By Uganda President Yoweri Museveni
Command and General Staff Officers College  Print     Share  

FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kansas, 

Sep 30, 2008 — The following transcript is from a speech by Uganda President Yowery Museveni September 26, 2008 at the Command and General Staff Officers College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This presentation is not related to U.S. Africa Command but is posted on the website to increase public understanding of African security issues.

Moderator: His Excellency, President Museveni.

(Audience applause)

HEYM: LTG Caldwell, the Commandant of the school; officers; ladies and gentlemen. I asked the permission of the Commandant to talk to you in the old way. My staff had arranged that they give Power Points as I speak. (Audience laughter)

HEYM: But I want to ask them to hold on so that I speak and you consider my words. Then afterwards, they can quickly show those slides. (Audience laughter and applause)

HEYM: So, please, don't distract my audience with those slides. We shall have time for them.

HEYM: The genesis of my coming here was a few months ago. I had come here to attend the graduation of my son, who was a student here. Now, LTG Caldwell invited me for lunch. When we were having lunch, the audience around the table--the American audience--were [sic] very curious about our history. Then I said, "By the way, if you are interested, I could come back when I come back for the United Nations General Assembly, because I normally come to the United Nations--not always to do so much useful work there-- (Audience laughter) but to put in an appearance for whatever it is worth. Now since I come all the way to do not so useful work in the United Nations. (Audience laughter))I told the General that I could come two more hours here and I would come and share our history with you.

The reason I also thought about this is that the United States and Africa lost time in the 1950s-1960s. Your leaders in the 1950s-1960s did not understand our cause--did not understand the cause of African nationalism. We, therefore, at that time mainly worked with the Russians, the Chinese and those Eastern peoples. Although we are not communists, but because you did not come to help, we got help from where it was available. And that's how our armies really did not work with yours for much of the 50s, 60s--it was only recently in the 1970s and 80s that, especially the armies of liberation, those who fought for freedom, did not have initial contact with you.
So, I was conscious of this and when I met the General, I said, "Now this would be a good chance for us to close that gap." Hence, the genesis of this talk; it is partly for you to understand what goes on in the mind of a revolutionary fighter, what goes on in his mind. Secondly, it is for us to close that gap. The relationship with the United States is now very good--not only with Uganda but with many of the African countries. So that difference of opinion has been cured but I don't think we have synchronized our histories, the histories, especially, of the Army. And that's why I am interested in this talk.

Now, the topic I'm going to talk about is "The Strategy of the Protracted Peoples' War." Protracted Peoples' War...the Protracted Peoples' War is a strategic instrument in the hands of the oppressed against the oppressor, whether he's local or foreign. It is a strategic instrument and you who study about strategy, you know what that means. It is a means that can be used to change a situation completely, from A to Zed. However, the Protracted Peoples' War is only possible under certain conditions. It cannot take place under all conditions, and I've been able to think of five conditions that must exist before a Protracted Peoples' War is fought and won.
First, there must be extreme and widespread oppression enough to generate desperation and resentment by a wide cross-section of the population. This oppression would not only include denial of political rights, which sometimes is a bit remote in underdeveloped societies, but more especially, it must include land alienation--taking land from the population--extra-judicial killings, desecration of cultural sites, suppression of a people's culture, including language, and such other extreme measures. This is condition number one. There must be widespread oppression, especially involving taking away of people's land and assaulting their identity.
This was, for instance, the situation in the Sudan. You must have heard of the Sudan. Sudan is a place where Africans live by side [sic] with Arabs--I'm sure you know those people. You can tell an Arab from an African--I'm not an Arab. (Audience laughter) I'm an African. In the case of the Sudan, the black people lived together with the Arabs. However, some of the Arabs wanted to make the Africans, Arabs--and that was a very big issue. That has caused all of the problems you must have heard of in the Sudan.

Second condition--it must be clear to many people in the oppressed community that there is no other peaceful option to get them out of their oppression--that armed struggle is the only option. If the people think they can use elections--they can use other means to solve that problem--then it will be very wrong to propose using war. Therefore, the Protracted Peoples' War must be a means of last resort.

Three--the other crucial factor is the terrain--the terrain of the country. If you are fighting in the urban areas, the political environment, which somehow is linked with number one--meaning that you should have either favorable terrain or you should have overwhelming support if it is an urban area, political support.

Number four--external allies for or against the revolutionary cause may also act as a catalyst to expedite the liberation process or slow it down. I'm sure you remember the war in Vietnam--the support by the communist bloc for the war of resistance in Vietnam played a crucial role in the victory of Vietnamese nationalism and reunification of Vietnam. The support by the Western countries for the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan helped to defeat the Soviet occupation in that country.

The rear bases provided by Tanzania and Zambia to the liberation movements in southern Africa enabled our brothers and sisters there to defeat the white racist regimes in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, itself. There are some cases, however, where the revolutionary forces received little or no external aid from outside but they defeated the repressive forces. The examples of Cuba--that Castro man who you are struggling with near here--and Uganda stand out in this connection. In these two situations you did not have significant support from outside, but from within the revolutionary leadership was able to get enough resources to bring down the dictatorship.

In Uganda, having started with 27 rifles, we received only 92 rifles and 100 land mines from outside between 1981 and 1985. All the other equipment we got from within Uganda at the expense of the regimes, the enemy regimes, which we were fighting. The government forces were our weapons suppliers and quartermasters--two in one. The regime would import arms and we would capture them. The enemy, therefore, was our weapons procurement agent as far as importing weapons was concerned. But here I was talking about the question of external support. External support is crucial, but not always necessary. If the conditions are right, you can prosecute a revolutionary war even from the internal resources.

Number five--there must be a revolutionary leadership able to do two things:
(a) Articulate how much better the future will be when the revolutionary forces win and convince the people by advocacy and actions that it is possible to triumph.
That leadership must convince the people that, first of all, the future will be better and, secondly, it is possible--it is doable. Because, initially, the people are skeptical, they may be feeling oppressed but they doubt whether that method can work or not. It is up to the leadership to convince them that it is desirable and doable and feasible.

(b) An intellectual leadership is very important to deal with these issues. If you have a mediocre type of leadership, they may not be able to deal with both the theoretical issues of the struggle, as well as the practical issues. In fact this is the problem for many of the resistance movements.

Those are the five conditions that in my view must exist for a revolutionary war to be started, sustained and successfully concluded.

Once you are sure that the objective conditions exist--objective on the ground there is oppression. But there is what you call "the subjective factors"--"subjective factors" means people understanding the realities on the ground but the people may not grasp that reality. That means there is a discrepancy between the objective conditions on the ground and the subjective factors. So it is up to the leadership to ensure that they wake up the population so that they can see both the desirability and the feasibility of the struggle.

There are some groups--if you remember--those who are old enough or through your readings, you must have read about the groups that emerged in different parts of the world. Some of the groups were in Europe, like for instance the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany, like the Japanese Red Army. These were groups--they thought they could bring revolution in Europe using violence--but they did not study the objective conditions in Europe. Those conditions did not exist.

Now such groups, we call them "adventurists." We call that "adventurism." When you push for a cause and you want to use violence in conditions that do not permit that type of method of solving your problem--the name we give you is that you are an adventurist.

The strategy of a Protracted Peoples' War hinges on two factors. You realize that, strategically, you are strong and the enemy is weak; however, tactically, you are weak and the enemy is strong. If you don't realize that, you are going to make very big mistakes.

That's what Mao Zedong meant--those of you who have heard of a man called Mao. Mao Zedong--that's what he said, one of his conditions, he said, "In the long run all imperialists are paper tigers. Strategically, we must despise the enemy; tactically, however, we must take him seriously." That's what he means, in the long run you the revolutionary, you know that I am stronger than this fellow because my cause is just, the majority of the people support me but they are not organized well enough now. But in the short run I am weak so, therefore, the purpose of the Protracted Peoples' struggle--what I have written in my essay here--it is this process of gradual mutation in the balance of forces between the protagonists that constitutes the Protracted Peoples' War--that mutation. Initially, in the short run the revolutionary is weak, but in the long run he is strong. Why? Because his cause is just. Therefore, in order for you to allow that evolution to take place--that evolution of the revolutionary from weakness to actualize your potential strength, you must design your tactics very, very carefully.

In the beginning, avoid head-on collision with the enemy forces--dominate the enemy, but preserve yourself. This is the very important principle of that war--first of all, you survive. Survival, for the insurgent, for the revolutionary, is in itself a success. When he survives, the mere survival is a success and it is part of the primary aims of the revolutionary. Avoid annihilation. In order to avoid annihilation, you must make sure to fight battles you are absolutely sure about. Otherwise, avoid the enemy. Some of the writers, like Mao Zedong--that one I did not include here but if you read Mao Zedong you will see that--when the enemy advances, we retreat; when he retreats, we advance, like that. Therefore, in the initial stages, the revolutionary must avoid head-on collision, must attack targets which are weak--I will talk about that in a minute.

But the revolutionary war itself has got four phases. Phase one is agitation and clandestine operations...agitation--political agitation--and clandestine operations. Hitting here, hitting there, targeting intelligence staff of the other side--that is phase number one. Phase number one is to prepare the people and shake up the system.
Phase two is guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, now, you form groups which attack those soft targets--police stations, policemen on duty, blowing up infrastructure. The African revolutionary wars are different from the Middle Eastern revolutionary wars--this is something you should know, you should bear in mind. And that's why we won and the groups in the Middle East have taken a very long time to achieve their aims. Because in Africa--you remember one of the conditions I mentioned, that there must be a revolutionary leadership. A revolutionary is like a holy man, but using guns. If you can imagine Jesus wielding a gun (audience laughter), that is a revolutionary.

You must never do anything wrong, must be very, very careful...therefore, when you select targets, you must select them very carefully. First of all, you must never attack noncombatants. Never, never, never, never! You would never have heard that Museveni attacked noncombatants, or that Mandela blew up people drinking in a bar. Why do you bother with people in a bar? People in a bar are not political, they are just merrymakers. (Audience laughter) Why do you target them? Targeting people in a bar is bankrupt. In the bars...in an aircrafttit is rubbish. The police station, the policeman on duty--not off duty, no...must be armed, soft but armed. Infrastructure--if you blow up an airwave, there's no humanitarian consideration. You just blow it up. You blow up a power station--this is the difference between the revolutionary warfare in Africa, which we fought, and what goes on in the Middle East. Middle East...blowing up this...people going for a wedding, they are blown up... So, in the guerrilla phase, you aim at soft targets. That is the second phase. You will see it in my document here.

The third phase is what you call mobile warfare. That is when you are able to operate like a battalion or brigade size and go and attack, mainly, in the rear of the enemy. Like in our case, you will see that in our document, when we started operations we concentrated them in one area called the "Luwero Triangle." This Luwero Triangle has, like, 3600 square miles of land and it was a forested area, that's where we concentrated all our operations. Then the regimes, they collected their soldiers, came and flooded them into that area to crush us. By so doing, they removed troops from the rear, their rear, and by this time we had gained strength so we attacked into their rear to capture weapons and so on. So that is phase three. You'll see it in this document here.

Now the final phase is conventional warfare. I normally hear people talking of guerrilla warfare as if it is a parallel form of warfare. No, guerrilla warfare is a phase. But in the end, for the cause to win, you must fight conventional warfare. Unless, of course, you weaken the other side through guerrilla warfare and then the other side negotiates, you get a political settlement. There is also that possibility, when the other side does not wait for the total, for the conclusion of the whole affair, of the whole affair militarily. But if you are to win, you must eventually fight conventional warfare.

During the phase when the revolutionary stages an agitation, clandestine operations, then training starts, military training. The leaders select some people who are very reliable and start training them. The whole population may not be aware that training is going on because you select the most advanced, the ones who are most committed. And this training has four components--ideological, organizational, military and political. A revolutionary is first and foremost ideological, military is second. When he is committed, it will be easy for him to undertake any assignment. That ideological training is most important, even more important than the military. The military is a means in the hands of the vision of the revolutionary.

Now during much of these phases, the revolutionary has always used the principle of "need to know." You don't broadcast information to everybody. You only give somebody what he needs to know in order to do his work. And you avoid bureaucracy. Recently I laughed--I was in Uganda and I saw on TV that there's a group in Colombia, they call them "something-something." Now that group had computers and they had information in the computers--those are amateurs. (Audience laughter) Information must be in the revolutionary's head, not on any piece of paper, especially future plans. If you attack and capture the materials--yes, you can record it but also the enemy knows because the enemy knows what he lost. See there's nothing new there, you can record you captured so much ammunition, that one you can record. But plans, plans, planssshould never be on paper, should never be anywhere. So when I heard of that group in Colombia and think those people are lucky to have such a group to fight.
Now in order to maintain secrecy, that one I'll talk about later, about communication and so on, that one I'll talk about laterrlet me wait for that point.

During all these phases, the phase of guerrilla warfare and the phase of mobile warfare, you should never attack the enemy who is entrenched, who is in the trenches or who is prepared. You should attack the enemy on the move. Always lure out the enemy, get him out of his camp to come and look for you. That's when you wait for him. He's slightly more vulnerable than when he is camped.

Earlier on, I talked about the revolutionary's ability to survive, constituting a form of victory, but that's not enough. If you survive without growing, then you are not succeeding. Survival must also involve growing, growing in terms of numbers, in terms of more cells, in terms of equipment, in terms of accouterment. If you are just there surviving, surviving--then you are a bandit. You are now becoming a bandit. So, the one fighting the revolutionary, if you manage to stop him from growing, then you can also regard it a victory on your side, if he's not growing in terms of numbers, in terms of equipment, in terms of cells.

I had talked about the targets in the other phases...attack police stations; attack policemen on duty because they are not in great numbers; blow up infrastructure--railways, power lines, waterworks; attack intelligence staff; scare away government administrators--don't kill civilians! Civilians should not be killed if they are not armed--even if they are for the government--you scare them away, "Don't come back here. If we find you here again, you'll see..." The fellow will just run away. You don't have to kill. And that, by the way, is also part of building the prestige of the revolutionary movement. Because the word goes around, "These people are not killers! They could have killed me; they captured me. I was in their control but they told me to go away." Very big, very big--you are now like Jesus, but armed, armed Jesus. (Audience laughter) Just scare them away. You come and arrest him. "You, fellow, we told you to go away." Because, what is your interest? You want these people to--they are administrators, you want them to leave the area so that the government has no control there, that's what you are interested in. You are not interested in killing them; just scare them away.

Ambush army vehicles so that they are forced into convoys--that's very crucial. You ambush vehicles so they stop moving as single vehicles, they start now from a convoy; when you form a convoy, that's very good because you are slowed down. You are no longer so fast.

During phase two and three, guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, we fight battles, which we call "battles of quick decision." You should always fight battles of quick decision. In the guerrilla warfare, don't fight for more than 20 minutes. When you reach the phase of mobile warfare you can fight, like, for three hours, depending on what sort of enemy you are dealing with. Because if you linger around there, then the enemy will bring reinforcements and you will be overwhelmed. So you must attack, go away quickly. You fix damage, go away--get out of harm's way. We, therefore, talk of fighting battles of quick decision in a protracted war. The war is protracted, but the battles are short.

For the revolutionary warrior, war is a very clear business. Don't fight a battle from where you expect to expend more ammunition than you will get from the captured equipment. So, it's a business. The profitability ratio must be very high. You expend 10,000 rounds, you must expect to get about 30,000-40,000 rounds of ammunition. If you expend 10,000 rounds, you get 5,000 rounds--that's a loss and you should never fight such battles, because you are getting weaker. Because you know that you don't have a rival source, the source is the other side. So, if you squander your resources, you are making a very big mistake.

Now, eventually, in the mobile warfare, you open a second front in the Rwenzori Mountains, you will see it there. And eventually, we launched a strategic counteroffensive. Once we were strong, we launched a strategic counteroffensive and from that time we were fighting conventional war.

Command, control and communicationnas we were fighting, we evolved two types of forces. They are forces we called, "zonal forces," or rather in the phase of guerrilla warfare you don't communicate much. You meet as leaders and you agree, "We are going to do this and we shall do it like this." Then you disperse to your different areas. When you disperse, you don't communicate again. Each one attacks in the agreed way. But you don't communicate, you don't report back, "You know today we did thiss," no, no, no, no. The enemy will be the one reporting on his radiooBBCCthey will be reporting for you. You don't have to talk about it, you just do.
Now when you create zones laterrin each zone you carry out operations in the manner you agreed, but you don't communicate so much. That's very important; it avoids leakage, it avoids interception by the other side. Because if there is too much traffic--radio, telephone--that is very dangerous for the revolutionary side.
Then the second type of forces are [sic] what we call, "mobile forces." These are under the control of the top leadership, especially in the third phase, and these are the ones that get central directions to go and attack this one, attack that. Otherwise, the zonal forces are dispersed. You agree on the targets, you go and act separately, and then you can convene, like, after one year to see what has been achieved and the way forward.

For security, we never discussed in houses--wouldn't sit in a house like this and start discussing plans--never. Always discuss in the open field. Therefore, for commanddsome of the command is dispersed; some is concentrated. Communication is by courier. You avoid using your radios, telephones and so on.

Disciplineeas I told you, a revolutionary warrior is like Jesus. You must not drink alcohol, you must not mistreat civilians, you must not take liberties with women, you must not--as Mao Zedong said, "You should never take a single needle or thread from the people without paying for it." And in case one of our soldiers commits a mistake, especially killing people, he must be punished where the mistake was committed--where the mistake was committed--that's where he must be punished, in front of the people. If you take him away, that you are going to punish him somewhere else, you are in trouble with the population, especially a population which is not educated. Because they will not know whether you punished him or not, they will think that you have just covered him up. So that discipline is very crucial for the revolutionary cause to succeed.

Finally, after the Vietnam War, you the Americans, you were in Vietnam, you know what happened there and we were all following. After the Vietnam War, there has been a lot of technological improvement in the weapons--the smart bombs, better observation, overhead imaging, thermal imaging, acoustic ways of getting information. Now, do all these make it impossible, does technology make it impossible for a side that is weaker technologically but correct in terms of justice to wage a resistance? My answer is, "No." It needs some change in the tactics. For instance, if the technology was improving and you can detect through remote means people who are hiding in the forest--although, it is still not perfect, there's some improvement but there are still some gaps--but even if you achieve that, the revolutionary warrior can still find a solution to that. What would be the solution? Be with the people where the people are--especially in the other phases--be with the people so that it will not be easy for you to know who is an insurgent and who is not an insurgent. Still there is a way they can go around that.

Therefore, in conclusion, in my view I think it is still the old story. The real answer to a revolutionary war is political reform so that you deny the other side the reasons for getting support from the people. I think this is the real strategic answer to a revolutionary challenge. Thank you very much. (Audience applause)

HEYM: You can now show those slides quickly. (Audience laughter)

SLIDE 2: (photo caption) Mobutu Sese Seko
Janjaweed in Darfur

SLIDE 3: (photo caption) A Mujahadeen Fighter Prepares to Launch a US Supplied Stinger Missile)

SLIDE 4: (photo caption) Yoweri Museveni addressing NRA fighters during Uganda's resistance war

HEYM: That's myselff (Audience laughter) when I was not attending the United Nations...

(Audience laughter)

SLIDE 5: (photo caption) Yoweri Museveni Campaigning in 1980

SLIDE 6: (graphic) RAF (caption) Red Army Faction Insignia

This ultra left-wing organization was first known as the Baader Meinhof Group and later as the Red Army Faction

(photo caption) Ulrike Meinhor

(photo caption) Andreas Baader)

HEYM: Those are the adventurists I told you about.

SLIDE 7: (photo caption) Hans Martin Schleyer an influential German employer and industrialist was kidnapped and murdered by the Red Army Faction in 1977.)

HEYM: Baader-Meinhof--oh, that's Mao Zedong...

SLIDE 8: (photo caption) "All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful."

SLIDE 9: (photo caption) Oliver Cromwell one of the earliest political agitators in history. Introduced the practice of political agitation in his New Model Army in 1647.)

SLIDE 10: (photo caption) Amilcar Cabral's PAIGC fought for the independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde from Portuguese colonialism.

(photo caption) Yoweri Museveni in the Luwero Triangle)

HEYM: Those are some of the African revolutionaries--that Amilcar Cabral, the revolutionary of Guinea Bissau, the one on the left. That's myself in my bush house.

SLIDE 11: The war of popular resistance went through 4 phases:

• Agitation and clandestine operations (1971-1978);


• Guerrilla warfare (1981-1984);


• Mobile warfare (1984-1985); and,


• Conventional warfare (September 1985 up to the capture of Kampala).

HEYM: The phasessagitation and clandestine operations are our phasessagitation and clandestine operations 1971-788guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare and so onnwhat I talked about...

SLIDE 12: (photo caption) The Casspir and Buffel two mine-resistant armored vehicles developed by Apartheid South Africa during the wars of liberation in Southern Africa.

HEYM: (slide 13) No, go back... (slide 12)...the South Africans developed those vehicles as an answer to mine warfare. They are high and V-shapeddso it helped. We are now using them ourselves. It helped us to...even if it is blown by a mine from below, the people will not be harmed. It will just topple over but the people will be safe. But, I don't know whether that one... we need another answer for these roadside bombs, the ones from the side, this one is for the mines from below, but the ones from the side I think we may need a different solution. Go on, go on...

SLIDE 13: (photo caption) IFVs can be attacked by Anti-Tank Missiles, Mines, or IEDs like the EFP

HEYM: You know those roadside bombs...

SLIDE 14: (photo caption) General Georgios Grivas was the leader of the Cypriot guerrilla organization EOKA, that fought for independence from Great Britain and 'Enosis' (unification with Greece).

HEYM: (slide 15))ok, this one--go back, go backk (slide 14)) This man, you remember, General GrivassGeneral Grivas was a Greek Cypriot who was fighting for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. They used to call it "Enosis." Now, he didn't go far, so I am using him to show that you can be an insurgent but you don't grow. You don't grow, you just get stunted. And I think his caseehe got stunteddGeneral Grivas, he was from Cyprus. Yes, go on, go on...

SLIDE 15: (map of Uganda, highlighted area) Luwero Triangle

HEYM: That was our Luwero Triangle, that triangle thereewere the 3,600 square miles where we spent years fighting the government army before we opened the second front. They'll show it later, the second front.

SLIDE 16: (photo caption) Phase III of a Protracted Peoples' War comprises Mobile Warfare

HEYM: Those are some guerrillas, I don't know from where...they are certainly Africans but I don't know from which country nowwbut they are not ours.

SLIDE 17: (photo caption) During the guerrilla warfare phase (i.e. phase II), fight battles of short duration. An engagement should not exceed 20 minutes.

HEYM: Those are our groups...go on.

SLIDE 18: (photo caption) A successful peoples' war is about gun raising. Yoweri Museveni inspects arms obtained from the enemy.

HEYM: Oh, that's myself in slightly better circumstancesswhen we had captured all that equipment from the other side.

SLIDE 19: The Second Front in the Uganda's Protracted Peoples' War was opened in the Ruwenzori mountains by NRA units under the command of Fred Rwigema.

HEYM: That's one of our commanders. Now, you may not know that Uganda, that you can find permanent snow on the equator. Those are snow mountains right on the equator. Because they are very high, it is forbidden territory. Once you are there it is quite a challenge.

SLIDE 20: (photo caption) The final phase (i.e. phase IV) of a peoples' war involves conventional warfare. These operations were led by Salim Saleh in the NRA experience.

HEYM: That's one of our generals. I think by this time--you see, they are fat, the general's are fat. That means they had come to town. (HEYM and audience laughter)

SLIDE 21: (photo caption) 'Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.' Mao Zedong

HEYM: Mao Zedong...go on, go on.
SLIDE 22: (photo caption) Yoweri Museveni with NRA commanders preparing for the final assault on the dictatorship.

HEYM: Again, those are ourselves.

SLIDE 23: (photo caption) H.E.GEN. YOWERI KAGUTA MUSEVENI
President of the Republic of Uganda)

HEYM: Thank you very much. (Audience applause)



Question and Answer Period

Moderator: Your Excellency, as your moderator, I have the privilege of asking you the first question. Sir, you recently spoke at the United Nations in New York. What do you see as the future role of the United Nations in Africa?
HEYM: United Nationssoh, ok, I can answer from here. But it's good exercise to stand. Now the United Nationssthe United Nations needs to be serious. They are not serious. The United Nations is full of careerists. You know, a "careerist?" A careerist is a "job-doer" who is doing the job as a career...as a job. But we need people of conviction in the United Nations and this is totally lacking. They, therefore, don't do good work. They make a lot of mistakes, but having said that, I am for the reforming of the UN. Not for scrapping it, but if you scrap it, then you have no other forum, so I think the answer is to reform it. But, they are not doing too good a job, in my opinionnespecially in peacekeeping and so on, but even in development issues, like when they are talking about what they call MDGs, millennium development goals. Now what they did, they set up social indicators...infant mortality should be brought down to...so many, so many...maternal mortality, but the question is...how are you going to do that? Are you going to use witchcraft? (Audience laughter) Or are you going to use development?

Now one of the biggest problems of Africa is exporting raw materials. This is part of our struggle now. Like you take UgandaaUganda is the fourth biggest exporter of coffee in the whole world. Of course we are now changing this, but in the past we'd get one dollar per kilogram of coffee. And when it is taken to somewhere else--a group called "Nestll"--they roast it, grind ittand for them they get twenty dollars for the same kilogram for which I got one dollar. That means, therefore, that Uganda is giving aid. (Audience laughter) Uganda is a donor to some of these countries for nineteen dollars in every kilogram of coffee.

So if you do not deal with these structural problems, like for instance, Africa exporting raw materialssand when we export raw materials we are not losing only the nineteen dollars per kilogram of coffee, we are also losing jobs. Those jobs are taken, they are exported. Now if you don't deal with that, then how will you deal with the so-called millennium development goals? If someone does not have a job, if I am not employed, how can you eradicate my poverty? How will poverty be eradicated if people don't have jobs? And how will people have jobs if there is no industrialization?

So, the UN has got a lot of weaknesses, but I think they are curable. This is my answer.

Moderator: Thank you, sir. Paddle number three in the center.

MAJ David Dengler: Good morning, sirrMAJ David Dengler from 16B. Is there any growing concern amongst the people of your country and other African nations as to the growing influence of China throughout Africa?

HEYM: Pardon? Repeat...

MAJ Dengler: I'm sorry, sir. Is there any concern within your country and other African nations for the increasing influence of China throughout Africa?

HEYM: Oh, China! Oh, no, no, noo (Audience laughter) We are very happy with China. Some people have asked me this and it's really good that we have a talk aboutt First, China has been a good influence--up to now. They may change in the future. But up to now, they have been a very good influence. Why? Well, first of all, when we were fighting the colonialists, they gave us weapons, which was very good. (Audience laughter) When we would come to the United Nations so see Henry Kissinger--to the United States--Henry Kissinger, all those people, they would give us the Bible, "You go and preach to the oppressor." But the oppressor was not listening to the verses of the Bible, he wanted some force. And the Chinese gave us support to get rid of the colonialists in Africa. But now, the important role of China--and India, China and India, both--their important roles are as follows: African raw materials had gone down in value. The price of steel had gone down. The price of copper had gone down. The price of--all commodities had gone down. Why? We are being told that there is too much steel in the world. Let's take the example of steellthere's too much steel in the world, so the price goes down. But why was there supposed to be too much steel? This was, of course, an aberration. It was a misperception. But what they meant was, people who are living a rich life, who are living a life of affluence--we are only in North America--the United States and Canada--western Europe and Japan--these who are living a life of affluence, in good houses, driving cars, and so onnthe rest of the world--living in very bad conditions. So what happens? Because of the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in China and the reforms in India, hundreds of millions now of Indians and Chinese have moved from peasant to middle class. So--they are living now in good houses. What does that mean? The price of steel goes up. The price of cement goes up. Chinese, they are walking--you see them on the streets of Beijing, walking or cycling--they are now driving. What does that mean? The price of fuel goes up. And who is sending fuel? Uganda. Not bad. (Audience laughter) The price of steel goes up because of more cars. The price of food goes uppso it's very good. The Chinese have become a very big group in the world economy. So the commodity prices have now gone uppthe food prices have gone uppand I'm very happy in Uganda. Our economy is growing very well--nine percent per annum. Why? Because we produce a lot of food; we have always produced it but we had nowhere to sell it because the markets were blocked by protectionism. Now, because of the hunger in the world, the whole world is crying for food. So the Chinese and Indians are a good influence.
But, Africans--we are taking no chances. We were colonized once; we shall never be colonized again. We don't want to sit down, because we don't know, when China becomes a superpower suppose they also become aggressive. And they say "we are too many in China"-- because Africa is a very big continent, Africa is 11 million square miles of land. You can fit the United States, China, India, Argentina all into Africa and they would fit there. Now suppose the Chinese say, "There is empty land in Africa, we want to go and live there," when they are a superpower? That's why we are talking of African integration--economic, political integration. We are even now working for the Political Federation of East Africa. We want east Africa to become one country. Our brother Muammar Ghaddafi from Libya, he wants the whole of Africa to become one country. Some of us are saying "that's a bit too much." (Audience laughter) But, certainly, the political map of Africa will change.

And why do we do this? We want to implement our Lord's Prayer--our Lord is Jesus Christ--those who are not Christian. Our Lord's Prayer says, "Thou shall not lead us into temptation, but deliver us from evil." We don't want to lead anybody into temptation by remaining weak. Whilst you are weak, you lead people into temptation, to think that they can control you. And we don't want that to happen again in Africa.

Moderator: Paddle number one in the top balcony.

MAJ James Galluzzo: Mr. President, I'm MAJ Galluzzo from Section 23B--your last comments lead me to my question. What do you see is the role of faith and religion in the protracted war?

HEYM: The role of religion and...?

MAJ Galluzzo: Faith.

HEYM: And faith. Maybe what I did not clarify is that for a revolutionary warfare to succeed, it must be ideologically correct. And what does that mean? It means you must be fighting for just aims. I talked about it but indirectly. Now if you fight for religion, per se, I don't think you will be fulfilling that condition. Because you find sometimes some of the old religious beliefs, in older religions you find that, for instance, the role of women is handled differently. In fact in some of the religions, women are suppressed. Now if you set out with that ideology of--the English word is atavism--atavism--atavism means when you want to go back and live like the people lived in the olden days--I don't think you will go far, especially if you are dealing with people who know what they are doing. Because they can mobilize the sections you are neglecting against you and you may not win. So, sectarianism, in my opinion, is not one of the conditions that can be covered under revolutionary warfare. Revolutionary warfare is a war of liberation liberating the broadest possible sections of the population. Now, if you are not liberating women, and women always form 51 percent of the population in all countries, whom are you liberating? I think those are some of the adventurists, some of the efforts I would classify as adventurist.

Moderator: Thank you, sir. Paddle number four in the center.

HEYM: Or even reactionary--adventurist or even reactionary.

MAJ Jason Pike: Sir, MAJ Jason Pike, group 14C. What are your thoughts on the establishment of AFRICOM?

HEYM: AFRICOM. General Ward told me about it--General Ward, he came to see me--he told me about it. In Africa, generally, we don't like foreign bases. We don't want foreign bases--somebody brings and puts a base there--that's what we don't like. In fact, I think there are resolutions of the African Union against that. But, coordinatinggwe normally work with the United States in some situations, like when there was a problem in the Congo, the American Army came and used the Entebbe airport. On an ad hoc basis, we can work together. But what we would not accept is to have a situation where part of our country is a base of another country. Africans are totally against that and in my opinion it's not necessary. So if AFRICOM stays where they are--I don't know where they areethey are somewhere (audience laughter)--and once in a while they come and we coordinate on an ad hoc basis, I think that would be good enough. But it's good to have a group--an American Army group and a command--which concentrates on the problems of Africa. I think that's good because they generate knowledge, they generate information, but bases in Africa, is very, very controversial. They would not support it--military bases on a permanent basis.
Moderator: Thank you, sir. Paddle number two in the back left.

MAJ Richard Bell: Your Excellency, MAJ Richard Bell from the British Army. After you won your successful insurgencies, twice, how did you reconcile the opposing forces to ensure long-term peace in Uganda?

HEYM: What? I didn't get it.

MAJ Bell: Sir, after you won your insurgency how did you ensure long-term peace amongst the people? How did you reconcile the people?

HEYM: Those, what you call "insurgents," in Uganda we call them "terrorists." We call them terrorists because they were proxies of Sudan. You know we had a problem with the Sudan government. As I told you earlier on there was this problem of Africans and Arabs in Sudan. Now the Sudanese suspected us that, one day, we may side with our black brothers in their internal conflict. They, therefore, wanted to get rid of us and we were not very interested in being got rid of. So, we had to fight. And now that issue of Sudan is over, we don't have any other political reason inside Uganda that could cause a sustained war. But secondly, our army was also growing at that time--was still a one-service army, just with infantry. Now we are a bi-service force, we have got all means to guarantee peace in the country and there is total peace in the country.

Moderator: Thank you, sir. Paddle number three on the right side.

LTC Solomon Gonny: Good morning, sir. I'm LTC Gonny from Liberia. I have two questions I'd like to ask you. My first question has to do with being head of state and president of Uganda you have transgressed [sic] to the rank and file.

HEYM: The what?

LTC Gonny: You have gone from a military officer to that of a president. What are your visions toward insurgency, extremists, poverty reduction and equal distribution of wealth in Africa as a whole? My second question is--as we know that we have the organization of African unity has be changed into AU--what is your own role as it relates to the Global War on Terrorism?

HEYM: The Global Warrnow, distribution of wealth in Africaathat's what you talked about, the distribution of wealth in Africaathe biggest challenge in Africa is transformation--social, economic transformation. That's what I was telling the United Nations. You know the difference between Europe and Africa is that between 1500 and nowwif you go to about 1400, you'll find that the level of development in Africa and in Europe was not very different. But the problem was that since 1500 or 1400, European societies have been metamorphosed. I always like to use that word, metamorphosed. It's a biological term, which means an insect evolving from egg to caterpillar to pupa to mature butterfly. The European society had been metamorphosed from feudal societies--peasant societies--to middle class, skilled working-class societies. African societies up to know are still peasant, or even feudal in some cases. That's where the challenge is. The challenge is transformation, not just the distributinggbecause what do they have to distribute? Sometimes they are just distributing poverty. But the challenge is transformation. And how do you do transformation? First of all, education for all, education for everybody; secondly, private sector-lead growth, the private sector leading the industrialization of Africa--now that will create jobs for people. They are the people you have sent through school. Jobs would enable you to collect more taxes, the government and so onnso therefore I do not think the primary issue is wealth distribution. I think the primary issue is transformation. Yes, distributing wealth may help in the process of transformation but I don't think it is the primary one. Because even where it is done, if you do not have wealth to distribute you may not go very far.

Now, the Global War on TerrorrUganda supported President George Bush when he went to Iraq the other time. Mainly because of our experience with Sudan, this terrorism of Sudan--we, therefore, do not like terrorism. And I've told you that we have got a differenceein colonial times, we used to have the same group with the Arabs. We used to call it the Afro-Asian Solidarity Group. We were together with the Indonesians, the Indians, Nehru and Nasser, the Arabs. We had that bloc--the Afro-Asian Solidarity bloc. But I've been talking to some of the Arab leaders, we really don't agree with their methods. I've already talked about it in my speech. Why do you go to hijack a plane? You know, women who are pregnant, they are in the plane going to antenatal care...now you hijack that one. What sort of revolutionary are you? So, we do not support terrorism. We don't think that terrorism is the right instrument for a revolutionary force. I know the Palestinians have got issues with the Israelis--they are entitled to their homeland--but the methods they useewe do not associate ourselves with them.

Now the Global War on Terror I happened to have met President Bush the other day when I was in New York, and I had met him last year. And when I met him--last year, not this time, because now he doesn't have enough time--I suggested to him that we should have a United States-African Union summit so that we talk about these issues. We have had a summit with China--Sino-African summit in Beijing--we had a summit with India; we have had a summit with the European Union. And I have proposed to President Bush that we should have African Union-United States summit so that we can talk about these issues. Now, pending that summit, I would not like to give more views on that matter because I would want us to discuss it directly--how to move forward. But, generally speaking, we do not support terrorism because it is not necessary. As I said in my speech here, you can fight without being a terrorist. I am a revolutionary; I have never been a terrorist. And terrorism is not about the cause, it is about the methods. When you target noncombatants, you are a terrorist. When you use violence indiscriminately--a terrorist is the one who uses violence indiscriminately--that is a terrorist. And we do not support that.

Moderator: Your Excellency, we have time for one more question. Paddle number one up in the top balcony.


MAJ John Hill: Sir, Mr. President, John Hill, 23A. I had the privilege of being deployed--up here, sir. Top left.
HEYM: Oh, up there!

MAJ Hill: Yes, sir. (Audience laughter) I had the privilege of being deployed to Uganda from April of '06 to August of '06 and was the OIC--the officer in charge--of training UPDF, about 300 UPDF soldiers. And seeing their spirit--their active learning will--really, truly impressed me. What do you see as the future UPDF role in reference to Somalia's struggle for strong governance and independence?
HEYM: Thank you very much for contributing to our training. Our role in Somalia is to try to help the Somalis rebuild their state. And we are there to help them, first of all, defend the airport and the seaport and the government house, which we defend all the time--when the terrorists come to attack us we just send them off. (Audience laughter)

But, more important, we'd like to see ourselves as a catalyst in building the Somali army and police by training them. And even the other day we had a small meeting in New York, which involved Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazier of the United States, the prime minister of Ethiopia and some other people--were discussing this very point. If only the Somali government would also deal with the issue of revenue collection, because when we train people and they are not paid then they disperse and become part of the militia. And it would be good if the Somali government, or that wonderful United Nations--if the wonderful United Nations could pay the Somali Army for, like, one year or one-and-a-half years--and then, in the meantime the head of the Somali state starts collecting their own revenue, it would be easy to rebuild that country. Because the Somalis are fighters, they are easy to organize. They just need leadership. But the Somali government must collect revenue to pay the soldiers. And for us our job is to guard those strategic centers, but also train the new Somali army.

I thank you very much.

(Audience applause and standing ovation)

LTG Caldwell: Sir, I was going to tell youuwhen you heard MAJ John Hill up there in the balconyythey like to sleep up there sometimes. So I was glad to see he was awake and they're very attentive up there.

For you all who don't know it, when the President was here in June for his son's graduation we were captivated by the fact that he was a leader in his country's movement to bring back the power to the people. And listening to his stories was absolutely fascinating--a first-hand, personal account over many years. And then to hear what he has done today for the people of Uganda as he serves them still now as their President.

Sir, you're true to your word. You told us in June you would come back and as a president of a nation, I'll be very honest, we had very low expectation with the demands on your schedule! (Audience laughter) But we are extremely honored that you took the time and came back here to share with all of us here today your experiences. We are very much enriched and enlightened by what you had to say and we appreciate it very much. Thank you, sir.

(Audience applause and standing ovation)