# **Long-Term Detention Strategy**



Senior Detainee Leadership SVTC February 22, 2008


Hosted by: Ms. Sandra Hodgkinson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Detainee Affairs

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# Global and GTMO Screening Criteria



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# **Background of GSC until present**

- ☐ Global Screening Criteria was promulgated in 2003; was an evolution of earlier criteria and was used to determine who should be transferred to GTMO
- Movements to GTMO did not take place from September 2004 until 14 HVDs arrived 2 years later;
  - First non-HVD moved into GTMO in January 2007 (Malik)


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- □ Based on practice approved at DSD-level, the criteria for moving detainees to GTMO is now more restrictive than GSC
  - There was discussion at the Deputies-level at NSC last summer, but no new criteria was officially promulgated
  - The various DOD positions were discussed and refined somewhat in Horn of Africa paper circulated last fall



### **DC-level Discussion on Possible Criteria**

- ☐ Is the enemy combatant a significant figure in al-Qaeda?
  - Either listed in one of the top tiers by DIA or CIA
  - Listed in an approved EXORD
  - In a position to significantly expand AQ international reach
- □ Does the enemy combatant possess unique or singular access to other senior officials?
  - Access to multiple contacts in the groups listed above
  - Direct access to the key leaders in AQ or an affiliated terrorist group
  - Has unique information about multiple terrorist cells and / or planned operations
- □ Is the detainee responsible for the deaths of Americans? Has the enemy combatant participated or planned terrorist acts that would or could be described as heinous acts?
  - Embassy bombings, attempted airliner shoot-down, USS Cole Bombing, 9/11, etc.
  - Civilian casualties, mass casualties, or other significant acts





### **Pros and Cons of More Restrictive Criteria**

#### ☐ Pros


- Supports President's policy of moving towards day when GTMO can be closed without increasing size of legacy population that may need to be moved to the U.S. or released
- Smaller numbers of detainees (particularly of new captures from HOA or elsewhere) minimizes exposure of sensitive operations in a transparent arena like GTMO
- Provides a systematic mechanism that allows the U.S. to hold terrorists whose threat cannot be mitigated any other way

#### □ Cons

- Creates a two-tiered system of detainees (some who are bad, but not bad enough for GTMO)
- New arrivals may be significantly worse than residual population
- Requires a possible additional location for detaining long-term closer to theater



# **Temporary Screening**



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## **Temporary Screening**

- □ Likely requires additional screening capabilities and/or facilities for non-AF and IZ captures (e.g., HOA, PACOM, etc.)
  - Does not necessarily require intelligence exploitation facilities, but rather a short-term ability to hold individuals securely while you make an initial status determination as to who you have
  - Personnel needed are trained and can be in place as required upon notice of an impending operation
  - Allows for quicker repatriation if determination is made to return to another country in the region for release, prosecution and/or detention under their own laws



- □ Update Global Screening Criteria to reflect current political and operational realities, and designate who is eligible for transfer to GTMO
  - Define where respective cut-off criteria exist
  - Determine where those eligible for capture, but ineligible for GTMO, will go
- □ Determine what additional screening capabilities and/or facilities will assist in sorting out detainees
- □ Need for diplomatic strategy to achieve alternative avenues for handling those terrorists posing the greatest threat
  - Prosecution
  - Foreign detention
  - Information sharing

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