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Supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice. 


Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 
Problem-Specific Guides Series 
Guide No. 21 

Check and Card Fraud 

Graeme R. Newman 

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 
#2002CKWX0003 by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein 
are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the 
official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

www.cops.usdoj.gov 

ISBN: 1-932582-27-4 


About the Problem-Specific Guides Series 

The Problem-Specific Guides summarize knowledge about 
how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime 
and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention and 
to improving the overall response to incidents, not to 
investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. The 
guides are written for police–of whatever rank or 
assignment–who must address the specific problem the 
guides cover. The guides will be most useful to officers 
who 

• 
Understand basic problem-oriented policing 
principles and methods. The guides are not primers in 
problem-oriented policing. They deal only briefly with 
the initial decision to focus on a particular problem, 
methods to analyze the problem, and means to assess 
the results of a problem-oriented policing project. They 
are designed to help police decide how best to analyze 
and address a problem they have already identified. (An 
assessment guide has been produced as a companion to 
this series and the COPS Office has also published an 
introductory guide to problem analysis. For those who 
want to learn more about the principles and methods of 
problem-oriented policing, the assessment and analysis 
guides, along with other recommended readings, are 
listed at the back of this guide.) 
• 
Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the 
complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to 
spend perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and 
responding to it. Carefully studying a problem before 
responding helps you design the right strategy, one that 
is most likely to work in your community. You should 
not blindly adopt the responses others have used; you 
must decide whether they are appropriate to your local 
situation. What is true in one place may not be true 



elsewhere; what works in one place may not work 
everywhere. 

• 
Are willing to consider new ways of doing police 
business. The guides describe responses that other 
police departments have used or that researchers have 
tested. While not all of these responses will be 
appropriate to your particular problem, they should help 
give a broader view of the kinds of things you could do. 
You may think you cannot implement some of these 
responses in your jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In 
many places, when police have discovered a more 
effective response, they have succeeded in having laws 
and policies changed, improving the response to the 
problem. 
• 
Understand the value and the limits of research 
knowledge. For some types of problems, a lot of useful 
research is available to the police; for other problems, little 
is available. Accordingly, some guides in this series 
summarize existing research whereas other guides illustrate 
the need for more research on that particular problem. 
Regardless, research has not provided definitive answers to 
all the questions you might have about the problem. The 
research may help get you started in designing your own 
responses, but it cannot tell you exactly what to do. This 
will depend greatly on the particular nature of your local 
problem. In the interest of keeping the guides readable, not 
every piece of relevant research has been cited, nor has 
every point been attributed to its sources. To have done so 
would have overwhelmed and distracted the reader. The 
references listed at the end of each guide are those drawn 
on most heavily; they are not a complete bibliography of 
research on the subject. 



• 
Are willing to work with other community agencies 
to find effective solutions to the problem. The police 
alone cannot implement many of the responses 
discussed in the guides. They must frequently implement 
them in partnership with other responsible private and 
public entities. An effective problem-solver must know 
how to forge genuine partnerships with others and be 
prepared to invest considerable effort in making these 
partnerships work. 

These guides have drawn on research findings and police 
practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and 
Scandinavia. Even though laws, customs and police 
practices vary from country to country, it is apparent that 
the police everywhere experience common problems. In a 
world that is becoming increasingly interconnected, it is 
important that police be aware of research and successful 
practices beyond the borders of their own countries. 

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to 
provide feedback on this guide and to report on your own 
agency's experiences dealing with a similar problem. Your 
agency may have effectively addressed a problem using 
responses not considered in these guides and your 
experiences and knowledge could benefit others. This 
information will be used to update the guides. If you wish 
to provide feedback and share your experiences it should 
be sent via e-mail to cops_pubs@usdoj.gov. 


For more information about problem-oriented policing, 
visit the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at 
www.popcenter.org or via the COPS website at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website offers free online access to: 

• the Problem-Specific Guides series, 
• the companion Response Guides and Problem-Solving Tools 
series, 
• instructional information about problem-oriented policing 
and related topics, 
• an interactive training exercise, and
• online access to important police research and practices.



Acknowledgments 

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police are very much a 
collaborative effort. While each guide has a primary 
author, other project team members, COPS Office staff 
and anonymous peer reviewers contributed to each guide 
by proposing text, recommending research and offering 
suggestions on matters of format and style. 

The principal project team developing the guide series 
comprised Herman Goldstein, professor emeritus, 
University of Wisconsin Law School; Ronald V. Clarke, 
professor of criminal justice, Rutgers University; John E. 
Eck, associate professor of criminal justice, University of 
Cincinnati; Michael S. Scott, clinical assistant professor, 
University of Wisconsin Law School; Rana Sampson, 
police consultant, San Diego; and Deborah Lamm Weisel, 
director of police research, North Carolina State 
University. 

Karin Schmerler, Rita Varano and Nancy Leach oversaw 
the project for the COPS Office. Suzanne Fregly edited 
the guides. Research for the guides was conducted at the 
Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University under the 
direction of Phyllis Schultze. 

The project team also wishes to acknowledge the members 
of the San Diego, National City and Savannah police 
departments who provided feedback on the guides' format 
and style in the early stages of the project, as well as the 
line police officers, police executives and researchers who 
peer reviewed each guide. 


Contents 

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series. . . . . i 

Acknowledgments . . .  . v 

The Problem of Check and Card Fraud . . . . . . 1 
Illegal Acquisition of Checks and Cards . . . 6 
Illegal Use of Checks and Cards . . . . 7 
Low Reporting of Check and Card Fraud . . . . . . 8 
Factors Contributing to Check and Card Fraud. . . . . 10 

Understanding Your Local Problem. . . . . 13 
Asking the Right Questions. . . . . 13 
Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Offenders. . . . . . . . 14 
Victims. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Locations/Times. . . . . . . . . . 15 
Measuring Your Effectiveness. . . . . . 16 

Responses to the Problem of Check and Card Fraud . . . . . 19 
General Considerations for an Effective Response Strategy . . . . 20 
Working with Businesses. . . . . . . 21 
Community Partnerships . . . . . . . . 33 
Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . 36 
Responses with Limited Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . 40 

Appendix: Summary of Responses to Check and Card Fraud . . . . 43 

Endnotes  . . . 49 

References. . . . . . . . 51 


About the Author. . . . . . 57 
Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . 59 
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . . . 63 


The Problem of Check and Card Fraud 

This guide describes the problem of check and card fraud, 
and reviews factors that increase the risks of it. It then 
identifies a series of questions to help you analyze your 
local problem. Finally, it reviews responses to the problem, 
and what is known about them from evaluative research 
and police practice. 

The guide covers fraud involving (1) all types of checks 
and (2) plastic cards, including debit, charge, credit, and 
"smart" cards. Each can involve a different payment 
method. While there are some obvious differences 
between check and card fraud, the limitations and 
opportunities for fraud and its prevention and control by 
local police are similar enough to warrant addressing them 
together. Furthermore, some cards (e.g., debit cards) are 
used and processed in a similar way to checks, and 
electronic checks are processed in a similar way to cards, 
so that the traditional distinction between cards and 
checks is fast eroding. Table 1 summarizes the essential 
differences between check and card fraud. 


Table 1 
Common Differences between Check and Card Fraud 

Check Card 
Counterfeiting Check Entry level: requires photocopier or 
personal computer with standard 
color printer 
Card Entry level: amateur alterations easily 
detectable; more advanced card 
alteration or production requires 
more costly resources 
Conversion to 
Cash 
Check Can be converted to cash at 
checkout 
Card Cannot be converted to cash at 
checkout (except for debit and 
phone cards) 
Additional ID Check Retail stores typically require 
additional ID; banks may not ask for 
ID if account number on check 
matches bank records 
CArd Additional ID rarely requested 
Signature 
Checking 
Check Signature rarely checked, unless 
check-cashing card required 
Card Signature prime means of verifying 
card user 
Payment 
Processing 
Check Merchant submits check to bank for 
payment 
Card (Highly simplified): merchant 
submits card charge to bank, which 
submits payment request to card 
issuer, which verifies payment to 
merchant's bank, which then pays 
merchant 
Loss Liability Check If bank rejects payment, merchant 
carries loss and must recoup it from 
customer; legitimate account owner 
may be liable, depending on bank's 
policies 
Card Negotiable: merchant may incur loss, 
or card issuer may agree to do so; 
legitimate card owner generally 
protected from loss 
Vulnerability 
Points 
Check acquisition; check payment 
and cashing; check processing; and 
bank, business, and consumer 
environments 
Card issuance; card acquisition; 
checkout; card-not-present sales 
(usually telephone or online sales); 
and after the sale (product returns) 
Organized 
Crime 
Check Less common with checks, though 
sophisticated check-counterfeiting 
rings do exist 
Card Counterfeiting and distribution of 
credit cards widely adopted by 
organized crime groups 


In 2000, Visa International estimated that the yearly cost 
of fraud worldwide was about 0.05 cent per every dollar 


spent. This small amount works out to 300 million pounds 
in Britain and an estimated $1 billion in the United States. 
Since 1995, the amount of fraud losses on payment cards 
has consistently risen in the United Kingdom,1 and in the 
United States, the losses from online credit card fraud2 
alone are estimated to reach $3.2 billion in 2007. Over 50 
percent of Britons surveyed fear they will be victims of 
credit card fraud.3 

Apart from the obvious financial loss caused by check and 
card fraud, it is a serious crime that requires preventive 
action. It affects multiple victims and significantly 
contributes to other types of crime. At an elementary 
level, fraud is easy to commit, and the chances of 
apprehension and punishment are slight.† Thus check and 
card fraud is an ideal entry-level crime from which people 
may graduate to more serious offenses. Other crimes that 
either feed off check and card fraud or facilitate its 
commission include the following: 

• 
Drug trafficking. Addicts forge checks or fraudulently 
use credit cards (often bought cheaply as "second 
string" cards–that is, stolen or counterfeit cards that 
have already been used). So the fraud fuels the drug 
trade.4 
• 
Identity theft. There is increasing evidence to suggest 
that obtaining or accessing credit card accounts is the 
main motive for identity theft,†† a crime that causes 
victims very serious economic harm (ranging from 
$5,000 to $20,000 per victim)5 and psychological 
harm.††† Sophisticated technology has made the 
counterfeiting of checks and plastic cards much more 
difficult over the last decade. Although there is no 


† In a Montreal study, the success 
rate with a totally counterfeit card 
was 87 percent, and with an altered 
card, 77 percent. At checkout, the 
average success rate was 45 percent, 
although in most of the cases where 
the sales clerk rejected the card, the 
offender simply walked away, 
without being accosted (Mativat and 
Tremblay 1997). 

†† In 2002, the Federal Trade 
Commission reported that the main 
motives for identity theft were as 
follows: To obtain/take over a credit 
card account - 53%; To acquire 
telecommunications services - 27%; 
To obtain/take over a checking 
account - 17%; Other - 3%. 

††† A 2000 survey of identity theft 
victims found that less than half felt 
their problems had been fully 
resolved; all but one had gone to the 
police as a last resort and had 
received little satisfaction from doing 
so (CALPIRG 2000). 




definitive research available, it is likely that, as 
counterfeiting has become increasingly difficult, 
offenders have turned to the next best thing: stealing 
cardholders' identity, and using legitimate cards. Thus 
identity theft has become a serious crime; the U.S. 
Congress has passed a special bill to deal with it.6 

• 
Mail fraud. Offenders intercept checks, credit cards, or 
bankcards in the mail, or do not forward mail that card 
issuers or banks send to a customer's old address. 
• 
Burglaries, robberies, and thefts from cars. Offenders 
may commit these crimes specifically to get plastic 
cards, or they may get them as a by-product of the 
crime.† 

† Thefts from cars may increase as a 
way to get credit card and personal 
information if other opportunities 
to get such information are blocked 
by improved security measures in 
the manufacture and processing of 
plastic cards and checks (Levi 1998). 
However, in other studies, this 
"displacement" does not always 
occur, even within card fraud itself– 
for example, from using stolen 
credit cards to counterfeiting cards 
(Mativat and Tremblay 1997). 

• 
Pickpocketing. Pickpocketers may be attracted to 
shopping malls and other crowded shopping venues 
where people use checks and cards. 
• 
Fencing. In areas where offenders commit check and 
card fraud to buy high-priced goods, a fencing 
operation may arise to facilitate conversion of the 
goods into cash. 
• 
Extortion. Customer databases that include credit card 
and other personal information are very valuable to 
businesses. They have therefore become targets in their 
own right, and hackers sometimes steal them and hold 
them for ransom.7 
• 
Organized crime. Counterfeiting and marketing cards 
requires considerable organization, for both production 
and distribution. International organized crime rings 
working out of East Asia tend to be involved in such 
operations. 
• 
Local gang-related crime. Small gangs may feed the 
needs of addicts and the poor by using second-string 
cards to buy food and other items at supermarkets. The 
locals may protect these gangs, because they provide a 
"service" to the community. 



• 
Cons and scams.8 The Internet now carries a wide range 
of cons and scams offenders use to get credit card and 
other personal information from unknowing victims. 
People can easily create false websites and storefronts, 
as little skill is required to do so. Furthermore, many 
websites offer information on setting up such websites 
and on running scams. 
• 
Financial crimes against the elderly. The elderly are 
prime targets of cons and scams, including check and 
credit card fraud. (For more information, see the 
Problem-Specific Guide on Financial Crimes Against the 
Elderly.) 
• 
Shoplifting. Committing check and card fraud is simply 
another way of "lifting" products from retailers. Using 
a credit card fraudulently at checkout is much less risky 
(because the authentication methods are so cursory).9 
This type of theft from retail stores is probably much 
greater than regular shoplifting, or it may be used in 
concert with shoplifting. 
• 
Car theft. Car rental companies are prime targets for 
credit card fraud. Offenders may sell fraudulently 
rented cars in the stolen vehicles market. 


Plastic-card technology is developing rapidly. Issuers are 
now offering both debit and credit services on one card, 
are requiring a personal identification number (PIN) for 
credit cards (introduced in France a decade ago, and in 
England in 2001), and are replacing magnetic strips with 
computer chips. Paperless or electronic checks are 
increasingly used in business-to-business transactions. 
Criminal use of these different products involves a wide 
range of skills, activities, and financial investment. The 
type of fraud will depend on the points of vulnerability 
targeted in the delivery of services, as outlined in Table 1. 



In general, check and card fraud may be divided into two 
activities: the illegal acquisition of checks and cards, and the 
illegal use of checks and cards. This distinction is not 
absolute, since offenders may gain access to some cards 
(e.g., phone cards) without actually acquiring the cards (e.g., 
by stealing account numbers). 

Illegal Acquisition of Checks and Cards 

The following are some of the ways offenders illegally 
acquire checks and cards: 

• Altering checks and cards. Offenders can do so with 
the simplest equipment. However, altered checks and 
cards are sometimes easy to detect. 
• Counterfeiting checks and cards. Reasonably priced 
machines for embossing, encoding, and applying 
holograms to cards are available on the Internet. 
• Committing application fraud. Offenders get a checking 
or credit card account by using another person's 
identity or a fictitious one. 
• Stealing checks and cards through muggings, 
pickpocketing, theft from cars, and burglaries.† 

† Levi (1998) has noted that one in 
five street robbers in London obtain 
credit or debit cards from their 
victims. 

• Intercepting checks and cards in the mail. Intercepted 
cards are particularly desirable because they are 
unsigned. Offenders may also intercept boxes of blank 
checks. 
• Getting another person's PIN through trickery, for 
example, by "shimming" (watching as the person 
punches in a PIN). 
• Manufacturing and marketing counterfeit cards via 
internationally organized crime rings. 
• Renting or selling stolen or counterfeit cards to a group 
of "steady customers" via locally organized crime rings. 



• Hacking into a retailer's customer database to get credit 
card numbers. 
• Setting up bogus websites that request credit card and 
other personal information. 


Illegal Use of Checks and Cards 

The following are some of the ways offenders illegally use 
checks and cards: 

• 
Presenting a bogus check or card at checkout. The sales 
clerk is supposed to verify that (a) the check or card 
represents an actual account (usually done by checking a 
computer database), and (b) the person presenting the 
check or card is the account holder. If the offender gets 
away with using the check or card, he or she may then 
dispose of the goods by (a) selling them through a 
known fencing operation or informally in local bars, or 
(b) returning the goods to the same store (or a different
branch of the store) for cash.


• 
Making a "card-not-present" purchase (by telephone or 
on the Internet). Offenders avoid the scrutiny of sales 
clerks or security cameras and need only the card 
information, not the card itself. Card-not-present fraud 
is a major contributor to overall card fraud (see Figure 
1). Between 1999 and 2001, it increased some 130 
percent in the United Kingdom, with similar increases 
internationally.10 

• 
Denying ordering and/or receiving an item. Customers 
who order an item online using a legitimate credit card 
may deny doing so, claim they never received the item, 
and stop payment on the card. Or they may claim that 
an item they did order was never delivered, and demand 
a refund. 




• 
Targeting a particular store or set of stores. Small 
bands of career fraudsters may work together to "hit" a 
particular store or set of stores with stolen or 
counterfeit cards. These bands usually do not target 
stores in or near their own neighborhoods; rather, they 
will travel some 50 miles to other shopping areas to 
commit fraud.11 

Pie chart of U.K. loss by fraudFig. 1. U.K. card fraud loss by type of fraud, 2001 
Source: Adapted from Association of Payment Clearing Services (2002)
www.epaynews.com/statistics/fraud.html. 
Fraudulent application 2%
Lost/stolen card 28%
Counterfeit 39% 
Intercepted in mail 6%
Other 2%


Low Reporting of Check and Card Fraud 

Perhaps the biggest problem for police is that people 
rarely report check and card fraud to them.† In one recent 
study, only one in four incidents of check and card fraud 
were reported to the police.12 It is very likely that you have 
a check or card fraud problem in your area, but do not 
know about it. Many credit card issuers promise zero loss 
to the user if the card is lost or stolen and illegal are 
charges made. Thus, if cardholders do not suffer 

† Over 90 percent of people report 
their lost or stolen card to the card 
issuer within one day. They rarely, 
however, report their loss to the 
police, unless it results from a crime 
such as pickpocketing, burglary, or 
mugging (Levi and Handley 1998a). 


financially, they may have less motivation to report the 
offense to the police. Merchants are also reluctant to 
report fraud, or even to use fraud prevention techniques at 
checkout, for fear that it will slow down the purchasing 
process and negatively affect sales.13 Thus, fraudsters think 
their chances of getting caught are very slim. One study 
reported that some 80 percent of respondents thought it 
was easy or very easy to carry out credit card fraud.14 


The situation with check fraud is slightly different. Some 
banks hold the account holder liable for loss. The 
merchant who accepts the check may also be held 
responsible, since the bank simply refuses to honor the 
check if it detects a forgery. (Thus, retailers–especially 
North American supermarkets, where check cashing is a 
common service–are often more willing to cooperate with 
police or develop their own security procedures 
concerning check fraud.) It is not uncommon for some 
conflict to arise between merchants and banks as to who 
should bear the loss.15 This is a serious problem because, 
as we will see, cooperation among competing merchants 
and between merchants and banks is central to preventing 
and reducing check and card fraud.16 

Banks, large retail stores, and supermarket chains 
commonly prefer to deal with merchandise loss, employee 
theft, shoplifting, and check and card fraud internally.17 
There are three significant reasons for this preference: 

• 
They do not think police have the specific skills, 
knowledge, and experience needed to deal with security 
issues in the banking and retail environment. 



• 
They hold a widespread view that losses due to theft 
and fraud are simply a cost of doing business, and that 
those losses are more than offset by the profits made 
from using tempting product displays or only quickly 
checking customer identities at checkout. 
• 
They fear that calling in the police might negatively 
affect business, because the crime problems become 
public. 


The check and card fraud that businesses do report to the 
police is usually committed by repeat or "professional" 
fraudsters. Or, for whatever reasons, the in-house security 
wants to transfer responsibility to the criminal justice 
system. 

Factors Contributing to Check and Card Fraud 

Understanding the factors that contribute to your problem 
will help you frame your own local analysis questions, 
determine good effectiveness measures, recognize key 
intervention points, and select appropriate responses. You 
should be aware that most check and card fraud is due to 
factors beyond police control. Such factors include the 
following: 

• There are security flaws in check and card design and 
production. 
• Police typically do not have access to the vulnerability 
points in the complex transactions that make up check 
and card processing. 
• It is inherently difficult to verify a check or card user's 
identity. 
• The Internet has greatly increased the opportunities for 
fraud, perhaps having its greatest impact through 
fraudulent card-not-present sales (see Figure 1).† 

† A traditional credit card purchase 
goes something like this: At 
checkout, the customer gives the card 
to the sales clerk, who runs it 
through the computer to check 
whether the account is legitimate. 
The clerk then checks whether the 
customer is the person named on the 
card (usually by comparing 
signatures, which are not an 
especially reliable form of 
identification, by the way). In a face-
to-face situation, the clerk can try to 
verify the customer's identity. 
However, with telephone and online 
purchases, there is no direct way to 
do so. 



• 
Information about counterfeiting, skimming, and 
hacking is now widely available on the Internet. Thus, it 
is easier to commit card fraud than ever before.18 

• 
To some extent, the sheer volume of card use accounts 
for the increased amount of card fraud. In the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Australia, debit and 
credit card use has increased tremendously over the last 
20 years, although in the U.S., checks remain the 
primary form of payment (besides cash). In Japan, 
credit cards have been very slow to catch on, but debit 
cards have gained wider acceptance.19 These differences 
are largely related to the structure of financial service 
markets in the various countries. 

• 
The amount of card fraud committed internationally 
has substantially increased in recent years. For example, 
the proportion of fraud committed abroad on U.K. 
cards has doubled in the past decade.20 

• 
Although the rate of check fraud has decreased 
considerably in the past decade, the financial loss due 
to check fraud continues to increase, simply because of 
the increase in the volume of sales. 

• 
There is a technological "arms race."21 Each 
technological advance makes it harder and harder to 
counterfeit checks and cards. Microdot printing on 
checks, hidden markings on checks and cards that show 
up on color photocopiers, holograms, magnetic strips, 
and now embedded chips–all these and many more 
advances have raised the level of skill and equipment 
needed for fraudsters to counterfeit checks and cards. 
Unfortunately, dedicated fraudsters quickly acquire the 
skills and equipment, so are soon able to produce 
checks and cards that are extremely difficult to identify 
as counterfeit. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, counterfeiting 
is the major type of card fraud, and it is increasing 
rapidly.22 



• 
International organized crime groups that specialize in 
counterfeit credit cards generally lie beyond the reach 
of local police, although their markets certainly lie 
within local neighborhoods. These groups became very 
active in Southeast Asia toward the end of the 1990s, 
and in a short time, have managed to overcome every 
new security feature introduced into plastic-card 
manufacture. Their distribution system employs Asians 
in large North American and European cities.23 

• 
Many card issuers are eager to get customers. In recent 
years, the competition has become very intense. The 
mail and Internet are loaded with tempting offers, and 
it is now very easy to get a credit card. 

• 
Many card issuers do not hold cardholders responsible 
for any loss incurred through fraudulent use by 
another. Thus, cardholders have no real motivation to 
take security precautions. In fact, they may even collude 
with others. Retailers may bear the loss in card-notpresent 
sales, and card issuers in standard credit-card 
sales. 


Although police face these and other obstacles when 
addressing check and card fraud, there is much that can be 
done. 


Understanding Your Local Problem 

The information provided above is only a generalized 
description of check and card fraud. You must combine 
the basic facts with a more specific understanding of 
your local problem. Analyzing the local problem carefully 
will help you design a more effective response strategy 
later on. 

Asking the Right Questions 

The following are some critical questions you should ask 
in analyzing your particular problem of check and card 
fraud. (Depending on the local circumstances, you may 
need to focus on one specific type of fraud. In general, it 
is best to focus on one small aspect of the problem at a 
time, such as a single merchant or bank.) Your answers to 
these questions will help you choose the most 
appropriate set of responses later on. 

Incidents 

• Have checks or cards been targeted in other crimes 
such as burglaries of homes and offices, pickpocketing 
in shopping malls, muggings, and thefts from cars? 
• When you receive reports of check or card fraud, what 
kinds of offenses do they usually entail: check 
alteration, card counterfeiting, assaults at ATMs, 
Internet fraud, etc.? 
• Who typically reports these crimes: checking or card 
account holders, retailers, banks, or card issuers? 
• Is online fraud (from card-not-present sales) a problem 
in your area? Online fraud may become apparent when 
fraudsters order online but arrange to pick up 
merchandise at the store. Do merchants report any 
such instances? 



• Are there any cases of parcels stolen or "lost" during 
delivery of items ordered online? 
• Are there known fencing operations in or near your 
area? If so, what kinds of items are most commonly 
fenced, and are they traceable to any local stores? Do 
new items frequently appear in pawnshops? 
• What national, regional, or local databases do public or 
private agencies maintain concerning check and card 
fraud? 


Offenders 

• 
Do fraudsters work alone, or in groups? How many 
work alone? How many work with others? How and 
where do they get together? How do they offend 
together? Why do they offend together? (Arrested 
offenders are a good information source, but remember 
that they may differ from active fraudsters in important 
ways. In addition, they may be reluctant to share 
information if they are concerned about three-strikes 
laws.) 

• 
What are fraudsters' demographic characteristics, such 
as age and gender? What is their ethnicity, as this may 
relate to the source of counterfeit or stolen cards, or 
the targeting of victims? 

• 
Where do fraudsters live, work, or hang out? 

• 
Do they know their victims? 

• 
How active are fraudsters? Do particular offenders 
account for a few frauds, or many? Do they specialize 
in one particular type of check or card fraud? 

• 
What, specifically, motivates fraudsters? Do they need 
quick cash to party or to support a family? Are they 
addicted to drugs, and if so, to what? Are they recently 
jobless, or are they long-term offenders? 



• 
Do they show evidence of planning their crimes, or do 
they take advantage of easy opportunities? 

• 
What special skills and techniques do they use to 
commit their crimes?† 


Victims 

• 
How do individuals respond to their victimization? (It 
is likely that you will rarely speak with cardholders, 
because they usually report stolen cards to the card 
issuers, rather than to the police.) 

• 
Are particular individuals repeatedly victimized? If so, 
why? 

• 
How do businesses respond to their victimization? Do 
they routinely report check and card fraud to the 
police? (Some may be unwilling to do so for fear that 
police attention will drive business away, or, in the case 
of card fraud, because they do not have to bear the 
loss.) What kinds of stores report fraud: small family 
stores, large retail chains, supermarkets, local or 
regional banks, etc.? Why do they report it? 

• 
What are merchant attitudes regarding police 
involvement in dealing with fraud? 

• 
What procedures do they have for detecting or 
preventing fraud? 

• 
Are particular businesses repeatedly victimized? If so, 
why? 


Locations/Times 

• 
Does check and card fraud occur in a specific area, on a 
particular day, and/or at a particular time? 

• 
Are specific types of places targeted, such as 
supermarkets, electronics stores, retail chains, 
restaurants, or online stores? 


† In one study, fraudsters had 
worked out over 100 different ways 
of committing credit card fraud 
(Jackson 1994). In another, 
offenders displayed considerable 
innovation in switching from one 
technique of check forgery to 
another (Lacoste and Tremblay 
2003). 


• 
Do muggings or thefts from cars that entail theft of 
credit cards occur in neighborhoods where drug dealing 
is common? 

• 
Does fraud occur at checkout in local stores? 

• 
How do fraudsters travel to and from the scene? 

• 
If fraudsters make "card-not-present" purchases, do 
they use the telephone or the Internet? Do they call 
stores from home or from public phones? Do they 
access online stores from home computers or those 
available in public places (e.g., college campuses, public 
libraries, Internet cafés)? 


Measuring Your Effectiveness 

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree 
your efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you might 
modify your responses if they are not producing the 
intended results. You should take measures of your 
problem before you implement responses, to determine 
how serious the problem is, and after you implement 
them, to determine whether they have been effective. 
(For more detailed guidance on measuring effectiveness, 
see the companion guide to this series, Assessing Responses 
to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers.) 
It should be emphasized that some measures will depend 
on merchants' providing information and establishing 
systematic procedures for collecting the data you need. 
You will need to convince merchants that the loss-
prevention benefits will offset the data-collection costs, 
and that data collection is necessary for a cost/benefit 
analysis. 



The following are potentially useful measures of the 
effectiveness of responses to check and card fraud: 

• 
Fewer repeat offenders. 
• 
Increased reporting of check and card fraud. 
• 
Decreases in retail losses attributed to check and card 
fraud. Retailers may use the number of transactions, or 
the total amount of sales, as the base against which 
they compute losses. 
• 
Differences in reported frauds between stores or banks 
where you focus your activities and those where you do 
not (keeping in mind that changes may be due to other 
factors, and that reported crime does not always reflect 
actual crime). 
• 
Reductions in related crimes such as burglaries, thefts 
from cars, or robberies at ATMs where credit or 
bankcards may be a prime target (keeping in mind that 
changes may be due to other factors related to those 
crimes).24 
• 
Increases in some related crimes when fraudsters' 
efforts are thwarted and they shift to easier targets 
(displacement). One study has suggested that 
acquisitive crime may increase as credit card fraud 
decreases.25 Other studies have found that fraudsters 
tend not to switch easily between different types of 
credit card fraud26 though they are resourceful in 
shifting between different types of check fraud, or at 
least in inventing new ways to commit check fraud.27 
• 
Reductions in the amount of new products fenced or 
available in pawnshops. 
• 
Fewer reports of lost or stolen goods purchased for 
home delivery. 



Responses to the Problem of Check and 
Card Fraud 

Your analysis of your local problem should give you a 
better understanding of the factors contributing to it. 
Once you have analyzed your local problem and 
established a baseline for measuring effectiveness, you 
should consider possible responses to address the 
problem. 

This section reviews what is known about the 
effectiveness of various practices in dealing with check 
and card fraud. Unfortunately, the information is severely 
limited because few of the common preventive practices 
have been evaluated. Card issuers, retailers, and bankers 
have been reluctant to conduct the necessary studies, or to 
share the results of those they do conduct. The 
government has funded little research in this field, 
generally regarding it as the private sector's domain. 

The following response strategies provide a foundation of 
ideas for addressing your particular problem. It is critical 
that you tailor responses to local circumstances, and that 
you can justify each response based on reliable analysis. In 
most cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing 
several different responses. Do not limit yourself to 
considering what police can do: give careful consideration 
to others in your community who may share responsibility 
for the problem. It will be essential to work closely with 
local businesses and community groups. The most 
effective program to reduce check and card fraud reported 
to date involved banks, retailers, business associations, 
database administrators, and local, regional, and national 
police.28 



General Considerations for an Effective Response 
Strategy 

As noted, local police can do little on their own to prevent 
check and card fraud. In many cases, you will have to 
persuade local bankers and merchants to act. You may 
have to explain why police can achieve little using 
traditional responses such as surveillance and arrest, and 
why heavier court sentences are of limited value. You may 
want to explain to merchants that the way they process 
check and card payments may be contributing to the 
problem. You may have to convince retailers and bankers 
that they cannot ignore the problem, because the costs to 
the community are too great and, in the long run, the 
stores and banks themselves suffer. Finally, you will need 
to advise them on preventive measures they can take to 
reduce the problem. 

It is important that responses be selective and based on a 
thorough understanding of the particular circumstances. 
For example, fraudsters often target high-priced electronic 
gadgets and appliances because they promise more cash.29 
Or, it might be better to concentrate on preventing check 
and card fraud by casual offenders, who are easier to deter, 
than to focus on the much smaller number of 
"professionals," who are harder to defeat. Again, such 
choices depend on your local circumstances. In framing 
advice, you must think carefully about the nature of the 
risk, which varies greatly depending on the kind of store 
and goods offered; the types of cards accepted; the store's 
check-cashing policies; and the store's or bank's marketing 
practices. These factors determine the nature of the 
remedies. Department stores with huge turnovers of 
expensive goods can afford to spend much more on 
security than small retailers can, and their corporate 
headquarters often dictate security procedures.† In all 


cases, you must appreciate stores' need to make a profit. It 
cannot be emphasized enough that the success of your efforts will 
depend heavily on how well you can convince local retailers that 
improved security procedures can and do increase the bottom line. In 
making your case, you may need to: 

• 
calculate the likely cost of measures such as installing a 
computerized customer database and issuing customers 
ID cards for check cashing; 
• 
convince retailers that they can recoup the cost of 
increased security through reduced losses from fraud 
(e.g., item replacement, profit, and lawsuit losses); 
• 
enlist the support of the local Chamber of Commerce 
or other business organizations in persuading business 
owners to improve security; and 
• 
brief (with care) the local media on the problem and 
the proposed solutions. 

† Most large retail stores now have 
standard antishoplifting technology, such 
as item tagging, tracking, etc. However, 
such technology cannot prevent card 
fraud at checkout. People commonly do 
not notice their credit cards are missing 
until a day or more after their loss. 
Unlike shoplifters, card fraudsters are in 
no immediate risk of being detected or 
of setting off alarms. Thus it may be 
expected that, as technology makes 
shoplifting more and more difficult, 
thieves may turn more to card fraud. 


Working with Businesses 

1. Raising responsibility awareness. As noted, many 
card issuers and banks do not hold cardholders liable for 
losses if their card is lost or stolen. Nor, in many cases, do 
they hold the merchant who accepts the card liable. 
Similarly, although merchants and banks incur losses from 
bad checks, they are reluctant to implement the security 
procedures necessary to prevent these losses, because they 
believe customers (especially regular customers) are 
"turned off" by being asked for ID. Yet research has 
shown that simply requiring two forms of ID for check 
cashing can significantly reduce the rate of fraudulent 
checking (see response #3). You must convince card 
issuers, banks, and merchants that any monetary losses due 
to fraud are serious losses both to them and to customers 


 

(who, of course, eventually bear the ultimate loss through 
higher prices and higher card interest rates). Perhaps 
worse, though, is the harm done to the community when 
identity theft is part of the fraud, because of the loss of 
trust it causes.† All parties concerned must be convinced 
of their responsibility: 

• 
merchants and bankers: to adopt antifraud procedures; 
• 
card issuers: to adopt marketing techniques that do not 
offer opportunities to potential fraudsters: and 
• 
customers: to take security precautions with their cards 
(for example, not leaving their purses or wallets in a 
locked car). 




2. Increasing the reporting of fraud. You should try to 
persuade local retailers and bankers to report fraud so that 
you can get some estimate of both the extent and the 
pattern of the problem. This will help you to raise 
awareness of the problem and to pinpoint businesses 
experiencing a higher rate of fraud. However, you must 
take care to ensure that any reporting of incidents be 
linked to a planned preventive program, not done merely 
"to add information to police records." That is to say, data 
collection must have a specific preventive purpose. You 
must also take care that police action resulting from 
increased reporting of fraud does not receive publicity 
that may negatively affect merchant activity, or be 
perceived to do so. Unless there is an active and positive 
program linked to reporting fraud, negative publicity can 
easily ensue.30 


3. Verifying checks, cards, and users. Check and card 
manufacturers have introduced an impressive array of 
technological features that make counterfeiting or 
alteration very difficult. However, two significant facts 
work against them: 

• 
Committed counterfeiters can easily match 
technological developments because all the equipment 
they need is relatively cheap and widely available on the 
Internet. 
• 
Counterfeit checks and cards do not need to be all that 
good. They just need to get by what is usually only a 
cursory or inadequate checkout inspection.31 Even 
amateurs who simply need a small amount of cash 
quickly to buy food or drugs can often avoid detection 
at checkout. 


Thus, while local police may not be able to get at the 
source of many counterfeit cards (Asia), they can do 
something about where counterfeit cards and checks are 
used (checkout), if they work with the merchants 
concerned. 

You can do much to inform merchants about modern 
verification procedures, particularly small businesses that, 
unlike large retail chains, may not have ready access to 
account and cardholder databases. Many police department 
websites offer lists of specific actions merchants can take 
to detect check and card fraud at checkout. In general, 
sales clerks must do the following: 

• 
Verify that the check or card is legitimate and 
represents a legitimate account. In the case of cards, 
this is usually done electronically by transmitting the 
card information to a central card-issuer database. 


 

• 
Verify that the person offering the check or card is the 
account holder. Sales clerks typically do this by 
checking the customer's signature. Unfortunately, it is 
widely known that a signature alone is a very poor 
verification of customer identity. So there is a very high 
probability (over 60 percent) that someone using, say, a 
stolen check or credit card will get away with it at 
checkout. 

Researchers have shown that adding simple security 
procedures can significantly reduce check and card fraud. 
In one U.S. study in a retail store,32 a system that used 
picture IDs of customers who paid with credit cards 
reduced fraud by over 80 percent. Furthermore, retail 
stores (especially supermarkets) have found that customer 
databases that issue customers ID cards can also be used 
as an effective marketing tool to advertise special sales and 
promotions. A study in Norway33 showed that legislation 
requiring people to show two forms of ID when cashing 
checks reduced check fraud by over 80 percent.† 

† Since the late 1990s, U.S. retailers 
have increasingly required a customer 
thumbprint (using special invisible 
ink) to accept checks. Some police 
departments provide the ink for free 
to local retailers. However, unless 
police work closely with retailers, 
retailers may fear this requirement 
will have a negative effect on 
customers, who may consider it an 
invasion of their privacy (even 
though the print is used only if the 
check turns out to be fraudulent).

Picture of thumbprint verification machine
A sales clerk checks a customer’s thumbprint. 


While these simple measures seem obvious and 
commonsense, if you visit any retail store and observe the 
security procedures for verifying checks or cards, you will 
see that sales clerks rarely or only casually use the ones 
described here. As noted, merchants often do not implement 
such procedures because they fear the negative effect they 
may have on sales. There is, however, no research to justify 
this view–although there is research that suggests that 
checkout delays do reduce sales. Therefore, you must take 
these concerns into account if you try to get local merchants 
to change their security procedures. Simply informing them 
about security possibilities is not enough. To avoid the 
negative effects of checkout delays, a carefully planned 
system has to be developed. This may require the input not 
only of the merchants, but also of security experts. Finally, 

an evaluation of the program's effectiveness must be built in to show 
that the savings from frauds prevented more than offset the cost of 
implementing the program. Without this assurance, retailers are 
unlikely to adopt security procedures.† 

4. Training checkout staff. As noted in the previous 
response, introducing new technology and procedures to 
identify illegal credit card use or fraudulent check cashing 
will be of little help if the staff who are required to check 
IDs are not trained to do so effectively. Ideally, a 
combination of technology (e.g., biometric techniques) and 
procedures that make identity verification independent of 
sales clerks' judgment would be the solution. The 
introduction of PINs for credit cards (as with debit cards) 
has been shown to substantially reduce credit card fraud in 
Europe, but widespread introduction will take several years. 
Using thumbprint, black light, and other biometric 
techniques to validate checks also shows promise.34 

† A simple, inexpensive, and quick 
procedure that can be done without 
checkout delays is to use black light 
to check for counterfeit cards. All 
major cards (MasterCard, Visa, 
American Express, and Discover) 
contain images that are visible under 
black light. The Troy (N.Y.) Police 
Department has successfully 
implemented this procedure. 


In the meantime, there are three important ways you can 
help businesses train staff: 

• 
Work with business associations or specific businesses 
to play a role in their training of new and continuing 
staff. In training sessions, you should work to raise 
staff's responsibility awareness (see response #1), for 
you can be assured that if the general business attitude 
is that card fraud is simply a cost of doing business, 
that attitude will show in the everyday practices of 
checkout staff. 
• 
You should also inform staff of the known methods of 
check-cashing fraud and illegal card use that involve 
collusion with sales clerks, and inform them of the 
dangers of participating in such offenses. Keep in mind 
that, by various estimates, some 50 percent of 
"shrinkage" (loss of stock in a retail store due to any 
cause) is attributed to employee theft. For this reason, 
if a business has an especially serious fraud or theft 
problem, it may be advisable to install closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) cameras at checkouts. This step 
should, however, be a last resort, because CCTV 
requires carefully planned and defined implementation, 
usually requiring the services of an experienced security 
professional for installation and, especially, evaluation.35 
• 
You should encourage the merchant to conduct–and, 
where legally appropriate, you should assist with– 
background checks on new employees. The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce estimates that some 30 percent 
of all business failures result from employee theft. If 
businesses hire honest employees, then the risk of 
collusion with customers at checkout is obviously less. 


As with other responses in this section, you will need to 
gain a considerable amount of trust from businesses–and, 


where appropriate, security professionals–to participate in 
staff training. You must make your role and goals very 
clear to businesses, so they know you are not out to find 
something amiss in their business practices.† 

† Unfortunately, there are 
merchants who set up bogus 
companies to collude with cooffenders 
to process fraudulent 
purchases made with credit cards, or 
to defraud honest cardholders. 
Merchant-alert databases have been 
successfully used in the United 
Kingdom to identify fraudulent 
merchants and warn honest 
cardholders of possibly risky 
locations and businesses (Levi and 
Handley n.d.). 


5. Reducing card application fraud. By far the biggest 
contributor to application fraud is the huge volume of 
invitations to apply for cards sent out in the mail every 
day, and available on the Internet. Fraudulent applications 
are very easy to complete using false personal 
information.36 In general, local police cannot do much 
about this–it is a problem of national and international 
proportions. However, there are three types of local card 
application fraud: 

• Getting new cards using a stolen identity. 
• Intercepting card renewal mail or other mail that 
contains a person's identifying information (some 
postal employees have done this). 
• Surveilling mail delivered to vacant houses, such as 
those for sale, or obtaining credit card applications by 
not forwarding mail to a previous resident. (In this 
case, you can work with real estate agencies and the 
post office to ensure that card renewal letters reach 
their proper destination. Since vacant residences may be 
located in several different mail-delivery areas, 
coordination with the post office may be very difficult.) 


6. Using information to fight online card fraud. 
Offenders make online or telephone card-not-present 
purchases from retail stores that are most likely out of 
state or even abroad, beyond local police jurisdiction. A 
significant amount of card application fraud also occurs 
when people apply for cards either online or by telephone. 
As distant as such frauds may seem to local police, the fact 




remains that they are committed by people who live in 
particular jurisdictions, and at the other end, fraud victims, 
whether merchants or individual cardholders, also live in 
particular jurisdictions. Depending on your department's 
resources (some large departments have specialized fraud 
and electronic-crime squads), you can take some practical 
steps (limited though they might be) to counteract at least 
the effects of fraud, and perhaps prevent some of it from 
occurring. You can do this by using the most powerful 
tool available in the 21st century–information: 

• In 2002, the FBI set up a computer crime squad that 
has considerable technical and prosecution capabilities. 
The U.S. Justice Department also issues updates on 
current frauds and scams, and on where they are 
occurring in the United States. 

• Check with the major online websites that specialize in 
collecting information about frauds and scams in 
general, credit card frauds, and other fraud-related 
crime that occurs on the Internet. Many sites provide 
useful information on how to identify various frauds 
and how to protect against victimization (see list in 
box). 



Useful Internet Sources 

Association of Payment Clearing Services: www.cardwatch.org.uk/
Better Business Bureau: www.bbb.org/
CERT/CC. Carnegie Mellon University repository of reported hacking incidents:


www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html
Credit Federal: www.creditfederal.com/credit-card-fraud-prevention.htm
Crime Prevention Service: http://crimeprevention.rutgers.edu/
FBI National Computer Crime Squad, through the Washington Field Office: email


nccs@fbi.gov, or call 202.324.9164
FBI Washington Field Office: www.nipc.gov/sites/ipcis/ipcis.htm
Federal Citizen Information Center: www.pueblo.gsa.gov/scamsresources.htm
Federal Communications Commission, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau:


www.fcc.gov/cgb/information_directory.html
Federal Trade Commission: www.ftc.gov/
International Web Police: www.scamwatch.com/
Netcheck.com: www.netcheck.com/
US Department of Justice: www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud.html


Most states have websites for their attorney general's office, many of which provide updates and 
advice on current and past scams: 

New Jersey Office of the Attorney General: www.state.nj.us/lps/oag/index.html 
Office of New York State Attorney General: www.oag.state.ny.us/ 


† Visa claimed card fraud 
reductions of up to 20 percent after 
it introduced software that detected 
unusual spending patterns 
(Maremont 1995). 

• 
Because of the risks involved in maintaining massive 
online databases of individual cardholder information, 
businesses should (and increasingly do) develop and 
clearly publicize a privacy policy to ensure their 
customers that their personal information is safe, and 
will not be used for any other purposes except 
purchases. Small local businesses can increasingly 
accept credit card payments online as web-purchasing 
software becomes cheaper and easier to install on small 
websites. You can help local businesses by providing 
any available information on privacy policies and 
procedures. This may involve simply providing website 
addresses as part of maintaining a productive working 
relationship with local businesses. You should not 
assume that businesses, especially small ones, are well 
acquainted with such information, since many hire 
website developers to design their websites and may 
have limited knowledge of the risks involved in web 
retailing. 
• 
As an information provider, you may be able to help 
small businesses get connected to services that 
maintain databases of card-use patterns. Currently, the 
major card issuers (e.g., Visa, MasterCard, and 
American Express) provide this service, which analyzes 
card use and detects any abnormal patterns. This 
service has significantly reduced card fraud by not only 
flagging unusual card use,† but also errant merchant 
processing. Stores that issue check-cashing cards could 
also use this service. 


The obvious difficulty with this response is that it does 
not focus as much on a specific crime as is usual in 
problem-oriented policing, but instead entails a more 
general approach of enhancing police-business relations. 
Thus, although it may help in implementing some of the 


other responses described in this section, it may be 
difficult to evaluate its specific effects on online credit 
card fraud. 


7. Tracking products. Legitimate cardholders sometimes 
use the following techniques to commit online card fraud: 

• They deny having made a purchase and insist the item 
was not delivered. 
• They say they made a purchase (it was charged to their 
account), the item was not delivered, and they want a 
refund. 


In the first case, local police can do very little. But in the 
second, they might work with delivery companies to 
locally track items bought online. Tracking technology is 
revolutionizing retailing and many other business areas, 
and it is certainly at the operational core of UPS, Federal 
Express, and other delivery companies. Small transmitters 
are rapidly replacing bar coding, the most pervasive 
tracking technology of the late 20th century. These 
transmitters can be placed on retail items (they have 
proved particularly effective in reducing shoplifting),37 
vehicles (including delivery vehicles),38 pets, livestock, and 
even people. They can be programmed to hold substantial 
information and to transmit location. Such devices make 
the recovery of stolen items much easier and can precisely 
track the delivery of products. Indeed, some companies 
already provide this service for stolen cars and trucks.39 
Because of the massive increase in online retailing, many 
more products are delivered to the home, creating 
opportunities for theft en route. The following are ways 
you can help businesses verify product delivery and detect 
possible card fraud: 


• 
Work with Neighborhood Watch and local delivery 
companies to ensure that deliveries to residences where 
no one is home are left in safe places. Using focused 
Neighborhood Watch programs is one of many ways to 
ensure safe deliveries.40 
• 
Fraudsters claiming nondelivery may give a bogus 
address (perhaps that of a vacant house) to get the 
item. Working with real estate agencies (see response 
#5) to track vacant local residences may help reduce 
such opportunities. 
• 
Work with local retail chains from which customers can 
purchase products online. Credit card fraudsters 
commonly return items to the store for a refund. 
Patterns of product return and cases of excessive 
returns should be monitored. 


The amount of card fraud committed through nondelivery 
claims is probably quite low, though there are no data to 
support this assumption. There may be high rates of 
product theft from delivery vehicles in some densely 
populated urban areas.41 You may have to balance your 
delivery-monitoring efforts against competing demands on 
police time. But bear in mind that your responses to 
delivery theft may also work in reducing other crimes, such 
as selling stolen goods, returning stolen goods for refunds, 
and shoplifting. 

8. Raising perceptions of wrongdoing and risk. 
Reminding would-be shoplifters that shoplifting is a crime 
and warning them that they will be prosecuted can help 
reduce shoplifting.42 Stores commonly post signs to that 
effect. As noted above, making purchases via check or 
card fraud is a form of shoplifting, but with much less 
risk. A simple sign such as "WE REQUIRE ID FOR 
CHECKS AND CARDS" indicates that the business takes 


IDs seriously. Sign placement may depend on a store's 
particular patterns of theft, procedures for processing 
check and card payments, and ways of dealing with 
customers. Putting up a sign costs very little, and 
monitoring its effectiveness is relatively straightforward. 
Of course, this presumes that stores keep records of 
check or card fraud incidents. 


Community Partnerships 

9. Educating cardholders. Although cardholders are not 
liable for losses if their credit cards are lost or stolen, they 
may be liable for many other card-related thefts. And if 
their entire identities are stolen, they may suffer 
considerable financial loss. Customer education 
concerning practical precautions to avoid identity theft, 
including credit card and bank account access, may 
contribute substantially to preventing fraud. These 
precautions may include: 

• 
carrying only a minimum of cards in high-risk 
neighborhoods; 
• 
covering the keypad when punching in a PIN at an 
ATM, or a card number and PIN on a telephone, to 
prevent a passerby or someone using binoculars from 
seeing your number; 
• 
never giving out personal information (e.g., Social 
Security, credit card, or bank account numbers) over 
the phone to telemarketers or anyone claiming to be 
collecting money for charity; 
• 
never responding to online requests for personal or 
card information unless they are on a trusted website; 
• 
never buying from an online retailer unless the website 
has a clear statement about the security measures it 
takes with its personal information databases, and 
about its online privacy policy; 




• 
never leaving credit or bankcards in a vehicle, whether 
locked or unlocked (these are among the most common 
items stolen from cars);43 
• 
never letting anyone (including family members) use 
your debit or credit card, or know your PIN; 
• 
watching carefully how sales clerks process your credit 
card and, if the store still uses mechanical card-
processing devices, making sure that copies of receipts 
are destroyed; and 
• 
not using publicly accessible computers (e.g., in 
libraries or Internet cafes) to make online purchases, 
because hackers may later retrieve your personal data. 


Who should tell cardholders about these precautions? 
Local police do not have the ready access to customers 
that merchants and card issuers do: it is much easier for 
merchants and card issuers to provide crime prevention 
information along with customer bills and statements, or 
on ATM welcome screens. However, police do have access 
to two groups of customers (or potential customers): 
those who are typically targets of scams–senior citizens– 
and those who know little about banking or using credit 
cards–children. With the cooperation of local businesses 
and community groups, police could set up educational 
programs to give talks to senior citizen groups, and to visit 
schools to talk to students about responsibly managing 
personal information, bank accounts, and payment cards.† 
While it would be sensible to target high school students, 
as some either already use credit and debit cards, or soon 
will, there may be good reason to target younger students 
as well, as they increasingly use the Internet. Of course, 
the effectiveness of such a program will be difficult to 
measure, since it requires a broad approach directed at 
affecting future behavior. 

† See the POP Guide on Financial 
Crimes Against the Elderly. 


10. Publicizing the costs of fraud. Perhaps the biggest 
challenge in dealing with fraud is changing attitudes 
toward it. Offenders typically view merchants and banks as 
rich and able to afford losses from fraud (one of their 
"excuses" for breaking the law).44 Card issuers view fraud 
as a cost of doing business. Police must allocate scarce 
resources where they are most cost-effective. It seems 
reasonable, then, given merchants' reluctance to report 
credit card fraud and banks' reluctance to report check and 
debit card fraud, for police to give such crime a low 
priority. Yet don't merchants–who pay taxes–have at least 
some right to expect the police to "do something" about 
fraud when it directly affects their businesses?45 The 
problem here is one of perception: who does fraud harm, 
how much harm does it do, and who is responsible for 
preventing it? 

One response is to publicize what is known about fraud– 
emphasizing its financial and human costs, and spelling 
out the steps people can take to avoid becoming victims. 
Response #2 entailed working with businesses to increase 
the reporting of fraud, and response #1 suggested ways of 
raising responsibility awareness among merchants, card 
issuers, and customers. The most direct and–probably– 
effective way to reach all those affected by fraud is 
through the local media, which tend to be very interested 
in reporting on crime victims.46 Police could write a piece 
outlining the costs to both victims and police: for 
example, it can take victims up to three months to 
straighten out credit problems caused by stolen identity, 
and may cost police up to $20,000 to investigate a case of 
identity theft.47 As usual, you must take care to ensure that 
any publicity is linked to a planned prevention program 
agreed to by local business associations and merchants. 


11. Collaborating with colleges. College students using 
campus computers have committed some of the major 
hacking offenses.48 Offenders have committed other 
crimes, such as stalking and pornography-related offenses, 
using Internet cafes and public libraries. As part of your 
overall strategy, you might work with college computer 
departments, to make sure that they have established a 
clear and publicized policy on campus computer use, 
outlining users' rights and responsibilities, and that they 
can track computer use if a hacking incident is traced to 
the campus. In addition, colleges are increasingly adopting 
"smart" cards that students use to charge meals and buy 
items from campus stores. You should work with colleges 
to make sure they have taken precautions to prevent 
fraudulent use of such cards and, if possible, work with 
campus security to educate students about fraud 
prevention. There is some indication that a fraud 
prevention program may work best if combined with 
programs to prevent other common campus crimes,49 such 
as shoplifting and mobile phone theft. Bear in mind, 
though, that different colleges have different traditions 
and policies regarding local police participation in crime 
prevention. They also carefully guard information about 
crimes occurring on or near campus, for fear that publicity 
may adversely affect college applications. You should be 
sensitive to this issue and be aware that collecting the 
necessary information or data to measure the effectiveness 
of crime prevention programs may be difficult. 

Enforcement 

12. Monitoring fencing outlets, pawnshops, and online 
auctions. A major problem for check and card fraudsters 
is converting goods into cash. At the local level, you can 
be sure that the existence of fencing outlets may 
substantially contribute to fraud and to retail theft, in 


general.50 Thus you should monitor any known outlets, as 
well as monitor the flow of new items into pawnshops 
and the sale of goods through online auctions. The 
majority of auction websites now list the sellers' locations– 
though these tend to be broad regions. However, since 
research has shown that card fraudsters tend to operate 
some distance from home,51 the broad regional 
information is probably accurate enough. To make 
monitoring the sale of stolen goods of use in preventing 
fraud, you will need to have a close working relationship 
with retailers, so that you can track the items. Today's 
tracking technology will help in doing so. 


13. Monitoring chat rooms, bulletin boards, and 
bogus websites. Response #12 included monitoring 
online auctions for sales of stolen goods. You may also 
monitor chat rooms and bulletin boards where people 
discuss acquiring counterfeit or stolen cards, hacking into 
databases containing card information, and committing 
card fraud. Have a look at alt.phreaking 
(http://members.tripod.com/~SeusslyOne/FAQ.html) or 
the various alt.hacker newsgroups 
(http://newsgroup.netwings.ch/alt.hacker.html). It is not 
difficult to join these chat rooms and bulletin boards, and 
given the anonymity the Internet allows, it is relatively easy 
to conduct "undercover" surveillance of them. 
Unfortunately, finding out users' location is difficult 
without the help of Internet service providers (ISPs) or 
computer crime specialists. 

You should be on the lookout for bogus websites, as well. 
(Again, not much skill is needed to set up a website. Nor 
does it cost much, if anything, to do so.) Fraudsters have 
tricked many unsuspecting web users into sending credit 
card and other personal information to bogus companies. 


There are websites that constantly monitor the Internet 
for such scams, so you should routinely visit these to 
check on the latest incidents. Again, unless you have help 
from an ISP or a computer crime expert, you may have 
difficulty determining the location of the people operating 
the scams. As suggested in response #6, you should keep 
in close contact with nearby police departments that have 
specialized computer crime departments, and with the 
relevant state and federal agencies that monitor Internet 
fraud. You can also check with the Better Business Bureau 
or other local consumer-reporting agencies, as well as pay 
attention to news reports, to find out if there have been 
scams in your area. 

14. Targeting high-risk merchants. Rates of check and 
card fraud vary enormously, both between different chains 
and between stores in the same chain. One study reported 
that recoveries per fraudulent check ranged from 
approximately one in 268 for one large chain, to one in 24 
for another in a similar line of business.52 You must 
develop a systematic way of collecting fraud information, 
so that you can identify high-risk merchants in your area. 
If collecting incident data is initially impossible (and it 
probably will be), you should try other avenues such as 
working with business associations to get a rough idea of 
which businesses are victimized most. It is likely that 
offenders target particular types of stores (such as large 
electronics stores for card fraud, and supermarkets for 
check fraud). Or they may target particular stores because 
they are considered "easy." Using crime mapping,53 perhaps 
with assistance from specialized task forces in the region 
or from larger police departments nearby (see next 
response), may also help in identifying high-risk 
merchants. Once you have identified them, you should try 
to build a working relationship with management to 
implement fraud-prevention measures. 


15. Getting help from experts. If your police 
department is in or near a big city, you probably have 
access to a variety of experts who can help you. These 
may fall into several categories: 

• 
Professional security consultants. These experts 
specialize in areas such as product scanning and 
tracking, checkout fraud, CCTV, card authentication, 
employee screening and training, and check verification. 
You can find them through a simple web search. 
• 
Specialist police units or individuals. Some police 
departments have specialist units or individuals who 
conduct fraud investigations. However, the extent to 
which they address fraud proactively (with prevention 
in mind) rather than reactively (from an investigative 
viewpoint) is not known. Unless these units or 
individuals adopt carefully planned preventive 
programs, they may find themselves inundated with 
incident reports from merchants who see the police as 
the solution to their problems.54 For example, a 1995 
Scottsdale (Ariz.) Police Department program 
successfully addressed a serious case-backlog problem 
in the check fraud bureau by adopting a team approach 
to working with local merchants.55 Many police 
departments in the United States and elsewhere have 
special antifraud programs, though they vary 
considerably in sophistication. A web search will reveal 
hundreds of such programs, though few with a 
problem-oriented approach. 
• 
Regional or national squads. Some check and card 
fraud is of a regional, national, or international scope. 
For example, credit card counterfeiting and distribution 
operations reach from Southeast Asia to North 
America and Europe, requiring highly focused and 
specialized squads to track down the perpetrators and 




identify their manufacturing and marketing systems.56 
There is a good chance that these organized crime 
networks reach into your area; hence the importance of 
working with regional and national squads. However, 
bear in mind that, with a few notable exceptions, such 
squads primarily (perhaps necessarily) focus on 
investigating and prosecuting individual cases, and do 
not use a problem-oriented approach. 

Responses with Limited Effectiveness 

16. 
Conducting crackdowns. There are some difficulties 
with crackdowns. If, by "crackdowns," we mean intensive 
campaigns to publicly catch and arrest perpetrators of 
check and card fraud,† then we face a serious problem in 
police-business relations. This is because retailers, and 
even bankers, have a longstanding belief that a strong 
police presence on or near their premises, especially when 
arrests are likely, contributes considerably to negative 
customer attitudes that translate into decreased business. 
The reluctance of merchants to use thumbprints to verify 
ID, even when strongly pressured to do so by police, 
illustrates this problem. 

† If crackdowns are to work–and 
they do in some cases, for some 
crimes–they should be carefully 
tailored to work with the other 
responses described in this guide. 
See the POP Guide on The Benefits 
and Consequences of Police Crackdowns. 

17. 
Implementing business watch. The popularity of 
Neighborhood Watch has spawned some attempts to use 
that approach for businesses. However, unless business 
watch is clearly oriented toward solving a specific problem 
(e.g., the reduction or prevention of check fraud at 
supermarkets), in contrast to reducing business crimes in 
general, it is likely to fail for want of focus, enthusiasm, 
and participation. Business owners must have specific 
crime-prevention goals if they are to devote the time and 
effort needed to make the program work.57 



18. Handling offenders through means other than the 
criminal justice system. Check and card fraud offenders 
who are reported to the criminal justice system tend to 
receive a low priority in processing, resulting in extensive 
case backlogs.58 Rather than formally report people who 
commit crimes against businesses (e.g., shoplifting, drug-
and alcohol-related misdemeanors, vandalism), many 
jurisdictions opt for informal procedures, issuing warnings 
to offenders, requiring that they compensate their victims, 
and/or requiring that they get counseling. These 
alternatives to the regular criminal justice system are 
usually reserved for juveniles and depend heavily on 
community–and, in the case of shoplifting, business and 
shopping mall security–involvement. No research exists on 
whether these alternatives would work for check and card 
fraud, nor has research established the extent to which 
juveniles are involved in such fraud. What data are 
available suggest that check and card fraud offenders tend 
to be adults, with an occasional preponderance of drug 
users and college students. However, without research that 
examines the entire range of behaviors that make up check 
and card fraud, it is difficult to predict whether any 
criminal justice or quasi-criminal justice procedures that 
effectively address shoplifting could also be applied to 
fraud. 


19. Conducting publicity campaigns. We have 
recommended establishing educational programs to help 
people avoid being fraud victims (response #9), and 
publicizing the economic and human costs of fraud 
(response #10). These responses must be part of a 
broader business and community initiative, not solely a 
police initiative (as with "lock your car" campaigns). In 
fact, a study of a Stockholm, Sweden campaign failed to 
demonstrate any measurable effect on the rate of theft 
from cars. The campaign looked more promising, however, 
when combined with security measures such as 
environmental changes to enhance natural surveillance.59 


Appendix 

Appendix: Summary of Responses to 
Check and Card Fraud 

The table below summarizes the responses to check and 
card fraud, the mechanism by which they are intended to 
work, the conditions under which they ought to work best, 
and some factors you should consider before 
implementing a particular response. It is critical that you 
tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can 
justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most 
cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing 
several different responses. Law enforcement responses 
alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the 
problem. 

Response 
No. 
Page No. Response How It Works Works Best If… Considerations 
Working With Businesses 
1. 21 Raisingresponsibility 
awareness 
Local businesses 
and card issuers 
are encouragedto take more 
responsibility forpreventing fraud 
…policeemphasize thecommunity costsof fraud to 
merchants 
Many security,
card-issuing, andverification 
policies aredictated bynational and 
international card 
issuers, bankers, 
and retail chains, 
making it difficultto change localpractices 
2. 22 Increasing thereporting offraud 
Data collection 
allows police todetermine the 
extent of the 
problem in their 
area 
…it is combined 
with a preventiveprogram (seeresponse #3) 
The media mayportray increasedreporting ofincidents as a 
"crime wave" 
demanding apolice crackdown,
rather then an aid 
to plannedpreventiveprocedures 


Response 
No. 
Page No. Response How It 
Works 
Works 
Best If… 
Considerations 
3. 23 Verifying checks,
cards, and users 
Retailers with 
high check orcard fraud losses 
are targeted, andverification 
procedures areestablished 
…verification 
procedures areintegrated intothe established 
checkout 
practices, and anevaluation 
demonstrates 
cost-
Merchants mayresist spending 
money onverification, 
especially if itrequires investingin new technologyand changingcheckout 
effectiveness procedures 
4. 25 Trainingcheckout staff 
Regular stafftraining raisesawareness about 
fraud prevention 
…policeestablish a close, 
trustingrelationship withbusinesses and 
clearlycommunicate 
Merchants maydistrust police 
attempts toparticipate in stafftraining sessions 
goals 
5. 27 Reducing cardapplication fraud 
Vacant 
residences and 
newly occupiedresidences where 
credit card 
information maybe sent are 
identified 
…police workclosely withpostal employeesand real estate 
agencies toensure that mail 
is not delivered 
to unoccupiedresidences, and is 
forwarded to the 
appropriatepeople 
Vacant residences 
may be in severaldifferent mail-
delivery areas,
requiring extensivecoordination with 
the post office 
6. 27 Usinginformation to 
fight online cardfraud 
Specifiedwebsites alert 
users to online 
fraud 
…police provideprevention andenforcement 
information to 
small local 
businesses 
It is difficult to 
evaluate this 
response's effecton online fraud, 
since it is 
primarily directedat enhancingpolice-businessrelations; 
generally,
preventing onlinefraud is beyondthe means of local 
police 


Response 
No. 
Page No. Response How It 
Works 
Works 
Best If… 
Considerations 
7. 31 Trackingproducts 
Police work with 
deliverycompanies, localretailers, and 
NeighborhoodWatch to 
monitor productdelivery andproduct returns 
…manufacturers, 
retailers, and 
deliverycompanies usenew trackingtechnology 
Cost-effectiveness 
may be difficult todetermine; trackingmay work inreducing relatedcrimes such as 
shoplifting andtheft of items in 
transit 
8. 32 Raisingperceptions ofwrongdoing andrisk 
Retailers postwarning signs atcheckouts 
…retailers keeprecords of check 
and card fraud 
both before and 
after postingsigns, to measuretheir 
effectiveness 
Merchants mayresist this 
response,
inexpensive thoughit is, for fear that it 
will have a 
negative effect onlaw-abiding 
customers 
Community Partnerships 
9. 33 Educatingcardholders 
Educational 
programs teachpeople to avoidvictimization bytaking simpleprecautions 
…it is combined 
with crime 
preventioneducation about 
a variety ofcrimes for which 
they may betargeted 
This responserequiresconsiderable 
cooperation fromcommunity groupsand schools 
10. 35 Publicizing costsof fraud 
The media are 
used to publicizethe financial and 
human costs of 
fraud 
…police workwith businesses 
and the media to 
craft stories that 
emphasize crimeprevention 
Stories of 
victimization mayaffect businesses 
negatively; mediatreatment of 
stories and 
information maybe unpredictable;
effectiveness is 
probably notmeasurable 


Response 
No. 
Page No. Response How It 
Works 
Works 
Best If… 
Considerations 
11. 36 Collaboratingwith colleges 
Police encouragecolleges toestablish 
responsible-usepolicies forcomputingfacilities, to 
minimize hacking 
…it is combined 
with crime 
preventioneducation about a 
variety of crimesfor which theymay be targeted 
Effectiveness is 
difficult to measure, 
and depends oncolleges' willingnessto invite local policeto their campuses tohelp solve crimeproblems 
Enforcement 
12. 36 Monitoringfencing outlets,
pawnshops, andonline auctions 
Police work with 
businesses to 
develop strategiesto track goodsthat may bestolen 
…police acquireextensive local 
and regionalknowledge ofknown fencingand pawnshopoperations 
Local businesses 
must cooperate inidentifying andtracking goods 
13. 37 Monitoring chatrooms, bulletin 
boards, and boguswebsites 
Police conduct 
surveillance of 
crime-facilitatingInternet venues 
…police get helpfrom ISPs and 
computer crime 
experts 
It is difficult to 
determine whether 
online fraudsters 
live in your area 
14. 38 Targeting high-
risk merchants 
Police determine 
what stores have 
high rates offraud and focus 
their efforts on 
them 
…police workwith business 
associations to 
collect 
information if 
incident data are 
not available 
Information-sharingrequires a long-
term, trustingrelationshipbetween police andbusinesses 
15. 39 Getting helpfrom experts 
Experts on fraudprovideinformation and 
skills that mayhelp with localproblems 
…police networkwith professionalsecurityconsultants and 
fraud squads atthe local, regional,
and national level 
Fraud squads maybe investigation-
rather than 
problem-oriented 
Responses With Limited Effectiveness 
16. 40 Conductingcrackdowns 
Police conduct 
very public,
intensive 
campaigns tocatch fraudsters 
Merchants may fearthat crackdowns 
will drive business 
away 


Response 
No. 
Page No. Response How It 
Works 
Works 
Best If… 
Considerations 
17. 40 Implementingbusiness watch 
Businesses set upprograms similarto NeighborhoodWatch 
…programs arefocused on 
specific crimes,
rather than crime 
in general 
Businesses must 
have clear crime-
prevention goals 
18. 41 Handlingoffenders throughmeans other than 
the criminal 
justice system 
Police and/orbusinesses issue 
offenders 
warnings, requirevictim 
compensation,
and/or requirecounseling ratherthan make formal 
criminal reports 
This response hasusually been usedwith juveniles whohave committed 
other offenses; it 
has not been 
evaluated for check 
and card fraud 
19. 42 Conductingpublicitycampaigns 
Police alone 
publicize fraudrisks 
…it is combined 
with the 
implementationof practicalsecurity measures 
Research has not 
shown this 
response, alone, tobe effective 


49 

Endnotes 

1 
Levi and Handley (1998a); Association of Payment Clearing Services (2002); 
www.epaynews.com/statistics/fraud.html 

2 
Association of Payment Clearing Services (2002); 
www.epaynews.com/statistics/fraud.html 

3 
Levi and Handley (1998a). 

4 
Levi (1998). 

5 
U.S. General Accounting Office (2002). 

6 
U.S. House (1998). 

7 
Newman and Clarke (2003). 

8 
Newman and Clarke (2003). 

9 
Levi (2000). 

10 
Levi and Handley (1998a); Association of Payment Clearing Services (2002); 
www.epaynews.com/statistics/fraud.html 

11 
Levi and Handley (1998b). 

12 
Taylor (2002). 

13 
Clarke and Newman (2002). 

14 
Levi, Bissell, and Richardson (1991). 

15 
Levi, Bissell, and Richardson (1991). 

16 
Duncan (1995). 

17 
Newman and Clarke (2003). 

18 
Newman and Clarke (2003). 

19 
Mann (2002). 

20 
Levi (2000). 

21 
Ekblom (2000). 

22 
Levi (2000); Levi and Handley (1998a, 1998b). 

23 
Mativat and Tremblay (1998). 

24 
Scott (2001). 

25 
Levi and Handley (n.d.). 

26 
Mativat and Tremblay (1997). 

27 
Lacoste and Tremblay (2003). 

28 
Levi, Bissell, and Richardson (1991); Levi and Handley (1998a). 

29 
Mativat and Tremblay (1997). 

30 
Scottsdale Police Department (1995). 


31 Levi and Handley (n.d.)
.
32 Masuda (1996)
.
33 Knutsson and Kulhorn (1997)
.
34 Texas Banking (2001)
.
35 Pierce (2003); Clarke (2001a); Painter and Tilley (1999)
.
36 Levi and Handley (n.d.)
.
37 DiLonardo (1996)
.
38 McKinnon and Tallam (2002)
.
39 Newman and Clarke (2003)
.
40 McKinnon and Tallam (2002); Laycock and Tilley (1995)
.
41 McKinnon and Tallam (2002)
.
42 Clarke (1997); Clarke (2001b)
.
43 Clarke (2001a)
.
44 Clarke (1997)
.
45 Levi and Handley (n.d.)
.
46 Chermak (1995)
.
47 CALPIRG (2000)
.
48 Newman and Clarke (2003)
.
49 Sampson (2002)
.
50 Sutton (1995)
.
51 Levi (2000); Mativat and Tremblay (1997)
.
52 Levi, Bissel, and Richardson (1991)
.
53 Eck and Weisburd (1995)
.
54 Scottsdale Police Department (1995)
.
55 Scottsdale Police Department (1995)
.
56 Newton (1994); Mativat and Tremblay (1997)
.
57 Charlton and Taylor (2003)
.
58 Scottsdale Police Department (1995)
.
59 Clarke (2001a)
.



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About the Author 

Graeme R. Newman 

Graeme R. Newman is a distinguished teaching professor at 
the School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, State 
University of New York. He has published works in the fields 
of the history and philosophy of punishment, comparative 
criminal justice, private security, situational crime prevention, 
and ecommerce crime, and has written commercial software. 
He was the CEO of a publishing company for 15 years and, 
in 1990, established the United Nations Crime and Justice 
Information Network. Among the books he has written or 
edited are Superhighway Robbery: Preventing Ecommerce Crime 
(with Ronald V. Clarke), and Rational Choice and Situational 
Crime Prevention (with Ronald V. Clarke and Shlomo Shoham). 


Recommended Readings 

• 
A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 
Environments, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This 
guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners 
to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying 
public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It 
provides guidance on whether and how to conduct cost-
effective surveys. 
• 
Assessing Responses to Problems: An 
Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers, by 
John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide is 
a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. It 
provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing 
problem-oriented policing efforts. 
• 
Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with 
accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic 
pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The 
document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs. 
• 
Crime Prevention Studies, 
edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of 
volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing 
opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of 
initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems. 





• 
Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing:The 1999 
Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This document 
produced by the National Institute of Justice in 
collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum 
provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the 
annual award program that recognizes exemplary problem-
oriented responses to various community problems. A 
similar publication is available for the award winners from 
subsequent years. The documents are also available at 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij. 
• 
Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime 
Reduction, 
by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office 
Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and 
describes the factors that make problem-solving effective or 
ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in 
England and Wales. 
• 
Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for 
Crime Prevention, 
by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. 
Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 
1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity 
theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory have 
practical implications for the police in their efforts to 
prevent crime. 
• 
Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police 
Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem 
analysis and provides guidance on how problem analysis 
can be integrated and institutionalized into modern 
policing practices. 








• 
Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein 
(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). 
Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented 
policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses 
how a police agency can implement the concept. 
• 
Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime 
Prevention, by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice 
Press, 2003). Provides a through review of significant 
policing research about problem places, high-activity 
offenders, and repeat victims, with a focus on the 
applicability of those findings to problem-oriented 
policing. Explains how police departments can facilitate 
problem-oriented policing by improving crime analysis, 
measuring performance, and securing productive 
partnerships. 
• 
Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 
First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 
2000). Describes how the most critical elements of 
Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have 
developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes 
future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report 
is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 
• 
Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in 
Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman 
(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the 
rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the 
problem-solving process, and provides examples of 
effective problem-solving in one agency. 




• 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime 
and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 
Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 
Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 1998) (also available at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov). Provides a brief introduction to 
problem-solving, basic information on the SARA model 
and detailed suggestions about the problem-solving process. 
• 
Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 
Studies, 
Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and 
methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 
20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives. 
• 
Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 
Case Studies in Problem-Solving, 
by Rana Sampson 
and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available 
at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective 
police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder 
problems. 
• 
Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 
for Law Enforcement, 
by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for 
police to analyzing problems within the context of 
problem-oriented policing. 
• 
Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement 
Managers, 
Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. 
LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains 
many of the basics of research as it applies to police 
management and problem-solving. 



Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides series: 

1. 
Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-00-2 
2. 
Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-01-0 
3. 
Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-02-9 
4. 
Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. 
Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7 
5. 
False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-04-5 
6. 
Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-05-3 
7. 
Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1 
8. 
Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-07-X 
9. 
Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8 
10. 
Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. 
Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6 
11. 
Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X 
12. 
Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8 
13. 
Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6 
14. 
Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4 
15. 
Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-14-2 
16. 
Clandestine Drug Labs. Michael S. Scott. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-15-0 
17. 
Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-16-9 
18. 
Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 
2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7 
19. 
Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-18-5 



20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly. 

Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3 

21. 
Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 
ISBN: 1-932582-27-4 
22. 
Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-30-4 
23. 
Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A. 
Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2 
24. 
Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell, Nancy G. La Vigne. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-33-9 
25. 
Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004 ISBN: 1-932582-35-5 
26. 
Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glensor, Kenneth J. Peak. 2004 
ISBN: 1-932582-36-3 


Response Guides series: 

• 
The Benefits and Consequences of Police Crackdowns. 

Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X 

Problem-Solving Tools series: 

• 
Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for 
Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-19-3 

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides 
Disorder at Budget Motels 
Domestic Violence 
Mentally Ill Persons 
Robbery of Taxi Drivers 
Student Party Disturbances on College Campuses 
School Break-Ins 
Street Racing 


Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Bomb Threats in Schools 
Underage Drinking 
Open-Air Drug Markets 
Sexual Offenses in Public Places 
Drunk Driving 
Cruising 
Bank Robbery 

Response Guides 
Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime 

Problem-Solving Tools 
Repeat Victimization 
Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem-Solving 

Other Related COPS Office Publications 

• 
Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 
for Law Enforcement. Timothy S. Bynum. 
• 
Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 
20 Years. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
• 
Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 
Case Studies in Problem-Solving. Rana Sampson and 
Michael S. Scott. 2000. 
• 
Community Policing, Community Justice, and 
Restorative Justice: Exploring the Links for the 
Delivery of a Balanced Approach to Public Safety. 


Caroline G. Nicholl. 1999. 

• 
Toolbox for Implementing Restorative Justice and 
Advancing Community Policing. Caroline G. Nicholl. 
2000. 


• 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing 
Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 
Partnerships. Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 
Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. 1998. 
• 
Bringing Victims into Community Policing. The 
National Center for Victims of Crime and the Police 
Foundation. 2002. 
• 
Call Management and Community Policing. Tom 
McEwen, Deborah Spence, Russell Wolff, Julie Wartell 
and Barbara Webster. 2003. 
• 
Crime Analysis in America. Timothy C. O’Shea and 
Keith Nicholls. 2003. 
• 
Problem Analysis in Policing. Rachel Boba. 2003. 
• 
Reducing Theft at Construction Sites: Lessons 
From a Problem-Oriented Project. Ronald V. Clarke 
and Herman Goldstein. 2003. 
• 
The COPS Collaboration Toolkit: How to Build, 
Fix, and Sustain Productive Partnerships. Gwen O. 
Briscoe, Anna T. Laszlo and Tammy A. Rinehart. 
2001. 
• 
The Law Enforcement Tech Guide: How to plan, 
purchase and manage technology (successfully!). 


Kelly J. Harris and William H. Romesburg. 2002. 

• 
Theft From Cars in Center City Parking 
Facilities - A Case Study. Ronald V. Clarke and 
Herman Goldstein. 2003. 

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for 
Police series and other COPS Office publications, please call 
the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 or visit 
COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 


FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20530 

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the 
COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below. 

e07042442 Updated Date: July 27, 2004 
ISBN: 1-932582-27-4 


www.cops.usdoj.gov