/SVC	USAFE	19
RED HORSE	USAFE	16

TOP SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

ALCE
COMMS

MAC
USAREUR
JCSE

2
8
4

EYES ONLY

POL

TAC

AFCC 70

15

TOTAL: 303

8. ~~(TS/NF)~~ STATUS



E

FUNCTION

UNIT/CMD

TOTAL

LIAISON

USAFE

1

E-3A

AWACW

1

COMMS

JCSE

4

TOTAL: 5

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.

8. ~~(TS/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 10 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0005

NIHNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 1

OPF0255
LSP-012428
BT CDSF = 024044
TOR: 90911Z APR 80 TOT: 90911Z APR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00031
RTR=55

FLASH

ZTTMZYU* YD-ANC 0007 1000726-10FN--YEKDCM.
ZNY MMORN
ZK7K ZZ SCA DE
Z O 090725Z APR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS/J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DC//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
SSO SAC//DO//
CINCPAC//J3//
USNAVEUR
[REDACTED]/DMC// E

ZEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2 VHM 1915 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH,
MGEN ADAMS, MGEN DAVIS, [REDACTED] FROM WADM PACKER.
SUBJ: ~~USEUCOM E-3~~ [REDACTED] 19 AS OF 090720Z APR
80 (TS/NF)

G. E
E

A. SSO USEUCOM 080646Z MAR 80, VHM 1889 (SITREP 11E) (TS/NF) (U)
1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (TS/NF) E-3A.

(1) (TS/NF) E-3A/TF-70/B-52 INTERFACE TRAINING MISSION
COMPLETED WITH THE E-3A RECOVERY [REDACTED] 081537Z APR 80.
MISSION INTERFACE PROFILE IAW PARA 2A, REF A. E-3A ON STATION
4.0 HOURS. MISSION HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. DEBRIEF WITH SAC AND USN
INDICATES BEST MISSION TO DATE. E-3A ABLE TO CONTROL ENTIRE
MISSION BASED ON COMPREHENSIVE DATA PROVIDED BY CTF-70. TADIL-A/
LINK 11 OPERATIONAL ON HF AND VHF. TADIL-C OPERATIONAL. TWELVE
F-14 INTERCEPTS CONDUCTED ON B-52 AIRCRAFT.

(2) (TS/NF) FLIGHT ACTIVITY 8 APR 80. E-3A(604) AIRBORNE
12.1 HOURS (080329Z - 081537Z APR 80).

8 - 9

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

(3) (TS/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.
(A) (TS/NF) ACFT 350 NMC (BLEND AIR UNITS), FIVE PARTS PLUS

FOUR.

(B) (TS/NF) ACFT 604 FMC.

B. (TS/NF) KC-135.

(1) (TS/NF) KC-135(317) AIRBORNE 4.6 HOURS (V87320Z - 080810Z APR 82) IN SUPPORT OF 8 APR 82 E-3A TRANSIT ENROUTE TF-72 OPNL AREA, CONDUCTED SUCCESSFUL REFUELING OPNS OVER [REDACTED] AND RETURNED [REDACTED] BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED].

E

(2) (TS/NF) KC-135(548) AIRBORNE 5.3 HOURS (R81005Z - 081523Z APR 82) AND KC-135(538) AIRBORNE 5.4 HOURS (R81205Z - 081530Z APR 82) IN SUPPORT OF 8 APR 82 E-3A TRANSIT FROM TF-72 OPNL AREA, CONDUCTED SUCCESSFUL REFUELING OPNS OVER [REDACTED] AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED].

(3) (TS/NF) ALL KC-135 FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.

(4) (TS/NF) KC-135 AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED 9 APR 82 FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] DEPARTURE TIMES ZULU ACTUAL-

ARRIVAL TIMES ZULU ESTIMATE.

ACFT	DEPART	ARRIVE
548	0600Z	1137Z
538	0615	1152Z
317	0630Z	1207Z

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A. NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 9 APR 82. CONTINUE COORDINATION/PLANNING FOR 10 APR 82 E-3A [REDACTED] AILLIARIZATION/ [REDACTED] FLIGHT.

(B) (TS/NF) KC-135. COMPLETE REDEPLOYMENT OF KC-135 AIRCRAFT TO [REDACTED]

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 9 APR 82. ALL TIMES ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-29(C-5)	0507 [REDACTED]	1710 [REDACTED]	1
	1415 [REDACTED]	2205 [REDACTED]	
1780-16(C-130)	0735 [REDACTED]	1600 [REDACTED]	2

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA PER REF A.

2. VI [REDACTED]

B. (TS/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (MMOGAL).

- (1) (TS/NF) AREA 1: 58.1 (68 PERCENT)
- AREA 2: 66.4 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 108.4 (92 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14: 156.2 (78 PERCENT)
- TOTAL: 408.6 (87 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 8 APR 82 16.6. 61.5 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL. NOTE: STATUS DOES NOT REFLECT DECREASE DUE OFFLOADS FOR THREE KC-135, AND ONE E-3A. 10 APR SITREP (120) WILL REFLECT DECREASE.

C. (TS/NF) BASE SUPPORT. INCLUDING OF HANGER 3 FOR PROPOSED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ EYE ©

CONDITIONING PROJECT STARTED. DEMIN PLANT BEING PREPARED FOR OPERATION.
REVW 9 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0007

NNNN

~~NOFORN~~

~~EYE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

ZCZCD-0241
060-010470
CUSA = OKACSO
TDF: 90915Z APR 88 TOT: 90915Z APR 88

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNCD(1)

FLASH

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=55

ZYTMZYUW YDHANO 0028 1000725-MORN--YEKOOH.
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SDA DE
Z 0 090725Z APR 88 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
SSC SAC//DO//
CINCPAC//J3//
CTCUSNAVEUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ /OMC/TE

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES FINAL SECTION OF 2 VHN 1915 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO RGEN LARSON, RGEN WELCH,
RGEN ADAMS, RGEN DAVIS, RADM TESH, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RADM PACKER,
SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SITREP 119 AS OF 090700Z APR
88 (TS/NF) E

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
(TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9 APR 88. ALL
TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-30(C-5)	0513 CONFIDENTIAL	1400 CONFIDENTIAL	1,2 E
	1715 CONFIDENTIAL	2300 CONFIDENTIAL	
1780-17(C-130)	0556 CONFIDENTIAL	1300 CONFIDENTIAL	3,4

NOTE: 1. LOAD DATE: TWO '52 ST TRACTORS, 140
101 TRACTORS.
2. VIA ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR ON LOAD OF 29 PAX
BUS, TEN WATER BLADDERS.
3. LOAD DATA: PORTABLE SCALES, MISG
GEN CARGO.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

COMMUNICATIONS.

A. ~~(S/NF)~~ TELETYPE BETWEEN [REDACTED] RELIABILITY 80 PERCENT DUE TO FAULTY KW-7 CRYPTO EQUIPMENT AT REMSTEIN. (U)

E

B. ~~(S/NF)~~ ALL OTHER EUROPEAN CIRCUITS FULLY OPERATIONAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. ~~(S/NF)~~ STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD	USAFE	12
E-3A	AWACW	93
SP	TAC	27
SVCS	TAC	23
MED	TAC	2
	USAFE	2
ENG	TAC	20
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	19
RED HORSE	USAFW	16
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	8
	JCSE	4
	AFCC	70
PDL	TAC	15
	TOTAL:	313

B. ~~(S/NF)~~ STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
	AWACW	1
30	USAFE	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL:	7

E

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. ~~(S/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 9 APR 2000

SSD NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT. DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0008

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~ EYES ONLY

ZCZC DP 0628
DAN: 079-620033
IN: CDSN = 0K4998
TO: 020009Z APR 80 TOT: 80809Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==
INFO= UNCC(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00041
RTP=23

FLASH

BTMZYU YDHANO 0205 2990647-MORN--YEKQOH.
NY MMJRN
KZK ZZ 504 DE
0 080646Z APR 80 ZYH
FM SSU USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//OO//
AFSSO TAC//OO//
SSO SAC//OO//
INCUSSNAVEUR
DES [REDACTED] /OAC// *EA*

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2 VHM 1889 ECJ3-CAT *E*
REF: [REDACTED] INFO: GEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN
ADAMS, RAC1 TESH [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER.
004J: [REDACTED] SITREP 118 AS OF 280700Z APR *E*
1. SSU USEUCOM 270531Z MAR 80, VHM 1853 (SITREP 117) ~~(TS/NF)~~ (U)
(U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
(U) ~~(TS/NF)~~ E-3A.
(1) ~~(TS/NF)~~ NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 7 APR 80.
(2) ~~(TS/NF)~~ E-3A (604) LAUNCHED 280329Z APR 80 FOR E-3A/TF-70/
B-52 INTERFACE TRAINING IN NORTH ARABIAN SEA. MISSION PROFILE
HIGHLIGHTS AT PARA 2A BELOW.
(3) ~~(TS/NF)~~ AIRCRAFT STATUS:
(A) ~~(TS/NF)~~ ACFT 353 VMC (BLEED AIR DUCT).
(B) ~~(TS/NF)~~ ACFT 504 FMC AT LAUNCH.
(C) ~~(TS/NF)~~ KC-135.
(1) ~~(TS/NF)~~ NO KC-135 FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 7 APR 80.
(2) ~~(TS/NF)~~ KC-135 (317) LAUNCHED 280320Z APR 80 IN COMPANY
WITH E-3A FOR INITIAL E-3A REFUELING IN SUPPORT OF TF-70/B-52

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

8 8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

INTERFACE TRAINING. MISSION PROFILE PARA 2A BELOW.

- (3) (U) AIRCRAFT STATUS.
- (B) ~~(U)~~ ACFT 317 FMC AS OF LAUNCH.
- (C) ~~(U)~~ ACFT 538 FMC.
- (C) ~~(U)~~ ACFT 548 FMC.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
 1. ~~(TS/AF)~~ E-3A/KC-135. COMPLETE 8 APR 80 E-3A/TF-70/B-52
 INTERFACE MISSION IAW FOLLOWING PLANNED PROFILE. ALL TIMES
 ZULU, 8 APR 80:

TIME	EVENT
2320 (ACTUAL)	IC-135 LAUNCH.
2329 (ACTUAL)	E-3A LAUNCH.
2542 (ACTUAL)	COMPLETE AAR, KC-135 RETURNS [REDACTED]
2700 (ACTUAL)	E-3A ENTER TF-70 AO B-52 ACFT ENTER TF-70 AO. B-52 RECCE OF TARGET OF INTEREST. B-52 MINEY.
0825	AIR INTERCEPT ACTIVITY. KC-135 (2) LAUNCH. B-52 ACFT DPT TF-70 AO. E-3A DPT TF-70 AO. COMPLETE AAR 2 E-3A RECOVER [REDACTED] KC-135 (2) RECOVER [REDACTED]
0840	
0925	
1005	
1225	
1100	
1326	
1607	
1615	

3. ~~(TS/AF)~~ COMPLETE PLANNING FOR 9 APR 80 KC-135 REDEPLOYMENT
 TO [REDACTED] SCHEDULED DEPARTURES 090600Z, 090615Z AND
 090630Z APR 80.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE
 A. ~~(TS/AF)~~ MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 7 APR 80. ALL
 TITLES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1720-15 (C-130)	0656 [REDACTED]	1304 [REDACTED]	1,2

NOTE: 1. LOAD DATA PER REF A.
 (U) 2. RDN.
 5. ~~(TS/AF)~~ FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (300 GAL)
 (1) ~~(TS/AF)~~ AREA 1: 65.1 (99 PERCENT)
 (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
 AREA 3: 138.5 (92 PERCENT)
 R-9: 29.0 (100 PERCENT)
 R-14: 132.4 (66.2 PERCENT)
 (2) ~~(TS/AF)~~ NET FILL 7 APR 80 (0). 78.3 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE
 FILL. (U)

C. ~~(TS/AF)~~ BASE SUPPORT.
 (1) ~~(TS/AF)~~ INSTALLATION OF DEMINERALIZED WATER UNIT COMPLETE.
 PREPARING FOR OPERATIONAL TEST.
 (2) ~~(TS/AF)~~ TRENCHING OPERATIONS STARTED FOR ELECTRICAL
 DISTRIBUTION LINE. ELECTRICAL UPGRADE FOR COMMAND POST COMPLETED.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
~~(TS/AF)~~ MAC MISSION SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 8 APR 80. ALL

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
17 9(C-15)	0507 [REDACTED]	1300 [REDACTED]	1
	1415 [REDACTED]	2200 [REDACTED]	2 E
1780-15(C-130)	0730 [REDACTED]	1600 [REDACTED]	

NOTE: 1. LOAD DATA: MB-2 TOG, LOX CART, FOUR MISS FUEL TRLS.
2. VIA [REDACTED]

REV 38 APR 2002

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0025

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOFORN 1

ZCZCOPG635
DAN: 079-020144
IN: CDSN = UKA008
T: 00820Z APR 80 TOT: 00820Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==
INFO= CNCO(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=47

EYES ONLY

ZITMZYUW YOHANO 0006 0990547-MORH--YEKQOH,
NY AMCRN
ZK ZZ SOA DE
L 0 280546Z APR 80 ZYM
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
SSO SAC//DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR
COS ~~██████████~~ GMC//E
ZEM

FLASH

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2 VHM 1889 ECJ3-CAT
FINAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO RGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN
ADAMS, ROOM TESH, ~~██████████~~ FROM ROOM PACKER.
SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM ~~██████████~~ ITREP 118 AS OF 080700Z APR 80
~~██████████~~ E

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.
(1) ~~(S//NF)~~ WSC-3 AND TSC-85 SATCOM HAD NO OUTAGES.
(2) ~~(S//NF)~~ HF TTY CONNECTING ~~██████████~~ VIA ~~██████████~~
WAS 75 PERCENT. OUTAGE WAS FROM 1515Z TO 2130Z DUE TO NO RECEIVE
SIGNALS AT ~~██████████~~

6. (U) PERSONNEL:
A. ~~(S//NF)~~ STATUS: ~~██████████~~

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD	USAFE	12
E-3A	AWACH	90
SP	TAC	27
SVCS	TAC	23
MED	TAC	2

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

2

EN
EX ICS
REN WURSE
ALCE
COMMS

USAFE	2
TAC	20
USAFE	20
USAFE	18
MAC	2
USAREUR	8
JCSE	4
AFCC	70
TAC	14
USAFE	2
SAC	38

TOTAL: 352

EYES ONLY

POL

TANKER TASK FORCE

B. ~~(TS/NF)~~ STATUS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FUNCTION
LIAISON
E-3A
MC-130
COMMS

UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
USAFE	1
AWACH	1
USAFE	1
JCSE	4
TOTAL:	7

TOTAL: 7

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.
 8. ~~(TS/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
 REV# 8 APR 2000

SSC NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
 DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#2205

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

ZC7CD00361
D 070-231261
I CDSR = 0KAP55
TOP: 70746Z APR 80 TOT: ... 72747Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==
-INFO= DMCC(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTF=47

**NOFORN
EYES ONLY**

FLASH

ZITMZYN YDFAND 0002 0980632-MORF--YEKDH.
ZNY MORF
ZKZK ZZ SGA DE
Z O 070031Z APR 80 ZYS
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DC//
AFSSO TAC//DG//
SSO SAC//DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR
CD [REDACTED] /DMC// E

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1863 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, MGEN ADAMS, G E
RADM TESH [REDACTED] RADM PACKER.
SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 117 AS OF 070700Z APR 80 (TS/NF) E
A. SSO USEUCOM 060807Z MAR 80, VHN 1859 (SITREP 116) (TS/NF)(U)
1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (U) (TS/NF) E-3A.
(1) (TS/NF) E-3A (604) LAUNCHED 060707Z APR 80 FOR
E-3A FAMILIARIZATION FLIGHT. SIMULATION FAMILIARIZATION ONLY
WAS ACCOMPLISHED AS ALL [REDACTED] TARGET AND INTERCEPTOR SORTIES WERE
CANCELLED. SUSPECT CANCELLATION DUE DEATH OF [REDACTED] EARLY 6 APR E
80. AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE 3.6 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 061043Z
APP 80.
(2) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.
(A) (S/NF) ACFT 604 FMC.
(B) (S/NF) ACFT 353 NMC (BLEED AIRDUCT) ETIC
071000Z APR 80
B. (S/NF) KC-135
(1) (S/NF) NO KC-135 FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 6 APR 80.

EYES ONLY

Copy No 8 of 8

~~TOP SECRET~~ **NOFORN**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- (2) (U) ~~(S/NF)~~ AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.
 - (A) ~~(S/NF)~~ ACFT 536 FMC.
 - (B) ~~(S/NF)~~ ACFT 317 NMCS (PILOT ADI) ETIC 071700Z APR 80.
 - (C) ~~(S/NF)~~ ACFT 548 NMCS (ENGINE EXCITER) ETIC 071700Z

APR 80.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

- A. ~~(S/NF)~~ E-3A.
 - (1) ~~(S/NF)~~ NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 7 APR 80.
 - (2) ~~(S/NF)~~ E-3A LAUNCHES 080335Z APR 80 FOR E-3A/TF-70/B-52 INTERFACETRANING IN NORTH ARABIAN SEA. ESTIMATE ARRIVAL TF-70 AO 0507Z 7 APR 80 AND DEPARTURE 071100Z APR 80. E-3A TRANSITS ~~██████████~~ ENROUTE TO AND RETURN FROM TF-70 AO.

E

- B. ~~(S/NF)~~ KC-135.
 - (1) ~~(S/NF)~~ NO KC-135 FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 7 APR 80.
 - (2) ~~(S/NF)~~ KC-135 LAUNCHES 080320Z APR 80 AND IN COMPANY WITH E-3A FOR INITIAL E-3A REFUELING IN SUPPORT OF INTERFACE TRAINING CITED PARA 2A(2) ABOVE.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

- A. ~~(S/NF)~~ NO MAC MISSIONS CONDUCTED TO/FROM ~~██████████~~ 7 APR 80.
- B. ~~(S/NF)~~ FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL).
 - (1) ~~(S/NF)~~ AREAS 1-3, R-9 REFUELERS NO CHANGE. R-14 BLADDERS 140.4 (70 PERCENT). TOTAL 392.1 (83 PERCENT)
 - (2) ~~(S/NF)~~ NET FILL 7 APR 80 (27.3). 78.3 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

E

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

- ~~(S/NF)~~ MAC MISSION SCHEDULED TO/FROM ~~██████████~~ APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN#	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
-16(C-132)	0652 ██████████	1300 ██████████	1,2

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: LOX CART, MISC GEN CARGO, E-3A/ KC-135 PARTS.

E

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

- A. ~~(S/NF)~~ HF TTY, ~~██████████~~ D USAF VIA ~~██████████~~ AT 80 PERCENT BECAUSE OF BAD CRYPTO AND BAD RECEIVE-REPERFORATOR. PROBLEMS LOCATED AND CORRECTED.

- B. ~~(S/NF)~~ ALL OTHER COMM FULLY OPERATIONAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL. NO CHANGE

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. ~~(S/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REV# 7 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT. DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0002

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOD

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

ZCZCDPU573
DAN: 077-004067
INPUT CDSN = DKA795
TOP: 40923Z APR 80 TOT: 40925Z APR 80

AUTO=PTQ(1)

ACTION=** UI.ASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

1 Copy furnished [REDACTED] G

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTP=21

NOFORN

ZTTMZYQ* YDHAND 0010 0950150-MORN--YEKQGH.

ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SQA DE
Z O 040749Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF-386
FM SSD USEUCOM
TO J S/J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSS TAC//DO//
CINC SNAVEUR
COS [REDACTED] VMC//E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2 VHN 1029 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, RADM TESH,
[REDACTED] FROM PACKER

SUBJ: ~~TOP SECRET~~ E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 114 AS OF 040700Z APR 80. E
A. SSD USEUCOM 030801Z APR 80, VHN 1004 (SITREP 113) (TS/NF). (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (TS/NF) E-3A(353) LAUNCHED 030625Z APR 80 FOR FINAL E-3A/
TF-60 INTERFACE TRAINING IN CONJUNCTION WITH MEDITERRANEAN MULTIPLEX.
AIRCRAFT ON STATION 3.3 HOURS. TADIL-A WAS 100 PERCENT. FOUR FIGHTERS
AND ONE TANKER WERE CONTROLLED BY E-3A. AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE 10.5 HOURS
AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 031654Z APR 80. E

B. (U) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

- (1) (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 353 FMC.
- (2) (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 604 FMC.

C. (TS/NF) COMPLETED E-3A GROUND FAMILIARIZATION FOR FIVE
EAF CONTROLLERS.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS

A. (TS/NF) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 4 APR 80

B. (TS/NF) COMPLETE COORDINATION FOR 5 APR 80 US [REDACTED] E
FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U)
C. ~~(S/NF)~~ CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 8 APR 80
E-3A/TF-70/B-52 INTERFACE TRAINING.
3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE
A. ~~(S/NF)~~ MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] APR 80. ALL
TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-08(C-141)	0132 [REDACTED]	0550 [REDACTED]	1 [REDACTED] E
	0816 [REDACTED]	1625 [REDACTED]	VI [REDACTED]
1780-09(C-141)	0434 [REDACTED]	0858 [REDACTED]	1
	1049 [REDACTED]	1700 [REDACTED]	

(U) NOTE: 1. LOAD DATA PER REF A.
D. ~~(S/NF)~~ FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000GAL).

- (1) ~~(S/NF)~~ AREA 1: 65.0 (99 PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 83.0 (70 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- (U) R-14: 169.5 (84 PERCENT)

(2) ~~(S/NF)~~ NET FILL 3 APR 80 3.6. 66.7 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE
FILL.

(U) C. ~~(S/NF)~~ BASE SUPPORT
(1) ~~(S/NF)~~ INSTALLATION OF THREE WASHERS IN HANGER 6 COMPLETED.
ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS ON DINING HALL HOT WATER HEATER REPLACED.
BROKEN TAXIWAY LIGHT WIRING REPAIRED.

(2) ~~(S/NF)~~ ELECTRICAL UPGRADE OF BOO 1 COMPLETED. REALIGNING
OF WATER PLANT PIPEING CONTINUES.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
~~(S/NF)~~ MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 4 APR
80.

ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE [REDACTED] (DEPARTURES ACTUAL).

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-10(C-141)	0309/ [REDACTED]	0800/ [REDACTED]	1 E
	1015/ [REDACTED]	1600/ [REDACTED]	
1780-27(C-5)	0615/ [REDACTED]	1100/ [REDACTED]	2
	1515/ [REDACTED]	2100/ [REDACTED]	
1780-02(C-130)	0615/ [REDACTED]	1300/ [REDACTED]	3,4

- NOTES:
- 1. LOAD DATA: LOX CART, TWO 10 TON TRACTORS.
 - 2. LOAD DATA: GCA EQUIP (MPN--4, TWO VANS/TRLS)
 - 3. LOAD DATA: MISC GEN CARGO (5 PALLETS).
 - 4. RCN. ETD 050730Z APR 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.
A. ~~(S/NF)~~ WSC-3 SATCOM NET RELIABILITY 100 PERCENT.
B. ~~(S/NF)~~ TSC-85 SATCOM RELIABILITY ON EUROPEAN CIRCUITS 97 PERCENT.
C. ~~(S/NF)~~ HF RADIO DCS ENTRY CIRCUITS BEING USED FOR TEST
MESSAGES ONLY AND RELIABILITY APPROXIMATELY 90 PERCENT.
REVW 04 APR 2000

EYES ONLY

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

:0010

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0574
JAN: 077-024107
INPUT CDSN = DKA796
FOR: 40924Z APR 80 TOT: 40925Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=21

~~NOFORN~~

ZTTMZYUW YOHANO 0011 0950150-MORN--YEKQOM.

ZNY MORN

ZK7K ZZ SDA DE

Z O 040749Z APR 80 ZYM ZFF-386

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS/J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DD//

AFSSO TAC//DD//

CINCUSNAVEUR

CDS [REDACTED] /DMC// ~~EC~~

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF 2 VHN 1829 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, RADM TESH, G E

[REDACTED] FROM PACKER

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 114 AS OF 040700Z APR 80. ~~EC~~

5. (U) PERSONNEL:

(TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	10
E-3A	AKACH	89
SP	TAC	27
SVCS	TAC	23
ENG	TAC	18
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	24
RED HORSE	USAFE	18
ALCE	MAC	30
COMMS	USAREUR	8
	JCSE	3
	AFCC	63
POL	TAC	14
	USAFE	2

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. (TS/NF) STATUS	UNIT/CHD	TOTAL	329
FUNCTION		E	
IAISON	USAFE		TOTAL
E-3A	AWACW		1
MC-13E	USAFE		1
COMMS	JCSE		4
		TOTAL	7

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE
 8. (U) (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 4 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT,
 DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0011

~~NOFORN~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE 1

SOD

ZCZCDP0056
JAN: 076-010115
INPUT CDSN = DK4568
TOR: 31102Z APR 80 TOT: 31103Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==
INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTP=54

EYES ONLY

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0019 0940805-MORN--YEKQCH.
ZNY MORN
ZK7K ZZ SOA DE
Z 0 030801Z APR 80 ZYH
FROM: SSO USEUCOM
TO: JCS//J3//
INFO:
AFSSO USAF //DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR
COS [REDACTED] OMCI/E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1804 ECJ3-CAT

SECTION ONE OF TWO
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, RADM TESH,
[REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP 113 AS OF 030700Z APR 80. E
A. SSO USEUCOM 020758Z MAR 80, VHN 1784 (SITREP 112) (TS/NF). (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE
A. (U) (TS/NF) E-3A.

(1) (U) (TS/NF) E-3A (604) LAUNCHED 020628Z APR 80 FOR E-3A/TF-60
INTERFACE TRAINING IN CONJUNCTION WITH MEDITERRANEAN MULTIPLEX.
ACFT ON STATION 2.7 HOURS. MISSION SUCCESSFUL WITH OUTSTANDING
TADIL-A ON UHF AND GOOD CORRELATION CHECKS. TADIL-C WAS USED AND
SIX AIRCRAFT WERE CONTROLLED. HF RADIO CONTACT UNSUCCESSFUL DUE A
LOW AND UNREADABLE FREQUENCY. A DIFFERENT FREQUENCY HAS BEEN
COORDINATED FOR 3 APR 80 MISSION. AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE 10.3 HOURS
AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 21640Z APR 80.

(U) (2) (TS/NF) E-3A (353) LAUNCHED 030625Z APR 80 FOR FINAL
E-3A/TF-60 INTERFACE TRAINING IN CONJUNCTION WITH MEDITERRANEAN
MULTIPLEX. MISSION PROFILE SAME AS 2 APR 80.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(3) (U) AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- (A) ~~(S/NF)~~ ACFT 353 FMC AS OF LAUNCH.
- (B) ~~(S/NF)~~ ACFT 604 FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.
- ~~(S/NF)~~ MC-130 ACFT (3) LAUNCHED 020821Z APR 80 OR RE-DEPLOYMENT FROM [REDACTED] B VIA [REDACTED] (FUEL). ACFT CLOSED [REDACTED] 022004Z APR 80.

2. (U) OPERATIONS-PLANNED ACTIONS.

- A ~~(S/NF)~~ COMPLETE E-3A/TF-62 INTERFACE TRAINING CITED PARA 1A(2) ABOVE. ESTIMATE RECOVERY [REDACTED] 031630Z APR 80.
- B ~~(S/NF)~~ NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 4 APR 80.
- C ~~(S/NF)~~ CONTINUE PLANNING /COORDINATION FOR 5 APR 80 E-3A/EAF FAMILIARIZATION:ORIENTATION FLIGHT.

3. (U) LOGISTICS-ACTIONS TO DATE.

- A ~~(S/NF)~~ MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 2 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-04(C-141)	0743 [REDACTED]	1213 [REDACTED]	1
1780-06(C-141)	1401 [REDACTED]	1950 [REDACTED]	2
1780-07(C-141)	0945 [REDACTED]	1425 [REDACTED]	3
	1702 [REDACTED]	2310 [REDACTED]	
	1217 [REDACTED]	1645 [REDACTED]	
	1856 [REDACTED]	030055 [REDACTED]	

- NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA : WATER TANK, REFRIG UNIT
 2. LOAD DATA: WATER TNL, 40 FT FLATBED TRL
 3. LOAD DATA: 40 FT FLATBED TRL

B. (U) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL):

- (1) ~~(S/NF)~~ AREA 1: 65.1 (99PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 104.4 (88.1 PERCENT)
- R-14: 144.9 (72.4 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- TOTAL: 400.4 (85.2 PERCENT)

- (2) ~~(S/NF)~~ NET FILL 2 APR 80 (6.4). 70.0 REQUIRED TO

COMPLETE FILL.
REVW 3 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELVIER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELVIER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

10019

INNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NOFORN~~

ZCZCDP003A
DAN: 076-007737
INPUT CDSN = DK455A
FOR: 31054Z APR 80 TOT: 31055Z APR 80

AUTC== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

EYES ONLY

INFO= DNCO(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
PTR=78

TTMZYUW YDHANO 0020 0940805-MORN--YEKDOM.
NY MMORN
KZK ZZ SOA DE
O 030901Z APR 80 ZYM
FROM: SSO USEUCOM
TO: JCS//J3//

INFO:
FSSO USAF //DO//
FSSO TAC //DO//
INCUSNAVEUR
OS [REDACTED] OMC//E
EM

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ EYES ONLY 1804 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, RADM TESH,
[REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

SUBJ: HW USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 113 AS OF 030700Z APR 80

(U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
A. (TS/NF)-MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 3 APR 80.
ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

SN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
780-08(C-141)	0132 [REDACTED]	0600 [REDACTED]	1,2
	0815 [REDACTED]	1330 [REDACTED]	
780-09(C-141)	0434 [REDACTED]	0900 [REDACTED]	1,3
	1115 [REDACTED]	1700 [REDACTED]	

- NOTES: 1. [REDACTED] DEPARTURE TIMES ACTUAL.
2. LOAD DATA: FLATBED TRL, R-14 TRL, HB485 DEMIN
3. LOAD DATA: WATER TRL, AM-2 MATTING, M-52

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (U) COMMUNICATIONS: ALL COMMUNICATIONS ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL.
- (U) PERSONNEL:
- A. ~~(TS/NF)~~ STATUS [REDACTED]

E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
MO ELEMENT	USAFE	10
-3A	AWACW	90
P	TAC	27
VCS	TAC	23
NG	TAC	18
MG/SVCS	USAFE	25
ED HORSE	USAFE	18
LCE	MAC	30
OMMS	USAREUR	8
	JCSE	3
	AFCC	63
DL	TAC	14
	USAFE	2
	TOTAL	331

- B. ~~(TS/NF)~~ STATUS - [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
IAISON	USAFE	1
-3A	AWACW	1
C-130	USAFE	1
OMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	7

E

- C. ~~(TS/NF)~~ STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.
 - (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.
 - ~~(TS/NF)~~ REMARKS. PREPARING FOR CSAF VISIT TO [REDACTED] ON APR 80. WEATHER OUTLOOK FAVORABLE. AUGMENTED ALCE NOW PERMITS ONE PLUS THIRY TURN AROUND ON C-141 TRAFFIC.
 - ~~(TS/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL ASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
- EVW 3 APR 2000
- SO NOTE: DELVIER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
 DELVIER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

0020

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLASH

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN

EYES ONLY

ZC7CDPQ402

DAN: 075-011151

INPUT CDSN = DKA210

TOR: 21113Z APR 80 TOT: 21114Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

COPY PROVIDED TO OPG [REDACTED]

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=25

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ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0019 0930810-MORN--YEKQOH,

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SGA DE

Z 0 020758Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

AFSSO TAC//DO//

CINCUSNAVEUR

COS [REDACTED] /OMC//E

ZEM

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~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1784 ECJ3-CAT

SEC 1 OF 2

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, RADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM Packer

SUBJ: ~~NOFORN~~ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 112 AS OF 020700Z APR 80. E

A. SSO USEUCOM 010732Z MAR 80, VHN 1757 (SITREP 111) (S/NF). (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (S/NF) E-3A.

(1) (S/NF) E-3A (353) COMPLETED DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] 011242Z APR 80. AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE 9.4 HOURS (010317Z - 011242Z APR 80). E

INTERFACE TRAINING WITH TF-60 CONDUCTED ENROUTE. TADIL- NET ESTABLISHED WITH BOTH TG 60.1 AND 60.2. COMMUNICATIONS POOR DURING MOST OF MISSION AND UHF CONTACT NOT ESTABLISHED. POOR COMMUNICATIONS PRECLUDED FIGHTER ACTIVITY AND TRACK DATA CORRELATION.

(2) (S/NF) E-3A (604) LAUNCHED 020628Z APR 80 FOR E-3A/TF-60 INTERFACE IN CONJUNCTION WITH MEDITERRANEAN MULTIPLEX. ESTIMATE ACFT ON-STATION 021030Z APR 80 AND RECOVERY [REDACTED] 021830Z APR 80. E

(3) (U) AIRCRAFT STATUS:

(A) (S/NF) ACFT 353 FMCD (ONE CHAIN INOP) AS OF THIS REPORT.

(B) (S/NF) ACFT 604 FMC AS OF LAUNCH.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN EYES ONLY

B. (TS/NF) MC-130.

(1) (TS/NF) NO MC-130 LOCAL OR US [REDACTED] FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHTS CONDUCTED 1 APR 80. E

(2) (TS/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

(A) (TS/NF) ACFT 523 FMC

(B) (TS/NF) ACFT 555 FMC

(C) (TS/NF) ACFT 566 FMC

(4) (TS/NF) COMPLETED COORDINATION FOR 2 APR 80 MC-130 REDEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] AB.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A.

H (1) (TS/NF) COMPLETE E-3A/TF 60 INTERFACE TRAINING MISSION LAUNCHED PER PARA 1(A) (2) ABOVE.

(2) (TS/NF) COMPLETE COORDINATION FOR 3 APR 80 E-3A/TF 60 INTERFACE TRAINING. MISSION PROFILE PLANNED SAME AS 2 APR 80.

B. (TS/NF) MC-130 [REDACTED] ACFT [REDACTED] ESTIMATE ARRIVAL [REDACTED] APR 80. FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED]

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 1 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-05(C-141)	0757Z [REDACTED]	1405Z [REDACTED]	1
	1540Z [REDACTED]	2130Z [REDACTED]	
1780-03(C-141)	0811Z [REDACTED]	1520Z [REDACTED]	2
	1620Z [REDACTED]	2205Z [REDACTED]	

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA PER REF A.
2. E-3A SUPPORT.

B. (TS/NF) FUEL SUPPLY AS OF THIS REPORT (200 GAL).

(1) (TS/NF) AREA 1: 65.1 (99 PERCENT)

(U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)

AREA 3: 104.4 (95 PERCENT)

R-14: # 151.4 (75 PERCENT)

R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)

(U) TOTAL: 406.9 (86 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 1 APR 80 (8.1). 63.4 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

C. (TS/NF) BASE SUPPORT.

(1) (TS/NF) ~~LARGE FANS INSTALLED~~ IN DINING HALL. 220V LIGHTING CONNECTED IN HANGER 8 FOR FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL. NEW SECURITY DOOR INSTALLED AT HANGER 5.

(2) (TS/NF) INSTALLING ELECTRICAL PANEL AT WATER PLANT. REWIRING OF 6001 CONTINUES.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 2 APR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU. E

REVW 02 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT. DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0019

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLASH TOP SECRET NOFORN EYES ONLY

PAGE 1

ZC7COPQ484
DAN: 075-011242
INPUT CDSN = OKA212
TOR: 21114Z APR 80 TOT: 21115Z APR 80

AUTO>** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION>** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=40

ZITMZYUW YOHANO 0020 0930610-MORN--YEKQNH.

ZNY HMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 020758Z APR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

AFSSO TAC//DO//

CINCUSNAVEUR

COS ~~REDACTED~~ OMC//TE

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN. 1784 ECJ3-CAT

SEC 2 OF 2

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, RADM TESH, G E

~~REDACTED~~ FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A ~~REDACTED~~ SITREP 112 AS OF 020700Z APR 80. E

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1780-04(C-141)	0545/ REDACTED	1030/ REDACTED	1
	1245/ REDACTED	1830/ REDACTED	.
1780-06(C-41)	0415/ REDACTED	0900/ REDACTED	2 E
	1115/ REDACTED	1700/ REDACTED	
1780-07(C-141)	0715/ REDACTED	1200/ REDACTED	2
	1415/ REDACTED	2000/ REDACTED	
1780-08(C-141)	0915/ REDACTED	1400/ REDACTED	3
	1615/ REDACTED	2200/ REDACTED	

- NOTES: 1. E-3A SPT.
2. 40 FT TRAILER, WATER TANK.
3. MISC GEN CARGO.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

HA. (S/NF) WSC-3 SATCOM WAS 100 PERCENT.

B. (TS/NF) TSC-85 TRUNK WAS 96 PERCENT. OUTAGE WAS FROM 1824Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ **NOFORN EYES ONLY**

TO 1920Z DUE TO SWAPPING OF UP CONVERTER AND MODEM CARD A [REDACTED]
C (TS/NF) TTY CIRCUIT CONNECTING USAFE AND [REDACTED] VIA TSC-
85 SATCOM WAS 61.6 PERCENT. OUTAGES WERE:

- 1115Z - 1213Z BAD PATCH [REDACTED]
- 1213Z - 1320Z REPLACED TTY RIBBON MECHANISM A [REDACTED]
- 1437Z - 1824Z CRYPTO PROBLEMS AT [REDACTED]
- 1824Z - 1920Z TSC-85 TRUNK WAS DOWN
- 2230Z - 0001Z [REDACTED] TECH CONTROL RELOCATED ISOLATION RELAYS

E

D (TS/NF) HF TTY CONNECTING RAMSTEIN AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WAS 73.2 PERCENT OUTAGES WERE:
0105Z - 0202Z BAD TTY EQUIPMENT AT [REDACTED]
1618Z - 2150Z [REDACTED] TECH CONTROL REWIRED CIRCUITS.

6. (U) PERSONNEL.

A (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	9
E-3A	AWACH	82
SP	TAC	27
SVCS	TACH	24
ENG	TAC	19
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	23
RED HORSE	USAFE	17
ALCE	MAC	30
COMMS	USAREUR	8
	JCSE	3
	AFCC	72
POL	TAC	14
	USAFE	2
MC-130	USAFE	45
OTHER	--	6
	TOTAL	381

B (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACH	1
MC-130	USAFE	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	7

E

C. (U/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS NO CHANGE.

8. (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 02 APR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVERHTO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0020

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PAGE 1

07CDP0703

N: 273-025316

INPUT CDSN = DK4870

TOR: 10951Z APR 80

TOT: 10952Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

COPY PROVIDED TO OPG [REDACTED]

FLASH

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=25

EYES ONLY

ZTTMZYUW YDHAND 0011 0920745-MORN--YEKDDH,

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SDA DE

Z O 010732Z APR 80 ZYH

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS //J3//

INFO AFSSO USAF //DO//

AFSSO TAC //DO//

CINCUSNAVEUR

COS [REDACTED] //DMC// E

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1757 ECJ3-CAT

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH,

RADM TESH [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER

SECTION ONE OF TWO

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 111 AS OF 010700Z APR 80 E

APR 80.

A. SSO USEUCOM 310641Z MAR 80, VHN 1729 (SITREP 110) (TS/NOFORN) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NOFORN) E-3A.

(1) (TS/NOFORN) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 31 MAR 80.

(2) (TS/NOFORN) E-3A (353) LAUNCHED 010317Z APR 80 FOR DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] AND ENROUTE INTERFACE TRAINING WITH

CTF-60. ESTIMATE RECOVERY [REDACTED] 011330Z APR 80.

(3) (TS/NOFORN) AIRCRAFT STATUS:

(A) (TS/NOFORN) ACFT 604 FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.

(B) (TS/NOFORN) ACFT 353 FMC (ONE CHAIN INOP)

B. (TS/NOFORN) (01130Z APR 80) (DMC-130) LOCAL OR US [REDACTED] FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHTS CONDUCTED 31 MAR 80. ACET 566 NMC

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(U) (S/NOFORN) (B) (BLEED AIR LEAK) AS OF THIS REPORT, ETC. UNKNOWN

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (U) (S/NOFORN) E-3A.

(1) (U) (S/NOFORN) COMPLETE DEPLOYMENT OF ACFT 353 TO [REDACTED] 1 APR 80.

(2) (U) (S/NOFORN) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 2-3 APR 80 INTERFACE TRAINING WITH CTF-60. MISSIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH MEDITERRANEAN MULTIPLEX AND WILL BE FLOWN ROUND ROBIN FROM [REDACTED]

B. (U) (S/NOFORN) MC-130. IF REPAIRED, ACFT 566 LAUNCHES PM 1 APR 80 FOR LOCAL AREA UNILATERAL TRAINING MISSION TO INCLUDE HALO DROP OF CCT MEMBERS AND PILOT PROFICIENCY.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (S/NOFORN) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 01 MAR 80.

ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTES
1730-49(C-141)	0415 [REDACTED]	0858 [REDACTED]	1
	1026 [REDACTED]	0616 [REDACTED]	
1730-48(C-141)	0532 [REDACTED]	1005 [REDACTED]	1
	1210 [REDACTED]	180 [REDACTED]	
1730-39(C-130)	0520 [REDACTED]	1400 [REDACTED]	1,2

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA PER REF A.

(U) 2. RON, ETD (10730Z APR 80).

B. (U) (S/NOFORN) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (200 GAL).

(U) (S/NOFORN) AREAS 1-3, R-9 REFUELERS NO CHANGE.

(U) (U) R-14 BLADDERS: 152.7 (76 PERCENT).

(U) (S/NOFORN) NET FILL 31 MAR 80 (15.9). 55.2 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

C. (U) (S/NOFORN) BASE SUPPORT. 220V POWER INSTALLED IN HANGER 4. SEVEN LATRINES COMPLETED AND STORED IN HANGER 12. UPGRADING OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS FOR DORMS CONTINUES.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(U) (S/NOFORN) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 1 APR 80.

ALL TIMES ARE ZULU, ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTES
1780-05(C-141)	0800 [REDACTED]	1245 [REDACTED]	1
	1500 [REDACTED]	2100 [REDACTED]	
1780-03(C-141)	0815 [REDACTED]	1300 [REDACTED]	2
	1515 [REDACTED]	2100 [REDACTED]	
1780-04(C-141)	0915 [REDACTED]	1400 [REDACTED]	2
	1615 [REDACTED]	2200 [REDACTED]	

REVW 1 APR 2000
#0011

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PAGE 1

CDPO704

073-025333

OUTPUT CDSN = DKA871

TOR: 10952Z APR 80 TOT: 10953Z APR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

FLASH

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=25

EYES ONLY

ZTMMZYUW YDHAND 0012 0920745-MORN--YEKQDH,

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 010732Z APR 80 ZYH

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS //J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//

AFSSO TAC //DO//

CINCUSNAVEUR

//OMC// E

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1757 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH,
RADM TESH, FROM RADM PACKER

SECTION TWO OF TWO

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3 [REDACTED] SITREP 111 AS OF 010700Z
APR 80. E

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: MISC GEN CARGO,
2. E-3A SUPPORT.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. (TS/NF) WSC-3 VOICE AND TTY WERE 100 PERCENT.

B. (TS/NF) HF TTY CIRCUIT TO [REDACTED] WAS 80 PERCENT. OUT-
AGES WERE 1125Z TO 1525Z [REDACTED] TRANSMITTING ONLY SPACES

AND 1530Z TO 1625Z TECH CONTROL SEIZURE AT [REDACTED].
C. (TS/NF) TSC-85 TRUNK WAS 85 PERCENT. OUTAGES WERE 0851Z
TO 0951Z TRANSMISSIONS WERE GARBLED AND 1530Z TO 1625Z THE
TD-660 EQUIPMENT WAS SWAPPED OUT AT [REDACTED]. E

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CHD	TOTAL
CHD ELEMENT	USAFE	13

PAGE 2

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E	AWACH	42
SP	TAC	27
SVCS	TAC	24
ENG	TAC	19
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	23
RED HORSE	USAFE	17
ALCE	MAC	30
COMMS	USAREUR	11
	JCSE	15
	AFCC	70
POL	TAC	14
	USAFE	22
MC-130	USAFE	45
OTHER	--	6
	TOTAL	358

B. ~~(TS/NF)~~ STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACH	1
MC-130	USAFE	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	7

E

C. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.
 7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. ~~(TS/NF)~~ REMARKS: WARMER TEMPERATURES CAUSING ASPHALT SOFTEN TO THE POINT THAT NORTH RAMP IS NOT BEING USED IN AFTERNOON FOR LOADED C-141. RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY NOT YET IMPACTED BY HEAT, BUT COULD BE AS TEMPATURES INCREASE.

9. ~~(TS/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
 DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

REVW 1 APR 2000
 #0012

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PAGE 1

CDPO13E

IS: 270-044574

OUT CDSN = DKA372

IR: 281141Z MAR 80 TOT: 281141Z MAR 80

UTO>** UNASSIGNFC **

COPY PROVIDED TO OPG [REDACTED]

ACTION>** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 20001

R1R=24

CY NR

J30	1
J31	1
J32	
OPG	Copy
J33	2
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J34	
J35	
J38	
FILE	1

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ZTTHZYUW YDHAND 0013 0881012-MORN--YFKDQH.

ZNY MMGRN

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Z O 281141Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF-124

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

AFSSO TAC//DO//

CINCUSMAVEHR

COS [REDACTED] /OMC// E

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 2 VHN 1678 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER INFO RGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH,
RADM TESH [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 107 AS OF 280700Z MAR 80 E

A. SSO USEUCOM 271145Z MAR 80, VHN 1654 (SITREP 106) (S/NOFORN)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

(S/NOFORN) E-3A, E-3A (353) LAUNCHED 270934Z MAR 80

FOR E-3A/OTF-60 INTERFACE TRAINING IN CONJUNCTION WITH MULTIPLEX
(MEDITERRANEAN). INTEROPERABILITY TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED WITH
CIG-60.2 (SARATOGA). TADIL-A NET ESTABLISHED. SIX F-4 ACFT
WERE CONTROLLED (VOICE ONLY) IN THE EXECUTION OF TEN INTER-
CEPTS. E-3A ARRIVED ON STATION LATE DUE TO 44 MINUTE ATC DELAY
AND AERIAL REFUELING CORRIDOR ALPHA WAS UNAVAILABLE. PROBLEMS
WERE EXPERIENCED IN DATA CORRELATION ON TADIL-A TRACKS AND
E-3A WAS UNABLE TO CONTROL ON TADIL-C. LATE ARRIVAL ON
STATION AND SHORT STATION TIME PRECLUDED FULL ANALYSIS OF
THE PROBLEM. PARTICULAR ATTENTION WILL BE GIVEN THESE AREAS
ON 28 MAR 80 MISSION. AIRCRAFT ATROPNF 0.4 HOURS AND
RECOVERED [REDACTED] 271845Z MAR 80. ACFT 353 AND 604 FMC AS
OF THIS REPORT.

B. (S/NOFORN) MC-130

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EYES ON
NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EYES ONLY

PAGE 2

(1) (S//NOFORN) MC-130 (566) LAUNCHED 270705Z MAR 80 FOR AIR INTERCEPT PROFILE. AT 270800Z MAR 80 [REDACTED] THAT INTERCEPT ACFT HAD BEEN CANCELLED DUE TO WEATHER. ACFT RETURNED TO [REDACTED] OR HSLADS BUNDLE DROP AND [REDACTED] AT 271223Z MAR 80.

ACFT AIRBORNE 5.4 HOURS. ACFT PROCEEDED TO [REDACTED] SHUTDOWN. NECESSARY PARTS TO BE FORWARDED TO [REDACTED] FOR ACFT REPAIR.

(2) (U) (S//NOFORN) AIRCRAFT 566 NKC [REDACTED].

ENGINE CHANGE REQUIRED.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (U) (S//NOFORN) E-3A LAUNCHES AM 28 MAR 80 FOR E-3A/CTF-60 MULTIPLEX INTERFACE TRAINING.

B. (U) (S//NOFORN) MC-130 PLANNED [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT REPAIR.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (S//NOFORN) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 27 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1146-01 (C-141)	0115 [REDACTED]	0621 [REDACTED]	1
	0813 [REDACTED]	1410 [REDACTED]	2
1130-02 (C-141)	0456 [REDACTED]	DIVER [REDACTED]	1
1130-03 (C-141)	0816 [REDACTED]	1300 [REDACTED]	2
	1520 [REDACTED]	2004 [REDACTED]	
1730-42 (C-141)	1209 [REDACTED]	DIVERT [REDACTED]	2
REVW 27 MAR 2000			

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0013

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~~TOP SECRET~~

EVES ONLY

TOR: 281143Z MAR 80 TOT: 281143Z MAR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=23

NOFORN

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0014 0881012-MORN--YEKDOH.
ZNY MMORN
ZY7K Z7 SOA DE
Z O 281117 MAR 80 ZYH ZFF-1&4
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DD//
AFSSO TAC//DD//
CINCUSNAVEUR
COST [REDACTED] /DMC// E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES FINAL SECTION OF 2 VHN 1678 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER INFO RGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH, G E
RADM TESH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER.
SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3 [REDACTED] SITREP 107 AS OF 280700Z MAR 80 E

- DTED: 1. LOAD DATA PROVIDED SEPARATELY.
2. LOAD DATA PER REF A.

B. (S//NOFORN) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

- (1) (S//NOFORN) AREAS 1-3, R-9 REFUELERS NO CHANGE.
(U) R-14 BLADDERS: 116.2 (58 PERCENT)
(U) TOTAL: 385.7 (82 PERCENT)

(2) (S//NOFORN) NET FTL 27 MAR 80 (8.4) R4.6
REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FTL. NOTE: AN ADDITIONAL FOUR ACFT
WILL REQUIRE FUEL 28 MAR 80 FURTHER DRAWING DOWN AVAILABLE
SUPPLY.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS:

(S//NOFORN) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED]
28 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	OPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
112R-01(C-141)	0130 [REDACTED]	0601 [REDACTED]	

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EVES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

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PAGE 2

1130-01 (C-141)

0815

1400

1730-42 (C-141)

0413

0851

1130-06 (C-141)

1115

1815

0755

1030

1245

1830

0730

1200

1415

2000

NOTE 1: VIA [REDACTED]

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

A. (U) (S/N OFORN) WSC-3 SATCOM 100 PERCENT OPERATIONAL.

B. (U) (S/N OFORN) TSC-88 SATCOM RELIABILITY 76 PERCENT.

6. (U) (S/N OFORN) PERSONNEL. DEPARTURES 27 MAR 80 TOTALD 17. E

TOTAL NOW [REDACTED] 257. OTHER LOCATIONS NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. (U) (S/N OFORN) REMARKS: TEMPERATURES CONTINUE ABOVE THE 100 DEGREE MARK.

9. (U) (S/N OFORN) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVN 27 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.

DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0014

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EYES ONLY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NOFORN EYES ONLY

PAGE 1

TOT: 310932Z MAR 80

ZNY 310932Z MAR 80 0910725-MORN--YEKDDH.

ZNY 310932Z MAR 80
FM 310932Z MAR 80
TO 310932Z MAR 80
INFO AFHQ//DC//
AFHQ//DC//
COM 310932Z MAR 80

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1729 ECJ3-CAT.
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH,
FROM RADM PACKER.

SEC 1 OF 1
SUBJ: USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 109 AS OF 310700Z MAR 80.

A. USEUCOM 302931Z MAR 80, VHN 1720 (SITREP 109)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) E-3A.
(1) E-3A (604) LAUNCHED 302520Z MAR 80 FOR DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] E-3A/CTF-11 INTERFACE TRAINING CONDUCTED ENROUTE. RADAR CORRELATION WAS WITHIN TOLERANCE AND TAOIL-4/LINK 11 WAS OPERATIONAL FROM 0845-1045Z. E-3A CONTROLLED FIVE F-4J ACFT FROM THE USS SARATOGA (TAOIL-4). COORDINATION WITH AIR WARFARE CDR OUTSTANDING. WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT WAS LIMITED AFTER LINK 11 FAILED AT 1045Z. ACFT DEPARTED ORBIT 1045Z TO MEET REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE. AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE 9.9 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 301525Z MAR 80.

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY

(U) ~~(S/NF)~~ AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

- 1 ~~(S/NF)~~ ACFT 353 FMC.
- 2 ~~(S/NF)~~ ACFT 604 FMC.
- 8. ~~(S/NF)~~ MC-130. NO MC-130 FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 30 MAR 80.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

- A. ~~(S/NF)~~ E-3A.
- (1) ~~(S/NF)~~ E-3A. NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 31 MAR 80.

(2) ~~(S/NF)~~ COMPLETE COORDINATION FOR 1 APR 80 DEPLOYMENT OF E-3A (353) TO [REDACTED]

(3) ~~(S/NF)~~ CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 2-3 APR 80 E-3A/CTF-60 INTERFACE TRAINING IN CONJUNCTION WITH MEDITERRANEAN MULTIPLEX. E-3A FLIGHT PROFILE TO BE ROUND ROBIN [REDACTED]

8. ~~(S/NF)~~ MC-130. NO MC-130 FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 31 MAR 80. ACFT 566 REPAIRED AND FMC [REDACTED] OF THIS REPORT.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. ~~(S/NF)~~ MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 30 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	SPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-46(C-141)	0549/[REDACTED]	1036/[REDACTED]	1
	1238/[REDACTED]	1830/[REDACTED]	
1730-44(C-141)	0824/[REDACTED]	1326/[REDACTED]	2
	1419/[REDACTED]	2130/[REDACTED]	
1730-47(C-141)	0916/[REDACTED]	1406/[REDACTED]	3
	1547/[REDACTED]	2200/[REDACTED]	
1730-38(C-130)	1730/[REDACTED]	3101/[REDACTED]	

- NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: MISC GENERAL CARGO.
 2. SUPPORT E-3A DEPLOYMENT.
 3. LOAD DATA: TWO FIRE TRUCKS (P-4 AND P-10), FOAM.

8. ~~(S/NF)~~ FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL):

- (1) ~~(S/NF)~~ AREA 1: 65.1 (99 PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 111.3 (95 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14: 168.6 (84 PERCENT)
- (U) TOTAL: 431.2 (95 PERCENT)

(2) ~~(S/NF)~~ NET FILL 30 MAR 80 29.9. 39.4 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

C. ~~(S/NF)~~ BASE SUPPORT.

(1) ~~(S/NF)~~ TWO DOUBLE PORTABLE LATRINES COMPLETED FOR NORTH END. SECURITY DOOR AT HANGER 5 REPAIRED. RUNWAY SWEEPING OPERATIONS STARTED.

(2) ~~(S/NF)~~ REWIRING AND INSTALLATION OF OUTLETS IN FOUR DORMS COMPLETED. TWO LATRINES REWIRED AND RECEPTACLES INSTALLED.

REVH 31 MAR 2000

Mooyok!

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.

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EYES ONLY

PAGE 3

DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.



#0002

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EYES ONLY

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NOFORN



FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZI 0303
072-032476
INPUT CDSN = DKA675
TOR: 310936Z MAR 80

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~~NOFORN~~

PAGE 1

TOT: 310937Z MAR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

EYES ONLY

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=55

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ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 310641Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 8 6

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

AFSSO TAC //DO//

CINCUSNAVEUR

CC [REDACTED] /OMC// E

Z

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1729 ECJ3-CAT.
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN WELCH,
RADM TESH, [REDACTED] OM RADM PACKER.

SEC 2 OF 2

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 110 AS OX 310700Z E
MAR 80.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 31 MAR
80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-49(C-141)	0415 [REDACTED]	0900 [REDACTED]	1
	1115 [REDACTED]	1700 [REDACTED]	
1730-48(C-141)	0515 [REDACTED]	1000 [REDACTED]	2
	1215 [REDACTED]	1820 [REDACTED]	
1730-39(C-130)	0615 [REDACTED]	1400 [REDACTED]	3,4

- NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: MISC GEN CARGO.
2. LOAD DATA: TRENCHER, H-TRACTOR, FOAM.
3. LOAD DATA: MISC GEN CARGO
4. RON, ETD 010730Z MAR 80.
5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS. ALL COMMUNICATIONS FULLY OPERATIONS.
6. (U) PERSONNEL:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	11
E-3A	AWACH	43
SP	TAC	27
SVCS	TAC	21
ENG	TAC	19
ENG/SVC	USAFE	23
RED HORSE	USAFE	16
ALCE	MAC	30
COMMS	USAREUR	9
	UCSE	15
	AFCC	68
POL	TAC	14
	USAFE	22
MC-130	USAFE	45
OTHER	-	6
	TOTAL	349

B. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACH	1
MC-130	USAFE	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	7

C. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE. E

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. (S/NF) REMARKS: SHORTAGE OF BILLET SPACE NOW EXISTS AS POPULATION SURGED TO OVER 300. MAXIMUM CAPACITY NORMAL OPERATIONS REMAINS APPROX 300. PERSONNEL NOW PLACED IN HANGER OPEN BAYS.

9. (U) (S/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. REVW 31 MAR 2003

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT. DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING OUTY HOURS. #0003

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~
PAGE 1

DPQ793
D...: 071-042503
INPUT CDSN = DKA668
TOR: 291132Z MAR 80 TOT: 291133Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1) -

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=24

FLASH

ZTTMZYUW YDHAND 0013 0890903-MORN--YEKQOH,
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z 290902Z MAR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS. //J3//
INFO AFSSD USAFE //DO//
AFSSD TAC //DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ //DMC// E

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1708 ECJS-CAT
SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS.
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER INFO BGEN LARSON, MGENWELCH,
RADM TESH, FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A (SITREP 108 AS OF 290700Z MAR 80)
A. SSO USEUCOM 281011Z MAR 80, VHN 1678 (SITREP 107) (TS/NOFORN)-

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (U)(S/NF) E-3A (603) LAUNCHED 281016Z MAR 80 FOR E-3A/CTF-60
INTERFACE TRAINING IN CONJUNCTION WITH MEDITERRANEAN MULTIPLEX.
ACFT DELAYED 55 MINUTES DUE FUEL DOWNLOAD FOR CROSSWIND/WET
RUNWAY. TADIL-A NET ESTABLISHED AND TADIL-C INTERCEPTS WERE
CONDUCTED. TWO ACFT WERE CONTROLLED IN THE CONDUCT OF FOUR
INTERCEPT MISSIONS. AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE 8.4 HOURS AND RECOVERED

281849Z MAR 80.
(2) (U)(S/NF) AIR CRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:
(A) (U)(S/NF) ACFT 604 FMC.
(B) (U)(S/NF) ACFT 353 NMC (BOTH CHAINS INOP) EIC TBD.
B. (U)(TS/NF) ~~NO MC-130. (NO MC-130 FLIGHTS ACTIVELY CONDUCTED~~
28 MAR 80. ACFT 566 REMAINS NMC DUE DECOUPLED PROP. REPAIR

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~~NOFORN~~

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PARTS ON BOARD MAC 1730-38.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (U) (S/NF) E-3A.

(1) (U) (S/NF) E-3A LAUNCHES 290920Z MAR 80 FOR E-3A/CTF-60 INTERFACE TRAINING IN CONJUNCTION WITH MEDITERRANEAN MULTIPLEX. ESTIMATE RECOVERY [REDACTED] 291800Z MAR 80.

(2) (U) (S/NF) [REDACTED] PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 30 AND 31 DEPLOYMENT OF E-3A AIRCRAFT TO [REDACTED]

B. (U) (S/NF) MC-130 FLIGHT ACTIVITY TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT REPAIR.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (S/NF) [REDACTED] MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 28 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1120-01(C-141)	0130/[REDACTED]	0601/[REDACTED]	
	0816/[REDACTED]	1416/[REDACTED]	
1730-01(C-141)	0413/[REDACTED]	0851/[REDACTED]	
	1300/[REDACTED]	1846/[REDACTED]	
1730-42(C-141)	0755/[REDACTED]	1017/[REDACTED]	
	1218/[REDACTED]	1810/[REDACTED]	
1730-06(C-141)	0730/[REDACTED]	1208/[REDACTED]	
	1333/[REDACTED]	1925/[REDACTED]	

EYES ONLY

B. (U) (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL).

- (1) (U) (S/NF) AREA 1: 65.1 (99 PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 3: 118.4 (100 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14: 126.5 (63 PERCENT)
- TOTAL: 396.0 (84 PERCENT)

(2) (U) (S/NF) NET FILL 28 MAR 80 10.3 74.3 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(U) (S/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 29 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-43(C-141)	0220/[REDACTED]	0700/[REDACTED]	1
	0915/[REDACTED]	1500/[REDACTED]	
1730-45(C-141)	0655/[REDACTED]	1132/[REDACTED]	2
	1315/[REDACTED]	1900/[REDACTED]	
1730-38(C-130)	0627/[REDACTED]	1300/[REDACTED]	2,3
1130-02(C-141)	0925/[REDACTED]	1200/[REDACTED]	
	1415/[REDACTED]	2000/[REDACTED]	

- NOTE: 1. TIMES ACTUAL
- 2. DEPARTURE TIME ACTUAL
- 3. RON ETD 300730Z MAR 80

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

A. (U) (S/NF) RELIABILITY OF WSC - 3 SATCOM NET AND TSC-85 EUROPEAN CIRCUITS 100 PERCENT.

B. (U) (S/NF) HF RADIO RELIABILITY 92 PERCENT. TWO HOUR

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~~NOFORN~~

MESSAGE DUE TRANSMITTER FAILURE [REDACTED] E
REVW 29 MAR 2000

PAGE 3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.
#0013

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~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDPQ786
DANI 071-042366
INPUT CDSN = OKA665
TOR: 291120Z MAR 80 TOT: 291121Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DNCO(1) -

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=24

EYES ONLY

FLASH

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0014 0890903-MORN--YEKQNH,
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 290902Z MAR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO: JCS //J3//
INFO: AFSSO USAFE //DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR
COS [REDACTED] //OMC// E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1700 ECJ3-CAT
SECTION FINAL OF TWO
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER INFO BGEN LARSON, MGEN
WELCH [REDACTED], RADM TESH, FROM FROM PACKER G E

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 108 AS OF 290700Z MAR 80 E

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CHU	TOTAL
COMD ELEMENT	USAFE	9
E-3A	AWACH	3
SP	TAC	27
SVCS	TAC	20
ENG	TAC	19
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	5
RED HORSE	USAFE	16
ALCE	MAC	38
COMMS	USAREUR	9
	JCSE	19

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

POL	AFCC	69
MC-130	TAC	14
OTHER	USAFE	28
	-	9
	TOTAL	269

B. (TS/NOFORN) STATUS [REDACTED]		
FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACH	1
MC-130	USAFE	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	7

E

C. (S/NOFORN) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. (TS/NOFORN) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVM 29 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELVIER TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ON RECEIPT.
DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

#0014

NNNN

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCPC0630
DAN: 057-040711
INPUT CDSN = 0KAR01
TOR: 251006Z MAR 80 TOT: 251007Z MAR 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLASH PAGE 1

AUTC== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

COPY PROVIDED TO OPG/ [REDACTED]

INFO= DNCO(1)

G

TOTAL COPIES = 0001
RTR=47

ZITHZYUW YDHAND 0016 0850800-MORN--YEKQW.

ZNY MORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 250750Z MAR 80 ZYH

FM SSO USELCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

AESSO TAC//DO//

CDS [REDACTED] /OMC// E

7EM

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN EYES ONLY~~ VHN 1580 ECJ3-CAT SEC 1 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO RGEN LARSON, MG WELCH, RGEN [REDACTED]
FROM RADN PACKER

E

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] SITREP 104 AS OF 250700Z MAR 80 (TS/NF)

A. SSO USELCOM 240721Z MAR 80, VHN 1566 (SITREP 103) (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) NO ERA FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 24 MAR 80.

ACFT 353 AND 624 FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.

B. (U) [REDACTED]

(1) [REDACTED] E

(U?) (TS/NF) [REDACTED] GROUND ABORTED

FIRST TRAINING SORTIE FOR BLEED AIR LEAK AND NUMBER TWO PROP

FLUCTUATION MAINTENANCE CORRECTED PROBLEM AND AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED

241945Z MAR 80 FOR AIRDROP OF CCT MEMBER. AIRDROP CANCELLED

DUE HIGH WINDS. REMAINING FLIGHT SHORTENED AS NO GROUND THREAT

ACTIVITY WAS OBSERVED. MISSION TERMINATED. 242210Z MAR 80.

(3) (TS/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

(A) (TS/NF) ACFT 555: FMC

(B) (TS/NF) ACFT 566: NMC (PROP CHANGE).

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2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (U) (S/NF) E-3A.

(1) (S/NF) E-3A (353) LAUNCHES 252200Z MAR 80 AND E3A (604) LAUNCHES 251815Z MAR 80 FOR GREEK SENTRY MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF 2/4 ATAF. ACFT ESTIMATED RECOVERY [REDACTED] 251400Z MAR 80 (353) AND 251415Z MAR 80 (604). E

(2) (U) (S/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR E-3A/TF-60 27-29 MAR 80 INTERFACE TRAINING.

B. (S/NF) HC-130 (555) LAUNCHES 250705Z MAR 80 FOR COMBINED US [REDACTED] AIR INTERCEPT FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION, UNILATERAL AIRDROP OF CCT MEMBER, A BUNDLE AIRDROP AND DAY LZ TRAINING. AIRCRAFT SCHEDULED RECOVER [REDACTED] 251320Z MAR 80. ACFT WILL LAUNCH 251700Z MAR 80 FOR SECOND SURVE TO INCLUDE LOW LEVEL TRAINING, CCT AIRDROP, HSLLAOS DROP AND NIGHT LZ PRACTICE. ACFT SCHEDULED RECOVER [REDACTED] 252225Z MAR 80. E

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (S/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 24 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-41 (C-141)	0253 [REDACTED]	0740 [REDACTED]	1
	104 [REDACTED]	190 [REDACTED]	2
1166-01 (C-141)	0411 [REDACTED]	0900 [REDACTED]	1
	114 [REDACTED]	174 [REDACTED]	
1129-01 (C-141)	0353 [REDACTED]	1212 [REDACTED]	1, 3
	1422 [REDACTED]	2035 [REDACTED]	

- NOTES: 1. LOAD DATE PER REF A.
 2. VIA [REDACTED]
 3. VIA [REDACTED]

B. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL).

- (1) (S/NF) AREA 1: 65.1 (90 PERCENT)
 AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
 AREA 3: 118.4 (100 PERCENT)
 R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
 R-14: 143.4 (71 PERCENT)
 TOTAL: 412.9 (88 PERCENT)

(2) (S/NF) NET FILL 24 MAR 80 (-11.0). 51.5 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.
 REVW 25 MAR 2003

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.
 DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.
 #0016

~~TOP SECRET~~

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PAGE 1

ZCZCOP0828
OAN: 067-040634
INPIIT CDSN = DKA095
TOR: 250952Z MAR 80 TOT: 250953Z MAR 80

AUTO==* UNASSIGNED *

ACTION==* UNASSIGNED *

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=95

FLASH

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0016 0850800 MORN--YFKDQH.
ZNY MMORN

ZKZK Z7 SOA DE
Z O 250750Z MAR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DC//
AFSSO TAC//DD//
COS [REDACTED] /DMC// E

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1580 ECJ3-CAT SEC 2 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER. INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH, AGEN
FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJECT: HQ USEUCOM E-3 [REDACTED] SITREP 104 AS OF 250700Z MAR 80 (TS/NF) E

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 25 MAR 80. ALL
TIMES ARE ZULU. [REDACTED] DEPARTURES ACTUAL, OTHERS ESTIMATED.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1186-02 (C-141)	0123 [REDACTED]	0600 [REDACTED]	1
	0815 [REDACTED]	1400 [REDACTED]	
1186-03 (C-5)	0532 [REDACTED]	1000 [REDACTED]	2
	1415 [REDACTED]	2000 [REDACTED]	

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: COMMS EQUIP. TTC 22, S400.
2. LOAD DATA: COMMS EQUIP. TYC 8 (TWO VANS), MK3

SATCOM TERMINAL.
5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS

- A. (U) (TS/NF) ALL EUROPEAN CIRCUITS ARE OPERATIONAL.
- B. (U) (TS/NF) ALL CIRCUITS ON AN/TSC-85 SATCOM HAD OUTAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

1220Z TO 1815Z DUE TO HIGH NOISE!

(U) C. ~~(S/NF)~~ AN/WSC-3 SATCOM NET HAS HIGH NOISE BUT IS OPERATIONAL.

6. (UAL) PERSONNEL:

A

~~(S/NF)~~ STATUS [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAF	9
E-3A	AWACW	3
SP	TAC	27
	USAF	11
SVCS	TAC	24
ENG	TAC	24
ENG/SVCS	USAF	8
ALCE	MAC	7
COMMS	USARFUR	8
	JCSE	14
	AFCC	46
POL	TAC	12
	USAF	4
MC-130	ASAF	36
	TOTAL	245

B

~~(S/NF)~~ STATUS [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAF	1
E-3A	AWACW	1
MC-130	USAF	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	7

C. ~~(S/NF)~~ STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE!

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE!

8. ~~(S/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 25 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE : DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS. DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

#0016

NNNN

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

FLASH ^{PAGE} 1

ZCZC00217

DAN: 067-021517

INPUT COSN = DKAR20

TOR: 241205Z MAR 80 TOT: 241007Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTP=55

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0107 0840730-MORN--YEKDDH.

ZNY MORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 240721Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 326

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS //J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE //DD//

AFSSC TAC //DD//

COS [REDACTED] //DMC// E

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1566 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFC BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH, RGFN
FROM PADM PACKER

SUBJECT: ~~MC-130~~ E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 103 AS OF 240700Z
MAR 80 (TS/NF) E

A. SSO USEUCOM 230014Z MAR 80, VHN 1558, (SITREP 102) (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A. NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 23 MAR 80.

ACFT 353 AND 524 FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.

B. (TS/NF) MC-130.

(1) (TS/NF) NO/MC-130 FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 23 MAR 80 DUE

RECURRENCE OF FLUCTUATING PROPELLER PROBLEM. PARTS AND

MECHANIC ENROUTE [REDACTED] A MAC 1230-21 / MC-130 NMC-88 OF

THIS REPORT.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A. NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 24 MAR 80.

NEXT MISSION (CREEK SENTRY) SCHEDULED 25 MAR 80.

B. (TS/NF) MC-130.

(1) (TS/NF) REPAIRED, MC-130 SCHEDULED TO LAUNCH 241700Z

MAR 80 FOR LOW LEVEL, CCT AIRDROP, HELLAS AIR DROPPING AND LZ

PRACTICE WITH TERMINATION [REDACTED] 242257Z MAR 80.

~~NOFORN~~

FLASH

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NOFORN

(2) (TS/NF) SECOND MC-130 SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE [REDACTED] 24 MAR 82 FOR 25 MAR 82 SWAP OUT WITH MC-130 (566).

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 23 MAR 82. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-40(C-141)	0915 [REDACTED]	1200 [REDACTED]	
	1850 [REDACTED]	2400 [REDACTED]	
1732-32(C-130)	0859 [REDACTED]	1715 [REDACTED]	

NOTE: 1. LOAD DATA PER GEF A.
B. (U) (TS/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL):

- (1) (TS/NF) AREAS 1-3 NO CHANGE.
- R-0 REFUELERS: 20.8 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14 BLADDERS: 154.4 (77 PERCENT)
- (2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 23 MAR 82 (-6.3). 40.5 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS

(TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 24 MAR 82. ALL TIMES ZULU. [REDACTED] DEPARTURES ACTUAL. [REDACTED] HYPERS ESTIMATED.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-41(C-141)	0253 [REDACTED]	0730 [REDACTED]	1
	1045 [REDACTED]	1700 [REDACTED]	2
1166-01(C-141)	041 [REDACTED]	0900 [REDACTED]	3
	1115 [REDACTED]	1700 [REDACTED]	
1129-01(C-141)	0353 [REDACTED]	1200 [REDACTED]	4.5
	1415 [REDACTED]	2000 [REDACTED]	

- NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: MC-130 PARTS
 2. VIA [REDACTED]
 3. LOAD DATA: COMMS EQUIP. TWO VANS W/TLR. TAC WX ANAL CTR.
 4. VIA [REDACTED]
 5. LOAD DATA: COMMS EQUIP. [REDACTED]

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS:

A. (U) (TS/NF) WSC-3 SATCOM NET WAS FULLY OPERATIONAL DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD.

B. (U) (TS/NF) TSC-85 SATCOM NET WAS DOWN FROM 231500Z TO 231730Z MAR 82 AS PART OF PLANNED TESTING OF THE ATLANTIC SATELLITE. THE EUCOM AND USAF POINT TO POINT VOICE CIRCUITS TO [REDACTED] WERE DOWN ADDITIONAL FROM 1730Z TO 1954Z HOURS FOR 90 PERCENT RELIABILITY. THE USAF TTY CIRCUIT TO [REDACTED] WAS DOWN ADDITIONALLY FROM 1730Z TO 2019Z HOURS FOR 87.2 PERCENT RELIABILITY. THE ADDITIONAL OUTAGES WERE DUE TO EQUIP PROBLEMS DURING RE-ACTIVATION OF THE [REDACTED] SATCOM TERMINAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. (U) (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTALS
CMD ELEMENT	USAF	9
E-3A	AWACW	3
SP	TAC	28

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOFORN

SVCS	USAFE	11
ENG	TAC	28
ENG/SVCS	TAC	23
ALCE	USAFE	15
COMMS	MAC	4
	USAREUR	7
	JCSF	1
	AFCC	38
POL	TAC	12
	USAFE	6
MC-133	USAFE	21
	TOTAL	198

6. (TS/NF) STATUS - CAIRO

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACH	1
MC-133	USAFE	1
COMMS	JCSF	5
	TOTAL	8

- C. (S/NF) STATUS ~~██████████~~ NO CHANGE.
 - 7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.
 - 8. (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
- SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEE DURING DUTY HOURS.
 DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.
 REVW 24 MAR 2000
 40007

NNNN

NOFORN

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCOPR233

DAN: 066-003062

INPUT CDSN = DKA593

TOR: 220921Z MAR 80 TOT: 220921Z MAR 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=78

~~NOFORN~~

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ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0023 0820747-MORN--YEKQGH.

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z 220746Z MAR 80 ZYH

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO: JCS //J3//

INFO AFSSD USAF//DO//

AFSSD TAC //DO//

COS [REDACTED] //OMC// E

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1542 ECJ3-CAT

SECTION 1 OF 2

PERSONEL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH,

[REDACTED] FROM ROOM PACKER

SUBJECT: ~~NOFORN~~ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 101 AS OF 220700Z E

MAR 80 (S/NF)

A. SSO USEUCOM 210732Z MAR 80, VHN 1519, (SITREP 100) (S/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (S/NF) E-3A

(1) (S/NF) E-3A(353) LAUNCHED 210800Z MAR 80 AND E-3A

(604) LAUNCHED 210810Z MAR 80 FOR CREEK ENTRY TRAINING WITH

2/4ATAF. ACFT 353 AIRBORNE 6.9 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] E

211455Z MAR 80. ACFT 604 AIRBORNE 7.0 HOURS AND RECOVERED

[REDACTED] AB 211510Z MAR 80.

(2) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

(A) (S/NF) ACFT 353IFMC,

(U) (B) (S/NF) ACFT 604IFMC,

(2) (S/NF) E-3A 354 LAUNCHED 210902Z MAR 80 FOR RE-

DEPLOYMENT TO TINKER AFB.

B. (S/NF) HC-130. E

~~TOP SECRET~~

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(1) (S/NF) MC-130 LAUNCHED 210705Z MAR 80 FOR UNILATERAL TRAINING AND COMBINED US FAMILIARIZATION/ ORIENTATION FLIGHT. PARA 2B(2) REF B. (S/NF) COMPLETED 15 TERCEPTS AND (S/NF) AIR-TO-GROUND ECM WAS ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST

A, E

(S/NF) (TRACU). A HSLADS BUNDLE WAS DROPPED ON DZ AND ONE ASSAULT LANDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO RECOVERY (S/NF) WITH PROPELLER MALFUNCTION. AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE 6.0 HOURS AND RECOVERED (S/NF) 211304Z MAR 80.

(2) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT NMC AS OF THIS REPORT DUE NUMBER THREE PROPELLER FLUCTUATION. NECESSARY PARTS AND PROP SPECIALIST SCHEDULED TO DEPART (S/NF) 220900Z MAR 80 ETA (S/NF) 221545Z MAR 80. ETIC 222200Z MAR 80.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (S/NF) E-3A, NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 22 MAR 80. NEXT CREEK SENTRY MISSION PLANNED 25 MAR 80.

B. (S/NF) MC-130, NO MC-130 FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 22 MAR 80 DUE NMC STATUS.

E. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE

A. (S/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM (S/NF) 21 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-30(C-141)	0835 (S/NF)	1320 (S/NF)	1
	1510 (S/NF)	2115 (S/NF)	

E

(U) NOTE: LOAD DATA PER REF A.
B. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000GAL):

(1) (S/NF) AREAS 1-3, R-9 REFUELERS NO CHANGE.
R-14 BLADDERS: 155.2 (78 PERCENT).

(2) (S/NF) NET FILL 21 MAR 80 4.5 50.6 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

C. (S/NF) BASE SUPPORT. THE TWO 30,000 GAL GROUND WATER TANKS WERE DISCOVERED VIRTUALLY DRY MORNING OF 21 MAR 80. IN PROCESS OF EXCAVATING FOR SUSPECTED FAULTY VALVE, A BROKEN PIPE WAS FOUND. ALL WATER TO BASE SHUT OFF UNTIL REPAIRS COMPLETED. (S/NF) ASSISTING AND PROVIDING NEW SECTION OF PIPE.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(S/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM (S/NF) 22 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU. (S/NF) DEPARTURES ACTUAL, OTHER ESTIMATES.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1191-01(C-141)	0130 (S/NF)	0600 (S/NF)	1
	0815 (S/NF)	1400 (S/NF)	
1191-02(C141)	0522 (S/NF)	1000 (S/NF)	2
	1315 (S/NF)	1900 (S/NF)	
1730-32(C-130)	0900 (S/NF)	1540 (S/NF)	3,4

E

- NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: TWO M-880, ONE WATER TRUCK
 2. LOAD DATA: TWO M-880, ONE WATER TRUCK
 3. LOAD DATA: PARTS FOR MC-130.
 4. RON ETD 230730Z MAR 80.

REVN 22 MAR 2000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0236
DAN: 066-003111
INPUT CDSN = DKA595
TOR: 220922Z MAR 80 TOT: 220922Z MAR 80

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=78

FLASH

ZITMZYUW YDHANO 0024 0820747-MORN--YEKDOH,
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z 220746Z MAR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//
AFSSO TAC //DO//
JCS [REDACTED] //OMC// E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHM 1542 ECJ3-CAT
SECTION 2 OF 2 SETIONS.
PERSONEL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH,
[REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJECT: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 101 AS OF 220700Z E
MAR 80 (TS/NF) E
5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS, ALL COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

FUNCTION	UNIT/END	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	9
E-3A	AWACH	3
SP	TAC	15
	USAFE	11
SVCS	TAC	16
ENG	TAC	7
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14

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ALCE	MAC	4
COMMS	USAREUR	7
	JCSE	1
	AFCC	31
POL	TAC	3
	USAFE	6
MC-130	USAFE	21
	TOTAL	144

B. (TS/NF) STATUS - CAIRO		
FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	H 1
E-3A	ANACW	1
MC-130	USAFE	1
COMMS	JCSE	4

EYES ONLY

TOTAL 7

C (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. (TS/NF) REMARKS: [REDACTED] BITTEN ON 21 MAR 80 AND WILL BE EVACUATED ON FIRST C-141 DEPARTING [REDACTED] 22 MAR 80 AIRMAN WILL BEGIN RABIES TREATMENT ON ARRIVAL [REDACTED] (SOME OF THE KANGAROO RATS IN THE AREA ARE KNOWN TO BE RABID).

9. (U) (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 22 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS. DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT. #0024

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE 1

ZC7CDP0294
DAN: 065-004627
INPUT CDSN = KDA443
TOR: 210929Z MAR 80 TOT: 210930Z MAR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==
INFO= DNCD(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
PTR=46

EYES ONLY

FLASH

ZTTMZYUW YOHANO 0015 0810754-PORN--YEKDOH,
ZNY MMORX
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 210732Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 386
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS //J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DD//
AFSSO TAC//DD//
COS [REDACTED]//MC//E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ E T NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1519 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO 8GEN LARSON, MG WELCH,
[REDACTED] FROM RADAR PACKER
SUBJECT: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] (SITREP 100 AS OF 210700Z
MAR 80 (TS/NF).
A, SSO USEUCOM 200724Z MAR 80, VHN 1487 (SITREP 099) (TS/NF). (U)
1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A (U) (TS/NF) E-3A,
H (1) (TS/NF) E-3A 604 LAUNCHED 200701Z MAR 80 FROM
[REDACTED] FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE
6.5 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 201301Z MAR 80.
(2) (TS/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:
(A) (TS/NF) ACFT 353: FMC.
(B) (TS/NF) ACFT 354: NMC (RADAR).
(C) (TS/NF) ACFT 604: FMC.
(3) (TS/NF) COMPLETED COORDINATION FOR 21 MAR 80 CREEK

SENTRY MISSION.
B (TS/NF) MC-130. MC-130 (566) COMPLETED DEPLOYMENT TO
[REDACTED] WITH ARRIVAL [REDACTED] 201500Z MAR 80. AIRCRAFT
[REDACTED] AS OF THIS REPORT.
2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

PAGE 2

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(U) A. (S/NF) E-3A.

(1) (S/NF) E-3A(353 AND 604) LAUNCH 210800Z AND 210815Z MAR 80 FOR CREEK SENTRY TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF 2/4 ATAF, ACFT SCHEDULED TO COMPLETE RECOVERY [REDACTED] 1415Z MAR 80.

(2) (S/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING FOR 25 MAR 80 CREEK SENTRY MISSION AND 27-29 MAR E-3A PARTICIPATION IN MULTIPLEX WITH CTF-60.

(3) (S/NF) E-3A(354) DEPARTS [REDACTED] TAB 210900Z MAR 80 FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO CONUS.

B. (S/NF) MC-130 LAUNCHES 210705Z MAR 80 FOR UNILATERAL TRAINING AND COMBINED US [REDACTED] FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHT. MISSION PROFILE PLANNED IAW PARA 2B(2) REF A. ESTIMATE RECOVERY [REDACTED] 211330Z MAR 80.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (S/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 22 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-31(C-130)	0910 [REDACTED]	1730 [REDACTED]	1

NOTES: 1. VIA [REDACTED]

B. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (000 GAL).

(1) (S/NF) AREAS 1-3, R-9 REFUELERS: NO CHANGE.
R-14 BLADDERS: 159.8 (80 PERCENT).

(2) (S/NF) NET FILL 20 AR 80 25.3, 46.1 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(S/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 21 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-30(C-141)	0600 [REDACTED]	1100 [REDACTED]	1
	1415 [REDACTED]	1945 [REDACTED]	

NOTE: 1. LOAD DATA: FLATBED TRAILER, MISC GEN CARGO.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS, ALL CIRCUITS FULLY OPERATIONAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	9
E-3A	AWACH	3
SP	TAC	15
	USAFE	11
SVCS	TAC	16
ENG	TAC	7
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	10
	JCSE	1
	AFCC	31
POL	TAC	3
	USAFE	6
MC-130	USAFE	21
	TOTAL	149

FLASH

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B. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] E		TOTAL
FUNCTION	UNIT CMD	
LIAISON	USAF	1
E-3A	AWACW	1
MC-130	USAF	1
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	7

FLASH

C. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. (TS/NF) REMARKS: PLANNING CONTINUES FOR 22 MAR 80 VISIT TO [REDACTED] BY [REDACTED] TAC. ITINERARY INCLUDES INBRIEFING, TOUR OF FACILITIES AND DISCUSSION WITH TAC TROOPS.

E, G

9. (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 21 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.
DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

#0015

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ZC7CDP0452.
DAN: 064-003663
INPUT CDSN = UKA458
TOR: 200959Z MAR 80

~~TOP SECRET~~
NOFORN

PAGE 1
FLASH
EYES ONLY

TOT: 201006Z MAR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

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ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

FLASH

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=40

ZRTMZYUW YDHANO 0025 0800730-MORN--YEKDOH.
ZNY MMORH
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 200724Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFFH386
FM SSD USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//CAT//
AFSSO TAC//DD//
DD [REDACTED]//DMC//
ZE [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1497 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH, [REDACTED]
FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] SITREP 099 AS OF 200700Z MAR 80 E

- 4. SSD USEUCOM 190630Z MAR 80, VHN 1468 (SITREP 098) (TS/NF) (U)
- 3. SSD USEUCOM 160657Z MAR 80, VHN 1409 (SITREP 095) (TS/NF) (U)
- 1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (TS/NF) E-3A.
(1) (TS/NF) E-3A (353) ARRIVED [REDACTED] AB FROM TINKER
AFB 190949Z MAR 80. ACFT WILL REPLACE E-3A TAIL NUMBER 354. REDE-
PLOYMENT DATE 354 TO TINKERAFB NOT YET DETERMINED.

(2) (TS/NF) E-3A (604) REMAINED [REDACTED] FOR REPAIR OF
MAIN GEAR ACTUATOR.
REPAIRS COMPLETED 19 MAR 80.

(3) (TS/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.

- A. (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 354 FMC (RADAR).
- H B. (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 604 FMC.
- C. (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 353 FMC
- B. (U) (TS/NF) MC-130 MC-130 (566) LAUNCHED FROM [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

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AB 200340Z MAR 80 ENROUTE [REDACTED] (SEE [REDACTED] BY [REDACTED]) AIR-
CRAFT FMC ASHOF LAUNCH.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
A. (S/NF) E-3A,

(1) (S/NF) E-3A (604) LAUNCHES 200730Z MAR 80 FOR REDE-
PLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] AB. REDEPLOYMENT PROFILE PLANNED IAW PARA
2B, REF B. ESTIMATE RECOVERY [REDACTED] 201300Z MAR 80

(2) (S/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR E-3A
CREEK SENTRY MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF 2/4ATF. INITIAL MISSION
SCHEDULED 21 MAR 80.

B. (S/NF) MC-130

(S/NF) MC-130 DEPLOYMENT PROFILE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAS FOLLOWS. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU. [REDACTED] DEPARTURE
ACTUAL, OTHERS ESTIMATED:

MARK	DPT
[REDACTED]	200340Z
200800Z	201050Z
201330Z	201330Z
201500Z	

(2) (S/NF) COMPLETE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 21-30 MAR
80 MC-130 UNILATERAL TRAINING AND COMBINED US [REDACTED] FAMILIARIZATION/
ORIENTATION FLIGHTS. AS PLANNED, 21 AND 22 MAR 80 FLIGHT PROFILES
INCLUDE:

0645Z LAUNCH
0830Z-1035Z AIR INTERCEPT FAN/ORIENT WITH [REDACTED] MC-130
ORBITS AT 10000 MSL AT 210 KNOTS. ORBIT BETWEEN
[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

H 1035Z ENROUTE [REDACTED]
1150Z CCT AIRDROP BETWEEN RUNWAY/TAXIWAY.
1150Z/1250Z LOW LEVEL TRAINING
1250Z HSLADS DROP AT [REDACTED] TRANSITION TO LANDING
ZONE PRACTICE
1320Z RECOVER AT [REDACTED]

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE

A. (S/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 19 MAR 80. ALL
TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	AIR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-31 (C-130)	0215 [REDACTED]	0910 [REDACTED]	1

H (U) NOTE: 1. LOAD DATA PER REF A.
B. (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 191200Z MAR 80, NO CHANGE.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (S/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 20 MAR 80.
ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	AIR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-31 (C-130)	0730 [REDACTED]	1730 [REDACTED]	1

NOTE: 1. VIA [REDACTED]

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

(S/NF) ONE OUTAGE: TTY FROM [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] DOWN
200012Z MAR - 200104Z MAR 80 BECAUSE OF A BAD ISOLATION RELAY AT

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THE RAMSTEIN END.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	H9
E-3A	AWACH	H 40
SP	TAC	15
	USAFE	11
SVCS	H TAC	16
ENG	TAC	7
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	10
	JCSE	1
	AFCCH	34
POL	H TACH	3
	USAFE	6
PC-132	USAFE	2
	TOTAL	170

B. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACH	1
COMMS	JCSE	5
	TOTAL	7

C. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE E

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS, NO CHANGE.

8. (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 20 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.
DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

#0025

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZCZCDDP0538
DAN: 063-007336
INPUT CDSN = DKA160
TOP: 190955Z MAR 80 TGT: 190956Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNCD(1)

TOTAD000=0IFS = 00001
PTR=6

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0022 0700740-MORN--YFKDQH.

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z 0 190638Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6

FM [REDACTED]

TO JLS//J3//

INFO AFSSD USAFE//DO//

AESSD IAC//S9//

CDS [REDACTED]//DMC// [REDACTED]

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 146R ECJ3-CAT

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO RGEN LARSON, MG WELCH, [REDACTED]

FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] STREP 008 AS OF 190700Z MAR 80 E

RE (TS/NF)

A. SSO USEUCOM 190733Z MAR 80, VHN 1434 (SITREP 097) (TS/NF) (U)

B. SSO USEUCOM 160657Z MAR 80, VHN 1400 (SITREP 095) (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (TS/NF) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 18 MAR 80.

B. (U) (TS/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

(1) (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 354: NO CHANGE (PADAP). ETA REPLACEMENT ACFT FROM TINKER AFB 191050 MAR 80.

(2) (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 604: NO CHANGE. ACFT REMAINS [REDACTED] WITH GEAR ACTUATOR PROBLEM. ESTIMATED DEPARTURE [REDACTED] REMAINS 20 MAR 80.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (U) (TS/NF) E-3A CREEK SENTRY MISSION SCHEDULED 19 MAR 80 CANCELLED DUE ACFT PROBLEMS CITED PAPA, 1B ABOVE. INITIAL CREEK SENTRY MISSION NOW SCHEDULED 21 MAR 80.

B. (U) (TS/NF) COMPLETE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 20 MAR 80 MC-130

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PAGE 2

DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] DEPLOYMENT PROFILE INCLUDES RWPBPPB7
MAPH60 DEPARTURE FROM [REDACTED] AB, ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE [REDACTED]
200600Z MAR 80/201025Z MAR 80, ARRIV [REDACTED] 201330Z MAR 80, AND
RECOVERY [REDACTED] 201500Z MAR 80.

E

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. ~~(TS/NF)~~ NO MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] AB MAR 80.

R. ~~(TS/NF)~~ FUEL STATUS AS OF 181000Z MAR 80.

(1) ~~(TS/NF)~~ AREAS 1 - 3: NO CHANGE.

(U) R-9 REFUELERS: 15.2 (75 PERCENT)

(U) R-14 BLADDERS: 185.1 (93 PERCENT)

(2) ~~(TS/NF)~~ ONE R-9 DRAINED TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE.

(3) ~~(TS/NF)~~ NET FILL 18 MAR 80 35.9. 20.7 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE

FILL.

C. ~~(TS/NF)~~ BASE SUPPORT.

(1) ~~(TS/NF)~~ SANITARY FILL EXCAVATION UNDERWAY. IN PROCESS OF
INSTALLING NEW WATER (SHOWER) BLADDER, ADDITIONAL GROUNDING RODS
AND WALK-IN REEFERS.

(2) ~~(TS/NF)~~ INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH [REDACTED] CIVIL ENGINEER
INDICATES THAT AIRFIELD (TAXIWAYS) TO BE TREATED BY CONTRACTING
FIRM WITH BITUMEN (SLURRY SEAL) 1-31 MAY 80. SPECIFIC DETAILS
NOT FORMALLY ESTABLISHED. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE.
WILL ADVISERM

E

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(1) ~~(TS/NF)~~ MAC MISSION TO [REDACTED] 19 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE

ZULU. DEPARTURE ACTUAL.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	H	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-31(C-130)	0215 [REDACTED]		0900 [REDACTED]	1,2

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA. ACTUATOR PARTS FOR E-3A, IPT TRACTOR.
CLASS J.

2. RON. ETD 200730Z MAR 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS. ALL CIRCUITS ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL. NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. ~~(TS/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL
TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 19 MARH2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFOR ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS

DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

#0022

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~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

ZCZCDDP0694
DANS: 062-012412
INPUT CDSN = 0KA934
THR: 150927Z MAR 80 TOT: 180929Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR#47

FLASH

ZYTMZYUW YDHANO 0211 0780804-MORN--YEKQGH.

ZNY MORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 180733Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6

FM SSD USEUCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

AFSSO TAC//DO//

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ //DMC// E

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ E T NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1434 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH,
FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJECT: HQ USEUCOM E-3A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SITREP 097 AS OF 180700Z
MAR 80 (TS/NF). (U)

A. SSD USEUCOM 170715Z MAR 80, VHN 1418 (SITREP 096) (TS/NF) (U)

B. SSD USEUCOM 160657Z MAR 80, VHN 1409 (SITREP 095) (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A (354) LAUNCHED 170705Z MAR 80 FOR RE-
DEPLOYMENT TO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AB. ACFT AIRBORNE 6.3 HOURS AND RE-
COVERED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 18071338Z MAR 80. E-3A (604) REMAINS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WITH LEAKING LEFT MAIN GEAR ACTUATOR. ACTUATOR REQUIRES RE-
PLACEMENT BY 552 AWAC WING WORKING TOWARD SHIPPING ACTUATOR TO
ARRIVE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AB 18 MAR 80. INTEND TO FORWARD SHIP ACTUATOR
TO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR REPLACEMENT AND GROUND RETRACTION TESTING PM
19 MAR 80. IF ACTUATOR ARRIVAL ON SCHEDULE AND RETRACTION
TESTING SUCCESSFUL, INTEND REDEPLOY ACFT TO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AB 20 MAR 80.

B. (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

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(1) (TS/NF) ACFT 354: NMC (RADAR). REPLACEMENT ACFT
ETA [REDACTED] 19 MAR 80.

(2) (TS/NF) ACFT 604: NMC (SEE ABOVE)

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A (604) LAUNCHES 200700Z MAR 80 FOR RE-
DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] AB. REDEPLOYMENT PROFILE PLANNED IAW
PARA 2B, REF B. ARRIVAL [REDACTED] ESTIMATED 201330Z MAR 80.

E

B. (U) (TS/NF) MC-132.

(1) (TS/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 20
MAR 80 MC-132 DEPLOYMENT FROM [REDACTED] AB TO [REDACTED] AS
PLANNED. ONE MC-132 AIRCRAFT DEPLOYS 20 MAR 80 AND A SECOND
MC-132 DEPLOYS 24 MAR 80. ONE OF THE AIRCRAFT WILL REDEPLOY
TO [REDACTED] AB 26 MAR 80. DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT WILL

BE CONDUCTED IN A LOW VISIBILITY MANNER.

(2) (TS/NF) MC-132 DETACHMENT WILL CONDUCT UNILATERAL
LOW LEVEL TERRAIN FOLLOWING FLIGHTS ON [REDACTED] APPROVED ROUTES.
ASSAULT LANDINGS AND PAPADROPS WILL BE CONDUCTED AT [REDACTED]
BILATERAL ECM/ESM FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHTS WITH
[REDACTED] GROUND AIR DEFENSE AND AIRBORNE INTERCEPTORS ALSO
SCHEDULED AND WILL BE CONDUCTED IAW APPLICABLE SECURITY GUIDE-
LINES.

E

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE:

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 17 MAR 80.
ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
173P-34(C-141)	0235/[REDACTED]	0700/[REDACTED]	1
	0917/[REDACTED]	1505/[REDACTED]	
173P-35(C-141)	0426/[REDACTED]	1205/[REDACTED]	1
	1500/[REDACTED]	2055/[REDACTED]	

E

(U) NOTES: 1. E-3A EXTRACTION SUPPORT
B. (TS/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 171000Z MAR 80.

- (1) (TS/NF) AREA 1: 65.1 (99 PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 118.4 (100 PERCENT)
- P-14: 149.2 (75 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- TOTAL: 418.7 (89 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 17 MAR 80 4.8. 51.6 REQUIRED TO
COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(TS/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED [REDACTED] 18 MAR 80.
NEXT SCHEDULED MISSION ETA 191300Z MAR 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

A. (U) (TS/NF) POWER OUTAGE ON TSC-85 CIRCUITS, 170955Z-171151Z
MAR 80 BECAUSE OF POWER SURGE THROUGH POWER DISTRIBUTION PANEL.

B. (TS/NF) AN ELECTRICAL FIRE AT OMCT [REDACTED] CAUSED AN OUTAGE
ON ALL CIRCUITRY 171445Z-171510Z MAR 80.

E

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]
FUNCTION UNIT/CMD TOTAL

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~~EYES ONLY~~

PAGE 3

CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	9
E-3A	AWACW	40
SP	TAC	15
	USAFE	11
SVCS	TAC	16
ENG	TAC	7
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	7
	JCSE	1
	AFCC	32
POL	TAC	3
	USAFE	6
	TOTAL	163

R. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] E

FUNCTION	UNIT CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACW	1
COMMS	JCSE	5
	TOTAL	7

C. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE E

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE

8. (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 18 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS
DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

PAGE 1

EYES ONLY
FLASH

ZCZCDDPD-67
DAN: 440-315256
INPUT CDS: = DKA508
TOR: 170958Z MAR 80 TOT: 170959Z MAR 80

AUTOB** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **
INFO: D400(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=47

ZTTHZYJW YOHAND 0702 0770747-MORN--YEKDH.

ZNY MNDPN

ZKZK ZZ SCA DE

Z O 170715Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6

FM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSD US&FE//DD//

AFSSD TAC//DD//

CDS [REDACTED]//MNC//E

ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1418 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH,

[REDACTED] FROM RAM PACKER

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] SITREP 096 AS OF 170700Z

MAR 80 (TS/NF)

A. SSD USEUCOM 160657Z MAR 80, VHN 1400 (SITREP 096) (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (TS/NF) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 16 MAR 80,

B. (U) (TS/NF) NO CHANGE TO AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT,

EXCEPT AS INDICATED AT PARA 2A BELOW.

C. (TS/NF) COMPLETED COORDINATION FOR 17 MAR 80 E-3A

REDEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED]

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (U) (TS/NF) E-3A (354) LAUNCHES 170700Z MAR 80 FOR

REDEPLOYMENT TO RAMSTEIN AB. REDEPLOYMENT PROFILE PLANNED

IAN PARA 25, REF A. E-3A (604) REDEPLOYMENT DELAYED 24 HRS DUE GEAR

ACTUATOR PROBLEM.

B. (U) (TS/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR E-3A

EMPLOYMENT FROM [REDACTED] 17-29 MAR 80. AS SCHEDULED,

CREEK SENTRY MISSIONS WILL BE FLOWN 19, 21 AND 25 MAR 80.

E-3A WILL PARTICIPATE IN CTF-60 MULTIPLEX 27-19 MAR 80 AND

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN

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THEN REDEPLOY TO [REDACTED] 29-31 MAR 80. SCHEDULE ALSO CALLS FOR 2-3 APR 80 PARTICIPATION IN CTF-60 MULTIPLEX ROUND ROBIN FROM [REDACTED]

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED] 16 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-33(C-141)	0202 [REDACTED]	0700 [REDACTED]	1
	0950 [REDACTED]	1535 [REDACTED]	2

NOTES: 1. E-3A EXTRACTION SUPPORT
2. LOAD DATA: E-3A EQUIP, 12 PAX

B. (TS/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 171000Z MAR 80.

- (1) (TS/NF) AREAS 1-3, R-9 REFUELER: NO CHANGE.
R-14 BLADDERS: 154.0 (77 PERCENT).
- (2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 17 MAR 80 2.56, 46.8 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO/FROM [REDACTED] 17 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-34(C-141)	0235 [REDACTED]	0730 [REDACTED]	1,2
	0915 [REDACTED]	1500 [REDACTED]	
1730-35(C-141)	0426 [REDACTED]	1230 [REDACTED]	1,2
	1500 [REDACTED]	2100 [REDACTED]	

NOTES: 1. E-3A EXTRACTION SUPPORT.
2. [REDACTED] DEPARTURE TIMES ACTUAL.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: [REDACTED] EUROPEAN CIRCUITS OPERATIONAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	12
	AWACW	90
	TAC	15
SP	USAFE	8
	TAC	17
ENG	TAC	6
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	18
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	7
	JCSE	1
FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
	AFCC	30
	TAC	3
POL	USAFE	6
	ESC	3
SECURITY	TOTAL	220

B. (TS/NF) STATUS - CAIRP

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LYATSON	ISAFE	1
E-3A	AWACW	1

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PAGE 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMS

JCSSE 5
TOTAL 7

C. (S//NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE E

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE

8. (S//NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOOD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

S&O NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS
DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.
REVW 17 MAR 2000
#0002

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0898
DAN: 356-026744
INPUT CDSN = 0KA922
TOR: 140843Z MAR 80 TOT: 140843Z MAR 80

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUTO=** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=41

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ZYTMZYUW YDHANO 0009 0740742-MORN--YEKQHM.

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 140637Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS //J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//

AFSSO JAC //DO//

CGS [REDACTED] //OMC// E

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1365 ECJS-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH,
FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP 093 AS OF 140700Z E

MAR 80 (TS/NF)

REFERENCE:

A. SSO USEUCOM 130727Z MAR 80, VHN 1334 (SITREP 092) (TS/NF)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (S/NF) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 13 MAR 80.

B. (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

(1) (S/NF) ACFT 354:NMCM (RADAR). ETIC 142200Z MAR 80.

(2) (S/NF) ACFT 604:FMC.

C. (TS/NF) E-3A GROUND FAMILIARIZATION FOR [REDACTED] CONTROLLERS
CONTINUED. COORDINATION COMPLETED FOR 14 MAR 80. E-3A [REDACTED] FLIGHT.
PLANNING FOR 15 MAR E-3A [REDACTED] FLIGHT CONTINUED. E

D. (TS/NF) E-3A(604) LAUNCHED 140630Z MAR 80 FOR E-3A [REDACTED]
FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION MISSION (SEE PARA 2 BELOW).

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (TS/NF) COMPLETE 14 MAR 80 E-3A [REDACTED] FAMILIARIZATION/
ORIENTATION FLIGHT. E-3A TO CONTROL [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT ORIGINATING
FROM [REDACTED] AIRFIELD [REDACTED] TARGET ACFT LAUNCH AT E

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0900Z, 1000Z AND 1200Z. [REDACTED] INTERCEPTOR ACFT TO LAUNCH THREE, SEVEN AND TWELVE MINUTES AFTER TARGET ACFT LAUNCH. TARGET ACFT WILL OPERATE AT 100 METERS AGL, 800 KPH. INTERCEPTOR ACFT WILL MAINTAIN AT LEAST 100 METER ALTITUDE SEPARATION WITH TARGET ACFT. E-3A WILL FLY ORBIT CHARLIE (CENTERED ON [REDACTED]).

B. (TS/NF) COMPLETE COORDINATION FOR 13 MAR 80 E-3A [REDACTED] FAN/ORIENT FLIGHT. FLIGHT PROFILE PLANNED SAME [REDACTED] PARA 2A ABOVE. [REDACTED] ACFT TO ORIGINATE FROM [REDACTED]

- 3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
 - A. (U) (TS/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS TO WADI KENA 13 MAR 80.
 - B. (U) (TS/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 131000Z MAR 80.
 - (1) (U) (TS/NF) AREA 1:65.1 (99 PERCENT)
 - AREA 2:66.0 (100 PERCENT)
 - AREA 3:118.4 (100 PERCENT)
 - R-9:152.4 (76.2 PERCENT)
 - R-14:20.0 (100 PERCENT)

(2) (U) (TS/NF) NET FILL 13 MAR 80 (-12.9), 44.8 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO [REDACTED] 14 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	OPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-28(C-130)	0700/[REDACTED]	1500/[REDACTED]	1,2,3
1730-29(C-130)	0615/[REDACTED]	1300/[REDACTED]	3,4

- NOTES: 1. VIA [REDACTED]
- 2. LOAD DATA: LOXCART, MISC BX SUPPLIES.
- 3. RON, ETO 150730Z MAR 80
- 4. LOAD DATA: CLASS I ITEMS, 26 PAX (REPLACEMENTS).

5. COMMUNICATIONS. A. (U) (TS/NF) ALL TSC-85 CIRCUITS FROM [REDACTED] TO USAFE AND EIJCOM WERE DOWN FROM 1330-1404Z WHEN SUN RAYS ALIGNED WITH THE DOWNLINK (PLUS SUN SPOT ACTIVITY) AT THE [REDACTED] END AND MADE ALL COMMUNICATIONS UNREADABLE.

B. (U) (TS/NF) WSC-3 NET WAS DOWN FROM 1600-1620Z BECAUSE AN UN-AUTHORIZED STATION ENTERED THE NET. PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED THROUGH COORDINATION WITH JCS.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

FUNCTION	UNIT/CHD	TOTAL
CHD ELEMENT	USAFE	10
E-3A	AWACW	102
SP	TAC	19
	USAFE	8
SVCS	TAC	17
ENG	TAC	8
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	9
	JCSE	1
	AFCC	32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

POL	TAC	3
	USAFE	6
SECURITY	ESC	3
	TOTAL	234
B. (TS/NF) STATUS - [REDACTED] E		
FUNCTION	UNIT CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	2
E-3A	AWACW	1
COMMS	JCSE	5
	TOTAL	8

NOFORN

C. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE. E

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 14 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS
DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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PAGE

ZCZCOP0811
DAN: 055-023175
INPUT CDSN = OKA423
TOR: 130832Z MAR 80 TOT: 130833Z MAR 80

AUTO** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **
INFO = DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=68

EYES ONLY

ZYTMZYUW YDHANO 0011 0730730-MORN--YEKDDH.
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 130700Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS //J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR
AFSSO TAC //DO//
COS [REDACTED] //OMC// E
ZEM

FLASH

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1334 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, ROOM TESH,
MG WELCH [REDACTED] FROM ROOM RACKER
SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP 092 AS OF 130700Z E
MAR 80 (TS/NF) (S)

- REFERENCES.
- A. SSO USEUCOM 120748Z MAR 80, VHN 1315 (SITREP 091) (TS/NF) (U)
 - B. SSO USEUCOM 080733Z MAR 80, VHN 1271 (SITREP 087) (TS/NF) (U)
 - 1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A(604) LAUNCHED 120402Z MAR 80 TO CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FOR E-3A/CTF-68 INTERFACE TRAINING. MISSION PROFILE PLANNED IAW PARA 2A, REF B. CLEAR VOICE HF COORDINATION NET AND NESTOR SECURE VOICE UHF NET WERE EXCELLENT FOR ENTIRE EXERCISE. MISSION DEGRADED DUE TO LOSS OF E-3A RADAR FOR 1.1 HOURS (OF 3.7 HRS ON STATION) AND INABILITY TO ESTABLISH TADIL A NET. MANUAL TELL OF TRACKS OF INTEREST WAS PROVIDED THE FLEET IN LIEU OF NET DATA EXCHANGE. AIR ACTIVITY CONTROLLED INCLUDED SIX INTERCEPTS, FOUR AIR COMBAT SORTIES AND ELEVEN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

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PAGE 2

SHORTIES. AIRCRAFT CONTROLLED INCLUDED F-4 AND A-6E. NCS SHARED BY FORRESTAL, SPRUANCE AND THE E-3A. OTHER UNITS IN THE LINK NET AT VARIOUS TIMES INCLUDED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE FORRESTAL AND THE FORRESTAL [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE 11.4 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 121528Z MAR 80.

B. (U) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

(1) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 354: NMC (RADAR). ETIC 131400Z MAR 80.

(2) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 604: FMCD (ROTODOME DRIVE, LOW

SPEED) INS). TROUBLESHOOTING-ETIC TBD.

C. (U) (S/NF) [REDACTED] CONTROLLERS ARRIVED

[REDACTED] 11 MAR 80 FOR E-3A GROUND FAMILIARIZATION 12 AND 13 MAR 80. FAMILIARIZATION IN PREPARATION FOR 14 AND 15 MAR 80

E-3A FAMILIARIZATION FLIGHTS.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(U) (S/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 14 MAR 80 E-3A [REDACTED]

FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHT. FLIGHT PROFILE INCLUDES

140630Z MAR 80 LAUNCH, CONTROL OF [REDACTED] ACFT FROM [REDACTED]

AIRFIELD AND RECOVERY [REDACTED] 141330 MAR 80.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (S/NF) MAC MISSION TO [REDACTED] 12 MAR 80 CANCELLED DUE

TO MAINTENANCE. RESCHEDULED FOR 14 MAR 80.

B. (U) (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 121000Z MAR 80.

(1) (U) (S/NF) AREAS 1-3, R-9: NO CHANGE.

R-14 BLADDER: 165.2 (83 PERCENT)

TOTAL 434.8 (92 PERCENT)

[REDACTED] (U) (S/NF) NO FILL RECEIVED 12 MAR 80. 35.6 REQUIRED

TO COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(U) (S/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO [REDACTED] 13 MAR 80.

TWO MSNS PLANNED 14 MAR 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS. NO CHANGE.

6. (U) PERSONNEL.

A. (U) (S/NF) [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.

B. (U) (S/NF) [REDACTED] PLUS ONE USAFAE LNO. (TOTAL 8)

C. (U) (S/NF) [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.

8. (U) (S/NF) REMARKS. PLANNING UNDERWAY FOR VISIT OF GEN

CREECH TO [REDACTED]. PLANNING BASED ON A THREE HOUR STAY TO

INCLUDE IN-BRIEF, TOUR OF FACILITIES, LUNCH AND, DISCUSSION

WITH TAC TROOPS. NOTE: ITINERARY CALLS FOR GEN CREECH TO BE

IN [REDACTED]

SPECIFIC DATE OF VISIT TO BE DETERMINED.

9. (U) (S/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL

TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PER-

SONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 13 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.

DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

#0011

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLASH

EYES ONLY

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NOFORN

PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0963
DAN: 054-024327
INPUT CDSN = DKA265
TOR: 121046Z MAR 80 TOT: 121047Z MAR 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

COPY PROVIDED TO OPG [REDACTED]

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=40

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0011 0720000-MORN--YEKDOH.

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SDA DE

Z 00000748Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 386

FM SSO USEUCOM

TO JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//

CINCUSNAVEUR

AFSSO TAC//DO//

COS [REDACTED] /DMC// E

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1315 ECJ3-CAT SEC 1 OF 2

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN. SHUTLER, INFO SGEN LARSON, RADM TESH,

NG WELCH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3 [REDACTED] SITREP 091 AS OF 120700Z E

MAR 80 (TS/NF) (C)

REFERENCES.

A. SSO USEUCOM 110759Z MAR 80, VHN 1302 (SITREP 090) (TS/NF) (U)

B. SSO USEUCOM 080733Z MAR 80, VHN 1271 (SITREP 087) (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (S/NF) F-3A.

(1) (S/NF) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 11 MAR 80.

(2) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

(A) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT 354: NMC (MISSION RADAR) TROUBLE

SHOOTING. ETIC UNKNOWN.

(B) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT 604: FMC.

(3) (S/NF) E-3A LAUNCHED 120402Z MAR 80 TO CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FOR E-3A/CTF -60 INTERFACE TRAINING. MISSION PROFILE PLANNED IAW PARA 2A, REF B. AIRCRAFT RETURN TO [REDACTED] E

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ESTIMATED 121600Z MAR 80.

B. (S/NF) KC-135. KC-135 AIRCRAFT COMPLETED REDEPLOYMENT FROM [REDACTED] IAW FOLLOWING. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU. E

AIRCRAFT	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
KC-135	0830 [REDACTED]	1521 [REDACTED]
KC-135	0858 [REDACTED]	1523 [REDACTED]

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(S/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 14 AND 15 MAR 80
E-3A [REDACTED] FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHTS AND 17 MAR 80
E-3A REDEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] AB.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (S/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS TO [REDACTED] 11 MAR 80.

(U) (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 111300Z MAR 80.

(1) (S/NF) AREAS 1-3, R-9: NO CHANGE.

(2) (S/NF) R-14 BLADDERS: 165.2 (33 PERCENT).

(3) (S/NF) NET FILL 11 MAR 80 15.7. 35.6 REQUIRED TO

COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(S/NF) MAC MISSION SCHEDULED TO [REDACTED] 12 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-28(C-130)	0615 [REDACTED]	1500 [REDACTED]	[REDACTED], 2, 3

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: MISC GEN CARGO.

2. VIA [REDACTED]

3. RON. ETD 120730Z MAR 80.

5. (S/NF) COMMUNICATIONS. ALL EUROPEAN CIRCUITS OPERATIONAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	19
E-3A	AWACW	102
SP	TAC	19
	USAFE	8
SVCS	TAC	17
ENG	TAC	8
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	9
	JCSE	1
	AFCC	32
POL	TAC	3
	USAFE	6
SECURITY	ESC	3
	TOTAL	234

B. (S/NF) STATUS - [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACW	1
COMMS	JCSE	5
	TOTAL	7

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PAGE 3

C. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE. E
7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.
REVM 12 MAR 2000
#0011

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EYES ONLY

PAGE 1

ZCZC DPQ967
DAN: 254-024361
INPUT CDSN = DKA268
TOR: 121048Z MAR 80 TOT: 121249Z MAR 80

AUTO>** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION>** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=40

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ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 120748Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 326
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
CINCUSNAVEUR
AFSSO IAC//DO//
CDS [REDACTED] /OMC// E
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHM 1315 ECJ3-CAT SEC 2 OF 2 (C) E
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, RADM TESH,
MG WELCH, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJ: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 091 AS OF 120700Z E
MAR 80 (TS/NF)
8 (TS/NF) OVERFLIGHT INCIDENT (RE PARA 8, REF A).
A (TS/NF) [REDACTED] D, E

[REDACTED] RED SEA). LIGHTNING JOINED ON LEFT WING OF KC-135 AND STAYED FOR ABOUT ONE MINUTE, PRIOR TO THE INTERCEPT (0340Z). A CALL WAS RECEIVED BY THE KC-135 ON 243.0 STATING AWAC ACFT CONTACT TABUK RADAR ON 131.0. KC-135 MADE NO RESPONSE TO THIS CALL AS CREW THOUGHT IT COULD BE ROGUS, THEIR ON-COURSE POSITION WAS CONFIRMED, AND THE CALL WAS NOT DIRECTED AT THEIR ACFT. TABUK RADAR IS LOCATED AT 2825N3635E. THE E3A AIRCRAFT WAS IN THE SCHEDULED WORKING AREA (CENTERED ON 2100N5300E) AT THE TIME THE KC135 WAS INTERCEPTED.

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PAGE 2

B. ~~(TS/NF)~~ USDAO [REDACTED] ADVISES THAT AFTER LENGTHY MEETING AMONG AIRA, SA DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION AND MANAGER OF WESTERN AREA AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, ALCON AGREED TO KEEP INCIDENT FROM FURTHER DISSEMINATION. [REDACTED] BELIEVE ACFT STRAYED BUT ARE SATISFIED SITUATION HIGHLIGHTED AND WILL NOT RECUR. AIRA SENSES KC-135 ROUTE AFTER POST REFUELING TURN BACK TO THE WEST EXAGGERATED BY [REDACTED] TO REFLECT FLIGHT TOWARD BISHA (2000N 4235E). C. ~~(TS/NF)~~ ACTUAL E-3A AND KC-135 FLIGHT ROUTE DATA BASED ON FREE RUNNING INS AND ONE ADDITIONAL OMEGA DOPPLER ASSISTED INS (E-3A) AND PALLETIZED INS, TACAN, VOR, ASN DOPPLER COMPUTER (KC-135) REFLECT BOTH ACFT ON PLANNED AND FILED ROUTES. NOTE: NORMAL ATC REPORTING PROCEDURES WILL BE USED FOR FUTURE FLIGHTS.

9. ~~(TS/NF)~~ AMBASSADOR [REDACTED] VISITED THIS HQ 11 MAR 80 FOR BRIEFINGS AND DISCUSSION WITH HQ USEUCOM STAFF. [REDACTED] ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST WERE DISCUSSED.

10. ~~(TS/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 12 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TOINFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.
DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

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0470 0000000000
INLET OPS, E. MARPA
TOT: 111000Z MAR 80 TCT: 111000Z MAR 80

AUTHORITY UNASSIGNED
ACTION UNASSIGNED
INFO DM00(1)

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TOTAL COPIES = 0000
RTR074

ZPTZYUS YDHAND 0001 2710000-MORN--YEKDSH.
ZNY MORN
ZNY ZZ 004 DE
Z 0 110759Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 386
FM SSO USEJCOM
TO JCS //J3//
INFO AFSSO USAF//DC//
CINCPAC//J3//
AFSSO TAC//DC//
SSO SAC//DC//
CDS [REDACTED] /DMC// E

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VHN 1302 EUJ3-CAT
SEC 1 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG DAVIS,
MG WELCH, MG ADAMS, [REDACTED] FROM RADH PACKER
SUBJ: [REDACTED] E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 090 AS OF 110700Z E
MAR 80 (TS/NF)

- REFERENCES.
A. SSO USEJCOM 100736Z MAR 80, VHN 1292 (SITREP 089) (TS/NF) (U)
B. SSO USEJCOM 062733Z MAR 80, VHN 1271 (SITREP 087) (TS/NF) (U)
1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (U) (TS/NF) E-3A.

(1) (TS/NF) E-3A/TF-70 INTERFACE TRAINING MISSION
COMPLETED WITH THE E-3A RETURN TO [REDACTED] 101353Z MAR 80.
E-3A ON STATION 5.1 HOURS. FIRST OF TWO EVENTS SCHEDULED FOR
CONTROL BY THE E-3A COMPLECTED WITH E-3A REFUELING AND COULD
NOT BE ACCEPTED. SECOND EVENT WAS SUCCESSFUL WITH 18
INTERCEPTS, TADIL C CONTROLLED. UNABLE TO ESTABLISH TADIL
A LINK UNTIL LATE IN THE MISSION AS BOTH HF RADIOS BECAME
INDP. TADIL A NET WAS ESTABLISHED ON UHF FOR 1.2 HOURS OF

6400 DATA ENCL-4 BE WITH THE OPERATIONAL.
 (2)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ FLIGHT ACTIVITY 11 MAR 80, E-3A
 (3)(U) AIRBORNE 14.3 (DNR) (DNR) 101355Z MAR 80.
 (3)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT:
 (1)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ACFT 3 E-3A
 (RADAR) E-3A 141 02 MAR 80.
 (3)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ACFT 3 E-3A.

(4)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ CONTINUED PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR
 12 MAR 80 E-3A/OT-450 INTERFACED TRAINING.
 (5)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ ACFT 3 E-3A COMPLETED COORDINATION FOR
 14 MAR 80 FEDE [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT TO [REDACTED] (SEE
 PARA 25 BELOW). AIRCRAFT 021 END AL OF THIS REPORT. ACFT
 344 END.

E

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
 (1)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ E-3.

(1)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 11 MAR 80.
 (2)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ COMPLETE COORDINATION FOR 12 MAR 80 E-3A/
 OT-450 INTERFACE TRAINING. PARA 2A, SSO USEUCOM 060729Z MAR 80,
 VRR 1214 (SITREP 008) PROVIDES MISSION PROFILE.
 (3)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR
 14-15 MAR 80 E-3A [REDACTED] FAMILIARIZATION/ORIENTATION FLIGHTS.

(4)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ KC-135 [REDACTED]
 (5)(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ KC-135 AIRCRAFT SCHEDULED TO REDEPLOY TO
 [REDACTED] AS THE FOLLOWING. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE:

ACFT	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION
021	0830 [REDACTED]	1430 [REDACTED]
344	0900 [REDACTED]	1500 [REDACTED]

E

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ MAC MISSIONS TO [REDACTED] 13 MAR 80. ALL TIMES
 ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTES
1734-23(C-137)	0626 [REDACTED]	141 [REDACTED]	1,2

NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA PER [REDACTED] A.
 (U) 2. PON. ETD 110730Z MAR 80.

B. (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ FUEL STATUS AS OF 101200Z MAR 80.
 (1) (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ AREA 1: 65.1 (99 PERCENT)
 (U) AREA 2: 65.0 (100 PERCENT)
 AREA 3: 118.4 (100 PERCENT)
 R-14: 149.5 (75 PERCENT)
 R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)

(2) (U) ~~(S//NF)~~ NET FILL 14 MAR 80 15.3. 66.6 REQUIRED
 TO COMPLETE FILL.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ NO MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO [REDACTED] 11 MAR 80.
 NEXT PLANNED MISSION ETA 121500Z MAR 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ THE POINT TO POINT SECURE VOICE CIRCUIT
 BETWEEN USAF AND [REDACTED] WAS DOWN FROM 101400 - 101555Z
 FOR 92 PERCENT RELIABILITY. THE OUTAGE WAS DUE TO A BAD
 TELEPHONE AT [REDACTED]

E

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PAGE 3

E

CTG-7D, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AT 192130Z AND TERMINATED
[REDACTED] GENERALLY GOOD WITH SOME WEAK
[REDACTED] CTG-7D.

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ZCZCOP096-
PAR: 003-923631
INERT CISM = OKAS3V
TFC: 111007Z MAR 67 TOT: 111000Z MAR 67

ANYC** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DMCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR:74

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ZNY UNDM

ZKZK ZZ SSA DE
Z O 110759Z MAR 67 ZYH ZFF 389
FM SSC USEUCOM
TO JCS //J3//
INFO AFSSO USAF//DC//
CINCPAC//J3//
AFSSO TAC//DC//
SSO SAC//DC//
COS [REDACTED]//DC// E

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1302 ECJ3-CAT
SEC 2 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG DAVIS,
MG WELCH, MG ADAMS, [REDACTED] FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJ: HC USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 600 AS OF 110700Z E
MAR 67 (TS/NF)

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAF	13
E-3A	AWAC	102
	NAVFUR	1 (TF-60 LNO)
SP	TAC	19
	USAF	8
SVCS	TAC	17
ENG	TAC	8
ENG/SVCS	USAF	14
ALCE	MAC	2
COMNS	USAFEUR	9

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~~EYES ONLY~~

	JOSE	1
	AFCM	52
REL	TAC	3
	USAFB	6
SECURITY	ESC	3
WALKER TASK FORCE SAL		32
	TOTAL	67

B. (S/AF) STATUS	[REDACTED]	
FUNCTION	UNIT/ [REDACTED]	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFB	1
E-3A	AWACN	1
COMMS	JOSE	5
		7

C. (S/AF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS: NO CHANGE.

8. (S/AF) REMARKS. USDAO [REDACTED] REPORTS THAT [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] OFFICIALS HAVE INFORMED HIM THAT KC-135/E-3A FLIGHTS ENTERED AIRSPACE WITHOUT RADIO CONTACT AND PROCEEDED ON OTHER THAN FILED ROUTE. TWO [REDACTED] ACFT WERE LAUNCHED TO INVESTIGATE. CREW DEBRIEF INDICATES NO DEVIATION FROM DESIGNATED FLIGHT PLAN AND THAT THE PROCEDURE DURING PREVIOUS MSNO OF NOT MAINTAINING RADIO CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] AGENCIES WAS THEREFORE FOLLOWED. DETAILED E-3A/KC-135 TIME/POSITION REPORTS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED. (U) (S/AF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL [REDACTED] LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF [REDACTED] CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

D, E

MAR 2000

NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.
DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

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120000Z MAR 80
TO: 129-022456
FROM: OCSA = OKA887
INFO: 120051Z MAR 80 TOT: 120052Z MAR 80

UNASSIGNED **

UNASSIGNED **

INFO: DNCC(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 10001

ATRETA

ATTN: YOHANO 0005 0700752-MORN--YEKDDH.

BY: MORN

ZEN ZZ SCA DE

~~090736Z MAR 80~~ ZYM

FM SSO USEUCOM

To JCS//J3//

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DC//

OTOPAC//J3//

AFSSO TAC//DD//

NO SAC//DD//

OPS ~~REDACTED~~ /OMC// E

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHM 1292 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG DAVIS
MG WELCH, MG ADAMS, ~~REDACTED~~ FROM RADM PACKER

SUBJ: ~~REDACTED~~ SITREP 089 AS OF 100700Z MAR 80 E

(TS/NF)

REFERENCES:

A. SSO USEUCOM 090610Z MAR 80, VHM 1285 (SITREP 088) (TS/NF) (U)

B. SSO USEUCOM 080733Z MAR 80, VHM 1271 (SITREP 087) (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) E-3A.

(1) (TS/NF) E-3A (354) LAUNCHED IAW PARA 2B, REF B 092335Z
MAR 80 FOR E-3A/TF-70 INTERFACE TRAINING IN NORTH ARABIAN SEA.
MAJOR E-3A EVENTS THROUGH THIS REPORT INCLUDE:

092335Z MAR 80 DEPART ~~REDACTED~~ E

100257Z MAR 80 ENTER TF-70 OPNL AREA

(2) (TS/NF) EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO 100700Z MAR 80 WILL BE PROVIDED
SEPARATELY.

(3) (TS/NF) FLIGHT ACTIVITY 9/10 MAR 80. E-3A (354) AIRBORNE
7.5 HOURS AS OF THIS REPORT (092335Z - 100700Z MAR 80).

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(U) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

- (A) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 354: FMC.
- (B) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 614: FMC.

(U) KC-135

(1) (U) (S/NF) KC-135 (122) LAUNCHED 092320Z MAR 80 IAW PARA 2B, REF 8 AND 11 COMPANY WITH E-3A. CONDUCTED REFUEL OPNS AAR1. KC-135 RETURNED [REDACTED] RECOVERING 100430Z MAR 80.

(2) (U) (S/NF) FLIGHT ACTIVITY 9/10 MAR 80. KC-135 (044) AIRBORNE 5.2 HOURS (092320Z - 100430Z MAR 80).

(U) KC-135 AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

- (A) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 121: FMC.
- (B) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 244: PRC (RADAR)

(C) (U) (S/NF) KC-135 [REDACTED]. KC-135 TANKERS LAUNCHED FROM [REDACTED] 100332Z, 100333Z, 100334Z MAR 80. AIRBORNE SPARE [REDACTED] 100352Z MAR 80. FOR E-3A REFUEL OPERATIONS AT AAR.2.

(U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A (U) (S/NF) E-3A. E-3A (354) RETURN TO [REDACTED] ESTIMATED 101412Z MAR 80.

B (U) (S/NF) KC-135. KC-135 AIRCRAFT TO REDEPLOY [REDACTED] 11 MAR 80.

C (U) (S/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 12 MAR 80 E-3A/CTF-60 INTERFACE TRAINING.

(U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A (U) (S/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS TO [REDACTED] 9 MAR 80.

B (U) (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 091200Z MAR 80.

- (1) (U) (S/NF) AREAS 1-3, R-9: NO CHANGE
- (2) (U) (S/NF) R-14 BLADDERS: 134.2 (67 PERCENT)
- (3) (U) (S/NF) NET FILL 9 MAR 80 11.3. 66.6 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

(U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(U) (S/NF) MAC MISSION SCHEDULED TO [REDACTED] 10 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DEPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-23(C-133)	WS15 [REDACTED]	1300 [REDACTED]	1, 2

- NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA: TWO GENERATORS, LOX CART, E-3A WRSK, MISC GEN CARGO.
- 2. RON, ETD 110730Z MAR 80

(U) COMMUNICATIONS

A (U) (S/NF) SHORT OUTAGE, 100100Z-100150Z MAR 80, WJBS AT [REDACTED] END; WRONG KEY LIST/EMPLOYED.

B (U) (S/NF) WSC-3 NET WITH CTG 70 SUPPORTING E-3A OPERATIONS FULLY OPERATIONAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL - NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8 (U) (S/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 10 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS. DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

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PAGE 1

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ACTION>** UNASSIGNED **
INFO: DUCD(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=47

FLASH

ZTTMZYU YDHAND 0712 0690816-MORN--YEKDON.
ZNY MORN
ZKZK ZZ SDA DE
Z O [REDACTED] RB ZYM ZFF 3 & 6
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSG USAF//DC//
CINCPAC//J3//
AFSSG TAC//DD//
SSO SAC//DD//
COS [REDACTED] /OMC// E
CINCUSNAVEUR
ZEN

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~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1285 ECJ3-CAT
SECTION 1 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG DAVIS,
MG WELCH, MG ADAMS, [REDACTED] RADM TESH FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP 088 AS OF 090700Z
MAR 80 (S/NF) (U)

9
E 88
E 88 of 88

- A. SSO USEUCOM 080733Z MAR 80, VHN 1271 (SITREP 087)
(S/NF) (U)
- B. SSO USEUCOM 060729Z MAR 80, VHN 1214 (SITREP 085)
(S/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (U) (S/NF) E-3A.
(1) (S/NF) E-3A(604) LAUNCHED 080702Z MAR 80 TO
CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FOR INTERFACE TRAINING WITH CTF-60.
MISSION PROFILE IAW PARA 2A, REF B. E-3A ON STATION 080815Z -
081215Z MAR 80.
CLEAR VOICE HF COORDINATION NET WAS EXCELLENT FOR ENTIRE

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EXERCISE PERIOD. PARAFILL HF SECURE VOICE WAS SATISFACTORY, E3A INITIAL VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WERE WITH SPRUANCE APPROX 0850Z. TABIL-A/LINK 11 LINK EXERCISE WAS SUCCESSFUL. E3A IN THE LINK FROM 080615Z UNTIL 081245Z WITH ONLY BRIEF PERIODS OF "DOWN" TIME. NCS WAS SHARED DURING E3A ON-STATION PERIOD BY SPRUANCE, E-3A AND WAINWRIGHT. OTHER UNITS IN THE LINK AT VARIOUS TIMES INCLUDED FORRESTAL. LINK WAS ALSO ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE [REDACTED]

E

[REDACTED] ALBANY AND THE FORRESTAL E2C ACFT. THE E3A ACFT CONTROLLED ONE SECTION OF TWO F-4 ACFT ON FIVE HEAD-ON INTERCEPTS. AIR CONTROL WAS GOOD WITH A FOUR NAUTICAL MILE ERROR IN RANGE. E-3A REPORTED RADAR WAS "UP" AND "DOWN" DURING INTERCEPTS. E-3A WAS ASKED TO CONTROL TWO A-7 ACFT ON A RAID OF SPRUANCE GROUP BUT HAD TO TURN CONTROL OVER TO THE E2C ACFT DUE TO E3A RADAR PROBLEMS. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION REMAINED EXCELLENT AND LINK EXERCISE WAS SUCCESSFUL DESPITE E-3A RADAR FAILURE. E3A AIRBORNE 11.5 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 081536Z MAR 80.

(2)(U)(S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT:

(A)(U)(TS/NF) ACFT 354: FMC.

(B)(U)(TS/NF) ACFT 604: PMC (RADAR, SIF/IFF). PARTS/ETIC UNKNOWN. MAINTENANCE INVESTIGATING.

B. (U)(S/NF) KC-135.

(1)(U)(TS/NF) DEPLOYMENT FROM [REDACTED] COMPLETE WITH ACFT 021 LANDING 081030Z MAR 80 AND ACFT 044 LANDING 081145Z MAR 80.

E

(2)(U)(S/NF) ACFT 021 AIRBORNE 5.2 HOURS. ACFT 044 AIRBORNE 5.2 HOURS. BOTH ACFT FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.

(U)(TS/NF) CONTINUED COORDINATION OF 9-10 MAR 80 E3A/CTF-70 INTERFACE MISSION.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (U)(TS/NF) KC-135 [REDACTED]: KC-135 SCHEDULED TO LAUNCH 092320Z MAR 80 FOR TANKER OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF E-3A DEPLOYMENT TO ARABIAN SEA. TANKER MISSION PROFILE IAW PARA 2B, REF A.

B. (U)(TS/NF) E-3A LAUNCHES 092335Z MAR 80 ENROUTE E-3A/CTF 70 INTERFACE TRAINING IN NORTH ARABIAN SEA. FLIGHT ROUTE OVER [REDACTED] IAW PARA 2B, REF B.

E

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U)(TS/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS TO [REDACTED] 8 MAR 80.

B. (U)(TS/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 081200Z MAR 80.

- (1) (U)(TS/NF) AREA 1: 65.2 (99 PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 118.4 (100 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.2 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14: 145.5 (73 PERCENT)
- (U) TOTAL: 415.1 (94.4 PERCENT)

(2) (U)(TS/NF) NET FILL 8 MAR 80 5.9. 55.3 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

C. (U)(TS/NF) BASE SUPPORT.

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EYES ONLY

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REV. 4 MAR 2000
5312

PAGE 3

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ZCZCOP9325
OAN: 052-003520
INPUT DESN = DK4137
TOP: 01210Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

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AUTO=** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DMCS(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=23

ZTTMZYUW YOHANO 0013 069016-MORN--YEKDDH.
ZNY MHORN
ZKZK ZZ SDA DE
Z 0 000010Z MAR 80 ZYH ZFF 3 & 6
FM SSD USEJCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAF//DO//
CINCPAC//J3//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
SSO SAC//DO//
CNS [REDACTED] OMCI/E
CINCUSMAVEJP
ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1285 ECJ3-CAT
SECTION 2 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO SGEN LARSON, MG DAVIS,
MG WELCH, MG ADAMS, [REDACTED] RADM TESH FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJ: HQ USEJCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 088 AS OF 090700Z
MAR 80 (S/NF) (U)

(1) (S/NF) NINE GROUNDING STATIONS COMPLETE. FOUR
AT A-FRAME, ONE AT SOUTH END OF TAXIWAY AND TWO AT EACH
K-14 SITE. (U)

(2) (S/NF) SECOND FIELD SHOWER OPERATIONAL (KC-135
CREW BILLETS AT HANGER 1).

4. (S/NF) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS. NO MAC MISSIONS
SCHEDULED TO [REDACTED] MAR 80. NEXT SCHEDULED MISSION
ETA 101300Z MAR 80.

5. (S/NF) COMMUNICATIONS. ALL CIRCUITS OPERATIONAL.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

A. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED]
FUNCTION [REDACTED] UNIT/CMD [REDACTED] TOTAL [REDACTED]

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CHD ELEMENT	USAFE	12
E-3A	AWACW	101
	NAVEUR	1 (TF60 LNO)
SP	TAC	19
	USAFE	8
SVCS	TAC	17
ENG	TAC	8
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	9
	JCSE	1
	AFCC	31
POL	TAC	3
	USAFE	6
SECURITY	ESC	3
TANKER TASK FORCE	SAC	32
	TOTAL	267

B. (S/NF) STATUS - [REDACTED]		
FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACW	1
C-130	USAFE	2
COMMS	JCSE	5
	TOTAL	9

C. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. (S/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 9 MAR 2000

SSD NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS. DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT. #0013

EYES ONLY

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PAGE 1

ZCZCPR01AS
DTG: 081-125112
INPUT CLSK = DKA48P
TOR: 51033Z MAR 80 TOT: 81003Z MAR 80

AUTD== UNASSIGNED ==

ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==

INFO= DNOC(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 10001
RTR=47

FLASH

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ZYTHZYUR YDHAND 0812 056 [REDACTED] -MORN--YEKDOH.

ZNY UNFORN

ZKZK ZZ SQA DE

Z [REDACTED] ZYH

FROM: SSO USEUCOM

TO: JCS//J3//

INFO: AFSSO USAFE //DD//

AFSSO TAC //DD//

COS [REDACTED] //DNC// E

CINCSNAVLANT

ZEN

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~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1271 ECJ3-CAT SEC 1 OF 2

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH, [REDACTED]

ROOM TESH FROM KADM PACKER

SUBJ: [REDACTED] E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 087 AS O 080700Z MAR E

NO (TS/NF) (C)

4. SSO USEUCOM 070757Z MAR 80, VHN 1246 (SITREP 086) (TS/NF) (C)

6. SSO USEUCOM 060729Z MAR 80, VHN 1214 (SITREP 085) (TS/NF) (C)

1. OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

~~(TS/NF)~~ E-3A(354) LAUNCHED 070400Z MAR 80 TO CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FOR INTERFACE TRAINING WITH CTF-60. MISSION PROFILE PLANNED IAW PARA 2A, REF B. ACFT ON STATION 070815Z - 071233Z MAR 80. CLEAR VOICE HF COORDINATION NET COMMUNICATIONS WERE EXCELLENT FOR ENTIRE EXERCISE PERIOD. PARKHILL HF SECURE VOICE WAS SATISFACTORY FOR ENTIRE EXERCISE PERIOD. ACFT INITIALLY REQUESTED AND CONDUCTED COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS ON HF COORDINATION NET 070500Z. TADIL-A/LINK 11 EXERCISE WAS SUCCESSFUL. E3A IN THE LINK AT 070815Z AND REMAINED IN THE LINK UNTIL 071315Z, EXCEPT FOR A TEN MINUTE PERIOD. E3A NCS FROM 070840Z UNTIL 071233Z. FOLLOWING SHIPS WERE IN THE LINK AT VARIOUS TIMES: ALBANY, FORRESTAL, WAINWRIGHT, SPRUANCE, AND

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[REDACTED] DURING SECOND CYCLE
 E-3A CONTROLLED THREE F-4ACFT ON FOUR HEAD-ON INTERCEPTS.
 ATK CONTROL WAS EXCELLENT. ON THIRD CYCLE E-3A CONTROLLED
 A SECTION OF F-4ACFT ON SEVEN HEAD-ON INTERCEPTS. BOTH
 ACFT HAD GOOD TADIL C (LINK 4) WITH TWO OF THE INTERCEPTS
 CONTROLLED IN "COUPLED" MODE. ON SECOND CYCLE E-3A ATTEMPTED
 AN UNBRIEFED RAID-OF-OPPORTUNITY ON ALBANY WITH THREE
 F-47 ACFT AND ONE F466 UTILIZING TADIL-A/LINK 11 INFORMATION.
 EXERCISE MET WITH MINIMAL SUCCESS DUE TO FAILURE TO SUCCESS-
 FULLY IDENTIFY/LOCATE THE ALBANY. E-3A WAS OVERFLOWN BY TWO
 F-104 ACFT AT 070900Z MAR 80 COORDINATES 4020N 1110E.
 COORDINATION AND COORDINATION EXCELLENT. E-3A EQUIPMENT CAME ON LINE
 RAPIDLY
 AND SYSTEMS PERFORMED WELL THROUGHOUT THE EXERCISE. F-3A
 AIRBORNE 11.5 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 071530Z MAR 80.
 B. (S/NF) KC-135 ACFT LAUNCHED FROM [REDACTED] AND ARE ENROUTE
 TO SUPPORT 9-10 MAR 80 E-3A/CTF-70 INTERFACE MISSION.
 ACFT DEPLOYING IAW FOLLOWING. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU (DEPARTURE
 ACTUAL, ARRIVAL ESTIMATED):

ACFT	DEPT	ARR
021	060517Z	081015Z
(U) 044	060637Z	081140Z

C. (S/NF) E-3A(604) LAUNCHED 060402Z MAR 80 TO CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FOR INTERFACE TRAINING WITH CTF-60. MISSION PROFILE PLANNED IAW PARA 2A, PFF H.

D. (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS:

- (1) (S/NF) ACFT 354 FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.
- (2) (S/NF) ACFT 004 FMC AS OF LAUNCH.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

A. (S/NF) COMPLETE 5 MAR 80 E-3A(604)/CTF 60 INTERFACE MISSION. ESTIMATED RETURN [REDACTED] 081000Z MAR 80.

B. (S/NF) COMPLETE COORDINATION FOR 9 MAR 80 E-3A LAUNCH TO NORTH ARABIAN SEA FOR E-3A/CTF-70 INTERFACE TRAINING. AS PLANNED, E-3A WILL DEPART [REDACTED] AND TRANSIT TO OPNL AREA VIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AIRSPACE, REMAIN ON STATION APPROX SIX HOURS AND RETURN [REDACTED] VIA REVERSE ROUTING. F-3A AND KC-135 CREWS WILL FILE ROUTE ROUTIN FORM [REDACTED] USING NORMAL AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION PROCEDURES. TAIL NUMBER CALL SIGNS WILL BE USED ON FLIGHT PLAN. INTERFACE OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE TADIL A/LINK II INTERFACE WITH SURFACE AND AIRBORNE ELEMENTS OF CTF-70 AND E-3A CONTROL OF CTF-70 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. CTF-70 OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED WITHIN 100NM OF AN AREA CENTERED ON [REDACTED] E-3A OPNL AREA BOUNDED BY [REDACTED]

KEY FLIGHT PROFILE/COORDINATIONS/TIMES INCLUDE:

OPT [REDACTED]	092335Z	
2511N 0942E	092400Z	ENTER SA AIRSPACE
2200N 4630E	100120Z	ARCP (40K LB)
2830N 5500E	100219Z	ENTER JIDDA FIR
2900N 5100E	100300Z	ENTER OPNL AREA
2900N 6100E	100905Z	EXIT OPNL AREA

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PAGE 3

APP [REDACTED]

101412Z

BASED KC-135 WILL DEPART APPROX 202328Z MAR 80 TO
RENDEZVOUS WITH E-3A AT 101120Z FOR AAR. [REDACTED] BASED TANKERS
WILL DEPART TO ALLOW RENDEZVOUS WITH E-3A AT E-3A LAUNCH PLUS FIVE
HOURS THIRTY MINUTES.

E

C. (U) (S/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 12 MAR 80 E-3A/
OFF-OF INTERFACE MISSION.

REF: 25 MAR 2000
#0010

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ZCZCOP1179
CALL: 851-725444
INFO: ODSN = 0K4419
TOR: 81034Z MAR 80 TOT: 81034Z MAR 80

PAGE 1

EYES ONLY

AUTHOR: UNASSIGNED **
ACTION: UNASSIGNED **
INFO: ONC7(1)

FLASH

TOTAL COPIES = 10701
RTR: 47

ZTTMZ YUH YDHAND 0413 4-662754-MORN--YEKDOH.
ZNY MORN
ZKZK ZZ 804 DE
Z D 080733Z MAR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSD USAFE//DC//
AFSSD TAG//DO//
COS [REDACTED] /ONC// E
CINCPACVAVEJR
ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHM 1271 ECJ3-CAT SEC 2 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH [REDACTED] G. E
RADM TESH FROM RADM PACER [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: HQ USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 087 AS OF 080700Z MAR E
80 (TS/NE) [REDACTED]

- (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
 - (TS/NE) MAC MISSION TO [REDACTED] 7 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ZULU.

M34	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-22(C-130)	0650 [REDACTED]	1540 [REDACTED]	1,2 E

 NOTE: 1. LOAD DATA: GEN CARGO
 2. ROW . ETD 080730Z MAR 80.
 - (TS/NE) FUEL STATUS AS OF 071200Z MAR 80
 - (TS/NE) AREAS 1-3, R-9: NO CHANGE.
 (U) R-14: 139.5 (70 PERCENT).
 - (TS/NE) NET FILL 7 MAR 80 19.4. 61.2 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.
 - (TS/NE) BASE SUPPORT.
 - (U)(1) (TS/NE) AIRFIELD PAVEMENT EVALUATION FINAL REPORT RECEIVED AT THIS HQ. REPORT INFORMATION WILL BE FOR-

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PAGE 2

MAPS ISSUED SEPARATELY.

(2) ~~(S/NF)~~ EXTERIOR POWER FEED TO BOG NUMBER 1 COMPLETED.

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

~~(TS/NF)~~ NO MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO [REDACTED] 6 MAR 82. NEXT SCHEDULED ETA 101300Z MAR 82.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

A. ~~(S/NF)~~ ALL CIRCUITS OPERATIONAL.
B. ~~(TS/NF)~~ SEVEN NRST CALLS FROM [REDACTED] VIA AUTOVON INCLUDED TWO NO CONTACT, ONE NOT SECURE, AND FOUR WERE SUCCESSFUL SECURE. AVERAGE COMPLETION TIME 1.4 MINUTES.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

FUNCTION	STATUS	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	12
E-3A	AWACW	101
SP	TAC	19
	USAFE	8
SVCS	TAC	18
ENG	TAC	8
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	9
	JCSE	1
	AFCC	35
POL	TAC	3
	USAFE	6
SECURITY	ESC	3
	TOTAL	239

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
F-3A	AWACW	1
C-130	USAFE	2
COMMS	JCSE	5
	TOTAL	9

C. ~~(S/NF)~~ STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE.

D. ~~(TS/NF)~~ PERSONNEL INBOUND [REDACTED] NO LONGER REQUIRE EXTREME COLD WEATHER GEAR. NORMAL WEIGHT SLEEPING BAG SUFFICIENT AT NIGHT. FIELD JACKET WITH LINER SUFFICIENT FOR NIGHT WORK. MESS KITS AND HARD HATS NOT REQUIRED. SHORT SLEEVED FATIGUES SUFFICIENT FOR DAY.

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE

8. ~~(TS/NF)~~ CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 6 MAR 2020

PAGE 3

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ZCZCDP0391
DAN: 050-030320
INPUT CDSN = DKA236
TOR: 71012Z MAR 80 TOT: 71012Z MAR 80

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PAGE 1

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **
INFO= DNCO(1)

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• TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=47

CORRECTED COPY
DESTROY ALL OTHERS

ZTTMZZSX YDHANO 0008 0670943-MORN--YEKDDH,
ZNY MHORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z [REDACTED] ZYM ZFF 3 & 6 ZS
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
COS [REDACTED] /DMC// E
CINCUSNAVEUR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1246 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH, [REDACTED] G
RADM TESH FROM RADM PACKER
SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP 085 OF 070700Z MAR E

90 (TS/NF)
A. SSO USEUCOM 060729Z MAR 80, VHN 1214 (SITREP 085) (TS/NF) (U)
1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A (TS/NF) E-3A (604) LAUNCHED 060400Z MAR 80 TO CENTRAL
MEDITERRANEAN FOR INTERFACE TRAINING WITH CTF-60, NAVY LNO ON
BOARD E-3A. MISSION PROFILE IAW PARA 2A, REF A, ALTHOUGH
FIGHTER ACTIVITY WAS LIMITED BY WEATHER, ELEVEN SUCCESSFUL
INTERCEPTS WERE CONDUCTED (VOICE CONTROLLED). TADIL A INTER-
FACE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. PROBLEM APPARENTLY DUE DIFFERENT
OPERATING TIME IN COMPUTER PROGRAMS. AFTER DEPARTING STATION,
E-3A WAS INTERCEPTED BY TWO [REDACTED] ACFT. INTERCEPT TOOK
PLACE AT 061214Z MAR 80 AT [REDACTED] AT FL300. [REDACTED] ACFT E
WERE APPARENTLY FROM [REDACTED]
ONE ACFT JOINED IN LOOSE FORMATION ON EACH WING, APPROX 500 FEET
OUT. E-3A MADE CALL ON 243.0 TO ADVISE OF RADIATION HAZARD

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WITHIN 1500 FEET OF E-3A. [REDACTED] ACFT DEPARTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] E-3A AIRBORNE 11.4 HOURS AND RECOVERED [REDACTED] 061525Z MAR 80.

B. (TS/NF) E-3A (354) LAUNCHED, 070400Z MAR 80 TO CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FOR INTERFACE TRAINING WITH CTF-60. MISSION PROFILE IAW PARA 2A, REF A.

C. (U) (S/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS:
(1) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 604 FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.
(2) (U) (S/NF) ACFT 354 FMC AS OF LAUNCH.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
A. (TS/NF) COMPLETE 7 MAR 80, E-3A (354) CTF-60 INTERFACE MISSION. ESTIMATE RETURN TO [REDACTED] 071600Z MAR 80.
B. (TS/NF) CONTINUE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR 8 MAR 80 E-3A/CTF-60, 10 MAR 80 E-3A/CTF-70 AND 12 MAR 80 E-3A/CTF-60 INTERFACE TRAINING MISSIONS.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
A. (TS/NF) NO MAC MISSIONS TO [REDACTED] 6 MAR 80.
B. (U) (S/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 061200Z MAR 80.

- (1) (U) (S/NF) AREA 1: 65.2 (99 PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 118.4 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14: 159.0 (80 PERCENT)
- R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)
- (U) TOTAL: 428.6 (95.8 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 6 MAR 80 15.8, 41.8 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

C. (U) (S/NF) BASE SUPPORT. [REDACTED]

MEASURES TO COPE WITH HEALTH HAZARD AND NUISANCE TO BE INCREASED (SPRAYING OF BREEDING AREAS, PROPER DISPOSITION OF ALL SEWAGE AND GARBAGE).

4. (U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
(U) (S/NF) MAC MISSION TO [REDACTED] 7 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/DEPART	NOTE
173A-23(C-130)	0615 [REDACTED]	1300 [REDACTED]	1,2

- NOTES: 1. LOAD DATA MISC GEN CARGO.
- 2. RON. ETD 060730Z MAR 80

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.
A. (S/NF) ONLY OUTAGE WAS WITH WJBS, DOWN AT [REDACTED] END 062245Z - 070115Z BECAUSE OF BAD PRINTER.

B. (S/NF) NBST CALLS, WK TO [REDACTED] 4 COMPLETIONS WITH AVERAGE COMPLETION TIME OF 1 MINUTE, ALL LOUD AND CLEAR. ONE CALL NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE OF CIRCUIT OUTAGE AT [REDACTED]

6. (U) PERSONNEL [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CDR	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAF	9
E-3A	AWACH	102 (INCL ONE USN LNO)
SP	TAC	19

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AGE 3

SVCS	USAFE	8
ENG	TAC	16
ENG/SVCS	TAC	8
ALCE	USAFE	14
COMMS	MAC	2
	USAREUR	9
	JCSE	1
	AFCC	33
POL	TAC	4
	USAFE	8
SECURITY	ESC	3
	TOTAL	234

B. (TS/NF) STATUS	[REDACTED]	
FUNCTION	UNIT/CHD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACW	2
C-130	USAFE	2
COMMS	JCSE	5
	TOTAL	10

C. (S/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE

8. (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

REVW 7 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS.
DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

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ZCZCOP0330

DAN: 049-027546

INPUT CDSN = DKA871

TOR: 60853Z MAR 80

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOT: 60854Z MAR 80

~~FLASH~~

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

~~NOFORN~~

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001

RTR=24

ZTTMZYUK YDHAND 0003 0660737-MORN--YEKDH.

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK ZZ SOA DE

Z O 060729Z MAR 80 ZYH

FM

TO JCS77J377

INFO AFSSO USAFE//DD//

AFSSO TAC//DO//

CNS [REDACTED] OMC//E

CINCSNAVEUR

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1214 ECJ3-CAT SEC 1 OF 2

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH, [REDACTED]

RADM TESH FROM RADM PACKER [REDACTED]

SUBJ: ~~AFUSEUCOM E-3A~~ [REDACTED] ~~SITREP 085 AS OF 060700Z~~ MAR E

60 (TS/NF) (U)

A. SSO USEUCOM 050914Z MAR 80, VHN 1192 (SITREP 084) (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (U) (TS/NF) NO E-3 A FLIGHT ACTIVITY CONDUCTED 05 MAR 80.

B. (U) (TS/NF) E-3A(604) LAUNCHED 060400Z MAR 80 TO CENTRAL

MEDITERRANEAN FOR INTERFACE TRAINING WITH CTF-60 (SEE PARA 2

BELOW FOR MISSION PROFILE).

C. (U) (TS/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS:

(1) (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 354: FMC AS OF THIS REPORT.

(2) (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 604: FMC AS OF LAUNCH.

D. (U) (TS/NF) UNSUCCESSFUL E-3A/CTF-60 INTERFACE 3 AND 4 MAR

80 DUE A MOTOR GENERATOR CASUALTY TO 400 CYCLE 100KW AND 300KW

UNITS ABOARD USS FORESTAL (IN PORT). CASUALTY PRECLUDED FORRESTAL

FROM OPERATING NDTs AND LINK 11 INTERFACE. REPEAT OF PROBLEMS

NOT ANTICIPATED.

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

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PAGE 1

ZCZCDP0350
DAN: 049-027704
INPUT CDSN = DKA873
TOR: 60904Z MAR 80 TOT: 60904Z MAR 80

NOFORN

AUTO*** UNASSIGNED **
ACTION*** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCC(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
KTR=24

FLASH

ZTTMZYUW YDHANO 0004 0660737-MORN--YEKDOM.
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 060720Z MAR 80 ZYH
FM SSD USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFS60 USAFE//DD//
AFSSO TAC//DD//
COS [REDACTED] OMC//E
CINCSNAVEUR
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHM 1214 ECJ3-CAT SEC 2 OF 2
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH [REDACTED] 16 E
RADP TESH FROM RADP PACKER
SUBJ: MG USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] SITREP 085 AS OF 060700Z MAR E

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

FUNCTION	UNIT/CD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	10
E-3A	A-:2	87
SP	TAC	P 19
	USAFE	8
SVCS	TAC	16
ENG	TAC	8
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14
ALCF	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	9
	JCSE	1
	AFCC	39
POL	TAC	4

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ZCZCDPG491
AN: 048-333733
INPUT CDSN = OKA564
TOR: 51032Z MAR 80 TOT: 51033Z MAR 80

AUTO>** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION>** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

COPIES PROVIDED TO OPG- [REDACTED] G

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=25

ZYTMZYUW YDHANO 0007 0650925-MORN--YEKDDH.
ZNY HMORN
ZKZK ZZ SOA DE
Z O 050914Z MAR 80 ZYH
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS//J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE//DO//
AFSSO TAC//DO//
CDS [REDACTED] /OMC//E
INCUSNAVEUR
SSO SAC
SSO MAC
ZEM

EYES ONLY

NOFORN

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY VHN 1192 ECJ3-CAT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN SHUTLER, INFO BGEN LARSON, MG WELCH [REDACTED]
RADM TESH, MG ADAMS, MGEN BAGINSKI FROM RADM PACKER.

SUBJ: SSO USEUCOM E-3A [REDACTED] (TS/NF) E

- A. SSO USEUCOM 040913Z MAR 80, VHN 1164 (SITREP 083) (TS/NF) (U)
- B. SSO USEUCOM 010821Z MAR 80, VHN 1124 (SITREP 080) (TS/NF) (U)

1. (U) OPERATIONS - ACTIONS TO DATE.
 A. (TS/NF) E-3A (354) LAUNCHED 040757Z MAR 80 FOR
 DEPLOYMENT TO [REDACTED] FLIGHT PROFILE IAW PARA 28, REF B.
 PLANNED DATA LINK EXERCISE WITH ELEMENTS OF CTF-60 AGAIN NOT
 CONDUCTED. WILL ADVISE. E
 AIRCRAFT COMPLETED DEPLOYMENT WITH ARRIVAL [REDACTED] 041321Z
 MAR 80. ACFT AIRBORNE 5.4 HOURS.

- B. (U) (TS/NF) AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT.
 - (1) (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 354:FMC
 - (2) (U) (TS/NF) ACFT 604:FMC

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS.
 A. (U) (TS/NF) NO E-3A FLIGHT ACTIVITY SCHEDULED 5 MAR 80.

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(U) B. (TS/NF) COMPLETE PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR E-3A/CTF-60 INTERFACE TRAINING.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE.

A. (TS/NF) MAC MISSIONS TO [REDACTED] 4 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-25(C-141)	0320 [REDACTED]	0800 [REDACTED]	1
1730-26(C-141)	0840 [REDACTED]	1321 [REDACTED]	1

NOTE: 1. E-3A SUPPORT.

B. (U) (TS/NF) FUEL STATUS AS OF 041200Z MAR 80:

- (1) (TS/NF) AREA 1: 65.2 (99 PERCENT)
- (U) AREA 2: 66.0 (100 PERCENT)
- AREA 3: 118.4 (100 PERCENT)
- R-14: 158.3 (79 PERCENT)
- (U) R-9: 20.0 (100 PERCENT)

(2) (TS/NF) NET FILL 4 MAR 80 3.6. 42.5 REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL.

C. (U) (TS/NF) BASE SUPPORT.

(1) (U) (TS/NF) VASI SYSTEM INSTALLED AND CALIBRATED AT TWO AND ONE-HALF DEGREES. INSTALLATION SIXTY FEET EITHER SIDE OF RUNWAY EDGES OR 125 1/2 FEET EITHER SIDE OF RUNWAY CENTERLINE. SYSTEM WILL BE FLIGHT CHECKED BY C-141 ARRIVALS.

(2) (U) (TS/NF) FIFTH GROUNDING STATION COMPLETE AT C-141 OFFLOAD STATION AT FAR SOUTH END OF TAXIWAY (ADJACENT TO HANGER ACCESS RAMP). SUBSEQUENT GROUNDS TO BE INSTALLED AT BOTH R#14 EAS.

(U) LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS.

(U) (TS/NF) MAC MISSION TO [REDACTED] 5 MAR 80. ALL TIMES ARE ZULU ESTIMATE.

MSN	DPT/LOCATION	ARR/LOCATION	NOTE
1730-27(C-141)	0615 [REDACTED]	1300 [REDACTED]	1

NOTE: 1. LOAD DATE: A2 WATER TRUCK, HISC GENERAL CARGO.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

A. (U) (TS/NF) ALL CIRCUITS OPERATIONAL.

B. (U) (TS/NF) NINE ATTEMPTS MADE VIA NBST AUTOVON FROM [REDACTED] [REDACTED] FOUR CALLS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL INCLUDING TWO UNABLE TO OPERATE SECURE. FIVE CALLS SUCCESSFUL WITH MAX TIME FOR COMPLETION SIX MINUTES AND AVERAGE 3.4 MINUTES.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
CMD ELEMENT	USAFE	11
E-3A	AWACH	86
SP	TAC	19
	USAFE	8
SVCS	TAC	16
ENG	TAC	8
ENG/SVCS	USAFE	14
ALCE	MAC	2
COMMS	USAREUR	9

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POL

JCSE	1
AFCC	38
TAC	4
USAFE	7
TOTAL	223

B. (TS/NF) STATUS - [REDACTED]

FUNCTION	UNIT/CMD	TOTAL
LIAISON	USAFE	1
E-3A	AWACW	1
C-130	USAFE	2
COMMS	JCSE	4
	TOTAL	8

E
EYES ON

C. (TS/NF) STATUS [REDACTED] NO CHANGE. E

7. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. NO CHANGE.

8. (U) (TS/NF) CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE HOLD ON ALL OPERATIONAL TASKS. LIMIT SITREP DISSEMINATION TO MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
REVW 5 MAR 2000

SSO NOTE: DELIVER TO INFO ADDRESSEES DURING DUTY HOURS
DELIVER TO ACTION ADDRESSEES IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.

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(U) The Iran-Iraq conflict has apparently halted further consideration of the hostage issue by the Majlis for an indefinite period. Yesterday Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani said the Iraqi attacks were part of "a large US plot and will have an impact on the destiny of the hostages." Tehran Radio announced the Majlis had decided that the problem of the hostages spies has been frozen indefinitely. Also yesterday the militants holding the hostages announced that hostages in six cities were being transferred.

Prepared By:

Colonel, USAR
Joint Operations Division, J-3
Ext 52927/24 September 1980

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 1256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE OF DDO, NMCC
 DEEL DOWNING TO _____
REVISED ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

#522

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AS OF: 24 September 1980

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

E-3A OPERATIONS

No mission aircraft are located at [REDACTED]

AIRLIFT

C-141 missions to [REDACTED] were conducted on 18 and 20 September 1980.

C-141 missions are scheduled into [REDACTED] 24 and 27 September 1980.

B-52s IN INDIAN OCEAN

A future B-52 mission is planned to be flown from [REDACTED]

- Previous approval must be reconfirmed at [REDACTED] request
- No date set

Use of [REDACTED] for B-52 Ops pending [REDACTED] approval (probably December)

A flight of 2 B-52s departed [REDACTED] 181510Z September for activity in Indian Ocean.

- Sea surveillance
- Simulated minelaying
- Fighter intercept training

Mission successfully completed 192005Z September 1980.

Missions are planned for 25 September, 9 and 23 October 1980.
7th Fleet concurs.

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Classified By: *DJSOA*
Declassified ON: *OADR*

Downgraded by: DDO, WACC

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U. I. F. - 155

B#5

ZCZCNID089
NIDS

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SECT 01 OF 70473

ACTION
J3(05)
DISTR

- CJCS:(02) CJCS OJS(02) SJCS(01) J4(04) J5(02) J3:ANCC
 - NIDS SECDEF(07) SECDEF: USDP(15) DIA(10) NMIC RDTF:LO(01)
 - CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 - CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 - CNO WASHINGTON DC
 - CSA WASHINGTON DC
 - DJCS NEACP
 - ANMCC FT RITCHIE MD
- FILE

(049)

TRANSIT/2632317/2632331/000:14TOR2632326
DE RUHQSGG #6078 2632317
ZNY SSSSS

Q 192 06Z SEP 80
FM CI CPAC HONOLULU HI
TO RUTKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC//J3//
INFO RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//02//
RUHQ0AA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHVAAA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO//

RUHGPBA/CTF SEVEN ZERO
RUHGPBA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT ZERO
RUHQ0AA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN
RUHGPIA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT NINE
BT

SECTION 01 OF 02

- A. JCS 2122322 MAY 80 (NOTAL)
- B. CINCPAC 0721537 JUN 80 (NOTAL)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING WEEKLY SITREP IS SUBMITTED IAW REF A AS MODIFIED BY REF B.

A. (U) NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS SEVEN DAY PERIOD INCLUDING INFORMATION ON SIGNIFICANT EVENTS/OPERATIONS RELATED TO TASK GROUP READINESS:

(1) (U) UTG 72.1: BATTLE GROUP ALFA CONDUCTED SINGLE BATTLE GROUP OPERATIONS UNTIL THE EISENHOWER BG ARRIVED IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA ON 14 SEP. FRANCIS HAMMOND CONTINUED TAV ALONGSIDE

Declassified by DDO, NMCC

PAGE 1

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PAGE 2

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AJAY IN DIEGO GARCIA WHILE ROBERT E. PEARY CONTINUED TRANSIT TO PORT VISIT AT PORT LOUIS, MAURITIUS ARRIVING 10 SEP. WICHITA DEPARTED DIEGO GARCIA 15 SEP AND COMMENCED TRANSIT TO MOOLCC, ETA 20 SEP. DURING THE PERIOD BATTLE GROUPS ALFA AND

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WENT PARTICIPATED IN EXERCISE GONZO 80-5 WHICH INCLUDED LONG-RANGE TAV, ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE A D OVER-THE-HORIZON TARGETING EXERCISES. KALAMAZOO COMPLETED PASSENGER AND CARGO TRANSFER AT WASHINGTON ISLAND ON 16 SEP AND RENDEZVOUSED WITH BATTLE GROUPS ALFA AND BETA FOR AN EARLY MORNING UNREP ON 17 SEP. UPON COMPLETION OF THE UNREP, MIDWAY, LEAHY, PARSONS AND KALAMAZOO DETACHED FOR TRANSIT TO HONOLULU AND KIRK DETACHED FOR TRANSIT TO COLOMBO. SAMPLE, WICHITA, RIGEL AND NAVASOTA CHOPPED TO CTG 70.9. MIDWAY'S AIRWING FLEW 864 SORTIES DURING THE PERIOD WITH AIRWING STANDDOWN BEING HELD ON 12-13 SEP.

(2) CTG 70.7 CONDUCTED SURVEILLOPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, GULF OF ADEN AND GULF OF OMAN INCLUDING NORMAL TG TRAINING. LAWRENCE CONDUCTED AN ABBREVIATED PASSEX WITH SULTAN OF OMAN NAVY BOON IN THE GULF OF OMAN 12 SEP. THE PASSEX WAS TERMINATED WHEN BOON PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO A SMALL BOAT IN DISTRESS. DURING THE TRANSIT OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, LAWRENCE WAS THE SUBJECT OF CLOSE SURVEILLANCE BY AN IRANIAN C-130 AIRCRAFT. LAWRENCE COMMENCED AN

UPKEEP IN BAHRAIN ON 13 SEP. THOMAS G HART AND VOGEL TRACKED AN IRANIAN C-130 AIRCRAFT (CPA 12NM) WHILE CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE IN THE CENTRAL PERSIAN GULF ON 14 SEP. CONOLLY CONDUCTED PSE AND DEPARTED DJIBOUTI 16 SEP. A PASSEX BETWEEN CONOLLY AND THE FRENCH NAVY WAS CONDUCTED IN THE WESTERN GULF OF ADEN ON 17 SEP. CONOLLY'S LAMPS HELD SIGHTED A SURFACED FOXTROT SUBMARINE IN COMPANY WITH A KRYUK PEG IN THE BAB EL MANDER STRAIT 17 SEP. WHILE SURVEILLING SOVIET IVD IVAN ROGOV ON 17 SEP, CONOLLY WAS CLOSELY SURVEILLED BY A HORMONE HELO. LASALLE'S PAV WAS EXTENDED THROUGH 18 SEP DUE TO THE C-3 CASREP TO NR ONE BOILER.

(3) CTG 70.9: ON 12 SEP, EISENHOWER AND VIRGINIA CONTINUED TRANSIT TO MODLOC AND EXERCISE GONZO 80-5 WHILE SOUTH CAROLINA COMPLETED THE FINAL STAGES OF TAV AT DIEGO GARCIA AND HISPILLION CONTINUED OPS IN THE MODLOC AREA. THE FOLLOWING DAY, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTED DIEGO GARCIA ENROUTE TO 17 SEP RENDEZVOUS WITH EISENHOWER. ALSO ON 13 SEP, EISENHOWER CONDUCTED NORMAL AIR OPERATIONS AND TRAINING. DURING THAT ACTIVITY AN F-14 AIRCRAFT WAS LOST AT SEA. BOTH CREWMEMBERS EJECTED SAFELY AND WERE RESCUED UNINJURED BY TWO EISENHOWER SH-3 HELOS. THE SAME DAY EISENHOWER F-14'S INTERCEPTED AND ESCORTED A BRITISH CARRERA TRANSITING NORTHWARD IN THE VICINITY OF THE BATTLE GROUP. FROM 14-16 SEP THE EISENHOWER BATTLE GROUP PARTICIPATED WITH TG 70.1 IN EXERCISE

PAGE 2
PAGE 3

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GONZO 80-5. ON 14 SEP EISENHOWER F-14'S INTERCEPTED AND ESCORTED A SOVIET IL-18 CROT AS IT CONDUCTED A NORMAL SOUTHWESTWARD TRANSIT ENROUTE TO 300. DURING THE MORNING OF 17 SEP, THE EISENHOWER AND MIDWAY BATTLE GROUPS COMPLETED TURNOVER OF MATERIALS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN PREPARATION FOR MIDWAY'S DEPARTURE FROM MODLOC. SOUTH CAROLINA AND VIRGINIA ASSUMED PIRAZ AND AAWC RESPONSIBILITIES, RESPECTIVELY. ALSO ON 17 SEP, EISENHOWER AND MIDWAY AIRCRAFT INTERCEPTED AND ESCORTED A SOVIET AN 22 CROK AS IT CONDUCTED A NORMAL SOUTHWESTERLY TRANSIT EAST OF THE BATTLE GROUP AREA. THE FOLLOWING DAY TWO IL-38 MAY AIRCRAFT CONDUCTED SURVEILLANCE OPS AGAINST THE MIDWAY BATTLE GROUP. [REDACTED] SOUTHWARD TOWARDS

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MOMBASA, AND THE EISENHOWER BATTLE GROUP AS IT MOVED NORTHWARD TOWARDS MODLOC. THE MAYS WERE ESCORTED BY MIDWAY A-7'S AND F-4'S. AND EISENHOWER F-14'S. LATER ON 18 SEP, TWO B-52'S AND EISENHOWER AIRCRAFT CONDUCTED INTERFACE TRAINING IN THE MODLOC AREA. DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD EISENHOWER'S AIRWING FLEW 682 SORTIES.

(4) (2) U TG 78.3: NEW ORLEANS AND VANCOUVER ARRIVED AT DIEGO GARCIA FOR A BRIEF STOP FOR CARGO AND FUEL 18 SEP, COMPLETING A SIX DAY GROUP SAIL FROM THE KENYAN COAST. VANCOUVER DEPARTED DIEGO GARCIA PM 18 SEP AND NEW ORLEANS DEPARTED AM 19 SEP. THE

TWO SHIPS WILL RENDEZVOUS ALONG PIM ENROUTE TO PERTH, AUSTRALIA. RACINE AND FREDERICK ARRIVED COLOMBO, SRI LANKA 15 SEP FOR A THREE DAY PORT VISIT. ON 18 SEP, RACINE AND FREDERICK DEPARTED COLOMBO ENROUTE TO GERALDTON AND BUNBURY, AUSTRALIA, RESPECTIVELY.

B. (U) FUTURE EVENTS SCHEDULED/PLANNED FOR PERIOD 190800Z - 260800Z SEP: (U)

(1) (S) UNITS SCHEDULED FOR PORT VISITS:

SHIP	PORT TO BE VISITED	DATES OF PVST
LASALLE	BAHRAIN (RAV)	21 AUG - 19 SEP
FRANCIS HAMMOND	DIEGO GARCIA (TAV)	11 - 21 SEP
LAWRENCE	BAHRAIN	13 - 25 SEP
ROBERT E PEARY	PT LOUIS, MAURITIUS	19 - 22 SEP
THOMAS C HART	BAHRAIN	19 SEP - 01 OCT
<hr/>		
LEAHY	MOMBASA, KE	22 - 26 SEP
PARSONS	MOMBASA, KE	22 - 26 SEP
KIRK	COLOMBO, SRI LANKA	22 - 26 SEP
KALAMAZOO	MOMBASA, KE	22 - 26 SEP

(2) (S) SIGNIFICANT EXERCISES PLANNED:

NAME OF EXERCISE/ TYPE TRAINING	DATES	PARTICIPANTS
WASEX	19 SEP	MIDWAY, LEAHY
GUNEX	20, 23 SEP	VIRGINIA, SOUTH
PAGE 3	SECRET	00110001
PAGE 4	SECRET	70473
GUNEX	22 SEP	CAROLINA
WASEX	22, 25 SEP	SOUTH CAROLINA, SAMPLE
HARPOONEX	24 SEP	EISENHOWER, SOUTH CAROLINA, SAMPLE
B-52 OPS	25 SEP	EISENHOWER, VIRGINIA, SAMPLE
FASTBREAK OPS	25 - 27 SEP	EISENHOWER, TWO B-52 ACFT
BT		EISENHOWER,

#6074
ANNOTES
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NIDS

70469

SECT 02 OF 70473

ACTION

J3(05)

DISTR

CJCS(02) CJCS DJS(02) SJCS(01) J4(04) J5(02) JS:NMCC
NIDS SECDEF(07) SECDEF: USDP(15) DIA(10) NMIC RDJTP:LO(01)

- CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
- CSAP WASHINGTON DC
- CNO WASHINGTON DC
- CSA WASHINGTON DC
- OJCS NEACP
- ANMCC FT RITCHIE MD

FILE

(049)

TRANSIT/2632317/2632336/202:19TOR2632325

DE RUHQSGG #A079 2632317

ZNY SSSSS

O 192326Z SEP 82

FM CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

TO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC//J3//

INFO RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//02//

RUMGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHVAAA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO//

RUMGPBA/CTF SEVEN ZERO

RUMGPBA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT ZERO

RUMGBAA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN

RUMGPAA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT NINE

BT

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

	(3)	(U)	AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS PLANNED:	KNONE.	VIRGINIA
	(4)	(U)	OPERATIONS PLANNED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES:		
OPS SKED			DATE OF OPERATION		UNIT/COUNTRY
PASSEX			27 SEP		USS CONOLLY/U.S.
					CDT BOURDAIS/FR
	(5)	(U)	SHIP TURNOVERS:		
INCHOP SHIP			OUTCHOP SHIP		TURNOVER DATE
NA			USNS MISPILLION		OUTCHOP 23 SEP
	(6)	(U)	MAJOR SHIP CASUALTIES:		
SHIP			TYPE DEGRADATION		ETR/CASCOR
PAGE 1					

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PAGE 2
VIRGINIA
KIRK

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C-3 AN/SPS-48C 3D
AIR SEARCH RADAR
C-3 MK 16 MOD 8 ASROC
LAUNCHER

ETR 04 JUN 81
ETR 05 DEC

MIDWAY

C-3 PORT CATAPULT
LAUNCH VALVES

CASCOR 12 SEP

PARSONS

C-3 MK 72 MOD 13 SIGNAL
DATA CONVERTER

ETR 20 SEP

NEW ORLEANS

C-4 AN/SPS-48 RADAR
C-4 AN/SPS-20E RADAR
BPDMS VOLTAGE REGULATOR
(50PCT REDUCTION IN AAW)

ETR 22 SEP
ETR 28 SEP
ETR 28 OCT

RIGEL

C-3 AN/SPS-10F

CASCOR 12 SEP

KALAMAZOO

C-3 TSEC/KY-8 SER
NRS 4964/4966/5986

CASCOR 11 SEP

LAWRENCE

C-3 AN/ULQ-6R PORT ECM
UNIT

ETR 23 SEP

C-3 NR ONE LP AIR
COMPRESSOR ELECTRIC
DEHYDRATOR

ETR 02 OCT

C-3 NR ONE LUBE OIL
PURIFIER

ETR 20 SEP

LASALLE

C-3 AN/SPG-51 MFCS RADAR
NR TWO

ETR 24 SEP

THOMAS C HART

C-3 NR ONE MAIN BOILER
C-3 5"/54 MK 42 MOD 9

ETR 16 NOV
ETR 29 SEP

GUN MOUNT

2. (U) REMARKS: NONE.
REVW 19 SEP 86
BT
#6079
ANNOTES
FW 444

PAGE 2

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PAGE 1

DDP0398
DAN: 104-016736
INPUT CDSN = DKA361
TOR: 221655Z SEP 80 TOT: 221656Z SEP 80

AUTO== UNASSIGNED ==
ACTION== UNASSIGNED ==
INFO= DNCO(1)
TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=54

OTTMZYUW YDHANO 0849 2661640-MORN--YEKDGH.
ZNY HMORN
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 221627Z SEP 80 ZYH ZFF 3&6
FM SSO USEUCOM
TO JCS //J3//
INFO AFSSO USAFE //DO//
INFO SO IAC //DO//

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PERSONAL FOR LTGEN GAST

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] 150700Z-220700Z

1. [REDACTED] OPERATIONS-ACTIONS TO DATE: NONE,
NO MISSION AIRCRAFT

2. (U) OPERATIONS - PLANNED ACTIONS: NONE.

3. (U) LOGISTICS - ACTIONS TO DATE:

A. (U) MAC MISSIONS TO/FROM [REDACTED]

15-21 SEP 80, ALL TIMES ARE ZULU.

MSN	ARR	DPT
1149-31 (C-141)	180955	181115
1149-35 (C-141)	201645	201911

B. (U) FUEL STATUS AS OF THIS REPORT (900 GAL).

(1) [REDACTED] TOTAL ON HAND: 433.2.

(2) [REDACTED] REQUIRED TO COMPLETE FILL: 24.7.

4. [REDACTED] LOGISTICS - PLANNED ACTIONS: MAC
MISSION PLANNED FOR 24 AND 27 SEP 80.

5. (U) COMMUNICATIONS: ALL UPS NORMAL. UNIVAC 1050II
SUPPLY REMOTE SHIPPED OUT OF COUNTRY FOR REPAIR. SUPPLY

Classified By: USEUCOM
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:
DBO, NMCC

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TRANSACTION WILL BE CONDUCTED VIA MESSAGE. NO SIGNIFICANT
MISSION DEGRADATION FORESEEN.

6. (U) PERSONNEL:

E A (S) NF [REDACTED] STATUS [REDACTED] E
B (S) NF [REDACTED] STATUS [REDACTED]

REVIEW: 22 SEP 86

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
#0849

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~~SECRET~~

24 September 1980

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

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I. SUBJECT: USN Force Levels in IO (U)

II. PURPOSE: Provide tabulation of surface/subsurface assets in IO.

III. MAJOR POINTS

- Units in Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region 24 September 1980.

CV/CVN	2	
Cruisers	3	
Destroyer/ Frigates	12*	
[Submarines	4]	
Logistic Support	13	
AGF (USS LASALLE)	1	(COMIDEASTFOR Flagship)
ARG/MAU	4	
TOTAL	39	

* Includes Oldendorf, Turner Joy, and Marvin Shields in port at Hobart, Davonport and Burnie, Australia respectively.

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Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC

Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR

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Five ships have helo detachments embarked:

USS HART (FF-1092)
USS CONOLLY (DD-979)
USS KIRK (FF-1087)

USS LA SALLE (AGF-3)
USS HAMMOND (FF-1067)

Six ships have an operational DSE capability:

USS MIDWAY (CV-41)
USS LA SALLE (AGF-3)
USS LEAHY (CG-16)

USS EISENHOWER (CVN-69)
USS SOUTH CAROLINA (CGN-37)
USS KIRK (FF-1087)

SOURCE: CINCPAC OPNS 24 September 1980

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPLOYED CARRIERS

~~SECRET~~

24 September 1980

DATES

EVENT

INDIAN OCEAN

19 Aug - 11 Nov

MIDWAY on station Arabian Sea

Present - 5 Dec

EISENHOWER on station Arabian Sea

MED

24 Jul - 7 Mar 81

KENNEDY on station

WESTPAC

20 August - 3 Oct

CONSTELLATION: [96 hour] Korean contingency
(RANGER Relieves-3 Oct -25 Apr 81)

DIST/TIME To GONZO Sta [(2330N/06030E)]

Time @ 20 kts

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Distance</u>	<u>Hrs</u>	<u>Days</u>	<u>Rmks</u>
SECRET	Singapore	3070	152.2	6.4	SECRET
MIDWAY	Mombasa	2131	103.9	4.4	
CONSTELLATION	Subic	4347	214.4	9.0	
KENNEDY	Augusta Bay	10,750	534.4	22.4	(Canal Closed)
NIMITZ	Teamwork 80	11,154	554.6	23.2	(Canal Closed)
RANGER	Pearl Harbor	8,985	445.5	18.7	
EISENHOWER	On Station Gonzo				

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Classified By: JCS
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Declassify on: OADR

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CONFIDENTIAL
AS OF: 0700, 1 Mar 80

STRIKE TIMELINES*

Denny

GRAPHIC I (S)

- Timelines are shown for coordinated carrier based air/AC-130 attacks--AC-130 prior to dawn, carrier just at dawn. If exercised separately, more flexible time over target will result.
- If execution not received by the time shown at end of yellow lines, mission must be slipped up to 24 hours because of requirements for specific times on target, crew rest, aircraft prepositioning, etc.
- Red code indicates period aircraft are airborne enroute to target.
- Forward positioning AC-130 aircraft to [REDACTED] will reduce notification time to that time shown as point at which pre-launch crew rest begins (blue line).

GRAPHIC II (u)

- Carrier air mining time is shown.
- Sawtooth depicts decay of decision time from 39 to 15 hours. Straight line at 24 hours reflects period of launch window.

*All times are Eastern Standard Time (EST).


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STRIKE TIMELINES

CARRIER BASED STRIKE - [REDACTED]



ALL TIMES ARE EST

AS OF

SECRET

SECRET

STRIKE TOT

STRIKE TOT


STRIKE TOT

(S)

TIME TO LAUNCH MINING MISSION
24 HOUR ALERT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



ALL TIMES ARE EST

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B#10

OPTION PAPERS

SUBJECT (Q)

TAB

BLOCKADE/QUARANTINE

- 1

MINING OPERATIONS

- 2

PERSIAN GULF CARRIER AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

- 3

A, C

[REDACTED] STRIKES -- AC-130H

- 4

AC-130H STRIKE AGAINST [REDACTED]

- 5

AIR FORCE OPTIONS

- 6

SR-71 IRANIAN OVERFLIGHT

- 7

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~~TOP SECRET~~
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I. SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

II. PURPOSE: [REDACTED] establishing and maintaining traffic in Iran.

III. MAIN POINTS:

A. Legality.

- A quarantine is a form of special function blockade that can be varied in its application and still be maintained legally.
- US has satisfied all conditions and would be legally justified in enforcing an Iranian Quarantine.

B. Operational Concept.

- Embargo of all maritime imports and exports with the exception of crude oil/liquid fuels.
- Oil tankers entering and leaving Persian Gulf not intercepted.

C. Operational Requirements.

- US naval forces currently in Indian Ocean are sufficient to establish a quarantine in the outer-Strait of Hormuz. (2 CV + 11 surface combatants)
- Two carrier battle groups would provide air cover, force defense and surveillance. This force is considered capable of successfully defending against any likely Iranian surface and/or air threat.
- NTDS command and control ship would maintain positive surface plot.
- LPH/LPD ship would increase capability; however, not required.

D. Sustainability.

- Support forces presently assigned to TF-70 are capable of fulfilling the logistic requirements associated with naval quarantine operations in outer-Strait of Hormuz.

E. Risk Assessment.

- Quarantine includes high military/political risk.
 - Increased potential for armed confrontation with Iranian forces.
 - Potential for armed confrontation with Soviet forces or surrogates.
 - Potential loss of Iranian oil exports to supporting allies.
 - Possible OPEC or Organization of Arab Petroleum Export Countries (OAPEC) embargo of oil exports to US.


F. Conclusions

- US can legally establish/maintain an effective quarantine.
- Serious political/military risks will be incurred.

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POINT PAPER

B



II. PURPOSE: To provide information concerning proposed options for carrier aircraft operations in the Persian Gulf.

III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. Shallow Penetration Option: Strike Group launch, proceed to Strait of Hormuz, then to a point 112 NM inside Persian Gulf, and then return.

- Shallow Penetration Option One:

- Simultaneous launch of approximately 68 aircraft from both carriers.
- Provide one large launch on 2.5 hour mission.

- Shallow Penetration Option Two:

- Carriers launch on alternate 2.0 - 2.5 hour cycles providing an almost continuous flow into Gulf.
- Each carrier could complete two cycles (three cycles if last cycle reduced by half for night recovery).

- Shallow Option Two is preferred option.

- Easier to handle aircraft and maintain force defensive posture.


B. Deep Penetration Option: Strike Group proceeds as in shallow option, then to a point 200 NM further north, and return.

- Strike Group includes 14-16 aircraft supported by 6-7 tankers.
- First carrier launches and recovers first strike (4.1 hours) followed by second launch and recovery from second carrier.
- Off cycle carrier would provide airborne CAP and E-2 backup.

C. Peacetime ROE would apply.

D. CINCPACFLT recommends Shallow Option Two.

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DELTA

CHARLIE

BRAVO

ALPHA

SHALLOW OPTION

DEEP OPTION

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(BOUNDARIES IN THIS AREA ARE UNDETERMINED)

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
(BOUNDARIES IN THIS AREA ARE UNDETERMINED)

(BOUNDARIES IN THIS AREA ARE UNDETERMINED)

SAUDI ARABIA

GV 24 W

(OEP31)

(OEP31)

14650

9770

30°

30°
60°

50°

1°E

GV 24 W

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ A. Mining Options

A, B

- [redacted] option - close [redacted]
- [redacted] option - adds [redacted]

~~(S)~~ B. Delivery Methods

A, B

- [redacted] aircraft - night delivery [redacted] CEP with DST.
- [redacted] aircraft each target.
- [redacted] mines each aircraft.
- [redacted] ranges.

A, B

- [redacted] - 190 NM Mission time 1.5 hour.
- [redacted] - 580 NM Mission time 2.6 hour.
- [redacted] 720 NM Mission time 3.5 hour.

~~(S)~~ C. Mine Data.

A, B

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted] Limitation

A, B

- [redacted] only, less than [redacted]
- Range of army [redacted] options (See Atch).
- [redacted] mine.

A, B

- Being considered as an alternative.
- [redacted] mine.
- [redacted] and [redacted]
- Wide range of army [redacted] options.
- Limitations.

B

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted] greater than [redacted]

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 COMPLETED ON 21 JUN 92
 REEVALUATED BY DDO NMCC
 UNCLASSIFIED DOWN TO SECRET
 REVIEW ON OADR
 DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~(S)~~ D. Economic Impact.

C

- [redacted] Option - Blocks [redacted] of Iranian imports, primarily food stuffs.
- [redacted] Option - Blocks [redacted] of crude oil exports.
- Average [redacted] ships in transit on [redacted] on daily basis in Persian Gulf during the first 10 days of December.

~~(S)~~ E. Mine Countermeasures.

E

- Three Options using US RH-53 helos.
 - Operate from Persian Gulf bases.
 - Operate from MED Amphibious Ships.
 - Operate from PAC Amphibious Ships.
- MC capabilities of Persian Gulf nations limited or non-existent.
- [redacted] have some capability with "US" assistance.

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AB
~~(S)~~

DELAY ARM AND [REDACTED] OPTIONS

DELAY ARM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (days)

MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

*Recommended options. Others exist.

SELECT DELAY ARM AND [REDACTED] INDEPENDENTLY

DELAY ARM

[REDACTED] (days)

MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

AVERAGE

MAXIMUM

AB
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

B#14

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

INTENT: Strike on [REDACTED] complex to destroy 60% of Iran's total [REDACTED] capability used for internal consumption. Conduct a coordinated strike by AC-130H gunships and carrier based aircraft.

AC-130 NIGHT STRIKE:

E, A - Concept: The AC-130H Gunships depart from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Two aircraft will attack the [REDACTED] two hours prior to dawn and return to launch base. [REDACTED] KC-135 tankers, staging from [REDACTED] will be required.

- Timing.

- B, A, E -- Reaction time: [REDACTED]
- Forward deployment with [REDACTED] refuelings.
- Aircraft preparation/crew rest: 15 hours
- Employment:
 - Ingress: 5 hours
 - On target: 30 minutes = Total 10 1/2 hours
 - Egress: 5 hours

B -- Total (alert to on target): [REDACTED]

E -- Refuelings: Two AC-130 employed will require refuelings inbound and outbound (one each way) over [REDACTED]

STRIKE DATA:

<u>TYPE AMMO</u>	<u>QUANT</u>	<u>DIR. HIT</u>	<u>10'/LESS</u>
<u>B</u> 105 MM	96	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
40 MM	250	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

NOTE: Above CEPS based on data for 8,500'-10,000' attack altitudes; CEP this mission better due to lower attack from 5,500'-7,500'.

CARRIER BASED STRIKE - DAWN ATTACK (u)

- Strike composition:

- 5 A-6E MK-83 (1000#) Laser Guided Bombs (4 EA A/C).
- 4 A-7E WALLEYE II (2000#) (1 EA A/C)
- 2 F-14/F-4 provide barrier CAP
- 2 F-14/F-4 provide force CAP
- 4 F-14/F-4 Condition 1 Alert
- 2 EA-6B provide EW capability

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Declassified ON OADR
Downgraded by: [REDACTED] DDO, NMCC

~~AC-130H SPECIAL OPERATIONS~~

B

CONCEPT: Employ three AC-130H Gunships in a night interdiction role against Iranian [redacted] strike missions launch from and recover [redacted]

FORCES REQUIRED: Four AC-130H Gunships, [redacted] (3 for attack, 1 spare) and [redacted] supporting KC-135 tankers.

TIMING:

- Reaction time: [redacted]
- Forward deployment [redacted]: [redacted] refuelings.
- Aircraft preparation/crew rest: 15 hours.
- Employment: Ingress, 5+35 hours; on target, 2+25 hours; egress, 5+35 hours. Total: 13+35 hours.
- Total time from alert to on target: [redacted]

EMPLOYMENT:

- Refuelings:
 - Three AC-130 employed will require pre and post-strike refuelings over [redacted]
- Target Planning:
 - Two aircraft strike [redacted] targets [redacted] one strikes [redacted]

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Forward deploy all four AC-130 Gunships to the [redacted] staging base.
- Employ two AC-130s against [redacted] and one AC-130 against [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 12355

DECLASSIFIED ON 21 JUN 92

Classified By: [redacted]

Declassified ON: [redacted]

DDO, NMCC

SECRET

AAAR

Multiple Sources

16

AIR FORCE UNITS:

MDS	NO	SOURCE	BED-DOWN	CLOSURES*
F-4D/E	18/24	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
F-15	12/24	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
F-111F	18	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

*Includes generation time; may be impacted by TAC day/VFR landing requirements.

EMPLOYMENT:

F-4D/E - Increased presence and exercise with [REDACTED]

F-4D/E - Counter-air or air-to-ground missions [REDACTED]

F-15 - Increased presence and exercise with [REDACTED]

F-15 - Counter-air missions with or without E-3A.

F-111 - Show of force (deep strike) [REDACTED]

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

- High level political assistance required to expedite diplomatic clearances and altitude reservation clearances for aircraft deployments. May require 72 hours (minimum).

- Only jet fuel available at [REDACTED] Will require additives to convert to JP-8 for F-15s.

DECISION TIMES (FOR DEPLOYMENT):

- 72 hours lead time (or more) can be required to gain approval from countries to block airspace for passage of tankers and their receiver aircraft.

[REDACTED] - F-4D/E from Execute.

[REDACTED] hours generation
[REDACTED] hours enroute

hours - F-15 Execution non stop. Assumes expediated
dip clearances and ALTRAVS

B, E

hours to generate F-15s and position tankers
hours enrouté non stop

hours - F-111F from Execute

hours generation
hours flight time



~~SECRET~~

D 2

THE JOINT STAFF

Memorandum for the Record

16 April 80

Subject: ~~SR-71 Options in Iran~~ (U)

1. (TS) The options for the SR-71 to overfly IRAN follow:
(Time to obtain diplomatic approval is not included in TOT times.)

A, E ~~(S)~~ Option 1 - ~~_____~~ overflying ~~_____~~ and ~~_____~~ Decision to TOT ~~_____~~ hours.
Limiting Factor - Diplomatic approval of overflight and tanker staging from ~~_____~~

A, E Option 2 - ~~_____~~ overflying ~~_____~~ Decision to TOT ~~_____~~ hours.
Limiting Factor - Diplomatic approval of overflight and tanker staging from ~~_____~~

A, E Option 3 - ~~_____~~ overflying ~~_____~~ Decision to TOT ~~_____~~ hours.
Limiting Factor - Diplomatic approval of overflight and tanker staging from ~~_____~~ and ~~_____~~ tankers required on ~~_____~~

Option 4 - Kadena to ~~_____~~ Decision to TOT ~~_____~~ hours.
Limiting Factor - Tanker and tanker crew deployment from Beale and 7 tankers required on ~~_____~~

A, E Option 5 - ~~_____~~ Decision to TOT ~~_____~~ hours.
Limiting Factor - Tanker and tanker crew deployment from Beale and ~~_____~~ tankers required on ~~_____~~

~~(S)~~ E 2. (TS) When the SR-71 completes the current deployment to ~~_____~~ the Options above will be rearranged.

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

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CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-3
REVIEW ON 16 APRIL 00

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(WORKING PAPER DESTROY WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED)

E SUBJECT: SR-71 [redacted] Mideast Mission (TS)

~~(S)~~ 1. ASSUMPTIONS:

- The SR-71 and KC-135Q tankers are operationally ready [redacted]
- Tanker operation from/to [redacted] is approved.
- SR-71 overflight and air refueling over [redacted] is authorized.
- At decision time KC-135Q tankers are O.R. at Beale

A ~~(S)~~ 2. Option 1 - SR-71 overflies [redacted]

- [redacted] Central Med [redacted]
- [redacted] Central Med [redacted]

A B [redacted] total KC-135Qs required [redacted]

~~(S)~~ 3. Option 2 - SR-71 overflies [redacted]

- Same as above except [redacted] are over [redacted] the KC-135Q tankers coming from [redacted]

~~(S)~~ 4. Response timing dependent on overflight and/or tanker staging approval from [redacted]

- At decision time approval sought from countries in question.
- Tankers from [redacted] med base
- Tankers from Beale deploy to [redacted]
- Tankers from Beale deploy to [redacted]
- All in place and ready to fly 40 hours from decision
- Delay 20 hours maximum for best available target sunlight
- Mission duration [redacted] hours
- Decision to TOT [redacted] dependent on day light plus time required to obtain appropriate diplomatic approval.

G Prepared by [redacted] USAF
Recon Plans & Prog Div, JRC, J3

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Sequence of Events

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E8 12356

CONDUCTED ON _____

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Nov 79:

US Embassy seized by Iranian Militants

- MIDEASTFOR on station in Persian Gulf

- MIDWAY CVBG in central Indian Ocean enroute Mombasa, Kenya

- On both 4 and 5 November, Iranian Revolutionary Guards broke into the Iraqi Consulate in Khorramshahr. On the 6th, the Iraqi Consulate in Khorramshahr and Kermanshah were occupied. Iran expelled the Iraqi staff of the Korrramshahr Consulate on 7 November. Iraq reciprocated on the 6th, by seizing the Iranian Consulate in Basra. At present, the Iraqi Consulate at Khorramshahr remains closed and Iran is pressing for the complete closure of both countries' consulates.

U) 05 Nov 79:

Prime Minister Bazargan and his cabinet resigned over the dispute with the militants at the US Embassy and his failure to secure the release of the US hostages. Bazargan had tendered his resignation on at least three other occasions because of interference by committees and the Revolutionary Council as well as lack of support by Ayatollah Khomeini. Bazargan's dispute with the captors again demonstrated his lack of power, and proved to be the final straw in his continuing struggle with the unofficial shadow government for control.

J) 09 Nov 79:

MIDWAY CVBG arrives Mombasa

~~MS~~ 12 Nov 79:

JCS and AF Liaison Officers travel to MIDWAY

~~MS~~ 13 Nov 79:

AC-130 gunships deploy from Hurlburt Field, FL to Guam

MIDWAY CVBG departs Mombasa

I) 14 Nov 79:

Exercise BEACON COMPASS is conducted through 19 Nov 79

I) 16 Nov 79:

MIDWAY CVBG arrives Arabian Sea

~~MS~~ 17 Nov 79:

USCINCEUR & CINCPAC directed to maintain two DSE equipped ships in Persian Gulf

Classified By: DJSA-18 October

Declassified ON: OADR

* indicates extremely sensitive event

UNINTEL

Classified By: DIA

Declassified ON: OADR

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

19: MIDEASTFOR, chopped to CINCPAC

NOV 79:

A group of some 300 to 600 individuals forcibly gained control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia during the early morning hours. The group barricaded itself within the mosque and engaged Saudi national guard troops in a firefight. After two weeks of fighting, the Saudis were able to recapture the mosque.

~~(S)~~ 20 Nov 79: HM-16 (6 RH-53s) moved by C5 to [REDACTED]

(U) 20 Nov 79: KITTY HAWK directed deploy to Indian Ocean

(U) 21 Nov 79: More than 1,000 Pakistani and Palestinian university students stormed the U.S. Embassy compound in Islamabad. Pakistani military troops were finally dispatched to rescue the U.S. Embassy staff members who were besieged for about six hours. All of the demonstrations were against U.S. property and citizens. Two U.S. service personnel were killed in the incident, and the embassy compound received extensive fire damage.

~~(S)~~ 22 Nov 79: ~~HM-16~~ chopped to CINCPAC

~~(S)~~ 23 Nov 79: [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ 23 Nov 79: 4 KC-135s arrive [REDACTED]

(U) 26-30 Nov 79: Religious demonstrations by the Shia communities in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and in southern Iraq during the mourning period of Muharram were sparked by violence. Saudi National Guard forces suppressed the demonstrations harshly which resulted in 50 deaths and over 150 seriously injured. On the 30th, Iraqi security elements clashed with Shiite demonstrators in the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. Over 30 casualties resulted from these clashes.

~~(S)~~ 28 Nov 79: 6 RH-53s embarked aboard KITTY HAWK

~~(S)~~ 01 Dec 79: [REDACTED] warm-up package began arriving [REDACTED]

* indicates extremely sensitive event

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01 Dec 79:

KITTY HAWK arrived Arabian Sea

02 Dec 79:

Libyan protestors demonstrating in support of the Iranian militants and Iran's Islamic Republic set fire to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. There was apparently no attempt to take hostages. The demonstration was clearly not a spontaneous undertaking and had definitely received official sanction. However, whether the Libyan government truly intended for the embassy to be attacked remains unclear.

U) 2-3 Dec 79:

The Iranian constitutional referendum was held on 2-3 December. The Referendum served to legitimize the position already held by Khomeini on a defacto basis. Article 110 established the position of a supreme religious leader who is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In addition, he has the authority to remove the elected president and to declare war with the approval of a Council of Guardians which is appointed by him.

U) 08 Dec 79:

Iraqi-Iranian problems again flared as Iranian Revolutionary Guards seized an Iraqi school in Khorramshahr and arrested the staff. Iran accused the school of involvement in sabotage operations. On 9 December, another Iraqi school, in Ahvaz, was also closed. An exchange was arranged after Iraq had retaliated by arresting several Iranian teachers. The situation continued to worsen, however, and on 14 December, heavy Iraqi artillery shelling of Iran's western provinces was reported. Additionally, some 100 Iraqi infiltrators crossed the frontier into Iran under the cover of Iraqi mortar barrages. A later report stated that after a penetration of 5 kilometers, the Iraqis had retreated and calm had been restored.

08 Dec 79:

A/E

2 AWACS directed to [redacted]

09 Dec 79:

A/E

2 AWACS arrive [redacted]

* indicates extremely sensitive event

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dec 79: 2 AWACS directed

16 Dec 79: 2 AWACS arrive

19 Dec 79: Squadron of B-52s to Guam

19 Dec 79:

U) 20 Dec 79: USS NIMITZ directed to Indian Ocean

22 Dec 79: WESTPAC MAU directed to Singapore

U) 24 Dec 79: The USSR began a massive combat airlift of troops into Kabul, Afghanistan. On 27 Dec, the Soviets moved quickly to topple the Amin government and established the regime of Babrak Karmal. In coordination with these events in Kabul, two Soviet Ground Forces divisions moved into Afghanistan on 28 and 29 December. A massive build-up of troops and equipment has occurred and the latest intelligence estimates indicate that approximately 74,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanistan.

27 Dec 79:

B-3A/TF-70

31 Dec 79:

WESTPAC MAU at Singapore

U) 01 Jan 80: Thousands of Afghans and their Iranian supporters stormed the Soviet Embassy in Tehran (just 10 blocks away from the occupied American Embassy) and ripped down the Russian flag before Iranian police drove the protestors away. The attack on the Soviet Embassy was one of two major protests in Iran against the Soviet-led coup in neighboring Afghanistan.

U) 03 Jan 80: USS NIMITZ departs Italian ports enroute Indian Ocean

U) 04 Jan 80: Syrian government defended press surprisingly defends the Soviet operation into Afghanistan and supports the new regime in Kabul. Although Syrian relations with the USSR have improved over the last year, previous examples of Soviet adventurism-in Ethiopia and South-Yemen-were not well received by Damascus. At present, however, Syria feels politically isolated and militarily vulnerable, and is apparently not inclined to burn bridges with its principal arms supporters.

* indicates extremely sensitive event

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~(S)~~ (U) 04 Jan 80: A [REDACTED] WESTERN MAU depart Singapore

~~(S)~~ (U) 08 Jan 80: 3 Harpoon-capable P-3C aircraft arrive

(U) 12 Jan 80: Egypt officially asked the USSR to reduce its 50 member diplomatic staff in Egypt to a number "proportional" to the 7 member Egyptian embassy in Moscow. Remaining South Yemeni and Syrian diplomatic personnel are to be expelled for their nations' support of the new government in Afghanistan. In addition, Egypt stated it would provide training and military assistance to Afghani rebel forces

~~(S)~~ (U) 13 Jan 80: E-3A/TF-70 Joint Training Mission

~~(S)~~ (U) 14 Jan 80: Civilian and military opposition to the Babrak government and Soviet presence reportedly is spreading. The Herat general strike continues into its sixth day. [REDACTED]

(U) US media personnel expelled from Iran.

~~(S)~~ (U) 15 Jan 80: The number of Soviet ground forces personnel believed to be in Afghanistan is approximately 60,000. The number of Soviet ground forces personnel believed to be in major combat units in the USSR along the Afghan border is approximately 35,000

~~(S)~~ (U) 16 Jan 80: E-3A aircraft depart [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ Rebel forces may be pausing to regroup. Soviet direction and support of the Afghan Army is gradually increasing, but as yet the Soviets remain reluctant to become bogged down in the counter-insurgency

~~(S)~~ (U) 18 Jan 80: Soviet ground forces in Afghanistan are now estimated to number 74,000 with the [REDACTED] as being in Afghanistan. A series of press and diplomatic reports state fighting between Soviet and Afghan units has again erupted in Kabul

* Indicates extremely sensitive event

[REDACTED]

(S)

~~(TS)~~ 19 Jan 80:

Ar. Signal ~~reports~~ reports air-dropped chemicals
which result in death from contact, have been
used in the past. ~~28 December~~

[REDACTED]

~~(TS)~~ 20 Jan 80:

E MC-130 deploys to

A E

2 B-52Hs from Guam conduct sea
surveillance of Soviet naval forces in
Indian Ocean

~~(TS)~~ 21 Jan 80:

A USS NIMITZ arrives Arabian Sea

~~(TS)~~ 22 Jan 80:

A 6 ~~transferred~~ transferred from USS KITTY HAWK
to USS NIMITZ

E, I

MC-130 deploys

~~(TS)~~ 23 Jan 80:

[REDACTED]

The Arab League extends the mandate of the
Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon for an
additional six months

~~(TS)~~ 24 Jan 80:

USS KITTY HAWK CVBG departs Arabian Sea enroute
Subic Bay


[REDACTED]

(U) 25 Jan 80: Abol Hassan Bani Sadr is elected to be Iran's first President. Israel completes its withdrawal behind the Al Arish-Ras Al Mohammed line in the Sinai. This withdrawal marks the normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt

(U) ~~(S)~~ 26 Jan 80: Afghan Army strength is believed to now total only about 50,000 down from total of 80,000 in December


(U) 27 Jan 80: Foreign Minister Gromyko of USSR visits President Hafez Al Assad in Damascus

~~(S)~~ 28 Jan 80



(U) ~~(S)~~ 29 Jan 80: The Islamic Conference in Islamabad issued a harsh denunciation of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is to be ousted from the conference organization and the members are urged to support the Afghan people in defending their independence and territory

~~(S)~~ 30 Jan 80



(U) 31 Jan 80: The official Kabul newspaper printed an editorial on 31 January critical of the Babrak government. This is the most direct sign yet of dissatisfaction with the government

~~(S)~~ 2 Feb 80: **JE**

2 AWACS arrived 


(U) ~~(S)~~ The present estimate of Soviet forces in Afghanistan is 80,650.

(U) 3 Feb 80: Syria announces a plan for withdrawal of its forces from Beirut

~~(S)~~ 4 Feb 80:



*Indicates extremely sensitive event



~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ (S) 5 Feb 80:
(U)

USS CORAL SEA CVBG relieves USS MIDWAY CVBG in Arabian Sea

~~44F52Bs from Guam conduct sea surveillance of Soviet naval forces in Indian Ocean~~

(U) (S) 7-12 Feb 80:

Syrian forces side with Franjiyah Family in a Feud with the Phalange, largest Christian militia. The resulting clashes in North Lebanon cause heavy losses to both the Syrians and the Christians. The Syrian Army is forced to bring in reinforcements during the clashes. Syria postpones any withdrawal from Beirut

~~(S)~~ (S) 8 Feb 80:

~~WESTPAC MAU directed to deploy to Northern Arabian Sea to arrive NLT 28 Feb 80~~

(U) (S)

Rumors of assassination of President Babrak Karmal remain unconfirmed. Vice President/Deputy Prime Minister Keshtmand is reported to be seriously ill either in Kabul or the USSR. Karmal supposedly stated recently the Soviets will make a "gesture" at a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to stop the U.S. effort at the Moscow Olympic boycott

(U) 9 Feb 80:

Babrak Karmal conducted a press interview on 7 February, dispelling rumors of his death

~~(S)~~ (S) 10 Feb 80:

The security situation in Jalalabad and in the eastern border provinces is extremely precarious. Rebels are said to be basically in control of Jalalabad. The Soviets stated they would not commit their forces unless Afghan units were defeated and refused Afghan requests for air support. The Soviets insisted that their forces were engaged with defending Afghanistan from external threats, not with fighting internal dissidents.

~~(S)~~ (U) (S) 12 Feb 80:

~~WESTPAC MAU deployment to IO held in abeyance~~

(U) (S) 14 Feb 80:

Israel reiterates its support for Christians both in North and South Lebanon. The Israel Defense Force moves to reinforce the Golan Heights in reaction to the "unusual" Syrian military moves in Lebanon and Syria. This action raises tensions between Syria and Israel as both accuse each other of provocations which could lead to war

*Indicates extremely sensitive event

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ 15 Feb 80:

An Intelligence Community agreement based on a comprehensive review has been reached on manpower strength estimates for Soviet forces in Afghanistan: Ground and Air Forces in Afghanistan-57,770; those based in the USSR-40,240; total involved-98,010

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ 16 Feb 80:

[REDACTED]

Violent fighting was reported near Jalalabad

~~(S)~~ 18 Feb 80:

E-3A/TF 70 Joint Training Mission

~~(S)~~ 19 Feb 80:

E-3A aircraft depart

(U)
~~(S)~~

A new area of severe rebel activity is Konduz Province, where rebels recently captured a senior Afghan officer

~~(S)~~ 20 Feb 80:

The general strike continues in Kabul with a high likelihood of violent demonstrations. The Kabul strike seems part of a nationwide demonstration of protest in the major cities, but no major surge of rural fighting has coincided with it.

~~(S)~~ 22 Feb 80:

NC-130 deploy

~~(S)~~ 23 Feb 80:

WESTPAC JAW directed to deploy to the Arabian Sea to arrive NLT 24 March 80

(U)
~~(S)~~

The UN Commission to investigate the alleged crimes of the deposed Shah arrived in Tehran. Its mission does not appear related to the release of the hostages. General strike in Kabul continues into 3rd day. U.S. Embassy authorized to advise some 60 private U.S. nationals to depart Afghanistan

(U)

Ayatollah Khomeini announced that the yet-to-be elected Iranian Majles should decide the fate of the hostages. Ayatollah Beheshti, Secretary of the Revolutionary Council, was appointed head of the Iranian Supreme Court.

~~TOP SECRET~~

18A8

[REDACTED]

(u)
~~(S)~~ 24-25 Feb 80:

~~TOP SECRET~~
Demonstrator activity reduced somewhat probably reflects Soviet direct confrontation

(u)

Admiral Alavi, Commander in Chief of the Iranian Navy, was arrested and charged with having "contacts with US spies". Ayatollah Khomeini, resigned as Deputy Minister of Defense and as head of the Revolutionary Guards, saying appointment of Bani Sadr as Military Commander in Chief makes his job unnecessary.

~~(S)~~ 26 Feb 80:

~~TOP SECRET~~ from Guam conduct sea surveillance, ~~Went~~ Naval forces in Indian Ocean

(u)
~~(S)~~

General Strike has lost some of its momentum. Non-involvement of Karmas seems to suggest success c strikes. Israel and Egypt conduct formal exchange of Ambassadors

(U) 27 Feb 80:

The general strike in Kabul ended on 27 Feb. Nearly all shops were open with both pedestrian and vehicular traffic back to normal levels.

~~(S)~~ 28 Feb 80:

AE MC-130 returns to ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ 29 Feb/ 1 Mar 80:

AE Four AC-130s depart Guam for Hurlburt AB

~~(S)~~ 1 Mar 80:

AE WESTPAC MAU departs Subic Bay for Northern Arabian Sea

(U)

French President Valery Giscard D'Esta began a ten day visit to Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and Bahrain.

(U)

In Syria, demonstrations continued in Aleppo.

(U)

Ayatollah Khomeini was released from the hospital in Tehran. He will reportedly reside in a house near the hospital for a month.

(u)
~~(S)~~

Following the Soviet and Afghan Army seizure of Asmar on 2 Mar, Afghan exile leaders in Pakistan admitted that Konar province is lost.

*Indicates extremely sensitive event

~~TOP SECRET~~

18A09

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~(TS)~~ 3-4 Mar 80:

Two E-3A aircraft redeploy to [redacted]

(U)

Iran's Revolutionary Council voted to allow the UN Commission to visit the hostages

~~(TS)~~ 4-13 Mar 80

Strikes and acts of violence increase in Aleppo and other cities in northern Syria [redacted]

(U)

~~(TS)~~ 5 Mar 80:

In South Lebanon, the Christian forces renewed artillery shelling after a standown since 27 Mar

(U)

~~(TS)~~

Soviet dependents are reportedly being evacuated from Kabul.

~~(TS)~~ 6 Mar 80:

Two B-52s from Guam conduct sea surveillance of Soviet naval forces in Indian Ocean

(U)

~~(TS)~~

[redacted] forces in Afghanistan [redacted] received an estimated total of 17,095. An additional 27,525 are based in the USSR near the Afghan border. The militants offer to turn [redacted] over to Revolutionary Council [redacted] insist on retaining control of the Embassy [redacted]

(U) 7 Mar 80:

US media personnel readmitted to Iran

~~(TS)~~ 9-10 Mar 80

One E-3A conducted an E-3A/TF-70 interface training mission in the Arabian Sea [redacted]

~~(TS)~~ 10 Mar 80

The Afghan Government issued the annual spring conscription order, indicating that Army reconstruction plans are progressing

*Indicates extremely sensitive event



(U) 10 Mar 80: Israeli Government announces expropriation of 1000 acres of land just north of Jerusalem

(U) Ayatollah Khomeini issues statements which support militants' conditions regarding visits to hostages by the UN Commission

(U) 11 March 80: As a result of the impasse on the visitation issue, the UN Commission departed Iran

(u) ~~(S)~~ 11-13 Mar 80: Soviet and Afghan operations have been highlighted by major operations in the Konar Valley, Paktia, and Nangarhar Provinces and by operations designed to close crossing points along the Pakistan border

(u) ~~(S)~~ 12-13 Mar 80: Two B-52H aircraft flew from K. I. Sawyer AFB, MI around-the-world and conducted a one hour 16 minute sea surveillance mission in the Arabian Sea reconnoitering Soviet vessels. Mission duration was 43 1/2 hours

(u) ~~(S)~~ 12 Mar 80: A large scale shakeup involving the removal of 104 person from high positions in the Afghan government occurred. A change in the Afghan government is possible

(u) ~~(S)~~ 12-15 Mar 80: Marine Amphibious Unit conducted port visit at Singapore. ETA Arabian Sea is 24 Mar 80

(u) ~~(S)~~ 13 Mar 80: Strength figures for Soviet forces involved in Afghanistan show a total of 105,000 personnel, of which 80,000 are in Afghanistan.

~~(S)~~ 14 Mar 80: 7 [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ 14 Mar 80:

C

[REDACTED]

~~(u)~~
~~(TS)~~ 15 Mar 80:

The Iraqi Ambassador to Iran returned to Baghdad thus reducing Iraq's representation in Tehran to the Charge D'Affairs level.

~~(TS)~~ 17 Mar 80:

A E

One E-3A deployed to [REDACTED] TF 60 training [REDACTED]

~~(TS)~~ 18 Mar 80:

A E

E-3A rotation between [REDACTED] began today.

~~(TS)~~ 19 Mar 80:

A E

E-3A from Tinker AFB, OK arrives at [REDACTED] to replace E-3A #354. Departure of the second E-3A [REDACTED] is delayed until arrival of a part for the left gear actuator

~~(TS)~~ 20 Mar 80:

A E

One MC-130 arrives at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(TS)~~ 21 Mar 80:

A E

Two E-3As [REDACTED] participate in a CREEK SENSURE (NATO C2 interface) exercise.

A E

Second E-3A at [REDACTED] is repaired and redeploys to Tinker AFB, OK

~~(u)~~
~~(TS)~~

The Afghan government cancelled Muslim New Year celebrations to avoid Muslim demonstrations.

(U) 23 Mar 80:

The Israeli cabinet passed a decision to establish settlements in the Arab city of Hebron.

* Indicates extremely sensitive event

•(U) 23 Mar 80:

The Israeli cabinet passed a decision to establish settlements in the Arab city of Hebron.

~~(TS)~~ 24 Mar 80: *FE*

One E-3A rotates from [redacted] to Tinker AFB,

VE
[redacted] -130 arrives

Pacific [redacted] [redacted]
SAN BERNARDINO, RIDLEY and [redacted]
the northern Arabian sea for operations with [redacted]

(U)

The deposed Shah of Iran departed Panama for Egypt, and has accepted President Sadat's offer of assylum.

~~(TS)~~ 26 Mar 80: *C*

[redacted]

~~(TS)~~ 27 Mar 80: *C*

[redacted]

(U) 28 Mar 80:

Anti-Shah demonstration took place in Assuet, Egypt. Over 5,000 students reportedly participated.

~~(TS)~~ 29 Mar 80: *C*

Press reports indicate Moscow has agreed to discuss the Soviet presence in Afghanistan with Tehran.

~~(TS)~~ 30 Mar 80: *ANN/E*

One E-3A deploys to [redacted]

~~(TS)~~ 31 Mar 80: *(u)*

Major Haddad's Christian forces occupied 2 UN observation posts in south Lebanon. Before their departure, the Christians destroyed and stole equipment belonging to the observation posts.

~~(TS)~~ 1 Apr 80: *ANN/E*

Second E-3A deploys to [redacted]

~~(S NF, NN)~~

The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister was the target of an attempted assassination. Baghdad has accused Iran of responsibility.

* Indicates extremely sensitive event

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(TS) ~~(S)~~ 1 Apr 80: C

(TS) ~~(S)~~ 2 Apr 80: A, E (MC-130 departed)

(TS) ~~(S)~~ C

(TS) ~~(S)~~ 3 Apr 80: C

(TS) ~~(S)~~ 4 Apr 80: C

(TS) ~~(S)~~ 4 April C

TASS announces Soviet/Afghan treaty on stationing of troops.

(TS) ~~(S)~~ 5 Apr 80: E

conducts operations with

(TS) ~~(S)~~ 5 April C

~~(S)~~ 6 Apr 80: C

(W) ~~(S)~~ 6 April

Soviet operations continue in Jalulabbad area in Afghanistan.

6-13 April

Syrian troops conducted corden and search operations in Aleppo and Hamah.

6 April C

* Indicates extremely sensitive event.

(U) 7 April

US breaks ~~SECRET~~ relations with Iran.

7 April

Iran reciprocates by ordering its embassy staff in Iraq to return to Tehran.

(S) 7 April

[REDACTED]

(u) 7 April

Following the Iranian Revolutionary Council's predictable failure to reach a decision on the hostage-trading issue, Ayatollah Khomeini announced that the hostages would remain under the control of the militants until the Majlis meets and decides their fate.

(u) 7-10 April

Egyptian President Sadat had summit talks with US President Carter regarding the Middle East autonomy negotiations.

(u) 7-12 April

Tehran reported numerous clashes along the Iraq-Iran border.

(S) 8 Apr 80

E-3A/TF-70/B-52 interrace training in North Arabian Sea.

(S) 9 April

[REDACTED]

USSR/Afghanistan sign new military assistance agreement.

(S) 9-12 April

[REDACTED]

(S) 11 April

[REDACTED]

(u) 12 April

Insurgents still endanger Laghman province in Afghanistan despite recent Soviet operations.

(u) 12 April

Major Haddad's forces destroyed UNIFIL Headquarters at Naqoura, Lebanon. Heavy fighting occurred with UNIFIL at At-Tiri, Lebanon.

(u) 12 April

Syrian government dismissed the leaders of the professional syndicates.

(S) 12 April

Iran began its first major redeployment of ground forces into the western region.

(u) 12-14 April

Steadfastness Conference held in Tripoli, Libya.

~~TOP SECRET~~

18B12

~~SECRET~~

(S) 13 April

[REDACTED]

(u) 13 April

Palestinians attempted a raid against Israel from Jordan.

(u) 13 April

Iranian Revolutionary Council announced that the second round of the Majlis elections scheduled for this week will be postponed until 2 May.

(S) 13-15 April

[REDACTED]

(S) 14 April

One E-3A redeploys from [REDACTED]

(S) 14 April

An official from the International Red Cross and a medical doctor reportedly visited all of the US Embassy hostages.

(S) 14 April

[REDACTED]

(u) 14-17 April

Israeli Prime Minister Begin in the US for talks with US President Carter.

(S) 15 April

[REDACTED]

(S) 16 April

Last E-3A redeploys from [REDACTED]
Three MC-130s deploy from [REDACTED]

(S) 18 April

Insurgents creating disorder in Herat, Ghowr and other southern and western provinces in Afghanistan. Main focus of Soviet activity remains in the east and northeast Afghanistan.

(S) 18 April

Israeli [Commando] Forces raided a Palestinian logistics base at As-Sarafana, Lebanon.

(S) 18 April

Soviet and Afghan forces in Afghanistan have begun joint operations against partisan forces in and near Herat. Partisans cut electric power to government offices in Herat.

18 April

Two Irish UNIFIL soldiers were executed in South Lebanon by Major Haddad's forces/Shia villagers.

18 April

Israeli Defense Forces launched a seaborne raid in South Lebanon. Two Israelis were injured and several Palestinians killed.

(S) 19-24 April

20 April

Iraq held a naval exercise in the Persian Gulf.

People's Democratic Republic of Yemen's Chairman of the Presidium and Secretary-General of the Central Committee Ismail, resigned his positions.

(S) 20 April

Schools and bazaar closed on strike in Herat, Afghanistan. Herat's deputy for conscription was kidnapped and killed.

(S) 21 April

[REDACTED]

noted in Afghanistan, indicating a long-term Soviet stay. Anti-government, anti-Soviet demonstrations were staged in Kabul protesting Afghanistan's new flag.

(u) 22 April

A western correspondent claims to have photographed partisans carrying Egyptian made AKM assault rifles in Afghanistan.

(S) 23 April

[REDACTED]

(u) 24 April

Shia's in Bahrain demonstrated to protest the 7 April execution in Iraq of the Shia religious dissident Ayatollah Bakir al-Sadr.

(u) 24 April

Fighting at campuses in Rasht and Ahvaz, Iran left 16 dead and hundreds injured as the enforced Islamization of Iran's universities continued.

(S) 25 April

Zaranj, the capital of Nimruz province Afghanistan, is reported under heavy partisan pressure. There are 115,000 Soviet forces committed to Afghanistan; of this number 85,000 are based in Afghanistan.

(u) 25 April

Tehran reported that Iraqi troops crossed the border into Iran to conduct Sabotage activities against oil pipelines.

(u) 25 April

Attempted rescue of hostages is aborted when only five of eight RH-53s were flyable at the refueling area.

(u) 27 April

Bodies of eight Americans who died in rescue attempt were placed on public display at US Embassy in Tehran.

(S) (S)
1157 A
(S) (S)
1157 A

Three MC-130s and two AC-130s begin redeployment

Four MC-130s depart

* Indicates extremely sensitive event.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(u) 27 April

Ceremonies in Kabul and other cities in Afghanistan celebrating the Second Anniversary of the Saur (Communist) Revolution took place with only minor disturbances. Country wide anti-government disruptions that had been anticipated did not take place.

(S) 28 April

[REDACTED]

(u) 29 April

An assassination attempt was made against Iranian Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh while he was on a state visit to Kuwait.

(u) 1 May

Mines planted by Afghan nationalists are destroying more Soviet and Afghan Army vehicles. As a result, more Soviet mine detection and clearing equipment as well as dismountged operations are expected.

(u) 2 May

It is estimated that 115,000 Soviet forces are involved in Afghanistan operations. Of this number 85,000 are based inside Afghanistan.

(u) 2 May

Recent combat operations involving a Soviet/Afghan effort to clear the Panjshir Valley possibly resulted in a bitter Soviet defeat. A variety of sources have reported the Soviets suffered heavy losses in men and equipment before terminating the operation.

(u) 2 May

Student demonstrations have been occurring almost daily in Kabul, Herat, Kunduz, Ghanzi, Kandahar, and Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The mood in Kabul has turned ugly and the Babrak Government is discussing ways to respond to the situation.

(u) 2 May

Iranian Shia religious leader, Imam Hassan Shirazi was assassinated in Beirut, Lebanon. Iraqi elements have claimed responsibility.

(u) 3 May

There has been no change in Soviet forces of 115,000 involved in Afghanistan operations. 85,000 are based inside of Afghanistan.

(u) 5 May

The hostages being held at the Iranian Embassy London were rescued by British commandos. Hostilities between Iraq and Iran have continued.

(u) 5 May

Student demonstrations throughout Afghanistan appear to have abated.

(S) 5 May

A new airfield is under construction near Karudi, Afghanistan.

C

(u) 9 May

The second round of Iranian Parliamentary elections were held.

(S) 12 May

[REDACTED]

12 May

The Afghan government is believed to have initiated efforts to disrupt nationalist activities in the Pakistan border region with a series of terrorist bombings.

(S) 16 May

Probable Soviet MI-24 HIND helicopters conducted a cross border bombing raid 8 miles inside Pakistan on 8 May. The raid was witnessed by an American journalist

(S) 20 May

A major Soviet/Afghan operation is underway in Ghazni province, some 150-250 KM southwest of Kabul.

(S) 21 May

Kabul, Afghanistan remains tense after several weeks of unrest, demonstrations, assassination attempts, and killing of Soviet soldiers. A major outbreak of violence could occur at any time.

22 May

[REDACTED]

(u) 22 May

The Syrian Government instituted repressive measures in Hamah in an effort to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood. Counter dissident activities by the government have continued in Aleppo.

(S) 23 May

A new major combined Soviet and Afghan army sweep operation is underway in the Konar Valley. This is the second such operation in 3 months. It indicates that Soviet forces cannot retain control of territory without continuous occupation and that border denial operations have not been successful.

31 May - 6 June

[redacted] while units normally conduct battalion and brigade sized exercises near their garrisons during this time of year, at least [redacted] these units could be used to increase security along the border with Iran.

(a) 2 - 4 June

(U) The Iranian Navy conducted an exercise in the Persian Gulf.

(u) 2 - 5 June

(U) The International Anti-American Conference was held in Tehran, Iran.

(u) 5 June

(U) Marches and demonstrations were held in Iran to commemorate the 17th anniversary of the religious uprising of 1963, which led to Khomeini's exile.

(u)

9 June

(u) The arrest of Qashqai tribal Chieftan Khosrow Qashqai provoked a clash between Qashqai tribesman and Revolutionary Guards near Shiraz.

(u)

12 June

(U) A rally in Tehran by the leftist Mujahedin was broken up by the Hezbollahi, a Muslim fundamentalist gang, resulting in at least one death and 300 injuries.

18 June

(u) Ayatollah Khomeini appointed three clerics as regional representatives in the Revolutionary Guards, Gendarmerie, and Police. These appointments were made by Khomeini to tighten control over Iran's internal security apparatus.

19 June

(u) A massive top-level military shake-up, Iran's highest ranking officer as the Chief of the Army Force. This makes a clean sweep in the Armed Forces. The Navy Commander was replaced on 1 June.

20 June

(u) A number of air and ground incursions and incidents along Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan and Iran have been recently observed.

20 June

(u) Intelligence Community estimates of Soviet forces involved in Afghanistan have declined slightly.

(u) Soviet forces involved in Afghanistan operations are estimated to be 120,000. Of this number 85,000 are based inside Afghanistan.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S) 21 June

Tass announces the withdrawal of unnecessary troops from Afghanistan.

In Kabul, a general strike closed an estimated 85% of shops. Only 2 small demonstrations were associated with the activity.

(S) 22 - 23 June

Press reports indicate that artillery and tank elements have begun movement north to the USSR.

(S) 23 - 24 June

(S) 25 June

(u) 27 June

(S) The Soviet strength figures/agreed upon by the Intelligence Community are 80,000 in Afghanistan, and 120,000 total committed.

(u) 27 June

(U) Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini delivered a surprising and sharp attack upon the Iranian Government denouncing its effectiveness.

(u) 28 June

(U) In response to Khomeini's speech, Iranian President Bani Sadr made public that Khomeini possesses his letter of resignation which the Ayatollah can accept at any time.

(S) 1 July

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 July - (U) Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh announced that the number of diplomats in Tehran and Moscow must be equal. Presently, the number of Soviet diplomats in Tehran greatly exceeds that of Iranian diplomats in Moscow.

3 July - (U) Approximately 2000 water-board employees struck to protest reductions in pay and allowances. Some of the protestors held the Managing Director of Tehran's Water Board hostage in his office.

4 July - (U) Mass demonstrations were held in Tehran to show support for Khomeini's latest calls for purging the country of the vestiges of the Shah's regime. The demonstrators also denounced Iran's two largest leftist organizations.

5 July - ^(U)~~(C)~~ The deposed Shah underwent a second operation. Reports on his condition are conflicting, but we believe him to be in quite serious condition.

6 July - (U) No significant activity.

7 July - (U) No significant activity.

10 July - (U) President Bani Sadr announced the thwarting of a sixth military coup plot to overthrow the government this year. This plot supposedly involved members of the army and air force.

10 July - ^(U)~~(C)~~ Admiral Ahmad Madani, a prominent secularist and former navy commander, announced he would no longer sit in the Majlis, after refusing to appear before a Majlis review of his credentials. His resignation was another victory for the fundamentalist clerics.

11 July - (U) Mr. Richard Queen was released and was flown from Tehran to Zurich. He was immediately taken to a Zurich hospital for diagnosis of the ailment which led to his release from captivity in Iran.

12 July - ^(U)~~(C)~~ Several hundred military officers were arrested for involvement in the coup plot announced on 10 July. While the Iranian government charged the US and several other nations with backing the plot and asserted former Prime Minister Bakhtiar was involved, it is apparently using the coup plot as an opportunity to purge the armed forces.

13 July - (U) Revolutionary Council member Hashemi Rafsanjani asserted that 99 percent of the Majlis deputies favor trying the hostages as spies unless the Shah and his money are returned. Rafsanjani also said the Majlis should not consider the hostage question for two months.

14 July - (U) No significant activity.


UNCLASSIFIED

- 15 July - (U) The Revolutionary Council ordered Iran's land, sea, and air frontiers closed for 48 hours. The purpose was to prevent alleged members of the coup attempt from fleeing the country.
- 16 July - (U) No Significant Activity.
- 17 July - (U) No Significant Activity.
- 18 July - (U) An unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on Shahpur Bakhtiar at his daughter's house in Paris. A group calling itself the Guards of Islam claimed credit for the attempt. The Tehran government denied involvement in the attack.
- 19 July - (U) No Significant Activity.
- 20 July - (U) The Majlis commenced formal legislative business with the selection of a speaker. The new speaker is a leader of the fundamentalist Islamic Republic Party and has favored trials for the hostages.
- 20 July - (U) Ayatollah Khomeini severely attacked the Cabinet and ordered the Majlis to keep tight control over the government. He said Iran's problems stemmed from not being sufficiently Islamic.
- 21 July - (U) No Significant Activity.
- 22 July - (U) A mob stormed the Tehran offices of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party as part of Iran's continuing "cultural revolution."
- 23 July - (U) Three bomb explosions rocked one of Tehran's main shopping areas reportedly killing six persons and injuring nearly a hundred others. The Forqan group claimed responsibility for the bombing.
- 24 July - (U) No significant activity.
- 25 July - (U) No significant activity.
- 26 July - (U) Bani Sadr nominated Mostafa Mir-Salim as Iran's new prime minister. Although Mir-Salim is a young, western educated technocrat, he is also a member of the IRP.
- 27 July - (U) The former Shah of Iran died in exile in Egypt. His death is not expected to effect the fate of the 52 American hostages.
- 28 July - (U) No significant activity.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

A, G, C



JTF-79 ORGANIZATION

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
 CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
 INITIATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 DESL DOWNED TO _____
 REVIEW BY OADR
 DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
 [Redacted]

Classified By: DT30A
 Declassified ON: OADR

48-20

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES

EVENT/
SITUATION

DECISION/OPTIONS

1/MC-130 with [redacted]
DELTA Dep [redacted]
- MC-130 Aborts

Lead DELTA Team
late or unavailable

- Abort
- Have spare MC-130 ready; transload DELTA continue

NOTE: Maximum delay for MC-130 launch, 1+00.

up to 2:00 hrs.

1/MC (DELTA) & 1/EC OK
(FUEL) T/O from [redacted]
- MC-130 ABORT

DELTA unavailable

- Transload DELTA to spare - continue.

- EC-130 ABORT

Require 2/EC-130's at refuel point.

- Use 3rd EC-130 as primary fuel A/C

NOTE: 1+00 delay acceptable up to 2:00 hrs.

NOTE: Any delay of these A/C beyond 10 min requires notification to Helos for possible delay.

7/Helos dep carrier
< 7 airborne

Insufficient helos for mission.

ABORT

1/MC-130 (DELTA)
2/EC-130 (FUEL) T/O from [redacted]
- 1/MC-130 Abort

Equip & parts of DELTA unavailable

Transload to spare MC-130, if unavailable .. ABORT and recall all forces.

- 1/EC-130 ABORT

Insufficient fuel for helos

- If no refueling available for MC-130 ... ABORT
- If refueling available, continue give 5000# from each of 3/ MC-130s to helos plan a 5 helo launch out of refueling.

1/16/19
A, E

Can afford 1 MC or 1 EC
in 20 go. 40% pathfinder?
oin to MC ahead.

Classified by: [redacted] DDO, NMCC
Declassified on: OADR
Downgraded by: [redacted] DDO, NMCC

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

Must get KC135

EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

CONSEQUENCES (w)

DECISION/OPTIONS

A, B, E, G

1/MC-130 (DELTA) lands
at refuel point.

- [REDACTED]

OK

Blind landing

Continue

- [REDACTED] guide
pilot to landing
by the road

[REDACTED]

- A/C damaged or
breaks through
crust on landing

A/C will have to be
destroyed in place

- Make area near
damaged A/C appe
to be Russia and
burn it, continu
How?

Helos pass turn around
≥ 6 helos OK

Sufficient force to
support extraction.
Insufficient helos.

Continue

< 6 helos OK

ABORT

2nd/MC-130 lands
at refuel point

OK

Continue

- A/C damaged or
breaks through
crust

Same as above

Same as above

3rd/MC-
[REDACTED]-130 lands
- A/C damaged

OK
Same as above

Continue
Same as above

Continue, bring
crew out on MC-130
Continue

1st E
[REDACTED] MC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

OK
Same as above

Continue
Same as above

2nd/EC-130
lands
- A/C damaged

OK
Same as above

Continue
Same as above

- Because of damage
or malfunction,
unable to pass fuel

Land 3rd EC-130

Continue

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

EVENT/
SITUATION (S)

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES (S)
FUEL

DECISION/OPTIONS

LANDS AT
3rd EC-130 ~~orbit~~
~~orbit over landing site~~ REFUEL
site

Provide ~~terminal~~
~~guidance~~ for helos

Continue (S) (S)

Helos arrive at
landing site

OK

Continue

- If helos are more
than 45 min late
[1+45 min]

Will not be enough
darkness to reach
hideout

Helos refuel and
move north to
desert hide
location

Helos depart refuel
point with DELTA
≥ 6 OK

Sufficient helos for
operation

Continue

< 6 OK

Insufficient helos for
operation

Good helos return
to carrier, rest
of force return
on C-130

NOTE: Max headwind
from desert 1 to
dropoff is 15 knots.

[Time and fuel check] ²⁺⁴⁰ min.

NOTE: If there is a
problem with any A/C
departing the refuel
point, it will be
destroyed in place and
the area made to appear
Russian.

Helos arrive at
dropoff with DELTA

OK

Continue

DELTA unable to move
to city

- DELTA moves to
hideout with h
- DELTA remains
dropoff to wai
for trucks

- Helo breaks at
dropoff

Possibility of
discovery

- Leave Farci
speaker at Hel
with cover stc
If possible,
capture discov
keep with helo
hideout, relea
when helos lea
continue.

Motor cycles.
Go to town

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

EVENT/
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

Helos depart dropoff
< 5 Helos OK

OK
Insufficient helo
support

Continue
ABORT - load DEL
hide till next n
return to desert
one.

A

[would have to shuttle]
Decision to launch.

Helos arrive hideout

OK

Continue

Helos must be in the
hideout by 0016Z to
arrive in total
darkness

Could send helo to
Mangarsh to get
fuel

[shuttle to
intermediate?]

130 to
Mehrabad.
Shuttle there.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

ME
IPAN

EVENT/SITUATION CONSEQUENCES DECISION/OPTIONS

1/MC-130 with [redacted]
DELTA Dep [redacted]
- MC-130 Aborts

Lead DELTA Team
late or unavailable

- Abort
- Have spare MC-1
ready; transload
DELTA continue

NOTE: Maximum delay for
MC-130 launch, 1+00.

1/MC [redacted] (DELTA) & 1/EC OK
(FUEL) T/O from [redacted]
- MC-130 ABORT

DELTA unavailable

- Transload DELTA
to spare -
continue.

- EC-130 ABORT

Require 2/EC-130's at
refuel point.

- Use 3rd EC-130
primary fuel A/C

NOTE: 1+00 delay acceptable

NOTE: Any delay of these
A/C beyond 10 min requires
notification to Helos for
possible delay.

7/Helos dep carrier
< 7 airborne

Insufficient helos for
mission.

ABORT

1/MC-130 [redacted] (DELTA)
2/EC-130 [redacted] (DEL) T/O
from [redacted]
- 1/MC-130 Abort

Equip & parts of DELTA
unavailable

Transload to spare
MC-130, if un-
available .. ABORT
and recall all
forces.

- 1/EC-130 ABORT

Insufficient fuel
for helos

- If no refueling
available for
MC-130 ... ABORT
- If refueling
available, con-
tinue give 5000#
from each of 3/
MC-130s to helos
plan a 5 helo
launch out of
refueling.

1/10/19
A, E

E
TRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION (S)

CONSEQUENCES (S)

DECISION/OPTIONS (S)

1/MC-130 (DELTA) lands at refuel point.

- [REDACTED]

- A/C damaged or breaks through crust on landing

Helos pass turn around ≥ 6 helos OK

< 6 helos OK

2nd/MC-130 lands at refuel point

- A/C damaged or breaks through crust

3rd/MC-
~~MC~~-130 lands
- A/C damaged

1st E
~~MC~~ MC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

2nd/EC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

- Because of damage or malfunction, unable to pass fuel

OK

Blind landing [REDACTED]

A/C will have to be destroyed in place

Sufficient force to support extraction. Insufficient helos.

OK

Same as above

OK
Same as above

OK
Same as above

OK
Same as above

Land 3rd EC-130

- If decision made to ABORT, give 800 gals to ea c 7 helos, helos return to carriage all C-130s return to [REDACTED]

Continue

- [REDACTED] guide pilot to landing by the road

- Make area near damaged A/C appear to be Russian and burn it, continue

Continue

ABORT

Continue

Same as above

Continue
Same as above

Continue, bring crew out on MC-130
Continue

Continue
Same as above

Continue

Same as above

Continue

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

EVENT/
SITUATION

3rd EC-130 ~~orbit over landing site~~ **LANOS AT REFUEL**
site

Helos arrive at landing site

- If helos are more than 45 min late

1 hr 45 min

Helos depart refuel point with DELTA
≥ 6 OK

< 6 OK

NOTE: Max headwind from desert 1 to dropoff is 15 knots.

NOTE: If there is a problem with any A/C departing the refuel point, it will be destroyed in place and the area made to appear Russian.

Helos arrive at dropoff with DELTA

- Helo breaks at dropoff

~~SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES

Provide ~~terminal~~ **FUEL** guidance for helos

OK

Will not be enough darkness to reach hideout

Sufficient helos for operation

Insufficient helos for operation

OK

DELTA unable to move to city

Possibility of discovery

~~SECRET~~
DECISION/OPTIONS

Continue

Continue

Helos refuel and move north to desert hide location

Continue

Good helos return to carrier, rest of force return to ~~██████████~~ on C-130'

Continue

- DELTA moves to hideout with helo
- DELTA remains at dropoff to wait for trucks

- Leave Farci speaker at Helo with cover story
If possible, capture discover keep with helos hideout, release when helos leave continue.

A, E

20 A

ME
IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION (u)

Helos depart dropoff
<5 Helos OK

Helos arrive hideout

Helos must be in the
hideout by 0016Z to
arrive in total
darkness

~~SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES (u)

OK
Insufficient helo
support

OK

DECISION/OPTIONS (u) (X)

Continue
ABORT - load DELT
hide till next ni
return to desert
one.

Continue

skilled

01 20 25 Z

*fly out
ambulance*

*01 20 25 Z
ambulance
parade*

G [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

12 APR 1980

EXPOSED MISSION PERSONNEL *

(S) TYPE/NUMBER	(S) LAUNCH LOCATION	(S) REMARKS
A, E Delta [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Presently - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Presently - [REDACTED]
Farsi Speaking [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Presently - Various
7 Helicopter Crews/37	Nimitz	Presently - Yuma PG, AZ
A, E Rangers [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Presently - [REDACTED]
3 MC-130/30	[REDACTED]	Presently - [REDACTED]
2 MC-130/20	[REDACTED]	Presently - [REDACTED]
Medical Support/15	[REDACTED]	Six medical personnel on one C-141 Four medical personnel on second C-141 Three medical personnel on one MC-130 Two medical personnel on second MC-130
3 AC-130/60	[REDACTED]	Presently - Hurlburt
E 2 C-141/14	[REDACTED]	Presently - Various
3 EC-130/21	[REDACTED]	Presently - Hurlburt

Total Mission Personnel - 389

~~(S)~~ * - Approximately [REDACTED] personnel (Delta, [REDACTED] Monitors, [REDACTED] and 37 Helicopter Crew Members) will be above or on Iranian territory throughout the mission period. The remaining [REDACTED] personnel (Rangers, 145 Airmen and 15 Medical) will be above or on Iranian territory for approximately 12 hours.

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B# 25

13 April 1980

Support Personnel*

<u>Element/Number</u> (v)	<u>Mission Launch Site</u> (/)	<u>Remarks</u> (/)
JTF Alternate/2	[REDACTED]	Presently - Pentagon
JTF Main/31	[REDACTED]	Presently - Pentagon
RH-53/JTF Liaison ELM/4	Nimitz/Eisenhower	Presently - Pentagon
JCSE/20	Pentagon (5); [REDACTED] (7); [REDACTED] (8)	Presently - MacDill AFB
KC-135/48	[REDACTED]	Presently - Various
Helicopter Maint/130	Nimitz/Eisenhower	Presently - Nimitz
AC-130 Maint/93	[REDACTED]	Presently - Hurlburt
MC-130/45	[REDACTED]	Presently - [REDACTED]
KC-135 Maint/68	[REDACTED]	Presently - Various
C-141 Crews & Maint & Med/75	[REDACTED]	Presently - Various
MAC ALCE/28	[REDACTED]	Europe
Fuels/20	[REDACTED]	Presently - [REDACTED]
WX Package/5	[REDACTED]	Presently - McClellan, AF CA
Total Support Personnel - 569		

* - Estimated number of personnel. Exact number may vary.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

b 26

13 April 1980

~~TOP SECRET~~
Base Population SOD Option*

A, E, C

Category	Count
Drivers	[REDACTED]
Comm	42
KC-135/Maint	98
MC-130/Maint	121
JTF	31
AC-130/Maint	145
MAC ALCE	26
[REDACTED]	3
JCSE	15
AF Comm PKG	30
WX	5

Total: [REDACTED]

Base Operation Support Personnel [REDACTED]

Total U.S. Population: 933

* - Estimated number of personnel. Exact number may vary.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: ~~DDA, dmc~~
Declassified ON: OADR

b # 28

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

Subject: Iran Situation Report as of 0500 24 April 1980

(U) Significant Events:

--(U) Although campus unrest has quieted in Tehran and at most universities, clashes between Muslim Fundamentalists and Leftwing groups continue in some provincial areas. According to press reports, 11 people were killed and over 1,000 injured yesterday in further clashes in the Caspian Sea port of Rasht.

[REDACTED]

Speaking at Tehran University on Tuesday, President-elect Bani-Sadr proclaimed the first stage of what he called an Islamic Cultural Revolution in the nation's universities.

--(U) In spite of an announcement by Iranian army forces on Tuesday that a cease-fire exists in Sanandaj, press reports indicate that fighting continues in both Saqqez and Sanandaj. Government forces reportedly remain trapped in both the Officer's Club and garrison, with all water, electricity, and telephone links severed.

--(U) In a move that is sure to increase tensions with Iraq, Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council announced yesterday it has verified reports that Ayatollah Baqr Sadr, a leading Muslim Shiite leader in Iraq, had been executed by the Iraqi regime. Khomeini's office in Tehran called for three days of mourning for the slain religious leader beginning on the 23rd. The mourning period will culminate tomorrow with large marches in Tehran.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

~~_____~~ Significant Military Activity:

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~ Significant Political, Economic and Diplomatic Activity:

--(U) Canada and Japan apparently will join the nine nations of the European Economic Community in ordering partial diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran. The text of the EC Nine decision calls on national parliaments to prepare to impose sanctions in accordance with the January 10 draft Security Council Resolution. The sanctions will be imposed if there has not been "decisive progress" toward the hostages' release by May 17. In the meantime, the EC will immediately reduce their Embassies' staffs, reduce Iranian diplomatic staffs in their countries, require visas for Iranians and ban sales of exports of military equipment and new contracts for any type of sales or exports to Iran.

4/24/80 7:38 CRT 2 L

PAGE 1
240600Z APR 80

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

1. SHIP ACTIVITY

[REDACTED]

VIS PAMIR AGI 677 230513Z 2237H/86101E (USS NIMITZ)

B. [REDACTED]

D. [REDACTED]

E. [REDACTED]

2. AIR ACTIVITY

[REDACTED] TS

[REDACTED] TS

[REDACTED]

4. SOVIET PRESS (U): NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORTING WITH INCREASED ANTI-US POLEMICS IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND NEW COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY WARNS TEHRAN AND THE ARAB WORLD OF POSSIBLE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.

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24 APR 1980

~~APR 22 1980~~

~~16 April 1980~~

B# 30

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: Threat Review (U)

1. ~~(TS)~~ The following comprises the JTF J-2 assessment of the threat to RICE BOWL posed by Soviet, Iranian, and other Mideast nations' reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. The assessment is divided by country and collection means.

2. ~~(TS)~~ ^(U) Soviet Capabilities.

a. ~~(TS)~~ Photo

~~(1)~~ [REDACTED]

(2) Aircraft Photo/Visual Reconnaissance: [REDACTED]

The IL-38's primary mission is maritime surveillance and ASW.

We expect this activity to continue. The MAY has an operating radius of 1400 NM.

(3) Soviet coverage of [REDACTED] the Helo Hide Site would have to be provided by satellite. Coverage of [REDACTED] could be accomplished by either satellite or aircraft.

The likelihood of a photo mission covering the Helo Hide Site is assessed as very low.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~(S)~~
~~(S)~~
~~(U)~~
[REDACTED]

(2) Soviet Embassies and other diplomatic missions invariably conduct COMINT collection operations.

[REDACTED]

(3)

A, E, E

(4) The Soviets have both naval and land-based long range direction finding equipment. They are capable of tracking - at least on a random basis.

[REDACTED]

Given the open availability of ICAO flight plans, it must be assumed that intelligence "tip-offs" result.

(5) We assess the Soviet capacity to detect and track any radio-silent clandestine mission associated with RICE BOWL as low, if third country radars are avoided and "cover" flight plans are filed as necessary.

3. (U) (S) Iranian Detection/Surveillance Capabilities.

a. (S) Iranian photo reconnaissance: Iran has a limited capability to photograph or visually reconoitier US naval units operating in the Persian Gulf or Northern Arabian Sea utilizing P-3 aircraft. Additionally, Iranian F-4s and C-130s have some visual recon capacity. We believe that any threat to security of RICE BOWL from any of these platforms is negligible.

b. ~~(S)~~ Aural detection: We believe that the greatest danger of detection for both the helicopter and fixed-wing elements operating in Iranian airspace on Night #1 is posed by Gendarmerie posts. These posts (usually consisting of 6-10 men) are scattered throughout the country along major lines of communication. Mission planning has taken their locations into account and flight routes are designed to avoid all known posts.

[REDACTED]

(2)

[REDACTED]

(3)

[REDACTED]

c. Visual detection: Despite flight routes which avoid populated areas, the possibility exists that aircraft could be seen by motorists or nomads. The latter, lacking communications, can be discounted as a warning source. Critical areas for visual detection are the Gulf coastal region, the Refueling Site, and the Transfer Point/Helo hide area. We assess the possibility of detection at any of these locations as low-moderate. Whether a truck driver would bother to report sighting aircraft [REDACTED] to some official entity of the Iranian government is problematical.

(S) SAC penetration analysis of several generic low level routes indicated low probability of detection/interception on all the inbound legs and only a slightly higher possibility of detection/interception on the egress routes. SAC team prepared study for MC-130 at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] probabilities would still be on the low end of the spectrum if route planning [REDACTED] network was not on high/active alert posture.

ENEMY COMMAND AND CONTROL

- The Iranian command and control structure inside the AMEMB Compound and in the immediate vicinity consists of a series of overlapping but not consciously connected communications circles.

-- Within the compound, the occupation elements use verbal and written communications for routine actions.

[redacted], the Iranians holding the compound use captured walkie-talkies and the existing base station radios located in the Chancery, Ambassador Residence, DCM Residence and possibly in the Bijan Apartments (Apt Nr. 20), which the Marine guards formerly used as billets.

-- Telephone is the principal means of communication to areas outside of the compound. This means is complemented in the immediate vicinity of the compound by a public address (PA) system. Telephone and the PA system are the two primary means that can be expected to be used to sound an alarm, to request reinforcements, and to rally crowds to the compound. Once calls/announcements are initiated by telephone or PA system, the information can be relayed to all points of the city from neighborhood Khomiteh Offices and Mosques.

-- Key Communications Facilities:

-- The telephone switchboard for the compound is located in the Chancery basement.

-- The power sub-station/transformer yard which supplies the neighborhood is located less than a kilometer north of the compound at the north intersection of Roosevelt and Karim Khan-E-Zand.

-- The main telephone/telecommunications facility is located at Sepah Square. [redacted] Destruction of the roof-top antenna would seriously disrupt microwave and telephone communications from Tehran.

-- The more critical radio/TV facilities are:

-- The National TV Facility on Pahlavi Road. [redacted] Focal point for all TV and FM broadcasts.

-- AM BC Station NE [redacted]: Major radio broadcast facility.

-- AM BC Station SW [redacted]: Major radio broadcast facility.

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J DEEL ~~EX~~ SECRET

BY OADR

ORIGIN FROM [REDACTED]

64 APR 1980 ~~APR 80 1980~~


~~22 APR 1980~~

~~18 APR 1980~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Defensive Forces and Reaction Times

B-35



- (u) - External reaction forces. Reinforcements for the student guards and Pasdaran are available from several locations and organizations. Principal forces and their estimated reaction times once they have received notification or heard a major disturbance in the vicinity of the compound are shown below.
- (u) -- Within 0-5 minutes - fire from within the compound and, possibly, from a limited number of weapons positioned in surrounding buildings.
- (u) -- Within 10-15 minutes reinforcements from student headquarters and Pasdaran Komiteh strength 75-100 from nearby Komiteh stations.
- Within 15-30 minutes Pasdaran reinforcements of up to 200 plus.
- (A) ~~(u)~~ Within 45-60 minutes IRG Residual Forces and mobs of 2,000-3,000 could form. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] could frustrate this potential threat.
- (C) ~~(u)~~ -- Within 60 minutes, it is possible that a [REDACTED] could react and attempt a launch against any orbiting aircraft.
- (C) ~~(u)~~ -- Within one hour it is possible that helicopters from [REDACTED] or fighters from [REDACTED] could launch and attempt to interdict the force.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION

Security of the hostage areas is maintained by [redacted] personnel.

[redacted] personnel within the compound are made up of several factions in approximately the following proportions:

- Actual students//60 percent/[redacted] personnel
- Fatah trained militants//10 percent//[redacted] personnel
- Pasdaran//15 percent//[redacted] personnel
- Student leadership cadre (including university/religious leaders) 5 percent//[redacted] personnel
- PLO advisors//3-5 percent//[redacted] personnel

NOTE: PLO advisors are probably only present during the day and in the evenings when strategy meetings are being held. The actual students function as personal guards of the hostages and as propagandists and ideologues trying to indoctrinate the hostages. The PLO function as observers, advisors, and propagandists. The Fatah trained militants supervise security, interrogation, and document exploitation. The Pasdaran, besides providing external security, maintain a presence within the compound, primarily providing sentries. Within the buildings, the students typically carry pistols. Those on duty outside typically are armed with G-3 rifles. Guards carrying rifles have not been observed carrying any spare magazines for their weapons.

Guard Force distribution is estimated as follows with a day/night duty/ratio of 60/40.

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~~SECRET~~

24 APR 1980

~~APR 22 1980~~

~~22 APR 1980~~

~~16 April 1980~~

B-36

OVERALL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- (E) - The operation will be accomplished during a nine day period (7 days for warning and positioning the force and 2 days for execution and recovery). Heavy lift helicopters (RH-53s), AC and MC-130 aircraft, refuelable C-130Es, C-141 airlifters and KC-135 tankers will be used. The helicopters will launch from the Nimitz. Other air operations will be conducted from [REDACTED]
- (u) - The operation in Iran takes two nights and one day. It is divided into three phases - Insertion, Hostage Release and Extraction.
- (A, E) - Upon last light of the insertion day, SFOD-Delta [REDACTED] Delta personnel plus [REDACTED] will be airlifted by 3 MC-130s [REDACTED] to an isolated desert LZ in Iran.
 - The first MC-130 will land on the desert LZ and Delta forces will immediately set up blocking positions on the road in order to control any vehicular traffic transiting the area.
 - (u) -- The second and third MC-130 land desert LZ where number one has secured the area.
 - (E) - The MC-130 aircraft will be followed by three EC-130s from [REDACTED]. Each of these aircraft will have two fuel bladders for a total of 18,000 gallons of fuel available for refueling purposes. Once the EC-130s have landed and are in position, the 3 MC-130s will depart for [REDACTED].
 - Concurrently, 7 RH-53s will depart the USS Nimitz to marry up with the forces at the LZ. While at the LZ, the helos will refuel from the EC-130s and load the Delta personnel (the
 - (u) -- Once refueled and loaded, the helos will fly to a hideout area which is located approximately 100 KM from Tehran.
 - (E) - The MC & EC-130s at the desert LZ will depart [REDACTED].
 - (u) -- Once the helos reach the hideout area, they will be camouflaged and defensive positions set up. This evolution will be completed prior to sunrise.

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- (A, C) -- The Delta force will [redacted] the hideout area to a warehouse which is located approximately 15 KM from Tehran [redacted]
- (U) -- While at the warehouse, final preparations will be made for the hostage release phase.
- A -- That night, Delta will [redacted] and enter the compound early the next morning.
 - The hostage release can be completed in less than one hour - most will be out in 30 minutes or less.
- E -- Two AC-130s will fly [redacted] to the compound and provide on-call fire support if required.
- E, A -- Concurrently, 4 MC-130s w/Rangers [redacted] and fuel blivets from [redacted] will secure Manzariyeh. Two C-141s from [redacted] will land immediately thereafter and prepare for the arrival of the helos from Tehran.
- A, E -- A third AC-130 from [redacted] will be available to provide on call fire support at [redacted].
 - Once Delta has entered the Embassy Compound and initiated the hostage release, the helos will be called in for extraction and transportation of the hostages and Delta to Manzariyeh.
 - A separate fully coordinated, concurrently executed plan will be used to free Mr. Laingen + 2 from the Foreign Ministry.
- E -- At Manzariyeh the former hostages and any wounded JTF personnel will be loaded on the C-141 which will be staffed with an emergency medical team. This aircraft will fly to the nearest US military hospital [redacted]
- E -- Other personnel (Delta, helo crews) will board the second C-141 and fly to [redacted] for further transportation to CONUS.
- A, E -- The AC and MC-130s [redacted] (Rangers) will return to [redacted] or to other airfields, as the situation requires. All MC/AC-130 flights from [redacted] and return will require air refueling [redacted]

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12 APR 1980

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

REV BY OADR

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (US Charge Laingen plus two)

Considerations

- This rescue must be coordinated with the Delta Force Assault on the US Embassy.

-- If not coordinated with the AMEMB assault, and conducted prior to the AMEMB assault, increased security at the Embassy will inevitably occur.

-- If the assault on the Foreign Ministry is conducted after the AMEMB assault, the Iranian security presence at the Foreign Ministry will undoubtedly have been reinforced.

General Plan

- Forces. Eight to ten personnel [redacted]

- Insertion Method.

[redacted]

-- Five to six others inserted via helo with Delta.

Assault

-- Conducted upon receipt of execute message from Delta Force Commander [redacted]

-- Minimum force envisioned based on current intelligence.

-- Weapons carried aboard helos with Delta.

Extraction

-- Primary. Helicopter from Delta Force's hostage recovery operation at the AMEMB makes intermediate stop enroute to DELTA pickup site.

-- Alternate. Vehicle exfiltration from Tehran to vicinity of [redacted] pickup, or exfiltration [redacted]

Current Status

Concept developed; two personnel [redacted]

[redacted] is currently conducting training to accomplish the mission.

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Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

Downloaded by

24 APR 1980

DEPLOYMENT FLOW

D-1

D-DAY

- 2 C-141 [redacted]
- w/ [redacted] Return to [redacted]
- 1 C-141 arrives [redacted]
- returns to [redacted]
- 1 C-130 [redacted]
- [redacted] Backup [redacted]
- 2 C-141 [redacted]
- 1 C-141 [redacted]
- [redacted] Backup [redacted]

- 1 C-141 [redacted]

D+1

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DDO, NMC

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24 APR 1980

B 39

EMPLOYMENT FLOW

~~D-1~~

~~D-DAY~~

- 4 MC-130 [redacted] Refuel
- 3 EC-130 [redacted] Refuel
- 8 RH-53 NIMITZ/Refuel/
Dropoff/Hideout
- 7 KC-135 [redacted]
- F-14 30 min Deck Alert/NIMITZ
- A-6 30 min Deck Alert/NIMITZ
- A-7 30 min Deck Alert/NIMITZ
- KA-6 30 min Deck Alert/NIMITZ

- 4 MC-130 [redacted] Obj M/
- 3 AC-130 [redacted] Embassy/
- 2 C-141 [redacted] Obj M/
- 4 KC-135 [redacted]
- 8 RH-53 Hideout/Embassy/
Obj M
- 2 KC-135 [redacted]
- 1 KC-135 [redacted]
- 7 KC-135 [redacted]
- 2 F-14 Orbit Northern
Persian Gulf
- 2 A-6 Orbit Northern
Persian Gulf

~~D+1~~

- 2 C-141 [redacted] to Conus
- 1 C-141 [redacted] to Conus
(Backup)

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Declassified ON: *OADR*

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24 APR 1980

CURRENT DISPOSITION OF FORCES

- 1. DELTA - In place [REDACTED] E
- 2. RANGERS - In place [REDACTED] E
- 3. MC-130 - 4 in place [REDACTED] E
3 in place [REDACTED] E
- 4. AC-130 - 4 in place [REDACTED] E
- 5. EC-130 - 3 in place [REDACTED] E
- 6. KC-135 - 11 at [REDACTED] E
- 7. RH-53 - 8 in place on NIMITZ with crews
- 8. C-141 - Various locations within MAC system
- 9. [REDACTED] - In place [REDACTED] E

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Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:
DRO NMCC

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~~TOP SECRET~~

24 APR 1980

AIR FLOW TO [REDACTED] (C) E

TYPE ACFT (u)	ONLOAD SITE (C)	DPT DATE (u)	ARR DATE (u)	LOAD (C)
C-141	[REDACTED]	23 Apr	24 Apr	Backup
C-141	[REDACTED]	23 Apr	24 Apr	Misc
C-141	[REDACTED]	24 Apr	24 Apr	Misc
C-130	[REDACTED]	24 Apr	24 Apr	Backup
C-141	[REDACTED]	24 Apr	25 Apr	Misc
C-141	[REDACTED]	25 Apr	26 Apr	MEDEVAC

ACFT TO OTHER LOCATIONS

C-141 (2)	[REDACTED]	24 Apr	24 Apr
C-141 (2)	[REDACTED]	24 Apr	24 Apr
C-141	[REDACTED]	24 Apr	24 Apr

Backup)

~~TOP SECRET~~

B42
24 APR 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LOGISTICS UPDATE

A [REDACTED] for Travel Orders (e)

- T.O.'s of JTF have [REDACTED]
Potential problem on retrograde.

A MAC Pax terminals not briefed
Players could be [REDACTED]

E Acceptance of T.O.'s would raise visibility of carriers
[REDACTED] will be provided [REDACTED] for orders

E Flares, Flare Racks (e)

These items for AC-130's [REDACTED] 40130Z Apr 80.

E Air Drop of Fuel (u)

- Received following requirement from JTF:

Prepare the following at Pope AFB for airdrop: 12 blivets
with JP-5; 4 pumps; 2 mules.

- Riggers currently moving to Pope AFB where equipment is
already rigged.
- JTF will arrange to have a C-141B on 2 hour availability.
- Riggers to go with aircraft.

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DDO, N MCC

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
E ~~(S)~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ COMMUNICATIONS

- E - Four command networks provide long haul communications with the JTF ~~TOP SECRET~~
 - Command network ALFA (chart one) provides secure communications from the Pentagon to the JTF.
 - Command network BRAVO (chart two) provides the JTF Commander a non secure satellite communications link to assault forces.
 - Command network CHARLIE (chart three) provides the JTF Commander a secure satellite communications network with all locations and forces. Not all stations operational at one time.
 - Command network DELTA (chart four) provides high frequency single side band emergency backup to command networks BRAVO and CHARLIE. All stations will be on listening silence except for emergencies.
- (u) - Various other line of sight radio networks have been designated for use by aircraft and assault force operations.
- Base support communications have been established which provides:
 - AUTODIN message traffic, AUTOSEVOCOM Secure Voice, 100 line switchboard, intrabase radio (handheld).
 - Navigational aids/flight facilities.
 - Weather communications/forecasting facilities.

SECURE VOICE CONNECTIVITY

- Chart five is CJCS Secure Voice connectivity for JTF operations.

~~TOP SECRET~~




— DCS
--- UHF SATCOM

~~TOP SECRET~~

26 APR 1968

FLTSAT (IO)
(CHNS)




--- UHF SATCOM

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FLTSAT (10)

~~C, E~~



FOL [redacted]

E

FOL [redacted]

E

311 MAIN [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

311 PALT [redacted]

E

USS NIMITZ

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ R's

OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS AS OF 23 APR 80


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SECURE VOICE CONNECTIVITY

APR 23 1980



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~~TOP SECRET~~

24 April 1980

DAILY EVENTS

(ALL TIMES ZULU)

- 0124 C141 departs [REDACTED] (engines)
- 0130 C141 arrives [REDACTED] (flares/backup)
- 0345 C141 departs [REDACTED]
- 0545 C141 departs [REDACTED] (Delta)
- 0615 C141 departs [REDACTED] (Delta)
- 0615 C130 departs [REDACTED] (Backup)
- 0710 C141 arrives [REDACTED] (engines)
- 0830 C141 recovers [REDACTED]
- 0900 C141 departs [REDACTED]
- 0925 C141 departs [REDACTED]
- 1045 C141 arrives [REDACTED] (Delta)
- 1115 C141 arrives [REDACTED] (Delta)
- 1300 C141 departs [REDACTED]
- 1300 C130 arrives [REDACTED] (Backup)
- 1315 C141 departs [REDACTED] (supplies)
- 1330 C141 departs [REDACTED]
- 1400 C141 departs [REDACTED]
- 1405 MC130 departs [REDACTED] (Delta)
- 1410 C141 recovers [REDACTED]
- 1506 8 RH-53 depart NIMITZ
- 1510 MC130 departs [REDACTED] (Delta)
- 1511 EC130 departs [REDACTED] (Fuel)
- 1517 MC130 departs [REDACTED] (Delta)
- 1518 EC130 departs [REDACTED] (Fuel)
- 1519 EC130 departs [REDACTED] (Fuel)
- 1600 C141 departs [REDACTED]
- 1600 3 KC135 depart [REDACTED]
- 1610 C141 arrives [REDACTED]
- 1745 3 KC135 depart [REDACTED]
- 1800 C141 departs [REDACTED]
- 1800 2 C141 recover [REDACTED] (one w/supplies)
- 1810 MC130 arrives Refuel Site
- 1830 C141 recovers [REDACTED]
- 1845 KC135 departs [REDACTED]
- 1910 MC130 arrives Refuel Site
- 1917 MC130 arrives Refuel Site
- 1920 EC130 arrives Refuel Site
- 1923 EC130 arrives Refuel Site
- 1924 MC130 departs Refuel Site
- 1925 MC130 departs Refuel Site
- 1930 C141 arrives [REDACTED]
- 1930 EC130 arrives Refuel Site

E, H

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DDO, N MLC

(S)

- 1930 8 RH-53 arrive Refuel Site
- 1945 KC135 recovers [REDACTED]
- 2010 8 RH-53 depart Refuel Site
- 2015 C141 depart [REDACTED]
- 2020 MC130 departs Refuel Site
- 2022 EC130 departs Refuel Site
- 2024 EC130 departs Refuel Site
- 2026 EC130 departs Refuel Site
- 2110 C141 arrives [REDACTED]
- 2145 KC135 recovers [REDACTED]
- 2220 8 RH-53 arrive [REDACTED]
- 2250 8 RH-53 depart [REDACTED]
- 2300 KC135 recovers [REDACTED]
- 2315 8 RH-53 arrive Hideout
- 2325 MC130 recovers [REDACTED]
- 2326 MC130 recovers [REDACTED]
- 0026 MC130 recovers [REDACTED]
- 0027 EC130 recovers [REDACTED]
- 0028 EC130 recovers [REDACTED]
- 0029 EC130 recovers [REDACTED]
- 0345 KC135 recovers [REDACTED]
- 0400 KC135 recovers [REDACTED]
- 0445 2 KC135 recover [REDACTED]

E,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

B 46

TIME CONVERSIONS

A, E

A, E

TODAY

EST	EDT	ZULU	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	TEHRAN	[REDACTED]
0100	0200	0600	0800	1000	1030	1100
0200	0300	0700	0900	1100	1130	1200
0300	0400	0800	1000	1200	1230	1300
0400	0500	0900	1100	1300	1330	1400
0500	0600	1000	1200	1400	1430	1500
0600	0700	1100	1300	1500	1530	1600
0700	0800	1200	1400	1600	1630	1700
0800	0900	1300	1500	1700	1730	1800
0900	1000	1400	1600	1800	1830	1900
1000	1100	1500	1700	1900	1930	2000
1100	1200	1600	1800	2000	2030	2100
1200	1300	1700	1900	2100	2130	2200
1300	1400	1800	2000	2200	2230	2300
1400	1500	1900	2100	2300	2330	2400
1500	1600	2000	2200	2400	0030	0100
1600	1700	2100	2300	0100	0130	0200
1700	1800	2200	2400	0200	0230	0300
1800	1900	2300	0100	0300	0330	0400
1900	2000	2400	0200	0400	0430	0500
2000	2100	0100	0300	0500	0530	0600
2100	2200	0200	0400	0600	0630	0700
2200	2300	0300	0500	0700	0730	0800
2300	2400	0400	0600	0800	0830	0900
2400	0100	0500	0700	0900	0930	1000

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 DDO, NMEC
 Declassify on: OADR

Tomorrow
 Classified By: ~~DTSSA~~
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01A17

~~TOP SECRET~~
AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT

D
1100

	21			22			23			24			25		
	IN/OUT/RON			IN/OUT/RON			IN/OUT/RON			IN/OUT/RON			IN/OUT/RON		
KC-135	3	2	6	2	0	8	3	0	11	0	0	11	0	0	11
MC-130	1	0	2	1	1	2	1	0	3	0	0	3	1	0	4
EC-130	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AC-130	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	4
C-141	5	5	0	2	2	0	5	4	1	3	4	0	0	0	0
C-130	0	1	0	2	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	2	0	2	0
RON TOTAL	6 KC-135			8 KC-135			11 KC-135			11 KC-135			11 KC-135		
	2 MC-130			2 MC-130			3 MC-130			3 MC-130			4 MC-130		
	3 EC-130			2 AC-130			4 AC-130			4 AC-130			4 AC-130		
				2 C-130			1 C-141			2 C-130					
MC-130	0	0	3	1	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	1	3
EC-130	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	3
C-141	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
C-130	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RON TOTAL	3 MC-130			4 MC-130			4 MC-130			4 MC-130			3 MC-130		
				3 EC-130			3 EC-130			3 EC-130			3 EC-130		
KC-135	1	0	5	0	1	4	2	0	6	0	0	6	0	0	6
MC-130	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RON TOTAL	5 KC-135			4 KC-135			6 KC-135			6 KC-135			6 KC-135		

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1235
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B* 54

OT
MSG 284
DTG 201100Z APR 83
FM JCS/RC-J2
TO SITE ALPHA/J2
INFO [SFOD/32
1 SOW/A2]

~~TOP SECRET~~ ✓

SUBJECT: CRY WOLF LIST

SITE ALPHA/J2 PASS TO COMJTF

(1) THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS COPY OF MEMO PROVIDED TO CJCS ON 20 APRIL 83 PER COMJTF DIRECTION.

(2) THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ACTIVITY THAT MAY BE REPORTED DURING THE COURSE OF THE RICE BOWL OPERATION THAT IF TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT COULD UNDUE CONCERN AND POSSIELY A PRECIPITOUS DECISION.

- A. DETECTION OF AN IRANIAN C130 OR P3 ON A MARITIME SURVEILLANCE MISSION OVER THE PERSIAN GULF. THE IRANIANS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING MISSIONS OF THIS TYPE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS ON A ROUTINE BASIS.
- B. DETECTION OF AN IRANIAN NAVAL UNIT IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THE IRANIANS HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN A NAVAL PATROL IN THE STRAITS FOR MORE THAN TWO MONTHS, AND MORE RECENTLY HAVE INCREASED THEIR PATROLLING OF THE NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF.

C

D

S

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E8 12255

EXPIRES ON 21 JUN 92

PREPARED BY DDO/VMC

REL OWNER JC

BY OADR

DATE FROM Multiple Same

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~~SECRET~~

B#

C, D [

[REDACTED]

C

[REDACTED]

C

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

C

[REDACTED]

C

[REDACTED]

(3) CJCS HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT THEIR MAY BE A NEED TO ADD TO LIST AS TIME GOES BY WILL PROVIDE INFO COMJTF SIMULTANEOUSLY//

G

REVW 20 APR 10

NNNN

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

20 April 1980

B#53

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Cry Wolf List

The following is a list of activity that may be reported during the course of the RICE BOWL Operation that if taken out of context could cause undue concern and possibly a precipitous decision.

a. Detection of an Iranian C130 or P3 on a maritime surveillance mission over the Persian Gulf. The Iranians have been conducting missions of this type for several months on a routine basis.

b. Detection of an Iranian naval unit in the Straits of Hormuz. The Iranians have been attempting to maintain a naval patrol in the straits for more than two months, and more recently have increased their patrolling of the Northern Persian Gulf.

C
C
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D,C
[Large redacted area]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EP-42356

CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92

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REMOVED FROM Multiple Sources

[Signature]
JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

Classified By *JCS*
Declassified ON *01*

Page 1 of 6

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

[REDACTED]

B# 57 D

copy
OK

[REDACTED]

PRICE BOOK

TO: [REDACTED]

TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE AT 230710Z APRIL CARRIED THE FOLLOWING HEADLINE WITHOUT ELAPORATION:
'A CIA PLAN TO KIDNAP THE U.S. POSTAGES IN TEHRAN' HAS BEEN PIVEALED.

[REDACTED]

~~Classified By DJE/A 18 October 1985
Declassified ON: OADR~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 ORG. EX. NUMBER TO Secret
REVISED ON OADR
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~~Classified By JES
Declassified ON: OADR~~

EXEMPT

NNNN

[REDACTED]

B# 58

FM: JCS/RC-J2

TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: TEHRAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE REPORTING

REFERENCE: OUR MSG 201332z APR 80

(u)

1. The credibility of reporting from Tehran International Service has proved to be particularly low in the past. The report of today's date, concerning a "CIA plan to kidnap the US hostages," must be viewed with considerable skepticism.
2. For example, in item 10 of reference, Tehran International Service reported "without elaboration" that the U.S. was in the process of mining Iran's southern border waters.
3. Without more complete details and corroboration, all such reports from Tehran International Service should be view with a very high degree of skepticism, **AND CONSIDERED A TOOL OF IRANIAN PROPAGANDA.**
4. Full text of headlines regarding the hostages, which was broadcast at 0710Z on 23 April in Arabic, reads: "Iran will use Soviet territories for its foreign trade if United States closes our waterways; There are great possibilities that pumping of natural gas to Soviet Union will resume;" and "A CIA plan to kidnap the U.S. hostages in TEHRAN has been revealed."

Declassified by:
DDO, NMCC

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 12356

COMPLETED ON 21 JUN 92

DERIVATIVE OR BY DDD N.M.C.

ORL NUMBER 12 _____

REV BY OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Source

SUBJECT: Fighter Operations

TIMEFRAME: ~~Nov 1979~~ - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (S) DIA was the primary source of Air Order of Battle and fighter operations information. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and ^{DIA} [REDACTED] provided photographic interpretation.

2. (U) AF Plans and Programs, Fighter Operations, Air Force Logistics and AF Assessments (Checkmate) provided back-up information to fighter systems employed in Iran.

3. (U) J-2 obtained systems parameters on airframes and munitions used in Iran. These parameters were valuable in establishing threat areas, reaction times and probable weapons loads.

[REDACTED]

(ISOW, AWACS, 101st) as well as any operations analysis made by DIA or JTF.

COMMENTS:

[REDACTED]

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (X) Establish contact with primary Air Force analysis and operational offices for systems used in Iran.

A, G

POINTS OF CONTACT:

[REDACTED]	SAGF	45201
[REDACTED]	SAGR	51789
[REDACTED]	PAI	51161
[REDACTED]	XOOXT	50397
[REDACTED]	INXX	57267
[REDACTED]	NAV OPS TECH TRNSFR	20350
[REDACTED]	Tankers (Iran)	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ ATTACHMENTS:

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B 61

Item Number: _____

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Civil Air Operations

TIMEFRAME: ~~NOV 1979~~ December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. [REDACTED]

2. (U) Mehrabad Civil Air procedures follow internationally recognized patterns, as outlined in the JEPPESON Manual. (Flight publication for civil air)

COMMENTS:

1. (U) The civilian terminal areas ^{were} was crowded with foreign flag aircraft prior to the onset of the war. International flag flights during the war dropped to zero within a few days of initiation of hostilities. However, Iran Air continued to fly both internationally and domestically but at a reduced rate.

2. (U) Stringent inspection procedures were instituted at Mehrabad for all international passengers (pre-war).

3. (U) International passenger aircraft were not radar-controlled after passing the borders, but flew navaid to navaid.

GCA/Area approach radars at Mehrabad were not employed on civilian aircraft (prewar).

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CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDO, NMCC
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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (U) J-2 acquire appropriate section of JEPPSON Manual.
2. (C) J-2 continue tracking civilian [REDACTED]

J-2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: [REDACTED]

POINTS OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

45261

ATTACHMENTS:

1. CIVIL FLIGHT ACTIVITY [REDACTED]



SUBJ: JTF 79 CE01 (TS)

1. (U) ITEM #1 INDEX
INDEX

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

CALL SIGNS/IDENTIFIERS

SUFFIXES

RADIO NETS AND FREQUENCIES/NAVAIDS

CODE WORDS

TELEPHONE LISTING

ITEM NO.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. (TS) ITEM #2 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. (TS) THIS CE01 IS EFFECTIVE 24/0001Z APR 80

B. (TS) PRIOR TO D-1 ALL COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE BY SECURE MEANS EXCEPT ROUTINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND DECEPTION TRAFFIC.

C. (TS) FROM D-1 UNTIL COMPLETION OF OPERATION, LISTENING SILENCE IS IMPOSED ON ALL ELEMENTS. THIS SILENCE MAY BE BROKEN ONLY UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

(1) REPORTING AS LISTED IN ITEM #6 REQUIRED REPORTS.

(2) AS REQUIRED USING SECURED WSC-3 AND PT-25 RADIOS.

(3) TO TRANSMIT EMERGENCY/DISTRESS TRAFFIC.

(4) TO TRANSMIT COMMAND AND CONTROL/COORDINATION TRAFFIC DURING THE ASSAULT AND EXTRACTION PHASE.

(5) ABSOLUTELY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL AIR TO AIR TRAFFIC ENROUTE (E.G. BETWEEN TANKERS AND MC-130S) USING KY 28 SECURED UHF.

D. (TS) ALL HF, VHF/FM VHF/AM, AND UHF SYSTEMS WILL BE NON-SECURE FROM D-1 (LAUNCH OF DELTA AND HELO FORCES) UNTIL END OF OPERATION, EXCEPT FOR AIRCRAFT UHF RADIOS, WHICH WILL BE KY 28 SECURED WHEN OUTSIDE THE TEHERAN/MANZARIYEH AREA. UHF GUARD CHANNEL (243.00 MHZ) WILL BE MONITORED AT ALL TIMES.

E. (TS) COMSEC MATERIAL TO BE USED.

(1) ORESTES (KW-7) FOR WSC-3 TTY NETS USKAK- [REDACTED]

(2) PARKHILL (KY 65/75) USKAT - [REDACTED]

(3) NESTOR (KY 28/38) USKAK [REDACTED]

(4) [REDACTED]

(5) CRYPTO KEY WILL BE DAY 24. EVERYONE WILL STAY ON THE SAME KEY UNTIL OPERATION TERMINATION.

F. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES.

(1) ALL TRANSMISSIONS WILL BE MADE IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER WITH TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN REPETITIONS STRICTLY OBSERVED.

(A) ALL RADIOS - TRANSMIT BY VOICE. WAIT FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. IF NO RESPONSE HEARD WITHIN 30 SECONDS REPEAT TRANSMISSION AND WAIT 30 SECONDS. ON THIRD TRANSMISSION REQUEST ANY STATION HEARING CALL TO RELAY TO ADDRESSEE.

(B) ON HF COMMAND NET - IF THERE IS STILL NO CONTACT AFTER REQUEST FOR RELAY BY ANY STATION IS MADE, SEND MESSAGE IN INTERNATIONAL MORSE CODE.

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14 PAGES

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CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

BEEL IS DOWN TO Secret

REVISED ON OADR

REVIEWED BY Multiple Sources

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

(2) TELETYPE TRANSMISSION ON THE WSC-3 UHF TACSAT JTF NET (COMMAND NET CHARLIE) IS NOT PERMITTED AFTER LAUNCH OF FORCES SO THAT THE NET REMAINS CLEAR FOR VOICE TRANSMISSIONS.

G. ~~USE~~ PRIMARY PARKHILL PREAMBLE WILL BE "NON-HF", ALTERNATE PREAMBLE IS "HF" POSITION. PARKHILL OPERATORS MUST BE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE EACH MODE AND MUST "MATE" WITH THE TRANSMITTING STATION.

3. (TS) ITEM #3 CALL SIGNS/IDENTIFIERS
USER-

AC-130 SPECTRE

C-141

CCT-DESERT LAND

CCT-MANZARIYEH

CJCS

COMJTF

CORAL SEA

CORAL SEA F4N

F4N

A6E

KA6D

CTF-70

DELTA RECEPTION PARTY

DEPCOMJTF

DEPCOMJTF FIXED WING OPS

DEPCOMJTF HELO OPS

DESERT LAND RANGER ELEMENT

C-141 BASE

EC-130

JCS

JTF-ALTERNATE

JTF-MAIN

KC-135

MEDEVAC AIRCRAFT

MC-130 TALON

NIMITZ

NIMITZ F-14

F-14

A6E

KA6D

EA6B

EA6B

PRESIDENT

RANGERS - MANZARIYEH

RH-53

(C) VOICE


A, B

(C) CW

A, B

TOP SECRET

RH-53 (MFA)
SECDEF
SFOD-DELTA
SFOD-ALPHA



4 (S) (TS) ITEM #4 SUFFIXES

- CDR
- DEP CDR/XO
- J1/S1
- J2//S2
- J3/S3
- J4/S4
- J6/CE OFF
- CH OF STAFF
- ACFT #1
- ACFT #2
- ACFT #3
- ACFT #4
- ACFT #5
- ACFT #6
- ACFT #7
- ACFT #8



5 (U) (TS) ITEM #5 RADIO NETS AND FREQUENCIES/NAVAIDS.

- A. (TS) COMMAND NET ALFA. (JTF MAIN NCS) WSC-3
PARKHILL SECURED VOICE OR TTY, 75 BAND, KW-7 SECURED
 - (1) OPERATING STATIONS: JCS, JTF-MAIN, JTF-ALTERNATE.
 - (2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: ATLANTIC OCEAN AFSAT.
 - (3) FREQUENCY: UPLINK XMT 295.075 DOWN LINK REC 261.475
- B. (TS) COMMAND NET BRAVO, PSC-1 NON SECURE VOICE (JTF MAIN NCS)
 - (1) OPERATING STATIONS: JTF, DELTA, HELOS, RANGERS (MANZARIYEH).
 - (2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: INDIAN OCEAN FLEETSAT II, CHANNEL 5
 - (3) FREQUENCY: UPLINK XMT 298.150 DOWN LINK REC 257.150.
- C. (TS) COMMAND NET CHARLIE, WSC-3/PT-25 UHF TACSAT JTF NET.
(JTF MAIN NCS).
PARKHILL SECURED VOICE OR TTY, 75 BAND, KW-7 SECURED
 - (1) OPERATING STATIONS: JTF-MAIN, JTF-ALTERNATE [REDACTED] NIMITZ,
[REDACTED] AC-130, C-141, HELOS, MC-130S, DELTA, RANGERS, [REDACTED] EC-130
DELTA RECEPTION PARTY, [REDACTED]
 - (2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: INDIAN OCEAN FLEETSAT II, CHANNEL 9
 - (3) FREQUENCY: UPLINK XMT 309.450 DOWNLINK REC 268.450
- D. (TS) COMMAND NET DELTA, HF SSB; UPPER, VOICE OR CODE
NON-SECURE. (JTF MAIN NCS)
 - (1) OPERATING STATIONS: JTF-MAIN, JTF-ALTERNATE, DELTA,
HELOS, SPECTRE, TALONS, NIMITZ, MANZARIYEH RANGERS, EC-130S,
C-141S, TANKERS.

E
A

(2) FREQUENCIES DAY (0600Z-1759Z) 17967 KHZ
NIGHT (1800Z-0559Z) 8855 KHZ

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(A) THIS NET IS A SECONDARY BACK-UP TO THE PSC-1 AND PT-25 SATCOM NETS AND STATIONS WILL BE ON LISTENING SILENCE EXCEPT WHEN AN EMERGENCY DICTATES TRANSMISSION AS DETERMINED BY THE COMMANDER MAKING SUCH TRANSMISSION.

(B) THIS NET WILL BE USED AS REQUIRED WHEN DELTA EXECUTES THE ASSAULT.

(C) SERVES AS EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS NET FOR ALL FORCE ELEMENTS.

(E. (TS) EXTRACTION IN FLIGHT NET, UHF, NON SECURE, EXCEPT AS STATED BELOW (DELTA NCS)

4 (1) OPERATING STATIONS: DELTA, HELOS, DELTA RECEPTION PARTY

(2) FREQUENCY: 305.7 MHZ PRIMARY. SEE PARA 5.1 FOR SECONDARY. 321.6 MHZ WILL BE SECONDARY ONLY FOR RECEPTION PARTY/HELO LINK UP.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(A) THIS NET WILL BE USED FOR GROUND TO AIR/AIR TO GROUND COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DELTA, HELOS AND DELTA RECEPTION PARTY.

(B) THIS NET WILL ALSO BE USED FOR AIR TO AIR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HELOS. HELOS WILL SECURE THIS NET WITH KY-28 SECURE DEVICE FROM TIME OF DEPARTURE UNTIL ARRIVAL AT THE HIDE SITE. AFTER ARRIVAL AT THE HIDE SITE THE NET WILL BE NON-SECURE UNTIL COMPLETION OF THE OPERATIONS, SO AS TO ALLOW COMMUNICATION WITH GROUND ELEMENTS WHICH DO NOT HAVE SECURE DEVICES.

(U) F. (TS) DELTA COMMAND NET, VHF-FM, NON-SECURE (DELTA NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: DELTA, SPECTRE IN SUPPORT OF DELTA AND NAVY TACAIR

(2) FREQUENCY: 341.4 MHZ PRIMARY. 240.5 MHZ SECONDARY.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. THIS NET IS PRIMARILY FOR USE OF DELTA ELEMENTS

B. THIS NET IS BACK-UP TO THE DELTA UHF COMMAND NET FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DELTA AND HELOS

C. THIS NET IS ALSO BACK-UP TO THE DELTA FIRE SUPPORT NET FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DELTA AND SPECTRE IN SUPPORT OF DELTA.

(U) G. (TS) DELTA FIRE SUPPORT NET, UHF, NON-SECURE (DELTA NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: DELTA, SPECTRE IN SUPPORT OF DELTA AND NAVY TACAIR

(2) FREQUENCY: 341.4 MHZ PRIMARY. 240.5 MHZ SECONDARY.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS: THIS NET IS USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DELTA, THE SPECTRE SUPPORTING DELTA AND ANY NAVAL TACTICAL AIR WHICH MAY BE CALLED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT.

(U) H. (TS) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL NET, UHF, NON-SECURE EXCEPT AS STATED BELOW (CCT NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: CCT ATC ELEMENT AT DESERT LAND CCT ATC ELEMENT AT MANARIYEH, TALONS, SPECTRE, HELOS, TANKERS,

C-141S, EC 130S AND NAVY TACAIR.

(2) FREQUENCY: 321.6 MHZ PRIMARY. SEE PARA 5.1 FOR SECONDARY.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(a) THIS NET IS USED FOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AT DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH. ALL AIRCRAFT WILL BE ON THIS FREQUENCY WHEN IN THE DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH AREAS. HELOS WILL SWITCH FROM THE DELTA UHF COMMAND NET FREQUENCY TO THIS FREQUENCY AFTER DEPARTURE FROM THE EMBASSY COMPLEX.

(b) THIS FREQUENCY IS ALSO USED FOR AIR TO AIR COMMUNICATIONS ENROUTE BETWEEN AND AMONG TALONS, TANKERS, SPECTRES, EC 130S AND C-141S. SUCH USE WILL BE ONLY THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL AND WILL BE KY-28 SECURED. SWITCH TO NON-SECURE WHEN WITHIN 100 MILES OF MANZARIYEH TO ALLOW COMMUNICATIONS WITH GROUND ELEMENTS.

(c) THIS FREQUENCY WILL ALSO BE USED FOR AIR TO AIR COMMUNICATION DURING AIR REFUELING OF NAVY TAC AIR.

(u) I. (TS) HELO COMMAND/AIR TRAFFIC GROUND CONTROL NET, VHF-AM, NON-SECURE (CCT NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: CCT ATC ELEMENTS AT DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH TALONS, SPECTRES, HELOS, C-141S, EC 130S

(2) FREQUENCY: 121.65 MHZ

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. THIS NET IS USED FOR ACT GROUND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AT DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH. ALL AIRCRAFT WILL BE IN THIS NET WHEN IN THE DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH AREAS.

B. THIS NET IS ALSO THE ALTERNATE UHF ATC NET.

C. THIS NET MAY ALSO BE USED AS BACK-UP AIR TO AIR NET BETWEEN AND AMONG AIRCRAFT WHILE EN-ROUTE. HOWEVER, AIR TO AIR COMMUNICATIONS MUST BE STRICTLY MINIMIZED WHEN IN THE DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH AREAS TO PRECLUDE INTERFERENCE WITH ATC GROUND CONTROL OPERATIONS. SINCE THIS NET IS NONSECURE ONLY EMERGENCY TRAFFIC MAY BE PASSED ENROUTE WHEN OUTSIDE THE TEHRAN/MANZARIYEH AREA.

J. (u) (TS) RANGER FIRE SUPPORT NET, UHF, NONSECURE (RANGERS NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: MANZARIYEH RANGERS, SPECTRE IN SUPPORT OF RANGERS AND ANY NAVAL TACTICAL AIR WHICH MAY BE CALLED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT.

(2) FREQUENCY: 348.4 MHZ PRIMARY, 240.5 SECONDARY.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS: THIS NET IS USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE MANZARIYEH RANGERS AND THE SUPPORTING SPECTRE.

K. (TS) RANGER INTERNAL NETS:

FM COMMAND NET: 32.10 MHZ

DACO FM NET: 46.50 MHZ

FIRE SUPPORT FM NET: 38.20 MHZ

THESE ARE INTERNAL RANGER NETS. FRIENDLY STATIONS MAY ENTER THE NETS IN EMERGENCIES WHEN PRIMARY COMMUNICATIONS FAIL.

L. (TS) ALFA/HELO UHF NET, UHF-AM NONSECURE

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: [REDACTED] (NCS), HELOS

(2) FREQUENCY: 361.7 MHZ

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS: THIS NET WILL BE USED BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND DESIGNATED HELOS FOR EXTRACTION.

M. (U) (TS) AIR REFUELING NET, UHF-AM, SECURE

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: TALONS, SPECTRE, EC-130, C-141, TANKERS, NAVAL TAC AIR.

(2) FREQUENCY: 321.6 MHZ

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTION:

(A) THIS NET WILL BE USED DURING IN-FLIGHT REFUELING OPERATIONS BETWEEN TANKERS, C-130 TYPE AIRCRAFT AND C-141 AS REQUIRED.

(B) THIS NET WILL ALSO BE USED TO SUPPORT NAVAL TACTICAL AIR IN-FLIGHT REFUELING IF NECESSARY.

(4) AIR REFUELING INFORMATION:

SUPPORT AIRCRAFT	AIR-TO-AIR TACAN (RCVR/TNKR)	BEACON
NAVY-GULF OF OMAN AND ARABIAN SEA	30/93	2-1-1
NAVY-PERSIAN GULF EC-130-GULF OF OMAN AND ARABIAN SEA	31/94	1-1-3
MC-130	32/95	2-1-3
AC-130 (U)	33/96	2-1-2
	29/92	2-2-1

N. (TS) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) ALL ELEMENTS MUST BE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE ABOVE NETS. ALTERNATE NETS MAY BE ENTERED BY FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE EVENT PRIMARY COMMUNICATIONS FAIL DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE.

(2) ALL ELEMENTS MUST GUARD ALL NETS IN WHICH THEY ARE LISTED AS OPERATING STATIONS.

O. (TS) NAVAIDS:

(1) TRN 41 TACAN AT DESERT LAND: CHAN 99 IDENT PETE

(2) TRN 41 TACAN AT MANZARIYEH: CHAN 99 IDENT FRED

(3) GAR-1 BEACON - CODE 1 (ALL SWITCHES IN UP POSITION)

(4) ANY RADIO MAY BE USED AS A NAVAID BY SETTING ON FREQUENCIES AS LISTED FOR NETS ABOVE.

NAVAID. ON FREQUENCY 243.00 MHZ IT CAN BE USED IN THE BEACON, VOICE AND CW MODE. FREQUENCY 282.8 MHZ IT CAN BE USED IN THE VOICE MODE ONLY.

6 (U) (TS) CODE WORDS

A (U) (TS) SCHEDULED EVENTS TO BE REPORTED TO JTF MAIN

REQUIRED REPORTS	CODE WORD	REPORTED BY/VIA
(1) 7 RH-53S LAUNCHED FROM CARRIER	[REDACTED]	CARRIER/WSC-3 SECURE
(2) AFSOB REPORTS ALL AIRCRAFT DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS AT [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	LOCAL SECURE LANDLINE
(3) [REDACTED] REPORTS ALL AIRCRAFT ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES	[REDACTED]	WSC-3 SECURE
(4) MC 130 LAND AT DESERT LAND	[REDACTED]	MC 130/WSC-3 SECURE
(5) DELTA REPORT ALL	[REDACTED]	DELTA/PT 25 SECURE

E

ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES
AT DESERT LAND VIA PT-25
PARKHILL SECURED. SHOULD
RADIO NOT WORK IN THE
SECURE MODE, DO NOT
TRANSMIT.

(6) HELOS LANDED HLZ.SITE SECURE [REDACTED]

HELOS/PT-25 OR
WSC-3 SECURE
DELTA/PT-25
SECURE OR PSC-1
MC130/WSC-3
SECURE
DELTA/PT25/
PSC-1/HF/UHF
DELTA/" " "

(7) DELTA CONFIRMS "H" HOUR
(ASSAULT TIME) [REDACTED]

(8) ALL MANZARIYEH BOUND
MC-130S REFUELED [REDACTED]

(9) DELTA CALLS HELOS FOR
EXTRACTION [REDACTED]

(10) DELTA ATTACKS EMBASSY [REDACTED]

NOTE: THE CODEWORD [REDACTED] WILL BE RETRANSMITTED BY JTF ON
THE SATELLITE NETS AND THE JTF HF COMMAND NET TO INSURE ALL
UNITS ARE AWARE OF THIS EVENT.

(11) RANGERS ARRIVE [REDACTED]

RGR/PT-25 OR
WSC-3 SECURE
" " "

MANZARIYEH
(12) MANZARIYEH SECURE [REDACTED]

(13) RANGERS REPORT ALL AIRCRAFT ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES AT MANZARIYEH
VIA PARKHILL SECURED WSC-3 IN MC130 OR PARKHILL SECURED PT-25,
SHOULD RADIO NOT WORK IN THE SECURE MODE, DO NOT TRANSMIT.

(14) AIRCRAFT CLEARING
IRANIAN AIRSPACE [REDACTED]

ALL AIRCRAFT WSC-3
SECURE OR HF

(15) THE C141 EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT PROVIDE A BRIEF AFTER ACTION
REPORT (I.E. KIA, WIA, NR HOSTAGES RESCUED AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT
INFO) VIA PARKHILL SECURED WSC-3. SHOULD RADIO NOT WORK IN THE
SECURE MODE, DO NOT TRANSMIT.

(16) AIRCRAFT ARRIVING AT RECOVERY. EVERGLADE
SITE [REDACTED]

ALL ACFT/SATCOM
[REDACTED]
WSC-3 SECURE

B. (TS) BREVITY CODES

(1) LOCATIONS

- AIR REFUEL CONTROL POINT
- ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE
- AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE
- ANARAK
- ARDALAN ST
- BANDAR ABBAS
- CHANCERY BUILDING
- COMMISSARY BUILDING
- CONSULATE BUILDING
- COTTAGES (A THRU D SUFFIX)
- DASHAN-TAPPEH A/F
- DCM RESIDENCE
- DELTA SAFEHAVEN
- DESERT LAND

[REDACTED] C-141 BASE

CODEWORD

[REDACTED]

A, E

EMBASSY
ESFAHAN (KHEYAMI). A/F
FISCHERABAD QM DEPOT.
GHALE MAGHRI /F
HELO HIDE SITE

[REDACTED]

IRAN
JASK

JHAHROK ASF
KAHRIZAH AIRSTRIP
KARAZ
KARAZ AIRFIELD
MANZARIYEH

[REDACTED]

MEHRABAD AIRPORT
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)
NAIN MILITARY
NAM JU ST

[REDACTED]

NIMITZ
OLD GUARD QUARTERS
PRACTICE FIELD
PRIMARY LANDING ZONE
QUOM
ROOSEVELT BLVD

[REDACTED]

SEMNAH NEW AIRFIELD
SHIRAZ
STADIUM
TABRIZ
TAKHT-E-JAMSHID ST
TEHRAN

[REDACTED]

VAHDATI A/F

[REDACTED]

(2) AGENCIES:

AC-130 SPECTRE
C-141
CCT-DESERT LAND
CCT-MANZARIYEH

[REDACTED]

CJCS
COMJTF
CORAL SEA
CTF-70
DELTA RECEPTION PARTY
DEPCOMJTF

[REDACTED] G-141 BASE

EC-130
ENEMY
HOSTAGES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

C
A, E

E

JCS
JTF-ALTERNATE
JTF-MAIN
KC-135 TANKERS

E

MEDEVAC AIRCRAFT
MC-130 TALON
NIMITZ

C

PRESIDENT
RANGERS - MANZARIYEH
RH-53
RH-53 (MFA)
SECDEF
SFOD-DELTA

A

TAC AIR
UNKNOWNNS

(3) ACTIVITIES

- AIR ATTACK
- ABORT MISSION/NO GO
- AZIMUTH
- COMMUNICATIONS
- COMPLETE
- COORDINATES
- CRASHED
- DEPART
- DIVERT
- E AND E
- EAST
- EMERGENCY EXTRACTION LZ
- EMERGENCY FUEL
- EXECUTE/GO
- FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
- FREQUENCY CHANGE
- GO TO
- GROUND FIRE (AAA)
- KIA
- KILOMETER
- LANDING
- LAUNCH
- LZ
- MISSING
- NORTH
- OVERHEAD
- POSITION
- RADIO CONTACT
- REFUELING
- REQUEST NAVY FIGHTERS

[REDACTED]

SECRET

A

RETURN TO
SAM
SAR
SATCOM
SECURE
SOUTH
TAKING FIRE (SMALL ARMS)
TOOK OFF
WEATHER
WEST
WIA

NOTE: REPORT DISTRESS SITUATIONS/DEVIATIONS FROM PLAN BY
BREAKING LISTENING SILENCE IN BREVITY CODES, IF SITUATION ALLOWS,
OTHERWISE TRANSMIT CLEAR TEXT.

EXAMPLE: ONE MC-130 CRASHED 1100Z REPORT, "ONE
AT 1100Z."

(4) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL BREVITY CODES

ACTIVITY	CODE WORD
GO AROUND	
LAND	
TAKE OFF	
EXECUTE 360	
ORBIT	
TAXI OFF RUNWAY ASAP	
HOLD	
DO NOT LAND	
TURN RIGHT	
TURN LEFT	

C. ~~(TS)~~ DECODE SECTION

CODE WORD

MEANING

RANGERS ARRIVE MANZARIYEH

ALL MANZARIYEH BOUND MC-130S REFUELED

AIRCRAFT CLEARING IRANIAN AIRSPACE

DO NOT LAND

TAXI OFF RUNWAY ASAP

SECDEF

HELOS LANDED AT HLZ. SITE SECURE.

RH-53

RH-53 (MAF SUPPORT)

OVERHEAD

DELTA CONFIRMS "H" HOUR (ASSAULT TIME)

130 LANDS AT DESERT LAND

SATCOM

NIMITZ EA6B

TAKE OFF

7 RH-53S LAUNCHED FROM CARRIER

KAHRIZAH AIRSTRIP
REQUEST NAVY FIGHTERS
MC-130 TALONS
DELTA ATTACKS EMBASSY
MANZARIYEH SECURE
DELTA CALLS HELOS FOR EXTRACTION

MEDEVAC

IRAN
TEHERAN
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)
MANZARIYEH
ORBIT
AIRCRAFT ARRIVING AT RECOVERY SITE

NIMITZ F-14
HELO HIDE SITE
DELTA SAFE HAVEN
EMBASSY
AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE
DCM RESIDENCE
COMJTF
CHANCERY BUILDING
L2
FREQUENCY CHANGE
CONSULATE BUILDING
COMMISSARY BUILDING
COTTAGES (A THRU D SUFFIX)
OLD GUARD QUARTERS
ROOSEVELT BLVD
TAKHT-E-JAMSHID
ARDALAN ST
NAM JU ST
PRESIDENT
FISHERABAD QM DEPOT
STADIUM
PRACTICE FIELD

SEM NAN NEW A/F
ANARAK
AC-130 SPECTRE
ESFAHAN (KHETAMI) A/F
NAIN MILITARY
BANDAR ABBAS
SHIRAZ

A, E

~~TOP SECRET~~

QUOM
CORAL SEA
DASHAN-TAPPEH A/F
GHALE MAGHRI A/F
MEHRABAD A/F
JASK
KARAZ
TABRIZ
VAHDATI A/F
C-141
JHAHROKI A/F
PRIMARY LANDING ZONE
ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE

UNKNOWNNS
HOSTAGES
TAC AIR
ENEMY
KIA
WIA
AIR ATTACK
HOLD
MISSING
GROUND FIRE (AAA)
ABORT MISSION/NO GO

E AND E
CTF-70
DEPART
GO TO
REFUELING
NORTH
COMPLETE
CJCS
EMERGENCY FUEL
COMBAT CONTROL TEAM (CCT) DESERT LAND
EAST
COORDINATES
CRASHED
DIVERT
SOUTH
TAKING FIRE (SMALL ARMS)
CORAL SEA F4N
SAM
RADIO CONTACT
TURN RIGHT
WEST
RETURN TO
SECURE
POSITION
LANDING

A, E

JCS
LAUNCH
TOOK OFF
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
SAR
CORAL SEA A6E/KA6D
EXECUTE/GO
KILOMETER
LAND
COMMUNICATIONS
DEPCOMJTF
KC-135 TANKERS
EXECUTE 360
AZIMUTH
WEATHER
NIMITZ EA6B
NIMITZ A6E/KA6D
JTF MAIN
EC-130
AIR REFUEL CONTROL POINT
GO AROUND
COMBAT CONTROL TEAM (CCT) MANZARIYEH
CORAL SEA F4N
RANGERS - MANZARIYEH
TURN LEFT
JTF ALTERNATE
NIMITZ
DELTA RECEPTION PARTY
EMERGENCY EXTRACTION LZ
NIMITZ F-14
KARAZ ARIFIELD
DESERT LAND
SPOD DELTA
C-141 BASE

A, B, C, E

~~(S)~~ (TS) NUMERICAL CODE

~~(S)~~ (TS) TELEPHONE LISTING

A. JCS AUTOVON 22X-XXXX; COMERCIAL 202-69X-XXXX

PARKHILL

TTY

KY-3

NON-SECURE

KY-70

KY-70 (CJCS)

B. JTF - MAIN

AUTOSEVOCOM HY-2

PARKHILL

TTY

KY-70 -----
C. JTF ALTERNATE
PARKHILL --- AUTOVON
TTY -----
NON-SECURE - AUTOVON

COMMERCIAL

D. KY-3/KY-70 INTERFACE POINTS

- A) GSA
 - KY-3 -
 - KY-70 -
- B) WHITE HOUSE COMM AGENCY
 - KY-3 -
 - KY-70 -
- C) PENTAGON
 - KY-3 -
 - KY-70 - COMMERCIAL
 - AUTOVON

A, B, E

E.
AUTOSEVOON -2
PARKHILL

REVW 19 APR 10

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TIME ZONE CONVERSIONS
(Effective 21 March 1980)

(Destroy Previous Editions)

(-10)	(-5)	(0)	(+1)	(+4-1/2)
<u>HAWAII</u>	<u>EST</u>	<u>ZULU</u>	<u>ROME</u>	<u>TEHRAN</u>
0200	0700	1200	1300	1630
0300	0800	1300	1400	1730
0400	0900	1400	1500	1830
0500	1000	1500	1600	1930
0600	1100	1600	1700	2030
0700	1200	1700	1800	2130
0800	1300			2230
0900	1400	1900	2000	2330
1000	1500	2000	2100	0030
1100	1600	2100	2200	0130
1200	1700	2200	2300	0230
1300	1800	2300	2400	0330
1400	1900	2400	0100	0430
1500	2000	0100	0200	0530
1600	2100	0200	0300	0630
1700	2200	0300	0400	0730
1800	2300	0400	0500	0830
1900	2400	0500	0600	0930
2000	0100	0600	0700	1030
2100	0200	0700	0800	1130
2200	0300	0800	0900	1230
2300	0400	0900	1000	1330
2400	0500	1000	1100	1430
0100	0600	1100	1200	1530
0200	0700	1200	1300	1630
(W)	(R)	(Z)	(A)	(C) (C+1-1/2)

Classified by: DDO, NMCC

Declassify on: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO, NMCC

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JAS
Declassified On: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

B 71

SATRAN EXTENSION

Purpose

(S) SATRAN Extension provides to individual users [redacted] times of vulnerability to Soviet [redacted] photoreconnaissance satellites. [redacted]

System

(S) SATRAN Extension [redacted]

[redacted] to produce a message giving the times a certain set of geographic coordinates could be covered by satellite photography. The message is tailored for the user's location and is sent to that user only.

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EA 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, ALMCC
 DECL DOWNGR TO _____
REVISED ON OADR
REVISED FROM _____

~~SECRET~~

Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR

[REDACTED]

B1

C

(S) Information required from user is as follows:

(u)

- a. Organizational message address with office symbol.
- b. Organizational message AUTODIN routing indicator.
- c. Beginning and ending dates of service required.
- d. Site name(s)
- e. Site latitude(s) and longitude(s) in degrees, minutes, (seconds).
- f. OPSEC justification for service.

(S) The SATRAN Extension message is formatted as follows (Figure 12):

- a. User (Target) location given in degrees, minutes, and seconds of latitude and longitude;

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

e. [REDACTED]

f. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

g. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

h. Instructions and explanations.

~~SECRET~~
Figure 12

P 152211Z MAR 79
FM HQ ADCOM PETERSON AFB CO/INW
TO 1 STRAD VANDENBERG AFB CA/DOX
BT

~~SECRET~~

C
SUBJECT: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)
SITE NO 1 FOR 1 STRAD/DOX VANDENBERG CA
1. ~~(S)~~ THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE
COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 150379/235500 TO 190379/240000; .

2.
3.
REVW 15 MAR 1999
BT

SAMPLE SATRAN EXTENSION MESSAGE

SECRET

2022 HELO'S
ARRIVES DESERT ONE
2101 ALL 9 HELOS AT
DESERT ONE

DESERT TRACK LZ

1810 FIRST MC-130 LANDS

1000 HELO'S REVERSED

1705-1 MC-130 ENTERS
SECOND DUST AREA

1605-1 MC-130 ENTERS
FIRST DUST AREA

1740 HELOS ENTER
FIRST DUST AREA

1740 HELOS ENTER
FIRST DUST AREA

HELICOPTER RTE
MC EC-130 RTE

1540 HELICOPTER FORMATION
CROSSES IRANIAN COAST

1827 T MC-130 CROSSES
IRANIAN COAST

SECRET

33

32

31

30

29

28

SECRET

26

56

57

58

59

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

B# 106
INCOG.11111

PAGE 21 HQ = 8592
REFRAME -- 000000 -- 00000 MESSAGE -- 0000 CHARACTERS
REFERENCING FROM [REDACTED]
REFERENCES ASSIGNED BY MSG:
00 00 0000 0000
REFERENCES ASSIGNED BY MSG:
0000 00, 000000, 000000, 0000 (II), 0000 (II),
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSG:
01, [REDACTED] MISSILE, OCEAN FLAG,

EZ01:
EZ02:
EZ03:
EZ04:

AC

DICTIONARY: 01, PROFILE:
70 149 209 071 300 400 540
[REDACTED]

REF

Saw

Bill

Tim I

00000000
PT000000 VERBOM 0000 1000000-0000-000000
EZ01:
000 00000
ZUCK PP 000 000 200 200 000 000 00
EZ02:
P P 000000 000 00
EZ03:
[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET
EZ03:
EZ04:

SECTION 01 OF 15
CHANGING REF AND P IS TO 0000 000000 (OR 10000000)
000000 000 000 00000000, 000 000 00000000 AND 000 24.1
400 00000 0000 000 000 000000
0000: 00000000 0000
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND IS SUBJECT TO
[REDACTED] INFORMATION BECOMES



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INCOMING

PAGE 01 MSG # 8775
PRIORITY -- TOP SECRET -- REQS MESSAGE -- 3190 CHARACTERS
REFERENCE FROM 10010, [REDACTED]
ROUTING ASSIGNED BY MSG:
DIAF CMA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
PRINTED ASSIGNED BY MSG:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED];
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSG:
DI, [REDACTED] PHILIPPINES,
SOUTH PACIFIC,

[REDACTED]

RECEIVED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
EZ05:
EZ07:

AC

DICTIONARY: 01, PROFILE:
20 93 117 202 309 405 543
UNIC-ALTERN [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PTTNYFDY YENHAI DSSA 1220051-NINA--YE-001
EZ01:
EZ02:
ZKZK FP DSA NSR DCR SOL RVI ORN DE
EZ03:
P R 220000 [REDACTED] 070
FM 10010
TO CREAM
ZEN
[REDACTED]
EZ04:
EZ05:

SECTION 11 OF 19

CHRYMAT REEF AND RANG TO KING DAMPEN FOR MANUPACOR
CHRYMAT REEF FOR COM CDRS, CTE SET REFLAVIA AND STD CALL
ADD THREE [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

C

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INCOMING

PALE DI MISC # 0747
PRIORITY -- TOP SECRET -- GOOD MESSAGE -- 1100 CHARACTERS
REFERENCE FROM 10010, [REDACTED]
FOOTING ASSIGNED BY 1001:
CLASS. REF. [REDACTED]
FRANCO ATTEMPT AT [REDACTED]
ACQ 101, 101, 101, 101, 101, 101, 101, 101, 101, 101,
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY 1001:

E200:
E201:
E202:
E203:

A, C


DI, [REDACTED]
AFRICA SECTION,
DICTIONARY: DI, PROFILE:
93 047 119 403 400 543
MIND-CONTROL [REDACTED]
100-10010

ZUCCHINISSI
PETHICFY 10010 1001 1000001-1001-10010.
E204:
ZKZK PP DM HSH JCR ZSL PNI DMN DE
E205:
P 10 000000 1001 TO 1001
10 10010
TO 10010
1001


D

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
E206:
E207:
E208:

SECTION 10 1001 10
CONTINUED FROM 1001 TO 10010 10010 10010 10010
COMPLIANCE FOR 1001 10010 10010 10010 10010 10010 10010 10010
REQ VISER 1001 TO 1001 10010



C



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INCOMING

PAGE 01 PDS # 8751
FOI 001-100 SECRET -- DTIC DISSEMINATION -- DTIC DISSEMINATION
REFERENCE FROM AGO: [REDACTED]
FOI 001-100 SECRET -- DTIC DISSEMINATION -- DTIC DISSEMINATION

[REDACTED]

REV: 02 MAY 10
E200:
E201:
E202:
E203:

FOI 001-100 SECRET -- DTIC DISSEMINATION -- DTIC DISSEMINATION

SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY AGO:
CI, [REDACTED]

DICTIONARY: BI, PROFILES:

1 470 543

NIIC-AJEDC: 454 4 4789

127-001574

127-001574

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AC

D

127-001574

C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INCOMING

PAGE 01 NCS = 6762
PRIORITY -- TOP SECRET -- DCSG MESSAGE -- 3120 CHARACTERS
REFERENCE FROM HOSIC, [REDACTED]
ROUTING ASSIGNED BY HSS:
SAR 3113 014V
PRINTER ASSIGNED BY HSS:
A012 (1), 0012 (1), 0013 (1), 0000 (1),
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY HSS:
01, [REDACTED] ELECTRONIC,



AC

DICTIONARY: 01, PROFILE:
93 179 210 400 403 408 543
MTC-OUTCOM HQ NUMBER:
127-107005

40059
40060
EZ05:
EZ07:

ZCZOM1599
PITHZFDY VER047 0258 103Z051-MIVX--VERDIO.
EZ01:
ZNY 121114
ZNR PP DNM MSH ZCR 25L RMI OAN DE
EZ02:
P R 000052 MAY 03 1960
FM HOSIC
TO OHEAN
ZEM


D

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]


EZ03:
EZ04:
EZ05:

SECTION 15 OF 19

ORNAVAT KEEP AND PASS TO HOND C. LORON FOR PAVOAC'S
COMPAIRSE FOR COMICEDEFOR, CTE DET KEPLAVIN AND CTO 24.1
SSC TINKER PASS TO 552 WACW/IN
S APP



C



~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

B111

TOR 251636Z

MSG 292
O 251608Z APR 80
FM DELTA REAR
TO JTF [REDACTED]
BT
~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS REPORTS
THE FOLLOWING WAS RECEIVED AT 1054 EST:
IRAN-STRIKE FORCE--N.C.

Declassified by:
DDO, NMC

URGENT

(WASHINGTON) SOURCES SAY TODAY THAT THE U.S. MILITARY UNIT THAT TRIED TO RESCUE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN IS A HIGHLY SECRET ANTI-TERRORIST FORCE BASED AT FORT BRAGG. THE SOURCE SAYS PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION WAS WELL UNDERWAY IN JANUARY AND THAT THE SPECIAL UNIT HAD VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED BUDGET AND ACCESS TO THE MOST SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS AND DEBILITATING GASES.

-DASH-

THE SOURCE SAYS THE ALL-VOLUNTEER UNIT WAS KNOWN AS THE DELTA TEAM. PENTAGON SOURCES CONFIRMED THERE WAS A DELTA TEAM, ALSO KNOWN UNDER THE CODE NAME OF BLUE LIGHT. BUT THEY COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT THIS WAS THE TEAM INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE ACTION. THE ATTEMPT LEFT EIGHT SERVICEMEN DEAD IN THE COLLISION OF TWO AIRCRAFT. SOURCES SAY ONLY A HANDFUL OF TOP OFFICIALS KNEW WHAT UNITS AND HOW MANY MEN WERE INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL OPERATION. PENTAGON OFFICIALS WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE REPORT, SAYING THE PENTAGON HAD NOTHING TO ADD BEYOND WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD ANNOUNCED.

MORE STRIKE FORCE

WASHINGTON...

THE SOURCE SAYS HE PERSONALLY WAS AWARE OF THE PLANNING. HE SAYS THE DELTA TEAM OPERATIONS WERE DIRECTED BY A SPECIAL DIRECT ACTION GROUP OF PLANNERS IN THE PENTAGON. HE SAYS THE TEAM WAS A SPECIALLY DESIGNED COUNTER-TERRORIST UNIT THAT WAS TRAINED IN RESCUING HOSTAGES AND IN THE USE OF NAUSEA-PRODUCING GASES. THE PENTAGON HAS IN THE PAST ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTENCE OF A TEAM MODELED ON THE CRACK ISRAELI AND WEST GERMAN ANTI-TERRORIST UNITS AND HAS SAID IT WAS HEADQUARTERED AT FORT BRAGG.

-DASH-

THE TEAM REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND IS COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF VOLUNTEERS FROM ARMY SPECIAL FORCES AND RANGER UNITS. THE ARMY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIT'S TRAINING. THERE WAS NO INDICATION ON THE SIZE OF THE DELTA TEAM. AT THE TIME OF ITS FORMATION IN 1978. PENTAGON OFFICIALS SAID THEY WERE SEEKING BETWEEN

~~SECRET~~

B111.02

~~SECRET~~

200 AND 250 SEASONED SOLDIERS AS VOLUNTEERS FOR THE UNIT. UNQUOTE.

ADVISE THAT NO PERSONNEL BE BROUGHT BACK TO BASE. SECURITY AT THE BARRACKS ARE DUE TO THE VITABLE PRESS COVERAGE. HIGH SECURITY INVOLVED AT DEATH COMPOUND.

RVW 25 APR 68
BT

NNNN

THIS WAS THE TEAM INVOLVED IN THE PROXIMATE ACTION. THE ALLIANCE TEAM UNDER THE CODE NAME OF BLUE LIGHT. BUT THEY COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT BIRMINGHAM SOURCES CONFIRMED THERE WAS A DEPTA TEAM ALSO KNOWN THE SOURCE SAID THE ALL-ALLOMIBER UNIT WAS KNOWN AS THE DEPTA TEAM.

IDENTIFIED MEMBERS AND IDENTIFYING CASES. UNIT HAD AIRBORNE AND GROUND FORCE AND ACCESS TO THE WORK FOR THE OPERATION AND WERE OPERATING IN JAMAICA AND THAT THE SPECIAL UNIT-TERMINAL FORCE BASED AT FORT BRASS. THE SOURCE WAS PLANNING THIS TO BECOME THE AMERICAN MORTAR IN IRAM IS A HIGHLY SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL) - SOURCE SAID TODAY THAT THE U.S. AIRBORNE UNIT THAT

SECRET

INVA-SITIVE FORCE--M.C.

THE FOLLOWING ARE RECEIVED AT 1824 ZR:

SUBJECT: ASSOCIATED BIRTH NAME MEMBERS

[REDACTED SECTION]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B120

ZZQGMSG 068
O 271155R NOV 79
FM DELTA
TO JCS/SOD
BT
~~SECRET~~

Declassified by:
DDO, Nmcc

SUBJECT: EVIN, CASR AND THE COMMITTEE PRISONS

(U) 1. EVIN PRISON (MAP GRID 3662) IS A FORMER SAVAK FACILITY WHICH HOUSED THE SHAH'S POLITICAL PRISONERS AS WELL AS INVESTIGATIVE AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF SAVAK DEPARTMENT THREE (INTERNAL SECURITY).

(U) 2. EVIN PRISON IS A ROUGHLY CIRCULAR COMPOUND OF AN ESTIMATED 195,000 SQUARE METERS LOCATED WEST NORTHWEST OF THE SHEMIRAN AREA AND ABOUT ONE MILE NORTHWEST OF THE TRADE FAIR GROUNDS. IT CONSISTS OF A NEW PRISON, AN SMALLER OLD PRISON, BARRACKS FOR 35 MILITARY POLICE GUARDS, SAVAK DEMONSTRATION AND CLASSROOMS, AN INDOOR SHOOTING RANGE, WEAPONS AND AMMO BUNKERS. A PRISONERS' MEETING BUILDING, STAFF APARTMENTS, THE PRISON DIRECTOR'S RESIDENCE AND A GUARDS GYMNASIUM (UNDER CONSTRUCTION).

(U) 3. THE EVIN PRISON COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A FIFTEEN FOOT BRICK WALL ABOUT ONE FOOT THICK. THERE IS NO BARBED WIRE, BROKEN GLASS OR OTHER SECURITY IMPEDIMENTS ON THE WALLS. PERIMETER LIGHTING IS PROVIDED BY STREET LAMPS ON THE EXTERIOR ONLY. THERE IS NO INTERIOR SECURITY LIGHTING SYSTEM. THERE WERE NO LANDMINES, TRIP WIRES, INFRARED MOTION DETECTORS OR SIMILAR ANTI-INTRUSION OR ANTI-ESCAPE DEVICES AS OF FEBRUARY 1979. THERE ARE FOUR GATES INTO THE COMPOUND: THE MAIN OR SOUTHEAST GATE WHICH WAS ALWAYS GUARDED BY TWO ARMED MP'S AS OF FEB. 1979; THE SECONDARY OR NORTHEAST GATE ALWAYS MANNED BY ONE ARMED MP; AND THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST GATES WHICH WERE UNGUARDED AND SELDOM USED. THE NORTHEAST SECTOR OF THE COMPOUND ABOVE THE BISECTING DIRT ROAD WAS UNGUARDED AS LATE AS FEBRUARY 1979.

(U) 4. THE NEW PRISON WAS FINISHED IN 1976 AND CONSISTS OF THREE STORIES, ONLY ONE OF WHICH IS ABOVE GROUND. THE BUILDING IS SURROUNDED BY A BRICK AND CONCRETE WALL ABOUT 15 FEET TALL WITH ONE GATE IN THE EAST WALL. STREET LIGHTS COMPLETELY ILLUMINATE THE EXTERIOR OF THE WALLS. SOURCE CANNOT RECALL SECURITY IMPEDIMENTS IN THE INTERIOR COURTYARD BUT WAS AN INFREQUENT VISITOR INSIDE THE NEW PRISON COMPLEX ITSELF. THERE IS ONLY ONE POINT OF ENTRANCE AND EXIT INTO THE PRISON BUILDING, A DELIBERATE DESIGN FEATURE.

CONSTRUCTION PHASE, HE VISITED MOST OF CELLS ON FIRST FLOOR OF
SURVEY SOME LOCATIONS TO PLANT MICROPHONES. SOURCE VISITED OLD
PRISON TWICE IN NOVEMBER 1978. DURING THE VISIT SOURCE WENT
THE MAIN LOBBY TO CHECK SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND OBSERVED A HEAVY
DOUBLE METAL ENTRANCE DOOR, AN OUTER LOBBY ABOUT 40' BY 20' WITH
AN ORDINARY DESK FOR A GUARD/RECEPTIONIST, AND A SECOND HEAVY
BARRER-METAL, JAIL-TYPE DOOR WHICH LEAD INTO THE INTERIOR
CORRIDORS. SOURCE IS NOT AWARE OF INTERIOR SECURITY DOORS OR
CHECKPOINTS AND IS OF OPINION THEY DON'T EXIST. ALL WINDOWS ARE
HEAVILY BARRERED AND CONTAIN HEAVY DUTY SECURITY SCREENS. SOURCE
HAS NEVER VISITED LOWER FLOORS WHICH ARE NORMALLY REACHED BY AN
ELEVATOR (OR ELEVATORS?) PROBABLY LOCATED SOMEWHERE IN THE
NORTHWEST QUADRANT.

6. SOURCE RELATED THERE WERE ABOUT 25 UNARMED SAVAK INTERIOR
GUARDS AS WELL AS ONE OR TWO MP'S (ONLY ONE ARMED) IN THE SMALL
RECEPTION/INTERROGATION BUILDING ADJUTING THE WALL; ONE ARMED MP
IN THE COURTYARD INSIDE THE WALL; ONE ARMED MP ON THE NORTHEAST
CORNER AND ONE ARMED MP ON THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF MAIN ROOF;
AND ONE ARMED MP JUST OUTSIDE THE RECEPTION/INTERROGATION BUILDING.
THEY, LIKE ALL THE MP'S, WERE ARMED WITH G-3 RIFLES.

7. THE NEW PRISON POPULATION IN FEBRUARY 1979 WAS 800 POLITICAL
TYPES, NO CRIMINALS WERE EVER KEPT HERE. SOURCE BELIEVES THE
HIGHEST TOTAL WAS ABOUT 2,000 PRISONERS CIRCA 1977. HE RELATES A
CURRENT RUMOR IN TEHRAN THAT 12,000 RPT 12,000 FORMER POLICE AND
MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE IMPRISONED TODAY WITH A PRESUMED MAJORITY
AT EVIN.

8. THE OLD PRISON AT EVIN CONSISTS OF THREE WINGS IN A "U"
SHAPE WITH THREE STORIES ABOVE GROUND AND NO PASEMENT. THE
BUILDING IS LARGELY HIDDEN BY TREES AND IS DIRECTLY EAST OF THE NEW
PRISON. A 15' BRICK WALL COMPLETELY SURROUNDS THE BUILDING WITH
A SINGLE GATE IN THE SOUTH WALL. ACCESS TO THE BUILDING ITSELF IS
IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE EAST WING. A SECONDARY DOOR IS
LOCATED IN THE INTERIOR PORTION OF THE WEST WING TOWARD THE NORTH
WEST HALF. THERE IS NO SECURITY CHECKPOINT OR INTERIOR GUARDPOSTS
INSIDE THE BUILDING. WINDOWS ARE BARRERED AND SCREENED. TWO
SMALL OFFICES AT THE ENTRANCE GATE IN THE WALL WERE MANNED BY ARMED
SAVAK GUARDS AND ONE ARMED MP JUST OUTSIDE THE GATE. THE OLD
PRISON WAS USED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR FEMALE PRISONERS AND WAS
STAFFED BY FOUR UNARMED MEN AND TWO UNARMED WOMEN.

9. AN 85 MAN MILITARY POLICE DETACHMENT GUARDED THE EVIN
COMPOUND AS LATE AS FEBRUARY 1979. THEY LIVED IN BARRACKS NEAR THE
SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE NEW PRISON AND HAD GUARD POSTS (IN ADDITION
TO THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE) AS FOLLOWS: ONE UNARMED MP AT BRIDGE
OUTSIDE COMPOUND TO EAST OF MAIN GATE; ONE UNARMED TRAFFIC MP OUTSIDE
MAIN GATE AND TWO ARMED MP'S INSIDE MAIN GATE; (TWO SAVAK GUARDS WITH
PISTOLS SAT IN A KIOSK ABOUT 20 YARDS INSIDE THE GATE TO CONTROL
VISITORS); TWO ARMED MP'S AT CONTROL POINT IN PRISONER'S MEETING
AREA LOCATED SOUTH OF GUARD BARRACKS; ONE ARMED MP AT A RAILROAD
TYPE GATE IN THE ROAD TO THE EAST OF THE MP BARRACK AND TO THE
SOUTH OF THE SAVAK DEMONSTRATION/INTERROGATION BUILDING; TWO ARMED
MP'S WERE GUARDING AREA EAST OF DEMONSTRATION ROOM (WHICH CONTAINED
WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES); TOTAL OF FOUR ARMED MP'S WERE AT FOUR
BUNKERS IN SOUTH AREA OF COMPOUND; ONE ARMED MP NEAR SOUTHWEST
CORNER OF SHOOTING RANGE TO SOUTH OF COMPOUND; ONE ARMED MP ON THE
HILL ABOUT 200 METERS ABOVE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF WALL OF NEW PRISON
AND ONE ARMED MP ABOVE NORTHWEST CORNER OF WALL; TWO ARMED MP'S ON
ROOF OF STAFF APARTMENTS IN SOUTHEAST CORNER OF COMPOUND SOME 50
METERS EAST OF MAIN GATE. SOURCE NOTES THAT THESE MP'S HAVE
PROBABLY BEEN AUGMENTED BY AN ESTIMATED 80-90 ARMED REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS AND AN ADDITIONAL ESTIMATED 100-150 INVESTIGATORS AND
REVOLUTIONARY OFFICIALS.

10. SOURCE MONITORED PERSIAN LANGUAGE BROADCAST ON 18
NOVEMBER WHICH ANNOUNCED THAT THE MAIN REVOLUTIONARY COURT IS LOCATED
AT EVIN. SOURCE BELIEVES THIS COURT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN
THE THREE STAFF APARTMENT BUILDINGS.


11. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF COMPOUND INCLUDING SOURCE'S PLOT
PLAN AVAILABLE SEECTREE. ADDITIONAL DETAILS SUCH AS NEIGHBORHOOD
LAYOUT AND NIGHTTIME ACTIVITY PATTERNS TO FOLLOW.

RUM258OV99


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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B-116



Declassified by:
DDB, NMC







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~~SECRET~~










~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

LIMITED

B125

CLASSIFIED

100/NOV 80
 100/NOV 80
 100/NOV 80
 100/NOV 80
 100/NOV 80

CLASSIFIED

SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY (U)
 REF: A. 100/NOV 80/10 00 071800Z NOV 80, SAR (NOTAL)
 B. 100/NOV 80/10 00 011610Z NOV 80, CONTENT: INTEL
 HISTORY (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED

2. MATERIAL TO BE INCORPORATED IN JTF 1-79 INTELLIGENCE HISTORICAL REPORTS SHOULD COVER THE PERIOD:
 FROM: DATE UNIT ENTERED RICEBOWL (SFOD, 1-SQU, [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED] SHOULD BE (ICIST, [REDACTED] AMACS) PLANNING
 TO: 15 DECEMBER 1980

CLASSIFIED

3. (U) INPUTS FROM INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS SHOULD CORRESPOND TO FORMAT GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN REFS.
 4. (U) FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM REF 9 THAT GOVERNS PURPOSE OF THIS INTELLIGENCE HISTORY AND MANNER IN WHICH IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED:
 PLEASE KEEP IN MIND THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS REQUEST IS TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF SIMILAR OPERATIONS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT MEANINGFUL AND COMPREHENSIVE INPUTS BE MADE. SO MUCH EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN GAINED TO LET IT FADE AWAY.
 A LINE: WE ARE INTERESTED IN BALANCED PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENTS/SUGGESTIONS, THAT WILL BE OF VALUE TO FUTURE GENERATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS."

CLASSIFIED

5. (C) SUSPENSE DATE FOR MATERIAL TO ARRIVE AT [REDACTED] IS 15 JAN 81.
 REVW 15 DEC 80
 RT

1

~~SECRET~~

Classified by DDD/WMC e
 Declassify on OADR
 Classified by
 Declassified on

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

blat

SECRET
131515Z DEC 80

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

THIS MSG IS RETRANSMITTED FOR UR INFO

CJCS/DIG 131457Z DEC 80

- AFSSO DA
- CNO
- AFSSO USAF
- AFMCHC
- AFSSO CINCLANT
- AFSSO MAC
- CINCPAC
- AFSSO REDCOM
- AFSSO SAC
- AFSY SEC SHAPE
- AFINFO AFSSO TAG

[REDACTED]

DIA//DR//

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

CSA FOR GEN MEYER; CNO FOR ADM HAYWARD; CSAF FOR GEN ALLEN; CMC FOR GEN BARROW; CINCLANT FOR ADM TRAIN; CINCMAC FOR GEN HUYSER; CINCPAC FOR ADM LONG; CINCREC FOR GEN WARNER AND GEN SHOEMAKER; CINCSAC FOR GEN ELLIS; SY SEC SHAPE NOT ADDEE, PASS TO GEN ROGERS, USCINCEUR AND GEN ALLEN DUSCINCEUR; TAC FOR GEN GREECH FROM GEN JONES, CJCS

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IN 1236
 CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 REL UNCLASSIFIED
 REVISED BY ADR
 REASON Multiple Smc

A

[REDACTED]

WARM REGARDS.
REVW 12 DEC 1000 REAS 5 & 6
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B 128

MSG NO. 011
DTG 231622Z JAN 81

A [REDACTED]
FM [REDACTED]
TO [REDACTED]
INFO [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12350
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, N MCC
 REL DOWN TO
KEYS ON OADR
SERIES FROM Multiple Sources

SEC 1 OF 2

A [REDACTED] 211610Z NOV 80 SUBJ: NONE

OBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

A THE [REDACTED] (RANCF) WAS INVOLVED AT THE OUTSET IN
RECONNOITERING, PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF RESCUING THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES
IN IRAN. THIS INVOLVEMENT COMPRISED BOTH THE RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD
PLANS FOR THE POTENTIAL RESCUE OF THE HOSTAGES. THIS PARTICULAR
MISSION, SO CLOSELY GUARDED, CREATED NEW AND COMPLEX ISSUES FOR THIS
UNIT. PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES, ADEQUATE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
AND PROPERLY SECURE FACILITIES WERE BUT A FEW OF THE IMMEDIATE AND
PERSISTING PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE OVERCOME IN AN EXTREMELY SHORT
MOMENT OF TIME. INITIALLY THIS UNIQUE SITUATION CAUSED THE SERVICING
TO A GREAT DEAL OF CONSTERNATION; HOWEVER, THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL
OF DISCLOSURE TO FORSCOM HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
AS WELL. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE [REDACTED] WAS INVOLVED IN
A "SUPER SECRET MISSION" WHICH AT THAT TIME COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN
WHAT IT TRULY WAS - PLANNING A RESCUE ATTEMPT OF THE AMERICAN HOS-
TAGES IN IRAN. THUS, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OPERATIONS SECURITY
BECAME A WAY OF LIFE FOR THE [REDACTED] LIVING UNDER THIS
ENVIRONMENT CREATED MORE COMPLEX AND COMPLEX ISSUES THAT WERE
DIFFICULT TO PREVIOUS METHODS OF OPERATIONS. [REDACTED]
PLANS AND STRICT ABSOLUTE "NEED TO KNOW" WERE STRICTLY ENFORCED. THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFICERS IN THE [REDACTED] WITH [INITIALLY, RICEBOWL
AND SNOWBIRD] CONSEQUENTLY INTERNAL [REDACTED] OPERATIONS, BOTH DAY TO
[REDACTED] LONG RANGE, SUFFERED FROM OFFICERS AND NCO'S RESPONDING
ONLY TO ORDERS AND NOT FULLY UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE, HOWEVER SMALL
OR LARGE, OF WHAT WAS BEING ASKED OF THEM TO ACCOMPLISH. RESPONDING
TO THE CHALLENGE HOWEVER, ALL PROBLEMS WERE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED,
ALTHOUGH AT TIMES THE PREMIUM PRICE WAS PAID IN TERMS OF PERSONAL
ACCOMPLISH.

2. MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS.

ABC OF THE GROUND ELEMENTS THIS UNIT'S PRIMARY CONCERN WAS WITH
SECURITY OF AIRFIELD. AIRFIELDS BOTH IN TERMS OF THE GENERIC SENSE
AND CLANDING STRIPS DESIGNATED BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THEREFORE, OUR INTEREST FELL
IN THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AREA, THAT WAS: TERRAIN, WEATHER,
AND IRANIAN FORCES. OF THE THREE IRANIAN FORCES WAS THE MOST DIFFI-
CULT AND ILLUSIVE. SIMPLY STATED INSUFFICIENT DATA ON ENEMY FORCES
WAS OF PLACE. FOR WHATEVER REASONS, NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS COULD NOT PROVIDE DETAIL ANALYSIS ON NUMBER AND LOCATI-
ON OF ALL TYPES OF IRANIAN FORCES. THE MORE COMPLEX THE AIRFIELD
THE MORE LIKELY YOU WERE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY FEI. OTHER THAN
INFORMATION PROVIDED FROM [REDACTED] THE INFORMATION WAS
LOW, COLLECTING AND SOMETIMES JUST NOT AVAILABLE. FRANKLY, THE
REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THAT OUR
NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCY COULD NOT OR WAS
RESTRICTED FROM FUNCTIONING IN A MANNER THAT BENEFITED ALL
CONCERNED. LACKING CURRENT AND ADEQUATE TACTICAL MAPS OF THE AREAS
OF INTEREST THIS HEADQUARTERS RELIED VERY HEAVILY ON [REDACTED]

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Classified by: JES
Declassified ON: OADR

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE.

~~SECRET~~

... WAS THE [REDACTED] INTELLIGENCE [REDACTED]
... RECEIPT OF THE MISSION. [REDACTED] SERVED IN THIS [REDACTED]
... FACILITY UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 20 MARCH 1980 AND WAS THE ONLY INTEL-
... OFFICER WITH [REDACTED] ACCESS IN THE [REDACTED]
... PLACED [REDACTED] AS THE [REDACTED] INTELLIGENCE
... SHIFTED TO THE OPERATIONS SECTION AND
... TO BE A PLANNER FOR [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]. LIKE [REDACTED]
... WAS THE ONLY OFFICER IN THE INTELLIGENCE
... SECTION WITH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] ACCESS. THE ASSISTANT INTEL-
... OFFICER AND INTELLIGENCE NCO SIMPLY RESPONDED TO INSTRUCT-
... AND GUIDANCE FROM THE SIO.

A, G

PERSONNEL SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS

A. PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.
THE EXTREMELY-HIGH CLASSIFICATION OF [REDACTED] AND THE [REDACTED]
... WAS DIFFICULT TO ADJUST TO PRIMARILY DUE
... LACK OF A PROPER PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (SEE PAPA B) AND PROPERLY
... (SI-CLEARED) INDIVIDUALS. [REDACTED] COMMANDER SELECTED FOR THE
... MISSION DID NOT HAVE A [REDACTED] AT THE OUTSET OF THE
... NOT HAVING PREVIOUSLY OPERATED ON MISSIONS SUCH AS THIS
... NO PREVIOUS REQUIREMENT EXISTED TO HAVE ALL KEY MEMBERS OF
... CLEARED. THIS SITUATION WAS CORRECTED BY OBTAINING
... BILLETS FOR ALL KEY MEMBERS. THERE WAS HOWEVER THE NORMAL DELAY
... ASSOCIATED WITH OBTAINING [REDACTED]

C
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B. PHYSICAL SECURITY.

AS MENTIONED ABOVE FOR A MISSION OF THIS TYPE AND SENSITIVITY THE
... DID NOT RUN AN SI-CLEARED FACILITY. ADEQUATE
... SPACE WAS OBTAINED FROM THE THEN [REDACTED] LOCATED IN A SI
... CLEARED AREA. THIS IN AND OF ITSELF WAS STILL MARGINAL, IN THAT
... WHAT WAS REALLY NEEDED WAS A [REDACTED] WITHIN A [REDACTED]
... AREA TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF THE ROOMS OBTAINED FROM THE [REDACTED]
... TSCM AND TEMPEST INSPECTIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN LATE APRIL
... OR EARLY MAY 1980. SIGNIFICANT IRREGULARITIES WERE NOTED. WHAT WAS
... POSSIBLE TO CORRECT BY THE OPERATORS WAS PERFORMED. HOWEVER, IT
... SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AS OF THIS WRITING WORK ORDERS ARE STILL OPEN
... FOR MAJOR IRREGULARITIES NOTED DURING THE INSPECTION. THE TEMPEST
... INSPECTION WAS DONE IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER 1980. WITHIN A FEW
... WEEKS ALL DEFICIENCIES HAD BEEN CORRECTED. INSPITE OF THE NOTED
... PROBLEMS THIS UNIT INSURED THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF SECURITY AWARE-
... NESS THROUGH THE PERSONAL EFFORTS OF ALL PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS.

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C. OPERATIONS SECURITY.

MORE TIME WAS CONSUMED BY THIS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON THIS SUBJECT
... THAN ALL THE OTHERS COMBINED. DURING [REDACTED] PLANNING EVERY PER-
... SONAL DEPARTURE AND EVERY TROOP MOVEMENT FROM [REDACTED]
... WAS SUPPORTED BY A [REDACTED]. THIS WAS DIFFICULT AND AS NOTED,
... TIME CONSUMING. [REDACTED] SHOULD HAVE ORIGINATED
... FROM THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS AND PASSED TO SUBORDINATE UNITS
... IT WAS LEFT UP TO EACH UNIT TO DO AS EACH UNIT SAW FIT. IT WAS NOT
... UNTIL LATE INTO THE [REDACTED] PLANNING THAT THE COORDINATION BETWEEN
... HEADQUARTERS IMPROVED. ALTHOUGH THE OPTIMUM WAS NOT ACHIEVED ALL
... UNITS BECAME MORE AWARE OF THE NEED FOR A CONSOLIDATED [REDACTED]
... THIS WAS A DIFFICULT AREA AND ALL SERVICES
... WERE HAMPERED BY LACK OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN WORKING WITH [REDACTED]
... AND IN SOME CASES THE RAPID
... CHANGING DEVELOPMENTS PRECLUDED ADEQUATE TIME TO PLAN [REDACTED]

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12-812
16222 JAN 81

S2

FINAL SEC OF 2

COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS.
 LACKING ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS TO DEAL WITH A CRISIS OF THIS PROPORTION THE JCSE WAS TASKED TO PROVIDE A COMMO-LINK BETWEEN ALL STATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH RICEBOWL/SNOWBIRD. THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS PROVIDED BY JCSE PROVED ADEQUATE FOR THE MISSION (PARKHILL, WSC, AR/UGC-129). IT SHOULD BE NOTED AGAIN HOWEVER, THAT THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT ORGANIC AND UNLESS THIS EQUIPMENT IS RETAINED AT THIS LOCATION THIS HEADQUARTERS IS NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH A SITE OUT OF WASHINGTON OR [REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS IN ANY FUTURE MATTERS. THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM THAT IS NOW ESTABLISHED MUST REMAIN IN PLACE FOR THIS UNIT TO BE RESPONSIVE IN CRISIS SITUATIONS. THE JCSE ELEMENT WAS COLOCATED IN THE ROOMS OBTAINED FROM THE [REDACTED]. THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS SATISFACTORY AND PROVIDED FOR EAST-WEST COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE OPERATORS AND RANGER PERSONNEL.

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REQUIREMENT AND PRODUCTION.
 TO ASSIST IN PLANNING [REDACTED] TACTICAL MAPS WERE THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS OF THIS UNIT. IN ADDITION TERRAIN MODELS WERE OF EXTREME VALUE. THE AVAILABILITY OF MAPS WAS NOT AS PROMPT AS THIS UNIT WOULD HAVE LIKED. HOWEVER, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED [REDACTED] AS FOR MAINTAINING CURRENT ON THE SITUATIONS THE TRAFFIC PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS WAS ADEQUATE. A POINT OF CRITICISM THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF MATERIAL SIMPLY REPRINTED FROM PRESS RELEASES. THIS DID NOT ADD TO THE OVERALL VALUE OF THE INTELLIGENCE DATA PROVIDED THIS UNIT. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS DATA THAT HAD BEEN ANALYZED AND PROVEN TO BE TO THE BEST OF THE ANALYST ABILITY, FACTUAL INFORMATION. MOREOVER, THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED A MORE CONDENSED INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. PRODUCTION BY THIS UNIT RELIED COMPLETELY ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] BRIEFINGS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION, AS IT DEVELOPED IN BOTH RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD WERE DEPRIVED FROM INFORMATION PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] DURING FTX'S THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF THIS UNIT PROVIDED SCENARIOS, CONSTRUCTED TARGET CITES AND SUPERVISED THE OPFOR IN PREPARATION FOR MISSION PLANNING.

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6. (S) INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE.
 STAFF INTERFACE, WITH RESPECT TO RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD, WAS LIMITED TO INITIALLY THE CO, XO, S2 AND S3. FOLLOWING THE FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT IT WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE S1 AND S4. THE SMALL NUMBER OF STAFF OFFICERS WITH ACCESS LIMITED THE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING AND CREATED A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM. IN THAT, STAFF OFFICERS WITH ACCESS WERE PERFORMING [REDACTED] DUTIES IN

~~INTERNAL-LATERAL INTERFACE.~~

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~~SECRET~~
A, G

FOR THE MOST PART, FOR WHATEVER REASON, LATERAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION WAS ALMOST NON-EXISTANT. THE ONLY EXCEPTION WAS COORDINATION WITH THE [REDACTED] DURING [REDACTED] IN MY OPINION THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF AT [REDACTED] HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE AND HELD A [REDACTED] INTELL UPDATE OR WHATEVER AT WASHINGTON. THIS WOULD HAVE [REDACTED] A MEDIUM FOR EXCHANGE AND PERMITTED DETAIL DISCUSSIONS OF [REDACTED] AREAS AND WHAT WE AS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS NEEDED FROM THE [REDACTED] OFTEN THAN NOT, THE CO AND S3 KNEW OF NEW INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER DID. THIS WAS A FUNCTION WHICH REQUIRED MORE FREQUENT VISITS TO [REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS FOR PLANNING.

~~INTELL/J2 INTERFACE:~~

THE J2 ON OPERATIONAL PLANNING REQUIREMENT DID ALL THAT WAS POSSIBLE OR WITHIN HIS POWER TO ACCOMPLISH. THE ASSISTANCE WAS ALWAYS THERE IF ONE NEEDED IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, DURING TRAINING EXERCISES THE J2 WAS CONSPICUOUS BY HIS ABSENCE. THIS CREATES A [REDACTED] STAFF PLANNING AND PLACE THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN UNDESIRABLE SITUATIONS. FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING/EXERCISES ARE, INDEED, CRUCIAL. THE LACK OF SCENARIOS, MAPS, AND [REDACTED] PHOTOGRAPHS FOR THESE EXERCISES WERE UNEXCEPTABLE. VERY LATE IN THE [REDACTED] PLANNING THE SITUATION STARTED TO IMPROVE. THIS WAS A GREAT RELIEF FOR UNIT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. PROGRESS WAS MADE AT THIS CRUCIAL POINT OF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING SHOULD NOT BE FOR-

~~ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:~~

- A. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE CRUCIAL ITEMS LEARNED FROM THE MONTHS EXPERIENCE AND SHOULD BE STRONGLY CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.
- B. FOR THIS UNIT TO REMAIN RESPONSIVE THE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS MUST REMAIN WITH THIS HEADQUARTERS.
- C. THE INTELLIGENCE FLOW SHOULD CONTINUE OVER THESE SAME COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.
- D. THERE SHOULD BE A PERIODIC MEETING OF INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICERS WITH THE [REDACTED]
- E. EACH STAFF SHOULD HAVE A MINIMUM OF ONE ANALYST, THE J2 SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT ANALYST FOR 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.
- F. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF MISSION PLANNING.

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~~SECRET~~

31 December 1979

B 92

[REDACTED] (S)

1. (S) Following are instructions for satisfaction of daily Soviet space reconnaissance requirements for 1 January 1980.

a. (u) (S) Soviet satellites in orbit.

(1) - (u) Enclosure 1 is a list of Soviet reconnaissance satellites in orbit as of 31 December 1979. This list can change if a new launch occurs, in which case a SATRAN activation message will be sent (sample at Enclosure 2), or if a satellite is deorbited, in which case a SATRAN termination message will be sent (sample at Enclosure 3). These types of messages should be retrieved from the NMIC Support System and used as backup for the input to the J-3 support element in the Alert Center.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c. (C) (S)

[REDACTED]

(1) (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 72
INITIATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 DECL DOWNGR TL
REF ID: OADR
REMOVED FROM DIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

Not Codeword

WORKING COPY

Classified By: OADR
Declassified On: DIA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

d. (U) SATRAN-S

(1) (U) SATRAN-S services began on 24 December 1979. A description of this service is at Enclosure 6.

2. (S) If you want to enter any more places into SATRAN Extension simply call [REDACTED] tell them you want to add a new location to the JSI-6A SATRAN Extension message, and pass then the geographic coordinates and a name for the point (e.g. Point "P" for Pentagon). Please keep a record for JSW-2A. [REDACTED] also can be contacted if there are any questions on SATRAN messages (e.g. the date/time group of the latest SATRAN message might be checked from time to time to make sure that the latest one is available in DIA).

3. (U) The name and home phone number for the JSW-2A analyst point of contact follows: [REDACTED] (Acting Chief/SATRAN analyst); Mr. [REDACTED] (Photo and ELINT satellite analyst).

6 Enclosures

- 1. [REDACTED] (S)
- 2. Advisory Message (S)(U)
- 3. Termination Message (S)(U)
- 4. [REDACTED]
- 5. SATRAN Extension message (S)(U)
- 6. SATRAN-S Messages (S)(U)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

RECEIVED BY HQS:
2012 (1), 2012 (11),
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY HQS:
MISSILE, TERRORIST, SPACECRAFT, SATELLITE DECAY,

EQZ:
AUG:
ADP:
SAC
PAGE 2
BMM
EZC:

SECRET

000000


DICTIONARY: GS, PROFILE:
49 100 111 113 239 311 357
EMIC-OUTCOM MSG NUMBER:
66-03365

ZCZCH:440 S E C R E T ZYU 75244
EMIC
ACTION

DISTR
DIR: DIA (10) INIC FILE
(010)
TRANSIT/3621331/3621335/000:040703021333
EZD1:
GE RWTECA 20729 3621333
ZNY 00000
EZD2:
O 261323Z DEC 79
FM HQ ADCOM PETERSON AFB CO/INO
TO AIG 954
AIG 8655

BT
S E C R E T

EZD3:
EZD4:
SUBJECT: SATRAM ADVISORY MESSAGE (U)
EZD5:
REF: DIA SI-MP-16-16-77



PAGE 1 S E C R E T 00001010
PAGE 2 S E C R E T 75244

5. (U) - STATUTE EXTENSION WITH WILL BE PROVIDED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE
TO THOSE USERS WHICH HAVE REQUESTED THAT SERVICE.

~~SECRET~~

Encl #2

IMMEDIATE -- SECRET -- PRIORITY -- SECURITY --
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DEC 79

ROUTING ASSIGNED BY MSS:

SMIS

PRINTER ASSIGNED BY MSS:

AO12 (1), PG12 (1)

SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSS:

SPACECRAFT,

DICTIONARY: G9, PROFILE:

113 357

NMIC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:

65-101546

ZCZCDIC798

~~SECRET~~

ZYUW

71726

NMIC

ACTION

DISTR

DIA: DIA (10) NMIC FILE

(010)

TRANSIT/3601032/3601055/000: 23TOR3601054

EZ01:

DE RUWRMOA *6716 3601032

ZNY SSSCC

EZ02:

O 261000Z DEC 79

FM HQ ADCCM PETERSON AFB CO//INOW//

TO AIG 954

AIG 8055

BT

~~SECRET~~

EZ03:

EZ04:

SUDJ: SATRAN TERMINATION MESSAGE (U)

EZ05:

REVW-26 DEC 99

BT

EZ06:

*6716

ANNOTES

CLH

PAGE 1

~~SECRET~~

00001010

NNNN

EZ07:

~~SECRET~~


Encl #3

TIME ASSIGNED BY MSS:
5110
PRIORITY ASSIGNED BY MSS:
A012 (U), B012 (U)
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSS:
SPACECRAFT,
DICTIONARY: CS, WFOFILE:
113 357
KNIC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:
64-013156

ZCZCJIC055 S E C R E T ZYUW 65515
KNIC
ACTION
DIA:
DISTR:
QIA (U) KNIC FILE

(UIC)
TFANSIT/3542251/3550000/001:127000042058
EZ01:
DE KUMTESA 02554 3542035
ZNY SSSGS
EZ02:
P 202205Z DEC 79
FM HQ 40004 PETERSON AFB CO//INCO//
TO: DIA WASH D.C.//J51-5A RTM: COMNET DESK-PASS TO LTCOL KOJALESKI//
INFO DIA WASHINGTON D.C.//J5W-2F//
BT

S E C R E T
EZ03:
EZ04:
SUBJECT: SATRAH EXTENSION (U)
1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/
EZ05:
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 201275/000000
TO 241275/000000;




SECRET

Encl

SECRET

SECRET



REV. TO
BY
EZGG:

WLF

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

30
31

(U) Information Required from Users.

- a. Organizational message address with office symbols.
- b. Organizational message Autodin router.
- c. Message precedence required for weekly messages (immediate,

priority, or routine), [REDACTED]

d. The maximum number of days of advance notification required. The maximum fourteen days is suggested, but up to 30 days may be provided with justification. For all users, a weekly update will be provided.

e. Site name (up to 26 characters), site latitude (deg/min/sec north or south) and longitude (deg/min/sec east or west), site altitude (feet above mean sea level). Up to 20 sites may be requested per user.

f. [REDACTED]

g. [REDACTED]

h. Reason you require this service; e.g., to protect experimental weapons system radar, to protect deployment tactics in an exercise, etc.

(S) For additional assistance [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] contact OPSEC personnel

within your own chain of command, as suggested in the introduction to this manual.

(S) Information provided in the SATRAN-S message includes (See Figure 13):

- a. Period covered by the message.
- b. Site name, latitude, longitude, elevation.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

e. Remarks.

~~SECRET~~

SATRAM-S MESSAGE

P 071526Z MAY 79
FM HQ ADCOM PETERSON AFB CO/INW
TO SAIC ABERDEEN RO INSCOH CIBSIGSEC SPT BN APG MD/IAGPA-A-AN
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: SATRAM-S FOR USER 001 (U)

1. (U) PERIOD COVERED: 080001Z MAY 79 THRU 200001Z MAY 79

2.

[REDACTED]

(Continued on Next Page)

AC

~~SECRET~~

8

[REDACTED]

3.00) ~~SECRET~~ USER-SPECIFIC REMARKS:
4.00) ~~SECRET~~ GENERAL REMARKS:
COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS ON THIS PRODUCT MAY BE DIRECTED TO HQ ADCOM PETERSON
AFB CO/LHWS ATTN: [REDACTED]


REVW 07 MAY 1999
BT

NOTE: Phone numbers given in the Remarks section are for all SATRAM, SATRAM
Extension, and SATRAM-S matters.

~~Secret~~

Site Locations in JSI-6A SATMAN-3 11.3508 C

CIAME 107A



Site 1 = 35°N / 15°E
Site 2 = 35°N / 20°E
Site 3 = 35°N / 25°E

~~Secret~~

A, G

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B130

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

REFERENCE: YOUR MSG 003, DTG 011610Z NOV 80

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A INTELLIGENCE HISTORY OF OUR ROLE IN MISSION PLANNING FOR PROJECT SNOWBIRD:

(S) A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW:

(S) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF OF THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP WAS FIRST INTRODUCED TO THE SNOWBIRD PROJECTION 29 JULY 1980. AT THE INSTRUCTION OF [REDACTED] THE REQUIREMENT WAS TWO OFFICERS, TWO PHOTO INTERPRETERS (PI) AND A COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ATTENDED THE SNOWBIRD BRIEFING AT THE PENTAGON [REDACTED] ON 29 JULY 80:

A, G

RANK/NAME	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	ASSIGNED UNIT
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	101ST AVN GP
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	TF 158
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	101ST AVN GP
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	101ST MI CO
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	101ST MI CO

A, G

BASED UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE J-2 AN ADDITIONAL PERSON WAS READ ON FOR THE PROJECT. [REDACTED] NCOIC OF THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE, SERVED AS THE SECURITY ADVISOR FOR HANDLING [REDACTED] MATERIAL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR OUR FACILITY. [REDACTED] JOIN THE ORGANIZATION AT A LATER DATE AS THE S-2 OF [REDACTED]

C, A, G

(S) UPON RETURN TO FT CAMPBELL THE FIVE PERSONNEL WERE TO ESTABLISH A SECURE WORK AREA TO HANDLE SNOWBIRD INFORMATION, PLUS A COMMUNICATION CENTER. THE AREA WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO) OF THE 101ST AVN DIV (ADLT). THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MATERIAL [REDACTED] THE ACTUAL MISSION REQUIRED STRINGENT SECURITY AS TO PREVENT COMPROMISE. BECAUSE OF THE WORK AREA LOCATION (SSO FACILITY) IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A COMPELLING NEED REQUEST WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THOSE PERSONNEL, WHO REQUIRED ACCESS TO SNOWBIRD MATERIAL, WHO DID NOT HAVE A SI ACCESS.

C

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 10 1255
JED ON 21 JUN 92
THE C. O. DDO, NMCC
FOR [REDACTED] TO Secret
I IN OADR
NO FROM Multiple (S) [REDACTED]
Sources
A, G

AFTER ESTABLISHING THE WORK AREA [REDACTED] REMAINED TO [REDACTED] DURING THE WEEK OF 4-6 AUG 80 TO ACCOMPLISH BACKGROUND RESEARCH ON [REDACTED] THE WEEK WAS DEVOTED TO READING THE EVENTS THAT LEAD UP TO THE RICEBOWL OPERATION AND THE INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTED THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN. LATER HE RECEIVED BRIEFINGS ON THE SEPARATE SNOWBIRD OPTIONS TO GAIN KNOWLEDGE OF LOCATIONS, TARGETS, AND ROUTES OF MOVEMENT.

A

(S) IN AN EFFORT TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE EXERCISES, REAL WORLD MISSION, PERSONNEL OF THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP, S-2 SPENT SEVERAL DAYS AL [REDACTED] WORKING WITH THE 1ST DETACHMENT, [REDACTED] A-2. THIS MONTH PROVED TO BE INVALUABLE SINCE THIS UNIT HAD PLANNED AND EXECUTED THE RICEBOWL OPERATION. DURING THIS PERIOD WE PLANNED AND EXECUTED TWO MAJOR EXERCISES, POTENTIAL CHARGE, AND POISON DART WHICH PROVIDED "WALK THRU" PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. ALSO DURING THIS PERIOD IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE [REDACTED]

A

HAD THE MOST UP TO DATE DATA BASE AVAILABLE, BOTH BECAUSE [REDACTED] INVOLVEMENT WITH RICEBOWL AND CONTINUATION WITH SNOWBIRD. THIS DATA BASE WAS LATER COPIED AND SENT TO S-2, 101ST AVN GP.

~~SECRET~~

(S) FROM 9-16 OCTOBER [REDACTED] TRAVELED TO FT BRAGG, NC TO WORK WITH FLIGHT CREWS AND MEMBERS OF DELTA. DELTA [REDACTED] TO BRIEF TF 158 CREW MEMBERS ON THE [REDACTED] COMPOUND ASSAULT. AFTER WORKING WITH THE FLIGHT

A, G

~~SECRET~~

(6) DURING NOVEMBER [REDACTED] ATTENDED AN E&E CONFERENCE HOSTED [REDACTED] THIS CONFERENCE DISCUSSED THE E&E OPTIONS FOR EACH SNOWBIRD PLAN. E&E KITS WERE DISCUSSED AT THIS CONFERENCE, THE FORMAL E&E PLAN IS STILL BEING DRAFTED.

B. MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION IS TO SUPPORT THE TASK FORCES OF THE 101ST IN OPERATION SNOWBIRD. WE PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS MAPS, PHOTO PRODUCTS, CLIMATE INFORMATION AND TERRAIN ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATION.


(2) THE INTELLIGENCE IS DEVELOPED FROM DAILY REPORTS FROM [REDACTED] ETC. THE [REDACTED] AS MENTIONED ABOVE PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR OUR INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE WHICH WE UPDATED AND SUBMITTED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) TO FILL THE GAPS. IF EITHER OF THE ELEMENTS S-2'S HAD QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MISSION OR IRANIAN CAPABILITIES THEY WERE SUBMITTED TO THE S-2 LOCATED AT THE SSO FACILITY FOR ANSWERS. IF RESEARCHING OUR DATA BASE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION AN EEI REQUEST WAS CREATED AND FORWARDED TO [REDACTED] U-2. ON ALL OCCASIONS [REDACTED] WAS VERY RESPONSIVE ON FINDING THE ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS. MOST EEI'S TO DATE RELATED TO THE TEHRAN AREA SPECIFICALLY THE MFA COMPOUND AND THE U.S. EMBASSY.

A,C

C. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF FOR SNOWBIRD CONSIST OF FIVE MEMBERS. THREE ARE ACTUAL MEMBERS OF THE AVIATION GROUP AND THE REMAINING TWO ARE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE TASK FORCE.

A,G



AVIATION GROUP
AVIATION GROUP
AVIATION GROUP
1F 158TH
1F 229TH

(2) THE AVIATION GROUP S-2 STAFF RECIEVES THE INTELLIGENCE MESSAGES, TAKES THIS INFORMATION AND DEVELOPES AND UPDATES THE DATA BASE. THE GROUP S-2 ALSO SERVES AS A FOCAL POINT FOR THE TASK FORCE PERSONNEL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, PRESENT BRIEFINGS, AND DEVELOPE EEI'S TO SATISFY MISSION REQUIREMENTS. THE SECTION ALSO REQUESTS AND DISTRIBUTES MAPS AND PHOTO PHODUCIS FOR REAL WORLD AS WELL AS EXERCISE PLANNING.

D. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS:

(1) DUE TO THE ACTUAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION WE RECIEVE FROM [REDACTED] WE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH OUR SECURE WORKING AREA IN THE 101ST SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO). BY DOING THIS WE PREVENTED THE NEED OF GUARDS SINCE THE SSO MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS [REDACTED]

A,C

(2) [REDACTED] ESTABLISHED OUR "POINT TO POINT" SECURE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, THE SAFES FOR STORAGE, AND MAPS WERE ALL LOCATED IN THE ROOM PROVIDED BY THE SSO. THE SSO PROVIDED A SINGLE ROOM FOR OUR USE AND RESTRICTED ACCESS TO OUR PERSONNEL.

A,G

(3) ALL PERSONNEL WHO WORKED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE POSSESSED SI/SAD CLEARANCE. COMPELLING NEED REQUESTS WERE SUBMITTED TO [REDACTED] TO ENABLE PERSONNEL TO BE CLEARED. [REDACTED] WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN OBTAINING THE CLEARANCES FROM CCF.

A,C

(4) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE THE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT SINCE UNLIKE OTHER UNITS, WE WERE NOT PROVIDED ANY PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE EQUIPMENT.

~~SECRET~~

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(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD FEW PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS, EXCLUDING THE SECURE AREA IN THE SSO, THE SECTION REQUIRED TWO SAFES TO SECURE MESSAGE TRAFFIC, MAPS AND CHARTS, AND CRYPTO MATERIALS. NO MATERIAL WAS UNSECURED EVEN THOUGH WE

SECURED THE ENTRANCE TO OUR WORK AREA.

(2) AS A SEPARATE ENTITY, WE DID NOT PREPARE SPECIAL PRODUCTS. THE 150W FURNISHED A COPY OF THEIR DATA BASE ON WHICH WE WERE TO BUILD AND CONTINUALLY UPDATE. WE DID PREPARE WEEKLY

A,B,C ~~S~~ SUMMARIES [REDACTED] TO PROVIDE THE COMMANDER AND KEY PLANNERS AN UP TO DATE REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN.

A (3) SINCE THIS ORGANIZATION DID NOT HAVE ANY DEDICATED COMMO FROM [REDACTED] OFTEN THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE DEWOTED FULL TIME TO RECEIVING AND SENDING TRAFFIC.

F. INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE:

~~1~~ (1) PRIMARY STAFF INTERFACE WAS BETWEEN THE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. THE LOGISTICAL OFFICER PLAYED A SUBSTANCIAL ROLE IN MISSION PLANNING; HOWEVER, HE DID NOT HAVE A [REDACTED] CLEARANCE AND DIDN'T HAVE A NEED TO KNOW ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

1 G (2) [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] ATTENDED ALL MAJOR CONFERENCES AND EXERCISES. AT FT CAMPBELL WHERE THE FLIGHT CREWS COULD NOT ENTER THE SSO, WE ESTABLISHED A SECURE WORKING AREA WHERE THE FLIGHT CREWS COULD ACCOMPLISH MISSION PLANNING AND BRIEFINGS. SNOWBIRD MATERIALS WERE CARRIED TO THE AREA WHEN THE BRIEFINGS WERE CONDUCTED. AT THE COMPLETION OF THE BRIEFINGS, THE MATERIAL WAS COURIED BACK TO THE SSO FOR STORAGE.

G. EXTERNAL/LATERAL INTERFACE:

A,G (1) 1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING - OUR INTERFACE WITH THE 101ST SO WAS EXTENSIVE. ON 26 AUG [REDACTED] WENT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AND MET [REDACTED] THE A2 OR MY COUNTERPART FROM THIS ORGANIZATION. AFTER MEETING WITH [REDACTED] ON THE 27TH WE TRAVELED TO [REDACTED] HE WAS TO SPEND THE NEXT MONTH RESEARCHING THIS UNIT'S DATA BASE (WHICH WAS LATER TO BECOME THE BASIS FOR THE 101ST DATA BASE) AND THE EXPERIENCE DURING THE RICEBOWL OPERATION.

A,G (2) WE WORKED FOR DAYS EXCHANGING THOUGHTS AND IDEAS ON PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS. WE DECIDED UPON THE USE OF THE SINGLE DATA BASE, SINCE DURING THE CURRENT SNOWBIRD OPTION OUR HELICOPTERS WOULD FLY TOGETHER. [REDACTED] SENT A MESSAGE BACK TO FT CAMPBELL ESTABLISHING A FILE SYSTEM THAT WAS IDENTICAL TO 1ST SOW'S. THE IDEA WAS THAT IF WE DEPLOYED TO SEVERAL FORWARD OPERATING BASES WE WOULD BRIEF TOGETHER UTILIZING PERSONNEL FROM BOTH ORGANIZATIONS AT EACH LOCATION. SIMILAR FILES WOULD FACILITATE RESEARCH INTO THE DATA BASE.

(3) WE ALSO DEVELOPED AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MAP REQUIREMENTS FOR EXERCISE AS WELL AS FOR DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS. THE EXERCISE REQUIRED THOUSANDS OF CHARTS WHICH MEANT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MAP DEPOT. THIS DEPOT WAS MANNED BY BOTH AIR FORCE AND ARMY PERSONNEL WHO HANDLED ONC, TPC, JOG, AND SMALLER SCALE MAPS.

A,G (4) DURING THE MONTH [REDACTED] SPENT AT [REDACTED], HE PARTICIPATED IN THREE TRAINING EXERCISES. THIS PARTICIPATION INCLUDED WRITING SCENARIOS, DEVELOPING THREAT, AND FORMAL BRIEFINGS.

~~SECRET~~

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SECRET

THEIR PORTION OF THE COMPOUND ASSAULT. AFTER SATISFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FLIGHT CREWS, [REDACTED] WORKED WITH THE DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND THEIR ACTIONS IN THE FIRST ATTEMPT AND THEIR SYSTEM OF COLLECTION, ANALYZATION, AND STORAGE OF SNOWBIRD INFORMATION.

A H. UNIT [REDACTED] INTERFACE:

(1) INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE BEGAN WITH THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING THE STAFF RECEIVED ON AUG 1980. AN EXTENSIVE BRIEFING WAS PROVIDED TO BRING US UP TO DATE ON THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT AND THE EVENTS FOLLOWING.

B,C

[REDACTED]

(2) THE MAIN EXTENT OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE 101ST AND THE [REDACTED] WAS BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

A,G

(3) MAJ. PREVOST WAS THE FOCAL POINT FOR WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT, RADAR COVERAGE, MILITARY FLIGHTS, AND ESCAPE AND EVASIONS PLANS.

G

(4) PERHAPS OUR GREATEST INTERACTION INVOLVED THE INTELLIGENCE PORTIONS OF TRAINING EXERCISES. WHILE OTHER [REDACTED] MEMBERS SUPPORTED FROM THE PENTAGON [REDACTED] AT THE FIELD SITE COORDINATING BRIEFINGS AND INSURING PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT. [REDACTED] BEING AN AVIATOR, PROVIDED DETAILED INFORMATION [REDACTED]

A,B,C

(5) [REDACTED] WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF [REDACTED] MAPS, AND SPECIAL REQUESTS REQUIRING THE WORK OF DIA PHOTO INTERPRETTERS. HE PROVIDED COVERAGE OF LANDING ZONES [REDACTED] AND TARGETS FOR HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. WHILE OUR PRIMARY CONTACT WAS WITH THESE INDIVIDUALS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE J-2 STAFF SHOULD BE COMMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORTS PROVIDED IN THE SNOWBIRD MISSION.

A,B,C

I. ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:

(1) PROBLEM: SECURITY CLEARANCE

(A) DISCUSSION: ARMY AVIATORS POSSESS A SECRET SECURITY CLEARANCE WHICH WOULD SUFFICE FOR NORMAL DUTIES. HOWEVER, THOSE AVIATORS CHOSEN TO WORK ON THIS PROJECT REQUIRED ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL TO SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION. WE BEGAN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS TO INITIATE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS. BUT FOUND THAT THIS WAS DRAWING MORE ATTENTION THAN WE DESIRED. DUE TO THIS ATTENTION

A,B,C

I RECOMMENDED TO [REDACTED] WE STOP THIS PROCESS AND GRANT A "ONE TIME ACCESS" TO THE AVIATORS. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY [REDACTED] ON 17 OCT 61.

A

(B) RECOMMENDATION: THAT THOSE AVIATORS CHOSEN TO CONTINUE IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING HAVE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND MAINTAIN A SECRET CLEARANCE. THIS COULD BE UPGRADED TO TOP SECRET SHOULD THE NEED OCCUR.

C

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(A) DISCUSSION: DURING THE TRAINING FOR SNOWBIRD OPTIONS, INTELLIGENCE SEEMED TO TAKE A "BACK SEAT" TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS. AFTER ROUTES WERE PLANNED FOR AN EXERCISE IE., THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE ASKED TO DEVELOP A "THREAT" WHICH DEPICTED THE ESTABLISHED ROUTE. LATER WHEN THE THREAT WAS ESTABLISHED FIRST, THE "THREAT" HAD TO BE CHANGED TO ENABLE MISSION PLANNERS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TRAINING. THIS THREAT WAS AS REALISTIC TO THE REAL WORLD THREAT IN IRAN AS WE CHANGE THIS THREAT NEGATED THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TRAINING SINCE THE THREAT IN IRAN WOULD NOT CHANGE.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THOSE THAT ARE OBTAINED DURING TRAINING EXERCISES.

(3) PROBLEM: INTELLIGENCE - TRAINING SUPPORT

(S) (A) DISCUSSION: DUE TO THE MINIMAL STAFFING OF THE J-2, AND THEIR TOTAL DEDICATION TO LOCATING THE HOSTAGES, SUPPORT OF TRAINING EXERCISES WAS OFTEN LACKING. IF THE CSOW HAD NOT ESTABLISHED ITS OWN MAP DEPOT, WE WOULD HAD WAITED UNTIL THE ELEVENH HOUR TO RECIEVE MOST MAPS AND CHARTS. SITE SURVEYS TO DETERMINE TRAINING LOCATIONS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALWAYS ACCOMPLISHED AT THE LAST MINUTE REQUIRING "EMERGENCY" SMALL SCALE MAPS

BC AND PHOTOGRAPHY REQUESTS. [REDACTED] BY WAITING UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MINUTE, WEATHERD OUT, AND SOMETIMES FLOWN OVER THE WRONG TARGET.

(S) (B) RECOMMENDATIONS: ESTABLISH PERSONNEL TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REALISTIC SENARIOS AND THREAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH MISSION TRAINING. [REDACTED] ESTABLISH A MAP DEPOT FOR SUPPORT OF REAL WORLD AND EXERCISE PLANNING. [REDACTED] ALSO DEVELOPE A "FILE" OF FIELD SITE PHOTOS TO PREVENT LAST MINUTE COORDINATION FOR PHOTOGRAPHY.

(4) PROBLEM: COMMUNICATION CENTER

(S) (A) DISCUSSION- DURING THE SNOWBIRD MISSION, THE [REDACTED] J-2 WAS NOT PROVIDED ANY COMM CENTER PERSONNEL, UNLIKE OTHER UNITS, TO MAN THE EQUIPMENT. THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE COMM CENTER EQUIPMENT. OFTEN OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF THIS INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL'S TIME WAS SPENT PREPARING AND RECIEVING MESSAGE TRAFFIC. DURING EXERCISES WHEN SOME PERSONNEL WERE DEPLOYED TO FIELD SITES, THIS INCREASED TO ONE HUNDRED PERCENT. NO COMM CENTER PERSONNEL, EXCEPT THE SSO PERSONNEL [REDACTED] WHICH PROHIBITED UTILIZATION OF SOME UNIT PERSONNEL.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: HIGHER HEADQUARTERS SHOULD PROVIDE THE EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ASSIGNED MISSION.

(S) (U) PROBLEM: COMPARTIMENTATION

(A) DISCUSSION- DURING THE SNOWBIRD MISSION, MUCH OF THE OPERATIONS WERE COMPARTIMENTED WHICH WAS RIGHTFULLY SO, HOWEVER, I DEVELOPED THROUGH EXCHANGES WITH MY COUNTERPARTS, A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MY MISSION AND NEW IDEAS/TECHNIQUES FOR ACCOMPLISHING THEM.

(S) (B) RECOMMENDATION: DURING THE PLANNING FUR EXECUTION OF AN OPTION, CONFERENCES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD CONDUCTED PERIODICALLY TO UPDATE, REFINE, AND DEVELOP NEW IDEAS. THE CONFERENCES I ATTENDED [REDACTED] SEEM TO HAVE "NEW" PERSONNEL AT EACH MEETING RATHER THAN DEVELOPING SOME CONTINUITY.

6. POC THIS HQ IS [REDACTED] AUTOVON 635-4546
REVW 23 JAN 01
DL

Secret

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, 544TH STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE WING (SAC)
DEPUTY AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113



20 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JCS SPECIAL PLANNING TEAM

Subject: Special Mission Analysis, 16-19 April 1980 (U)

G 1. (U) At the request of JCS (J3) staff officer [redacted] the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing's Strategic Targeting Intelligence Center (STIC) conducted a detailed analysis of the attrition probabilities and the vertical obstructions which pertained to a defined mission. Initial contact for project approval was made between the JCS project officer and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence on 16 April 1980.

2 (U) (TS) The mission involved the covert penetration and exit of a single MC-130 Combat Talon special mission into Iranian airspace. Three ingress routes were specified, defined as Valley, Backdoor, and N1. Three egress routes, defined as South, North, and N1, were also provided. Ingress and egress routes were not connected in the tasking specified. Data was provided via DACOM from AFXOP (Special Plans) and is returned as directed as Attachment 1.

G A G 3 (TS) STIC was requested to evaluate the routes provided and develop probabilities of attrition for each. [redacted] specified that the [redacted] These parameters were reiterated on query, and further cross checked with [redacted] subsequently designated as the STIC point of contact.

A, B 4 (TS) By agreement, STIC developed four cases for the attrition evaluation. Case One assessed the probability of attrition under conditions [redacted]

C In addition, STIC conducted an evaluation of the vertical obstructions which, within five miles of the center line of each ingress and egress route, could pose a threat to the mission. [redacted]

[redacted] The results of the attrition analyses are at Attachment 2. In the absence of defined linkage between specific ingress and egress routes in Attachment 1, STIC analysts have connected the combinations to provide a range of values for the probability of arrival at a friendly base. In addition, because the egress of the mission cannot

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CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDA NMCC
 DECLASSIFIED TO Secret
REVIEW BY OADR
REVIEW FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

C
be handled in the same warning context as the ingress conditions, the [redacted] position defenders along the egress routes was considered. While the possibility of the defenders picking the right egress route is remote, [redacted] significantly increases the risk to this phase of the mission.

C
6. (S) In particular, the issues of Iranian pilot proficiency and the capability of the radar system operators are not clear. The operational readiness of the F-14 and the Phoenix missile is also in question. [redacted]

Moreover it is thought, for example, that there may be only sufficient missiles to effectively arm five or less F-14s. Since these factors are decisive in the computation of engagement success, all analyses have afforded the defender the more sophisticated capability. As a consequence, the risk to the penetrator may be lower than that which is computed and shown in Attachment 2.

G
[redacted]
[redacted] STIC, 544 SIW

- 2 Atch
- 1. Ingress/Egress Routing
- 2. Attrition Analyses Results

Approved.

James C. Enney
JAMES C. ENNEY, Major General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence
Headquarters, Strategic Air Command

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS

~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~
C

Ingress N1, Egress N1 [redacted]
Ingress Valley, Egress North ✓
Ingress Backdoor, Egress South ✓

CASE #1	CASE #2	CASE #3	CASE #4
.035	.505	.674 //	.931

[redacted]

.035	1.0	.704	1.0
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C

Ingress N1, Egress N1 [redacted]
Ingress Valley, Egress South
Ingress Backdoor, Egress North

.035	.505	.674	.931
------	------	------	------

[redacted]

.035	1.0	.704	1.0
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Average Mission Success

.035	.753	.689	.966
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROBABILITY OF ARRIVAL AT FRIENDLY AIR BASE BY ROUTE COMBINATIONS

	CASE #1	CASE #2	CASE #3	CASE #4
<i>B</i> Ingress N1, Egress N1 [REDACTED]	.36 .36	.97 1.0	.88 .91	.99 ✓ 1.0
<i>C</i> Ingress Valley, Egress North [REDACTED]	.31 .31	.93 1.0	.89 .91	.98 1.0
<i>C</i> Ingress Valley, Egress South [REDACTED]	.31 .31	.56 1.0	.86 ✓ .86	.96 1.0
<i>C</i> Ingress Backdoor, Egress North [REDACTED]	.31 .31	.93 1.0	.89 .91	.98 1.0
<i>C</i> Ingress Backdoor, Egress South [REDACTED]	.31 .31	.56 1.0	.86 .86	.96 1.0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROBABILITY TO ATTRIT FOR EACH ROUTE SEGMENT

	INGRESS VALLEY	INGRESS BACKDOOR	INGRESS N1	EGRESS SOUTH*	EGRESS NORTH*	EGRESS N1*	EGRESS SOUTH	EGRESS NORTH	EGRESS N1
Case #1	.44	.44	.40	.44	.44	.40	.44	.44	.40
Case #2	0	0	0	.44	.07	.03	0	0	0
Case #3 (Wong) ✓	.07	.07	.06	.07	.04	.06	.07	.02	.03
Case #4 (N. Wong) ✓	0	0	0	.04	.02	.01	0	0	0

BC

[REDACTED]

XASP 0010/108 00 00 00

Declassify on: Originating Agency's Determination Required

((THIS MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED ~~TOP SECRET~~ UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE IN ITS ENTIRETY))

RISK ASSESSMENT

//HOLD IN WORKING PAPER STATUS - SUBJECT TO FINAL APPROVAL BY
//DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

KEY QUESTIONS

A. THREE-TO-FIVE FIAED WING AIRCRAFT TO PENETRATE IRAN IN CLOSE
TRAIL OR WITH ONE HOUR SEPARATION CONTACT RECON ETC

RISK: 3

B. UP TO 3 OR 4 FIVED WING AIRCRAFT AND 4 TO 5 HELICOPTERS PENETRATE
IRAN, LAND REMAIN ON GROUND 2 HOURS, ETC

RISK: 5

C. UP TO 3 OR 4 FIVED WING AIRCRAFT AND 4 TO 5 HELICOPTERS PENETRATE
AND LAND THREE TIMES IN THE SAME AREA OVER A 3-5 DAY OR IRREGULARLY
OVER A 3 TO 10 DAY PERIOD

RISK: 7

D. APPROXIMATELY 2 500 CUBIC FEET OF SEMI-MOVEABLE EQUIPMENT IS
DELIVERED VIA AIR DROP MOVED TO COVER AND LEFT UNATTENDED FOR

- 1 TWO DAYS RISK: 3
- 2 FOUR DAYS RISK: 3
- 3 SIX DAYS RISK: 4
- 4 TEN DAYS RISK: 5
- 5 TWO WEEKS RISK: 5
- 6 THREE WEEKS RISK: 6 PLUS

BACKGROUND

[REDACTED]

THEY WILL BE RISK FOR ITEM A AT 1
AND FOR ITEMS B AND C AT BETWEEN 2 AND 4 THE RISK FACTOR IS ONLY
APPLICABLE TO HELICOPTERS IF LAUNCH OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN FULL
VIEW OF SOVIET INDIAN OCEAN ESPADRA ELEMENTS SCREENING OF LAUNCH
OPERATIONS AND GOOD CO-SEC WOULD REDUCE RISK OF SOVIET DETECTION
TO [REDACTED]

IRANIAN ASSESSMENT ANALYSTS NOTE THAT THE LACK OF SPECIFIC
INFORMATION REGARDING FLIGHT ROUTES AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT INCLUDING
THE NOISE GENERATED BY THE AIRCRAFT AFFECTED THE CAPABILITY TO
ACCURATELY ASSESS RISKS. CHANCES OF DETECTION ARE INCREASED
IF NOISY AIRCRAFT ARE INVOLVED AND IF FLIGHT ACTIVITY IS
CONCENTRATED IN TIME OR TERRITORY. THE RISK ASSESSMENT ASSUMES
THAT AIR OPERATIONS WILL TRUELY [REDACTED]
AND THAT MEANINGFUL DETECTION (THE DETECTOR REPORTS WHAT HAS BEEN
SEEN TO HIGHER AUTHORITY IS THE QUESTION ANALYSTS BELIEVE
THAT RISK OF DETECTION OF ANY ONE PHASE OF A PENETRATION IS
[REDACTED] THE RISK FACTOR OF THE TOTAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

(U)
PENETRATION AND DEPLOYMENT GOING UNDETECTED HOWEVER IS SUBSTANTIALLY
HIGHER RISK 7 TO 8
REV. 14 APR 2010

NF53185


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[REDACTED]

Releasing On: Originating Agency's Determination Required



RISK ASS
XX Apr
B-13

11 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DIA, [REDACTED]

Subject: Risk Assessment

1. (TS) Request your analysis of risk of detection of clandestine penetration of Iranian airspace by a small mixed force of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. All flight activity would be at low altitude [500-2,000 feet AGL under cover of darkness. All flight tracks will be flown over isolated areas of Iran and outside of all known Iranian radar coverage. All potential ground operating areas are isolated but some occasional civilian activity can be anticipated at locations during a 3-5 day period.

2. (u) Key questions are listed below. A numerical value assessment on a scale of one to ten (10 is high risk) should be applied to each question/sub-question. What are chances of detection if:

a. (u) (TS) Three-five fixed wing aircraft were to penetrate Iran in close trail or with one hour separation, conduct recon, RTB.

b. (u) (TS) Up to 3-4 fixed wing aircraft and 4-5 helicopters penetrate Iran, land/remain on ground 2 hours, RTB.

c. (u) (TS) Up to 3-4 fixed wing aircraft and 4-5 helicopters penetrate and land three times in the same area over a 3-5 day or irregularly over a 3 to 10 day period.

d. (u) (TS) Approximately 2,500 cubic feet of semi-moveable equipment is delivered via airdrop, moved to cover and left unattended for:

- (1) Two days
- (2) Four days
- (3) Six days
- (4) Ten days
- (5) Two weeks
- (6) Three weeks

James B. Vaught
JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
GENERATED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, WMCC
 UNCLASSIFIED SECRET
REVIEW ON OADR
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
~~TOP SECRET~~

B-139

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

15 1980

Subject: Risk Assessment (U) (#008)



C

2. (U) (TS) With the foregoing as background, the chances of detection for each sub-question are assessed on a scale of one to ten as follows:
- a. (U) (TS) 3-5 fixed wing aircraft in close trail or with one hour separation is probably 3-4.
 - b. (U) (TS) 3-4 fixed wing aircraft and 4-5 helicopters staying 2 hours and RTB is probably 4-5.
 - c. (U) (TS) 3-4 fixed wing aircraft and 4-5 helicopters landing 3 times over a 3-5 day or irregularly 3-10 day period is probably 5-6.
 - d. (U) (TS) Equipment air-dropped, concealed, and left unattended for:

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO, NMC

~~TOP SECRET~~

(0)

(1) Two days = 2-3

(2) Four days = 3-4

(3) Six days = 4-5

(4) Ten days = 5-6

(5) Two weeks = 6-7

(6) Three weeks = 6-7

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX B, Updated
JAN 1980

B-140

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #5

REFERENCES:

- A. JTF MSG 216: SUBJ: COMPOUND PERIMETER SECURITY
- B. JTF MSG 214: SUBJ: HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT
- C. JTF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #4

1. THIS ASSESSMENT CONSOLIDATES AND SUPERCEDES DATA CONTAINED IN REFERENCES. THE FORMAT OF THIS ASSESSMENT IS IAW WITH THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX OF AN OPLAN/OPORD AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH. MAJOR CHANGES/SUPPLEMENTS TO THIS ASSESSMENT WILL BE MADE BY TTY AND WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN THE SUBJECT AS SUCH. THE FOLLOWING INDEX IS PROVIDED AS A BASE OF REFERENCE:

PART I: SITUATION (2)

- A. GENERAL
- B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA
- C. HOSTAGE DISTRIBUTION
- D. GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION
- E. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCE
- F. ENEMY COMMAND AND CONTROL
- G. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

AC

PART II: BACKGROUND (4)

- A. GROUND FORCES
- B. AIR DEFENSE/AIR FORCES
- C. NAVAL FORCES

PART III: KEY EXTERNAL LOCATIONS (2)

- A. MAIN MILITARY AIRFIELD
- B. SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD
- C. MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD

AFB

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E8 1258
 CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 DERIVATIVE IN Secret
 REVIEW BY OADR
 DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By: JCS
 Declassified ON: OADR

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ITAN'S

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2. PART I SITUATION

(u) A. GENERAL: ON 4 NOVEMBER 1979 MEMBERS OF AN IRANIAN STUDENT GROUP SWARMED ON TO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND IN TEHRAN, TOOK THE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE AND STATED THEY WOULD HOLD THE EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE UNTIL THE USG RETURNED THE SHAH TO IRAN FOR TRIAL. THE TAKE OVER WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT BLOODSHED. APPROXIMATELY 62 AMCITS AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF IRANIAN AND 3RD COUNTRY CITIZENS WERE INITIALLY HELD. SHORTLY AFTER THE TAKE OVER THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL WERE RELEASED. ON 19 NOVEMBER THE "STUDENTS" BEGAN TO RELEASE SELECTED HOSTAGES, LARGELY NON-WHITE AMCIT MALES, AMCIT FEMALES AND 3RD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THE REMAINING AMERICAN HOSTAGES INCLUDE TWO WOMEN AND 48-50 MALES. THE "STUDENTS" REMAIN ADAMANT IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR THE RETURN OF THE SHAH AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE IRAN GOVERNMENT (REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) HAVE REFUSED TO HONOR THE INJUNCTION OF THE WORLD COURT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND RETURN THE EMBASSY TO AMERICAN CONTROL.

(u) - IN ADDITION BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE "STUDENTS" HAVE STATED THEY PLAN TO PUT THE REMAINING HOSTAGES ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE. ALTHOUGH THE LABEL "STUDENTS" IS USED IN THE MEDIA AND IN THIS REPORT WHEN REFERRING TO THE PRINCIPAL CAPTIVES THE LABEL IS NOT CORRECT. THE "STUDENT CAPTIVE" FORCE CONSISTS OF A GROUP OF SENIOR MEDICAL, ENGINEERING AND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS BELONGING TO A MOJAHEDIN FACTION WHICH SUBSCRIBES TO A BLEND OF ISLAM AND MARXISM. SEVERAL LEFTIST INSTRUCTORS FROM TEHRAN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, MEMBERS OF THE TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY MAY HAVE ALSO INFILTRATED THESE GROUPS. IN ADDITION, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COLLECTIVE GROUP (WHICH IS CALLED A COMMITTEE) RECEIVES COUNSEL ON PROPAGANDA, AND SECURITY MATTERS FROM PLO AND FEYADEEN ADVISORS. THE SITUATION HAS NOW CRYSTALLIZED TO THE POINT THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTRACTED AND UNCOMPROMISING NATURE OF THE IRANIAN POSITION. THE SITUATION APPEARS TO BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM WITHOUT AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN OR THE USG.

(u) B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA: THE EMBASSY COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN CENTRAL TEHRAN (UTM 39S-WV-383518//GEOGRAPHIC 4230N/5125E). THE COMPOUND AREA CONSISTS OF 27 ACRES OF FLAT TERRAIN SHAPED IN BASICALLY A RECTANGLE PATTERN RUNNING NORTH/SOUTH. THE COMPOUND IS BOUNDED ON THE SOUTH BY TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD WHICH IS A MAJOR EAST/WEST THOROUGHFARE; ON THE EAST BY ROOSEVELT STREET, (A RELATIVELY BUSY NORTH/SOUTH ROAD); ON THE WEST BY AMERICA AVENUE AND THE NORTH BY ARDALAN STREET. THE MAIN BUILDING (CHANCERY) RUNS EAST/WEST AND FORMS THE BASE LINE REFERENCE POINT. THE CHANCERY FACES ON TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD. THE COMPOUND CAN BE DIVIDED INTO FOUR GENERAL AREAS, GROUPED AROUND TWO PLAYING FIELDS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF THE COMPOUND. THE CHANCERY AND MOTOR POOL AREA ARE TO THE SOUTH. THE WAREHOUSE, TEMPORARY APARTMENTS AND SUPPLY AREA ARE TO THE NORTH. THE COMMISSARY, CONSULATE STAFF COTTAGES AND OLD POLICE QUARTERS ARE TO THE WEST. THE AMBASSADOR'S AND DCM RESIDENCES ARE LOCATED IN THE EASTERN HALF OF THE COMPOUND WHICH IS FORESTED WITH HIGH TRUNKED PINE TREES. THE NORTHWEST SEGMENT OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND ABUTS AN IRANIAN ARMY DEPOT. THE COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A SERIES OF WALLS AND FENCES WHICH RESTRICT INTERIOR VISIBILITY FROM THE SURROUNDING STREETS. STREET AND BUILDING LIGHTS ARE LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE COMPOUND AND SURROUNDING AREAS BUT MANY ARE NOT FUNCTIONING.

B-2 ~~TOP SECRET~~

(1) (u) THE COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN DOWNTOWN TEHRAN IN THE MIDST OF A MIXED BUSINESS AND RESIDENTIAL AREA, WITH RELATIVELY EASY ROAD ACCESS FROM THE NORTH AND EAST. SEVERAL HIGH BUILDINGS IN THE AREA PROVIDE GOOD VANTAGE POINTS FOR VIEWING THE INTERIOR OF THE COMPOUND. A MAJOR SPORTS COMPLEX WITH LARGE STADIUM AND SEVERAL PLAYING FIELDS IS LOCATED NORTHEAST OF THE COMPOUND DIAGONALLY ACROSS ROOSEVELT AVENUE. A LARGE PARKING LOT IS ALSO LOCATED EAST OF THE COMPOUND ON ROOSEVELT, MIDWAY BETWEEN THE STADIUM AND TASHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD.

(2) (u) THE BUILDINGS FACING THE COMPOUND ON THE SOUTH (TAKHT-E-JAMSHID) ARE MOSTLY OFFICE BUILDINGS WITH SOME RESIDENTS. ON THE WEST SIDE THE PRINCIPAL STRUCTURES APPEAR TO BE FOUR SMALL BUT AFFLUENT PROFESSIONAL OFFICE BUILDINGS SURROUNDED BY TREES AND BACKED BY TWO LARGE PARKING LOTS. THE NORTH SIDE OF THE COMPOUND BACKS INTO A MIDDLE CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA CONSISTING OF THREE BLOCKS OF MULTI-STORY APARTMENT HOUSES.


(3) (u) ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE EMBASSY TAKEOVER IS LARGELY LOCALIZED WITHIN A TWO BLOCK RADIUS OF THE COMPOUND EVEN WHEN MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ON GOING.

(4) (u) TRAFFIC IN THE CITY IS HIGHLY CONGESTED BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0600-2300 DURING THE ISLAMIC WORK WEEK (SAT-WED) DECREASING IN VOLUME ON THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND (THURS-FRI) ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC ACTIVITY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE THURSDAY NIGHT UNTIL 0200 FRIDAY MORNING.

(5) (u) THE EMBASSY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KM WEST OF THE NEAREST AIRFIELD (DOSHAN-TAPPEH AFB WHICH IS A NON COMBAT BASE). TWO OTHER AIRFIELDS ARE WITHIN 10KM, GHALI-MORGHJI, AN ARMY LIGHT AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTER FIELD IS 8KM SSW AND MEHRABAD INTERNATIONAL IS LOCATED 10 KM WSW.

(6) (u) WEATHER AT THIS TIME OF YEAR IS COMPARABLE TO NW UNITED STATES/DENVER COLORADO WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS, OCCASSIONAL MIST/RAIN IN THE CITY AND SNOW IN THE NEARBY MOUNTAINS. WINTER TEMPERATURES ORDINARILY RANGE BETWEEN 20 AND 40 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AT NIGHT RAISING TO THE MID FIFTIES DURING THE DAY.

(S)



E. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES
REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE STUDENT GUARDS AND PASDARAN ARE AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PRINCIPAL FORCES AND THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OR HEARD A MAJOR DISTURBANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND ARE SHOWN BELOW:

- (1) WITHIN 4-7 MIN; FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.
- (2) WITHIN 10-15 MIN; REINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HQS AND PASDARAN KOMITEH STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.
- (3) WITHIN 15-20 MIN; 100-300 PASDARAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS.

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G. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

(1) PRIOR TO INITIATION OF RESCUE OPERATION

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION, I.E. HOLD ALL HOSTAGES PENDING RETURN OF THE SHAH.
- (2) BEGIN TO EXECUTE HOSTAGES AS MEANS OF APPLYING PRESSURE ON US.
- (3) MOVE HOSTAGES FROM AMEMB COMPOUND TO PRISONS OR OTHER LOCATIONS IN TEHRAN.
- (4) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES WITHOUT TRIAL.
- (5) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES; HOLD REMAINDER UNDER THREAT OF TRIAL.
- (6) CONVENE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF U.S. IMPROPRIETIES.
- (7) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL PUBLISHES ITS FINDINGS.
- (8) GRANT CLEMENCY TO ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INDIVIDUAL ESPIONAGE TRIALS.
- (9) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES FOLLOWING ESPIONAGE TRIALS; SENTENCE THOSE FOUND GUILTY TO PRISON TERMS OR DEATH.

(B) PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, 30-45 DAYS, THE IRANIANS WILL MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION, CONVENE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, AND PREPARE FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIALS. THEY WILL NEITHER RELEASE ALL THE HOSTAGES NOR COMMENCE ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS. (NOTE: THE POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE IRANIAN HIERARCHY CONTINUES. THE "STUDENTS" AT THE COMPOUND, THE IRG, KHOMEINI AND THE CLERGY, AND OTHER GROUPS ARE VYING FOR POWER. LEFTIST ELEMENTS WITHIN EACH OF THESE GROUPS ALSO ARE MAKING THEIR INFLUENCE FELT. GIVEN THESE POLITICAL CONDITIONS, THE POSSIBILITY OF UNEXPECTED AND/OR ILLOGICAL BEHAVIOUR BY ANY OF THESE GROUPS WITH REGARD TO THE HOSTAGES IS HIGH. FOR THE TIME BEING, THOUGH, THE "STUDENTS" ARE IN CHARGE AT THE COMPOUND, AND THEIR ACTIONS/PRONOUNCEMENTS STILL HAVE THE PRIMARY IMPACT ON THE HOSTAGES' WELL-BEING.)

(2) DURING ASSAULT PHASE

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) SURRENDER HOSTAGES TO THE US RAID FORCE WITH MINIMAL RESISTANCE.
- (2) RESIST THE RAID FORCE WITH ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS AND PERSONNEL.
- (3) KILL HOSTAGES ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED.
- (4) REINFORCE PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND WITH KHOMITEH AND/OR IRANIAN ARMY ELEMENTS.
- (5) ENGAGE US PERSONNEL IN AND NEAR THE COMPOUND WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS.

(B) PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND ARE NON-MILITARY AND HAVE ACQUIRED ONLY LIMITED MILITARY TRAINING. NEVERTHELESS, SUFFICIENT MILITARY-TRAINED INDIVIDUALS ARE PRESENT WHO WILL OFFER A CREDIBLE RESISTANCE DURING THE ASSAULT PHASE. GUARD PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO RESIST THE ASSAULT FORCE WITH SMALL ARMS, GRENADES, AND POSSIBLY MINES. SOME PERSONNEL WHO ARE GUARDING THE HOSTAGES WILL ATTEMPT TO KILL THE HOSTAGES WITH SMALL ARMS/GRENADES; ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED. IRREGULAR FORCES IN TEHRAN WILL ATTEMPT TO REINFORCE THE COMPOUND AS SOON AS THE ALARM IS GIVEN. THE POSSIBILITY THAT MILITARY AIR ASSETS WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND EXISTS, BUT IS NOT CONSIDERED LIKELY.

(3) DURING EXTRACTION

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) PROVIDE TOKEN OR NO RESISTANCE.
- (2) ENGAGE US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS ENROUTE TO EXTRACTION AIRFIELD.
- (3) ENGAGE US FORCES AT EXTRACTION AIRFIELD WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS/GROUND ELEMENTS.
- (4) PURSUE AND ATTEMPT TO DESTROY US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS FROM EXTRACTION AIRFIELD TO AREAS OUTSIDE OF IRANIAN AIRSPACE.

(B) PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION

THE CAPABILITIES OF THE IRANIAN ARMY/AIR FORCE ARE LIMITED. HOWEVER, ONLY ONE DETERMINED FIGHTER/HELICOPTER PILOT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO WREAK HAVOC ON THE RAID FORCE DURING EXTRACTION. THE LIKLIHOOD OF IRANIAN MILITARY EFFORTS TO ENGAGE RAID FORCE AIRCRAFT OR CONDUCT GROUND ATTACK OPERATIONS WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS AGAINST THE EXTRACTION AIRFIELD IS CONSIDERED HIGH; IF THE US PRESENCE AND PURPOSE IS DETECTED AND REPORTED AND EXCESSIVE TIME IS EXPENDED AT THE AIRHEAD AFTER EXTRACTION BEGINS. (NOTE: THE MINIMUM REACTION TIME IS ESTIMATED TO BE 60 MINUTES, WITH THE MOST PROBABLE BEING 90 MINUTES. REACTION TIMES ARE CALCULATED FROM THE TIME THAT THE COMPOUND ASSAULT ENTERS THE OVERT ACTION PHASE, AND IS FURTHER QUALIFIED BY THE ASSUMPTION THAT US FORCE PRESENCE AND PURPOSE AT THE AIRHEAD BECOMES KNOWN TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES IN TEHRAN. ALTHOUGH ATTEMPTS TO INTERCEPT EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT ARE POSSIBLE, THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY LOW IF PROPER PRECAUTIONS (RADIO SILENCE, LOW ALTITUDE, RADAR AND POPULATION CENTER AVOIDANCE) ARE EMPLOYED BY THE EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT. A, B

3. PART II BACKGROUND.

THE INCREASED TENSION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BROUGHT ABOUT AT LEAST IN PART BY THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN, DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND THE RESULTANT FEAR OF FOREIGN AGGRESSION HAVE LED THE IRANIAN MILITARY TO ISSUE DIRECTIVES AIMED AT INCREASING ITS STATE OF PREPAREDNESS. THESE DIRECTIVES, WHILE HAVING A SHORT TERM EFFECT OF RALLYING PEOPLE BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT, MAY PRODUCE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT IF CONTINUED FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME.

A. GROUND FORCES

(1) THE REGULAR ARMY NUMBERS APPROX 150,000, ABOUT HALF WHAT IT WAS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION. THE BULK IS STATIONED ALONG BORDERS WITH IRAQ AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE ARMY IS WELL EQUIPPED BUT HINDERED BY LACK OF MAINTENANCE AND SPARE PARTS. DISCIPLINE AND MORALE ARE LOW IN SOME UNITS, DUE TO INTERFERENCE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD.

UNITS IN THE NORTHWEST AND IRAQI BORDER AREAS ARE OCCUPIED WITH SUPPRESSING THE KURDS. EXTRA TROOPS AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO THESE AREAS AS REINFORCEMENTS. IN THE SOUTHWEST THERE HAS BEEN SOME GUERRILLA ACTIVITY BY ETHNIC ARABS, BUT THIS HAS NOT REACHED THE DIMENSIONS OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM. IRAQ HAS INCREASED PRESSURE IN THE WEST BY A SERIES OF BORDER INCIDENTS, RESULTING IN CONSIDERABLE REINFORCEMENT OF THIS AREA.

~~B~~ AIR DEFENSE/ AIR FORCES

(1) FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

(A) THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF

THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED BY MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY AND TRAINING PROBLEMS.

IRAN HAS A TOTAL OF APPROX 190 X F-4, 135 X F-5, AND 77 X F-7 FIGHTERS DEPLOYED PRIMARILY IN WESTERN IRAN.

REPORTEDLY ONLY 28 PILOTS HAD BEEN THROUGH INTERCEPT TRAINING AND ONLY 3 HAD FINISHED THE COMPLETE AIR DEFENSE/ AIR SUPERIORITY COURSE AND WERE OPERATIONALLY QUALIFIED AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION. ONLY 15IP'S WERE TRAINED WEAPON SYSTEMS OFFICERS AND THEY HAD ONLY BEEN THROUGH FIRST-PHASE TRAINING (SINGLE MISSILE ON A SINGLE TARGET)

(C) FIGHTER SUMMARY:

(3) [REDACTED]

C. NAVY.

THE NAVY'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY IMPAIRED SINCE THE REVOLUTION DUE TO MAINTENANCE AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS AND COMPOUNDED BY A LACK OF PARTS AND REVOLUTIONARY INTERFERENCE IN COMMAND CHANNELS. THE NAVY'S NINE HARPOON-FIRING GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOATS ARE PROBABLY IN THE BEST CONDITION OF ALL IRANIAN SHIPS. THERE ARE ALSO 3 DESTROYERS IN THE IRANIAN INVENTORY, [REDACTED]

THESE SHIPS EACH CARRY 4 "STANDARD" [REDACTED] (NAME OF MISSILE) SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES. MAINTENANCE MAY HAVE REDUCED THE MISSILE CAPABILITY. THE NAVY HAS 2 COASTAL MINESWEEPERS, [REDACTED] RH-53D MINE-SWEEPING HELICOPTERS, [REDACTED] THERE IS ALSO [REDACTED] SM-3D AND AB-31 HELICOPTERS [REDACTED]

THE IRANIAN NAVY IS NOT BELIEVED TO HAVE ANY MINES OR MINE-LAYING CAPABILITY.

4. PART III

A. MAIN ORIENTATION DATA

(1) LOCATION: MAIN MILITARY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 20NM (37KM) NE OF NAIN, 100NM (180KM) ENE OF ESFAHAN, AND 180NM (330KM) SE OF TEHRAN. GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES: 33 DEG 05 MIN 19 SEC NORTH - 053 DEG 24 MIN 28 SEC EAST (CENTER OF RUNWAY).

(2) MAP REFERENCES

- (A) 1:1,000,000 DMC 03
- (B) 1:500,000 TACTICAL PILOTAGE CHART 03C
- (C) 1:250,000 JOINT OPERATIONS GRAPHIC SERIES 1501, SHEET NI

40-9

(3) [REDACTED]
(A) [REDACTED]
(B) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B. SEMNAN NEW ORIENTATION DATA

(1) LOCATION: SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 20NM (37KM) SE OF SEMNAN TOWN AND APPROXIMATELY 120NM (220KM) EAST OF TEHRAN. GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES: 35 DEG 24 MIN 00 SEC NORTH--053 DEG 40 MIN 00 SEC EAST (CENTER OF THE RUNWAY).

(2) MAP REFERENCES:

- (A) 1:1,000,000-ONC G-5
- (B) 1:500,000 TACTICAL PILOTAGE CHART-G5C
- (C) 1:250,000 JOINT OPERATIONS GRAPHIC SERIES 1501, SHEET

NI 39-4

(D) SEMNAN NEW PHOTO MAP SUBSTITUTE

[REDACTED]

(E) ENEMY FORCES

[REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ C. MANZARIYEH ORIENTATION DATA

(1) LOCATION: MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5NM (9KM) NW OF MANZARIYEH, 20 NM (35KM) NORTH OF QOM, AND 50NM (90KM) SSW OF TEHRAN. GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES: 34 DEG 58 MIN 39 SEC NORTH--050 DEG 48 MIN 12 SEC EAST (CENTER OF THE RUNWAY).

(2) MAP REFERENCES:


- (A) 1:1,000,000-ONC G-5
- (B) 1:500,000 TACTICAL PILOTAGE CHART-G5D
- (C) 1:250,000 JOINT OPERATIONS GRAPHIC SERIES 1501, SHEET

NI 39-6

(D) MAP SUBSTITUTES: MANZARIYEH PHOTO W/GRID, APPROX SCALE

1:25,000

MANZARIYEH PHOTO SUPPLEMENT



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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDO, NMCC
 REL DOWNGR TO
REVISED BY OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

(Ricebowl) 143

MSG 0454
040010Z FEB 80
FM JTF /J-2/
TO SFOD /S-2/
U SOW /A-2/

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SUBJECT: SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE SAFE EXIT OF SIX AMERICANS FROM TEHRAN, THE CONTINUATION OF POLITICAL FACTIONALISM, THE LESSENING OF FOCUS ON THE MILITANTS HOLDING THE EMBASSY TOGETHER WITH OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE QUESTIONABLE HEALTH OF KHOMEINI MAY PORTEND A MAJOR SHIFT IN THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

(A) THE NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT BANI-SADR HAS STATED HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE HOSTAGE SITUATION RESOLVED QUICKLY. HOWEVER HIS ABILITY TO CARRY THIS THROUGH IS HIGHLY SUSPECT.

(B) FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBAZADEH HAS CONSISTENTLY ATTEMPTED TO PROLONG THE INCIDENT, HAS PUBLICLY SUPPORTED THE MILITANTS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO MANIPULATE THE SITUATION TO HIS PERSONAL BENEFIT.

(C) THE MILITANTS HAVE STATED THEY WOULD NOT TURN THE HOSTAGES OVER TO A THIRD PARTY UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED BY KHOMEINI.

(D) THE STATUS OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH IS OPEN TO QUESTION. THE COMBINATION OF ADVANCED AGE, MINOR INFIRMITIES, AND RECENT HEART CONDITIONS MAKE THE EXTENT OF HIS CONTROL AND KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY LIMITED AND HIMSELF OPEN TO MANIPULATION BY COMPETING ELEMENTS.

(E) MODERATE ELEMENTS IN IRAN ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY AND PROBABLY DESIRE THE HOSTAGE SITUATION BE RESOLVED QUICKLY WITH MINIMUM COMPLICATION. DESPITE THIS, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN REVEALING THEMSELVES IN THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT AND THEIR IMPACT ON A RESOLUTION OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IS MINIMUM TO NIL.

(F) THE LACK OF A PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT OF SUPPORT AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING OF JRD WORLD LIBERATION MOVEMENTS REPRESENTATIVES HELD IN TEHRAN IN EARLY JANUARY WAS PROBABLY A DISAPPOINTMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF A PERIOD OF INTERNAL DEBATE AMONG THE CAPTORS.

(G) THE ESCAPE OF THE SIX AMERICANS PROBABLY PROMPTED ADDITIONAL DEBATE AND AT LEAST TEMPORARY IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES

(H) AS LONG AS KHOMEINI REMAINS ALIVE HE IS A STABILIZING FACTOR. NONE OF THE COMPETING ELEMENTS HAVE THE POWER TO OPENLY TAKE AN INITIATIVE THAT MIGHT RUN COUNTER TO THE IMAM'S DESIRES OR THE DESIRES OF HIS CLOSE ADVISORS.

2. AS LONG AS KHOMEINI REMAINS ALIVE THE SITUATION...

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(A) ESCORT HOSTAGES TO AIRPORT AND RELEASE AS MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE OF GOOD WILL.

(B) RELEASE THE HOSTAGES TO A 3RD PARTY AS DIRECTED BY KHOMEINI

(C) REFUSE TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND RESTATE THEIR DEMAND FOR RETURN OF SHAH.

(D) MAINTAIN CONTROL OF HOSTAGES AND REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THEIR CAUSE BY INITIATING PUBLIC TRIALS OF SELECTED HOSTAGES.

3. HOWEVER THIS OFFICE HOLDS THAT FACTIONALISM EXISTS WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND SEVERAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT PROBABLY COMPETE FOR CONTROL.

(A) THE RELIGIOUS/MEDICAL STUDENTS WOULD BE INCLINED TO CONCLUDE THE INCIDENT WITHOUT BLOODSHED AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO OBEY A DIRECTIVE FROM KHOMEINI TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES TO A THIRD PARTY.

(B) THE MORE RADICAL FACTIONS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH RECEIVED TRAINING FROM THE PLO WOULD PROBABLY BALK AT THE IDEA OF RELEASING THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT EXACTING SOME CONCESSIONS FROM THE USG.

4. HOWEVER IF KHOMEINI WERE TO DIE WITHOUT A CLEAR MANDATE OF AUTHORITY BEING ESTABLISHED THE MILITANTS WOULD PROBABLY QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF THE PREVAILING AUTHORITIES AND CONSIDER THAT THEIR CAUSE WAS ABOUT TO BE SOLD OUT. THIS SUSPICION WOULD ENGENDER A MAJOR INTERNAL DEBATE WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.

5. IN SUMMARY ALTHOUGH NEGOTIATIONS ARE ONGOING BETWEEN IRANIAN OFFICIALS THE SGUN AND OFFICIALS OF THE USG, THE PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS (THE MILITANTS) ARE NOT INVOLVED AND THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE MILITANTS HAVE ANY INTENTIONS OF MODIFYING THEIR OBJECTIVES. THE MILITANTS, OUT OF A BELIEF THAT VICTORY IS SLOWLY ESCAPING THEM, WILL ATTEMPT TO REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THEIR CAUSE THROUGH A MAJOR PEACEFUL MEDIA EVENT. HOWEVER IF KHOMEINI SHOULD DIE PRIOR TO A RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS SOME OF THE MILITANTS MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO RESORT TO A MORE VIOLENT COURSE OF ACTION.

REVW 4 FEB 80

THESE HIGH PROFILE EVENTS POINT TO THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE AMERICAN LOCK-
DOWN. THE CONTINUATION OF POLITICAL FACTIONALISM, THE
PUBLIC DISCOURSE OF THE SAFE EXIT OF SIX AMERICANS FROM

CONNECT: SHOH1 1284 22822441

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SUBJ: MEDIA ANALYSIS, IRAN

(W) ANALYSIS OF MEDIA BROADCASTING FROM IRAN INDICATES AT LEAST THREE TYPES OF PROPAGANDA ARE IN USE AND ARE INDICATED BY THE ORIGINALS. THE THREE CATEGORIES ARE:

(A) NORMAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS

(B) REVOLUTIONARY STATEMENTS WITH MARXIST FLAVOR

(C) REVOLUTIONARY STATEMENTS WITH ISLAMIC/RELIGIOUS FLAVOR

2. EXAMPLES OF

(A) NORMAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS

(1) INTERIOR MINISTRY CIRCULAR ON LOCAL ELECTIONS
ID 271700 TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN PERSIAN 1630 GMT FEB 79

1980 LB
(3) (TEXT) ACCORDING TO PARS NEWS AGENCY, THE SUPERVISOR OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY ANNOUNCED IN A CIRCULAR TO ALL GOVERNORS AND ASSISTANTS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSTITUENCY CENTERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THAT IN CONFORMANCE WITH ARTICLE 17, SECTION 4 OF THE ACT FOR THE ELECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE ELECTORAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES INVITE ALL CLASSES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUENCY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORMATION OF ELECTORAL SUPERVISORY BOARDS, IN ORDER TO OBSERVE IMPARTIALITY AND TOTAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LETTER OF LAW AND ITS CODE OF CONDUCT. ALSO THE NUMBER AND THE LOCATION OF THE POLLING BOXES SHOULD BE DETERMINED AND SPECIFIED BY 7 MARCH, SO THAT ALL THE COMPATRIOTS MAY EASILY VOTE FOR THEIR CHOSEN CANDIDATE OR CANDIDATES DURING ELECTION DAY, 15 MARCH.

(4) (SIGNED) MOHAMMAD REZA MAHDAVI KANI.

(B) REVOLUTIONARY STATEMENTS WITH MARXIST FLAVOR

(1) REVOLUTION GUARDS ISSUES ANNOUNCEMENT ON MARCHES

(2) ID 271700 TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN PERSIAN 1630 GMT FEB 79

(3) (TEXT) ACCORDING TO A CENTRAL NEWS BUREAU REPORT THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC REVOLUTION GUARDS CORPS HAS ISSUED AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE MARCHES TO BE HELD TOMORROW AND PROBABLY FRIDAY. THE TEXT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO ALL UNITS IN THE FORM OF A CIRCULAR READS AS FOLLOWS:

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED, OPPORTUNISTS AND THE DEFEATED ENEMIES WHO NOW SEE THEIR EXISTENCE AT THE POINT OF EXTINCTION ARE HATCHING CONSPIRACIES AIMED AT TARNISHING THE PURE RECORD OF THESE SELF-SACRIFICING INDIVIDUALS (PRESUMABLY THE GUARDS) WHOSE SERVICE AND CAPABILITY IS KNOWN TO ALL CONSCIENTIOUS IRANIANS AND TO INVOLVE THE GUARDS AGAINST VARIOUS OTHER GROUPS. FOR THIS REASON WE SHOULD ACT WITH COMPLETE VIGILANCE AND NOT ALLOW THE ENEMY TO TAKE UNFAIR ADVANTAGE OF OUR ACTIONS. ACCORDING TO REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED, THE OPPORTUNISTS AND THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION ARE PLANNING TO INVOLVE THE GUARDS CORPS BROTHERS IN CLASHES DURING THE MARCHES TO BE HELD TOMORROW AND PROBABLY ON FRIDAY. THEREFORE, THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS HEREBY ANNOUNCES THAT YOU SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY KIND OF INVOLVEMENT AND NOT GIVE THE ENEMIES ANY EXCUSE FOR MISUSING THE OPPORTUNITY. WE ALSO REQUEST THE NOBLE PEOPLE TO BE COGNIZANT OF CONSPIRACIES AND PLOTS BY THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES, TO NIP THEM IN THE BUD AND NOT ALLOW THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION TO BE DIVERTED FROM ITS COURSE.

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Classified by:
DDO, NMCC
Declassify on: OADR
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DDO, NMCC

(C) REVOLUTIONARY STATEMENTS WITH ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS FLAVOR

(1) STUDENTS' REVELATION STATEMENT

(2) LD271010 TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN PERSIAN 2030 GMT 26
FEB 80 LD

(3) UNNUMBERED REVELATION STATEMENT BY THE MUSLIM STUDENT FOLLOWERS OF THE IMAM'S POLICY--RECORDED

(4) (EXCEPTS) IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL. AS THE DAYS PASS WE FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THE ENEMIES OF (WORDS INDISTINCT) AND ITS CRUEL SUPPORTERS. IT IS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER HISTORY ITSELF CAN MATCH SUCH CRIMES. THE CRIMES OF THE OPPRESSORS GO BEYOND THE LIMITS OF HUMAN NATURE. THE MIGHTY SEE THEIR SHAMEFUL EXISTENCE IN DOMINATION AND THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR CRIMES IN SMASHING AND KILLING OTHERS; AND LUST FOR POWER HAS MADE THEM BLIND AND DEAF. ALL THE OPPRESSED MUST JOIN TOGETHER AND REMOVE THE ROOTS OF CORRUPTION FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. WORLD PEACE AND SAFETY DEPEND ON THE EXTINCTION OF THE OPPRESSORS; THE OPPRESSED WILL NOT REACH THE HERITAGE GRANTED TO THEM BY ALMIGHTY GOD SO LONG AS THESE IGNORANT HEGEMONISTS ARE ALIVE IN THE WORLD.

O, OPPRESSED OF THE WORLD, TO WHATEVER REGION OR COUNTRY YOU BELONG, COME TO YOUR SENSES AND DO NOT BE AFRAID OF THE NOISE AND CLAMOR OF AMERICA AND OTHER EMPTY-HEADED SUPERPOWERS. MAKE THE WORLD TOO CONSTRICTED FOR THEM (TO LIVE IN) AND SEIZE YOUR RIGHTS FROM THEM WITH CLENCHED FISTS.

THE WORLD OF ISLAM IS NOW IN COMBAT WITH THE WORLD OF BLASPHEMY. AND THE NOBLE NATION OF IRAN, AFTER PROVIDING TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MARTYRS AND NUMEROUS CASUALTIES, IS STILL FACED WITH SATANIC PLOTS FROM ALL DIRECTIONS, ESPECIALLY FROM AMERICA. THE CRIMINAL AMERICA WHICH, AS THE IMAM SAYS, IS THE CAUSE OF ALL MISFORTUNES OF THE MUSLIMS AND IS PLOTTING AGAINST US OVERTLY AND COVERTLY. AND IN DOING SO IT DOES NOT HESITATE EVEN TO EMPLOY SAVAK AGENTS. AND IT ARRANGES THE ESCAPE FROM THIS COUNTRY OF THESE SAVAK AGENTS, WHOSE HANDS WERE ONCE DRENCHED IN THE BLOOD OF OUR YOUTH ON AMERICAN ORDERS. AND IT STILL TALKS ABOUT FRIENDSHIP AND SAYS THAT IT IS THE NATION OF IRAN WHICH IS FLOUTING ALL INTERNATIONAL LAWS.

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Intell Assessment: 29 Dec 79

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LIMDIS FOR CDRS/S3/S2

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #4

REFS:

- A. JTF MSG044 SUBJ: INTELL SUMMARY DTG 142015R NOV 79
- B. JTF MSG008 SUBJ: SITUATION SUMMARY DTG 151800Z NOV 79
- C. JTF MSG024 SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE UPDATE DTG 201320Z NOV 79
- D. JTF MSG056 SUBJ: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT DTG 260945R NOV 79
- E. JTF MSG010 SUBJ: COMPOUND SITUATION UPDATE DTG 040100Z DEC 79
- F. JTF MSG023 SUBJ: COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DTG 092100Z DEC 79
- G. JTF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #3 (NOTAL)

THIS ASSESSMENT CONSOLIDATES AND SUPERCEDES DATA CONTAINED IN REFERENCES. THE FORMAT OF THIS ASSESSMENT IS IAW WITH THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX OF AN OPLAN/OPORD AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH. MAJOR CHANGES/SUPPLEMENTS TO THIS ASSESSMENT WILL BE MADE BY TTY AND WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN THE SUBJECT AS SUCH. THE FOLLOWING INDEX IS PROVIDED AS A BASE OF REFERENCE:

PART I SITUATION

- A. GENERAL
- B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA
- C. HOSTAGE DISTRIBUTION
- D. GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION
- E. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCE
- F. ENEMY COMMAND AND CONTROL
- G. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

PART II BACKGROUND

- A. GROUND FORCES
- B. AIR DEFENSE/AIR FORCES
- C. NAVAL FORCES

PART III KEY EXTERNAL LOCATIONS

- A. MAIN MILITARY AFLD
- B. SEAMAN NEW AFLD

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2. PART I SITUATION

(U) A. GENERAL: ON 4 NOVEMBER 1979 MEMBERS OF AN IRANIAN STUDENT GROUP SWARMED ON TO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND IN TEHRAN, TOOK THE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE AND STATED THEY WOULD HOLD THE EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE UNTIL THE USG RETURNED THE SHAH TO IRAN FOR TRIAL. THE TAKE OVER WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT BLOODSHED. APPROXIMATELY 62 AMCITS AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF IRANIAN AND 3RD COUNTRY CITIZENS WERE INITIALLY HELD. SHORTLY AFTER THE TAKE OVER THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL WERE RELEASED. ON 19 NOVEMBER THE "STUDENTS" BEGAN TO RELEASE SELECTED HOSTAGES, LARGELY NON-WHITE AMCIT MALES, AMCIT FEMALES AND 3RD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THE REMAINING AMERICAN HOSTAGES INCLUDE TWO WOMEN AND 48-50 MALES. THE "STUDENTS" REMAIN ADAMANT IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR THE RETURN OF THE SHAH AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE IRAN GOVERNMENT (REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) HAVE REFUSED TO HONOR THE INJUNCTION OF THE WORLD COURT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND RETURN THE EMBASSY TO AMERICAN CONTROL.

(U) IN ADDITION BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE "STUDENTS" HAVE STATED THEY PLAN TO PUT THE REMAINING HOSTAGES ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE. ALTHOUGH THE LABEL "STUDENTS" IS USED IN THE MEDIA AND IN THIS REPORT WHEN REFERRING TO THE PRINCIPAL CAPTIVES THE LABEL IS NOT CORRECT. THE "STUDENT CAPTIVE" FORCE CONSISTS OF A GROUP OF SENIOR MEDICAL, ENGINEERING AND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS BELONGING TO A MOJAHEDIN FACTION WHICH SUBSCRIBES TO A BLEND OF ISLAM AND MARXISM. SEVERAL LEFTIST INSTRUCTORS FROM TEHRAN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, MEMBERS OF THE TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY MAY HAVE ALSO INFILTRATED THESE GROUPS. IN ADDITION, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COLLECTIVE GROUP (WHICH IS CALLED A COMMITTEE) RECEIVES COUNSEL ON PROPAGANDA, AND SECURITY MATTERS FROM PLO AND FEYADEEN ADVISORS. THE SITUATION HAS NOW CRYSTALLIZED TO THE POINT THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTRACTED AND UNCOMPROMISING NATURE OF THE IRANIAN POSITION. THE SITUATION APPEARS TO BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM WITHOUT AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN OR THE USG.

(U) B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA: THE EMBASSY COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN CENTRAL TEHRAN (UTM 39S-WV-383518//GEOGRAPHIC 4230N/5125E). THE COMPOUND AREA CONSISTS OF 27 ACRES OF FLAT TERRAIN SHAPED IN BASICALLY A RECTANGLE PATTERN RUNNING NORTH/SOUTH. THE COMPOUND IS BOUNDED ON THE SOUTH BY TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD WHICH IS A MAJOR EAST/WEST THOROUGHFARE; ON THE EAST BY ROOSEVELT STREET, (A RELATIVELY BUSY NORTH/SOUTH ROAD); ON THE WEST BY AMERICA AVENUE AND THE NORTH BY ARDALAN STREET. THE MAIN BUILDING (CHANCERY) RUNS EAST/WEST AND FORMS THE BASE LINE REFERENCE POINT. THE CHANCERY FACES ON TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD. THE COMPOUND CAN BE DIVIDED INTO FOUR GENERAL AREAS, GROUPED AROUND TWO PLAYING FIELDS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF THE COMPOUND. THE CHANCERY AND MOTOR POOL AREA ARE TO THE SOUTH. THE WAREHOUSE, TEMPORARY APARTMENTS AND SUPPLY AREA ARE TO THE NORTH. THE COMMISSARY, CONSULATE STAFF COTTAGES AND OLD POLICE QUARTERS ARE TO THE WEST. THE AMBASSADOR'S AND DCM RESIDENCES ARE LOCATED IN THE EASTERN HALF OF THE COMPOUND WHICH IS FORESTED WITH HIGH TRUNKED PINE TREES. THE NORTHWEST SEGMENT OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND ABUTTS AN IRANIAN ARMY DEPOT. THE COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A SERIES OF WALLS AND FENCES WHICH RESTRICT INTERIOR VISIBILITY FROM THE SURROUNDING STREETS. STREET AND BUILDING LIGHTS ARE LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE COMPOUND AND

PROVIDE GOOD VANTAGE POINTS FOR VIEWING THE INTERIOR OF THE COMPOUND. A MAJOR SPORTS COMPLEX WITH LARGE STADIUM AND SEVERAL PLAYING FIELDS IS LOCATED NORTHEAST OF THE COMPOUND DIAGONALLY ACROSS ROOSEVELT AVENUE. A LARGE PARKING LOT IS ALSO LOCATED EAST OF THE COMPOUND ON ROOSEVELT, MIDWAY BETWEEN THE STADIUM AND TASHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD.

(2) THE BUILDINGS FACING THE COMPOUND ON THE SOUTH (TAKHT-E-JAMSHID) ARE MOSTLY OFFICE BUILDINGS WITH SOME RESIDENTS. ON THE WEST SIDE THE PRINCIPAL STRUCTURES APPEAR TO BE FOUR SMALL BUT AFFLUENT PROFESSIONAL OFFICE BUILDINGS SURROUNDED BY TREES AND BACKED BY TWO LARGE PARKING LOTS. THE NORTH SIDE OF THE COMPOUND BACKS INTO A MIDDLE CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA CONSISTING OF THREE BLOCKS OF MULTI-STORY APARTMENT HOUSES.

(3) ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE EMBASSY TAKEOVER IS LARGELY LOCALIZED WITHIN A TWO BLOCK RADIUS OF THE COMPOUND EVEN WHEN MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ON GOING.

(4) TRAFFIC IN THE CITY IS HIGHLY CONGESTED BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0600-2300 DURING THE ISLAMIC WORK WEEK (SAT-WED) DECREASING IN VOLUME ON THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND (THURS-FRI) ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC ACTIVITY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE THURSDAY NIGHT UNTIL 0200 FRIDAY MORNING.

(5) THE EMBASSY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KM WEST OF THE NEAREST AIRFIELD (DOSHAN-TAPPEH AFB WHICH IS A NON COMBAT BASE). TWO OTHER AIRFIELDS ARE WITHIN 10KM, GHALI-MORGH, (AN ARMY LIGHT AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTER FIELD) IS 8KM SSW AND MEHRABAD INTERNATIONAL AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTER FIELD IS 10 KM WSW. [REDACTED] IN THE CITY.

ORDINARILY RANGE ^{DETO.} AT THIS TIME OF YEAR IS COMPARABLE TO NW UNITED STATES WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS, OCCASSIONAL MIST/RAIN RAISING TO THE MID FIFTIES NEARBY MOUNTAINS. WINTER TEMPERATURES 40 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AT NIGHT DAY.

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(2) DURING ASSAULT PHASE

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) SURRENDER HOSTAGES TO THE US RAID FORCE WITH MINIMAL RESISTANCE.
- (2) RESIST THE RAID FORCE WITH ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS AND PERSONNEL.
- (3) KILL HOSTAGES ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED.
- (4) REINFORCE PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND WITH KHOMITEH AND/OR IRANIAN ARMY ELEMENTS.
- (5) ENGAGE US PERSONNEL IN AND NEAR THE COMPOUND WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS.

(B) PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL IN THE COMPOUND ARE NON-MILITARY AND HAVE ACQUIRED ONLY LIMITED MILITARY TRAINING. NEVERTHELESS, SUFFICIENT MILITARY-TRAINED INDIVIDUALS ARE PRESENT WHO WILL OFFER A CREDIBLE RESISTANCE DURING THE ASSAULT PHASE. GUARD PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO RESIST THE ASSAULT FORCE WITH SMALL ARMS, GRENADES, AND POSSIBLY MINES. SOME PERSONNEL WHO ARE GUARDING THE HOSTAGES WILL ATTEMPT TO KILL THE HOSTAGES WITH SMALL ARMS/GRENADES, ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED. IRREGULAR FORCES IN TEHRAN WILL ATTEMPT TO REINFORCE THE COMPOUND AS SOON AS THE ALARM IS GIVEN. THE POSSIBILITY THAT MILITARY AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND EXISTS, BUT IS NOT CONSIDERED LIKELY.

(3) DURING EXTRACTION

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) PROVIDE TOKEN OR NO RESISTANCE.
- (2) ENGAGE US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS ENROUTE TO EXTRACTION AIRFIELD.
- (3) ENGAGE US FORCES AT EXTRACTION AIRFIELD WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS/GROUND ELEMENTS.
- (4) PURSUE AND ATTEMPT TO DESTROY US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS FROM EXTRACTION AIRFIELD TO AREAS OUTSIDE OF IRANIAN AIRSPACE.

(B) PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION

THE CAPABILITIES OF THE IRANIAN ARMY/AIR FORCE ARE LIMITED. HOWEVER, ONLY ONE DETERMINED FIGHTER/HELICOPTER PILOT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO WREAK HAVOC ON THE RAID FORCE DURING EXTRACTION. THE LIKELIHOOD OF IRANIAN MILITARY EFFORTS TO ENGAGE RAID FORCE AIRCRAFT OR CONDUCT GROUND ATTACK OPERATIONS WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS AGAINST THE EXTRACTION AIRFIELD IS CONSIDERED HIGH; IF THE US PRESENCE AND PURPOSE IS DETECTED AND REPORTED AND EXCESSIVE TIME IS EXPENDED AT THE AIRHEAD AFTER EXTRACTION BEGINS. (NOTE: THE MINIMUM REACTION TIME IS ESTIMATED TO BE 10 MINUTES, WITH THE MOST PROBABLE BEING 90 MINUTES. REACTION TIMES ARE CALCULATED FROM THE TIME THAT THE COMPOUND ASSAULT BEGINS TO THE START OF ACTION PHASE, AND IS FURTHER QUALIFIED BY AN ASSUMPTION THAT US FORCE PRESENCE AND PURPOSE AT THE AIRHEAD IS COMMUNICATED TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES IN TEHRAN. ALTHOUGH ATTEMPTS TO INTERCEPT EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT ARE POSSIBLE, THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY LOW. IF PROTECTIVE MEASURES (RADIO SILENCE, LOW ALTITUDE, AND ROUTING CENTER AVOIDANCE) ARE EMPLOYED BY THE EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT.

3. PART II BACKGROUND.

THE INCREASED TENSION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BROUGHT ABOUT AT LEAST IN PART BY THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN, DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND THE RESULTANT FEAR OF FOREIGN AGGRESSION HAVE LED THE IRANIAN MILITARY TO ISSUE DIRECTIVES AIMED AT INCREASING ITS STATE OF PREPAREDNESS. THESE DIRECTIVES, WHILE HAVING A SHORT TERM EFFECT OF RALLYING PEOPLE BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT, MAY PRODUCE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT IF CONTINUED FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME.

A. GROUND FORCES

(1) THE REGULAR ARMY NUMBERS APPROX 150,000, ABOUT HALF WHAT IT WAS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION. THE BULK IS STATIONED ALONG BORDERS WITH IRAQ AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE ARMY IS WELL EQUIPPED BUT

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UNITS IN THE NORTHWEST AND IRAQI BORDER ARE OCCUPIED WITH SUP-
PRESSING THE KURDS. ~~SEVERAL~~ GROUPS AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HAVE BEEN
DEPLOYED TO THESE AREAS AS REINFORCEMENTS. IN THE SOUTHWEST THERE HAS
BEEN SOME GUERRILLA ACTIVITY BY ETHNIC ARABS, BUT THIS HAS NOT REACHED
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM. IRAQ HAS INCREASED PRESSURE
THE WEST BY A SERIES OF BORDER INCIDENTS, RESULTING IN CONSIDERABLE
REINFORCEMENT OF THIS AREA.

B. AIR DEFENSE/ AIR FORCES

(1) FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

(A) THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE IS IMPAIRED BY MAINTENANCE.

IRAN HAS A TOTAL OF APPROX 190 X
F-4, 135 X F-5, AND 77 X F-14 FIGHTERS DEPLOYED
PRIMARILY IN WESTERN IRAN.

REPORTEDLY ONLY 28 PILOTS HAD BEEN THROUGH INTERCEPT
TRAINING AND ONLY 3 HAD FINISHED THE COMPLETE AIR DEFENSE/ AIR
SUPERIORITY COURSE AND WERE OPERATIONALLY QUALIFIED AT THE TIME
OF THE REVOLUTION. ONLY 15 P-38 WERE TRAINED WEAPON SYSTEMS OFFICERS
AND THEY HAD ONLY BEEN THROUGH FIRST-PHASE TRAINING (SINGLE
MISSILE ON A SINGLE TARGET).

(2) FIGHTER SUMMARY

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LIMDIS FOR CDRS/S3/S2

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #4

(E) NORTH SIDE (ARDALAN)

E. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES
REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE STUDENT GUARDS AND PASDARAN ARE AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PRINCIPAL FORCES AND THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OR HEARD A MAJOR DISTURBANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND ARE SHOWN BELOW.

(1) WITHIN 5-7 MIN-FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

(2) WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HQS AND PASDARAN KOMITEH STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.

(3) WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 PASDARAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS.

(4) WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES PASDARAN REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

(5) WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES
(6) WITHIN 30-40 MINUTES PASDARAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

(7) WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

(8) WITHIN 60 MINUTES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A HAWK SITE AT [REDACTED] COULD REACT AND ATTEMPT A LAUNCH AGAINST ANY ORBITTING AIRCRAFT.

(9) WITHIN ONE HOUR IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HELICOPTERS FROM [REDACTED] OR FIGHTERS FROM [REDACTED] COULD LAUNCH AND ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT THE FORCE. At the [REDACTED] compound or [REDACTED] location if [REDACTED] location becomes known.

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~~6. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION~~

- (1) PRIOR TO INITIATION OF RESCUE OPERATION
 - (A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
 - (1) MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION, I.E. HOLD ALL HOSTAGES PENDING RETURN OF THE SHAH.
 - (2) BEGIN TO EXECUTE HOSTAGES AS MEANS OF APPLYING PRESSURE ON US.
 - (3) MOVE HOSTAGES FROM AMEMB COMPOUND TO PRISONS OR OTHER LOCATIONS IN TEHRAN.
 - (4) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES WITHOUT TRIAL.
 - (5) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES; HOLD REMAINDER UNDER THREAT OF TRIAL.
 - (6) CONVENE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF U.S. IMPROPRIETIES.
 - (7) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL PUBLISHES ITS FINDINGS.
 - (8) GRANT CLEMENCY TO ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INDIVIDUAL ESPIONAGE TRIALS.
 - (9) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES FOLLOWING ESPIONAGE TRIALS; SENTENCE THOSE FOUND GUILTY TO PRISON TERMS OR DEATH.
 - (B) PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
 - (1) FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, 30-45 DAYS, THE IRANIANS WILL MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION; CONVENE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, AND PREPARE FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIALS. THEY WILL NEITHER RELEASE ALL THE HOSTAGES NOR COMMENCE ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS. (NOTE: THE POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE IRANIAN HIERARCHY CONTINUES; THE "STUDENTS" AT THE COMPOUND, THE IRG, KHOMEINI AND THE CLERGY, AND OTHER GROUPS ARE VYING FOR POWER. LEFTIST ELEMENTS WITHIN EACH OF THESE GROUPS ALSO ARE MAKING THEIR INFLUENCE FELT. GIVEN THESE POLITICAL CONDITIONS, THE POSSIBILITY OF UNEXPECTED AND/OR ILLOGICAL BEHAVIOUR BY ANY OF THESE GROUPS WITH REGARD TO THE HOSTAGES IS HIGH. FOR THE TIME BEING, THOUGH, THE "STUDENTS" ARE IN CHARGE AT THE COMPOUND, AND THEIR ACTIONS/PRONOUNCEMENTS STILL HAVE THE PRIMARY IMPACT ON THE HOSTAGES' WELL-BEING.)

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LIMDIS FOR CDRS/S3/S2

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #4

(2)

ABC

(C) C. NAVY.

THE NAVY'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY IMPAIRED SINCE THE REVOLUTION DUE TO MAINTENANCE AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS AND COMPOUNDED BY A LACK OF PARTS AND REVOLUTIONARY INTERFERENCE IN COMMAND CHANNELS. THE NAVY'S NINE HARPOON-FIRING GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOATS ARE PROBABLY IN THE BEST CONDITION OF ALL IRANIAN SHIPS.

THERE ARE ALSO 3 DESTROYERS IN THE IRANIAN INVENTORY. THESE SHIPS EACH CARRY 4 "STANDARD" (NAME OF MISSILE) SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES.

MAINTENANCE MAY HAVE REDUCED THE MISSILE CAPABILITY. THE NAVY HAS 2 COASTAL MINESWEEPERS, 1 SM-3D MINE-SWEEPING HELICOPTERS, 1 SM-3D AND AB-31S HELICOPTERS. THERE IS ALSO

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~~TOP SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS~~

SUBJECT: IMPENDING CHANGE INDICATORS

(1) SINCE THE FIRST OF FEBRUARY THERE HAS BEEN AN APPARENT CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TOWARD THE HOSTAGE SITUATION. THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN MANY ACTIONS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO DURING THE UP COMING DAYS AND WEEKS TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS.

(2) THIS APPARENT CHANGE AND SOME OF THE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN NOTED BY THE MILITANTS HOLDING THE COMPOUND. THE STUDENTS ARE CONCERNED AND ARE PROBABLY REEVALUATING THEIR OPTIONS IN VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, BOTH ONGOING AND SUSPECTED.

E-EVALUATING

(3) THIS OFFICE IS PREPARING AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPTIONS OPEN TO THE

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0055 ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN LIMDIS
MILITANTS AS VIEWED FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE. THE FIRST ITERATION OF THIS ANALYSIS WILL BE ISSUED BY FOLLOW ON MESSAGE.

(5) IN AN EFFORT TO STAY-AHEAD OF THE SITUATION THIS OFFICE HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING LIST OF INDICATORS. REQUEST EACH ACTION ADDRESSEE REVIEW THESE AND SUGGEST ADDITIONAL ITEMS AS APPROPRIATE AND INSURE PROMPT REPORTING TO JCS/RICEBOWL OF ANY DATA BEARING ON THESE INDICATORS.

[REDACTED]

(7) NEW SPATE OF RUMORS THAT COMPOUND WALLS HAVE BEEN MINED.

(8) FRESH CIRCULATION OF RUMORS THAT SOME OF HOSTAGES HAVE

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B-146



MSG 198

O 111945Z FEB 80
FM: 1ST SFOD-D [REDACTED]
TO: JIF RICE BOWL [REDACTED]
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~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: IMPENDING CHANGE INDICATORS

REF: MSG 091735Z FEB 1980; SUBJECT: IMPENDING CHANGE INDICATOR.

1. WE BELIEVE YOUR LIST OF IMPENDING CHANGE INDICATORS IS COMPLETE.
2. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT MAY HAVE IMPACT RE: DELTA'S PORTION OF THE MISSION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

~~B. INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE IN COUNTRY INDICATING A MODUS VIVENDI ACCOMODATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND SOVIETS.~~
~~C. A PARTIAL RELEASE OF HOSTAGES INDICATING A HARDER LINE TOWARD~~

RVM 11 FEB 80
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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
 CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
 DERIVATIVE CL BY Doo, Nance
 UNCL DOWNGR TO _____
 REVIEW ON OAW
 DERIVED FROM DIA

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[REDACTED]

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OO RUEAIIF RUEAIIF
DE RUEIZJC #0056 0401900
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O 091855Z FEB 80
FM JCS/RICE BOWL
TO RUEAIIF/SFOD-D/S-2
SOW/A-2

B-147

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CD 1256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDO, NMCC
 REEL DOWNSIDE TL
REVIEW ON OADR
REMOVED FROM Multiple sources

INFO RUEAIIF [REDACTED]
ZEN DIA/ITF
BT
SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS

SUBJ: ANALYSIS OF "STUDENT"/MILITANT OPTIONS

REF: JTF MSG 0454/DTG 040010Z FEB 80 (SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT)

1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT HOSTAGE SITUATION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE MILITANTS AND "STUDENTS" HOLDING THE EMBASSY COMPOUND.
2. THE ELECTION OF BANI-SADR, HIS INSTALLATION AS PRESIDENT OF IRAN BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AND HIS SUBSEQUENT DESIGNATION AS "PROVISIONAL" HEAD OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWING FEELING OF ISOLATION FELT BY THE STUDENTS AND MILITANTS.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0056 [REDACTED] SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS

3. PUBLIC STATEMENTS (DENOUNCEMENTS) BY BOTH BANI-SADR AND FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH INDICATE THE GOVERNMENT IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE MILITANTS' INFLEXIBILITY AND INTRANSIGENCE. THE REVERSAL OF AN ARREST ORDER FOR IRANIAN INFORMATION MINISTER MINATCHI; THE TEMPORARY DETENTION OF THE 49 (50) AMERICAN MUSLIMS VISITORS AT MEHRABAD; AND THE SEVERING OF MILITANT ACCESS TO IRANIAN RADIO/TV BROADCAST FACILITIES PROVIDE FURTHER INDICATIONS OF A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN THE MILITANTS AND AT LEAST PART OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AND CLERICAL HIERARCHY.

4. STUDENT/MILITANT DEBATES AND DISCUSSIONS ARE DOUBTLESS NOW MOTIVATED BY A GREATER SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND SUSPICION THAN EVER BEFORE. THIS ATMOSPHERE MAY BREED DECISION-MAKING BASED MORE ON FEAR THAN FACT. PREVIOUSLY, THE MILITANTS' COMMITTEE SYSTEM HAS ENABLED THEM TO PRESENT A CONSISTENTLY UNITED FRONT, INDICATING THAT DISCUSSION, DEBATE, AND CONSENSUS PRECEDED VIRTUALLY ALL MAJOR MOVES OR STATEMENTS. THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OBJECTIVES HAVE REMAINED CONSTANT AND STRATEGIES WERE FORMULATED WELL IN ADVANCE. THUS TACTICAL MOVES AVOIDED SELF CONTRADICTION AND ALLOWED THE CAPTORS TO STAY AHEAD OF THE SITUATION. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THIS SAME SORT OF REAPPRAISAL OF CURRENT CONDITIONS HAS BEEN ONGOING SINCE AT

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PREVIOUS ACTIONS (BOTH SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL),
A REEVALUATION OF THE DEGREE OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO BE
EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE "THREAT"
TO THE COMPOUND. DEBATE PROBABLY FOCUSES ON A SERIES OF THREE
OR FOUR BROAD OPTIONS.

OPTION A: CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES WITHIN THE COMPOUND
AND ATTEMPT TO STAGE SOME SORT OF MEDIA "EVENT" WHICH WOULD REFOCUS
ATTENTION ON THE "CRIMES OF THE SHAH" AND/OR THE DUPLICITY OF
AMERICAN "SPIES". TO DATE THE MILITANTS HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL
IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO GARNER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FROM THIRD WORLD
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OR FROM ANY PROMINENT LEFTIST POLIT-
ICAL FIGURES. THEIR CALLS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL HAVE NOT RESULTED
IN ANY TANGIBLE MOVEMENT IN THAT DIRECTION. THEY MAY HOPE THAT
THE RECENT ARRIVAL OF THE 49 LIBERAL AMERICANS MAY PROVIDE AN
OPPORTUNITY OR STEPPING STONE TO SUCH AN EVENT. HOWEVER, IT IS
DOUBTFUL THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. IF SUCH
A TRIBUNAL WAS HELD WITHIN THE COMPOUND WITH SELECTED THIRD WORLD
TV COVERAGE, IT MIGHT PROVIDE A FACE-SAVING VEHICLE FOR THE MILI-
TANTS TO RESTATE THEIR POSITION, OFFER EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN
"CRIMES", AND THEN MAGNANIMOUSLY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES. THIS OPTION
WOULD THUS ALLOW THE MILITANTS AN APPEARANCE OF CONTROLLING THE
SITUATION AND ENDING THE CRISIS ON THEIR OWN.

C (B) OPTION B: CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES WITHIN THE COMPOUND
AND PREPARE TO DEFEND AGAINST ANY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN ATTEMPT
TO GAIN CONTROL WITHIN THE COMPOUND. THE MILITANTS MAY BELIEVE
THAT SUCH A STAND COULD REAFFIRM THEIR POSITION AS TRUE VANGUARDS
OF THE REVOLUTION AND WILLING MARTYRS FOR ISLAMIC MARXISM.

OPTION C: CLADESTINELY REMOVE SOME OR ALL OF THE HOSTAGES
FROM THE COMPOUND TO ANOTHER LOCATION OR LOCATIONS. THIS OPTION
WOULD ALLOW THE MILITANTS TO AVOID A PHYSICAL CONFRONTATION
WITHOUT MATERIALLY AFFECTING THEIR BARGAINING POWER. IT WOULD
REFOCUS WORLD ATTENTION ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE AND EMBARRASS THE
BANI-SADR GOVERNMENT. SUCH A MOVE WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN A
NUMBER OF SEPARATE DETENTION AREAS, COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM OF
SAFELY RECOVERING THE HOSTAGES.

(A)

(B)

C (C)

(D)

(E)

(F)

(G)

(u) 4. IN SUMMARY, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE STUDENTS/MILITANTS HAVE AT
LEAST THREE OPTIONS:

(A) CONTINUE CURRENT POSTURE, ARRANGE MEDIA EVENT, AND EVENTUALLY
RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AT A TIME OF THEIR CHOOSING.

(B) BUILD UP DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND PREPARE
TO REPULSE ANY GOVERNMENT ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE COMPOUND.

(C) BUILD UP A CAPABILITY TO SECRETLY RELOCATE OUT OF COMPOUND
TO UNKNOWN LOCATION(S) TAKING SOME OR ALL HOSTAGES WITH THEM.

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CR 1256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REWRITING CL BY DDD, NMC
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B-148

DTG 161805Z FEB 80
FM: JTF /J-2/
TO: SEOD /S-2/
ADJ SUBJ /A-2/
INFO

VZCZCDVA257
OO RUEAIIF RUEAIIJ
DE RUEIZJC #0059 0471810
ZNY TTTT
O 161805Z FEB 80
FM JTF/RICE BOWL
TO RUEAIIF
INFO RUEAIIJ/DELTA
BT

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS CITE JS 0000059

SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION//SITUATION PROJECTIONS.

- REF: (A) JTF HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT DTG 291516Z JAN 80
- (B) JTF SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT DTG 040010Z FEB 80
- (C) JTF ANALYSIS STUDENT/MILITANT OPTIONS DTG 040010Z FEB 80
- (D)
- (E)
- (F)

(1) THIS REPORT PROVIDES UP DATE ASSESMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATION AND JTF /J-2/ PROGNOSIS OF THE SITUATION EXPECTED TO PREVAIL DURING THE NEXT THREE-FOUR WEEKS.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0059

(2) -AS LONG AS THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS CONTINUES WITHOUT A PUBLIC AND DIRECT STATEMENT OF SUPPORT BY KHOMEINI TO THE MILITANTS THE SAFETY OF THE HOSTAGES WILL REMAIN UNCERTAIN AND EVENTS UNPREDICTABLE.

(4) ASSUMING THE UNSG CAN ASSEMBLE A "UN COMMISSION" ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES AND THE COMMISSION IS ABLE TO CONVENE IN TEHRAN AND

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*Suppl. covered
25/1700Z LRS*

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PAGE 3 RUEIZJC0059 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

BEGIN REVIEWING EVIDENCE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (O/A 25 FEB 79), THIS OFFICE OFFERS THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

(A) UNLESS CONTROL OF THE COMPOUND IS GAINED BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO OR IN CONCERT WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION, IT IS DOUBTFULL IF ANY OF THE HOSTAGES MUCH LESS ALL OF THEM WILL BE RELEASED BY THE MILITANTS.

(B) IF THE COMMISSION INDICATES THAT "CRIMES AGAINST THE IRANIAN PEOPLE" DID OCCUR UNDER THE SHAH AND RECOMMENDS THAT THE SHAH BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL, THE MILITANTS MIGHT RELIASE SOME OF THE HOSTAGES BUT NOT ALL. HOLDING SOME AS INSURANCE AGAINST THE TRIAL AND RETURN OF THE SHAH.

(C) IF THE COMMISSION INDICATES THAT THE USG WAS NOT INVOLVED IN "THESE CRIMES" THE MILITANTS WILL PROBABLY REJECT THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AS AN EXAMPLE OF AMERICAN MANIPULATION OF FACTS AND CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES AND DECLARE THEY (THE MILITANTS) MUST NOW HOLD THE TRIAL THEMSELVES TO PROVE "AMERICAN COMPLICITY" TO THE WORLD.

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0059 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

THIS OFFICE BELIEVES THAT THE STUDENT/MILITANT OPTIONS AS STATED IN REFERENCE ARE STILL OPERATIVE. ALTHOUGH THE VIABILITY OF OPTION ALFA SEEMS TO BE FADING, WHILE [REDACTED] MAY INDICATE AN INCREASING POSSIBILITY OF OPTION BRAVO.

IN SUMMARY, UNLESS KHOMEINI DECLARES SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION, ORDERS THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND THEY (THE HOSTAGES) ARE IMMEDIATELY AND SECRETLY FLOWN OUT OF THE COUNTY THEIR LIVES AND THOSE OF [LAINGEN, HONLAND AND TOMBETH] WILL REMAIN IN JEOPARDY.

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B-149

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ID 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWER CL BY DDO NMCC
 REAL NUMBER 11
REVISED ON 04 92
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DE RUEIZJC #2272 254191Z
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FM: JTF/PRICE 8005Z
TO: RUEAIIF [REDACTED]
INFO: RUEAIIJ [REDACTED]
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~~SECRET~~ LINDIS CITE J3 02270 SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS

SUBJ: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ASSESSMENT.
REF: JTF/PRICE COML//02259//DTG 161805Z FEB 80 SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION//
SITUATION PROJECTIONS.

(1) THIS ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED AS A COMPANION TO THE REFERENCE
CITED ABOVE WHICH DELTA WITH FACTORS HAVING AN IMMEDIATE (INTERMID)
IMPACT ON THE FUTURE SAFETY OF HOSTAGES. THIS ASSESSMENT ADDRESSES
OTHER FACTORS WHICH HAVE HAD AN IMPACT ON HOSTAGES SITUATION AND ARE
LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. THE FACTORS TO BE COVERED ARE:
(A) THE POLITICAL (POWER) POSTURE OF KEY IRANIAN OFFICIALS SUCH
AS KHOMEINI, BANI-SADR, GHOTBZADEH AND AYATOLLAH KHEZESTI.
(B) PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE HOSTAGES AND THEIR CAPTORS.
(C) TIMING OF FUTURE EVENTS IN THE NEXT 30 DAYS.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0270 ~~SECRET~~ LINDIS

(2) A SUMMARY OF POLITICAL (POWER) POSTURE OF KEY IRANIAN FIGURES
FOLLOWS:

(A) AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AS SPIRITUAL FOCAL POINT OF
THE REVOLUTION AND ARCH-ENEMY OF THE FORMER SHAH, HOLDS A SPECIAL
POWER POSITION THAT RESTRICTS THE FULL AND INDEPENDENT USE OF POWER
BY ANY OF THE OTHER IRANIAN PRINCIPLES. KHOMEINI HAS HAD THE
POWER AND STILL HAS THE POWER TO EFFECT THE SAFE RELEASE OF THE
AMERICAN HOSTAGES. KHOMEINI IS APPARENTLY CONCERNED WITH CONTINUATION
OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NON-ALIGNED INDEPENDENT
ISLAMIC IRANIAN REPUBLIC. HIS CHARGE TO THE MILITANTS AND THE PEOPLE
OF IRAN NEVER TO COMPROMISE THEIR DEMAND FOR THE SHAH'S RETURN AND
NOT TO STOP UNTIL VICTORY IS ACHIEVED IS AN ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE
THE COURSE OF AFFAIRS AFTER HE DIES.

(B) BANI-SADR'S POWER IS LIMITED AND HIS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN
HIS POSITION IS QUESTIONABLE IF HE LOSES KHOMEINI'S SUPPORT.
BANI-SADR'S POLITICAL RIVALS ARE SEVERAL AND ARE MERELY WAITING
FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN AMBITIONS.
SADR HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS AN ADEPT POLITICAL INDIVIDUAL INTENT ON
ADVANCING HIS OWN PRESTIGE AND POWER. HE IS AND HAS BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0270 ~~SECRET~~ LINDIS

AND HAS NOT SOUGHT THE SPEEDY RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES PREFERRING
TO PROLONG THE CRISIS AND EXTRACT MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS FROM THE USG AT
THE EXPENSE OF BOTH THE HOSTAGES AND THE MILITARY, AERONAUTICAL
AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF IRAN.

BANI-SADR CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS A QUIET BEHIND THE SCENES INTEL-
LECTUAL WITH A PSEUDO-ACADEMIC BACKGROUND WHO IS A FERVENT BUT FRAC-
TUMIC ISLAMIC MILITANT MORE INCLINED TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE
PROBLEMS THROUGH DISCUSSION AND CONSENSUS THAN VIOLENT ACTION. HE
IS ASSESSED AS MOVING ON A SUBJECT ONLY WHEN THE
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS HIGH.

(C) FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH IS RECOGNIZED AS A RIVAL TO
BANI-SADR AND CAN BE DESCRIBED AS A POLISHED POLITICIAN WITH A
"HARDLINE" APPROACH TO MOST SUBJECTS, HE OFTEN SPEAKS IN EXTREME TERMS,
TAILORS HIS OPINIONS TO SUIT THE AUDIENCE (TO SUIT HIS OBJECTIVES
AT THE TIME) INCLINED TO BE SEMI-CLANDESTINE IN NATURE MIXED WITH A
FLAIR FOR THE MEDIA SPOTLIGHT. SAID TO HAVE PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE
IN THE HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT. HAS OPENLY AND PRIVATELY
DEMONSTRATED PRO-PROLEANINGS. CAN BE DESCRIBED AS AN OPPORTUNIST,
AN INSTIGATOR, OR QUIET ADVOCATE OF VIOLENT ACTION BY OTHERS.
IS RECOGNIZED AS ANTI-AMERICAN AND MAY BE DESCRIBED AS SUCH.

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0070 ~~SECRET~~ LINDIS
PRO-MARXIST IDEAS. MORE INCLINED TO CALCULATED INDEPENDENT ACTIONS
THAN BANI-SADR.

(D) AYATOLLAH BEHESTI, SENIOR RELIGIOUS MEMBER OF REVOLUTIONARY
COUNCIL, ADVISOR TO KHOMEINI, ANTAGONIST OF BANI-SADR, ADHERENT
OF PURE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, WITHOUT CONTAMINATION
OR DIMINUTION BY EITHER USSR OR USA. CONTENDER FOR KHOMEINI RELIGIOUS
LEADERSHIP IF KHOMEINI WERE TO DIE.

(E) AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADANI ALSO CONTENDER TO REPLACE KHOMEINI
SHOULD HE DIE. OPPOSED BY BEHESTI, BECAUSE OF HIS MODERATE ATTITUDE
AND POSITION THAT CHURCH AND STATE SHOULD BE SEPARATE. CONSIDERED
TO BE SENSIBLE, POLITICAL PRAGMATIST, BELIEVES THAT AN ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC CAN BENEFIT FROM MODERN CIVILIZATION. BELIEVES USSR MAJOR
ENEMY OF IRAN. NOT INCLINED TO INSTIGATE, PROVOKE, OR SUPPORT A
VIOLENT ACTION. IS OPEN IN HIS CRITICISM OF POLICIES AND MAY BE THE
ONLY STABILIZING RELIGIOUS FACTOR IF CIVIL UNREST WERE TO BREAK OUT
AFTER KHOMEINI'S DEATH. ADVISED FORMER ADMIRAL MADANI TO REFRAIN
FROM ACCEPTING POST AS BANI-SADR'S PRIME MINISTER.

(F) ADMIRAL MADANI IS REGARDED AS A MODERATE AND ALTHOUGH HE
DID NOT MAKE A GOOD SHOWING IN THE RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,
THIS MAY HAVE BEEN MORE A RESULT OF KHOMEINI SUPPORT FOR BANI-SADR

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THAN A REJECTION OF MADANI BY THE PEOPLE.

(u)
(3) ONCE KHOMEINI PASSES FROM THE SCENE AND WITH HIS WIFE BANI-SADR
OF GHOTZABEH, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AYATOLLAH MADANI AND
ADMIRAL MADANI COMBINATION MIGHT COME TO A POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY
WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE BUSINESS POPULATION.

(u)
(3) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDE OF THE CAPTORS AND HOSTAGES COULD
HAVE AN EFFECT ON EVENTS IN THE NEXT 30-60 DAYS.

(A) THE CAPTORS ARE ASSESSED AS BEING A MULTI-FUNCTIONAL GROUP
UNITED BY THEIR AIM OF OBTAINING THE RETURN OF THE SHAH AND ALL IT
IMPLIES (EMBARRASSMENT OF USC). IF THE GROUP CONSENSUS WERE TO FALL
DOWN UNDER FRUSTRATION, PERCEPTIONS OF IMPENDING DEFEAT OR ALIENATION
BY THEIR SUPPORTERS THE LIVES OF THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE IN DANGER.
THE RECENT CHARGE BY KHOMEINI NOT TO GIVE UP THEIR AIM OF OBTAINING
RETURN OF THE SHAH HAS PROBABLY GIVEN THEM NEW HOPE OF SUCCESS.
THIS HOPE HAS BEEN FUELED BY THE HARDLINE ATTITUDE EXPRESSED BY BANI-
SADR AND GHOTZABEH AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE UP COMMISSION DISCLOSING

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~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS CITE JS 00070 FINAL SECTION OF 2 SECTIONS

EVIDENCE OF THE SHAH'S CRIMES

AND U.S. COMPLICITY.

(B) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE OF HOSTAGES HAS PROBABLY UNDERGONE SEVERAL CHANGES SINCE THE INITIAL TAKE OVER, FROM SHORT TERM THOUGHTS THAT THE INCIDENT WOULD BE OVER QUICKLY, (FIRST TEN DAYS) TO ONE WHERE THEY ACCEPTED SOME DELAY WHILE THE USG WAS ARRANGING FOR THEIR RELEASE. THROUGH SOME MEANS (NEXT THIRTY DAYS), TO A PROBABLE HIGH POINT OF EXPECTATION JUST PRIOR TO CHRISTMAS, THEN RESOLUTION WHEN THE HOLIDAYS PASSED WITHOUT ACTION, REACHING A POINT OF EITHER DETERMINED RESOLUTION OR FEELING OF ISOLATION AND ABANDONMENT BY THE USG AND GROWING DISLIKE FOR THEIR CAPTORS. DURING THIS PERIOD THOSE HOSTAGES THAT WERE AFFECTED BY THE STOCKHOLM SYNDROME MAY HAVE PASSED BEYOND THAT PHASE AND NOW RESENT THEIR CAPTORS. ALTHOUGH EACH HOSTAGE IS COPING WITH THE STRESS OF ISOLATION

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AND CONFINEMENT IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL WAYS SOME HAVE SHOWN A CHANGE WHICH INDICATES A GROWING FEELING OF FRUSTRATION AND DESPAIR, WHILE OTHERS HAVE EVIDENCED A GREATER DEGREE OF HOSTILITY TO THEIR CAPTORS. THE UN COMMISSION HEARINGS MAY BE VIEWED BY SOME AS AN APPEAL (OR TRIAL) OR BY OTHERS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE BACK AT THEIR CAPTORS. IF THE COMMISSION HEARINGS ARE CONCLUDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND THE HOSTAGES NOT RELEASED WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE TIME (POSSIBLY 7-10 DAYS), IN THE EYES OF THE HOSTAGES, SEPARATE HOSTAGES MAY TAKE SEPARATE ACTIONS TO SECURE THEIR OWN RELEASE.

(4) IN EXAMINING THE POSSIBLE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE NEXT 30 DAYS THE PRINCIPLE UNPREDICTABLE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF KHOMEINI'S DEATH. IF HE WERE TO DIE DURING THE COMMISSION'S VISIT TO TEHRAN, THE COMMISSION'S ACTIONS WOULD BE SUSPENDED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF MOURNING.

(A) DURING THE FIRST MOURNING PERIOD (3-4 DAYS) THE HOSTAGES ARE LIKELY TO BE IGNORED AS MASSIVE PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS WILL FOCUS ON THE RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS OF LOSS AND GRIEF. HOWEVER, LARGE CROWDS WILL BE EVIDENT THROUGHOUT TEHRAN INCLUDING THE VICINITY OF THE COMMISSION

3

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0071 ~~SECRET~~ LHM:IS
ELEMENTS AT THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. SECURITY ELEMENTS WOULD BE UNABLE
TO CONTROL THE CROWDS WITHOUT INFLUENTIAL RELIGIOUS SUPPORT. IF
STABILITY IS NOT MAINTAINED THE DANGER TO THE HOSTAGES WILL INCREASE
AND REACH ANOTHER HIGH POINT WITH THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF COMMEMORATION
OF KHOMEINI'S DEATH.

(u)
5. ASSUMING THAT KHOMEINI DOES NOT DIE THE FOLLOWING
EVENTS ARE LIKELY TO TRANSPIRE IN THE NEXT 22-30 DAYS.

(A) UN COMMISSION HEARING CONTINUE THROUGH AT LEAST 27 FEB
MORE LIKELY 3/4 MARCH WITH EARLIEST OFFICIAL RELEASE OF THE
COMMISSION'S FINDING COMING ON 5 MARCH ALTHOUGH A MORE LIVELY DATE
WOULD BE THE 8TH IN NEW YORK.

(B) THE IRANIAN RESPONSE TO THE FINDINGS WILL LIKELY COME WITHIN
IN 24-48 HOURS AFTER THE FINDINGS ARE RELEASED AND IF THE FINDINGS ARE
FAVORABLE TO THE IRANIAN GOALS, SOME OF THE HOSTAGES MIGHT BE RELEASED
BUT NOT ALL. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE
MILITANTS TO TRANSFER CONTROL OF THE REMAINING HOSTAGES TO THE GOVERN-
MENT FOR TRIAL IF KHOMEINI SO DIRECTS.

(C) ALTERNATIVELY, THE IRANIAN OFFICIALS MAY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
KHOMEINI'S STATEMENT THAT THE DISPOSITION OF THE HOSTAGES IS A

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0071 ~~SECRET~~ LHM:IS
FUNCTION OF THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENT. ELECTION OF THE PARLIAMENT
(MAGHLES) IS NOW SCHEDULED TO BE HELD 14-17 MARCH. DELIBERATIONS
BY THE PARLIAMENT WOULD THEN PRESUMABLY TAKE SEVERAL DAYS WITH
A POSSIBLY OF FURTHER DELAYS DUE TO THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PERSIAN NEW YEAR. (22 MARCH).

(u)
6. IN SUMMARY THE PROJECTED EVENTS AS WE KNOW THEM NOW DO NOT INDICATE
A RELEASE OF HOSTAGES, BUT RATHER A FURTHER PROTRACTION OF THE CRISIS.
FROM AN INTELLIGENCE STANDPOINT THE CRITICAL TIME FRAME WILL BE
THAT TIME FROM WHEN THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ARE RESPONDED TO
BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE IMPLEMENTAL OF FOLLOW-UP
ACTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OR THE MILITANTS. THIS TIME FRAME
WILL RUN 7-10 DAYS AND COULD BEGIN AS EARLY AS 5 MARCH 82.

REVW 23 FEB 2010

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DTG 262215Z FEB 80

FM: COMJTF

TO: SFOD

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HELLO

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SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

REF: A. JTF/RICE BOWL/00070/ DTG 231900Z FEB 80
SUBJ: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ASSESSMENT

B. JTF382/DTG 26/1525Z/INTELLIGENCE SUPPLEMENT

(W) C. JTF/RICE BOWL/ DTG 251700Z FEB 80 SUBJECT:

1. REF ALPHA REVIEWED THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS PERTAINING TO THE HOSTAGE SITUATION AND INDICATED TWO CRITICAL TIMES IN THE NEXT 30 DAYS. THE FIRST, WHICH IS UNPREDICTABLE WOULD BE 4 - THROUGH 7 DAY AFTER KHOMEINI'S DEATH IF THIS WERE TO OCCUR. THE SECOND WILL BE THE PERIOD AFTER THE UN COMMISSIONS FINDINGS ARE RELEASED AND COMMENTED ON BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THIS LATTER TIME FRAME WILL RUN 7-10 DAYS AND COULD BEGIN AS EARLY AS 5 MARCH 1980.

2. (S) REF BRAVO PROVIDED RETRANSMISSION OF DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE 56-1A/WT FEB 80 WHICH CLOSED WITH THE STATEMENT QUOTE "BARRING ANY DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT THE HOSTAGE CRISIS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED FOR MANY MONTHS".

3. (S) REF CHARLIE PROVIDED LATEST JTF ESTIMATE

(W) (S) IN EXAMINING OTHER FACTORS WHICH COULD IMPACT ON MISSION PLANNING SEVERAL DATES IN MARCH MUST BE RECONSIDERED. THESE ARE:

- (A) 14-17 MARCH - THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENT. (MAJLIS)
- (B) 21-22 MARCH - BEGINNING OF PERSIAN, NEW YEAR WHICH IN THE PAST (DURING THE SHAH'S REGIME) WAS A PERIOD OF MAJOR SECULAR CELEBRATION. THE DEGREE OF PUBLIC CELEBRATION DECREASED SUBSTANTIALLY FOLLOWING THE REVOLUTION. PERIOD OF CELEBRATION THEORETICALLY RUNS 10 DAYS (UNTIL 2 APRIL)
- (C) 30-31 MARCH - FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE REFERENDUM WHICH ESTABLISHED THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE FOR REVOLUTIONARY AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS. LIKELY TO BE MARKED BY MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS.
- (D) OTHER DATES OF INTEREST ARE THE IRANIAN WEEKENDS (NOON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY.) THESE ARE 6 AND 7TH //13 AND 14TH// 20 AND 21// 27 AND 28 MARCH.

(W) (S) A SUMMARY OF CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA (SUNRISE/SUNSET/MOON LIGHT) FOR THE PERIOD 5 MARCH THROUGH 30 MARCH 80 FOLLOWS.

- (A) NUMBERS OF HOURS OF DARKNESS AVAILABLE
 - (1) FIFTH MARCH (10:37 HRS)
 - (2) FIFTEENTH MARCH (10:13 HRS)
 - (3) TWENTY FIFTH MAR (09:47 HRS)
- (B) NUMBER OF HOURS OF MOONLIGHT AND ILLUMINATION AVAILABLE
 - (1) 5 MAR/07:45 HOURS AT 91 PERCENT LATE NIGHT THRU DAWN
 - (2) 10 MAR/0330 HOURS AT 50 PERCENT EARLY MORNING (2130Z) TO DAWN
 - (3) 15 MAR/NO USEABLE MOONLIGHT
 - (4) 20 MAR/04:02 HOURS AT 15 PERCENT DUSK THRU EARLY NIGHT
 - (5) 25 MAR/07:49 HOURS AT 65 PERCENT DUSK PAST MID-NIGHT
 - (6) 30 MAR/10:33 HOURS AT 98 PERCENT FULL NIGHT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12358

CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92

REWRITING CL BY DDO, NMCC

DECLASS CONTINUED TO

REVIEW BY OADR

REMOVED FROM Multiple Sources

B-151

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ 17 March 1980

and 17 Mar 80
Cy 6 CJS
DJS
ACTES

WORKING PAPER FOR LTG SHUTLER

SUBJECT: Reaction to Rescue Attempt (~~S/NOFORN~~)

E
E

1. (~~S/NOFORN~~) [redacted] and Middle East:

a. (~~S/NOFORN~~) A US military operation to free the hostages in Tehran will most likely trigger a negative public reaction from [redacted] and all other Arab states except [redacted]. The extent and duration of Arab reaction would depend on several factors. The strongest public outcry would result from the violation of airspace or territorial waters of any neighboring Arab state by the US military force. The use of the airspace or territorial waters of any Arab state would imply that either the US has no respect for the independence of that state or even worse, that the state in question has cooperated with an outside force in an attack against a fellow Islamic nation. Therefore, despite possible private feelings of support for the US action, any such state interested in maintaining its strong Islamic credentials will be required to condemn the US action. The same requirement to maintain strong Islamic credentials will prompt negative public reaction from the other Arab states. At least two other factors will determine the degree of the private reaction. Although Arab leaders would not wish to be considered in any way a party to such an operation against Iran, they would most likely be upset if they did not receive official US notification of such an operation at least as it was being launched. The emotional response would also expectedly be keyed to the nature and extent of damage or injuries incurred by Iran as a result of the operation.

b. (~~S/NOFORN~~) Despite the fact that Arab leaders can be expected to denounce such a US military action, most of them would privately be expected to take delight in any successful operation which would serve to embarrass the Iranian leadership. Over the longer term, a successful operation would result in renewed respect by the leadership of the more radical states of the region, and possible increased US influence among the Arab moderates.

2. (~~S/NOFORN~~) Soviet Union:

a. (~~S/NOFORN~~) The Soviet Union likely would view with alarm an attempted US military rescue of the American hostages in Iran. Moscow is unlikely, however, to counter such a US move militarily if Washington--as the rescue mission commences--announces to the world that the mission is limited in scope to rescuing our hostages and that our forces will be withdrawn as soon as the mission is completed. Should the mission extend beyond a short duration, however, Moscow would likely offer Tehran military aid thereby gaining considerable propaganda profit. Additionally, should the rescue mission encounter difficulty and require an additional

Classified by: DDO, NMCC
Declassify on: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET/NOFORN
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Downgraded by: [redacted]

Classified by: *Multiple Sources*
Declassify on: *17 MAR 86*
Review on: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

military commitment, Moscow's reaction would necessarily depend on the size and perceived intent of the US action.

b. ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ Although we cannot rule out Soviet military intervention into northern and eastern Iran with Moscow invoking the terms of the 1921 Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship as justification, we do not believe a limited US rescue operation of short duration would prompt a Soviet military move against Iran. However, Soviet military units along the Iranian border would probably go on an increased state of readiness. Moscow would likely launch a vigorous propaganda campaign and diplomatic effort citing "US military aggression", not only to exploit the situation and cultivate the current Iranian regime, but to divert world attention from Afghanistan.

3. ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ There would not likely be a "Muslim" reaction per se, simply because there is no united Islamic movement. The possible exception might be a reaction from the Islamic Conference, an organization of states with large Muslim populations. The Conference might meet and condemn the action. Strongly Muslim states, other than those in the Middle East, such as Pakistan and some African states, would likely react negatively. Pakistan as well as Libya would condemn the action as excessive. President Zia of Pakistan has made it clear that he would support Iran if the US were to take military action, and there would be harsh rhetoric from Islamabad. If the operation were detected by the Pakistanis, there is the possibility that they could react in time to launch aircraft against US forces. Other states with large Muslim populations would deplore the loss of life in the rescue attempt, but we do not expect it to be a lasting phenomenon. Aside from the official reaction noted above, there would likely be demonstrations against the US on the part of Muslims in some states. Sudan and Libya are probable candidates for this type activity.

4. ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ The rest of the world, including Western Europe and Japan, would likewise voice expressions of concern that the hostage situation had to be resolved in such a way; but the US would probably not be condemned. To protect their interests in Iran these countries would likely avoid laudatory statements for the US act. Privately there would be expressions of approval.

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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B-152

101230Z MAR 80

FM: JTF
TO: [REDACTED]

1 SOM
HELIO DET]

SUBJECT: POLITICAL FORECAST MESSAGE

1. (u) THE EMPASSY TEHRAN HOSTAGE SITUATION REMAINS A POLITICAL PROBLEM WITHOUT A NEGOTIABLE SOLUTION. HOWEVER DUE TO THE INTERNAL ISOLATION OF IRAN, INCREASED THREATS ON ITS WESTERN AND NORTH, AND A WORSENING OF THE MEDICAL CONDITION OF KHOMEINI, THE SITUATION COULD BE PARTIALLY RESOLVED THE NEXT 10-14 DAYS.

2. (u) THIS POSSIBILITY EXISTS ONLY IF PANT SADR IS ABLE TO CONVINCE KHOMEINI THAT IN FACT THE HOSTAGE SITUATION IS HAVING A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION. IF SADR SUCCEEDS IT IS POSSIBLE THE KHOMEINI COULD IN HIS 22 MARCH NEW YEARS ADDRESS DIRECT THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO A HOSPITAL UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, REQUEST THE UN COMMISSION TO RETURN TO TEHRAN AND RESUME HEARINGS, WITH THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF NEGOTIATING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES IN EXCHANGE FOR A PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF ITS FINDINGS.

3. (u) IF HOWEVER A PRINCIPLE SADR RIVAL SUCH AS PESHESTI (WHO COVETS KHOMEINI'S ROLE) WHO IS EXTREMELY INFLUENTIAL IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND WHOSE POLITICAL PARTY (THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PARTY) APPEARS TO HOLD A MAJORITY IN THE NEW PARLIAMENT SUCCEEDS IN GAINING KHOMEINI'S EAR AND CONVINCING HIM THAT THE RELIGIOUS FEROR OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY WILL NOT BE SERVED BY THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT EXTRACTING A FORMAL STATEMENT OF APOLOGY FROM THE US GOVERNMENT, THE SITUATION IS LIKELY TO DRAG ON INDETERMINABLY.

4. (u) THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOVE REFLECT TWO EXTREMES OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC. THE REALITY OF THE FUTURE LIES SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN, AND SOME INDICATION AS TO THE MOST PROBABLE COURSE HOPEFULLY WILL BE FORTH COMING ON THE 22 OF MARCH. IN EITHER CASE IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR ANY ELEMENTS OF THIS TASK FORCE TO STACK ARMS. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO FURTHER REFINE OUR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SKILLS AND BE PREPARED TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ASSIGNED MISSION UNTIL ALL THE HOSTAGES ARE FREE.

VAUGHT SENDS.

REVV 10 MAR 2010

Classified by:
DDO, NMCC

Declassify on: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC

~~SECRET~~

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B-155

051600Z APR 80

BT 3/1-2/

CO: 3/1/15-2/

SDV 7A-2/

~~SECRET~~
TRANSFER PROJECTION

1. THE ASSUMPTION OF CONTROL BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (IF IT OCCURS) DOES NOT MEAN THE END OF THE HOSTAGES. THIS OFFERS HOPE THAT THE TENSION AND FACETIOUSNESS BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT GROUPS AND PARTS OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE SHORTLY RESOLVED.

2. THE ABOVE INTERVIEW WITH THE RELIGIOUS HARD LINER (NAME) PROBABLY PROVIDES THE CLEAREST INDICATION OF THE MINDS OF THE MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. (INTERVIEW TEXT FOLLOWS)

AYATOLLAH DR MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT AND MEMBER OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION COURT, ANNOUNCED THAT THE FORMER SHAH'S FLIGHT TO EGYPT NOT ONLY MADE HIS EXTRADITION MORE DIFFICULT, BUT ALSO COMPLICATED THE ISSUE OF THE HOSTAGES. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE DR BEHESHTI ADDED THAT UP TO NOW, HE CANNOT OFFER ANY SUGGESTION TO THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY. WHAT IS IMPORTANT, HE SAID, IS THAT IRAN WANTS TO ACHIEVE ITS TOTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE, BUT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT WANT TO RESPECT IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE OR THE INDEPENDENCE OF SIMILAR COUNTRIES.

DR BEHESHTI SAID THAT WHEN THE UNITED STATES STOPS PRACTICING SUCH POLICIES, WE CAN FIND A BASIS FOR RECONCILIATION WITH IT.

DR BEHESHTI ADDED THAT THE HOSTAGES TRIAL SHOULD HELP US AND THE PEOPLE TO ARRIVE AT COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE. AS THE IMAM SAID: AFTER THAT, WE MIGHT FORGIVE THEM. (END OF INTERVIEW TEXT)

3. EVEN IF CONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES OCCURS, THIS DOES NOT MEAN MOVEMENT WILL TRANSPIRE, AND IN FACT DOES NOT EVEN GUARANTEE THAT THE MILITANTS WILL RELINQUISH COMPLETE PHYSICAL CONTROL.

4. ASSUMING CONTROL IS TRANSFERRED THE MILITANTS WILL AT A MINIMUM RETAIN CONTROL OF THE COMPOUND AND IF THE HOSTAGES ARE RELOCATED THEY WILL PROBABLY BE MOVED TO A MILITARY FACILITY, COMMANDERED HOTEL OR A FOREIGN-MINISTRY BUILDING.

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: DBO, Nmc

Declassify on: OADR

Classified by: JCS
Declassify on: OADR

Downgraded by:

201910Z MAR 80
FM: JIF/J-2
TO: SFOD/S-2
A: LSON/A-2
HEL0/S-3

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B 154

8

~~SECRET~~ LINDIS

SUBJ: DETECTION ASSESSMENT

1. THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE J-2 STAFF AND BRIEFED AT THE 18 MARCH PLANNING MEETING. THE ASSESSMENT WAS PREPARED WITHOUT ACCESS TO ALL OPERATIONAL PLANS AND THEREFORE IN A FEW CASES THE ASSESSMENT MAY BE MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN WARRANTED.

2. THE ASSESSMENT COVERS THE PERIOD FROM NCA DECISION TO FORCE EXTRACTION FROM MANZARIYEH AND WAS BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THE GREATEST DANGER TO MISSION SUCCESS IS DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION, AND COMPROMISE OF THE FORCE PRIOR TO CLOSURE WITH THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, AND RECOGNITION THAT MANZARIYEH AFLD IS BEING USED AS THE EXTRACTION AIRHEAD.

3. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE ASSESSMENT THE MISSION SEQUENCE WAS DIVIDED INTO FIVE STAGES AS FOLLOWS. AND EACH SUB SET WAS EVALUATED AS TO THE CHANCES OF MISSION COMPROMISE.

- A. DEPLOYMENT ORDER
- B. MOVEMENT TO STAGING AREA
- C. FORCE LAUNCH AND INSERTION
- D. OBJECTIVE RECON AND CLOSURE
- E. EXECUTION AND EXTRACTION

4. DEPLOYMENT ORDER (LIMITED ACCESS)

- A. JCS (SOD/OPG/DIA) LOW #
- # INITIATE CAMPAIGN TO PLAYDOWN POSSIBILITY.
- B. U AND S COMMAND CINC LOW #
- # CLOSEHOLD VIA BACK CHANNEL TO CINC
- C. JIF STAFF LOW #
- # IF NORMAL PROFILE MAINTAINED UNDER EXERCISE COVER
- D. JIF FORCES
- DELTA FAMILIES LOW
- HELO FAMILIES LOW
- STAYBEHINDS MOD
- AC/MC SUPPORT TROOPS MOD
- CVA (AIR OPS TEAM) LOW
- 135 UNIT STAFF LOW
- MAC UNIT STAFF LOW

5. MOVEMENT TO STAGING AREA

- A. MC/AC - LOW
- B. UNIT MOVEMENT - USING NON-DESCRIPT ID'S LOW
- C. TANKER MOVEMENT - USING AWAC/FTR/RECCE/SUPPORT --LOW
- D. FOREIGN OBSERVATION
- 1. USSR MODERATE
- 2. ISRAEL MODERATE
- 3. SAUDI LOW
- 4. IRAQ LOW
- 5. IRANIAN LOW

6. FORCE LAUNCH AND INSERTION

- A. HELO LAUNCH --LOW
- B. MC LAUNCH --LOW
- C. KC LAUNCH --MOD/HI
- D. HELO PENETRATION --MOD
- E. MC REFUEL -- MOD/HI
- F. HELO TO NAIN --LOW
- G. SEIZURE OF NAIN --LOW
- H. NAIN 2ND DAY --MOD #
- I. EGRESS OF MC --LOW
- J. HELO TO TRANSFER PT --LOW
- K. DELTA TRANSFER --LOW/MOD
- L. HELO HIDE --LOW #
- M. DELTA TO WAREHOUSE --LOW #

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 12356
 CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
 REWRITING BY DDD, nmcc
 REC APPROV TO
 REVISED BY AADR
 REVIEWED BY Multiple Joints

Classified by JCS
 Declassified on OADR

~~SECRET~~

- ~~SECRET~~
- B. NIGHTIME LDRS RECON--LOW
 - C. FORCE MOVEMENT TO CITY LIMITS--LOW
 - D. FORCE MOVEMENT TO RENDEVOUS AREA--LOW
 - E. RECON/SURVEILLANCE TM MOVEMENT (EAST-WEST APPROACH)--LOW
 - F. MAIN FORCE MOVEMENT- NORTH/SOUTH APPROACH--LOW
EAST/WEST APPROACH--HI

- G. HELO LAUNCH --LOW
- H. HELO APPROACH SOUTHERN RTE--MOD
NORTHERN RTE--LOW
- I. HELO ORBIT/HOLD AREA--MOD
- J. AC/MC LAUNCH--LOW
- K. AC/MC REFUEL--MOD
- L. MC MANZARIYEH--LOW
- M. AC MEHRABAD--MOD
- N. MC NAIN ---LOW
- O. C-141/C-135 MANZARIYEH--MOD

8. EXECUTION PHASE. THE FOLLOWING ARE ESTIMATED SAFETY TIME WINDOWS BASED UPON ONLY A GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXECUTION TIMING SEQUENCE.

- A. HELO HOLDING ORBIT --10-15 MINUTES IF BEYOND POPULATION FRINGE
- B. AC HOLDING ORBIT--15-20 MINUTES IF BEYOND ATC RANGE (80 MILES)
- C. COMPOUND--WINDOW BEGINS AFTER PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF ASSAULT
20-25 MINUTES
- D. STADIUM SAFETY WINDOW (15-20MINS) IS ADDITIVE TO COMPOUND WINDOW IF TRANSFER OCCURS WITHIN THE 20-25 MINUTES WINDOW.
- E. MANZARIYEH WINDOW
 - 1. QUIET SEIZURE--NO LIMIT
 - 2. DISCERNABLE ACTIVITY--45 MINS
 - 3. HELO RECOVERY--45 MINS

9. IN SUMMARY TWO ELEMENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE ARE EVALUATED AT THIS TIME AS CARRYING A HIGH POTENTIAL FOR MISSION COMPROMISE. THESE ARE THE TANKER LAUNCH [REDACTED] AND THE FINAL MOVEMENT OF DELTA MAIN FORCE ELEMENT TO THE COMPOUND IF CONDUCTED VIA THE NARROW RESIDENTIAL SIDE STREETS TO THE EAST.

10. IN ADDITION NINE OTHER AREAS ARE EVALUATED AS POSING A MODERATE RISK OF DETECTION/COMPROMISE, THESE AREAS ARE:

- A. [REDACTED] STAYBEHIND
- B. AC/MC SUPPORT TROOPS
- C. HELO COASTAL PENETRATION
- D. DELTA HELO/VEHICLE TRANSFER
- E. DELTA DAYLIGHT LDRS RECON
- F. HELO APPROACH RTE SOUTH
- G. HELO HOLDING ORBIT AREA
- H. AC APPROACH TO MEHRABAD
- I. C-141/C-135 AIRCRAFT PENETRATION

11. THE BASIS PREMISE OR CONCLUSION OF THIS ANALYSIS IS THE ABSOLUTE NEED TO MINIMIZE THE US MILITARY SIGNATURE WHERE EVER POSSIBLE BRING ALL PHASES OF FORWARD MOVEMENT.

12. AS A MATTER OF SELF PROTECTION AND MISSION SUCCESS [REDACTED] IS THE VALUE OF HAVING FARSI SPEAKERS AT ALL PRINCIPAL FORCE DETECTION POINTS SUCH AS:

- A. DELTA - TRANSFER AREA, ENROUTE WAREHOUSE AND ENROUTE COMPOUND
- B. HELO - AT HIDE AREA
- C. [REDACTED] MEHRABAD
- D. AC 135 - [REDACTED]

13. IN ADDITION THE POSSESSION OF AN ORGANIC CAPABILITY [REDACTED] ON MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FORTHCOMING FRIDAY 21 MAR 80.

14. COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

B-156 r

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

3 April 1980

Subject: GOI Efforts to Transfer Control of Hostages

1. (S/NOFORN) President Bani-Sadr and his supporters on the Revolutionary Council are apparently continuing their efforts to arrange for transferring control of the hostages from the militants to the Government of Iran (GOI). The militants are likely to veto any such arrangement, since control of the hostages is the basis for their current influence in Iranian politics. Without the hostages, the power of the militants would evaporate. In addition, militant control of the hostages continues to be an issue championed by Ayatollah Beheshti and the radical clergy, providing them with an important political weapon in their power struggle with Bani-Sadr. Beheshti and his supporters, including the militants, undoubtedly see the issue in a zero-sum framework: transferring control of the hostages would be a plus for Bani-Sadr and therefore a minus for them.
2. (S/NOFORN) Should the militants at some future date, and for whatever reason, eventually agree to a transfer, such an arrangement is likely to be largely cosmetic in nature. Initially the militants might allow a token group of government representatives, including a contingent of Pasdaran, to go to the embassy and "assume responsibility" for the hostages. In all probability, both the hostages and most of the militants would remain at the embassy, with the militants retaining de facto veto power over any decision regarding the hostages. This type of arrangement would not bode well for the hostages, and in fact might increase the danger to them. The militants and the government force would be rivals, and the danger of an incident would be substantial. Furthermore, the situation would be exacerbated by the inevitable competition which would result as various factions on the Iranian political scene--including Bani-Sadr, Qotbzadeh, and the clergy--vied for influence with the government force.
3. (S/NOFORN) It is conceivable that, following a significant but as yet unforeseen development in negotiations between Iran and the US, the Iranian government will assume full responsibility for the hostages at a point just prior to their release. At this time it is reasonable to assume that the hostages might be transferred to an Iranian medical facility in preparation for their transportation to the US. At the present time, however, both DIA and [redacted] agree that such an eventuality appears remote.

cc:

JOD (3)
SOD
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Lawson

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B-157

DIADIN 99-1A
AS OF 1455 EST
7 APR 80

IRAN: KHOMEINI AGAIN BLOCKS TRANSFER OF HOSTAGES. (U)

(u) (c) PREDICTABLY, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WAS AGAIN UNABLE TO REACH A DECISION ON 6 APRIL REGARDING TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES, VOTING INSTEAD TO REFER THE MATTER TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI FOR A DECISION. AS A RESULT, ALL HOPE OF TRANSFERING THE HOSTAGES WAS EFFECTIVELY KILLED. BY FORCING THE AYATOLLAH TO INTERVENE, THE COUNCIL PLACED KHOMEINI IN A POSITION WHERE HE HAD TO SAY NO. KHOMEINI MUST CONTINUOUSLY DEMONSTRATE HIS "MORAL SUPERIORITY" OVER THE US AND MUST NEVER APPEAR CONCILIATORY.

(u) (c) KHOMEINI'S PRIMARY GOAL APPARENTLY IS TO ASSURE THE ACCEPTANCE OF HIS MORAL AUTHORITY. HE IS NOT CONCERNED WITH THE WESTERN IDEA THAT A GOVERNMENT WORKS FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE AS MEASURED BY MATERIAL OR ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT. FOR THE AYATOLLAH, A CONDITION OF PHYSICAL WELL-BEING CAN ONLY RESULT FROM HIS UNDISPUTED AUTHORITY. BECAUSE HE SEES HIMSELF AS GOD'S SPOKESMAN, KHOMEINI BELIEVES THAT ONLY AFTER THE SWAY OF HIS MORAL INFLUENCE IS ESTABLISHED WILL GOD (AND NOT THE GOVERNMENT) PROVIDE SUSTENANCE TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. THIS THINKING IS REFLECTED IN KHOMEINI'S MANY WRITINGS AND SPEECHES. WHETHER HE REALLY BELIEVES THIS OR IS JUST AN OPPORTUNIST WHOSE FIRST PRIORITY IS TO CONSOLIDATE HIS OWN POSITION IS NOT KNOWN. HOWEVER, THE RESULTS ARE THE SAME.

(u) (c) THE HOLDING OF HOSTAGES IS NOT NEW IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS RECENTLY AS 1962, THE IMAM AHMED OF YEMEN HELD THE SONS OF TRIBAL LEADERS TO ASSURE THE GOOD BEHAVIOR OF THE ZAIDE TRIBES. THE LEADERS DELIVERED THEIR SONS VOLUNTARILY, THEREBY DEMONSTRATING THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF HIS MORAL AUTHORITY AS ORDAINED BY GOD. THE SONS WERE WELL TREATED AS EVIDENCE OF THE IMAM'S MORALITY AND GOOD WILL. AND SO IT IS WITH KHOMEINI. THE HOSTAGES NOT ONLY ASSURE AMERICAN QUIESCENCE, BUT OUR QUIESCENCE DEMONSTRATES KHOMEINI'S MORAL AUTHORITY. THE DEMAND OF THE IRANIANS, FIRST THAT WE APOLOGIZE FOR OUR SUPPORT OF THE SHAH AND THEN THAT WE DELIVER HIM FOR JUSTICE, HAS THE SAME PURPOSE TO SHOW IRANIAN MORAL AUTHORITY. FOR THE IRANIANS, WE ARE INFERIOR IN THESE TERMS, WHATEVER OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

Declassified by:
DDB, NMCE

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIADIN 99-1A

(u)
(c) FINALLY THE PROSPECT REMAINS THAT THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENT COULD FREE THE HOSTAGES WHEN IT ADDRESSES THE ISSUE IN JUNE OR JULY. WHILE THIS PROSPECT IS NOT LIKELY, IT COULD BE KHOMEINI'S ESCAPE-VALVE. TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES, SUCH AS KHOMEINI HAS FASHIONED, OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS. IN TRADITIONAL ISLAM, A PARLIAMENT WAS NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF REPRESENTATION, BUT RATHER IT EMBODIED A POPULAR CONSENSUS, WHICH ITSELF WAS INSPIRED BY GOD. IF KHOMEINI FREED THE HOSTAGES ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY, HIS OPPONENTS COULD CHARGE HE HAD MOVED AGAINST GOD'S WILL. BUT THIS CHARGE COULD NOT BE MADE AGAINST THE VOICE OF CONSENSUS. KHOMEINI WILL HAVE NO TROUBLE ACCEPTING THE PARLIAMENT'S JUDGMENT, WHATEVER IT MAY BE. HOWEVER, THE PARLIAMENT WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY FREE THE HOSTAGES. IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE UNSURE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND EAGER TO ESTABLISH REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS. ALSO, IT WILL PROBABLY BE DOMINATED BY THE HARD-LINE, CLERGY-ORIENTED ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY.

(u)
(c) WE THEN FIND OURSELVES IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE. KHOMEINI CANNOT FREE THE HOSTAGES. THE PARLIAMENT CAN, BUT IT IS NOT LIKELY TO DO SO. IT WILL PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES FOR FEAR OF GOING AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE IMAM. THUS, BARRING ANY DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS, WE BELIEVE THE HOSTAGES WILL NOT BE RELEASED PRIOR TO THE CONVENING OF PARLIAMENT IN JUNE OR JULY. MOREOVER, THE PARLIAMENT WILL PROBABLY DETERMINE THAT THE HOSTAGES MUST BE HELD UNTIL THE SHAH AND HIS WEALTH ARE RETURNED. (REVW 7 APRIL 86)

PREPARED BY: LCDR D. ADAMS, USN, ITF, 697-0344

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

B-160

THIS FILE MAIL AND REFER TO THE NEXT ONE

TOT 220159Z

105 AM
RTR 212712Z APR 92
FROM JCS/DC-12
TO CITE ALPHA 02
INFO (S)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: OVERFLIGHT REACTION
REF: HQ 338 0077 JCS 012112
ACTION: REACTION TO JCS OVERFLIGHTS.

(1) EXAMINATION OF JCS PENETRATION
TEAM ANALYSIS

E

ABCE

[REDACTED]

ABCE

[REDACTED]

ABCE

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EA 12256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDO, NMCC
 REAL APPROVED TO
REV BY OADR
REMOVED FROM ~~DDO~~ Multiple S

Classified By: ~~DDO, NMCC~~
Declassified On: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TOT 1-3012
B-1162

MSC 72
DTG 220025Z APR 80
FM: JCS/RC6
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2
INFO: STOD/S2
SON/A2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: THREAT REVIEW
SITE ALPHA/J2, PASS TO COMJTF

1. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS COPY OF MEMO PROVIDED TO CJCS ON 22 APR 80.
2. THE FOLLOWING COMPRISES THE JTF J-2 ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO RICE BOWL POSED BY SOVIET, IRANIAN, AND OTHER MIDEAST NATIONS' RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES. THE ASSESSMENT IS DIVIDED BY COUNTRY AND COLLECTION MEANS.

3. SOVIET CAPABILITIES.
A. PHOTO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B. AIRCRAFT PHOTO/VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE

[REDACTED]

THE 11-308'S PRIMARY MISSION IS MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND ASW.

[REDACTED]

WE EXPECT THIS ACTIVITY TO CONTINUE, THE MAY HAS AN OPERATING RADIUS OF 1400 NM.

SOVIET COVERAGE OF THE MELO HIDE SITE WOULD HAVE TO BE PROVIDED BY SATELLITE. COVERAGE OF [REDACTED] COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EITHER SATELLITE OF [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EA 12258
 CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
 DERIVATIVE OF BY DDO, NMCC
 REF DOWNGR TO
 REVS BY OADR
 REVISOR [Signature]

THE LIKELIHOOD OF PHOTO MISCOS COVERING THE MELO HIDE SITE IS ASSESSED AS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Classified By: JCS
 Declassified On: OADR

SOVIET EMBASSIES AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
 INVAI [REDACTED] COMINT COLLECTION OPERATIONS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE SOVIETS HAVE BOTH NAVAL AND LAND BASED LONG RANGE DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENT. THEY ARE CAPABLE OF TRACKING - AT LEAST ON A RANDOM BASIS -

GIVEN THE OPEN AVAILABILITY OF ICAO FLIGHT PLANS, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT INTELLIGENCE "TIP-OFFS" RESULT.

5. ~~ASSESS~~ THE SOVIET CAPACITY TO DETECT AND TRACK ANY RADIO-SILENT CLANDESTINE MISSION ASSOCIATED WITH RICE BOWL AS LOW, IF THIRD COUNTRY RADARS ARE AVOIDED AND "COVER" FLIGHT PLANS ARE FILED AS NECESSARY.

IRANIAN DETECTION/SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES.

A. IRANIAN PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE: IRAN HAS A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PHOTOGRAPH OR VISUALLY RECONOITER US NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE PERSIAN GULF OR NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA UTILIZING P-3 AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONALLY, IRANIAN F-4S AND C-130S HAVE SOME VISUAL RECON CAPACITY. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY THREAT TO SECURITY OF RICE BOWL FROM ANY OF THESE PLATFORMS IS NEGLIGIBLE.

B. AURAL DETECTION: WE BELIEVE THAT THE GREATEST DANGER OF DETECTION FOR BOTH THE HELICOPTER AND FIXED-WING ELEMENTS OPERATING IN IRANIAN AIRSPACE ON NIGHT 1 IS POSED BY GENDARMERIE POSTS. THESE POSTS (USUALLY CONSISTING OF 6-10 MEN) ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ALONG MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. MISSION PLANNING HAS TAKEN THEIR LOCATIONS INTO ACCOUNT AND FLIGHT ROUTES ARE DESIGNED TO AVOID ALL KNOWN POSTS.

C. VISUAL DETECTION: DESPITE FLIGHT ROUTES WHICH AVOID POPULATED AREAS, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE SEEN BY MOTORISTS OR NOMADS. THE LATTER, LACKING COMMUNICATIONS, CAN BE DISCOUNTED AS A WARNING SOURCE. CRITICAL AREAS FOR VISUAL DETECTION ARE THE GULF COASTAL REGION, THE REFUELING SITE, AND THE TRANSFER POINT/HELO HIDE AREA. WE ASSESS THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION AT ANY OF THESE LOCATIONS AS LOW-MODERATE. WHETHER A TRUCK DRIVER WOULD BOTHER TO REPORT SIGHTING AIRCRAFT

TO SOME OFFICIAL ENTITY OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS PROBLEMATICAL.

D. SAC PENETRATION ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL GENERIC LOW LEVEL ROUTES INDICATED LOW PROBABILITY OF DETECTION/INTERCEPTION ON ALL THE INBOUND LEGS AND ONLY A SLIGHTLY HIGHLY POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION/INTERCEPTION ON THE EGRESS ROUTES. SAC TEAM PREPARED STUDY FOR MC130 AT

THE PROBABILITIES WOULD STILL BE ON THE LOW END OF THE SPECTRUM IF ROUT PLANNING NETWORK WAS NOT ON HIGH/ACTIVE ALERT POSTURE.

4. REVIEW OF INCOUNTRY TACTICAL PHASES IS UNDER PREPARATION WILL FORWARD UPON COMPLETION.

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. ^(u) ~~(S)~~ PLANNING. FACT OF US PLANNING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

2. ^(u) ~~(S)~~ PREPARATIONS.

E

a. ^(u) ~~(S)~~ STRIKE FORCES. MIDWAY AND KITTY HAWK MOVEMENTS AND LOCATIONS KNOWN. AC-130s [REDACTED] TO DEMONSTRATE CAPABILITIES [REDACTED] KNOWN. VARIOUS TARGETS THAT MIGHT BE ATTACKED SUBJECT TO NEWSPAPER SPECULATION. VULNERABILITY OF IRAN KNOWN.

b. ^(S) ~~(S)~~ ^(u) RESCUE FORCES

(1) PROBABILITY OF 82ND AIRBORNE / RANGERS BEING RESCUE FORCE IN PRESS. FACT NOT ON ALERT POINTED OUT. NO INDICATIONS ACTUAL GROUND FORCES HAVE BEEN DETECTED.

(2) MOVEMENT OF RH-53s TO KITTY HAWK NOTED IN PRESS. PRESS STATED REASONS TO CONDUCT MINE SWEEPING OR MINELAYING. PRESS NOTES OFFICIAL STATEMENTS IRAN NOT CREDITED WITH GOOD MINELAYING CAPABILITIES, AND ~~IS~~ THAT NO LARGE HELOS NECESSARY FOR ASSAULT ON CARRIERS. NO REFLECTIONS THAT RH-53s AND MICHIGANS HAVE BEEN LINKED, NOR HAS BLUE-GREEN CONCEPT IN WHICH RH-53s WERE USED FOR TROOP ASSAULT. ^{SURFACE} UNKNOWN IF SOVIETS KNOW ~~BE~~ CONCEPT OR ~~WAVE~~ DRAWN DAMAGING CONCLUSIONS. UNLIKELY IRAN KNOWS OF BLUE GREEN CONCEPT.

A: (3) DELTA FORCE NO INDICATIONS.

(4) AC-130s. NO INDICATIONS.

(5) JTF. NO INDICATIONS.

(6) RANGER FORCE. NO INDICATIONS.

(7) COMMO SUPPORT. NO INDICATIONS.

(8) MAC / SAC SUPPORT. INCREASED ACTIVITY UNDOUBTEDLY NOTED BY SOVIETS. SOME ACTIVITY PROBABLY KNOWN TO IRAN. NO INDICATIONS THAT INCREASED ACTIVITY RELATES TO RESCUE ATTEMPT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12256

REMOVED ON 21 JUN 92

REPLACED BY DDO, NMCC

DEN OTHER TO

BY ON OADR

REMOVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

Classified By: fcs
Declassified ON: OADR

3. (U) (S) Timing. PRESS SPECULATION RELATES LOGICALLY STRIKES TO HARM TO PRISONERS. NO INDICATIONS OF DATES. IRAN, AS REFLECTED IN KHOMEINI'S STATEMENTS, PROBABLY REQUIRES STRIKES COULD COME AT ANY TIME.

4. (U) (S) SOVIET INTELLIGENCE REACTIONS. ~~SOVIET~~ SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES AND COVERAGE, APPEAR ~~NORMAL FOR THE SITUATION EXISTING.~~ C

5. (U) (S) IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE REACTIONS. SEABORNE PATROL NEAR KHARG ISLAND AND ~~SOUTH~~ C

6. (U) ASSESSMENT

a. (U) STRIKES. ~~US~~ SURPRISE OF TIME AND TARGET POSSIBLE. SOVIETS PROBABLY WILL DETECT CARRIER MOVEMENT AND LAUNCHES. ESTIMATE INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR SOVIETS TO WARN IRANIANS AND FOR IRANIANS TO REACT.

b. (U) RESCUE. SECRECY AND POSSIBILITY OF SURPRISE APPEAR TO BE RETAINED TO DATE.

c. SOVIET ACTIONS. ~~REDACTED~~ C

~~REDACTED~~
~~REDACTED~~
~~REDACTED~~
~~REDACTED~~
~~REDACTED~~
~~REDACTED~~

d. (U) (S) IRANIAN ACTIONS. IRANIANS CONCERNED ABOUT FEASIBILITY OF US ACTION. (ALERTING OF FORCES) ~~THE~~ ~~COMPLETENESS~~ OF WARNINGS MAY HAVE ~~BEEN~~ ~~IRAN~~ ~~BETTER~~ ~~PREPARED~~ ~~FOR~~ ~~ACTION~~ ~~AND~~ ~~THE~~ ~~IRAN~~ ~~IS~~ ~~CONDITIONED~~ ~~TO~~ ~~WARNING~~ ~~AND~~ ~~REDUCE~~ ~~REACTIONS~~ ~~CONCERNING~~ ~~AND~~ ~~FALSE~~ ~~WARNINGS~~ ~~TOP~~ ~~SECRET~~ C

~~REDACTED~~

C MAY ALSO INCREASE APPREHENSION IN IRAN
IRANIAN PERCEPTION MAY BE DEVELOPING THAT
THE HOSTAGES THEY HOLD MUST REMAIN UNHARMED
TO AVOID A SEVERE US RETRIBUTION.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• CONTINUE TO STRESS THREAT OF STRIKES
AND VULNERABILITY OF IRAN.

• ^{CONSIDER} ~~INITIATE~~ ACTIONS TO CREATE PERCEPTION
THAT US WILL NOT CONDUCT ATTACKS IF
HOSTAGES RELEASED.

• CONTINUE TO ~~EMPHASIZE~~ REFLECT TO PRESS
PERCEPTION THAT RESCUE IS TOO DIFFICULT TO
UNDERTAKE.]

• ENSURE C-130 ACTIONS TO PRESERVE SECRECY
OF RH-53 MOVEMENTS ~~TO~~ TO KITTY HAWK E
AND KITTY HAWK TO LAUNCH POINT PRESERVED.

• INITIATE LEAKS THAT ~~IN~~ GULF OR OMAN, E
GULF STATES] LIKELY PLACES TO MARSHAL FORCES
FOR RESCUE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~██████████~~

~~████████████████████~~

2 JAN 80
B165

CURRENT PERCEPTION/
PREDICTED PERCEPTION

CS
H

1. No indications reported that Iranians or Soviets have identified US plans or intentions to rescue US diplomats held in Tehran.

2. NIMITZ was subject to Soviet surveillance off Africa. Currently, the task group is scheduled to arrive vicinity KITTY HAWK on or about 22-23 Jan 1980. Predict that Iranians and Soviets will be alert for several days either side of 22-23 Jan for US military action.

E

3. Because of probable high interest and suspicions of the Soviets and the Iranians that the arrival of the NIMITZ is likely to generate, movement of forces through [redacted] Red Sea should be unrelated to that date to degree possible. Units most visible are the 3 MC-130s [redacted] the 2 AC-130s [redacted] and the 2 C-141s carrying ammo, parts, and maintenance personnel for the AC-130s.

E, A

The area where their flights will be most noted will be during transit of the [redacted]

E

E

4. The buildup of aircraft at [redacted] may be an indicator of impending operations. This could be assumed to be for a rescue operation, or might simply be reported by Soviet clandestine radio as preparations for operations against Iran to stir up anti-American feelings.

5. The establishment of HF circuits to be used from [redacted] will be an indicator that a command to direct some sort of operations has been established. To reduce correlation with force movements, the HF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD, NMCC
 RECLASSIFIED TO CONFIDENTIAL
REVISED ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified by [redacted]
Declassified on [redacted]

circuits should be activated as soon as possible.

E ~~6.~~ Planned pattern of flights into [redacted] results in a [redacted] E
[redacted] This will
be an indicator of impending operations.

7. Surge of tanker flights will be an indicator of impending operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A, B ~~a.~~ [redacted] E
E o AWACS operations from [redacted] will continue. / E
o AF support capability for possible other USAF/USN a/c
operations being established and tested.
o Surveys underway of possible US aid to upgrade [redacted] F
E airfields (e.g., [redacted]). E

(TAB A is [redacted] outline)

E ~~b.~~ Sortie MC-130s [redacted] on or about 14 Jan to arrive
[redacted] as soon as possible.

(TAB B outlines movement concept)

E ~~c.~~ Sortie MC-130s and supporting C-141s to [redacted] Hold A, E
E at [redacted]
Sortie from [redacted] to arrive at [redacted] to be on ground A, E
E [redacted] prior to MC-130 departure on mission). A A

(TAB C outlines movement concept).

A, E ~~d.~~ Approve activation of HF net at [redacted] with [redacted] traffic. A, B
E ~~e.~~ Approve maintenance of [redacted] air A, B
traffic into and out of [redacted] until the rescue is completed

TAB A

A, E

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

A 1. Establish HF circuits ASAP [REDACTED] A

A, E, C 2. Task suitable units F15, F111, F14 to plan for possible deployment to [REDACTED] late Jan - early Feb. [REDACTED] N, E

to indicate planning. Indicate close hold needed on intentions so unnecessary to coordinate with [REDACTED] Prepare outline of our actual plan in Washington and [REDACTED]

E 3. COMM/telephone breaches of security re: upgrading/clearing w/ EOD personnel of [REDACTED] E

E 4. Smooth out air traffic flow [REDACTED] E

o Deploy at an early date R-14, R-9 and fuel bladder systems to

E [REDACTED] Have [REDACTED] gradually increase fuel capacity to fill systems. E

o Deploy supporting ground vehicles at an early date.

A, B o Plan [REDACTED] traffic, including if possible, C-141 flights to [REDACTED] A, B, I

A, B o Plan [REDACTED] to cover period of operation.

5. Schedule (if diplomatically and operationally feasible):

A, E [REDACTED] US fighters,

E [REDACTED] fighters.

TAB B

MC-130 MOVEMENT CONCEPT

~~(S)~~
1. THREATS

a. At home base

E b. [REDACTED] (Diplomatic clearances) F

c. [REDACTED] E

A, E 2. [REDACTED] at home base: A

a. Deployment to [REDACTED] for possible clandestine delivery E
of [REDACTED] relief supplies. Operation currently close E
hold since no firm NSQ decision yet made.

b. [REDACTED]

E 3. [REDACTED] E
a. Alt #1 - cross peninsula black

A b. Alt #2 - [REDACTED] A

E 4. [REDACTED]

E a. File ICAO as C-130s, [REDACTED] E

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TAB C

~~AC-130~~ MOVEMENT CONCEPT

~~(C)~~
I. THREATS:

E a. [REDACTED] (Diplomatic clearances)

E b. [REDACTED]

A 2. [REDACTED] or use [REDACTED] or fly as A, B

a group [REDACTED]. C-141s file and fly as MAC flights one at a time.

A, E 3. Hold [REDACTED] Possibly conduct "weather flights."

E 4. Sortie in groups or as one group to [REDACTED] (AC-130s).

One C-141 depart before AC-130s (with ammo, etc.). One C-141

depart after AC-130s. [REDACTED] enroute

A, B, E

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Militant Data

13-166

17 November 1979

WORKING PAPER FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

[REDACTED]

(1)

1. (S) Statements issued by the students holding the US Embassy have been used to rationalize and justify their actions, promote anti-American propaganda, and to issue their demands. Their propaganda consistently describes the Embassy as a "spy den" and "house of espionage" and charges the US with plotting to overthrow the Islamic Revolution. Their demands for the return of the Shah to stand trial have been uncompromising, and attempts by the Foreign Ministry to soften the demands have been quickly rejected. They made it clear they answered only to Ayatollah Khomeini. Statements by the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards have been supportive of the students' actions. They have also pledged to defend the students against any "counterrevolutionary" action.

(1)

2. (S) Since the takeover, Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr, has issued several statements which appeared to be a softening of the original demands. As a first step to commencing negotiations, he proposed that the US admit that the Shah is a criminal and return all of the Shah's assets located in the US to Tehran. After this was rejected by the students, he later proposed that all except white males be released. However, this too was rejected, again indicating that the government is not in control of the students. Whether Bani-Sadr was being used as a sounding board for Khomeini, or whether the ideas were his own is not known. However, we suspect the latter to be the case. Bani-Sadr announced that the government could not intervene in matters to which it was not a party. He said that the Americans at the Embassy were not hostages of the government, but of the people.

(S)

C

Statements issued by Khomeini and other religious leaders appear supportive of the students' actions. They have blessed the occupation of the Embassy, the CIA, and although Khomeini supported the occupation of the Embassy, he issued many statements shortly after the takeover calling for restraint. He probably feared that more radical elements might take advantage of the tense atmosphere, and the situation would get out of control. Khomeini's latest pronouncement, on 17 November, was to direct the students to release the American women and babies, who have spent ages under American pressure and tyranny and who might have come to Iran under pressure. This conciliatory gesture is totally out of character for Khomeini. We believe that he was probably convinced of the propaganda value of such a move by the PLO legation.

C

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958

EXEMPTED BY 21 JUN 92

Classified By: [REDACTED] DATE: [REDACTED] DDO NMCC

Declassified ON: [REDACTED]

EXEC MONTHLY FE

REVISED BY: OADR

REMOVED FROM: [REDACTED]

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SECT 01 OF 40599

ACTION

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OPSECDEF(71) USDP(72) NMIC
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CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
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FM [REDACTED]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEVAAA/CNO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEHVV [REDACTED]

BT
SECTION 01 OF 02 38250
NOFORN//NOINTEL//ORCON//NOCONTRACT
DIA FOR NMIC//ONLY// CNO FOR OP-08, OP-009 [REDACTED]

USCINCPAC FOR J-2
SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORTING (U)
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. (U) COUNTRY: IRAN (IR), [REDACTED] UNITED STATES

- 2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: IRAN SITUATION REPORTING
- 3. (U) TITLE: IRAN SITUATION REPORTING
- 4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
- 5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 791226
- 6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 791226
- 7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: [REDACTED]

PAGE 1

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E0 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
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SERVICE

47 DEC 79

PAGE

4559

1. (U) REFERENCES: [REDACTED] 48218/CONTINUES

2. (U) ASSESSMENTS: SOURCE P, INFO 2

3. (U) ORIGINATORS: [REDACTED]

E

A, B, E

4. (U) REQUEST EVALUATIONS: N/A

5. (U) PREPARING OFFICERS: [REDACTED]

6. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

G

7. (U) SOURCE: [REDACTED] 6 932 8234

8. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC - NO; CAVEATS
NOFORN/NOINTEL/ORCON/NOCONTRACT USED TO PROTECT SENSITIVE COLLECTION METHODS THIS STATION AND TO PRECLUDE RELEASE RESULTS THEREOF TO ANY SECOND PARTIES

9. (U) ORCON/NOCONTRACT SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

C, B, G

C, D, E

DETAILS:

A, G

C, D, E

G

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
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PAGE 3

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SECT 02 OF 0259

ACTION
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CJCS(22) CJCS DIA JS(22) JS(23) J38NMCC SECDEF
OP3CDEF(21) USDP(12) NMIC
CNC CC WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CRA WASHINGTON DC

FILE

(318)

TRANSIT/3421927/3471948/237141TOR34:1921
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ZNY 99999
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DE (C)

RUENJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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RUSNAAA/USCINCPAC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/

SECTION 02 OF 02 39250
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
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4-594

PAGE 2



D, E
A, C
A, F
1, 2

WE
ASSUME THEREFORE THAT [REDACTED] AS MADE ABOVE ARE
AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THE POSITION OF THE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WE ARE NOT IN A
POSITION AT THIS TIME TO ASSESS TO WHAT EXTENT THAT
POSITION HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS
[REDACTED]

REV 3 DEC 2009, REASONS 6, 3, AND 7.

BT
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ANNOTES
PPM 961

PAGE 2
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

D-172

AIRFIELD FACILITIES REPORT

PAGE NO- 006

NAME- [REDACTED] C (C)
COUNTRY CODE- 1X
SITE NUMBER- [REDACTED]
PUBLISHED DATE- 27 JUN 80

ALTERNATE NAME- NONE

WEATHER

STATION (U)

NONE

CLIMATE (U)

DRY SUMMER SUBTROPICAL. DRY, MILD SUMMERS AND RELATIVELY COLD WINTERS. SNOW LIABLE DEC THRU MAR.

FLYING CONDITIONS (U)

VISIBILITIES AND CEILINGS ARE GENERALLY GOOD. OCCASIONALLY RESTRICTED FOR PERIODS IN WINTER AND SPRING BY SNOW AND FOG.

PRECIPITATION (U)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.8	00.9	02.0	01.7	01.7	01.2
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	U	U	U	U	U	U
MEAN	00.3	00.1	00.3	00.9	01.1	01.9
MIN	U	U	U	U	U	U

REMARKS-DATA RECORDED AT [REDACTED] (U)

TEMPERATURE

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MAX	037.0	039.0	049.0	062.0	073.0	083.0
MEAN	023.5	030.0	040.0	051.5	061.5	070.0
MIN	020.0	021.0	031.0	041.0	050.0	057.0

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX	089.0	090.0	083.0	069.0	053.0	040.0
MEAN	076.0	076.5	069.5	057.0	044.0	032.5
MIN	063.0	063.0	056.0	045.0	035.0	025.0

REMARKS-DATA RECORDED AT [REDACTED] (U)

DEW POINT

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	022	022	031	038	045	048	051	050	047	041	035	026

REMARKS-DATA RECORDED AT [REDACTED] (U)

PRESSURE ALTITUDE OF FACILITY

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
MEAN	U	U	U	U	U	U

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MEAN	U	U	U	U	U	U

SIGNIFICANCE (U)

LANDING STRIP HAS NO SUPPORT FACILITIES AND WOULD BE LIMITED TO LIGHT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SNUMB = 7625T, ACTIVITY # = 01, REPORT CODE = 02, RECORD COUNT = 000009

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
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EXECUTIVE INFO TALK
DOI: AS of 11 MAR
B-186

GENERAL



- The compound is located in downtown Tehran in the midst of a residential area, with relatively easy access from the North and East. Several high buildings in the area provide good vantage points for viewing the interior of the compound. A major sports complex with large stadium and several playing fields is located adjacent to the compound.

Access is related to the Embassy takeover, largely because of the compound's location when major demonstrations are on going.

- Weather at this time of year is in transition from cold wintry weather to the long hot summer period. Skies are generally clear to partly cloudy. Average low temperatures of 40°F increasing to 60°F and highs of 50°F increasing to 90°F. The chance of precipitation decreases from an average high of 7 day in March to 1 day in June. With this decrease in rainfall and increasing gusty surface winds, blowing dust or sand reduces visibility 1-2 days during the month.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
 NEEL (S) DOWN TO Secret
REVISED ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR


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C



- External reaction forces. Reinforcements for the student guards and Pasdaran are available from several locations and organizations. Principal forces and their estimated reaction times once they have received notification or heard a major disturbance in the vicinity of the compound are shown below.

-- Within 5-7 min - fire from the chancery and weapons positioned in surrounding buildings.

-- Within 10-15 minutes reinforcements from student headquarters and Pasdaran Komiteh strength 75-100 from nearby Komiteh stations.

-- Within 15-20 minutes 100-300 Pasdaran and the beginnings of local crowds.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-- Within 20-30 minutes Pasdaran reinforcements of an additional 200-300 plus.

-- Within 30-40 minutes Pasdaran back-up units and additional crowds.

-- Within 45-60 minutes IRG Residual Forces and mobs of 2,000-3,000.

-- Within 60 minutes, it is possible that a [redacted] could react and attempt a launch against any orbiting aircraft.

-- Within one hour it is possible that helicopters from [redacted] or fighters from [redacted] could launch and attempt to interdict the force.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (J-3)

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

B-28

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

Date 20 26

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EOP 12356

CONDUCTED ON 28 JUN 92

REWRITING BY DDA NMCC

DEEL IMPROVED TO

REVIEW ON OADR

REVIEW FROM Multiple Sources



To: ACJC

Subject:

John,

(U)

When Jim Naught and I discussed this our concern was the possibility that State / NSC and possibly the President himself were not aware of these assessments danger to hostages.


For our part we will keep the training going so our options are open.

Would like to have Jim brief you soon

PHILIP D. SHUTLER
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director for Operations

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~



20 FEB 80

B-187

~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

(c)

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

WARNING

ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!

EYES ONLY FOR:

MG Dyke

~~LtGen Shutler~~ *BS*

LtGen Pustay *P*

General Jones

RETURN TO

JCS/SOD

G

ACTION OFFICER: _____

TELEPHONE: EXT 55078

SECURE

2817


~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)


TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET SECRET	ORG CONTROL NUMBER			
SUBJECT: Hostage Assessments		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INITIALS	OTHER
				X	

REMARKS

1. Attached are copies of [redacted] DIA, and JTF assessments regarding the likelihood of a peaceful transfer/release of the 53 American hostages.
2. The assessments were arrived at independently but provide a generally uniform view.
3. All doubt that the hard core militants will release all of the hostages at any time in the near future.
4. All the assessments expect some of the militants to forcibly resist a government attempt to take control of the compound.
5. None of the assessments credit the Iranian government with the capability to secure the safe release of the hostages through military action.
6. The most recent JTF assessment concludes that unless Khomeini declares support for the UN Commission, orders the transfer of the hostages to government control, and the hostages are immediately and secretly flown out of the country their lives and those of Laingen, Howland and Tomseth will remain in jeopardy.


JAMES B. VAUGHT
 Major General, USA
 Commander, JTF

CLASSIFIED BY: **JCS, J-3**
 DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
 OR (X) REVIEW
 IS: **20 Feb 2000**
 EXTENDED BY:
 REASON: **5200R 301C**

ACTION OFFICER  LECOL, USAF SOD, J-3 EXT 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
	J-3 P						
	EXEC						
	TRM CIP						
	VCOPS						
	COPS						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
20 Feb 80							

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

DIA [REDACTED] HOSTAGE ASSESSMENTS

TAB A: DIA Working Paper, Subject: Capability of the Government of Iran to Secure the Release of the Hostages, 19 Feb 80

TAB B: [REDACTED]

JTF HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT

TAB C: Hostage Location/Situation Projections, 16 Feb 80

TAB D: Analysis of "Student"/Militant Options, 9 Feb 80

TAB E: Short Term Assessment, 4 Feb 80


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
19 February 1980

WORKING PAPER FOR SOD

Subject: Capability of the Government of Iran to Secure the Release of the Hostages (U)



~~(S//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT/ORCON/WNINTEL)~~ The date of information of this report is shortly after the late January landslide victory of Bani Sadr in the presidential elections and before his taking of the oath of office before Ayatollah Khomeini. He had made clear that the resolution of the hostage issue was a major objective, but the challenging of the militants and proposals for dealing with the crisis were yet to come. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that a report of this nature should occur, given the disparate views within the different factions among the militants and the controversial nature of the hostage issue. ~~We have noted~~ for some time our reservations about the loyalties of some of the militants and that some might not even obey a direct order from Khomeini to release the hostages. Bani Sadr of course would not unilaterally order the release; he realizes that the authority of Khomeini would be needed in this case. If Khomeini does order the release, there may very well be a refusal by some of the militants, who could claim that Khomeini had been duped by Bani Sadr and that the will of the "people" dictated that they hold the hostages until the Shah was returned.



(U) ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ The government could employ Revolutionary Guards, Ground Forces, or National Police forces in an effort to evict the captors. There is no known specially trained anti-terrorist force available. Based on previous employment philosophy, the Revolutionary Guards would be utilized in any government attempt to control the situation. However, such an action would require an order from Khomeini. A decision to forcefully capture the embassy would be taken only as a last resort. In the event of a direct confrontation, the risk to the hostages would increase significantly, and casualties among them are likely.

~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS
OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF
INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

WARNING SOURCE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

HULLFUST 0293
DANGERS 0437

DTG 161805Z FEB 80
FM: JTF /S-2/
TO: SFOD /S-2/
[REDACTED] /S-2/
1 SOW /A-2/
INFO: [REDACTED]

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FM JTF/RICE BOM
TO RUEAIIF
INFO RUEAIIJ/DELTA
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ LINDIS CITE J3 0000659

~~TOP SECRET~~ HOSTAGE LOCATION/SITUATION PROJECTIONS

- REF: (A) JTF HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT DTG 291516Z JAN 80
- (B) JTF SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT DTG 040010Z FEB 80
- (C) JTF ANALYSIS STUDENT/MILITANT OPTIONS DTG 040010Z FEB 80
- (D) [REDACTED]
- (E) [REDACTED]
- (F) [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ JTF HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATION

PAGE 2 RUEI2JC 0059 ~~TOP SECRET~~

2) AS LONG AS THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS CONTINUES WITHOUT
PUBLIC AND DIRECT STATEMENT OF SUPPORT BY KHOMEINI TO THE
MILITANTS THE SAFETY OF THE HOSTAGES WILL REMAIN UNCERTAIN AND
EVENTS UNPREDICTABLE.

3) [REDACTED]

4) ASSUMING THE UNSC CAN ASSEMBLE A "UN COMMISSION" ACCEPTABLE
TO ALL PARTIES AND THE COMMISSION IS ABLE TO CONVENE IN TEHRAN AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0059 ~~TOP SECRET~~

BEGIN REVIEWING EVIDENCE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (O/A 23 FEB 80), THIS OFFICE OFFERS THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

(A) UNLESS CONTROL OF THE COMPOUND IS GAINED BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO OR IN CONCERT WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION, IT IS DOUBTFULL IF ANY OF THE HOSTAGES MUCH LESS ALL OF THEM WILL BE RELEASED BY THE MILITANTS.

(B) IF THE COMMISSION INDICATES THAT "CRIMES AGAINST THE IRANIAN PEOPLE" DID OCCUR UNDER THE SHAH AND RECOMMENDS THAT THE SHAH BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL, THE MILITANTS MIGHT RELIASE SOME OF THE HOSTAGES BUT NOT ALL. HOLDING SOME AS INSURANCE AGAINST THE TRIAL AND RETURN OF THE SHAH.

(C) IF THE COMMISSION INDICATES THAT THE USG WAS NOT INVOLVED IN "THESE CRIMES" THE MILITANTS WILL PROBABLY REJECT THE COMMISSIONS FINDINGS AS AN EXAMPLE OF AMERICAN MANIPULATION OF FACTS AND CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES AND DECLARE THEY (THE MILITANTS) MUST NOW HOLD THE TRIAL THEMSELVES TO PROVE "AMERICAN COMPLICITY" TO THE WORLD.

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0059 ~~TOP SECRET~~

5. THIS OFFICE BELIEVES THAT THE STUDENT/MILITANT OPTIONS AS STATED IN REFERENCE ARE STILL OPERATIVE. ALTHOUGH THE VIABILITY OF OPTION ALFA SEEMS TO BE FADING,

[REDACTED] MAY INDICATE AN INCREASING POSSIBILITY OF OPTION BRAVO. C

6. IN SUMMARY, UNLESS KHOMEINI DECLARES SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION, ORDERS THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND THEY (THE HOSTAGES) ARE IMMEDIATELY AND SECRETLY FLOWN OUT OF THE COUNTY THEIR LIVES AND THOSE OF LAINGEN, HOWLAND AND TOMSETH WILL REMAIN IN JEOPARDY.

REVW 16 FEB 10

BT

0059

NNNN

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~~SECRET~~

~~T O P S E C R E T N O F O R N L I M D I S~~

SUBJ: ANALYSIS OF "STUDENT"/MILITANT OPTIONS

REF: JTF MSG 0454/DTG 040010Z FEB 80 (SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT)

1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT HOSTAGE SITUATION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE MILITANTS AND "STUDENTS" HOLDING THE EMBASSY COMPOUND.
2. THE ELECTION OF BANI-SADR, HIS INSTALLATION AS PRESIDENT OF IRAN BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AND HIS SUBSEQUENT DESIGNATION AS "PROVISIONAL" HEAD OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWING FEELING OF ISOLATION FELT BY THE STUDENTS AND MILITANTS.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0056 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ N O F O R N L I M D I S

3. PUBLIC STATEMENTS (DENOUNCEMENTS) BY BOTH BANI-SADR AND FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH INDICATE THE GOVERNMENT IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE MILITANTS' INFLEXIBILITY AND INTRANSIGENCE. THE REVERSAL OF AN ARREST ORDER FOR IRANIAN INFORMATION MINISTER MINATCHI; THE TEMPORARY DETENTION OF THE 49 (50) AMERICAN MUSLIMS VISITORS AT MEHRABAD; AND THE SEVERING OF MILITANT ACCESS TO IRANIAN RADIO/TV BROADCAST FACILITIES PROVIDE FURTHER INDICATIONS OF A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN THE MILITANTS AND AT LEAST PART OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AND CLERICAL HIERARCHY.

4. STUDENT/MILITANT DEBATES AND DISCUSSIONS ARE DOUBTLESS NOW MOTIVATED BY A GREATER SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND SUSPICION THAN EVER BEFORE. THIS ATMOSPHERE MAY BREED DECISION-MAKING BASED MORE ON FEAR THAN FACT. PREVIOUSLY, THE MILITANTS' COMMITTEE SYSTEM HAS ENABLED THEM TO PRESENT A CONSISTENTLY UNITED FRONT, INDICATING THAT DISCUSSION, DEBATE, AND CONSENSUS PRECEDED VIRTUALLY ALL MAJOR MOVES OR STATEMENTS. THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OBJECTIVES HAVE REMAINED CONSTANT AND STRATEGIES WERE FORMULATED WELL IN ADVANCE. THUS TACTICAL MOVES AVOIDED SELF CONTRADICTION AND ALLOWED THE CAPTORS TO STAY AHEAD OF THE SITUATION. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THIS SAME SORT OF REAPPRAISAL OF CURRENT CONDITIONS HAS BEEN ONGOING SINCE AT LEAST 1 FEBRUARY.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. DISCUSSIONS NOW PROBABLY REVOLVE AROUND A REVIEW OF PREVIOUS ACTIONS (BOTH SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL), A REEVALUATION OF THE DEGREE OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO BE EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE "THREAT" TO THE COMPOUND. DEBATE PROBABLY FOCUSES ON A SERIES OF THREE OR FOUR BROAD OPTIONS.

OPTION A: CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND ATTEMPT TO STAGE SOME SORT OF MEDIA "EVENT" WHICH WOULD REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THE "CRIMES OF THE SHAH" AND/OR THE DUPLICITY OF AMERICAN "SPIES". TO DATE THE MILITANTS HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO GARNER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FROM THIRD WORLD NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OR FROM ANY PROMINENT LEFTIST POLITICAL FIGURES. THEIR CALLS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL HAVE NOT RESULTED IN ANY TANGIBLE MOVEMENT IN THAT DIRECTION. THEY MAY HOPE THAT THE RECENT ARRIVAL OF THE 49 LIBERAL AMERICANS MAY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY OR STEPPING STONE TO SUCH AN EVENT. HOWEVER, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. IF SUCH A TRIBUNAL WAS HELD WITHIN THE COMPOUND WITH SELECTED THIRD WORLD TV COVERAGE, IT MIGHT PROVIDE A FACE-SAVING VEHICLE FOR THE MILITANTS TO RESTATE THEIR POSITION, OFFER EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN "CRIMES", AND THEN MAGNANIMOUSLY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES. THIS OPTION WOULD THUS ALLOW THE MILITANTS AN APPEARANCE OF CONTROLLING THE SITUATION AND ENDING THE CRISIS ON THEIR OWN.

OPTION B: CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND PREPARE TO DEFEND AGAINST ANY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL WITHIN THE COMPOUND. THE MILITANTS MAY BELIEVE THAT SUCH A STAND COULD REAFFIRM THEIR POSITION AS TRUE VANGUARDS OF THE REVOLUTION AND WILLING MARTYRS FOR ISLAMIC MARXISM.

OPTION C: CLADESTINELY REMOVE SOME OR ALL OF THE HOSTAGES FROM THE COMPOUND TO ANOTHER LOCATION OR LOCATIONS. THIS OPTION WOULD ALLOW THE MILITANTS TO AVOID A PHYSICAL CONFRONTATION WITHOUT MATERIALLY AFFECTING THEIR BARGAINING POWER. IT WOULD REFOCUS WORLD ATTENTION ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE AND EMBARRASS THE BANI-SADR GOVERNMENT. SUCH A MOVE WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN A NUMBER OF SEPARATE DETENTION AREAS, COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM OF SAFELY RECOVERING THE HOSTAGES.

- (A) [REDACTED]
- (B) [REDACTED]
- (C) [REDACTED]
- (D) [REDACTED]
- (E) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

(F)

[REDACTED]

(G)

[REDACTED]

4. IN SUMMARY, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE STUDENTS/MILITANTS HAVE AT LEAST THREE OPTIONS:

(A) CONTINUE CURRENT POSTURE, ARRANGE MEDIA EVENT, AND EVENTUALLY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AT A TIME OF THEIR CHOOSING.

(B) BUILD UP DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND PREPARE TO REPULSE ANY GOVERNMENT ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE COMPOUND.

(C) BUILD UP A CAPABILITY TO SECRETLY RELOCATE OUT OF COMPOUND TO UNKNOWN LOCATION(S) TAKING SOME OR ALL HOSTAGES WITH THEM.

6.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

MSG 0454

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TO:SFOD /S-2/
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[REDACTED] /S-2/
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[REDACTED] A, C

RJ

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SUBJECT: SHORT-TERM ASSESSMENT~~

1. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE SAFE EXIT OF SIX AMERICANS FROM TEHRAN, THE CONTINUATION OF POLITICAL FACTIONALISM, THE LESSENING OF FOCUS ON THE MILITANTS HOLDING THE EMBASSY TOGETHER WITH OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE QUESTIONABLE HEALTH OF KHOMEINI MAY PORTEND A MAJOR SHIFT IN THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

(A) THE NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT BANI-SADR HAS STATED HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE HOSTAGE SITUATION RESOLVED QUICKLY. HOWEVER HIS ABILITY TO CARRY THIS THROUGH IS HIGHLY SUSPECT.

(B) FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBAZADEH HAS CONSISTENTLY ATTEMPTED TO PROLONG THE INCIDENT, HAS PUBLICLY SUPPORTED THE MILITANTS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO MANIPULATE THE SITUATION TO HIS PERSONAL BENEFIT.

(C) THE MILITANTS HAVE STATED THEY WOULD NOT TURN THE HOSTAGES OVER TO A THIRD PARTY UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED BY KHOMEINI.

(D) THE STATUS OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH IS OPEN TO QUESTION. THE COMBINATION OF ADVANCED AGE, MINOR INFIRMITIES, AND RECENT HEART CONDITIONS MAKE THE EXTENT OF HIS CONTROL AND KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY LIMITED AND HIMSELF OPEN TO MANIPULATION BY COMPETING ELEMENTS.

(E) MODERATE ELEMENTS IN IRAN ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY AND PROBABLY DESIRE THE HOSTAGE SITUATION BE RESOLVED QUICKLY WITH MINIMUM COMPLICATION. DESPITE THIS, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN REVEALING THEMSELVES IN THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT AND THEIR IMPACT ON A RESOLUTION OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IS MINIMUM TO NIL.

(F) THE LACK OF A PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT OF SUPPORT AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING OF 3RD WORLD LIBERATION MOVEMENTS REPRESENTATIVES HELD IN TEHRAN IN EARLY JANUARY WAS PROBABLY A DISAPPOINTMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF A PERIOD OF INTERNAL DEBATE AMONG THE CAPTORS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(G) THE ESCAPE OF THE SIX AMERICANS PROBABLY PROMPTED ADDITIONAL DEBATE AND [REDACTED]

(H) AS LONG AS KHOMEINI REMAINS ALIVE HE IS A STABILIZING FACTOR. NONE OF THE COMPETING ELEMENTS HAVE THE POWER TO OPENLY TAKE AN INITIATIVE THAT MIGHT RUN COUNTER TO THE IMAM'S DESIRES OR THE DESIRES OF HIS CLOSE ADVISORS.

2. AS LONG AS KHOMEINI REMAINS ALIVE THE CHOICES OPEN TO THE MILITANTS ARE RELATIVELY LIMITED.

(A) ESCORT HOSTAGES TO AIRPORT AND RELEASE AS MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE OF GOOD WILL.

(B) RELEASE THE HOSTAGES TO A 3RD PARTY AS DIRECTED BY KHOMEINI

(C) REFUSE TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND RESTATE THEIR DEMAND FOR RETURN OF SHAH.

(D) MAINTAIN CONTROL OF HOSTAGES AND REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THEIR CAUSE BY INITIATING PUBLIC TRIALS OF SELECTED HOSTAGES.

3. HOWEVER THIS OFFICE HOLDS THAT FACTIONALISM EXISTS WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND SEVERAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT PROBABLY COMPETE FOR CONTROL.

(A) THE RELIGIOUS/MEDICAL STUDENTS WOULD BE INCLINED TO CONCLUDE THE INCIDENT WITHOUT BLOODSHED AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO OBEY A DIRECTIVE FROM KHOMEINI TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES TO A THIRD PARTY.

(B) THE MORE RADICAL FACTIONS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH RECEIVED TRAINING FROM THE PLO WOULD PROBABLY BALK AT THE IDEA OF RELEASING THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT EXACTING SOME CONCESSIONS FROM THE USG.

4. HOWEVER IF KHOMEINI WERE TO DIE WITHOUT A CLEAR MANDATE OF AUTHORITY BEING ESTABLISHED THE MILITANTS WOULD PROBABLY QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF THE PREVAILING AUTHORITIES AND CONSIDER THAT THEIR CAUSE WAS ABOUT TO BE SOLD OUT. THIS SUSPICION WOULD ENGENDER A MAJOR INTERNAL DEBATE WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.

5. IN SUMMARY ALTHOUGH NEGOTIATIONS ARE ONGOING BETWEEN IRANIAN OFFICIALS THE SGUK AND OFFICIALS OF THE USG, THE PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS (THE MILITANTS) ARE NOT INVOLVED AND THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE MILITANTS HAVE ANY INTENTIONS OF MODIFYING THEIR OBJECTIVES. THE MILITANTS, OUT OF BELIEF THAT VICTORY IS SLOWLY ESCAPING THEM, WILL ATTEMPT TO REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THEIR CAUSE THROUGH A MAJOR PEACEFUL MEDIA EVENT. HOWEVER IF KHOMEINI SHOULD DIE PRIOR TO A RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS SOME OF THE MILITANTS MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO RESORT TO A MORE VIOLENT COURSE OF ACTION.

REVW 4 FEB 88

~~SECRET~~



B193

31 July 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Collection Approval

1. (TS) This memorandum requests CJCS approval for expenditure of \$250,000 [redacted] and the authority to reinsert an Iranian national [redacted], who may be able to [redacted]

2. (TS) This individual has provided apparently credible information in the past, portions of which have been supported [redacted] He has undergone five polygraph examinations since his departure from Tehran without any signs of deception indicated.

3. (TS) During his previous mission, he was apprised that a [redacted]

[redacted] Total cost of the operation is estimated at \$250,000, with \$200,000 deposited to a foreign bank account for withdrawal in Iran to cover the bribe. The balance will be held in the CONUS and will be used only if essential. The source will receive his own salary upon return to CONUS prior to being reunited with his family in [redacted]

5. (TS) Although it is realized that this individual may be bogus, I believe he is the only source that has actually [redacted] in the past nine months. Since the pacing activity in rescue preparation is intelligence, recommend approval of funding and reinsertion of this source.

James B. Vaught
JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

Copy to:
VADM Hanson

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 1226
CLASSIFIED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC
 DESL (S) DOWN TO Secret
BY ON OADR
REVISED FROM ~~SECRET~~ Multiple sources
SECRET

Classified by JCS
Declassified ON OADR

TSE TIP




B197

DIA

TARGET SUPPORT ELEMENT (TSE)

TARGET INFORMATION PACKAGE (TIP) (U)

FOR



DATED:

6 NOV 79

Classified By: **DIA**
Declassified ON: **OADR**

Classified By:
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule Of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 2.3
Declassify On Impossible To Determine

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions





~~TOP SECRET~~

B198

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

5 MAY 1981

S-2556/DI-2

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Intelligence Capability (U)

Reference: J3-JCS Memorandum of 10 December 1980, subject as above.

*See last: attached
is reference for info.
v/R
(2)*

As noted in your memorandum, planning for the Iranian crisis was hampered initially by a lack of operational intelligence. As you observed, much of the required data could be acquired only by human sources and technical collection systems had limited utility in satisfying the requirements.

Additional funds have been programmed and additional personnel have been dedicated to the type of problem you have noted. I am persuaded that our responsiveness will be enhanced as these measures take effect.

normal collection activities" could be employed under some circumstances; at this time limited resources, extensive and diverse threat environments, and other national-level initiatives militate against creation of such a cadre.

3. (U) The provision of timely and accurate intelligence support to both military planners and operational commanders is a matter of utmost concern to this Agency. Hence, methods are continually reviewed and improvements sought to enhance this key intelligence function. Your comments and thoughtful suggestions toward this end are appreciated.

~~SECRET~~

Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.
EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CD 1256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
INITIATIVE CL BY DDD, NMCC
 RECLASSIFIED TO Secret
BY ON OADR
REASON Multiple for

~~TOP SECRET~~

Issued by DI-2
Classify on 14 APR 87
Rev on _____

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

MA 315-81
SOD-AA

~~SECRET~~

-30 RU:	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE		
		DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE	
SUBJECT: Intelligence Capability (U)	DJSM DATE			
	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
	XX	XX		

MARKS

~~Use~~ Timely and ~~accurate~~ situational data is crucial to effective crisis response planning. Technical collection systems are severely limited in their ability to obtain the essential data. Seasoned human observers are the key to obtaining much of this data.

(U) The attached memorandum to Director, DIA identifies intelligence deficiency and proposes a solution.

(U) Recommend J-3 approve and forward the attached memorandum to Director, DIA.

~~CLASSIFIED BY JCS, 3-3, JTD~~
~~REVIEW ON 8 DECEMBER 2000~~

OFFICER USAF JTD 55078	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
	A					
PREPARATION						
1980						

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

10 DEC 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Intelligence Capability

1. (U) (TS) A review of the intelligence collected during the past year to support Iranian contingency planning revealed a serious and persistent information deficiency. This deficiency revolves around the need of military planners to have accurate and timely situation oriented operational and environmental data such as:

ABC
1-1

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]
- e. [REDACTED]
- f. [REDACTED]

2. (TS) Although technical systems can and did provide some of the information needed, the nature of the required data puts the burden of collection on reliable human observers.

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY DJS
REVIEW ON 8 DECEMBER 2000

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

3. (S) The current DOD/Service HUMINT structure is not organized to satisfy these requirements. Recommend consideration be given to developing within DOD, [REDACTED]

4. (S) [REDACTED]

5. (S) [REDACTED]

Philip C. Gast

PHILIP C. GAST
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director for Operations



~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

B 199

3-33

18 JUN 1981

S-2690/DI-2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Pre-Incident Intelligence Preparations (U)

Reference: J3/JCS Memorandum of 8 December 1980, subject as above.

(S) Pursuant to your referenced memorandum, DIA approached the Department of State with your suggestions for improving the security of high-risk embassies. As State is currently involved in a multi-million dollar program to improve the security at embassies and consulates, they demonstrated a lively interest in the proposals. They were, however, concerned about the additional costs involved and the possibility of certain measures.

2. (S) While State is taking effective steps to improve the security posture of US diplomatic facilities worldwide, (enclosure 1), we have observed very little concrete action to implement any of your specific proposals. DIA therefore is developing a formal proposal to State's Office of Security to add impetus to the previous discussions.

3. DIA also is preparing a proposal to introduce your suggestions through the National Foreign Intelligence Board. This will serve to broaden the forum behind actions for embassy security as well as involving the [redacted] the development effort.

4. (U) We at DIA appreciate your thoughtful suggestions and concur that implementation of the measures you have proposed would enhance the security of our embassies. We will keep you advised of our efforts to involve the Department of State in effecting the security enhancement measures you have proposed.

1 Enclosure
SecState Msg
041945Z Apr 81
(C) 1 Cy

EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMC
 DEEL DOWNER TO _____
REVW ON OADR
REVISED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified by DI-2
Declassify on _____
Review on 26 May 87

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

.....
CONFIDENTIAL
.....

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

RTTCZEXV RUEHCAA5941 0950629
ROUTINE
R 041945Z APR 81 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 085941

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/17/87 (PEREZ; F. H.)

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: EMBASSY PROTECTION

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. (u) AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN A STRONG STAND AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID THAT HENCEFORTH AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE ACCORDED EVERY MEANS OF PROTECTION THAT AMERICA CAN OFFER. ANY FURTHER LOSS OF DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES OR THE TAKING OF OFFICIAL AMERICANS HOSTAGE WOULD HAVE GRAVE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. IN THIS CONNECTION, CHIEFS OF MISSION BEAR A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTION OF THEIR INSTALLATIONS AGAINST ASSAULT AND FOR THE SAFETY OF OFFICIAL AMERICANS ASSIGNED TO THEM. THEREFORE, IT IS INCUMBENT UPON ALL AMERICAN AMBASSADORS TO INSURE THAT EVERY APPROPRIATE STEP HAS BEEN TAKEN TO REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OF THEIR INSTALLATIONS AND PERSONNEL TO TERRORIST OR MOB ACTION. YOU SHOULD INSURE THAT CONTINGENCY PLANS

42

ACTION
INFO

(U,6)

NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) RDJTF:LO(1)
SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) USDP(15) DR(1) DD(1) CS(1)
CI-2(1) NMIC(*) RSS(1) RSS-3E(1) SWS(1) AT(2) VP(1)
- DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1) DB-4A(1) DB-5(1) DT-1(1)
DIA FILE(1) ARMY(*) NAVY(*) AIR FORCE(*)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 42

MCN=81095/01910 TCR=81095/0707Z TAG=81095/0708Z CDSN=RPC464

.....
CONFIDENTIAL
.....

PAGE 01
041945Z APR 81

42

.....
[REDACTED]
.....

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

ARE PREPARED AND PROVIDE FOR AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION OF EMBASSY RESOURCES TO RESPOND SHOULD EMBASSY INSTALLATIONS COME UNDER ATTACK.


3 (u) FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE WE HAVE LEARNED SEVERAL IMPORTANT LESSONS WHICH ALL CHIEFS OF MISSION SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN PREPARING THEIR CRISIS CONTINGENCY PLANS. THESE INCLUDE:

-- THE NEED TO BE QUICKER AT REDUCING STAFF WHEN PUBLIC ORDER APPEARS FRACTURED AND THE ABILITY/INTENTION OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT IS IN QUESTION.

-- THE NEED TO DEFINE, COMMUNICATE AND EXERCISE EMERGENCY REACTION CHAIN-OF-COMMAND. THIS SHOULD INVOLVE CLEAR DESIGNATION OF A CHAIN OF COMMAND BELOW THE DCM.

-- THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING CLASSIFIED HOLDINGS TO BARE ESSENTIALS IN A VOLATILE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.

-- THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT INTERNAL DEFENSE PLANS AND INTERNAL DESTRUCTION PLANS ARE CLEARLY FORMULATED AND SUPPORTED BY FREQUENT LIVE DRILLS INVOLVING ALL POST PERSONNEL.



.....
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
.....

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

UNDERSTOOD BY ALL.

5. (u) CHIEFS OF MISSION SHOULD ALSO URGENTLY FOCUS ON WAYS TO STRENGTHEN THE EMBASSY AGAINST ASSAULT. IN THIS CONTEXT, AMBASSADORS ARE URGED TO CONSIDER ADOPTING A DEFENSIVE STRATEGY OF TAKING SUITABLE FORCEFUL ACTION EARLY IN ANY INCURSION TO AVOID BEING OVERWHELMED BEFORE THE FULL PANOPLY OF PASSIVE SECURITY MEASURES CAN BE INVOKED. WHEN SUCH A POLICY IS ADOPTED AT A PARTICULAR POST, IT SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO MARINE GUARDS OTHER MISSION PERSONNEL WITH SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES. PLANS WHICH INVOLVE A HIGHER DEFENSE PROFILE SHOULD BE

TESTED AND REVIEWED REGULARLY. IN ALL CASES, AMBASSADORS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT EVERY PRUDENT MEASURE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PROTECT THEIR MISSIONS AND CONSTITUENT POSTS AGAINST ATTACK.

6. (u) THE DEPARTMENT FOR ITS PART IS MAKING EVERY EFFORT UNDER THE SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM TO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY POSITION OF THE MOST ENDANGERED POSTS. THIS IS A MULTI-YEAR PROGRAM WHICH BY 1985 WILL HAVE RESULTED IN MAJOR SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS AT 125 OF OUR DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS.

7. (u) WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED BY MAY 15 OF STEPS WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO ABOVE GUIDELINES AND OF ANY SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAY ARISE AT YOUR MISSION IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

8. (u) FYI - THE DEPARTMENT IS CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF FINALIZING AN EMERGENCY ACTION MANUAL (EAM) WHICH WILL NOT ONLY REPLACE THE OUTDATED EMERGENCY AND EVACUATION MANUAL BUT ALSO INCORPORATE SECTIONS ON BOMB THREATS, INTERNAL DEFENSE, EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION AND COMMUNICATIONS, TERRORISM, HIJACKING AND DISASTERS INTO A SINGLE CRISIS MANAGEMENT VOLUME. POST REPLIES TO THIS MESSAGE WILL THEREFORE ALSO BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE IN THE COMPLETION OF THE EAM WHICH WE PLAN TO DISTRIBUTE TO THE FIELD

MCN=81095/01910

TGR=81075/0707Z

TAD=81095/0708Z

CDSN=RP0464

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PAGE 03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

041945Z APR 81

DIS SUMMARY SHEET

TO: J-3d	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE	
THRU:	DJSM NO.	ODJS SUSPENSE DATE	
	DJSM DATE		
SUBJECT: Pre-Incident Intelligence Preparations	ACTION		
	APPROVAL XX	SIGNATURE XX	OTHER

REMARKS

1. (C) The attached memorandum to Director, DIA, enumerates a series of intelligence actions that could be implemented by DOD upon receipt of "reliable" warning of impending hostile action against a US overseas facility.

2. (C) Implementation of these actions would substantially improve DOD operational planning should the facility be seized by hostile elements.

3. (U) Recommend J3 approve and forward memorandum to Director, DIA.

A

CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, [REDACTED]
REVIEW ON 8 DECEMBER 2000

ACTION OFFICER [REDACTED] Ext 55078	COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
DATE OF PREPARATION 8 Dec 1980	J33	[REDACTED]	52789			
	J31	Johnson	5243			

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~ **SECRET**



8 December 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Pre-Incident Intelligence Preparations

1. (TS) Effective CT or Special Operations can better be accomplished if the internal and external Target Environment is known. This memo outlines a series of DOD intelligence actions that would substantially enhance operational planning, if the actions are implemented upon receipt of "reliable" early warning of a potential attack on a US facility.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

ABC

A (S) CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3 [redacted]
REVIEW ON 8 DECEMBER 2000

M.B.C.

[REDACTED]

C

2. Recommend Director, DIA consider discussing the above suggestions with [REDACTED] Service Intelligence Chiefs in an effort to develop a set of DOD intelligence options that can be implemented upon receipt of warning of a impending hostile action against a US facility, such as Nicaragua.

Philip C. Gast

PHILIP C. GAST
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director for Operations

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN~~ 202

(CLASSIFICATION)

SENSITIVE MATERIAL

WARNING

ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!

EYES ONLY FOR:

LTG Pustay

**CONTAINS
CODE WORD
MATERIAL**

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1256

CONDUCTED ON DDO, NMCC

REVIEWED BY 21 JUN 92

REL DOWN TO

LEVEL ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple sources

RETURN TO OPG, NMCC

ACTION OFFICER: _____

TELEPHONE: EXT _____ SECURE 2711

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

Classified By JCS
Declassified On: OADR

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

- I. Subject: Analysis of documents left aboard helicopters
- II. Purpose: To conduct an operational analysis of the effect of compromise of documents and equipment left aboard helicopters at the desert #1 crash site.

III. Main points:

- (1) Only helicopters #7 and #8 were left intact following the Iranian airstrikes and contained the following documents and equipment: (See Tab 1 for details)

TYPE DOCUMENTS ABOARD HELICOPTERS NUMBER 7 AND 8

- JTF-79 CEOI EXTRACT (TAB 2)
- EMERGENCY LZ BOOKS FOR TEHRAN AREA (NOT INCLUDED)
- ROUTE BOOKS WITH MAPS (NOT INCLUDED)
- CVW-8 CARD OF THE DAY (CALL SIGNS AND FREQUENCIES) (TAB 3)
- TACAIR INFORMATION (IDENTIFIES COORDINATES OF WAREHOUSE) (TAB 4)
- (c) - COURSE CARDS SHOW ENTIRE ROUTE TO TEHRAN AND MANZARIYEH (TAB 5)
- PILOT MISSION BRIEFING NOTES (NOT INCLUDED)
- WATCH SCHEDULE FOR HIDEOUT SECURITY (TAB 6)
- USS NIMITZ FREQUENCY CODES (NOT INCLUDED)

(2) COMSEC EQUIPMENT POSSIBLY COMPROMISED

- Only one KY-65 PARKHILL Tactical Voice Secure equipment device was possibly compromised. It was aboard helicopter #1 which was destroyed by Iranian airstrike.

- (b) [REDACTED]
- NESTOR Tactical Voice security equipment compromised aboard helicopters is considered [REDACTED] by NSA (par 1a, Tab 7).

- (c) (3) [REDACTED] Iranian TV releases confirm that documents and equipment removed from helicopters 7 and 8 were taken to Tehran by Ayatollah Khalkalki.

IV. Analysis of Security Compromise:

- Documents. There does not appear to be any long range security damage due to the compromise of documents left in helicopters 7 and 8.

-- Most damaging compromise is the identification and location of the Warehouse.

-- The rescue mission profile is discernable through analysis of documents aboard helicopters 7 and 8 to include:

--- Location of Hideout.

--- Targeting of Embassy and MFA.

--- Stadium vice Embassy was primary LZ.

--- Identification of emergency LZs in Teheran.

--- Manzariyeh was staging site.

--- Identifies SPOD-Delta and Rangers.

--- Identifies JTF main was located at [redacted]

E

(S)

C (S)

[redacted]

IV. Conclusions:

- Sufficient time existed prior to the IAF bombing attacks for Iranian Gendarmerie to remove documents from all helicopters at the desert site; however, it is unlikely any equipment was removed.

- The document compromise effects are short range and except for the identification of the Warehouse are restricted to compromise of the rescue plan.

C (S)

[redacted]

KY-65 Parkhill device was probably destroyed by the IAF bombing and destruction of helicopter #1.

DISPOSITION OF RESCUE HELICOPTERS

#1 Arrived at desert site #1 intact, abandoned by US
[redacted] until discovered [redacted]
[redacted] strafed and destroyed by
Iranian air strike [redacted]

#2 Same as #1.

#3 Destroyed while in US possession as a result of
crash with C-130.

#4 Same as #1.

#5 Returned to USS NIMITZ.

#6 Abandoned at remote desert location following
forced landing. Documents and equipment removed
by crew and placed aboard helo #8.

#7 Arrived at Desert site intact, abandoned by US
[redacted] until discovered [redacted] and

#8 Same as #7.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRG 90 BACKUP NAVAID
243.0 SEACON
282.8

RADIO NETS

HF DAY (0600Z-1759Z) 1796Z
NIGHT (1800Z-0559Z) 8855

UHF PRIMARY [REDACTED]
EXTRACTION/IN FLIGHT/NON SECURE
AIR TO AIR - SECURE
AIR TO GD. - UNSECURE
HIDE TO COMPLETION ← UNSECURE

DESERT LAND

MANZARIYEH 321.6s

FM PRIMARY [REDACTED]
PRIMARY [REDACTED] NET
BACKUP FOR DELTA/HELO

FIRE SUPPORT NET [REDACTED]

VHF GRD CONT 121.65

NAV AIDS CH 99 (ID PET) DESERT
CH 99 (ID FRE) MANZ.

ALPHA HELO NET [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

BREVITY CODES

LOCATIONS

CODEWORD

ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE

AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE

ARDALAN ST

CHANCERY BUILDING

COMMISSARY BUILDING

CONSULATE BUILDING

COTTAGES (A THRU D SUFFIX)

DCM RESIDENCE

DELTA SAFEHAVEN DESERT LAND

DESERT LAND

EMBASSY

FISHERABAD OM DEPOT

HELO HIDE SITE

IRAN

JASK

JRAHROK A/F

KARAZ

MANZARIYEH

MEHRABAD A/F

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)

NAH JU ST

NIMITZ

OLD GUARD QUARTERS

PRIMARY LANDING ZONE

QUON

ROOSEVELT BLVD

SEMAN A/F

SHIRAZ

STADIUM

TEHERAN

VAHDATI A/F



~~TOP SECRET~~

BREVITY CODES

AGENCIES

CODEWORD

[REDACTED]
AC-130 SPECTRES

COMJTF

ENEMY

HOSTAGES

JTF MAIN [REDACTED]

JTF ALTERNATE [REDACTED]

KC-135 TANKERS

C-141's

MANZARIYEH RANGERS

MC-130 TALONS

EC 130 (ABCCC)

JCS

NIMITZ

RH-53 HELOS

SEAS DELTA

TAC AIR

UNKNOWN

COMBAT CONTROL TEAM (CCT) DESERT LAND

COMBAT CONTROL TEAM (CCT) MANZARIYEH

DELTA RECEPTION PARTY

(S) A

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

BREVITY CODES

ACTIVITIES

CODENORD

- AIR ATTACK
- ABORT MISSION/NO GO
- AZIMUTH
- COMMUNICATIONS
- COMPLETE
- COORDINATES
- CRASHED
- DEPART
- DIVERT
- E AND E
- EAST
- EMERGENCY FUEL
- EXECUTE/GO
- FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
- FREQUENCY CHANGE
- GO TO
- GROUND FIRE (AAA)
- KIA
- KILOMETER
- LANDING
- LAUNCH
- MISSING
- NORTH
- OVERHEAD
- POSITION
- RADIO CONTACT
- REFUELING
- RETURN TO
- SAM
- SAR
- SATCOM
- SECURE
- SOUTH
- TAKING FIRE (SMALL ARMS)
- TOOK OFF
- WEATHER
- WEST
- WIA



AKT

HALOS in High SITA

NOTE: REPORT DISTRESS SITUATIONS/DEVIATIONS FROM PLAN BY BREAKING LISTENING SILENCE IN BREVITY CODES, IF SITUATION ALLOWS, OTHERWISE TRANSMIT CLEAR TEXT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CODE WORDS/REPORTS

53 LAUNCH - [REDACTED] C68

130 LDS [REDACTED]

53 LD HIDE [REDACTED] PT 25
WSC 3

△ CALLS HELO [REDACTED] PT 25
PSC 1

△ HITS EMBASSY [REDACTED] PT 25
PSC 1


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS
COMJTF
JTF ALT.
JTF MAIN
SEOP DELTA

PARTY
MC-130 TALON
AC-130 SPECTRE
MASIRAH
RANGERS-MANZARIYEH
HELOS

NIMITZ
MEDEVAC A/C
EC 130 (FUEL)
C111
CCT (DERERT)
CCT (MANZAR)
PRESIDENT
DESERT RANGERS
DEPCOM-JTF/HELO OPS



A, E

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CODE WORDS FOR 24 APRIL, 1969

<u>AIRCRAFT:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>MISSION ABOVE:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>AN-12/CUB:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>MISSION CHANGE:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>ATLANTIQUE:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>MISSION SUCCESS:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>BASE ALT:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>MISSION UNSUCCESSFUL:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>BASE FUEL:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>NAVAL UNIT:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>BASE HEADING:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>OMANI:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>BASE R:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>P-3:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>DATA LINK:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>PAKISTANI:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>F-4E:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>POFA:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>FRIENDLY:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>PUSH TIME:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>FRENCH:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>RECALL:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>GRIDLOCK:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>SAUDI ARABIAN:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>HOSTILE:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>SOVIET:CYCLIC</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>IL-38/MAY:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>SSSC MISSION:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>INDIAN:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>STEER TIME:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>IRANIAN:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>SUBMARINE:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>IRAQI:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>SYSTEM DEGRADED:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>JAGUAR:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>SYSTEM DOWN:</u>	[REDACTED]
<u>MERSHIP:</u>	[REDACTED]	<u>SYSTEM UP:</u>	[REDACTED]
		<u>UNKNOWN:</u>	[REDACTED]

Handwritten mark

COMMENCE EMCON: [REDACTED]
CEASE EMCON: [REDACTED]
APPROACHING RESTRICTED AIRSPACE: [REDACTED]
QUICK REACTION STRIKE: [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TACAIR INFORMATION

TACAIR A/C

CALL SIGN

FREQ. PRI/SEC

F-11

NIMITA A/C

FAST EAGLE (100X) 343.4/240.5

A-6

VICTORY (200X)

A-7

Raygun

Streetcar

F-4

Coral Sea A/C

SNAKE (100X)

A-6

LEDGE (200)

MILESTONE

C130

HAMMER

AIR CAP REFERENCE POINTS

EGAP

ECAP

ECAP

ECAP

ECAP

ECAP

ECAP

ECAP

ECAP

ECAP

A



IN ADDITION TO POINTS ALFA THROUGH INDIA GIVE
RNO/BRO OF TARGET FM CH 99 IF AVAILABLE.

AN/PPN-18 CODES

HELOES A

DELTA B

RANGERS C

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Based on current information, the cryptosystems subject to compromise consisted of at least one NESTOR tactical voice security equipment, one PARKHILL tactical voice security equipment, one secure IEP (Identification Friend of Foe Authentication) equipment, and two unused one-time pads.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

a. (U) (c) PARKHILL is among the newest crypto-equipments now entering the U.S. inventory and was designed specifically to support tactical HF communications.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2
REVIEW ON 21 April 2016

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

B206

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: [redacted] 135-80
8 May [redacted]

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF/J-33
ATTN: BG James H. Johnson

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment - Iran (U)

1. (U) The following information is provided in response to the query received this morning from MCEN Dalton in support of the Chairman's forthcoming Congressional testimony.
2. (U) Because of the many unknowns involved, our reply should be regarded as educated speculation.

[Large redacted block of text]

5. (U) Please let me know if you desire any further details.

Eugene F. Yeates
EUGENE F. YEATES
Chief, Office of Policy

Encl:
4/8

Declassify On: Originating Agency's Determination Required

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: NSA
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:
[signature]

COMSEC Damage Assessment

(S) 1. There were a number of classified U.S. cryptosystems subject to compromise in connection with Operation RICE BOWL.

[REDACTED]

(S) 2. There remains one area of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) 4. CONCLUSIONS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B,
C

B,
C

- PHASE I Delta Reception Committee formed, infiltrated (US)
- PHASE II Rangers and Combat Control Team placed at refuel point (Desert Land) Coordinates 33-04-25N, 055-52-55E. Possibly airdropped by C-141 or air landed - installed Nav Aid - CH 99.
- PHASE III C-130's with SFOD Delta launch from [redacted] refuel at [redacted] - fly to refuel point - meet helo's from NIMITZ (eight). Refuel helos from KC-130's.
- PHASE IV C-130's and KC-130's depart, back haul rangers and CCTC. Helo's with Delta Force move to hide site - Coordinates 35-15-45N, 052-10-50E. Meet Reception Committee - may have two separate hide sites.
- PHASE V Rangers and CCT secure primary departure field - Manzariyeh - Coordinates 34-58-30N, 050-48-10E. Air drop/air land?
- PHASE VI Reception Committee and Delta Force move in by vehicle (route marked on map) to stage area -- Warehouse [redacted] Final Coordination - Maybe bring air cap on station.
- PHASE VII [redacted] moves to MFA and Delta to Embassy - Helo's start move forward - Hostages released - Helo's pick up at PZ#7. Can't tell if a separate pick up is programmed by MFA. Possible -- have helo call sign of [redacted] and [redacted]
- PHASE VIII Fly to Manzariyeh to meet C-130's - extract force to [redacted] Link up with C-141's. Alternate departure field - (Karaj - Coordinates 35-46-25N, 050-53-05E.

COMMAND AND CONTROL (-)

- 1. Primary JTF HQ [redacted]
- 2. Alternate - [redacted]
- 3. Airborne CP - EC-130. Probably had CDR, JTF on board.

E&E

Had plan - possibly [redacted]

CALL SIGNS AND CODE WORDS

All units and participants identified.

FIRE SUPPORT

Extensive air cap (see force list) and 2 AC-130's.

Classified by: DBO, NMC
Declassify on: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO, NMC
Classified By: JES
Declassified on: OADR

REACTION FORCE

Rangers that secured Manzariyeh? USMC units afloat?

(U) PICK UP POINTS

All clearly marked map.

~~(C)~~ REAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY COMPROMISE

1. ID of [REDACTED]
2. ID and coordinates of warehouse (Staging area).
3. JTF main - [REDACTED]
4. Alt. JTF HQ [REDACTED] (Country ? - maybe [REDACTED])
5. ID of [REDACTED]
6. ID of [REDACTED]
7. Delta Reception Party - tied to warehouse - hide out area.
8. Photo capability (USSR)

PREPARED BY:

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FORCES

- (1)
1. Reception Committee [REDACTED] (Code) Call Sig [REDACTED]
 2. SFOD Delta [REDACTED]
- Main Force - Call sign [REDACTED]
 3. [REDACTED]
- Call sign - [REDACTED]
 4. Rangers - Manzariyeh [REDACTED]
- Call sign [REDACTED]
 5. Desert Rangers. Call sign [REDACTED] (code word -
 6. Combat Control Team - Desert Land [REDACTED]
 7. Combat Control Team - Manzariyeh [REDACTED]
 8. AIR CAP

- NIMITZ

F-14 (Fast Eagle & Victory)

A-6 Ray Gun

A-7 Street Car

- CORAL SEA

F-4 Snake & Ledge

A-6 Milestone

- Air Cap Reference Points

(2) 9. AIR LIFT/AIR REFUEL

- A
- C-141 [REDACTED] (MEDEVAC?)
 - Some type MEDEVAC aircraft.
 - C-130 [REDACTED]
 - KC-135 - [REDACTED] (tanker)
 - EC-130 - Fuel -
 - AC-130 - [REDACTED]
 - EC-130 - (ABCCC) [REDACTED] code

10. HELOS

- RH-53 - Blue Beard
- Blue Beard Alpha

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJ: JTF 79 CE01 (U) (TS)

- 1. (U) ITEM #1 INDEX
- INDEX
- GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
- CALL SIGNS/IDENTIFIERS
- SUFFIXES
- RADIO NETS AND FREQUENCIES/NAVAIDS
- CODE WORDS
- TELEPHONE LISTING

- ITEM NO.
- 1 CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 1255
 - 2 CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
 - 3
 - 4 REPIVATE CL BY DDO NMCC
 - 5 REL DOWN TO Secret
 - 6 REV BY OADR
 - 7 DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

2 (U) (TS) ITEM #2 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
 A (U) (TS) THIS CE01 IS EFFECTIVE 24/0001Z APR 80
 B (U) (TS) PRIOR TO D-1 ALL COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE BY SECURE MEANS EXCEPT ROUTINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND DECEPTION TRAFFIC.
 C (U) (TS) FROM D-1 UNTIL COMPLETION OF OPERATION, LISTENING SILENCE IS IMPOSED ON ALL ELEMENTS. THIS SILENCE MAY BE BROKEN ONLY UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

- (1) REPORTING AS LISTED IN ITEM #6 REQUIRED REPORTS.
- (2) AS REQUIRED USING SECURED WSC-3 AND PT-25 RADIOS.
- (3) TO TRANSMIT EMERGENCY/DISTRESS TRAFFIC.
- (4) TO TRANSMIT COMMAND AND CONTROL/COORDINATION TRAFFIC DURING THE ASSAULT AND EXTRACTION PHASE.
- (5) ABSOLUTELY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL AIR TO AIR TRAFFIC ENROUTE (E.G. BETWEEN TANKERS AND MC-130S) USING KY 28 SECURED UHF.

D (U) (TS) ALL HF, VHF/FM VHF/AM, AND UHF SYSTEMS WILL BE NON-SECURE FROM D-1 (LAUNCH OF DELTA AND HELO FORCES) UNTIL END OF OPERATION, EXCEPT FOR AIRCRAFT UHF RADIOS, WHICH WILL BE KY 28 SECURED WHEN OUTSIDE THE TEHRAN/MANABAD AREA. UHF GUARD CHANNEL (243.00 MHZ) WILL BE MONITORED AT ALL TIMES.

E (U) (TS) COMSEC MATERIAL TO BE USED.
 (1) ORESTES (KW-7) FOR WSC-3 TTY NETS USKAK- [REDACTED]
 (2) PARKHILL (KY 65/75) USKAT - [REDACTED]
 (3) NESTOR (KY 28/38) USKAK [REDACTED]
 (4) [REDACTED]

(5) CRYPTO KEY WILL BE DAY 24. EVERYONE WILL STAY ON THE SAME KEY UNTIL OPERATION TERMINATION.

F (U) (TS) COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES.
 (1) ALL TRANSMISSIONS WILL BE MADE IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER WITH TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN REPETITIONS STRICTLY OBSERVED.
 (A) ALL RADIOS - TRANSMIT BY VOICE. WAIT FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. IF NO RESPONSE HEARD WITHIN 30 SECONDS REPEAT TRANSMISSION AND WAIT 30 SECONDS. ON THIRD TRANSMISSION REQUEST ANY STATION HEARING CALL TO RELAY TO ADDRESSEE.
 (B) ON HF COMMAND NET - IF THERE IS STILL NO CONTACT AFTER REQUEST FOR RELAY BY ANY STATION IS MADE, SEND MESSAGE IN INTERNATIONAL MORSE CODE.

B,C

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14 PAGES

Classified By: JCS
 Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

(2) TELETYPE TRANSMISSION ON THE WSC-3 UHF TACSAT JTF NET (COMMAND NET CHARLIE) IS NOT PERMITTED AFTER LAUNCH OF FORCES SO THAT THE NET REMAINS CLEAR FOR VOICE TRANSMISSIONS.

6. (TS) PRIMARY PARKHILL PREAMBLE WILL BE "NON-HF", ALTERNATE PREAMBLE IS "HF" POSITION. PARKHILL OPERATORS MUST BE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE EACH MODE AND MUST "MATE" WITH THE TRANSMITTING STATION.

3. (TS) ITEM #3 CALL SIGNS/IDENTIFIERS
USER

- AC-130 SPECTRE
- C-141
- CCT-DESERT LAND
- CCT-MANZARIYEH
- CJCS
- COMJTF
- CORAL SEA
- CORAL SEA F4N
- F4N
- A6E
- KA6D

(C) VOICE

(S) CW

A,B

A,B

- CTF-70
- ~~DELTA~~ RECEPTION PARTY
- DEPCOMJTF
- DEPCOMJTF FIXED WING OPS
- DEPCOMJTF HELO OPS
- DESERT LAND RANGER ELEMENT
- C-141 BASE

EC-130

- JCS
- JTF-ALTERNATE
- JTF-MAIN
- KC-135

- MEDEVAC AIRCRAFT
- MC-130 TALON
- NIMITZ
- NIMITZ F-14
- F-14
- A6E
- KA6D
- EA6B
- EA6B

- PRESIDENT
- RANGERS - MANZARIYEH
- RH-53

RH-53 (MFA)
SECDEF
SFOD-DELTA
SFOD-ALPHA

4. (U) (TS) ITEM #4 SUFFIXES

CDR
DEP CDR/XO
J1/S1
J2//S2
J3/S3
J4/S4
J6/CE OFF
CH OF STAFF
ACFT #1
ACFT #2
ACFT #3
ACFT #4
ACFT #5
ACFT #6
ACFT #7
ACFT #8

5. (U) (TS) ITEM #5 RADIO NETS AND FREQUENCIES/NAVAIDS.

- A. (U) (TS) COMMAND NET ALFA. (JTF MAIN NCS) WSC-3
PARKHILL SECURED VOICE OR TTY, 75 BAND, KW-7 SECURED
(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JCS, JTF-MAIN, JTF-ALTERNATE.
(2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: ATLANTIC OCEAN AFSAT.
(3) FREQUENCY: UPLINK XMT 295.075 DOWN LINK REC 261.475
- B. (TS) COMMAND NET BRAVO, PSC-1 NON SECURE VOICE (JTF MAIN NCS)
(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JTF, DELTA, HELOS, RANGERS, MANZARIYEH.
(2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: INDIAN OCEAN FLEETSAT II, CHANNEL 5
(3) FREQUENCY: UPLINK XMT 298.150 DOWN LINK REC 257.150.
- C. (U) (TS) COMMAND NET CHARLIE, WSC-3/PT-25 UHF TACSAT JTF NET.
(JTF MAIN NCS).
PARKHILL SECURED VOICE OR TTY, 75 BAND, KW-7 SECURED
(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JTF-MAIN, JTF-ALTERNATE, NIMITZ,
AC-130, C-141, HELOS, MC-130S, DELTA, RANGERS, EC-130,
DELTA RECEPTION PARTY
(2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: INDIAN OCEAN FLEETSAT II, CHANNEL 9
(U) (3) FREQUENCY: UPLINK XMT 309.450 DOWNLINK REC 268.450
- D. (U) (TS) COMMAND NET DELTA, HF SSB; UPPER, VOICE OR CODE
NON-SECURE. (JTF MAIN NCS)
(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JTF-MAIN, JTF-ALTERNATE, DELTA,
HELOS, SPECTRE, TALONS, NIMITZ, MANZARIYEH RANGERS, EC-130S,
C-141S, TANKERS.

(2) FREQUENCIES DAY (0600Z-1759Z) 17967 KHZ
NIGHT (1800Z-0559Z) 8855 KHZ

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(A) THIS NET IS A SECONDARY BACK-UP TO THE PSC-1 AND PT-25 SATCOM NETS AND STATIONS WILL BE ON LISTENING SILENCE EXCEPT WHEN AN EMERGENCY DICTATES TRANSMISSION AS DETERMINED BY THE COMMANDER MAKING SUCH TRANSMISSION.

(B) THIS NET WILL BE USED AS REQUIRED WHEN DELTA EXECUTES THE ASSAULT.

(C) SERVES AS EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS NET FOR ALL FORCE ELEMENTS.

E (TS) EXTRACTION IN FLIGHT NET, UHF, NON SECURE, EXCEPT AS STATED BELOW (DELTA NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: DELTA, HELOS, [REDACTED] RECEPTION PARTY, [REDACTED]

(2) FREQUENCY: 305.7 MHZ PRIMARY. SEE PARA 5.1 FOR SECONDARY. 321.6 MHZ WILL BE SECONDARY ONLY FOR RECEPTION PARTY/HELO LINK UP.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(A) THIS NET WILL BE USED FOR GROUND TO AIR/AIR TO GROUND COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DELTA, HELOS AND DELTA RECEPTION PARTY.

(B) THIS NET WILL ALSO BE USED FOR AIR TO AIR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HELOS. HELOS WILL SECURE THIS NET WITH KY-28 SECURE DEVICE FROM TIME OF DEPARTURE UNTIL ARRIVAL AT THE HIDE SITE. AFTER ARRIVAL AT THE HIDE SITE THE NET WILL BE NON-SECURE UNTIL COMPLETION OF THE OPERATIONS, SO AS TO ALLOW COMMUNICATION WITH GROUND ELEMENTS WHICH DO NOT HAVE SECURE DEVICES.

(U) (TS) DELTA COMMAND NET, VHF-FM, NON-SECURE (DELTA NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: DELTA, SPECTRE IN SUPPORT OF DELTA AND NAVY TACAIR

(2) FREQUENCY: 341.4 MHZ PRIMARY. 240.5 MHZ SECONDARY.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. THIS NET IS PRIMARILY FOR USE OF DELTA ELEMENTS

B. THIS NET IS BACK-UP TO THE DELTA UHF COMMAND NET FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DELTA AND HELOS

C. THIS NET IS ALSO BACK-UP TO THE DELTA FIRE SUPPORT NET FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DELTA AND SPECTRE IN SUPPORT OF DELTA.

G. (TS) DELTA FIRE SUPPORT NET, UHF, NON-SECURE (DELTA NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: DELTA, SPECTRE IN SUPPORT OF DELTA AND NAVY TACAIR

(2) FREQUENCY: 341.4 MHZ PRIMARY. 240.5 MHZ SECONDARY.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS: THIS NET IS USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DELTA, THE SPECTRE SUPPORTING DELTA AND ANY NAVAL TACTICAL AIR WHICH MAY BE CALLED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT.

(U) (TS) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL NET, UHF, NON-SECURE EXCEPT AS STATED BELOW (CCT NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: CCT ATC ELEMENT AT DESERT LAND CCT ATC ELEMENT AT MANZARIYEH, TALONS, SPECTRE, HELOS, TANKERS,

~~TOP SECRET~~
C-141S, EC 130S AND NAVY TACAIR.

(2) FREQUENCY: 321.6 MHZ PRIMARY. SEE PARA 5.1 FOR SECONDARY.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(a) THIS NET IS USED FOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AT DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH. ALL AIRCRAFT WILL BE ON THIS FREQUENCY WHEN IN THE DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH AREAS. HELOS WILL SWITCH FROM THE DELTA UHF COMMAND NET FREQUENCY TO THIS FREQUENCY AFTER DEPARTURE FROM THE EMBASSY COMPLEX.

(b) THIS FREQUENCY IS ALSO USED FOR AIR TO AIR COMMUNICATIONS ENROUTE BETWEEN AND AMONG TALONS, TANKERS, SPECTRES, EC 130S AND C-141S. SUCH USE WILL BE ONLY THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL AND WILL BE KY-28 SECURED. SWITCH TO NON-SECURE WHEN WITHIN 100 MILES OF MANZARIYEH TO ALLOW COMMUNICATIONS WITH GROUND ELEMENTS.

(c) THIS FREQUENCY WILL ALSO BE USED FOR AIR TO AIR COMMUNICATION DURING AIR REFUELING OF NAVY TAC AIR.

I. (TS) HELO COMMAND/AIR TRAFFIC GROUND CONTROL NET, VHF-AM, NON-SECURE (CCT NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: CCT ATC ELEMENTS AT DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH TALONS, SPECTRES, HELOS, C-141S, EC 130S

(2) FREQUENCY: 121.65 MHZ

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. THIS NET IS USED FOR ACT GROUND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AT DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH. ALL AIRCRAFT WILL BE IN THIS NET WHEN IN THE DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH AREAS.

B. THIS NET IS ALSO THE ALTERNATE UHF ATC NET.

C. THIS NET MAY ALSO BE USED AS BACK-UP AIR TO AIR NET BETWEEN AND AMONG AIRCRAFT WHILE EN-ROUTE. HOWEVER, AIR TO AIR COMMUNICATIONS MUST BE STRICTLY MINIMIZED WHEN IN THE DESERT LAND AND MANZARIYEH AREAS TO PRECLUDE INTERFERENCE WITH ATC GROUND CONTROL OPERATIONS. SINCE THIS NET IS NONSECURE ONLY EMERGENCY TRAFFIC MAY BE PASSED ENROUTE WHEN OUTSIDE THE TEHRAN/MANZARIYEH AREA.

(U) J. (TS) RANGER FIRE SUPPORT NET, UHF, NONSECURE (RANGERS NCS)

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: MANZARIYEH-RANGERS, SPECTRE IN SUPPORT OF RANGERS AND ANY NAVAL TACTICAL AIR WHICH MAY BE CALLED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT.

(2) FREQUENCY: 348.4 MHZ PRIMARY, 240.5 SECONDARY.

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS: THIS NET IS USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE MANZARIYEH RANGERS AND THE SUPPORTING SPECTRE.

K. (TS) RANGER INTERNAL NETS:

FM COMMAND NET: 32.10 MHZ

DACO FM NET: 46.50 MHZ

FIRE SUPPORT FM NET: 38.20 MHZ

THESE ARE INTERNAL RANGER NETS. FRIENDLY STATIONS MAY ENTER THE NETS IN EMERGENCIES WHEN PRIMARY COMMUNICATIONS FAIL.

L. (TS) ALFA/HELO UHF NET, UHF-AM NONSECURE

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: [REDACTED] (NCS), HELOS

(2) FREQUENCY: 361.7 MHZ

(3) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS: THIS NET WILL BE USED BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND DESIGNATED HELOS FOR EXTRACTION.

~~TOP SECRET~~

M. (U) (PS) AIR REFUELING NET, UHF-AM, SECURE
 (1) OPERATING STATIONS: TALONS, SPECTRE, EC-130, C-141, TANKERS, NAVAL TAC AIR.
 (2) FREQUENCY: 321.6 MHZ
 (3) OPERATING INSTRUCTION:
 (A) THIS NET WILL BE USED DURING IN-FLIGHT REFUELING OPERATIONS BETWEEN TANKERS, C-130 TYPE AIRCRAFT AND C-141 AS REQUIRED.

(B) THIS NET WILL ALSO BE USED TO SUPPORT NAVAL TACTICAL AIR IN-FLIGHT REFUELING IF NECESSARY.

(4) AIR REFUELING INFORMATION:

SUPPORT AIRCRAFT	AIR-TO-AIR TACAN (RCVR/TNKR)	BEACON
NAVY-GULF OF OMAN AND ARABIAN SEA	30/93	2-1-1
NAVY-PERSIAN GULF	31/94	1-1-3
EC-130-GULF OF OMAN AND ARABIAN SEA	32/95	2-1-3
MC-130	33/96	2-1-2
AC-130 (U)	29/92	2-2-1

N. (PS) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) ALL ELEMENTS MUST BE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE ABOVE NETS. ALTERNATE NETS MAY BE ENTERED BY FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE EVENT PRIMARY COMMUNICATIONS FAIL DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE.

(2) ALL ELEMENTS MUST GUARD ALL NETS IN WHICH THEY ARE LISTED AS OPERATING STATIONS.

O. (PS) NAVAIDS:

- (1) TRN 41 TACAN AT DESERT LAND: CHAN 99 IDENT PETE
- (2) TRN 41 TACAN AT MANZARIYEH: CHAN 99 IDENT FRED
- (3) GAR-1 BEACON - CODE 1 (ALL SWITCHES IN UP POSITION)
- (4) ANY RADIO MAY BE USED AS A NAVAID BY SETTING ON FREQUENCIES AS LISTED FOR NETS ABOVE.

NAVAID. ON FREQUENCY 243.00 MHZ IT CAN BE USED IN THE BEACON, VOICE AND CW MODE. FREQUENCY 282.8 MHZ IT CAN BE USED IN THE VOICE MODE ONLY.

6 (U) (TS) CODE WORDS

(U) (TS) SCHEDULED EVENTS TO BE REPORTED TO JTF MAIN	REQUIRED REPORTS	CODE WORD	REPORTED BY/VIA
(1) 7 RH-53S LAUNCHED FROM CARRIER		TOP SECRET	CARRIER/WSC-3 SECURE
(2) AFSOB REPORTS ALL AIRCRAFT DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS AT TOP SECRET			LOCAL SECURE LANDLINE
(3) TOP SECRET REPORTS ALL AIRCRAFT ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES			WSC-3 SECURE
(4) MC 130 LAND AT DESERT LAND		TOP SECRET	MC 130/WSC-3 SECURE
(5) DELTA REPORT ALL			DELTA/PT 25 SECURE

ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES
AT DESERT LAND VIA PT-25
PARKHILL SECURED. SHOULD
RADIO NOT WORK IN THE
SECURE MODE, DO NOT
TRANSMIT.

(6) HELOS LANDED HLZ. SITE SECURE

HELOS/PT-25 OR
WSC-3 SECURE

(7) DELTA CONFIRMS "H" HOUR
(ASSAULT TIME)

PT-25
SECURE OR PSC-1
MC130/WSC-3
SECURE

(8) ALL MANZARIYEH BOUND
MC-130S REFUELED

PT25/
PSC-1/HF/UHF

(9) DELTA CALLS HELOS FOR
EXTRACTION

(10) DELTA ATTACKS EMBASSY

NOTE: THE CODEWORD [REDACTED] WILL BE RETRANSMITTED BY JTF ON
THE SATELLITE NETS AND THE JTF HF COMMAND NET TO INSURE ALL
UNITS ARE AWARE OF THIS EVENT.

(11) RANGERS ARRIVE

PT-25 OR
WSC-3 SECURE

MANZARIYEH

(12) MANZARIYEH SECURE

(13) RANGERS REPORT ALL AIRCRAFT ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES AT MANZARIYEH
VIA PARKHILL SECURED WSC-3 IN MC130 OR PARKHILL SECURED PT-25,
SHOULD RADIO NOT WORK IN THE SECURE MODE. DO NOT TRANSMIT.

(14) AIRCRAFT CLEARING
IRANIAN AIRSPACE

ALL AIRCRAFT WSC-3
SECURE OR HF

(15) THE C141 EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT PROVIDE A BRIEF AFTER ACTION
REPORT (I.E. KIA, WIA, NR HOSTAGES RESCUED AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT
INFO) VIA PARKHILL SECURED WSC-3. SHOULD RADIO NOT WORK IN THE
SECURE MODE, DO NOT TRANSMIT.

(16) AIRCRAFT ARRIVING AT RECOVERY. EVERGLADE
SITE

ALL ACFT/SATCOM

B. (PS) BREVITY CODES

WSC-3 SECURE

(1) LOCATIONS

AIR REFUEL CONTROL POINT

ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE

AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE

ANARAK

ARDALAN ST

BANDAR ABBAS

CHANCERY BUILDING

COMMISSARY BUILDING

CONSULATE BUILDING

COTTAGES (A THRU D SUFFIX)

DASHAN-TAPPEH A/F

DCM RESIDENCE

DELTA SAFEHAVEN

DESERT LAND

[REDACTED] C-141 BASE

A, E

EMBASSY
ESFAHAN (KHEYAMI) A/F
FISCHERABAD QM DEPOT
GHALE MAGHRI /F
HELO HIDE SITE

IRAN
JASK
JHAHROK ASF
KAHRIZAH AIRSTRIP
KARAZ
KARAZ AIRFIELD
MANZARIYEH

MEHRABAD AIRPORT
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)
NAIN MILITARY
NAM JU ST

NIMITZ
OLD GUARD QUARTERS
PRACTICE FIELD
PRIMARY LANDING ZONE
QUOM
ROOSEVELT BLVD


SEM NAN NEW AIRFIELD
SHIRAZ
STADIUM
TABRIZ
TAKHT-E-JAMSHID ST
TEHRAN

VAHDATI A/F

(2) AGENCIES:

AC-130 SPECTRE
C-141
CCT-DESERT LAND
CCT-
CJCS
COMJTF
CORAL SEA
CTF-70
DELTA RECEPTION PARTY
DEPCOMJTF
C-141 BASE
EC-130
ENEMY
HOSTAGES

C
A, E



JCS
JTF-ALTERNATE
JTF-MAIN
KC-135 TANKERS

MEDEVAC AIRCRAFT
MC-130 TALON
NIMITZ

PRESIDENT
RANGERS - MANZARIYEH
RH-53
RH-53 (MFA)
SECDEF
SFOD-DELTA

TAC AIR
UNKNOWNNS

(3) ACTIVITIES

AIR ATTACK
ABORT MISSION/NO GO
AZIMUTH
COMMUNICATIONS
COMPLETE
COORDINATES
CRASHED
DEPART
DIVERT
E AND E
EAST
EMERGENCY EXTRACTION LZ
EMERGENCY FUEL
EXECUTE/GO
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
FREQUENCY CHANGE
GO TO
GROUND FIRE (AAA)
KIA
KILOMETER
LANDING
LAUNCH
LZ
MISSING
NORTH
OVERHEAD
POSITION
RADIO CONTACT
REFUELING
REQUEST NAVY FIGHTERS

EMERGENCY
REQUESTERS

RETURN TO
SAM
SAR
SATCOM
SECURE
SOUTH
TAKING FIRE (SMALL ARMS)
TOOK OFF
WEATHER
WEST
WIA

NOTE: REPORT DISTRESS SITUATIONS/DEVIATIONS FROM PLAN BY
BREAKING LISTENING SILENCE IN BREVITY CODES, IF SITUATION ALLOWS,
OTHERWISE TRANSMIT CLEAR TEXT.

EXAMPLE: ONE MC-130 CRASHED 1100Z REPORT, "ONE
AT 1100Z."

(4) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL BREVITY CODES
ACTIVITY
GO AROUND
LAND
TAKE OFF
EXECUTE 360
ORBIT
TAXI OFF RUNWAY ASAP
HOLD
DO NOT LAND
TURN RIGHT
TURN LEFT
C. (TS) DECODE SECTION

CODE WORD

MEANING
RANGERS ARRIVE MANZARIYEH
ALL MANZARIYEH BOUND MC-130S REFUELED
AIRCRAFT CLEARING IRANIAN AIRSPACE
DO NOT LAND
TAXI OFF RUNWAY ASAP
SECDEF
HELOS LANDED AT HLZ. SITE SECURE.
RH-53
RH-53 (MAF SUPPORT)
OVERHEAD
DELTA CONFIRMS "H" HOUR (ASSAULT TIME)
130 LANDS AT DESERT LAND
SATCOM
NIMITZ EA6B
TAKE OFF

7 RH-53S LAUNCHED FROM CARRIER

[REDACTED]
KAHRIZAH AIRSTRIP
REQUEST NAVY FIGHTERS
MC-130 TALONS
DELTA ATTACKS EMBASSY
MANZARIYEH SECURE
DELTA CALLS HELOS FOR EXTRACTION

[REDACTED]
MEDEVAC

[REDACTED]
IRAN
TEHERAN
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)
MANZARIYEH
ORBIT
AIRCRAFT ARRIVING AT RECOVERY SITE

[REDACTED]
NIMITZ F-14
HELO HIDE SITE
DELTA SAFE HAVEN
EMBASSY
AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE
DCM RESIDENCE
COMJTF
CHANCERY BUILDING
LZ
FREQUENCY CHANGE
CONSULATE BUIDLING
COMMISSARY BUILDING
COTTAGES (A THRU D SUFFIX)
OLD GUARD QUARTERS
ROOSEVELT BLVD
TAKHT-E-JAMSHID
ARDALAN ST
NAM JU ST
PRESIDENT
FISHERABAD QM DEPOT
STADIUM
PRACTICE FIELD

[REDACTED]
SEM NAN NEW A/F
ANARAK
AC-130 SPECTRE
ESFAHAN (KHETAMI) A/F
NAIN MILITARY
BANDAR ABBAS
SHIRAZ

A, E

TOP SECRET
QUOM
COPAL SEA
DASHAN-TAPPEH A/F
GHALE MAGHRI A/F
MEHRABAD A/F
JASK
KAPAZ
TABRIZ
VAHDATI A/F
C-141
JHAHROKI A/F
PRIMARY LANDING ZONE
ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE

UNKNOWN
HOSTAGES
TAC AIR
ENEMY
KIA
WIA
AIR ATTACK
HOLD
MISSING
GROUND FIRE (AAA)
ABORT MISSION/NO GO
E AND E
CTF-70
DEPART
GO TO
REFUELING
NORTH
COMPLETE
CJCS
EMERGENCY FUEL
COMBAT CONTROL TEAM (CCT) DESERT LAND
EAST
COORDINATES
CRASHED
DIVERT
SOUTH
TAKING FIRE. (SMALL ARMS)
CORAL SEA F4N
SAM
RADIO CONTACT
TURN RIGHT
WEST
RETURN TO
SECURE
POSITION
LANDING

A, E

JCS
LAUNCH
TOOK OFF
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
SAR
CORAL SEA A6E/KA6D
EXECUTE/GO
KILOMETER
LAND
COMMUNICATIONS
DEPCOMJTF
KC-135 TANKERS
EXECUTE 360
AZIMUTH
WEATHER
NIMITZ EA6B

A, B, C, E

NIMITZ A6E/KA6D
JTF MAIN
EC-130
AIR REFUEL CONTROL POINT
GO AROUND
COMBAT CONTROL TEAM (CCT)
CORAL SEA F4N
RANGERS - MANZARIYEH
TURN LEFT
JTF ALTERNATE
NIMITZ
DELTA RECEPTION PARTY
EMERGENCY EXTRACTION LZ
NIMITZ F-14
KARAZ ARIFIELD
DESERT LAND
SFOD-DELTA
C-141 BASE

(6)
D. (PS) NUMERICAL CODE

7 (6) (PS) TELEPHONE LISTING

A. JCS AUTOVON 22X-XXXX; COMERCIAL 202-69X-XXXX

PARKHILL ---

TTY - - - - -

KY-3 - - - - -

NON-SECURE -

KY-70 - - - - -

KY-70 (CJCS)

B. JTF - MAIN

AUTOSEVOCOM HY-2

PARKHILL

TTY - - - - -

KY-70 -----

C. JTF ALTERNATE

PARKHILL --- AUTOVON

TTY -----

NON-SECURE - AUTOVON

ASK OPERATOR FOR

COMMERCIAL -

D. KY-3/KY-70 INTERFACE POINTS

A) GSA

KY-3 -

KY-70 -

B) WHITE HOUSE COMM AGENCY

KY-3 -

KY-70 -

C) PENTAGON

KY-3

KY-70 - COMMERCIAL

AUTOVON

E.

AUTOSEVOCOM HY-2

PARKHILL

REVW 19 APR 10

AB
E

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

BREVITY CODES

LOCATIONS

(S) CODEWORD

- ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE
- AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE
- ARDALAN ST
- CHANCERY BUILDING
- COMMISSARY BUILDING
- CONSULATE BUILDING
- COTTAGES (A THRU D SUFFIX)
- DCM RESIDENCE
- DELTA SAFEHAVEN DESERT LAND
- DESERT LAND
- EMBASSY
- FISHERABAD CM DEPOT
- [REDACTED]
- HELD HIDE SITE
- [REDACTED]
- IRAN
- JASK
- JHAHROK A5F
- KARAZ
- MANZARIYEH
- MEHRABAD A/F
- MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)
- NAM JU ST
- [REDACTED]
- NIMITZ
- OLD GUARD QUARTERS
- PRIMARY LANDING ZONE
- QUOH
- ROOSEVELT BLVD
- [REDACTED]
- SHIRAZ
- STADIUM
- TEHERAN
- [REDACTED]
- VAHDATI A/F
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

W/E
W/E

Classified by
Doo Nme
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

BREVITY CODES

AGENCIES

CODEWORD

AC-130 SPECTRES

COMJTF

ENEMY

HOSTAGES

JTF MAIN

JTF ALTERNATE

KC-135 TANKERS

C-141's

MANZARIYEH RANGERS

MC-130 TALONS

EC 130 (ABCCC)

JCS

NIMITZ

RH-53 HELOS

SFOD-DELTA

TAC AIR

UNKNOWN'S

COMBAT CONTROL TEAM (CCT) DESERT LAND

COMBAT CONTROL TEAM (CCT) MANZARIYEH

DELTA RECEPTION PARTY

ABE

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~


BREVITY CODES

(J)

ACTIVITIES

CODEWORD

- AIR ATTACK
- ABORT MISSION/NO GO
- AZIMUTH
- COMMUNICATIONS
- COMPLETE
- COORDINATES
- CRASHED
- DEPART
- DIVERT
- E AND E
- EAST
- EMERGENCY FUEL
- EXECUTE/GO
- FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
- FREQUENCY CHANGE
- GO TO
- GROUND FIRE (AAA)
- KIA
- KILOMETER
- LANDING
- LAUNCH
- MISSING
- NORTH
- OVERHEAD
- POSITION
- RADIO CONTACT
- REFUELING
- RETURN TO
- SAM
- SAR
- SATCOM
- SECURE
- SOUTH
- TAKING FIRE (SMALL ARMS)
- TOOK OFF
- WEATHER
- WEST
- WIA



HLDS in Hnd SIA

NOTE: REPORT DISTRESS SITUATIONS/DEVIATIONS FROM PLAN BY BREAKING LISTENING SILENCE IN BREVITY CODES, IF SITUATION ALLOWS, OTHERWISE TRANSMIT CLEAR TEXT.

~~SECRET~~

JCS (S)
COMJTF
JTF ALT.
JTF MAIN
SFOD DELTA

Δ RECEP. PARTY
MC-130 TALON
AC-130 SPECTRE

RANGERS-MANZARIYEH
HELOS

NIMITZ
MEDEVAC A/C
EC 130 (FUEL)
C141
CCT (DERERT)
CCT (MANZAR)
PRESIDENT
DESERT RANGERS
DEPCOM JTF/HELO OPS.

AE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)
PRC 90 BACKUP NAV AID
243.0 SEACON
282.8

RADIO NETS

HF DAY (0600Z-1759Z) [REDACTED]
NIGHT (1800Z-0559Z) [REDACTED]

UHF PRIMARY [REDACTED]
EXTRACTION/IN FLIGHT/NON SECURE
AIR TO AIR - SECURE
AIR TO GD. - UNSECURE
HIDE TO COMPLETION ← UNSECURE

A.B.

DESERT LAND

MANZARIYEH [REDACTED]

FM PRIMARY [REDACTED]
PRIMARY [REDACTED] NET
BACKUP FOR DELTA/HELO

FIRE SUPPORT NET /SPECTOR [REDACTED]

VHF GRD CONT [REDACTED]

NAV AIDS CH 99 (ID PETE) DESERT
CH 99 (ID FRED) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HELO NET [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ CODE WORDS/REPORTS

53 LAUNCH [REDACTED] C68

130 LDS [REDACTED]

53 LD HIDE [REDACTED] PT 25
WSC 3


A

△ CALLS HELO [REDACTED] PT 25
PSC 1

△ HITS EMBASSY [REDACTED] PT 25
PSC 1

Classified By: D, JSOA
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~




- 100 Watt FM, FSK, PSK
- 30 Watt AM - Narrowband and Wideband
- MTBF - 2100 Hours Demo
- ERT - 10 Minutes Demons
- Built-in Test Equipment
- Remote Control with 20 Preset Channel Selection and Modulation Mode Selection
- Nuclear EMP/TREE Harde
- Multicoupler Compatible

Developed for the U.S. Navy, the AN/WSC-3 is a highly flexible, new generation ship/submarine UHF satellite - LOS communications terminal which sends and receives AM/FM or data information via satellite relay or line of sight. The AN/WSC-3 (Whiskey-3) has a min-

imum of 100 watts output in FM or data modes. It features internal modulation and detection for 75 bits per second FSK or 75 to 9600 bits per second PSK. A 70 MHz interface capability is provided for expansion with a variety of external modems.

AN/WSC-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




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- 30 Watt AM Narrowband and Wideband
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PARKHILL KY-85/75





PARKHILL KY-85/75

WINTER
COUNTRY





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

JTF V
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CS
J3
RD
B2
B219
M

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 1235
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDO-NM
 REC DOWGR F
REV ON OADR
REASON FOR Multiple Sources

MSG NR 830
DLG 831755Z SEP 80
FM SNOBIRDY J2
TO SOW

LIBIST
DELTA

A A

SUBJECT: SOVIET REACTION TO US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAN.

1. (TS) THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF USSR REACTIONS TO A US MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD DEPEND VERY MUCH ON WHAT MOSCOW THOUGHT WERE THE US MOTIVES. IF THE SOVIETS CONCLUDED THAT A SMALL, QUICK US MILITARY MOVE WAS DESIGNED STRICTLY TO OBTAIN RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, THEY MAY NOT INTERVENE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WERE HIGHLY EMBARRASSED BY THEIR OBVIOUS LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE EAST RAID. WHEN VIEWED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THEIR ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND, MORE RECENTLY, EVENTS IN POLAND, ACTION BY THE SOVIETS IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER HOSTAGE RELEASE ATTEMPT IS MUCH MORE LIKELY

2. (TS) IF THE SOVIETS CONCLUDED THE US INTENDED TO CREATE A PRO-US REGIME IN TEHRAN OR TAKE THE OILFIELDS, THEY WOULD PROBABLY PREEMPTORILY INVADE AND OCCUPY ALL OR PART OF IRAN.

3. (TS) IN ANY CASE, REACTION IN THE FORM OF RUSSIAN INVASION WOULD TAKE A MINIMUM OF TWO WEEKS AND PROVIDE 3-10 DAYS WARNING.

4. (TS) EMPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIR RESOURCES AGAINST A SMALL US HOSTAGE-RELEASE TYPE OF FORCE IS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH NOT PROBABLE.

5. (TS) DESPITE THE PREPONDERANCE OF TACTICAL AIR AND PVO STRANGY (SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES), THESE AIR FORCES WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE EMPLOYED AGAINST A US RESCUE FORCE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. DIRECT SUPERPOWERED FORCE CONFRONTATION.

~~SECRET~~

... THE REASON TIME WOULD MITIGATE AGAINST SUCCESS.

... LESS ADVANTAGE TO INTERDICT THAN TO INVADE AND "PROTECT
IRAN" VIA 1921 AGREEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

6. (S) ALTHOUGH ANY MILITARY ACTION TAKEN BY THE US COULD
TRIGGER A SOVIET REACTION, DIRECT TACTICAL OR PVO STRANY
INTERDICTION OF A US RESCUE IS NOT LIKELY.

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

B222

MSG 294
3 021422R DEC 79
FM CDR DELTA //BECKWITH
TO COMJTF //MG VAUGHT
BT

~~SECRET~~

1. I HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO REEXAMINE OUR PAST ACTIVITIES AT YUMA DURING 03-06 DEC, AND PASS TO YOU MY JUDGEMENT ON KEY ISSUES:

A. THE AIR DROPPING OF HELO FUEL MUST BE VIEWED AS A LAST RESORT/EMERGENCY METHOD OF REFUELING HELOS IN ANY PHASE OF OUR PROPOSED OPERATION. THE PROBABILITY OF RECOVERING USABLE FUEL IS NOT VERY GOOD COUPLED WITH THE MAMMOTH TASK OF RECOVERY OF AIR ITEMS/ FUEL ETC.

B. YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF THE HELO PILOT PROBLEM. THEIR ABILITY TO FLY AT NIGHT DID NOT IMPROVE DURING YOUR ABSENCE. IN FACT, IT WAS FORTUNATE THAT WE DID NOT LOSE AN ELEMENT OF DELTA AS A RESULT OF A HELO CRASH. THERE ARE THREE STRAIGHT FORWARD IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN SELECTING PERSONNEL TO PERFORM EXTRAORDINARY HAZARD TASKS/SPECIAL OPERATIONS.

(1) THE INDIVIDUAL BEING CONSIDERED FOR THE ABOVE TASKS MUST UNDERSTAND THE RISKS, VOLUNTEER, AND BE CAREFULLY SELECTED BASED ON AN APPROPRIATE ASSESSMENT PROCESS.

(2) TIME MUST BE ALLOTTED TO TRAIN AND EVALUATE EACH VOLUNTEER CANDIDATE.

(3) EACH CANDIDATE MUST BE PROVIDED WITH PRECISELY THE SAME TOOLS, MACHINES HE WILL USE ON AN ACTUAL OPERATION.

(4) THERE ARE NO SHORT CUTS TO THE ABOVE THREE PRINCIPLES. I ALSO REALIZE I AM PREACHING TO THE CHOR. HOWEVER, IT HAS BEEN MADE OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES WERE NOT CONSIDERED IN SELECTING THE HELO CREWS TO INSERT AND EXTRACT DELTA INTO IPAM.

C. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO CONDUCT THE NEXT FTX, INVOLVING DELTA, HELOS, TALONS AND SPECTRE AT SITE 51 VICE VISA. DELTA PERSONNEL REMAINED IN THEIR ISOLATED SITE DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD AT YUMA. ON THE OTHER HAND, OTHERS RESIDED IN SEPARATE LOCATIONS IN PLUSH BILLETTS AND WERE EXPOSED TO OUTSIDE AGENCIES, USE OF COMMERCIAL TELEPHONES AND THE U.S. MAIL. IN MY VIEW, OUR LOW VISIBILITY APPROACH TO A NON-PERMISSIVE FORCE OPTION MAY QUICKLY BECOME HIGH VISIBILITY BASED ON THE OPSEC CONSIDERATIONS. I WILL BRIEF YOU ON MY FUTURE PLANNED TRAINING PROGRAM TOMORROW. VERY RESPECTFULLY.

3 021422R DEC 2009

*Declassified by -
DDO, NMCC*

(U) [REDACTED] The independent analyst cannot support the conclusions concerning the sensitivity of the probabilities of five arriving at the extraction site to a 5% reduction in probability of take-off at the hide site. The probability of five mission capable arriving would be .856 rather than .636. Therefore, the subsequent observations would appear to be in question. It is agreed that a pre-mission parametric analysis might have provided the mission planners with a more perspective in-sight into the probabilities of mission success or failure from the standpoint of systems reliability. However, the analysts confirm that the synergistic effects of unrelated and unpredictable events, such as those experienced by helicopter #5, or combat losses, cannot be quantified.

(U) [REDACTED] The paragraph on Page E-6 concerning Figure E-1 is not clear as to how the histogram of malfunctions relates to RH-53Ds. Without reference to the type of aircraft, the nature of the failures (i.e., abort or non-abort malfunction), or the schedule length of sortie, it is difficult to ascertain the relevance of this figure to the failures experienced on this mission. One occurred two hours after take-off. The second abort occurred almost four hours into the mission. The third aircraft flew for almost six hours before the decision was made that it could not continue.

(U) [REDACTED] It should be noted that the "peacetime rules" probabilities identified by the analysts were selected to represent the "worst case" to be expected by the planners, given the limitations of the analysis and the available data. For example, the data available from the NIMITZ indicates that during the period of 1 Jan 80 to 10 Mar 80 the average mission was significantly longer (4.55 hours) and the pre-flight and in-flight abort rates were substantially lower. Therefore, the analysts elected to choose abort rates which would represent what could be expected to be the best (combat) or worst (peacetime) cases.

(U) [REDACTED] Annex E correctly concludes that additional RH-53Ds could have been accommodated on the NIMITZ and that additional crews could have been trained if the requirement had been recognized by the mission planners. A pre-mission statistical analysis of the available data could have given the planners a better in-sight into the probabilities of successfully completing the mission. It could also have served to identify the limitations of the analysis to predict, with any degree of confidence, those events such as combat losses, unforecast weather conditions or accident caused by aircrew error. This might have caused the planners to re-evaluate mission requirements and request additional aircraft and crews.

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] The Annex postulates several scenarios which are operationally feasible. The scenario wherein some helicopters would return to NIMITZ from a predetermined point would require the Helicopter Flight Leader to communicate with the flight to determine which aircraft were most capable of continuing the mission. Whether or not such communications would have compromised the mission would be speculative.

(U) [REDACTED] One scenario calls for nine RH-53Ds to receive 1700 gallons each from the three EC-130s and two additional RH-53Ds to receive 900 gallons each to either return to NIMITZ or continue directly to the hide-side. This scenario is operationally feasible. However, for the eleventh RH-53D to receive the full 900 gallons, it would have^{to be} refueled from three different tankers. This would virtually eliminate any contingency fuel for the C-130s.

(U) [REDACTED] In summary, Annex E is an objective evaluation of the factors bearing on the determining the appropriate number of helicopters to be used on the mission. In retrospect it can be concluded that there were an insufficient number of helicopters and crews available for, and scheduled to fly the mission. But, it should also be noted that, had any one of the events which influenced the crew of helicopter #5 to abort not occurred, there is a high probability that there would have been a sufficient number of mission capable helicopters at Desert One to continue the mission.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ B2

IMPERATIVE ACTIVITY/DOMINANT AUTHORITY CONCEPT

1. The Commander, JTF, is in full command of all forces, during all phases of each operation. All subordinate commanders will function in an Imperative Activity/Dominant Authority Mode

overall command of all operations. All subordinate commanders will function in an Imperative

2. Imperative Activity is defined as that portion of the operation which, at a given point in time, is critical to successful mission completion.

is that portion of the operation which, at a given point in time, is critical to

3. The term Dominant Authority designates the commander responsible, at that time, for execution of the Imperative Activity.

designates the commander responsible for execution of the Imperative

4. The Dominant Authority concept applies to one or more lateral elements; not to a formal command. For example, during an amphibious assault phase, the Ground Forces Commander (GFC) has dominant authority, and, for that period, is the Dominant Authority. The Air Mission Commander (AMC) who had just been assigned to the JTF command net, but would be required to execute, on the order of the GFC (under the monitoring of the JTF), various tasks necessary to successfully complete the seizure phase of the operation.

applies temporary OPCON of lateral elements; not formal transfer of command. For example, during an amphibious assault phase, the Ground Forces Commander (GFC) has dominant authority. The Air Mission Commander (AMC) who had just been assigned to the JTF command net, but would be required to execute, on the order of the GFC (under the monitoring of the JTF), various tasks necessary to successfully complete the

5. At certain times during an operation there may be more than one Dominant Authority. An amphibious assault phase might be the Air Support Commander defending against an air attack over the target area at the same time that a ground assault phase is in progress. In these instances the general situation and the nature of events will dictate which commanders will respond to the requirements of the operation. Priorities will be monitored and adjusted, and positive command guidance will be provided when required, by the Commander, JTF.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by
DJO, NMCC

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER			
SUBJECT: Iran Reintroduction of Media		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
					X

REMARKS

The attached memorandum provides recommendations regarding the reintroduction of American news personnel into Iran. The recommendations are listed in three paragraphs. The first recommends against the reintroduction, the second provides a list of possible concessions to be sort from the Irans in exchange for allowing the reintroduction; the third provides suggestions regarding the status of the three Americans held in the Iranian Ministry of Affairs.

ACTION OFFICER SECRET ETC, USAF SOD, J-3 EXT 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
	J-3 P						
	EX2C						
	T2J C1F						
	VCCP9						
	CCP8						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
29 FEB 80							



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

*Jim - I discussed with Sec Def. 29 February 1980
If agree you have some good points.
We will consider if any further movement
towards recognizing each recognizing how
difficult it will be. J*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Iran, Reintroduction of Media (TS)

1. (TS) The reintroduction of selected American media into Iran will complicate any future rescue operations by increasing the number of potential "replacement" hostages available. I recommend against it.

2. (TS) However if the decision is made to reintroduce American media recommend all or most of the following conditions be posed to the Government of Iran prior to reintroduction.

- a. Guarantee of personnel safety.
- b. Guarantee of freedom of movement.
- c. Guarantee of unrestricted departure.
- d. Guarantee of no-press censorship.
- e. Guarantee of immediate access to all American hostages by media reps and American medical team.
- f. Guarantee of scheduled weekly access to all hostages and USG personnel being held in MFA.
- g. Recognition of Mr. Laingen, and party as official USG representatives with full diplomatic immunity including freedom of movement and freedom of private communication and continuing access to the compound hostages.
- h. Recognition of the fact that the failure to fulfill any and all of these guarantees is a purposeful abrogation of the civil and religious responsibilities of the Government of Iran.

3. (TS) If the decision to allow American media to reenter Iran is made without extracting any of the above suggested or alternate concessions recommend that every effort be made to clarify the official position of the Iranian Government regarding the status of Mr. Laingen, Howland and Tomseth. It is readily apparent that the militants do not control the fate of these three gentlemen, but the civil government, particularly the foreign ministry, does. The return of Mr. Laingen, Howland, and Tomseth to the USA for "discussions" or their amalgamation with the compound hostages would substantially ease any future rescue operations.

[Signature]
JAMES B. VAUGHT
MGEN USA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OPERATIONS CENTER

IRAN WORKING GROUP

SITREP NO. 244

Situation in Iran as of 0530 EST, March 6, 1980

S/S (3)
S/S-O (2) + TF

(U)

(C) Commission Visit to the Hostages Still Not On

A spokesman at the Embassy informed UPI this morning that Khomeini has not yet ordered the militants to allow the Commission to visit the hostages. We believe Bani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council are continuing to work hard to get such an order issued; Khomeini, however, may prove to be unwilling or unable to exert his authority with the militants. The Commission remains in Tehran for the moment in the hope that something still can be arranged.


(U) Tudeh Party Claims Winning Seats Not Its Goal

FBIS reports Iran's Marxist Tudeh Party as saying yesterday that it plans to participate in the upcoming elections, but "not to secure seats or form an influential faction" in the new Parliament. Rather, according to the Party statement, it plans to make use of the campaign for a "distortion free propagation of the Party's program and to build closer relations between the Party and the masses." 110 Tudeh candidates will contest the election, 70 of them from Tehran.

The Party may not even be able to use the campaign for propaganda purposes. A Reuter report this morning quotes a revolutionary official as saying a Marxist cannot believe in Islamic teachings and so Tudeh candidates will be banned from running for Parliament.

(U) American Journalists to Re-enter Iran Shortly

Tehran Radio announced yesterday that the appropriate revolutionary authorities have decided that "within the next few days" one group of reporters from American radio and television and "a very few" representatives of U.S. newspapers will be given permission to return to Iran. Those journalists to be blessed with new entry visas must be proven to be "not biased in preparing reports."


Andrew Sens
Senior Officer
Iran Working Group


J. Hulings
Senior Watch Officer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CDA 3/6/80 (Sens, A.)~~

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SITREP NO. 244

Situation in Iran as of 0530 EST, March 6, 1980

S/S (3)
S/S-O (2) + TF
S/S-S

(U)
(C) Commission Visit to the Hostages Still Not On

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EA (5)
JR
LPEP

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EDITOR
(LDX)
D (LDX)
E (LDX)

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(U) American Journalists to Re-enter Iran Shortly

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
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A. Sens
Andrew Sens
Senior Officer
Iran Working Group

J. Hulings
J. Hulings
Senior Watch Officer

~~SECRET~~
CNS 3/5/80 (Sens, A.)

SECRET



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~~TOP SECRET~~
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

B# 106
INCOMING

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E206: [REDACTED]
E207: [REDACTED]
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01, [REDACTED] MISSILE, OCEAN FLAG,

E202:
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E204:
E205:
E206:
E207:

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RFR

DICTIONARY: 01, PROFILE:
70 148 209 271 302 400 543

Saw

Bill

Tom

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TOP SECRET

SECTION 01 OF 15

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COMBAT AND R-10 COMBODENT, OTE DEY REFLECTIN AND OTG 24.1
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AND IS SUBJECT TO
DISSEMINATION AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BECOMES

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INCOMING

PAGE 01 MSG # 6775
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00010, 00010, 00010, 00010;
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSG:
01, [REDACTED] PHILIPPINES,
SOUTH PACIFIC,
DICTIONARY: 01, PROFILE:
20 03 117 202 009 009 043

[REDACTED]

RECORDED BY 12
R000
R000
R000
R000

AC

UNCLASSIFIED AND NUMBER:
117-107-01
Z0000000
PTTHWFOY YERKOH 0000 1000001-MIXA--YE-000.
EZ00:
EZ01:
ZKZK FP CNA HSH 000 000 PNI ORN 00
EZ02:
P R 000000 117 00 070
FM 00010
TO CREAM
ZEN
[REDACTED]
EZ03:
EZ04:
EZ05:

SECTION 11 OF 19

CONTAINMENT BEING HELD IN ACCORD TO AVOID DISSEMINATION FOR UNAUTHORIZED
PERSONNEL FOR COM OPERATIONS, SEE LIST REFERENCE AND CITE CALL
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.

[REDACTED]

C

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INCOMING

PAGE 01 MISC # 0747
PRIORITY -- TOP SECRET -- SOURCE REFERENCE -- INFO CHARACTER
REFERENCE FROM [REDACTED]
PROBING ASSIGNED BY [REDACTED]
CASE HEAT [REDACTED]
FRAMES [REDACTED]
AGENCY, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

E200:
E201:
E202:
E203:

A, C

DI, [REDACTED]
AFRICA SECTION
DICTIONARY: DI, PROFILE:
93 347 119 413 400 503
INDICATED BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

ZKZK PP QM WSH JON ZOL PNI QM DE
E200:
E201:
E202:
E203:
E204:
E205:

D

[REDACTED]

E200:
E201:
E202:

SECTION 12 10F 19

CONTAINING [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c

[REDACTED]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INCOMING

PAGE 01 NSS = 6762
PRIORITY -- TOP SECRET -- DODS MESSAGE -- 3100 CHARACTERS
REFERENCE FROM HOSIC, [REDACTED]
ROUTING ASSIGNED BY NSS:
OATR SIII3 024V
PRIORITY ASSIGNED BY NSS:
A012 (1), B012 (1), E013 (1), G000 (1),
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY NSS:
01, [REDACTED] ELECTRONIC,



AC

DICTIONARY: D1, PROFILE:
93 179 210 400 402 408 543
FMIC-AUTOCOM MSG NUMBER:
127-107005

EZ03:
EZ04:
EZ05:
EZ07:

ZCZOM1599
PITHZFDY YEMG4V 0259 1032051-MIXV--YEM10.
EZ03:
OAT 1201VA
ZEM PP OAH MSH ZCR ZSL RMI OAH DE
EZ02:
P R 000005Z MAY 00 ZFD
FM HOSIC
TO OHEAN
ZEM

D

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]


EZ03:
EZ04:
EZ05:

SECTION 15 OF 19

CHAVMHT KEEP AND PASS TO HOND C/INLORON FOR HOSIC/O
COMFAIRREF FOR COMUSDEFOR, CTE DET KELLAVIN AND CTO 24.1
SSC TINKER PASS TO 552 AMACV/IN



C



~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

B111

MSG 292
O 251608Z APR 80
FM DELTA REAR
TO JTF [REDACTED]
BT
SECRET

TOR 251636Z

SUBJECT: ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS REPORTS

THE FOLLOWING WAS RECEIVED AT 1054 EST:

IRAN-STRIKE FORCE--N.C.

URGENT

(WASHINGTON) SOURCES SAY TODAY THAT THE U.S. MILITARY UNIT THAT TRIED TO RESCUE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN IS A HIGHLY SECRET ANTI-TERRORIST FORCE BASED AT FORT BRAGG. THE SOURCE SAYS PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION WAS WELL UNDERWAY IN JANUARY AND THAT THE SPECIAL UNIT HAD VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED BUDGET AND ACCESS TO THE MOST SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS AND DEBILITATING GASES.

-DASH-

THE SOURCE SAYS THE ALL-VOLUNTEER UNIT WAS KNOWN AS THE DELTA TEAM. PENTAGON SOURCES CONFIRMED THERE WAS A DELTA TEAM, ALSO KNOWN UNDER THE CODE NAME OF BLUE LIGHT. BUT THEY COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT THIS WAS THE TEAM INVOLVED IN THE ABORTIVE ACTION. THE ATTEMPT LEFT EIGHT SERVICEMEN DEAD IN THE COLLISION OF TWO AIRCRAFT. SOURCES SAY ONLY A HANDFUL OF TOP OFFICIALS KNEW WHAT UNITS AND HOW MANY MEN WERE INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL OPERATION. PENTAGON OFFICIALS WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE REPORT, SAYING THE PENTAGON HAD NOTHING TO ADD BEYOND WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD ANNOUNCED.

MORE STRIKE FORCE

WASHINGTON...

THE SOURCE SAYS HE PERSONALLY WAS AWARE OF THE PLANNING. HE SAYS THE DELTA TEAM OPERATIONS WERE DIRECTED BY A SPECIAL DIRECT ACTION GROUP OF PLANNERS IN THE PENTAGON. HE SAYS THE TEAM WAS A SPECIALLY DESIGNED COUNTER-TERRORIST UNIT THAT WAS TRAINED IN RESCUING HOSTAGES AND IN THE USE OF NAUSEA-PRODUCING GASES. THE PENTAGON HAS IN THE PAST ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTENCE OF A TEAM MODELED ON THE CRACK ISRAELI AND WEST GERMAN ANTI-TERRORIST UNITS AND HAS SAID IT WAS HEADQUARTERED AT FORT BRAGG.

-DASH-

THE TEAM REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND IS COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF VOLUNTEERS FROM ARMY SPECIAL FORCES AND RANGER UNITS. THE ARMY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIT'S TRAINING. THERE WAS NO INDICATION ON THE SIZE OF THE DELTA TEAM. AT THE TIME OF ITS FORMATION IN 1978. PENTAGON OFFICIALS SAID THEY WERE SEEKING BETWEEN

Declassified by:
DDO, NMC

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B111.02

~~SECRET~~

200 AND 250 SEASONED SOLDIERS AS VOLUNTEERS FOR THE UNIT. UNQUOTE.

ADVISE THAT NO PERSONNEL BE BROUGHT BACK TO CAMP...
AND DUE TO INEVITABLE PRESS COVERAGE. SECURITY INVOLVED AT
DETA COMPOUND.

RVW 25 APR 00
BT

NNNN

THIS WAS THE TEAM INVOLVED IN THE PROMPT ACTION. THE ALLIANCE FEEL
UNDER THE CODE NAME OF BLUE LIGHT. BUT THEY COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT
BENJAMIN SOURCES CONFIRMED THERE WAS A DEPTA TEAM ALSO KNOWN
THE SOURCE SAYS THE ALL-ALPHABETIC UNIT WAS KNOWN AS THE DEPTA TEAM.
-0431-

OPERATIONAL MEMBERS AND IDENTIFYING CASES.
UNIT HAD AIRBORNE AND GROUND FORCE AND ACCESS TO THE MORT
FOR THE OPERATION WAS LEFT UNDETERMINED IN JAMAICA AND THAT THE SPECIAL
ANTI-TERRORIST FORCE BASED AT FORT BRAGG. THE SOURCE SAYS PLANNING
WAS TO RESCUE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN IS A HIGHLY SECRET
(S) SOURCE SAYS TODAY THAT THE U.S. MILITARY UNIT THAT

SECRET

INFORMATIVE FORCE--M.C.

THE FOLLOWING WAS RECEIVED AT 1024 021:

SUBJECT: ASSOCIATED WITH THE MEMBERS

[REDACTED SECTION]

G

[REDACTED SECTION]

~~SECRET~~

B120

ZZQGMSG 068
O 271155R NOV 79
FM DELTA
TO JCS/SOD
BT
~~SECRET~~

Declassified by:
DDO, NMcC

SUBJECT: EVIN, CASR AND THE COMMITTEE PRISONS

(U) 1. EVIN PRISON (MAP GRID 3662) IS A FORMER SAVAK FACILITY WHICH HOUSED THE SHAH'S POLITICAL PRISONERS AS WELL AS INVESTIGATIVE AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF SAVAK DEPARTMENT THREE (INTERNAL SECURITY).

(U) 2. EVIN PRISON IS A ROUGHLY CIRCULAR COMPOUND OF AN ESTIMATED 195,000 SQUARE METERS LOCATED WEST NORTHWEST OF THE SHEMIRAN AREA AND ABOUT ONE MILE NORTHWEST OF THE TRADE FAIR GROUNDS. IT CONSISTS OF A NEW PRISON, AN SMALLER OLD PRISON, BARRACKS FOR 35 MILITARY POLICE GUARDS, SAVAK DEMONSTRATION AND CLASSROOMS, AN INDOOR SHOOTING RANGE, WEAPONS AND AMMO BUNKERS. A PRISONERS' MEETING BUILDING, STAFF APARTMENTS, THE PRISON DIRECTOR'S RESIDENCE AND A GUARDS GYMNASIUM (UNDER CONSTRUCTION).

(U) 3. THE EVIN PRISON COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A FIFTEEN FOOT BRICK WALL ABOUT ONE FOOT THICK. THERE IS NO BARBED WIRE, BROKEN GLASS OR OTHER SECURITY IMPEDIMENTS ON THE WALLS. PERIMETER LIGHTING IS PROVIDED BY STREET LAMPS ON THE EXTERIOR ONLY. THERE IS NO INTERIOR SECURITY LIGHTING SYSTEM. THERE WERE NO LANDMINES, TRIP WIRES, INFRARED MOTION DETECTORS OR SIMILAR ANTI-INTRUSION OR ANTI-ESCAPE DEVICES AS OF FEBRUARY 1979. THERE ARE FOUR GATES INTO THE COMPOUND: THE MAIN OR SOUTHEAST GATE WHICH WAS ALWAYS GUARDED BY TWO ARMED MP'S AS OF FEB. 1979; THE SECONDARY OR NORTHEAST GATE ALWAYS MANNED BY ONE ARMED MP; AND THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST GATES WHICH WERE UNGUARDED AND SELDOM USED. THE NORTHEAST SECTOR OF THE COMPOUND ABOVE THE BISECTING DIRT ROAD WAS UNGUARDED AS LATE AS FEBRUARY 1979.

(U) 4. THE NEW PRISON WAS FINISHED IN 1976 AND CONSISTS OF THREE STORIES, ONLY ONE OF WHICH IS ABOVE GROUND. THE BUILDING IS SURROUNDED BY A BRICK AND CONCRETE WALL ABOUT 15 FEET TALL WITH ONE GATE IN THE EAST WALL. STREET LIGHTS COMPLETELY ILLUMINATE THE EXTERIOR OF THE WALLS. SOURCE CANNOT RECALL SECURITY MEASURES IN THE INTERIOR COURTYARD BUT WAS AN INFREQUENT VISITOR INSIDE THE NEW PRISON COMPLEX ITSELF. THERE IS ONLY ONE POINT ONE ENTRANCE AND EXIT INTO THE PRISON BUILDING, A DELIBERATE DESIGN FEATURE.

CONSTRUCTION PHASE, HE VISITED MOST OF CELLS ON FIRST FLOOR TO SURVEY SOME LOCATIONS TO PLANT MICROPHONES. SOURCE VISITED THE PRISON TWICE IN NOVEMBER 1978. DURING THE VISIT, SOURCE WENT TO THE MAIN LOBBY TO CHECK SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND OBSERVED A HEAVY DOUBLE METAL ENTRANCE DOOR, AN OUTER LOBBY ABOUT 40' BY 20' WITH AN ORDINARY DESK FOR A GUARD/RECEPTIONIST, AND A SECOND HEAVY BARRED-METAL, JAIL-TYPE DOOR WHICH LEAD INTO THE INTERIOR CORRIDORS. SOURCE IS NOT AWARE OF INTERIOR SECURITY DOORS OR CHECKPOINTS AND IS OF OPINION THEY DON'T EXIST. ALL WINDOWS ARE HEAVILY BARRED AND CONTAIN HEAVY BUT Y SECURITY SCREENS. SOURCE HAS NEVER VISITED LOWER FLOORS WHICH ARE NORMALLY REACHED BY AN ELEVATOR (OR ELEVATORS?) PROBABLY LOCATED SOMEWHERE IN THE NORTHWEST QUADRANT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. SOURCE RELATED THERE WERE ABOUT 25 UNARMED SAVAK INTERIOR GUARDS AS WELL AS ONE OR TWO MP'S (ONLY ONE ARMED) IN THE SMALL RECEPTION/INTERROGATION BUILDING ADJUTING THE WALL; ONE ARMED MP IN THE COURTYARD INSIDE THE WALL; ONE ARMED MP ON THE NORTHEAST CORNER AND ONE ARMED MP ON THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF MAIN ROOF; AND ONE ARMED MP JUST OUTSIDE THE RECEPTION/INTERROGATION BUILDING. THEY, LIKE ALL THE MP'S, WERE ARMED WITH G-3 RIFLES.

7. THE NEW PRISON POPULATION IN FEBRUARY 1979 WAS 300 POLITICAL TYPES, NO CRIMINALS WERE EVER KEPT HERE. SOURCE BELIEVES THE HIGHEST TOTAL WAS ABOUT 2,000 PRISONERS CIRCA 1977. HE RELATES A CURRENT NUMBER IN TEHRAN THAT 12,000 RPT 12,000 FORMER POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE IMPRISONED TODAY WITH A PRESUMED MAJORITY AT EVIN.

8. THE OLD PRISON AT EVIN CONSISTS OF THREE WINGS IN A "U" SHAPE WITH THREE STORIES ABOVE GROUND AND NO PASEMENT. THE BUILDING IS LARGELY HIDDEN BY TREES AND IS DIRECTLY EAST OF THE NEW PRISON. A 15' THICK WALL COMPLETELY SURROUNDS THE BUILDING WITH A SINGLE GATE IN THE SOUTH WALL. ACCESS TO THE BUILDING ITSELF IS IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE EAST WING. A SECONDARY DOOR IS LOCATED IN THE INTERIOR PORTION OF THE WEST WING TOWARD THE NORTH HALF. THERE IS NO SECURITY CHECKPOINT OR INTERIOR GUARDPOSTS INSIDE THE BUILDING. WINDOWS ARE BARRED AND SCREENED. TWO SMALL OFFICES AT THE ENTRANCE GATE IN THE WALL WERE MANNED BY ARMED SAVAK GUARDS AND ONE ARMED MP JUST OUTSIDE THE GATE. THE OLD PRISON WAS USED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR FEMALE PRISONERS AND WAS STAFFED BY FOUR UNARMED MEN AND TWO UNARMED WOMEN.

9. AN 85 MAN MILITARY POLICE DETACHMENT GUARDED THE EVIN COMPOUND AS LATE AS FEBRUARY 1979. THEY LIVED IN BARRACKS NEAR THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE NEW PRISON AND HAD GUARD POSTS (IN ADDITION TO THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE) AS FOLLOWS: ONE UNARMED MP AT BRIDGE OUTSIDE COMPOUND TO EAST OF MAIN GATE; ONE UNARMED TRAFFIC MP OUTSIDE MAIN GATE AND TWO ARMED MP'S INSIDE MAIN GATE; (TWO SAVAK GUARDS WITH PISTOLS SAT IN A KIOSK ABOUT 20 YARDS INSIDE THE GATE TO CONTROL VISITORS); TWO ARMED MP'S AT CONTROL POINT IN PRISONER'S MEETING AREA LOCATED SOUTH OF GUARD BARRACKS; ONE ARMED MP AT A RAILROAD TYPE GATE IN THE ROAD TO THE EAST OF THE MP BARRACK AND TO THE SOUTH OF THE SAVAK DEMONSTRATION/INTERROGATION BUILDING; TWO ARMED MPS WERE GUARDING AREA EAST OF DEMONSTRATION ROOM (WHICH CONTAINED WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES); TOTAL OF FOUR ARMED MPS WERE AT FOUR BUNKERS IN SOUTH AREA OF COMPOUND; ONE ARMED MP NEAR SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SHOOTING RANGE TO SOUTH OF COMPOUND; ONE ARMED MP ON THE HILL ABOUT 200 METERS ABOVE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF WALL OF NEW PRISON AND ONE ARMED MP ABOVE NORTHWEST CORNER OF WALL; TWO ARMED MP'S ON ROOF OF STAFF APARTMENTS IN SOUTHEAST CORNER OF COMPOUND SOME 50 METERS EAST OF MAIN GATE. SOURCE NOTES THAT THESE MP'S HAVE PROBABLY BEEN AUGMENTED BY AN ESTIMATED 50-50 ARMED REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND AN ADDITIONAL ESTIMATED 100-150 INVESTIGATORS AND REVOLUTIONARY OFFICIALS.

10. SOURCE MONITORED PERSIAN LANGUAGE BROADCAST ON 18 NOVEMBER WHICH ANNOUNCED THAT THE MAIN REVOLUTIONARY COURT IS LOCATED AT EVIN. SOURCE BELIEVES THIS COURT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE THREE STAFF APARTMENT BUILDINGS.

11. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF COMPOUND INCLUDING SOURCE'S PLOT PLAN AVAILABLE SEECREE. ADDITIONAL DETAILS SUCH AS NEIGHBORHOOD LAYOUT AND NIGHTTIME ACTIVITY PATTERNS TO FOLLOW.


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DDB, NMC







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


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CLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

B125

CLASSIFIED

12/15/80
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 12/15/80

CLASSIFIED

SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY (U)
 REF: A. JOC/NOMR/ID/IS 80 071800Z NOV 80, SAR (NOTAL)
 B. JOC/NOMR/ID/IS 80 011610Z NOV 80, CONTENT: INTEL
 HISTORY (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED

2. MATERIAL TO BE INCORPORATED IN JTF 1-79 INTELLIGENCE HISTORICAL REPORTS SHOULD COVER THE PERIOD:

FROM: DATE UNIT ENTERED RICEPOWL (SFOD, 1-SOU, [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED] SHOUR ID (ICIST, [REDACTED] AWACS) PLANNING

TO: 15 DECEMBER 1980

3. (U) INPUTS FROM INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS SHOULD CORRESPOND TO FORMAT GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN REFS.

4. (U) FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM REF 9 THAT GOVERNS PURPOSE OF THIS INTELLIGENCE HISTORY AND MANNER IN WHICH IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED:

"PLEASE KEEP IN MIND THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS REQUEST IS TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF SIMILAR OPERATIONS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT MEANINGFUL AND COMPREHENSIVE INPUTS BE MADE. TOO MUCH EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN GAINED TO LET IT FADE AWAY. WE ARE INTERESTED IN BALANCED PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENTS/SUGGESTIONS, THAT WILL BE OF VALUE TO FUTURE GENERATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS."

5. (C) SUSPENSE DATE FOR MATERIAL TO ARRIVE AT [REDACTED] IS 15 JAN 81.

REV 1 15 DEC 80
 ST

~~SECRET~~

Classified by DSO, NMC e
 Declassify on OADR
 Classified By
 Declassified On

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~~SECRET~~

blg

131515Z DEC 80

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

THIS MSG IS RETRANSMITTED FOR UR INFO

CICS/DIG 131457Z DEC 80

- SSO DA
- CNO
- AFSSO USAF
- CMC
- SSO CINCLANT
- SSO MAC
- CINCPAC
- SSO REDCOM
- SSO SAC
- SY SEC SHAPE
- INFO AFSSO TAC

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 1256
 CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
 RECLASSIFIED BY DDO NMCC
 NCL NUMBER 11
 REV IN AAR
 REVISED FROM Multiple Smiles

DIA77DR//

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

CSA FOR GEN MEYER; CNO FOR ADM HAYWARD; CSAF FOR GEN ALLEN; CMC FOR GEN BARROW; CINCLANT FOR ADM TRAIN; CINCMAC FOR GEN HUYSER; CINCPAC FOR ADM LONG; CINCPAC FOR GEN WARNER AND GEN SHOEMAKER; CINCSAC FOR GEN ELLIS; SY SEC SHAPE NOT ADDEE, PASS TO GEN ROGERS, USCINCEUR AND GEN ALLEN DUSCINCEUR; TAC FOR GEN GREECH FROM GEN JONES, CICS

A

[Large redacted block]

WARM REGARDS.
 REVW 12 DEC 1000 REAS 5 & 6
 BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B, 128

MSG NO. 011
DTG 021622Z JAN 81

A TO [REDACTED]
INFO [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 1235
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REDACTIVE BY DDO, MCC
 DEL NUMBER TO
KEY ON OADR
SERIES FROM Multiple Sources

SEC 1 OF 2

A [REDACTED] 011510Z NOV 80 SUBJ: NONE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

A THE [REDACTED] (CRANER) [REDACTED] WAS INVOLVED AT THE OUTSET IN
PREPARING, PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF RESCUING THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES
IN IRAN. THIS INVOLVEMENT COMPRISED BOTH THE RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD
PLANS FOR THE POTENTIAL RESCUE OF THE HOSTAGES. THIS PARTICULAR
MISSION, SO CLOSELY GUARDED, CREATED NEW AND COMPLEX ISSUE FOR THIS
UNIT. PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES, ADEQUATE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
AND PROPERLY SECURE FACILITIES WERE BUT A FEW OF THE IMMEDIATE AND
PRESSING PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE OVERCOME IN AN EXTREMELY SHORT
AMOUNT OF TIME. INITIALLY THIS UNIQUE SITUATION CAUSED THE SERVICING
TO A GREAT DEAL OF CONSTERNATION. MOREOVER, THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL
OF DISCLOSURE TO FORSCOM HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
AS WELL. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE [REDACTED] WAS INVOLVED IN
"SUPER SECRET MISSION" WHICH AT THAT TIME COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN
WHAT IT TRULY WAS - PLANNING A RESCUE ATTEMPT OF THE AMERICAN HOS-
TAGES IN IRAN. THUS, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OPERATIONS SECURITY
BECAME A WAY OF LIFE FOR THE [REDACTED] LIVING UNDER THIS
ENVIRONMENT CREATED MORE URGENT AND COMPLEX ISSUES THAT WERE
UNION TO PREVIOUS METHODS OF OPERATIONS. [REDACTED]
PLANS AND STRICT ABSOLUTE "NEED-TO-KNOW" WERE RIGIDLY ENFORCED. THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFICERS IN THE [REDACTED] WITH INITIALLY, RICEBOWL
AND SNOWBIRD ACC[REDACTED] WAS RESTRICTED TO THE LARE
ELEMENT. CONSEQUENTLY INTERNAL [REDACTED] OPERATIONS, BOTH DAY TO
[REDACTED] LONG RANGES, SUFFERED FROM OFFICERS AND NCO'S RESPONDING
ONLY TO ORDERS AND NOT FULLY UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE, HOWEVER SMALL
OR LARGE, OF WHAT WAS BEING ASKED OF THEM TO ACCOMPLISH. RESPONDING
TO THE CHALLENGE HOWEVER, ALL HURDLES WERE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED,
ALTHOUGH AT TIMES THE PREMIUM PRICE WAS PAID IN TERMS OF PERSONAL
ACCOMPLISH.

2. MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS.

1. OF THE GROUND ELEMENTS THIS UNIT'S PRIMARY CONCERN WAS WITH
SECURITY OF AIRFIELDS. AIRFIELDS BOTH IN TERMS OF THE GENERIC SENSE
PUBLIC LANDING STRIPS DESIGNATED BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THEREFORE, OUR INTEREST FELL
IN THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AREA, THAT WAS: TERRAIN, WEATHER,
AND IRANIAN FORCES. OF THE THREE IRANIAN FORCES WAS THE MOST DIFFI-
CULT AND ILLUSIVE. SIMPLY STATED INSUFFICIENT DATA ON ENEMY FORCES
WAS IN PLACE. FOR WHATEVER REASONS, NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS COULD NOT PROVIDE DETAIL ANALYSIS ON NUMBER AND LOCA-
TION OF ALL TYPES OF IRANIAN FORCES. THE MORE COMPLEX THE AIRFIELD
THE MORE LIVELY YOU WERE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY INT. OTHER THAN
INFORMATION PROVIDED FROM [REDACTED] THE INFORMATION WAS
LOW, UNRELIABLE AND SOMETIMES MUST NOT AVAILABLE. FRANKLY, THE
REQUIREMENT FOR INFORMATION CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THAT OUR
NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCY COULD NOT OR WAS
RESTRICTED FROM FUNCTIONING IN A MANNER THAT BENEFITED ALL
CONCERNED. LACKING CURRENT AND ADEQUATE TACTICAL MAPS OF THE AREAS
OF INTEREST THIS HEADQUARTERS RELIED VERY HEAVILY ON [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified ON: OADR

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE.

SECRET

... WAS THE [REDACTED] INTELLIGENCE [REDACTED]
... RECEIPT OF THE MISSION. [REDACTED] SERVED IN THIS [REDACTED]
... UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 28 MARCH 1980 AND WAS THE ONLY INTEL-
... OFFICER WITH [REDACTED] ACCESS IN THE [REDACTED]
... PLACED [REDACTED] AS THE [REDACTED] INTELLIGENCE
... SHIFTED TO THE OPERATIONS SECTION AND
... TO BE A PLANNER FOR [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]. LIKE [REDACTED]
... WAS THE ONLY OFFICER IN THE INTELLIGENCE
... SECTION WITH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] ACCESS. THE ASSISTANT INTEL-
... GENCE OFFICER AND INTELLIGENCE NCO SIMPLY RESPONDED TO INSTRUCT-
... AND GUIDANCE FROM THE SIO.

A, G

PERSONNEL SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS

PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.
THE EXTREMELY-HIGH CLASSIFICATION OF [REDACTED] AND THE [REDACTED]
... WAS DIFFICULT TO ADJUST TO PRIMARILY DUE
... LACK OF A PROPER PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (SEE PARA B) AND PROPERLY
... (SI-CLEARED) INDIVIDUALS. [REDACTED] COMMANDER SELECTED FOR THE
... MISSION DID NOT HAVE A [REDACTED] AT THE OUTSET OF THE
... NOT HAVING PREVIOUSLY OPERATED ON MISSIONS SUCH AS THIS
... NO PREVIOUS REQUIREMENT EXISTED TO HAVE ALL KEY MEMBERS OF
... CLEARED. THIS SITUATION WAS CORRECTED BY OBTAINING
... BILLETS FOR ALL KEY MEMBERS. THERE WAS HOWEVER THE NORMAL DELAY
... ASSOCIATED WITH OBTAINING [REDACTED]

C
A

PHYSICAL SECURITY.

AS MENTIONED ABOVE FOR A MISSION OF THIS TYPE AND SENSITIVITY THE
... DID NOT RUN AN SI-CLEARED FACILITY. ADEQUATE
... SPACE WAS OBTAINED FROM THE THEM [REDACTED] LOCATED IN A SI
... CLEARED AREA. THIS IN AND OF ITSELF WAS STILL MARGINAL, IN THAT,
... WHAT WAS REALLY NEEDED WAS A [REDACTED] WITHIN A [REDACTED]
... AREA TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF THE ROOMS OBTAINED FROM THE [REDACTED]
... TSCM AND TEMPEST INSPECTIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN LATE APRIL
... OR EARLY MAY 1980. SIGNIFICANT IRREGULARITIES WERE NOTED. WHAT WAS
... POSSIBLE TO CORRECT BY THE OPERATORS WAS PERFORMED. HOWEVER, IT
... SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AS OF THIS WRITING WORK OPDERS ARE STILL OPEN
... FOR MAJOR IRREGULARITIES NOTED DURING THE INSPECTION. THE TEMPEST
... INSPECTION WAS DONE IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER 1980. WITHIN A FEW
... WEEKS ALL DEFICIENCIES HAD BEEN CORRECTED. INSPITE OF THE NOTED
... PROBLEMS THIS UNIT INSURED THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF SECURITY AWARE-
... NESS THROUGH THE PERSONAL EFFORTS OF ALL PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS.

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OPERATIONS SECURITY.

MORE TIME WAS CONSUMED BY THIS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON THIS SUBJECT
... THAN ALL THE OTHERS COMBINED. DURING [REDACTED] PLANNING EVERY PER-
... SONAL DEPARTURE AND EVERY TROOP MOVEMENT FROM [REDACTED]
... WAS SUPPORTED BY A [REDACTED]. THIS WAS DIFFICULT AND AS NOTED,
... TIME CONSUMING. [REDACTED] SHOULD HAVE ORIGINATED
... FROM THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS AND PASSED TO SUBORDINATE UNITS
... IT WAS LEFT UP TO EACH UNIT TO DO AS EACH UNIT SAW FIT. IT WAS NOT
... UNTIL LATE INTO THE [REDACTED] PLANNING THAT THE COORDINATION BETWEEN
... HEADQUARTERS IMPROVED. ALTHOUGH THE OPTIMUM WAS NOT ACHIEVED ALL
... UNITS BECAME MORE AWARE OF THE NEED FOR A CONSOLIDATED [REDACTED]
... THIS WAS A DIFFICULT AREA AND ALL SERVICES
... WERE HAMPERED BY LACK OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN WORKING WITH [REDACTED]
... AND IN SOME CASES THE RAPID
... CHANGING DEVELOPMENTS PRECLUDED ADEQUATE TIME TO PLAN [REDACTED]

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COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS.
 LACKING ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS TO DEAL WITH A CRISIS OF THIS PROPORTION THE JCSE WAS TASKED TO PROVIDE A COMMO-LINK BETWEEN ALL STATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH RICEBOWL/SNOWBIRD. THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS PROVIDED BY JCSE PROVED ADEQUATE FOR THE MISSION (PARKHILL, WSC, AN/UGC-129). IT SHOULD BE NOTED AGAIN HOWEVER, THAT THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT ORGANIC AND UNLESS THIS EQUIPMENT IS RETAINED AT THIS LOCATION THIS HEADQUARTERS IS NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH A SITE OUT OF WASHINGTON OR [REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS IN ANY FUTURE MATTERS. THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM THAT IS NOW ESTABLISHED MUST REMAIN IN PLACE FOR THIS UNIT TO BE RESPONSIVE IN CRISIS SITUATIONS. THE JCSE ELEMENT WAS COLOCATED IN THE ROOMS OBTAINED FROM THE [REDACTED]. THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS SATISFACTORY AND PROVIDED FOR EASY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE OPERATORS AND RANGER PERSONNEL.

REQUIREMENT AND PRODUCTION.
 TO ASSIST IN PLANNING [REDACTED] TACTICAL MAPS WERE THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS OF THIS UNIT. IN ADDITION TERRAIN MODELS WERE OF EXTREME VALUE. THE AVAILABILITY OF MAPS WAS NOT AS PROMPT AS THIS UNIT WOULD HAVE LIKED. HOWEVER, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED [REDACTED] AS FOR MAINTAINING CURRENT ON THE SITUATIONS THE TRAFFIC PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS WAS ADEQUATE. A POINT OF CRITICISM THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF MATERIAL SIMPLY REPRINTED FROM PRESS RELEASES. THIS DID NOT ADD TO THE OVERALL VALUE OF THE INTELLIGENCE DATA PROVIDED THIS UNIT. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS DATA THAT HAD BEEN ANALYZED AND PROVEN TO BE TO THE BEST OF THE ANALYST ABILITY, FACTUAL INFORMATION. MOREOVER, THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED A MORE CONDENSED INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. PRODUCTION BY THIS UNIT RELIED COMPLETELY ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] BRIEFINGS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION, AS IT DEVELOPED IN BOTH RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD WERE DEIVED FROM INFORMATION PROVIDED BY [REDACTED] DURING FTX'S THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF THIS UNIT PROVIDED SCENARIOS, CONSTRUCTED TARGET CITES AND SUPERVISED THE OPFOR IN PREPARATION FOR MISSION PLANNING.

6. (S) INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE.
 STAFF INTERFACE, WITH RESPECT TO RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD, WAS LIMITED TO INITIALLY THE CO, XO, S2 AND S1. FOLLOWING THE FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT IT WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE S1 AND S4. THE SMALL NUMBER OF STAFF OFFICERS WITH ACCESS LIMITED THE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING AND CREATED A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM. IN THAT, STAFF OFFICERS WITH ACCESS WERE PERFORMING [REDACTED] DUTIES IN

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~~INTERNAL-LATERAL INTERFACE.~~

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FOR WHATEVER REASON, LATERAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION WAS ALMOST NON-EXISTANT. THE ONLY EXCEPTION WAS DURING (SNOWBIRD) IN MY OPINION THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF AT [REDACTED] HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE AND HELD A MEETING OR WHATEVER AT WASHINGTON. THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED A MEDIUM FOR EXCHANGE AND PERMITTED DETAIL DISCUSSIONS OF AREAS AND WHAT WE AS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS NEEDED FROM THE [REDACTED] OFTEN THAN NOT, THE CO AND S3 KNEW OF NEW INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER DID. THIS WAS A FUNCTION THAT REQUIRED MORE FREQUENT VISITS TO [REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS FOR PLANNING.

~~UNIT/ITE INTERFACE:~~

J2 ON OPERATIONAL PLANNING REQUIREMENT DID ALL THAT WAS POSSIBLE OR WITHIN HIS POWER TO ACCOMPLISH. THE ASSISTANCE WAS ALWAYS THERE IF ONE NEEDED IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, DURING TRAINING EXERCISES THE J2 WAS CONSPICUOUS BY HIS ABSENCE. THIS CREATES A SITUATION WHERE STAFF PLANNING AND PLACE THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN UNDEFINABLE SITUATIONS. FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING/ EXERCISES ARE, INDEED, CRUCIAL. THE LACK OF SCENARIOS, MAPS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS FOR THESE FTX'S WERE UNEXCEPTABLE. VERY LATE IN THE SNOWBIRD PLANNING THE SITUATION STARTED TO IMPROVE. THIS WAS A GREAT RELIEF FOR UNIT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. PROGRESS WAS MADE AT THIS CRUCIAL POINT OF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING SHOULD NOT BE FOR-

~~ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:~~

THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE CRUCIAL ITEMS LEARNED FROM THE MONTHS EXPERIENCE AND SHOULD BE STRONGLY CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

A. FOR THIS UNIT TO REMAIN RESPONSIVE THE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS MUST REMAIN WITH THIS HEADQUARTERS.

B. THE INTELLIGENCE FLOW SHOULD CONTINUE OVER THESE SAME COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.

C. THERE SHOULD BE A PERIODIC MEETING OF INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICERS WITH THE [REDACTED]

D. EACH STAFF SHOULD HAVE A MINIMUM OF ONE ANALYST, THE J2 SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT ANALYST FOR 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.

E. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF MISSION PLANNING.

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31 December 1979

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[REDACTED] (S)

1. (S) Following are instructions for satisfaction of daily Soviet space reconnaissance requirements for 1 January 1980.

a. (u) (S) Soviet satellites in orbit.

(1) ^u ~~(S)~~ Enclosure 1 is a list of Soviet reconnaissance satellites in orbit as of 31 December 1979. This list can change if a new launch occurs, in which case a SATRAN 25.1 body message will be sent (sample at Enclosure 2), or if a satellite is deorbited, in which case a SATRAN termination message will be sent (sample at Enclosure 3). These types of messages should be retrieved from the NMIC Support System and used as backup for the input to the J-3 support element in the Alert Center.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c. (C) (S)

[REDACTED]

(1) (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 72
DERIVATIVE EL BY DDO, NMCC
 NECL DOWNER TL
REVISED BY OADR
REMOVED FROM DIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

Not Codeword

WORKING COPY

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: OADR

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

d. (U) SATRAN-S

(1) (U) SATRAN-S services began on 24 December 1979. A description of this service is at Enclosure 6.

2. (S) If you want to enter any more places into SATRAN Extension simply call [REDACTED] tell them you want to add a new location to the JSI-6A SATRAN Extension message, and pass then the geographic coordinates and a name for the point (e.g. Point "P" for Pentagon). Please keep a record for JSW-2A. [REDACTED] also can be contacted if there are any questions on SATRAN messages (e.g. the date/time group of the latest SATRAN message might be checked from time to time to make sure that the latest one is available in DIA).

3. (U) The name and home phone number for the JSW-2A analyst point of contact follows: [REDACTED] (Acting Chief/SATRAN analyst); Mr. [REDACTED] (Photo and ELINT satellite analyst).

6 Enclosures

- 1. [REDACTED] (S)
- 2. Advisory Message (S)(U)
- 3. Termination Message (S)(U)
- 4. [REDACTED]
- 5. SATRAN Extension Message (S)(U)
- 6. SATRAN-S Messages (S)(U)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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d. The maximum number of days of advance notice required. The maximum of fourteen days is suggested, but up to 30 days may be provided with justification. For all users, a weekly update will be provided.

e. Site name (up to 26 characters), site latitude (deg/min/sec north or south) and longitude (deg/min/sec east or west), site altitude (feet above mean sea level). Up to 20 sites may be requested per user.

f. [REDACTED]

g. [REDACTED]

h. Reason you require this service; e.g., to protect experimental weapons system radar, to protect deployment tactics in an exercise, etc.

(S) For additional assistance [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] contact OPSEC personnel

within your own chain of command, as suggested in the introduction to this manual.

(S) Information provided in the SATRAN-S message includes (See Figure 13):

a. Period covered by the message.

b. Site name, latitude, longitude, elevation.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

e. Remarks.

~~SECRET~~

SATRAM-S MESSAGE

P 071526Z MAY 79

FM HQ ADCOM PETERSON AFB CO/INW

TO SAIC ABERDEEN RD INSCOM CIBSIGSEC SPT BN APG MD/IAGPA-A-AH

BT

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SUBJ: SATRAM-S FOR USER 001 (U)

1. (U) PERIOD COVERED: 090001Z MAY 79 THRU 200001Z MAY 79

2.

(Continued on Next Page)

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[REDACTED]

3000 ~~SECRET~~ USER-SPECIFIC REMARKS:

4000 ~~SECRET~~ GENERAL REMARKS:

COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS ON THIS PRODUCT MAY BE DIRECTED TO HQ ADCOM PETERSON
AFB CO/LHWS ATTN: [REDACTED]


REVW 07 MAY 1999
BT

NOTE: Phone numbers given in the Remarks section are for all SATRAM, SATRAM
Extension, and SATRAM-S matters.

~~Secret~~

Site Locations in JSI-GA SATMAN-S MESSAGE

CIANE 167A



Site 1 = 35°N / 15°E
Site 2 = 35°N / 20°E
Site 3 = 35°N / 25°E

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SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

REFERENCE: YOUR MSG 003, DTG 011610Z NOV 80

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A INTELLIGENCE HISTORY OF OUR ROLE IN MISSION PLANNING FOR PROJECT SNOWBIRD:

~~(S)~~ A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW:

(S) (1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF OF THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP WAS FIRST INTRODUCED TO THE SNOWBIRD PROJECTION 29 JULY 1980. AT THE INSTRUCTION OF [REDACTED] THE REQUIREMENT WAS TWO OFFICERS, TWO PHOTO INTERPRETERS (PI) AND A COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ATTENDED THE SNOWBIRD BRIEFING AT THE PENTAGON [REDACTED] ON 29 JULY 80:

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RANK/NAME	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	ASSIGNED UNIT
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	101ST AVN GP
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	TF 158
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	101ST AVN GP
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	101ST MI CO
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	101ST MI CO

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BASED UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE J-2 AN ADDITIONAL PERSON WAS READ ON FOR THE PROJECT. [REDACTED] NCOIC OF THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE, SERVED AS THE SECURITY ADVISOR FOR HANDLING [REDACTED] MATERIAL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR OUR FACILITY. [REDACTED] JOIN THE ORGANIZATION AT A LATER DATE AS THE S-2 OF [REDACTED]

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(2) UPON RETURN TO FT CAMPBELL THE FIVE PERSONNEL WENT TO ESTABLISH A SECURE WORK AREA TO HANDLE SNOWBIRD INFORMATION, PLUS A COMMUNICATION CENTER. THE AREA WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO) OF THE 101ST AVN DIV (ADULT). THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MATERIAL [REDACTED] THE ACTUAL MISSION REQUIRED AIRCRAFT SECURITY AS TO PREVENT COMPROMISE. BECAUSE OF THE WORK AREA LOCATION (SSO FACILITY) IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A COMPELLING NEED REQUEST WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THOSE PERSONNEL, WHO REQUIRED ACCESS TO SNOWBIRD MATERIAL, WHO DID NOT HAVE A SI ACCESS.

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ON 21 JUN 92
BY DDO, NMC
FOR SECURITY TO Secret
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NO FROM Multiple (S)
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AFTER ESTABLISHING THE WORK AREA [REDACTED] RETURNED TO [REDACTED] DURING THE WEEK OF 4-8 AUG 80 TO ACCOMPLISH BACKGROUND RESEARCH ON [REDACTED] THE WEEK WAS DEVOTED TO READING THE EVENTS THAT LEAD UP TO THE RICEBOWL OPERATION AND THE INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTED THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN. LATER HE RECEIVED BRIEFINGS ON THE SEPARATE SNOWBIRD OPTIONS TO GAIN KNOWLEDGE OF LOCATIONS, TARGETS, AND ROUTES OF MOVEMENT.

(4) IN AN EFFORT TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE EXERCISES, REAL WORLD MISSION, PERSONNEL OF THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP, S-2 SPENT

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SEVERAL DAYS AT [REDACTED] WORKING WITH THE 1ST DETACHMENT, [REDACTED] A-2. THIS MONTH PROVED TO BE INVALUABLE SINCE THIS UNIT HAD PLANNED AND EXECUTED THE RICEBOWL OPERATION. DURING THIS

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PERIOD WE PLANNED AND EXECUTED TWO MAJOR EXERCISES, POTENT CHARGE, AND POISON DARI WHICH PROVIDED "WALK THRU" PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. ALSO DURING THIS PERIOD IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE [REDACTED]

HAD THE MOST UP TO DATE DATA BASE AVAILABLE, BOTH BECAUSE

[REDACTED] INVOLVEMENT WITH RICEBOWL AND CONTINUATION WITH SNOWBIRD. THIS DATA BASE WAS LATER COPIED AND SENT TO S-2, 101ST AVN GP.

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(5) FROM 9-16 OCTOBER [REDACTED] TRAVELED TO FT BRAGG, NC TO WORK WITH FLIGHT CREWS AND MEMBERS OF DELTA, DELTA [REDACTED] TO BRIEF TF 158 CREW MEMBERS ON THE [REDACTED] COMPOUND ASSAULT. AFTER WORKING WITH THE FLIGHT

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DURING NOVEMBER [REDACTED] ATTENDED AN E&E CONFERENCE HOSTED [REDACTED] THIS CONFERENCE DISCUSSED THE E&E OPTIONS FOR EACH SNOWBIRD PLAN. E&E KITS WERE DISCUSSED AT THIS CONFERENCE, THE FORMAL E&E PLAN IS STILL BEING DRAFTED.

B. MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION IS TO SUPPORT THE TASK FORCES OF THE 101ST IN OPERATION SNOWBIRD. WE PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS MAPS, PHOTO PRODUCTS, CLIMATE INFORMATION AND TERRAIN ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATION.


(2) THE INTELLIGENCE IS DEVELOPED FROM DAILY REPORTS FROM [REDACTED] ETC. THE [REDACTED] AS MENTIONED ABOVE PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR OUR INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE WHICH WE UPDATED AND SUBMITTED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) TO FILL THE GAPS. IF EITHER OF THE ELEMENTS S-2'S HAD QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MISSION OR IRANIAN CAPABILITIES THEY WERE SUBMITTED TO THE S-2 LOCATED AT THE SSO FACILITY FOR ANSWERS. IF RESEARCHING OUR DATA BASE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION AN EEI REQUEST WAS CREATED AND FORWARDED TO [REDACTED] S-2. ON ALL OCCASIONS [REDACTED] WAS VERY RESPONSIVE ON FINDING THE ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS. MOST EEI'S TO DATE RELATED TO THE TEHRAN AREA SPECIFICALLY THE MFA COMPOUND AND THE U.S. EMBASSY.

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C. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF FOR SNOWBIRD CONSIST OF FIVE MEMBERS. THREE ARE ACTUAL MEMBERS OF THE AVIATION GROUP AND THE REMAINING TWO ARE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE TASK FORCE.

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AVIATION GROUP
AVIATION GROUP
AVIATION GROUP
1F 158TH
1F 229TH

(2) THE AVIATION GROUP S-2 STAFF RECIEVES THE INTELLIGENCE MESSAGES, TAKES THIS INFORMATION AND DEVELOPES AND UPDATES THE DATA BASE. THE GROUP S-2 ALSO SERVES AS A FOCAL POINT FOR THE TASK FORCE PERSONNEL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, PRESENT BRIEFINGS, AND DEVELOPE EEI'S TO SATISFY MISSION REQUIREMENTS. THE SECTION ALSO REQUESTS AND DISTRIBUTES MAPS AND PHOTO PRODUCTS FOR REAL WORLD AS WELL AS EXERCISE PLANNING.

D. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS:

(1) DUE TO THE ACTUAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION WE RECIEVE FROM [REDACTED] WE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH OUR SECURE WORKING AREA IN THE 101ST SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO). BY DOING THIS WE PREVENTED THE NEED OF GUARDS SINCE THE SSO MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS [REDACTED]

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(2) [REDACTED] ESTABLISHED OUR "POINT TO POINT" SECURE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, THE SAFES FOR STORAGE, AND MAPS WERE ALL LOCATED IN THE ROOM PROVIDED BY THE SSO. THE SSO PROVIDED A SINGLE ROOM FOR OUR USE AND RESTRICTED ACCESS TO OUR PERSONNEL.

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(3) ALL PERSONNEL WHO WORKED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE POSSESSED SI/SAD CLEARANCE. COMPELLING NEED REQUESTS WERE SUBMITTED TO [REDACTED] TO ENABLE PERSONNEL TO BE CLEARED. [REDACTED] WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN OBTAINING THE CLEARANCES FROM CCF.

A,C (S)

(4) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE THE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT SINCE UNLIKE OTHER UNITS, WE WERE NOT PROVIDED ANY PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE EQUIPMENT.

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(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD FEW PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS, EXCLUDING THE SECURE AREA IN THE SSO, THE SECTION REQUIRED TWO SAFES TO SECURE MESSAGE TRAFFIC, MAPS AND CHARTS, AND CRYPTO MATERIALS. NO MATERIAL WAS UNSECURED EVEN THOUGH WE SECURED THE ENTRANCE TO OUR WORK AREA.

(2) AS A SEPARATE ENTITY, WE DID NOT PREPARE SPECIAL PRODUCTS. THE 150W FURNISHED A COPY OF THEIR DATA BASE ON WHICH WE WERE TO BUILD AND CONTINUALLY UPDATE. WE DID PREPARE WEEKLY

A, B, C G (u) SUMMARIES [REDACTED] TO PROVIDE THE COMMANDER AND KEY PLANNERS AN UP TO DATE REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN IHAN.

A (u) (3) SINCE THIS ORGANIZATION DID NOT HAVE ANY DEDICATED COMMO FROM [REDACTED] OFTEN THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE DEWATED FULL TIME TO RECEIVING AND SENDING TRAFFIC.

F. INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE:

(u) PRIMARY STAFF INTERFACE WAS BETWEEN THE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. THE LOGISTICAL OFFICER PLAYED A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN MISSION PLANNING; HOWEVER, HE DID NOT HAVE A [REDACTED] CLEARANCE AND DIDN'T HAVE A NEED TO KNOW ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

G (u) [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] ATTENDED ALL MAJOR CONFERENCES AND EXERCISES. AT FT CAMPBELL WHERE THE FLIGHT CREWS COULD NOT ENTER THE SSO, WE ESTABLISHED A SECURE WORKING AREA WHERE THE FLIGHT CREWS COULD ACCOMPLISH MISSION PLANNING AND BRIEFINGS. SNOWBIRD MATERIALS WERE CARRIED TO THE AREA WHEN THE BRIEFINGS WERE CONDUCTED. AT THE COMPLETION OF THE BRIEFINGS, THE MATERIAL WAS COURIED BACK TO THE SSO FOR STORAGE.

G. EXTERNAL/LATERAL INTERFACE:

A, G (u) (1) 1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING - OUR INTERFACE WITH THE 1ST SO WAS EXTENSIVE. ON 26 AUG [REDACTED] WENT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AND MET [REDACTED] THE A2 OR MY COUNTERPART FROM THIS ORGANIZATION. AFTER MEETING WITH [REDACTED] ON THE 27TH WE TRAVELED TO [REDACTED] HE WAS TO SPEND THE NEXT MONTH RESEARCHING THIS UNIT'S DATA BASE (WHICH WAS LATER TO BECOME THE BASIS FOR THE 101ST DATA BASE) AND THE EXPERIENCE DURING THE RICEBOWL OPERATION.

A, G (u) (2) WE WORKED FOR DAYS EXCHANGING THOUGHTS AND IDEAS ON PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS. WE DECIDED UPON THE USE OF THE SINGLE DATA BASE, SINCE DURING THE CURRENT SNOWBIRD OPTION OUR HELICOPTERS WOULD FLY TOGETHER. [REDACTED] SENT A MESSAGE BACK TO FT CAMPBELL ESTABLISHING A FILE SYSTEM THAT WAS IDENTICAL TO 1ST SOW'S. THE IDEA WAS THAT IF WE DEPLOYED TO SEVERAL FORWARD OPERATING BASES WE WOULD BRIEF TOGETHER UTILIZING PERSONNEL FROM BOTH ORGANIZATIONS AT EACH LOCATION. SIMILAR FILES WOULD FACILITATE RESEARCH INTO THE DATA BASE.

(u) (3) WE ALSO DEVELOPED AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MAP REQUIREMENTS FOR EXERCISE AS WELL AS FOR DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS. THE EXERCISE REQUIRED THOUSANDS OF CHARTS WHICH MEANT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MAP DEPOT. THIS DEPOT WAS MANNED BY BOTH AIR FORCE AND ARMY PERSONNEL WHO HANDLED ONC, IPC, JOG, AND SMALLER SCALE MAPS.

A, G (u) (4) DURING THE MONTH [REDACTED] SPENT AT [REDACTED], HE PARTICIPATED IN THREE TRAINING EXERCISES. THIS PARTICIPATION INCLUDED WRITING SENARIOS, DEVELOPING THREAT, AND FORMAL BRIEFINGS.

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THEIR PORTION OF THE COMPOUND ASSAULT. AFTER SATISFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FLIGHT CREWS, [REDACTED] WORKED WITH THE DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND THEIR ACTIONS IN THE FIRST ATTEMPT AND THEIR SYSTEM OF COLLECTION, ANALYZATION, AND STORAGE OF SNOWBIRD INFORMATION.

A H. UNIT [REDACTED] INTERFACE:

(1) INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE BEGAN WITH THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING THE STAFF RECEIVED ON AUG 1980. AN EXTENSIVE BRIEFING WAS PROVIDED TO BRING US UP TO DATE ON THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT AND THE EVENTS FOLLOWING.

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[REDACTED]

A, G (2) THE MAIN EXTENT OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE 101ST AND THE [REDACTED] WAS BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

G (3) MAJ. PREVOST WAS THE FOCAL POINT FOR WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT, RADAR COVERAGE, MILITARY FLIGHTS, AND ESCAPE AND EVASIONS PLANS.

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(4) PERHAPS OUR GREATEST INTERACTION INVOLVED THE INTELLIGENCE PORTIONS OF TRAINING EXERCISES. WHILE OTHER [REDACTED] MEMBERS SUPPORTED FROM THE PENTAGON, [REDACTED] AT THE FIELD SITE COORDINATING BRIEFINGS AND INSURING PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT. [REDACTED] BEING AN AVIATOR, PROVIDED DETAILED INFORMATION [REDACTED]

(5) [REDACTED] WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF [REDACTED] MAPS, AND SPECIAL REQUESTS REQUIRING THE WORK OF DIA PHOTO INTERPRETTERS. HE PROVIDED COVERAGE OF LANDING ZONES [REDACTED] AND TARGETS FOR HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. WHILE OUR PRIMARY CONTACT WAS WITH THESE INDIVIDUALS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE J-2 STAFF SHOULD BE COMMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORTS PROVIDED IN THE SNOWBIRD MISSION.

I. ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:

(1) PROBLEM: SECURITY CLEARANCE

(A) (a) DISCUSSION: ARMY AVIATORS POSSESS A SECRET SECURITY CLEARANCE WHICH WOULD SUFFICE FOR NORMAL DUTIES. HOWEVER, THOSE AVIATORS CHOSEN TO WORK ON THIS PROJECT REQUIRED ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL TO SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION. WE BEGAN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS TO INITIATE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS. BUT FOUND THAT THIS WAS DRAWING MORE ATTENTION THAN WE DESIRED. DUE TO THIS ATTENTION

A I RECOMMENDED TO [REDACTED] WE STOP THIS PROCESS AND GRANT A "ONE TIME ACCESS" TO THE AVIATORS. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY [REDACTED] ON 17 OCT 81.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: THAT THOSE AVIATORS CHOSEN TO CONTINUE IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING HAVE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND MAINTAIN A SECRET CLEARANCE. THIS COULD BE UPGRADED TO TOP SECRET SHOULD THE NEED OCCUR. [REDACTED]

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(A) DISCUSSION: DURING THE TRAINING FOR SNOWBIRD OPTIONS, INTELLIGENCE SEEMED TO TAKE A "BACK SEAT" TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS. AFTER ROUTES WERE PLANNED FOR AN EXERCISE IE., THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE ASKED TO DEVELOP A "THREAT" WHICH DEPICTED THE ESTABLISHED ROUTE. LATER WHEN THE THREAT WAS ESTABLISHED FIRST, THE "THREAT" HAD TO BE CHANGED TO ENABLE MISSION PLANNERS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TRAINING. THIS THREAT WAS AS REALISTIC TO THE REAL WORLD THREAT IN IRAN AS WE CHANGE THIS THREAT NEGATED THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TRAINING SINCE THE THREAT IN IRAN WOULD NOT CHANGE.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THOSE THAT ARE OBTAINED DURING TRAINING EXERCISES.

(3) PROBLEM: INTELLIGENCE - TRAINING SUPPORT

(S) (A) DISCUSSION: DUE TO THE MINIMAL STAFFING OF THE J-2, AND THEIR TOTAL DEDICATION TO LOCATING THE HOSTAGES, SUPPORT OF TRAINING EXERCISES WAS OFTEN LACKING. IF THE [redacted] HAD NOT ESTABLISHED ITS OWN MAP DEPOT, WE WOULD HAD WAITED UNTIL THE ELEVENTH HOUR TO RECIEVE MOST MAPS AND CHARTS. SITE SURVEYS TO DETERMINE TRAINING LOCATIONS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALWAYS ACCOMPLISHED AT THE LAST MINUTE REQUIRING "EMERGENCY" SMALL SCALE MAPS

B,C AND PHOTOGRAPHY REQUESTS. [redacted] BY WAITING UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MINUTE, WEATHERD OUT, AND SOMETIMES FLOWN OVER THE WRONG TARGET.

(S) (A) RECOMMENDATIONS: ESTABLISH PERSONNEL TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REALISTIC SENARIOS AND INHEAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH MISSION TRAINING. [redacted] ESTABLISH A MAP DEPOT FOR SUPPORT OF REAL WORLD AND EXERCISE PLANNING. [redacted] ALSO DEVELOPE A "FILE" OF FIELD SITE PHOTOS TO PREVENT LAST MINUTE COORDINATION FOR PHOTOGRAPHY.

(4) PROBLEM: COMMUNICATION CENTER

(S) (A) DISCUSSION- DURING THE SNOWBIRD MISSION, THE [redacted] -2 WAS NOT PROVIDED ANY COMM CENTER PERSONNEL, UNLIKE OTHER UNITS, TO MAN THE EQUIPMENT. THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE COMM CENTER EQUIPMENT. OFTEN OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF THIS INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL'S TIME WAS SPENT PHEPARING AND RECIEVING MESSAGE TRAFFIC. DURING EXERCISES WHEN SOME PERSONNEL WERE DEPLOYED TO FIELD SITES, THIS INCREASED TO ONE HUNDRED PERCENT. NO COMM CENTER PERSONNEL, EXCEPT THE SSO PERSONNEL, [redacted] WHICH PROHIBITED UTILIZATION OF SOME UNIT PERSONNEL.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: HIGHER HEADQUARTERS SHOULD PROVIDE THE EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ASSIGNED MISSION.

(S) (U) PROBLEM: COMPARTMENTATION

(A) DISCUSSION- DURING THE SNOWBIRD MISSION, MUCH OF THE OPERATIONS WERE COMPARTMENTED WHICH WAS RIGHTFULLY SO, HOWEVER, I DEVELOPED IHROUGH EXCHANGES WITH MY COUNTERPARTS, A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MY MISSION N AND NEW IDEAS/TECHNIQUES FOR ACCOMPLISHING THEM.

(S) (B) RECOMMENDATION: DURING THE PLANNING FOR EXECUTION OF AN OPTION, CONFERENCES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD CONDUCTED PERIODICALLY TO UPDATE, REFINE, AND DEVELOP NEW IDEAS. THE CONFERENCES I ATTENDED [redacted] SEEM TO HAVE "NEW" PERSONNEL AT EACH MEETING RATHER THAN DEVELOPING SOME CONTINUITY.

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B-134

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, 544TH STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE WING (SAC),
DUFFETT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113



20 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JCS SPECIAL PLANNING TEAM

Subject: Special Mission Analysis, 16-19 April 1980 (U)

G 1. (U) At the request of JCS (J3) staff officer [redacted] the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing's Strategic Targeting Intelligence Center (STIC) conducted a detailed analysis of the attrition probabilities and the vertical obstructions which pertained to a defined mission. Initial contact for project approval was made between the JCS project officer and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence on 16 April 1980.

2 (U) (TS) The mission involved the covert penetration and exit of a single MC-130 Combat Talon special mission into Iranian airspace. Three ingress routes were specified, defined as Valley, Backdoor, and N1. Three egress routes, defined as South, North, and N1, were also provided. Ingress and egress routes were not connected in the tasking specified. Data was provided via DACOM from AFXOXP (Special Plans) and is returned as directed as Attachment 1.

G A G 3 (U) (TS) STIC was requested to evaluate the routes provided and develop probabilities of attrition for each. [redacted] specified that the [redacted] These parameters were reiterated on query, and further cross checked with [redacted] subsequently designated as the STIC point of contact.

A, B 4 (U) (TS) By agreement, STIC developed four cases for the attrition evaluation. Case One assessed the probability of attrition under conditions [redacted]

C In addition, STIC conducted an evaluation of the vertical obstructions which, within five miles of the center line of each ingress and egress route, could pose a threat to the mission. [redacted]

5 (U) (TS) The results of the attrition analyses are at Attachment 2. In the absence of defined linkage between specific ingress and egress routes in Attachment 1, STIC analysts have connected the combinations to provide a range of values for the probability of arrival at a friendly base. In addition, because the egress of the mission cannot

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be handled in the same warning context as the ingress conditions, the [redacted] position defenders along the egress routes was considered. While the possibility of the defenders picking the right egress route is remote, [redacted] significantly increases the risk to this phase of the mission.

C
6. (S) In particular, the issues of Iranian pilot proficiency and the capability of the radar system operators are not clear. The operational readiness of the F-14 and the Phoenix missile is also in question. [redacted]

Moreover it is thought, for example, that there may be only sufficient missiles to effectively arm five or less F-14s. Since these factors are decisive in the computation of engagement success, all analyses have afforded the defender the more sophisticated capability. As a consequence, the risk to the penetrator may be lower than that which is computed and shown in Attachment 2.

G
[redacted]
[redacted] STIC, 544 SIW

- 2 Atch
- 1. Ingress/Egress Routing
- 2. Attrition Analyses Results

Approved.

James C. Zinney
JAMES C. ZINNEY, Major General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence
Headquarters, Strategic Air Command

[redacted]

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PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS

~~(S)~~

~~MC~~

	CASE #1	CASE #2	CASE #3	CASE #4
Ingress N1, Egress N1 [REDACTED]	.035	.505	.674 //	.931
Ingress Valley, Egress North ✓				
Ingress Backdoor, Egress South ✓				
[REDACTED]	.035	1.0	.704 ✓	1.0
[REDACTED]				
Ingress N1, Egress N1 [REDACTED]	.035	.505	.674	.931
Ingress Valley, Egress South				
Ingress Backdoor, Egress North				
[REDACTED]	.035	1.0	.704	1.0
Average Mission Success	.035	.753	.689	.966

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PROBABILITY OF ARRIVAL AT FRIENDLY AIR BASE BY ROUTE COMBINATIONS

	CASE #1	CASE #2	CASE #3	CASE #4
<i>B</i> Ingress N1, Egress N1 [REDACTED]	.36 .36	.97 1.0	.88 .91	.99 ✓ 1.0
<i>C</i> Ingress Valley, Egress North [REDACTED]	.31 .31	.93 1.0	.89 .91	.98 1.0
<i>C</i> Ingress Valley, Egress South [REDACTED]	.31 .31	.56 1.0	.86 ✓ .86	.96 1.0
<i>C</i> Ingress Backdoor, Egress North [REDACTED]	.31 .31	.93 1.0	.89 .91	.98 1.0
<i>C</i> Ingress Backdoor, Egress South [REDACTED]	.31 .31	.56 1.0	.86 .86	.96 1.0

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


PROBABILITY TO ATTRIT FOR EACH ROUTE SEGMENT

	INGRESS VALLEY	INGRESS BACKDOOR	INGRESS N1	EGRESS SOUTH*	EGRESS NORTH*	EGRESS N1*	EGRESS SOUTH	EGRESS NORTH	EGRESS N1
Case #1	.44	.44	.40	.44	.44	.40	.44	.44	.40
Case #2	0	0	0	.44	.07	.03	0	0	0
Case #3 (Wong) ✓	.07	.07	.06	.07	.04	.06	.07	.02	.03
Case #4 (N. Wong) ✓	0	0	0	.04	.02	.01	0	0	0



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(U)

PENETRATION AND DEPLOYMENT GOING UNDETECTED HOWEVER IS SUBSTANTIALLY
HIGHER RISK 7 TO 8
REV. 14 APR 2310

NF53185

NF53416

606/4413
105222
0475

NNNN

[REDACTED]

Requires Originating Agency's Determination Required

[REDACTED]

RISK ASS
XX Apr
B-13

11 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DIA, [REDACTED]

Subject: Risk Assessment

1. (TS) Request your analysis of risk of detection of clandestine penetration of Iranian airspace by a small mixed force of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. All flight activity would be at low altitude [500-2,000 feet AGL under cover of darkness. All flight tracks will be flown over isolated areas of Iran and outside of all known Iranian radar coverage. All potential ground operating areas are isolated but some occasional civilian activity can be anticipated at locations during a 3-5 day period.

2. (TS) Key questions are listed below. A numerical value assessment on a scale of one to ten (10 is high risk) should be applied to each question/sub-question. What are chances of detection if:

a. (TS) Three-five fixed wing aircraft were to penetrate Iran in close trail or with one hour separation, conduct recon, RTB.

b. (TS) Up to 3-4 fixed wing aircraft and 4-5 helicopters penetrate Iran, land/remain on ground 2 hours, RTB.

c. (TS) Up to 3-4 fixed wing aircraft and 4-5 helicopters penetrate and land three times in the same area over a 3-5 day or irregularly over a 3 to 10 day period.

d. (TS) Approximately 2,500 cubic feet of semi-moveable equipment is delivered via airdrop, moved to cover and left unattended for:

- (1) Two days
- (2) Four days
- (3) Six days
- (4) Ten days
- (5) Two weeks
- (6) Three weeks

James B. Vaught
JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

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
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WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

15 1980

Subject: Risk Assessment (U) (#008)



C

2. (U) (TS) With the foregoing as background, the chances of detection for each sub-question are assessed on a scale of one to ten as follows:
- a. (U) (TS) 3-5 fixed wing aircraft in close trail or with one hour separation is probably 3-4.
 - b. (U) (TS) 3-4 fixed wing aircraft and 4-5 helicopters staying 2 hours and RTB is probably 4-5.
 - c. (U) (TS) 3-4 fixed wing aircraft and 4-5 helicopters landing 3 times over a 3-5 day or irregularly 3-10 day period is probably 5-6.
 - d. (U) (TS) Equipment air-dropped, concealed, and left unattended for:

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- (0)
- (1) Two days = 2-3
 - (2) Four days = 3-4
 - (3) Six days = 4-5
 - (4) Ten days = 5-6
 - (5) Two weeks = 6-7
 - (6) Three weeks = 6-7

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ANNEX

B, Updated
JAN 1980

B-140

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #5

REFERENCES:

- A. JTF MSG 216: SUBJ: COMPOUND PERIMETER SECURITY
- B. JTF MSG 214: SUBJ: HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT
- C. JTF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #4

1. THIS ASSESSMENT CONSOLIDATES AND SUPERCEDES DATA CONTAINED IN REFERENCES. THE FORMAT OF THIS ASSESSMENT IS IAW WITH THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX OF AN OPLAN/OPORD AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH. MAJOR CHANGES/SUPPLEMENTS TO THIS ASSESSMENT WILL BE MADE BY TTY AND WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN THE SUBJECT AS SUCH. THE FOLLOWING INDEX IS PROVIDED AS A BASE OF REFERENCE:

PART I: SITUATION (S)

- A. GENERAL
- B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA
- C. HOSTAGE DISTRIBUTION
- D. GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION
- E. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCE
- F. ENEMY COMMAND AND CONTROL
- G. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

A/C

PART II: BACKGROUND (u)

- A. GROUND FORCES
- B. AIR DEFENSE/AIR FORCES
- C. NAVAL FORCES

PART III: KEY EXTERNAL LOCATIONS (S)

- A. MAIN MILITARY AIRFIELD
- B. SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD
- C. MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD

A/B

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2. PART I SITUATION

(U) A. GENERAL: ON 4 NOVEMBER 1979 MEMBERS OF AN IRANIAN STUDENT GROUP SWARMED ON TO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND IN TEHRAN, TOOK THE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE AND STATED THEY WOULD HOLD THE EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE UNTIL THE USG RETURNED THE SHAH TO IRAN FOR TRIAL. THE TAKE OVER WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT BLOODSHED. APPROXIMATELY 62 AMCITS AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF IRANIAN AND 3RD COUNTRY CITIZENS WERE INITIALLY HELD. SHORTLY AFTER THE TAKE OVER THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL WERE RELEASED. ON 19 NOVEMBER THE "STUDENTS" BEGAN TO RELEASE SELECTED HOSTAGES, LARGELY NON-WHITE AMCIT MALES, AMCIT FEMALES AND 3RD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THE REMAINING AMERICAN HOSTAGES INCLUDE TWO WOMEN AND 48-50 MALES. THE "STUDENTS" REMAIN ADAMANT IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR THE RETURN OF THE SHAH AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE IRAN GOVERNMENT (REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) HAVE REFUSED TO HONOR THE INJUNCTION OF THE WORLD COURT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND RETURN THE EMBASSY TO AMERICAN CONTROL.

(U) - IN ADDITION BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE "STUDENTS" HAVE STATED THEY PLAN TO PUT THE REMAINING HOSTAGES ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE. ALTHOUGH THE LABEL "STUDENTS" IS USED IN THE MEDIA AND IN THIS REPORT WHEN REFERRING TO THE PRINCIPAL CAPTIVES THE LABEL IS NOT CORRECT. THE "STUDENT CAPTIVE" FORCE CONSISTS OF A GROUP OF SENIOR MEDICAL, ENGINEERING AND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS BELONGING TO A MOJAHEDIN FACTION WHICH SUBSCRIBES TO A BLEND OF ISLAM AND MARXISM. SEVERAL LEFTIST INSTRUCTORS FROM TEHRAN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, MEMBERS OF THE TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY MAY HAVE ALSO INFILTRATED THESE GROUPS. IN ADDITION, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COLLECTIVE GROUP (WHICH IS CALLED A COMMITTEE) RECEIVES COUNSEL ON PROPAGANDA, AND SECURITY MATTERS FROM PLO AND FEYADEEN ADVISORS. THE SITUATION HAS NOW CRYSTALLIZED TO THE POINT THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTRACTED AND UNCOMPROMISING NATURE OF THE IRANIAN POSITION. THE SITUATION APPEARS TO BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM WITHOUT AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN OR THE USG.

(U) B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA: THE EMBASSY COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN CENTRAL TEHRAN (UTM 39S-WV-383518//GEOGRAPHIC 4230N/5125E). THE COMPOUND AREA CONSISTS OF 27 ACRES OF FLAT TERRAIN SHAPED IN BASICALLY A RECTANGLE PATTERN RUNNING NORTH/SOUTH. THE COMPOUND IS BOUNDED ON THE SOUTH BY TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD WHICH IS A MAJOR EAST/WEST THOROUGHFARE; ON THE EAST BY ROOSEVELT STREET, (A RELATIVELY BUSY NORTH/SOUTH ROAD); ON THE WEST BY AMERICA AVENUE AND THE NORTH BY ARDALAN STREET. THE MAIN BUILDING (CHANCERY) RUNS EAST/WEST AND FORMS THE BASE LINE REFERENCE POINT. THE CHANCERY FACES ON TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD. THE COMPOUND CAN BE DIVIDED INTO FOUR GENERAL AREAS, GROUPED AROUND TWO PLAYING FIELDS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF THE COMPOUND. THE CHANCERY AND MOTOR POOL AREA ARE TO THE SOUTH. THE WAREHOUSE, TEMPORARY APARTMENTS AND SUPPLY AREA ARE TO THE NORTH. THE COMMISSARY, CONSULATE STAFF COTTAGES AND OLD POLICE QUARTERS ARE TO THE WEST. THE AMBASSADOR'S AND DCM RESIDENCES ARE LOCATED IN THE EASTERN HALF OF THE COMPOUND WHICH IS FORESTED WITH HIGH TRUNKED PINE TREES. THE NORTHWEST SEGMENT OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND ABUTS AN IRANIAN ARMY DEPOT. THE COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A SERIES OF WALLS AND FENCES WHICH RESTRICT INTERIOR VISIBILITY FROM THE SURROUNDING STREETS. STREET AND BUILDING LIGHTS ARE LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE COMPOUND AND SURROUNDING AREAS BUT MANY ARE NOT FUNCTIONING.

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(1) (u) THE COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN DOWNTOWN TEHRAN IN THE MIDST OF A MIXED BUSINESS AND RESIDENTIAL AREA, WITH RELATIVELY EASY ROAD ACCESS FROM THE NORTH AND EAST. SEVERAL HIGH BUILDINGS IN THE AREA PROVIDE GOOD VANTAGE POINTS FOR VIEWING THE INTERIOR OF THE COMPOUND. A MAJOR SPORTS COMPLEX WITH LARGE STADIUM AND SEVERAL PLAYING FIELDS IS LOCATED NORTHEAST OF THE COMPOUND DIAGONALLY ACROSS ROOSEVELT AVENUE. A LARGE PARKING LOT IS ALSO LOCATED EAST OF THE COMPOUND ON ROOSEVELT, MIDWAY BETWEEN THE STADIUM AND TASHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD.

(2) (u) THE BUILDINGS FACING THE COMPOUND ON THE SOUTH (TAKHT-E-JAMSHID) ARE MOSTLY OFFICE BUILDINGS WITH SOME RESIDENTS. ON THE WEST SIDE THE PRINCIPAL STRUCTURES APPEAR TO BE FOUR SMALL BUT AFFLUENT PROFESSIONAL OFFICE BUILDINGS SURROUNDED BY TREES AND BACKED BY TWO LARGE PARKING LOTS. THE NORTH SIDE OF THE COMPOUND BACKS INTO A MIDDLE CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA CONSISTING OF THREE BLOCKS OF MULTI-STORY APARTMENT HOUSES.

(3) (u) ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE EMBASSY TAKEOVER IS LARGELY LOCALIZED WITHIN A TWO BLOCK RADIUS OF THE COMPOUND EVEN WHEN MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ON GOING.

(4) (u) TRAFFIC IN THE CITY IS HIGHLY CONGESTED BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0600-2300 DURING THE ISLAMIC WORK WEEK (SAT-WED) DECREASING IN VOLUME ON THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND (THURS-FRI) ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC ACTIVITY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE THURSDAY NIGHT UNTIL 0200 FRIDAY MORNING.

(5) (u) THE EMBASSY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KM WEST OF THE NEAREST AIRFIELD (DOSHAN-TAPPEH AFB WHICH IS A NON COMBAT BASE). TWO OTHER AIRFIELDS ARE WITHIN 10KM, GHALI-MORGHII, AN ARMY LIGHT AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTER FIELD IS 8KM SSW AND MEHRABAD INTERNATIONAL IS LOCATED 10 KM WSW.

(6) (u) WEATHER AT THIS TIME OF YEAR IS COMPARABLE TO NW UNITED STATES/DENVER COLORADO WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS, OCCASSIONAL MIST/RAIN IN THE CITY AND SNOW IN THE NEARBY MOUNTAINS. WINTER TEMPERATURES ORDINARILY RANGE BETWEEN 20 AND 40 DEGREES FANRENHEIT AT NIGHT RAISING TO THE MID FIFTIES DURING THE DAY.

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G. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) PRIOR TO INITIATION OF RESCUE OPERATION
- (A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
- (1) MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION, I.E. HOLD ALL HOSTAGES PENDING RETURN OF THE SHAH.
- (2) BEGIN TO EXECUTE HOSTAGES AS MEANS OF APPLYING PRESSURE ON US.
- (3) MOVE HOSTAGES FROM AMEMB COMPOUND TO PRISONS OR OTHER LOCATIONS IN TEHRAN.
- (4) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES WITHOUT TRIAL.
- (5) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES; HOLD REMAINDER UNDER THREAT OF TRIAL.
- (6) CONVENE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF U.S. IMPROPRIETIES.
- (7) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL PUBLISHES ITS FINDINGS.
- (8) GRANT CLEMENCY TO ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INDIVIDUAL ESPIONAGE TRIALS.
- (9) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES FOLLOWING ESPIONAGE TRIALS; SENTENCE THOSE FOUND GUILTY TO PRISON TERMS OR DEATH.
- (B) PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
- FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, 30-45 DAYS, THE IRANIANS WILL MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION, CONVENE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, AND PREPARE FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIALS. THEY WILL NEITHER RELEASE ALL THE HOSTAGES NOR COMMENCE ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS. (NOTE: THE POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE IRANIAN HIERARCHY CONTINUES. THE "STUDENTS" AT THE COMPOUND, THE IRG, KHOMEINI AND THE CLERGY, AND OTHER GROUPS ARE VYING FOR POWER. LEFTIST ELEMENTS WITHIN EACH OF THESE GROUPS ALSO ARE MAKING THEIR INFLUENCE FELT. GIVEN THESE POLITICAL CONDITIONS, THE POSSIBILITY OF UNEXPECTED AND/OR ILLIGICAL BEHAVIOUR BY ANY OF THESE GROUPS WITH REGARD TO THE HOSTAGES IS HIGH. FOR THE TIME BEING, THOUGH, THE "STUDENTS" ARE IN CHARGE AT THE COMPOUND, AND THEIR ACTIONS/PRONOUNCEMENTS STILL HAVE THE PRIMARY IMPACT ON THE HOSTAGES' WELL-BEING.)

(2) DURING ASSAULT PHASE

- (A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
- (1) SURRENDER HOSTAGES TO THE US RAID FORCE WITH MINIMAL RESISTANCE.
- (2) RESIST THE RAID FORCE WITH ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS AND PERSONNEL.
- (3) KILL HOSTAGES ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED.
- (4) REINFORCE PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND WITH KHOMITEH AND/OR IRANIAN ARMY ELEMENTS.
- (5) ENGAGE US PERSONNEL IN AND NEAR THE COMPOUND WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS.
- (B) PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION
- THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND ARE NOT MILITARY, AND HAVE ACQUIRED ONLY LIMITED MILITARY TRAINING. NEVERTHELESS, SUFFICIENT MILITARY-TRAINED INDIVIDUALS ARE PRESENT WHO WILL OFFER A CREDIBLE RESISTANCE DURING THE ASSAULT PHASE. GUARD PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO RESIST THE ASSAULT FORCE WITH SMALL ARMS, GRENADES, AND POSSIBLY MINES. SOME PERSONNEL WHO ARE GUARDING THE HOSTAGES WILL ATTEMPT TO KILL THE HOSTAGES WITH SMALL ARMS/GRENADES; ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED. IRREGULAR FORCES IN TEHRAN WILL ATTEMPT TO REINFORCE THE COMPOUND AS SOON AS THE ALARM IS GIVEN. THE POSSIBILITY THAT MILITARY AIR ASSETS WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND EXISTS, BUT IS NOT CONSIDERED LIKELY.

(3) DURING EXTRACTION

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) PROVIDE TOKEN OR NO RESISTANCE.
- (2) ENGAGE US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS ENROUTE TO EXTRACTION AIRFIELD.
- (3) ENGAGE US FORCES AT EXTRACTION AIRFIELD WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS/GROUND ELEMENTS.
- (4) PURSUE AND ATTEMPT TO DESTROY US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS FROM EXTRACTION AIRFIELD TO AREAS OUTSIDE OF IRANIAN AIRSPACE.

(B) PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION

THE CAPABILITIES OF THE IRANIAN ARMY/AIR FORCE ARE LIMITED. HOWEVER, ONLY ONE DETERMINED FIGHTER/HELICOPTER PILOT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO WREAK HAVOC ON THE RAID FORCE DURING EXTRACTION. THE LIKLIHOOD OF IRANIAN MILITARY EFFORTS TO ENGAGE RAID FORCE AIRCRAFT OR CONDUCT GROUND ATTACK OPERATIONS WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS AGAINST THE EXTRACTION AIRFIELD IS CONSIDERED HIGH IF THE US PRESENCE AND PURPOSE IS DETECTED AND REPORTED AND EXCESSIVE TIME IS EXPENDED AT THE AIRHEAD AFTER EXTRACTION BEGINS. (NOTE: THE MINIMUM REACTION TIME IS ESTIMATED TO BE 60 MINUTES, WITH THE MOST PROBABLE BEING 90 MINUTES. REACTION TIMES ARE CALCULATED FROM THE TIME THAT THE COMPOUND ASSAULT ENTERS THE OVERT ACTION PHASE, AND IS FURTHER QUALIFIED BY THE ASSUMPTION THAT US FORCE PRESENCE AND PURPOSE AT THE AIRHEAD BECOMES KNOWN TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES IN TEHRAN. ALTHOUGH ATTEMPTS TO INTERCEPT EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT ARE POSSIBLE, THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY LOW IF PROPER PRECAUTIONS (RADIO SILENCE, LOW ALTITUDE, RADAR AND POPULATION CENTER AVOIDANCE) ARE EMPLOYED BY THE EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT. A, B

3. PART II BACKGROUND.

THE INCREASED TENSION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BROUGHT ABOUT AT LEAST IN PART BY THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN, DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND THE RESULTANT FEAR OF FOREIGN AGGRESSION HAVE LED THE IRANIAN MILITARY TO ISSUE DIRECTIVES AIMED AT INCREASING ITS STATE OF PREPAREDNESS. THESE DIRECTIVES, WHILE HAVING A SHORT TERM EFFECT OF RALLYING PEOPLE BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT, MAY PRODUCE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT IF CONTINUED FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME.

A. GROUND FORCES

(1) THE REGULAR ARMY NUMBERS APPROX 150,000, ABOUT HALF WHAT IT WAS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION. THE BULK IS STATIONED ALONG BORDERS WITH IRAQ AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE ARMY IS WELL EQUIPPED BUT HINDERED BY LACK OF MAINTENANCE AND SPARE PARTS. DISCIPLINE AND MORALE ARE LOW IN SOME UNITS, DUE TO INTERFERENCE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITS IN THE NORTHWEST AND IRAQI BORDER AREAS ARE OCCUPIED WITH SUPPRESSING THE KURDS. EXTRA TROOPS AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO THESE AREAS AS REINFORCEMENTS. IN THE SOUTHWEST THERE HAS BEEN SOME GUERRILLA ACTIVITY BY ETHNIC ARABS, BUT THIS HAS NOT REACHED THE DIMENSIONS OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM. IRAQ HAS INCREASED PRESSURE IN THE WEST BY A SERIES OF BORDER INCIDENTS, RESULTING IN CONSIDERABLE REINFORCEMENT OF THIS AREA.

B. AIR DEFENSE/ AIR FORCES

(1) FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

(A) THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF

THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED BY MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY AND TRAINING PROBLEMS.

IRAN HAS A TOTAL OF APPROX 190 X F-4, 135 X F-5, AND 77 X F-14 FIGHTERS DEPLOYED PRIMARILY IN WESTERN IRAN.

REPORTEDLY ONLY 20 PILOTS HAD BEEN THROUGH INTERCEPT TRAINING AND ONLY 3 HAD FINISHED THE COMPLETE AIR DEFENSE/ AIR SUPERIORITY COURSE AND WERE OPERATIONALLY QUALIFIED AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION. ONLY 151P'S WERE TRAINED WEAPON SYSTEMS OFFICERS AND THEY HAD ONLY BEEN THROUGH FIRST-PHASE TRAINING (SINGLE MISSILE ON A SINGLE TARGET)

(C) FIGHTER SUMMARY:

(S) [REDACTED]

C. NAVY.

THE NAVY'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY IMPAIRED SINCE THE REVOLUTION DUE TO MAINTENANCE AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS AND COMPOUNDED BY A LACK OF PARTS AND REVOLUTIONARY INTERFERENCE IN COMMAND CHANNELS. THE NAVY'S NINE HARPOON-FIRING GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOATS ARE PROBABLY IN THE BEST CONDITION OF ALL IRANIAN SHIPS. THERE ARE ALSO 3 DESTROYERS IN THE IRANIAN INVENTORY.

THESE SHIPS EACH CARRY 4 "STANDARD" (NAME OF MISSILE) SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES. MAINTENANCE MAY HAVE REDUCED THE MISSILE CAPABILITY. THE NAVY HAS 2 COASTAL MINESWEEPERS, RH-53D MINE-SWEEPING HELICOPTERS, SM-3D AND AB-3D HELICOPTERS. THERE IS ALSO [REDACTED]

THE IRANIAN NAVY IS NOT BELIEVED TO HAVE ANY MINES OR MINE-LAYING CAPABILITY.

4. PART III

A. MAIN ORIENTATION DATA

(1) LOCATION: MAIN MILITARY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 20NM (37KM) NE OF MAIN, 100NM (180KM) ENE OF ESFAHAN, AND 180NM (330KM) SE OF TEHRAN. GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES: 33 DEG 05 MIN 19 SEC NORTH 53 DEG 24 MIN 28 SEC EAST (CENTER OF RUNWAY).

(2) MAP REFERENCES

- (A) 1:1,000,000 ICG 65
- (B) 1:500,000 TACTICAL PILOTAGE CHART 65C
- (C) 1:250,000 JOINT OPERATIONS GRAPHIC SERIES 1501, SHEET NI

40-9

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B. SEMNAN NEW ORIENTATION DATA

(1) LOCATION: SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 20NM (37KM) SE OF SEMNAN TOWN AND APPROXIMATELY 120NM (220KM) EAST OF TEHRAN. GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES: 35 DEG 24 MIN 00 SEC NORTH--053 DEG 48 MIN 00 SEC EAST (CENTER OF THE RUNWAY).

(2) MAP REFERENCES:

- (A) 1:1,000,000-ONC 8-5
- (B) 1:500,000 TACTICAL PILOTAGE CHART-G5C
- (C) 1:250,000 JOINT OPERATIONS GRAPHIC SERIES 1501, SHEET

NI 39-4

(D) SEMNAN NEW PHOTO MAP SUBSTITUTE

[REDACTED]

(E) ENEMY FORCES

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ C. MANZARIYEH ORIENTATION DATA

(1) LOCATION: MANZARIYEH AIRFIELD IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5NM (9KM) NW OF MANZARIYEH, 20 NM (35KM) NORTH OF QOM, AND 50KM (90KM) SSW OF TEHRAN. GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES: 34 DEG 58 MIN 39 SEC NORTH--050 DEG 48 MIN 12 SEC EAST (CENTER OF THE RUNWAY).


(2) MAP REFERENCES:

- (A) 1:1,000,000-ONC G-5
- (B) 1:500,000 TACTICAL PILOTAGE CHART G5D
- (C) 1:250,000 JOINT OPERATIONS GRAPHIC SERIES 1501, SHEET

NI 39-6

(D) MAP SUBSTITUTES: MANZARIYEH PHOTO W/GRID, APPROX SCALE 1:25,000

MANZARIYEH PHOTO SUPPLEMENT



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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E3 12256
COMPLETED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWER BY DDO, NMCC
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H SOV /A-2/

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SUBJECT: SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE SAFE EXIT OF SIX AMERICANS FROM TEHRAN, THE CONTINUATION OF POLITICAL FACTIONALISM, THE LESSENING OF FOCUS ON THE MILITANTS HOLDING THE EMBASSY TOGETHER WITH OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE QUESTIONABLE HEALTH OF KHOMEINI MAY PORTEND A MAJOR SHIFT IN THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

(A) THE NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT BANI-SADR HAS STATED HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE HOSTAGE SITUATION RESOLVED QUICKLY. HOWEVER HIS ABILITY TO CARRY THIS THROUGH IS HIGHLY SUSPECT.

(B) FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBAZADEH HAS CONSISTENTLY ATTEMPTED TO PROLONG THE INCIDENT, HAS PUBLICLY SUPPORTED THE MILITANTS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO MANIPULATE THE SITUATION TO HIS PERSONAL BENEFIT.

(C) THE MILITANTS HAVE STATED THEY WOULD NOT TURN THE HOSTAGES OVER TO A THIRD PARTY UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED BY KHOMEINI.

(D) THE STATUS OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH IS OPEN TO QUESTION. THE COMBINATION OF ADVANCED AGE, MINOR INFIRMITIES, AND RECENT HEART CONDITIONS MAKE THE EXTENT OF HIS CONTROL AND KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY LIMITED AND HIMSELF OPEN TO MANIPULATION BY COMPETING ELEMENTS.

(E) MODERATE ELEMENTS IN IRAN ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY AND PROBABLY DESIRE THE HOSTAGE SITUATION BE RESOLVED QUICKLY WITH MINIMUM COMPLICATION. DESPITE THIS, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN REVEALING THEMSELVES IN THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT AND THEIR IMPACT ON A RESOLUTION OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IS MINIMUM TO NIL.

(F) THE LACK OF A PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT OF SUPPORT AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING OF 3RD WORLD LIBERATION MOVEMENTS REPRESENTATIVES HELD IN TEHRAN IN EARLY JANUARY WAS PROBABLY A DISAPPOINTMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF A PERIOD OF INTERNAL DEBATE AMONG THE CAPTORS.

(G) THE ESCAPE OF THE SIX AMERICANS PROBABLY PROMPTED ADDITIONAL DEBATE AND AT LEAST TEMPORARY IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES

(H) AS LONG AS KHOMEINI REMAINS ALIVE HE IS A STABILIZING FACTOR. NONE OF THE COMPETING ELEMENTS HAVE THE POWER TO OPENLY TAKE AN INITIATIVE THAT MIGHT RUN COUNTER TO THE IMAM'S DESIRES OR THE DESIRES OF HIS CLOSE ADVISORS.

2. AS LONG AS KHOMEINI REMAINS ALIVE...

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(A) ESCORT HOSTAGES TO AIRPORT AND RELEASE AS MAGNANIMOUS GESTURE OF GOOD WILL.

(B) RELEASE THE HOSTAGES TO A 3RD PARTY AS DIRECTED BY KHOMEINI

(C) REFUSE TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND RESTATE THEIR DEMAND FOR RETURN OF SHAH.

(D) MAINTAIN CONTROL OF HOSTAGES AND REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THEIR CAUSE BY INITIATING PUBLIC TRIALS OF SELECTED HOSTAGES.

3. HOWEVER THIS OFFICE HOLDS THAT FACTIONALISM EXISTS WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND SEVERAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT PROBABLY COMPETE FOR CONTROL.

(A) THE RELIGIOUS/MEDICAL STUDENTS WOULD BE INCLINED TO CONCLUDE THE INCIDENT WITHOUT BLOODSHED AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO OBEY A DIRECTIVE FROM KHOMEINI TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES TO A THIRD PARTY.

(B) THE MORE RADICAL FACTIONS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH RECEIVED TRAINING FROM THE PLO WOULD PROBABLY BALK AT THE IDEA OF RELEASING THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT EXACTING SOME CONCESSIONS FROM THE USG.

4. HOWEVER IF KHOMEINI WERE TO DIE WITHOUT A CLEAR MANDATE OF AUTHORITY BEING ESTABLISHED THE MILITANTS WOULD PROBABLY QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF THE PREVAILING AUTHORITIES AND CONSIDER THAT THEIR CAUSE WAS ABOUT TO BE SOLD OUT. THIS SUSPICION WOULD ENGENDER A MAJOR INTERNAL DEBATE WITH UNKNOW RESULTS.

5. IN SUMMARY ALTHOUGH NEGOTIATIONS ARE ONGOING BETWEEN IRANIAN OFFICIALS THE SGUN AND OFFICIALS OF THE USG, THE PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS (THE MILITANTS) ARE NOT INVOLVED AND THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE MILITANTS HAVE ANY INTENTIONS OF MODIFYING THEIR OBJECTIVES. THE MILITANTS, OUT OF A BELIEF THAT VICTORY IS SLOWLY ESCAPING THEM, WILL ATTEMPT TO REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THEIR CAUSE THROUGH A MAJOR PEACEFUL MEDIA EVENT. HOWEVER IF KHOMEINI SHOULD DIE PRIOR TO A RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS SOME OF THE MILITANTS MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO RESORT TO A MORE VIOLENT COURSE OF ACTION.

REVW 4 FEB 80

THESE HIGH-LEVEL EVENTS...
PERFORMING OF LOGS ON THE VIGILANCE HOLDING THE...
LENNER THE CONTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL...
1. BODIC DISCREPANCY OF THE SAFE EXIT OF SIX AMERICANS FROM

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A

SUBJ: MEDIA ANALYSIS, IRAN

(W) ANALYSIS OF MEDIA BROADCASTING FROM IRAN INDICATES AT LEAST THREE TYPES OF PROPAGANDA IN USE AND ARE INDICATED BY THE ORIGINALS. THREE TYPES OF PROPAGANDA ARE:

- (A) NORMAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS
- (B) REVOLUTIONARY STATEMENTS WITH MARXIST FLAVOR
- (C) REVOLUTIONARY STATEMENTS WITH ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS FLAVOR

2. EXAMPLES OF PROPAGANDA

(A) NORMAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS

(1) INTERIOR MINISTRY CIRCULAR ON LOCAL ELECTIONS
TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN PERSIAN 1630 02 FEB 80
1980 LB

(3) (TEXT) ACCORDING TO PARS NEWS AGENCY, THE SUPERVISOR OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY ANNOUNCED IN A CIRCULAR TO ALL GOVERNORS AND ASSISTANTS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSTITUENCY CENTERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THAT IN CONFORMANCE WITH ARTICLE 17, SECTION 4 OF THE ACT FOR THE ELECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE ELECTORAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES INVITE ALL CLASSES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUENCY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORMATION OF ELECTORAL SUPERVISORY BOARDS, IN ORDER TO OBSERVE IMPARTIALITY AND TOAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LETTER OF LAW AND ITS CODE OF CONDUCT. ALSO THE NUMBER AND THE LOCATION OF THE POLLING BOXES SHOULD BE DETERMINED AND SPECIFIED BY 7 MARCH, SO THAT ALL THE COMPATRIOTS MAY EASILY VOTE FOR THEIR CHOSEN CANDIDATE OR CANDIDATES DURING ELECTION DAY, 15 MARCH.

(4) (SIGNED) MOHAMMAD REZA MAHDAVI KANI.

(B) REVOLUTIONARY STATEMENTS WITH MARXIST FLAVOR

(1) REVOLUTION GUARDS ISSUES ANNOUNCEMENT ON REARRED MARCHES
(2) 102717Z TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN PERSIAN 1630 02 FEB 80
1980 LB

(3) (TEXT) ACCORDING TO A CENTRAL NEWS BUREAU REPORT THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC REVOLUTION GUARDS CORPS HAS ISSUED AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE MARCHES TO BE HELD TOMORROW AND PROBABLY FRIDAY. THE TEXT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO ALL UNITS IN THE FORM OF A CIRCULAR READS AS FOLLOWS:

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED, OPPORTUNISTS AND THE DEFEATED ENEMIES WHO NOW SEE THEIR EXISTENCE AT THE POINT OF EXTINCTION ARE HATCHING CONSPIRACIES AIMED AT TARNISHING THE PURE RECORD OF THESE SELF-SACRIFICING INDIVIDUALS (PRESUMABLY THE GUARDS) WHOSE SERVICE AND CAPABILITY IS KNOWN TO ALL CONSCIENTIOUS IRANIANS AND TO INVOLVE THE GUARDS AGAINST VARIOUS OTHER GROUPS. FOR THIS REASON WE SHOULD ACT WITH COMPLETE VIGILANCE AND NOT ALLOW THE ENEMY TO TAKE UNFAIR ADVANTAGE OF OUR ACTIONS. ACCORDING TO REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED, THE OPPORTUNISTS AND THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION ARE PLANNING TO INVOLVE THE GUARDS CORPS BROTHERS IN CLASHES DURING THE MARCHES TO BE HELD TOMORROW AND PROBABLY ON FRIDAY. THEREFORE, THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS HEREBY ANNOUNCES THAT YOU SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY KIND OF INVOLVEMENT AND NOT GIVE THE ENEMIES ANY EXCUSE FOR MISUSING THE OPPORTUNITY. WE ALSO REQUEST THE NOBLE PEOPLE TO BE COGNIZANT OF CONSPIRACIES AND PLOTS BY THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES, TO NIP THEM IN THE BUD AND NOT ALLOW THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION TO BE DIVERTED FROM ITS COURSE.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by:
D20, NMcC
Declassify on: OADR
Downgraded by:
D20, NMcC

(C) REVOLUTIONARY STATEMENTS WITH ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS FLAVOR

(1) STUDENTS' REVELATION STATEMENT

(2) LD271010 TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN PERSIAN 2030 GMT 26"
FEB 80 LD

(3) UNNUMBERED REVELATION STATEMENT BY THE MUSLIM STUDENT FOLLOWERS OF THE IMAM'S POLICY--RECORDED)

(4) (EXCEPTS) IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL. AS THE DAYS PASS WE FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THE ENEMIES OF (WORDS INDISTINCT) AND ITS CRUEL SUPPORTERS. IT IS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER HISTORY ITSELF CAN MATCH SUCH CRIMES. THE CRIMES OF THE OPPRESSORS GO BEYOND THE LIMITS OF HUMAN NATURE. THE MIGHTY SEE THEIR SHAMEFUL EXISTENCE IN DOMINATION AND THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR CRIMES IN SMASHING AND KILLING OTHERS; AND LUST FOR POWER HAS MADE THEM BLIND AND DEAF. ALL THE OPPRESSED MUST JOIN TOGETHER AND REMOVE THE ROOTS OF CORRUPTION FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. WORLD PEACE AND SAFETY DEPEND ON THE EXTINCTION OF THE OPPRESSORS; THE OPPRESSED WILL NOT REACH THE HERITAGE GRANTED TO THEM BY ALMIGHTY GOD SO LONG AS THESE IGNORANT HEGEMONISTS ARE ALIVE IN THE WORLD.

O, OPPRESSED OF THE WORLD, TO WHATEVER REGION OR COUNTRY YOU BELONG, COME TO YOUR SENSES AND DO NOT BE AFRAID OF THE NOISE AND CLAMOR OF AMERICA AND OTHER EMPTY-HEADED SUPERPOWERS. MAKE THE WORLD TOO CONSTRICTED FOR THEM (TO LIVE IN) AND SEIZE YOUR RIGHTS FROM THEM WITH CLENCHED FISTS.

THE WORLD OF ISLAM IS NOW IN COMBAT WITH THE WORLD OF BLASPHEMY. AND THE NOBLE NATION OF IRAN, AFTER PROVIDING TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MARTYRS AND NUMEROUS CASUALTIES, IS STILL FACED WITH SATANIC PLOTS FROM ALL DIRECTIONS, ESPECIALLY FROM AMERICA. THE CRIMINAL AMERICA WHICH, AS THE IMAM SAYS, IS THE CAUSE OF ALL MISFORTUNES OF THE MUSLIMS AND IS PLOTTING AGAINST US OVERTLY AND COVERTLY. AND IN DOING SO IT DOES NOT HESITATE EVEN TO EMPLOY SAVAK AGENTS. AND IT ARRANGES THE ESCAPE FROM THIS COUNTRY OF THESE SAVAK AGENTS, WHOSE HANDS WERE ONCE DRENCHED IN THE BLOOD OF OUR YOUTH ON AMERICAN ORDERS. AND IT STILL TALKS ABOUT FRIENDSHIP AND SAYS THAT IT IS THE NATION OF IRAN WHICH IS FLOUTING ALL INTERNATIONAL LAWS.

REVW 02 MAR 10

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Intell Assessment: 29 Dec 79

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EA 12256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REPLATIVE CL BY DDO, Nmcc
 REG DOWNS TO
REVISED BY OADR
REVIEWED FROM Multiple Sources
[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE JS 00044 SECTION 1 OF 8

LIMDIS FOR CDRS/S3/S2

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #4

REFS:

- A. JTF MSG044 SUBJ: INTELL SUMMARY DTG 142015R NOV 79
- B. JTF MSG008 SUBJ: SITUATION SUMMARY DTG 151800Z NOV 79
- C. JTF MSG024 SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE UPDATE DTG 201320Z NOV 79
- D. JTF MSG056 SUBJ: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT DTG 260945R NOV 79
- E. JTF MSG010 SUBJ: COMPOUND SITUATION UPDATE DTG 040100Z DEC 79
- F. JTF MSG023 SUBJ: COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DTG 092100Z DEC 79
- G. JTF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #3 (NOTAL)

THIS ASSESSMENT CONSOLIDATES AND SUPERCEDES DATA CONTAINED IN REFERENCES. THE FORMAT OF THIS ASSESSMENT IS IAW WITH THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX OF AN OPLAN/OPORD AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH. MAJOR CHANGES/SUPPLEMENTS TO THIS ASSESSMENT WILL BE MADE BY TTY AND WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN THE SUBJECT AS SUCH. THE FOLLOWING INDEX IS PROVIDED AS A BASE OF REFERENCE:

PART I SITUATION

- A. GENERAL
- B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA
- C. HOSTAGE DISTRIBUTION
- D. GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION
- E. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCE
- F. ENEMY COMMAND AND CONTROL
- G. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

PART II BACKGROUND

- A. GROUND FORCES
- B. AIR DEFENSE/AIR FORCES
- C. NAVAL FORCES

PART III KEY EXTERNAL LOCATIONS

- A. MAIN MILITARY AFID
- B. SEAMAN NEW AFID

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

2. PART I SITUATION

(U) A. GENERAL: ON 4 NOVEMBER 1979 MEMBERS OF AN IRANIAN STUDENT GROUP SWARMED ON TO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND IN TEHRAN, TOOK THE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE AND STATED THEY WOULD HOLD THE EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE UNTIL THE USG RETURNED THE SHAH TO IRAN FOR TRIAL. THE TAKE OVER WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT BLOODSHED. APPROXIMATELY 62 AMCITS AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF IRANIAN AND 3RD COUNTRY CITIZENS WERE INITIALLY HELD. SHORTLY AFTER THE TAKE OVER THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL WERE RELEASED. ON 19 NOVEMBER THE "STUDENTS" BEGAN TO RELEASE SELECTED HOSTAGES, LARGELY NON-WHITE AMCIT MALES, AMCIT FEMALES AND 3RD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THE REMAINING AMERICAN HOSTAGES INCLUDE TWO WOMEN AND 48-50 MALES. THE "STUDENTS" REMAIN ADAMANT IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR THE RETURN OF THE SHAH AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE IRAN GOVERNMENT (REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) HAVE REFUSED TO HONOR THE INJUNCTION OF THE WORLD COURT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND RETURN THE EMBASSY TO AMERICAN CONTROL.

(U) IN ADDITION BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE "STUDENTS" HAVE STATED THEY PLAN TO PUT THE REMAINING HOSTAGES ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE. ALTHOUGH THE LABEL "STUDENTS" IS USED IN THE MEDIA AND IN THIS REPORT WHEN REFERRING TO THE PRINCIPAL CAPTIVES THE LABEL IS NOT CORRECT. THE "STUDENT CAPTIVE" FORCE CONSISTS OF A GROUP OF SENIOR MEDICAL, ENGINEERING AND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS BELONGING TO A MOJAHEDIN FACTION WHICH SUBSCRIBES TO A BLEND OF ISLAM AND MARXISM. SEVERAL LEFTIST INSTRUCTORS FROM TEHRAN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, MEMBERS OF THE TUDEH (COMMUNIST) PARTY MAY HAVE ALSO INFILTRATED THESE GROUPS. IN ADDITION, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COLLECTIVE GROUP (WHICH IS CALLED A COMMITTEE) RECEIVES COUNSEL ON PROPAGANDA, AND SECURITY MATTERS FROM PLO AND FEYADEEN ADVISORS. THE SITUATION HAS NOW CRYSTALLIZED TO THE POINT THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTRACTED AND UNCOMPROMISING NATURE OF THE IRANIAN POSITION. THE SITUATION APPEARS TO BE A POLITICAL PROBLEM WITHOUT AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN OR THE USG.

(U) B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA: THE EMBASSY COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN CENTRAL TEHRAN (UTM 39S-WV-383518//GEOGRAPHIC 4230N/5125E). THE COMPOUND AREA CONSISTS OF 27 ACRES OF FLAT TERRAIN SHAPED IN BASICALLY A RECTANGLE PATTERN RUNNING NORTH/SOUTH. THE COMPOUND IS BOUNDED ON THE SOUTH BY TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD WHICH IS A MAJOR EAST/WEST THOROUGHFARE; ON THE EAST BY ROOSEVELT STREET, (A RELATIVELY BUSY NORTH/SOUTH ROAD); ON THE WEST BY AMERICA AVENUE AND THE NORTH BY ARDALAN STREET. THE MAIN BUILDING (CHANCERY) RUNS EAST/WEST AND FORMS THE BASE LINE REFERENCE POINT. THE CHANCERY FACES ON TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD. THE COMPOUND CAN BE DIVIDED INTO FOUR GENERAL AREAS, GROUPED AROUND TWO PLAYING FIELDS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF THE COMPOUND. THE CHANCERY AND MOTOR POOL AREA ARE TO THE SOUTH. THE WAREHOUSE, TEMPORARY APARTMENTS AND SUPPLY AREA ARE TO THE NORTH. THE COMMISSARY, CONSULATE STAFF COTTAGES AND OLD POLICE QUARTERS ARE TO THE WEST. THE AMBASSADOR'S AND DCM RESIDENCES ARE LOCATED IN THE EASTERN HALF OF THE COMPOUND WHICH IS FORESTED WITH HIGH TRUNKED PINE TREES. THE NORTHWEST SEGMENT OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND ABUTTS AN IRANIAN ARMY DEPOT. THE COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A SERIES OF WALLS AND FENCES WHICH RESTRICT INTERIOR VISIBILITY FROM THE SURROUNDING STREETS. STREET AND BUILDING LIGHTS ARE LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE COMPOUND AND

PROVIDE GOOD VANTAGE POINTS FOR VIEWING THE INTERIOR OF THE COMPOUND. A MAJOR SPORTS COMPLEX WITH LARGE STADIUM AND SEVERAL PLAYING FIELDS IS LOCATED NORTHEAST OF THE COMPOUND DIAGONALLY ACROSS ROOSEVELT AVENUE. A LARGE PARKING LOT IS ALSO LOCATED EAST OF THE COMPOUND ON ROOSEVELT, MIDWAY BETWEEN THE STADIUM AND TASHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD.

(2) THE BUILDINGS FACING THE COMPOUND ON THE SOUTH (TAKHT-E-JAMSHID) ARE MOSTLY OFFICE BUILDINGS WITH SOME RESIDENTS. ON THE WEST SIDE THE PRINCIPAL STRUCTURES APPEAR TO BE FOUR SMALL BUT AFFLUENT PROFESSIONAL OFFICE BUILDINGS SURROUNDED BY TREES AND BACKED BY TWO LARGE PARKING LOTS. THE NORTH SIDE OF THE COMPOUND BACKS INTO A MIDDLE CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA CONSISTING OF THREE BLOCKS OF MULTI-STORY APARTMENT HOUSES.

(3) ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE EMBASSY TAKEOVER IS LARGELY LOCALIZED WITHIN A TWO BLOCK RADIUS OF THE COMPOUND EVEN WHEN MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ON GOING.

(4) TRAFFIC IN THE CITY IS HIGHLY CONGESTED BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0600-2300 DURING THE ISLAMIC WORK WEEK (SAT-WED) DECREASING IN VOLUME ON THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND (THURS-FRI) ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC ACTIVITY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE THURSDAY NIGHT UNTIL 0200 FRIDAY MORNING.

(5) THE EMBASSY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KM WEST OF THE NEAREST AIRFIELD (DOSHAN-TAPPEH AFB WHICH IS A NON COMBAT BASE). TWO OTHER AIRFIELDS ARE WITHIN 10KM, GHALI-MORGH, (AN ARMY LIGHT AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTER FIELD) IS 8KM SSW AND MEHRABAD INTERNATIONAL AIRCRAFT BASE (REDACTED) IS LOCATED 10 KM WSW.

IN THE CITY. WEATHER AT THIS TIME OF YEAR IS COMPARABLE TO NW UNITED STATES WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS, OCCASSIONAL MIST/RAIN RAISING TO THE MID FIFTIES NEARBY MOUNTAINS. WINTER TEMPERATURES 40 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AT NIGHT.

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(2) DURING ASSAULT PHASE

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) SURRENDER HOSTAGES TO THE US RAID FORCE WITH MINIMAL RESISTANCE.
- (2) RESIST THE RAID FORCE WITH ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS AND PERSONNEL.
- (3) KILL HOSTAGES ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED.
- (4) REINFORCE PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND WITH KHOMITEH AND/OR IRANIAN ARMY ELEMENTS.
- (5) ENGAGE US PERSONNEL IN AND NEAR THE COMPOUND WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS.

(B) PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL IN THE COMPOUND ARE NON-MILITARY AND HAVE ACQUIRED ONLY LIMITED MILITARY TRAINING. NEVERTHELESS, SUFFICIENT MILITARY-TRAINED INDIVIDUALS ARE PRESENT WHO WILL OFFER A CREDIBLE RESISTANCE DURING THE ASSAULT PHASE. GUARD PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO RESIST THE ASSAULT FORCE WITH SMALL ARMS, GRENADES, AND POSSIBLY MINES. SOME PERSONNEL WHO ARE GUARDING THE HOSTAGES WILL ATTEMPT TO KILL THE HOSTAGES WITH SMALL ARMS/GRENADES, ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED. IRREGULAR FORCES IN TEHRAN WILL ATTEMPT TO REINFORCE THE COMPOUND AS SOON AS THE ALARM IS GIVEN. THE POSSIBILITY THAT MILITARY AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND EXISTS, BUT IS NOT CONSIDERED LIKELY.

(3) DURING EXTRACTION

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) PROVIDE TOKEN OR NO RESISTANCE.
- (2) ENGAGE US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS ENROUTE TO EXTRACTION AIRFIELD.
- (3) ENGAGE US FORCES AT EXTRACTION AIRFIELD WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS/GROUND ELEMENTS.
- (4) PURSUE AND ATTEMPT TO DESTROY US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS FROM EXTRACTION AIRFIELD TO AREAS OUTSIDE OF IRANIAN AIRSPACE.

(B) PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION

THE CAPABILITIES OF THE IRANIAN ARMY/AIR FORCE ARE LIMITED. HOWEVER, ONLY ONE DETERMINED FIGHTER/HELICOPTER PILOT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO WREAK HAVOC ON THE RAID FORCE DURING EXTRACTION. THE LIKLIHOOD OF IRANIAN MILITARY EFFORTS TO ENGAGE RAID FORCE AIRCRAFT OR CONDUCT GROUND ATTACK OPERATIONS WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS AGAINST THE EXTRACTION AIRFIELD IS CONSIDERED HIGH; IF THE US PRESENCE AND PURPOSE IS DETECTED AND REPORTED AND EXCESSIVE TIME IS EXPENDED AT THE AIRHEAD AFTER EXTRACTION BEGINS. (NOTE: THE MINIMUM REACTION TIME IS ESTIMATED TO BE 15 MINUTES, WITH THE MOST PROBABLE BEING 30 MINUTES. THESE TIMES ARE CALCULATED FROM THE TIME THAT THE COMPOUND ASSAULT BEGINS TO THE EXTRACTION PHASE, AND IS FURTHER QUALIFIED BY THE ASSUMPTION THAT US FORCE PRESENCE AND PURPOSE AT THE AIRHEAD IS COMMUNICATED TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES IN TEHRAN. ALTHOUGH ATTACKS ON EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT ARE POSSIBLE, THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY LOW. IF PROPER PRECAUTIONS (RADIO SILENCE, LOW ALTITUDE, FORWARD AND REARWARD EMISSION AVOIDANCE) ARE EMPLOYED BY THE EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT.

3. PART II BACKGROUND.

THE INCREASED TENSION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BROUGHT ABOUT AT LEAST IN PART BY THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN, DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND THE RESULTANT FEAR OF FOREIGN AGGRESSION HAVE LED THE IRANIAN MILITARY TO ISSUE DIRECTIVES AIMED AT INCREASING ITS STATE OF PREPAREDNESS. THESE DIRECTIVES, WHILE HAVING A SHORT TERM EFFECT OF RALLYING PEOPLE BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT, MAY PRODUCE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT IF CONTINUED FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME.

A. GROUND FORCES

(1) THE REGULAR ARMY NUMBERS APPROX 150,000, ABOUT HALF WHAT IT WAS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION. THE BULK IS STATIONED ALONG BORDERS WITH IRAQ AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE ARMY IS WELL EQUIPPED BUT

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UNITS IN THE NORTHWEST AND IRAQI BORDER ARE OCCUPIED WITH SUP-
PRESSING THE KURD REBEL GROUPS AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HAVE BEEN
DEPLOYED TO THESE AREAS AS REINFORCEMENTS. IN THE SOUTHWEST THERE HAS
BEEN SOME GUERRILLA ACTIVITY BY ETHNIC ARABS, BUT THIS HAS NOT REACHED
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE TURKISH PROBLEM. IRAQ HAS INCREASED PRESSURE
ON THE WEST BY A SERIES OF BORDER INCIDENTS, RESULTING IN CONSIDERABLE
REINFORCEMENT OF THIS AREA.

B. AIR DEFENSE/ AIR FORCES

(1) FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

(A) THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE IS IMPAIRED BY MAINTENANCE.

IRAN HAS A TOTAL OF APPROX 190 X
F-4, 135 X F-5, AND 77 X F-14 FIGHTERS DEPLOYED
PRIMARILY IN WESTERN IRAN.

REPORTEDLY ONLY 28 PILOTS HAD BEEN THROUGH INTERCEPT
TRAINING AND ONLY 3 HAD FINISHED THE COMPLETE AIR DEFENSE/ AIR
SUPERIORITY COURSE AND WERE OPERATIONALLY QUALIFIED AT THE TIME
OF THE REVOLUTION. ONLY 151PIS WERE TRAINED WEAPON SYSTEMS OFFICERS
AND THEY HAD ONLY BEEN THROUGH FIRST-PHASE TRAINING (SINGLE
MISSILE ON A SINGLE TARGET).

(2) FIGHTER SUMMARY

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MSG 195
291330R DEC 79

FM JTF
TO SFOD DELTA
INFO 1/SOW

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~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE J3 00044 SECTION 4 OF 8

LIMDIS FOR CDRS/S3/S2

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #4

(E) NORTH SIDE (ARDALAN)

E. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES
REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE STUDENT GUARDS AND PASDARAN ARE AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PRINCIPAL FORCES AND THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OR HEARD A MAJOR DISTURBANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND ARE SHOWN BELOW.

(1) WITHIN 4-7 MIN-FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

(2) WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HQS AND PASDARAN KOMITEH STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.

(3) WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 PASDARAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS.

(4) WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES PASDARAN REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

(5) WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES [REDACTED]
(6) WITHIN 30-40 MINUTES PASDARAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

(7) WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

(8) WITHIN 60 MINUTES IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A HAWK SITE AT [REDACTED] COULD REACT AND ATTEMPT A LAUNCH AGAINST ANY ORBITTING AIRCRAFT.

(9) WITHIN ONE HOUR IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HELICOPTERS FROM [REDACTED] OR FIGHTERS FROM [REDACTED] COULD LAUNCH AND ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT THE FORCE. AT THE [REDACTED] COMPOUND OR SIX OTHER [REDACTED] AIRFIELD IF [REDACTED] LOCATIONS BECAME KNOWN.

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[REDACTED]

~~G~~ ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

(1) PRIOR TO INITIATION OF RESCUE OPERATION

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- (1) MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION, I.E. HOLD ALL HOSTAGES PENDING RETURN OF THE SHAH.
- (2) BEGIN TO EXECUTE HOSTAGES AS MEANS OF APPLYING PRESSURE ON US.
- (3) MOVE HOSTAGES FROM ANEMB COMPOUND TO PRISONS OR OTHER LOCATIONS IN TEHRAN.
- (4) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES WITHOUT TRIAL.
- (5) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES; HOLD REMAINDER UNDER THREAT OF TRIAL.
- (6) CONVENE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF U.S. IMPROPRIETIES.
- (7) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL PUBLISHES ITS FINDINGS.
- (8) GRANT CLEMENCY TO ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INDIVIDUAL ESPIONAGE TRIALS.
- (9) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES FOLLOWING ESPIONAGE TRIALS; SENTENCE THOSE FOUND GUILTY TO PRISON TERMS OR DEATH.

~~(B)~~ PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, 30-45 DAYS, THE IRANIANS WILL MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION; CONVENE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, AND PREPARE FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIALS. THEY WILL NEITHER RELEASE ALL THE HOSTAGES NOR COMMENCE ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS. (NOTE: THE POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE IRANIAN HIERARCHY CONTINUES; THE "STUDENTS" AT THE COMPOUND, THE IRG, KHOMEINI AND THE CLERGY, AND OTHER GROUPS ARE VYING FOR POWER. LEFTIST ELEMENTS WITHIN EACH OF THESE GROUPS ALSO ARE MAKING THEIR INFLUENCE FELT. GIVEN THESE POLITICAL CONDITIONS, THE POSSIBILITY OF UNEXPECTED AND/OR ILLOGICAL BEHAVIOUR BY ANY OF THESE GROUPS WITH REGARD TO THE HOSTAGES IS HIGH. FOR THE TIME BEING, THOUGH, THE "STUDENTS" ARE IN CHARGE AT THE COMPOUND, AND THEIR ACTIONS/PRONOUNCEMENTS STILL HAVE THE PRIMARY IMPACT ON THE HOSTAGES' WELL-BEING.)

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291330R DEC 79

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TO SEOD DELTA

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~~TOP SECRET~~ CITE J3 00044 SECTION 6 OF 8

LIMDIS FOR CDRS/S3/S2

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT #4

(2)

ABC

(C) C. NAVY.

THE NAVY'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY IMPAIRED SINCE THE REVOLUTION DUE TO MAINTENANCE AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS AND COMPOUNDED BY A LACK OF PARTS AND REVOLUTIONARY INTERFERENCE IN COMMAND CHANNELS. THE NAVY'S NINE HARPOON-FIRING GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOATS ARE PROBABLY IN THE BEST CONDITION OF ALL IRANIAN SHIPS.

THERE ARE ALSO 3 DESTROYERS IN THE IRANIAN INVENTORY. THESE SHIPS EACH CARRY 4 "STANDARD" (NAME OF MISSILE) SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES.

MAINTENANCE MAY HAVE REDUCED THE MISSILE CAPABILITY. THE NAVY HAS 2 COASTAL MINESWEEPERS, 1 SM-3D MINE-SWEEPING HELICOPTERS, 1 SM-3D AND AB-31S HELICOPTERS. THERE IS ALSO

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SUBJECT: IMPENDING CHANGE INDICATORS

(1) SINCE THE FIRST OF FEBRUARY THERE HAS BEEN AN APPARENT CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TOWARD THE HOSTAGE SITUATION. THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN MANY ACTIONS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO DURING THE UP COMING DAYS AND WEEKS TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS.

(2) THIS APPARENT CHANGE AND SOME OF THE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN NOTED BY THE MILITANTS HOLDING THE COMPOUND. THE STUDENTS ARE CONCERNED AND ARE PROBABLY REEVALUATING THEIR OPTIONS IN VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, BOTH ONGOING AND SUSPECTED.

E-EVALUATING

(3) THIS OFFICE IS PREPARING AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPTIONS OPEN TO THE

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0055 ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN LIMDIS
MILITANTS AS VIEWED FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE. THE FIRST ITERATION OF THIS ANALYSIS WILL BE ISSUED BY FOLLOW ON MESSAGE.

(5) IN AN EFFORT TO STAY-AHEAD OF THE SITUATION THIS OFFICE HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING LIST OF INDICATORS. REQUEST EACH ACTION ADDRESSEE REVIEW THESE AND SUGGEST ADDITIONAL ITEMS AS APPROPRIATE AND INSURE PROMPT REPORTING TO JCS/RICEBOWL OF ANY DATA BEARING ON THESE INDICATORS.

7BC

[REDACTED]

(F) NEW SPATE OF RUMORS THAT COMPOUND WALLS HAVE BEEN MINED.

(G) FRESH CIRCULATION OF RUMORS THAT SOME OF HOSTAGES HAVE

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B-146

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MSG 198

O 111945Z FEB 80
FM: 1ST SFOD-D
TO: JTF RICE BOWL
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SUBJ: IMPENDING CHANGE INDICATORS

REF: MSG 091735Z FEB 1980; SUBJECT: IMPENDING CHANGE INDICATOR.

1. WE BELIEVE YOUR LIST OF IMPENDING CHANGE INDICATORS IS COMPLETE.
2. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT MAY HAVE IMPACT RE: DELTA'S PORTION OF THE MISSION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

~~B. INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE IN COUNTRY INDICATING A MODUS VIVENDI ACCOMODATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND SOVIETS.~~
~~C. A PARTIAL RELEASE OF HOSTAGES INDICATING A HARDER LINE TOWARD~~

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW IS 1256
CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
REVIEWED BY DDO, DMCC
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SUBJ: ANALYSIS OF "STUDENT"/MILITANT OPTIONS

REF: JTF MSG 0454/DTG 040010Z FEB 80 (SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT)

- 1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT HOSTAGE SITUATION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE MILITANTS AND "STUDENTS" HOLDING THE EMBASSY COMPOUND.
- 2. THE ELECTION OF BANI-SADR, HIS INSTALLATION AS PRESIDENT OF IRAN BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AND HIS SUBSEQUENT DESIGNATION AS "PROVISIONAL" HEAD OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWING FEELING OF ISOLATION FELT BY THE STUDENTS AND MILITANTS.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0056 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN LIMDIS

3. PUBLIC STATEMENTS (DENOUNCEMENTS) BY BOTH BANI-SADR AND FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH INDICATE THE GOVERNMENT IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE MILITANTS' INFLEXIBILITY AND INTRANSIGENCE. THE REVERSAL OF AN ARREST ORDER FOR IRANIAN INFORMATION MINISTER MINATCHI; THE TEMPORARY DETENTION OF THE 49 (50) AMERICAN MUSLIMS VISITORS AT MEHRABAD; AND THE SEVERING OF MILITANT ACCESS TO IRANIAN RADIO/TV BROADCAST FACILITIES PROVIDE FURTHER INDICATIONS OF A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN THE MILITANTS AND AT LEAST PART OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AND CLERICAL HIERARCHY.

4. STUDENT/MILITANT DEBATES AND DISCUSSIONS ARE DOUBTLESS NOW MOTIVATED BY A GREATER SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND SUSPICION THAN EVER BEFORE. THIS ATMOSPHERE MAY BREED DECISION-MAKING BASED MORE ON FEAR THAN FACT. PREVIOUSLY, THE MILITANTS' COMMITTEE SYSTEM HAS ENABLED THEM TO PRESENT A CONSISTENTLY UNITED FRONT, INDICATING THAT DISCUSSION, DEBATE, AND CONSENSUS PRECEDED VIRTUALLY ALL MAJOR MOVES OR STATEMENTS. THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OBJECTIVES HAVE REMAINED CONSTANT AND STRATEGIES WERE FORMULATED WELL IN ADVANCE. THUS TACTICAL MOVES AVOIDED SELF CONTRADICTION AND ALLOWED THE CAPTORS TO STAY AWAY FROM THE SITUATION. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THIS SAME SORT OF REAPPRAISAL OF CURRENT CONDITIONS HAS BEEN ONGOING SINCE AT

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PREVIOUS ACTIONS (BOTH SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL), A REEVALUATION OF THE DEGREE OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO BE EXPECTED IN THE FUTURE, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE "THREAT" TO THE COMPOUND. DEBATE PROBABLY FOCUSES ON A SERIES OF THREE OR FOUR BROAD OPTIONS.

OPTION A: CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND ATTEMPT TO STAGE SOME SORT OF MEDIA "EVENT" WHICH WOULD REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THE "CRIMES OF THE SHAH" AND/OR THE DUPLICITY OF AMERICAN "SPIES". TO DATE THE MILITANTS HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO GARNER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FROM THIRD WORLD NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OR FROM ANY PROMINENT LEFTIST POLITICAL FIGURES. THEIR CALLS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL HAVE NOT RESULTED IN ANY TANGIBLE MOVEMENT IN THAT DIRECTION. THEY MAY HOPE THAT THE RECENT ARRIVAL OF THE 49 LIBERAL AMERICANS MAY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY OR STEPPING STONE TO SUCH AN EVENT. HOWEVER, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. IF SUCH A TRIBUNAL WAS HELD WITHIN THE COMPOUND WITH SELECTED THIRD WORLD TV COVERAGE, IT MIGHT PROVIDE A FACE-SAVING VEHICLE FOR THE MILITANTS TO RESTATE THEIR POSITION, OFFER EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN "CRIMES", AND THEN MAGNANIMOUSLY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES. THIS OPTION WOULD THUS ALLOW THE MILITANTS AN APPEARANCE OF CONTROLLING THE SITUATION AND ENDING THE CRISIS ON THEIR OWN.

C (B) OPTION B: CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND PREPARE TO DEFEND AGAINST ANY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL WITHIN THE COMPOUND. THE MILITANTS MAY BELIEVE THAT SUCH A STAND COULD REAFFIRM THEIR POSITION AS TRUE VANGUARDS OF THE REVOLUTION AND WILLING MARTYRS FOR ISLAMIC MARXISM.

OPTION C: CLADESTINELY REMOVE SOME OR ALL OF THE HOSTAGES FROM THE COMPOUND TO ANOTHER LOCATION OR LOCATIONS. THIS OPTION WOULD ALLOW THE MILITANTS TO AVOID A PHYSICAL CONFRONTATION WITHOUT MATERIALLY AFFECTING THEIR BARGAINING POWER. IT WOULD REFOCUS WORLD ATTENTION ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE AND EMBARRASS THE BANI-SADR GOVERNMENT. SUCH A MOVE WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN A NUMBER OF SEPARATE DETENTION AREAS, COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM OF SAFELY RECOVERING THE HOSTAGES.

(A)

(B)

C (C)

(D)

(E)

(F)

(G)

4. IN SUMMARY, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE STUDENTS/MILITANTS HAVE AT LEAST THREE OPTIONS:

(A) CONTINUE CURRENT POSTURE, ARRANGE MEDIA EVENT, AND EVENTUALLY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AT A TIME OF THEIR CHOOSING.

(B) BUILD UP DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND PREPARE TO REPULSE ANY GOVERNMENT ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE COMPOUND.

(C) BUILD UP A CAPABILITY TO SECRETLY RELOCATE OUT OF COMPOUND TO UNKNOWN LOCATION(S) TAKING SOME OR ALL HOSTAGES WITH THEM.

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SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION//SITUATION PROJECTIONS.

REF: (A) JTF HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT DTG 291516Z JAN 80
(B) JTF SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT DTG 040010Z FEB 80
(C) JTF ANALYSIS STUDENT/MILITANT OPTIONS DTG 040010Z FEB 80
(D) [REDACTED] C
(E) [REDACTED]
(F) [REDACTED]

(1) THIS REPORT PROVIDES UP DATE ASSESMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATION AND JTF /J-2/ PROGNOSIS OF THE SITUATION EXPECTED TO PREVAIL DURING THE NEXT THREE-FOUR WEEKS.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0059

(2) -AS LONG AS THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS CONTINUES WITHOUT A PUBLIC AND DIRECT STATEMENT OF SUPPORT BY KHOMEINI TO THE MILITANTS THE SAFETY OF THE HOSTAGES WILL REMAIN UNCERTAIN AND EVENTS UNPREDICTABLE.

[REDACTED]

(4) ASSUMING THE UNSG CAN ASSEMBLE A "UN COMMISSION" ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES AND THE COMMISSION IS ABLE TO CONVEINE IN TEHRAN AND

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PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0059 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~
 BEGIN REVIEWING EVIDENCE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (OZA 23 FEB 74), THIS OFFICE OFFERS THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.
 (A) UNLESS CONTROL OF THE COMPOUND IS GAINED BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO OR IN CONCERT WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION, IT IS DOUBTFULL IF ANY OF THE HOSTAGES MUCH LESS ALL OF THEM WILL BE RELEASED BY THE MILITANTS.
 (B) IF THE COMMISSION INDICATES THAT "CRIMES AGAINST THE IRANIAN PEOPLE" DID OCCUR UNDER THE SHAH AND RECOMMENDS THAT THE SHAH BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL, THE MILITANTS MIGHT RELIASE SOME OF THE HOSTAGES BUT NOT ALL. HOLDING SOME AS INSURANCE AGAINST THE TRIAL AND RETURN OF THE SHAH.
 (C) IF THE COMMISSION INDICATES THAT THE USG WAS NOT INVOLVED IN "THESE CRIMES" THE MILITANTS WILL PROBABLY REJECT THE COMMISSIONS FINDINGS AS AN EXAMPLE OF AMERICAN MANIPULATION OF FACTS AND CONTINUE TO HOLD THE HOSTAGES AND DECLARE THEY (THE MILITANTS) MUST NOW HOLD THE TRIAL THEMSELVES TO PROVE "AMERICAN COMPLICITY" TO THE WORLD.

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0059 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~
 THIS OFFICE BELIEVES THAT THE STUDENT/MILITANT OPTIONS AS STATED IN REFERENCE ARE STILL OPERATIVE. ALTHOUGH THE VIABILITY OF OPTION ALPHA SEEMS TO BE FADING, WHILE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY INDICATE AN INCREASING POSSIBILITY OF OPTION BRAVO.

IN SUMMARY, UNLESS KHOMEINI DECLARES SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION, ORDERS THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND THEY (THE HOSTAGES) ARE IMMEDIATELY AND SECRETLY FLOWN OUT OF THE COUNTY THEIR LIVES AND THOSE OF LAITGEN, HOWLAND AND TOMSETT WILL REMAIN IN JEOPARDY.

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SUBJ: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ASSESSMENT.
REF: JTF/PRICE BOWE//02259//DTG 161805Z FEB 80 SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION//
SITUATION PROJECTIONS.

(1) THIS ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED AS A COMPANION TO THE REFERENCE CITED ABOVE WHICH DELTA WITH HOSTAGES HAVING AN IMMEDIATE (INTERNAL) IMPACT ON THE FUTURE SAFETY OF HOSTAGES. THIS ASSESSMENT ADDRESSES OTHER FACTORS WHICH HAVE HAD AN IMPACT ON HOSTAGES SITUATION AND ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. THE FACTORS TO BE COVERED ARE:
(A) THE POLITICAL (POWER) POSTURE OF KEY IRANIAN OFFICIALS SUCH AS KHOMEINI, BANI-SADR, GHOTBZADEH AND AYATOLLAH KHEZESTI.
(B) PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE HOSTAGES AND THEIR CAPTORS.
(C) TIMING OF FUTURE EVENTS IN THE NEXT 30 DAYS.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0270 ~~SECRET~~ LINDIS

(2) A SUMMARY OF POLITICAL (POWER) POSTURE OF KEY IRANIAN FIGURES FOLLOWS:

(A) AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AS SPIRITUAL FOCAL POINT OF THE REVOLUTION AND ARCH-ENEMY OF THE FORMER SHAH, HOLDS A SPECIAL POWER POSITION THAT RESTRICTS THE FULL AND INDEPENDENT USE OF POWER BY ANY OF THE OTHER IRANIAN PRINCIPLES. KHOMEINI HAS HAD THE POWER AND STILL HAS THE POWER TO EFFECT THE SAFE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES. KHOMEINI IS APPARENTLY CONCERNED WITH CONTINUATION OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NON-ALIGNED INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC IRANIAN REPUBLIC. HIS CHARGE TO THE MILITANTS AND THE PEOPLE OF IRAN NEVER TO COMPROMISE THEIR DEMAND FOR THE SHAH'S RETURN AND NOT TO STOP UNTIL VICTORY IS ACHIEVED IS AN ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF AFFAIRS AFTER HE DIES.

(B) BANI-SADR'S POWER IS LIMITED AND HIS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN HIS POSITION IS QUESTIONABLE IF HE LOSES KHOMEINI'S SUPPORT. BANI-SADR'S POLITICAL RIVALS ARE SEVERAL AND ARE MERELY WAITING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN AMBITIONS. SADR HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS AN ADEPT POLITICAL INDIVIDUAL INTENT ON ADVANCING HIS OWN PRESTIGE AND POWER. HE IS AND HAS BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0270 ~~SECRET~~ LINDIS

AND HAS NOT SOUGHT THE SPEEDY RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES PREFERRING TO PROLONG THE CRISIS AND EXTRACT MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS FROM THE USG AT THE EXPENSE OF BOTH THE HOSTAGES AND THE MILITARY, AERONAUTICAL AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF IRAN.

BANI-SADR CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS A QUIET BEHIND THE SCENES INTELLECTUAL WITH A PSEUDO-ACADEMIC BACKGROUND WHO IS A FERVENT BUT PRAGMATIC ISLAMIC MILITANT MORE INCLINED TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS THROUGH DISCUSSION AND CONSENSUS THAN VIOLENT ACTION. HE IS ASSESSED AS MOVING ON A SUBJECT ONLY WHEN THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS HIGH.

(C) FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH IS RECOGNIZED AS A RIVAL TO BANI-SADR AND CAN BE DESCRIBED AS A POLISHED POLITICAN WITH A "HARDLINE" APPROACH TO MOST SUBJECTS, HE OFTEN SPEAKS IN EXTREME TERMS, TAILORS HIS OPINIONS TO SUIT THE AUDIENCE (TO SUIT HIS OBJECTIVES AT THE TIME). INCLINED TO BE SEMI-CLANDESTINE IN NATURE MIXED WITH A FLAIR FOR THE MEDIA SPOTLIGHT. SAID TO HAVE PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENT. HAS OPENLY AND PRIVATELY DEMONSTRATED PRO-PROLEANINGS. CAN BE DESCRIBED AS AN OPPORTUNIST, AN INSTIGATOR, OR QUIET ADVOCATE OF VIOLENT ACTION BY OTHERS. IS RECOGNIZED AS ANTI-AMERICAN AND MAY BE DESCRIBED AS SUCH BY OTHERS.

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0070 [REDACTED] LINDIS
PRO-MARXIST IDEAS. MORE INCLINED TO CALCULATED INDEPENDENT ACTIONS
THAN BANI-SADR.

(D) AYATOLLAH BEHESTI, SENIOR RELIGIOUS MEMBER OF REVOLUTIONARY
COUNCIL, ADVISOR TO KHOMEINI, ANTAGONIST OF BANI-SADR, ADHERENT
OF PURE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, WITHOUT "CONTAMINATION"
OR DIMINUTION BY EITHER USSR OR USA. CONTENDER FOR KHOMEINI RELIGIOUS
LEADERSHIP IF KHOMEINI WERE TO DIE.

(E) AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADANI ALSO CONTENDER TO REPLACE KHOMEINI
SHOULD HE DIE. OPPOSED BY BEHESTI, BECAUSE OF HIS MODERATE ATTITUDE
AND POSITION THAT CHURCH AND STATE SHOULD BE SEPARATE. CONSIDERED
TO BE SENSIBLE, POLITICAL PRAGMATIST, BELIEVES THAT AN ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC CAN BENEFIT FROM MODERN CIVILIZATION. BELIEVES USSR MAJOR
ENEMY OF IRAN. NOT INCLINED TO INSTIGATE, PROVOKE, OR SUPPORT A
VIOLENT ACTION. IS OPEN IN HIS CRITICISM OF POLICIES AND MAY BE THE
ONLY STABILIZING RELIGIOUS FACTOR IF CIVIL UNREST WERE TO BREAK OUT
AFTER KHOMEINI'S DEATH. ADVISED FORMER ADMIRAL MADANI TO REFRAIN
FROM ACCEPTING POST AS BANI-SADR'S PRIME MINISTER.

(F) ADMIRAL MADANI IS REGARDED AS A MODERATE AND ALTHOUGH HE
DID NOT MAKE A GOOD SHOWING IN THE RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,
THIS MAY HAVE BEEN MORE A RESULT OF KHOMEINI SUPPORT FOR BANI-SADR

PAGE 5 RUEIZJC 0070 [REDACTED] LINDIS
THAN A REJECTION OF MADANI BY THE PEOPLE.

(u)
(3) ONCE KHOMEINI PASSES FROM THE SCENE AND WITH HIM WITHIN BANI-SADR
OF GHOTZADEH, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TWO AYATOLLAH MADANI AND
ADMIRAL MADANI COMBINATION MIGHT COME TO A POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY
WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE BUSINESS POPULATION.

(u)
(3) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDE OF THE CAPTORS AND HOSTAGES COULD
HAVE AN EFFECT ON EVENTS IN THE NEXT 30-60 DAYS.

(A) THE CAPTORS ARE ASSESSED AS BEING A MULTI-FUNCTIONAL GROUP
UNITED BY THEIR AIM OF OBTAINING THE RETURN OF THE SHAH AND ALL IT
IMPLIES (EMBARRASSMENT OF USG). IF THE GROUP CONSENSUS WERE TO BREAK
DOWN UNDER FRUSTRATION, PERCEPTIONS OF IMPENDING DEFEAT OR ABANDONMENT
BY THEIR SUPPORTERS THE LIVES OF THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE IN DANGER.
THE RECENT CHARGE BY KHOMEINI NOT TO GIVE UP THEIR AIM OF OBTAINING
RETURN OF THE SHAH HAS PROBABLY GIVEN THEM NEW HOPE OF SUCCESS.
THIS HOPE HAS BEEN FUELED BY THE HARDLINE ATTITUDE EXPRESSED BY BANI-
SADR AND GHOTZADEH AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE UN COMMISSION DISCLOSING

REVW 23 FEB 80

BT:

#0070

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OO RUEAIIF RUEAIIJ
DE RUEIZJC #0071 254191C
ZNY TTTT
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FM: JTF/RICE BOWL
TO: RUEAIIF [REDACTED] C
INFO: RUEAIIF [REDACTED]
BT

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS CITE J3 02070 FINAL SECTION OF 2 SECTIONS
EVIDENCE OF THE SHAH'S CRIMES AND U.S. COMPLICITY.

(B) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE OF HOSTAGES HAS PROBABLY UNDERGONE SEVERAL CHANGES SINCE THE INITIAL TAKE OVER, FROM SHORT TERM THOUGHTS THAT THE INCIDENT WOULD BE OVER QUICKLY, (FIRST TEN DAYS) TO ONE WHERE THEY ACCEPTED SOME DELAY WHILE THE USG WAS ARRANGING FOR THEIR RELEASE, THROUGH SOME MEANS (NEXT THIRTY DAYS), TO A PROBABLE HIGH POINT OF EXPECTATION JUST PRIOR TO CHRISTMAS, THEN RESOLUTION WHEN THE HOLIDAYS PASSED WITHOUT ACTION, REACHING A POINT OF EITHER DETERMINED RESOLUTION OR FEELING OF ISOLATION AND ABANDONMENT BY THE USG AND GROWING DISLIKE FOR THEIR CAPTORS. DURING THIS PERIOD THOSE HOSTAGES THAT WERE AFFECTED BY THE STOCKHOLM SYNDROME MAY HAVE PASSED BEYOND THAT PHASE AND NOW RESENT THEIR CAPTORS. ALTHOUGH EACH HOSTAGE IS COPING WITH THE STRESS OF ISOLATION

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0071 ~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS
AND CONFINEMENT IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL WAYS SOME HAVE SHOWN A CHANGE WHICH INDICATES A GROWING FEELING OF FRUSTRATION AND DESPAIR, WHILE OTHERS HAVE EVIDENCED A GREATER DEGREE OF HOSTILITY TO THEIR CAPTORS. THE UN COMMISSION HEARINGS MAY BE VIEWED BY SOME AS AN APPEAL (OR TRIAL) OR BY OTHERS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE BACK AT THEIR CAPTORS. IF THE COMMISSION HEARINGS ARE CONCLUDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND THE HOSTAGES NOT RELEASED WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE TIME (POSSIBLY 7-12 DAYS), IN THE EYES OF THE HOSTAGES, SEPARATE HOSTAGES MAY TAKE SEPARATE ACTIONS TO SECURE THEIR OWN RELEASE.

(c)
4. IN EXAMINING THE POSSIBLE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE NEXT 30 DAYS THE PRINCIPLE UNPREDICTABLE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF KHOMEINI'S DEATH. IF HE WERE TO DIE DURING THE COMMISSION'S VISIT TO TEHRAN, THE COMMISSION'S ACTIONS WOULD BE SUSPENDED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF MOURNING.

(A) DURING THE FIRST MOURNING PERIOD (3-4 DAYS) THE HOSTAGES ARE LIKELY TO BE IGNORED AS MASSIVE PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS WILL FOCUS OF THE RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS OF LOSS AND GRIEF. HOWEVER, LARGE CROWDS WILL BE EVIDENCE THROUGHOUT TEHRAN INCLUDING THE VICINITY OF THE COMMISSION

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0271 ~~SECRET~~ LINDIS
ELEMENTS AT THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. SECURITY ELEMENTS WOULD BE UNABLE
TO CONTROL THE CROWDS WITHOUT INFLUENTIAL RELIGIOUS SUPPORT. IF
STABILITY IS NOT MAINTAINED THE DANGER TO THE HOSTAGES WILL INCREASE
AND REACH ANOTHER HIGH POINT WITH THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF COMMEMORATION
OF KHOMEINI'S DEATH.

(u)
5. ASSUMING THAT KHOMEINI DOES NOT DIE THE FOLLOWING
EVENTS ARE LIKELY TO TRANSPIRE IN THE NEXT 22-30 DAYS.

(A) UN COMMISSION HEARING CONTINUE THROUGH AT LEAST 27 FEB
MORE LIKELY 3/4 MARCH WITH EARLIEST OFFICIAL RELEASE OF THE
COMMISSION'S FINDING COMING ON 5 MARCH ALTHOUGH A MORE LIVELY DATE
WOULD BE THE 8TH IN NEW YORK.

(B) THE IRANIAN RESPONSE TO THE FINDINGS WILL LIKELY COME WITHIN
IN 24-48 HOURS AFTER THE FINDINGS ARE RELEASED AND IF THE FINDINGS ARE
FAVORABLE TO THE IRANIAN GOALS, SOME OF THE HOSTAGES MIGHT BE RELEASED
BUT NOT ALL. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE
MILITANTS TO TRANSFER CONTROL OF THE REMAINING HOSTAGES TO THE GOVERN-
MENT FOR TRIAL IF KHOMEINI SO DIRECTS.

(C) ALTERNATIVELY, THE IRANIAN OFFICIALS MAY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
KHOMEINI'S STATEMENT THAT THE DISPOSITION OF THE HOSTAGES IS A

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0271 ~~SECRET~~ LINDIS
FUNCTION OF THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENT. ELECTION OF THE PARLIAMENT
(MAGHLES) IS NOW SCHEDULED TO BE HELD 14-17 MARCH. DELIBERATIONS
BY THE PARLIAMENT WOULD THEN PRESUMABLY TAKE SEVERAL DAYS WITH
A POSSIBLY OF FURTHER DELAYS DUE TO THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PERSIAN NEW YEAR. (22 MARCH).

(u)
6. IN SUMMARY THE PROJECTED EVENTS AS WE KNOW THEM NOW DO NOT INDICATE
A RELEASE OF HOSTAGES, BUT RATHER A FURTHER PROTRACTION OF THE CRISIS.
FROM AN INTELLIGENCE STANDPOINT THE CRITICAL TIME FRAME WILL BE
THAT TIME FROM WHEN THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ARE RESPONDED TO
BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE IMPLEMENTAL OF FOLLOW-UP
ACTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OR THE MILITANTS. THIS TIME FRAME
WILL RUN 7-10 DAYS AND COULD BEGIN AS EARLY AS 5 MARCH 82.

REVW 23 FEB 2010

BT

#0071

NNNN

MSG: 587

SECRET

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DTG 262215Z FEB 80

FM: COMJTF

TO: SFOD

150W

HELLO

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12958

CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92

REMIATVE CL BY DDO, NMCC

DECL SERVICE TO

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

REF: A. JTF/RICE BOWL/00070/ DTG 231900Z FEB 80
SUBJ: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ASSESSMENT

B. JTF582/DTG 26/1525Z/INTELLIGENCE SUPPLEMENT

(u) C. JTF/RICE BOWL/ DTG 251700Z FEB 80 SUBJECT:

1. REF ALPHA REVIEWED THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS PERTAINING TO THE HOSTAGE SITUATION AND INDICATED TWO CRITICAL TIMES IN THE NEXT 30 DAYS. THE FIRST, WHICH IS UNPREDICTABLE WOULD BE 4 - THROUGH 7 DAY AFTER KHOMEINI'S DEATH IF THIS WERE TO OCCUR. THE SECOND WILL BE THE PERIOD AFTER THE UN COMMISSIONS FINDINGS ARE RELEASED AND COMMENTED ON BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THIS LATTER TIME FRAME WILL RUN 7-10 DAYS AND COULD BEGIN AS EARLY AS 5 MARCH 1980.

2. REF BRAVO PROVIDED RETRANSMISSION OF DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE 56-1A/WT FEB 80 WHICH CLOSED WITH THE STATEMENT QUOTE "BARRING ANY DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT THE HOSTAGE CRISIS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED FOR MANY MONTHS".

3. REF CHARLIE PROVIDED LATEST JTF ESTIMATE

4. IN EXAMINING OTHER FACTORS WHICH COULD IMPACT ON MISSION PLANNING SEVERAL DATES IN MARCH MUST BE RECONSIDERED. THESE ARE:

- (A) 14-17 MARCH - THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENT. (MAJLIS)
- (B) 21-22 MARCH - BEGINNING OF PERSIAN, NEW YEAR WHICH IN THE PAST (DURING THE SHAH'S REGIME) WAS A PERIOD OF MAJOR SECULAR CELEBRATION. THE DEGREE OF PUBLIC CELEBRATION DECREASED SUBSTANTIALLY FOLLOWING THE REVOLUTION. PERIOD OF CELEBRATION THEORETICALLY RUNS 10 DAYS (UNTIL 2 APRIL)
- (C) 30-31 MARCH - FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE REFERENDUM WHICH ESTABLISHED THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE FOR REVOLUTIONARY AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS. LIKELY TO BE MARKED BY MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS.
- (D) OTHER DATES OF INTEREST ARE THE IRANIAN WEEKENDS (NOON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY.) THESE ARE 6 AND 7TH //13 AND 14TH// 20 AND 21// 27 AND 28 MARCH.

5. A SUMMARY OF CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA (SUNRISE/SUNSET/MOON LIGHT) FOR THE PERIOD 5 MARCH THROUGH 30 MARCH 80 FOLLOWS.

- (A) NUMBERS OF HOURS OF DARKNESS AVAILABLE
 - (1) FIFTH MARCH (10:37 HRS)
 - (2) FIFTEENTH MARCH (10:13 HRS)
 - (3) TWENTY FIFTH MAR (09:47 HRS)
- (B) NUMBER OF HOURS OF MOONLIGHT AND ILLUMINATION AVAILABLE
 - (1) 5 MAR/07:45 HOURS AT 91 PERCENT LATE NIGHT THRU DAWN
 - (2) 10 MAR/0330 HOURS AT 50 PERCENT EARLY MORNING (2130Z) TO DAWN
 - (3) 15 MAR/NO USEABLE MOONLIGHT
 - (4) 20 MAR/04:02 HOURS AT 15 PERCENT DUSK THRU EARLY NIGHT
 - (5) 25 MAR/07:49 HOURS AT 65 PERCENT DUSK PAST MID-NIGHT
 - (6) 30 MAR/10:53 HOURS AT 98 PERCENT FULL NIGHT

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B-151

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ 17 March 1980

Cont
17 Mar 80
CJCS
DJS
ACJCS

WORKING PAPER FOR LTG SHUTLER

SUBJECT: Reaction to Rescue Attempt (~~S/NOFORN~~)

E. 1. (~~S/NOFORN~~) [redacted] and Middle East:

E. a. (~~S/NOFORN~~) A US military operation to free the hostages in Tehran will most likely trigger a negative public reaction from [redacted] and all other Arab states except [redacted]. The extent and duration of Arab reaction would depend on several factors. The strongest public outcry would result from the violation of airspace or territorial waters of any neighboring Arab state by the US military force. The use of the airspace or territorial waters of any Arab state would imply that either the US has no respect for the independence of that state or even worse, that the state in question has cooperated with an outside force in an attack against a fellow Islamic nation. Therefore, despite possible private feelings of support for the US action, any such state interested in maintaining its strong Islamic credentials will be required to condemn the US action. The same requirement to maintain strong Islamic credentials will prompt negative public reaction from the other Arab states. At least two other factors will determine the degree of the private reaction. Although Arab leaders would not wish to be considered in any way a party to such an operation against Iran, they would most likely be upset if they did not receive official US notification of such an operation at least as it was being launched. The emotional response would also expectedly be keyed to the nature and extent of damage or injuries incurred by Iran as a result of the operation.

b. (~~S/NOFORN~~) Despite the fact that Arab leaders can be expected to denounce such a US military action, most of them would privately be expected to take delight in any successful operation which would serve to embarrass the Iranian leadership. Over the longer term, a successful operation would result in renewed respect by the leadership of the more radical states of the region, and possible increased US influence among the Arab moderates.

2. (~~S/NOFORN~~) Soviet Union:

a. (~~S/NOFORN~~) The Soviet Union likely would view with alarm an attempted US military rescue of the American hostages in Iran. Moscow is unlikely, however, to counter such a US move militarily if Washington--as the rescue mission commences--announces to the world that the mission is limited in scope to rescuing our hostages and that our forces will be withdrawn as soon as the mission is completed. Should the mission extend beyond a short duration, however, Moscow would likely offer Tehran military aid thereby gaining considerable propaganda profit. Additionally, should the rescue mission encounter difficulty and require an additional

Classified by: DDO, NMCC
Declassify on: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET/NOFORN
Date: 0402
Source: [redacted]

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 17 MAR 86
Review on: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

military commitment, Moscow's reaction would necessarily depend on the size and perceived intent of the US action.

b. ^(U) ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ Although we cannot rule out Soviet military intervention into northern and eastern Iran with Moscow invoking the terms of the 1921 Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship as justification, we do not believe a limited US rescue operation of short duration would prompt a Soviet military move against Iran. However, Soviet military units along the Iranian border would probably go on an increased state of readiness. Moscow would likely launch a vigorous propaganda campaign and diplomatic effort citing "US military aggression", not only to exploit the situation and cultivate the current Iranian regime, but to divert world attention from Afghanistan.

3. ^(U) ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ There would not likely be a "Muslim" reaction per se, simply because there is no united Islamic movement. The possible exception might be a reaction from the Islamic Conference, an organization of states with large Muslim populations. The Conference might meet and condemn the action. Strongly Muslim states, other than those in the Middle East, such as Pakistan and some African states, would likely react negatively. Pakistan as well as Libya would condemn the action as excessive. President Zia of Pakistan has made it clear that he would support Iran if the US were to take military action, and there would be harsh rhetoric from Islamabad. If the operation were detected by the Pakistanis, there is the possibility that they could react in time to launch aircraft against US forces. Other states with large Muslim populations would deplore the loss of life in the rescue attempt, but we do not expect it to be a lasting phenomenon. Aside from the official reaction noted above, there would likely be demonstrations against the US on the part of Muslims in some states. Sudan and Libya are probable candidates for this type activity.

4. ^(U) ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ The rest of the world, including Western Europe and Japan, would likewise voice expressions of concern that the hostage situation had to be resolved in such a way; but the US would probably not be condemned. To protect their interests in Iran these countries would likely avoid laudatory statements for the US act. Privately there would be expressions of approval.

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B-152

191230Z MAR 80

FM: JTF
TO: SEOD

1 SOM
HELIO DET

SUBJECT: POLITICAL FORECAST MESSAGE

1. THE EMBASSY TEHRAN HOSTAGE SITUATION REMAINS A POLITICAL PROBLEM WITHOUT A NEGOTIABLE SOLUTION. HOWEVER DUE TO THE INTERNAL ISOLATION OF IRAN, INCREASED THREATS ON ITS WESTERN AND NORTH, AND A WORSENING OF THE MEDICAL CONDITION OF KHOMEINI, THE SITUATION COULD BE PARTIALLY RESOLVED THE NEXT 12-14 DAYS.

2. THIS POSSIBILITY EXISTS ONLY IF PANT SADR IS ABLE TO CONVINCE KHOMEINI THAT IN FACT THE HOSTAGE SITUATION IS HAVING A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION. IF SADR SUCCEEDS IT IS POSSIBLE THE KHOMEINI COULD IN HIS 22 MARCH NEW YEARS ADDRESS DIRECT THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO A HOSPITAL UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, REQUEST THE UN COMMISSION TO RETURN TO TEHRAN AND RESUME HEARINGS, WITH THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF NEGOTIATING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES IN EXCHANGE FOR A PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF ITS FINDINGS.

3. IF HOWEVER A PRINCIPLE SADR RIVAL SUCH AS PESHESTI (WHO COVETS KHOMEINI'S ROLE) WHO IS EXTREMELY INFLUENTIAL IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND WHOSE POLITICAL PARTY (THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PARTY) APPEARS TO HOLD A MAJORITY IN THE NEW PARLIAMENT SUCCEEDS IN GAINING KHOMEINI'S EAR AND CONVINCING HIM THAT THE RELIGIOUS FEROR OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY WILL NOT BE SERVED BY THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT EXTRACTING A FORMAL STATEMENT OF APOLOGY FROM THE US GOVERNMENT, THE SITUATION IS LIKELY TO DRAG ON INDETERMINABLY.

4. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOVE REFLECT TWO EXTREMES OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC. THE REALITY OF THE FUTURE LIES SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN, AND SOME INDICATION AS TO THE MOST PROBABLE COURSE HOPEFULLY WILL BE FORTH COMING ON THE 22 OF MARCH. IN EITHER CASE IT WOULD BE PREMATURE FOR ANY ELEMENTS OF THIS TASK FORCE TO STACK ARMS. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO FURTHER REFINE OUR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SKILLS AND BE PREPARED TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ASSIGNED MISSION UNTIL ALL THE HOSTAGES ARE FREE.

VAUGHT SENDS.

REVV 19 MAR 2010

Classified by:
DDO, NMCC

Declassify on: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC

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B-155

051500Z APR 80
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10: 2201/5-27
SDW 7A-2/

~~SECRET~~ TRANSFER PROJECTION

THE ASSUMPTION OF CONTROL BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
(IF IT OCCURS) DOES NOT MEAN THE END OF THE HOSTAGES.
THIS OFFERS HOPE THAT THE
TENSION BETWEEN THE [REDACTED] GROUPS
AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT [REDACTED] SHORT
[REDACTED] RESOLUTION OF THE [REDACTED]

2. THE ABOVE PRESS INTERVIEW WITH THE RELIGIOUS HARD LINER
[REDACTED] PROBABLY PROVIDES THE CLEAREST INDICATION
[REDACTED] OF THE MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
COUNCIL (INTERVIEW TEXT FOLLOWS)

AYATOLLAH DR MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND MEMBER OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION COURT, ANNOUNCED THAT THE FORMER
SHAH'S FLIGHT TO EGYPT NOT ONLY MADE HIS EXTRADITION MORE DIFFI-
CULT, BUT ALSO COMPLICATED THE ISSUE OF THE HOSTAGES. IN A PRESS
CONFERENCE DR BEHESHTI ADDED THAT UP TO NOW, HE CANNOT OFFER ANY
SUGGESTION TO THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY. WHAT IS IMPORTANT, HE SAID,
IS THAT IRAN WANTS TO ACHIEVE ITS TOTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDE-
PENDENCE, BUT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT WANT TO RESPECT IRAN'S
INDEPENDENCE OR THE INDEPENDENCE OF SIMILAR COUNTRIES.

DR BEHESHTI SAID THAT WHEN THE UNITED STATES STOPS PRACTICING SUCH
POLICIES, WE CAN FIND A BASIS FOR RECONCILIATION WITH IT.

DR BEHESHTI ADDED THAT THE HOSTAGES TRIAL SHOULD HELP US AND THE
PEOPLE TO ARRIVE AT COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE. AS THE IMAM SAID:
AFTER THAT, WE MIGHT FORGIVE THEM. (END OF INTERVIEW TEXT)

(u) 3. EVEN IF CONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES OCCURS, THIS DOES NOT MEAN MOVE-
MENT WILL TRANSPIRE, AND IN FACT DOES NOT EVEN GUARANTEE THAT THE
MILITANTS WILL RELINQUISH COMPLETE PHYSICAL CONTROL.

(u) 4. ASSUMING CONTROL IS TRANSFERRED THE MILITANTS WILL AT A MINIMUM
RETAIN CONTROL OF THE COMPOUND AND IF THE HOSTAGES ARE RELOCATED THEY
WILL PROBABLY BE MOVED TO A MILITARY FACILITY, COMMANDERED HOTEL OR
A FOREIGN-MINISTRY BUILDING.

BT

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Classified by:
DBO, NMCB

Declassify on: OADR

Classified by: JCS
Declassified on: OADR

Downgraded by:

201910Z MAR 80
FM: JTF/J-2
TO: SFOD/S-2
A: LSON/A-2

~~SECRET~~

B 154

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8

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

SUBJ: DETECTION ASSESSMENT

1. THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE J-2 STAFF AND BRIEFED AT THE 18 MARCH PLANNING MEETING. THE ASSESSMENT WAS PREPARED WITHOUT ACCESS TO ALL OPERATIONAL PLANS AND THEREFORE IN A FEW CASES THE ASSESSMENT MAY BE MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN WARRANTED.

2. THE ASSESSMENT COVERS THE PERIOD FROM NCA DECISION TO FORCE EXTRACTION FROM MANZARIYEH AND WAS BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THE GREATEST DANGER TO MISSION SUCCESS IS DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION, AND COMPROMISE OF THE FORCE PRIOR TO CLOSURE WITH THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, AND RECOGNITION THAT MANZARIYEH AFLD. IS BEING USED AS THE EXTRACTION AIRHEAD.

3. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE ASSESSMENT THE MISSION SEQUENCE WAS DIVIDED INTO FIVE STAGES AS FOLLOWS. AND EACH SUB SET WAS EVALUATED AS TO THE CHANCES OF MISSION COMPROMISE.

- A. DEPLOYMENT ORDER
- B. MOVEMENT TO STAGING AREA
- C. FORCE LAUNCH AND INSERTION
- D. OBJECTIVE RECON AND CLOSURE
- E. EXECUTION AND EXTRACTION

4. DEPLOYMENT ORDER (LIMITED ACCESS)

- A. JCS (SOD/OPG/DIA) LOW #
INITIATE CAMPAIGN TO PLAYDOWN POSSIBILITY.
- B. U AND S COMMAND CINC LOW #
CLOSEHOLD VIA BACK CHANNEL TO CINC
- C. JTF STAFF LOW #
IF NORMAL PROFILE MAINTAINED UNDER EXERCISE COVER
- D. JTF FORCES
 - DELTA FAMILIES LOW
 - HEL0 FAMILIES LOW
 - STAYBEHINDS MOD
 - TAC/MC SUPPORT TROOPS MOD
 - CVA (AIR OPS TEAM) LOW
 - 135 UNIT STAFF LOW
 - MAC UNIT STAFF LOW

5. MOVEMENT TO STAGING AREA

- A. MC/AC [REDACTED] LOW
- B. UNIT MOVEMENT - USING NON-DESCRIPT ID'S LOW
- C. TANKER MOVEMENT - USING AWAC/FIR/RECCE/SUPPORT --LOW
- D. FOREIGN OBSERVATION
 - 1. USSR MODERATE
 - 2. ISRAEL MODERATE
 - 3. SAUDI LOW
 - 4. IRAQ LOW
 - 5. IRANIAN LOW

6. FORCE LAUNCH AND INSERTION

- A. HEL0 LAUNCH --LOW
- B. MC LAUNCH --LOW
- C. KC LAUNCH --MOD/HI
- D. HEL0 PENETRATION --MOD
- E. MC REFUEL -- MOD/HI
- F. HEL0 TO NAIN --LOW
- G. SEIZURE OF NAIN --LOW
- H. NAIN 2ND DAY --MOD #
- I. EGRESS OF MC --LOW
- J. HEL0 TO TRANSFER PT --LOW
- K. DELTA TRANSFER --LOW/MOD
- L. HEL0 HIDE --LOW #
- M. DELTA TO WAREHOUSE --LOW #

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EQ 1256
 CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92
 DERIVATIVE CL BY DDD Nmcc
 HQ BWHM TO
 REVISED BY AAD R
 REVISION FROM Multiple Issues

Classified by: JCS
 Declassified on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

1. ^(u) ~~(S)~~ PLANNING. FACT OF US PLANNING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

2. ^(u) ~~(S)~~ PREPARATIONS.

E

a. ^(u) ~~(S)~~ STRIKE FORCES. MIDWAY AND KITTY HAWK MOVEMENTS AND LOCATIONS KNOWN. AC-130s [REDACTED] TO DEMONSTRATE CAPABILITIES [REDACTED] KNOWN. VARIOUS TARGETS THAT MIGHT BE ATTACKED SUBJECT TO NEWSPAPER SPECULATION. VULNERABILITY OF IRAN KNOWN.

b. ^(S) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) RESCUE FORCES

(1) PROBABILITY OF 52ND AIRBORNE / RANGERS BEING RESCUE FORCE IN PRESS. FACT NOT ON ALERT POINTED OUT. NO INDICATIONS ACTUAL GROUND FORCES HAVE BEEN DETECTED.

(2) MOVEMENT OF RH-53s TO KITTY HAWK NOTED IN PRESS. PRESS STATED REASONS TO CONDUCT MINESWEEPING OR MINELAYING. PRESS NOTES OFFICIAL STATEMENTS IRAN NOT CREDITED WITH GOOD MINELAYING CAPABILITIES, AND ~~NOT~~ THAT NO LARGE HELOS NECESSARY FOR ASSAULT ON CARRIERS. NO REFLECTIONS THAT RH-53s AND MICHIGANS HAVE BEEN LINKED, NOR HAS BLUE-GREEN CONCEPT IN WHICH RH-53s WERE USED FOR TROOP ASSAULT. ^{SURFACED.} ~~UNKNOWN~~ IF SOVIETS KNOW OF CONCEPT OR HAVE DRAWN DAMAGING CONCLUSIONS. UNLIKELY IRAN KNOWS OF BLUE GREEN CONCEPT.

A: (3) DELTA FORCE NO INDICATIONS.

(4) AC-130s. NO INDICATIONS.

(5) JTF. NO INDICATIONS.

A (6) RANGER FORCE. NO INDICATIONS.

(7) COMMO SUPPORT. NO INDICATIONS.

(8) MAC / SAC SUPPORT. INCREASED ACTIVITY UNDOUBTEDLY NOTED BY SOVIETS. SOME ACTIVITY PROBABLY KNOWN TO IRAN. NO INDICATIONS THAT INCREASED ACTIVITY RELATES TO RESCUE ATTEMPT.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 1256

CONDUCTED ON 21 JUN 92

REVIEWED BY DDO, NMCC

SEAL APPROVED TO

BY OADR

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Classified By: fcs
Declassified ON: OADR

3. (u) (S) Timing. PRESS SPECULATION RELATES LOGICALLY STRIKES TO HARM TO PRISONERS, NO INDICATIONS OF DATES. IRAN, AS REFLECTED IN KHOMEINI'S STATEMENTS, PROBABLY REJECTS STRIKES COULD COME AT ANY TIME.

4. (u) (S) SOVIET INTELLIGENCE REACTINS. ~~SOVIET~~ SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES AND COVERAGE, APPEAR ~~NORMAL FOR THE SITUATION EXISTING.~~ C

5. (u) (S) IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE REACTINS. SCABORNE PATROL NEAR KHARG ISLAND AND ~~OTHER~~. C

6. (u) (S) ASSESSMENT

a. (u) (S) STRIKES. ~~WAS~~ SURPRISE OF TIME AND TARGET POSSIBLE. SOVIETS PROBABLY WILL DETECT CARRIER MOVEMENT AND LAUNCHES. ESTIMATE INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR SOVIETS TO WARN IRANIANS AND FOR IRANIANS TO REACT.

b. (u) (S) RESCUE. SECRECY AND POSSIBILITY OF SURPRISE APPEAR TO BE RETAINED TO DATE.

c. (u) (S) SOVIET ACTIONS. ~~REDACTED~~ C

d. (u) (S) IRANIAN ACTIONS. IRANIANS CONCERNED ABOUT FEASIBILITY OF US ACTION. (ALERTING OF FORCES) ~~WILL~~ ~~COMPLETLY~~ ~~BE~~ ~~WARNING~~ ~~MAY~~ ~~HAVE~~ ~~BEEN~~ ~~EXPECTED~~ ~~IRANIANS~~ ~~BETTER~~ ~~PREPARED~~ ~~FOR~~ ~~ACTION~~ ~~IF~~ ~~THEY~~ ~~WERE~~ ~~ADVISED~~ ~~CONDITIONED~~ ~~TO~~ ~~WARNING~~ ~~AND~~ ~~REDUCE~~ ~~REACTINS~~ ~~CONCERNING~~ ~~AND~~ ~~FALSE~~ ~~WARNINGS~~ ~~TOP~~ ~~SECRET~~ C

C MAY ALSO INCREASE APPREHENSION IN IRAN.
IRANIAN PERCEPTION MAY BE DEVELOPING THAT
THE HOSTAGES THEY HOLD MUST REMAIN UNHARMED
TO AVOID A SEVERE US RETRIBUTION.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• CONTINUE TO STRESS THREAT OF STRIKES
AND VULNERABILITY OF IRAN.

• ^{CONSIDER} ~~SIMULATE~~ ACTIONS TO CREATE PERCEPTION
THAT US WILL NOT CONDUCT ATTACKS ~~IF~~ IF
HOSTAGES RELEASED.

• CONTINUE TO ~~EMPHASIZE~~ REFLECT TO PRESS
PERCEPTION THAT RESCUE ~~IS~~ IS TOO DIFFICULT TO
UNDERTAKE.]

• ENSURE C-130 ACTIONS TO PRESERVE SECRECY
OF RH-53 MOVEMENTS ~~TO~~ TO KITTY HAWK E
AND KITTY HAWK TO LAUNCH BINT PRESERVED.

• INITIATE LEAKS THAT ~~THE~~ GULF OF OMAN, E
GULF STATES] LIKELY PLACES TO MARSHALL FORCES
FOR RESCUE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~██████████~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~